    [House Hearing, 108 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

       HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOLLOWING MILITARY OPERATIONS: OVERCOMING
                                    BARRIERS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
                       EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
                                   RELATIONS

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 13, 2003

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 108-56

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

                                     ______

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                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       TOM LANTOS, California
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    DOUG OSE, California                 DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia               JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   DIANE E. WATSON, California
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia          CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma              C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
    NATHAN DEAL, Georgia                     Maryland
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania                 Columbia
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    JOHN R. CARTER, Texas                CHRIS BELL, Texas
    WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota                 ------
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
                                             (Independent)

                           Peter Sirh, Staff Director
                     Melissa Wojciak, Deputy Staff Director
                          Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
                           Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
                  Philip M. Schiliro, Minority Staff Director

     Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
                                   Relations

                    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           TOM LANTOS, California
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia          LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
    TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania                 Maryland
    WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota     CHRIS BELL, Texas
                                         JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

                                   Ex Officio

    TOM DAVIS, Virginia                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
                Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
                  R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Advisor
                            Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
                        David Rapallo, Minority Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on May 13, 2003.....................................     1
    Statement of:
        Greene, Richard L., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
          Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of
          State; and William J. Garvelink, Senior Deputy Assistant
          Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian
          Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development......    33
        Welling, Curtis R., president and CEO, AmeriCares; George C.
          Biddle, senior vice president, International Rescue
          Committee; Rudy Von Bernuth, vice president and managing
          director, Children in Emergencies and Crisis, Save the
          Children; and Kevin M. Henry, director, policy and
          advocacy, Care.............................................    79
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Biddle, George C., senior vice president, International
          Rescue Committee, prepared statement of....................    92
        Garner, Lieutenant General Jay, retired, Director of Office
          of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, Department
          of Defense, prepared statement of..........................    23
        Garvelink, William J., Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator
          for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S.
          Agency for International Development, prepared statement of    44
        Greene, Richard L., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
          Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of
          State, prepared statement of...............................    36
        Henry, Kevin M., director, policy and advocacy, Care,
          prepared statement of......................................   115
        Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Ohio:
            Article dated May 10, 2003...............................     6
            Prepared statement of....................................    15
        Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Connecticut:
            Discussion Paper, Protecting Iraqis from a Security
              Vacuum.................................................   125
            Information concerning critical tasks....................    55
            Letter dated May 9, 2003 and prepared statement of Bill
              Frelick................................................    69
            Prepared statement of....................................     3
        Von Bernuth, Rudy, vice president and managing director,
          Children in Emergencies and Crisis, Save the Children,
          prepared statement of......................................   103
        Welling, Curtis R., president and CEO, AmeriCares, prepared
          statement of...............................................    83

       HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOLLOWING MILITARY OPERATIONS: OVERCOMING
                                    BARRIERS

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MAY 13, 2003

                      House of Representatives,
    Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
                           and International Relations,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in
    room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
    Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Janklow, Kucinich, Maloney,
    Ruppersberger and Tierney.
        Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
    counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, Phd, senior policy advisor;
    Robert A. Briggs, clerk; David Rapallo, minority counsel; and
    Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.
        Mr. Shays. The Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
    Threats, and International Relations hearing entitled,
    ``Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations:
    Overcoming Barriers,'' is called to order.
        In defense of international peace and human dignity,
    coalition Armed Forces have liberated Iraq from the death grip
    of a brutal corrupt regime. They did so brilliantly and
    bravely, executing a battle plan that demanded unparalleled
    military precision and unprecedented efforts to minimize
    civilian casualties.
        That same concern for the long oppressed people of Iraq now
    motivates our efforts to stabilize that nation, bring relief to
    millions in need, and help them create a government they can
    trust and support. We cannot fail to complete this journey. The
    forces of liberation, military and civilian, are working to
    fill the vacuum created by the collapse of Saddam's insidious
    tyrannical control apparatus.
        The same urgency that propelled armored columns into
    Baghdad must now drive efforts to establish civil order,
    restore basic services, and reopen safe passage for people,
    food, medicine, and necessities.
        During my very brief stay in Iraq last month, as the guest
    of Connecticut-based humanitarian organization Save the
    Children, I saw heart-wrenching poverty and unendurable living
    conditions. Not the war, but decades of Saddam's sadism and
    brutal selfishness robbed the Iraqi nation of the means and
    capability to thrive. As liberators, the culminating, perhaps
    more difficult, duty of regime change is to care for the people
    of Iraq until they are able to harvest the fruits of human
    dignity and freedom for themselves.
        The task is absolutely enormous. Before the war, 60 percent
    of the population relied solely on the United Nations' Oil for
    Food Program for basic needs. After the war, food warehouses
    were looted. Lack of clean water and reliable power are
    crippling an already inadequate health care system. In an oil-
    rich country, shortages of cooking fuels and other refined
    products inflame hardship and resentments.
        We cannot and should not expect to meet the challenge
    alone. International aid programs and nongovernment
    organizations referred to as NGO's have the most experience
    assessing humanitarian needs and getting essential supplies
    through logistic and political barriers. NGO staff are willing
    to take risks, but they cannot yet operate fully or freely in
    an unsettled security environment that threatens the physical
    safety and political neutrality of humanitarian workers.
        The transition from combat to police operations has not
    been as rapid or as smooth as planned. Hard lessons learned in
    Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan on the need to
    quell emergent lawlessness seems to have fallen out of the
    battle plan during the dash to Baghdad. The military mechanics
    of basic security and free-flowing humanitarian assistance need
    to be brought forward quickly before vicious thugs and radical
    mullahs can occupy the moral high ground so nobly gained in
    battle.
        The President charged the Pentagon's Office of
    Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance with bringing civil
    order and much needed aid to Iraq. Ambassador Paul Bremer and
    Retired Army General Jay Garner are leading U.S. efforts to
    meet that challenge. We will hear a taped message from General
    Garner this afternoon. We will also hear from Federal agencies
    and NGO's directly involved in rebuilding Iraq. Their testimony
    will help us understand the difficulties of delivering
    assistance in postwar Iraq and the scope of humanitarian
    mission facing the world.
        With military might and precious lives, we have paved the
    way for peace and Democracy in Iraq. For that struggling
    nation, that troubled region and a changing world, the road
    ahead is perilous and the stakes are enormous. We cannot fail
    to complete the journey.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.001

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.002

        Mr. Shays. At this time, the Chair would recognize the
    distinguished ranking member, Mr. Kucinich, for an opening
    statement.
        Mr. Kucinich. I want to thank the Chair for his dedicated
    efforts to try to obtain General Garner's testimony today.
        And I want to state, for the record, that I am concerned
    about the Defense Department's refusal to send any department
    officials to this hearing so we could have our questions
    answered.
        General Garner's testimony will be on videotape, and we are
    not going to have any opportunity to question him. I might add
    that, for the Department of Defense, that this is a U.S.
    congressional oversight subcommittee with responsibility for
    the Department of Defense. In my view, a videotape testimony is
    not acceptable. This is not Emerald City, folks, and General
    Garner is not the Wizard of Oz. I mean, we have an obligation
    to get answers to our questions. And it's also a great concern,
    because the International Relations Committee is holding a
    hearing on Thursday in which the general will testify and is
    sending the Department's Under Secretary for Policy as a
    personal representative.
        I also want to say that I am disappointed in the
    administration's approach to the security situation in Iraq.
    Based on all evidence, it appears the administration is more
    concerned about the security of oil reserves than of the Iraqi
    people or in its supposed weapons of mass destruction. Let me
    tell you why.
        First, the administration did not begin preparations for
    Iraqi reconstruction until early 2003. Although AID, AID's
    secret and exclusive contracting process has been criticized
    elsewhere, the bottom line is that the White House did not tell
    them to start preparing for the war's aftermath until 2003.
        In contrast, the administration began preparing to secure
    Iraqi oil fields months earlier. The Army asked Halliburton
    back in November to develop a contingency plan for
    extinguishing oil well fires, repairing damage, and continuing
    operations. This begs the question, why wasn't the same level
    of preparation given to the humanitarian relief?
        With respect to weapons of mass destruction, during the
    first days of occupation in Baghdad, the military rushed to
    secure a single government agency, the oil ministry. They did
    not secure hospitals, electrical grids, or water facilities. As
    the military rushed by these facilities--and rushed by, I might
    add, the Iraqi National Museum--it also bypassed Iraq's nuclear
    headquarters and the nuclear research facility. These are known
    nuclear sites that the IAEA has inspected dozens of times, and
    that contained sealed containers of nuclear material. U.S.
    forces left them unguarded for weeks while hundreds of people
    looted them.
        In a series of investigative articles on these lootings,
    the Washington Post reports that, inexplicably, these
    facilities are still not secure. As a result, the military says
    it is now impossible to determine whether nuclear material was
    stolen. I would like to submit these articles, Mr. Chairman,
    for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.003

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        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.008

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.009

        Mr. Kucinich. If this is the administration's record for
    securing materials that are highly questionable, this is their
    record for securing materials that can be connected to the
    concerns that many have expressed, if this is their record, we
    need to reflect on the whole reason why this administration
    went to war against Iraq. And one can only imagine the state of
    security for humanitarian relief efforts.
        Mr. Chairman, before the war, the Army's Chief of Staff
    General Shinseki testified before the Senate Armed Services
    Committee. When asked how many troops were necessary to secure
    Iraq after the war, he said several hundred thousand; but
    superiors in the administration refused to listen. Two days
    after the general testified, the administration sent Deputy
    Defense Secretary Wolfowitz to publicly rebuke him, saying his
    estimate is way off the mark. The administration has now
    reduced the number of troops in Iraq to fewer than 150,000. As
    a result, this weekend General David McKiernan, the commander
    of ground forces in Iraq, made a frank and disturbing comment.
    He said, ``Ask yourself if you could secure all of California
    with 170,000 troops. The answer is no.'' This individual is the
    commander of the U.S. ground forces.
        But, again, in spite of this dire situation, the
    administration plans to reduce the number of troops by tens of
    thousands more over the coming months. What is most troubling
    about these actions is that they are taking place while the
    administration is excluding the international community from
    assisting with security and other critical functions. Dr. Blix
    and Dr. ElBaradei, for example have both offered to dispatch
    trained international weapons inspectors to assess the looted
    nuclear facilities and help search for those elusive weapons of
    mass destruction, but their offers have been rebuffed.
        On January 14, only 6 weeks after U.N. inspectors began
    their search for such weapons, the President denounced the U.N.
    inspection process for taking too long. Yet today, almost 2
    months after the start of the war, and without the obstacles of
    the Hussein regime, the administration still has not found such
    weapons.
        It is a misconception to assume that the U.S. forces are
    the most effective to administer a post-Saddam Iraq. Certainly,
    Iraqis are happy to be rid of Hussein, but many Iraqis blame
    their current humanitarian crisis on a decade of U.S. support
    for economic sanctions. Certainly, they are pleased to be free
    of a tyrant, but they are extremely skeptical of a
    reconstruction effort by a single occupying Nation, and
    especially by that Nation's military force.
        Mr. Chairman, we know the factions inside and outside Iraq
    are trying to exploit this anti-American sentiment to their
    advantage. The Washington Post reported that in the city of
    Najaf, for example, Shiite leaders are denouncing the U.S.
    military occupation. As a result, U.S. troops are not
    patrolling or providing security there. At least in this
    portion of Iraq, it appears, U.S. troops are not being used to
    support security efforts. And unilateral actions by the
    administration can only serve to further inflame these
    factions. Without the inherent legitimacy and expertise of the
    international community, the administration may end up creating
    a larger problem than it hoped to solve.
        Mr. Chairman, last week the President landed aboard the USS
    Lincoln and proclaimed victory in Iraq. He spoke in front of a
    large banner that read: Mission Accomplished. Clearly, this
    mission is nowhere near finished, and I'm concerned that the
    administration's cavalier attitude will end up costing this
    country more than we know.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich
    follows:]

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.010

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.011

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.012

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.013

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.014

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.015

        Mr. Shays. Mr. Janklow, Governor.
        Mr. Janklow. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I will
    be extremely brief with my comments.
        I really appreciate, Mr. Chairman, you setting up this
    meeting for today. At this point in time, there can't be
    anything more appropriate than to look at the question of
    humanitarian assistance following the military operation
    overcoming barriers.
        I'm not as smart as a lot of other people that have all the
    answers to these types of things. My understanding is, we just
    came through a war. In this war, all kinds of different things
    happened. Very little goes according to actual plan. A perfect
    example of the kinds of misinformation you can get in a war is
    you can read stories in very credible newspapers that talk
    about a hundred thousand objects plus disappearing from a
    museum, and then you can find out that in reality it may be a
    couple hundred objects that have disappeared from a museum.
    These kinds of misinformation happen during war.
        As a matter of fact, I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that the
    testimony before this committee is under oath with people
    appearing. And I realize, I wish the administration also would
    send folks from the Defense Department. But to say that they
    will be here Thursday as opposed to today, at this point in
    time, doesn't violate any sensitivities that I have. I think
    it's more important that things continue on an orderly basis,
    recognizing that Congress bears the ultimate responsibility on
    behalf of the people for the oversight.
        I also think, Mr. Chairman, that we now get an opportunity
    to look at what worked, what didn't. But as you said in your
    opening statement, Mr. Chairman, I think it's incredibly
    important that we understand that there are basic levels of
    service that have to become functioning. I am old enough to
    remember some of the things following the Second World War and
    how long it took, for example, in some of those countries to
    get the electrical system running, to get the water systems
    working, to get the basic public transportation operating. I
    realize that Iraq is about the size of California, but I also
    understand that's where it ends. That the vast, vast majority
    of people in Iraq are clustered into metropolitan centers as
    opposed to cities that run for hundreds of miles, as you have
    in the State of California. The difference between the two is
    really what takes place outside the cities. But for all
    practical purposes, there's still basic telephone service,
    there is still water that has been restored. There is
    electrical services that are up and running. And clearly these
    weren't world class operations before the war started. So I
    think our country has been able to accomplish a lot. We all
    wish it was more.
        And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing so we
    can find out the extent to which humanitarian assistance that
    follows military operations has barriers; where are they. Let's
    hope we can all learn from this and go forward.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. I thank both gentlemen.
        I ask unanimous consent that all members of this
    subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the
    record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that
    purpose. Without objection, so ordered.
        I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
    permitted to include their written statements in the record.
    And, without objection, so ordered.
        We have two panels. Part of that panel will be Lieutenant
    General Jay Garner, retired, Director of Office of
    Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, Department of
    Defense, in a taped testimony. I would just acknowledge to my
    ranking member and colleague, Mr. Janklow, that we did, in
    fact, ask Jay Garner to testify using modern technology. They
    said they would provide a tape, and I didn't pursue it. And the
    part of me that didn't pursue it was not wanting the system to
    break down as we tried to make it work. But also, the
    recognition that he will be available to this committee in the
    future to testify and, in fact, will be testifying to others.
    So I just basically feel this is an introductory hearing to an
    effort that this committee, with ranking member support, will
    be pursuing with some vigor.
        So we will be hearing first from Jay Garner. We will not be
    able to question him, we will not be able to swear him in. We
    will take his testimony as it comes in tape, and I guess we are
    going to lower the lights a bit and listen to that. Then I will
    swear in both our witnesses in our first panel, and then go to
    the second panel.
        So if we can start the tape. Any popcorn?
        [Videotape played.]
        Mr. Shays. We thank General Garner's participation. When I
    was in Iraq, he was very generous with his time, and I think he
    was very generous in his very long statement, but that doesn't
    get around the fact that we aren't able to question him. And
    Congress will be able to, I guess, later this week. Is that
    right?
        [The prepared statement of General Garner follows:]

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        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.025

        Mr. Shays. I'd like to thank Mr. Ruppersberger for being
    here, and Mr. Tierney.
        We have not yet sworn in our first panel, and so if you had
    any opening statements or any comments, I would be happy to
    recognize you.
        Mr. Tierney. Not at this time.
        Mr. Shays. Let me announce that Mr. Richard Greene,
    Principle Deputy Assistant, Bureau of Population, Refugees and
    Migration, Department of State and Mr. William J. Garvelink,
    Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Democracy,
    Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for
    International Development under the auspices of the State
    Department, as well, are here.
        And at this time, gentlemen, if you'd rise, we'll swear you
    in. Then we'll take your testimony.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Shays. Note for the record both our witnesses have
    responded in the affirmative, and Mr. Greene, we'll start with
    you. I think you realize your statement will not be as long as
    the previous one on video, but we're very eager to hear your
    testimony and thank you both for participating.
        Mr. Greene.

      STATEMENTS OF RICHARD L. GREENE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
        SECRETARY FOR POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, U.S.
     DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND WILLIAM J. GARVELINK, SENIOR DEPUTY
         ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND
        HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
                              DEVELOPMENT

        Mr. Greene. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll summarize my
    record statement.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the
    opportunity to discuss humanitarian assistance following
    military operations. Providing effective humanitarian
    assistance is critical in establishing stability in
    postconflict situations----
        Mr. Shays. Move the mic a little closer. Even though we're
    hearing you, just a little closer would help.
        Mr. Greene [continuing]. And is in keeping with America's
    core values. In Iraq, we're dealing with major humanitarian
    challenges every single day. In our context, as emphasized by
    General Garner, is that there were significant infrastructure
    problems preconflict, and that so far General Garner has only
    been there for 3 weeks, it has only been 12 days since
    President Bush declared the end to major combat operations in
    Iraq, and that we're making dogged progress every single day.
        Our approach to Iraq incorporates many lessons from
    previous postconflict assistance efforts, and it includes the
    following elements. First, civil/military cooperation and
    coordination is absolutely essential, from the first stages of
    planning and assessment to the eventual--through delivery of
    assistance to the eventual handover to nationally led
    institutions. We do everything we can to ensure that military
    plans take into account vulnerable noncombatants and the
    humanitarian infrastructure, so that there is minimal damage to
    both.
        For Iraq, the multiagency humanitarian planning team and
    numerous exchanges between senior State and DOD officials
    underscored the importance of incorporating effective
    humanitarian response into our overall Iraq campaign efforts.
    The civil/military exchange continues on a daily basis on a
    whole range of humanitarian assistance issues in both Iraq and
    Afghanistan.
        Second, our approach relies on the expertise of the main
    providers of humanitarian assistance worldwide, which are
    humanitarian agencies and other international and
    nongovernmental organizations. They have the technical
    expertise and experience to assess the needs of refugees and
    internally displaced persons across the sectors of protection,
    food, water, sanitation, health, shelter and education.
        Third, the prompt and effective delivery of humanitarian
    assistance depends upon a permissive security environment where
    adequate security and public safety measures are in place.
    Clearly, the most pressing concern of humanitarian agencies in
    parts of Iraq and Afghanistan is the absence of a permissive
    security environment, again, a point emphasized by General
    Garner.
        Fourth, our approach reflects a clear linkage between the
    establishment of effective coordination mechanisms among the
    humanitarian agencies operating on the ground and how well
    assistance programs actually work. In Afghanistan, for example,
    the Afghans and the international community developed a new
    mechanism for coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction
    assistance efforts. This initiative called the ``Program
    Secretariat'' structure twinned U.N. agencies with counterpart
    Afghan government ministries, and perhaps just as importantly,
    provided an overall framework for NGO's to help plug into.
        Our emphasis on effective coordination mechanisms is also
    why we strongly supported the recent--strongly supported recent
    reentry to Baghdad of the U.N.'s humanitarian coordinator for
    Iraq and other U.N. international staff to join the almost
    4,000 U.N. national staff who remained in Iraq during the
    recent conflict.
        Fifth, our approach aims to leverage the capacity of these
    skilled, experienced, and internationally mandated humanitarian
    assistance organizations by establishing formal civilian/
    military coordination operation centers. We set up one in
    Kuwait, set up one in Jordan and, as General Garner said, about
    to set up one in Baghdad. These centers provide direct access
    between humanitarian planners and military officials on the
    myriad of logistical and security issues involved in
    postconflict relief operations.
        Sixth, our approach emphasizes the importance of early and
    significant funding. We built our funding requirements and
    decisions around the needs of the populations that these
    organizations will assist. In Afghanistan, the 2001 Emergency
    Supplemental Appropriation Act provided the U.S. Government the
    ability to jump-start the efforts of the key international
    humanitarian organizations, thus averting a humanitarian
    disaster.
        In Iraq, the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriation
    Act of 2003 provides $2.4 billion for relief and initial
    reconstruction that will serve a similar purpose.
        Seventh, our approach relies on the assessments and work
    plans done by the international organizations for the
    international community. We also work closely with our NGO
    partners to get their assessment of the needs in an affected
    country as they play an important role in filling critical gaps
    in the programming done by international organizations. Our
    funding decisions are based on needs and activities outlined in
    these work plans, which are closely coordinated among the
    agencies.
        Eighth, also on the critical funding issue, our approach
    emphasizes the importance of international burden sharing.
    Securing fair-share contributions from other international
    donors is a major USG goal.
        So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, each postconflict
    humanitarian relief operation has it own set of unique
    circumstances, but we don't have to reinvent the wheel each
    time. Providing humanitarian assistance in postconflict
    environments is an extraordinarily challenging task, and you
    can just hark back to some of the examples General Garner was
    providing.
        We've worked hard to coordinate planning and implementation
    within the U.S. Government and to forge good working
    relationships with our key U.N. and NGO partners in providing
    humanitarian assistance in complex humanitarian emergencies.
    We'll continue to do everything possible to facilitate the
    great work they do on behalf of the international community.
        Thank you, and I'd be glad to answer your questions.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Greene.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Greene follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Mr. Garvelink.
        Mr. Garvelink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
    committee.
        I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you about
    humanitarian assistance efforts following military operations.
    Although, the specific circumstances our relief teams face
    today in Iraq are unique, we have learned a great deal from
    previous experiences in northern Iraq more than a decade ago,
    as well as in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, Kosovo and, most
    recently, Afghanistan.
        There is a division of responsibility between the State
    Department and my agency, the U.S. Agency for International
    Development [USAID]. In very general terms, State works most
    closely with U.N. agencies, with a special emphasis on refugees
    and the International Committee of the Red Cross. USAID works
    mostly with its Private Voluntary and Non-Governmental
    Organization [PVO-NGO] partners providing general humanitarian
    assistance and responding to the needs of internally displaced
    persons.
        The exception is that USAID is the principal funder of the
    World Food Program, but regardless of the division of
    responsibilities, we share general principles when responding
    to humanitarian emergencies.
        First, early planning is essential. Sometimes we have only
    hours or days to plan if it's a hurricane, or we have weeks in
    the case of Afghanistan, and sometimes we have months, which we
    did in the case of Iraq. The earlier planning begins the
    better, and this--a good example of this was Iraq, where for
    several months teams met in Tampa with the Department of
    Defense Central Command and in Washington. The team included
    all of the U.S. Government agencies that were involved, plus
    NGO's and U.N. agencies.
        Second, we cannot plan in isolation. We must engage
    immediately all the international humanitarian agencies that
    will be involved. We need to rely on the full range of these
    organizations. Each has its own strengths, and all are
    necessary to accomplish the job. United Nations agencies work
    effectively with host governments and national programs, the
    International Committee of the Red Cross is most effective in
    conflict situations, and the NGO's are most effective in
    smaller community situations and community development
    activities.
        Third, the provision of assistance must be driven by needs
    assessments. To use our expertise and our resources
    effectively, we must know precisely what is needed and where it
    is needed. We can't justify sending assistance to these
    countries blindly.
        Finally, United States and one or two other donors cannot
    respond to humanitarian emergencies alone. The international
    community must share the burden.
        When humanitarian assistance follows military operations,
    these principles become even more important. The military plays
    several critical roles in these kinds of relief operations. The
    military becomes an enabler for the humanitarian community. The
    military often provides the initial assistance in unstable
    environments. It does some of the initial assessments, and the
    military facilitates the entry or return of humanitarian
    organizations.
        Consequently, early planning with the military is critical,
    as it allows the military to understand the humanitarian
    architecture that is on the ground. In Afghanistan, for
    example, U.N. agencies and NGO's had a long presence. In the
    center and south of Iraq, there were no NGO's, and the U.N.
    presence was limited to only monitoring activities. And that is
    important to know, as we plan to work together to provide
    humanitarian assistance.
        Coordination and information sharing are essential to
    identifying the most critical needs in the emergency and the
    bottlenecks to providing that assistance.
        In one of the first operations of this sort in Somalia, we
    established a Humanitarian Operations Center to coordinate with
    military forces on the ground, U.S. Government agencies, the
    United Nations, and NGO's. That model has been refined several
    times until it has been used effectively in the Humanitarian
    Operations Center in Kuwait City today.
        Finally, assessments are critical, and for the first time
    in Iraq, the military and civilian agencies are using the same
    assessment tools. We have learned a lot about how to coordinate
    with each other in the past decade, and though we have a ways
    to go, civilian agencies and the military have learned to meet
    the humanitarian needs of civilians in post-conflict settings.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Garvelink follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
        We will go to you first, Mr. Janklow, Governor. And I think
    what we'll do is, we'll do 5 minutes the first pass and maybe
    10 the second.
        Mr. Janklow. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        If I could ask both of you gentlemen, when I look at your
    testimony, you have well-thought-out, laid-out plans in
    advance, criteria, protocols, whatever you'd like to call that
    you follow.
        Let me ask you first, Mr. Greene, what didn't work
    according to your criteria? And I realize the Xs and Os always
    score touchdowns on the wall.
        Mr. Greene. Sir, I think that, again, given the--I'm not--
    given the context--let me put your question into a context, in
    that I think that a lot is working----
        Mr. Janklow. No, no. What didn't work specifically? I think
    a lot is working too.
        Mr. Greene. And I think that a lot of our planning focused
    on dealing with major population displacements. We and many
    others went--the other international organizations projected
    that somewhere between 2.3 and 3 million Iraqis would be
    displaced during conflict, and that we'd have to put systems in
    place, and that a lot of our focus would be getting assistance
    to displaced populations, and we didn't--thankfully we didn't
    have that problem.
        I think what also didn't work was that there was a pretty
    grand underestimation by us as to the degree of looting that
    would take place, and now we're faced with dealing with a lot
    of problems created by looting that I don't think the extent
    was anticipated by anybody in the planning process.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Garvelink, what didn't work?
        Mr. Garvelink. Well, again, I would characterize it a
    little bit more like Rich Greene. I think we didn't anticipate
    some of the things that happened. Again, as Rich said, the
    population movements didn't happen. The intensity of the
    humanitarian crisis has not occurred.
        I think what we did not anticipate to the extent that it is
    out there now, is some of the water and sanitation problems and
    the importance of electricity to maintaining reliable water
    supplies for hospitals and health clinics. I don't think we
    focused on those sorts of things. We were focused on population
    movements and refugees----
        Mr. Janklow. Let me ask you, if I could, and I'll start
    with you, Mr. Greene--or you, Mr. Garvelink, either one of you,
    are the international organizations in place? I realize about
    4,000 U.N. workers stayed there. We keep hearing conflicting
    reports. Is the U.N. there at work, or isn't it?
        Mr. Greene. The U.N. is coming back into Iraq.
        Mr. Janklow. Does that mean they are not at work now, they
    are coming back----
        Mr. Greene. They are at work now, but not at full capacity.
    At the end of this week, there will be about, something like,
    200 international staff, and they're starting to come back in.
    This is where we tie back to security considerations, where
    security considerations are impacting their ability to get out
    in the country and provide assistance efforts.
        Mr. Janklow. Let me, if I can--and I'm trying to be very
    poignant. We'd like to know what are the barriers. I mean, as
    both of you say in your testimony, whether it was Bosnia,
    Kosovo, Afghanistan, every operation, you learn--every crisis,
    every incident, you learn something. What is it that we're
    going to learn from this one, at this point in time? And I
    realize it's not over. We're looking at barriers. What barriers
    are there to overcome, you didn't plan for other than the
    security barrier?
        Mr. Greene. In my view, that is the single-most important
    barrier----
        Mr. Janklow. What is No. 2?
        Mr. Greene. Quickly setting up a civil administration
    structure in Iraq, getting ministries up and running.
        Mr. Janklow. Mr. Garvelink.
        Mr. Garvelink. We seem to be saying a lot of the same
    things, so I'm agreeing with Rich again. I think the security
    obviously is something that we thought would not be the kind of
    problem it has turned out to be.
        Mr. Janklow. No. 2?
        Mr. Garvelink. No. 2, I think is the reestablishment of
    civil administration and rule of law.
        Mr. Janklow. Well, if we bombed several of these
    ministries, which we did--I don't know whether we bombed them
    all, but I know we bombed several of them. If we deliberately
    took out the communication system, what is it that we didn't
    anticipate with respect to setting up civil government? I mean,
    did we honestly think they'd all just show up for work when the
    shooting stopped or quieted down?
        Mr. Greene. I think there were----
        Mr. Janklow. Let me preface it with one more thing.
    According to testimony we heard from--I believe it was the
    general--the police were corrupt, they were ill-trained, they
    weren't very good. The other technocrats were pretty good, so
    what is it that we--and I'm not trying to be critical. OK. What
    I'm trying to do is figure out how can we all learn, what is it
    that we need to learn. So from that perspective, what is it
    about the Civil Service that we didn't anticipate?
        Mr. Greene. I think, with all due respect, sir, we're
    learning lessons while we're on the ground there, and I think
    we found out the difficulty of accurately assessing the quality
    of the civil service, the linkage to the Ba'ath Party by being
    outside of Iraq, and now that we're in and having conversations
    with people on a daily basis, we're in a much better situation
    to assess what's going on and what's needed to happen.
        Mr. Janklow. What about you, Mr. Garvelink?
        Mr. Garvelink. Well, one of the things that we've seen in
    other humanitarian situations of this nature, in post-conflict
    situations, is that the pace with which a conflict ends and the
    pace with which rule of law is restored is usually different.
    And that seems to be a problem that's very hard for the
    international community to deal with. It's easy, and whether
    it's Bosnia or Kosovo, to win a conflict. It's a little more
    difficult to train a police force and put it in place.
        Mr. Janklow. Both of you heard the testimony of the
    general. Which of his 11-point criteria do you think we're not
    going to be able to meet the deadline on, with respect to June
    15 or thereabouts? Because he made it sound like--and I realize
    he may not get all 11, but this was a darn important list from
    the perspective of making sure that things went smoothly, and
    without it, he looked for the opposite to take place in Iraq.
    Which of his list do you think we're going to have trouble
    meeting and why?
        Mr. Greene. I think we're going to be able to accomplish or
    make significant progress on every one of these things. I know
    that a lot of activity is going on now, and I think that all
    these are doable.
        I think a big variable here is getting police trained. It's
    one thing to get police back to work. It's another thing to
    have police back and trained that people trust and respect and
    that could implement----
        Mr. Janklow. That can't happen by June 5----
        Mr. Greene. Getting police back to work, and there are
    significant numbers of police back to work, can happen.
        Mr. Janklow. What about you, Mr. Garvelink?
        Mr. Garvelink. Well, I'm just looking over the list, and
    some of the activities that he has listed here which my agency
    is involved in, I think there's a real chance to, if not
    accomplish them by June 15, to come very close.
        Mr. Janklow. No, sir. I don't mean your agency. I mean all
    of them.
        Mr. Garvelink. I know. I can't speak to a number of these,
    because I have not been involved with them.
        If you talk about the public distribution system, I think
    they will be up and running. We've made a lot of progress
    working with the world food----
        Mr. Janklow. A fuel crisis?
        Mr. Garvelink. Pardon?
        Mr. Janklow. Are we going to be able to avoid a fuel
    crisis?
        Mr. Garvelink. Again, that's not one I'm very familiar
    with.
        Mr. Janklow. Are you, Mr. Greene?
        Mr. Greene. I think that already we've brought in emergency
    deliveries of LPG gas, which runs a lot of the cooking stoves
    throughout Iraq, and so we're figuring out how to, again,
    respond to the emergency. Will it be a normal distribution
    pattern, no, but will we be able to respond in an emergency, I
    think the answer is yes.
        Mr. Janklow. Were the town councils democratically elected
    in the past?
        Mr. Greene. I don't know, sir.
        Mr. Janklow. Do you, sir?
        Mr. Garvelink. No. I'm not sure.
        Mr. Janklow. How are we going to set up elected democratic
    councils? What agency is this? Who will be doing that?
        Mr. Garvelink. For the Agency for International
    Development, we have our responsibilities for Iraq divided in
    two basic categories. One is the bureau I work for, which does
    humanitarian assistance, and another bureau does
    reconstruction. And the way we've divided up responsibilities,
    democracy and governance, these sorts of activities are in the
    other bureaus.
        Mr. Janklow. And they are not here today?
        Mr. Garvelink. Correct, and so I have a hard time
    addressing the issue.
        Mr. Janklow. We don't know how they're electing them, do
    we?
        Mr. Garvelink. No.
        Mr. Janklow. Sir?
        Mr. Greene. No. I do not know that, sir.
        Mr. Janklow. One other question. With return to the buying
    of the crops, I assume you have got--I mean, they were able to
    continue farming during all of this, and what you're saying is
    to the extent you can buy the crops, you cool off the farmers,
    and you get the food on the shortest travel distance.
        Mr. Garvelink. Well, yeah, it's all of those. What's
    happened over the past few years and under the Oil for Food
    Program and the sanctions in Iraq is that the local production
    was not allowed to be purchased, and in the northern part of
    the country, they have a fairly large wheat crop. I think
    they're expecting in the neighborhood of 600,000 tons this
    year. We're hoping to buy the surplus from the farmers and then
    feed it into the distribution system, but there's been no
    incentive for the past few years for farmers to grow anything,
    because they can't legally sell their crops.
        Mr. Janklow. Thank you. My time is expired.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Ruppersberger, please.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, first, there are a lot of issues
    that we have to deal with here today. In the time that I have,
    I would like to address the planning that we had, really, prior
    to the war. There were some statements made by certain people
    in the military that we should have done a little more
    planning, but what I would really like to get to, at this
    point, I think right now, whenever you're going to stabilize a
    country, you need to have order, and I assume that, based on
    your testimony today, that the order needs to be clearly taken
    care of. And at this point we're having problems.
        From information that I've received, is that one of the
    biggest issues that the coalition forces are having problems
    with is that there are a lot of civilians that have guns, and
    there are a lot more guns than was anticipated. Is that your
    understanding, or do you have any knowledge to that effect?
        Mr. Greene. That is a significant problem, and I think,
    sir, in order to get a more detailed response on what the
    response locally will be to that question, we're going to have
    to talk to representatives of the Defense Department.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Right, which are not here, but I think
    that the whole issue, as we're trying to study and get
    information today, is how do we best deal with that. You have
    to deal with the basics, and as a result of that, the lack of
    security that exists at this point really is preventing the
    humanitarian efforts to go forward. Correct? Is that your
    understanding?
        Mr. Greene. The----
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Either one.
        Mr. Greene [continuing]. Humanitarian efforts are going
    forward, and the issue is can they go forward more effectively?
    And the answer is clearly, yes, in a more secure environment.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. And what we're trying to establish is
    how we can, in our role, develop a plan to help the military.
    You know, you go in as the military to invade. Then you change
    your roles, and these roles are a lot different, and what we
    really would like to know is how, from your opinion, that we
    can effectuate something to help or to give resources or
    whatever is needed with respect to establishing security, so
    that we can get to the next level.
        Mr. Garvelink. Well, clearly, security is an issue, and as
    you say, it's very difficult to provide humanitarian assistance
    or to expand the humanitarian assistance that is being provided
    without a secure environment, without the protection of silos
    where wheat and other commodities are stored, and, you know,
    clearly, that is a concern for us. I'm sure it's a concern for
    our NGO colleagues, but it's a problem for the military, and
    that's an issue that, you know, I wouldn't presume to answer on
    their behalf. It's a big concern, and it complicates the
    humanitarian picture, but not being----
        Mr. Ruppersberger. From your perspective, you know, what do
    you feel that we need? You've been involved in other countries.
    What do you feel that we need?
        Now, this is a different situation. Each situation was
    different to move forward.
        Mr. Garvelink. Well, I guess from experience in other
    situations like this, we need the rule of law established as
    soon as possible. That's a police force. It's not really the
    military that does that, and so the introduction and
    establishment of a police force would be very important.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. And the reasons we talked--I raised the
    issue about the guns, I mean, how to effectuate that, and
    there's why we do have military police, and they're becoming
    very active, and there are ways to do it.
        Let me get on to something that maybe you might know a
    little bit more about and answer the questions. We talk about
    the costs of what we need to do. We talk about after we have
    order and establish some type of government, that the citizens
    of Iraq need to develop a quality of life, and that's,
    hopefully, what we can do through jobs, through dealing with
    humanitarian concerns. But that costs a lot of money, and the
    unique situation about Iraq is that there is a lot of oil if
    it's taken care of in the right way, if it's marketed the right
    way. And I praise President Bush and the military for taking
    control of the oil fields and making sure that they were
    secure, and I believe they are secure.
        Is there in effect now--and I guess this is through--really
    a State Department question--negotiations with other countries
    and working with people within Iraq to develop that source of
    oil that will help to bring money into the citizens of Iraq?
        Mr. Greene. Sir, clearly the anticipation is that the oil
    industry will get going and that oil revenues will be utilized
    by the Iraqi people to reconstruct and redevelop their country.
    Clearly, there is the anticipation that will play the major
    role.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. I'm not talking of anticipation. Is
    there, right now, ongoing communications? Is there, right now,
    an effort, a strong effort to----
        Mr. Greene. There is a strong effort going on, sir.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. And where are we going, or is it too
    confidential to talk about it in this hearing?
        Mr. Greene. I'd rather not--I don't think it's
    confidential, but I don't believe I should be the one to talk
    about it. All I can tell you is that a major emphasis is on
    that going on there----
        Mr. Ruppersberger. From my point of view in this hearing, I
    want to make sure that unless there's a reason that we
    shouldn't, I want to do what's best for our country first. To
    help the situation, which would be best for our country and the
    world, we need to be, in my opinion, aggressive. If we're being
    aggressive that's fine, but I want to raise the issue of what
    we're doing in order to do two things, to work with other
    countries in establishing what we need to do with respect to
    the oil, which will give the resources to help that country.
    But second, there are a lot of countries that are out there and
    should be allies of ours, that are we or are we not working
    with them, including France and Germany and those countries
    that gave us a hard time prior to the war?
        Mr. Greene. We're doing everything possible to get the oil
    flowing in Iraq again, A, and, B, we have mounted a major
    effort with countries around the world to solicit major
    contributions to the Iraq relief and reconstruction effort. The
    feedback from every country is that people are willing to come
    up with big bucks to contribute toward this effort.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Are they also going to come up with the
    resources and also the people power, so to speak, to do the
    things that are necessary once we get this security there? Are
    they willing to move to that level so the burden isn't
    completely on the United States and Great Britain?
        Mr. Greene. There have been offers from in-kind
    contributions of people and equipment from countries around the
    world, and we're having ongoing discussions with many
    countries----
        Mr. Ruppersberger. How about France?
        Mr. Greene. There has been discussions with France on
    contributions to--on a number of areas.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. That's all, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
        I would love make sure that you have a list of the 11 items
    that General Garner gave. Were they given to you? I'm going to
    ask you to look through that list and tell me what you would
    think needs to be part of that in the first--mid to late June
    to establish a positive slope. He said 11 critical tasks to
    complete by mid to late June to establish a positive slope
    toward success in Iraq.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9546.037

        Mr. Shays. So if you would please, look at that and see if
    there is anything that you would add to it. Is there anything
    that you catch right off that you would add?
        Mr. Greene. It looks pretty comprehensive to me, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Is there anything?
        Mr. Garvelink. The only other thing, and it----
        Mr. Shays. I'm going to ask you to put your mic a little
    closer, even though I hear you, both of you.
        Mr. Garvelink [continuing]. Is the restoration of the
    electrical grid.
        Mr. Shays. OK. The restoration of the electrical grid. OK.
        If you think about anything that you had to add to it
    before the hearing ends, I'd love for you to add. So
    periodically, maybe if you would take a second look.
        There's a general acceptance that on a scale of 1 to 10,
    the war effort was an 11, that it was pretty stunning, and I
    think there's a feeling that people will look back and say,
    this was a moment in time in which there was some classic
    changes in battle. it will be studied. But I think most people
    would agree that the failure to rebuild Iraq, the failure to
    get it on a positive slope in which people are back to work,
    kids are back to school, the economy is starting to percolate
    after 20 years of being somewhat dormant, that there's a
    government established that recognizes majority rule but
    appreciates minority rights. I think it's very easy for people
    who aren't used to democracy to get the idea of majority rule.
    I'm not sure it's easy for them to accept the concept of
    minority rights.
        But that, I think, has got to be the key issue, and I don't
    think there's any option for failure. And so you both are
    involved in something that I think is huge, and I would say to
    you, as someone who voted to go into Iraq with great
    conviction, that if in the end we fail to rebuild this country,
    that the critics of my vote will in some ways be right.
        Would you tell me a logical reason why you would not want
    Members of Congress to be in Iraq, to understand the problem,
    to talk with people, to size up the problem and to be able to--
    as leaders of a country, be able to do our job of knowing how
    to provide resources and so on. Is there a logical reason that
    you can see why Members of Congress shouldn't be in Iraq?
        Mr. Greene. There's not a logical reason, except if there
    were security considerations.
        Mr. Shays. Are you free to go to Iraq?
        Mr. Greene. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. Is the press free to go to Iraq?
        Mr. Greene. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. Do you think Members of Congress should get
    their positions based on what they see in the press, or should
    we try to get it firsthand? If it's possible?
        Mr. Greene. In Iraq and every place else in the world, we
    welcome Members of Congress visiting.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Garvelink.
        Mr. Garvelink. I would agree. I think the only constraint
    would be the security situation, and there--I think while we're
    free to go to Iraq, if you're going for extended periods of
    time, there are certain kinds of training we're still required
    to get before we go, and I think everybody is. But I agree with
    Mr. Greene, everybody would welcome your presence as Members of
    Congress in Iraq to see what's going on and understand the
    programs that are underway there.
        Mr. Shays. The 8 hours I spent in Iraq were the most
    vibrant 8 hours I've spent in a long time, and everything I saw
    was not necessarily a surprise, but there were heightened
    degrees of, I didn't realize this was here or not. So it wasn't
    like everything was new, but everything I saw had an impact on
    me. I was struck by the poverty. I was struck by, in this one
    town, the lack of roads. I was struck by the housing
    conditions. I was struck by the failure of having running
    water. I was struck by the fact that the gas station I went to
    had nothing there, nothing. It was just like a skeleton, and it
    made me appreciate how immense the task was.
        I was struck by the fact that when I went there and the
    Save the Children were negotiating when they would bring in the
    fuel for the heat, that they were having to debate with the gas
    station attendant that there would be security, because there
    was a concern that as soon as the supply of this fuel came, it
    would just be taken by a mob of people.
        I might be able to see that on TV, but somehow hearing
    someone talk about it.
        Now, let me ask you, should I be surprised that neither of
    you knew what form of elective government exists in the local
    level?
        Mr. Greene. I don't know, Mr. Chairman. My focus has been
    on the relief efforts. I mean, I could have hazarded a guess
    that, of course, there wouldn't have been any democratic
    government elected locally.
        Mr. Shays. No. I wouldn't want you to hazard a guess, and
    there are going to be things you don't know. And that's not my
    point. I'm just asking if I should be surprised.
        Mr. Greene. No. I think it points to the--at least for my
    part, the lack of information about what was going on inside of
    Iraq.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Garvelink.
        Mr. Garvelink. Yeah. I guess I would agree. For the past 4,
    5, or 6 months, I don't know quite how long it's been that
    we've been working on these issues, I think a lot of folks have
    been working on a lot of different humanitarian issues, and you
    focus on what you're doing. And I think Jay Garner gave a
    fairly good indication the task was a big one. One of the
    things we're doing at USAID is trying to get 487,000 tons of
    food to people every month. That requires something in the
    order of 10,000 trucks a month. One really has to focus one's
    attention to make that work. So this was not one of the areas
    I've been focused on.
        Mr. Shays. Fair enough. Abdul Hassan Mohammed when I was in
    Umm Qasr said to me--after he had pointed out some other
    concerns, he looked me in the eye, and he said, you don't know
    us, and we don't know you.
        I know what it said to me. What does that say to you? He
    was talking about Americans and Iraqis. We don't know you and
    you don't know us, what does that say?
        Mr. Greene. I just think it points to the--sort of the
    years of images we've built up about each other through various
    discussions in the press and in the media. It points to a lack
    of direct contact between Iraqi and Americans on issues that
    are of importance to how people carry out their daily lives,
    and it points to how we have to resume that as quickly as
    possible.
        Mr. Shays. Would you just elaborate on that last point,
    because it shows what they didn't know, and now you're stating
    an action, and what do you think that action has to be?
        Mr. Greene. The action means that we have to get out and
    get into the country as quickly as possible and factor in what
    Iraqis want for their country and to understand what the
    problems are, to understand what they've been going through, to
    understand how they see solutions emerging. There has to be a
    huge Iraqi involvement in everything that we do, and the only
    way you get that involvement is to get out and get into the
    country and talk to people.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Garvelink.
        Mr. Garvelink. Yes. I would agree completely. The way--from
    your own explanation, when you're in the country and see
    things, it's very different. There are perceptions that both
    nations or both peoples have of each other that may be
    accurate. A lot of it is also inaccurate. Until we work
    together, you know, and start to understand each other's
    culture, we're never going to resolve some of the problems that
    are between us. You can't do that unless you work hand in hand.
        Mr. Shays. When I was in the Peace Corps in the south
    Pacific in the Fiji Islands, when you went from one village to
    another, if it was on one of the smaller islands, you couldn't
    go to the other village through one village without stopping
    in, and if there were three villages along the way, you had to
    stop in every village. You had to interact, you had to sit, you
    had to talk. You had to just go through these so-called
    niceties and kind of get to know each other.
        The next time you could walk through all three villages to
    get to that final destination, and so I felt the same way that
    you're basically stating, that in order for us to succeed,
    we're going to have to get to know them, and they're going to
    have to get to know us, besides our just trying to do good
    things for them.
        And I'm curious as to how you think that happens.
        Mr. Greene. I think that goes hand in hand with the--sort
    of the theme that we've had here in General Garner and part of
    your questions, is improving the security situation, so we can
    get out and have greater freedom of movement. So when we do
    have this freedom of movement, it's not in bullet-proof vests
    and heavy armored accompaniment, that we hold normal regular
    conversations with the regular Iraqi citizens. I mean, it's
    clearly what General Garner wants to get to as quickly as
    possible, and it's clearly what our entire team wants to get to
    as quickly as possible.
        Mr. Shays. I would tell you this is someone who has
    observed General Garner. He is an easy guy to talk with. He's
    very unassuming, and I would think that the Iraqi people, if
    they get to interact with him, would find him a very good man
    to work with. That's just kind of my--not my hope, but it's--I
    guess it's my hope as well.
        I'd like another 10 minutes, but we're going to go to you,
    Mr. Janklow, and then we'll go to you, Mr. Ruppersberger.
        Mr. Janklow. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to be brief.
        The question was asked earlier about safety in the
    communities. As I recall, prior to the war, the government of
    Iraq passed out weapons to the general public, tens of
    thousands of rifles. Is that accurate as far as either one of
    you know?
        And I'm also under the impression from--at least from news
    reports I saw prior to the war, that they sent the prisoners
    home.
        Mr. Greene. I've read probably the same reports you have
    about that, sir.
        Mr. Janklow. To what extent do either of you think on one
    of our secret weapons in this whole--we don't know us and you
    don't know us thing are the men and women of our Armed Forces--
    I mean, there's a helicopter pilot from my home State we were
    just notified was killed rescuing a young Iraqi girl that had
    been injured by a land mine. I'm not aware that Saddam
    Hussein's military was known for those kinds of acts. I'm not
    sure that their military were known for treating individuals
    that were sick as opposed to just injured. I'm not aware that
    their military was known--at least even our media, some of whom
    don't like the effort, weren't known for writing stories about
    how their military went in and mingled amongst the people, fed
    them, transported them, assisted them. I'm just wondering to
    what extent you're planning on that being a secret weapon, if I
    can call it, in a getting to know each other routine.
        Mr. Greene. The men and women of our Armed Forces have been
    incredible Ambassadors for what we stand for as a country, and
    the more they get out, the more they get in situations where
    people can see what they're about and to see what our intents
    are, the better off we are and the more progress we'll make on
    this overall situation. I mean, they've been fantastic in every
    aspect of this operation.
        Mr. Janklow. Let me ask you, if I can, we've seen the
    looting, but to my understanding, it hasn't involved private
    property. It's involved governmental buildings of one sort or
    another. Is that relatively accurate or not?
        Mr. Greene. There's been reports--I mean, I've seen plenty
    of reports of looting of private property as well as----
        Mr. Janklow. Of individual's homes?
        Mr. Greene. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Janklow. I'm talking about the general citizenry as
    opposed to the people that own lots of palaces and things like
    that.
        Mr. Greene. Most of the reports that I've seen of general
    looting have been probably people with a lot of wealth.
        Mr. Janklow. Do you agree with that, Mr. Garvelink?
        Mr. Garvelink. Yeah. I've probably seen the same thing he
    has, and the great majority of the looting that has gone on has
    been of government buildings.
        Mr. Janklow. Both of you indicated that it was somewhat of
    a surprise the level of the looting that we've all seen and
    heard about. What I'm wondering is why, if I can ask that
    question general? This is a country where $20 in wages is a
    significant--is an at least an increase over what people were
    getting. It's a country where individuals didn't have, for all
    practical purposes from the testimony today, a water system
    that worked, a sewer system that worked, an electrical system
    that worked, schools where they didn't have books for the
    students, why wouldn't we think that where there's largesse out
    there, people under these circumstances wouldn't go after it as
    soon as they could, especially given the fact that they have
    lived for decades under these kinds of circumstances. What I'm
    wondering is why is this a surprise?
        Mr. Greene. I think that the fact that there was looting
    was not a surprise. I think that the extent of the looting was
    a surprise to the extent that water treatment plants had been
    looted, hospitals stripped bare, things like that.
        Mr. Garvelink. Yeah. I guess I was quite surprised by the
    extent of it. Having spent a lot of time in Somalia and Rwanda
    and other places at the time when we were providing
    humanitarian assistance, there was a lot of looting that went
    on, but I've never seen anything on the scale of this.
        Mr. Janklow. But in none of those countries do I think the
    government was overthrown by us when they were there. Here the
    government was gone, and we were the new people in town.
        Mr. Garvelink. Well, that's true. I'm thinking of terms
    where there was just general--well, in both--in Somalia there
    was no government, and the looting that went on just never
    reached this magnitude. I'm not sure that--I don't know why it
    would happen.
        Mr. Janklow. Look, I'm not going to take all my time. I
    just want to say it's been 3 weeks since the general shooting
    has stopped. As late as a few days ago, we still had members of
    our Armed Forces being killed. There have been phenomenal
    accomplishments made. I was sworn in on January 7, and Congress
    didn't even come back until the end of the month. That was 3
    weeks, and you got a lot more done in that 3 weeks than I did
    my first 3 weeks around here. So I think you've done an awful
    lot, and I think we've done an awful lot since January.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Ruppersberger.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. We're talking about security, and I want
    to get into just a couple comments that were made. Let me say
    this before I get into these comments. It's very easy to
    criticize after the fact. The purpose of maybe the criticism
    would be to point out what we can learn, so that we can make
    sure that we can do it better the next time.
        After the President gave his speech about the mission
    accomplished, some media accounts and reports from
    nongovernmental and some governmental agencies is that we
    really did not sufficiently plan for or implement security
    measures in Iraq to the extent they should have been, except
    maybe for the oil fields.
        And as a result of that, we do have a lack of humanitarian
    assistance, and the pace still has not been where we need to be
    because of security, and we do have to have security first. We
    can't put people's lives on the line, whether it's our military
    or the civilians or whatever.
        And also I think just to quote a couple, it was an issue
    that I'm sure the administration wasn't happy about, but the
    Army's Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, testified before
    the Senate Armed Services Committee and several hundred
    thousand soldiers--over 200,000 soldiers would have been
    necessary to maintain the security after we--the war was over.
    He also was involved in the stabilization of Bosnia. Did you
    work with him at all?
        Mr. Garvelink. No.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Also we have retired Major General
    William Nash who commanded the first Army peacekeeping
    operations in the Balkans in 1995, and then he also said that
    there needed to be at least 200,000 U.S. and Allied Forces to
    stabilize Iraq.
        Now, Secretary Wolfowitz countered Shinseki saying that he
    disagreed. And since the war was over, the Pentagon has
    reportedly reduced the number of troops from 250,000 to
    135,000. Do you have any knowledge of that?
        Mr. Garvelink. No, sir.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Now, if you did have, assuming that is a
    reduction, would you have an opinion whether or not that is
    appropriate at this time, based on the fact that there are
    security problems that exist which really affect the
    humanitarian assistance we can start giving the citizens and
    stabilizing the country? Would you feel that there needs to be
    more Armed Forces there?
        Mr. Greene. Sir, I'm not going to comment on any force
    deployment decisions by the Department of Defense, and I'm only
    going to highlight that every person associated with this
    operation at every level knows that restoring security is the
    highest priority and, sir, that currently there is no
    humanitarian crisis in Iraq. There are clearly pockets of need.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Did I say crisis? I didn't mean to say
    crisis. I take that back. Humanitarian problem that exists.
        My point is that, if in fact it is necessary--there's a
    difference of opinion. That's always the way it is. It's just
    we want to try and get it right.
        Now, let me go to some specifics as far as what we're doing
    with respect to the humanitarian issues, and first ask you, did
    we learn anything from what was going on and what is still
    going on in Afghanistan that might help us in dealing with the
    issues that are going on from a humanitarian point of view that
    might help us with respect to Iraq? Or are they two different
    countries and it's tough to compare?
        Mr. Garvelink. I think, first of all, the situations are
    quite different and it's tough to compare the two. I think one
    of the lessons that we're seeing is that it's important to get
    to rural areas and to work in the rural communities and to
    emphasize assistance there. We're trying to do that in both
    locations, and it made very clear that's an important thing to
    do in Iraq.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me ask this question. I think a lot
    that we have to look at--and I'm sure you have some expertise
    in the field. But what is our process of determining the types
    and amounts of humanitarian assistance needed for this
    postconflict? I mean, we have to have a plan. What is the
    process that we're looking at with respect to Iraq? I mean, are
    we focusing on--we have the list that was given to us, but
    there are also some other issues. I think you have different
    religious conflicts. You might have certain areas of the
    country that need to be targeted, where others might not. I
    mean, what process maybe that we've used in the past do you
    think is effective where we need to move forward?
        Mr. Greene. There is an extensive interagency planning
    process that has gone on for months in Iraq. General Garner
    talked about the entire Orhau operation. Ambassador Bremer has
    just gone out to Iraq to take over his position. We get
    extensive information and assessments of needs by international
    organizations and NGO's. We rely heavily on those assessments.
    There's just a wealth of information that we tap into and use
    to decide strategies.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. From a medical point of view, do you
    feel that, at this point, we are getting the resources both
    with respect to physicians and nurses--the physician assistance
    or the drugs that are needed to help those people that are in
    need? Where are we with respect to the medical option or the
    medical area of this humanitarian issue?
        Mr. Garvelink. I think we're doing quite well, but what
    we've done prior to the conflict is preposition medical
    supplies and equipment in the region. We had what they call
    World Health Organization [WHO] kits that could provide a
    basic--it provides basic medicine and equipment for 10,000
    people for 3 months.
        We had enough of those kits to have that kind of medical
    care for a million people in place when the conflict started.
    So WHO kits were moved into Iraq with military civil affairs
    units as soon as possible to health units and health clinics.
        When our teams actually could get into the country, they
    looked at clinics and at hospitals and looked at what more
    extensive repairs could be carried out. I think we're meeting a
    lot of the needs in the health sector that we can reach at this
    point in time, and as I mentioned earlier, one of the issues
    that is a concern is electricity, because you have to have a
    constant source of power for the hospitals, and that is
    improving, but that has been a concern.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Do we have American doctors that are
    going over to Iraq and either volunteering their services or
    going over with fellowship or other programs? I know we did
    that in the Gulf war. I was on a board of the University of
    Maryland Shock Trauma System where we had physicians that were
    going. Do we have that program in place?
        Mr. Garvelink. On our USAID teams that we have, meaning the
    USAID teams, we have four or five physicians in Iraq right now
    or in Kuwait, and I think that your NGO panel that is coming
    later will probably be able to talk specifically about American
    doctors going back and forth.
        We have them on our USAID team, but the NGO's will be
    better placed to answer that question.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Unfortunately, I have to leave at 4
    p.m., so I'm raising the issue now.
        That's all. Thanks.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman for participating.
        I'd like to just go through another round of questions here
    as well.
        I'd like to know how long we have been preparing for the
    rebuilding of Iraq. When did humanitarian assistance planning
    for Iraq begin? Mr. Garvelink, do you want to start?
        Mr. Garvelink. I'm trying to think of the exact month. I
    got into it a little bit later, I think in October.
        Mr. Greene. My participation in the effort started in late
    August, I think.
        Mr. Shays. Full time?
        Mr. Greene. Not full time but a lot of time, a lot of
    meetings.
        Mr. Shays. OK. I know you are both very dedicated public
    servants, and I know you work far more than 40 hours a week,
    but I really would like to get a sense of when this became your
    primary focus and responsibility.
        Mr. Greene. Became my primary focus probably with the first
    meeting in late August.
        Mr. Shays. OK. That's good. What did that process entail? I
    mean, did it entail a lot of meetings? Did it entail a lot of
    contacts with people? How does one start to begin to--did it
    involve contacting a lot of NGO's and saying, you all better
    get started here, we may be going in?
        Mr. Greene. It involved participating with Mr. Garvelink
    and many others on an interagency planning team, talking about
    various scenarios, trying to link up with possible military
    options. Obviously, no decision had been made about the use of
    force then or for many months afterwards. It also involved
    reaching out to international organizations, trying to get an
    assessment of their plans and their requirements and trying to
    match up our planning with their planning.
        Mr. Shays. Well, we all work for one country.
        Did you want to say something, Mr. Garvelink?
        Mr. Garvelink. Well, I was going to say, we've spent a lot
    of time together in the past 7 or 8 months in meetings. The
    other element to this is trying to determine budget
    requirements.
        Mr. Shays. But the----
        Mr. Garvelink. We've both made a few trips to the region to
    talk to countries there. So it's been----
        Mr. Shays. So the argument that somehow this plan to help
    rebuild Iraq was put together without a lot of thought or care
    is simply not true.
        Mr. Greene. I agree with that, sir.
        Mr. Garvelink. Correct. A lot of thought and work has gone
    into the planning.
        Mr. Shays. Did the war end a little sooner--I mean, most of
    the combat--sooner than you expected? Was there this thing, my
    God, we've got to be ready a little sooner than we anticipated?
    Was this a factor in this process?
        Mr. Greene. I don't think so. We focused I think, as I said
    to an earlier question, on a lot of--a lot of our focus earlier
    on was getting ready for large population displacements, and
    then----
        Mr. Shays. That never happened.
        Mr. Greene. That never happened. But to get ready for that,
    we talked about prepositioning assets around the region and
    doing what was necessary to be able to quickly move people
    quickly into the region.
        Mr. Shays. So there was some preparation for something you
    never had to deal with, and that was a relief. Then there was
    some surprise that some of the facilities became vulnerable and
    actually were a tempting target for looting, which was a
    surprise that you didn't anticipate in August--and I'm not sure
    I would have either--that you then had to do a little getting
    caught up to speed?
        Mr. Greene. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. OK, you are both from the State Department. I
    get a little confused. USAID doesn't like to say they're from
    State Department, so----
        Mr. Garvelink. I think technically we are separate from the
    State Department.
        Mr. Shays. I knew you would say that.
        Mr. Garvelink. I have to say that or I can't go back to
    work.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Well, we'll say you're separate from, but
    you have to come under their budget; and if Secretary Powell
    tells you to jump, you jump. But other than that, you are
    separate.
        Mr. Garvelink. Right.
        Mr. Shays. OK. But I'm not quite sure whether I'm to view
    State Department as under the direction of DOD as things stand
    now. In other words, technically Mr. Bremer was with State,
    Ambassador with State, but his chain of command is through
    Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to the White House. So are you
    technically working with the Department of Defense or do you
    view yourselves as working not under the Department of Defense?
    I just----
        Mr. Greene. Clearly, the State Department is not working
    for the Department of Defense. Ambassador Bremer, as you point
    out, is reporting to Secretary Rumsfeld; and we are working
    very closely with the whole effort. We all at ORHA--we are all
    trying to make it work, sir.
        Mr. Shays. OK.
        Mr. Garvelink. Our view of how this all operates is through
    a Country Team approach. When an ambassador is in his country
    or her country, all U.S. agencies are represented there, and
    the overall authority in the country is the U.S. Ambassador.
    And that's the way we viewed this. General Garner, Ambassador
    Bremer, is the overall authority there. We are all working
    under the general guidance of that individual.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Bremer? You are working under the guidance
    of Mr. Bremer?
        Mr. Garvelink. I'm not sure where it stands at the moment,
    with the shift. But it would be under the senior U.S. official
    in the country.
        Mr. Shays. Wouldn't you agree by your answer that there is
    a little bit of uncertainty as to how this works, both of you?
        Mr. Greene. I'm----
        Mr. Shays. These questions are not to put you on the spot.
    It's to understand--you both are doing a great job, and I know
    that from many people who have spoken to me and knowing of your
    coming to testify. But the bottom line is, should I just view
    this as kind of a fluid situation a bit?
        I mean, what I get nervous about is, in my office, if three
    people have control, nobody has control. In the end, I say, if
    something goes right or wrong, it rests with--and I pick
    somebody, because I need to have one person ultimately know.
        So you both--you report to your superior at USAID, and you
    ultimately report to the Secretary of State. Correct?
        Mr. Greene. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. But you are working under the auspices of ORHA
    and under the Department of Defense, and is that just kind of
    the way I'm to view it?
        Mr. Greene. No, sir.
        Mr. Shays. OK.
        Mr. Greene. We are working with ORHA in a collaborative
    effort. The people that are on the ground in Iraq are working
    under ORHA report to--will now report to Ambassador Bremer who
    reports to the Secretary of Defense. But here, back here at
    headquarters, we are working collaboratively with the
    Department of Defense on these issues.
        Mr. Garvelink. Because the perspective I was offering was
    from the field. Rich is right from back here.
        Mr. Shays. Fair enough. What criteria does USAID use to
    gauge the capacity and success of humanitarian assistance
    organizations and their suitability as partners? That's your
    responsibility pretty much, Mr. Garvelink?
        Mr. Garvelink. Yeah.
        Mr. Shays. You work with the NGO's. And let me just
    editorially say, for me, the big heros in this process are the
    NGO's. I mean, for me to see them kind of getting ready--they
    are in Jordan. They are in Cyprus. They are in Kuwait. They do
    this all the time, that they go to many places around the world
    where life is a danger. They are pros, they are experienced
    people, and you make them--it seems to me you help them with
    the extraordinary resources you provide them. But they are
    absolutely--you are absolutely dependent on them, I gather, in
    order to accomplish the tasks that USAID needs to accomplish.
    Is that correct?
        Mr. Garvelink. Correct. We have a very close working
    relationship with the NGO community, and we are an agency that
    provides support to them. Our job is to facilitate their work.
    We do not implement our humanitarian programs. We rely
    primarily on the NGO's to do that.
        Mr. Shays. And that's a policy over the last 10 years.
    That's a shift in policy over the last 10 to 15 years?
        Mr. Garvelink. I think for USAID that's always been their
    approach to providing humanitarian assistance, is through the
    NGO's.
        Mr. Shays. My sense was that we squeezed down the number of
    people in USAID, and that you became more and more dependent on
    NGO's to accomplish the operational task. But that's not true?
        Mr. Garvelink. Well, I'm looking at it from the
    humanitarian side of USAID. We've always been kind of small,
    and we have always been reliant on the NGO's.
        Mr. Shays. Fair enough. So, getting to my question: What
    criteria do you use to gauge the capacity and success of
    humanitarian assistance organizations?
        Mr. Garvelink. Well, the organizations that we work with we
    know and have worked with for a long time; and so we know their
    capacity for management back in their headquarters. We travel
    frequently to the field and look at their programs, talk to
    them, plan their programs.
        One of the issues that's just a very fundamental one is the
    accounting structure that's a requirement to handle U.S.
    Government funds. So all of these NGO's certainly have that
    capacity, and in our working with these--and as I have over the
    years you get to know the strengths and weaknesses of each
    organization.
        Mr. Shays. Because you've worked with them in so many parts
    of the world?
        Mr. Garvelink. All over the world and for the past 25
    years.
        Mr. Shays. I mean, is it conceivable that five NGO's are
    going to compete for the same grant, or do you have so many
    grants right now there is not this kind of competition? Are you
    running out of NGO's to do the work, or are NGO's running out
    of money to get from you?
        Mr. Garvelink. Neither.
        Mr. Shays. OK.
        Mr. Garvelink. There is resources to go around to fund the
    NGO's. And I think the way we have divided up--if you are
    speaking specifically of Iraq, we have six cooperative
    agreements with major NGO's to work in certain parts of the
    country and provide a whole range of assistance; and under the
    circumstances right now, that seems about right.
        Mr. Shays. Would you explain to me--the NGO's will tell me
    why neutrality is extraordinarily important. Would you both--
    Mr. Greene, you get involved with the NGO's as well.
        Mr. Greene. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. Would you both explain to me in your words while
    you believe neutrality is important.
        Mr. Garvelink. I think impartiality is important. I'm not
    so sure that I would put neutrality in that same category. And
    I think Iraq may be a good case. We are not neutral in Iraq. We
    are----
        Mr. Shays. The issue is, are these NGO's to be an
    instrument of the U.S. Government, or are they an instrument of
    their own organization to do good works using the resources of
    the U.S. Government? They would argue that they can't go into a
    place as an instrument of the U.S. Government.
        Mr. Garvelink. I would accept that.
        Mr. Shays. That's how I meant the word neutrality.
        Mr. Garvelink. OK. We do not view the NGO's as an
    instrument of the U.S. Government. We view them as a partner in
    providing humanitarian assistance, and they have expertise in
    skills and characteristics that the U.S. Government does not
    have. We are not there for that long period of time. We are not
    on the ground. We don't know the people like they do. NGOs have
    to maintain a certain independence from us, and that makes
    sense to us.
        Mr. Shays. And that makes sense.
        Mr. Greene.
        Mr. Greene. I would agree with that, sir.
        I would also add that there are many cases--in most cases
    there's a confluence of objectives between what NGO's want to
    have happen and what we as a U.S. Government also want to have
    happen in terms of responding to the humanitarian distress.
        Mr. Shays. You know, I think you both have extraordinary
    opportunities. I think you're--if I could say it this way, I
    think you are doing the Lord's work. And one of the things that
    moved me deeply when I got to go into Iraq was I looked at
    these NGO's as we were having a meeting in the base, the
    British base at the port; and I was thinking these folks devote
    80 hours plus a week. They are not--their remuneration isn't
    what it might be in some other business. But they are doing
    extraordinarily good things with the resources, in many cases,
    of the U.S. Government; and they do it with a lot of courage,
    frankly.
        When we went in, there was the argument that there needed
    to be someone guarding me; and Save the Children's folks said,
    we are not going in under any protection, military protection.
    The explanation was because they have to go in as a neutral
    force; and I thought, they do this all around the world, and I
    just pray that we use them well.
        Just one last area. I would like to know if you believe
    that we should be--excuse me. This is a policy issue, so I
    don't want to put you on the spot this way.
        How do you react to the argument that the U.N. has--first,
    let me ask you this. How did you react to the fact that the
    U.N. seemed reluctant to end the embargo?
        Mr. Greene. I don't accept the premise that the U.N. was
    reluctant to enter Iraq. U.N.--I know that the U.N. relief
    agencies were doing everything possible to get into Iraq and
    are now in Iraq and gathering storm and gathering momentum.
        Mr. Shays. And these are very skilled people. Correct?
        Mr. Greene. Yes, sir; and they also provide the overall
    coordination structure that the NGO's will plug into. Their
    presence and coordination is essential to this process.
        Mr. Shays. That's very important to put on the record. In
    other words, we need their network or their system in order for
    the NGO's to be successful.
        Mr. Greene. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. Do you agree with that, Mr. Garvelink?
        Mr. Garvelink. Yeah. I think the various organizations that
    we work with all have particular skills and strengths, and the
    U.N. is very important as the overall umbrella to humanitarian
    operations. Its presence is critical for dealing with host
    governments and setting the stage for what the rest of us do.
    No one else can play that role, and we can't operate without
    them.
        Mr. Shays. I had this feeling, if I didn't have the job I
    have right now, I would love the job that both of you have. And
    you might say I'm crazy because I maybe don't understand what
    keeps you up at night. But I would think that you are doing
    very important work. The success of our Nation's endeavor
    depends in large measure on what you do with the people that
    you work with; and the impact in the region and ultimately on
    the world, to me, rests with your good work. So, not to put a
    burden on you, I hope to God you succeed with flying colors.
        Do you have anything you want to put on the record before
    we go to our next panel?
        Mr. Greene. No, sir. Only that we greatly appreciate your
    support.
        Mr. Shays. Well, you have it.
        Mr. Garvelink. Yes. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you both very much. I appreciate it a lot.
        Our final panelists are Mr. Curtis Welling, president and
    CEO of AmeriCares; Mr. George C. Biddle, senior vice president,
    International Rescue Committee; Mr. Rudy Von Bernuth, vice
    president and managing director, Children in Emergencies and
    Crisis, Save the Children; Mr. Kevin M. Henry, director, Policy
    and Advocacy, CARE.
        And for nothing but honesty in government, I would like to
    disclose that two of these witnesses--and with some pride--
    disclose that two of these witnesses or organizations,
    AmeriCares and Save the Children, are based in the Fourth
    Congressional District of Connecticut.
        I would ask unanimous consent to insert the following
    documents into the record: a letter from Dean R. Hirsch,
    president, World Vision, stating they will not be able to
    testify; and written testimony from Mr. Bill Frelick, Refugee
    Program, Amnesty International. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. I'm going to ask all of our four witnesses to
    stand. Gentlemen, I'm sorry to keep you waiting so long, but
    it's great to have you here.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Shays. Note for the record all four of our witnesses
    have responded in the affirmative.
        We will go in the order that you are sitting and do really
    appreciate your being here. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Welling.

    STATEMENTS OF CURTIS R. WELLING, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AMERICARES;
     GEORGE C. BIDDLE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE
       COMMITTEE; RUDY VON BERNUTH, VICE PRESIDENT AND MANAGING
        DIRECTOR, CHILDREN IN EMERGENCIES AND CRISIS, SAVE THE
     CHILDREN; AND KEVIN M. HENRY, DIRECTOR, POLICY AND ADVOCACY,
                                  CARE

        Mr. Welling. Thank you, Congressman----
        Mr. Shays. You need to move that mic up and turn it on.
        Mr. Welling. Is that better?
        Mr. Shays. That's wonderful.
        Mr. Welling. Thank you, Congressman Shays. It's a pleasure
    and honor to be here to discuss our experience in providing
    emergency medical assistance in the context of the war in Iraq.
        AmeriCares is a privately funded disaster relief and
    humanitarian aid organization. For 20 years we have been
    providing rapid humanitarian response to disasters worldwide in
    the form of medicines, medical equipment, and other shelter and
    relief supplies. Over that time, we have worked in 137
    countries and we have been involved in virtually all
    significant disasters for two decades, including earthquakes,
    floods, hurricanes, as well as man-made disasters in places
    like Rwanda, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.
        To date, we have delivered more than $3 billion worth of
    humanitarian assistance, and we stay after the disaster is
    completed. Last year, we provided ongoing humanitarian medical
    assistance in over 50 countries around the world.
        Our model stresses speed, careful needs assessment, the
    identification of strong local partners, leveraging cash
    donations with in-kind contributions to maximize volume and
    impact of assistance. Our donors responded immediately and
    enthusiastically to the crisis in Iraq. To date, we have raised
    $700,000 in cash and over $10 million in in-kind contributions
    from a broad range of America's pharmaceutical and medical
    companies.
        Despite the logical difficulties and impediments that one
    is confronted with in this situation, I'm happy to report that
    the model has worked in Iraq. As a result, on April 23, we were
    able to move 20 tons of critical medical supplies over land
    through Turkey into Erbil and Kirkuk. We are told that's the
    first distribution of emergency medical assistance of any
    consequence in that part of Iraq.
        More recently, just this past Sunday, on May 11, an Ilyshin
    76, a plane not of our manufacture, with 40 tons of medicines
    and other critical supplies landed in Baghdad. We believe that
    was the first NGO flight of emergency medical supplies.
        Mr. Shays. Did you fly in that plane?
        Mr. Welling. I didn't, although I expect to go in one soon.
        Mr. Shays. OK.
        Mr. Welling. And those medical supplies are being
    distributed as we speak pursuant to an assessment that had been
    going on on the ground by AmeriCares' personnel for the
    preceding week.
        We are planning another airlift of equal size, about 40
    tons, for the 22nd of this month; and, Congressman, I am here
    to tell you, pursuant to the question that you asked earlier,
    if you would like to go with us, we would be happy to have you
    accompany us on that trip on the 22nd.
        Despite these missions, we all believe that this is just
    the beginning. We expect to be working in Iraq for a
    considerable time; and despite the fact that these are early
    days, we have learned much from our experience.
        One of the unique things about this situation is that we
    had time and a great deal of information, and that's not the
    norm in a disaster context, as you know. So there was time to
    plan and organize. There was time to consider the very
    substantial amount of information that had been produced by the
    NGO's and the multi-lateral organizations on the ground. We
    knew the war would cause significant incremental deterioration;
    we knew it would require massive effort; and, very importantly,
    we knew that America would be judged in part by how well we met
    the challenge. And, reflecting that, the President made a
    pledge on behalf of the American people to provide immediate
    humanitarian assistance.
        Notwithstanding all of these things--the time to plan, the
    information, the understanding of what was at stake and, I have
    to say, notwithstanding the good-faith efforts of hundreds if
    not thousands of people in and out of government--our
    experience has caused us to conclude that there are things that
    we could have done better.
        The first thing that we learned was not to trust or be
    complacent about our assumptions but to question and plan for
    contingencies. The government and the nongovernmental
    worldwidely anticipated a refugee and displacement crisis
    perhaps of historic magnitude. In the event, happily, that
    crisis never materialized. However, substantial redeployment
    and retooling of the plan was required as a result of that
    planning assumption. The lesson is that contingency planning
    and flexibility are critical, given the extraordinary
    complexity of the situation.
        But of all the lessons that we learned--and our learning
    continues--two stand out to us as particularly important.
        First, we think it's critically important to designate and
    empower a central point of authority at the highest level. I
    want to say that again, because we believe it's so important.
    We believe it's critically important to designate and empower a
    central point of authority at the highest level.
        What I mean by this is an authority which is clearly in
    charge, an authority which can speak with clear, unambiguous,
    and authoritative voice, which can cut decisively across
    departmental and organizational lines to direct, facilitate,
    communicate and control and to ensure that efforts are planned
    and not duplicated or frustrated because of turf, confusion, or
    red tape.
        Clearly, this was not done. Many organizations were created
    with lots of acronyms, but, in our view, if there was ever a
    need for a government czar empowered at the highest level to
    oversee planning and execution of a critical government
    priority, this was such a time.
        In our own case, the absence of an authority to cut through
    some of this red tape was particularly dramatic. The fact that
    it took us 24 days to receive OFAC and U.N. 661 approval, which
    approvals had clearly been rendered moot by the stunning
    military success of our Armed Forces, while at the time we
    waited on the Iraqi border with 65,000 pounds of critical
    medicines and supplies was both frustrating and deeply
    troubling.
        The second key lesson we take from this crisis is that
    planning and preparedness are crucial, and we've heard much
    about planning and preparedness in the discussion so far today.
    Simply put, it's our view that the resources committed to
    planning and preparation for the humanitarian response were not
    well coordinated, were not transparent, and didn't match the
    magnitude of the challenge nor the importance of success.
        Consider, if you will, as a counterpoint the experience of
    the journalist community and the resources committed to
    facilitate an unprecedented level of access and media coverage.
    Giving credit where it's due, the Department of Defense did a
    remarkable job in anticipating and finding creative ways to
    plan for and manage the process, down to the reporters' boot
    camp. The same level of preparation, planning, and transparency
    could have been employed with respect to post-conflict security
    and humanitarian assistance. Such a thoughtful commitment would
    have facilitated better coordination, earlier access for
    evaluation and analysis purposes, clearly would have
    facilitated a speedy transition from military to civilian
    control.
        While I'm not sure if humanitarian boot camp is the
    appropriate characterization, the same rationale is valid:
    Creative planning, transparency, and preparation under the
    direction of a central point of control are critical elements
    for success.
        To those who argue that the situation is too complicated, I
    respectfully disagree. The greater the complexity of the crisis
    and in the resource coordination, the geometrically greater the
    need for thoughtful planning, modeling and one person to be
    held accountable.
        Finally, let me conclude my remarks with a word about
    safety and security. Much has been made and reported about the
    reluctance of nongovernmental organizations to work under the
    direction or protection of a military force; and, as you have
    observed, different organizations will accept different
    boundaries in this context. This is a valid and important
    issue, and it's important for this body to recognize it as
    such.
        The reluctance of NGO's to work under the control of a
    military power is appropriate. One of the first principles of
    humanitarian assistance is neutrality and independence. It's
    the cornerstone of our reason for being and a source of much of
    our credibility.
        In order to maximize the effectiveness of the humanitarian
    response, this principle must be acknowledged and respected.
    It's as simple as that. No one doubts the need to have military
    in control of all the activities during the period of active
    hostilities. Further, it's clear that for a period of time
    thereafter, the period in which we now find ourselves, all
    parties are acting under the security umbrella provided by the
    Coalition forces as an occupying force. This is correct. It's
    also the Coalition's responsibility.
        I'm pleased to tell you that in our own activities in Iraq
    so far we have received superb coordination from the military
    units we have dealt with in Iraq, both in Kirkuk and in
    Baghdad. Simply put, however, it does not seem at the policy
    level that a high enough priority was given to providing
    security arrangements to facilitate access of humanitarian aid
    organizations for evaluation and assessment purposes.
    Obviously, this is an important consideration in an environment
    where speed, days and weeks, desperately matter. Our future
    response in future contexts will be compromised to the extent
    that these principles are not well understood or accepted.
        Once again, we thank you for the opportunity to share these
    views with the committee today, and we look forward to your
    questions.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you so much, Mr. Welling.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Welling follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Mr. Biddle.
        Mr. Biddle. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
    thank you for the opportunity to speak about Humanitarian
    Assistance Following Military Operations: Overcoming Barriers.
        I have submitted my statement for the record and will take
    this opportunity to highlight the critical actions that should
    be taken to overcome barriers and best ensure that humanitarian
    activities in Iraq and Afghanistan will be carried out
    successfully and effectively. They include: No. 1, protecting
    civilian populations and establishing a secure environment; No.
    2, obtaining the greatest level of international legitimacy and
    support by defining a clear role for the United Nations; and,
    No. 3, separating military and humanitarian efforts.
        Delaying or not carrying out these actions can have
    profound consequences for the successful delivery of
    humanitarian assistance after military operations.
        Protecting civilians and establishing a secure environment.
    If you ask the United Nations and the humanitarian and human
    rights nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan what the
    greatest obstacle is to Afghanistan's rehabilitation, they all
    give the same answer, lack of security. The U.N. Security
    Council supported establishment of the international security
    assistance force in Afghanistan following the war. To date, the
    5,000-member force has deployed in and around Kabul but not to
    the other regions of Afghanistan. The need to enhance security
    because of the multitude of threats is critical to the ability
    of aid organizations and the U.N. as well as the government of
    Afghanistan to deliver assistance to communities in need.
        I recommend that you read the May 6 report to the U.N.
    Security Council from Lakhdar Brahimi, the Secretary General's
    Special Representative in Afghanistan, which gives an
    unvarnished view of this acute problem.
        There are a number of efforts under way to address the
    security crisis in Afghanistan, including demobilization of
    combatants, decommissioning of weapons, the creation of an
    inter-ethnic Afghan international army, and the establishment
    of a national civilian police force.
        Beyond strengthening these efforts, the real issue at hand
    is the critical need to extend the international security
    assistance force beyond Kabul, to assist the government, the
    international community and local and international NGO's to
    meet the real needs of Afghan citizens.
        NATO is due to take the lead in ISAF this summer, and we
    hope that NATO's involvement will be more robust and more
    effective in disarming the warlords, securing the borders and
    creating an environment for the central government to develop
    and govern beyond Kabul. NATO can aid the national army in
    securing the countryside and protecting the Afghan people. A
    firm NATO mandate in Afghanistan is critical to that country's
    future, especially in advance of national elections in 2004.
        The threats to security in Afghanistan and Iraq are eerily
    similar. They include insecurity in the aftermath of war,
    desire for revenge and retribution, ethnic and sectarian
    divisions, displaced populations, factional competition, and
    interference by neighboring countries.
        There are currently over 200,000 U.S. forces deployed for
    Iraq. At present, they are unable to maintain effective law and
    order, and there is no administration of justice. Under the
    Geneva conventions, the Coalition is legally responsible as the
    occupying power to protect civilians, including restoring law
    and order, basic due process, and judicial guarantees. The
    upsurge in violence and crime in Baghdad, the looting of
    hospitals, and the recent violence in Falujah all speak to the
    urgency of this critical issue.
        The Iraqi people are not accustomed to this level of chaos
    and crime. They are becoming increasingly scared and angry and
    are beginning to lose confidence in the coalition's ability to
    do what it said it would do: restore electricity, water, and
    sanitation services, rehabilitate hospitals and clinics and
    meet the critical needs of the populace.
        The Coalition must comply with international humanitarian
    law and do more to protect Iraqis from the looting, lawlessness
    and frontier justice developing in the center and southern
    regions of Iraq. Civilians are asking Coalition forces for more
    security and protection measures. Shadow security networks are
    now emerging. Tribes, villages, ethnic groups, mosques,
    communities are banding together or around leaders to man armed
    neighborhood watches and administer on-the-spot justice. This
    will only develop and spread in the absence of legitimate
    security authorities and make the work of humanitarian actors
    more difficult.
        If the Coalition doesn't get a grip on the situation
    quickly, they will find themselves in a dire situation.
    Temperatures are reaching close to 100 degrees Farenheit in
    parts of the country, and outbreaks of waterborne disease, like
    cholera, which recently appeared in Basra, will likely become
    more widespread. It is urgent that the security environment be
    addressed immediately so that the Coalition doesn't ``lose the
    peace.''
        Obtaining the greatest level of international legitimacy
    and support by defining a clear role for the U.N.
        Since the fall of the Taliban, the U.N. has been an
    integral leader in providing humanitarian assistance as well as
    developing a transitional administration in Afghanistan. At the
    Bonn Conference to decide the transitional administration and
    loya jirga process in Afghanistan, the U.N. effectively
    facilitated the overall post-conflict effort to ensure peace
    and improve the welfare of Afghans.
        Once the Afghan interim administration took office, the
    U.N. assistance mission in Afghanistan, known by its acronym
    UNAMA, was established in Kabul to support and provide
    technical assistance to the interim administration in meeting
    humanitarian and protection needs. Another critical role the
    U.N. has played is to rally the donor community to meet
    Afghanistan's needs.
        In Iraq, the Coalition continues to go it alone and has
    just indicated its support for a clear U.N. role. The
    International Rescue Community, together with other NGO's, has
    called on President Bush to turn to the U.N. to lead
    humanitarian efforts in Iraq. The World Food Program and UNICEF
    have worked in Iraq for the last decade, and the U.N. has
    managed the Oil for Food Program, the largest single relief
    effort in the world, for the past 12 years. U.N. involvement
    will help to coordinate agencies, international donors, and
    local and international NGO's and will encourage burden sharing
    by the international community in meeting the needs of the
    Iraqi populace. A U.N. role will also ensure the independence
    and impartiality of humanitarian assistance in a way that no
    occupying power can. This will enhance the trust of national
    and international actors, which is critical to a successful
    humanitarian effort.
        A clearly defined and leading U.N. role in the relief and
    reconstruction of Iraq is also necessary for the development of
    civil society.
        In many towns and cities, Iraqis are beginning to form city
    councils and reinvigorate civic organizations. To date, it has
    been the Coalition forces, specifically the Civil Military
    Operations Centers, that have encouraged and at times even co-
    located with fledgling city councils as they begin to address
    key issues such as water, sanitation, power, education, and
    health services. Yet for all the good intentions and even early
    progress, the city councils' military association may have a
    divisive and discrediting long-term effect in the eyes of many
    Iraqi citizens wary of occupation.
        According to an IRC senior staff member just back from 6
    weeks in the region, a sustained military role in the
    development of Iraqi society to the exclusion of the United
    Nations may well be self-defeating. In An Nasiriyah, for
    example, some key community groups such as a women's volunteer
    association composed of education and health professionals are
    intentionally staying away from relief and reconstruction
    efforts perceived to be military led.
        This is a critical time for Iraq and its nascent civil
    society. It is imperative that structures be put in place that
    encourage maximum civilian participation. A clear and robust
    role for the U.N. can help bring Iraqis together to develop the
    practices and institutions necessary to ensure a free and
    democratic society.
        Last, just a few points on the separation of military and
    humanitarian efforts.
        The blurring of the lines between military and humanitarian
    operations is of the utmost concern to the humanitarian
    community. It is important to understand the humanitarian
    community's perspective on the reasons why U.N. authority and
    civilian oversight of humanitarian activities are so important,
    and in my remarks I will echo what my colleague has just said.
        First, the military should do what it does best--fight wars
    and provide security--and humanitarian organizations should do
    what we do best--care for civilians and deliver assistance to
    those in need.
        Second, humanitarian assistance must be provided on an
    impartial basis to ensure that all civilians in need--
    regardless of race, creed, nationality, or political belief--
    have fair and equal access to aid. The U.N. is clearly more
    independent and more impartial than any one party to a conflict
    and therefore should coordinate and direct relief efforts.
        Although the Pentagon's Office for Reconstruction and
    Humanitarian Assistance is currently heading the humanitarian
    response in Iraq, the IRC and other humanitarian organizations
    have been assured that our efforts and implementing
    partnerships remain with USAID and the State Department. This
    distinction, while critical to the provision of aid in this
    circumstance, is a dangerous precedent and one that calls into
    question the motivations as to why, how, and where humanitarian
    assistance is provided. This is shared by other NGO's and many
    in the international donor community and will likely become a
    greater concern of local Iraqi communities over time.
        For NGO's such as the IRC to work effectively in a post-
    conflict setting, we must establish a close and trusting
    relationship with the communities we serve. To do so, we must
    be seen and known to be impartial and independent of any
    military force.
        Last, confusing military and humanitarian activities
    carries great security risks for those delivering assistance.
    Our safety often depends on local perceptions. Aid workers are
    obviously not armed, cannot defend themselves, and must never
    be mistaken for members of the military. Their lives depend on
    it.
        The humanitarian agencies respect and appreciate the
    critical role the military plays in establishing security after
    conflict, and we are grateful for it. But because of our
    commitment to impartiality and independence and the critical
    need to develop a trusting relationship with he communities we
    serve, we cannot accept military supervision. This is a
    challenge we are facing in Iraq. As a result, we have had to
    add conditional language to our grant agreements with USAID to
    ensure traditional civilian reporting structures.
        If this trend continues, the space for humanitarian
    agencies will shrink and fewer will be involved in responding
    to crises such as exist in Iran and Afghanistan. Donors from
    other countries will likely refuse to coordinate and cooperate
    and the result will mean fewer people in need will receive the
    services they so desperately require.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you very, Mr. Biddle.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Biddle follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Mr. Von Bernuth.
        Mr. Von Bernuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you
    again for providing Save the Children the opportunity to
    testify before your committee. I want to thank especially you,
    Congressman Shays, for your leadership and support of Save the
    Children's work in Connecticut and around the United States and
    in more than 40 countries around the world. Your recent visit,
    which you have referenced several times, to our programs in
    Iraq and West Bank and Gaza and your subsequent support for the
    Women and Children in Armed Conflict Protection Act are greatly
    appreciated by myself and all of my colleagues.
        Save the Children has been active in the Middle East for
    more than 30 years. We are committed to addressing the ongoing
    needs of children and their families in Afghanistan and Iraq as
    well as those in need around the world.
        My comments today will focus on three points regarding the
    role of nongovernmental organizations in post-conflict
    settings: the lessons we have learned from Afghanistan, the
    barriers that we are encountering in Iraq, and finally the
    solutions that we recommend for overcoming these barriers in
    Iraq and in future conflict situations. And I will try to
    lightly edit my remarks to eliminate too many repetitions of
    what George has recently said.
        In 1985, Save the Children established its Pakistan-
    Afghanistan Field Office to respond to the needs of an
    estimated 3.5 million Afghan refugees then living in Pakistan.
    We expanded our work to Afghanistan in 1989. We opened our
    first offices in 1993 inside of Afghanistan, and we have been
    working there ever since, throughout the Taliban period and
    afterwards.
        In the year following September 11, Save the Children
    delivered approximately $25 million in relief and
    reconstruction assistance in that country.
        In Afghanistan, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan
    Relief [ACBAR], of which Save the Children serves with CARE,
    IRC, and other major NGO's, has articulated the following two
    key points about the role of NGO's working in Afghanistan: the
    importance of a secure environment for reconstruction, the
    necessity of long-term funding commitments for Afghanistan.
        Indeed, these two key issues and the failure to address
    them currently compromise the prospects for an Afghan recovery.
    Let me address each of them.
        The importance of a secure environment for reconstruction.
    Security and protection are vital to the work that we do and to
    the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Because of
    the international desire to support the notion of a successful
    interim government, the fragility of the political and security
    situations today tend to be underplayed by our government and
    in representations to the international media. Let me assure
    you that anyone who has staff on the ground in Afghanistan
    today knows that there is no question but that security is
    tenuous and is getting worse.
        In Kabul, the biggest risks today are terrorist acts and
    armed robbery; and George has already talked a bit about the
    role of ISAF and the need to expand that role to provide a
    secure working environment throughout the country.
        Anecdotally, I would just mention that outside of Kabul in
    the north, where Save the Children conducts programs, the
    tensions between the political parties seem to be on the
    increase; and where politics fail, security also fails.
        For example--and this is just one of a number of incidents
    over the last year which have affected our staff. On April 8,
    following the appointment of a new civilian Governor, tensions
    between Jamiat and Jumbush troops came to a head, resulting in
    2 days of heavy fighting and 3 days of sporadic fighting. A
    Save the Children international staff member based in the town
    of Maimana was evacuated along with others in a convoy of U.N.
    and NGO staff on April 9. As of April 17h, an unexploded rocket
    propelled grenade was still lodged in the wall of the house of
    one of our national staff members who was waiting for de-miners
    to remove it, a reminder of the continuing risk posed by the
    conflict.
        So, the bottom line, we need the U.S. Government to support
    efforts to ensure security and to recognize that this requires
    an external presence in order to succeed.
        Point two, the necessity of long-term funding commitments
    for Afghanistan. We have learned from our experience in
    Afghanistan that the only way to ensure development success is
    by ensuring long-term funding that provides the bridge from
    emergency humanitarian assistance to sustainable community-
    based development programs. And yet we are woefully behind
    meeting the funding levels agreed to in the Afghan Freedom
    Support Act, and we are seeing an increasingly dangerous
    situation for NGO's working in Afghanistan.
        From the start, the money pledged to Afghanistan did not
    compare well to other host conflict situations, for instance,
    the countries in the Balkans. Even more serious, those
    commitments have not been fulfilled as donor aid has fallen far
    short of the Tokyo pledges.
        Among my colleagues in the field, we are seeing a general
    sense of progressive disengagement by our government toward the
    Afghan people. Having seen U.S. interests and commitments to
    Afghanistan wax and wane several times over the last decade,
    Save the Children calls on the U.S. Government to make
    commitments on a multi-year basis. The United States and other
    countries need to keep faith with Afghanistan and stay the
    course with substantive and sustained support if we hope to
    achieve a sustainable peace.
        Working in Iraq. Save the Children currently has 26
    expatriate staff, most of them now in Iraq. Congressman Shays,
    when you were there, many of them were still in Kuwait. We have
    received a $10 million award from the Office of Foreign
    Disaster Assistance, part of AID, and have also allocated over
    $100,000 in private funds to support our agency's work in Iraq.
        Initially, Save the Children has provided assistance in Umm
    Qasr, cooking gas distributions to hospitals and clinics in Az
    Zubayr, and preschool education kits distributed in Safwan. On
    an ongoing basis now, we have established a main program office
    in Basra last week, and we now have a dozen expatriate staff
    based there.
        We have done initial assessments in Karbala and An Najaf,
    and we will begin setting up programs and offices in both of
    those gubernots next week. I have more detailed information in
    my written testimony on our programs there.
        Roadblocks and solutions to providing humanitarian
    assistance in Iraq. The primary obstacle to providing
    humanitarian assistance right now, as everybody else has said,
    is security--or insecurity. The lack of security has created an
    anarchic situation where citizens cannot access basic services
    such as education and health care.
        Our team in Baghdad says that parents are not letting their
    children attend schools because roving criminal gangs are
    kidnapping children from local neighborhoods. Consequently,
    schools are operating at 30 percent of normal capacity. People
    are also not visiting health clinics or returning to work
    because of the lack of order.
        Many ministry employees are still unable to go back to
    work, and ministries are closed. Employees often are stopped by
    U.S. military at the doors of the ministries because the
    military can't distinguish who are employees and who are
    looters.
        Further, as has been mentioned by everybody, including
    General Garner, government salaries must resume so that people
    can get back to work. These employees and the systems they run
    will ultimately be responsible for feeding, educating, and
    vaccinating the Iraqi people.
        Point two. The U.S. military must move quickly to establish
    a functioning police force that can restore order. Until basic
    order is restored, life-saving humanitarian assistance cannot
    be delivered with the speed and the quantity that is now
    needed. Many of our European allies have experienced police
    trainers who are skilled in providing policing and training
    local police forces at the same time. Kosovo provides a good
    example of this sort of policing support provided by NATO
    members.
        I think it's also important that the Department of Defense
    understands the very delicate cultural and political issues at
    play and the way in which our military performs in communities
    throughout Iraq. I have just heard an alarming report from one
    of my colleagues who yesterday met with senior Shiite clerics
    in Kerbala where he heard tremendous anger and concern about
    the way U.S. tanks had rolled up next to some of the holiest
    Shiite shrine and their fear that this could spontaneously
    erupt into some sort of a bloodbath.
        We need experienced leadership that knows how to deal with
    these sensitive cultural and political issues. The U.S.
    military has done a great job of winning the war, a job they
    have trained for. Now is the time to let people trained and
    experienced in rebuilding societies do the job that we have
    been trained to do.
        In Iraq, even before the outbreak of the war in March,
    women and children were facing very severe risks and unmet
    protection needs. These risks have now risen. Protection from
    sexual violence and physical harm is one of the six critical
    protection needs measured in our recent State of the World
    Mothers Report. According to yesterday's Washington Post, the
    dark accounts of kidnapping, rape, and sexual abuse of women
    and children are only likely to increase.
        Our Iraq team is also seeing many children harmed by
    unexploded ordinance. The clearing of exploded ordinances must
    be stepped up, and education of children on avoiding them also
    has to be stepped up.
        We are concerned that neither in the initial office of
    foreign disaster assistance awards that some of us at this
    table received nor the more recent requests for application
    from AID for community rehabilitation has women and child
    protection been listed as a prioritized project activity. U.S.
    Government and NGO's must prioritize the protection needs of
    women and children in the onset of our humanitarian response.
        Finally, Save the Children supports an expanded role for
    the United Nations for post-conflict reconstruction.
        Again, to summarize four key recommended solutions: The
    United States must move quickly to establish a functioning
    police force that can restore order, and we probably need
    European expertise to accomplish this.
        The differentiation between the roles of humanitarian
    workers and the military must be made clear.
        The U.S. Government and NGO's must prioritize the
    protection needs of women and children at the onset of our
    humanitarian response.
        And the role of the United Nations in post-conflict
    reconstruction must be expanded.
        Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before
    this committee; and I am happy to answer any questions.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Von Bernuth follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Mr. Henry, and then we will get to the
    questions.
        Mr. Henry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee. Thank you for inviting CARE to participate in
    today's hearings. CARE International has been working
    continuously in central and southern Iraq since the 1991 Gulf
    war.
        As the last panelist, I have the challenge of saying
    something that hasn't already been said, and I'm not sure that
    I can do that. I'm pleased to say that what I will have to say
    coincides largely with what my colleagues had to say, despite
    the fact that we had no opportunity to coordinate our
    testimony.
        I will focus my testimony on the efforts of CARE and other
    humanitarian organizations to deliver assistance in Iraq today,
    the context in which we are operating, and our recommendations
    for priority action by the U.S. Government. I will also, like
    my colleagues, highlight critical lessons that need to be
    learned from our experience in Afghanistan.
        The central reality in Iraq today is that a vacuum has
    developed in a country that was for decades completely
    dominated by institutions that now no longer exist--the Iraqi
    Government led by Saddam Hussein, the Ba'ath party, and the
    Iraqi security and intelligence services. A swift military
    victory must now be followed by an equally effective response
    in filling this vacuum. Failing to do so could prove tragic for
    the Iraqi people and very damaging for the international
    credibility of the U.S. Government.
        What is required of the U.S. Government is obvious and
    straightforward: restore order, reestablish the central public
    services, and set in motion a process that will allow the Iraqi
    people to rebuild their country and establish a legitimate
    government.
        I say straightforward. And while it's straightforward, the
    magnitude of the challenges that we face in doing all that is
    required in Iraq is enormous, and we should not underestimate
    those challenges.
        So the question is, what are the priorities? General Garner
    in his testimony today did David Letterman one better and came
    up with 11 on his top list of things that need to be done in
    Iraq. We are a little bit more realistic, perhaps, or a little
    less ambitious, and we would focus on four priorities.
        The first I think we all absolutely agree--it was No. 1 on
    General Garner's list, all my colleagues have raised it--it is
    that immediate action must be taken to restore law and order.
        While the Iraqi people have no desire to return to the
    police state that was Iraq under Saddam Hussein, they are
    urgently calling for a restoration of security. Many Iraqis are
    still afraid to venture outside their homes, especially at
    night, and most parents are still unwilling to send their
    children back to school fearing for their safety.
        The lack of security is already having a very detrimental
    effect on the ability of CARE and other humanitarian
    organizations to do our work. Just since the end of the
    conflict, CARE's warehouse in Baghdad has been looted. Just
    this past weekend, two of our cars have been hijacked. Over the
    last few days, we have had to send international staff that we
    just recently deployed into Baghdad back to Amman for their own
    safety. So that's a measure of our sense of the security
    problems in Baghdad.
        You know, as one of my colleagues in Baghdad said today,
    what does it say about the situation when criminals can roam
    freely around Baghdad and humanitarian aid workers cannot?
    Unless law and order can be reestablished promptly, there is a
    risk of rapid downward spiral in the humanitarian situation in
    Iraq, and civilian relief agencies will be in no position to
    respond. Establishing security throughout Iraq must be priority
    No. 1 of the U.S. Government, and the assets required to
    accomplish this objective should be deployed immediately.
        The other three priorities on our list--and I will go
    through these very quickly because they have been touched on
    and actually they figure near the top of General Garner's list
    as well.
        First is the restoration of electricity, water supply, and
    waste treatment. These services are essential, not just because
    of their tangible benefits and impact on the health system but
    also for the positive signal they would send to the Iraqi
    people that life is returning to normal.
        Second--and here I would take issue with the testimony of
    our colleague from USAID--we fear that the health system in
    Iraq is in danger of complete collapse unless urgent action is
    taken. We all saw the footage of hospitals being looted. Anyone
    who has visited the hospitals in Iraq today know that they are
    struggling to cope with a very difficult situation. So we think
    urgent action needs to be taken to prevent a complete collapse
    of that system.
        Finally, we were pleased to hear General Garner report on
    progress being made in making emergency payments to civil
    servants. We think that's very important. We think that should
    be expanded immediately. It's important to remember that, in
    Iraq prior to the war, the Iraqi Government was by far the
    largest employer. So getting civil servants--getting money back
    in the pockets of civil servants not only allows them to do
    their important jobs and support their family, it helps get the
    Iraqi economy going again.
        Like my colleagues, I also believe that it's extremely
    important that we learn lessons from our recent experience in
    Afghanistan; and I fear for the most part that these lessons
    are not yet being very well learned. I would highlight briefly
    four lessons that I think are most critical.
        First is, following regime change, priority must be given
    to establish a nationwide law and order as a basis for economic
    reconstruction and political transformation. Regime change by
    definition creates a security vacuum. If it is not filled by
    international peacekeepers and new national security forces, it
    will be filled by less savory forces, including criminals,
    warlords, terrorists, and drug traffickers.
        One and a half years after the end of the war in
    Afghanistan to unseat the Taliban and defeat al Qaeda, a large
    portion of the country remains insecure. Despite repeated
    calls, the U.S. Government and the rest of the international
    community have failed to expand international peacekeepers
    beyond Kabul. Current U.S. Government strategy in Afghanistan,
    which includes the deployment of small provincial
    reconstruction teams and the very slow training of a new
    national army are simply, in our judgment, inadequate to the
    task; and we urge Congress to ensure that similar policy
    mistakes are not made in Iraq.
        Second, post-conflict reconstruction is a long and costly
    undertaking, requiring sustained commitment from the U.S.
    Government and the rest of the international community. There,
    I would only say that, although the U.S. Government has been
    very slow in the case of Afghanistan to get off the mark, there
    has been progress recently. Congress did--despite President
    Bush's failure to make a specific request for funding for
    Afghanistan in this year's budget, Congress has appropriated
    money and Congress has appropriated additional resources in the
    Iraq supplemental; and we congratulate you for doing that. The
    Iraq supplemental also already has $2\1/2\ billion in relief
    and reconstruction funding for Iraq. We view that as a good
    down payment on what will be a large-scale, multi-year effort.
        Third, establishing an international framework for managing
    post-conflict situations like Afghanistan and Iraq is in the
    best interest of those countries as well as the American
    taxpayers. The people of Iraq and the eventual new Government
    of Iraq will need all the help they can get--financial aid,
    technical assistance, trade and investment and debt relief--in
    rebuilding their country economically and politically. Creating
    a framework that enjoys the widest possible international
    support is, thus, vital. Like my colleagues, I believe that
    necessitates a major role for the United Nations.
        Finally, the last lesson for us in Afghanistan--and it's
    been alluded to not only by members of this panel but by
    Congressman Shays as well--is the issue of civilian leadership;
    and we urge transitioning as quickly as possible to full
    civilian leadership and control of relief and reconstruction in
    Iraq because we believe that will encourage the widest possible
    participation of U.S. and international humanitarian
    organizations in those efforts.
        The military's expertise is in the security area, and that
    should be their focus in Iraq. By contrast, most experience in
    relief and reconstruction resides in the civilian branches of
    the U.S. Government, the United Nations, and humanitarian NGO's
    like those testifying here today.
        Also, as we have learned the hard way in Afghanistan, it is
    vital that the military respect the need for humanitarian
    organizations to be seen as impartial and independent and that
    they do nothing to blur the distinction between military and
    humanitarian action. Organizations like CARE work in many very
    dangerous situations. The safety of our staff largely depend on
    their reputation in local communities as unbiased providers of
    humanitarian assistance, and I was reassured to hear the dialog
    between Congressman Shays and Mr. Garvelink on that point
    reaffirming the importance of impartiality.
        In conclusion, I would say this week's news from Baghdad is
    unsettling. The Saddam Hussein regime clearly is no more, but
    in its place a security vacuum has developed. Clearly, the team
    of U.S. officials tasked with governing Iraq in the interim is
    also in a state of flux. A high degree of insecurity coupled
    with confusion as to who is in control make Iraq a difficult
    and dangerous place for humanitarian organizations to work. We
    urge the President's new special envoy for Iraq to accord
    highest priority to the establishment of law and order
    throughout Iraq, as that is the foundation on which economic
    and political reconstruction must be built. If that is done, we
    can work to ensure that the basic needs of Iraq's 24 million
    people are met, and a humanitarian crisis can be avoided.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. Henry.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Henry follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. We have heard four excellent statements that's
    constituted over 40 minutes, but there will be questions. But
    it's been very, very helpful; and it's been a very wonderful
    panel and statements.
        Mr. Janklow, Governor, you are on.
        Mr. Janklow. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Biddle, I couldn't help, as I listened to you and read
    your testimony, pick up what I thought was somewhat of a
    difference between you and the other three panelists,
    especially with respect to the--if I can call it--the primacy
    of getting the United Nations involved as opposed to having the
    United Nations involved. Do you understand the distinction?
        And I'm just wondering did I pick up something incorrectly,
    or do you feel that strongly about the United Nations?
        Mr. Biddle. No. I think it's a question of clarity in terms
    of the role. Our previous panel, Mr. Greene referenced the fact
    that the U.N. agencies humanitarian and--the humanitarian arms
    of the United Nations such as the World Food Program and WHO
    and others are beginning to return, but I think it's important
    as well that the coalition make clear that they would welcome
    that in a more specific fashion so there's an understanding of
    the coordinating role in providing relief which will help to
    facilitate an understanding at the community level that this is
    a coordinated international impartial process to rebuild and
    both address acute needs, as well as to rebuild the
    infrastructure and the society.
        Mr. Janklow. Help me, if you would, sir, for a second. What
    I don't understand is that where you have--let's just say that
    your organizations directly deal with the people and the U.N.
    is not there, and I'm not suggesting that not be the case at
    all, but do they really care who gives them or provides for
    them textbooks, gets the electricity turned on, gets the water
    functioning, gets the garbage hauled away, brings them the
    security and assists them in getting food for their families?
    Does it really make that big a difference to people?
        Mr. Biddle. I think it does from the perspective of
    civilian interaction.
        Mr. Janklow. Where else has that been the case around the
    world, an example of that?
        Mr. Biddle. Well, I think if you take a look at many
    different crises in the world community, you'll find that the
    both--two points that I think are critical here.
        One is the role--the coordinating role that the U.N. plays
    in working both the local NGO's international organizations----
        Mr. Janklow. Excuse me, sir. I want to know if people have
    reacted negatively to those people that are providing them
    assistance with respect to food, clothing, education, medical
    care and housing when it's provided by a government as opposed
    to--or not--or NGO's as opposed to the U.N.
        Mr. Biddle. I think it depends on the political context in
    which it occurs, and I think what we're trying to do in
    supporting a clear role for the U.N. in leading and
    coordinating humanitarian relief here is that we don't give
    succor or support to those parts of a given society--it can be
    any group, and obviously there are a number of factual forces
    at work in Iraq--that could perhaps----
        Mr. Janklow. I'm sorry, sir. What I'm asking--I hate to
    interrupt, but I'm trying to be very focused. Can you cite to
    me anything historically or anecdotally where it has been a
    problem where NGO's or a government have provided elsewhere in
    the world food, clothing, education, health or housing and it's
    been perceived as negative by the recipients?
        Mr. Biddle. I mean, I'd like to think about that for a
    minute to come up with a specific example. I think the issue
    that we're looking at, though, is the overarching----
        Mr. Janklow. I understand the issue. I understand the
    issue, sir. I'm just wondering, because I sense that there was
    a--maybe what I perceived to an overreliance on the U.N. as
    posed--and I'm not knocking the U.N. I think they do marvelous
    work. There was a lady who was in the Somalian group that was
    slaughtered, the charitable workers, the Filipino-American
    group that was slaughtered as missionary nurses, and so I have
    some appreciation for what your various organizations do in
    various places around the world.
        But, again, let me ask you, if I can, Mr. Henry, how strong
    do you think it has to be the United Nations, as opposed to
    agencies like yours and all the others from our country and
    other countries--clearly we don't have the only NGO's in the
    world. There are a lot of them.
        Mr. Henry. We see the primary role of the U.N. in playing
    that coordination and facilitation role, and also very
    importantly, in mobilizing resources. Even with the U.N.
    programs, the NGO's do most of the heavy lifting. OK? But in
    our estimation, if the U.S. Government wants to mobilize the
    widest possible participation of the international community in
    providing peacekeepers, in providing funding for
    reconstruction, then the U.N. is the vehicle that will get that
    broad support. So, I mean, setting aside all of the
    philosophical reasons from a purely practical point of view, I
    think that's the best reason to involve the United Nations.
        Mr. Janklow. What is it--if I can ask you this, recognizing
    that--it's 3 weeks since, basically, the war has ended, and but
    for a few individuals, who may have known better, I think most
    of us think it really went very quickly and with an incredibly
    small amount of damage to the civilian infrastructure given the
    enormity of taking over a whole country that's one of the most
    armed in the whole world, you know. And I hear about, like,
    people being upset that the tanks are parked next to a mosque,
    but they had to be terribly upset when they had Fedayeen,
    several hundred of them, in Baghdad in the mosque shooting at
    the soldiers that were coming through the community, and the
    arms that we found in the schools can't have made any mother
    feel well about sending her children to school, given the laws
    that came down and what we found behind those walls in a lot of
    the school systems.
        So I guess what I'm asking is, do you folks think we were
    that unprepared for--what have your organizations been doing to
    get ready for this? Is it just the government that was
    unprepared? Let me ask you, Mr. Welling, what did you do during
    the months that you thought we were leading up to this?
        Mr. Welling. Well, I think everyone was working in their
    own way to prepare, in our own case----
        Mr. Janklow. When did you start?
        Mr. Welling. We started in February, and as I think I
    mentioned in my written testimony by----
        Mr. Janklow. Prepositioning----
        Mr. Welling. In March, we prepositioned a substantial
    volume of supplies.
        I think there's a point here to be made about the volume of
    planning versus the coordination and the quality of planning. I
    don't think there's any debate about the fact that each of the
    organizations and each of the agencies that had a potential
    role in what is now the postwar environment spending a lot of
    time planning.
        When a division of labor becomes fragmentation, redundancy,
    I think, is an important question, and so one of our
    observations would be that absent the central point of control
    that we talked about, that there was a lot of planning going
    on, that it wasn't necessarily going on in a consistent way,
    and it wasn't necessarily being done in a way that maximized
    the potential contributions of each of the organizations.
        Mr. Janklow. Mr. Biddle, when did your organization start
    planning for the fact that you may end up in Iraq providing
    substantial assistance?
        Mr. Biddle. We began preliminary discussions in
    headquarters in July or August as we saw the possibility of----
        Mr. Janklow. And you, Mr. Von Bernuth, your organization?
        Mr. Von Bernuth. We began in the early autumn, and we did a
    planning workshop in Jordan in December to prepare staff for--
    --
        Mr. Janklow. And you, Mr. Henry.
        Mr. Henry. Similar to Save the Children, in the fall of
    last year.
        Mr. Janklow. And I realized, you know, the U.N. assisting
    coordination, but is there ever a point in time when all of
    your organizations or some of them and others sit down with
    each other planning for going into it? I assume you're all
    basically in sort of the same--you at least have a lot of
    overlapping in terms of what you do. Some of you are faith-
    based. Some of you are not, but I think all your hearts are in
    about the same place when it comes to what it is that you do.
    Do you ever sit down and plan with each other over who is going
    to do what?
        Mr. Henry. There has been extensive coordination among our
    agencies and many others.
        Mr. Janklow. Prior--specifically with respect to Iraq.
        Mr. Henry. Yes.
        Mr. Biddle. As a matter of fact, USAID provided a $900,000
    grant to what was termed the Joint NGO Emergency Preparedness
    Initiative which was set up in Arman, Jordan and included CARE,
    Save the Children----
        Mr. Janklow. When was that done, sir?
        Mr. Biddle. I think that was initiated in the late winter.
    I think it was probably March--February, March.
        Mr. Janklow. Of this year?
        Mr. Biddle. Yes.
        Mr. Janklow. What I'm trying to get at is how much planning
    did our government do preparing for the eventuality they may
    have to be providing substantial humanitarian assistance on the
    ground in Iraq at some point?
        Mr. Biddle. I think if I can respond to that, I think one
    of the issues was a lot of the planning was classified. So it
    was difficult for us to know exactly what they had in mind. I
    think everyone had anticipated a larger displacement crisis,
    and we're thankful that there wasn't one.
        At the same time, there were some impediments to the kind
    of planning that humanitarian NGO's traditionally do, which are
    on the ground assessments and prepositioning of supplies, as
    well as building relationships with local communities, and
    those were hindered by the presence of U.S. sanctions, the OFAC
    restrictions on our being there.
        Mr. Janklow. Sir, I noticed in your oral testimony you
    talked about the fact of cholera having appeared and the
    concern of that. And you, Mr. Von Bernuth, in your testimony I
    believe it is, I read what has been endemic in Iraq, in rural
    areas in Iraq since 1991. So it doesn't appear to be--it may be
    new in some areas, but it's not new on the scene.
        What I'm wondering is, that with respect to the assistance
    that has to be provided, what's the biggest surprise that you
    folks have encountered? I mean, I can't believe that y'all
    didn't think security might be a problem. Are any of you
    shocked that security is a problem 3 weeks after the occupation
    of a country?
        Mr. Henry. No. The only thing that I would say surprised me
    was the looting, specifically of hospitals and facilities of
    that nature. The more general looting wasn't a surprise, but
    that it would extend to hospitals surprised us, and that is--
    that definitely complicated matters.
        Mr. Janklow. Mr. Von Bernuth, what was your biggest
    surprise for your organization?
        Mr. Von Bernuth. I think it has been the slowness to get
    access to get into places, even in the southern part of the
    country that had been bypassed or liberated early on in the war
    and then the difficulty of developing local staff. Almost all
    of us depend tremendously on local staff in all the countries
    we work in to succeed, and with the exception of CARE, which
    had a previous basis in the country, the rest of us didn't, and
    therefore, that has been a surprise, how difficult it's been.
        Mr. Janklow. Mr. Biddle.
        Mr. Biddle. I think that the issues we had to face were in
    our own preparations for the responding to the humanitarian
    needs and that we couldn't get access earlier, we couldn't
    develop local partnerships. And now, of course, we can't move
    as freely in the country as we'd like. So those----
        Mr. Janklow. You and Congress, huh.
        Mr. Biddle. Well, it's field travel. Obviously we'd like to
    be able to get into Baghdad a little more effectively. CARE has
    had a long-standing presence there, but our staff had trouble
    getting from our northern locations down there because of
    security concerns.
        Mr. Janklow. And very briefly you, Mr. Welling.
        Mr. Welling. Our biggest surprise was the extent to which
    for all this planning the questions of access were not better
    thought out and more transparent.
        And I would also add that with respect to the preexisting
    conditions that we have found when we got there, the fact that
    the conditions are preexisting doesn't diminish its importance
    in terms of providing humanitarian assistance.
        So that would be a relatively low standard for compliance
    to restore things to preexisting conditions.
        Mr. Janklow. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one quick question,
    please.
        Mr. Shays. Ask it.
        Mr. Janklow. And I'll be brief. In your planning up to this
    point, did you ever--prior to the time the war was over, was
    there ever a time when your NGO's sat down, literally, with our
    military talking about how we would proceed when the war was
    successful, because I don't think anybody ever doubted the
    outcome. So given that fact, was there ever a planning session
    or coordination between you folks and the military as to how
    you would proceed once the war was over?
        Mr. Biddle. I mean, I can answer. I know there were many
    discussions in Washington through the interaction consortium of
    humanitarian agencies to meet with officials at DOD to discuss
    what our views of the situation were at that time and what they
    might become as a result of the war.
        One of the issues I'd just like to go back to is the
    security situation. Our vice president for government relations
    here in Washington issued a paper in January and then testified
    before the Senate Foreign Relations which on this issue going
    through the various threats to security in Iraq as a result of
    a war there and the fact that we would be in a position to be
    responsible under the Geneva conventions as the occupying power
    for law and order of protection of civilians. That paper
    Protecting Civilians From the Security Vacuum, I'd like to make
    available for the record. I think it would be very interesting
    for you all to see, and we did share that widely with the U.S.
    Government at the time when it was issued in January and also
    presented at the hearing in May--excuse me, in March.
        Mr. Henry. Just on the subject of exchange of information
    with the military----
        Mr. Shays. Without objection, we'll make that a part of the
    record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Mr. Henry. I would just like to say that there were any
    number of meetings that NGO's participated in with
    representatives of the Pentagon. On the whole, as my colleagues
    have said, our ability to get information was hampered by the
    level of secrecy and confidentiality of the planning within the
    U.S. Government. Much we didn't find out until very late in the
    game, and in general with the Pentagon, their idea of
    information exchange was, you know, NGO's, give us all the
    information you have. Thank you. And, you know, we'll call you
    if we have anything to share with you at a later date.
        Mr. Shays. I'm loving this panel, and I have so many
    questions I'd love to ask, but I'd love to have you tell me if
    you agree or not or want to elaborate or whatever with Bill
    Frelick's testimony that we put into the record, who is the
    humanitarian assistance--this is from Amnesty International. He
    is the Director of Refugee Program. This is the paragraph. If
    you'll listen to this paragraph and tell me if you agree with
    it, ``for security reasons, U.N. agencies themselves were not
    able to establish offices in Iraq during the first critical
    weeks. This created a circumstance in which the NGO's inside
    Iraq could not establish connections with U.N. agencies but
    only with the DART teams or ORHA, making their ties to the
    occupying power stronger. (The U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator
    for Iraq, Romiro Lopes da Silva, moved into Baghdad on the 5th
    of May.) NGO's will be watching closely how the Kuwait-based
    Humanitarian Operations Center, run by U.S. military and
    civilian forces, will be affected by the establishment of the
    U.N. Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance inside Iraq. If
    there are two competing centers of humanitarian coordination
    with significantly different objectives and principles, each
    with its own resources to bring to bear, humanitarian
    assistance could become paralyzed.''
        Let me just tell you how I comment, and then I want to go
    to you, Mr. Welling. My sense was kind of the more the merrier,
    and I am missing something here that I don't understand about
    the system? And I gather that the U.N. somehow has--over time
    has become the structure in which NGO's kind of fit in.
        So Mr. Welling, do you have a comment on what I read?
        Mr. Welling. I do. I think perhaps so we have a
    clarification, I certainly agree from a capacity standpoint
    that your observation of the more the merrier in terms of the
    aggregate resources that could be brought to bear is a
    desirable thing.
        Clearly, it creates coordination problems, and I think one
    of the issues that we're all groping here with is the
    fragmentation of the parties that had responsibility or thought
    that they had responsibility for a piece of the activities. And
    uncertainty with respect to who had responsibility for the
    totality of the activities, and if it was ORHA, it wasn't clear
    that it was ORHA, and if it was the United Nations, it wasn't
    clear that it was the United Nations. And to our way of
    thinking, in fact, that uncertainty persists today.
        So I would say capacity maximization is an important thing
    pursuant to an intelligent assessment and the coordination of
    capacity. So we don't see, for example, some of the things we
    saw in Kosovo, where tons and tons of medical supplies had to
    be destroyed because they were redundant or inappropriate.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Mr. Biddle.
        Mr. Biddle. Yes. I think they're--I've had conversations
    with officials at the U.N. who were confused as to what role
    they should be playing. There's the Offices of Coordination of
    Humanitarian Affairs at the United Nations, which tends to try
    and coordinate both the U.N. agencies and bring the NGO's in in
    cooperation with donors, and their role has been somewhat
    confused at the field level, both in terms of how NGO's
    interact with them, as well as interaction with other bodies
    related to the U.S. Government, if it is ORHA or others.
        I have seen it in the draft resolution that was at least
    put forward in the press to the U.N. There was attempt to begin
    to clarify the role of the U.N. in that role, and I think
    that's an important thing that needs to be pushed from the U.S.
    perspective to make sure that there is an understanding of what
    they will be doing and how they will interface both with the
    United States and the coalition efforts to reconstruct and
    rehabilitate----
        Mr. Shays. And would you care to say how you think that
    should be, that----
        Mr. Biddle. We've been on the record, and we've written to
    President Bush saying that they should be the lead coordinating
    body in bringing both humanitarian and longer-term
    reconstruction.
        Mr. Shays. Which is consistent with your testimony. Right?
        Mr. Von Bernuth.
        Mr. Von Bernuth. A couple comments. One, yes, the U.N. was
    late getting into the country, but on the other hand, there had
    been an active dialog in Larnaca and Jordan and Kuwait between
    the U.N. agencies and NGO's, so it wasn't that there wasn't a
    lot of discussion going on.
        Second, we almost always do have a problem in emergencies
    with multiplicity in terms of direction. Usually, it's a donor
    working group on the one hand and a U.N. group on the other
    hand. But lip service, at least, is usually given to the U.N.
    as taking primacy in terms of that coordinating role.
        Third, in practical terms, if you'll look, for instance, at
    education, UNICEF can play a very constructive role, for
    instance, in bringing together multiple donors who will support
    a UNICEF-mandated education reform package. Multiple NGO's who
    regularly work with UNICEF and government officials within Iraq
    who will feel comfortable working with a U.N. agency in a way
    that a bilateral donor or government is not going to be able to
    do.
        So there really is a special role that the U.N. can play,
    for instance, in organizing the education sector or organizing
    the health sector, that a unilateral donor will not be able to
    do.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Henry.
        Mr. Henry. Oh, yes. CARE has made an effort from the
    beginning to coordinate very actively with the United Nations,
    and despite their lateness in arriving and in Baghdad, we have
    been coordinating with them closely, primarily in Aman. If
    we're critical of anything, it was their decision to originally
    base their operations in Larnaca, Cypress, which was too far
    from the scene when most NGO's were actually either in Jordan
    or in Kuwait.
        In terms of the role of the United Nations, I think, you
    know, what it comes down to at the end of the day are two
    things. One, who sets the priorities. Right? The more the
    merrier, yes, but at the end of the day in something like this,
    there have to be priorities, someone has to set them, and, you
    know, you do have the potential for two competing frameworks,
    right now the ORHA framework and the U.N. framework, and that
    is potentially problematic.
        And second who is, will----
        Mr. Shays. And they differ?
        Mr. Henry. Sure. I mean, one is a U.S. Government Pentagon-
    managed structure, and the other one is----
        Mr. Shays. And those structures are different, but do their
    goals differ and their objectives and so on differ?
        Mr. Henry. Well, I think both sides would probably--you
    know, ask them, but I think both the Pentagon and the United
    Nations would probably say that, you know, once you get beyond
    the very high-level goal of rebuilding, you know, Iraq, they
    would disagree on a lot of things.
        Mr. Shays. Would you all agree with that really quickly?
    Mr. Von Bernuth, you've said----
        Mr. Von Bernuth. I'd agree.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Biddle.
        Mr. Biddle. I'd agree, and there are going to be micro and
    macro issues. There's the large-scale issues, and then there's
    going to be what a U.N. agency or body might see at the
    community level versus what another agency, bilateral or in
    this case U.S. Government agency might see.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Welling.
        Mr. Welling. I don't have anything to add.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Henry, I interrupted you.
        Mr. Henry. The final thing is what's very important in
    these kind of complex emergencies when you have so many actors
    is there has to be a form and there has to be a framework
    within which we all interact, and the question is going to be
    who is going to provide and create that framework. So, you
    know, at the end of the day NGO's will do a lot of the work,
    you know, with funding from the U.N. and from the U.S.
    Government and other donors, but the existence of that
    framework in that form is vital for our efforts in making sure
    that there aren't major gaps on the one hand or big overlap and
    duplication.
        Mr. Shays. Yes. I came with a bias that maybe is so
    offbase, that you need to correct me. I came with a bias that
    the U.N. takes so long to make a decision, that basically you
    just can't wait that long. So I came with this decision that if
    the U.S. military did it, it might be 3 years, and if the U.N.
    did it, it might be 7 or more. But what I'm getting a sense
    from your testimony is that they go into automatic pilot.
    There's not a lot of decisions that go back to the U.N. that
    take a long time to be decided. Is that correct? I don't want
    to put words in your mouth, but disavow me of my misconception
    here or confirm it.
        Mr. Welling. Well, I don't think it's necessarily a
    question of timeframe. I think it's a question of experience
    and expertise. I think that the point that's been made before
    about expertise and division of labor, I think, is a valid one.
        Mr. Shays. And the U.N. has it then?
        Mr. Welling. The U.N. has it and the expertise, and I also
    think an important point from a U.S. taxpayers standpoint and
    from an aggregate capacity standpoint, it's clear the United
    Nations has access to donors on a basis that no unilateral
    organization is going to have. The U.S. Government will not
    have the same access to donor resources that the United Nations
    would have on some of these programs in education, health care
    and infrastructure rehabilitation.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Biddle, anything to add to what?
        Mr. Biddle. I would echo that. I think the burden-sharing
    aspect is critical because donor governments are going to
    participate if they view it as an international effort as
    opposed to an effort by one, two or a small group of
    governments and the expertise factor is a given in that.
    There's no question that the U.N. is an international body, and
    sometimes things will take longer in working through it, but
    from the perspective also of the current situation in Iraq, the
    military and the other efforts of the U.S. presence in the
    field is going to need to be directed, especially at this time,
    to providing a secure environment. So you're also dealing with
    capacity. You want to allow others to come in and share in the
    relief and rehabilitation efforts, and the U.N. is the best
    vehicle to ensure an international cooperative effort.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Von Bernuth.
        Mr. Von Bernuth. The U.N. in the aggregate, certainly can
    be slow and cumbersome and many times has been, but the
    agencies that we're talking about, UNHCR, World Food Program,
    UNICEF have each of them a particular mandate, a particular set
    of interventions that they've worked on and a number of other
    crises like this. They've worked in the Balkans. They've worked
    in Afghanistan, etc., and the people that they're bringing in
    to work on the ground are people that many of us have worked
    with in other crises, and I think they can be reasonably
    efficacious, as well as bringing in a far broader spectrum of
    supporters.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Henry.
        Mr. Henry. I think the U.N. is imperfect, as are all
    institutions created by man, but they have a role to play, and
    if they put some of their best people, you know, in the field,
    in Iraq, they can play a very important role.
        Mr. Shays. Well, I'm struck by the fact that--Mr. Welling,
    you were the most forceful on this, about the need to designate
    a central authority, and you talked about turf battles and so
    on. And before I go to Mrs. Maloney who has joined us, can I
    envision a U.N. being a major participant without the United
    States losing its ability to kind of take some definitive
    action in terms of humanitarian efforts? In other words, will
    the United States have to give up as they invite the U.N. in?
        Mr. Welling. No. I don't see it as a zero-sum game. In
    other words, I don't think there's any sense in which the
    United States would have to compromise its interests. You made
    the point several times during these hearings that with respect
    to goals, broad-based objectives, the objectives of the
    humanitarian community and the objectives of the American
    people and the British people have the same objectives. I think
    this is a question now of effectiveness and efficiency. The war
    has been won. There's a set of tasks that need to be
    accomplished, and we should be about identifying the parties
    who are the most competent to accomplish the tasks on the
    table.
        Mr. Shays. Anybody have something to add to that before I
    go to Mrs. Maloney?
        Well, I'm going to want another shorter round, but Mrs.
    Maloney, you have the floor. And thank you for joining us.
        Mrs. Maloney. Thank you very much, and I--you all represent
    extraordinarily important organizations that have really
    responded to world crises in the past. That I believe our
    government is working very strongly with the United Nations. In
    fact, we are funding them. USAID has provided $1.2 million to
    the United Nations office for the coordination of humanitarian
    assistance to support several initiatives in Iraq, including
    the Humanitarian Information Center. So we are working with
    them.
        I'd like to ask each of you, to whom do you, as a
    nongovernmental organization involved in assistance programs in
    Iraq, report? Who do you report to? Do you report to the
    Humanitarian Information Center? Do you report to the U.S.
    Government, USAID or to your board of directors?
        Mr. Henry.
        Mr. Henry. Well, yes. I mean, first and foremost as a
    nongovernmental organization, we are accountable to our board
    of directors and our mandate and mission as an organization.
        Now, of course working in a context like Iraq, we're
    subject to whoever, you know, is the power that be in any given
    context, ma'am.
        Mrs. Maloney. So who do you report to?
        Mr. Henry. Well, we don't report to anyone, but, for
    instance, we have accepted funding from the Office of Foreign
    Disaster Assistance, and one of the issues that we have worked
    to clarify is we've said, look, in that context, we will report
    to the Disaster Assistance response team, which is part of OFDA
    and that we do not want to amend, will not accept reporting
    directly to the military.
        So as regards U.S. Government funding, we are reporting to
    and accountable to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance,
    which is a part of AID and under the Department of State.
        Mrs. Maloney. Well, are you reporting to the United Nations
    Humanitarian Information Center to let them know what you're
    doing so that they can coordinate? Because now they are funded
    by our government to help coordinate. I'm wondering have you
    interacted with them?
        Mr. Henry. We are actively interacting with all of the
    specialized agencies of the U.N. We're working particularly
    closely with UNICEF and the World Food Program, because our
    programs focus on water supply, sanitation, food, health. So
    that's the main--the main players really in Iraq for the United
    Nations today are the specialized agencies such as UNHCR, the
    World Food Program, UNICEF, and they are the people we're
    working with.
        The coordination folks had literally just arrived in
    Baghdad in the last week or two and really haven't fully gotten
    up to speed.
        Mrs. Maloney. Although you have been supported by USAID in
    the past, did your funding increase dramatically recently
    because of Iraq to respond to this problem?
        Mr. Henry. Not dramatically, but we have received
    assistance. We have received CARE, a grant of $4 million which
    we understand could go up to as much as $10 million for
    immediate relief and reconstruction activities including in the
    water supply, sanitation and health sectors.
        Mrs. Maloney. Mr. Von Bernuth.
        Mr. Von Bernuth. We've received a mix of funding. We have,
    right now, received funding from Norway, the British
    Government, USAID through an instrument similar to the one that
    Mr. Henry just described, the World Food Program and private
    resources.
        In regard to the utilization of each of those moneys, we
    have a reporting obligation to the donor. Overall, in terms of
    overall program, I would not say that we report to any of them.
    I would say as a member of the community, we have an
    information-sharing responsibility, both with ORHA in Kuwait
    and when it gets underway, with the UNOCHA coordinating
    mechanism in Baghdad. But it doesn't constitute a report to; it
    constitutes a share information with and collaborate with.
        Mrs. Maloney. Well, as one who works for our children, Save
    the Children--and I think they're probably the most vulnerable.
    I've read about children being kidnapped, being blown up by
    mines, just terrible, parents not wanting their children to go
    to school because of the turmoil and the fact that they do not
    believe security is there, and when the U.S. Government is
    withdrawing troops, who do you call when you have a security
    problem? Who do you call when you find out that there's such
    turmoil in a certain area, that children cannot go out in a
    street? Is there a phone number you call? Do you call the
    military? Who do you call for security for the children?
        Mr. Von Bernuth. That is a very good question. We have all
    of us today in our testimony basically said that as the
    occupying power in Iraq today, we would call on the U.S.
    Government to ensure that adequate police services are in
    place, security is in place, so that people don't need to worry
    about leaving their homes and don't need to worry about sending
    their children to schools.
        Mrs. Maloney. But there is turmoil. I have numbers I could
    call in New York when there's a security problem.
        Mr. Henry. There is no 911 in Baghdad today.
        Mrs. Maloney. There is no 911, there is no police
    department, there is no place you can call and say, there's
    turmoil in this particular school.
        Mr. Biddle. And that's one of the reasons that children
    aren't going to school and women are staying at home and
    allowing men to go out and do the shopping. Especially in
    Baghdad, there's a real fear on the security level.
        Mrs. Maloney. And I support the United Nations for many,
    many reasons, one of which is burden sharing, and I just came
    from a hearing on Financial Services where we're talking about
    the deficit, we're talking about the trade deficit, the growing
    deficit and the economic challenges that we have in our own
    country, and I'd like to know, what is your USAID commitment,
    and did it come--grow up or grow because of Iraq, Mr. Von
    Bernuth?
        Mr. Von Bernuth. The Iraq instrument that we received
    represents $10 million, and it's a short-term instrument all to
    be used within this given fiscal year. About 50 percent of our
    total funding comes from the U.S. Government, mostly from AID,
    and that represents about $85, $90 million a year from the U.S.
    Government. So this represents a tenth of it for this fiscal
    year.
        Mrs. Maloney. And how long do you think you'll be in Iraq?
    Is there any timetable that's been given to you? This contract
    you said was for a year, but are they saying it's going to be a
    continuing contract? Do you have any sense of how long you'll
    be in Iraq?
        Mr. Von Bernuth. The current U.S. contract we have is for 6
    months actually, not for a year, and we've been offered the
    opportunity to bid another contract which would be for, I
    believe, a year, possibly extendable to a year and a half. So
    the U.S. Government, in terms of its funding, is looking at
    fairly short-term instruments right now. I think we strongly
    believe that the commitment in terms of work in Iraq has to be
    in a much more multi-year basis. Rebuilding a society isn't
    going to take place in 6 months or a year. So we would hope
    that we would be able to work with the Iraqi people for a
    number of years.
        I gave the example earlier of Afghanistan, where we've been
    working in Afghanistan since 1989, and we stayed through the
    Taliban period. And we're still working there. We've seen U.S.
    Government funding instruments wax and wane during that period
    several times.
        Mrs. Maloney. Well, we're hoping that other citizens of the
    world community will donate not only to the United Nations and
    donate to Iraq, but donate to organizations such as the one
    that you represent. Are foreign governments coming up and
    contributing to the effort, or is our country carrying the
    whole burden?
        Mr. Henry. Well, CARE, I can say, is receiving funding from
    the Australian Government, the UK Government, the European
    Government, the Norwegians, the Canadians and the United
    States, and we are also working with both UNICEF and the World
    Food Program. So there is an international effort.
        Mrs. Maloney. What about Mr. Von Bernuth with the Save the
    Children?
        Mr. Von Bernuth. I mentioned earlier that we've received
    funding support so far from Norway, from DFID, which is the
    British Government equivalent of AID, from the World Food
    Program, and we currently have proposals funding with Finland
    and Canada.
        Mrs. Maloney. That's terrific, and I'd like to ask the same
    questions if I could from Mr. Biddle and Mr. Welling. What is
    the U.S. commitment? Has it grown larger? How long is the
    commitment for you to be in Iraq? And are other nations coming
    to help you? And also going back to the Humanitarian
    Information Center, it seems if we're funding someone to
    somewhat coordinate information on humanitarian efforts with
    the United Nations, it seems that like all of you should be,
    sort of, in there sharing information so that you--there's a
    central place--you said we need a central place. Possibly this
    could serve as a central place to share this information.
        Mr. Biddle. We're actively in touch and coordinating with
    the UNOCHA team on the ground, as well as with other NGO's in
    locations that we operate in and with any other bodies that are
    working, including, obviously, local communities, which is the
    critical group that we need to work with to ensure that we are
    both reaching the most vulnerable populations and building in a
    mechanism to sustain our work past our involvement.
        We also received a cooperative agreement to respond to
    humanitarian needs in Iraq from the U.S. Agency for
    International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster
    Assistance. In our case it was a $5 million cooperative
    agreement for 6 months. We have not applied for further funding
    at this stage. We're going to watch to see how the situation
    evolves, whether our services will be needed over the long-term
    in Iraq.
        There have been large, I think, requests for proposals put
    out by USAID for longer-term work, which we declined to apply
    for at the time. And in terms of European or international
    support for our work, I just came back from a visit to some of
    the European capitals and some of the funding agencies in
    Europe, and a lot of the questions I got were specifically
    wanting to know how we were going to operate in an impartial
    fashion, were we being directed by the U.S. military, and what
    assurances could we give to some of our traditional donors
    that, in fact, we were maintaining our own standards and our
    own commitment to our principles of being both impartial and
    responsible to ourselves in assessing and delivering services
    on a needed basis.
        And I should come back to Congressman Janklow's question
    specifically. I was trying to think. Nothing came into my mind
    at the time of your question, but in the case of Colombia,
    we've had some local partners in Colombia that have refused to
    work with us if we had U.S. Government funding, not because
    they were opposed necessarily to U.S. policy or the money
    itself, but because it actually endangered their operations.
    They could be seen as a potential target from a particular
    group, be it a paramilitary force or one of the guerilla forces
    for whatever view that funding may--how it may be perceived at
    the local level.
        So it's a question of perception sometimes as much as
    anything, and one of the reasons I raised the U.N. to begin
    with is the perceptions in some communities in Iraq that they
    may not want to work with the United States because it's
    directing the assistance with a particular goal in mind that
    may be not necessarily accurate, but unfortunately can add to
    confusion as to what the objectives of an assistance program
    are.
        Mrs. Maloney. Well, all of you represent in many ways truly
    international organizations. My time is up and the chairman is
    going to continue, but I did want to let you know, Mr. Biddle,
    that we had a fundraiser for your organization yesterday in the
    district that I represent. So I hope that will be helpful--more
    helpful in your efforts, and I congratulate all of you, and
    we're all praying for you.
        Mr. Shays. You've got a nice district.
        Governor Janklow.
        Mr. Janklow. Thank you very much. If I could, I just really
    have a couple of questions. Y'all heard the testimony of
    General Garner, his kind of speech. Which one of his 11 points
    were--and I realize maybe you didn't write them all out, but to
    the extent you can recall, did any of them trigger your head? I
    guess they're up on the board there. Like, geez--is he too
    optimistic, and if so, with respect to which ones?
        Go ahead, Mr. Henry.
        Mr. Henry. Well, I think reestablishing town councils and
    provincial governments that are seen to have genuine legitimacy
    in the eyes of their communities in that kind of timeframe
    would be very difficult. You could put in place very temporary
    kind of structures, but I think we need to recognize that those
    kind of political processes will take much more time than
    something like purchasing the crop or getting the refineries
    moving so that you can buy gasoline in Baghdad.
        Mr. Janklow. Mr. Von Bernuth.
        Mr. Von Bernuth. I noted that on three points from his
    list, that I thought were probably not as feasible as some of
    the others, of which installed town councils was one. The
    second one was the training of the police, getting a police
    force actually to be credible and operational by June 15, I
    think it was. And the third, deeply related to the second, was
    establishing security.
        Mr. Janklow. Mr. Biddle.
        Mr. Biddle. I would echo what Rudy had to say, that
    security issue is going to be the most challenging. If we look
    at Afghanistan, the bombing ended there in December 2001 and
    it's still a very unsecure environment. These are very
    different countries obviously, different stages of development,
    but the fact is, postconflict settings are extremely difficult
    to sometimes assess where the threats may--where they may come
    from and what the circumstances may be. And the issue of
    policing and creating basic judicial procedures and law and
    order throughout the country is going to be very difficult. And
    to have that in hand within the next 45 days would seem to me
    to be a very great task.
        Mr. Janklow. Mr. Welling.
        Mr. Welling. Yes. To be fair to General Garner, I'm not
    sure whether he meant these to be in priority order, but if he
    did, we would probably have all different opinions of----
        Mr. Janklow. I'm just wondering which ones you think aren't
    feasible to get done.
        Mr. Welling. I don't have anything to add to what my
    colleagues have said about feasibility. I would say our
    perspective, we were surprised that a higher priority and more
    discussion wasn't given to dealing with the emergency health
    care needs of the already fragile or endangered populations,
    cholera being a subset of all that, but there's clearly a much
    wider range of things that require immediate assistance from a
    health care standpoint.
        Mr. Janklow. Look, if I could to all of you at the risk of
    being accused of being insensitive, which, you know, I don't
    think I am, but who knows, I think everybody understands the
    concern of a great number of Americans with respect to some of
    the people on the continent who historically have been somewhat
    givers, at least to their old colonies and old areas. And I'm
    not into France bashing, but given their conduct prior to the
    war, given the way they treated our Secretary of State,
    basically sandbagging him, giving the documentation that's been
    found and the business relationships between the last
    government of Iraq, which I assume people like as little as our
    Armed Forces over there, I think all of your organizations can
    understand the concern about a lot of taxpayers in this country
    about contributing money into a pool where that country may
    have--and some others may have any voice at all with respect to
    what's going on, at least in the short-term in Iraq. Am I
    making sense?
        Mr. Welling. Yes. I guess I'd like to say--and I didn't get
    to answer Mrs. Maloney's question----
        Mr. Janklow. And I don't want you to answer in such a way
    as to jeopardize your people.
        Mr. Welling. No. I understand. We don't take any money from
    the U.S. Government, so we're certainly sensitive to our
    donor's attitudes with respect to political questions.
        I think two observations. I think one is most Americans--
    and I think this is the strength of the American people--have
    the ability to disassociate political things from humanitarian
    things, and the response that we got in the wake of Iraq, both
    from individual donors and from corporate donors suggests to us
    that they have the ability to make that differentiation.
        I certainly understand the emotional dynamic that you're
    describing, that people would like some company in this boat,
    they would like some people to be contributing and they
    wouldn't be very happy about relieving some of these other
    countries' obligations of bearing their fair share. I think
    that's perfectly reasonable.
        But I do think that the American people have the ability to
    differentiate between those two things.
        Mr. Janklow. Any of the rest of you?
        Mr. Henry. Well, I would just say that I think the U.S.
    Government, you know, can choose. We can have a smaller pool of
    money that we completely control, or we can have a bigger pot
    of money into which, you know, as many governments as possible
    will be contributing.
        And, you know, that is in part the debate that will play
    out in the U.N. Security Council in the next week or two, and I
    think, you know, our perspective is, you know--you have to
    create an international framework that everyone can buy into if
    you want them to also be putting their money, you know, into
    that structure.
        So it just comes down to that simple calculus.
        Mr. Janklow. I'm not sure their money is not important at
    this point in time.
        Mr. Henry. That is a decision we have to make.
        Mr. Janklow. Right, that is a value judgment we have to
    make, but you would understand given the fact that none of you
    work for a government, you're all independent, you're true to
    your own ideals of each of your respective organizations, you
    can understand the concern of taxpayers of this country vis-a-
    vis contributing to your organizations to the extent you may or
    may not be dealing with others that some consider to be at
    least in the short term if not the long term people who tried
    to get some of our soldiers killed and tried to make the
    endeavors that our country embarked on unsuccessful.
        Any of you disagree with that?
        Mr. Henry. How dare we?
        Mr. Janklow. No, no. You----
        Mr. Biddle. Well, I think we wouldn't want to put it in
    that purely bilateral context. I think what we're looking at is
    the multilateral framework that the U.N. provides and using
    that as the mechanism to move forward burden-sharing and
    cooperation and building that extra layer of legitimacy so that
    others build into the process in a way that hopefully will make
    it that much more successful which is in the U.S.'s interest.
    That I think is the bottom line.
        Mr. Janklow. If you can help me--Mr. Biddle, maybe you can
    help me with something else. I think you feel pretty strongly
    that you need to be separated from our government, our
    military. I accept that.
        Mr. Welling. Those are not the same things.
        Mr. Janklow. I'm sorry. I mean the military side of our
    government in Iraq. I apologize. That's what I meant to say,
    one.
        And two, that you've been very forceful in terms of your
    testimony that our military should be in a security role,
    because anything else they basically do, they're not going to
    be trusted or they run the risk of not being trusted of
    substantial numbers of people in Iraq. Yet at this point in
    time, at least from the television stuff that we're able to see
    at times, there's a huge amount of support when the military
    has been able to work with civilians to get the electricity
    turned on, watching the military give water to people when it's
    given out, watching the British troops distributing food. I
    haven't--sure I see the animosity and I see they're able to
    bring large crowds. It's in a particular area where no one has
    been friendly to us anyhow, so I don't think that surprises too
    many people, but my point is that is it that's unique about
    aid-giving now that's different about what we've been able to
    see over the last several weeks in terms of the enthusiasm for
    the public for the nonmilitary functions that military people
    are doing?
        Mr. Biddle. Well, I think the bottom line is--if I can get
    to the perception aspect of this, there is obviously a fear as
    to what the long-term intentions of the U.S. Government may be
    among some sector of the population.
        Mr. Janklow. But isn't that true as long as we have people
    with uniform there, no matter what their function and role is,
    whether--if they're not giving out food, they're not helping
    with medical care, they're not restoring services but they're
    patrolling the streets helping guard the citizenry, I would
    think that the public would be far more concerned about that
    than the----
        Mr. Biddle. Well, I think that's right, and I think that's
    where the conformity aspect comes into play where on an
    expertise level, obviously civilians with expertise in
    providing humanitarian assistance are best suited to do to play
    that rule and the military is best suited to provide security
    so that those actors can go about doing their job.
        And, in fact, I've seen on television certain members of
    the military saying, you know, let's go back to our primary
    mission which is to fight wars and provide a secure
    environment, so I think there is an understanding. As conflicts
    and as you get into a secure enough environment for civilian
    agencies or private contractors or companies that are obviously
    going to be going into Iraq, there is a role for the military
    in that transitional phase and obviously they're doing an
    outstanding job at that--those tasks at that time. But I think
    as you go further down the line, you want to actually have
    specialization in----
        Mr. Janklow. I agree. I don't think we have a huge level of
    disagreement on that.
        Mr. Welling. I think I may have a slightly different view
    about this in the following respects. I don't think anyone is
    saying--we're not saying that it's outside the scope of the
    American government's resources to accomplish this objective. I
    think what we're saying is that there are important policy
    issues that arise in the context of assigning responsibility to
    in that each organization is going to feel deferently about and
    depending on how you come down on those issues, you may have
    diminished expert capacity. But what we're saying is from the
    perspective of the American people, what's the most efficient
    way to accomplish these objectives and what's going to be the
    smart way for the U.S. Government to do it from a longer-term
    policy standpoint. If we were so convinced that we could do
    this effectively and we were prepared to take the
    accountability and be judged based on the results, that's
    clearly our prerogative. I think the question is being raised
    whether that's both the smart thing to do and the cost-
    efficient thing to do.
        Mr. Biddle. There's of the aspect to this which was raised
    to your question Congressman Shays about getting to know each
    other and there are force protection guidelines that the
    military has to adhere to. And unless those are changed, it's
    difficult for the military to go out and do some of the things
    it needs to do at the local community to be able to interface,
    get to know what's going on and to do their job, especially
    obviously they're armed and they have a different role
    traditionally in the eyes of a civilian population. And for
    that reason, it seems appropriate, as my colleague has just
    said, to allow those different actors to play their separate
    roles.
        Mr. Henry. If I could just say a couple things, first of
    all, CARE believes that if the military are the only actors in
    a position to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to
    people, they should do it, and we congratulate them for doing
    that where they have done it in Iraq. So it isn't, you know,
    just a turf kind of thing. We're not saying the military should
    never do that. Saving lives is the most important thing, and if
    the military are the only people who can do it, then they
    should absolutely do it.
        You know, on this sort of burden-sharing issue, the way I
    look at it as a taxpayer myself is we the American taxpayers
    can either pick up the whole tab for what is going to be a very
    expensive banquet in Iraq in the coming years, or we can go
    Dutch with the rest of the international community. And I would
    rather go Dutch. And the way to do that is to bring everyone in
    to a framework that makes them feel a sense of--a part
    ownership of that process.
        Mr. Janklow. I'd just far rather go Dutch than French.
        Mr. Shays. Mrs. Maloney has a few questions. I'll have a
    few. We will get you out of here. Your problem, gentlemen, is
    that you're too interesting and too informative. That is the
    problem.
        Mrs. Maloney. I have constituents and organizations calling
    me that want to contribute and want to be part of this effort
    to help Iraq.
        During 9-11, we had a command central that would pool--you
    could go to with your resources and they would tell you where
    to go, or they'd tell you what resources they needed. Where can
    I direct constituents and organizations that are calling me
    saying they want to be part of this great effort to help Iraq?
    Where do they go? Where do we direct them?
        Mr. Biddle. I would say to each of these organizations, Web
    sites--you can get online. You can find out how to volunteer.
    There's a wealth of information available.
        Mrs. Maloney. But I think they want to be plugged in, I
    think into the whole U.S. effort and not particularly an
    organization, an who's coordinating it? USAID? Would you direct
    them to USAID? I don't know.
        Anyway----
        Mr. Henry. Most of our organizations are--not all our
    members have interaction, which is the biggest umbrella of
    international agencies and they have a list of all the member
    agencies doing work in Iraq, and you can get to their Web site
    and from their Web site to ours.
        Mrs. Maloney. That's helpful.
        One of the most troubling things that you've said to me is
    that there is nowhere to call for security, and if you don't
    have security, you don't really have a society, because society
    cannot function if people are afraid to walk out of their homes
    to buy food or go to school. And we have to restore security
    before we can really provide adequate health care or aid to our
    children or food or whatever. So what is your idea of how we
    should do that? Should we--we have to--what is your idea of
    how--should we bring in an international force? Should it be
    the U.S. military? Should it be a funded Iraqi group? How do we
    make this happen?
        Mr. Biddle. Well, that--under the Geneva conventions,
    that's the responsibility of the occupying power to find out
    and determine the best ways to do that. There are obviously--
    there are various options that might be available to them,
    internationalizing the peacekeeping efforts to increase the
    number of forces on the ground or bring in more coalition
    forces. International constabulary force to support police
    training and expand the level of security across the country,
    changing the force protection guidelines of the coalition
    forces to be able to do more creative things on a security
    measure. We're not experts on this. These are just ideas and
    things that we've seen in other settings around the world, but
    the bottom line is that it is the responsibility of the
    occupying power to develop approaches to meet this need, and I
    do think it permeates all the aspects that we've described of
    our work in the field.
        Particularly there was a report in the New York Times today
    that one of the issues in addressing cholera right now is the
    fact that the health system is so affected by the security
    environment, that hospitals are underequipped, staff are scared
    to go into the hospitals, that they've had to send the cholera
    tests up to Kuwait to have them checked.
        So it's not just a question of the sewage and the
    electricity and the mechanized aspects of addressing this in an
    urban environment. It's also the fact that you can't even
    address the specific health intervention for a given case
    because of the environment in the country right now. And
    granted, there have been challenges in the case of cholera in
    the country over the last 12 years, but usually the health
    system was trying to identify cases and respond to it quickly.
    So preventing a cholera outbreak is going to be that much more
    difficult because of that.
        Mrs. Maloney. In conclusion, I'm concerned very much about
    the economic burden to America. We have many problems here at
    home in our own schools and our own health care delivery
    system, and I agree with Mr. Henry that we should go Dutch,
    that we should get as much help as we can. And one obvious
    place is the frozen Iraqi assets. I believe $1.7 billion in our
    own country, and there are probably assets from the Saddam
    Hussein Government in many countries around the world. And one
    approach would be to freeze that money and return it to the
    Iraqi people in terms of hospitals, teachers, schools,
    sanitation and clean water systems. And I wondered what your
    comments would be on that.
        Mr. Henry. Well, by all means what we have to remember is
    that Iraq not only has some assets that can be seized, they
    have massive debts, and that is probably the biggest financial
    problem that's going to have to be sorted out in the years to
    come, is how can we pay for the reconstruction of Iraq while,
    you know, also allowing Iraq to overcome its huge debt burden.
        Mrs. Maloney. Thank you. Any other comments on freezing
    Iraqi assets in foreign countries?
        Mr. Shays. Let me just finish up here real quick. I'm not
    asking for you to comment if you don't have a particular
    reaction, but I want you to react to anything General Garner
    said or Mr. Greene or Mr. Garvelink said. You've sat here all
    day long since 2 p.m., plus, and was there anything that
    General Garner said that you want to put on the record either
    reacting positively or negatively to what Mr. Greene or Mr.
    Garvelink said, any of you? Yes.
        Mr. Von Bernuth. Just for starters, I was a little bit
    surprised when General Garner said there was no humanitarian
    crisis in Iraq, and he then went on to describe the conditions
    that he had just observed in Basra of sewage flowing through
    the streets, hospitals that weren't functioning very well, etc.
    I think there was a preexisting humanitarian crisis in Iraq
    before the war happened, and I think that crisis in some areas
    has only been exacerbated as the health systems, etc. have been
    looted and savaged and what have you.
        So I would take issue with that statement.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Any other comment that any of them said that
    you would like to speak about?
        Mr. Henry. Well, as I've already noted, I think Mr.
    Garvelink's suggestion that things aren't so bad in the health
    care system, I just don't accept as being an accurate statement
    of the current situation in Iraq.
        Mr. Biddle. And I would just say that General Garner's
    timeline might be a bit optimistic on the number and variety of
    issues need to be addressed during that short a period.
        Mr. Welling. I'm just going to add that I think that the
    point that you made earlier is, if you have someone in your
    office who you want to be responsible for something so you can
    go to one place and give credit if it succeeds or one place to
    understand why it doesn't if it didn't, was manifest in some of
    the discussion that we had here today with people being
    responsible for different parts of the puzzle and not
    necessarily being able to address questions, that if you had
    someone who had primary responsibility as the central point of
    control here, some of the questions that were presented would
    have been answered.
        Mr. Shays. I don't want this last question to take 5
    minutes to answer, but I would like someone to define success
    and then tell me if we are going to succeed. Mr. Biddle, your
    mouth started to move first.
        Mr. Biddle. I mean, I'll take it in the short-term. I think
    one of the reasons all of us have focused on the security issue
    is we're worried about losing the hearts and minds of the Iraqi
    people. They've lived under 12--or 25 years of a brutal
    dictatorship. They suffered through a number of wars,
    repression of minorities and dissident. They've had a very
    challenging time, and the opportunity now to create a better
    society obviously through the removal of Saddam Hussein means
    that you need to touch people at their very core existence,
    which means being able to help them achieve some of their
    particular needs in the near-term.
        So health care, education for children, a secure
    environment to live in and obviously the transition to a
    governing process at the local and provincial and national
    level.
        But in the near-term, I think that really means the law and
    order, secure environment and then beginning to address these
    critical services, health, water, education and, of course, the
    food issue could become a challenging one in the near-term as
    well, and making sure that the Oil for Food Program
    distribution process is successful in meeting the needs of the
    population in the near-term. I would say that's going to
    determine the success over the next 6 months or so.
        So security on the one hand and basic human needs as you
    move to a larger reconstruction, transitional governance,
    larger issues that will obviously take some time. But I think
    those two aspects--and they go hand in hand together.
        Mr. Shays. Anybody else want to make a comment? Yes?
        Mr. Von Bernuth. I go back to your observations of your
    visit to Iraq not very long ago and what it meant to see it as
    opposed to read about it, and I think for me success is going
    to be when I visit Iraq and see kids going to school in the
    morning, see women being able to go out to market, see people
    milling about the streets in a casual way in the evenings, see
    storefronts opening up and be able to travel from town to town
    without going in a convoy. That's going to be success.
        Mr. Shays. I saw you, Mr. Biddle, nod your head as well.
        Mr. Biddle. It was more eloquently put in terms of the
    image he created. So I laud him for that.
        Mr. Shays. But you started it. And so you gave him time to
    think.
        Mr. Welling.
        Mr. Welling. It's a very important thing, to have time to
    think, yes. I think that success will be defined both for the
    Iraqi people in terms of quality of life which is better than
    the quality of life that they had prior to the war, so that not
    only do we need to meet the standard of what existed there
    before, but obviously our aspiration is to do something
    substantially better than that, and I personally think there's
    no question that we'll succeed, because I think that the--I
    think the American people have been engaged in this and
    understand that not only is it a great opportunity, but it's
    part of our obligation in undertaking this in the first
    instance.
        Mr. Shays. Should we end on that positive note? You all
    have been a wonderful panel. Mr. Henry, you wanted to say
    something.
        Mr. Henry. No. I just wanted to say that we will know that
    we've achieved success when the majority of the Iraqi people
    say that their lives are better than they were before, not just
    before the war but before this long nightmare that they've been
    living through.
        Mr. Shays. Right. And do you think we are going to succeed?
        Mr. Henry. I think we can succeed if we're prepared to
    commit the resources and stay the course.
        Mr. Shays. And based on what you've said we have done in
    Afghanistan, that would not be a positive model for us.
        Mr. Henry. We think more would need to be done.
        Mr. Shays. OK. I think all of you are a credit to your
    organization, and I think very highly of each of your
    organizations, in part by the presentation that you all have
    made today, and I thank you very much for participating in this
    very--I think very educational and helpful hearing. Thank you
    so much. And with that, the record will remain open for 2 weeks
    to provide information about documents, and with that we will
    adjourn this hearing. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 6:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]