[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WHAT REGULATIONS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE PORT SECURITY?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY POLICY, NATURAL
RESOURCES AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 24, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-23
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
87-738 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia Maryland
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Columbia
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas ------
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee (Independent)
Peter Sirh, Staff Director
Melissa Wojciak, Deputy Staff Director
Randy Kaplan, Senior Counsel/Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Philip M. Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs
DOUG OSE, California, Chairman
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia JIM COOPER, Tennessee
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Dan Skopec, Staff Director
Barbara F. Kahlow, Deputy Staff Director
Melanie Tory, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 24, 2003................................... 1
Statement of:
Keller, Larry, executive director, Port of Los Angeles;
Timothy Parker, executive secretary, Steamship Association
of Southern California; John Ochs, security manager, Maersk
Sealand, Ltd.; Rob Marshall-Johns, director of operations
and quality control, the Oppenheimer Group; Stephanie
Williams, vice president, California Trucking Association;
and Dr. Domenick Miretti, senior liaison, Ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach, International Longshore and
Warehouse Union............................................ 19
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Hahn, Councilwoman Janice, prepared statement of............. 14
Keller, Larry, executive director, Port of Los Angeles,
prepared statement of...................................... 22
Marshall-Johns, Rob, director of operations and quality
control, the Oppenheimer Group, prepared statement of...... 41
Miretti, Dr. Domenick, senior liaison, Ports of Los Angeles
and Long Beach, International Longshore and Warehouse
Union, prepared statement of............................... 57
Ochs, John, security manager, Maersk Sealand, Ltd., prepared
statement of............................................... 34
Ose, Hon. Doug, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, prepared statement of....................... 5
Parker, Timothy, executive secretary, Steamship Association
of Southern California, prepared statement of.............. 29
Williams, Stephanie, vice president, California Trucking
Association, prepared statement of......................... 50
WHAT REGULATIONS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE PORT SECURITY?
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THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 2003
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources
and Regulatory Affairs,
Committee on Government Reform,
San Pedro, CA.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
the Board Room of the Port of Los Angeles Administration
Building, 425 South Palos Verdes Street, San Pedro, CA, Hon.
Doug Ose (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Ose and Janklow.
Also present: Representatives Harman and Rohrabacher.
Staff present: Dan Skopec, staff director; Barbara Kahlow,
deputy staff director; Melanie Tory, clerk; and Yier Shi, press
secretary.
Mr. Ose. Good morning. Welcome to today's hearing before
the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and
Regulatory Affairs.
I ask that we allow Members not on the full committee to
join us today for the purpose of this hearing. Hearing no
objections, so ordered.
I want to touch on the rules when Congress holds committee
hearings. We are now required under the rules of the House to
extend written invitations within a certain period of time
prior to the hearing, to which we get responses. The witnesses
whom we do invite are discussed by the majority and minority.
Both sides are allowed to invite witnesses, and the witnesses
that have been invited and have been agreed on and have been
invited long in advance in the hearing to come testify today.
We are grateful for their joining us.
To the extent other citizens wish to submit written
comments to the committee, we'll be happy to take them.
Unfortunately, we will not be able to entertain oral testimony
in this regard, but we will welcome your written submittals
instead. The record of this hearing will be open for 10 days
following its completion, during which time comments can be
submitted by turning them into the clerk either here today or
in Washington in the coming days. A number of our colleagues
here will be joining us shortly. They are making their ways
through the security downstairs.
This is an investigative committee. And, as an
investigative committee, we routinely swear in our witnesses
and put them under oath.
Congressman Janklow and I will and the other Members will
be allowed to make opening statements. Then, we will go to a
panel, from which we have received written statements, who will
be allowed to make oral statements for the record. We will
constrain each of these statements to 5 minutes maximum. We're
always grateful for any statements that do not take the entire
5 minutes that are allocated.
So with that, I want to welcome our witnesses. As I said,
we routinely swear in our witnesses. So, if you all would rise,
please. Raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Ose. Let the record show the witnesses answered in the
affirmative.
We do have apparently some folks here who are helping some
of the named witnesses who are behind. I need to make sure I
receive the names of these folks over here, so we can identify
them for purposes of noting that they did get sworn in
accordingly.
We are joined today by a number of witnesses. I am going to
introduce them, and then we are going to go through opening
statements. First is the executive director of the Port of Los
Angeles, Mr. Larry Keller. Nice to see you again.
Mr. Tim Parker is the executive secretary of the Steamship
Association of Southern California. Good to see you, Tim.
Mr. John Ochs, who is the security manager for Maersk
SeaLand Limited. Good to see you again.
Mr. Rob Marshall-Johns, who is the director of Operations
and Quality Control for the Oppenheimer Group. Nice to see you.
We will be joined by Ms. Stephanie Williams, who is the
vice president of California Trucking Association.
And, then we have our good friend, Dr. Domenick Miretti,
who is senior liaison for the Ports of Los Angeles and Long
Beach, for the International Longshore and Warehouse Union.
Pleased to see you, Dr. Miretti.
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, shook the
confidence of the U.S. Government and its citizens in the
Nation's security. Immediately after September 11th, the
President and Congress began to examine the existing system,
including the laws, regulations, and actual practices governing
the Nation's security. Much was found to be in need of repair.
Some changes were made immediately, others were made later, and
more changes are still needed.
On November 19th of that same year, the President signed
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. This law
established emergency procedures for the Federal Government to
issue interim final regulations without the usual opportunity
for public notice and comment, as provided for in the
Administrative Procedure Act. To ensure congressional and
public input into the regulatory decisionmaking process, this
subcommittee held a November 27, 2001, hearing entitled, ``What
Regulations are Needed to Ensure Air Security?''
During 2002, Congress passed the Maritime Transportation
Security Act to address security of the Nation's ports. On
November 25, 2002, the President signed that piece of
legislation into law. This law similarly provides for some
interim final regulations without any public notice and
comment. These include interim final rules on anti-terrorism
plans for port security, facility security, and vessel
security, and other rules to follow, such as for transportation
security cards.
The U.S. maritime system includes more than 300 ports with
more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals. The top 25 ports
account for 98 percent of the more than 6 million container
shipments entering U.S. ports annually. The Port of Los Angeles
is the busiest port in the United States and the seventh
busiest in the world.
The vast maritime system is particularly susceptible to
terrorist attempts to smuggle personnel, weapons of mass
destruction, or other dangerous materials into the United
States. And, ships in U.S. ports could be attacked by
terrorists. A large-scale terrorist attack at a U.S. port would
not only cause widespread damage but also it would seriously
impact our economy.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act raises questions
about the right balance between increasing port security on the
one hand and not impeding the flow of commerce and trade on the
other. Standard versus port-specific security measures--in
other words, what is our national standard and what are the
unique circumstances of any given port? And also, what is the
role of government in solving these problems, as opposed to the
role of private industry?
Two other key questions are how the United States should
pursue higher standards for port security abroad, in other
words securing the original point from which a product is
shipped to us, and how to generate funds for improved port
security, both here and abroad. Currently, there is
insufficient Federal funding to fully ensure port security.
And, we are going to visit about that during the course of this
hearing.
Many Federal departments and agencies have a role in port
security. The two agencies with the most presence are the Coast
Guard and the Customs Service. Since September 11, 2001, both
have sought improved and timelier information, so that they can
better evaluate the risk of ships, cargo, passengers, and crew
destined for the United States, and decide which to target for
additional and closer inspection. Currently, the Customs
Service only inspects about 2 to 5 percent of imports and 1
percent of exports.
This hearing will examine what Federal regulations are
needed to ensure port security for various aspects, such as
security of U.S. and foreign ports, facility security, vessel
security, cargo identification and screening, and
transportation security cards and background checks. Federal
regulations govern the conduct of non-Federal parties and
specify detailed procedures to ensure uniform implementation of
laws.
Key questions are whether the Federal Government should
require a core, minimum, or baseline set of regulations; for
instance, training, drills, fencing, cameras, lighting, and
guards, and the like, for non-Federal private parties, or more
prescriptive requirements, and if the Federal Government should
allow self-certification by non-Federal private parties.
Coming out of business as I do, I recognize the
difficulties of balancing the need for security with the
demands of commerce. That is a very, very sensitive subject for
us. I am particularly sensitive to the costs of excessive
government regulation. But I have to admit, I must say, we live
in a changed world, and these additional precautions to protect
our fellow citizens and our economic well-being are necessary.
I do look forward to hearing the testimony of our
witnesses. I introduced them previously. I do want to add a
couple of things.
First of all, we have prepared for this hearing. We came
out here a month and a half ago to visit a number of you. We
followed up on a number of things that we have talked about at
that time. I am aware that this port--and this area in
general--has far in excess in revenues than it spends in costs
in the form of customs and customs duties.
I happen to think one of the things we ought to look at
very closely is whether to take at least a portion of that
excess and allocate it directly for investment in this port as
a means of financing various commitments to a number of things
that we will talk about today.
With that, I want to, first, welcome my good friend from
this area who represent a number of geographic communities
around America, welcome. I will recognize you for comments, Mr.
Janklow, for the purpose of an opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Doug Ose follows:]
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Mr. Janklow. Thank you. Thank you very, very much, Mr.
Chairman, and thank you for conducting this hearing. I have
been a Member of Congress now for just a couple of months, and
was elected to represent my State and have very quickly moved
in this direction. Let me show you clearly, the importance of
dealing with issues such as this, and I say that because there
can't be anything more timely than the security of the ports in
this country.
Just in the last couple of weeks, we in Congress
appropriated several billion for additional assistance to the
airline industry, having only 2 years ago appropriated from
Congress billions more for helping the airline industry. The
assistance that has been given with respect to the major
modality for moving goods into the United States, the shipping
industry, has been minuscule compared to what has taken place
with respect to the safety of the goods coming into our ports.
A classic example would be the huge reduction in thefts in
this particular port over the last few years. But you can
really see it at least from the statistics that I have looked
at pre-September 11th, and the post-September 11th activity
with respect to thefts within the port. There is an indication
that, since September 11th, there has been an incredible
reduction, which tells us it can be done. Safety can be made
better when people really focus on it.
Looking at some of the testimony from the witnesses that
are going to testify today, I am really excited to see the
various comments that they have to make with respect to a
common ID system, or an ID system of some type, and how they
struggle to determine what may be the best thing. And, this may
be something which is a seemingly unique Federal role that
needs to be played.
The fact of the matter is, the terrorists are not going to
send into our country trucks and cranes and huge vehicles. They
are going to send into our country things like plutonium, the
size of which would fit in this 12-ounce can, enough to make an
atom bomb according to one of the lead physicists at the
Lawrence Livermore Lab at UCLA. The amount of uranium-235 that
it takes to make an atom bomb, assemble an atom bomb, would fit
in a water bottle.
So an atomic bomb can be made nowadays by anyone who is
trained as a physicist, and he has some rudimentary skills--or,
I should say, reasonably good skills--in the manufacturing of
technology. Not that I can do it, but there are five ways you
can find on the Internet that will tell you how to assemble a
device such as that.
We talk about the standards, and Congress very quickly
passed things like the Maritime Safety Act, but didn't include
really the standards that have to be applied by the executive
branch with respect to the parameters of how this is going to
be implemented. What makes that important is it is following
the things that we should require all the local ports to decide
for themselves what the average security mechanisms are that
they have to follow.
Various National Guards from all over this country have
been called to active duty recently. There are none of them
wandering around active duty in the Armed Forces making their
own plans, or coming up with their own schemes on how to win a
war, and deciding what their roles will be in terms of our
country's national defense.
Once they were called to active duty, they also fell under
one unified command in terms of one set of implementation. It
can't be under different with respect to the standards that are
going to be applied to the safety of this country for the
importation of things which come through our harbors.
In the written comments, Mr. Ose, you talk about the huge
surplus that is generated in this particular port. I believe it
was something like $600 million. It was gathered in collections
of duties in this port in excess of the surplus that is
generated in America. Forty-two percent of all the goods in
America come through this port, and a minuscule amount of the
number that has been appropriated for safety in this country
has yet to come through this port.
That defies logic. There is no other way to look at it.
And, recognizing that we in America are in the ``me'' business
of homeland security--something honestly we haven't been
concerned about since Pearl Harbor back in 1941--a whole new
dimension. Recognizing that the only three things that were
built in this country, with true security in mind, are the
military bases, the prisons, and the banks.
There is nothing else that has been designed abroad for
America to be concerned about national security, but we have
got a huge amount of ground to cover in a short period of time.
As I say all the time, we talk about interim roles. The
fact of the matter is, Al-Qaeda, the Hezbollah, the people who
hate us, aren't on an interim schedule, and we can't afford to
be on an interim schedule either.
Your calling this meeting today is so timely, and I
appreciate the opportunity to participate in it with you, and
the leadership that you have provided here for the safety of
every man, woman and child in this country.
Thank you.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Congressman Janklow.
We have been joined by both Congressman Rohrabacher and
Congresswoman Harman. We have already passed unanimous consent
to have them join us to participate in the hearing. You are
certainly welcome.
I know one of the duties I need to take care of this
morning is to duly have our last witness sworn in. Would please
rise and raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Ose. Let the record show the witness answered in the
affirmative.
I need to enter into the record that this was with
unanimous consent a written statement by Councilwoman Hahn.
Without objection, that will be done.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hahn follows:]
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Mr. Ose. I would like to recognize my friend from UCLA,
Congressman Rohrabacher, for the purpose of an opening
statement.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will try to make this short. First of
all, my gratitude to Congressman Ose. I have worked with him
for several years now in the House of Representatives. He is
probably one of the hidden treasures in Congress, and probably
the folks down here don't know about you, but he is one of the
creative and energetic leaders that we have in Congress. We are
very grateful that he is now focusing on a problem that
concerns the safety of our local area, as well as our families,
and we are very grateful for the leadership you are providing
here today.
We have taken for granted security and safety issues in the
ports for far too long, and we could get away with it in the
world the way it used to be. We cannot get away with it
anymore. There is a crying call now for us to act, not just to
talk but to act, and to take those steps that are necessary to
make sure that our ports are not the entry portals into our
society from which terrorists will be able to murder millions
of our people.
This is a very awesome responsibility, but we need not only
to be caught up in the overwhelming nature of this challenge
but also we need to be able to break loose and make the
decisions and do what is necessary to make the changes, so that
we are no longer vulnerable, or at least to dramatically reduce
the vulnerability.
To do this, we will need technology development. I
understand that there is technology being developed. We will
need the cooperation, and that is cooperation between the
members of government, but also between government and the
private sector, and also in the private sector cooperation
between management and labor.
Third, we are going to need resources, and I do not believe
that we should just look at traditional areas for resources
with duties collected alone as the means of achieving this
goal. We have to be creative.
I have proposed that we consider a container fee on the
containers coming in and out of this port that would then be
used to finance the upgrades in security and other types of
infrastructure upgrades needed by this port and by the various
ports in our country. This will mean that the people using the
ports overseas, in Shanghai or wherever, would be paying the
costs, because they are paying a fee to use the containers
through the port.
They would be paying the cost, rather than having the
American people pick up the entire cost for making this more
secure, and, thus, basically paying for an infrastructure cost
for our competitors overseas.
So, that is my suggestion, and I will be looking forward
today to hearing the testimony and hearing other people's
description of the problem, but also offering their solutions.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Ose. I thank the gentleman.
I would like to welcome our good friend and a staunch
advocate for California's and the country's security interests
among others, Congresswoman Harman, for the purpose of an
opening statement.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize for being late. Dana Rohrabacher and I were
participating in a forum in Torrance, CA, up the road on
hydrogen power.
The reason I mention that because maybe some of you folks
are interested in that, but also one piece of the answer long-
term to our national security problem is energy independence,
and I feel very strongly about that, and do take to heart my
curmudgeon self-identified curmudgeon friend's observation: We
always have to ask, what will it cost, and who will pay? But I
do think it is important to think about, what will it cost, and
who will pay, if we don't wean ourselves from dependence on
Middle Eastern oil.
Segue to this hearing, which I think is extremely important
and commend you for coming down here. We are physically this
minute in the 36th Congressional District, which I represent,
and I also represent the neighbors around the port. The port
was well cared for, I hope, in the last decade. It will
continue to be well cared for, the actual physical port, by
Dana Rohrabacher, who has reacquired it as part of his
congressional district.
My point in mentioning all of this incredibly interesting
history is to make the point that we are here together to work
together. National security and homeland security issues are
not partisan issues. The terrorists won't check our party
registration before they blow us up. We had better darn well
work together, all of us in government, all parts of this
community, labor and management, and so forth, if we are going
to solve this problem.
In that regard, I would really like to commend many of the
people in this audience, all of whom are different, but one of
them Coast Guard Captain John Holmes. Are you here, John? Where
are you? There he is.
On September 12th, if I remember this--or maybe it was
September 11, 2001, he made the Federal Government resources in
this area work together, and he would also have to commend
Janice Hahn for what she does at the local level to make this
work. I would like to commend the leadership of the port for
what it does.
I would like to commend the private sector, both organized
labor, the ILWU, and management, for what they are doing to
make all of us work together.
Well, let me make some points that you may have made, but
they stand out in my mind particularly today because the
Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge arrives in the
neighborhood in about 2 hours. He is not coming here, although
his Deputy, Gordon England, was here about a month ago.
Ridge will be downtown meeting with first responders from
all over the State. He will then go to the Terrorism Early
Warning Group, which is an emergency center set up by the
county. Tomorrow he will be at LAX, which I think we all know
is a top terrorist target. But, I know his mind is on, or
better be on, what security is. I know he knows, as we do, that
these ports are not just jewels of this neighborhood. They are
the gateways of 40 percent of the trade in and out of the
United States.
Now, as Dana Rohrabacher was just saying, while the
consequences of not acting to make these ports safer are huge,
and so by any of your thoughts, what does it cost and who is
going to pay for it, I know the answer about the costs of
inaction. So I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.
I would just like to make a couple of comments on what you
are holding this hearing about, this Maritime Act that we
passed last year in the Congress. It is a good thing, but in
the fiscal 2004 budget, you should be aware that the
administration has not requested full funding, and it is--as
far as I can tell as yet unlikely that this bill will be fully
funded. I think the consequences of that are sobering.
It is not, of course, only about money. It is about
cooperation and strategy. But, let me just point out something
that I think we should all reflect on, and that is that a
little while back, a few months back, we had a lockout in this
port for 10 days. That was not related to homeland security. It
was related to a labor-management dispute.
But, the loss to the U.S. economy from 10 days of closure
was $2 billion, with a B, a day. The ramifications were felt
from Wilmington, CA, to Wilmington, DE. Everybody got hurt.
Imagine the disruption. Some ports were instead affected by the
international sinking of a ship in the outer channel or the
detonation of weapons of mass destruction inside of containment
at one of the terminals.
Indeed, a recent simulation which was an exercise,
actually, I was involved in, determined that steps following
the identification of a radiological device on an inbound ship
could lead to a $58 billion loss to the U.S. economy. So, this
is real money. These are real people. This is an urgent
problem.
Hopefully we will fund the MSTA fully, but beyond that we
will develop one national integrated homeland security strategy
that values ports as much as it values airports. That will be,
I think, the critical agreement and something I am going to
talk to Tom Ridge about.
I really commend my colleagues for their work on this and
the electives in the audience and the officials here, I am
happy to welcome you all to the 46th Congressional District.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Congresswoman.
We will now go to the witness panel. There are six
witnesses. We have received written testimony from each of you,
and we have them recorded. Our standard operating procedure is
that the witnesses will be given 5 minutes to summarize their
testimony that they have previously submitted.
For the members of the audience, there are copies of their
written testimony at the entrance to the room. You are welcome
to get copies of those.
I recognize Mr. Keller for the purpose of 5 minutes for an
opening statement.
STATEMENTS OF LARRY KELLER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PORT OF LOS
ANGELES; TIMOTHY PARKER, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, STEAMSHIP
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA; JOHN OCHS, SECURITY
MANAGER, MAERSK SEALAND, LTD.; ROB MARSHALL-JOHNS, DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS AND QUALITY CONTROL, THE OPPENHEIMER GROUP;
STEPHANIE WILLIAMS, VICE PRESIDENT, CALIFORNIA TRUCKING
ASSOCIATION; AND DR. DOMENICK MIRETTI, SENIOR LIAISON, PORTS OF
LOS ANGELES AND LONG BEACH, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND
WAREHOUSE UNION
Mr. Keller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciated your
visit in February, and we welcome you back today. Thanks, too,
to the members of the Government Reform Subcommittee on Energy
Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs for inviting
the Port of Los Angeles to testify before you to share our
concerns about what is needed to enhance our port security. Our
concerns focus on Federal port security grants, international
cooperation, and smart economics.
As you know, the Port of Los Angeles is one of the Nation's
busiest ports. As a premier port of entry for the cargo on the
West Coast, the port occupies 7,500 acres of land and water,
along with 43 miles of waterfront. Together with our San Pedro
Bay neighbor, the Port of Long Beach, we handle more than 42
percent of the Nation's containerized commerce. Additionally,
the Port of Los Angeles is the fourth busiest cruise center in
the United States, and is No. 1 on the West Coast with over 1
million vacationers annually.
At this time in our Nation's history, the Port of Los
Angeles must balance the increasing demand for development and
international trade with critical security requirements.
Without a doubt, as a critical hub for commerce, the Port of
Los Angeles is vital to our Nation's economic well-being.
We take very seriously our responsibility to maximize
security for cargo, people, and property. In the event of an
unforeseen incident, whether caused by outside sources or
natural disasters, it is our responsibility to stay up and
running without delay in order to bolster the national economy.
Since September 11th, we have spent approximately $6
million of our own funds to enhance the port's security. We
have added manpower and equipment resources for our Port
Police. We have spent millions to improve our World Cruise
Center, so it is now a model for efficient and safe passenger
handling for Customs, Immigration, and the cruise line
passengers.
There is, of course, always room for improvement, and we
are no exception. With Federal funding through the TSA's Port
Security Grant Program, we will be more than able to pursue
security enhancements for port facilities and infrastructure
improvements. We have started the process to assess our needs
and to serve as a national and international model for
credentialing inspection systems, but funding is needed to
implement these measures.
Since September 11, 2001, just $92.3 million of $368
million in appropriations has actually been distributed to
ports in the first round of TSA grant funding. During that
initial round of grants, the Port of Los Angeles received only
$1.5 million for a joint grant request with the Port of Long
Beach, despite the fact that we are the busiest port complex in
the Nation.
More is truly needed as our Nation depends on efficient and
safe transportation networks to distribute cargo efficiently
along our trade corridors. The ability to move cargo seamlessly
through the Port of Los Angeles is crucial to the overall
economic vitality of the Nation.
The second round of grants for these funds, which closed
last month, drew requests for nearly $1 billion in
improvements, with only $104 million available. We have a long
way to go. The Port of Los Angeles applied for approximately
$15.5 million. I have provided a detailed list of our proposed
programs with our submitted testimony. The Port of Los Angeles
is not seeking frivolous enhancement. We are, however, seeking
improved security measures through the available Federal
grants.
Security infrastructure and improvements at the Port of Los
Angeles are critical to ensure that the flow of international
trade is maintained at the highest and safest best possible
standards.
Our Nation requires these security enhancements to
safeguard our transportation systems which are dependent upon
international commerce.
A terrorist attack at the port would not only cause havoc
in our region but also seriously affect the maritime trading
system and thus disrupt U.S. and international commerce. As
part of the Nation's largest port complex, we need to receive a
reasonable and appropriate share of the Federal port security
funding. Security funding needs to be based on the potential
consequences of terrorist activities.
Realizing that the safety of southern California's port
system is closely tied to international transportation hubs,
our programming has also extended offshore to our Asian
partners. Focusing on containers, we have instituted measures
to push back our borders to the points of origin for the
millions of containers crossing our docks each year.
Of primary concern was the ability to ensure that a cargo
container hasn't been tampered with at the port of origin or in
transit. We believe that it is a far better approach than
applying maximum security once the container reaches our shores
and it is basically too late.
The Container Safety Initiative, as part of Operation Safe
Commerce, is the vehicle currently being utilized to review the
supply chain of containerized cargo. Operation Safe Commerce is
a $28 million pilot project funded by the Transportation
Security Administration and managed by the U.S. Customs Service
and the Department of Transportation.
Customs officials are being dispatched overseas to Hong
Kong and Singapore, among other ports. The project will provide
security gap analysis and act as a testing ground for a myriad
of technologies. OSC was approved in July 2002.
The port complex of Los Angeles and Long Beach is one of
only three load centers in the Nation chosen to participate in
this unique project. The other participating port complexes are
New York/New Jersey and Seattle/Tacoma. Modern Terminals in
Hong Kong became the first foreign terminal operator to agree
to participate in Operation Safe Commerce with us, and Mayor
Hahn, following his initiative. We anticipate that the Port of
Singapore Authority will sign on as well near in the future.
Sandia National Laboratory is the port's security
consultant for Operation Safe Commerce and is already doing
evaluations here and abroad.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Keller, given the number of witnesses, can
you--I have your written testimony. Can you summarize, sir, in
the remaining time?
Mr. Keller. I certainly can, sir.
Mr. Ose. Thank you.
Mr. Keller. The costs are high, indeed. You understand
that. But we implore you to give us the funding we need. We
don't believe we are not asking for a handout. We are asking
for some help, so we can do with technology and modern tools
what we are currently doing with manpower and sweat and blood
right now.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Keller follows:]
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Mr. Ose. Thank you for your testimony.
We have done some quick math up here. I have doublechecked
it and triplechecked it, which is unusual in a Federal agency.
We are going to come back to the question on funding relative
to the amount of duties that are collected here and what has
been reinvested here by the Federal Government. So make sure we
get back to that question. OK?
Mr. Keller. Certainly.
Mr. Ose. I would like to now recognize Mr. Tim Parker for
the purpose of an opening statement for 5 minutes.
Mr. Parker. Good morning. My name is Timothy Parker. I am
the executive secretary of the Steamship Association of
Southern California, which represents 45 shipping lines and
terminal operators at the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles,
collectively the largest port complex in the United States and
the third largest in the world.
In the way of background, the Steamship Association of
Southern California and the Pacific Merchant Shipping
Association, based in northern California, have recently voted
to merge to form one united organization representing shipping
companies throughout California. Collectively, under the name
of the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association, we believe that
we will be even better able to meet the challenges we face in
the evolving environment at the local, State, and Federal
levels.
One of these challenges is clearly security. We greatly
appreciate your invitation to appear before you. We would like
to share some of our insights on how we can all work together
to enhance port security and ways that seem insecure at this
time.
My brief presentation is framed around four core themes.
What are shipping companies doing today? How are the cities,
counties, and State of California assisting us? What can the
Federal Government do to enhance these efforts? And, what are
the economic ramifications?
First, I would like to state that while shipping companies
are ready, willing, and able to support and assist the
government to protect our ports, we cannot act as government
functionaries. We cannot, for example, perform law enforcement
activities, such as patrolling the waters around the ports. We
can, on the other hand, control access to our terminals and
facilities.
Current measures include increased security at terminal
gates and vessel gangways to verify both cargo and personnel
movement. These additional costs are borne by shipping
companies and terminal operators.
We have made numerous upgrades to computer systems at every
terminal to meet the new regulations of the Customs 24-Hour
Rule. This cost is now part of the overall transportation cost
to a consumer. We work directly with the Coast Guard in the Sea
Marshall Program, which provides the escorted vessels to dock
areas.
As representatives for the ports of Los Angeles and Long
Beach have indicated, they are collectively spending
significant portions of their revenue for additional port
police, security equipment, port infrastructure, including
cargo inspections, identification, and security systems.
At the same time, these are tough times for State and local
agencies. There is a growing temptation for local government to
cost-shift more obligations onto private shipping and
stevedoring concerns for basic port operations. State and local
governments are also imposing more regulatory conditions on
port operations, some of which may actually divert resources
from port security.
A proposed $1 billion bond measure would secure $200
million for port security, with a significant amount targeted
for southern California. There, however, are no immediate
fixes, nor approval of this bond measure.
While the Federal Government has taken a lead role in
securing our harbors, there is more it can do. I have to
commend the leadership of the U.S. Coast Guard for running what
I think is the best command in the United States. The random
boarding of vessels and unannounced inspections, among other
measures, are crucial steps. U.S. Customs Service and
Immigration and Naturalization Service have also been very
supportive of efforts to keep our facilities secure.
The focus and attention of each of these Federal agencies
is crucial, since the shipping companies and terminal operators
cannot perform Federal functions, whether it is patrolling the
waters, inspecting cargo, or checking the identification of
seafarers.
That said, there are two areas where the Federal Government
can provide the necessary leadership. First, it should fully
fund the activities of government agencies to provide port
security in a comprehensive and effective manner.
Second, it should ensure, by Federal preemption where
necessary, that operating requirements and restrictions imposed
by State and local governments are consistent with the goals of
the overall port security. The U.S. Coast Guard, for example,
should be given authority to ensure that State and local
mandates are consistent with enhanced port security.
There has been much discussion at both port and Federal and
State levels of applying some of the cost of added security to
the cost of cargo or transportation. As an industry, we believe
that fees placed on cargo or goods movement would have a
disastrous effect on both the regional economy and broader
economic objectives of the United States.
I thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Parker follows:]
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Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Parker.
Our next witness is Mr. John Ochs, who joins us from
Maersk. Thank you for joining us. You are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Ochs. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am John Ochs,
representing Maersk SeaLand. Maersk SeaLand sails a fleet of
250 ships, owns 1 million containers, and manages 13 terminals
here in the United States.
We salute the effort of the Federal Government to secure
our Nation against terrorism. I am pleased to report that
Maersk was the very first ocean carrier to become certified
under C-TPAT, the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.
We are also active participants with both the container
security goals and the Operation Safe Commerce.
Maersk supports the intent of the Maritime Transportation
Security Act and is prepared to comply with the MTSA and the
related Federal interim rules expected to be promulgated this
summer. A review of the pending regulations has produced some
concerns that I would like to bring to your attention this
morning.
These issues are generic to every waterfront facility,
including refineries, powerplants, and ferry terminals.
Although we do not represent our peers in the container
industry--who are also our competitors--we are confident that
they would agree with our observations.
The key point for your consideration, sir, is the basic
concept that port security must be a true partnership between
the government and the maritime transportation community. We
each have different roles, because we each have different
responsibilities, jurisdiction, and legal authority.
Over the last year, prudent measures have been implemented
to control access into waterfront facilities. As a waterfront
facility operator, we can inspect personnel and vehicles as a
condition of entry into our terminal. But, our employees do not
have the power to detain or arrest, and, clearly, do not have
the legal authority to actually search a vehicle as is
suggested by the pending regulations. Further, we lack the
special equipment and dogs required to actually detect
potential explosives.
The pending regulations imply that each waterfront facility
should deploy their own fleet of security boats. We do not
conduct patrols on the public roads outside of our property
line and should not be expected to conduct waterside security
operations on public waterways next to our terminals. We do not
have the legal authority to police the navigable waters of the
United States.
The regulations also suggest that each terminal have their
own staff of divers to inspect pier structures prior to the
arrival of a vessel. The detection of underwater explosives is
a national defense mission performed by the military, or a
counterterrorism activity conducted by a very few police
departments with specially trained dive teams. Clearly, this
responsibility cannot be deferred to civilian resources.
As a commercial enterprise, we do not enjoy the
government's certain sovereign immunity, and, therefore, cannot
be expected to conduct either law enforcement or military
operations. In fact, if these responsibilities are thrust upon
us, we doubt that any facility would be able to obtain property
or liability insurance.
The Maersk SeaLand container terminal here in Los Angeles
is the largest container terminal in the world. It is protected
by the Los Angeles Port Police, the Coast Guard, and the other
Federal agencies reporting to the new Department of Homeland
Security. These agencies are staffed by dedicated professionals
who train and operate as a unified team. They comprise the
finest law enforcement and port security cadre in this Nation.
The $8 billion--I want to repeat that, $8 billion--in
Federal funds used to protect our airports should serve as the
benchmark for additional resources that our local agencies
require to enhance their capabilities to secure this
economically strategic harbor.
In conclusion, some of the pending Federal regulations blur
the line between commercial responsibilities and government
duties. We hope you will agree that any mandate to actually
conduct searches or to patrol public waterways must be
performed by a government agency that is staffed with the
trained personnel, the proper equipment, and the legal
jurisdiction and actual authority to arrest potential
terrorists, identify contraband, and detect explosives.
I appreciate the opportunity to share our concerns with you
here this morning about how these regulations will impact the
security of our Nation's strategic commercial seaports. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention to the critical issues
regarding the partnership between the maritime industry and the
government.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ochs follows:]
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Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Ochs. I appreciate your sharing
with us your testimony.
Our next witness is Mr. Rob Marshall-Johns who is the
director of operations and quality control of Oppenheimer Co.
Thank you for joining us. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Thank you, Congressman Ose, thank you
to the committee for the opportunity to testify here today. The
Oppenheimer Group is an international marketer of produce, with
our imports into the United States and Canada.
The security rules and requirements, we believe, must be
collaborative in nature on an international basis. We see that
the requirements for U.S. and foreign port security should be
centered around recommendations on a systematic approach for
inclusion in the global or international port security--for
example, through the International Maritime Organization, as a
branch of the United Nations.
U.S. Federal agencies should be focused more on an auditing
role. This will allow individual countries and ports
flexibility due to individual physical requirements, laws and
requirements, similar in content to the C-TPAT, of which we are
a member.
The focus, as it has been outlined in the proposal, shall
be based on three areas, and this is important for facility
security. At the present moment, the U.S. Coast Guard is
adequately controlling or monitoring vessel security. We see
that any new rules or regulations must be consistent across all
agencies. For example, the 24-Hour Rule for U.S. Customs and
the proposed FDA Bioterrorism Act have similar requirements, as
far as presentation of information prior to arrival. However,
there are inconsistencies in how that information is to be
delivered, and, therefore, this is adding extra costs to the
exporter, in particular.
Port security. Again, we have been doing this for the
consistency required in terms of mandated requirements, and
this has been left up to the individual port facilities to
undertake. We see that the role of Federal agencies should be
an auditing or monitoring role in assuring that these
requirements are met.
Facility and port security. We have to investigate the
restrictions of access to certain areas at certain times,
whether its locked-downs during lunch breaks, or whether its
restrictions of personnel to specific parts of the facility.
Personnel security needs to be improved, and we have heard a
lot about the transportation workers identification cards, the
pilot program that is now about to be implemented in the port
of Philadelphia.
BC. Background checks and ID cards are an absolute
necessity. For instance, in the trucking industry, we see a
need for the same. This is part of the total transport network
that is involved in the ports. The screening and monitoring of
cargo going into and out of their ports must be checked on a
random basis.
The cargo identification and screening, under the U.S.
Customs 24-Hour Rule, we believe, is far too restrictive on the
produce industry. The requirement is now 24 hours' advance
notice prior to loading. Based on climate, based on the
perishable nature of products, there should be some way that
you would get some latitude here.
We believe that U.S. Customs screening, which is required
now, should be included as part of the previously discussed
international standards, we should see random screening in the
ports of loading, and also random screening at the ports of
discharge. The costs can be excessive, and they must be spread
across the whole community.
At the moment, we are seeing charges of anywhere between
$100 and $800 per container charged to the exporter for each
screening. We believe that perhaps we should be looking at a
surcharge across all cargo. The transportation security cards,
as I was saying, we need to ensure that anybody who has access
to any of our port facilities across this Nation and perhaps
internationally is carrying them.
We see that product security is an important part of trying
to defend and ensure that the supply of food to the consumer is
not in any way jeopardized, and that we've tried to strengthen
it. We see this in the protocols that we have developed for our
own internal use--for our own company and for all of our
service providers and suppliers this is something that we have
now--we're not forcing, but we're requesting that they adhere
to.
Just in closing, September 11th changed our lives forever,
and I think we, as a community feel, the cost of security is
for everybody to be involved. It can't be loaded on one person.
It can't be loaded on one company. And, whether it comes
through from Federal agencies, taxes, whatever way, the
consumer is going to end up paying. Security is the
responsibility of us all, and it should be proactive versus
reactive in nature.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Marshall-Johns follows:]
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Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Marshall-Johns.
I want to come back to the protocols that you mentioned,
but I would like to examine them, so don't let us get away
without coming to those, OK?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Sure.
Mr. Ose. Ms. Williams, we appreciate your coming. Stephanie
Williams joins us as the vice president of the California
Trucking Association. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Williams. Thank you. Good morning, and thank you for
inviting the California Trucking Association to this hearing.
We appreciate being participants in this and want to continue
being participants as this moves along.
We, of course, are most concerned of the landside
operation, and I think, as you look at the ports, especially in
California, the landside has been ignored for a very long time,
and it has caused lots of conflict with communities, with the
trucking industry, in general, in the State of California.
We have actually had a number of bills move forward on
security in California that may conflict with what is happening
federally, and we are hoping that the Federal Government would
preempt and make consistent the protocols for all ports. Either
way, they would include what California has done but in a way
that is fair to the ports in California from a competitive side
versus those on the East Coast.
There was initially, a bill passed, S.P. 1257, by the
Senate Transportation Chair Murray that requires trucks moving
interstate/intrastate loads to lock their facilities with some
particular lock right now. So this particular bill is going to
have far-reaching impacts on interstate trucking.
There are 1.8 million intrastate/interstate trucks allowed
to come into California registered in the IRP. There are only
207,000 intrastate trucks registered here. Some of the things
that are happening in California with respect to intrastate
loads carried by interstate carriers, they are going to have
far-reaching impacts. So, we would hope that the Federal
Government does step in and prevent some of the things that are
happening as we move along.
The definition of a port facility will have long-lasting
impacts on some of the carriers located near the port
facilities. There are trucking companies that have facilities
on port operations, and it would make sense for a trucking
company to be held to a port security protocol, because they
truly are moving freight and moving boxes from point A to point
B. So, we would like that to be considered when rules are
coming down.
Our biggest concern is the background check and the
credentialing. Although we feel supportive that it is a good
time to do that, if you look at the land-side facilities you
imagine that there are more trucking people, drivers, moving
through those facilities than probably port people moving
through those facilities. You really can see that the problems
can come from both sides.
The number of drivers and the type of drivers that we have
at our port facilities, we really need to be considerate of
congestion and people standing around with idle time. There is
really a lot more concern on the land side that we see that is
worth being addressed that is being addressed on the port side.
When a big ship comes in, there are a lot of people that
handle that one big ship. Just on the land side you have got
12,000 people interfacing on the streets and at the terminal
gates. It is a time when you need to look at how much the
trucking industry should interface in the port side, and should
we even be inside the ports? Should we stop at the gate and
remain there, and let the port people handle what is on the
inside of the port and the truck people handle the outside land
side?
There are lots of things that could be considered here,
but, on a safety side, there are more trucking individuals
operating inside port facilities right now than port employees.
Our comments go through our concerns on credentialing, and
the American Trucking Association and California Trucking
Association have a common interest in this. The background
checks, we want to see them done once. There is a lot of
duplication between aviation imports, hazardous materials
credentialing, explosives, goods for the Department of Defense,
carrying those, border crossings.
I think the worst-case scenario is Florida, which has 14
ports, 14 credentials, 14 background checks, and I am sure the
FBI is not very happy with them. It is costly, it is
duplicative, and it seems like we could just come up with one
really good credential and that would apply to everybody, and
we could have periodic checks where you could make sure that
something hasn't gone wrong.
The disqualifying criteria: we have a driver shortage. It
is difficult to find drivers that want to work in the ports
because of the conditions. We don't want to have the drivers we
have disqualified, so we would like to be more involved in
that. We would like to see what it is that would possibly
disqualify a driver.
It is very arbitrary to us, and there is too much
delegation to the Secretary, meaning that the disqualifying
standard is if the Secretary determines the applicant poses a
security risk. We would like that defined and possibly have the
criteria defined, and then the security can disqualify it after
one of the criteria were met. Just so we would have a better
idea what we could expect from our drivers.
We would like to see the background check tied to the
credentialing card just done once, possibly have that card be
in lieu of the hazardous waste and hazardous materials; have
those put together, combined.
I think the most important part is we want to be at the
table, because there are more people interfacing on the truck
side at the ports right now than are on the marine side. But
for some reason, we are just not at the table. I think we have
a lot to bring to this as far as safety for the ports, as far
as safety for the communities, as far as safety for the State
of California.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Williams follows:]
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Mr. Ose. Thank you, Ms. Williams, for joining us today.
The next witness comes to us as a senior liaison to the
ports of L.A. and Long Beach from the International Longshore
and Warehouse Union. It is Dr. Domenick Miretti.
Dr. Miretti, before I recognize you, I want to extend to
you and your colleagues in the union here, the appreciation of
the Members of Congress. It is little known, but it is a fact
that after September 11th, in the face of great uncertainty as
to what other threats or dangers existed, the longshoremen took
upon themselves a conscious decision to go back on the docks
and load commerce, and we are grateful.
And, for no other reason, I mean, I want to say to you and
your colleagues that this country and this Congress is grateful
for your colleagues' willingness to do that blind, purely
blind.
You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Dr. Miretti. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your
generous remarks and for including organized labor as a part of
this hearing and for asking me to speak on their behalf.
Because labor is involved in numerous maritime activities,
we have a wide range of port security concerns. For those
additional issues too numerous to mention, please see our
written testimony.
The smuggling of weapons of mass destruction in containers
through our ports is labor's worst nightmare. Those containers
that are empty provide the easiest, most logical hiding place.
Labor believes that therein the soft underbelly of port
security.
In the congressional subcommittee report, the ILWU put
forth a program based on standardized procedures for inspecting
empty containers. Under this plan, dock workers would inspect
empty containers. Container seals would also be checked to
ensure that they haven't been tampered or altered. This ILWU
proposal is in keeping with the minimum criteria for a model
port as set forth in the Graham Commission on Port Security.
An additional area of concern is with those individuals
entering marine terminals. Included in this group are truckers,
contractors, vendors, or any occasional port visitor. Their
arrival and departure must be more closely scrutinized.
Recently, a trucker was given clearance to enter a containment
facility. Once in the yard, two individuals hiding in the
truck's sleeper proceeded to strip yard equipment for spare
parts. They were apprehended, but this raises the question, how
secure are the terminal gates?
The ILWU has proposed the creation of holding areas where
truckers could drop off and pick up containers near terminal
gates. These secured holding areas would not only limit the
number of truckers in a terminal, but would also expedite the
flow of cargo.
Organized labor working on the docks is also concerned
about security force management and practices. The ILWU
advocates minimum men and training standards for security
personnel at local seaports. Presently, security guards at
marine terminals have little or no training in crime or
terrorist detection, prevention, or what course of action must
be followed should a terrorist attack occur.
Unfortunately, some local port security guards with
invaluable on-the-job experience are being replaced by a less
expensive work force. When workers are paid a living wage, they
provide a dependable and responsible work force. Low-paid
security officers become a revolving work force creating
weakness in port security.
If and when a terrorist event does occur, port contingency
plans will take effect. But, unfortunately, individual workers
don't have a clue as to what they should do. Final instructions
will be broad and general in nature, and will vary from
terminal and terminal. What is needed is a worker port
readiness plan. Once implemented, port readiness exercises will
be conducted with total worker involvement.
In order for this plan to work, there must be a centralized
and integrated communication system that ties together all port
terminals. Should a terrorist event occur, all facilities could
then act in unison.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the level of security at which
our ports will ultimately function will be driven in large part
by port productivity and the cost involved in funding anti-
terrorist measures. Industry's ability to increase revenues is
critical in their staying competitive.
Unfortunately, as security measures are increased, most
often, productivity levels decrease. New anti-terrorist
technology and more on-the-job worker involvement could, and
should, play a crucial role in keeping our ports safe, secure,
and productive.
Three critical questions still beg to be answered. One,
what realistic level of funding will be required to develop
best practices and basic principles for marine terminal
security? Second, is such an effort affordable or too costly to
achieve? And, third, how involved or committed will the Federal
Government be in funding port security programs and badly
needed infrastructure improvements around our ports?
Mr. Chairman, hopefully, you can help provide us with an
answer to my last question.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miretti follows:]
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Mr. Ose. Thank you, Dr. Miretti.
All right. The way we are going to proceed here is that
each of the Members on the dais here, in a systematic manner,
will be given 5 minutes to ask questions. We will have as many
rounds as the Members wish to ask questions of the witnesses.
The questions may range far afield, but they are all adjoining.
To the extent that there are questions and we are running
out of time in terms of our scheduled period in this room, we
have the opportunity to submit written questions to you, in
which case we would appreciate timely responses back. That is
the purpose of leaving the record open.
The order we are going to proceed is I will go first, then
the vice chairman of the subcommittee will proceed, and then we
will go to Mr. Rohrabacher and then Ms. Harman, and we will
just repeat that process over and over. If a Member has no
questions, then they pass.
With that, we will proceed.
My primary interest in this is, what is the worst-case
scenario that the citizens of commerce would be as exposed to
in a port security incident? I am going to proceed from my
right to my left here. Dr. Miretti, how do you view that
question? What is the worst-case scenario? What are we
confronted with here?
Dr. Miretti. The worst-case scenario I believe would be a
situation where security might be breached, some type of weapon
of mass destruction does find its way into the port, a bomb
could be detonated, some kind of chemical warfare could be
used, something of that sort.
So it would not only be devastating to life and limb, but
it could be catastrophic in terms of shutting down the port.
Congresswoman Harman indicated the devastation that would incur
in terms of the national economy. So that there, not just loss
of life and limb, could occur but could help bring the economy
of the United States to its knees.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Ochs, one of the things that we hear about in
Congress is blockading a port, or sanctions on perhaps some of
the other countries in the world that the United Nations puts
in. Could a ship be dropped in the entry to a port, and thereby
just block it? And, if that happened, how long would it take to
clear the channel?
Mr. Ochs. I think folks look back on the incident with the
USS Cole and think that a similar situation could occur here
and shut down the port. I guess, to give you a brief answer,
sir, the Cole is a small ship. A small ship could be sunk in
the channel here. I think a small ship could be cleared in a
matter of days.
A large ship, like most of the container ships are and the
tanker ships are, are literally unsinkable. And, if you think
back to the experience you had in the Persian Gulf in 1988,
where the Gulf was mined after the USS Princeton was literally
broken in half by a mine, the Navy ships followed the tankers
through the Persian Gulf.
So a USS Cole-type strike against a merchant ship, in my
opinion, is unlikely because it would be unsuccessful. Just
from the structural nature of the merchant ship, from the sheer
size of the ship, and the fact that a container ship, because
it is full of steel boxes, is essentially multi-hulled.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Keller, do you agree with him?
Mr. Keller. I do, Mr. Chairman. We have examined this at
some length. It is one of the worst scenarios that anybody
could face. But, in examining it in great detail, as Mr. Ochs
says, the types of ships that we have here, the large nature
and the target types that would be afforded, are essentially--I
wouldn't say unsinkable but certainly have the capability of
being maneuvered out of the way rather than create some kind of
inert blockage.
Adding to that, we have also made sure that we have
standing contracts with people with heavy lift equipment with
the ability to move these ships as quickly as possible to
reopen our channels.
Mr. Ose. Congressman Janklow, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Janklow. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
If I could, Mr. Keller, in your testimony, you list several
things that you have requested funding for there on the second
page. Starting with construction of a high-risk container
inspection facility, and ending with a security assessment for
$300,000. Are these in your order of priority, or are they just
listed on there?
Mr. Keller. I don't believe they are in a list of priority.
Mr. Janklow. Something really bothers me. It is a practical
thing. Are you saying that for $15 million, in the estimation
of you and your team, you can make this port adequately secure?
Or is this just a round of funding that you are looking for?
Mr. Keller. This is a round of funding, Governor. These are
some of the most important things that we see right off the
top. As I said in my testimony a few minutes ago, we really
need to get beyond using people to do things that technology
can do better, so we can redeploy our people.
Mr. Janklow. I notice that everyone wants to be at the
table. Has labor been at the table? Has the trucking industry
been at the table? Have the private shippers been at the table?
Has the shipping association been at the table? Have all of
these people been at the table, as you folks were preparing
your plans for what is necessary to make this port secure?
Mr. Keller. I am not certain that there is a single table.
I mean, we have all dealt with multi-agencies at various
levels.
Mr. Janklow. I am not so sure I know what that means.
Mr. Keller. Well, we tend to be very maritime-focused. So
we have certainly been at the table with labor and the shipping
companies. I think the trucking companies probably deal with it
at a little different level of Federal and State officials and
have probably been at that table.
Mr. Janklow. How do you get this stuff out of your port,
once it comes in on a ship or a boat?
Mr. Keller. Truck and rail.
Mr. Janklow. Pardon me?
Mr. Keller. Truck and rail, basically.
Mr. Janklow. Has rail and trucking been at the table with
you?
Mr. Keller. They have been at various venues, but not at
all the same.
Mr. Janklow. How many different law enforcement agencies
are there that you deal with that have different communication
systems?
Mr. Keller. Myriad. I could begin listing them, but in
terms of the communication systems, there is probably two or
three. I think we have, in this area, certainly come a long way
to harmonizing those.
Mr. Janklow. Mr. Ochs, in your testimony you talk about the
Maritime Security Act and the things that you like about it,
and that you generally support it. With respect to the doing
the security things, you assume that, for example, you want to
be watchman, but you don't have the power to arrest them, you
are not looking for the power to arrest. It is not your job to
go around and figure out what are explosives and those types of
things.
Mr. Keller, do you agree with that?
Mr. Keller. I do, Governor. I think that is exactly right,
and it is particularly pertinent here, because we are what you
call a landlord port, and we don't operate. But, for instance,
we do have our own police force. We do have a dive team with
that police force, and we work very cooperatively with Federal
agencies who do the waterside and some landside enforcement as
well.
Mr. Janklow. Mr. Marshall-Johns in your testimony you talk
about the programs that your company has implemented. When you
talk about employee security, you say that you do background
checks for ship crew and others appropriate, but you do a
screening process for temporary employees. Why should there be
a difference between temporary employees and full-time
employees?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. The background checks and screening are
carried out on all employees, particularly the full time
employees. They are undertaken on all employees that have any
possible safety contact with the product, and the concern was--
--
Mr. Janklow. But, they all have some background check, all
of those who have contact with the product?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Yes, they do.
Mr. Janklow. OK. So we are looking at the difference, then,
between temporary and full-time in that respect.
Mr. Marshall-Johns. In that respect, no.
Mr. Janklow. Why would you need to use the logs
meticulously? Wouldn't that be an after-the-fact thing that
would help you?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. It is part of precautions that we
consider that security is knowing who has been in a facility at
what times.
Mr. Janklow. My time is about up, but I have one more
question for you, sir. You say, ``Our personnel are trained to
be vigilant for signs of unusual behavior among peers.'' Could
you tell me how you train people for that? What would the
training modality be for training people to be vigilant for
unusual behavior among peers?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. What that involves is just being
cognizant of what has happened and what has consistently
happened around you at all times.
Mr. Janklow. Do you hold classes for that?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Yes, we do. Internally, we hold
classes. We hold our own training sessions as part of our
safety and security program.
Mr. Janklow. Well, I am talking about goofy behavior of
others. I am just wondering what kind of class you would hold
to look for unusual behavior among peers. Before the witness
answers, I just want to remind you that this is Congress you
are talking to. [Laughter.]
Mr. Marshall-Johns. It is a matter of just being logical
and a matter of just being observant of what is happening
around you. That is the key thing. Especially with new
employees, the younger employees, it is a matter of just
identifying where a particular risk could be.
Mr. Janklow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Congressman.
Congressman Rohrabacher for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. Obviously, there are
some things that we can do--watch out for goofy behavior,
etc.--that will not be costly, but other things seem to be very
costly.
In your testimony, you suggested that, if I heard you
correctly, that it would cost $800 per container to have the
proper inspection of containers.
Mr. Marshall-Johns. That price would be in some ports for
the Customs screening of containers would be charged, depending
on the freight and the location, and it would be from $100 to
$800 per container for the screening.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So $100 to $800?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Not $800. That is your maximum cost?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. That is the maximum cost.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And, that is at the current level of
technology when you are doing it on a very manual basis?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Correct.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. OK. I got you.
We have discussed a lot of issues here, and there have been
a lot of great suggestions, which I hope that there is a method
of following up on some of the suggestions. I know from the
trucking industry, you just had a whole lot of good things.
I want to know how we are going to be sure that we just
don't listen to this, that we do something about it. I think
your idea is also--I mean, a lot of it stems from the fact that
you are going to have a new standard in terms of where the
truckers were and where the truckers weren't.
That is a very interesting approach as well, and so I am
going to be watching this very closely and working with you.
Please feel free to call me at my office, and we will see what
we can do to implement some of these specific suggestions.
And, that would be true, for the others, except of course,
you weren't just asking for money. A lot of people are just
asking for money. You are asking for a change in the way we do
things. I think that we have to handle every one of those type
of recommendations that we can, and we also have to know, in
terms of spending money, I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that,
if we spend money, it has to be in the beginning. We have to
spend the money in a way that will help us come to grips with
the worst-case scenario, which you, Mr. Chairman, had the panel
outline. So what is it going to cost us to handle this worst-
case scenario? What will we have to do? The worst-case scenario
being someone trying to smuggle into the United States a
chemical/biological weapon or a nuclear weapon.
We have to have the technology necessary and the system
established that will handle that worst-case scenario without
major delays box-side. OK?
We have heard the suggestion for overseas inspection as a
part of the new way we organize things. Again, that may not be
a major expense, but it may be a change in the way we do
things. In terms of inspection on the dock, it won't cost $800
a container, because we will try to--we have to develop a
system, and probably using technology where containers can be
scanned as they are being taken off a boat. By the time it
reaches the dock, that has already been taken care of.
We are a people, a bright people, and we should be able to
develop that technology. That, however, will be costly. Let me
note, again, these things are costly and will cost money. We
should do the things that we can do without costing money. The
things we need to pay money for, we should try to find new
sources of revenue.
Again, sorry to disagree with your testimony, the very best
way to do that is through a container fee that will permit
people overseas to make a contribution, the people who are
using the containers and using the system that we are
developing, to sell their products, rather than simply taxing
the American people in order to come up with the revenue that
lets people overseas make money through using our ports.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Ose. I thank the gentleman.
I am pleased to recognize the Congresswoman from San Pedro
and the surrounding areas, Congresswoman Harman, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to apologize to
you and others that I have to leave shortly to return to the
hydrogen event that Congressman Rohrabacher alluded to previous
to this.
But, first, I want to mention to Mr. Keller that--I think
you know this--Congressman Rohrabacher and I are supporting
your request for approximately $15.5 million additional for a
command-and-control center, a new screening facility, and an ID
credentialing system. We were happy to send a letter together,
this is true bipartisanship, in support of that request last
week. I appreciate the input of the Coast Guard, by the way, in
making sure that we understood what was needed.
I thought the testimony was very good. I particularly want
to commend Ms. Williams for the way she comes at these
problems. First of all, I learned a lot about trucking that I
didn't know. What I liked about her testimony is that she said,
``Here is the problem, and here is a suggested solution.''
Perhaps it is my advanced age and depleted brain cells, but it
is really refreshing to hear somebody come up with some new
ideas and suggested solutions, and so I commend you for that.
I also want to say to you, Dr. Miretti, that it is great to
see you, and that I think that the comments made by our
chairman about the role that ILWU had right after September
11th are correct, and I want to associate myself with him. I
thought that was very considerate of him and appropriate of him
to say that.
Dr. Miretti. If I may respond, I would like to thank you
very much. You played a very active role with the ILWU. In
fact, I had the pleasure of serving on a maritime advisory
committee with you 8 years ago. Thank you very much for your
involvement.
Ms. Harman. Well, you are welcome. I am glad that we had a
happy outcome, some months back, to that lockout situation. It
put that before us again as kind of the idea of what it would
be like if we truly had a terrorist attack here. It would be
like that times 10, and that is what we should keep in mind
when we talk about worst case.
Let me just ask one question. I think Congressman
Rohrabacher is right that it is not only about money. I think
you all agree with that. No matter how much money we provide
here, there are things that money can't pay for. It can't pay
for courage. It can't pay for a cooperative spirit. It can't
pay for true, creative innovation. It can buy stuff, but the
creative ideas have to come from folks who truly apply
themselves and think up new systems and technologies and
programs and ways to share. So we can't buy all that stuff, and
I think he is right about that.
I also think that there are things the Federal Government
can do other than provide money, including help you bring best
practices within the ports, provide for an integrated system of
port security across the country, because I think we all get
it, that even if we made these ports 99 percent secure, there
is no such thing as 100 percent security.
The Port of Oakland, if it were not secure, would be an
easy way for the bad stuff to get here anyway. So port security
isn't port security unless there's an integrated system of port
security.
The last comment, and I am just going to ask you for your
reflections on what I am saying. What have you heard with these
congressional people who have odd behavior--I'm trying to think
about ways in which we can add value, in addition to paying for
things. But, this whole notion of pushing borders outward, it
does seem to me that, in addition to money, Congress, the
Federal Government, through negotiation with foreign
governments, can help push the borders outward, can make
certain that foreign countries, points of embarkation, do what
they are supposed to do to ensure that the cargo going into
containers is safe, that those containers are inspected and
hopefully sealed in some fashion so that we know what is coming
along and don't have to inspect it offshore, don't have to
worry about it offshore or onshore or on trucks or on rail.
My light is going off. If someone has a response to this, I
wish you would make it briefly, so that I don't take any extra
time.
Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for letting me participate.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Congresswoman Harman. Does somebody
have a response?
Mr. Keller. Congresswoman----
Mr. Ose. Ladies first. We will go to Ms. Williams first.
Ms. Williams. As a newcomer to the congressional side of
this--I always worked in a State--I understand why the world's
biggest--the country's biggest port, L.A./Long Beach complex,
is so far down in the highway moneys.
The communities in your district are bearing the burden.
The trucking industry is congested, and, you know, at high
levels of frustration. But, when it comes time for doling out
highway moneys, we are a donor. We provide the United States--
you talked from Wilmington to Wilmington, why haven't they
provided us the money to build 17?
Mr. Ose. Mr. Keller.
Mr. Keller. I would just like to answer the question about
accessibility of foreign ports. I think the U.S. Government has
done a marvelous job of fashioning agreements in China, Hong
Kong, Singapore, among other countries, overcome sovereignty
issues, privacy issues, and some of the other things, too, and
they really get it as a result of what the government has done.
And, I do applaud Federal resources.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Ochs.
Mr. Ochs. I fully concur with the concept of extending our
borders overseas. Right now we are playing defense. For us to
scan or sniff the box on our dock and realize that we have
something that is ticking or glowing here is bad. We need to
sniff or scan it overseas and fix the problem prior to it
arriving, not just at our port but at any of the ports in North
America.
Your concept about a common approach for all of the ports
in the United States is valid. I would say that it should also
extend to the ports in Canada and Mexico under NAFTA and the
free trade. Lots of the boxes that arrive in those ports end up
here.
Thank you.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Parker.
Mr. Parker. Yes. I think that is money that would be well
spent. Protecting the borders is money well spent. I would much
rather see us put that $100, or whatever fee we want to put on
it, over there to ensure that nothing gets to the gate, rather
than having a fee placed on something once it is inside the
gate.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Marshall-Johns.
Mr. Marshall-Johns. From a Canadian company's perspective,
from the Canadian international perspective, we see this
pushing out the borders as part of a global problem. Terrorism
is a global problem, and pushing the borders out to our
international trading partners is part of trying to resolve the
problem. So, I see that as a possibility and it's often
mentioned in my oral presentation.
Going through the International Maritime Organization as
part of the United Nations is a possible solution. That's one
way of pushing them out, but I see that as a very real need.
Mr. Ose. Dr. Miretti.
Dr. Miretti. Yes. I think pushing the borders out is an
excellent idea. However, I still think that we need to be very
much concerned about what is exported from the United States. A
lot of things can be put in containers prior to being loaded
onto the ship. You can push the borders out all you want to,
but we still have to know what's in the containers here, what
is being exported.
There is an awful lot of non-intrusive kinds of technology
today that might be able to help us with that, and checking
containers, things of that sort. I think we need to be
concerned about what is exported, as well as merchandise that
is being imported.
Mr. Ose. I want to extend the subcommittee's appreciation
for the participation of Congresswoman Harman. It is nice to be
down here visiting your district and the surrounding areas. We
are grateful for your hospitality. Thank you for participating.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ose. One of the issues that we are struggling with--and
I think Ms. Williams talked about it in Florida, in
particular--had to do with every single different port having
their individual identification cards. These are the folks who
have the transportation worker identification credentials. I
call it the TWICs for simplicity's sake.
Mr. Keller, Mr. Ochs put some written comments in asking to
accelerate the development of TWICs. The question I have is: do
you have any concerns about the viability of a standardized
smart card, so to speak, for identification purposes?
Mr. Keller. Mr. Chairman, as I said in my testimony, they
are one of three areas that is now funded to test the prototype
here. I think my greatest concern is the maintaining of the
system once it is begun. As workers move from workplace to
workplace, or from geographical location, or from one transport
profession to another, the updating of the system I think is
crucial. And, in there could lie a possible weakness, if these
things aren't thought through.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Parker, does your enterprise have any input on
this issue?
Mr. Parker. Yes. As a matter of fact, I sit on the
committee that meets out here for the Port of Los Angeles. We
have been exposed not only to what is happening here in the
port but also at the airport. I have a very strong feeling that
the technology that we are moving toward is already there. We
just have to decide what is the best one.
I share Mr. Keller's concern that we have to keep the
database right, and that is a very difficult thing, with a very
large work force and a very transient work force at times.
Today, they can be working at one facility, and tomorrow they
can be working at another. The question is: can we readily
identify who the person is? Does that person belong here, and
do they belong here today? And, those are the issues I think
that are going to be critical to the success of the TWICs.
Mr. Ose. Well, one of the things I have been trying to be
sure I understand is that of the pilot projects, of which one
is here, there are different technologies that are being
attempted to be implemented, the purpose being that we need to
check the efficacy of these against each other.
Is there any indication yet from where you sit that one is
superior to the other?
Mr. Parker. No, not yet. Actually, they just identified,
you know, first of all, where they are going to do it, and they
are going to do it at two container terminals, one in Long
Beach, one in Los Angeles. Those are perhaps harder to control,
but the ones that are really going to be the proof in the
pudding is going to be definitely, how do we deal with that
terminal, with all of the people coming in and out of it?
Now, some of the test cards are going to be blind. The
people won't know it. They will just get a green light when
they go through. They will be able to test and see what it
does, and it will be more sophisticated as we move on.
The fast track that TSA is operating under I think will
come into fast decisions, and we have to get this thing
identified, and then go for a full-scale test of one operating
system.
Mr. Ose. Ms. Williams, you testified that you have probably
more truckers moving around the immediate areas than there are
employees onsite. What input, if any, would you provide us
regarding the TWICs proposal?
Ms. Williams. I don't think we should be in the port
facilities. I think the trucks should be on the land side, and
staff on the land side, and the people inside should be part of
the inside. That would be a number of things because yesterday
many of us were at a funeral for a trucker who was killed
pulling in his truck and another truck hit him. It's just not a
safe environment for us, the untrained or truckers. Education
not only reflects important work conditions, but with
congestion in different areas this becomes more complicated. I
think it is not safe, it is not fair, and I think that security
would be better served by moving this outside.
Mr. Ose. I'm for it, because I have watched waterside and
dockside. I've seen them moving the containers off the vessels
onto the trucks. How do you move a container off the vessel and
unto the truck or have the truck come in----
Ms. Williams. Yes. A train hostler is a smaller piece of
equipment that transports it.
Mr. Ose. So, then you have to pick up the container twice?
Ms. Williams. Well, actually, if you look at what's going
on right now. I have a presentation that, if you come to the
office, we can actually give you. But we move in through the
facility, and we drop them off empty. And then, depending on if
it is the right brand then we put them over there. So then we
would do that and come back and move the container onto the
mounting chassis and we will move to go to the next turn to
pick up a fill and ``Oh this one's messed up.`` Then they will
pick it up and take it over to the maintenance shop.
Mr. Ose. My concern is more related to the person driving
the vehicle. In your testimony before you mentioned ``It's just
a mess.``
Ms. Williams. Right.
Mr. Ose. You mentioned a chain around their neck with 14
parts. The standardization in that it would seem to me a great
deal of eliminating that concern of yours.
Mr. Williams. Right. We don't want to be inside doing this,
doing the land side. We want to pick up something else.
Mr. Ose. Right. Congressman Janklow.
Mr. Janklow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me touch briefly
on what you've seen, Ms. Williams, to all of you. Are there any
of you that feel that when it comes to let's say, an
identification card there shouldn't be a uniform standard? You
all agree that would be one. I assume you all agree there is
some concern by different interests on the panel--and I read
your testimony Ms. Williams--but with respect to the privacy of
this information that is gathered by individuals from a
background security check. Are there any of you that don't have
concerns about a centralized place in the government where this
privacy is guided? You have some concern, don't you? Yes, Mr.
Keller.
Mr. Keller. I think there is a natural concern of having
anybody's personal data reside anywhere. The level of security
and how that is assured is probably our greatest concern.
Mr. Janklow. I don't speak for others when I say this, but
to all of you, but the fact that some of those do have a DWI in
their background may be of keen interest when it comes to
getting a CDI license or a current DWI, a drug conviction in
the past, let us say. But for those things, are there any of
you that feel that those things in and of themselves should
make you a national security risk? I mean, I can't imagine
anybody would suggest that makes you a national security risk.
Mr. Keller. Not at all.
Mr. Janklow. The information that would really be gathered,
and that we would look into as a country, ought to be whether
or not the person that is giving you the ID card is someone
that this Nation can trust, at least not be concerned about
with respect to the security of others in the country. Do you
all agree with that?
The question has come up about Federal corruption, and I
would like to think I am probably the last of the Federalists.
Do you agree that--and maybe this is targeted toward you, Ms.
Williams. In your testimony, you talk about the fact that there
may be Federal corruption with respect to identification cards.
Do you disagree with that Mr. Keller--and I hear that, because
you are operating the facility around here, so you focus on the
other side?
Mr. Keller. No, I don't disagree at all, Congressman. Part
of the reason that I say that is that as this situation has
gone on from September 11th, and people get frustrated, they
see, you know, very little visible progress in the area of
securing our facilities.
They tend to introduce legislation at State/local levels,
as well as Federal, and the fact is there should really only be
one standard. There should only be one national standard by
which these things are done. There should be flexibility within
those, so that it accounts for local conditions. But I think
Federal preemption is absolutely necessary.
Mr. Janklow. If I can take, in a spare moment, the question
I asked in your comments. When it comes to the plan, our
standards if I can use it that way, our protocols that are
necessary for defending the ports, if we do have some national
standards and then a lot of things that are done by each port
themselves call it semi-sovereignce. Or, we can have a pretty
rigid set of national standards that courts have to follow with
things that they could voluntarily add to that.
Are there any of you that are opposed to the latter? Go
ahead, Mr. Parker.
Mr. Parker. Thank you.
Mr. Janklow. Do you understand what I am getting at?
Mr. Parker. I do. I do understand. Yes, I do believe that
there should be some very, very rigid Federal standards,
because the law wants to say every transportation worker,
that's me, that's Mr. Keller, that is--and I am not just
talking about workers. I am talking about the whole system of
defense.
But, at the same time, let us say that because the State of
California decides it wants to do something, I am concerned
about the overall effect on the economy of southern California
if we say, for example, we are going to have a modified,
enriched TWICs program that has a separate database, costs
more, costs $15 million a year, and that has to somehow flow
into the cargo and flow back to the shipper, or they may choose
to go somewhere else.
And so, we don't have trucks showing up at our front door,
because there would be no cargo. Clearly, there will always be
cargo in southern California, but, we would like to see it be
as much as it always has been.
Mr. Janklow. Thank you.
Dr. Miretti. If I might respond to that. Thank you. Mr.
Congressman, you indicated at some point that we were asking
the question about individual concerns about information that
might be gathered about someone. I think there is a certain
amount of concern on the part of workers. First of all, I think
a worker would be very concerned about the confidentiality of
that information.
Something else that might be of concern to the worker is,
how might that information be used? Could it be used, for
example, to terminate some individual's employment? Would it
infringe, for example, on an individual's civil liberties? Just
thinking off the top of my head.
As a recommendation, let's just say that post September
11th, or excuse me, pre-September 11th, I had developed a
geopolitical interest in the Middle East. Let's just say that I
had subscribed to a Taliban publication, attended some of their
meetings simply to gain an understanding as an academician of
what might be happening in that particular region.
If there was a background check, would that send up a red
flag? Would I be suspect, for example? So I think there is a
certain amount of concern in that particular regard.
I've owned a Coast Guard identification card that was
issued in 1969. I was a bit concerned when I filled out the
application for this particular card because of the questions
that were asked. Have you ever read any of these publications?
Have you ever attended any of these meetings? Do you belong to
any of these organizations? How many times did you contribute
to Harry Bridge's deportation defense?
Did that send up a red flag? Would that be of concern?
These are the kind of concerns that I have. I am not against
the TWICS kind of program, but I think we have to be very sure
of how that program is developed, how it is implemented, and
who is involved in that program, and what happens to that
information. Thank you Congressman.
Mr. Ose. Congressman Rohrabacher for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to leave
after this. Thank you very much, Tim, for your leadership. I
appreciate the opportunity to participate. I also appreciate
the fact that you are here in this area focusing on these ports
and what we can do to make them safer, more secure, and at the
same time not injure the effectiveness of the ports in doing
the job that they have to do.
By the way, I would hope that some of you went to a--some
sort of a school in Iran or Libya or someplace like that. I
would hope that they are investigated and that we know that
they are not engaged in activities that could put us at risk.
There is certainly some concern for people's privacy, but we
really have to be concerned right now, because we know that
there are people out there who have a grudge against the United
States, simply for our way of life and they want to hurt us.
And so, I think it will take a high level of goodwill and
cooperation on the part of all of us to, you know, overcome
these challenges.
You asked a question earlier about why we don't get our
share of the highway money. One of the first things I was
approached on when they redistricted me into this area, again
was how we need to change--put so much money into changing the
710 freeway or, you know, redoing it in a way.
Frankly, again, this is going to demonstrate what I meant
by there are things you can do that will make things safer,
make these ports safer, and make it more effective without
having to spend large amounts of money.
When I went to the 710 Freeway to check on this, I found it
to be absolutely vacant. There was no one on the freeway. I was
told, ``Oh, my gosh, the freeway is totally crowded, and you
can't--`` of course, I was there at 1 a.m. [Laughter.]
However, we have a freeway that is totally vacant and
available to use, a huge asset that is available to use at that
time of the morning. The Union would have to pay more money to
work an overtime shift. That is why we don't have a 24-hour
port. They can pay more money.
Why not pay a little more money to do an overnight shift?
If an overnight shift is going to be a little bit more of a
hardship on somebody, which it is, you pay them a little more
money, and then do it, for Pete's sakes. I think we need to
have some very serious and frank talks with one another about
what specifically we can do to change the way things are
operated. You give a lot of great suggestions. We have heard a
lot of good suggestions today that will make it better.
We have to figure out what exactly we have to spend in
order to at least bring down our vulnerability on our No. 1
scenario that we would hope to avert, which is some sort of
mass chemical weapon or weapon of mass destruction being
brought into the port.
So with that, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
benefited by everything that is here, and I am looking forward
to working with all of you to see if maybe we can have some
sort of big pow-wow and come up with a list of those things
that we all agree on how to restructure the way things are
done, and then go about doing it.
So, you know, I am here to help. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ose. I would like to add my thanks to Congressman
Rohrabacher for his hospitality here. He is a source of great
influence and information for those of us in Congress who don't
have large ports that are such academic engines. You serve the
district well.
We are grateful for your attendance this morning. Thank
you.
I wanted to examine a particular part of the new law, and
that is the law that requires each facility with vessels to
submit a security plan for Federal review and approval. My
question is: what should such plans include for establishing
and maintaining physical security, passing communication
security, and personnel security and the like?
In the interim final rules before we go beyond this. The
process, as it works, is that the law allows the agency to
issue what are called interim final rules. They can do that
without what is ordinarily called due process where they
publish their rules for comment, people will comment, the
agency responds to their comments, the agency amends the rule,
and then the agency publishes it again.
The interim final rule process allows the agencies to issue
such rules permanently without going through this particular
process. There are people in the audience today who are
prescribed, in other words prevented from participating in our
discussion today, but who are involved in writing these interim
final rules.
This is a new poll that we did on the interim rule thing
shortly after September 11, 2001. We put out some proposed
interim final rules. We didn't have time to go out and have a
long, deep process exchange. We brought in a bunch of witnesses
from El Al and elsewhere to talk about the steps that needed to
be done. We need a public setting with people in attendance who
are part of the interim final rulemaking process, listening but
not participating. We were able to put forth a number of ideas.
That is the purpose of this hearing today is to convey to
those individuals who are with us today but unable to
participate by statute the ideas that industry and operators
have for what ought or ought not to be included in these
interim final rules. This is a very arduous piece of the
process, but it is very critical for our success.
I want to come back to the original question that I started
dealing with. And that is, what are the minimum requirements on
these issues establishing and maintaining physical security,
and establishing personnel security, establishing communication
systems? What are the minimum requirements that the interim
final rules can incorporate? Mr. Keller.
Mr. Keller. Mr. Chairman, we have thought a lot about this.
We certainly think that access control through the use of ID
cards, the TWIC card, is probably the No. 1 issue in terms of
the facilities, securing the facilities. It allows control of
the access. It allows identification of people. It allows us to
know who is in and who is out or the facility operated in and
know at any given time who is in and who is out. We think that
this is exceedingly important.
On the vessel side, and I am going to try to touch on a
number of things, obviously, because there are so many pieces.
On the vessel side, we think that the Coast Guard and Customs
rules right now adequately define what is on a vessel and give
some indication of the condition of the vessel as it approaches
the port. We have the 96-hour, 72-hour, 24-hour notifications,
which have served well on personnel, on possible intrusions on
board the vessel as well as any indication that there might be
cargo difficulties.
And also, incidentally, it has served as a good
notification for people coming who are possibly ill with SARS,
for instance.
On the trucking side or the railroad side, again, I think
the idea that you know who is coming to the terminal and that
the person who represents themselves is, in fact, the person
who is designated to come to the terminal is exceedingly
important.
In terms of physical security, which is the subject of some
of the grant material that we have put in, we think that things
such as fence heights, locks, and security, video surveillance,
the physical barriers should have minimum standards that are
observed as you so rightly said. Enhancements can come as
necessary for adaptation.
Captain Holmes, in fact, our captain of the port, has done
a fine job of taking a first cut at defining these minimum
requirements. And, we have those, to some extent, in place
already.
Mr. Ose. Dr. Miretti, do you have input on this?
Dr. Miretti. Yes. I would concur with what Mr. Keller
indicated. I would like to add something, though. I think we
are vulnerable in terms of rail access. We have a lot of stack
trains, trains coming into the container facilities. And, they
aren't being monitored quite as closely, as, let us say, a
truck coming in.
We also have a lot of rail cars coming into our bulk
container facilities. Those I think should be more closely
monitored.
Mr. Ose. Your point being that a train that's waiting to
come onto a boat, that's a pretty big piece of equipment, so to
speak, for an engineer to keep an eye on, as compared to, say a
cab in a trailer.
Dr. Miretti. Yes, that is correct. As I understand it, some
of the stack trains are 8,500 feet long. And, certainly, as
they come into the facilities, any one of those cars could have
something illegal on the train.
Mr. Ose. Ms. Williams, any input?
Ms. Williams. Separation of the land side and the water
side in the rules are completely separate.
Mr. Ose. On message, on task.
Ms. Williams. On message, on task. A fingerprinted Federal
TWICs that is quick, efficient, efficiently turned around,
doesn't disrupt the flow of commerce, and that there should be
greater thought put in this big port in California in the
adequate funding to supply the Nation the goods they have that
are cheap.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Parker, any input?
Mr. Parker. The issue that you raised on the security plan,
obviously every terminal should have a security plan. Every
ship that calls on a liner basis with containers should have a
security plan. It covers the gate side, it covers the gangway
side, but it also should cover the cargo side. Congressman
Janklow mentioned the initial effect of if something were just
put out in the yard, and somebody can get to it easily through
non-traditional means rather than just a truck or a train, but
right out the back door.
We need to make sure that part of the security is also
dealt with, and I think we are doing a good job in getting it
there. It is not perfect, but it is much improved, and both the
city and the county are helping us.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Ochs.
Mr. Ochs. A national standard for all ports, a national
TWIC that is on the street this year, and continued recognition
of the partnership between the tenant and the landlord. We are
very fortunate here that both the port and the Coast Guard are
doing more than their fair share. They have met us more than
halfway on securing our terminal.
Our concern is under the new regulations some of those
lines are blurred, and some of the responsibility may be
shifted to us as the civilian tenant.
Mr. Ose. So you need greater clarity in those areas.
Mr. Ochs. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. All right. Mr. Marshall-Johns.
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Yes. I think it is just focusing on the
three areas again. The physical security of the premises that
is defined as Ms. Williams put to be between the land side and
the dock side. It is security of the personnel. And, it is
also, last for the food industry, the security of the product,
in particular. Reducing the susceptibility of some products we
are discharging from vessels and the fumigation process, to the
contamination of food, and effects on the people of America if
such a contamination did occur. I think that is a real threat.
Mr. Ose. Are the protocols operated in any of those areas
in the port?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. No, they are not. They are just
requests. What we did was establish minimum protocols that
would be supplied to the service providers in that flowchart
that I showed that was on the screen earlier. It was basically
looking at our whole chain of sequence, and all of those people
that are involved in the process of working, handling, or
delivering the product, or distributing the product. And, it is
asking them to develop protocols to ensure that their product
was kept as safe as possible throughout the chain.
Mr. Ose. Well I have some questions I don't want to ask in
public, and so I might ask you the specifics in the protocols.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Thank you.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Janklow.
Mr. Janklow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Miretti, in your testimony, about three pages in, it
says, ``Based on an employer's own statements we have concerns
that the Pacific Maritime Association will use the information
on cards for purposes that should be reviewed in collective
bargaining.'' Specifically, what did you mean by that? What is
that concern that none of them are more than you said?
Dr. Miretti. Thank you. In terms of utilizing information
as to----
Mr. Janklow. I know they could use it, but what have they
said that triggered that statement?
Dr. Miretti. I think anyone who belongs to a union, who is
involved in union activities, who might become involved in any
kind of a collective bargaining type of activity, might be
looked at as someone who could be looked at, I guess, by the
employer as being favorable to the outcome of contract
negotiations. And, if they could gather information on that
particular individual.
Mr. Janklow. I know they should do that, but it says,
``Based on the employer's own statement.'' I understand that it
could be done. But, I am wondering, is there a basis now, based
on what somebody has said? If there is not, fine.
Dr. Miretti. I think that is basically a general term,
taken in a general sense, because I think those kinds of things
certainly have happened over the years, and, if we go back a
bit, certain kinds of information was used against individuals.
Mr. Janklow. I understand that it can be done. I just
wondered if that was a prospective statement or a historical
statement?
Dr. Miretti. I think that's a general term indicating that
there certainly are possibilities it can happen and have
happened in the past.
Mr. Janklow. All of you seem to feel very strongly that the
Coast Guard and the Customs Service, since September 11th, have
done a pretty good job. Are there any of you who don't feel
that way? Are there any of you who feel there ought to be an
expanded role for, first of all, the Coast Guard, with respect
to port security, that they don't now have available to them in
the existing law?
Is there any of you who would suggest, if you were in
Congress or the executive branch, an expanded role for the
Coast Guard? Is there anything they list in their timeline that
they are required to do that you think ought to be taken from
them?
Dr. Miretti. If I can respond, I think more Federal funding
for the Coast Guard certainly would be in order. They are doing
a tremendous job, and they're doing this enormous task without
the funds that they desperately need.
Mr. Janklow. That is true for most of the government, we're
$400 billion short----
Dr. Miretti. That is true.
Mr. Janklow. That's a problem. I understand that's 40
percent of the total, and I just don't know how much more we
should send to the kids of America for what would be--are there
others of you who feel that there's more or less of a role the
Coast Guard ought to be doing? What about the Customs Service?
Mr. Marshall, what do you think?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. I think, and I put in my oral
presentation here, that the Customs Service and what they are
doing; they are doing a tremendous job as is the Coast Guard.
The one thing I see here is that, when you are looking at other
Federal agencies, whether it is USDA, PPQ, or whether it is
FDA, the only thing that I see is there is the inconsistency
between the departments and how they do things.
And perhaps, Customs could take the lead, whether it comes
under homeland security, whether it comes under transport
security, there needs to be some more consistency in how
procedures and processes are implemented.
Mr. Janklow. Did you say they are inconsistent?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. They are not seemingly consistent.
Mr. Janklow. Ms. Williams.
Ms. Williams. Are you talking about Customs at the border,
which is----
Mr. Janklow. I am talking about ports. But, if it is more
than that, go ahead. I am aware that they are probably used on
the borders.
Ms. Williams. I think there is so much congestion on the
land side, the trucking and communities are dealing with
inefficiencies that should be resolved. And, that lines at the
border--4 hours to get into the country, take back an empty, 4
hours to stay at the port.
I spent last night with a Wilmington community group, and
something should be done. Something should be put there,
because the taxpayers are being burdened that are closest to
the facilities and providing these services for the Nation.
Mr. Janklow. So, Mr. Keller, you had something?
Mr. Keller. I just wanted to say that we asked for certain
enhancements for Customs after September 11th, and happily
enough the appropriators saw their way to fully funding the ACE
customers' computer, which it is pushing back the borders doing
the work here. We think is absolutely necessary in determining
which containers should be looked at and how frequently. But
aside from that, no, we have had splendid relations here with
our Federal partners.
Mr. Janklow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Given the fact that within most of our lifetimes we haven't
had to be concerned about this type of issue, at this
magnitude, generally port security has been something related
by theft or smuggling of things for profit as opposed to
foreign attacks. Customs issues as opposed to national
security.
And, recognizing that this is an immense port area--good
grief, the impact it has on the--not just this local area, but
the Nation and the world's commerces almost, you know,
unfathomable. I'm thinking what the impact would be if it was
shut down. But, also understanding that a weapon of mass
destruction that could wreak havoc on America, could just as
easily come into a very small port as it could the Nation's
largest port.
And, I also recognize that it's one of the best ways to
issue Congress to authorize the President to go to war against
a country, if necessary. We don't fund it in advance. The
President comes back with a supplemental to tell us what it
costs and who will fund it. I don't understand why this,
frankly, is any different. It is part of the war effort to
protect America.
What mechanism do any of you have to suggest that--I mean,
you are citizens, you are also in the industry, but you are
also citizens--to the executive branch that's promulgating the
rules now? Let me ask you this, first of all, do you all feel
there's sufficient authority within the executive branch to
solve the problem, or do you think it will take more
legislation? How many of you think it will take more
legislation? If so, what would it be? Ms. Williams.
Ms. Williams. Preemption legislation. Legislation that
would preempt States from moving ahead in different directions.
For example, the----
Mr. Janklow. I understand.
Ms. Williams [continuing]. Very important.
Mr. Janklow. OK. And what else? Anybody else? Dr. Miretti.
Dr. Miretti. Yes. I think if any kind of legislation were
to occur, especially if it involves ports, that there has to be
total involvement by the stakeholders to make sure that any
kind of legislation really benefits the port itself.
We have 200, at least 200 ports in this particular country
that are commercial ports. And, they all operate a little bit
differently, so we have to be careful as to what kind of a
standardized law that we might pass. We have to be careful that
each individual port has a certain amount of latitude as well.
Mr. Janklow. With the concept that you're using, we can't
keep cocaine and marijuana out of this country. I don't know
what makes you think we can keep out small weapons of mass
destruction. I just saw a shipment of a load of marijuana.
[Laughter.]
We can't keep people from coming into this country by the
hundreds of thousands, if not the millions. And so, I'm not
saying it to be derogatory but I just feel like the task you
folks have is almost unbelievable. It is a feeling about every
place. What can be done to make your job easier in making this
country safe? That is really what it comes down to.
Mr. Keller. I don't think there is any magic bullet,
Governor. You know, it is a lot of hard work. We have our Port
Police working with the Federal and the county and the local
guys. And, frankly, a lot of it is putting up a credible
defense. I mean, getting out there letting the bad guys and the
good guys know that we are working hard to make this safe.
It wouldn't hurt to put up TV cameras. It wouldn't hurt to
see people see new fencing going up. It wouldn't hurt to see
more uniformed guards at the gates. It wouldn't hurt to have
people know that the equipment is overseas, as we talk about
pushing back the borders, and that as containers come flying
off ships from Indonesia and Pakistan and Manila and other
places through Singapore, that they are going past radiation
detectors. So, we take off that whole piece of it.
I think basically what we are suggesting is, when you see
that level--not of a perfect system but of a system that
addresses a variety of threats--that it makes people turn their
eyes elsewhere. If, in fact, we are going to have a continuing
threat against this country, I think what we want to let the
bad guys know is this isn't the place to do it.
You do it here, and you are going to get caught, or your
efforts are going to be frustrated. Or, if it costs you
hundreds of thousands of dollars to put together the effort, it
is not going to work here, because we are going to blunt it.
That is the best we can do. This is a huge business. We are
part of a global network now. We couldn't shut that down if we
wanted to. That's such as our interdependence. But I think best
measures, best practices, cost effective measures, are the best
we can do.
Mr. Parker. The issue or issues is not just money. There
are other efforts. There are things--let us put the people in
places where they can do the most good. If there is technology
out there, let us not be blind to the fact that may cost a
little bit of money, and spend it there. We can build a better,
a bigger mousetrap because we have more money than anybody. Let
us not do that. I don't think anyone is asking for that.
What we are asking for is a combination of that, and I
think you have heard the common theme from my friend Dr.
Miretti all the way down to over here, we think that there is a
Federal Government role in things that make the most sense.
I don't want the PMA having information on people. I think
that is a Federal function. I think that is something. I don't
know how much that is going to cost, but I will come back with
a supplemental on it and let you know.
Mr. Janklow. One last question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for the expanded time. I appreciate it.
Have each of your industries or all you been solicited or
involved in the regulations that are being written at the
national level? Has there been any request to have you submit
your opinions in terms of what ought to be done, and how it
ought to be done, when it ought to be done, and where it ought
to be done? Have any of you, I mean, as you felt to write for
the issue of regulations?
Dr. Miretti. We do have legislative representatives back in
Washington who have been involved. However, we firmly believe
that their involvement should be much greater than it is at the
present time. Although we solicit the support of legislators,
we also hope that they would contact us at the appropriate time
and say, ``Look, we would like to hear what you folks have to
say. After all, you are the folks who work in the trenches, who
work on the docks, and we would appreciate your input or
submissions.''
Mr. Janklow. We have been?
Ms. Williams. No, we haven't.
Mr. Janklow. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Ose. I want to followup on something. We talked about a
lot of things that need to be done. Mr. Keller's list is a
little bit over $15 million. I just want to make sure I have
this right. The information I have is that the surplus in
Customs revenue over expense is $15.6 billion nationally in
2001.
Mr. Keller. That is income. That is income. It is the gross
income.
Mr. Ose. All right. Forty percent of that would be $6.2
billion. I don't have my calculator, but I presume it would be
42. But the share of these facilities relative to that overall
number is over $6 billion. Over $15 million that we are talking
about in terms of the list you put forward, Mr. Keller,
constitutes one-quarter of 1 percent of the revenue generated
from these facilities. Is my math on target here?
Mr. Keller. You haven't lost a thing, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ose. OK. The question then becomes, what's the
financing mechanism resource used to fund these port security
upgrades, it seems to me that there is a whole lot of logic
between tying the source of the revenue to the excess revenue
over cost that is generated here with the facility that would
otherwise benefit. Am I missing something here? Mr. Keller.
Mr. Keller. Not at all. Not at all, Mr. Chairman. We think
sources and uses is the perfect answer to this. I know that the
Customs revenues go to the general fund with about a 30 percent
exception that goes to agriculture and food programs, which is
probably appropriate given the fact that much of that material
is ultimately exported.
But, this is a growth industry, and we have submitted in
our testimony the growth in Customs revenues from year to year,
and it grows at almost $1 billion a year in the last 5 or 6
years. We are talking about possibly taking a single year's
increment, not for the port of Los Angeles, but for all ports
in the United States, as a set aside to allow us to have
security material that we need in the ports.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Parker.
Mr. Parker. I think that is a key point. We don't want what
is happening now just give us the growth. Now, just focus in on
what happened between 2003 and 2004 for your fiscal budget and
say that is going to be set aside for security.
Mr. Ose. I mean, I want to zero in particularly on the
steamship issue. I am not doing it pejoratively. I just need to
make sure I understand this. If someone gets on a plane, there
are some fees that get tacked on to their ticket through
transportation that is provided. And then, a semi-fee for cargo
that's moved by air.
Ultimately, if I were one of the appropriators, I'd say,
``Look, we have to tie at least a portion of these funds going
back to the place where they are generated from.'' They are
going to say, ``How much of it is cargo, and how much of it is
passenger?'' That will lead to discussion as to whether or not
steamship passengers can pay a fee similar to what airline
passengers pay. What arguments can we logically use to defeat
the assessment or imposition of a new fee on customers and
steamships?
Mr. Parker. Well, I do think that we are looking at values
of goods as they increase in the marketplace. That is part of
this increase in the billion dollars. It is where the fees are
coming from. You know, every shoe that comes in or every
television set that comes in has a fee attached to it.
Mr. Ose. Right.
Mr. Parker. Just in ad valorem value they are growing over
time. And obviously, when a passenger comes in, we don't
customize the bill. You know, he can come in for free, but he
pays that security fee. So they found a mechanism of a head
count, and that is exactly what happens in a passenger
terminal.
Mr. Ose. What you are telling me is that your passengers,
your human passengers, are already paying a fee?
Mr. Parker. Right.
Mr. Ose. That is my question.
Mr. Parker. I think that is right, because they are using
the facility. I think the shippers of the cargo are paying it
by paying duties and paying certain fees to each and every
port. The operating port receives certain fees as well, and
some of that goes into their general fund, and some of that
goes into their general security measures.
Now, we are taking this quantum leap to get up to what
needs to be done to bring us up to your worst-case scenario,
and that is going to take something more than just the norm.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Ochs, in terms of risks positional risks, what
feedback would you provide?
Mr. Ochs. Mr. Chairman, I would have a two-part answer. In
regard to, is there any additional legislation needed, the
answer would be no. I think the goals and the missions of the
Coast Guard and the Customs Service are very clear. I think
what their challenge is, that they are mandated to do many
things that they are not funded for.
So I think from the Maersk standpoint, the cargo that we
ship, our customers are already paying a fair share of this $16
billion that you talk about. I think we would like to see the
money that is currently going into the general fund end
specifically at this problem of port security as we attempt to
defend our Nation.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Marshall-Johns, what is your experience around
the world in terms of how such improvements are funded?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Generally, it is a cost that is taken
from the fund, that Customs regularly generates through duties,
etc., from my experience is what is used to generate funding.
Mr. Ose. So they are tied together elsewhere? Is it
practiced anywhere else but here?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. To some extent. It is the same all over
the world. They are looking at what they can do as far as
security in their ports, their facilities, and how we can be
sure--it is a similar situation to where we are now.
Mr. Ose. Ms. Williams, you talk about the 710 the capacity
of Mr. Rohrabacher's observation on 24-hour cycles used in
examination. Could the money be used to address perhaps the
capacity issues in 710?
Ms. Williams. I think it is important if the ports,
especially in California, are going to service the entire
United States, then I think the Federal Government is
responsible for providing us highways that can do the job. If
you look at 710, it is just awful. I have done it today----
Mr. Ose. So we've been hearing.
Ms. Williams. Yes. [Laughter.]
Mr. Ose. Dr. Miretti.
Dr. Miretti. On the question of funding port anti-terrorist
programs and infrastructure improvements outside of the port,
there has been a lot of talk about a container tax. We
certainly want to look at that very carefully, we don't want to
tax our ports out of business. I have heard talk about a
gasoline tax.
Can a trucker afford any more costs attached to his
equipment? He would basically go out of business. He has a very
small profit margin that he works on. User fees are high. Maybe
this is the question to ask: why can't the increase go to the
allocation of funds for infrastructure improvement for
terrorist activity programs and so on?
As I understand it, for road use we need to allocate even
more money and funds for infrastructure improvement for
terrorist activity preparedness?
As I understand it, for variable use or for low spending, I
think the allocation from the Federal Government has dropped
from 20 percent down to about 2 percent. So I would like to
take a look at how we could allocate, or have the Federal
Government allocate, even more money for the things we need
here in the port.
Mr. Ose. Chair recognizes Congressman Janklow for 5
minutes.
Mr. Janklow. You know, there is another side to the user
fee issue. It's the obvious one. Everyone who collects revenues
for the government thinks that it ought to be spent on their
particular issues. The liquor tax people think it ought to be
spent on alcoholism treatment, and the lottery people think it
ought to be spent on lottery advertising and compulsive
gambling problems.
I mean, it doesn't work when everybody collects their piece
of the pie and then eats their piece of the pie. I think we
ought to understand that.
I think we also ought to understand these are unusual
times. We are dealing with the national defense of this
country. During the Second World War, if I recall, they passed
things like a luxury tax on jewelry, which lasted until the
late 1960's. They passed various taxes to assist in financing
the war.
Absent that, they fund it out of the National Treasury.
This is war. I mean, we keep forgetting the only reason we are
even here today, all of us, is because we are trying to figure
out how to better protect the people of the United States
before a number of catastrophic things happens to us in this
war that people have declared on us.
I understand you have to labor in this port, except for the
folks in southern California, maybe the trucking group. Has
anyone estimated what it would cost to come up with the defense
of the ports in this country? Is there a number that anyone has
used, and I realize nothing is perfect, as you say. Mr. Keller,
you said it very well. We should just keep doing things and
hoping that each one incrementally is more effective.
Is there a number that it is going to take from someone's
pockets, to fund all of this? Does anybody know the number?
Have any of the industries pulled it together?
Mr. Keller. Congressman, I am going to guess that maybe in
some of the first rounds of grant requests somebody might at
TSA or MARAD or someone else might have collected the numbers.
Our first guess when MARAD asked last year was $36 million here
to begin. We figured for something approaching a thorough
system, just for the port of Los Angeles, it was probably $100
million. I mean, this is with the bells and whistles and all of
the things that would say, ``Hey, we have got this wired.''
Mr. Janklow. Do you think if you had $100 million you would
be wired? I ask that because I realize you have hundreds of
ports in this country. But to take care of 42 percent of them,
of all the traffic for $100 million, may be a cheap investment.
I mean, we can't do them all at once.
Mr. Keller. We are at a little over half of that 42
percent. Long Beach would require probably about the same
amount of money. So, now we are at $200 million. We are getting
into some stratospheric numbers here, and there is a lot of
American ports. They are all going to need protection in some
fashion.
I don't think we are looking for perfect solutions. At the
same time, let me say this. We have to be looking, if I can
argue with you for a moment, we have to be looking for the
perfect solution, because all the security in the world doesn't
make any difference. If I'm in the airliner that hits the
building, it only takes one incident. It's no different from
the gentleman sitting there in the policeman's uniform, the
chief. It only takes one person to rob the store from all the
citizens.
The way I look at it, you might not find it, but we have to
be looking for the perfect solution. We shouldn't kid
ourselves. Our enemies truly understand where we are
vulnerable. They don't say that we want to talk about this.
We're not the only ones that are going to talk about it. They
talk about it every day. They aren't going to hit us where it's
obvious; they're going to hit us where it isn't obvious.
And again, that is the best that we can do. I mean, we can
go on with bells and whistles and some of these other things,
but realistically when we say $15 million, and you see our list
of things here, we think this is a big takedown. Now,
maintaining it over the longer term, that is where the numbers
come from. And, adding on and replacing, that is where the
numbers come from.
Mr. Janklow. Good point. Well, let me just go back to your
point about the liquor tax and some of these other taxes and
the jewelry tax, and maybe, arguably, even airline taxes. Those
to some point are choices that people make, whether you are
going to drink or whether you are going to buy a diamond
bracelet, or whether you're going to fly unless perhaps on
business.
When we are talking about the goods now that we are moving,
both the stuff that goes for retail and further manufacture, we
are talking about America's goods. I understand it is tempting
to think, for instance, that the exporter in China or Singapore
is going to pay that bill, but somehow that is going to end up
on the total cost of goods. It is going to be passed along.
Our economy over the last 3 or 4 years hasn't been so
strong. This has been a strong sector, and we think, in our own
small way, that we have contributed, through inexpensive
transportation and the like, to keeping inflation low and
keeping this vigorous.
Please understand, personally I agree with the comments
that the chairman made when he was asking the questions. It is
just given that the fact that our budget is $440 billion,
depending on whom you listen to, it's $400-$500 billion out of
whack, one. And, two, the excess money goes into the Treasury.
So, to take a billion out of there is just to add a billion to
the shortfall, or take a billion off the income. It still has
the identical effect.
There may be no shortage of people that would think that
what you do is, given the fact just that the trade deficit
alone this year will be about $300 billion for this country.
The total amount of goods that are imported into this country
is just--the deficit of that is $300 billion, and it wouldn't
be cheap to put another tax on to go ahead and pay for it all.
I am trying to avoid heading in that direction in my comments.
That is all.
Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ose. We do have a little bit of information on the cost
in terms of the port security plans. The Department of
Transportation published a notice dated December 30, 2002, on
behalf of the Coast Guard indicating that the plans alone--the
present value of creating the plans--plans, not the actual
improvements but the plans, the present value total through
2012, we estimate at $477 million.
I don't have any additional information beyond that. That
is just the plans themselves, the submittals, if you will.
Let me take a second here.
I want to ask a question in terms of how we go about
implementing these port security standards, if you will, at the
forward point of contact, if you will, the foreign port. One of
the ways it seems to me is either by negotiating on a very
specific basis. What would be the feedback, or what would your
feedback be individually in terms of suggesting to the
administration that as they go into these international trade
agreements that one of the pieces of those trade agreements is
a resolution of how we are going to implement, if you will, a
forward security point? Would that make sense? Mr. Marshall-
Johns, do you have any feedback on that?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Yes, I believe it would make sense.
Also, you have to look at going around to those international
trade agreements already in place and how would you then
develop the needs or the minimum requirements on that side of
it. So, I think it is part of, when you look at the whole
picture, it is part of an agreement. This is one of the
requirements for importing into the United States.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Ochs.
Mr. Ochs. I would concur, Mr. Chairman. It would seem that
again, a staying requirement to work with whatever the process
that our Customs Service wants to do overseas should be a point
of entry in order to participate with trade.
As the government with a $3 billion trade deficit to the
folks overseas to sustain their own economic well-being, they
are going to be very anxious to sustain the current
relationships that they have with us. In effect, it takes the
port security plans in the aggregate, develop the standards
that we want to have implemented, that would otherwise be able
to, if you will, project to the forward point, and put it as an
integral whole. So we have a consistent message and
implementation, if you will.
Mr. Ose. Yes, sir. Then set that as the U.S. standard. If
you want to trade with the United States, you will comply with
this standard.
Mr. Keller, would that present complications relative to
the operation of the port?
Mr. Keller. I don't really think so, Mr. Chairman. I think
this is a matter of getting people's attention when it's best
had. Self-interest after all is important, and the United
States is probably the world's largest consumer of goods from
other countries. I think that would be the perfect time to make
those agreements.
Mr. Ose. How do you deal with the need for flexibility as
you go into the future? Because, I mean, the means of defending
against such attack necessarily evolve as the means of
delivering such an attack evolve. Do you have any feedback as
to how you would provide the flexibility under an international
agreement?
Mr. Keller. That is difficult to say. Once the doors were
opened, though, in Hong Kong and in Singapore, we found a great
deal of flexibility in the ability to have our consultants work
with their authorities and the like to come up with
technologies and procedures, on-the-ground procedures that
would work.
Those will have to be worked out with the U.S. Customs
officers who are stationed there, but one of the comments that
came out of one of the ports that we were working with was,
``My God, maybe now we ought to be pushing back the borders to
the people who send us goods for transshipment to the United
States.'' I think awareness builds as well.
Mr. Ose. I want to go back to a couple of things we have
talked about, and I have read about in the last couple of days.
First of all, I am unclear on the issue of the unsealed
container. That is, the empty container if you will, the empty
container. I don't quite grasp, Dr. Miretti, your point about
needing to inspect an outgoing empty container. Can you explain
that?
Dr. Miretti. Yes. Let us start first with a container that
might be coming into a particular facility. Often times, and in
most cases, that container is not opened. It is not inspected.
It doesn't have a seal on it. There could be something in
there. It is then parked into the yard, and it's left there
until it is loaded on the ship. When that empty container comes
off the ship the same thing happens. It is just waiting until
someone comes to pick it up. It has not been opened.
In the ground report, they indicate that the containers
that would be coming into a particular facility should be
opened and should be inspected. Any empty container that comes
off the ship should be opened and looked at then stacked in the
yard. They should be stacked door-to-door. That is pretty
stringent stuff. In a sense, we are not asking for that, but
that is in the ground report.
So what they are saying is that an empty container is a
good hiding place.
Mr. Ose. When I see the vessels dockside, and I look at
large stacks of containers, generally speaking, what percentage
of those containers on the vessels, dockside, unloaded are
empty?
Dr. Miretti. Many of the vessels, as they come into port,
discharging containers, are full. It is when a vessel is going
out.
Mr. Ose. Taking empty containers back.
Dr. Miretti. Taking a lot of empties back.
Mr. Ose. OK.
Dr. Miretti. So a larger percentage of empties are going
out on the outbound ships. A large percentage of the containers
that are coming in are basically fully loaded containers.
Mr. Ose. So the empty containers will be basically
warehoused until a vessel comes in, off loads their existing
containers, then the cranes would load the empty containers
back on that ship, and then leave?
Dr. Miretti. That is correct. They would be staged out in
the yard until the vessel comes in, and then from that staging
point on the dock, it would be brought up to the ship.
Mr. Ose. So, if I understand your point, it is when those
empty containers come back into the dock itself, that is the
concern, that something more being placed in there at that
point, and then they'd get dockside, and then we have a problem
because we haven't inspected it.
Dr. Miretti. Well, it could very well be that if a
container is sitting there in the yard, and it is empty----
Mr. Ose. Let us say somebody walks up and puts something in
it----
Dr. Miretti. Yes, somebody could put something in it, and
if it goes up to Los Angeles to get loaded, it might explode in
Los Angeles.
Mr. Ose. From an operational standpoint, the suggestion
that Dr. Miretti said, the point about door to door. How
difficult is that to implement?
Mr. Ochs. It is tough. It would certainly be an added
chore, and depending on the type of container, it may need to
be physically spun around.
Mr. Ose. It would seem from a logistics standpoint the
containers are stacked on the ships in a particular area--you
know, in a particular mode, so it structurally can be loaded up
high. And then, the cranes themselves off load them in an
appropriate manner so they get loaded on the chassis
appropriately.
Dr. Miretti. Right. When you are loading on the ship, it is
actually a fairly complicated matrix on the actual weight, the
weight of that stack of containers in the ship, and then, when
the ship arrives, the final destination of that box. All of the
boxes in a certain stack are probably going to the same city.
Mr. Ose. The same cranes that unload the ships, are they
the same cranes that move the empty containers into the
warehouse area for, if you will, sending them back out?
Dr. Miretti. No. The cranes that load and off load the ship
are fixed pierside, and then we have smaller mobile cranes
inside the terminal that stack them up for short-term storage.
Mr. Ose. So the point that those empty containers are in-
loaded on the ship for departure, you've got a piece of
equipment that brings the container dockside. The crane lifts
that box up, puts it on the ship, and picks up another one, and
so on and so forth.
Dr. Miretti. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. And, that has to occur in a particular manner, in
terms of how the container itself goes on the ship.
Dr. Miretti. Right. There is a very set and logical order
to the way they are loaded and off loaded.
I think the more general topic is we are making the
assumption that there is a threat to our terminal from inside
the United States and the way that a weapon would be brought
into our terminal is in an empty container. I think
theoretically that is possible. As we look at the current
threats and the risks to our terminals and our ports, I think
most of those threats and risks are deemed from coming from
overseas.
And, therefore, we need to focus on that threat first more
than we need to focus on the potential threat of someone
already here in America who has a weapon and is going to choose
to use that weapon at one of the terminals.
Mr. Ose. Dr. Miretti, thank you. I was unclear on what you
were trying to get at. I appreciate your clarification.
Dr. Miretti. It's my pleasure.
Mr. Ose. The other issue that I have heard is that we
passed in the act standards or direction to the Homeland
Security Department to develop performance standards for these
containers, including the types and standards of seals, and
locks. And, implicit in that was a concern of ours about the
structural integrity of the container itself.
I heard some people talking lately that we now need to add
that into the law that we need to have bomb-proof or blast-
proof containers, and the like. As far as I am concerned, that
is already in the law. What should the container performance
standards include? I mean, obviously, we have structural
necessity, because you stack them on top of each other. Then,
you have to seal them satisfactorily, so that when they get
here you know the seals haven't been broken and it is, if you
will, secure. What should those performance standards be? Mr.
Keller.
Mr. Keller. Well, you have already addressed the idea of
the strength of the container needed to do its primary task. In
terms of securing the container itself, frankly, I think the
idea that we would build a blast-proof container that could
contain a small thermonuclear device is----
Mr. Ose. No, that is not going to happen.
Mr. Keller [continuing]. Probably not going to happen.
Right. The hinges have always been an issue, tampering with the
hinges on the container, which prevent the doors from being
lifted off, with or without a seal on them, has always been an
issue. Any structure of the type of a container or a trailer, I
mean, could be breached is similar to doing it an obvious way--
cut a hole in the side, rip up one of the aluminum sheets. But,
that in itself is probably not what somebody would do if they
were wishing to smuggle.
So, again, the means of entry and egress in the container,
focus on the doors. So its hinges, its hardware, it will remain
secure with a lock or seal in place in such a way that you will
know that the lock or seal, in fact, has been locked for the
duration of its voyage. That there was not some other point of
entry. And, typically speaking, that is a concentration on the
doors and the hardware.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Marshall-Johns, you guys bring a lot of fresh
vegetables, and the like, into the country. It seems to me from
a tort exposure standpoint, you have done quite a bit of work
to ensure the sanctity, if you will, of the cargo. Is it
possible for us to come up with a system, as Mr. Keller says,
for egress and ingress into these containers, so that it is
absolutely 100 percent secure?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. I think it is, but at the same time
you've also got to look at the cost of that system. I agree
entirely with Mr. Keller's comments about the one source of
entry into the container is the doors, the hinges, and the
locking mechanisms. Whether the existing seal units are the
right way to go, whether it's an electronic seal unit, or
whether there's some other control system in place, that was to
be decided, as far as looking at the cost of it.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Ochs, do you agree with this? Are you in
agreement with Mr. Marshall-Johns?
Mr. Ochs. Yes, sir. Maersk owns 1 million of these boxes.
They are rigid shipping boxes. They have a lifespan of about 7
years. When you start to look at a Kevlar box or extra locks on
the box, at some point you are going to start to build bank
vaults. At some point, the value of the box may exceed the
value of the cargo.
The thicker the box gets, the harder it is to use any type
of technology to x-ray or sniff or scan what might be inside of
that box.
So, I think, from our standpoint, under the general concept
of Operation Safe Commerce, which is to maintain the integrity
of the container from the time it starts overseas to the time
it is opened, somewhere once it arrives here, is a standard,
smart, high-security seal that may have the capability to
transmit some type of signal that can be tracked through the
entire transit of that box, both when it is loaded overseas, on
the ship, on the rail, or on the local truck, until it finally
arrives at the warehouse or the store.
So, yes, we think that the solution is a smarter and better
seal and not necessarily a bank vault-type box.
Mr. Ose. All right. Congressman Janklow for 5 minutes.
Mr. Janklow. Thank you very much.
If I could, Ms. Williams, let me ask you a question. In
your testimony under No. 11, you say, ``Government, with the
assistance of industry, must make every effort to effectively
build sufficient security infrastructure without being so
costly or cumbersome as to destroy the economy it seeks to
protect,'' which goes to the heart of what the chairman was
just asking you and what you were responding about, Mr. Ochs,
and all of you have.
``Since September 11th, thousands of government agencies
and private businesses have been waiting for Congress and the
agencies it controls to provide leadership to specified local
architecture and protocols necessary to further investment.''
Now, you make that statement within the framework that
talks about mandated versus performance-based systems. I mean,
it is a statement that could almost be applied to all of this.
With respect to mandated versus performance-based systems, is
there any indication as to which direction the administration
is headed with respect to that very issue of mandated versus
performance-based system?
Ms. Williams. No, there isn't. I think it is important to
note these were part of the comments, and this particular
section was written by ATA. They have been working on the
Federal level, and we have been working on the State level.
California has a pattern of moving ahead quickly. There is a
bill this year specifically introduced by Senator Feinstein,
Assembly Chair Detra, that requires trucks to use these GIS
devices.
It is really expensive. The manufacturer is promoting the
bill. So, they have put over the first week, because it started
to slow down. But, these things keep happening in California.
In our legislature, people are moving ahead, people want to
pass this bill, get their name in the paper, and a picture,
and----
Mr. Janklow. Which creates, as you know, a tremendous
problem, because then they amended something out here that you
have implemented, they had costs, to find out the national
standards going to be something different. So, that is what you
are getting at?
Ms. Williams. It's the second bill that could possibly pass
since this has happened, and there hasn't been one assembly.
Mr. Janklow. Is this something that has really been very
clearly expressed to the administration?
Ms. Williams. No, it hasn't. We here in California, with
our limited resources, try and carry these bills ourselves.
But, if you could preempt it, that would help us a great deal,
of course. There needs to be some action; there needs to be a
public dialog. I don't understand the congressional manner.
When you say ``intramurals,'' to me that sounds like going and
getting public input and affecting taxes. I have a problem with
that.
It doesn't seem like you have the right people at the table
to make the decisions, and I appreciate you disagreeing like
this. There's people with their pencils in the back of the
room, and they are going to stay until the end. But it is
important that everybody is on the same page and we don't have
manufacturers lobbying for devices that get adopted.
Mr. Janklow. If I move to you, Mr. Parker, for a moment. In
your testimony you say, ``State and local governments are also
imposing more military conditions of port operations. Some
events may actually divert resources from port security.'' You
don't have to come up with it right now, but can you give me a
list of those kinds of specific things that you could submit in
your supplemental testimony? Because that would be of a lot of
assistance.
Mr. Parker. I would be happy to. But one of them would be
actually this bill, and I think in terms of what we are looking
at, the CTA and the steamship association, at times have been
at different sides of it. But in this particular case, we both
I think agree that perhaps this bill is ill-timed at best.
[Note.--No information provided.]
Mr. Janklow. When you say ``this bill,'' are you
referencing the bill that----
Mr. Parker. 575. Yes.
Mr. Janklow. OK. And then, you also say a proposed $1
billion bond issue would secure $200 million for port security
for southern California. I'm sorry I haven't given this to you
earlier, but specifically, is this a State bonding proposal? Is
that what it is?
Mr. Parker. Yes, it is. But, it would not be funded until
the State solves its own set of funding----
Mr. Janklow. Its own problems?
Mr. Parker [continuing]. Problems, yes.
Mr. Janklow. OK.
Mr. Parker. So, it could be a significant period of time.
Mr. Janklow. Would this be an authorization for a bonding,
but not the authorization to issue the bonds?
Mr. Parker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Janklow. OK. Mr. Ochs, if I could go to for a second,
as I saw in your testimony. In a couple of spots you say,
again, I can't remember the text, the pending regulations imply
a mandate to randomly inspect and search individuals and
vehicles into waterfront facilities. And then, you talk about
contracting law enforcement officers or watchmen.
Is this or isn't this in the regs? I don't understand what
that ``simply'' means. I understand the word, obviously, but is
there something that you have asked them, is it in or out of
the regs? I will jump to the next one. I will hit them all at
one time.
Then, in the next paragraph, ``The pending regulations
suggest that each waterfront facility deploy their own security
boats.'' Then, you talk about how to police them out in the
waters. Then, you say the regulations discuss the use of divers
to inspect pier structures. Then you say, in summary, ``The
regulations imply each terminal hire a trained and fully
equipped posse to search personnel vehicles, crew boats,
patrolling offshore from our docks, in search for underwater
ordnance.'' That is incredible.
You have contacted the administration about that, haven't
you? What is their response? Where do you think this is going
to be required in the regs?
Mr. Ochs. It is our current interpretation of the language
in those regs that requirement could be mandated on us. The
language is written fairly wishy-washy, but you can interpret
it that all of those functions could be transferred to each
terminal.
Mr. Janklow. Do you agree with that, Mr. Keller?
Mr. Keller. I haven't studied that.
Mr. Janklow. I am not actually arguing with you, but I am
just saying this is new to me, this is a big deal.
Mr. Keller. I haven't studied the reg or read it the same
way that John has, Congressman.
Mr. Janklow. What about any of the rest of you? Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Williams. This goes to the point of when we bring the
chassis in the terminal, who's in there, what's in the empty
chassis, and begs the point, why are you letting 4,000 truckers
with empty containers in there at all?
Mr. Janklow. What you are saying is, Mr. Ochs, at this
point, you are not able to tell whether or not it is going to
be your company's job, or the terminal's job, the port of Los
Angeles or Long Beach or Miami, their job to inspect all
vehicle passenger spaces and trucks, to deploy security boats,
to be in the underwater explosive detection business, to patrol
offshore, etc.
Mr. Ochs. The short answer is yes. We have 13 terminals in
the United States. Most of our terminals are on smaller ports
where the local port authority and/or the Coast Guard doesn't
have the same resources that we have here where, for example,
the local port does, in fact, have a dive team.
So, at those ports where the government resources may not
be available, if it is a requirement under these interim final
rules that, for example, a pier be searched for underwater
bombs, then does that put the burden on us as the terminal to
make sure that search is done, if there is no local group
working under the protection of the government sovereign
immunity to actually conduct that function?
Mr. Janklow. I think it was your testimony is it not, it
was Mr. Parker's, that expresses a concern that in the event
you do have these responsibilities, you are going to be self-
insured.
Mr. Ochs. We are going to be self-insured, because as the
tenant of that leased property, we probably will not be able to
obtain liability insurance.
Mr. Janklow. Mr. Marshall-Johns, if I could go to you for
just a second, you say Oppenheimer contends it is the
responsibility of the country of export to establish a system
that satisfies U.S. requirements. What you are saying there,
then, I assume is that, if we set the standards in this
country, people exporting to the United States have to meet
them?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Yes, exactly. That is what I discussed
in Congressman Ose's request before, about extending the
borders. Again, setting the minimum standards and then allowing
the party responsible to adhere to them.
Mr. Janklow. At their expense?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Yes, at their expense.
Mr. Janklow. In your written testimony you talk about the
24-Hour Rule, and how Oppenheimer would prefer if it was
modified to the point where it would be 24 hours post-departure
that would be allowed to be reported, correct?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Correct.
Mr. Janklow. What do you think, Mr. Ochs, Mr. Parker, all
of the rest of you?
Mr. Parker. Well, there are an awful lot of companies that
are really struggling with this rule. Just from the standpoint
of they have multiple containers, they have hot cargo that is
arriving at the----
Mr. Janklow. Do you think post 24 hours would be OK?
Mr. Parker. I think post would be a great improvement.
Mr. Janklow. Mr. Ochs.
Mr. Ochs. Speaking very selfishly, just for Maersk, once
the box is on our ship, the 24-Hour Rule is useless, because
the ship has sailed. So, we would prefer that the inspection is
done on the dock overseas for the safety of the ship.
Mr. Janklow. OK.
Mr. Ochs. But for the safety of our country, the post-24
Hour rule would be an improvement.
Mr. Janklow. I was being a little facetious, but I just
want to make sure I understand what you are saying.
Mr. Ochs. Yes, sir.
Mr. Janklow. I think from a practical standpoint, if the
ship has 4,000 boxes on it, and we do the electronic inventory
of the manifest after it has sailed, and there is some type of
red flag that pops up, are we going to turn that ship around
because of the one box?
Mr. Ochs. Sure.
Mr. Janklow. Dr. Miretti, do you have a problem with post-
24-hour?
Dr. Miretti. Yes, I think so. For worker security, I think
we would certainly like the 24-Hour Rule to apply.
Mr. Janklow. What about you, Mr. Keller?
Mr. Keller. I think you have already heard our comments
about CSI and pushing back the borders. I don't think there is
any way to do that without the 24-Hour Rule being in place.
Mr. Janklow. It has to be in place.
Mr. Keller. I think it has to be in place.
Mr. Janklow. Mr. Marshall-Johns, in your testimony you talk
about the identification card and the issue of the
identification card, and you previously discussed, we all
basically agree. On the way out here yesterday, I read it and
left it in the airplane, I read an article in the U.S. News and
World Report where on the new Florida statutes that have been
imposed on the trucking industry.
Four of the state employees just in the last week have been
indicted for selling the cards to people that weren't eligible
to get them. So that problem could happen with any system. But,
that's a system that would probably make a lot more sense under
these circumstances with Federal preemption.
Mr. Chairman, that is all the questions I have. Thank you
very much for giving me this extra time.
Mr. Ose. You are welcome.
I want to go back to something Mr. Ochs and I were
discussing on these containers and making them bomb-proof. Now,
I want to try and understand your comment. If I understand your
comment correctly, it was that the type of bomb that we need to
be worried about would not be contained under any circumstances
by a container whose structural integrity is such as to contain
the explosive power of that bomb. In other words, if it's a
thermonuclear bomb, it doesn't matter.
Mr. Ochs. It doesn't matter.
Mr. Ose. You also have problems in terms of screening
containers, as we get a heavier and heavier and heavier
container. In other words, our technology is diminished. Our
technology, our means of detection of something within that
container, as that container gets heavier and heavier
structurally, is our ability to detect something we want to
prevent from happening, is that diminished?
Mr. Ochs. Yes. I think with the current technology that is
on the street with the MRU and the back-scatter type x-rays,
and the types of gadgets that are out there that can detect
radioactivity, the thicker the box is, the less chance that you
have to detect something that's bad inside.
Mr. Ose. So, if the Federal Government mandated a
structural integrity requirement, such as to contain an
explosive force of X, we may very well undermine the
effectiveness of our CSI systems, and the like, to detect what
we are trying to keep out of the country in the first place?
Mr. Ochs. Absolutely. In fact, it has been suggested that,
if anything, the boxes should be made out of plexiglass, so you
can actually see what is inside. So this would go against a
bank vault or Kevlar box.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Marshall-Johns, do you agree with that
analysis?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Yes, I do. I think this is pretty
straightforward, that as you build strength, the integral
structure of a container, your ability to scan or view anything
inside is going to be greatly diminished.
Mr. Ose. So your advice to elected officials, who might
otherwise put that forward, would be very careful?
Mr. Marshall-Johns. Yes, I think so. I think it certainly
adds some huge costs into the container industry.
Mr. Ose. Dr. Miretti, do you concur?
Dr. Miretti. Yes. I think, if you are going to build a box
that is like a bank vault, it is not only going to cost a
tremendous amount of money, but then, you are also going to
have to consider the fact that you are not going to be able to
put as much cargo into that box, because now you are looking at
a load weight that has to pass over the street. So that would
be a factor that would have to be taken into consideration.
Mr. Ose. Wouldn't it also diminish the ability of vessels
that are bringing cargo to or from the United States in terms
of the weight that they would have to carry?
Dr. Miretti. Yes, it would diminish the number of
containers that it could carry.
Mr. Ose. Yes. The displacement tonnage would be reduced in
terms of the number of containers.
Dr. Miretti. Right, right.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Keller, do you concur?
Mr. Keller. I do. Transportation is a practical business,
when you talk about container weight, it is called tare weight
as opposed to cargo weight for a reason. And, that is because
it is basically non-productive in terms of the customer's
needs.
Mr. Ose. All right. Mr. Parker.
Mr. Parker. If you are concerned about that, and then every
container in the world was a bank vault, you could just do it
in a cargo ship that was non-containerized. So it wouldn't
solve anything.
Mr. Ose. So the technology, at least the logistical
systems, would have to be thrown out the window. Ms. Williams.
Ms. Williams. I would just say something about the
transparency, to be able to look inside these. Is that
clearly----
Mr. Ose. The issue is, if your wall is this thick, and you
have a gamma-ray system that is in place, you can see through
that, and you double or triple the thickness of the wall, then
your gamma-ray system can't get through. My question is,
logically, it seems to me what we want to have is a minimum
protective shield, if you will, on these containers in many
cases, so we can, in fact, see what is inside them.
Ms. Williams. We don't really have any great problem in
this industry at the port, so it seems good.
Mr. Ose. In terms of the containers being bank vaults, if
you will, putting them on the truck, then putting them on the
road, and then we have all sorts of maintenance problems on the
roadways.
Ms. Williams. Caltrans just did a study that showed there
are, on California roads, 13 percent of the trucks are over
80,000 pounds. I don't know how valid. I haven't seen the
background, but we already have a problem. Increasing the
container weight would be problematic.
Mr. Ose. All right. I don't have any other questions. I do
have a statement. Do you want to add anything? All right. I do
want to express my appreciation to all of the witnesses here.
Again, Ms. Williams, I understand your skepticism about the
manner in which we are doing this in the interim final rules.
But trust me, it works.
Ms. Williams. OK. Great.
Mr. Ose. It does work. The system forced upon us is kind of
upside-down, but this does help those who are writing these
interim final rules the concerns that they need to account for.
Ms. Williams. Great.
Mr. Ose. Or, at least it did the one time we've done it
before.
Today's hearing did show how much we still have to do, but
it is as a Federal Government and in partnership with the
people who are in the day-to-day business of maritime
transportation, to ensure effective implementation of this law
and port security.
I encourage my colleagues to reflect upon the combined
wisdom of today's witnesses and those implementing the
regulations. I mean, you are the experts. We are not the
experts. You are the experts, and we need to access your
wisdom, and we are talking about security of our citizens and
the potentially serious effects on commerce, so we really have
very little room, if any, for error.
This is an important step in the whole process. We are
trying to make sure our ports are safe. As we have evidenced in
the record, these facilities here are enormous economic engines
for California and for the country as a whole. They are crucial
to our well-being. We need to protect them.
I will tell you, it has not been missed by me, but given
the excess revenue over cost generated from these facilities in
terms of Customs duties, I will be going back to Washington
next Tuesday, and shortly thereafter we will be putting in a
bill that at least starts the debate about committing those
revenues for reinvestment in ports from which they come from.
That process is long, and it might take some time, but we
are going to start that today and attempt to force the issue.
So, that these economic engines and the jobs that are so
dependent upon their success, and the States that depend upon
them have the opportunity to have the funds and the resources
to meet the mandates that the Federal Government is going to
lay on them.
I appreciate the time you all have taken to come down here
and educate Ms. Harman, Mr. Rohrabacher, Mr. Janklow, and me.
It is a positive experience. We thank you.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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