[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER (TTIC) AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE AND HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
AND THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 22, 2003
__________
Serial No. 64
(Committee on the Judiciary)
Serial No. 108-19
(Select Committee on Homeland Security)
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
and the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary
and http://hsc.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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_____________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee ZOE LOFGREN, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MAXINE WATERS, California
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
RIC KELLER, Florida ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
STEVE KING, Iowa
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
TOM FEENEY, Florida
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Philip G. Kiko, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief CounselF0486 deg.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington JIM TURNER, Texas
C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
DON YOUNG, Arkansas LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Wisconsin NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
BILLY TAUZIN, Louisiana BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
DAVID DREIER, California JANE HARMAN, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New
SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, Illinois York
LAMAR SMITH, Texas PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania NITA M. LOWEY, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
PORTER J. GOSS, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, D.C.
DAVE CAMP, Michigan ZOE LOFGREN, California
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
PETER T. KING, New York DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin
JOHN LINDER, Georgia Islands
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas KEN LUCAS, Kentucky
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
KAY GRANGER, Texas KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
PETE SESSIONS, Texas
JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York
John Gannon, Majority Staff Director
David H. Schanzer, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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JULY 22, 2003
OPENING STATEMENT
Page
The Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress From the
State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary... 1
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in
Congress From the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Committee
on the Judiciary (given by Mr. Coble).......................... 1
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 2
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 5
The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the
Judiciary...................................................... 7
WITNESSES
Mr. John O. Brennan, Director, Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC)
Oral Testimony................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Larry Mefford, Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism
and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Department of Justice
Oral Testimony................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Bill Parrish, Acting Assistant Secretary for Information
Analysis, Directorate of Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Oral Testimony................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Jerry Berman, President, Center for Democracy and Technology
Oral Testimony................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable James R. Langevin, a
Representative in Congress From the State of Rhode Island...... 81
Responses from John O. Brennan, Director, Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC), to post-hearing questions........... 82
Response from Eleni P. Kalisch, Assistant Director, Office of
Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigations, U.S.
Department of Justice on behalf of Larry Mefford, Executive
Assistant Director, Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, to
post-hearing questions......................................... 125
TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER (TTIC) AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE AND HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 22, 2003
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
and
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The Committees met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in Room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Coble
presiding.
Mr. Coble. [Presiding.] Good afternoon, ladies and
gentlemen. The joint hearing of the Judiciary and Homeland
Security Committees will come to order. Chairman Sensenbrenner
may or may not appear. He had other duties to attend to, but he
may be here imminently. And, I underwent facial surgery
yesterday, so I may have to depart before too long. So don't
take my departure as lack of interest in this subject. Now, I
will try to come back. I appreciate all of you being here.
In the wake of the terror--this will be Mr. Sensenbrenner's
opening statement:
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
at the height of the shock and horror, the American people
asked who? Who would attack so many innocent people so
viciously?
The who was answered rather quickly as names, pictures, and
affiliations replaced speculation. Then the American people
asked why? Why would anyone do this? The answer was somewhat
more complicated then determining who, but eventually it was
answered--having historical and political roots combined with
pure hatred and a wanton disregard for human life.
Eventually, the American people asked how? How could the
most industrialized, technologically advanced Nation in the
world, with an unmatched military might, fall prey to what
essentially amounted to a band of thugs, mostly in their
twenties, armed with box cutters? And how could we not see it
coming?
As we convene this hearing today, just a month away from
the 2-year anniversary of those attacks, we are still examining
how. As Congress attempted to answer how this could have
happened, it became apparent that our national intelligence
apparatus had serious deficiencies. After numerous
congressional hearings, briefings, and reviews, including the
Joint Intelligence Committee inquiry, serious shortcomings were
identified.
The shortcomings covered all phases of intelligence,
including its collection, analysis, and dissemination. In
general terms, terms you have certainly heard by now, there was
a failure to connect the dots. The world changed on September
11, 2001, and the mission and structure of our Government--
including our law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies,
and military forces--are changing to meet the threats of this
new world.
As a result, our Nation's laws are evolving. With the
passing of the PATRIOT Act, law enforcement and intelligence
officials can more freely share information. Many agencies have
reinvented themselves since the events of September 11th, the
response to specific performance relating to criticism leveled
at them.
With so many changes, we must occasionally pause and
conduct a pulse check and evaluate how our new organizational
creations, technologies, and procedures are performing. We must
ensure that these structural changes are real and produce
positive results that allow our intelligence and law
enforcement communities to effectively connect the dots.
By not connecting the dots, a picture does not emerge; but
connecting the dots in the wrong order produces a result that
is just as useless. Congress and the Administration must work
together to ensure that our attempts at making those
connections are logical and unified.
One new creation that evolved from the need to coordinate
intelligence information was the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center, known by its acronym TTIC. TTIC was announced by
President Bush during his State of the Union address on January
28, 2003, with instructions to the FBI, CIA, the Department of
Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense to merge and
analyze all threat information in a single location.
During our hearing today, the Judiciary Committee and the
Select Committee on Homeland Security will examine how the
center is working, the impediments that may prevent successful
implementation, and its relationship with law enforcement and
information collection.
Furthermore, the witnesses need to address concerns some
have raised about the future evolution that TTIC might yield.
Additionally, I would like to examine where there might be some
unnecessary duplication of effort, realizing fully that as a
general principle, the more eyes reviewing intelligence
information the better.
I look forward to hearing from your panel today, and now
yield to the distinguished gentleman from California, Mr. Chris
Cox, who chairs the Select Committee on Homeland Security.
Chairman Cox. Good afternoon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
would like at the outset to thank the Chairman of the full
Committee, Mr. Sensenbrenner, for arranging this hearing in
which the Homeland Security Committee is participating jointly,
and to thank my friend, the Chairman of the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Mr.
Coble, for joining me in arranging this very important hearing
today.
It is important because between our main witnesses today,
the organizations represented have a central role in the war on
terrorism. Just as important, this joint hearing is necessary
because multiple Committees of the Congress must tackle this
matter of mutual interest in a constructive and cooperative
way.
I believe we are showing here how we can work together for
the good of the country. That is important, because even with
the creation of the Homeland Security Committee in the House of
Representatives, both the FBI and the CIA lie chiefly within
the jurisdiction of the Judiciary and the Intelligence
Committees.
So I join Chairman Sensenbrenner, who cannot be with us at
the moment, in welcoming all of our witnesses this afternoon.
Each of our Committees has a good reason for wanting to hear
about TTIC. TTIC is a creation of four principal agencies,
including the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. The
Administration's intent was that each agency participant in
TTIC would be an equal partner. Representatives of two of those
equal partners are with us today. Each agency partner in TTIC,
including the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI,
contributes its personnel, assigns them to the TTIC, and funds
them and their activities.
Each pays its costs. They are not reimbursed. More
importantly, each of TTIC's agency participants brings its
authorities to TTIC. Without them, TTIC would have none,
because TTIC itself has no basis in law. It was not created by
statute. It has no authority that is not borrowed from its
agency participants. In the private sector, TTIC would probably
be called a joint venture. Several different entities have come
together to get a particular job done. It is a shared activity
that is one of a variety of new post-9/11 partnerships that
seek to match information to needs. We are achieving this
regardless of traditional bureaucratic boundaries.
The stated purpose of TTIC is to bring together and analyze
all terrorist threat-related information available to the
United States Government. That is a tall order, but just one
part of the Department of Homeland Security's own threefold
objective: First, to prevent terrorism; second, to protect our
Nation, its population, and critical infrastructure; and,
third, since anything else would be irresponsible, to prepare
to respond if we are unsuccessful in the first two objectives,
because, to prepare for what was once unthinkable is a good way
to avoid reliving it.
That brings me to our larger interest. The Select Committee
on Homeland Security is the House Committee for ensuring that
the Department of Homeland Security reaches its full
statutorily mandated potential. This is our 20th hearing. Most
of our hearings in one way or another have touched on the
Department's analytic responsibilities. This is because the
Department's Directorate of Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection is at the very heart of nearly all of
the Department's activities, from cyber security to border
protection, to awarding first responder grants.
It enables them, focuses them, prioritizes them. It makes
them relevant to the protection of the United States citizens
and the prevention of terrorism in the United States. Good,
timely, and relevant information analysis enables us to act
intelligently to protect our most vulnerable critical
infrastructure, much of which is private-sector owned. Last
week's hearing of our full Committee also made clear that it is
good analysis of the most relevant information that will enable
first responders to plan and train to meet the threats most
likely to put the communities they protect at risk, and that
will enable them to meet those threats.
We saw an even more pointed demonstration of the need for
an expert and independent in-house analytical cadre of the
Department of Homeland Security recently when we considered
H.R. 2122, the ``Project BioShield Act of 2003.'' That
legislation requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to
determine on an ongoing basis which chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear agents around the world constitute a
material threat to the population of the United States. This
will require a standing in-house capability to analyze all
terrorist threat-related information available to the U.S.
Government. Any such information that could translate into a
risk that the American homeland, our people, our critical
infrastructure, and our core interests could be attacked would
be relevant for this purpose. The Homeland Security Act itself
requires that the Department have direct access to all such
information, including specifically raw; that is, unanalyzed,
unprocessed, intelligence information.
If the Department of Homeland Security fulfills its
statutory mandate, it will be efficient and effective in
meeting its responsibilities under the BioShield legislation.
Nothing must be allowed to get in the way of this. But just
yesterday the Washington Post reported that, ``The intelligence
unit of the 4-month-old Department of Homeland Security is
understaffed, unorganized, and weak-willed, diminishing its
role in pursuing terrorists.'' If there is any truth in this
report, it is our job on this Committee and in this Congress to
make sure that the situation changes without delay; because
this is not about oiling the clattering wheels of the Federal
bureaucracy, it is about protecting the American people, our
country, and our core interests from those whose declared
intention is to destroy them.
We have seen what they can do. And if we had to draw just
one lesson from the tragic 9/11 attacks, it would be that we
did not have all of the information that we needed and that
what we did have did not get where it was needed, when it was
needed.
Congress and the President acted immediately. Enactment of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 crushed the bureaucratic
barriers that had, until then, been able to obstruct the flow
of terrorist threat-related information from where it was
obtained to wherever it was actually needed. It created a new
Department of Homeland Security whose core responsibility is to
consolidate, analyze, and act upon all of the information the
U.S. Government has about terrorist-related threats,
vulnerabilities, and risks.
For the first time, our law treats all of the intelligence
information that taxpayer dollars have purchased as assets of
the whole Government, not of the host of individual agencies
that may or may not talk to each other. That is critical
because our prime objective is to detect, deter, and prevent
terrorist attacks on our homeland, not to clean up after them.
Our task now is to make sure that the vision of the
Homeland Security Act quickly becomes reality. As we move
forward, we must remember that the Department of Homeland
Security is as much a part of the President's program as it is
a statutory creature of our own. To ensure that the Department
reaches its full potential as quickly as possible is part of
the President's program. It is good and it is necessary, and we
will continue to do our part. This hearing is one more step.
Today, we want to hear that the Department of Homeland
Security is fully and unequivocally committed to bringing its
Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection to its full statutorily mandated capabilities. We
need to know that the Department of Homeland Security is
engaged in a systematic program to build up its analysts'
cadre, and to give its analysts cutting-edge tools so that they
can conduct the independent analysis the Homeland Security Act
requires them to do.
We want to be persuaded that TTIC is a force multiplier for
its member agencies, helping them to meet their own
responsibilities more effectively. We want to make sure TTIC
isn't impeding the Department from reaching its objectives,
that TTIC is not, for example, trying to hire the same analysts
that the Department of Homeland Security needs, and that TTIC
is not a filter through which some but not all terrorist
threat-related information is allowed to reach the Department's
analysts.
We are also interested in knowing why it is more
appropriate for the director of this new center to report to
the Director of Central Intelligence rather than, say, to the
Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security. We need
to be reassured that TTIC will not itself engage in any
collection activities whatsoever, as that would be to engage
our foreign intelligence agencies in domestic collection
activities. That has been a sad chapter of our history that
must remain closed.
And we all want to rest assured that mixing all kinds of
information and databases in an entity answerable only to the
Director of Central Intelligence carries with it no risk to our
civil liberties and to our privacy, because part of the point
of fighting terrorism is not to surrender our way of life.
I want once again to thank Chairman Sensenbrenner, Chairman
Coble, my Ranking Member, and each of our witnesses for joining
us this afternoon, and for their work in promoting the
Department's success.
I would like, finally, to remind Members how we will
proceed today. First, Chairman Coble will take the gavel for
half an hour. Then I will take the gavel for half an hour.
Members will have 5 minutes each to question the witnesses. We
will recognize Members in the order they arrived today,
alternating between majority and minority. I regret that we do
not have time for every Member of both full Committees to make
an opening statement or presumably even to ask questions, but
the combined full Committee format requires that we save our
time for questions. We hope Members will, nevertheless, submit
statements to be included in the record of this hearing.
With that, Chairman Coble, I yield back.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman. And we have a vote on.
But at this time the chair recognizes the distinguished
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Jim Turner, the Ranking Member of
Homeland Security.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today's joint hearing
of the Homeland Security and the Judiciary Committees considers
one of the most important steps that we must take to protect
our homeland; that is, gathering, understanding, and sharing
information about terrorists intending to attack America.
Following the September 11 attacks, we learned that the
agencies of the Federal Government such as the FBI and the CIA
had information about some of the hijackers in their files.
Although we can never know for sure, it is possible that had
the bits of information scattered throughout the agencies been
brought together and properly analyzed, we might have had a
chance to thwart the attacks.
It is clear that in order to prevent another attack we must
make full use of the information available to our Government on
terrorist threats. It must be clear to everyone with a
counterterrorism role, whether they serve at the Federal, State
or local level, where to report terrorist threat information so
that it can be analyzed in one center. If it is not clear, it
will be too easy for a key piece of information to be lost and
ignored again.
It is also critical that we have full participation of
State and local officials in the sharing of information. Even
if the Federal Government does its job right, it will be of
little use if information is not shared with local and State
officials who serve their communities where terrorists could be
active.
Information sharing always must be a two-way street. State
and local law enforcement are in a position to observe unusual
activity and provide information that can prevent a potential
attack. Information they provide should not fall into a Federal
black hole; it must be shared, analyzed, and when appropriate,
acted upon.
In order for the information sharing to work, officials at
the local, State and Federal level must have a clear
understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities.
At this very moment, terrorists could be plotting another
attack. But who is in charge of making sure that critical
information doesn't fall through the cracks? Right now there is
more confusion than clarity. For example, the Homeland Security
Act states that the Department of Homeland Security will
access, analyze, and assess terrorist threats to the homeland.
The White House fact sheet announcing the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center states that the Center will perform the same
functions.
This same fact sheet states that the Center will maintain
an up-to-date database of known and suspected terrorists. Yet a
recent General Accounting Office report indicates that the
Department of Homeland Security had taken the responsibility
for maintaining a terrorist watch list. And to date, we
continue to have a multitude of watch lists.
Surely almost 2 years after September 11, 2001, we can come
up with one consistent terrorist watch list. Senate hearings
held on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center indicated that
the Center, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security
all had some responsibility for information sharing with State
and local officials. We cannot afford to have this confusion
about counterterrorism responsibilities within our Government.
The statutory mandate given to the Department of Homeland
Security by the Congress and the role and responsibilities
granted to the Threat Integration Center by the President
result in a system where there is unclear division of
responsibility and, therefore, no clear basis for
accountability.
We want to know from the witnesses today who is in charge
of notifying local law enforcement of a threat to their
communities. We want to know who will be creating a unified
terrorist watch list and distributing it to our embassies, our
airport security officials, our Border Patrol and others. We
want to know who is responsible for receiving information from
local law enforcement and making sure that other agencies are
provided access to it.
We want answers to these questions, because if these
functions fail and terrorists are successful again, we all will
be accountable to the American people. Regardless of who is
responsible for performing these functions, the job must get
done. One thing we do know, the robust intelligence unit
envisioned by the Homeland Security Act does not exist today.
The Office of Information Analysis is not yet equipped and
staffed to do the job. This is particularly concerning, because
it is the only entity in the Government charged with analyzing
threats and comparing them to our vulnerabilities. This is the
function that the Department of Homeland Security was given by
the Congress. That function is the same as the brain is to the
human body. It is the nerve center. It is where the direction,
the focus, the priorities on the war on terrorism must be
determined. And if we do not have a clear plan on where the
terrorist information should be reported and who is responsible
for analyzing the information, we run a grave risk of missing a
key piece of information that could prevent the next September
11. This is simply not acceptable.
I am very pleased that we have the high-ranking officials
before us from the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the
FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security. And I hope today
they will be able to shed some light upon these very troubling
issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. [Presiding.] Thank you. The gentleman's time
has expired. There is a vote on the floor. So we will be in
recess, and I encourage Members to come back promptly after
this vote so we can continue. We are in recess.
[recess.]
Mr. Chabot. The Committee will come back to order.
I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, who
will make an opening statement on behalf of the Ranking Member
of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Conyers. Mr. Scott is
recognized.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate you
holding the joint Committee hearing between the Committee on
the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Homeland Security.
Coordination between the various intelligence and law
enforcement entities is the focal point of the hearing. So I am
pleased that we are applying the principles in our joint
oversight responsibility to this issue.
There is no question that we must have more coordination
between our intelligence entities, foreign and domestic, and
between intelligence and law enforcement operations at the
international, national, State and local level, as well as with
our governmental and private-sector partners in our efforts to
prevent and respond to terrorism.
It was on September 11, 2001, that we just saw how vital
ongoing collection and quick assessment and dissemination of
intelligence can be.
These incidents clearly showed that there were shortcomings
in our intelligence systems. Through the enactment of the USA
PATRIOT Act and establishment of the Homeland Security
Department, we eliminated many of the traditional barriers to
collection, collation, and dissemination of intelligence. The
Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the TTIC, is designed to
coordinate and strengthen our ability to efficiently and
effectively analyze and disseminate intelligence data.
While I am very much in support of what it is supposed to
do, I am concerned about the implications on civil liberties,
and I would also be interested in hearing comments from our
witnesses on whether it would be better to house this new
agency at the CIA, Department of Homeland Security, or the FBI.
Moreover, I am concerned that the proposed placement at the
CIA avoids the carefully crafted and vitally important civil
liberties and privacy protection issues that are unique to our
Nation. Those liberties are much more protected at the
Department of Homeland Security and the FBI than they are at
the CIA, and that is one of the reasons I have that concern.
So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our
witnesses and working with you to ensure that our intelligence
gathering, assessment, and dissemination systems perform in the
most efficient and effective way in preventing and addressing
terrorism as well as protecting our rights and freedoms.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
We will now introduce the distinguished panel that we have
before us this afternoon. Our first witness today is Mr. John
Brennan, Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center,
or TTIC. He began his career as an intelligence officer in 1980
with the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of
Operations as a career trainee. Throughout his career, Mr.
Brennan has held numerous intelligence posts, including as head
of terrorism analysis in the DCI's Counterterrorist Center
between 1990 and 1992. He has also served as the CIA's daily
intelligence briefer at the White House in 1994 and 1995, and
as DCI Tenet's chief of staff from 1999 to 2001. On March 26,
2001, Mr. Brennan was appointed Deputy Executive Director of
DCI and served in that capacity until he was named to be the
first Director of TTIC on March 12, 2003. We welcome you here
this afternoon, Mr. Brennan.
Our next witness is Mr. Larry Mefford, Executive Assistant
Director of Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence in the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Mefford was just appointed
to this by Director Mueller on July 17, 2003. Mr. Mefford
joined the FBI in 1979, after serving as a law enforcement
officer in Reno, Nevada. He has 30 years experience managing
counterterrorism, criminal and crisis management matters. At
FBI headquarters he oversaw the establishment of the FBI's
Cyber Division, assisted in the interagency weapons of mass
destruction contingency planning efforts, and authored the
FBI's plan to address a chemical or biological terrorist
incident. We welcome you here this afternoon.
Our third witness is William Parrish, who became the Acting
Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis in the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, IAIP on
July 3rd. He is a retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel with more
than 29 years of leadership experience and a proven record of
achievement in antiterrorism training and operations planning.
He served as senior advisor to the Secretary of Homeland
Security for combatting terrorism and served as the senior
Homeland Security representative to the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center. In February of 2003, Assistant Secretary
Parrish was reassigned from U.S. Customs to the Office of the
Secretary for Homeland Security. While serving in U.S. Customs
he established the first Office of Antiterrorism on October 23,
2001. We welcome you here as well.
And our final witness this afternoon is Jerry Berman,
President of the Center for Democracy and Technology, or CDT.
The CDT is a Washington, D.C.-based Internet public policy
organization. Mr. Berman founded the organization in December
1994 to address free speech, privacy, Internet governance, and
architecture issues affecting democracy and civil liberties on
the global Internet.
Thank you all for testifying. We have written statements
from each witness on this panel, which I ask unanimous consent
to submit into the record in their entirety, and we would ask
that each witness please limit their oral statement to 5
minutes. We actually, as you know, have a lighting system here.
The yellow light will indicate that you have 1 minute to go,
and when the red light comes on, if you can wrap up fairly
promptly there, we would appreciate it.
And we will begin with you this afternoon, Mr. Brennan.
STATEMENT OF JOHN O. BRENNAN, DIRECTOR,
TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER
Mr. Brennan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege to
appear before this joint Committee today to talk about the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center, TTIC. I would like to say
a few words in my opening statement about the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, many of which have already been stated here
by the distinguished Members.
As was stated, the United States faces a very serious
terrorist threat to its interests both at home and abroad. Al-
Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are trying to do
serious damage to our people and to our facilities, whether it
be overseas at the many embassies and installations we have, as
well as at home. If we are going to counter this threat, the
U.S. Government must use all available resources and
capabilities, and use all available knowledge if we are to stop
repeat attacks such as we saw on September 11, 2001.
By statute, most notably the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, there is a
shared responsibility within the U.S. Government for dealing
with the terrorist threat to U.S. Interests. In reality, no
single department or agency has sufficient authority or
capability to deal with the terrorist threat alone. It is this
shared responsibility within the Government, as well as the
need to combine capabilities and authorities in an integrated
framework, that TTIC was established on 1 May of this year.
TTIC is an innovative joint venture comprising at this time
over 100 officers from partner agencies. Those partner agencies
include the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Homeland Security, and the Department of State. The officers in
TTIC have full access to the information systems and databases
of their parent agencies. Their primary responsibility is to
analyze all threat information available to the U.S.
Government, to connect the dots if you will, and make their
findings and analysis available to those outside of TTIC who
are responsible for preventing and defending against terrorist
attacks.
As Director of TTIC, I report to the Director of Central
Intelligence, but I believe as head of a joint venture that I
am equally responsible to the Director of the FBI, to
Secretaries Ridge, Rumsfeld, and Powell.
The leadership team of TTIC is an ecumenical one, made up
of senior officers from the partner agencies. TTIC is not a
separate agency or department. TTIC is not a part of the CIA or
any other Government department or agency. And TTIC is not
engaged in any collection activity clandestine operations or
law enforcement matters, and there is no intention for TTIC to
become involved in such activities.
TTIC has a special responsibility to understand how the
threat of international terrorism endangers the homeland. Thus,
TTIC officers are in constant contact with the partner
agencies, sharing analysis and information to help ensure that
critical pieces of the terrorism puzzle, including those
uncovered abroad, are made available to the Department of
Homeland Security and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The expeditious sharing of threat information, as called
for in the Homeland Security Act, and which was reinforced by
the memorandum of understanding signed by the Attorney General,
Secretary Ridge, and Director Tenet earlier this year, requires
major changes in how many Government departments and agencies
do business. The TTIC partner agencies are working hard to
fulfill these obligations, and a joint program office has been
formed to ensure close collaboration on the work that must be
done.
But there are many challenges. The many challenges involve
ensuring that information systems are compatible, that security
protocols are well established, that sources and methods are
well protected, that declassification processes are
streamlined, and that privacy rights of U.S. persons are
carefully safeguarded. It is especially important that we
address these issues appropriately as we leverage the power of
computer technology to deal with the overwhelming volume of
data available to the U.S. Government and when we try to find
the nuggets that will give us the ability to avoid devastating
terrorist attacks.
It is a privilege and a tremendous responsibility to lead
the TTIC. With less than 11 weeks at the helm, I have already
witnessed the force multiplier effect of having officers from
different Government agencies and departments working together
in an integrated environment, sharing information, insights and
analysis, and doing their absolute best to ensure the safety of
Americans everywhere. The American people rightly expect and
deserve no less.
I look forward to taking your questions.
Chairman Cox. [Presiding.] Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brennan follows:]
Prepared Statement of John O. Brennan
Good afternoon, Chairman Sensenbrenner, Chairman Cox, Ranking
Member Conyers, Ranking Member Turner, and the Members of the Committee
on the Judiciary and House Select Committee on Homeland Security.
I appreciate the opportunity to join my colleagues from the
Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
to discuss the mutually supporting relationship between the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the Department of Justice/Federal
Bureau of Investigation (DOJ/FBI) and Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).
As the members of the Judiciary and Homeland Security Committees
well know, international terrorism poses a serious threat to U.S.
interests, both at home and abroad. Al Qa'ida and other terrorist
organizations continue to make plans to carry out attacks against U.S.
citizens and facilities worldwide. While many of these plans have been
disrupted since the tragic events of 11 September 2001, constant
vigilance and proactive efforts on the part of many government
departments and agencies are required to prevent the loss of additional
U.S. lives in terrorist attacks. In recent years we have learned that
terrorist threats that initially appear to be directed at overseas
targets may actually be threats against our homeland, with the reverse
being possible as well. We need to have all of our efforts--both
overseas and domestic--working together in a seamless manner. DHS is a
critical part of that seamless effort; TTIC is as well.
A key ingredient of the U.S. Government's counterterrorism strategy
is to ensure that the many government agencies and departments involved
in the war on terrorism work closely together and share threat
information and analysis that could be used to prevent terrorist
attacks. The May 1, 2003 establishment of the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center is supporting this objective.
TTIC's mission is to enable full integration of terrorist threat-
related information and analysis. It is a multi-agency joint venture
that integrates and analyzes terrorist-threat related information,
collected domestically or abroad, and disseminates information and
analysis to appropriate recipients. As of today, TTIC has a little over
one hundred (100) officers drawn from partner agencies, and we
anticipate a workforce of several hundred by this time next year. As
established, TTIC has sufficient authority to accomplish this
overarching mission. It is important to note that TTIC does not engage
in any collection activities nor does it engage in operations of any
kind. It is not part of the Central Intelligence Agency. Rather, it is
a joint venture composed of partner organizations including the
Departments of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland
Security, Defense and State, and the Central Intelligence Agency. As
Director of TTIC, I report to the Director of Central Intelligence in
his statutory capacity as head of the Intelligence Community. At the
same time, as the head of this innovative joint venture of partner
agencies, I believe I must be responsive to the Director of the FBI and
to the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Defense, and State. TTIC's
roles and responsibilities are spelled out in Director of Central
intelligence Directive (DCID) 2/4, which was effective as of 1 May
2003. I have provided a copy of this DCID to the Chairmen and Ranking
Members of your committees.
When TTIC opened for business, we were fortunate to have seven (7)
DHS and eight (8) FBI representatives assigned. Over the next year, we
expect to have approximately forty (40) DHS assignees and thirty (30)
FBI assignees in TTIC. From the very first day at TTIC, these assignees
were contributing to the development of terrorist threat-related
analysis and finished products.
Current DHS representatives assigned to TTIC include two from the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IA/IP) directorate;
an analyst each from U.S. Secret Service, Transportation Security
Administration, and Coast Guard; and two analysts from the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Of these DHS representatives, five
(5) provide direct support to the development of terrorist threat-
related analytic products, while the other two serve as part of the
TTIC senior leadership team. Bill Parrish has served as the TTIC
Associate Director for Homeland Security and principal senior conduit
back to the Department of Homeland Security; as you are aware, he has
returned to the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
directorate of DHS and is currently serving as Acting Secretary for
Information Analysis.
Current FBI representation at TTIC includes the Principal Deputy
Director, Jim Bernazzani, nine (9) analysts and two (2) agents. The
inclusion of agents with extensive field experience in TTIC informs the
analytic process and helps apply innovative approaches to ``connect the
dots'' in a more comprehensive manner. FBI officers in TTIC maintain
close contact with FBI Headquarters elements as well as with FBI field
offices, as appropriate, on a variety of important international
terrorism issues.
In the context of TTIC, embedded DHS and FBI representatives, and
analysts assigned from the other TTIC partner organizations, have
exceptionally broad access to intelligence. Within TTIC, there is
desktop access to all partner agency networks, which are accessible
only by those who are appropriately cleared and have a need-to-know.
This extensive access to threat-related intelligence has resulted in
unprecedented sharing of information among analysts from a variety of
federal departments and agencies. This type of information sharing is
critical to the many federal, state, local, and law enforcement
entities that are responsible for detecting, disrupting, deterring, and
defending against terrorist attacks. Through regular interaction, TTIC,
Intelligence Community, DHS, and FBI analysts work hand-in hand to
understand and substantiate terrorist threat-related information.
Just as analysts are partnering to address substantive issues,
TTIC, DHS, and FBI senior leadership are also partnering on various
initiatives. One such initiative is the establishment of a joint
program office to implement a systematic approach to inter-agency
information sharing. The task at hand is to ensure that all obligations
are met, as detailed in the Homeland Security Act and in the Homeland
Security Information Sharing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed
by Secretary Ridge, Attorney General Ashcroft, and the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI). On behalf of the DCI, TTIC is facilitating
efforts within the Intelligence Community--in concert with law
enforcement activities--to ensure that the Department of Homeland
Security has access to all information and analytic products required
to execute its mission. In this endeavor, we must move with alacrity to
ensure that we are doing everything possible to support the national
effort to protect our homeland, while balancing the absolute need to
safeguard the Constitutional liberties of all Americans. These are
difficult issues, and we are endeavoring to address them in a
conscientious, yet forward-leaning manner.
Progress has already been made. As an example, there are currently
ninety (90) registered DHS users and three hundred sixty two (362)
registered FBI users of a TTIC-sponsored classified website providing
terrorism-related information. This website, which has over two
thousand (2,000) users throughout the government is currently being
updated to include expanded need-to-know access with rich content
available at varying classification levels, from Top Secret to
Sensitive-But-Unclassified. Further, it is being updated in a manner
that will also enable users to search across disparate data sets in
many different ways. The website will increasingly include products
tailored for the needs of state and local officials, as well as private
industry, such that the DHS and FBI--who are, by mandate, the
designated conduits of information to state and local representatives,
and private industry--can readily pass this information along. It is my
belief that the combination of this increasingly robust website, full
implementation of the MOU on information sharing, and the application
of advanced analytic tools in a conscientious manner will allow TTIC,
DHS, FBI, and the entire terrorism analytic community to stand a far
better chance of successfully ``connecting the dots'' and taking the
necessary preemptive actions to prevent future terrorist attacks.
Another area where we are making progress toward enhanced
information sharing and streamlined governmental processes is in regard
to terrorist identities and watchlisting. As you are aware from the GAO
study released this year, there is a critical need to establish
uniformity and enhanced access to watchlist information. Through
coordinated partnership with entities across the Federal government, we
are converting various existing terrorist identities databases into a
comprehensive, all-source repository of information.
In closing, this good news story does not mean that we are without
significant challenges ahead. But, together we are making progress. I
would even venture to say that TTIC itself--as an innovative construct
in the Federal government--is serving as a forcing function for
progress in addressing long-standing challenges such as inter-agency
information sharing. After only eleven weeks in existence, TTIC has
been a lightening rod, attracting hard issues and running them to
ground through the active collaboration of partner agencies. Together,
we are defining issues and systematically addressing them with all
deliberate speed to protect the nation, while dedicating significant
attention to the protection of civil liberties. We need your help in
these activities and in finding ways to reconcile the inherent tensions
therein. We recognize the need for an expanded and ongoing dialogue
with various interested committees on Capitol Hill. This will enable
appropriate oversight as well as sufficient latitude for us to be
effective in supporting the overall national effort to protect America.
I look forward to our continued dialogue.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Mefford.
STATEMENT OF LARRY MEFFORD, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Mefford. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify about this very important topic today.
It is also an honor to share this table with several of our
partners in this very important initiative, the Terrorist
Threat Integration System, known as TTIC.
During a speech at FBI headquarters, President Bush
emphasized that the FBI has no greater priority than preventing
terrorist acts against America. I want to ensure that everybody
clearly understands that in our view TTIC is crucially
important to the success of our mission in the FBI and that it
will take us to the next level in being able to prevent another
terrorist attack on our Nation.
TTIC's mission is to enable full integration of the
terrorist threat-related information and analysis, and ensure
that this threat product is disseminated expeditiously and
appropriately. TTIC will have no new or independent authority
to engage in the collection of intelligence. TTIC will assess,
integrate, and analyze available threat information collected
domestically and abroad to provide a comprehensive threat
picture for the Nation.
TTIC members will continue to be bound by all applicable
privacy statutes, executive orders and other relevant legal
authorities for protecting privacy and our constitutional
liberties. Information technology and handling procedures are
consistent with the protection of our constitutional liberties.
The FBI views TTIC as an important resource, an all-source
vehicle to provide integrated threat analysis to the FBI, the
Department of Homeland Security, and other Federal intelligence
and law enforcement agencies, which in turn can quickly share
that information with State and local law enforcement, who are
obviously the essential partners in the fight against
terrorism.
TTIC analytical products will be shared with FBI joint
terrorism task forces located in every major metropolitan area
of the Nation, which include our State and local counterparts.
The FBI is committed to working with the Department of Homeland
Security to push this vital information into the hands of those
who need it most.
By September of next year, the FBI hopes to complete the
planned collocation of our counterterrorism operational
elements into a facility that will also house TTIC. Collocation
is important in our view to ensure that the cooperation which
is so necessary for our success today not only continues, but
grows in the years ahead between, the FBI, CIA, DHS and TTIC.
The attacks of September 11 demonstrated that terrorism
knows no boundaries, and neither should the agencies
participating in TTIC who, when working together, greatly
enhance the Government's ability to stop future acts and bring
terrorists to justice.
In closing, on behalf of the men and women of the FBI, I
would like to thank each of you for the support that you have
given us. You have provided us with many new and vital tools,
and with TTIC I am confident that we carry out our mission to
protect America.
Again, I thank you for this opportunity to appear at this
joint hearing and look forward to responding to your questions.
Chairman Cox. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mefford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Larry Mefford
Good afternoon Chairman Sensenbrenner and Chairman Cox, I am
honored to appear at what may be a very historic hearing. I cannot
recall when a witness from the FBI has testified before a combined
panel that encompasses over 80 distinguished Members of the House of
Representatives.
It is also an honor to share this table with several of our
partners in this very important initiative--the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC). During a speech at FBI Headquarters,
President Bush emphasized that the ``FBI has no greater priority than
preventing terrorist acts against America.'' I want to ensure that
everyone clearly understands that TTIC is crucially important to the
success of our mission in the FBI, and it will take us to the next
level in being able to prevent another terrorist attack on our nation.
TTIC's mission is to enable full integration of the terrorist
threat related information and analysis and ensure that this threat
product is disseminated expeditiously and appropriately. TTIC will have
no new or independent authority to engage in the collection of
intelligence. TTIC will access, integrate and analyze available threat
information, collected domestically and abroad, to provide a
comprehensive threat picture. TTIC members will continue to
be bound by all applicable privacy statutes, Executive Orders, and
other relevant legal authorities for protecting privacy and our
Constitutional liberties. Information technology and handling
procedures are consistent with the protection of our Constitutional
liberties.
The FBI views TTIC as an important resource--an all-source vehicle
to provide integrated threat analysis to the FBI, DHS, and other
federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies, which in turn, can
quickly share that analysis with state and local law enforcement who
are essential partners in the fight against terrorism. TTIC analytical
products will be shared with dozens of FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces
around the country which include our state and local counterparts. The
FBI is committed to working with DHS to push this vital information
into the hands of those who need it most.
By September of next year, the FBI hopes to complete the planned
co-location of our counterterrorism operational elements into a
facility that will also house TTIC. Co-location is essential in
ensuring that the cooperation, which is so necessary for our success,
not only continues but grows in the years ahead between the FBI, CIA,
DHS and TTIC. The attacks of September 11th demonstrated that terrorism
knows no boundaries--neither should the agencies participating in
TTIC--who when working together greatly enhance the government's
ability to stop future acts and bring terrorists to justice.
In closing, on behalf of the men and women of the FBI, I would like
to thank each one of you for the tremendous support you have given us.
You have provided us with many new and vital tools and with TTIC, I am
confident that we can carry out our mission to protect America. I again
thank you for this historic opportunity to appear at this joint hearing
and I will be happy to respond to your questions.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Parrish.
STATEMENT OF BILL PARRISH, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INFORMATION ANALYSIS, DIRECTORATE OF INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Parrish. Good afternoon, Chairman, and I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before each of you and distinguished
Members of the Committees. This is my first opportunity to
appear before our Congress, and I look forward to the
opportunity to convey what I think is an important message.
Following changing my uniform and putting on a three-piece
suit and standing up the Office of Antiterrorism for then the
U.S. Customs organization, one of the things I quickly learned
was that there is a very important aspect for agencies to
understand each other's capabilities. During my tenure there in
Customs, I saw and what I observed was that Government
agencies--that once they clearly understood the capabilities of
another agency and how they could use this information or
intelligence, that the sharing process became much easier.
For example, Customs inspectors at our borders having
access to the watch lists of suspected terrorists allows for
the collection of information that contributes to the threat
analysis and assessment process of connecting the dots. I
continue to emphasize this important aspect in knowing the
capabilities of other agencies and understanding how they
support the national effort in combatting terrorism.
Within the Information and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate, we have representation from multiple Federal
agencies, both in the Information Analysis Directorate as well
as our Homeland Security Operations Center. This exchange of
information and recognition of the agencies' capabilities has
significantly enhanced the information flow, both internally
and externally, of the Department.
As you know from the legislation which you passed, the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
is unique among U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement elements
in the authority, the responsibility, and access to
information.
IAIP possesses robust, comprehensive and independent access
to information relevant to homeland security collected both
domestically and abroad. Our mission is to obtain the
intelligence and provide the necessary analysis and assessment
to ensure appropriate actions are taken to protect against
terrorist attacks directed to the U.S. homeland.
The 19 statutory functions listed in the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 are being implemented, and progress is being made
daily to further enhance our capabilities within each of those
functions. The Secretary of Homeland Security has placed the
highest priority on expeditiously completing the new home for
IAIP, which, when completed, will give us more personnel and
the appropriate electronic connectivity.
I am pleased to report that just recently I walked through
the new spaces of IA, and tremendous progress has been made.
However, in the meantime, we have identified procedures to
ensure we are meeting our tasks and accomplishing our mission.
Procedures such as employing liaison personnel to other
agencies, bringing in members of other agencies into IA. I have
initiated a program, since assuming the position of Assistant
Secretary for Information Analysis, to coordinate directly with
analysts of the FBI, TTIC, and other members of the
Intelligence Community.
This exchange of personnel and direct access to other
analysts will provided the face-to-face or voice-to-voice
connectivity that will provide essential connectivity to ensure
information is shared until all of our IT systems are in place.
I am confident that these work-around measures are succeeding
in ensuring a timely and efficient flow of information both
into and out of the Department of Homeland Security.
In preparation for today's hearing, I reflected back on my
time in Bahrain, where I led 120 of America's finest, U.S.
Marines from a special antiterrorism unit. We were sent to
ensure the security posture of the U.S. facilities in Bahrain
following the dastardly attack at Khobar Towers. As I stood on
a rooftop at 2 in the morning, talking to a young lance
corporal, one of my designated marksman, he looked at me and he
said, ``Sir, how are we doing?'' I responded by saying, ``You
are doing great, nothing has blown up so far.''
There is a correlation here. And thanks to you, to your
staffs, to our Federal agencies, to include the law enforcement
agencies and the Intelligence Communities of our Government,
the dedicated State and local authorities, the private sector,
and the American people in general, we are doing well. But we
must not become tired nor must we grow weary. The dedication
and commitment must continue. And, above all, continuous
prayers for the safety and security of this great Nation.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Cox. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Parrish follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Parrish
Good morning Chairman Cox, Chairman Sensenbrenner and distinguished
Members of both Committees. I am delighted to appear before you today
to discuss The Department of Homeland Security's role in the
President's Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
Currently, I am the Acting Assistant Secretary for Information
Analysis in the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate (IAIP). Prior to assuming this position on July 3rd of this
year I was the Senior DHS representative to the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC). In this capacity I served in a senior
leadership position as the Associate Director for Homeland Security.
IAIP is unique among U.S. intelligence and law enforcement elements
in authority, responsibility, and access to information IAIP possesses
robust, comprehensive, and independent access, to information relevant
to homeland security, collected both domestically and abroad. Our
mission is to obtain that intelligence and provide the necessary
analysis to ensure the appropriate actions are taken to protect against
terrorist attacks directed at the U.S. homeland. IA has the ability to
conduct its own, independent threat analysis based on information and
intelligence drawn from other agencies within DHS, the FBI, the CIA ,
other members of the Intelligence Community, plus state and local law
enforcement and private sector entities. This enhances IA's ability to
provide threat assessments to the Infrastructure Protection in support
of the Department's mission to protect the homeland.
IA has the specific authority and responsibility for providing
Federally-collected and analyzed homeland security information to first
responders and other state and local officials and, as appropriate,
security managers and other key private sector contacts. As such, IA,
in coordination with IP, is in the position to effectively manage the
collection from state and local governments, and private sector
officials, of crucial homeland security-related information that may
be, in the first instance, available only to those officials. DHS will
continue to work closely with other government agencies to make certain
that those who are on the front lines have the necessary information
and resources to protect the homeland.
IA is a central information nerve center of DHS' efforts to protect
our homeland. IA is responsible for turning the voluminous threat
information collected every day at our borders, ports, and airports,
into usable and, in many cases, actionable intelligence. IA provides
the full-range of intelligence support--briefings, analytic products,
including tailored analysis responding to specific inquiries, and other
support--to the Secretary, DHS leadership, the Undersecretary for IAIP,
and DHS' components.
IAIP will ensure that homeland security-related intelligence
information is shared with others who need it as well as support of the
Secretary's responsibility to administer the Homeland Security Advisory
System by independently analyzing information supporting decisions to
raise or lower the national threat level.
As IAIP's anti-terrorism mission is focused entirely on the
homeland, some of DHS' work in this area will be carried out in part by
IA analysts who are full participants in the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center initiative, and physically located at TTIC.
Certain IA officers will be located at TTIC, working day-in-day-
out, participating in processing and analyzing terrorist threat-related
information, developing, shaping, and disseminating TTIC products,
assessing gaps in the available information, and ensuring that TTIC
products reach appropriate DHS Headquarters officials, as well as
appropriate state, local, and private sector officials.
IA analysts assigned to TTIC will ensure that information gathered
by DHS (from its own collectors as well as state and local governments
and the private sector) reaches TTIC and informs its work and, equally
important, that TTIC's work directly supports DHS's unique mission to
protect the homeland.
As provided by Congress and the President, authorities and
capabilities to deter and disrupt terrorist threats, particularly
overseas, are shared among a number of departments and agencies and
such activities often must be undertaken in concert with state, local,
and foreign governments. Recent experience has shown that terrorist
groups may attempt to coordinate multiple attacks, both overseas and
within the United States, and that threats that appear to be directed
overseas may actually be directed towards the homeland, and vice versa.
This is an essential element of the utility of the TTIC and the
partnership of DHS in looking at the correlation of overseas terrorist
activities and how they could be tied to activities in the homeland. IA
is a key member of the TTIC team and plays an important role in
identifying critical pieces of intelligence that must be shared with
appropriate DHS agencies as well as state, local and private sector
entities.
DHS/IP will rely upon the analysis produced by IA, to help
determine threat vulnerabilities that will assist in establishing
priorities for protective and support measures of federal, state, and
local government agencies and authorities, as well as private sector
entities. In support of its mission, DHS components will identify
intelligence requirements to IA. IA will submit them to the
Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and parts of DHS. This process
will identify vulnerabilities and threats which will allow for
appropriate protective actions to be taken.
In addition to the critical role of mapping infrastructure
vulnerabilities against threats to the homeland, IA also will conduct
other analysis distinct from that in which IA analysts participate at
TTIC.
LTailored Analysis. IA Headquarters-based analysts
will routinely be tasked to take a different ``cut'' at a
similar universe of information as that analyzed at TTIC. For
example, TTIC may reach a conclusion about a general terrorist
threat to the United States, while DHS Headquarters may want a
more targeted and specific analysis directed at how such a
threat might affect a particular sector of the U.S.
infrastructure. Such threat analysis would be different than
that performed at TTIC, but crucial to the overall DHS mission
and to our homeland security. Similar tailored analytic
products are systematically used by the leaders of other
Intelligence Community member Departments and Agencies based on
each agency's individual mission.
LCompetitive Analysis. IAIP analysts located at
Headquarters will also conduct competitive terrorism threat
analysis to that taking place at TTIC. For example, the
Secretary may want an independent look at a particular
conclusion reached by analysts--including IA analysts--at TTIC.
Such competitive analysis not only is sound practice, but it
has been for decades a cornerstone of U.S. Intelligence
Community analytic efforts.
LRed-Teaming. IA's tailored and, at times, competitive
terrorism threat analysis, will take another form as well:
``red teaming.'' IA's analysts will not only look independently
at threat data from a traditional analytical perspective, i.e.,
``connecting the dots,'' but will also undertake ``red team''
analysis. In this mode, analysts will view the United States
from the perspective of the terrorists, seeking to discern and
predict the methods, means and targets of the terrorists. The
analysis produced as part of this red teaming will then be
utilized to uncover weaknesses, and to set priorities for long-
term protective action and target hardening.
Everyone is a partner in this new effort and we must work closely
to be successful. By working together, we can detect and prevent
potential terrorist attacks and identify protective measures that will
enhance the security of our homeland.
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committees, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Berman.
STATEMENT OF JERRY BERMAN, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND
TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity,
and Members, for this opportunity to testify here today. I have
spent a lifetime in civil liberties advocacy work, working a
lot on national security issues, including helping to draft the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FBI guidelines, and on
the PATRIOT Act with Members of the Judiciary Committee and
other Members of Congress.
I am here today to express our concern about what is
transpiring in the organization of TTIC and its relationship to
the Department of Homeland Security as it affects our civil
liberties. As you know, the first response to the grave threat
of terrorism, which we all recognize, was that Congress gave
our intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies broad
new powers under the PATRIOT Act to collect more information,
to disseminate it widely, and to share criminal law
enforcement, grand jury and other information. We know what the
list is--and the business records, medical records, databases--
with mere relevance to an investigation standard.
After stepping back from that, and Congress passing that,
it got to the Department of Homeland Security Act, and I think
took another look, and said the real issue here was not the
lack of collection authority, but the need for better analysis,
better integration of information between our agencies. It was
clear that information they already had hadn't been shared, so
they coordinated it. It was coordinated under the Department of
Homeland Security Act.
And that act did two things. It said that the functions
which I now hear are being performed by TTIC--and, according to
Mr. Brennan, are not under any agency--were supposed to be
performed by the Department of Homeland Security; that they
were going to do the integration, they were going to do the
analysis, they were going to look at the raw data, and they
were going to disseminate it not simply among the agencies, but
down to the people on the front line at State and local levels.
As citizens of the United States, we want that to work. We
want that to work to break down the bureaucratic barriers and
make sure that good intelligence gets to our front line.
But at the same time, Congress said we want to make sure
that our civil liberties are protected, not just because it is
our national value but because those civil liberties are part
of the national security mission. Unless the investigations are
focused on criminal activity and not wandering and fishing
expeditions, unless information is reliable, unless information
is accurate, unless information is collected relevantly and not
on a ``Total Information Awareness'' kind of way, we are not
doing our national security job and we are threatening our
civil liberties.
So we welcome the creation of an oversight system within
the Department of Homeland Security, a privacy office, a civil
liberties office, and we hope that they would get ahold of the
guidelines being recommended by the FBI for data mining
American files; that they would be able to deal with who is on
a watch list and who might be stopped at an airport and suffer
the consequence of not being able to travel; who would be
investigated, and how they would audit all of these
investigations conducted by TSA, FBI, and make sure that CIA is
not investigating in the United States.
That is the job that has been given to DHS. My belief is
that the organizational creation of TTIC has taken that
authority outside of DHS. So that while you have an agency that
is doing integration analysis but not the way Congress
intended, and the oversight system is not applicable; they can
claim that they are protecting all privacy laws, but there was
an officer and an office set up to do that. That is not being
in place. There is no serious staffing of that function, just
as there was no serious staffing, until recently, of the
intelligence analysis function. And that, we are on two ticking
time bombs. One is that we may not be getting the best
intelligence analysis that this country needs and integration
done on our homeland. And we may find that our agencies may be
collecting the wrong information, making false positives, and
leading us down a track where, in the next incident which
causes a crisis or a panic, we sweep up the wrong people, for
the wrong reasons, and cause a civil liberties disaster.
You cannot simply talk about the potential of a terrorist
disaster without saying that our experience of Watergate was
that secret intelligence without guidelines, without oversight,
without careful scrutiny, without auditing, may start with the
best intentions; but a Government of discretion is not what we
are, we are a Government of laws. And it is up to this
Committee to make it right and bring it back within DHS.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Cox. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jerry Berman
Chairman Sensenbrenner, Chairman Cox, Ranking Member Conyers,
Ranking Member Turner, Members of the Committees, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today at this important hearing. We commend you
for beginning public oversight of the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC), its role in the nation's counter-terrorism efforts, its
relationship with the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and
its implications for civil liberties. The Center for Democracy and
Technology \1\ believes that it was a serious mistake for the President
to place the TTIC under the Director of Central Intelligence, because
it appears to have been cut loose from the oversight mechanisms that
Congress specifically created for the intelligence fusion and analysis
function that Congress placed at the Department of Homeland Security.
Regardless of where TTIC is organizationally located, there are major
unanswered questions about the collection, dissemination and
consequences of intelligence information that the Executive Branch and
these Committees need to address. We urge you, therefore, to continue
this oversight process, and we look forward to being of assistance to
you however we can.
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\1\ The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit, public
interest organization dedicated to promoting civil liberties and
democratic values for the new digital communications media. Our core
goals include enhancing privacy protections and preserving the open
architecture of the Internet. Among other activities, CDT coordinates
the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group (DPSWG), a forum for
computer, communications, and public interest organizations, companies
and associations interested in information privacy and security issues.
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i. introduction
The threat terrorism poses to our nation is imminent and grave. The
government must develop a strong organizational structure capable of
preventing terrorism to the greatest extent possible and swiftly
punishing it when it occurs. Information sharing and analysis are
central to success. It is now clear that, before 9/11, the government
was unable to use effectively the information that it was collecting.
Moreover, it is clear that privacy laws and constitutional principles
were not the main barriers to collection, sharing or analysis. Even
before the changes put into place by the PATRIOT Act, the government
had very broad authority to infiltrate organizations, collect
information from public and private sources, and carry out wiretaps and
other forms of electronic surveillance. Overseas, of course, there were
few, if any, rules. Since 9/11, the power of the government to collect
information domestically has been further expanded. Legal barriers
against sharing law enforcement information with intelligence agencies
have been eliminated. But information sharing and sound analysis cannot
be legislatively mandated. With the TTIC, the President has created a
structure that he believes will be better able to conduct analysis and
promote information sharing. The first important question the
Committees are asking today is whether this new structure will in fact
produce better sharing and analysis.
At the same time, the Committees are appropriately asking what will
be the effect of this new organization on civil liberties. The
government's powers, even in this time of crisis, must be subject to
checks and balances. Within the United States, surveillance and data
gathering should be exercised with a focus on potential violence,
guided by the particularized suspicion principle of the Fourth
Amendment, and subject to executive, legislative and judicial controls.
Yet checks and balances were seriously eroded by the USA PATRIOT Act
and Executive Branch actions. When Congress created the Department of
Homeland Security in 2002, it attempted to partially address these
concerns by creating internal oversight mechanisms in the new
Department. If the TTIC is not brought back under the DHS, Congress
should respond by establishing standards for sharing of information and
its consequences and should establish internal oversight mechanisms for
TTIC. Finally, these Committees should continue practicing ongoing,
nonpartisan, and in-depth oversight.
ii. where is the oversight of ttic?
When Congress passed the PATRIOT Act, it specifically directed the
Inspector General of the Department of Justice to designate an official
who would review information and receive complaints alleging abuses of
civil rights and civil liberties by employees and officials of the
Department of justice. The DOJ is required to make public announcements
on how to contact this official. And the official is required to submit
to the Judiciary Committees a semi-annual report detailing the
complaints and findings. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, sec. 1001.
Last week, such a report was presented to the Judiciary Committee.
Where is the similar function for the TTIC?
When Congress created the Homeland Security Department and gave it
responsibility for threat integration and analysis, Congress recognized
that the new Department's powers required close internal and external
oversight. Congress created within the Homeland Security Department two
oversight offices--one for privacy (Sec. 222) and one for civil rights
and civil liberties (Sec. 705). Homeland Security may be the only
department in government that has such statutorily mandated offices.
The Privacy Officer is specifically directed by legislation to take
primary responsibility for issues such as:
(1) Lassuring that the use of technologies sustain, and do not
erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and
disclosure of personal information;
(2) Lassuring that personal information contained in Privacy
Act systems of records is handled in full compliance with fair
information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 1974;
(3) Levaluating legislative and regulatory proposals involving
collection, use, and disclosure of personal information by the
Federal Government;
(4) Lconducting a privacy impact assessment of proposed rules
of the Department or that of the Department on the privacy of
personal information, including the type of personal
information collected and the number of people affected; and
(5) Lpreparing a report to Congress on an annual basis on
activities of the Department that affect privacy, including
complaints of privacy violations, implementation of the Privacy
Act of 1974, internal controls, and other matters.
The DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer also has an express
statutory charge to:
(1) Lreview and assess information alleging abuses of civil
rights, civil liberties, and racial and ethnic profiling by
employees and officials of the Department; and
(2) Lmake public through the Internet, radio, television, or
newspaper advertisements information on the responsibilities
and functions of, and how to contact, [his office].
Where are the comparable officers for the TTIC?
Other questions could be asked: Who has control over the budget for
TTIC? When the FBI's Counterterrorism Division is transferred to TTIC,
will the Judiciary Committee still have authorization authority over
the Counterterrorism Division?
Who is the FOIA officer for the TTIC? Judicial and Executive Branch
interpretations have weakened the Freedom of Information Act as a
mechanism for oversight and accountability, but it remains an important
element of the system of checks and balances.
What guidelines will govern the dissemination of intelligence from
the TTIC to state and local officials? Will those guidelines be public?
These are not concerns that are at odds with the mission of
ensuring that intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination are
organized effectively to support the war on terrorism. To the contrary,
the answers to these questions will help determine whether TTIC is
doing its job. Because the analysis function at DHS is subject to a
specific statutory charter, while TTIC lacks one, and because DHS is
subject to oversight mechanisms, while TTIC apparently has none, we
recommend that TTIC be brought back within DHS.
iii. the need for a ttic charter and guidelines on information sharing
and its consequences
Regardless of where it resides, TTIC needs a charter--something
more binding than the testimony you are receiving from government
officials today--to delimit what it can and cannot do, including how it
can acquire information, how that information can be used, and how
individuals obtain redress. In order to appreciate why this is so
important, let me describe briefly the domestic intelligence system as
it exists today.
Collection Standards: The FBI, the nation's domestic intelligence
agency, has both intelligence and law enforcement surveillance powers.
In international terrorism investigations, the FBI can exercise either
or both sets of powers for maximum collection. Under both the criminal
wiretap statute and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, courts
rarely if ever deny requests for electronic surveillance. For access to
stored records, the criminal grand jury is a powerful, wide-ranging
tool, and Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act gives the FBI the authority to
obtain a court order on a minimal showing to compel disclosure of any
record in the name of international counter-terrorism.
It has been said that TTIC will not be a collection agency. But it
is also said that TTIC will be involved in tasking--that is, in telling
other agencies what to collect. Increasingly, CIA agents are working
closely with FBI agents. That is in some ways highly desirable and long
overdue. But doesn't it mean that the CIA, especially with the TTIC and
its tasking function operating under the Director of Central
Intelligence, now has access to the very ``police, subpoena, or law
enforcement powers or internal security functions'' that the National
Security Act denied to the DCI?
Dissemination: At the same time, the PATRIOT Act broke down the
limits on sharing law enforcement information with intelligence
agencies. (There were never any statutory limits on sharing
intelligence information with law enforcement agencies.) And sharing of
information with state and local officials has become a major topic of
discussion.
Consequences: What is most significant about this sea-change is
that information collected domestically can now be shared and used
outside of the confines of the criminal justice system. In the past,
information collected with grand jury powers or Title III powers had to
be kept confidential and could be used against a person only when they
were accorded the full panoply of due process rights in the criminal
justice system. Intelligence information supported the foreign policy
process or was used in spy-versus-spy operations, but after the reforms
of the Church Committee era was not supposed to be used in ways that
affected the rights of Americans outside the criminal justice system.
Now that information can be used domestically for other barely defined
counter-terrorism and protective purposes. We need to put clearer
definition on how that information can be used and what the
consequences can be, starting with TTIC.
iv. the need for close congressional scrutiny of the effectiveness and
privacy implications of data mining and establishment of guidelines for
any application of the technology
One important avenue of oversight for these Committees is whether,
and if so how, the TTIC intends to use the technique known as data
mining, which purports to be able to find evidence of possible
terrorist preparations by scanning billions of everyday transactions,
potentially including a vast array of information about Americans'
personal lives such as medical information, travel records and credit
card and financial data. We know that other agencies are pursuing this
technology, which seems to assume government access to personal
information about everyone from any source. The Pentagon's Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency is carrying out research on its Total
(now Terrorism) Information Awareness program. The FBI's Trilogy
project includes plans for data mining. According to an undated FBI
presentation obtained under the FOIA by the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, the FBI's use of ``public source'' information
(including proprietary commercial databases) has grown 9,600% since
1992.\2\ And the Homeland Security Act provided DHS with explicit
authorization to develop data mining technologies.
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\2\ http://www.epic.org/privacy/publicrecords/cpfbippt.pdf.
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Two kinds of questions must be asked about data mining.
LFirst, is the technique likely to be effective?
LSecondly, assuming it can be shown to be effective,
what should be the rules governing it?
Current laws place few constraints on the government's ability to
access information for terrorism-related data mining. Under existing
law, the government can ask for, purchase or easily demand access to
most private sector data. Unaddressed are a host of questions:
LWho should approve the patterns that are the basis
for scans of private databases and under what standard?
LWhat should be the legal rules limiting disclosure to
the government of the identity of those whose data fits a
pattern?
LWhen the government draws conclusions based on
pattern analysis, how should those conclusions be interpreted?
LHow should they be disseminated and when can they be
acted upon?
Adapting the Privacy Act of 1974 to government uses of commercial
databases is one way to look at setting guidelines for data mining. But
some of the principles reflected in the Privacy Act are simply
inapplicable and others need to have greater emphasis. For example,
perhaps one of the most important elements of guidelines for data
mining--one that is not part of the Privacy Act--would be rules on the
interpretation and dissemination of hits and on how information
generated by computerized scans can be used. Can it be used to conduct
a more intensive search of someone seeking to board an airplane, to
keep a person off an airplane, to deny a person access to a government
building, to deny a person a job? What due process rights should be
afforded when adverse actions are taken against individuals based on
some pattern identified by a computer program? Can ongoing audits and
evaluation mechanisms assess the effectiveness of particular
applications of the technology and prevent abuse?
All of these questions must be answered before TTIC (and DHS) move
forward with implementation of data mining techniques on commercial
databases. Congress should limit the implementation of data mining
until effectiveness has been shown and guidelines on collection, use,
disclosure and retention have been adopted following appropriate
consultation and comment.
v. conclusion
We need limits on government surveillance and guidelines for the
use of information not merely to protect individual rights but to focus
government activity on those planning violence. The criminal standard
and the principle of particularized suspicion keep the government from
being diverted into investigations guided by politics, religion or
ethnicity. A set of guidelines needs to be issued for the unique
intelligence tasking, fusion, analysis and dissemination function now
contemplated for TTIC. We believe that those guidelines can best be
developed and implemented within the structure of the DHS, with the
statutory charter and oversight mechanisms that Congress established.
But first, Congress needs to know what is going on. It needs to see
a public, binding charter for TTIC, to define its tasking or collection
authorities and protect against mission creep. Congress could start by
inquiring into TTIC's use, if any, of commercial databases. And the
question of consequences and redress looms large.
Chairman Cox. Obviously, there is a vote on the floor. Mr.
Chabot, immediately upon the ringing of the bells, went to the
floor; I believe the vote is on a motion to rise, a procedure
vote; and he is going to come back, so we are going to be able
to keep this hearing in open session while Members go to the
floor. And I encourage Members to do that at their discretion
and leisure.
The Chairman recognizes himself for 5 minutes of questions.
If I may, Mr. Brennan, I want to begin with a fundamental
question about how TTIC and Homeland Security, as between those
two, are going to work to see to it that nothing that goes on
in TTIC is redundant of what is supposed to or is already going
on in the Department of Homeland Security, specifically, with
respect to threat analysis. And let me just begin with that,
and I will follow up with more detail. But I would like to have
you address that broadbrush, if you would, to begin with.
Mr. Brennan. Okay, Mr. Chairman.
TTIC and DHS officers have met repeatedly over the past
several weeks since, in fact, TTIC's stand-up to discuss the
relationship and the complementary nature of the TTIC mission
and the mission of IAIP Director within the Department of
Homeland Security. We see that they are very complementary.
TTIC analysts are looking at information that is available
overseas and domestically here, sharing that information with
DHS analysts, both within TTIC as well as back at DHS
headquarters, and IA, and we are making sure that there is this
robust exchange.
As you well know, a lot of information that becomes
available to the intelligence community is still of a rather
generic nature as far as the type of threats that face the
United States. So what we see is that we are to be working very
closely with IA directorate to ensure that that information is
shared with IA, and that IA can actually look at it at a much
more fine level.
And working with State and local governments, they are
going to try to make this rather generic threat information,
sometimes that is available, much more specific so that IP then
can take action on it. So we do see a natural hand-off between
TTIC analysts and IA analysts.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Parrish, do you want to address that?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir. I think it is important to
understand first of all the nature of the enemy that we are up
against, very decentralized. The intelligence that we get
sometimes is very general, as Mr. Brennan just indicated. One
of the things that IA is looking at is our customer base, and
that is, the private sector as well as State and local
authorities.
If I could, just a quick example of how this may work. Let
us say that TTIC receives an intelligence report of SIGINT
indicating a potential attack to Chicago. Very general. It is
just a threat to Chicago. But yet it is deemed credible based
on the source. IA will then begin to look at this threat and
analyze it working within the Infrastructure Protection
directorate so that they will assess potential target sites
within the Chicago area, identifying critical chemical
facilities, chemical facilities that may be located near the
lake that has an offshore breeze, located in large population
centers around Chicago. They may look and see that there is an
NBA championship being played, and there are five major
conventions being held downtown.
This is the assessment which IAIP does with this
intelligence collected from TTIC. This then allows us to serve
our customer base, to go back to the Mayor of Chicago, to the
Governor of Illinois, and to say there is a credible threat to
Chicago, it is general in nature. Our assessment, though,
places the following areas of considerable risk or high-valued
targets to this, and we would encourage them to take a look at
the security posture of those facilities.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Parrish, your description suggests that
at the time that information comes to TTIC--you gave us a
specific hypothetical example--that it is either shortly
thereafter or in real-time simultaneously being shared with the
Department of Homeland Security. Is that what actually happens?
Mr. Parrish. That is, in fact, the case. As my bio
referenced in the beginning, on May 1, I was the Associate
Director for Homeland Security at TTIC. In that capacity, I had
access to all of those systems we are referring to that are
available within TTIC. I had very timely information that then
would be called back to IA that says we have a piece of
intelligence we are working right now, and I would convey to
them the actions that they should begin to take. So, yes, sir,
it was very real time.
Chairman Cox. And is it something that doesn't require
judgment? Is it automatic?
Mr. Parrish. It is automatic. I think it is important to
understand that within TTIC, we have Department of Homeland
Security analysts that are looking at the operational
environment of which the Department of Homeland Security is
responsible for. So they are looking at it with a set of eyes
that may be different from a CIA analyst or for an FBI analyst.
They are looking at it from the standpoint of border
protection, the maritime picture of the Coast Guard, critical
infrastructure to bridges and tunnels, information that must be
conveyed back to the private sector quickly.
Chairman Cox. Help me understand what is meant in the
Memorandum of Understanding among the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Attorney General, and the DCI concerning this
point, how information passes to TTIC or to the Department of
Homeland Security. Section 3(f) of the MOU provides that,
``When fully operational, TTIC shall be the preferred, though
not the exclusive, method for sharing terrorist threat
information at the national level.'' That implies rather
strongly that sometimes information is going to go first to
TTIC and only subsequently, if at all, to Homeland Security.
Does that never happen? What does that portion of the MOU mean
if it is automatic? It doesn't require any judgment, and all
this information in real-time simultaneously is being provided
both to TTIC and DHS?
Mr. Brennan. If I could address that, sir?
Chairman Cox. Sure.
Mr. Brennan. There are different types of threat
information. Any threat information that is collected by the
intelligence community, by the Bureau is immediately
disseminated and is made available to the Department of
Homeland Security. I think what Bill was referencing here is
that by connecting the dots there are different data points.
Chairman Cox. But just help me understand the MOU. When the
MOU says that TTIC is the preferred method for sharing
information, what does that mean?
Mr. Brennan. I think it says may be the preferred. I am not
certain on that.
Chairman Cox. No. I believe, I am quoting directly, and the
words within the quotation are, ``shall be.'' That is what the
MOU says in section 3(f).
Mr. Brennan. I don't know the context of those words in
that statement.
Chairman Cox. But you are familiar with the MOU that
establishes the procedures for running TTIC that are directing
it?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, I am. The MOU addresses border issues in
TTIC. It addresses the issue of information sharing across the
Government. And, as I said, there is a program office now----
Chairman Cox. But this particular sentence directly
addresses TTIC. It says: TTIC shall be the preferred, though
not the exclusive, method for sharing terrorist threat-related
information at the national level.
Mr. Parrish, do you care to comment on that while Mr.
Brennan is thinking about that?
Mr. Parrish. I can speak for how the system is working and
how it has worked for me when I was----
Chairman Cox. And that is what we are concerned with. We
want to know what is actually happening.
Mr. Parrish. And as I was sitting in TTIC, working there,
again, working back to IA. If there was a piece of information
or intelligence that came in, that I would look to see, in
fact, to ensure DHS was on the list to receive that
information, I would highlight that back to the IA staff to be
sure to pull that table up. If they didn't have that table, I
would ensure that they got that information.
Chairman Cox. But now that sounds like a system that
requires human intervention, that there is judgment and
discretion involved.
Mr. Parrish. I think, in the nature that we are operating
against, there is some requirement for that. But, again, what I
am looking for is to make sure that the originating agency
provided that information to DHS. If it was not, be it an
oversight or if it was sensitive information based on sources
and methods, I would ensure then to go back to the originator
to say there are pieces here that must be shared with the
Department of Homeland Security.
And I will tell you that in all cases when that occurred, I
was never denied access to any of that information.
Chairman Cox. Well, my concern is that on the one hand we
have a paradigm in which the information sharing is automatic,
and it is in real-time, and there is nothing going to TTIC that
isn't also going to the Department of Homeland Security. And,
in the alternative, we have people in TTIC coordinating with
the Department of Homeland Security. And if information might
be of particular interest to the Department of Homeland
Security, then it gets forwarded to them. That is obviously
something that takes place subsequently in time. And because of
the discretion, judgment, and nonautomatic nature of it, it
screams out, willingly or not, wittingly or not, information
that certainly, by statute, we would expect that DHS would get
as a matter of routine.
Mr. Brennan. But a lot of information, sir, is not apparent
to be related to the terrorist threat. A lot of disparate
pieces----
Chairman Cox. Then why is it coming to TTIC in the first
place?
Mr. Brennan. Because the offices in TTIC have full and
unfettered access to their home information systems and
databases. And it is not just limited to threat information, it
is a more broader set. And a lot of information that is
available to the U.S. Government is not, obviously, terrorist-
threat-related. But by comparing data, you create new
knowledge. You put one bit of data together with something
else, and you say there is a match here. And that is what we,
in fact, are trying to do in TTIC, to make that knowledge
available to other Government agencies such as Department of
Homeland Security. But if there is a piece of threat
information that is issued by a department or agency, it goes
immediately, directly to DHS; it doesn't have to go through
TTIC at all.
Chairman Cox. Well, as you can infer from this discussion--
Mr. Berman has been wagging his head. I should let him comment
before I finish.
Mr. Berman. I just am reading the statute, where Congress,
I think, asked that this function be housed at DHS. In fact,
the DHS would even be able to set priorities--I don't want to
establish myself as a national security expert. But in meeting
with national security experts who have talked about this
integration function, the coordination function, there has
been, as part of the Markle Task Force on National Security,
which has already issued a report, very vital importance that
DHS have this function because it is not only that they should
be looking and making judgments about what are the threat
vulnerabilities; they should be looking at the raw data and
making their own analysis. And this sounds like they are
getting a finished product which they can then act on or not
act on, but that they do not have analytic capability. And
that, I think, is not what Congress intended. Congress intended
the functions of TTIC that you are talking about would have
been done by DHS, on a plain reading of the statute.
Chairman Cox. Thank you for that comment. Let me infer from
the discussion that we have just had that it is probably
impossible either for Congress to write a statute or for the
executive branch to write an MOU that reduces all of this to an
algorithm. There is going to be judgment and discretion
involved no matter at what level we make the cut. The statutory
concept is that raw, unanalyzed information is going to come
directly to the Department of Homeland Security. And what I
understand is going on right now is possibly consistent with
that. That is to say, DHS may be getting in real-time all of
the raw, unanalyzed information, but the judgment that is
necessarily involved in it is whether that is terrorist-threat-
related, or otherwise related to the statutory mission of DHS.
And the act of making that cut almost certainly is going to
involve some analysis of the raw data.
And so we may have a metaphysical problem that we cannot
escape, but the hope is that we are making this cut at a pretty
high level so that TTIC does not act as a screen in any way.
I have additional questions, and I think the other Members
certainly do. I need to yield because my time has expired to
the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. And if you would yield further, Mr. Turner. I
also would yield the gavel at this point to Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Turner. This question I would like to address to each
of our three Government witnesses. As all of you know, the
declassified version of the report of the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees on September 11 is expected to be made
public in the next few days. While we don't have the full
report, the Committees released their unclassified findings and
recommendations in December of last year. Their investigation
revealed that, prior to September 11, there were bits of
information scattered throughout the Federal Government about a
number of hijackers. Because the Committees found that these
pieces of information were not brought together, they
recommended that the Department of Homeland Security develop an
all-source terrorism information fusion center.
In light of the creation of TTIC and as a follow-up on the
questions that Chairman Cox asked, my question for you is
really very simple: As of today, who is, in the Federal
Government, responsible for making sure that all the terrorism
information in the Government's possession is brought together,
analyzed, and shared appropriately? Is it the Secretary of
Homeland Security? Is it the Director of the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center? Or is it the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency? Or is it someone else?
I would like for each of you, starting with Mr. Brennan, to
answer that question for me.
Mr. Brennan. Sir, I believe by statute it is a shared
responsibility. Again, pointing to the National Security Act of
1947 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and a series of
executive orders and other statutes, there is a shared
responsibility within the Government. There is no secretary of
terrorism. And so, therefore, that responsibility is shared
among those different agencies and departments. And TTIC is
those agencies and departments. We are not something separate
from them. And that is why this--the purpose of TTIC was to
bring together those authorities and responsibilities within
this joint venture.
Mr. Turner. Well, if it is shared, who ultimately has the
responsibility? Who is ultimately accountable to the Congress
to get this job done?
Mr. Brennan. Sir, I would, again, point to statute to say
that there is a shared responsibility by law for tracking
transnational threats to U.S. interests, both at home and
abroad, among senior Government officials, to include the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, and
the Secretaries of Homeland Security, State, and Defense.
Mr. Turner. So you are telling me that it is not the
statutory responsibility of the Department of Homeland
Security, as I read the Homeland Security Act?
Mr. Brennan. No, sir. I am not saying that at all. I am
saying, it is the statutory responsibility of the Secretary of
the Homeland Security. But it also is the statutory
responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence and the
statutory responsibilities of other Government officials.
Mr. Turner. Maybe I should go to Mr. Parrish. Is that the
way you understand it, Mr. Parrish?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir. I think clearly the Secretary of the
Homeland Security has the responsibility, based on the
information that is brought to the Department, based on the
information that is acquired by the Department, to assess that
information of statutory responsibility. But at the same time,
it is a shared responsibility, as Mr. Brennan indicated, with
the Director of Central Intelligence, with other Federal
agencies.
As I indicated before, the nature of the threat does not
isolate itself to one single area. It cuts across the entire
Federal Government with roles and responsibilities.
Mr. Turner. And Mr. Mefford, do you concur with those
answers, or do you think the FBI has a similar responsibility?
Mr. Mefford. We concur with the shared aspect. The FBI is
included in that. Clearly, in the world of intelligence,
particularly when we talk about the terrorist threat, there is
a very complex set of types of information that we may develop.
The FBI, obviously domestically, being the primary operational
arm of the Federal Government to combat terrorism in the U.S.,
the FBI has responsibility to deal with our information to
ensure that it is passed rapidly and shared broadly, just as we
look to the DCI and Mr. Brennan, in charge of TTIC, to have a
similar responsibility and also with DHS.
So we agree that there is a shared responsibility based on
our statutory and policy issues.
Mr. Turner. We all know that sharing information is
important, and it is only the first step in protecting our
homeland. This information that is shared and collected also
has to be shared back with local and State officials. The
Homeland Security Act gives the responsibility for
disseminating such information to the Department; yet, in a
hearing earlier this year, Mr. Mefford, your predecessor
testified that the Terrorist Threat Integration Center will
provide integrated analysis to the FBI, as well as to State and
to local officials, and that the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task
Forces will have a role in sharing information.
I would like to ask each of you, who is responsible for
making sure that terrorism information is disseminated to State
and local governments? And I might also add, who is responsible
for disseminating information to the private sector as
appropriate? Is it the Department of Homeland Security? The
Terrorist Threat Integration Center? Or is it the FBI?
Mr. Chabot. [Presiding.] The gentleman's time has expired,
but you can answer the question.
Mr. Brennan. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center has a
responsibility to provide information analysis to other Federal
departments and agencies. What the TTIC has to do is to
anticipate what the needs are of the ultimate consumers, which
frequently are the first responders, at the State, local, and
law enforcement levels.
So TTIC provides analysis information to the FBI and to the
Department of Homeland Security, because they are the duly
recognized mechanisms and agencies to share the information
beyond the Federal family. And I would leave it to the FBI and
DHS to explain that. But we are packaging information up so
that they can then readily access it and make it available as
appropriate.
Mr. Mefford. Sir, the FBI again views our role in the war
on terrorism as the primary operational arm of the Federal
Government inside the United States to combat terrorism. So in
reacting to threats, the foundations of our system are the 66
Joint Terrorism Task Forces that are located throughout the
country in every major metropolitan area. We assume a primary
responsibility to ensure that threat, terrorism-threat
information, is shared quickly and broadly with State and local
law enforcement. We look to the Department of Homeland Security
to provide that mission with local and State officials and with
the private sector. But, again, we have--and perhaps later we
will have an opportunity to explain this in more detail.
We have established a very aggressive integration of
resources both here in Washington, D.C. at our headquarters
level, and throughout the field across the United States with
Homeland Security to ensure that that occurs appropriately and
efficiently.
Mr. Parrish. Sir, if I might add. On the morning following
the most recent attacks in Riyhad at the Jadawel compound, the
Cordoval compound, and the Al-Hamra compounds, as I read that
traffic sitting at TTIC, I realized that there were tactics and
techniques that had not been conveyed to the private sectors,
State and locals. When I reached back to Information Analysis
and told them to begin preparing a Homeland Security advisory
bulletin and that I would be working the terror line to get
this information declassified so that we could get this out to
the private sector to identify potential tactics and techniques
used by al Qaeda in these attacks, I am here to tell you, at
the end of the day, by six o'clock that evening, we had out on
the street to the private sector, the State and local, a
document that I have before me here of roughly seven pages that
captured the tactics and techniques employed, and recommended
protective measures that a chemical facility may consider in
placing, or any other facilities for that regard.
So the process is working. The information is being
collected by Department of Homeland Security. It is being
assessed in IA, and then against the Infrastructure Protection
Directorate in getting that information out to the critical
infrastructure facilities across the United States.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for the purpose
of asking questions.
Mr. Brennan, there are many agencies involved in the
collection of intelligence and an increase in the number of
places and people analyzing intelligence. How does the local
police officer patrolling, say, near a bridge or a nuclear
power plant receive information about potential threats, either
general or specific? And does information automatically flow,
or do the local law enforcement officers have to seek out the
information on their own?
Mr. Brennan. If threat information is received from
national sources about a particular and very specific threat to
a bridge or a building, whatever, that local law enforcement
needs, we, in TTIC and the intelligence agency that actually
collected and disseminated the information, would make that
available immediately to the FBI, which has, as Mr. Mefford
mentioned, the responsibility for then interacting with the
local law enforcement.
But we would do whatever we could to ensure and facilitate
the sharing, not only the information, but the context and
analytic context that that information needs to be understood
in.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
Let me add another question, Mr. Brennan. What role do
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) play in the collection or
dissemination of intelligence information? And are they
conduits for TTIC's analytical products?
Mr. Brennan. Since the JTTFs are part of the FBI, I would
defer to Mr. Mefford to explain exactly how that process works.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Mefford?
Mr. Mefford. Yes, sir. The JTTFs play a critical role.
Simply put, they are the foundation and the starting point of
all of our operational activity nationwide. Because they
comprise almost 3,000 investigators today, from State and local
law enforcement agencies, the FBI, and other Federal agencies,
including about 330 DHS personnel assigned to these task forces
around the country, they integrate and relate to local law
enforcement on a daily basis, on a continual basis.
We recognize that we have had some failings in that regard,
and we are moving very rapidly to improve to provide additional
useful and enhanced information to State and local agencies. We
have a variety of initiatives under way today as we speak to
improve our efforts to do that.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
Mr. Parrish, does the creation of TTIC in any way detract
from or interfere with the mission of the Department of
Homeland Security or the Department of Justice? And wasn't the
new department created to do just what TTIC will apparently be
doing?
Mr. Parrish. Sir, TTIC certainly does not negate our
responsibilities as a partnership. As I said before, it is
complementary, it is not competitive. One of the things that we
are doing here is a recent initiative which began--in fact, I
had a large meeting on Friday. There has been some great
successes by the FBI, by the CIA, and by the Department of
Defense over the past 12 months in capturing key al Qaeda
leadership.
When we talk about threats, it is Homeland Security's,
CIA's responsibility to really analyze those threats. Our
initiative now is to assess the capabilities of these threats.
As you mentioned, the police officer that is looking at
security of a bridge. I want to go in now and find out exactly
how capable are the terrorists in order to effect an attack on
a bridge. What were their skill sets? What were their training
capabilities? How are they going to acquire the resources
necessary to take down a bridge?
This is the information that we have to then develop,
analyze, and assess, and then work with Infrastructure
Protection to be able to convey this to our customer base, the
private sector, the State and local. We want to be able to help
them spend their limited resources. So if we can assess a
threat that says that we assess their capability as minimal,
they then might be able to expend only monies toward
surveillance systems, rather than, next time we go to orange,
hiring a security force of adding another 150 security guards.
This is where our focus is. This is complementary of how
TTIC is providing that information with DHS analysts, with FBI
analysts, and the other IC analysts there. This information
then is really being assessed there at IAIP in partnership with
our Infrastructure Protection Directorate to serve our
customers.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. And I note that my time is about
ready to expire. So rather than ask another question, I will
now yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, for the
purpose of asking questions.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. We have been talking about the
statutory scheme whereby everybody has their responsibilities.
Mr. Brennan, it is my understanding that your agency was not
created by statute. Is that right? Is it by executive order?
Mr. Brennan. I do not have an agency, Congressman. It is a
joint venture. It was created by the Administration and reports
directly to the DCI, but I am not a separate agency or
organization.
Mr. Scott. Okay. The Gilmore Commission recommended an
agency that sounds like what you do. There would be appointed,
the head would be appointed by the President with advice and
consent of the Senate. You are not subject to confirmation; is
that right?
Mr. Brennan. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Scott. Now, Mr. Parrish, you indicated a lot of
coordination that is going on now, coordination, dissemination,
evaluation. Are you in fact duplicating what Mr. Brennan is
supposed to be doing, or is he duplicating what you are
supposed to be doing?
Mr. Parrish. No, sir. Our activities are coordinated. It is
complementary. I think we have to ensure in the nature of the
threat the nature of the enemy and how he operates. We cannot
afford to have any gaps or seams. There is going to be overlap,
and there has to be overlap. We must ensure that it is a
seamless operation in analyzing the intelligence to ensure
another 9/11 attack never occurs.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Brennan, you indicated that you are not
gathering information. When you get all this information before
you, are you making recommendations as to what more information
might be needed by various agencies?
Mr. Brennan. As part of our responsibility to be as
knowledgeable as possible about the terrorist threat, one of
our other responsibilities is to identify the gaps in our
knowledge, and to make those gaps known to those authorized
collection agencies.
Mr. Scott. And when you talk about terrorist attacks, are
you talking about domestic attacks like the Oklahoma bombing
case?
Mr. Brennan. What we are talking about, right now, are
transnational terrorist activities, whether they be manifest on
U.S. soil or overseas.
Mr. Scott. Let me ask it again. Are you talking about
domestic terrorism like the Oklahoma bombing case that, to the
best of the knowledge that I have seen, didn't have any
international implications?
Mr. Brennan. At this point, since TTIC is 11 weeks old, we
are looking only at the transnational issues. And the Bureau
has the responsibility for analyzing and assessing the threat
from homegrown terrorist organizations, militias, other types
of white supremacist groups, whatever.
Mr. Scott. The Bureau, you mean the FBI?
Mr. Brennan. The FBI. Correct.
Mr. Scott. You will have information from--you might
discover information about domestic terrorism. How would you
know the difference if people--you overhear people talking
about bombing? You would not--how do you focus on local
threats? I mean, do you first, before you go further, try to
figure out whether there is an international connection? Or do
you find somebody that is storing dynamite, getting ready to
bomb something?
Mr. Brennan. I will let Mr. Mefford address it, but from my
perspective, until something is actually determined to be
solely a domestic event, we keep our minds open as far as the
potential international nexus there. But just from a threat
perspective, any threat information, whether it is here in the
United States or overseas, if there is any potential for
international connections, we will work very closely with the
Bureau and others on it.
Mr. Scott. So if you have got an Oklahoma bombing
assessment, you wouldn't worry about whether it was
internationally connected or not?
Well, Mr. Berman, you want to comment?
Mr. Berman. Yes. It is a serious issue here, because we are
not going to know what the nexus is in many cases. And there is
always a potential for a foreign nexus. So in dealing with
Homeland Security, I think Congress thought it carefully
through, and wanted to put this under the Department of
Homeland Security, namely, the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Mr. Brennan was appointed by Mr. Tenet, not by the Congress.
And that means that the CIA, in our view, and I think at least
arguably and from a policy point of view, is on the cusp of
being involved in, at some point, police, subpoena and law
enforcement functions which are not supposed to be under the
National Security Act.
Mr. Scott. My time is just about to run out, and I wanted
to ask one other question. And that is, just mechanically, Mr.
Brennan, you are getting information from everywhere? I would
assume it is tens of thousands of little bits of information.
Mechanically, who is analyzing, doing the analysis?
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired, but the
gentleman can answer the question.
Mr. Brennan. We have the information systems and databases
available in TTIC from the partner agencies. We apply
analytical tools to that. We apply human analysts to that. It
is being analyzed within TTIC with the assistance of the
different partner agencies. So we do rely heavily on those
analysts that reside within the intelligence community, within
FBI and others.
Mr. Scott. How many people are you talking about?
Mr. Brennan. Right now, within TTIC, we have a little over
100 officers. We are talking about growing to several hundred
by next year this time.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, is recognized.
The senior gentlelady from California, the senior Sanchez is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You mean
senior by seniority? Right?
Gentlemen, thank you for being before us today. I guess we
are just trying to understand who all is doing analysis, who is
passing information where, and what you all are doing. So I
have a question. Are all the Federal agencies providing the
same information to TTIC and to the Department of Homeland
Security? I mean, what kind of information is coming in to
these two different areas that are analyzing things? FBI maybe?
Are you----
Mr. Mefford. The FBI is rapidly sharing all terrorism-
threat-related information with TTIC and all terrorism-related
information with the Department of Homeland Security. Clearly,
with TTIC, our focus is on international connections. And as
you know, threat data can take a variety of forms and often is
very complicated. But the FBI is the agency that is responsible
for operationally responding to any threat information in the
United States.
And, again, as I indicated earlier, we do that through the
Joint Terrorism Task Force network that has been established in
the country and through our 56 field offices around the
country.
Ms. Sanchez. I understand that. So the FBI is getting it
done through the JTTF, but is the Homeland Security Agency,
through its analytical arm of intelligence, also sending
information down to the local and State agencies? And what does
TTIC do with the same information that you are feeding it and
others are feeding it? I mean, are you all doing the same thing
is, I guess, what we are asking. And I ask that because I am
taking a look at the June 18, 2002 message to the Congress from
the President when he talked about the need for a Homeland
Security Agency. And in it he writes, you know, all these great
reasons why we need a Department of Homeland Security. And, one
of the things he says, he says we need one department that
would analyze Homeland Security intelligence from multiple
sources, synthesize it with a comprehensive assessment of
America's vulnerabilities, and take action to secure our
highest-risk facilities and systems.
So I am wondering, are we just duplicating all over the
place this effort? I mean, it seems to me that 9/11, one of the
problems we had was that, first of all, people weren't talking
to each other and, quite frankly, our intelligence community
wasn't as good as we thought it was. And so now, we are
creating all of these new pieces and new analytical arms, and
to what end? I mean, what are we doing with it? What are you
each doing that you could tell me is so different than the
next? And why don't we have it just in one place like the
President asked?
Mr. Mefford. Well, in our view, when the FBI relays
terrorism-threat data and we also relay it to DHS. In fact, as
I indicated, they have a total, between their field personnel
and their headquarters components, they have a total of about
342 personnel assigned with the FBI to work shoulder-to-
shoulder every day. So they have access, Homeland Security
personnel have access to our raw intel in the terrorism world.
We also share that as fast as we can with IA of Homeland
Security.
In regards to TTIC, we view that as an interagency process
that represents Homeland Security, CIA, FBI, DOD, Department of
State, and other entities so that we can quickly share threat
information, and that there is one point in time that somebody
can look at all terrorism threat information. In our view,
based on the nature of the threat that we face today in this
country, which we assess to continue to be al Qaeda, which is
foreign-based, in our view it is reasonable that the CIA have a
significant part in this. But, however, it is a team effort,
and it is an integrated effort----
Mr. Parrish. If I could add.
Ms. Sanchez. I am not arguing about the CIA. I am asking
why we have--I mean, this looks like the intelligence
community, you know, Jobs Forever Program that we have got
going here. I am trying to understand, why not under one
department? Why in so many different places? My understanding
is TTIC doesn't even have a charter. I want to get back to the
gentleman on the end about that one, but somebody was about to
say something, and I will give you the opportunity.
Mr. Parrish. If I could. It is important to understand that
what we are dealing with is an integration of both operations
and intelligence. If I could, the example will be a vessel that
comes in to Long Beach, and we put on a maritime boarding crew
of the Coast Guard of Customs Border Protection or Immigration
Customs Enforcement, because there might have been some
intelligence that indicated some of those crew members may have
terrorist ties. That search team goes on board, and let us say
they find some information relative to a terrorist nexus. This
information is then transmitted to the Joint Terrorism Task
Force in LA. This information was acquired by a subordinate
agency of the Department of Homeland Security, in this case
Customs or rather Coast Guard, let us say. It is then compared
and shared with the Joint Terrorism Task Force to say we found
some, perhaps, phone numbers. And this information is shared to
say, is there any nexus here? It is all part of connecting the
dots. So there is a close integration of the operational
functions of law enforcement agencies and border security
agencies, and integrating that into information that becomes
intelligence that we can then take a look at between TTIC,
Department of Homeland Security, and then make an assessment to
see we have a threat.
Ms. Sanchez. I understand the operational nature. And Mr.
Chairman, I will end on this note. I understand the
operational. But it seems to me like TTIC doesn't do
operational, the Analysis Department of Intelligence for
Homeland Security doesn't do operational. They are just getting
information, they are getting it fed from different arenas. My
whole question is, why are we duplicating our efforts? You
know, if the President asks for one place--it was one of the
reasons he asked for this Homeland Security agency, that we set
it up, was that we have one place, where we get all the
information in one place, and we get it fed in.
I am trying to understand why, you know, why we kept the
CIA out in some other place and the FBI out of Homeland
Security agency; then we created the Security Agency, now we
have created--somebody created TTIC. I am sure that Congress
didn't create TTIC. I am just trying to understand why so many
places for intelligence gathering. Can't one of you do it
right?
Mr. Brennan. If I could respond to that. We are trying to
do it right. The overwhelming majority of information about the
terrorist threat to U.S. interests comes from abroad. The
threat emanates from overseas. It is international terrorism
that has found its way to our shores. The Homeland Security Act
which set up the Department of Homeland Security has given the
Secretary of Homeland Security the responsibility for the
United States proper, U.S. soil. It frequently requires tedious
work sifting through mounds and mounds of information and data
that is collected overseas that has no obvious nexus or
connection to a threat in the United States that is required in
order to surface that threat to the United States. And,
therefore, if you want to give just one entity that full
responsibility for being all knowledgeable and being able to
analyze all the information, when most of it comes from
overseas, I think you are putting more responsibility, in fact,
than the statute has provided to the Department of Homeland
Security. But also more fundamentally, you are giving a very
complicated issue and problem to a single department when
really it requires the joint efforts of many different agencies
and departments throughout this U.S. Government.
Ms. Sanchez. Except that you have created this joint issue
that wasn't created by us, wasn't thought of by us. And, by the
way, it is not just that one I am looking at. We were at
NORTHCOM, Mr. Chairman, the other day, and they have got their
own analysis and intelligence gathering going on. So my biggest
concern is just who is doing what, why are you all doing what
seems to me to be the same thing? And, you know, one of the
problems we have was lack of coordination of information going
to one spot when 9/11 happened, and that is a concern----
Mr. Parrish. If I may respond?
Chairman Cox. [Presiding.] The gentlelady's time has
expired, but the gentleman may surely address the comment.
Mr. Parrish. We do have the representation within the
Department of Homeland Security in our operations center, which
is 24/7; we have over 15 Federal agencies, to include soon a
member of NORTHCOM coming to our staff. We will have the
integration of the information intelligence that is coming out
there, and Department of Homeland Security Information Analysis
Directorate will abide by the mission that we have been tasked
by you all in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. And I am
confident that we are doing it today. Can we do better? Yes, we
can do better, and we will do better as we continue to increase
our numbers, as we increase the IT connectivity. But right now,
the information is coming in, it is being analyzed, and we are
ensuring, to the best of our ability, that there are no gaps.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to address a threat to our national security
that has often been underplayed,and I don't believe I am the
only one in believing so. So let me ask these questions
primarily to Mr. Mefford, but, of course, if Mr. Brennan or Mr.
Parrish have any additional comments, then I would certainly
welcome them.
In 1999, it was reported that the Peoples Republic of China
is using Cuba as a base for sophisticated spying operations
targeting the United States. In 2001, Vice Admiral Wilson, the
Director of Defense Intelligence, told the congressional
hearing that Cuba has the potential, and I quote, ``to use
information warfare or computer network attack,'' ``to disrupt
our access,'' he continued to say, ``or flow of forces to the
region.''
Last year, Under Secretary of State Bolton stated, and I
quote: ``Cuba's threat to our security has often been
underplayed.'' And he went on to say: ``Here is what we know.
Cuba has at least a limited-offensive biological warfare
research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use
biotechnology to other rogue states. We are concerned that such
technology could support bioweapons programs in those states.''
The State Department has continued to maintain that the
Cuban regime continues to host terrorists and U.S. fugitives,
it has permitted numerous Basque ETA terrorists to reside in
Cuba, and that it continues to provide safe haven and support
to the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, FARC, and the ELN
of Colombia, another terrorist group.
Less than a week ago, various press sources reported, and I
quote: ``The Cuban government has been jamming U.S. broadcasts
into Iran since the Voice of America began beaming new Farsi
language programming into that country.''
In addition to the events that I have mentioned, in the
last few years more than a dozen Cuban spies have been
arrested, including Ana Belen Montes, a senior DIA analyst. So
I have, I guess, a general question and then a more specific
one.
The general question would be, what is being done to
counter these types of espionage efforts by the Cubans? For
example, are there other known Cuban spy networks operating in
the U.S., and are we efficiently countering them?
And, my more specific question would be, with regard to Ana
Belen Montes, that high-level spy who was arrested, when will
the damage assessment be completed, and when will we know the
extent to which she compromised U.S. security? Mr. Mefford?
Mr. Mefford. Yes, sir. In reference to your general
question, we appreciate the potential threat posed by that
country. In the terrorism world, because it is a foreign
country, this is one reason why, in our view, it seems
reasonable that an agency such as TTIC, closely aligned with
the FBI and CIA and DHS focus on terrorist activities.
Chairman Cox. Excuse me. The gentleman didn't mean to say
TTIC as an agency. Did you?
Mr. Mefford. No. Coordinated by TTIC. I am sorry.
So in the example of terrorist activities, in our view,
this is a significant reason why TTIC, as a coordinating
entity, combined CIA, FBI, and Homeland Security where there is
value added.
In regards to the espionage threat posed potentially by
Cuban government officials, I would ask that perhaps we could
brief you in private based on the sensitivities of this
information. I am not at liberty in an open hearing to delve
into this today.
In regards to the damage assessment, I do not know the
date, but we can get back to you on that.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I would appreciate that, because we were
informed that it was, when we spoke with your agency--and I
would say I have great admiration for--that it was not
completed, but it spent a significant amount of time. And a
significant amount of time has passed. And it is important to
know not only when it would be completed, to what extent that
spy compromised U.S. security, for example, and did she pass on
any intelligence information about other areas besides Cuba? So
if you would please get back to me on that. I understand
sensitivity at an open hearing, but I would appreciate if you
would get back to me within a reasonable amount of time.
Mr. Mefford. We will.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I had the pleasure of serving for 8 years on the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 4 years as the
Ranking Democratic Member. And I must tell you that I am
concerned about what I have heard here today in that it sounds
like we have got a lot of people doing the same thing, and I
worry that, when everybody is responsible, nobody is
responsible. And this concerns me very much.
As I understand the DHS legislation, TTIC should be inside
the Department of Homeland Security. And what has happened here
is this creation has occurred, and I still am trying to figure
out what are the IAIP people doing at Homeland Security that is
different than what is happening at TTIC?
Now, I understand that the TTIC people have access to raw
intelligence where the IAIP people at Homeland Security do not.
Well, doesn't that defeat what Congress wanted in the first
place? Congress wanted DHS to have access to this raw security.
And with all due respect to this great international specter
here, the CIA has always been responsible for the international
aspects of counterterrorism. It is the FBI that is responsible
here in the United States and, in my judgment, who failed us
before 9/11 having had information that should have been acted
upon and didn't, wasn't acted upon.
Now, the FBI still is in charge of collecting the
counterterrorism information inside the United States. Is that
not correct?
Mr. Mefford. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. And then they collect the information on
counterterrorism inside the United States, and they translate
that information, I guess, to TTIC in a raw form, and then TTIC
gives it over to the IAIP people at--or does it go directly
from FBI to TTIC and to IAIP? How does it work?
Mr. Mefford. Simultaneously, sir, it goes to IAIP and it
also goes to TTIC.
Mr. Dicks. Why have these two separate agencies? I don't
understand why we just didn't create one entity, as the statute
said, inside the Department of Homeland Security and then give
to Homeland Security people the responsibility for dealing with
the counterterrorism--I mean, with the threat of terrorism
inside the United States. That is what we are worried about.
And I agree that there are a lot of international implications
and foreign entities involved in all of that, but it is the
threat in the United States that 9/11 was all about that we
have got to be concerned about. And we want to make sure that
DHS has the ability to act to thwart the terrorism.
So can somebody explain to me why creating these two
separate entities helps DHS in its role to thwart terrorism in
the United States? Doesn't it just create confusion and a
division that is unnecessary? Can somebody explain why we are
doing this?
Mr. Brennan. Yes. I will try to explain, again, sir.
There are many different Government departments and
agencies involved in the fight against terrorism, different
departments, different agencies with different statutory
authorities and different capabilities. In light of that, in
the view of the Administration and in an effort to be as
aggressive as possible against the terrorist threat, the TTIC
was created as a joint command. Think of it in some respects
like a military command. You have CENTCOM, where you have
Marines and Air Force and Navy and Army fulfilling their
missions in a joint command structure so that they can bring to
bear the capabilities, authorities that they have. TTIC is
similar to that. We are not trying to take away anything from
the Department of Homeland Security. We are not trying to take
away anything from those department agencies that have their
responsibilities. We are trying to be a force multiplier. So,
rather than creating stove pipes, and I don't like to use that
term, but different departments and agencies need to find new
ways to cooperate.
Frequently, in a crisis we pull together a task force, a
multi-agency task force because it makes a lot of sense,
because you bring to bear those capabilities that reside
throughout the U.S. Government in a determined and concerted
fashion. TTIC is similar to that. It tries to bring together
those capabilities.
Mr. Dicks. Wouldn't you put TTIC inside the Department of
Homeland Security? Why have it out here, this hybrid created
without a document, without any Executive order, without any
legislative background? It is a hybrid. Why wouldn't you just
put it in the Department of Homeland Security where Congress
said it should be in the first place? And then you wouldn't
have these IAIP people doing much the same thing that these
TTIC people are doing over here. You would have one entity that
would be responsible for gathering the information from the
CIA, the FBI, and whoever else provides the information. I
don't get it. Why two separate entities? Can you explain that?
You have made a nice case for TTIC, but why two separate
entities?
Mr. Brennan. Sir, if I can, the Department of Homeland
Security is receiving this information in compliance with the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. Again, our customer base is to
serve the homeland, to serve State and local authorities.
Mr. Dicks. Who is TTIC's base? Who are they serving?
Mr. Parrish. TTIC is serving a wider variety, a wider
customer base and taking a look at the international aspects of
it, taking a look at the threats overseas to U.S. interests
overseas; and I will let Mr. Brennan address that. What DHS is
acquiring is taking a look at the intelligence that is coming
in that poses threats to the homeland. Looking at our own
subordinate agencies, a wealth of information is brought in
from our border security agencies, transportation security, the
Coast Guard, the Secret Service.
This information is being analyzed within the Department of
Homeland Security. Those, if you will, are our operating forces
out in the field.
This information is being looked at. It is compared with
the FBI reports. It is compared with the State and local
reports. It is even compared with a Wackenhut security guard
guarding a chemical facility that has reported surveillance
operations.
All of this is an effort to connect the dots. This is what
IAIP is doing in looking at applying these threats to the
protection of the critical infrastructure. TTIC complements
this process by having an integration of several intelligence
community agencies all operating and looking to see if there is
a correlation to potential overseas intelligence that may
indicate possible indications and warnings and threats to the
homeland.
This is how we are trying to connect these dots. It is a
very diverse enemy. It is a very decentralized enemy. Pieces of
information sit throughout many agencies of the Government that
needs to be brought in and analyzed.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Berman, have I missed this here or have I
got it about right?
Mr. Berman. I think you have got the statute right.
Mr. Dicks. I am wondering then what is the analytical
function and raw data function for DHS. It would seem that if
you subtract the foreign connection, then it is a domestic
security agency which raises a lot of issues for both the
mission of DHS--if it is just looking at domestic decisions,
how does it--why--if the threat is both international and
national, I think Congress said we wanted it under one agency
and one Secretary so that there would be accountability.
It is more than duplication. It is, when the proverbial
hits the fan, who is in charge both from a national security
point of view and who do you call up here to explain that they
have violated civil liberties or gone too far? That is why,
right now, you would be hard pressed to know who was
responsible for the next suicide attack or intelligence failure
that hit our homeland.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I appreciate the questions from both
sides of the aisle, and I want to share some of the same
concerns that my colleague from Washington has.
I was involved with a number of hearings with my own
Committee on National Security and the Government Reform
Committee and involved with establishing the Department of
Homeland Security, so I have some familiarity with what we were
trying to accomplish. I remember we had a big battle with
trying to say to people that the Department of Homeland
Security should be a plug in which a lot of intelligence
information comes to and that they should have analytical
ability. Unlike Ms. Sanchez, I am not troubled that there is
operational; I don't want another operational.
I want, though, to know, first off, does the Department of
Homeland Security analysis area and the Secretary have the
ability to task our intelligence community in operations?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir. If I can, just to clarify when I say
operations, information is being collected by our operational
forces.
Mr. Shays. With all due respect, I would like you to do
that on someone else's time.
Mr. Parrish. As far as the requirement, sir, we have just
submitted 28 pages to the DCI----
Mr. Shays. Right. So the bottom line is, the answer is,
yes, you do have the ability to task. And if you are not
satisfied with what you task them to do, who do you complain
to? If they don't do what you want, who do you complain to?
Mr. Parrish. You referring to--who is the who? Who is who?
Mr. Shays. Mr. Berman, help me out here. Who do they--if
they task someone for the intelligence community, who do they
complain to if the intelligence community doesn't respond?
Mr. Berman. I do not know.
Mr. Shays. Okay. Well, let me go back to you, Mr. Parrish.
Mr. Parrish. As I said, the DCI has a requirement to go out
and submit and solicit intelligence requirements throughout the
intelligence community. The Department of Homeland Security is
now a member of the IC, of the intelligence community, as you
know.
Mr. Shays. Would you answer my question, though?
Mr. Parrish. As I said, we just submitted 28 pages of
intelligence requirements----
Mr. Shays. I only have 5 minutes, Mr. Parrish. I want to
know, who you complain to if you ask the intelligence community
to do something and they don't do it? What is the answer to
that question?
Mr. Parrish. That will be back to the DCI to request an
answer to the requirements.
Mr. Shays. Okay. And do you believe that you have the
authority to get whatever you need done in an operational
setting?
Mr. Parrish. Absolutely.
Mr. Shays. Okay. That is what I just need to have
established for the record.
I am interested to know, it gets to this whole concept of
accountability, because TTIC is something that--I think you
gave a pretty good answer, obviously, in pointing out the
answer in domestic and foreign needs on terrorism issues. But I
am still trying to wrestle with who ultimately takes
responsibility for TTIC--Homeland Security, the CIA or the FBI.
When some bit of intelligence is not properly viewed or vetted
for what it is and something bad happens as a result, who takes
responsibility?
I feel like there are too many folks involved here. Who
takes responsibility?
Mr. Brennan. It is that person or agency that did not do
what it was supposed to do with that information in passing it
along. So it would be very case-specific in terms of who was
responsible for it.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Berman, do you think that we would know who
it is? Based under the present structure?
Mr. Berman. I think, under the present structure, that you
would have to have another commission and start to investigate.
Because it is not clear whether DHS could say, we told the CIA
and the FBI to do this, and they just didn't do it. And the CIA
can say, well, that really wasn't our mission because it was
foreign or it was domestic, and it should have been the FBI.
And it is not clear on the bureaucratic chart where this lands.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Parrish, I want you to have tremendous
authority. One of things that was very disappointing to me, and
I want to say for the record, it was a painful experience for
Mr. Redmond when he came and testified, because he has been an
outstanding participant in helping our country for well over 26
years. But he told me afterwards that he was told not to have
testimony, that his name was attached to someone else, but he
also spoke the truth. He said 25 people involved with this
pillar. He said no space in which to get classified
information. It was deadly. It was the most depressing day I
have had in a long time. I want to know what you are doing to
correct that.
Mr. Parrish. Sir, I am pleased to report to the Committee,
I talked to Paul Redmond today, and you are right, he is a
great American, and he is doing much better in his health.
Mr. Shays. But besides his health.
Mr. Parrish. But to say that he was completely honest, I am
here to tell you that I am also completely honest, that right
now we are moving very rapidly to move into the new facility,
as I said earlier in my opening statement.
I walked through that space a week before last. We have
made great progress. We have 53 analysts----
Mr. Shays. When will it be ready?
Mr. Parrish.--on board right now. We look to move in about
the 25th of September.
Mr. Shays. And it will be able to get all classified
information, and you will not be prevented, like Mr. Redmond
said, of getting whatever information you need, no matter how
classified?
Mr. Parrish. As I said earlier in my remarks, we now have
access in place with a representation of other agencies within
IA that have reach-back to their parent agencies. We are seeing
that information.
Mr. Shays. Let me clarify this one answer to the question.
He implied that there is some information you will not be able
to get because you do not have the facility. I am just asking a
simple question to set the record straight. Will you have the
capability to get whatever intelligence you need, no matter how
classified, in this new facility?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir, we will. But I want to caveat that
by saying that the Department of Homeland Security and IA
respects and understands the sensitivity of sources and
methods. We as taxpayers have spent a lot of money on
developing sources.
Mr. Shays. I am not asking about sources.
Mr. Parrish. I just want to clarify that for the record,
though, sir, because some of this information will not go to
all analysts within IA. It may only come to me, of which I go
back to that originating agency to say, I need this information
broken out to a tear line that I can give to my analysts to
work.
Mr. Shays. I am comfortable with that. Thank you.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Ethridge.
Mr. Ethridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for
this meeting. I am going to follow that line of conversation
just a bit. I want to thank my two previous colleagues for
their questions and your comments, because I tend to agree with
them.
Let me go back to the June 5 Subcommittee meeting, when Mr.
Redmond was here and also Mr. Pat DeMoro. Mr. Redmond said at
that time that the IAIP's job was to provide intelligence
information to State and local governments. The FBI at that
time said TTIC would provide intelligence analysis to States
and local governments. My question is, can you tell us who has
responsibility for collecting intelligence and threat
information from State and local governments for analysis and
providing intelligence products to those State and local
governments?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir. The Department of Homeland Security
in our homeland security operations center, which is manned 24
by 7, we have a State and local desk that is there. We have an
initiative ongoing with the regional information system,
RISNET, of which we will establish connectivity in a pilot
program right now with several State and local officials as
well as to encourage the private sector.
So reporting back to State and local is a responsibility--
State and local authorities, the homeland security advisories,
the first responders, as well as the private sector, we have a
responsibility to report back to them information that we
acquire, we analyze. It is either developed within DHS, IA, or
comes in through TTIC. We have a responsibility to get that
information out.
Mr. Ethridge. I only have 5 minutes. I don't want to cut
you off.
Mr. Parrish. At the same time, though, the important
factor, though, is we then open up this dialogue and exchange
of information to allow them to get information back to us that
can be valuable pieces of information.
Mr. Ethridge. It is interesting that you say that, but let
me tell you what my first responders are telling me. What they
are saying is--this is in my district, we may be unique,
anyplace in the United States. I don't think so. They are
saying that the threat information they receive from Washington
is usually outdated and so general that it is useless, and also
it lacks the security clearances that have hampered the
dissemination of specific data that they could use.
So by that I ask, which agency is responsible for providing
security clearances for State and local responders so that they
can get the information they need to identify and prevent
threats of attack? Because if you can't give them the
information you have, then we have thrown this money and all of
this effort and it really isn't going to be effective at the
local level where we need it.
We have a responsibility to assist and work with our State
and local partners to get the right clearances. The homeland
security advisors now within each State have a secure means, a
secure secret clearance, of which we can fax classified
information to them at the homeland security level.
Mr. Parrish. I will defer to Mr. Mefford to talk about the
JTTF and the State and local representation with their security
clearances.
Mr. Ethridge. In answering that question, let me go a step
further, because it is important. Are we doing training of the
local officials so they will know what information to receive,
what information they will get, what is available to them, so
someone will have the clearance to accept the data? And who is
responsible for that?
Mr. Parrish. Sir, that is a great question. We do have a
program we are getting ready to work as we move into this new
facility. Within IA, we are going to have an information----
Mr. Ethridge. Do you have a time line?
Mr. Parrish. I would expect that we should have something
in place in the late October time frame. What I want to be able
to do is to bring in State and local individuals for about a 2-
week period to work in our fusion cell to help them understand
how to analyze information that they receive from Washington,
from us.
Mr. Ethridge. Well, all right. In October. How long is it
going to take to get everybody in so they will be up to speed,
though? This is a big country and a lot of people.
Mr. Parrish. That is just one aspect of it. We also are
working on a training program that earlier had been initiated
to get out and give some intelligence analyst training, and
that program is being worked aggressively within the Department
of Homeland Security. I don't have the exact time line on that,
but I will get an answer to you.
Mr. Ethridge. We would like to have that time line, because
that is critical. Because we are now a long ways since 9/11,
looking at--and this is what the agency was created for, so we
don't have this kind of thing. If locals don't see something
happen, we have got problems.
Mr. Parrish. I agree.
Mr. Ethridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Shadegg.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Parrish, I want to begin by letting you know that we on
this Committee want you to do well. We are deeply concerned. I
regret that the hearing with Mr. Redmond didn't go well. I
think it was two ships passing in the night. Perhaps his skills
were elsewhere and not in presenting the best case to this
Committee.
But some disconcerting information came out in that
discussion, and I think it is simply important that we try to
move forward, and we in the oversight role obtain assurances
that you are making the progress you need, in part because if
you need resources or if we need to revise the law, we want to
work with you to do that.
I think many of us are concerned that it is not clear to us
where TTIC came from and whether or not TTIC is getting
resources that you ought to be getting. I, quite frankly, don't
pretend to know what the right role should be. I do know as a
lawyer that I can read the homeland security statute that
Congress wrote, and I know that it imposes substantial--I would
say intelligence analysis responsibilities on you.
I guess my first question of you is, just to get you on the
record, I would like you to assure me that you have read the
section of law, the Department of Homeland Security statute
that assigns you these various responsibilities to analyze
intelligence data.
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir, I have.
Mr. Shadegg. Okay. And from your testimony and your
prepared statement, I gather that you view your relationship
with TTIC to be positive in that regard, not negative?
Mr. Parrish. I do, sir.
Mr. Shadegg. Okay. A reading of the statute could lead one
to conclude that it imposes an independent burden of analysis
on you. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Parrish. No, sir.
Mr. Shadegg. You would not agree with that. You think that
the statute allows you to obtain your intelligence information
and the conclusions you operate on derivatively and not
independently analyze it?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir. We still have ability to
independently conduct our own analysis.
Mr. Shadegg. Well, I guess my question isn't what ability
you have. I hope you do have that ability. My question is your
understanding of the statute.
As I read the statute, I think it imposes a duty on you to
independently analyze the data that you gather, that is to say
that you could get information from TTIC or from CIA or from
wherever else is appropriate but then that you are supposed to,
as I read the statute, independently analyze it. And your
testimony before this Committee is you do not agree with that.
You do not believe you----
Mr. Parrish. Sir, I misunderstood. We are independently
analyzing this information. I am sorry. I misunderstood. We
are. And we have the authority, based on that legislation, to
acquire and access any information, unfettered information, of
which, right now, I have not been denied any information when I
have asked for it.
Mr. Shadegg. Great. I am happy to hear that. My question
wasn't so much do you have the authority, because I think you
clearly do understand the statute, my question is: Do you
understand that you have the responsibility? And your answer to
that question is, yes, you do understand you do have that
responsibility. Am I right, sir?
Mr. Parrish. I do, sir.
Mr. Shadegg. The reason I raise that point is that--and I
can understand and have immense sympathy with the challenge
that the Department faces. Trying to stand up a Department of
the size of DHS under these circumstances for this pressure to
meet is incredibly difficult.
What was disconcerting about the conversation we had as a
Committee with Mr. Redmond is that he didn't seem to understand
that that was a responsibility of his, and I am very much
encouraged by the fact that you recognize that you do have that
responsibility of independently analyzing that data.
The reason that is important to me is because I think the
American people understand what the statute says; and if
something is to happen, or if something does happen, they are
going to look at the Department and say, why didn't you stop
this? Or why didn't you catch this? Or why didn't you discover
this? And at that point it may be an adequate answer to say,
look, we weren't provided the proper data, nobody knew, but it
won't be an acceptable answer under the wording of the statute
to say, it wasn't our job. And you would agree with me on that,
is that right?
Mr. Parrish. I do, sir.
Mr. Shadegg. Okay. As I understand your current schedule,
your testimony to this Committee today is that, A, we have--how
many analysts did you say?
Mr. Parrish. Currently, we have 53 on board in IA. That is
analysts as well as liaison personnel.
Mr. Shadegg. And you are rapidly acquiring more and will
have space for them as of--did I hear you say September 30?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir. That is, the targeted date is 20, 25
September.
Mr. Shadegg. Okay. And in the interim I understand you
believe you are getting very adequate information from the
agencies that are responsible for providing information to you,
is that correct?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir, we are. Through the workaround with
personnel assigned within IA.
Mr. Shadegg. Okay. And that would then also be true of your
relationship with TTIC?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shadegg. Okay. I would like to ask Mr. Brennan, if I
could, you are--are you currently responding to all of the
requests you are getting from the Department of Homeland
Security and from Mr. Parrish?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, we are.
Mr. Shadegg. And you would agree, also--well, let me ask
you this. Have you read the Department of Homeland Security
statute that imposes an independent analytical burden on them?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, I have.
Mr. Shadegg. So you would agree with me that it is your
duty to provide sufficient raw data for them to perform an
analytical function as well as simply accepting whatever
conclusions you might provide them in addition to that data,
would that be correct?
Mr. Brennan. That is correct. But the collection agency is
the one that provides that raw data to DHS.
Mr. Shadegg. And do they provide it also to you?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, we have access to that.
Mr. Shadegg. In that regard, do you independently analyze
it as well?
Mr. Brennan. We analyze the information that we have access
to, yes.
Mr. Shadegg. And provide it to DHS as one of your
customers?
Mr. Brennan. As appropriate, yes, we do.
Mr. Shadegg. So you would pass on to them not just
conclusions that you had reached but also basic data from which
they can form their own conclusions?
Mr. Brennan. Right, and they would have had that data
already, but it will be included in our products.
Mr. Shadegg. Mr. Parrish, the specific issue when Mr.
Redmond was here, or at least a specific issue that I am deeply
concerned about, is the bioterror threat. As you know----
Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Shadegg. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Cox. I think there will be an opportunity for a
second round very shortly. Thank you very much.
Mr. Markey, the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Markey. Thank you very much.
Mr. Brennan, do you participate in the development of the
National Intelligence Estimate?
Mr. Brennan. No, I do not.
Mr. Markey. Okay. If the CIA learned that al Qaeda was
planning or thinking about planning on blowing up an American
passenger plane because they knew that they could sneak on, in
the cargo, on any passenger plane in America an explosive
because we don't screen cargo that goes on American passenger
planes, and if the CIA learned about that, that al Qaeda was
thinking about it, would you automatically have to learn about
that or could they decide not to pass that on to you?
Mr. Brennan. Could CIA decide not to pass that on to me?
Mr. Markey. Yes.
Mr. Brennan. Our analysts or our officers have real-time
access to CIA information flows.
Mr. Markey. So they would have to give it to you?
Mr. Brennan. They don't have to provide it. We have access
to it.
Mr. Markey. They do not have to provide it to you?
Mr. Brennan. We have access to it. It doesn't require an
action on their part.
Mr. Markey. They don't have to provide all of their
information to you, is that correct, because you are not part
of the National Intelligence Estimate construction?
Mr. Brennan. That is two different issues. The National
Intelligence Estimate is an analytic product. That is a product
that is put together by the community.
Mr. Markey. So they have to pass on all of this raw data to
you as well so that you can decide?
Mr. Brennan. We have access to that data by the fact that
we have CIA information systems in TTIC.
Mr. Markey. So would you get it automatically?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, we would have access to it.
Mr. Markey. Now, after you get it, do you automatically
have to pass it on to Homeland Security, or can you make a
decision that Homeland Security should not get that
information?
Mr. Brennan. CIA, which is the collection agency, has a
responsibility to ensure that all information that DHS requires
to fulfill its mission, even without requesting it, is made
available to it. So it is CIA that would provide that
information directly to DHS.
Mr. Markey. So it would not go through you. CIA would have
to decide whether or not DHS got the information about al Qaeda
potentially thinking about using this wide-open gap that allows
for cargo to be put on passenger planes without any screening?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, it is CIA's responsibility to make sure
that information is provided directly to DHS. It would not have
to go to TTIC.
Mr. Markey. So that would not be your responsibility. You
would not feel any responsibility to pass that on because you
think that the CIA has the principal responsibility for passing
that on to Homeland Security?
Mr. Brennan. CIA has the responsibility for passing on
information that it has collected.
Mr. Markey. Would you pass it on in redundancy? Would you
pass it on just to make sure that there had been no mistake, or
would you have to get permission from the CIA to pass it on?
Mr. Brennan. I would not have to get permission. I would
ring the bell long and loud, and I would make sure that
everybody that needed to know that information was aware of it
as soon as possible.
Mr. Markey. What if the CIA asked you not to pass it on and
you evaluated it to be a greater risk than the CIA did because
you have a greater homeland security orientation than the CIA
has?
Mr. Brennan. I don't envision anything that----
Mr. Markey. No. I am asking you what happens if there is a
conflict.
Mr. Brennan. If there is a conflict, I am a direct report
to the DCI. I would be in the DCI's office within a minute, and
I am sure that the DCI would have no problem with that
information being passed to DHS.
Mr. Markey. Right. What if the head of the CIA told you: I
don't want it passed on. That has happened before. We have seen
that.
Mr. Brennan. The Director of Central Intelligence is the
head of the CIA.
Mr. Markey. I know who it is. That is why I am saying, what
if the head of the CIA now says to you, I don't want you to
pass it on?
Mr. Brennan. If there is threat information----
Mr. Markey. We just learned that in Niger they make
decisions like that. Don't pass it on.
Mr. Brennan. I wouldn't equate the DCI with the situation
in Niger. So I think the DCI understands his statutory
responsibilities to ensure that that information is passed on.
Mr. Markey. The rest of America didn't know that there was
a threat that did not exist in Niger, that was not passed by--
on by the DCI. So I am questioning you on whether or not, if
there was a risk, it is also potentially possible that the
opposite could be true, that they asked not to pass it on. So
what happens in that--who breaks the tie? Can he tell you, I am
not passing it on? Or can you, in turn--can you say to him, I
am sorry, sir, I am passing on that information to Homeland
Security. I disagree with your analysis. Can you say that to
him?
Mr. Brennan. I am sure that information would be passed to
DHS.
Mr. Markey. No. Can you say, no, I disagree with you? Do
you understand?
Mr. Brennan. If I feel as though U.S. lives are at stake,
and is a theoretical possibility, which I find far out of the
realm of possibility, I would make sure that the information is
provided to that department or agency that requires the
information to act on it. Yes, sir, I would.
Mr. Markey. Just so you understand, the Congress now
realizes that there was not a full disclosure of all of the
information with regard to the presence of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq. So you may think it is a remote
possibility, but, believe me, there are many Members of
Congress and the American public that do not believe it is a
remote possibility, because it just happened.
So you can sit down there and you can say, well, don't
worry about it, we are all going to work it out. But I want to
know if you are accepting the responsibility if the information
is there and it doesn't get passed on, because we saw before 9/
11 it wasn't getting passed on.
That is the very reason we are having this hearing. We know
that in Arizona, we know that in Minnesota, we know that in
other places it wasn't acted on. That is why we are setting
this up. We want to see here who has got the responsibility for
ensuring after 9/11 and pass it on and who is accepting that
responsibility. It is not a theoretical impossibility. It is a
very real possibility. Because it already happened.
Mr. Brennan. I didn't say it was a theoretical
impossibility. I said, in my estimation, it is an exceptionally
unlikely possibility. But if you wanted to address theoretical
possibilities, that is fine.
Mr. Markey. So he cannot order you not to pass it on? Is
that what you are saying?
Mr. Brennan. I can't tell him what he can and can't order
me to do.
Mr. Markey. Well, if he orders you not to do it, what is
your responsibility at that point?
Mr. Brennan. My responsibility is to my conscience and to
the American Government, and I would make a decision about
needing to do that.
Mr. Markey. Legally----
Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am having a problem understanding the rationale for the
existence of this agency as well. I wonder, Mr. Brennan, how
are you funded? I am sorry I haven't heard the whole testimony
here. But where do your funds come from?
Mr. Brennan. Right now, our funds come from the partner
agencies that have provided funds to us in 2003. Right now,
there is a discussion under way with the Hill about how our
funding is going to be handled in fiscal year 2004.
Mr. Goodlatte. Where does your staffing come from?
Mr. Brennan. My staffing comes from the partner agencies.
Mr. Goodlatte. And I take it there is some distinction here
between assigned and detailed. Are your employees assigned or
detailed?
Mr. Brennan. They are all assignees. We are not an agency
or an organization. Therefore, somebody cannot be detailed to
something that doesn't exist.
In addition, we have assignees because they bring with them
their authorities from their parent organizations. That is the
express intent, in fact, of TTIC, that we would have under the
umbrella joint venture a joint command, if you will, sir, the
authorities as necessary to combat terrorism.
Mr. Goodlatte. And why is this necessary? Why can't these
agencies simply cooperate amongst themselves?
Mr. Brennan. I think it takes a lot more than cooperation.
As we see from our military experience, with the command
structure in terms of the central command where you bring
together the different types of capabilities in order to go
after your target, this is--the same is true within the
intelligence community and the war against terrorism.
No single agency has the authority or the capability or the
statutory mandates to understand and to deal with the terrorist
threat that comes from abroad but is manifest here in the
States. Therefore, this TTIC was an attempt by the
Administration, and it makes a lot of sense from my estimation,
having worked terrorism issues for a long time, bringing
together those people so they can have the access that is
available to the U.S. Government and then empower those
departments and agencies that have the statutory
responsibilities to help to prevent terrorist attacks from
taking place.
Mr. Goodlatte. Can you envision a scenario where TTIC
collects information on its own rather than analysis of that
which comes to it?
Mr. Brennan. No, sir. I envision no scenario whereby we
would collect information. We just analyze the information and
understand it.
Mr. Goodlatte. But, Mr. Parrish, you will have that
capacity at the Department of Homeland Security?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir. The subordinate agencies that I
mentioned before--the Customs Bureau of Protection, Immigration
Customs Enforcement, Coast Guard, Secret Service--all of those
operational forces at times do pick up information that can be
used in connecting the dots once it is analyzed.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you.
Mr. Brennan, Mr. Mefford, in December of 2002, the joint
inquiry report concluded that, although relevant information
that is significant in retrospect regarding the attacks was
available to the intelligence community prior to September 11,
2001, the community too often failed to focus on that
information and consider and appreciate its collective
significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack. Neither
did the intelligence community demonstrate sufficient
initiative in coming to grips with the new transnational
threats. Some significant pieces of information in the vast
system of data being collected were overlooked, some were not
recognized as potentially significant at the time and therefore
not disseminated, and some required additional action on the
part of foreign governments before a direct connection to the
hijackers could have been established.
How is TTIC, IAIP, and the FBI resolving these issues?
Mr. Brennan. From TTIC's perspective, this is one of the
reasons why TTIC was created, to ensure that we don't have,
through some type of oversight, information available to us
that we can prevent terrorist attacks. It is bringing together
all of the information available to the U.S. Government on
threats, applying the analytic tools, and ensuring that there
is, in an integrated framework and environment, those officers
from different parts of the Government who can shed insight and
context as well as requests for additional information on it,
so we can be connecting the dots.
It is particularly for that reason that----
Mr. Goodlatte. So are you reviewing again all of the
information that these various agencies that assign employees
to you are already reviewing in the first place?
Mr. Brennan. They are reviewing the information that they
may have available to them. But TTIC has unmatched access, in
fact, to information that is available on threat information in
the U.S. Government.
Mr. Goodlatte. Mr. Mefford.
Mr. Mefford. Yes, sir. After September 11, Director Mueller
has created a layered system throughout the United States,
starting at the foundation with the Joint Terrorism Task Forces
situated around the country all of the way up to FBI
headquarters to the National Joint Terrorism Task Force where
we have integrated DHS personnel, CIA personnel and others so
that we can have a more coordinated, efficient approach to this
issue.
We also agree that the value of TTIC to the FBI is that it
is a center that the FBI can contribute to and provide one-stop
shopping for the analysis of threat information, both overseas
and domestic.
Mr. Goodlatte. Is TTIC operational at this point? Are you
actually receiving information?
Mr. Brennan. We have been operational since 1 May.
Mr. Goodlatte. Okay. So that is not a very long period of
time to judge. But, Mr. Mefford, are you getting back
information from TTIC, from other information sources that
would not otherwise be available to you that is proving useful
to you in combatting terrorism?
Mr. Mefford. Yes, sir, we think we are, on a daily basis.
Mr. Goodlatte. Mr. Berman, do you have a comment on that?
Mr. Berman. One point. I think that the--the issue--TTIC
has been established, and it is operational. And the question--
and there is, I think, some duplication of what at least the
statutory framework for DHS wanted there. But I think it was
clearly Congress's intent that this function of coordination
analysis and really looking at information which can be very
sensitive--and you want it both from a national security and
public policy point of view--that it operate under a charter;
and Congress created that charter when it created the
Department of Homeland Security Act.
I think there are serious policy issues that are raised and
cannot be answered, the Markey questions, your own, about who
is accountable, unless this TTIC function is brought under some
charter. It is operating outside of the balance of clear,
specified law about what its function is, who it is accountable
to and, for example, from my point of view, who is going to
mind the store in terms of making sure that national security
and civil liberties are balanced, which Congress wanted done
when it passed the Department of Homeland Security Act.
If TTIC is going to continue, it should be operating under
that charter, or Congress should create a charter for TTIC if
it is going to have a new agency, because that is what it has.
Mr. Goodlatte. Are you seeking such status, Mr. Brennan?
Mr. Brennan. No. At this point I don't believe that there
is any additional authorities needed for the TTIC mission. We
are learning about it every day. I would not exclude the
possibility that there should be legislation at some point in
the future, but it is still taking shape at this point. We are
working with the different departments and agencies that have
partnered with us. So at this point, no, we are not seeking any
type of legislation.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Brennan, I know you mentioned--someone
mentioned about the budget before. Who has control over the
budget of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center? Who controls
the budget?
Mr. Brennan. The budget will be falling within the National
Foreign Intelligence Program budget, the NFIP, which falls
under the DCI, which falls within the oversight Committees of
the intelligence community.
Mr. Pascrell. If you can follow that you are pretty good.
But do you know what that sounds like to me?
Mr. Brennan. That is the Senate Appropriations Committee
and the House Appropriations Committee and HASC and SASC in
terms of appropriating the budget.
Mr. Pascrell. You know, just put as much stuff in there as
possible. It is stew. You are having the same problem that we
have. It is our fault, not your fault. And the problem is
that--the question of jurisdiction. The Speaker put it very
specifically when he said on the opening day of this session
that he would preserve the jurisdiction of the standing
Committees.
So we have a joint Committee today, but the people who have
shown up, I believe, are mostly from--mostly from, except for
one or two, the Homeland Security Committee. And we have more
problems defending turf than we really get to the objective of
protecting the American people.
And I disagree with the gentleman, my good friend from
Washington. I have a lot of confidence in the FBI. They are
going to make mistakes. And, boy, the Congress makes mistakes--
I have sat with the FBI and their antiterrorism folks--about
situations in my own State of New Jersey and the Northern part
of the State. And I have sat and talked with them at length
about al Qaeda and its network throughout the United States and
the world. And much of that is, of course, confidential,
secret, top secret. But I have confidence in them.
I don't have confidence in what I heard today. It is
absolutely critical--you have all said it in different ways--
that the Government develop a strong organizational structure
that is capable of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting and
disseminating intelligence so that we can prevent terrorism to
the greatest extent possible.
But that is in doubt. You know, Kurt Vonnegut would have a
field day. He used to use the word ``materialize.'' This
agency, or whatever you want to call it, materialized. And it
could very easily dematerialize. Because we certainly didn't
put it together, not by any act which we had anything to do
with; and that concerns me. And, you know what, it has got to
create anxieties in terms of what all of you are trying to do.
So I would like each of you to respond to the following
statement. I would like to get your response to a statement
which you made, Mr. Berman. I would like to get the three
gentlemen's response to this statement. You said--on page 3 you
said that when Congress created the Department of Homeland
Security in 2002, he writes, or spoke, ``It attempted to
partially address these concerns by creating internal oversight
mechanisms in the new Department.''
If the TTIC, better known as the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, is not brought back under the Department of
Homeland Security, Congress should respond by establishing
standards for sharing of information and its consequences and
should establish internal oversight mechanisms for TTIC.
Finally, these Committees should continue practicing
ongoing nonpartisan and in-depth oversight. I will talk about
nonpartisanship at another time, not today. I would like three
of your quick responses to that statement which the gentleman
to your left made.
Mr. Brennan. TTIC has a very special responsibility in
terms of handling the information that it has access to. There
needs to be very strict rules put in place, which we have done
within TTIC, working with our partner agencies. We have, in
fact, oversight of every individual agency that is a part of
TTIC. We also have oversight of a number of different
congressional Committees as well. So does there need to be
oversight of what we do? Yes, there needs to be. We already
have, though, existing in place within TTIC what we needed to
do in our first 10 weeks to ensure that information is handled
appropriately and to the spirit and the letter of the
Constitution.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Mefford. Thank you.
Mr. Mefford. Yes, sir. When the FBI assigns personnel to
TTIC, we don't relinquish any of our responsibilities for the
actions of those individuals, and we think that there are
adequate safeguards and oversight abilities today that exist
directing and overseeing the FBI operations that would suffice
for our personnel assigned to TTIC.
We also agree with Mr. Brennan's statement that, clearly,
as a coordinating entity, as a joint venture, TTIC has internal
guidelines which we support and contributed to, to ensure
appropriate oversight.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you. Mr. Parrish.
Mr. Parrish. Sir, TTIC is enhancing the capabilities of the
Department of Homeland Security and Information Analysis. The
presence of the DHS analysts over there are very sensitive to
their responsibilities, especially in conveying rapidly the
information that comes in to TTIC so that it is shared back to
IA in a timely fashion, to ensure that IA has that information,
which in most cases they already do have, and that this
information is rapidly processed, assessed and placed in the
hands of the people who need it.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Chairman, can I just have a quick
question? Final question.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman seeks unanimous consent to
extend his time for an additional minute. Without objection.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Mr. Brennan, who made the decision to house you at the CIA
headquarters in Langley, in the complex? Who made that
decision?
Mr. Brennan. That decision was made as a result of the need
to stand up TTIC by 1 May in an area that was sufficient to
accommodate our size, in an area where we could ensure that
there would be secure connectivity to the information systems
that we needed to have access to.
Mr. Pascrell. Who made the decision?
Mr. Brennan. The decision was made by me, when the CIA
building was the only available place at the time.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Thank you.
The gentleman from Arizona--but, Mr. Brennan, if you would
just clarify for the record, it is my understanding that, in
fact, TTIC will not be located at Langley and that you have
other plans, is that correct?
Mr. Brennan. That is correct. In May of next year we are
moving out to a separate facility.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake.
Mr. Flake. I thank the Chairman.
So that the witnesses don't have to plow old ground,
because I wasn't here to hear it, Mr. Shays has some questions,
and I yield to him.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
I was taken back, Mr. Brennan, by your comment that you
can't have anyone detailed to you because you don't exist. And
I know you didn't mean it that way. I want you to set the
record straight, or if you meant it, I need you to clarify it.
Chairman Cox. Clarifying. Mr. Brennan does exist.
Mr. Brennan. What I think I said, or what I meant to say,
that is, we do not exist as a separate agency or department
that has been set up by statute. Since we don't exist as that
separate agency or department, an individual, a U.S. Government
employee cannot be detailed to something that doesn't exist.
Mr. Shays. Okay. The challenge I am still trying to
reconcile--and I did ask Mr. Berman to respond. I mean, he
basically was saying, as it related to the issue of who
ultimately takes responsibility, TTIC, Homeland Security, CIA,
FBI, when some bit of intelligence is not properly viewed for
what it is and something bad happens as a result, Mr. Parrish,
I really believe that your job is to be the--to do
extraordinary analysis of information that was--you tasked in
some cases and in other cases it was done without you tasking.
But I view you as basically being that conduit that takes
this information and does your own analysis, and I don't think
you basically disagree with that. But what I am unclear about
is it seems to me we have the intelligence community, that the
CIA is an intelligence gatherer, and you have the FBI which is
evidence gathering. So you already have cultural problems
between the two, and now we have TTIC kind of stuck in here
doing a lot of what I thought would be done out of this new
pillar of DHS. So I need you to talk to me about ultimately bad
data, not getting it--or bad data getting there or good data
never getting to you. I need to know who takes responsibility.
Mr. Parrish. Sir, if there is intelligence information that
is held by an agency within the Federal Government, it is their
responsibility to convey that information to appropriate
agencies. As legislation states, we have unfettered access to
that.
In the example used by Congressman Markey, I will tell you
that in my position, as far as Bill Parrish is concerned, and
when I sat there at TTIC as the Associate Director of Homeland
Security, that intelligence report that comes in from an agency
that says this needs to be contained and not shared--I have
already had a career. I am in this for my grandson. I will
ensure that that report is provided appropriately to the agency
that needs to take immediate action.
Mr. Shays. But I think----
Mr. Parrish. That process is now working in TTIC.
Mr. Shays. I know that the Chairman may want a little time
yielded, but let me just understand this other part. It seems
to me that you don't exist, but you do exist, and you are
funded by the legislative Appropriations Committees. Is that
what we are hearing, Mr. Brennan?
Mr. Brennan. Defense. We are funded by the Defense
Appropriations Committees, since the National Foreign
Intelligence Program falls under----
Mr. Shays. You are really a creature--you owe your--and
tell me----
Mr. Dicks. If the gentleman would yield. This is part of
the Defense Appropriations bill. Because we fund all of foreign
intelligence, the budget for the CIA, and the National Foreign
Intelligence Program, which this is part of. I am sure that it
would be funded through the money that goes to the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Mr. Shays. Let's just clarify. The bottom line is you are
basically in the black part of the budget?
Mr. Brennan. Well, with one exception. All of the officers
being assigned to TTIC, they bring with them their personal
services and nonpersonal services dollars, so that each agency
will be contributing to the TTIC effort.
Mr. Shays. Just a big concern, Mr. Parrish. I hope you are
not losing your spot as a pillar on DHS with this TTIC process.
And I thank Mr. Flake for yielding me time.
Mr. Parrish. Sir, I can assure you that I am not losing
anything, nor is Secretary Ridge, in the relationship that we
have with TTIC. I am confident that the information that is
being looked at at TTIC, and looked at simultaneously within
IA, we are providing to this Nation the best intelligence
assessment of potential terrorist threats to the country.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, just a quick observation--30
seconds.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Arizona still controls the
time.
Mr. Flake. I will yield to Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you for yielding.
The one thing that my experience tells me--it is one thing
to share information, gather information. The problem is acting
upon the information. That is where judgment and experience
really counts. And when I said--I did not mean to demean the
FBI--the information flowed up to the New York office of the
FBI, and it wasn't acted upon. And the challenge for you
gentlemen, I believe, is knowing when to act upon the
information and how to act and what to do. Because we want to
prevent these things from happening. That means forceful action
by the agencies involved.
Thank you for yielding.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Dr. Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I had looked forward to this hearing hoping that having
both the director of TTIC and IA here would have helped them
clarify some of these issues and the maze of conflicting
processes, but so far that hasn't happened.
My first question, Mr. Brennan. You know, it has been
stressed over and over again--and I guess this is a follow-up
to the gentleman from Connecticut's question. It has been
stressed repeatedly that TTIC is not an agency. Why is that
important?
Mr. Brennan. Because, I believe it takes an act of Congress
to create a U.S. Federal agency or department.
Mrs. Christensen. Mr. Berman, I wanted to ask if you had
any take on why repeatedly this is being stressed, that it is
not an agency?
Mr. Berman. I think it is being repeatedly stressed because
it happens to be a fact. It is not an agency, and that means
that its accountability is floating somewhere and hasn't come
to ground.
In my view, it is left to the Department of Homeland
Security a mission that the President, the Congress and the
American public thought was critical and in fact which has been
the conclusion of every commission that has studied what
happened pre-9/11 from a national security point of view, that
the--that what we needed was, if we were not going to create a
new intelligence agency, that--to replace the CIA or the FBI,
that we at least needed someone, a new culture of information
sharing and a new shake-up and that DHS was supposed to provide
that by bringing in new blood, new analysis and new people to
work with the existing agencies.
And what I see is TTIC has floated out of the Department of
Homeland Security; and in my view, as I sit here and listen
today, the CIA and the FBI continue to make decisions about how
to break the logjam of information sharing that was a problem
before 9/11.
Mrs. Christensen. Well, that is basically my next question.
I know Mr. Brennan has been asked in various ways over and over
again, but I understand the need for the coordination that
takes place at TTIC. But why is it better outside of the
Department of Homeland Security, in your opinion? Why shouldn't
it be in the Department of Homeland Security?
Mr. Brennan. Because, as I mentioned earlier, that the
overwhelming majority of information about the terrorist threat
to U.S. Interests comes from abroad. To understand that
information, to analyze that information, it takes an
understanding of that environment, that overseas environment.
That is not the Secretary of Homeland Security's
responsibility.
Mrs. Christensen. But why can't the same analysts that are
now sitting where your office is, coming from all of the
different agencies to take in this information and analyze it,
why aren't they sitting in the Department of Homeland Security?
The same--the CIA analysts, the FBI analysts, State Department
analysts, why aren't they best seated in the Department of
Homeland Security, which is where the information is going to
be acted on?
Mr. Brennan. Many officers from those other agencies are,
in fact, sitting in the Department of Homeland Security. But
TTIC has those partner agencies as the TTIC foundation, and so
we need to have those different perspectives not just because
of different information systems and databases that they bring,
but they also bring a number of different perspectives that
really help our understanding of the terrorist threat and to
connect the dots.
Mrs. Christensen. I have a concern also about the
dissemination of information. Because if I understood the
different testimonies and responses to questions, TTIC
disseminates information directly to the local agencies. Is
there a difference in who TTIC disseminates information to and,
Mr. Parrish, who you disseminate your information to?
Mr. Parrish. No, TTIC does not disseminate information down
to the State and local. That is the responsibility of the
Department of Homeland Security. That is why we work in this
partnership, if you will, to assess the information together,
to ensure that in a timely fashion we put an actionable product
back out into the hands of our customers.
It is easy to put out just an intelligence report, but it
is more important that we give to our customers some protective
measures so as this intelligence flows up through TTIC, as it
is analyzed in IA, as it is correlated in infrastructure
protection, we are able to put out a product that says, here is
a piece of intelligence posing a threat to your sector and here
are some recommended protective measures that we would
encourage you to review and consider to deter this attack,
potential attack or threat, I should say.
Mrs. Christensen. Well, who disseminates information to the
Joint Terrorism Task Forces?
Mr. Mefford. The FBI is responsible for that role.
Mrs. Christensen. So TTIC disseminates it to you, gives you
that information, and you direct it to the local task force?
Mr. Mefford. If it is threat--terrorism threat information,
the FBI, the Counterterrorism Division of the FBI here at FBI
headquarters in Washington, D.C., through the National Joint
Terrorism Task Force, which is an entity formed here in D.C.
that comprises 35 Federal agencies. Soon certain State and
Federal and local law enforcement agencies will be a member.
That entity integrates with the JTTF network around the
country, and we have the responsibility in the FBI to ensure
that relevant terrorism threat data is shared very rapidly with
the agencies that have a need to know.
Mrs. Christensen. Do you also simultaneously share it with
the Department of Homeland Security, or does your JTTF have to
get it first, or do they get it first? How is that coordinated?
Mr. Brennan. There are many ways to disseminate
information. Mainly, it is done now electronically. There are
classified systems, Web sites, that are available to different
Government agencies.
When threat information comes in, sometimes it is referred
to as raw information or raw intel. A signals intelligence
report, a HUMINT report is a raw piece of intelligence. If it
is threat information, it gets posted immediately on that Web
site so that it is immediately available to those officers at
the Department of Homeland Security, at the FBI, at the JTTFs
and other places. So what we are trying to do is to streamline
the processes so that we can make that information available as
quickly as possible so it doesn't have need to have human
interventions, so it doesn't need to be handed off by somebody,
so it is immediately posted and made available to the officers
and analysts that need it.
[3:55 p.m.]
Mrs. Christensen. Now, Mr. Parrish, you said that you----
Chairman Cox. The gentlelady's time has expired. But by all
means, ask the question you were in the middle of.
Mrs. Christensen. It will be quick.
You independently analyze. If you analyze this data and
TTIC analyzes the same data and comes up with different
conclusions, what happens then?
Mr. Parrish. The analysis that is done by the Information
Analysis Directorate will be that information that we move
forward in putting out to our customer base. The information we
look at, again, we are looking at it from the eyes of our
customers, the private sector, the State and local, to make
sure that this information we are putting out there is
something that they can actually react to, not just a
generalized threat.
Chairman Cox. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
Let me just take a moment to step back from where we are,
because you have all been seated at this table for a while,
although at least we got some unscheduled--actually, you didn't
have any unscheduled breaks; we did, we got walking time--and
let me just state that if any member needs to absent himself
for any purpose, any member of the panel, please feel free to
do so and I will address my questions to whoever remains.
But then please come back.
Second, because we are drilling down to some very specific
questions at this hearing, I think it is appropriate to take a
step back and remember why we are all here and the debt of
gratitude that we owe to everyone at this table. We are very
grateful, and we can't say so often enough, for the work that
you are doing to defend our country.
We just want to make sure it works. We want to make sure
that the bureaucratic design that Congress wrote only a year
ago in statute is implemented in a way that both fulfills the
intent of Congress, but more importantly, fulfills the
objective that we are trying to seek.
And so, as we discuss the relationship of TTIC, for
example, the Department of Homeland Security, keep in mind that
is what you have in mind and what we have in mind, and we are
on a joint mission here.
I was at the FBI on Valentine's Day when the President
fleshed out the recommendation that was carried in the State of
the Union message for the creation of TTIC. And I have stated
publicly on many subsequent occasions that I view TTIC as a
good thing for a number of reasons, signal among being that it
is combining elements that are already there.
We are creating the Department of Homeland Security, in
some respects, from scratch, and it takes time to get things up
and running. And I consider TTIC to be there for, if nothing
else, an expedient so that the American people are protected on
Day One.
And the question arises, where are we going over the long
term? And what will this relationship look like? And will TTIC
at some point recede in favor of a more robust capability that
is ultimately constructed within the Department of Homeland
Security?
Last June, the DCI testified in support of this new
organization. He stated that it will, quote, ``merge under one
roof the capability to assess threats to the homeland.''
Mr. Brennan, I just want to make sure if that is your
understanding.
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. My understanding, that is what he
said.
Chairman Cox. No. But is that your understanding of the
mission?
Mr. Brennan. The mission is to integrate the information so
that we can understand the threat to U.S. interests both at
home and abroad.
Chairman Cox. This idea of doing everything under one roof
that is the essence of his comment; is that how you understood
your mission?
Mr. Brennan. I understand the mission as under this joint
venture umbrella that we have at our disposal those agencies
that have a share of the responsibility for this. So I agree
with that, all the things that you said leading up to that
question in terms of TTIC's providing this type of assistance
now to the Department of Homeland Security.
It may be an expedient. We don't know where it is going to
go in the future. But it is trying to have all the different
agencies do the right thing together.
And so TTIC does have broad-based responsibility for the
Homeland Security as well as foreign terrorists.
Chairman Cox. Well, the reason I mention that is that the--
I was deliberately ambiguous in my question when I stated that
this new organization will, quote, ``merge under one roof the
capability to assess threats to the homeland,'' because what
the DCI was testifying about was not TTIC, but the Department
of Homeland Security; and I am personally very confused about
how it is different. Because that, to me, is a very key reason
for the Department of Homeland Security.
It is a statutory mandate. And we have a similar mandate
for TTIC. I might say, by extension, that we have a similar
mandate for the FBI, because I have been very impressed with
the Director's efforts to focus on the terrorist threats to the
homeland. But he has made that job one of the FBI's preventing
terrorism.
That is also the job of Homeland Security, job one of its
three missions, preventing terrorism. I don't think it is
necessarily bad that we have multiple people, multiple agencies
with capabilities, after all, working on this. We just need to
make sure that in the Homeland Security realm, this all fits
together and that it all works.
And it is a challenge, because there are things about TTIC
and things about Homeland Security, things indeed about the FBI
that not only overlap, but if you take them apart, look exactly
identical to one another.
You mentioned earlier, Mr. Parrish, that you have not been
denied any information that you have asked for. In addition, I
take it that you are getting all of the information that you
haven't asked for.
Mr. Parrish. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Cox. Because the statute is very clear that you
are not supposed to have to ask for information except in
narrow categories. And I think it is vitally important that all
the participants in this process understand that; because if I
were you, or if any person were you, our unique inability would
be to ask for things we don't know about. We can only ask for
what we suspect we need to know, but we can't possibly know
what we are not getting, and, therefore, we are entirely
dependent upon the other agencies to fulfill their statutory
mandate to provide, in this case, unanalyzed information.
Mr. Parrish. Sir, if I might just add on that comment just
very quickly. We are getting better and better each day, but I
will be honest, it is not a push-pull system at this point. And
I think that was kind of the intent of your comment, and that
is why I made that remark early on about the work-arounds of
having the representation of other agencies inside IA and being
able to explain why this piece of information is germane to an
organization in Homeland Security, why this is important to a
critical aspect of the mission of Homeland Security. Once that
is explained, the lights come on.
As I mentioned earlier, Friday, over 40 people gathered
from a wide variety of intelligence communities, predominantly
Department of Defense, as I was pulling the string on some
debriefings of some detainees, because there is critical
information. As I explained how we used that information to our
customer base, the private sector, the public, State and
locals, it was a new concept.
So each day we are making progress when we educate our
partners in this fight.
Chairman Cox. I want to thank you. My time has expired, and
I am going to ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute to
leave the panel with a question, and then I will yield the time
without objection.
First, to the Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Parrish,
I hope that you can assure us that TTIC's rapid development
will not be allowed to delay or otherwise hinder the Department
of Homeland Security's information analysis capability from
reaching its full statutorily mandated scope; and, also, your
mandate to conduct independent all-source analysis of terrorist
threat information.
And, second, to our other two witnesses--both, if you can
speak on behalf of your parent agency, Mr. Brennan, the CIA,
and if you can answer on behalf of the FBI: Will sharing
information with TTIC either as a matter of routine or on
occasion meet the Agency's statutory obligations to share
information with the Department of Homeland Security?
And those are my questions, and I appreciate the indulgence
of the panel. And I will allow time for responses and then
yield.
Mr. Parrish. Sir, the Under Secretary for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Frank Libutti, is very
committed toward rapidly standing up the IA capability to its
fullest extent possible.
TTIC is a force multiplier right now. It is an enhancement;
it complements what we are doing. But it is also making sure
that we have the mechanisms in place to ensure we have no gaps
and we have no seams. It is not slowing down the progress that
we are pushing hard to get us up to a full 100 percent
capability.
Mr. Mefford. The FBI, sir, recognizes our responsibility to
share terrorism threat information with TTIC and all terrorism-
related intelligence with the Department of Homeland Security.
Chairman Cox. Thank you, Mr. Mefford.
Mr. Brennan. Each of the agencies has a responsibility to
share information with DHS. Sharing it with TTIC does not
obviate that requirement. My understanding, based on the MOU,
is that only by a separate written agreement, in fact between
the Secretary, Secretary Ridge, and the DCI or one of the
signatories to the MOU, may information be shared exclusively
with TTIC. But it does not, in my mind, mean that information
that is shared with TTIC should not be shared with the home
agency.
Chairman Cox. Thank you for your answers.
And I next yield to Ms. McCarthy.
Ms. McCarthy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
witnesses. They have been here a long while and answered every
question, and we are very grateful for that.
I wanted to follow up briefly on a line of questioning Mr.
Etheridge had with you a little over an hour ago, with regard
to your role in providing information to the State and local
governments who need it.
And my concern--and I very much appreciated your response
to him, but, Mr. Parrish, if a State or local government
officer finds information that should be reported to the
Federal Government, to you or what other appropriate
individual, my concern is whether the officer will know where
to report that information and whether there are guidelines for
that kind of information being reported.
You know, I am just worried. I have had a lot of meetings
with my local responders back home, which everybody is doing,
and it is of great interest to them and to us. But I am not
sure that it is clear to the State and local officials and law
enforcement what types of information should be reported. This
has come up over and over again in meetings that I have had.
Is there training on what kinds of information might be
indicators of terrorist activity? Who is responsible for
training those State and local officials? Will it be through
the FBI, the DHS? The Federal Government has chosen my
district, Kansas City, to receive funds for technology to
upgrade their communication skills with each other, which is
important for my fire chief and my police chief to be able to
talk together and to get training for that. But as far as
information-sharing goes, there are a lot of questions and
concerns about, what do we know and when do we know it, and
when do we share it if we do know it, and if we know it, is it
what we are supposed to know.
Any thoughts you have on that, on plans for the future to
help our local responders, I would be grateful for your
information today or whenever it is appropriate. Thank you.
Mr. Parrish. We are moving forward as quickly as possible.
As you know, the Office of Domestic Preparedness now falls
under the Department of Homeland Security. One of the things
that I am looking to do is to rapidly establish a training
program exactly for that reason, to help the State and local,
again in coordination with FBI who has that responsibility.
But you are exactly right. They need to understand what is
a critical piece of information.
During the 4th of July weekend, the Department of Homeland
Security Operations Center, which is manned 24/7, reached out
and established connectivity throughout the country with a lot
of local departments and operations centers for that very
reason, to report suspicious activities.
As you recall, Operation Liberty Shield when our Nation
went to a high state of alert, an orange, in anticipation of
hostilities in Iraq, again our operations center was receiving
phone calls from State and local, reporting things. And it is
not just the State and local, but he is getting a phone call
from American citizens that are saying, I saw something out
there that appeared to be strange. That is the means of
connecting the dots.
And, again, the Department has only been up and running
since March 1. I know that may seem like a long time to some,
but we are making progress. But that connectivity is critical
to the information flow that must come into IA so we can assess
that to see, is there a correlation to the surveillance at one
chemical facility in Warrensburg as compared to another
facility maybe over in Liberty. And then we could take
corrective action and take a look at what we are dealing with.
So it is a great question, and certainly it is a high
priority, at least from my perspective, on getting that
training out to the field.
Ms. McCarthy. I thank you for your response. And please
keep the Chairman, Ranking Member, and Committee Members
apprised of anything we might do to help further that effort
that you have, especially if it is funding issues or other
means where we may be of assistance.
I know it is a commitment of every Member to be able to
make sure that those homeland first responders have the
knowledge that they need to take the action that they should in
a timely and correct way.
So thank you for making this a priority. I very much
appreciate your testimony and the thoughts that you all shared
with us today.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This hearing has been very interesting to me in trying to
sort this out. And I think, if we go back and look carefully at
the transcript that will be produced of your testimony, we will
probably have even more questions.
For example, the suggestion was made, I believe by Mr.
Brennan, that you had a responsibility at TTIC to look at
foreign intelligence that came to CIA, and you look at that. I
don't know if it was you or Mr. Parrish that suggested that the
Department of Homeland Security looks at domestic intelligence,
inputs domestic intelligence. There seemed to be an effort
there to distinguish the two roles that you have.
But when you go and read Mr. Parrish's testimony, it
clearly says that the Information Analysis section of Homeland
Security has the ability to conduct-and I am quoting here--
``its own independent threat analysis based on information and
intelligence drawn from other agencies within the Department of
Homeland Security, the FBI, the CIA, or the members of the
intelligence community plus State and local law enforcement and
private-sector entities.''
Now, I would be very frightened if anybody told me that the
only intelligence that they were going to look at was the
domestic side and that the foreign intelligence is somebody
else's role. Obviously, in fighting terrorism they overlap and
intertwine. Maybe what we are coming down to here is, when I
look, Mr. Parrish, at the last page of your written testimony,
you speak in terms of the Department's analysts who are located
at your headquarters. You say that they will also conduct
competitive terrorism threat analysis to that taking place at
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
For example, you say the Secretary may want an independent
look at a particular conclusion reached by analysts, including
IA analysts, at the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. And
you acknowledge that such competitive analysis is a sound
practice and has been followed for decades in the intelligence
community.
So what you may be telling us today is that both of you are
going to do the same thing because we need to do it twice,
maybe. And when I hear the FBI telling us that your role is to
notify local law enforcement of what you know and the
information you collect through the Joint Terrorism Task Force,
and I hear Mr. Parrish say that his job is to notify local
officials, which, to me, includes law enforcement, then it
seems to me that we are doing the same thing through two
different channels.
And I am not going to suggest to you that I have concluded,
that is a bad thing. It could very well be that all three of
you are going to do all the same things in terms of information
collection analysis.
The one thing that I do understand that is only done by the
Department of Homeland Security is an evaluation and analysis
of our critical infrastructure. And it is in that role that the
Department seems to have a unique responsibility. That is, we
look at the threats on the one hand and our critical
vulnerabilities on the other, and we match them up, and out of
that flows action on the part of the Department and other
agencies to be sure that we are protecting America.
Out of that activity also should flow the priorities for
funding by the Congress, because there is no other place that I
know of that we have created the expertise to decide what are
the most important things for this Congress and the American
people to spend money on to protect this country, unless that
function within that department takes place.
So maybe we have come to a conclusion here, after listening
to all of you, that all three of you collect the information,
all three of you analyze the information, all three of you
receive it from the various sources that all of you can get,
and then you share it. And then Mr. Parrish at the Department
of Homeland Security takes that information, matches it against
our critical vulnerabilities, and comes up with action on the
part of the Government to protect America and recommendations
to this Congress on what we ought to be spending our hard-
earned tax dollars on.
Now, do any of you want to comment on my conclusions, and
tell me that I am wrong and haven't been hearing you correctly
today?
Mr. Parrish, you seem anxious to give me the first
response.
Mr. Parrish. Sir, I think you have listened well today.
Then, what you said--I would like to clarify, when I say
``domestic intelligence,'' really what we are looking at is all
of the intelligence toward the domestic threat. In other words,
there is overseas intelligence that has a string possibly to a
domestic threat, so IA is assessing it in that regard.
But you are exactly right. We are trying to assess the
information and intelligence against the critical
infrastructure, identify the vulnerabilities in that to help
prioritize the spending plan of the Federal Government, to help
the spending of the private sector as they enhance their own
security postures, to confront their border directors to say,
we need to increase security.
This is a team effort. It is a partnership across the
entire Federal Government, State and local and private sector.
But I am very positive that we are making progress in this team
effort.
Mr. Mefford. Sir, I have just a slightly different view of
that.
While we agree that the team approach and the coordinated
entities both at the headquarters level in D.C. and, even more
importantly, throughout the country regionally are critical to
success in the war on terrorism, where we work very closely
with Federal agencies and State and local agencies.
In the FBI's case, we have a very focused mission, and that
is to prevent terrorist attacks, to actually respond to
terrorist threats; and we think that we have the responsibility
to make sure that an attack does not occur. That is why the
Director has prioritized the prevention of terrorism as the
number one focus of the FBI today.
In that approach, it is very important for us as an agency
to work with our State and local partners and with our Federal
partners in the JTTFs to establish a comprehensive intelligence
base domestically in the United States in conformance with all
constitutional standards and parameters. And by doing that, we
bring our law enforcement mission, fused with our intelligence
mission, to focus on identifying terrorist threats in the
United States, both domestic- and foreign-based.
It is absolutely critical that we work closely with the CIA
and with Homeland Security to fulfill that mission, and
consequently, the mechanisms that have been created, we think--
and we see advantages in the collocation and the integration of
these agencies while they maintain their separate status.
Mr. Turner. And all the information that you receive from
your Joint Terrorism Task Force and your other intelligence-
gathering activities, you immediately share with the Threat
Integration Center and immediately share with Homeland Security
simultaneously?
Mr. Mefford. Yes, sir. The threat information goes to TTIC,
and then the raw intelligence information goes to Homeland
Security.
Now, to clarify this issue, as you know, one of the
weaknesses that the FBI has experienced is in our automation
tools. And we have a very aggressive, under Director Mueller's
leadership, IT program to enhance our capabilities. That is
scheduled to come on line later this year.
Because of that fact, the fact that we do not have the
automated tools today, we have to do many things, as my
counterpart, Mr. Parrish, has indicated, in a roundabout or
work-about fashion. That is why we have 342 DHS personnel
assigned to FBI JTTFs and at FBI Headquarters, because there is
no other way to do it today.
But we have improvised to make sure that all the
information is shared.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Brennan, do you want to comment on my view
of where we are?
Mr. Brennan. Just a couple comments. I think you made
reference to the fact that we all collect, analyze, process,
disseminate intelligence. TTIC alone, here at the panel, does
not collect information. Again, I just want to make that very
clear.
Secondly, I think you are absolutely right, and it was
mentioned here before, knowledge and information for the pure
sake of knowledge may be self-gratifying, but it doesn't do any
good in terms of preventing terrorist attacks. We have to make
sure that that information and knowledge is shared
appropriately and provided so that action is taken. It is
actionable intelligence that we are looking for.
Third, I would really like there to be very bright lines
between our respective responsibilities in the U.S. Government,
between the different departments and agencies. It would
probably make all our lives a lot easier. Unfortunately,
though, as I look closely at the statute--and I have done a lot
of reading of the statutes over the last several weeks and
months--there are not the bright lines there. And so what we
are trying to do here in TTIC is find an innovative approach to
meet and fulfill the obligations of the different statutes.
The Homeland Security Act is a wonderful act. I think there
are a lot of things in there--there are a lot of things that
are going to take time to realize. Because just saying it has
to be done is not something that in the Government can happen
very quickly.
So what we are trying to do is understand fully those
obligations and make sure we work closely with the FBI and DHS
to realize all those goals and objectives laid out in the
Homeland Security Act.
Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman, just one comment on it.
I hear different agencies are doing similar functions. And
I want to remind the Committee that we are talking about very
information-intensive analysis of threats, and that when they
say that there may be--they may not be collecting, but when
they say there is a gap or the threat is scuba divers, then
that may trigger 6 billion background checks of scuba divers.
Or if they say it is bank records, and foundations are
funneling money to al Qaeda or to possible threats, that means
bank records of American citizens are being scanned or patterns
are being looked at by combing through credit records, bank
records, under very loose authority which says, give it to the
Government, give them the discretion, and let them use high-
tech technology and look at the threat analysis.
Those are significant privacy issues. And it was the
intent, I believe, of the President and the Congress and
whoever worked on this act that that would come under some
oversight system, that there would be standards, audits, and
accountability of what is being collected, how it is being
collected, and how it is being disseminated.
And I urge the Committee that whether it lets TTIC continue
to float or watch the experiment grow, that we have to answer
the question of how this accountability is going to be
structured and how they are going to operate.
Simply saying the privacy laws in the Constitution doesn't
help you here, because, as you know, our privacy laws are
mostly based on policy decisions, particularly for information
not held by you in your home. And we have a whole regime of
laws, regulations, so forth, with the private sector, that are
much stricter.
The Government does not have those restrictions, and we do
not know what the rules are and what data is being collected
and how it is being used, without that oversight system that
Congress called for, which is in section 221, I believe, of
this act.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chairman recognizes himself.
This has been an excellent discussion, and I just want,
before we finish, to see if I have inferred the proper
understanding of what you are trying to make sure we
understand. Let me begin with the question of redundancy, which
has been a major theme of questioning here today and which you
have addressed repeatedly, redundantly perhaps.
I understand, Mr. Brennan, that you are at least indulging
the possibility that if DHS ultimately achieves its full
statutory mandate and potential, that TTIC might be, in the
final analysis, an intermediate expedient; is that right?
Mr. Brennan. I think TTIC is going to continue to grow and
evolve, and I would like to keep it flexible so that we can
adapt to the requirements over time. And so where TTIC is going
to be or what it is going to look like 2, 3, 5 years from now,
I can't say. I am open-minded on the issue, certainly.
Chairman Cox. But I do believe that you said in response to
an earlier question that one of the things that might happen is
that it might sunset in favor of the capability that has been
established in the Department; is that right?
Mr. Brennan. No. I think I agreed with your statement that
it may be an expedient at this point in terms of facilitating
the stand-up of DHS and helping DHS fulfill its mission.
Chairman Cox. So it is not even within prospect that it
might sunset then? It is your view that it is permanent?
Mr. Brennan. No. I am saying that--I was just stating that
I agreed with your earlier characterization, which means that I
would say that, yes, there is the possibility that it, in fact,
should have at some point a different type of role or
responsibility.
Chairman Cox. But do you----
Mr. Brennan. There is no sunset clause right now in any of
the documents that have been setting up.
Chairman Cox. Right. But I am just trying to understand
what is within the range of possibility.
TTIC, thus far, is an expedient; and one of the things that
we can do is set it up in statute and make it permanent.
Another thing that can happen is that it can sunset. And it
seems to me that everything else is in between.
I am wondering whether you think all of those are, at this
point, possibilities, or whether you don't see any
circumstances under which TTIC would sunset.
Mr. Brennan. No. I think, by definition, they are all
possibilities.
Chairman Cox. Thank you.
Next, let us assume that it does not sunset and let us
assume that IAIP within DHS has reached its full potential and
its statutory mandate.
What is it then that TTIC is going to be doing that DHS
does not do? And I would address that to Mr. Brennan and Mr.
Parrish.
Mr. Brennan. I would say, first of all, as I talked about
before, that the overwhelming majority of information available
on the threats to the homeland comes from foreign intelligence
sources. It frequently requires a lot of digging analysis of
that information in order to identify potential threats to the
homeland. So I would see TTIC still having a role, along with
the other partner agencies--with the partner agencies to
understand that threat.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Parrish?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir.
Again, the function of IAIP is really taking a look at the
threat to the homeland as far as the threat mapping that we do
to the critical infrastructure in the country. At the same
time, we also have responsibility to our subordinate agencies
to ensure that we are providing intelligence products to
Customs and Border Protection, to Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Secret Service, Coast Guard, so we have a
constituent both within the Department, as well as getting
products of threat assessments out to the State, local, and
private sector.
Chairman Cox. And so what is TTIC doing that you are not
once you have reached your full potential?
Mr. Parrish. Well, TTIC will continue to be doing the
intelligence analysis, and providing that information to us
that we will again----
Chairman Cox. But you are going to be, when you reach your
full potential, doing the intelligence analysis; and I am just
wondering what it is they are doing that you are not doing.
Mr. Parrish. Again, I would agree with Mr. Brennan on the
standpoint of looking at some of the international aspects of
it. Again, we are looking at domestic threats, so we are really
trying to look at the international threats for the domestic
nexus. Their focus is more--broader in that area.
Chairman Cox. But let us take al Qaeda as a fairly relevant
example.
Al Qaeda is located within the United States, so
intelligence collection on al Qaeda is domestic; al Qaeda is
located overseas, and so intelligence collection on al Qaeda is
foreign. Are you suggesting that Homeland Security is not
charged with foreign intelligence analysis?
Mr. Parrish. No, sir. We are.
Chairman Cox. So you are doing both domestic and foreign
intelligence analysis. What is the TTIC doing that you are not
doing?
Mr. Brennan. If I could jump in here, they are not
evaluating the threat to U.S. interests abroad. TTIC is.
Chairman Cox. All right. So the difference is that the
threat to U.S. interests abroad is what remains for TTIC. And
what the Department of Homeland Security will be doing is
looking at both domestic and foreign intelligence with a view
to the domestic threat.
All right. Is that acceptable to you, Mr. Brennan, that
once--that is to say, do I properly state your understanding?
Because I don't want to put words in your mouth.
Mr. Brennan. I still am very much in favor of an integrated
environment where you can have the representatives from these
different agencies working collectively together, not just in
one agency or another, but in a task force command, joint
venture activity. Because there are synergies that develop from
that environment that you can't replicate in any individual
department or agency.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Parrish, we have been speaking of some
time in the future when the Department of Homeland Security's
IA function reaches its full, statutorily mandated potential.
When do you think that the IA subdirectorate will be at full
potential as contemplated by the statute?
Mr. Parrish. In fiscal year 2004 funding, we have the
appropriations, once passed, that we should be able to hire the
additional analysts that are required. So what I would expect
of IA, somewhere in--hopefully, by this time next year is that
we would have the full complement of personnel required to do
the analytical as well as the assessments necessary.
Chairman Cox. Now, from the testimony, I inferred that in
terms of its contribution to TTIC, we expect by the end of the
year DHS will have about 40 analysts contributing to TTIC; is
that right?
Mr. Parrish. Right. The manning for TTIC, what we are
looking at really is kind of a rule of thumb: 10 percent of the
total TTIC manning at a given time, we would have 10 percent of
that number of DHS analysts. So, for example, as Mr. Brennan
has indicated, right now they are at about 100; we are
somewhere--between seven and ten analysts is what we will have
over there. Currently, there was six, plus the Associate
Director for Homeland Security. By May of 2004, if TTIC reaches
their number of 300, we would envision then probably 30
analysts representing the Department of Homeland Security.
If time allows, I would like to explain a little bit of the
concept there, because I think it is very important to
understand the DHS analysts.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Parrish, I wonder if I might--in
deference to my colleagues, I would like to give you that
opportunity to explain it, and I shall. But my time has
expired, and so I would like to recognize Ms. Jackson Lee. And
I will be sure to ask you that immediately when it is my time
again.
Ms. Jackson Lee is recognized.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman very much. I probably
will abbreviate my questions, and ask unanimous consent that my
statement be submitted into the record.
Chairman Cox. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me point my question to Mr. Brennan.
The President announced the formation of TTIC, I believe,
in his State of the Union address. My question to you is, and I
will make a few comments before I ask you to answer--my concern
with all the work that we are doing, though I know that we are
certainly with good intentions, both the Select Committee on
Homeland Security, various jurisdictional Committees, TTIC; is
that why Rome is burning?
We are idly sort of treading water. I see that with respect
to processes with first responders. I see that in terms of
local communities being prepared for terrorist attack.
I see a certain malaise developing. Oh, it hasn't happened.
It was 9/11; we talk about that in historical terms. We are
mourning, we are certainly overwhelmed by the tragedy and the
enormous loss of life, but we are not ready, and I don't
believe that we are at the level of seriousness that we need to
be.
My question to you, as the head of TTIC as I understand it,
are we synergized, energized, and interrelated?
The CIA is known as having a history of not sharing
information. That was one of the concerns we had after 9/11,
along with certainly enormous questions with respect to the
FBI. What has occurred that I should feel more comfortable that
there is some sort of interrelatedness? And what do you need
from this Committee to ensure that that happens?
Mr. Brennan. I believe there has been a lot of energy and
synergy created over the past year, in particular with regard
to Homeland Security issues and the sharing of terrorism
information.
There are a number of initiatives under way right now to
ensure that we put in place the best information systems, the
best business practices, the best security procedures and
declassification efforts to move threat information as swiftly
as possible from its point of collection to the point that
needs the information in order to defend against terrorist
attacks.
So I think TTIC's being stood up is an indication of the
seriousness with which certainly CIA views the importance of
sharing that information, because within TTIC right now CIA
information systems and databases are made available, and that
information is made available to their colleagues, their fellow
analysts within TTIC, to ensure that there are no oversights,
intentional or otherwise.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And where does that information go once it
is analyzed in TTIC?
Mr. Brennan. It is provided, as appropriate, to those
Federal agencies and departments that have a responsibility to
take that information and then to act upon it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What about to local law enforcement?
Mr. Brennan. We rely on FBI and the Department of Homeland
Security to do that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So then you give it to the FBI and
Homeland Security, and then they are supposed to trickle it
down to local?
Mr. Brennan. It is their responsibility, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So I am concerned about layered
responsibilities, because it was my understanding, or at least
my misunderstanding, that that information would go directly to
a need-to-know--on a need-to-know basis, so that if there was a
potential attack in California, Texas, Seattle, Washington,
Jackson, Mississippi--and I randomly say these names, so I hope
I don't get calls from the constituents there. I am not saying
there are any terrorist attacks at all; I am only using those
as examples.
Then they would have to wait until it trickled over to and
then down to the local communities? Is that the way it
functions?
Mr. Mefford. No, ma'am. Threat information is relayed
immediately. And it is our view that we have made tremendous
progress since 9/11.
Prior to 9/11/01, we had 35 Joint Terrorism Task Forces in
the country; today, we have 66, growing to 84. They will be in
every major metropolitan area, incorporating State and local
law enforcement and our other Federal partners in the war on
terrorism.
The FBI has rolled out brand-new, very aggressive training
programs to provide basic and advanced counterterrorism
training to these folks. We have created the national JTTF in
D.C. to coordinate the Federal Government's efforts
operationally. We send out a weekly Intel bulletin to the
16,800 police agencies throughout the United States. We are in
the process of establishing a system through law enforcement
on-line, known as LEO, so that we can refer relevant terrorism
information, not just specific threat data, because that will
be transferred directly to the JTTFs, but other relevant
information that would be helpful to State and local law
enforcement.
We have created a brand-new position----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Mefford--is that Mr. Mefford--let me,
because my time is going to run out. If we had a situation
where an area of this country was under immediate threat, am I
to understand that there is the SOS ability to get it directly
in the hands necessary? Or I am to hear--and I appreciate what
you are saying to me, a whole long sort of grid that I am
hearing, but I am sort of seeing stars.
I want to know if we can get the word about a terrorist
attack pending--let us not say ``attack''--to the appropriate
entity quickly, without detail and without bureaucracy?
Mr. Mefford. Yes, absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask Mr. Brennan. Are you in a state
of organization, or you are in place working? Is this still in
an organizing mode, or are you in place so that you are
actually functioning with all of your particulars in place?
Mr. Brennan. We have been functioning since 1 May. But we
are a growing and evolving organization. We have about 100
folks now, but we are growing to about 300 or so by this time
next year.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me finish on this point. I am
concerned, as well, that we balance getting direct information
and avoiding terrorist acts and terrorist disasters with civil
rights and civil liberties. Is there a component in TTIC that
deals with that? Or do you embrace or work with other agencies
on that issue?
Mr. Brennan. We are working very closely with all the
partner agencies, the Department of Justice, the FBI. I have
spoken to the Attorney General about the importance of this
issue. Within TTIC we have rules in place. We are trying to
make sure that we do everything possible to ensure that there
is no abridgement of U.S. citizens' privacy rights.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You would be open to Members of this
Committee visiting TTIC and having a walk-through and also
probing these questions a little bit further?
Mr. Brennan. I would certainly not be opposed to that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Cox. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Now, Mr. Parrish, I want to allow you the opportunity to
complete your thought.
Mr. Parrish. Just quickly, sir, I appreciate it.
But as we look at the Department of Homeland Security
analysts, I like to look at that as somewhat of a hybrid. It is
a new organization. It is melding together, as you know, 22
agencies. But bringing from the operational perspective of
Customs and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Coast Guard,
Secret Service, we are bringing them together in NIA.
We will have a fusion cell there that will be kind of the
incubator, if you will, of developing this new hybrid analyst
who is looking at operational information that may be collected
by a Customs inspector or a maritime boarding team from Coast
Guard, information that is acquired, and training them within
IA. And then they will be the ones that will eventually be the
IA or DHS analyst that will be assigned to TTIC and rotate
through there on either an 18-month or 24-month basis.
I think this will be healthy for the entire process. It
will establish continuity and will certainly represent, within
TTIC, individuals who understand the operational environment of
the Department of Homeland Security.
Chairman Cox. Thank you.
Now, my understanding is that--from your testimony, Mr.
Brennan, that TTIC is now a little over 100 officers.
Mr. Brennan. Total officers, yes. About 65 or so analysts.
Chairman Cox. Sixty-five or so analysts.
That the complement from DHS lies somewhere between the
seven that we had when TTIC opened its doors and the 40 we
expect to have at the end of the year. Is that right, Mr.
Parrish?
Mr. Parrish. At TTIC, actually the number will be about
300. If the total number of TTIC by May of 2004 is at 300, we
will have about 10 percent. So roughly 30 would be our
personnel assignment to TTIC.
Chairman Cox. About 30 is what you expect to have by what
date?
Mr. Parrish. Looking at May of 2004 when TTIC moves to its
new facility.
Chairman Cox. And what is it just now?
Mr. Parrish. Right now, it is seven. So we are looking at
bringing over, I believe it is six additional.
Chairman Cox. And how many analysts do we have at IA right
now?
Mr. Parrish. It is 53 and a liaison person.
Chairman Cox. And where is the Department getting its
analysts? The reason I ask is that if you are attracting them
from other United States Government agencies, won't the
Department of Homeland Security have to compete with TTIC as we
add people?
Mr. Parrish. I don't think we will see the competition.
Again, I think right now we have analysts, some that are
detailed from other agencies as we are standing up for that
capability. But we look to hire then, on a full-time employment
basis, the total complement of analysts.
We are also looking internally at some of the analysts that
reside within the subordinate agencies of the Department of
Homeland Security, intelligence analysts that may exist in some
of the other agencies where we could draw upon their expertise
and bring them in.
Chairman Cox. Now, at 53, you are part way along the road
to where you intend to be. When you are at the end of that
road, how many analysts will you have?
Mr. Parrish. The total number we are looking at within IA--
again, I would come back with an official number for you at a
later time. But it is roughly at about--150 is the number we
are looking at.
Chairman Cox. And when do you think that would be?
Mr. Parrish. Our target goal--obviously, as I said before,
next summer, if we could achieve that, would be great.
In 2003, we have space for, I believe the number is a total
of 86 within IA. And, again, IA is both the Information
Analysis where we have our Risk Assessment Division and also
our Information Management Requirements Division. So the total
number in that area 86 for 2003, we will continue to hire more
during 2004 with a goal of, as I said, about 150 analysts.
Chairman Cox. Now, as you look to treble the number of
analysts from present to a year from now, going from roughly 50
to roughly 150, you are absolutely certain that this will not
place you in competition with TTIC for recruiting analysts from
other agencies of the U.S. Government? You are not going to be
looking toward any of the same people?
Mr. Parrish. I think it would be, obviously, premature for
me to say specifically ``no'' to that at this point in time.
Really, we haven't gone out there and tested the market at this
point.
Chairman Cox. The Department of Defense over the last year
has stood up NORTHCOM. The Committee went out and met with the
people at NORTHCOM, and learned a great deal during our visit.
In terms of analysts, they have since last year grown to 300
from a standing start of zero.
The 300 analysts at NORTHCOM, who are looking at the same
thing, in large measure, that TTIC is looking at and the
Department of Homeland Security is looking at with respect to
domestic threat, according to the diagram that was presented to
us during our visit--we were there qua congressional
Committee--they are relating to the Department of Homeland
Security through TTIC. Is that your understanding?
Mr. Parrish. The relationship with NORTHCOM is still being
developed. We look to have some NORTHCOM representatives up in
our operations center, again, 24/7 coverage. Reaching back into
NORTHCOM to coordinate with them on some of the products that
their analysts do is certainly going to be an additive to
receiving that information.
You are right, the Department of Defense has a significant
number of analysts and resources available of which we are
closely coordinating with Secretary Paul McHale's office in
accessing DOD information.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Brennan, is it your understanding that
NORTHCOM is going to go through TTIC to the Department of
Homeland Security?
Mr. Brennan. I would defer to NORTHCOM on what they are
going to do vis-a-vis Homeland Security.
Chairman Cox. What is your experience? Is that happening?
Mr. Brennan. We are working with NORTHCOM and other
commands to establish exactly what the type of relationship we
are going to have with them. So we are developing our
relationship with Department of Defense commands and agencies
currently.
Chairman Cox. I will say that it took Members of the
Committee by surprise, because in the same diagram that the
Department of Defense showed us, all the other members of the
intelligence community had a direct relationship to NORTHCOM,
and the only member of the intelligence community that did not
was the Department of Homeland Security.
Surely if the mission of NORTHCOM is protecting the
homeland, we ought, it seems to me, to have a direct
relationship. And here, I would hope that TTIC would become, as
you say, a force multiplier and not interference and not a
filter.
So I direct your attention to that. I realize it is a work
in progress.
Mr. Parrish. I might add, it is maybe your visit then, but
we are getting a NORTHCOM, as I say, liaison into our
operations center. So I may be coming back and saying thank
you.
Chairman Cox. Well, anything we can do.
On this question of foreign intelligence, I am a little bit
puzzled, still. In this future that we are describing in which
the Department of Homeland Security has fully realized its
information analysis capabilities, and we are doing, as the
statute requires, the full scope of global analysis of the
domestic terror threat, we are going to be looking at foreign
intelligence, because, for example, al Qaeda is overseas and
yet they pose a threat to us here in the United States.
Are we not going to be looking at the threat to U.S. assets
overseas? Because I understood in the earlier discussion--Mr.
Brennan, at least--you to say that TTIC is going to be looking
at threats to U.S. assets overseas, but the Department of
Homeland Security should not do that.
I am a little bit troubled by that, because when I take a
look again at al Qaeda, the main paradigm that prompted the
creation of this entire Cabinet department, we have an
antecedent event, several of them, actually. But take, for
example, the bombing of the Cole; al Qaeda did that. Surely, if
you are piecing together the al Qaeda threat to the United
States here, you would want to look at all of that information.
And we would want the Department of Homeland Security to
look, therefore, not only at foreign intelligence that relates
to attacks on the United States, but also foreign intelligence
that relates to U.S. assets overseas, because it is the global
threat that DHS is responsible for; isn't that right?
Mr. Parrish. Sir, if I misrepresented, we certainly are
looking at the international intelligence picture from that
standpoint to connect the dots, if you will, of what might be
developed in planning an attack that occurs overseas, could the
same occur in the United States.
With regard to threats to U.S. interests, U.S. businesses
overseas, we work very closely with the Department of State
that has--as you know, the Overseas Advisory Council that has a
mechanism of conveying these threats to U.S. businesses
overseas.
I will defer to Mr. Brennan, but the State Department now,
I think, is a team member of the TTIC, or soon, and that
intelligence piece is being worked through the State
Department.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Brennan, do you want to elaborate on your
earlier comment that down the road, when DHS is fully staffed
up and it has complete capability to do global threat analysis
vis-a-vis the domestic threat, that the difference between TTIC
and what DHS is doing is that you are going to also look at
threats to U.S. assets overseas?
I mean, is that--because I think Mr. Parrish is saying they
are going to be looking at some of that, too.
Mr. Brennan. I don't think there is anything in the
Homeland Security Act that gives DHS the responsibility for
analyzing and evaluating and assessing the threat to U.S.
interests abroad, in terms of having that responsibility. I
believe that still falls with, in fact, the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and
others. They are going to have access to that information as
they need to in order to understand the threat to the homeland.
But to evaluate the potential for al Qaeda to carry out
attacks against the embassy in Amman or against U.S. citizens
in India or Pakistan, that is not what the purpose of their
looking at the information is for. It is to understand better
and evaluate the threat to the homeland. TTIC and other
agencies represented within TTIC have the responsibility for
understanding that threat and making sure information analysis
is made available so that actions can be taken to prevent those
attacks.
Chairman Cox. And so what we find is that the CIA
ultimately is looking at the same information, but in major
part for a different purpose; is that right?
Mr. Brennan. Many times we are looking at the same
information for different purposes, exactly right.
Chairman Cox. And isn't that why we created the Department
of Homeland Security? Because we have the CIA, which is in
chief responsible for certain overseas operations, but also
foreign intelligence analysis; we have the FBI, which is
responsible for domestic counterterrorism. And yet we have a
domestic threat that is located both here within the United
States and overseas, and we don't want to put the CIA in charge
of domestic collection in any respect.
So, in part because we have had sharing problems in the
past and we want to overcome that, we want to create a new
structure, and in part because we don't want CIA to be in
charge of it because of civil liberties concerns, we created
the Department of Homeland Security.
And, Mr. Berman, what am I missing here? Do you want to
respond?
Mr. Berman. You are not missing a thing. I think that is
why the Congress did it, and there is a significant oversight
issue and policy issue being raised by this dual authority that
is TTIC. It doesn't fit that scheme of ensuring that the CIA is
not involved in domestic law enforcement activities, because
the CIA Director hired the head of TTIC. They may not be doing
collection activities, but they--when they say there is a gap,
that certainly triggers activity down at the FBI or abroad for
the CIA; and it triggers collection.
And I think that in terms of information sharing, Congress'
concern that these agencies were not--did not have a culture of
sharing and are trying to bring in new blood, new direction,
new leadership through the Department of Homeland Security. And
I think there is a very serious question on whether that is
being carried out today.
Chairman Cox. My time has expired.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank our
witnesses for their indulgence.
I think the comments that you made, Mr. Chairman, focus on
one of the things that occurred to me that we--right after 9/
11, I thought the idea was that we noticed that the CIA, the
FBI, and the Department of Defense weren't talking to each
other, so we got the Department of Homeland Security together
to try to coordinate everything. And then we looked up, and
after all the dust settled, the CIA, the FBI, and the
Department of Defense weren't even in the Department of
Homeland Security. So rather than three people not talking to
each other, now you have got four people not talking to each
other.
This, the TTIC, frankly cannot fit in any statutory
framework because it is not part of any statute. So whatever is
going on is not part of a statutory framework.
Mr. Brennan, you indicated you had hundreds of people
working--your title is Director of the Center, so I assume you
are talking about 100 people now working at the Center or with
the Center?
Mr. Brennan. There are a little over 100 people who are
working in TTIC right now.
Mr. Scott. Now, do you have a personnel budget?
Mr. Brennan. We have people coming from all the different
partner agencies, and they bring with them their personal
services dollars, along with nonpersonal services dollars, to
provide them support as far as training and other types of
requirements.
Mr. Scott. Now, who are they reporting to after they show
up?
Mr. Brennan. I have day-to-day management responsibility
for the individuals within TTIC. They are still representing
their agencies. So they are assignees, again with the full
authorities of their agencies.
Mr. Scott. And who picks them to be with your agency?
Mr. Brennan. It is a combination of my reaching out to
those agencies and making recommendations about the type of
people, as well as the agencies identifying individuals who can
meet our needs within TTIC.
Mr. Scott. In practice, out of the 100 people, how long did
you pick and how many were selected to go?
Mr. Brennan. I selected maybe 10 percent of them. I
interviewed another 10 percent of them or so, and the others
came from the agencies.
Mr. Scott. In addition to this, is there any other staff
that you have working?
Mr. Brennan. I have the people that are assigned to TTIC,
and I have the support of the partner agencies, and a lot of
support from them, for TTIC.
Mr. Scott. I mean, you have got millions of pieces of
information coming in in your direction, kind of floating. I
mean, just mechanically, when you get all of these little bits
of information, is there a staff to look at them, or are these
individuals--where do these 100 individuals come in?
Who is actually looking at the hundreds and thousands and
hundreds of thousands and, I assume, millions of little pieces
of information? Who is looking at them?
Mr. Brennan. A lot of different people are looking at them.
We could have a very long conversation about the disparate data
sets that are available to the U.S. Government and the
different types of information systems, and the difficulty of
being able to search across those different information systems
and databases as a result of legacy practices and procedures
within individual agencies.
What we are trying to do is apply the analytical tools to
make sure that we have the capability, the computing power that
can identify that information which is important to our
understanding of the terrorist threat. If we can narrow down
the field, narrow down the volume of data, then what we want to
do is to put eyes on those pieces of traffic so that we can
understand it. But this is a very tedious process and a very
complicated process as far as making sure that in the wealth of
data that is available to the U.S. Government, we narrow it
down into a field that is manageable, but also contains the
dots that we are looking for.
Mr. Scott. Well, and I mean, so you people are working on
computers? I mean, I am a little lost as to how all of this
information gets out of the FBI field office and into your
office.
And, well, whose idea was this? Who asked for it? Did
Homeland Security come up with this idea?
Mr. Brennan. There was a decision made within the
Administration that there needed to be--especially with the
stand-up with the Department of Homeland Security and with the
Department of Intelligence within the FBI, it made a lot of
sense to a lot of people working terrorism issues to bring
together in one integrated environment representatives from
those different organizations so that there would be full
access to the information that is needed in order to understand
the full array of threats to U.S. interests.
Mr. Scott. And we thought that was what we were doing when
we set up the Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Berman, what concerns should we have, in terms of
privacy, about the overlapping and duplicative information-
sharing with all of these different agencies? What privacy
concerns should we have?
Mr. Berman. Our major privacy concern is that while we have
a privacy officer appointed at the DHS, we do not have
guidelines in place for audits, for standards of investigation,
for retention of data, for under what circumstances they are
shared and what happens when there are consequences of--
agencies are talking about keeping people off of airplanes
because of certain information that they have collected. We
want to make sure that if that information is false, there is a
consequence for that.
So that privacy violations as--that might happen out of
data mining or data collection have the same consequences and
have the same kind of oversight as we have over the detainees
by the Justice Department's Inspector General, who just issued
a report saying there are violations, how do we deal with them.
A system was set in place to do that within the Homeland
Security Act, but we need a status report on how that is going
and what kind of guidelines are TTIC and the information--and
DHS operating under. It is very uncertain, and I think that the
Committee really has to press. Because what information are
they collecting? How are they disseminating?
Under what guidelines should be, in my view, a publicly
debatable issue. And it was, from Watergate, a debatable issue
on the domestic side for the FBI; it has become less so since
their new guidelines were issued in July. But DHS should be
engaging in the same public process of telling us how they are
going to collect what standards and what kind of technology
they are going to pick.
The issues that Congress has raised about the Total
Information Awareness research program and stop funding for it,
and very important that privacy questions haven't been asked,
but I think that is a research program.
What we have are ongoing programs of data mining and data
collection, by FBI, TSA, and so forth without Congress coming
together and exercising significant sufficient oversight over--
under what guidelines, circumstances, standards are they doing
it? And please--would you please make those public so we can
discuss them?
Mr. Scott. Let me follow up a little bit on that same
issue, because we have gotten kind of different answers to the
same question.
Mr. Brennan, are you doing domestic information evaluation?
Mr. Brennan. We are evaluating any information that is
available in terms of the terrorist threat to U.S. interests
domestically or abroad, international terrorist threats.
Mr. Scott. International terrorism?
Mr. Brennan. Yes. The FBI has the lead role in terms of
assessing the domestic terrorist group threat to the United
States interests.
Mr. Scott. Well, they have primary. What about you? Do you
have any role to play----
Mr. Brennan. At this point, no, we do not.
Mr. Scott. And if there is a known terrorist threat of
unknown origin, are you evaluating that information if you
don't know whether it's international or domestic?
Mr. Brennan. I don't know how it would come to us in terms
of what you are referring to, this theoretical possibility. But
if it is undetermined and we have access to it, yes, we are
going to see if it is a dot that needs to be connected to
something else.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Berman, are you concerned about all of this
analysis of things that may be totally domestically oriented?
Mr. Berman. Absolutely. A threat in Oklahoma is going to be
looked at by TTIC because there is a possible foreign
connection. And I believe that the assumption would be, until
it is ruled out, they are going to take a look at it. And even
if they looked at it and it wasn't there, apparently, they are
going to look very deeply into it now to see whether it came
from Iraq. Or who--you know, where did the materials come from.
So we are going to have a crossover between foreign
intelligence and domestic intelligence. In fact, with the lines
between law enforcement and intelligence, Congress brought down
because they--in some respects they are--those lines don't make
sense. So you are--that transparency, that wall between
intelligence and law enforcement, is down.
You can now prosecute under both FISA and investigate for
law enforcement and intelligence reasons. So, therefore, you
must look at the standards for investigation depending on the
threat and what kind of information they need to become more
intrusive.
Mr. Scott. The significance of that wall going down is that
you can get information on the intelligence side without the
traditional----
Mr. Berman. Traditional fourth amendment standards.
Mr. Scott. Probable cause. You can just get the
information?
Mr. Berman. You can get the information.
Now, if it is--if you have a--now, if you have a FISA
warrant on a terrorist organization, or someone aiding or
someone abetting, you can get significant third-party
information on any information relevant to that investigation
whether--regardless of whether it pertains to the target of the
investigation. So it can be everyone in the apartment building
that you are living in, because they suspect that you are a
terrorist.
I didn't mean that, Mr. Scott, but----
Mr. Scott. Well, none of that information is protected,
because it is going to be shared over all----
Mr. Berman. It can be shared. It is under no--we have done
a chart at my organization of restrictions from different
statutes; and we have red lights for warrants, and green for
the Government gets it with a piece of paper, or with nothing,
no, just give it to us. And it looks like the whole country of
personal information went green. It is a green light.
Now, I am not saying that we should--that they may not need
some of that information, but that is enormous discretion. And
that discretion should be bound by guidelines, rules and
accountability. And the only reason that we are sitting here
and not--you know, we don't know what is going on, and because
we haven't had a second 9/11, we--there is--that is both a--
that is a blessing.
But we certainly, before we have another one, ought to know
who goes into the different boxes and what the boxes are for
standards, collection, dissemination and so forth. And that is
a public policy issue that this Committee needs to address.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman's time has expired.
Does the gentleman from Texas wish to be recognized for a
concluding statement?
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our thanks to all four
of you for your testimony today. It is my hope that out of it,
we can continue to further define and specify the various
responsibilities that each of you has so that we can be more
efficient and effective in the way that we carry out this task.
I know, Mr. Parrish, you have plenty of room to grow in
terms of the development of your agency and the particular
division of your agency. We were all shocked to hear a few
weeks ago from Mr. Redmond, as we were pursuing our efforts to
develop the Project BioShield legislation, to learn that you
have only one analyst in the department that knows anything
about the threat of bioterrorism and the vulnerabilities that
we face.
I would assume you are probably in a similar posture today.
But I also know that your intent would clearly be to expand
that manpower to ensure that we can deal with that effectively.
So all of you have a very tremendous responsibility, one
that I know all of you take very seriously, and all of you, I
hope and am confident, carry out your task with the sensitivity
to the issues that Mr. Berman raised today.
So we want to be supportive of your effort. But we also
want to know that you are accountable to the Congress, and that
the intent of the Congress and the legislation that we have
passed in the Department of Homeland Security Act will clearly
be carried out and the full realization of its purpose will be
achieved.
But we thank you, and we appreciate the good work that all
of you do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Thank you.
I too want to join in thanking our witnesses, Mr. Brennan,
Mr. Mefford, Mr. Parrish, Mr. Berman, you have been very
patient and very helpful. I think the Committee has gained, our
Members and our staff, a much better appreciation of the jobs
that you are seeking to discharge, the responsibilities that
you carry.
And I think, just as there is a difference at this juncture
between the Homeland Security Act, and the Department itself,
because it is a work in progress, so too there is a difference
between what on paper we have set out to do with TTIC and where
we are finding ourselves at present.
This is a people business. And the three of you, Mr.
Berman, not being a member of this group for this purpose, the
three of you sitting at this table have as much reason simply
to talk to each other as to consult with your lawyers about
how, allegedly, you are to interact.
And I do hope that you will infer from the questions that
we put to you some of Congress' aims, some of our aims in the
House of Representatives, with respect to both the Department
of Homeland Security and TTIC.
TTIC, which is led by the CIA, most importantly, from the
Chairman's standpoint, must not be allowed in any way to impair
the development of the Department of Homeland Security. That is
the Hippocratic Oath for homeland security; First, do no harm.
Our aim, as it has been represented by the witnesses today, is
far from doing any harm: to multiply our force, to make the
Department of Homeland Security more effective at what it does,
to make the FBI more effective at what it does, to make the
CIA, likewise, more effective, and all of the participants
within TTIC. I know that is your aim, and I hope that we can
make that happen.
Second, the Department of Homeland Security's information
analysis responsibilities are global. I think it is vitally
important for us to recognize going in--both going into the
construction of that capability within the Department of
Homeland Security and going into TTIC--that that is so.
I will say that as a Member of Congress, my estimation of
the scope that we have planned for the IA function within the
Department of Homeland Security is modest. At 150 analysts, as
compared, for example, to the 300 analysts already put in place
over the last year at NORTHCOM, is not an overpowering
ambition. I hope that the statutory--but it is not my job, and
the statute certainly doesn't say how many numbers of analysts
that we have to have to determine what that figure is.
But I hope that we do focus on results and that we have
enough people, enough resources, to do that job; and that we
set out to accomplish it as rapidly as possible.
And, lastly, I have inferred from this hearing that the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center is a good thing. I am glad
we have it because it works, because it is functioning in a way
that even with the best of intentions and armed fully with
congressional statutory language, the Department of Homeland
Security cannot do this yet.
But the Department of Homeland Security is beginning to do
this, and I hope that whereas presently we don't have,
therefore, too much redundancy, as that redundancy inevitably
develops, that we do scale back what we are doing at TTIC, and
that we not seek simply to morph it into something else.
Because--after all, it is there, and the rule of bureaucracy is
that things never go away--I think it would be vitally
important for us to recognize that that, in the long run, would
not contribute to homeland security, but actually contribute to
a diffusion of responsibility.
This is for the Congress, as well as for the executive
branch, a work in progress. And I look very much forward to
working with all of you.
I want to end with a comment that I made earlier, in the
middle of the hearing, which is that I and, I think, every one
of us, has enormous respect for you gentlemen and for what you
are doing--and in that group, Mr. Berman, you are included--
both within and without the Government.
Homeland security more than any other function in the
national security area is involving the private sector, and so
we have got to do this together.
We have kept you here very late tonight. You have been
absolutely stalwart, and so we look forward to working with you
in shorter bursts in the future. Thank you for being here
today.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the joint Committees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative
in Congress From the State of Rhode Island
Responses from John O. Brennan to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses from Eleni P. Kalisch, on behalf of Larry Mefford,
to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses to post-hearing questions from the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security had not been received by the
Committee on the Judiciary at the time this hearing was
submitted for printing.
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