[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SPORTS AGENT RESPONSIBILITY AND TRUST ACT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
H.R. 361
__________
MAY 15, 2003
__________
Serial No. 17
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee ZOE LOFGREN, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MAXINE WATERS, California
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
RIC KELLER, Florida ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
STEVE KING, Iowa
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
TOM FEENEY, Florida
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Philip G. Kiko, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law
CHRIS CANNON, Utah Chairman
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JERROLD NADLER, New York
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
TOM FEENEY, Florida
Raymond V. Smietanka, Chief Counsel
Susan A. Jensen, Counsel
Diane K. Taylor, Counsel
James Daley, Full Committee Counsel
Stephanie Moore, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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MAY 15, 2003
OPENING STATEMENT
Page
The Honorable Chris Cannon, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Utah, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law............................................. 1
WITNESSES
Honorable Tom Osborne, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nebraska
Oral Testimony................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Honorable Bart Gordon, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Tennessee
Oral Testimony................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Scott Boras, Owner/President of the Scott Boras Corporation
Oral Testimony................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Prepared Statement of William Saum, Director of Agent, Gambling,
and Amateur Activities, National Collegiate Athletic
Association.................................................... 13
SPORTS AGENT RESPONSIBILITY
AND TRUST ACT
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2003
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Commercial
and Administrative Law,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Chris Cannon
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Cannon. The Committee will come to order. We are
gathered here today for a hearing on H.R. 361, the ``Sports
Agent Responsibility and Trust Act.'' I would find it hard to
believe that anyone in this room today has not been moved in
some way by athletics in their lives, whether it is eagerly
awaiting the tip-off of game seven of the NBA finals, gathering
together with friends and family in anticipation of the kickoff
of the Super Bowl, or cheering the likes of Mark McGwire and
Barry Bonds in their quest to set home run history. I suspect
everybody in this room has done all those things and more.
Sports touches all of us. It is a unique form of
entertainment, athletic appreciation, and geographic pride. We
sit in front of our televisions, we make trips to the stadiums,
we even approach those we may not know very well with the
comfortable oft-used phrase: ``Did you catch the game last
night?'' But there is a business and personal side that can
often be not quite as entertaining, usually with very real and
sometimes sad results.
The multi-million dollar value of professional athletes'
salaries, signing bonuses, and endorsement contracts has
resulted in a proliferation of questionable ethical practices
by some sports agents more concerned with lining their pockets
than the welfare of those they are supposed to represent. These
people are willing to break the rules in order to sign
promising student athletes to representational contracts. They
are willing to do this because the fees that accompany the
representation of a professional athlete are considerable, and
the agent will risk little consequence in comparison to the
athlete or the school.
Motivated largely by financial gain, agents have gone to
extreme measures to represent promising student athletes with
even a remote chance of becoming a professional athlete. The
reality that a college athlete will succeed professionally is
highly speculative. It has been estimated that an NCAA athlete
has no more than a 1 percent chance of making a professional
team even in a backup role. These agents or their cohorts,
often known as runners, will use tactics, including secret
payments to the athlete, undisclosed payments to the family or
friends of the athlete who may be in a position to influence
him or her, unrealistic promises, and even pressuring the
athlete through intimidation and threats. In some cases, these
agents have made secret payments to student athletes or their
families, and then blackmailed them into signing a contract
with the threat that they would disclose the violation of
collegiate rules, thus jeopardizing the student's competitive
eligibility. These acts go unpunished due to disparate,
ineffective or, in some cases, a complete absence of State
laws.
A student athlete entering into an oral or written agency
contract generally forfeits collegiate eligibility. The college
or university may be subject to various sanctions for violation
of competition rules if contests were played with ineligible
athletes. If this occurs, the economic impact on the school and
the athlete can be substantial. Not only can a student athlete
lose a scholarship, the university can be sanctioned with
monetary penalties, loss of scholarships, forfeiture of
contests, and loss of television revenues.
Currently, there is no Federal law that directly addresses
the actions of these agents, although a majority of the States
do regulate in varying degrees athlete, agents, and/or their
conduct. Most recently, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws passed the Uniform
Athlete's Agent Act addressing the conduct, practices, and
registration of athlete agents. H.R. 361 will provide remedies
for student athletes and the educational institutions,
particularly in those States with no existing law addressing
athlete-agent conduct.
I appreciate the fact that we have our Ranking Member Mr.
Watt here with us today, and I am assured that many of our
colleagues on this Subcommittee will be here before we finish
this hearing.
It is my pleasure to welcome those who are with us today to
testify regarding the subject matter of today's hearing. Each
brings a unique perspective and a wealth of knowledge to this
body.
As Dean of the Tennessee delegation, Congressman Bart
Gordon is currently serving his tenth term in Congress.
Congressman Gordon serves on the House Energy and Commerce
Committee and on the Science Committee, where he is the second
Ranking Democrat, is the Ranking on the Subcommittee on Space
and Aeronautics. He also serves on two Subcommittees in Energy
and Commerce, Health and Telecommunications and the Internet.
Educated in Rutherford County Public Schools, Congressman
Gordon graduated with honors from Middle Tennessee State
University in 1971. He served in the Army Reserves from 1971 to
1972 and received an honorable discharge in 1972. Gordon went
on to receive his law degree from the University of Tennessee
School of Law in Knoxville. The Murfreesboro lawmaker is
married to Leslie Peyton Gordon, and the two have a daughter,
Peyton Margaret Gordon.
As author of H.R. 361, we appreciate his presence and the
testimony to be offered today.
Mr. Osborne became a Member of the United States House of
Representatives on January 3, 2001. Congressman Tom Osborne
sits on the Committees on Agriculture, Education and the
Workforce, and Resources. From 1972 until 1997, Representative
Osborne served as the head football coach of the University of
Nebraska Cornhuskers. Representative Osborne retired as the
most winning active football coach in the NCAA Division 1-A.
Prior to retiring, Congressman Osborne led the Huskers to three
national championships in 1994, 1995, and 1997, thereby
becoming a household name. Congressman Osborne and Mrs. Osborne
have three children, Mike Osborne, Ann Wilke, and Susie Dobbs,
as well as four grandchildren.
The author of several books, including More than Winning
and Faith in the Game, Congressman Osborne graduated with a
B.A. in history from Hastings College in 1959. Following
graduation, he played three seasons in the National Football
League. He earned an M.A. in educational psychology from the
University of Nebraska, Lincoln, in 1963, and a doctorate in
educational psychology from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln
in 1975.
Congressman Osborne has a concurrent markup going on with
this hearing, and so we are going to ask him to testify first
and then move to Congressman Gordon. And then we will hear from
Scott Boras, who is the owner and president of Scott Boras
Corporation. Among his clients are such superstars and
potential Hall of Famers as Greg Maddox, Kevin Brown, Barry
Bonds, Alex Rodriguez, and Kevin Millwood, who just last week
pitched a successful no-hitter for the first time in his
career.
Mr. Boras has become a leader in his field, negotiating the
first 50 million, 100 million, and $200 million contracts in
major league baseball history. Would you like to come into
politics, sir? Just kidding. As well as negotiating the largest
athlete contract in the history of professional sports. In
2002, the Sporting News recognized Mr. Boras as one of the 100
most powerful people in sports and was the most highly ranked
athlete representative in all sports.
Mr. Boras played with the St. Louis Cardinals and Chicago
Cubs organizations in the mid-1970's, after which he returned
to law school at the University of the Pacific McGeorge School
of Law. The Scott Boras firm provides legal counseling to
amateur athletes. In addition, the agency also provides legal
athlete representation and contract negotiations services for
numerous professional baseball players. Mr. Boras is also the
owner of Impact Sports Marketing and Agency, which secures and
negotiates contracts for endorsements, personal appearances,
equipment, and baseball cards.
In addition, William Saum, Director of Agent, Gambling, and
Amateur Activities for the National Collegiate Athletic
Association will be appearing through written testimony only.
Again, thank you for coming to today's hearing, and Mr.
Osborne, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM OSBORNE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA
Mr. Osborne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Watt,
Members of the Committee, and also Congressman Gordon and Scott
Boras. I am really pleased to have a chance to be able to speak
to you about H.R. 361 today.
I would like to recognize the fact that Congressman Gordon
has worked on this for a long time, and so I have joined him
recently in the last couple of years and appreciate his
leadership on this issue. My comments are going to be directed
primarily to the world of football, because that is what I
understood best. There is certainly a lot of agents in other
sports.
I would say the reasons that we need this legislation are
several, and the first that I would mention is that the
financial incentives for agents and for athletes have become
huge. If you are a first-round draft pick in the National
Football League, the average amount of money, bonus and salary,
that you could expect to receive in the first year would be $8
to $9 million. So the going rate for many agents is about 3
percent, so that is $250,000 if you represent a high draft
pick, and the amount of time required is not huge. You could
represent theoretically eight or nine or 10 first-round picks,
which would add up to some fairly large money. So we think that
the money is big.
Secondly, it is important to realize that the National
Football League certifies each year about 1,200 agents. These
agents are required to be certified in order to represent a
player who has already made the National Football League. So
these would be players going in their second, third, fourth,
fifth year. If you are coming out of college, you don't need to
be certified by anyone. All you have to do is say you are an
agent, and if you say you are one, you are one. You have no
qualifications at all.
So we have 1,200 agents certified by the NFL, probably
another 3 or 400 that aren't certified. And the difficulty is
that there are only about 400 of those agents who represent
anybody. So roughly three-fourths of the agents out there don't
represent anybody in the National Football League. So there is
tremendous competition to have access to an athlete.
So if you are not very competent and if you have no
background or any expertise, what you often do is go after an
undergraduate player, because the reputable agents normally
will not do that.
So they will go to great lengths. And so if you check with
your players, you will find out most of them have unlisted
numbers because the agents start badgering them. They will go
see them in the dorm even as early as their freshmen and
sophomore years. So this makes it very difficult as far as
education is concerned.
Of course, there are a great many illegal inducements that
are offered. Sometimes it is money, sometimes it is a car,
sometimes it is clothes, sometimes it is trips, and
occasionally it even gets into drugs and women and the whole
nine yards. So it is a fairly seamy business. It is not very
attractive.
Oftimes what these people will do, with an undergraduate
particularly, is to offer an agency contract which obligates
the player, and many times they will couch it in terms as
though we will post date the contract, it really doesn't mean
anything, it is not going to affect your eligibility. But when
you sign that contract, even when it is post dated, your
eligibility is gone. If anybody finds out about it, if the NCAA
finds out about it, it is gone. So that is one thing that they
often do.
Probably the most common issue that I have run into that is
really misleading is that they will promise a player that he
will be a higher draft pick. So you called in the National
Football League, and they have a Committee that will tell you
how high a player is going to be drafted. And they say, well,
so and so is going to be in the third round. And the agent will
invariably say, well, that is a lot of hogwash, they are just
trying to keep you in school. I will make you a first-round
pick if you will come with me, and I am going to get you a
personal trainer, I am going to get you a nutritionist. We are
going to take you to California and we are going to have you
prepared, and you are going to go up in that draft because you
are going to go and test so well at the combine that you are
going to be a first-round pick.
Well, actually, nobody can make a player better in the
draft. You know, that is a false promise. But it is what a lot
of players want to hear, so obviously they buy into it. And a
lot of them will invariably leave school. They may have 3 hours
left to graduate. They will bail out, and they will go follow
some agent somewhere. And of course that is a problem.
Also, we find that many of these agents will promise to
handle the contract, they will handle taxes, they will handle
endorsements, and also they will ask for power of attorney. And
so we have some cases of people who are 35 years old all of a
sudden find that their career is over and they have no money.
One-half of the players leaving the National Football League
have no money. Sometimes it is their own fault, sometimes it is
the problem with the individual agents.
I am probably going to have to hustle here. Let me just
give you three examples of some cases that impacted us very
greatly. I went out to--we are getting ready to go to the
Orange Bowl one night, and I can't find my starting
quarterback. I find him sitting between two agents who have got
him over in the corner of a hotel lobby, and we are 2 hours
from kickoff. And these guys are hammering him. And of course
none of these guys have any credentials at all.
Another guy we had signed in the 1980's, and buried in his
contract was 13 percent. Normally it would be 2 or 3 percent.
So he had to pay 13 percent in his contract. Fortunately, that
particular agent was from California that did have some laws
governing agents, and as a result we were able to prosecute and
get $300,000 back for that individual.
The last thing I will mention very quickly. We had a player
who took a trip to California and we began to hear about it. It
didn't sound good. He was talking about meeting Patty LaBelle
and somebody else who was a TV star. And so I--there was guy
named Lloyd Bloom, who his name came up. And I called Lloyd,
and I said, ``Look, is this guy involved with you?'' And Lloyd
said, ``Oh, no. No. We would never do anything to jeopardize
his eligibility.'' Well, it turned out that we were sure that
he had taken a trip, it was unauthorized, and so we declared
him ineligible. He had one more year, and he probably would
have been a first-round draft pick. So this guy lost his
eligibility, and eventually Lloyd Bloom and Norby Walters went
to prison, as did Tank Black and some others.
But, anyway, those are some of the examples of things that
happen.
So, anyway, I know Congressman Gordon can fill you in on
the details. But we think this is absolutely necessary that we
have this type of legislation, and we appreciate your
consideration of the legislation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Osborne follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Tom Osborne, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Nebraska
Thank you Chairman Cannon, Ranking Member Watt, and Members of the
Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to come and speak with you
today about legislation that Representative Bart Gordon and I have
introduced. As you may know, I feel strongly about H.R. 361, the Sports
Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, or SPARTA, and am thankful for the
committee's consideration of this important legislation.
While the notorious cases of Norby Walters, Lloyd Bloom and Tank
Black have shed some light on deceptive sports agents, we still allow
unethical sports agents to prey upon hundreds of college athletes on
campuses across this country each year. During my 36 years as a
football coach, I was deeply concerned by overly aggressive, unethical
sports agents who knowingly compromised a student-athlete's eligibility
or took financial advantage of student-athletes and their families.
With the lure of big money involved in professional sports, I
experienced first-hand the difficulty in trying to keep agents and
their runners from attempting to illegally recruit my players with cash
and gifts. In pursuit of the hefty fees that are associated with
representing professional athletes, sports agents often engage in
unethical behavior that undermines the integrity of college sports.
When sports agents engage in this type of impermissible behavior,
their actions undermine the integrity of college sports and threaten
the athlete's college experience. By accepting anything of value from
an agent, a student-athlete loses his eligibility and scholarship, the
school faces sanctions, the reputation of the institution is tarnished,
and the sports agent walks away with absolutely no consequences for his
actions.
If a sports agent provides inducements to a student-athlete and
therefore breaks NCAA rules, the student-athlete loses his eligibility
to compete in collegiate competitions, and often times loses his
scholarship. For many of these collegiate athletes enticed into
forfeiting eligibility, the loss of eligibility means the loss of a
college education if they cannot afford to pay their own way. In
addition to facing sanctions they may not expect, these athletes often
times damage promising professional careers. When a sports agent
promises student-athletes fame and fortune--or a first-round draft
selection--a focus on superstardom and wealth may prevent them from
considering the consequences of signing away their NCAA eligibility.
In the 1980s, one of my players was offered some illegal
inducements, and in turn lost his eligibility, which for the most part
ruined his career. This particular player was involved with agents who
had already given illegal inducements to players across the country.
Eventually, these agents were indicted on a number of felonies, leading
them to go as far as threatening some of the players with bodily harm.
At the time, however, we lacked the laws to pursue these agents in the
State of Nebraska, and these loopholes still exist today.
Unscrupulous agents often take advantage of students who have
little or no experience in contract negotiations, potentially causing
financial harm for student-athletes, their teams, and their respective
schools. On a personal note, I had a player back in the 1980s that
thought he signed a contract giving 3 percent of his earnings to the
agent, but somewhere buried in the contract was a much larger figure of
13 percent of his earnings, causing him to lose thousands of dollars.
Fortunately, this player was able to recover more than $300,000 under
California state law where this agent originated. In my home state of
Nebraska, however, we did not have the laws to go after this agent.
Schools also stand to lose financially from the deceptive actions
of sports agents. If a student-athlete loses his eligibility because he
accepted inducements from an agent, and his ineligibility is not
disclosed to the school and the ineligible student is allowed to
compete in violation of the rules, that school may face a number of
sanctions, including suspensions, fines, the potential loss of post-
season play and revenue that this might represent.
When student-athletes lose their eligibility by entering into an
agency contract with unethical agents, intercollegiate athletics
suffers because of the negative perception that is often associated
with this type of activity. In recent years, the number of incidents
where student-athletes were persuaded by unscrupulous agents to accept
payment or other consideration in exchange for exclusive representation
has created a negative perception that threatens the integrity of
college athletics and the educational institution involved. While
colleges and universities rarely do anything wrong in these situations,
the mere fact that their student-athlete entered into such an agent
contract reflects negatively on the school.
Why is this legislation necessary? As of April 2002, the National
Football League Players Association reported that there were 1,196
certified football agents, almost double the number from 10 years ago.
But, more than 800 of these agents have no clients. Hundreds of these
so-called ``agents'' lack both certification and qualification.
Unethical sports agents, often motivated purely by greed, will use any
means necessary to represent a student-athlete who has even a remote
chance of playing professional sports.
As of April 25, 2003, seventeen states in our country, including my
home state of Nebraska, had no regulations governing the conduct of
sports agents, while many other states have a patchwork of vague and
differing agent regulations. Until all 50 states adopt the same
standards for regulating sports agents, there will be no uniformity in
the laws governing sports agents. SPARTA would provide a minimum
federal backstop for regulating sports agent conduct, while at the same
time respecting tough state laws.
SPARTA would make it unlawful for an agent to give false or
misleading information or make false promises or representations in
order to entice a student-athlete into signing an agency contract. This
legislation would also make it unlawful for an agent to fail to
disclose to the student in writing before signing a contract that the
student may lose his eligibility to compete in collegiate athletics.
SPARTA requires sports agents and student-athletes to notify the
school's athletic director within 72 hours--or before the student-
athlete's next sporting event--of signing an agency contract. This
legislation is needed in order to protect our student-athletes from
unscrupulous sports agents.
The bottom line is most student-athletes do not make it in
professional sports. But, they may have been enticed to leave school
early only later to realize that their agents acted solely for their
own financial benefit, with no concern for the athletes' future. Over
36 years of coaching, I saw too many student-athletes taken advantage
of by sports agents looking out for their own bottom lines. I firmly
believe we need to treat sports agents who lie, cheat and deceive, as
we would treat any other businessperson who promises the world but
delivers only heartache.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today to offer my
thoughts about this important legislation.
Mr. Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Osborne. I think that we don't
have the pressure of a vote; we have about 13 minutes left. I
am inclined, Mr. Gordon, if you would like to go ahead and
testify, then we expect, Mr. Osborne, that you will rejoin us.
You are certainly welcome, Bart, to come back if you would
like. And Mr. Boras, if you wouldn't mind, I think this is
going to be a quick vote, and we can come back. So why don't
you go ahead with your 5 minutes, Mr. Gordon?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BART GORDON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Chairman Cannon, Ranking Member
Watt, and Members of the Committee. And also many thanks to my
friend Tom Osborne for bringing his expertise and help into
this bill.
Chairman Cannon, you basically gave my opening statement in
your opening statement, so I will just ask that my statement be
made a part of the record, and I will try to be mercifully
brief since I think that we have something of a consensus here.
I first became interested in this issue really in 1996,
when a friend of mine at home who was a former NFL as well as
college coach started telling me about the real problems that
they are having, and with the escalation in money since that
time they have only gotten worse and younger in that this is
into the high schools, and even with some gymnasts even younger
than that.
Mr. Osborne went through a lot of the horror stories, so I
won't go into that much more other than to say that the real
problem now is not as much the agents as their runners. I mean,
they go so far as to have walk-ons go on the football teams to
get to know some of the star players so they then can get to
know them better and entice them in some way later on. And what
we are trying to do here is stop really a win situation and a
lose for everybody else but the agents. Right now, if some kid
takes a gold chain, a suit of clothes, a trip or something by
an agent or by one of their runners, then that athlete loses
his scholarship, loses his eligibility. The school is penalized
even though they have done everything they can to try to stop
it. And the kid, since he loses his scholarship, he is out. The
agent is the winner. Nothing happens to him. But now the kid
can't play ball anymore, and so he winds up going ahead and
signing. He or she.
And what we are trying to do is make those agents obviously
more accountable. And we want to try to do this by not setting
up a Federal, you know, police force for athletics, but rather
we are going to be deputizing the State Attorney Generals,
allowing them to use current unfair and deceptive practices
through the FTC, and this way we can really allow the States to
move forward.
Now, some States already have legislation, but it is not
uniform. You have a situation where North Carolina doesn't have
anything, so you can have a kid that could be playing at the
University of Tennessee where we do have a State law but they
are from North Carolina, so when you go down in North Carolina
they get you, or if they go up and play Boston College, there
is not a law in Massachusetts, they can get you there.
So what we do is make it an unfair and deceptive practice
by a sports agent or a runner giving false or misleading
information or promises to an athlete, providing anything of
value to a student or anyone associated with those students,
fail to disclose in writing to students that they can lose
their eligibility to play college sports if they sign with an
agent. Also, to pre-date or post-date a contract. Additionally,
they are required to notify the school if a kid signs, so that
the school then won't mistakenly play him in a game somewhere
and wind up being penalized.
As I say, this is about as consensus as you can get. This
bill has been endorsed by the NCAA, the National Association of
Collegiate Directors of Athletics, the Black Coaches
Association, the National Association of Basketball Coaches,
the American Football Coaches Association, the National Junior
College Athletic Association, the Knight Foundation
Commissioner on Intercollegiate Activities, and a growing list
of coaches, Tubby Smith to Joe Paterno. So this really has been
vetted and I think presents a good approach.
It also does not hinder any State that wants to take their
legislation further. These are not criminal penalties; these
are civil penalties. If the State wants to do more, they can.
Also, I want to thank my staff, Dana Lichtenberg, for all
the time she has put in on this by building these coalitions.
You have done a good job, Dana. Thank you for your help.
And I will yield back my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bart Gordon, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Tennessee
Thank you Chairman Cannon, Ranking Member Watt and Members of the
Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to come and speak with you
today about H.R. 361, the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act.
I have been working on the problem of predatory sports agents since
1996 when a friend and constituent of mine, Coach Ken Shipp, came to
see me about the need for a uniform federal law to protect kids from
unscrupulous sports agents.
The agent problem has only grown since 1996. Agents hoping to cash
in on the next NFL or NBA star will stop at nothing to convince a
student-athlete with even a remote chance of playing professional
sports to drop out of school and go pro early. Agents offer athletes
cash, cars and clothing. They pay runners to curry favor with star
athletes. They secretly pay off their friends and offer jobs to their
family members who are in a position to influence the athlete.
Sometimes physical threats are involved.
Agents know it's against NCAA rules for kids to sign with an agent
and still compete in college sports. It's also against NCAA rules and
many state laws for them to bribe a student-athlete. Yet agents, would-
be agents and their runners continue to aggressively pursue student-
athletes with little regard for their future or the school's athletic
program.
That's because unscrupulous agents know they face little or no
consequences under most state laws for enticing student-athletes with
lies and gifts, even though these actions may cost student-athletes
their scholarships, and may result in significant fines and penalties
for the schools. If these practices are illegal in the student's home
state, it is easy enough to contact student-athletes when they are in a
state with no sports agent law.
Efforts are underway on the state level to create a comprehensive
uniform licencing process for sports agents. However, the Uniform
Athlete Agent Act (UAAA) has been passed in only 21 states.
Rep. Osborne and I introduced H.R. 361 to address this interstate
problem head on. It is intended to work hand in hand with state law by
creating a basic uniform federal standard for sports agent conduct vis
a vis student-athletes without preempting stronger state laws. This
will stop sports agents from using the 29 states with weak or no sports
agent laws as safe havens to prey on student-athletes.
SPARTA would make it an unfair and deceptive business practice for
a sports agent to give false or misleading information or make false or
misleading promises or representations; provide anything of value to
students or anyone associated with these students; fail to disclose in
writing to students that they may lose their eligibility to play
college sports if they sign an agency contract; or predate or postdate
contracts.
In addition, the bill requires sports agents to immediately notify
a student-athlete's school in writing when an athlete agrees to an
agency contract so the athlete is not unknowingly played in a game, and
subjecting the school to sanctions and disqualifications.
The bill deputizes state attorneys general to prosecute violators
in federal district court on behalf of the FTC. In addition, schools
would be given the right to sue to recoup damages caused by the illegal
recruiting activities of a sports agent.
The pressures on student-athletes in college are tremendous. I
believe we have a responsibility to educate our student-athletes and
protect them from unscrupulous sports agents whose bottom line is their
own financial gain. This legislation will send a loud signal to
``rotten apple'' agents that they will be held accountable for
unethical recruiting practices.
SPARTA is supported by the NCAA, National Association of Collegiate
Directors of Athletics, Black Coaches Association, National Association
of Basketball Coaches, American Football Coaches Association, National
Junior College Athletic Association, the Knight Foundation Commission
on Intercollegiate Athletics, and a growing list of coaches including
Tubby Smith of the University of Kentucky, Joe Paterno of Penn State
University and R.C. Slocum of Texas A&M.
Thank you again Chairman Cannon, Ranking Member Watt. and Members
of the Committee for the opportunity to speak to you today about this
very important issue.
Mr. Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Gordon. The Chair would now like
to recognize that Mr. Delahunt has joined us from
Massachusetts, Mr. Coble from North Carolina, who has another
hearing or a markup at the same time, Mr. Flake from Arizona,
Mr. Carter from Texas, Mr. Chabot from Ohio.
And Mr. Boras, if you wouldn't mind, you are sort of an
attractive witness, and I think if we leave you until after the
vote, we will get everybody back so we get this marked up and
move on. And with that, the Chair will recess for a 15-minute
period to handle this vote.
Let me remind all Members of the Committee we need you back
here for the markup. This markup should not take long, so
please.
[Recess.]
Mr. Cannon. We are going to call this hearing back to
order. Thank you. We do expect several Members of the Committee
to join us. But in the meantime, Mr. Boras, if you would like
to give us your testimony, we are anxious to hear it.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT BORAS, OWNER/PRESIDENT OF
THE SCOTT BORAS CORPORATION
Mr. Boras. Thank you, Chairman Cannon and Ranking Member
Watt and Members of the Committee. This is something that is
very close to heart for me because of my personal experiences
being a professional athlete and being recruited to a college
and being really a student athlete that has gone through the
system and watching how the system has changed from when I
processed through it as an athlete to the current system that
we see in the 1990's and 2000.
The field of sports agency I think is one that has resulted
in a different field, depending on the sports. In football and
basketball you have identifiable named players that are coming
out of primarily college that are going to be of immediate
benefit to professional franchises. As a result of that, you
have an immediate benefit that then would result to the sports
agents. A sports agency by its nature is that the fee is only
gained when the student athlete becomes a professional. Sports
teams are only improved if they gain under contract the
athlete's skills.
So when we have the relationship of university, sports
agent, and professional team, the interplay of the three is
something that creates the dynamic of concern. Pro sport teams
I noticed have been undressed in the process of what we have
begun to undertake, which I think primarily is the concern for
the student athlete; is that we really want to make sure that
the student athlete makes an informed decision, that the
student athlete has the appropriate information to enter
professional sports if he so chooses knowing the risk.
Professional sports teams--and I know of none in any sport--
ever publish or provide to universities or to student athletes
the risk of professional sport. How many players in any sport
spend 6 years or 3 years? What is the average earned income?
And none of those teams provide that information to anyone. It
is an undisclosed fact, it is a hidden risk. And it is
something that, if that information was provided and if there
was cooperation from the professional sports teams, I think
that the university officials, I think the sports agents and
their contacts to suggest that the overpromotion of the
athlete, to suggest that will be a great major league player or
professional football player or basketball player, once those
numbers are revealed by the league and the universities have
them, then we can begin the information and education process.
The student athlete needs information. The NCAA rules state
that an athlete cannot have a sports agent but he is allowed to
have legal counsel. One of my concerns--and I support this bill
greatly--the sports agency industry has absolutely no methods--
we have heard from the panel and Congressman Osborne and
Congressman Gordon that there is no criteria, there is no
qualifications. So where do we go to make sure the student
athlete is aware of the needed qualifications and what type of
system do we mandate?
In a bill, I think that when universities are given the
access to sanction and damages, certainly there should be
requirements that--the universities also benefit from student
athletes, and there should be requirements by the universities
to provide information to these student athletes. Panels. For
example, when I went to Georgia Tech to see Kevin Brown,
Georgia Tech University had an agent review committee, and they
may have interviewed, I don't know, 70, 80 agents and examined
their qualifications, their experience. And so Kevin Brown got
an opportunity to--he was not interfaced with agents directly.
The university had a system by which there was a review panel
and they were able to really provide a scrutiny so that the
athlete was protected, and, through that process, learned of
the qualifications needed to be properly advised in a
professional career.
Many universities have--while they certainly, I think, want
to have great athletic programs, and go to great lengths to
recruit athletes--and I think we have heard a lot about how
sports agents recruit athletes. Let us not forget how
universities recruit athletes. And part and parcel of that
process, and if we want to really devise a bill that considers
what the needs of the student athlete are, certainly the
university is an educational institution and it can do a great
job of having classes, panels, methods of getting information
to the athletes of the knowledge of this bill itself and of the
knowledge of who out there in the world is qualified to provide
information to the student athlete.
Pro sport teams, colleges, high schools open their arms to
them. They have access to the campuses, they have the ability
to talk to the student athletes, they have the ability to reach
out to them. This is a level of recruitment. When we hear about
what agents do, I want to point out that if you become a
professional athlete, you understand that everyone wants your
services and your skills. And pro sport teams are trying to
acquire you at the lowest cost. Consequently, pro sport teams
do not want athletes to attend college. It provides a leverage
point for them. It provides something where that athlete is not
under control by that team. It also provides the fact that the
athlete may improve in college, and therefore increase the
acquisition cost by the professional team.
The bill should also include some mechanism by the
universities where pro sport teams are required to report
contact to the student athlete. Because remember, the student
athlete's belief about their success in professional sports
doesn't alone come from sport agents; it comes from the scouts
and people in professional sports who are trying to lure that
athlete away from college sometimes earlier than graduation to
pursue a professional sports career, because what you pay a
rookie is a lot less than what you pay a seasoned veteran. And,
consequently, if you can get a great athlete as a rookie, it
lowers the cost of operation to the professional sports team.
So in looking at a bill--and while this is a tremendous
first step, I think that we have to really consider the dynamic
and prioritize that the student athlete needs to be protected.
We are talking about 18, 19, 20-year-old young men who are
walking into a system. You are given a scholarship, you go to
college, and all of a sudden the pro world is opened up to you,
and now where do I go. If education is the measurement of the
university, and we know that a career development is part of
the university program, when you invite great athletes to your
campus, you should also have as a part of the athletic
department programs which certify, qualify representatives and
give the athlete knowledge of his future career, which may be
in pro sports.
Secondarily----
Mr. Cannon. Mr. Boras.
Mr. Boras. Yes.
Mr. Cannon. Your time has expired. If you could wrap up
fairly quickly, we will then go to questioning.
Mr. Boras. I will. Thank you, Mr. Cannon. Nothing new about
a sports agent talking too much.
Finally, I think the bill is a wonderful first step. We are
finally putting some credence to the process. The bill creates
a cause of action for the university. It allows the recovery of
damages. I think it should be required that allocation of those
damages to the university should at minimum provide scholarship
to the student athlete from which the damages arose.
Secondarily, they should consider a private right of action
for the student athlete in the bill itself in addition to the
private right of action for the university.
Thirdly, I think that we should provide something in the
bill that requires the universities who benefit from the
sanctioning power and the damage action to also control the
conduct of professional teams.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boras follows:]
Prepared Statement of Scott Boras
To Mr. Chairman Cannon, Ranking Member Watt and members of the
Committee:
I am a former college and professional baseball player. After
finishing my pro career, I attended law school. During that time, my
former professional teammates approached me to serve as their baseball
attorney. My law practice grew and I began providing legal advice to
high school and amateur baseball players.
In my 20 years as a baseball attorney, my company has strongly
encouraged 99 percent of our athletes--including potential first-round
draft picks--to attend college. Our research provided to colleges and
universities shows that less than 1 percent of the student-athletes go
on to have a 6-year pro career. Our college recommendation is unpopular
with professional baseball franchises that want the student-athletes to
turn pro.
The unfortunate part of sports agency is that because agents' fees
are gained only when a student-athlete signs a professional contract,
many agents encourage the athlete to skip college and pursue a pro
career. Thus, because we promote college, we concur that the Sports
Agent Responsibility and Trust Act is needed to regulate agents who are
following their own interests as opposed to the student-athletes.
Although H.R. 361 creates a cause of action and remedy for the
university, Federal Trade Commission remedy and state attorney general
remedy, paramount attention should be directed to providing relief for
the student-athlete. The bill should be amended to create a cause of
action and remedy for student-athletes if agents damage them.
Student-athletes and their families rarely understand the
complexity of the NCAA and professional sports rules. In most
instances, athletes are only left with the information that is given to
them by a university or outside counsel. The decision whether to forgo
a college scholarship and pursue a professional career requires
sophisticated analysis and legal counsel. Any bill drafted to insure
attendance and completion of a college education should promote the use
of legal counsel to assist the student-athlete in making a fully
informed decision. In its present state, the bill does not distinguish
between a sports agent whose relationship has one intended direction
for the student-athlete and that of an attorney, who is mandated to
serve the best interest of the student-athlete.
While H.R. 361 is the first step to protect student-athletes from
inappropriate conduct by sports agents, the conduct of professional
sports teams also needs to be monitored. Team representatives are
invited to visit high school and college campuses. They draft and sign
the players. And yet, the teams are not accountable.
This bill should include a provision requiring pro sports
franchises to report to the NCAA their meetings and discussions with
student-athletes, and which agents they've had contact with. The
conduct of a pro sports franchise should be subject to the same
scrutiny as that of a sports agent.
The bill should include a meaningful remedy for a student-athlete
who is damaged by inappropriate agent conduct. The bill should require
agents to hold up to a million dollar bond or proof of net worth in
that amount. If the agent relies on net worth, then any damage award
against the agent should be a non-dischargeable debt.
Additionally, the bill should authorize the athlete to recover up
to one million dollars in damages from an agent whose conduct results
in termination of the athlete's collegiate eligibility or loss of
scholarship.
If the athlete has a significant remedy, the agent would be unable
to count on the athlete's secrecy in the agent's wrongdoing. This
remedy would be an effective deterrent to unauthorized oral and written
agreements between the student-athlete and agent.
To conclude, student-athletes who have the ability to perform at
the college or professional level have decisions and opportunities that
most students do not face upon entering college. This bill represents a
major step in regulating how academic institutions, sports franchises,
and sports agents interact with the student-athlete. Currently, the
student-athlete suffers due to the absence of a uniform state or
federal regulation that oversees the interaction of these three
entities. This bill will help in the resolution and creation of a
responsible approach to the advancement of our coveted student-athletes
through the academic and professional system.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Saum follows:]
Prepared Statement of William S. Saum
I appreciate the opportunity to provide written comments on behalf
of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and to express
our support for H.R. 361, the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act
(SPARTA). The NCAA is a tax-exempt, unincorporated association of
approximately 1,260 colleges, universities, athletics conferences and
related organizations devoted to the regulation and promotion of
intercollegiate athletics for male and female student-athletes.
As director of agent, gambling and amateurism activities, and a
former campus administrator and coach, I am acutely aware of the impact
that unscrupulous athlete agents can have on the lives of college
student-athletes. In today's society, professional athletes are highly
compensated and most have agents that perform valuable services.
Unfortunately, the illicit practices of some of these agents, would-be
agents and their runners have caused serious problems for student-
athletes and educational institutions as these agents aggressively
pursue the substantial fees that accompany the representation of
professional athletes. These agents, motivated largely by financial
considerations, are willing to use any means necessary to represent a
student-athlete who has even a remote chance of playing professional
sports. They frequently employ tactics that involve secret payments or
gifts (goods, autos, cash, clothing) to the athlete, undisclosed
payments to friends and relatives who may be in a position to influence
the athlete, unrealistic promises and considerable arm-twisting.
There can be significant damage that results from these
impermissible and oftentimes illegal practices. Impermissible benefits
provided by agents violate NCAA rules and may result in the following:
student-athlete ineligibility for participation in NCAA competition,
harsh penalties on the team and the university (including the
imposition of NCAA sanctions that have resulted in the repayment of
monies received from NCAA championship competition, forfeiture of
contests and other penalties.)
The SPARTA would make it unlawful for an agent to give false or
misleading information or make false or misleading promises or
representations; provide anything of value to students or any
individuals associated with these students; fail to disclose in writing
to students that they may lose their eligibility to compete as student-
athletes if they sign an agency contract; or to predate or postdate
contracts. All of these activities are necessary to protect our
student-athletes from unscrupulous agents.
In addition, the NCAA strongly supports Section 7 of SPARTA that
recommends states pass the Uniform Athlete Agent Act. The adoption of
the state model bill creates a comprehensive, uniform registration
process that will provide important consumer information for student-
athletes, parents and institutions, as they will have access to the
detailed information contained in the agent application. Currently, the
Uniform Athlete Agent Act (UAAA) has been passed in 21 jurisdictions,
and 12 additional jurisdictions have introduced the Act into their
state legislatures. We plan to work hard in the coming year to get it
passed in many more states.
The NCAA has developed an arsenal of educational information on
athlete agents, including videos that raise the awareness about agents
and NCAA regulations, an NCAA information packet and a list of
questions that student-athletes should ask agents. Also, an important
brochure entitled ``A Career in Professional Athletics'' is available
to member schools.
The NCAA's agent, gambling and amateurism activities staff works
closely with high school athletes, member institutions and even agent
groups, through the professional players associations. In short, we
want to educate student-athletes, athletics administrators and agents,
prevent violations of NCAA regulations, and enforce the current agent
rules.
Our member institutions have developed a variety of programs to
achieve these results. Several schools conduct agent days where a
student-athlete can meet with an agent in an organized and monitored
manner. Many of our schools also conduct educational seminars for their
elite athletes, which include alumni who have participated at the
professional level. These alumni provide first-hand experiences from
which enrolled athletes can learn. Finally, our schools provide a panel
of experts (Pro Sports Counseling Panel) for athletes to visit with
regarding the search for an agent.
The SPARTA, in conjunction with the UAAA in all 50 states, will
provide important and necessary steps to address the problem of
unscrupulous athlete agents. The NCAA plans to continue its strong
efforts and use its resources to pass the UAAA in the remaining states.
Mr. Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Boras.
Mr. Watt, do you have questions?
Mr. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I will be brief.
I hope I will.
I am a cosponsor of this legislation. But it is always
easier to be a cosponsor of a piece of legislation that has
kind of high-powered, high-minded sounding purposes than it is
to take the consideration of that legislation seriously and do
the job that we are here to do. And one of the concerns I had
as a Member of the Judiciary Committee I think I have satisfied
myself about, but I will give Representative Gordon a chance to
talk about it just a little bit. And that is the concern that
there is a Federal interest here that we are furthering. And
the way you seem to have done that is you have defined some
conduct that seems to be unfair, and you have made it in effect
an unfair and deceptive trade practice under the Federal Trade
Commission Act. That presumes that there is some overriding
Federal purpose here that we are trying to achieve. And just
talk to me about that aspect of it a little bit.
Mr. Gordon. Well, I think it is certainly again unfair and
deceptive to approach these young athletes with bad information
as it would be to try to sell an automobile or anything else.
So I think you have the same type of Federal interest.
This was what you might call sort of the lowest impact type
of approach. We wanted to try to do this in a way where we
weren't setting up, again, a Federal sports police, trying to
use existing vehicles to accomplish our goal, and this seemed
to be the easiest way to do it.
Mr. Watt. Is there a notice that you have and a provision
for an action by the Commission and an action by States and
Attorney Generals and ultimately an action by educational
institutions, which I want to ask you a question about also.
But I presume under the unfair and deceptive trade practices
statute of the Federal Trade Commission Act, there is also a
private right of action. Is there not, or is there?
Mr. Gordon. I would not think so. No.
Mr. Watt. Why wouldn't that be the first recourse that we
would be talking about providing?
Mr. Gordon. Well, again, you are talking about----
Mr. Watt. First and foremost, it is the athlete that gets
injured. I understand the State's interest, I understand the
Commission's interest. I think I understand the educational
institution's interest, although I may have some reservations
about giving them an independent right of action. But why
wouldn't the student athlete and/or his guardian or family be
the first in line to have a private right of action?
Mr. Gordon. Well, as a practical matter, you are still
dealing with 18, 19, 20-year-olds, many of which are coming
from an already fairly desperate economic situation, that
probably also doesn't have either experience or a comfort maybe
level in the court system, and that it would seem that it would
be better to, again, through using your State Attorney Generals
they would be more comfortable taking this action. And as a
practical matter, what happens here--and I have to take some
disagreement in terms of the universities' role. I think the
universities have a very big role here, and all the coaches
that I have talked to have made it very clear to me that they
spend a lot of time trying to inform their athletes about these
type of problems. And so you really have got a built-in
situation where you have got the universities that are trying
to look after the athletes, who then can go to the Attorney
General that already has a vehicle to take quick action. And
that was sort of the process that we set up, rather than
leaving it just to an individual, who wouldn't be familiar and
may be even uncomfortable with this type of action.
Mr. Watt. Okay. I guess I have some reservations about is
there any cause of action that the individual independently has
who gets really taken advantage of by an agent?
Mr. Gordon. You know, potentially through contract law in
the individual States you might be able to. And, again, this is
somewhat of an umbrella to give uniformity across the country.
And individual States, some have criminal penalties and some,
you know, go much further than this. So I think the States
would be able to do it in that regard.
Mr. Watt. All right. I will yield back in the interest of
time.
Mr. Gordon. You know, and I am not sure--you asked a good
question and I am sorry I don't have a complete answer; I can
get you more. But I am not even sure that we would have
jurisdiction to give that personal----
Mr. Watt. Well, an individual, unfair and deceptive trade
practice, I mean, the harm is actually to the individual in
addition to the public harm that we assume goes with an unfair
and deceptive trade practice. The most direct harm is to the
individual. And if there is a Federal interest in doing it on
the global level, I would think there would be a Federal
interest in giving some cause of action to the individual
student athlete who has the most direct injury, much more
direct than either the Commission, the Attorney General, who is
supposed to protect the public's interest through the State, or
the university's interest, all of whom have an interest. But I
guess I assume that the individual had a private cause of
action under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and
apparently that is not the case.
So we will take a closer look at that. I am not saying that
that is necessarily a good idea. I kind of started with the
assumption that there was a private cause of action, and that
was--I am glad we clarified it at least.
Mr. Gordon. That is why we have hearings, to bring in more
thought and look at these issues a different way. That was
something that really didn't occur earlier.
Mr. Watt. I yield back.
Mr. Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Watt. Inasmuch as we have a
markup left, does anyone to my right have a burning desire to
ask questions?
Mr. Gordon. I would point out, I see that my neighbor Mrs.
Blackburn is here. I guess you were probably your first term in
the Tennessee State Senate when the Tennessee equivalent of
this bill came forward.
Mrs. Blackburn. I think that you are correct, and I think
that that was handled by----
Mr. Gordon. Mr. Womack.
Mrs. Blackburn. Mr. Womack. Thank you. I was struggling for
his name there. But yes, he always did a good job with the
higher education and secondary education issues. And thank you
for your good work on this.
Mr. Cannon. Mr. Feeney, would you like to----
Mr. Feeney. Yes, Mr. Chairman, just briefly. A couple
questions. And it occurs to me that Mr. Watt from North
Carolina is maybe correct, that the student has an interest
here. And perhaps, Mr. Watt, what we may want to do is take a
look at putting a provision in the bill at some point perhaps
allowing the athlete to void the contract within a period of
time, say 2 or 3 years, and require the agent to disgorge him
or herself of any profits that were gained from the illicit
activity. At a minimum, that would allow the athlete to protect
him or herself.
Mr. Watt. If the gentleman would yield. I am not sure that
would go as far as I would want to go. If he still has lost his
eligibility, he has lost--you know, he has been damaged far in
excess of just the ability to void a contract, I think. So, but
we can talk about that further.
Mr. Feeney. At a minimum, that might be something we could
move toward.
But I guess I would ask Mr. Boras, because student athletes
have other legal needs at times other than a formal agent to
negotiate a percentage clause of a deal, and I guess I would
ask, how do we delineate--you have used the term ``agency
contract.'' but, for example, supposing a student athlete is
anticipating some new-found wealth or may be already wealthy
and is talking to attorneys about estate planning or insurance
needs, supposing that I happen to be fortunate enough to be
dating the best female collegiate golfer in school and she
decides that she wants to, before we get married, enter into a
prenuptial contract, how are we going to make sure that we are
getting and precluding the activity that we want to preclude
without making it difficult for attorneys to render competent
advice and counsel to student athletes?
Mr. Boras. I think one of the reasons that we are here
today and discussing this bill is the very delineation between
licensed, qualified and, maybe more importantly, bonded and
held to fiduciary responsibilities by State and, you know,
National Bar Association rules. The NCAA has drafted rules. If
you look at them, the overriding view of college coaches and of
the athletes themselves is that someone who is an expert in a
sport field, who also is an attorney, however you want to label
him, he is an agent. So don't--stay completely away.
I come in contact with the big issue of high school
athletes who are drafted annually by major league baseball
teams. The percentage of high school athletes that make it to
the major leagues for 6 years is .0025 percent. The teams draft
them because every now and then they get a superstar that
becomes an Alex Rodriguez. But the reality of it is, is that
this is bad medicine. Now, we have told teams this; we show
them the data, we give the data to the families. The scouts of
the teams go to the families and say, don't talk to them, they
are agents, you are going to lose your eligibility. So,
whenever these bills are drafted--and the first thing that I
saw was, we need to clearly delineate and distinguish between
use of an attorney. And I must tell you that an athlete--
negotiating with a major, with a professional team is something
that an athlete definitely needs economic and legal counsel on,
without a doubt. And he needs legal counsel on a number of
other areas. But the confusion that pro teams promote is--and
sometimes colleges promote is that use of legal counsel is akin
to an agent, it is illegal, it will get you in trouble. And I
think responsible drafting and further education of coaches and
universities, I think will help to allow the student athlete to
know what directions he can go, with the fine line being an
attorney who is an agent is acting as an attorney provided he
doesn't do the one thing, and that is negotiate with a
professional franchise.
Mr. Feeney. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Feeney.
I want to thank the panel. We appreciate the testimony. It
has been very clear, very concise, and we appreciate--and
particularly, Mr. Boras, your comments on what we might do in
further legislation with colleges. We will view that as it
comes up.
Again, thank you very much for being here now. You are free
to depart if you wish. We are going to go forward and mark up
this bill.
So thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 2 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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