[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION
IN SPACE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 11, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-25
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee
DANA ROHRABACHER, California JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOE BARTON, Texas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan NICK LAMPSON, Texas
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan MARK UDALL, Colorado
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota DAVID WU, Oregon
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
Washington CHRIS BELL, Texas
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri ZOE LOFGREN, California
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia JIM MATHESON, Utah
ROB BISHOP, Utah DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas VACANCY
JO BONNER, Alabama
TOM FEENEY, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
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Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
JOE BARTON, Texas CHRIS BELL, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California NICK LAMPSON, Texas
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., DAVID WU, Oregon
Washington EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma BRAD SHERMAN, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
ROB BISHOP, Utah ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas VACANCY
JO BONNER, Alabama RALPH M. HALL, Texas
TOM FEENEY, Florida
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York
BILL ADKINS Subcommittee Staff Director
ED FEDDEMAN Professional Staff Member
RUBEN VAN MITCHELL Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Professional Staff Member
CHRIS SHANK Professional Staff Member
RICHARD OBERMANN Democratic Professional Staff Member
TOM HAMMOND Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
June 11, 2003
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 6
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 3
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Minority Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 4
Statement by Representative Sherwood Boehlert, Chairman,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 5
Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on
Science, U.S. House of Representatives......................... 52
Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 55
Panel:
Mr. John D. Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for External
Relations
Oral Statement............................................... 25
Written Statement............................................ 27
Mr. Robert M. Davis, President and CEO, California Space
Authority
Oral Statement............................................... 29
Written Statement............................................ 30
Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center
Oral Statement............................................... 34
Written Statement............................................ 36
Biography.................................................... 37
Ambassador Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, State Department
Written Statement............................................ 38
Discussion
Iran Nonproliferation Act...................................... 40
Partnerships Between U.S. and Russian Companies................ 41
Russian Support for the International Space Station............ 43
Proliferation Issues........................................... 47
Reliance on Russia While the Shuttle Fleet Is Grounded......... 50
European Participation and Contributions to the ISS............ 51
Status of Russian Economy...................................... 53
Russian Political Changes...................................... 53
Dependence on Russian Support to ISS........................... 54
Russian Commitments to Support the ISS......................... 55
Safety of the Russian Soyuz Vehicle............................ 58
Technology Transfer............................................ 58
U.S.-Russian Rocket Engine Technology Investment............... 60
Russian Budget Commitments for Progress and Soyuz Vehicles..... 61
U.S.-Russian Relations......................................... 63
Clarification on Russia's Commitment to ISS.................... 65
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. John D. Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for External
Relations...................................................... 68
Mr. Robert M. Davis, President and CEO, California Space
Authority...................................................... 75
Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center........................................ 77
Ambassador Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, State Department...... 79
U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN SPACE
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2003
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:09 p.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana
Rohrabacher [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Chairman Rohrabacher. I apologize for keeping us a little
late here. We have had a little bit of a glitch in terms of who
was willing to testify and who is not willing to testify, so--
but I hereby call this meeting of the Space and Aeronautics
Subcommittee to order. And without objection, the Chair will be
granted the authority to recess this meeting at any time.
Hearing no objection.
Last week, in St. Petersburg, President Bush and Russian
President Putin issued a joint statement that is the subject of
today's hearing. Both countries promised to continue to
cooperate in the arena of human space flight and in the ongoing
challenge of assembling and operating the International Space
Station in light of the current Space Shuttle situation. They
committed themselves to taking ``energetic steps'' toward
greater space cooperation.
Today's hearing will explore the benefits and risks of
U.S.-Russian cooperation in space, particularly in light, as I
say, of the tragedy of the Space Shuttle Columbia. These
issues, balancing our nonproliferation concerns against the
benefits of space cooperation, remind me a little bit of that
Russian, I think they call it, matryoshka doll where you can
see it on the outside. It sort of looks like there is--that is
what it is all about, but as you go down, you find layer after
layer of different concerns and different things within the
issue. So foreign--U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis Russia is
almost as complicated as rocket science issues, but of course,
our Subcommittee does deal with rocket science issues.
The U.S.-Russian partnership on the Space Station over the
years has been frustrating. And I have followed that very
closely over the years, and that has been frustrating. And that
especially was frustrating when our Russian partners failed to
meet their commitments about a decade ago. But during--but in
terms of the chaotic scene in Russia, that now appears to be
stabilizing, as we would hope it would be, and a new potential
may well be on the horizon.
I am pleased that the United States and Russia are
continuing to combat the threat posed by proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. And while there is reason for
optimism in terms of this relationship, let us always remember
the words of my former boss, ``Trust but verify.''
Specifically, this hearing will explore Russia's ability to
meet its commitments to the Space Station with Soyuz and
Progress flights and our dependence on them. Of particular
interest will be to examine calls from the United States
industry for Congress and NASA to clarify the interpretations
of the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Americans and Russians can
work together on future space enterprises that will maximize
our individual national goals and capabilities. We can do more
by working together with the Russians than we can--than each of
us could do working separately. We could benefit by working
together, not just in terms of financial profit, but by working
toward mutual goals.
And when it comes to making the Space Station a success, I
believe that the United States companies should work with
Russian companies. But it must be with companies that are not
involved with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
That is clear that there is a--and it is clear that there is a
restriction on working with the Russian Government in terms of
as long as there is a proliferation question. I, however, would
advocate that we can work company to company, American company
to Russian company, and still be within the bounds of this
nonproliferation legislation.
Our relationship with Russia has changed in the past three
years. Significant progress has been made since the days that
our space dollars ended up financing lucky Russian bureaucrats,
known as apparatchiks. But let us not dwell on the mistakes of
the 1990's nor let us repeat those mistakes. Let us, instead,
chart a positive course for the future, and to me, achieving
our space goals, by definition, means working with the Russians
to make sure we can accomplish what we can accomplish.
So with that said, I will be happy to now turn to Bart
Gordon for his opening statement.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good morning
everyone. I want to welcome you to today's hearing. I look
forward to your testimony. I also want to thank Chairman
Rohrabacher for holding this hearing. It is a very timely
hearing and a very important hearing.
U.S.-Russian space cooperation has been an important part
of our space program since the early 1990's. And today, it is
critical to the continued survival of the International Space
Station. With the Space Shuttle fleet grounded, it is no
exaggeration to say that we are just one Progress or Soyuz
failure away from having to pull the crew off of the Space
Station. If that happens, the rest of the Space Station will go
up significantly.
It is clear that the Iran Nonproliferation Act has
complicated the situation. However, a discussion of how fast to
achieve the Nation's nonproliferation goals is not the purpose
of this hearing. And Members may have different views on
whether linking the Space Station program to nonproliferation
is a good idea. The fact of the matter is that the Iran
Nonproliferation Act had been public law since 2000. In light
of that, Congress needs to hear from the Administration in
specific terms how it will protect the considerable taxpayer
investment in the Space Station.
And Mr. Schumacher, in your testimony that you submitted,
it was rather brief. It didn't really go into these questions.
So let me, since you are going to have some extra time, I would
like to pose these questions so that you could help us in your
testimony, if you don't mind. The United States is responsible
for providing Space Station crew return support for non-Russian
astronauts starting in the year 2006. How will the
Administration meet that commitment and still comply with the
Iran Nonproliferation Act? Secondly, the Space Shuttle fleet
was grounded for more than 21/2 years after the Challenger
accident. How will the Administration ensure that the Space
Station can continue to operate if the Shuttle fleet is
grounded that long again? And whether or not the Administration
is expecting the Russians or other Space Station international
partners to pay for the Soyuz and Progress flights until the
Shuttle starts flying again as well as from 2006 onward, and
have the partners, in fact, agreed to pay? And if so, is there
a signed agreement?
And I will just point out, I understand, Mr. Schumacher,
that you are going to be Mr. O'Keefe's new Chief of Staff, and
congratulations on that important position. Similar questions
were submitted to him on February the 27th, so hopefully you
could maybe give us a first installment today and then you can
look for those questions there in the office and help us with
this. It is something that is important. And again, these are
not easy questions. I--you know, and there won't be easy
answers. I don't intend to say that. We have to start this
process of trying to figure out where we are going.
NASA is dependent upon Russia's spacecraft to keep the
Space Station operational until the Shuttle flights resume.
Since the Administration canceled the U.S. Space Station Crew
Return Vehicle in 2001, NASA is totally dependent on the
Russian Soyuz CRV until the end of this decade. And finally,
the only alternative to the Space Shuttle for getting crews
into the space over the next 10 years is the Russian Soyuz
spacecraft. So it is not enough to say that today there hasn't
been a need for NASA to seek an exemption or to change the Iran
Nonproliferation Act. Given existing commitments and other
realities coming over the next 10 years, the Administration
needs to tell us or at least start the process of telling us
and trying to figure this out, you know, what to do and what we
can do with these commitments and realities.
Again, we have got a lot of ground to cover. Thank you for
being here. And I look forward to hearing your suggestions.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. Without
objection, the opening statement of other Members will be put
into the record, but I would like to now, at this point, extend
to the Chairman of Full Committee any--the--if he would like to
say a few words, we would love to have them.
Mr. Boehlert. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
want to commend you for having this important oversight
hearing. This is the type of thing we do day after day, week
after week. It is critically important.
I think the International Space Station and the
transportation system now serving it provide a testimony to the
benefit derived from a meaningful working partnership between
the United States and Russia. And I would ask, Mr. Chairman,
that you consider inserting in the record at this juncture the
statements of President Bush and Putin arrived at last week. I
think they are very important and reassuring, and I thank you
for it.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Yes, their statements will be
inserted in the record without objection. And anything further,
Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Boehlert. That is it, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Well, we are very, very pleased
whenever the Chairman of the Full Committee graces our
Subcommittee. And we appreciate your involvement and your
guidance.
So without objection, we will include that reference to the
statements issued by President Putin and President Bush in the
record. (See Charter, Attachment 1, p. 11.)
As I said, other Members here will have to put their
opening statements in the written record, and I--hearing no
objection, so ordered. I also ask unanimous consent to insert
at the appropriate place in the record the background
memorandum prepared by the Majority Staff for this hearing.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
U.S.-Russian Cooperation
in Space
wednesday, june 11, 2003
2:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose of Hearing
On Wednesday, June 11, 2003, at 2:00 p.m. in Room 2318 of the
Rayburn House Office Building, the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee
will hold a hearing on U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space. This hearing
will explore the benefits and risks of U.S.-Russian cooperation on
space programs. Specifically, the hearing will review Russia's
participation in the International Space Station (ISS) program and the
Russian Space Agency's (RSA) ability to provide near-term and long-term
support for the ISS with Soyuz and Progress space vehicles. Members
will examine how NASA has interpreted Section 6 of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act (INA) of 2000, how the INA has affected U.S.-
Russian space collaboration, and how INA policies have influenced
Russian nonproliferation. In addition, the hearing will also review
other areas of technical collaboration in space between the U.S. and
Russia and how best to organize these collaborations between government
and industry.
Major Issues for Congress
Joint Statement on U.S.-Russia Cooperation in Space. On June 1st,
President Bush and Russian President Putin issued a Joint Statement on
Cooperation in Space that committed the U.S. to safely returning the
Space Shuttle to flight and Russia to meeting the Space Station crew
transport and logistics resupply requirements until the Shuttle returns
to flight. The statement also reaffirmed a U.S.-Russia commitment to
take ``energetic steps'' to enhance cooperation in space technologies
and techniques. How will Russia fund its commitments for the Space
Station?
Reliance on the Russians to Support the Space Station. U.S. human
spaceflight is completely reliant on the Russian Soyuz and Progress
space vehicles for all crew transport and rescue as well as cargo
delivery to the Space Station while the Space Shuttle fleet is
grounded. Even when the Space Shuttle fleet returns to flight, U.S.
human spaceflight will still rely on the Russian Soyuz vehicle for
Space Station crew rescue. Several NASA reports call into question the
inability of RSA to support the Space Station over the next several
years without additional funding.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA). Section 6 of the INA prevents the
U.S. Government from providing payments to the Russian Government,
including the RSA, in connection with the ISS unless certain conditions
are met. U.S. industry has raised questions about whether the INA
allows U.S. contractors to enter into relationships with Russian
contractors on Space Station work.
Background on Russia's Participation in the International Space
Station. The history of the Cold War and human spaceflight are closely
intertwined with U.S.-Soviet/Russian foreign relations. In 1993,
President Clinton invited Russia into the international partnership
(Europe, Canada, and Japan were already partners) to build the Space
Station. The primary reasons behind this invitation were to promote
Russian adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and
promote nonproliferation by helping Russia's aerospace industry shift
from military to civilian work. Between 1994 and 1998, NASA paid the
Russian Space Agency approximately $800 million to build the Zarya
space station module, support the Shuttle-Mir program, and other
spaceflight activities while the RSA agreed to build and launch the
Zvezda Service Module as well as Soyuz and Progress crew and cargo
vehicles to support the Space Station.
Throughout the past 10 years, Russia had financial problems and
schedule delays in meeting its commitments to the Space Station
program. Also, during the 1990s, several reports raised concerns that
the RSA and Russian aerospace industry were proliferating weapons
technologies to rogue states. In response to these concerns, the House
and Senate unanimously (419-0 in the House and 98-0 in the Senate)
passed the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) that became law on March 14,
2000.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) restricts the U.S. Government
from making payments to the RSA or any organization under its
jurisdiction in connection with the International Space Station unless
the President determines that the Russian Government is not
proliferating any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or ballistic
missile technology to Iran. Exceptions to this restriction are allowed
in cases of crew safety, and support for the Russian Zvezda Service
Module (See Attachment 3 for more detailed background on U.S.-Russia
Space Cooperation and Attachment 5 for the relevant portions of the
INA). Key issues to consider:
Has Section 6 of the INA helped stem proliferation
between Russia and Iran?
How has Section 6 of the INA impacted the Space
Station program?
Reliance on Russian Support to the Space Station. The Space Shuttle
Columbia tragedy and subsequent grounding of the Shuttle fleet has made
the U.S. human spaceflight program completely reliant on the Russian
Soyuz and Progress space vehicles for all crew transport and rescue as
well as cargo delivery to the International Space Station while the
Space Shuttle fleet is grounded. RSA informed the ISS international
partners at the February 26th Multilateral Configuration Board meeting
that while RSA agreed to the accelerated production schedule for
Progress cargo vehicles (see Attachment 2) additional funds from the
international partners were needed to meet that schedule. Since then,
the Space Station international partners have agreed to a Progress and
Soyuz flight schedule while the Space Shuttle fleet is grounded, but
have not yet found the necessary funds for those Russian flights. NASA
described its concern last April:
L``The concern was based on the fact that Russian performance
appeared to depend on the receipt of `off-budget' funds from
the sale of flight opportunities [space tourist flights] on the
Soyuz missions. The European Space Agency (ESA) had arranged to
purchase two of the four available flight opportunities, but
prospects for the other two were unclear. The grounding of the
Space Shuttle fleet and the subsequent Multilateral
Coordination Board-agreed upon interim operations plan have put
additional financial strain on Rosaviakosmos [Russian Space
Agency]. To assist during this difficult period, ESA has agreed
to defer the flights of its astronauts, while continuing
payments to Rosaviakosmos for the flights on the original
schedule.''\1\
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\1\ NASA Bimonthly Russian Performance Report with regard to the
International Space Station January 1, 2003-February 28, 2003, dated
April 14, 2003.
Unless the Administration requests a waiver to the Iran
Nonproliferation Act, additional funds for Russia's support to the
Space Station will need to come from the international partners other
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
than the U.S.
Long-Term Viability of Russian Support for the Space Station. Even
before the Columbia tragedy made issues about reliance on Russian
Progress and Soyuz flights more acute, NASA reported ``uncertainties
associated with the outlook for Russia's future funding'' \2\ for the
Space Station in its bimonthly performance reports to the Committee.
The agreement between the international partners called upon Russia to
provide Soyuz capsules to serve as crew rescue vehicles through 2006.
These NASA reports call into question the ability of the Russian Space
Agency to support the Space Station over the next several years without
additional funding from the Russian Government, the Space Station
international partners, or the sale of more space tourist flights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ NASA Bimonthly Russian Performance Report with regard to the
International Space Station July 1-August 31, 2002, dated November 13,
2002.
How is NASA mitigating the risks to the Space Station
and its crew if the Russian Space Agency is not able to support
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
long-term crew transport/rescue as well as cargo delivery?
Due to NASA's problems in developing a Space Station
crew rescue vehicle and RSA's financial problems, is continued
reliance on the Russian Soyuz a prudent and viable plan?
Safety of the Soyuz Vehicles
The flight of the Russian Soyuz vehicle that returned the
Expedition 6 crew last month raised new questions about the safety of
our reliance on Russian vehicles. This capsule did not re-enter the
Earths atmosphere as planned but re-entered the Earth's atmosphere in
an anomalous ballistic entry, and the capsule landed over 275 miles
from its intended landing target in Kazakhstan. The astronauts
experienced more than 8 G forces versus the normal 4 Gs during this re-
entry. Further, search and rescue crews took more than two hours to
locate the crew. Rescue teams could not pinpoint the crew until they
unfurled a 15-foot auxiliary antenna.
Key issues include:
What actions have the ISS international partners
taken to ensure that the necessary resources are available for
Russian Progress cargo flights to the Space Station?
Are the funding shortfalls for Russian Soyuz and
Progress missions causing any undue safety risks to the Space
Station or its crew while the Shuttle fleet is grounded?
The Iran Nonproliferation Act. The INA prohibits the U.S. Government
from making payments to Russia in connection with the ISS and prohibits
payments to any other entity if the U.S. Government anticipates that
such payments will be passed on to an entity proliferating to Iran.
Recently, industry bidders for the Space Station Cargo Mission Request
for Proposals (RFP) sought guidance from NASA on the applicability of
INA restrictions to U.S.-Russian company subcontracts. NASA asked for
information from potential bidders on their proposed Russian
subcontractor relationships and impact on the bidder's team if the
Russian company could not participate in the work. Key issues include:
What impacts have potential bidders to the ISS Cargo
Mission RFP identified to NASA as a result of this guidance?
To what degree does Section 6 of the INA restrict
U.S.-Russian companies relationships on launch vehicles or
cargo carriers to the Space Station?
Collaboration with Russia on Space Programs. The Iran Nonproliferation
Act only covers U.S.-Russian collaboration on the International Space
Station, but the U.S. and Russia collaborate in several other space
programs. NASA provided a summary of its cooperation with Russia in
Attachment 4.
The joint U.S.-Russia statement says that the two countries ``are
prepared to take energetic steps to enhance our cooperation in the
application of space technology and techniques.'' Other than the Space
Station, space launch is the main area of collaboration between the
U.S. and Russia. These joint ventures are formed between U.S. and
Russian companies rather than through government-to-government
collaboration.
Rocket Engines. Lockheed Martin's Atlas V uses the RD-180 first
stage engine built by Energomash, a Russian company, and Sea Launch is
a partnership between Boeing, Energia, and Yuzhnoye/Yuzhmash using the
Ukrainian Zenit rocket and Russian upper stage engines. Several U.S.
commercial satellites are launched from Russia or Kazakhstan.
Space Nuclear Power. NASA, through the Department of Energy,
purchases plutonium fuel from Russia for its in-space nuclear power.
During the early 1990s, the U.S. purchased the Russian Topaz space
nuclear reactor in order to analyze its design for future systems.
However, further collaboration between the U.S. and Russia in NASA's
new nuclear systems development appears doubtful.
Russian Collaboration with other Nations. The Russian Space Agency
also has a number of cooperative ventures with other countries in
space--France, Germany, Canada, China, India, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Pakistan, Portugal, Israel, and the European Space Agency. Of
particular interest, RSA signed agreements to support China's human
spaceflight program. Russia also has ties with India and Pakistan's
rocket program.
What are some areas of technical collaboration in
space between the U.S. and Russia that would provide meaningful
benefit to the U.S. space program while also discouraging
Russian proliferation of space and missile capabilities to
other countries?
How best should these cooperative space endeavors be
organized, either between U.S.-Russian companies or between the
governments?
Witnesses
Amb. Steve Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, State Department
Mr. John Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for External
Relations
Mr. Robert M. Davis, President and CEO of the California Space
Authority
Mr. Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center
Witness Questions
The witnesses were asked to address the following questions in
their testimony.
Questions for Ambassador Steve Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, State
Department
How has the INA, along with other factors, influenced
the activities and behavior of Russian Government, Russian
Space Agency, and other organizations under its jurisdiction to
exert more control to stem the proliferation of space and
missile technology from Russia to states such as Iran?
Is the State Department actively monitoring Russian
collaboration in space and missile technology with the U.S. and
other countries and keeping other Federal agencies informed of
these Russian collaborations?
What is the State Department's role in working with
NASA to ensure that the INA is interpreted and implemented
properly?
Questions for Mr. John Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for
External Relations
What have been the benefits and difficulties from
NASA-Russian Space Agency cooperation on the ISS over the past
three years?
What actions have the International Partners taken to
ensure that the Russian Space Agency has the necessary
resources to accelerate the production for Progress resupply
flights and meet the cargo needs for the ISS while the Space
Shuttle is grounded?
Given the problems with the Soyuz TMA-1 return flight
with the Expedition 6 crew, have NASA and the Russian Space
Agency considered any changes to remedy safety concerns with
Soyuz flight operations? If so, what are those changes?
Have any potential bidders for NASA procurements
identified any adverse impacts due to NASA's interpretation of
Section 6 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act?
To what degree does NASA believe that Section 6 of
the Iran Nonproliferation Act restricts U.S. contractor-to-
Russian contractor relationships?
Questions for Mr. Robert M. Davis, President and CEO of the California
Space Authority
What are the benefits and risks when U.S. companies
collaborate with the Russian Space Agency or Russian companies
on space projects?
What areas of technical collaboration with Russian
space industry would you recommend that U.S. aerospace
companies pursue?
How has the INA affected U.S. aerospace industry
collaboration with Russia?
Questions for Mr. Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
What areas of collaboration between the U.S. and
Russia in space have been beneficial or difficult over the past
three years?
How reliant is Russia on funding from other countries
to maintain its space and missile capabilities? In what areas
is Russia collaborating with other countries on space
capabilities? What are the proliferation concerns of these
collaborations?
What areas of future collaboration in space would you
recommend between the U.S. and Russia governments and
companies?
How have the behavior and actions of the Russian
government and Russian Space Agency changed over the past three
years in order to better stem the proliferation of space and
missile technology from Russia?
Attachments:
1. LJoint Statement by President Bush and Russian President
Putin on U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space
2. LChart: MCB-Approved Soyuz and Progress Launch Schedule Re-
Plan 2003-2004
3. LCongressional Research Service Background Paper
4. LNASA Summary on U.S.-Russia Space Cooperation
5. LSections 6 and 7 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000
Attachment 1
Joint Statement by President Bush and Russian President Putin on U.S.-
Russian Cooperation in Space. On June 1, 2003 during their meeting in
St. Petersburg, Russia, the U.S. and Russian presidents issued the
following joint statement:
LThe loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia has underscored the
historic role of the United States and Russia as partners in
space exploration, who have persevered despite tragedy and
adversity. During this challenging time, our partnership has
deepened and the International Space Station (ISS) program
remains strong. The extraordinary efforts of our countries
continue.
LThe United States is committed to safely returning the Space
Shuttle to flight, and the Russian Federation is committed to
meeting the ISS crew transport and logistics resupply
requirements necessary to maintain our joint American astronaut
and Russian cosmonaut teams on board the ISS until the Space
Shuttle returns to flight.
LWe confirm our mutual aspiration to ensure the continued
assembly and viability of the International Space Station as a
world-class research facility, relying on our unprecedented
experience of bilateral and multilateral interaction in space.
We reaffirm our commitment to the mission of human space flight
and are prepared to take energetic steps to enhance our
cooperation in the application of space technology and
techniques.\3\
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\3\ White House Office of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2003.
Attachment 4
United States-Russia Space Cooperation Summary
Background
NASA has been engaged in cooperative activities with Russia for
nearly 40 years, starting with modest contacts in fields such as space
biology and medicine, geodesy and geodynamics. In 1972, the United
States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for
Peaceful Purposes (Civil Space Agreement), which expanded these
contacts into other areas of study including space science, Earth
science, satellite-based search and rescue and later, human space
flight. Cooperation with the USSR reached a high point with the Apollo-
Soyuz Test Project in 1975. The Civil Space Agreement was renewed in
1971, but was allowed to lapse in 1982 as a sign of U.S.
dissatisfaction with Soviet behaviors, especially in Afghanistan. In
1987 the Agreement was revived and it was subsequently re-established
as an agreement with the Russian Federation in 1992. This Agreement was
renewed for additional five-year terms in 1997 and 2002.
In October 1992, the United States and Russia signed an
Implementing Agreement for the Shuttle-Mir Program, under which 9
missions were flown to the Mir Space Station by the Space Shuttle,
including 7 docking missions and 7 long duration visits on orbit by
NASA astronauts. Discussions on broadening NASA's cooperation with
Russia took place in 1993 in the context of the Space Station redesign
effort. A December 1993 Protocol to the Agreement, laid the foundations
for U.S.-Russia cooperation in the development of the ISS. NASA's
cooperation with the newly formed Russian Space Agency (now known as
the Russian Aviation and Agency or Rosaviakosmos) on the ISS program
was formalized in June 1994 with the signing of an ``Interim
Agreement'' for the Station's design, development and assembly. In the
following years, the U.S. State Department and NASA worked with the
existing ISS partner countries and Russia to negotiate and conclude an
overarching set of agreements on the ISS. This effort culminated with
the signature of a multilateral Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) and
bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) on the ISS program in
January 1998.
Current Human Space Flight Cooperation
International Space Station: In the 1990s, Rosaviakosmos struggled
to meet Russia's commitments to the ISS due to a shortage of Russian
Government funding. These funding deficiencies had a negative impact on
the ISS program's assembly schedule. The first element of the ISS, the
U.S.-funded, Russian-built and launched FGB (Zarya) was successfully
completed under a contract with Boeing. However, the launch of the
first Russian-funded element, the Service Module (Zvezda), was delayed
by approximately two years before it was successfully launched in July
2000. Since that time, Russia has been meeting its obligations under
the ISS agreements. Permanent human presence on ISS began on November
1, 2000, with the arrival of the Expedition One crew, commanded by U.S.
astronaut Bill Shepherd. Russian and U.S. crew members have alternated
command of the joint ISS expedition crews for the last two and a half
years. Following the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia on February 1,
2003, the ISS partnership has relied on Russian logistics and crew
transportation capabilities to sustain operation of the ISS in
accordance with the partnership-agreed plan for operations. This
circumstance has prompted the Russian Government to adjust its funding
plans for 2003 and review plans for 2004. On June 1, 2003, at the U.S.-
Russia summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, Presidents Bush and Putin
released a joint statement that emphasized our mutual commitments to
International Space Station and our aspiration to complete this world-
class research facility together with our international partners.
Current Earth Science Cooperation
NASA has cooperated with the USSR and Russia for over 30 years in
the fields of Earth science, global change research and environmental
monitoring. The overall goal of this cooperation is to advance our
understanding of the Earth's systems through the use of space-based
sensors, which make quantitative measurements of the state and behavior
of the Earth's atmosphere, ocean, land surface, biology and interior.
NASA's cooperation with Russia is coordinated through the joint
U.S.-Russia Earth Sciences Joint Working Group (ESJWG). NASA and the
Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) are the co-chairs of the ESJWG, and
other representatives participate from various U.S. and Russian
Government agencies, universities and institutes, including
Rosaviakosmos. In between formal meetings of the ESJWG, scientists
continue cooperative activities and initiate ideas for future
collaboration to be brought forward to the next ESJWG meeting. The
ESJWG has met twelve times since 1998, with the next session scheduled
for fall 2003, in Washington, D.C. Examples of the activities
coordinated through the ESJWG include:
Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment (SAGE III)/Meteor 3M mission:
The SAGE III/Meteor 3M mission is NASA's major space flight mission and
highest priority cooperation with Russia in the area of Earth science.
The mission is providing long-term, global measurements of key
components of the Earth's atmosphere and conducts important scientific
investigations of the state of the ozone layer. The satellite was
launched December 2001 on a Zenit-2 rocket from the Baikonur Cosmodrome
in Kazakhstan. Several Russian researchers are full members of the SAGE
III Science Team.
High Resolution Picture Transmission (HRPT) Stations and Advanced Very
High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) data: This cooperative research
effort is focused on the study of boreal forests and to provide data to
international programs, such as the International Geosphere Biosphere
Program (IGBP). In this cooperation, three NASA-loaned HRPT stations
are installed in Siberia for the collection of 1-km image data from the
AVHRR instrument on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's (NOAA) polar orbiting satellites. The raw, processed
and analyzed data is available to the international science community
on a full and open basis.
U.S. Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor (SeaWiFS) program: Russia is
participating in the SeaWiFS program, which observes the world's oceans
from space to measure ocean color (phytoplankton) in efforts to
understand the role of the oceans in the global carbon cycle. A
representative from the RAS Shirshov Institute of Oceanology (SIO) is a
principal investigator on NASA's SeaWiFS mission and a member of the
science team.
Space Geodesy: NASA is currently cooperating with RAS and the Ukrainian
Academy of Sciences in a trilateral cooperative effort in Very Long
Baseline Interferometry (VLBI) geodetic experiments. This cooperation
encompasses the use of a NASA-loaned data acquisition system installed
in St. Petersburg, and of the radiotelescope of the Crimean
Astrophysical Observatory in Simeiz, Ukraine. The experiments focus on
improved accuracy in VLBI measurements required for studies of Earth
orientation, angular momentum and crustal dynamics. In addition, Russia
and the U.S. are cooperating on the laser tracking of satellites of
mutual interest, including U.S., Russian and Italian geodetic
satellites, Russian GLONASS satellites, U.S. Global Positioning
Satellites, and the U.S./French TOPEX/Poseidon oceanography satellite.
Aerosol Robotic NETwork (AERONET): NASA has loaned several sun
photometers to various Russian institutions in support of the global
AERONET program. The sun photometers measure vital aerosol optical
properties and water vapor, which contribute to a more detailed
understanding of global atmospheric change phenomena with a particular
focus on the assessment of air quality.
Current Space Science Cooperation
Mars Exploration: NASA has cooperated with Russian space scientists on
Mars exploration since the 1980s. Recent collaboration has centered on
the Russian High Energy Neutron Detector (HEND) instrument, launched on
the NASA 2001 Mars Odyssey spacecraft. Since Odyssey arrived at Mars,
the REND device has returned significant data regarding possible water
on Mars.
Astrophysics: NASA-Russia astrophysics cooperation has centered on two
Russian missions: Spectrum-X-Gamma (SXG) and Radioastron. SXG is a
Russian high-energy astrophysics observatory under development since
the late 1980s and originally conceived with a launch date of 1991.
NASA and Rosaviakosmos signed the MOU on SXG cooperation in June 1995.
Due to continuing Russian Government funding constraints, Russia has
terminated development on the baseline mission and is currently
redesigning the project.
In March 2002, Rosaviakosmos announced that SXG was no longer its
top priority in astrophysics and that Radioastron (a radioastronomy
mission) had assumed this role. Like SXG, this mission was conceived in
the 1980s, with a planned launch in the mid-1990s, but continual
shortfalls in financial resources have also left Russian obligations on
this mission incomplete. NASA and Rosaviakosmos signed the MOU on
Radioastron cooperation in February 1997. NASA was originally slated to
provide a series of four ground tracking stations to support this
mission, but with Radioastron far from completion, the stations have
been decommissioned.
Scientific Balloon Flights: NASA-Russia scientific balloon cooperation
began in 1992 with the establishment of a Balloon Implementation Team.
Two successful flights were held in the mid-1990s before over-flight
clearance was denied by Russia. The two sides have negotiated a long-
term Scientific Ballooning Implementing Agreement (IA) for future
flights over Russia and possible Russian science participation on NASA
missions. It is expected that this new agreement will be finalized
later this summer.
International Living With A Star: Russia is participating in the
ongoing Office of Space Science (OSS) Living With a Star Program,
including participation in the International Living With a Star
Executive Steering Committee that held its first meeting in January
2003. The goal of this endeavor is to stimulate, strengthen and
coordinate space research in order to understand the physical processes
that govern variability in the connected Sun-Earth system.
Chairman Rohrabacher. We have a distinguished panel with us
today to provide their unique perspectives on this issue.
Unfortunately, we don't have all of the members of the
distinguished panel who could provide us a perspective. One was
unable to join us, and we will talk about that later, but we
have asked our witnesses to, if possible, to summarize their
testimony to five minutes. And we will have a robust discussion
thereafter.
One of the reasons we have a hearing panel is so that we
can have an interchange of ideas that will benefit the Members
of Congress as well as add to the national debate.
Unfortunately today, the Administration, or at least the State
Department, has determined that if it has a witness to present
to Congress, or at least to this subcommittee, that it--that
that witness must testify independently, not sitting next to or
part of a panel of other witnesses. This was a demand made upon
this Chairman by the State Department. And let me note, having
worked in the Executive Branch, and now having been elected to
a position in the Legislative Branch, it is not my reading of
the Constitution that the Executive Branch will dictate to the
Legislative Branch the format of our hearings.
And I think that this is an issue that concerns all of us
on both sides of the aisle. I think that the Administration
should think very thoroughly this issue out before they decide
to try to force this policy upon the Congress. It does not
speak well of any Administration that is committed to openness
and transparency and an honest discussion of the issues to try
to put restrictions on the type of exchange that witnesses--
their witnesses before Congress can participate in.
So I would hope that we can work this little issue out, but
it must be worked out with due respect to both the rights of
the Executive Branch and the rights of the Legislative Branch.
And I find this format to be the most informative. I have never
had objection from the other side of the aisle on this. I don't
know of any party who has ever objected to this format. I
happen to share the same party as the person now who heads the
Executive Branch. There--I don't see why this is an issue, but
it will be if we continue to have this type of----
Mr. Boehlert. Mr. Chairman, if I may.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Yes. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Boehlert. Just let me say that I wish to associate
myself with your remarks. It is not clear to me. I think it is
somewhat hazy whether this is an Administration policy or one
department responding in this manner. And I hope we can get
some clarification on that.
Chairman Rohrabacher. I will--it will be up to all of us to
work together to get that clarification and to try to work
something out where we respect the rights of both parties and
both the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch.
So our first witness was to be Ambassador Steve Pifer, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian
Affairs. That meant that he oversees our relationship with
Russia.
As you see before us today, Ambassador Pifer is not here to
answer questions, not here to participate in the discussion and
I regret that. And that is unfortunate.
Our second witness is John Schumacher, who is in charge of
NASA's external relations and NASA's lead negotiator with the
Russian Space Agency. I am glad to welcome him here today, and
you may proceed with your testimony.
Mr. Boehlert. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would observe that
Mr. Schumacher is a very valuable member of this
Administration. So that would indicate that this is not an
Administration policy, at least at this juncture, as far as we
are aware of, not to let Members testify in the manner in which
you have indicated is most helpful to the Congress.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Yes, sir. And make sure that the
record is straight on that. There was a serious negotiation as
to whether he would be here and be on the panel. And
Administrator O'Keefe wisely decided to send him and to be part
of the regular format that we have here in the Subcommittee.
And I would applaud Administrator O'Keefe for demonstrating
that he wants to take the extra step in order to work in
cooperation with this subcommittee.
Mr. Schumacher, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN D. SCHUMACHER, NASA ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Mr. Schumacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr.
Boehlert. I will make sure that your very clear remarks are
conveyed.
Thank you again for having this hearing. I greatly
appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Committee on
U.S.-Russia cooperation in space. It is an important topic.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will submit a copy of
my full testimony for the record and make a brief oral
statement to summarize the testimony.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Without objection.
Mr. Schumacher. First of all, and not exactly a topic of
this hearing, it is great to report to you that Mars
Exploration Rover named ``Spirit'' just this Sunday launched
successfully yesterday afternoon from Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station on its way to a January 4 arrival date at Mars. The
second Mars exploration Rover named ``Opportunity'' is
scheduled for launch on the 24th. They join an Express mission
and a Japanese mission all on the way to Mars for dates later
this year and early next year.
And exactly in line with the subject of this hearing, a
Russian Progress successfully docked with the International
Space Station this morning. I talked to the program office a
little while ago. The hatch is open and they are getting ready
to unload cargo, so another good news piece. I will speak to
that Progress launch and what it involved in the relationship
to the partnership later in my remarks.
I think everyone is pretty much aware that during the last
decade, NASA has engaged in cooperative activities with Russia
in the fields of aeronautics, Earth science, space science, and
human space flight. The accomplishments have included historic
steps forward in human space flight by our astronauts and
cosmonauts as well as important projects such as our joint work
on the study of the Earth's ozone layer, coordination of
research on the Sun-Earth system, and cooperation on the study
of Mars.
Building a strong human space flight partnership with our
colleagues in Russia has yielded many benefits. This has been
particularly evidenced since the loss of Columbia on February 1
of this year. The redundancy and unique capabilities provided
by Russian spacecraft have made it possible for the
International Space Station partnership to maintain a crew
aboard the Space Station despite the grounding of the Space
Shuttle fleet. This has also allowed the ISS partnership to
continue ISS operations and scientific research and to prepare
for a resumption of construction of the Space Station once the
Space Shuttle fleet returns to flight status.
The concrete results of this unprecedented cooperation with
Russia were clearly evident on April 26 when NASA astronaut, Ed
Lu, and Russian cosmonaut Yuri Malenchenko launched aboard a
Russian Soyuz spacecraft to begin their ongoing six-month
mission. This success was followed on May 4 with the landing of
the ISS Expedition 6 crew, Ken Bowersox, Don Pettit, and
Nikolai Budarin, ending their 51/2-month mission.
I am also pleased to be able to report to this committee
that the Progress launch was successful and is proceeding. The
vehicle was launched on June 8 and carried 5,300 pounds of
food, fuel, water, and other supplies to support the Expedition
7 crew and continued ISS ops. This Progress mission is the
eleventh Progress flight to the International Space Station.
The challenges of the last four months since the tragic
loss of Columbia have drawn the ISS partnership, which also
includes participation from Japan, 11 European nations, and
Canada into an effective and very integrated team. At the start
of 2003, the partnership was well on its way to achieving ISS
Core Complete on schedule in early 2004. In 2003, we had talked
about a lot that it was to be a very demanding year technically
and managerially, as the partnership planned to execute five
Russian and five U.S. missions to the ISS and closeout
multilateral work on selecting an ISS configuration. Within
hours of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, the ISS
partners offered their full support and began work to address
our new challenges. By the end of February, the partnership had
a new plan for interim operations while the Space Shuttle
remain grounded.
The partnership has continued to implement this plan and
update it as necessary. In particular, the Russian Aviation and
Space Agency, Rosaviakosmos, has demonstrated a steadfast
commitment to the ISS program by assuming increased
responsibility for operational support of ISS. The Progress
that just docked is a great example of that and how fast people
move when--with the use--the switch from crew rotation, which
was supposed to be on Space Station to two, the Soyuz, that was
done in a couple of months. The crews were retrained. The
vehicle was made safe, and launched on time, and brought
another crew home. At the same time, work was made across the
partnership. And Mr. Gordon, in response to your comments, I
will get into that in more detail later, if that is acceptable,
a lot of work, very hard work and a lot of hours between U.S.,
Russia, and other partners on these very detailed technical
looks at what was needed to sustain human presence on Station,
conduct research, and keep Station safe and operational until a
shuttle returns to flight.
On this Progress, the Russians, again, in this short time
period, installed an internal water tank, so water could be
carried up. This was not the configuration of Progress that was
to carry water. They also actually literally strapped in,
literally, five gallon cans of water into there. We had a
cooling pump fail on one of the U.S. cooling systems. The
Russians went in and installed the hard components that allowed
that cooling pump to be hard-wired, if you will, you know,
locked into the Progress and carried up. The food, they--the
Russians--looked and worked a way where they could double the
amount of food that was brought up on this Progress. All things
at a fast turnaround, we are going to make this work is the
type of great cooperative effort between the two of us. So I
highlight those types of things, because that is not easy to
do. That is a lot of engineering, a lot of work on center of
gravity, all types of things that--to get that Progress and get
some--as much backup on the Station as we can for our two
astronauts that are up there.
In summary, our relationship with the Russian space program
is strong and effective. President Bush and President Putin
highlighted the importance of this cooperation, the Joint
Statement both Chairmen have referred to. And it is really
significant that both Presidents--I mean, they picked several
key issues they wanted to highlight, and one of them was space
cooperation and, in particular, the importance of sustaining
and moving ahead with the completion of assembly and the
operation and use of the Space Station.
We greatly appreciate the willingness of Russia, as with
all of our ISS partners, to act decisively to address the
challenges faced in the wake of the Columbia tragedy.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my oral statement. Mr. Gordon,
I ask for indulgence, and I will get into those in more detail
after the other gentlemen get to do their opening comments. I
would very much be glad to, and I look forward to any other
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schumacher follows:]
Prepared Statement of John D. Schumacher
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee today on
the subject of NASA's cooperation with the Russian Federation in civil
space. As highlighted by President Bush and Russian President Putin
during their discussions on the first of this month in Saint
Petersburg, ``The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia has underscored
the historic role of the United States and Russia as partners in space
exploration, who have persevered despite tragedy and adversity. During
this challenging time, our partnership has deepened and the
International Space Station (ISS) Program remains strong.''
During the last decade, NASA has engaged in cooperative activities
with Russia in the fields of aeronautics, Earth science, space science,
and human space flight. The accomplishments have included the historic
steps forward in human space flight by our astronauts and cosmonauts,
as well as important projects such as our joint work on the study of
the Earth's ozone layer, coordination of research on the Sun-Earth
system, and cooperation on the study of Mars. For example, the Russian
High Energy Neutron Detector (HEND) is an instrument on the NASA 2001
Mars Odyssey spacecraft. Since Odyssey arrived at Mars in October 2001,
the HEND device has returned significant data regarding possible water
on Mars.
Building a strong human space flight partnership with our
colleagues in Russia has yielded many benefits. This has been
particularly evident since the loss of Columbia on February 1, 2003.
The redundancy and unique capabilities provided by Russian spacecraft
have made it possible for the ISS partnership to maintain a crew aboard
the Space Station despite the grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet.
This has also allowed the ISS partnership to continue ISS operations
and scientific research, and to prepare for a resumption of
construction of the ISS, once the Space Shuttle fleet returns to flight
status.
The challenges of the last four months have drawn the ISS
partnership, which also includes participation from Japan, Europe and
Canada, into an even more effective integrated team. At the start of
2003, the ISS partnership was well on its way to achieving ISS Core
Complete on schedule in early 2004. 2003 promised to be a demanding
year technically and managerially, as the partnership planned to
execute five Russian and five U.S. missions to the ISS, and close out
multilateral work on selecting an ISS configuration. Within hours of
the tragic loss of Space Shuttle Columbia, the ISS partners offered
their full support and began work to address our new challenges. By the
end of February, the partnership had a new plan for interim operations
while the Space Shuttle remained grounded. The partnership has
continued to implement this plan and update it as necessary. In
particular, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos) has
demonstrated a steadfast commitment to the ISS program by assuming
increased responsibility for operational support of the ISS.
In early May, the partnership executed the first ISS expedition
crew exchange using Soyuz vehicles. Despite the necessity to re-train
the crew for launch on Soyuz instead of on the Space Shuttle, the
launch of Soyuz TMA-2 (ISS Flight 6S) was successfully accomplished on
schedule. A week later the Expedition 6 crew executed the first return
of U.S. astronauts on a Soyuz vehicle. During reentry the Soyuz TMA-1
executed a back-up reentry profile. Rosaviakosmos appointed a
Commission to investigate this anomaly. The Commission reported on May
26, 2003, that the guidance system on the vehicle erroneously detected
a malfunction and, in accordance with safety protocols, the system
``failed safe'' to the back-up re-entry profile. As another indication
of our close partnership with Rosaviakosmos, NASA has been regularly
briefed on the progress of the Soyuz investigation. Later this summer,
a joint Russian-American team, led by Thomas Stafford, Lt. Gen. USAF
(Ret.) and his Russian counterpart Nikolai Anfimov, will review the
findings of the Russian Commission and report to the NASA Administrator
and the General Director of Rosaviakosmos on the implications for ISS
operational readiness. We are continuing to work closely with Russia in
preparation for the next Soyuz crew exchange planned for October 2003.
The unwavering support of the ISS partners has reaffirmed the
strength and depth of our partnership. NASA has conducted frequent
consultations with its Partners as the Columbia accident investigation
proceeds. These consultations are being held at all levels, including
at the programmatic and technical level, through the Space Station
Control Board; at the program management level, through the
Multilateral Coordination Board; and at the Heads of Agency level. The
ISS partners have scheduled a Multilateral Coordination Board and Heads
of Agency meeting for the end of July.
To date, near-term ISS operational plans and decisions taken by the
partnership have not resulted in a need for NASA to seek an exception
to, or request an amendment of, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.
Mr. Chairman, NASA has conducted a broad range of cooperative civil
space programs with Russia over the last decade. At present, our
relationship with the Russian space program is strong and effective. We
greatly appreciate the willingness of Russia, as with all of our ISS
partners, to act decisively to address the challenges faced in the wake
of the Columbia tragedy. Moreover, we look forward to resuming Space
Shuttle operations so that we can continue the construction of the ISS
and make full use of its remarkable capabilities.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Well, we appreciate you being here to
present that to us. Thank you very much.
Mr. Schumacher. My pleasure, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Our next witness is Bob Davis, who
will represent the United States industry perspective on
cooperative ventures with the Russians in space. And while Mr.
Davis is the President and CEO of the California Space
Authority, his testimony before the Committee today is based on
his own experience in working U.S. industry deals with the
Russians. And the opinions he expresses are his own today, but
he is a man whose opinions have been shaped by his own
experience.
So with those caveats, Mr. Davis, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT M. DAVIS, PRESIDENT AND CEO OF THE
CALIFORNIA SPACE AUTHORITY
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, honorable
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for addressing this
matter of considerable importance to the future of our U.S.
space enterprise community.
As you have heard, my name is Robert M. Davis. I am the
President and Chief Executive Officer of the California Space
Authority, a member-supported, California-based, non-profit
corporation that exists to retain, grow, and create U.S. space
enterprise in an intensively competitive global market that is
highly coveted by all space-faring nations, current and future.
Our constituents have little choice but to compete sometimes on
unequal footing in these tough markets.
As you have heard, the comments and viewpoints expressed
today are my own. They do reflect extensive experience gained
throughout the 1990's for the number of U.S.-Russian company-
to-company and company-to-Russian government dealings and
ongoing monitoring of these projects, most of which continue
today.
With several provisos, I support U.S.-Russian cooperative
space enterprise initiatives and strongly encourage U.S.
Government support of company-to-company projects, particularly
when they contribute to a strong U.S. industrial base. Overall,
aerospace projects performed with Russian entities have been a
positive experience for U.S. companies.
Many companies view the Russians as good, positive
partners. Strong and positive relationships have developed in a
number of instances, and a number of these business ventures
have become very successful over time. Tangible, specific
benefits occur to those companies who enter these arrangements,
from which the United States Government also benefits
significantly, including ostensibly from reductions of Russian
missile technology proliferation elsewhere. Cooperative
aerospace projects gainfully employ Russian companies and
individuals, thereby creating positive behavioral incentives.
U.S. companies have gained highly productive access to
Russian technology and know-how. The opportunity to leverage
technology, particularly in propulsion, metallurgy, ceramics,
optics, and other select areas has significantly advanced U.S.
interests.
Aerospace endeavors have helped bring about Russia's
transition toward a true market economy. A number of early
U.S.-Russian company-to-company dealings broke new ground in
adoption of western business approaches, financial thinking,
and judicial practices. Projects with Russian aerospace
entities expose and teach market-oriented Western economic
philosophy, practices, and operations to Russian entities and
citizens. In kind, we have gained far better understanding of
Russian interests, viewpoints, and objectives.
On the subject of undesirable technology proliferation, it
is difficult to know what else a Russian partner company may be
doing. The Russians are very proud, by their nature, can be
very suspicious, even of one another, and secretive. Their
cultural behaviors and motives can create uncertainty as to
what they are doing, as to whether what they are doing is or
not in the interest of the U.S., particularly as interpreted by
U.S. citizens doing project work.
That said, Russians can be quite trustworthy. After a
failed first deal, my second undertaking built first on gaining
each other's trust and thereafter enacting a relatively simple
contract that became a true, enduring partnership, even when
subjected to extreme Russian Government pressures to abandon
it. That partnership endures and every tenet of the agreement
has been upheld to date. That said, the Russians are tough,
able competitors who have their own needs to satisfy and will
invariably do so.
There are significant U.S. industrial base downsides that
result from U.S.-Russian space cooperative endeavors. Given the
weak, worldwide commercial launch demand, U.S. companies,
particularly in propulsion, are working at 50 percent of
capacity and far worse. A real tangible downside is the loss of
work done in Russia that could be done here. Comparatively
meager and unsustained United States Government space
propulsion investment, as one case in point, is what
stimulated, originally, strategic alliances with Russian
propulsion entities at the probable cost of some U.S. jobs.
While not their preference, perhaps, U.S. company employment
and investment losses are somewhat offset by access to and
selective use of Russian technology, know-how, and U.S.
development projects. Projects such as Sea Launch, Orbital
Space Plane potentially launched on an EELV, or other known ISS
access concepts, do or could make highly productive use of said
Russian capabilities, albeit at some U.S. employment cost.
Absent U.S.-Russian cooperative aerospace endeavors, Russia
will fill the vacuum. If projects are stopped or slowed, Russia
will likely turn to China or increase its dealing with
Russian--excuse me, with European interests. The U.S. would
also lose access and insight into Russian aerospace plans and
technological capabilities, which we may later come to regret.
The U.S. Government should clearly articulate and steadfastly
support policy that enables U.S. Government--excuse me, U.S.-
Russian company to company transactions. I urge the policies,
laws, and regulations be implemented in a fashion that minimize
business disruption.
Mr. Chairman, honorable Members of the Committee, thank you
again for the opportunity to speak with you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert M. Davis
Mr. Chairman, and Honorable Members of the Subcommittee, I would
like to thank you for taking time from your busy schedules to look into
a matter that is of considerable importance to and impact on the future
of our U.S. space enterprise community.
My name is Robert M. Davis. I currently serve as the President and
Chief Executive Officer of the California Space Authority, a member-
supported California-based non-profit corporation, whose purpose is to
Retain, Grow and Create California Space Enterprise. Our membership is
comprised of individuals and entities from industry, academia, labor
and workforce developers, and local government. Our membership includes
a number of companies, large and small, from whom you hear frequently
in behalf of their and our nations' aerospace interests. The name of my
corporation implies that we are interested only in the well being of
California Space Enterprise. However, Space Enterprise is an intensely
competitive, internationally coveted industry, and many of our
constituents compete in tough global markets. The California Space
Authority is therefore keenly attentive to policy positions taken by
the U.S. Government that bear on the future competitiveness of our
industry and nation and therefore do not limit our interests and voice
solely to the confines of the borders of the State of California.
While I appear before you today as an employee of the California
Space Authority, the comments and viewpoints today are my own. They are
drawn from and reflect extensive earlier experience that I gained
throughout the 1990s with a number of U.S.-Russian company to company
and company to Russian government dealings and to which I continue to
pay ongoing attention. I am flattered to have been invited to appear
before you today, and thank you for the opportunity to offer and share
my views as a U.S. space enterprise industrialist.
With several provisos that I will define in my subsequent remarks,
I support U.S.-Russian Space Cooperation and initiatives, and strongly
encourage that our policy-makers and policies support company to
company cooperative pursuits, in particular where they contribute to a
strong U.S. industrial space enterprise base, and compliment our
National Security interests.
In support of the aforementioned statement, I offer the following
points for the Committee's consideration:
Overall, U.S. industry dealings with Russian space
entities have been a positive experience for U.S. companies.
Many U.S. entities have found their Russian partners to be good
partners. It is fair to say that strong and positive
relationships have developed over the years in a variety of
areas. A number of these business ventures have grown to be
very successful and they have gained use of technologies that
are beneficial to U.S. space enterprise companies' interests.
Later in my remarks, I will underscore what my own experiences
have taught me as to how Russians become good partners, which
is quite different than how such relationships occur and grow
in a U.S. to U.S. business framework.
Those with whom I speak from across industry for the
most part endorse company-to-company engagements with Russian
aerospace industries. There are tangible and specific benefits
that accrue to the companies who enter into these engagements,
from which the USG also benefits significantly. It appears that
these dealings have reduced the likelihood of missile
technology proliferation. Whether they have wholly stopped
proliferation is not known. Company to company aerospace
projects do keep Russians (companies and individuals) gainfully
employed, thereby creating incentives to behave in ways that
comply with U.S. ITAR and export/import requirements, which is
beneficial to the interests of the U.S. and USG's objectives.
Dealing with Russian entities on development and
production of aerospace products achieves other outcomes that
are beneficial to the interests of the U.S. Government. These
dealings expose and demonstrate market-oriented/western
economic operations and philosophies to Russian entities and
citizens. Presuming the USG finds it desirable for the Russian
Republic to continue in the direction of becoming a true market
versus command economy, these relationships and ongoing
business dealings do help in achieving the transition of Russia
toward that end.
Aerospace endeavors appear to have been helpful in
bringing about Russia's transition in the direction of a true
market economy. A number of early U.S.-Russian company to
company dealings broke new ground in Russian adoption of
western business approaches, financial thinking and juridical
practices that did not broadly exist during the Cold War. Last
year the USG recognized Russia as a Market Economy, which can
only be helpful to U.S. global economic interests in the
future.
Another real plus is the access U.S. companies have
gained to Russian technology and know how through conduct of
company to company projects. The opportunity we thereby have to
leverage technology, particularly in propulsion, which is
selectively more highly performing and a high quality product,
has been of specific benefit to U.S. propulsion interests, and
thereby the USG and other U.S. companies that buy products that
incorporate these technologies.
I do not have a specific answer to the question ``How
do U.S. companies ensure that Russian partner companies not
proliferate?'' In my experience, which admittedly is somewhat
dated, I think it very difficult to detect what a Russian
partner may or not also be doing that is not in the interests
of the U.S. As professional relationships grow, particularly
when U.S. people are operating in situ, it is reasonable to
expect that if one has his or her eyes open and ears attuned,
one might coincidentally witness circumstances that would give
rise to suspicions about undesirable dealings the Russian
partner may be conducting. In my own case and those of my past
and current colleagues who have ongoing dealings with Russians,
none with whom I have worked would allow business interests to
cloud their view of U.S. interests and let some concern, if it
were to arise, go ignored.
Cultural behaviors and motives can create an air of
uncertainty about whether a Russian entity is conducting
ancillary activities that are not in the interests of the U.S.
national security and diplomatic interests elsewhere in the
world. The Russians are very proud, by their nature very
suspicious even of one another, and secretive. They are
deservedly proud of their aerospace accomplishments, highly
protective of their technology, and behave diligently to ensure
that their intellectual property remains theirs, and is not
exploited, at least without specific offsetting gain. These
behaviors can create concern over their underlying motives,
which may not be warranted.
Russians can become very Trustworthy. My personal
experiences speak volumes about dealing with Russians. My and
my earlier company's first ``deal'' with a Russian design
bureau came apart in August 1991, after some months of joint
activity, probably the result of a collision of expectations,
and more importantly due to fundamental failures in
communications borne out of vast initially indiscernible
cultural differences. My second undertaking, which became a
true, enduring partnership, even when the leaders of the
Russian partner were subjected to extreme Russian government
pressures to abandon it, have stayed the course. The
fundamental difference between the two was the presence or
absence of one-to-one trust on the part of the two leaders of
the two entities. In the first case, we went at it as a
standard business to business transaction, wrapped in typical
Letters of Agreement, Contracts, payments, etc., which in the
outcome didn't endure at the first moment of any pressure. The
second was a partnership that was built first on gaining each
other's trust, then jointly resolving how to meet our mutual
business interests and objectives, and finally entering into a
relatively simple ``contract''. That partnership endures yet
today, and in the case of the Russian partner, has upheld every
tenet of the agreements, even when it has been very financially
painful for both partners to do so. I can also report that this
has been the experience with many of my industrial colleagues
who have entered into and continue to conduct business to
business dealings with Russians and Russian entities today.
That said, neither I, nor my many colleagues who have worked
closely with Russian counterparts hold a Pollyanna view of the
Russians--they are tough, able competitors, who have their own
national and international needs to satisfy, and they will
invariably seek to do so.
There are significant U.S. industrial base downsides
that result from U.S.-Russian Space Cooperative Endeavors.
U.S.-Russian company to company (and government to government)
dealings has and does displace U.S. company workers. Propulsion
and other aerospace work that could be done by employees and
U.S. companies is being done by Russian companies and workers.
Given the recent and dramatic decline in demand worldwide for
commercial launches, U.S. propulsion companies, in particular,
are suffering, probably all working at something less than 50
percent of capacity, and worse. From first hand experience, our
nation has not had an enduring space launch propulsion
investment program, which is what compelled me, one of my
former employers and other propulsion companies to look toward
Russia as a means of expediently gaining a better domestic
competitive position. Essentially, our nation's only enduring
space propulsion investment has been in the Shuttle's main
engine, which generally powers but a fraction of our national
launch program needs and capabilities. The expense of large
engine development, as a general rule, exceeds the financial
capacity of essentially any of the U.S. propulsion companies or
corporations. While not necessarily the choice or preference of
U.S. propulsion companies, the comparatively meager USG
investment in space propulsion is what has helped create the
gradient or incentives that stimulated strategic alliances with
Russian propulsion developers and producers. In order to
achieve the access and workable alliances, a number of those
U.S. companies have heavily invested private capital in order
to achieve productive agreements; in some cases those
agreements have not been particularly lucrative, especially in
light of the downturn in the worldwide commercial launch
market. To somewhat offset their losses (and domestic
technology investments) in propulsion base, those same
alliances have gained access to and use of technology and know
how developed by the Russians in the course of their space
program. The Russians took different technology and production
routes than those of the U.S., and produced, selectively, more
highly performing, very durable rocket engines; several of
those different approaches are being incorporated into future
U.S. engine technology development. In fact, in the era of a
future Orbital Space Plane, potentially launched on a US EELV,
powered by an engine of Russian technology origin, U.S. ISS
access interests are likely to be served. Other such projects
such as Sea Launch, arrangements and possibilities exist that
could enable routine ISS access in yet different beneficial
ways, again selectively using Russian aerospace technologies
and capabilities.
On the subject of U.S.-Russian cooperative interests,
nature abhors a vacuum, which absent U.S.-Russian cooperative
aerospace endeavors, Russia will seek to fill. If the U.S. were
to take the route that future dealing with Russian aerospace
developers and producers is undesirable, and cause their
discontinuation, several things will or could occur. First, a
part of our current expendable launch stable will be disrupted
for a period of time. That will result in a loss of competition
and in the long run, quite possibly a loss of technological
innovation and progress. Absent competition, the flow of
innovative juices is eventually stunted. Absent government to
government, company to company dealings, Russia will be forced
to seek new markets for its capabilities and products. China
appears headed in a direction that some U.S. aerospace leaders
feel could seriously threaten U.S. space enterprise leadership.
Russia may well be induced to turn to dealing with China in
order to keep its aerospace community productively employed and
earning, something that the U.S. may not find in its longer-
term best interests. The same outcome may occur between
European and Russian interests. The U.S. would also lose access
to and insight into the ongoing evolution of Russian aerospace
interests and capabilities, which we might later come to
regret.
In closing, it is therefore my viewpoint that the U.S. should
clearly articulate and steadfastly support policy that enables U.S.-
Russian company to company (and government to government) undertakings.
I urge that these and our Administration's deliberations produce
policies and accompanying laws and regulations that are implemented in
a fashion that minimizes the potential for business disruption. Many
U.S. companies have invested considerable sums of private capital in
joint U.S.-Russian aerospace endeavors. From time to time they find
their partnership and financial expectations disrupted, or relations
with their investors imperiled because of a temporary diplomatic
position taken by the USG in order to produce a behavioral modification
on the part of Russia. Most companies enter into these business
partnerships with a prudent appreciation of the potential for
instability and possibility of disruption. However, whatever actions
the USG can take to insulate these U.S. companies, particularly those
that are entrepreneurial, and often thinly capitalized, from
contemporary diplomatic issues, should be further explored and
implemented.
Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members of the Committee, thank you again
for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be delighted to
answer any questions that you may in regards to my remarks.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
Our final witness is Henry, and it looks like Skoloski.
Mr. Sokolski. Sokolski.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. Now say that again. Let me hear
it.
Mr. Sokolski. Sokolski. Sokolski.
Chairman Rohrabacher. There it is.
Mr. Sokolski. There it is.
Chairman Rohrabacher. I mean, with a name like Rohrabacher,
I----
Mr. Sokolski. Yeah.
Chairman Rohrabacher [continuing]. Shouldn't ever complain.
Mr. Sokolski. I know. We are afflicted with this.
Chairman Rohrabacher. But he is the Director of the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and has testified
before our committee when we were considering the Iran
Nonproliferation Act. And just last week, you testified before
the International Relations Committee. And I welcome you. I
understand that you are a witness who is a little bit more
cautious about this, and we are very interested in these
relations with the Russians, and we are very interested in your
opinion. So you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY D. SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER
Mr. Sokolski. Thank you for letting me testify here today,
Mr. Chairman.
Conventional wisdom has it that the more we and our allies
cooperate with Russia on civil space projects and show them
that we can profit from peaceful trade--show them that they
could profit from peaceful trade, the less they will be
inclined or need to sell this sensitive technology to nations
that would use it for military purposes. According to this
view, the more U.S.-Russian civil space cooperation and
commerce one has, the more the cause of nonproliferation will
be served. Unfortunately, I don't think things are quite that
simple.
In fact, two of Russia's most important incentives to
proliferate have nothing at all to do with profit. The first of
these is the foreign political access and influence Russia
gains when it sells militarily useful space technology to
others. It isn't just the few hundreds of millions of dollars a
year in sales in dangerous technologies that keeps Moscow
cooperating with Iran and China, to name two, it is also the
leverage it affords Russia with these nations on a host of
other diplomatic, trade, and security issues. Second, for
cultural and political reasons, Russia is still anxious to
maintain its outmoded military-related industries, including
its oversized space and missile sectors. Because this
infrastructure is still--despite downsizing--too large to be
either profitable or fully employed supplying legitimate
demand, efforts to maintain it continue to drive Russia toward
risky exports in the mistaken belief that cornering this
illegitimate market might keep it from having to further
downsize its space and missile sectors.
These proliferation motivations are really quite important.
As long as they are in play, U.S.-Russian space cooperation and
even commerce and our efforts to curb dangerous missile
proliferation, will be at odds on at least three counts.
First there is an immediate tension, which I am sure this
committee is seized with, between the U.S. funding work on the
International Space Station and our desire not to have U.S.
taxpayers support Russian entities that are proliferating
missile technology to Iran and others. The original idea behind
the U.S.-Russian cooperation on Space Station, an idea, I might
add, that I first remember raising with our delegation in 1992
when we visited Russia, was to get Moscow to fully comply with
the Missile Technology Control Regime. This deal was
subsequently struck under President Clinton. When it became
clear that Russia was not living up to this understanding, the
nonproliferation requirements, however, the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 was finally enacted. Its aim was
to assure that, at the very least, U.S. taxpayers would not pay
to have Russian entities engage in such proliferation.
Now one of the issues is whether or not President Bush
should invoke the Act's safety waiver. Invoking the waiver
would require stretching the law quite a bit. The Act reads
that one can only invoke the waiver to prevent the imminent
loss of life or grievous injury to those aboard the Station. So
long as the Station's current crew can be returned to Earth,
and it can, this condition is not present. Then, there are the
politics of making such a waiver, which again are awkward.
Making the waiver certainly would set quite a precedent. What
parts of the Space Station aren't important to safety? There
aren't many. Yet if you waive for one without meeting the law's
clear language, why or where would you ever stop? More
important, nobody really thinks our intelligence agencies can
give Russia a clean bill of health on Iranian missile
proliferation.
This, in turn, raises a host of difficult questions. Is
keeping the Space Station's schedule on track, even though we
have already let it slip year after year after year, and on
budget, even though we have already paid billions and billions
and billions over the project's original cost estimate, a
priority that should now trump our security and that of
millions of people who will live downrange from Iran's
missiles? Is slowing the project down until Moscow can get a
clean bill of health from our intelligence agencies, or until
we can develop an alternative to the Soyuz, more than we can
afford? The President certainly spoke up in support of the
Space Station, but he and Putin also warned the world about
Tehran's worrisome development of strategic weapons, and it was
this announcement, not Bush's statement on the Station, that
got the world's attention.
Second, there is a tension between U.S. civilian Russian
space commerce and cooperation and peaceful Russian space-
related transfers that Moscow knows are being diverted for
military purposes in Iran, Pakistan, Libya, India, and China--
nations either primed to proliferate or that already have a
track record of doing so. President Bush only increased this
tension with his announced desire recently to work with
friendly states, including Russia, to interdict the export of
weapons of mass destruction, including illicit missiles and the
means to make them. If Russia fails to cooperate fully in this
effort, including Russian space and nuclear help to Iran's
suspect nuclear weapons program, this failure will only work to
expose U.S.-Russian space cooperation and commerce to increased
political scrutiny and skepticism.
Let me conclude, I would ask that the entire statement be
placed in the record, by stating that until Russia's space
industry is downsized to accord with legitimate private and
domestic military demand, continued space cooperation and
commerce with Moscow at current or higher levels, I am afraid,
is doomed to encourage at least as much Russian missile and
space proliferation as it might prevent.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sokolski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Henry D. Sokolski
Conventional wisdom has it that the more we and our allies
cooperate with Russia on civilian space projects and show them that
they can profit from peaceful trade, the less they will be inclined or
need to sell this sensitive technology to nations that would use it for
military purposes. According to this view, the more U.S.-Russian
civilian space cooperation and commerce one has, the more the cause of
nonproliferation will be served. Unfortunately, things are not so
simple.
In fact, two of Russia's most important incentives to proliferate
have nothing at all to do with earning a profit. The first of these is
the foreign political access and influence Russia gains when it sells
militarily useful space technology to others. It isn't just the few
hundreds of millions of dollars a year in sales in dangerous
technologies that keeps Moscow cooperating with Iran and China; it's
also the leverage it affords Russia with them on a host of other
diplomatic, trade, and security issues. Second, for cultural and
political reasons, Russia is anxious to maintain its outmoded military-
related industries--including its oversized space and missile sector.
Because this infrastructure is still too large ever to be either
profitable or fully employed supplying legitimate demand, efforts to
maintain it continue to drive Russia toward risky exports in the
mistaken belief that cornering this illegitimate market might keep it
from having to further downsize its space and missile sector.
These proliferation motivations are important: As long as they are
in play, U.S.-Russian space cooperation and our efforts to curb
dangerous missile proliferation will be at odds on at least three
counts.
First, there is an immediate tension between U.S. funding work on
the International Space Station (ISS) and our desire not to have U.S.
taxpayers support Russian entities that are proliferating missile
technology to Iran and others. The original idea behind U.S.-Russian
cooperation on the Space Station--an idea I remember first raising as
an option in talks with the Russians in l992--was to get Moscow fully
to comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This deal
was subsequently struck under President Clinton. When it became clear
that Russia was not living up to this deal's nonproliferation
requirements, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 was finally
enacted. Its aim was assure that, at the very least, U.S. taxpayers
would not pay to have Russian entities engage in such proliferation.
Now, one of the issues is whether or not President Bush should invoke
the act's safety waiver. Invoking the waiver would require stretching
the law quite a bit. The act reads that one can only invoke the waiver
``to prevent the imminent loss of life or grievous injury'' to those
aboard the Station. So long as the Station's current crew can be
returned to Earth--and it can--this condition is simply not present.
Then, there are the politics of making such a waiver, which, at best,
are awkward. Making the waiver certainly would set quite a precedent.
What parts of the Space Station aren't important to safety? There
aren't many. Yet, if you waive for one without meeting the law's clear
language, why or where would you ever stop? More important, nobody
really thinks our intelligence agencies can give Russia a clean bill of
health on Iranian missile proliferation. This, in turn, raises a host
of difficult questions. Is keeping the Space Station's schedule on
track (even though we've already let it slip year after year) and on
budget (even though we've already paid billions and billions over the
project's original cost estimate) a priority that should now trump our
security and that of millions of people who live down range from Iran's
missiles? Is slowing the project down until Moscow can get a clean bill
of health from our intelligence agencies or until we can develop an
alternative to the Soyuz more than we can afford? The President
certainly spoke up in support of the Space Station in Moscow. But he
and Putin also warned the world about Tehran's worrisome development of
strategic weapons and it was this announcement, not Bush's statement on
the station, that got the world's attention.
Second, there is a tension between civilian U.S.-Russian space
commerce and cooperation and ``peaceful'' Russian space-related
transfers that Moscow knows are being diverted for military uses in
Iran, Pakistan, Libya, India, and China--nations either primed to
proliferate or that already have a track record of doing so. President
Bush only increased this tension with his announced desire to work with
friendly states, including Russia, to interdict the export of weapons
of mass destruction including illicit missiles and the means to make
them. If Russia fails to cooperate fully in this effort, this failure
will only work to expose U.S.-Russian space cooperation and commerce to
increased political scrutiny and skepticism. Russia is helping to build
missiles for India; India has just signed a military cooperation
agreement with Iran and is talking about exporting its own missile
technology. Iran, meanwhile, is not just getting covert missile
assistance from Moscow. It is also overtly buying Russian satellites
and earth tracking stations that could help it and others target their
missiles against our friends and forces abroad. Moscow knows this but
continues to claim that all of its space commerce is peaceful.
Finally, there is a tension between the lack of domestic military
and civilian call for Russian space related goods and services and
U.S.-Russian space transfers, which tend to keep Russia's space
infrastructure larger than legitimate demand can support. U.S. and
European cooperative space efforts and commerce with Russia are too
modest to keep all of Russia's oversized space and missile industry
fully employed. But they are not small enough to force Russia to make
the painful political decisions to further downsize their industry so
it will not be so prone to proliferate. In the U.S., whatever surplus
of space-related capabilities we have is maintained with the federal
funding of space related projects. Russian government funding of its
space industry, however, is much smaller. As such, there is constant
pressure on many of its space enterprises to sell militarily useful
technology to foreign customers who might use or sell this technology
to proliferate. Until Russia's space industry is downsized to accord
with legitimate private and domestic military demand, continued U.S.
space cooperation and commerce with Moscow at current or higher levels
is doomed to encourage at least as much Russian missile and space
proliferation as it might prevent.
Biography for Henry D. Sokolski
Henry D. Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons
proliferation issues for academics, policy-makers, and the media.
He served from 1989 to 1993 as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense under Paul Wolfowitz and
received the Secretary of Defense's Medal for Outstanding Public
Service. Prior to his appointment to this post, Mr. Sokolski worked in
the Secretary's Office of Net Assessment on proliferation issues.
In addition to his Executive Branch service, Mr. Sokolski served
from 1984 through 1988 as Senior Military Legislative Aide to Senator
Dan Quayle and as Special Assistant on Nuclear Energy Matters to
Senator Gordon Humphrey from 1982 through 1983. Mr. Sokolski also
served as a consultant on proliferation issues to the intelligence
community's National Intelligence Council. After his work in the
Pentagon, Mr. Sokolski received a Congressional appointment to the
Deutch Proliferation Commission, which completed its report in July of
1999. He also served as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's
Senior Advisory Panel from 1995 to 1996.
Mr. Sokolski has authored and edited a number of works on
proliferation related issues including, Best of Intentions: America's
Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2001), Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons
Proliferation Threats from Russia (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, 2002); 21st Century Weapons Proliferation: Are We Ready?
(London: Frank Cass, 2001); Planning for a Peaceful Korea (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001); Prevailing in A Well Armed
World (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000) and Fighting
Proliferation (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996).
Mr. Sokolski has been a resident fellow at the National Institute
for Public Policy, the Heritage Foundation, and the Hoover Institution.
He currently serves as an adjunct professor at the Institute of World
Politics in Washington and has taught courses at the University of
Chicago, Rosary College, and Loyola University. Mr. Sokolski attended
the U. of Southern California and Pomona College and received his
graduate education at the University of Chicago.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR STEVEN PIFER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS,
STATE DEPARTMENT
While not appearing before the Space and Aeronautics
Subcommittee, Deputy Assistant Secretary Steven Pifer provided
the following written testimony and agreed to answer questions
for the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pifer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven Pifer
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of this committee. It is an honor to
appear before you with my colleague from NASA. We at the State
Department consider it a privilege to work together with John
Schumacher and his colleagues at NASA to further one of America's
loftiest goals--the mission of human space flight. At State, our
contribution to this mission is to facilitate relations with our
international partners in space exploration while safeguarding our
broader national security interests. Although we cooperate closely with
many space agencies around the world, any conversation about the U.S.
space program would be incomplete if it did not note the unique and
historic partnership we share with Russia in the field of human space
flight. Space cooperation between the United States and Russia remains
one of the most visibly successful elements of the U.S.-Russian
bilateral relationship.
U.S.-Russian Space Cooperation
In recent months, this partnership has had to face tragic and
unforeseen challenges. In the wake of the loss of the Shuttle Columbia,
we have turned to our Russian colleagues for their assistance in
sustaining the operations of the International Space Station (ISS).
Considering our mutual experience in space exploration, Russia has
undertaken important additional efforts to maintain the viability of
the ISS. With the Shuttle fleet grounded, the Russian Aviation and
Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos) readily accepted its role as provider of
the world's only physical link to the Station.
When the International Partners became concerned about the supply
of water and other critical provisions to the Station, Russia made
every effort to ensure that its Progress resupply vehicle would be
available to provide support for the Station. The unmanned Progress
vehicles are critical workhorses for delivering supplies to the
Station. When the International Partners were faced with the
possibility of mothballing the Station, Russia utilized a previously
planned Soyuz launch to ferry a fresh crew to the Station, a mission
that had been slated to be carried out by the Shuttle. This kind of
cooperation, in the aftermath of the loss of the Columbia, has
strengthened further our space partnership.
Underscoring the depth of this partnership, President Bush and
President Putin reaffirmed U.S.-Russian cooperation in space at their
June 1 meeting in St. Petersburg. In their joint statement, the
Presidents extolled the role our two countries have played in the field
of human space flight and confirmed their mutual aspiration to ensure
the continued assembly and viability of the International Space Station
as a world-class research facility. Looking to the future, the
Presidents agreed to explore ways to enhance our cooperation in the
field of space technology and techniques.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000
As our space partnership proceeds and explores new areas of
cooperation, both the State Department and NASA have been rigorous in
enforcing the legislative requirements of the Iran Nonproliferation Act
(INA) of 2000. With the International Partners and separately with
Russian officials, the Administration has consistently made clear that
all activity with Russia must be conducted within the bounds of U.S.
law and our nonproliferation policy.
Bolstering nonproliferation remains a core issue on the U.S.-Russia
security agenda. The State Department and other U.S. officials in the
Administration have engaged the Russian government at the most senior
levels to seek an end to sensitive cooperation between Russian entities
and state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran.
In the context of our diplomatic engagement, Russia has taken
steps, though not yet sufficient, to implement stronger export controls
and improve oversight at Russian facilities. In the case of Iran, we
have made clear our very strong concern that Russian cooperation with
Iran not facilitate Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons or long-range
ballistic missiles. While we cannot go into great detail in an
unclassified forum, we can affirm that Russia has taken actions in
response to specific cases related to the proliferation of sensitive
nuclear technology in the course of our dialogue on nonproliferation.
We continue to monitor the issue of ballistic missile technology
assistance, and continue to be committed to Russia's cessation of any
assistance that could help Iran with the delivery of WMD.
Iran's nuclear program was a key issue addressed by Secretary
Powell with President Putin in their May meeting in Moscow and by
President Bush with President Putin in St. Petersburg on June 1. We
have stressed our concerns about the recent revelations of hidden
Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear fuel cycle capable of supporting a
nuclear weapons program, such as the centrifuge facility at Natanz.
Given what this new information says about Iran's nuclear ambitions, we
have again urged the Russians to reconsider their nuclear cooperation
with Iran and believe they are actively doing so.
President Putin made clear at the G-8 Summit in Evian that all
Iranian nuclear programs must be under IAEA safeguards. The IAEA
Director General is conducting an investigation of the Iranian nuclear
program, and his report will soon be taken up by the IAEA Board of
Governors. Until Iran has fully satisfied the IAEA's examination and
fully addressed the international community's concerns and questions,
including full implementation of the Additional Protocol, no country
should be engaging in nuclear cooperation with Iran. The Administration
will continue to press the Russian government not to engage in nuclear
cooperation with Iran until Iran signs an Additional Protocol and
verifiably abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Although it would be difficult to quantify the INA's impact on the
Russian government's export control policy, I assure you that the
pressure applied by the INA is palpable in any dialogue with Russia on
space. Mr. Yuriy Koptev, General Director of Rosaviakosmos, has been
particularly active in promoting reform throughout the Russian
government, and frequently notes the constraints imposed by the INA on
U.S.-Russian space cooperation. Other Russian officials also regularly
express their concern about the INA constraints. While the
Administration acknowledges Rosaviakosmos' sincere efforts to reform
and to maintain a good record on nonproliferation, we remain concerned
about Russia's broader nonproliferation record. We will continue our
high-level diplomatic dialogue with Rosaviakosmos and other relevant
Russian agencies to address this issue.
The U.S. Export Control Process
Domestically, State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls in the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs ensures that our own export
control policy is sound and is implemented effectively, including in
our space cooperation with Russia. The Directorate is charged with
controlling the export and temporary import of defense articles and
defense services covered by the United States Munitions List (USML).
The Directorate's mission is to advance national strategic objectives
and U.S. foreign policy goals through timely enforcement of defense
trade controls and the formulation of defense trade policy. It carries
out its mission by enforcing the law and reviewing export license
applications for defense articles and services, ensuring that exports
approved are consistent with this mission and that companies comply
with defense trade laws and regulations. Through the licensing process,
relevant U.S. Government agencies have the opportunity to review
individual export license applications and advise whether proposed
exports would be consistent with our national security and foreign
policy. The State Department makes licensing decisions accordingly.
This extensive procedure applies not only to exports to Russia, but to
all U.S. exports, and helps ensure that federal agencies such as NASA
and U.S. aerospace firms do not, even inadvertently, contribute to the
proliferation of sensitive technology around the globe.
U.S.-Russia Relations
A word about our overall bilateral relationship with Russia. Our
two countries are working hard to move past our recent disagreement
over Iraq. In St. Petersburg, Presidents Bush and Putin made clear
their determination to reinvigorate the partnership. Expanding
cooperation in the security dimension remains at the top of the agenda,
and this includes pressing the Russians to improve their performance on
key nonproliferation issues. Likewise, the Administration will persist
in its efforts to enhance U.S.-Russian cooperation in counterterrorism,
strategic stability, and missile defense. We also hope to broaden our
cooperation in space and expand the economic component of our
relations, particularly in the energy field. We intend to continue
working closely with our colleagues at NASA to implement the
Presidents' commitment to enhance our cooperation in space, while
remaining fully consistent with our security and nonproliferation goals
for the bilateral relationship.
Discussion
Chairman Rohrabacher. Thank you for your words of caution.
And before we get into the question and answers, I would ask a
Member of my Staff, we happened to find a little matryoshka
doll here. We were talking about not knowing what is inside and
not being able to ask any questions, so we just have this
little matryoshka doll to remind us that Ambassador Pifer is
not here to answer any questions and to let us get any deeper
insight into this issue. So he will just sit there like a
little wooden dummy instead of being here to answer questions
and to express--explain to us the policies of the
Administration.
Thank you.
Mr. Boehlert. Mr. Chairman, apparently the State
Department--the Administration is represented by Mr.
Schumacher.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Well said, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
With that said, I would like to start the questions and answers
off with just--I think we need to go to Mr. Schumacher first.
Right.
Iran Nonproliferation Act
To what degree does NASA believe that the--and of course,
this is the crux--one of the major issues here today is whether
the Iran Nonproliferation Act restricts U.S. contractor to
Russian contractor relationship. And is a congressional
clarification needed on that account?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. I can tell you for the Iran
Nonproliferation Act, and specifically Section 6 with--which is
titled International Space Station, but in the definitions
talks about all human space flight-related goods or purchases
in kind transfers. We have worked closely with State on that. I
can tell you the view from State to us is that they express
serious concern about any contemplation of a contract--what--in
short version, contractor to contractor meaning U.S. funds to a
U.S. contractor. U.S. contractor goes out and buys from a
Russian contractor.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Um-hum.
Mr. Schumacher. Any entity under the Russian Aviation and
Space Agency that that might well be violative of the Act, and
if it is not violative of the black letter law of the Act, it
is, at a minimum frustrates and deemed violative of the intent
and the spirit of the Act. So the short version would be----
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. I have the law in front of me
here, and it doesn't seem to mention private companies. It
talks about the Russian Government.
Mr. Schumacher. Well, in the definition, it defines any
entity under the jurisdiction or control of Rosaviakosmos. And
then it even says even an entity where the Russian
Rosaviakosmos had a joint stock ownership and then got rid of
that.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Well, it says here neither the
Russian Aviation and Space Industry nor any other organization
or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian
Aviation Space Agency. Now that seems to be pretty definitive
in terms of if you have an American company, would you say
that--and that same restriction was placed on NASA, would you
say that that applied and that that then related to all
American companies?
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir; I sure wouldn't.
Chairman Rohrabacher. All right. I am sorry that the--as
you are relaying the position of the State Department, I am
just sorry the State Department couldn't come here and express
that to us themselves. And Mr. Woodenhead here isn't going to
tell us, so we will just have to have this discussion based on
what we have here today. So but you believe that then if we are
going to be in compliance with nonproliferation, you--it is
your reading, and for what you know, the Administration's
position that that also relates to private companies?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. And if I could take you in the--
in Section 7 of the definitions of the Act, it is a sub--let me
see. It is number 5, organization or entities under the
jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation Space Agency.
And then in there, it goes through a whole bunch of subsets,
but it--any entity--basically, it is any entity that was under
the jurisdiction or control of Rosaviakosmos, which covers, the
way the Russians are structured, some 450 aerospace
enterprises. And then a little later on, it even says that--let
us see, any entity that the Russian Aviation and Space Agency
or Russian Space Agency had a holding or controlling interest
and then divested it, it would still be subject to the Act.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Now I--it seems to me, now I was
around when this happened, in fact, I was one of the
supporters. And I still support the concept of this. We should
make sure that we keep the pressure on. And I know that Mr.
Sokolski, no, whatever it is, anyway, sorry about that, what--I
understand the concerns that you have, and we cannot just
ignore the fact that the Russians are building a nuclear power
plant for the Iranians and Iran happens to be a--you know, an
oil and gas rich country. So, is this a threat to our national
security along with missile development? The answer is yes, it
is. How we can, perhaps, instead of using a punitive attempt,
and maybe I should open this up to the panel, would not a more
carrot rather than a stick be more appropriate in getting the
Russians to have their--to judge their decisions in something--
in a more positive way?
Mr. Schumacher. Mr. Rohrabacher, I can tell you we, as we
have talked with you and with the Committee over these years
about this, certainly nonproliferation issues are the
threshold. That is where we start. And the people we work with,
and we look to State in their interaction in the other parts of
the government, to certify that people do meet those
nonproliferation orders before we can work with them. We think
that is a very positive and high standard to set, and then we
get into a cooperative relationship with them. So, in
particular, if you are trying to work with a nation or work
with companies, it is an encouragement for them to have to
adhere to these laws.
Partnerships Between U.S. and Russian Companies
Chairman Rohrabacher. Well, if we show--Mr. Davis, if we
could show them that they are going to make hundreds of
millions if not billions of dollars in doing partnerships with
American companies doing something positive, isn't this
something that you think that would lead them to use their
resources in the right direction rather than building missiles
and nuclear weapons?
Mr. Davis. It has been my experience that--that the
possibility and the prospects for them, indeed, being engaged
by former companies prevent--potentially resulting in millions
of dollars of work certainly moderated or modified their
behavior. Yes.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Here you go, Mr. Sokolski.
Mr. Sokolski. Sokolski.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. Got it. And you have to speak a
little into the mike.
Mr. Sokolski. I forgot to turn it on.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. There you go.
Mr. Sokolski. I hope my job isn't to be ogre, but let me
suggest something. I can remember quite well why the Iran
Nonproliferation Act laid off the U.S. vendors that were doing
space launches, because if you remember correctly, the first
charge up to the Hill was, ``Let us go after the space quota.''
Remember that? Boy, did I get called in by an awful lot of
people in that business asking for advice. I suggested, ``Well,
maybe we should just all agree that the U.S. Government should
not use taxpayer money to make progress payments to entities
that are in the Russian press being identified as
proliferaters.'' And everyone said, ``Oh, what a relief. Let us
do that.''
Now if what you do is say, ``Well, but we have got a
problem. They are still proliferating, and we want to do
business with Russian companies that we think are cleaner, or
perhaps totally clean.'' If you shift all of the contracting
from the dirty entities to the clean ones, you do two things.
You get around the law, in a sense, without breaking it,
because you can interpret this thing differently, quite
clearly. You have seen that. But I think you are going to do
something else that you may not intend, and that is when
Russia's continued cooperation on Iranian rockets and nuclear
activities gets to be really bad, and it is going to get bad,
and we don't do something much more dramatic with our European
allies than we are doing. There is going to be a spotlight
turned right on the contractors that you focused on, much like
we wanted to avoid when we originally focused on the Space
Station. So there is no free lunch here. If there is
proliferation, getting around the legal issues won't get you
around the political ones is my hunch.
Chairman Rohrabacher. And so you are suggesting that if we
are going to have a more expanded cooperative effort with the
Russians on--in these space efforts, that we do have to come
down and face this hard decision and not try to hedge, just
face it head on? Unless there is an agreement made, we just
cannot expand our cooperation any further with the Russians in
space?
Mr. Sokolski. I guess I am Shrek here. Yes.
Chairman Rohrabacher. All right. I--let me just note before
we go on to Mr. Gordon, we are not talking about a country,
when we talk about Russia, as the same being that we are
talking about Communist China. In Communist China, there has
not been one inch of political reform. They have no opposition
parties. It is a totally totalitarian state. I believe that the
people who run Communist China still harbor some evil designs
on the United States of America and other Western democracies.
However, in Russia, in contrast, over the last 10 years,
there has been tremendous reform. And while there are still
undercurrents that we are talking about today that are very
serious and we--and affect our national security, the Russians
have opposition in newspapers. They have got opposition
parties. They are well on a way toward an evolution, toward a
more democratic and free country. They haven't reached it yet,
and we owe it to them, you know, it is a tough-love type of
thing, to be very solid and serious about what they must do.
Mr. Sokolski. I think this was the reason why we made a
distinction originally when we tried to pass this law between
commerce--between companies that aren't government-funded
indirectly, which is--you know, you could get a contract from
NASA and then give it to an American firm. And then an American
firm could then do a bankshot to a Russian firm. That is not
really private industry to private industry. That is a Federal
Government contract to a private firm to a Russian company.
We made a distinction between what was going on between
entities that wanted to try to make a go at making a profit and
those that, like those that are underneath the agency of the
Government of Russia, that really are still too large in number
and not really up to making a profit yet.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. Mr. Gordon, you may proceed.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you.
First let me concur with Chairman Rohrabacher and Chairman
Boehlert in their concerns with State. Assured goodness, this
is going to get worked out and we can move forward. We all need
to do our job.
Mr. Schumacher, thank you for being here today. As I said
earlier, I had submitted some questions to Administrator
O'Keefe at our NASA posture hearing in February and haven't
heard from them yet. And but I also--my staff put your staff on
notice that we would be talking about some of that today, so I
would hope that you would be able to get us started.
Russian Support for the International Space Station
So let me start with you. What specific financial
arrangements are in place to ensure that all needed Soyuz and
Progress vehicles will be available to support the
International Space Station for a period up to 32 months that
the Shuttle fleet was grounded after the Challenger accident?
And specifically, how much will it cost to provide the
necessary Soyuz and Progress vehicles and who will be paying
that expense?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. And I did not pass off lightly on
your first issue. Part of my first action as Chief of Staff is
to make sure your questions get answered and up here very
quickly.
So with regard to your questions, a couple things. First,
the partnership has really responded to the tragedy of Columbia
in a way that really emphasized how strong it is. And we went
to the partners, and we said this will really be a test of the
partnership, no doubt about it. Yes, we have had a tragedy. We
need to go and take care of that. And we are going after it,
you know, as hard as we can. In the meantime, we hope we can
look across partnership solutions to resupply and maintain
human presence on the Station, keep the ops and the science
going. And as a matter of fact, that was one of the strengths
in the partnership we always talked about was the redundancy
and that type of thing.
We went into the partnership, and we have, through the
partnership, as I talked about, late February, early March,
laid out a plan. It is really--and it is approved at the--
through the SSCB, which is a technical Space Station Control
Board level to multilateral control, which is really the heads
of the program. It is endorsed by the heads of agency. So a
long winded way of saying the--all of the space agencies in the
partnership have signed up to this. What it is is a plan for
Soyuz and Progress coverage, both human and cargo resupply of
the Station through 2003 and 2004. That plan is being iterated.
You might have seen some comments this morning from Mike
Kostelnik, the ISS program head here in Washington, where he
said the Progress we were looking to accelerate from the
beginning of 2004 into 2003, it looks like we may well be able
to back off that, because watching six weeks of consumables
with a two partner crew has allowed us to start looking at
pushing back. Both teams are working that really hard and keep
a very careful watch on that. And that is looking good.
In--so in response to your question about do we have a plan
and do we have a schedule, yes, we have a partnership----
Mr. Gordon. Do you have any commitments?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir, I will get to that, if I could.
We have a partnership plan for those vehicles in that sequence.
And the sense of commitments to the Station, I think first and
foremost, you have seen the strong support of both Presidents
to make the Station fly, remain crewed, and move forward to
assembly and completion. You see the commitment from the
Russian President, himself, that Russia will do what it takes
to sustain Station until we return to flight.
Mr. Gordon. Excuse me. What it takes or what it can?
Mr. Schumacher. Well----
Mr. Gordon. They are two different matters.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. And I will be glad to get into
that. The Russian Government itself, and I will through each of
the parties, but Russia itself, Russia has taken the funding
for Rosaviakosmos for the full year----
Mr. Gordon. Yeah, I understand that. I mean--if I could--
you have--answer the question that way you don't have to repeat
it----
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gordon [continuing]. I mean, because we have got a
short time here. I know it is really that the Russians want to
help. I know that they have moved their next year's funding to
this year's funding. I also know that our--some of our partners
have taken up some of the additional slots, but that was done
before the accident. And so where I think we are now is that
NASA has finally admitted what we have all known and that is
the Shuttle, in all likelihood, is not going to fly this year.
And we are pretty much, I think, hopeful covered this year by
virtue of the Russians taking next year's funds and moving them
here and by commitments that our partners had already made. The
question is what--you know, the Challenger, we were down for 32
months, so what happens next year?
Now my concern is that it is just--I have to say--I mean,
it is inconceivable to think that our partners, who think that
they are less wealthy and have tough budget problems like we
do, are going to say, ``Sure, we are going to pay for NASA's
responsibilities next year.'' Maybe they will, but I think that
is going to be a hard sell, and it would be irresponsible for
us not to think that they might think that the U.S. has more
money than they do and maybe the--you know, and the U.S. should
go forward. So I think if really, you know, we--they think
about this.
Now obviously one concern is just the mechanical aspect;
can the Russians--how long can they do this? Let us assume that
they can continue to. I would like to know that question, but I
still don't see what the funding is for next year, other than
maybe goodwill. Have any of the partners agreed for next year?
Who and give me specifically, and for how much?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. With regard to the Russians,
Rosaviakosmos, first, their funding for this year has been
phased forward six months.
Mr. Gordon. Yeah. Right.
Mr. Schumacher. They will have a government level meeting
again early in the fall to decide on the increased funding for
their budget for this year. They will also decide on an augment
to next year's budget.
Mr. Gordon. And when will that be?
Mr. Schumacher. In the September timeframe. They are
looking at that. They are--again, they are assessing, like we
are, over the summer looking at the Progress and all of that
type of thing. The Soyuz vehicle flow remains, as before, to a
year. This is really about the increase and the acceleration of
Progress. Originally, we were operating very conservatively
right after the loss of Columbia looking at a Progress this
year and another next year.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. Let me--because my time is----
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gordon. In case the Russians, in September, say, ``We
can't afford to do this next year,'' are we going to wait until
September to come up with our plan or are we going to come up
with an alternative before that?
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir. Well, two parts. First, they have
said just the opposite. They have said they will do--they are
not--when they say they will do it, it takes--it is not just a
wishful--the government level administrative finance, the
President said they are looking at what the budget increases
are necessary to cover their part.
Mr. Gordon. I don't mean to be--and I have really got a
joint statement.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gordon. And it is still a little loosey goosey to me
and that they want to--they hope to--it is important, but I
could read you a number, if you want me to, examples in past
years where they said they were going to do things and they
didn't do it. So again, I just don't think that it is the
responsible thing, looking at their past history and looking at
the lack of real definitive statement here, for us not to plan
for an alternative.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gordon. But don't we--are we planning for an
alternative, if they say they can't do it?
Mr. Schumacher. Certainly. First of all, we watched,
obviously the statements and the discussions as well as vehicle
flowing. I know you are aware, we have people on the ground
that--we have people that interact with these folks every day.
As you talked about for crew slots, that also plays into next
year. Japan has stepped forward. Canada is talking to Russia
about a crew opportunity. So there are a number of different
activities that are going forward in the partnership to look at
additional support in this area. But I would say, first and
foremost, the Russian Government has stepped up to this. And I
think you are certainly right, and I just----
Mr. Gordon. Are we not worried about it? So should we
just--I mean, you know, the Members of this committee just not
worry? You are going to take responsibility to say this is
going to be paid for. We don't have it on the dotted line, but
it is for us not to worry about it, not to be asking for
alternatives and just worry--we should worry about other
things?
Mr. Schumacher. We worry about these things everyday, Mr.
Gordon. I can assure you. And it is something we have to watch,
and we will be the first to----
Mr. Gordon. Are you going to do any planning? Besides
watching, are you going to make any plans, alternative plans?
Mr. Schumacher. Well, the alternative plans would be we
know the Europeans are going to come on line with ATV in the
fall of next year. Other than that, it is Russian vehicles in
the near-term and the alternatives would have to be alternative
funding mechanisms if we got to that.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. So are you going to present any of those
to us?
Mr. Schumacher. No, it is not, because this time we don't
think we need to. I mean, we can move forward quickly if we
have to.
Mr. Gordon. How quickly can you--how quickly then?
Mr. Schumacher. How quickly?
Mr. Gordon. How quickly will you have a plan after they say
they are not going to be able to pay for this?
Mr. Schumacher. I think that would be very fast, because it
is a pretty straight forward issue of watching if they----
Mr. Gordon. Okay. So how fast can you be then? Would it be
a day? Would it be a week? Would it be a month?
Mr. Schumacher. It would certainly----
Mr. Gordon. Would it be a day?
Mr. Schumacher. I would say within a week of knowing.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. Well, then if that is the case, it must
be pretty easy if you can do it that quickly. So you can just
go ahead and tell us what it is.
Mr. Schumacher. The alternative?
Mr. Gordon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Schumacher. It would be some form of funding other--
with other partner contributions or us. And we would have to
come forward to you for relief on the Act, should that ever be
the case.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. So the--so you would feel like--would
that--I mean, that is a pretty simple, sane suggestion.
Mr. Schumacher. Thank you. Thank you.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Gordon. And
with the Chairman's prerogative here, that would be, that type
of cooperation and expanded cooperation would be within keeping
of the Iran Nonproliferation Act, correct?
Mr. Schumacher. It would have--to start on, it would have
to be.
Chairman Rohrabacher. All right.
Mr. Schumacher. We could do it one or two ways.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Mr. Sokolski, I am sorry. Mr.
Sokolski, there it is. Mr. Sokolski is nodding his head yes,
and he is the skeptic here, so I would take it that that means
that it probably is well within the definition of the Russian
Nonproliferation Act and the Iranian Nonproliferation Act. Let
me note that there are many other areas of cooperation that we
could do, but that you are suggesting now that would be limited
by the Nonproliferation Act. And we will discuss that in the
second round of questions.
And then I will turn to distinguished Co-Chairman in the
National Security Committee, who is probably one of the
greatest--well, not probably, one of the--he is the foremost
expert on Russian-American relations in the United States
Congress, Curt Weldon.
Mr. Weldon. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
the compliment. Thank you for the foresight to hold this
hearing. Thank you all for coming.
And I want to take a little different tact here, and I
would ask my colleagues to listen to this, because it is
important as we discuss violations of arms control agreements
and proliferation. First of all, we do have some other
successful programs with the Russians involving space. There
was a brief allusion, I believe by Mr. Davis, to the Lockheed
Martin-Khrunichev Initiative. That has been an extremely
successful initiative involving billions of dollars that has
benefited both the Russians through the Khrunichev organization
and Lockheed Martin and--as an example of how the private
sector can work together in developing space launch
opportunities.
There has also been a very successful effort funded by the
Department of Defense on the RAMOS program, which is fostered
in--on the U.S. side, the Utah Russian Institute, and on the
Russian side where we are building two joint satellites to
build some confidence in the area of understanding when
launches occur around the country.
We are also, at the--again, at the suggestion of President
Bush and President Putin, moving forward on missile defense.
And there is currently a study by our Missile Defense Agency
looking at the parameters of missile defense cooperation.
Proliferation Issues
But I am going to talk for a moment about proliferation.
And I want to remind my colleagues of some facts. We talk about
the Iran Missile Sanctions Bill. I would remind my colleagues,
the first time that bill passed the House and the Senate with
veto-proof margins in both bodies, the President vetoed the
bill. We had 398 votes in the Senate, 98 votes in the--398
votes in the House, 98 votes in the Senate, and President
Clinton vetoed the bill. In fact, I got called down to the
White House twice by Vice President Gore, both before the House
voted and before the Senate voted. And with Senate and House
colleagues from both parties, we were lectured that we
shouldn't pass the bill, and we did.
Unfortunately, the blame doesn't all lie with the
President, because Newt Gingrich wouldn't let us override the
veto. We had the votes. We had the votes in the House and the
Senate, and for reasons as yet unknown, in the fall of the year
that Newt Gingrich went down, we could not issue the veto
override, and we had the votes to do it. And Henry Sokolski
knows that. So the bill was vetoed the first time by the
President. And we came back the following year and President
Clinton said, ``Okay, I will support it.'' And he came out at
the beginning. In fact, the bill passed a second time.
But I want to make the case that some of our own actions
have caused the very proliferation that we rail about. In fact,
Mr. Chairman, I did a--had a Congressional Research Service do
a study in 1998, which I have put in the record probably five
times. And I would be glad to put it in the record here. From
1991 to 1998, there were 38 violations of arms control
agreements by China and by Russia: 38 times, 20 by Russia and
18 by China. Of the 38 times that we had evidence, according to
the Congressional Research Service, of violations of arms
control agreements, and our responsibility as a signatory is to
let that country know that they are in violation and take
action. We imposed the required sanctions less than 10 times.
Now Mr. Sokolski knows this, because his group did a study
looking at some possible options, less than the full
requirements of treaty compliance or treaty requirements that
could, in fact, be considered, but the Administration didn't
want to hear that.
So by our very inaction of not enforcing arms control
agreements, when we knew there were violations, we encourage
the problem. In fact, I carry around an accelerometer and
gyroscope when I give speeches that we caught being transferred
from Russia to Iraq three times. We had the evidence. The
Administration knew about it and never imposed the required
sanctions under the MTCR. So I would make the case that we, by
our own actions, and in my opinion is it because we were trying
to reinforce the status of Boris Yeltsin as President. And we
didn't want to publicly acknowledge violations of arms control
agreements in the '90's, because the Administration's
overriding policy was to keep Yeltsin in. Even though we had
evidence, time and again, of violations, we pretended that we
didn't see it. We pretended we didn't see it with the missile--
with the gyroscopes and accelerometers, which I have examples
of and which I asked Tom Pickering about when he was the
Ambassador of Moscow. And he said, ``Congressman, you have got
to go ask the President.'' And I did. And the President wrote
me in March of that year, and he said, ``We have no evidence.''
And at the same time he wrote me, one of our intelligence
agencies had over 100 sets of accelerometers and gyroscopes
that we intercepted three times going from Russia to Iraq.
So before we criticize, I think we have to understand that
some of our own actions have, in fact, caused the problem. And
the second example, I was on the Cox Committee, and I would ask
Mr. Sokolski if he wants to respond to this. What about our own
companies? I sat through seven months of closed briefings where
I saw our own companies, again because the Administration
lowered thresholds, sold technology to China. What kind of
technology? Stage separation technology, technology for
launching missiles. Now we are quick to blame Russia for all of
the problems, and I am, too. I am Russia's toughest critic, but
I also think we have to acknowledge that sometimes our own
actions have sent very wrong mixed signals. In the case of
China, we had instance after instance where--and Boeing just
paid a big fine, where those companies from California were
illegally transferring sensitive technology or got special
exceptions made by the Administration to lower thresholds that
allowed technology to go to China.
So if you are in Russia and you see us not calling into
play the violations that they know are taking place, and you
see us on the other hand sending technology to China because
our companies want to do that, even though that technology was,
up until that time, prohibited, then I think we--certainly
think you send a mixed signal. And talking about nuclear
technology, Mr. Chairman, which you did, you are right. The
Russians should not have helped Iran build the Bushehr nuclear
power plant, but every time I raise that issue with the
Russians, do you know what they say? ``Well, wait a minute,
aren't you building one for North Korea?'' And what is the
answer? The answer is yes.
So the point is, when it comes to proliferation, yes, we
ought to be critical of the Russians, and I am and will
continue to be. And you are also, Mr. Chairman, but we are--
also need to be willing to look at ourselves squarely in the
mirror and say, ``Maybe the problem is that we have a double
standard ourselves.'' And then we ought to take that into
consideration in all of our dealings with Russia and other
agencies involving space.
Thank you.
Chairman Rohrabacher. You might want to just comment on Mr.
Weldon's eloquent statement, I might add.
Mr. Schumacher. If I could, Mr. Chairman, what I would
offer is that whole--about how we push on compliance. You know,
we talked a little bit earlier about for space cooperation, the
threshold that--it is very important. We have--every time we go
into one of these agreements, the Space Station is a great
example of it, a very rigorous export control regime put in
place. Our partners understand that when you put the lines in
place and people understand that, they respond. And you
really--you can get into even some very involved and high-tech
cooperatives as long as you have clean lines and people are
watching what they are doing and you enforce those.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Mr. Davis, did you--Sokolski--Mr.
Sokolski, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. The only thing I would comment on but in the
early days circa 1990 and through the 1997 time frame, I think
both sides of this were learning. I can tell you that it was
exceedingly difficult as an industrialist to stay abreast of
the law and our approach to interpretation of the law. My
company went to extraordinary lengths, as do I know another of
other--a number of other companies go to extraordinary lengths
to place some technology transfer control regimes for their own
companies so as to protect our employees first and our company
second from being--becoming violators of all of the export
control issues under ITAR and so forth. Sometimes it is a
little hard to tell whether or not you are being completely
compliant because those regulations are subject to some level
of interpretation.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Mr. Sokolski.
Mr. Sokolski. We work together, though what I am going to
say is just going to amplify what was said. First, two wrongs
make two wrongs. The only difference now is the price of two
wrongs is getting much steeper. I think this country honestly
is going to be facing some security problems, the likes of
which are actually going to be making me very, very worried. I
was a happy camper for a long time, because things were getting
better. But they are not getting better. And they are about to
get a lot worse. So one thing we could do is listen to
Congressman Weldon and stop simply being hypocritical and start
taking these things seriously. I, and others, have recommended
that Congress follow through on the Markey-Cox bill and unplug
those damn reactors and ask the President to do it without
legislation. Let us get on with that.
In addition, I think it is very important that we set a
good example with sanctions. And I am happy to say that most
recently there is a tougher line. I have to speak on behalf of
the State Department. They are taking a tougher line. It is
very important that they not over-interpret or be malicious in
how they interpret the law, but in some cases, they are right
on target, and they are sanctioning even China now.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much, Mr.
Sokolski. I got it right this time. Let me note that Curt
Weldon has been just personally involved and so focused on this
relationship that he really makes a major contribution. When he
talks about sending the wrong signals, we probably did send
wrong signals. There is no doubt about that. We now face
decisions that--of how to proceed from here. And we have got--
there are ways that we can benefit greatly by cooperating with
the Russians. And the question is can we do that in space and
still remain consistent with our law? And if--and is that law
still important for us to enforce? And that--so far, we are not
necessarily saying that that law isn't important for us to
enforce.
And with that, there is a very active Member of this
subcommittee who even has some legislation dealing with the
particular issue of the day. And Mr. Lampson, you may proceed.
Reliance on Russia While the Shuttle Fleet Is Grounded
Mr. Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We know that while the Shuttle fleet is grounded that,
obviously, we are dependent--the United States is dependent on
the Russian Soyuz and Progress spacecraft operating with a crew
on board. And we believe that NASA needs to have as much
flexibility as it possibly can have while the Space Shuttle
fleet is grounded to ensure astronaut safety, and that is why I
introduced H.R. 1001. And my bill amends the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 to allow NASA to purchase
additional Soyuz and Progress vehicles if the President
notifies Congress that they are needed to ensure the safety of
the crew aboard the International Space Station and to maintain
its operational viability while the Space Shuttle fleet is
grounded.
With that being said, we will very likely talk about that
some more. I still don't know what extent there is going to be
support elsewhere, particularly among NASA. But let me go back
to what Mr. Gordon was asking a few minutes ago and help me
with some of my assumptions right now. Is NASA assuming, what I
am getting out of this, that you and the other international
partners will subsidize NASA and pay for Soyuz vehicles on
their own? They are going to do this and we are not?
Mr. Schumacher. I wouldn't call it subsidizing, Mr.
Lampson. It is getting pretty involved, but I will try and make
it as simple as I can, because it--we get into all of these
agreements and it gets very, you know, bounded. So please--I am
in the weeds on this a lot, so pull me back out if you need to.
Basically, if you start with the intergovernmental
agreement between the nations and you get all the way down
through the space agencies to the implementing agreements,
there is an implementing agreement between us and Rosaviakosmos
that deal--we call it the balance agreement for shorthand. And
what this is that between we and Rosaviakosmos at the end of
the day, at the end of the program, what we cross between us in
propellant, in power, take your pick, should be equal. And we
went forward with some assumptions for the first five years of
that program about what that arrangement would be, what--how
much we would bring up on Shuttle, what they would bring up on
Soyuz, how many Progress, and that type of thing. We work to
keep things in balance.
And so right now, we had been bringing up more than the
Russians had using Shuttle. While we are on hiatus of Shuttle
flights, we are counting on Progress. So the Russian side on
that balance will start increasing. So at the end of the day,
we are working across the balance over a several year period.
They are not subsidizing us. They are meeting their commitment
to that balance arrangement, as we will--as we go forward with
the program.
Mr. Lampson. Well, you are at--hold on a second. That is
over time, and paying right now, paying between now and next
year or the year after, they are going to carry that cost?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lampson. And we are not going to be putting anything in
it in--between Europe and Russia, the dollars necessary to
perform those services will come from them, period?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. Rosaviakosmos, the Russian
Government phase their--we, in December of last year, in Tokyo,
the partners met and decided on the plan for Space Station
assembly for the coming year. Russia was committed to a certain
number of Soyuz and Progress, and they had actually gotten a
governmental budget to do that. Their budget for that whole
year has now been phased forward to the first six months of the
year. The government will meet again in the fall to decide on
an increase for that budget in '03, and then they will look at
an increase for '04 that is necessary. They are certainly
waiting to see what happens with us when the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board reports out and what it looks like for us
to return to flight, as----
European Participation and Contributions to the ISS
Mr. Lampson. The agreement--or there is agreement that
precludes Europe participating in that is not necessary?
Mr. Schumacher. No, it is not. No. That is--forgive me if I
am more opaque than usual. Europe, the way Europe comes in,
Europe is committed to providing a laboratory and a number of
other things. What they have done to actually help overall and
to get more astronauts, their astronauts flying, they have
actually purchased two seats at present, they may purchase
more, from the Russians. One of those seats was to fly in this
last Soyuz and another in the fall. What the Europeans have
committed to, they stepped up and said, ``We will keep the
money on track as if our astronauts were flying on--right now
and in the fall. We will keep the money on track for that, but
we will slip them six months.'' So Pedro Duque will now fly in
October, and then a second astronaut will fly next spring. So
the Europeans are keeping that money phased.
Likewise, the Canadians are talking about a Soyuz flight
opportunity, purchasing one from Russia in '04 or '05.
Mr. Lampson. But is there a signed agreement that says how
much Europe, Japan, Russia will pay?
Mr. Schumacher. Well, the Europeans have signed agreements
with Russia for those flights. The Canadians are in the initial
discussion phase on that.
Mr. Lampson. Old money or is that a new agreement? Old
money? The old--is that something past or is that----
Mr. Schumacher. No, this is----
Mr. Lampson. Are those new agreements?
Mr. Schumacher. Well, again, it is a bilateral agreement
between the European Space Agency and Rosaviakosmos. These are
agreements that are--have been signed this year, though. They
are new agreements.
Mr. Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Chairman Rohrabacher. And we have with us Ms. Bernice
Johnson, who would like to join us. You may proceed.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize
for being late. I was on the Floor with the bill. And I would
like to ask unanimous consent to have my opening statement put
in the record.
Chairman Rohrabacher. So ordered.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing today. I would
also like to thank our other invited guests for agreeing to testify
here today on exploring the benefits and risk of U.S.-Russian
cooperation on space programs.
In years past, cooperation and competition between the United
States and the former Soviet Union attracted much attention. In 1993,
President Clinton made an historic decision to merge NASA's Space
Station program with the Russian space programs.
This symbolic change in policy had the potential to revolutionize
the space program.
The Columbia Shuttle disaster has handed Russia a crucial role as
the sole nation capable of providing needed supplies to the
International Space Station. But cash strapped Russian space officials
say additional funding is needed to build new rockets. They also warn
astronauts they may have to stay in space longer because of a lack of
ships ready to fly.
Because of the Columbia tragedy, many are concerned that NASA might
choose to leave the Space Station unoccupied once the current crew
comes down--a move that could possibly doom the 16-nation project.
With prospects for future shuttle flights unclear pending the
outcome of the investigation into the Columbia Shuttle disaster,
Russia's Soyuz crew capsules and Progress cargo ships are now the only
link to the Space Station and the three-man crew currently in space.
Research and analysis has revealed that at current levels of
support, Russia cannot sustain its space program in its present form.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian space
effort has been coasting on strategic reserves, winding down from the
higher energy levels of former times and cannibalizing the last pieces
of redundant equipment. Yet Russian space officials hope that such
measures can bridge the gap until the country's current political,
social, and economic crises pass and funding becomes healthier.
Russian officials and cosmonauts say leaving the International
Space Station empty could doom the celestial outpost.
With Russia's economic problems and the future of their space
program left in doubt, the operation our multinational program is
threatened. The present and long-term stability of the Nation's space
program has profound implications for the future health of the American
space program.
The space exploration research program has been one of the most
successful research programs in the history of this country. Because of
what we have learned through this research, many lives have been saved,
weather catastrophes have been averted, businesses have flourished and
economies have boomed. I am hopeful that we will have the foresight to
continue this type of research and continue to support the
international space program.
Status of Russian Economy
Ms. Johnson. Many years ago, I traveled to Russia to talk
about this very issue with the Russians and members of the Duma
with Mr. Sensenbrenner. And at that time, the economy was so
bad, as a matter of fact, they were having demonstrations from
scientists who had not been paid in this program. The economy
was supposed to be so bad until they were asking us to fill in
until the economy got better. What is the situation now? Mr.
Schumacher.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, ma'am. I will be glad to answer.
There are two parts. Understanding first on the economy,
there are still problems and issues with the economy, but I
think it certainly better than when you were there with
Chairman Sensenbrenner. With regard to funding for the agency
and through the government, they have established a track
record of a very lean budget for Rosaviakosmos and other
Russian organizations under the government, but they have met
those budgets. And so we've seen when they--what President
Putin, when they say, ``Here is the Russian Space Agency budget
for 2003, they get that money. And that is why we have a--
obviously, as always, will wait and see that it really occurs,
but the money is being phased forward. They are talking about
an increased budget for this year, and the President has
committed to that. So those are all pretty sound indicators of
where they are going.
Russian Political Changes
Ms. Johnson. It was my understanding that one of the
reasons why it was important to keep Mr. Yeltsin in office is
that he was strongly for democracy, and they were teetering on
whether they wanted to go forward or go backward. What is your
opinion of that?
Mr. Schumacher. On democracy? I certainly vote democracy. I
certainly always defer to State for the official answer. I can
tell you, though, as we watch, we can--we watch a continual
evolution of people that get more and more vibrant about
contracting, about wanting to do contracts with, especially,
American companies, with people that want to interact on a
scientific level. I mean, the push just seems to continue, and
it is a very gratifying thing to watch. Are there stumbling
blocks? Are there problems? Sure, there are. But it is a great
thing, and I have been fortunate to watch. It is the first--
really, the first cooperative steps in a while in the '91/'92
time frame that we have had. And sure, we have had some tough
times in different places, but it is a very gratifying thing to
see everything from, you know, demonstrations to different
religious groups out there, to people coming and saying, ``Why
do you do a contract like that? We think this is a better way
to do one.'' Where before they would just nod because you
handed them all of your contract clauses and that type of
thing. A long way to go, but it--you know, I think the signs
are positive.
Ms. Johnson. Do you think--in your opinion, is there a
relationship between Saddam Hussein and Russia since his family
was supposed to go to Russia just before Baghdad was bombed?
Mr. Schumacher. Well, I have my own opinion on that, but--
--
Ms. Johnson. I have mine, too.
Mr. Schumacher [continuing]. I can certainly provide that
to State, though, and get you an answer.
Dependence on Russian Support to ISS
Ms. Johnson. Um-hum. I do have some security concerns. And
I wonder about the opinion of any of you as to whether--not
whether it is wise, I think it is wise to continue the program.
But how far do we go into our dependence with the Russian
Government while we are waiting to get all of the answers over
the Columbia crash?
Mr. Schumacher. Well, the redundancy we always claim for
Space Station was we were there if Russian Soyuz and Progress
couldn't go, and likewise, they were there if we couldn't. So
right now, we are dependent on the Russian Soyuz and Progress
until we return to flight.
Ms. Johnson. But we have enough safeguards in place that we
are not too worried about any security?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, ma'am. We--yes, ma'am, I thank you for
that question, because there were a lot of concerns expressed
early on, and we actually got an interagency group together to
say, ``Here is an interactive program with 15 and 16 nations
building, many more countries are going to do research. We need
to put in place a rigorous export control tech transfer regime
force for Station on the U.S. side.'' And we have done that.
And we continually monitor that, and we bring in other folks to
look at it. So I think we are good there.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired.
Chairman Rohrabacher. And we are joined by Ms. Sheila
Jackson Lee and who is always very articulate and involved, and
we would welcome you to proceed with your questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I cannot thank you enough
for holding this important hearing and of course to the Ranking
Member for collaborating on the important points.
Might I ask the unanimous consent to include my statement,
my opening statement, into the record?
Chairman Rohrabacher. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for calling this hearing. Obviously, we all are anxious
to hear the Gehman Report on the Columbia disaster and what the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommends for the future of the
Space Shuttle program. It is tempting to just wait for the report, and
maybe start making decisions after we read it. But that could be a
grave mistake. I applaud you and Ranking Member Hall for keeping the
dialogue active--for seeking alternatives and contingency plans, so
that no matter what the Gehman Report reveals--we can ensure that the
U.S. vital investment and progress in space exploration can continue.
Since the Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft docked in 1975, the United
States and Russia have had a wonderful collaboration in space that has
been a great benefit to both nations and to the world. Although that
initial collaboration was mostly an act of diplomacy between the U.S.
and the former Soviet Union, today's interactions have much broader
significance for the advancements of science, our economy, and even our
health care. The most obvious symbol of our great collaborative effort
is the International Space Station. We have invested decades in
planning, and billions of dollars to make this great dream a reality.
Now we are poised to start harvesting the great potential of that
facility.
But, unfortunately, the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy has put the
future of the ISS at risk. The Space Shuttle serves as an agile craft
for delivering delicate instruments and crew to the ISS, and also a
powerful device for lifting heavy equipment and components into orbit.
I hope that the Gehman Board will give us some definite answers, and
quick-fixes for getting the shuttles up and running. However, we cannot
bet the future of the International Space Station on that hope. If the
Shuttle fleet is grounded for 32 months, as it was after the Challenger
accident--or indefinitely--we must be ready to step up with all the
creativity and ingenuity that NASA and the world have to offer to keep
the mission going.
The Soyuz craft seems to be the most likely choice for filling the
potential void in the near future. As I, and many of my colleagues
here, have been saying consistently--we need to see a thoughtful vision
for the future of the NASA mission, from the NASA Administrator. Once
that vision is articulated, I feel that the technology and innovation,
projects, and funding will fall into line. But until they develop the
big picture for the future, we need to use the tools we have at hand to
keep critical programs moving forward. The Soyuz may be one of our most
important tools for the next decade.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel today to
learn about the U.S.-Russian collaboration in space. Specifically, I
hope to hear about how NASA is working with Russia and our other
international partners to ensure that if we need a Soyuz craft or its
services, that we can get it. Maybe this is not a crisis today, but we
should have agreements and understandings in place, so that we can
avoid a crisis in the future.
My greatest concern is that if we put off making contingency plans
now, that we may be rushed to do so later. If we are in a rush to get a
Soyuz funded and manufactured, after we become faced with the prospect
of abandoning the ISS--we may not have enough time to give due
attention to safety issues. If there is a chance that we are going to
end up counting on the Russians exclusively to provide transportation
to and from the Space Station, I believe we should have agreements in
place that would allow us to collaborate on monitoring the quality and
safety of the product we are purchasing. Our Russian colleagues have
done an admirable job in the past, but ultimately it is we that are
responsible for American astronauts and their safety.
That is why I feel we should be laying the groundwork for that
collaborative work now. We should be exploring funding mechanisms,
purchasing agreements, and the implications for the Iran
Nonproliferation Act, now. We must cover our bases, so that if we do
not get the answer we hope for from Admiral Gehman, we can move forward
expeditiously to get a safe Soyuz craft ready, if deemed appropriate.
I hope progress is already being made on this front, since we have
been inquiring for months now. I look forward to the testimony. Thank
you.
Russian Commitments to Support the ISS
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me also acknowledge, Mr. Chairman,
that I was in some additional meetings in my office and on the
Floor, and I accept the fact that I have had the opportunity to
review the testimony. I apologize for not hearing the
testimony.
I think that we have sort of mountains to climb. And one of
them, of course, is that we hope we can impress upon the State
Department the importance of their witnesses being present in
hearings that have a lot to do with the International Space
Station and our relationships with our neighbors and our
partners. And so I hope between the Ranking Member and the
Chairman that we can impress upon them the importance of that
fact.
We are all waiting on the Admiral Gehman's Report on the
Columbia investigation. And I think, learning through newspaper
releases, of course, more than we thought we might learn, but
more importantly, we are probably learning a lot on what many
Members had suspected, that we have some very serious problems
as it relates to safety, serious problems as it relates to
funding, serious problems as it relates to analyzing what, in
fact, the Shuttle's capacity happens to be and how we can
ensure the safety of our astronauts.
But let me focus on the U.S.-Russian cooperation, which I
think partly goes to the question of safety, because it
certainly has a lot to do with resources and a lot to do with
the stability of the space program. Might I acknowledge, of
course, the help that Russia has given us in the past? Might I
also acknowledge that we realize the economic conditions in
Russia and some of the problems that they have had?
But let me bring to your attention, Mr. Schumacher, a quote
by the President and President Putin just recently. ``The
Russian Federation is committed to meeting the U.S. crew
transport and logistics resupplying requirements necessary to
maintain our joint American and Russian cosmonaut teams on
board the ISS until the Space Shuttle returns to flight.'' My
question to you, does that statement mean that Russia has
formally agreed to pay for all of the Soyuz and Progress
flights needed to support the International Space Station while
the Shuttle fleet is grounded? Has Russia agreed that it will
not seek compensation from NASA, or any of the other
international partners, for those Progress and Soyuz flights?
And if not, what, in specific terms, does the release mean?
We have challenges before us, so we certainly--I know you
have already offered your appreciation for the last return that
was assisted by Russia, but exactly what does that statement
mean? And is the Administration prepared to make good on that
commitment, meaning are they prepared to press the Russians to
make good on that and to remain engaged so that we can have
that assistance?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much for that
question. If I could start with your last point. Certainly, to
us, we, at NASA, were very impressed that both Presidents, when
they look at a limited number of issues that they are going to
address in joint statements, the civil space and in particular,
the commitment to Space Station is something to be highlighted
at the summit. So that was impressive to both of us.
I can tell you with regard to Russia's plans, what will
Russia do and how does it work out with cost and that type of
thing, we have a balance arrangement with Russia as part of the
Space Station agreements, all of the implemented agreements. We
looked throughout the overall program that we and Russia will
balance what we provide in the sense of logistics, electricity
on board the Station, all of the types of things that make the
Station operate, up-mass, downmass, all of those types of
things. While we are in a hiatus of Shuttle flights, Russia
will supply using Soyuz and Progress both crew and robotically,
you know, crew and then other supplies.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So that is a yes that they will provide
that in the interim?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, ma'am. They are planning that, and we
have a partnership-approved plan through the rest of '03 and
into '04 that lays out Soyuz and Progress. Now they, like we,
await the results of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
and the planning for return to flight to look at how long we
will be in hiatus with Shuttle. Certainly, we could get well to
the point where Russia is supplying and supplying so their side
of the balance goes beyond what we have provided. But we would
look to work that out in the overall context of the whole
program, not by near-term funding.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, they have a deficit to us at this
point, don't they? I imagine that we could utilize their
services for quite a period of time without having to pay them.
Is that what you are telling me that you are going to be
balancing out?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, in the sense of logistics and crew,
the balance is, if you did a scale, our scale is heavy right
now. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I see my light is on. It says you are
going to be working out the specific terms of the agreement,
and so I can assume this will go forward?
Mr. Schumacher. We keep on looking at how much we are
consuming on Station and what that Progress flow needs to be in
the time when the Shuttle is down.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, this is to you and the
Ranking Member. I say this at every Space and Aeronautics
Subcommittee is safety, safety, safety. And I assume we are
trying to follow protocol with respect to the Gehman Report.
But I believe that it is long overdue for this committee and
the Science Committee to investigate thoroughly what occurred
to Columbia's seven crew quickly and to not be fearful of
citing those and the procedures that may be at fault in that
tragedy.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Hopefully we will have
that hearing very soon.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. I might also add
that you not only talk about safety, safety, safety, but
inclusion, inclusion, inclusion. So that is another one of your
battle cries. So we appreciate that.
Now we have--for a question--or for a period of time, Mr.
Burgess, who is a new Member who actually heard the sonic boom
of the Shuttle when it was coming down, the Space Shuttle
Columbia. Also, he was active in trying to work with those
people who were putting together the wreckage after this
catastrophe. And he now is a Member of our committee. We are
very happy to have him with us.
Safety of the Russian Soyuz Vehicle
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing today.
Mr. Schumacher, if I could go back, perhaps, to Ms. Jackson
Lee's concern about safety, and of course, with the loss of the
Columbia, we have had our astronauts from the Space Station
return to Earth via the Soyuz capsule. And it didn't get a lot
of press here, but as I understand it, there was a fairly
harrowing return to Earth, and they did land somewhat off the
mark and it took awhile to locate them. Are we putting any
procedures in place for the contingency of that maybe having to
happen again and perhaps providing some type of locating
beacon, satellite telephone, GPS receiver, any of that
technology that may facilitate the location of our astronauts
when they land?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. I can tell you I was over there
with the Administrator and other Members of the NASA
delegation, and it certainly was a very tense period until we
were really clear that the crew was there and safe and they
were returned and we met with them. To your point, several
things, and I think this speaks to--on the cooperative aspects
and how close we have become in the way we operate. The
Russians have done an internal review on what anomalies
occurred on that Soyuz return. And it--you are exactly right.
It did not come in on exactly the path they had. They had
three, pick your term, of off-nominal loads, and it came in on
one of those. They have identified what they think is the
source of that. Now they are going to a review group on that,
and then they will share those results with a U.S. task force
led by Lieutenant General Tom Stafford. And he works--he has a
U.S. task force set up that works closely with it. A task force
set up by, on the Russian side, by Anfimov, and they will
review those results, both for what went wrong to understand
it, corrective action, as well as the very types of things you
are talking about. What other things we--should we need giving
to the crew so they are easily located, improve safety, that
type of thing. And General Stafford will be over there at the
end of this month.
Technology Transfer
Chairman Rohrabacher. All right. Well, thank you very much.
I am going to have a final round of questions here, because
we--several of us have a couple more questions to ask, and then
we will bring this to a conclusion.
I would like to just focus a little bit on--we know now
that there is a hurdle that we must jump over in order to
expand the type of cooperation that we have with Russia. Let me
note, especially in regard to some of the comments that Mr.
Weldon made, yes, our companies did a great disservice to our
country. And I believe that they--some of our major corporate
leaders--betrayed our country's national security interests
when we transferred rocket technology to the Communist Chinese.
That was wrong. But as I mentioned earlier, let us note that
the Communist Chinese, there has not been one inch of political
reform in China. And the Chinese Government is still controlled
by a hard core clique of authoritarians. And in Russia, Russia
has been going through a very--a time of uncertainty. And to
the degree--and also let me note, there is very little reason,
and you might--and I might throw this to the panel. In terms of
the transfer of American technology to the Russians, our
cooperation, actually, opens up the door for us to receive more
technology from them than they do from us. Is that not the
case? Mr. Davis or whoever wants to----
Mr. Davis. I would be happy to address that one, and I will
speak in the realm of propulsion.
If you go back in '93, we were reluctant after the power
plant fire to entertain engine cycles that had anything to do
with an oxidizer rich--I don't want to get too technical here.
Chairman Rohrabacher. That is very technical.
Mr. Davis. The consequence of that is, however, that the
Russians, who had different experiences, developed engine
cycles that selectively provide about 15 percent better
performance than what has been enjoyed by the United States. To
that extent, it was a scientific, technical, philosophical
different of approach--different approaches. And as a result of
the work that was undertaken beginning back in 1990 were the
United States have technologically benefited by having gained a
lot of insight into what the Russians did. Their engines are,
in certain cases, more highly performing.
Now the consequence, or the consequential benefit to us
today is we, having now gained the insight into some of their
approaches, system approaches, and the ways in which they
accomplished those outcomes and have then thereby built fairly
reliable, meaning quite reliable, safe engines, has been, in
fact, a benefit to us. And we see, routinely, the incorporation
of some of those viewpoints and technologies being incorporated
into our own engine aspirations.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Well, that is my reading. And Mr.
Sokolski, maybe you have a different reading of that.
Mr. Sokolski. No, I think that is true. Unfortunately,
there are other things that are true, too. That is the problem.
Russia is helping build missiles for India. India just signed a
military cooperation agreement with Iran and is talking about
exporting its missile technology. Iran, meanwhile, is not just
getting covert missile assistance from Moscow, it is also
overtly buying Russian satellites and Earth tracking stations
that could help it and others target their missiles against our
friends and forces abroad. Moscow knows this but continues to
claim that all of its space commerce is peaceful. So I mean,
the problem is that we don't gain, it is that others gain.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Okay. Let us note, then, that what we
are talking about here is fundamentally different than the tech
transfer problem with China. Transferring technology--we--with
the China relationship, we are concerned about an American
gyroscope, for example, that we spent hundreds of millions of
dollars in developing, ending up in the hands of the Communist
Chinese for almost nothing. We are worried about, for example,
the other stage separation technology and the multiple payload
technology that we have now in the possession of the Communist
Chinese. They didn't pay a cent to develop it.
U.S.-Russian Rocket Engine Technology Investment
However, with the Russians, what we are really talking
about is technology that they invested a great deal in back
during the Cold War and it is helping us whether or not we are
going to be taking advantage of that, considering that they
have some policies and some other trade policies that are
detrimental to us. So it is a--that is--it is not an exactly
juxtaposed national security issue. I would suggest--and let me
ask Mr. Schumacher this, NASA is, for example, planning to
spend, is it not, up to $350 million over the next five years
in developing a new rocket engine that is arguably less
efficient than a rocket engine already available and available
to us at a very cheap price from the Russians. And why is it
that we should be spending $350 million of our development
money to develop what the Russians already have? Should we be
using that money on newer technology?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. Thanks for that question. If I
could clarify. First, if I could just touch real quickly on
your other question, because----
Chairman Rohrabacher. Right.
Mr. Schumacher [continuing]. I think it feeds right into
it.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Go right ahead.
Mr. Schumacher. We have got a tremendous amount of benefit
from the cooperation with Russia. One of the key things I would
highlight, there are a lot of things like the Universal Docking
Adapter that we use on Station now for the different vehicles
and the Europeans are using. We got it from the Russians. One
of the most important things is the--very much what you talked
about. They developed on a whole different path, and they have
a lot of dissimilar systems for safety, for propulsion, for
ops. They just come at it a different way. And so it provides
redundancy, but redundancy for a function in a different manner
than we would have. And I can give you a bunch of examples, but
I won't eat up the time now. But it is a great add to the
program.
Also, a lot of experience in human long duration space
flight. And there are other things, like--that we think and we
will come forward and work very carefully through. But there
are other parts of our program that we don't think are
precluded under Section 6, because they are non-human space
flight related. For example, in response to an RFP, for Project
Prometheus, our nuclear systems initiative, Stanford has come
forward with a proposal to buy thrusters from a Russian entity
that they think can help in that program. We think we have to
vet it through the interagency process. We think that may well
be allowable and in accord with the INA, both the letter and
the spirit of the law. Again, something Russia has that we
think will be of benefit to our program in technology.
With regard to the rocket program, though, it is a great
question, because it shows all of this push and tug we are
talking about. The Russians have some tremendous capabilities
in rocket engine propulsion, and I think Mr. Davis has talked a
lot about that.
And certainly, there have been some great marriages of
joint venture types of things with American companies to make
those work. Rosaviakosmos has really worked with some of the
Russian agent manufacturers, such as those teaming with
American companies to try and come forward and successfully
compete for contracts, including NASA contracts. The one in
particular you are talking about, I believe, and I will double
check when I go back, but there are a series of contracts. And
a Russian-American joint venture competed in two of those and
was unsuccessful. The third phase of this actually comes this
fall. When the--these were technology looks and technology
developments. The actual development of the engine contract
will come later this fall. And they are welcome to bid, as is
any other joint venture or American company that meets all of
the other criteria for export----
Chairman Rohrabacher. But would they be precluded because
of the nonproliferation legislation?
Mr. Schumacher. Again, sir, we would have to--on the facts
of the contract, go forth, but because it doesn't appear to be
human space flight related, we would think they could compete
and go forth. And it would be--but I am working with----
Chairman Rohrabacher. That is fascinating. That is
interesting. All right. I--let me just note that, again, the
Chinese and that whole scenario were the recipients of American
technology, and thus, we upgraded their ability to hurt the
United States. In this case, we are talking about limiting the
United States of our ability to take or partake of Russian
technology for our financial benefit and our ability to get the
job done.
I would now like to turn to Mr. Gordon and Mr. Lampson, if
they have some other things to finish this off with.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Russian Budget Commitments for Progress and Soyuz Vehicles
First, let me say I think that NASA has done a good job of
cobbling together a Soyuz/Progress program for the rest of this
year. Everything has to go perfectly, but, you know, at least
you have got a plan there. And hopefully it will go perfectly.
Once again, I am concerned about next year. And I want to try
to get some clarification on our earlier conversation.
Now as I understand it, in September, the Russians will
make a--their budget decision as to whether or not they are
going to allocate funds for this next year. I am just going to
go ahead, just for brevity, go through it. And Mr. Schumacher,
if you think I am off somewhere, then just let me know,
otherwise, I am assuming you are concurring.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, it is--that is--the objective is for--
we understand, is for increased funding for this year and then
what increase would be made on top of the budget already
planned for 2004.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. Now come September, I think it would be
reasonable, or not unreasonable, to look at history and see
where the Russians have reneged on past promises. It would not
be unreasonable for them to come forward and say, ``We want to
help. We think it is important to help, but we have a lot of
hungry people at home, and I may lose my, you know,
constituency here if I don't give them food rather than a
spacecraft.'' So I think that is, you know--hopefully that
won't happen, but that is not an unreasonable thing to
consider.
Now as I understand, if that occurred--earlier, you stated
that--if that were to happen, you would seek relief.
Mr. Schumacher. What I believe NASA would do is go first
and foremost to the partnership, because we have had great
success with solving these things within the partnership.
Mr. Gordon. You say great success. All I know is they have
bought some additional seats, but they already did that before
this accident occurred. So I am not seeing a lot of great
success here.
Mr. Schumacher. Well, again, certainly it might be the
perspective we have on it, but for the Russian Government to
step in and forward fund--increase funding coming next year----
Mr. Gordon. All right. Well, that is being done, but
again----
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. For the Canadians to come forward
and look to buy a seat that they had not planned or seats,
Europe to look at--to sign----
Mr. Gordon. But they would not have done anything.
Mr. Schumacher. Well, they have signed the contracts, and
then they are looking at additional seats beyond----
Mr. Gordon. But the ones they have done, though, weren't
they before the accident, so this is nothing new?
Mr. Schumacher. The two European seats, it is correct that
they were contemplated before the accident. But what they have
done is they have signed the contracts and kept the funding on
track as if the people were flying in April and in October when
they are flying in October and----
Mr. Gordon. Right. Right. But it is no new money. So you
know, again, if you don't want to look at this, then just
don't. But I mean, we--somewhere, we have got to be responsible
here. I mean, it may--sure, the goodness you recognize that
there is a--you know, a fairly good chance that this fall the
Russians are going to say, ``We can't afford to do this.'' The
Europeans are saying--well, could say, ``We have stepped up
already. We don't feel like that we can subsidize NASA any
longer.'' Now if that occurs, then, as you said, you are going
to have to seek some kind of relief. Now again, that relief may
be trying to get the partners to do even more, but if they
choose not to, then you are stuck with the situation of the
Iran Nonproliferation Act in terms of us having to help the
Russians pay for this.
Now either the President has to certify that there is no
proliferation, which I think could be tough, not necessarily
because there would be, but it might be hard to have the
intelligence to say that, or you are going to have to come to
Congress for, as you said, relief. Now I just want to sort of--
you know, hopefully you know these things, but let us get them
out on the table. If these decisions are going to be made in
September, even in September, they may say they are going to do
it, but wind up not having the money next year, then by our
calendar, we are supposed to be out of here October the 3rd.
Now we were also supposed to have been out October the 4th
last year. Nobody really thinks that we are going to get out on
October 3. So I mean, I have about as much confidence of
getting out on October 3 as I have confidence that the Russians
and the Europeans, you know, are going to pay or underwrite
NASA. So I mean, I think that we all need to think of these
contingencies. So you know, the deadline really isn't October
the 3rd, but hopefully we are going to be out of here, you
know, by the end of October. So you really get a pretty narrow
window. And somewhere, you have to--you know, and I don't think
Congress is going to be too happy with you coming up here and
saying that you have got to go through the full legislative
process and--in a week or something to give us this waiver. So
there really has to be, I think, some type of a contingency
plan put in place.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. First, it is not government
meeting in September to watch. I mean, the flow on these
vehicles starts 20 to 24 months out. So we can see the Progress
is in flow. We can see the Soyuz is in flow. And the Progress
and Soyuz, to meet that plan, are in flow. Now if they need--if
we need----
Mr. Gordon. For this year?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. And----
Mr. Gordon. I am talking about next year.
Mr. Schumacher. No. Yes, sir, and '04, too, because their
flow is there now. If they need to add those additional
Progress in '04 like we are talking about, you are going to
have to start to see that flow start, too. And we will watch
for that. So if there is a funding--if they don't come through
with the funding they are talking about in September, that is
the first thing we would watch, and then we would have to go
forth with that. But it is----
Mr. Gordon. Yeah. What would you do? Okay. I mean, what is
your plan? What would you do?
Mr. Schumacher. What would be the plan? Normally, we would
have the time, because we are talking almost----
Mr. Gordon. You plan to do what? I mean, you tell them to
do what?
Mr. Schumacher. Again, I would go to the partnership first.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. Then if that----
Mr. Schumacher. Talk to the partnership, and then if--the
last resort, and we would look at different operational things,
again, when do we return to flight. We would then, the last
step or the last thought we would have is come to the Congress
and ask for relief on INA. And I think that would be a judgment
we would have to really consider before we do.
Mr. Gordon. Yeah. I don't think that is unreasonable. I
just want you to think about it. And I will quickly close by
this saying that once this crisis is over with, then we get to
the fact that in 19--whether--in 2006, we have to do the whole
works. And at which time, we, once again, get to the situation
of either changing the nonproliferation pact or we are going to
have to hope that our partners are going to subsidize NASA, you
know, for four or five years. You know, I just don't think that
is reasonable to assume. And I just want all of this on the
record. I want it all, you know, there so that we don't play in
kind of, you know, games. You know, at home--well, I won't
get--I guess----
U.S.-Russian Relations
Chairman Rohrabacher. Mr. Gordon, I would suggest that
there is another alternative. And that is if we send the
Russians the right kind of signals that they will change their
behavior. And that--as Mr. Weldon suggested, maybe some of
these agreements that they got into could have been either
because of economic necessity, they were really starving when
they got into some of these agreements with Iran, or it could
be mixed signals that we sent them in policies for the last 10
years where our own people were upgrading Chinese missiles, et
cetera, et cetera. And the other alternative that would make
this happen and would make it work and really launch this--a
great relationship that would be beneficial to both, if the
Russians could change their basic behavior and not be
proliferaters and decide that they are going to make more
profit from dealing with the United States and our Western
allies as partners in a space enterprise rather than trying to
build rockets for the Indians or the Iranians.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. But Mr. Chairman, are we going to say,
then, that we are prepared to let the Space Station not have
any Russian support, which means that the Space Station, then,
would be unmanned if they don't act right?
Chairman Rohrabacher. That is a very tough challenge, isn't
it? And you are right. No, no. This is something we have got to
pay absolute attention to, and it is not something that we can
take for granted. But it is something that we all have to work
together on. And I am just sorry that our State Department
representative was not here to participate in this discussion.
Mr. Lampson is, again----
Mr. Schumacher. Could I have just a moment just to respond
to that----
Chairman Rohrabacher. Sure, go right ahead.
Mr. Schumacher [continuing]. Just very quickly? And I know
we are at a rush for time.
First of all, when we talk about subsidizing the United
States program, I can tell you, it is a welcome change from
talking about subsidizing the Russian program, but still, it is
just as worrisome. Because again, we do this a lot. We get into
this whole conversation, and then when we step back, we say,
``Look at how much America is putting into this Space Station
program.'' We are a huge player. We are the biggest partner in
this program, and we don't trump around and push that around,
but the fact of the matter is----
Mr. Gordon. But are we doing more than we said we would?
Mr. Schumacher. Are we doing--in different areas we are,
and in different areas----
Mr. Gordon. Right now, are we doing more than we said we
would?
Mr. Schumacher. In--overall, in the agreements? You mean
the overall----
Mr. Gordon. Yeah. I mean, you say we were doing so much,
but are we doing more than we said we would?
Mr. Schumacher. I think we are doing what we contemplated.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. So we are not really doing more than we
said we would. You know, if we are doing that much, then I
guess that means we have more to lose than anyone if the Space
Station is not manned. And so it would seem that our
negotiating position, then, is less with everyone else, if we
have the most to lose.
Mr. Schumacher. Well, I want to be the--but what I would
say, though, on that is, again, I would not underestimate this
partnership and--for example, crew--in 2006, crew beyond three.
There is no reason that we can not adjust what each partner is
bringing. Russian--Russia could step up and provide the second
Soyuz, if they wish. We could provide more up-mass or
downmass----
Chairman Rohrabacher. Well, let me know, Mr. Schumacher.
You are looking at the number one Cold Warrior that you will
ever meet. I mean, I was the speech writer for Ronald Reagan,
and I am not going to go into any details about which speeches
I wrote, but they were pretty raw meat compared to what most
people put out at the time.
The bottom line is, however, times have changed. And we
have tremendous opportunity to work with the Russians and--but
we have to do it realistically. And we cannot hedge, Mr.
Sokolski, I am sorry. I have a, you know, road block right in
your name there, a block about your name. But no, you have been
very--you have been--what you are saying is very reasonable. We
have got to be responsible, and we have got to be realistic,
but the potential is tremendous----
Mr. Sokolski. Right.
Chairman Rohrabacher [continuing]. If we can convince the
Russians to live in a responsible way.
I have to go to Mr. Lampson now.
Clarification on Russia's Commitment to ISS
Mr. Lampson. I feel like I am sort of getting the
impression that we are not getting everything. And we are
having a terrible perception that, in my opinion, is being left
through this kind of discussion. Somehow, you all have to find
a way to help, at least people like myself, clearly and easily
understand where the money is coming from and where it is
going. I believe the people of this country want to support
programs like this. We--you have heard it a thousand times from
the folks that sit on this panel up here how much we want to
support NASA, how much we want to do because we believe in what
we can learn by being in space. It is almost as if somebody is
trying to play a game, use artful words, cheat, lie to us. And
that is very angering and frustrating. And there is no need for
it. We are on the same team. But let us play. So come to us
with simple answers. And tell us that the dollars are coming.
How can you explain this statement that came out in the
NASA bimonthly Russian performance report that got here on June
the 10th? It says, ``Although European, Japanese, and Canadian
partners have proposed new limited commercial arrangements,''
those flights, ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency officials
have said that the funding is not sufficient to address all of
the proposed resupply activities.'' You didn't answer the
question of where those dollars are going to come from for
Russia. You didn't answer Ms. Jackson Lee's question: has
Russia agreed that it will not seek compensation from NASA or
any of the other international partners for those flights while
Shuttle is grounded? Give us the simple answers so that we can
understand, and we don't have to try to fight or sit here and
look stupid or silly.
Mr. Schumacher. I am not communicating well.
Mr. Gordon. You can come out in the audience to do it, too.
Mr. Schumacher. Not a problem. I guess I am trying to think
of the way to describe this, because I think I understand it,
but I am not saying it very well. Maybe if I start with there
is a baseline of the Soyuz and Progress for this year and next.
There is an approved plan of what the upper limit might be, of
what we might need. When I see a statement--when you see a
statement like that, that is a conservative statement that says
if we have got to go to an upper end, additional resources may
be needed. Now we would look to Russia to provide those, and we
would look to the assurances of the Presidents and that type of
thing. But there is a baseline program, which we are on path
which we think meets the needs to keep the Station manned and
operating. That is a partnership-agreed plan----
Mr. Lampson. You think that. But if it doesn't happen, you
are going to have to come here and take a long period of time
for this body to go through a process to get you the
permission, the okay, to do it. And that is why we asked for a
simple support for our legislation that would give the
flexibility for our government to be able to do what was
necessary to keep those people safe.
Chairman Rohrabacher. And it would be on you, that
legislation?
Mr. Lampson. I just happen to----
Chairman Rohrabacher. He just happens to----
Mr. Lampson. It is not hard to see whose names are on it.
Mr. Gordon. Mr. Schumacher, some of the questions we have
asked are in the ones that I have presented to Mr. O'Keefe
earlier, and once we get these, maybe we--a lot of this is--it
will be less complicated and maybe we can better understand it.
And that will be a good way to start this--or continue the
dialogue.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. We would be glad to come up and
talk.
Chairman Rohrabacher. Well, let me congratulate everyone
here and thank you, Sokolski--Mr. Sokolski. I have had a block
all day about that name. And thank you very much, Mr. Davis.
Thank you, Mr. Schumacher. And Ambassador Pifer, there you are.
I am sorry you didn't make it, because this was a wonderful
discussion.
And let me note, just in final for everyone is that
everything isn't--reality isn't cement right now. There are a
lot of creative new ideas that could come up, a lot of new
alternatives that could come up. And we would be--we just need
the flexibility to be able to take advantage of new
alternatives and creative approaches. And the Russians, a good
relationship with the Russians give us--gives us those things
that we can't even perceive right now, but tomorrow we might
come up with an idea that will solve some of the financial
challenges that we face ahead.
And with that said, I would like to thank the witnesses,
yes, and please be advised that Subcommittee Members may
request additional information, for the record. And I would ask
other Members who are going to submit questions to do so within
one week of this date of the hearing.
That concludes this hearing. The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by John D. Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for
External Relations
Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. Under NASA's interpretation of the Iran Nonproliferation Act,
would NASA be allowed to purchase or enter into a contract with a U.S.
company for a good or service for the Space Station that the U.S.
company had jointly developed with a Russian company?
A1. NASA has not had a baselined ISS requirement that would necessitate
procurement of jointly developed ISS goods or services; the agency has
not directly addressed this question and is reluctant to do so in a
hypothetical context. To some extent, the answer may depend upon the
nature of the good or service and the degree of Russian involvement.
However, an important policy consideration bearing upon any such
determination is the fact that the Iran Nonproliferation Act has been a
source of pressure on Russia to improve the proliferation record of
companies in the aerospace sector. NASA is concerned that its
procurement activities not diminish this pressure. The agency would
need to ensure full consistency with the legal and policy objectives of
the INA before authorizing any such transaction.
Q2. Would your response to (1) above differ if the good or service
would also be marketed for other applications not specific to the Space
Station?
A2. Again, while NASA has not addressed this issue directly and is
reluctant to do so in a hypothetical context, the policy background
noted in the response to Question 1 above must be considered.
Q3. Would your response to (1) or (2) above differ if the good or
service was jointly developed with a Russian company not under the
jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency
defined in Section 7 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act and the State
Department determined that the company has not been involved in any
proliferation activities with Iran?
A3. Please see the response to questions 1 and 2 above.
Q4. During your response to questions during the hearing, you referred
to ``the black letter of the Act'' and ``the intent and spirit of the
Act.'' Is each of your responses to the case situations in questions 1-
3 above based on ``the black letter of the Act'' or based on the
``intent and spirit of the Act''?
A4. NASA has sought to comply with both the ``letter'' and ``spirit''
of the Act in transactions involving Russian entities.
Q5. Is NASA concerned about the long-term viability of the Russian's
Soyuz and Progress production capability, given U.S. reliance on Soyuz
and Progress vehicles until U.S. Orbital Space Plane and Alternate
Access capabilities are developed?
A5. Since the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, Russia has
demonstrated a steadfast commitment to the ISS program by assuming
increased responsibility for operational support of the ISS. President
Putin reaffirmed this commitment in a joint statement with President
Bush on June 1, 2003. At the ISS Heads of Agency meeting held in
California on July 29, 2003, the ISS Partnership noted Russia's
commitment to continuing critical support for general ISS operations,
logistics and crew transportation and rescue capability until the Space
Shuttle returns to flight and beyond.
NASA recognizes that Rosaviakosmos' ability to continue to fulfill
its ISS obligations are dependent upon sustained adequate funding from
the Russian Government, as well as Rosaviakosmos's ability to continue
to secure adequate ``off-budget'' funding, such as the funding it
receives from customers who pay for seats on Soyuz flights. NASA will
continue to monitor this situation and will continue to work closely
with Rosaviakosmos and the other International Partners to address and
resolve in advance any issues that arise that could affect ISS
operations.
Q6. Are the Russians obligated to provide Soyuz support for American
astronauts past 2006?
A6. Under the ISS Agreements, the Rosaviakosmos has committed to
provide crew rescue capability for the entire international crew after
its initial obligation if the NASA crew rescue capability is available
later than planned, for agreed compensation from NASA. The ISS
Partnership is addressing the requirements for accommodation of crew
rescue capabilities after 2006 as part of the ISS Program Action Plan,
which was established at the Tokyo 2002 Heads of Agency meeting and is
currently being updated. All Partners recognize that any solution
related to ISS crew rescue must be consistent with U.S. law.
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. The June 11, 1996 Space Station Protocol between NASA and the
Russian Space Agency states that:
``NASA will provide crew rescue capability following
completion of assembly. In the event the NASA crew rescue
capability becomes later than is currently planned. . .RSA [the
Russian Space Agency] agrees to provide the capability to
rescue the entire international crew using the Soyuz for agreed
upon compensation from NASA'' [Emphasis Added].
NASA's responsibility to provide Space Station crew return starts
in 2006. Under NASA's own proposal, the Orbital Space Plane would not
be available as a crew return vehicle until about 2010. Since OMB
canceled the U.S. crew return vehicle in 2001, the Soyuz is the only
crew return vehicle that will be available as of 2006.
Q1a. Given the Iran Nonproliferation Act's prohibition against NASA
purchasing Soyuz vehicles or services, how is NASA planning to meet its
crew return commitment in 2006 and beyond?
Q1b. Is NASA assuming that the Europe and the other International
Partners will assume NASA's responsibility and pay for the Soyuz
vehicles on their own?
Q1c. If not, who will pay for the Soyuz, and have they agreed to do
so?
A1a,b,c. NASA been working closely with its International Partners to
fully assess the implications of the loss of Columbia on ISS operations
and to develop and implement an appropriate near-term plan of action.
The ISS Partnership is also addressing the requirements for
accommodation of crew rescue capabilities after 2006 as part of the ISS
Program Action Plan for Selection of an ISS Configuration. This Program
Action Plan was established by the ISS Heads of Agency during their
meeting in Tokyo in December 2002. The implementation of the Program
Action Plan was delayed by the loss of Columbia. A revised
implementation schedule is now under development by the ISS Partners.
All of the ISS Partners recognize that any solution related to ISS crew
rescue must be consistent with U.S. law. Meanwhile, NASA is working
with its contractors to create an option to accelerate acquisition of
the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) with the goal of initial operational
capability of a crew return vehicle as early as 2008.
Q1d. Alternatively, are you planning to seek a change in the Iran
Nonproliferation Act to allow such purchases by NASA?
A1d. NASA currently has no plans to request any changes to the Iran
Nonproliferation Act in order to meet ISS crew rescue responsibilities.
The INA clearly outlines the responsibilities and procedures upon which
NASA can act should circumstances change in the future.
Q1e. Does NASA believe that the ``in-kind'' and ``third party''
transaction prohibitions in the Iran Nonproliferation Act would
prohibit one or more of the other Space Station International Partners
from purchasing Soyuz spacecraft or crew return services from Russia in
exchange for some compensation from the United States? Why or why not?
A1e. The Iran Nonproliferation Act has been a source of pressure on
Russia to improve its proliferation record. If NASA provided
compensation to another ISS International Partner ``in exchange for''
that partner purchasing spacecraft or services that NASA could not
purchase directly from Russia due to the restrictions in Section 6 of
the INA, this pressure would be diminished or eliminated altogether.
Such arrangements would raise legal questions under Section 6 of the
INA and would likely be viewed by many as an evasion of the law.
Q2. Even if NASA is allowed to proceed with the Orbital Space Plane
project, the only means other than the Shuttle of getting U.S.
astronauts into space for the next ten years will be the Russian Soyuz
spacecraft.
Q2a. In light of the Columbia accident, what specific steps is the
Administration taking to ensure that the U.S. will be able to make use
of the Soyuz as a backup to the Space Shuttle for the next ten years?
Q2b. Will any modification to the Iran Nonproliferation Act be
required to ensure that the U.S. can make use of the Soyuz if needed?
Q2c. If the Administration is not taking any particular steps to
ensure that the Soyuz is available as a backup to the Shuttle, why not?
A2a,b,c. NASA has been working closely with its International Partners
to assess fully the implications of the loss of Columbia on ISS
operations and to develop and implement an appropriate near-term plan
of action. The ISS Partnership is addressing the requirements for
accommodation of crew rescue capabilities after 2006 as part of the ISS
Program Action Plan for Selection of an ISS Configuration. This Program
Action Plan was established by the ISS Heads of Agency during their
meeting in Tokyo in December 2002. The implementation of the Program
Action Plan was delayed by the loss of Columbia. A revised
implementation schedule is now under development by the ISS Partners.
All of the ISS Partners recognize that any solution related to ISS crew
rescue must be consistent with U.S. law. The ISS Program Action Plan
for Selection of an ISS Configuration does not depend on the
modification of the INA, use of an exemption, or its repeal. NASA
currently has no plans to seek an exception to, or request an amendment
of, the INA. Meanwhile, NASA is working with its contractors to create
an option to accelerate acquisition of the Orbital Space Plane (OSP)
with the goal of initial operational capability of a crew return
vehicle as early as 2008 and a system for crew transfer approximately
two years later.
Q3. In NASA's April 2003 bimonthly status report on Russian
participation in the Space Station program, concern was expressed over
the ability of the Russians to continue to provide Soyuz and Progress
vehicles, stating that ``Russian performance appeared to depend on the
receipt of `off budget' funds from the sale of flight opportunities on
the Soyuz missions. . .'' and going on to conclude that ``The grounding
of the Space Shuttle fleet and the subsequent Multilateral Coordination
Board-agreed-upon interim operations plan have put additional financial
strain on Rosviakosmos.'' In addition, the head of the Russian Space
Agency has stated in recent months that the Russian Space Agency did
not have sufficient funding to provide the needed Soyuz and Progress
vehicles beyond this year. And a recent edition of Aerospace Daily
reported that the vice president of the company that builds the Soyuz
and Progress vehicles said that the company had to borrow money to
begin building an extra Progress vehicle to support the Space Station
while the Shuttle fleet is grounded.
Q3a. How much money do the Russian Space Agency and contractors need
to build the necessary Soyuz and Progress vehicles?
Q3b. Do you or anyone at NASA knows what fraction of the needed funds
is actually being provided to the Russian contractors?
A3a,b. Specific cost figures and contractual allocations for Russian-
provided elements are not available. Earlier in the year, however,
Rosaviakosmos officials asserted that Rosaviakosmos required
approximately $100 million USD to successfully implement a near-term
operations plan adopted by the ISS Multilateral Coordination Board in
February 2002. To date, without significant additional funding from the
other ISS international partners, the Russian Government has continued
to implement the agreed near-term operations plan. The Russian
government has recently indicated that it is also moving ahead with
plans to increase its funding of the ISS program in 2004 and is
continuing to assess a potential augmentation to the Rosaviakosmos 2003
budget to support ISS operations.
Q3c. From the time a decision is made to proceed, how long does it
take to build and ready a Soyuz vehicle for launch? What is the time
required for a Progress vehicle?
A3c. Officials from Rosaviakosmos and Energia, the company which builds
the Soyuz and Progress spacecraft, have indicated that it takes
approximately two years to build a Soyuz or Progress spacecraft and
ready them for launch.
Q4. One of my questions to NASA Administrator O'Keefe for the record
of the February 27, 2003 NASA Posture hearing was ``Have you ever
discussed either using one of the exemptions permitted under the Iran
Nonproliferation Act (INA), modifying the INA, or seeking repeal of the
INA with any White House officials up to and including the President?
If so, when, with whom, what was the nature of the discussion, and what
was the response by the White House officials)?'' The response from
NASA, which was received on June 18, 2003, stated: ``NASA has discussed
various aspects of INA with other Agencies and Departments within the
Administration.'' Unfortunately, that answer does not respond to the
specific questions asked for the record of the February 27th hearing.
Therefore,
Q4a. Has NASA Administrator O'Keefe ever discussed either using one of
the exemptions permitted under the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA),
modifying the INA, or seeking repeal of the INA with any White House
officials up to and including the President?
Q4b. If so, when, with whom, what was the nature of the discussion,
and what was the response by the White House official(s)?
A4a,b. It would not be appropriate for NASA to disclose the specific
nature or content of the Administrator's discussions with the White
House. As previously indicated, NASA officials, including the
Administrator, have consulted a variety of experts within the Executive
Branch, including the White House, concerning the Act's application to
ongoing and potential NASA actions relating to the ISS.
Questions submitted by Representative Curt Weldon
Q1. NASA has begun a new space nuclear power system program that is
estimated to cost approximately $9 billion over the next 10 years. The
Russian Space Agency has a great deal of experience in space nuclear
power systems, and in the early 1990s, the Department of Defense
purchased a Russian Topaz space nuclear reactor. Cooperation presents
an opportunity for NASA to build on the progress already made and
lessons-learned in Russia and save billions of dollars by not having to
develop its own space nuclear power program.
A1. Project Prometheus, the nuclear systems program (formerly the
Nuclear Systems Initiative), is comprised of three major components: 1)
the development of radioisotope power systems; 2) the development of
nuclear fission power and electric propulsion systems; and 3) the first
mission to use nuclear-electric power and propulsion, the Jupiter Icy
Moons Orbiter (JIMO).
The President's FY 2004 budget request runout through FY 2008
includes roughly $3 billion for Project Prometheus, of which just over
$2 billion would be for JIMO. Because NASA is in the early stages of
planning key aspects of Project Prometheus, we are not in a position to
establish a definitive cost projection over the next 10 years for the
entire program. Such projections are particularly dependent on the
mission approaches and costs for JIMO, which are being studied in-depth
by industry (three teams are participating) and the government. When
these mission studies are concluded, JIMO life cycle cost estimates
will be developed and finalized.
Q1a. To what extent does NASA plan to utilize Russia's nuclear
experience? If not, under what circumstances would the United States be
willing to take advantage of this opportunity?
A1a. The two areas for potential international participation in Project
Prometheus are the development of science instrumentation and
spacecraft system technology development. At this time, NASA envisions
potential partnerships in developing science instruments for JIMO and
future Prometheus missions. Regarding the second area of possible
interaction, which would include the development of nuclear-related
technologies, NASA does not have any definitive plans for such
collaborations at this time. At this early stage of the program, we
believe our efforts to establish the most appropriate technologies for
near-term development can be best-managed and implemented via U.S.
Government, industry, and academia.
NASA recognizes the significant experience the Russians have in
developing the TOPAZ and TOPAZ II (Enisy) space reactors. However,
after conducting an in-depth analysis of technologies applicable to
JIN40 and other similar space science missions, we determined that the
Russian space reactor technologies were not suited to NASA's current
needs. In particular, the technologies employed by the Russians
(specifically the power conversion system and fuel) have significant
lifetime limitations that make them incompatible with the longer-term
missions of interest to NASA.
It is worth noting, however, that foreign entities do have the
opportunity to participate in Project Prometheus, as permissible by
law, by cooperatively contracting with proposers for NASA grants. As
future opportunities present themselves, within the context of
competitively awarded contracts, we will evaluate each on a case-by-
case basis for their applicability to the program.
Q1b. What has been the funding history of space nuclear power since
the purchase of the Russian Topaz? What funding level is necessary to
sufficiently develop a U.S. space nuclear program?
A1b. NASA is not in a position to quantify the funding history of space
nuclear power, or for that matter any specific space nuclear reactor
work prior to the proposal of the Nuclear Systems Initiative in FY
2003, because several agencies other than NASA were involved in the
various programs, including the TOPAZ II-related work. As for the
second question, please see our response to the opening statement
accompanying the questions for the record.
Q1c. Have there been cooperative efforts to work with the Russians on
further space power development since the Topaz reactor?
A1c. NASA has not been involved in any cooperative activities with the
Russians involving space nuclear power during this time period.
Q1d. What is the timeline for development, testing, and deployment of
NASA's space nuclear power systems? What mission is driving this
schedule?
A1d. Project Prometheus' two space nuclear power system development
efforts--radioisotope power systems and fission reactors--are on
separate development schedules, which are driven by very different
applications.
Project Prometheus's radioisotope power system program is
supporting two near-term missions: the New Horizons mission to Pluto,
scheduled for 2006, and the Mars Science Laboratory, planned for 2009.
The New Horizons mission is to be powered by the last Radioisotope
Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) in our inventory.
Because of the need expressed by mission planners for radioisotope
power systems, NASA has begun development of the next generation of
systems that will operate not only in space (as is the case with the
most recent RTG systems) but also within an atmosphere, such as on the
surface of Mars. Two technologies are under development--the Multi-
Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) and the Stirling
Radioisotope Generator (SRG)--for possible use on the 2009 Mars
mission. The MMRTG is a smaller, more advanced version of the RTG. The
SRG produces a comparable amount of electricity as the MMRTG by
converting the heat from radioisotope decay to electricity through a
dynamic power conversion system (the Stirling free-piston engine). The
SRG system is more complex than the MMRTG, but this technology promises
to be up to four times more efficient in converting heat to electricity
than the MMRTG, requiring less fuel per watt of power produced.
The nuclear fission electric power and propulsion components of
Project Prometheus are supporting the development of technologies for
science missions that would be uniquely enabled by these technologies--
in the near-term the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO). Initial planning
estimates call for launch of the JIMO spacecraft no earlier than 2011.
Q1e. What missions need space nuclear power to be successful? When are
these missions scheduled? What funding will be necessary to achieve
this schedule?
A1e. NASA is making a strategic investment in both radioisotope and
fission space power systems because they can uniquely enable a range of
near- and long-term NASA missions. Such missions would take advantage
of these systems' ability to provide NASA mission planners ``all
weather, anytime, anywhere'' capabilities. That is, they are capable of
providing continuous power, from milliwatts to 100s of kilowatts, in
hostile environments, irrespective of the availability of the sun
(generally speaking, once further out into the solar system than Mars,
the Sun is not a very effective source of power with today's solar
power technologies). Thirty years of experience in the design and use
of radioisotope power sources have also demonstrated the ruggedness and
reliability of these systems, some of which have now operated for well
over 20 years. While we cannot identify specific missions beyond JIMO
at this point, we do envision follow-ons in the next decade.
Beyond these inherent benefits of both space radioisotope and
fission power systems, space nuclear fission systems offer NASA space
science mission planners unprecedented levels of power for use in space
or on the surfaces of planetary bodies. Access to power levels up to
1,000 times greater than those available today would enable
revolutionary capabilities in the areas of spacecraft maneuverability
and scientific exploration.
In the area of radioisotope power systems, the Mars Science
Laboratory (MSL) science return would be significantly enhanced by a
power system that would enable increased observation time on the
planet, and a greater range of potential destinations that could be
explored. Rather than being limited to the equatorial sector of Mars
(to optimize solar power), MSL could be sent, independent of seasonal
variations, to those areas that hold some of the greatest potential for
scientific return, i.e., high latitude areas where water has been
detected. Also, the MSL would function for an extended period of time--
one to two years, rather than several weeks--and this would not be
possible with solar power.
Making use of this power, NASA can now begin to plan close-range,
months-long orbits of multiple destinations for optimal science
observation. Throughout such a mission, power could be directed to an
entirely new class of scientific instruments the likes of which are
currently only available to satellites in near-Earth orbit. Even at
great distances (e.g., the orbit of Jupiter and beyond), the increased
power from a space nuclear reactor would enable transmission of more
data to Earth daily than would be returned by the Pioneer, Voyager,
Galileo, and Cassini over their entire mission lifetimes combined.
Moreover, this power would also enable the highly efficient propulsion
systems under development (similar to that used on Deep Space-1) to
transport significantly larger payloads to any final destination.
Taken in total, the benefits outlined above could open up a whole
new range of missions, both robotic and human, in space and on the
surfaces of planets and moons, to NASA and the scientific community.
Because this is a new initiative for NASA, we are going to great
lengths to identify, hand-in-hand with the science community, future
missions, instruments, and technologies that can leverage the unique
capabilities enabled by Project Prometheus technologies.
The first mission to make use of nuclear electric power and
propulsion technologies from Project Prometheus is the JIN40 mission
that would orbit three of Jupiter's moons--Callisto, Ganymede, and
Europa--that are believed to have subsurface watery oceans; where there
is water, there is the possibility for life. Exploration of Europa is
the leading large mission candidate identified by the National Research
Council in its Decadal Solar System Exploration Survey. JIMO's nuclear-
powered electric propulsion system would enable it to orbit all three
moons at close range for several months at a time, while its high-
powered, active science instruments (e.g., ice penetrating radar) and
high-powered communications equipment would enable unprecedented
scientific return.
Q1f. How do other power systems compare with space nuclear power on
the basis of safety, cost, or availability?
A1f. Non-nuclear power and propulsion systems currently available or
under development will generally not be appropriate for the types of
missions on which Project Prometheus technologies would be employed.
Such considerations as safety, cost, and availability are balanced with
the specific mission science objectives prior to the development of any
NASA mission. Only when the science objectives are best achieved by the
use of space nuclear power, and requirements for cost, safety, and
availability are met, will these technologies be baselined into mission
planning.
Q2. Is the technology for space nuclear power systems mature enough
for testing or use at this time?
A2. The technologies under development by Project Prometheus are in
various stages of development, ranging from research and development of
high-temperature materials to life-testing of Stirling Radioisotope
Generators. In the area of radioisotope power sources, we are confident
that both near-term systems (MMRTG and SRG) will be ready for use on
the 2009 Mars Science Laboratory. We are also confident that a fully
tested nuclear fission power system will be ready for flight by the
early part of the next decade in support of the JIMO mission.
Q3. What efforts are necessary to further develop the technology?
A3. Because the radioisotope power source technology is well
established or very near demonstration, we will only address nuclear
fission related space systems. Significant work was carried out during
the 1980s and 1990s on technologies related to space nuclear reactors
under the SP-100 program, and we intend to leverage these efforts in
our work. It will be challenging to develop and test the various power
generation and conversion technologies to the point of being flight
ready, but many of the individual components under consideration have
been tested in one form or another over the years, which is why we are
confident in our ability to fly the JIMO mission in the early part of
the next decade.
Q3a. Who has this task?
A3a. The Department of Energy (DOE), as mandated by U.S. law, is
responsible for all nuclear materials-related tasks under Project
Prometheus. Such activities will be carried out via a Memorandum of
Understanding between the two agencies. As in the past, NASA will fund
the RPS work, but DOE will maintain responsibility for all RPS
development. In addition, DOE will have responsibility for the fission
reactor system. These activities will be supported by industry and
academia as necessary or appropriate. The remaining, i.e., non-nuclear,
systems and components of the program will be managed directly by NASA
and will also involve industry, academia, and NASA and DOE
laboratories.
Q3b. What are their current plans?
A3b. Plans for the RPS are well established, and we are on schedule to
have systems ready for possible use on the Mars 2009 mission. Regarding
the nuclear fission power system, NASA is currently funding internal
government and external industry studies to determine the best
configuration for the JIMO spacecraft and its primary systems, which
will drive future development activities. This detailed mission and
technology analysis should be completed in 2005. Once the final systems
have been selected, detailed system development plans will be
formulated. In parallel, NASA would continue to fund development work
on a range of technologies applicable to the mission.
Q3c. What is the Russian involvement in these plans?
A3c. There is currently no Russian involvement in Project Prometheus
activities.
Q3d. What is the private sector involvement?
A3d. Currently, there are over 60 private sector participants
(including industry and academia from 20 states) participating in
Project Prometheus-funded work, with between 60-70 percent of all
program work competitively awarded. In addition, the final spacecraft
integrator contract for JIMO will go to industry.
Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson
Q1. What would be the consequences if the International Space Station
had to be abandoned [uncrewed] for an indefinite period of time (from
months to years) because the Shuttle fleet was grounded and none of the
Space Station partners could pay to provide the Soyuz and Progress
spacecraft needed to keep it operating?
A1. The ISS is built to be human-tended and cannot be used to conduct
meaningful science without human interaction. Without the crew to
perform routine maintenance on the ISS, systems would begin to degrade,
complicating the process of reactivation.
In the event that a de-crewing is necessary for any reason NASA has
a plan in place for such a contingency. The ISS program has defined the
best operational vehicle configuration (hardware, software and
orientation) that will maximize the chances of vehicle survivability
while operating without a crew.
Q2. If the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) would force abandonment of
the International Space Station for an indefinite period, would NASA
seek relief from the INA? If not, why not?
A2. Since the loss of Columbia, NASA has looked to the ISS Partnership
to assist in sustaining human presence on orbit while NASA concentrates
on the necessary actions to return the Shuttle safely to flight. NASA
has been working closely with its International Partners to fully
assess the implications of the loss of Columbia on ISS operations and
to develop and implement an appropriate near-term plan of action. This
plan of action does not depend on the modification of the INA, use of
an exemption, or its repeal. Therefore, NASA currently has no plans to
seek an exception to or request an amendment of the INA. The provisions
contained within the INA clearly outline the responsibilities and
procedures upon which NASA can act should circumstances change in the
future.
Q3. Does NASA see the need to renegotiate the multilateral
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) or any of the Space Station bilateral
Memoranda of Agreement? If so, why? And if so, when would NASA like to
have those negotiations begin?
A3. No, NASA has no plans at this time to seek to renegotiate the
multilateral ISS IGA or bilateral MOUs.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Robert M. Davis, President and CEO, California Space
Authority
Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. Is this shift in work from the U.S. to Russia a large contributing
factor to the decline of the U.S. aerospace industrial base over the
past 10 years?
A1. The shift primarily affects the U.S. commercial launch industry
base, and does so in two ways, and has selectively contributed to U.S.
aerospace industrial declines.
First, it can be qualitatively argued that launches of U.S. origin
commercial satellites on Russian vehicles reduce the number of vehicles
produced and flown by U.S. manufacturers. However, competition for
provision of commercial launch services went global ten or more years
ago, and of late has been greatly intensified by the reduction of
satellite launches in this era of the telecom glut. The degree, then,
to which the U.S. commercial launch industry has declined uniquely due
to Russian launches of U.S. and foreign commercial satellites is
difficult to enumerate. Unquestionably, however, as the number of U.S.
vehicles produced and launched declines, it becomes increasingly
difficult to avoid worker complacency, which leads to declines in
flight reliability, and looking to the future, increasingly difficult
to attract new entrants to the community as older workers retire. In
the nearer-term, unreliability as measured in flight failures of all
types, poses adverse economic consequence in a host of industry sectors
(manufacturing, services, insurance, investment, satellite services,
etc.). In the longer-term, a loss of industrial vigor will be
experienced as the launch industry increasingly operates as a commodity
market.
Second, the U.S. propulsion industry has been adversely affected by
the use of engines of Russian origin on U.S. vehicles, and jobs have
been lost that would have otherwise been performed by U.S. workers. As
one example, in recent testimony before a Senate Science, Technology,
and Space subcommittee hearing, Mr. Bryon Woods of Boeing Rocketdyne,
cited that during 2002 the U.S. propulsion community provided a mere 14
percent of required launch engines, while the Russians provided over 60
percent, and Europe providing the remainder.
Q2. Do you have any analyses about how many U.S. jobs have been
affected by this shift in aerospace work to Russia?
A2. As a consequence of the shift in supply of rocket engines,
Rocketdyne has experienced a decline in the engine production workers,
and of equal importance, a significant decline in its design and
development staff (from a peak of slightly more than 800 in 1999 to
about 260 in 2002). Aerojet and Pratt & Whitney reflect similar, if not
significantly greater losses of production and design/development
personnel for many of the same reasons.
Q3. Do you have any concerns about U.S. reliance on Russian aerospace
industry to supply critical aerospace technologies rather than the U.S.
developing its own capabilities?
A3. The world is less stable now than it has been for a number of
decades. Orbits near the earth provide the high ground in terms of
sensing and communications (as well as precise navigation), and if the
U.S. intends to sustain its dominance in the realm, it is important
that the U.S. also maintain its aerospace technological leadership.
Within its borders, Russia still retains all strategically key natural
resources; the U.S. does not, and therefore must rely on other nations
for some of its strategically critical resources. Therefore, it remains
of critical importance to the future welfare and well being of the U.S.
to maintain its space enterprise leadership so as to be able to ensure
ready sources of supply in this volatile era across the globe.
Q4. Do you have any recommendations to remedy these concerns [about
reliance on Russian aerospace]?
A4. The U.S. Government and taxpayers need to recognize and accept that
our aerospace industry is itself a critical strategic resource that
must be sustained, including ensuring that it will have the workforce
that is needed throughout the future. The answer to this question
should address current investments by NASA and other agencies in the
future of the U.S. aerospace community, including development of a
sustainable workforce, and should be the exclusive subject of a
separate hearing. These investments should stimulate early to advanced
education, worker development, technology development, and operating
proficiency needs across the board if this community is to be sustained
at a level that will serve preservation of our national security and
defense interests.
Q5. Are U.S. aerospace companies seeking to do business with Russian
companies informed beforehand by the State Department about any
proliferation concerns with certain Russian companies?
A5. I do not have any recent first hand experience on which to base an
answer to this question.
Q6. Would such information be useful to U.S. industry before a U.S.
company seeks a Technical Assistance Agreement from the State
Department to work with certain Russian companies on particular
programs?
A6. Some 450 aerospace entities in Russia have or in the past have had
ties in one form or another with the Russian government. From time to
time the U.S. evidences concerns about proliferation by various Russian
entities, including some of these 450 companies. Developing an operable
and productive relationship with a Russian aerospace entity is
expensive, uncertain, and time consuming. Availability of information
from the Department of State about select Russian entities that pose
concerns for the interests of U.S. national security before making the
investment to apply for a TAA would be highly beneficial to companies
large and small. A second interest to be addressed is that from time to
time U.S. Company to Russian Company commerce is put into limbo as
contemporary U.S. Government to Russian Government issues play
themselves out on the world stage. Companies that do not have a lot of
cash to weather business disruptions would benefit by knowing
beforehand which Russian companies are more likely than not to incur
business delays so that they might be avoided if other choices exist
with whom business might be undertaken.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center
Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. Your testimony highlights the need to stem Russian proliferation
of all aerospace capabilities by shrinking the Russian aerospace
industrial base. The Iran Nonproliferation Act stops all U.S. payments
to Russia for any support they might provide for the International
Space Station in order to induce the Russian Government to stop
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile
technology to Iran. Would you recommend restricting or embargoing other
U.S.-Russia aerospace trade and collaboration in other areas, such as
launch vehicle engines and other capabilities, in order to stop Russian
proliferation to Iran and other countries?
A1. If there was a way to leverage Russian behavior that would
effectively stop Russia from proliferating illicit strategic technology
to hostile states such as Iran I would favor it. I support simple
notion that the U.S. taxpayer should not be asked to support Russian
entities that do such proliferation because the U.S. loses moral
authority to complain about Russian proliferation generally if it does
not show this minimum of self-restraint itself. On the other hand, I
am, like many other experts, skeptical about how much more can be done
with new sanctions that would effectively stop Russian proliferation.
Q2. Why not simply restrict our trade and collaboration to those
entities in Russia that the State Department deems as proliferators?
A2. This is what the current law effectively does by requiring the
President to certify that the Russian Space Agency no longer has
entities under its purview that do proliferate. Once the President
certifies, it is my understanding that NASA is free to make progress
payments to RSA.
Q3. Why are Russian companies that are not proliferators made to
suffer from an embargo on U.S. trade and collaboration on the Space
Station when they cannot control the actions of a few Russian companies
despite the Russian Government making some efforts toward improved
export control/nonproliferation?
A3. Russian entities working under the control of RSA benefit from this
association through subsidies and so must be held accountable when
entities under the RSA's authority misbehave. As I noted in my
testimony, the best and perhaps only solution to this problem is to
right-size the number of RSA space entities to smaller number that
would include only the most responsible and profitable entities.
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. In your testimony, you appear not to favor granting any waivers to
the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Would you oppose any exception to or
modification of the terms of the INA even if the result was that the
Space Station had to be abandoned on orbit for an indefinite period,
with an increased risk that the entire Station might be lost?
A1. I think the current waiver for safety--i.e., to prevent the
imminent loss of life or grievous injury to those aboard the Station--
is entirely reasonable and should not be changed. The U.S. should fund
the Station in such a fashion that the U.S. would not have to exercise
this waiver. If that means funding an alternative means to rescue crews
other than Soyuz, I would do this. Modifying the existing waiver on
these points, I believe would only undermine the law's original intent,
which was to keep U.S. taxpayers from paying money unnecessarily to
entities the President believed were still proliferating strategic
rocket related technologies to Iran. Forced to choose between making
the Space Station's success less dependent on contracting taxpayers'
dollars to proliferating Russian entities and being complicit in such
commerce, I would prefer making the station less dependent every time.
Q2. Your testimony highlights the need to stem Russian proliferation
of all aerospace capabilities by shrinking the Russian aerospace
industrial base. The Iran Nonproliferation Act stops all U.S. payments
to Russia for any support they might provide for the International
Space Station in order to induce the Russian Government to stop
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile
technology to Iran. Would you recommend restricting or embargoing other
U.S.-Russia aerospace trade and collaboration in other areas, such as
launch vehicle engines and other capabilities, in order to stop Russian
proliferation to Iran and other countries?
A2. If there was a way to leverage Russian behavior that would
effectively stop Russia from proliferating illicit strategic technology
to hostile states such as Iran I would favor it. I support simple
notion that the U.S. taxpayer should not be asked to support Russian
entities that do such proliferation because the U.S. loses moral
authority to complain about Russian proliferation generally if it does
not show this minimum of self-restraint itself. On the other hand, I
am, like many other experts, skeptical about how much more can be done
with new sanctions that would effectively stop Russian proliferation.
Q3. Why not simply restrict our trade and collaboration to those
entities in Russia that the State Department deems as proliferators?
A3. This is what the current law effectively does by requiring the
President to certify that the Russian Space Agency no longer has
entities under its purview that do proliferate. Once the President
certifies, it is my understanding that NASA is free to make progress
payments to RSA.
Q4. Why are Russian companies that are not proliferators made to
suffer from an embargo on U.S. trade and collaboration on the Space
Station when they cannot control the actions of a few Russian companies
despite the Russian Government making some efforts toward improved
export control/nonproliferation?
A4. Russian entities working under the control of RSA benefit from this
association through subsidies and so must be held accountable when
entities under the RSA's authority misbehave. As I noted in my
testimony, the best and perhaps only solution to this problem is to
right-size the number of RSA space entities to smaller number that
would include only the most responsible and profitable entities.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Ambassador Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, State
Department
Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. According to several news reports, the Russians are helping to
train Chinese astronauts. When Chinese President Hu Jintao toured the
Khrunichev Space Center recently, the Russians reportedly offered to
build them a Space Station out of spare parts of the Zarya control
module that the U.S. paid for during the 1990s.
Did Russia offer to help the Chinese build a space
station?
Would any U.S. owned parts or equipment be used to
help build a space station for China?
Will the U.S. Government be reimbursed for the re-
sale of any parts or equipment?
Is the State Department closely monitoring this
exchange between Russia and China?
Does the State Department have any proliferation
concerns with this exchange of technical capabilities and
knowledge from Russia to China?
A1. Based on past history, Russia would likely be involved in Chinese
space efforts. But China is still attempting to launch its first manned
space flight, and China's own estimates place the launching of any
space station ten years into the future.
The intergovermental agreement on the ISS, to which both the United
States and Russia are parties, provides that each government's space
agency shall mark with a notice technical data or goods that are to be
protected for export control purposes, and that this notice shall
indicate that (1) such technical data or goods shall be used only for
the purposes of fulfilling the obligations of the receiving space
agency and its contractors and subcontractors; and (2) that such
technical data or goods shall not be used by persons or entities other
than the receiving space agency, its contractors or subcontractors, or
for any other purposes, without the prior written permission of the
furnishing government.
The State Department would be concerned with any unauthorized
Russian transfer of U.S.-developed space technology. The level of
concern would depend upon the specific technology transferred, the
potential military utility, and any relevant export licenses. The State
Department monitors space issues that may involve the use or transfer
of U.S. technologies.
Q2. Your written testimony states, ``Russia has taken steps, though
not yet sufficient, to implement stronger export controls and improve
oversight at Russian facilities.''
What steps have been taken to implement stronger
export controls?
What additional steps for stronger export controls
would Russia need to make?
Has the State Department communicated to the Russian
Government the steps that it thinks are necessary and
sufficient for export controls?
A1. U.S. bilateral cooperation with Russia has contributed to
improvements in Russia's export control laws and implementing
regulations over the past few years; it also supports Russia's outreach
and internal compliance programs aimed at educating its industry on
export controls.
Since the enactment of Russia's Federal Law on Export Control in
July 1999, the Russian Federation has adopted new regulations to
implement the law and create a more functional export control system.
Russia's export control law now extends to intangible transfers of
technology and includes provisions for catch-all controls. The
Government of Russia has updated its seven control lists to bring them
in closer harmony with the standardized EU international control lists
and all of the international nonproliferation regimes. President Putin
established the Export Control Commission in January 2001 to provide
policy oversight on key export control and licensing issues. Russia's
Administrative Code was revised in July 2002 to provide the Department
for Export Control (DEK) under the Ministry of Economic Development and
Trade with significant administrative enforcement authority. The DEK is
now responsible for drafting export control regulations, processing
export license applications, conducting industry compliance outreach
programs, and administrative prosecution of export control violations.
Increased focus should be placed on the enforcement of Russian
export control legislation and regulations. The Russian Government has
not prosecuted enough export control violations to effectively
demonstrate serious political will in enforcing its law or to establish
the effectiveness of the catch-all provisions of the law. Industry
outreach efforts are also seriously limited by scarce resources,
including personnel.
The State Department maintains an ongoing dialogue with the Russian
Government on export control issues and continues to communicate to the
Russian Government the steps that it thinks are necessary and
sufficient for an effective export control system.
Q3. Your written testimony states, ``Mr. Yuriy Koptev, General
Director of Rosaviakosmos, has been particularly active in promoting
reform throughout the Russian Government, and frequently notes the
constraints imposed by the Iran Nonproliferation Act on U.S.-Russian
space cooperation.''
What proliferation reforms have been promoted or
taken by Rosaviakosmos?
Are these proliferation reforms only between Russia
and Iran or between Russia and other countries?
Does the State Department advise other U.S.
Government agencies like NASA through reports, briefings, and
communication about which Russian Government agencies,
companies, and individuals are known proliferators?
Does the State Department advise U.S. aerospace
companies to any degree about U.S. Government proliferation
concerns with particular Russian Government agencies,
companies, and individuals?
A3. In recent years, senior USG officials have had an open and
productive dialogue on nonproliferation with Rosaviakosmos' General
Director Koptev. Under Mr. Koptev's stewardship, Rosaviakosmos has
implemented a number of reforms that safeguard against transfers and
assistance to missile programs of concern, in Iran and elsewhere. These
include:
A Federal Security Service (FSB) representative is
permanently positioned on the security staff at various
Rosaviakosmos' organizations;
Security staff holds foreign passports and restricts
travel of particular Rosaviakosmos' employees;
All foreign visitors must submit requests for visits
to Rosaviakosmos facilities two weeks in advance; all visitors
must be pre-approved and must state their agenda/reason for
visit;
All data to be used and presented to visitors (both
domestic and foreign) must be cleared through security, and a
security representative must be present at all meetings to
ensure that data and discussions are consistent with what had
been approved for release;
Key Rosaviakosmos firms have Internal Compliance
Programs (ICPs)--internal export control units--installed with
U.S. assistance to help vet transactions against export control
requirements;
Russia's Export Control Law outlines provisions
against intangible transfers of technology, and key
Rosaviakosmos personnel and presentations that attend
international conferences and symposia are vetted to ensure
these provisions are met.
We support these efforts and continue to work with the Russian
Government to strengthen existing controls and related mechanisms. The
State Department will also continue its close partnership with other
agencies such as NASA. With respect to working with our executive
branch colleagues, the State Department works with a wide array of
agencies to identify and impede proliferators of missile technology
through the Missile Transfer Analysis Group (MTAG). Many items used for
space systems, especially spacelift, are controlled by the MTAG and are
therefore identified and discussed by the USG agencies. Russia is a
signatory to the MTAG. The State Department does not identify
proliferators of space-unique equipment.
With respect to advising U.S. aerospace companies about U.S.
Government proliferation concerns with particular Russian Government
agencies, companies, and individuals, space technology that does not
have a secondary military use is not a proliferation concern. Space
technology is controlled through the standard export licensing process.
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. The June 1st Bush-Putin joint release states that: ``. . .the
Russian Federation is committed to meeting the U.S. crew transport and
logistics resupply requirements necessary to maintain our joint
American and Russian cosmonaut teams on board the ISS until the Space
Shuttle returns to flight.''
Q1a. Does that statement mean that Russia has formally agreed to pay
for all of the Soyuz and Progress flights needed to support the
International Space Station while the Shuttle fleet is grounded?
Q1b. Has Russia agreed that it will not seek compensation from NASA or
any of the other International Partners for those Progress and Soyuz
flights?
Q1c. If not, what in specific terms does the release mean?
A1a,b,c. The ISS Multilateral Coordination Board (MCB), chaired by NASA
Deputy Administrator Fred Gregory, on February 26, 2003, approved an
option to maintain a continued crew presence on ISS until the Space
Shuttle is able to return to flight. This option required that the ISS
crew size be reduced from three to two, that the April 2003 Soyuz
flight be used for crew exchange, and that the Russian Progress flight
schedule be accelerated to support crew and ISS consumable needs until
the Space Shuttle returns to flight. This option also required the
addition of two Russian Progress logistics vehicles to the ISS manifest
(one in 2003 and one in 2004) and assumes that the Space Shuttle and
the European Space Agency's (ESA's) Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV)
will be flying in 2004. This option was adopted by the ISS Partnership
contingent upon the ability of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency
(Rosaviakosmos) to receive additional funding.
Rosaviakosmos has informed NASA that the Russian Government has
advanced Rosaviakosmos all of its 2003 ISS funding to assist in the
acceleration of logistics vehicles. Similarly, each of the other space
agencies has made modest proposals to Rosaviakosmos that are currently
being evaluated. These activities are taking place within the framework
of the international agreements that govern the relationship among the
ISS Partners.
The June 1st joint statement issued following the meeting of
Presidents Bush and Putin does not mean--and was not intended to mean--
that Russia has agreed to pay for all costs related to provision of
Soyuz and Progress vehicles needed to support the ISS while the Shuttle
fleet is grounded. Nor does it mean that Russia will not seek
compensation from the United States for this purpose. What the joint
statement means is that Russia is committed to working with the United
States and other ISS partners to find a solution to the current problem
of sustaining an operational ISS.
Q2. Even if NASA is allowed to proceed with the Orbital Space Plane
project, the only means other than the Shuttle of getting U.S.
astronauts into space for the next ten years will be the Russian Soyuz
spacecraft.
Q2a. In light of the Columbia accident, what specific steps is the
Administration taking to ensure that the U.S. will be able to make use
of the Soyuz as a backup to the Space Shuttle for the next ten years?
Q2b. Will any modification to the Iran Nonproliferation Act be
required to ensure that the U.S. can make use of the Soyuz if needed?
A2a,b. The Administration does not plan to seek an exception to, or
request an amendment of, the Iran Nonproliferation Act. We are
continuing to urge the Russian Government to cease the kinds of
proliferation activities that have caused Congress to pass the INA with
the objective of influencing Russia in this regard such that we will no
longer require the INA.
Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson
Q1. From a foreign policy perspective, is having to take the crew off
of the International Space Station for an indefinite period an
acceptable alternative to loosening the restrictions of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act if the ISS had to be abandoned because the Shuttle
fleet was grounded and none of the Space Station partners could pay to
provide the Soyuz and Progress spacecraft needed to keep it operating?
A1. From a foreign policy perspective, neither loosening the
restrictions imposed by Iran Nonproliferation Act nor abandoning the
ISS would be acceptable alternatives. While NASA is working on issues
related to returning the Shuttle to flight, it is also consulting with
the Russian Aviation and Space Agency to develop options that will
support continuing ISS crew presence on orbit without resorting to
measures that would be inconsistent with the INA.
Q2. Does the Administration believe that the ``in-kind'' and ``third-
party'' transaction prohibitions in the Iran Nonproliferation Act would
prohibit the U.S. companies from purchasing Space Station related goods
and services from Russian companies? Why or why not? If not, are there
other provisions in the INA that would prevent such company-to-company
contracts?
A2. The Iran Nonproliferation Act was intended as a source of leverage
on Russia to improve the proliferation record of Russian companies in
the space sector. If U.S. companies under contract with NASA were to
subcontract with these same Russian companies for space station-related
goods or services, this leverage would be diminished or lost
altogether. We believe such arrangements would raise legal questions
under Section 6 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act and would likely be
viewed by many as an evasion of the law.
Q3. Khrunichev and RSC Energia are the two main Russian Space Station
contractors. Does the Administration believe that they are
``organizations or entities under the jurisdiction or control of the
Russian Aviation and Space Agency'' under the terms of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act? Why or why not?
A3. As referenced in the answer to the preceding question, payments by
NASA to Russian companies, either directly or through NASA contractors,
would diminish pressure on Russian aerospace companies to improve their
nonproliferation record or would also raise legal questions. If
procurement from Russian sources to support the ISS or NASA's human
space flight programs became necessary, NASA would need to conduct the
specific inquiry required to make a formal determination of whether
companies like Energia or Krunichev meet the Act's detailed definition
of jurisdiction and control of Rosaviakosmos. This inquiry could
require significant research and analysis of Russian records to verify
the firm's creation, legal structure, corporate governance,
transactions in its equities and other factors. To date, neither State
nor NASA has had occasion to make such a determination.
Q4. Does the Administration believe that the ``in-kind'' and ``third-
party'' transaction prohibitions in the Iran Nonproliferation Act would
prohibit one or more of the other Space Station International Partners
from purchasing Soyuz or Progress spacecraft or services from Russia in
exchange for some compensation from the Untied States? Why or why not?
A4. The Iran Nonproliferation Act has been a source of pressure on
Russia to improve the proliferation record of companies in the space
sector. If the U.S. Government provided compensation to another Space
Station International Partner ``in exchange for'' that partner
purchasing spacecraft or services that the U.S. could not purchase
directly due to the restrictions in Section 6 of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act, this pressure would be diminished or eliminated
altogether. We believe such arrangements would raise legal questions
under Section 6 and would likely be viewed by many as an evasion of the
law.