[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOMELAND SECURITY: THE BALANCE BETWEEN CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE
MANAGEMENT THROUGH TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
H.R. 2512, H.R. 3266, and H.R. 3158
__________
NOVEMBER 20, 2003
__________
Serial No. 65
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary
______
90-547 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee ZOE LOFGREN, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MAXINE WATERS, California
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
RIC KELLER, Florida ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
STEVE KING, Iowa
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
TOM FEENEY, Florida
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Philip G. Kiko, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina, Chairman
TOM FEENEY, Florida ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin MAXINE WATERS, California
RIC KELLER, Florida MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
Jay Apperson, Chief Counsel
Elizabeth Sokul, Counsel
Katy Crooks, Counsel
Patricia DeMarco, Full Committee Counsel
Bobby Vassar, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
NOVEMBER 20, 2003
OPENING STATEMENT
Page
The Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress From the
State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security............................... 1
The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security........................ 3
The Honorable Anthony D. Weiner, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New York..................................... 4
The Honorable John E. Sweeney, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 5
WITNESSES
The Honorable C. Suzanne Mencer, Director, Office for Domestic
Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Oral Testimony................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
The Honorable Raymond W. Kelly, Police Commissioner, City of New
York
Oral Testimony................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. William H. Bishop, Director, Bureau of Homeland Security,
State of Idaho
Oral Testimony................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress From the State of Texas............. 44
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Adam B. Schiff, a
Representative in Congress From the State of California........ 54
Prepared Report of Dr. Joseph P. Indusi of Brookhaven National
Laboratory..................................................... 55
Questions and Responses for the Record from Ms. Suzanne Mencer... 57
Questions and Responses for the Record from Mr. Raymond W. Kelly. 60
Questions and Responses for the Record from Mr. William Bishop... 64
HOMELAND SECURITY: THE BALANCE BETWEEN CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE
MANAGEMENT THROUGH TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2003
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Coble
(Chair of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Coble. Good morning. The Judiciary Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security will come to order. It
is good to have all of you with us. I'll give my opening
statement and be followed by the Ranking Member, Mr. Scott, and
then we will hear from our panel.
As we all know, in 2001, our nation was attacked without
provocation and our citizens murdered by an organized but
amorphous enemy. We all wish that day had never occurred and
that such an enemy was not plotting to destroy the way of life
we hold dear. But that awful event did happen and that enemy
does, in fact, exist. Now we have no choice but to fight
overseas and on our homeland to protect that way of life.
As an aside, many people have compared our enemy today with
Adolph Hitler. I think there is a salient distinction. Adolph
Hitler, his thugs wanted to conquer the world. This crowd who
is opposing us now, they are not averse to destroying the
world, and I think that is indeed a difference.
Those efforts are costly as we defend, but again, we have
no option. We either sink or swim. That is why we must support
our local law enforcement and emergency responders, the
nation's first line of defense to protect the homeland. With
that in mind, today's hearing will focus on our domestic
efforts carried out by the Department of Homeland Security to
assist and train the State and local officials to anticipate,
prevent, and resolve a threat or act of terrorism, and God
forbid, if one does occur, to respond immediately and
effectively.
As part of this review, the Committee will examine H.R.
2512, the ``First Responders Funding Reform Act of 2003,''
introduced by Representative Sweeney from New York; H.R. 3266,
the ``Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders Act,''
introduced by Representative Cox, the gentleman from
California; and finally, H.R. 3158, ``Preparing America to
Respond Effectively (PREPARE) Act,'' introduced by the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner.
These bills are designed to change the formula and
standards used by the Department of Homeland Security to
provide assistance and grants to States and localities to
implement crisis and consequence management plans. Crisis
management includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the
use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, or resolve a
threat or act of terrorism. Consequence management primarily
fulfills the cleanup and restoration function after an attack
occurs.
Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Justice through the Office of
Domestic Preparedness offered the only integrated program to
provide needed funds for training, equipment, and technical
assistance to first responders for crisis management and
consequence management for a terrorist threat or attack. While
ODP has existed since 1998, it was first authorized in 2001 by
the Judiciary Committee to establish Federal domestic
preparedness programs and activities to assist State and local
governments in their preparedness efforts.
ODP provides State grants that enhance the capability of
State and local jurisdictions to prepare for and respond to
terrorist acts, including events of terrorism involving weapons
of mass destruction. Immediately after the 2001 attacks, the
Committee on the Judiciary met with the Office of Domestic
Preparedness to determine whether they were on schedule to
provide grants and assistance to the States. The Committee
continued to monitor ODP's progress with the States and
localities on this matter.
In 2002, the administration and Congress created the new
Department of Homeland Security. Over two dozen agencies and
several offices and bureaus were transferred to the new
Department, including ODP. The mission of ODP remained the same
when it became part of the new Department. When Congress was
considering transferring, the Office of Management and Budget
proposed that the Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA,
coordinate and conduct the grant program operated by the ODP
and that ODP be placed in the division of the new Department
that would be responsible for response.
The Committee strongly disagreed with the idea of FEMA
being the new home of ODP because FEMA is, in fact, a response
management agency with no, and I don't mean this in a bad way,
but with no understanding or capability to provide an
integrated training program that includes crisis management. A
terrorist attack is a Federal crime, and a crisis event which
requires a response different from that of a natural disaster.
As a result of the Committee's efforts, the ODP retained
its responsibility for the coordination and management of these
programs. The office was placed under the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate because of that
Directorate's support for crisis management measures, including
the anticipation, prevention, and resolution of threats as well
as post-incident response and consequence management.
The Committee has heard reports from the first responders
that ODP has done an excellent job, but there are still some
concerns. For instance, a USA Today article entitled,
``Homeland Security Money Doesn't Match Terror Threat,'' cites
complaints that the Federal Government provides too much
support to rural towns and insufficient to big cities and more
densely populated States that are more likely terrorist
targets.
Now, we have a rural area and an urban area represented
today. Mr. Scott's and my States would be somewhere between
Idaho and New York. So we will have some sort of balance today.
Some also believe that the grant process could be improved
through new standards and a more efficient process. I hope the
witnesses will explain the intricacies of the current process
and programs that address some of the proposed changes to the
process and standards and look forward to hearing from the
witnesses today.
I am now pleased to recognize the distinguished gentleman
from Virginia, the Ranking Member, Mr. Bobby Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am pleased to
join you in convening this hearing on first responder
antiterrorism preparedness prevention and response. They are
the two primary responsibilities of the first responders in
their efforts to prevent acts of terrorism whenever possible
and to address those that were not prevented.
Since any act of terrorism falls under law enforcement,
prevention will be much of the focus of law enforcement
entities. Law enforcement must also focus on identification,
capture, and prosecution of perpetrators of acts of terrorism.
This makes any incident of terrorism a crime scene, requiring
control to protect any evidence from destruction and
contamination, as well as a chain of custody and other
considerations which may be crucial to bringing perpetrators to
justice.
At the same time that law enforcement must focus on
prevention and response to terrorism, we must assure that
traditional law enforcement activities and capacities are not
diminished or undercut. The heightened state of awareness and
concern that we have been under since 9/11/2001, even false
alarms or hoaxes or over-precaution, eat up a significant chunk
of law enforcement time and attention.
In addition to these important responsibilities, an equally
important though distinct function of law enforcement first
responders is to cooperate with and assist other first
responders who address the casualties, damage to property,
collateral threats, such as public health threats, that can
stem from an incident of terrorism.
All law enforcement personnel, as well as budgets, are
grossly strained, and while it is clear that some places are at
higher risk or threat of terrorism than others, the fact is
that terrorism can strike anywhere, including where we least
expect it. And depending on the nature of it, an act of
terrorism anywhere, such as a nuclear incident or threat to our
water supply, food supply, energy supply, information
management, public health systems, can have devastating effects
over a large area, if not the entire United States.
So it is clearly a responsibility of the Federal Government
to do all it can to contribute to the efforts to empower first
responders to prevent and effectively respond to terrorist
threats. But we must prioritize our expenditures. We do not
have an unlimited amount of money. We must prioritize that in
an intelligent manner.
As the Chairman has indicated, all areas are not equally at
risk, and we have to prioritize our expenditures accordingly.
If we are doing snow removal, we do not fund Boston and Miami
equally for snow removal. We prioritize snow removal money, and
likewise, all areas of the country are not equally at risk, and
we have to have a priority system to establish which areas are
more at risk than others. And establishing that priority system
ought to be part of any legislation that we adopt.
Mr. Chairman, we look forward to hearing our witnesses
today. I would like to ask unanimous consent that the gentleman
from New York be allowed to have the balance of my time.
Mr. Coble. The gentleman from New York, although who does
not sit as a Member of the Subcommittee, we are pleased to have
him, and without objection, is recognized for the minute and a
half.
Mr. Weiner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it and I
just want to take this opportunity to welcome Commissioner
Kelly, who has been a great servant to this country and to my
city, and my colleague, Congressman Sweeney, as well. I thank
you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
There is something that I think all of us agree upon right
down, or right up to Secretary Ridge, that there is no way that
we should be distributing to antiterrorism funding as if it
were any other portion of the budget. It would be equally
absurd to be distributing agriculture money equally to New York
City as it is to Louisville as it is to distribute terrorism
money equally to Louisville, Kentucky, as it is to New York
City.
The problem is that we in Congress envisioned, and frankly,
the administration recognized, that there were certain high-
threat areas and in doing so identified seven cities, a list
where there was chatter, a list where there was exposure, a
list where there was greater danger. That list has been
expanded now to 30 cities and it is soon going to go to 50
cities.
The situation is simply now that we are devoting the same
attention to Minneapolis, Anaheim, Louisville, and Fresno as we
are to New York City, where in fact, arguably, and we will hear
testimony to this effect, we in New York City have more in
antiterrorism demands in an average week in just overtime than
some of these departments have in their entire police
departments throughout an entire year. It is simply a fact of
life in New York City, where we have to protect things like the
United Nations, bridges and tunnels, gatherings of State
leaders just about every day, that we have added costs and
added needs.
I would never stand up in the well of Congress and demand
that New York City get equal access to, say, wheat subsidies. I
think it is equally absurd for people in Charlotte, who have to
protect such great institutions as the Charlotte Raptor Center,
as getting the same amount of funding or at least be on the
same list as a city that has to protect Wall Street and Ground
Zero.
I believe that as it was originally envisioned, the list
was correct, roughly seven cities, seven high-threat areas,
seven areas that had demonstrated this higher need. Now this
list, unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, has become the classic pork
barrel pork project that everyone wants to be a high-threat
area.
We are in New York City, literally and figuratively, Ground
Zero for the war on terrorism. Commissioner Kelly will be
testifying about what New York City has been up against in
terms of costs. The effect of us diluting the high-threat
grants formula has been to take money away from where the
threat really exists.
And I want to commend Congressman Sweeney, with whom I am
cosponsoring legislation, to make this formula more fair, and I
thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, for holding
this hearing.
Mr. Coble. You are indeed welcome. We are pleased to have
the gentlemen from Florida and Ohio. Did you all want to make
opening statements, either of you?
Our first witness this morning is the Honorable Sue Mencer,
Director of the Office for Domestic Preparedness in the
Department of Homeland Security. Director Mencer was nominated
by President Bush and confirmed by the Senate on September 16
of this year to serve in her present position.
She served in the FBI for 20 years, from 1978 to 1998.
After she retired, she worked as a consultant providing
antiterrorism training for local law enforcement throughout the
United States in cooperation with the Institute of
Intergovernmental Research. In 2000, Ms. Mencer was appointed
by the Governor of Colorado to serve as the Executive Director
of Public Safety for that State. She graduated from the Ohio
State University with a Bachelor of Science in education.
Our second witness today is the Honorable Ray Kelly,
unknown to none of us, the Police Commissioner of New York
City, who will testify about the need of more resources in the
urban areas. And the distinguished gentleman from New York,
Congressman John Sweeney, has requested permission to formally
introduce the Commissioner. Mr. Sweeney?
Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me divert for a
second and thank you and recognize you and Mr. Scott for the
importance of this hearing, for the wisdom in conducting this
hearing as we in Congress attempt to focus ourselves more
keenly and get to some resolve in terms of the formulation
issues and the other issues that are attendant to our
responsibilities in making us more responsive to homeland
security.
I sit in a unique position as a Member on the authorizing
side of the Select Committee and as a Member of the
Subcommittee on Appropriations. I had the opportunity, in fact,
to help construct the high-risk, high-density concept in the
first supplemental. It was an important concept, but it is not
the only one. And indeed, in fact, I think today we focus on
the broader issue of not just high-risk, high-density, but
really how we become as efficient as we possibly can.
And we are joined in that endeavor by, I think, one of the
most preeminent experts in the world, with extensive private
and public sector experience, and I am pleased to introduce
Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly of the City of New York.
I would like to point out in this introduction, unlike my
friend and colleague, Mr. Weiner, I am not a resident of New
York City. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I am a resident and
representative of the 32nd largest rural district in America.
So this isn't necessarily about geographic competition. This is
about how we in Congress ensure the most accurate and safest
response that we can.
Commissioner Kelly was appointed by Mayor Michael R.
Bloomberg to his post, making him the first person to hold that
post for a second and separate tenure. Immediately prior to his
service as Police Commissioner, Mr. Kelly was the Senior
Managing Director of Global Corporate Security at Bear Stearns.
Before that, he served as Commissioner of the U.S. Customs
Service. I think that, as well as anything, points out the
diverse nature of his experience.
Commissioner Kelly prior to that spent 31 years in the New
York City Police Department, serving in 25 commands. That
included a different stint as Police Commissioner from 1992 to
1994. He was there before, during, and after, and he has been
there to really understand the complexities of the issues that
we face.
Prior to that, he was a combat veteran of the Vietnam War.
Commissioner Kelly retired as a Colonel from the Marine Corps
Reserves after 30 years of service. He holds a bachelor's
degree from Manhattan College, a J.D. from St. John's
University, an L.L.M. from New York University Graduate School
of Law, and an M.P.A. from the Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard. He has received honorary degrees from a number of
different sources.
But I also think, Mr. Chairman, more importantly,
Commissioner Kelly will give us the real kind of hands-on,
nitty-gritty understanding of both our capabilities and our
shortfalls and I thank you for having the wisdom of bringing
him here.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, John. You know, oftentimes, many
people, when they hear New York, they synonymously think New
York City, but you have just told us that there's a little bit
of rural in New York, and in the rural South, Bobby, oftentimes
when the minister starts preaching in a sermon and starts
tramping on the toes of the parishioners, they accuse him of
meddling. Mr. Weiner, when he talked about Charlotte, he is
coming close to meddling in terms of North Carolina and
Virginia, getting down our way, Bobby.
But finally, we have heard from the urban side. Now we have
the rural side represented. Our final witness is Mr. William
Bishop, the Director of the Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security.
Director Bishop will give the perspective of the rural States
regarding the need for Federal support of first responders.
Mr. Bishop was just promoted this October to his new
position. Prior to that, he served as the Director for the
Idaho Bureau of Hazardous Materials. In addition to providing a
rural State perspective, Director Bishop can provide a non-law
enforcement perspective as a former fire chief, which will add
additional balance.
Director Bishop has had a distinguished and interesting
career that has ranged from managing homeland security to
teaching to being a cowboy. Mr. Bishop received a B.A. with
distinction from the University of New Mexico.
Now, Mr. Bishop, I am a fan of the rodeo, but you say
cowboy. Do you mean riding the range and herding cattle or do
you mean riding those Brahma bulls, or both?
Mr. Bishop. I mean herding cattle, working on the land. I
had a stint as a roper. I found out you have to have eye-hand
coordination and found other ways to donate money besides
attending organized roping.
Mr. Coble. Well, in any event, it is good to have each of
you with us. Folks, the only thing I will ask you, I want you
to keep a sharp lookout on that panel in front of you, and when
that red light appears, that is your warning. Your 5 minutes
have expired. We have your written testimony that has been
examined. It will be reexamined. But in the interest of time,
we may be called to the floor at any unknown time. So when the
red light appears, that is your time. Your time is up.
So we will start with you, Ms. Mencer.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE C. SUZANNE MENCER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE
FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Mencer. Good morning, Chairman Coble and Members of the
Subcommittee. It is a pleasure and a privilege to be here today
to talk to you about the Department of Homeland Security's
Office for Domestic Preparedness efforts to provide support to
our nation's emergency first responders. On behalf of Secretary
Tom Ridge, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Office
for Domestic Preparedness, I would like to express my
appreciation for your support and your interest in Federal
programs to combat terrorism. I have provided a written
statement for the record, but in the interest of time, I will
summarize my remarks.
In the 10 months since DHS was established, significant
progress has been made toward making America safer. To date,
DHS has allocated or awarded approximately $7 billion to State
and local governments to enhance security and overall
preparedness to prevent, respond, recover from acts of
terrorism, as well as natural disasters. A large majority of
this assistance is provided through ODP.
As you know, the Homeland Security Act vests ODP with the
primary responsibility within the executive branch of
Government for the preparedness of the United States for acts
of terrorism. ODP's role in this capacity includes directing
and coordinating preparedness efforts, assisting States and
local jurisdictions with prevention, deterrence, response, and
recovery from acts of terrorism.
Since its establishment in 1998, ODP has provided
significant support to our nation's emergency response
community. To date, ODP has delivered weapons of mass
destruction training to more than 325,000 emergency responders
from approximately 5,000 jurisdictions nationwide. We have also
conducted nearly 300 preparedness exercises, to include the
Congressionally mandated TOPOFF Exercises 1 and 2.
But let's make no mistake. Despite ODP's successes, as
great as they are, we still have much work to do.
ODP is currently working closely with all 50 States, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. territories, to
develop a comprehensive, multi-year State homeland security
strategy. These strategies are based on a thorough assessment
of threat, vulnerability, capability, and needs, conducted at
the local level and utilizing a process developed jointly with
State, local, and Federal partners. When looked at in the
aggregate, they provide a clear road map for our nation's
preparedness and will assist ODP and its partners with
allocating resources for homeland security.
In addition to this strategy, we encourage regional
cooperation in a way to maximize the valuable assets and
resources and close the gaps. The vast majority of States have
established regional prevention and preparedness efforts.
For example, in Colorado, we have a multi-regional approach
and multi-disciplinary approach. We have nine planning regions
which we are using to develop our Statewide strategy. We are
working with our other existing entities within our State to
make sure that occurs.
In Illinois, they use the Homeland Security Grant Program
to fund and support regional prevention, preparedness, and
response efforts for the past 4 years. Illinois has established
three State WMD teams as regional assets that would augment a
local response to a WMD incident and could respond anywhere in
the State within 60 to 90 minutes of notification. Funding has
also been used to create an Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm
System and 15 regional containment teams. The State of Illinois
is also taking a regional approach to the FY '03 State Homeland
Security Assessment and Strategy, delegating responsibility of
data collection and analysis to the regional level.
ODP is committed to ensuring that States and local
jurisdictions are able to maximize the impact of available
homeland security funding. The recently announced $2.2 billion
in the Homeland Security Grant Program combines three formula-
based funding programs for States and territories into a single
application, including the State Homeland Security Program, Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, and the Citizens
Corps Program. The consolidation of these programs has enabled
ODP to streamline the grant application process and better
integrate Federal, State, and local grant distribution and
operations.
The funding provided will be applied against critical
resource gaps identified through the assessments and
prioritized in the State homeland security strategies. ODP
believes that only through addressing a combination of threat,
vulnerability, and needs can homeland security be improved
nationwide and that every citizen in the country is protected.
ODP accomplishes this by administering two complementary
programs, the State Homeland Security Program, which utilizes
the USA PATRIOT Act formula, specifying a base amount for each
State and territory plus an additional amount determined by
population, and the Urban Areas Security Initiative, which
utilizes a risk-based formula, taking into account threat,
critical infrastructure, and population density. The latter
program provides a dedicated funding stream specifically for
the nation's higher-threat areas. By administering these both
programs, we are able to ensure that critical first responder
and first responder funding is targeted in the areas where they
are needed. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Ms. Mencer.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Mencer follows:]
Prepared Statement of C. Suzanne Mencer
Good morning, Chairman Coble and Members of the Subcommittee. My
name is Sue Mencer, and I serve as the Director of the Department of
Homeland Security's Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP). It is a
pleasure and privilege to be here today to talk about ODP's efforts to
provide support to our nation's emergency responders. On behalf of
Secretary Tom Ridge, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and
ODP, I would like to express my appreciation for your support of
federal programs to combat terrorism.
Assisting states and localities is critical to DHS' mission of
protecting the homeland. As Secretary Ridge has often stated, the
homeland is secure only when the hometowns are secure. And the way to
ensure that the hometowns are secure is to ensure that State and local
officials, State and local emergency response agencies, and State and
local emergency response personnel have the resources, the information,
and the tools they need to do their jobs.
Before the creation of DHS in March 2003, ODP was a component of
the Department of Justice. With the passage of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, ODP was transferred to DHS. Further, the Homeland Security
Act designates ODP as the principal federal agency for assisting State
and local jurisdictions to prepare for, prevent, and respond to
incidents of terrorism.
In the ten months since DHS was established, significant progress
has been made towards making America safer. Since its creation, the
Department has provided a significant amount of support to States,
territories, tribes, and localities in support of homeland security. To
date, DHS components have allocated or awarded approximately $7 billion
to state and local governments to enhance security and terrorism
preparedness. A large majority of this assistance is provided through
the ODP.
Since its establishment in 1998, ODP has provided significant
support to our nation's emergency response community. To date, ODP has
delivered weapons of mass destruction awareness training and incident
command training to more than 325,000 emergency responders from
approximately 5,000 jurisdictions nationwide. Additionally, ODP has
conducted nearly 300 preparedness exercises, including the Top
Officials (or TOPOFF) I and II exercises.
But let us make no mistake, despite ODP's successes, much more work
needs to be done. Every day 180,000 DHS employees are focused on one
primary goal--ensuring America is safe and secure. More significant,
however, is that every day we share that vital mission with many times
our number in State and local jurisdictions across the nation. These
men and women, these first responders, are not just our partners, but
they are essential to our success as a nation in securing our homeland.
It is a priority of this Administration and the Department to
effectively and efficiently meet our responsibility to support First
Responders in fulfilling their critical role in our nation's counter-
terrorism efforts. We at DHS take very seriously the need to ensure
that federal support is focused and well-organized.
The Department recognizes the financial constraints placed on State
governments, which require difficult decisions to be made about limited
resources, and the Department is committed to helping states meet their
needs in this area. It is the Department's view that Federal, State and
local governments have a shared responsibility with respect to homeland
security efforts. As such, State, territorial, tribal and local
governments should take lead responsibility to directly fund the costs
associated with traditional domestic preparedness. The Federal
government's role, on the other hand, should largely be geared to
building capacity for major events beyond normal operations. One of the
most important federal roles is also to provide guidance, subject
matter expertise, and technical assistance.
To this end, ODP provides extensive support for local communities
to conduct domestic terrorism preparedness exercises. Experience and
data show that exercises are a practical and efficient way to prepare
for crises. Exercises provide a unique learning opportunity to
synchronize and integrate cross-functional and intergovernmental crisis
and consequence management response. The tragic events of September 11,
2001, taught us many things. One of the overarching lessons learned was
that emergency responders need to respond in a coordinated and
collaborative manner. Exercises allow cities and localities to practice
their response to simulated terrorist incidents.
Another critical component of ODP's mission is its ongoing Training
and Technical Assistance Program, which provides an extensive array of
terrorism preparedness training to Federal, State, and local emergency
response personnel through a variety of training sites and methods.
Through this program, ODP provides more than 30 direct training and
technical assistance courses and programs to state and local
jurisdictions. This includes training delivered in residence at ODP
training facilities, on-site in local communities through mobile
training teams, and through such electronic means as the Internet,
closed circuit broadcasts, and video-conferencing. ODP terrorism
preparedness training is tailored for a wide range of emergency
responders, including courses for fire and rescue personnel, law
enforcement officers, public works and public safety communications
officials, emergency medical personnel, and many other disciplines. It
also addresses a range of emergency response levels available to State
and local emergency responders--awareness, performance, planning, and
management.
The National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) is the
principal vehicle through which ODP identifies, develops, tests, and
delivers terrorism preparedness training to State and local emergency
responders. The NDPC membership includes ODP's Center for Domestic
Preparedness, the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology,
Louisiana State University's Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education,
Texas A&M University, and the Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site.
Each consortium member brings a unique set of assets to the domestic
preparedness program. ODP also utilizes the capabilities of a number of
specialized institutions in the design and delivery of its training
programs. These include private contractors, other Federal and State
agencies, the National Terrorism Preparedness Institute at St.
Petersburg Junior College, the U.S. Army's Pine Bluff Arsenal, the
International Association of Fire Fighters, and the National Sheriff's
Association. Additional training for first responders is delivered
through other DHS training units, such as the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center in Glynco, Georgia, and the FEMA National Fire Academy
in Emmitsburg, Maryland.
To ensure coordination of our training efforts with other Federal
agencies, ODP staff have established regular and recurring meetings
with representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Public Health Service/
Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the FEMA National Fire Academy
and Emergency Management Institute to discuss and coordinate WMD
training development and delivery of training courses. Additionally,
ODP has on-site representation from the National Guard Bureau to
coordinate program efforts and provide technical assistance and
guidance.
ODP also provides targeted technical assistance to State and local
jurisdictions to enhance their ability to develop, plan, and implement
a program for WMD preparedness. Specifically, ODP provides assistance
in areas such as the development of response plans; exercise scenario
development and evaluation; conducting of risk, vulnerability,
capability, and needs assessment; and development of the Statewide
comprehensive all-hazards domestic preparedness strategies that form
the basis for receipt of Federal preparedness assistance funding. These
strategies should incorporate local government concerns and assess the
most effective ways to enhance preparedness and address areas facing
high risk.
Perhaps the most notable means through which ODP provides support
to states and localities are the State Homeland Security Grant Program
(SHSGP) and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI).
As you are aware, the FY 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act, together
with the FY 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act,
provided DHS with approximately $2 billion for ODP's SHSGP and $800
million to fund ODP's UASI. The SHSGP funds were allocated according to
a base plus population formula and the UASI funds were allocated in a
manner prescribed by the Secretary to address the security requirements
of high density urban areas, high threat urban areas, and for the
protection of critical infrastructure.
During FY 2003, all 50 States, the territories, and the District of
Columbia received funding under SHSGP while over 30 urban areas,
including mass transit systems and ports, received support under the
UASI program. For FY 2004, the Congress appropriated an additional $2.2
billion for ODP's Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), formerly the
SHSGP, and $725 million for the continuation of UASI.
Prior to allocating the UASI funds, DHS conducted a thorough and
comprehensive review of population and population density, the presence
and vulnerability of critical infrastructure of national significance,
and credible threat intelligence data from several Federal agencies.
Based on this analysis, the Department has determined that 50 urban
areas including 30 mass transit systems are eligible funds under the FY
2004 UASI program.
The recently announced $2.2 billion HSGP combines three formula-
based funding programs for States and territories into a single
application, including the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), and Citizen Corps
Program (CCP).
This consolidation was done to streamline the grant application
process and better coordinate Federal, State and local grant funding
distribution and operations. The homeland security assessments and
strategies currently being finalized by the 50 States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, U.S. territories, and
selected urban areas for submission to DHS-ODP will play a pivotal role
in the identification, prioritization, and allocation of financial
resources provided through the three grant programs. The funding
provided will be applied against critical resource gaps identified
through the assessments and prioritized in the State strategies.
Providing funds through a single assessment and strategy,
application and award process facilitates coordination of preparedness
activities related to the goals and objectives identified in the State
strategies, resulting in a more effective and efficient use of funding.
A single application also minimizes time spent on the application
process and consolidates reporting requirements.
The three programs further provide the opportunity to enhance
regional prevention, preparedness, and response efforts. States are
encouraged to employ regional approaches and to adopt regional response
structures whenever appropriate to meet the needs identified through
the assessments and in the State's Strategy.
While the Department is working hard to provide assistance and
support to our nation's emergency responder community, it is
continually looking to improve its own operations and how it does
business. In order for State and local jurisdictions and first
responders to be effective partners with the Federal government in
securing our homeland, they need quick and easy access to the terrorism
and emergency preparedness grant programs designed to support their
work. Prior to the formation of DHS, terrorism and emergency
preparedness grant programs were scattered throughout various agencies
and departments of the Federal government. Many of these are now
located within DHS, although several are divided among the Department's
various components. However, with the movement of the Fire Grant and
Citizen Corps programs to the ODP, the Department is one step closer to
the ``one-stop shop'' that State and local governments have requested.
In addition, the Department has established a web site, www.dhs.gov/
grants, listing all Federal homeland security and public safety grants
as well as all Federal anti-terrorism training courses available to
State and local officials. Despite all of this progress, it is
Secretary Ridge's intention to move even further in better organizing
DHS' grant-making and overall preparedness structure, and improve
coordination with other Federal programs.
We at DHS are convinced that State and local grant programs must be
more centralized and more accessible. It is our goal to provide State
and local authorities a single point of contact for terrorism and
emergency preparedness efforts--one access point to obtain critical
grant funding, and we look forward to working with Congress on this
important issue.
As the Subcommittee is aware there are a number of additional bills
that would impact how DHS and ODP support our first responders. While
we are still reviewing the particulars of each bill, we are in support
of their goals and objectives--improving our ability to protect our
nation.
We have learned much about securing our homeland since September
11th, 2001, including much within the past few months from Operation
Liberty Shield. One of the lessons that has become clear is that the
formula currently being used for distribution of ODP grants, and
partially defined within the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, can be improved
upon.
We at DHS have come to realize the shortcomings of the PATRIOT Act
formula. The Congress, I believe, has seen them as well. Indeed, the
need to separate funds out for high-threat urban areas was first
recognized by the Congress and addressed in the Department's Fiscal
Year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act. That need was again addressed in
the Fiscal Year 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act
and the FY 2004 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act. We
at the Department believe that more of the overall funds available to
State and local governments need be distributed using the risk or
consequence based formula of population density, presence and
vulnerability of critical infrastructure of national significance, and
credible threats, while at the same time recognizing that all
jurisdictions need a baseline preparedness capability to prevent,
respond to and recover from acts of terrorism and natural disasters.
We look forward to working closely with the Congress, our nation's
State and local first responders, and stakeholder communities to
improve the distribution of funds to ensure effective support of state
and local homeland security needs.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
critically important work that the ODP is doing for our State and local
emergency responders. Through the combined and collaborative efforts of
Federal, State and local agencies, we have greatly enhanced the safety
and security of our nation. At this point, I'd be happy to answer any
questions that you might have about the programs of ODP.
Mr. Coble. We are pleased to have all of you here, but I am
especially happy to welcome a group of law enforcement people
from Rowland County, North Carolina. It is good to have you
fellows with us. I'm sure you'll benefit from this.
Commissioner Kelly.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RAYMOND W. KELLY, POLICE
COMMISSIONER, CITY OF NEW YORK
Mr. Kelly. Chairman Coble, Ranking Member Scott, Members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I want
to thank Congressman Sweeney for that generous introduction as
well as Congressman Weiner.
There's no question that the terrorist threat to New York
City is serious and ongoing. Terrorists have targeted New York
City at least five times in the last decade alone. The first
bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 was followed by its
destruction 8 years later. In between, there was a conspiracy
to destroy the Holland and Lincoln tunnels, the George
Washington Bridge, the United Nations, and the Main Federal
Building in Lower Manhattan, as well as a plot to bomb the
subway system. The subway plot was foiled at the last minute by
a New York City police officer who broke down the door of two
Palestinians who were putting the finishing touches on the
device.
Since then, two major news media outlets in New York City
were the subject of anthrax attacks. And as recently as
February of this year, a tough, seasoned al Qaeda operative
named Iyman Faris was in New York City on a mission to destroy
the Brooklyn Bridge. He was deterred.
But New York City remains a target nonetheless. Just this
past weekend, a police officer assigned to our transit system
apprehended two Iranian agents engaged in reconnaissance of the
subway. The intelligence community tells us that New York
remains the terrorists' highest priority target in the United
States.
Homeland security funding formulas, however, do not
recognize this fact. The funding is spread too thin and
disproportionately away from the places most likely to be
attacked.
We know what to do to make New York less vulnerable to
attack. We also have the personnel and the expertise to get it
done. What we don't have is adequate funding from the
Department of Homeland Security. The block grant formula where
most of the funding originates does not consider threat at all.
The Urban Areas Security Initiative, which seemed so
promising at the outset, has been watered down as more and more
localities are added to the list. In the first round, New York
City received 25 percent of the funding allocated among seven
cities. By the time last year's supplemental was announced, the
list had grown to 30 cities and New York's share had shrunk to
about 18 percent. Now there are 50 localities plus 30
transportation agencies on the list and the share for the New
York metropolitan region, not just the city alone, has dwindled
to below 7 percent.
New York City's Urban Area Grant was cut by two-thirds, the
Washington, DC, area by half. And these are the most at-risk
cities in the nation. Virtually every locality in the country
can make claims to hypothetical threats, but the threats
against New York City are very real, indeed.
We know how al Qaeda thinks. If at first you don't succeed,
try, try again. They viewed the first attack on the World Trade
Center as a failure, so they came back with a vengeance on
September 11. We have to be concerned that they will try to
return to attack the targets that they were denied in New York.
This is not a mystery. The plots were aimed at New York City,
Washington, D.C., and in one instance Los Angeles International
Airport.
The legislation that Congressman Sweeney has introduced, as
well as others the Committee is considering, is necessary
because it makes threat assessment a priority in deciding how
funding should be allocated.
At the beginning of 2002, we created a new Counterterrorism
Bureau. We assigned over 250 officers to it. On September 11 of
2001, we had 17 detectives assigned to our Joint Terrorism Task
Force with the FBI. Now, 121 are assigned there. When all is
said and done, we have about 1,000 police officers directly
involved in protecting the city against another terrorist
attack.
Our Hercules teams, comprised of specially trained officers
with heavy weapons, appear unannounced at sensitive locations.
They are there to respond to a terrorist incident and to
disrupt the kind of surveillance we know that al Qaeda engages
in.
Our detectives met with, or meet with suppliers of
explosives, laboratory equipment, scuba gear, specialized
rental equipment, just about anything that a terrorist may want
to acquire in advance of an attack. These suppliers now serve
as trip-wires, warning us that preparation for an attack may be
underway.
Last March, with the commencement of the war in Iraq, we
launched a heightened security program called Operation Atlas
to protect New York City from possible reprisal. Given the
ongoing terrorist threat, Operation Atlas remains in place
today.
The short version is this. We are doing a lot and it is
costing a lot. We are grateful for the help we have received
from the Federal Government, but it does not come anywhere near
the need. Right now, over 80 percent of the Federal assistance
to first responders across the country is distributed in the
manner that is blind to threats, the vulnerability
infrastructure, and the consequences of an attack. Congress can
help rectify this problem by adopting changes proposed in the
legislation before you.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to testify and I will
be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Commissioner.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Raymond W. Kelly
Chairman Coble, Ranking Member Scott and Members of the Committee,
thank you for this opportunity to testify.
There is no question that the terrorist threat to New York City is
serious and ongoing. Terrorists have targeted New York City at least
five times in the last decade alone. The first bombing of the World
Trade Center in 1993 was followed by its destruction 8 years later. In
between there was a conspiracy to destroy the Holland and Lincoln
Tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, the United Nations and the main
Federal building in lower Manhattan, as well as a plot to bomb the
subway system. The subway plot was foiled at the last minute by the New
York City police officers who broke down the door of two Palestinians
who were putting the finishing touches on the device. Since then, two
major news media outlets in New York City were the subject of anthrax
attacks. And as recently as February of this year, a tough, seasoned Al
Qaeda operative named Iyman Faris was in New York City on a mission to
destroy the Brooklyn Bridge. He was deterred. But New York City remains
a target, nonetheless. Just this past weekend, a police officer
assigned to our transit system apprehended two Iranian agents engaged
in reconnaissance of the subway. New York is the Nation's largest city,
the world center for finance and communications, and in the estimate of
the Federal intelligence community, the terrorists' highest priority
target in the United States.
Homeland security funding formulas, however, do not recognize this
fact. The funding is spread too thin, and distributed
disproportionately away from the places most likely to be attacked.
The New York City Police Department alone spent $200 million in the
last fiscal year to make sure we were not attacked again. The Police
Department has also identified $261 million in training needs,
equipment and supplies directly related to counter terrorism. We asked
the Federal government for $261 million. And that $261 million request
does not include requests from other New York City departments. The
City of New York's initial estimate of its counter terrorism needs for
all agencies, which I have attached, was $900 million. We've received a
little less than $60 million for all the City agencies involved in
counter terrorism and response.
We know what to do to make New York less vulnerable to attack. We
also have the personnel and the expertise to get it done. What we don't
have is adequate support from the Department of Homeland Security. The
block grant formula, where most of the funding originates, does not
consider threat at all. The Urban Areas Security Initiative, which
seemed so promising at the outset, has been watered down as more and
more localities are added to the list. In the first round, New York
City received 25 percent of the funding allocated among seven cities.
By the time last year's supplemental was announced, the list had grown
to 30 cities, and New York's share had shrunk to about 18 percent. Now
there are over 50 localities plus 30 transportation agencies on the
list, and the share for the New York metropolitan area has dwindled to
below 7 percent.
Virtually every locality in the country can make claims to
hypothetical threats, but the threats against New York City are very
real, indeed. There is nothing hypothetical about it. We know how Al
Qaeda thinks: If at first you don't succeed, try, try again. They
viewed the first attack on the World Trade Center as a failure. So they
came back with a vengeance on September 11th. We must be concerned that
they will try to return to attack the targets that they were denied in
New York. This is not a mystery. The plots we know about were aimed at
New York City, Washington, D.C., and in one instance, Los Angeles
International Airport.
The bill Congressman Sweeney has introduced, as well as others the
committee is considering, is necessary because it makes threat
assessment the leading priority in deciding how funding should be
allocated.
Iyman Faris, who I mentioned earlier, is the same man who fought
alongside Osama Bin Laden, who engaged in a battle which included the
wholesale slaughter of Russian prisoners, and who helped supply Al
Qaeda fighters more recently with sleeping bags, airline tickets, cash
and cell phones. Nearly two years after the destruction of the World
Trade Center, Iyman Faris was in New York City. He stayed in a hotel
near Newark airport. He rented a car there and drove into Manhattan. He
ate at a Pakistani restaurant a few blocks from City Hall. And after
conducting surveillance of the Brooklyn Bridge, Faris reported back to
his handlers that, ``the weather is too hot;'' meaning security was too
tight for the plot to succeed. I want to stress, again, that an
experienced Al Qaeda operative, linked directly to Bin Laden, was in
Manhattan plotting to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge just nine months ago.
The highly visible security that the New York City Police
Department had in place on the Brooklyn Bridge, in addition to the
unseen protection, appeared to pay off in the Faris case. That is why,
in the wake of last week's horrifying near-simultaneous bombings of two
synagogues in Turkey, we have increased our visible presence around
synagogues and other New York City landmarks and national symbols. The
added coverage we have been providing at sensitive locations like the
Brooklyn Bridge, synagogues and other national symbols, is just the tip
of the iceberg in a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. At the
beginning of 2002, we created a new Counter Terrorism Bureau. We
assigned over 250 officers to it. About half of them were posted to the
Joint Terrorist Task Force with the FBI. On September 11th of 2001 we
had 17 detectives assigned to the Task Force. Now 121 are assigned
there.
When all is said and done, we have about a thousand police officers
directly involved in protecting the city against another terrorist
attack. We also dramatically expanded the role of our Intelligence
Division. We are conducting around-the-clock threat assessments, and
integrating this real-time information into daily decisions about where
to place resources and personnel. We appointed outstanding individuals
from outside the Department to lead our intelligence and counter-
terrorism functions. They have decades of CIA, counter terrorism and
national security experience.
We built a new counter terrorism center from scratch and staffed it
with police officers who speak Farsi, Urdu, Arabic, and Pashto. We have
sent New York City detectives with the FBI to Guantanamo, Cuba and to
Afghanistan to interrogate terrorist suspects there. We have also sent
our detectives to other international capitals to work directly with
their counterparts in tracking down any threats to New York.
At home, we are engaged in extensive training, and we are
conducting drills on a daily basis. Our Hercules teams, comprised of
specially trained officers, with heavy weapons, appear unannounced at
sensitive locations. They are there to respond to a terrorist incident
and to disrupt the kind of surveillance we know Al Qaeda engages in. We
also regularly conduct something we call Sampson drills, involving
teams of up to 100 officers at a time, including snipers, who can be
dispatched quickly to any given location in the city.
Our detectives meet with suppliers of explosives, laboratory
equipment, scuba gear, specialized rental equipment--just about
anything that a terrorist may want to acquire in advance of an attack.
The Police Department has also held briefing sessions for various
segments of the public who may come in contact with terrorist plotters.
For example, we briefed real estate agents on exactly what Al Qaeda
tells its operatives to look for in renting an apartment.
Last March, with the commencement of the war in Iraq, we launched a
heightened security program called ``Operation Atlas'' to protect New
York City from possible reprisal. Given the ongoing terrorist threat,
Operation Atlas remains in place today.
It brings together all of the core elements of the Police
Department; Patrol, specialized units, Counter Terrorism, and our
Intelligence Division, in a coordinated defense of New York City.
Checkpoints are established periodically at key locations into and out
of Manhattan. COBRA teams, which specialize in biological and
radiological response, have been deployed throughout the city. We have
increased protection of commuter ferries. Archangel teams, composed of
emergency services personnel, bomb experts and investigators, have been
staged across the city. Hammer teams, the police and fire department
experts in hazardous materials, have been deployed jointly. We are also
having teams of officers board subway trains, and search them car-by-
car for anything suspicious. We want to discourage or even intercept a
terrorist attack in the subway system. We have put a medical team
together to help us train and protect police officers who might face
biological or other unconventional weapons.
The short version is this: We are doing a lot, and it is costing us
a lot; something on the order of $200 million a year in operational
expenses for counter terrorism in the Police Department alone. Only
recently has financial help from the Federal government begun to
arrive. We are grateful for the help, but it does not come anywhere
near the needs that we have. Part of our challenge is, of course, the
fiscal restraints under which we all must operate. You may not be able
to do anything about those. But you can correct the system that sends
more than 80% of the Federal assistance to first responders across the
country in a manner that is blind to the threats this country faces,
blind to the vulnerable infrastructure that exists in different places,
and blind to the consequences of an attack.
Of the total of approximately $232 million in Federal assistance
for New York City, during the last two federal fiscal years, 70 percent
of those funds have come from the High Threat Urban Area program, even
though that program accounts for only about twenty percent nationally
of the federal assistance for first responders. The High Threat Urban
Area program attempts to compensate for the failure of the other
programs to address the country's counter-terrorism needs.
Unfortunately, it does not succeed in correcting the lack of any
consideration for threat in the other programs.
In fiscal 2003, the Federal government provided a total of $3.45
billion for first responders through the Department of Homeland
Security in three major programs: $1.9 billion in homeland security
formula grants to states, $750 million in Firefighter Assistance
Grants, and $800 million for high threat urban areas. Only the last
program for High Threat Urban Areas--which was only 23 percent of the
total--takes into account terrorist threat, vulnerabilities and
consequences.
In fiscal 2004, the total amount and proportion of funds being
distributed on the basis of threat and need has declined. For this
year, high threat urban areas will receive $725 million, nearly a ten
percent cut, while the other programs will receive $2.95 billion, more
than a ten percent increase. The result is that more than 80% of the
Department of Homeland Security's first responder funds will be
distributed blind to the nation's counter-terrorism needs. In real
terms, for example, let's look at New York City and the National
Capital Region, our Nation's highest threat areas. In New York City the
high threat funding this year when compared to last year was slashed by
an astounding two-thirds, and in the National Capital Region, by half.
These deep cuts were made despite the fact that both areas were
previously attacked--New York more than once--and both remain the
targets of choice for international terrorists.
Let me first tell you why I am including the firefighter assistance
grants in these totals. I recognize that there are needs in many
communities throughout the country and that the Firefighter Assistance
grants program existed prior to the events of September 11, but it has
been increased greatly in response to September 11. I am not suggesting
that those funds should be distributed on the basis of threat, but
neither can their existence be ignored. Because these grants are
limited to a maximum of $750,000 per jurisdiction, they are of little
help in those areas that have significant counter-terrorism needs,
though they can be a significant help to rural areas and smaller
communities.
Regarding the Homeland Security formula grants to the states, they
were created after the events of September 11 and are a direct response
to those terrorist attacks. They should be distributed on the basis of
known threats, the presence of critical infrastructure and the
magnitude of the consequences of an attack. Currently, those grants are
distributed completely otherwise. Each state receives three-quarters of
one percent of the total amount and the remainder is distributed on the
basis of the state's population.
The result is virtually a complete mismatch between the funding
provided under this program and the need, as evidenced by the
Department of Homeland Security's funding of the high threat urban
areas. I have attached a table that compares the funding received by
the ten states that received the most high threat urban area funds and
their ranking, on a per capita basis, of the formula grants. New York,
which received the most high threat funds, ranked 49th in the formula
grants. California, which received the second most high threat funds,
ranked 50th. Texas, which received the third most high threat funds,
ranked 48th.
Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, I was Commissioner of U.S. Customs when
Ahmad Ressam, the millennium bomber, was captured by Customs inspectors
as he attempted to smuggle explosives into the U.S. as part of a plot
to bomb Los Angeles International Airport. More evidence, I believe,
that Al Qaeda focuses on high profile, major city targets.
It is clear that large amounts of the first responder funding are
not going where they are needed. The result is wasted resources and,
much worse, a population placed at risk of attack and of the economic
consequences of an attack. Some have suggested that the high threat
funds ``make up'' for the misdirected block grant and firefighter
grants but the goal is not to even out every state and locale. We are
in a war against terror and we must deploy our resources where they
will do this country the most good.
In light of this, I have a few recommendations.
First, the funds in all of the programs to assist first responders
established after September 11 should be distributed on the basis of
three factors--known threats, the presence of vulnerable critical
infrastructure, and the consequences of an attack. I want to thank
Chairman Cox, Congressman Turner and Congressman Sweeney for
introducing legislation that would move these programs in that
direction.
Second, as you can see from my description of the steps that New
York has taken, personnel costs are a significant part of the expense.
Consequently, overtime costs and the personnel costs associated with
training and with filling positions while personnel are being trained
should be eligible uses of the funds.
Third, the funds should be directed to local governments.
Currently, this is done by requiring a minimum pass-through to local
governments. In New York, the City and the State are working very well
together. I would also recommend that the Department have the authority
to provide grants directly to individual local governments, as was done
in the first round of High Threat Urban Area grants.
The funds should not require maintenance of effort on the part of
the local governments as a condition of the grant. Such a requirement
can result in the denial of Federal assistance just when it is needed
most. Unlike the federal government, local governments cannot run
deficits. As a result they may have to cut expenditures and if there is
a maintenance of effort requirement they could become ineligible for
federal grants. Similarly, any matching requirements should be
interpreted to include, for example, in kind contributions.
Finally, State and local governments should be able to make
procurement purchases through the federal contracts already negotiated
by the General Services Administration. In New York, for example, the
City can purchase equipment through statewide contracts. If State and
local governments were able to do this through federal contracts, it
would be more expeditious, help ensure the interoperability of the
equipment and would probably produce a cost savings.
The City has its own budget difficulties. This year the City of New
York closed an $8 billion deficit. The deficit for next year is
estimated to be an additional $2 billion. Although the Mayor has
attempted to protect the Police Department from cuts, even we have had
to reduce our expenses. I would just like to note here, that the City
estimated that it lost $3 billion in revenues directly as a result of
the September 11 attacks, and not as a result of the general economic
slowdown, in 2002 and 2003. That estimate was reviewed and validated by
the General Accounting Office. Although the City has been promised $20
billion from the federal government post-September 11, that figure will
cover only about one-quarter or less of the actual losses, both to the
City and the City economy, from the attack. The City did not receive
any Federal assistance for lost tax revenues. We are grateful for the
Federal assistance received to date but the City needs further
assistance to meet the threats posed by this war on terror.
Thank you for this opportunity. I would be happy to work with you
on any proposals and I will be glad to answer any questions.
Mr. Coble. Director Bishop.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. BISHOP, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, STATE OF IDAHO
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank
you so much for having me here. I have got to share with you
that I am honored to share this table with Commissioner Kelly
and Ms. Mencer.
Three weeks ago, a UPS truck stopped at St. Luke's Hospital
in Boise, Idaho, and tracked a white powder from that truck
into the receiving area in the emergency department. St. Luke's
is our primary hospital in the City of Boise and in the
Treasury Valley for obstetrics. The other hospital would like
to be, but St. Luke's is.
Within 45 minutes, we were able to determine that white
powder was, in fact, a soap product advertised on TV, and we
did that with a piece of infrared spectrography equipment that
we purchased for our seven HAZMAT teams through the ODP grant
system. It works. It works. It works every day for us. It
resolved an incident in 45 minutes that would have taken at
least 48 hours to confirm that it was not a biological agent.
We are making good use of this money. We think it is very,
very important. But I also have to tell you that I am concerned
about overplaying threat and vulnerability analysis, and the
reason I am concerned about it is that our track record has not
been good. We think we understand the mentality and we think
that we understand where they are going to go next, but they're
predators, and we understand that if we harden one target, if
we, as Commissioner Kelly makes great progress in New York
City, other targets are going to become the targets of choice.
I think perhaps there is some expectation that this might
be a WWF kind of event between Commissioner Kelly and I and I'm
sorry to disappoint you because I don't think the issue is
rural versus urban. A long, long time ago, somebody in this
country said, if we don't hang together, we'll hang separately.
New York City needs a lot of money. It's a jewel for this
nation. The State of Idaho, as other rural States, understand
that. We understand they have a great complexity and a great
need. However, we also need to make sure that we don't create a
greater vulnerability in the rural States by diverting
resources to more urban areas.
I share Commissioner Kelly's confusion over an urban area
initiative that started out with seven and continues to grow.
We see the same thing in our State, in which people's feelings
are almost hurt and they feel as though you're just not giving
them enough value if you don't name them a top-ten target. I
think the proper way to do this is to have a base allocation
and then enhancement, such as was contemplated originally with
the Urban Areas Initiative.
I need to take just a moment, as well, of my time and talk
about standards, because that's implicit in a number of the
pieces of legislation before us. And I've got to tell you that
there are standards and there are plenty of standards. They are
not well catalogued. They are not well brought together. We
need to do that.
But as an example, we encountered difficulty in buying
self-contained breathing apparatus because it was being tested
by NIOSH for CBRNE agents. And just as the tests were complete
and some of it was getting certified, we were within 2 months
of the new NFPA, National Fire Protection Association, standard
becoming effective, a consensus standard. And so we waited
until the breathing apparatus met both standards before we
started expending these funds.
Lastly, I've got to tell this Committee and the United
States Congress and the Office for Domestic Preparedness that
this program is working. We need to tinker with it some, but it
is working. The men and women in the Office for Domestic
Preparedness have provided an outrageous amount of support to
the State of Idaho and the other States. Weekends, evenings,
they're always there for us. They've worked with us. We've
worked through some serious problems together. They're doing
the job. I would ask that we give them a little bit of an
opportunity to work in a stable environment because it's really
changed a lot every year in the last 4 years.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bishop follows:]
Prepared Statement of William H. Bishop
H.R. 2512, H.R. 3158, H.R. 3227, AND H.R. 3266
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to speak with you in regard to pending legislation that
will affect not only my state, but emergency responders in all the
states and territories as well as the safety of every one in our
country.
While I speak to you today as the Director of Idaho's relatively
new Bureau of Homeland Security, I bring with me the perspective of a
former Fire Chief in a small rural Montana Fire Department and a
hazardous material responder and agency manager. I have also been the
``State Administrative Agency'' for the various versions of the federal
``First Responder Grant'' programs from their inception in 1999 to the
present.
I would first like to discuss the concept of threat, vulnerability,
and risk because that concept is pertinent, if not at the core, of all
four bills before this committee today.
Threat, vulnerability, and risk assessments are accurate for only a
short moment in time. They are only snapshots. Any assessment should
always be dynamic, rolling and held in suspicion by those who use it--
and those who produce it. It is vital to our public safety and our
nation's security that we not over emphasize any given assessment at
any given moment. If we focus too tightly on a particular assessment,
we will surely miss a vulnerability that arises within the next hour,
day, or week.
There can be found no better example than the tragic event at the
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Please, please understand my
remarks are not meant to criticize the actions of anyone leading up to
that day. But we owe it to all who perished and were harmed to learn as
much as we can from the events of that day.
After the attack upon the World Trade Center in 1993, local, state
and federal agencies came together to rebuild, redesign and harden that
facility. Particular attention was given to ensuring that there was no
possibility of a reoccurrence of a motor vehicle based attack. That
effort was an extraordinary success. I attended a conference at the WTC
in 2000 and took great recognition of the labors of those who had made
such great improvement. I was impressed and took away some great ideas
to improve the security of facilities in Idaho.
The attack of September 11th came elsewhere on the structure using
another means of delivery and exploiting an unanticipated, and until
that day, inconceivable vulnerability.
Among the thousands of lessons we need to learn from the loss of so
many souls are these two:
The elimination or reduction of vulnerability in one location
invariably creates vulnerability in another because those we
call terrorists are simple predators that are adept at looking
for, finding, and exploiting weakness.
We need, to the extent possible, manage our vulnerabilities as
though they were ball bearings on very flat plate. If the plate
is not kept level, very level, the bearings quickly cascade of
the plate. We lose not just a single bearing, but likely all of
them. Actions which over emphasize one vulnerability, will
always tip the delicate balance of vulnerabilities and will
decrease our security in other locations.
H.R. 2512
I believe H. R. 2512 might lead our nation's management of risk,
vulnerability and threat to be too static, unresponsive, and dangerous.
If, for example, our neighbors in the State of Washington become less
vulnerable because of increased response capability and target
hardening, we in Idaho are more at risk unless we make commensurate
improvement.
I would respectfully suggest that H. R. 2512 does not well serve
either Idaho's or the nation's security. It will likely relocate some
vulnerabilities from currently higher risk areas toward areas that
might now be at a slightly lower risk. In this war on terrorism, I can
not afford to have a higher vulnerability than my neighbor. I become
the more desirable prey--and that serves neither the nation nor the
citizens of Idaho well. I would suggest leaving the base funding as it
now is in Section 1014 of the Patriot Act.
H. R. 3266
H. R. 3266 also offers problems in how the nation would apply
threat, vulnerability, and risk in its language proposed to amend
Section 802 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. It is not very likely
that the World Trade Center, Boca Raton, or this city itself would have
met the need for specificity under Section 802(e)(3), (4), or (5). The
required specificity in those sections presumes a level of reliable
intelligence and anticipation for which we, as a nation, lack
capability. The World Trade Center would probably not have made the
list because we believed it to be hardened. The threat of anthrax
exposure was too vague before the fall of 2001. Most responders would
not have seen anthrax exposure as a specific threat in virtually any
location in the country.
A similar problem in H. R. 3266 is that it looks at specific damage
in specific locations. It is the nature of terrorism that a gross
failure to protect citizens in Stanley, Idaho can substantially erode
the confidence of citizens throughout this country in their
government's ability to protect them from attack. As in all states,
emergency responders ran hard day and night to deal with Anthrax fears
during late 2001 and 2002. We successfully resolved all calls within 24
hours--including several that our FBI colleagues felt had very high
potential. The priorities in Section 802(e)(5) would have to include
``the ability to engender fear'' in order to be meaningful in a
vulnerability assessments.
Our current management of threat, vulnerability and risk is working
well because we use it dynamically and the Office of Domestic
Preparedness has helped us adapt to changing intelligence and improving
technology.
The Equipment Grant programs currently administered by the Office
of Domestic Preparedness are very effective because they are 100%
federally funded. That formula means that equipment is place where it
is most effective without being ``held hostage'' by conflicts in
perception of priorities. For equipment specifically, I would suggest
that 100% federal funding be maintained even if it means less equipment
purchased. The program will be less costly to administer and less prone
to delay. A 25% local or state match may be more appropriate in the
areas of planning, training, and exercising.
The proposed sanctions in H. R. 3266 concerning timely distribution
of funds would present a nightmare to all three branches of government.
In this branch, I can foresee Members bombarded by requests from
constituents, organizations, and Governors. The Department of Homeland
Security will be faced with managing the same grant process in at least
three ways, and there are bound to be court battles that border on the
absurd.
I know that timely distribution of funds is an issue. We in the
states are trying very hard to streamline, accommodate and meet our
legal responsibilities both in grants management and distribution of
funds. It is a popular notion that the system is ``broken.'' I would
suggest that there is no system.
In our haste to do the right thing, we have changed the ``rules''
in providing equipment at least annually since 1999. New programs are
added, emphasis changed, and guidance changed. The funding in 2003
ballooned between the original appropriation and the supplemental. The
rate and amount of change has been extraordinary and the Office of
Domestic Preparedness and the states have struggled to staff, develop,
and execute appropriately. I particularly commend the efforts of the
staff at ODP. They have labored well into the night and on through
weekends to make the current programs work during a period of change
that is unprecedented in our nation. I would ask this body to let our
colleagues in the Department of Homeland Security and the states have
an opportunity to work in a slightly less dynamic environment during
the coming year. Further complicating the process of administering the
grants by developing permutations of jurisdictional grant management
options will lead to failure of the whole system. I will guarantee an
exponential increase in waste, fraud, and abuse, mostly by error, if
congress enacts Section 802(h)
H.R. 3158
I believe we need standards in the realm of homeland security and
terrorism preparedness. I don't believe we are bereft of standards,
however. There are a combination of pertinent federal, state, and
consensus standards that hold sway. Annual evaluations of preparedness
based on Federal Emergency Management Agency criteria have been long
been done. That there is not a well codified ``federal'' set of
standard is a concern, but does not constitute a ``a public policy
crisis.''
This is an arena in which haste is almost certain to make waste. I
believe that the Department of Homeland security--only 8 months old--
has sufficient initiatives underway to begin the process of standard
development. Some efforts require time and a form of gestation to
develop well and fully. Increased funding and adding more people often
does not cause the desired results. As a great neighbor of mine in
Montana once said ``Just because it takes a cow 10 months to have a
calf, it doesn't follow that if you get 10 cows together then you can
have a calf in one month.'' From where I sit, this looks like ``10
cow'' legislation
I strongly disagree that ``The Federal Government should play a
predominant role in assisting communities to reach the level of
preparedness they need to respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack.''
I am committed to a full partnership among federal, state, and--most
importantly--local responders. The federal government should be a full
and significant partner--but not predominant. It will be local people
that will die during a large incident and it will be local responders
will have the greatest effect in saving lives. We need and want federal
partners, but neither need nor want federal predominance.
Some specific comments are:
1. Section 1804(C) Emergency Medical services are really of
many types in the nation. Significant differences include: Fire
based services versus stand alone services; advanced life
support versus basic life support, paid versus volunteer, and
private versus public providers. I'm not sure that two
representatives can be representative.
2. Section 1804(G) Given the broad spectrum of hospitals and
medical providers, I am again doubtful two representative can
be representative.
3. Section 1804 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Fire
Administration should be named as de facto members.
While there is certainly a national security interest in defining
``essential capabilities'' doing so at the federal level radically
changes many emergency preparedness principles. First and most
important is that communities have usually set their own level of
service through local legislation and budget. While federal support in
equipment, training, and exercising is important, we quickly reach the
point at which emergency responder staffing is the limiting factor in
reaching capability goals. Staffing levels are usually set by local
budgets. I've not heard any initiative to provide for continuing
staffing support for operations. To the contrary, the informal
discussions I have heard is that the federal government has no interest
in providing permanent staffing where none now exists. Meeting
nationwide standards for essential capabilities given staffing
limitations at the state and local level is very unlikely.
H. R. 3227
While the provision of this bill are less invasive to state and
local perogatives, I would like to, nonetheless, offer some
perspective.
Section 2. Findings (3). I do not agree that ``the standard setting
activities . . . need to accelerated and coordinated.'' Given the
upheaval and complexity of forming the Department of Homeland
Security,I would suggest that letting the agency go to work is a good
idea. I also would point out that there are useful standards
available--those standards are just spread broadly through federal
agencies and consensus organizations.
Section 2. Findings (4). The finding represents a value judgement
that is widely held. I think that preparedness for attacks involving
weapons of mass destruction has increased incredibly in the last two
years. I certainly would not suggest that we're done--that we're
completely ready. But the popular and oft repeated notion that we are
no better off today than we were on September 11th is not true and is
an insult to virtually all emergency responders at the local, state,
and federal level. These men and women have worked hard. They have some
equipment that they had not even dreamed of 4 years ago. They have
training and skills that would have seemed irrelevant 4 years ago. They
are well on the way to extraordinary preparedness--and have succeeded
beyond what would have been reasonable to expect in such a short time.
Section 2. Findings (5). There is risk of waste here. While
standards will offer some help, the greatest risk of waste comes from
undue haste and lack of oversight.
Section 510. Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards (d). I
would suggest adding the National Emergency Management Association as a
cited group.
Thank you again Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. That
this Subcommittee and the members of Congress continue to work to
enhance national security and take such great interest in the well
being of first responders is of great credit to this body. We in the
field will always find a way of supporting the results of your
deliberations.
Mr. Coble. Now, folks, we impose the 5-minute rule against
ourselves, as well, and Mr. Weiner, I will recognize all the
Members of the Subcommittee first and then I will give you a
chance to examine the witnesses at the conclusion.
Ms. Mencer, Congress provided $2 billion in appropriations
for the ODP State Homeland Security Grant Program and its new
Urban Area Security Initiative. If you will, explain the
difference between these two programs, A, and B, does the new
Urban Area Security Initiative address the concern that
additional funds are needed in higher-threat areas, and if so,
how?
Ms. Mencer. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I'd be happy to. The first
grant, the State Homeland Security Grant, provides a minimum
base funding level for all States, with remaining funds
distributed based on population, as well. The Urban Area
Initiative Grant, however, looks at different areas. We look at
the infrastructures that are there. We look at the threats to
that area. And then we look at the population density, as well.
So we think we have a balanced approach there using a base
level funding for all the States and then adding to that with
the Urban Area Initiative a more concentrated effort on where
we have the highest concentration of our critical
infrastructures and our threats.
Mr. Coble. Commissioner Kelly, do you see any way of
protecting rural States and cities and still by the same token
improving the grant program for the higher risk usually urban
areas?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do. I think Congressman
Sweeney's bill addresses that issue. It gives an equal amount
of money to each State, if I understand it correctly, one-half
of 1 percent to each of the States, and then the balance of the
money is distributed based on a threat analysis. To me, this
certainly addresses the concerns in the rural areas. The States
will have to make the judgments as to where their resources are
distributed, but to me, it makes common sense to put the
majority of the available funds at places that are deemed to be
at a higher risk.
We don't have unlimited resources. In an ideal world,
everybody would get everything that they want. We just don't
have that ability. I would recommend, of course, that the
majority of funds be distributed on a threat basis with the
base amount as Congressman Sweeney lays out in his legislation,
being distributed equally to all 50 States.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Bishop, in your testimony, you stated that
H.R. 2512 might lead to our nation's management of risk
vulnerability and threat to be too static, unresponsive, and
dangerous. Elaborate, if you would, on that.
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chairman, I think history shows us,
absolutely the events of today show us, that as predators,
these people act to create terror as much as they act to damage
infrastructure. Our ability to protect, in this case act
effectively on intelligence and divert an attack and help the
government of Turkey divert an attack, just didn't work very
well, and the reason it didn't work very well is because we had
hardened and we were paying attention in other arenas.
I think that the difficulty in using a threat analysis done
this year to allocate funds for the next year or the next 4
years is that events with terrorists are so dynamic that it
often has to be rolling in moment by moment.
I agree with, again, I agree with Commissioner Kelly that
we have got a real well identified threat toward New York City
and some other urban areas, as well. However, in the City of
Boise, we also have some multinational corporations who operate
in Indonesia and have plants in Indonesia and connections with
Indonesia and we know from intelligence that Indonesia is, in
fact, at this moment, one of the hotbeds of radical Islamist
folks and our intel is that we have some pretty strong
potential targets that happen to be in a more rural State.
Mr. Coble. Well, my red light is about to appear, so we may
have a second round here as we go along.
The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Mencer, you indicated that you are in the process of
prioritizing expenditures. That is, you are going to put more
money where the threat is heightened. Are you getting
information from other agencies, the CIA and others, to
ascertain where those threats are more likely to occur?
Ms. Mencer. Yes, sir, we are. We have a very detailed
matrix that we use to determine the urban area grants, which
included information from the CIA and the FBI to help us
determine where the threats are. I think we want to be careful
when we look at threats and not just be myopic and focus on a
threat from the Middle East. I think we only need to look at
Oklahoma City to remember that terrorism can strike anywhere at
any time and be done by a variety of different folks.
Mr. Scott. Is there a formula or do you just keep this in
the back of your head as you make grants?
Ms. Mencer. Well, we assign a numerical value to each of
the elements in the matrix.
Mr. Scott. Is there also a part of the grant program that
establishes what one bill refers to as essential capabilities
needed to respond? That is, what do the local first responders
actually need in terms of equipment and training to properly
respond and do those that are on the high priority list have
those? Is establishing a list of essential capabilities part of
the work that you do?
Ms. Mencer. That is certainly something that will be
hopefully examined very carefully when we get our assessments
back from the States, their strategies on December 31, and that
is a----
Mr. Scott. That is what you are getting back from them. Are
you establishing for them a list of capabilities?
Ms. Mencer. Well, the problem with that is each area is so
different in its composition and makeup and what they actually
need to protect what they have that it would be hard to develop
a one-size-fits-all approach for each of the areas. But it's
certainly something that we're working on and working to
develop.
Mr. Scott. You indicated that the States were doing the
State plans and Illinois had done a good job. Does each State
have to reinvent the wheel, or can the other States that
haven't quite finished up benefit from the work done in the
States that have already completed their work?
Ms. Mencer. Well, I think the Department of Homeland
Security has tried very hard to make sure that all the States
can communicate with each other through conference calls,
biweekly conference calls, also with meetings that we've held
with the Homeland Security Advisors, of which I attended when I
represented Colorado. I think they've done a good job of trying
to share best practices, and we in ODP try very hard to make
sure we can provide the technical assistance to all States and
share with them what we see in other States, as well.
Mr. Scott. You mentioned communication, compatibility with
communications networks between agencies and between States. Is
that part of something that Homeland Security is working on?
Ms. Mencer. Certainly interoperability is something that
everyone is concerned about. Coming from Colorado and Littleton
in particular, I can tell you interoperability is something
that's always on my mind. I think it is something we can do
better and I think we are continuing to do that. But certainly,
they can use some of these funds for interoperability issues.
Mr. Scott. Are there enough funds to solve that, because I
know that's been one of the problems that comes up after every
event, that some agency couldn't talk to another.
Ms. Mencer. Yes. Interoperability is a very costly thing
because the radio equipment is very costly. There are quick
fixes and short-term remedies to that which can be purchased
which aren't as extensively dramatic in terms of cost and we
have some of those in Colorado, as well, that link different
radio frequencies together. But there are solutions short of
doing a complete interoperability change of radios for every
State.
Mr. Scott. One of the things that we saw after Hurricane
Isabel was the kind of work that citizens can do when they're
called. One of the bills includes an Office for Citizen
Preparedness. Is that something that you're working on, so that
people can be prepared to fulfill certain functions, food
service deliveries, cutting trees, this kind of thing?
Ms. Mencer. Yes, sir. We now have Citizens Corps under our
responsibility, as well, in ODP, and I just met with the
Director of Citizens Corps last week. So we will be working
very closely with them.
Mr. Coble. We have been joined by the other gentleman from
Florida, the gentleman from Massachusetts, the gentlelady from
Texas. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for 5
minutes. I'm growing tired here. The gentleman from Florida,
Mr. Feeney, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Feeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having what I
believe is a very important hearing as we start this new
process of dealing with post-September 11 threats. I really
want to thank Congressman Sweeney for really taking the lead on
pointing out a very serious problem in the way we allocate
funds.
Respectfully to Director Bishop, much as you said I agree
with, but I think that the formula that we have now is
unresponsive and lacks the dynamism that we need to be
flexible, as you suggested in your comments.
The truth of the matter is that a threat-based assessment
makes sense in so many ways, but mostly because of what the
terrorists are trying to accomplish. It seems to me that it is
the strategic targets and it is the psychological effect of
certain targets that is what are leading the terrorists to
where they ultimately would like to strike.
Now, obviously, opportunity is something that they have to
have in order to pull off a successful strike. So, for example,
if you took a very rigid line, as I think my colleague Mr.
Weiner suggested earlier, supposing we could draw eight
perfectly secure urban areas where there was zero terrorist
threat because we were perfectly capable of stopping it, I
mean, in a theoretical world anyway, that would do nothing but
what Director Bishop has said. It would make everybody else
more vulnerable. So there is a fine balance here to play.
The population seems to be key, but, you know, Mr. Kelly,
to the extent that population is the only thing that drives
this, I would suggest that there are some problems with that.
The Pentagon wasn't struck because Washington, D.C., is the
largest population center in the United States. As a matter of
fact, D.C. itself is less than two-tenths of the United States
population. And I would suggest the World Trade Center,
although New York is our largest and most famous city
nationwide, also had some psychological and strategic reasons.
The Brooklyn Bridge, obviously tunnels would create a lot of
chaos. But there are some psychological impacts.
That leads me as a Floridian to suggest that this urban
versus rural battle is insufficient to take in all of the
necessary parts of the equation. We have got more coastline
than the rest of the Eastern Seaboard put together to defend.
We have got 14 deep water seaports that have enormous potential
threats and don't necessarily represent population centers.
We've got international airports that have record international
visitors. Miami is the gateway to Latin and South America for
the United States.
And we have got theme parks, and thank God that Congressman
Keller led the way the other day to put Orlando, which is not
one of the nation's largest cities per capita in terms of
residency, but a lot of your constituents come join us every
year and we are glad to have them. We have got international
tourists that really are beating down a path to our doors
there.
I would leave this for you to think about. In a real
disaster scenario, there are weapons of biological nature that
have incubation periods of seven to 10 days that are incredibly
infectious that, with the right threat at, say, Disney World or
Universal Studios or one of our other great theme parks, or
many others across the country, but these are the largest,
actually could transport these infectious diseases all over the
world by the time we actually discovered there was a threat. So
there are needs beyond just the population centers, and
obviously the psychological impact, not just to the United
States but to the free world, of attacking a place like that.
The only place to launch East-West satellites to protect
our national security is at Patrick Air Force Base, as a
practical matter today. The only place to launch the commercial
satellites is at the--commercial applications. We wouldn't have
cell phones in use today. We wouldn't have our Blackberrys. We
couldn't pull money out of our ATM, let alone all the other
disasters. And, of course, we've got the NASA center.
So one of the things I would suggest is that as we go
through this formula, I really do believe the threat base,
based on vulnerabilities, based on the impact and consequences,
are what we need to be driven.
Ms. Mencer, in my brief time, I've got a question for each
of you. I understand that the actual threat-based funding is
set to decline this year by 10 percent while the base funding
goes up, actually going counter to the problem we are trying to
resolve?
Commissioner Kelly, are you getting the immediate
intelligence information that you need in places like
Guantanamo and Cuba and elsewhere from the FBI?
And finally, Mr. Bishop, with all due respect, would you
address my concern that you've been inconsistent? You talk
about a proposed formula that will be annually adjusted based
on risk and threat assessment being too static, but I actually
think the population formula that you suggest is best and the
40 percent for the States equally divided is as static as you
can get and is not flexible enough to meet the needs.
Thank you. Ms. Mencer?
Ms. Mencer. Thank you----
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman from Florida.
The gentleman from Massachusetts now----
Mr. Feeney. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I actually squeezed
three questions into the last 30 seconds.
Mr. Coble. I stand corrected. Mr. Bishop, you may respond.
He did put the question before the light came on.
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chairman, you know, there may be an
apparent inconsistency, but I don't believe there is. I think
we need to establish a sound funding level that's relatively
consistent over time and then--and then do enhancements,
perhaps annually, taking into account large urban areas, taking
into account maybe even mid-year events and intelligence.
The difficulty in making that 0.75 to 0.5 reduction is that
it tends to depress particularly the preparedness level in
those more rural States. I would be derelict in my duty if I
didn't advocate that we keep that higher level of funding
available.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, Mr. Bishop.
Now, finally, the gentleman from Massachusetts is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Feeney. Mr. Chairman, if I can respectfully, I actually
had a question for Mr. Kelly and Ms. Mencer, too, if it is all
right.
Mr. Coble. I'll tell you what. We're going to go a second
round.
Mr. Feeney. Okay.
Mr. Coble. If you would hold for your second round----
Mr. Feeney. That would be fine.
Mr. Coble.--and Marty, 5 minutes.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I compliment the
gentleman from Florida for an excellent 2-minute drill, getting
in all his questions before the time was off. I hope the New
England Patriots' 2-minute drill is as effective on Sunday.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Coble. And if the gentleman will yield, I am a Patriot
fan. I've told you that before.
Mr. Meehan. Which I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.
A recent U.S. Conference of Mayors study found that 90
percent of the cities have not received funds that were
promised from the Federal Homeland Security Assistance programs
for localities, and I hear those complaints in Massachusetts
and I'm interested, first, Commissioner Kelly, have you run
into this problem yourself, and in your opinion, is this an
extensive problem?
Mr. Kelly. It is a bit of an issue. The city has been
identified as receiving $232 million through the Department of
Homeland Security. So far, $60 million, according to our
records, have been received. Now, there is an application
process, administrative process that we're aware of and I think
to the credit of the Department of Homeland Security, I know
there's a lot of effort being given to streamlining that
process. But there is clearly a lag between, I guess,
appropriation, you might say, and receipt on the part of
localities.
Mr. Meehan. Ms. Mencer, how do we make sure that Federal
assistance for homeland security actually reaches first
responders and do you expect that, to the extent that there are
these funding conflicts to be resolved so that local
governments can address issues like port security or security
at nuclear plants, for example?
Ms. Mencer. Yes, sir. As Commissioner Kelly said, we are
working very hard to streamline this grant process. We have
turned funds around quicker than any other time in our nation's
history. Certainly, it's unprecedented, the speed with which we
are getting these grants out the door. And we are under
restrictions that we place on ourselves to turn around the
applications and the States have also very tight deadlines to
turn around their applications to us. So I believe a lot of the
delay comes in waiting for the States to submit their
applications to us for approval. But we're working very hard at
doing that with our one-stop shop and our web portal so we're
working very hard in that regard.
Mr. Meehan. And have you seen some progress in terms of the
turnaround being quicker?
Ms. Mencer. Yes.
Mr. Meehan. Is there any evidence to suggest that you're
getting that down?
Ms. Mencer. Yes, absolutely, sir, and I think----
Mr. Meehan. Or that States are.
Ms. Mencer.--I think we're getting better all the time. The
States are getting better with the grant process, as well,
because they have organized their regions, a lot of the States
have, and now have a mechanism in place to respond more quickly
to our grant applications.
Mr. Meehan. According to a bipartisan task force sponsored
by the Council on Foreign Relations, the United States is
still, quote, ``drastically underfunding local emergency
responders and remains dangerously unprepared to handle an
attack on American soil, particularly one involving chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-impact conventional
weapons.'' For example, most fire departments lack equipment
and personnel to respond to building collapses, let alone major
catastrophes.
The task force concluded that America will fall about $98
billion short of meeting critical first responder needs, and
then when you look at, or I talked to the cities and towns in
Massachusetts that I represent, it appears to me that we
actually have fewer cops and fire fighters on the street than
we did before September 11. I'm trying to determine whether
that's so or not. I guess, Commissioner, I would ask you, are
there fewer police officers on the streets in your----
Mr. Kelly. We have 4,000 fewer officers than we had in
October of 2000. So, obviously, that's over a 10-percent
reduction for New York City Police Department.
Mr. Meehan. So presumably, the same is true with fire
fighters. I know I've talked to the head of local fire fighters
or the head of unions in Massachusetts and other parts of the
country and they seem to be in the same position.
I guess, Ms. Mencer, the question would be how are we going
to get to a point where we're actually--if we don't even have
the--if we have fewer personnel than we did in first
responders, police and fire, around the country than we did on
September 11, 2001, how are we going to make up this gap?
Because it seems to me that we're asking them to do so much
more and most departments in the country have fewer people.
Ms. Mencer. Sir, we do have some allowances in our grant
programs to fund overtime expenses for police officers and
first responders, so that should help considerably. I have a
vested interest in Massachusetts since my daughter goes to
school there, so I want to make sure you're safe and your State
is safe. But I think we do have some ways to address the
shortfall that may or may not be out there with the law
enforcement communities.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Florida is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to begin,
Director Mencer, by just offering my unqualified, unmitigated
praise in support of the Department of Homeland Security for
adding the Orlando area to the Urban Area Security Initiative,
and I would like to just briefly address why I think that is
important, because two of our witnesses, I know Commissioner
Kelly and Mr. Bishop, have said something that could be implied
to be a little critical, that adding too many cities has
watered this down.
But I have a city. The greater Orlando area only has about
a million people, but we are the world's number one vacation
destination, with 43 million tourists, and you have al Qaeda
documents found in terrorist training camps in Afghanistan
specifically identifying these critical infrastructures in
Orlando as being a target that they would be likely to hit, and
that is very expensive, when you go from yellow to orange and
you have terrorist alerts, to protect 43 million people. So I
think it made sense that it was added and it was a very smart
move.
I know that Commissioner Kelly feels like New York City is
not getting enough money, and I certainly don't want to quarrel
with him. I'm someone who has voted to give hundreds of
millions of dollars to New York and I will continue to be
supportive of New York. But I would point out, under the list
of cities from the Urban Area Security Initiative, New York is
number one in the United States--that just came out last week--
with $47 million. So I don't think they're trying to dis New
York. I understand that more money could be provided, but
they're still number one there.
You did say something, Commissioner Kelly, that I found
very intriguing. You say that the Department of Homeland
Security should give the money under the high-threat urban
areas directly to the local governments instead of funneling it
through the States. That is something I agree with. So let me
ask you this, as someone who heads a major police department.
You get the money directly from the Federal Government
under the COPS program and then, in the alternative, you get
your homeland security money through the States first. Tell me
which approach you like better and why.
Mr. Kelly. Well, first of all, the State takes an
administrative fee, the money that comes to the city, or----
Mr. Keller. That's 20 percent, I think.
Mr. Kelly. Twenty percent.
Mr. Keller. Right.
Mr. Kelly. So obviously, it means less money for the
localities. That's reason one. And, generally speaking, it
slows it down. There's an administrative lag that has to be
addressed. I think certainly a city like New York has shown
that it has the ability to process that money and spend it
wisely and do it quickly. So that's the reason that we would
argue for money going directly to localities. We have a good
relationship with the State, and I understand some money will
necessarily go to the State, but certainly we think that a
significant portion of it should go directly to the cities.
Mr. Keller. Thank you, Commissioner Kelly. I would say also
to Director Mencer, that's exactly really what I hear from our
sheriffs and chiefs of police, also. The COPS program is about
the most popular program I've ever seen because they get it
directly. There's not the red tape. There's not the
bureaucratic waste, and it's simplified and quick. And sending
it through the States is a little bit more cumbersome and they
take 20 percent off.
So I would say, as a compromise, one humble suggestion I
offer is while you may want to continue to funnel the money
through the States with respect to the population-based formula
that is used, with each State getting a certain percent and the
rest population, because after all, you are holding the
governor accountable for making his State safe, when it comes
to the money for the high-threat urban areas, I think there is
some merit to the approach of sending that money directly to
the individual cities. I know that Orlando has some great ideas
as to what they want to do with the $8.7 million and they're a
bit frustrated that the folks in Tallahassee will take 20
percent off the top and not do much for it.
What are your thoughts about having some tinkering there
with respect to the money that's under the high-threat urban
areas, going directly to the cities as opposed to funneling it
through the States?
Ms. Mencer. Well, sir, having been the Director of Homeland
Security for the State of Colorado and now in my national
position, I have kind of a unique perspective of it because I
can see both sides of this issue.
I think that funneling it through the States or guiding it
through the States promotes great oversight and a regional
concept approach by having the State receive it first. The
States actually don't have to take all 20 percent. They can
take as much as they feel necessary to administer the cost. You
have to remember what the State is responsible to do, as well,
which is to have a State strategy put together. So if we funnel
money directly to the individual entities, then we kind of lack
the incentive for a regional approach or to get a State
strategy together. There's no overriding group that can do
that. In our area, in Denver, what we did in our urban area is
we took some of our State money and gave it to the Urban Area
Initiative, the regional, as well as, the region.
Mr. Keller. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman.
It appears we have a vote on, but Ms. Jackson Lee, let me
recognize you for 5 minutes. Then we'll go vote and come back
because I think we have some more questions. The gentlelady
from Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman very much. First of
all, let me thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for a
very, very important hearing to emphasize the concerns that I
maintain as a Member of the Homeland Security Committee in
addition to this Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, that
this question of preparedness is key to, I believe, our
responsibilities in Government.
Having just come back from Iraq, I might pose more
provocative questioning that I would like to take us down the
pathway of, experts that are here. You come from different
perspectives. So let me just, as a backdrop to the visit in
Iraq and the evidence of the continued insurgent actions
against troops and others, with the backdrop of the series of
threats and terrorist acts in Turkey as late as just 24 hours
ago, and what I just glean in terms of what is healthy. It is
positive that we are going about our business here in the
United States since 9/11. That's extremely positive, but
recognizing the horrificness of the tragedy.
Let me just go directly to the honorable head of the New
York Police Department, who has had, Mr. Kelly, a wide range of
experiences and we've worked together in the past. Are we being
complacent and ineffective, if you will, in dealing with the
potential soft target threats that we may be facing? Are we
moving too slowly? Do we need to stop for a moment and get a
threat assessment not in a year's time, but right now, where we
finish it in 2 weeks, 4 weeks, because I think we're still
analyzing or trying to achieve, or maybe haven't gotten there,
a threat assessment, and how do we do that?
Mr. Kelly. Well, we receive intelligence information from
the Federal Government on a steady basis, a daily basis. I
think the fundamental issue is what we're receiving as a
nation. So when you say threat assessment, I think the Federal
Government is doing the best it can and we are doing the best
we can in New York City to analyze the intelligence that we
have. But it's still a very difficult process. It's not clear
what the threats are. Yes, we know chemical, biological,
certainly conventional means can be used as a weapon, but it's
very difficult to more specifically define the threats that we
face.
In my prepared remarks prior to your arrival, I mentioned
Iyman Faris, who was clearly an al Qaeda operative who was
apprehended on March 20 of this year. He had been scouting the
Brooklyn Bridge and he was deterred because of the uniformed
presence, the security that we had in place. Now, that's what
we're doing on the local level. That's what we're doing in New
York.
But you say threat assessment. The information or the
intelligence that is available, I don't think can be more
finely honed than it is now. We simply don't--we don't have it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you. Ms. Mencer, both of the bills
that have come out of Homeland Security have a threat
assessment component to it. Where are we in terms of having
completed anywhere near a threat assessment by the Department
of Homeland Security, which we spoke to the governor about so
many weeks ago, if you will--not many weeks ago, many months
ago. Has the Department of Homeland Security completed its
threat assessment for the nation?
Ms. Mencer. Well, certainly that's a little bit out of my
purview with ODP. We have gotten our matrix together to
determine our urban area grants, but that's, you know, very
limited. We're not really privy to the intelligence, all of the
intelligence behind that matrix. That probably is a question
more appropriately answered by the Infrastructure Analysis
and----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me do this very quickly, then.
As you look at our two bills that we have before us, at least
from Homeland Security, our goal is to look at the threats and
vulnerabilities that every area faces, including rural areas,
and the people, and to provide the essential capabilities that
are needed to meet that threat and protect those
vulnerabilities. Can you comment on our funding system that we
may have and can you comment on giving to Citizen Corps,
community groups, direct funding?
Mr. Coble. If the lady would suspend, how long will it take
you to answer that, Ms. Mencer, because we're going to have a
second round of questions. Sheila, can you come--Ms. Jackson
Lee----
Ms. Jackson Lee. If she could just do it very quickly----
Mr. Coble. Very quickly, Ms. Mencer.
Ms. Mencer. Okay. We are requesting each State to do a
threat assessment and a strategy, which is due to us December
31, which will give us a much more comprehensive view of the
States' vulnerabilities and what they perceive their threats to
be. So that should be very helpful.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And Citizen Corps direct funding?
Ms. Mencer. Citizens Corps, I am working with Citizens
Corps. I had a meeting with the Director last week and we have
just received that program, so we'll be working very closely
with them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I'd like to work with you and meet with
you on that, please. Thank you.
Ms. Mencer. I would appreciate that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows in the
Appendix]
Mr. Coble. Folks, I hate to do this to you, but----
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, could we recognize Mr. Weiner? We
have a couple of minutes----
Mr. Coble. Mr. Weiner, if you could do it real fast, we
can----
Mr. Weiner. Yes. I will take less than just a minute or
two. I just want to clear up a couple of quick things that have
emerged.
First of all, a couple of members of the panel here have
made reference to it and Mr. Bishop did. We have to draw a
distinction between the hypothetical what if, could be,
possibly, and what is actually going on today in New York City,
what's actually going on in Washington, D.C., what's actually
being reported in the intelligence chatter. It is no dispute
that the shoreline of Florida or a hospital in Boise could be
under risk. No doubt about that. The fact is, though, that New
York City is.
And let's make it very clear what we're talking about here.
Two-point-two billion dollars went into the general fund to
fund the general threats. This was a specific program set up
for high-threat--high-threat--high-density areas, of which
$7.25 billion--$725 million is gone. And the issue here, Ms.
Mencer, and to my colleagues, as well, is you add city, add
city, add city, add city, add city, you are having the effect
of taking away from the top, taking away from the top, taking
away from the top.
So I have two very quick questions. One, are you done
adding cities? Is Fresno enough of a high-threat, high-density
area to be lumped in with New York City? Is San Antonio? I
mean, at what point will you stop adding cities? Are you done?
Mr. Coble. If the gentleman would suspend, Mr. Weiner, let
them think about that. Can you come back for the second round,
Mr. Weiner?
Mr. Weiner. I've got nothing but time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coble. Folks, why don't you all get a cup of coffee and
a sandwich. I hate to do this irregularly, but there are a
couple more questions I want to put to you, too. We should be
back in about 35 minutes. So you all stand easy in the
meantime.
[Recess.]
Mr. Coble. We will resume our hearing now. Our witnesses
are still around. Mr. Weiner, you have three-and-a-half minutes
remaining.
Mr. Weiner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When we had left, I
had posed a question as to how big the list of urban areas
security initiatives, States, how big of a list of high-threat,
high-density urban area grant-eligible areas there would be,
and the reason I was asking that is every time you add one, you
take away money from New York City. Every time you add one, you
take away money from the original seven. You are, by doing each
additional State, taking away from the top. And so my question
was, are you done adding cities?
Ms. Mencer. Well, sir, I think that's a difficult question
to answer. I think it will continue to change as we continue to
look at the threats that are out there and the vulnerabilities
that exist. So will it stay at 50? I really don't know. It may
expand. It may get less. I don't know yet. We'll have to assess
each time we have money to award.
Mr. Weiner. I would point out to you that it's going to be
very difficult politically and, frankly, substantively to take
a city off this list because you are then tacitly saying that
the risk is now lowered to the point it no longer falls into
this high-threat, high-density, and I think that that is a
consideration that hasn't been fully thought through by your
office. When you add Fresno, it becomes very difficult next
year to take Fresno off. And so your answer is, this thing
could--you could add another 20 cities next year.
Ms. Mencer. Mr. Chairman, I think it--I don't know. I mean,
we're going to get these strategies and assessments from the
States at the end of this year and we will look at those and
that will give a good indication to us where the
vulnerabilities still remain, where the needs still exist, and
that's a needs assessment, as well, so----
Mr. Weiner. Well, let me ask you about the formula that's
written into the law by Congress. The Secretary shall take into
consideration credible threat--and by the way, this order was
not random, this was the intent of Congress to order it in this
way--take into consideration credible threat, presence of
critical infrastructure, population, vulnerability,
cooperation, and multiple jurisdictions.
Can you tell me--it has been reported that population is
weighted by a factor of nine, infrastructure is weighted by a
factor of six, credible threat is weighted by a factor of
three. Can you confirm that?
Ms. Mencer. I believe that's correct.
Mr. Weiner. Can you explain to me how credible threat,
meaning a reason that the gentleman to your left, the two
gentlemen to your left, have reason to believe that there is
going to be a threat to their locality, is weighted less than,
say, population?
Ms. Mencer. Well, I think it's all part of the mix and I
think----
Mr. Weiner. I'm not saying it's not. I'm saying, how come
you and your office, when deciding how dollars will be
distributed, weight the credible threat, the likelihood that al
Qaeda is going to try to blow up a bridge, a tunnel, a
building, is weighted less than population?
Ms. Mencer. I think because threat is a fluid thing and we
can't--it's difficult to assess, if you say you have a threat
against one facility, what the level of threat is on that, and
we don't, in the Office for Domestic Preparedness, we don't
have the raw intelligence data to determine that.
Mr. Weiner. But the whole purpose of this element of the
grant, the high-threat, high-density urban area grant, if you
don't have the wherewithal to determine the threat part of that
grant, then, madam, perhaps you're the wrong person to be
distributing it, because I certainly know the gentleman to your
left has that data.
Ms. Mencer. I think, sir, that even though we have threats
that are audible threats, or visible threats, or identifiable
threats, we in no way as a Government, in the intelligence
community or in the law enforcement community, can say
definitively that we know all the threats out there. We will
never know all the threats.
Mr. Weiner. I don't think I've asked you, madam, to
identify all the threats out there. I'm asking you how you
allocate funds that are to be used for high-threat, high-
density areas. And if you're saying that you don't have the
ability to weigh it sufficiently, so you put it lower on the
list, I can tell you that there's someone sitting at your table
who does, who can take you into a quiet room right now and tell
you about them, and that's the purpose of this grant.
If you don't have the ability to assess that, then frankly,
madam, I think we should give the authority to someone who has
that ability, and there are people in this country who can tell
you that the threat to New York City today is exponentially
higher than the threat to, say, Boise.
Ms. Mencer. Well, sir, I'm not sure that we know where all
the threats are.
Mr. Weiner. Madam, I'm not asking you to identify what all
the threats are.
Ms. Mencer. But you----
Mr. Weiner. I just want to make that clear. But your job is
trying to give out the high-threat, high-density urban area
grant is based first and foremost on high threat, and we have
had hearing upon hearing upon hearing about improving our
intelligence gathering to the point now that we do know where
the high-threat areas are. We do know that. I mean, I can tell
you where they are, and this isn't violating any State secret.
Wall Street, high threat area. U.N., high threat area. Brooklyn
Bridge, high threat area. These are them. I can keep listing
them for you and I can help you do your formula. But by
weighting threat lower than, say, population, you are simply
not doing the job that Congress intended when they set up these
grants.
Mr. Coble. Your time has expired, Mr. Weiner.
Mr. Weiner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coble. Again, folks, I apologize to you. Mr. Weiner, do
you want--Ms. Mencer, do you want to correspond by mail in
response by writing Mr. Weiner and to further extend your
questioning to the Director?
Mr. Weiner. I think it actually might be much more
productive for Commissioner Kelly to be corresponding with the
Director because he apparently has the information necessary
for her to make these grants----
Mr. Coble. Well, perhaps they can get together.
I again apologize to the witnesses for keeping you all
here, but we can't control the voting and this is too important
an issue, it seems to me, to give it short shrift.
Let me put a question--well, strike that. I have a question
for Mr. Feeney and a question for Mr. Scott. Let me put this
question to you, Ms. Mencer, and maybe we've touched on this,
but what steps are the Department of Homeland Security and the
Office for Domestic Preparedness taking to assess the nation's
emergency response capabilities and what guidance is DHS
providing States and locals in assessing their own needs?
Ms. Mencer. Yes, Mr. Chairman. As I've mentioned earlier,
we are requesting the States to do a State homeland security
assessment and a strategy, which is due to us December 31, and
they are required to look at all their needs, their gaps, their
vulnerabilities, what kind of equipment, training, what kind of
resources do they presently have and what do they need. So we
are waiting for that. We did a previous assessment back in
1999, so we have a baseline, and this will now give us a more
current, up-to-date view of what their needs are.
Mr. Coble. Now, this is from Mr. Feeney, the gentleman from
Florida, and Commissioner Kelly, I think it was directed to
you. Let me reiterate the question. What are the concerns about
the Congress using the grant program for pork barreling on the
one hand, and on the other hand, because the formula is
intelligence driven in part, the program not being accountable
and responsive to the public? I think that was the question
that he ended on when his time expired.
Mr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, I believe he did ask a question
concerning intelligence information that we're gathering. Is
there sharing of information among the Federal agencies, at
least in New York City? He mentioned whether or not we were
getting information from Guantanamo Bay, for instance, and I
would submit to that question the answer in response to that,
yes, we are.
There is much more effective sharing of information,
intelligence information, now. We, in fact, have 121
investigators working with the FBI and other agencies in our
Joint Terrorist Task Force, and indeed, our investigators have
been to Guantanamo Bay, have been to Afghanistan, and I think
we're working closely with our Federal partners and we are
sharing intelligence information.
That was the question that Mr. Feeney asked. He had three
questions that he put out in the last 30 seconds of his time.
Mr. Coble. And I think two of them were answered and then
the red light was illuminating in our eyes----
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Coble.--so I cut him off and didn't mean to do that.
Now, this is Mr. Scott's question. Some of the bills
propose modifying the threat advisory system--now I presume
that's the color coding system--by shifting to a regional or
economic sector focus. Do you agree with these proposals? Why
or why not? And either of the three or all three of you can
answer. Why don't I start with you, Ms. Mencer.
Ms. Mencer. Yes, sir. I think there is that flexibility now
within the threat advisory system that it could be done on a
regional basis, if necessary. So I think that flexibility
currently exists.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Kelly, do you or Mr. Bishop want to weigh in
on this?
Mr. Kelly. I haven't seen it done on a regional basis, but
it makes sense to me. Obviously, you know, there are very few
threats that would impact on the entire country. So it seems
reasonable to have a regional or perhaps a sector-based warning
system. So I would agree with that.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Bishop?
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chairman, what we're developing in Idaho
through some ODP-funded exercises is a system whereby our local
emergency planning committees will meet and specific sectors,
and law enforcement being a principal one, will meet at the
time the Federal Government changes the threat level, and then
through that meeting, decide, based on the intel as we
understand it that led to the Federal change, we will decide on
local and regional actions that are specific to the cause of
the threat level being raised. So in a strong sense, we're
regionalizing in Idaho and we're not, of course, not changing
the Federal color, but we're reacting to the Federal color in
shades, if you will.
Mr. Coble. Thank you.
Bobby, do you have any questions?
Mr. Scott. I understand the question I had has just been
asked, and I appreciate the response.
Mr. Coble. Again, I thank you all for being here.
Commissioner Kelly--oh, do you want one more, Mr. Weiner? Okay.
Mr. Weiner. A brief follow-up directed to Commissioner
Kelly. Commissioner Kelly, is part of the problem here
something that Congress created? Let me read again the language
that we included in the conference report on how this money is
to be distributed. Quote, ``The Secretary shall take into
consideration credible threat, presence of critical
infrastructure, population, vulnerability, cooperation of
multiple agencies, of multiple jurisdictions preparing domestic
preparedness plan,'' and let me just stop there.
Is the fact that our police department is such an
extraordinary one and that we have invested so much and we have
hired so many, and frankly done an extraordinary job beyond,
frankly, many of the Government agencies, is it your view in
watching this process as a participant that, in fact, it is the
very fact that the city police department has done a good job
that is now being scored against them and the very fact that
other police departments perhaps are not up to snuff and,
therefore, have greater vulnerabilities that they are now kind
of leapfrogging ahead in terms of the Federal dollars they are
getting from this limited fund?
Mr. Kelly. I don't--or at least I hope that's not the case.
I don't believe that's the case. I think, having spent four and
a half years here in Washington, I understand that there is
this desire to share the wealth, you might say, to make certain
that everybody gets something good for their districts. I think
what's different now is the post-9/11 world that we find
ourselves in. You would hope that in this area of securing the
country that it wouldn't be business as usual.
What we are proposing here in these pieces of legislation
makes eminent common sense to me. All it says is--that is
legislation, Congressman Sweeney's legislation and the two
others, as well--is that you take the preponderance of your
resources and you distribute it based on the threat that we
face. You now have a situation where only roughly 20 percent of
the resources dedicated to protecting the country, roughly $3.5
billion each year, is being distributed based on threat, and we
can talk about how you do that analysis.
It just is common sense that you would, in my judgment,
anyway, shift the preponderance of those resources to be
distributed based on threat analysis. That's not what it is
now. Eighty percent of it, or roughly 80 percent, is
distributed based on population or based on each State gets the
same amount, and to me that's illogical.
Mr. Weiner. And I just want to reiterate the history here,
because, in fact, Mr. Bishop and other members of the panel
have alluded to the general need. The history of this was the
block grant formula that was originally conceived, that it was
based essentially on a per capita formula. It was widely
criticized. Even Secretary Ridge said it was flawed, it was
fatally flawed.
And Congress, and the Secretary and the President of the
United States, came back with this proposal to create this fund
of money that was based on threat, just as Commissioner Kelly
just said, and what we are essentially doing is transforming
that element of the funding that was supposed to be targeted
toward threat, putting aside the other fund, which continues to
exist, the funding that's supposed to be targeted toward
threat, and we are now transforming it into another generalist
pot of funds.
I just want to remind you, Ms. Mencer, that the reason this
fund was created is not to do those other things, to do exactly
the thing you said you're having a tough time getting your
hands on. That's the purpose of the fund. It is to--it was not
a mistake that it was called the high-threat, high-density
urban area grants. And if it's the testimony of the Director
today that you are unable to get your hand around that threat,
well, in that case, fundamentally, then this program is not the
way that Congress designed it. If you're saying we're not
really good at that so we're going to weigh it a little less,
that is countervening the intention of Congress when we drafted
this element of the program.
And I see that you're shaking your head, but I want to just
say the testimony you've given today is that you have a lower
ratio basing the formula on credible threat than you do on
either population or infrastructure because, in your words,
it's a fluid thing that you have a difficult time assessing
from day to day. That, to me, is an argument that if you have a
difficult time doing it, not to weight it less, develop a
better way to do it better.
Weighting it less was not an option Congress intended to
give you. We said very clearly how we wanted this to be
assessed, and we said first in the language, first in the name
of the section that you're administering, threat was supposed
to be the preponderance of the way that your office distributed
this money, not third or fourth or fifth. So if you are having
difficulty, ask this Congress. I am sure we'll give you help.
Ask the Homeland Security Committee. Ask your boss. We will
give you help in addressing the threat if it's really so
difficult. Thank you.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman.
Finally, Mr. Kelly, the spokesman for the fire fighters
asked if I would put this question to you, and I'm reading from
the question. Your statement regarding the assistance to fire
fighters grants in your testimony presented before the Select
Committee on Homeland Security regarding homeland security
grants has caused concern among fire fighter groups who have
contacted this Committee. They appear to be concerned with your
statement that these grants are of little help in HOES areas
that have significant counterterrorism needs. And from reading
your testimony, they say, I am not sure what you are suggesting
be done with these grants, if anything. Can you clarify or
elaborate on that, Mr. Kelly, for the record?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Those grants are capped at
$750,000 per locality. It doesn't make sense to me to have that
cap in place for cities such as New York or other major cities.
My understanding of that piece of legislation says you can't
get more than $750,000 per city. So my suggestion was that that
cap be eliminated. New York--the Fire Department of New York
City has 13,000 employees, has a budget of probably $1.5
billion. So, clearly, $750,000 is not going to make significant
impact on their budget, not going to help them very much.
Mr. Coble. Folks, again, we thank you all for being here. I
apologize again for the delay, but as I say, we can't control
the voting on the floor.
Let me conclude with this. I revisit something Mr. Bishop,
Director Bishop said, and granted, folks, we're still a work in
progress. I mean, who would have anticipated 9/11? I think on
balance, we're doing a good job. But you said, Mr. Bishop, and
I'm inclined to concur, that when we emphasize or concentrate
our focus in one area, that inevitably may cause other areas to
be more vulnerable. And I realize this is a balancing act with
which we're dealing, but I want you all to keep that in mind as
you go about your day to day work.
I thank you again for your testimony and your presence
here. This concludes the legislative oversight hearing on
``Homeland Security: The Balance Between Crisis and Consequence
Management Through Training and Assistance, Review of
Legislative Proposals.'' The record will remain open for 1
week. So if you all want to come forward with something you
think about that you failed to say today, or if we, in turn,
think of something we failed to mention, we can come--we have a
week's time in which to tread water.
Thank you again, and the Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Representative Adam B. Schiff
Chairman Coble and Ranking Member Scott, thank you for holding this
hearing today on an extremely important issue facing our country as we
work to prevent and best prepare to respond to future terrorist attacks
in our local communities.
Earlier this month, the Department of Homeland Security announced
their FY04 homeland security grant funding distribution--and once
again, the Department's formula has failed the most vulnerable
communities in our country.
The current formula used to allocate funding to states and
localities through the State Homeland Security Grant Program continues
to give states with smaller populations more money per person than
states with larger populations. This leads to the reality of Wyoming
receiving $35.31 in per capita funding as compared to merely $4.68 in
per capita funding for my home state of California.
The Department has acknowledged that this formula has serious
shortcomings, but changes have not been made. The Urban Areas Security
Initiative (UASI) was designed to allocate funds in a manner to address
the security requirements of high density and high threat urban areas,
as well as to protect critical infrastructure. However, this program
has failed the highest density and highest threat urban areas as well,
due to the fact that over 50 localities now compete for this funding
originally focused at a few major urban high-threat areas.
It is clear that a new formula is desperately needed, and I am
pleased that we will be examining three such alternative approaches
during today's hearing. I am a cosponsor of one such approach, H.R.
3158, the ``Preparing America to Respond Effectively Act of 2003,'' or
the ``PREPARE Act'' introduced by Rep. Jim Turner. This piece of
legislation would create a task force to identify the essential
capabilities needed by every state and local government and determine
the extent to which each state or local government has achieved or
failed to achieve these essential capabilities.
I believe this approach is more preferable than the static formula-
based approach that has failed those areas that are most at risk. I am
pleased that the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Select Committee on
Homeland Security are working together on an approach that will
incorporate a number of important provisions in the various bills
before us today.
Community leaders and disaster preparedness coordinators in my
district have also expressed concern with the inability to quickly
access grant funding because of the current practice of distributing
these funds from the federal government to the states. I urge the
Department to examine whether this practice needs to be refined or
changed in order to ensure that we expedite the distribution of these
crucial funds to our local first responders who need it most.
Once again, thank you Chairman Coble and Ranking Member Scott for
holding this important hearing and providing a forum for a closer
examination of these important legislative proposals.
----------
Prepared Statement of Dr. Joseph P. Indusi, Nonproliferation and
National Security Department, Brookhaven National Laboratory
This work was performed under the auspices of the US Department of
Energy, Contract No. DE-AC02-98CH10886.
ABSTRACT
Since the events of 9/11, there have been considerable concerns and
associated efforts to prevent or respond to acts of terrorism. Very
often we hear calls to reduce the threat from or correct
vulnerabilities to various terrorist acts. Others fall victim to
anxiety over potential scenarios with the gravest of consequences
involving hundreds of thousands of casualties. The problem is
complicated by the fact that planners have limited, albeit in some
cases significant, resources and less than perfect intelligence on
potential terrorist plans. However, valuable resources must be used
prudently to reduce the overall risk to the nation.
A systematic approach to this process of asset allocation is to
reduce the overall risk and not just an individual element of risk such
as vulnerabilities. Hence, we define risk as a function of three
variables: the threat (the likelihood and scenario of the terrorist
act), the vulnerability (the vulnerability of potential targets to the
threat), and the consequences (health and safety, economic, etc.)
resulting from a successful terrorist scenario.
Both the vulnerability and consequences from a postulated adversary
scenario can be reasonably well estimated. However, the threat
likelihood and scenarios are much more difficult to estimate. A
possible path forward is to develop scenarios for each potential target
in question using experts from many disciplines. This should yield a
finite but large number of target-scenario pairs. The vulnerabilities
and consequences for each are estimated and then ranked relative to one
another. The resulting relative risk ranking will have targets near the
top of the ranking for which the threat is estimated to be more likely,
the vulnerability greatest, and the consequences the most grave. In the
absence of perfect intelligence, this may be the best we can do.
RISK CONCEPT
The concept of risk has different meanings depending on the context
and individual. Here we use a logical or systematic definition based on
the mathematical construction used in nuclear reactor safety and other
physical systems. In this context, the risk is generally defined as
(1) R = P x C,
where P = probability that a system failure occurs and C is an estimate
of the consequences resulting from the system failure. The analyses of
the various failure events and consequences associated with nuclear
power reactors have been extensively studied and delineated.
In an effort to introduce the concept of risk to the design of
nuclear materials safeguards systems, there evolved the formulation
known as the Societal Risk Approach to Safeguards.\1\ In this
formulation, the safeguards risk is approximated by an equation of the
form:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Societal Risk Approach to Safeguards Design and Evaluation,''
C. A. Bennett, W. M. Murphy, and T. S. Sherr, ERDA-7, 1975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) R = Pa x (1-Pi) x C,
where Pa = probability that a person or group attempts an adversary
action, Pi is the probability of adversary interruption (by the
safeguards system), and C is an estimate of the consequences from the
action. The implementation of this societal risk approach is
problematic because of the difficulty in estimating the probability of
attempt Pa. The situation for estimating the probability of
interruption Pi and the consequences C is somewhat more amenable to
analysis. Indeed, there has been significant progress in analyzing and
quantifying both of these factors, at least in the case of nuclear
facilities safeguards analysis. To cope with the difficulty in
determining Pa and in an attempt to develop a useful formulation for
protective system planning, we may use a less formal mathematical
version of equation (2). In equation (2), we may think of Pa as the
threat, that is, the element controlled by the adversary or terrorist
group. The factor (1-Pi), the probability that the adversary is not
interrupted, is analogous to the vulnerability (to the potential
threat) of the protective system. Just as in equation (2), the
consequences must also be considered. With these concepts, we now
define risk as:
(3) R = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequences
which is estimated for each threat scenario at a given facility. A risk
value for each threat scenario at a given facility may be analyzed to
give a set of risk values for the given facility. Now these risk values
may be ranked, relative to one another, from the highest to the lowest.
Since there is no certainty or mathematical accuracy in developing the
probability of attempt or threat, the risk values so derived are
necessarily relative to each other.
RISK CONCEPT ATTRIBUTES
In the weeks and months following the attacks of 9/11, there were
many calls for vulnerability, threat and risk assessments. Often, these
terms were used with no standard or agreed meaning for each. In the
risk formulation of equation (3), it is clear that each element has a
meaning and the relationship between them is consistent and systematic.
For example, using equation (3), a high risk implies a very plausible
adversary scenario (threat), a target which is very vulnerable to the
threat, and a severe set of consequences will occur if the threat is
carried out. It should follow easily that upgrades or security plans
should be based on risk and not on one or two of the elements of risk
alone. Clearly, basing security upgrades on say vulnerability alone
does not optimize the use of resources.
Unfortunately, upgrades in facility security were often based on
vulnerabilities alone. Similarly, the general public tends to focus on
high consequence events, even when other elements of the risk are low.
The National Strategy for Homeland Security in its' July 22, 2002
report stated ``Accordingly, the federal government will apply a
consistent methodology to focus its efforts on the highest
priorities.'' \2\ In practice, a relative value, such as low, medium or
high, can be assigned to the threat, vulnerability and consequences for
each threat scenario. As in the case with equation (2), given a threat
scenario at a given facility, we are capable of assigning relative
vulnerability, and consequence values. In utilizing equation (3), the
difficulty again lies in the threat element. Of course, with perfect
intelligence, the threat can be neutralized before the adversary acts.
However, in the absence of reliable threat intelligence, we must act
prudently to use resources for the highest risk scenarios and targets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland
Security, July 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To proceed, it is necessary to delineate the full spectrum of
potential threats against a given target or facility. For purposes of
homeland security, these targets are largely the elements of the
critical infrastructure such as transportation (bridges, tunnels,
aircraft), energy (pipelines, power lines, etc.), finance and banking
and the others. Developing these threat scenarios requires that we
focus on the future, integrating and analyzing available intelligence,
and thinking in the ways an adversary thinks. This is part of the
message given by Col. Randall J. Larsen, (USAF-Ret.), Director of the
ANSER Institute for Homeland Security in his statement for the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.\3\ Similarly,
the National Strategy also states ``Mapping terrorist threats . . .
against specific facility sectoral vulnerabilities will allow
authorities to determine . . . which facilities and sectors are most at
risk''. The process of developing the threat scenarios will require
participants from many disciplines and experiences, including
historians, intelligence specialists, technical experts, and including
military and law enforcement organizations. Once this formidable task
is completed, the development of a relative risk ranking may proceed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Col. Randall J. Larsen, (USAF-Ret.) Director, ANSER Institute
for Homeland Security, Statement for National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States,April 1, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IMPLEMENTATION
Constructing a relative risk ranking begins with the list of threat
scenarios against targets or facilities. Presumably this list may be
small or large, but countable in number. While there is no guarantee of
completeness, the mere act of developing threat scenarios is
instructive in itself and provides insight into potential future
threats. For each threat scenario, the vulnerability and consequences
are then estimated. Fortunately, there are mathematical models to
analyze both, developed in the nuclear safety and safeguards community
and the military operation research community. These estimates may be
qualitative such as low, medium or high. The exact values are not
important for purposes of this analysis.
The risk values are then determined and ranked from the highest to
the lowest producing a relative risk ranking. Obviously, resources
should be used to reduce the vulnerabilities or mitigate the
consequences from the highest ranked threat scenarios first. In the
National Strategy for Homeland Security, it is stated ``Protecting
America's critical infrastructures thus require that we determine the
highest risks . . .''
In planning security upgrades at Brookhaven National Laboratory, a
select committee was established and this relative risk ranking concept
was used for ordering the upgrade schedule.
CONCLUSION
The relative risk assessment concept or approach for protection
system planning provides a framework for systematically allocating
resources. It avoids the tendency to focus only on one element of risk
such as vulnerability. It also forces planners and protection managers
to look to the future and identify potential threat scenarios. Given
the current global threat of terrorism, we cannot continue the methods
of the past or follow the path of business as usual.
----------
Questions for Director Mencer for the November 20, 2003 hearing.
1) How effective has ODP been in supporting you in development
and implementation of your homeland security program?
2) How have you included local jurisdictions in the development
of your State Strategic Plan for Homeland Security?
3) How is the Department currently working to reduce the
paperwork burden on state and local governments by simplifying and
streamlining planning, application, reporting, and administrative
requirements?
Answer:
As a result of feedback from our grantees, and to continue to
improve the nation's ability to prevent, deter, respond to, and recover
from threats and acts of terrorism, the Office for Domestic
Preparedness (ODP) combined three programs into a single solicitation
in Fiscal Year 2004. The following grant programs will be awarded and
administered in one application: State Homeland Security Program
(SHSP), Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), and
Citizen Corps Program (CCP). These three programs will be administered
under a single application called the Homeland Security Grant Program.
This consolidation was done to streamline the grant application
process and better coordinate Federal, State, and local grant funding
distribution and operations. The homeland security assessments and
strategies currently being finalized by the 50 States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, U.S. territories, and
selected urban areas for submission to ODP will play a pivotal role in
the identification, prioritization, and allocation of financial
resources provided through the three grant programs. The funding
provided will be applied against critical resource gaps identified
through the assessments and prioritized in the State strategies.
Providing funds through a single application and award process
facilitates coordination of preparedness activities related to the
goals and objectives identified in the State strategies, resulting in a
more effective and efficient use of funding. A single application also
minimizes time spent on the application process and consolidates
reporting requirements.
The three programs further provide the opportunity to enhance
regional preparedness efforts. ODP is strongly encouraging States to
employ regional approaches to planning and preparedness and to adopt
regional response structures whenever appropriate to meet the needs
identified through the assessments and in the State's strategy.
Furthermore, it is DHS' intent to steer State and local security and
preparedness efforts toward a project-oriented process to address
common, measurable objectives. Security and preparedness officials at
all levels should seek opportunities to leverage funding from multiple
sources whenever possible and not restrict their activities to Federal
funding alone.
4) What specific steps would you take to establish consistency
across federal grant programs, especially those programs administered
by different agencies/offices, to make it easier for states,
communities, and first responders to apply for homeland security
grants?
Answer:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed a Website--
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=2155--that contains
information on all DHS first responder and training grants. In an
effort to assist the emergency response community, this Website also
provides information on homeland security and public safety grant
opportunities offered by other Federal agencies. This site was
developed by DHS, working in conjunction and cooperation with our
Federal partners, to simplify access to these grants by placing
information in a single, easily accessible site. Critical State and
local missions supported through these grants include the preparedness
of first responders and citizens, public health, infrastructure
security, and other public safety activities. While these programs vary
considerably in their size and scope, they all contribute to making our
nation more secure against the threat of terrorism, as well as other
natural and man-made hazards.
In addition to grant opportunities, this Website contains a link to
the Compendium of Federal Terrorism Training for State and local
audiences, a database of the terrorism-related training offered by
Federal departments and agencies that is available to State and local
emergency personnel. It is designed as a resource for State, local and
tribal officials and especially for those responsible for arranging
training for emergency personnel. The Compendium includes details such
as course objectives, intended audience, how the training is delivered
(in the field, at a training center, by distance learning), and how to
enroll students or arrange for the training to be delivered in a
particular jurisdiction. Users can search for courses based on the
course title and sponsoring agency, but they can also find very
specific courses by entering the desired training topic or other
criteria on a special search page.
Additionally, ODP organized the Training Resources and Data
Exchange (TRADE) Group, consisting of Federal interagency partners, to
address synchronization of training efforts and the need for a
standardized training curriculum for State and local responders. The
TRADE Group consists of representatives from a number of Federal
agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United
States Fire Administration, and the Department of Energy.
5) The House Intelligence bill will authorize the Department of
Homeland Security to provide training for first responder managers for
``identifying sources of potential terrorist threats'' and improving
information sharing. Would the Office of Domestic Preparedness handle
this training? Do you provide any such training now?
Answer:
ODP currently provides a wide-range of awareness level training
courses through the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC).
As you know, the NDPC includes ODP's Center for Domestic Preparedness
in Anniston, Alabama, the New Mexico Institute of Mining and
Technology, Louisiana State University, Texas A&M University, and the
Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site. ODP also works with a number
of other training partners to provide training to the Nation's
emergency prevention and response community.
Through the NDPC and our other training partners, ODP provides more
than 30 direct training and technical assistance courses and programs
to state and local jurisdictions. This includes training delivered in
residence at ODP training facilities, on-site in local communities
through mobile training teams, and through such electronic means as the
Internet, closed circuit broadcasts, and video-conferencing. ODP
training is tailored for a wide range of emergency responders,
including courses for fire and rescue personnel, law enforcement
officers, public works and public safety communications officials,
emergency medical personnel, and many other disciplines. It also
addresses a range of emergency response levels available to State and
local emergency responders--awareness, performance, planning, and
management.
6) H.R. 3158, the ``PREPARE Act,'' introduced on September 24,
2003, by Mr. Jim Turner D-TX, has listed as one of its findings that a
lack of national standards and an absence of functioning methodology
makes it impossible to determine how prepared a state or local
government is and how prepared they need to be. Do you agree? How does
ODP determine what the states need?
Answer:
ODP has implemented and continues to develop additional standards
and guidelines for the equipment, training, and exercise support funded
through its grants. These standards and guidelines have been and are
being developed collaboratively with subject matter experts within ODP,
other Federal agencies and the State and local emergency response
community. They are intended to ensure that an appropriate preparedness
baseline is achieved nationally for response to incidents of terrorism
involving weapons of mass destruction. Compliance with many of these
guidelines and standards is achieved by tying receipt of grant funds to
their acceptance. For example, in an effort to improve emergency
preparedness and response interoperability, all new or upgraded radio
systems and new radio equipment purchased with Fiscal Year 2004
Homeland Security Grant Program funds should be compatible with a suite
of standards called ANSI/TIA/EIAA-102 Phase I (Project 25). These
standards have been developed to allow for backward compatibility with
existing digital and analog systems and provide for interoperability in
future systems.
Also, ODP sponsors and is active in the Interagency Board (IAB) for
Equipment Standardization and Interoperability. The IAB is comprised
primarily of local responders, but is also represented by State and
Federal officials. ODP has used the standardized equipment lists
developed through the IAB as the basis for the equipment it allows
grantees to purchase through its grant programs. The IAB has also taken
an active role in supporting the development and implementation of
federal equipment and operational standards.
In a related effort, ODP has developed a methodology and guidance
for the evaluation of performance-based exercises, which are described
in Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), Volume
II: Exercise Evaluation and Improvement. The exercise evaluation
methodology outlined in HSEEP Volume II is designed to enhance the
quality and usefulness of homeland security exercises by evaluating
performance against standardized criteria, enhancing data analysis, and
focusing greater attention on implementation of improvements.
It is a methodology that recognizes that homeland security is a new
activity for most Federal, State, and local agencies and that
capabilities will need to be built and enhanced over time. The
evaluation process recognizes those critical tasks that the exercise
participants perform well and identifies improvements that need to be
made. The goal is to improve the overall preparedness of the Nation so
that all jurisdictions can perform required tasks at least at the 90
percent level.
The evaluation guides included in Volume II are an initial effort
to define expected levels of performance. They build on past experience
and will continue to be refined. The guides are incomplete at this time
because they focus on response, with emphasis on a chemical attack.
Additional evaluation guides are being developed to address prevention
and deterrence, recovery, and other types of weapons of mass
destruction. ODP plans to issue subsequent editions of Volume II as
additional guides are developed and as the evaluation methodology is
refined.
Finally, it is a strategic goal of ODP to provide information to
first responders on best practices. Currently ODP established and
maintains several programs through which it provides for the sharing
and dissemination of best practices. Programs to disseminate best
practices information include training, publications, and Web pages.
Programs that focus on providing best practices information include the
previously mentioned HSEEP and ReadyNet. HSEEP establishes a formal
process for State and local communities to test their practices in a
terrorism scenario. From this the participants learn what works and
what does not. The lessons learned or best practices obtained from the
exercises are incorporated into a web-based system called ReadyNet for
national on-line distribution to first responders.
While ODP maintains a number of current efforts to disseminate and
share best practices information with the field, ODP is simultaneously
looking prospectively at how to improve and augment these efforts. This
includes ODP's plan to establish the Homeland Security Best Practices
(HSBP) program. Under HSBP, ODP will establish a national grant program
to encourage and support the development of best practices in homeland
security. Consistent with the mission and goals of DHS, the HSBP
initiative will provide grant funding to address awareness, prevention,
preparedness, and response.
7) Commissioner Kelly recommends that States and local
governments should be able to make procurement purchases through the
Federal contracts already negotiated by the General Services
Administration. He suggest that this would help ensure interoperability
of equipment and may produce costs savings. This sound like an good
idea. Do you agree?
Answer:
ODP agrees that State and local governments should be provided the
opportunity to use the General Services Administration's (GSA)
purchasing schedule if they so choose. ODP is currently discussing this
option with GSA to determine how best to accomplish this objective.
----------
----------
Questions for Director Bishop for the November 20, 2003 hearing.
1) Mr. Bishop, after reading your prepared statement, I am left
with an optimistic view of the current state of affairs. Not that you
do not acknowledge that much work remains to be done, but your remarks
offer a refreshing glimmer of hope. You state that emergency responders
on the Federal, state, and local level have training and skills that
seemed irrelevant 4 years ago. What type of training and skills are you
alluding to? Do new skills come at the expense of maintaining skills
that were viewed as critical in the pre 9/11 world? What types of
equipment do you now have that you would not have dreamed of 4 years
ago?
As Idaho began to broaden its weapons of mass destruction
perspective in 1998, we identified a number of training needs--the most
basic of which concerned responder awareness. We began revision of
basic responder curricula to include Chemical Biological Radiological
Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) response and terrorism awareness. We
also began a round of seminars for elected officials and responder
leadership. We believe that we've made substantial inroads at the
awareness level, but continue to work the issues. We've broadly
developed specific skills concerning incident analysis and size-up for
both responders and leadership. We evaluate incidents more thoroughly
these days and in a manner that improves strategy and tactic
development for all incidents. Idaho responders are acquiring good
CBRNE recognition skills and understand how to ask for technical help
as well as additional resources. Our hazmat teams have acquired
substantial specific skills in mass decontamination and in operation of
acquired leading edge detection equipment.
Idaho has had great training experiences with ODP funded facilities
in Alabama, Nevada, and Socorro. That training is sound, efficient and
extremely effective. It is particularly valuable to our First Responder
leadership because of the great peer interaction and nationwide
connections.
We do struggle integrating responder CBRNE skills into responder
training. Our fire and medical responders are about 85% volunteer or
paid-on-call personnel. Our ability to train CBRNE is limited by our
need to train to basic skills. We are well underway, however, to use
non-traditional course deliveries to provide effective training. With
ODP assistance we are using CD ROM based training for awareness. We
will be using video conference based training for more advanced
training. We are designing modularized training so that we can
capitalize on two-hour presentations during traditional ``training
nights'' with volunteer departments. We will also continue efforts to
integrate training into present curricula. Basic level Firefighters,
EMTs and Firefighters should have CBRNE ``Operations Defensive''
competency when they complete their basic training. Almost every skill
and tactic that they learn can easily be enhanced within the context of
their basic training. Over the long term, we expect a very limited need
for ``follow-on'' courses that impart CBRNE skills outside of the
context of training a responder to do their job.
In Idaho we are using a lot of leading edge infrared technology to
deal with unknown substances. We have acquired equipment, through the
ODP grant process, that allows us to more quickly and precisely
determine the composition of a variety of solids, liquids and gases on
scene. In as little as 15 minutes we can get a more definitive
identification today than we would have been able to obtain with over
an hour's work four years ago. This class of equipment also requires
fewer training hours to maintain competence. Tactically it allows us to
clear a scene for benign substances in a fraction of the time we would
have required two years ago. For truly threatening substances, we are
able to focus our strategy and tactics to the particular hazard more
quickly.
We've been able to make great advances with our ability to deal
with suspected and actual explosive devices. The best example is the
full development of a Bomb Squad in Twin Falls Idaho. The police
department in that small city had invested the time and money to train
bomb technicians and had ballistic suits. They lacked a robot,
disrupters, and other equipment to truly operate as a bomb squad. The
leader of that unit was sure that it would be years before they had
full capability. Their ``dream'' happened much more quickly thanks to
the ODP grant. Their local efforts were enhanced and they have become a
fully functional Bomb Squad with a number of complex responses to their
credit including improvised explosive devises.
2) It does seem clear that States still need more resources to
protect against a terrorism attack. While I share your concern that
providing more assistance to states with higher targets could shift the
targets to rural states, we cannot ignore the level of risk that New
York and these other cities face. How can we resolve this issue and
still protect the other states?
We need to preserve the current fundamental grant formula. We then
need to take a discriminating approach with grant enhancements--and
make some tough decisions with those enhancements--decisions that
members will often find unpopular. That New York City, for example, is
an attractive target is reasonable--and the current formula provides
the greatest amount of financial support to New York State. The concept
of the ``Urban Areas Security Initiative'' is, I believe, an
appropriate means of enhancing funding to higher threat Cities. But the
management of that enhancement has to be based on pretty narrow
criteria--and not based upon how much pressure is being brought to bear
upon ODP or Members of Congress. If enhancements apply to every city in
the country--then it is not an enhancement, but just another part of
the funding formula. The halving the funding allocation to the states
in order to fund enhanced programs in just fifty cities smacks of
indifference to the security for that 51st city as well as all of the
less urbanized areas of the country.
Criteria for enhancement should balance risk, threat, vulnerability
AND local efforts. For example, I vested two new regional response
teams in Idaho with particular departments and agencies because of what
they have done on their own--with local funding, effort, and teamwork.
It is not a ``match'' or a ``reward.'' It is recognition that they took
preparedness seriously and that we could make a big gain by enhancing
local efforts.
I believe homeland security is not just a federal government
responsibility. The federal support is a grand resource that lets us
move rapidly ahead. But it is our neighbors that we have to rescue and
save. The responsibility is shared. Local and state governments are
providing response personnel, buildings and basic response equipment.
Having spoken about shared responsibility, please don't interpret
my remarks as a request for moving to a matching funds environment. The
administration and management of grants requiring match will reduce the
usefulness of this effort. Reward effort or provide seed money and
evaluate results. Don't ask us to implement and monitor matching funds
or ``in kind'' contributions.
I will discuss threat and vulnerability assessment management in my
reply to Question 7.
3) You express concern with the notion advocated in H.R. 3158,
Sec. 1802 (6), that the Federal government should play a predominant
role in assisting communities in reaching the level of preparedness
they need to respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack. Have you had
negative experiences where the Federal government was the lead on any
matter? What role should the Federal government play and why?
I will try to be brief, but I may fail. I have had personal
experience, shared experience and studied events when the federal
government's need to be the ``lead'' ended in poor outcomes. I hasten
to add that I have had great experiences with federal, state, local
partnerships.
A good incident for all of us to examine and understand is the
``Ruby Ridge'' event that occurred in Idaho during 1992, prior to my
moving to the state. I've spent more than a little time studying the
circumstances because the event has such far-reaching and long lasting
effects throughout Idaho and the nation. The outcomes were federal and
civilian deaths, damage to confidence in federal law enforcement from
which it is still recovering, an intensification of radicalism of the
extreme and violent right wing throughout the our country, and ongoing
damage to all the people involved--federal agents and private citizens
alike.
The assertion of primacy and predominant role on the part of the
federal government set events in motion that led directly to the
outcomes that I've listed. Had the agents formed an effective
partnership with local law enforcement, there would have been no ``Ruby
Ridge.'' The person sought by the federal agents would have been
arrested without incident within a reasonable period of time when he
came to town to conduct normal business.
A better outcome occurred in 1996 in Garfield County, Montana when
local, state, and federal officials managed to arrest radicals after an
81-day standoff. While there was no question that this was a federal
case under federal leadership, the federal, state, local partnership
produced much more desirable results.
The model we anticipate and which we have used well includes
appropriate federal, state and local partners. That model does work and
is the means by which we can ensure a much greater chance of success.
No federal official can reasonably be expected to have enough intimate
knowledge of the local influences that shape the environment in which
we plan for and respond to incidents. No local official can reasonably
be expected to have broad perspective and specific knowledge of
external forces acting upon the response environment. While state
officials do have bridging knowledge between local and federal
perspectives, state officials often lack the specificity of either.
So, the role of the federal officials is to advocate and accomplish
federal and national goals and objectives. The federal officials should
also bring the appropriate, extraordinary federal resources to bear on
the problem at hand. If the federal official wants to succeed, however,
he or she will understand that they will do so not through
``predominance'' but through partnership. I would object just as
strenuously to a local official who might assert some sort of
predominance.
Asserting predominance just does not work very well. Such efforts
usually end badly and people are often harmed unnecessarily.
I have worked with a number of federal Incident Commanders on large
fires. The best of the Best--Type I team Incident Commanders--work
extremely hard at not exercising their ``predominance.'' While they
have overarching authority, their approach is focused upon
collaborative problem solving.
In my experience, when federal officials are forced to express
their ``predominance,'' it is because they have already failed to find
viable solutions to problems. What follows is inevitably of great
interest to litigators.
4) Calling on your experiences as a former fire chief, what role
do volunteer fire departments play as first responders to terrorist
events? Do you believe that the Firefighter Assistance grants programs
should be included when considering changing first responder grants?
Please explain why?
5) How do volunteer fire departments benefit from grant programs?
Do they have a role in homeland security?
I will answer questions 4 and 5 together. In our state, and many
states, volunteer firefighters are the backbone of response to
incidents requiring rescue in towns and small cities. It will be they
who have the greatest potential to limit the loss of life after an
incident occurs. In many areas, our volunteer firefighters work
directly with volunteer Emergency Medical Service providers--the two
are often separate entities within a local jurisdiction. With their
colleagues in local law enforcement (usually paid, but often with very
active reserve officer programs), they are the ones that will identify
the homeland security incident first, have the greatest change to save
lives, protect property and the environment, as well as preserve
evidence. In Idaho, they constitute 85% of our ``front'' line. They are
the men and women who will help us staff the second and third
operational periods in our major city that have paid departments. They
are the men and women who will help restore our initial response
capability, while the affected jurisdictions work large, overwhelming
incidents.
When I was a chief in a small rural volunteer department in
Montana, we provided mutual aid and response resources throughout
Montana and occasionally adjoining states. We had that capability
because of support from Montana state government and we had the desire
to assist because we knew that, sooner or later, we would need the help
of our neighbors. The smaller department and the volunteer departments
``cover the backs'' of the larger and paid departments by providing an
extraordinary pool of human resources for the extraordinary incident.
In fact, two important components of Idaho's hazardous materials
response system are volunteer, paid on call departments that host
hazmat teams. They are trained, effective and of great value to our
response system. The most complex of their equipment was purchased
through the ODP grant program.
I suggested in the past that the ``Fire Grant'' program wasn't
broken when it was vested with FEMA and didn't really need to be fixed
by moving it to ODP. I remain concerned that separating the program
from the U.S. Fire Administration will result in a loss of vigor,
advocacy, and effectiveness of the program.
I have great respect for my friends and colleagues in ODP and I
know they will work extraordinarily hard to make the Fire Grant system
work. I even have an appreciation of the need to create a one-stop shop
concept for grants. I still remain nervous, however, about grant
programs that are not directly administered by an agency populated by
individuals who have ``been there, done that.''
I have heard some rumors about eliminating the award cap on
individual fire grants in a manner that would benefit larger cities.
The Fire Grant was originally conceived to help fire departments in
their basic mission. The current cap helps preserve that intended
purpose, I think, as opposed to becoming just another source of
homeland security funding. While firefighting capability is important
to our security, this grant should remain focused upon rescue and
putting out fires. The program does currently help most those
departments that have limited revenue resources. I'd like to see that
maintained. The proposed $2,000,000 cap simply reduces the number of
departments receiving assistance and therefore reduces the area
benefited by the grant. We are already emphasizing the largest urban
areas in the State Homeland Security Grant. The Fire Grant really needs
to stay focused on helping fire departments with basic capability.
The 2005 budget proposal that emphasizes Homeland Security in the
Fire Grant is a great change in the purpose of the grant. The name
should be changed to reflect the new role--the Homeland Security Grant
for Fire Departments. It is so much more important that we continue to
build firefighting capability nationwide--that capability is also of
great value to homeland security response--providing decontamination
support, dust abatement and putting out fires
6) H. R 3266, Sec 802 (h), relates to penalties for failure of a
grant recipient that is a state or multi-state entity to provide the
funds /resources to local governments/first responders within 45 days.
Why do you believe waste fraud and abuse will increase under this
section? What alternative would you propose to ensure timely
disbursement?
I worked for a while for an agency of the federal government. I
have seen, and the members of the committee certainly have heard horror
stories about spending ``end of year funds.'' In order to meet the
spending deadline, federal agencies, state agencies, and local agencies
have done some pretty strange and wasteful things. While it's important
to press for urgency and to streamline processes, providing a fiscal
penalty probably will likely tend to push some states into obligating
funds in a manner that is careless, poorly thought out, and
occasionally intended to obscure the true nature of the obligation. We
already are seeing some news coverage suggesting inappropriate
purchases in the SHSGP.
Rather than a financial penalty, I would suggest a requirement that
the Secretary communicate any failure to commit funds with in the
required period directly to the affected state's Governor as well as to
the Congress. I know my Governor well enough to know that I will
improve my efforts or someone else will have an opportunity to meet
future deadlines. I also know the Governor well enough that he will
understand when there is a problem with a local jurisdiction that must
be resolved before a sub-grant or other obligation is made.
The other problem with a financial penalty is that it is likely to
harm the responder, not necessarily motivate the administrator. The
value in having the Secretary communicate directly with the Governor is
that more focused effort will be brought to bear upon fulfilling the
purposes of the grant.
7) What do you mean when you say that the current management of
threat, vulnerability and risk are working well because it is used
dynamically? How do any of these proposed bills impact these dynamic
qualities?
Several bills seem to over emphasize the element of threat in
relationship to risk and vulnerability. Threat varies daily either
because those who would do us harm change tactics or because we
perceive the threat differently. Greater emphasis given threat
legislatively reduces the executive branch's ability to adapt to meet
changes in targeting intelligence or developments in tactics.
I certainly would never wish to offend the members of congress, but
I have noticed that, occasionally, Congress finds it difficult to act
with rapidity. Vulnerability and risk tend to be a little more stable.
I think the current mix of emphasis is serving us well allow
adaptability and flexibility nationwide. I would again suggest that
enhancements are great ways to cope with changing conditions in threat.
The base relationship really ought to reflect a long-term balance.
It is also worth noting that jurisdictions are perfectly willing to
find ways to enhance their ``threat rating'' when they understand that
it may mean more money. I have had some difficult moments convincing
some communities that their appraisal of threat just wasn't realistic.
The more we emphasize threat, the more likely we are to see inflated
threat ratings meant to capture more funding.
I believe that our national threat analysis continues to
overemphasize more traditional targets consistent with the traditional
battlefield. While we certainly must plan to protect critical
infrastructure, we may be focusing too tightly upon those targets. We
call them ``terrorists'' because they wish to create terror. We see, in
Israel for example, attacks upon places and facilities that are
certainly not ``critical infrastructure.'' Instead, there are attacks
that are designed to promote terror by convincing citizens that their
government cannot protect them in any location.
Because we can cope more easily with threat analysis that focuses
upon ``critical infrastructure,'' I believe we are relying too heavily
upon that analysis. We are, in a sense, ``fighting the last war''
instead of the present one. The attacks of September 11, 2001 should
not create an expectation that the next attack will be similar. I would
not rule out a similar attack certainly, but it is foolish to overly
focus on what has occurred as the principal predictive element of what
will occur. I think we're close to doing that.
There is currently a reasonable, even allocation of resources among
jurisdictions that includes reasonable emphasis upon threat to well-
defined and clearly definable targets as well as room for funding to
accommodate protecting targets of opportunity and such non-traditional
targets as we have seen in other areas of the world. I am as concerned
about a personal suicide attack at a middle class restaurant in a small
city in America's Heartland as I am about an attack upon a substantial
piece of infrastructure. Terrorists are predators. Predators cannot use
more energy in obtaining the ``kill'' than they will derive from it.
I would add that I am very suspicious of experts who believe they
can pin down terrorist threat analysis. There is not a good track
record for such experts--that's how we got here.
I am fond of experts who couch their analysis in terms that suggest
that their analysis has highly transitory components and suggests that
their readers constantly obtain and evaluate other analyses.