[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND
SECURITY IN VISA POLICY:
STATUS AND NEXT STEPS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 25, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-43
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
91-903 WASHINGTON : 2004
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California NICK LAMPSON, Texas
NICK SMITH, Michigan JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DAVID WU, Oregon
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
Washington LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois ZOE LOFGREN, California
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland BRAD SHERMAN, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia JIM MATHESON, Utah
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah VACANCY
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas VACANCY
JO BONNER, Alabama VACANCY
TOM FEENEY, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
VACANCY
C O N T E N T S
February 25, 2004
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 13
Written Statement............................................ 14
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Minority Ranking Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 15
Written Statement............................................ 15
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 16
Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives.... 16
Prepared Statement by Representative Lincoln Davis, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 17
Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 17
Witnesses:
The Hon. Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 19
Written Statement............................................ 21
Biography.................................................... 23
Mr. Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade,
General Accounting Office
Oral Statement............................................... 23
Written Statement............................................ 25
Biography.................................................... 32
Ms. Janice L. Jacobs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of
Consular Affairs, Department of State
Oral Statement............................................... 33
Written Statement............................................ 34
Mr. Robert J. Garrity, Jr., Deputy Assistant Director, Record/
Information Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Oral Statement............................................... 37
Written Statement............................................ 39
Biography.................................................... 45
Discussion....................................................... 46
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
The Hon. Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security, Department of Homeland Security....... 68
Ms. Janice L. Jacobs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of
Consular Affairs, Department of State.......................... 70
Mr. Robert J. Garrity, Jr., Deputy Assistant Director, Record/
Information Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation.... 75
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Statement by Janice L. Jacobs, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Visa Services, United States Department of State, on the 117th
class of Foreign Service Officers.............................. 80
Statement by the Association of American Universities............ 84
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND SECURITY IN VISA POLICY: STATUS AND
NEXT STEPS
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2004
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.
Boehlert (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The Conflict Between Science and
Security in Visa Policy:
Status and Next Steps
wednesday, february 25, 2004
9:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On Wednesday, February 25, 2004, the House Science Committee will
hold a hearing to review the impact of enhanced security measures on
the entry into the U.S. of foreign students and scholars. More
specifically, the Committee will examine whether the new security
measures have enhanced security, whether they have been unnecessarily
detrimental to the U.S. scientific enterprise, and how they can be
implemented more smoothly. As part of the hearing, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) will release a new study, conducted at the
Committee's request, on the extent of visa delays and what might be
done to reduce them without compromising security.
The hearing will build on a hearing the Committee held on visa
issues on March 26, 2003 and on other hearings the Committee has held
over the past two years on the impact of security concerns on
scientific research.
2. Witnesses
The Honorable Asa Hutchinson is the Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Prior to being confirmed as Under Secretary, Mr. Hutchinson served as
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Before that, he
served as a Member of Congress from Arkansas from 1997-2001.
Mr. Jess Ford is the Director of International Affairs and Trade at the
General Accounting Office (GAO). Since 1973, Mr. Ford has worked
extensively in the national security and international affairs areas at
GAO, with issues ranging from trade, foreign assistance, and foreign
policy.
Ms. Janice Jacobs is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Office of
Consular Affairs at the Department of State. Prior to this appointment,
she served two years as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in
Santo Domingo. Ms. Jacobs's 23-year foreign service career has included
a mix of Washington, D.C. and overseas assignments, including the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Mexico, Nigeria,
and Thailand.
Mr. Robert Garrity, Jr. is the Deputy Assistant Director for Record/
Information Administration at the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). Mr. Garrity began his career with the FBI in August 1976 and he
served in the Savannah, New York, and Dallas field offices. More
recently, Mr. Garrity served as the FBI's Interim Records Officer at
FBI headquarters, where he was charged with the responsibility of
assessing the FBI's records management systems.
3. Overarching Questions
How can the Federal Government implement a visa
regime that protects the Nation from terrorist threats without
turning away the foreign students and scholars on which the
U.S. scientific enterprise has long depended? Have changes in
visa processes instituted since September 11th had unnecessary
detrimental effects on the U.S. scientific enterprise?
Does the U.S. collect the data needed to determine
the impact of visa processes on the interest and ability of
foreign students and scholars to work in the U.S.? Does the
U.S. collect the data needed to determine whether visa
processes are effectively screening applicants to identify
potential terrorists?
How can the visa processes for foreign students and
scholars be made to work more smoothly? Specifically: How does
the Administration plan to respond to the new GAO report, just
completed for the Science Committee, Improvements Needed to
Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and
Scholars? What is the current status of the Student Exchange
and Visitor Information System (SEVIS), the relatively new,
automated and sometimes-troubled system run by DHS to track
foreign students in the U.S.? What is the status of the
Interagency Panel on Advanced Science Security (IPASS), an
interagency committee that was supposed to screen foreign
students interested in studying topics that raised security
concerns?
4. Background and Current Issues
How dependent is the U.S. scientific enterprise on foreign students and
scholars?
The U.S. has long been a magnet for foreign-born scientists and
engineers, and many of the greatest U.S. scientific achievements have
depended on them. Two classic examples are the scientists who fled the
Nazis before World War II and became the leaders of the program that
built the atomic bomb, and the scientists who left Germany after the
war and helped form the core of the U.S. space program.
Even with a far more extensive U.S. scientific enterprise today,
the U.S. depends on foreign students and scholars. In 1999, the latest
year for which figures were available, foreign students received more
than one-third of the doctorates awarded in the U.S., and accounted for
an even higher percentage in critical scientific fields. Foreign
students were awarded almost half the U.S. doctorates in engineering,
47 percent of the doctorates in mathematics and computer sciences, and
40 percent of the doctorates in the physical sciences. Of the foreign
students who received doctoral degrees in the U.S., 36 percent came
from China and India. Many of them remained in the U.S. after
completing their studies. In 1999, 72 percent of foreign doctoral
recipients planned to stay in the U.S., and half had already received
firm job offers. (Statistics are from National Science Foundation,
Science and Engineering Indicators.)
Statistics are not available for faculty, but many faculty in the
physical sciences and engineering are also in the U.S. on visas. Also,
foreign scholars require visas to attend scientific conferences in the
U.S. where their contributions can help U.S. scientists keep abreast of
the most important global developments in their fields.
What changes have taken place since the September 11th attacks that
affect foreign students and scholars?
While the U.S. has benefited incalculably from being a haven for
foreign students and scholars, U.S. openness also makes the Nation more
vulnerable to security threats. Several of the September 11th hijackers
were in the U.S. on student visas (though not to study science or
engineering), and scientific know-how gained in the U.S. could later be
turned against our country. With that in mind, both Congress and the
Administration have made significant changes to the visa system in the
past few years. Changes in visa policy and the specific ways those
changes have been implemented have tended to make the visa process
slower and more cumbersome. The most significant changes are described
below:
New Bureaucracy
First, in the Act creating the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), Congress significantly altered the bureaucracy in charge of
visas. DHS (rather than the State Department) is now in charge of
establishing visa policy and reviewing its implementation. The State
Department continues to implement the policy by managing consular
officers, making decisions on individual visa applications and issuing
the visas. The Act also abolished the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), which was part of the Justice Department, and replaced
it with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which
is part of DHS. That Bureau is responsible for the student tracking
system (SEVIS) and related policies. DHS began full operations last
March and has since signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the State
Department concerning visa processes.
Additional Security Checks
Second, visa applicants are much more likely than they were before
September 11th to be subject to security checks. However, the
government does not seem to have clear and consistent criteria about
which visa applicants warrant a security check or how to determine
whether an applicant presents a security threat. The State Department
has been encouraging consular officers to err on the side of caution.
By contrast, prior to September 11th, State Department visa operations
focused primarily on screening applicants to determine whether they
intended to work or reside illegally in the U.S. following expiration
of their visas rather than on security concerns. Consular officers were
encouraged to facilitate legitimate travel, and many even faced
pressure to issue more visas.
The security check process for those engaged in sensitive
technologies is known as Visas Mantis (Appendix I). Consular officers
can request a Visas Mantis review whenever they have doubts about an
individual applicant. A request for a Visas Mantis review is sent from
the consulate to Washington, and then an investigation is carried out
by the FBI or other relevant security agency. State Department
officials in Washington review the results of the investigation and
advise the consular officer on whether to grant the visa. But the
ultimate decision is left up to the consular officer who originally
requested the Visas Mantis review.
In deciding whether to request a Visas Mantis review, a consular
officer may consider whether a visa applicant will be dealing with
technologies that are on the State Department's Technology Alert List
(TAL). The TAL includes technologies with potential ``dual-use''
applications in 15 categories, which range from munitions and rockets
to urban planning and sensors. Some observers believe that the TAL is
not sufficiently selective to be of real use and increases the
likelihood that consular offices will seek Visas Mantis reviews that
are not needed. The TAL is so broad that it includes nearly every
possible associated technology or skill involving chemistry,
biochemistry, immunology, chemical engineering and pharmacology to name
a few.
Personal Interviews
Third, in August 2003, the State Department issued a new policy,
requiring virtually all visa applicants to be interviewed in person by
a consular officer. The requirement can only be waived for a person who
is either very young or very old. Limited exceptions also exist for
diplomatic or official visas and those in the national interest. No
additional funds were provided to consulates to meet this additional
workload. Delays in scheduling interviews have, in some cases, made it
impossible for a student to enroll.
SEVIS
Finally, to improve the tracking of foreign students and scholars,
Congress created the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
(SEVIS), a computerized database of foreign students in the U.S., which
was fully implemented in August 2003. Institutions of higher education
must input information on their foreign students into the system and
must keep such information as a student's address and educational
status up-to-date. SEVIS replaced a paper-based system, which was
widely criticized as antiquated and inadequate. Initially, the system
was plagued with technical flaws. The system sometimes lost, changed or
misplaced data. Universities report that the system is improving, but
continues to have technical glitches that may complicate a foreign
student's ability to enter the U.S.
What impact have the new rules had on the U.S. scientific enterprise?
There are some early indications that the new visa rules are
discouraging foreign students from coming to the U.S., and there are
numerous anecdotes of students and researchers needlessly running afoul
of the new rules, with damage to their research as a result.
According to a recent report by the Institute of International
Education, the number of foreign students enrolled in American colleges
and universities rose by 0.6 percent in 2002, the smallest growth since
1996. In each of the previous two academic years, foreign student
enrollment increased by 6.4 percent. In a 2003 survey of 320 U.S.
university officials by the Association of International Education (a
different group from the Institute), 94 percent of respondents said
they believed that foreign student enrollment was declining because the
students felt that U.S. visas were too difficult to get. The drop is
coming as other nations are competing more aggressively for students
from outside their borders. In the 2003 survey, 45 percent of the
university officials said that increased marketing efforts by other
countries or relaxation of other countries' visa regulations had
contributed to the drop off in foreign students.
Typical of the anecdotes was a case in which a graduate student
briefly returned to China after working at the Johns Hopkins Medical
School for two years. When he attempted to return to the U.S. he was
delayed and his diabetes research was compromised.
How much information do we have on how the new system is working?
Data on how the visa system is working is extremely difficult to
obtain. The State Department keeps very few statistics related to visas
for scientists and engineers. Also, some information is inherently
difficult to obtain, such as information on how many individuals
decided not to apply for a visa because of the new regulations.
Broad data can be pieced together. Based on an analysis of State
Department data, GAO determined that in fiscal year 2003, the State
Department issued 235,579 student visas (for students in all fields and
at all levels of study) and 283,660 exchange visitor visas. In that
same period, the State Department rejected 128,660 applicants for
student visas (for any reason) and 54,614 applicants for exchange
visitor visas. No further breakdowns of those data are available.
For example, the State Department has no data on the number of
science student and scholar visa applicants who undergo a Visas Mantis
check or on how long it took to conduct Visas Mantis checks.
What did the GAO examination of the system find?
Because of the lack of data, the Science Committee turned to GAO to
get some sense of how the visa system has been working. The study
focused on implementation rather than policy. Last March, Science
Committee Chairman Boehlert and then-Ranking Member Hall sent a letter
to GAO (Appendix II), asking GAO to determine how long it took a
science student or scholar from another country to obtain a visa. The
request also asked GAO to identify the factors that contributed to visa
delays and to review the measures underway to improve the visa process.
Findings
GAO reviewed the State Department's visa-related data systems and
determined they could not track science applicants within student (F)
and exchange visitor (J) visa categories. As a result, they were unable
determine the length of time to adjudicate visas for science students
or scholars. However, GAO did find that visa adjudication time is
largely dependent on whether applicants were subject to Visas Mantis
reviews. GAO then sampled Visas Mantis cases involving science students
and scholars and determined the following:
It took an average of 67 days to adjudicate Visas
Mantis requests (from the time American consular office
received the visa application to the time the Department of
State notifies the office of the results of the review).
Personal interviews with consular officers also
contributed to visa delays (generally taking two to three weeks
at American consulates in China, India and Russia).
Many consular staff were concerned that they were
contributing to the wait because they lacked clear guidance on
when to seek Visas Mantis checks and on whether the checks
provided enough background information.
In response to the GAO findings, the Department of State and the
FBI reported that they have several measures underway to improve the
visa process. To improve transparency, both agencies have set up public
inquiry desks to answer questions about the status of pending visa
applications. To reduce the time it takes to process Visas Mantis
cases, the agencies indicated that they are working together on a case-
by-case basis to identify and resolve Visas Mantis cases that have been
outstanding for several months to a year (estimated at nearly 1,000
cases). In addition, the State Department has invested $1 million to
upgrade its technology for transmitting Visas Mantis requests, though
the implementation timetable and other details associated with this
technology remain unclear.
Recommendations
The GAO report recommended that the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the FBI Director, and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, develop and implement a plan to improve the Visas Mantis
process. In developing this plan, GAO urged the Secretary to consider
actions to: 1) establish milestones to reduce the current number of
pending Visas Mantis cases; 2) develop performance goals and
measurements for processing Visas Mantis checks; 3) provide additional
information, through training or other means at consular posts, to
clarify guidance on the overall operation of the Visas Mantis program,
including when Mantis clearances are required, what information
consular posts should submit to enable the clearance process to proceed
as efficiently as possible, and how long the process takes; and 4) work
to achieve inter-operable systems and expedite transmittal of data
between agencies.
What are the other main problems and issues facing the visa system
right now?
There are a number of issues beyond those discussed above:
IPASS
In May 2002, the White House announced that an interagency
committee would be set up to review the visa applications of
individuals intending to come to the U.S. as graduate students, post-
doctoral fellows, or researchers in ``sensitive'' fields to do work
``uniquely available'' on U.S. campuses. The committee was dubbed the
Interagency Panel on Advanced Science Security (IPASS) and was to
include representatives of the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP), DHS, the State Department and other relevant
agencies. Initially, OSTP was heading up the efforts to create IPASS,
but that task moved to DHS once that Department was created.
DHS is still putting together IPASS. It remains unclear exactly who
will be on IPASS, how it will function, and what visa applications it
will review. The initial impetus for IPASS was to ensure that federal
officials with scientific expertise would have a role in reviewing
visas, in part, to prevent foreign scientists from being turned away
needlessly. But now, some in the scientific community are concerned
that IPASS could add another level of screening and delay to an already
burdensome process.
Visa Waiver
The Enhanced Border Security Act of 2001 called for 27 countries
whose citizens do not require a visa to enter the U.S. (such as Canada,
Germany, Britain and New Zealand) to issue passports with biometric
data for all citizens who travel to the U.S. Under the law, if one of
those countries does not issue such passports by October 26, 2004, then
the U.S. will begin requiring visas for that country. So far, only two
nations seem likely to meet the deadline. That could mean that the
State Department may need to begin processing as many as five million
more visa applications annually. That could easily overwhelm the
resources of the visa system.
US VISIT
The Border Security Act of 2002 requires all U.S. ports of entry to
have equipment and software installed that will allow biometric
comparison and the authentication of all visas and other travel and
entry documents by October 26, 2004. Named the U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (U.S. VISIT) Program by DHS, the
system is designed to secure the border and track visa overstays. U.S.
VISIT is going to be implemented in phases over the next several years.
The first phase has been deployed at 115 airports and 14 seaports.
Foreign visitors who require a visa to travel to the U.S., including
those in this country on student or exchange visitor visas, will have
their travel documents scanned, fingerprints and photos taken, and
identification checked against terrorist watch lists. They system
replaces the current National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
and will be integrated with SEVIS. Some are concerned that the system
will not be prepared to handle its first mass influx of students this
fall, which could result in delays in entry into the U.S.
SEVIS
Although SEVIS continues to improve, a fully functioning system
appears to still be a few years away. In addition, in October 2003, the
State Department issued a proposed rule to implement the Congressional
requirement that the SEVIS system be funded by visa applicants.
Universities have a number of concerns about the proposal.
Under the proposed rule, individuals interested in obtaining a visa
would have to pay a $100 fee before they are eligible to get a visa
application. The fee must be remitted either by credit card or with a
check or money order in dollars drawn on a U.S. bank. Universities are
concerned that the fee may be too high, that it must be paid even by
applicants who do not end up enrolling in a U.S. institution (and only
such students get recorded in SEVIS), and that it will create a system
of paper receipts that could further slow down the electronic SEVIS
system.
5. Questions for Witnesses
Under Secretary Hutchinson (DHS)
When establishing visa policy, how do you balance the
potential threat of terrorism posed by visiting students and
scholars and the benefits to the U.S. of welcoming visiting
scholars to participate in our scientific enterprise?
Is it possible to design a system that will weed out
potential terrorists without discouraging the world's best
scientists and brightest students from visiting the U.S. and
contributing to our knowledge base?
How does the Department of Homeland Security work
with State Department consular officers to help them determine
which would-be visiting scholars pose a potential security
threat?
An effective tracking system is an essential tool in
reducing the threat of terrorism, yet at a March 2003 Science
Committee hearing, one witness testified that the Student and
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) was deployed before
it was fully operational, leading to numerous glitches and
breaches of confidentiality. What is the current status of
SEVIS? What steps has the Department of Homeland Security taken
to address problems that were identified last year?
Is the SEVIS fee a processing fee or a tracking fee?
What is the status of the SEVIS fee? How will it be collected
and why is that agency best suited for the job? What impact
will this method of collection have on foreign students and
scholars seeking entry to the U.S.?
In remarks to the American Association of
Universities, Secretary Ridge characterized the Interagency
Panel on Advance Science and Security (IPASS) as ``one of the
greatest solutions'' in dealing with the problems of foreign
students and scientists. What is the status of IPASS? How will
it work? When will it be operational?
Mr. Garrity (FBI)
How are Visas Mantis requests currently transmitted
from the State Department to the FBI and from the FBI to the
State Department?
What is your internal process for tracking a Visas
Mantis case? How often is that information available
electronically? And how often must that file be located
physically? What are your plans to fully automate this process?
Have there been cases where a file has not been located and the
applicant is still pending a response?
What priority do Visas Mantis investigations have
among other FBI work? How do you think these waits impact your
ability, and the ability of other law enforcement agencies, to
identify and capture a terrorist as opposed to simply
preventing him or her from entering the country at that
particular post?
What steps are you taking to make FBI's systems
inter-operable with the State Department, which recently
invested about $1 million to upgrade its technology for
transmitting Visas Mantis requests? Until systems are inter-
operable, how will information be transmitted and what impact
will it have on processing time?
How satisfied are you about the appropriateness of
the cases referred for additional review under Mantis? Are
consular officers providing agents with enough information and
the right type of information in their requests?
What steps have you taken to improve the visa
application vetting process? In light of the fact that there
have been lengthy waits and there are still Mantis cases that
have been pending more than 60 days, what measures do you have
underway that will identify and resolve these cases?
Ms. Jacobs (State)
In managing the visa application process, the
consular corps, and their functions, how does the State
Department balance the potential threat of terrorism posed by
visiting students and scholars and the benefits to the U.S. of
welcoming visiting scholars to participate in our scientific
enterprise?
In your view, is it possible to design a system that
will weed out potential terrorists without discouraging the
world's best scientists and brightest students from visiting
the U.S. and contributing to our knowledge base?
What guidance do you provide to consular staff on the
Visas Mantis process? Do you provide guidance on when to apply
Visas Mantis? How do consular officers know if they are
applying the checks appropriately?
What steps has the State Department taken to improve
the visa process during the last year? In light of the fact
that there are still Mantis cases that have been pending more
than 60 days, what measures do you have underway that will
identify and resolve these cases? How do you propose to better
track these cases in the future?
How--and how often--are the results of name checks
for Visas Mantis cases provided to the State Department? Why do
you think it took the State Department two weeks or longer to
inform a post that it could issue a visa?
What impact have new requirements, such as the
personal appearance requirement, had on the length of time it
takes to adjudicate a visa? What impact has your request to
give priority consideration to students and exchange visitors
been accommodated at various posts and how has this impacted
staffing? What impact will the implementation of new biometrics
requirements in October 2004 have on the length of time to
adjudicate a visa?
Appendix I--Visa Adjudication Process
1. The process begins when an applicant schedules a visa
interview at an American consulate abroad.
2. After receiving an interview time, the applicant goes to
the post, where the visa application is reviewed by the
consular officer and the applicant's name is checked against
the Department of State's automated system of law enforcement
watch lists (also known as CLASS).
3. The consular officer reviews the data and conducts a
personal interview.
4. If the consular officer determines that the applicant is
eligible for non-immigrant status under the INA\1\, the
applicant moves to the next step in the process. If the
applicant is not eligible for non-immigrant status, the visa
application is denied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The term non-immigrant generally refers to a foreign national
seeking to enter the U.S. temporarily for one of the specified purposes
allowed under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The most
common reason for denial of a visa is that the applicant intends to
come to the U.S. and remain. Section 214(b) of the INA presumes that
every alien is an immigrant until he or she establishes that he or she
is eligible to non-immigrant status under the INA. Often, this means
establishing, in addition to other criteria, that the alien has
sufficient social or economic ties to compel him or her to return home
after visiting the U.S.
5. After establishing the applicant's non-immigrant status,
the consular officer determines if there is any reason the
applicant might be ineligible to receive a visa. After looking
to see if the applicant's field or area of study falls under
the Technology Alert List (TAL), a consular officer may use his
or her discretion to request a security advisory opinion (in
the case of TAL, or sensitive technology concerns, this request
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
is known as Visas Mantis).
6. If the consular officer does not request a security
advisory opinion, he or she makes a decision to issue or deny a
visa to an applicant. If the consular officer requests the
security advisory opinion, he or she sends a Visas Mantis cable
to State Department headquarters in Washington, DC.
7. The State Department's Consular Affairs sends the cable to
the Nonproliferation Bureau, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other federal agencies.
8. These agencies conduct an investigation and return with
their findings to Consular Affairs.
9. Consular Affairs summarizes the findings and returns the
prepared security advisory opinion, which indicates whether or
not they have an objection to the visa, to posts.
10. Using the security advisory opinion, the consular officer
issues or denies the visa to the applicant.
Appendix II--GAO Request
The Honorable David M. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States
Dear Comptroller General Walker:
Each year, thousands of international scholars and students
participate in education and exchange programs at U.S. universities and
institutions. Their research is important to achieving technological
advancements that serve U.S. and global interests. Furthermore, it
brings together the U.S. and international communities, promoting
dialogue and teamwork that is useful for our overall science and
foreign policy goals. While the Committee wants to facilitate this type
of exchange, we are well aware of the need to balance that effort with
those to screen out visa applicants who pose a threat to our country.
We have received information that the research and study plans of
some scientific scholars and students from abroad have been derailed
because their visa applications were denied or the adjudication process
took too long. The Committee believes that it is in our national
interest for these visa decisions to be made as quickly as possible,
consistent with immigration law and homeland security concerns. For
that reason, we would like to obtain a fuller understanding of the visa
backlog issue and its magnitude.
We read with interest your report entitled BORDER SECURITY: Visa
Process Should Be Strengthened as an Anti-terrorism Tool. In
particular, we were interested in the report's discussion of the Visas
Condor program and the delays and problems identified in the special
visa checks initiated after September 11, 2001.
We believe that a similar assessment of the visa process as it
pertains to foreign scientific scholars and students (particularly for
F-1 and J-1 visas) would be very useful to the Committee and our
oversight agenda. In carrying out this investigation, we suggest that
you consider (1) results of visa adjudication, including denial rates,
visa backlogs, and duration of visa reviews, (2) operation of the Visas
Mantis program, (3) visa policies and procedures concerning applicants
who will engage in research or studies involving potentially sensitive
technologies, (4) existing exchange programs and bilateral protocols
guiding scientific exchanges, and (5) the impact of actions taken since
September 11 to strengthen and improve visa policies and procedures.
In addition, because many seeking entry to the United States for
scientific research and studies are citizens of China (mainland and
Taiwan), India and Russia, we ask that you determine what other factors
may be affecting the processing of visas in these countries, including
adequacy of trained staff at post, level of scrutiny over applications,
and special security or other concerns.
Based on your analysis, we would appreciate your thoughts on
potential improvements that can be made. As you develop your work
scope, please contact Kara Haas at 225-8115 to discuss study
alternatives and timing.
Thank you for the kind consideration of this request. We look
forward to your findings.
Sincerely,
Sherwood Boehlert Ralph Hall
Chairman Ranking Member
Appendix III--Request for Written Testimony from Dr. Marburger
John H. Marburger, III, Ph.D.
Director
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, DC 20502
Dear Dr. Marburger:
I understand that you will be unable to attend the Science
Committee's February 25 hearing on the impact of new visa regulations
on the ability of foreign students and scholars to enroll in education
and engage in research in the U.S. Your perspective on this issue is
important, however, and I would appreciate it if you could provide
written answers to the following questions by February 20, 2004.
1. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP),
together with the Office of Homeland Security, established an
interagency working group to implement the requirements of
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2, which called on the
Federal Government to prohibit certain international students
from receiving education and training in sensitive areas. In
May 2002, based on the recommendations of the working group,
the White House unveiled its plan to create an Interagency
Panel on Advanced Science Security (IPASS) to provide increased
scrutiny for student or exchange visitor applicants who hoped
to study or conduct research in certain sensitive science and
technology fields. What is the status of IPASS? When will IPASS
be operational?
2. What role does OSTP currently have in IPASS?
3. When you appeared before the Science Committee in October
2002, you indicated that those responsible for the enhanced
review of sensitive science and technology under IPASS would be
drawn from the Department of State, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Bureau, Department of Homeland Security), intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, and federal science and technology
agencies. What role have you--or the federal science and
technology agencies under your purview--had in the review of
the visa applications of science students and scholars? Does
this structure meaningfully enhance homeland security or stem
the proliferation of sensitive science and technology without
the case-by-case review by scientific experts envisioned by
IPASS? Absent IPASS, how can we embed technical expertise in
the visa process?
4. In what way is your Office monitoring the extent to which
security procedures are hampering the entry of scientists and
engineers to the United States? Have you pressed for additional
data collection so that policy-makers can get a clearer picture
of the impact of the security regime?
Thank you for addressing these issues. It is my hope that this
hearing will encourage greater cooperation among the various agencies
involved in the visa process--and provide greater appreciation for the
impact of visa delays on students, scientists, universities and
research facilities.
Sincerely,
SHERWOOD BOEHLERT
Chairman
Chairman Boehlert. I want to welcome everyone to this
morning's hearing which focuses on two issues of vital concern
to this committee, and to the Nation as a whole; namely, how to
enhance homeland security and how to ensure that we continue to
have a thriving scientific enterprise. When it comes to visa
policy, we sometimes talk about finding the proper balance
between those two concerns. But talk of balance is in many ways
misleading. Our nation will not be secure in the long run if it
does not have a healthy scientific enterprise, and science
cannot thrive in an atmosphere of insecurity.
But security and science are also complementary in more
practical ways that must be kept in mind when reviewing visa
policy. A visa regime that casts too wide a net that holds up
just about everybody for excessive security checks, that regime
is not good for security or for science. It is not good for
security because it distracts and overwhelms the system, taking
resources away from investigations of individuals more likely
to present a real threat to our nation. And it is obviously not
good for science, given that the United States' success in
science has always depended on attracting the best minds from
around the world.
Now all of this is easier to talk about in the abstract
than to implement on a daily basis. Potential terrorists
obviously aren't easily identifiable. As a Member of the
Intelligence Committee, I am painfully aware of the real and
insidious threats facing our nation. I spent three hours
yesterday afternoon with the Director of the CIA in a world
threat assessment briefing. Not very comforting. In the
immediate wake of September 11, it was right to err on the side
of caution. But we have had time to learn since then and we
can't have a visa system that needlessly discourages and
alienates scientists from around the world who could be a boon
to this country.
The General Accounting Office study that Congressman Hall
and I requested, and that will be released at this hearing,
indicates that we have some real problems with our current visa
processes. That shouldn't surprise anyone. The study also
indicates that we can solve these problems without compromising
security, and in that respect, let me compliment one of our
witnesses, Secretary Hutchinson, for the leadership he is
providing in this area.
I know about the problems, not only from the fine work of
GAO, but from personal experience. I had to personally
intervene repeatedly to get a visa for Dr. Ramon Bruguda, a
world-class heart specialist who was featured recently in the
New York Times for his life-saving research. He was having
trouble getting permission to come to this country to do his
world-class research at the Masonic Research Facility in my
hometown of Utica, New York. Our visa system shouldn't be
spending its time worrying about the Ramon Brugudas of the
world.
I am very pleased and grateful that we have before us today
my friend and former colleague, Secretary Hutchinson, who is
the person on the hot seat on this issue. His job ain't easy.
Secretary Hutchinson has the extraordinarily daunting task of
creating a visa policy that will let in scientists, while
keeping out terrorists. I look forward to hearing from him. I
hope that at the end of this hearing, we will have reached at
least a preliminary agreement on steps that can be taken to
make sure that our consular officers ask for security checks on
anyone who might present a threat, but only on those who might
present a threat, and how to collect better data to see if our
visa security processes are properly focused.
Everyone has to be willing to put up with more delays and
bureaucracy in the post-September 11 world. But we still have
an obligation to ensure that we are not needlessly alienating
scholars from around the world who could help this Nation, and
that we are not unnecessarily hamstringing or burdening our
universities and research centers. As I said earlier in my
testimony, and my high school English teacher would be offended
if she heard me say it, it ain't easy. This is very, very
difficult, and we all have to be mindful of the challenge
facing Secretary Hutchinson and Governor Ridge. It is a
difficult task.
Our purpose here is to work cooperatively to face that
challenge and overcome it in a responsible way so that we can
shape public policy to the benefit of all Americans. Mr.
Gordon.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
I want to welcome everyone to this morning's hearing, which focuses
on two issues of vital concern to this committee and to the Nation as a
whole--namely, how to enhance homeland security and how to ensure that
we continue to have a thriving scientific enterprise.
When it comes to visa policy, we sometimes talk about finding ``the
proper balance'' between those two concerns. But talk of balance is in
many ways misleading. Our nation will not be secure, in the long run,
if it does not have a healthy scientific enterprise, and science cannot
thrive in an atmosphere of insecurity.
But security and science are also complementary in more practical
ways that must be kept in mind when reviewing visa policy. A visa
regime that casts too wide a net--that holds up just about everybody
for excessive security checks--that regime is not good for security or
for science.
It's not good for security because it distracts and overwhelms the
system, taking resources away from investigations of individuals more
likely to present a real threat to our nation. And it's obviously not
good for science, given that U.S. success in science has always
depended on attracting the best minds from around the world.
Now all this is easier to talk about in the abstract than to
implement on a daily basis. Potential terrorists obviously aren't
easily identifiable. As a Member of the Intelligence Committee, I'm
painfully aware of the real and insidious threats facing our nation.
And in the immediate wake of September 11th, it was right to err on the
side of caution.
But we've had time to learn since then, and we can't have a visa
system that needlessly discourages and alienates scientists from around
the world who could be a boon to this country. The General Accounting
Office (GAO) study that Congressman Hall and I requested, and that will
be released at this hearing, indicates that we have some real problems
with our current visa processes. The study also indicates that we can
solve those problems without compromising security.
I know about the problems not only from the fine work of GAO, but
from personal experience. I had to intervene repeatedly to get a visa
for Dr. Ramon Bruguda, a world-class heart specialist, featured
recently in The New York Times for his life-saving research, who was
having trouble getting permission to come to this country to do work at
the Masonic Home in Utica. Our visa system shouldn't be spending its
time worrying about the Ramon Brugudas of the world.
I'm very pleased and grateful that we have before us today, my
friend and former colleague, Secretary Hutchinson, who is the person in
the hot seat on this issue. Asa has the extraordinarily daunting task
of creating a visa policy that will let in scientists while keeping out
terrorists. I look forward to hearing from him.
I hope that at the end of this hearing, we will have reached at
least a preliminary agreement on steps that can be taken to make sure
that our consular officers ask for security checks on anyone who might
present a threat, but only on those who might present a threat, and on
how to collect better data to see if our visa security processes are
properly focused.
Everyone has to be willing to put up with more delays and
bureaucracy in the post-September 11th world. But we still have an
obligation to ensure that we are not needlessly alienating scholars
from around the world who could help this nation, and that we are not
unnecessarily ham-stringing or burdening our universities and research
centers.
Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses today, and I
want to thank you for providing the opportunity for the
Committee to explore this important issue. As I was listening
to your opening statement, as usual, I concur, and quite
frankly could not add to it or make it any better. So I will
just again concur with your remarks, and we will move forward.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Bart Gordon
I am pleased to join the Chairman in welcoming our witnesses to
today's hearing.
I want to thank the Chairman for providing this opportunity for the
Committee to explore an important issue that is at the intersection of
strengthening homeland security and ensuring the well being of the
Nation's science and technology enterprise.
Throughout much of our history, the United States has benefited
from the infusion of scientific and engineering talent from abroad.
Today, U.S. universities rely on foreign students to fill half or
more of their graduate student positions in many fields of science,
mathematics and engineering.
Without these students, research programs could not go forward; and
since about half of the graduates from these programs remain here, the
science and technology capabilities of the Nation would also suffer if
this pipeline were to dry up.
As we learned in our hearing last Spring, there is growing evidence
that excessive delays and uncertainty in obtaining visas by foreign
students and scholars has made the U.S. less attractive as a
destination for scientific training and for research collaborations.
While the Nation clearly benefits from the presence of
international students and scholars, we all understand the importance
of being vigilant in guarding our boarders against those who would do
us harm.
Putting in place effective screening procedures for visa
applications is reasonable and necessary.
The issue before us today is not whether we need thorough and
effective procedures for reviewing visa applications. Rather it is to
find an appropriate balance between two important national goals.
On the one hand we benefit from attracting talented international
students to our universities, and we benefit by nurturing scientific
collaborations and information exchange with foreign researchers.
On the other hand, we must defend ourselves against terrorists.
We must find ways to ensure that boarder security is applied
effectively while also ensuring that this country remains an inviting
place for bright foreign students to study and for scientific exchanges
to occur with leading researchers from all parts of the world.
The Committee charged the GAO to explore the current state of the
visa application and approval process to help us understand how well it
is working and to make recommendations on how it could be improved.
The GAO's recommendations focus on the need for the three agencies
represented here today to work together to develop and implement an
improvement plan for the Visas Mantis process--the main source of delay
in the processing of visas for science applicants.
I look forward to hearing the agencies' reactions to the GAO
findings and recommendations regarding the sticking points in the
system, and how it can be made to work better.
Also, I hope to learn what has become of the Interagency Panel on
Advanced Science and Security, which Secretary Ridge has characterized
as one of the greatest solutions for dealing with visa requests by
students and scientists.
I want to thank the Chairman for calling a hearing on this
important subject.
I appreciate the attendance of our witnesses today, and I look
forward to our discussion.
Thank you and yield back.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith, do you
have any opening remarks? Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good morning. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before
our committee to discuss the impact of security measures to control
entry of foreign students and scholars into the United States. I
believe we must work hard to balance national security with the needs
of universities. If visa delays and denials are indeed substantially
increasing, the U.S. science and technology enterprise could be
damaged.
In response to events such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
and the attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns have been raised about
foreign students in the U.S. as well as the courses they studied and
research they conducted. Certain government officials and members of
the intelligence community were concerned that our existing student
visa policy and free learning environment would provide terrorists easy
access to our country and put us at risk of training future terrorists
in sensitive areas. New regulations were imposed on processing visa
applications, which have caused severe backlogs, delays, denials, and
has hindered attendance at international conferences. Universities
depend heavily on foreign students to fill postgraduate programs,
particularly in science, and these students represent an important
source of research assistance in the sciences and mathematics. In
engineering, foreign students make up half of all candidates for
advanced degrees. While national security is a great concern, we must
recognize that very few international students are indeed a risk to the
U.S. and the vast majority provides necessary assistance to our
nation's academic environment.
In my congressional district, Southern Illinois University-
Carbondale has been experiencing delays and decreases in international
enrollments. Grassroots efforts have been underway to bring attention
to the issue. For example, the Carbondale City Council recently passed
a resolution objecting to certain cumbersome restrictions placed on
foreign students. The decline in the international student population
has had strong consequences for not only the university but also the
town itself. The schools, businesses, and community are all enriched by
the international community and are feeling the effects of the delays
and decreases.
I am interested to learn more about the trends in delays and
denials over the past few years. I am also interested in learning more
about implementation of the student visa system policy and ensuring
that the overall process is both efficient and effective.
I welcome our panel of witnesses and look forward to their
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Thank Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this hearing today. I
would also like to thank our invited guests for appearing.
Today, we meet to examine the new security measures that have been
put in place to enhance national security. We all agree that foreign
scientists and scholars are important to maintaining the vitality and
quality of the U.S. research enterprise. In fact, almost 35 percent of
advanced degrees are conferred upon foreign scholars resident in the
U.S. for all areas of science and technology.
However, because of the events of September 11, Congress and the
Administration took action to track foreign students and more carefully
review the applications of those wishing to study sensitive areas of
science and technology in the U.S.
But scientists and educators complain that consular officers are
using vague, arbitrary standards to decide which visa applications to
refer for security reviews, trapping legitimate foreign researchers in
a frustrating backlog.
These delays bother educators and scientists, who say the free
exchange of ideas is essential to scientific discovery. They point out
that foreign-born scientists have been responsible for many major
advances in medicine and technology, including the kidney dialysis
machine, the Pap smear, plastic and the atomic bomb.
The National Academies (the National Academy of Science, the
National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine)
complained over a year ago that recent efforts by the government to
constrain the flow of international visitors in the name of national
security are having serious unintended consequences for American
science, engineering and medicine.
It is a sad day when even the research to combat chemical
biological terrorism has been stalled by the visa delays.
In fact, in my home state of Texas, the 44,192 foreign students at
colleges and universities fuel Texas' economy with money is spent on
tuition and living expenses in excess of $700 million dollar during the
2001-2002 school year alone. Therefore, foreign students are an
essential part of our economic structure.
Let me make this clear, educators and scientist support tighter
screening of visitors after 9/11. However, something must be done to
streamline the visa. I hope our witnesses can shine some light today on
possible solutions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Lincoln Davis
I would like to echo the comments of the Chairman and Ranking
Member as to the great importance of this issue of student visas.
There must be a careful balance between an efficient and effective,
homeland security system and a student visa system that doesn't hold up
bright, productive researchers from training and contributing to the
great scientific research being done in this country.
As we know, some of the 9/11 terrorists took advantage of the
student visa system. Everyone in this room has concerns about the way
people are admitted into this country. Several Members have introduced
bills focusing on security issues. Representative Pete Sessions and I
have also introduced a homeland security bill addressing visa issues.
I thank the witnesses who are here today to clear up some of these
concerns.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for calling this important and timely hearing. I would
also like to welcome this distinguished panel for coming to join us
today. Mr. Hutchison, thank you for taking the time from your important
work to let us benefit from your insights.
The transition from the pre-9/11 world to the post-9/11 world has
presented challenges that Congress will probably be dealing with for
years. Making this nation safer will be an ongoing project. Of course
the transition will impact our Defense and Intelligence and State
Departments. But it will also touch almost every sector of American
life--our agriculture, our communications systems, our hospitals--and
as we see today our research centers.
American labs lead the world in the biological and physical
sciences. We have a rich tradition of openness and collaboration with
partners from around the world. The best and the brightest come from
all over to attend our fine colleges and universities as students or
fellows, or just to attend conferences and symposia. That kind of
interaction has many benefits. Our students get exposed to more diverse
ideas and opinions, and become more competitive because of it. Our labs
get excellent workers for little money. That feeds our industries and
our economy. Our scientists are enabled to forge collaborations with
scientists around the world that make them more effective.
And, of course, the foreign visitor gets great benefits as well.
They get an outstanding education or research experience. Sometimes
they end up getting a job here. Often they go home. Regardless, they
have a better understanding and appreciation for American people and
culture. These days when even our allies find us troubling, and our
enemies feel we deserve destruction--that kind of person-to-person
diplomacy can be an excellent investment.
But opening up our doors brings risks as well. There are people out
there who wish to do us harm, so it is prudent that we do what we can
to keep them out. However, the vast majority of people who apply for
visas are peaceful. The challenge, therefore, is finding the perfect
balance: efficiently welcoming the many lawful visitors into the
Nation, while putting in obstacles that are most likely to block would-
be terrorists.
Right now, it seems that we have a cumbersome system that penalizes
all foreign students, exchange scientists, and our own universities,
and probably would not do much good in preventing attacks. As we
learned over the past weeks in Pakistan, it is probably much easier to
buy weapons technology on the black market than it is to find an
intelligent young terrorist ``wannabe'' and send him to the United
States for a five-year Ph.D. or post-doctoral fellowship. It is hard to
imagine a few-minute interview with a first-year foreign service
person, would stop many terrorists. And the long waiting lists we have
now for exchange visas probably serve no one, since I would assume that
a good portion of the 2-3 month wait is time that the application sits
in an inbox.
I don't mean to be too harsh. I know that all of the agencies are
struggling to cope with new challenges in the wake of 9/11. But we must
be critical and probing so that we can quickly refine our methods to
achieve the best possible balance of openness and security. We need to
develop an effective high-throughput system. If we don't we could
cripple our scientific progress, and simultaneously leave ourselves
vulnerable to terrorists.
That is why I am proud of the initiative taken by this committee in
calling for a GAO report on this critical subject. I look forward to
hearing from this panel, about how our visa policy is working. I want
to know what are the weak links, or the rate-limiting steps in the
application process. We all have the same goals here today. I hope that
we can work together to make this nation safer, and provide for
scientific and cultural growth or years to come.
Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Our witnesses today are a very
distinguished panel, and we want to thank all of you for
serving as resources for this committee. We are here to learn,
and so we will listen in order to learn, and then we will
question and then we will have a meaningful dialogue,
hopefully.
The Honorable Asa Hutchinson is the Under Secretary for
Border and Transportation Security at the Department of
Homeland Security. Prior to being confirmed as Under Secretary,
Mr. Hutchinson served as Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (he is a glutton for punishment). Before that,
he served as a Member of Congress from Arkansas from 1997 to
2001, and it was our privilege to call him a colleague.
Mr. Jess Ford is Director of International Affairs and
Trade at the General Accounting Office. Since 1973, Mr. Ford
has worked extensively in the national security and
international affairs area at GAO, with issues ranging from
trade and foreign assistance, to foreign policy.
Ms. Janice Jacobs is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the
Office of Consular Affairs at the Department of State. Prior to
this appointment, she served two years as Deputy Chief of
Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Santa Domingo. Ms. Jacobs' 23-
year distinguished foreign service career has included a mix of
Washington, D.C. and overseas assignments, including the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Mexico,
Nigeria and Thailand.
And Mr. Robert Garrity, Jr., is a Deputy Assistant Director
for Record/Information Administration at the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Mr. Garrity began his career with the FBI in
August 1976, and he served in the Savannah, New York and Dallas
field offices. More recently, Mr. Garrity served as the FBI's
Interim Records Officer at FBI headquarters, where he was
charged with the responsibility of assessing the FBI's records
management systems. Quite a challenge.
Lady and gentlemen, it is our privilege to welcome you
here. We would ask that you try to summarize your opening
statement. This committee is not arbitrary because this is so
important, but we try to give you a guideline of five minutes
or so. Don't get nervous if the red light comes on if you have
got a thought or a paragraph you want to finish.
Mr. Hutchinson, you are up first.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Gordon. It is a pleasure to be with you, all the Members of the
Committee, and I would emphasize at the outset that the
Department of Homeland Security agrees with the sentiments
expressed by the Chairman on the importance of academic access
to the outstanding educational institutions of our nation.
Our goal is to facilitate such access in a way that is
consistent with security, and not to impede or deny those
opportunities. Higher education is the fifth largest service
sector export, and international students contribute $12
billion to the U.S. economy through tuition and general
spending. Welcoming foreign scholars, scientists and
researchers into our country expands knowledge, fosters a
sharing of information, and aids the development of
technologies critical to our defense and the defense of our
allies.
But as we are all aware, the benefits of this exchange must
be protected against exploitation by those who would use that
information to threaten our security. Two September 11
terrorists abused the foreign student program to enter and stay
in the United States. Since then, actions have been taken.
President Bush mandated action to end the abuse of student
visas and to prohibit certain international students from
receiving education and training in sensitive areas. Likewise,
the U.S.A. Patriot Act mandates an electronic system to monitor
student and school compliance with immigration laws.
These security directives have been accomplished through
SEVIS, the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System.
This system electronically tracks the entry and exit of the
more than 800,000 international students who visit the United
States each year. Despite these security measures, it is not in
the interest of the United States to place unnecessary burdens
or delays on legitimate foreign students and scientists. One of
the subjects of this hearing is the recent GAO report, which I
understand will be released today, which identifies some
security measures that may cause delays.
Let me just simply address the perspective of homeland
security. The Homeland Security Act transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security the responsibility for
establishing visa policy and to review how these policies are
implemented. This authority is exercised in close consultation
in cooperation with the Department of State, pursuant to a
memorandum of agreement that was signed with the Department of
State on September 26 of last year. As a result of this
transfer of visa policy, we are working with the Bureau of
Consular Affairs in a number of areas. First of all, to improve
the visa revocation notification processes. Secondly, we have
taken the lead role in the statutorily mandated country reviews
of participating Visa Waiver Program nations, and third, we are
in the process of establishing the Visa Security Program, as
mandated by Congress, which builds on the experience that we
are gaining in Saudi Arabia, which is our Visa Security Office.
This year, we anticipate opening four additional Visa Security
Offices that will add a security perspective on visa issuance,
and also hopefully to help facilitate the processing of those
visas that are legitimate.
Our staffs are also working to review the special visa
application process known as Security Advisory Opinions.
Through this, the U.S. Government is able to more closely
scrutinize the security implications of issuing visas and
permitting the travel of certain individuals. One trigger of
the Security Advisory Opinions is the Visas Mantis process.
This Visas Mantis is a coordinated procedure between
intelligence and border security agencies to determine whether
the travel of certain foreign students and business people may
jeopardize the safeguarding of critically sensitive technology
and information.
Finally, I know a special interest has been expressed by
this committee in the SEVIS program and certain technical
difficulties that were being experienced by system users at the
time of the March 2003 hearing on this subject. The Department
has spent a substantial amount of time, resources and personnel
to correct these problems, and we have added a number of system
corrections to make SEVIS easier to use and to increase
compliance. But I think of great significance to this committee
is the fact that we created a SEVIS Response Team, anticipating
the return of a couple 100,000 foreign students and scholars to
the United States, anticipating that there might be some
glitches, and wanting to eliminate those glitches so that they
are not turned back whenever they are a legitimate student.
We created the Response Team, a personnel investment,
whereby an inspector at a port of entry, when they encounter a
student that might not be properly entered into the online
system, we can then have the inspector call the Response Team.
We can then check with the university. Is this person a valid
student or not? They fax us the I-20 form. We, while that
student is waiting, can get them cleared through. Whenever
there is a question but our instinct is that this is a
legitimate student, we will waive them in and then have that
verified in terms of having the I-20 provided to us.
These teams have responded to more than 8,000 calls, which
means we have facilitated over 8,000 scholars and foreign
students coming into our educational institutions. During that
process, though, we identified over 200 individuals, right at a
little over 200, posing as legitimate students. But whenever
they did not have their I-20, when they were not registered in
the SEVIS online system, we would call and verify with the
academic institution, and they would say we have never heard of
that student. Those individuals were denied entry into our
country and turned away, and I believe that that illustrates
the success of the response team, both in terms of facilitating
legitimate scholars that come to our schools, welcoming them,
but at the same time, adding the security measure that is
important to our country.
At this point, SEVIS is a highly capable, reliable system
that has accomplished the purpose it was designed for. In the
words of the president of the American Counsel of Education,
David Ward, ``SEVIS is the most important step that the Federal
Government can take to improve its ability to monitor
international students, scholars and exchange visitors, and we
strongly support its full and effective implementation.''
I'll end with a comment that we are relying a great deal
upon technology. It is important for us to facilitate travel,
commerce, education, but at the same time, to zero in on those
people that might pose a risk. But despite our investment in
technology, the greatest protection are those human resources
and a trained workforce that does a good job out there in
interviewing and using their judgment and discretion, as they
accomplish the security objectives and the educational needs of
our society. I look forward to our discussions and questions
later.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hutchinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Asa Hutchinson
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you on the subject
of how we can remain a welcoming nation to foreign scholars and
scientists and not compromise security requirements. I would emphasize
at the outset that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
appreciates the importance of academic access to the outstanding
educational institutions of our nation. Our goal is to facilitate such
access in a way that is consistent with security and not to impede or
deny those opportunities. Specifically, today, I will speak about those
individuals who seek to come to our country to study, research or
acquire advanced technologies. The development, knowledge and sharing
of information about these advanced technologies are crucial to our
defense and the defense of our allies, so there is good reason to
permit the entry of foreign scholars, scientists and researchers.
However, as we are all aware, when access to these resources and
technologies is provided to those who mean us harm, then the security
of our nation and that of our allies is compromised. Consequently, we
have the responsibility to review and, as needed, establish policies
and procedures that permit a more secure way to protect the flow of
scientific information and individuals to and from our country. The
Homeland Security Act transferred to the Secretary the responsibility
to mange policy affecting visa issuance.
As a result of this mandate, on September 26, 2003, Secretary of
State Powell and Secretary Ridge signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) that addresses the division of responsibilities between the two
departments with regard to visa issuance. As stated in the MOU, the
Departments will work together to ``create and maintain an effective,
efficient visa process that secures America's borders from external
threats and ensures that our borders remain open to legitimate travel..
. .'' This declaration supports DHS' national strategy and Secretary
Powell's vision of ``Secure Borders, Open Doors,'' and affirms the
Administration's understanding of the importance of such policy to our
international, economic, and national interests, as well as to the
security of our homeland.
I would like to mention briefly some of the actions that DHS has
already begun taking to enhance border security by evaluating visa
issuance policy to identify vulnerabilities and, when possible, to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the process. We are working
with the Department of State's (DOS) Bureau of Consular Affairs on
improving the visa revocation and notification processes. Our staffs
have also worked closely to restructure the review and processing of
requests for waivers of inadmissibility and the special visa
application evaluative process, known as ``Security Advisory Opinions''
(SAOs). I will speak more about SAOs in a moment. The DHS has also
taken the lead role in the statutory mandated country reviews of
participating Visa Waiver Program nations.
As I mentioned a moment ago, we are beginning to be actively
involved in the SAO process by which the U.S. government more closely
scrutinizes the effect of issuing visas to and permitting the travel of
certain individuals on the security of the country. Of particular
importance to the subject of the testimony today is the ``Visas
Mantis'' process. Visas Mantis is a coordinated procedure between
intelligence and border security agencies to determine whether the
travel of certain foreign students and businessman may jeopardize the
safeguarding of critically sensitive technology and information.
Understanding the need to balance threats to national security with the
need to welcome visiting scholars, DHS is working with DOS to develop
policies which will ensure that the impact of the SAO/Visas Mantis
processes is reviewed regularly. These policies will articulate and
address the need for:
effective efficient, and consistent procedures;
regular feedback to post officials, including visa
security officers on their application of SAO policy and
procedures and their management of SAO cases;
tracking and integrating visa applications that raise
national security concerns into a larger intelligence/security
framework; and
implementing best practices for facilitating the visa
issuance and public access to information.
Prior to the establishment of DHS, there was some preliminary
development of IPASS, a proposed interagency panel that would
scrutinize students and exchange visitor applicants who intended to
study certain sensitive science and technology fields. DHS intends to
review the Mantis process with the intent of incorporating the best
elements of the IPASS concept without creating an additional layer of
review.
Furthermore, building on our experience in Saudi Arabia, the
Department is also establishing the Visa Security Program (VSP) which
will expand DHS' presence at consular posts. Since the implementation
of the VSP in Saudi Arabia, DHS has reviewed 100 percent of visa
applications at the consular posts there, in compliance with the
statutory mandate and is moving forward to refine VSP operations and
procedures. The VSP is using the experience in Saudi Arabia as a model
for developing its program plans, systems needs and organizational
structure. DHS is initially planning to establish the VSP at four
additional locations.
I know Committee Members have expressed special interest in SEVIS,
and I will now report on its status and current functionality. Witness
testimony given at the March 2003 House Science Committee hearing
reflected the technical difficulties that were being experienced by
system users at that time. However, DHS has addressed and corrected
each of the critical system problems that were noted in the March 2003
testimony. In addition to addressing the system problems, DHS has added
a large number of system enhancements to SEVIS to increase the ease of
system use. These system changes were largely identified by and
implemented at the request of system users. While SEVIS is still
evolving as a system, it was fully implemented by January 1, 2003, in
accordance with the USA PATRIOT Act. System releases following
implementation addressed the large majority of system problems,
including changes that incorporate the resolution of every anomaly that
was discussed in the March 2003 hearing. During Fiscal Years 2003 and
2004, SEVIS will have undergone a total of twelve major releases, which
represent several hundred individual improvements. Changes in these
releases include the SEVIS-U.S. VISIT interface, enhanced reporting
capabilities, especially regarding enforcement-related data, and e-gov
software upgrades.
The subsequent successful implementation and expansion of SEVIS has
been the direct result of our aggressive effort to analyze anomalies,
prioritize remediation, and implement fixes. This series of system
changes not only ensures that SEVIS ``works as advertised,'' but also
enhances the system to respond to end user needs.
SEVIS implementation and execution requires the partnership of DHS,
colleges, universities, exchange visitor programs, and all other
organizations and individuals participating in the education of foreign
students and exchange visitors in the United States. Through our
Internet website, publications, participation in the conferences of
professional associations, help desks, and one-on-one communication,
the ``Student and Exchange Visitor Program'' (SEVP) has taken a
comprehensive inventory of customer needs and desires.
With regard to suggested reported ``breaches of confidentiality,''
we are aware of only a handful of instances where this may have
occurred. Extensive system analysis has revealed that the likelihood of
these occurring was one in 40,000 system transactions. However, DHS
recognized that even this level was unacceptable and a solution to this
inconsistency was implemented in May 2003. No new data crossover issues
have been identified since then.
At this point, SEVIS is highly capable, reliable, and more than
able to support the purposes for which it was designed. DHS will also
continue to address outstanding issues and enhance the system according
to system user needs.
SEVIS and SEVP are required to be fully user-fee funded, in
accordance with Section 641 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Funds were appropriated
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service by Congress after
September 11th in order to complete the technical development of SEVIS
by the mandatory deadline. However, having expended those funds in the
accelerated development and deployment of SEVIS, the SEVP must begin
collection of the student fee in this fiscal year to continue the
program. The projected revenue from the SEVIS fee will provide the
funding for the SEVP within the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. This includes upgrades and maintenance of the SEVIS
database, school liaison officers as well as the monitoring and
enforcement functions associated with the program.
The proposed SEVIS fee rule was published in the Federal Register
on October 27, 2003, with a 60-day comment period ending on December
26, 2003. We are currently working to finalize the rule.
Section 641 of IIRIRA also mandates that the fee be paid prior to
visa issuance. DHS has made efforts to reach a workable arrangement for
fee collection with the Department of State at the time of visa
issuance. However, such an arrangement is not possible at this time.
Therefore, the SEVIS rule requires that DHS collect the fee. The fee
may be paid by the intending student, a third party of the student's
choice, and in some cases in bulk payments made by the sponsoring
program. Current options for paying the fee are by check drawn on U.S.
funds, by mail, or on-line with a credit card. In addition, school,
sponsoring program, or ``third party'' payments are allowed and program
sponsors can pay for participants via ``batch'' payment. The SEVP will
continue to assess additional payment options, which may be made
available at some later date.
Technology systems and solutions alone cannot ``weed out''
potential terrorists and allow us to identify those scientists,
students and businessmen whose contributions would be clearly
beneficial to the U.S. Doing so requires the expertise and evaluative
abilities of the consular officers, technical and security advisers,
and the officers at the Ports of Entry. We must, however, develop
policies and procedures and use technologies as tools to allow all
involved individuals to make proper and more informed judgments. And
while I predict that technology will play a critical role in defending
us against further harm, I must also acknowledge that our best defense
is a well-trained and resourced workforce.
And lastly while the ultimate responsibility for our national
security rests with the public sector we should and must recognize that
industry and academia play critical roles in ensuring that our most
valuable technological and intellectual assets are protected and
secured by developing and implementing practices which assist the
overall security of our nation and our allies. While I have the primary
responsibility in DHS for visa policy, I have worked, and will continue
to work closely, with Under Secretary Charles McQuery of DHS' Science
and Technology Directorate to ensure that the concerns of scientists
and engineers are adequately addressed.
I would be please to take any questions at this time.
Biography for Asa Hutchinson
Asa Hutchinson was appointed by President Bush and confirmed by a
unanimous vote of the U.S. Senate in January 2003.
As Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security,
Hutchinson leads a directorate of over 110,000 employees and is
responsible for coordinating the enforcement activities of our borders,
transportation and immigration systems.
Prior to coming to DHS, Hutchinson served as a Member of Congress
from Arkansas from 1997-2001. While in Congress, Hutchinson served on
the Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Judiciary Committee.
After being re-elected to his third term, he was appointed as
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), where he
combined tough law enforcement initiatives with advocating increased
investment in treatment and education programs.
Prior to his election to Congress, Hutchinson practiced law in
rural Arkansas for 21 years and tried over 100 jury trials. During this
time, he was appointed by President Ronald Reagan as U.S. Attorney for
the Western District of Arkansas. At the age of 31, he was the youngest
U.S. Attorney in the Nation.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Mr.
Ford.
STATEMENT OF MR. JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
AND TRADE, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Committee.
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the report which
we are issuing to the Committee today on the need for
improvements in the visa process to reduce the time it takes to
adjudicate visas for science students and scholars. The State
Department's Office of Consular Affairs, who adjudicate visa
applications, must facilitate legitimate travel. At the same
time, the United States has important national security
interests in screening these individuals when they apply for a
visa. Since September 11, visa operations have played an
increasingly important role in assuring our country's national
security. The State Department's goal is to adjudicate visas as
quickly as possible, consistent with immigration laws and
homeland security objectives.
Mr. Chairman, you asked us several months ago to conduct an
analysis on how long it takes for a science student and scholar
from another country to obtain a visa, and what factors
contribute to the length of time in obtaining that visa, and
also what measures are underway to improve the process. I will
describe recommendations that are in our report that are
designed to help reduce the time to adjudicate some types of
visas.
It is difficult to estimate how long it takes to adjudicate
visas for science students and scholars. According to the State
Department, the Department has no set specific criteria or
timeframes for how long a visa process should take, and data
are not available on a number of visas that were issued or
denied to science students or scholars, or how long the process
took. However, a key factor that can contribute to the length
of time for adjudicating visas is whether an application must
undergo a headquarters interagency security check. This check
is referred to as Visas Mantis. The check is required by the
State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other
interested Washington agencies when there are potential
concerns that the visa applicant may engage in illegal transfer
of sensitive technology, which could undermine U.S. national
security. While state systems do not allow us to keep an
aggregate--to keep aggregate data on security check processing
times, State does have information on individual cases, which
we use to conduct our own analysis.
We conducted a random sample of Visas Mantis cases
involving science students and scholars that were sent from
posts between April and June of 2003, and found that it took an
average of 67 days for the security check to be processed. In
September and October of this year--of last year, we visited
seven posts, in China, Russia and India, and found the backlog
of 410 cases outstanding for more than 60 days. We found that
several factors make it difficult to resolve some of the
security checks expeditiously. The process has several steps.
First, the post notifies the State Department and
interested agencies that a security check is required. The
agencies must conduct the check. The agencies have to notify
the State Department of the results, and the State Department
has to notify the post on what action to take. Because
different agencies, bureaus, posts and field offices have
different databases and systems, cases can get delayed or lost
at different points in the process. For example, in fiscal year
2003, some cases did not always reach their intended recipient,
and as a result, some of the security checks were delayed.
In some instances, posts' requests for security checks did
not get to the FBI because the requests were improperly
formatted. Also, inter-operability problems between the systems
at the State Department and the FBI contributed to delays in
processing time. The State Department and the FBI acknowledge
that they have had problems in lengthy waits, and they--but
they report that they have a number of measures underway, which
they believe will improve the process and resolve outstanding
cases. For example, officials from the State Department's
Bureau of Consular Affairs and the FBI told us that they are
working together to identify and resolve outstanding cases.
Consular Affairs officials have told us that the State
Department has invested about a million dollars to upgrade its
technology for transmitting requests for security checks, and
the system is expected to be functional later this year.
According to State, the new system will help reduce the
time it takes to process security checks. State also indicated
that our analysis of cases from earlier in 2003 did not reflect
the current processing situation. The State Department has
provided us with two samples that it has taken recently, which
it believes shows that processing times are improving. These
data do indicate that there is improvement in processing times,
but they also show there are some continuing problems, and we
were unable to scientifically validate either of the samples,
so we can't--we don't know if they represent the entire
situation.
Mr. Chairman, we are recommending that the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security
and the Director of the FBI, develop and implement a plan to
improve the Visas Mantis process to avoid unnecessary delays in
issuing visas. In developing this plan, the agency should
consider establishing milestones to reduce the current number
of pending cases. They should develop some performance goals
and measures for processing security checks, providing
additional information to Consular Affairs that clarifies
guidance on Visas Mantis program, and they should work to
achieve inter-operable systems so that they can expedite the
transmission of data between agencies. The State Department has
indicated in their response to our report that they plan to
study our recommendations and look for ways to improve the
process.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would
be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jess T. Ford
Why GAO Did This Study
Each year thousands of international science students and scholars
apply for visas to enter the United States to participate in education
and exchange programs. They offer our country diversity and
intellectual knowledge and are an economic resource. At the same time,
the United States has important national security interests in
screening these individuals when they apply for a visa. At a House
Committee on Science hearing in March 2003, witnesses raised concern
about the length of time it takes for science students and scholars to
obtain a visa and about losing top international students to other
countries due to visa delays. GAO reviewed 1) how long it takes a
science student or scholar from another country to obtain a visa and
the factors contributing to the length of time, and 2) what measures
are under way to improve the process and decrease the number of pending
cases.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making a recommendation to the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, to develop and implement a plan to improve the security check
process known as Visas Mantis to avoid unnecessary delays in visa
issuance. State commented it had taken some action to improve the Visas
Mantis process and it would study our recommendation to make further
improvements.
BORDER SECURITY
Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for
Science Students and Scholars
What GAO Found
State Department (State) cannot readily identify the time it takes
for a science student or scholar to obtain a visa. State has not set
specific criteria or time frames for how long the visa process should
take, but its goal is to adjudicate visas as quickly as possible,
consistent with immigration laws and homeland security objectives. GAO
found that the time it takes to adjudicate a visa depends largely on
whether an applicant must undergo an interagency security check known
as Visas Mantis, which is designed to protect against sensitive
technology transfers. Based on a random sample of Visas Mantis cases
for science students and scholars sent from posts between April and
June 2003, GAO found it took an average of 67 days for the security
check to be processed and for State to notify the post. In addition,
GAO's visits to posts in China, India, and Russia in September 2003
showed that many Visas Mantis cases had been pending 60 days or more.
GAO also found that the way in which Visas Mantis information was
disseminated at headquarters level made it difficult to resolve some of
these cases expeditiously. Furthermore, consular staff at posts GAO
visited said they were unsure whether they were contributing to lengthy
waits because they lacked clear guidance on when to apply Visas Mantis
checks and did not receive feedback on whether they were providing
enough information in their Visas Mantis requests. Another factor that
may affect the time taken to adjudicate visas for science students and
scholars is the wait for an interview.
While State and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials
acknowledged there have been lengthy waits for visas, they report
having measures under way that they believe will improve the process
and that they are collaborating to identify and resolve outstanding
Visas Mantis cases. In addition, State officials told GAO they have
invested about $1 million to upgrade the technology for sending Visas
Mantis requests. According to State officials, the new system will help
to reduce the time it takes to process Visas Mantis cases.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss the report we are issuing today
on the need for improvements to the visa process to reduce the time it
takes to adjudicate visas for science students and scholars.\1\
Citizens of other countries seeking to enter the United States
temporarily for study, exchanges, business, tourism, and other reasons
generally must apply for and obtain a U.S. travel document, called a
non-immigrant visa, at U.S. embassies or consulates abroad before
arriving at U.S. ports of entry. Since September 11, 2001, visa
operations have played an increasingly important role in ensuring our
country's national security. In deciding who should and should not
receive a visa, consular officers must balance the need to facilitate
legitimate travel with the need to protect the United States against
persons whose entry could be harmful to U.S. national interests. For
example, consular officers need to delicately balance U.S. national
security interests with other interests such as promoting U.S.
education and cultural exchanges, business, tourism, and the overall
health of our economy. As part of the visa application process, many
applicants with a science background, including students and scholars,
must undergo an interagency security check, known as Visas Mantis,
before being issued or denied a visa. A Visas Mantis check is required
by the State Department (State), the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and other interested Washington agencies when there are
potential concerns that the visa applicant may engage in the illegal
transfer of sensitive technology, which could undermine U.S. national
security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Improvements
Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Students
and Scholars, GAO-04-371 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At a hearing held by the House Committee on Science on March 26,
2003, witnesses raised concern about the length of time it takes for
science students and scholars to obtain a visa and about losing top
international students to other countries due to visa delays. You asked
us to review 1) how long it takes a science student or scholar from
another country to obtain a visa and the factors contributing to the
length of time, and 2) what measures are under way to improve the
process and decrease the number of pending cases.
Summary
State cannot readily identify the time it takes for a science
student or scholar to obtain a visa.\2\ According to State officials,
the department has not set specific criteria or time frames for how
long the visa process should take, but its goal is to adjudicate visas
as quickly as possible, consistent with immigration laws and homeland
security objectives. We found that a key factor that can contribute to
the length of time for adjudicating visas is whether an applicant must
undergo a Visas Mantis security check. While State's systems do not
allow it to keep aggregate data on the number of Visas Mantis cases,
State does have information on individual cases,\3\ which we used to
conduct our own analysis. We conducted a random sample of Visas Mantis
cases for science students and scholars between April and June 2003 and
found that it took an average of 67 days for the security check to be
processed and for State to notify the post. Also, we visited posts in
China, India, and Russia in September 2003 and found that many Visas
Mantis cases had been pending 60 days or more. We also found several
factors that made it difficult to expeditiously resolve some Visas
Mantis cases. For example, in some instances, Visas Mantis cases sent
by posts did not get to the FBI for its security check because of
improperly formatted requests. Also, inter-operability problems among
the systems that State and FBI use contribute to the time taken to
process a Visas Mantis case. In addition, the consular staff at the
posts we visited told us that they lacked clear guidance on when to
apply Visas Mantis checks and did not receive feedback on whether they
were providing enough information in their Visas Mantis requests.
Finally, we found that the wait for an interview also may affect the
time it takes to adjudicate visas for science students and scholars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ State data are not available on the number of visas that were
issued or denied to science students and scholars or the length of time
it takes to issue visas to these people. Consular Affair officials told
us that State's systems can track aggregate student or scholar data by
F (students) and J (exchange visitors) visa categories, but they cannot
narrow their query search to specifically identify science students or
scholars.
\3\ During our review, State data were not available on the overall
number of Visas Mantis cases or on the Visas Mantis cases by visa
category. State's systems can track the visa process for individual
Visas Mantis cases but do not allow for aggregate queries of Visas
Mantis cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State and FBI officials acknowledge that there have been lengthy
waits but report having measures under way that they believe will
improve the process and resolve outstanding cases. For example,
officials from State's Bureau of Consular Affairs and the FBI told us
they are working together to identify and resolve outstanding Visas
Mantis cases. These officials also told us that State has invested
about $1 million to upgrade its technology for transmitting Visas
Mantis requests, and the system is expected to be functional later this
year. According to State officials, the new system will help to reduce
the time it takes to process Visas Mantis checks.
State claims that the time taken to adjudicate visas for science
students and scholars has decreased from last year. While this may be
true, the data presented by State in support of its claim continues to
show that some applicants still face lengthy waits. We acknowledge that
there may be valid reasons for taking long periods of time on some visa
applications, given the national security concerns that may be
involved. However, we believe it is important that State and the FBI
continue to make improvements to avoid unnecessary delays. Therefore,
our report recommends that the Secretary of State, in coordination with
the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, develop
and implement a plan to improve the Visas Mantis process in order to
avoid unnecessary delays in visa issuance. In developing this plan,
State should consider actions to establish milestones to reduce the
current number of pending Visas Mantis cases; develop performance goals
and measurements for processing Visas Mantis checks; provide additional
information to consular posts that clarifies guidance on the Visas
Mantis program; and work to achieve inter-operable systems and expedite
the transmittal of data between agencies.
Mr. Chairman, my statement today will elaborate further on the
waits that may occur when Visas Mantis security checks are conducted
and on the measures State and the FBI are implementing to improve the
process.
Background
Visa applicants, including science students and scholars, generally
begin the visa process by scheduling an interview at a consular post.
On the day of the appointment, a consular officer reviews the
application, interviews the applicant, and checks the applicant's name
in the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS).\4\ The consular
officer then decides if the applicant will need a Security Advisory
Opinion, which provides an opinion or clearance from Washington on
whether to issue a visa to the applicant and may include a Visas Mantis
check. In deciding if a Visas Mantis check is needed, the consular
officer determines whether the applicant's background or proposed
activity in the United States could involve exposure to technologies on
the Technology Alert List, which lists science and technology-related
fields where, if knowledge gained from work in these fields were used
against the United States, it could be potentially harmful.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ CLASS is a State Department name check database that posts use
to access critical information for visa adjudication. The system
contains records provided by numerous agencies and includes information
on persons with visa refusals, immigration violations, and security
concerns.
\5\ Under Section 212(a)(3)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, an applicant is rendered inadmissible if there is
reason to believe that the applicant is seeking to enter the United
States to violate U.S. laws prohibiting the export of goods,
technology, or sensitive information from the United States. 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(3)(A)(i)(II).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After a consular officer decides that a Visas Mantis security check
is necessary for an applicant, several steps are taken to resolve the
process. The consular officer prepares a Visas Mantis cable, which
contains information on the applicant, and then transmits the
information to Washington for an interagency security check. The State
Department's Bureau of Nonproliferation, the FBI, and other agencies
review the information contained in the cable and then provide a
response on the applicant to the Consular Affairs section of State
headquarters.\6\ The Bureau of Nonproliferation and other agencies are
given 15 working days to respond to State with any objections. However,
State has agreed to wait for a response from the FBI before proceeding
with each Visas Mantis case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The Visas Mantis program allows all participating agencies to
provide information and raise any particular concerns that they may
have regarding an applicant and/or the applicant's proposed activity in
the United States. According to State, the key role of the Visas Mantis
process is to protect U.S. national security, particularly in combating
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
systems, and conventional weapons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Once State headquarters receives all the information pertaining to
an applicant, Consular Affairs summarizes the information and transmits
a response to the consular post. A consular official at post reviews
the response and decides, based on the information from Washington,
whether to issue the visa to the applicant.
Security Check Is Major Contributing Factor to Length of Time It Takes
to Adjudicate Visas
State cannot readily identify the total length of time it takes for
a science student or scholar to obtain a visa. However, in discussions
with State officials, we learned that a key factor that contributes to
the length of time is whether an applicant must undergo a Visas Mantis.
To obtain visa data on science students and scholars, and to
determine how long the visa process takes, we reviewed all Visas Mantis
cables received from posts between April and June 2003, which totaled
approximately 5,000. Of these cases, 2,888 pertained to science
students and scholars, of which approximately 58 percent were sent from
China, about 20 percent from Russia, and less than two percent from
India.
We drew a random sample of 71 cases from the 2,888 science student
and scholar visa applications to measure the length of time taken at
various points in the visa process. The sample of 71 cases is a
probability sample, and results from the data in this sample project to
the universe of the 2,888 science visa applications. We found that
visas for science students and scholars took on average 67 days\7\ from
the date the Visas Mantis cable was submitted from post to the date
State sent a response to the post.\8\ This is slightly longer than two
months per application, on average. In the sample, 67 of the visa
applications completed processing and approval by December 3, 2003. In
addition, three of the 67 completed applications had processing times
in excess of 180 days. Four of the cases in our sample of 71 remained
pending as of December 3, 2003. Of the four cases pending, three had
been pending for more than 150 days and one for more than 240 days.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The 95 percent confidence interval for the average number of
days to process a science visa application is between 50 and 84 days.
\8\ According to State, factors that contribute to the length of
time it takes to process a Visas Mantis check include investigations by
clearing agencies or requests for additional applicant information.
Once State sends a response regarding a Visas Mantis check, the post
has to contact the applicant to issue or deny the visa. However, we did
not attempt to determine how long this process takes.
\9\ We assessed the reliability of the sample data provided by
State by tracing a statistically random sample of data to source
documents. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to our sample of 71 cases, State provided us with data
on two samples it had taken of Visas Mantis case processing times. Data
on the first sample included 40 visa cases taken from August to October
2003; data on the second sample included 50 Visas Mantis cases taken
from November and December 2003. State indicated that both samples show
improvements in processing times compared with earlier periods in 2003.
However, based on the documentation of how these cases were selected,
we were unable to determine whether these were scientifically valid
samples and therefore we could not validate that processing times have
improved. For the first sample, the data show that 58 percent of the
cases were completed within 30 days; for the second sample, the data
show that 52 percent were completed within this time frame. In
addition, the data for both samples show that lengthy waits remain in
some cases. For example, nine of the 40 cases had been outstanding for
more than 60 days as of December 3, 2003, including three cases that
had been pending for more than 120 days. Also, nine of the 50 cases
were still pending as of February 13, 2004, including six that had been
outstanding for more than 60 days. State officials commented that most
of the outstanding cases from both samples were still being reviewed by
the agencies.
During our fieldwork at posts in China, India, and Russia in
September 2003, we also obtained data indicating that 410 Visas Mantis
cases submitted in fiscal year 2003 were still outstanding more than 60
days at the end of the fiscal year.\10\ In addition, we found numerous
cases--involving 27 students and scholars from Shanghai--that were
pending more than 120 days as of October 16, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Outstanding cases include those where the posts had not heard
back from State headquarters and those where State had responded to the
posts by indicating that additional information or review time was
needed. The number of outstanding Visas Mantis cases is based only on F
and J Visas Mantis cases for the posts in China but includes other visa
categories for the remaining posts we visited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several Factors Contribute to the Length of Time It Takes to Resolve
Visas Mantis Cases
We found that several factors, including inter-operability problems
among the systems that State and FBI use, contribute to the time it
takes to process a Visas Mantis case. Because many different agencies,
bureaus, posts, and field offices are involved in processing Visas
Mantis security checks, and each has different databases and systems,
we found that Visas Mantis cases can get delayed or lost at different
points in the process.\11\ We found that in fiscal year 2003, some
Visas Mantis cases did not always reach their intended recipient and as
a result, some of the security checks were delayed. For example, we
followed up with the FBI on 14 outstanding cases from some of the posts
we visited in China in September 2003 to see if it had received and
processed the cases. FBI officials provided information indicating that
they had no record of receiving three of the cases, they had responded
to State on eight cases, and they were still reviewing three cases. FBI
officials stated that the most likely reason why they did not have a
record of the three cases from State were due to cable formatting
errors. State did not comment on the status of the 14 cases we provided
to the FBI for review. However, a Consular Affairs official told us
that in fall 2003, there were about 700 Visas Mantis cases sent from
Beijing that did not reach the FBI for the security check. The official
did not know how the cases got lost but told us that it took Consular
Affairs about a month to identify this problem and provide the FBI with
the cases. As a result, several hundred visa applications were delayed
for another month.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Posts have no way to ensure that State receives the Visas
Mantis request, State has no systematic check to know if the FBI
receives the cases, and the FBI has no way to ensure that its results
are forwarded to the posts. Information regarding a case may
potentially be sent back and forth between different agencies and
offices several times before a decision can be made on whether to issue
a visa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1 illustrates some of the time-consuming factors in the
Visas Mantis process for our sample of 71 cases. While the FBI received
most of the cases from State within a day, seven cases took a month or
more, most likely because they had been improperly formatted and thus
were rejected by the FBI's system. In more than half of the cases, the
FBI was able to complete the clearance process the same day, but some
cases took more than 100 days. These cases may have taken longer
because (1) the FBI had to investigate the case or request additional
information from State; (2) the FBI had to locate files in field
offices, because not all of its files are an electronic format; or (3)
the case was a duplicate, which the FBI's name check system also
rejects. In most of the cases, the FBI was able to send a response--
which it generally does in batches of name checks, not by individual
case--to State within a week. The FBI provides the results of name
checks for Visas Mantis cases to State on computer compact disks (CDs),
a step that could cause delays. In December 2003, a FBI official told
us that these CDs were provided to State twice a week. However, in the
past, the CDs were provided to State on a less frequent basis. In
addition, it takes time for data to be entered in State's systems once
State receives the information. In the majority of our sample cases, it
took State two weeks or longer to inform a post that it could issue a
visa. State officials were unable to explain why it took State this
long to respond to post. Officials told us that the time frame could be
due to a lack of resources at headquarters or because State was waiting
for a response from agencies other than the FBI. However, the data show
that only five of the 71 cases were pending information from agencies
other than the FBI.
Post Officials Seek Clearer Guidance and More Feedback
During our visits to posts in September 2003, officials told us
they were unsure whether they were adding to the wait time because they
did not have clear guidance on when to apply the Visas Mantis process
and were not receiving feedback on the amount of information they
provided in their Visas Mantis requests. According to the officials,
additional information and feedback from Washington agencies regarding
these issues could help expedite Visas Mantis cases. Consular officers
told us that they would like the guidance to be simplified--for
example, by expressing some scientific terms in more easily understood
language. Several consular officers also told us they had only a
limited understanding of the Visas Mantis process, including how long
the process takes. They told us they would like to have better
information on how long a Visas Mantis check is taking so that they can
more accurately inform the applicant of the expected wait.
Consular officers at most of the posts we visited told us they
would like more feedback from State on whether the Visas Mantis cases
they are sending to Washington are appropriate, particularly whether
they are sending too many or too few Visas Mantis requests. They said
they would like to know if including more information in the security
check request would reduce the time to process an application in
Washington. Moreover, consular officers indicated they would like
additional information on some of the outstanding Visas Mantis cases,
such as where the case is in the process. State confirmed that it has
not always responded to posts' requests for feedback or information on
outstanding cases.
Wait for an Interview Can Also Add Significant Time
Aside from the time it takes to process Visas Mantis checks, an
applicant also has to wait for an interview. State does not have data
or criteria for the length of time applicants at its overseas posts
wait for an interview, but at the posts we visited in September 2003,
we found that it generally took two to three weeks. Furthermore, post
officials in Chennai, India, told us that the interview wait time was
as long as 12 weeks during the summer of 2003 when the demand for visas
was greater than the resources available at post to adjudicate a visa.
Officials at some of the posts we visited indicated they did not have
enough space and staffing resources to handle interview demands and the
new visa requirement that went into effect on August 1, 2003. That
requirement states that, with a few exceptions, all foreign individuals
seeking to visit the United States need to be interviewed prior to
receiving a visa. Factors such as the time of year an applicant applies
for a visa, the appointment requirements, and the staffing situation at
posts generally affect how long an applicant will have to wait for an
interview.
Agency Officials Cite Improvements
State and FBI officials acknowledged that visa waits have been a
problem but said they are implementing improvements to the process and
working Improvements to decrease the number of pending Visas Mantis
cases. For example,
State and FBI officials told us that the validity of
Visas Mantis checks for students and scholars has been extended
to 12 months for applicants who are returning to a program or
activity and will perform the same functions at the same
facility or organization that was the basis for the original
Visas Mantis check.
FBI officials said that to address delays stemming
from problems with lost case files or systems that are not
inter-operable, the FBI is working on automating its files and
setting up a common database between the field offices and
headquarters. They also told us they have set up a tracking
system within the FBI for all Security Advisory Opinions,
including Visas Mantis cases.
Consular Affairs officials told us that State has
invested about $1 million on a new information management
system that it said would reduce the time it takes to process
Visas Mantis cases. They described the new system as a
mechanism that would help strengthen the accountability of
Visas Mantis clearance requests and responses, establish
consistency in data collection, and improve data exchange
between State and other agencies involved in the clearance
process. In addition, officials said the system would allow
them to improve overall visa statistical reporting capabilities
and data integrity for Mantis cases. The new system will be
paperless, which means that the current system of requesting
Visas Mantis clearances by cable will be eliminated. State
officials told us that the system is on schedule for release
early this year and that the portion relating to Security
Advisory Opinions will be operational sometime later this year.
However, challenges remain. FBI officials told us that the name
check component of the FBI's system would not immediately be
inter-operable with State's new system but that they are
actively working with State to seek solutions to this problem.
Nonetheless, FBI and State have not determined how the
information will be transmitted in the meantime. We were not
able to assess the new system since it was not yet functioning
at the time of our review.
Officials from Consular Affairs and the FBI told us
they are coordinating efforts to identify and resolve
outstanding Visas Mantis cases. For example, they have been
working together on a case-by-case basis to make sure that
cases outstanding for several months to a year are completed.
However, State officials said they do not have a target date
for completion of all the outstanding cases, which they
estimated at 1,000 in November 2003.
In addition to improvements to the Visas Mantis
process, State officials told us that they are monitoring post
resource needs and adding staff as needed. These officials also
told us that State added 66 new officers in 2003 and plans to
add an additional 80 in 2004.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, agency officials recognize that the
process for issuing a visa to a science student or scholar can be an
important tool to control the transfer of sensitive technology that
could put the United States at risk. They also acknowledge that if the
process is lengthy, students and scholars with science backgrounds
might decide not to come to the United States, and technological
advancements that serve U.S. and global interests could be jeopardized.
Our analysis of a sample of Visas Mantis cases from April to June 2003
show that some applicants faced lengthy waits. While the State
Department and the FBI report improvements in Visas Mantis processing
times, our analysis of data from the posts we visited in September 2003
and our contact with post officials in January 2004 show that there are
still some instances of lengthy waits. State's and FBI's implementation
of the Visas Mantis process still has gaps that are causing wait times
for visas. State's new information management system could improve the
Visas Mantis process. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the new
system will address all the current issues with the process.
To help improve the process and reduce the length of time it takes
for a science student or scholar to obtain a visa, we are recommending
that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of the
FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, develop and implement a
plan to improve the Visas Mantis process. In developing this plan, the
Secretary should consider actions to:
establish milestones to reduce the current number of
pending Visas Mantis cases;
develop performance goals and measurements for
processing Visas Mantis checks;
provide additional information through training or
other means to consular posts that clarifies guidance on the
overall operation of the Visas Mantis program, when Mantis
clearances are required, what information consular posts should
submit to enable the clearance process to proceed as
efficiently as possible, and how long the process takes; and
work to achieve inter-operable systems and expedite
transmittal of data between agencies.
In commenting on our draft report, State said it had taken some
actions to improve the Visas Mantis process and it would study our
recommendation to make further improvements.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to answer any questions you or other Members of the Committee may
have.
Biography for Jess T. Ford
Mr. Ford joined GAO in 1973 and has worked extensively in the
natural security and international affairs area concerning trade,
foreign assistance, and foreign policy issues. He has managed GAO
audits of the Agency of International Development, the State
Department, and the Department of Defense.
In January 1994, Mr. Ford was selected into GAO's Senior Executive
Service and, subsequently, was appointed Associate Director for
National Security Analysis Issues. He subsequently, he served as an
Associate Director for International Relations and Trade in GAO's
National Security and International Affairs Division. In October 2000,
he was appointed Director, International Affairs and Trade. He has
directed the completion of numerous studies on U.S. natural security
issues, foreign assistance, counter narcotics, and foreign affairs
management activities and has testified before Congress on several
occasions on these topics.
Mr. Ford received a Bachelor's degree in political science from
Hiram College and a Master's degree in international relations from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is also a graduate of the
National War College. Mr. Ford has received numerous awards throughout
his GAO career, including the Meritorious Service Award and the
Distinguished Service Award.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Ford. Ms.
Jacobs.
STATEMENT OF MS. JANICE L. JACOBS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Jacobs. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank
you for inviting me to testify on the visa process and its
effect on the security of the United States, our economic,
scientific and technological health, and our openness to other
societies. Secretary Powell has succinctly articulated our
policy as ``Secure Borders, Open Doors,'' and we at the
Department are acutely aware of the need to satisfy both of
these objectives. Our universities reap the economic benefits
of preeminence among destination countries for international
students, and our scientific establishment flourishes in a
climate of open exchange across borders.
While we are committed to facilitating the travel of
legitimate visitors to the United States, we consider national
security the highest priority in visa matters. The Department
of State has long used specialized clearance procedures for the
review of visa applications of individuals whose proposed
activities in the United States may have security-related or
other concerns. The purpose of the additional review is to
focus on serious issues, such as hostile intelligence activity,
potential terrorist threats, and access to sensitive
technology.
One of the highest foreign policy and national security
priorities of the United States is preventing the spread of
nuclear, biological, chemical and other weapons of mass
destruction, and their means of delivery. The Visas Mantis
program, designed to address nonproliferation and technology
transfer concerns, is an effective tool for U.S. intelligence
and law enforcement agencies to support consular officers in
screening individuals and entities that seek to gain controlled
goods, technology and sensitive information in violation of
U.S. export laws.
Under the current system, if a consular officer believes a
particular applicant poses a potential threat under the Mantis
rules, the post transmits a request for a security advisory
opinion, or SAO, by cable simultaneously to the Department, the
FBI and other interested agencies. The other clearing agencies
generally take 15 working days to respond to SAOs unless they
require additional time or information to clear a specific
case. Consequently, the visa office may have a clearance from
one agency, but may be waiting for another clearing agency to
complete its review. The Bureau of Nonproliferation may also
ask post to obtain more information from an applicant, which
can take time and delay a response to post. Waiting for highly
classified reports through appropriate channels can also delay
a response to post.
The business, academic and scientific communities have all
expressed concern that delays in Mantis procedures result in
disruptions to ongoing research and commercial activities. We
have taken steps to address these concerns by investing in
people and technology, and pioneering new processes with our
law enforcement colleagues that have solved many of the
problems that we have encountered during the start-up period.
To increase efficiency, we have made a number of changes to
staffing and procedures. We have created a stand-alone Mantis
team that now has five full-time employees who are dedicated to
processing only Mantis cases. We have procedures for expediting
individual cases with the FBI. We were able to extend the
validity of the Visas Mantis clearances, allowing for more
freedom of travel to and from the United States, and we have
put students and research scholars at the top of our
appointment queue. We also periodically send the FBI
spreadsheets of unresolved cases that are on hold, which they
work through to provide us with a response.
The Visa Office, with input from the Bureau of
Nonproliferation, will soon begin sending to the field a
quarterly report that will provide feedback to posts on the
quality of their Mantis SAO cables. The report will also
include information from the NP Bureau on threat analysis and
what technologies, groups or individuals might be of interest.
The Bureau of Consular Affairs recently funded the travel of an
officer from the Nonproliferation Bureau to attend a consular
conference in China, the largest source country for Mantis
cables. The officer met with consular officers from all China
posts and discussed in detail the purpose of the Mantis
program, what consular officers should be looking for, how to
decide whether a case should be a Mantis or not, and what
information to provide in the cable.
We are also using technology to enhance efficiency and
provide for better statistical report. We have invested $1
million in the development of a cable-less system called the
SAO Improvement Project or SAO IP, whereby SAOs will be made
electronically through the Consular Consolidated Database. The
new program will eliminate formatting problems. Beta tests of
this program began last November, and we hope to bring all of
our posts online during this year. The SAO IP will operate
through the Open Source Information System or OSIS, which will
provide inter-operable data transmission. Our partners are
committed to electronic transmission of data over the OSIS
network, and are taking complimentary steps to participate
fully in the SAO Improvement Project.
The Department of State is working hand-in-hand with our
colleagues at Homeland Security and the Justice Department to
ensure that we have a system that properly identifies potential
threats to the United States and stops them from reaching our
shores. We also work every day with business and industry to
see that access to our country is not impeded for those whose
business we encourage and whose presence we value. We are
determined to preserve the crucial benefits provided by these
international visitors to the United States, as we work to
strengthen the security of the visa process.
I am happy to answer any questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobs follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janice L. Jacobs
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the visa
process and its affect on the security of the United States, our
economic, scientific and technological health, and our openness to
other societies. Secretary Powell has succinctly articulated our policy
as ``Secure Borders, Open Doors,'' and we at the Department of State
are acutely aware of the need to satisfy both of these objectives. The
U.S. economy counts on the billions of dollars spent each year by
international tourists, our universities reap the economic benefits of
preeminence among destination countries for international students, our
scientific establishment flourishes in a climate of open exchange
across borders, and our entire society is accustomed to living in a
free and open manner that counts upon an ease of movement across
international borders. We are determined to preserve these crucial
benefits to the United States even as we work to strengthen the
security and integrity of the visa process.
While we are committed to facilitating the travel of legitimate
visitors to the United States, we consider the protection of national
security the highest priority in visa matters. The Department of State
has long used specialized clearance procedures for the review of visa
applications of individuals whose proposed activities in the U.S. may
have security-related or other concerns. These procedures are carried
out by the State Department at the request of and in coordination with
other federal agencies. This is known as the security advisory opinion
process. The purpose of the additional review is to focus on serious
issues such as hostile intelligence activity, potential terrorist
threats, and diversion of sensitive U.S. technology. A relatively small
number of non-immigrant visa applications, less than three percent of
our workload, are submitted by consular officers overseas to the
Department of State for Washington-level screening by federal
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
One of the highest foreign policy and national security priorities
of the United States is preventing the spread of nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons, their delivery systems and advanced conventional
weapons. The Visas Mantis program, designed to address technology
transfer and nonproliferation concerns, is an effective tool for U.S.
government agencies to prevent entry into the U.S. of foreign nationals
to gain controlled goods, technology and sensitive information in
violation of U.S. export laws. Federal agencies review applications and
provide the information needed by State to determine an applicant's
visa eligibility under section 212(a)(3)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. That section provides in relevant part that:
Any alien who a consular officer or the [Secretary of Homeland
Security] knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, seeks to
enter the United States to engage solely, principally, or
incidentally in--(i) any activity. . . (II) to violate or evade
any law prohibiting the export from the United States of goods,
technology, or sensitive information. . .is ineligible to
receive a visa.
As part of their consular training at the National Foreign Affairs
Training Center, all Foreign Service Officers assigned to consular
positions receive 12-15 hours of training devoted to the processing of
SAOs, including Mantis. During this training, the Non-Proliferation
(NP) Bureau, which reviews Mantis cases in the Department, briefs on
the proliferation threat and the importance of the Mantis screening
process in helping to protect our national security.
The basic document that provides instructions to consular officers
in the field on how to process Visas Mantis cases is the Technology
Alert List (TAL). This is an annual cable that is disseminated to all
posts at the beginning of every Fiscal Year. The cable contains two
parts: the list of sensitive technologies and guidance to consular
officers on how to process Mantis cases. The list contains some 200
technologies arranged in alphabetical order that nonproliferation and
export control agencies have designated as sensitive for national
security purposes. The TAL guidance cable describes the specific
purpose of the Mantis program, instructs consular officers what to look
for when reviewing an application that may result in a Mantis cable and
provides details on what information to include in a cable. The
guidance encourages consular officers to check with resources at post
who might be able to help them decide whether or not a case should be
submitted as a Mantis SAO. The cable further provides consular officers
with a number of websites where they can access more in-depth
information about the TAL technologies. Finally, the cable urges
consular officers to use their judgment but to err on the side of
caution when deciding whether or not Mantis considerations apply.
Under the current system, posts transmit Mantis SAOs by cable
simultaneously to the Department, the FBI and interested agencies. We
receive twice-weekly CDs from the FBI with updated clearance
information on SAO cases. After the FBI name check unit runs the names
of the subjects of SAOs through their name check system, they upload
their responses onto a CD which the Visa Office picks up twice a week.
The CD is an historical record of more than 500,000 responses the FBI
has provided to us. The Visa Office uploads the information from the CD
onto its own FBI Response database that it maintains as well as into
the automated system known as VISTA, which is the Visa Office's
tracking system for SAOs. Unfortunately, for various technological
reasons, VISTA does not always capture all of the clearance
information. If analysts do not find an updated response to a case in
VISTA that they know is coming due, they must look at the FBI Response
database to see if, in fact, FBI has cleared the case. In some cases it
can take up to a week or longer between the time FBI responds to a
clearance request and when the Visa Office analyst is able to send out
the clearance response to post.
The other clearing agencies generally take 15 working days to
respond to SAOs but, occasionally, they notify the Visa Office when
they need additional time to clear a specific case. Consequently, the
Visa Office may have a clearance from the FBI but may be waiting for
another clearing agency to complete a review of a specific case. The NP
Bureau may ask post to obtain more information from an applicant which
can take time and delay a final response to post. At other times, the
Visa Office must wait to receive a report from another clearing agency
that may contain derogatory information pertaining to the applicant.
Waiting for highly classified reports through appropriate channels can
be another reason for delay in responding to post.
The business, academic, and scientific communities have expressed
concern that delays in Mantis process result in disruptions to on-going
research and commercial activities. A backlog did occur in the summer
of 2002 when the Department mandated a positive response to all SAO
requests. That requirement, combined with the sudden spike in
additional clearance requests following the attacks of September 11,
overburdened the system. Since then we have worked through many of
these problems, invested in people and technology, and pioneered new
processes with our law enforcement colleagues that have solved many of
the problems of this start-up period.
To increase efficiency, we have made a number of changes to
staffing and procedures. We created a stand-alone Mantis team that now
has five full-time employees who are dedicated to processing only
Mantis cases. We have procedures for expediting individual cases when
appropriate. When an expedited clearance is needed, we fax such
requests to the FBI, which routinely responds in a timely manner. We
also periodically send the FBI spreadsheets of unresolved cases on
``hold'' which they work through to provide us with a response. The
Visa Office, with NP input, will soon begin sending to the field a
quarterly Mantis report to provide additional feedback. The Bureau of
Consular Affairs recently funded the travel of an officer from the NP
Bureau to attend a consular conference in China, the largest source
country for Mantis cables. The officer met with consular officers from
all China posts and discussed in detail the purpose of the Mantis
program, what consular officers should look for, how to decide whether
a case should be a Mantis or not, and what information to provide in
the cable.
We are also using technology to enhance efficiency and provide for
better statistical reporting. The Department of State has invested one
million dollars in the development of a cable-less SAO process, called
the SAO Improvement Project (SAO IP) whereby requests and responses
will be made electronically through the Consular Consolidated Database
(CCD). The new program will eliminate formatting problems. Beta tests
of the NIV portion of the SAO IP started in Riyadh and Kuwait in
November. (We started the beta test of the IV portion in Naples in
December.) We began shipping the software for the new SAO NIV system to
the field at the end of January and we hope to bring posts on line
gradually as the year progresses. The State Department uses industry
standards in designing our automated systems to facilitate data share
with appropriate federal partners.
SAO IP will operate through the Open Source Information System
(OSIS) which will provide inter-operable data transmission. The FBI is
currently working on connectivity to OSIS in order to make full use of
SAO IP. In the meantime, we are still sending case specific information
to the FBI via cable. Once the FBI establishes connectivity to OSIS,
they will receive all SAO requests electronically directly from post.
The system will be much more efficient and will eliminate the human and
technological errors that have occurred under the present system that
relies on cable requests and responses. Our partners are committed to
electronic transmission of data over the OASIS network and are taking
complementary steps to participate fully in the SAO Improvement
Project.
The Department of State is addressing other factors which affect
visa processing times, including the biometric visa program and
staffing levels. To comply with Section 303 of the Enhanced Border
Security Act, the Department began deployment of the Biometric Visa
Program on September 22, 2003, at the U.S. Embassy in Brussels,
Belgium, and quickly followed suit at the U.S. Consulate General in
Frankfurt and Embassies in San Salvador and Guatemala City. The program
is now operational at more than 60 visa-adjudicating posts and with our
aggressive roll-out schedule the program will be in effect at all visa-
adjudicating posts by October 26 of this year.
This congressionally mandated program requires the physical
presence of most applicants in order to enroll the biometric
identifiers. To this end and to enhance security in the visa process,
we established a new worldwide standard for visa interview policy. On
August 1, 2003, new regulations were implemented which limit the waiver
of personal appearance for non-immigrant visa applicants to only a few
categories of exceptions, such as diplomats, children, and the elderly.
This allowed all posts worldwide to ramp up their staffing in
anticipation of the meeting the deadline. To meet additional staffing
needs, the Department is establishing 168 new consular positions in FY
2004 and is requesting 123 additional positions for FY 2005.
We are working with the academic and scientific research
communities to be as responsive as possible while maintaining the
integrity of the process and meeting the goals of the nonproliferation
program. Every spring as students begin applying for visas, we instruct
all visa-adjudicating posts to make special arrangements to facilitate
visa interviews for students and researchers. Some posts do not require
appointments, some reserve appointment slots for students, and some
assign specific days to student processing. Last October we obtained
interagency agreement to extend the validity of the mantis clearance to
one year provided that the applicant was attending the same program.
Our Public Inquiries office treats all science-related visa inquiries
as top priorities and has conducted extensive outreach efforts with the
scientific and medical communities. We have also designated a Senior
Visa Specialist as a point of contact for federal laboratories and
other scientific establishments. Finally, we are establishing
performance goals, whenever possible, of 15 working days from the date
of receipt of the SAO by Washington agencies, after which the Visa
Office sends a response to post as quickly as possible, provided
clearances have been received from all clearing agencies.
The Department of State is working hand in hand with our colleagues
at Homeland Security and the Justice Department to ensure that we have
a visa system that properly identifies potential threats to the United
States and stops them from reaching our shores. We also work every day
with business and industry to see that access to our country is not
impeded for those whose business we encourage and whose presence we
value. We are determined to preserve the crucial benefits provided by
these international visitors to the United States as we work to
strengthen the security of the visa process. We want the world to know
that we value our visitors and that we want them to come to the United
States to enjoy the richness our country has to offer in so many areas.
We want them and our own people to be safe while they are here and
towards that end we are taking extra precautions, but America remains
an open and welcoming country.
I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Ms. Jacobs. Mr.
Garrity.
STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT J. GARRITY, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, RECORD/INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
Mr. Garrity. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
inviting the FBI here to testify on this very sensitive
question.
We appreciate the Committee's interest in this conflict
between science and security in our visa policy. I have
submitted a comprehensive statement for the record, but I will
make a short statement, if you don't mind.
I would first like to say I hope that the GAO found the FBI
both cooperative and forthcoming in developing their report. As
this committee is very well aware, there is a delicate balance
between allowing scientists and students into our country for
education and exchange programs, and the necessity to protect
the security of our homeland and our most sensitive
technologies. As you have stated most eloquently, Mr. Chairman,
it ain't easy balancing those competing interests.
The Visas Mantis program is designed to assist in the
deliberative process by which we strive to recognize this
balance. The Visas Mantis is a designation relevant to certain
individuals who have access during their visit to American
special technologies. The FBI provides specific name
information to the Terrorist Screening Center regarding
individuals about whom the FBI has a concern related to
terrorism or other activities that could harm our national
security. The Visas Mantis process is essential in looking at
visa applications regarding those about whom we may have
records, but about whom we have not gathered sufficient
information to cause their addition to a watch list. We must
protect the homeland by preventing the issuance of a visa to an
individual who may seek to gain access to information or
technology in the United States that may cause our nation harm.
The FBI receives information on the applicants from the
Department of State by a variety of means. Either by a computer
disc, from a cable, from any Embassy or Consul around the
world, or in special circumstances, we'll receive a facsimile
and give that expedited processing. The requests are all
entered into the FBI's National Name Check Program. This
information is then searched against our Universal Indices. The
names are searched in a multitude of combinations, switching
the first, middle, last name, as well as combinations of first
and last, first and middle, etc. It also searches different
phonetic spellings and variations of the name, which is
especially important considering that many names in our indices
have been transliterated from a language other than English.
A common question that we are asked is how long does it
take to complete a Visas Mantis name check. As shown on the
graph with my prepared statement, 88 percent of our requests
are completed in 30 days, and 98 percent of the requests are
resolved in 120 days. Most name check requests that are over 60
days old are the result of the time required to retrieve and
review the field office record for information. One of the
things that we have that is a concern to us is we have a
decentralized record-keeping system. The FBI stores records in
265 locations worldwide. That is one of the issues that we are
addressing, but we have to track down many times the file and
find the information, wherever it may be.
I do want to emphasize to you that the FBI is sensitive to
the impact the delays, and visa processing of students and
scholars, may have on business, education, foreign relations
and the worldwide perceptions of the United States. With these
considerations in mind, the FBI is working diligently with the
State Department toward the common goal of improving the
expediency and efficiency of the visa clearance process. But at
the same time, the consequences of our mission on homeland
security requires that our name check process be primarily
focused on accurate and thorough results. This does mean that
there are instances when the FBI's review of a visa request
must require as much time as needed to obtain an unequivocally
correct result.
We are working together with the State Department to ensure
that all old visa requests are accounted for and processed.
This has been accomplished through a systematic comparison
between the FBI name checks and the State Department's visa
databases. We closely monitored student visa submissions for
this school year, and believe that we were able to meet the
seasonal demand. We are using the National Academy of Sciences'
data to assist us in monitoring our response time for both
students and visiting scholars. We have a public inquiry system
where we check the status of individual cases, and this system
has been helpful in identifying and resolving individual
problems. We have not detected any systematic problems
associated with our review process.
The FBI recognizes that the increase in numbers of requests
necessitates the development of even more efficient processes
in order to sustain the current pace of processing name check
requests. We are in the process of implementing a number of
interim improvements to minimize manual submissions by all
agencies and to increase efficiency within our process. In
addition, we have developed a high-level functional requirement
for an entirely new name check application that would be
compatible with these improvements. The new name check
application is now undergoing review as part of our ITIM
Process.
Additionally, the FBI is participating in the development
of the Department of State's new visa database. As the existing
FBI Name Check System is a legacy system that serves numerous
other agencies, the data from the new Department of State
database must be translated before it can enter into the FBI's
Name Check System. This is not an insurmountable obstacle,
however. Current planning is focused on the optimum method to
move requests from the State Department to the FBI. In the
interim, the State Department submits requests to the FBI from
its new database by computer disk, and this process has proven
to be highly reliable.
In conclusion, the FBI recognizes the importance of
accurate and timely name check processing. I want to emphasize
to you that this has the full attention of Director Mueller. We
appreciate the Committee's interest, and I am prepared to
answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Garrity follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert J. Garrity, Jr.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
Assistant Director Hooton here today to testify in this hearing, in
which the Committee is reviewing the conflict between science and
security in visa policy. Unfortunately, Mr. Hooton could not be here
today, so I have been designated to provide testimony in his stead. My
name is Robert Garrity, and I have served as an FBI Special Agent since
1976. I currently serve as the Deputy Assistant Director of one of the
FBI's newest divisions, the Records Management Division (RMD). My goal
today is to discuss the FBI's role in vetting foreign visa applicants
under the Visas Mantis program. First, I would like to say that the FBI
appreciates the Committee's interest in this subject and hopes that the
General Accounting Office (GAO) found us both cooperative and
forthcoming in developing their report on Improvements Needed to Reduce
Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars.
FBI Name Check Process
The FBI receives information on the applicants from the Department
of State via computer disc, cable, or manual (facsimile) submissions.
The requests are entered into the FBI's National Name Check Program
(NNCP). The information is searched against the FBI Universal Indices
(UNI). The searches seek all instances of the individual's name and
approximate date of birth, whether a main file name or reference. By
way of explanation, a main file name is that of an individual who is
the subject of an FBI investigation, whereas a reference is someone
whose name appears in an FBI investigation. References may be
associates, witnesses, co-conspirators, or victims whose names have
been indexed for later retrieval. The names are searched in a multitude
of combinations, switching the order of first, last, middle names, as
well as combinations with just the first and last, first and middle,
etc. It also searches different phonetic spelling variations of the
names, especially important considering that many names in our indices
have been transliterated from a language other than English.
If there is a match with a name in a FBI record, it is designated
as a ``Hit,'' meaning that the system has stopped on a possible match
with the name being checked, but now a human being must review the file
or index entry to further refine the names ``Hit'' upon. If the search
develops a name and birth date match, it is designated an ``Ident.'' An
``Ident'' is usually easier to resolve.
Approximately 85 percent of name checks are electronically returned
to the Department of State as having ``No Record'' within 72 hours. A
``No Record'' indicates that the FBI's Central Records System contains
no identifiable information regarding this individual. By agreement
with the Department of State, partially due to our concern about the
time factors in approving visa requests, a ``No Record'' equates to a
``No Objection'' to the issuance of a visa. The investigative divisions
in the FBI, (i.e., the Counterterrorism Division, the
Counterintelligence Division, the Criminal Investigative Division, and
the Cyber Division) do not review visa requests where there is no
record of the individual. Duplicate submissions (i.e., identically
spelled names with identical dates of birth submitted within the last
120 days) are not checked and the duplicate findings are returned to
State.
With the remaining 15 percent that were not immediately eliminated
as a ``No Record,'' because a name and birth date are not sufficient to
positively correlate the file with an individual, additional review is
required. A secondary manual name search usually identifies an
additional 10 percent of the requests as also not being identical to an
individual in our files, for a 95 percent overall ``No Record''
response rate. This is usually accomplished within a week of the
request. The remaining five percent are identified as possibly being
the subject of an FBI record. The FBI record must now be retrieved and
reviewed. If the records were electronically uploaded into the FBI
Automated Case Support (ACS) electronic record-keeping system, it can
be viewed quickly. If not, the relevant information must be retrieved
from the existing paper record. Review of this information will
determine whether the information is identified with the subject of the
request. If not, the request is closed as a ``No Record.''
The information in the file is reviewed for possible derogatory
information. Less than one percent of the requests are identified with
an individual with information that is derogatory or poses concern to
the FBI about having access to sensitive or special U.S. technologies.
These requests are forwarded to the appropriate FBI investigative
division for further analysis. If the investigative division determines
there is no objection to the visa request, the request is returned to
the name check dissemination desk for forwarding to the Department of
State. Results of the name check process are returned to the Department
of State twice weekly by computer disc or telephonically in expedited
requests.
If there is an objection to the visa request, the investigative
division will prepare a written Security Advisory Opinion and forward
it separately to the Department of State. In instances where the
investigative division determines it appropriate, that individual will
be placed on a watch list. In reviewing these visa requests, the FBI
has, in the past, identified individuals attempting to enter the United
States who are of serious concern to the FBI.
I want to emphasize to you that the FBI is sensitive to the impact
that delays in visa processing of students and scholars may have on
business, education, foreign relations, and worldwide perceptions of
the United States. With these considerations in mind, the FBI is
working diligently with the Department of State toward the common goal
of improving the expediency and efficiency of the visa clearance
process. At the same time, the consequences of the FBI's mission on
homeland security requires that our name check process be primarily
focused on accurate and thorough results. This means that there are
instances when the FBI's review of a visa request must require as much
time as needed to obtain an unequivocally correct result.
Processing Times
The FBI's goal is to have all visa requests completed within 120
days. Attachment A illustrates the current status of how long it takes
to complete Visas Mantis name checks. This status is current as of
February 23, 2004. For Visas Mantis, the FBI received 1,522 requests in
the month of January 2004 and by February 23 had resolved 1,334, or 88
percent of them. In the month of December 2003, the FBI received 1,446
Visas Mantis requests and by February 23 had resolved all but 130 of
these requests for a 91 percent resolution rate. The percentages
continue to rise over time, with 95 percent of Visas Mantis requests
resolved within 90 days. Visas Mantis are particularly difficult to
resolve due to the predominance of requests from China and the
commonality of Asian names.
A common question we receive is, ``How long does it take to
complete a visa request name check?'' As shown on the graph, 88 percent
are completed in 30 days and 98 percent of the requests are resolved in
120 days. Most name check requests that are over 60 days old are the
result of the time required to retrieve and review field office record
information. Some delay occurs at substantive analysts' desks, but this
is to be expected. These analysts are assigned to an investigative
division and are primarily assigned to the analysis of intelligence
reports from around the world in order to support on-going
investigations, or to support the flow of intelligence to policy-
makers. Despite these significant and voluminous responsibilities,
these are the best professionals to review information in our records
and to then make an informed decision on whether a requester of a visa
represents a threat to our homeland, or is interested in illegally
acquiring targeted U.S. special technology. You will understand,
however, that with the press of other business, the reviews of visa
requests do not always achieve the analysts' highest priority in their
assigned work. I would add, in response to one of the questions posed
in the invitation to testify before this committee, that the
investigative divisions believe the information found in the Visas
Mantis requests they review is of use in their other responsibilities.
FBI Visa Tracking System
The FBI's name check application accurately tracks each visa
request within the our name check process. At any moment, we are able
to electronically retrieve the status of an individual request,
including where it is within the name check process, determine which
requests have been pending for a certain period of time, identify the
FBI files associated with an individual, ascertain the result of a name
search, identify the type of visa request, and generate the data found
in Attachment A. This tracking capability serves not only the 200,000
visa requests submitted each year, but also the other 6.1 million
requests submitted by over 70 other federal, State, and local agencies.
Process Improvement
We are working together with the Department of State to ensure that
all old visa requests are accounted for and processed. This is being
accomplished through a systematic comparison between the FBI name
checks and the Department of State's visa databases. We closely
monitored student visa submissions for this school year and believe
that we were able to meet this seasonal demand. We are using the
National Academy of Sciences' data to assist us in monitoring our
response time for both students and visiting scholars. We have a public
inquiry system where we check the status of individual cases. This
system has been helpful in identifying and resolving individual
problems. We have not detected any systematic problems associated with
our review process.
However, the FBI recognizes that the increase in numbers of
requests necessitates the development of even more efficient processes
in order to sustain the current pace of processing name check requests.
We are in the process of implementing a number of interim improvements
to minimize manual submissions by all agencies and increase efficiency
within the name check process. In addition, the FBI has developed high-
level functional requirements for a new name check application that
would be compatible with these improvements. The new name check
application is now undergoing review within the FBI's Information
Technology Investment Management Process.
Additionally, the FBI is participating in the development of the
Department of State's new visa database. As the existing FBI name check
system is a legacy system that serves numerous other agencies, the data
from the new Department of State database must be translated before it
can enter into the FBI's name check system. This is not an
insurmountable obstacle. Current planning is focused on the optimum
manner to move requests from the Department of State to the FBI. In the
interim, the Department of State submits requests to the FBI from its
new database by computer disc. This process is highly reliable and has
improved processing times.
Decentralized Recordkeeping System
As I stated earlier, a significant factor in any delay in the FBI
responding to a visa name check is retrieval of information from paper
files. While many FBI files are available electronically, the majority
of Visas Mantis checks pending over 60 days require review of physical,
paper records currently stored at one of approximately 265 locations
worldwide. FBI files are currently stored at FBI Headquarters, all 56
field offices, many of the larger of our 400 resident agencies, several
warehouses around the country, in records centers operated either by
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) or a commercial
concern, four large Information Technology Center facilities on the
east and west coast, and at Legal Attache offices worldwide. Delays
result from NNCP personnel identifying a file's location and then
requesting the relevant information from a field office. Time delays
mount as field office staff search file rooms and then fax or ship
copies of the needed file or a prepared summary to FBI Headquarters.
This process, repeated for many tasks, not only dilutes the FBI's
responsiveness, but also limits information sharing, a critical success
factor in protecting the security of our homeland and working
counterintelligence and counterterrorism cases.
One possible solution to these problems the FBI is exploring is the
establishment of a central records complex where all of our closed
paper files would be located, and our active files stored
electronically. Our frequently requested closed files could be scanned
and uploaded into our electronic record-keeping system, so that Agents
and analysts worldwide would have instant electronic access to the
information they require for their jobs.
Conclusion
The FBI recognizes the importance of accurate and timely name check
processing. I want to emphasize to you, this issue has the full
attention of Director Mueller and Assistant Director Hooton. The FBI
appreciates the interest of the Committee in this matter. To ensure the
Committee's specific pre-testimonial questions have been answered, I
have attached an addendum that discusses them directly. The FBI
welcomes any further study by the GAO on this issue. I am prepared to
answer any questions the Committee may have.
Questions submitted by the House Science Committee
Q1. How are Visas Mantis requests currently transmitted from the State
Department to the FBI and from the FBI to the State Department?
A1. The FBI receives Visas Mantis requests from the Department of State
via computer disc, cable, or manual (facsimile) submissions. Results of
the name check process are returned to the Department of State twice
weekly by computer disc or telephonically in expedited requests.
Q2. What is your internal process for tracking a Visas Mantis case?
How often is that information available electronically? And how often
must that file be located physically? What are your plans to fully
automate this process? Have there been cases where a file has not been
located and the applicant is still pending a response?
A2. The FBI's name check application accurately tracks each visa
request within the our name check process. At any moment, we are able
to electronically determine the status of an individual request,
including where it is within the name check process, determine which
requests have been pending for a certain period of time, identify the
FBI files associated with an individual, ascertain the result of a name
search, identify the type of visa request, and generate a status
report. We do not keep track of how often a paper file must be located,
as opposed to having the information in our electronic recordkeeping
system. As stated in my testimony, each name check entails every
combination of the first, middle, and last name, which means that
records may be found responsive for each combination. In addition,
often there is a combination of paper and electronic files for each
name. So, with one name check there may be numerous files, both paper
and electronic, on a combination of name variations. As our system
cannot quantify these numbers for us, it is too large a task to
manually count and I cannot state how many name checks have required
paper files. However, on February 23 there were 203 names that were
pending over 60 days. It would be safe to assume most of these name
checks required review of paper files. While we intend to fully exploit
information technology, the system will never be fully automated. Files
and information must be reviewed by human beings, which cannot be
automated.
Now, if the question is more appropriately, when will it be fully
electronic or the paper records digitized, the answer depends on our
success in building a new central records complex and relocating all
closed files to that location where the files of interest can be
scanned-on-demand by an agent or analyst. There have been instances
where files have not been located, but by agreement with the State
Department, the FBI may close a case administratively if there are no
counterintelligence or counterterrorism files associated with the name.
Q3. What priority do Visas Mantis investigations have among other FBI
work? How do you think these waits impact your ability, and the ability
of other law enforcement agencies, to identify and capture a terrorist
as opposed to simply preventing him or her from entering the country at
that particular post?
A3. Within the NNCP, they are a very high priority together with other
homeland security name checks. As stated, the NNCP can resolve 99
percent of the name checks, with only one percent of the names and
related files having to be reviewed by an investigative division.
Within the investigative divisions, review of these files is usually
assigned to intelligence analysts. These analysts are primarily
assigned to the analysis of intelligence reports from around the world
in order to support on-going investigations, or to support the flow of
intelligence to policy-makers. Despite these significant and voluminous
responsibilities, these are the best professionals to review
information in our records and to then make an informed decision on
whether a requester of a visa represents a threat to our homeland, or
is interested in illegally acquiring targeted U.S. special technology.
Despite the press of other business, the reviews of Visas Mantis
requests by the investigative divisions generally are handled
expeditiously.
As for the impact of these waits on the ability to identify and
capture a terrorist as opposed to simply preventing him or her from
entering the country, I am not sure that can be quantified. However, I
can say that the investigative divisions believe the information found
in the Visas Mantis requests they review is of use in their other
responsibilities.
Q4. What steps are you taking to make [the] FBI's systems inter-
operable with the State Department, which recently invested about $1
million to upgrade its technology for transmitting Visas Mantis
requests? Until systems are inter-operable, how will information be
transmitted and what impact will it have on processing time?
A4. The FBI is participating in the development of the Department of
State's new visa database. Current planning is focused on the optimum
manner to move requests from the Department of State to the FBI. In the
interim, the Department of State submits requests to the FBI from its
new database by computer disc. This process is highly reliable and has
improved processing times.
Q5. How satisfied are you about the appropriateness of the cases
referred for additional review under Mantis? Are consular officers
providing agents with enough information and the right type of
information in their requests?
A5. The name check process culls out 99 percent of the Visas Mantis
submissions prior to review by the investigative divisions. The
information they review is useful and is focused appropriately on
sensitive technology.
Q6. What steps have you taken to improve the visa application vetting
process? In light of the fact that there have been lengthy waits and
there are still Mantis cases that have been pending more than 60 days,
what measures do you have underway that will identify and resolve these
cases?
A6. We are in the process of implementing a number of interim
improvements to minimize manual submissions by all agencies and
increase efficiency within the name check process. The FBI has
developed high-level functional requirements for a new name check
application that will be compatible with the new FBI information
systems in development. These new information systems, over time, will
eliminate dependence on the retrieval of paper files. The development
of this new name check application is now undergoing review within the
FBI's Information Technology Investment Management Process.
Biography for Robert J. Garrity, Jr.
Mr. Garrity was born and raised in the Baltimore, Maryland
metropolitan area, where he received his early education. He graduated
from the University of Maryland Baltimore County with a Bachelor's
degree in psychology; the University of Baltimore School of Law; and
earned a Master's of Public Administration degree from the University
of Southern California. He entered on duty with the FBI in 1976 and,
following a period of training, was assigned to the Savannah Field
Office. In 1977, he was transferred to the Statesboro, Georgia Resident
Agency. In 1978, he was transferred to the New York Office, where he
was assigned to a foreign counterintelligence squad investigating the
activities of the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). He was promoted,
in 1980, to Supervisory Special Agent and transferred to the former
Intelligence Division and assigned as an attorney to the Special Staff,
the precursor to the National Security Law Unit. In 1983, he was
reassigned to the Soviet Section, as a supervisor providing guidance,
oversight and support to offices conducting counterintelligence
activities against the former Soviet Committee for State Security
(KGB).
In 1984, he was transferred back to the New York Office as the
supervisor of a squad engaged in counterintelligence activities
directed against the KGB. In 1989, he was promoted and transferred back
to FBI Headquarters as the Chief of the GRU and Arms Control Treaties
Unit in the Intelligence Division. In 1992, Mr. Garrity returned to
criminal investigative assignments and was designated the Special
Assistant to the Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division.
In 1995, he was promoted to the position of Assistant Special Agent in
Charge of the Dallas Field Office, where he was responsible for the
day-to-day operations of the division.
In 2000, he was selected into the FBI's Senior Executive Service at
the rank of Inspector, and assigned to the Office of Inspections. In
this capacity, he was responsible for leading inspection teams to
ensure field office and headquarters division compliance with existing
policies and regulations, and to facilitate the improvement of
performance by providing independent, evaluative audits of all
investigative and administrative operations. He served as the
Inspector-in-Charge of the Information Security (InfoSec) Working
Group, analyzing the FBI's InfoSec policies, practices and procedures
in light of the damage committed by a former Special Agent who was
convicted of committing espionage.
In July 2001, Inspector Garrity was appointed the FBI's Interim
Records Officer, reporting directly to the Acting Director, and charged
with the responsibility of assessing the FBI's records management
systems in light of the belated production of documents in the Oklahoma
City bombing investigation. After assessing the records management
system, Inspector Garrity recommended re-commissioning the Records
Management Division (RMD), to bring all records management functions
under a central manager during the records life cycle. The FBI hired a
professional records officer and then Inspector Garrity was detailed to
serve as his deputy during the formulation stages of this new
organizational entity. In January 2002, Inspector Garrity was detailed
to the RMD as the Acting Deputy Assistant Director. On May 22, 2002,
Director Mueller selected Inspector Garrity as the Deputy Assistant
Director of the Records Management Division. From January, 2003 through
January, 2004, DAD Garrity served as the Acting Assistant Director
while the Assistant Director was on a special assignment.
Discussion
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Garrity, and
you had some insight on a complexity of the issue, and I
appreciate that.
Mr. Ford, I assume that you found all of the agencies, DHS,
State and FBI cooperative?
Mr. Ford. Yes, we did.
Chairman Boehlert. Okay. Fine. So no problems in
responding? And I would assume that all of the agencies are--
did they have an advanced copy of your report?
Mr. Ford. They had an advanced copy of a draft of the
report, which they commented on.
Chairman Boehlert. But I assume they are not just going to
throw it on a shelf, but they are going to read it carefully
and begin to study these things? Okay. Fine. Let the record
show that all witnesses nodded yes in the affirmative. And I
think we would all agree--let me see if you agree with this
statement. That the current visa system operates in a way that
oftentimes creates needless problems for foreign students and
scholars, problems that don't enhance our security. Do you
challenge that statement in any way? Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I just get a little nervous about
conceding that point completely. I think there are certainly
instances in which there has been needless delays or system
problems in it. I think that the security regime that are--is
in place is important and critical, but clearly, we have system
problems to work on and there is work to be done to improve the
process.
Chairman Boehlert. And let me applaud you and the
Department for doing just that. I mean, you are moving in the
right direction. I don't want anyone to think that this hearing
is designed to criticize what you are doing. We just want to
encourage you. We want to get some facts on the record, if you
will, and go forward from here, because it is a changed world.
I mean, just because someone in some distant point on the globe
would like to come to the United States to study or to teach or
to tour doesn't mean they can come here. I mean, we have an
obligation to open our doors as much as possible, but our first
obligation is for the security of the American people, and as I
said in my opening statement, it just ain't easy.
Let me ask you this, Mr. Secretary. We all acknowledge
there were some real glitches in getting SEVIS up and running,
and I would assume you are in constant communication with the
university community. And do your consultations with them, the
dialogue, indicate that they feel that there is some
substantial progress being made?
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely. We are first of all in regular
contact with them. Jill Deary, our SEVIS program director, has
weekly or regular conference calls with the associations
representing the academic community, addressing problems on the
SEVIS system or questions they might have. We are regular
participants in their conferences. I personally have met with
them rather frequently, listened to their concerns. But I think
there were clearly some early glitches, and those have been
addressed. From a technical standpoint, I believe they are
satisfied with those, and I think it is illustrated by the fact
that in the first SEVIS rule--interim rule that was put out, we
had literally thousands of comments. The last time we put out a
rule, there were 225 comments that came in.
Chairman Boehlert. So moving in the right direction?
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely.
Chairman Boehlert. Ms. Jacobs, one of the problems, it
seems to me, is that a lot of consular officers around the
world might be afraid to let someone in these days. They are
going to err not only on the side of caution, but be doubly
cautious. Is there specific guidance we can give to visa
officers that would enable them to focus more on those most
likely to present a threat? You indicated the China gathering,
but the others I am concerned about. And secondly, to add to
that, my experience and--appears over these years is that
oftentimes, the consular officer in one of our posts around the
world handling visas is a junior person, not a senior, more
experienced person, because they go onto something else as they
get seniority and experience. Let us talk about the consular
officers, Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Thank you for the question, because we
consider the training of our officers to be a key component to
this entire process. When new officers come in to the Foreign
Service, they all go through basic consular training, and part
of that training is devoted to how to do this security advisory
opinion process. What the different checks are, what to look
for. In addition to that, we send out every year a telegram
that includes the technology alert list to all of our posts
overseas, and the first part of that cable of course lists the
various sensitive technologies. But the rest of the telegram is
devoted to giving the officers guidance on what to look for,
the types of technologies of concern. We tell them to consult
within the Embassy if they have, for example, a science attache
to run the case by that person to see if, in fact, it does
present concerns. We give them a list of websites that address
many of the technologies in question so that they have more
background on that.
Chairman Boehlert. Well--and my red light is on, but the
same question, part two. I've learned this from Ms. Jackson
Lee. Mr. Ford, is that your experience? When you are out in the
field talking to the consular officers, do you feel that the
guidance that they get gives them some comfort level in dealing
with this issue?
Mr. Ford. Actually--well, you have to remember we were
there in September prior to some of the things the State
Department has recently implemented. But I can say that in
particular in China and Russia, a number of consular officers
there felt that they didn't have as much specific guidance as
they would like in order to determine whether they were making
the right decisions. For example, the technology alert list
itself is a fairly extensive document. It has a lot of fields
in it, and a lot of the consular officials were--that we met
with indicated they had some difficulties trying to interpret,
you know, how they were supposed to interpret that list and how
they are supposed to apply it.
So they felt that getting a little more specific guidelines
from the Department would have been very helpful, and if it
sounds like the--I know the Department has told us they sent an
individual to China, which of course is the key country in this
issue. So hopefully, that issue has been improved, based on
what we heard from last fall.
Chairman Boehlert. And just to follow up, Ms. Jacobs, the
consular officer issue--am I correct in my general feeling that
consular officers dealing with these issues are usually junior
on the list, in terms of seniority and experience?
Ms. Jacobs. Yes, sir. In most of our posts, especially
where we process large numbers of visas, the people on the line
doing the visas are, for the most part, junior officers. But
they are all supervised by more senior officers, and as I said,
they do get training before they go to post. And let me just
follow up just real quickly on what Mr. Ford said. We are
giving them feedback on individual cases every day. We are in
constant communication with Nonproliferation and the posts,
passing information back and forth, and we hope with this new
quarterly cable that we are going to send out, we are going to
actually present samples of good cases and again try to
reiterate what the officer should be looking for.
And in addition, we always talk about these SAO issues at
conferences, consular conferences that we have. I have just
recently been to three of these, and I spent a good couple of
hours talking about all of these issues.
Chairman Boehlert. My time is up, but I just want to make
sure you understand that we want to work with you because we
don't want to deny our great educational institutions, the
Cornells, the Syracuses, the Utica Colleges, a plug for my alma
mater, to be denied the faculty and students the opportunity to
contribute to those institutions. On the other hand, we are
going to make darned sure that we don't let the wrong people in
the country.
So it is very, very difficult, and every one of us up here
have to understand it. And something else we have to
understand. We are part of the problem. Mr. Garrity, I know
about the whole system in the FBI, computers and everything
else. I mean, talk about inter-operability and sometimes
operating with yesterday's technology is a real problem for you
guys. And you say we will solve the problem if you give us some
money, so we have got to give some more resources dedicated to
that so that you can talk to State and State can talk to
Homeland Security, and you can do it instantly around the
globe. So we will work on that too. Mr. Udall.
Mr. Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome the
panel as well, and I want to direct my questions at Ms. Jacobs.
Your visit here last year, you talked about IPASS, the
Interagency Panel on Advanced Science and Security, and I
understand in a recent communication with the Committee, the
Office of Science and Technology Policy, OSTP, and the
Department of Homeland Security have indicated they are putting
together a plan to implement IPASS. Can you talk a little bit
about the current status of that and then what the schedule is,
and I am going to turn to Secretary Hutchinson as well, when
you are finished to comment.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Thank you for that question. The IPASS
was an interagency group that we formed back in 2002 in order
to get at the issue of advanced students coming here who might
be studying in areas of sensitive technology. This group met
and came up with a plan to try to complement the Visas Mantis
program. They decided that they would look at technologies that
are uniquely available in the United States. When Department of
Homeland Security took over responsibility for IPASS, I
understand that they are now looking at this and that they plan
to set up a process within the appropriate time frame.
Perhaps Under Secretary Hutchinson can talk more about
that, but certainly, the State Department has been a very
active part. And as I said, the whole goal is to add value, not
to add further delays to the processing system.
Mr. Udall. So will it supplant the existing Visas Mantis
system or add to it or compliment it? Is that still being
worked out?
Ms. Jacobs. It is.
Mr. Udall. Yeah.
Ms. Jacobs. I think the idea though is to complement it----
Mr. Udall. Yes.
Ms. Jacobs [continuing]. To try to really target the
interests on a certain category of students coming to study in
areas of concern.
Mr. Udall. I want to apologize to my colleague. It is
actually Secretary Hutchinson, and he served here in the House.
We are proud of what he is doing, so Asa, do you want to
comment on the----
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, and former colleague is the best
title I could have today, so it is good to be with you and I
want to mirror what Ms. Jacobs indicated. We view IPASS as
complimentary to Mantis, and I think we have to be careful that
when IPASS was mandated, that was in 2002, before we had a
fully compliant SEVIS system and before we had an implemented
U.S. VISIT Program, both adding security measures for the entry
of people into our country. But IPASS does have some specific
application, particularly bringing on the academic scientific
community to help us measure those that ought to have special
review.
We want to make sure we don't do things that are
duplicative and add an extra layer that would add to delays, so
we are reviewing how IPASS can be utilized in a complimentary
fashion, and that is an ongoing process that we have at the
department.
Mr. Udall. Secretary Hutchinson, have you--I am going a
little bit off on a tangent here, but have you gotten any
indication when you look overall at visa applications and--that
the bad guys have tried to use this particular approach to get
into our country to do mischief, or are we in a better be safe
than sorry mode at this point?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, first of all, it is clear that there
has been instances of technology transfer. That some countries
in the past have utilized our research, friendliness and
academic institutions to gain knowledge and also the technical
expertise, and so it is not just simply a terrorist issue, but
also a technology transfer issue.
Mr. Udall. Good point.
Mr. Hutchinson. And so I think the mandate is very
appropriate that we look at these sensitive areas very
carefully. But whenever you look at what terrorists are doing,
they are looking at ways to avoid our visa system, where they
do not have perhaps the interview process, where they don't
have the background checks. And so the fact that these are in
place have a deterrent value as well as a detection value.
Mr. Udall. One of the messages you would want us to absorb
is that this is as much about technology transfer concerns as
it is about particular individuals using this particular
channel in which to enter the country. That that is the greater
challenge we face?
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely. That is correct.
Mr. Udall. Yeah. I still have a little bit of time left,
and I am going to hold off using the Chairman's technique until
later in another hearing with the same question, part two. So I
want to thank you all again for being here, and this has been
very informative, and we look forward to working with you to
find that balance that the Chairman so articulately mentioned
and outlined. So thanks again.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Udall. And
without objection, I would like to insert in the record at this
juncture a statement from the Association of American
Universities dealing with this very important subject.
[The information referred to appears in Appendix 2:
Additional Material for the Record.]
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
let me make a couple of comments, and that is actually to
compliment the folks who work for the Department of Homeland
Security and the Offices of Consular Affairs and the FBI. They
do a tremendous job with limited resources under oftentimes
very stressful circumstances and conditions, so I just want to
express my appreciation to you all and the people who work with
you all for the jobs that you do.
In that regard, I want to read back again, Ms. Jacobs, a
point that you made in your written testimony and also in your
oral testimony a while ago, because I think it bears repeating.
You said while we are committed to facilitating the travel of
legitimate visitors to the United States, we consider the
protection of national security the highest priority in visa
matters. That was echoed by the Chairman a minute ago as well,
but it is a point that ought not be forgotten in our--not
haste, but in our eagerness to admit people who we want to come
to the United States. That is really a second priority and
comes after the need to protect America and American lives
here.
Mr. Ford, in your GAO report, I just want to comment on
your finding that--in regard to the Visas Mantis program, that
it only took a little over two months to process those
applications. To me, that is not burdensome, and in fact, as
you all know, compared to most visa applications, that is
pretty fast. In fact, two months is probably less than a lot of
students wait to find out whether they have even been admitted
to college. So when you put it in perspective, I don't think
two months is too bad and all things considered, when you
understand the importance of what we are trying to do to--that
is to prevent would be or potential terrorists from entering
the country, two months is, I don't think, unacceptable.
In that regard, let me direct sort of a two-part question
toward Mr. Hutchinson and Ms. Jacobs, I think, and it is this.
What criteria, other than what we are using under the Visas
Mantis program, are you using or developing to enable us to
differentiate between the prospect of terrorists and the
legitimate student or scientist? And the second part is how
does that criteria differ from what we used to use in the
Immigration and Naturalization Service? Mr. Hutchinson, if I
could ask you to respond first.
Mr. Hutchinson. All right. Well, first, you know, I would
point out, according to my information, in China, the refusal
rate for visa applications is close to 40 percent. Now that, in
most instances, is not because there is a terrorist concern,
but because there is a question as to whether they would return
to their own country and whether they are, in fact, an
intending immigrant. But whenever you look at the criteria we
use, and of course, the consular office, in a direct
application, is whether they are a legitimate traveler, and
there are a number of measures that you look at in terms of
whether they intend to return to their home country or not.
Secondly, from the terrorist standpoint, obviously we look
at everyone who applies for a visa in terms of whether they are
on a terrorist watch list, whether they have overstayed
previous visas, which is an indication of risk, whether they
have any criminal offenses. Those are all routine checks, and
closer scrutiny is given to those that are applying for entry
into sensitive areas, and that is where we have this more
extensive review.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Thank you. Ms. Jacobs--and Mr.
Hutchinson, I was going to come back in a minute and ask you
how that differs from the INS, but I will do that on the second
round. Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. The--well, as Secretary Hutchinson said, we
continue to adjudicate visas in accordance with the immigration
law. The section that Visas Mantis gets at is 212(a)(3), which
talks about the illegal transfer of sensitive technology. As
far as the criteria used, that sort of gets back to the
guidance that we provide to the field. We give them a list of
about 200 technologies that the interagency group back here has
identified as being sensitive for national security purposes.
And then we go further and try to explain what all of that
means to the officers, what they should be looking for, what
questions to ask. And as I said, we are doing additional
training in that regard.
I think one of the biggest challenges that all of us face
after 9/11 is I think we are doing a much better job of
identifying bad people and getting those people into look-out
systems. I think we have come a long way. We still face this
issue though that we have to identify high-risk travelers who
may not be known to us, who are not in a look-out system, and
that is why we have these various screening processes in place,
so that the case can come back for review to see if there are
concerns that we need to be aware of.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Okay. That answered my question. Thank
you all very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. There is clearly a consensus here that this is,
as has been said over and over, a both important and a
sensitive issue, and that--you know, clearly that we should
always err on the side of security. But that should also not be
an excuse for inefficiency, and I think that is what we need to
try to determine today. And Mr. Ford, thanks for a good report.
GAO is--does a great service to Congress and the country, and
this is once again, another good report. Let me ask you is this
just--these delays, is this just a natural bubble in new
programs getting started, and--or--and we have heard a
variety--a list of things that these groups are doing. Do you
feel like these are in order and feel like this is going to
come together soon, or do you still see there might be
problems?
Mr. Ford. Well, first of all, as we say in our report,
there has been a lot of activity on the part of the State
Department and the FBI in particular to address some of what I
characterize as inefficiencies in the process. And I want to
make it clear that GAO did not set a standard that 60 days is
the--a right amount of time. Actually, if there is information
out there indicating that somebody is going to do harm to the
country, it should take as long as necessary. Our main point
here is whether or not the process can be made more efficient,
because we found cases when that didn't occur.
I believe that some of the steps that the Department of
State and the FBI have underway can help improve the
efficiency, particularly the transfer of information because
when we started this project, clearly, there were cases when
applications got lost. They were sitting on someone's desk. The
process just had places where there could be gaps that good
technology ought to be able to overcome. So if the Department's
new data system works and if they can get it so that it is
inter-operable with the FBI, a lot of the inefficiencies that
we saw ought to be corrected.
Mr. Gordon. Well, we really need to have you back the 1st
of next year and see how things are going. I think you are
correct in that there shouldn't be--we could have a model time,
but the time is whatever it takes. But again, that is not an
excuse to let something just sit on a desk somewhere. Now the
principle recommendation of GAO was that there be a coordinated
plan between the various agencies, and my mother used to say
that, you know, if it is not written down, you don't have a
plan. So let me just ask Mr. Hutchinson--I know that you have
responded--all of you have responded to this report and we are
generally in agreement. But they didn't get into too much
specifics.
Are you planning to work with these other agencies and have
a written plan as to the Visas Mantis process, how to make it
more efficient?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, and I think there are a number
of improvements that have to be looked at, based upon the GAO
report. One of them of course is more State Department
dependent, which is a cable-less SAO process, an online system
that the FBI and the Department of State I know are looking to
address. The second issue is----
Mr. Gordon. Mr. Hutchinson, I am not trying to cut you off,
but my time is short here, and I am sure you are--really, the
question that I have is do you intend to work with these
agencies to develop a written plan to make it more efficient?
Mr. Hutchinson. We certainly intend to work with these
agencies. In terms of a written plan, our responsibility at
Homeland Security is to add the security perspective. If it
takes a written plan to do that, we will certainly look at it.
But we intend to address the issues raised by the GAO report
from the Homeland Security perspective.
Mr. Gordon. Well, the principal--again, the principal
recommendation was that there be a coordinated plan between the
different groups. Ms. Jacobs, what about you? What are your
plans in terms of developing a written plan for coordination?
Ms. Jacobs. One of the things that we are doing within
State is to develop SOPs for handling these cases. For example,
we are setting now a performance goal that if we can get all of
the clearances back from the other agencies within 15 days that
the cable will go back to the post within two to three business
days. And so we are really taking a much deeper interest in
looking at the processing times, at the numbers involved. This
project that we have in place that will connect us with the FBI
through the OSIS system will actually allow for electronic
questions and answers to go back between posts and the FBI.
Mr. Gordon. Just--I know that my time is going to be
running out. Again, I have no doubt whatsoever that each of
your agencies are doing all that you can to try to make your
agency effective and efficient, and I would just hope though
that there needs to be a point somewhere where you have got to
be talking together, in being sure that those things come
together. And I would hope that you will, expect that you will,
and look forward to Mr. Ford coming back next year with a hunky
dory report.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It seems to
me this hearing should not be seen as a forum to pit the
interests of science against the interests against security,
but somehow work together to accomplish the same--the kind of
compromise that is going to be good for our ultimate economy.
Maybe the two goals are not jeopardizing our economic future
and not jeopardizing the security of this country, and let me
just ask you, Mr. Secretary, the question on the H-1B, 2 and
3s, are you increasing or decreasing--are you familiar with the
increase or decrease in the green card, H-1B, 2 and 3s?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the--in terms of the green cards, of
course, the President's initiative indicated that there should
be a reasonable increase in the number of those. In terms of
the B-1s, being a former Judiciary Committee Member, that is
statutorily fixed as to the number of those, and I think that
is something that will continue----
Mr. Smith of Michigan. But of course, that is what we do
here. We change that. It was much higher, now it is back down
to 65,000. But a lot of students, as I contacted my
universities, as Chair of the Research Subcommittee, a lot of
the universities suggest that maybe even most of their students
that are graduating with their doctorates in the science, math,
engineering, etc., tend to stay in this country, and I assume
they go from the restricted F student visas and become more
important and more educated scientifically, and then apply for
an H-1B or a 2 or 3, and so I assume that is the----
Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct. That would be the process.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. Just in terms of our future economy,
we have worked very hard in this committee trying to encourage
more interest and success in science and math with our
students, and for a lot of companies that say look, lift--make
it--relax the restrictions on the H-1Bs so we can keep our
economy going, and after all, we have the prevailing wage
provisions. I would just suggest that if demand increases, by
increasing the salaries to available people in this country for
their--those high-tech jobs, eventually in the long run, we are
going to stimulate greater interest in the number of students
and hopefully the number of parents that encourage their kids
in K through 12. But it seems to me that as long as we already
know that 9/11 had one person that was over here on a student
visa, it is justified in getting tighter.
Have you--has anybody got any specific suggestions on how
we facilitate that compromise to not jeopardize security, and I
am also concerned about your restriction of visas for our
scientific gatherings in this country. Already, some other
country is saying look, come--for your international scientific
forums, come to our country because it is too hard to get into
the United States.
Mr. Hutchinson. We are in a transition, in my judgment. We
have imposed new security requirements that are appropriate,
from the interview of visa applicants to the biometric
confirmation of identity. But it is important that we one, send
the message that we welcome people to our country, and secondly
that we are going to do everything that we can to facilitate
that. That is the--we are going to have to improve our
processes, our technology, and the message that we have to our
foreign guests.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. Anyway, part of the increase in
demand is increased pay for some of these high-tech students in
our country over the long run. I am introducing legislation
that is going to be hopefully a stimulus and an awards system
for those companies and industries that make a special effort
to work with and improve our science and math in our schools in
our country. But simply lifting the door to allow more
immigration to replace our shortage by students coming in from
other countries, I don't think in the long-term is the kind of
solution that is going to motivate a better job in science and
math education in this country.
Let me ask Mr. Garrity if we have become sophisticated in
terms of the school reporting. Maybe I--in terms of the school
monitoring what happens to these students, is that fairly--is
that running smoothly and efficiently now?
Mr. Garrity. I am probably not the best person to answer
that question because they don't report to the FBI.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. Who do they report to? Back to you,
Asa.
Mr. Hutchinson. Yeah. The students coming in? It is----
Mr. Smith of Michigan. No, no. The responsibility of
schools to monitor what happens to these foreign students.
Mr. Hutchinson. It is really working very, very well. For
example, the universities have a responsibility to go online,
to tell us if a student is not complying with the visa, showing
up for class, changing the majors inappropriately, these type
of things. We have had 25,000 violations reported by the
universities and academic institutions on SEVIS violators. Of
those, only about 1000 were actionable leads that we could
follow up on. But they are doing a good job cooperating with us
and getting the information on student compliance with the
visas.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. Do you require personal interviews
now for if there is an international forum in the United States
from scientists from around the world? Do you require a
personal interview? My understanding is, and their complaint
is----
Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct.
Mr. Smith of Michigan [continuing]. You now require a
personal interview. Even if they come here twice a year or
three times a year, shouldn't there be some kind of flexibility
for a reoccurring U.S. visitor, whether it is business or
whether it is scientific forums of some kind?
Mr. Hutchinson. Janice, do you want to take that? Ms.
Jacobs might----
Ms. Jacobs. It is true that we interview the vast majority
of people coming here for any type of visit. We changed that
policy last year because we felt that we needed to be
interviewing more people to really know more about the people
who were coming here----
Mr. Smith of Michigan. Well, my question is this. Somebody
that comes once every year or every two years, there is no
flexibility?
Ms. Jacobs. Well, a lot of that depends on the reciprocity
schedule that we have with any given country. For example, if
they are coming here to visit and they--in some countries, they
can get a 10-year visa, which allows them to travel freely
during that period. We wouldn't see them again for 10 years. If
it is someone coming to a conference where there is sensitive
technology involved, in that case, we might give the person a
single-entry visa to come to that conference.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. And sometime, it takes two months,
I'm told. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Dr. Gingrey.
Mr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to direct
my questions first to Secretary Hutchinson, and then to State,
to Ms. Jacobs. First of all, let me just say that I was--during
this recent President's Day recess, I went to Guatemala on a
medical mission with the Flying Doctors of America. And we each
were provided--those of us who speak no Spanish--with an
interpreter, and my interpreter was a young Guatemalan lady who
was in college in Guatemala. She actually would go to the
university there on the weekends, and of course, work--had a
full-time job.
In Guatemala, I think the currency--I think I am
pronouncing this right, quetzales and eight quetzales equal $1.
And they earn maybe the equivalent of 250 quetzales a week, and
I was--the question I want to ask in regard to the fee--because
I asked her why she didn't come to the United States and go to
school, and she said because I don't have $100 to apply for a
visa, and some of my friends or co-students have tried that and
they pay their $100 and fill out the form, and a month later,
they get a letter back telling them that they are denied. And
that is the equivalent of about two weeks' wages, and, as you
all know, many countries in Central America, and Guatemala in
particular, are very poor countries.
So in regard to the amount that is charged, the question of
course--and I will direct this to Secretary Hutchinson first.
The former INS, which oversaw SEVIS before it was folded into
the Department of Homeland Security in March, hired KPMG to
evaluate whether a $95 fee they wanted to impose would cover
the costs of the SEVIS program, and they actually came back and
said it would more than cover the cost. In fact, a more
appropriate cost would be $54. And for that reason, I think
some may have been surprised when you proposed--your proposed
rule included a $100 fee.
And so the question is what will the increased fee go to
support that was not included in the original evaluation, and
if you can address that problem. And, Mr. Secretary, before you
do, this $100 fee or whatever the fee is, is if--if it is a
standard, across-the-board fee applicable to students from any
country, if the student is from Western Europe and an affluent
country and, you know, with my--$100 may be nothing to them,
but for this young student in Guatemala, it was impossible.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, and certainly a very appropriate
question. The fee is in place because Congress directed that
this be a fee-supported program, and you are absolutely correct
that the original study indicated that--I believe it was $56
would be sufficient for the administration of the program. But
that was in terms of the administering the processing of the
students, but it did not include the compliance side. And so we
felt like it would be inappropriate to generate 25,000 leads
and not have the ability to follow up on those leads. So the
additional $44 is for the compliance side to follow up on the
leads, to sort through these, and to make sure the students are
complying with their obligations.
We are certainly sensitive to the burdens on the students
and it is a fact and reality. We are sensitive to it. I know
that many universities are trying to, you know, accommodate
that burden on the students by giving them assistance.
Mr. Gingrey. And my second question--I know my time is
getting short, and I will direct this to Ms. Jacobs. The State
Department has almost no data that would enable policy-makers,
including all of you, to know whether the visa system is
focusing properly. And for example, we don't know how many
cases are being referred for Mantis reviews or how often those
reviews turn up a real problem. What are the Departments of
Homeland Security and State going to do to make sure that we
all have the data we need to evaluate the system, to see if it
is truly working?
Ms. Jacobs. We do have some figures on the number of cases
that we processed last year. We issued around 4.8 million
visas, and out of those, we did about 220,000 checks, and that
is all types of different clearances. In the case of Mantis, we
did about 20,300 cases. And so I think in the big scheme of
things, we can say that the percentage of people who have to
undergo these additional checks is still relatively small
compared to the numbers of visas that are issued.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much----
Mr. Gingrey. Thank you----
Chairman Boehlert [continuing]. Dr. Gingrey.
Mr. Gingrey [continuing]. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Weldon.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for not
being here for the whole hearing. I had an Armed Services
hearing at the same time. But I do have some concerns here, and
I am going to ask the Committee to support me in a request that
I am going to make.
I have been working for the past 17 years on improving
relations with a number of nations, both in the former Soviet
States, Eastern Bloc, and now recently with North Korea and
with Libya. In fact, we will take another delegation back to
Libya this coming weekend, with the support of the
Administration. The Chairman just got back from Libya. Was it
last week? And----
Chairman Boehlert. Last week. Two hours in the deserts of
Libya with Moammar Gadhafi.
Mr. Weldon. And we took a delegation over about a month
ago, and so I am very familiar with the issue of visas, as it
relates to our interaction with these nations that want to
become closer to America. And while I, as a Member of the Armed
Services Committee and Homeland Security Committee, understand
the need for absolute security and absolute transparency, I
will tell you that the process is broken. I can't tell you the
number of times that our government has sponsored seminars with
scientists and academicians, only to find that 24 hours before
the event, 48 hours before the event, they can't get a visa to
come in.
This sets our relations back with these nations years in
terms of embarrassments. We have even had deputies from the
Russian Duma denied. Now some of them legitimately have been
denied because of questions about involvements that they are
in, in the country. But some, there have been no reason given,
and yet they have been denied access to the United States
So Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do, there--and I
will--and I am also concerned about the system we have. We are
working with Libya right now and there are very delicate
discussions going on with the Libyans about a statement by the
Prime Minister yesterday that appear to renege on the
commitment relative to the responsibility of Libya on the
Lockerbie crash and the bombing in Berlin. So I was on the
phone all day yesterday afternoon with the--with my Libyan
contacts right directly to the Prime Minister and the Foreign
Minister, and with the person who is acting as intermediary who
was given a letter by our Embassy, by our consular officer in
Dubai last June basically stating--and I have a copy of the
letter, which I will give you for the record--that your visa is
approved from our standpoint. And this is the guy that is
acting as intermediary who is helping us accomplish what we
want to get the Libyans to reinstate the acceptance, which is
going to happen today, which will allow us to remove the travel
ban on Libya.
And so we have this letter from our Dubai consular office
approving his visa and saying, but it is back in Washington
being reviewed. When my staff called the State Department here
in Washington this week, they said we have no record of this
man. To us, he doesn't exist. He did apply at some point in
time, for a visa in Spain. Now my question is not whether or
not this guy deserves a visa. My question is the left hand
doesn't know what the right hand is doing if we have a letter
from a consular office in Dubai, but the State Department back
here doesn't even know the person exists. Now I don't know how
you explain that and I don't know how we--and let alone figure
out how we can increase the capability of getting legitimate
people in this country and keeping out the bad guys.
I want to praise Asa Hutchinson, because it was the
Homeland Security Agency this past summer, last summer, who
prevented an ultimate disaster in having 20 young Russian high
school students stay in America with 20 young American high
school students, all of whom were nominated by Members of our
Congress, the House and the Senate, and members of their Dumas,
and they couldn't get visas to come over to spend time at the
Freedoms Foundation for a conference on democracy building and
free enterprise. It was only because of Homeland Security that
we were able to get that issue resolved, and it was an
embarrassment, but finally, it was rectified, and Director
Hutchinson, I--Secretary Hutchinson, I congratulate you for
your effort, and it was a very successful program.
So I am asking today, Mr. Chairman, and I would hope my
good friend Bart Gordon would agree, that the GAO do an
investigation, an independent investigation, and I would like
to meet with them to give them some facts to work with, on the
visa process relative to Eastern European nations and former
Soviet States, specifically. And I would ask the Chairman and
the Ranking Member if they would support that request.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, speaking for the Chair, I have--I
would be fully supportive with the request, and Mr. Gordon has
indicated the same.
Mr. Weldon. I thank the Chair, and I thank my colleagues.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. With students, I would assume that frequently
the case is they are here for multiple years, and also for them
to get clearance, you want to be sure that they are going to go
back home, which means they have got family and things of that
nature back home. So if you are going to be here for two, three
or four years, you want to go home and see your family. Yet you
have to go through this same--as I understand it, through the
same process again. So I guess, Mr. Hutchinson and Ms. Jacobs,
is it the case? You have to go through the same process, and if
so, would there be a way to flag these folks and have an
expedited process on their--you know, on a--they go home for
three weeks to visit family on some holiday?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, and actually the--if a student
gets a four-year visa to go to the academic university, they do
not have to reapply every year, and so that visa is good for
all of their travel back and forth during that timeframe.
Mr. Gordon. That is not what we understand, but that is--I
am--is that your understanding, Ms. Jacobs?
Ms. Jacobs. That is true for the students who are coming
here who are not subject to the Visas Mantis process. We first
of all look at their intention to return to the home country
after the studies, and provided there is no other reason to
find them ineligible for a visa; the vast majority of
applicants would get the student visa to come here. I don't
think----
Mr. Gordon. So what would be the difference between someone
who was subject to the Mantis and someone who was not, and
about what percent is that?
Ms. Jacobs. Well, it is a very small percent. Of all the
checks we do, I said we did about 220,000 last year, only about
10 percent of those are Visas Mantis in general, and a smaller
percentage of that would actually be students. But what we have
done to address, I think your question is once they are
cleared, if it is a student, for a particular program in the
United States, we have worked with our fellow agencies to make
the clearance valid now for one year. We are hoping to talk
about getting that clearance to be valid for the entire length
of the program, and that way, they can travel freely. They
would not have to go through that check again.
Mr. Gordon. But it would seem like, by definition, if they
have gone through this advanced check, then they have cleared,
and so they ought to be in a different category.
Ms. Jacobs. No. We agree with that. The idea would be that
they could come here for the length of the program. If there is
somehow some derogatory information developed during the stay
in the States, that would go into a look-out system to alert
us.
Mr. Gordon. I guess my other question--you know, in the
past, this was a vehicle for folks to come here and then just
disappear and stay, and we wouldn't even keep up with them. And
I know that you are doing a--you have got a tracking system now
with this, I guess it is SEVIS? Is that how you pronounce it?
But how much tracking is this? I mean, do--whether it is
quarterly or by semesters? Are the universities checking in and
saying yes, that this person did pass and that we know they are
going to classes? I mean, how do you really keep up with
someone a year or two later?
Mr. Hutchinson. The obligation on the university is to
report any anomalies, and those can be specifically defined,
but for example, if the student who comes in--first of all,
they have to verify that they have been accepted before they
would be entered, and then that they actually show up at class.
And if they fail to show up at class or drop out, any anomaly--
for example, if they come in to major in English and wind up
having nuclear physics as their major, that is an anomaly that
they should report online to our SEVIS program office.
Mr. Gordon. So they only report bad news. No good news?
Just for----
Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct.
Mr. Gordon [continuing]. Terms of--yeah. Okay. Is this
enough? Are you satisfied that--I mean, is this working and are
the universities really doing that? Is there any spot-checking,
you know?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes. There is spot-checking. I am satisfied
that they are very, very cooperative. Like I said, they have
referred 25,000 anomalies to us.
Mr. Gordon. They have? Okay.
Mr. Hutchinson. Now some of those anomalies are
misinformation or some confusion, and that is why the vast
majority of those are not valid violations that we would
pursue, but they are doing a good job of reporting. Now
obviously, within that context, there would be a few schools
that aren't, and it is a continued education and evaluation
process.
Mr. Gordon. Ms. Jacobs, do you have any comments on that,
or----
Ms. Jacobs. No. I agree with everything the Secretary said.
Mr. Gordon. Good. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. In the report--and
once again, my experience over the years has been that GAO
reports are outstanding and they are well thought out. They
have some specific recommendations that deserve to be
addressed, rather than put on a shelf gathering dust. And I
notice on page 24 and 25 of the report on ``Recommendations for
executive action,'' they say that ``The Secretary of State, in
cooperation with the DHS and the FBI should develop and
implement a plan to improve the Visas Mantis process, and that
plan should consider actions to establish milestones, to reduce
their current number, develop performance goals and
measurements for processing,'' and Mr. Gordon addressed that
earlier, and we want to accommodate his grandmother, who likes
to put things in writing.
You know, but you see what the recommendations are. They
are very specific recommendations. Ms. Jacobs and the others,
is this something you intend to follow, and might we get an
indication of when we could hear from you, when this plan has
been--these recommendations have been implemented?
Ms. Jacobs. Yes, sir. Thank you. We do intend to consider
all of these recommendations very seriously. I think, in fact,
we have taken some action on some of them. I mentioned earlier
that we have established this performance goal now on the
amount of time where we turn around a case. The inter-operable
systems is absolutely key, I think, to increasing the
efficiency of this whole system. This improvement project that
I talked about, once it is up and running, should really go a
long way to reducing delays.
Chairman Boehlert. Do we have in place the technology for
the inter-operable systems to be up and running?
Ms. Jacobs. We are going to depend on the Open Information
System, the OSIS system that was developed back in the mid-
1990's to share the information from our visa database.
Chairman Boehlert. But when we could expect--give me a
reasonable--and I don't say a precise hour and day and----
Ms. Jacobs. Right.
Chairman Boehlert [continuing]. Month, but when could we
expect that we hear back from you that DHS, FBI, State all on
the same wavelength, here is what they are doing in response to
the recommendations contained in this GAO report?
Ms. Jacobs. Certainly, we talk to these agencies every
single day about the process and ways to improve it. I think
now we need to sit down together and develop a plan for putting
all of this together so that we have a more----
Chairman Boehlert. Well, when do you think----
Ms. Jacobs [continuing]. Clear picture----
Chairman Boehlert [continuing]. It would be fair to call
you back for a progress report?
Ms. Jacobs. I think maybe in six months.
Chairman Boehlert. I would like it a little bit shorter,
but I will take that under consideration. We might call you
sooner. Ms. Jacobs, let me--another thing. Although consular
officers at some post told GAO that the most recent cable and
using Technology Alert List was an improvement, many indicated
it was still very confusing to apply, particularly for junior
officers, and we know most of these are junior officers without
a scientific background. To what extent are resources available
to these junior officers to help them find answers to their
questions about sensitive military and dual-use technology? And
let me add, sad to report, we have a number of Embassies around
the world without a science advisor.
Ms. Jacobs. Yes, sir. Well, where we do have a science
attache at an Embassy, of course, that is a very valuable
resource for the consular officers to use. In our TAL cable, we
also give them a number of websites that they can consult that
give them more information about the particular technology
involved. We don't expect them to be scientific experts, but we
do, I think, give them a fair amount of guidance on what to
look for, things to--and they can always come back and consult
with us on an informal basis. But when in doubt, we do
encourage them to submit the case for a review back here.
Chairman Boehlert. Let me ask you, Secretary Hutchinson,
the same question I asked Ms. Jacobs. When can we invite you
back to give us sort of a progress report on the implementation
or the recommendations of GAO?
Mr. Hutchinson. Looking quickly at the recommendations,
three of those are really more technical between Department of
State and the FBI. They need to comment on their timeframes and
capabilities. One of them though is referenced to training and
guidance on policy, which is a Department of Homeland Security
lead responsibility, and certainly, I think six months, we
should have more information to provide in that regard. Policy
changes take some interagency work do take some time, but we
certainly do intend to start on it very expeditiously.
Chairman Boehlert. All right. Thank you very much. You
know, in some respects, we are dealing with perception. We
are--problems versus an inconvenience, and let me say what I--
if I might amplify that. You know, prior to 9/11, I was typical
of the American traveler. If I had a flight to catch, I would
arrive about 10 minutes before, expect to dash up and say here
is my ticket, get me aboard. And then prior to 9/11, when we
have got these machines to process us through, I would stand in
line and I would watch the people ahead of me be very upset
with the screeners who were, at that time, making minimum wage
with limited training. But screeners suggesting that they have
to open up the purse or open up their bag, and they were very
upset with that because they were being inconvenienced. Well,
they--there was no desire to inconvenience anyone. There was a
fervent desire to add to the security of everyone.
That has changed rather dramatically today, and sometimes,
I find myself at airports where there is a rather lengthy line,
and I don't find people complaining when the Transportation
Security Administration makes them take off their shoes, for
example, or remove their belt or something. So we are moving in
the right direction, but in this instance, I still think there
is a perception out there that we should instantly approve any
visa application. It is a free and open society. It is not a
free and open society anymore of necessity. I mean, we just
can't do what we would like to do. And so if someone has to be
slightly inconvenienced for a few more days of processing a
visa or has to fill out yet one more form and--to enable all of
your respective operations to review very thoroughly and to
make a determination on security matters, so be it.
But I think you are getting the gist of our strong feeling
up here that it is a changed world and there have been some
problems and challenges presented, and I think you are
addressing them in a responsible manner. We would encourage you
to do so, to continue that effort, with as much dispatch as
possible because foreign students at our universities, foreign
faculty members at our universities, foreign distinguished
visitors at our conferences all enrich America. They add
something, and we don't want to stifle that. And I want to just
address the old song that says where all of these foreign
people coming into our universities are taking the place of
American students and that is not fair, that is not the case at
all.
Our experience is that students aren't being denied
opportunities to go to school to study engineering or the
various science disciplines. The problem is we don't have
enough of them, and as Chairman Smith indicated, we have got to
do a better job at K through 12 to prepare more students to go
on to graduate training. And if we deny our universities
students from beyond our borders, then what choice do they
face? They have a lot of vacancies that we are not filling with
American students. Then they cut back on the spending for their
various departments, and the effectiveness is reduced, so this
is a real big issue. And I think I want you to know how much we
appreciate what each of you are doing to address this, working
cooperatively with us. And once again, let me thank GAO for
doing another outstanding job. And with that, I will turn to
Ms. Lofgren for a final comment.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my apologies for
being late.
I have been concerned for some time, as Mr. Hutchinson
knows and the Committee knows, about the delays that students
are encountering and the impact it is going to have on our
ability to be an innovative technology society in the future. I
mean, as we know, half of the Ph.D. candidates in the hard
sciences and math and engineering are foreign students and, you
know, that has been a huge engine of innovation for our
country. I have a couple of questions about the use of
technology as well as some systems that I think would assist.
I recently met with a group of primarily engineering
students who were from various Middle East countries, and the
interesting thing in talking to them--and these are very smart
kids who were recruited by fine universities all over the
world. I mean--and they didn't have to come to this particular
prestigious university where I talked to them. They could have
gone anywhere and were lucky that they came here. Because they
were from Middle Eastern countries, they had special scrutiny,
and they weren't even complaining about that. In fact, most of
them hadn't been in their country of origin for many years. I
mean, they had been undergraduates in America, and then they
were in graduate school. I mean, they have probably been more
time in America than they had been in the country they were
from. They can't actually interview--in the case of Iranian
students, they can't--there is no Embassy there, and so there
was a problem in terms of doing the security checks.
A security check needed to be done in Iran, but they hadn't
lived in Iran. They had nothing to do with Iran, and so they
went to an adjacent country where they were trying to do an
analysis, and in fact, the FBI analysis needed to be where they
were living, in the United States. And these kids said--and
they were great kids. Said we will tell you anything. I mean,
come in, investigate us. We will take lie--whatever you want,
because we want to be safe too from terrorists. But there was a
real glitch in terms of just doing the analysis. And then the
other problem they had was that once the analysis was done, it
needed to be redone every time they needed to go out and come
back in.
And I am just wondering is there a way to do the analysis
once and to target the analysis where somebody actually lives
and has the ability to--you know, where we can find something
out, and then to give some kind of advanced reentry permit or
something of that nature to students that we have thoroughly
examined? Because what some of these students were saying is,
you know, that if you are doing post-doctoral work, you need to
go to these conferences in Europe and other places and then
come back. If you can't go to the conferences, you really--it
doesn't work, and you really can't be a post-doc at, you know,
MIT or Stanford. You have to go to a European University
instead.
What do you think--what--is that a possibility?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think that is the type of thing that
should be examined, ways that we can help the frequent traveler
that comes to conferences that has had a clearance. As Ms.
Jacobs pointed out, on the Visas Mantis, which is the sensitive
technology, the check is good for one year. And now, there is
some rationale there. When you are dealing with sensitive
technology, a check after one year is probably appropriate to
make sure there is not additional information or they have
complied fully with it. But if we can simplify that process and
recheck--help that student out, then that is what we need to
work toward doing.
Ms. Lofgren. Now in terms of the inoperability between--I
was, thinking, looking at you, Mr. Hutchinson, about a meeting
that we went to. I think you were there and I was there. The
Attorney General----
Mr. Hutchinson. Um-hum.
Ms. Lofgren [continuing]. Asked us all, Members of the
Judiciary Committee, to come and meet with him and have
breakfast, and I--so we all did. It was a bipartisan group, and
we spent the entire morning berating him and complaining about
immigration functions, and now we get to complain to you.
Mr. Hutchinson. I have a totally different view these days.
Ms. Lofgren. But--so I know that you, because you were
complaining just like the rest of us, had the same level of
frustration that we still have about inter-operability and the
use of technology. And I am concerned that if we build our
technology on what currently exists in the agency, we are
building on a very fragile foundation, since it doesn't really
work. I am wondering, are you looking at utilizing technology
that might be more vigorous than some of the systems that have
proved not to be robust?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes. Absolutely, and one of the mandates
that Congress gave us was to integrate the databases for our
ports of entry. We have styled this mandate U.S. VISIT, and it
has given us tremendous success in terms of making our systems
a little bit more advanced, more capable, and certainly
connected to the Department of State. But there is more
progress that needs to be done. We need to upgrade many of
those old legacy systems. You know, the--in the 2004 budget,
the President asked for $400 million for that, and we got $330
million, and so there are some--and that will impact the
ability to bring the systems up to date and to modernize those,
but we will continue to work to do that.
Ms. Lofgren. I see my time is up, but just one final
question, and then maybe you can answer it subsequent to this.
There is a fee increase being imposed. It is not for student
visas, but in the whole immigration arena, and it is not clear
to me how--I mean, I am not opposed to charging applicants the
full cost for, you know, dealing with their application. But I
am not seeing a clear trail of how the money has been used, and
it is just--instead of getting quicker, it seems to be getting
slower. I mean, you know, for not just students, but all types
of applications, and I am wondering if you could provide,
subsequent to this hearing, some----
Chairman Boehlert. Yeah, and----
Ms. Lofgren [continuing]. Information on that.
Chairman Boehlert [continuing]. There--some other questions
that we are going to ask that they respond to in a timely
manner in writing. Earlier, Dr. Gingrey posed that same
question, and he posed an intriguing thought. He was talking
about a case in Guatemala where the income is, you know,
dollars a day. They had--students there having to pay the same
fee as someone in Western Europe where they make, you know,
maybe a lot more than that. So we would appreciate a response
in writing to that specific issue on the dollar amount charged
and what the proposal is and how it is used.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. With that, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
thank the panel for their presentation. Mr. Hutchinson, you
realize that there is not a time when the Judiciary Committee
is not in operation, and we are presently in a markup just a
few floors down. I think you can remember that, so I thank the
witnesses for their presentation, and I ask your indulgence, if
I may raise some points that have already been raised. I am
going to make a few statements, and then ask, as the Chairman
has graciously allowed, that some of my questions be answered
in writing because the Committee is still in the markup as we
speak.
I think this is a very important hearing for any of us who
live in university towns, and any large city, any rural area is
impacted by universities and impacted clearly by the importance
of their academic exchange, students on the undergraduate
level, graduate students; all of them are a part of our vital
energy and engine in this country. We realize that a page was
turned on 9/11 and we must do a better job, but when I hear the
numbers of the backlog that I think was noted by Mr. Ford, 67
days for processing and 410 backlog of cases in the region that
he investigated, and out--more than--that are outstanding, more
than 60 days. Obviously, we have somewhat of a problem.
So my question is how many actual man hours does the
application process take? How much time is spent sending things
back and forth? How much time is the application spending just
sitting in an inbox, the pending application just sitting in an
inbox, and how can we boost efficiency? Now I am going to want
those questions to be answered in writing, and I would like to
just get Mr. Hutchinson to answer this concern that I have.
I think that there is an inconsistency beyond the
application process for our students as they are seeking visas
to come into the United States or exchange for our
professionals, our scientists, which I am delighted that the
Chairman and the Ranking Member has held this hearing because
these are important issues for the opportunities of our nation.
But let me just point out to you that I think we also have a
problem in enforcement of those entering this country in our
respective airports.
There is an inconsistency, and I think it is partly
training and it is partly I think the atmosphere that is
suggested, meaning that we are getting terrorists. We are not
getting terrorists if we are misreading their applications, the
individuals coming in. We are interrogating people from
Pakistan and India who are frightened to death and may say
things that may be inconsistent and make them be perceived as a
terrorist, and they are simply coming here, for example, to
have--to testify in a lawsuit, accompanying their mother to
testify in a lawsuit. It is a particular problem in Houston,
Texas in that airport, which is in my Congressional District.
The insensitivity of the questioning and the detaining of
individuals who really have no interest, sense of purpose to do
a terrorist act.
So to you, I am asking what kind of training is--are we
providing those agents who are dealing with the individuals
coming into this country with visas, by the way. Obviously,
they could not come in with visas, who are randomly detaining
people for no reason whatsoever and finding out that they have
made mistakes, and have said oh, I apologize, only after
Members of Congress have had to, in the wee hours of the night,
intervene. So I think there is an inconsistency in training. We
were discussing today the backlog in visas for the talented who
may want to come over in exchange. But what is the agency doing
about making sure that it refines its job to do what the
American people want it to do? That is, to stop terrorism, but
not to terrorize innocent visitors to this country, and that is
what we are doing, and I would appreciate your response.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, and obviously, sensitivity and
respect is an important part of the inspectors' responsibility.
We try to instill that in the inspectors' training and in their
subsequent counseling. I think the vast majority of inspectors
do a tremendous job out there, using good judgment and
discretion. Obviously, there are individual cases in which bad
judgment and discretion has been used, and we are happy to
respond to any specific incidents or any case that you have and
take a look at it.
But we do try to have that as an important part of the
training and ongoing, and we do have a Civil Rights Officer
that has been specifically statutorily designated for the
Department that can review particular cases, where anything has
been a problem.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you, and I might say that you
do have a vast number of hardworking employees for the U.S.
Homeland Security. I would invite you to visit Houston, as I
have done before. I would like to have you come down and I
would like to have you again visit our airport and again look
at some of the operations. We are using U.S. VISIT. But I will
look forward to the answers to my other question by writing,
but I look forward to getting back with you, and I thank you
very much. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Ms. Jackson Lee.
And thank all of you, and notice the efficiency with which this
committee operates. Secretary Hutchinson, we are going to meet
your deadline of 11:30. For all of you, I know you have busy
schedules and you have important responsibilities. We thank you
for serving as resources to the Committee. This will not be
your first visit on this subject to the Committee. We will
extend an invitation to you in a timely manner for another
visit. Thank you. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Submitted to Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security, Department of Homeland Security
These questions were submitted to the witness, but were not
responded to by the time of publication.
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
Q1. GAO made a number of recommendations to reduce the time necessary
to adjudicate visas for foreign students and scholars. Among them, GAO
urged the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, to develop and implement a plan to improve the visa
process, with milestones for pending cases and performance goals and
measurements for future cases. What steps are you taking to develop and
implement a plan? Specifically, what are you doing to establish
milestones and performance goals? How should Congress evaluate whether
the planning recommendation is being implemented?
Q2. What work is being undertaken to achieve system inter-operability
and to expedite data transmissions between agencies?
Q3. What would be an appropriate time for the Committee to have you
back to review your agency's progress?
Q4. In the proposed SEVIS fee rule, foreign students will be required
to pay their fee either electronically (with a credit card) or by a
check drawn on a U.S. bank and payable in U.S. dollars. Are you
concerned that the check option introduces a paper element into a
system that was designed to be entirely electronic? How will you
accommodate students from countries where access to credit cards and
reliable mail systems is limited?
Q5. A foreign student already pays a $100 visa processing fee to the
Department of State as well as a visa issuance fee determined by their
country of origin--all before the applicant knows whether he or she
will be allowed to enter the U.S. as a foreign student or scholar. Some
have suggested a legislative fix to allow the SEVIS fee to be paid
subsequent to the issuance of a visa. Would DHS support this statutory
change? Why or why not?
Q6. Some have suggested that the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), part of DHS, should collect the SEVIS fee at the
applicant's point of entry into the U.S. This way, the agency
benefiting from the fee is also the one responsible for collecting it.
Does CBP have the capability to collect this fee? Assuming that
Congress provides a legislative fix to allow the fee to be collected
subsequent to the issuance of the visa, what do you think of having CBP
collect this fee?
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. In your testimony you refer to the Visa Security Program, which
has placed DHS personnel at consular posts in Saudi Arabia and which
will be expanded to other posts. What is the role of the DHS personnel
relative to that of the consular officers in reviewing visa
applications?
Q2. Do the DHS personnel have scientific or technical knowledge, and
do they advise consular offices relative to the need for Security
Advisory Opinions?
Q3. You indicate in your testimony that, `` DHS intends to review the
Mantis process with the intent of incorporating the best elements of
the IPASS concept without creating an additional layer of review.'' Are
you working out how to develop this new approach for security reviews
in consultation with the State Department and the Office of Science and
Technology Policy?
Q4. What is the timeline for developing and implementing this new
system?
Question submitted by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Q1. Please provide a timeline for a student visa application coming
through your agency: who it comes from, what form it comes in (i.e.,
digital, or hardcopy, etc.), how you process it, what your role is
(phone calls, letters of inquiry, compare to databases, etc.), how many
actual man-hours are needed per application for those tasks (mean,
range), how much time the application waits in a queue or inbox, and
then where it goes from there.
Question submitted by Representative Lynn Woolsey
Q1. There have been cases at American universities, including
incidents at the University of California campuses, where international
scholars have had to be detained upon arrival in the United States
because there were problems with their paperwork. Through some of the
anecdotal information I have received, I have heard of professors and
scholars, who arrive without having completed every step of a new
clearance process, but they have letters from their universities,
inviting them to the United States. In some of the instances, the
scholars were harshly detained and poorly treated while their visa
status was investigated. I am concerned that international students and
scholars, whose contributions to American society and education are
immeasurable, are afraid to come to the United States. They have heard
horror stories about people being handcuffed, detained on wooden
benches with a small blanket, and denied access to their luggage or
medicines. Rather than potentially face this type of treatment,
international students and scholars may choose to study or present
their research in other countries. I do not have issue with the fact
that their entry is delayed until problems are resolved, but I think
there should be a protocol for handling these cases in a more
reasonable and standardized way.
Do officials at American ports of entry have the proper training
and financial resources needed to manage detained international
scholars in a humane way that encourages them to come back?
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Janice L. Jacobs, Assistant Secretary, Office of Consular
Affairs, Department of State
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
Q1. GAO made a number of recommendations to reduce the time necessary
to adjudicate visas for foreign students and scholars. Among them, GAO
urged the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, to develop and implement a plan to improve the visa
process, with milestones for pending cases and performance goals and
measurements for future cases. What steps are you taking to develop and
implement a plan? Specifically, what are you doing to establish
milestones and performance goals? How should Congress evaluate whether
the planning recommendation is being implemented?
A1. The Department of State has prepared a plan to implement the GAO
recommendations and is submitting it to DHS in accordance with the MOU
with DHS concerning implementation of section 428 of the Homeland
Security Act. Paragraph 4 of the MOU specifically addresses changes in
the security advisory opinion process. We will inform the GAO when this
plan has been finalized, and will continue to keep the GAO and Congress
informed of progress. Meanwhile, we continue to make progress in
streamlining the security advisory opinion process, which is a high
priority. For example, we have created a new system for fully
electronic communication of SAO data in near-real time, increasing both
the speed and the accuracy of our communications. More than half of our
visa-adjudicating posts are now using the new software for SAO data,
and we are working with other agencies to establish fully electronic
connectivity.
Q2. It is my understanding that consular officers already collect fees
from visa applicants to fund State Department operations. Some have
suggested that consular officers should also collect the SEVIS fee. Do
you support that idea? How might such a change impact existing fee
collection processes?
A2. The Department of State has no plans to collect the SEVIS fee, but
we are working with the Department of Homeland Security to share our
experience with overseas collection to determine how that model might
be used to collect SEVIS fees. This is a fee of the Department of
Homeland Security. We have thoroughly explained our thinking to DHS.
The Department of State has made many changes over the past few
years to reduce the expense and burden of collecting visa fees. Our
biggest collection effort concerns the non-immigrant visa application
fee, also known as the MRV fee, from all persons applying for non-
immigrant visas of any type, including student and exchange visitor
visas. In many countries, we have instituted off-site MRV fee
collection systems with local banks. In other words, the visa applicant
appears at the bank to pay the fee and presents the consular officer a
receipt at the time of the visa interview. This process minimizes the
administrative burden on consular and financial sections of U.S.
diplomatic offices in terms of personnel resources and safeguarding
large amounts of cash. Posts overseas do not have the resources to
collect the SEVIS fee.
We are concerned that if consular officers collect the SEVIS fee,
or if the fee is collected as part of the application process foreign
governments will see the SEVIS fee as an additional fee for student
visas, and may increase the reciprocity fee for American students
seeking visas in those countries accordingly.
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. GAO found that because the State Department does not maintain
records on Visas Mantis cases by visa category, it was not possible to
determine how many such cases involving students and scholars were
being processed or the status of these cases at any time. What are your
plans to begin tracking these cases? What are your plans with respect
to establishing model timelines and benchmarks for cases subject to the
Visas Mantis process?
A1. The Department has developed the Security Advisory Opinion
Improvement Project (SAO/IP) to improve the automation that supports
the SAO process (Visas Mantis cases are one type of SAO). The enhanced
software allows us to better track the progress of specific cases
through the interagency clearance system. The software also allows
tracking of cases by visa category. The software is in use in
approximately half of our overseas consular sections. We expect to have
all posts using the software by mid-May. At that point, the Visa Office
will be able to monitor progress in all SAO cases through a variety of
standardized reports.
Our suggestions for establishing timelines and benchmarks are being
submitted to DHS. Per the MOU between the Department and DHS concerning
the implementation of section 428 of the Homeland Security Act, DHS
must concur in changes to policy and procedures involving SAOs.
Q2. GAO indicates that the upgrades being carried out by the State
Department in its information management system to allow for electronic
transfer of data on visa security checks will not be immediately inter-
operable with FBI information systems but that efforts are being made
to provide inter-operability in the future. What is the status of
upgrades to State's information management system and when do you
expect to achieve inter-operability of information systems with the
FBI?
A2. To upgrade the automation that supports the interagency clearance
process, visa processing posts overseas need new software. That
software has now been provided to all our posts overseas. CA
headquarters has verified that the software has been installed properly
at 105 posts. We will continue over the next few weeks to verify with
the remaining 106 posts that the software is functioning properly.
The improvement of connectivity to the FBI depends on our
respective use of the inter-operable Open Source Information System
(OSIS). CA is already using this network for other projects. We have no
obstacles to expanding our use of this network. The FBI is now using
this network with limited numbers of users. Once the FBI informs us
that they are fully prepared to rely on the network, CA will transfer
SAO data solely in an electronic manner. CA will then eliminate the
transmission of such data in telegrams that have caused errors such as
garbles in transmission to the detriment of efficient data processing.
Q3. You indicate that State's Nonproliferation Bureau must sometimes
ask consular posts for additional information about an applicant. Do
you track the frequency of such information requests, and do you
periodically inform consular posts on how to improve their security
checks based on experience with past shortcomings?
A3. The Nonproliferation Bureau (NP) requests additional information
from consular posts in only about five percent of Visas Mantis cases.
We work closely with NP to provide consular officers feedback on the
type of information that is helpful for the screening process. In 2004,
the State Department started sending a quarterly report to the field
about Visas Mantis policy and procedural issues. The report also
provides guidance that reflects current issues of concern to reviewing
agencies. NP and the Visa Office (VO) give a training session on the
Visas Mantis program to all consular officers before they head out to
post.
The Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) is funding trips by NP
officials to regional consular conferences. An NP official attended a
regional consular conference for China posts last January. VO also uses
video conferences with posts that submit large numbers of Visas Mantis
requests. For instance, we held such a conference with consular
officers in Moscow in March.
CA is also creating a web page for classified information for use
by consular officers. This will allow CA and NP to provide feedback of
a classified nature to the benefit of consular officers around the
world.
Q4. The GAO study showed that the time required for State to transmit
the results of an FBI clearance to a consular post was nearly 24 days,
and could be as much as 141 days. What are some of the reasons for
these very long delay times? What steps have you taken to reduce
delays?
A4. Upon receipt of a final response from all reviewing agencies, our
goal is to transmit a response to post within two business days. Delays
that occurred a year ago related to problems with telegraphic
transmission, glitches in the data transferred between the FBI and the
Visa Office, and shortcomings in the software in use in the Visa
Office. To fix such problems, we developed new software and added
personnel resources. We analyzed the results of the pilot program for
the improved software to handle transmission of clearances and case
tracking. We believe that we have successfully addressed the causes of
the delays that GAO found. The new software is in place in
approximately half of our overseas posts. We should complete this
project over the next few months.
Q5. What is the source of the technical problem you mentioned in your
testimony regarding State's automated visa tracking system failing to
capture all of the clearance information from FBI's security reviews?
A5. The technical problem mentioned is due to a lack of a shared unique
identifier in both, the Visa Office's internal case tracking system
(VISTA), and the FBI response Database. VISTA uses the Post's cable
transmission number, applicant name, and date of birth to identify a
response record from the FBI. However, when the FBI response does not
report this data accurately, VISTA cannot identify a matching record.
The most significant problem with data received from the FBI is that
the FBI reformats names that come into its name-check unit. Multiple
last names are combined into one name.
For example, if a cable is sent with the name EL AHI, SEYED, the
FBI will reformat it to ELAHI, SEYED. When the FBI sends its response
back to VO, the record has the reformatted name and therefore VISTA
will not be able to match the record. According to VISTA data, about 17
percent of all SAOs from FY 2003 had this problem. The Security
Advisory Opinion Improvement Project (SAO/IP) eliminates this problem
because it does establish a unique identifier for each transaction. The
FBI concurs with this solution.
Question submitted by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Q1. Please provide a timeline for a student visa application coming
through your agency: who it comes from, what form it comes in (i.e.,
digital, or hardcopy, etc.), how you process it, what your role is
(phone calls, letters of inquiry, compare to databases, etc.), how many
actual man-hours are needed per application for those tasks (mean,
range), how much time the application waits in a queue or in-box, and
then where it goes from there.
A1. The majority of student visa applicants receive a decision
concerning visa eligibility from the consular officer upon conclusion
of the visa interview. Some cases may be suspended for anti-fraud work.
Some cases that raise national security concerns may need to be
submitted for interagency review in Washington. The interagency
screening process is normally concluded within 30 days.
Initial Steps
An educational institution issues a Form I-20 to a prospective
student and registers the student in the on-line Student and Exchange
Visitor Information System (``SEVIS'') maintained by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).
Once the student has compiled all appropriate supporting
documentation, the student may obtain an appointment for a visa
interview at a U.S. Consulate. The minimum supporting documentation
includes the visa application forms (DS 156, 157, and 158), a photo, a
valid passport, and a receipt for payment of the visa application fee
(also known as the MRV fee). Different consulates have different
systems for making visa appointments, depending on local conditions.
Consulates worldwide give priority to student and exchange visitor
applications. At this time, appointments are available around the world
within a week except at five posts. The Department is helping those
five posts with additional resources and/or management assistance.
The student may apply for a visa at any time before the initial
program start date for his/her initial entry as a student to the United
States. However, a visa may not be issued for an initial-entry until 90
days before the program start date.
Visa Application at the Consulate
When a student arrives at the consulate, s/he will normally turn in
the application form so that clerical staff can undertake data entry.
Visa applicants may now fill out their visa applications on line. The
data is downloaded into a data base. At the consulate the student
presents a print-out of the application with a bar code, and the
information on the form is downloaded onto the visa processing system
based on the bar code. Applications written manually are still
accepted, and consulate staff transcribe the information on these
applications into the consular database. Data entry may take a few
minutes to approximately an hour.
The next step would be biometric collection. At over 100 posts,
consular officers are now collecting biometric identifiers of all visa
applicants. The biometric collection consists of a digital photo and an
electronic scan of the applicant's two index fingerprints. All posts
will be processing biovisas in accordance with section 303 of EBVERSA
by October 26, 2004. This step occurs in front of the consular officer
and takes approximately 30 seconds.
The consular officer will then normally take a minute or two to
quickly look over the supporting documentation to determine the nature
of the application and decide how to initiate the visa interview.
Visa Adjudication
The consular officer is responsible for conducting the visa
interview. It is viewed as an important tool in determining the bona
fide nature of a visa application. Immigration law places the burden of
proof on the student to demonstrate that s/he is a bona fide non-
immigrant who has the intention to return to his/her home country after
a temporary stay in the United States, is a bona fide student able to
pursue the proposed course of study, demonstrates funds for the
proposed course of study, and is either proficient in English or will
receive English language study in the United States. There is no fixed
length for the interview; but the average interview of a bona fide
applicant lasts about five minutes.
During the visa interview, the consular officer checks the SEVIS
database to make sure that the I-20 is valid and that the student is
still in active status within the system. If the consular officer
approves the visa for issuance, that information is automatically sent
to the SEVIS database.
Name-checks
When an applicant is entered into the consular database, a name-
check is automatically done on the applicant's name in the Consular
Lookout and Support System (CLASS). The consular officer has the
results of that name-check at the interview, and verifies whether or
not any ``hits'' pertain to the applicant. If there is a ``hit'' that
appears to pertain to the visa applicant, the consular officer will
deny the visa application under section 221 (g) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. This is a technical denial to indicate that further
administrative processing is required. The consular officer will pursue
the case with the agency that developed the derogatory information. In
some instances, the Visa Office may act as intermediary. It normally
takes 2-3 weeks for the consular officer to receive the appropriate
background information and call in the applicant to discuss further a
potential visa ineligibility.
In some instances, the consular officer will notice that an
application raises national security concerns as identified by federal
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The criteria for cases that
require screening through an interagency process are included in the
Foreign Affairs Manual. The consular officer will deny the case under
section 221 (g) pending guidance from Washington. The Visa Office acts
as a clearinghouse, receiving and analyzing responses from the clearing
agencies. The Visa Office provides final guidance to the consular
officer. Most such cases are fully resolved within a month.
There are two types of interagency screening efforts that may
affect students. ``Visas Mantis'' is the codeword that refers to a
screening process designed to look for inappropriate access to
sensitive technology. ``Visas Condor'' is a codeword that refers to a
screening process for counterterrorism purposes.
Consular officers generally send an interagency screening request
the same day of the interview or the next day. The request is in the
form of a telegram that is simultaneously transmitted to the Visa
Office and all appropriate federal clearing agencies.
Visa Issuance
In most cases, the consular officer makes a final decision whether
to issue a student visa at the end of the interview. The applicant is
informed of the decision at that time. The consular officer notes the
visa decision in the automated system. In the case of a visa denial,
the consular officer is required to add his/her reasoning to the
system. The officer may also include notes in issuance cases.
If approved, the applicant's passport and approved application
form(s) are provided to the clerical staff for visa printing. Normally,
the visa is printed in the afternoon or the next day.
Visa Delivery
Visaed passports are delivered to applicants in a variety of ways.
Some low-volume consulates are able to produce visas while the
applicant waits. Other consulates have a designated time to return
passports in the afternoon or the next day. Many consulates have
introduced a courier system whereby visaed passports are delivered
directly to the applicant's home address after several days, and the
individual does not have to wait at the consulate.
The Department of State does not have any statistics concerning how
much officer time or man-hours an individual visa takes to process.
Interview times will vary among applicants, and preparation time will
vary due to local conditions.
Once a visa is issued, the student may travel to the United States
at any time during the period the visa is valid, although an initial-
entry student may not enter the United States more than 30 days before
the start of classes.
Question submitted by Representative Lynn Woolsey
Q1. There have been cases at American universities, including
incidents at the University of California campuses, where international
scholars have had to be detained upon arrival in the United States
because there were problems with their paperwork. Through some of the
anecdotal information I have received, I have heard of professors and
scholars, who arrive without having completed every step of a new
clearance process, but they have letters from their universities,
inviting them to the Unites States. In some of these instances, the
scholars were harshly detained and poorly treated while their visa
status was investigated. I am concerned that international students and
scholars, whose contributions to American society and education are
immeasurable, are afraid to come to the United States. They have heard
horror stories about people being handcuffed, detained on wooden
benches with a small blanket, and denied access to their luggage or
medicines. Rather than potentially face this type of treatment,
international students and scholars may choose to study or present
their research in other countries. I do not have issue with the fact
their entry is delayed until problems are resolved, but I think there
should be a protocol for handling these cases in a more reasonable and
standardized way.
Do officials at American ports of entry have the proper training
and financial resources needed to manage detained international
scholars in a humane way that encourages them to come back?
A1. The Department of State cannot address the issues concerning
procedures at Ports of Entry. That is the responsibility of the
Department of Homeland Security.
The Department of State can affirm that we have proactive public
outreach programs to ensure that scholars understand that to travel to
the U.S. they must have visas appropriate for the type of activity they
wish to conduct in the U.S. We also have close working relations with
the DHS National Targeting Center (NTC) that supports port of entry
inspectors. NTC may phone us to discuss the case of an individual who
has arrived with incomplete and inappropriate information. We use
replicated data from our overseas posts to help advise NTC about
specific cases.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Robert J. Garrity, Jr., Deputy Assistant Director, Record/
Information Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
Q1. GAO made a number of recommendations to reduce the time necessary
to adjudicate visas for foreign students and scholars. Among them, GAO
urged the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, to develop and implement a plan to improve the visa
process, with milestones for pending cases and performance goals and
measurements for future cases. What steps are you taking to develop and
implement a plan? Specifically, what are you doing to establish
milestones and performance goals? How should Congress evaluate whether
the planning recommendation is being implemented?
A1. The FBI is participating in the development of the Department of
State's (DOS) new visa database. DOS and the FBI have agreed on the
process by which electronic visa information will be transmitted
between them, and a Memorandum of Understanding is in the final stage
of completion. In the interim, DOS submits requests to the FBI on
computer disc. This process is highly reliable and has improved
processing times.
Additionally, the FBI and DOS, as members of the Intelligence
Agencies' Working Group, are reviewing the need for the approval of
Visas Mantis by the FBI. In the interim, DOS notifies the FBI of cases
requiring immediate attention so the FBI can provide expedited
resolution.
The FBI is able to track the receipt and disposition of these
requests and will be able to measure the performance improvements
expected from the application of these new technological and management
methods.
Q2. Your testimony indicated that the main cause for the long delay
times in the FBI's visa security checks are for the cases that require
the retrieval of paper records. You also indicated that FBI is moving
toward a fully electronic database system. What is the status of your
planning and your timeframe for deploying this new electronic
information system?
A2. The FBI's Records Management Division (RMD) has planned a Central
Records Complex (CRC) that will house the FBI's paper records from all
265 FBI locations worldwide. As a preliminary step in relocating all
files, the FBI has initiated a multi-year inventory to account for
every file in its records system. Those files due for disposal under
the FBI's records retention plan will either be destroyed or
accessioned to the National Archives. Those files not due for disposal,
such as files that have continuing law enforcement,
counterintelligence, or counterterrorism value, will be scanned,
processed by optical character recognition programs, and uploaded as
electronic records in the FBI's electronic record keeping system.
The FBI is working aggressively to achieve a fully electronic
digitized record system. Interim improvements within the FBI, including
the development of electronic databases to prevent duplicate work, the
scanning of files, and work flow improvements, will reduce processing
times. The timetable for completing this effort is contingent on
multiple factors, including the personnel resources available in the
event of evolving priorities, possible enhancements to technology which
may improve efficiency and speed the process, legal considerations
related to the use of scanned documents for judicial and administrative
purposes, and the financial resources committed to this project
(including the funding received for the building of the new CRC, which
is a first step to be followed by the relocation of closed files so
that files of interest can be scanned for future use as digitized
records).
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. How common is it for defective or incomplete information regarding
Visas Mantis security checks to be provided to the FBI from consular
officers?
A1. The FBI's tracking of the visa process does not specifically record
errors or duplicate visa requests, so the FBI cannot provide a precise
response to this question. However, since DOS began providing
information to the FBI on computer disc, the number of duplicates and
errors has been minimal.
Q2. Are follow-up requests to State for additional information a
significant factor in determining the time it takes the FBI to perform
its security reviews?
A2. No. DOS ordinarily sends the appropriate information in the initial
request.
Q3. Do you believe that consular officers apply too little judgment in
requesting security checks for visa applications for students and
scholars, thereby placing an unnecessary burden on the system that
impairs the FBI from concentrating on applications involving true
security threats?
A3. The FBI recognizes that all agencies are attempting to fulfill
their missions within the finite resources allocated. Consular officers
attempt to discern, through a very limited opportunity for interview,
whether or not the visa applicant will have access to those American
special technologies that warrant a Visas Mantis name check. While the
expenditure of more time by consular officers would enable them to make
more precise determinations regarding the need for security checks,
reducing the FBI's need to expend resources, the FBI has not evaluated
how much additional consular time would be needed or how much FBI time
would be saved in this effort.
Question submitted by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Q1. Please provide a timeline for a student visa application coming
through your agency: who it comes from, what form it comes in, how you
process it, what your role is, how many actual man-hours are needed per
application for those tasks, how much time the application waits in a
queue, and then where it goes from there.
A1. Following is the work flow process with respect to the FBI's review
of student visa applications from the date of receipt at the FBI
through completion. The statistical information with respect to the
steps in that process is derived from a recently completed work process
study with respect to FBI name checks.
Visa applications are received via cables from
individual consulates or by disc or facsimile from DOS.
Requests received by cable or disc are processed on
the day of receipt through an automated process. Approximately
80 percent of Visas Mantis are returned to DOS within 72 hours
as ``No Record'' responses, indicating that the FBI has no
record with respect to the individual involved.
When an automated search reveals the possibility of a
responsive file, the request is forwarded for manual review.
This review is conducted by an analyst within 14-30 days. Each
analyst reviews the files related to an average of 33 names per
hour. Approximately 10 percent of visas are returned as ``No
Record'' responses at this point, meaning that the file did
not, in fact, relate to the individual at issue. Consequently,
within 30 days of receipt at the FBI, 90 percent of all
applications are resolved.
The remaining applications are forwarded for
additional file review; time in this file review queue averages
one week. Among recurring submissions, visas are placed among
the highest priorities. (White House requests for name checks
with respect to individuals visiting the President have the
highest priority. Special requests relating to counterterrorism
investigations are also given a higher priority.)
Processing times at this file review stage are as
follows.
Electronic files--Electronic files are
retrieved within minutes. It takes an average of 30
minutes for name check personnel to review a given file
or reference.
Paper files located in FBI Headquarters--
Files are retrieved within three to 30 days. File
service personnel average 40 minutes per file to locate
and retrieve a file. It takes an average of 30 minutes
for name check personnel to review a given file or
reference.
Paper files located in FBI field offices--
Files are retrieved within five to 90 days. An average
of 30 minutes is expended to forward a file request to
a field office (phone call, e-mail, or electronic
communication). Once a file is located, it takes an
average of four to five hours for a field office
employee to draft a summary of the file for
transmission to name check personnel. It takes an
average of 30 minutes for name check personnel to
review each summary.
Paper files that cannot be located-A small
percentage of files are not located (the exact number
of such files has not been maintained). If a file is
not located within 180 days, the appropriate
substantive FBI office coordinates with DOS to
determine whether the visa request can be resolved
without benefit of the file. This is a risk management
issue that requires the evaluation of several factors
by appropriate FBI and DOS personnel.
An additional six percent of requests are resolved through
this manual file review, which takes from two to 60 days to
complete. Consequently, after a total of 90 days, 96 percent of
the requests have been resolved.
Review of the files related to the remaining
applications (four percent), all of which have been identified
as being germane to the requester and as potentially having
relevant information requiring review by an analyst from the
cognizant subject matter office, is typically completed within
a week. If there is no objection to granting the visa, the
analyst notifies the name check unit and, within 72 hours, DOS
is notified. If there is an objection, DOS is notified by cable
sent directly from the analyst. 97 to 98 percent of requests
are resolved within 120 days after receipt by the FBI.
Appendix 2:
----------
Additional Material for the Record