[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NASA-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATION
IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 18, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-49
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California NICK LAMPSON, Texas
NICK SMITH, Michigan JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DAVID WU, Oregon
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
Washington LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois ZOE LOFGREN, California
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland BRAD SHERMAN, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia JIM MATHESON, Utah
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah VACANCY
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas VACANCY
JO BONNER, Alabama VACANCY
TOM FEENEY, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
VACANCY
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Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas NICK LAMPSON, Texas
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania MARK UDALL, Colorado
KEN CALVERT, California DAVID WU, Oregon
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
Washington BRAD SHERMAN, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
ROB BISHOP, Utah VACANCY
MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas VACANCY
JO BONNER, Alabama VACANCY
TOM FEENEY, Florida BART GORDON, Tennessee
VACANCY
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York
BILL ADKINS Subcommittee Staff Director
ED FEDDEMAN Professional Staff Member
RUBEN VAN MITCHELL Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Professional Staff Member
CHRIS SHANK Professional Staff Member
RICHARD OBERMANN Democratic Professional Staff Member
TOM HAMMOND Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
March 18, 2004
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 9
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Nick Lampson, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on
Science, U.S. House of Representatives......................... 10
Written Statement............................................ 11
Witnesses:
Rear Admiral (Ret.) Craig E. Steidle, Associate Administrator,
Office of Space Exploration Systems, National Aeronautic and
Space Administration, accompanied by Ms. Karen Poniatowski,
Assistant Associate Administrator, Launch Services
Oral Statement............................................... 13
Written Statement............................................ 14
Biography.................................................... 17
Major General (Ret.) Robert S. Dickman, Deputy for Military
Space, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force,
Department of Defense
Oral Statement............................................... 18
Written Statement............................................ 20
Biography.................................................... 23
The Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director, Defense Research and
Engineering, Department of Defense
Oral Statement............................................... 25
Written Statement............................................ 27
Biography.................................................... 29
Mr. Elon Musk, Chief Executive Officer, Space Exploration
Technologies
Oral Statement............................................... 30
Written Statement............................................ 32
Biography.................................................... 34
Discussion
NASA's Policies Toward the Use of New Launch Vehicles.......... 35
Impacts of the President's Space Exploration Initiative on
NASA's Space Launch Initiative............................... 39
NASA Contribution to the National Aerospace Initiative......... 41
Future of Space Launch Initiative Projects..................... 41
National Security Interests in Space Exploration............... 42
NASA and DOD Cross-Certification of Launch Vehicles............ 44
Difference Between Military and Civil Spacecraft............... 44
Crew Exploration Vehicle....................................... 45
Cooperation in Near-Earth Objects Detection.................... 48
Role of Industry............................................... 49
Crew Exploration Vehicle....................................... 50
Impediments to NASA-DOD Cooperation............................ 50
National Space Transportation Policy........................... 51
NASA-DOD Test Facilities....................................... 52
Cross-Certification of Launch Vehicles......................... 53
Review of Space Treaties Affecting DOD and Commercial Use of
the Moon..................................................... 53
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Rear Admiral (Ret.) Craig E. Steidle, Associate Administrator,
Office of Space Exploration Systems, National Aeronautic and
Space Administration........................................... 56
Major General (Ret.) Robert S. Dickman, Deputy for Military
Space, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force,
Department of Defense.......................................... 62
The Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director, Defense Research and
Engineering, Department of Defense............................. 64
Mr. Elon Musk, Chief Executive Officer, Space Exploration
Technologies................................................... 72
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Statement of Michael C. Gass, Vice President, Space
Transportation, Space Systems Company, Lockheed Martin
Corporation.................................................... 76
Statement of Northrop Grumman.................................... 79
Statement of Wilbur Trafton, VP and GM, Expendable Launch
Systems; President, Boeing Launch Services..................... 81
NASA-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATION IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION
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THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana
Rohrabacher [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NASA-Department of Defense Cooperation
in Space Transportation
thursday, march 18, 2004
1:00 p.m.-3:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
I. Purpose
The House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will hold a hearing
entitled NASA-DOD Cooperation in Space Transportation on Thursday,
March 18, 2004, at 1:00 p.m. in room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office
Building.
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) both depend on rockets manufactured by
private sector contractors to launch payloads into orbit--payloads such
as reconnaissance satellites, weather satellites, or scientific
instruments that are necessary for national security or to carry out
research in space. This hearing will explore whether better
coordination between NASA and DOD in developing and purchasing rockets
could increase the reliability and lower the cost of launch vehicles.
The hearing will also explore how DOD and NASA could encourage the
emergence of new, entrepreneurial companies that can launch payloads
into space.
The hearing will explore the following questions:
(1) To what extent can NASA and the DOD benefit from greater
cooperation in the development and purchasing of launch
vehicles?
(2) What steps is NASA taking to collaborate with the DOD in
order to realize those benefits?
(3) What areas of launch vehicle development are exclusively
the role and responsibility of one agency or the other?
(4) To what extent can NASA and the DOD encourage the growth
of the U.S. domestic launch market, including emerging U.S.
launch vehicle providers who provide unique capabilities?
II. Witnesses
Rear Admiral (Ret.) Craig Steidle, NASA Associate Administrator for the
Office of Exploration Systems, is responsible for developing NASA's new
launch vehicles. Prior to joining NASA, RADM Steidle was Vice Commander
of Naval Air Systems and Director of the Joint Strike Fighter Program.
Major General (Ret.) Robert Dickman, Deputy for Military Space in the
Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, manages the planning,
programming, and acquisition of Air Force space systems. Maj. Gen.
Dickman previously commanded the launch wing at Patrick Air Force Base,
Florida.
The Honorable Ron Sega, Director of Defense Research & Engineering, is
the chief technical adviser to the Secretary of Defense for all
scientific and technical matters, basic and applied research, and
advanced technology development. A veteran of two NASA Space Shuttle
missions, Dr. Sega also serves as a major general in the Air Force
reserves.
Mr. Elon Musk, Chief Executive Officer of Space Exploration
Technologies or SpaceX, is developing a new, privately-financed family
of launch vehicles intended to reduce the cost and increase the
reliability of access to space. Previously, Mr. Musk co-founded and was
the largest shareholder of PayPal, a company that developed an internet
electronic payment system that was sold for $1.5 billion in October
2002.
III. Brief Overview
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) each contract with
industry to build the rockets, or launch vehicles, needed to
launch each agency's payloads into orbit. For example, from the
1950s through the 1990s, the DOD funded the development of the
Atlas, Delta and Titan families of rockets to lift payloads
such as reconnaissance satellites of varying sizes into orbit.
Used once and then discarded, these rockets are known as
expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). NASA's Apollo program
designed the Saturn rocket, which was also expendable, to carry
very heavy payloads to the Moon. In the 1970s, NASA developed
the Space Shuttle, the world's first and only reusable launch
vehicle. (While the Space Shuttle was originally intended to be
wholly reusable, the version ultimately built is only partially
reusable, as the large, orange-colored external tank is used
only once.) The government developed these launch vehicles
through contracts with various aerospace contractors, the
largest of which today are the Boeing Company and the Lockheed
Martin Corporation.
The domestic launch industry has suffered
economically from the recent decline in demand for commercial
launches, making the costs of these rockets more expensive. In
addition to serving the government's launch needs, aerospace
companies also serve the commercial launch market. For example,
satellite telecommunication companies purchase launches from
commercial launch vehicle providers to carry their
communications satellites into orbit. However, while the
government's demand for launch vehicles from aerospace
companies has remained steady, the private sector's demand has
dropped precipitously in recent years (due in large part to the
use of fiber optics and cellular technologies). This sharp
downturn in the commercial launch vehicle market increases the
prices that commercial providers charge NASA and the DOD. For
the past decade or so, U.S. aerospace companies have also faced
increasing competition from foreign launch companies,
particularly Arianespace, which is partially owned by European
governments.
The President's new space exploration initiative will
require NASA to use more expendable launch vehicles after 2010,
which may provide new opportunities for greater coordination
with DOD. The vision for NASA that the President announced on
January 14th calls for NASA to retire the Shuttle after
assembling the International Space Station, now targeted for
completion by 2010. After that, NASA must decide whether it
will develop a new heavy-lift expendable rocket, convert the
Shuttle (which is a heavy-lift vehicle) into a configuration
designed to carry only cargo, or use or modify existing
expendable launch vehicles, which are not capable of launching
the heaviest loads. The vision also calls for NASA to develop a
new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to carry humans back to the
Moon as early as 2015. Such a vehicle would most likely be
lifted into orbit on an expendable launch vehicle. Any existing
rocket probably would have to be modified to be rated as safe
for humans.
NASA and the DOD have had mixed success when
collaborating on launching payloads into orbit and on
developing new technologies. Some NASA and DOD collaborations
have produced spectacular successes. For example, in 1947 the
Bell X-1 experimental vehicle (flown by Chuck Yeager) was
operated by the Air Force and designed by NASA's predecessor
agency, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. On the
other hand, the Space Shuttle itself is an example of a
collaboration that did not work out as originally intended.
Meeting both NASA and DOD requirements made it more difficult
and more costly to design, build and operate the Shuttle.
Moreover, eventually the Shuttle proved to be too risky for DOD
to use. In 1986, when the entire Shuttle fleet was grounded for
32 months in the wake of the Challenger accident, DOD was
unable to launch critical national security satellites. Partly
as a result, DOD stopped using the Shuttle to launch its
national security payloads and turned solely to expendable
rockets.
New entrants in the domestic launch industry have the
potential to lower costs, and increase reliability. Some
relatively new companies are beginning to produce new launch
vehicles for the commercial sector and for government. One such
company, SpaceX, has said that its goal is to reduce the cost
and increase the reliability of launching payloads into space
by a factor of ten. DOD awarded SpaceX a contract to launch a
research satellite this May on its new Falcon I rocket. NASA
has been unwilling to consider making an award to SpaceX,
saying that NASA will only launch on types of rockets that have
already had at least one successful launch. However, NASA has
recently announced its intent to award a contract to Kistler
Aerospace Corporation to demonstrate the company's reusable
launch vehicle that someday could carry cargo to the
International Space Station. (The contract is contingent on
Kistler emerging from bankruptcy.)
The White House is preparing to update the
government's space transportation policy, which is expected to
specify the roles DOD and NASA should play in developing future
space launch systems. In 1994, the Clinton Administration
issued a National Space Transportation Policy to delineate the
roles DOD and NASA would each play in developing new space
launch vehicles. Under the 1994 policy, NASA was to concentrate
on developing and demonstrating reusable vehicle technology,
while the DOD would focus exclusively on expendable launch
vehicles. In 2002, the Bush Administration directed the
National Security Council to review this policy due to NASA's
failure to develop and demonstrate reusable vehicle technology
and the downturn in the commercial, expendable launch vehicle
market that affected the government's costs. The release of the
Administration's new space transportation policy has been
delayed due to the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, but it is
expected later this year. The new space transportation policy
is expected to reflect the Administration's space exploration
policy objectives.
IV. Issues
What are the benefits and drawbacks of NASA and DOD
cooperating on developing and purchasing launch vehicles?
Cooperation between NASA and DOD can lead either to lower
costs--or to a proliferation of requirements and higher costs,
depending on the situation. Cooperation can also either be an
acknowledgement of areas where the two agencies' needs and
missions overlap--or an improper merging of distinct missions.
Congress and the agencies need to figure out how to decide when
cooperation is optimal and when it might be harmful.
How can the government better encourage the
sustainable growth of the domestic launch industry? Greater
cooperation between NASA and the DOD in developing and
purchasing rockets might also benefit the industry by
increasing demand for those rockets used by both agencies. A
healthy domestic launch industry is important for both NASA and
the DOD. But NASA has not yet decided what kinds of launch
vehicles it will need for either crew or cargo after it retires
the Shuttle and, as mentioned above, cooperation between the
two agencies is not always appropriate.
How can the government foster the entry of new,
innovative launch companies to meet the government's needs?
Both DOD and NASA could benefit from the entry of new companies
into the launch vehicle market, especially since such companies
promise lower costs and greater reliability. However, using
these companies also presents a greater level of risk to the
agencies because the companies' technology is unproven. The
agencies need to balance the need to encourage emerging
companies against the need to carry out agency missions with
limited risk.
V. Background
History of NASA and DOD Space Transportation Development Efforts
The DOD funded the development of the Atlas, Delta, and Titan
families of ELVs (called expendable because they can only be used once)
based on ballistic missile technology from the 1950s-60s. In the 1960s,
NASA developed the small Scout rocket and the heavy-lift Saturn
rockets, both of which are no longer produced. Today, the Boeing
Company manufactures the Delta family of expendable launch vehicles and
is part of the Sea Launch joint venture with the Russian/Ukrainian
Zenit rocket. Lockheed Martin manufactures the Atlas, Athena, and Titan
launch vehicles, and Orbital Sciences Corporation manufactures the
smaller Pegasus and Taurus launch vehicles. Both Boeing and Lockheed
Martin build portions of NASA's Space Shuttle, and both companies own
equal portions of the United Space Alliance (USA), which manages
Shuttle operations and maintenance.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, NASA and DOD worked together on
an ultimately unsuccessful effort to develop a new reusable launch
vehicle to replace the Shuttle, as well as new expendable launch
vehicles. These programs failed because of a combination of technical
failures and problems with funding. One unsuccessful effort to create a
reusable vehicle was the X-30 or National Aerospace Plane project
initiated by President Reagan. The project was doomed by insurmountable
technical hurdles with hypersonic technology and was also affected by
the end of the Cold War, which made moot some of the impetus for the
project. At the same time, NASA and DOD initiated expendable launch
vehicle programs. Those programs--Advanced Launch System, National
Launch System, and Spacelifter--were not sustained by either the
agencies or the Congress for long enough to fully develop any new
system.
President Clinton issued a National Space Transportation Policy in
1994 that designated lead responsibility for improving expendable
launch vehicles to DOD and lead responsibility for upgrading the Space
Shuttle and technology development of new reusable launch vehicles to
NASA.
The 1994 policy directed NASA to conduct research designed to
demonstrate by the year 2000 a rocket engine that could fly to orbit
using only a single stage (rather than the multiple-stage rockets that
are used today). In response, NASA began two experimental flight test
programs in 1995, the X-33 (with Lockheed Martin) and X-34 (with
Orbital Sciences). Neither program was able to successfully demonstrate
a vehicle, and NASA terminated both programs in March 2001. NASA had
spent approximately $1.2 billion on the X-33 and $205 million on the X-
34 by the time the programs were canceled. Lockheed Martin said that it
had spent $356 million of its own money on the X-33.
At the same time, the 1994 policy directed the DOD to work with
industry to modernize or ``evolve'' the expendable launch vehicle fleet
under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program ``to reduce
costs while improving reliability, operability, responsiveness, and
safety.'' The policy also directed the U.S. Government to meet its
future launch needs by purchasing commercial launch services.
In 1995, DOD began funding the development of the latest generation
of Delta and Atlas launch vehicles through the EELV program. Under that
program, DOD has awarded contracts to Boeing valued at $1.88 billion
($500 million for development plus $1.38 billion for 19 launches) for
the Delta IV, and contracts to Lockheed Martin valued at $1.15 billion
($500 million for development plus $650 million for nine launches) for
the Atlas V. EELV contracts were awarded to both companies to ensure
that DOD would not be forced to rely on a single supplier. Each company
has spent about $1 billion of its own money on EELV development. DOD
also has a variety of other programs to develop new launch vehicles and
vehicle components.
Some low-level cooperation between NASA and DOD on rocket
technologies continued even under the 1994 policy, but cooperation
began again in earnest around 2000. In the wake of failures in the X-33
and X-34 programs, NASA proposed the Space Launch Initiative, under
which it would cooperate with DOD on both reusable and expendable
launch technologies.
Economic Landscape for Domestic Launch Industry and Recent Developments
DOD hoped the EELV would be less expensive to purchase than
previous launch vehicles. However, that assumed a thriving commercial
launch business that would add to the demand for the new rockets.
Instead, the demand for commercial launches has plummeted. In 1999, 76
commercial payloads were launched, producing $2.3 billion in launch
revenues, while in 2003 only 18 commercial payloads representing $1.2
billion were launched. Furthermore, competition has become more intense
even as the number of launches has declined.
Today, both Boeing and Lockheed Martin are seeking to negotiate
higher launch prices with DOD and NASA, and the agencies predict that
launch costs could increase by 50 percent. DOD's efforts to keep both
companies in the launch business were complicated recently when it
penalized Boeing after the company was found to have used proprietary
information from Lockheed Martin. The penalties included losing awards
for several launches and restrictions on bidding for some future
launches.
The President's space exploration initiative announced on January
14th would have a significant impact on the launch industry. While NASA
does use expendable launch vehicles for some of its current needs, such
as Earth science satellites, NASA uses the Space Shuttle (and Russian
Soyuz vehicles) to launch humans into space and uses the Space Shuttle
and Russian vehicles for related cargo needs. Under the President's
proposal, the Shuttle would be retired around 2010. The proposal does
not say what NASA will use to take cargo to and from the International
Space Station after that time or what will be used to launch payloads
to the Moon or other locations. The President proposed developing a new
vehicle, called the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), to launch humans
after the Shuttle is retired, but NASA has not yet decided what kind of
rocket would lift the CEV.
As part of its FY05 budget, NASA has proposed eliminating the Space
Launch Initiative as a discrete program. NASA is in the process of
deciding which elements of the Space Launch Initiative to retain (in
other programs) as relevant to the President's exploration proposal.
For example, NASA has already decided to cancel one joint project on
advanced rocket engines and to continue a joint project to demonstrate
autonomous satellite rendezvous capability.
In addition, the National Security Council is working on an inter-
agency effort, begun in 2002, to develop a new space transportation
policy. The policy is expected to be released later this year.
Emerging Commercial Launch Providers
Space Exploration Technologies (commonly referred to as SpaceX) is
a privately funded company developing a family of launch vehicles
called Falcon rockets. SpaceX has said it intends to reduce launch
costs ultimately by a factor of ten. The Falcon I launch vehicle is a
small rocket priced at $6 million per launch, a significant price
savings compared to other comparably-sized rockets. The first launch of
the Falcon I rocket, carrying a DOD research satellite, is scheduled
for mid-2004.
In addition to Space X, other emerging launch providers include
Kistler Aerospace and Universal Space Lines. NASA recently announced
that it intends to pay Kistler Aerospace about $227 million to
demonstrate that it can carry cargo to and from the International Space
Station. This contract is contingent on Kistler successfully emerging
from bankruptcy.
NASA has also requested $10 million for FY05 to buy launch services
from emerging companies. However, NASA's current launch policy forbids
NASA to contract for launch services unless the type of rocket being
used has performed at least one successful flight. The policy was put
in place in the mid-1990s after several rockets failed on their maiden
flights. Those rockets were made by Orbital and CTA, which is no longer
in business. The DOD does not have an analogous policy for its research
satellites, which is why it is able to use SpaceX's new Falcon I
rocket.
VI. The witnesses were asked to respond to the following questions in
their testimony before the Subcommittee:
Rear Admiral (Ret.) Craig Steidle, NASA Associate Administrator for
the Office of Exploration Systems, was asked to address:
Are there any specific lessons learned from past
NASA-Department of Defense (DOD) joint ventures in space
transportation development and operations that NASA is applying
to future programs, such as the Crew Exploration Vehicle,
human-rated EELV, and heavy-lift launch vehicle?
What are the benefits and risks to NASA from
increased collaboration with the DOD in launch vehicle
development and purchases to support human space flight
missions and develop the next generation launch technologies?
What steps is NASA taking to encourage the growth of
the U.S. domestic launch market, including emerging commercial
launch service providers to support the Space Station and
launch research payloads? What risks, if any, is NASA willing
to take by relying on these emerging launch providers?
Major General (Ret.) Bob Dickman, Office of the Air Force Under
Secretary, was asked to address:
What are the benefits and risks to the Department of
Defense (DOD) from increased collaboration with NASA in launch
vehicle development and purchases to support DOD missions?
What steps is the DOD taking to ensure that it
leverages the potential benefits of NASA's investments to
improve the capabilities of U.S. launch vehicles?
What steps is the DOD taking to encourage the growth
of the U.S. domestic launch market, including emerging
commercial launch service providers to support DOD missions?
Dr. Ron Sega, Defense Research and Engineering, was asked to
address:
What is the status of the Administration's review of
U.S. space transportation policy?
How do NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD)
coordinate their broad research portfolios for space launch
vehicles? How might the DOD's launch and propulsion research
and development activities contribute technologies to NASA
initiatives?
How is the DOD using emerging commercial launch
vehicle providers, like SpaceX? What risks, if any, is the DOD
taking by relying on these emerging launch providers?
Mr. Elon Musk, Space Exploration Technologies, was asked to
address:
What are the benefits and risks for the U.S. domestic
launch industry, including emerging U.S. launch vehicle
providers, if NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD)
collaborated more in the development and purchases of launch
vehicles?
What specific recommendations would you make for how
NASA and the DOD can encourage the healthy growth of the U.S.
domestic launch market, especially for emerging commercial
launch providers?
What unique capabilities do emerging launch vehicle
providers, like SpaceX, provide to NASA and the DOD?
Chairman Rohrabacher. I hereby call this meeting of the
Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee to order, and without
objection, the Chair will be granted authority to recess this
committee at any time. Hearing no objection.
At today's hearing, we will examine how well NASA and the
Department of Defense collaborate on the development of launch
vehicle technology. Our focus will also include how NASA and
the Department of Defense can do a better job in encouraging
the emergence of entrepreneurial space launch companies. The
President's recent announcement on space exploration begins a
new chapter in the American space experience. Improving the
Nation's launch capability is a critical step in achieving the
President's goal of exploring new worlds.
Early in his tenure, the President took the first step in
realizing this goal by revisiting space launch policies of the
1990s. These policies drove a wedge between NASA and the
Department of Defense where the Department of Defense was
limited to improving expendable launch vehicles in terms of
design and development. The reusables were--and that technology
was to be the responsibility of NASA. Well, and I might add
that this Chairman supported that compromise at the time. It
seemed like the right thing to do at the time, but
compartmentalizing launch vehicle development, however, may
have had unintended consequences, the unintended consequences
of preventing improvements to the national launch capability.
And I believe the President's renewed commitment for discovery
and exploration will encourage a more comprehensive and
cooperative spirit between NASA and the Department of Defense.
As long as it does not duplicate, as long as we are talking
about not duplicating efforts, this new approach should work to
our country's benefit.
NASA and the Department of Defense also must establish
investment strategies that promote innovative ideas from the
private sector. Purchasing launch services demonstrates a
desire on the part of government to adopt market-based
solutions and use market-based and private sector options. The
DOD has a long history in giving a fair shot to emerging launch
providers like SpaceX. Unfortunately, NASA does not share this
track record. NASA should become, hopefully, zealous in its
approach to supporting space entrepreneurs. This shouldn't just
be the Department of Defense. NASA should be encouraging
entrepreneurs in the private sector. Only then can we expect
the type of contributions coming from our private industry that
American industry is capable of.
Cooperation between NASA and the Department of Defense on
technology development is not new and has not always been easy.
Indeed, there are plenty of examples that suggest that such an
undertaking is difficult, at best, but there are shining
examples of success as well. But let us face it, both agencies'
approaches to developing space transportation requires, in
terms of their requirements, derive from very different
cultures and philosophies. We have both the NASA and the
Department of Defense, two very different organizations, and
bridging the gap between them is going to take strong
leadership and a lot of Congressional involvement.
As Chairman, I will vigorously support the joint NASA and
Department of Defense space launch initiatives that promise
significant benefits, not only to NASA, not only to the
Department of Defense, but significant benefits to our country
as a whole.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
Today's hearing will examine how well NASA and the Department of
Defense collaborate on the development of launch vehicle technology.
Our focus will also include how NASA and DOD can do a better job in
encouraging the emergence of entrepreneurial space launch companies.
The President's recent announcement on space exploration begins a new
chapter in the American space experience. Improving the Nation's launch
capability is a critical step in achieving the President's goal of
exploring new worlds.
Early in his tenure, the President took the first step in realizing
this goal by revisiting space launch policies of the 1990s. These
policies drove a wedge between NASA and DOD, where DOD was limited to
improving expendable launch vehicle design and development of reusable
launch vehicle technology was the responsibility of NASA.
Compartmentalizing launch vehicle development may well have had the
unintended consequence of preventing improvements to the national
launch capability. I believe the President's renewed commitment for
discovery and exploration will encourage a more cooperative spirit
between NASA and DOD. As long as it is not duplicative, this new
approach should work to our benefit.
NASA and DOD also must establish investment strategies that promote
innovative ideas from the private sector. Purchasing launch services
demonstrates a desire on the part of government to adopt market-based
solutions. DOD has a long history of giving a fair shot to emerging
launch providers like SpaceX. Unfortunately, NASA does not share this
track record. NASA should also become zealous in its approach in
supporting space entrepreneurs. Only then can we expect real process in
supporting industry.
Cooperation between NASA and DOD on technology development is not
new and has not always been easy. Indeed, there are plenty of examples
that suggest such an undertaking is difficult at best, but there are
shining examples of success as well. Let's face it, both agencies'
approach to developing space transportation requirements derive from
very different cultures and philosophies. Bridging this gap is going to
take strong leadership.
As Chairman, I will vigorously support joint NASA and DOD space
launch initiatives that promise significant benefits to them, as well
as the Nation.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Mr. Lampson, you may now proceed with
your opening statement.
Mr. Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is nice to be
able to join you in this particular chair for this committee.
It is going to be a pleasure working with you and on many of
the initiatives that we will be facing, and I look forward to
the cooperation, not only that needs to exist between NASA and
DOD, but also that needs to exist through all levels of our
House of Representatives and our Federal Government.
And so I, too, want to welcome the witnesses today to this
hearing, and I look forward to your testimony.
As I just said, the topic of the NASA-DOD cooperation on
space transportation is certainly an important one. I hope that
our witnesses will be able to provide some useful insights into
when such cooperation makes sense as well as when it is,
perhaps, inappropriate. So NASA and DOD have had a long history
of cooperation across a range of activities, dating back to the
early years of the space age. While there have occasionally
been difficulties and tensions over the years, I believe that
the Nation has benefited from NASA-DOD cooperation.
Space transportation, however, is an area where the record
has been mixed. The National Aerospace Plane and the National
Launch System were two major joint NASA-DOD initiatives that
ultimately wound up being canceled. More recently, the two
organizations jointly funded the X-37 space test vehicle until
DOD decided that it wasn't enough of a priority to warrant its
continued participation. I hope that our witnesses will help us
to understand why these previous collaborations failed and how
we can ensure that future cooperative space transportation
efforts will fare better.
Finally, I think that we need to examine the potential
impact of the President's space exploration initiative on NASA-
DOD cooperation in space transportation. While there has been
some discussion of the role that DOD's expendable launch
vehicle programs might play in the initiative, my attention is
focused on a different matter. Specifically, in order to fund
the President's space initiative, NASA is canceling the Space
Launch Initiative, and in particular, the Next Generation
Launch Technology Program.
Advanced engine programs are also being terminated, and the
funding intended for hypersonics research and development is
being diverted to the Exploration Systems budget. Indeed, some
of these efforts were supposed to be NASA's contribution to the
joint NASA-DOD National Aerospace Initiative that was announced
with much fanfare only a few years ago.
I am very concerned that we are eating our technological
``seed corn'' to make the exploration initiative's budget math
work. That doesn't make sense to me. And that is not my
definition of an ``affordable'' exploration initiative.
So clearly, we have a lot to talk about today, and I look
forward to hearing from the witnesses, and I yield back my
time, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lampson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Nick Lampson
Good afternoon. I'd like to welcome our witnesses to today's
hearing, and I look forward to your testimony.
The topic of NASA-DOD cooperation on space transportation is an
important one, and I hope that our witnesses will be able to provide
some useful insights into when such cooperation makes sense as well as
when it is inappropriate. NASA and DOD have had a long history of
cooperation across a range of activities, dating back to the early
years of the space age. While there have occasionally been difficulties
and tensions over the years, I believe that the Nation has benefited
from NASA-DOD cooperation.
Space transportation, however, is an area where the record has been
mixed. The National Aerospace Plane and the National Launch System were
two major joint NASA-DOD initiatives that ultimately wound up being
canceled. More recently, the two organizations jointly funded the X-37
space test vehicle until DOD decided that it was not enough of a
priority to warrant its continued participation. I hope that our
witnesses will help us understand why these previous collaborations
failed, and how we can ensure that future cooperative space
transportation efforts will fare better.
Finally, I think we need to examine the potential impact of the
President's space exploration initiative on NASA-DOD cooperation in
space transportation. While there has been some discussion of the role
that DOD's expendable launch vehicle programs might play in the
initiative, my attention is focused on a different matter.
Specifically, in order to fund the President's space initiative, NASA
is canceling the Space Launch Initiative-and in particular the Next
Generation Launch Technology program.
Advanced engine programs are being terminated, and the funding
intended for hypersonics R&D is being diverted to the Exploration
Systems budget. Indeed, some of these efforts were supposed to be
NASA's contribution to the joint NASA-DOD National Aerospace Initiative
that was announced with much fanfare only a few years ago.
I am very concerned that we are eating our technological ``seed
corn'' to make the exploration initiative's budget math work. That
doesn't make sense to me. And that's not my definition of an
``affordable'' exploration initiative.
Well, we have a lot to talk about today, and I look forward to a
productive hearing.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And it will be a
pleasure working with you, as it was with your predecessor, and
appreciate your thoughtful statement and the points that you
have made.
I would like to take the Chairman's prerogative at this
moment to call the attention of the Committee and those present
at today's hearing to a very important event that has just
happened. On Monday, NASA announced that an asteroid would pass
closer to Earth than any other previous asteroid that it has
charted. So what we have got here is an asteroid that we didn't
know anything about two weeks ago, but now, as I understand,
passing within 26,000 miles, is that it, of the Earth. When we
talk about cooperation between NASA and the Department of
Defense, if there is any example where this might be of benefit
to us, it might be in tracking and providing some sort of
protection against this type of threat. I certainly would like
to hear everybody's ideas on this. If we didn't know this,
apparently, NASA has catalogued 600 asteroids so far, which is
about--which are a half a mile in diameter or larger. And by
2008, 90 percent of these large asteroids will be charted. But
there are still thousands of other smaller asteroids out there.
And I believe that we need to take this very seriously. This is
not something that--I mean, these small asteroids could take
out a city, and if you take a look up at the Moon--now that is
not saying that the one that they saw could take out a city, I
am not sure--but the fact that we just found it is reason for
concern. And take a look at the Moon. All of those craters up
there didn't happen because of some space debris from the world
from our space program; it happened because there are asteroids
and meteorites and objects out there that could threaten the
Earth as well.
So with that said, without objection, the opening
statements of other Members will be put in the written record
unless someone has something they would like to jump in with
right now. If not, hearing no objection, your opening
statements will be put in the record. And I also ask unanimous
consent to insert at the appropriate place in the record the
background memorandum prepared by the majority staff for this
hearing. Hearing no objections, so ordered.
And we have a distinguished panel of witnesses today, and
we appreciate you being with us. I would ask you to, if you
could, summarize your written statements to five minutes. And
if you can get to the heart of the matter, we will have a
better chance for a dialogue right after we come back from this
vote. We will have a--we will be able to hear you. So actually,
we--actually, we have six recorded votes, so we'll get to two
witnesses prior to taking off. We will--the Chair will--the
Chair is glad to hear from two witnesses and then to take off
and then to come back immediately after the last vote. And we
apologize. This is out of our control, just sort of like that
asteroid coming right over there that we didn't know anything
about. But we did know these votes were coming. That is where
we had a--all right.
So first, our opening witness is Major General--no, it is
not. Our first witness is Rear Admiral, sorry, Admiral, I
almost made you a Major General. Craig Steidle, who is
responsible for developing NASA's launch vehicles and Crew
Exploration Vehicle. He is new to NASA. I appreciated our visit
when he came to my office, but he comes here, perhaps new to
NASA, but with a wealth of experience from the Pentagon. And if
there is anyone that would have a perspective on how NASA and
the Pentagon can cooperate, it would be you, Admiral. You may
proceed.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL (RET.) CRAIG E. STEIDLE, ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SPACE EXPLORATION SYSTEMS, NATIONAL
AERONAUTIC AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY MS. KAREN
PONIATOWSKI, ASSISTANT ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, LAUNCH SERVICES
Rear Admiral Steidle. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I will make this
very brief, Sir, I would like to thank you for this opportunity
to appear today to discuss NASA's ongoing cooperative
activities with the Department of Defense.
On January 14, the President visited NASA Headquarters and
announced the Nation's vision for space exploration. In his
address, the President presented a vision that is bold and
forward-looking, yet practical and responsible, one that
explores answers to long-standing questions of importance to
science and society, and will develop revolutionary
technologies and capabilities for the future, while maintaining
good stewardship of the taxpayers' dollars. Key to the good
stewardship of taxpayers' dollars is appropriate partnering
between NASA and DOD.
At this time, I would first like to introduce Karen
Poniatowski. Karen will be joining me at the table when we
start the session for questions. She is the Associate
Administrator for Launch Services in the Office of Space Flight
and has a lot of knowledge on the areas that you are interested
in today as well.
Chairman Rohrabacher. So you brought your institutional
memory with you. All right.
Rear Admiral Steidle. Yes, sir.
She is a significant--she has been a significant
contributor to cooperative efforts with DOD on the Space
Shuttle, Space Station, expendable launch vehicles and such, so
that is why I asked her to come with me today.
There has been a rich history of collaboration and
cooperation between DOD and NASA, and I fully expect this
tradition will continue. I have some examples that I hope to
provide you with later on.
The Office of Exploration Systems, which I have been
privileged to head, has implemented a strategy of communicating
with our partners and our stakeholders, and we have begun this,
holding our first series of NASA days and industry days in our
auditorium, and some of the staff in here have attended those.
This provides an opportunity for my leadership team to directly
communicate and hold a dialogue with our partners about our
plans for implementing the Nation's vision. We are currently in
the requirements development phase, and that is well underway.
Once the requirements have been defined, future opportunities
for collaboration, in cooperation with DOD, will be better
understood and pursued, and I intend to continue this
communication strategy throughout, as I did before in the Joint
Strike Fighter program, and I found it very productive to do
that.
The Partnership Council, as you will probably hear from my
colleagues, is a multi-agency forum with a diverse membership
of renowned leaders: Mr. O'Keefe, Mr. Teets, Admiral Jim Ellis,
General Lord, and Mr. Sega at the end of the table. The Council
is a mechanism for agencies to frame issues and discuss their
individual space mission needs and identify actions to benefit
the entire space community, and I understand that the
Exploration Systems flowed from the original discussions in
that partnership.
Project Constellation, which you have referenced, will
develop a new Crew Exploration Vehicle for future crew
transport. This vehicle will be developed in stages with the
first flight demonstration test in 2008, the first unmanned
flight in 2011, and the first crewed flight in 2014. Project
Constellation will be discussed at the Partnership Council this
spring to ensure that our space partners and DOD are kept fully
informed about its implementation and our way forward.
Areas of mutual concern to both NASA and DOD include launch
assets. Discussions are underway with DOD on the topic of
assured space access, exploring the possibility of human rating
and enhancing performance and reliability of launch systems to
support the Nation's vision for space exploration, and defining
a science and technology strategy that will advance the
Nation's ability to meet future launch needs.
As we implement the recommendations of the CAIB, the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board, we are working with DOD
to refine their support for spacecraft operations and members
of various DOD organizations and facilities are being employed
to develop and validate return-to-flight implementations and
approaches. And NASA is also partnering with DOD to respond to
both technical and cultural issues outlined in the CAIB report.
NASA and the Department of Defense have a long history of
cooperation on services, and we hope to have an opportunity to
discuss that with you today. Although we have different
missions, we share many of the same issues. The technical
challenges are the same as are some of the requirements,
working together within partnerships to maximize these unique
resources. Through numerous cooperative efforts, the American
people can benefit from our joint endeavors in space and on
Earth, and I sincerely appreciate the forum in this particular
committee for providing us today the opportunity to discuss
that.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Steidle follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral (Ret.) Craig E. Steidle
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to appear today to discuss NASA's ongoing cooperative
activities with the Department of Defense (DOD). Let me begin with a
discussion of a key part of that cooperation.
Partnership Council
NASA's relationship with the DOD has been coordinated primarily
through the Partnership Council since Mr. O'Keefe began his tenure as
the NASA Administrator. During the last 18 months, NASA's role has
proven instrumental in the evolution of the Council. Early on, key
changes began to occur that had elevated the level of the Council
members and changed completely how meetings were run. We now have on
track an effective mechanism for cooperation in a variety of areas.
The Partnership Council is a multi-agency forum with a diverse
membership that includes Mr. Sean O'Keefe, NASA Administrator; Mr.
Peter Teets, the DOD Executive Agent for Space and Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office; Admiral James Ellis, the Commander of
U.S. Strategic Command; General Lance Lord, the Commander of Air Force
Space Command; and Dr. Ronald Sega, the Director of Defense Research &
Engineering.
The Agency leaders established the Partnership Council to provide a
forum for senior DOD and civil space leaders to meet face-to-face on a
regular basis to discuss cross cutting issues relevant to the national
space community. The purpose of the Partnership Council is to
facilitate communication between the organizations and to identify
areas for collaboration and cooperation.
On January 14th, 2004, the President visited NASA Headquarters and
announced the Vision for Space Exploration. In his address, the
President presented a vision that is bold and forward-thinking, yet
practical and responsible--one that explores answers to longstanding
questions of importance to science and society and will develop
revolutionary technologies and capabilities for the future, while
maintaining good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Key to good
stewardship is appropriate partnering between NASA and DOD. The
Partnership Council provides us the necessary forum for the strategic
communication necessary to turn the vision into reality.
The Council has proven an invaluable mechanism to enable the
Agencies that use space assets to discuss their individual mission
needs and capabilities in a forum where issues can be framed and
appropriate actions assigned to benefit the entire space community.
NASA-DOD Cooperative Activities in Space Transportation
Space launch systems are inextricably woven into the fabric of
America's national security. As a result, the ability of the United
States to launch critical space assets when and where they are needed
is a national security requirement. Civil missions are also dependent
on assured access. Currently, access to the International Space Station
is dependent solely upon Russian launch capability until the Space
Shuttle returns to flight. Accordingly, the Partnership Council
routinely discusses launch topics to ensure that agencies partner
appropriately in their approach.
Return to safe flight is a driving priority at NASA. It is
imperative that we are able to return the Space Shuttle to flight in a
safety-driven, expeditious manner. As we implement the recommendations
of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), NASA is working
with DOD to redefine DOD support for space flight operations. Memoranda
of Agreement concerning the CAIB recommendations are being reviewed and
rewritten at all levels.
In addition to the CAIB activities, there are currently over 400
active agreements between various NASA and DOD organizations.
Agreements cover a range of activities between each of the NASA Centers
and varied groups within DOD.
Looking to the future, there are new opportunities for
collaboration and support between NASA and the DOD. For example,
Project Constellation will develop a new Crew Exploration Vehicle for
future crew transport. This vehicle will be developed in stages, with
the first flight demonstration test in 2008, the first unmanned flight
in 2011, and the first crewed flight in 2014. Project Constellation
will be discussed at the Partnership Council this spring to ensure that
our space partners in DOD are kept fully abreast of the ongoing
implementation of our Vision for Space Exploration.
For cargo transport to the International Space Station after 2010,
NASA will rely on existing or new commercial cargo transport systems.
NASA does not plan to develop new launch vehicle capabilities except
where critical NASA needs--such as heavy lift--are not met by
commercial or military systems. Discussions are underway with DOD on
the topic of assured access to space, exploring the possibility of
human rating and enhancing performance and reliability of launch
systems to support the Vision for Space Exploration, and defining a
Science and Technology strategy that will advance the Nation's ability
to meet its future launch needs.
Space Shuttle and Expendable Launch Vehicles
There is a rich history of cooperation with the DOD on the Space
Shuttle and Expendable Launch Vehicles. From NASA's early days, we have
depended on the DOD to provide launch range facilities and support for
the NASA Space Shuttle and expendable launch activities on a
reimbursable basis at both the Eastern and Western ranges. NASA
represents one of the largest reimbursable customers of the Air Force
on the Eastern Range. NASA, in close cooperation with the DOD and
Industry, established the Advanced Spaceport Technology Working Group
and Advanced Range Technology Working Group. Through these government
and industry working groups we are able to identify advanced
technologies to ultimately improve the performance and reduce the cost
of range operations for all range users.
NASA has also utilized USAF-unique launch support for missions for
which commercial capability was not available, such as the Cassini
mission that required the performance of the USAF Titan IV. Refurbished
Atlas E and Titan II services were provided on a reimbursable basis to
support flight of the NOAA Polar Meteorological satellites and the
quick response QuikScat mission launched in June 1999. NASA has also
conducted shared missions, most recently the Kodiak Star launch on an
Athena launch vehicle from Alaska in September 2001 and the February
2000, STS-99 Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM), which was a joint
effort of NASA and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA-
formerly NIMA). The data collected provided precise, uniform, 3-
dimensional elevation data for roughly 80 percent of the land mass of
the Earth.
The Space Shuttle is the only reusable launch vehicle in the world
capable of transporting humans to and from space. This capability has
made it a workhorse for the United States space program for more than
20 years. The Shuttle has been used for a variety of purposes, ranging
from launching, retrieving, and servicing scientific payloads to
conducting experiments on behalf of the other NASA enterprises to
transporting elements of the International Space Station (ISS) into
orbit.
The DOD has flown 11 dedicated missions on the Space Shuttle. NASA
is proud to have provided space access to about 270 secondary DOD
payloads, some 260 on the Shuttle as mid-deck or cargo bay payloads,
and four to the Russian Space Station MIR. They were also one of the
earliest users of the International Space Station (ISS). To date, four
DOD payloads have used the ISS as a space based research platform.
Areas of emphasis for these (and future) payloads include surveillance
and weather, space control and situational awareness, satellite
subsystems, assured/responsive access to space, and education.
At present, NASA remains focused on safe return-to-flight of the
Space Shuttle and successful assembly of the ISS. The return-to-flight
(RTF) effort is being guided by ``NASA's Implementation Plan for Space
Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond.'' This plan addresses NASA's
approach for implementing each of the recommendations from the CAIB
report.
Members of various DOD organizations and facilities are being
employed to develop and validate RTF implementation approaches to
fulfill the CAIB recommendations. NASA is also partnering with the DOD
to respond to both technical and cultural issues outlined in the CAIB
report. Some examples include the use of thermal-vacuum facilities at
the Arnold Engineering Development Center and Eglin Air Force Base to
test design modifications to the External Tank, collaborating with the
Navy's Submarine Nuclear Reactors Program, and Submarine Safety Program
to enhance NASA's processes for evaluating issues and concerns.
We are also working with the DOD to respond to the CAIB
recommendations as they pertain to expendable launch vehicles (ELVs).
NASA, the United States Air Force, and the National Reconnaissance
Office recently held the 4th Government/Industry ELV Mission Assurance
Forum on March 9-10, 2004. This forum was originally established by
these agencies to ensure that the ELV lessons learned from the 1998
Presidential Broad Area Review into Launch Failures are not lost and
continues to be one of the many forums established to facilitate
communication between the government agencies with regards to space
transportation.
The Vision for Space Exploration
Discussions have begun with the DOD in support of the Vision for
Space Exploration. At this point, we are early in the process of
defining requirements for the vision. The goal of this process is to
develop documented requirements that are traceable, verifiable and
measurable.
Definition of Level 0 requirements for the Crew Exploration Vehicle
(CEV) is the responsibility of the NASA Space Architect. NASA
anticipates the final set of Level 0 requirements by the end of this
month, pending approval by the Joint Strategic Assessment Committee
(JSAC). The JSAC is comprised of the following NASA personnel: the
Space Architect (Chair), the Chief Scientist (Deputy Chair), the
Enterprise Associate Administrators, Institutions Management and key
functional offices.
Definition, documentation and management of Level 1 and 2
requirements will be the responsibility of the Office of Exploration
Systems. Requirements will be subject to an open and formal review and
approval process to be managed by the Office of Exploration Systems.
The Office of Exploration Systems will develop necessary companion
products, including a Management Plan. Parts of this process are the
studies and systems analysis of potential exploration scenarios to be
conducted as a means of bounding the requirements trade space and
developing meaningful figures of merit to be used in the design and
development of the CEV.
A Requirements team, lead by Office of Exploration Systems is
focusing on developing these requirements and scenarios. This activity
began in February 2004. A rigorous requirements formulation approach
will yield Level 1 requirements in early September 2004. At that time,
the requirements will be provided to the JSAC for approval. The JSAC
will present the requirement to the Executive Council, which is
composed of the following NASA personnel: the Deputy Administrator
(Chair), the Associate Deputy Administrator for Institutions, the
Associate Deputy Administrator for Technical Programs, the Enterprise
Associate Administrators, the Chief Engineer, the Safety and Mission
Assurance Associate Administrator, the Chief Financial Officer, and the
General Council. The Executive Council will have the ultimate approval
authority for CEV requirements. This effort will be followed by a
solicitation in Fall 2004 for concept development. Level 2 requirements
will be baselined in early 2005.
In order to develop safe, reliable, and cost-effective requirements
for space launch vehicles to implement NASA's Vision for Space
Exploration, it is essential to learn from past and present programs
such as the Space Shuttle, the Space Launch Initiative, the Orbital
Space Plane (OSP), and Next Generation Launch Technology. The
Requirements team, lead by the Office of Exploration Systems, will
focus on developing these requirements and scenarios utilizing these
lessons learned. Knowledge from OSP will help define the fundamental
requirements necessary for developing missions beyond Earth orbit.
The Office of Exploration Systems will work closely with the DOD
throughout the requirements process. Once requirements have been
defined, future relationships with DOD will be further developed in
terms of identifying new areas for collaboration and cooperation.
Conclusion
NASA's Office of Space Flight and the Department of Defense (DOD)
have a long history of cooperation on services that range from staffing
our astronaut corps to collaborating on numerous space technology
projects. Although we have different missions, we share many of the
same issues, technical challenges, and requirements. Working together
we have formed partnerships to maximize our unique resources. Through
numerous cooperative efforts, the American people have benefited by our
joint endeavors in space and on the Earth.
I sincerely appreciate the forum that the Committee has provided
today, and I look forward to responding to your questions.
Biography for Craig E. Steidle
Adm. Craig E. Steidle is the Associate Administrator for the Office
of Exploration Systems. He is the first to hold this position, since
the office was created in January 2004.
The Office of Exploration Systems was established to set priorities
and direct the identification, development, and validation of
exploration systems and related technologies. Users and technologists
will work together to enable a balancing of factors between
requirements, program schedules and costs leading to future space
exploration systems.
Since retiring from the Navy in March 2000, Adm. Steidle served as
an independent aerospace consultant. His last assignment was as Chief
Aerospace Engineer and Vice Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, which
develops, acquires and supports naval aeronautical systems.
Adm. Steidle entered the Navy after graduating with merit from the
United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md. He trained as an attack
pilot, flew carrier night combat missions in North Vietnam; served as a
test pilot and test pilot instructor; and commanded the Navy's A-3
weapon systems program. During the 1980's, he deployed on carriers,
frigates, and cruisers in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.
Additionally, he served as manager of the Navy's Aerospace Engineers
and as the Special Assistant for Air Combat to the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy.
Adm. Steidle commanded the Navy's F/A-18 Program, naval aviation's
largest production, research and development program, as well as the
largest foreign military sales program. The Secretary of Defense
presented Steidle with the Navy's Outstanding Program Manager Award.
Adm. Steidle served as the Director of the Department of Defense
(DOD) Joint Advanced Strike Technology Office and was the Director of
the Joint Strike Fighter Program, DOD's largest program. Under his
command, the Joint Strike Fighter Program was awarded the David Packard
Excellence in Acquisition Award.
Adm. Steidle earned a Master of Science degree in systems
management from the University of Southern California and a Master of
Science degree in aerospace engineering from Virginia Polytechnic
Institute. He is a member of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots
and a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society.
His decorations and honors include the Defense Distinguished
Service Medal; Navy Distinguished Service Medal; Legion of Merit;
Distinguished Flying Cross; Meritorious Service Medal with gold star;
Air Medals with bronze star; Navy Commendation Medals; Republic of
Vietnam Gallantry Cross; and Joint Meritorious Unit Award.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much.
And now we are going to give the General a chance, General
Bob Dickman, who manages the planning and programming and
acquisition of the Air Force Space Systems at the Pentagon. And
he has a great deal of experience in working with NASA and
commanded the Air Force launch wing in Florida. And we welcome
you today, and you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL (RET.) ROBERT S. DICKMAN, DEPUTY FOR
MILITARY SPACE, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Major General Dickman. Mr. Chairman and distinguished
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss DOD's close relationship
with NASA, and in particular, our cooperative efforts in space
launch.
In particular, I am honored to be here with Admiral Steidle
and Dr. Sega, and Mr. Musk, and our partner in launch, Ms.
Poniatowski. And Karen, I am sorry, I got that--something went
wrong.
Your hearing today underscores the importance to DOD and
NASA and the commercial sector of working together on the
challenges in developing launch systems. A healthy and vigorous
cooperation, which takes into account the lessons learned from
past ventures, is central to sustaining America's preeminence
in space. Mr. Chairman, I share your view that there were
unintended consequences from that policy of the mid-1990s, but
I would point out that it also led to the two finest expendable
launch vehicles flying in the world today, the Delta IV and the
Atlas V.
Let me start off by saying that cooperation between NASA
and the DOD is nothing new, as Craig has pointed out. Civil and
DOD space organizations have worked together since 1958. We
share our commitment to excellence in our space endeavors.
Sometimes we forget that the Atlas and Delta launch vehicles
that were the centerpiece of our own launch capability in the
military over the last 15 years were developed by NASA and
transitioned to military vehicles. There is no issue, then, of
whether or not we should cooperate on launch, rather the
question is when does the collaboration make sense.
NASA-DOD collaboration and cooperation in space and in
aeronautics makes the most sense when our missions, our
requirements, and our technologies are similar. Both NASA and
DOD benefit from polling our skills and our limited resources.
For instance, there is a clear advantage to joint DOD and civil
efforts in basic science and technology in areas such as
propulsion, materials, avionics, and other launch technologies.
However, cooperation is inappropriate when it crosses the
line from civil towards military activities. Tradition and
policy dictate that civil and military space endeavors should
remain, and do remain, separate.
On a different level, true joint programs, the field
operational systems that involve funding from multiple agencies
and require design tradeoffs to achieve a common configuration,
have proven both difficult to bring to completion and
inordinately expensive. Given these bounds on when DOD and NASA
might work together, there are many fruitful areas of ongoing
and future collaboration.
As I mentioned a moment ago, in the realm of basic science
and technology, the military and civil space communities share
many common interests. Collaborative S&T projects, in addition
to the areas that I mentioned earlier, include sensors,
electronics, power generation, communications, thermal
protection systems, structures, test facilities, microsatellite
technology, and as you have noted, detection of near-Earth
asteroids. NASA's Scramjet flight, now scheduled for March 27,
will be an important milestone in our hypersonics road map.
Cooperative development is also underway through the Integrated
High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology Program, a three-
phase, 15-year national program to double propulsion
capability.
Another major DOD priority is developing operationally
responsive space lift. The program to make responsive spacelift
a reality is called FALCON, not to be confused with SpaceX's
Falcon Launch Vehicle. Our FALCON program is run jointly by the
Air Force and DARPA, and current efforts are focused on concept
design. Mr. Musk's Falcon is one of the competing designs.
I bring the Committee's attention to the FALCON program,
because NASA has played an important part in those efforts. In
particular, the Marshall Space Flight Center is continually
consulting with Air Force Space Command as we have gone through
our yearlong operationally responsive spacelift analysis of
alternatives.
Our major launch program also has the potential to further
NASA's space flight efforts, and again, we have a good history
of cooperation. I am speaking, of course, about the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle. NASA will use both the EELV
boosters, the Delta IV and the Atlas V, to launch intermediate
and heavy payloads. For example, in 2005, they plan to launch
the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter on the Atlas V and GOES-N on
the Delta IV. In addition, both the Atlas and Delta boosters
have the potential to be rated for human flight and modified to
meet very heavy lift needs. Should NASA choose to do so, the
DOD will work with NASA to facilitate their efforts.
While EELV is a major arrow in our space launch quiver, the
DOD must continue to look to the future. In this process, we
pay careful attention to encouraging the growth of a domestic
launch market to include emerging commercial space launch
providers. A very appropriate example, considering Mr. Musk's
presence here, is SpaceX's Falcon launch vehicle. Later this
year, this new launch vehicle is scheduled to carry a satellite
into space, launching from Vandenberg Air Force Base.
Let me close by saying we appreciate the support the
Congress and this committee have given to help guide and field
vital national space capabilities. We look forward to working
with you as we continue to develop, produce, and operate
critical space systems, both civil and military, for this great
nation.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Major General Dickman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert S. Dickman
Introduction
While missions and requirements may not always be common, there
will always be obvious synergies that allow a close relationship
between the DOD and NASA. Our shared environment is hazardous, and we
will continue to rely on each other's experience and continued
technical innovation to succeed.
In recent years, the Air Force (AF) and NASA have supported each
other in a wide range of activities. The four major areas of
cooperation were centered on interagency coordination, science and
technology development, space operations, and human space flight
activities.
NASA-DOD Interagency Coordination
While NASA and DOD have different primary missions, there is
significant overlap in the science and technology (S&T) challenges both
organizations face. DOD and NASA are aware of, and recognize this
potential for, dual use and therefore, the importance of cooperation.
To facilitate this cooperation, several forums are acting to promote
collaborative planning.
Partnership Council--Initially established in February 1997 by Air
Force Space Command (AFSPC) and NASA, this forum is at the most senior
level of the planning process. The Partnership Council, consisting of
the Honorable Peter B. Teets, Under Secretary of the Air Force and
Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); Mr. Sean O'Keefe, NASA
Administrator; Admiral James Ellis, Commander, USSTRATCOM; Dr. Ron
Sega, Director Defense Research & Engineering; and General Lance Lord,
Commander, AFSPC; is the primary forum for high-level discussions
between the community. It is intended to achieve efficiencies,
effectiveness, risk reduction, and better understanding of plans and
activities in areas of mutual interest, to include S&T.
Monthly Meeting between Deputy for Military Space, Office of the
Under Secretary of the Air Force; Director, National Security Space
Integration; Director, National Security Space Architect; and NASA
Space Architect--These National Security Space (NSS) principals and the
NASA Space Architect meet regularly, and as needed, to improve the
intermediate planning process and products, and implement opportunities
identified by the Partnership Council.
Space Technology Alliance (STA)--The STA was initiated in 1997
among the AF, NRO, and NASA to foster cooperative efforts and improve
communications.
Other Planning Activities--NASA participates with the NSS community
in conducting the annual NSS Program Assessment that, among other
things, identifies interagency S&T cooperation opportunities. NASA also
participates in the annual update of the NSS Plan that provides
implementation guidance to the NSS community on desired capabilities,
including S&T. In addition, NASA is participating with the DOD and the
Intelligence Community in developing the Congressionally-directed DOD
Space S&T Strategy, which will be complete in the summer of 2004.
There are a number of good examples of cooperation and mutual
support between DOD and NASA over our long history of working together.
These include launch and range support, communications, flight
experiments, and environmental science. However, there is always room
for improvement. We recognize this as being in the best interest of the
Nation and have therefore taken steps to strengthen our efforts with
the recent initiation of monthly planning meetings and the development
of the Space S&T Strategy.
There are, however, some important differences between NASA and the
NSS community--one open by design, and one generally closed for
national security reasons. For the most part, these differences can be
overcome on S&T activities through appropriate collaborative planning.
Science and Technology Development
When our missions are common, when our technology requirements are
similar, and when we can make the best use of our nation's limited
space infrastructure, both NASA and the DOD benefit from cooperative
efforts in S&T development. Whether maneuvering in space, experimenting
in space or communicating in space, there is shared workspace that
leads to the best possible equipment, processes and procedures to
ensure success, whether the mission is military or civil in nature. In
developing basic technologies for launch systems, materials for use in
space activities, or developing infrastructure to command and
communicate with our space assets, DOD and NASA cooperation is key to
making the most of our space dollars.
When resources, missions, and technologies are purely military in
nature, we are not best served by collaborating. It is important that
our civil space activities be kept free from possible accusations of
militarism. While many technologies developed by NASA-DOD collaboration
are dual-use in nature, there are some developmental areas that should
remain out of bounds.
NPOESS--One of the most important joint collaborative efforts
currently underway between NASA and the Air Force is the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environment System (NPOESS) a tri-agency
program of NASA, DOD, and the Department of Commerce (DOC) that
converges the DOD and DOC/NOAA polar-orbiting weather satellite
programs. NASA, working with NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO), is
providing pre-operational risk-reduction demonstration and validation
tests for four critical NPOESS sensors that will fly on the NPOESS
Preparatory Project (NPP). NPP is a primary NASA mission that serves as
a ``bridge'' between the Earth Observation Satellite (EOS) mission and
NPOESS. NPP is also a critical risk reduction mission for the Visual
Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), the Cross-track Infrared
Sounder (CrIS), the Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS), and
the Ozone Mapper/Profiler Suite (OMPS) sensors and serves as an end-to-
end test for the Command, Control and Communication (C3) and data
processing systems for NPOESS.
DOD Space Test Program--While DOD currently has no requirement for
manned space flight, the S&T community, through the auspices of the DOD
Space Test Program, has made excellent use of the Space Shuttle. When
necessary, NASA and DOD have worked to develop new integration methods
and hardware to make the most use of every ounce of available space
lift. To date, the Space Test Program has launched over 200 experiments
on over seventy Shuttle missions, including some of the first science
experiments that were carried out on the international Space Station.
As part of the effort to provide risk reduction to the NPOESS system,
the DOD Space Test Program launched the Coriolis Mission in January
2003. This mission hosted both a solar mass ejection imager and WindSat
sensor. The WindSat sensor will be evaluated for use on the NPOESS
system.
NASA also assisted the Space Test Program in tests of a new Vibro-
Acoustic Launch Protection Experiment (VALPE). NASA supported two
successful sounding rocket launches from the Wallops Island launch
facility. At Cape Canaveral, the AF supports the launch of NASA
payloads, most recently the Spirit and Opportunity rovers now
investigating Mars, from the Eastern and Western ranges.
S&T Forums--In more basic research and development, the AF and NASA
collaborate in several major research projects and have several forums
set up to facilitate S&T. The three major coordination forums for
collaborative work are: the National Thermal Protection Systems (TPS)
Working Group, which is led by the AF and NASA with participation of
Army, Navy, Department of Energy (DOE), industry, and academia, and
fosters development of new and advanced thermal protection materials
and systems; the National Space and Missile Materials Symposium, which
fosters increased communication and understanding in pursuing key
materials technology challenges for space and missiles; and the Air
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)-Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Annual
Summit, which is held annually to discuss and coordinate research
efforts.
Other areas of research range across the complete spectrum of S&T
activities. NASA and the AF work to track and characterize orbital
debris as well as performing asteroid surveys to detect any large
objects that are at risk of striking Earth. Many materials science
experiments are carried out to look at environmental effects of space
exposure, as in the DOD Space Test Program MISSE experiments, as well
as high stress/high-cycle experiments on airframe or fuel tank
materials. In the Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology
(IHPRPT) Program, AFRL and NASA have worked to develop a spiral
improvement system to the Space Shuttle Main Engines with technology
benefits that will help all U.S. next generation rocket engines. In
addition to all of these areas, NASA and the AF collaborate on other
S&T programs that touch on almost every facet of both aviation and
space technologies. For instance, AFRL is teaming with JPL to develop
the L-Band antenna for NASA's space based radar effort.
Even NASA's Mars exploration mission benefits from AF collaboration
with NASA utilizing AF-developed Rad-6000 32-bit microprocessors and
lithium-ion batteries in both planetary rovers. In addition, AF
operational studies provided expertise on human fatigue-related
performance issues that will help provide counter-fatigue strategies
for rover operators.
Space Operations
The AF and NASA have existing memoranda of agreement establishing
partnerships to support NASA launches with Spacelift Range assets and
to pursue advanced launch and test range technologies. The AF's
Spacelift Ranges support all launch operations for NASA manned and
unmanned launches from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) or from
Vandenberg AFB. Also, at the recommendation of the Interagency Working
Group on Future Management and Use of the U.S. Space Launch Bases and
Ranges, the AF and NASA established the Advanced Range Technology
Working Group (ARTWG), co-chaired by AF Space Command and NASA-KSC. The
ARTWG charter focuses on improving safety, increasing flexibility and
capacity, and lowering range costs in support of future generations of
reusable and expendable launch vehicles. The Joint Base Operating
Support Contract (JBOSC) is a joint procurement effort between KSC NASA
and the AF's 45th Space Wing (SW) to provide unified base support
services for KSC, Cape Canaveral AFS, and Patrick AFB.
Human Space Flight
AFSPC provided support to NASA (via USSTRATCOM to USNORTHCOM) on
the Columbia accident response and subsequent investigation. Major
General John Barry and Brigadier General Duane Deal, USAF, both served
on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). General Deal also
heads the wing (21st SW) responsible for operating the space
surveillance network, which assisted in the Columbia investigation.
Approximately 20 AFRL personnel from six technology directorates
participated in the CAIB via the DOD
Columbia Investigation Support Team. Subject matter expertise was
provided in the fields of non-destructive inspection and test of
critical composite structures, space weather, atmospheric space
chemistry and physics, reentry physics, high-speed aerodynamics,
aerothermal environments, kapton insulated wiring, ceramic materials,
structural fatigue/fracture failure, and human behavior ``group think''
decision-making.
In an effort to assist NASA in its return-to-flight activities for
the Shuttle fleet, the AF is assisting in developing and evaluating
leading edge repair concepts that can be applied by astronauts in
orbit. To date, 20 specimens from seven different organizations have
been tested with three concepts surviving thermal conditions
representative of flight heat flux and temperature. These three will be
studied further to fully characterize the performance of the repair
methods and materials and certify the concepts for flight. The AF is
also assisting to analyze and improve the manual foam spraying
operation previously used on the Space Shuttle Columbia external tanks.
NASA-DOD Space Organizations
Since 1958, the White House has created several organizational
mechanisms to coordinate civil and military space programs and
activities, including R&D investment. These range from President
Eisenhower's Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, which was designed to
coordinate NASA and DOD activities, to the Kennedy-Johnson-era National
Space Council and Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, to
President Reagan's National Security Council-led interagency group, and
then to President Clinton's decision to separate Space Council
functions under the Office of Science and Technology Policy and
National Security Council. The current organization mechanism for
coordination between NASA and DOD, however, is the Partnership Council.
The U.S. can, and always will, explore better ways of coordinating
NASA and DOD space activities. Analysts from both NASA and DOD
routinely track developments in space management involving
international partners in space cooperation as well as other
spacefaring nations. While it is always beneficial to study how other
countries attack similar problems, we must always be cognizant of the
fact that other countries have different policies, laws, technologies
and national security and civil requirements.
DSB/AFSAB Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space
Programs
We in the DOD have benefited greatly from the recommendations of
the joint Defense Science Board and Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
task force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, led by
Mr. A. Thomas Young. Mr. Young is a past Director of the Goddard Space
Flight Center, and headed the 1999 NASA-chartered review of the Mars
Polar Lander loss.
Just as in the DOD, during the 1990s, NASA experienced declining
budgets, increased acceptance of risk (for example--Faster, Better,
Cheaper), unrealized growth of a commercial space market, increased
dependence on space by an expanding user base, and consolidation of the
space industrial base.
The Young Panel identified five ``basic reasons'' for cost growth
and schedule delays in National Security Space programs:
Cost has replaced mission success as the primary
driver in managing space development programs. . .resulting in
excessive technical and schedule risk.
Unrealistically low cost estimates lead to
unrealistic budgets and unexecutable programs.
Undisciplined definition and uncontrolled growth in
system requirements.
Government capabilities to lead and manage the
acquisition process have seriously eroded.
Industry has failed to implement proven practices on
some programs.. . .The space industrial base is adequate to
support current programs, although long-term concerns exist.
Within the DOD, we have taken the Young Panel findings and
recommendations very seriously, and are continuing to implement policy
and process changes in response to the Young Panel recommendations.
Many of these findings likely have some applicability to NASA since we
share much of the same industrial base and have experienced similar
budget pressures. We have shared the Panel's results and our lessons
learned with senior NASA leadership during the Partnership Council and
our other interactions.
Conclusion
Historically, the DOD and NASA have fostered a collaborative
relationship to maximize responsive access to space and national space
investment strategies, and we will continue to do so in the future.
Both organizations have benefited from this open exchange of ideas and
lessons learned, laying the foundation for future collaborations.
NASA was formed with many DOD centers of excellence as its space-
related core. The Mercury and Gemini missions, for instance, all flew
on DOD launch vehicles. From that time forward, we have continued to
collaborate across the full spectrum of space--launch, communications,
sensors, materials, life sciences, and much more. In many respects, the
relationships between NASA and the DOD are as close, or closer, than
they have ever been.
Biography for Robert S. Dickman
Robert S. Dickman is Deputy for Military Space, Office of the Under
Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. He supports the Under
Secretary, who is also the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office, in executing space responsibilities, which include managing the
planning, programming and acquisition of space systems for the Air
Force and other military services.
Mr. Dickman was born in Brooklyn, N.Y., grew up in New Jersey, and
entered the Air Force as a distinguished graduate of the ROTC program
at Union College, Schenectady, N.Y. He has had a varied career in space
operations, and acquisition and planning, including being assigned at
the Space and Missile Systems Center, the Pentagon, North American
Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Space Command, Air Force Space Command,
and the National Reconnaissance Office. While serving on active duty,
he was the first Vice Commander of the 2nd (now 50th) Space Wing,
Schriever Air Force Base, Colo., Commander of the 45th Space Wing,
Patrick Air Force Base, Fla., Department of Defense Space Architect,
and the senior military officer at the NRO in Washington, D.C. He
retired from active duty in 2000 in the rank of major general, and was
appointed to the Senior Executive Service in March 2002.
EDUCATION
1966-- Bachelor's degree in physics, Union College, Schenectady, N.Y.
1968-- Master's degree in space physics, Air Force Institute of
Technology
1976-- Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell
Air Force Base, Ala.
1978-- National Security Management Course, National Defense University
1983-- Master's degree in management, Salve Regina College, Newport,
R.I.
1983-- Distinguished graduate, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
CAREER CHRONOLOGY
1. June 1966-June 1968, student, Air Force Institute of
Technology
2. June 1968-June 1972, program manager for theoretical and
particle physics, Air Force Office of Scientific Research,
Arlington, Va.
3. July 1972-May 1973, satellite communications program
element monitor, Directorate of Space, Headquarters U.S. Air
Force, Washington, D.C.
4. June 1973-May 1975, terminal systems manager, Air Force
Satellite Communications System Program Office, Los Angeles
AFB, Calif.
5. June 1976-September 1979, operational manager for military
satellite communications, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and
Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
6. October 1979-January 1982, Chief, Implementation Branch,
Space Defense Operations Center, Headquarters Aerospace Defense
Command, Cheyenne Mountain AFB, Colo.
7. February 1982-June 1982, Executive Officer to the Vice
Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command,
Colorado Springs, Colo.
8. July 1982-June 1983, student, Naval War College, Newport,
R.I.
9. July 1983-June 1984, Director of Space Systems, Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters Air Force Space
Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
10. July 1984-June 1985, Chief, Commander's Group,
Headquarters North American Aerospace Defense Command and Air
Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
11. July 1985-May 1986, Vice Commander, 2nd Space Wing, Falcon
AFB, Colo.
12. June 1986-June 1987, Assistant to the Director of
Operations, U.S. Space Command, later, Director of Missile
Warning, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
13. July 1987-June 1989, Chief, Space Systems Division,
Directorate of Space and Strategic Defense Initiative Programs,
Washington, D.C.
14. July 1989-June 1992, Deputy Director of Space Programs,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, Washington, D.C.
15. July 1992-June 1993, Director of Plans, Headquarters Air
Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
16. July 1993-January 1995, Commander, 45th Space Wing, and
Director, Eastern Range, Patrick AFB, Fla., and Cape Canaveral
Air Station, Fla.
17. February 1995-September 1995, Director of Space Programs,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, Washington, D.C.
18. October 1995-June 1998, Department of Defense Space
Architect, Washington, D.C.
19. June 1998-August 2000, Director, Office of Plans and
Analysis, and System of Systems Architect; Director, Office of
Architectures, Assessments and Acquisition; Director, Corporate
Operations Office; and senior military officer, National
Reconnaissance Office, Washington, D.C.
20. March 2002-present, Deputy for Military Space, Office of
the Undersecretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.
BADGES
Master Space Badge
MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS
National Reconnaissance Office Gold Medal
1995 Ira Eaker Fellow, Air Force Association
1998 Astronautics Award, National Space Club
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS AND ASSOCIATIONS
Air Force Association
U.S. Naval Institute
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Chairman Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And we will have
Ron Sega and, of course, Elon Musk, after this. I would--I am
sorry I can't say short break. It is going to probably be
around 40 minutes or 45 minutes. So I appreciate those of you
who could stay around. Elon, you are out in California. I know
you are enjoying yourself out there. And I will be out there
tonight. But we will all be back in 45 minutes. This
subcommittee is in recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman Rohrabacher. All right. And so the hearing is
called to order. Our next witness is the Honorable Ron Sega,
Director, Defense Research and Engineering, also one of our
beloved astronauts and someone who has seen this firsthand,
which we, of course, appreciate your firsthand experience. And
he is the Chief Technical Advisor to the Secretary of Defense
for all scientific and technical matters, basic and applied
research, and advanced technology development. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RONALD M. SEGA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Sega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today to talk about the Department of Defense's programs in
research and engineering, particularly in space and aeronautics
and DOD's collaboration with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. Thank you for allowing my written testimony to
be submitted for the record.
In addition to discussing some of the specifics of the
NASA-DOD collaboration, it is important to understand how the
research and development program and our activities in space
and aeronautics are integrated within the Department of
Defense. We do have several mechanisms for coordination of the
R&D activities between DOD and NASA. One that you heard about
was Space Partnership Council, established in 1997. This
Council meets regularly and coordinates space issues. And it is
actually meeting more recently than it has in the past. As a
member of the Space Partnership Council, I believe it is a
productive forum to address the overarching DOD-NASA
requirements and issues related to space.
One initiative from the Department of Defense and in
collaboration with NASA is the National Aerospace Initiative.
As I began in the fall of 2001, it came apparent that there are
many studies and reports in progress, in draft state, and near
completion, but there was a lack of integration among the
various efforts. So it was our goal to look at integrating
these activities. And we divided it into three areas: high-
speed hypersonics, space access, and space technology. And
through a series of workshops within government, all branches
of the DOD services and agencies, and NASA looked at what
technologies were a--currently--the state of technology, which
ones were available and opportunities for the future, and then
worked with industry and academia to establish the state of
technology in these three areas and then to provide technology
roadmaps.
One example of a crosscutting program is RASCAL. It is the
Responsive Access Small Cargo Affordable Launch program from
DARPA. It combines a high-speed, air-breathing first stage with
a rocket-based upper stage and a small responsive satellite to
demonstrate reusable, affordable, and responsive space access.
So RASCAL is an innovative approach to space access.
We looked at continuing many programs, because they made
sense, they were part of the roadmap ahead, one was the
Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine Technology program,
called IHPTET. It had been a sustained investment from DOD and
NASA and industry since 1988, and it was building a technology
base and meeting milestones. Another example of an ongoing
program was a Hypersonic Flight Demonstration Program, called
HyFly, a program that is funded by DARPA and the Navy, in
collaboration with NASA, universities, and industry. I
personally visited the Langley Research Center during the
summer of 2002, and they were testing in the Mach 6.2 to Mach
6.5 range in the eight-foot tunnel and the effective altitudes
of 85,000 to 100,000 feet. And I believe that the work was
being done in a very positive and effective way.
Recent additional programs, after doing this analysis, were
several. Two examples would include a Single Engine
Demonstration program at DARPA, Air Force funded program in the
same flight regime of Mach 7 with a first flight target around
2008. A second example is FALCON, which you have heard about
earlier, that provides technologies toward small launch
vehicles, a Common Aero Vehicle for thermal protection system
and aerodynamics as well as a hypersonic cruise vehicle.
An ongoing program that looks at rocket propulsion is
IHPRPT, Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology
program. I concur with Bob Dickman's assessment that this is a
good program. It is a 15-year effort focused on developing
measurable, affordable, and goal-directed rocket propulsion
technologies. We believe the payoffs could be quite positive in
that program. An example inside of IHPRPT is an Integrated
Powerhead Demonstration, IPD. This is a key demonstration that
is a joint NASA-Air Force project, and it is scheduled for
engine testing at the NASA Stennis Space Center in 2005. They
have had four successful component demonstrations over the last
18 months. It is a new flow engine cycle, and it should enable
an increase in rocket engine reliability and mission life as
well as reducing maintenance time and cost.
In terms of developing a space science and technology
strategy, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2004 requires the Secretary of Defense to development,
implement, and annually review and revise a space science and
technology strategy. As the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, I am charged to jointly develop and implement this
strategy with the Under Secretary of the Air Force, who is the
Department of Defense's Executive Agent for space.
We are actively working with the Department's research
laboratories, the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency,
DARPA, National Reconnaissance Office, and the Missile Defense
Agency through a space S&T strategy team to develop and
implement this strategy.
And finally, the Department of Defense and NASA's research
and development programs support building the technology base
to enable future capabilities. Since the days of Chuck Yeager,
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, and the Bell
X-1 that broke the sound barrier, the DOD has conducted a broad
range of cooperative and collaborative programs with NACA and
now NASA. Recently, the National Aerospace Initiative
technology plans provided an integrated technology roadmap and
outlined the requisite investments to enable critical military
and civil capabilities. We are excited about the synergies that
can be derived as we work collaboratively to achieve our common
science and technology goals.
And thank you for allowing me to appear before your
committee.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sega follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ronald M. Sega
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to talk about the Department of
Defense's (DOD) research and engineering programs in space and
aeronautics and DOD's collaboration with National Aeronautics and Space
Agency (NASA). In addition to discussing some specifics of DOD-NASA
collaboration, it is also important to understand how the research and
development (R&D) activities for space and aeronautics technologies
within the Department of Defense are integrated. There are several
mechanisms for coordination of R&D activities between DOD and NASA.
Space Partnership Council
Since 1997, the Space Partnership Council (SPC) has been, and
continues to be, a very productive mechanism for DOD-NASA collaboration
and program coordination. The SPC addresses overarching DOD-NASA
requirements and issues related to space. The council is comprised of
the following members:
Under Secretary of the Air Force/Director of National
Reconnaissance Office
Commander of Air Force Space Command
Commander of United States Strategic Command
Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Administrator of NASA
The Council meets regularly and coordinates space issues, such as
technology development to enable goals like transformational space
access, and operational space capabilities.
National Aerospace Initiative
Collaborative efforts between DOD and NASA over the past several
years have been encompassed in the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI).
NAI is a focused effort to coordinate technology development and
demonstrations in three key aerospace technology areas, which are the
pillars of the NAI. The three pillars are high speed and hypersonic
flight; space access; and space technologies. Beginning as a concept in
2001, NAI has matured and supported development of integrated
technology plans. One program that highlights the potential synergy
gained between the pillars is the Responsive Access, Small Cargo,
Affordable Launch (RASCAL) DARPA program. RASCAL is a program that
combines a high speed air breathing first stage, with rocket-based
upper stages, and a small responsive satellite to demonstrate a
reusable, affordable, responsive space access system. RASCAL is a five
year program to demonstrate the feasibility of coupled high speed/
hypersonic flight, affordable access to space and small payload
systems. Beyond RASCAL, extensive collaborations have occurred in
research and development in all three areas. Through a series of
workshops convened by DOD and NASA, which were followed by input from
outside the government, detailed goals, objectives, technical
challenges and approaches were developed.
NAI supports many important continuing programs such as the
Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine Technology (IHPTET)/
Versatile Affordable Advanced Turbine Engines (VAATE) projects. VAATE
is a successful collaborative program that started in 1988, and
involved DOD, NASA, and industry to have a long-term, focused research
program to improve turbine engine technology. IHPTET is currently
developing a common core to be used in the various commercial and
military engines. The industry match has been an important component of
the in IHPTET program. This turbine engine technology development is
essential to many future government and commercial aerospace systems.
Each of the three pillars has significant activity. For high speed/
hypersonic flight, the Hypersonic Flight Demonstration Program, known
as HyFly, is a jointly funded program by DARPA and Office of Naval
Research. The objective of HyFly is to develop and demonstrate, in
flight, advanced technologies for hypersonic flight with near-term
emphasis on a missile application. The HyFly hypersonic strike missile
demonstrator vehicle is powered by a Dual Combustion Ramjet (DCR)
engine. A DCR engine performance at Mach 6.5 was demonstrated on a
full-scale model in freejet testing at NASA Langley Research Center in
2002. Its first powered flight in the atmosphere is expected in
approximately one year.
Another example of an advanced prototype hypersonic missile is the
Single Engine Demonstration (SED). SED will integrate the United States
Air Force Hypersonic Technology (HyTech) engine with air vehicle
technologies developed by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
The project involves government, industry, and academic hypersonic
researchers and builds on previous DOD-NASA efforts. This exciting new
demonstration will be flight tested by the end of the decade. The
flight vehicle will be propelled by a hydrocarbon supersonic combustion
ramjet (scramjet), and should ultimately achieve a Mach 7 to 8 flight.
Success of HyFly and SED could enable a new aviation flight regime,
historically analogous to the revolutionary introduction of the jet
engine to propeller-driven aircraft.
The second area of significant collaboration is in our access to
space access pillar. A long-term government/industry effort for
advancing rocket propulsion is the Integrated High Payoff Rocket
Propulsion Technology (IHPRPT) program. The IHPRPT is a three phase,
15-year national program to double space/missile propulsion capability,
decrease cost and increase reliability by 2010, using government-
industry partnership. A key element under IHPRPT is the joint NASA-Air
Force project called the Integrated Powerhead Demonstration (IPD),
which should culminate in the completion of engine testing at NASA's
Stennis Space Center in 2005. Four successful component demonstrations
have occurred in the past 18 months. This new liquid engine cycle
should enable a 25 percent increase in rocket engine reliability, a
200-mission life for the engine, and a reduction in maintenance time
and cost. The DOD-NASA cooperation, leading to the IPD full-flow cycle
engine, should result in enhanced reusable and expendable space vehicle
propulsion.
Another program which is jointly funded by DARPA and the Air Force
is known as FALCON (Force Application and Launch from CONUS). FALCON is
a new program to develop a Small Launch Vehicle (SLV), a Common Aero
Vehicle (CAV), and a Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle (HCV). An initial goal
is a rocket boosted glide vehicle capable of delivering 1,000 pounds at
a distance of 3,000. Initial phases of FALCON are on-going and will
demonstrate the aerodynamic properties of the flight vehicles. This
program is envisioned to mature to a hypersonic glide plane capable of
delivering 12,000 lbs. over 9,000 miles. Thus, the FALCON program
should demonstrate and validate in-flight technologies that should
enable both a near-term and far-term capability to execute time-
critical, prompt global reach missions while at the same time,
demonstrating affordable and responsive space lift.
Space Science and Technology Strategy
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
requires that the Secretary of Defense develop, implement and, annually
review and revise a space science and technology (S&T) strategy. As the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, I am charged to jointly
develop and implement this strategy with the Under Secretary of the Air
Force, who is the Department of Defense's Executive Agent for Space.
The space S&T strategy is focused on short-term and long-term goals
within the Department, the process of achieving these goals, and the
process for assessing these goals. We are actively working with the
Department's research laboratories and the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) through a space S&T strategy team to
develop and implement this strategy. This Space Science and Technology
Strategy will be incorporated in the National Security Space Plan.
Conclusion
The Department of Defense and NASA research and development
programs support building the technology base to enable future
capabilities. Since the days of Chuck Yeager and the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) X-1 that broke the sound barrier, the
DOD has conducted a broad range of cooperative and collaborative
programs with NACA now known as NASA. Recently, the National Aerospace
Initiative technology plans have provided integrated technology
roadmaps, and outlined the requisite investments to enable critical
military and civil capabilities. We are excited about the synergies
that can be derived as we work collaboratively to achieve our common
science and technology goals and transformational objectives.
Biography for Ronald M. Sega
The Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E), is the chief technical advisor to the Secretary of
Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics (USD-AT&L) for scientific and technical matters, basic
and applied research, and advanced technology development. Dr. Sega
also has management oversight for the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA). [Defense Research and Development official
functions]
Dr. Sega has had an extensive career in academia, research, and
government service. He began his academic career as a faculty member in
the Department of Physics at the U.S. Air Force Academy. His research
activities in electromagnetic fields led to a Ph.D. in Electrical
Engineering from the University of Colorado. He was appointed as
Assistant Professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs in 1982.
In addition to teaching and research activities, he also served as the
Technical Director of the Laser and Aerospace Mechanics Directorate at
the F.J. Seiler Research Laboratory and at the University of Houston as
the Assistant Director of Flight Programs and Program Manager for the
Wake Shield Facility. Dr. Sega became the Dean College of Engineering
and Applied Science, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs in
1996. Dr. Sega has authored or co-authored over 100 technical
publications and was promoted to Professor in 1990. He is also a Fellow
of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers and the
Institute for the Advancement of Engineering.
In 1990, Dr. Sega joined NASA, becoming an astronaut in July 1991.
He served as a mission specialist on two Space Shuttle Flights, STS-60
in 1994, the first joint U.S. Russian Space Shuttle Mission and the
first flight of the Wake Shield Facility, and STS-76 in 1996, the third
docking mission to the Russian space station Mir where he was the
Payload Commander. He was also the Co-Principal Investigator for the
Wake Shield Facility and the Director of Operations for NASA activities
at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center, Russia, in 1994-95.
Dr. Sega has also been active in the Air Force Reserves. A Command
Pilot in the Air Force with over 4,000 hours, he has served in various
operational flying assignments, including a tour of duty as an
Instructor Pilot. From 1984 to 2001, as a reservist assigned to Air
Force Space Command (AFSPC), he held positions in planning analysis and
operational activities, including Mission Ready Crew Commander for
satellite operations--Global Positioning System (GPS)--Defense Support
Program (DSP), and Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX), etc. He was
promoted to the rank of Major General in the Air Force Reserves in July
2001.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And I have some
questions for you when we get back--or get past our final
witness, which is--who is, I might say, Elon Musk, the CEO of
SpaceX, an entrepreneurial launch company developing a new
family of rockets. He is speaking to us on a video link from
Los Angeles Air Force Base. And we welcome you, Mr. Musk, and
you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. ELON MUSK, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SPACE
EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES
Mr. Musk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you can hear me
okay.
It is an honor to be here with Admiral Steidle, Bob
Dickman, Dr. Sega, and Ms. Poniatowski, I guess in the question
period.
It is common knowledge that the U.S. launch industry is
noncompetitive. An appropriate comparison is the U.S. auto
industry of the 1970s, prior to entry of the Japanese. However,
that would be quite generous. At no point during that period
did General Motors decide, as Boeing has recently done, that
they would only service government customers.
In the case of launch vehicles, the noncompetitiveness is
so great that SpaceX is confident of not just a significant
improvement in reliability, but also of maintaining a several
fold price reduction. Hopefully, this will stimulate the other
three U.S. launch vehicle companies to reexamine their
processes, as GM and Ford did in their time, and provide a
better and lower cost product to their customers.
I am also optimistic that the success of SpaceX will result
in other entrepreneurial companies entering the space business,
both in launch and the manufacture of lower cost spacecraft.
Some look at the cost of launch and comment that it only
represents a portion of the total mission cost. This is a very
naive conclusion. In fact, it all starts with launch. If you
are paying $5,000 a pound for something in orbit, you will
naturally pay up to $5,000 a pound to save weight on your
satellite, creating a vicious circle of cost inflation.
The result is a cost impedance match between the spacecraft
and the launch vehicle, but it is driven by the launch vehicle.
If you could launch for much lower cost and manifest quickly,
that satellite would cost a lot less. A case example is TacSat-
1, the DOD satellite on the maiden flight of Falcon I.
The benefits and risks for the U.S. launch industry of
NASA-DOD collaboration, the most significant would be automatic
cross-certification of a new launch vehicle. If a launch
vehicle is found to be satisfactory for a DOD satellite, then
it should be satisfactory for NASA, and vice versa.
That is currently not the case. For example, the Boeing
Delta IV and Lockheed Atlas V have had to undergo separate DOD
and NASA on-ramp processes. The result is greater expense to
the taxpayer and those companies. SpaceX is in a similar
position where we are undergoing a DOD review of our Falcon
launch vehicle by the Aerospace Corporation, but will later
have to repeat the process for NASA.
The biggest risk to launch vehicle development from NASA-
DOD collaboration would be excessive requirements accumulation,
as occurred with the Space Shuttle. In my experience, having
personally developed extremely complex technology systems, it
is critical that the number of people determining requirements
be kept very small and consist of only the most talented and
experienced personnel. Otherwise, one may be faced with
requirements that are easily addressed individually, but not
combined. Asking that a product serve as either a floor wax or
a dessert topping is fine, but not both at the same time. It
won't be a tasty dish.
Recommendations for how NASA and the DOD can support
emerging U.S. launch companies. Okay. Number one, buy an early
launch. Although our launch vehicle has been an entirely
private development, the DOD has been very supportive by
purchasing the first flight. Here we would like to express our
thanks to Air Force Space Command, the Force Transformation
group in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Naval
Research Laboratory. Our country should be proud of those
organizations and what they are doing to strengthen our
capabilities in space.
To date, there has been limited dialogue with SpaceX
initiated by the launch vehicle procurement office of NASA.
This may be a function, historically, of the Code M office
believing that they have no mandate to foster new U.S. launch
providers. We recommend that this be established as an explicit
goal and that NASA offer to buy the first, or at least an early
launch, of a new vehicle. A promising sign is the funding
allocation in the proposed NASA budget, referred to as the
Small Payload Launch Initiative.
All right. Number two, streamline the regulatory process.
Obtaining approval to launch from the government ranges is a
very complex process. Once SpaceX has completed this process
for the Falcon, we will work with the Air Force to provide
recommendations for how it can be streamlined for other
emerging launch providers. This will not benefit SpaceX, as we
already will have had our approval. We will do it simply
because it is a good thing for our country, and the cause of
space exploration will be greater served.
Number three, increase and extend the use of prizes. The
strategy of offering prizes for achievements in space
technology can pay enormous dividends. History is replete with
examples of prizes spurring great achievements, such as the
Orteig Prize, famously won by Charles Lindbergh, and the
longitude prize for ocean navigation. The subjectivity and
error of proposal evaluation is removed, and the solution may
be, in a way and from a company, that no one ever expected. We
strongly endorse and urge Congress to support and extend the
proposed Centennial Prizes put forward in the recent NASA
budget. No dollar spent on space research will yield a greater
value for the American people than those prizes.
What unique capabilities might emerging launch providers
offer to NASA and the DOD? Well, number one, reliability.
Current launch vehicles are considered to be ``reliable'' if
their failure rate is only one in fifty. In any other mode of
transport, this would be considered outrageously unreliable.
New companies might ultimately provide reliability levels more
comparable with airline transportation.
In the case of SpaceX, we believe that our second-
generation vehicle, in particular, the Falcon V, will provide a
factor of ten improvement in propulsion reliability. Falcon V
will be the first U.S. launch vehicle since the Saturn V Moon
rocket that can complete its mission even if an engine fails in
flight, like almost all commercial aircraft.
Number two, cost. Citing an inability to sell rockets
commercially, the incumbent launch providers are dramatically
increasing their prices, forcing NASA and the DOD to do fewer
missions while paying more and more. The effect is material,
severe, and gets worse every year. For a given budget, this
obviously results in being forced to cancel missions that might
otherwise have flown. Apart from public relations, there is no
practical difference between a mission that was canceled for
cost reasons and one that failed for other reasons. Either way,
you have lost the mission.
In contrast, the SpaceX launch vehicles are commercially
competitive worldwide in price and are only a fraction of the
cost of our U.S. competitors. Moreover, we expect to decrease
our prices in real, if not absolute terms every year.
Factoring in overhead, as anyone could tell by visiting our
headquarters, SpaceX can provide a launch vehicle at half the
price of both Boeing or Lockheed. We have made significant
strides in each of the technical cost drivers, which I would be
happy to address in the question period.
Number three, responsiveness. If space assets are needed to
cover a particular geography or replace an unexpected loss of
coverage, they can not be deployed in time with the existing
launch providers. Emerging launch vehicle companies can
provide, and dramatically improve, response time.
Four, flight environment. Existing rockets provide a
terrible flight environment for satellites that is extreme in
noise, vibration, shock, and g loading. These factors drive
much of a satellite's design, despite the fact that it sees
these loads for only the first 10 to 15 minutes required to
reach orbit. For the remaining years of life, being in
microgravity, the satellite sees essentially zero load.
New launch vehicles, like the Falcon, provide a much better
flight environment, thus making the satellite design easier and
the satellite itself more likely to reach orbit.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Musk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Elon Musk
How would you characterize the state of the U.S. space launch industry?
It is common knowledge that the U.S. space launch industry is
fundamentally uncompetitive. An appropriate comparison one could draw
is the U.S. auto industry of the 1970's, prior to entry of the
Japanese. However, that would be quite flattering. At no point during
that period did General Motors decide, as Boeing has recently done,
that they would only service government customers.
One must be cautious, therefore, in reaching launch vehicle
economics conclusions that are based on historical U.S. costs. What the
reliability and price of launch should be cannot be determined by
looking at Boeing and Lockheed, any more than one could properly draw
conclusions about automobile reliability and pricing by looking at a
1975 Pinto or Cadillac.
Please note that I emphasize and place reliability ahead of price.
The Japanese automobiles, especially in the 1980's with the adoption of
total quality management techniques, were not just lower cost, but also
of much greater reliability. The latter was arguably a bigger
determinant of their success than price.
In the case of launch vehicles, the level of uncompetitiveness is
so great that we at SpaceX are confident of not just a significant
improvement in reliability, but also of establishing and maintaining a
several fold price reduction. Hopefully, this will stimulate the other
three U.S. launch vehicle companies to re-examine their processes, as
GM and Ford did in their time, and provide a better and lower cost
product to their customers.
I am also optimistic that the success of SpaceX will result in
other entrepreneurial companies entering the space business, both in
launch and the manufacture of lower cost spacecraft. Some look at the
cost of launch and comment that it only represents a portion of the
total mission cost. This is a very naive conclusion. In fact, it all
starts with launch cost. If you are paying $5000/lb. to put something
in orbit, you will naturally pay up to $5000/lb. to save weight on your
satellite, creating a vicious circle of cost inflation.
The result is a cost impedance match between the spacecraft and the
launch vehicle, but it is driven by the launch vehicle. If you could
launch for much lower cost and manifest quickly, instead of the two
years advance notice required to launch in the U.S., that satellite
would cost a lot less. A case example is TacSat-1, the DOD satellite on
the maiden flight of Falcon I.
What are the benefits and risks for the U.S. domestic launch industry,
including emerging U.S. launch vehicle providers, if NASA and the
Department of Defense (DOD) collaborated more in the development and
purchases of launch vehicles?
The most significant benefit for the U.S. launch industry from
greater NASA-DOD collaboration would be automatic cross-certification
of a new launch vehicle. If a launch vehicle is found to be
satisfactory for launch of a Department of Defense satellite, then it
should be satisfactory for NASA and vice versa.
That is currently not the case. For example, in the EELV program,
both the Boeing Delta IV and Lockheed Atlas V have had to undergo
separate DOD and NASA certification or on-ramp processes. The result is
greater expense to the taxpayer and the aforementioned companies.
SpaceX is in a similar position, where we are undergoing a DOD review
of our Falcon launch vehicle by Aerospace Corporation, but will later
have to repeat the process for NASA.
The biggest risk to a launch vehicle development from NASA-DOD
collaboration in a development program would be excessive requirements
accumulation, as occurred with the Space Shuttle. In my experience,
having personally developed extremely complex technology systems, it is
critical that the number of people determining requirements be kept
very small and consist of only the most talented and experienced
personnel. Otherwise, one may be faced with requirements that are
easily addressed individually, but not combined. Asking that a product
serve as either floor wax or a dessert topping is fine, but not both at
the same time.
What specific recommendations would you make for how NASA and the DOD
can encourage the healthy growth of the U.S. domestic launch market,
especially for emerging commercial launch providers?
Buy an Early Launch
Although our Falcon launch vehicle has been an entirely private
development, the DOD has been very supportive by purchasing the first
flight. Here we would like to express our thanks to Air Force Space
Command, the Force Transformation group in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the Naval Research Laboratory. Our country should be
proud of those organizations and what they are doing to strengthen our
capabilities in space.
To date, there has been limited dialogue with SpaceX initiated by
the launch vehicle procurement office of NASA. This may be a function
historically of the Code M office operating under the assumption that
they have no mandate to foster new U.S. launch providers. We recommend
that this be established as an explicit goal and that NASA offer to buy
the first or at least an early launch of a new vehicle, even if only on
a success contingency basis. A promising sign is the funding allocation
in the proposed NASA budget referred to as the Small Payload Launch
Initiative.
Streamline the Regulatory Process
Obtaining approval to launch from the government ranges is a very
complex and arduous process. Once SpaceX has completed this process for
the Falcon I, we will work with the Air Force to provide a series of
recommendations for how this can be streamlined, without sacrificing
safety, for other emerging launch providers. Please note that this will
not benefit SpaceX, as we will have already received our approval. We
will do it simply because it is a good thing for our country and the
cause of space exploration will be greater served.
Increase and Extend the Use of Prizes
The strategy of offering prizes for achievements in space
technology or launch vehicle development milestones can pay enormous
dividends. We are beginning to see how powerful this can be by
observing the recent DARPA Grand Challenge and the X-Prize. History is
replete with examples of prizes spurring great achievements, such as
the Orteig Prize, famously won by Charles Lindbergh, and the Longitude
prize for ocean navigation.
Few things stoke the fires of American creativity and ingenuity
more than competing for a prize in fair and open competition. The
result is an efficient Darwinian exercise with the subjectivity and
error of proposal evaluation removed. The best means of solving the
problem will be found and that solution may be in a way and from a
company that no-one ever expected.
We strongly endorse and urge Congress to support and extend the
proposed Centennial Prizes put forward in the recent NASA budget. No
dollar spent on space research will yield greater value for the
American people than those prizes.
What unique capabilities do emerging launch vehicle providers, like
SpaceX, provide to NASA and the DOD?
The service of space transportation is defined by four variables:
reliability, cost, responsiveness and payload environment. Emerging
launch vehicle providers can provide breakthroughs in all areas.
Reliability
Current launch vehicles are considered by NASA and the DOD to be
``reliable'' if their failure rate is only one in fifty. In any other
mode of transport, this would be considered outrageously unreliable.
New companies might ultimately provide reliability levels more
comparable with airline transportation.
In the case of SpaceX, we believe that our second generation
vehicle in particular, the Falcon V, will provide a factor of ten
improvement in propulsion reliability. Falcon V will be the first U.S.
launch vehicle since the Saturn V Moon rocket that can complete its
mission even if an engine fails in flight--like almost all commercial
aircraft. In fact, Saturn V, which had a flawless flight record, was
able to complete its mission on two occasions only because it had
engine out redundancy.
Cost
Citing an inability to sell rockets commercially, the incumbent
launch vehicle providers are dramatically increasing their prices,
forcing NASA and the DOD to do fewer and fewer missions while paying
more and more. The effect is material, severe and gets worse every
year. For a given budget, this obviously results in being forced to
cancel missions that might otherwise have flown. Apart from public
relations, there is no practical difference between a mission that was
canceled for cost reasons and one that failed for other reasons. Either
way, you have lost the mission.
In contrast, the SpaceX launch vehicles are commercially
competitive worldwide in price and are only a fraction the cost of our
U.S. competitors. Moreover, we expect to decrease our prices in real,
if not absolute, terms every year.
Launch vehicle pricing is driven by five factors: company overhead,
engine costs, airframe costs, avionics costs and launch operations
(including payload integration and range costs). Factoring in overhead
alone, as anyone could tell by visiting our headquarters, SpaceX can
produce a launch vehicle at half the price of Boeing or Lockheed. We
have also made significant strides in each of the technical cost
drivers, although time does not allow me to address each in detail. I
would be happy to do so in the question period.
Responsiveness
The minimum time from contract signing to launch for incumbent U.S.
launch companies is approximately two years. For the DOD in particular,
this means a very constrained ability to respond quickly to threats as
they develop. If space assets are needed either to cover a particular
geography or replace an unexpected loss of coverage, they cannot be
deployed in time. Emerging launch vehicle companies, like SpaceX, will
provide a response time measured in months or weeks.
Payload Flight Environment
Existing rockets provide a terrible flight environment for
satellites that is extreme in noise, vibration, shock and g-loading.
These factors drive much of a satellite's design, despite the fact that
it only sees these loads for the 10 to 15 minutes required to reach
orbit. For the remaining years of life, being in microgravity, the
satellite sees essentially zero load.
New launch vehicles, like the Falcon, provide a much better flight
environment, thus making the satellite design easier and the satellite
itself more likely to reach orbit safely.
Biography for Elon Musk
SpaceX is the third company founded by Mr. Musk. Prior to SpaceX,
he co-founded PayPal, the world's leading electronic payment system,
and served as the company's Chairman and CEO. PayPal has over twenty
million customers in 38 countries, processes several billion dollars
per year and went public on the NASDAQ under PYPL in early 2002. Mr.
Musk was the largest shareholder of PayPal until the company was
acquired by eBay for $1.5 billion in October 2002.
Before PayPal, Mr. Musk co-founded Zip2 Corporation in 1995, a
leading provider of enterprise software and services to the media
industry, with investments from The New York Times Company, Knight-
Ridder, MDV, Softbank and the Hearst Corporation. He served as
Chairman, CEO and Chief Technology Officer and in March 1999 sold Zip2
to Compaq for $307 million in an all cash transaction.
Mr. Musk's early experience extends across a spectrum of advanced
technology industries, from high energy density ultra-capacitors at
Pinnacle Research to software development at Rocket Science and
Microsoft. He has a physics degree from the University of Pennsylvania,
a business degree from Wharton and originally came out to California to
pursue graduate studies in energy physics at Stanford.
Discussion
NASA's Policies Toward the Use of New Launch Vehicles
Chairman Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Musk.
And we will have some questions now. I would like to ask--
first of all, thank you to all of the witnesses for their
testimony, of course, but before we proceed, I would like to
ask Ms. Karen Poniatowski to come to the witness table. And as
NASA's Assistant Associate Administrator for Launch Services,
she will be joining the Admiral in answering some of these
questions. And of course, the first question, which I will pose
to both of you, is NASA's. What we have heard today, especially
from Mr. Musk just there, is that current NASA policy forbids
NASA to contract for launch services unless the type of rocket
being used has performed at least one successful flight. NASA's
policy was put in place in the mid-1990s after several rockets
failed.
Now we have heard that the DOD does not have this same
policy. And in fact, Mr. Musk, who has spent a considerable
amount of his own money, has been investing in a new rocket
system, because he is being given the opportunity by the
Department of Defense. Now shouldn't NASA be providing this
same sort of incentive for people like Mr. Musk to invest their
money into launch systems? And you may answer those questions.
Rear Admiral Steidle. Yes, sir. Thank you. Yes, you are
accurate. That is the policy. What we have launched is
generally one-of-a-kind, significant investment, and Karen was
here when that policy was put together, so she is going to
extrapolate from here on where and why we are doing that.
Ms. Poniatowski. Yeah. Thank you for the opportunity, Mr.
Rohrabacher and Committee, to sort of address some of these
issues, particularly with the emerging companies. I followed
the small launch companies for, I hate to say it, almost 20
years now. I started when I was very, very young.
Mr. Musk. I am having a problem. It is very difficult to
hear unless you speak directly to the mike.
Ms. Poniatowski. Okay. Is that better?
Mr. Musk. Yes, that is much better. Thank you.
Chairman Rohrabacher. All right. Go right ahead.
Ms. Poniatowski. Okay. And so what we have been watching is
an ebb and flow in this particular market class. If you go back
to the early '90s, you will see, with DARPA, they developed an
emerging launch capability that was Orbital Science's Pegasus,
and it had some initial start-up failures but then became a
very robust, reliable system. In the mid-'90s, NASA sponsored
and did fly on the first and only launch of the Conestoga
commercial launch vehicle. Unfortunately, that ended in
failure. We flew on the first of the Athena I launch vehicles
after their first test flight was a failure. We flew the first
Athena II mission, and so we do, indeed, have a history of
flying on vehicles with no flight history.
Chairman Rohrabacher. That--does that cost NASA a lot of
money to do that, is that why the policy changed?
Ms. Poniatowski. No, not at all. What the policy actually
did is it tried to say, ``We need to take flight history into
consideration.'' The actual policy allows us to fly payloads
with no--to fly on vehicles with no flight history. What has
happened--what we did is we set up a process that identified
payloads that had the level of risk that could tolerate a first
flight with a new vehicle, missions that needed at least one
flight, and those high-value kinds of missions that needed a
more demonstrated flight history as one of the conditions when
we looked at making a mission assignment.
What has happened is, over the past few years, we don't
have many requirements that have been able to tolerate that
risk, and in tandem with that, as we have worked with the
emerging community of which, at any given time, there is nine
to ten different entities that would like to enter the rocket
business, we have seen an influx of international capability in
the small class that has really hurt the domestic capability in
that market niche. And that really has been the biggest threat
that we have seen for some of the emerging companies not being
able to get access. There is not a lot of demand. On average,
NASA's requirements in this class run one to two flights per
year. The DOD is in a similar position, so the overall demand
is not particularly robust in this kind of a class. But we do
look forward to working with vehicles, companies like SpaceX.
We have met with Elon a number of occasions.
The other is NASA is--will not be able to be the first
launch on Falcon since the DOD got there first, but we do have
a small technology payload, Spacetech VI, which had been
planning to fly as an instrument on a commercial bus team
encounter, they had been looking at making arrangements for a
launch, and they are subsequently now, I believe, in
discussions with Mr. Musk on flying that----
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. Well, let me get this straight
in what we are saying here. You are suggesting that there has
not been a policy of no first use, but that you judge--you are
making judgments based on risk----
Ms. Poniatowski. Right.
Chairman Rohrabacher.--and you just haven't found one yet,
or have you found one that I don't know about, that is worth
the risk?
Ms. Poniatowski. And as I said, the Spacetech VI, the
current payload we are discussing right now----
Chairman Rohrabacher. Correct.
Ms. Poniatowski. Correct.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Correct. But over the last, what,
five or 10 years, that has not been the case.
Ms. Poniatowski. That is correct.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. So this is the first one in how
many years?
Ms. Poniatowski. 1997.
Chairman Rohrabacher. All right. So about six or seven
years now.
Ms. Poniatowski. Yeah, we did have--I think you are
familiar with the University Explorer program. And those were
small payloads we were trying to look at in that capability. It
ended up, at that point, there weren't any small launch
vehicles, so we flew those as half of the Pegasus----
Chairman Rohrabacher. How many satellites do we have
waiting to be launched?
Ms. Poniatowski. In this payload class, on average, about
one to two per year.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. How many do we have waiting now
to be launched?
Ms. Poniatowski. I don't have any that aren't tied to a
mission vehicle. I have none pending.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. There are no pending satellites
of this class that need a transportation system?
Ms. Poniatowski. Not that aren't assigned right now.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. Because all of these other
satellites that are waiting are larger satellites that are----
Ms. Poniatowski. Right. Correct. Yeah, we have got some
that we are starting to look at new missions downstream, but
right now, the missions we have are manifested on a vehicle
today.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. Mr. Musk, does that satisfy you
and the private sector, that answer?
Mr. Musk. If it were the--that the TMA counter satellites,
I think we are working through that possibility of launch, and
hopefully that works out. The sense I get though, and we can
provide more detail on this outside of this forum, is that
there are actually--that there are more satellites that wish to
go up than one or two a year. And in particular, there were
satellites and payloads and so forth that might otherwise have
gone up on the Space Shuttle, which obviously could not go up
on the Space Shuttle today, and even when it is flying, there
is quite a backlog. So I----
Chairman Rohrabacher. So there is a backlog? Now you are
suggesting, is there a backlog of the smaller satellites that--
is that what you are saying?
Mr. Musk. I--that is my understanding, yes.
Chairman Rohrabacher. We have got a little contradiction
here. How about that, Karen?
Mr. Musk. That is my idea.
Ms. Poniatowski. Yeah. There are instruments----
Mr. Musk. The biggest distinction between satellites which
are destined to go up by themselves and satellites which might
otherwise have gone up as hitchhikers or as payloads on the
Space Shuttle, which still need to go up, but are not
considered distinct travels by themselves.
Chairman Rohrabacher. All right. Let me see----
Ms. Poniatowski. Yeah.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Let me get to the heart of that
matter. Were you just referring to all satellites or are you
referring to just the ones that aren't going to be hitchhiking?
I mean, are there satellites that are small satellites that
were going up on the Shuttle that you weren't counting?
Ms. Poniatowski. Yeah. The difference is when you fly an
expendable launch vehicle, it means that you bring with you a
bus that has your power, your resources to be able to deploy
that spacecraft and then use it in space. Many--most of the
payloads that we flew as secondaries on the Shuttle, they take
their power from the Shuttle, and so you can't transpose
something like the gascan payloads that we fly, those are on a
one for one transfer to be able to say you are going to fly on
an expendable space vehicle.
Chairman Rohrabacher. So these satellites that Mr. Musk is
referring to----
Ms. Poniatowski. Right.
Chairman Rohrabacher.--are not satellites that a rocket
that he is developing could put into space?
Ms. Poniatowski. Not without an additional reformatting of
those payloads. Some of them need to be returned. Some of those
payloads need to have intervention; they need a switch turned
on or off. And these types of payloads have tended to be very
small, 50-kilogram types of payloads.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Um-hum.
Ms. Poniatowski. In the case of gas, you have got
predominately university community in that the payload value--
what they do is they basically pay us $50,000 for that kind of
a----
Chairman Rohrabacher. And that has to be all done on the
Shuttle you are suggesting?
Ms. Poniatowski. Correct.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Is that your understanding, Mr. Musk,
that all of these things have to be done on the Shuttle?
Mr. Musk. Well, they have basically been intended for the
Shuttle, and in some cases you get satellites which are
relatively self-contained, and in some cases, they are more
sort of instruments, but there is still that need that exists
for them to go to space. And the Shuttle is not going to be
able to meet that need, which I think, therefore, points one in
the direction of adding the necessary functionality to those
payloads--to those satellites as such that they can be launched
on something like the Falcon I or other launch vehicles,
because the alternative is that nothing happens to them and
they stay on Earth.
Chairman Rohrabacher. I think--well, why don't we give
Karen the last word for this one?
Ms. Poniatowski. Yeah, and that is why what the agencies
put forward is the new Payload Launch Initiative, which is
allowing us to put some money in the budget to start looking at
some of these new flight opportunities that may arise, again,
and partnering with both DARPA and with the Air Force Space
Test Program, ways that we might be able to join some of these
and do some joint missions and fly some of those payloads. That
is why, as we have been retiring the capability on the Shuttle,
we are looking at can we prime the pump, so to speak, and make
some opportunities for some of these missions.
Chairman Rohrabacher. I would like to end this part of the
discussion, and then I will go to Mr. Lampson, with a general.
It seems like the Air Force is willing to do this, but we are
not willing--we are not getting much response from the Navy and
NASA here. What----
Major General Dickman. Well, if the Navy doesn't launch
their own----
Chairman Rohrabacher. I am sorry. I shouldn't blame the
Admiral for the Navy. I should just--you are in NASA now,
Admiral.
Major General Dickman. The unwritten policy of the DOD is
not particularly different than the one NASA uses. We judge the
material of the launch vehicle and the mission criticality of
the payload. For example, the first heavy-lift EELV, Delta IV,
will fly without a payload, because we are going to do a
demonstration flight. We weren't willing to fly that vehicle
with a payload on it. So we make the same assessment that Karen
and her team often does, and then chose to fly a demonstration.
Chairman Rohrabacher. But for a smaller payload, you have
been willing to be a lot more----
Major General Dickman. That is correct. It is----
Chairman Rohrabacher.--courageous.
Major General Dickman. It is a great demonstration of both
a launch vehicle and a responsive spacecraft that is worth the
risk.
Chairman Rohrabacher. All right. Mr. Lampson. And there
will be a second round of questions.
Impacts of the President's Space Exploration Initiative on
NASA's Space Launch Initiative
Mr. Lampson. Admiral Steidle, one of the results of the
President's space initiative is that NASA has decided to
terminate the Space Launch Initiative, including the Next
Generation Launch Technology Program and a number of advanced
rocket engine R&D programs have been terminated. And the
funding intended for hypersonics R&D is being shifted to the
exploration systems activity. As I understand it, a number of
the activities undertaken in the Space Launch Initiative
represented NASA's contribution to the joint NASA-DOD National
Aerospace Initiative.
Last year's budget request stated that NASA's Space Launch
Initiative ``insures America's superiority on the space
frontier in both conventional rocket and air-breathing
hypersonics technology fields.'' And it also cited, as
accomplishments, that NASA had officially established the
rocket-based combined cycle and X-43C projects. So what are
NASA's plans for the RBCC and the X-43C projects?
Rear Admiral Steidle. Yes, sir. Your statement is correct,
sir, but we--the Space Launch Initiative has not been
terminated, it has been kind of modified and transferred into
the Transportation Systems. We have taken the Orbital Space
Plane and the NGLT, the Next Generation Launch Technology, and
have taken the lessons learned and the concepts and the pieces
of those particular programs as the starting point and the
baseline for our exploration program, which is the CEV systems
of systems pieces of it.
Part of the NGLT piece, as you correctly pointed out, was
the hypersonics piece. I did a technology assessment of a
number of programs, 140 programs total, and those different
pieces were in there as well as we made the transition. There
are several pieces that are going on and several of them that
did not fit into where we are headed with exploration. The X-
43A program is a piece of that. We did a business case
assessment of: does the demonstration of those particular
capabilities meet our needs in exploration? And the answer came
back yes, if we have a disciplined, demonstrated performance of
one flight, second flight, third flight. If we meet those
objectives in each one of the flights, the Office of
Exploration Systems will continue to fund that program through
demonstrated performance.
We looked at NASA-unique technologies, and we made an
agreement with the Office of Aeronautics that my particular
Office of Exploration will fund the non-procurable pieces of
that NASA-unique pieces for hypersonics study and development
and that the Office of Aeronautics will fund the procurement
pieces of that. So we continue on with that program in our
commitment to hypersonics.
There was a piece, the X-43 program. It did not fit our
needs. The X-43C, it did not fit our particular needs at this
particular point for an exploration systems development
program, so it was, indeed, terminated. We shared that
information as we went forward with the baseline assessment and
the cost benefit analysis of that particular program, and it
was, indeed, canceled. We are doing that throughout all of the
programs and refocusing all of our tech maturation programs as
we go forward in the exploration piece of it.
Mr. Lampson. Is it an accurate statement to say that the
funding that had been intended to follow the hypersonics work,
such as the X-43C project, will be retained by the Exploration
Systems Office and used to support other activities?
Rear Admiral Steidle. Not exactly, sir. We--our funding was
reduced $130 million last year and part of finding offsets for
that reduction, the X-43 fit in that particular area.
There were some other things that came out that I want to
make sure I am aware of--make you aware of. In that program,
also, is risk mitigation systems engineering development and
some very, very fine work in the people in Marshall that we are
bringing on to our program now. In fact, the director of the
NGLT program, I have just selected him to be my deputy director
for Transportation Systems. So besides the technology pieces of
it, there is a wealth of experience in personnel that I am
moving on, either actually physically moving to Washington or
moving into these programs.
Mr. Lampson. The--what is NASA's plan for the RS-84
Reusable Rocket Engine Program?
Rear Admiral Steidle. Sir, that did not fit at this
particular time. I canceled that program. I called the
contractor personally, the President of that company, and told
him that that does not fit into the needs of our program at
this particular time. I had him--he came to me, Byron Wood is
the CEO of that particular company, and I sat down with him and
said, ``This does not fit in our particular program at this
time, and this is why, and this is what the business case
analysis shows of that. However, Mr. Wood, I want you to
participate in the program and continue on with the association
with where we are headed in the future.'' And he has agreed,
and he is pursuing that.
NASA Contribution to the National Aerospace Initiative
Mr. Lampson. What specific projects, if any, will NASA be
contributing to the joint NASA-DOD National Aerospace
Initiative?
Rear Admiral Steidle. There are three sections of that. On
the hypersonics side, we are going to continue on to fund the
X-43 demonstration through its second, and possibly, its third
flight for demonstration of the Mach 10. We will fund the NASA-
unique pieces of hypersonics work, and that is mainly personnel
that are supporting the interfaces with the NAI. And I hope to
increase the emphasis on the other two pillars of NAI, that
being space access and space technology pieces of it.
Mr. Lampson. Thank you. Dr. Sega, what do you understand
that NASA's future role will be in the National Aerospace
Initiative?
Dr. Sega. As we formed the technology roadmaps, and that
was a detailed process from a technology perspective, and it
went from goals, objectives, technical challenges, approaches,
and tasks, there was an understanding that they needed to fit
within the programmatic requirements and strengths of the
organization. So we have outlined the participation of all--of
the partners and the organizations in each of these areas. Now
we are not sure, at this point, how the details and the
programs will continue forward by NASA in these three areas. We
anticipate that the collaboration will be there where it
continues to make sense. In the areas where we had anticipated
NASA participation, such as the work in some of the hypersonics
work, we will continue our hypersonics research and
development. It will go at a bit slower pace and will have a
bit of an increased risk, but our program will continue.
Mr. Lampson. Thank you.
Future of Space Launch Initiative Projects
I would like to request that NASA provide a list of all of
the previously planned Space Launch Initiative projects and
what NASA's intentions--what NASA intends to do with each,
including the consequences for both the civil service and
contractor personnel. If we could have that----
Rear Admiral Steidle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lampson.--done at some point, I would appreciate it.
And I would yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Mr. Lampson, if I could make a
recommendation; put that request in writing and that you copy
my office, because I want to tell you that I have seen so many
Members over the years make requests and it just never happens.
Now I am sure that the Admiral is new to his job, and every
time he gets a request from Congress like this, he is going to
make sure that the answer--that the questions are answered, but
I think that we ought to just have a policy from now on,
whenever we are asking members of the Administration, we put it
in writing and we hold people to get answers to our questions.
Mr. Lampson. I would be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rohrabacher. All right. Thank you very much.
And Mr. Feeney from Florida, who is, of course, the
energetic representative from that part of Florida who serves
as our launching area for America's space program. You may
proceed.
Mr. Feeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And some days I have
more energy than others, but as you pointed out, the Space
Coast blends the NASA Civilian Launch System. We have got the
commercial launch facilities, and we have got, of course, Air
Force launch facilities, as well. I think, as General Dickman
notes, because of your--when you handled that command of the
45th Space Wing, there are some times that the artificial
boundaries that we create between those three launch facilities
sometimes create some difficulties in coordinating amongst the
three different launch facilities. Sometimes they have
historically impeded cooperation, although we have had some
successes. And I am glad that there is a reemphasis on not just
the relationship between NASA and DOD, but also, obviously,
NASA and the private facilities, and not just Lockheed and
Boeing that have a significant presence in the Space Coast, but
also Mr. Musk's and other, you know, entering facilities out
there. So I am very grateful that we are having this hearing
today.
National Security Interests in Space Exploration
I wanted to ask the panel, in general, two questions and
then leave it to you to address them during my time. One is
with respect, specifically, to President Bush's new proposal
and vision for a future journey in space, and specifically as
he talks about the United States' national security interests.
What specific national security interests do you think that the
mission that he has laid out, the journey for the future of
NASA, need to be addressed? And as part of that, General
Dickman, you have mentioned in your written remarks that there
are certain areas that are unsuitable for sharing between the
military and NASA. If you would sort of outline what they are
and why it is unsuitable to have cooperation. I understand
there is a need for secrecy, for example, but if you could be
more specific and help me, in my mind, clarify the appropriate
places where cooperation should not be expected.
And then finally, I think Mr. Musk has a great
recommendation that NASA and DOD find a way to adopt cross-
certification, where applicable, so that we don't have to have
redundant hurdles in getting space flight either of the manned
or unmanned side, especially in the commercial area, and
obviously the regulatory burden that has made it very difficult
for commercial entities to--and created a barrier for greater
commercial growth in space. So if the panel would sort of
address those two questions during my time, I would be
grateful.
Rear Admiral Steidle. I will start out with the vision, and
we are in the process of defining our requirements. And there
are not any specific requirements along those lines for
national security investments and integration pieces of it, but
I think the point is if--from my particular understanding of
it, is perhaps if we go along, perhaps we develop our
requirements in the Exploration Office for a time for
rendezvous and docking capabilities or, perhaps, the remote
sensing capabilities, those things may be applicable to other
areas of technology maturation as well. Although we don't have
anything specifically entailed, the collaboration is necessary
so that we share these particular technology areas as we go
forward.
There were some examples that came out of the partnership,
particularly in hyperspectral imagery. NASA had an EO-1
satellite capability, and it was almost ready to be
decommissioned or not to be used when, at the partnership, the
exchange of information on the requirements showed that some
other agency needed that capability, and it was passed on to
that. So if we redeem this collaboration and we define the
requirements to share our tech maturation programs, I think we
will come up to some of those, although they aren't defined
right from the start.
Mr. Feeney. Well, also the infrastructure sharing, like the
EELV, for example, and the capabilities.
Major General Dickman. I think, Mr. Feeney, there is going
to be an enormous benefit for the Department of Defense and the
national security space community from the increased emphasis
on space and the related technologies that will come from the
exploration. Whether it is bringing young people through high
school and college educations that are more focused on
engineering to the specific technical base itself, we will
benefit directly from that flow, that increased emphasis, that
will be more like where we were in the 1960s and the 1970s than
where we have been over the last 10 years.
With respect to your specific question of where I think it
would be inappropriate to share, the first, and most obvious,
is where there is a direct application of technologies where
the technology level we may be sharing to a weapon system. I
refer, additionally, for example, the thermal protection
systems where, at the basic materials level, we will work very
closely with NASA, but as we extend that technology to, for
example, nose cones on ICBMs, that is not NASA's business. It
would be totally inappropriate for NASA to be involved in
designing a nuclear weapon delivery system. That is what our
job is. As we become more reliant on space in wartime, and
certainly in Operation Iraqi Freedom. That was clear, not only
to us, but to our adversaries. We will be far more concerned
about both defending our own space assets and denying space
capabilities to others if they choose to use them to attack the
United States or threaten our interests. That is also not
NASA's business, that is our business. And while we may have
common science and technology, the translation of that into
systems is one that is the responsibility of the Department,
and not a shared collaboration with NASA.
Third, and perhaps more vision in the future, but more real
now, is military presence and a base on the Moon. It is
prohibited by treaty. It is not our business to be doing that.
It is NASA's challenge now from the President to go to Mars and
go to the Moon, and so while we will assist as best we can at
the launch pad and whatnot, there will be no military bases on
the Moon. Those are three examples of where that translation
from the shared programs to uniquely military or uniquely NASA,
I think, are appropriate.
Dr. Sega. I would--the segment about--what General Dickman
said about the impact on the national security interests, with
advancing technology, you gain benefits. You gain benefits from
civil systems, from military systems. And the excitement and
motivation for folks to pursue science and engineering
education and leading to a more robust aerospace world would be
a positive outcome of the increased excitement in this general
area.
NASA and DOD Cross-Certification of Launch Vehicles
Rear Admiral Steidle. Karen has expertise in the cross-
certification piece.
Ms. Poniatowski. Yeah. Mr. Feeney, what we have been doing,
as a matter of fact, is working very closely between NASA and
the DOD. Vehicles, such as the EELVs, we have a ``one
government'' team that looks at the RD-180----
Mr. Musk. I beg your pardon, again. I am sorry. I can't
hear you at all.
Ms. Poniatowski. I am sorry, Elon. Is that better?
Mr. Musk. Yeah, that is much, much better.
Ms. Poniatowski. Okay. I am sorry. I apologize.
What we have done is, in the case of the RD-180 and the RL-
10, we have a one government approach where we are all read
into and look at the same data at the same time. There are two
parts to the certification: one is the generic how do you
understand the vehicle, how do you understand how the systems
work, and when failures happen, the correction of those; the
other is that, for each mission you have, you go through a
launch review to make sure that the mission overall, the
changes you might have made and the vehicle you are actually
flying, that it is going to have the highest probability of
success. And so there are two different things. For when you
own a mission and you are flying it, there is one set of
certification that you do for flight readiness for that given
mission, and then there is a more fleet-wide, consistent type
of a work. And what we have been doing with the Air Force, in a
very close partnership across all of the various vehicles, is
working together on understanding that baseline understanding
and anomaly resolution, so as we come to each individual
launch, we are partnering off of what we have learned across
the board.
Chairman Rohrabacher. And Elon, would you like to
contribute to this part of the questioning?
Mr. Musk. You know, I apologize, cross-certification?
Chairman Rohrabacher. We are talking about cross-
certification.
Mr. Musk. Yes, and I apologize, I only heard a portion of
Karen's response, but I--you know, I think--I am sorry. I have
to get--unfortunately, I just didn't hear the--most of the
response, but it seems to me that it would make sense to, as
much as possible, not duplicate efforts, and I assume Karen is.
That sentiment makes sense. Yeah. Sorry.
Chairman Rohrabacher. It is okay.
Difference Between Military and Civil Spacecraft
The Chairman will now reclaim the time. Thank you. And I--
things that Elon didn't hear, General, what percentage of the
payloads that the military puts up are weapons systems? I mean,
most--aren't these satellite sensors and a lot of things that
are very similar to civilian payloads?
Major General Dickman. Certainly there are, and most of the
technologies would apply. The weapons that we put on the front
end of ICBMs are, obviously, very different.
Chairman Rohrabacher. And there is very--we are putting
very few nuclear weapons on to the heads of ICBMs these days,
aren't we? I mean, this is----
Major General Dickman. There are still 500 warheads that--
--
Chairman Rohrabacher. Yeah, but I hope we are not putting
any--putting them on any new rockets. I don't think that that
would be----
Major General Dickman. Oh, that is correct.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. So in terms of what we are
doing now in the future, there is certainly a huge crossover
between what you are doing in space and what NASA is doing in
space in terms of sensors, satellites, you have observation
satellites, communication satellites, et cetera, et cetera.
Major General Dickman. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, if I
suggested anything other than that. It is clear that in science
and technology, many of the systems and subsystems that we work
on are very common.
Chairman Rohrabacher. I am just--this is a guess, I would
say the vast majority. I am just guessing now, being a big
supporter of the SDI and Missile Defense, I know that we don't
have that based up there yet, but I would hope someday we do.
But seeing that it is not up there yet, the huge number of the
satellites, military satellites, are very similar to the
civilian satellites that are put into orbit. And if that is the
case, wouldn't just making sure that we have sort of a
consistency of requirements rather than--and an attempt to be
consistent within the requirements, wouldn't that be something
that makes common sense?
Major General Dickman. I think that for the requirement for
technology, that is probably correct. But NASA doesn't have the
responsibility, for example, for tracking ICBM or missile
launches that take place either in Iraq or from Russia or
somewhere else. So as we take the technology for IR detectors
and translate it into a Space-Based Infrared System, it is a
different endgame than NASA would in taking those same sensor
technologies and building an IR telescope to look into space.
Crew Exploration Vehicle
Chairman Rohrabacher. Yeah, but we are going to--I am going
to get to that in my very last question, which is going to be
about this near-Earth object that just came by and how--which
fits right into your answer there, but first I am going to ask
a couple more questions. And I believe Dr. Sega was talking
about the first flight of the crew exploration vehicle. Was
that your testimony? Was that you, General? Admiral?
Rear Admiral Steidle. It must have been mine, sir, okay.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Yes, it must have and because I just
read it in my notes here. You said the first flight of this
crew exploration vehicle is going to be in 2014?
Major General Dickman. Yes, sir, the first manned flight of
that, that is correct.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Holy cow. That is 10 years from now.
Rear Admiral Steidle. Yes, sir.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Can't we do anything, you know--does
it take 10 years to build something?
Rear Admiral Steidle. Well----
Chairman Rohrabacher. When it took 10 years to get to the
Moon, we built everything, and actually had the mission to the
Moon and back in 10 years--less than 10 years.
Rear Admiral Steidle. It could be, yes, sir. What I--what
we have got out there is a demonstration program in '08, which
is very well achievable, not necessarily an orbital flight, but
a demonstration of systems, so it is much more than the vehicle
itself, it is the systems that go with it and the protocols and
those pieces. And then we follow that up about 21/2 years later
in the start of 2011 with an orbital demonstration of that
capability, docking, autonomous rendezvous capabilities. Do we
need to do in-space assembly? So there are a lot of systems
that go along with this as well. And of course, what we are
looking at is the exploration piece, not just a one data point,
perhaps, a capsule, but the development of a whole program or
systems of systems. And that is what we will be developing when
we put this up into orbit with humans in 2014.
Chairman Rohrabacher. What about it, Elon? Do you think the
private sector could build something, if they had this kind of
budget, in less than 10 years?
Mr. Musk. I would say without a doubt. I mean, one has to
establish, sort of, the private sector in smaller
entrepreneurial companies versus the----
Chairman Rohrabacher. The large companies that are----
Mr. Musk.--large aerospace giants, like Boeing and
Lockheed, which I think the fundamental issue with the pace of
progress is not so much--it is not a question of NASA being to
blame. I think I would place, really, the bulk of the blame on
the options that NASA has available to it from industry. And I
think that there may be some new and better options from SpaceX
and, perhaps, from other companies.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Well, I am just noting that we have
the, you know, Dick Rutan, out there about ready to show us
what can be done in terms of a suborbital spacecraft, and I
just have a feeling that the more we get small companies into
this and into the mix that there is going to be a lot of--let
us put it this way. There is going to be a transfer of know-how
and technology from the private sector into the public sector
as compared to what we used to have where all of it was the
military and the public sector providing technology for people
in the private sector. And I find--Elon, I find a 10-year
timeline to be just--look, I am out of here; I won't be around
here in 10 years. Is anybody in this room going to be around
here in 10 years?
Rear Admiral Steidle. Sir, can I----
Chairman Rohrabacher. Sure.
Rear Admiral Steidle. Yes, sir. Because what we are looking
for is something beyond just a spacecraft. It is the system of
systems that is going to go and do something that we have never
done before. It is going to go beyond. The Moon is going to be
a piece of it, but it is going to be on. It is going to be a
spiral development program. It is going to be systems to
support that. It is going to be--in that particular time frame,
we will be going to the Moon and leaving an orbiting
communications satellite.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Right.
Rear Admiral Steidle. It is the development of our
infrastructure. So there is quite a bit. Now if those
particular requirements were just to produce a vehicle and put
it in orbit, we could do that, but to be the right vehicle to
grow into something for an exploration vision, that takes an
awful lot of work. Now----
Chairman Rohrabacher. Well, let me suggest that if we end
up, and I knew that when the President made his vision
statement that one of the Achilles' Heels is that if people
start thinking that they are developing something right now
that is going to be used on the Mars mission for the humans to
go into Mars, it is going to create a lot of waste, and it is
going to drain huge sums of money. Mr. Lampson is already
afraid about the money that is being drained away from other
programs. And you start talking about developing the craft for
the Mars program now, there is not going to be any money left
for anything. And I--when you--it seems to me, we are talking
about some crew transportation vehicle that should have
something to do with achieving the goal on the Moon, and then
we are going to find out what we need for Mars. But if it is
taking 10 years because we have got to take all of those other
things into consideration, no wonder it is taking 10 years. And
I will tell you, it is going to be expensive. How much are you
suggesting this crew exploration vehicle will cost, as it
stands now in a 10-year program?
Rear Admiral Steidle. We don't have the end pieces of that,
sir, but what we have is from here to '09 and '10 time frame
and the development of that and all of the demonstration
programs to go and----
Chairman Rohrabacher. And how much is that?
Rear Admiral Steidle. That is about $6.8 billion that is in
the--in our program that----
Chairman Rohrabacher. Holy cow. That is over a--that is $6
billion over a five-year period, right? Okay.
Rear Admiral Steidle. Sure.
Chairman Rohrabacher. And then--but we are not going to get
anything that we really are going to be using. I mean, there is
a demonstrator, but we won't be using----
Rear Admiral Steidle. No.
Chairman Rohrabacher.--it for another 10 years?
Rear Admiral Steidle. No, sir. If we do this right--and
that is what a spiral development program is. If we do this
right and set the requirements to where we eventually want to
go so we don't eliminate and don't have some false starts and
don't start down this path for something in '11 and then have
to start over in '14 and develop this program so that we can
have a vehicle in '14 that can be adapted just a couple years
later to go to the Moon and back and support those particular
pieces, that is how much it costs to be able to do a detailed
program like that.
Cooperation in Near-Earth Objects Detection
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. One last question, and then I
will turn it over to Mr. Lampson. About the near-Earth objects,
about these near-Earth objects, one, as I say, I announced at
the beginning of this hearing, there is a near-Earth object
that came within 25,000 or 26,000 miles of the Earth. And it is
passing by tonight, I guess, or today sometime. We didn't know
about it intil four days ago. I consider--now this particular
one isn't big enough to have caused major damage, but the fact
that we really didn't know about it until a few days ago
indicates that there could be something out there that might
actually be a threat to the world. Maybe we could just go down
the panel and you could suggest to me what you think would be a
good way for NASA, the Department of Defense, and the private
sector to work together in terms of meeting this potential
challenge.
Rear Admiral Steidle. I can't answer that question fully,
sir. I could tell you it is a very small object, 30 meters,
that is 43 kilometers away will go down through the Atlantic
Ocean in--about--I have the time is about 17:08 tonight, but
probably late. But that is a--I am going to pass it on to my
experts here who can say that sounds like a very difficult one
to track. We picked it up on Monday evening. Lincoln labs did
a--It was put on our web at JPL on Monday night.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Now who discovered it?
Rear Admiral Steidle. I was informed that Lincoln labs did,
sir.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay.
Major General Dickman. I am not familiar with how Lincoln
discovered it. Obviously an asteroid is a passive object, and
so tracking an asteroid is--requires either an optical system
or--well, it requires, essentially, an optical system or radar,
if it gets much closer. But losing radar 1/r4, you can't get
very far away to do a serious radar track. And so we provide
our optical sensors to NASA----
Chairman Rohrabacher. We have got a radar station on the
Moon.
Major General Dickman. It is still a long--it is still 1/r4
to wherever the asteroid is. Radar, we don't lose much distance
going through the atmosphere, so I am not sure that would help
us a whole lot, although it is certainly worth looking into.
Chairman Rohrabacher. All right. See, I don't--I certainly
plead guilty to not being a technical expert on these things.
How can you work with NASA more effectively in this
challenge?
Major General Dickman. Right now, we provide our optical
sensors to NASA for tracking those--tracking asteroids in
space. The best sensors we have are optical sensors that are
maintained by the Department of Defense by our Directed Energy
Directorate. And I think we provide something like 18 nights a
month every month to NASA for doing that tracking.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Dr. Sega.
Dr. Sega. Our role, in the Department of Defense, has been
principally the support of the--NASA's Near-Earth Asteroid
Tracking program. And so it is in the area of, as Bob said, the
optics, the processing, and so forth of datas where the
technology that is either developed or there is additional
sensors that can be supportive of the NASA tracking program
would be the role of the Department.
Chairman Rohrabacher. And as I mentioned to you earlier,
Doctor, I went to a Shuttle launch, and the Shuttle went off--
took off, and we were all standing there, and within two
minutes after the Shuttle took off, a comet went directly over
the Florida station there at Cape Kennedy. And everybody was
just aghast, because, I mean, no one had any idea that this
thing was coming, but it just--it was close. It was very close.
And it seems to me that NASA and the military need to look at
this as a potential threat. Look at the Moon. Those craters
didn't just get there by themselves. These aren't volcanic
craters.
And Mr. Musk, are you ready to go and to recruit the oil
workers off of the derricks in order to fly up to the asteroid
and destroy the asteroid before it gets to the Earth? That is
what was in the--that was in the movie, I think.
Mr. Musk. Yes, sir. It is ironic what they have
accomplished in movies. You know, the fact of the matter is
that the state of technology today: if the asteroid is big
enough for us to see it, we won't be able to stop it, and if it
is small enough--if it is so small that we don't see it, we
won't get it in time. That is sort of where we are today. Some
decades on, that, hopefully, will all be changed. Certainly, of
all of the threats humanity faces over the long-term, some sort
of asteroid, either at--can either significantly damage
civilization or possibly end it. It is highly probable that
that possibility certainly exists, and I hope that, at some
point in the coming decades, we are able to present a
reasonable counter to that threat.
Chairman Rohrabacher. All right. Well, thank you. And I
think the private sector will play a role in that. And if by
nothing else, keeping the cost of the rockets down that are
part of the system.
Thank you very much.
I would like to turn to Mr. Lampson. Would you----
Mr. Lampson. I would. You know, one thing that we could do,
Mr. Chairman, is to have--get a greater look at the points
contained within the Space Exploration Act, because it does,
indeed, set a goal of building a craft that would allow us to
go out and do something to those asteroids when and if they are
discovered. And we are going to have to address it. You are--
you know, this is a serious issue, and it is something that we
ought to be talking about. So hopefully we will at some point
in time.
Role of Industry
As much as I respect and appreciate not just Elon Musk's
company, but all of them, I think it important--we don't have
the opportunity for Boeing and Lockheed Martin to be here to
make some comment in reference back to some comments that were
made about their size and how slow they might be in
accomplishing something, but they are doing things that this
government has asked to do that perhaps adds cost to a lot of
what they do, because they have to maintain a lot of personnel
to accomplish something over a long period of time they might
not otherwise be doing. I think that is important to note at
some point.
Crew Exploration Vehicle
And I--Admiral Steidle, I wanted to also get you to just
make a short comment about, perhaps--that you were talking
about all of the complaints of the development of the CEV and
what all we have to go through in order to meet a 10-year
accomplishment for flight. What is the difference in what we
did with Apollo during those--all of those Apollo years to
develop all of the craft that were involved in those missions?
Rear Admiral Steidle. That particular program was a--I
would call a single data point. That was one particular event
and a destination that we were flying to, and all of our
efforts and integration efforts that--were focused on the
development of that particular system to accomplish that. This
program differs in the fact that we are looking beyond that. We
are looking at a continuum. We are looking at an infrastructure
that will, as well as just the spacecraft, support future
missions. We are looking at a spacecraft that we will slowly
develop, through spiral development, to take us into orbit, to
take us to the Moon, to take us beyond into journeys to,
perhaps, Mars and beyond. So there is much more into it than
that single data point; there is the infrastructure. And I keep
referring to this, and we heard it earlier, the systems of
systems integration piece of this is quite large, not just the
development of the spacecraft itself, but all of the supporting
structure, the support of the infrastructure that will be here
on Earth, the demonstration of capabilities either on the Space
Station or on the surface of the Moon and the other things that
come together to support this development. So this is the
significant difference from that.
Mr. Lampson. There is also the role that money has played
in it, too. Was there not a little different----
Rear Admiral Steidle. Yes, sir. If you look at the funding
profile in that particular program, it was a program manager's
joy. It was----
Impediments to NASA-DOD Cooperation
Mr. Lampson. Okay. Let me get back to what I wanted to ask
about in the first place. I would like to ask all of you, if
you could, to respond to this. What do you consider to be the
biggest impediments to meaningful cooperation between NASA and
DOD in space transportation, and how would you overcome those
impediments? And try to keep them as succinct as possible.
Would you start, Admiral?
Rear Admiral Steidle. Yes, sir. Very, very quickly. I have
looked at the collaboration efforts that are taking place. We
mentioned the partnership. We mentioned NAI. I asked my staff
to put together where do we stand and what kind of
collaboration efforts are underway, and they came with a long
list. And there are almost 400 relationships and collaboration
agreements and MOUs between our centers and our departments in
NASA. There are some main program pieces that are working here.
What I have seen, as I have gone back and studied this in
preparation for coming here, that something changed about two
years ago. The emphasis came from the top down, not from the
bottom up. This is my own assessment. It appears that something
took place at the partnership, perhaps just the new people that
are involved in that. But their focus on the collaboration and
the partnership was felt throughout the organization, all of
the way down to the tech maturation people and the people
managing each program. So the impediment would be the loss of
that particular dedication and focus on making these things
happen.
Mr. Lampson. Thank you. General.
Major General Dickman. I think the greatest impediment in a
long-term collaboration is that we have different requirements
for the vehicles when they finally get put to use. There is no
impediment to collaboration in developing the technology, and
the work that Admiral Steidle mentioned was specifically
focused on the whole spectrum of technologies with--related to
launch. The collaboration is very, very good.
With respect to the comment that the partnership changed
two years ago, I would share that view as well. And since Dr.
Sega might not want to comment since he was one of the players
in that, the reality is, the membership of the Partnership
Council changed. It includes the Administrator of NASA. The
Administrator is very proactive about dealing with the
Department of Defense. It includes Under Secretary Teets, but
it also includes Dr. Sega and Admiral Ellis and General Lord
from Space Command, who are all committed to making the
partnership work, rather than getting together and seeing where
there might be opportunities for interface.
Mr. Lampson. Dr. Sega, do you want to make a comment?
Dr. Sega. Sure. The--I think the environment is very
positive, not only in the Space Partnership Council, but also
at the working level as we worked hard over a period of over a
year to develop these technology roadmaps. Now once we have
this in place, the challenge is to keep the integrated program
on track. We have participation from the Army, Navy, and Air
Force in developing some of the technologies with DARPA and, of
course, the Department of Defense, and NASA inside the
government. We have industry, and so forth, engaged. We also
have some of the budgets, as they come here, are viewed here in
Congress. It is important that when there are connections being
made, that that information be passed to you so that there is
an understanding of where the integration is, where the
connections are as one looks at the programs in total versus in
isolation, so keeping it together all of the way through the
process.
Mr. Lampson. Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me and let
me--and allow me to ask just a couple more questions, I will
be--I will pass this.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Go ahead quickly.
Mr. Lampson. Okay. I will be quick.
National Space Transportation Policy
The Bush Administration--and this is, again, for everyone.
The Bush Administration has indicated that it is reviewing the
existing national space transportation policy. Have any of you
played a role in that policy review?
Major General Dickman. I have, Mr. Lampson.
Mr. Lampson. Can you--is it Admiral? Have you or Dr. Sega?
Rear Admiral Steidle. No, sir. I am too new to be a part of
that. I believe Karen's office has, though.
Mr. Lampson. All right. And Dr. Sega?
Dr. Sega. Not at this time.
Mr. Lampson. What sorts of issues are being considered in
that review, and when do you expect the review will be
completed, both of you?
Major General Dickman. We are optimistic that the review
will be completed by summer. The issues are, if you will, the
ones you would expect: what kind of work should be done in
terms of next generation launch vehicles, in terms of
innovative approaches for a workforce for launch vehicle, in
terms of what NASA would need for exploration, for what kind of
expendable launch infrastructure we should sustain over the
next decade and beyond. Really, it is a very comprehensive look
at how we are going to do space transportation.
Mr. Lampson. Karen?
Ms. Poniatowski. Yeah. I think the only thing I would add
to that is it does reinforce the need for the--unlike the
previous policy that said the Air Force would have one focus
and NASA another, the policy is again focused at cooperation
between the NASA and the DOD.
Mr. Lampson. Thank you.
NASA-DOD Test Facilities
And the last thing, what specific steps are NASA and DOD
taking to ensure that the national test facilities needed for
future space transportation systems will be maintained? We know
that some of these things were--are being shut down. We know
that there have been some facilities that--at NASA that haven't
been maintained and are actually--we are losing the capability
to provide some service with those at some point of time in the
future. Are there any specific facilities that any of you are
concerned about, and if so, what are they? Everybody.
Dr. Sega. It wouldn't be fair to give any specifics,
because there are an awful lot of facilities, but there are
needs in terms of testing. I gave an example of the HyFly test.
In this case, it was a DARPA-Navy program testing at Langley
and soon to have a single-engine demonstrator test from the Air
Force and DARPA also at the Langley wind tunnel. So this is a
case I know personally, and it is an area that you look at what
is coming forward and you look at the test facilities they
need. Now in the future, technology will move forward and your
needs will change, but I think it is a question that needs to
be evaluated continually.
Mr. Musk. I think, in general, the test structure right
now, at least for propulsion, is fairly robust. Certainly it is
robust for testing spacecraft. I believe there are five test
facilities that can handle a one million-pound class engine, a
variety of fuels and flows and sizes. There are test facilities
that are relatively new that can handle high-altitude engine
testing. So until we actually break new ground on what we need
that would drive us to some place we haven't been before, I
think we are probably in pretty good shape right now.
Mr. Lampson. Thank you.
Admiral.
Rear Admiral Steidle. I have been--in my initiation in
NASA, I have been making trips to as many of the facilities as
I possibly can, looking at their lab structure. In my previous
position, I was commander of a number of centers, so I know
what to look for. I have been looking for those particular
capabilities. I haven't found anything lacking, so far, in my
trips to them.
Mr. Lampson. Those are some of the things that I have heard
from some NASA installations around. I went--that is more--
thank you all for your answers, and thank you for your
indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Thank you.
Mr. Feeney.
Mr. Feeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Cross-Certification of Launch Vehicles
When I last addressed you, you talked about the increasing
cooperation. Specifically, if we could get a commitment to try
to find some redundancies in the certification requirements, I
think that would be helpful and useful to us. And if you are
having success and everything, we would appreciate any
continued success.
But I want to----
Chairman Rohrabacher. Perhaps we could be very specific on
that. If you could, within a month, get back to the Committee a
letter indicating what areas you think that you could work on
in this cross-certification area, and making sure that we
don't--where it is that duplicate and where--with the military
and where can people accept the standards and the--already the
specifications that are on the other side that have already
been proven so that people like Mr. Musk can invest $1 million
and can expect it not to have to be doing the same exact thing
with that $1 million with NASA that it does with the Department
of Defense, I mean, rather than waste that money.
Mr. Feeney, go right ahead.
Mr. Feeney. Well, despite the optimistic answer, Mr.
Chairman, that we got, I think that there is cause for
optimism. You remember Lockheed Martin that has testified in
front of this committee that they think a one-government team
would be very helpful to them. The Space News has recently
reported that while these meetings are going on, very little is
accomplished, and these may be accusations that are inaccurate,
but if you can give us details, we, at least, can defend you,
at a minimum.
Review of Space Treaties Affecting DOD and Commercial Use of
the Moon
And secondly, I would like the Admiral and the General to
tell me whether it would be a useful exercise for this
Partnership Council, or some other group involving the civilian
and the military and the commercial launch advocates in the
United States, to review the 10 or 15 different space treaties
that we have out there. For example, General, you suggested
that one of the reasons that we do--we couldn't put a permanent
facility on the Moon was not that it was Air Force related, it
is because of treaties. Well, treaties come and go, and by the
way, the United States tends to honor its commitments; other
nations don't, many times. You are tracking some 8,000 pieces
of ``space junk,'' as we speak. It may turn out that the Moon,
for example, is a better place to do some of those things or
enhance what we are doing.
And finally, on the commercial side, there is very--we have
used space treaties to socialize the rewards of exploring
space. So if Mr. Musk, for example, wanted to find a way to
colonize a square mile of the Moon, he would have to share
everything that he could accomplish with 191 other nations
recognized by the State Department. One wonders, in that light,
whether the Queen of Spain would have subsidized Columbus'
journey knowing that she would have had to share all of the
fruits of his discoveries with the Dutch and the French and the
Brits. So maybe you could tell me a little bit about a review
of space treaties in our future.
Major General Dickman. We will be glad to take that as an
action.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Now with that said, we are going to
adjourn now, because I do have a plane out at six o'clock at
Dulles. I want to thank Mr. Lampson. This is his first hearing
as the Ranking Member. Thank you very much for your--he has
always been an activist and always had thought-provoking
questions and different insights that he has shared with us. We
are very happy now that he is playing a more important role.
You are not just a Member of the Committee; now you are the
Ranking Member. And someday, who knows, you may sit in this
chair. So I have got to be--I have to be very, very, you know,
courteous to this man.
But Mr. Feeney, thank you, as well. And thank you to our
panel. I appreciate it.
One thought, we did say a couple things that seemed
derogatory about big companies, because we have got Elon Musk,
this great entrepreneur here who has put his own money in, and
we always admire that so much, but just----
Mr. Lampson. We need them both.
Chairman Rohrabacher. We need them both. And for the
record, Lockheed, Boeing, Orbital, all of them were contacted
about the hearing, and all are providing written testimony for
the record in this hearing and have been very cooperative with
us and couldn't cooperate more. They just--so we had a good
hearing today, and I would like to thank the witnesses again.
And please be advised that the Subcommittee Members may request
additional information for the record, and I would ask other
Members who are going to submit written questions to do so with
one--within one week of this date. And I would then conclude
this hearing by saying this meeting is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Rear Admiral (Ret.) Craig E. Steidle, Associate
Administrator, Office of Space Exploration Systems, National
Aeronautic and Space Administration
Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. In written testimony provided to this committee, Michael Gass of
Lockheed Martin Space Systems recommends that ``there ought to be one
government team [between NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD)] to
define mission assurance requirements'' for launch vehicles before
entering into a development program with industry. He explains that
this approach ``would eliminate wasteful redundancy, use common
processes for acquisition and contract oversight, share the benefits of
complementary hardware systems and reduce the cost of maintaining
infrastructure.'' (See Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
for Mr. Gass's full testimony.)
Will NASA and the Air Force consider this ``one government team''
approach in defining launch vehicle requirements to meet both NASA and
DOD requirements? What are the pros and cons of such a proposal for
NASA?
A1. NASA, the Air Force, and the NRO are looking to maximize our
limited resources in space launch. To that end, we collaborate in a
number of areas. For example, we share data and common analysis
sources. We participate in an interagency working group. We share
common risk lists between organizations for our common rocket fleets.
We participate in each other's Pedigree Reviews and Design Equivalency
Reviews on the key engine systems in the EELV fleet.
However, the concept of a common set of mission assurance
requirements, while attractive, does not recognize the different
emphasis each organization places on various elements of mission
assurance. Differences in requirements stem from the difference in how
the systems are to be used. A common set of requirements would end up
being composed of the lowest common denominator. It would treat a human
space launch, a low-cost technology demonstration satellite, and a
National security missile warning satellite as equals. Certain missions
demand unique mission assurance investments and scrutiny that are not
appropriate or affordable for all flights. We need the flexibility to
succeed at this priority, rather than having a common set of
requirements that we constantly deviate from and issue for waivers
based upon the mission's importance.
Q2. During the course of the March 18th hearing, both you and Major
General Dickman agreed to investigate how NASA and the Air Force's
separate certification processes for new launch vehicles could be
better coordinated. The concern was that these separate certification
processes might be redundant, wasting taxpayer money. What progress has
been made to-date? What plans have you made to minimize the redundancy
in the certification process?
A2. NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD) collaborate on technical
assessments (sometimes referred to as certification) of the launch
vehicles we each use to accomplish our unique space missions. Common
reviews and technical assessments on both existing and evolutionary
systems have moved us toward a better understanding of the core launch
system. Each agency continues to perform mission assurance and
``certify'' each individual mission for launch (including the
integrated spacecraft and launch vehicle as ready for launch). However,
neither the United States Air Force (USAF) nor NASA formally
``certify'' a launch vehicle design, as is done by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) for commercial aircraft in order to ensure public
safety.
The U.S. has not fielded many ``new'' national launch systems; for
example the DOD did not have a use for the Athena or the Conestoga
launch system and was not engaged in the technical assessments for
those ``new'' vehicles. In the case of the Pegasus, NASA worked closely
with Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the USAF to
understand and address challenges met in the start up of the commercial
program. NASA and DOD have built a pattern of cooperation in the
sharing of common launch systems; we would expect to extend that
cooperation to the fielding of ``new'' systems. Likewise, every
individual user, be they commercial or government, employs varying
levels of technical assessment leading up to a unique mission. We would
expect that practice to continue on new launch systems as well.
Q3. To accomplish NASA's missions to the Moon and Mars, NASA may need
to develop a new heavy-lift launch vehicle beyond the capabilities of
the current Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV). At a recent
Senate Appropriations hearing, NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe said
there are ``competing options and alternatives'' for heavy-lift launch
vehicles using the Space Shuttle stack of boosters and external tank or
enhancing DOD-developed expendable launch vehicles.
What is the timeframe for NASA's decision-making on whether to
develop and how to develop a heavy-lift launch vehicle?
A3. NASA intends to make a decision on both cargo and human launch
capability by the release of the CEV Level 1 requirements in January
2005.
Q3a. What trade studies are NASA conducting to answer the question on
whether or not a heavy-lift launch vehicle is needed? Why wouldn't
existing or slightly modified expendable launch vehicles be sufficient
for NASA's space exploration initiative?
A3a. NASA has initiated trade studies that consider options using Space
Shuttle propulsion elements, commercial systems, international systems,
and Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV). The study teams are
considering payload mass capabilities from 25mT (the current capability
of the EELV heavy) up to 100mT. The trade parameters currently focus on
performance, non-recurring cost, and recurring cost. A trade study has
also been initiated that will define the human rating requirements for
a CEV and launch system. These trade studies will be completed this
summer. The follow-on trade studies will combine the CEV human launch
capability and cargo launch system requirements into a common study
that will evaluate the synergy between the two system requirements.
NASA's objective is to separate crew and cargo launch to the maximum
extent possible. Industry has also been encouraged to consider these
critical launch trades as they prepare responses to the Request for
Information (RFI) and proposals to the Broad Agency Announcement (BAA)
for Concept Exploration and Refinement.
Q3b. Why aren't the designs for NASA's Saturn V rocket adequate for
NASA's future heavy-lift launch needs?
A3b. Elements of the Saturn launch system are being considered in the
trade studies for cargo launch, including the J-2/J-2S engine that
provided propulsion for the Saturn upper stage and the Apollo trans-
lunar injection stage. The J-2/J-2S powerhead was most recently used to
power the X-33 aerospike engine that was successfully demonstrated.
Other elements of the Saturn launch system may be applicable to a
modern launch capability. Although the Saturn launch vehicle design
would provide the performance capability to conduct a lunar mission,
the capability to manufacture it does not exist today and would be
extremely expensive to duplicate. More recent launch systems have
incorporated modern manufacturing processes and structural materials.
Building from the current launch vehicle manufacturing and launch
operations infrastructure may be more affordable than resurrecting the
Saturn; but the trade studies are assessing all possible launch
solutions.
Q4. Both NASA and the DOD are reporting to Congress a 50 percent cost
increase in what industry plans to charge for future purchases of
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles due to a sharp downturn in the
commercial launch market and U.S. launch providers not being able to
recoup their costs for these new rockets. Could the U.S. Government
possibly achieve some cost savings if NASA and the DOD bargained
together when negotiating its launch vehicle purchase prices with
industry? If so, are there any plans to begin such cooperative
bargaining?
A4. NASA and the DOD have a practice of coordinating on launch vehicle
acquisitions. We have established forums and working groups to assure
that our respective launch requirements and acquisition plans are
discussed to maximize the overall national benefit. NASA and the USAF
closely coordinated our individual requests for proposals for recent
awards to Boeing for Delta II activity. We have also shared our
requirements for EELV class services to facilitate assurance that the
U.S. Government is getting a fair and reasonable price. The depressed
international market for U.S. launch services in the EELV class has
indeed raised concerns with the potential for cost increases to all
government users. We are working with the DOD to understand and address
these concerns.
Q5. NASA recently informed the Committee that it is no longer planning
to fly secondary research payloads on the Space Shuttle, affecting 125
experiments. The European Ariane rocket has developed a fairly robust
capability to carry secondary research satellites into orbit, while the
U.S. has not developed an analogous means to carry secondary satellites
on an EELV. Are NASA and the DOD developing an analogous capability for
U.S. expendable launch vehicles? If not, why not? Could some of these
secondary payloads be launched on an Ariane rocket instead?
A5. NASA has invested funds to enable secondary capability on existing
launch systems and has flown approximately 15 secondary payloads over
the past 10-15 years using Delta, Pegasus and Taurus launch systems.
With the advent of the EELV, the USAF has invested in the development
of the EELV Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA), which is scheduled for
flight in 2006. Flight opportunities for small payloads have been a
topic of discussion between the agencies. In December 2003, NASA, the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the USAF met to discuss both
the opportunities for excess space on future EELV missions and
investment strategies for complementary secondary carriers beyond ESPA.
All agencies have been actively engaged in maximizing any excess space
and performance on larger launch systems and will continue to
coordinate efforts.
The majority of the experiments/payloads that will no longer be
flown on the Space Shuttle are Get Away Special (GAS) payloads that
were expressly designed to fly as tertiary payloads on a ``space-
available'' basis. Most were designed to require human intervention
and/or return, which are unique Shuttle capabilities, and are not
readily converted for flight on expendable systems.
Q6. A recent news article said that cost overruns with the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency's Orbital Express satellite project
threaten to shut down the project. NASA invested $25 million in DARPA's
Orbital Express project to demonstrate robotic docking technology
applicable to future missions to the Space Station.
If DARPA decides to cancel the Orbital Express project, what would
the impact be on NASA's investment and technical objectives?
Is DARPA coordinating its decisions with NASA on the Orbital
Express project?
A6. NASA has invested $17 million in DARPA's Orbital Express project
and intends to invest another $8 million through FY 2004 and FY 2005.
The Orbital Express takes the next step beyond NASA's Demonstration of
Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) flight project in demonstrating
robotic docking technology. Orbital Express will utilize the Advanced
Video Guidance System (AVGS) that will be demonstrated on DART to
maneuver within close proximity to the target satellite but, unlike
DART, Orbital Express will demonstrate actual docking with the target
satellite. Both experiments demonstrate technologies that may be used
in the on-orbit assembly of elements of an exploration mission. If
DARPA decides to cancel the Orbital Express project, NASA would
incorporate that decision into the technology gap analysis that is
currently underway. NASA will assess the risk to the overall concept of
operations and develop a risk mitigation plan to reduce or eliminate
that risk. NASA supports the Orbital Express project and believes that
the partnership with DARPA is the most effective way to reduce the risk
of autonomous rendezvous and docking.
NASA is currently providing engineering support to the Orbital
Express project. DARPA has coordinated their project plans with NASA
and intends to complete the project.
Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson
Q1. Please provide a list of all of the previously planned Space
Launch Initiative projects, their intended five-year funding profiles,
the numbers of civil service and contractor personnel involved in each,
and what NASA intends to do with each project, including the
consequences for both the civil service and contractor personnel.
A1. See Enclosure 1 for a list of Space Launch Initiative projects.
Q2. In your announcement to Congress regarding the cancellation of the
X-43C contract, you stated: ``It is important to note that the FY 2004
NGLT budget reduction will only impact contracted activities. NASA
civil service workforce efforts will continue in-house.. . .'' This
statement leaves the impression that NASA is not concerned with the
impact that the abrupt cancellations have on contractors, and is only
focused on protecting its civil service workforce. NASA officials have
indicated that NASA's Office of Aeronautics is considering whether it
might be able to pick up some of the hypersonics work that has been
terminated. If there is the possibility that NASA will seek to restart
some hypersonics activities in the FY 2006 budget request, what steps
are you taking now to minimize the disruption to the contractor
workforce between now and FY 2006?
A2. NASA is always concerned about its contractor teams and any adverse
impacts Agency decisions may have on them. However, part of the
rationale for outsourcing an activity includes the increased
flexibility that NASA gains for later reprogramming or termination of a
program/project. This flexibility is lost when NASA performs the work
in-house based upon the Government civil service laws. Consequently, X-
43C contractors were allowed time to close out the contracts in an
orderly way, including placement of the employees connected to the
contract. NASA is currently reviewing the options to ease the
transition as it considers the priorities of future hypersonics
research. Should NASA validate the requirement to restart the
hypersonic research in FY 2006, the FY 2005 funding will be re-
examined, and if funds are necessary, NASA will work with Congress to
adjust the FY 2005 operating plan to ensure an orderly transition. It
is also noted that the Department of Defense continues its hypersonics
activities (e.g., the single engine demonstrator project) using many of
the same contractors.
Q3. What specific factors led you to decide to continue the X-37
program? What data or systems do you expect to come from that program
that will help you achieve the goals set forth in the new exploration
initiative? Please be specific. How much will the X-37 program cost in
total, and what is included in that cost estimate?
A3. The X-37 project provides hardware development experience for the
NASA/industry team that will be applied to the exploration mission. The
Exploration Mission requires development of new technologies to achieve
the mission objectives and the X-37 effort provides key technology
development in thermal protection systems and hot structures.
The X-37 Approach and Landing Test Vehicle (ALTV) effort will
provide an in-flight calibration of air data system technologies, and
verification of the aerodynamics and guidance and control for a vehicle
other than the Space Shuttle. The data obtained will be utilized to
validate analytical models and trade studies. The orbital vehicle
technologies (wing leading edge thermal protection system and hot
structures) will provide higher reentry temperature capability to apply
to the exploration mission. The hot structures development will develop
capability in the U.S. that currently only exists overseas.
The estimate of total X-37 program cost is currently being
developed and will include contractor effort, government in-line
effort, government insight and management.
Q4. What role, if any, did DOD play in the decision to continue the X-
37 program? Will DOD provide any funding for it?
A4. In the summer of 2001, the Air Force decided to complete its
commitment to the X-37 project of $16 million but provided no
additional funding. This commitment was completed in FY 2002. NASA
decided independently to continue the X-37 project in 2003 via the NRA
8-30 competitive process. DOD was not involved in that decision. NASA
encourages potential partnerships where appropriate, however, no DOD
funding is currently committed.
Q5. NASA and DOD are collaborating on the National Aerospace
Initiative (NAI). However, it is hard to get a clear picture of the
extent of the cooperation. Please provide for the record: a list of the
projects that make up the NAI, which of them are jointly funded, and
the estimated cost of each of the NAI projects.
A5. The following is a list of NAI projects that will continue:
The Integrated Powerhead Demonstrator (IPD) will continue from the
NGLT Propulsion Technology. NASA and the Air Force Research Laboratory
jointly manage IPD. NASA will provide $3.4 million in FY 2004 and will
provide $7 million in FY 2005. NASA is also providing 25 civil service
and 27 support contractors to the effort. IPD is on the NAI Space
Access Roadmap and is managed by the DOD Integrated High Payoff Rocket
Technology Program.
The X-43A project will continue through the third flight in FY
2005. X-43A is a critical step in the development of scramjet
technology and is on the NAI Hypersonics roadmap.
Other continuing projects will contribute to the NAI Space Access
roadmap, including Auxiliary Propulsion, Vehicle Subsystem power and
electric actuator technology, and the University Research and
Engineering Technology Institutes. NASA is providing funding of $25
million in FY 2004 and $21 million in FY 2005. NASA civil service and
support contractor employees supporting these projects in FY 2004 is
121 and 98 in FY 2005.
Q6. NASA's decision in the 1990s not to be the first user of an
unproven rocket was based on a series of failures of three new launch
vehicles (the Pegasus XL, the Conestoga, and the LLV). How should the
government weigh the risks versus the benefits when considering the use
of new launch vehicles? That is, where should the government draw the
line between prudent stewardship of the taxpayers' money by not risking
a taxpayer-funded satellite on an unproven launch vehicle versus the
need to encourage the development of new launch vehicles that could
ultimately reduce governmental launch costs?
A6. NASA has developed a risk mitigation process that seeks to balance
mission criticality with flight history. The policy enables NASA to
launch on a first flight of a brand new system, the second flight (post
demonstration flight), or systems with proven demonstrated flight
history. Over the past several years, NASA has not identified any
missions that can tolerate the risk of a new launch system. NASA
payloads, even the small payloads, tend to be unique, one-of-a-kind
efforts, with a higher overall mission cost.
NASA does believe in encouraging the development of new launch
vehicles and emerging launch companies. NASA is partnering with DARPA
on their FALCON Program, which will provide flight demonstrations for
new launch systems. The payloads will be more risk tolerant and better
suited to initial flights of new launch systems. Through this
partnership, the government agencies are each able to participate in
enabling new launch systems with a balanced risk approach.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Major General (Ret.) Robert S. Dickman, Deputy for
Military Space, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force,
Department of Defense
Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
ONE GOVERNMENT TEAM
Q1. In written testimony provided to this committee, Michael Gass of
Lockheed Martin Space Systems recommends that ``there ought to be one
government team (between NASA and the DOD) to define mission assurance
requirements'' for launch vehicles. He explains that this approach
``would eliminate wasteful redundancy, use common processes for
acquisition and contract oversight, share the benefits of complementary
hardware systems and reduce the cost of maintaining infrastructure.''
(See Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record for Mr. Gass's full
testimony.)
Will NASA and the Air Force consider this ``one government team''
approach in defining launch vehicle requirements to meet both NASA and
DOD requirements? What are the pros and cons of such a proposal for the
Air Force?
A1. All agencies--the Air Force, the NRO, and NASA--are looking to
maximize our limited resources in space launch. To ensure best use of
these resources, we collaborate in a number of areas. For example, we
share data, common analysis sources, and have coordination meetings. We
share common risk lists between organizations for our common rocket
fleets. We participate in each other's Pedigree Reviews and Design
Equivalency Reviews on the key engine systems in the EELV fleet. The
Air Force and the prime contractors are looking for ways to develop
common support in order to reduce the program costs. However, common
acquisition processes would likely add complexity and cost.
The concept of a common set mission assurance requirements, while
attractive, does not recognize the different emphasis each organization
places on various elements of mission assurance. A common set of
requirements would end up being composed of the lowest common
denominator. It would treat a manned space launch, a low cost
technology demonstration satellite, and a national security missile
warning satellite as equals. Our history is not all space capabilities
are equal. Certain missions demand unique mission assurance investments
and scrutiny that are not appropriate or affordable for all satellite
flights. Mission assurance, often referred to as mission success, is
the #1 priority for AF, NRO, and NASA space programs. We need the
flexibility to succeed at this priority, rather than having a common
set of requirements that we constantly deviate from and waiver based
upon the mission's importance.
SEPARATE CERTIFICATION PROCESSES
Q2. During the course of the March 18th hearing, both you and Rear
Admiral Steidle agreed to investigate how NASA and the Air Force's
separate certification processes for new launch vehicles could be
better coordinated. The concern was that these separate certification
processes might be redundant, wasting taxpayer money. What progress has
been made to-date? What plans have you made to minimize the redundancy
in the certification process?
A2. Neither the Air Force nor NASA formally ``certify'' a launch
vehicle design, as is done by the FAA for aircraft. The Air Force and
NASA do share information to gain understanding of flight worthiness
that aids in certification of the booster. Technical teams share
information on the pedigree of flight hardware--for example, Air Force
and NASA teams review each other's hardware on Delta II rockets, in
addition to hardware for commercial missions, and share their findings
to assure they understand the state of the fleet. Mission teams discuss
common rehearsed goals and techniques between Air Force and NASA
Mission Directors. Air Force and NASA teams jointly work test
requirements for hardware--for example, the new solid rocket booster on
the Atlas V will be tested to a program defined by the contractor,
NASA, and the Air Force. Additionally, the Air Force, National
Reconnaissance Office, and NASA hold a mission assurance forum in which
the contractors and government teams look for synergies, best
practices, as well as lessons learned. The most recent forum was
successfully concluded this past March of 2004.
HEAVY-LIFT LAUNCH VEHICLE
Q3. If NASA needs to develop a heavy-lift launch vehicle for its space
exploration missions, do you foresee possible uses for such a launch
vehicle for future DOD missions?
A3. The recent Air Force mission model (from 2000-2020) does not
require development of a heavy-lift vehicle beyond the current
capability of the EELV fleet. NASA's heavy-lift requirements and
architecture appear to be still developing. It is unclear where the
NASA heavy-lift requirements, once defined, can be satisfied by the
existing heavy-lift capability of our EELV fleet. However, NASA is
keeping DOD informed of any contemplated performance or reliability
enhancements to the EELV fleet to allow DOD to consider how those
potential enhancements would benefit DOD mission needs.
EELV
Q4. Both NASA and DOD are reporting to Congress a 50 percent cost
increase in what industry plans to charge for future purchases of
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles due to a sharp downturn in the
commercial launch market and U.S. launch providers not being able to
recoup their costs for these new rockets. Do NASA and the DOD
coordinate their launch purchases before going out with bids to
industry? Could the U.S. Government possibly achieve some cost savings
is NASA and the DOD bargained together when negotiating its launch
vehicle purchase prices with industry?
A4. Although NASA and the Air Force do not coordinate with each other
on their respective launch purchases, they do share appropriate
information. Despite requirement differences between NASA and the Air
Force, it is possible there could be some synergy if NASA and DOD
bargained together for EELV launch services; however, whether this
would yield any saving over the current process is unknown.
Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson
HUMAN-CARRYING SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
Q1. Do you foresee a DOD requirement for a human-carrying space
transportation system?
If so, when?
What would be the reason for the requirement?
Will DOD either review or participate in the formulation of the
requirements for NASA's proposed Crew Exploration Vehicle?
A1. There is no Air Force requirement for a human-carrying space
transportation system at this time. However, the Air Force intends to
support NASA's effort to formulate requirements for their Crew
Exploration Vehicle (CEV), especially as it relates to EELV.
These questions were submitted to the witness, but were not
responded to by the time of publication.
Q2. NASA's decision in the 1990s not to be the first user of an
unproven rocket was based on a series of failures of three new launch
vehicles (the Pegasus XL, the Conestoga, and the LLV). How should the
government weigh the risks versus the benefits when considering the use
of new launch vehicles? That is, where should the government draw the
line between prudent stewardship of the taxpayers' money by not risking
a taxpayer-funded satellite on an unproven launch vehicle versus the
need to encourage the development of new launch vehicles that could
ultimately reduce governmental launch costs?
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by The Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director, Defense Research
and Engineering, Department of Defense
Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. In the wake of the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy and need to
finish Space Station construction, NASA recently informed the Committee
that it is no longer planning to fly secondary research payloads on the
Space Shuttle. According to Major General Dickman's testimony, over 200
DOD experiments have flown on over 70 Shuttle missions. NASA reports
that over 125 satellite experiments, including DOD payloads, will be
affected.
Q1a. What is the impact to DOD space research if these Shuttle rides
are canceled?
A1a. The reduction in science and technology demonstration
opportunities would limit collection of scientific data and could
result in increased program development risk. Shuttle and International
Space Station flights are an effective means for developing and testing
technologies, especially for those test units and experiments requiring
post-flight physical analysis.
Q1b. The European Ariane rocket has the means to carry secondary
research satellites into orbit. Are NASA and the DOD developing an
analogous capability for U.S. expendable launch vehicles?
A1b. The Space Test Program (STP) and Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)
developed the EELV Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA) that can fly
multiple space experiments. The ESPA fits any EELV medium-class launch
vehicle and holds up to six small satellites, in addition to the
primary payload. The first ESPA flight will be on a dedicated STP
launch aboard a medium EELV in September 2006. Success of this first
ESPA flight would provide DOD space experiment possibilities on future
EELV medium launch vehicles.
Q2. If NASA needs to develop a heavy-lift launch vehicle for its space
exploration missions, do you foresee possible uses for such a launch
vehicle for future DOD missions?
A2. Launch needs for DOD and National Security missions are under the
purview of the Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space.
Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson
Q1. What, if any, are DOD's interests in NASA's X-37 program?
What role, if any, did DOD play in NASA's decision to
continue that program?
DOD previously had withdrawn funding for the X-37
program. Will DOD provide any funding for it in the future?
A1. The proposed X-37 Orbital Vehicle (OV) has the potential to
demonstrate technologies that would have a range of utility to both DOD
and NASA. The technologies that could be demonstrated on the X-37 OV
include: non-toxic, storable propulsion and power; advanced thermal
protection system materials and structures; materials, structures and
components for long-duration exposure to the space environment;
advanced flight control systems; and algorithms for autonomous in-
space, reentry and landing maneuvers.
Q2. NASA and DOD are collaborating on the National Aerospace
Initiative (NAI). However, it is hard to get a clear picture of the
extent of the cooperation. Please provide for the record: a list of the
projects that make up the NAI, which of them are jointly funded, and
the estimated cost of each of the NAI projects.
A2. The National Aerospace Initiative serves an integrating role for
Science and Technology (S&T) investment to focus national aerospace
research and technology development and demonstrations toward goals and
objectives which support future high payoff capabilities. Technology
roadmaps were developed in the areas of high speed/hypersonics, access
to space and space technology through a collaborative effort between
DOD and NASA. The NAI and NASA's Office of Exploration Systems are
currently identifying and evaluating NAI S&T projects that will support
the Vision for Space Exploration. Attachment 1 contains a listing of
DOD projects which include NAI S&T activities. The attachment indicates
overall project funding levels and the level of NAI investment within
that particular project. NAI funding is also split into two categories:
core and enabling technologies. Core technologies and enabling
technologies, such as materials, aerodynamics, guidance and control,
and power support NAI and other S&T objectives.
Q3a. Do you foresee a DOD requirement for a human-carrying space
transportation system? If so, when? What would be the reason for the
requirement?
A3a. On July 22, 2002, the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for
Plans, Policies, and Operations published a Universal Need Statement
(UNS) for Small Unit Space Transport and Insertion Capability
(SUSTAIN). This UNS outlined the need to deliver 13 combat-equipped
personnel through and from low earth orbit. The UNS did not specify a
date required.
Q3b. Will DOD either review or participate in the formulation of the
requirements for NASA's proposed Crew Exploration Vehicle?
A3b. The DOD will participate as appropriate.
Q4. NASA's decision in the 1990s not to be the first user of an
unproven rocket was based on a series of failures of three new launch
vehicles (the Pegasus XL, the Conestoga, and the LLV). How should the
government weigh the risks versus the benefits when considering the use
of new launch vehicles? That is, where should the government draw the
line between prudent stewardship of the taxpayers' money by not risking
a taxpayer-funded satellite on an unproven launch vehicle versus the
need to encourage the development of new launch vehicles that could
ultimately reduce governmental launch costs?
A4. Every launch decision must weigh a complex series of factors to
determine acceptable risk. The analysis approach of weighing risk
versus benefits of use of new launch vehicles should be accomplished on
a case by case basis. For example, the launch of Tactical Satellite I
(TacSat I), an R&D satellite, is currently scheduled this year on the
first flight of a new booster called Falcon.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Elon Musk, Chief Executive Officer, Space Exploration
Technologies
Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. Your testimony mentioned some of your concerns with the regulatory
certification process and costs attendant with those regulations.
Q1a. What specific examples do you have where Air Force or FAA launch
regulations were overly burdensome and not adding value in terms of
safety?
A1a. To date, SpaceX has only undergone the Air Force range safety
approval, but will be seeking an FAA license shortly. Our company can
therefore only comment on the Air Force process, but would be happy to
provide similar comments on the FAA at a later date. Most of the FAA
regulations are drawn from the Air Force document EWR-127-1 and so some
of the comments are likely to be common.
The Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have been
working with SpaceX to improve the certification process and in bring a
new launch vehicle to flight (moreover, using only thrust termination,
rather than explosive termination). My recommendations below should be
seen in the context of a relationship that is working well.
Specific recommendations are:
1. Remove the piece parts & traceability requirement for flight
termination systems in favor of more extensive testing
Piece parts and traceability requirements necessarily result in
extremely expensive components, because modern (extremely reliable)
electronics are mass manufactured and do not lend themselves to being
built in tiny batches. If standard electronics are suitable for a
flight critical autopilot on a 400 passenger 747 landing in zero
visibility over a densely populated city, then they should be suitable
for a launch vehicle carrying no-one departing over unpopulated ocean.
2. Automatic safety cross-certification between the eastern and
western ranges
At present, there are slightly different subjective preferences
held by the eastern and western ranges. This requires a company to have
either both ranges present throughout the EWR tailoring process,
increasing expenses to both the company and the government, or work
with just one and then be forced to modify the system later for launch
on the other range. New airplane companies are not forced to work with
FAA branches from all corners of the country and this should not be the
case with rockets either. If a vehicle and its flight termination
system are suitable in California, they should be automatically allowed
anywhere else in the country with a similarly unpopulated flight path.
3. Require transparency of evaluation metrics
One of the critical evaluation metrics is the maximum probable loss
calculation for property and casualty. However, unlike the situation
with FAA aircraft certification, this calculation is not done working
with the launch vehicle company and the methodology is not shared. This
makes it very difficult for a launch vehicle company to determine how
to improve the MPL.
Q1b. How much does it cost your company per launch to comply with the
Government's regulations? Of that amount, how much does your company
spend to comply with regulations that you would categorize as overly
burdensome and not adding value in terms of safety?
A1b.
SpaceX estimates for compliance with Government regulations:
$400,000 for purchase, integration and installation
of the flight termination system. This number was over $300,000
higher prior to being granted a waiver of the flight
termination explosives requirement by Air Force range safety.
$650,000 for range services required for launch,
including flight analysis, flight termination system oversight,
ground safety and launch oversight.
SpaceX estimates of costs that add minimal value and could be
eliminated:
$200,000 could be eliminated from the flight
termination system by being able to use flight termination
components with extensive testing as a substitute for piece
parts and traceability requirements. Simply being able to use
the low cost, high reliability flight termination receivers
that are used on missiles and UAVs would net an immediate
$80,000 saving. In fact, SpaceX is approved to use these
receivers at the Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein, but not at the
Eastern or Western ranges.
At least $300,000 or more than half the range
services cost could probably be eliminated by streamlining the
launch process. Please note that SpaceX expects to yield close
to this number simply by working with the ranges and increasing
their comfort level with the Falcon launch system. I will not
have any recommendations until SpaceX is past its second or
third launch.
Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson
Q1. NASA's decision in the 1990s not to be the first user of an
unproven rocket was based on a series of failures of three new launch
vehicles (the Pegasus XL, the Conestoga and LLV). How should the
Government weigh the risks versus the benefits when considering the use
of new launch vehicles? That is, where should the Government draw the
line between prudent stewardship of the taxpayer's money by not risking
a taxpayer-funded satellite on an unproven launch vehicle versus the
need to encourage the development of new launch vehicles that could
ultimately reduce Governmental launch costs?
A1. Prudence is certainly warranted before placing a valuable satellite
on a new launch vehicle. The chance of failure is significant, as
suggested by history and common sense. However, we must necessarily
venture forth and encourage new developments or be trapped into using
the same transport system forever. As I will show below numerically,
staying with the old transport system will very quickly overwhelm the
cost of a failure or two on a new launch vehicle.
It is one thing to ask a new company to underwrite all the costs of
development, it is another to force them to fly first with other
customers, it is yet another to insist that serious dialogue on
purchase cannot even begin until a successful launch takes place. This
latter point is particularly harsh, since payload manifests are planned
years in advance. If a company cannot enter serious manifesting
discussions until after first successful launch, it means that first
launch of a NASA payload will only occur four to five years after the
maiden launch. Our company was told precisely this by the Office of
Space Flight at NASA.
As it is, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has chosen to
purchase the first launch of Falcon I (at a discount to the standard
price), for which SpaceX is very appreciative. The second flight of
Falcon I has been purchased by the Malaysian Space Agency, raising the
question of why a foreign government's space agency is more supportive
of a U.S. launch company than our own.
The first flight of Falcon V, our medium lift vehicle, has also
been purchased, in this case by a U.S. commercial customer.
The analysis below compares Falcon I with Pegasus, the primary NASA
launch vehicle for small payloads.
As can be seen from the above table, at the low end of small
satellites, it would make more financial sense to buy three complete
satellites, launch them on Falcon I and have two fail completely, than
buy one launch of Pegasus ($34.8M versus $35M). The numbers become even
more compelling if you consider that SpaceX offers discounts for
purchases of three or more flights.
However, even considering the high end for small satellites, it
makes sense to choose Falcon I. Using the commercial launch insurance
market as a gauge for probable risk, the premium for a first launch is
approximately 30 percent, obviously mostly for replacement of the
satellite. Adding 30 percent to the maximum mission cost of $56.6M for
launch on Falcon I, we obtain an amount of $73.6M, which is still
significantly less than the $80M mission cost for launch on Pegasus.
Note, in this analysis I have assigned a 100 percent success
probability to Pegasus. In actual fact, the failure rate for Pegasus
historically has been 10 percent, which means roughly $3.5M to $8M must
be added as risk premium to that price for launch. Moreover, the above
analysis considers only the first few launches. A net present value of
cost savings should be obtained by discounted back over the entire
launch manifest, which would include dozens of launches. The value
equation is therefore overwhelmingly in favor of a new, low cost
rocket.
Seen in this light, the Pentagon purchase of first flight on Falcon
I is not irrational or based on an appetite for more risk (even if it
should turn out that our first launch fails). The same is true of the
commercial customer that has bought the first launch of Falcon V. While
there may be other strategic reasons for these actions, they can also
be viewed simply as sound financial judgment.
Appendix 2:
----------
Additional Material for the Record
Statement of Michael C. Gass
Michael C. Gass
Vice President, Space Transportation, Space Systems Company
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Mr. Chairman, Thank you for the opportunity to provide a statement
for the Subcommittee hearing record on NASA-DOD cooperation. The
subject of cooperation between the Department of Defense and NASA is
both timely and delicate. It is timely because we as a nation are about
to embark on a new mission of space exploration. All of our skills and
resources must be brought to bear if this mission is to realize its
ambitious goals. NASA-DOD cooperation is a delicate subject because it
evokes institutional and philosophical biases that have in the past
gotten in the way of mission objectives.
Lockheed Martin has, for many years, worked with each of these fine
organizations. In partnership with NASA we have built spacecraft and
systems that have surveyed the surface of Venus, monitored the Earth's
environment, landed on Mars, photographed storms on Jupiter, analyzed
the rings of Saturn and sampled the dust of a distant comet.
With DOD, we have built the space-borne eyes and ears of our
military forces, from surveillance to communications to weather
analysis and more. For both institutions, we have provided the boost
vehicles that take these spacecraft to orbit and beyond.
Our experience with each organization has been characterized by
mutual respect and a shared sense of accomplishment. We have seen over
the years the thing that they and we have most in common: a dedication
to mission success.
If the Space Exploration initiative is to be successful, NASA and
DOD must work together. Lockheed Martin supports productive cooperation
between them, focused on areas of common interest and respectful of
their differing charters.
In the past, the differences between the two--in both size and
mission--has caused some justifiable caution on the part of NASA. This
caution is shared no doubt by Members and staff of this subcommittee.
Nonetheless, there are areas in which these differences can be used to
NASA's advantage, and space launch is one of those areas.
Currently, access to space for NASA missions involves four distinct
sets of infrastructure: STS, Delta II, Delta IV, and Atlas V. There are
good, historical reasons that this is so, but it is an expensive and
inefficient way to operate.
The latter two boosters, the Delta IV and Atlas V, are new systems
developed by DOD under the EELV program. Together, they constitute a
robust, modular and reliable foundation for virtually all future space
launch requirements, be they scientific, military or commercial. STS
and Delta II have been workhorse systems for NASA. If it is to both
afford and execute the critical missions of the Space Exploration
initiative, NASA must rationalize and streamline its space launch
infrastructure. This should be done in accordance with a strict
timetable in order to achieve the necessary savings and meet the
necessary milestones.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the four areas that
will be addressed in your hearing today.
1. To what extent can NASA and the DOD benefit from greater
cooperation in the development and purchase of launch vehicles?
NASA and DOD will obtain both cost and reliability benefits from
greater cooperation in space launch vehicles. Launch vehicle cost and
reliability are significantly driven by the simplicity of the system
design and launch rate. The Atlas V program has made significant
reductions in system complexity and labor by the evolutionary (spiral)
development of the Nation's launch vehicle fleet. One of the main
objectives of the EELV acquisition was to reduce launch costs by at
least 25 percent. This has been accomplished with a combination of
reduced infrastructure and improved designs. Infrastructure was reduced
by going from nine heritage (three Delta, three Atlas and three Titan
IV) launch pads to four pads (one Atlas and Delta pad per coast). On
the vehicle side, the Atlas program has reduced the number of
propulsion elements from nine on the Atlas HAS to only two on the Atlas
V 401 configuration improving both reliability and increasing
performance. The Atlas launch operations crew size and processing time
have been reduced by 50 percent through increased use of automation,
while performing 70 consecutive successful launches. If NASA were to
launch science and exploration missions on EELV exclusively, the nearly
doubled launch rates would minimize the need for USG-funded, fixed
infrastructure, while maintaining two viable systems to provide assured
access to space. This will create incentives for innovation while
maintaining the benefits of competition.
Reliability Enhancements--As part of the Atlas V evolution, we have
significantly improved reliability by both reducing parts and adding
fault tolerance. Withy support from NASA, we have performed an initial
Atlas V assessment to identify high value reliability launch vehicle
improvements. The NASA study included single-point failure
identification, fault avoidance and fault tolerance, design enhancement
and ultimately a recommendation of the top 5-10 investments in
reliability improvement. The key elements identified were the upper
stage and booster engine single-point failure elimination, additional
robustness of the solid rocket boosters (SRBs) and avionics upgrades.
These NASA reliability improvements are currently unfunded. The AF
Assured Access to Space (AATS) program is initially funding RL-10 upper
stage engine producibility enhancements and critical component
engineering which inherently improves reliability. Cooperative NASA and
DOD funding of these high value reliability improvements would directly
benefit all launch vehicle customers.
The recommended NASA approach for human rating combines highly
reliable EELVs with intact crew abort systems enabled by a robust
launch vehicle health management (LVHM) system. The LVHM system
provides the critical sensing and indications required to initiate a
crew system abort. This same LVHM sensing system would also provide a
valuable Mission Assurance tool for DOD Missions by providing in flight
measurements of critical systems, valuable for post flight mission
assessments and feedback for future flights. This valuable activity is
also currently unfunded.
Performance Enhancements--An evolutionary launch vehicle strategy
allows incremental and affordable performance improvements, with
demonstrated performance at each step, which benefits both NASA and
DOD. This enables incremental funding decisions based upon the ultimate
architecture needs. This strategy maintains common launch vehicle
elements to maximize production rate benefits. It minimizes changes to
the launch infrastructure (pads, vehicle integration facilities). This
enables common launch infrastructure for both current and future NASA
and DOD missions.
Increased launch rate provides both reduced cost and increased
reliability. Common elements in the EELV configurations, with
appropriate production and launch rate, maintain proficiency of the
production and launch crews, resulting in increased reliability. The
NASA human-rating approach will further improve reliability. Both DOD
and NASA mutually benefit from launch vehicle reliability improvements.
In summary, we believe that there ought to be one government team
to define mission assurance requirements. This would eliminate wasteful
redundancy, use common processes for acquisition and contract
oversight, share the benefits of complementary hardware systems and
reduce the cost of maintaining infrastructure.
2. What steps NASA is taking to collaborate with the DOD in order to
realize those benefits?
There are several positive examples of NASA/DOD cooperation:
First is the USG Partnership Council. This Council consists of the
senior leadership from NASA/DOD/AF/NRO/DARPA and meets quarterly to
continue to foster interagency cooperation in technology and program
support.
Second, NASA is working with DOD to adapt the EELV program for the
Crew Exploration Vehicle and other space launch requirements. NASA has
initiated studies for EELV reliability, human rating and crew escape
systems technology that will benefit all USG agency users.
Third, the NASA Prometheus initiative builds on the Navy's vast
experience in nuclear power development. By doing so, it will
accelerate the availability of advanced space power and propulsion
technologies for civil space applications.
Finally, the National Aerospace Initiative has been focused on the
development of third-generation technologies in support of hypersonics,
space transportation, and in-space technologies. A U.S. government
joint project office (staffed by experts from NASA, DOD and NRO) has
been working with industry partners for the past several years on
focused technology demonstrations in these disciplines.
Government working groups should give priority to the establishment
of common launch vehicle requirements. This process would benefit both
NASA and DOD missions in the future.
3. What areas of launch vehicle development are exclusively the role
and responsibility of one agency or the other?
Current U.S. National Space Transportation policy establishes NASA
as ``lead agency for technology development and demonstration for next
generation reusable space transportation systems.'' DOD's role in the
current Policy is focused on expendable launch systems. The practical
effect of this language has been to limit unnecessarily DOD's
involvement in decisions pertaining to next generation reusable
systems. To meet emerging national security requirements for space
control and force projection, DOD should be able to fully explore next
generation reusable system solutions. Conversely, this delineation has
precluded NASA innovation in exploiting the DOD investment in
expendable launch vehicles. As mentioned earlier, the current and
foreseeable launch rates do not support the development of fully
reusable launch systems.
The National Space Transportation Policy (currently in revision)
should clearly state that the Department of Defense/U.S. Air Force has
the flexibility to develop and utilize more responsive launch vehicle
capabilities as required to support its mission requirements. The
updated policy should promote full cooperation between NASA and DOD on
both next generation reusable and expendable space transportation
systems and clearly articulate the desirability of comprehensive
collaboration.
4. To what extent can NASA and the DOD encourage the growth of the
U.S. domestic launch market, including emerging U.S. launch vehicle
providers who provide unique capabilities?
Due to the collapse of the commercial launch market and relatively
flat demand for government launches, the current domestic launch
vehicle providers are at a greater than 50 percent over capacity. This
has driven prices to below cost, an unsustainable condition.
By concentrating both NASA and DOD space launch demand around the
two EELV vehicles, the government can help stabilize and strengthen the
industrial base on which space access depends.
As regards emerging U.S. launch vehicle providers, the newly-
identified need for ``responsive'' launch capabilities may provide an
opportunity. DARPA, for example, is developing the Force Application
Launched from CONUS (FALCON). This and related technology programs,
driven by military utility, offer the best prospect for these
entrepreneurial business. They would be unwise to project a commercial
demand that covered their cost.
Many, including Lockheed Martin, have developed small launch
vehicles only to find that the market is not adequate to support the
cost. Selling at below cost to establish a market has not proven to be
a successful long-term strategy. Emerging launch vehicle providers face
the historic challenge to make a viable business case in an unforgiving
environment.
Summary
There is an old adage among pilots that says, ``Plan your flight
and then fly your plan.'' With this subcommittee's oversight and
support, NASA is being reinvigorated and refocused. If it is to achieve
its new goals, however, NASA needs to stick to a well-thought-out plan.
A key enabler is assured access to space. This plan must include a
reduction in the complexity, cost and management burden of its current
launch infrastructure. In cooperation with DOD, NASA can take advantage
of an adaptive, responsive range of boosters to meet the needs of its
exciting future.
Statement of Northrop Grumman
NASA-DOD Cooperation in Space Transportation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for convening
a hearing on March 18, 2004, on the important topic of cooperation
between NASA and the Department of Defense on space transportation.
Northrop Grumman believes this is an important issue, and we would like
to take this opportunity to provide input to the process.
Developing safer, more reliable and cost-effective space
transportation systems is the key to all future U.S. activities in
space. New systems will mean more robust capabilities to defend America
and improve our national security. New launch capabilities are a
prerequisite to turn our dreams of exploring the Moon, Mars and beyond
into reality, because without new systems we will never achieve those
dreams. Such systems would support viable opportunities for industry in
space and enable us to explore concepts such as generating energy from
orbit. Science missions would also benefit since launch costs--often
half the cost of a science mission--would be less significant.
The Defense Department needs operationally responsive spacelift--
vehicles that can be launched on a few hours' notice, from a variety of
locations and with adaptable launch facilities. The current systems,
although technologically impressive, are slow and cumbersome, and they
cost so much to operate that they preclude our nation from taking the
best advantage of innovative thinking on national security from space.
NASA needs a system that augments safety while decreasing costs,
especially if it is to achieve sufficient cost savings to support its
bold new mission to explore the Moon, Mars and beyond. As Robert
Heinlein once said, ``Reach Earth orbit and you're halfway to anywhere
in the solar system.''
These two agencies may seem to be driven by different requirements,
yet they are not mutually exclusive. When there are so many pressing
concerns facing our nation, we don't have the luxury of developing a
vehicle that fills only a single need. A next-generation launch system
can be developed that will meet the needs of both DOD and NASA.
Later this year the White House is expected to issue a new national
space transportation policy. Preliminary drafts indicate that the
policy will eliminate the current bifurcation that limits NASA to
studying the development of reusable vehicles and DOD to studying the
development of expendable vehicles. This is a positive step. There are
great synergies between the needs of NASA and DOD, and although the
Nation needs to be careful not to develop a vehicle that attempts to be
all things to all customers, the two agencies should work together to
develop a vehicle architecture that can serve both of their needs.
There are three key aspects to ensure that the United States stays
at the forefront of space launch and develops the systems that will
support our future national security and exploration needs:
The Government must make a long-term commitment to sustained
investments in space launch technologies
A spiral development approach that makes gradual improvements
is essential to continued success
NASA and DOD should reach out beyond the traditional base of
launch systems providers to seek out new technologies and
approaches
NASA's recent investments in the Space Launch Initiative and Next
Generation Launch Technology programs have led to tremendous strides in
the development of numerous launch vehicle enabling technologies like
Composite Cryogenic Tanks and Integrated Vehicle Health Management
Systems. Similarly, DOD's FALCON program and future investments in
Operationally Responsive Space will continue to expand our knowledge
and capabilities. Taken together, these NASA and DOD programs are
critical investments in U.S. launch competitiveness.
These programs are an indication that our leaders are beginning to
understand that space launch is not a near-term technological hurdle,
but an enduring national necessity. The United States must invest in
these systems and technologies on a regular and continuous basis,
allowing for steady progress and continual improvements to keep this
nation at the forefront. Our national security and our scientific and
technological industry base require such a sustained commitment.
Using the stepping-stone, spiral development approach to space
launch--moving from expendable launch vehicles, to hybrid systems that
are partially reusable, and finally to fully reusable systems--is a
viable way to ensure steady improvements that will keep the United
States at the forefront of space access. It is time to move beyond 30-
and 40-year old technologies and build the launch systems that can
sustain space development safely and affordably, and in the long run
reusable systems are the clear choice. To get there does not require a
revolution, but regular technological improvements that build upon each
other. In the same way we evolved from the Model T Ford to the safer,
less expensive and more reliable automobiles of today, our nation
should make the investments in launch technologies that will move us
from expendable vehicles to the reliable workhorses of the future.
A number of companies have innovative solutions to U.S. space
launch requirements, and both DOD and NASA should look beyond the
established space launch providers. As recent work on FALCON, NASA's
Alternate Access to Station, and the National Aerospace Initiative
demonstrate, many of the most inventive solutions can come from
companies that take a fresh approach and have not been immersed in
traditional technologies and methods of operation from the past 30
years. Northrop Grumman is certain we are one of these companies that
can bring critical breakthroughs and innovative thinking to our
nation's space launch challenges, and we hope that space leaders
recognize the importance of competition and pioneering contributions
from those who are not wedded to the status quo.
Cooperation between NASA and DOD is central to successful
advancement in meeting this nation's space launch requirements now and
into the future. We need a government-wide assessment of requirements
that establishes clear objectives and acknowledges the technical
tradeoffs--that would provide the necessary direction to build a next-
generation system that meets the Nation's requirements.
Northrop Grumman believes U.S. Government and industry are on the
path to progress. Together we have made great technological strides in
recent years, and with a sustained commitment and step-by-step spiral
development we can achieve lasting success. Congress can provide the
multi-year funding to continually invest in space launch technologies
and oversee an obligation to an open, competitive process. With this
support from Congress, industry--with the firm commitment of Northrop
Grumman--will deliver the launch systems that will maintain U.S.
leadership in space far into the future.
Thank you for accepting Northrop Grumman's view on this very
important topic.
Prepared Statement of Wilbur Trafton
Wilbur Trafton
VP and GM, Expendable Launch Systems;
President, Boeing Launch Services
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to offer you Boeing's Launch Services
perspective on NASA-DOD cooperation in space transportation. While this
is an area with a complex history, what is not often appreciated is how
often NASA and DOD's space activities have resulted in synergistic
benefits to each organization. This trend continues to this day.
First, however, I would like to point out two areas of cooperation
that many may not be well recognized. Most specifically, in the mid-
1980's, NASA's space station program, provided an excellent training
ground for young space professionals who had entered the field during a
lull in the industry when the Shuttle development was complete, the
existing expendable launch systems were being phased out, and the DOD
did not have a major new development program underway. These young
professional engineers, scientists and factory workers, under the
guidance of their Apollo era superiors, designed and built today's
International Space Station--a technological marvel which, despite
budget and programmatic issues over the years, continues to function
nearly flawlessly six years after it began its on-orbit assembly in
1998.
In the mid-90's, as the U.S. Air Force sought to reduce the cost of
access, the Boeing Company employed many of the same professionals,
benefiting from their ISS experience, in leading the effort to design
and develop the Delta IV--our entry into the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) program. To date, the Delta IV has flown flawlessly
three times--a tribute to these professionals and the lessons they
learned while working on space station.
Now that the EELV development is complete, the U.S. has two new
fleets of highly capable, modern launch vehicles which can be used both
to support the original DOD mission model as well as jump start the new
NASA Space Exploration Vision. While NASA is currently engaged in trade
studies and analysis of the optimal space transportation solution for
crewed missions to Mars and the Moon, a decade or more of preparatory,
early missions can be supported by the existing Delta IV fleet and
modifications to it.
Relatively straightforward and affordable upgrades to the Delta IV
Heavy launch vehicle could increase our capabilities to Low Earth Orbit
(LEO) from our current 23 metric tons (mt) up to 45 mt. We would
encourage the USG to consider existing vehicle upgrades as an early
element of spiral development to enable near-term successes for space
exploration missions. This is similar to the process used in the Apollo
era which grew the early Redstone and Jupiter rockets into the Saturn I
and Saturn IB--which became the stepping stones which led to the Saturn
V.
This spiral development approach could focus on, for example, a
larger upper stage engine that would enhance Delta IV's performance to
support exploration missions and could also be used to support a new
super heavy-lift capability--whether an EELV-Derived, Shuttle-Derived
or a Clean Sheet concept. By developing such an engine early on, the
cost and schedule risk of developing the ultimate exploration launch
system could be reduced and, a new in-space propulsion capability (a
trans-lunar or trans-Mars stage) could also be developed. Other
technologies that could be considered include upgrades to the existing
Delta IV RS-68 engine (the only new large U.S. booster engine in
decades), densified cryogenic propellants, and aluminum lithium
propellant tanks.
In the course of these spiral developments of the existing EELV
fleets to support NASA's Space Exploration Vision, the Nation's defense
will directly benefit from these upgraded performance capabilities
which will be available to meet future military space requirements. And
future DOD programs will leverage the engineering skill base that is
sustained and enhanced in support of NASA's development efforts. In
this way, synergistic cooperation between NASA and DOD will continue to
benefit the respective visions of each organization as well as that of
our space dependent society.
I thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony.