[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
H.CON.RES. 268, A RESOLUTION REGARDING ATLANTIC HIGHLY MIGRATORY
SPECIES, INCLUDING MARLIN
=======================================================================
LEGISLATIVE HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES CONSERVATION, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS
of the
COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
Thursday, September 11, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-54
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Resources
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
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______
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COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES
RICHARD W. POMBO, California, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia, Ranking Democrat Member
Don Young, Alaska Dale E. Kildee, Michigan
W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin, Louisiana Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American
Jim Saxton, New Jersey Samoa
Elton Gallegly, California Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii
John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas
Wayne T. Gilchrest, Maryland Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey
Ken Calvert, California Calvin M. Dooley, California
Scott McInnis, Colorado Donna M. Christensen, Virgin
Barbara Cubin, Wyoming Islands
George Radanovich, California Ron Kind, Wisconsin
Walter B. Jones, Jr., North Jay Inslee, Washington
Carolina Grace F. Napolitano, California
Chris Cannon, Utah Tom Udall, New Mexico
John E. Peterson, Pennsylvania Mark Udall, Colorado
Jim Gibbons, Nevada, Anibal Acevedo-Vila, Puerto Rico
Vice Chairman Brad Carson, Oklahoma
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Raul M. Grijalva, Arizona
Greg Walden, Oregon Dennis A. Cardoza, California
Thomas G. Tancredo, Colorado Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam
J.D. Hayworth, Arizona George Miller, California
Tom Osborne, Nebraska Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Jeff Flake, Arizona Ruben Hinojosa, Texas
Dennis R. Rehberg, Montana Ciro D. Rodriguez, Texas
Rick Renzi, Arizona Joe Baca, California
Tom Cole, Oklahoma Betty McCollum, Minnesota
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico
Rob Bishop, Utah
Devin Nunes, California
Randy Neugebauer, Texas
Steven J. Ding, Chief of Staff
Lisa Pittman, Chief Counsel
James H. Zoia, Democrat Staff Director
Jeffrey P. Petrich, Democrat Chief Counsel
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SUBCOMMITTE ON FISHERIES CONSERVATION, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland, Chairman
FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey, Ranking Democrat Member
Don Young, Alaska Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American
W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin, Louisiana Samoa
Jim Saxton, New Jersey Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas
Walter B. Jones, Jr., North Ron Kind, Wisconsin
Carolina Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam
Randy Neugebauer, Texas Nick J. Rahall II, West Virginia,
Richard W. Pombo, California, ex ex officio
officio
------
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on Thursday, September 11, 2003..................... 1
Statement of Members:
Faleomavaega, Hon. Eni F.H., a Delegate in Congress from
American Samoa............................................. 6
Pallone, Hon. Frank, Jr., a Representative in Congress from
the State of New Jersey.................................... 4
Prepared statement of.................................... 5
Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from the State
of New Jersey.............................................. 1
Prepared statement of.................................... 3
Statement of Witnesses:
Balton, David A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Oceans and Fisheries, U.S. Department of State............. 20
Prepared statement of.................................... 23
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 25
Considine, John, Director of Cargo Verification Division,
Trade Compliance and Facilitation, Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection.......................................... 27
Prepared statement of.................................... 28
Dunnigan, John H., Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries,
National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.... 10
Prepared statement of.................................... 13
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 16
Hathaway, Rear Admiral Jeffrey J., Director of Coast Guard
Operations Policy, U.S. Coast Guard........................ 29
Prepared statement of.................................... 31
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 32
Additional materials supplied:
Recreational Fishing Alliance, Statement submitted for the
record by The Honorable Jim Saxton......................... 7
LEGISLATIVE HEARING ON H.CON.RES. 268, A RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE
SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON NATIONS THAT
ARE UNDERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT
MEASURES FOR ATLANTIC HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES, INCLUDING MARLIN,
ADOPTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
ATLANTIC TUNAS AND THAT ARE THREATENING THE CONTINUED VIABILITY OF
UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL AND RECREATIONAL FISHERIES.
----------
Thursday, September 11, 2003
U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans
Committee on Resources
Washington, DC
----------
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room 1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Jim Saxton
presiding.
Present: Representatives Saxton, Faleomavaega, and Pallone.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Saxton. Good morning and welcome to Members of the
Subcommittee and witnesses who have taken time out of their
schedules to be here with us today. Thank you for coming.
I am pleased to be here to discuss a resolution I have
sponsored and one which Mr. Gilchrest has joined me on. And
though he could not be here with us today, this is an issue of
importance to him as well.
While we held a hearing on a similar resolution during the
107th Congress, several new issues and subsequent questions
regarding this problem have arisen since then, and it is my
hope that we can examine them further and hopefully draw some
conclusions as to how we ought to proceed.
One of the biggest of these issues is that of compliance on
many levels. For example, as more than 90 percent of the
world's fish are taken within countries' EEZs, how do we get
compliance with international fishery regimes and within
countries' EEZs?
Another part of the compliance issue is, since white marlin
has been petitioned for listing under the U.S. Endangered
Species Act and the problem is international fishing pressure,
how do we get compliance on marlin conservation measures which
are already in place?
Finally, ICCAT was created to protect these species and to
work toward sustainable management goals to ensure their
survival. One question which could be logically asked of this
process is: What mechanisms are there for ICCAT to ensure
enforcement with member nations?
I have, for a very long time, been concerned with the
dramatic drop in population of white marlin. Prior to the
1960s, these species were healthy and thriving, just before the
introduction of pelagic longline fishing in the Atlantic Ocean.
Since this time, the species has steadily plummeted.
The latest stock assessment I have seen indicates the total
Atlantic marlin stock population has declined to less than 12
percent of its maximum sustainable yield level. Current fishing
mortality was estimated to be at least 7 times higher than the
maximum sustainable level. Overfishing had taken place for over
three decades, and the stock is less productive than previously
estimated, with a maximum sustainable yield of less than 1,300
metric tons. The bottom line: This species needs an immediate
strong conservation measure, or it may disappear forever.
This resolution represents an important step in the process
of international conservation of this dwindling species. I have
spent a great deal of time on this issue. It is important we
recognize that the bottom line is pelagic longline fishing is
an indiscriminate, irresponsible way of fishing. Though the
U.S. longline fleet does contribute to the taking of this
species, the majority of the bycatch comes from the
international fleets, and this needs to be stopped.
I was pleased that the Recreational Fishing Alliance filed
a petition with the U.S. Trade Representative last year,
requesting the President take action against the European Union
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended. Though
this petition was withdrawn, the issue remains a critical one.
As a contracting nation, the U.S. has a history of
compliance with ICCAT quotas and conservation measures.
However, the European Union, particularly Spain and Portugal,
has a history of serious non-compliance with ICCAT. For
example, the EU has consistently exceeded catch limits, quotas,
and landing limits for the Eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna and
ignored rules for the protection of juvenile swordfish.
In deciding that the white marlin does not warrant
designation as threatened or endangered under the Endangered
Species Act, the National Marine Fisheries Service said the
U.S. accounts for approximately 5 percent of the total
mortality of white marlin, while the rest is due to bycatch by
the international longline fisheries.
The petition alleges that the EU has committed three unfair
trade practices under Section 301, including: non-compliance
with ICCAT catch limits, quotas, and landing limits for certain
species of highly migratory fish; non-compliance with ICCAT
rules for the protection of juvenile fish; and granting
subsidies to the fishing industry through its Common Fisheries
Policy in violation of the WTO's Subsidies Agreement.
The U.S. is a world leader on so many important and complex
issues. I do not understand why the issue of fisheries
management and enforcement of regulations currently in place,
both domestically and internationally, seems to be impossible
to accomplish. I look forward to working with all of you to
find a solution to this grave problem. I fear if we do not,
many of these species will simply disappear forever, which
would be tragic.
Thank you, and I look forward to hearing the testimony. At
this time I will yield to Mr. Pallone for his comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton follows:]
Statement of The Honorable Jim Saxton, a Representative in Congress
from New Jersey
Good morning, and welcome members of the Subcommittee and the
witnesses who have taken the time out of their schedules to be with us
today. I am pleased to be here to discuss a resolution I have
sponsored, and one which Mr. Gilchrest has joined with me on, and
though he could not be with us today, this is an issue of importance to
him as well.
House Concurrent Resolution 268, which was introduced on July 31,
2003, expresses the sense of Congress regarding the imposition of trade
sanctions on nations that are undermining the effectiveness of
conservation and management measures for Atlantic marlin adopted by the
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)
and that are threatening the continued viability of United States
commercial and recreational fisheries.
While we held a hearing on a similar resolution during the 107th
Congress, several new issues and subsequent questions regarding this
problem have arisen since then and it is my hope we can examine them
further and hopefully draw some conclusions as to how we ought to
proceed.
One of the biggest of these issues is that of compliance--on many
levels. For example: as more than 90 percent of the world's fish are
taken within countries' EEZs, how do we get compliance with
international fishery regimes within countries' EEZs?
Another part of the compliance issue is: Since white marlin has
been petitioned for listing under the U.S. Endangered Species Act and
the problem is international fishing pressure, how do we get compliance
on marlin conservation measures already in place?
Finally, ICCAT was created to protect these species and to work
toward attainable management goals to ensure their survival. One
question which could be logically asked of this process is: what
mechanisms are there within ICCAT to insure compliance with member
nations?
I have for a very long time been concerned with the dramatic drop
in population of white marlin. Prior to the 1960s these species were
healthy and thriving, just before the introduction of pelagic longline
fishing in the Atlantic Ocean. Since this time, the species has
steadily plummeted.
The latest stock assessment I have seen indicates the total
Atlantic stock population had declined to less than 12 percent of its
maximum sustainable yield level; current fishing mortality was
estimated to be at least seven times higher than the maximum
sustainable level; over fishing had taken place for over three decades
and the stock is less productive than previously estimated, with a
maximum sustainable yield of less than 1300 metric tons. The bottom
line--this species needs an immediate strong conservation measure or it
may disappear forever.
This resolution represents an important step in the process of the
international conservation of this dwindling species. I have spent a
great deal of time on this issue, it is important we recognize the
bottom line is pelagic longline fishing is an indiscriminate,
irresponsible way of fishing. Though the U.S. longline fleet does
contribute to the taking of this species, the majority of bycatch comes
from the international fleets and this needs to be stopped.
I was pleased that the Recreational Fishing Alliance (RFA) filed a
petition with the U.S. Trade Representative last year, requesting the
President take action against the European Union under Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. Though this petition was withdrawn,
this issue remains a critical one.
As a contracting nation, the U.S. has a history of compliance with
ICCAT quotas and conservation measures. However, the European Union,
particularly Spain and Portugal, has a history of serious non-
compliance with ICCAT. For example, the EU has consistently exceeded
catch limits, quotas, and landing limits for Eastern Atlantic bluefin
tuna and ignored rules for the protection of juvenile swordfish.
In deciding that the white marlin does not warrant as threatened or
endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Marine
Fisheries Service said the U.S. accounts for approximately five percent
of the total mortality of white marlin, while the rest is due to
bycatch in international longline fisheries.
The petition alleges that the EU has committed three unfair trade
practices under Section 301 including: non-compliance with ICCAT catch
limits, quotas, and landing limits for certain species of highly
migratory fish, non-compliance with ICCAT rules for the protection of
juvenile fish, and granting subsidies to its fishing industry through
its Common Fisheries Policy in violation of the WTO Subsidies
Agreement. The U.S. is a world leader on so many important and complex
issues; I do not understand why the issue of fisheries management and
enforcement of the regulations currently in place both domestically and
internationally, seems impossible to accomplish. I look forward to
working with all of you to find a solution to this grave problem. I
fear if we do not, many of these species may simply disappear forever,
which would be tragic.
Thank you, and I look forward to hearing your testimony.
______
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Saxton. I want to thank you for
reintroducing this resolution and also our Chairman for
promptly holding a hearing on it. And if I am not already a
cosponsor, I would ask that I be made a cosponsor of the
resolution because I do support it.
As I said at our May Subcommittee hearing, international
fisheries agreements, including the International Commission
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, ICCAT, are critical for
a healthy ocean and a healthy economy. When fish stocks remain
at severely depleted levels, ecosystem structure is altered and
millions of dollars in revenue are lost every year.
As we learned at the Subcommittee's hearing last year on a
similar resolution, the Atlantic white marlin stock is in the
worst shape of all the species managed by ICCAT. Considering it
is only one of eight overfished highly migratory species, this
is quite a distinction. It is a distinction, however, that our
fishermen would rather not have to live with. Not only does
illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing undermine market
prices to a point that our law-abiding commercial fishermen can
no longer afford to fish, but IUU fishing also forces non-
commercial fishermen to be stringently regulated.
Forty years of ICCAT management has led to two-thirds of
the highly migratory species it oversees being overfished.
Although fisheries management is not easy and has not been done
exceptionally well anywhere in the world, the lack of
compliance by ICCAT contracting members with ICCAT's own
recommendations hamstrings this commission considerably. And if
U.S. fishermen are expected to adhere to national and
international laws while maintaining an economically viable
industry, our administration must be willing to take a strong
position supporting internationally enforceable
recommendations.
I am heartened, however, by the attention this problem is
receiving both within our Subcommittee and also with the
public. The Pew Oceans Report and the Dr. Myers and Dr. Worm's
Nature article leave no doubt that ICCAT's management of
international fisheries needs to improve, and I have high hopes
that this resolution will provoke a thorough debate at this
November's ICCAT meeting in Dublin.
The United States must continue to be a leader in
formulating internationally enforceable commission that will
lead to healthy stocks, but we must also improve our own
compliance as well. Although a challenging task, the increased
monitoring of the import and export of fish will lead to
greater understanding of this trade and help impede illegal and
unregulated commerce. And I look forward to hearing how the
administration is tackling this charge and whether we in
Congress can do anything to help.
And, again, thank you, Mr. Saxton, for once again bringing
this to our attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
Statement of The Honorable Frank Pallone, Ranking Democrat,
Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans
Good morning. I'd like to thank Mr. Saxton for reintroducing this
resolution and our Chairman for promptly holding a hearing on it. As I
said at our May subcommittee hearing, international fisheries
agreements, including the International Commission for the Conservation
for Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), are critical for a healthy ocean and a
healthy economy. When fish stocks remain at severely depleted levels,
ecosystem structure is altered, and millions of dollars in revenue are
lost every year.
As we learned at the subcommittee's hearing last year on a similar
resolution, the Atlantic white marlin stock is in the worst shape of
all the species managed by ICCAT. Considering it is only one of eight
overfished highly migratory species (HMS), this is quite a distinction.
It is a distinction, however, that our fishermen would rather not have
to live with. Not only does illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU)
fishing undermine market prices to a point that our law-abiding
commercial fishermen can no longer afford to fish, but IUU fishing also
forces non-commercial fishermen to be stringently regulated.
Forty years of ICCAT management has led to two thirds of the highly
migratory species it oversees being overfished. Although fisheries
management is not easy and has not been done exceptionally well
anywhere in the world, the lack of compliance by ICCAT contracting
members with ICCAT's own recommendations hamstrings this commission
considerably. And if United States fishermen are expected to adhere to
national and international laws, while maintaining an economically
viable industry, our administration must be willing to take a strong
position supporting internationally enforceable recommendations.
I am heartened, however, by the attention this problem is receiving
both within our subcommittee and the public's eye. The Pew Oceans
report and Dr. Myers and Dr. Worm's Nature article leave no doubt that
ICCAT's management of international fisheries needs to improve. I have
high hopes that this resolution will provoke a thorough debate at this
November's ICCAT meeting.
The United States must continue to be a leader in formulating
internationally enforceable recommendations that will lead to healthy
stocks, but we must also improve our own compliance as well.
Although a challenging task, the increased monitoring of the import
and export of fish will lead to greater understanding of this trade and
help impede illegal and unregulated commerce. I look forward to hearing
how the Administration is tackling this charge and whether we in
Congress can do anything to help. Thank you.
______
Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Faleomavaega?
STATEMENT OF HON. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, A DELEGATE IN CONGRESS
FROM AMERICAN SAMOA
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to add
my name as a cosponsor to the proposed resolution and commend
you and Mr. Gilchrest for bringing forth this resolution for
consideration by our Subcommittee. Not only is it overdue, but
we seriously need to review the situation with the fisheries.
It has always been my understanding that in the Atlantic area
there are some very serious problems in conservation and there
are moratoriums on several different species of fish. Of
course, for those of us from the Pacific, we have similar
problem, for example, with all the fishing countries from
Europe and everywhere else coming to the Pacific.
To my understanding, right now 53 percent of the world's
tuna comes from the Western and Central Pacific regions. We are
having problems with some of the European countries coming over
here, those having bilateral agreements with some of the island
nations. They completely disregard any measures of
conservation. They just take everything.
One of the concerns that I have expressed in earlier years,
Mr. Chairman, when you were Chairman of our Subcommittee is
that of miscellaneous fish that we just do not seem to care
about. Fishing boats go out and do not like the swordfish--
which have, you know, just as much protein in them, but are
disregarded because there is not a market value like tuna or
other species.
I am very concerned about this. In fact, I would like to
see a similar resolution to address the concerns we have in the
Pacific.
The question of drift nets is also being raised in the
Pacific. We have had some very interesting experiences in
dealing with these drifts nets, 15, 30 miles a stretch,
catching just about everything in sight. It has been a real
learning experience over the past years regarding some of the
countries that provide for these kinds of fishing methods.
I have also recommended to our Chairman that we hold an
oversight hearing on the recent Pew Oceans Commission Report
and a couple of other reports that address the situation with
the oceans and what this means to fisheries.
Unfortunately, I think we are not doing enough in promoting
more fisheries programs, agricultural development and fish
farming. Why we have to import $9 billion worth of fish every
year from foreign countries just escapes me. Why can't we do it
domestically on our own? I am puzzled by this.
I do want to offer my welcome to our friends who are going
to be testifying this morning, and I look forward to hearing
from them.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing
this morning.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega. I appreciate your
comments.
Just let me say that from a conservation point of view,
this is an extremely important issue--set of issues, I should
say. From an economic point of view, it is equally important.
You know, we talk a lot about the commercial fishing industry,
and that is very important to our economy. But it is a small
fraction, frankly, the commercial fishing aspect of this is a
small fraction of the total economic impact.
When Mr. Pallone stands on Sandy Hook and watches the
fishing boats go out to sea, you see a commercial boat go out,
and then you see ten recreational boats go out. And when he
stands at Manasquan Inlet in his district and he sees a
commercial fishing boat go out, then he sees 20 recreational
fishing boats go out. And when I stand at Barnegat Light or
Atlantic City Inlet and watch a commercial boat go out, I see
20 or 30 recreational boats go out.
And so this is a conservation issue, a set of conservation
issues that has enormous economic consequences if we do not
deal with it in an expeditious way.
And I might say that a lot of the economic impact is really
hidden from many who think about conservation. In the southern
part of New Jersey, Mr. Pallone and I probably have something
in the neighborhood of seven, eight, ten thousand people
working building boats that go out of Cape May and Atlantic
City and Barnegat and Manasquan and the other smaller inlets
along the coast. And these are little guys. These are guys that
do fiberglass work. These are guys that do plumbing. These are
electricians. These are people who are working hard to put
together a system of systems that is called a fishing boat.
For our State and for other coastal States, and for your
home as well, these are great issues, conservation issues, but
also economic issues that affect both the commercial and
recreational fishing industry.
So thank you all for being here. I just would like to ask
unanimous consent at this point to include a statement from the
Recreational Fishing Alliance for the record.
[The prepared statement of the Recreational Fishing
Alliance follows:]
Statement submitted for the record by the Recreational Fishing Alliance
I. Introduction
The Recreational Fishing Alliance (RFA) is a national, grassroots
political action organization representing individual sport fishermen
and the sport fishing industry. The RFA Mission is to safeguard the
rights of saltwater anglers, protect marine, boat and tackle industry
jobs and ensure the long-term sustainability of U.S. saltwater
fisheries. RFA members include individual anglers, boat builders,
fishing tackle manufacturers, party and charter boat businesses, bait
and tackle retailers, marinas, and many other businesses in fishing
communities.
The U.S. recreational fishing industry has a right to expect
foreign governments to live up to their treaty obligations. The
European Union has not lived up to its obligations under the
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT). The U.S. must take stronger steps to assert the interests of
the recreational fishing industry through ICCAT. Therefore, the RFA
fully supports H.Con.Res. 268.
II. Economics of Recreational Fishing
As stated in the 2003 Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation for
Atlantic Highly Migratory Species (SAFE report) from the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), recreational fishing has a large
impact on the economies of coastal communities. In fact, a 2002 report
from the American Sportfishing Association states that overall,
recreational fishing is a $116 billion industry in the United States.
While recreational fishing for highly migratory species such as
marlin, sharks, swordfish and tuna is a specialized segment of this
industry, it has a major impact on our Nation's economy and quality of
life. There is a vast segment of boat builders, fishing tackle
manufacturers, party and charter boat businesses, bait and tackle
retailers, marinas, and many other businesses in fishing communities
which cater specifically to recreational fishermen who fish for
Atlantic highly migratory species (HMS). For example, the Viking Yacht
Company in New Gretna, N.J., in Mr. Saxton's District employs over 1200
people who build 100 yachts a year that are specifically designed and
primarily used to target highly migratory species. There are also a
number of annual Atlantic HMS tournaments such as the Ocean City White
Marlin Open in Ocean City, Md., and the Mid-Atlantic $500,000 in Cape
May, N.J., which generate millions of dollars for coastal communities.
Thus, a large segment of the recreational fishing industry is dependent
on healthy stocks highly migratory species.
These fishermen have a strong, voluntary conservation ethic and
employ sustainable, inefficient fishing gear that traditionally has not
resulted in overfishing. In fact, recreational fishermen who fish for
marlin release over 98% of the fish they catch believing that fishing
for, hooking, fighting and releasing them to swim another day is a more
valuable experience than killing the fish for consumption.
III. Overfishing by the European Union
The Recreational Fishing Alliance asserts that fishing pressure by
the highly subsidized commercial longline vessels of the EU has placed
certain highly migratory species of the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent
seas at risk and resulted in violations of the International Convention
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), a commercial fisheries
treaty that permits the use of trade-related sanctions, and the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies
Agreement). The actions of the EU have turned the International
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas into the
International Convention for the Destruction of Atlantic Tunas. Less
fish plus more regulation of U.S. fishermen equals significantly less
participation in recreational fishing. Less participation equals
significantly less commerce for the recreational fishing industry.
IV. Why ICCAT is a Trade Agreement
The ICCAT Convention is a commercial fisheries agreement and, as
such, is a ``trade agreement'' within the meaning of Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974. The domestic implementing legislation for the ICCAT
Convention is the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975 (ATCA). This
statute is listed in the ``Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade
Statutes'' published by the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives (emphasis added), underlining the fact that the ICCAT
Convention is a type of trade agreement and the ATCA is the U.S. trade
statute implementing the ICCAT Convention domestically.
The ICCAT Convention is an international commodity agreement
designed to conserve natural resources by limiting harvesting of fish
through a total allowable catch (TAC) and individual participating
country quotas. As such, the ICCAT Convention is an international
commodity agreement that restricts the play of competitive market
forces because of its form. The ICCAT Convention is a ``trade
agreement'' because it restricts trade in the fish species that it
covers. By limiting the volume of fish that may be landed from national
vessels, the ICCAT Convention is restricting international trade in the
covered species.
V. The European Union's Unfair Trade Practices
The RFA alleges that the EU has committed three unfair trade
practices under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended:
(a) It has acted unjustifiably by violating and acting
inconsistently with the ICCAT Convention by non-compliance with the
catch limits, quotas, and landing limits for certain species of HMS and
rules for the protection of juvenile fish;
(b) It has acted unreasonably by refusing to accept the
determination of the scientific advisory body of ICCAT, the Standing
Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), that the stock for East
Atlantic bluefin tuna is over-exploited and that the total allowable
catch (TAC) for East Atlantic bluefin tuna should be limited to 25,000
metric tons, resulting in overfishing of East and West Atlantic bluefin
tuna; and
(c) It has provided subsidies to its fishing industry through its
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its funding mechanism, the Financial
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), that violate and are
inconsistent with the WTO Subsidies Agreement adopted by the EU and the
United States in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
These unfair trade practices are related because they are all part
of a common scheme by the European Union. The subsidies granted by the
European Union to its fishing sector have contributed to increasingly
large fleets that participate in unsustainable and illegal fishing in
the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas. The injection of 1.1 billion
Euros of public money into the fisheries sector each year in the EU
represents a significant proportion of the value of the total Community
production (7 billion Euros for fish landings). About $440 million a
year has been contributed by the EU and national governments to the
fisheries sector in subsidies that contribute to reducing the costs of
the investment of the fisheries sector and thus contributes to
overfishing.
Twenty-four percent of the structural aid provided by the EU to its
fisheries sector, or about 160 million Euros a year, has been used to
promote investment in the modernization or renewal of fishing vessels,
while 280 million Euros per year are paid for the right of about 850 EU
vessels to fish outside EU waters under fisheries agreements with non-
European third countries. The over-capacity in EU fleets has, in turn,
resulted in over-exploitation by the EU of HMS. The trade-distorting EU
fishing subsidies have had adverse effects on the U.S. commercial and
recreational fishing industries, resulting in serious prejudice to the
interests of the United States.
That EU subsidies for its fishing sector have led to overfishing
has been recognized by the EU Commission, which has stated bluntly that
``if current trends continue, many stocks will collapse. At the same
time, the available fishing capacity of the Community fleets far
exceeds that required to harvest fish in a sustainable manner.'' (See
ICCAT, 1999 Detailed Report--Swordfish, available at http://
www.iccat.es/, under ``Assessment and Biology,'' Species Groups, at
Table 29). Fueled by its subsidized over-capacity, the EU has violated
and acted inconsistently with the ICCAT Convention by failing to ensure
that vessels registered under its laws fish in a manner that is
consistent with ICCAT conservation and management measures relating to
East Atlantic bluefin tuna, North Atlantic swordfish, Atlantic white
marlin, and Atlantic blue marlin, all of which are highly migratory
species.
The EU has violated the ICCAT Convention by failing to enforce
binding ICCAT recommendations related to the catch of juvenile
swordfish and bluefin tuna. For example, despite a tolerance level set
at 15% of total landings for undersize fish, in 1998 Spain had a
landing percentage of juvenile North Atlantic swordfish of 37% and
Portugal had a landing percentage of 39.5%. Thus, Spain and Portugal
caught more than twice as many juvenile swordfish as permitted under
ICCAT rules.
The EU has acted inconsistently with the ICCAT Convention by
overfishing East Atlantic bluefin tuna in contravention of the
recommendations of ICCAT's Standing Committee on Research and
Statistics (SCRS). Such overfishing not only affects East Atlantic
bluefin tuna stocks but also West Atlantic bluefin tuna stocks because
there is significant mixing between the ``two stocks''. The
unwillingness of the EU to accept the scientific advice of the SCRS of
ICCAT is part of the pattern of systematic fixing of Total Allowable
Catch for fish by the EU members at levels higher than indicated in the
scientific advice provided to the EU from experts within the EU.
The EU's actions have placed excessive pressure on several HMS,
including the Atlantic white marlin, which is at approximately 15% of
the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) level. Drastic remedial action at
the international level forced by the United States is required because
the level of catch of white marlin by the U.S. domestic vessels
operating under the catch-and-release policy is only 5% of the total
mortality for Atlantic white marlin.
VI. Burden on U.S. Commerce
The unjustifiable and unreasonable practices of the EU have
burdened U.S. commerce by severely reducing fishing opportunities for
the recreational fishing industry as highly migratory species such as
the white marlin and bluefin tuna become harder and harder to catch.
Moreover, the failure of foreign ICCAT signatories to comply with catch
limits and quotas has resulted in increasing restrictions on U.S
recreational fishermen related to volume of fish they are allowed to
land in the United States.
For example, current regulations allow recreational fishermen to
retain only one bluefin tuna per person per trip during a short season;
current regulations allow recreational fishermen to retain only three
yellowfin tuna per person per trip; current regulations allow
recreational fishermen to retain only one swordfish per person per trip
and a maximum of only three per vessel. Depleted stocks of HMS combined
with these restrictions have resulted in significant harm to the
recreational fishing industry. Less fish plus more regulation equals
significantly less participation and less participation equals
significantly less commerce.
The U.S. recreational fishing industry has a right to expect
foreign governments to live up to their treaty obligations. The
European Union has not lived up to its obligations under the
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT). The U.S. must take stronger steps to assert the interests of
the recreational fishing industry through ICCAT. Therefore, the RFA
fully supports H.Con.Res. 268.
______
Mr. Saxton. I would also just note that a couple of
witnesses have asked that they be permitted to provide
testimony for more than the allotted 5 minutes, which is fine.
We are going to use the lights just as indicators so that you
know that your 5 minutes have come and gone, but we are
flexible this morning.
So thank you for being here. Our witnesses this morning
are: Mr. John Dunnigan, Director of the Office of Sustainable
Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service at NOAA; and Mr.
David A. Balton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans
and Fisheries, Department of State; Mr. John Considine,
Director of Cargo Verification Division, Trade Compliance and
Facilitation, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection; and Rear
Admiral Jeffrey J. Hathaway, Director of Coast Guard
Operations, United States Coast Guard.
Gentleman, thank you all for being here with us this
morning. Mr. Dunnigan, why don't you begin.
STATEMENT OF JOHN H. DUNNIGAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE
FISHERIES, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, NOAA, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. Dunnigan. I am Jack Dunnigan. I am the Director of the
Office of Sustainable Fisheries in NOAA Fisheries. If I could,
before I get into my testimony, Mr. Chairman, just a couple of
comments.
Today is obviously a very memorable day in the recent
history of our country. It is a day that reminds all of us as
to why we are Americans and brings us back to the true values
that are important to us all.
I would also like to take note of a sort of sad event last
week, and that is the passing of a former staffer of this
Committee and former NOAA Congressional Affairs staffer, Kip
Robinson. He was a leader and a true gentleman and a great
professional, and just a good guy. And we are all somewhat
diminished that he is not with us anymore, and I hope we can
all continue to carry forward the excellent example that he set
for us, both in his time at NOAA and working with the
Committee.
With that thank you, let me say I think this is the first
time, Mr. Chairman, that I have actually been before the
Committee in my new Federal capacity. I have had the pleasure
many times of being with you in my former position when I
worked for the Atlantic Coastal States. I am glad to be back
and honored to be able to represent the employees of NOAA and
its Fisheries Service in dealing with what really are some of
the very important issues that we have in the future of
fisheries conservation and management.
My new position has afforded me the opportunity to get more
actively involved with international fisheries issues. I am the
U.S. Government Commissioner now to the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization, and I a member of our ICCAT delegation,
and I supervise the International Fisheries Division. So it has
been an interesting and eye-opening experience. In many ways,
it is similar to what I encountered at the Atlantic State
Marine Fisheries Commission in that you are trying to put
together effective fisheries conservation and management with
regulatory institutions that are somewhat sovereign and take
great pride in their sovereignty. And what it does is it makes
the job very difficult because rather than being able to just
as a Federal Government say this is the way it is going to be
because our authority derives from the Magnuson-Stevens act, we
have to take the longer, harder, tougher approach of working
with colleagues and convincing them of the importance of what
we are doing and the absolute necessity to be aggressive in
moving forward with fisheries conservation and management.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask at this time that my written
statement be inserted in the record, and I will just summarize
a couple of the most salient points. Thank you.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you. Your statement will be included in
the record.
Mr. Dunnigan. I would like to focus, I think, for the
Committee's benefit mainly on the questions that you
specifically directed to NOAA in your letter of invitation.
Obviously, there is an interest here in trying to understand
what is it we can do in this international world to try to
bring countries together to do fisheries conservation and
management effectively.
The first thing that we have found that you have to do is
you have to create a big table. You have to have a forum and
encourage all of the parties to come together. We have seen a
major change, for example, in the International Commission for
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas over the last 15 years where
the membership of that organization has gone from about 20 to
almost 40. And by bringing more of the countries under the
tent, we say, it gives everybody a sense that they are
stakeholders in the process.
It is actually what we are doing now in the Western Pacific
with the development of the Western and Central Pacific Treaty
and Commission, creating a forum where all of the parties, all
of the countries who are stakeholders in these fisheries can
come together and decide mutually what is in their best
interest.
The second thing that we have to do is to be very attentive
and very aggressive, really, in making sure that these regional
fishery conservation organizations move forward with
responsible fisheries conservation and management measures. We
do that in all of the regional fishery management
organizations. I think if you look around the globe, you will
find that the United States is a leader in promoting
responsible fisheries conservation and management practices.
And it is not always easy to do because you have to recognize
that parties come to the table with a lot of different
interest, but that should not dissuade us from being as
assertive as we can in sticking to good science-based
management that points the direction that we have to go so that
we can achieve some of the economic benefits that the Chairman
was referring to in his opening statement.
The third thing that you have to do is you then have to
make sure that all of those countries go home and implement
those measures, and that requires a lot of attention and a lot
of follow-up by all of the parties. Certainly in my office, we
are responsible for implementing, for example, all of the ICCAT
recommendations for United States fishermen. But at the same
time, it is very important for us to not just focus on what we
are doing in our own fisheries, but keep a weather eye out for
what our partners in the international community are doing.
Earlier this year, there was an exchange of correspondence
with the European Community over steps that they are taking to
implement the recommendations out of ICCAT, and I think Dr.
Hogarth in his discussions with the EU representatives has made
is very clear that we appreciate the steps that the EU has said
that they are going to take, but we are going to keep our eyes
on them to make sure that they follow through.
And then the fourth thing that we have to do is to make
sure that these countries not only talk the talk and that we
talk the talk, but that we actually implement and carry these
things out. So it is a complex process to try to make these
organizations work, but as a matter of fact, it is the steps
that you have to take in a modern world if you are going to be
able to influence ultimately the outcomes that you want to see
in our international oceanic fisheries.
A number of your questions also deal with IUU fishing, and
let me say that I think over the last 5 years, there has been
more attention given to IUU fishing by all countries than any
of us might have expected when we started down this road. The
problem with IUU fishing, your questions indicated some concern
about whether it was a bigger problem in oceanic fisheries as
opposed to coastal fisheries. And we don't really have a good
feel for that. The problem, of course, is that the IUU
fishermen who are all fishing illegally are not very
transparent about what they are doing, so it is hard to get
information.
The other thing that has made IUU a greater problem in
oceanic fisheries over the last couple of years really stems
from three factors.
First of all, the technology has gotten a lot better with
advances in GPS, with advances in gear, with mechanical
advances in power plants that fishing vessels can put on. It is
much easier for fishermen to get out into the oceans and
exploit these where they are away from surveillance that often
predominates in coastal fisheries.
I think, second, there has been a stepped-up amount of
enforcement by countries all over the world in their coastal
fisheries, and that enforcement has forced these IUU vessels,
these illegal vessels that do not belong in any fishery, away
from coastal fisheries.
And, third, some of the species that these IUU fisheries
are most interested in have become extremely valuable in the
current world marketplace for fish products. If you look at the
value of salmon, if you look at the value of Chilean sea bass,
there is tremendous profit to be made in these illegal
fisheries, and I think that also is stemming there.
One of the things that the United States has done over the
last couple of years to help address this issue is to become a
leader in putting together what we call the MCS, the marine
monitoring, conservation, and surveillance program, which
involves about 20 countries right now. The United States chairs
this effort. The United States runs the website, and it is a
cooperative enforcement program among all of these countries to
work together to identify where the IUU fishing is happening
and coordinate enforcement responses to that.
We think we have had a lot of success in the last couple of
years, for example, with illegal imports of Patagonian
toothfish, and we have been able to do that because we have the
enforcement cooperation of the other countries through the MCS
network. Chile has been an important part of that, as have
other countries from the Southern oceans. So it is an important
thing for us to continue to follow up on.
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, a couple of your questions dealt
specifically with ICCAT. We are getting ready right now very
carefully for the ICCAT meeting, which will be held in Dublin
in the second week of November. There are a number of
activities that are ongoing. I know at least one of our
commissioners is with us here this morning. Bob Hayes is here.
I don't know if Glenn has made it yet. But we would agree that
it is very important to improve the conservation and
implementation measures that the countries are taking under
ICCAT.
There was an intercessional meeting that was held in
Madeira last May where we looked at the compliance measures
that are currently in place. Part of the problem in ICCAT is
that these measures have been specified on a fishery-by-fishery
basis as the commission moved forward to address the
conservation that was necessary for these species. We think
that ICCAT ought to take a broader approach, and we think that
by doing that, we will be able to improve overall the ability
of the ICCAT contracting parties to make sure that the
recommendations are complied with.
We also think that there is a very difficult problem with
data in a lot of these ICCAT fisheries. The United States
delegation made a major point of this at our meeting last year,
and we will be having a follow-up meeting in Madrid on October
the 11th.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, let me move on here and say
again it is a pleasure to be able to be here, and I look
forward to being able to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dunnigan follows:]
Statement of John H. Dunnigan, Director, Office of Sustainable
Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to present testimony on H.Con.Res. 268 and topics related
to international fishery conservation and management. I am John H.
Dunnigan, Director of the Office of Sustainable Fisheries in the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of
Commerce. I am the U.S. Government Commissioner to the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries Organization, and I serve on the U.S. Delegation to
the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT).
NOAA is pleased that the Subcommittee is focusing on efforts to
ensure greater compliance with conservation measures adopted by
international regional fishery management organizations (RFMOs) by both
member and non-member nations, as well as the effect that illegal,
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities are having on the
effectiveness of conservation measures. We have devoted increased
effort to these areas in recent years, and we appreciate the
Subcommittee's interest in and support of these activities.
The Department welcomes H.Con.Res. 268, expressing the sense of
Congress in ensuring compliance by foreign fishing fleets with the
ICCAT conservation and management program. We recognize that Congress
has provided a number of tools to encourage compliance with ICCAT rules
and the rules of other RFMOs. We believe that the tools that result
from multilateral decision processes are likely to be the most
effective, and we intend to pursue their development and
implementation.
In its letter of invitation, the Subcommittee raised a number of
questions regarding compliance with international conservation and
management measures, and IUU fishing. I will address these concerns in
this same order.
Compliance with RFMO Conservation and Management Measures and IUU
Fishing
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
defines IUU fishing to include wrongful fishing wherever it might occur
on the high seas or in areas of national jurisdiction. The United
States is completing its corresponding National Plan of Action in
response to the agreement of the international community to the FAO
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate IUU
Fishing. The Department of State took the lead in its development, and
I will defer to its witness to brief you fully on this National Plan of
Action.
The FAO estimates that more than 90 percent of the world's marine
fish harvests take place within areas of national jurisdiction. The
question then arises, how do we secure compliance with international
fishery regimes within areas of national jurisdiction? By definition,
the question relates to highly migratory and straddling fish stocks.
The answer is simpler in theory than in practice: first, we must ensure
that the relevant coastal states are members of the applicable RFMO or,
at least, observe its rules; second, we must ensure that the RFMO
adopts appropriate conservation and management measures; third, we must
ensure that the members implement in their domestic laws and
regulations the measures agreed to within the RFMO; and, finally, we
must ensure that these domestically implemented measures are properly
enforced by the coastal states. Conservation can and will fail if any
of these links is broken or not present. Importantly, the United
Nations Fish Stock Agreement requires states whose fishing vessels
operate in any area covered by a relevant RFMO to join the RFMO or
agree to apply its conservation and management measures. This
provision, however, only applies to Parties to the U.N. Agreement.
The Subcommittee has also asked how much of the world's overfishing
takes place within areas of national jurisdiction and how much occurs
on the high seas. Complete documentation of the incidence of IUU
fishing, either on the high seas or in areas under national
jurisdiction, and the degree to which it contributes to overfishing
does not exist. Those engaged in IUU fishing make every effort to
conceal their activities. Also, I am not aware of any accepted estimate
of the share of overfishing in high seas areas versus areas of national
jurisdiction. I believe, however, that many of the most well-known
examples of historic overfishing, e.g., various cod fisheries in the
Atlantic off Canada, Iceland and Norway; sardines off California; and
orange roughy in the South Pacific, have taken place largely, if not
predominantly, in areas of national jurisdiction.
IUU fishing on the high seas is a significant contemporary problem
because the fishing technology employed tends to be very efficient and
the target species, e.g., salmon and Patagonian toothfish, very
valuable. IUU fishing on the high seas can do serious damage in a
relatively short period of time; nevertheless, IUU fishing within areas
of national jurisdiction likely contributes more to missing
conservation goals than does IUU fishing on the high seas. At one
extreme, even countries with the finest fisheries enforcement
capabilities, like the United States, cannot conduct monitoring and
surveillance everywhere within their jurisdictions. At the other
extreme, the majority of the world's coastal states have far less
adequate and, in some cases, virtually nonexistent fisheries
enforcement capabilities. The same is true of their fisheries
management, and scientific information collection and analysis
capabilities. Coastal states that target highly migratory and
straddling fish stocks, share a common interest in their ability to
execute these functions. A number of ICCAT's newest members are
countries in need of and desiring such internal capacity building. To
that end, the United States is involved in a number of initiatives that
directly address capacity building in needed areas, including the White
Water to Blue Water initiative and the Large Marine Ecosystems project.
While there are no quick fixes with regard to this important matter,
any efforts to improve the ability of countries to monitor and control
their fleets will help in combating IUU fishing.
I also want to note our involvement in establishing and providing
leadership to, along with our Chilean colleagues, the International
Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) Network. The MCS Network is
a web-based, virtually cost-free alliance of fisheries enforcement
professionals founded to enhance cooperation, coordination, and
information collection and exchange. Its expanding membership includes
11 states plus the Forum Fisheries Agency of the Central and South
Pacific and the European Union. It is a very tangible implementation of
the International Plan of Action on IUU fishing, as well as a means to
expand the effectiveness and efficiency of fisheries enforcement,
particularly for developing countries.
ICCAT
ICCAT coordinates the international management of Atlantic tunas
and tuna-like species. The organization currently has 36 members.
Primary U.S. objectives over the last several years have included
seeking measures to rebuild overfished stocks and improve adherence to
ICCAT rules by members and non-members. With regard to rebuilding, we
have had a number of successes, including the adoption of rebuilding
plans for western bluefin tuna (1998), North Atlantic swordfish (1999),
and blue and white marlins (2000). As you may know, the sacrifices made
to rebuild North Atlantic swordfish began to show results last year
with a significant increase in biomass. Although the resultant increase
in total allowable catch was higher than the United States would have
liked, we were nevertheless pleased to see such encouraging signs from
the fishery in such a short time.
ICCAT has adopted a variety of state-of-the-art compliance
measures, including imposing penalties (e.g., quota reductions, trade
sanctions) against members for infractions. The Commission has also
adopted action plans that contemplate the use of trade sanctions
against member and non-member countries that diminish the effectiveness
of ICCAT, and sanctions have been imposed in several instances. These
measures have been successful in reducing IUU fishing in the Convention
area. Most recently in its fight against IUU fishing, ICCAT adopted a
vessel list program that provides a basis to limit market access to
only those products taken by authorized vessels.
Despite the strides made at ICCAT, particularly over the last
decade, a number of difficult issues remain. Data collection and
reporting continue to be a challenge for some parties, and a special
meeting will be held in fall 2003 to consider this matter. Moreover,
the stock structure of Atlantic bluefin tuna, currently managed as two
separate stocks, remains in question. ICCAT agreed to convene a meeting
of scientists and managers in November 2003 to consider this issue. In
addition, ensuring that ICCAT rebuilding plans stay on course and that
new programs are developed for any other overfished stocks will be
important. We intend to ensure that ICCAT continues to make needed
progress in improving member compliance and non-member cooperation,
including addressing IUU issues. Progress was made in this area during
recent intersessional meetings at which members worked to streamline
ICCAT's current trade instruments and considered the need to broaden
substantially its existing compliance regime. Currently, the 100
percent quota payback provision applies to all species under catch or
landings limitations, including marlin. The penalty and trade sanction
provisions of this regime, however, only apply to bluefin tuna and
swordfish. Trade sanction provisions also apply to bigeye tuna. ICCAT
is developing a more comprehensive monitoring and control program, part
of which includes clearly defining flag state duties and requiring the
use of vessel monitoring systems and logbooks. ICCAT will again
consider these issues in November 2003.
With respect to compliance issues in ICCAT fisheries, the Secretary
of Commerce sent letters to the European Commission (EC) in April of
this year. Secretary Evans noted the importance of the conservation of
marine fisheries and expressed concern about actions and positions
taken by the EC at ICCAT in 2002, particularly regarding EC support of
an eastern bluefin tuna total allowable catch far in excess of
scientifically recommended, sustainable levels. Secretary Evans stated
that positions such as these have the potential to threaten the long-
term future of shared resources and to lead to serious friction in
U.S.- EC trade relations. As an example, the Secretary pointed to a
petition filed by a recreational fishing organization under Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 that sought relief from allegedly
unjustifiable acts, policies, and practices of the EC related to ICCAT.
Although this petition was withdrawn prior to the 2002 ICCAT meeting,
in his letter, the Secretary urged the EC to take prompt action to
improve EC compliance with existing ICCAT measures and to reconsider
accepting science-based conservation measures in the future.
NOAA Fisheries has also received a request to certify the EC
pursuant to the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of
1967, for diminishing the effectiveness of ICCAT. The decision on
certification has been left open for the time being while we monitor
the activities of the EC and its Member States. In this regard,
Assistant Administrator Hogarth sent a letter to EC Director General
for Fisheries explaining the request, noting its seriousness, and
indicating that we intend to investigate it fully. He has also been in
contact with the head of the EC delegation to ICCAT concerning this
matter, and we continued our dialogue at the U.S.-EC High Level
Fisheries Consultations, held June 30 - July 1, 2003, in Washington,
D.C., we have consistently stressed the importance of EC implementation
of its ICCAT commitments and will continue to do so.
The United States intends to continue its active involvement in
addressing the problems of overfishing and IUU fishing at the national,
regional, and global levels. NOAA and its federal partners faced these
challenges with regard to large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing on the
high seas. NOAA Fisheries will bring our responsibilities for
recovering and conserving protected species and habitats, and our
concern with reducing bycatch and addressing IUU fishing to bear in
addressing these problems as part of NOAA's global marine stewardship
mission.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to review how NOAA
Fisheries is conducting the tasks assigned it pursuant to the many
international fisheries treaties and conventions with which the United
States is involved. We are committed to working with our state and
federal partners for the effective management of our Nation's fisheries
resources. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions from Members of the Subcommittee.
______
[Mr. Dunnigan's response to questions submitted for the
record follows:]
Questions submitted for the record by John Dunnigan from The Honorable
Frank Pallone, Jr., Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife
and Oceans Hearing on H.Con.Res. 268, September 11, 2003
Question #1: Can you give examples of the instances in which trade
sanctions have been imposed and particularly the ones the U.S. has been
involved with?
Answer: The International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) has adopted and the United States has
implemented the following trade restrictive measures with respect to
the following countries:
Bluefin Tuna and Swordfish Action Plan Recommendations:
Panama--ICCAT agreed to impose bluefin tuna sanctions in 1996;
recommendation entered into force August 1997; U.S. regulations
effective January 1998. ICCAT agreed to lift sanctions in 1999; entered
into force June 2000; U.S. regulations effective January 2001.
Honduras--ICCAT agreed to impose bluefin tuna sanctions in 1996;
entered into force August 1997; U.S. regulations effective August 1997.
ICCAT agreed to impose swordfish sanctions in 1999; entered into force
June 2000; U.S. regulations effective January 2001. ICCAT agreed to
lift bluefin and swordfish sanctions in 2001; entered into force
September 2002; U.S. regulations under development.
Belize--ICCAT agreed to impose bluefin tuna sanctions in 1996;
entered into force August 1997; U.S. regulations effective August 1997.
ICCAT agreed to impose swordfish sanctions in 1999; entered into force
June 2000; U.S. regulations effective January 2001. Preliminary
agreement in 2002 to lift bluefin tuna and swordfish sanctions; there
was an affirmative decision at the 2003 ICCAT meeting to lift sanctions
as of January 2004.
Unregulated and Unreported Catches Recommendations:
ICCAT members:
Equatorial Guinea--Agreed to impose bigeye tuna sanctions in 2000;
entered into force June 2001; regulations effective December 2002.
Honduras--Agreed to impose bigeye tuna sanctions in 2000; entered
into force October 2001. Agreed to lift in 2002; entered into force
June 2003; U.S. regulations under development.
Non-Members:
Belize--Agreed to impose bigeye tuna sanctions in 2000; entered
into force October 2001; U.S. regulations effective December 2002.
Preliminary agreement in 2002 to lift bluefin tuna and swordfish
sanctions; there was an affirmative decision at the 2003 ICCAT meeting
to lift sanctions as of January 2004.
Cambodia--ICCAT agreed to impose bigeye tuna sanctions in 2000;
entered into force October 2001; U.S. regulations effective December
2002.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines--ICCAT agreed to impose bigeye tuna
sanctions in 2000; entered into force October 2001; U.S. regulations
effective December 2002. Preliminary agreement in 2002 to lift as of
January 2004 pending affirmative decision by ICCAT in 2003.
Sierra Leone--ICCAT agreed to impose bigeye tuna, swordfish, and
bluefin tuna sanctions in 2002; entered into force June 2003; U.S.
regulations under development.
Bolivia--ICCAT agreed to impose bigeye tuna sanctions in 2002;
entered into force June 2003; U.S. regulations under development.
Georgia--ICCAT agreed to impose bigeye tuna sanctions in 2003; will
enter into force June 2004. U.S. regulations will be developed.
ICCAT compliance recommendations requiring quota payback for
overharvest and authorizing trade sanctions as a last resort:
Equatorial Guinea (ICCAT member)--ICCAT agreed to impose bluefin
tuna and swordfish sanctions in 1999; entered into force June 2000;
regulations effective January 2001.
Question #2: Have these sanction measures been effective?
Answer: The sanction decisions taken by ICCAT have greatly reduced,
if not eliminated, harvests of the embargoed species by the sanctioned
country. Moreover, the multilateral sanctions have provided an
incentive to many of these countries to cooperate with ICCAT by
deregistering IUU vessels, implementing monitoring and control regimes,
joining the Commission, etc. These actions have reduced fishing
pressure on the stocks in question and have improved ICCAT's control
over the fisheries under its purview.
Question #3: What is the hesitancy of the Commission to adopt
action plans that actually use trade sanctions rather than
contemplating them?
Answer: The idea expressed by the word ``contemplate'' does not
mean ICCAT does not take decisions to apply trade restrictive measures,
where appropriate and deemed to be effective. ICCAT has adopted a
number of measures that provide the Commission express authority to
adopt binding decisions to impose trade restrictive measures under
certain circumstances. Further, the process for arriving at these
decisions is set out in the action plans and other documents to ensure
that the Commission acts in a fair and transparent manner relative to
any trade decision it may take. As noted, ICCAT has used trade measures
numerous times to support stock conservation.
Question #4: Can you explain the quota payback provision of ICCAT's
compliance recommendations and why trade sanction provisions only apply
to swordfish and bluefin tuna?
Answer: The 1996 compliance recommendation outlines a process for
members to first explain how any overharvest occurred and then describe
the actions they have taken to prevent further overharvests. Such
explanations must be made to the Compliance Committee each year. The
agreement also requires repayment of 100 percent of the amount of these
overharvests, and ICCAT may recommend other appropriate actions.
Continued overharvests can result in other penalties, including quota
reductions of at least 125 percent of the overharvest and, as a last
resort, trade restrictive measures. ICCAT agreed at its 1997 meeting to
extend the 1996 compliance agreement to include the South Atlantic
swordfish fishery. At its 1998 meeting, ICCAT adopted a supplemental
recommendation that clarifies the application of the compliance
recommendations in the eastern Atlantic bluefin fishery and the North
Atlantic swordfish fishery.
In 2000, a recommendation was adopted to simplify the rules
regarding the application of quota overharvest and underharvest. This
recommendation specifies that for any species under quota/catch limit
management, underages/overages from one year may be added to/must be
subtracted from the quota/catch limit of the management period
immediately after, or one year after that year. However, if any
recommendation on a stock specifically deals with overages/underages,
then the stock-specific recommendation will take precedence. The 2000
recommendation recognizes that it is difficult to deduct an overharvest
from the following year's quota given that there is a one year lag in
the receipt of catch information and Compliance Committee action. It is
possible, however, that certain countries can anticipate an overharvest
and take internal steps to address overharvests from one year to the
next. This recommendation entered into force in 2001.
The compliance recommendations of 1996 and 1997 only covered
swordfish and bluefin tuna because these were the only species under
quota management at the time. Since then, a number of other stocks have
come under such management, including bigeye and albacore tunas and
blue and white marlins.
Question #5: Would you need additional authority to implement trade
sanctions on other highly migratory species and if so, what form would
this authority ideally take--U.S. legislation or ICCAT recommendation?
Answer: In order to assess quota penalties and to apply trade
sanctions on species not already covered by ICCAT's compliance
recommendations, the Commission needed to expand the scope of existing
measures to include all species under quantitative harvest restriction.
At its November 2003 meeting, ICCAT adopted a resolution on trade that
lays out a comprehensive approach to the application of trade
restrictive measures. It applies broadly to all species, and all
countries, both contracting and non-contracting parties.
Question #6: Under what regime are trade sanctions applied to
bigeye tuna fishing infractions?
Answer: To date, the Commission has recommended trade restrictive
measures against ICCAT members and non-members on bigeye tuna products
in accordance with the 1998 Unregulated and Unreported Catches
Resolution. This instrument was limited in its application as it
addressed IUU fishing by large-scale tuna longline vessels. In future
years, trade restrictive measures will be adopted in accordance with
the November 2003 trade resolution.
Question #7: Has the United States received a response to the
letters sent to the EC in early 2003?
Answer: The United States received a response from the EC's
Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries in early
June. The Commissioner expressed surprise at the letter sent by
Secretary Evans, noting, among other things, that the United States had
agreed to the eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna total allowable catch at
the 2002 ICCAT meeting and disagreeing with the U.S. interpretation of
the scientific advice. Secretary Evans responded to the EC in July
2003. He noted that the United States and the EC differ on our
interpretations of scientific advice but that the United States did
agree to the eastern bluefin tuna TAC in 2002. An important part of
that agreement, however, was EC implementation of measures to reduce
small fish harvests, which should help offset any negative effects of
the high TAC, and to improve data collection and reporting. He called
on the EC to implement faithfully its ICCAT commitments.
Question #8: Are these letters a precursor to further action?
Answer: The United States will continue to engage the EC on
conservation and compliance matters relative to ICCAT species. We have
met with our fisheries counterparts numerous times to emphasize to them
the importance of full implementation of ICCAT's decisions
(particularly relative to quotas, reducing small bluefin tuna harvests,
and improving data collection and submission), and to seek specifics on
this implementation. We will continue to make these efforts. As you may
know, late last year a request was submitted to the Department of
Commerce to certify the EC under the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's
Protective Act. At this time, we have left the certification decision
open pending further investigation and discussion with the EC.
Question #9: Is this the extent to which the administration is
willing to push countries to comply with international fisheries
management recommendations or is this administration willing to impose
trade restrictions to encourage other countries to comply with
international recommendations?
Answer: Notwithstanding the Pelly review discussed above, this
administration has imposed trade sanctions against both ICCAT members
and non-members to encourage conformance with ICCAT's rules pursuant to
multilateral decisions taken at ICCAT. In addition, we have implemented
a trade tracking program for swordfish that allows us to keep
undersized swordfish out of our market. As noted above in the response
to Question #5, ICCAT took action at its November 2003 meeting to adopt
a new resolution on trade, which we expect will improve the process
significantly.
Question #10: Has information concerning the Atlantic Tunas
Convention Act (ATCA) requirement to identify annually those nations
whose fishing vessels are fishing or have fished in the previous
calendar year in a manner that diminishes the effectiveness of a
conservation recommendation been regularly provided to the Committee?
When was the last time it was provided?
Answer: Yes. The ATCA requires that the Secretary of Commerce
prepare an annual report to the Congress on Atlantic Highly Migratory
Species by April 1 of each year. Section 2 of that report contains
relevant information with respect to the identification requirement. We
last sent in this report in April 2003.
Question #11: Has a plan to develop a trade monitoring program for
the import, export, and re-export of swordfish and bigeye tuna been
formulated? What are the obstacles to implementing such a plan?
Answer: NOAA Fisheries is currently developing a proposed rule that
would replace the existing U.S. Swordfish Certificate of Eligibility
program with the ICCAT Swordfish Statistical document. The rule would
also implement the ICCAT and IATTC Bigeye Tuna Statistical document
programs and adopt means to use the statistical documents in
conjunction with the ICCAT authorized vessel list to prohibit imports
of IUU product. Careful coordination will be required between NOAA
Fisheries and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection regarding
examination and validation of documents. NOAA Fisheries is examining
the resource implications of implementing the programs.
Question #12: Is it true that the United States has been out of,
and may still be out of, compliance with ICCAT recommendations on
observer coverage for all longline trips targeting yellowfin and bigeye
tuna?
Answer: U.S. observer coverage on the pelagic longline fleet has
fluctuated between about 3 percent and 6 percent between 1992 and 2001
and was increased to 8 percent in 2002. Coverage has been 100 percent
for the Grand Banks swordfish fleet for the last 3 years. While the
United States may have been out of compliance on some harvest
limitations and minimum size tolerances in particular years, this is
not a routine occurrence. In such cases, corrective actions are taken
either through regulatory adjustments or catch limit adjustments
consistent with ICCAT recommendations. All such corrective actions have
been reported to ICCAT via the annual U.S. National Report.
Question #13: NOAA Fisheries is reportedly evaluating the efficacy
of recently implemented time-area closures intended to reduce bycatch.
Can you summarize the preliminary results that have been found for
these closures? Are international time and area closures a potentially
effective tool for international fisheries management?
Answer: The preliminary evaluation of the area closures was
presented in the 2003 Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation Report
for Atlantic Highly Migratory Species. Generally, swordfish discards
declined by 25 percent and bluefin tuna and marlin discards declined by
around 50 percent. International time area closures could be effective
if the bycatch species of concern are concentrated in discrete areas.
If the bycatch species are widely dispersed, the costs in terms of lost
target catch would render area closures impractical. In such cases gear
modifications may be more feasible.
Question #14: Last year this hearing focused heavily on white
marlin and the depleted nature of the stocks. Dr. John Graves mentioned
the lack of data about post-release mortality as a problem. Have any
further studies on post-release mortality been completed? Is post-
release mortality factored into the current stock assessments of
Atlantic white marlin?
Answer: Dr. Graves and his research team are investigating post-
release mortality of Atlantic white marlin. It is an ongoing research
concern, but certainly not the only one. The ICCAT Advisory Committee
and the ICCAT Standing Committee on Research and Statistics have
separately compiled lists of research needs for this species. In
addition to post-release mortality, they include: the identification of
habitat preferences; more generalized production-based population
assessment models; development of methods to minimize bycatch in each
of the multiple fisheries in which bycatch occurs; and the
identification of biological parameters. Research on post-release
mortality is not yet at a stage at which it can be factored into
current stock assessments in any comprehensive manner.
Question #15: Do you think that recovery of North Atlantic
swordfish by 2009 or before is possible given the total allowable catch
(TAC) limit set by ICCAT in 2002? If not, does the rebuilding plan need
to be amended?
Answer: Recovery of North Atlantic swordfish to biomass levels that
would support maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is possible by 2009 under
the revised ICCAT quotas. However, given the high proportion of
juvenile fish in the current standing stock, it is important that
harvesting nations abide by the minimum size restrictions to avoid
excess mortality on pre-spawning fish. If continued progress is not
evident at the next stock assessment, ICCAT may revise the TAC to
reduce fishing mortality. The United States will monitor contracting
parties' compliance with minimum sizes.
Question #16: A paper appeared in the journal Science in January of
this year estimating that populations of several of the large coastal
and oceanic sharks (including scalloped, hammerhead, white, and
thresher sharks) have declined by over 75% in the past 15 years. ICCAT
is not responsible for managing these highly migratory species;
however, it is obvious that without some regulation these species will
continue to be decimated.
Is there currently an international body monitoring and/
or regulating the demise of highly migratory shark species?
If not, should there be and what form should it take--
regulation under ICCAT or a separate body or conservation fund?
Answer:
The United States has been aggressively pursuing for a
number of years improved information collection requirements and
management measures for sharks in the ICCAT context. Similarly, we have
been pressing the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) for
the establishment of catch limits on thorny skates, which account for
the vast majority of skate catches in the NAFO Regulatory Area. When
the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean comes into force,
the Commission it creates will have management competence over pelagic
sharks, although its initial focus will be on tunas.
Working with the Congress, we are addressing the problem
of shark finning. We have implemented and are enforcing the Shark
Finning Prohibition Act, and I am happy to inform you that the
following countries and the European Union have adopted domestic
measures that address shark finning in an effort to prohibit the
practice: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, India, Nicaragua,
Oman, and South Africa. In the case of Nicaragua, U.S. officials
consulted regularly with authorities in Managua in the drafting of
anti-finning legislation, and their final law is nearly identical to
that of the United States. Mexico is in the process of developing
comprehensive shark fishing regulations that may prohibit shark
finning.
Generally speaking, we think the best approach at this
time to addressing the conservation needs of sharks is to continue
carrying out the international mandates in the Shark Finning
Prohibition Act and to implement the FAO International Plan of Action
for the Conservation and Management of Sharks (IPOA) by urging
countries to develop corresponding national plans of action and by
insisting that regional fishery management organizations carry out
their important roles under the IPOA.
Question #17: Are data collected by Custom's Automated Commercial
System (ACS) on imports for fish species and products reported to
Congress in an annual report? When was the last time that equivalent
information was provided to Congress?
Answer: The annual report to Congress required by the Atlantic
Tunas Convention Act provides import statistics for all Atlantic highly
migratory species of fish. In addition, specific information on the
swordfish and bluefin tuna import monitoring programs is provided in
the annual U.S. National Report to ICCAT and the annual Stock
Assessment and Fishery Evaluation Report for Atlantic Highly Migratory
Species (both available on NOAA Fisheries website). We are not aware of
any particular Congressional request to the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection.
______
Mr. Saxton. Jack, thank you very, very much for a very good
statement.
Mr. Balton?
STATEMENT OF DAVID A. BALTON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR OCEANS AND FISHERIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Balton. Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee,
thank you. It is a great pleasure to be here today. I do have a
written statement, and with your permission, I would ask that
it be included in the record.
Mr. Saxton. Without objection.
Mr. Balton. Thank you.
I know that this Subcommittee has a particular interest in
matters affecting Atlantic tunas and the organization known as
ICCAT. What I would like to do in my oral statement, though, is
to provide what I see as the broader context within which these
issues need to be dealt. I would like to make three basic
points today:
One--and this will not come as a surprise to anyone--IUU
fishing, illegal fishing, is a very serious problem worldwide.
Two, the United States has been a real leader
internationally in trying to tackle this problem, and we have
had some real successes.
But, three, we still face very daunting challenges ahead.
On that first point, illegal fishing occurs in all capture
fisheries, both that are conducted within EEZs and those on the
high seas. As Mr. Dunnigan said, it is difficult to know where
the problem is greatest. By its very nature, illegal fishing is
very hard to quantify. Since most fishing occurs within EEZs,
it may be possible to presume that a large majority of illegal
fishing also occurs there. However, the high seas does pose
special challenges because it is the area of the world where no
one state has authority to enforce. Only cooperatively can high
seas fishing be brought under control.
IUU fishing directly frustrates fishing management
objectives. It can seriously hamper efforts to restore depleted
fish stocks. It is also grossly unfair to the fisheries who do
follow the rules and creates disincentives for them to continue
to do so. The IUU fishers are, in effect, free riders who are
benefiting from the conservation costs borne by those who do
follow the rules.
Although it is difficult to quantify, IUU fishing has been
estimated by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization to
account for up to 30 percent of catches in some important
fisheries worldwide, perhaps even more. More troubling still,
there is evidence that it seems to be on the rise in some
fisheries.
Let me turn now to what we have been doing. The United
States has been working hard to combat illegal fishing on both
the global level, the regional level, and bilaterally.
Globally, our efforts have focused on the U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization. We were leaders in pressing for and
getting adopted in 2001 an International Plan of Action to
prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing. This document is
conceived of as a toolbox to help countries both individually
and in cooperation with others to crack down on illegal fishing
in their own waters and on the high seas. FAO followed up on
this effort by publishing a book of guidelines further giving
states, including the United States, recommendations for what
to do to deal with various types of IUU fishing.
One of the central commitments in this was for each nation
that is a member of FAO, including the United States, to
develop a corresponding national plan of action on IUU fishing.
And I can report to you today, Mr. Chairman, the United States
is doing just that. We have a comprehensive national plan of
action on IUU fishing. It is in the final stages of clearance
now. It will have quite a few recommendations for us to take as
an administration and for us to consider in consultation with
you for recommendations for possible legislative change as
well. We hope to have it ready for presentation to the
Subcommittee in the coming weeks, and we look forward to
discussing it with your staff at that time.
Regionally, we have been hard at work, as Mr. Dunnigan has
said, in all of the fishery management organizations of which
the United States is a member to deal with IUU fishing there
too. And in many of these organizations, often at the behest of
the United States, we have new measures in place to control
illegal fishing. These measures can include satellite-based
vessel monitoring systems, independent observers on some
percentage of fishing boats, schemes for boarding and
inspecting boats at sea, or inspecting them as well when they
land in port. Other types of ports that control is restrictions
on landings and transshipment. We have now a wide variety of
catch documentation schemes, paperwork that must follow fishery
products around the world. And we have adopted import
restrictions on a multilateral basis in a number of
organizations.
These seem to be having some beneficial effect, and they
are not just being done in ICCAT. Some of the other
organizations that are working on these issues include the
Northwest Atlantic Fishery Organization, NAFO; the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission, the IATTC; the Commission
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
CCAMLR. And even in the organization not yet up and running,
the new Tuna Commission for the Central and Western Pacific, in
its preparatory meetings, work is being done in illegal fishing
there as well.
One of the latest efforts that I would highlight is the
creation of these white lists and black lists of vessels. The
vision is to ultimately create registers of vessels that
operate in each of these fisheries. If vessels are not in good
standing on these lists, products caught by these vessels ought
not to be imported or traded.
Bilaterally, we are working with our closest neighbors to
deal with incidents of cross-border illegal fishing. With
Canada, we have reciprocal enforcement agreements that apply in
the Atlantic and Great Lakes. We have good cooperation with
Canada as well on incidents of cross-border illegal fishing in
the Pacific.
With Mexico, we have arrangements in place, and we would
like to broaden those as well to deal with cross-border
problems.
With the People's Republic of China this summer, I would
highlight a number of instances of very good cooperation we
received. There were a number of incidents of large-scale drift
net fishing by Chinese vessels in the North Pacific this year.
We have an agreement with the PRC that is in place that allowed
a PRC ship rider to ride aboard U.S. Coast Guard cutters. The
PRC Government allowed us to board and inspect those vessels on
the high seas. We were able to document the instances of
illegal fishing and turn those vessels over to the PRC for
further investigation and prosecution.
I would note as well we are dealing with our neighbor
across the Bering Sea, the Russian Federation, where there are
serious problems of Russian and third-country vessels crossing
the maritime boundary line to fish illegally in U.S. waters. We
have reasonable cooperation with the Russian Fisheries
Enforcement Service in dealing with those matters, but we have
proposed a broader, comprehensive agreement, bilateral
agreement with Russia that we will be discussing with them next
week in the meeting in Portland.
Despite all this activity, we have many challenges that we
face. We must press for full implementation of the measures
that have already been adopted, both globally and regionally
and bilaterally. We must, I believe, expand the use of the
tools in this toolbox to deal with IUU fishing in all its
forms. No one set of tools works in every situation. It depends
a lot on the type of fishery involved.
I would highlight as well that we must provide more
assistance to developing countries. A large percentage of IUU
fishing occurs in the zones of developing countries that cannot
monitor their fisheries there. It is in our own interest to
help them do a better job of monitoring and controlling those
fisheries.
We look forward to working with Congress and considering
possible strengthening of U.S. laws in this area. As I
mentioned, we will very likely have a series of recommendations
for you in the coming weeks.
Thank you very much for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Balton follows:]
Statement of David A. Balton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Oceans and Fisheries, U.S. Department of State
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on international
fisheries conservation issues and particularly to address issues of
compliance. It has become increasingly apparent that, even as the
international community has made enormous progress in the last decade
towards coordinated management of the world's fishery resources, this
progress is meaningless without compliance. We are seeing a growing
incidence of fishing that does not respect international laws and
regulations. Left unchecked, this illegal fishing can significantly
diminish the benefits of the fisheries management regimes we have
worked so hard to establish. And this type of activity is clearly
unfair to those fishers who do follow the rules.
The Department of State has been focusing much of its attention on
fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing within
regional fisheries management organizations, and through our National
Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate this type of fishing. I
will outline the efforts underway not just in the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas but also in other
regional bodies, and will summarize some of the new tools contemplated
by the U.S. National Plan of Action on IUU Fishing.
Compliance Agreement
In its letter of invitation, the Subcommittee asked about the 1993
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (``the
Compliance Agreement''). The Compliance Agreement entered into force on
April 24, 2003, upon the deposit of the 25th instrument of acceptance
with the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which serves as
depository for this treaty. Most of the major fishing States are party
to this treaty, including the United States, Canada, Japan, Mexico,
South Korea, Norway and the European Community.
The Compliance Agreement is one of three global fisheries
instruments of vital significance that have been adopted in the past
decade, along with the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement and the non-binding
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. The United States played a
pivotal role in the development of each of these instruments and has
steadfastly urged all States to implement them.
Building on the general framework of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Compliance Agreement seeks to
address the threat to international fisheries management posed by
vessels that do not abide by agreed fishing rules. The Agreement
contains three basic requirements:
Each Flag State must ensure that its vessels do not
engage in any activity that undermines the effectiveness of
international fishery conservation and management measures, whether or
not the Flag State is a member of the regional fishery organization
that adopted such measures;
No Flag State shall allow any of its vessels to be used
for fishing on the high seas unless the Flag State has specifically
authorized it to do so; and
No Flag State shall grant such authority to a vessel
unless the Flag State is able to control the fishing activities of that
vessel.
These three rules represent a new vision for high seas fisheries.
To abide by these rules, Flag States may no longer allow their fishing
vessels to venture out onto the high seas the way that the early
explorers ventured out beyond the frontiers of known society. Flag
States must now actively oversee the high seas fishing operations of
their vessels. They must decide on a case-by-case basis whether to
authorize any vessel to fish on the high seas. Most importantly, they
may not permit any vessel to fish on the high seas at all, unless they
are able to prevent the vessel from undermining agreed conservation
rules. The Agreement also seeks to increase the transparency of high
seas fishing operations through the collection and dissemination of
data. Parties must submit to FAO a wide range of information on each of
their respective high seas fishing vessels.
If all States were parties to the FAO Compliance Agreement and
other relevant international agreements, and if all States fully
implemented their commitments under these instruments, there would be
virtually no IUU fishing. Unfortunately, most of the Flag States whose
vessels are the greatest source of IUU fishing are not parties to these
treaties. Encouraging these States to accede to these treaties and to
implement effective control over their fishing vessels remains a top
priority.
I do not want to give the impression, however, that only vessels
flying the flags of non-parties to these agreements conduct IUU
fishing. Even responsible fishing nations, such as the United States,
do not achieve 100 percent compliance by their vessels. Ocean fishing,
by its very nature, is difficult and costly to monitor. As fish stocks
decline, the temptation to evade fishing rules grows. To deal with this
daunting situation, the United States has been among the leaders of the
international community in fashioning a comprehensive ``toolbox'' of
measures to crack down on IUU fishing.
National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing
As part of the implementation of the Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries, the FAO has adopted a number of International
Plans of Action (IPOA) to address specific international fisheries
problems. Most recently, the FAO undertook a concerted effort to
develop a comprehensive ``toolbox'' of measures that States could take,
both individually and collectively, to address the problems of IUU
fishing. This effort culminated with the adoption in 2001 of the FAO
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.
As its title suggests, the objective of the IPOA is to prevent,
deter and eliminate IUU fishing. The principles to guide the pursuit of
this objective include: (1) broad participation and coordination among
States, as well as representatives from industry, fishing communities
and non-governmental organizations; (2) the phasing-in of action to
implement the IPOA on the earliest possible timetable; (3) the use of a
comprehensive and integrated approach, so as to address all impacts of
IUU fishing; (4) the maintenance of consistency with the conservation
and long-term sustainable use of fish stocks and the protection of the
environment; (5) transparency; and (6) non-discrimination in form or in
fact against any State or its fishing vessels. States were charged to
develop their own National Plans of Action to implement the IPOA.
The draft U.S. National Plan of Action was developed over the past
two years by the Department of State, the Department of Commerce and
the U.S. Coast Guard, with input from the U.S. Trade Representative,
the Customs Service, and others. It is undergoing a final review and
should be released shortly.
It is organized along the same lines as the IPOA, including
sections on All State Responsibilities, Flag State Responsibilities,
Coastal State Measures, Port State Measures, Internationally Agreed
Market State Measures, Measures to be Implemented Through Regional
Fisheries Management Organizations and Special Requirements of
Developing States. In addition to describing what the United States
already does to fight IUU fishing, the National Plan of Action also
lays out a wide range of recommendations for enhancing our abilities in
this regard, such as changes to vessel registration rules, increased
sanctions and penalties, tightened port controls, and broader outreach
and capacity-building with other States.
ICCAT and other Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
My colleague from NOAA Fisheries has provided a thorough overview
of the issues surrounding member compliance and illegal fishing within
ICCAT. Although, with U.S. leadership, ICCAT has been at the forefront
of developing innovative approaches towards controlling IUU fishing, it
has become clear that ICCAT's existing tools need to be re-examined and
updated to reflect the changing nature of IUU fishing. As part of that
effort, the Department welcomes Congressional action to support U.S.
efforts in ICCAT such as H.Con.Res. 268, which reiterates U.S.
commitment towards ensuring compliance with ICCAT measures and offers
specific guidance how we should support that commitment. We do note
that some parts of H.Con.Res. 268 would change the standard of review
for taking trade measures from looking at the actions of a number of
vessels to the actions of a single vessel. While we agree the United
States should take every possible action to fight IUU fishing, such a
narrow standard may present significant implementation difficulties. We
would be happy to discuss this issue with staff.
In addition to the work carried out within the FAO and ICCAT, the
United States is working in other regional organizations to address the
issue of IUU fishing. In particular, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC) has been working actively to address the issues of
IUU fishing in the area regulated by the IATTC. In 2002, the IATTC
adopted a resolution on purse seine fleet capacity. Among other things,
the resolution specified that any purse seine vessel not included on
the IATTC vessel register is not authorized to fish in the IATTC area.
In the fall of 2002, a number of vessels from the western Pacific
crossed over into the eastern Pacific to fish on a large biomass of
yellowfin tuna that moved from the west into the eastern Pacific. The
Flag States of these vessels ordered the vessels to withdraw from the
area once they were notified by the Director of the IATTC that the
vessels were fishing in violation of the IATTC rules.
More recently, at its annual meeting in June 2002, the IATTC
adopted measures, similar to the measures adopted in ICCAT, both for a
catch certification scheme for bigeye tuna and for the development of a
``positive list'' of large-scale longline fishing vessels authorized to
fish in the area regulated by the IATTC. The Commission also adopted a
set of criteria for identifying ``cooperating non-parties.'' Key to
such designation is that vessels from such non-parties provide all
relevant data about their operations and that they respect all rules,
regulations and resolutions governing fishing for highly migratory
species in the IATTC area.
Finally, at a special meeting of the IATTC scheduled for this fall,
the IATTC will consider a U.S. proposal on steps to be taken by members
and cooperating non-parties of the IATTC in cases of noncompliance with
IATTC conservation and management measures.
The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR) also provides a model of how a more comprehensive
``negative'' vessel list approach could work. Last year, CCAMLR adopted
measures that establish lists of both member and non-member vessels of
any kind that are diminishing the effectiveness of CCAMLR. Under the
CCAMLR measures, the Flag State of vessels on the lists may be
identified and subject to further action, but the vessels themselves
are also subject to restrictions on access to certain fisheries. We
will be watching the implementation of these new measures carefully in
the next year or two.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to discuss these
issues. I would be happy to try to answer any questions from the
Members of the Subcommittee.
______
[Mr. Balton's response to questions submitted for the
record follows:]
Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary David A. Balton by
Rep. Frank Pallone (#1)
Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation
Committee on Resources
Sept. 11, 2003
Question: You mention that even responsible fishing nations, such
as the United States, do not achieve 100 percent compliance by their
vessels, and point to monitoring costs as a limiting factor. Is
achieving 100 percent compliance by the United States possible? If so,
how can we achieve this? If not, what percent compliance should we be
striving for and what needs to be done to get there?
Answer: No government can guarantee 100 percent compliance by all
its vessels with all fishery conservation and management measures all
the time. There will always be those who seek to bend or break the
rules. Even wealthy and technologically advanced nations such as the
United States cannot have an enforcement presence monitoring all
fisheries at all times. But the United States has one of the best
fisheries management and enforcement regimes in the world. The combined
efforts of the National Marine Fisheries Service's Office of Law
Enforcement and the U.S. Coast Guard are extremely effective in
ensuring that the vast majority of U.S. fishing vessels are in
compliance with both domestic regulations and our international
obligations. Of course, there is more that we can do. The soon-to-be-
released U.S. National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing represents a comprehensive
assessment of what the United States is doing to ensure compliance by
its fishing vessels and lays out a number of recommendations for
regulatory and legislative changes to make our enforcement regime even
stronger.
As we look at compliance by other countries with the rules adopted
in ICCAT and other regional organizations, we recognize that individual
violations are less of an issue than a systemic and pervasive lack of
will or ability by the flag State to control its vessels. In these
regional fisheries bodies, the United States has led efforts to take
strong action--including the imposition of trade sanctions--against
States whose vessels consistently undermine international conservation
and management measures.
Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary David A. Balton by
Rep. Frank Pallone (#2)
Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation
Committee on Resources
Sept. 11, 2003
Question: The U.S. sent letters to the European Commission (EC) in
April 2003 regarding catch limits that were set above what ICCAT's
scientific advisory body recommended for bluefin tuna. Has the U.S.
received a response to these letters? Are these letters a precursor to
further action? Is this the extent to which the administration is
willing to push countries to comply with international fisheries
management recommendations or do you think this administration is
willing to impose trade restrictions to encourage other countries to
comply with international recommendations?
Answer: The Secretary of Commerce exchanged a series of letters
with EC officials earlier this year on this subject, and the Department
of Commerce could certainly provide more information on that exchange.
We met with the EU several times this summer and raised once again our
concerns about overfishing and excessive juvenile catches in the east
Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery, among other things. We continue to press
the EU at a high level to implement the commitments it made at the 2002
ICCAT annual meeting, and we will work closely with the Department of
Commerce as it considers the pending request to certify the EU under
the Pelly Amendment.
The United States has imposed trade restrictions on a number of
countries that were identified by ICCAT as undermining ICCAT
conservation and management measures, and we will consider additional
action against several others at the upcoming ICCAT annual meeting.
Combating IUU fishing and achieving compliance with internationally
agreed rules are essential if we are to ensure the sustainability of
our shared fisheries resources. This is why the United States has been
the leader in ICCAT and other organizations in developing strong,
multilateral programs that use trade and other economic tools to change
the behavior of problem countries. Our efforts are paying off on many
fronts, but they will only be successful if all the major fishing
States and market States work together.
At the upcoming ICCAT annual meeting, one of our top priorities
will be updating ICCAT's compliance regimes to ensure that both members
and non-members are held to the same, strict standard--and that ICCAT
members can use a suite of quota penalties, landing restrictions, and
market controls to uphold ICCAT's conservation and management rules.
Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary David A. Balton by
Rep. Frank Pallone (#3)
Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation
Committee on Resources
Sept. 11, 2003
Question: A question was raised last year that if other nations
adopt policies similar to those detailed in H.Con.Res 427, the U.S.
itself would be vulnerable to trade sanctions. If I recall correctly,
one of the recommendations for which our compliance was questionable
required a minimum of five percent observer coverage for all longline
trips targeting yellowfin and bigeye tuna. While this violation has
less severe conservation consequences than most of those discussed
today, it ostensibly makes the United States vulnerable to retaliatory
actions. Is it true that the U.S. has been out of, and may still be out
of compliance with ICCAT recommendations? Which ones?
Answer: The United States acts in good faith within ICCAT and is
generally in compliance with the conservation and management measures
adopted under its auspices. Occasionally, we have faced regulatory
delays--for instance we could not meet a deadline to implement
mandatory VMS coverage for pelagic longliners pending the resolution of
litigation. The National Marine Fisheries Service may be better able to
address the specifics of our level of compliance with all ICCAT
recommendations.
______
Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much, Mr. Balton.
Mr. Considine?
STATEMENT OF JOHN J. CONSIDINE, DIRECTOR, CARGO VERIFICATION
DIVISION, TRADE COMPLIANCE AND FACILITATION, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Considine. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,
thank you for this opportunity to testify.
Although the main focus of Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) has shifted to protecting the United States from
terrorist attacks, CBP also enforces over 400 requirements for
more than 40 other Federal agencies at the U.S. borders. These
requirements include the laws that prohibit the illegal
importation of fish and marine products that fall under the
jurisdiction of the National Marine Fisheries Service, a part
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration under
the Department of Commerce.
While the NMFS has the expertise and authority over these
laws and takes the lead in developing regulations to implement
these laws, they consult closely with CBP to ensure that such
regulations are practical to enforce.
CBP and NMFS have a close working relationship. A
Memorandum of Understanding between the agencies has been in
force since 1996. Under this MOU, CBP provides to NMFS, on a
monthly basis, data collected by our Automated Commercial
System on imports of fish species and products that NMFS
monitors for enforcement and compliance purposes. This MOU is
modified on a regular basis by NMFS to reflect any changes in
laws, rules, and requirements regarding products under their
jurisdiction.
The two agencies have also worked closely in enforcing
import restrictions on various types of fish. When the
requirements for the import of these fish and marine products
are changed, CBP will inform its local offices of these changes
through memoranda issued to the field. Instructions in our
Automated Commercial System are updated to ensure that these
new requirements are met.
Cooperation between the two agencies on Antarctic and
Patagonian toothfish, popularly known as the Chilean sea bass,
over the past few years has led to several significant
enforcement actions, including seizures and arrests by NMFS for
the smuggling of toothfish. CBP is also working with NMFS on
several ongoing investigations on the West Coast.
NMFS is also exploring setting up a task force to address
the issue of the illegal importation of Chilean sea bass.
Representatives from several Federal agencies will be invited
to participate, and a representative from CBP will be on that
task force.
CBP enforces the restrictions and the documentation
requirements for the importation of Chilean sea bass in the
following manner: instructions in ACS, our Automated Commercial
System, have been updated to alert CBP officers to the new rule
that took effect on June 16, 2003, requiring that imports of
frozen toothfish and fresh shipments of over 2,000 kilograms
present a signed and stamped approval NMFS form titled
``Approval Action of Catch Documents for Toothfish Imports.''
Included in the instructions are contact points for CBP
officers who have questions about the validity of such permits.
All toothfish shipments are reviewed by CBP for proper
documentation before they are released.
If a decision is made to impose import restrictions on more
fish species, CBP believes that it could operate in a similar
manner. NMFS would approve a shipment in advance and issue an
approval document. CBP would examine the paper entry work
package to ensure that the shipment is in compliance and has
approval from NMFS. Because of the anticipated volume, CBP
would not--unlike what is done for toothfish--examine every
entry package. Instead, CBP would perform selected verification
on a risk management basis and concentrate on countries and
importers that NMFS has identified as potential violators of
international agreements. Any shipment not in compliance would
be detained or appropriate action by NMFS.
CBP does not have the knowledge, expertise, or authority to
implement fish tracking programs. We would leave such matters
to agencies like NMFS, but as mentioned above, CBP could act as
a gatekeeper helping prevent illegally caught shipments of
fish, as determined by NMFS, from entering the U.S.
CBP does have the authority under its own statutes to seize
products that are imported in violation of the laws of other
agencies. The decision on the destruction of any seized fish
products would be made on a case-by-case basis. Input from the
agencies concerned would be sought as to whether destruction or
exportation would be appropriate.
I would like to thank you and the members of the Committee
for considering Customs and Border Protection in your review of
this resolution and will answer any questions the Committee may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Considine follows:]
Statement of John J. Considine, Director, Cargo Verification Division,
Trade Compliance and Facilitation, Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify. I am John Considine, Director of the Cargo
Verification Division, Trade Compliance and Facilitation at the Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
Although the main focus of the CBP has shifted to protecting the
United States from terrorist attacks, CBP also enforces over 400
requirements for more than 40 other federal agencies at U.S. borders.
These requirements include the laws that prohibit the illegal
importation of fish and marine products that fall under the
jurisdiction of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), a part of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) under the
Department of Commerce.
While the NMFS has the expertise and authority over these laws and
takes the lead in developing regulations to implement these laws, they
consult closely with CBP to ensure that such regulations are practical
to enforce.
CBP and NMFS have a close working relationship. A Memorandum Of
Understanding (MOU) between the agencies has been in force since 1996.
Under this MOU, CBP provides to NMFS, on a monthly basis, data
collected by our Automated Commercial System (ACS) on imports of fish
species and products that NMFS monitors for enforcement and compliance
purposes. This MOU is modified on a regular basis by NMFS to reflect
any changes in laws, rules and requirements regarding products under
their jurisdiction.
The two agencies have also worked closely in enforcing import
restrictions on various types of fish. When the requirements for the
import of these fish and marine products are changed, CBP will inform
its local offices of these changes through memoranda issued to the
field. Instructions in ACS are updated to ensure that these new
requirements are met.
Cooperation between the two agencies on Antarctic and Patagonian
toothfish, popularly known as Chilean sea bass, over the past few years
has lead to several significant enforcement actions, including seizures
and arrests by NMFS for the smuggling of toothfish. CBP is also working
with NMFS on several ongoing investigations on the West Coast.
NMFS is also exploring setting up a task force to address the issue
of the illegal importation of Chilean sea bass. Representatives from
several federal agencies will be invited to participate. A
representative from CBP will be on that task force.
CBP enforces the restrictions and documentation requirements for
the importation of Chilean sea bass in the following manner:
Instructions in ACS have been updated to alert CBP officers to the new
rule that took effect on June 16, 2003 requiring that imports of frozen
toothfish and fresh shipments of over 2,000 kilograms present a signed
and stamped approval NMFS form titled ``Approval Action of Catch
Documents for Toothfish Imports''. Included in the instructions are
contact points for CBP officers who have questions about the validity
of such permits. All toothfish shipments are reviewed by CBP for proper
documentation before they are released.
If a decision is made to impose import restrictions on more fish
species CBP believes that it could operate in a similar manner. NMFS
would approve a shipment in advance and issue an approval document. CBP
would examine the entry package to ensure that the shipment is in
compliance and has approval from NMFS. Because of the anticipated
volume, CBP would not (unlike what is done for toothfish) examine every
entry package. Instead, CBP would perform selected verification on a
risk management basis and concentrate on countries and importers that
NMFS has identified as potential violators of international agreements.
Any shipment not in compliance would be detained for appropriate action
by NMFS.
CBP does not have the knowledge, expertise, or authority to
implement fish tracking programs. We would leave such matters to
agencies like NMFS, but as mentioned above, CBP could act as a
``gatekeeper'' helping prevent illegally caught shipments of fish (as
determined by NMFS) from entering the U.S.
CBP does have the authority under its own statutes to seize
products that are imported in violation of the laws of other agencies.
The decision on the destruction of any seized fish products would be
made on case by case basis. Input from the agencies concerned would be
sought as to whether destruction or exportation would be appropriate.
I want to thank you and the members of the Committee for
considering Customs and Border Protection in your review of this
resolution and will answer any questions the Committee may have.
______
Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much, Mr. Considine.
Admiral Hathaway?
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JEFFREY J. HATHAWAY, DIRECTOR OF
COAST GUARD OPERATIONS POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Hathaway. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of
the Subcommittee. I know that you have received my written
testimony, and I request that that be accepted into the record,
and I have just a couple other comments to make.
First of all, the Coast Guard sits here today representing
our country's at-sea enforcement arm, whether it is operations
inside our exclusive economic zone or in support of
international agreements in international waters. Today I will
tell you that in the international fora, the Coast Guard is
concentrating its enforcement activities in three areas. Mr.
Balton has talked about some of those. First of all, the threat
of high seas drift netters in the North Pacific Ocean. There
are enforcement regimes there that make that a very good use of
Coast Guard assets, and as Mr. Balton pointed out, we have made
some very fruitful seizures there this past year.
We also concentrate in the Central and Western Pacific
Island area assisting those island countries to develop their
own domestic fisheries regimes, which we think is, again, a
very good long-term investment for this country in terms of
eventually successfully impacting IUU fishing in that part of
the world.
And, finally, in the international fora, we have been
concentrating in the Pacific in conjunction with our drug
enforcement and illegal migrant enforcement activities. We have
found several fishing vessels in violation of the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission regulations. All of those, by
the way, have been foreign flag vessels, not U.S. flag vessels,
who for the most part abide by regulations. But what are we
able to do? We are only able to make a case package and refer
it to whoever the flag state is. In most cases, it is Mexico
based on where we operate.
A couple comments on ICCAT. ICCAT from an at-sea
enforcement point represents a great challenge for at-sea
enforcement activities. All of the fish species covered by
ICCAT are highly migratory, and the geographic area covered by
ICCAT extends from Iceland to Cape Horn. So, from an at-sea
enforcement point of view, very, very challenging for your at-
sea enforcement arm, the U.S. Coast Guard. And because of that,
the focus of ICCAT has not been on at-sea enforcement to date.
Other enforcement regimes--again, Mr. Balton mentioned several
of the more fruitful--have been pursued under ICCAT to date.
With that said, the Coast Guard's integrated deep water
acquisition project, which will recapitalize our long-distance
cutters, our high seas cutters, and our long-range aircraft, is
well under way. The capabilities that that acquisition project
will give the Coast Guard will allow us to reach further out
into the international fora and be a more effective
international enforcement arm for fisheries for the U.S., which
will include something we don't have now, which is unmanned
aerial aircraft.
Finally, I would just like to say that the Coast Guard,
despite our increased activity in defending our maritime
borders, remains totally dedicated to our fisheries enforcement
mission. I will say that just yesterday we seized 47,000 pounds
of shrimp from a U.S. vessel fishing inside the EEZ. We found
that he had sewn shut his turtle exclusion devices, and he had
no bycatch reduction equipment on board. And in addition to
that, the captain was arrested by the U.S. Coast Guard on an
outstanding drug charge. So the Coast Guard remains multi-
mission as we are out there.
I would also say, as we speak in this hearing room, a U.S.
Coast Guard C-130 aircraft from our air station in Kodiak,
Alaska, at the request of our Russian colleagues, is flying in
support of the Russians in an area called the ``doughnut
hole,'' which is a North Pacific almost no-man's-land, looking
for a vessel that the Russians had previously sighted who was
taking illegal offloads of crab from, most likely, Russian
crabbers in violation of Russian quotas. Mr. Balton mentioned
some of the international cooperative arrangements we have. The
U.S. Coast Guard has a reasonably good relationship with the
Russians, and I see that we would respond to a request from
them to fly into an area that truly is not under any one
country's jurisdiction to assist in an international fisheries
matter as very important.
So we remain very dedicated to that mission, and the Coast
Guard, as we increase our assets in the future to be able to
take into account our new work in defending our maritime
borders, will be returning probably in fiscal year 2004 to our
historic levels of resource hours dedicated to the fisheries
mission.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Hathaway follows:]
Statement of Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway, Director, Coast Guard
Operations Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee. I am Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway, Director of Coast
Guard Operations Policy. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to
discuss House Concurrent Resolution 268 and its implications for the
Coast Guard.
With respect to House Concurrent Resolution 268, I encourage any
action that highlights the importance of responsible resource
management throughout the world's oceans. As the demand for fish
products increases globally, so too does the responsibility of all
nations to ensure the sustainability of our very precious and very
finite fishery resources. The high seas and the resources they hold are
the village commons of the 21st Century.
Today we see many significant threats to their sustainability.
These threats take the form of illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing, under-reported catch, using illegal harvesting methods such as
high seas drift nets (HSDN), and unlawful encroachment into the U.S.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Coast Guard's role is to enforce the
laws and regulations that prohibit these practices. This is a mission
we take very seriously and into which we funnel significant resources.
This year, 12% of the Coast Guard's Operating Expenses budget is
dedicated to supporting the fisheries mission.
The Coast Guard is the only Federal agency capable of projecting a
law enforcement presence throughout the EEZ and in key areas of the
high seas. Under the auspices of the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act, the Coast Guard invests significant
resources to patrol these waters and works closely with domestic and
international enforcement agencies to thwart illegal fishing practices
at sea.
The Coast Guard assists the Department of State in developing
international enforcement regimes through various Regional Fishery
Management Organizations such as the International Convention for
Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, the North Pacific Anadromous Fish
Commission, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, and the
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific to name a few. The Coast
Guard maintains a liaison officer at the State Department's Office of
Marine Conservation to advise U.S. delegations to these organizations
on the enforceability of proposed management regimes. We also work
closely with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
(NOAA) Fisheries Office for Enforcement and the Department of Justice
in prosecuting foreign fishers who illegally encroach upon the U.S.
EEZ.
``Fish do not recognize Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) boundaries''
is an oft-quoted phrase in the fisheries management and enforcement
business, and the Coast Guard is directly engaged with enforcement
agencies in Canada, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Japan, South Korea,
the People's Republic of China and many other nations to promote
sustainability through compliance with regulations and management
regimes. Our efforts include enforcement Memoranda of Agreement,
fisheries enforcement workshops, ship rider agreements, joint
operations, and boarding officer training. In an action plan on the
Marine Environment and Tanker Safety prepared in June 2003 at the G-8
Summit in Evian, France, G-8 leaders, including President Bush, pledged
to work toward sustainable fisheries and marine conservation.
I would like to share with you a success story in international
cooperation and effective enforcement. In 1991, the United Nations
declared an international moratorium on the use of large-scale (greater
than 2.5 kilometers in length) pelagic high seas driftnets. Since that
time, the U.S. Coast Guard, NOAA Fisheries, the Canadian Department of
Fisheries and Oceans, the Russian Federal Border Service, the People's
Republic of China Bureau of Fisheries, and the Fisheries Agency of
Japan have worked together to seize 18 high seas driftnet vessels,
including four this summer. Our closely coordinated efforts have
resulted in Russian officers staffing a joint command center in Alaska;
Chinese enforcement officers sailing on U.S. Coast Guard cutters; and
NOAA Fisheries agents flying in Canadian Air Force surveillance planes.
These countries are also members of the North Pacific Heads of Coast
Guard organization in which the Commandant of the Coast Guard is a
participant. The North Pacific Heads of Coast Guard, recognizing the
importance of fisheries, recently implemented a Fisheries Working Group
to meet regularly and discuss fisheries issues of regional interest.
The Coast Guard's fisheries law enforcement strategic plan OCEAN
GUARDIAN, stipulates that our highest priority enforcement mission is
to prevent encroachment of the U.S. EEZ and internal waters by foreign
fishing vessels. The Plan also emphasizes ensuring compliance with
international agreements for the management of living marine resources,
such as the International Convention on the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas (ICCAT), and the HSDN moratorium I mentioned earlier.
Fisheries enforcement, particularly enforcement of international
fisheries management schemes, is a mission largely conducted by Coast
Guard Deepwater assets. The U.S. EEZ is the largest and most productive
in the world. It covers 3.36 million square miles of ocean and includes
95,000 miles of coastline. It contains an estimated 20% of the world's
fishery resources. These vast patrol areas, coupled with the long
distance from U.S. shores--for example the non-contiguous EEZ in the
central Pacific--provide a significant challenge to the Coast Guard's
assets. As fish stocks throughout the world dwindle and the fleets of
distant water fishing nations are being pushed farther from home and
into the high seas in search of catch, the bounty of our EEZ becomes a
more attractive quarry. The improved capabilities the Coast Guard will
garner and the technology we will have available to leverage as a
result of the Integrated Deepwater System project will greatly enhance
our ability to enforce international fisheries regulations in the U.S.
EEZ and beyond.
The world is becoming more aware of the need to ensure the
sustainability of our collective fish stocks. At the same time, the
United States is becoming increasingly involved in the management of
living marine resources on the high seas. Naturally, this means the
Coast Guard will become even more involved in the enforcement of
agreements to which the U.S. is a party. In the past, international
policies governing the conservation of high seas fisheries fell well
short of their goals because they lacked any effective enforcement
provisions. However, in 1995, a landmark agreement, the Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement established the
framework for all future international fishery regimes. This agreement
calls for strict adherence with fishery conservation measures and, more
importantly, contains non-flag state enforcement provisions that allow
the Coast Guard to board foreign fishing vessels flagged by any nation
party to any mutual international fishing agreement. The Agreement
entered into force on December 11, 2001.
I believe emphasis in three areas is the key to improving our
international fisheries enforcement posture. First, active
participation in international fora such as the Regional Fishery
Management Organizations I mentioned earlier. Second, working within
those fora to develop a regulatory regime that not only sustains the
resources, but is also enforceable. Finally, providing the resources
necessary to carry out enforcement operations under that scheme. By
resources, I am referring to people, vessels and also technology such
as the Vessel Monitoring System, multi-lateral working groups like the
North Pacific Heads of Coast Guard organization, and combined
operations such as the high seas driftnet operations in the North
Pacific.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will
be happy to answer any questions you may have.
______
[RADM Hathaway's response to questions submitted for the
record follows:]
Response to questions submitted for the record by Rear Admiral Jeffrey
Hathaway, Director, U.S. Coast Guard Operations Policy, Department of
Homeland Security
IUU FISHING
QUESTION: RADM Hathaway, Mr. Balton from the State Department
mentions in his testimony that most of the flag States whose vessels
are the greatest source of IUU fishing are not parties to international
fishing treaties.
In your testimony you mention the Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, which allows the Coast Guard to board
foreign fishing vessels flagged by nations that are a party to the
mutual international fishing agreements. It appears that you are
helpless to stop IUU fishing from flag states whose vessels are the
greatest source of IUU fishing.
Is this True?
Besides convincing these rogue nations to sign international
agreements, how could this problem be solved (see below related
question/suggestions)?
ANSWER: The Coast Guard is not helpless to stop IUU fishing.
International law, fishery management conventions, and various
memorandums between the U.S. and foreign governments present a number
of enforcement options available to the Coast Guard depending on the
specific circumstances of each scenario. Examples of enforcement
options against foreign fishing vessels available to the Coast Guard on
the high seas include:
Taking action on behalf of the flag state. This was done
in July and August 2003 on four People's Republic of China vessels
conducting illegal high seas driftnet operations.
The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement allows non-flag
state boardings, and we are using this as leverage in all of our
interactions with foreign nations when looking for their assistance or
approval of USCG actions.
Assisting the flag state in conducting its own
enforcement operations by embarking law enforcement ship riders on
Coast Guard vessels.
Preparing a case package and submitting it to the flag
state for enforcement action via State Department as a demarche. This
was done in Aug 2003 for two South Korean vessels suspected of illegal
high seas driftnet operations.
FISHING VESSELS
QUESTION: A recent Atlantic Monthly article (September 2003)
mentioned that in July 2002 President Bush signed an executive order
expanding the U.S. Navy's authority to intercept merchant ships on the
high seas in order to keep watch over the several hundred ships on the
government's terrorist suspect list.
Does the U.S. government list of suspect merchant vessels include
fishing vessels?
ANSWER: The U.S. government list of suspect merchant vessels would
include fishing vessels only if they are suspected of activities
unrelated to fishing operations that were for or in support of
terrorist activities.
ILLEGAL FISHING VESSELS INTERCEPTION
QUESTION: Does the Coast Guard have a similar authority to
intercept illegal fishing vessels from countries not party to
international fishing agreements?
ANSWER: With regard to the authority attributed to the Atlantic
Monthly article ``Anarchy at Sea'' (September, 2003), the Coast Guard
is unaware of any executive order issued during the stated time period
that expanded on the U.S. Navy's authority to intercept merchant ships
on the high seas. As a result, the Coast Guard does not have similar
authority.
However, in the absence of an international agreement in force and
if a vessel is not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, the Coast Guard has the authority to board foreign vessels
engaged in illegal fishing only with the ad hoc consent of the flag or
coastal State. Under international law, the Coast Guard may also board
and exercise jurisdiction over vessels without nationality that may be
engaged in illegal fishing.
ICCAT
QUESTION: Can this list (mentioned in the Atlantic Monthly article)
be combined with the ICCAT's recommended ``black list'' of fishing
vessels from non-Contracting parties that have been involved in IUU
fishing for joint enforcement among U.S. agencies?
ANSWER: ICCAT is not recommending a ``black list'' of fishing
vessels, but a ``white list'' of vessels that do not engage in illegal
fishing practices. This makes it impossible to combine these two lists.
Further, it would be inappropriate to combine any U.S. government's
terrorist suspect list with any list of vessels that are suspected of
engaging in illegal fishing practices. We are, however, fusing this
``white list'' and many other pieces of information and intelligence to
further our Maritime Domain Awareness and increase the effectiveness of
our operations.
______
Mr. Saxton. Admiral, thank you.
Let me return for just a moment, or maybe for more than
that, to an issue that I mentioned in my opening statement, and
that is that the latest stock assessment that I have seen
indicates that the total Atlantic stock population of white
marlin has declined to less than 12 percent of its maximum
sustainable yield level. This is an issue which should serve,
in my opinion, as an example or a warning of the level of
effectiveness of the international fisheries management regimes
that we currently depend on for conservation purposes. Those
international regimes I think have proven to be less effective
than we all would at least hope they would be.
Several of you have talked about the IUU issues, and I
think most everyone would agree that fishing and non-compliance
are serious problems within the context of conservation and the
issues that we are dealing with.
So, from a United States point of view, a country which has
proven over decades and now centuries to be world leaders in a
variety of ways, one need only to turn on a cable news station
to see examples of leadership or attempts at leadership in a
variety of ways, economically, politically, militarily, and
conservation-wise.
So what is it that we need to do--let me ask this question:
How can the U.S. take unilateral action as a world leader to
bring into compliance the conservation measures that are
necessary to have a reasonable chance of conserving species
such as white marlin, but not limited to white marlin, and
others? What unilateral action can we take to try to accomplish
these kinds of goals? Mr. Dunnigan?
Mr. Dunnigan. Thank you very much. Let me say first off
that we in NOAA certainly share your concern and appreciate
your leadership on this question of the status of white marlin.
We did make the determination last year that it didn't deserve
to be listed under the Endangered Species Act, but that does
not mean that we are not completely dedicated to working
through the ICCAT forums and in our own management program to
provide the conservation that this species needs. ICCAT has
started to put together the rebuilding plan. They have
instituted very conservative country quotas. We are in the
process right now of promulgating the rule that will make these
quotas apply, the 250-fish limit that we have for our
fishermen, that will make them apply to our fishermen.
Part of the problem in white marlin is that it is a lot
more important to us than it is to a lot of other countries,
where we have the very large recreational fishery that depends
on white marlin. In a lot of other countries where they have
commercial fisheries, it is considered to be a relatively low-
value species, so they have not really devoted the kind of
attention to it that we would want them to.
So we will continue to press at ICCAT, and we believe that
ICCAT needs to do a better job with its conservation and
enforcement measures, and we will be working very hard to push
ICCAT in that direction.
As far as unilateral measures, which is what you really
asked about, there is not a lot that we can do without having
some start. We can take unilateral action, for example, under
the Pelly Amendment, or there are some provisions that are
available to us in the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act. And we
were asked to look into the Pelly Amendment by five State
Governors and a couple of nongovernmental organizations last
year. We have kept that record open. We are going to continue
to observe the actions of the European Community as they step
forward to carry out the responsibilities that we all came home
from ICCAT with last year. And if the case presents itself, I
believe that we will be prepared to follow through on the
statutory authority that we have.
But, essentially, in both of those cases you are talking
about first having to have some underlying conservation regime
that is established by an international organization so that we
can make a finding that a country's vessels are taking action
that diminishes the effectiveness of that regime. So you have
to at least start, I think, with some level of cooperation to
specify what the management program needs to be. And then later
on, if a country is not following through, then we have some
ability under those laws to take unilateral action.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Balton, do you want to take a crack at
this?
Mr. Balton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have very much
to add to what Mr. Dunnigan said. International fisheries,
particularly for highly migratory species, are such that no one
state operating on its own can produce a successful solution.
As Mr. Dunnigan, you first need to get agreement from the major
fisheries and the major market states on a conservation regime,
but once that is in place, the United States does have tools at
its disposal to promote compliance with the rules that have
been adopted multilaterally.
But a lot of what can be done are the sorts of things you
are doing. Congress can raise the profile of this issue. You
can put pressure on the United States administration to put
pressure on other countries at international meetings. We can
look at the statutory tools that we have in place already and
use them more, maybe broaden them.
A strictly unilateral approach is not likely to win the
day. We need to somehow mix multilateral conservation measures
with unilateral measures. So, for example, there are certain
species, bluefin tuna, for which the U.S. has a very small
market, relatively speaking. There is not much we can do on our
own to control problems of overfishing in bluefin tuna. Ninety
percent of it goes to Japan. We need to work with Japan if we
are to have a successful regime there. With swordfish, the U.S.
shares the lion's share of the market with the European and
other states. Once again, operating solely on our own, we are
unlikely to achieve a full solution to the problem of swordfish
conservation.
Thank you.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Considine, do you want to take a crack at
this?
Mr. Considine. I am afraid it is probably outside my area
of expertise, sir.
Mr. Saxton. OK. Then let me just go back and revisit this
question again with Mr. Dunnigan and Mr. Balton. It seems to me
that both of your answers tended to point toward international
cooperation, which is what ICCAT is all about. But that wasn't
my question. My question is: What can the United States do
unilaterally to be a world leader to show the folks at ICCAT
and other participants in the fisheries that we are going to
lead the way in solving this problem?
For example, if the United States and Japan, for example,
the two largest importing nations for fish products, if these
two countries were to block imports from countries that are not
complying with ICCAT fishing measures, wouldn't that be
effective?
Mr. Balton. Mr. Chairman, we are doing just that within
ICCAT. We have pioneered rules. If countries are fishing
illegally, they are identified by ICCAT. They have 1 year, in
principle, to correct the behavior. If they do not do so, ICCAT
will require all members in the United States, Japan, all of
the importing states to prohibit imports of that species from
that country.
Mr. Saxton. Which countries have we prohibited imports
from?
Mr. Balton. I would have to give you a--get back to you on
a full list. But, for example, one member of ICCAT itself, an
actual ICCAT member, Equatorial Guinea, was under trade
sanctions for bluefin tuna. Many countries are under import
restrictions with respect to swordfish. A couple of years ago,
we instituted import restrictions, prohibitions on a variety of
countries with respect to big-eye tuna. So that is expanding.
And with respect to bluefin tuna, as I said, the market is in
Japan; swordfish is shared. Big-eye tuna mostly goes to Asia.
It depends on the species, it depends on the nature of the
fishery. But we are doing exactly what you are suggesting. And
yes, it was largely at U.S. behest that these procedures were
put into place.
Mr. Saxton. Do we ever take unilateral action outside of
ICCAT, or do we have to wait for ICCAT to make a determination
that a country is in violation?
Mr. Balton. We have not gotten ahead of ICCAT. But I think
when we present to you the list of countries under a trade
sanction, you will be rather impressed just how many there are.
And I cannot think of instances off the top of my head where we
felt strongly that a particular country ought to be under trade
sanctions and ICCAT did not agree.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Dunnigan?
Mr. Dunnigan. I hate to keep coming back to this, but I
just believe it is absolutely the truth. We are going to make
the greatest progress toward getting where we want to go by
working with our partners. If you look at a lot of the IUU
fishing that has been going on over the last couple of years,
it has been centered in Asia. And the Japanese have actually
been very aggressive in working with the Government of Taiwan
and a number of other parties in that part of the world to
ferret out and track where this IUU fishing has been happening.
And we would not be able to move forward on this if we were
doing it strictly on our own. The best strategy that we have to
get to where we want to go is to work with the other countries.
Mr. Saxton. Well, I am going to yield my time, or move on
to Mr. Pallone. But I couldn't disagree with you more. I mean,
the record proves that we are not being effective in using the
regimes that we are currently using.
Here is what I think is going to happen. We are going to
take unilateral action. You know what it is going to be? It is
going to be unilateral action against U.S. commercial and
recreational fishing interests through the Endangered Species
Act. That is what is going to happen. When we are forced to--
when you are forced to close the white marlin fishery because
of the Endangered Species Act, you are going to put everybody
out of business that goes offshore for commercial fishing or
for recreational fishing. That is when we will finally get
serious about international conservation. I don't think we are
serious about it today.
And I don't think--I am not pointing at you as individuals.
I am talking about the conservation regimes that are in place
today, that are proven ineffective. If you look at what has
happened to, again, white marlin over the last 40 years, these
regimes have been in place, you have all been working
internationally, cooperating with each other, getting ICCAT to
identify bad actors, doing what you do, and the population of
marlin continues to drop.
So, if this was a court of law, a prosecutor would come and
indict the process and lock it up, because it is not working.
Mr. Pallone?
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My questions are of
Mr. Dunnigan, although I guess others can jump in if they like.
In your written testimony you mentioned that the decision
on certification of the EC pursuant to the Pelly Amendment has
been left open. When do you expect to make a decision in that
regard?
Mr. Dunnigan. Thank you, Mr. Pallone. This is a matter that
we, as I said, have left open, and we don't have a specific
timetable. We have made it very clear to the European Community
that we are going to continue to monitor their implementation
and their compliance with the recommendations that came out of
ICCAT last year. They have made great statements about what
they are going to do for juvenile tuna, they have made great
statements about what they are going to do for their data
programs. All of these are very important.
Mr. Pallone. Can you give us any estimated timetable?
Mr. Dunnigan. After we get back from ICCAT this year, we
will review the situation again, but no, we don't have any
specific drop-dead date that we are looking at that we are
going to--
Mr. Pallone. But you are going to try to address it after
the ICCAT meeting?
Mr. Dunnigan. Well, we will take another review of it at
that point.
Mr. Pallone. Last year, this hearing focused heavily on
white marlin and the depleted nature of the stocks. Obviously,
you know, that is a--from the Chairman's comment, that is a
continued concern. And Dr. John Graves mentioned the lack of
data about post-release mortality as a problem. Have any
further studies on post-release mortality been completed? And
is post-release mortality factored into the current stock
assessments of Atlantic white marlin?
Mr. Dunnigan. Mr. Pallone, I think that deserves a very
specific answer that I can't give you here this morning.
Mr. Pallone. Or you can get back to us.
Mr. Dunnigan. Yes, we would be glad to get back to you.
Mr. Pallone. All right. I appreciate that.
With regard to swordfish, the recovery rate of North
Atlantic swordfish has been impressive, from the accounts that
I have read, but nonetheless, the stock is still severely over-
fished. Do you think that recovery of North Atlantic swordfish
by 2009 or before is possible, given current rates of fishing
and stock recovery? And if not, does the rebuilding plan need
to be amended?
Mr. Dunnigan. If we are talking specifically about
swordfish, I think I would not say that the rebuilding plan
appears to need to be amended. As I recall, the assessment last
year told us that the swordfish stock was at about 94 percent
of the biomass at maximum sustainable yield. It is as close to
being recovered as--well, it is very close to being recovered,
and we expect that it will get to that level.
Mr. Pallone. So you think it is--we will be able to recover
by 2009?
Mr. Dunnigan. For North Atlantic swordfish, yes.
Mr. Pallone. There was a paper that appeared in the journal
Science in January this year estimating the populations of
several of large coastal and oceanic sharks--and that includes
scalloped hammerhead, white, and thresher sharks--have declined
by over 75 percent in the past 15 years. I know ICCAT is not
responsible for managing these highly migratory species;
however, it is obvious that without some regulation, these
species will continue to be decimated.
So my question is, is there currently an international body
monitoring and/or regulating the demise of highly migratory
shark species? And if not, should there be one?
Mr. Dunnigan. I am going to ask that I be allowed to
supplement this in writing, just to make sure. I don't believe
that we have a specific body right now. There has been a lot of
attention paid to sharks all over the world. There is an
international plan of action for addressing elasmobranch
species. I know at NAFO, the United States is a leader in
having that organization look at, especially, thorny sharks. I
know there is a lot of attention given to it around the world.
We, of course, have a significant management responsibility for
sharks in our own waters, under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and
that occupies a lot of the time of our Highly Migratory Species
staff. But I am not specifically aware that there is a single
international body right now that is looking at shark
management.
Mr. Pallone. Well, do you think there should be something--
Mr. Dunnigan. Perhaps Mr. Balton could add to that.
Mr. Pallone. --then, is what I am asking, if there isn't
anything now? Sure, Mr. Balton?
Mr. Balton. Mr. Dunnigan is right that, in the Atlantic,
the organization that deals with tunas doesn't have direct
management authority for sharks. It is only tunas and tuna-like
species. It might be possible to change that. It would require
amending the ICCAT Convention.
In the Pacific, however, we are better off. We have the
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. It was based on a 1950
treaty that has just been renegotiated. We will be presenting
it to the Senate this year, I believe, and it should enter into
force fairly soon. And it will give that organization
responsibility for species including sharks.
Similarly, in the Central and Western Pacific, a new
convention creating a new commission there will also have
authority to deal with shark species.
Mr. Pallone. But you might have to amend ICCAT, you said?
Mr. Balton. ICCAT as currently configured does not have
direct management responsibility for sharks. They can be dealt
with as bycatch. We would like to see that changed. The
prospects of doing so are not great, though, right now. ICCAT
has so much else on its agenda.
Mr. Pallone. OK. Did you want--I can ask one more
question--again of Mr. Dunnigan or Mr. Considine, whoever wants
to answer it.
The Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation for Atlantic
Highly Migratory Species 2003 said that NOAA fisheries would
have developed a trade monitoring program for the import,
export, and reexport of swordfish and big-eye tuna by early
this year. And this was to comply with ICCAT's 2001 annual
meeting recommendations. Do you know if a plan has been
developed with a program, or a program formulated in this
regard, and whatever obstacles there might be to implementing
such a plan?
Mr. Dunnigan. We have implemented a program to carry out
those recommendations. We actually do import-export
documentation now for swordfish, for bluefin tuna, for big-eye
tuna, and for Patagonian tooth fish. And really, this is the
way that a lot of enforcement is going for international trade,
the requirement for documentation to accompany all imports. It
helps us to know that the fish was harvested legally in the
first place.
Those programs are cooperative. We are working, as I said
earlier, through the MCS network with other countries. We work
very closely with the Customs Service.
Mr. Pallone. You say you have developed a plan, though? Is
that something that--
Mr. Dunnigan. Those documentation programs are in effect.
We are supplying documentation to our exporters for big-eye
tuna, because that was the new one that was added.
Mr. Pallone. Right.
Mr. Dunnigan. Because other countries have insisted that
the ICCAT recommendation be implemented immediately. We are
still getting the rule out to make it final for big-eye in this
country, but the other ones, documentation programs, are in
place.
Our big challenge right now, by the way, is that they are
all a little different in the way they got their authority, so
we are trying to figure out a way to come up with a common
system that meets all of the data requirements for all four of
those programs.
Mr. Pallone. And what about other highly migratory species?
Why not for all highly migratory species?
Mr. Dunnigan. Right now, the requirement is not there in
ICCAT or other organizations to do that. But frankly, I see
that coming. I see we are moving, especially in this context of
authorized vessel lists and prohibited vessel lists. I think we
are moving to a world where the import-export trade is going to
be accompanied with documentation that ties the product back to
the method of harvest and the legality of harvest. I think it
is coming generally in fishing.
Mr. Pallone. Do you want authorization for these other
species or, you know, should Congress do something about that?
Mr. Dunnigan. I think we ought to look into it. Right now,
our authority to do that derives from specific statutory bases,
for example, the Atlantic Tunas Act that gives us the authority
to implement the ICCAT recommendations, the CCAMLR statute that
gives us the authority to implement those. If we are going this
way generally--we will have to look at it, but it may be
appropriate to have a broader approach legislatively for the
United States. And we would be glad to work with you on that.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Faleomavaega?
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest
of time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to
submit a series of written questions to the members of the
panel to respond to for the record.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more with
your concerns about the problems that we face. And unless I am
hard of hearing--and I apologize, I did not specifically read
every portion of the gentlemen's statements--I have not heard
whether your respective agencies support the substance of this
resolution. I would like to ask Mr. Dunnigan, does the
administration support the resolution?
Mr. Dunnigan. The administration welcomes the attention
that Congress is giving. We do support the intent of the
resolution. We have some concerns about some specific language
that is in it that we would like to have an opportunity to talk
to the Committee staff about.
For example, part of the language refers to actions by
individual vessels in other countries and if they violate a
law, it creates a--it appears to create a presumption that the
country has violated the international statute. We need to--
Mr. Faleomavaega. So you do have some concerns.
Mr. Dunnigan. --make sure we don't set an unrealistic
standard.
Mr. Faleomavaega. So you do have some concerns.
Mr. Dunnigan. Just about the language, yes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. So do you have some recommendations to
make changes in the resolution?
Mr. Dunnigan. We think we ought to talk to your staff about
that.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I think we are being too diplomatic about
this, Mr. Chairman. I think we need a sledgehammer, because if
my sense of the Chairman's concerns are accurate, this has not
been a 1-year problem. This has been 5 years, 20 years, and
thousands of his constituents from the commercial fishing
industry who have had a tremendous, tremendous impact on the
coastline states. I suspect in this part of our country,
despite whatever international and regional commissions or
organizations that we are a part of, that the problem is that
we are just spinning our wheels. There are no substantive
results from all these recommendations, those which are
supposed to be enforced by these commissions. I think what the
Chairman is trying to say is, if they cannot do the job, then
maybe the Congress has to do it, and the recommendation offered
in this resolution is let's put forth trade sanctions.
I would like to offer a suggestion, Mr. Chairman, that
maybe we ought to extend our EEZ zone to 1,000 miles. Maybe
that might be a better way of allowing us, our own country,
unilaterally, to take real, strong conservation measures and to
protect our economic interests, not only for our commercial
fishermen but as well as our recreational interests.
What do you think of that, Mr. Dunnigan?
Mr. Dunnigan. I certainly don't believe that the
administration has a position yet on suggesting that we extend
our exclusive economic zone beyond 200 miles.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Could I offer a recommendation? Because
of the failures of these regional organizations to do what they
should be doing, could the administration do a little study to
see what the economic impact would be if we say, all right,
because you failed to do this, we are going to extend our
exclusive economic zone to 1,000 miles? What would be the
result in terms of our recreational and our commercial
interests given the problems that we have had with white marlin
and all these other things? We have 110 long-line fishermen
from the East Coast that are now in Hawaii because of the
moratorium placed on the swordfish, as I recall, simply because
of over-fishing.
I welcome your comment, Mr. Dunnigan.
Mr. Dunnigan. Well, I thank you, and I certainly respect
and understand your concerns. Even if we were to carve up all
of the oceans and give them all to different countries'
exclusive jurisdictions, it wouldn't solve our problems when
you are talking about fishery resources that migrate broadly
across oceans. One way or the other, we are going to have to
resolve these problems in collaboration with the other
countries that we are going to share these resources with.
And I think that, and what I would like to say is that
there is always this question of the glass being half-full or
half-empty. I think that there is a lot of progress that has
been made. There is a lot of progress that has been made in
ICCAT. We have seen rebuilding of swordfish. We saw in the
latest stock assessment some improvement in bluefin tuna
stocks. We have now got an agreement by the Eastern Atlantic
countries to sit down and talk about managing the entire tuna
stock as unit. We have commitments for better data programs,
and we are working on having better compliance and monitoring.
ICCAT only started working with a recommendation on white
marlin in the year 2000. So some of these things have got to
have some time to play out. I still think that we have some
hard work to do at ICCAT. And it is not perfect; it is
difficult. But it is really the way that we are going to be
able to go, with these highly migratory species that are trans-
oceanic, to get effective conservation.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Oh, I know what you mean, because this is
one of the issues that we have faced in the Pacific, our self-
declaration that tuna, being highly migratory fish, have no
boundary. So this little island nation named the Solomons,
confiscated one of our purse seiners and it caused a tremendous
international problem. We put sanctions on this little island
nation, the Solomons, simply because our vessels went right
into their EEZ. As a result we had to get rid of this theory,
or this idea, that because tuna is a highly migratory fish, you
can fish anywhere. That did not help our fishing industry, I
might say.
But, sharing the Chairman's concerns, has the
administration established any benchmarks? For example, where
are we after a 2-year period, and where are we going in order
to show exactly whether ICCAT is really doing its job or is it
just dragging its feet? Or are they just giving you the
runaround? As the Chairman had said, there continues to be a
depletion of the stock of species that are supposed to be
ICCAT's responsibility to conserve.
Mr. Dunnigan. Thank you. Again, I would say that I think
that ICCAT is making a lot of progress. We don't have
benchmarks in ICCAT quite the same way that we do in our
domestic management program, where we look at minimum spawning
stock thresholds and maximum fishing mortality thresholds. All
of those parameters are calculated by the scientists that
support the decisionmakers, but ICCAT doesn't adopt those same
sorts of benchmarks specifically.
This is a business of incremental progress and of being
patient and of sticking to it and not giving up.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I didn't mean to hit you with these
questions. I would like to ask Admiral Hathaway, do you think
the Coast Guard should participate in our military operations
in Iraq?
Admiral Hathaway. Thank you for that question. A little off
the subject, but the Coast Guard has been for many years a very
proud and capable member of our joint war-fighting team. And I
certainly believe, and I know the commandant of the Coast Guard
believes, that it is in the best interest of the American
public that it stay that way. However, we do bring unique
capabilities to our joint force package. We have a niche in the
expeditionary overseas missionary, and we think we perform that
very well. And I think that everyone involved had only rave
reviews for Coast Guard participation that continues today
supporting Iraqi freedom.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Well, I just want you to know how
appreciative and proud I am to know that you had a role, and
that all the men and women associated with our Coast Guard are
doing a fantastic job. Whether it be in time of military need
or protecting our coastline, I think you are doing a fantastic
job.
I don't have any questions to ask Mr. Considine. As you
have constantly said, Customs is out of this whole picture,
practically, but that is OK.
Mr. Balton, regarding the State Department policy on this
very issue: Is suggesting that we do trade sanctions as a
possible option something that the State Department would
support, such as that offered in the proposed resolution?
Mr. Balton. Let me first look at the resolution and talk
about trade sanctions more generally. As Mr. Dunnigan said, we
support the thrust of this resolution. We do think it is
appropriate that Congress express its view of the need for
ICCAT to take stronger measures and to be more effective.
There is some wording in here, as Mr. Dunnigan suggested,
that raise a question. So for example, I am looking at this
phrase that says ``if any vessel'' of a commission member or
non-member fishes in a way in violation of ICCAT rules, then
trade sanctions kick in. If every nation adopted this rule, the
U.S. could not export tuna. Because no country, including the
United States, can guarantee 100 percent compliance by all its
vessels at all times.
It is that sort of issue we want to sort out with your
staff, to try to get the standard to be the right standard.
That is what he was referring to.
Mr. Faleomavaega. As you know, the concurrent resolution
really is just an expression of the sense of the Congress.
Mr. Balton. Yes, I understand.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I thought that maybe the Chairman may
want to go to the next phase by putting more teeth into it and
by not calling it a resolution, but by making a bill out it and
really get the attention of ICCAT. What do you think of that?
Mr. Balton. That would make it all the more important to
get the standard to be the appropriate one. And single-vessel
standard, in my view, is not the appropriate standard. We could
not meet that standard.
However, we are already prohibiting imports of tuna caught
in the Atlantic from many countries, based on the ICCAT
multilateral trade restriction scheme. We chair the committee
in ICCAT that governs these issues. Indeed, I chaired it myself
one year. It is quite effective. We may need to expand it, may
need to do more of the same. But it is not like we are not
using trade sanctions already.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Gentlemen, thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Balton, do you agree with the general
thrust of the resolution?
Mr. Balton. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think I already said that.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Dunnigan, do you agree with the general
thrust of the resolution?
Mr. Dunnigan. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you. That is a good thing.
Mr. Dunnigan. Thank you.
Mr. Saxton. We held a hearing similar to this one--I am
sure my colleagues will remember--about a year ago. Are we any
better off today than we were a year ago, when we held the
hearing? Have we made any progress?
Mr. Dunnigan. I think we significantly are, Mr. Chairman. I
think we made a lot of progress at ICCAT last year. And
frankly, I think, from our standpoint in the delegation, it is
helpful to know that we have the support and the attention and
the concern of the Congress behind us. But last year at ICCAT,
we worked on rebuilding programs, we emphasized the need for
data. ICCAT, for the first time in a long time, recognized that
as an organization it was changing, and we brought a lot of
countries under the tent. There is now a quota table for
eastern bluefin tuna, where all of the countries that are
fishing are on that table and now have a clear, affirmative
obligation to limit themselves to quotas.
I think we came back from ICCAT with an improving structure
that gives us some hope that the organization is going to be
able to be even more effective in the future. And by my earlier
comments, I think you understand, we agree that ICCAT needs to
become more effective. We are working very hard to make it a
more effective organization. And we think we made a lot of
progress. That was part of the good news that we came back from
ICCAT with last year. So I think we are further ahead,
especially, you know, once ICCAT recognized the scientific
advice of the improvement in the swordfish stocks.
There is still a lot to do. White marlin is a problem; we
have got to keep working on it.
Mr. Saxton. Tell me what--in a general sense, what is the
biggest issue, what is the biggest problem facing the ICCAT
process?
Mr. Dunnigan. I would say right now the biggest issue is
improving and making more effective its compliance schemes.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Balton, you are agreeing, I think?
Mr. Balton. Yes.
Mr. Saxton. What can Congress do to be helpful? You both
have indicated that it is helpful to have Congress sit up and
take notice and say that we are interested, which we are, as
you can tell. If you had a blank sheet of paper and you could
say here, Congress, this is what you need to do to help us,
what would that be?
Mr. Balton. It is a difficult question to answer. Let me
try this: I have a vision of ICCAT that in several years we
will have gotten the organization to fully implement this white
list approach. This would be, in effect, a register of ICCAT
vessels that are permitted to fish in the Atlantic for tunas;
and that vessels that are not on the list--and you only get on
the list if you are in good standing--cannot sell their
product, cannot land it, cannot have it transshipped, cannot
have it imported. I would like to see that implemented. I don't
know whether the current ATCA, the Atlantic Tuna Conventions
Act, provides the type of specific legislative you need to make
that work. But that is still a few years down the road. I think
that ultimately will be the best approach for ICCAT, along with
many other measures that it will be taking. But it may not be
timely for us to look at changing the law today. We may need to
see how specifically ICCAT develops and implements its white
list. But that is the sort of thing that we will want to work
with Congress on to make effective.
Mr. Saxton. Jack?
Mr. Dunnigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I would
agree with Mr. Balton. And getting back to a comment that I
made a little bit earlier, as we see more and more of
international fisheries conservation going in the direction of
focusing on trade, we may need to have some serious discussions
about whether this sort of fishery-by-fishery piecemeal
approach is the best one, or whether we ought to have a more
comprehensive, broader approach toward fisheries trade and
developing mechanisms to really effectively keep illegal
product out of this country.
The other thing that we ought to be thinking about in terms
of improving conservation, in a monitoring sense, is observer
coverage. It is a very controversial issue. In NAFO, for
example, right now, NAFO requires 100 percent observers on all
vessels fishing in the NAFO area. And that is very expensive.
But we need to look at whether or not--clearly, in most
fisheries, we need to have dramatically more observer coverage
than we have now. And I think we need to look at other new
technologies, such as vessel monitoring systems, and the
possibility of making investments there.
In an international sense, the United States could be even
a better leader if we could help export some of this
capability, this monitoring and compliance capability to other
countries. We have been doing some of that, and that might be
an area where we could devote some more attention.
Mr. Saxton. Let me make a suggestion for short-term help.
You both agree with the general thrust of the resolution, and I
think that is great. And Dave has indicated that he is more
than willing to work with you on language. Let's get this
passed. Let's get it in a form that the administration can
support it. Let's get it passed. Then about the same time, I
will introduce, as Mr. Faleomavaega suggested, a proposed
statute which does--which would implement the provisions of
this resolution. And when you go to ICCAT, you can go and say
those crazy guys in Congress, look at what they are going to do
if we don't make progress. And maybe that will give you some
leverage that you don't have. I mean, if we take a baby step
and then we say that we are going to take a real step, and then
you go with an arrow in your quiver that you don't now have.
What do you think?
Mr. Dunnigan. I think we would be glad to work with you on
that. Again, we need to know--
Mr. Saxton. Does that mean yes?
Mr. Dunnigan. --and our partners at ICCAT--
Mr. Saxton. You know, there are some guys that advise us
over on the House floor. And when we walk in, we say what time
are we going to vote? They say, well, sir, it may be about 2
o'clock or so. And then I come back and I ask them another
question, and I say what time are we going to be finished
today? And they say, well, possibly around 10 o'clock, but it
could be a little earlier or a little later.
Now, you are giving me those kinds of answers. I want to
know if this would be helpful as an arrow in your quiver when
you go to ICCAT.
Mr. Dunnigan. Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to be compared
to House of Representatives staff.
Mr. Saxton. That is an even more vague answer than I got
before. Is there something wrong with my English?
Mr. Dunnigan. And we will be glad to work with you. Thank
you.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Saxton. OK.
Frank, have you got any questions?
Mr. Pallone. Yes, I wanted to ask a couple of things, but
I--
Mr. Saxton. You will probably get a ``maybe'' answer.
Mr. Pallone. What you said about the questions we get, you
know, about the House schedule was certainly true last night
and this week. That is a perfect example of it.
I just--a couple of things. Following up on one thing that
Mr. Dunnigan said, you mentioned the importance of observer
coverage. And I know that we have also raised this concern to
you, with regard to the resolution, that, you know, whether the
U.S. itself would be vulnerable to trade sanctions. And one of
the recommendations for which our compliance was questionable
required a minimum of 5 percent observer coverage for all long-
line trips targeting yellowfin and big-eye tuna.
Is it true--I guess the question is, is it true that the
U.S. has been out of, and may still be out of, compliance with
ICCAT recommendations. And if you want to comment on which ones
those might be?
Mr. Dunnigan. I don't believe that we are out of compliance
with ICCAT recommendations right now. I don't have the numbers
on the specific details for the question you asked, and we will
have to get you those separately. We take these
responsibilities for implementing ICCAT very seriously. Ask our
fishermen. You know, they certainly understand that we are
serious about implementing these things.
Mr. Pallone. Well, if you want to get back to us on it.
Mr. Dunnigan. I am going to have to get back to you on
that.
Mr. Pallone. I would appreciate it.
Mr. Dunnigan. Sure. Thank you.
Mr. Pallone. And then I wanted to ask Admiral Hathaway, Mr.
Balton mentions in his testimony that most of the flag states
whose vessels are the greatest source of IUU fishing are not
parties to international fishing treaties. And in your
testimony, you mentioned the Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks agreement, which allows the Coast Guard
to board foreign fishing vessels flagged by nations that are
party to mutual international fishing agreements. It appears
you are helpless to stop IUU fishing from the flag states whose
vessels are the greatest source of IUU fishing. Is that true?
And how could that problem be solved if it is true?
Admiral Hathaway. Well, sir, once again we come at this
from the Coast Guard point of view, at-sea enforcement. We have
seen that where we are able to devise cooperative agreements
with signatory flag states to various international agreements,
we can devise very effective at-sea enforcement regimes. I
think Mr. Balton's statement is right, that many of our
international agreements that exist today are absent the
signatures of some very significant countries that we would
like to see as signatories. And I think that that is a process
that is going to take time. And as we bring more countries on
board, those countries that are hold-outs for whatever reason
are going to be pressured to eventually get on board.
What I can tell you is that, when we have those significant
countries as signatories, the Coast Guard has been very
successful in devising very enforceable at-sea regimes to be
able to take very effective action. And the best example of
that in recent memory has been in the high seas driftnet arena,
where we do have, in many cases, the right countries signed up,
the PRCs of the world--South Korea, Russia--and we have been
able to devise some very effective at-sea enforcement regimes.
But we have a lot of work to do to bring some significant
countries on board with other international agreements--and, I
would say, including ICCAT. I am sure that there are other
countries we would like to bring into that forum.
Mr. Pallone. OK. And I just have one more question, Mr.
Chairman. Mr. Dunnigan, this year's Stock Assessment and
Fishery Evaluation for Atlantic Highly Migratory Species
indicated that NOAA fisheries is currently evaluating the
efficacy of recently implemented time-area closures intended to
reduce bycatch. Can you summarize the results that have been
found for these closures? And are international time and area
closures a potentially effective tool for international
fisheries management?
Mr. Dunnigan. Yes, thank you, Mr. Pallone. I think that
time and area closures are always an effective tool that needs
to be in the arsenal of any fishery management organization,
and they need to be applied appropriately with the fishery
conservation needs and the practices in those fisheries.
We have implemented some significant time-area closures in
our fisheries, and we are still in the process of doing an
assessment of the effectiveness of those. But some of the
preliminary information is showing that they can be very
effective, and we are very pleased with the early returns that
we are getting. But we are still looking at that, and we
won't--we don't have that available yet.
Mr. Pallone. This is specifically with reducing bycatch,
right?
Mr. Dunnigan. Not only with reducing bycatch, but also with
improving the status of some of the resources.
Mr. Pallone. OK. Thank you.
And Mr. Chairman, I know I asked some of the questions he
said he would get back to us in writing, and maybe we can
submit those in writing, with your permission, so that you know
specifically what we were asking.
Thank you.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Pallone.
One of you mentioned the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries
Enforcement Act, and Dave reminded me that the Act, that Act
has serious trade sanctions in the law and that when we
threatened driftnet fisheries nations with sanctions, we got
compliance. Do we need to do something like that to the
Atlantic Tuna Conservation Act?
Mr. Dunnigan. I wouldn't suggest that right now, Mr.
Chairman. I think that we have a lot of tools that are
available to us working with ICCAT and in the Atlantic Tunas
Convention Act. So I wouldn't suggest right now taking that
same approach. I think it is fairly clear to people who watch
what we do--and they do watch--that there is an enormous amount
of interest in the Congress and in the community at large in
making sure that these systems work. And I wouldn't recommend
right now that you need to take that action. But I think
knowing that you have it on your mind is helping us. It is
helping us with the other countries.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much. Do you have further
questions, Mr. Pallone?
We have no further questions at this time. We thank you for
coming here today.
I would just remind everyone who is here that at 12 o'clock
on the west side of the Capitol, there will be a memorial
service for the events of 2 years ago today. I am sure
everybody remembers exactly where they were. I do. And as I
turned on the television this morning, although I deal in a
different forum with that subject every single day, seeing
those pictures again was a grim reminder of those events and
everything that has transpired since then. So it would
certainly be appropriate for all of us to go and join our
colleagues and friends on the west side of the Capitol this
morning. I certainly will be there, and hope you will.
Thank you. And thank you for being here today. We are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]