[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NASA'S RESPONSE TO
THE COLUMBIA REPORT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 10, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-28
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee
DANA ROHRABACHER, California JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOE BARTON, Texas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan NICK LAMPSON, Texas
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan MARK UDALL, Colorado
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota DAVID WU, Oregon
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
Washington CHRIS BELL, Texas
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri ZOE LOFGREN, California
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia JIM MATHESON, Utah
ROB BISHOP, Utah DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas VACANCY
JO BONNER, Alabama
TOM FEENEY, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
C O N T E N T S
September 10, 2003
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 5
Written Statement............................................ 6
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Minority Ranking
Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives.... 7
Written Statement............................................ 8
Statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 9
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Minority Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 10
Prepared Statement by Representative Nick Smith, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Research, Committee on Science, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 11
Prepared Statement by Representative Vernon J. Ehlers, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 12
Prepared Statement by Representative Rob Bishop, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 12
Prepared Statement by Representative Tom Feeney, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 13
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 13
Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives.... 14
Prepared Statement by Representative Michael M. Honda, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 14
Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 15
Prepared Statement by Representative Jim Matheson, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 16
Witnesses:
The Honorable Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA)
Oral Statement............................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 17
Admiral Harold Gehman (retired), Chairman, Columbia Accident
Investigation Board
Oral Statement............................................... 22
Discussion
Schedule Pressure.............................................. 22
One-Year Look-Back............................................. 23
Operating Plan Changes......................................... 24
Crew Escape.................................................... 25
Foam........................................................... 26
Vision and the Interagency Review.............................. 28
The Independent Technical Authority............................ 31
Management Communication Regarding Schedule.................... 33
Countermeasures to Schedule Pressure........................... 34
Shuttle Safety and Risk........................................ 35
Vision Formulation and the Interagency Process................. 38
External Tank Foam and the Use of Freon........................ 40
RTF Workforce.................................................. 42
Schedule Effects on Workforce.................................. 43
NASA/Navy Benchmark............................................ 44
Accountability................................................. 46
Vision......................................................... 50
Shuttle Upgrades............................................... 53
OMB Passbacks.................................................. 55
Independent Technical Engineering Authority.................... 56
Stafford/Covey................................................. 59
Attitude/Culture............................................... 61
OSP and ISS.................................................... 64
ASAP........................................................... 68
Effects of the Proposed $200 Million Cut to Human Space Flight. 69
Political Appointees and Bonuses............................... 69
Budget Cuts.................................................... 72
Supplemental Request........................................... 72
Manned vs. Unmanned Space Flight............................... 74
RTF Costs and Schedule......................................... 76
Hubble......................................................... 77
Schedule Pressure.............................................. 77
Hubble......................................................... 79
Stafford/Covey................................................. 80
Alternative Access to Station.................................. 81
Interagency Working Group Participants......................... 82
OSP............................................................ 85
Accountability................................................. 87
ISS Safety..................................................... 87
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
The Honorable Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA)................................ 92
Admiral Harold Gehman (retired), Chairman, Columbia Accident
Investigation Board............................................ 110
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
NASA's Implementation Plan for Return-to-Flight and Beyond,
September 8, 2003.............................................. 114
Letter to Chairman Sherwood Boehlert from Sean O'Keefe,
Administrator, NASA, dated July 23, 2003....................... 264
Return-to-Flight Task Group Charter.............................. 265
Stafford-Covey Task Group Biographies............................ 268
Stafford-Covey Task Group Members................................ 272
Implementation Plan, NASA Engineering & Safety Center, Langley
Research Center, August 15, 2003............................... 284
Management Plan, NASA Engineering & Safety Center, Revision A.... 291
Letter to The Honorable Ted Stevens, Chairman, Committee on
Appropriations, from Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director,
Congressional Budget Office, dated July 29, 2003............... 304
NASA's Space Flight Operations Contract and Other Technologically
Complex Government Activities Conducted by Contractors, July
29, 2003, Congressional Budget Office.......................... 306
Not Culture But Perhaps a Cult, Op. Ed. on NASA and the Shuttle
by Homer Hickam, Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2003.......... 333
Convert the Shuttle, article by Robert Zubrin, SpaceNews,
September 8, 2003.............................................. 335
NASA'S RESPONSE TO THE COLUMBIA REPORT
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2003
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.
Boehlert [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NASA's Response to
the Columbia Report
wednesday, september 10, 2003
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On Wednesday, September 10th at 10:00 a.m., the Science Committee
will hold a Full Committee hearing on the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's (NASA) response to the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board Report. The Committee will receive testimony from
NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe and retired Navy Admiral Harold Gehman,
Chairman of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB).
The hearing will examine NASA's just released plan, ``NASA's
Implementation Plan for Return-to-Flight and Beyond,'' which is NASA's
response to the CAIB report. Issues for the hearing include whether the
plan fully complies with the CAIB recommendations; the cost and
schedule associated with implementing the plan; whether the task group
(led by the two former astronauts Thomas Stafford and Richard Covey)
that NASA has appointed to oversee return-to-flight provides the best
mechanism to assess NASA's implementation; and the criteria used to
determine when the Shuttle is ready to return to flight. The hearing
will also review the impact a significant delay in return-to-flight
might have on the International Space Station, the Hubble Space
Telescope, and the proposed Orbital Space Plane.
2. Background
On Monday, September 8, 2003, NASA released its response to the
CAIB report, ``NASA's Implementation Plan for Return-to-Flight and
Beyond.'' (See Attachment.) In the plan, NASA states that it accepts
the findings of the CAIB, will comply with the recommendations, and
embraces the entire report. The plan outlines NASA's response to each
recommendation made by the CAIB, along with the current status and a
schedule of milestones. In addition to the CAIB recommendations, NASA
has developed 10 additional corrective actions to address other areas
of concern. Two of these actions (SSP-1 and SSP-2) coincide with
``observations'' in the CAIB report. (The CAIB labeled as
``observations'' several recommendations for changes at NASA that did
not relate directly to the Columbia accident.)
NASA describes the implementation plan as a ``living document''
that will be periodically updated as plans are refined and progress is
made in making technical, management, cultural, and safety changes.
NASA Administrator O'Keefe has stated that the Shuttle will not return
to flight until it is ``fit to fly.'' However for planning purposes,
NASA continues to work toward a March 11, 2004 date for return-to-
flight.
NASA has a poor record of fully implementing recommendations from
previous reports, particularly non-technical recommendations.
Therefore, a key issue is whether NASA will fully satisfy the CAIB
recommendations. The return-to-flight plan says little at this point
about how NASA will implement the central organizational
recommendations of the CAIB, such as creating an independent technical
authority. NASA officials say they are still figuring out how to
respond to those recommendations, and implementation plans for
reorganization will be added to the return-to-flight plan later. (The
CAIB required only that NASA have a detailed plan for reorganizing in
place before flights resume; CAIB said the plan could be implemented
after return-to-flight.)
Since the CAIB only laid out criteria for reorganization, rather
than providing a detailed plan of its own, the Committee will have to
review NASA's plans carefully against the CAIB criteria. For example,
in July, NASA created a new safety center at the Langley Research
Center in Virginia. NASA at first described the center as being in step
with the CAIB recommendations, but reversed itself once the CAIB
publicly disagreed with that description. NASA is now in the process of
reviewing how the new safety center at Langley will operate.
Several months ago, NASA Administrator O'Keefe appointed a Return-
to-Flight Task Group, headed by former astronauts Richard Covey and Tom
Stafford and including 26 other members, to independently assess NASA's
implementation of the CAIB recommendations, but only insofar as they
relate to the readiness of the next Shuttle launch, STS-114. The
Stafford-Covey Task Group was created under the auspices of the NASA
Advisory Council and is subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
The Task Group will formally and publicly report its results. The Task
Group is not to second-guess the CAIB recommendations, but is only to
report on NASA's progress on meeting the intent of the CAIB.
This differs from the approach taken after the Challenger accident
in 1986 when the National Academy of Sciences was tasked to form a
special independent technical oversight team to evaluate NASA's return-
to-flight actions. Unlike the Stafford-Covey Task Group, which
apparently can only advise NASA, the Academy team had the authority to
reject technical changes proposed by NASA. In fact, the Academy
rejected the first two concepts proposed by NASA for fixing the ``O-
ring'' joint of the Solid Rocket Booster. Earlier this year, the
Academy offered to provide NASA a similar service, but NASA apparently
rejected the offer. Administrator O'Keefe is reluctant to give ``sign
off'' for return-to-flight to anyone outside the NASA structure for
fear that doing so would cloud his message that NASA managers are
responsible and accountable for flight safety.
NASA plans to review the more than 3,000 waivers that exist to the
Shuttle's technical specifications--a move that goes even beyond the
CAIB's recommendations, but a step that was taken after the Challenger
explosion. Such waivers allowed the Shuttle to continue flying, for
example, without NASA fixing the foam problem even though the design
requirements stipulate that no foam debris be allowed to strike the
Shuttle's delicate thermal insulation. The CAIB reported that more than
a third of the Shuttle's waivers had not been reviewed in over 10
years.
NASA's plans to have the Shuttle program review the waivers by next
January. (The CAIB did not mention reviewing the waivers explicitly,
but assumed that the new, independent technical organization it
recommended would review all specifications and waivers after return-
to-flight.) NASA's plans raise questions about how such a review can be
accomplished so quickly and about what process and structure NASA will
use to carry out the review to ensure that it is independent and
thorough. Since the specifications and waivers were created by the
Shuttle program; the CAIB was skeptical of the program's ability to
take a hard look at them itself.
3. Witnesses
The Honorable Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. Mr. O'Keefe was sworn in as the 10th
Administrator of NASA on December 21, 2001. Prior to NASA, O'Keefe
served as the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
Prior to joining the Bush Administration, he was a Professor at the
Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
and previously at Pennsylvania State University. O'Keefe has served as
Secretary of the Navy and Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer of
the Department of Defense during the first Bush Administration. Before
joining the Defense Department, he served as Staff Director of the
Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. His public service began in
1978 upon selection as a Presidential Management Intern.
Admiral Harold Gehman (retired), Chairman, Columbia Accident
Investigation Board. Formerly Co-Chairman of the Department of Defense
review of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. Before retiring, Gehman served
as the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, Commander in Chief of
the U.S. Joint Forces Command, and Vice Chief of Naval Operations for
the U.S. Navy. Gehman earned a B.S. in Industrial Engineering from Penn
State University and is a retired four star Admiral.
Attachment
NASA's Implementation Plan on Return-to-Flight and Beyond, dated
September 8, 2003, appears in Appendix 2: Additional Material for the
Record.
Chairman Boehlert. The hearing will come to order.
I want to welcome everyone here this morning for the second
of our hearings on the report of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, and the first of our hearings on ``NASA's
Implementation Plan on Return-to-Flight and Beyond.''
I think Administrator O'Keefe and NASA are to be
congratulated for their wholesale embrace of the CAIB report
and for moving so swiftly to put together a detailed, specific
plan in response. But while the wholesale embrace is
comforting, what happens at the ``retail'' level is what will
matter in the end. We need to ensure that, after this report,
reforms are put into effect that will truly change NASA
behavior up and down the chain of command.
The current iteration of the NASA Implementation Plan is a
useful start, but as I am sure Administrator O'Keefe will be
the first to acknowledge, it is only a start. It is a work in
progress. At this point, for example, the report is still
pretty much silent on how NASA will implement the CAIB's
recommendation to establish an independent technical authority,
one of the essential reforms sought by the CAIB.
And yet, at the same time, the Plan says that NASA will go
beyond the CAIB recommendations and review all waivers before
return-to-flight. Such a review is undoubtedly a useful
additional step, but it raises questions about who will conduct
such a review and whether enough time is being allowed for it
to occur thoroughly.
Indeed, timing remains a critical question for NASA and
this committee. Administrator O'Keefe has made clear in his
recent statement, and I am sure he will again today, that there
is no fixed date for return-to-flight and that the target date
of March 11 is a ``no earlier than'' date.
That said, I am still concerned that the target is
exceedingly ambitious and could skew NASA's efforts to return-
to-flight. We also need to hear more about how NASA will
schedule launches after return-to-flight to avoid the excessive
schedule pressure related to the construction of the
International Space Station, pressure that was discussed in
great detail in the CAIB report, and pressure that Admiral
Gehman has cited as an area in which NASA leadership created a
cultural problem.
So we have many questions about the Implementation Plan,
but they are just that, questions. This report has been
available for less than a week, and it is, as I said earlier, a
work in progress. It is far too early for us to comment
definitively on it. All we can really say now is that we will
monitor the Implementation Plan and how it is carried out as
closely as humanly possible, even as we deal with larger
questions about the future of the human space flight program as
a whole.
I should add that NASA personnel, including the
Administrator, have been extremely accessible to both the
Members and the staff of this committee in recent weeks, which
should enable our oversight of return-to-flight to go more
smoothly. I am sure Administrator O'Keefe will continue to be
helpful to us this morning.
Let me also thank Admiral Gehman for appearing before us
again today.
I want to make clear that Admiral Gehman is not here to
comment on the Implementation Plan itself; he has only had a
week or two to look at it, and he isn't authorized to speak on
this subject on behalf of his Board, which has officially
dissolved now.
The reason we have asked Admiral Gehman back is to ensure
that no one mischaracterizes the findings or recommendations of
the Board at today's hearing even inadvertently. The last thing
we need is for a misinterpretation to originate here and for it
then to be perpetuated as NASA plans for its future. So Admiral
Gehman will have a circumscribed, but vital role today, keeping
us on the straight and narrow, and I want to thank him for
doing that.
Mr. Hall.
[Statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
I want to welcome everyone here this morning for the second of our
hearings on the report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
(CAIB)--and the first of our hearings on ``NASA's Implementation Plan
on Return-to-Flight and Beyond.''
I think Administrator O'Keefe and NASA are to be congratulated for
their wholesale embrace of the CAIB report and for moving so swiftly to
put together a detailed, specific plan in response. But while the
wholesale embrace is comforting, what happens at the ``retail'' level
is what will matter in the end. We need to ensure that, after this
report, reforms are put into effect that will truly change NASA
behavior up and down the chain of command.
The current iteration of the NASA Implementation Plan is a useful
start, but--as I'm sure Administrator O'Keefe will be the first to
acknowledge--it is only a start. At this point, for example, the report
is still pretty much silent on how NASA will implement the CAIB's
recommendation to establish an independent technical authority--one of
the essential reforms sought by the CAIB.
And yet, at the same time, the Plan says that NASA will go beyond
the CAIB recommendations and review all waivers before return-to-
flight. Such a review is undoubtedly a useful additional step, but it
raises questions about who will conduct such a review and whether
enough time is being allowed for it to occur thoroughly.
Indeed, timing remains a critical question for NASA and this
committee. Administrator O'Keefe has made clear in his recent
statements, and I'm sure he will again today, that there is no fixed
date for return-to-flight and that the target date of March 11 is a
(quote) ``no earlier than'' date.
That said, I'm still concerned that the target is exceedingly
ambitious and could skew NASA's efforts to return-to-flight. We also
need to hear more about how NASA will schedule launches after return-
to-flight to avoid the excessive schedule pressure related to the
construction of the International Space Station--pressure that was
discussed in great detail in the CAIB report, and pressure that Admiral
Gehman has cited as an area in which NASA leadership created a cultural
problem.
So we have many questions about the Implementation Plan--but they
are just that--questions. This report has been available for less than
a week, and it is a work in progress. It is far too early for us to
comment definitively on it. All we can really say now is that we will
monitor the Implementation Plan and how it is carried out as closely as
is humanly possible, even as we deal with larger questions about the
future of the human space flight program as a whole.
I should add that NASA personnel, including the Administrator, have
been extremely accessible to both the Members and staff of this
committee in recent weeks, which should enable our oversight of return-
to-flight to go more smoothly. I'm sure Administrator O'Keefe will
continue to be helpful to us this morning.
Let me also thank Admiral Gehman for appearing before us again
today.
I want to make clear that Admiral Gehman is not here to comment on
the Implementation Plan itself--he's only had a day or so to look at
it, and he isn't authorized to speak on this subject on behalf of his
Board, which has officially dissolved now.
The reason we've asked Admiral Gehman back is to ensure that no one
mischaracterizes the findings or recommendations of the CAIB at today's
hearing even inadvertently. The last thing we need is for a
misinterpretation to originate here and for it then to be perpetuated
as NASA plans for its future. So Admiral Gehman will have a
circumscribed, but vital role today, keeping us on the straight and
narrow, and I want to thank him for doing that.
Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, good morning. I thank you for the
capability that you have brought and the responsibility and the
flexibility you have practiced and the availability that you
have given to us. By golly, you have been available here and
there, so I have attended almost every meeting we have had with
the families and you have both performed admirably. And I
respect and I thank you.
These hearings are some of the most important that this
committee will hold during this Congress, and I think they are
arguably probably the most important we have held in the last
10 years on the subject matter that we are talking about here
today. We are examining the causes of the terrible accident
that took the lives of seven brave astronauts and resulted in
the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia. We are looking for
solutions to the problems that were uncovered by the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board to ensure that we do all that we
can do to avoid any type of Shuttle problems in the future.
Admiral Gehman and his colleagues gave very helpful
testimony last week. We thank you for that. We appreciate their
insights and constructive criticisms. Now it is your turn, Mr.
O'Keefe. This Committee is interested in hearing your response
to the CAIB report, what you agree with, what you may disagree
with, and what you intend to do with the report's
recommendations.
We are talking about the future of the Nation's human space
flight program. All of us are going to have to work together to
address the issues raised by the Columbia tragedy. I intend to
work with you, Mr. Administrator, with the White House, and
with my colleagues in Congress to get past this setback and to
continue the exploration of space.
We are dealing with gentlemen and capable men and leaders
of this country, two of the finest leaders we have in this
country. And I look forward to working with you and working
toward making the Shuttle work and getting back into space and
continuing the progress that we have made. Mr. Administrator, I
intend to work with you and with the White House and with my
colleagues in Congress. And I intend, Admiral, to keep in touch
with you. And I know your interest is not going to wind up with
the day that your jurisdiction ceases or is slowed down.
As part of that effort, I intend to devote myself to an
examination of how we can best protect the lives of the Shuttle
astronauts. All of us have that hope and that desire. We may
not have another Shuttle accident for many, many years. I hope
we never have another one, but God forbid, we may have one a
lot sooner than that. However, if an accident does ever happen
again, I just want to know that we did all we could to develop
a crew escape system for the Shuttle, if it is feasible, if it
is workable. And we have to know that, but we have to start on
that route. And we have to get on that route. And we have to
get underway with doing that. I don't know how much money ought
to be put up. I am not sure where the money ought to come from,
but I know that that ought to be everyone's goal is to have a
way out. If we guess wrong on the type of Shuttle to put up
there, the type of protection we put in there, they need to
have an alternative or a way out if we have all guessed wrong
or if we guess wrong in the future. And we are capable of it,
because we have guessed wrong in the past.
Last week, I asked one of the distinguished Board members,
Dr. Sheila Widnall, MIT professor and former Secretary of the
Air Force, if she thought it made sense to at least start down
the trail of looking seriously at Shuttle crew escape systems.
And she, as of record, agreed with us saying ``it is a
completely reasonable path to take.''
Well, I will not take any more of your time to discuss
these issues in my opening statement. I think we all want to
hear from the witnesses. And I think we all want to know that
those youngsters that we send up there--we want to know that
they have the safest vehicle, the safest circumstances, and if
we don't give them those safer circumstances or if they don't
turn out to be the safest, that they have an alternative and an
opportunity to live. That is my whole--that is what I will be
working toward, but I plan to work with you, Mr. Chairman, with
the President, and with you, Mr. Administrator, and with every
Member of Congress.
I yield back my time.
[Statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Ralph M. Hall
Good morning. I want to join the Chairman in welcoming NASA
Administrator O'Keefe to our hearing, as well as welcoming Admiral
Gehman back for some further discussion.
These hearings are some of the most important that this committee
will hold during this Congress, and they are arguably some of the most
important we have held over the last 10 years. We are examining the
causes of the terrible accident that took the lives of seven brave
astronauts and resulted in the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia. And
we are looking for solutions to the problems uncovered by the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)--to ensure that we do all we can to
avoid another Shuttle accident in the future.
Admiral Gehman and his colleagues gave very helpful testimony last
week, and we appreciate their insights and constructive criticisms.
Now, it is your turn, Mr. O'Keefe. This committee is interested in
hearing your response to the CAIB report--what you agree with, what you
may disagree with, and what you intend to do with the report's
recommendations.
We are talking about the future of the Nation's human space flight
program. All of us are going to have to work together to address the
issues raised by the Columbia tragedy. I intend to work with you, Mr.
Administrator, with the White House, and with my colleagues in Congress
to get past this setback and to continue the exploration of space.
As part of that effort, I intend to devote myself to an examination
of how we can best protect the lives of the Shuttle astronauts for as
long as we continue to fly the Shuttle fleet. We may not have another
Shuttle accident for another 17 years. God forbid, we might have one
much sooner than that. However, if an accident ever does happen again,
I want to know that we did all we could to develop a crew escape system
for the Shuttle if it is feasible. We need to at least start down that
road.
Last week, I asked one of the distinguished CAIB members, Dr.
Sheila Widnal--MIT professor and former Secretary of the Air Force--if
she thought it made sense to at least start down the path of looking
seriously at Shuttle crew escape systems. She agreed with me, saying
``it is a completely reasonable path to take.''
Well, I will not take any more time to discuss these issues in my
opening statement. I know we all want to hear from the witnesses, and I
will continue this discussion during the question period.
I look forward to your testimony, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall. You
demonstrate the bipartisan spirit that has always dominated the
proceedings of this committee.
Let me make a correction for the record. In my opening
statement, I said that Admiral Gehman had the NASA return-to-
flight plan for a week or so. It is a day or so. I want to make
that clear.
Now the Chair recognizes Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Space and Aeronautics, the distinguished gentleman from
California, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
appreciate the fact that you have taken personal leadership and
put so much time and energy into this to make sure that we not
only have a full understanding of the Columbia tragedy but also
that we have accounting and that we have the changes necessary
to make sure that America's space program gets back on track
and remains a leader in space exploration utilization.
Tomorrow marks the second anniversary of the attack on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. That happened roughly a
half year into President Bush's Administration. A half-year
after that, Mr. O'Keefe, you were appointed to head NASA. One
half year after that, a major--another major catastrophe
happened, the destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia.
The American people understand that it takes time for a new
leader to affect change within an organization, especially the
size and scope of the United States Government and the size and
scope of NASA. At some point, however, there must be
accountability.
Well, when you add it all up, Mr. O'Keefe was the
Administrator of NASA for roughly a year before the Columbia
went down. He was a good choice to head the agency, and I still
believe that. It was a good choice, because NASA needed
accounting. And Mr. O'Keefe was affectionately dubbed, as he
took control, the ultimate bean counter and the one who would
make sure we understood all of the financial happenings over at
NASA, and what was going on there.
However, more than financial responsibility was vitally
necessary at NASA. The Gehman Report suggests an evolution in
attitude toward safety. Evolution that took place for over a
decade, long before Mr. O'Keefe got there. This downward
evolution towards safety was a major cause of the Columbia
tragedy. I am disturbed that there still seems to be certain
attitudes at NASA, even after the Gehman Report has pointed out
this attitude and that the general attitude was a major cause
of this crisis or this catastrophe. Perhaps--and it just seems
to me to be reflected in what I see as a rush to return-to-
flight, in terms of NASA, and a rush, I might say, to return to
policies that would keep us dependent on the Shuttle. NASA's
recent decisions which basically nixed alternative resupply
efforts to the Space Station seem to reflect this mindset, a
mindset that would keep us dependent on the Shuttle even after
the Gehman Report, even after all has been said and done. We
end up having policies that are pushing away alternatives to
the Shuttle and keeping us dependent on that in terms of the
completion of Space Station and the supple of Space Station.
Today, we examine the causes of the Columbia tragedy. We
are looking for accountability and solutions. We need to know
about changes in personnel, in policy, and in mindset at NASA.
Let me state for the record that I still have, and I believe
this committee, has faith in Mr. O'Keefe. He was Chairman--or
Administrator for a year. Now how much he could have changed
things in that year, I know that he personally went to all of
the Space Shuttle launches, and we will be talking about that
during the questions and answers, and we know that he took his
job very seriously and continues to take his job very
seriously. But what he does now is as important in his place in
history in terms that he will be viewed in history as what he
did before. And so we are looking for not only an examination
of what you did before and what your predecessor did before,
but also the policies that you are advocating and the
leadership you are providing now to NASA. And again, let me
state that I have full faith in Mr. O'Keefe and consider him to
be--we are lucky to have a man of his caliber leading NASA.
Finally, I think, Mr. Chairman, that we, in Congress, need
to accept some accountability ourselves to not just always be
pointing fingers. The fact is that all of us on this committee
have been serving on--with this responsibility of overseeing
NASA and for a lot longer than Mr. O'Keefe has been on his job.
And I think that that deserves some self-introspection as well
and some thoughtful examination by this committee as to whether
we are doing our job.
So with that said, I look forward to the testimony today.
And again, I appreciate the leadership you are providing, Mr.
Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Mr. Chairman, I am interested in hearing the NASA Administrator
provide this Committee his agency's response to the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board's recommendations, particularly as they relate to
resuming our human space flight program. As painful as the lost of life
can be, the risks of human space travel should not detour us from
pursuing this worthy endeavor.
I see little evidence that NASA fully appreciates the Board's
findings on near-term, cargo delivery to the Space Station. For
example, NASA's return-to-flight plan includes a new goal of having the
International Space Station serve as a safe haven for the crew in the
event of an emergency. But it is contingent upon the Russians'
timetable for showing up with Progress and Soyuz vehicles to keep the
crew alive.
Unfortunately, alternatives for Space Station cargo resupply
missions have gained little attention from NASA over the last few
years. Why are we still risking lives on the Shuttle to deliver cargo
supplies to the Space Station when there are other unmanned vehicles
available to deliver cargo with our international partners? This
problem is compounded by the fact NASA has repeatedly failed to develop
a successful replacement for the Shuttle. This is now a national crisis
resulting from NASA's failure to develop a new vehicle. They promised
hi-tech solutions during the last decade with the X-33 and could not
deliver it. This is why I believe NASA must seriously consider low-
tech, safe, low-cost and practical solutions for human space flight.
Further, NASA's ability to implement the Board's recommendations
will take money more than organizational wiring diagrams. In this
instance, I share Chairman Boehlert's view that the Congress should not
be in the business of rubber-stamping NASA's funding requests. NASA
must be forthcoming in its near-term budget plans in order for this
committee to make well-informed policy decisions. Determining the
future of NASA is a team effort involving both the Congress and the
Administration. We need straightforward, honest answers from NASA to
avoid further deferring our dream of man's exploration of space.
I look forward to today's discussion with Sean O'Keefe and the
opportunity to learn more of his agency's plans for the future.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member on the Subcommittee
on Space and Aeronautics, Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Admiral
Gehman and Mr. O'Keefe.
Let me start by reading some statements that struck me from
a report here--the report. ``NASA must support the Space
Shuttle Program with resources and staffing necessary to
prevent the erosion of flight safety critical processes. The
Committee feels strongly that the workforce augmentation must
be realized primarily with NASA personnel rather than with
contractor personnel. Space Shuttle maintenance and operations
must recognize that the Shuttle is not an operational vehicle
in the usual meaning of the term. The size and complexity of
the Shuttle system and of NASA contractor relationship placed
extreme importance on understanding, communication, and
information sharing.'' Admiral Gehman, you may recognize that
from the McDonald report that came forth in 2000. And I think
it is probably why you have said candidly, on a variety of
occasions, that--and you can say it for yourself, but you
didn't plow all that much new ground in those areas, that
McDonald laid out a good premise there.
Then on April the 18th, 2002, Mr. Blumberg, who was the
head of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, testified before
this panel--or this committee: ``In all my years of
involvement, I have never seen--I have never been as worried
for Space Shuttle safety as I am right now. All of my instincts
suggest that the current approach is planting the seeds for
future danger.'' And I think those statements laid a premise
for this statement that was--that Admiral Gehman, your Board
put in your report. ``Based on NASA's history of ignoring
external recommendations or making improvements that atrophy
with time, the Board has no confidence that the Space Shuttle
can be safely operated for more than a few years based solely
on renewed post-accident vigilance.'' The report also noted
that ``the long-term recommendation will be internally resisted
by the space agency.'' That is pretty rough.
But let me say, I am not that pessimistic. As I told Mr.
O'Keefe the other day, he has received a lifetime's worth of
criticism and advice from the front page of most every
newspaper in the country. And so I think that he is an able
person who has gotten the message. And I am looking forward
today to hearing more about how we get these benchmarks so that
when the crowds recede and the cameras go away that we can make
sure that the attention is still on safety and moving this
process forward.
And again, Mr. O'Keefe, I think we are all in this
together. I am optimistic that you are going to--that you have
gotten the message and that you are going to lay out a good
plan for us. And thank you for being here today.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. And all of the
Members will have the authority to put their statements in the
record at this juncture.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Nick Smith
I'd like to thank Chairman Boehlert and Ranking Member Hall for
holding this hearing today to discuss NASA's reaction to the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report.
In the wake of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia there are a
number of questions that need to be answered. The CAIB has done an
admirable job of investigating the accident, pinpointing the direct
cause, and identifying related factors, such as the ``NASA culture,''
that contributed to the tragedy. There are reasonable arguments why
manned space flight should be put on hold. On this committee and as a
nation, we need to have an honest, open discussion about whether or not
the Shuttle program is viable and should be continued as is and whether
there should be a greater shift to unmanned flight in terms of science
and space exploration. I am concerned that NASA's ``Return-to-Flight''
plan, which sets March 11, 2004, as a goal for the next Shuttle launch,
is an attempt to rush back to manned space flight, ignoring this
important policy debate.
By setting the goal of a March launch date, it almost feels like
back to business as usual for NASA. The CAIB report cited unreasonable
expectations for the Shuttle program, both by Congress and NASA, as one
of the factors that detracted from attention to safety concerns. Last
week, Admiral Gehman told the Committee that NASA has a history of
promising more than they can deliver in order to get a program
approved. He also said that lower level officials felt pressured to
meet deadlines at the expense of safety.
Administrator O'Keefe, you have said that the Shuttle will not
return to flight until it is ``fit to fly,'' but with the target date
for the next launch six months away I am concerned that we will end up
not dealing with all past mistakes. A successful mission would merely
give us a false sense of confidence in the Shuttle and create inertia
against a thorough re-evaluation of the space program that includes a
shift to unmanned flight.
The American people deserve a spice program that focuses on
producing quality and efficient scientific research. The conversation
that needs to be taking place right now is whether or not continuing
the Shuttle program advances this goal. Instead, Mr. O'Keefe, you seem
to be debating that the same priority for manned flight is a forgone
conclusion and how quickly we can resume sending astronauts into space.
I look forward to working with my colleagues and Administrator O'Keefe
to work on ways to create a safer, mode effective research-oriented
space program.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ehlers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Vernon J. Ehlers
Our nation is at a crossroads in space science and space
exploration. Our task is not as simple as determining whether NASA can
implement the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's recommendations
and return-to-flight. It is much more difficult and fundamental than
that. We need to determine whether our nation should continue human
space exploration.
If we decide to continue, we must decide on the extent of that
exploration and ensure that the program has goals that clearly
contribute to NASA's overall mission as a science agency. We must
remember that dollar for dollar unmanned missions provide significantly
more scientific knowledge than human space flight. A commitment to
human space exploration will be expensive and risky--we must be
prepared to pay the price and accept the risk.
Deciding the fate of human space flight at NASA requires an
extensive and open national debate on a range of subjects from NASA's
cultural and organizational flaws to the design of a new launch
vehicle. I am pleased that the NASA Administrator, Mr. O'Keefe, and the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board Chairman, Admiral Gehman, are
here today to engage in this debate.
I know that Mr. O'Keefe recognizes the need for change at NASA; I
look forward to hearing NASA's response to the Board's report. Make no
mistake though, Congress must now provide the necessary leadership and
oversight to help NASA make the right changes and emerge as a stronger
science agency.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bishop follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Rob Bishop
Since the Columbia disaster, only the second Shuttle failure in
over 22 years of operation, we have re-evaluated the importance and
viability of human space flight and exploration. It has been a valuable
discussion, and we must continue to define the role our nation will
play in space exploration, but an overwhelming majority of Americans
support our continued human presence in space--it's part of our
heritage and vital to our future. I reject much of the recent criticism
by ``Monday morning quarterbacks'' directed at NASA, when NASA and the
Space Shuttle program have so greatly benefited us and this nation.
I am proud to live 40 miles from Promontory Summit, Utah, where in
1869 the first transcontinental railroad was completed. This
advancement in transportation was achieved at an enormous cost of human
lives and material resources, but was crucial for the unification and
technological advancement it provided this country. The railroad, in
its prime, was the most vital transportation link in America. Although
this form of transportation has since been complemented by automobiles
and airplanes, it still serves an important function today in
transporting heavy cargo and people across the country. About ten miles
from the historic Promontory Point, the motors that propel the Space
Shuttle through our atmosphere are manufactured. The Shuttle has proved
to be just as important and significant to travel and technological
innovation in our time as the transcontinental railroad was over 100
years ago.
I fully support the development of a new human space flight launch
vehicle that will be more reliable and more cost-effective than the
Space Shuttle; however, the Shuttle--in the immediate future--is our
only link to human presence in space. The Shuttle should be returned to
service as soon as safely practical. NASA should be commended for its
commitment to safety and willingness to comply with the safety
recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and to
improve its cultural infrastructure, not criticized with the 20/20
vision of hindsight. Our development of a new human space flight launch
vehicle should supplement--and not immediately replace--the Space
Shuttle that has served us so well for 22 years.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feeney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Tom Feeney
Last week, Admiral Gehman, Dr. Hallock, Major General Hess, and Dr.
Widnall testified about the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's
(CAIB) report. Like that report, they provided candid, direct, and
insightful testimony about Columbia's loss. Furthermore, they agreed to
reconstitute, if asked, the CAIB in one year to review NASA's progress
in implementing the report's recommendations and observations. This
nation is deeply grateful for the unselfish and tireless dedication of
the CAIB's members and staff--a remarkable example of public service.
We now focus on moving forward. Two days ago, NASA released its
plan to implement the CAIB's recommendations. This plan remains a work
in progress but provides a good faith effort to returning the Shuttle
to flight. Time will tell whether NASA meets the challenges laid down
by the CAIB. But I know the NASA family--who lost so much on February
1--possesses the potential to do so. I urge every one of them to
unconditionally dedicate themselves to this effort.
Today, NASA Administrator O'Keefe joins us. I commend him for fully
embracing the CAIB Report--not only the words but also more importantly
its spirit. I was with Administrator O'Keefe on that terrible February
day and have watched his leadership during the subsequent months. At
times, he seems like Atlas--carrying America's human space program on
his shoulders. He too exemplifies genuine public service.
I look forward to today's testimony and the subsequent give and
take. Chairman Boehlert and this committee's Members provide a much
needed forum for thoughtful discussion about achieving a rigorous and
sustainable American human space program--a final example of public
service.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good morning. I want to thank Administrator O'Keefe and Admiral
Gehman for appearing before our committee to discuss NASA's response to
the Columbia Investigation Board (CAIB) Report. In any discussion of
the Columbia accident, we must remember to honor the seven astronauts,
their vision and their legacy. Both our nation and our world benefit
enormously from each mission.
NASA just released its plan, ``NASA's Implementation Plan for
Return-to-Flight and Beyond,'' which is NASA's response to the CAIB
report. This report provides a start at how NASA plans to reorganize
its programs to become flight ready.
The CAIB report is quite critical of schedule pressure placed on
the Shuttle program to meet a February 19, 2004 date for the launch of
Node 2 to complete the ``core complete'' milestone. ``Core complete''
was not a recognized space station assembly milestone prior to this
Administration's decision in early 2001 to cut the station program by
eliminating the planned U.S. crew return vehicle and habitation module,
cutting the planned crew size from 7 to 3, and cutting the planned
research budget by 40 percent.
In the House Science Committee hearing last week, Admiral Gehman
stated that Shuttle program workers felt pressure because of
requirements to work weekends and to make up a potential 45-day delay
in the milestone by performing some safety activities in parallel
rather than in a prescribed sequence. Even more telling was that
Admiral Gehman believes there was a disconnect between managers and
workers, whereby managers viewed the deadline as flexible and workers
got a message that it was not.
Because of this, I find it surprising that we see echoes of the
management focused on deadlines for return-to-flight. With respect to
the schedule for returning the Shuttle to flight, NASA management set
an aggressive milestone of December 2003 before the CAIB report was
even completed. As the magnitude of the Board's recommendations became
known, NASA management then changed the date to early March 2004. After
further criticism of a rush to return the Shuttle to flight, NASA
stated that the schedule would be ``event driven'' and not ``schedule
driven.'' Nevertheless, the just-released NASA return-to-flight plan
sets March 11, 2004 as the current planning date.
CAIB found that management goals were having a negative impact on
the line workforce that keeps the Shuttles flying, and more
significantly for Columbia, affecting the attitudes of Shuttle program
managers who came to view flight problems through the lens of threats
to the schedule rather than threats to the safety of the astronauts. I
find it problematic that there may be similar pressure on NASA
employees to return-to-flight by the March 2004 deadline and I am
interested in delving further into this issue of schedule pressure.
I am also interested in the independent organizations recommended
by the CAIB report. I have been a fervent proponent of external review
for the Department of Energy (DOE) civilian labs. I see many
similarities and differences to the current system at DOE in the
proposed CAIB recommendations and believe Congress must take a closer
look at how the report and NASA will interpret and define independent,
who will staff these organizations (government employees, contract
employees, or both), and what exactly their duties will be.
I again thank the witnesses for being with us today and providing
testimony to our committee.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you for calling this
important hearing today, and I would also like to thank Administrator
O'Keefe for agreeing to appear here today and Admiral Gehman for
returning to answer our questions on this most important hearing on the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report.
Today we are brought here again to discuss the details of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report. To protect the
safety and integrity of the future of this country's space program, we
must learn from the mistakes of the past. The report from this
investigation will allow us to see what went wrong and how to prevent
it from happening again. It is essential that we put forth a concerted
effort to protect the safety of our astronauts.
Unfortunately, we see from the CAIB report that there was pressure
from the leadership that led to unsafe practices. One of the biggest
concerns I've had with this current NASA administration has been the
privatization and competitive sourcing of governmental functions.
Throughout the 1990's, the Shuttle workforce has shrunk. From the 1992-
2002, NASA Shuttle workforce was reduced by more than 50 percent and
the Shuttle contractor workforce by more than 40 percent. The Gehman
report documents these facts as well as the fact that the diminished
capability of the NASA Shuttle workforce was a factor in the Columbia
accident. I find this quite alarming.
We can no longer pass blame or hide behind ignorance when we
discuss the safety of our astronaut core. Its time we stand up and face
the music of the mistakes made, if not only to honor of our brave
heroes who have passed because of our arrogance or failure to see the
errors of our ways. That is the least we owe in their memory.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Honda follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Michael M. Honda
I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for holding this important
hearing, and Administrator O'Keefe and Admiral Gehman for taking the
time to join us today.
I want to quote from an anonymous e-mail sent by a NASA employee to
NASAWATCH regarding the Columbia accident and accountability:
``(W)hat is most disheartening in the aftermath of this accident,
is that not one of those (NASA or contractor) managers has resigned.
Mr. Gregory, who oversaw the downsizing of the safety program, and
still believes safety is alive and well at NASA, continues to provide
Mr. O'Keefe with technical advice. Mr. O'Connor, who did not feel he
should interfere with the Shuttle Program on a potentially catastrophic
safety matter, continues to occupy NASA's highest safety position. Mr.
Readdy, who signs off on the CoFR, accepted the ``lousy'' rationale for
continuing to fly after previous Shuttle flights were damaged by foam
from the ET. And what about the iron fisted Major General Kostelnick,
who steadfastly controls any communication coming from Shuttle or
Station Program Managers?''
``Why are American managers so beset with ego that they cannot
accept responsibility for their actions? How many times must we hear,
``I serve at the pleasure of the (fill in the blank). And only they can
fire me.'' These people are not leaders. . .''
Another writer noted that no repercussions have been seen at USA or
Boeing. One could add that Steve Isakowitz, NASA's CFO, was the program
examiner who presided over cuts the Shuttle upgrades budget. I know
that 14 or 15 people have been moved around--so I don't want to hear
about them--but cynics within NASA those moves as program or project
managers getting moved to save the skin of top management.
In light of the comments CAIB members have made about the
importance of leadership in setting a new culture at NASA, I look
forward to hearing from the Administrator why he has not made any
changes at the top in the wake of Columbia. I would like to know why he
feels that his mix of leaders are the right one's to change NASA's
culture, especially when Deputy Administrator Gregory, is actually
quoted as saying there is no such thing as a NASA culture.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for moving so swiftly to organize this series of hearings
to ensure that this committee does all that it can do to help America
get back to its vital mission in space. And again I would like to
commend Ranking Member Hall, and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the
Space Subcommittee for their excellent leadership in that endeavor.
Last week's hearing with Admiral Gehman and CAIB members was
enlightening and productive. Although it is always a pleasure to see
you, Admiral, I hope you'll understand as we turn our attention toward
NASA today--to hear how they will proceed in the weeks, months, and
years to come.
Administrator O'Keefe, thank you for taking the time to be with us
today. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board report has obviously
set some great challenges before you. I know you have a lot of work
ahead, but I am sure that working together, we can get this job done
more effectively.
Mr. Chairman, Admiral Gehman's findings must have been tough to
hear at NASA. They were tough for all of us to hear--the overlooked
clues, the missed opportunities. But I guess this is a time for tough
love. I think we all share a commitment to science, and exploration,
and to a bold mission at NASA. But, quite frankly, I for one am
frustrated. I have sat in this room time after time over the past
years, talking about safety, talking about the chronic under-funding of
NASA programs, talking about the need for a vision for the future of
mission that will capture the hearts of young engineers and scientists,
talking about how much this program is worth to the American people.
But my words, as those of many of my colleagues on this side of the
aisle, never seemed to take hold. I respect the Administrator's recent
comments, accepting responsibility for this tragedy, and vowing to
fulfill the CAIB report recommendations. But I have a nagging fear that
it is just lip-service. NASA does not just need some quick fixes, and
maybe a new office with a catchy name. It needs a dramatic alteration
in the mindset of every NASA worker, and every NASA contractor, and
every NASA manager. They all need to be fully committed to the safety
of NASA spacecraft and crew. That is the cultural change that Admiral
Gehman called for, and we need it immediately.
I am concerned that kind of dramatic change in mindset is not yet
happening. Admiral Gehman's team has been very specific about instances
of gross negligence in the NASA decision making chain, but as yet the
managers who made those decisions are still in critical positions. I
want to hear if the Administrator believes it is possible to have a new
culture-of-safety at NASA, without holding NASA managers accountable
for their lack of attention to safety in the past.
Furthermore, the CAIB report has pin-pointed dwindling budgets and
a lack of a clear vision for the mission of NASA--saying that both had
a role in bringing down the Shuttle Columbia. And now, as NASA
engineers need to be rising to their highest heights, getting our
Shuttles back to work safely, and intensive study needs to be
undertaken so that tough decisions can be made about where human space
flight is going, and what we will need to do to get there--I am still
not hearing a request for money, or any ideas from NASA or the
Administration of what to do next. I hope that NASA is not trying to do
it on the cheap, yet again. I appreciate that this process will take
time, but I hope that soon we see a clear statement of the importance
of the NASA, of its mission, and of what resources it will take to make
it happen.
Finally, this change of culture at NASA needs to be comprehensive,
not just focussed on a handful of immediate recommendations, or on the
Shuttle alone. Right now we have two brave astronauts up above us,
orbiting the Earth in the multi-billion dollar International Space
Station, the culmination of decades of dreaming and hard work. Last
week, in response to a question I asked, Admiral Gehman suggested that
the Space Station could also have technical problems or weaknesses that
may have been discounted, as was the falling foam. Today I hope to hear
that the Administrator is looking into safety of the Space Station with
the same kind of diligence and objectivity that the CAIB used in the
case of the Space Shuttle.
As a Representative of Houston, I know just how talented and
committed the people at NASA are. They have great ideas, but they must
be heard. We need to open up channels of communication at NASA to get
answers to the questions of the past, and to develop a bold vision for
the future. To foster that dialogue, I have a bill with me today, that
I will be introducing soon, to enhance the whistleblower protections
for NASA employees. The CAIB reported that several engineers had
recognized that the Columbia may have been fatally wounded, but ``when
asked by investigators why they were not more vocal about their
concerns, Debris Assessment Team members opined that by raising
contrary points of view about Shuttle mission safety, they would be
singled out for possible ridicule by their peers.'' This can never
happen again. The NASA Promotion of Excellence and Safety Act of 2003,
will ensure that legitimate safety concerns of NASA workers are heard
and respected.
NASA's mission is vital to our economy, and to our growth as a
people. It is time for some bold steps forward. I look forward to the
discussion.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Matheson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jim Matheson
Thank you Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hall for your
consideration.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, under the
excellent direction of Admiral Gehman, produced 29 essential
recommendations for NASA and the Space Shuttle program that will
hopefully result in a safer human space flight program at NASA.
Following the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia earlier this year,
Congress has naturally turned its attention to ensuring that NASA fixes
the internal problems that led to the accident.
I am impressed by Mr. O'Keefe's energy and hope that he will be
able to lead NASA away from the institutional mindset that led to the
Columbia accident. However, I remain concerned about the lack of a
long-term focus on implementing the Gehman recommendations. NASA
created the Stafford-Covey panel in order to direct the agency's
return-to-flight actions, but this panel is slated to exist for only
eight months. It is essential to the long-term viability of human space
flight that NASA is vigilant about following through on all of the
Gehman report's findings over the next five years.
The present circumstances have focused our attention on the Shuttle
program, but I hope that the passage of time does not result in a
return to a NASA culture that compromised safety in the Shuttle
program. In order for this nation to benefit fully from the CAIB
findings, NASA must meet all of the Gehman Board's recommendations and
I look forward to working with my colleagues in support of that end.
Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. We will go right to our witnesses. Our
panel today consists of the Honorable Sean O'Keefe,
Administrator of NASA, and Admiral Harold Gehman, Chairman of
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
Gentlemen--Mr. O'Keefe, you are first. And we will not be
arbitrary with any time limit, and then we will hear from
Admiral Gehman.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SEAN O'KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. O'Keefe. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hall, Members of the
Committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss NASA's response to the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board's report.
Mr. Chairman, if you would, I have a statement that I would
like to submit for the record and then summarize.
Chairman Boehlert. Without objection, so ordered.
[Statement of Mr. O'Keefe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sean O'Keefe
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you here today with Admiral Gehman, who
along with the other members of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board (CAIB) has selflessly performed a valuable and patriotic public
service these past seven months.
Shortly after the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle and its heroic
crew, I made a solemn pledge to the families of Columbia's crew that we
would find out what caused the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and
its crew, correct what problems we find, and safely continue with the
important work in space that motivates our astronauts and inspires
millions throughout the world. Thanks to the CAIB's thorough report, we
now definitively know what caused the accident. It was a combination of
hardware, process and human failures. We also have a more complete
understanding of the problems that must be fixed at NASA to ensure that
Space Shuttle operations are conducted as safely as humanly possible in
pursuit of our Nation's space exploration and research agenda.
The CAIB report provides NASA with a very detailed roadmap for
returning to flight safely, one that we intend to faithfully follow. I
can assure you that we will not only implement the CAIB's
recommendations to the best of our ability, but we are also seeking
ways to go beyond their recommendations.
Today's focus is on the hard lessons we've learned from the
Columbia accident and about the hard work that lies ahead before we are
ready to launch the Space Shuttle Atlantis for the STS-114 mission. I
want to emphasize, as we undertake this work, we will be ever mindful
of and appreciative of the people who have helped NASA and our entire
country recover from that terrible first day of February.
First and foremost, we owe enormous gratitude to the brave families
of the Columbia crew. Through their steadfast courage and dignity they
have provided inspiration to the Nation. A fitting memorial for the
crew will be constructed at Arlington National Cemetery. We thank the
Members of this committee for your strong support of the Columbia
Orbiter Memorial Act, which President Bush signed into law on April 16,
2003.
One month ago, the family members demonstrated an incredible spirit
of exploration and discovery in their own right as they joined
astronaut Scott Parazynski in climbing to the top of the recently named
Columbia Point, a prominent vista on Colorado's Kit Carson Mountain
that now honors the memory of the Columbia STS-107 crew.
We are also indebted to the over 14,000 people from the
Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defense Department, U.S. Forest
Service, the Texas and Louisiana National Guards and many State and
local law enforcement and emergency service units who contributed to
the recovery of Columbia's debris. As a result of this unprecedented
interagency and intergovernmental cooperative effort, an area in
eastern Texas and western Louisiana, about the size of Rhode Island,
was carefully searched, resulting in the recovery of thirty-eight
percent of the dry weight of the orbiter, including several key parts
from the left wing, the part of the Orbiter damaged by a foam strike
during liftoff, and the critical Orbiter Experimental Recorder--the
data recorder that verified and validated much of what was learned
about the accident. We are deeply saddened to note that one of the
helicopters searching for debris from the Shuttle Columbia crashed in
the Angelina National Forest in east Texas on March 27, claiming the
lives of the pilot and a Forest Service Ranger. Our thoughts and
prayers go out to the families of the helicopter crew members.
In support of this unprecedented operation, we received tremendous
hospitality and support from the Texas communities of Lufkin, Hemphill,
Nagadoches, Palestine and Corsicana, as well as the Louisiana
communities of Shreveport and Leesville, particularly in support of
activities at Barksdale AFB and Fort Polk. NASA vows not to forget the
many kindnesses bestowed upon our people and the other recovery workers
by all these communities. We will use the resources and people of our
Education Enterprise to help nurture the spirit of discovery and
exploration in the young people who grow up in the region, just as we
are working to help inspire and motivate school children throughout the
country as they embark on their studies this fall.
Finally, we are grateful for the diligent work of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board members and staff. As many of you know,
the Board has worked non-stop since it was given this important
responsibility. Admiral Gehman has performed many tremendous acts of
public service throughout his distinguished career, and I'm certain
that the history books will regard his work on this report as among his
most significant contributions to his country.
We accept the findings of the Board and will comply with its
recommendations. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's report
recommendations will be our benchmark for Return-to-Flight. Using the
Board's recommendations as NASA's organizing principles for emerging
from the Columbia accident as a safer, stronger and smarter
organization, we have developed a preliminary Return-to-Flight
Implementation Plan which details the Agency's evolving blueprint for
returning to flight safely and reliably. Released on September 8, this
preliminary Implementation Plan provides an outline of how NASA will
comply with the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board, and also includes other corrective actions. The Implementation
Plan is a living document and will be updated on a regular and frequent
basis, with input from across the entire Agency.
Following the logic of the Board's report, the preliminary
Implementation Plan focuses on making improvements in the following key
areas:
Technical excellence--Making specific technical
engineering changes that will enhance our overall technical
capabilities. Among these changes is the establishment of our
new NASA Engineering and Safety Center at the Langley Research
Center in Hampton, Virginia that will draw upon talent
throughout our Agency to take a no holds barred approach to
mission safety. If people in the center spot a problem or
potential problem during their engineering and safety
assessments of all our programs, they will be empowered to get
the entire Agency, if necessary, focused on finding and
implementing solutions.
Management--Putting in place more effective
management procedures, safeguards, and decision-making
processes.
Organizational Culture--NASA recognizes that prior to
the Columbia, mission cultural traits and organizational
practices within the Agency detrimental to safety were allowed
to develop. We will now work diligently to develop an
organizational culture that reflects the best characteristics
of a learning organization, one based on clear and open
communications throughout our Mission Teams, with a management
culture that empowers both dialogue and achievement.
At the same time the CAIB was developing its report, NASA pursued
an intensive, Agency-wide effort to identify additional actions that
will further improve the Space Shuttle Program. We took a fresh look at
all aspects of the Program, from technical requirements to management
processes, and developed a set of internally-generated actions that
complement and go well beyond the CAIB recommendations. For example,
some of the types of activities we are focusing on include rudder speed
brake actuator inspections and re-evaluation of catastrophic hazard
analysis, to name a few.
The Implementation Plan integrates the CAIB recommendations as well
as other actions. It is the first installment in a living document that
will be periodically updated to reflect the progress toward safe
return-to-flight and faithful implementation of the CAIB
recommendations.
With respect to preliminary budget implications of the return-to-
flight efforts, on September 4, 2003, NASA submitted to the Committee
an update to the FY 2003 Operating Plan. This update reflects
anticipated costs of about $40 million associated with implementation
of an initial set of actions tied to the CAIB recommendations and other
corrective actions. NASA is determining the full spectrum of
recommended return-to-flight hardware and process changes, as well as
their associated costs. The Administration is also assessing the long-
term implications of the return-to-flight requirements. We will keep
the Committee informed as decisions are made.
We are now determined to move forward with a careful, milestone-
driven return to space flight activities, and to do so with the utmost
concern for safety, incorporating all the lessons learned from the
tragic events of February 1st. That's exactly what we will do.
Our Return-to-Flight effort involves a team of space flight
professionals, led at NASA headquarters by Dr. Michael Greenfield,
Associate Deputy Administrator for Technical Programs and veteran
astronaut Bill Readdy, Associate Administrator for Space Flight.
Another veteran astronaut, Jim Halsell, who has flown on five
Shuttle missions, will oversee the day-to-day work required for our
return-to-flight. As the commander of an upcoming Shuttle mission, STS-
120, Jim has a personal interest in ensuring that Return-to-Flight is
done right. I can assure you we will also rely on the advice and
judgment of all members of the astronaut corps, the men and women who
have the most vested interest in safe operations of the Shuttle
program.
We will also have the benefit of the wisdom and guidance of a
seasoned Return-to-Flight Task Group, led by two veteran astronauts,
Apollo commander Thomas Stafford and Space Shuttle commander Richard
Covey. Members of the Stafford-Covey Task Group were chosen from among
leading industry, academia and government experts. The Members of the
Task Group have knowledge and expertise in fields relevant to safety
and space flight, as well as experience in leadership and management of
complex programs. The diverse membership of the Task Group will
carefully evaluate and publicly report on the progress of our response
to implement the CAIB's recommendations.
There is another body that NASA will greatly rely on in the Return-
to-Flight process: this committee, and all in Congress who have a vital
interest in how NASA performs our work on behalf of the American
public. We very much respect and value this committee's oversight
responsibility, and I personally look forward to working with the
Committee in the weeks and months ahead to ensure that we do our job
right.
Building upon work already underway to address issues previously
identified by the CAIB, the release of our preliminary Implementation
Plan marks an important step in our efforts to address and fix the
problems that led to the Columbia accident. We are about to begin a new
chapter in NASA history, one that will be marked by a renewed
commitment to excellence in all aspects of our work, a strengthening of
a safety ethos throughout our organization and an enhancement of our
technical capabilities.
As we proceed along this path, all of us will be challenged. I am
absolutely certain that the dedicated men and women of NASA are up to
this challenge and we will not let the families of the Columbia
astronauts and the American people down.
I would also like to provide an update on the status of the
International Space Station (ISS) and the impact from grounding the
Space Shuttle. The Space Shuttle's return-to-flight is critical to
complete assembly and ensure research capability for the ISS. Only the
Shuttle can deliver the large elements, spare parts and the logistics
required to successfully meet our research goals and international
agreements. While the Space Shuttle fleet is grounded as a result of
the Columbia accident, Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles continue to
provide assured crew and cargo access to and from the ISS.
In the absence of Space Shuttle support, NASA and the International
Partners are addressing contingency requirements for the ISS for the
near- and long-term. In order to keep the Expedition 7 and future crews
safe, we are ensuring that there are sufficient consumables, that the
ISS can support the crew, and that there is a method for safe crew
return available.
The ISS Expedition 7 crew (Yuri Malenchenko and Ed Lu) continue
their stay on-board the ISS, which began in late April 2003. The ISS
was re-supplied with a Progress vehicle (ISS Flight 12P) launched on
August 28 and docked to the Station on August 30, 2003. The crew is
continuing experiments for which sufficient hardware and supplies are
already on-board the ISS. Twenty-six science investigations are in
process or planned for Increments 7 and 8. Operations continue to go
well, with sufficient consumables on-board the ISS. The launch of the
next Progress to resupply the ISS has been accelerated from January
2004 to November 2003. I am proud that the ISS partnership has come
together as a true partnership during this challenging time. I also
wish to assure you that there is no schedule pressure to return the
Space Shuttle to flight until we are confident it is safe to fly.
The Expedition 8 crew (Commander C. Michael Foale and Flight
Engineer Alexander Kaleri) is scheduled to accept hand-over of the ISS
from the Expedition 7 crew following their launch on Soyuz in October,
2003.
In closing, I want to reiterate that the country owes Admiral
Gehman and the entire Board a tremendous debt of gratitude for the
service it has performed. We embrace the CAIB report and we are
committed to implementing the recommendations and safely returning to
flight.
Finally, I believe it is important to note that all 13 CAIB members
arrived at and agreed to the final conclusion of their report: ``The
United States should continue with a Human Space Flight Program
consistent with the resolve voiced by President George W. Bush on
February 1, 2003: `Mankind is led into darkness beyond our world by the
inspiration of discovery and the longing to understand. Our journey
into space will go on.' ''
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Committee.
Mr. O'Keefe. Over our 45 years as an agency, since NASA was
founded in 1958, we have found, in the course of this history,
that our time has been defined by great success and by great
failures. In each of these defining moments, our strength and
resolve as professionals has been tested. This is one of those
seminal moments in our history, and it is defined by failure.
On February 1, we pledged to the families of the Columbia 7
that we would find the problem, fix it, and return to the
exploration objectives that their loved ones dedicated their
lives to. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board report
completes the first of these commitments, and we are indebted
to Admiral Gehman and his colleagues to their exception of
public service and extraordinary diligence to a very difficult
task. We asked for an unvarnished, objective, independent view,
and we got it.
As we begin to fulfill the second commitment to the
families, to fix the problem, our critical first step is to
accept the findings, to comply with the recommendations, and to
embrace this report. There is no equivocation on that pledge.
This report is a blueprint. It is a road map to achieving that
second objective.
In the course of the proceedings in this investigation, the
Board has given us an extraordinary head start by their candor,
their openness, and the release of findings and recommendations
during the course of their investigation itself. They didn't
wait until the final words were drawn on the paper of the
report itself. They had been conducting this is a very open
setting, and they had been communicating regularly and often.
In the telegraph all along the way, in the course of their
public hearings and commentary exactly where their findings
were, and they found them and moved forward in that particular
direction, and we have been listening. It was started, thanks
to their good work and the manner in which they conducted it by
developing an implementation plan. This is not something we
developed in the last 10 days. It has been a work in progress
as we have listened carefully to their open testimony, their
open commentary, their written advice and recommendations to us
so that we could begin to prepare that effort.
And as the Chairman mentioned, on the 8th of September, we
released a preliminary Implementation Plan in response to these
recommendations, which we will upgrade regularly, often, amend
it as necessary, all of the way to the point of return-to-
flight and well beyond.
The report is divided into two primary categories: the 29
recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board,
and a second approach, which is to raise the bar to a standard
higher than what has been stated in those recommendations. And
that raise the bar input will include observations of the
Board, other findings, commentary in the course of the Board's
report with you, different ideas or initiatives that they have
proposed separately, factors we have discovered during the
course of supporting the investigation, and any other good
ideas from the general public or anybody else who wants to
offer it. We are trying to inventory all of those different
approaches in order to work through each of those
recommendations and additional ideas to make this a better,
safer, stronger organization. We include in that category
anything and everything that is going to improve this process
as well as the capabilities and the hard work.
As we work through these recommendations, we have chosen to
implement them very thoughtfully in order to be compliant with
the recommendations. There are several options that may be
considered for each of those respective recommendations. We
must continually improve and upgrade that plan to incorporate
every aspect we find along the way in the implementation
effort, any other observations, wherever they may come, that
need to be addressed as we work our way through this commitment
to fix the problem. And in doing so, there will be regular
updates, regular amendments, regular republication of that
Implementation Plan to assure that everyone knows exactly where
it stands.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board report covers
hardware failures and human failures and how our culture needs
to change to mitigate against succumbing to failures of both
kinds. We must go forward to resolve to follow this blueprint
and do it in a way that is our very best effort to make this a
stronger organization.
It is important to recognize, and we do, that it will
require all of us in the agency, not just those within the
space flight community or any one center or any one program. It
must involve all of us at NASA. And to those who don't get that
message, we will continually, diligently transmit that message.
And there is no question. Some may not have received it, but
that is not an excuse to not keep trying to make sure it is
received by all.
We must recognize this is an institutional set of findings
well beyond the scope of this accident. It has application to
everything we do. And that is a profound set of
recommendations. It does have applicability to everything we
are engaged in. Again, we wanted an unvarnished assessment from
the Gehman Board, and that is exactly what we got.
NASA is a very different organization today than it was on
February the 1st. Our lives are forever changed by this tragic
event, but not nearly to the extent of the lives of the
Columbia families. Again, we sincerely apologize for our
failures.
In taking inspiration from their approach, we must be as
resolute and courageous in our efforts as they have been in
working through this tragedy, it will be with them for the rest
of their lives, by committing ourselves to accepting these
findings, complying with these recommendations and embracing
this report. We know that how we respond in the days, weeks,
and months ahead will matter as much as what we decide to do.
And whether it will be a lasting change that will withstand the
years of time. And it must be an institutional change. Of that,
there is no doubt. We must also resolve to be definitive in our
acceptance of our failures and following through on our
commitments to the Columbia families to fix the problem and
return to the exploration objectives that our loved ones
dedicated their lives to. And in that effort, we know we have
got a lot of work ahead of us. And we accept that, and we are
pursuing that with great diligence.
In this period of this tragedy, in this chapter, we take
great guidance and inspiration from the words uttered so many
years ago by Oliver Wendell Holmes. ``Greatness is not where we
stand but in what direction we are moving. We must sail
sometimes with the wind and sometimes against it, but sail we
must and not drift, nor lie at anchor.''
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify this
morning, and I would be happy to respond to any questions you
have, sir.
[The Return-to-Flight Task Group Charter appears in
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record.]
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator.
Admiral Gehman.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL HAROLD GEHMAN, CHAIRMAN, COLUMBIA ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION BOARD.
Admiral Gehman. Why thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hall, and
Members of the Committee.
I will just make two short points. The--I appreciate the
opportunity to appear here at this second hearing. The Board's
intent was to--was that the report we submitted would be the
catalyst to cause changes. The Board was very direct and clear
that we don't intend that our report be dropped in somebody's
in basket and that our duties are finished. In furtherance of
that goal, I am pleased to appear here and to assist in making
sure that the changes that are necessary, the changes we feel
are necessary, are pursued vigorously.
The second point I would make is just to remind the Members
of the Committee that our report is also clear that the full
implementation of our recommendations are not completely in the
hands of Mr. O'Keefe. Many of the recommendations are going to
take the cooperation of NASA plus the Congress and the White
House in order to implement. And I would like to--I just want
to remind the Committee of that.
I hope that during the questions and answers that I get an
opportunity to reply to Mr. Hall and Mr. Gordon who asked two
very provocative questions, and I will prepared to deal with
those during the questions and answers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Discussion
Schedule Pressure
Mr. O'Keefe, one of the most serious concerns discussed by
the CAIB was undue schedule pressure born of, among other
things, an unrealistic schedule of Shuttle flights to complete
node two of the International Space Station. In your
preliminary schedule for returning to flight, you show four
flights in 10 months, three flights in six months, and three--
within two months between two of the flights. Is this
realistic? How are you determining what the pace of Shuttle
flights can be once STS-114 is launched?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will be
guided by two primary objectives. The first one is we will
return-to-flight when we have determined that based on all of
these recommendations and all of the efforts that are necessary
to comply with them have been met and that we are fit to fly
and not one day before. So whatever date is published as a
``not earlier than'' schedule. And we intend to be driven by
those milestones and achievement of compliance with those
individual options we may choose to implement the
recommendations.
The second guidepost we will use for whatever flight
sequence occurs thereafter will be based on the optimum systems
integration planning or how the components and modules may be
transported and installed aboard the International Space
Station. And that will be at a flight sequence, again, that is
based on whatever that engineering sequence model is and will
occur no earlier than we are fit to fly. So there will be a
requirement each and every flight that we have met all of these
objectives prior to doing so. And so what you see is a notional
schedule that is intended to try to drive out what the long
poles in the tent are and the issues are in order to achieve
those objectives.
Chairman Boehlert. So it is absolutely clear, in your mind,
as I think it should be, and it is clear in our minds, as we
want it to be, that you will be driven by milestones and not a
calendar?
Mr. O'Keefe. Indeed, sir.
One-Year Look-Back
Chairman Boehlert. Admiral Gehman has agreed to--and we had
a rather lengthy discussion on this last week. And let me, once
again, praise the Admiral and the entire Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, for the outstanding public service they
have rendered, not just to NASA and the Federal Government, but
to the Nation. But during our discussion, he has agreed to
reconvene the Columbia Accident Investigation Board after a
year. We think, on the Committee, and I feel very strongly
about this, that a one-year look-back would be very useful. It
is good to hear you say you embrace the recommendations and you
are going to implement the recommendations, but we require some
assistance in helping us to evaluate the whole process. Are you
willing to bring the Board back to evaluate NASA's performance?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, having appointed the Board in the hopes
that we would receive an unvarnished, objective opinion, and
having received just that, this is an imposition on the time of
Admiral Gehman and his colleagues as to their willingness and
availability later, but by all means, if that is the desire of
the Congress, the Committee, and yourself, and willingness on
the part of the former Chairman of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, we are always anxious for their input. It
has been most helpful, and I think they have given us a very
objective view.
Chairman Boehlert. Once again, let me say, hindsight is
always 20/20, but I think there is great admiration for the
Board, for the diligence with which they pursued their task,
the thoroughness with which they executed the mission, and the
independence they displayed at all times. Admiral, would you
care to comment on the Administrator's response to that
question?
Admiral Gehman. Mr. Chairman, the Board discussed this
matter, and I am authorized to speak on their behalf and to say
that, if asked, we will serve. And we feel that we would know
exactly where to go and where to look. And it wouldn't take us
very long to figure out whether or not these changes that Mr.
O'Keefe proposes are really taken or not.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you so much. And that is precisely
why I individually--or collectively, we are so interested in
having that reconvening of the Board for that one-year look-
back at evaluation.
Mr. O'Keefe. So ordered.
Operating Plan Changes
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. That is the spirit
of cooperation we hope for, and quite frankly, expect.
NASA submitted an update to its fiscal year 2004 operating
plan last week. In the plan, NASA requests to transfer $40
million from the science account to the human space flight
account. Why are you requesting this transfer? Is it more than
a coincidence that this is the same amount of 2003 funding NASA
intends to spend on return-to-flight activities? And how will
this reduction impact on the science program?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Let me give you a breakdown for the
record, but it is a very small portion of the fiscal year 2003
costs that we anticipate will be continuing to incur through
September 30, in other words, three weeks from now, that
represent the expenses we have engaged in, primarily related to
supporting the investigation as well as the costs additional to
the amount that we have already absorbed to provide for all of
the institutional support necessary to the Board's activities.
A very small fraction of it, but again, we will provide all of
the information for the record, begins to identify the costs to
look at options to begin implementing the recommendations. It
is a full cost estimate of what it takes for all of the folks
institutionally within NASA to support this activity. And so we
will provide a greater detail of that, as is contained in that.
As far as the consequence to the science programs, it
derives from a number of different programs that is based on
just program execution realities that occurred there. But
again, I will give you greater detail for that for the record
as--and provide exactly where the consequences are, but I don't
see it as being a case in which we are deferring science or
eliminating any scientific program as much as execution savings
or efforts necessary during the course of implementation to
make that kind of resource available.
Chairman Boehlert. We would hope that this is not a trend,
getting into the habit of dipping into the science fund to
finance other operations, vital though they may be.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. We want to do it right the first time
with the other operations as well as we want to do it right all
of the time with the science portion of the budget. And I will
look forward to the more detailed information you are willing
to submit for the record.
Mr. Hall.
Mr. O'Keefe. If I could, I am sorry, real quick, Mr.
Chairman. I apologize. The--part of it, too, is due to the
proposal that the President submitted in July for an additional
$50 million to support the activities related to the
investigation from NASA as well as the Board itself and the
beginnings of the activities we are looking at for the options.
That not having made it as part of the supplemental
consideration prior to the Congress adjourning in August, we
have had to accommodate those '03 costs within funds available,
again, very, very mindful of your precise point, which is that
we not defer science objectives to do so. But we endeavored to
cover it elsewhere. That was not feasible, given the nature of
the Congressional schedule, so as a consequence, we are working
through what resources are available to do this.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. O'Keefe.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Hall.
Crew Escape
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, thank you. In continuance of my--I
think from the very word go, my effort not to seek causation
nearly as much or not looking for blame on what has already
happened behind, but how to lessen our loss and how to lessen
that thing that we talk about and we call risk, and if we can't
lessen it down to zero, then to find an alternative to losing a
crew. And that alternative has to be a crew escape vehicle of
some type.
Mr. O'Keefe, I would like to follow-up on the topic that I
raised in my opening statement. As you know, I feel strongly,
and I am not alone in that. This entire Committee feels
strongly, and I am sure the President, you, and everybody under
you feels strongly that we need to do more than we are doing
now to protect the astronauts who fly the Space Shuttle or its
upgrade or its replacement, whatever vehicle we have, to have
safety as the number one factor in there and as a necessary
part of the amount that we have raised or appropriated toward
that cause that safety occupies its proper percent of that
appropriation. It seems to me that it doesn't have to be as
risky as it is. At the present time, if we lose a Shuttle, it
is almost certain that we are going to lose the crew, and it
just shouldn't be that way.
As I have said in my opening statement, we need to be
taking a serious look at what could be done to add crew escape
systems to the Shuttle that would protect all of the crew, not
three of them or four of them or just the Captain, but
everybody that is aboard. And we ought to be challenging
industry to come up with innovative approaches that could make
such a Space Shuttle crew escape system possible and affordable
and doable and look to them to find a way to lessen the weight
and to lessen the costs and to work it into any future
spacecraft we have and to be working toward making it available
to the spacecraft we are using. As I understand it, NASA has a
modest study underway to review previous crew escape studies.
That is good, but it is really just not sufficient. We need the
kind of in-depth engineering analysis and a consideration of
design options advocated by Dr. Widnall at last week's hearing.
And that is what we are aiming for up here when I offered my
amendment to the NASA Appropriations Bill just two months ago
and it was accepted unanimously. As you know, that amendment
was adopted by the entire House without objection, so far as I
know, supported by this good Chairman, supported by everybody
on the Floor and voted unanimously as an amendment. It is not
the final answer, but it ought to start us down the road to
getting the information we need to work and to make an informed
decision.
Now Mr. Administrator, I guess my question is to you. Will
you support our efforts on crew escape for the Space Shuttle,
and are you prepared to work with us on establishing a serious
initiative to seek the best, most innovative crew escape
concepts industry can provide and then allow these design
concepts to get a thorough, independent assessment----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall.--by the best that you have----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall.--the finest minds you have?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall. And I think it is the responsible thing to do.
And I believe your answer is going to be yes.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall. I am through. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
Foam
I would like to focus a little bit on the actual, you know,
technical cause of this tragedy, which is, as we know, the foam
coming off of the Shuttle and hitting the wing. When were you
first--when did you first hear about the foam as a potential
threat to the Shuttle as a safety problem, Mr. O'Keefe?
Mr. O'Keefe. After the accident.
Mr. Rohrabacher. After the----
Mr. O'Keefe. After the accident.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. No one ever mentioned to you, no
staff member mentioned to you before, in your one year prior
to--as Administrator leading up to that? And how many Space
Shuttle launches did you go to?
Mr. O'Keefe. Six.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Six. So you took personal--you paid
personal attention to each one of these, and you were there at
each one of these launches. And no one--none of your staff--no
one on your staff ever mentioned the foam?
Mr. O'Keefe. I have searched my recollection, and I can not
recall a single occasion.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. And Dan Goldin was, of course, the
Administrator prior to you. For about 10 years, I guess, he was
the Administrator. Eight years? Well, for about a decade, he
was----
Admiral Gehman. Nine and a half.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Nine and a half? All right. Thank you.
Is there any evidence? Did he ever leave anything that
suggested that the foam was a potential problem that needed to
be dealt with?
Mr. O'Keefe. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Admiral Gehman, did----
Admiral Gehman. Mr. Rohrabacher, the Board did a search of
over 50 reviews and investigations into NASA, including the
Rogers Commission, in which foam came up during the Rogers
Commission. And all 50 reviews missed categorizing the foam as
a danger to the Shuttle.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Now so right up unto the--but there was an
awareness that the foam was coming off. And Mr. O'Keefe, were
you ever--was it mentioned that foam was coming off as a
phenomena but not as a threat? Did anyone ever mention it?
Mr. O'Keefe. Not that I recall.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Shortly after the--I mean, I think within
a matter of hours after the Columbia went down, I remember
reading a press account that the foam had been ruled out by
NASA. Someone in your organization said that. Do you know who
in your organization made that statement?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. The policy of the agency, from the
first day, the first moments after the accident all the way up
until the completion of this report and the drying of the ink
on it was that we were never going to rule out any scenario,
never going to fall in with any particular option----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Mr. O'Keefe.--and yet there were always going to be some
folks who didn't quite get the message.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yet there was a quote in the paper----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir, that is quite true.
Mr. Rohrabacher.--saying that the foam had been ruled out.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. That was quite true, and that was
corrected. The individuals involved in that case were advised
that no, the policy is we will leave every single option open
until the Board closes off those options methodically in their
efforts----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So NASA people took it upon themselves to
announce to the press that the foam had been ruled out?
Mr. O'Keefe. There were some folks that expressed an
opinion, and that was corrected. By our actions--sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah.
Mr. O'Keefe. We have supported the Board in the effort in
order to assure that every single option, scenario, every
approach was run in the ground at their choosing. That is by
our actions. The statements on the part of some individuals
were corrected and we acted on the larger policy I just
enunciated.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But does that--did that not reflect the
mindset that Admiral Gehman was--it was reported it was a major
contributor to the fact that we have the foam ruled out shortly
after the tragedy yet we now know the foam was the technical
cause of this tragedy.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, the larger question I think you are
raising on this specific instance is that we assume we know
what we know while then proving what it is we know. One of the
most powerful comments in this entire report that I have seen
repeated several times, for a fact, is that the burden of proof
must be shifted from prove that it is unsafe to prove that it
is safe. And that is a--something that is going to require not
only a management focus, a leadership objective, a set of
processes that support that particular approach, and a complete
twist of that particular approach, and I have taken that to
heart.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah, I think that is called being
proactive rather than reactive.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And now I hate to do this, but I think
that the public deserves this. You, yourself, mentioned after
people kept asking about the foam, that people were taking--
were not--in what I took as being not taking this seriously,
you referred to people who were looking at the foam as
``foamologists.'' Of course, now I regret saying that, and--but
who advised you that it was so unlikely that the foam was an
issue that it should be taken that lightly?
Mr. O'Keefe. My comments to that effect were during the
course of the early weeks of this investigation, which several
folks, journalists, sought to write about this particular
strike as being the likely condition. And the plea in that case
was let us keep all of the options on the table until the Board
has closed off every element of the fault analysis, and they
arrive at a conclusion of what they believe was the source of
this accident. And so on that regard, it was meant to try to
put it in perspective.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah.
Mr. O'Keefe. And I do not regret statements made. Looking
back, you can't correct them. So yes, that is exactly the
terminology used. And it was intended to please--ask folks, let
us not get a lot of exercise leaping to conclusions. Let us
wait for the Investigation Board----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Mr. O'Keefe.--to reach those findings in a deliberate way.
And they did.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. I think that we needed that
explanation, Mr. Chairman, because at first glance, it would
appear that that phrase was used to belittle those who were
thinking that foam was a--wasn't a potential, but instead, what
you are suggesting is that you were trying to caution people to
make a broader scope of their investigation rather than a
focus, technical focus.
Mr. O'Keefe. We purposely appointed 13 investigators. We
wanted to see what those 13 investigators thought rather than
the opinions of everybody else.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I accept that.
Mr. Chairman, I would--if we have a second round, I would
like to go into questions about the future strategies for the
Shuttle----
Chairman Boehlert. We will have a second round.
Mr. Rohrabacher.--which are very important.
Chairman Boehlert. And the Chair now recognizes Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vision and the Interagency Review
There has been, obviously, a lot written about this
incident. One article that I thought was particularly good was
written by David Sanger at the New York Times. And I will
quote. Here is how he starts: ``The bitter bottom line of the
Columbia disaster comes down to this: NASA never absorbed the
lessons of the Challenger explosion of 1986, and four
successive American presidents never decided what America's
space program should head--where America's space program should
head after the Cold War and what it would cost in dollars and
the risk of human life to get there.'' And so, Mr. O'Keefe, I
was particularly pleased to read the other day about the
interagency review within the White House of the future of
NASA. My friend and Chairman, Dana Rohrabacher, for at least
the five years that he has been our Chairman, and I think
before that, has frequently criticized every Administration
that he could get his hands on for not having this vision with
NASA. And Admiral Gehman the other day--I wanted to write it
down, because it was much more eloquent than I am going to say,
but he--by paraphrasing him, he said that basically vision is
just a dream unless you have some money behind it. So--and this
has got to start with the White House, so I am glad that this
process is starting. And I think it would be helpful for all of
us to know a little more about that.
So if you would, please, you could share with us first who
specifically in the Administration is heading the review? Is it
the Vice President, the Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, or someone else so we know at what level
this is taking place? What agencies are participating and at
what level? That is, is it at the Cabinet level, the
Undersecretary level, or at some other level? And I know you
have mentioned to me that there was no formal charter, but
could you tell us what the group's stated goals are and, you
know, what you see as the product? Do you expect that there
will be recommendations for the President or simply options?
What do you see as the schedule? And so far, I don't think
Congress has been involved. Do you expect to get Congress
involved, and how would you do that?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, I think, correctly cited, there is,
indeed, an internal effort underway, I think, to examine the
U.S. space exploration policy objectives. And this has been,
certainly, prompted by this cathartic event, without a doubt.
And the process is a--one that, again, is very familiar within
the internal functioning of the Administration of inclusion of
all of the interested interagency as well as within
Administration participants: the President's Science Advisor,
the Defense Department, the Commerce Department, NASA, others
who have a specific stake in the activity, as well as those who
would have a requirement to offer opinions, views, advice as we
serve up a range of options that ultimately would be presented
to the President for consideration. So that process is just a
very standard, normal procedure of what goes----
Mr. Gordon. Well, we know like with the--when they did
the----
Mr. O'Keefe. If I could conclude. I am sorry. I apologize.
You asked a whole series of questions, and I wanted to----
Mr. Gordon. Yeah. Okay. Good.
Mr. O'Keefe.--respond to those. And--at your pleasure,
though. If you would prefer----
Mr. Gordon. No, no, no. I wanted to get to the specifics,
so go right ahead.
Mr. O'Keefe. Okay. So that process is serving up those
options. And again, what the timing of that will be is based
on, again, the maturity of that debate as we work our way
through it. Ultimately, again, this will be offered to the
President for his consideration and the options that may be
available. And again, it is a timing circumstance now that
would dovetail neatly into not only the policy deliberation
process but also that which would pertain to the resource
allocation, the budget process, and all of the other elements
that would pertain. So it is an organized effort in that
regard, again, not dissimilar to those that have been engaged
in every other effort, internal to not only this Administration
but others, and designed to serve up those alternatives for his
consideration.
Timing I would not speculate. And I think the answer to
that one flatly is whenever the President decides. It is very
clear, though, in the minds of all of the folks who are engaged
in this debate, which has been intensifying in light of the--
again the focus of the Board's report as well as that
particular concentration that it will be moving at a time in
which it needs to be relevant for Congress's consideration. As
we have discussed, as you mentioned in our private discussions,
indeed, we are looking to determine how Congressional input may
be developed here and brought into that equation. And again,
you have offered some interesting ideas of what we may want to
consider as questions for that, and I certainly await that
opportunity to see the kinds of things that I can bring in
during the course of these deliberations and make that
possible.
Again, if--in conclusion to this, though, my overarching
concern is that the expectations be calibrated. As you define
the vision requirements that has eluded us for the better part
of three decades, indeed since the end of the Apollo program,
have been difficult enough and I think it was best summarized
by commentary offered by the Augustine Commission, which met
and concluded its activities in the early '90s in which they
determined that yes, indeed, we are unanimous in the view that
a vision is required, but there are no two individuals who
could agree on what that vision should be. We are attempting to
do something that hasn't been done in quite some time. And we
are endeavoring to do that as deliberately as we possibly can.
Thank you for your patience.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. If I could--but if I could be more
specific, the questions that I asked were who heads it up. You
know, we know that the Vice President headed up the Energy Task
Force. I want to get an idea of at what level this is. So I
asked, you know, who heads it up and at what level are the
various agencies? What level are they participating?
Mr. O'Keefe. We are certainly not in the process of
describing in great detail exactly who the participants are in
these efforts.
Mr. Gordon. Can you say who heads it up?
Mr. O'Keefe. No, sir. It is an internal deliberative
process, one that includes all of the appropriate officials for
the purpose of advising the President on what the options are
for his consideration.
Mr. Gordon. But we are going to--we are developing a vision
for NASA and Congress doesn't even know who is on it, who heads
it, or you know, when, sort of, the game plan on reporting
back.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, again, this is----
Mr. Gordon. So I guess this is your review.
Mr. O'Keefe. No, sir, it is not.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. Well----
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired. We
will have a second round.
Mr. Gordon. Okay.
Chairman Boehlert. We will allow you back----
Mr. Gordon. I tried to--I would point out, I tried to----
Chairman Boehlert. I understand.
Mr. Gordon.--stop earlier, so I could get to the specifics,
but we never got there----
Chairman Boehlert. I understand----
Mr. Gordon.--so----
Chairman Boehlert.--and the Chair was very understanding of
your approach, and that is why we allowed an additional two
minutes, but we will have a second round.
Mr. O'Keefe. My apologies to the Congressman. I was
attempting to answer that. I apologize for being too long.
Mr. Gordon. Well, we----
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Calvert.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Independent Technical Authority
As I mentioned last week, when Mr.--Admiral Gehman was out
testifying, I was very much in agreement with the Board's
suggestion that responsibility and authority for decisions
involving technical requirements and safety should rest with an
Independent Technical Authority. I couldn't agree more with the
conclusion and the relating recommendation. NASA needs to
utilize independent assessment capabilities that will serve
them throughout the life cycle of the Space Shuttle system and
human space flight generally.
Admiral Gehman and Dr. Widnall had a nice exchange last
week about NAVSEA Corona's long experience with independent
assessment. Several months ago, as I understand, NASA created
the NASA Engineering Safety Center, NESC, at NASA's Langley
Research Center. The NESC purportedly will serve as the
independent safety oversight function. And I guess my question
is to you, Mr. O'Keefe, is what is the mission of the NESC and
what role does the NESC play in NASA's return-to-flight
activities, one? How does the NESC play into the independent
safety organization that the Gehman Board recommended? And
finally, what other DOD and other governmental agencies that
already employ independent assessment did you talk to in
setting up this new authority?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. The NASA Engineering Safety Center
was anticipating to be operational, up and running on or about
the 1st of November. So what we announced a couple of months
ago was our intent to recruit from around the agency
engineering and technical staff who have the expertise to
participate in one of the most, again, powerful parts of the
recommendation on the Independent Technical Authority that is
described in that recommendation is a requirement for trend
analysis the capacity to come in and look with a fresh set of
eyes, excuse me, at what we consider to be routine operations
and tease out of that what really are the anomalies that ought
to be investigated further. And so in that context, the primary
function of this group, but not exclusively, will be to have
that capacity among the technical engineering talent to make
determinations and to examine the records, operational
information and so forth, of every program we do, not just
Shuttle but anything else we are engaged in, in order to see
where those anomalies exist because we just flat missed them
during the course of operational conduct.
It also has a role that we are developing as part of its
charter to conduct, you know, the on-site inspections to see
that we are really living up to what we are talking about as
opposed to just simply, you know, reading our own press
clippings on this and believing it is true. We have got to have
the capacity to actually conduct the capabilities to see that.
In addition, it also will run what we--is the NASA Safety
Reporting System, which is the anonymous system for reporting
safety anomalies, or anything else, anybody has got a problem
with so it is just not lost in the shuffle along the way. So
this becomes just part of that recommendation on the
Independent Technical Authority is covered by this particular
initiative. By no means was it intended to be the monolithic
organization that answered all of the elements in that
recommendation. It covers large pieces of it. It--that covers
the second piece of your question, which is how does it play
into the operational activity. They will have a role in
operational activities in, again, any program that NASA
conducts as a means to assure that we are not just using the
engineering talent that is attached to the program and
therefore a potentially bias view. Another powerful observation
made by the Board is that there becomes advocacy on the part of
engineers and technical authority and the objectivity is lost.
And so as a consequence, this makes sure that we have done
that.
And in terms of the other Defense Department models used,
one of the reasons for setting it up at Langley is literally
across the runway is the Navy Safety Center. And again, given
my naval service background and history, that--in understanding
exactly how that institution operated, there are some real
interesting object lessons on how to do that right and a
regular advice that we don't need to have a conference center
required. They simply walk across the runway and can obtain
that right on the spot. So there are a number of different
ways. We are trying to bring best practices of how the Defense
Department has done this business into how we set up this
particular entity before we open its doors on November 1.
Mr. Calvert. And finally, Admiral Gehman, does the NESC
satisfy the Board's recommendation for the creation of an
independent safety organization for the Space Shuttle, or did
you have something else in mind?
Admiral Gehman. Not intended to. No. As Mr. O'Keefe said,
it is not intended to satisfy the requirements, and it does not
completely, but it is a good start.
Mr. Calvert. What would you like to see?
Admiral Gehman. We were very careful to not prescribe what
NASA should do to implement this, but clearly the functions
that we want to be performed are prescribed in our report. And
to be very brief, they are a robust engineering organization
that owns all of the requirements and specifications to the
Shuttle Program and all waivers to them as well as the funding
and engineering expertise to understand why those requirements
and specifications were written in the first place so they
could understand why or why they should not grant a waiver. And
so there are many ways to organize to do that, and we left that
up to NASA.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired.
And let me just explain. I am trying to be very arbitrary
in sticking to the five-minute rule, at least for the initial
round, because I want all Members to be given an opportunity to
participate.
Mr. Costello.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And Mr. O'Keefe,
welcome.
Management Communication Regarding Schedule
Let me talk just a little bit about the Core Complete goal
schedule for the International Space Station. I note that in
the report that the Board found that the management goals were
having a negative impact on the workforce and the workforce
keeping the Shuttle flying. It affected the attitudes of
managers who came to view the problems as threats to the
schedule rather than threats to safety of the astronauts.
Admiral Gehman testified that the workforce was aware that the
schedule was probably unrealistic, but they--that was not
communicated to management that there was a disconnect and a
lack of communications. I have reviewed your Senate testimony
concerning that issue and others. And you indicated in your
Senate testimony that because prior flights had slipped that
workers should have been getting the message that there was
flexibility in the Core Complete goal.
And I guess my first question is--first let me say that I
was pleased to hear you answer the Chairman's question on the
issue of return-to-flight that the number one issue will be
safety and we will not fly until we are certain. But my
question is, in your Senate testimony you said that the workers
should have been getting the message when there was slippage.
Was management getting the message? Were you getting the
message and was your team getting the message that if, in fact,
the goal of February 19, 2004, that if this goal was slipping,
number one, did you recognize it? Number two, if you did
recognize it, why didn't we modify the goal?
Mr. O'Keefe. Um-hum. Well, indeed, the opinion on this
point is irrelevant, because the Board has reached that
finding. It therefore, in my judgment and all of us in the
agency, it is fact now.
Mr. Costello. I would take issue with that. I would say
that it is relevant to the viewpoint of a management issue. If,
in fact, there are problems at the worker level, if they
believe that goals are unrealistic, I want to know if they are
communicating that to management and, if so, what action was
taken, not so much for the past, but for the future?
Mr. O'Keefe. I appreciate that. Thank you, sir. I
appreciate the clarification. Indeed, we failed to make sure
that that message was clearly understood by every single person
associated with the Shuttle Program. We failed to do that. We
failed to communicate that effectively. It was a very clear
understanding among the management team, the Shuttle Program
management, the International Space Station Program management,
all of the folks engaged in this that these were schedules to
move towards the optimum systems integration schedule. And that
is a point we have testified to and talked about lots in this
particular Committee proceedings in the past. And so in that
context, again, we failed to get that message out clearly that
this was a movement in the direction of the best systems
integration and engineering approach to achieve the deployment
of those modules and components to International Space Station
and that the critical feature in order to make any possible
final configuration of Space Station even arguable was to
achieve that node two configuration. Anything else builds off
of that.
And so we are trying to keep folks attended to that without
our international partnership who wanted to talk about longer
term goals, lots of different inputs from external oversight
that had different opinions in that. And we wanted to stay
concentrated on the first essential step in order to make any
of those debates meaningful. In the process, we failed to
communicate that point effectively. We need to do that in the
future more effectively, and that is the start we are trying to
make now to say these are milestone driven. When we are fit to
fly, that is when we are going to fly.
Mr. Costello. And that is what we are concerned about is
the future. A couple of quick questions, brief answers so I
don't run out of time here.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Costello. One is how often were you briefed on the
progress for the Core Complete and who briefed you, if I may
ask?
Mr. O'Keefe. We are engaged in regular program review on
the International Space Station. And the integrated effort from
Shuttle and Station, systems integration efforts, are roughly a
monthly basis. It involved the program management teams from
both programs as well as the senior folks in headquarters who
are engaged in space flight activity.
Countermeasures to Schedule Pressure
Mr. Costello. And do you--have you developed plans yet? I
realize that the Board just completed its work, but have you
developed plans as to how we will guard against an overly
aggressive schedule on return-to-flight?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, again, it is--this is a tough one,
because the--your observation is right on. The observation of
the Board, as I read the words, was our focus on the schedule
may have begun to influence the management team in the way they
made decisions about, and it proceeds. And what we have got to
do is just constantly remind ourselves that, indeed, these are
milestone objectives. And in the process of doing so, we have
to have some notional schedule. We all live by that. From the
moment the alarm clock goes off in the morning, we are driven
by schedules. Every Member of this committee is, I am sure,
driven by lots of schedules that are involved in terms of what
people expect of us. So it is--it has got to become more, as
the Board observed, an effective management tool for kind of
teasing out what those problems could be to achievement rather
than being violent objectives to trying to find, you know, an
accomplishment of some goal. And that is the shift in mentality
that I think we have had in the management team, but we have
got to effectively communicate to every single person turning
the wrench on this that that is exactly what the objective is.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Congressman.
Chairman Boehlert. The Chair recognizes Mr. Barton.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that two articles
be put into the record at the appropriate place. One is an
article that appeared on September the 8th, 2003 in Space News
entitled: ``To Convert the Shuttle.'' The author is Dr. Robert
Zugren. The other is an expanded version of an editorial that
appeared in the Wall Street Journal last week or the week
before, and it is written by Homer Higgman.
Chairman Boehlert. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to appears in Appendix 2:
Additional Material for the Record.]
Shuttle Safety and Risk
Mr. Barton. Mr. O'Keefe, I want to read to you something
from one of these articles and get your view of it. This is the
opening. The first sentence. ``It is now apparent that the
Space Shuttle orbiters can not be used much longer as the
system for transporting crews to Earth orbit. The Columbia
disaster has made it clear that the antiquated orbiters are
becoming increasingly unsafe. Moreover, even if the Shuttle
could be flown safely, it is clear that using a launch vehicle
with a takeoff thrust matching that of a Saturn 5 to transport
half a dozen people to International Space Station makes about
as much sense as using an aircraft carrier to tow water
skiers.'' What is your reaction to that?
Mr. O'Keefe. I think it is a wrong-headed view.
Mr. Barton. You think it is a wrong-headed view? How many
flights have there been of the orbiter that had astronauts
aboard?
Mr. O'Keefe. Oh, gee. Let me get a precise number for the
record.
Mr. Barton. Well, I think it is 113.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir, it is--no, 113 flights. I thought
you said the number of astronauts aboard.
Mr. Barton. Number of flights with----
Mr. O'Keefe. I am sorry. Yes, 113.
Mr. Barton. Okay. And----
Mr. O'Keefe. And there were some number of astronauts, and
I will have to get you precise----
Mr. Barton. I don't need to know the number. My question is
how many times has the orbiter gone up when there were people
on it? I think that number is 113.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Mr. Barton. It may be a little bit more or a little bit
less.
Mr. O'Keefe. That is it.
Mr. Barton. How many catastrophic accidents have there been
in that 113 flights?
Mr. O'Keefe. Two.
Mr. Barton. Two. What does that percentage turn out to be
if you take two over 113?
Mr. O'Keefe. It is one in 58 or 56, whatever it is.
Mr. Barton. It is about 1.7 percent. Do you know what the
probability of a combat death is in a fighter aircraft over
Iraq?
Mr. O'Keefe. No, sir, I don't.
Mr. Barton. It is not that. It is a lot less than that. It
is about one hundredth of that, maybe even one thousandth of
that. Now we are putting our astronauts at risk in these
orbiters that the technology, in some cases, is 30 years old so
that they can fly up to the International Space Station. How
long, if we build the Space Station--do exactly what we are
planning to do, how long will that Space Station be useful?
Mr. O'Keefe. The next 15 to 20 years or, you know, whatever
period of time it is going to take----
Mr. Barton. Right.
Mr. O'Keefe.--for that asset to----
Mr. Barton. Now what happens after that?
Mr. O'Keefe. I think our longer-term objectives are to look
at conquering the technology limitations that we currently live
with.
Mr. Barton. But right now, what is the next goal of the
manned space program after the International Space Station,
which is going to be obsolete and non-functional in the next 15
to 20 years?
Mr. O'Keefe. To conquer the technology limitations that we
have right now that really limit us from going----
Mr. Barton. But we have no goal. We are not going to the
moon. We are not going to Mars. We are not going to a Space
Station that is in synchronous orbit between the Earth and the
moon. We have no goal. Isn't that true?
Mr. O'Keefe. I beg to differ, sir. The strategic plan we
have developed, and again, I would be delighted to go through
this with you and make sure that we have it laid out, it is a
stepping stone approach in order to achieve getting beyond low
Earth orbit to be able to permit any exploration within the
Solar System. But the two things we have got----
Mr. Barton. My time is about to expire. Here is my point.
Here is my point, sir, and I am not upset with you, and I am
not upset with Admiral Gehman. But we are putting American men
and women at great risk for their lives to fly an orbiter that
is 30 years old, that can not be made safe, and there is
article after article after article that says that. So my
proposal, at the appropriate time, at least with the acceptance
of being able to offer it, is to use these orbiters in an
unmanned capacity, build a new space plane or a space orbiter
that is just for people and go to the President and get the
President to set a goal for the American people to have a real
mission for our astronauts.
And I don't know what that will be, but I am going to do
everything I can within the rules of this committee and the
House to prevent more Americans going up in the existing
orbiters. I just think it is inherently unsafe. We have already
lost 14 men and women, and if we keep flying them, we are going
to lose 21 other men and women in the next 10 to 15 years.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield back.
Chairman Boehlert. Would you like to comment on that, Mr.
O'Keefe?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your views, sir. We certainly are anxious to
meet with you to walk through what our vision and objectives
are. At this point, we are basing everything we are doing at
this stage, beginning with the strategic plan to determine how
we can proceed, and again, what I attempted to respond to is we
really have to conquer the technology limitations that
currently exist on in-space propulsion, power generation
capacity, and human endurance beyond low Earth orbit in order
to make any Solar System exploration objectives feasible. And
that is what we are trying to work through right now. I just
ask that you keep an open mind on that process, and I
appreciate the points you have raised. Positively, this is
among the issues that we need to adjoin as part of the
President's options that he will be considering for the purpose
of what that broader exploration space policy objective will
be.
Mr. Barton. Thank you.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you for that input, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired, but
Admiral Gehman, your report, the Commission's report, said the
Shuttle was not inherently unsafe, but it is inherently risky.
Now would you comment on that?
Admiral Gehman. Yes, sir. The Board felt that it would be a
pretty cheap shot to deliver to the Congress a long list of
woes without at least editorializing on a way out of this
dilemma. And in order to do that, we had to characterize the
risks, which we attempted to do. But we also suggested a way
out of this dilemma. And I might add that if we do get invited
to come back and reconvene a year from now, in our little
formula for addressing this very excellent question, if there
has been no action on our little formula, we will probably
comment on that. And our little formula is very simple. It does
go along the lines that were proposed here. That is, the Nation
needs to decide what it needs to do in space, not what the
vehicle should look like. First of all, we have to decide what
our--what we want to do in space. And NASA's vision doesn't
count. It has got to be an agreed national vision.
So if we are, one year from now, no further along with
that, we will probably put that in our report, too. But we did
opine that it--that the Shuttle can be operated for the next
couple of years with an acceptable amount of risk. It is still
risky, but it could be made safer, but as soon as possible, we
need to separate the crew from the cargo, and I think that was
the point that was made here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. And we will get
back to the second round. And that is why, Mr. Administrator, I
would suggest that Mr. Barton's question, which was very
specific, is so important, this interagency team and who is
doing what as we are trying to get a clear vision for the
future.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Lampson.
Mr. Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vision Formulation and the Interagency Process
And I, too, believe that same thing, Mr. Chairman. I think
that we have expressed and tried to express from this committee
and Members of it for several years a real vision for NASA to
develop, some place to go, something that not just gives us a
better concept of what the purpose of NASA is. But I honestly
believe that that will go light years in keeping the
excitement, the enthusiasm of employees of NASA, the dreamers
of this country who wanted to go and do things in space, giving
them the opportunity to have the continuity of program after
program rather than wondering when we come up with the
technology what might we then do with that technology.
So I think perhaps it is a matter of philosophy and which
comes first, the chicken or the egg. I happen to be of the
philosophy that you can achieve more technologically if you
have some place to go and you develop the technology necessary
to achieve those goals. And I hope that we can get about doing
some of that. The Gehman report cites the lack of agreed--an
agreed national vision for space--human space flight over the
last three decades as an organizational cause of this accident.
And I want to follow-through with some of the questions that
were asked by Mr. Barton a few minutes and come back to some of
the same points that were being made by Mr. Barton immediately
before me. Are you personally aware of who is in the meetings
on the--with the review committee?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. There are a variety of participants.
Mr. Lampson. You are familiar with each and every one of
them?
Mr. O'Keefe. They vary.
Mr. Lampson. From meeting to meeting?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lampson. Can you give me an idea of how many different
agencies are represented in these meetings----
Mr. O'Keefe. Sure.
Mr. Lampson.--from time to time?
Mr. O'Keefe. Sure. Exactly, as I have just described for
Mr. Barton--or for Mr. Gordon a little bit earlier is the
President's Science Advisor and his staff, the Defense
Department, the Commerce Department, Office of Management and
Budget. There is a range of other participants that will enter
into that equation, as necessary, to draw on those expertise to
look at what the longer-term exploration agenda objective----
Mr. Lampson. Including people from the outside?
Mr. O'Keefe. No, sir.
Mr. Lampson. It is all within the White House?
Mr. O'Keefe. Just strictly within the Administration. It is
an interagency process within the Administration to work
through these issues as a first start in order to serve this up
for the President's consideration of our options.
Mr. Lampson. When might the second step come?
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't know. I will get back to you very
shortly, though.
Mr. Lampson. Okay. But you said some time ago in some of
your testimony or statement some place that you wanted to
solicit public input. At what point will the public have its
opportunity to give its input?
Mr. O'Keefe. We have been--there have been lots of
different ways that those avenues have been adjoined of late.
And again, the oversight hearings. There has been a range of
outside witnesses who have been called.
Mr. Lampson. Before that committee?
Mr. O'Keefe. Before lots of Congressional committees. This
is not a committee. It is an internal, interagency process that
is very similar to what every Administration does. So this is
an internal process for the purpose of advising the President
on the options to be available.
Mr. Lampson. Is it something like the Cheney Committee?
Mr. O'Keefe. No, sir, it is not.
Mr. Lampson. Let me switch a little bit. Is the group
looking at costs and benefits of humans going beyond low Earth
orbit or----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lampson.--just robots?
Mr. O'Keefe. No, sir. I think it is looking at, again, the
full range of U.S. space exploration policy objectives, which
then includes the tactical questions you are raising: how do
you perform it; what platforms, as the Admiral just observed,
might be used? All of those questions need to be resolved after
you have answered the first top level set of questions, and
that is what we are really beginning at.
Mr. Lampson. Has that committee considered the goals that
have been set by China, to go to the moon?
Mr. O'Keefe. I have not--I don't recall specifically
whether it has been adjoined at any level at this juncture, but
I have no--have a specific recollection of that point. I am
aware of it. Certainly, that is an observation that many have
made. It has been written about extensively----
Mr. Lampson. In magazines and such, but it has certainly
not been brought to the public's level of awareness that, in my
opinion, it should. Do you have a feeling that we should push
harder to let the public be aware of the goals that other
nations have set to go to the moon? Is it important that others
get there before we are? Is it--do we need to care about that?
Mr. O'Keefe. Again, as a matter of policy, that ought to
enter into the debate. And I, with you, agree fully that there
ought to be a wider understanding within the general public of
exactly what the intentions may or may not be of other national
interests to achieve that objective.
Mr. Lampson. Is there one person that sits in the chair of
this committee considering these things or does it, too, change
from time to time?
Mr. O'Keefe. It is like every Administration does
interagency coordination process: to pull together the options
for the President's consideration.
Mr. Lampson. But who is doing it? Do you do it?
Mr. O'Keefe. I am one of the participants. There are
others.
Mr. Lampson. But there is no chairman?
Mr. O'Keefe. Not particularly. No. It is more--again a
coordination process is established as part of the interagency
functions.
Mr. Lampson. Okay. Let me take my 10 seconds to sum up my
statement. I have now talked, probably 21/2 years, maybe, about
the exploration--Space Exploration Act. You are familiar with
that----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lampson.--bill that I introduced before. I will be
reintroducing that bill today. The bill calls on NASA to
establish a phased series of goals over the next 20 years,
including human visits to the Earth/sun libation points and
Earth orbit crossing asteroids, deployment of a human tended
research and habitation facility on the moon, humanness
expeditions to the surface of--and to moons of Mars. And as we
work to return the Shuttle to flight, we need to move outward
beyond low Earth orbit, and in the process, we will revitalize
our space program. We will energize industrial and academic
sectors of this country. We will create new opportunities for
international cooperation. And more importantly than anything,
I think, it will inspire young people. And I firmly believe
that we have got to do it with what we have been talking about
here, not the concept that you are going. And I would plead
with you to please make that point to whatever this committee
is, and maybe we will find out a little bit more about the
committee as we go along.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. The gentleman's time has
expired.
The Chair recognizes Dr. Bartlett for five minutes.
Dr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
External Tank Foam and the Use of Freon
In an attempt to put this accident in perspective, my
colleague, Mr. Barton, asked about the probability of a fatal
accident in the Shuttle Program and a possibility of a fatal
encounter in our fighter pilots over Iraq. There are two little
statistics I would like to get on the record to put this in
perspective. In the roughly hour and a half since our hearing
began, seven people have been killed on our highways, just the
number of the astronauts, and 81 of our fellow citizens have
died prematurely from smoking cigarettes. I wonder where the
outrage is over this statistic?
I would like to get something straight for the record that
if you have only the previous--there were some questions about
the application of the foam and that in earlier flights, and I
don't know exactly when this was changed, that the foam blowing
agent used chloroflurocarbons. In an attempt to reduce
pollution, NASA then changed to HCFC-141B blowing agent, which
resulted in increasing loss of foam due to popcorning. I am not
sure that at that earlier hearing it was made clear that there
are two different techniques for applying foam and that the
agent was changed in only one of those. You might conclude from
that earlier hearing that the probable cause of the foam coming
off, which caused this accident, was because of the change in
the use of this agent. Would you explain, please? I know you do
this in your accident report, but that may not be as widely
read as the record, and in this previous hearing, the
implication was that if we hadn't been so concerned about the
environment and kept on applying the foam with the
chloroflurocarbons that we probably wouldn't have had this
accident. Can you set the record straight?
Admiral Gehman. Sir, I presume that that is--may I answer
that question?
Dr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
Admiral Gehman. Yeah, right. Yes, sir. You are exactly
right. The change in blowing agent, even though it did cause,
in the next two flights, a dramatic increase in the number of
pieces of foam that came off, that was fixed right away and was
immediately taken care of. And the Board attributes not at all
the change in blowing agent to this accident. Besides that, we
are talking about two different foam areas. The popcorning
occurred in the vast acreage foam that goes around the tank,
and we are talking here about the bipod ramp, the--that wedge
shape, handmade piece of foam, which has come off only seven
times that we know of.
Chairman Boehlert. And Admiral, that foam was never
changed, is that correct?
Admiral Gehman. That foam has never been changed.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you.
Admiral Gehman. It has been laid up the same way all of the
time, so the change in blowing agent had nothing to do with
this accident.
Dr. Bartlett. I appreciate that explanation, because when I
sat through that former hearing, my impression I came away with
was that gee, we changed the application of the foam and that
caused a whole lot more loss of foam, which is true. But it is
a loss of popcorning, which I gather, were tiny flakes of foam,
which really were not a risk.
Admiral Gehman. I don't know that they are not a risk, but
they did not cause this accident. And it--in any case, it was
fixed. And the incidence of foam coming off was immediately
statistically reduced back down to----
Dr. Bartlett. What do you mean by fixed? Do we now use
chloroflurocarbons for their application?
Admiral Gehman. No, sir. No. Thousands of little tiny
pinholes were drilled to the acreage foam to allow venting, to
allow normal venting of the compressed gases.
Dr. Bartlett. Admiral, in the grand scheme of things, the
amount of chloroflurocarbons that would be used in these once
in a while application of foams to the--to this craft, that
really wouldn't amount to a--much of an impact on the
environment, would it?
Admiral Gehman. I have no earthly idea to know how much.
The main reason--the testimony we received was that the main
reason they shifted blowing agents was to the--was because of
the lack of availability of Freon, as we used to call it. They
just couldn't get the hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of
tons of it that they used to need.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you, Dr. Bartlett.
Dr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Your time is expired, and I thank you
very much, the very distinguished scientist that you are, for
bringing that to our attention, because the theory advanced by
some that this tragic accident occurred because NASA was
required to adhere to certain environmental law. That theory
doesn't hold water. Secondly, NASA has had repeatedly
exemptions from EPA. And so I am so glad, Dr. Bartlett, that
you brought that to our attention. And it means more coming
from a distinguished scientist. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes Eddie Bernice Johnson.
RTF Workforce
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
apologize for having to run to the Floor for resolution. I
would like to express my appreciation for you continuing these
hearing, and I would like to thank Administrator O'Keefe for
agreeing to appear here today and the Admiral for returning to
answer our questions on this most important hearing on the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board report.
Today, we are brought here again to discuss the accident
and the report to protect the safety and integrity of the
future of this country's space program. We must learn from the
mistakes of the past. The report from this investigation will
allow us to see what went wrong, how to prevent it from
happening again. It is essential that we put forth concerted
effort to protect the safety of our
astronauts.I21Unfortunately, we see in the report that there
was pressure from the leadership that led unsafe practices. One
of the biggest concerns I have had with this current NASA
administration has been the privatization and competitive
souring of governmental functions. Throughout the '90s, the
Shuttle workforce has shrunk. And from 1992 to 2002, NASA's
Shuttle workforce was reduced by more than 50 percent and the
Shuttle contractor workforce by more than 40 percent. The
report documents these facts as well as the fact that the
diminished capacity of the NASA Shuttle workforce as a factor
in the Columbia accident, and I find this quite alarming.
We can no longer pass blame or hide behind ignorance when
we discuss safety of our astronaut corps. It is time we stand
up and face the music of the mistakes made, if not only to
honor our brave heroes who have passed because of our arrogance
or failure to see the errors of our ways, that is the least
that we owe to their memory.
So Mr. O'Keefe, I would like to ask you how many people
will you be hiring within NASA to enable you to meet the
return-to-flight recommendations?
Mr. O'Keefe. We are just beginning to develop the--an
estimate of exactly what kind of internal hiring of U.S.
Government public servants would be required. It will be at
least on the order of a couple of hundred. It will be
associated with the NASA Engineering and Safety Center that we
announced a couple of months ago. And it will be initiating on
the 1st of November. And then looking at all of the
recommendations that have been made and the options we will
choose to implement them, we will hire, as necessary,
engineering, technical, and management staff, as appropriate,
in order to carry out the options we may choose to go forward
with the recommendations, on the basic assumption, though, of
what the distribution is of what we do at NASA as a public
service relative to contractor folks comparison. There was a
very instructive Congressional Budget Office report that was
released about a month ago that compared what we do within the
Shuttle Program Office with a number of other major program
integration efforts, systems integration efforts that go on
across the government and have found that what we are doing is
not substantially dissimilar in that regard.
So Mr. Chairman, if you would, I would like to at least
submit this CBO report for the record as an interesting----
Chairman Boehlert. Without objection.
[The information referred to appears in Appendix 2:
Additional Material for the Record.]
Schedule Effects on Workforce
Mr. O'Keefe.--observation that I found that--in reviewing a
number of other comparable major programs that require systems
integration work, we are, you know, roughly of the same order
and magnitude of that same kind of distribution and comparison
of public versus private functioning. But we will be looking at
additional folks to be brought in in order to assure that
independent engineering expertise that the Board has called for
in the course of its commentary as well as to sure up the
safety objectives that we need for public servants to do so.
Ms. Johnson. Okay. As you know, the report reinforces
Goldin's and McDonald's conclusions that the workforce was
being severely strained by schedule pressures and by the
inability to oversee the contractor workforce effectively and
concludes that the balance between NASA and the contractor
workforces have become skewed and strongly implies that NASA
needs to beef up its workforce significantly. So once the
Shuttle has returned to flight, how many people will NASA need
to hire in order to assure a safe Shuttle program?
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't know. We are going to need to
inventory, again, each of the options that we would select for
compliance with each of these recommendations, and that then
will yield a number of how many people we hire.
Ms. Johnson. How much will that augmented workforce cost on
an annual basis? I guess if you don't know how many you are
going to hire, you don't know that, but how much have you
requested in the budget?
Mr. O'Keefe. Again, the budget right now has not been
amended or adjusted in order to reflect what we believe to be
return-to-flight costs. When those estimates have been
developed, we will certainly submit it expeditiously to
Congress for your consideration.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Feeney for five minutes.
Mr. Feeney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And we are
grateful for both of you being here. We appreciated Admiral
Gehman's testimony last week.
NASA/Navy Benchmark
Mr. O'Keefe, you and I were together on a very sad occasion
on February 1. We were with, amongst others, Congressman
Weldon, from Brevard County, and of course, Majority Leader,
Tom Delay, during a very, very sad day. I want to focus briefly
on some conversations you and I had before that disaster,
because the truth of the matter is that I really respected what
you were doing and where you were going, getting the full
accounting, not just of the accounting books and balance sheets
for NASA but also the resources, the capabilities, and you and
I talked about developing a long-term strategic vision. And I
understand, while I have been busy in two other committees,
that you have talked a great deal about that vision. And of
course, we will be continuing to pursue that, because all of us
are looking forward to the future.
But I will suggest that one of the things we have also
talked about is that there has to be a balance in terms of
safety but also getting things accomplished. This is an
inherently risky business. I think most people that support
manned space flight accept the notion that this is an
inherently imperfect process as long as human beings are going
to be involved in it. The safest advice I gave my clients when
I was lawyer but I had to stay out of court was to stay in bed
every day. And the truth of the matter is, you get very little
accomplished if you are going to be using safety as your only
goal. And I think that Admiral Gehman and his suggestions have
been very important in noting that we can do a lot better on
safety with respect to technical aspects, the culture, et
cetera, but that safety can't be the only goal or we will never
launch men and women again into orbit.
I am interested in the conversation you and I had before
the disaster, and that was one of the first things you did when
you took office was to use the benchmark study of the Navy's
nuclear submarine program. I think you and I had talked about
how instructive that could be in many ways, and it becomes even
more pertinent after the disaster on February 1. I want to
quote a letter that you sent to the Navy Secretary back on June
13 of 2002. You said, ``NASA's Space Shuttle and International
Space Station program managers are facing many challenges,
including maintaining product quality and safety, accomplishing
required performance and safety upgrades, and maintaining a
skilled and motivated workforce in the face of budget and
schedule pressures.''
I think you basically encapsulated a lot of the challenges
facing NASA that sort of, in some ways, all came to a head on
February 1. A lot of which you had to say before the disaster
parallel what the CAIB report is suggesting that we need to do
to improve NASA. Six months before Columbia, something about
NASA's safety culture caught your attention and your eye, and I
wonder if, in the firsthand, you can share that with us, and
secondly, I wonder if, with respect to Kennedy Space Center's
quality assurance procedures, General Deihl, as part of his
contribution to the CAIB report, said as follows: that NASA
ought to ``perform an independently led, bottom-up review of
the Kennedy Space Center quality planning requirements document
to address the entire quality assurance program and its
administration.'' You have been very proactive and very
generous in accepting the critique in the Gehman report. I
think you have accepted it in a most magnanimous and important
fashion. I hope that everybody throughout NASA will do that,
but I would like to note specifically with respect to General
Deihl's recommendation, how you intend to approach that.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. On the first
set of issues, in terms of what were the influences that kind
of provoked me to look towards the benchmarking within, not
only the submarine service but also the naval reactors
community. And I guess it kind of goes back to in vitro. A--one
of the originals within the Navy nuclear engineering program
spent an entire career in the submarine service as an engineer.
And so I grew up with this around the dinner table listening to
the kinds of concerns that that community has and the ethos
that that community has about safety and the objectives that
need to be accomplished there.
When the Thresher went down in the '60s, when I was a
little kid, I can recall very specifically an awful lot of real
tight-lipped, tight-jawed folks around the Portsman Naval
Shipyard, which is where we were stationed at that time. And it
was the beginnings of what then became what is now known as the
Sub Safe Program. And years later then, having the privilege of
serving as Navy Secretary and working with the naval reactors
community, submarine force again, in that capacity, I found the
ethos of what they are engaged in and the way they diligently
pursue these efforts for safety as well as operational
conditions and balancing both objectives as being the closest
comparable community to our own.
And in that regard, I asked Admiral Skip Bowman, who is now
the successor to Admiral Reichover's legacy as the naval
reactors chief today, attended the very first launch I ever
went to. He was with me there, and that was the first he had
seen one. We compared the processes and the systems to the
complexity of a Trident submarine, you know, and the very same
kinds of approaches have to be taken there. And he then helped,
along with then-Secretary Gordon England, who is on his way
back to that capacity, to initiate, at our request, a
benchmarking effort that, again, as you cite, in December
released its first effort to--for that particular benchmarking
procedure within the submarine program and then within the
naval reactors community, most recently in July of this year.
So an awful lot of what we have garnered from this effort that
went on well before the accident occurred just didn't mature in
time, clearly. And it has--but it is the same thing. We are not
going to slow up on that effort. It is something we have got to
redouble our efforts to implement. The cooperation and the
assistance from the naval reactors community, from Admiral
Bowman specifically, and from all of his principle staff has
been exemplary. Our chief engineer today is a fellow who was--
spent an entire career in the naval reactors community and has
been brought over as the chief engineer of NASA. So there is a
lot of cross pollination going on here in order to assure that
that ethos is infused.
As it pertains to the second part of your question and the
other observations offered by members of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, we will treat that like everything else.
There are two categories in our Implementation Plan, which very
clearly delineate 29 recommendations that have been faithfully
recorded by the Board, and then what we characterize as the
raise-the-bar inputs. And in that will be all of anybody and
everybody's inputs to include other members of the Board who
offered supplementary views or whatever else. We are not going
to discriminate between and among the--where the origin of
various ideas may come from. Instead, we want to work through
each of those and make sure there is careful consideration to
all inputs that we receive. We want to make sure that we make
this a stronger, safer procedure before we return-to-flight.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. The gentleman's
time has----
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you very much. I appreciate the inquiry.
Chairman Boehlert.--expired. The Chair recognizes Ms.
Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again,
let me thank the Chairman and our Ranking Member for the Full
Committee and as well our Chairman and Ranking Member for the
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics for these detailed
hearings that I find very, very effective.
Accountability
Mr. O'Keefe, I want to join in the premise of the Ranking
Member that we are not attempting to find blame for blame's
sake. And I join him in that. But my approach has been that
until you hold individuals accountable, until you respond to
the very core of the problem and begin to shine a light, it
will be difficult to correct whatever the culture might be
represented to be. And certainly NASA has had a wonderful
history. Needless to say, as we began the hearing last week, I
read the names of the Columbia 7. We could read a number of
names of individuals who sacrificed their lives in the course
of the great mission of NASA. I think we owe all of them
enormous debt of gratitude, and I mentioned last week that we
hope we will get Congressional gold medals for the Columbia 7,
but we owe them an enormous debt of gratitude by way of such
recognition. But we know that we owe them a debt of gratitude
by way of what we do from this day forward. So I first want to
say to you that I think the return-to-flight effort report that
came out certainly has a lot of strength to it.
And I want to note, in particular, two points about
starting the review of the several thousand waivers of Shuttle
safety requirements to determine whether they were justified.
And I would imagine the public would not even be aware that we
engage of thousands of safety waivers and with no notice to the
public as to whether they were justified or not, I am sure
there were individuals who thought so. But certainly, in light
of the tragedy, we would raise the question.
The other, I think is very worthwhile, and that is, of
course, to add cameras to the Shuttle and the International
Space Station to try to document launch damage and use imagery
from ground aircraft and ship-based sources. Again, a simple
feature, a camera, that wasn't even on-board in place in 2003.
We have had cameras around for at least a century. So I guess
my line of questions will lead as follows. And I would like to
engage NASA on the premise that I said not blame for blame's
sake, but to be able to find good solutions to work with my
colleagues and might I mind my manners and say to Admiral
Gehman again, we will say it over and over again, and to your
Board, a very, very effective report of which we can use as a
very effective, if I might use the terminology, road map to get
us where we would like to go.
But as I have looked over some of the regulations and
processes in NASA, I think more work needs to come. So Mr.
O'Keefe, let me refer to some testimony that was given last
week by one of the--by--I think it was Major General Hess. I
asked him to give me a sense of how the military operates. They
operate by way of finding out what happened and then
accountability. And there is a level there where there are
individuals who are removed. First, I would like you to give me
a list, not by names, I can engage you one on one on that,
positions that we now know people who have been moved. I would
like to know what has occurred with respect, I believe, to the
Deputy Administrator who was in charge of flight operations, if
you will, again not calling names, but whether there has been
any action. But I want to know the list of positions that
individuals held that no longer are in place or that they have
been moved as a response to the Columbia 7 tragedy.
I also will be, as I indicated, filing a whistleblower
protection legislation within days dealing specifically with
NASA. I am not happy with the approach. I understand there is a
hotline that the OIG utilizes. I will be seeking to find out
whether the OIG received any such calls during the course of
the Columbia 7 launch and what happened with those calls. Not
knowing whether or not the OIG is to be a witness, Mr.
Chairman, but I would want to call the OIG to this hearing room
and to ask what circumstances or what actions occurred around
Columbia 7 and whether any calls came in at that time.
This is a question to you, Mr. O'Keefe, and I thank you for
your presence here. On August 29, there was a message sent out
to the NASA family. In that e-mail, you addressed a perception
reported in the CAIB report among some employees that it is not
safe to report problems without risking retaliation. It is
noted that this is not something that is attributable to you,
Mr. Chairman. It has happened in past Administrators. There is
a fear that if you tell about problems, it may not be that you
are immediately eliminated, but your life becomes a life of
misery, that many of the individuals at higher positions are
those who happen to be friends of the Administrators. And so if
these criticisms are true, or even if they are perceived as
true, you have a huge challenge on your hands. How can we get
the talented technical people at NASA motivated to speak truth
to power, terminology used by a civil rights group, within your
organization when they see in--see it run by ``yes people'' and
they fear for their careers? And can we assure that there is no
way for NASA management to discover who has made a complaint to
the NSRS system so that these employees can be protected?
Finally, it is interesting that out of almost 300
interviews conducted by the CAIB, no line employee ever chose
to treat their interview as a public, unprotected event. Every
one of them wanted secrecy. How can we break this culture? And
when are we going to start breaking this culture? And as well,
in noting the report on the return-to-flight, I think it was
very admirable that Inspector--excuse me, Associate
Administrator for Space Flight, William Ready, said--he is a
flight engineer and a pilot, I believe. He doesn't know
anything about this culture thing. There was a culture that
stifled communications that somehow we have to eliminate. He
doesn't know anything about it. We have got to get some other
people in here to help him. Where do we go from that--from here
on those questions?
Mr. O'Keefe. I will attempt to respond to all of the points
you have attempted to raise here, and I will try to be brief,
and that will be a challenge here. But I think you have raised
some very important questions.
The first issue on accountability, there is no question.
There is no doubt. Please, make no misunderstanding. The
accountability starts with me. And I am responsible for what
the activities are of what goes on in this agency, and I am
personally accountable for that activity. I offered a witness
statement to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. It is
not a privileged statement. It is open testimony, so it has to
begin with me, and it has to begin with every leader in this
organization to make that kind of change. Now to your--to one
of the questions that you raised in the course of your
commentary, there have----
Ms. Jackson Lee. It goes to people that have been moved.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, I was just about to get there, and I
apologize for not getting there promptly enough. There are four
Space Flight Center Directors. All four of them are new within
the last year. Three out of those four are new within the last
seven months. The Deputy Directors of those four Space Flight
Centers, two of those four are new in the last seven months.
Within the Shuttle Program itself, 14 of 15 of the senior
management of the Shuttle Program are new in the last seven
months. So the--and I will give you a fuller accounting, for
the record, of every other move that has been made, because I
believe this to be not just a space flight, not just a Shuttle
Program set of issues, not just any individual center, it is
across the entire agency. And so as a consequence, you have
seen very significant change in the last year in the senior
leadership at almost every position. Three-quarters of the
leadership of this agency is different today than it was a year
ago. And in the course, that is the leadership team, I believe,
that is going to lead us to--from this point forward, to be
responsive in these situations. And as a consequence of that,
those who are not have been removed for a variety of reasons.
They have either left the agency. They have been
reassigned. They have been relieved, any number of different
cases. And each is a different story, which gets to the second
point, I believe, powerfully you made in your commentary, which
is the last thing I want to do in the course of this is
contribute to this retaliatory atmosphere that is asserted very
clearly by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's report
and the conclusion that each of the Board members have reached,
which is they have witnessed this same behavior themselves in
addition to recording how they believe that acted its way
through in the investigation, which is what prompted me to put
out the message that you very thoughtfully read. And again, it
is one that I am--I stand by. I think we must enforce. We must
be serious about it. And the very clear message to all
leadership of this agency is we can not tolerate that
repression or suppression of any observation of safety
concerns, difference of view. But we also have to have
responsibility to resolve those issues and move forward. I
think, as Congressman Feeney very thoughtfully observed, we
have to balance those two or else we spend all of our time
debating the question.
So as a consequence, it works both ways. The leadership
must set the tone for that. I believe the leadership team that
is in place today have been put there recently, comparatively
speaking, because they manifest that kind of characterization.
And they will remain there until such time as they fail to
demonstrate those characterizations as well as behaviors in the
future.
Finally, one approach that we will look to to try to sort
through and be sure that anyone out there, if they don't want
to use the OIG hotline, they don't want to use the NASA safety
reporting system, which again permits anonymous reporting, none
of which was recorded during the course of the operation or
during the STS-107 flight at all. There are any number of ways
to ensure that, and we would like to create yet another
possibility to do that, which is anyone on any day at any time
to observe that if they feel that they can not raise their
point of view or if it is suppressed in that process, that we
create a system that is so common in so many other agencies in
order to assure that these are run to the ground and resolved.
But first and foremost, it has to start and stop with the
leadership mentality and attitude. And that is what I am
committed to ensure that we infuse in this agency. I think we
are going down that road to do so. The changes have been made
in order to implement that. And this leadership team is up to
that challenge.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you be happy to----
Chairman Boehlert. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, could I just get him to----
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman is recognized--Dr.
Ehlers----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would he work with me on the whistleblower
legislation?
Chairman Boehlert. The gentlelady should understand, this
is a committee of nearly 50 Members. This committee tries to be
indulgent to every single Member. Five minutes opening
questions. Your opening question lasted seven minutes, just the
question. The Chair is trying to be very fair to each and every
panel Member, but each panel Member has to be fair to other
panel Members.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I respect that, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman
from Michigan, Dr. Ehlers.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I have been fair to others, as I have
listened to them go over the time. This is an important
question, and I respect----
Chairman Boehlert. Every Member has important questions,
Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I respect--and I----
Chairman Boehlert. I would like to emphasize that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Correct. And I respect that aspect.
Chairman Boehlert. Your time consumed 14 minutes, and each
Member is allocated five minutes. There will be a second
round----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I will look for the documentation of
14 minutes.
Chairman Boehlert.--and the Chair will be generous again.
The Chair recognizes Dr. Ehlers of Michigan.
Mr. Ehlers. I hope that interchange didn't come off my
time.
Chairman Boehlert. It did not.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vision
And I would like to just also add to Mr. Feeney's comment:
the only safe place is bed--staying in bed. And I should point
out that more people die in bed than anywhere else. So he--you
can't win.
I apologize for having to step out for a few minutes,
because I had to give a speech elsewhere, and I was going to
ask you about the next space vehicle. I understand that was
asked. While trying not to repeat this, but I am anxious to get
past the Columbia and get--and we have a complete report on
that. We know what went wrong. We will try to correct the
procedures. But I would like to look down the pike. People
talked a lot about a grand vision or a vision, and that is part
of it. But I think we should be thinking 30 or 40 years from
now. Where do we want to be? And in particular, I think a very
basic decision is to what extent do we want to engage in human
exploration of space. There are people who talk about going to
Mars. I don't--I think that would be a very unwise decision to
make unless we develop far better propulsion systems, far
better life support systems. At this point, given what we know,
it is simply not worth the dollars. And we ought to recognize
that.
We have the Space Station up there. We have to service it,
but it looks like we don't even have enough money to do that.
And we--and NASA basically, intrinsically, is a science agency.
And we have to make sure we have the money to do the science
that is important. And I understand that $40 million was cut
from that program recently, and I don't know if it is going to
be used for the Shuttle or other things, but over the years,
NASA's total budget has gone down, but particularly its science
budget has had difficulty.
I--that is all preliminary to just asking you, Mr.
Administrator, and I am very impressed with you as a person and
I am impressed with the work you have done. I am pleased to see
you there. But I am interested in your personal vision, how you
plan to tackle these problems, first of all, guiding the
American public and, therefore, the Congress in decisions we
have to make about human space flight, because that is the
expensive part. Secondly, what is your long-term vision of the
science, how we should handle that, what we are--how we are
going to allocate resources to that? So I am getting a bit at
what you see, and I don't want you to--I will specifically say
that neither I, nor the world, should tie you down to what you
say right now, because you may not have had time to think
through all of that. But what is your thinking about the
process you are going through? And then particularly, in
designing the next space vehicle, the last one I was totally--
the last attempt, I was totally unimpressed with. I went out to
look at the project, came away with the idea that this was not
going to fly. It was a waste of money, and a year later, it
ended at, I think a total expenditure, of $1 billion, public
and private. We need a thoughtful, careful approach. How do you
plan to approach that?
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Congressman.
I guess the first observation would be at the premise of
your commentary, at the very beginning, or preface of it, I
should say, is we want to look past Columbia. And while that is
true in terms of looking at what these larger and broader
exploration agenda objectives should be, I must tell you, in
all sincerity, I can't look past this accident. There is no
way. I can't take my eye off it for one second, because we have
got to learn from this, institutionalize that learning, fully
understand what the lessons from that are to assure that we
lower the probability that this will ever, ever happen again.
You can never eliminate the risk, but we sure can do better
than we have done. And this is one that I don't want to even
forget about that for a second of the day, because it is
imperative that what we do today, tomorrow in the near-term
must be done as safely as we possibly can, but at the same
time, driving towards those larger objectives. So I take your
point, but I appreciate your indulgence on the clarification of
that issue that I have really got to deal with. It is a
responsibility. I think it is something that is absolutely
insurmountable. There is no way we can move past that.
In terms of where do we want to be, well, you could put
your finger to it right. It is--in the strategic plan that we
have developed and the approach we are using now in order to
try to lay out what that broader exploration policy objective
should entail, we have got to begin with the premise, as you
said so, I think, exactly. There are limitations on power
generation, propulsion, and human endurance that we must
conquer or else we are just dreaming. And so every one of those
are the kinds of things that the Congress, this committee has
been extremely supportive of. The House demonstrated its
commitment on this point, I am impressed to say, at the end of
the last--well, prior to the time before the August recess on a
contest of exactly this point when the issue was raised on
reducing the resources necessary. There had been budgets, part
of the President's budget for Project Prometheus, which is
specifically designed in order to conquer these limitations on
in-space propulsion and power generation. If we don't move past
where we are today on chemical propulsion and the basic way we
will be doing business with improvements of incremental nature,
of course, for the last three to four decades, we are never
going to get out from underneath the limitations that are
always going to stop us from any exploratory effort that
requires you to get there sooner and do it in a way that
doesn't require nearly the fraction of mass that today is a--
just inhibitor. It stops you cold, because it requires so much
volume.
So moving in that direction, we have put in a very
aggressive program in that direction. Project Prometheus is
funded to the point of being able to demonstrate that
technology on future missions, and as a consequence, the
support from the Congress has been absolutely unbelievable,
very impressive, and we are deeply appreciative to you, to all
Members, for exactly that focus.
On the issue of human endurance, I think that is exactly
what Station is giving us today is the capacity to understand
what it is going to take for folks to survive this experience
for extended periods of time. In part, it relates, as you know
far better than I by virtue of your scientific background, an
understanding of the human capacity in order to sustain through
some very unusual conditions relative to what we experience
here on Earth. And we can only discover that, really understand
those effects, aboard International Space Station. So so much
of what we are doing, in terms of the scientific portfolio or
the agenda, is driven by, principally, biological and physical
research and materials research on International Space Station.
That is the liberation that has come from the remap exercise
that we engaged in just last year that Dr. David Shirley, a
nuclear physicist, and Dr. Ray Silver, a chemist, helped us get
to with all of the disciplines necessary represented in order
to identify where should those priorities be aboard Station for
what the scientific objectives ought to be in order to
understand that. And it principally turns on issues of human
endurance and the capacity of people to withstand the unusual
combination, the amazing combination, that only exists in that
microgravity condition of rapid acceleration of cell growth, in
some cases, and rapid deceleration in others. We can't explain
that. And until we do, that question of broader exploration
objectives, et cetera, become something that is inhibitor
constantly, in terms of longer term human objectives. So in the
end, those three issues. If we can conquer those technology
limitations and the capacity of humans to endure, we can do
this.
Finally, on your point of exactly where the science
priorities ought to be and how do we balance those, today, 1/3
of the overall NASA initiatives are related to space flight
objectives for which humans are involved. The other 2/3 focuses
on robotic means, a number of different capabilities that,
again represented by the strategic plan, are intended to be the
stepping stones, the pathfinders, if you will, in order to
determine exactly the approach we would use to conquer those
three objectives. And so the ultimate vision or objective would
be that we are starting with, as we begin this larger
exploration policy vetting process that we are into now, is to
start with this as a baseline, recognize those three primary
limitations on any vision objective that needs to be conquered,
redouble our efforts to be sure that we do so, and to again to
continue to encourage the Congress to support, as it has been
so handsomely demonstrated, that we move ahead with the budget
proposals we have already made and that are fully financed in
order to conquer those three objectives. That is extremely
helpful. That is the direction we are going. And as we refine
this particular vision, as manifested in the strategic plan, I
think that is going to give us a greater path in that
direction.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. O'Keefe.
The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair recognizes for
five minutes, Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I get into my
questions, I would like to express my thanks to you, Admiral
Gehman, for your hard work and an excellent report and great
leadership.
Shuttle Upgrades
I am a fan of the national archives. And on the outside of
the national archives, it says, ``The past is prologue.'' And I
think it is worth thinking about that phrase. And so I would
like to revisit how we got here, and one of the things I think
it is important to do is to follow the money. Administrator
O'Keefe, if you will recall during our first House--joint House
Senate hearing into the Columbia accident, I asked you a
question about Shuttle safety upgrades. And to refresh your
memory, the question was were there any Shuttle safety upgrade
proposals, recommendations, or projects presented to you,
either as NASA Administrator or in your former capacity at the
OMB, that you did not support, and if so, what were they and
why did you reach the conclusions that you did? And you said
that you could not recall any. Recently, the Committee received
a written response for the record that, I think, is misleading.
And it states, in part: ``Administrator O'Keefe has not
rejected any Shuttle upgrade proposal as NASA Administrator or
during his tenure at OMB.
The Administration prepared and submitted to Congress in
November 2002 an amendment to the fiscal year 2003 budget
request to increase the funding for upgrading the Space Shuttle
system by approximately $660 million for the fiscal year 2004-
2008 time frame.'' The response goes on to detail several
specific safety upgrades that were, in fact, canceled during
this Administration, including the electric auxiliary power
unit because of ``cost growth of technical immaturity,'' and I
am not sure I know what that means. The Administration's
position seems to be that safety upgrades will be funded unless
they cost too much, in which case, they will be canceled. And I
think this is a funny way to run a safety program, since
canceling an expensive program does not mitigate risk, it only
mitigates cost.
One final issue, I think, of note, this committee, on a
bipartisan basis, has been attempting to obtain full budget
documentation over the past 10 years for the Shuttle Program
and for NASA's safety program. Chairman Boehlert and Mr. Hall
have requested in writing from you internal NASA budget
request, NASA's request to OMB, and NASA lawyers, I understand,
have been claiming deliberative process protection while they
are reviewing the documents. I think it is unfortunate that
this committee will probably not see any of these documents
unless our Chairman is forced to issue subpoenas for them. Mr.
O'Keefe, your earlier response to me, on the record, indicated
that you have not rejected any Shuttle safety upgrade proposal,
either as NASA Administrator or Deputy Director of OMB. I would
point out, however, that the CAIB report notes that the
Administration's fiscal year 2003 budget request for Shuttle
upgrades was a 34 percent cut from the fiscal year 2002 planned
level, that is on page 114 of the report. The report fails to
note, but it is a fact, that the fiscal year 2002 level also
represented a significant cut from the fiscal year 2001 planned
level. In other words, by fiscal year 2003, you had made cuts
totally hundreds of millions of dollars over five years from
the totals approved by your predecessor, Mr. Goldin. When the
Bush Administration canceled any hope of the Shuttle
replacement when they terminated the X-33 program in 2001, it
became obvious that the human space flight program was going to
be dependent on the Shuttle for a very long time. At that very
point, when the termination lengthened the effective life span,
OMB cut the Shuttle upgrades budgets by hundreds of millions of
dollar over the next five years.
So I have four questions. First, do you dispute these
figures showing significant cuts in the Shuttle upgrades
program while you were at OMB and at NASA? Number two, why did
you make these cuts? Number three, the Committee's leadership,
on a bipartisan basis, has asked you in writing for copies of
budget documents that would give this committee an assessment
of how Shuttle safety budgets have been created by NASA, OMB,
and Congress over the past 10 years. This is not a partisan
request. And in fact, most of the time period covered is in the
Clinton years. You have, so far, not provided us with these
documents. Will you commit to us today that these documents
will be provided so the Committee, on a bipartisan basis, can
perform its constitutional oversight function? And finally, I
find it disturbing that, as I understand it, $40 million has
been shifted from centers who are doing basic science research,
and my question is when will that money be returned to the
centers?
Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentlelady exhausted four minutes
and 53 seconds with that question. And we will give the
Administrator, because of the importance of the question, some
ample time to respond to that.
Mr. O'Keefe. We have not, to my knowledge, nor of anything
I have seen presented, reduced the specific upgrade requested.
Indeed, if anything, as part of the amendment to the
President's budget last November, attempted to, as part of the
Service Life Extension Program, inventory all of the upgrades
that may be candidates in approaches to taking improvements to
the Shuttle Program in an organized way and a more
comprehensive way as we go through this and have funded it as
such.
The second question was why the cuts. I don't know that we
did. And again, I am--prepare to be corrected in that view when
I go back and take a look at the side-by-side comparisons you
have so thoughtfully offered here of what is involved. I have
been looking at page 114, and I guess it doesn't jump out at me
right away, of where this is. Today, the Shuttle upgrade budget
is, by what has been documented in the report, a $347 million,
which relative to what it was just at the end of the last
decade, was 175, so that is still near doubling of that across
the way. So--but let me get you a more precise answer to that,
but I am looking at the same graphic, and I see that we have
been increasing in that regard. Is--there--to my knowledge,
there has--and again, I emphasize----
Ms. Lofgren. It is the third paragraph on the second side.
Mr. O'Keefe. Okay. Third paragraph on the second side.
``Responding to NASA's concern, the Shuttle required safety
related upgrades, the President proposed NASA's budget for '01
proposing safety upgrades initiative. This initiative had a
short life span.'' Is that the paragraph?
Ms. Lofgren. No, ``A year later, the fiscal year 2003
request contained a plan to spend 1.220 billion, a 34 percent
reduction.
OMB Passbacks
Mr. O'Keefe. I see. Okay. Excuse me. ``A year later, the
fiscal year 2003 request contained a plan to spend--a 34
percent reduction.'' Let me go back and see what the exact
comparison is there, because again, as part of the '03 budget,
if you recall the President's budget included a specific entry
to corral up all of this into the Service Life Extension
Program to then organize and prioritize those specific upgrades
that would be required to increase the Shuttle safety as well
as improve its service life performance over the time of that.
And to the extent that we have got a disconnect here, let me
reconcile that, and I will go back and dig into the numbers and
see where we are.
Yes. The third question you asked is the Committee request
for information. I apologize. I thought, Mr. Chairman, that--
and to Mr. Hall or Mr. Gordon, that there was a specific
understanding with the Office of Management of Budget, I am
advised, in which they are prepared to walk through all of that
with members of staff, with Members, whatever, that may go
through that entire accounting in the last decade. That is
where I left this a couple of--a few months ago, and I thought
that had been done. I will go back and assure that that is the
case, but my last discussion with the OMB General Counsel was a
more than willingness to engage in that discussion----
Chairman Boehlert. They have not yet indicated that more
than willingness attitude toward us, and we will look forward
to hearing from them.
Mr. O'Keefe. I will fix that. As soon as I leave this
hearing, I will make--the next call will be to our friends over
there who have assured us on several occasions that they are
prepared to sit down with staff and Members at any time to walk
through what those comparative differences were over the course
of the last decade of various agency submissions to the Office
of Management and Budgets----
Chairman Boehlert. We will be real receptive to that
message from OMB. And I would like to ask Admiral Gehman if he
would care to comment on this general thrust of the
questioning.
Admiral Gehman. The Board attempted to document as best as
we could the fact that the Shuttle upgrade program has been
underfunded for decades. And our point was not to point blame
at either the White House or the Congress or at OMB or at NASA
but to document the point that the reason why the Shuttle
upgrade program is continuously underfunded is because of a
lack of an agreement of how long the Shuttle is going to serve
us. And therefore, no one can agree how to amortize billions of
dollars of upgrades, whether we have to amortize them over five
years or 25 years, because nobody knows how long the Shuttle is
going to last. So that is what our point was.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. The gentlelady's
time has expired.
Dr. Gingrey.
Ms. Lofgren. Could--Mr. Chairman, I don't want to belabor
this. There was one more question, and maybe I can get that in
writing from the Administrator, the fourth question.
Chairman Boehlert. By all means. You can submit it in
writing, and the response will be in writing.
Dr. Gingrey.
Independent Technical Engineering Authority
Mr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to shorten
this up a little bit for you. My colleague on this side of the
room, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Feeney, earlier commented
that his advice to some of his clients, he is an attorney, is
the only way to totally eliminate risk is, of course, don't get
out of bed in the morning. And as a physician, when I took the
Hippocratic Oath many years ago, I remember most vividly the
admonishment in the first place, do no harm. And I think really
this whole discussion, this whole hearing, the whole issue is
about balancing achievements in the program and safety and not
putting anyone at unnecessary risk. And I don't think we can
overstate that or overemphasize that. I would like to ask
Admiral Gehman to comment on this. It does seem to me that in
the report, and in the hearing, and the questions, and--that
the concern is that a great deal or too much complacency
developed within NASA and not enough attention was directed to
the unscientific Murphy's Law. And I would like for you to
comment on that, Admiral Gehman.
And more specifically, Administrator--Mr. O'Keefe, the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board apparently believes in
the past the Shuttle Program had too much unchecked authority
to write itself waivers. And in fact, some 2,000 were written
for the Columbia flight. Yet it now appears that NASA plans to
have the Shuttle Program review its own waivers before
returning to flight. My question to you is shouldn't NASA wait
to conduct this important job until it puts in place the
Independent Technical Engineering Authority, or some other
oversight authority, other than the internal?
Admiral Gehman. Yes, sir. The--you have hit on probably the
building block or the fundamental finding of the Board, and
that is that over the years, due to forces on NASA, some forces
internal, some forces external, but nevertheless due to forces
that acted on the Shuttle Program over a decade or more, the
investments that were made were made to increase the chances of
meeting the schedule. And other things, such as basic research
and development, basic engineering, basic studies into aging
aircraft, attempts to fund, for example, engineering efforts to
reduce the number of waivers the Shuttle was flying with rather
than just keep adding, all of those kind of overhead kind of
programs were left unfunded. In other words, it is kind of the
cost of doing business. And that is alarming to the Board and,
we believe, contributory. And it is part of the cost of doing
business in human space flight, and you have just got to pay
those costs. And we think that we need to reverse that trend.
Complacency is the word you used. That is not the word we would
have chosen to use, but it clearly was a--it was a trend toward
spending money on those kinds of things, which assured--
increased the assurance that you could meet the schedule at the
expense of the underlying engineering and research that needed
to be done to assure safety.
Mr. O'Keefe. Congressman, thank you for your very
thoughtful question on both the waivers and the independent
technical authority. This is a really important set of issues.
The waivers--I think, given the background that I come from,
which again is more of a national security Defense Department
kind of approach to what a requirement means, is more like what
most people think the definition of requirement is. You ought
to be required to do it. I have come to find at NASA that
requirements mean goals, objectives. It is much like the
processes and procedures that we use for a variety of different
activities.
I think what has come out of this report is a real, you
know, scales falling from my eyes kind of event, that I have
found, is that our procedures, the way we define things, what
we do, the process that we engage in is a lot like the stop
lights in Naples, Italy. They are all advisory. Follow them if
you like; don't follow if you don't. And that is something that
has got to stop. Our definition of what a requirement is can't
be just this goal that we put out there and say, ``We would
like to achieve that some day. And maybe we will and maybe we
won't.'' It has got to be something we require that we do. And
to the extent that there is a deviation from that requirement,
we have got to have a clear justification to that. And again,
that is one of the really important things that I think
Congressman Feeney brought out in his commentary.
There is a discipline in the way that, for example, the
naval reactors community conducts this where there is a clear
understanding of why something doesn't comport with precisely
the requirements and what you are going to do to go fix it and
how you deal with that. And that is the same ethos we have to
adopt. We have got to get out of the mood of saying we have
goals and objectives, but we can achieve some of them and not
all of them on each and every flight. So we have got to go back
and revise that. And that is--so in that context, I think that
is more what we are talking about by doing a close-order drill
examination of these waiver procedures now, as opposed to
later, because it really cuts at the mindset we use here. We
have got to reverse that to mean something that, again, I think
is replete in this report. Prove to me it is safe. Don't put
the burden of proof on folks to show that it is not safe. You
have got to go to the other way to demonstrate that
overabundance of caution.
It cuts to the second point, I think very perceptively,
that you raised, which is you really can't afford to pass or
take your time figuring out how to do an important function
that they have identified in the recommendations here, which is
to sever the specification and control of those specifications,
the configuration control, if you will, of what the orbiter
looks like and what all its moving parts entail from the cost
and schedule pressures. That is a very profound commentary
about the organization of the way we manage ourselves as well
as the procedures that we put in place that we sometimes kind
of follow. And that is an important distinction is to say that
there is--we have got to look at options soon rather than
later, in my judgment, to sever those functions of the
engineering specification configuration control independence
from the cost and schedule functions. I think that is something
that not only pertains to the Shuttle Program, it pertains to
everything we do, every program we are involved in.
If you have got the folks with the schedule, costs, and the
engineering specification pressure all in the same room, then
tradeoffs are going to get made that will always be to the
deference of the immediacy of today's problem. The closest dog
to the sled will always be what gets the attention rather than
the kind of configuration control integrity that the Board
refers to and, again, is more reminiscent of the organizational
background I come out of within a Defense establishment that
really always has held that as a set of principles.
So inasmuch as that recommendation, which encompasses many,
many things as it pertains to independent technical authority
doesn't necessarily need to be done by one monolithic
organization or institution. It can--those individual functions
can be divided into different organizational efforts. But the
paramount principle that I read that is really quite profound
in my mind is there has to be a severability between the
independence of the engineering function and the configuration
control folks who really maintain the waiver authority, if you
will, from those who are driven by the cost and schedule and
daily operational pressures that we all live with all of the
time.
Chairman Boehlert. Admiral Gehman, would you care to
comment on that?
Admiral Gehman. No, sir. He has got it right. The basic
building block, basic finding of this Board is that the
morphing of the Shuttle Program over many, many years to wring
out of it the most cost-effective, most efficient kind of an
organizational structure was done so at the cost of basic
engineering and safety.
Chairman Boehlert. Should NASA wait until an independent
authority is set up to review the waivers, or should there be
some temporary system put in place? I mean, there are 3,000 or
so waivers.
Admiral Gehman. Right.
Chairman Boehlert. Some of them are more--1,000 of them are
more than a decade old.
Admiral Gehman. The Board wrote in its report our attempt
to answer that question, and that is that we are confident that
the zeal and the diligence and the vigilance that are
associated with the first half a dozen launches after this
tragedy will be so intense that they will leave no stone
unturned, but that like all big bureaucracies, over the years,
they will migrate back into bad habits. And it is that
migration back into bad habits is what our organizational
changes are designed to do. So we think that--we don't have--we
have no reason to believe that they can't review all of those
waivers and get it right for the first couple flights.
Mr. O'Keefe. Mr. Chairman, if I could real quick, because
this is a very important point. And it is a difference in the
way the Board has taken this on in terms of the--how expedient
we need to be about making decisions about this. They have set
it aside, I think, very thoughtfully as get a detailed plan
together before you return to flight on how you do this. I
don't think we can afford that. I think the approach we have
got to come to closure on sooner rather than later because for
the same reasons I think Admiral Gehman and your commentary
exchange just reveals, over the course of time, the urgency
starts to drift off. The urgency is now. People are really
focused on this. Everybody's attention is had. So as a
consequence, making this kind of organizational change, I
think, is something that we do it sooner rather than later and
make a determination on how to do that we are better off than
saying let us study the plan as we go down the road.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, how long is it going to take to do
a proper review of the waivers?
Mr. O'Keefe. Again, I think the first step is if you do the
major step that the Board recommended, which is to have a
severability between specification and configuration control
from cost and schedule program management, then it will really
mushroom from there. I think it will really snowball in its
effect of how fast you can do it, particularly if you take
another observation elsewhere in the report that says that the
design, the drawings of the Shuttle itself are in lots of
different places. I mean, the original drawings are in one
place. The engineering notices were somewhere else. The
engineering changes were in another location. So just the act
of pulling all of those together then is going to have the
effect, in this new independent technical authority, wherever
it is assigned and whatever option we choose, is then going to
grant a level of ownership, I think, to the engineering team
that says, ``Now I know exactly where all of these pieces are.
I have got to put it on some kind of computer aided design
system. I can look at it 3-D, and I have got all of the updates
of the engineering notices,'' and that is the equivalency of
starting down this road seriously to examine why waivers ought
to be granted, if at all, in any of those individual
categories.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Mr. Matheson.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate your indulgence on that.
Mr. Matheson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Stafford/Covey
Mr. O'Keefe and Admiral Gehman, welcome to the Committee. I
have a question for Mr. O'Keefe. As I understand it, many of
the Gehman recommendations are meant to be implemented in a one
to five-year time frame. And as I also understand it, the
Stafford/Covey return-to-flight panel, which you have created,
is expected to function for about eight months. And I am
wondering what mechanism you would recommend to oversee the
longer term, the one to five-year Gehman recommendations. There
seems to me--I will just throw out three options before you
answer. And that is should the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
assume the function or should Admiral Gehman be called back
every year for the next five years or should a new group be
created? Or how do you think we ought to handle that longer
time frame?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, thank you. I appreciate the question.
The first step, again, in this very immediate near-term, is
we have assembled a group led by General Tom Stafford, a former
Gemini and Apollo astronaut, and Dick Covey, who is the pilot
on the return-to-flight post-Challenger in the September of '88
effort. And they have, along with 25 other colleagues
representing lots of different disciplines of engineering,
technical management change, organization culture change,
academics, industry types, you name it, are on that particular
team to oversee, over the next two years they have been
chartered to do, the functions that we will be doing in order
to implement these recommendations. The intensity of their
focus, of course, will be between now and return-to-flight. And
Admiral Gehman has got it right. We are going to be all over
this like a bad habit, I am sure, for the next few flights, but
again, institutional change is what is absolutely imperative
that we do over time.
So in that regard, what we are looking to, again, as the
invitation, I think, the Chairman has issued for Admiral Gehman
and his colleagues to come back in a year and take a snapshot
picture of where we are, we would welcome that and look forward
to the opportunity to try to see where that progress ought to
go. The report of the Appropriations Committee just the other
day is now recommending that the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel be revised to more akin to what was intended when the
Congress enacted this capacity in the post-Apollo fire period,
1968, that we go back to its roots and think about using that
organization or that entity as a means to do it as
reconstituted and with a new set of fresh eyes to it. So we are
going to take that seriously, and that is an interesting
suggestion, and I think Admiral Gehman has opined about that in
this committee as well a week ago. So all of those, when
combined, I think is going to provide, in addition to the
extensive thorough oversight already provided by the Science
Committee here as well as the Commerce Committee on the other
side and the Appropriations Committee a continuing diligence
that we will adhere to.
Mr. Matheson. Let me go to a different question. A separate
issue. The Gehman report included a section on a possible
rescue mission for the Columbia, leaving an impression that a
rescue might have worked. What have you and others at NASA
concluded about whether either a repair effort or a rescue
mission involving another orbiter may have succeeded?
Mr. O'Keefe. I think the learned judgment on the part of
all who participated in the exercise led by the Flight Director
on the 107 mission, as a matter of fact, who organized it and
responded to the Board's findings, and I prepare to be
corrected by Admiral Gehman in terms of how that went down,
conclude that it could have been done. It is possible, but it
would have been very difficult. But that would, under no
circumstances, have prevented us from doing so. I think
anything it would have taken, and had we really focused and
been able to concentrate on all of the facts, had we been more
diligent, whatever, in order to understand all of the issues
that were pertaining here, would have done anything and
everything to have saved those folks. And I don't think there
would have been anything spared in the process of doing it,
even if it was a long shot.
Admiral Gehman. May I follow up on that?
Mr. Matheson. Yes. Please do.
Admiral Gehman. Just briefly, because I know time is of the
essence here, we were really trying to dispel myths. There were
myths going around that foam can't hurt shuttles. There were
foam--there were myths going around that we couldn't have done
anything anyway. There were all kinds of myths going around,
and we felt it necessary to start blowing holes in those myths.
And whether or not this rescue mission was plausible or not, it
is extraordinarily risky, as Mr. O'Keefe said. A whole lot of
ifs had to end up. But our real point was to start putting
myths in their proper place.
Mr. Matheson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. We add to that list of myths that we all
acknowledge the adherence to environmental laws somehow
contributed to the accident. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Gutknecht.
Mr. Gutknecht. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Attitude/Culture
This has been a very interesting hearing, and I want to
thank everybody here. Many of the questions that I would have
asked have already been asked, but I want to acknowledge Kathy
Sawyer from the Washington Post. And I don't know if you guys
have seen this, and all of us have a difficult time wading
through all of these reports. But it really, for Members who
haven't read it, it is probably the best chronology. It
appeared in the August 24 issue of the Washington Post. And I
just want to give her credit. And as I read it, it was
interesting to me that the night before I read this, there was
a documentary, and I am not even sure which channel it was on,
about Apollo 13. And I was just struck, especially as I read
this, how far we had drifted from the days of Gene Kranz and
``Failure Is Not an Option.'' And I happen to believe that one
of the most important words in the English vocabulary is the
word ``attitude.''
And as I read this, and particularly the story--the thing
that is the most haunting to me is the story of the engineers
requesting the images. And then as it is well documented in
your report, Admiral, there were numerous missed opportunities.
And I am just curious, I mean--and for the Members who don't
understand and maybe haven't followed this as closely, I mean,
there were a number of requests, beginning on January 21 from--
as the Washington Post says a large group of Houston engineers
responsible for troubleshooting, they asked--wanted to make a
formal request to get some images from our spy satellites,
which may or may not have proven anything. We don't know that.
We will never know. But the truth of the matter is, we might
have known very early on that there was a serious problem, and
perhaps a hole, in that wing. And let me just--for the Members,
let me just read what it--what the article says. And I think
the article is actually fairly generous. It goes on to say,
``As Columbia orbited, Manager Ham heard in phone chat that
there had been a request for imagery and spent most of the day
trying to track down its source.''
Admiral, wouldn't it be fair to say that what really
happened was she tried to quell that discussion?
Admiral Gehman. We--I believe that our report did a really
fine job of pinning that down quite well. And our conclusion
was that because they had a preconceived idea, an unshakable,
deeply held, preconceived idea that foam couldn't hurt the
orbiter, management considered that these requests for imagery
were stray voltage and that she wanted to know where it was
coming from. It wasn't that she was trying to quell it; she was
trying to figure out where it was coming from, and it was--she
was--there was noise in the background, but she couldn't pin it
down. Now that action about trying to pin down where it was
coming from could be construed as intimidating. It certainly
could be construed, but we didn't demonstrate--we didn't prove
that.
Mr. Gutknecht. Well, Admiral, with all due respect, no, you
didn't prove that. Nobody can prove anything today, but it
seems to me your report is actually pretty damning on that
front. And I guess the real bottom line--and the question
really is for you, Admiral. How do you change attitudes?
Because it just reads to me like--and I think Mr. O'Keefe even
said, you know, that this has become bureaucratized, and it is
a job. We still use the word ``mission'', but it is much more
of a job, it seems to me, the way I read this. And how do you
get back to that sense of failure is not an option?
Admiral Gehman. Yes, sir. Well, it is very difficult. And
the Board spent many hours trying to answer that question and
to make sure that our recommendations were couched in terms
that would hit that problem directly on the--directly. And what
we felt was that counting on really good people to be able to
overcome organizational difficulties or mal-organized systems
is a very poor way to do that. It would be better to fix the
organization. To bet that you can have heroic, brilliant,
fantastic people at every single position and that they can
overcome organizational difficulties is a bad bet and that we
need to change the organization and not pick on the people.
That is one thing.
The second thing is it this much more difficult issue of,
you called it attitudes, we call it cultures. And that can only
be fixed by leadership. It can't be fixed by--you can't
organize yourself out of cultural problems was our view. But
not--and not just leadership at the Administrator level. He is
going to have to have layers and layers of leadership below him
buy into this belief.
Mr. Gutknecht. But Admiral, but if I could just ask you to
kind of go through this, why do you think that the request from
Mr. Page and Mr. Rocha and the others never got above a certain
level?
Admiral Gehman. Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to take a
minute to answer this question, if that is all right.
Chairman Boehlert. Proceed.
Admiral Gehman. That is a--it is complex, but I believe
that the answer to your question that there are two answers to
your question. The first answer is all of those management
people really did believe the commonly held knowledge that foam
can't hurt the orbiter, and therefore, all of this e-mailing
and all of these questions about photography and things like
that were distractions, not relevant, waste of time, not well
proved out. The second--which is erroneous, of course. It is
wrong, but they--it was so widely held. And I believe that we
have tons and tons of documented evidence in here to prove our
points.
The second answer to your question is a little more
disturbing. We have, in our report, suggestions that because--I
have got to be careful here, because I want to make sure I say
what is in the report and not go beyond it. The flight schedule
for the next 16 months included 10 flights. That is not
possible. It is not physically possible to launch 10 in 16
months. I believe that the mangers were aware of that tight
schedule. And they were being careful not to allow
administrative impediments. By ``administrative impediments,''
what I mean was hazard reports or in-flight anomalies to rise
up, which would delay a flight readiness review. I believe
these managers knew the future schedule and therefore, anybody
who was bringing up problems was bringing up issues, which were
going to have to be resolved at higher levels and would slow
down the launch process.
I believe the tight schedule was in the back of their
minds. We elude to that in our report, but once again, can't
prove it. So you have this deeply held basic understanding,
wrong, and it is coloring the decisions.
I am sorry for the long explanation.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. And that was very--it was a
comprehensive response, and it was illuminating. Thank you.
Mr. O'Keefe. Mr. Chairman, would you mind if I comment very
briefly?
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. O'Keefe.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir. I am guided by what the report
says that program managers may have begun to be influenced by
these schedule pressures. A lot of qualifiers in that. That
tells me we have got to strike that balance between schedule
and safety objectives and be sure we are diligent about it all
of the time. And we have got to build in institutionally the
forces that create those checks and balances. And one of the
ways to do it, I think that you have touched on it very
eloquently at the very beginning of your commentary, was to
reach back into that ethos that everybody relates to in this
agency. Gene Kranz manifested.
I have been reading more of the historical, you know,
biographies of so many of these folks in the last few months
than I ever imagined or anticipated I would. I just did finish
Kranz's ``Failure Is Not an Option.'' And what I found
impressive is the guy must have spent a ferocious amount of
time every single day just writing up procedures, because he
describes how in every incident he went back and rewrote the
rules and the procedures. And that is true. We have got to
continue to do that, and we have got to be more diligent about
it. But then, the really important that I think comes out of
this report is then follow them. Really mean them. Don't write
them down just as an advisory thought. There are so many
different procedures that we have in place that this report
very clearly says, ``If you look at this just kind of
clinically, should be just great to fireproof any of the
process.'' And then you find that we conveniently follow some,
not others, interpret it differently. It kind of takes on this
informal process of how it goes on.
And the thing that comes out of Kranz's book that I found
to be very impressive is write the procedures and then follow
them like you mean them or amend them, abolish them, or rewrite
what is there, but mean what you have got in place until
demonstrated otherwise. Had that been the case in this
instance, the natural instinct on the part of engineers, flight
directors, flight controllers, all of these folks, would have
been more akin to the ethos he came from, which is I don't know
the answer to this question. People are assuming they know the
answer. Let us go prove it as fact or not. And that is what we
want to reinstall as a mindset, and that begins with this set
of challenges, I think, as a culture matter of saying write the
procedures and then really follow them like you mean them or
change them.
Mr. Gutknecht. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Admiral Gehman, did you--okay, fine.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Congressman.
Chairman Boehlert. All right. The Chair is tempted to come
in, because you raised a number of questions about scheduling,
but I am going to finish the first round before we go to the
second round, and I am not going to take advantage of this
position indifference to my colleagues.
Mr. Bell.
Mr. Bell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. O'Keefe, Admiral
Gehman. Thank you for being here again. Thank you for your
testimony.
OSP and ISS
Mr. O'Keefe, I would agree with you that I think we face a
very unique and wonderful window of opportunity. I do believe
the focus is on the space program like we haven't seen in
recent memory, and it is our duty now to take advantage of it.
And nobody wants to see manned space flight continue any more
than me. And I think many of my colleagues on this committee
share that belief. But I think, also, in the wake of the
tragedy that we witnessed last February and in wake of the CAIB
report that we have all read that we have to do so--or go
forward with a new sense of purpose and not just sign on to
projects and get behind projects because, well, NASA says that
is the next step so it must be a good idea.
We really have to look at what we are trying to accomplish.
And of course, in saying that, I am talking about the orbital
space plane, because from what I have read and heard, you have
taken Admiral Gehman's recommendation that the Shuttle should
be replaced as the ``Clarion call'' for accelerating
development of the OSP. Is that a fair statement? Am I reading
the reports correctly?
Mr. O'Keefe. It certainly is an option, and it is one that
clearly is observed in the course of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board report as a requirement in order to provide
crew transfer vehicle reliability, if you will, between and to
International Space Station.
Mr. Bell. And that----
Mr. O'Keefe. Accelerating it is going to be a challenging
statement. There is no doubt about it.
Mr. Bell. And that is what I would like to talk to you
about just a little bit today. And let me provide a scenario
for you and see if you could respond to it. And if it is
confusing, I would be glad to repeat it. But if we maintain the
International Space Station until the year 2020 and move toward
a full station complement of six to seven crew members, and
there is no OSP, under those circumstances, what would you
estimate--or how many Shuttle flights would you estimate would
be needed to service the International Space Station until
2020?
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't know. Let me--off the top of my head,
I don't know. Let me get it for you for the record, though. I
just don't recall off the top of my head.
Mr. Bell. Okay. Well, let me just share what staff has
learned and informed us of is that it is somewhere between 60
to 80 flights would be needed, Shuttle flights if that--under
that scenario. Does that strike you as unreasonable?
Mr. O'Keefe. I have no basis to think that it is or it
isn't.
Mr. Bell. Okay.
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't know.
Mr. Bell. And if you look at a different scenario, a little
different angle, let us say you have an orbital space plane in
2010, how many Shuttle flights would be needed to service the
Station until 2020? Under that scenario, do you have any idea?
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't know. I just--again, I would be
guessing, and it would certainly--among the things it would be,
it would certainly be wrong.
Mr. Bell. Well, it surprised me, too, Mr. O'Keefe, because
staff informs that what they have been told by folks who do
know is that you would still need 60 to 80 Shuttle flights,
even with the OSP having been developed. So if we are looking
toward a replacement vehicle, and if those numbers are
accurate, how does the OSP actually replace the Shuttle? What
is that sense of purpose?
Mr. O'Keefe. It supplements the capacity of a cargo-
carrying asset, like Shuttle, what it is, because what we have
designed the requirements to do is two--at least two primary
things. The first one is to perform crew transfer vehicle
function from the Earth's surface to the International Space
Station on a regular routine basis that is a lot less
constricted by the roll out time and--necessary for Shuttle.
That takes 30 to 45 days. You have got to do something that is
a lot more on-demand, if you will, than that.
The second thing it has to have is an expansion of the
launch window. There is currently no real, robust, on-board
propulsion capacity on the Shuttle to permit a launch on almost
any window. You have got to hit that ten-minute parameter
during the course of a day or else you might as well forget it
for the day, because that--unless you hit that exact orbital
maneuver, you are never going to rendezvous with the
International Space Station. So it has got to have some on-
orbit maneuvering capacity to do so.
Mr. Bell. But even with that, wouldn't you still--the point
is, wouldn't you still need the Shuttle until 2020 for the
transport of certain supplies and to service a six or seven-
member crew?
Mr. O'Keefe. For cargo capacity, yes, indeed. It is a--it
is the work horse asset that will provide that capability and
could, either autonomously or with individuals on-board,
astronauts on-board. So there are a lot of ways to look at it.
And there may be other approaches we could use in looking at
cargo-carrying assets. But at least it isolates the question to
that. And once you complete International Space Station, the
next objective, then, is how do you get the down mass necessary
for the science yield that comes off of it, and that doesn't
require nearly as much mass as what the Shuttle can provide. So
in sum, the objective behind the orbital space planes is to
provide the crew rescue capacity, crew transfer vehicle
capacity on a near, on-demand--near, you know--no notice launch
capacity as well as the ability to provide that capability
using modern technology that may inform what the next evolving
generation of capability will be thereafter.
Mr. Bell. And are you--are we married to the idea of
developing the OSP, or are you willing to look at other options
as we move forward?
Mr. O'Keefe. We are headed down the road here, in the
course of the last year, I think at the instruction of lots of
external commentary, to get more precise about what it is we
want to build. While we don't--you know, by no means do I have
a closed mind on this. We are marching down the road towards
trying to develop a crew transfer capability as well as the
crew rescue requirements that will go along with that. And that
is the primary requirement. And if we grow it beyond that to
include a cargo asset, we get back in the same kind of design
predicament that they were in 25 years ago when they settled on
Shuttle and compromised on every one of those requirements by
saying we will do all of them kind of mediocre but none of them
in an exemplary manner. And that is what we don't want to get
into. We would rather have a more limited asset that performs,
in an exemplary manner, one or two of those requirements and
then keep moving our way through this in order to assure that
we not try to pile everything into one asset.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired.
Admiral Gehman, did you have a point that you wish to make?
Admiral Gehman. Well, I just will point out what the report
said, sir, and that is that we suggest that the process that
ought to be followed by the Government of the United States is,
first of all, determine what you want to do. Don't design the
vehicle. Agree on what you want to do. And what we suggest that
concept is that you should separate the crew from the cargo.
And if you do separate the crew from the cargo, is develop the
requirements--the numbers come out for the same number of
Shuttle flights because of the up mass.
But if you put the cargo in a different category, you
wouldn't--then you would not need the Shuttle. But if you--as
long as you have the up mass requirement and you don't have any
other way to get the cargo up there, you have got to keep
flying the Shuttle. So we suggest decide on what you want to
do. Don't design the vehicle. Decide on what you want the
vehicle to do. And what we suggest the answer to that riddle is
separate the crew from the cargo, design a vehicle optimized
for crew, and some way other--some other way to get the cargo
up there.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. The gentleman's
time has expired, but Mr. O'Keefe, I need some clarification
here, because I think you have added a new dimension to the
issue. In response to Mr. Bell's question, you can send the
Shuttle up autonomously, I think that was your word, or with
people. You mean you can send the Shuttle up without people?
Mr. O'Keefe. Under its present configuration, you can't,
but there is--it is not a leap, and it is not a technology
impossibility to design the appropriate technology into the
Shuttle. It is not going to be a major leap to make it an
autonomous capacity to launch it unmanned. Yes. It is
conceivable. It is one of the options we are looking at as part
of the Service Life Extension Program effort that was
introduced last November. Is it the optimum one? Don't know
yet, but it certainly is possible. It can be done. It is
operationally not, you know, prohibited by----
Chairman Boehlert. Well, let me suggest, the Gehman
Commission Board got it exactly right. You have got to decide
what you want to do, then you design the vehicle.
Mr. O'Keefe. Oh, yes, sir. No. No.
Chairman Boehlert. Okay.
Mr. O'Keefe. And we are in the same pew. I mean, there is
no doubt about it. I think exactly the discussion with Mr. Bell
was what we decided is we want to have a crew transfer vehicle.
We want to have the capacity to separate people from cargo,
just exactly what the Board said. And we were down that road as
part of our integrated space transportation plan before. One of
the options to continue to service the cargo requirement is to
continue to use Shuttle either autonomously or with humans. And
there are any number of different ways that you can accomplish
that task for cargo as a separate derivative question. But the
first milestone was, as Admiral Gehman just articulated, the
Board--and the report says to separate the crew from the cargo.
Make the determination. What do you want to do? We have done
that.
That is what OSP is designed to do. And it is intended to
be a crew transfer vehicle and a crew rescue capacity for
people. Cargo assets is a separate question. And we will have
to work through that as we go on. But we have designed the
level one requirements, frankly, on a single sheet of paper to
comply with a very limited number of requirements so that it is
technologically doable.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you.
Mr. Weldon.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you.
Mr. Weldon. The Russian or Soviet side was Igor Kurchatov,
and the two of them in the end of their lives, before they
passed, both said the same thing, and I had the privilege of
talking to Dr. Teller earlier this year, that they only had one
regret, that in the end, that all of their work in physics was
not originally designed to kill people, but rather, for the
peaceful use of nuclear energy for science. And in fact, we are
considering legislation right now, as a part of our defense
bill, to create the Teller-Kurchatov Alliance for Peace, which
would do exactly that.
So, I think it is appropriate that on this committee, we
acknowledge one of America's great leaders who did so much for
our freedom. The passing of Dr. Edward Teller. Mr. Chairman, I
thank you for this hearing. I want to start by thanking both of
our distinguished colleagues for their work. Admiral Gehman, as
you have done throughout your career, and I have seen you many
times on the DOD side, you have performed in an unbelievably
outstanding fashion, and we appreciate that. Many of the
questions have been asked. Administrator O'Keefe, I want to
tell you I admire the work that you have been doing, and I
think you are an outstanding leader under some very difficult,
if not impossible conditions.
I want to acknowledge first of all not just the purpose of
this hearing, but your personal effort to restore the rotocraft
research effort within NASA. That is an issue that I have been
raising all throughout this year, both in this committee and
the Defense Committee. You personally have taken it on within
NASA, and I want to acknowledge the success that you have
achieved, although it is early, and let you know that we
appreciate that work among all of your other tasks and
responsibilities and assignments.
ASAP
I only had two questions that I would either ask you for
the record or to respond to, one you alluded to earlier while I
was here, and both of these involve actions on the part of the
other body, the Senate. One relates to the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel and the recommendations of the Senate, as
opposed to some of the calls by our colleagues for some new,
independent entity, and what your feeling would be toward the
Senate's proposal that we reconfigure that original advisory
panel and perhaps reconstitute it as a way to have the kind of
short and long-term monitoring that is no necessary, as defined
by the report done by the Admiral. And the second is what is
going to be the impact of the $200 million proposed cut by the
Senate appropriators on the human space flight program, so that
we in the House can respond to our Senate counterparts on both
of those issues.
I would ask you to respond either right now or for the
record to this committee, thank you.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, thank you, Congressman, for your very
thoughtful observations, and again, I appreciate your
commentary on the rotocraft effort. We have, indeed, attempted
to work that very hard, and I appreciate your recognition of
it. On the two issues you have raised, the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel, again I was intrigued to read the Committee
report on that matter, that we ought to go back and look at the
original charter and objective that was enacted in statute. The
post-Apollo fire in 1968, by then, the sponsor of the
legislation was then Congressman Don Rumsfeld from Illinois,
and the proposition was to create this particular panel for the
purpose of really having a constant, vigilant oversight, and
therefore, shouldn't we go back to its origins and reconstitute
it for that purpose, and that is a very compelling argument,
one that I am really pretty struck by, because the Congress
enacted that for a reason. We ought to make it perform the way
it is supposed to, and clearly, the performance has been not as
diligent as we could have received, and I think the observation
by the Board is even if it were, we wouldn't have the
disposition to follow it, so we have got to cover both ends of
this particular equation.
The second part is--and I think that is far preferable to
creating yet another oversight function. When the reviewers
outnumber the doers, we are in big trouble. And we are kind of
at the point where it is a foot race, right now, and so we are
trying to, you know, maintain absolutely all the appropriate
oversight necessary, but let us invigorate the ones that are
there, to assure we get the right performance.
Effects of the Proposed $200 Million Cut to Human Space Flight
On the $200 million cut to space flight, I just did see
that the other day, and I can assure you that now is a time
that is going to be incredibly difficult to accommodate
something like that. This--the return-to-flight activity is
going to cost something. It is going to be greater than zero. I
don't know exactly what yet until after we make the selection
of the options on all 29 recommendations and then make a
determination of how much that is going to cost. So surely, it
is going to be greater than what we have already budgeted. I
don't think it is going to be a show stopper, there is nothing
I have seen that looks like--just eyeballing it, it is going to
be ghastly expensive along the way, but it sure is going to be
more difficult if we are starting out in a hole that is $200
million deeper. And so as a consequence, this is an
opportunity, I think, to follow through on the report's
recommendation, too, that Congress be a partner in this
particular equation in helping to kind of set the baseline for
this, and the President's budget is a baseline we think is
properly priced for the International Space Station and for
Shuttle to continue operations, and we would appreciate your
support for that, and I thank you, Mr. Weldon, for your
observations.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. Mr. Miller.
Political Appointees and Bonuses
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. O'Keefe, you have
spoken of the changes in leadership since the Columbia
disaster, and I am very pleased we haven't really spent a lot
of time, because I think, as Admiral Gehman points out, the
career NASA employees were under a great deal of pressure. I
think Admiral Gehman mentioned or spoke of pressures, internal
and external pressures, which I am sure translated, for those
employees, as irreconcilable pressures from above and from
below. But I am very concerned about the kind of forces on NASA
that was being exerted from the top levels. By all accounts, or
evidently, at least before this Columbia disaster, you were
very pleased with the performance of the political appointees
in the Administration. The year before the Columbia disaster,
11 of the 11 political appointees in NASA got performance
bonuses. NAS was the only agency in the Federal Government in
which every political appointee got a performance budget. In
fact, there has been a great deal of criticism for using those
bonuses for political appointees at all, because they are
intended to retain, reward and retain career Federal Government
employees. And this is pretty remarkable for that level of
satisfaction with the performance of those top people in an
agency that now appears to have been mal-managed in many ways.
First of all, are all those 11 still there? When you talked
about the changes in management, are they there, or are some of
them gone, and second, what were the criteria that you used to
judge their performance that all 11 got performance bonuses?
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you for the question. Yes, there are
some folks who have departed, and have withdrawn. And again, as
you properly cite, that was more than a year ago, based on the
prior year's activities of the individual appointees who were
either Schedule C or specific folks that have been appointed by
the President in these chances. I am not one of those. I am not
eligible for any of those, and so therefore, this doesn't
pertain to those who are appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, all right, so that we are not in that
equation. Of the roughly dozen folks you are talking about,
some have left. The criteria that the Chief of Staff to the
President outlined in terms of how that needs to be complied
with were issues that went through very specific acts, things
that folks did in order to earn those performance awards, and
so, in going through that 10 or 11 folks, I could walk you
through each of them in terms of what their individual
performance was that earned them that recognition, and would be
happy to do that, either here or at any other time of your
convenience.
Mr. Miller. Five minutes is probably not enough, but I
would certainly welcome that. But the purpose of having
political appointees is so that an Administration can exert its
control on the various agencies of the Federal Government. I
understand that, I suppose that. You have got to do that to get
control of this huge federal bureaucracy, but certainly, some
of the pressures, some of the forces on NASA that the report
spoke of do appear to be politically driven pressures, budget
pressures. Representative Lofgren asked about those, about the
failure to do the budget for the upgrades that were pointed out
from below that bubbled up, that were needed. Also, the concern
about outsourcing, and that was a criticism made a couple years
before, three years before the Columbia disaster, by the Space
Shuttle Independent Assessment Team, and then, also, was
pointed out by the CAIB Report. The CAIB said that years of
workforce reductions and outsources have culled from NASA's
workforce the layers of experience and hands-on systems
knowledge that once provided a capacity for safe oversight.
Were those considerations, cutting budgets, outsourcing as
much as possible, were those coming from below? Were those part
of what you wanted your political people to be doing in NASA,
and are you still as committed to those considerations, those
forces, as you were?
Mr. O'Keefe. I guess, first of all, as a statistical
matter, we are talking about 10 or 11 folks out of an agency of
about 18,000.
Mr. Miller. Those are the ones that you control.
Mr. O'Keefe. No, those are the ones who were appointed
separately than this career civil service force appointment
system. Several of them were appointed by the previous
Administration, and are still with us, and are doing an
exemplary job, so they are Schedule C appointees per se, but
they not necessarily there because of their political focus of
how to exert policy matter. I think that is a responsibility
for leadership, and it is independent of the question of your
partisan view of these question.
The President has laid out a management agenda with five
primary points to it. That is the understanding, the mantra,
within every agency and department across the Federal
Government. Those are the five that the senior management,
whether they are career appointees, whether they are appointees
of the President of the United States confirmed by the Senate,
or whether they are Schedule C appointees, all of us have an
obligation to pursue those five management goals, and so those,
I think, are independent of the question of your partisan
leaning, or whether or not there is an influence of that
political agenda. There are five basic fundamental management
things that I can think we can all agree to, are the kinds of
things that we need to be cognizant of, and are really
management 101 kind of objectives.
[Material requested for the record follows:]
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired. Just
let me observe that the Gehman Report, some place in there, it
said something to the effect that the budget didn't meet NASA's
ambitions. Now, here is someone who has been very supportive of
the space program and the Shuttle program. But when that
situation occurs, it seems to me that NASA has to tailor its
ambitions to meet the realities of the budget. That does not
mean in any way, shape, or manner that safety is compromised or
sacrificed. It just means it is a wake-up call, and you have
got to deal with the everyday realities.
Mr. O'Keefe. If I could quickly observe, Mr. Chairman, you
know, you are right on the mark. But at the same time, and
there is no question, that does not absolve us whatsoever from
any obligation that we really must balance and make more
prominent the safety objectives over the mission objectives and
so forth. That said, I have never been associated with any
public entity, agency, function, department, anything, in which
all of the aspirations were satisfied with the resources that
were allocated. That is a null set proposition. Never seen it.
I would be delighted to see one the first time.
Chairman Boehlert. No, no, and I know exactly what you are
talking about. I have been around this place a few years, too,
and I have seen some of the same things you have.
Mr. O'Keefe. And I thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. The chair recognizes----
Mr. Hall. Chairman----
Chairman Boehlert.--Mr. Hall.
Budget Cuts
Mr. Hall. I know we have to hurry, because we have three
more and we are going to be voting pretty soon, but it is my
recollection that Vice President Gore, who was in control then
of the space program, or had been assigned that by the
President, told us to cut 25 percent. It has always been my
fear of cutting, because I didn't know where to cut for fear of
safety, but I knew there were those within NASA who knew how
to, and Mr. Sensenbrenner and I, as my recollection went to him
and asked Mr. Goldin to cut it the 25 percent. He could it with
a surgeon's knife, or we would do it with a baseball bat. He
cut it 34 percent, and didn't appear, at that time, to have
done any definite damage to the program. It seemed like a
pretty intelligent cut, but it turned out we have lost a
Shuttle, and we have lost a crew, and I don't know whether you
can tie that to that or not, but those are the hard, cold facts
of the past, and we operated with the facts we had at that
time, and the best information we could get from an entity that
we approved of and that we trusted, and that is NASA, and still
do.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. We learn from the past, but
we prepare for the future. Mr. Nethercutt.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
gentlemen. I am glad to have you here. Let me follow up on that
line of questioning relative to preparing for the future.
Supplemental Request
Mr. O'Keefe, as you look at--as we look at the Return-to-
Flight Program and recommendations in the CAIB Report, and all
that goes with it, and the needs to stress the safety of future
missions and Shuttle operations and the Space Station, it is
going to cost some money. The reprogramming that was requested
earlier, I understand, was not granted. I think it was $1.7
billion earlier this summer. $87 billion is what we are looking
at in the war effort, that the supplemental appropriations will
be presented next week. I am on the Appropriations Committee,
and you have a history of appropriations, I know. I understand
there won't be any request for NASA. I heard your response to
Mr. Weldon, relative to not knowing exactly how much it is
going to cost to return-to-flight, and implement the plan that
is out there. Can you be more specific? I know the Senate's
down $200 million, I mean what--it seems to me you are looking
at bigger numbers, and should, in order to assure safety, but
also, to meet the expectations of the mission that you have in
mind, and that the CAIB Report has in mind.
Mr. O'Keefe. Sir, now thank you for the question. The
answer to how much it is really going to cost us to implement,
on the 29 recommendations that have been made the Board, there
are lots of different options we could choose from to be
compliant with the recommendation. Depending on which we
choose, that is ultimately, then, going to arithmetically give
you the price tag at the end. So rather than start with a
number, and then back into the answer of what the options ought
to be, we are going to the other direction, vetting through
what are the best options we can do, airing with the Stafford-
Covey external review group that I referred to earlier, and
then make a determination on how much it is going to cost based
on that. Based on everything I can see, just again, eyeballing
it, not any scientific or really analytical, there is really
nothing here that looks like it is going to be a major redesign
effort, so the cost involved in those cases is probably going
to be a longer-term thing. Institutionally, when we start this
NASA Engineering and Safety Center, it is going to cost you not
a whole lot to get started, because you are talking about
initial expense for the folks assigned for a very small
fraction of the year, and then, as time goes on, though, that
will escalate, because you have got a full year cost associated
with more people, all that stuff. So really, it is the out year
tails of this, the out year costs and implications, that are
the part we really need to be mindful of.
The initial expense to do this, I don't think is going to
be anything that is really going to really amaze anybody. The
bigger cost is going to be to follow through, for example, on
discussions this committee has had on several occasions, as
well as what this report asserts, which is get on with a crew
transfer vehicle capacity, sooner rather than later. That is
not in the President's budget. What is in the President's
budget right now is an assumption of an Orbital Space Plane
crew transfer vehicle that will be developed and produced
between now and 2010. This is saying step that up and get on
with it, stop, you know, waiting around. That is going to cost,
and it isn't going to be cheap, and whether or not that option
is selected or not by the President is a different question,
and I wouldn't speculate at this juncture exactly how that will
come out.
Mr. Nethercutt. Have you--mindful that the VA/HUD Bill is
headed for conference, have you submitted, or do you intend to
submit any budget requests or alternate budget requests, or
other information that the conferees can take to the conference
and try to help you reach those goals in the next fiscal year?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, there is a number of alternatives, in
terms of avenues, you know, off-ramps that can be pursued here,
either amendment or a supplemental or part of the '05
submission, all of which are on the table right now, and I
wouldn't speculate on which one the President will choose.
Mr. Nethercutt. But my question goes to the next 30 to 45
days.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yeah. I don't--there is nothing there that
will be a show stopper that says if we don't have bucks within
the next 30 to 45 days, we can't do things. There is the '04
Budget, again starting $200 million bucks in a hole would be a
real big problem relative to the President's budget request,
but it is, you know, the resources are sufficient to make the
kind of thoughtful, you know, step by step decisions that we
are looking at right now, and I don't see a real huge bill
requiring emergency, urgent requirement to respond to now.
Mr. Nethercutt. I understand. I guess what I am wanting to
make sure is clear is you don't expect to have any
reprogramming or new budget requests for the fiscal year coming
up that has to be decided in the next 30 to 45 days relative to
the conference between the House and the Senate. Am I right on
that?
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't think so, but you know, again, the way
this deliberative process may come out internal to the
Administration, it is conceivable, but I just think that is an
unlikely prospect, but, you know, we will see. I mean, again, I
don't want to--I just don't want to foreclose any option at the
President's disposal at this point.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Keefe. And thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. I am particularly interested in your
response to that question being the appropriator that he is.
Mr. Nethercutt. Yes indeed.
Chairman Boehlert. The chair recognizes Mr. Nick Smith.
Mr. Nethercutt. Thank you, sir.
Manned vs. Unmanned Space Flight
Mr. Smith of Michigan. Thank you and Mr. Hall for having
this hearing, and gentlemen, thank you for your patience
through all these questions. I know the charge of the CAIB
Report was look at the causes and what can we do to increase
safety. But I want to talk about a larger policy decision in
light of what appears to be a rush back to business as usual,
with a possible March launching date. It seems to me that there
are reasonable arguments why manned space flight should be, in
effect, put on the shelf, and it seems to me this committee,
Mr. Chairman, this nation, needs to evaluate where we go--where
we are going, what we want to accomplish, what should be the
role of unmanned space flight. We already know that we have the
technology to Shuttle some of the accommodations for the Space
Station with robotics, with unmanned flight. We know that with
new technology, nanotechnology, microtechnology, we have the
capacity to more efficiently explore outer space than with
manned space flight, and so I guess part of my question is is
by setting the goal of a March launch date, it almost feels
like business as usual at NASA. The CAIB Report cited
unreasonable expectations for the Shuttle program, both by
Congress and NASA as one of the factors that detracted from the
attention of some of the safety concerns.
Last week, Admiral Gehman, you told us, that the committee,
that NASA has a history of promising more than it can
accomplish. I am very concerned about trying to charge--what
appears to be a charging ahead to keep going with the March
launch date. If it is successful, then there is going to be
some kind of an impression that things are good again, and we
can continue the program as-is.
And Administrator O'Keefe, you have said the Shuttle will
not return to flight until it is fit to fly, but with the
target date for six months away, I am concerned that adequate
consideration of that is not going to be made. So first, Mr.
O'Keefe, you have been quite supportive of unmanned space
flight and exploration for the accommodations that it can make,
but don't you believe we need to more deeply discuss what our
goals are, and what can be accommodated by manned space flight
versus unmanned space flight, versus some of this money going
into additional ground research. I chaired the Research
Subcommittee, and where are going to get our best bang for the
buck on scientific research?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Now, I appreciate the question and
thank you. Please let me reassure you there is just no question
we are going to follow this implementation plan and assure that
we have achieved these milestones, and when we have done so,
when those milestones are met, that is when we are fit to fly.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. No, but what I hear you saying, you
are going on with space--manned space flight as usual, with the
same kind of priorities as before.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, in part, in response, as we have
discussed with--Congressman Ehlers went down a very thoughtful
path with this as well, which is that this the means by which
we facilitate the completion of the International Space Station
to yield the science objectives that can only be accomplished
in that microgravity condition. Can't duplicate that anywhere
else. We can do it for a very short span of time, but we can't
sustain it the way that exists as----
Mr. Smith of Michigan. To my knowledge, there hasn't been a
good quantitative evaluation of what can be accomplished with
robotics and nanotechnology to accommodate a lot of this
research that is being conducted. Testimony in my--in our
Research Subcommittee over the past five years indicate that a
lot of it can be more effectively, more efficiently done with
unmanned space flight, especially for outer space exploration,
but also for the scientific experiments that have been
conducted.
Having high schools design scientific experiments is not
the kind of research. It adds excitement, but it doesn't
accommodate the kind of research goals that I think we should
be setting.
Mr. O'Keefe. But that is not the dominant priority of what
goes aboard. I mean, I take your point, and it is very well-
taken, and it is a thoughtful approach, but it--nonetheless, in
those kinds of scientific objectives, that is again referred
to, this is one acronym I had never heard until I went to NASA.
It is referred to as gas can experiments. And I said what the
hell is a gas can? Well, it is a getaway special, in other
words, additional room, that is it, you got a spot over in the
corner, put it in there. The primary focus of what goes aboard
Shuttle on the way to station, utilizing that is the
microgravity condition for biological and physical research and
some materials research that can't be done anywhere else.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. Well, that is what you are saying,
but I think we need a better evaluation, a better study,
because that is contrary to some other testimony we have heard.
Mr. Chairman, a quick question to Admiral Gehman.
Mr. O'Keefe. Sorry.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. And that is----
Chairman Boehlert. Make it quick.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. In the 1960s with the Apollo fire,
we set up the Advanced Safety Advisory Panel. Should that be
changed, enhanced, if it is going to continue?
Admiral Gehman. The answer to your question is the Board
believes that a periodic review of NASA's implementation does
need to be done. We don't have an opinion on what is the best
committee to do that. We recommended that as one of several
options.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. Mr. Lamar Smith.
RTF Costs and Schedule
Mr. Smith of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. O'Keefe,
did I understand you correctly a few minutes ago, when you said
you did not feel that the resumption of the Shuttle program
would lead to greater costs this year compared to the greater
outlying cost?
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't see the additional cost in this fiscal
year coming, in '04----
Mr. Smith of Texas. Right.
Mr. O'Keefe.--as being exorbitantly more expensive than
what we have seen in the past. These--this is no substantial
hardware redesign required here.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Right. Right. But I assume that there
were still--that there are still unanticipated costs----
Mr. O'Keefe. Oh, yeah.
Mr. Smith of Texas.--of making the Shuttle safer----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Smith of Texas.--that it--okay----
Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Now----
Mr. O'Keefe. That was a very narrow answer to the question
of '04----
Mr. Smith of Texas. Right.
Mr. O'Keefe.--that Mr. Nethercutt's request of do we see
anything that needs to be acted on in the next 30 to 45 days
for this coming fiscal year----
Mr. Smith of Texas. Right.
Mr. O'Keefe.--and the answer is I don't see it happening--
--
Mr. Smith of Texas. I understand.
Mr. O'Keefe.--in that narrow time window.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Well, given the unanticipated cost, and
given that you haven't requested a substantial increase in the
budget, what programs are, then, going to be cut to transfer or
to allow for the funding of making the Space Shuttle program
safer.
Mr. O'Keefe. The first step has got to be to look at the
recommendations, determine what options we choose, to
implement----
Mr. Smith of Texas. But you have admitted there is going to
be additional costs. I am just wondering what other programs
are going to have to----
Mr. O'Keefe. Haven't identified any at this time to be the
bill-payers.
Mr. Smith Texas. Will there be some other programs that
will be cut a result?
Mr. O'Keefe. It could very well be that there is additional
funding requested. I don't want to preclude the President's
option on any count.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Okay. Thanks. My next question is if
you don't make the March deadline, and I hesitate to use that
word deadline, which is--has a negative connotation these days,
but if you don't make that, what is your backup plan to
complete the Space Station and to maintain the Hubble
Telescope?
Mr. O'Keefe. Again, we will fly when we are fit to fly and
the milestones are achieved. In order to achieve----
Mr. Smith of Texas. Yeah.
Mr. O'Keefe.--that set of recommendations before return-to-
flight. There are several different launch windows that would
permit that, and we need to flexible enough to accommodate that
to assure optimum safety.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Thank you. But my question really went,
though, if you don't make the deadline, if you don't make the
March deadline, or a subsequent deadline, and make that open
window, then what plans do you have to maintain the Space
Station or the Hubble--or--either the Space Station or the
Hubble Telescope?
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, I am sorry sir. I misunderstood.
The current activity we are engaged in to maintain the Station
in its present configuration is the Russian Soyuz capsule, as
well as the Russian Progress Logistics Resupply Capsules. The
International Space Station Partnership of 16 countries have
done an impressive job of maintaining that----
Mr. Smith of Texas. They will continue to pick up the slack
on----
Mr. O'Keefe. That is the anticipation, and as recently as a
month ago, that seems to be the disposition on the part of all
the partners.
Hubble
Mr. Smith of Texas. And then what about the Hubble?
Mr. O'Keefe. The next servicing mission was planned to be
in late Fiscal Year '04, early '05, and we will have to assess
exactly when is the earliest opportunity when we will be able
to----
Mr. Smith of Texas. Okay.
Mr. O'Keefe.--to do that next servicing mission of Hubble.
Mr. Smith of Texas. So, even if the Shuttle doesn't stay
within that March goal, you still think you will have
sufficient time to service the Hubble even if you don't make
the March deadline?
Mr. O'Keefe. We will have to see. I don't want to kid you
on this, and I don't want to deceive you. I don't know what the
consequences will be with all the different program impacts, as
we move down the road for the unknowns of what it is going to
take to implement what is necessary to do this safely. I don't
know.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Okay. Thank you, Mr. O'Keefe. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Keefe. No, thank you, Congressman. I appreciate your
questions.
Schedule Pressure
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. That completes
round one. We are advised that momentarily we will have a
series of votes on the floor, and that will draw the hearing to
a logical conclusion, because it is unfair to ask you to wait
while we go over to the floor, and some of the games we play
over there with procedural motions and things like that, but
let us go to round two right away.
Mr. O'Keefe, I want to get back to a question I asked
earlier about scheduling and the pace of schedule. The Young
Commission determined that not more than four flights could
occur in a year. Do you agree with that?
Mr. O'Keefe. No, they started that as a working assumption
of what----
Chairman Boehlert. Yeah.
Mr. O'Keefe.--that couldn't occur, but that was their
working assumption of what would occur. They argued that the
sequence of the deployment ought to be based on the systems
integration schedule, and----
Chairman Boehlert. And are you still assuming that four
flights a year will occur?
Mr. O'Keefe. It is four to five.
Chairman Boehlert. All right, and the scheduling of four to
five flights a year, but in the next year, we are talking about
scheduling four flights between mid-March and mid-December. Is
that consistent with the basic recommendation of the Young
Commission, and how can NASA expect to function with fewer than
two months between launches?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, it is consistent with the Young
Commission, the Young Panel's view, which is to build a Space
Station at the optimum systems integration schedule that you
can achieve, in other words, send the modules and the
components up when they are necessary to fit into the array
that they ought to be. Whether or not this is an achievable
schedule or not, we will see. We will see what is dictated by
the implementation of each of those milestones, and we will
adjust it accordingly in order----
Chairman Boehlert. Well, Young was pre-Columbia and pre-
Gehman, and there are a lot of changes that are, you know, 15
hard recommendations that we have embraced totally, you have
embraced totally. You have got to address them.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. That is prior to return-to-flight.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. There are going to be a lot--there are a
lot of sort of turmoil if you will, or activity is a better
choice of word, and a lot of change going on.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. And you know, if we have got the
schedule pressure that everyone is concerned about, and you
share that concern----
Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Chairman Boehlert. As Admiral Gehman and everybody on the
Commission acknowledge, you have to have targets, you have to
have goals, and all that sort of thing, but undue pressure is
something else altogether. With all this change occurring to
address those 15 specific points, and the reorganization and
the culture being addressed, how can you even hope to have a
schedule that has four flights from March to December of next
year?
Mr. O'Keefe. We may not achieve that. What is--again, we
are trying to reconcile is, let us get the optimum systems
integration schedule that the Young Panel called for, because
we have got all the material stacked up at the Kennedy Space
Center. It is ready to go. But at the same time, not press the
schedule to achieve that simply because we have to. We have got
to make sure that the safety objectives, all the things, the
findings in the report are done, and we will do this at a pace
in which that balance is attained, and if we have to adjust
that schedule, so be it, and the message I got from this
discussion, as well as from the report, and several discussions
with Admiral Gehman is, we have to make sure every person in
this Agency, down to the guy turning the wrench, knows that
that schedule is flexible, in order to understand what the
safety imperatives are.
At the same time, we have got to also look at what do we do
to build the International Space Station. That is an imperative
that everybody has leveled, and so, as a consequence, we are
moving in that direction, but not at the expense of any
schedule objective. When we can fly, that is when we will fly.
Chairman Boehlert. I think it might be more realistic to
make an adjustment earlier rather than later, but----
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, Mr. Chairman, if you would--you are
raising a very important point as to whether you do it in front
or in back. One way you tease out or bring out the issues of
what are impediments to attaining some set of mission
objectives is to lay out what is the optimum systems
integration schedule, and then have folks contest as to why you
can't achieve it. The point that I think that the Board made is
listen to them, and incorporate that in your scheduling
activity. I got that message, and that is exactly what we have
got to do, but that doesn't mean you go abandon the approach
that says this is an optimum systems integration schedule that
the Young Panel spent all its time working on, and then just
throw that out and say well, we have got a launch going,
anything we want to go in the back. But----
Chairman Boehlert. Well, all right----
Mr. O'Keefe.--that is not----
Chairman Boehlert.--we could have this----
Mr. O'Keefe.--throwing the stuff----
Chairman Boehlert.--discussion all day long, but----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert.--the fact of the matter is you are not
going to snap your fingers and just develop the type of culture
that Gehman----
Mr. O'Keefe. That is true.
Chairman Boehlert.--and Congress and everybody wants, and
you yourself have acknowledged you want.
Mr. O'Keefe. That is true.
Chairman Boehlert. And it seems to me it would ease the
pressure on scheduling if we were a little bit more realistic
in looking at next year, and not scheduling four flights
between March and December, but it is a which came first----
Mr. O'Keefe. I got it. I got it.
Chairman Boehlert.--the chicken or the egg type of thing.
Mr. O'Keefe. I got the message and I appreciate that,
Chairman.
Hubble
Chairman Boehlert. In my few remaining seconds left, let me
ask you about the Hubble Telescope figuring into NASA's return-
to-flight plans. Will the Hubble take a back seat to the
Station even though it is far more important to science?
Mr. O'Keefe. I certainly hope not, and that is not our
intention. There is going to be some challenges to the next
Hubble servicing mission, given the fact that there is no means
for that mission to then dock with the International Space
Station if there is a problem, and that is one of the issues
called out in the report. So we are going to have to work
through that, and that is--our intention is not to sacrifice
the continuing viable operations of Hubble for more convenient
missions. That is not the objective at all, but we are----
Chairman Boehlert. When do you anticipate or project the
next Hubble launch, Hubble-dedicated launch?
Mr. O'Keefe. Gosh, I have forgotten the date. It was
scheduled for--before the accident, early '05, and it is--I
have just forgotten now.
Chairman Boehlert. Okay, but it is not one of the '04----
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't believe so.
Chairman Boehlert.--objective, okay.
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't believe so.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. Mr. Gordon.
Mr. O'Keefe. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple quick
questions. Mr. O'Keefe, you have stated on a number of
occasions that you want to embrace all of the recommendations
of the Gehman Board, and one of those recommendations, as
Admiral Gehman has pointed out today, was that we have national
goals, more specifically, what do we want to do in space, and
what are we prepared to pay for. Is that a goal that you hope
to have an answer to when they come back in a year and do their
snapshot?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Stafford/Covey
Mr. Gordon. Good. Thank you. And Admiral Gehman, this
sounds sort of, I guess, a little bit deja vu, the Return-to-
Flight Task Force is a--I think a good faith effort by Mr.
O'Keefe to try to get, as he says, some new eyes to look on
your recommendations in return-to-flight, but when you look at
this, you see this is a commission that was recruited by the
Administrator, appointed by the Administrator, reports to the
Administrator, many have economic ties to NASA. One of the vice
chairman, who I am sure is a very honorable person I don't
know, and very able, but is a vice chairman of the largest
contractor with NASA. What advice would you have for this group
in terms of, with your experience, of you know, trying to get
it right, as well as give the public the confidence that it is
going to be done properly.
Admiral Gehman. Mr. Gordon, I have, both myself and the
Board has had several interactions with the Stafford-Covey
Return-to-Flight Group, and we have told them in the strongest
possible terms what our concerns are, where the pitfalls are,
where the shortcuts might be taken, and we have found them to
be very aggressive. They actually had--they actually came back
at us, why didn't you do this, why didn't you do that? They
actually had other things, so I--they are very independent,
very aggressive. I have confidence they will do a great job,
and my advice is just to--just watch over it, and I am
confident in them.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. That it? Mr. Rohrabacher.
Alternative Access to Station
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to thank you for your leadership again. I would like to
thank your staff for the hard work that they have been putting
in to putting this meeting together today, and I think that we
have--this has been a very invaluable effort, and we all
profited from it. There is some specific--something specific I
would like to ask Mr. O'Keefe in terms of some problematic
areas here, but let me just say that overall, if anything has
come out of this hearing, it seems to be that there needs to be
a vision statement by the President of the United States, and I
would--I don't want to speak for the whole Committee here, but
I would suggest that the message of this hearing is loud and
clear to us that the President of the United States needs to
act, needs to give a vision statement, needs to give some
personal direction. I would recommend that on December 17, that
he be down in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, or some other venue,
at the 100th anniversary of human flight, to give us a
statement of the United States of America and perhaps all of
humankind on what our goals should be for human space flight in
the future, and I think that would be appropriate, and I think
that this--after hearing the testimony today, everybody is
calling out for some leadership from the White House on this,
and I think that the 100th anniversary of manned flight would
be a very good forum for that.
But with that said, I would like to ask you some--a couple
specifics. Especially--it seems disturbing to me again, we are
talking about mindset as being a major cause for this accident.
If anything came out of this--mindset--foam can't be a threat
was a mindset in NASA that contributed to the factor. Then, the
schedule should not be hurt because of something that is not a
threat was also a mindset, and so we see how those two mindsets
worked together to cause this tragedy. There seems to be
another mindset at NASA, and that is we need to get back to
flight as soon as possible, and I keep hearing even though
safety is going to be taken into consideration, but there are
other options. There are other options to bringing back the
Shuttle, and Mr. O'Keefe, I understand that resupply flights
being--bringing food and water and propellant and other things
to the Space Station, not people, can be done by alternatives,
by our partners, or by alternative--private sector
alternatives, yet NASA seems to be saying that they are going
to bring the--take the Shuttle up to help resupply the Space
Station. What is going on here? Is this another mindset?
Mr. O'Keefe. No, sir. I hope not. The approach that we
are--been using since the accident, in supporting the Space
Station, is to use the Russian Progress vehicles.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Mr. O'Keefe. Which incorporates, and has the capacity----
Mr. Rohrabacher. But Mr. O'Keefe, I'm talking about your
plan----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher.--in the near future.
Mr. O'Keefe. I apologize.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Mr. O'Keefe. Just let me finish that last sentence.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Keefe. It has--the Progress flights can carry a small
fraction of what Shuttle can, so the issue is not resupply, it
is how do you use that capability for the science objectives.
We are really maintaining right now.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Mr. O'Keefe. And I apologize. You were going to go on to--
--
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, I would suggest that the figures I
have seen is that the Space Station can be resupplied by the
Russians and by private sector alternatives that are out there,
and yet, it seem to me you are telling us that the Shuttle will
be assigned to carry supplies to the Space Station.
Mr. O'Keefe. Let me go back and take a look at that based
on what your findings are on what it is we could do without
Shuttle----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Mr. O'Keefe.--to maintain logistics, resupply, science, all
the things, and by the way, get the modules up there, too.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Mr. O'Keefe. If we have got other alternatives to Shuttle
to do that----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. Well, I am not suggesting that. I
am suggesting that there are certain missions for the Shuttle
that can only be done by Shuttle, and need to be done by
Shuttle in terms of finishing the Space Station, but those
missions that do not need to be done by Shuttle should not be
done by them, and it seems to me that NASA, by pressuring out,
by actually holding off alternative access to the Station in
terms of the private sector, and by our Space Station partners
in Russia, have made it--are trying to maneuver a greater
dependency on Shuttle than we need to have. Now, Mr.--Admiral
Gehman, I asked you this at the first hearing. It is--is it not
your finding that the Space Station should be resupplied, if
possible, by--not by the Shuttle, but by other sources?
Admiral Gehman. In the mid-term, yes, sir. As soon as
possible, it should be the policy of the United States to do
cargo by some other means.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, so let me put that on the record,
Mr. Gehman. I would hope that as soon as possible, and that
means if there is another alternative, it should be used,
rather than the Shuttle. It is risky other--too risky
otherwise. The Shuttle can be done for those things that only
the Shuttle can do. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. The gentleman's time has
expired. Mr. Hall.
Interagency Working Group Participants
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief again. I used most
of my time to ask my question, and gave you the chance to
answer it with a yes or a no. It took a little longer to say
yes than it did no, and you gave me a yes, and I appreciate it.
I wanted to ask a question from Mr. Lampson to where we can get
this on the record. He is not here. I think you overanswered
this question, but you didn't actually directly answer it,
because he wanted a name or a position or something as to who
he could talk to. A little girl went to her mama when she was
12 years old and said Mom, I have got to ask you a question,
where did I come from, and the mother said oh, my God, this is
the time I have got to give an answer and took an hour to
answer her, you know, and she said well, I just wondered,
Johnny said he came from Chicago. So I want a straight answer,
and if it is I came from Chicago, why give it to me, but this
White House set up, and if it is--if you give me a General Haig
answer, like ``I am in charge here,'' you may be the one. But
he wants to know. He is dying to know. He is probably upstairs
crying now because you didn't--you wouldn't tell him, or Dial-
a-Prayer, or something. I don't know what he is doing, but we--
the White House set up the interagency team, or interagency
review, and you must have talked to somebody, so let me make it
simple. Did you talk to the President? I know his name. I can
give him that name.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall. And then he is in charge really, just really, but
then, the Vice President----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall.--is--has he been----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall.--designated?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, he is definitely involved.
Mr. Hall. All right, and how about Andrew Card?
Mr. O'Keefe. Peripherally, yes.
Mr. Hall. Karl Rove?
Mr. O'Keefe. No.
Mr. Hall. I will scratch him off of here. Don Evans?
Mr. O'Keefe. No, he is--the Commerce department
representatives are, though.
Mr. Hall. Okay. Oh, and you know, like the former President
put the Vice President in charge, overseeing kind of.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall. Do we have anybody like that that is overseeing
interagency review?
Mr. O'Keefe. It is being set up through the usual policy
operation----
Mr. Hall. And who do you----
Mr. O'Keefe.--there isn't----
Mr. Hall.--no one kind of directing that are going to.
Mr. O'Keefe. There is not a permanent chair. There is not
someone yet. Maybe there is--will be one, maybe not. But again,
the objective is coordinate all of those opinions, advice, and
offer them to the President for his judgment.
Mr. Hall. Okay, all I can tell him is that Karl Rove is not
one of them.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, no, I think you can say me.
Mr. Hall. Okay.
Mr. O'Keefe. I am a member of that----
Mr. Hall. Yeah.
Mr. O'Keefe. I am a party to it. I am involved in all these
discussions. Certainly, the President's Science Advisor, Dr.
Jack Marburger, as well as other members of the Administration
as necessary to offer the views to the President on where we
ought to go with this particular process. If he wants to
communicate with the Vice President on his--or anybody does,
those are the kinds of things that I think we are all looking
forward to hearing inputs on that point. I am not trying to be
coy or cute with this, it is just not a--there is no committee,
per se, there is not--it is the same kind of process that you
use on this committee in consultation with your staff and other
Members. There is nothing formalized about it. It occurs----
Mr. Hall. There should be and there will be, won't--there
is somebody who will finally have the final answer, the final
say, we don't have to come to the President with everything we
want to know about it.
Mr. O'Keefe. It will be framed up in a set of options in
which the President will then have an opportunity to choose
where he wants to go.
Mr. Gordon. All right. And you promise me you will tell my
friend Mr. Lampson when that happens, won't you?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Mr. Gordon. Back.
Mr. O'Keefe. And you, sir. Thank you very much. And I am
from Chicago.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Barton.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I didn't say this at
the start of my question round, but I want everybody to know,
especially the Administrator and Admiral Gehman, I am a
supporter of the U.S. space program, and I am specifically a
supporter of the manned space program for the United States. So
I am not anti-space, and I am not anti-NASA, and I am not anti-
O'Keefe, but I am anti using the Shuttle to put Americans at
risk. If you will look back there on that wall, on that left
corner, that gentleman's name is Olin E. Teague. He was a tank
commander for General Patton in World War II. He came back to
College Station at the end of the war, introduced Dwight David
Eisenhower to about 30,000 veterans at the football stadium,
Kyle Field, and announced that he was going to run for
Congress, and he didn't even have an opponent. He later became
Chairman of the Veterans Committee, he became Chairman of the
Science Committee, and he and a guy named Lyndon Johnson were
the two guys that kind of put the muscle behind John Kennedy's
vision of putting a man on the Moon by the end of the 1960s.
After he left Congress, Phil Gramm became the Congressman for
the Sixth District, and after Phil Gramm became the Senator
from Texas, I became the Congressman for the Sixth District, so
I have a history in the space program, and I want it to
continue, but I believe if we could go from John Glenn in the
Mercury Program going around the Earth, first American to orbit
the Earth in February of 1962 to Neil Armstrong becoming the
first American to step foot on the Moon in July of 1969, that
is seven years. That is seven years, where we had no
technology, and we just had a vision. We can surely come up
with a space plane that puts Americans into space safely and a
way to get the cargo up to the space station in less than six
or seven years.
OSP
Now, here is my question. If we direct you, we being the
United States Congress and the President, if we were to direct
NASA to build a new space plane or a crew capsule that was just
manned-specific, no cargo other than the necessary elements for
to protect the crew and sustain them as they go to the Space
Station, how long would that take? If money was no object and
we just said do it, you know, how long would that take?
Mr. O'Keefe. Based on the inquiries of this committee over
the course of the last several months of saying what would it
take to accelerate the Orbital Space Plane to 2008, it is
conceivable. It can be done.
Mr. Barton. So you think five years.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barton. In a crash program, high priority, that is
going to take you five years.
Mr. O'Keefe. Matter of fact, the pace in which this works
is pretty brisk, but I would hardly call it crash. It is not a
24/7----
Mr. Barton. I don't--maybe I shouldn't use crash.
Mr. O'Keefe. No, no, but----
Mr. Barton. High priority.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yeah. Exactly. I understand your point. It is
a very attentive program, it is going to have a lot of folks
attached to it, and you bet, within five years, we should be
able--if we stick to the level 1 requirements that we have
levied, and said here are the things we want it to do, the
working assumption is we could attain that within five years.
Mr. Barton. All right, now, what would it take and how long
would it take if we also directed you to retrofit the three
remaining orbiters for cargo only, as you--I think you and the
Admiral said, autonomous operation, how long would that take
and what would that cost? If you were directed, not given a----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yeah.
Mr. Barton.--go study the dadgum thing, we just told you do
it.
Mr. O'Keefe. Don't know with precision, but certainly, a
lot less time than that.
Mr. Barton. Two years?
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't recall, but let me get back to you for
sure----
Mr. Barton. Can you have your----
Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely.
Mr. Barton.--experts----
Mr. O'Keefe. I will give you a call this afternoon.
Mr. Barton. Get the Chairman----
Mr. O'Keefe. I will call you this afternoon.
Mr. Barton.--an answer.
Mr. O'Keefe. I will call you this afternoon.
Mr. Barton. And do you know what is--do you know what--give
me an approximate cost number.
Mr. O'Keefe. Don't know.
Mr. Barton. Now, if we direct you to do these things, to
make it a high priority to build a new crew capsule, and to
make it a high priority to convert the three orbiters to cargo
only, would NASA be amenable if we put that in a supplemental
spending bill, so we did it outside of the normal budget
process, and if you were cooperating with us in your meeting
the Gehman Report estimates and all that, you tell us what it
is going to cost, give us a program that we sign off on, and we
put it in a supplemental so that it doesn't come out of your
existing budget, what is your reaction to that?
Mr. O'Keefe. Be happy to provide whatever advice or
commentary, costing, whatever the Committee needs on an issue
like that. The President's budget position, the way it is----
Chairman Boehlert. Would the gentleman yield for a second?
Mr. Barton. Be happy to yield.
Chairman Boehlert. Would you also include in whatever
analysis you give what we would do with the Hubble, how we
would service the Hubble? Admiral?
Admiral Gehman. Sir, don't forget to include in your
estimates that when you build a crew transport capsule, that
you also are going to have to get some kind of propulsion
system to get up there. And just sticking this thing on the top
of a Delta Four is not going to do it.
Mr. Barton. I am not the expert on how to do it, but I
strongly believe until people like us and the President tell
you what to do, you are going to be walking in the--you are
going to wander around in the wilderness.
Mr. O'Keefe. I am with you, but just in--remember there are
there two parts to it.
Mr. Barton. I understand that. I yield back my time.
Mr. O'Keefe. And in fairness, again, the answer of five
years can't be attained if you are talking about getting up
there by a different launch system.
Mr. Barton. Well, of course, I have--my--that caveat is a
show stopper.
Chairman Boehlert. Your time--you still have time.
Mr. Barton. My premise is different than anybody on this
panel. My premise is not one more American is going to go
strapped in a Shuttle. You know, if I can stop it, I am going
to stop it. I am just not--I am not going to play that game any
more. I have watched 14 Americans get killed, and I am--I have
had with that. But I also, since I support the space program
and manned space component of the space program for the United
States, I have an obligation to come up with an alternative
that still lets us operate the Space Station, but gives us a
new capability, and hopefully, get a new vision like President
Kennedy gave to the American people in the 1960s, and
Congressman Hall was very polite in his questions about who
have we got to talk to, you got to talk to, but all those
people that he mentioned by name are personal friends of mine,
and I am talking to them, and I am even talking to Karl Rove,
even though he is not on his list, and I think what
Congressman----
Mr. Hall. I may have missed the most important one.
Mr. Barton. Yeah, what Laura--you didn't put Laura Bush on
that list. And she is probably----
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Barton. So anyway. I apologize to Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Accountability
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
thank Mr. O'Keefe and Admiral Gehman for their patience. We
have run about 50 miles since I last saw you between meetings,
and I thought it was very important to come back to raise a
number of questions, and I think it is important to note that
Members are on this Science Committee because there is a degree
of passion and commitment, and every Member's inquiry is an
important inquiry, and so I appreciate your patience and you
were trying to be responsive to my inquiries, and I thank you
for the thoroughness in which you offered it, which I would not
have wanted to interfere with your expressing unto the best of
your ability the answers to my questions, and so I respect you
for that and I thank you, and would not in any way suggest that
you should not have the opportunity to continue on your answers
as I would likewise for my fellow colleagues on this committee.
My work is serious here, and I think it is important that
we try to find solutions. That is why we are here. So I have
four questions that tie in to the original line of reasoning
that I offered in the earlier series of questions. The first
one that I was attempting to seek a response as we were
concluding is to secure and enlist the collaboration of NASA on
the issue of anti-retaliation legislation or policies, and my
simple question to you, will you work with us on this issue of
putting a new light, a new atmosphere into NASA with actual
procedures, and we may engage you on legislation, but we are
going to be very thoughtful. Would you help us with that?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. On the issue of individuals who were held
accountable, you gave me who was moved. Do you have the numbers
of individuals who were terminated, pursuant to any actions or
inaction that might have occurred around Columbia 7, and again,
I have said numbers versus names.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, just off the top of my head, there are at
least three who have departed the Agency.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In their own way, as someone would say,
not necessarily through termination.
Mr. O'Keefe. Correct.
ISS Safety
Ms. Jackson Lee. And that I will want to pursue with both
of you, maybe in some other discussions about that structure.
The other question is related to the International Space
Station, and my discomfort with--and I am going to tie two
questions into that, my discomfort with whether or not the
Space Station is safe, whether or not, in all that we have
done, have we included, just to be safe, embraced the Space
Station, and I mentioned this return-to-flight issue, and I am
not sure whether it covers the Space Station, but again, what
struck me, start the review of the several thousand waivers of
Shuttle safety requirements to determine whether they were
justified, and I would like both you and Admiral Gehman to just
refer that, even though that is not your report, Admiral
Gehman, but I guess it is responding to your report, my last
point is, just to follow up my good friend from Texas, he wants
$30 billion more I last heard from him, and so he knows that I
am very supportive of Congressman Barton's effort to secure
more dollars that will hopefully embrace the word safety. I
think there is no NASA without safety. There is no tribute or
respect to those who lost their lives without safety, but the
Orbital Space vehicle, I understand you want to put it on an
Atlas or a Delta launch. What is the comparison of safety, it
is my understanding that that success rate, you might tell me,
is worse than or no better than the Shuttle, or we are not
getting any--gaining anything by using it in that way, and I
would like to be informed on that. If you could answer those
questions, I would greatly appreciate it, and I will look
forward to working with you on the anti-retaliation effort.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you very much, and you as well. I mean,
am committed to doing that. We want to be sure that there is no
one in this Agency who feels like they can't speak up, and that
if they do, that there is consequences for their opinion having
been offered. It is, I think, a profound observation in this
report that not only did the members say that they had
investigated that behavior, but that they witnessed it
themselves, and that is unacceptable under any circumstances,
so we are committed to assuring that does not happen. And there
is a lot of ways we got to go about doing it, and I want to
work with you to find acceptable ways to do that.
On the second issue of--it really cuts to the inquiry and
the dialogue we had on the Independent Technical Authority on
the waivers, which is--I think you can accomplish several
things that the Board recommended by procedural change that we
really have to figure out what the appropriate options are, but
it first starts with the proposition that the Board articulated
very forcefully with no ambiguity, which is to sever, separate,
remove, get out of the Program Management Team, the functions
related to specifications and configuration control from the
program management imperatives of day in and day out cost/
schedule operational imperatives, hiring people, bringing folks
in, getting talent. So that first step, I think we need to make
sooner rather than later. The time is now, because focus and
attention is on it, and we need to come to closure on a number
of very thoughtful ways to go about achieving that objective
organizationally, but we have got to pick one and pick one
sooner rather than later. Then, the step becomes justify the
waiver authorities you may be looking at, because now you have
an organizational entity that has the capacity to push back and
say prove to me, or demonstrate to me why such a requirement
needs to be waived, versus telling me it is just a neat goal
that we would like to attain in order to achieve that task.
Lastly, on your questions about the expendable launch
vehicle, that is the only way that anyone now knows how to get
folks off this rock and into space. If there is another idea
that comes up on how to achieve that, we are all ears, but it
is the only we know of right now to make it happen, and if that
is an unacceptable approach, we've got to move away from all
that and give this up, and that is an acceptable answer to some
Members, but to others, it would be viewed as just not
feasible, because there is--until we mature some of the other
technologies of how to do it, chemical propulsion is where we
have been stuck for 40 years, and we are trying to get out of
that, and I commend the Committee and the Congress for having
stood up to the efforts to try to diminish the Project
Prometheus efforts, which is the first serious effort to get
out from underneath that challenge.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. O'Keefe and
Admiral Gehman. To show you how much influence we have over the
House, they waited until we had the last word in this committee
before scheduling any votes in this very busy--I wish on behalf
of the entire Committee to salute both of you for your
continued cooperation through this whole very difficult
process, and for your outstanding contributions to finding out
what went wrong, so we can fix it and get on with the program.
Thank you all very much. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
Q1. According to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report NASA
assigned a working group an action to resolve the foam issue after STS-
112. How far along was the assignment at the time of the Columbia
accident? Are there any written materials that were produced as a
result of this assignment? Who was responsible for this assignment? Are
the individuals responsible for carrying out this assignment also
involved in the return-to-flight efforts?
A1. The Lockheed Martin Chief Engineer was responsible for authorizing
the preparation of a change proposal to the Space Shuttle Program
Requirements Control Board (PRCB) following STS-112. The PRCB issued
Action Item S062151 to determine the cause of the bipod ramp foam loss
on STS-112 and to suggest corrective actions. At the time of Columbia,
the Action Item team had identified the probable foam loss mechanism
and was in the process of formulating recommendations to eliminate this
mechanism. The work status for these corrective actions was to be
presented to the PRCB in early February 2003. The individuals
responsible for this action are still with the program and are involved
in the ongoing bipod ramp redesign effort for return-to-flight.
Q2. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that NASA
``initiate an aggressive program to eliminate all External Tank Thermal
Protection System debris-shedding.'' NASA's current Return-to-Flight
plan indicates that it ``Will evaluate the potential for debris loss in
all areas,'' but does not identify acreage foam as one of the areas for
study despite the fact that small flakes of acreage foam are shed on
every flight. What is NASA's current understanding of the threat posed
by acreage foam? What analysis is that based on? Is NASA going to
examine concepts to eliminate shedding of acreage foam? If not, please
explain the rationale.
A2. The NASA Return-to-Flight Planning Team is overseeing parallel
efforts that will characterize the types of debris (including External
Tank [ET] foam) that can lead to critical damage to the Orbiter during
launch, and the mitigation strategies necessary to prevent the
generation of this kind of critical debris. Full-scale impact testing
of reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) and tile continues at the Southwest
Research Institute in order to gather data and validate computer models
of the vulnerability of the Orbiter's thermal protection system (TPS)
to foam debris of various sizes, including ``acreage'' foam, and impact
speeds. Using the results of this testing, the ET project is working to
reduce individual foam loss mass across the entire ET down to less than
that which will cause critical damage to the Orbiter TPS. This ET foam
loss mitigation strategy includes the identification of additional
testing and characterization requirements necessary to determine the
size of flaws in the ET foam that can lead to the generation of debris
above the critical size, improvements to the ET manufacturer's foam
application process, and the development of nondestructive examination
techniques to detect critical ET foam flaws.
Q3. The Administrator was asked at the Senate Commerce Committee
hearing on September 3rd to perform a cost-benefit study of the human
space flight program and to deliver its findings to Congress within six
months. What steps is NASA taking to perform this study? Will it
include a comparative analysis of the costs and benefits of human space
flight with those of robotic space flight?
A3. NASA recognizes that space flight continues to be an endeavor
characterized by significant cost and risk. The Agency's goal is to
design missions the yield the greatest possible return. To accomplish
this goal, NASA understands the need to continuously evaluate the best
way to use human and robot resources. This study will provide an
important input by defining the costs and benefits associated with
flying people in space using quantitative measures to compare humans
and robot performance.
To provide a fresh look at this challenging topic NASA has
contracted with an independent external firm, the Center for Naval
Analysis, to provide an objective cost-benefit analysis. There are many
sociopolitical factors associated with flying humans in space that will
be addressed in the study. However, since NASA believes that these
factors are well documented, the study's effort will focus on a task-
based comparative analysis on options for conducting a vibrant space
research and exploration program. The study will compare the costs and
benefits of having humans or robots perform these tasks, as well as
various combinations of cooperative human-robot partnerships. The study
will also project the path of robotic technology and computational
power to account for rapid evolution in these areas.
NASA assembled an advisory board for this activity in October. The
results of this comparative analysis will be ready for briefings by
mid-March 2004 and a final public document printed by the end of March.
Q4. NASA submitted an update to its FY 2003 Operating Plan on
September 4, 2003. In the plan, NASA requests to transfer $40 million
from the Science, Aeronautics, and Technology Account to the Human
Space Flight Account. Please expand on the Administrator's testimony
from the hearing on the reasons for this transfer; will this funding be
used to support activities related to the Shuttle program? What
specific activities will the funding be used for? What specific
activities within the Science, Aeronautics, and Technology Account were
used as the source of funds for the transfer? What is the impact on
these activities?
A4. NASA's September 4, 2003 Operating Plan includes a reallocation of
institutional funds between SAT and HSF, under the conduct of the two-
appropriation budget concept. This change does not reflect a transfer
of funds to a program but rather reflects a re-allocation of
institutional resources against those activities budgeted under the HSF
appropriation in the HEDS Institutional Support account, including
Space Station as well as Shuttle. During any given year, there is a
certain amount of shifting of the civil service workforce among
programs to best apply the agency's technical expertise where needed.
Under the terms of the two-appropriation budget, along with the
reallocation of direct civil service salaries, travel, research
operations support, and general/administrative support salaries are
also reallocated in a representative manner against the program area.
Under the two-appropriation budget, the allocations of direct civil
service workforce is assumed to help represent the portion of the
center's institutional capabilities that are likely to support the
Enterprise's programs in some manner, directly or indirectly. This
approach will be more program specific under full cost starting in FY
2004.
This most recent allocation of institutional resources to HSF is
actually a rebalancing of an over-adjustment that was made in the
initial operating plan. The initial operating plan had projected that
approximately $80M of institutional resources would be allocated
against Science, Aeronautics, and Technology program activities rather
than Human Space Flight activities as proposed in the original budget.
However, with added attention to Human Space Flight Programs this year
including recovery and investigation and added planning and extension
of activities under International Space Station and Shuttle as a result
of the accident, approximately $40 million of this original $80
reallocation of institutional support from HSF to SAT is now being
reallocated back against Human Space Flight activities.
Q5. According to the Return-to-Flight plan, NASA ``will develop a plan
to re-certify the Space Shuttle as part of the Shuttle Service Life
Extension Program.'' Precisely what will this re-certification effort
involve? When will NASA decide whether it intends to fly the Shuttle
beyond 2010? What criteria will be used to make that decision? Does
this decision assume a date for when the Orbital Space Plane will be
available? If so, what date is assumed?
A5. On January 14, 2004, following months of interagency deliberations,
the President unveiled a new vision for space exploration. In his
speech that day, the President stated that the Space Shuttle will be
retired from service in 2010. Because the Shuttle will not be flown
beyond 2010, re-certification of the entire vehicle will not be
required. The Space Shuttle program will continue to monitor the health
of various components and subsystems to maintain safety and reliability
standards.
Q6. You have said that the Stafford-Covey Task Group will be in
existence for two years and have implied that they will review NASA's
Implementation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's
recommendations even after return-to-flight. Yet, the members of the
Task Group describe themselves as having a more narrow mission that
will end one month before the launch of STS-114. What precisely is the
assignment of the Task Group? If it is broader and longer in duration
than STS-114, why hasn't this been communicated to the Task Group? Will
the Task Group be reviewing NASA's plan to implement recommendations
R7.5-1 and 7.5-2?
A6. The Return-to-Flight Task Group, chaired by former astronauts
Thomas Stafford and Richard Covey, was formed by the NASA Administrator
specifically to address the Space Shuttle program's Return-to-Flight
activities for STS-114. The scope of the Task Group includes all
Return-to-Flight activities, including the adequacy of NASA's
reorganization strategy for the CAIB Recommendations 7.5-1, and 7.5-2.
The two-year duration set in the charter represented NASA's
conservative ``best guess'' as to the amount of time necessary to
implement the CAIB Return-to-Flight recommendations at the time that
the Task Group was commissioned. The charter allows the Administrator
to extend or terminate the Task Group's service depending upon the
timeframe for Return-to-Flight.
Q7. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board emphasized the need to
ensure independent funding for the Technical Engineering Authority and
safety organizations. How does NASA intend to implement the funding
independence advocated by the Board while complying with the mandate
for full-cost accounting?
A7. The NASA Administrator has asked the Associate Administrator for
Safety and Mission Assurance to develop and propose a solution to the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board's recommendations 7-5.1 and 7-
5.2--the Board's recommendations that relates to the independent
technical engineering authority and the safety organization. At this
juncture, the Agency is still considering options for addressing this
CAIB recommendation, so it is premature to provide an answer to this
question. NASA's approach to establishing an Independent Technical
Authority will be decided well before the decision to fly STS-114.
Q8. The Space Flight Operations Contract contains provisions dealing
with ``Fee Reduction for Catastrophic Loss.'' Those provisions require
that the NASA Contracting Officer, in conjunction with a Board of
Investigation, make a determination as to the cause of the loss. In his
testimony before the Committee, Admiral Gehman stated that the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board is not the Board of Investigation
referenced in the SFOC. Do the other contracts on the Shuttle program
have a similar provision? Does NASA have plans to establish a Board of
Investigation? If not, please explain why.
A8. The Deputy Associate Administrator for International Space Station
and Space Shuttle has established a Board of Investigation to assess
the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) catastrophic clause as it
relates to the Columbia accident. NASA recently determined the award
fee the United Space Alliance (USA) earned for their performance of the
Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) during the rating period that
included the Columbia accident. During this rating period, Columbia and
its crew were lost. Also during this rating period, two Space Shuttle
missions, STS-112 and STS-113, were successfully flown.
NASA's SFOC Fee Determining Official (FDO) determined a fee amount
of $36 million out of an available amount of $81 million for the fee
period running from October 1, 2002, through March 31, 2003. This
represents a substantial reduction in the historical award levels given
to USA in prior fee award periods.
Q9a. In light of the recommendations made by the Bahcall Commission,
what is NASA's plan for future servicing missions and eventual de-
orbiting of the Hubble Space Telescope?
A9a. On January 16, 2004, NASA's Administrator met with the Hubble
Space Telescope Project team announcing the Agency's decision to not
pursue any additional servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope. The
decision to cancel SM 4 was very difficult, and made only after
considerable deliberation and consultation with safety and Shuttle
experts. The decision was not budget driven, was based on Shuttle
safety considerations, and NASA's intent to fully comply with the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommendations and
ensuring astronaut safety. HST will be operated until such a time it
will no longer support science investigations (currently estimated to
be 2007 or later).
Q9b. Is a controlled de-orbit of the Hubble actually required or could
the Hubble re-enter in an uncontrolled manner?
A9b. Uncontrolled reentry of the Telescope violates NASA's safety
requirements.
Q9c. What propulsion module options is NASA studying to de-orbit the
Hubble?
A9c. NASA has reviewed most of the existing options and potential new
designs for this mission element. It is our intent to proceed with a
normal acquisition strategy, soliciting inputs from a wide range of
industry and government organizations prior to deciding the best option
to procure.
Q9d. Could the Interim Control Module developed for the Space Station
be modified for the Hubble de-orbit mission?
A9d. A preliminary review of the Interim Control Module, along with
many other existing STS- and ELV-compatible propulsion stages,
indicated that they all had excess capability for the mission
requirements, and that the program phasing was not appropriate.
Q9e. What assumption will be made in the Shuttle and Hubble program
budgets with regard to future servicing missions and the de-orbiting
mission?
A9e. On January 16, 2004, NASA's Administrator met with the Hubble
Space Telescope Project team announcing the Agency's decision to not
pursue any additional servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope. The
decision to cancel SM 4 was very difficult, and made only after
considerable deliberation and consultation with safety and Shuttle
experts. The decision was not budget driven, was based on Shuttle
safety considerations, and NASA's intent to fully comply with the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommendations and
ensuring astronaut safety. HST will be operated until such a time it
will no longer support science investigations (currently estimated to
be 2007 or later). Additional funding will be required for execution of
the deorbit mission, and portions of that funding will be seen in the
outyear proposals in the normal budget cycle. Early funding for the
deorbit mission will come from existing budget elements.
Q9f. How will a delay impact the budget runout for the Hubble program?
A9f. On January 16, 2004, NASA's Administrator met with the Hubble
Space Telescope Project team announcing the Agency's decision to not
pursue any additional servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope. The
decision to cancel SM 4 was very difficult, and made only after
considerable deliberation and consultation with safety and Shuttle
experts. The decision was not budget driven, was based on Shuttle
safety considerations, and NASA's intent to fully comply with the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommendations and
ensuring astronaut safety. HST will be operated until such a time it
will no longer support science investigations (currently estimated to
be 2007 or later).
Q10a. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's report compares
NASA's safety operations with three specific examples of independent
safety programs that strive with considerable success for accident-free
performance: the U.S. Navy Submarine Flooding Prevention and Recovery
(SUBSAFE), Naval Nuclear Propulsion (Naval Reactors) programs, and the
Aerospace Corporation's Launch Verification Process.
A10a.
General
The key issue, regardless of organizational model or approach
adopted, is one of establishing and maintaining safety-critical process
discipline.
Naval Reactors (NR)
The NR ``high reliability model'' achieves and maintains critical
process discipline through a unique multi-faceted approach including:
highly selective staffing, technically experienced management,
extensive recurrent training, relatively flat organization, insistence
on individual responsibility, long-term (``captive'') contractors,
military discipline-oriented culture, long-term organizational
stability, and comparative isolation from outside political/budget
drivers.
The Naval Reactors organization (NAVSEA 08) does not have a
formally structured, independent safety program. Safety is implemented
as a holistic, embedded, ingrained, ``mainstream'' activity. NAVSEA 08
has neither a separate, distinct, in-line safety organization, nor an
independent safety program. The NR ``high-reliability'' model provides
an example where safety is achieved without an independent safety
program.
For more information on the NR safety approach see: NNBE Progress
Report, Volume II, page 13, Section 3.1.2 Organizational Attributes,
Embedded Safety Processes.
(Reference: http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/
45608main-NNBE-Progress-Report2-
7-15-03.pdf)
SUBSAFE Program
The SUBSAFE Program involves only the specific hazards of flooding
prevention and recovery. This program is one of multiple programs
(weapons safety, Naval Reactors, industrial operations) that constitute
the overall submarine safety domain. A central thrust of the SUBSAFE
Program is robust independent compliance verification. The SUBSAFE
Program also includes requirements definition, configuration
management, material control, and training.
For more information on the SUBSAFE Program, see NNBE Interim
Report, Volume I, Section 3.1, SUBSAFE Program.
(Reference: http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/
45607main-NNBE-Interim-Report1-
12-20-02.pdf)
Aerospace Corporation
The U.S. Air Force ``Aerospace Model'' provides another approach to
high reliability program management. Over the long-term, this approach
has worked relatively well as part of the USAF government/contractor
assurance approach. Several failures in the late 1990's led to the CIA/
NRO/DOD ``Broad Area Review'' which identified numerous contractor and
assurance agent failures that resulted in a failure of critical process
discipline. The ``Aerospace Model'' is an approach that works, but
should supplement, not take the place of, an active internal safety and
quality program that establishes and maintains safety-critical process
discipline and ultimately ensures safety and mission success.
(Reference: Department of Defense. 2000. Broad Area Review: DOD
Assessment of Space Launch Failures. General Lester Lyles, Vice Chief
of Staff, USAF. Washington, D.C.)
Q10b. Given the differences in size, complexity, and missions between
these programs and the Shuttle program, are these organizational models
appropriate for the Shuttle program?
A10b. The SUBSAFE and Naval Reactors programs were specifically
selected as benchmarks for NASA Human Space Flight Programs because of
the many similarities that exist among these three highly complex,
tightly coupled, high reliability systems. Although none of these
programs is a one-to-one analogy with the Shuttle program, each has
characteristics worth emulating.
Q10c. What issues with each of these models would need to be addressed
prior to implementing organizational changes?
A10c. The ultimate objective is to ensure safety-critical process
stability, capability, and control. There is no single organizational
approach that will guarantee sustained critical process discipline.
Rather, ``organization'' is only one of many factors that should be
considered in formulating and implementing a revitalized approach to
establishing critical process discipline. Establishment of specific
safety policies, roles, responsibilities, functions, and authority must
be appropriately coupled to the selected organizational structure.
NASA is actively considering a wide range of ideas and elements
from various high reliability safety programs (including NR, SUBSAFE,
and Aerospace) for incorporation into an approach for a revitalized
NASA safety culture and safety assurance.
Q11a. NASA has created the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC)
at the Langley Research Center. Please provide the charter,
organizational structure, and management plan for the NESC.
What role will the NESC play in preparation for return-to-
flight?
A11a. The NESC is an independent organization, chartered in the wake of
the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, which will conduct robust
engineering testing and safety assessments of any engineering problem
determined by the Agency as a concern, including activities associated
with return-to-flight efforts.
[See Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record for the
charter, organizational structure and management plan for the NESC.]
Q11b. Will the NESC have any authority to direct or reject activities
carried out by the Shuttle program?
A11b. The NESC will not have any specifically assigned authority to
reject any decision made by the program but, based on independent
technical analysis and assessment, will recommend to the Associate
Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance the rejection of any
specific flight readiness decision by the Space Shuttle Program and
Office of Space Flight. During a NESC inspection where a critical
safety deficiency is identified, the NESC may issue a ``Stop Work''
notice on the delegated authority of the Associate Administrator for
Safety and Mission Assurance until the program resolves the
discrepancies to the satisfaction of the respective program board, with
NESC member concurrence.
Q12a. In response to Congressman Barton's question regarding how long
it would take NASA under directions from Congress to ``build a new
space plane or a crew capsule that was just man-specific, [and designed
to carry] no cargo other than the necessary elements to protect the
crew and sustain them as they go to the space station,'' you indicated
that it would take five years.
What is the basis for this estimate?
A12a. In July 2003 NASA announced plans to accelerate the OSP Program
in order to achieve crew rescue as early as 2008, but no later than
2010. To support an accelerated schedule, a number of essential near-
term and long-term milestones and management actions were identified.
This schedule, while aggressive, appeared reasonable when compared to
other similar programs (e.g., Gemini, Apollo, Shuttle, etc.) Important
management actions taken included approving streamlined procurement
processes, and initiating co-locations and reorganizations. Critical
OSP programmatic milestones included completion of the government
System Requirements Review, and baselining of the Level II requirements
documents. On a monthly basis the progress was evaluated by the
Administrator and his key management team.
Consistent with the President's new vision for space exploration
announced January 14, 2004, the OSP program will focus it's efforts on
developing a new manned exploration vehicle, the Crew Exploration
Vehicle (CEV), to travel beyond low earth orbit. NASA is also studying
the possibility of transporting astronauts and scientists to the
International Space Station on the CEV after the Shuttle is retired.
Q12b. What type of vehicle does this estimate assume NASA will build
(i.e., a winged vehicle or a capsule, a re-usable or expendable
vehicle, etc.)?
A12b. NASA was cautious under the OSP program not to direct industry
design solutions for meeting the safety, performance, cost and schedule
requirements. Capsules, winged vehicles, and lifting bodies, and
variations within each broad category, were considered candidates to
meet the needs of the Program. Although expendable systems were not
precluded from consideration, early data suggested that a relatively
small fleet of re-usable vehicles minimizes life cycle costs.
The design of the proposed Crew Exploration Vehicle has not been
determined yet.
Q12c. How much would it cost to develop such a vehicle within five
years?
A12c. The initial cost estimates under the OSP Program for the Crew
Rescue Vehicle (CRV) Initial Operating Capability (IOC) as early as FY
2008 was $13.8 billion.
It is important to note that this estimate included significantly
more than the traditional development cost. In addition to development
cost, the estimate included production, operations, facilities, launch
services and full cost (civil service personnel, contractors services,
other corporate and general and administrative costs).
The President's 2005 budget will provide the necessary details to
begin implementation of the Nation's long-term vision for space
exploration, including the development of the CEV. As the OSP program
transitions into the CEV program, program management will develop
spending schedules and milestones.
Q12d. What technologies, if any, would need to be developed before
producing such a vehicle would be possible?
A12d. The President's national vision for space exploration announced
on January 14, 2004 reflects the priority for human and robotic
exploration of the solar systems and beyond. The FY 2005 budget
supports a variety of key research and technology initiatives to enable
the new vision. NASA will invest in new transportation systems, such as
the Crew Exploration Vehicles (CEV), research on long-duration space
flight's impact on human physiology, and develop/demonstrate nuclear
power and advanced propulsion technologies and other breakthrough
exploration systems.
Q13. In response to Congressman Barton's question, Admiral Gehman
stated that a crew transport vehicle would also require ``some kind of
propulsion system'' and that existing systems, such as the Delta IV
rocket, would be insufficient. In response, you said that using a
``different launch system'' would make it impossible to meet the five-
year time frame. Do you believe that current propulsions systems could
be used for a new crew vehicle? If so, why? What steps have been taken
to man-rate existing propulsion systems? If a new propulsion system
were needed, how many years would that add to your estimate of the time
it would take to build a new space plane or crew capsule?
A13. Any new manned space exploration vehicle, including the proposed
CEV, will have its entire system human rated, not any individual system
element.
Q14. In a recent briefing at the Johnson Space Center, Mr. Halsell
indicated that no resources were dedicated to studying the capability
to develop and implement a fully autonomous Shuttle. Yet, Administrator
O'Keefe's testimony indicated that an autonomous Shuttle is one of the
options that is being looked at. How many people has NASA assigned to
study concepts for an autonomous Shuttle? What level of funding is
provided for this effort? Who is assigned to lead up this effort? When
will the study be completed? What limitations prevent the Shuttle from
flying missions autonomously today?
A14. NASA tasked United Space Alliance, as an element of the Shuttle
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), to perform a study of the
potential of developing an autonomous Space Shuttle capability once
assembly of the International Space Station is complete. The Autonomous
Operations Study statement of work is for $200,000 and was completed in
November 2003. This study examined the engineering trades and rough-
order-of-magnitude associated costs that would need to be made in order
to refit the avionics of one or more Shuttles to operate without pilot
input, and to do so in such a way that would not increase risks to
astronauts aboard the International Space Station or to the general
public during launch, operations on orbit, or reentry.
Q15. In response to Congressman Barton's question regarding ``what
[budget] would it take and how long would it take if [Congress] also
directed [NASA] to retrofit the three remaining orbiters for cargo
only,'' you replied that you would call Mr. Barton that afternoon with
an estimate of how long it would take. For the record, what were the
answers to these questions?
A15. Safe and successful Space Station assembly requires the full
availability of the Space Shuttle's capabilities including availability
of the Shuttle crew to support assembly operations. The development and
implementation of a significant modification to the Shuttle
configuration/operation will require substantial time and resources to
design, test, and certify. This includes significant time spent in off-
line reconfiguration of the vehicle(s). The current fleet of Shuttle
Orbiters cannot support development of an autonomous capability until
after ISS assembly is complete. In addition, autonomous docking of the
Space Shuttle to the ISS is inherently risky and not a technology that
is currently available. To that end, NASA has tasked United Space
Alliance, as an element of the Shuttle Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP), to perform an autonomous Shuttle study with an operational
focus. Tasks to be performed in this study are to review, consolidate
and summarize previous autonomous studies in the areas of:
top-level requirements and types of missions/draft
reference missions (DRM's) that an Autonomous Shuttle will
perform;
concept of operations;
design concept/implementation trades;
design concept/implementation analysis completed and
remaining, and;
rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimate and
implementation schedules.
Q16a. As a result of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report,
NASA has initiated a review of the waivers to the Space Station
program's technical requirements similar to that being conducted for
the Shuttle program. Who is assigned with leading the review of the
Space Station program? How is the Space Station review being
coordinated with the Space Shuttle review?
A16a. The ISS Program has a team in place that has begun a review of
the waivers, deviations, and exceptions to ISS requirements
documentation to assess the cumulative risk and potential impacts to
the ISS. The team is being led by the ISS Configuration Management
Office.
The ISS Special Assistant for Return-to-Flight (RTF) is also the
lead for JSC's Continuing Flight Team (CFT). This dual role provides a
conduit for information to flow freely between the two teams.
NASA will develop a plan to incorporate a periodic review of the
waivers, deviations, and exceptions and the risk accepted by the
program.
In addition, the ISS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) office
integrates safety, reliability, and waiver aspects of the ISS Program,
including International Partners, NASA centers, and other government
organizations. It performs this function by direct staffing within the
ISS Program office, Internal Technical Agreements (ITAs) with other
centers, Letters of Delegation with other government organizations, and
bilateral agreements with the International Partners.
Q16b. Does NASA plan on setting up an independent Technical
Engineering Authority for the Space Station program as well? Could this
Independent Technical Engineering Authority be the same one as the one
for the Space Shuttle?
A16b. The NASA Associate Administrator of the Office of Safety and
Mission Assurance (OSMA) has the action to address the recommendation
from the CAIB regarding the ITEA (R7.5-1). The OSMA is preparing
alternative concepts for independent technical authority(ies) to cover
all of NASA's Enterprises. Presently, the internal engineering and
safety and mission assurance communities and NASA management are each
reviewing these organizational concepts to assure a thoughtful and
careful application of a solution in order to avoid any unintended
consequences that may result from changes affecting organizations
intended to have independence. NASA is looking at extending the concept
beyond engineering, to all support organizations that deal with safety
and reliability relevant standards. It is NASA's intent for the
ultimately selected independent technical authority concept to apply to
all NASA centers and programs, and not just the Space Flight centers
and the Space Shuttle Program.
Q17. In light of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report,
will NASA be reviewing the Space Flight Operations Contract or any
other Shuttle contracts? If so, who is reviewing these contracts? What
is the schedule for reviewing these contracts? Are any changes to any
of these contracts necessary prior to returning to flight?
A17. Prior to the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, a NASA intra-agency
team had begun a review of the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC)
in preparation for the expiration and renegotiation of that contract in
September 2004. That review is ongoing and will incorporate lessons
learned from the accident and the recommendations of the CAIB. While
other contracts besides SFOC that support the Space Shuttle program are
also being considered during the SFOC renegotiation process, NASA does
not expect any additional changes to existing contracts to be required
prior to Return-to-Flight.
Q18. Given the concerns with a lack of systems engineering that
encompasses the entire Space Shuttle program, what is NASA doing to
improve systems engineering, both within the government and within the
contractor community? Is NASA considering tasking a contractor with the
responsibility for systems engineering across the Space Shuttle
program?
A18. The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) restructured its Shuttle
Integration Office into a Space Shuttle Systems Engineering and
Integration Office (SEIO). The SEIO manager now reports directly to the
SSP manager, thereby placing the SEIO at a level in the Shuttle
organization that establishes its authority and accountability for
integration of all Space Shuttle elements. To sharpen the focus of the
SEIO onto flight vehicle systems engineering and integration, the Cargo
Integration function (and personnel) from the old Shuttle Integration
Office are now relocated to the Mission Integration Office within SEIO.
With this move, the number of civil service personnel performing
analytical and element systems engineering and integration (SE&I) in
the SEIO was increased from 16 to 36 by acquiring new personnel from
the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Engineering and Mission Operations
Directorates and from outside of NASA. SE&I functions at Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC) and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) have been
consolidated and placed under the direction of the Space Shuttle
program SEIO at JSC. Critical technical panels, which are used for the
day-to-day work of SE&I in the Space Shuttle program, are now co-
chaired by JSC and MSFC Engineering Directorate personnel to ensure
that their activities encompass the entire span of the Shuttle program
and that full advantage is taken of institutional strength at the two
centers. A systems engineering and integration ``summit'' was held at
JSC in October 2003 to discuss further strengthening SE&I activities
throughout the Shuttle program; personnel form the Stafford-Covey Task
Group attended this meeting and are actively following NASA's progress
in this area. Finally, SEIO is responsible for managing the return-to-
flight (RTF) integrated schedule and writing the Systems Integration
Plan for all changes associated with RTF. NASA has also assigned a
member of the astronaut corps, Nancy Currie, to the Space Shuttle
program, with responsibility for integrating the safety and mission
assurance functions across all of the Space Shuttle projects.
In terms of contractor responsibilities for SE&I, the United Space
Alliance (USA) contract Statement of Work names USA as responsible for
systems integration and significant systems engineering duties
encompassing the Shuttle program. To further improve SE&I functions,
USA recommended an increase of 90 people. NASA has processed a change
request for this resource level and USA is in the process of
implementing these personnel augmentations.
In order to provide a continuing independent assessment of NASA's
SE&I performance, the SEIO has initiated two processes. First, a
``greybeard'' team consisting of personnel from inside and outside NASA
with experience in systems engineering complex systems has been
established, and the group will evaluate NASA's performance on a
quarterly basis starting in December 2003. Second, NASA has contracted
with The Aerospace Corporation to provide additional systems
engineering skills and assessment. The Aerospace Corporation will
assess SE&I processes in the Shuttle program using a modified Carnegie
Mellon University Systems Engineering Institute Capability Maturity
Model, which will allow NASA to compare its SE&I with the best in
industry and the government. The Aerospace Corporation will also
provide advice on strengthening SE&I in the Shuttle program and perform
selected SE&I tasks to show how better practices can be adopted in the
Shuttle program. This activity is already underway at JSC.
NASA believes that these actions will deliver a world-class SE&I
organization for the entire Shuttle program.
Q19. What is the role of the Space Flight Leadership Council in making
decisions regarding the implementation of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board recommendations? Who are the members of the Space
Flight Leadership Council? What role do contractors play in supporting
the Space Flight Leadership Council?
A19. The Space Flight Leadership Council (SFLC) is the primary senior-
level decision-making body for the Space Shuttle Program and is
responsible for reviewing and implementing the CAIB recommendations.
The SFLC is co-chaired by the Associate Administrator for Space Flight
(Mr. William Readdy) and the Associate Deputy Administrator for
Technical Programs (Dr. Michael Greenfield). Other members of the SFLC
include the Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance
(Mr. Bryan O'Conner), the Deputy Associate Administrator for the Space
Shuttle and Space Station Programs (ex officio, Gen. Michael
Kostelnik), and the Directors of the Johnson Space Center (Gen.
Jefferson Howell), the Kennedy Space Center (Mr. James Kennedy), the
Stennis Space Center (Adm. Donaldson), and the Marshall Space Flight
Center (Mr. David King). During the regular meetings of the SFLC, Space
Shuttle managers and engineers within both the government and the
contracting community advise the Council on broad technical and
organizational issues affecting the program.
Q20. By law, NASA is permitted to appoint up to four NASA employees to
the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP). However, you have said you
want to ensure that ASAP is viewed as independent. Do you intend to
appoint any NASA employees to ASAP?
A20. While the ASAP charter reflects the statutory option for NASA
personnel as members, NASA has no plans to use such authority. All of
the newly designated members of the Panel are noteworthy by their
current and prior experience in benchmarking agency, company, and/or
academic best practices in safety, and organization management other
than NASA.
Questions submitted by Representative Chris Bell
Q1a. Recent estimates from managers of the Orbital Space Plane program
indicate that accelerating OSP's development may require as much as an
additional $2 billion per year in NASA's budget. Even if the OSP
eventually reduces the Shuttle flight rate to less than four per year,
no significant savings will be generated because of the workforce
required to support any Shuttle flight rate.
What is your current position on how long the Shuttle will be
needed to supply the Space Station?
A1a. The Space Shuttle is needed to complete the assembly of the Space
Station, currently expected by 2010, depending on return-to-flight. On
January 14, 2004, the President unveiled a new vision for space
exploration. In this new vision, the Shuttle is planned to be retired
in 2010, following the completion of its role in Space Station
assembly. The Space Shuttle's unique capabilities (rendezvous, docking
and EVA) are essential for the assembly of the remaining modules and
components of the International Space Station. NASA will acquire cargo
transportation as soon as practical and affordable to support missions
to and from the International Space Station; and acquire crew
transportation to and from the International Space Station, as
required, after the Space Shuttle is retired from service.
Q1b. What studies or programs are underway to provide a non-Shuttle
method of transporting all cargo to and from the Station? Which NASA
employee is directing these efforts?
A1b. The Aerospace Technology Enterprise (Code R) led the Alternate
Access to Station (AAS) study with significant support from the Office
of Space Flight (OSF). Four AAS contractors were given the complete
U.S. portion of the ISS supply and return requirements (including mass,
volume and science electrical power requirements) in August 2003.
Results of the study are expected by early spring 2004. This effort is
now under the direction of Retired RADM. Craig Steidle, the Associate
Administrator for the new Exploration Systems office.
Q1c. In what year, and with what capability, will the European
Automated Transfer Vehicle provide cargo-carrying capacity to the Space
Station?
A1c. The first flight of the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) is
currently baselined in CY 2004, but the launch date is under review.
ATV is capable of transporting approximately 7600 kg of total cargo.
ATV has no return cargo capability or electrical power available for
science.
Q1d. In what year will the OSP and non-Shuttle cargo transporter(s)
render the Shuttle unnecessary for supporting the Space Station?
A1d. On January 14, 2004, the President unveiled a new vision for space
exploration. In this new vision, the Shuttle is planned to be retired
in 2010, following the completion of its role in Space Station
assembly. The Space Shuttle's unique capabilities (rendezvous, docking
and EVA) are essential for the assembly of the remaining modules and
components of the International Space Station. NASA will acquire cargo
transportation as soon as practical and affordable to support missions
to and from the International Space Station; and acquire crew
transportation to and from the International Space Station, as
required, after the Space Shuttle is retired from service.
Questions submitted by Representative Rob Bishop
Q1. What do you believe is the inherent value of human versus robotic
space exploration?
A1. NASA's exploration strategy attempts to optimize the partnership
between humans and robots. Both human and robotic exploration missions
have yielded extraordinary results. Humans and machines are always
partnered together in space exploration, sometimes remotely, as when
scientists at a University receive data from a probe orbiting Saturn,
and sometimes locally, as when mission specialists go to orbit in the
Space Shuttle.
Robotic space probes can withstand environments that exceed human
biological tolerances and robots can repeat patterns with high
precision. Robotic probes have traversed our solar system and traveled
beyond the heliopause, becoming human emissaries into deep space. Human
explorers bring on-site intelligence and creativity to the mission that
cannot be duplicated by machines and have demonstrated the ability for
increased science return over purely robotic space missions. A human
being's cognitive and adaptive reasoning, rapid learning ability, and
extraordinary dexterity are poorly mimicked by current machine
technologies and the presence of humans in space is also an important
source of inspiration to the people of Earth.
When humans are present locally, they are highly effective
participants in space exploration. They significantly improve the
likelihood of success while accelerating the pace and increasing the
return and benefits from investments in space activities. The human
explorers provide enabling capabilities:
Ambitious future missions will take place in never-before-
encountered, highly unstructured environments and in the inevitable
``20-20 hindsight'' of new scientific questions that emerge from the
results of ongoing investigations. Humans enable serendipity, the
immediate exploitation of emerging previously unexpected opportunities
for discovery.
The human brain synthesizes an enormous set of information
continuously and almost instantaneously in ways that no machine will be
able to match for decades to come: integrating perception, education,
training, and experience. Humans are able to rapidly reach sound
decisions based on very little information. Exploration beyond low
Earth orbit will involve time delays and reductions in bandwidth with
increasing distance, even as communications technologies continue to
advance dramatically. Beyond the Earth's neighborhood, these will
amount to orders of magnitude reductions in the data and delays in time
of response for remote human operators, compared to astronauts locally
present. People who are present at the site of complex operations can
decide and act much more quickly than will ever possible for remote
observers.
Many projected future systems are sufficiently complex and the
environments in which they will operate sufficiently distinct from
those here on Earth that these systems cannot be integrated and/or
adequately tested before launch. Design or development flaws will
emerge only in space and system failures will occur. Humans are able to
deal more effectively with unanticipated challenges in complex
activities.
There are extremely important aspects to human exploration other
than what specific task needs to be accomplished. Space exploration has
inspired an entire generation of Americans to pursue careers in
mathematics, science, and engineering. Moreover, U.S. leadership in
human space flight serves as a highly visible example of how we can
apply advanced technology toward peaceful ends and provides a uniquely
positive legacy to future generations of what America today embodies,
strives for, and stands for. Advances made to establish sustained human
exploration beyond low-Earth orbit will enhance U.S. scientific and
technological leadership and provide a vehicle for expanding peaceful
cooperation among nations.
Q2. You have stated that NASA's mission is not ``destination driven,''
but focused on developing the enabling technologies for human space
exploration. Please explain why NASA has decided not to pursue a
mission which is ``destination driven?''
A2. On January 14th, the President announced his vision for U.S. Space
Exploration. The vision forms the basis of the new U.S. space
exploration policy. This policy is the product of months of extensive
and careful deliberations. The importance of these deliberations
increased with the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board, which emphasized the importance of setting clear, long-term
goals for the Nation's human space flight program. Inputs from Members
of this committee and other Members of Congress informed the
Administration's deliberations. Many others contributed their ideas for
the future of the space program. These deliberations also formed the
basis for formulating the President's FY 2005 Budget request for NASA,
which will be released on February 2nd. A commission will advise on
specific issues for implementation of the policy's goals within four
months of its first meeting.
The fundamental goal of the new U.S. space exploration policy is to
advance U.S. scientific, security and economic interests through a
robust space exploration program. In support of this goal, NASA will
implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to
explore the solar system and beyond; to extend human presence across
the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year
2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other
destinations; to develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and
infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the
destinations for human exploration; and to promote international and
commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific,
security and economic interests.
Q3. Assuming the Shuttle returns to flight next year, what is the role
of the Space Shuttle in completing the International Space Station? How
many Shuttle flights are required to get to U.S. Core Complete and how
many to get to lnternationa1 Core Complete? How long will it take to
reach these goals, once flights are resumed? How many of these Shuttle
flights are logistics re-supply flights? Can these logistics flights be
accomplished with any other launch vehicle?
A3. The Space Shuttle is necessary for ISS assembly due to its crew and
cargo carrying capacity. ISS elements have been designed to take
advantage of the Space Shuttle's large cargo capability, both in terms
of weight and volume. In addition, visiting Space Shuttle crews have
been trained, and have the primary responsibility for, on-orbit
assembly and checkout of the elements they deliver.
Shuttle-based research and logistics delivery is primarily
accomplished using the Multi-Purpose Logistics Module (MPLM) or the
commercial SPACEHAB modules. The delivery modules are Shuttle-unique
cargo delivery systems that provide ground-based rack integration and
testing prior to launch, allowing for efficient and relatively simple
on-orbit rotation of large racks. The Russian Progress Vehicle,
European Automated Transfer Vehicle, and the Japanese HII Transfer
Vehicle will deliver pressurized and/or unpressurized cargo that does
not require the environmental control available in the Space Shuttle or
the MPLM/SPACEHAB delivery modules.
The current plan achieves U.S. core complete approximately 17
months after return-to-flight and International Partner elements fully
accommodated approximately five years after return-to-flight.
Additional flights may be necessary and could extend the timeline for
core complete. NASA and its International Partners are evaluating the
specific number of flights and respective manifests necessary for
completing ISS assembly. The first return-to-flight missions, STS-114
(LF-1) and the newly added STS-121 (ULF-1.1) will carry out key
activities related to Shuttle return-to-flight, as well as support ISS
logistics and utilization.
Q4. After the completion of assembly of the International Space
Station, what is the role of the Space Shuttle in supporting the Space
Station or other missions? Could the ``Shuttle-C'' concept of using the
Shuttle stack (External Tank and Solid Rocket Boosters) along with a
cargo carrier instead of an Orbiter provide a capability to transport
cargo to the International Space Station? Has NASA studied the Shuttle-
C concept for use with the Space Station? How much would it cost and
how long would it take to develop the Shuttle-C concept? Could a
Shuttle-C cargo container be made to return to Earth to meet NASA's
down-mass requirements? If NASA has not studied the Shuttle-C concept
to support Space Station, please explain why?
A4. The Space Shuttle is needed to complete the assembly of the Space
Station, currently expected by 2010, depending on Return-to-Flight. On
January 14, 2004, the President unveiled a new vision for space
exploration. In this new vision, the Shuttle is planned to be retired
in 2010, following the completion of its role in Space Station
assembly. The Space Shuttle's unique capabilities (rendezvous, docking
and EVA) are essential for the assembly of the remaining modules and
components of the International Space Station. NASA will acquire cargo
transportation as soon as practical and affordable to support missions
to and from the International Space Station; and acquire crew
transportation to and from the International Space Station, as
required, after the Space Shuttle is retired from service.
Following the loss of Columbia, NASA has begun reviewing its space
transportation requirements in support of ISS, as well as the R&D
needed to support future space exploration initiatives. This review has
included the feasibility of adapting as much existing Space Shuttle
infrastructure and engineering as possible in order to create heavier
lift Shuttle derivatives like Shuttle C. While Shuttle C could
significantly increase upmass capacity to the orbit of the Space
Station to roughly 150,000 pounds or more (as compared to the current
fleet's capacity of about 37,500 pounds to ISS), current heavy-lift
Shuttle derivatives are not equipped with wings, landing gear, and
other hardware necessary for reentry and, thus, could not supplant the
Space Shuttle downmass capability for ISS science utilization or crew
transfer.
Q5. Once the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations on
the Space Shuttle have been implemented, how long does NASA plan to
operate the Shuttle?
A5. On January 14, 2004, the President unveiled a new vision for space
exploration. In this new vision, the Shuttle is planned to be retired
in 2010, following the completion of its role in Space Station
assembly. The Space Shuttle's unique capabilities (rendezvous, docking
and EVA) are essential for the assembly of the remaining modules and
components of the International Space Station. NASA will acquire cargo
transportation as soon as practical and affordable to support missions
to and from the International Space Station; and acquire crew
transportation to and from the International Space Station, as
required, after the Space Shuttle is retired from service.
Questions submitted by Representative Jerry F. Costello
Q1a. The CAIB report points to schedule pressure as contributing to
the accident and recommends that future goals be realistically tied to
time and resources that are available to the agency. Specifically, the
management goal of ``core complete'' by February 19, 2004, was having a
negative impact on the line Shuttle workforce and changed the attitudes
of managers in the program so that flight problems came to be viewed as
threats to the schedule rather than threats to the safety of the
astronauts. In Senate testimony you indicated that because flights had
``slipped,'' workers and managers should have gotten the message that
there was flexibility in the ``core complete'' goal. However, although
the program repeatedly missing Interim checkpoints, the final goal date
was never shifted.
How often were you briefed on progress towards ``core complete''
and who briefed you?
A1a. The Administrator conducted monthly video teleconferences prior to
the Columbia accident. These conferences included executive management
from NASA headquarters and the field, with briefings provided by the
International Space Station (ISS) and Space Shuttle Program (SSP)
Managers and various project managers on specific subject areas as the
need was identified. The principal purpose of the conferences was to
monitor ISS program progress toward compliance with the recommendations
of the IMCE (ISS Management and Cost Evaluation) Task Force. Progress
toward the ``core complete'' milestone was provided at those meetings.
Q1b. Did anyone on your staff tell you that schedule pressure to meet
the ``core complete'' goal was leading to reductions in inspection
requirements and testing, an increase in tasks having to be done in
parallel, deferrals of flight controller recertifications, the need for
a third shift, overtime, and holiday work, and other examples of
excessive stress on the Shuttle program.
A1b. No.
Q1c. Did any of your managers warn you that such actions and workloads
could have a detrimental impact on Shuttle safety?
A1c. No.
Q1d. Did anyone on your staff or among the contractors tell you that
by December 2002 there were no more days of slippage left on the ``core
complete'' schedule and that contractors were actually projecting a
shuttle launch for ``core complete'' in the range of 45 days after
February 19, 2004? When did you learn this?
A1d. The ISS and SSP Programs were in the process of evaluating
scheduled milestone targets at the time of the Columbia accident.
Critical path analyses were underway which looked at both ISS launch
package progress and SSP orbiter availability. As these analyses were
being refined, SSP orbiter processing began to emerge as the critical
path element. When schedule margin degrades, there are multiple options
available to management, such as: (a) shifting production priorities;
(b) increasing workforce authorizations; or, (c) adjusting schedule
milestone targets to reinstate acceptable margins. Such approaches must
be evaluated in the total context of cost, schedule and technical
impact. The ISS Program was involved in these trades at the time of the
Columbia accident and had not yet reached a conclusion as to the most
effective solution for recommendation to the Administrator.
Q1e. What discussions did you have regarding the adoption of a more
realistic date for ``core complete'' that would reflect the realities
of Shuttle scheduling and provide more margin for safety of workers and
managers? When and with whom did these discussions occur?
A1e. There were no specific discussions with the Administrator on this
subject. The schedule challenges associated with ISS assembly are
broadly recognized across the NASA and contractor workforce at all
management levels. The ISS Program was working closely with the SSP
Program to define and evaluate all options in a systematic manner. All
SSP constraints were related to orbiter processing requirements that
vary across the fleet and at no time were safety implications
identified that would have affected the evaluations. Had the
evaluations proceeded on a normal course without accident occurrence,
the results would have culminated in a thoroughly substantiated
recommendation to the Administrator when the need for final decision
approached. The Columbia accident occurred a year in advance of the
target date for Node 2 launch. Analyses and studies were underway at
that time to develop the necessary data and information for
Administrator review.
Q1f. How will you guard against an overly aggressive schedule on
Shuttle return-to-flight? On OSP development?
A1f. The Space Shuttle program schedule, including the date for Return-
to-Flight, will be milestone driven, not schedule driven. The Space
Flight Leadership Council (SFLC)--co-chaired by the Associate
Administrator for Space Flight and the Associate Deputy Administrator
for Technical Programs--is the primary senior-level decision-making
body responsible for Return-to-Flight issues in the Space Shuttle
program. The SFLC holds regular meetings with Space Shuttle Program
managers and engineers to monitor NASA's Return-to-Flight activities
and to make decisions regarding cost and technical impacts on the
launch schedule. During the most recent meeting of the SFLC on October
3, 2003, the Council decided to push back the Return-to-Flight launch
opportunity from no earlier then March-April 2004, to no earlier than
September-October 2004. Key technical factors driving the revised
launch schedule include the need to perform additional technical
analysis on debris transport, reinforced carbon-carbon impact
tolerance, integration of boom and sensors to the Space Shuttle robotic
arm for on-orbit inspection and repair of the thermal protection
system, and External Tank foam loss. Should these or other technical
issues compel the SFLC to further reconsider the Return-to-Flight date
in order to ensure the safety of the crew, the vehicle, and the general
public, and then the Council will do so. NASA will also seek the
participation of independent experts from outside the Agency, including
the Stafford-Covey Task Group, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, the
NASA Advisory Council, the NASA Office of the Inspector General, and
others.
On January 14, 2004, following months of interagency deliberations,
the President unveiled a new vision for space exploration. Consistent
with the President's new vision for space exploration announced January
14, 2004, the OSP program will focus it's efforts on developing a new
manned exploration vehicle, the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), to
travel beyond low earth orbit. As the OSP program transitions to the
CEV program, program management will develop spending schedules and
milestones.
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1a. The CAIB uncovered a number of serious problems with the way in
which potential safety problems were identified and treated in the
Space Shuttle program.
What specific steps are you taking to ensure that there are no
``accidents waiting to happen'' in the International Space Station
program?
A1a. The ISS Program has been critically re-examining systems and
processes since February 1, and in light of the CAIB report. In
addition, The ISS Continuing Flight Team (CFT) was chartered to review
all CAIB results for applicability to the ISS Program. This team will
ensure that all necessary steps are taken to apply the lessons learned
from the Columbia accident to the ongoing operation of the ISS.
Representatives from all NASA field centers supporting human space
flight, as well the Astronaut and Safety and Mission Assurance offices,
are members of the team. NASA will continue to work closely with its
International Partners and keep the lines of communication open as NASA
implements process improvements and enhancements as a result of lessons
learned from Columbia. The first edition of NASA's Implementation Plan
for International Space Station (ISS) Continuing Flight has been
provided to Congress.
Q1b. What is your timetable for completing each of those steps?
A1b. The ISS CFT published the first edition of its report on October
28, 2003. Similar to the Space Shuttle Return-to-Flight Implementation
Plan, the CFT continuous improvement activity will provide updates on
the progress of the ISS Program in subsequent revisions.
Q2a. NASA's Return-to-Flight plan states that ``all waivers,
deviations, and exceptions to Space Shuttle Program (SSP) requirements
documentation will be reviewed for validity and acceptability before
Return-to-Flight.''
Who specifically will carry out the review? Will it be an
independent review by individuals outside of the Shuttle program? If
not, why not?
A2a. Each project and element (Space Shuttle Main Engine, Solid Rocket
Booster, Orbiter, etc.) will conduct an in-depth review of each waiver,
deviation and exception against his or her assigned systems, hardware
and software. This review will validate the basis for each waiver,
deviation and exception. All elements have developed plans whereby the
engineers within that element--both civil service and contractor, along
with Safety and Mission Assurance personnel, and Systems Engineering
and Integration personnel--provide a first level technical review of
each waiver, deviation, or exception. This review ensures that working-
level individuals with appropriate expertise for all Shuttle elements
are involved in decisions regarding the technical rationale for not
meeting the requirement, and that the process is thorough, proper, and,
most importantly, provides the best assessment of the potential risks
that result from the waiver.
After this initial activity, the project manager and chief engineer
must review that waiver package for acceptance. Then, the waiver is
presented to Space Shuttle Program management (Deputy Program Manager)
at the Daily Program Requirements Control Board where all the elements
of the program, including Safety and Mission Assurance personnel, and
the four Human Space Flight Center engineering organizations are
represented. These reviews are quite thorough and lengthy. Since this
effort started in May, approximately 12 percent of the waivers/
deviations/exceptions in the program have been reviewed. The current
schedule is that this work will be completed next spring, well before
the final Return-to-Flight reviews.
While the Stafford-Covey Task Group is not specifically charged
with a detailed review of all waivers, deviations, and exceptions in
the Space Shuttle program, this independent Group (co-chaired by former
astronauts Thomas Stafford and Richard Covey) will report on the
progress of NASA's response to the CAIB report directly to the
Administrator and may also make other observations on safety or
operational readiness--including waivers, deviations, and exceptions--
that it believes appropriate. Additional oversight is provided by the
multiple NASA Centers, contractors, and other organizations within NASA
that are involved in the process, many of which are independent of, and
not beholden to, the Space Shuttle program. A full and complete review
of any concerns with the technical rationale for each waiver is
conducted and all dissenting opinions or questions are fully heard and
answered with technical data.
At this time there is no specific independent technical authority
to oversee these reviews. That reorganization topic is under review at
NASA Headquarters. The data packages are being retained and at the
point that an independent technical authority is established, they will
be asked to review the decisions that are being made prior to its
establishment.
Q2b. NASA's return-to-flight plan states that ``all waivers,
deviations, and exceptions to Space Shuttle Program (SSP) requirements
documentation will be reviewed for validity and acceptability before
return-to-flight.''
Will there be a similar review of International Space Station
(ISS) program waivers, deviations, and exceptions to ISS requirements
documentation? If so, when, and who will carry out the review? If not,
why not?
A2b. The ISS Program has a team already in place reviewing the waivers,
deviations, and exceptions to ISS requirements documentation to assess
the cumulative risk and potential impacts to the ISS.
NASA will develop a plan to incorporate a periodic review of the
waivers, deviations, and exceptions and the risk accepted by the
program. An independent review and assessment will also be an integral
part of this process.
Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Regarding the interagency space policy review that was discussed at
the hearing,
Q1. Who is heading the review?
Q2. Please list the agencies participating in the review, and identify
which individuals are representing each agency.
Q3. What are the terms of reference and the schedule for the review,
including the dates of meetings that have already taken place or are
scheduled?
Q4. How do you intend to solicit Congressional input to the review?
A1-4. Since this activity was directed by components within the
Executive Office of the President, any requests for additional
information about the review should be directed to the White House.
Q5. An October 6, 2003 story in Space News indicates that you believe
``that the Space Station can be operated and produce sufficient science
with far fewer than the six or seven astronauts initially planned.'' On
other occasions, including in meetings with me, you have indicated the
Station crew will grow beyond the current ``core complete'' complement
of three astronauts. I am left wondering about the possible range of
numbers that lie between ``far fewer than six'' but ``more than
three.''
Please state clearly your position on the number of astronauts
that will be required to support the Space Station in configurations
beyond ``core complete.''
A5. The Administrator's remarks as reported in Space News were taken
out of context. He was highlighting the fact that through new
efficiencies identified by the Program, the two-person crew on-orbit
has been able to perform both operations and utilization activities at
a level not previously envisaged. Nevertheless, the implication of his
remarks that science requirements will drive the ultimate size of the
crew on Station is consistent with what the Administrator has said
previously. In December 2002, the ISS Partnership endorsed an ISS
Configuration Option Path based on science priorities, rather than an
arbitrary number of crew. This Option Path will ultimately increase the
size of the ISS crew beyond three to meet the ISS utilization and
resource requirements that had been re-validated in 2002. As the
International Partners agreed in their December 2002 Joint Statement,
the Program should undertake a ``phased growth of ISS capabilities
(with a) significantly increased quantity of crew.''
Upon return-to-flight of the Space Shuttle, the ISS Program plans
to continue implementation of its original assembly sequence, which
includes U.S. Core Complete with the launch of Node 2; this will allow
accommodation of the remaining International Partner elements.
Capability enhancement options to accommodate a larger crew are still
under consideration. The Partnership is currently revising the ISS
Program Action Plan for Selection of an ISS Configuration. This updated
Program Action Plan will enable the Partnership to make a final
determination of the Station's configuration by December 2004.
Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson
Q1. The CAIB report leaves the clear implication that the balance
between NASA and contractors' positions, responsibility, and expertise
had shifted too far in the direction of the contractors.
Q1a. How many people will you be hiring within NASA to enable you to
meet CAIB's return-to-flight recommendations?
A1a. We are still reviewing the civil servant skill mix that will be
required to implement the CAIB Return-to-Flight recommendations, and we
will keep the Congress informed, as we better understand the necessary
augmentations to our civil service skill mix.
Q1b. Once the Shuttle has been returned to flight, how many people
will NASA need to hire in order to assure a safe Shuttle program?
A1b. After Return-to-Flight, we expect to continue supporting a larger
civil servant workforce to provide additional government oversight into
the Space Shuttle program. These new civil service positions are not
expected to come at the expense of the existing contractor workforce.
Q1c. How much will that augmented workforce cost on an annual basis?
A1c. We will have a clearer picture of the budget impact of these
personnel requirements once we fully understand the necessary
augmentations to our civil service skill mix.
Q2. Please clarify for the record the activities that have been
underway in NASA over the past 3 years to ``contract out'' or
``competitively realign'' parts of the in-house Shuttle workforce.
Specifically:
Q2a. We understand the only Shuttle positions to be contracted out
during this period were 42 FTE's associated with the Launch Processing
System (LPS) at Kennedy Space Center. Is that number correct?
A2a. Forty-two FTE's associated with the LPS were identified for
competitive realignment in NASA's Competitive Sourcing Plan. Upon
further review of the Plan, it was noted that these individuals were
already contractor employees, not civil servants. Therefore, no in-
house Shuttle workforce activities were further contracted out in this
case.
Q2b. What plans are in place or were in place at the time of the
Columbia accident to contract out or competitively realign Shuttle
positions beyond the 42 in the LPS program? How many positions were
involved?
A2b. At the time of the Columbia accident, NASA was still developing
its competitive sourcing strategy for the Space Shuttle Program (SSP).
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), in its final report,
made a series of findings and recommendations regarding the
organization and operation of the Shuttle Program, which will influence
NASA's actions in this regard. As a matter of interest, the independent
Shuttle competitive sourcing study led by RAND in 2002 determined that,
when measured by the expenditure of program funding, the Shuttle
Program is currently 92 percent outsourced.
Q2c. At the time of the Columbia accident, how was NASA complying with
annual performance goal #2H21, as stated in NASA budget submissions
from fiscal years 2002-2004, to ``continue implementation of planned
and new Shuttle privatization efforts and further efforts to safely and
effectively transfer civil service positions and responsibilities to
private industry''?
A2c. NASA was in the process of developing a competitive sourcing
strategy for the Shuttle Program that was intended to be implemented as
a follow-on to the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC). To assist
in this effort, NASA was assimilating the findings and recommendations
of a number of studies on this subject to determine an appropriate
course of action.
Q2d. At the time of the Columbia accident, how was NASA complying with
OMB's evaluation of the Shuttle program, released with the fiscal year
2004 budget, which stated ``The Administration will incorporate the
Space Shuttle in the President's Competitive Sourcing Initiative and
make adjustments in the Shuttle infrastructure to help mitigate cost
growth in Shuttle operations''?
A2d. NASA was in the process of developing a competitive sourcing
strategy for the Shuttle Program that was intended to be implemented as
a follow-on to the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC). To assist
in this effort, NASA was assimilating the findings and recommendations
of a number of studies on this subject to determine an appropriate
course of action.
Q2e. Is it true that at the time of the Columbia accident, Shuttle
Program Manager Ron Dittemore had set a goal of out-sourcing half of
the Shuttle workforce?
A2e. In a concept of privatization of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP),
which Mr. Dittemore authored in 2001, he observed that since 1993 the
NASA SSP civil service workforce had been reduced by nearly one-half as
NASA pursued privatization of the SSP through contract consolidation.
He further observed that, if privatization were to proceed, this trend
would continue. While there was considerable discussion and debate on
the subject of further privatization efforts ongoing at the time of the
Columbia accident, no firm competitive sourcing strategy (and no firm
goals for further outsourcing) had yet been established by the SSP.
Q2f. Have NASA's plans far contracting out or competitively realigning
parts of the Shuttle program changed since February 1, 2003?
A2f. As noted in the response to question 1b above, the final report of
the CAIB included several findings and recommendations regarding the
organization and operation of the Shuttle Program. While no final
determination has been made, implementing the CAIB recommendations will
influence and possibly alter NASA's competitive sourcing strategy from
the direction it was headed prior to the Columbia accident.
Q3. The CAIB report also leaves the clear implication that the Shuttle
program is under-funded. Many past members of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Committee have reached the same conclusion.
Q3a. Once the Shuttle resumes flight, will additional resources (i.e.,
above the amounts appropriated in recent years) be required to operate
it safely?
Q3b. If so, how much? If not, why not?
A3a,b. NASA accepts the conclusion of the CAIB report that the Space
Shuttle is capable of returning to flight safely. There will be
additional costs to the Space Shuttle operations budget to implement
some of the CAIB recommendations. Once the Shuttle returns to flight,
the resources required for both Shuttle operations and long-term,
strategic investments will be vetted through the normal annual budget
process.
Questions submitted by Representative Zoe Lofgren
Q1a. The Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team (SIAT) report was
issued in early 2000.
When did you first become aware of the SIAT report at either OMB
or NASA?
A1a. After the Columbia Accident, officials in the Office of Space
Flight briefed me on a number of Space Shuttle studies, including the
SIAT report.
Q1b. Did you ever ask the SIAT chairman, Dr. Henry McDonald, to brief
you on the findings and recommendations or the report? If so, when?
A1b. No.
Q1c. Did you take any specific actions in response to the SIAT report?
If so, what were they, and when?
A1c. Most of the SIAT recommendations were aimed at bringing best
practices from other high-risk organizations into the Space Shuttle
Program, (SSP). Prior to my arrival at NASA, the Space Shuttle program
had begun a series of regular senior management meetings that
specifically addressed the issues of complacency and the inherent risk
to the SSP relative to process and procedure change. After I became
NASA Administrator in 2002, this review process was expanded to include
the best practices from the Navy submarine safety programs and working
to incorporate this experience into all of NASA's programs, including
the SSP.
Since the Columbia Accident and the subsequent Columbia Accident
Board recommendations, additional measures are being taken to improve
communication and streamline the reporting process. Initial management
changes have been put into place, such as the establishment of a new
independent NASA Engineering and Safety Center, initiation of Mission
Management Team training and simulations, and a reorganization of the
Space Shuttle program to include stronger systems integration. The
Agency will take additional actions in the future as we work with
representatives from industry, academia, and other government
organizations to determine how best to institutionalize ``best
practices'' into the NASA culture.
Q2. ``Nearly two weeks after the Columbia accident you (O'Keefe)
testified to a joint House-Senate hearing that the foam impact on
Columbia was like a foam beer cooler lid falling off the back of a
pick-up truck at 50, miles per hour. The size weight (about two lbs)
and velocity (about 500 miles per hour) of the destructive foam chunk
were known by scores of NASA contractor employees within two days after
the Columbia launch, as was the fact that the impact energy was orders
of magnitude grater than that of a foam beer cooler lid traveling at 50
miles per hour.''
Q2a. Why nearly a month (actually two weeks) after the size and speed
of the foam were widely known within the agency, did you so grossly
misstate the potential foam danger in public and Congressional
appearances?
Q2b. Who advised you on this matter?
Q2c. Did any agency employee ever tell you that the analogy would be
misleading and not meaningful?
A2a,b,c. In the wake of the Columbia disaster, all of us were searching
for the reasons as to the cause of the tragedy. With intense pressure
from the press and public to understand what happened, there was much
speculation and many people, myself included, tried to put some form to
possible explanations. I do not fault any of my colleagues for
searching and trying to provide me with scenarios of the possible and
probable causes, especially not during the immediate weeks following
the Columbia disaster. At that time, there were a variety of views
among the experts about foam as a possible cause of the Columbia
accident. NASA gave the CAIB the authority and the resources necessary
to conduct a full, complete, and independent investigation into the
ultimate causes behind the accident. The CAIB did so, and its final
report provides NASA with a clear blueprint for the safe return-to-
flight of the Space Shuttle fleet.
Question submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. How quickly could NASA develop and demonstrate the capability to
transport only cargo to the Space Station without using the Space
Shuttle? What issues would need to be addressed to develop this
capability? Does NASA intend to develop such a capability? If not,
please explain. If a decision on whether or not to develop such a
capability has not been made, what are the criteria for making this
decision?
A1. On January 14, 2004, the President unveiled a new vision for space
exploration. In this new vision, the Shuttle is planned to be retired
in 2010, following the completion of its role in Space Station
assembly. The Space Shuttle's unique capabilities (rendezvous, docking
and EVA) are essential for the assembly of the remaining modules and
components of the International Space Station. NASA will acquire cargo
transportation as soon as practical and affordable to support missions
to and from the International Space Station; and acquire crew
transportation to and from the International Space Station, as
required, after the Space Shuttle is retired from service.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Admiral Harold Gehman (retired), Chairman, Columbia
Accident Investigation Board
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
Q1. What recommendations do you have to strengthen the effectiveness
of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP)? Are changes to the
statute establishing the ASAP necessary? If so, please explain.
A1. The Board did not investigate the ASAP. However, it was clear that
the yearly report of the ASAP was not being utilized by NASA in any
great detail.
Q2. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that NASA
upgrade the ascent tracking cameras and that the operational status of
these cameras should be a Launch Commit Criteria. NASA has announced
the intent to launch during daylight hours. Was it the Board's intent
to limit the Shuttle to daylight launches? What issues would need to be
addressed prior to attempting a night launch?
A2. The Board never directed NASA that the only launches could be
accomplished during the daylight hours. We did make solid
recommendations on making sure that proper photography was being
recorded on launches to monitor debris hits on the Orbiter. The Board
simply stated the requirement to have three useful views of the orbiter
during every ascent. The Board did not address how to obtain these
three useful views during a night launch and does not have the
technical expertise in this area to make additional observations about
the issues of imaging during a night launch.
Q3. In your testimony, you stated, ``that when you build a crew
transport capsule, that you are also going to have to get some kind of
propulsion system to get it up there. Just sticking this thing on top
of a Delta IV is not going to do it.'' On what basis is this conclusion
based? Would a Delta IV or other similar vehicle satisfy the
requirements for safety, if a crew escape system were made part of the
crew transport capability? Would you have separate, more lenient,
safety requirements for loss of mission than for loss of crew?
A3. The Board recommended that the Shuttle be replaced ASAP as the main
means of getting manned space programs to orbit. Instead of just taking
off the shelf propulsion systems to get something to orbit, NASA needs
to look at its vision, move to the concept of operations, outline the
requirements and capabilities (to include crew escape) and finally
determine the platform that would meet the needs of manned space
flight.
Question submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Q1. One of the CAIB's return-to-flight requirements is the development
of an emergency repair capability for the ``widest possible range of
damage to the Thermal Protection System, including both tile and
Reinforced Carbon-Carbon.'' NASA officials now indicate that they might
not be able to comply with that recommendation in the near-term for
holes the size of the one that opened on Columbia's leading edge.
Does the CRIB still stand by its recommendation that the Shuttle
should not fly until such a repair capability is available?
A1. The Board was very clear on this issue--``. . .develop a
practicable capability to inspect and effect emergency repairs to the
widest possible range of damage to the TPS, including tile and RCC.. .
.'' The Board stands by that recommendation. The Return-to-Flight group
will need to determine if the intent of the recommendation has been
met.
Question submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. The CAIB report discussed at length the pressure exerted by senior
NASA management to meet the February 19, 2004 milestone for Space
Station ``Core Complete.'' Do you agree with the Administrator's
explanation that there was no schedule pressure since no recent Shuttle
mission launched on time, or do you think that the evidence shows that
each Shuttle launch delay simply added to the schedule pressure
perceived by the NASA workforce?
A1. Insidious scheduling pressure was evident to the Board during many
interviews of NASA personnel by Board personnel. While this pressure
may not have been evident at senior levels in NASA HQ, it was clear the
SSP felt the pressure of making the Node 2 deadline from the Program
Manager down to the shop worker at KSC. The Board found sufficient
evidence that schedule pressure was felt at the working level.
Question submitted by Representative Nick Lampson
Q1. In a response to a question by Mr. Barton on the potential
availability of a replacement vehicle for crew transport, you stated:
``Sir, don't forget to include in your estimates that when you
build a crew transport capsule, that you also are going to have
to get some kind of propulsion system to get up there. And just
sticking this thing on the top of a Delta IV is not going to do
it.''
Please elaborate on what you meant by ``just sticking this thing
on the top of a Delta IV is not going to do it.'' What is your concern,
and what do you think will need to be done to address that concern?
A1. This statement addresses a concern that the next launch vehicle is
designed with specific set of requirements in mind for a manned space
vehicle. While any number of solutions are possible to this problem,
including the modification of unmanned systems for use in the manned
space program, this can't be done without first considering the mission
requirements of our next launch vehicle.
The Board recommended that the Shuttle be replaced ASAP as the main
means of getting manned space programs to orbit. Instead of just taking
off the shelf propulsion systems to get something to orbit, NASA needs
to look at its vision, move to the concept of operations, outline the
requirements and capabilities (to include crew escape) and finally
determine the platform that would meet the needs of manned space
flight.
Questions submitted by Representative Zoe Lofgren
Q1a. What budget documents did you receive from NASA or OMB that
detailed upgrade requests from the Shuttle or Safety programs to the
NASA Headquarters budget office, from NASA to OMB, pass-backs from OMB
to NASA, or initial OMB guidance to NASA on the preparation of human
space flight budget requests?
How hard did the CAIB push to get these documents?
A1a. Executive privilege protects pre-decisional, NASA-executive office
communications. We could have requested such information from NASA, but
we were advised by NASA general counsel's office that the request would
have been denied on the basis of executive privilege.
Q1b. Did anyone advise you not to pursue the budget document requests?
If so, who?
A1b. Executive privilege protects pre-decisional NASA-executive office
communications. We could have requested such information from NASA, but
we were advised by NASA general counsel's office that the request would
have been denied on the basis of executive privilege.
Questions submitted by Representative Chris Bell
Q1. Administrator O'Keefe has been quoted in the press [Space News, 9/
1/03, page 1] saying that ``the demand--the clarion call'' of your
report is that NASA should accelerate its proposed Orbital Space Plane
(OSP) program. However, your report states that the Board ``does not
suggest what the next vehicle should look like.'' A Committee hearing
held earlier this year identified serious questions about NASA's
approach to its OSP program, including the cost uncertainty surrounding
the OSP, the relatively low level of improvement in crew safety being
sought in the OSP program, and whether OSP is the most appropriate
approach to moving beyond the Shuttle.
Q1a. Is Administrator O'Keefe making an accurate characterization of
your report as demanding that NASA accelerate the Orbital Space Plane
program currently being proposed to Congress?
A1a. The Board recommended that the Shuttle be replaced as the main
means of getting man to Low Earth Orbit as soon as possible. However,
we did not state what the solution should be--we did not tell NASA how
to do it but what to do. This was centered on a criticism that NASA has
been too platform centric and needed to revise its thinking by
developing a systematic process of starting with a vision, then
developing a concept of operations, move to a listing of requirements
and capabilities, and then and only then do you outline what platform
will answer the question of what the next space platform should look
like.
Q1b. Regarding the CAIB's finding that the U.S. should develop a
replacement vehicle for the Shuttle's crew-carrying capability, if NASA
develops a crew transfer vehicle to replace the crew-carrying
capability of the Shuttle, how many flights will be required before it
would cease being considered developmental and would become
operational?
A1b. After 113 flights, the Board felt that the Shuttle Program was not
operational. The Shuttle was still a research and development vehicle
in an era of aging spacecraft, an era mankind has never experienced so
there was still learning being gathered on every SSP flight. This
question is well outside the technical ability of the Board to answer.
Q1c. The CRIB has recommended that NASA have an autonomous on-orbit
TPS inspection and repair capability on the Shuttle. Should that also
be a requirement for any follow-on crew transfer vehicle?
A1c. The Board recommended that the Shuttle be replaced as the main
means of getting man to Low Earth Orbit as soon as possible. However,
we did not state what the solution should be--we did not tell NASA how
to do it but what to do. This was centered on a criticism that NASA has
been too platform centric and needed to revise its thinking by
developing a systematic process of starting with a vision, then
developing a concept of operations, move to a listing of requirements
and capabilities, and then and only then do you outline what platform
will answer the question of what the next space platform should look
like.
Appendix 2:
----------
Additional Material for the Record
Stafford-Covey Task Group Biographies
Col. James C. Adamson, U.S. Army (Ret.)
CEO, Monarch Precision, LLC, Consulting firm
Background: Astronaut (STS-28 & 43); President,
Allied Signal Systems Technical Services Corporation, which
later became Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc. (retired,
March 2001); Chief Operating Officer United Space Alliance
(1995-1999). Current member, NASA Advisory Council Task Force
on ISS Operational Readiness.
Maj. Gen. Bill Anders, USAF Reserve (Ret.)
Retired Chair and CEO of General Dynamics Corp. (1990-1994)
Background: Astronaut (Apollo 8); Executive Secretary
of the Aeronautics & Space Council; Chairman of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; Vice President of General Electric; U.S.
Ambassador to Norway; Member, National Academy of Engineering;
President, Heritage Flight Museum.
Dr. Walter Broadnax
President Clark University, Atlanta, Ga.
Background: Just prior to coming to Clark, he was
Dean of the School of Public Affairs at American University in
Washington. Previously, he was Professor of Public Policy and
Management in the School of Public Affairs at the University of
Maryland, College Park, Md., where he also directed The Bureau
of Governmental Research.
RADM Walter H. Cantrell, USN (Ret.)
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Background: Commander, Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command; Executive Director, Technology and Systems,
and later President of Signal Processing Systems Division at
Global Associates Limited; Program Director, Land Level
Transfer Facility, Bath Iron Works, responsible for the design
and construction of a $260M state-of-the-art shipbuilding
facility.
Dr. Kathryn Clark
Vice President for Education at TIVY, Inc.
Background: Clark is also consultant in the fields of
space, oceans and education. She consults for the Jean-Michel
Cousteau Society, the National Marine Sanctuaries, and the Sea
World--Hubbs Institute to enhance the study of oceans and
marine wildlife and use the data for education and awareness of
the environment of the seas.
Mr. Benjamin A. Cosgrove
Senior Vice President, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (Retired)
Background: 44 years at Boeing as engineer and
manager associated with almost all Boeing jet aircraft
programs, including chief project engineer and director of
engineering for the 767 program. Current member, NASA Advisory
Council Task Force on ISS Operational Readiness.
Mr. Richard O. Covey, USAF (Ret.)
Co-Chairman, NASA Return-to-Flight Task Group
Vice President, Support Operations, Boeing Homeland Security and
Services
Background: Astronaut (STS-51l, STS-26, STS-38, STS-
61); test pilot; held key management positions in the Astronaut
Office and Flight Crew Operations.
Dan L. Crippen, Ph.D.
Former Director of the Congressional Budget Office
Background: Chief Counsel and Economic Policy Adviser
to the U.S. Senate Majority Leader; Domestic Policy Advisor and
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs; Senior Vice
President of the consulting firm The Duberstein Group;
Principal in the consulting firm Washington Counsel.
Mr. Joseph W. Cuzzupoli
Vice President and K-1 Program Manager, Kistler Aerospace Corporation
Background: Aerospace engineer and manager for over
40 years. Vice President and Program Manager for Space Shuttle
Orbiter Project for Rockwell International during development
and served earlier as an Assistant Program Manager on Apollo.
Current Member, NAC Task Force on ISS Operational Readiness.
Charles C. Daniel, Ph.D.
Engineering Consultant
Background: Over 35 years experience as an engineer
and manager in the fields of space flight vehicle design,
analysis, integration and test at the Marshall Space Flight
Center--from Saturn V to ISS. He was SRB flight operations lead
for STS-1 through STS-8 and Chief Engineer for Space Station.
Current member, NASA Advisory Council Task Force on ISS
Operational Readiness.
Richard Danzig, Ph.D.
A Director of National Semiconductor Corporation, Human Genome
Sciences, and Saffron Hill Ventures
Background: Former Secretary and Under Secretary of
the Navy. Former partner at the law firm of Latham and Watkins.
Current Chairman of the Board of the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, Senior Fellow at the CNA Corporation,
and member of the NASA Advisory Council.
Dr. Amy K. Donahue
An Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the University of
Connecticut Institute of Public Affairs
Background: Under the Intergovernmental Personnel
Act, Donahue serves as Senior Advisor to the NASA Administrator
for Homeland Security. She teaches graduate courses in public
organizations and management, policy analysis,
intergovernmental relations, and research methods.
Gen. Ron Fogleman, USAF Ret.
President and Chief Operating Officer of Durango Aerospace Incorporated
Background: Former Chief of Staff of the United
States Air Force. Managed the Air Mobility Command and served
as Commander and Chief, U.S. Transportation Command. Current
member of the NASA Advisory Council.
Col. Gary S. Geyer, USAF (Ret.)
Consultant
Background: 35 years experience in space engineering
and program management, primarily in senior positions in the
government and industry. Served for 26 years with the National
Reconnaissance Office. Named NRO 2000 Pioneer. Vice President
for Lockheed Martin on major classified programs.
Maj. Gen. Ralph H. Jacobson, USAF (Ret.)
Consultant
Background: USAF Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for
Space Shuttle Development and Operations and later as Director
of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force.
President Emeritus, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory. Current
member, NASA Advisory Council Task Force on ISS Operational
Readiness.
Mr. Richard Kohrs
Chief Engineer, Kistler Aerospace Corporation
Background: Over 40 years of experience in systems
engineering and integration of NASA Apollo, Shuttle, and Space
Station programs. Managed the daily engineering, processing,
and operations activities of the Shuttle program from 1985
through 1989. Director of Space Station Freedom in 1989 with
overall responsibility for development and operation. Prior to
joining Kistler in 1997, he was Director of the ANSER Center
for International Aerospace Cooperation.
Susan M. Livingstone
Policy & Management Consultant
Background: She serves as a member of the National
Security Studies Board of Advisors (Maxwell School, Syracuse
University), is again a board member of the Procurement Round
Table and was appointed to NASA's Return-to-Flight Task Group
for safe return of Shuttle flight operations.
Mr. James D. Lloyd
Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance,
NASA
Background: Extensive background in system safety
engineering and management for U.S. Army research and
development programs. Came to NASA in aftermath of Challenger
to help reconstitute the NASA safety and mission assurance
program. Recently selected as the Deputy AA for the Office of
Safety and Mission Assurance.
Lt. General Forrest S. McCartney, USAF (Ret.)
Consultant
Background: Former Director of Kennedy Space Center
(1986-1992). Lockheed Martin Vice President for Launch
Operations, responsible for the Atlas, Titan, and Athena launch
operations/activities at Cape Canaveral, Florida, and
Vandenberg Air Force Base. USAF Program Director for several
major satellite programs. Current Vice Chairman, NASA Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel.
Rosemary O'Leary J.D., Ph.D.
Professor of public administration & political science at the Maxwell
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University
Background: An elected member of the U.S. National
Academy of Public Administration, she was recently a senior
Fulbright scholar conducting research on environmental policy
in Malaysia. O'Leary was professor of public and environmental
affairs at Indiana University and co-founder and co-director of
the Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute.
Mr. David Raspet
Consultant
Background: Former senior manager, USAF, McDonnell-
Douglas and Boeing. Experiences include leading the Future
Imaging Architecture Space Segment IPT, and working on EELV
Program Mission Assurance and Titan IVB-30 Readiness.
Dr. Decatur B. Rogers, P.E.
Dean, Tennessee State University College of Engineering, Technology and
Computer Science
Background: Since 1988, Dr. Rogers has served as the
Dean, College of Engineering, Technology and Computer Science
and Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Tennessee State
University in Nashville, Tenn. Rogers served in professorship
and dean positions at Florida State University, Tallahassee,
Fla., Prairie View A&M University, Prairie View, Texas, and
Federal City College, Washington.
Mr. Sy Rubenstein
Aerospace Consultant
Background: Former Rockwell International and
McDonnell Douglas Employee. Served as President Rockwell
International Space Systems Division responsible for Space
Shuttle and Space Station activities. Former Vice President of
Engineering and Orbiter Chief Engineer during the development
and early operations of the Space Shuttle. Over 25 years of
experience in the design, development and operation of manned
space systems.
Mr. Robert Sieck
Aerospace Consultant
Background: Former Director of Shuttle Processing,
Kennedy Space Center. Served as Launch Director for 52 Space
Shuttle launches and has been an engineer on aerospace projects
including Gemini, Apollo, and the Space Shuttle. Current member
of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
Lt. General Thomas Stafford, USAF (Ret.)
Co-Chairman, NASA Return-to-Flight Task Group
President, Stafford, Burke & Hecker Inc., technical consulting
Background: Astronaut (Gemini 6A, Gemini 9A, Apollo
10, CDR of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project); Commandant of the
USAF Flight Test Center; Deputy Chief of Staff, Research,
Development and Acquisition at USAF HQ; served as a consultant
to the President in various capacities and to NASA for the
coordination of Shuttle-Mir activities. Current Chairman, NASA
Advisory Council Task Force on International Space Station
Operational Readiness.
Tom Tate
Vice president of legislative affairs for the Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA)
Background: With AIA, the trade association
representing the Nation's manufacturers of commercial, military
and business aircraft, helicopters, aircraft engines, missiles,
spacecraft, and related components, he directs the activities
of the association's Office of Legislative Affairs.
Mr. William Wegner
Consultant
Background: Naval nuclear propulsion authority.
Deputy Director to Admiral Rickover in Nuclear Navy Program.
Founded Basic Energy Technology Associates and consulted in the
area of civilian nuclear power plant safety. Board of
Directors, Detroit Edison.
Mr. David Lengyel
Executive Secretary, Return-to-Flight Task Group
Background: Executive Director of the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel. Former Manager of NASA's Moscow
Technical Liaison Office. Several years' experience with ISS,
Shuttle-Mir Programs. Extensive knowledge of Columbia Accident
Investigation Board work.
STAFFORD-COVEY TASK GROUP MEMBERS
Colonel James C. Adamson, U.S. Army (Ret.):
CEO, Monarch Precision, LLC, Consulting firm
Colonel Adamson, a former astronaut, has an extensive background in
aerodynamics as well as business management. He received his Bachelor
of Science degree in Engineering from the U.S. Military Academy at West
Point and his Master's degree in Aerospace Engineering from Princeton
University. He returned to West Point as an Assistant Professor of
Aerodynamics until selected to attend the Navy Test Pilot School at
Patuxent River, Md. in 1979. In 1981 he became Aerodynamics Officer for
the Space Shuttle Operational Flight Test Program at the Johnson Space
Center's Mission Control Center. Colonel Adamson became an astronaut in
1984 and flew two missions, one aboard Columbia (STS-28) and the second
aboard Atlantis (STS-43).
After retiring from NASA in 1992, he created his own consulting
firm, Monarch Precision, and was then recruited by Lockheed as
President/CEO of Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company. In 1995 he
helped create United Space Alliance and became their first Chief
Operating Officer, where he remained until 1999. In late 1999, Colonel
Adamson was again recruited to serve as President/CEO of Allied Signal
Technical Services Corporation, which later became Honeywell Technology
Solutions, Inc. Retiring from Honeywell in 2001, Colonel Adamson
resumed part-time consulting with his own company, Monarch Precision,
LLC. In addition to corporate board positions, he has served as a
member of the NASA Advisory Council Task Force on Shuttle-Mir
Rendezvous and Docking Missions and is currently a member of the NASA
Advisory Council Task Force on International Space Station Operational
Readiness.
Maj. Gen. Bill Anders, USAF Reserve (Ret.):
Upon graduation in 1955, as an electrical engineer, from the United
States Naval Academy, General Anders earned his pilot's wings in 1956.
He received a graduate degree in nuclear engineering from the U.S. Air
Force (USAF) Institute of Technology while concurrently graduating with
honors in aeronautical engineering from Ohio State University. In 1963,
he was selected for the astronaut corps. He was the Lunar Module Pilot
of Apollo 8 and backup Command Module Pilot for Apollo 11. Among other
successful public and private endeavors, General Anders has served as a
Presidential appointee to the Aeronautics & Space Council, the Atomic
Energy Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (where he was the
first chairman), and as U.S. Ambassador to Norway.
Subsequent to his public service, he joined the General Dynamics
Corporation, as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (1990-1993) and
was awarded the National Security Industrial Association's ``CEO of the
Year'' award.
During his distinguished career, General Anders was the co-holder
of several world flight records and has received numerous awards
including the USAF, NASA, and Atomic Energy Commission's Distinguished
Service Medals. He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering,
the Society of Experimental Test Pilots, and the Experimental Aircraft
Association as well as the founder and President of the Heritage Flight
Museum.
Dr. Walter Broadnax:
He is President of Clark Atlanta University in Atlanta. Just prior
to coming to Clark, he was Dean of the, School of Public Affairs at
American University in Washington. Previously, he was Professor of
Public Policy and Management in the School of Public Affairs at the
University of Maryland, College Park, Md., where he also directed The
Bureau of Governmental Research. Before joining the University of
Maryland faculty, Broadnax served as Deputy Secretary and Chief
Operating Officer of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;
President, Center for Governmental Research, Inc., in Rochester, N.Y.;
President, New York State Civil Service Commission; Lecturer and
Director, Innovations in State and Local Government Programs in the
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University; Senior Staff
Member, The Brookings Institution; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare; Director, Children, Youth and Adult Services, State of Kansas
and Professor, The Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Va.
He is one of America's leading scholar-practitioners in the field
of public policy and management. He has published widely in the field
and served in leadership positions in various professional
associations: American Political Science Association, American Public
Personnel Association, Association of Public Policy and Management,
National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration,
National Association of State Personnel Executives and the American
Society for Public Administration.
Broadnax received his Ph.D. from the Maxwell School at Syracuse
University, his B.A. from Washburn University and his M.P.A from the
University of Kansas. He is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public
Administration and a former trustee of the Academy's Board. In March,
he was installed as President of the American Society for Public
Administration for (2003-2004). He is a member of the Syracuse
University Board of Trustees, Harvard University's Taubman Center
Advisory Board and United States Comptroller General Advisory Board. He
has also served on several corporate and nonprofit boards of directors
including the CNA Corporation, Keycorp Bank, Medecision Inc., Rochester
General Hospital, Rochester United Way, the Ford Foundation/Harvard
University Innovations in State and Local Government Program, the
Maxwell School Advisory Board and the National Blue Ribbon Commission
on Youth Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform in the District of
Columbia.
RADM Walter H. Cantrell, USN (Ret.):
Admiral Cantrell has a long history of successfully solving high
profile, technical issues. He is frequently asked to conduct reviews of
complex, politically sensitive programs and to make recommendations for
corrective actions.
He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1958 with a Bachelor of
Science degree in Naval Science. He also received a Master's degree in
Naval Architecture, Marine and Naval Engineering and a NavEng
(Professional Degree) from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in
1965. He is a graduate of the Senior Officials in National Security
Program, JFK School of Government at Harvard. After an extensive and
distinguished naval career, he retired in 1995.
He then joined Global Associates Limited as Executive Director for
Technology and Systems. From 1996-1997 he was President of the Signal
Processing Systems Division. Most recently, from 1997-2001, he was
Program Director, Land Level Transfer Facility, Bath Iron Works, and
was responsible for the design and construction of a $260M state-of-
the-art shipbuilding facility. Admiral Cantrell currently serves on
NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
Dr. Kathryn Clark:
Kathryn Clark is the Vice President for Education at TIVY, Inc., an
exciting game that combines strategy and mathematics in a manner that
makes learning fun. Organized competitions for the game have provided a
strong motivation for students to improve their skills, resulting in
increased standardized math scores. Baseball TIVY has competitions at
professional baseball games, with competitors and their parents
receiving free tickets to the game. Space TIVY has a National
Tournament on Space Day at the National Air & Space Museum the 1st
Thursday in May each year.
Clark is also consultant in the fields of space, oceans and
education. She consults for the Jean-Michel Cousteau Society, the
National Marine Sanctuaries, and the Sea World--Hubbs Institute to
enhance the study of oceans and marine wildlife and use the data for
education and awareness of the environment of the seas.
She recently completed a job for the Michigan Virtual High School
to aid in the development of the Math, Science and Technology Academy.
She worked on the vision and mission of the Academy as well as the
development of partners as they increase the scope and reach of the
program to a national and international scale. Clark recently resigned
from her job as NASA's Chief Scientist for the Human Exploration &
Development of Space Enterprise.
Having completed a two-year term as NASA's Chief Scientist for the
International Space Station Program, she became the HEDS Chief
Scientist in August 2000. She was on leave from the University of
Michigan Medical School. As Chief Scientist, Clark worked with
scientists from all other areas of NASA to communicate research needs
and look for possible collaboration among the science programs at NASA.
She also assisted with education and outreach activities related to any
human space flight endeavors, including the International Space
Station, the Shuttle, any expendable launch vehicles intended to
further human endeavors in space, and future missions to the Moon and
Mars. Clark's particular interest is in ``Human Factors;'' all the
elements necessary for the health, safety, and efficiency of crews
involved in long duration space flight. These include training,
interfacing with machines and robotics, biological countermeasures for
the undesirable physical changes associated with space flight, and the
psychological issues that may occur in response to the closed,
dangerous environments while traveling in space or living on other
planets.
She received both her Master's and Doctoral degrees from the
University of Michigan and then joined the faculty in the Department of
Cell and Developmental Biology in 1993. She also served as the Deputy
Director of the NASA Commercial Space Center, The Center for
Microgravity Automation Technology from 1996-1998. CMAT provides
imaging technology for use on the Space Station. The primary commercial
focus of that Center is on using high fidelity imaging technology for
science and education.
Clark's scientific interests are focused on neuromuscular
development and adaptation to altered environments. Experiments are
performed at the tissue level and include immunocytochemistry and in
situ hybridization of skeletal muscle and spinal cord grown both in
vivo and in vitro. Clark's experience with NASA began with a
neuromuscular development study (NIH.R1) that flew on STS-66 in
November of 1994. These experiments were repeated and augmented
(NIH.R2) on STS-70 in July of 1995. She was also involved in the
Neurolab project flown on STS-90 in May of 1998 and the aforementioned
ladybug experiment that flew on STS-93 with Commander Eileen Collins.
Clark is the Chair of the Academic Affairs Committee of Board of
Control of Michigan Tech University, the Chair of the Board of Visitors
of Western Reserve Academy, and serves on the boards of The Space Day
Foundation and Orion's Quest, both education oriented not-for-profit
organizations.
She is a past member of the Board of Directors of Women in
Aerospace, is an airplane pilot and member of the 99's (the
International Society of Women Pilots), and an avid cyclist, swimmer,
and cross-country skier. She owns a jazz club in Ann Arbor. She is
married to Dr. Robert Ike, a rheumatologist at the University of
Michigan Medical School.
Mr. Benjamin A. Cosgrove:
Consultant
Benjamin Cosgrove has a long and distinguished career as an
engineer and manager associated with most of Boeing jet aircraft
programs. His extensive background in aerospace stress and structures
includes having served as a stress engineer or structural unit chief on
the B-47, B-52, KC-135, 707, 727, 737, and 747 jetliners. He was Chief
Engineer of the 767.
He was honored by Aviation Week and Space Technology for his role
in converting the Boeing 767 transport design from a three-man to a
two-man cockpit configuration and received the Ed Wells Technical
Management Award for addressing aging aircraft issues. He received the
National Aeronautics Association's prestigious Wright Brothers Memorial
Trophy in 1991 for his lifetime contributions to commercial aviation
safety and for technical achievement. He is a member of the National
Academy of Engineering and a fellow of both the AIAA and England's
Royal Aeronautical Society. Having retired from his position as Senior
Vice President of the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group in 1993 after 44
years of service, he is now a consultant. He holds a Bachelor of
Science degree in Aeronautical Engineering and received an honorary
Doctorate of Engineering degree from the University of Notre Dame in
1993. Cosgrove is a member of the NASA Advisory Committee's Task Force
on International Space Station Operational Readiness.
Mr. Richard O. Covey, USAF (Ret.):
Co-Chair, Return-to-Flight Task Group
Vice President, Support Operations, Boeing Homeland Security and
Services
Richard Covey, a veteran of four Space Shuttle flights, has over 35
years of aerospace experience in both the private and public sectors.
He piloted STS-26, the first flight after the Challenger accident, and
was commander of STS-61, the acclaimed Endeavor/Hubble Space Telescope
first service and repair mission.
Covey is a highly decorated combat pilot and Outstanding Graduate
of the Air Force Test Pilot School, holds a Bachelor of Science degree
in Engineering Sciences from the USAF Academy and a Master of Science
degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics from Purdue University.
He served as the USAF Joint Test Force Director for F-15 electronic
warfare systems developmental and production verification testing.
During his distinguished 16-year career at NASA, he held key management
positions in the Astronaut Office and Flight Crew Operations
Directorate at JSC. Covey left NASA and retired from the Air Force in
1994.
In his position at Boeing, his organization provides system
engineering, facility/system maintenance and operations, and spacecraft
operations and launch support to commercial, Department of Defense and
other U.S. government space and communication programs throughout the
world. Prior to his current position, Covey was Vice President of
Boeing's Houston Operations.
He has been the recipient of numerous awards such as: two
Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medals, the Department of
Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, five Air Force
Distinguished Flying Crosses, 16 Air Medals, the Air Force Meritorious
Service Medal, the Air Force Commendation Medal, the National
Intelligence Medal of Achievement, the NASA Distinguished Service
Medal, the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal, the NASA Exceptional
Service Medal, and the Goddard and Collier Trophies for his role on
STS-61.
Dan L. Crippen, Ph.D.:
Former Director of the Congressional Budget Office
Dr. Dan Crippen has a strong reputation for objective and
insightful analysis. He served, until January 3rd of this year, as the
fifth Director of the Congressional Budget Office. His public service
positions also include Chief Counsel and Economic Policy Adviser to the
Senate Majority Leader (1981-1985); Deputy Assistant to the President
for Domestic Policy (1987-1988); and Domestic Policy Advisor and
Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy (1988-1989), where he
advised the President on all issues relating to domestic policy,
including the preparation and presentation of the federal budget. He
has provided service to several national commissions, including
membership on the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement.
Crippen has substantial experience in the private sector as well.
Before joining the Congressional Budget Office, he was a principal with
Washington Counsel, a law and consulting firm. He has also served as
Executive Director of the Merrill Lynch International Advisory Council
and as a founding partner and Senior Vice President of The Duberstein
Group.
He received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of South
Dakota in 1974, a Master of Arts from Ohio State University in 1976,
and Doctor of Philosophy degree in Public Finance from Ohio State in
1981.
Mr. Joseph W. Cuzzupoli:
Vice President and K-1 Program Manager, Kistler Aerospace Corporation
Joseph Cuzzupoli brings to the Task Group more than 40 years of
aerospace engineering and managerial experience. He began his career
with General Dynamics as Launch Director (1959-1962), and then became
Manager of Manufacturing/Engineering and Director of Test Operations
for Rockwell International (1962-1966). Cuzzupoli directed all
functions in the building and testing of Apollo 6, Apollo 8, Apollo 9
and Apollo 12 flights as Rockwell's Assistant Program Manager for the
Apollo Program; he later was Vice President of Operations. In 1978, he
became the Vice President and Program Manager for the Space Shuttle
Orbiter Project and was responsible for 5000 employees in the
development of the Shuttle.
He left Rockwell in 1980 and consulted on various aerospace
projects for NASA centers until 1991 when he joined American Pacific
Corporation as Senior Vice President. In his current position at
Kistler Aerospace (Vice President and Program Manager, 1996-present) he
has primary responsibility for design and production of the K-1
reusable launch vehicle. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in
Mechanical Engineering from the Maine Maritime Academy, a Bachelor of
Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of
Connecticut and a Certificate of Management/Business Administration
from the University of Southern California.
He was a member of the NASA Advisory Council's Task Force on
Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions and is a current member of
the NASA Advisory Council's Task Force on International Space Station
Operational Readiness.
Charles C. Daniel, Ph.D.:
Engineering Consultant
Dr. Charles Daniel has over 35 years experience as an engineer and
manager in the fields of space flight vehicle design, analysis,
integration and testing; he has been involved in aerospace programs
from Saturn V to the International Space Station. In 1968, he began his
career at Marshall Space Flight Center where he supported Saturn
Instrument Unit operations for Apollo 11, 12, and 13. In 1971, he
performed avionics integration work for the Skylab program and spent
the next decade developing avionics for the solid rocket boosters. He
was SRB flight operations lead in that activity.
Daniel worked as part of the original Space Station Skunk Works for
definition of the initial space station concept and developed the
Master engineering schedule for the Station.
Following the Challenger accident, he led the evaluation of all
Hazards Analyses associated with Shuttle and coordinated acceptance
analyses associated with the modifications to the SRMs and SRBs. During
Space Station Freedom development, he was the avionics lead and served
as MSFC lead for Level II assembly and configuration development. Dr.
Daniel was part of the initial group to define the concept for Russian
participation in the Space Station Restructure activity and later
returned to MSFC as Chief Engineer for Space Station.
Daniel holds a Doctorate degree in Engineering and has completed
postgraduate work at the University of California, Berkeley and MIT. He
was a member of the NAC Task Force on Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and
Docking Operations and is a member of the NASA Advisory Council Task
Force, ISS Operational Readiness.
Richard Danzig, J.D., Ph.D.:
A Director of National Semiconductor Corporation, Human Genome
Sciences, and Saffron Hill Ventures
Dr. Richard Danzig, former Under Secretary of the Navy (1993-1997)
and Secretary of the Navy (1998-2001), has vast and varied expertise in
law, business, military and government operations, as well as national
service. He is currently a Director of the National Semiconductor
Corporation and a Director of Human Genome Sciences. He also serves as
a consultant to the Department of Defense and other federal agencies
regarding response to terrorism and is Chairman of the Board of the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment.
Danzig holds a J.D. degree from Yale Law School and Bachelor and
Doctorate of Philosophy degrees from Oxford University, where he was a
Rhodes Scholar. He served as a law clerk for U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Byron White. In the 1970s, he was an Associate Professor of Law at
Stanford University, a ,Prize Fellow at Harvard and a Rockefeller
Foundation Fellow. He later served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and then as the
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve
Affairs, and Logistics. Between 1981 and 1993, he was a partner in the
law firm of Latham and Watkins, co-authored a book on national service,
and taught a law class at Georgetown University Law School. He has
written a book, Joseph's Way, on innovation in large organizations,
which will be published in 2004.
During his distinguished public career at DOD, Danzig received the
Defense Distinguished Public Service Award, the highest Department of
Defense civilian award, three times. He is a Member of the NASA
Advisory Council.
Dr. Amy K. Donahue, Ph.D.:
Dr. Amy K. Donahue is Assistant Professor of Public Administration
at the University of Connecticut Institute of Public Affairs.
She teaches graduate courses in public organizations and
management, policy analysis, intergovernmental relations, and research
methods. Donahue's research focuses on the productivity of emergency
services organizations and on the nature of citizen demand for public
safety services. She is author of published work about the design,
management, and finance of fire departments and other public agencies.
Donahue serves as a consultant for local governments seeking to improve
the structure and management of their fire and emergency services.
Under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, Donahue serves as Senior
Advisor to the NASA Administrator for Homeland Security. She functions
as NASA's liaison with the Department of Homeland Security and the
Homeland Security Council. She also works within NASA to discern
opportunities to contribute to homeland security efforts government-
wide, including evaluating existing projects and identifying new
opportunities for interagency collaboration targeted at homeland
security. She recently spent three months in the field in Texas
managing the Columbia recovery operation.
Previously, Donahue was a senior research associate at the Alan K.
Campbell Public Affairs Institute at Syracuse University. She conducted
research and analysis in support of the Government Performance Project,
a five-year initiative funded by the Pew Charitable,Trusts to evaluate
comprehensively performance of Federal, State, and local government
management systems. She developed conceptual models and evaluation
criteria, designed written survey instruments for administration to
governments and agencies, and conducted data analysis.
Donahue has 20 years of field experience and training in an array
of emergency services-related fields, including managing a 911
communications center, and working as a firefighter and emergency
medical technician in Fairbanks, Ala., and upstate New York.
As an officer in the U.S. Army Medical Service Corps, she spent
four years on active duty in the 6th Infantry Division, where her
positions included Main Support Battalion Training and Operations
Officer, Officer-in-Charge of the division's Forward Surgical Team, and
Chief of Mobilization, Education, Training and Security at Bassett Army
Hospital.
Donahue holds her Ph.D. in Public Administration and her M.P.A.
from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse
University, and her B.A. in Geological and Geophysical Sciences from
Princeton University.
She has been honored with the National Association of Schools of
Public Affairs and Administration Dissertation Award, the Syracuse
University Doctoral Prize, the Jon Ben Snow Graduate Fellowship in
Nonprofit Management at Syracuse University, the Arthur F. Buddington
Award for Excellence in the Earth Sciences at Princeton University, and
several military awards, including the Meritorious Service Medal, three
Army Commendation Medals, the Expert Field Medical Badge, Air Assault
Badge, and Basic Military Parachutist Badge.
General Ron Fogleman, USAF (Ret.):
President and Chief Operating Officer of Durango Aerospace Incorporated
General Fogleman has vast experience in air and space operations,
expertise in long-range programming and strategic planning, and
extensive training in fighter and mobility aircraft. He served in the
USAF for 34 years, culminating in his appointment as Chief of Staff,
until his retirement in 1997. Fogleman has served as a military advisor
to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the
President.
Among other advisory boards, he is a member of the National Defense
Policy Board, the NASA Advisory Council, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Advisory Board, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the
congressionally directed Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization. He is chairing a National
Research Council Committee on Aeronautics Research and Technology for
Vision 2050: An Integrated Transportation System.
Fogleman received a Master's Degree in Military History from the
U.S. Air Force Academy, a Master's Degree in Political Science from
Duke University, and graduated from the Army War College. He has been
awarded several military decorations including: Defense Distinguished
Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters; the Air Force Distinguished
Service Medal with oak leaf cluster; both the Army and Navy
Distinguished Service Medals; Silver Star; Purple Heart; Meritorious
Service Medal; and two Distinguished Flying Crosses.
Col. Gary S. Geyer, USAF (Ret.):
Consultant
Colonel Geyer has 35 years of experience in space engineering and
program management, primarily in senior positions in the government and
industry that emphasize management and system engineering. He has been
responsible for all aspects of systems' success, including schedule,
cost, and technical performance.
He served for 26 years with the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) and was the NRO System Program Office Director for two major
programs, which encompassed the design, manufacture, test, launch, and
operation of several of our nation's most important reconnaissance
satellites. Geyer received the NRO Pioneer Award 2000 for his
contributions as one of 46 pioneers of the NRO responsible for our
nation's information superiority that significantly contributed to the
end of the cold war.
Following his career at the NRO, Geyer was Vice President for a
major classified program at Lockheed Martin and responsible for all
aspects of program and mission success. His other assignments have
included Chief Engineer for another nationally vital classified program
and Deputy for Analysis for the Titan IV program. Geyer is teaching a
Space Design course and a System Engineering/Program Management course
at New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, N.M. He has a Bachelor of
Science degree in Electrical Engineering from Ohio State University,
arid a Master's in Electrical Engineering and Aeronautical Engineering
from the University of Southern California.
Maj. Gen. Ralph H. Jacobson, USAF (Ret.):
Consultant
During General Jacobson's 47 years of distinguished military and
civilian service, he has developed an expertise in aerospace program
management, satellite operations, business, and budget management. He
graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1956, earned his pilot's wings
in 1957, received a Master's Degree in Astronautics from the Air Force
Institute of Technology in 1962, and a Master's Degree in Business
Administration from The George Washington University in 1966.
His early USAF assignments included tours as: a tactical airlift
pilot, including a one-year assignment in Vietnam; the project officer
for the Titan II inertial guidance system; and an action officer on the
Air Staff in the Pentagon. Beginning in 1970; he held a series of
assignments in the Nation's space program, which included several
technical program management responsibilities and command
responsibility for satellite operations.
As a Brig. Gen., he was assigned to the Space Shuttle Program
Office at NASA Headquarters and later became the Air Staff Officer
responsible for budget development for the Air Force Space Program. In
1983 he became Director of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of
the Air Force, from which he retired in 1987. His military decorations
include the Defense, National Intelligence Community, and Air Force
Distinguished Service medals and the Distinguished Flying Cross. After
his military retirement, Jacobson became President and Chief Executive
Officer of The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory where he served in that
capacity until 1997.
He is a member of many advisory groups and boards, including the
Strategic Advisory Group, U.S. Strategic Command, Sandia National
Security Advisory Panel, Space Studies Board of the National Research
Council, and is a Trustee, United States Naval Academy Foundation.
Jacobson is a fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics as well as a Member of the NASA Advisory Council Task
Force on ISS Operational Readiness and a former member of the NAC Task
Force on Shuttle-Mir Operational Readiness.
Mr. Richard Kohrs:
Chief Engineer, Kistler Aerospace Corporation
Richard Kohrs has over 40 years of experience in aerospace systems
engineering, stress analysis, and integration. He has held senior
management positions in major NASA programs from Apollo to the Space
Station.
As a member of the Apollo Spacecraft Program's Systems Engineering
and Integration Office, he developed the Spacecraft Operations Data
Book system that documented systems and subsystem performance, and was
the control database for developing flight rules, crew procedures, and
overall performance of the Apollo Spacecraft.
After Apollo, he became Manager of System Integration for the Space
Shuttle Program; Deputy Manager, Space Shuttle Program; and then Deputy
Director of the Space Shuttle Program at Johnson Space Center. As
Deputy Director, he was responsible for the daily engineering,
processing, and operations activities of the Shuttle program and he
developed an extensive background in Shuttle systems integration. In
1989, he became the Director of Space Station Freedom, with overall
responsibility for its development and operation.
After years of public service, he left NASA to become the Director
of the ANSER Center for International Aerospace Cooperation (1994-
1997). Kohrs joined Kistler Aerospace in 1997 as Chief Engineer. His
primary responsibilities include vehicle integration, design
specifications, design data books, interface control, vehicle weight,
performance, and engineering review board matters. He received a
Bachelor of Science degree from Washington University, St. Louis, in
1956.
Susan Morrissey Livingstone:
Susan Livingstone has served her nation for more than 30 years in
both government and civic roles. From July 2001 to February 2003, she
served as Under Secretary of the Navy. As ``COO'' to the Secretary of
the Navy, she had a broad executive management portfolio (e.g.,
programming, planning, budgeting, business processes, organizational
alignment), but also focused on Naval space, information technology and
intelligence/compartmented programs; integration of Navy-Marine Corps
capabilities; audit, IG and criminal investigative programs; and
civilian personnel programs.
Livingstone is a policy and management consultant and also serves
as a member of the National Security Studies Board of Advisors (Maxwell
School, Syracuse University), is again a board member of the
Procurement Round Table and was appointed to NASA's Return-to-Flight
Task Group for safe return of Shuttle flight operations.
Prior to serving as Under Secretary of the Navy, Livingstone was
CEO of the Association of the United States Army and deputy chairman of
its Council of Trustees. She also served as a vice president and board
member of the Procurement Round Table, and as a consultant and panel
chairman to the Defense Science Board (on ``logistics
transformation'').
From 1993 to 1998, Livingstone served the American Red Cross HQ as
Vice President of Health and Safety Services, Acting Senior Vice
President for Chapter Services and as a consultant for Armed Forces
Emergency Services.
As Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and
Environment from 1989 to 1993, she was responsible for a wide range of
programs including military construction, installation management, Army
logistics programs, base realignment and closures, energy and
environmental issues, domestic disaster relief and restoration of
public infrastructure to the people of Kuwait following operation
Desert Storm. She also was decision and acquisition management
authority for the DOD chemical warfare materiel destruction program.
From 1981 to 1989, Livingstone served at the Veterans
Administration in a number of positions including Associate Deputy
Administrator for Logistics and Associate Deputy Administrator for
Management. She served as the VA's Senior Acquisition Official and also
directed and managed the Nation's largest medical construction program.
Prior to her Executive Branch service, she worked for more than nine
years in the Legislative branch on the personal staffs of both a
Senator and two congressmen.
Livingstone graduated from the College of William and Mary in 1968
with an A.B. degree and completed an M.A. in Political Science at the
University of Montana in 1972. She also spent two years in postgraduate
studies at Tufts University and the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy.
Livingstone has received numerous awards for her community and
national service, including the highest civilian awards from the NRO,
VA, and the Departments of the Army and Navy. She is also is a
recipient of the Secretary of Defense Award for Outstanding Public
Service.
Mr. James D. Lloyd:
Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance, NASA
Ex-Officio Member
James Lloyd has extensive experience in safety engineering and risk
management, and has supported a number of Blue Ribbon panels relating
to mishaps and safety problems throughout his career. He began his
career after an intern-training period as a system safety engineer with
the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command in St. Louis.
He transferred to its parent headquarters, the Army Materiel
Command (AMC) in 1973 and, after serving several safety engineering
roles was appointed as the Chief of the Program Evaluation Division in
the Command's Safety Office, where he assured the adequacy of safety
programs for AMC organizations.
In 1979, he continued his career as a civilian engineer with the
AMC Field Safety Activity in Charlestown, IN, where he directed
worldwide safety engineering, evaluation and training support. In 1987,
a year after the Shuttle Challenger disaster, Lloyd transferred from
the U.S. Army to NASA to help the agency rebuild its safety mission
assurance program. He was instrumental in fulfilling several of the
recommendations issued by the Rogers' Commission, which had
investigated the Challenger mishap. After the Shuttle returned to
flight with the mission of STS-26, Lloyd moved to the Space Station
Freedom Program Office in Reston, Va., where he served in various roles
culminating in being appointed as the Program's Product Assurance
Manager.
In 1993, he became Director, Safety and Risk Management Division in
the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, serving as NASA's ``Safety
Director'' and was appointed to his present position in early 2003. He
serves also as an ex-officio member of the NAC Task Force on ISS
Operational Readiness. Lloyd holds a Bachelor of Science degree in
Mechanical Engineering, with honors, from Union College, Schenectady,
N.Y., and a Master of Engineering degree in Industrial Engineering from
Texas A&M University, College Station.
Lt. General Forrest S. McCartney, USAF (Ret.):
Vice Chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
During General McCartney's distinguished USAF career, he held the
position of Program Director for several major satellite programs, was
Commander of the Ballistic Missile Organization (responsible for
Minuteman and Peacekeeper development), Commander of Air Force Space
Division and Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command.
His military decorations and awards include the Distinguished
Service Medal, Legion of Merit with one oak leaf cluster, Meritorious
Service Medal and Air Force Commendation Medal with three oak leaf
clusters. He was recipient of the General Thomas D. White Space Trophy
in 1984 and the 1987 Military Astronautical Trophy.
Following the Challenger accident in late 1986, McCartney was
assigned by the USAF to NASA and served as the Director of Kennedy
Space Center until 1992. He received numerous awards, including NASA's
Distinguished Service Medal and Presidential Rank Award, the National
Space Club Goddard Memorial Trophy, AIAA Von Braun Award for Excellence
in Space Program Management.
After 40 years of military and civil service, McCartney became a
consultant to industry, specializing in the evaluation of hardware
failure/flight readiness. In 1994, he joined Lockheed Martin as the
Astronautics Vice President for Launch Operations. He retired from
Lockheed Martin in 2001 and is currently the Vice Chairman of the NASA
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
McCartney has a Bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering from
Auburn University, Master's degree in Nuclear Engineering from the USAF
Institute of Technology, and an honorary Doctorate from the Florida
Institute of Technology.
Rosemary O'Leary J.D., Ph.D.:
Rosemary O'Leary is Professor of Public Administration and
Political Science, and Coordinator of the Ph.D. Program in Public
Administration at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
at Syracuse University. An elected member of the U.S. National Academy
of Public Administration, she was recently a senior Fulbright scholar
conducting research on environmental policy in Malaysia.
Previously O'Leary was professor of public and environmental
affairs at Indiana University and co-founder and co-director of the
Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute. She has served as the director
of policy and planning for a state environmental agency and has worked
as an environmental attorney.
She has worked as a consultant to the U.S. Department of the
Interior, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Indiana
Department of Environmental Management, the International City/County
Management Association, the National Science Foundation, and the
National Academy of Sciences.
O'Leary is the author or editor of five books and more than 75
articles on environmental management, environmental policy, public
management, dispute resolution, bureaucratic politics, and law and
public policy. She has won seven national research awards, including
Best Book in Public and Nonprofit Management for 2000 (given by the
Academy of Management), Best Book in Environmental Management and
Policy for 1999 (given by the American Society for Public
Administration), and the Mosher Award, which she won twice, for best
article by an academician published in Public Administration Review.
O'Leary was recently awarded the Syracuse University Chancellor's
Citation for Exceptional Academic Achievement, the highest research
award at the university. She has won eight teaching awards as well,
including the national Excellence in Teaching Award given by the
National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration,
and she was the recipient of the Distinguished Service Award given by
the American Society for Public Administration's Section on Environment
and Natural Resources Administration. O'Leary has served as chair of
the Public Administration Section of the American Political Science
Association, and as the chair of the Section on Environment and Natural
Resources Administration of the American Society for Public
Administration.
Mr. David Raspet:
Engineering Consultant
David Raspet is an expert in national security space architectures,
payloads, avionics, space electrical power development, and
integration, in addition to his experiences as a manager in a wide
variety of military and commercial programs. He is currently a
consultant to the USAF EELV Program Office, where he assists in
defining the mission assurance program and develops enhanced program
management methods. In 2002, he was responsible for the independent
review of Titan IVB-30 readiness and the spacecraft/launch vehicle
integration.
Prior public and private sector experience includes: Future
Imagining Architecture Space Segment IPT Lead--Boeing; FIA Mission
Payload IPT Lead, Low Altitude Demonstration System Program Director,
Delta IV Program Director, Director of Flight Systems--McDonnell
Douglas; Vice Director, Secretary of the Air Force Special Projects--
Air Force; Deputy Director, Launch and Support Operations--Air Force.
Raspet received his Bachelor of Science degree in Physics from
Mississippi State University and his Master's degree in Electro-Optical
Engineering Physics from the Air Force Institute of Technology.
Dr. Decatur B. Rogers, P.E.:
Dean Tennessee State University College of Engineering, Technology and
Computer Science
Since 1988, Dr. Rogers has served as the Dean, College of
Engineering, Technology and Computer Science and Professor of
Mechanical Engineering at Tennessee State University in Nashville,
Tenn. Rogers served in professorship and dean positions at Florida
State University, Tallahassee, Fla., Prairie View A&M University,
Prairie View, Texas, and Federal City College, Washington.
Rogers holds a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from Vanderbilt
University; Masters' in Engineering Management and Mechanical
Engineering from Vanderbilt University; and a Bachelor's in Mechanical
Engineering from Tennessee State University.
Mr. Sy Rubenstein:
Aerospace Consultant
Sy Rubenstein was a major contributor to the design, development
and operation of the Space Shuttle and has been involved in commercial
and government projects for more than 35 years. As an employee of
Rockwell International, the prime contractor for the Shuttle, he was
the Director of System Engineering, Chief Engineer, Program Manager and
Division President during twenty years of space programs.
He has received the NASA Public Service Medal, the NASA Medal for
Exceptional Engineering and the AIAA Space Systems Award for his
contributions to manned space development. Rubenstein, a leader,
innovator and problem solver, is a fellow of the AIAA and the AAS.
Mr. Robert Sieck:
Aerospace Consultant
Robert Sieck, the former Director of Shuttle Processing at the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), has an extensive background in Shuttle
systems, testing, launch, landing and processing. He joined NASA in
1964 as a Gemini Spacecraft Systems engineer and then served as an
Apollo Spacecraft test team project engineer. He later became the
Shuttle Orbiter test team project engineer, and in 1976 was named the
Engineering Manager for the Shuttle Approach and Landing Tests at
Dryden Flight Research Facility in California. He was the Chief Shuttle
Project Engineer for STS-1 through STS-7 and became the first KSC
Shuttle Flow Director in 1983. He was appointed Director, Launch and
Landing Operations in 1984, where he served as Shuttle Launch Director
for 11 missions.
He served as Deputy Director of Shuttle Operations from 1992 until
January 1995 and was responsible for assisting with the management and
technical direction of the Shuttle program at KSC. He also retained his
position as Shuttle Launch Director, a responsibility he had held from
February 1984 through August 1985, and then from December 1986 to
January 1995. He was Launch Director for STS-26R and all subsequent
Shuttle missions through STS-63. Sieck served as Launch Director for 52
Space Shuttle launches.
He earned his Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering
at the University of Virginia in 1960 and obtained additional
postgraduate credits in mathematics, physics, meteorology, and
management at both Texas A&M and the Florida Institute of Technology.
He has received numerous NASA and industry commendations, including the
NASA Exceptional Service Medal and the NASA Distinguished Service
Medal. Sieck joined the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel as a consultant
in March 1999.
Lt. General Thomas Stafford, USAF (Ret.):
Co-Chair, Return-to-Flight Task Group
President, Stafford, Burke & Hacker Inc., technical consulting
General Stafford, an honors graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy,
joined the space program in 1962 and flew four missions during the
Gemini and Apollo programs. He piloted Gemini 6 and Gemini 9, and
traveled to the moon as Commander of Apollo 10. He was assigned as head
of the astronaut group in June 1969, responsible for the selection of
flight crews for projects Apollo and Skylab.
In 1971, Stafford was assigned as Deputy Director of Flight Crew
Operations at the NASA Manned Spaceflight Center. His last mission, the
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975, achieved the first rendezvous
between American and Soviet spacecrafts.
He left NASA in 1975 to head the Air Force Test Flight Center at
Edwards Air Force Base and in 1978 assumed duties as Deputy Chief of
Staff, Research Development and Acquisition, USAF Headquarters in
Washington. He retired from government service in 1979 and became an
aerospace consultant.
Stafford has served as Defense Advisor to former President Ronald
Reagan; and headed The Synthesis Group, which was tasked with plotting
the U.S. return to the moon and eventual journey to Mars.
Throughout his careers in the Air Force and NASA space program, he
has received many awards and medals including the Congressional Space
Medal of Honor in 1993. He served on the National Research Council's
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, the Committee on NASA
Scientific and Technological Program Reviews, and the Space Policy
Advisory Council.
He was Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council Task Force on Shuttle-
Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions. He is currently the Chairman of
the NASA Advisory Council Task Force on International Space Station
Operational Readiness.
Tom Tate:
Tom Tate was Vice President of Legislative Affairs for the
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), the trade association
representing the Nation's manufacturers of commercial, military and
business aircraft, helicopters, aircraft engines, missiles, spacecraft,
and related components and equipment. Joining AIA in 1988, Tate directs
the activities of the Association's Office of Legislative Affairs,
which monitors policy issues affecting the industry and prepares
testimony that communicates industry's viewpoint to Congress.
Before joining AIA, Tate served on the staff of the House of
Representative's Committee on Science and Technology for 14 years.
Joining the staff in 1973 as a technical consultant and counsel to the
House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, he was appointed
Deputy Staff Director of the House Subcommittee on Energy Research and
Development in 1976. In 1978, Tate returned to the Space Subcommittee
as Chief Counsel, and in 1981 he became Special Assistant to the
Chairman of the Committee until joining AIA.
Tate worked for the Space Division of Rockwell International in
Downey, Calif., from 1962 to 1973 in various engineering and marketing
capacities and was Director of Space Operations when he departed the
company in 1973. He worked on numerous programs, including the Gemini
Paraglider, Apollo, Apollo/Soyuz, and Shuttle Programs.
Tate worked for RCA's Missile and Surface Radar Division in
Moorestown, N.J. from 1958 to 1962 in the project office of the
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) program being built for
the USAF. From 1957 to 1958, Tate served in the Army as an artillery
and guided missile officer at Fort Bliss, Texas.
Tate received a Bachelor's degree in Marketing from the University
of Scranton in 1956 and a Law degree from Western State University
College of Law in Fullerton, Calif., in 1970. In his final year of law
school, his fellow students awarded him the Gold Book Award as the most
outstanding student. In 1991, he received the Frank J. O'Hara award for
distinguished alumni in science and technology from the University of
Scranton.
Tate is a member of numerous aerospace and defense associations
including the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the
National Space Club, and the National Space Institute, where he serves
as an advisor. He also served as a permanent civilian member of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Senior Executive Service
Salary and Performance Review Board.
William Wegner:
Consultant
Wegner graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1948. He
subsequently received Masters' degrees in Naval Architecture and Marine
Engineering from Webb Institute in New York. In 1956 he was selected by
Admiral Hyman Rickover to join the Navy's nuclear program and was sent
to MIT, where he received his Master's degree in Nuclear Engineering.
After serving in a number of field positions, including that of Nuclear
Power Superintendent at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, he returned to
Washington. He served as Deputy Director to Admiral Rickover in the
Naval Nuclear Program for 16 years and was awarded the DOD
Distinguished Service Award and the Atomic Energy Commission's
Distinguished Service Award.
In 1979, he retired from government service, and formed Basic
Energy Technology Associates with three fellow naval retirees. During
its 10 successful years of operation, it provided technical services to
over 25 nuclear utilities and other nuclear-related activities. He has
served on a number of panels including the National Academy of Sciences
that studied the safety of Department of Energy nuclear reactors. From
1989 to 1992, he provided technical assistance to the Secretary of
Energy on nuclear-related matters. He has provided technical services
to over 50 nuclear facilities. Wegner served as a Director of the Board
of Directors of Detroit Edison from 1990 until retiring in 1999.
Mr. David Lengyel:
Executive Secretary, Return-to-Flight Task Group
Since February 2003, Lengyel has served on the administrative staff
of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). Prior to this he
was Executive Director of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel for
almost two years.
From 1999 through 2000, Lengyel served a tour of duty as the
Manager of the Moscow Technical Liaison Office (MTLO) for the
International Space Station Program in Russia. The MTLO interfaces with
Russian contractors and space agency personnel to monitor and track the
progress of Russian Segment elements, Soyuz/Progress vehicles as well
as provide technical liaison between U.S. and Russian engineering/
mission integration personnel.
Lengyel joined NASA in October 1993 as the third Executive Officer
to Administrator Daniel S. Goldin. He served in several program
operations and payloads capacities within the ISS and Shuttle-Mir
Programs at the Johnson Space Center from 1994 to 1998. He led an
analytical assessment of Shuttle-Mir lessons learned for application to
the ISS.
Prior to joining NASA, Lengyel was a senior aircrew-training
instructor for McDonnell-Douglas in St. Louis. He conducted pilot
training for the FA-18 Hornet and F-15 Eagle for both foreign and
domestic customers.
He is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserves and has
accumulated over 2000 hours flight time in the F-4S Phantom II, OV-10
Bronco, and FA-18 Hornet.
Lengyel holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Naval
Academy, an MBA from the University of Missouri, and an MA in
International Affairs from Washington University in St. Louis.
Table of Contents
I. Purpose
II. Charter
III. Management Plan
IV. Staffing
V. Deployment
VI. Integrated Schedule
VII. Appendix A--NESC Charter
I. Purpose
This document will provide guidance to the NASA Engineering and
Safety Center (NESC) Implementation Planning Team, to ensure that the
NESC is operational by October 1, 2003.
II. Scope
The Associate Administrator for the Office of Safety and Mission
Assurance and the NASA Chief Engineer established the Implementation
Planning Team. The team has participation from all NASA Field Centers,
Headquarters, Space Shuttle Program and International Space Station
Program.
The Implementation Planning Team is responsible for: establishing
the NESC Management Plan; establishing initial agreements between
Centers and external organizations; staffing the NESC; and,
communicating/deploying the NESC's operation plan across the Agency.
This Implementation Plan has been prepared as a guide toward
accomplishing these objectives and does not require formal approval.
III. Charter
The NESC charter was created by the Associate Deputy Administrator
for Technical Programs; NASA Chief Engineer; Associate Administrator
for the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, Langley Research Center
Director and Special Assistant to the LaRC Center Director. The Charter
was presented to, and approved by, the Executive Council on August 1,
2003. The Charter was used to develop this Implementation Plan and will
be used to develop the NESC Management Plan (reference Attachment A).
IV. Management Plan
The NESC Implementation Planning Team will use the Charter, concept
briefing and this Implementation Plan to develop a formal Management
Plan. The Management Plan will include, as a minimum: roles and
responsibilities of the NESC; interface of the NESC with the Centers,
programs and other independent assessment organizations; staffing plan;
independent reporting structure; metrics; and concept of operation.
The Implementation Planning Team will sponsor a minimum of two
retreats to obtain input from key stakeholders for use in the
development of the NESC Management Plan. The first retreat will include
those organizations that currently have the technical skills and
specialized facilities that the NESC will require. The second retreat
will involve the primary customers of the NESC, the Safety and Mission
Assurance (S&MA) Directors from each Center. After receiving feedback
from these two key groups, the Implementation Planning Team will
finalize the Management Plan through a series of twice-weekly meetings.
The final baseline draft will be placed under formal configuration
control. Implementation Planning Team members will obtain approval of
the Management Plan from each Center Director. Final approval is
targeted for September 15, 2003 with signatures from the Associate
Administrator for the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance and the
NASA Chief Engineer.
V. Staffing
The NESC will be NASA's elite engineering organization. The NESC
will be staffed with high-grade, high-performing civil service
scientific and engineering personnel. This workforce will be
distributed across NASA's Centers but will be centrally managed and
funded by the NESC, utilizing a Task Agreement, or equivalent, process.
. It will be supplemented by partnerships from across the Nation.
In order to attract and keep NASA's best engineers, consistent with
the NESC charter and mission, appropriate pay and promotion
opportunities will be offered. The NESC will require a high percentage
of Senior Executive, Leadership or Technical (SES, SL or ST) positions.
The following list does not reflect a detailed position-by-position
analysis of personnel requirements, but it can be used for planning
purposes: Director (1), Deputy Director (1), Principle Engineers (4),
Program Chief Engineers (6), Discipline Chief Engineers (12), Business
Manager (1), Chief Systems Engineer (1), Chief Astronaut (1), S&MA
Liaison (1). The Implementation Planning Team will seek special
approval from the NASA Human Resource Office, and the Excepted Service
category may be utilized as appropriate.
All positions will be posted internal and external to the agency in
an effort to recruit the Nation's best engineers to the NESC. The NESC
should be allocated a minimum of six outside hire slots, in the event
that the best candidates for a particular position are outside of NASA.
All senior level positions should be selected by October 1, 2003. The
remaining positions will be filled as required based on need.
Position descriptions and job announcements must be completed in
the month of August for these key positions. Once these senior
positions are selected, the remaining organization will be staffed,
utilizing existing engineering experts across the Agency. These
positions will be matrixed from their existing engineering organization
through formal task agreements, as stated above. These task agreements
will document requirements and resources and will be updated each year,
through the POP process, to reflect the needs of the NESC.
To ensure successful implementation of the NESC, initial operations
will be focused on the Space Shuttle and International Space Station
Programs and other selected programs to be determined with input from
the centers and enterprises. The initial staffing of the NESC will be
limited to the disciplines and skills required to support these
programs, based on the historical precedence of problem traffic.
A multi-Center board, chaired by the Special Assistant to the LaRC
Center Director, will be responsible for selecting the high-grade
positions. The board will ensure the best candidates are selected from
across the Agency and external community. The Special Assistant to the
LaRC Center Director will make lower-grade selections. The responsible
Chief Engineer will make the remaining matrixed positions selections.
VI. Deployment
The success of the NESC is contingent on the full support of NASA's
ten field centers. The engineering expertise crucial to provide the
best technical independent assessment resides at the field centers. For
the NESC to attract the best and brightest, it must be recognized as
NASA's elite engineering organization. The proposed charter clearly
defines the role of the NESC to provide independent engineering
technical expertise to evaluate and supplement safety and engineering
activities for NASA programs. This represents a very challenging role
for the Agency's best engineers.
The NESC must also create a natural hierarchical progression for
engineers to ensure the organization continues to be staffed with
NASA's best engineers. This will be accomplished by offering strong
leadership and pay and promotion opportunities commensurate with the
challenging work required by the NESC. The proposed NESC career
progression is depicted in Figure 1.
Also key to the success of the NESC is the full participation and
commitment by all the Centers and the programs in developing the
implementation and management plans for the NESC. Since the engineering
directorates at each Center are key participants, the NESC will sponsor
a separate retreat to review and revise the plans to allow each
Center's viewpoint to be considered. In addition there will be a
separate retreat with the S&MA Directors from each center to receive
their feedback on the plans as the NESC primary customers.
NASA has been conducting a benchmarking exchange with the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) that has an outstanding history of
safe operation of the Navy's nuclear reactors. The NESC Implementation
Planning Team will visit the NNPP during the month of August for
insight and lessons learned, which will be considered in the creation
of the NESC plans.
The NESC will visit all NASA Centers and Enterprises with a
briefing describing the NESC's function and operation. Active
recruiting and marketing of the NESC must be performed by the NESC,
Public Affairs Office, Human Resources and Engineering Organizations to
ensure the mission of the NESC reaches all levels of our organizations.
This needs to be an aggressive recruiting campaign through the months
of August and September to achieve start up in October 2003 and should
include such things as an NESC web site with access both internal and
external to NASA, NESC articles in all of the Centers newsletters, NESC
articles in national publications and even an NESC poster distributed
to all Centers. The NESC Implementation Planning Team members will
present the NESC concept briefing to key organizations at their
respective Centers and act as a focal point for NESC information.
Communication will be the key to attracting NASA's best engineers and
thus ensuring the NESC's success.
Each Center will be responsible for establishing facilities to
house the NESC members located at their respective Centers. This
includes office space, desks, phones, and computers, ect. In all cases,
the NESC members should be co-located with the engineering organization
or program they will be supporting. The NESC members should be provided
accommodations and equipment consistent with their pay grade.
Establishing appropriate facilities for NESC members will be essential
to demonstrating the Center's commitment to the NESC.
VII. Integrated Schedule
VIII. Appendix A--NESC Charter
NESC Charter
1.0 PURPOSE
1.1 This charter establishes the NASA Engineering and Safety Center
(NESC) and sets forth its functions and interfaces.
1.2 The NESC provides independent engineering technical expertise to
evaluate and supplement safety and engineering activities for NASA
programs. The NESC will perform independent engineering assessments,
analysis and testing to assure technical adequacy and safety of NASA
activities.
2.0 APPLICABILITY/SCOPE
2.1 This Charter is applicable to NASA Headquarters and all NASA
Centers, including Component Facilities, and to prime contractors
including the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to the extent specified in
applicable contracts.
2.2 The scope of the term ``Safety'' as used in the title and content
of this charter encompasses those aspects of NASA system designs and
operations that are important to mission success and that relate to
potential risks to the public, and to NASA and contractor flight and
ground personnel. The scope of the term ``Engineering'' as used in the
title and content of this charter signifies any of the professional
technical design, manufacturing, and operational disciplines, including
systems engineering, and the various specific engineering disciplines.
3.0 AUTHORITY
42 U.S.C. 2473 (c) (1), Section 203 (c) (1) of the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended.
4.0 FUNCTIONS
4.1 Provides a centralized location for the management of independent
engineering assessment supported by expert personnel, state of the art
tools and methods for the purpose of assuring safety.
4.2 Performs independent engineering review, analysis and testing to
uncover technical vulnerabilities and to determine the appropriate
preventative or corrective action for NASA programs.
4.3 Performs independent safety and engineering trend analyses and
technical risk assessments utilizing program and discipline data
sources and state of the art tools and techniques looking for trends
across and within programs.
4.4 Provides technical leadership and expertise in support of Agency
engineering and safety and mission assurance audits and reviews
(including providing recommendations certifying the adequacy of areas
reviewed).
4.5 Facilitates and/or leads mishap investigations. Analyzes Agency
mishap and close-call data for trends and causes and develops
countermeasures for prevalent proximate and root causes, and
disseminates information on analysis results.
4.6 Promotes continual improvement of engineering and safety within
NASA by capturing, disseminating, and using knowledge gleaned both
inside and outside the Agency.
4.7 Assesses and validates existing analytical techniques, engineering
standards, models, simulations, and other tools for adequacy and
capability. Enhances or corrects deficient analytical techniques and
tools and develops advanced assessment techniques and tools.
4.8 Based on Agency Lessons Learned, performs systems engineering
reviews of program management practices and processes. Establishes best
practices.
4.9 Participates as appropriate in Agency engineering and system
safety training and mentoring programs
5.0 MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
5.1 The NESC Director will report to the Director, Langley Research
Center.
5.2 The AA, OSMA with concurrence of the Chief Engineer will establish
program direction that LaRC will implement through the NESC. The AA,
OSMA; the Chief Engineer; and the Center Director, LaRC will create a
mutually agreed on standard process for establishing, integrating, and
implementing this program direction.
5.3 Other NASA Centers will provide technical personnel to support
operation of the NESC as requested by the NESC Director consistent with
program direction per 5.2.
5.4 The NESC Director will establish a suitable infrastructure to
execute the responsibilities of this Charter, making use of resources
at Langley, other NASA Centers, other government agencies, industry,
and academia as appropriate.
6.0 PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION
6.1 The NESC will be staffed with high grade, civil service, high
performing scientists, engineers and technicians who are considered
experts in their fields. The workforce will be supplemented through
partnerships with other federal agencies, National Laboratories,
universities and expert consultants, as needed. Funding will be
provided from Corporate G&A.
6.2 NESC will serve as a major Agency-wide technical resource focused
on safety and success for Agency missions. People assigned to NESC will
have upward mobility to other positions in the agency after rotational
(2-5 year) assignments with the NESC.
6.3 The NESC will draw expertise from other Centers to perform its
mission (capabilities should not be duplicated but rather leveraged).
When NASA employees at other Centers are used to support the NESC
because of their unique expertise, they will report to and be funded by
the NESC for the period of time of their support.
6.4 The NESC will serve the SMA, Engineering and program/project
communities as a value added, independent resource.
6.5 Independent assessments will be carefully chosen and managed with
a strong focus on the customer needs. Work will be prioritized based on
technical risk, the need for independence, and the potential for value
added contribution.
6.6 The NESC will generally not perform its work as a substitute for
that performed in support of specific programs and projects, but will
generally perform work to provide improvements in broadly applicable
technical disciplines and to independently assess and verify the
adequacy of program and project technical work.
7.0 DURATION
The NESC will remain in existence at the discretion of the
Administrator.
8.0 RECORDS
The Langley Center Director, in consultation with the NASA
Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance and the NASA
Chief Engineer, is responsible for the maintenance of this charter and
all other Agency-level records associated with the NESC.
Table of Contents
I. Purpose
II. Scope
III. Roles and Responsibilities
IV. Principles of Operation
V. Organization
VI. Processes
VII. Related Documentation
I. Purpose
This management plan documents the operation of the NASA
Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) and represents a contract between
the NESC and its primary customers.
The NESC is being formed to ensure that NASA's safety and mission
assurance (SMA) organizations will have adequate technical expertise
and resources for independent, in-depth, technical reviews of NASA's
programs. One of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board findings was
that the overall safety organizations previously lacked the expertise
and resources to adequately conduct independent technical reviews. In
order to bring the country's outstanding technical experts to bear on
the problems and challenges of NASA programs, the NESC will be
comprised of the best engineering expertise from across the Agency and
will include partnerships with expert consultants from other government
organizations, National Laboratories, universities, and industry.
II. Scope
The NESC will:
1. Perform independent in-depth technical reviews, assessments
and analyses of high-risk projects for SMA organizations,
engineering organizations and programs.
2. Perform independent engineering and SMA trend analysis.
3. Provide independent systems engineering analysis.
4. Facilitate or lead selected mishap investigations.
5. Support programs or institutions in resolving the Agency's
high-risk technical issues.
The NESC will perform these functions across all major NASA
programs and/or as directed by the Associate Administrator for Safety
and Mission Assurance and/or NASA Chief Engineer. To ensure successful
implementation of the NESC, initial operations will be focused on the
Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs and other
selected high-risk, high-visibility programs.
Rather than relieving NASA program managers from their
responsibility for safety, the NESC will complement the programs by
providing an independent technical review, assessment or analysis with
additional technical expertise, using independent funding. These
activities will be prioritized and selected based upon a formal risk
assessment and will encompass both NASA and contractor programs,
processes and facilities.
The NESC will provide an independent engineering chain-of-command
in commissioning and conducting independent technical reviews,
assessments and analyses. In addition, it will function as an
independent line of communication to ensure and encourage communication
for all NASA employees and consideration of all points of view on
critical technical issues.
III. Roles and Responsibilities
Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance
The Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance will
provide policy and funding authority for the NESC. The Office of Safety
and Mission Assurance and the SMA organizations at the Centers will be
the primary customer, and funding source, of the NESC and can request
the NESC to perform independent technical reviews, assessments and
analyses, based on safety and mission success concerns. The NESC will
report the results of these activities to the Associate Administrator
for Safety and Mission Assurance.
NASA Chief Engineer
The NASA Chief Engineer will, with concurrence from the Associate
Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance, have policy authority
for the NESC. The NASA Chief Engineer and the engineering organizations
at the NASA Centers will also be primary customers of the NESC. The
NASA engineering organizations will be the primary source of
engineering expertise that will make up the NESC. The NASA Chief
Engineer will review and approve the lessons learned, best practices,
and engineering policy that the NESC develops. The NASA Chief Engineer,
in consultation with the Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission
Assurance, can request the NESC to perform independent technical
reviews, assessments and analyses, based on safety concerns. The NESC
will report the results of these activities to the NASA Chief Engineer.
Director, Langley Research Center
The NESC will be located at the Langley Research Center in Hampton,
VA. The Center Director, Langley Research Center, will direct the
implementation of the policy and guidance provided by the Associate
Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance and the NASA Chief
Engineer. The Director, Langley Research Center, will make the required
Langley Research Center resources and facilities available for the NESC
to carry out its mission. The NESC will fund Center activities
performed on behalf of the NESC. The Director, Langley Research Center,
can request the NESC to perform independent technical reviews,
assessments and analyses with concurrence of the Associate
Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance. The NESC will report
the results of these activities to the Director, Langley Research
Center.
Director, NASA Engineering and Safety Center
The Director, NASA Engineering and Safety Center will implement the
direction, policy, and guidance as provided by the Director, Langley
Research Center, NASA Chief Engineer, and the Associate Administrator
for Safety and Mission Assurance. The Director, NASA Engineering and
Safety Center, will manage the resources of the NESC to perform
independent technical reviews, assessments and analyses of NASA's major
programs, based on safety and mission success concerns and prioritized
by formal risk assessment. The Director, NASA Engineering and Safety
Center, will ensure the NESC obtains, through accepted full cost
practices, the technical capability, resources and facilities to
conduct its activities for its customers.
Directors, NASA Centers
The Directors of the NASA Centers will make the required resources
and facilities at their respective Centers available for the NESC to
complete its mission. The NESC will fund Center activities performed on
behalf of the NESC. Directors of NASA Centers can request the NESC to
perform independent technical reviews, assessments and analyses. The
NESC will report the results of these activities to the respective
Directors.
IV. Principles of Operation
The NESC will perform independent in-depth technical reviews,
assessments and analyses as requested by its primary customers. These
activities will be performed across major NASA programs and NASA
Centers. The NESC will set the example for a strong safety culture by
providing knowledgeable leadership to perform technical reviews,
assessments and analyses in an open environment and attacking the
problems and issues with unequaled tenacity. By being independent, the
NESC will be able to focus on potential or current trouble spots in
three ways: proactive, active and reactive.
In being proactive, the NESC will be trained in, and use, new
techniques and tools for uncovering potential problems before they
occur. The NESC will review trends, not only within programs but also
across programs, to identify potential concerns before they become
major problems. The areas to be reviewed will be based upon criticality
and risk, regardless of whether a program has requested an independent
review. The NESC will also perform test and analysis of issues that no
particular program is currently working. In addition, the NESC will
document and maintain a compilation of lessons learned, communicate
lessons learned to all programs and Centers, and work with programs and
Centers to incorporate lessons learned into new programs and
activities.
The NESC will remain active by participating in major program
reviews and boards to gain insight into program decisions and technical
rationale. This insight will be used to determine if an independent
technical review, assessment or analysis of known risk areas is
warranted. The NESC will provide the agency a second look at these
known high-risk areas of programs and projects. In addition, the NESC
will work technical issues in real-time with the programs as needed.
The NESC will be reactive by independently leading, or
facilitating, investigations of selected mishaps and close calls, as
requested.
The NESC will also encourage, cultivate, document, review and
disposition dissenting opinions across the technical community. The
NESC will set an example for the Agency in seeking out and evaluating
differing points of view.
In order to fulfill these functions, the NESC will establish, and
maintain, a ``ready'' pool of critical skills from within NASA and from
outside organizations such as other government organizations, National
Laboratories, universities, and industry. The NESC will strive to
develop a diverse personnel base, in order to ensure the broadest
possible insight and perspective is maintained.
The NESC senior leadership positions may be limited in length (two
years with up to three one-year extensions) in order to maintain
competencies in the both the NESC and at the Centers. In addition, a
set of metrics will be established and maintained for the NESC to
assess its own performance.
V. Organization
The NESC will be a decentralized organization with a management
office located at the Langley Research Center. To build a diverse
organization, the NESC will draw upon expertise both internal to NASA,
and from outside the agency. The NESC will utilize the engineering
resources (both personnel and facilities) resident at each of ten NASA
Centers, leveraging off each Center's areas of expertise (Figure 1).
The NESC will procure additional engineering expertise as required, by
contracting consultants and partnerships with other government
organizations, National Laboratories, universities and industry. By
involving the external community, the NESC will ensure that a broad and
diverse perspective is maintained. The NESC will have strong technical
representation located at each of the NASA Centers to provide insight
into programs and projects.
The NESC organization will be comprised of the following offices
(see Figure 2):
Office of the Director (resident at Langley Research
Center)
Business Management Office (resident at Langley
Research Center)
Systems Engineering Office (resident at Langley
Research Center and NASA Centers)
Principal Engineers Office (resident at Langley
Research Center)
NESC Chief Engineers Office (resident at NASA
Centers)
Discipline Chief Engineers Office (resident at NASA
Centers)
The resources reporting to each Discipline Chief Engineer will be
matrixed from across the Agency by formal task agreements. Non-NASA
experts will also be acquired through appropriate mechanisms.
Maintaining the technical expertise of its personnel and providing
insight into the Agency's high-risk programs and projects is critical
to the success of the NESC. To accomplish both of these objectives,
NESC personnel must be co-located within the programs, projects and
engineering organizations. In addition, NESC personnel must maintain
positions of prominence within their parent organizations and must
participate as formal members of the respective boards and reviews.
Office of the Director
The Office of the Director is responsible for implementing the
direction and policy established by the Associate Administrator for
Safety and Mission Assurance and the NASA Chief Engineer, under the
direction of the Director, Langley Research Center.
The Director, NASA Engineering and Safety Center will distribute
technical resources, as required, to perform independent in-depth
technical assessments, reviews and analyses of NASA programs. The
Director will chair the NESC Review Board. Through the NESC Review
Board, the Director will approve requests for independent assessments
and will approve the final documentation for all independent reviews,
assessments and analyses performed by the NESC, prior to release to the
customer. The Director, or designee, will be a non-voting member of the
highest-level review board (such as Flight or Launch Readiness Reviews)
for selected programs, with authority to request action from the
program/board. The Director, NASA Engineering and Safety Center, is
authorized to delegate authority to act on his behalf.
The NESC Safety and Mission Assurance Liaison will be detailed to
the NESC by the Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission
Assurance and will serve as the NESC SMA engineering discipline expert
and senior SMA advisor to the Director, NASA Engineering and Safety
Center. In this capacity, the NESC Safety and Mission Assurance Liaison
will facilitate communications and coordination among Center SMA
organizations and NESC Chief Engineers, and will serve as a point of
entry for Center SMA organizations to obtain access to NESC technical
resources. The NESC Safety and Mission Assurance Liaison, through the
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, will be responsible for
accessing the SMA technical and engineering discipline experts from
across the Agency, other government organizations, universities, and
industry (including systems safety engineering, reliability and
maintainability engineering, quality engineering, software quality
assurance, quality control and industrial safety) necessary to support
NESC technical reviews, assessments, and analyses. The NESC Safety and
Mission Assurance Liaison and will also provide the technical
leadership of the safety and mission assurance technical resources
supporting NESC activities. In addition, the NESC Safety and Mission
Assurance Liaison will serve as day-to-day representative of the
Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance. The NESC
Safety and Mission Assurance Liaison will communicate Agency SMA policy
interpretations to the NESC and support the selection of reviews,
assessments, and analyses through the appropriate involvement of the
Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance. The NESC
Safety and Mission Assurance Liaison will serve on the NESC Review
Board and will also represent the NESC in all Agency-level SMA boards
and reviews.
The Chief Astronaut will assemble and lead a ``Flight Operations''
Super Problem Resolution Team for all operational independent technical
reviews, assessments or analyses involving human space flight
operations (both aerospace and aeronautic). Depending on the nature of
the activity, a different leader with the appropriate skills and
experiences will be selected to lead a specific flight operations team.
The Chief Astronaut will serve on the NESC Review Board.
The Chief Scientist will assemble and lead a ``Flight Operations''
Super Problem Resolution Team for all operational independent technical
reviews, assessments or analyses involving non-human flight operations
(both aerospace and aeronautic). Depending on the nature of the
activity, a different leader with the appropriate skills and
experiences will be selected to lead a specific flight operations team.
The Chief Scientist will serve on the NESC Review Board.
Business Management and Support Office
The Business Management and Support Office (BMSO) is responsible
for all the business management and administrative support for the
NESC. Responsibilities of the BMO include:
Establishing and developing partnerships and/or
contracts with other government agencies, National
Laboratories, universities and industries.
Establishing, maintaining, and managing formal Task
Agreements with each NASA Center for the matrix support of
technical experts.
Providing technical writers for NESC reports and
briefings.
Performing configuration control for NESC
documentation and boards.
Providing NESC knowledge-capture and communication of
lessons learned across the Agency.
Establishing a training regimen for NESC personnel.
The Manager, Business Management and Support Office will be
responsible for establishing the NESC Operating Plan, acting as the
Contracting Officers Technical Representative (COTR) for contracts
established to carry out the duties of the NESC and serving as a member
of the NESC Review Board.
Systems Engineering Office
The Systems Engineering Office (SEO) will be responsible for
conducting independent systems engineering reviews of NASA programs. As
appropriate, the reviews will include independent assessment of program
practices and processes, as well as systems engineering analysis. In
addition, the SEO will perform independent trending of problems,
mishaps and close calls within, and across, programs. The SEO will have
a core membership resident at the Langley Research Center and will be
full-time, hard-lined NESC employees. The SEO will also include
participation of matrixed systems engineering experts from across the
Agency and appropriate external organizations. The Manager, Systems
Engineering Office, will be a member of the NESC Review Board.
Principal Engineers Office
The Principal Engineers Office (PEO) will provide leadership for
teams of discipline specialists performing independent technical
reviews, assessments, and analyses of complex, multi-disciplinary
systems. The Principal Engineers will reside at the Langley Research
Center and will be full-time, hard-lined NESC employees. The Principal
Engineers will be responsible for leading teams in the performance of
established processes for Independent Technical Assessments, Technical
Inspections, Technical Support, Technical Advocacy, and Mishap
Investigations. The Principal Engineers will also be responsible for
maintaining a catalogue of interdisciplinary tools, methods, and
resources. Each Principal Engineer will be a member of the NESC Review
Board.
NESC Chief Engineers Office
The NESC Chief Engineers Office (NCEO) will provide the NESC with
technical insight into NASA's programs. The NESC Chief Engineers Office
is comprised of recognized experts who reside at each of the NASA
Centers and are full-time, hard-lined NESC employees. The primary duty
of the NESC Chief Engineers will be to evaluate technical decisions and
rationale in order to recommend to the NESC when an independent
technical review, assessment or analysis is warranted or requested by
the respective programs or institutional engineering. The NESC Chief
Engineer provides the direct insight into high-risk programs and
projects. By residing at the Centers, the NESC Chief Engineers will be
able to stay current on all issues and will continue to support their
home programs, projects and/or institutions. The NESC Chief Engineer
will utilize additional full-time, hard-lined engineering support to
cover all the Center's high-risk programs and projects, as required.
The NESC Chief Engineer will foster regular, open communication with
the program's SMA and engineering communities. The NESC Chief Engineers
will be non-voting members of their respective program's technical
review boards, with authority to request action from the program/board.
Each NESC Chief Engineer will be a member of the NESC Review Board.
Discipline Chief Engineers Office
The Discipline Chief Engineers Office (DCEO) will be comprised of
experts who will reside within their respective NASA Center's
engineering organizations, but will be full-time, hard-lined NESC
employees. The DCEO provides the technical leadership of the NESC
technical resources in order to perform independent technical reviews,
assessments and analyses. The core set of Discipline Chief Engineers
will be established to perform the initial technical assessments on
Space Shuttle, International Space Station, and other selected
Programs. Additional Discipline Chief Engineers will be added as
required to perform additional assessments as the scope of the NESC
expands. Each Discipline Chief Engineer will be responsible for
establishing a Super Problem Resolution Team (Super PRT) that will
consist of the Agency's best experts in that particular discipline,
augmented by external experts from other government organizations,
National Laboratories, universities, and industry, as required. While
each Discipline Chief Engineer will report to the Director, NASA
Engineering and Safety Center, the remaining Super PRT personnel will
be matrixed through formal Task Agreements. Non-NASA experts will also
be acquired through appropriate mechanisms. These Super PRTs will be
called into action depending on the skills required for a particular
independent technical assessment.
When not supporting NESC activities, the matrixed personnel will
perform their normal duties within their respective engineering
organizations. Priorities will be negotiated and established between
the Director, NASA Engineering and Safety Center and the Directors of
the respective engineering organizations.
If an independent technical review, assessment or analysis involves
a single discipline; the cognizant Discipline Chief Engineer will lead
the activity. If an independent assessment requires the involvement of
multiple disciplines, a Principal Engineer will lead the assessment,
with support from the appropriate Discipline Chief Engineers.
The Discipline Chief Engineer will maintain a catalogue of critical
skills and facilities available for their discipline. Each Discipline
Chief Engineer will be a member of the NESC Review Board.
VI. Processes
Insight and Requests
The NESC will gain insight into the programs through six separate
paths:
1. Direct participation of the NESC Chief Engineers in their
respective Center's boards and reviews. It will be imperative
that the NESC select and maintain a strong corps of senior
engineers as NESC Chief Engineers. The NESC Chief Engineers
will be located at the program sites and participating with the
programs or projects during reviews and boards to gain insight
into program decisions, technical rationale and problem
resolutions. To provide formality and discipline to this
insight process, the NCE will be non-voting members of the
programs technical boards and reviews with authority to request
action by the program or project. This will give the NESC Chief
Engineers access to program decisions and in turn will give the
programs access to the NESC Chief Engineer's experience.
2. SMA participation in the programs. SMA insight into the
programs has been previously defined in SMA documentation. The
SMA organization will now have access to the NESC technical
resources through the NESC Safety and Mission Assurance Liaison
or by direction from the Associate Administrator for Safety and
Mission Assurance.
3. Institutional engineering participation with the programs,
as previously defined in program documentation. The
institutional engineers will now have an alternate path to
request independent technical review through the NESC Chief
Engineers.
4. NESC systems engineering review and independent analysis
and trending of program problems, issues, mishaps and close
calls both within and across programs.
5. The broad technical community, through a new NESC web site
or the existing NASA Safety and Reporting System (NSRS) web
site. Hidden or underlying opportunities may be best uncovered
by a well-advertised, simple web site for anonymous requests,
which may, or may not, represent an immediate safety concern.
6. NASA Senior Management
Requests for an independent technical review, assessment or
analysis may result from any of these six insight paths. The NESC
Review Board will review these requests as they come in for technical
merit and prioritize them through a simple risk assessment described
below.
Independent Technical Assessments
Once a request for independent technical review, assessment, or
analysis (ITA) is made, either internally or externally, a formally
documented process will be followed. Depending on the nature of the
review, a NESC Principal Engineer will assemble and lead a multi-
disciplined team to perform the assessment. The composition of the team
will include the appropriate Discipline Chief Engineers, with
appropriate representation from their respective Super Problem
Resolution Teams, as well as SMA, flight operations, and ground
operations, and other independent assessment organization
representatives, as required. For example, the NESC might partner with
the independent verification & validation (IV&V) facility for those
activities involving flight, ground or test software. The Principal
Engineer will develop an Independent Assessment Plan (including
schedule for completion), present an in-briefing for the program being
assessed, lead the assessment (including any necessary testing and
analysis) and present an out-briefing to the program. During the
assessment, the Principal Engineers, and their teams, will conduct
intermediate reviews with the NESC Review Board to get a peer review of
the activity. The Principal Engineer will also be responsible for
completing a final written report. For those technical assessments
involving a single discipline, the Discipline Chief Engineer will lead
the assessment, present the briefings, and complete the final report.
Assessments of facility or ground systems will be conducted in the same
manner as flight system reviews.
During the course of the assessment, the NESC may issue requests,
non-conformance reports or other appropriate actions, which will become
constraints to proceed beyond a selected milestone. The NESC will use
the documentation and closure process for the respective program or
project. The constraint will be removed with the concurrence of the
NESC. If the issue represents a critical safety issue, the NESC may
issue a ``Stop Work'' notice until the program resolves the
discrepancies to the satisfaction of the respective program board, with
NESC member concurrence.
Technical Inspections
Based on insight into the programs gained by the NESC, as
previously described, the NESC may perform Technical Inspections (TI)
to evaluate the technical adequacy of a particular area within program,
even if a problem has not yet been detected. Examples of these
potential inspection areas include: math models, analytical tools,
manufacturing procedures, test procedures, vehicle processing,
troubleshooting techniques, manufacturing tooling, ground support
equipment, or special test equipment. As with the Independent Technical
Assessments, a Principal Engineer would assemble and lead a multi-
discipline team to perform Technical Inspections. The composition of
the team will include the appropriate Discipline Chief Engineers, with
representation from their respective Super Problem Resolution Teams, as
well as SMA, flight operations, ground operations and other independent
assessment organizations representatives as required. Technical
Inspections would be performed on short notice to the program, in order
to ensure a real-time evaluation. Although there would not be an in-
briefing, there would be an out-briefing to the program or Center. The
NESC will allow programs and projects the opportunity to correct any
identified technical inadequacies prior to publishing the final report.
During the course of the inspection, the NESC may issue requests,
non-conformance reports or other appropriate actions, which will become
constraints to proceed beyond a selected milestone. The NESC will use
the documentation and closure process for the respective program or
project. The constraint will be removed with the concurrence of the
NESC. If the issue represents a critical safety issue, the NESC may
issue a ``Stop Work'' notice until the program resolves the
discrepancies to the satisfaction of the respective program board, with
NESC member concurrence.
Technical Support
On limited occasions a program or NASA Center may be confronted
with a problem that is so complex that it would warrant assembling all
the resources available to the Agency to resolve the problem in a
timely manner. In this case the NESC, with approval from the Associate
Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance and NASA Chief Engineer,
could be used as direct technical support to a program or NASA Center
foregoing the role of independence. The requesting program or NASA
Center would then fund those resources, and would utilize an outside
team for an independent review of the activity. In this case the
program could request specific Super Problem Resolutions Team support,
with or without the NESC playing a leadership role. Use of NESC
resources in this manner should be extremely rare to avoid diluting the
primary charter of the NESC of providing independent technical
assessments.
Alternately, the NESC will make its catalog of resources,
(personnel and facilities) and network of experts, available to
programs and NASA Centers. In this case, the requesting programs can
seek assistance directly; through appropriate contracting channels and/
or agreements. The NESC would remain independent of the activity and
any individuals called upon by the requesting program or NASA Center
would not be available to perform an independent technical assessment
on the same issue.
Technical Advocacy
The NESC will provide technical advocacy to SMA organizations,
institutional engineering, program and projects as deemed necessary.
This advocacy may include, but is not limited to, the endorsement of:
suggested additional testing, maintaining critical skills or
facilities, or programs fulfilling in-line functions. In addition, the
NESC will promote the positive actions taken by individuals, programs
or projects to correct identified technical inadequacies.
Independent Technical Assessment, Technical Inspection, or Technical
Support Selection and Prioritization
Critical skills will always be a limited resource. Therefore the
NESC must focus its critical skills on those issues with the highest
risk. The prioritization of NESC activities will be accomplished
through a consistent formal risk assessment, based on likelihood and
consequence. In addition, a checklist of questions will be used when
determining likelihood and consequence, in order to provide consistency
and to uncover the less obvious risks. This approach, as illustrated in
Figure 3, is currently being used in most programs and projects and is
described in Agency polices.
NESC Review Board
The Director, NASA Engineering and Safety Center will Chair the
NESC Review Board. Membership will include the Deputy Director, NESC
Chief Engineers, Principal Engineers, Discipline Chief Engineers, NESC
Chief Astronaut, NESC Chief Scientist, Manager, Systems Engineering
Office, Manager, Business Management and Support Office, NESC SMA
Liaison and NASA Chief Engineer's Office.
The NESC Review Board will: review and approve all requests based
on selection and prioritization process; provide peer reviews of on-
going assessments; ensure the consistency and technical adequacy of all
reviews, prior to release to the customer; determine if any follow-on
activity is required after the review, and provide direction for use of
all resources including critical skills, facilities, testing, and
analysis.
Knowledge Capture and Communication
The NESC will capture and communicate knowledge through five
complementary processes: periodic reports; lessons learned; training;
annual workshops, and a web site.
Periodic Reports: Beginning on October 1, 2004, and recurring at
the beginning of each fiscal year, an annual report will be delivered
to the Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance. The
annual report will summarize the activities for the preceding year and
will establish goals and metrics for the coming year. In addition, an
internal reporting system will include quarterly reports from the
Discipline Chief Engineers and NESC Chief Engineers, with emphasis on
progress against the metrics of that year, for analysis by the NESC
Review Board.
Lessons Learned: One of the principal missions of the NESC is to
bring system and order to the effective retention and utilization of
lessons learned. To that end, three of the other processes in this
section--training, annual workshops and web site--will, as their
principal purpose, document and disseminate the results of NESC
investigations, reviews and other activities.
Training: NESC personnel will receive training to promote and
establish innovative techniques to proactively uncover potential
problems and issues in NASA's programs and projects. The NESC will
utilize existing tools for traditional purposes, such as maintaining
and enhancing specific discipline skills. Selected NESC members will
receive formal training for independent assessments and mishap
investigations. The NESC will also advocate improved training programs
specifically engineered to affect System Safety Awareness in the
workforce, including technical safety training based on NASA successes
and failures (e.g. Lunar Landings, Space Shuttle flights, ISS
construction, Apollo 1 fire, Apollo 13 hardware failure and response,
the loss of crews and orbiters on, Challenger and Columbia flights,).
Training resources available from other government organizations will
be surveyed for application to the NESC.
Annual Workshops: The NESC will sponsor an annual workshop to
discuss processes for proactively identifying and solving engineering
problems before they occur. While serving to publicize and record the
accomplishments of the NESC, through papers and proceedings that
document significant NESC activities, the workshop will also feature
invited lectures and papers from non-traditional fields. In concert
with the NESC training activities, the workshop will initiate and
perpetuate the proactive identification of potential problems before
they occur.
Web site: In addition to the functions described in other sections
of this plan, the NESC Website will provide a central repository and a
tool for disseminating the periodic reports, lessons learned, training
modules, and workshop proceedings outlined above.
Mishap Investigation
The NESC may be requested to lead or support selected Agency mishap
investigations. As such, Principal Engineers, and other key NESC
employees, will be formally trained in mishap investigation. The
Principal Engineers will lead most of the investigations that are
conducted by the NESC. Mishap investigations will be performed in
accordance with Agency policy and procedures.
Dissenting Opinions
The NESC will cultivate an environment that encourages and seeks
out dissenting opinions. In order to encourage this open environment,
and to solicit alternative perspectives, the NESC will establish a
disciplined process for addressing dissenting opinions. As a matter of
practice, each independent technical review, assessment and analysis
will seek out dissenting opinions for review and evaluation. These
dissenting opinions will also be documented and dispositioned in each
report and/or briefing.
Awards
The NESC will establish NESC Awards, given periodically for
outstanding technical achievement during independent technical reviews,
assessments or analyses. In addition, the NESC will utilize existing
Agency awards to reward and encourage the safety culture that the NESC
is trying to cultivate.
Internal NESC Reviews
Initially, it is anticipated that the Stafford-Covey Return-to-
Flight Task Group will review the NESC organizational and
implementation concepts to ensure proper independence and
implementation. The NESC will be subject to periodic reviews by an
external organization to ensure proper independence is being
maintained. In addition, the NESC will develop a set of metrics that
will be used to monitor the organizations progress and effectiveness.
VII. Related Documentation
NESC Charter
NESC Implementation Plan
NPG 8621--Mishap Investigations Procedure and Guidance
NPG 8000.4--Risk Management Procedure and Guideline
Not Culture But Perhaps a Cult
Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2003, Op. Ed. on NASA and the Shuttle
by Homer Hickam
At the end of the movie ``October Sky'' which was based on my
memoir Rocket Boys, there is a dramatic launch of the Space Shuttle.
The director of the film wanted to show the transition from my small
amateur rockets in West Virginia to the huge professional rockets of
NASA as a metaphor for my own transition from coal-town boy to big-time
space engineer. The scene works wonderfully. When I was at the Venice
Film Festival, the audience rose to their feet after this scene and
applauded me while tears streamed down their faces. When I go to the
Cape and watch the Shuttle being launched, I still get a lump in my
throat watching it soar aloft. Even though I no longer work for NASA,
its thunder affirms my dreams for space flight. Still, when I put
emotion aside, I cannot ignore my engineering training. That training
and my knowledge as a twenty-year veteran of the space agency (and also
a Vietnam veteran) has led me to conclude that the Space Shuttle
Program may well be NASA's Vietnam. A generation of engineers and
managers have exhausted themselves trying to make it work and they just
can't. But why not? I believe it is because the Shuttle's engineering
design, just as Vietnam's political design, is inherently flawed.
Much has been made over the report produced by the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). I have since read newspaper
articles that called the report ``scathing.'' Hardly. Its polite
recommendations probably had Shuttle managers who made poor decisions
dancing down their office hallways with relief. Essentially, it gave
them a pass by proclaiming ``culture'' made them do it. It is an echo
of the Rand Commission's study on the Shuttle Program produced almost
exactly one year ago which also wrung its hands over the NASA culture,
though with a different conclusion (turn the whole thing over to
contractors).
I do not believe there is a NASA culture other than a willingness
by its engineers to work their butts off to keep us in space. It might
be said, however, that there is a Shuttle cult. It is practiced like a
religion by space policy makers who simply cannot imagine an American
space agency without the Shuttle. Well, I can and it is a space agency
which can actually fly people and cargoes into orbit without everybody
involved being terrified of imminent death and destruction every time
the Shuttle lifts off the pad.
With some important reservations, the CAIB recommended to keep the
Shuttles flying but with more inspections, more bureaucracy (an outside
safety agency to keep an eye on everybody involved), and more money.
But I think piling on more inspections and people and dollars won't
make the Shuttle any safer. Neither will the safety sensitivity
training that will be probably be dumped on top of already overworked
and disillusioned NASA engineers. My God, they've already dedicated
their lives, their very souls, to keep the Shuttle flying safely! The
truth is no amount of arm-waving and worrying about ``culture'' can fix
a flawed design. Every engineer knows a design that tries to bypass the
realities of physics, chemistry, and strengths of materials by applying
complexity will fail eventually no matter how much attention is given
to it.
Take a look at the Shuttle stack and what do you see? A fragile
space plane sitting on the back of a huge propellant tank between two
massive solid rocket boosters. The tank holds liquid oxygen and
hydrogen and towers above the space plane. It is the foam off this tank
that hit Columbia and knocked a hole in her wing. But why is there foam
at all? Because without it, ice would form on the super-cooled tank and
hit the space plane. But why would ice or foam hit it in the first
place? Because of where the space plane sits. But why does it sit
there? Because the Shuttle Main Engines (SME's) need to come back to
Earth and therefore must be attached to the space plane to be returned.
And why do the SME's need to be returned? So that they can be reused.
And why do they have to be reused? Because, theoretically, it's cheaper
to refurbish them than build new ones. Therefore, the space plane we
think of as the Shuttle has to sit right in the middle of all the
turmoil of launch because we once believed it would be cheaper to bring
back those engines and rebuild them than to build new ones. That has
not proved to be the case--far from it--but it has left us with a crew
sitting in the most vulnerable position possible in terms of
engineering design and safety. Simply put, had that space plane been on
top of the stack, the destruction of Columbia would not have occurred
because its wings would have been out of the line of fire. Challenger
would probably not have happened, either. Had the space plane been
above the explosion, it likely would have been able to punch out and
glide back home.
The flawed design of the Shuttle is all in its history and it's
more than the way the stack is assembled. For instance, the Shuttle
uses hydrogen fuel, the most difficult, cranky fuel there is. Hydrogen
is the smallest atom in the universe and leaks through molecule-sized
pinholes. When it gathers in an enclosed space (such as under the
Shuttle stack on the pad), it's a bomb waiting to go off. Hydrogen
leakages grounded the Shuttles for three months before Columbia was
launched and scares a lot of NASA engineers to death. So why do they
use hydrogen and all its cranky plumbing? Because the Shuttle's
original designers had to wring the last ounce of performance out of it
to haul those mains into orbit along with the heavy payloads that the
Air Force demanded at the time (the Air Force long ago gave up on the
Shuttle). And what about those solid rocket boosters, unstoppable once
lit? They leave the crews with no choice but to hang on until they've
wound down even if their space plane is being torn apart. They were
added not because they were the best boosters around but because they
were relatively cheap. If his engineers had brought my father something
to dig coal as flawed in its suppositions as well as its design as the
Shuttle, he would have chased them out of his coal mine.
The odd thing is that the Shuttle was designed by great engineers.
The problem is they were forced to fit their designs to fit what has
proved to be an impossible concept, a chemically-propelled rocket ship
that would carry humans and heavy payloads into orbit routinely, then
land to be refurbished and sent aloft again within days. They also had
to do it on the cheap. It was inevitable that a flawed design would be
the result. In my second memoir, The Coalwood Way, I wrote about me
always complaining about the past until Roy Lee, a fellow Rocket Boy,
tells me to stop it because ``You can't beat history.'' And he was
right even though, as I wrote, ``It placed my heart in the icy vise of
truth where hearts tend to suffer.'' The heart of every NASA engineer
suffers today in this icy truth: the Space Shuttle is an inherently
flawed design and will destroy American human space flight if we don't
get it behind us. It's nearly done it already.
So what should be done? Let's get practical. We can't just shut the
thing down instantly. History's got us by the throat. We need the
Shuttle to finish the Space Station and to also keep the Russians and
Chinese from dominating space. I for one am not willing to see that
occur while we dither. Human space flight is important to this country.
But I think the Shuttle is as safe as you're going to get it pretty
much with what is in place today. Let's fire the managers responsible
for Columbia (they are not difficult to identify) so as to warn the
next crop they'd best be competent, put the toughest engineers we can
find to be in charge of the program, fly the thing eight to ten more
times over the next four years to finish the space station and meet our
international obligations. Then let's close the program down in a
controlled fashion and replace it with proven expendable launchers and
a shiny new space plane. And, this time, put it on top.