[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEALING WITH FOREIGN STUDENTS
AND SCHOLARS IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM:
VISA BACKLOGS AND TRACKING SYSTEMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 26, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-9
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee
DANA ROHRABACHER, California JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOE BARTON, Texas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan NICK LAMPSON, Texas
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan MARK UDALL, Colorado
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota DAVID WU, Oregon
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
Washington CHRIS BELL, Texas
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri ZOE LOFGREN, California
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia JIM MATHESON, Utah
ROB BISHOP, Utah DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas VACANCY
JO BONNER, Alabama
TOM FEENEY, Florida
VACANCY
C O N T E N T S
March 26, 2003
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 9
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Minority Ranking
Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives.... 11
Written Statement............................................ 12
Prepared Statement by Representative Nick Smith, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Research, Committee on Science, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 13
Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives.... 14
Prepared Statement by Representative Zoe Lofgren, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 15
Witnesses:
Ms. Janice L. Jacobs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Visa Services
Oral Statement............................................... 16
Written Statement............................................ 19
Biography.................................................... 21
Dr. David Ward, President, American Council on Education
Oral Statement............................................... 22
Written Statement............................................ 25
Biography.................................................... 30
Financial Disclosure......................................... 32
Dr. Shirley M. Tilghman, President, Princeton University
Oral Statement............................................... 34
Written Statement............................................ 36
Biography.................................................... 41
Financial Disclosure......................................... 42
Discussion....................................................... 43
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Ms. Janice L. Jacobs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Visa Services.. 72
Dr. David Ward, President, American Council on Education......... 77
Dr. Shirley M. Tilghman, President, Princeton University......... 79
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Articles submitted by Ms. Lofgren
``Security concerns may be shackling science,'' by Glennda
Chui, San Jose Mercury News, March 3, 2003................. 84
``Visa restrictions hamper research,'' San Jose Mercury News,
March 10, 2003............................................. 88
In America's Interest: Welcoming International Students, Report
of the Strategic Task Force on International Student Access,
submitted by Marlene M. Johnson, Executive Director and CEO,
NAFSA: Association of International Educators.................. 89
Biography.................................................... 91
Financial Disclosure......................................... 92
DEALING WITH FOREIGN STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM: VISA
BACKLOGS AND TRACKING SYSTEMS
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2003
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to other business, at 10:19
a.m., in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon.
Sherwood L. Boehlert (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Dealing with Foreign Students
and Scholars in an Age of Terrorism:
Visa Backlogs and Tracking Systems
wednesday, march 26, 2003
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On Wednesday, March 26, 2003, the House Science Committee will hold
a hearing on the enhanced security measures that foreign students and
scholars in science, mathematics and engineering face when they apply
for a visa and subsequently enroll in an academic or exchange program
in the U.S. This hearing is the second in a series on the need for
balance between heightened security and scientific openness in the
post-September 11 environment, and it will explore the development and
implementation of enhanced visa adjudication and monitoring systems and
their impact on individuals, universities and research collaborations.
2. Witnesses
Ms. Janice L. Jacobs is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa
Services. Prior to this appointment, she served two years as Deputy
Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo. Ms. Jacobs' 23-
year foreign service career included a mix of Washington, D.C. and
overseas assignments, including the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
Ethiopia, France, Mexico, Nigeria, and Thailand. Ms. Jacobs received
her BA in French and Education from Southern Illinois University and a
Master's in National Security Strategy from the National War College.
Dr. Shirley M. Tilghman is President of Princeton University in
Princeton, New Jersey. Before being named president, Dr. Tilghman
served on the Princeton faculty for 15 years. A native of Canada, she
received her Honors B.Sc. in chemistry from Queen's University in
Kingston, Ontario and ultimately obtained her Ph.D. in biochemistry
from Temple University in Philadelphia.
Dr. David Ward is the President of the American Council on Education, a
membership organization of college presidents of 1,800 institutions and
76 other educational and exchange programs. Before taking on the
presidency of ACE, Dr. Ward served as chancellor of the University of
Wisconsin-Madison for eight years, where he received his doctorate in
1963. Dr. Ward came to the United States on a student visa in 1960 and,
in 1976, he became a citizen of the United States.
3. Overarching Questions
The hearing will address the following overarching questions:
LHas the frequency of visa problems, including delays
and denials, for foreign students and scholars changed from
previous years? What progress has been made in streamlining the
process and reducing the current backlog to facilitate
legitimate travel for students and scholars?
LWhat steps have been taken to improve communication
between the government agencies that secure the homeland and
the institutions that rely on the contributions of foreign
students and scholars to advance science and technology?
LWhen will SEVIS, the Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System, be fully operational, linking government
and school officials and enabling them to accurately track
foreign students and scholars in real time? What challenges
must be overcome before this can happen?
4. Brief Overview
LForeign scientists and scholars are important to
maintaining the vitality and quality of the U.S. research
enterprise. In fact, almost 35 percent of advanced degrees are
conferred upon foreign scholars resident in the U.S. for all
areas of science and technology.
LThat said, the events of September 11 were a stark
reminder of the potential risks posed by foreign students. As a
result, the Congress and the Administration took action to
track foreign students and more carefully review the
applications of those wishing to study sensitive areas of
science and technology in the U.S.
LColleges and universities have voiced concerns about
the unintended consequences of enhanced security on our
campuses. Many foreign students and scholars, and especially
those from China, India and Russia, have experienced
substantial delays in obtaining visas. Others have had their
visas denied. This has resulted in missed program start dates,
derailed scientific research and the loss of potential students
and scholars to other destinations.
LColleges and universities have also express concern
about the implementation of SEVIS, the Student Exchange Visa
Information System, which makes the names, residences and
educational status of foreign students accessible to
immigration officials. According to reports, there are delays
in processing students, problems with system compatibility, and
even additional delays in visa processing, as student
information is not being saved in the database.
LOne concern is that the restrictions make it
undesirable to be a foreign student or scholar in the U.S., and
there are anecdotal indications that universities in other
countries, such as Germany and Australia, are stepping up
recruitment of students and scholars that might otherwise
attend American institutions. Failure to reconcile our equally
important, equally legitimate needs for security and science
could be a detriment to our education and research communities
as well as scientific collaboration and exchange.
5. Background
Even before September 11, 2001, Congress had enacted laws to
enhance the security of some activities relating to science,
technology, and education. In response to events such as the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing, concerns were raised about foreign students in
the U.S. as well as the courses they studied and the research they
conducted. Then, like now, many were concerned that our openness would
provide terrorists easy access to our country. Others were concerned
that we were training future terrorists in sensitive areas.
Processing and Approving Visa Applications
For many years, U.S. laws and practice have required certain visa
applicants, such as those from certain countries or those wishing to
study sensitive technologies, to go through additional security
clearances. To assist consular officers in determining who should be
subject to this enhanced review, the State Department maintains a
Technology Alert List (TAL), which establishes a list of major fields
of technology transfer concern, ranging from chemical and biotechnology
engineering to lasers, as well as a list of designated state sponsors
of terrorism.\1\ In light of the terrorist attacks, the State
Department increased the number of subjects included on the TAL
significantly and added such sub-areas as community development,
geography and urban planning. As a result, consular officers are
requesting security clearances for more foreign scientists and students
whose research or education falls into these sensitive technology
categories. This review, known as Visas MANTIS, requires the
application to be forwarded to Washington for review and a security
advisory opinion to be provided before the consular officer can approve
or deny the visa application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The seven countries that the U.S. has designated as state
sponsors of terrorism are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan,
and Syria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Administration is in the process of further strengthening the
system used to review visa applications, especially as they relate to
sensitive technology areas. One month after the terrorist attacks on
New York and Washington, the President directed, through Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 2 (HSPD-2), that the ``[t]he Government
shall implement measures to. . .prohibit certain international students
from receiving education and training in sensitive areas.'' To fulfill
the requirements of HSPD-2, the Office of Homeland Security and the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy established an
interagency working group, and, on May 2002, the White House unveiled
its proposal to create a panel that would screen foreign graduate
students, post-doctoral fellows, and scientists who apply for visas to
study ``sensitive topics. . .uniquely available'' on U.S. campuses. The
screening would be conducted by an Interagency Panel on Advanced
Science Security (IPASS), composed of representatives from the major
U.S. science agencies as well as the State, Justice, and Commerce
department. IPASS would be responsible for evaluating a number of
variables on the visa application, including the applicant's
background, education and training, country of origin, area of study,
training or research, and nature of the work conducted at the college
or university as well as the uniqueness of the knowledge, its
availability, and the terrorist groups or organizations that wanted to
gain access to it.
Although some originally suggested that IPASS could help reduce the
backlog of visas, it now appears that the system will overlay and even
incorporate some of the existing review systems--not replace them. Most
colleges and universities are anxiously awaiting guidance on IPASS, and
they are concerned that, if it is implemented incorrectly, the new
system could further disrupt the basic workings of their research
universities. Mostly, they are concerned that the criteria for the
IPASS review could be expanded to include entire areas of study, rather
than very specific research and development activities. They are also
concerned that the system could apply new restrictions to students
after they have begun to study at their institution, for which they
were properly granted a visa. The final policy on IPASS, which will be
implemented by the Department on Homeland Security, is pending further
study.
Finally, the State Department announced in November 2001 that all
men between the ages of 16 and 45 from certain Arab and Muslim
countries would be subject to a waiting period on non-immigrant visa
applications to conduct additional security screenings, particularly
for those in high tech, engineering and science. In practice, this
review, known by the name of CONDOR, has been applied to others, male
and female, from almost any country.
Prior to 2001, consular officers had broad discretion to clear
students and researchers--or to trigger a more thorough check through
MANTIS. Even those who were studying sensitive areas of science and
technology could be processed in as few as 10 business days--so long as
the consular officer did not receive a negative response from
Washington, D.C. In fact, consular officers were encouraged to
facilitate travel and, at some posts, they even faced pressures to
issue more visas.
Since the most recent terrorist attacks, however, strengthening the
visa process as an anti-terrorism tool has taken on greater
significance--especially since all 19 of the hijackers entered the U.S.
on visas. The State Department has acknowledged the resulting delays
and the backlog, and high-level Administration officials have described
the current backlog situation as a ``crisis.'' In late 2002, the State
Department announced that they would return to a more normal visa
processing time as a result of improved interagency and automated
procedures. As part of that effort, they released 10,000 visas in the
CONDOR backlog. The next month, 105 of those visas were recalled for
security reasons. After further review, 70 of the recalled visas were
cleared for release. Although the problems with the CONDOR review are
being resolved, visa delays in MANTIS persist, despite efforts by the
State Department to speed up visa processing.
Currently, there are a number of factors that contribute to the
MANTIS backlog. Many are concerned that the TAL is too vague and that
consular officers with little or no background in science are
misapplying the broad categories. Others believe that the consular
officers are using their discretion to err on the side of caution,
broadly and subjectively interpreting State Department policies and
guidance. Still others have attributed delays in processing visas--and
their denial--to a provision in the 1994 Foreign Authorization Act,
which established liability for consular officers who approve visas for
applicants who then commit an act of terrorism. Anecdotally, the
Committee has been informed that applicants can expect to wait three to
nine months for their visa. There also have been reports of an increase
in the number of students being denied visas entirely, often based on
lack of evidence of a planned return to the home country. Finally,
there have been reports that hundreds of foreign scientists, some
eminent in their fields, have been blocked from entering the U.S.,
slowing research on diseases such as AIDS and West Nile virus and in
areas such as space science and genetic mapping. More troubling, visa
delays and denials have even plagued multi-million dollar research
projects funded by the Federal Government and its agencies--the
National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation and
others. Many are concerned that this problem, which has produced an
estimated backlog of 25,000 visa applications (most of which relate to
science and engineering), persists and may be getting worse.
Monitoring Foreign Students
To improve the tracking of foreign students and scholars, Congress
created the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS).
This system was designed to link colleges and universities with foreign
students and scholars with the State Department and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) and allow them to share information, such
as changes in the foreign student's address or educational status, in
real time. Although SEVIS was created in 1996, the program was not
fully implemented due to lack of funding and objections from the higher
education community about the financial costs that colleges and
universities would incur. The terrorist attacks in 2001 gave the
program new urgency. Two laws, the USA Patriot Act and the Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, fully funded the
program and moved the compliance deadline from 2005 to 2003.
INS launched SEVIS as a voluntary program on July 1, 2002, with
mandatory participation for all colleges and universities targeted for
January 30, 2003. As the deadline approached, colleges, universities
and associations expressed ``enormous'' compliance concerns. Among
other things, they said that they had little information on how to
implement the system--and little time to prepare. Even the Department
of Justice Inspector General doubted that INS would be able to
implement the system by the proposed deadline and cautioned Congress
about the need for additional training for staff, school officials and
INS inspectors and investigators.
On January 29, 2003, one day before the proposed deadline, INS
granted a two-week grace period for mandatory compliance by schools,
saying that the delay was to accommodate the schools that were
experiencing technical problems. On February 15, SEVIS participation
finally became mandatory.
Today, all schools and exchange programs are required to use the
program as a condition of accepting foreign students and exchange
visitors. INS-approved schools (those certified by the INS to accept
foreign students and scholars) and exchange programs must use SEVIS to
enter directory information on all foreign students (F-1) and visitors
(M-1) at the time they accept the student/visitor's application to
their program. When the student or exchange visitor arrives at a U.S.
port-of-entry, the school or program is notified through SEVIS that the
student/visitor is in the country and should be reporting for class.
After the student enrolls, any changes in status (address, course of
study, employment) is collected and maintained in SEVIS until the
student either completes his or her current program or training and
departs the U.S. or changes immigration status. Failure to enroll or
falling out of status results notification to the appropriate federal
agencies for investigation and enforcement.
Currently, schools are only required use SEVIS to record data on
new students/visitors and changes in status for current students and
visitors but, on August 1, 2003, information on all students and
visitors will need to be maintained--and updated--in SEVIS.
As a result, colleges and universities are pushing hard for an
operational system, but many have a number of specific complaints.
Among other things, they continue to express concern about the
technological flaws, which cause data to be lost or inaccurate and
confidential SEVIS forms to be printed at colleges and universities in
other states. They also are concerned about the lack of real time
access to the data, saying students often have to wait weeks to apply
for their visa because their name is not showing up in the database at
the consular officer. Today, colleges and universities estimate that it
can take as long as 1.5 hours to enter one student. Finally, they are
concerned about the lack of training provided for campus officials and
INS staff. This situation is likely to be compounded by the large
numbers of foreign students and scholars who will apply to participate
in summer exchange and education programs. Between now and August 1, an
additional one million individuals will need to be registered in SEVIS,
aggravating the technological and other problems that already exist.
Administration and the New Department of Homeland Security
Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the
State Department was responsible for issuing visas to foreign students
who wanted to study in the United States. INS was responsible for
determining which schools were entitled to accept foreign students,
inspecting the documentation of persons arriving with student visas,
keeping track of entries and exits of foreign students, monitoring the
status of foreign students, facilitating the removal of foreign
students when their status ends, and approving requests by aliens who
were in the country through some other classification to acquire
student status. Responsibility for each of these obligations was
divided among several different offices, divisions and branches of the
INS and among private contractors.
In the past, INS was criticized for not handling these
responsibilities adequately and, on March 1, INS was dissolved and its
duties were transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). Under the new structure, SEVIS will be administered by the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement--the Department's law
enforcement arm--instead of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services--the Department's service arm. Although the same people who
were implementing SEVIS prior to the transfer are expected to be
administering the program under the new structure, some colleges and
universities have expressed concerns about having to deal with two
separate bureaus for their foreign students and scholars.
6. Current Issues
Impact on Science Education and Research in the U.S.
In science and technology, foreign students make up about a third
of all graduate students and contribute to the U.S. scientific effort
in this capacity. In 1998, foreign students made up 30 percent of
graduate students studying science and engineering in the U.S. and 33
percent of U.S. science and engineering doctoral recipients (52 percent
in engineering (most foreign doctoral recipients settle in the U.S.,
although the percentage of those who return to their home country has
been increasing), 49 percent in mathematics and computer sciences and
40 percent in physical sciences). Among college and university
representatives, there is concern that if the foreign student
population is reduced--or these students decide to return to their home
country--personnel shortages could grow and U.S. capabilities could
decline--especially since U.S. citizens are not currently attracted to
these fields in sufficient numbers to replace these students.
According to the Institute of International Education, 582,996
international students attended colleges and universities in the United
States in 2002. Yet, colleges and universities are concerned that new
review requirements--and visa delays--could hamper their ability to
compete for top students and scholars. Many report that registered
students who have left the country have had difficulty returning--
especially for students and scholars from China and India. According to
these sources, if the length of their delay is significant it will have
a negative impact on their ability to carry out their coursework,
thesis research, qualifying exams and thesis defense. One concern is
that the restrictions make it undesirable to be an international
student in the U.S., and there are anecdotal indications that
universities in other countries, such as Germany and Australia, are
stepping up recruitment of students that might otherwise attend
American institutions.
Finally, if visa delays become routine, foreign students and
scholars in the U.S. may be unable to attend international conferences,
interview for positions in their home countries and participate in
international collaborations. There is anecdotal information about
conferences relocating outside the United States to avoid immigration
issues, making it harder for U.S. students and researchers to attend
and reducing the flow of scientific information. In addition, many
major user facilities are fundamentally international in nature, and
limiting the ability of foreign researchers to use American facilities
like Fermilab could have a negative impact on the ability of U.S. teams
to participate in major international facilities overseas, such as the
Large Hadron Collider and the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor.
7. Questions for Witnesses
Questions for Ms. Jacobs
LHas the frequency of visa problems, including delays
and denials, for foreign students and scholars changed from
previous years? What laws, policies or practices, if any, have
contributed to this change?
LWhat type of data do you collect on the number and
the resolution of visa applications? Can you disaggregate that
data by region, visa category and clearance?
LWhat progress has been made in streamlining the
process and reducing the current backlog to facilitate
legitimate travel for students and scholars? What guidance is
available to help consular officers balance our collective
interest in facilitating legitimate travel and protecting our
country against potential terrorists?
LWhat steps have been taken to improve communication
between the government agencies that secure the homeland and
the institutions that rely on the contributions of foreign
students and scholars to advance science and technology?
Questions for Dr. Tilghman
LHow have visa delays or denials affected the ability
of your university to recruit and retain top students and
scholars for education and research programs? How has that
changed from prior years? What are the consequences--in both
the short- and long-term--of visa delays and denials to your
university (i.e., financial losses, empty classrooms, research
delayed, or stalled, etc.)?
LDo you keep data on the number of foreign students
and scholars enrolled in education or exchange programs at your
university? Has the number of applications from foreign
students changed from prior years? Are the numbers on the
foreign students who have been accepted to your program but
choose to go elsewhere beginning to change?
LWhat steps must be taken to fully implement the
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)? What
problems has your university experienced with the system? Have
the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department
of Homeland Security been responsive to your concerns?
LWhat concerns, if any, do you have regarding the
creation of a new panel to screen students and scholars who
wish to study sensitive topics?
Questions for Dr. Ward
LHow have visa delays or denials affected the ability
of your member organizations to recruit top students and
scholars for education and research programs in the U.S.? How
has that changed from prior years? What are the consequences--
in both the short- and long-term--of visa delays and denials to
your member organizations (i.e., financial losses, empty
classrooms, research delayed, or stalled, etc.)?
LWhat steps must be taken to fully implement the
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)? What
problems have your members been experiencing? Have the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of
Homeland Security been responsive to your concerns?
LWhat concerns, if any, do you have regarding the
creation of a new panel to screen students and scholars who
wish to study sensitive topics?
LHave your member organizations noticed any trends
regarding the participation of foreign students and scholars in
U.S. programs?
Chairman Boehlert. It is a pleasure to welcome everyone
here this morning to the second in what we expect will be a
long series of hearings on how the War on Terrorism is
affecting our nation's research enterprise.
Last October, we held a hearing on so-called sensitive but
unclassified information, I still don't understand what that
means, which looked at ways to balance the need for--of secrecy
to protect our security with the need for openness to enable
scientific inquiry. We continue to follow that issue very
closely.
Today, we turn our attention to a more tangible set of
issues: the backlog of visas for foreign students and scholars
and the problems that plague the SEVIS tracking system.
Problems with visas and SEVIS are at a critical point. One
administration official has described the visa situation to be
as a crisis. The origins of the crisis are easy to understand.
The attacks of September 11 made clear the potential threat
posed by the abuse of student visas and our shocking inability
to counter that threat. As a Member, for several years, of the
House Intelligence Committee, I take that threat very
seriously.
The Administration and the Congress deserve credit for
putting in place new and stricter protocols and for erring on
the side of caution. With that said, the current situation is
untenable. The visa problem is sometimes discussed as simply a
problem for our universities that needs to be balanced against
the need for security. But that is a distorted view. The reason
for concern is that unnecessarily impeding the flow of students
and scholars in and of itself can erode our national security.
Foreign students fill our graduate programs. Foreign
scholars fill our faculty and laboratory positions. These
people are a vital source of new ideas and perspectives, and
the flow of students and scholars creates good will on which
the U.S. depends and on--which would be difficult to generate
as effectively any other way.
You know, talking about the threat to homeland security,
some people say we need a Manhattan Project to come up with new
tools in the War Against Terrorism. Let me point out that the
Manhattan Project was not named for the birthplace of its
leading participants. The U.S. has always been dependent on
help from students and scholars who are not born and bred here.
And that remains true today, even though our scientific
enterprise is far more robust than it was in the 1940's.
So when we have a visa problem that impedes and even
discourages the flow of foreign students, that is bad for our
security. When we have a visa system that casts so wide a net
that we can't focus on real threats, that is bad for our
security. When we have a tracking system that creates undue
burdens on the flow of students, that is a threat to our
security. When we have a tracking system that can't be relied
upon to provide accurate information systematically, that is a
threat to our society.
Now I know that the Administration is working hard to solve
these problems, especially through the still new Department of
Homeland Security. Our effort today is to get a clear sense of
the extent of the problems with visas and SEVIS and how we can
all work together to solve those problems. I know other
Congressional Committees will be looking into these issues as
well, as they should.
One problem we now--we have now is that there isn't even
good data on the extent of the visa problem. Congressman Hall
and I will be sending a letter to the General Accounting Office
today, asking them to gather reliable data.
So as I said at the outset, this is just the first of many
hearings on a very important subject. We all need to work
together to assure that foreign students and scholars do not
threaten our security, either by their presence or their
absence.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boehlert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
It's a pleasure to welcome everyone here this morning to the second
in what we expect will be a long series of hearings on how the war on
terrorism is affecting our nation's research enterprise.
Last October, we held a hearing on so-called sensitive but
unclassified information, which looked at ways to balance the need for
secrecy to protect our security with the need for openness too enable
scientific inquiry. We continue to follow that issue closely.
Today we turn our attention to a more tangible set of issues--the
backlog of visas for foreign students and scholars, and the problems
that plague the SEVIS tracking system. The problems with visas and
SEVIS are at a critical point; one Administration official has
described the visa situation to me as a ``crisis.''
The origins of the crisis are easy to understand. The attacks of
September 11th made clear the potential threat posed by the abuse of
student visas and our shocking inability to counter that threat. As a
member of the Intelligence Committee, I take that threat seriously. The
Administration and the Congress deserve credit for putting in place new
and stricter protocols and for erring on the side of caution.
But that said, the current situation is untenable.
The visa problem is sometimes discussed as simply a problem for our
universities that needs to be balanced against the need for security.
But that's a distorted view. The reason for concern is that
unnecessarily impeding the flow of students and scholars in and of
itself can erode our national security.
Foreign students fill our graduate programs; foreign scholars fill
our faculty and laboratory positions. These people are a vital source
of new ideas and perspectives, and the flow of students and scholars
creates goodwill on which the U.S. depends and which would be difficult
to generate as effectively in any other way.
You know, talking about the threat to homeland security, some
people say we need a Manhattan Project to come up with new tools in the
war against terrorism. Let me point out that the Manhattan Project was
not named for the birthplace of its leading participants. The U.S. has
always been dependent on help from students and scholars who were not
born and bred here. And that remains true today even though our
scientific enterprise is far more robust than it was in the 1940s.
So when we have a visa system that impedes and even discourages the
flow of foreign students that's bad for our security. When we have a
visa system that casts so wide a net that we can't focus on real
threats, that's bad for our security. When we have a tracking system
that creates undue burdens on the flow of students, that's a threat to
our security. When we have a tracking system that can't be relied upon
to provide accurate information system, that's a threat to our
security.
Now I know that the Administration is working hard to solve these
problems especially through the still new Department of Homeland
Security. Our effort today is to get a clearer sense of the extent of
the problems with visas and SEVIS and how we can all work together to
solve them. I know other Congressional committees will be looking into
these issues as well.
One problem we have now is that there isn't even good data on the
extent of the visa problem. Congressman Hall and I will be sending a
letter to the General Accounting Office (GAO) today, asking them to
gather reliable data.
So, as I said at the outset, this is just the first of many
hearings on this important subject. We all need to work together to
ensure that foreign students and scholars do not threaten our
security--either by their presence or their absence. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, you said it very well, and I may
add to it a little bit, because I am concerned about the
percentages. I am concerned from both directions. I am
concerned about the American parent that provides tutelage and
guidance and encouragement to a youngster to enter the field of
science and the ability to get into the school, the ability to
reach the graduate areas. I am concerned about those who have
students who are near that capacity, but fall short and lose
their seat in a college program to someone from another
country.
I want to be blunt about this, and I want to be plain about
it. I am pleased to join you in welcoming our witnesses here
today. And I want to thank the Chairman for providing the
opportunity for the Committee to explore an important issue
that is at the intersection of strengthening homeland security
and ensuring the well being of the Nation's science and
technology enterprise.
Throughout much of our history, Mr. Chairman, a lot of
Americans feel that the U.S. has benefited greatly from the
infusion of scientific and engineering talent from abroad.
While I don't doubt that, today U.S. universities still fill
more--half or more of their graduate positions in many fields
of science, mathematics, and engineering with foreign students.
Many leaders in the academic world feel that without these
students, research programs couldn't go forward. And we are
told that about half of the graduates from these programs
remain here, and without them, science and technology
capabilities in the Nation would also suffer.
I would hope that we hear testimony today on how to lessen
that percentage by attracting our own to these fields. I--while
many feel that the Nation clearly benefits from this position,
we know of the presence of international students. And no one
would deny that it is imprudent for us not to be vigilant in
guarding our borders against those who would do us harm. I
don't categorize those that are in the schools here as among
that, but it is a possibility of it.
There is evidence that some terrorists have exploited the
student visa program, including at least one of the 9/11
terrorists. Therefore, effective screening of visa applications
is reasonable and necessary. The issue we are confronting here
today is not whether we need thorough and effective procedures
for reviewing visa applications; rather it is to find an
appropriate balance between two important National goals. We
benefit from attracting talented international students to the
universities, and we benefit by nurturing scientific
collaborations and information's exchanged with foreign
researchers. At the same time, we have to defend ourselves
against terrorists and use the influx of foreign students only
to compensate for a dearth of American students, who qualify
scholastically to keep the country in a position of scientific
leadership.
I realize that this is a large order, Mr. Chairman, and to
produce this type of leadership by enticing 18 and 19-year-old
American students, we have to prepare them better during the K
through 12 years. This might lessen the 50 percent foreign
participation we now experience in fields like engineering and
others. This percentage of reliance on foreign students bothers
me almost as much as this country with unbelievable energy
potential production in offshore, shut-in areas, not just
fossil fuels, but giant coal potential in the midsection of
this country. There is no reason for us to rely on OPEC
members, one of whom has us engaged as we meet here today.
We need to find ways to ensure that broader security is
applied effectively while ensuring the U.S. remains an inviting
place for bright, foreign students to study and for scientific
exchanges to occur with leading researchers from all parts of
the world.
I hope our witnesses today will help us understand how the
current visa application and approval system is functioning or
malfunctioning. The questions are, where are the sticking
points and how can it be made to work better? I invite your
recommendations for specific government actions that could
address problems that exist within the system. And I thank the
Chairman for calling this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Ralph M. Hall
I am pleased to join the Chairman in welcoming our witnesses to
today's hearing. I want to thank the Chairman for providing this
opportunity for the Committee to explore an important issue that is at
the intersection of strengthening homeland security and ensuring the
well being of the Nation's science and technology enterprise.
Many feel that the United States has benefited greatly from the
infusion of scientific and engineering talent from abroad. Today, U.S.
universities fill half or more of their graduate student positions in
many fields of science, mathematics and engineering with foreign
students. Many leaders in the academic world feel that without these
students research programs could not go forward. We are told that about
half of the graduates from these programs remain here, and without
them, the science and technology capabilities of the Nation would also
suffer. I would hope that we also hear testimony today on how to lessen
that high percentage of foreign students by attracting more U.S.
citizens to careers in science, mathematics and engineering fields.
While many feel that the Nation benefits from the presence of
international students, no one would deny that it would be imprudent
for us not to be vigilant in guarding our boarders against those who
would do us harm. There is evidence that some terrorists have exploited
the student visa program, including at least one of the 9/11
terrorists. Therefore, effective screening of visa applications is
reasonable and necessary.
The issue we are confronting here today is not whether we need
thorough and effective procedures for reviewing visa applications.
Rather it is to find an appropriate balance between two important
national goals. We benefit from attracting talented international
students to our universities, and we benefit by nurturing scientific
collaborations and information exchange with foreign researchers.
At the same time, we must defend ourselves against terrorists and
use the influx of foreign students only to compensate for a dearth of
American students who qualify scholastically to keep the country in a
position of scientific leadership. I realize that this is a large
order. To entice young Americans to pursue science and engineering
careers, we must do a better job of preparing them in the K-12 years.
In this way, we may be able to reduce the need to attract such a high
percentage of foreign students in fields such as engineering.
We need to find ways to ensure that boarder security is applied
effectively while ensuring the U.S. remains an inviting place for
bright foreign students to study and for scientific exchanges to occur
with leading researchers from all parts of the world. I hope our
witnesses today will help us understand how the current visa
application and approval system is functioning, or malfunctioning. The
questions are: where are the sticking points, and how can it be made to
work better? I invite your recommendations for specific government
actions that could address problems that exist with the system.
I want to thank the Chairman for calling a hearing on this
important matter. I appreciate the attendance of our witnesses today,
and I look forward to our discussion.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. And our sole panel
today consists of very--three very well qualified,
distinguished witnesses to share their points of view with us:
Ms. Janice Jacobs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Visa Services,
Department of State; Dr. David Ward, President, American
Council on Education; and Dr. Shirley Tilghman, President,
Princeton University. Thank you all for serving as resources to
the Committee. We are here to be educated. We are here to have
a dialogue and see if we can't, working together, make some
sense out of this rather confused situation. And we would like
to deal with facts, too, and not emotional arguments.
I would ask that each of you appreciate that your
statements will appear in the record at this juncture in their
entirety. I would ask that you try to summarize, in five
minutes or so, your main points, which will leave us ample
opportunity for a good exchange of questions and answers. Ms.
Jacobs, you are up first.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Nick Smith
I want to thank Chairman Boehlert for holding this hearing today to
review the implementation of new security systems for processing and
tracking foreign students, and the impact of these systems on our
university system and research enterprise. This is our second hearing
examining how to best achieve an appropriate balance between the need
to secure the homeland and our desire for scientific openness and
exchange.
As we all know, the world changed forever on September 11, 2001.
With the stark realization that our homeland is not immune from
horrific acts of terrorism, our priorities changed instantly. In the
days and weeks that followed 9/11, we learned that the 19 terrorist
hijackers received a total of 23 visas at five different posts, some of
them student visas. Even more telling, six months after the terrorist
attacks, approval notices for student visas were issued for two of the
hijackers--Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi. It was strikingly clear
that our system--with over 4,000 universities, colleges, and trade
schools educating almost 600,000 foreign students--would need to
undergo changes to ensure that all foreign students are better
scrutinized, and that those who may wish to do us harm not be allowed
to enter the country. It was also clear that there be better tracking
of foreign students once they have entered the country.
To its credit, the Federal Government acted immediately to respond
to this problem. The government has strengthened the system to review
visa applications. Also, two new laws, the USA Patriot Act and the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, provided
funding for the Student Exchange and Visitor Information System
(SEVIS), and moved the compliance deadline for this system from 2005 to
2003. SEVIS requires colleges and universities to inventory and update
detailed information such as names, residences, and educational status
of all foreign students, and to make this information available to
immigration officials. I believe these efforts, while imposing
additional burdens on college and university administrations, are an
appropriate and needed response to our security concerns related to
higher education.
Unfortunately though, these systems are still very much in the
development stage, and are not without their share of problems. For
example, while SEVIS has now been in operation for eight months, it has
been hampered by numerous technical problems--such as lost information
and other data processing errors that have had a significant impact on
students and university research endeavors alike. These problems have
raised real concerns that foreign students, which comprise 35 percent
of all U.S. science and engineering graduate students, are now
increasingly considering receiving their educations in other nations
such as Canada and Australia where security restrictions are far less.
Further, our foreign competitors have recognized this opportunity and
are increasing recruitment of students that may have otherwise attended
U.S. institutions. It is clear that if this trend continues to grow,
the quality of university research will suffer, at least over the
short-term.
While we should be careful not to downplay these problems, I am
confident that they will be resolved in a reasonable amount of time.
This will require adequate support and guidance from Congress, the
State Department, university organizations, and the Department of
Homeland Security. In the meantime, I believe it should motivate us to
place a much higher priority on increasing the number and quality of
U.S. math and science students. Security should remain the top priority
for the government, and we should continue to err on the side of
caution in dealing with foreign students that pose potential risks. It
is indeed a difficult balancing act, but with patience and persistence,
there is no reason why we cannot have a system that ensures security in
its handling of foreign students without sacrificing scientific
exchange.
I hope that today's discussion enlightens the Committee as to the
extent and seriousness of the problems associated with the handling of
foreign students, and I am looking forward to a productive discussion.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Thank Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this hearing today. I
would also like to thank our invited guest for appearing.
We have gathered here today to discuss the impact of security
measures to control entry of foreign students and scholars into the
United States. We all agree that foreign scientists and scholars are
important to maintaining the vitality and quality of the U.S. research
enterprise. In fact, almost 35 percent of advanced degrees are
conferred upon foreign scholars resident in the U.S. for all areas of
science and technology.
However, because of the events of September 11, Congress and the
Administration took action to track foreign students and more carefully
review the applications of those wishing to study sensitive areas of
science and technology in the U.S.
But scientists and educators complain that consular officers are
using vague, arbitrary standards to decide which visa applications to
refer for security reviews, trapping legitimate foreign researchers in
a frustrating backlog.
These delays bother educators and scientists, who say the free
exchange of ideas is essential to scientific discovery. They point out
that foreign-born scientists have been responsible for many major
advances in medicine and technology, including the kidney dialysis
machine, the Pap smear, plastic and the atomic bomb.
The National Academies (the National Academy of Science, the
National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine)
complained back in December that recent efforts by the government to
constrain the flow of international visitors in the name of national
security are having serious unintended consequences for American
science, engineering and medicine.
It is a sad day when even the research to combat chemical
biological terrorism has been stalled by the visa delays.
In fact, in my home state of Texas, the 44,192 foreign students at
colleges and universities fuel Texas' economy with money is spent on
tuition and living expenses in excess of $700 million dollar during the
2001-02 school year alone. Therefore, foreign students are an essential
part of our economic structure.
Let me make this clear, educators and scientist support tighter
screening of visitors after 9/11. However, something must be done to
stream line the visa. Here a few suggestions to do just that:
Recommendations to Streamline Visa Processing
LGiven the reality of limited resources, the U.S.
government must closely focus its efforts and establish a
viable means to identify the pool of visa applicants that
requires special screening, so that it can process non-problem
applications quickly and efficiently and dedicate scarce
resources to addressing real security needs.
LA system for students and scholars already in the
United States who are departing for short trips outside the
country (conferences or vacations) should be established,
similar to pre-screening mechanisms that already exist for
other visa categories, that allows them to begin processing of
their re-entry documents prior to leaving the United States.
LRealistic time estimates for visa screening should be
clearly articulated, so that international educators can advise
their students and scholars. The current incomprehensibility
and seeming randomness of the visa screening process is harmful
to U.S. diplomatic and foreign policy interests and must not
become the norm.
LCongress has charged a number of federal agencies
with the task of screening potential visitors to the United
States. It must provide them with adequate resources to fulfill
that mandate. Currently, limitations in system capabilities and
personnel have resulted in indefinitely suspended decisions on
large numbers of visa applications. This situation is
inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives and must be
remedied.
Now I have a few questions for our guest.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Zoe Lofgren
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this very important hearing on
the effects of enhanced security screening on foreign students and
scholars. As a Member of Congress from Silicon Valley, I always worry
when I hear that federal action threatens the academic and research
community.
As you know, my district lies in the heart of Silicon Valley, a
community on the cutting edge of technology and scientific discovery.
We not only depend directly upon exemplary researchers from around the
world, but we also indirectly depend upon universities to train top-
notch students to become our future Einstein's. So when I hear
troubling stories of foreign researchers and students experiencing
unnecessary delays in obtaining visas or being denied visas for
arbitrary reasons, I worry.
Just recently, I read two articles by the San Jose Mercury News,
one entitled ``Security Concerns May Be Shackling Science'' and another
``Visa Restrictions Hamper Research.'' In a time when Silicon Valley is
suffering a very serious economic slowdown, a visa program that hampers
research and technology in Silicon Valley is the last thing we need.
One article described the denial of a visa to a Chinese AIDS
researcher attempting to return to his California biotech company after
a trip overseas. Ironically, this came at a time when the President
promised a $15 billion initiative to fight the global HIV/AIDS
epidemic.
The article went further to describe a very troubling visa delay.
Despite serious concerns over unsecured Russian nuclear weapons falling
into the hands of terrorists, Russian physicists reportedly missed a
training program in California that would have taught them how to
safeguard dangerous nuclear weapons--all because their visas were not
approved on time.
Even worse is the story of Iranian earthquake expert so worried
about visa restrictions in the United States that he chose to go to
Canada instead of UC-Berkeley. As you well know, UC-Berkeley is located
in the San Francisco Bay Area where deadly earthquakes are always a
threat.
The tragedy of September 11, 2001 makes us understandably wary of
foreigners who attempt to enter this country to commit and promote
terrorism. This is why it is extremely important that we all reiterate
our strong support for enhanced and effective security screening for
all visa applicants.
As a recent San Jose Mercury News editorial states, ``the answer is
not to eliminate security checks, but to do them efficiently.'' We must
find a way to protect our security while also doing our best to
minimize the negative effects on our universities, businesses, and
research institutions attempting to attract a diverse group of top-
notch researchers, students, and business associates from around the
world.
The implications of an inefficient visa program that promises
bureaucratic hurdles without added security also creates problems for
us in the foreign policy arena. I recently learned that the State
Department is engaged in a public relations campaign to win the hearts
and minds of Middle Easterners. Apparently, the State Department is
spending $1 million on a radio station and a scholarship fund to
attract students from Arab nations and to combat American
misperceptions in the Middle East.
But when students apply to attend an American university, they're
finding it extremely difficult to navigate a complicated visa process
that can often extend beyond three months. Some Middle Eastern students
face even more difficult problems because they receive only single-
entry visas and are required to go through a new visa process every
time they leave the country. This means it is virtually impossible for
them to return home for winter vacation and even long summer breaks
because obtaining a visa can sometimes take more than three months. For
graduate students, it could mean seven years away from family and
friends. For young seventeen- and eighteen-year-olds leaving home for
the first time, it could mean four years away from parents and familiar
surroundings.
If we are truly engaged in a public relations battle to change the
image of the United States in the Middle East, we have to follow up on
our radio and scholarship program with a visa system that considers the
needs of visitors without sacrificing our number one priority--
security.
The time to act is now before we do permanent damage to our
science, technology, academic, and business communities and before we
permanently tarnish our image. We must create a visa system that
incorporates enhanced security checks necessary in a post-September
11th environment, but without the unnecessary bureaucracy that
endangers our scientific leadership and image around the world.
STATEMENT OF JANICE L. JACOBS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, VISA
SERVICES
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members
of the Committee. I welcome the opportunity to testify today
regarding the visa process for students and scholars. Visa----
Chairman Boehlert. I can't hear what you are saying.
Ms. Jacobs. I am sorry. Can you hear me now?
Chairman Boehlert. Yeah, I think we are all right now.
Thank you----
Ms. Jacobs. Okay.
Chairman Boehlert [continuing]. Very much.
Ms. Jacobs. All right. Visa work has always been about
striking the proper balance between protecting U.S. borders and
facilitating legitimate travel. Our operating environment
changed forever on September 11, 2001, and there is no turning
back the clock. Security is, and will continue to be, the top
priority in the processing of visas for international visitors.
The State Department is committed to strengthening the visa
process as a tool for protecting U.S. national security
interests. We have made a number of changes since 9/11 and will
continue to do so in response to the security needs of our
nation and recommendations by law enforcement and national
security agencies, and of course, the Department of Homeland
Security. At the same time, the State Department is keenly
aware of the need to balance national security interests with
other strategic interests, such as promoting scientific and
academic exchange and the overall health of our economy.
Enhancing U.S. security means pushing borders out to our
visa processing posts abroad. Here, I am happy to report that
we have made enormous progress in identifying individuals who
may present a threat to our nation through enhanced interagency
data sharing. Since 9/11, we have added over 7.3 million new
records, primarily FBI NCIC, which is criminal history data, to
our Consular Lookout Automated Support System, or as we call
it, CLASS. The TIPOFF database on suspected or actual
terrorists has incorporated into CLASS over 73,000 entries, an
increase from the 48,000 records that existed on 9/11/2001.
We try to work smart. We have been big users of automated
tools. Thanks to the work of Congress, our Machine Readable
Visa fees have allowed us to invest in new technology. We
continue to refine this technology and to increase connectivity
between the Department, overseas posts, and other agencies. But
technology can't do it all. We are working with other
interested agencies on a rational, more targeted clearance
process that is both transparent and predictable.
We are in pretty good shape to find the ``bad guys'' who
have already been identified by other agencies and who are
included in our visa lookout system. Dealing with what we don't
know is, of course, more of a problem. For that, we have the
security advisory opinion process to permit other agencies to
take a look at a case before we issue a visa.
Before I describe in detail the system whereby we handle
the visa requests of students and scholars whose travel has
national security or technology transfer implications, let me
say a word about the delays and backlogs that have effected
foreign visitors and U.S. institutions in the past year.
The procedures we now use to assure ourselves that students
and scholars working in the technology area do not pose a
threat to the U.S. are very similar to those used in the past.
The U.S. vets these applications with law enforcement agencies,
the intelligence community, and our own Nonproliferation Bureau
before a visa may be issued.
Why did the process work more rapidly in the past? For two
reasons, first the volume of visas that require security
advisory opinion clearances has exploded since 9/11,
overwhelming the technical and personnel infrastructure that
the Federal agencies, including the State Department, had in
place to handle this work. Secondly, we cease to use working on
a clock whereby a clearance not answered within a certain
period of time was, in effect, a clearance granted
automatically to the affected post that allowed that post to
issue the visa without further reference to Washington.
In the post-9/11 environment, we do not believe that the
issues at stake allow us the luxury of erring on the side of
expeditious processing. We now insist upon hearing from law
enforcement before we issue these visas. Expanding the
clearance universe as we did and dropping our clock would, in
more tranquil times, have been a process put into place over
months, if not years, while we built the infrastructure to
accommodate the work entailed. We did not have the luxury of
time after 9/11, so we moved as quickly as we were able to
strengthen the visa process and thereby the security of our
borders.
The result was improved security but at a cost of greatly
increased processing times. We have, as I will explain,
provided more resources to cope with this problem, and we are
making substantial progress, but I do not foresee a return to
the more rapid processing we enjoyed when we thought the threat
to our country was less than it turned out to be.
Our first obligation in this review process is to ensure
that no individual receives a visa who intends to do us harm or
violate the laws of the United States. This includes
individuals who may be coming to unlawfully obtain an export-
sensitive technology or information, especially if it relates
to the development or spread of weapons of mass destruction or
their associated technologies. The major events now unfolding
in Iraq, as our military forces and our coalition partners
endeavor to rid that nation of weapons of mass destruction,
dramatically underscore our nation's commitment in this regard.
At the same time, we fully recognize that the vast majority
of visa applicants who seek to come to the U.S. for study,
research, or temporary employment in scientific and technical
fields are legitimate. We are keenly aware of our double-edged
responsibilities in the area of national security and
facilitation of legitimate scientific exchange. This is not an
easy balance to strike, especially since the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, but we are working every day, along with other
agencies involved in the visa review process, to find that
proper balance.
Our caseload in this review process, which goes by the
identifier of Visas Mantis, has grown substantially. Denials
under the Mantis program increased from three findings of
ineligibility under INA 212(a)(3) in 2001 to 30 such findings
in 2002. At any given time, we have from 1,500 to 2,000 cases
pending in the interagency process review.
The Bureau of Consular Affairs Visa Office performs
essentially a coordinating role in this clearance process.
Cases are submitted by our visa issuing posts abroad for review
simultaneously to us, States Nonproliferation Bureau, and the
intelligence and law enforcement community. Each reviewing
entity advises us if it has concerns about a particular case.
We review the evidence supporting those concerns in light of
the relevant ineligibility provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and advise the post processing the case as to
whether or not a legal basis exists for denying the visa. We
ensure consensus before releasing a response to a consular
officer. In other words, we never advise a consular officer to
go ahead and issue a visa in a specific case, no matter the
sense of urgency, while there is an objection from another
agency that has not been resolved.
The increase in Visas Mantis referrals, as well as similar
increases in other categories of security-related referrals,
has seriously stressed the interagency clearance process. As a
result, cases on the average are taking longer to complete than
in the pre-9/11 environment. In our capacity as the
coordinating agency, the Department has made significant
progress in addressing these delays. We have negotiated
agreements with other agencies, implemented a number of
procedures to streamline the clearance process, and
reprogrammed staff in order to decrease the turnaround time for
Mantis clearances. We can now return clearances on cases
raising no problems in 30 days or less.
The Department has engaged in significant outreach to other
agencies to eliminate long delays and to assuage the fears of
the scientific and academic communities. The Department has had
regular and frequent contact with the Homeland Security Council
since its inception in September of 2001. We participate
regularly and frequently in interagency meetings convened by
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. We
also participate in activities with members of the scientific
and academic communities to share information on our clearance
requirements and to learn their needs.
I assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the Bureau of Consular
Affairs will continue these and any other feasible efforts to
enhance and expedite interagency review of these cases,
consistent with our overriding obligations to protect our
borders and prevent weapons of mass destruction and their
associated technologies from falling into the wrong hands.
I am submitting, for the record, a written statement that
discusses in greater detail our role in this visa review
process. Again, thank you for affording me this opportunity to
discuss the Bureau of Consular Affairs role in this vitally
important process. And I will be happy to answer any questions
that you have on this matter.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobs follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janice L. Jacobs
Thank you very much Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I
welcome the opportunity to testify today regarding the visa process for
students and scholars.
Visa work has always been about striking the proper balance between
protecting U.S. borders and facilitating legitimate travel. Our
operating environment changed forever on September 11, 2001, and there
is no turning back the clock. Security is and will continue to be the
top priority in the processing of visas for international visitors. The
State Department is committed to strengthening the visa process as a
tool for protecting U.S. national security interests. We've made a
number of changes since 9/11 and will continue to do so in response to
the security needs of our nation and recommendations by law enforcement
and national security agencies, and of course the Department of
Homeland Security. At the same time, the State Department is keenly
aware of the need to balance national security interests with other
strategic interests such as promoting scientific and academic exchange
and the overall health of our economy.
Enhancing U.S. security means pushing borders out to our visa
processing posts abroad. Here, I am happy to report that we've made
enormous progress in identifying individuals who may present a threat
to our nation through enhanced interagency data sharing. Since 9/11,
we've added over 7.3 million new records, primarily FBI NCIC (criminal
history) data, to our Consular Lookout Automated Support System
(CLASS). The ``TIPOFF'' database on suspected or actual terrorists has
incorporated into CLASS over 73,000 entries, an increase from 48,000
records on 9/11/2001.
We try to work ``smart.'' We have been big users of automated
tools. Thanks to the work of Congress our Machine Readable Visa fees
have allowed us to invest in technology. We continue to refine this
technology and to increase connectivity between the Department,
overseas posts, and other agencies. But technology can't do it all.
We're working with other interested agencies on a rational, more
targeted clearance process that is both transparent and predictable.
We're in pretty good shape to find the ``bad guys'' who have
already been identified by other agencies and are included in our visa
lookout system. Dealing with what we don't know is of course more of a
challenge. For that we have the security advisory opinion process to
permit other agencies to take a look at a case before we issue.
The Department of State has long used specialized clearance
procedures for the review of visa applications of individuals whose
proposed activities in the U.S. may have security-related or other
concerns. These programs carried out by the State Department at the
request of and in coordination with other federal agencies. The Visas
Mantis program is one such program related to technology transfer
concerns. Federal agencies participating in the Visas Mantis program
review select applications and provide the information needed by State
to determine an applicant's visa eligibility under section
212(a)(3)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. That
section provides in relevant part that:
Any alien who a consular officer or the [Secretary of Homeland
Security] knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, seeks to enter
the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in--
L (i) any activity. . .(II) to violate or evade any law
prohibiting the export from the United States of goods,
technology, or sensitive information.. . .is ineligible to
receive a visa.
Prior to 1998, the Department reviewed cases for controlled
technology, sensitive information concerns under several nationality-
based programs, e.g., CHINEX for PRC nationals, SPLEX for nationals of
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 1998, the Department
consolidated these nationality-based, Cold War era screening procedures
into the Visas Mantis program. The Visas Mantis program is an effective
tool for U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to support
consular officers in screening individuals and entities that seek to
gain controlled goods, technology and sensitive information in
violation of U.S. export laws.
Most other special clearance procedures are triggered by clear and
objective circumstances, such as applicant nationality or CLASS name
check results. However, in cases of illegal technology transfer,
falling within the purview of INA Section 212(a)(3)(A)(i)(II), the
Department must rely to a great extent on the observations and judgment
of consular officers in the field to identify applicants of any
nationality who may be subject to this ineligibility. To assist
officers in this difficult and vitally important task the Department,
in conjunction with federal intelligence and national security
agencies, regularly updates a list of policy objectives and critical
technologies, which trigger special clearance requests.
In deciding to submit an application for review for reasons related
to possible illegal technology transfer, the consular officer must
first determine whether the applicant's proposed activity in the United
States would involve exposure to any of fifteen sensitive technologies
included in the Technology Alert List (TAL). In deciding whether one of
the listed TAL activities may be in violation of U.S. export control
laws, the consular officer must review that activity in light of the
following broad policy objectives related to technology transfer:
LStem proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
missile delivery systems.
LRestrain the development of destabilizing
conventional military capabilities in certain regions of the
world.
LPrevent the transfer of arms and sensitive dual use
items to terrorist states.
LMaintain U.S. advantages in certain militarily
critical technologies.
Second, for applicants from any of the countries designated by the
Department to be state sponsors of terrorism, (Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan and Syria) consular officers are instructed to
assume that any visit providing exposure to any of the technologies on
the Technology Alert List will conflict with the policy objectives, and
therefore a Visas Mantis special clearance is mandatory under these
circumstances.
Third, consular officers may send to Washington any case that
appears to warrant further interagency review.
The Visas Mantis program, therefore, provides the Department and
other interested agencies with an effective mechanism to screen out
those individuals who seek to evade or violate our laws governing the
export of goods, technology or sensitive information. This screening in
turn addresses significant issues of national security and works to
enhance our national security. The Visas Mantis program allows all
participating agencies to provide information and raise any particular
concerns they may have regarding the applicant and/or the proposed
activities in the U.S.
The Department strives to balance this effort to protect our
national security with our responsibility to facilitate legitimate
travel and scientific exchange. We recognize that scientific exchange
supporting a wide range of research and development in the United
States is a vital component of our national security. We, therefore,
have worked diligently and creatively to clear legitimate travelers
subject to Mantis clearances as quickly as possible and, at the same
time, to deter or prevent potentially inadmissible travelers from
gaining entry to the United States.
The Visas Mantis case load grew significantly from calendar year
2001 through 2002. At any given moment, we have from 1,500 to 2,000
Mantis cases pending in this interagency review process. The increase
is attributable to increasingly vigorous interagency review of Mantis
cases, and has led to an increasing number of refusals under section
212(a)(3)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The Mantis case load represents only about 10 percent of all visa
cases submitted by posts abroad for review through the security
advisory opinion (SAO) process. SAO submissions across the board have
risen dramatically since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These increases
have stressed the review process and forced some procedural changes
which increased the amount of time needed to complete SAO reviews.
In addition to a Visas Mantis check, some students and academics
fall under the Visas Condor program that began in January 2002 in
counter-terrorism purposes. In consultation with U.S. national security
and law enforcement agencies, the Department implemented the Visas
Condor program to ensure that nationals of certain countries of concern
meeting certain criteria were subject to a security review.
Some of the delays that you have heard about are the result of the
Visas Condor, not Visas Mantis program. When the Condor program was
first instituted, it was put on a ``clock,'' a procedure traditionally
used in many of the clearances. If the Department had not received
derogatory information from a cooperating agency or agencies within
thirty (30) days of the date of the cable, then we could assume that
other agencies had no objection to the issuance of a visa. The agencies
assured us that they could and would notify us within that 30-day
period. If post did not hear from the Department by the end of that
time, it could process the case to conclusion.
The Visas Condor program resulted in a significant increase in the
number of cables sent to federal agencies for review. All participating
agencies found their resources strained as they took on substantially
more work. In the summer of 2002, in consultation with other agencies,
the ``clock'' system was ended because it was no longer reliable.
Agencies were having trouble meeting the 30-day period. Instead, we now
wait for an affirmative response from agencies before approving a visa.
These two enhancements to our security screenings--the Visas Condor
program that added a significant population subject to security
advisory opinions and the need for an affirmative response from the
other participating agencies--resulted in significant delays in
processing all security advisory opinion requests, including Visas
Mantis clearances.
Since last summer, each agency has taken measures to improve or
increase resources to address these delays. The Bureau of Consular
Affairs also worked to better improve its performance as the
clearinghouse for compiling other agency responses and provide a
coordinated reply to the consular officer overseas. In concert with
other agencies we implemented a number of procedures to improve our use
of automation and add personnel. To date these measures include:
LThe addition of two permanent visa specialists, two
retired Foreign Service Officers, and six contract employees,
Lthe ``detail'' of two clerical employees,
Lthe cross-training of other clerical staff to provide
overtime support,
Lthe improvement of case tracking methodology, and
Lthe improvement of automation related to data share
between agencies.
In general, the Bureau of Consular Affairs has noted the measures
taken by all participating agencies have improved response time so that
clearances on most cases raising no problems are available to consular
officers within thirty (30) days or less.
The Department has engaged in significant outreach to our federal
partners to work through problems and to improve predictability for the
scientific and academic communities about visa processing. This
outreach includes regular and frequent contact with the Homeland
Security Council since its inception in September 2001, and now with
the Department of Homeland Security. Our goal is to rationalize the
clearance process in light of today's national security threats and re-
establish rational, transparent clearance procedures that focus on
those applicants who present the highest risk. The Department also
participates regularly and frequently in interagency meetings convened
by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.
The proposed Interagency Panel on Advanced Science and Security
(IPASS) proposed by the Administration grew out of such meetings as a
response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 Section 3. The
proposed IPASS process is meant to increase the involvement of U.S.
Government scientific experts to work with intelligence, counter-
intelligence, and law enforcement representatives to advise the
Department of science-related visa applications, beginning with
students and visiting scholars. The White House (Office of Science and
Technology Policy and the Homeland Security Council), the Department of
Homeland Security, and the Bureau of Consular Affairs continue to
convene meetings to work out details of the IPASS process. Members of
the U.S. Government scientific community participate actively in these
meetings, to the extent allowed by their level, if any, of security
clearance.
The Department is in direct contact with the scientific and
academic community regarding visa policies and procedures. In various
briefings, we have explained the basis for the new security-related
procedures and the challenges we face in today's world of protecting
U.S. security interests while facilitating the travel of those coming
to the U.S. for legitimate purposes. The Department is committed to
working towards a continued free flow of people, information and ideas
that is the foundation of this great country. Secure borders, open
doors, that is what we are working towards every day.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. This concludes my statement. I would be
happy to answer any questions.
Biography for Janice L. Jacobs
Ms. Jacobs became the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services
on October 15, 2002. Prior to her arrival, she served two years as
Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo. Her
career includes a mix of Washington, D.C. and overseas assignments,
including working in the State Department's Visa Office, Operations
Center, and Office of Cuban Affairs.
Ms. Jacobs, a member of the Senior Foreign Service, joined the
Foreign Service in March 1980 after many years of overseas experience
as a Foreign Service dependent. She has lived in the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia (twice), France, Mexico (twice),
Nigeria, and Thailand. She received a BA in French and Education from
Southern Illinois University in 1968 and a Master's in National
Security Strategy from the National War College in 1995.
Janice is married and has two sons, Eric and Kurt. Eric is a
Foreign Service Officer (third generation) and Kurt is an aspiring
actor living in Chicago. Her husband, Ken, is a senior civilian
personnel specialist with the Department of Navy. Hobbies include
running, swimming, and biking. She speaks Spanish and French.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Ms. Jacobs. Dr.
Ward.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID WARD, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON
EDUCATION
Dr. Ward. Good morning, Members of the Committee and Mr.
Chairman. I am delighted to be here on behalf of the American
Council on Education, which represents degree granting,
independent and public universities.
I have been here before, and I want to say that today I
don't want to spend a great deal of time discussing the value
of international exchange both of students and scholars. I
think this committee has shown great respect and understanding
of that issue. Secondly, I am not here to argue about the
necessity for security through a much more enhanced visa
granting process. Both of these--I think there is broad
agreement. And it is a question of making it work, I think,
rather than seeing these as alternatives.
I would also in parentheses like to respond to Mr. Hall's
comments about access of native students to our graduate
programs in science and technology. My organization, in
connection with higher education reauthorization, will address
that issue. There is clearly a need to recruit more effectively
from our own students, from our own high school and
undergraduate students, as well as continuing to receive
foreign students. That is the second issue, which I don't think
the Committee is concerned about primarily today.
Much has changed in this country since September the 11th.
Many of the policies and practices by which the U.S. welcomes
international visitors and students are being changed. We
support these changes. The Federal Government and colleges and
universities need to make certain that international students
and scholars come here with only the best of intentions and
comply with all laws and regulations. But we fear that
inconsistent and inefficient implementation of these new
policies and procedures makes it more difficult for these
students and scholars to complete their research and complete
their studies in this country.
The Student Exchange Visitor Information System, or SEVIS,
is the single most important step that the Federal Government
has taken to improve its ability to monitor international
students and exchange visitors. America's colleges and
universities support its implementation; however, we have
repeatedly indicated our concern that this system is being
implemented before it was fully tested and ready for operation.
Sadly, our concerns have been justified. SEVIS was not
ready, and our campuses are confronting difficulties. Let me be
more specific. There are certain technological flaws in SEVIS.
Schools have reported frequent data losses. Some schools have
reported that their immigration forms have printed out on the
computers of other schools, often hundreds of miles away. Batch
processing, which is critical to those institutions with large
numbers of foreign students, has worked intermittently at best.
And some students have not been able to access this feature at
all.
Secondly, SEVIS does not, as it was intended, provide real
time access. The system was designed to link schools,
universities and colleges, the State Department, and the INS in
real time. Delays can cause confusion of consular offices and
embassies when students arrive to apply for their visas only to
discover that their service information is not available from
the system at the consular office.
INS has not provided adequate training to the full range of
people involved. Clearly, a complex data system of this kind,
which has both regulations to drive it and software to make it
work in a technical sense, requires training. The INS has
provided almost no training to campus administrators or even to
its own staff. One campus official recently visited an INS
regional Service Center and learned the staff did not know how
to identify service documents and had not yet received
training. INS then asked the campus administrators for
assistance. Additionally, the service help desk only provides
technical assistance about the system and is unable to answer
questions about regulatory requirements. That, of course,
leaves school officials with the great challenge of
interpreting regulations without any clear guidance.
Two other issues make this situation a little more
worrying. There will be a dramatic increase in the number of
new entries into the service system. And that is--and secondly,
there are no regulations yet about the collection of the fees.
Between today and August the 1st, an estimated one million
additional records will need to be entered as colleges begin
processing admissions for the fall of 2003. Since the system
was introduced, of course, the pace is fairly slow. It will now
pick up, because this is the period for maximum application for
admission in September. We don't know whether the capacity will
be stretched to the breaking point by this sudden increase in
volume, since with low volume levels it has obviously been
struggling.
On the subject of the service fee, the Federal Government
still has not published the regulations concerning how the fee
will be collected. We understand that the fee collection
process will be totally separate from the process by which
students are listed in the service. And additionally, it may
rely on traditional mail and paper receipts, undermining the
original goal of creating a complete electronic system.
Delays in entry into the country have become quite common.
In the last 18 months, visa delays to students and scholars
have become more extensive. I don't think we worry about that,
but they become unpredictable, too. I think there are really
two quite different issues. One can deal with predictable
delays, which can be understood by a logjam, but if there is
unpredictability in the system and no rationality for why one
visa is delayed and another is not, I think that
unpredictability is a serious problem. We have already heard
from my colleague from the State Department that their
procedures have obviously greatly tightened up. And many, many
more students are now flagged, and scholars for that matter,
who are just coming for a few weeks, are flagged because of the
fields of study that they're involved in.
We support that process, but we do have to recognize that
there are significant delays involved in that. And some of
these delays, in fact, are extreme. We do recognize that the
State Department is working hard from its point of view to deal
with that side of it. We are not convinced that on the SEVIS
side we have exactly the same level of concern to solve these
problems.
Many of our students are also further inconvenienced if
they wish to return home either for a death, for a marriage,
for a brief vacation or whatever, if they are here for three or
four years. The process by which students return home and then
need to re-enter the United States has also put many students
in a great deal of fear, such that they don't want to leave the
country because of the ambiguity that they will return for an
oral examination, perhaps only for three or four days, before
returning to their home country. There are many stories of
great anxiety about that.
Some, of course, may be invited to conferences outside of
the United States while here, maybe invited to Brazil even if
their home country is France, England, or Sweden. This, too, is
creating great apprehension, this great fear about leaving the
country and then not being able to return.
I should emphasize we do not, in any way, object to the
review of visa applicants. We seek a visa process that is
timely and will take more time, but it is predictable.
Moreover, we seek a process by which existing student and
scholar visa holders can revalidate their visas before leaving
the U.S. for academic, health, or other sensible, personal
reasons.
We also have another broad area of concern, which is the
issue of classified or sensitive courses. There are many, many
more areas of study, which may come under a list, which would
be prohibited for certain students from certain countries. Our
feelings about this kind of issue is that if we have any doubts
whatsoever, whether students from a certain country should be
able to take a certain course, it would be better not to issue
the visa in the first place. That kind of doubt should be kept
outside of our borders rather than forcing the universities, in
a sense, to select certain students out who might not, under
certain circumstances, be able to go to certain courses.
Imagine the identification problems of trying to deal with
that.
I emphasize that the Federal Government rightfully should
decide who receives a visa to study in the United States.
International students and scholars, who are of concern to the
government, should not receive a visa. However, since the U.S.
economy is unquestionably fueled by innovations in science,
engineering, and technology, it is important that our country
remain the destination of choice for the world's best students
and scholars. We value them, and I think there is increasingly,
in many parts of the world unrelated to terrorism, who are
feeling the pain and the hurt of not having free exchange with
their colleagues in the United States.
I recognize that the Science Committee does not have
jurisdiction over many of the agencies that oversee SEVIS and
the issuance of visas for international students. However, the
Committee could be helpful in encouraging the Federal
Government and the agencies involved in SEVIS implementation
and visa processing to implement several measures right now
that would be helpful. Ideally, SEVIS should be evaluated and
tested until all of the technical glitches have been resolved.
But that isn't likely for security reasons, so we need a system
that deals with the problems and tries to have a problem
resolution rather than what, I think, too often occurs, a
denial of the problems in the first place.
I have several recommendations, which are in my testimony.
And I think rather than providing them at detail at this point,
I will stop there, have you evaluate these at your leisure, and
I would be happy to answer any questions. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ward follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Ward
Mr. Chairman, my name is David Ward and I am President of the
American Council on Education. ACE represents 2,000 public and private
colleges and universities. I am testifying today on behalf of those
institutions as well as the 32 education and exchange visitor
organizations listed at the conclusion of my testimony.
I have a deep professional interest in the issue that we are
discussing today. As the former Chancellor of the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, a major research university with 4,500 international
students and scholars, I had the privilege of working with
international students and scholars every day and saw firsthand the
talents and skills they brought to my university. I am also personally
interested in this issue--I originally came to the United States as an
international student in 1960, earned a Ph.D. and then left, as my visa
required me to do. I returned to the U.S. later and became a U.S.
citizen in the Bicentennial year of 1976.
I believe that international students and exchange visitor programs
are enormously beneficial to the United States. They dramatically
increase the knowledge and skills of our workforce. They boost
worldwide appreciation for democracy and market-based economics and
give future world leaders first-hand exposure to America and Americans.
At the same time, international education generates billions of dollars
in economic activity every year.
The most important benefits of international students and exchange
scholars cannot be easily quantified. But we know what they are. First,
international students and visitors bring knowledge and skills to U.S.
classrooms, laboratories, and businesses. The sum total of their
intellectual contributions is enormous. For example, the rapid
developments in information technology that helped fuel the economic
growth of the 1990s benefited immeasurably from international students
and scholars from Southeast Asia who studied at American universities
in the late 1980s. In the same vein, a central feature of the advances
in biomedical research that will pave the way for future gains in the
quality and length of life are collaborative efforts between native and
foreign-born researchers now taking place in thousands of American
laboratories.
Second, international students and exchange scholars help bring
greater international understanding. In the current global climate, we
need more and better efforts to enhance international understanding.
One of the best ways to do this is through the everyday classroom
discussions that one finds on college and university campuses. Candid
discussion enhances familiarity--and familiarity leads to
understanding. When international students and exchange visitors return
home, they take with them first-hand understanding of our country and
our values. Indeed, some of America's strongest supporters abroad are
those who have spent time in this country.
International students add diversity to college classrooms. For
many native-born students, international students offer the first
chance for a sustained friendship with someone born in another country.
As the world grows ever smaller, meaningful exposure to international
students will better prepare American students to live, communicate,
and compete in the global economy.
This does not mean that the economic benefits are trivial.
According to the Institute for International Education, the nearly
583,000 international students who visit this country purchase some $12
billion a year in goods and services. They do this when they pay
tuition, rent an apartment, buy a pair of jeans, order a pizza, or go
to a movie. Of course, like everyone else, international students and
exchange visitors pay taxes on the goods and services they purchase. If
they are allowed to work while they are here, they also pay Federal and
State income tax.
According to the U.S. Commerce Department, higher education is the
Nation's fifth largest service-sector export. In an era when many
policy-makers and economists worry about our huge trade deficit, the
presence of international students helps reduce it.
In short, the benefits of international students are unambiguous
and overwhelming. So it is no surprise that President Bush has said:
``The United States benefits greatly from international students who
study in our country,'' or that he has committed his Administration to
``continue to foster and support international students.''
Secretary of State Colin Powell--no stranger to what is in
America's international interests--says that international education
``encourages and sustains Democratic practices, creates a cohort of
future leaders who understand each other's countries from the inside,
and promotes long-term linkages between institutions here and abroad.''
The list of foreign heads of state that have studied at an American
college is long and distinguished. The State Department has concluded
that fully one-half of the world leaders who agreed to support our war
on terrorism first came to this country as an international student or
exchange visitor.
The events of September 11th changed much in this country. Many of
the policies and practices by which the U.S. welcomes international
visitors have been the subject of examination and sustained discussion.
A large number of changes have been put in place, including, the
process by which international students and exchange visitors enter the
country and are monitored while they are here.
We support these efforts. Colleges and universities are among the
most open institutions in our very open society. The openness and the
freedom that campuses provide individual students and scholars is one
of the key factors in our widely admired system of higher education. To
maintain this openness, we need to make certain that all potential
students and researchers come here with the best of intentions, that
they remain in compliance with all appropriate laws and regulations,
and that we help the appropriate authorities monitor their academic
activities and visa status.
But we fear that the inconsistent and inefficient implementation of
these steps is making it more difficult to encourage international
students and scholars to come to our country and to complete their
studies, scholarship and research. I call the Committee's attention to
several problem areas:
LElectronic monitoring of international students and
exchange visitors who come to the U.S. does not work as
promised;
LExtensive visa delays for students and scholars who
seek to enter the country have become common; and
LVery real questions about what students can study or
what scholars can investigate when they do arrive create
confusion.
The new federal system for monitoring International Students and
Exchange Visitors does not work as promised.
On January 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
implemented the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System or
SEVIS. This is a large and complex information technology system that
is designed to link all U.S. embassies and consulates, all INS ports of
entry, every institution of higher education that sponsors
international students, and every exchange visitor program.
We believe that SEVIS is the single most important step that the
Federal Government can take to improve its ability to monitor
international students and exchange visitors and we strongly support
its implementation. However, we have repeatedly indicated a concern
that this system was being implemented before it was fully operational.
Last fall, at separate hearings held by the House Education and the
Workforce Committee and the House Judiciary Committee, the higher
education community indicated that we did not believe that the SEVIS
system would be operational in time for smooth implementation. The
Department of Justice Inspector General also expressed doubts about the
implementability of SEVIS at both hearings.
Sadly, as we feared, SEVIS was not ready and campuses are
confronting enormous difficulties. The simplest way to characterize
these problems is to say that the Immigration and Naturalization
Service implemented this system before it was fully tested. Campus
officials are now dealing with the failure to adequately develop this
system.
SEVIS suffers from three serious problems:
First, SEVIS is technologically flawed. Schools using SEVIS report
that it frequently `loses' data that has been properly entered into the
system. Many schools report that their immigration forms have printed
out on the computers of other schools. For example, official government
immigration forms that Stanford University in Palo Alto, California,
attempted to print were later discovered at Duke University in Durham,
North Carolina; forms for Michigan State University appeared on the
printer at Arizona State University. Most worrisome, perhaps,
confidential SEVIS forms printed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory--a
secure government installation--were printed at a proprietary school in
San Francisco. And batch processing, which schools need to submit large
amounts of data, works intermittently at best. Some schools have not
been able to make batch processing work at all.
These technological flaws can have serious consequences for
students. One local university discovered that, despite repeated
efforts, it could not successfully reactivate the record of an
international student from Thailand into SEVIS after the student record
was incorrectly terminated by the INS. INS officials told campus
personnel they would address the issue. However, INS officials visited
the student at home and, upon further discussion, arrested her and led
her away in handcuffs.
Second, contrary to promises, SEVIS does not provide real-time
access to data. SEVIS was designed to link schools, the State
Department and the INS in real time. This is a reasonable goal for an
electronic information system. Unfortunately, SEVIS does not yet
provide these linkages in a timely fashion. For an extended period in
February, no data was transmitted because the INS did not configure the
system to transmit it and failed to do a manual transmission of the
data for 10 days. Some embassies and consulates find that it takes a
week or longer for them to access data entered into SEVIS. This means
that students arrive at an embassy--sometimes after traveling a great
distance--only to be told (incorrectly) that their data has not been
entered into SEVIS and that they may not apply for a visa. In fact,
their data is in SEVIS--that's the only way they could receive an I-20
form--but the SEVIS data has not been forwarded to the consulate. The
bottom line is the same--without timely consular access to the SEVIS
data, a student may not apply for a visa. These delays cause confusion
and frustration for embassies, students and schools.
Third, the INS has not provided adequate training to anyone.
Training is critical for the successful implementation of any new
information technology system, yet the INS has provided almost no
training to campus officials or even to its own staff. One campus
official recently visited an INS regional service center and learned
that the center did not know how to identify SEVIS documents and had
not been provided with any training. The campus official was asked to
help INS officials understand what they were supposed to do. Regional
INS officials have not been adequately trained and therefore often
provide different answers to the same questions. INS's SEVIS Help desk
can answer technical questions about the system but is unable to answer
regulatory questions. As a result, school officials are on their own.
Two factors make this situation even more worrisome. First, the
volume of information in SEVIS is about to increase dramatically.
Between now and August 1, we conservatively estimate that an additional
one million records--approximately 250,000 per month--will need to be
entered in SEVIS. We do not believe there is any chance that SEVIS will
be able to accommodate this huge surge of information and are deeply
concerned that it will play havoc with students, colleges,
universities, and consular and immigration offices, alike.
Second, the Federal Government still has not published the
regulations specifying how the SEVIS fee will be collected. Under the
law, potential international students must be registered in SEVIS and
they must pay a SEVIS fee. The government has not yet begun to collect
the fee but there are indications that it plans to do so in the very
near future. While no regulations have been published, we understand
that the fee collection process will be totally separate from the
process by which students are listed in SEVIS. Moreover, fee collection
will reportedly rely on traditional mail and paper receipts and thus
dramatically undermines the promise that SEVIS would be an entirely
electronic system.
We have proposed ways to simplify the collection of this fee but
federal agencies have been unwilling to consider them. We believe that
adding a poorly designed fee collection process to a poorly functioning
SEVIS system is a prescription for further disaster.
Delays Entering the Country Have Become Common
Because of the enhanced background checks and additional
administrative procedures now being employed, it often takes far more
time for an international student or scholar to enter the country.
Prior to September 11, 2001, some visa applications routinely attracted
closer examination than others. For example, some international
students and researchers who hope to study or work in fields identified
on the State Department's ``Technology Alert List'' have been subject
to a higher level of scrutiny. In addition, individuals from countries
that are known to sponsor terrorism have long received more extensive
attention from government officials before a visa is granted.
In the last 18 months, visa delays for students and scholars have
become more extensive and unpredictable for several reasons. First, the
State Department has increased the number of subjects on the Technology
Alert List significantly. New fields added to the list include multiple
sub-areas of the biological sciences, as well as community development,
environmental planning, geography, urban planning, housing and
landscape architecture. Second, last summer, the State Department
imposed stricter procedures for visa applications flagged for review in
the Visa Mantis process. Under the stricter procedures, a visa
application that a consular officer refers to Visa Mantis must be
reviewed by appropriate government agencies and must receive a security
advisory opinion before a visa decision can be made. Prior to this
point, some visa applications referred to Visa Mantis did not require a
security advisory opinion. We understand that this increased level of
scrutiny coupled with the expansion of the Technology Alert List, has
been largely responsible for the enormous backlog of visa applications,
estimated to be 25,000 last fall.
International students and scholars tend to be severely impacted by
delays in granting visas for two reasons. First, their visits are most
typically tied to programs with specific start dates. Students need to
begin their programs at the start of an academic term. Scholars and
researchers need to be on campuses in time to begin research projects
and to begin teaching at the beginning of the academic term.
International students and researchers and host colleges and
universities rely on a timely and predictable visa process.
Second, international students and scholars travel outside the U.S.
during semester or term breaks, to attend international academic
conferences, to take care of personal affairs, or to visit family. Many
students and scholars who have done so in the past 18 months have
encountered enormous difficulties in re-entering our country.
Increasingly international scholars and students already in the country
are reluctant and refusing to travel outside of the U.S. for fear of
being unable to return to complete their studies or research. In
several cases, students who need only to defend their dissertation
before receiving their Ph.D.s have found themselves unable to re-enter
the United States. Visa delays have also made it increasingly
difficult, if not impossible, for international scholars and
researchers to attend short-term scientific conferences that are held
in the United States. Having the world's best scholars attending
international conferences in the U.S. benefits our nation in multiple
ways. However, if significant numbers of foreign scientists continue to
find that they are unable to enter this country in time to attend
conferences, then conferences will be hosted in other countries
instead. U.S. science and technology, tourism, and the economy would
suffer as a result.
I should emphasize that we do not in any way object to careful
review of all visa applications. We seek a visa process that is timely
and predictable. Moreover, we seek a process by which existing student
and scholar visa holders can revalidate their visas before leaving the
U.S. for academic, health, or other personal reasons. This would
significantly reduce the impact of visa processing delays because
students and scholars would be able to continue their studies,
teaching, and research uninterrupted while their visas are being
processed.
Unclear what international students can study or scholars can
investigate if they do come to this country.
Students and scholars who are granted a visa and enter the country
now find themselves subjected to additional levels of scrutiny and
restrictions. As noted above, the Technology Alert List that consular
officers use in evaluating visa applicants, now encompasses virtually
every area of contemporary science and engineering. Blanket areas like
``civil engineering'' have now been added to the list.
For the last year, the Administration has been working on a new
visa review process for international students and scholars who seek to
study in so-called ``sensitive areas'' as specified in Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 2. Known as I-PASS (for Interagency
Panel on Advanced Science and Security), its goal is to ensure that
international students and scholars do not acquire `uniquely available'
education and training in the U.S. in sensitive areas of study with
direct application to the development and use of weapons of mass
destruction. We have not seen the details of this proposal, but we have
some concerns that it could further increase the number of delayed visa
applications and impede teaching and research.
In addition, we increasingly see new restrictions on publication of
scientific research and on access to research and research results by
foreign nationals. For example, usage of export control restrictions
and talk of new categories of restricted information are growing. These
new categories include: ``sensitive but unclassified'' and ``sensitive
technical homeland information.'' Certainly, the results of scientific
research with national security implications should not be in the
public domain. It is our belief, however, that such research should be
clearly labeled as ``classified'' research as called for under
Administration policy. Current Administration policy on access to
scientific information can be found in National Security Decision
Directive 189 (NSDD 189). This policy, which is strongly supported by
colleges and universities, clearly establishes that research is either
``classified'' or ``fundamental.'' NSDD 189 was first promulgated in
1985 by President Reagan and it has been reaffirmed by every subsequent
administration. While this directive remains in effect, its meaning has
been lost or diluted in most departments and agencies. Indeed, we fear
that NSDD 189 has been replaced by an ad hoc approach that makes it far
harder for campuses and scientific organizations to understand exactly
what research security protocol the government wishes to follow.
I emphasize that the Federal Government must decide who receives a
visa to study in the United States. International students and scholars
who are of concern to the government should not receive a visa.
Speaking as a former university president and a devout supporter of
international education and scientific research, I do not want any
individuals on a college campus if the government has any reasonable
concerns about them. I do not want them in our nation's classrooms,
dormitories, laboratories, or libraries. I do not want them to have
access to scientific equipment or even to extracurricular activities.
The U.S. economy is fueled by innovations in science, engineering
and technology. Given the innovation-driven nature of our economy, it
is important that the U.S. continue to remain the destination of choice
for the world's best students and scholars.
Obviously in the new world in which we live, the government must
put new security procedures and policies in place. We support these
efforts and we have and will continue to work with the government to
meet security needs. We understand it will take some time before new
policies and procedures begin to operate smoothly. Some of these
procedures appear counter-productive, unworkable, ad hoc and
uncoordinated. As a result, costs associated with these new policies
will be higher than desirable and necessary. We fear that some of the
new policies and procedures may well make the Nation a less desirable
and welcoming place for international students and scholars and this
will force some students to choose to go elsewhere. The loss to our
economy and our scientific enterprise will be incalculable and
profound.
We recognize that the Science Committee does not have jurisdiction
over many of the agencies that oversee SEVIS and the issuance of visas
for international students and scholars. However, we think that the
Committee could be helpful in encouraging the Federal Government and
the agencies involved in SEVIS implementation and the issuance of visas
for international students and scholars implement several measures
right now. These measures would fix a number of the current and future
problems of SEVIS by making it the system it is supposed to be,
reducing the number of visa delays and making it clear that openness in
research is the policy of the U.S.:
LState Department consulate offices should collect the
SEVIS fee as a part of the visa collection fee. This maintains
SEVIS as an electronic system and streamlines the process for
the consular offices and for the international student.
LCampuses--specifically Designated School Officials
(DSOs)--should be given broader access to SEVIS in order to
correct clerical errors in the initial form. (For example, a
field of study change, correction of gender, name spelling.) In
one instance, a field of study change took 47 days to complete.
These types of changes are minor and should not require direct
involvement by the INS to correct.
LThe State Department should use the SEVIS system to
ensure real time access of data. Currently, the State
Department runs the SEVIS data through their own system instead
of using the secured Internet-based interface. In some
instances, this has caused data loss.
LThe Social Security Administration (SSA) should be
granted access to SEVIS to allow SSA officials to verify
information for work authorization before issuing Social
Security numbers to F-1 and J-1 visa holders.
LWith respect to openness in research, reaffirm and
strengthen National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD 189).
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the Members of the
Science Committee for holding this hearing on the development and
implementation of SEVIS and the impact on education and research on
U.S. campuses. I wish to assure you and the Members of this committee
our strong commitment to the implementation of SEVIS. But, to do this,
we ask that our campuses be given the tools and the regulatory guidance
to achieve this goal while ensuring that international student and
scholars are not discouraged from study and research in the U.S. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify this morning.
On behalf of:
Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange
American Association of Community Colleges
American Association of Higher Education
American Association of University Professors
American Council on Education
American Dental Education Association
APPA: The Association of Higher Education Facilities Officers
Association of American Medical Colleges
Association of American Universities
Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities
Association of Community College Trustees
Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges
Association of International Education Administrators
Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities
Council for Advancement and Support of Education
Council for Opportunity in Education
Council of Graduate Schools
Council of Independent Colleges
Educational Testing Service
Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities
NAFSA: Association of International Educators
National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education
National Association of College and University Business Officers
National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities
National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges
National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators
National Collegiate Athletic Association
National Council for Community and Education Partnerships
National Council of University Research Administrators
The College Board
United States Student Association
University Continuing Education Association
Biography for David Ward
A leading spokesperson for American higher education, David Ward
became the 11th President of the American Council on Education on
September 1, 2001. Ward is Chancellor Emeritus of the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, where he received his doctorate in 1963. Prior to
becoming Chancellor at UW-Madison, Ward also served as Associate Dean
of the graduate school from 1980 to 1987 and as Vice Chancellor for
Academic Affairs and Provost from 1989 to 1993.
Ward's service to higher education includes the chairmanship of the
Board of Trustees of the University Corporation for Advanced Internet
Development, a nonprofit group that spearheaded the development of
Internet 2. He also has chaired the Government Relations Council of the
National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, and
served on the Committee on Undergraduate Education of the Association
of American Universities, the Science Coalition, and the Kellogg
Commission on the Future of State and Land-Grant Universities.
During his four years as provost of UW-Madison, Ward led the
development of a strategic plan that improved the quality of
undergraduate education there; added to the campus research facilities;
enhanced the connections between the university, the city, the business
community, and the state; and creatively combined public and private
support for the institution. These changes gave new expression to the
Wisconsin Idea, the venerable philosophical framework for the
university's role in public service and knowledge transfer.
Ward also held the Andrew Hill Clark Professorship of Geography at
the university, served as Chair of the Geography Department from 1974
to 1977, and was President of the Association of American Geographers
in 1989. As an urban geographer, he pioneered research on English and
American cities during their rapid industrialization in the 19th and
early 20th centuries, and held visiting appointments at University
College London; The Australian National University, Canberra; Hebrew
University, Jerusalem; and at his undergraduate alma mater, the
University of Leeds.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you, Dr. Ward. Dr. Tilghman.
STATEMENT OF DR. SHIRLEY M. TILGHMAN, PRESIDENT, PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY
Dr. Tilghman. Good morning, Chairman Boehlert, Ranking
Member Hall, and Members of the House Science Committee. I want
to thank all of you for holding this very important hearing to
consider the impact of the post-September the 11th changes in
the international student and scholar visa program on research
and education in the United States.
In my written testimony, I had discussed our experiences
and concerns at Princeton in some detail. In my few minutes
this morning, I would like to highlight just a few points from
that testimony.
First, and most importantly, the events of the past two
years have made all of us more aware of the need to consider
the national security implications of our work and daily
activities. Higher education and scientific communities have
been responsive to the call to think carefully about security
issues in our research laboratories. As Chairman Boehlert said
so clearly a few minutes ago, in doing so, we are trying to
balance two exceedingly important objectives: to minimize the
risks that our laboratories and the materials that are
contained in them will be used for terrorist actives, and to
maximize the likelihood that the American scientific enterprise
will continue to flourish, as it has for the last 50 years, to
our great benefit as a country.
I am not going to repeat in my remarks many of the wise
things that Dr. Ward said about the importance of the United
States continuing to welcome scientists from outside the United
States to train in this country, to take advantage of the best
scientific education in the world, and to both stay in this
country as well as to go back to their own countries and spread
the value of American education system, the quality of our
scientific education to improve their lot. As I think you know,
a third of doctoral degrees in science and engineering are
awarded in the U.S. each year to foreign nationals as well as
40 percent of the doctoral degrees in engineering and computer
science earned by foreign students. I was one of those foreign
students 25 years ago, and I have benefited enormously from the
education I received in this country and the opportunity that I
have had to practice science for the last 25 years in the
country.
Of particular concern to me is the impact of our national
policies and procedures on our capacity as a Nation to continue
to attract the very best students and scholars from around the
world. These individuals, by virtue of their quality, have
options, have opportunities to study anywhere in the world. I
really believe that if this country is to sustain its
international leadership role in science and technology, it
must continue to engage the very best students and scholars
from around the world.
Let me briefly outline some of the concerns about our
current procedures, many of them Dr. Ward has already
mentioned. The first concern is with guidance that is currently
provided by consular officials, making it almost certain that
students and scholars with interests in science and engineering
will experience difficulties, or at least delays, in obtaining
visas no matter how non-threatening the work is likely to be.
In biology, my own field, for example, it would be a very rare
applicant who did not mention at least one of the key words or
phrases on the cheat sheets the consular officials have been
advised to use in conducting their interviews.
At Princeton, we have advised our students to build in the
time for delays, but even so, we have had a number of cases
that have been very difficult to resolve. Other universities
report similar delays, especially from individuals from Russia,
China, and the Middle East who wish to study particularly in
the physical sciences, computer sciences, and in engineering.
In some ways, as Dr. Ward just mentioned, we have an even
greater concern for the students who have already begun their
studies in the United States and then find that they have
difficulty leaving the country, either to attend scientific
meetings, or to visit their families, and then find that there
are extended delays in their ability to re-enter the United
States after their visits outside the country. This has the
complication of interrupting their academic work, and because
many of the graduate students are also teaching, interrupting
their responsibilities for teaching at the universities. We
would strongly recommend that a consideration be given to re-
instituting a pre-approval or a pre-certification program that
would allow these students to leave the country temporarily
knowing that they will be able to return in a prompt and
effective manner.
The proposed new IPASS system could address many of the
problems with the current non-immigrant visa program by
referring very sensitive cases to individuals with appropriate
scientific expertise that could help distinguish between those
who are going to study in areas that are likely to be sensitive
from those who are likely not to be studying in those kinds of
areas. It seems that IPASS is an opportunity, but it is also a
risk that it will, instead of expediting visas, just give an
opportunity to add another layer of review onto the process.
Because we have very little information about IPASS, it is
difficult at this time to judge whether it is in fact going to
be a helpful or an unhelpful addition to the system.
I will not say anything about SEVIS. I think that Mr.--Dr.
Ward has, I think, very clearly indicated the difficulties that
individual universities are facing with SEVIS. It has been
difficult for us to set this up. And we are a university that
only has 1,200 foreign students all together: 350 at the
undergraduate level, and about 850 at the graduate level.
Nevertheless, we have had considerable expense. We have had to
add personnel just to monitor this system. And we have run into
precisely the same kinds of technical glitches that Dr. Ward
has already enumerated.
Let me conclude by re-emphasizing that the higher education
community understands the need for increased scrutiny, and we
welcome and wish to work with the State Department, the INS,
and the new Department of Homeland Security to develop a more
effective and efficient screening procedure. Since we work on a
daily basis with international students, we are in a position
to understand both the needs of those students and scholars and
the vulnerabilities of the current system. We look forward to
learning more about the new Department of Homeland Security and
its plans regarding the student and scholar visa system, and we
ask the Department to include us in the dialogue on these and
other issues. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Tilghman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Shirley M. Tilghman
Good morning Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Hall and Members of
the House Science Committee. Thank you for holding this very important
hearing to consider the impact of post-September 11th changes in the
international student and scholar visa program on research and
education in the United States.
The events of the past two years have made us all more aware of the
need to consider the national security implications of our work and
daily activities. The higher education and scientific communities have
been responsive to the call to think carefully about security issues in
our research laboratories. In doing so, we are trying to balance two
exceedingly important objectives: to minimize the risk that our
laboratories and the materials in them will be used for terrorist
purposes, and to maximize the likelihood that the American scientific
enterprise will flourish. America's economic, political and military
strengths are rooted in its leadership in the worlds of science and
technology and in the freedom of thought and expression that are at the
core of our democracy and of our approaches to research and teaching.
As was so clearly articulated in the Hart-Rudman report, Road Map
for National Security: Imperative for Change, a robust system of
research and education is our greatest defense against terrorism. The
report calls the current investment in research and development a
``consumption of the capital'' of the past three generations, pointing
out that ``the U.S. need for the highest quality human capital in
science, mathematics, and engineering is not being met.'' It goes on to
explain that:
L``American students know that professional careers in basic
science and mathematics require considerable preparation and
effort, while salaries are often more lucrative in areas
requiring less demanding training. Non-U.S. nationals, however,
do find these professions attractive and, thanks to science,
math and technical preparation superior to that of many
Americans, they increasingly fill American university graduate
studies seats and job slots in these areas.''
So, while we make national and institutional efforts to attract
American students to careers in science and work to improve K-12
education to produce more Americans who have the capabilities necessary
to excel in science and mathematics, we turn to international students
and scholars to fill the widening gap between supply and demand for
U.S. scientists and engineers. These foreign scientists and scholars
make many critical contributions to the American scientific and
education enterprise. They bring a wealth of knowledge and experience
to our colleges and universities and they enrich the cultural diversity
of our campuses. Given the global nature of business, the economy,
education and the scientific enterprise, cultural diversity on our
campuses pays important dividends to our entire society; it is
imperative to the future success of our graduates and the international
leadership and stability of our nation.
Foreign-born scientists have, for more than 50 years, helped the
U.S. achieve the preeminence in science and technology that has led to
our strong economic growth and long-term national security. Almost 20
percent of the distinguished scientists and engineers who are members
of the National Academy of Sciences, and more than a third of U.S.
Nobel Laureates, are foreign born. I, too, am a foreign-born scientist,
having been raised and educated in Canada prior to my graduate studies
at Temple University. According to the 2002 Science and Engineering
Indicators, nearly a third of the doctoral degrees in science and
engineering awarded in the U.S. each year go to foreign nationals, with
well over 40 percent of the doctoral degrees in engineering and
computer science earned by foreign students. Two-thirds of foreign
students who receive a Ph.D. in science or engineering stay in the
U.S., taking positions in academia and industry, and nearly 40 percent
of the current U.S. engineering faculty is foreign-born.
Despite the important contributions that foreign students and
scholars have made and continue to make to U.S. advances in science and
technology, we are all painfully aware that at least three of the 19
September 11th hijackers were attending U.S. flight schools on student
visas when they committed their heinous acts. And we know from the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center that others exploited weaknesses in
the student non-immigrant visa program and were in this country on
expired student visas when they committed their crime. In the wake of
the September 11th attacks, there has been increased oversight of the
student and scholar visa program resulting in new legislation and
regulations in this area.
Most notable among the changes in the student/scholar visa program
are: 1) expansion of the Technology Alert List (TAL) to include the
biological sciences and urban planning as Critical Fields of Study; 2)
guidance to consular officers that restrictions on the export of
controlled goods and technologies (the TAL) apply to nationals of all
countries and not just to those who are from state sponsors of
terrorism; 3) guidance that consular officers are not expected to be
versed in all fields on the TAL, but should ``listen for key words or
phrases from the Critical Fields list'' while interviewing applicants;
and 4) elimination of time limitations on decisions by the State
Department to suspend the processing of a student visa request. Each of
these changes has increased the number of cases that are referred to
the State Department and other federal agencies for additional
screening and security approval, and the increased case load has
resulted in prolonged processing time for nearly all student visa
applications.
While I understand the reasons behind these changes in regulations
and enforcement, I am concerned about the lack of clarity in the
regulations and the lack of training for consular officers to interpret
them. For example, an October 2001 cable encouraged consular officers
to post ``cheat sheets'' at interview windows so that staff can become
familiar with the contents of the Critical Fields List. Consular
officers are reminded that ``restrictions on the export of controlled
goods and technologies apply to nationals of all countries'' and are
told directly that they are not expected to be versed in all the fields
on the list. Rather, they should ``shoot for familiarization and listen
for key words or phrases from the list in applicants' answers to
interview questions.''
In the category of chemical, biotechnology and biomedical
engineering, for example, the Critical Fields List notes that ``the
same technologies that could be applied to develop and produce chemical
and biological weapons are used widely by civilian research
laboratories and industry'' and that ``advanced biotechnology has the
potential to support biological weapons research.'' The list then goes
on to name nearly every conceivable field and subfield within biology
so that it would be almost impossible for a foreign national to
describe his or her area of study without using several of the terms on
the list, including biochemistry, bacteriology, microbiology, growth
and culturing of microorganisms, genetic engineering, recombinant DNA
technology, fermentation technology and immunology. The non-specific
nature of this list and the obvious lack of expertise and training
among consular officers raise serious concerns about the efficacy of
this program and about our future capacity as a country to attract
foreign graduate students and scholars to science and engineering
programs.
While the higher education community fears that increased screening
requirements and delays in the visa application process will have a
significant negative impact on the recruitment and retention of foreign
students and scholars, a look at the current data reveals that beyond a
few difficult cases, the business of higher education has not yet
changed significantly as a result of changes in the visa program. At
Princeton, international students have accounted for approximately 43
percent of our total graduate student population last year and this
year. (Since the size of our graduate student population has increased,
so too has the number of international students.) Our undergraduate
international student population has also increased over the past few
years, from 6.0 percent in 2001 to 6.9 percent in 2002 and 7.5 percent
in 2003. While we have had some difficulties at the undergraduate
level, these students generally are not subjected to the same level of
scrutiny as graduate students or scholars when applying for visas.
A recent survey of Ivy League universities revealed that some
institutions experienced slight decreases in international graduate and
professional student populations between 2001 and 2002, while others
experienced slight growth. Even among those reporting decreases, it is
hard to know how much is the result of real or perceived difficulties
in obtaining visas. These data suggest that while individual students
almost certainly have experienced difficulties--or at least delays--in
obtaining visas, the overall number of international students at these
institutions has remained relatively stable.
At Princeton, like many other U.S. universities, we find the
largest concentration of international students in the sciences and
engineering, along with a handful of other departments (in our case
Economics and our Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
Affairs). In fact, Economics has the second largest concentration of
international graduate students, following only Electrical Engineering
and just ahead of Chemistry. Our international student population in
the life sciences is relatively low (roughly 20 percent), but this is
largely because of citizenship requirements for NIH graduate training
grants, the largest source of support for our graduate students in the
life sciences.
In general, Princeton has responded to changes in the visa
application process by instructing international students to apply
early and build in time for delays. Still, we have had a number of
cases that have been particularly difficulty to resolve.
During the 2002-2003 academic year, two undergraduate students had
difficulty getting their F-1 visas, but ultimately did receive them
(although after the academic year had started). Among our graduate
students, one engineering student was delayed by a semester (requiring
an exception to our Fall-only admissions practice) and an Iranian
Visiting Student Research Collaborator in chemical engineering has been
waiting for over four months for a visa. Among our international
scholars, a Russian and a Libyan-born British engineer experienced
delays of several months in obtaining visas and a Russian physicist who
applied for his visa in mid-January is still waiting for permission to
enter the U.S. An Iranian chemist who applied for a visa in October
never succeeded in obtaining his visa. Other universities around the
country report similar delays for some of their students or scholars,
especially among individuals who are from Russia, China or the Middle
East and who wish to study in the physical or computer sciences or
engineering.
In addition to students and scholars who must endure prolonged
delays in getting their visas, institutions also have been coping with
students and faculty who are already in the U.S. but who leave the
country to attend professional meetings or family events abroad. These
individuals are experiencing prolonged waiting times (six weeks to
several months) when they try to secure the necessary visa to re-enter
the U.S. During the recent winter break there were four engineering
graduate students from Princeton who traveled abroad and had difficulty
re-entering the country. Among the four, one (a Chinese student in
physics) has returned, while three (a Malaysian electrical engineering
student, a Chinese mechanical engineering student, and a Chinese civil
engineering student) are still awaiting their visas to return. Our
colleagues around the country indicate that they, too, are experiencing
similar difficulties.
These cases of delayed re-entry are even more problematic than the
delays experienced by ``first-time'' students and scholars because
students or scholars who have already been in residence are generally
scheduled to teach classes or continue ongoing research upon their
return. Also, questions related to salary and benefits arise when
students or scholars experience prolonged delays in obtaining their
return visa, especially when the student or scholar is being paid and
receiving benefits through federal research grants. For example, an
international scholar may leave the country to attend a four-day
meeting abroad, only to find that his or her re-entry is delayed by
more than six weeks while the re-entry visa application is being
processed. The individual may be able to use several weeks of vacation
leave to cover time away from work, but the delay often exceeds the
accumulated leave by many weeks. The most troubling cases involve
international scholars detained outside the U.S. while their families--
often including spouses who do not have permission to work in the
U.S.--await their return in the U.S. These difficulties are exacerbated
if salary must be withheld and benefits interrupted as a result of the
re-entry delay.
In earlier times, a university could apply for advance pre-approval
for international students and scholars who would be traveling abroad
but then re-entering the U.S. This pre-approval allowed the student or
scholar to undergo security clearance before he or she left the U.S.,
thereby minimizing the waiting time during the re-entry approval
process at the foreign consulate. A similar pre-approval or pre-
certification process for foreign students or scholars already in the
U.S. would help enormously in reducing the re-entry waiting period and
in providing scholars with much greater confidence about their ability
to re-enter the U.S. after they fulfill their professional obligations
by participating in scientific meetings and collaborations abroad.
H1-B Visas
Another area in which the university has been forced to change its
practices and policies to accommodate prolonged screening and approval
processes is in the H1-B visa program. Following September 11th, the
processing time for H1-B visa applications has grown to four or five
months. This means that hiring decisions and contract extension
decisions have to be made far in advance to ensure that the visa will
be processed in time for an H1-B worker to enter or stay in the U.S.
Rather than make hiring and extension decisions based on our
institutions' needs at a particular time or based on an informed
performance assessment of an individual, we have to anticipate our
needs and an individual's performance in advance so that we can allow
adequate time for processing the visa. The INS does provide for
expedited H1-B visa processing when a $1,000 premium processing fee is
paid, but this fee strikes many in the higher education community as
unjust and inappropriate. Moreover, this practice extends the waiting
period for those who cannot or choose not to pay $1,000 for premium
processing.
IPASS
In May 2002, White House officials proposed a new international
student and scholar screening program that would create a panel, the
Interagency Panel on Advanced Science Security (IPASS), to screen some
graduate students, post-doctoral fellows and scientists who apply for
visas to study ``sensitive topics. . .uniquely available on U.S.
campuses.'' The panel would include representatives from the major U.S.
science agencies as well as the State, Justice, Commerce and Homeland
Security Departments. IPASS could solve some of the problems and
deficiencies in the current non-immigrant visa program. For example, an
IPASS panel made up of individuals with scientific expertise could
better evaluate the potential for technology transfer than a non-
scientist consular officer who is relying on a broad, uninformative
list of terms to make that decision. Secondly, by sending the most
difficult or questionable applications to IPASS, consular officers
could process the less questionable applications more quickly, thereby
reducing the backlog and delays for the majority of applicants. The
creation of IPASS also provides an opportunity for the new Department
of Homeland Security to work with scientific agencies and, we hope,
institutions of higher education to develop a student and scholar visa
screening program that could better differentiate between those with
malicious intent and those who would contribute productively while in
the U.S. We look forward to conversations with the new Department of
Homeland Security on this and other issues in the near future and hope
that IPASS will provide an opportunity for constructive partnership.
On the other hand, IPASS could add yet another layer of bureaucracy
to an already burdensome process and the visa backlog could grow even
longer. Even though the IPASS system was announced nearly a year ago,
details of the program have not yet been released. Not only are
university officials waiting to see what IPASS holds for them, but
foreign students and scholars are similarly concerned about what
restrictions and regulations this new program might entail. The absence
of information about IPASS could dissuade excellent international
students from applying to U.S. institutions for fear that this new
system will impose additional burdens and delays. We know that other
countries are working hard to develop higher education systems that
mirror the U.S. system, and the more difficult we make it for highly
desirable students and scholars to obtain American visas, the greater
the likelihood that the ``best and brightest'' students and scholars
throughout the world will elect to study and work in other countries.
SEVIS
The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) is the
web-based system that is being used to meet the Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS) information reporting and tracking
requirements for foreign students. Although we have anticipated the
system since 1996 when Congress directed the INS to develop an
electronic system to collect data on foreign students, the
implementation of the system was fast-tracked in response to the USA
PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56, October 26, 2001), which required full
implementation of the system by January 1, 2003. While Princeton is
fully supportive of SEVIS and the transition from an outdated paper
tracking system to an electronic format, there seem to be a number of
serious bugs in the system.
The March 2003 report issued by the U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General provides an informative review of the
SEVIS program and outlines the major difficulties associated with full
implementation of the program. Rather than repeat that discussion, I
will talk about our own experience in implementing SEVIS and using the
system to track and report on international students and scholars.
In order to comply with the requirements of SEVIS, Princeton has
spent over $38,000, including $15,000 to purchase software to
facilitate batch transfer of data, $5000 for a new server, and
thousands of dollars more for maintenance agreements, test servers and
added personnel costs. While we thought that the implementation of
SEVIS would be a ``one time'' cost, we are actually finding that SEVIS
is far from being ``plug and play'' technology and we are seeing rising
personnel costs associated with using the system. Implementing SEVIS on
our campus required weeks of effort on the part of our Office of
Information Technology, our Office of General Counsel, and our
undergraduate and graduate international student services offices.
Eventually, we had to assign a technical expert from our Office of
Information Technology to focus primarily on maintaining our SEVIS
reporting system.
Although the initial SEVIS program was fraught with software bugs
and glitches, INS has been working hard to develop patches to fix the
programming problems. But every time INS develops a new patch for its
software, we have to wait for our batch processing software vendor to
develop a corresponding patch that we must then install. At some point
we anticipate that an upgrade will be necessary to the SEVIS system and
that we will have to make an additional purchase of upgraded batch
processing software.
Beyond cost, the implementation of SEVIS has been extremely
frustrating to the people on our campus who work with international
students and scholars. For lack of a better word, the SEVIS system is
``quirky,'' especially when the user volume is high (afternoons are the
most difficult since both East Coast and West Coast institutions are
using the system). While the paper INS forms previously required 5-10
minutes to complete, the SEVIS system can take up to 30 minutes per
individual, especially on days when the program is running slowly.
Sometimes the system kicks the data entry person out just as he or she
is about to complete the web-based form, and all of the information is
lost. At other times the data entry person is interrupted by a phone
call or a student while entering data and the system automatically logs
the user out, requiring the user to log-in again and re-enter all of
the data. Other institutions have reported difficulties retrieving
their institutional data from SEVIS, sometimes receiving another
institution's data during a retrieval attempt.
Beyond system difficulties, SEVIS also has some substantive
deficiencies in that it is missing fields and options that correspond
to certain INS policies and regulations. For example, institutions are
allowed to provide a J-1 scholar with an extra six-month extension as
long as INS is notified of the extension. However, in the SEVIS system
institutions are required to request authorization of the extension
from the State Department. Since the SEVIS procedure is inconsistent
with current INS policy, either the policy must be changed or the SEVIS
system must be corrected so that our staff know how to proceed. Also,
while SEVIS provides a way to report practical training experiences for
F-1 visa holders, there is no similar reporting field in the J-1
program for students participating in academic training experiences.
Finally, there are some reporting functions that cannot be transmitted
to INS as part of a batch data transmission due to gaps in the SEVIS
software system. Information about transfer students, for example, must
be entered manually for each student and cannot be transmitted to INS
as part of a batch data transfer. While Princeton has no transfer
students, we appreciate the hardships imposed by this software gap on
institutions that do have a large transfer student population.
SEVIS provides customer support through users' guides and a help
desk, but both have deficiencies. Our staff finds the F visa manual to
be quite good, while the J visa manual is poorly written and missing
key information. The help desk operates from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. EST, but
since there are only 32 people staffing it, the wait time can exceed 30
minutes. Beyond that, the help desk can only answer technical questions
related to programming problems and cannot provide advice in the area
of policy, regulations or procedures. Questions of this sort must be
directed to the State Department, but sometimes the State Department
staff members are unfamiliar with the capabilities of the SEVIS system.
Since the most difficult questions have both policy and programming
elements, the help desk should be staffed by individuals who are
knowledgeable not only about the SEVIS software, but also about INS
regulations and requirements.
In summary, I want to re-emphasize that the higher education
community understands the need for increased scrutiny of those applying
to enter our country on student and scholar visas. We would like to
work with the State Department, INS and the new Department of Homeland
Security to develop a more effective and efficient screening procedure.
Since we work with international students and scholars every day, we
are in a position to understand both the needs of students and scholars
and the vulnerabilities of the current system. We look forward to
learning more about the new Department of Homeland Security and its
plans regarding the student and scholar visa system and we ask the
Department to include us in its dialogue on this and other issues. We
commend the State Department for its work in this area and are
encouraged to hear that the Department is adding personnel and re-
examining its procedures in an attempt to reduce the backlog and
expedite visa processing while maintaining high security standards.
While the backlog troubles us, we know that consular officers and State
Department officials have experienced dramatic increases in workload
and we appreciate their current efforts to reduce the backlog and
expedite visa processing while improving national security.
Thank you. I welcome questions regarding my testimony.
Biography for Shirley M. Tilghman
Shirley M. Tilghman was elected Princeton University's 19th
President on May 5, 2001, and assumed office on June 15, 2001. An
exceptional teacher and a world-renowned scholar and leader in the
field of molecular biology, she served on the Princeton faculty for 15
years before being named President.
Tilghman, a native of Canada, received her Honors B.Sc. in
chemistry from Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, in 1968. After
two years of secondary school teaching in Sierra Leone, West Africa,
she obtained her Ph.D. in biochemistry from Temple University in
Philadelphia.
During postdoctoral studies at the National Institutes of Health,
she made a number of groundbreaking discoveries while participating in
cloning the first mammalian gene, and then continued to make scientific
breakthroughs as an independent investigator at the Institute for
Cancer Research in Philadelphia and an adjunct associate professor of
human genetics and biochemistry and biophysics at the University of
Pennsylvania.
Tilghman came to Princeton in 1986 as the Howard A. Prior Professor
of the Life Sciences. Two years later, she also joined the Howard
Hughes Medical Institute as an investigator and began serving as an
adjunct professor in the Department of Biochemistry at the University
of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey-Robert Wood Johnson Medical
School. In 1998, she took on additional responsibilities as the
founding director of Princeton's multidisciplinary Lewis-Sigler
Institute for Integrative Genomics.
A member of the National Research Council's committee that set the
blueprint for the U.S. effort in the Human Genome Project, Tilghman
also was one of the founding members of the National Advisory Council
of the Human Genome Project Initiative for the National Institutes of
Health.
She is renowned not only for her pioneering research, but for her
national leadership on behalf of women in science and for promoting
efforts to make the early careers of young scientists as meaningful and
productive as possible. She received national attention for a report on
``Trends in the Careers of Life Scientists'' that was issued in 1998 by
a committee she chaired for the National Research Council, and she has
helped launch the careers of many scholars as a member of the Pew
Charitable Trusts Scholars Program in the Biomedical Sciences Selection
Committee and the Lucille P. Markey Charitable Trust Scholar Selection
Committee.
From 1993 through 2000, Tilghman chaired Princeton's Council on
Science and Technology, which encourages the teaching of science and
technology to students outside the sciences, and in 1996 she received
Princeton's President's Award for Distinguished Teaching. She initiated
the Princeton Postdoctoral Teaching Fellowship, a program across all
the science and engineering disciplines that brings postdoctoral
students to Princeton each year to gain experience in both research and
teaching.
Tilghman also has participated in teaching and other programs for
alumni on campus and across the country on such topics as science and
technology in the liberal arts curriculum, behavioral genetics and the
human genome project.
A member of the American Philosophical Society, the National
Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine and the Royal Society of
London, she serves as a Trustee of the Jackson Laboratory, a mammalian
genetics institute in Bar Harbor, Maine. She has also been a trustee of
Rockefeller University in New York, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory on
Long Island, a member of the Advisory Council to the Director of the
National Institutes of Health and a member of the Scientific Advisory
Board of the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Sciences at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Discussion
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. You know terrorism
wasn't invented on 9/11 in New York and Washington. It has been
around for a long time. Unfortunately, up until then, we
escaped it on our shores, but it has been a fact of life in so
many other nations for a long time. How are they coping with it
in terms of student visas, visiting scholars? Do we have any
comparative analysis? Dr. Ward and Dr. Tilghman, do your
visiting scholars report that it is so much more complicated
here than it might be in Germany, or the United Kingdom, and
Japan, etcetera, etcetera? Could you address that question?
Dr. Ward. Yeah. I mean, I think most other nations have
systematic arrangements and good data systems. I think the
problem is that the scale is so different. The scale is
manageable. We have a horrendous scale of immigration. Remember
the visas that we are talking about are only 1.6 percent of all
visas issued in the United States, but all of those visitors
visas, too. So the sheer scale of visa processing is enormous.
The second thing I would argue is our system had broken
down before 9/11. When I came to this country in 1960, it was a
very effective screening process, which worked well between the
State Department and INS. But during the period of the '80's,
either because of under-funding, because of preoccupation with
drug trafficking, will illegal immigration, INS was really not
focusing on student visas, so it was a very badly broken system
before 9/11 and needed to be improved. So it is A, scale, and
in other countries, the scale is smaller. And B, they are never
broken down. Our system had broken down irrespective of 9/11,
and its scale is just so staggering. And to recreate it, the
scale is proving to be a bigger problem than we expected.
Dr. Tilghman. I agree with what Dr. Ward said.
Chairman Boehlert. Let me ask you, Ms. Jacobs, for most
visa processors that--is their first assignment abroad
someplace? What is the buzz within the consular office
community? Are they being excessively cautious now because of
some potential personal liability?
Ms. Jacobs. I think it would be safe to say that after 9/11
that consular officers in the field are perhaps more cautious
than they were in the past. I think that that same thing
applies, though, back here at home with the agencies reviewing
these cases. I mentioned in my testimony that the number of
refusals for technology transfer grounds has increased. But I
think it is fair to say that in the post-9/11 environment that
consular officers looking at the Technology Alert List that we
give them, looking at the sort of definitions that we give them
to guide them, because these are not scientific experts, and we
do have to give them some kind of guidance on what they should
be looking for. I think that if they have a question about a
case, that they probably do refer it back to Washington. We
are, as you know, under a lot more scrutiny after 9/11. And I
think that the consular officers in the field are feeling that
and feel that they have an obligation to do that.
Chairman Boehlert. Do you have any specialized training you
have added to their program?
Ms. Jacobs. They get training on this as they go through
our consular training class on all of the different grounds of
ineligibility under the Immigration Act. And they do spend some
time talking about this and the Technology Alert List and what
it means. Let me just say that officers, and many of them are,
as you said, sir, first tour officers. But at the larger posts,
at least, many of them do have people there that they can talk
to if they have a science attache. There may be others at post
that they can talk to about a case, if they do have questions,
which might eliminate the need to send something back here for
a clearance. But I would say that certainly the numbers coming
back for clearances, at this point, the numbers have increased
over the last 16 to 18 months.
Chairman Boehlert. If they have a science attache. That is
another story for another day. We shouldn't have an embassy any
place in the world that doesn't have a science attache for a
whole lot of reasons, but that is another subject for another
day.
What is your prognosis for the backlog?
Ms. Jacobs. I think the backlog is the result of a number
of things that happened, more or less, at the same time. I
think the fact that we had to implement a lot of these security
procedures on very short notice. As I mentioned before, in
ordinary times, we would look at a problem and try to do things
slowly so that they make sense. After 9/11, we were under a
great deal of pressure to implement a lot of security measures
very quickly. And the--I think the resources of all of the
Washington agencies involved in this process were strained. I
think that most of the agencies have now at least added
additional resources. There are, I think, a lot of automation
issues, a lot of, perhaps, outdated technology issues that come
into play. But I think the simple answer is that we simply--the
infrastructure was not there at the beginning to handle this.
We are sorting through it now. I think we are doing much
better. But there is a group of cases from, I want to say,
early summer of last year where a lot of cases were held up
because of changes of--in procedures, changes in personnel, and
we are still dealing with a certain number of cases from that
time period. But the cases that are coming in today, especially
the Visas Mantis cases, if there is no problem, if we have no,
you know, negative information from another agency, we can get
those processed within 30 days.
Chairman Boehlert. So you feel we are making significant
progress?
Ms. Jacobs. I think we are making progress. I--in some
areas, I think it is significant. In others, we still have a
ways to go.
Chairman Boehlert. My time is up, but I will have a second
round of questions. Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall. Ms. Jacobs, I don't have any problem with your
problems. I want you to be thorough. And I lived in a day and
time when your State Department, my State Department, moved the
Japanese away from the West Coast here. Perhaps if they had had
the information that we have today about computers or had Tom
Ridge leading the Homeland Security with the information that
he has, much of that would have been done more on a personal
basis, rather than on just categorizing everybody with the same
sweep of the same brush.
Today, you have a delay. There is no question about that. I
don't think there is any question that it is 9/11 spawned that
that caused us to be in terror. And Roosevelt, back in that day
and time, said the only thing we had to fear was fear itself.
Well, we live in fear today in this country. We live in fear,
because our government tells us at any moment that we might be
hit again with an act of terrorism. And of course, we have to
believe that. I would like to believe what we are doing is
working, because they look at my card twice, get the dogs after
it once, then the mirror, and then they make me show my ID. And
we have not had an event since that time, so perhaps you and
your State Department are doing a great job for us. I hope
that, and I believe that, and I want to believe that.
But I must ask you that is this situation the result of new
policies, the slowness there, or procedures that have been
instituted after 9/11? Obviously they are.
Ms. Jacobs. Yes, I--primarily because of all of the new
procedures that were implemented after 9/11, just the sheer
volume----
Mr. Hall. Yes.
Ms. Jacobs [continuing]. Of cases coming back now for
review.
Mr. Hall. And as the Chairman suggested, we have been
terrorist friendly for probably the last 15 or 20 years here,
or maybe longer than that. So that places a terrific burden on
you. And but are we seeing a temporary effect as the system
adjusts to the new ground rules that you all are setting out,
or is this likely to become a permanent situation?
Ms. Jacobs. We are doing everything we can to keep this
from being a permanent situation. The State Department really
is committed to trying to balance the responsibilities that we
have to protect borders, but also to facilitate legitimate
travel. And we certainly--we have met with the scientific and
academic communities. We have talked about this. We really do
understand their concerns. I don't think anyone involved in
this process wants this to be a permanent situation.
Mr. Hall. Then if it is not--if it is temporary, of course,
we would want to know what steps are being taken to streamline
the visa requests and all of that and to rush it up. I am not
doing that. That is not my hope nor my goal for you. I am glad
that it is permanent, because I think it is going to be
permanent. I think we can learn that from another country that
has that permanent situation today. If it is permanent, has an
assessment been made of the tradeoff between increased security
and potential harm to the research and innovation capabilities
of the Nation, or I guess maybe I could ask it another way. Dr.
Ward told us what he wasn't going to go into, but let me tell
you what I do want to go into. How can we lessen the classroom
seats that are occupied by foreigners today and yet keep our
nation abreast in the field of technology and science along
with the intervention of the State Department and the
guidelines you are setting forth? Are you carrying that--are
you putting that in your computer as you go?
Ms. Jacobs. Well, we are responsible for processing visas
in accordance with the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Mr. Hall. And with the rules we make up here in Congress.
Ms. Jacobs. And you know, if someone is ineligible under
one of the grounds of the Immigration and Nationality Act, then
yes, we have the ability to deny the visa. But we wouldn't be
able to deny a visa just to slow down the process.
Mr. Hall. Well, Dr. Tilghman indicated that she was not
upset with the percentage of foreign participation. I am and
many Americans are. Many Americans who have sons or daughters
that they think are qualified can't get in because those seats
in those classrooms are occupied by foreigners. And surely,
that is of some benefit to this country. I understand that. I
understand it is a--we send students there. They send students
here. I think 50 percent in the field of engineering is
unreasonable, and I think that is a goal we ought to be trying
to--a spear that we ought to be trying to blunt. And I hope the
State--I thank you for what you have done in the State
Department, and I don't disagree with your progress. I don't
disagree with the time it is going to take. I want you to be
thorough. I yield back my time.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. The Chair
recognized the distinguished Chairman of Subcommittee on
Research, who has a vital interest and support in the subject.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and Mr.
Hall, for having this hearing. We have had sort of some
questions in our Subcommittee on Research as we reauthorized
the National Science Foundation. And as we discuss the 200
million authorization to try to do a better job with our math
and science students in this country. So sort of following up
on Mr. Hall, you know, in the long-term, it seems like each one
of our universities would consider it a priority to try to
figure out what we are doing wrong or what we could do better
in terms of our math and science interests and education from
the four-year-old on up to the time they graduate from high
school and go into college and sometimes get thrown out.
Particularly, I mean, we have some of the great people in
Michigan and other states, Dr. Tilghman, were foreign students
that graduated and decided to stay in this country are, at
Michigan State University, our Dean of Physics and Engineering,
I think it is called, is--was a foreign student that came and
did research. So I want to ask the question, Ms. Jacobs, on--
after they finish their doctor's degree, then I am told there
is extra pressure for them to leave the country. And how does
that play into consideration of flexibility in the Department--
in your Department?
Ms. Jacobs. The student visas are considered a non-
immigrant visa, which means that for most of those applicants,
there is a statutory presumption that they are intending
immigrants until they present sufficient evidence to the
consular officer of--that they are going to leave the United
States after their authorized stay. And so that provision does
apply to students. And so when they come in for their student
visas, one of the things that the consular officer has to take
a look at is this person going to come back after completing
the studies in the U.S. As you can imagine, that is no easy
task. Things change when people get here, etcetera. But it is
something that the consular officers do have to look at. And if
there is----
Mr. Smith of Michigan. But do I understand you to say what
they are looking at is do you promise to leave this country
after you finish your education sort of----
Ms. Jacobs. They would. Yes, they would look at that. They
would try to look at within the context of the local, you know,
economic social conditions. You know, is this person going to
be able to, you know, study this particular field and then come
back and, you know----
Mr. Smith of Michigan. What do you mean come back? Come
back where?
Ms. Jacobs. Go back home to find a job.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. See, I want to look at it a little
more selfishly. If these are exceptional individuals that can
help us either in the university level or in research and in
commerce, I would like to keep them here.
Ms. Jacobs. Many of them are able to stay. They are able to
find a way to adjust to another status. Some of them marry
American citizens, which allows them to stay. I mean, there are
a number of things that can happen, but until that----
Mr. Smith of Michigan. Well, Dr. Ward, can you--maybe you
need to help facilitate those marriages.
Ms. Jacobs. But----
Mr. Smith of Michigan. Put your mike on.
Dr. Ward. Oh, sorry. On the--I married a U.S. citizen, too,
so I suppose I am an example of this. But I came on an exchange
visitor visa, and that had a statutory necessity to leave. So
I--just there are some visas where there is virtually no
negotiation about leaving. On a student visa, I think under
certain circumstances, the employer can make a case that the
student can stay. So there are--it depends on the particular
visa the foreign scholar comes in on.
Mr. Smith of Michigan. Is that right, Ms. Jacobs?
Ms. Jacobs. Yes. There--as I said, there are ways for
people who come in with student visas to say. And with the
exchange visitors, Dr. Ward is correct. There are certain
categories of those exchange visitors that do--are supposed to
go home for at least two years after their program----
Mr. Smith of Michigan. 4,000 schools that now are educating
600,000 foreign students. It seems like that message should be
so very clear that we have got to do a better job in this
country of exciting our students in science and math rather
than simply continuing our dependence, if you will, on foreign
students and--yes, Dr. Tilghman.
Dr. Tilghman. You know, in--and Mr. Hall is about to leave,
but I was about to both agree and disagree with him on the
issue that he raised and that you are raising, Mr. Smith. I
couldn't agree more that we are not doing a good job as a
country at science education at exciting the young, K through
12. I think it is scandalous, actually. And I think it--the
direct result of this is not--is that foreign students compete
very effectively for spaces in our class. I mean, this is a
meritocracy. When we do admission into graduate school at
Princeton and at many other research universities in this
country, we are selecting the very best qualified, most
excellent students that we can find. And the fact of the matter
is, because of the quality of the science education that is
occurring in this country, foreign students compete very
effectively for those places. It needn't be so, but it is so
right now. So when you and Mr. Hall are focusing on why are we
admitting so many foreign students, the answer is because they
compete well for the places. They are of extraordinary high
quality. I think it goes all the way back to K through 12
education.
Chairman Boehlert. Your time is expired, but you are
exactly right, and this committee takes great pride in
recognizing the miserable performance of the United States of
America in educating young people, K through 12, in science in
math and inspiring them. And so if you had to depend
exclusively on domestic students to fill your graduate schools,
you would have an awful lot of empty seats. And one of the
alarming trends right now used to be, and I will just pull this
figure out of thin air, but it illustrates the point. It used
to be that about a 70 to 30 ratio, the graduate students that
came to the United States from abroad got their Ph.D.s, 70
percent went back home. 30 percent stayed. Now it is just the
reverse. You know what, that is cause for alarm. That is cause
for real alarm. With that, the Chair recognizes Ms. Eddie
Bernice Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking
Member. Let me thank the witnesses for coming and express my
appreciation for both Dr. Ward and Dr.--the President of
Princeton for giving your talents to this country. We are a
nation of nations. I looked around this room trying to see if I
could find any Native Americans, and I don't think I see any.
I understand what we are talking about, and I think that
the challenge is with our education system, because it really
is a sad day when we use visas to make sure that we don't have
any terrorists aboard. We have had terrorists in this country
all of my life that were not foreign-born, and so we have got
to do a better job on the other side of the issue. I have real
problems with the visa time span, because I have a district
that is probably the most diverse in the Nation. And we have a
lot of H1-B Visas, a lot of students, just from all over. And
it is absolutely inefficient in what they have to deal with and
standing in these lines and getting visas and trying to get a
citizenship. Efficiency is not noted as anything that I can
give any compliment to when the INS had control of it. I had to
visit several times myself to see what the problem--three and
four years, that is too long. And I don't believe that we would
have as much research since 85 percent of the researchers in
this country are foreign-born. That is not their fault. It is
ours, and we must do a better job.
I really do support some type of screening, but we can not
get it until we get more efficiency. We need more people in the
area, and we need more skill of the people that are in the
area. I am grateful to both of you for coming and adding to our
education system. I don't know who would be President of
Princeton if you weren't there, and you are not American-born.
I am very--I have such a personal experience with this in my
district, that this is really kind of disturbing to me. I have
a lot of people who have been profiled since 9/11. If we had
more efficiency, I think it would not have been 9/11 in that
fashion. So I think the responsibility really does rest with
us. And I am not for holding students back if they are
efficient, but I am for better preparation of students so they
can become efficient. And I think I can speak with authority
being black-skinned. If they had the right opportunities, they
would qualify. When we put students in special situations and
they have an opportunity to learn, they learn.
So my question would go to the State Department. Will the
State Department work to ensure that the memorandum or
understanding between the Department of State and the
Department of Homeland Security reflect the proper balance
between the need for security and the need for openness? We are
a Nation of nations.
Ms. Jacobs. We are certainly working toward that as we
discuss the MOU with the Department of Homeland Security. Let
me just add that there are a number of other agencies involved
in this visa review process, and we have talked to all of them
about the need for a more rational, a more predictable
clearance system so that we can stop the delays that we are
having.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate you holding this hearing.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. I understand in my enthusiasm
I misspoke a moment ago. What I meant to say was that of the
foreign-born students who come to the United States and get
their graduate degrees, it used to be that 70 percent would
stay here and 30 percent would go back home. Now it is almost
reversed, which is creating a real alarming deficiency right
here in the United States. We are trying to address that,
starting with K through 12 with the science and math
partnership, which was an initiative of this committee,
starting with the other partnership program. We are working
with our great universities to provide incentives for you to
increase the number of students in the science, math, and
engineering disciplines. It--this is a national security
problem of monumental proportions, and most people are not
getting a heck of a lot of attention outside the campus
community and the Corporate America, which recognizes that we
have some real unmet needs, and we have got to do something to
address that.
Dr. Gingrey. Oh, sorry. Mr. Rohrabacher is here. We can't
skip the distinguished Chairman of the Subcommittee----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And considering that
I am again going to be the proverbial skunk at the lawn party
that I think I would like to get this into the discussion a
little earlier. No, this is not a meritocracy for our students
to be competing with foreign students. American people pay a
lot of their tax dollars into the education institutions that
we are talking about. Their students--you know, their children
do not have to compete on an equal basis with people from
overseas who do not pay taxes for educational institutions,
thank you. Fifty-four percent of all of the Ph.D.s in science
and mathematics and engineering in this country go to non-
nationals.
Now we are all talking about this being a big problem, and
that is a big problem. But just suggesting, ``Oh, we have
failed. Let us spend more money on the education level of K
through 12,'' is not the answer. And you have to take a look at
the science and the--of mathematics and--or excuse me,
economics that has led to this. And it is not just a lack of
training at the bottom level. We have a perverse incentive
system in this country. We have a perverse incentive. If
somebody gets a degree in--a BS in science and somewhere or
engineering or--and one of these areas, mathematics, they can
be gobbled up at a very good pay level by private industry. And
it does not--it works against them in making a decision to go
on to get a Ph.D. and to further their education.
What happens with the foreign students, on the other hand?
In some other country, the pay that they are going to get with
a BS degree is going to be far less than what they will get if
they continue their education. And in fact, if our students
continue their education, they get very little help. They end
up with a truckload of debt. And these foreign students often
have some of the--some of their fees that our own students have
to pay waived or taken care of by different grant situations.
We have got to change that economic situation. It is just not a
matter--I mean, I--every time--I have been here for 15 years,
and every solution is, ``Let us spend more money for lower
education.'' Well, that is not an easy answer here. We have got
to come up with some other things. I would suggest--for
example, my office is looking into the idea of suggesting that
people who go on to get their graduate level degrees and their
Ph.D.s in science and engineering should, perhaps, have that
paid for by the government in exchange for working for the
government for every year we help them through school. I mean,
NASA could help that, Mr. Chairman. NASA could use that very
much. And thus we could bring down--the idea, the goal should
be bringing down that 54 percent so that Americans are filling
those slots. And again, I don't look at it as meritocracy. We
have many students here, foreign students, who come from non-
Democratic countries, who are potential adversaries of the
United States.
Let me ask Ms. Jacobs, are we training, are we allowing
students from Pakistan and India into the United States to get
Ph.D.s so they can be equipped to make nuclear weapons? I think
the answer is yes, is it not?
Ms. Jacobs. Those are just the types of people that would
be subject to the--one of the clearance processes that I talked
about.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, my guess is--well, up until now,
that has not been the case. And I hope that is corrected. But I
know that there are people from Communist China--there are
scientists swarming over Los Alamos lab, and many of them--when
the Chinese start building rockets efficiently enough to hit
any American city, we can start blaming this open exchange that
we have had between scientists and our universities. Now there
is a national security relationship here that really needs to
be looked at. And I think that it goes far beyond--I mean, we
like to give us this easy answer about spending more money for
kids in the lower grades, and that is just not where it is at.
Let me mention a couple of other things to you here. Ms.
Jacobs, in the past, there has been no verification, is this
correct, whether--we know the students are coming in, and you
are talking about the backlog of students coming in, but what
about the students going out? I am more interested in the legal
immigration problem, which we have got in California, where
students of all kinds come in and then we don't even know--
legally, and then we don't know if they have come back, is that
right?
Ms. Jacobs. I think for the most part, that is correct. The
new Department of Homeland Security is developing an entry/exit
system to track people coming here and also this new SEVIS
system for tracking students should help in that regard.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So just a note that we--our system, as it
is working right now, a student can come in from a country that
has many potential terrorists and maybe a country that is
friendly itself, the government is friendly, let us take Egypt
where we know that they have got some radical Islamic people
there. And they could come in on a student visa, and we
wouldn't even know if they left, as it stands right now, isn't
that correct? We need to correct that, Mr. Chairman. And that
is--I think some of the folks who flew the planes into the
buildings fit into that category. So again, let me just
reiterate--I will just say that our goal should be to make sure
that Americans are filling these slots in our higher
universities, getting the Ph.D.s in science, and let us try to
make it economically possible for them to do so. And I am
certainly--I know that the Chairman has paid a lot of attention
lately to the NASA requirements that we need to get top quality
people in NASA, younger people. Maybe we can work that in a way
that will help these young people get their education.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher. We
will have another discussion another day about K through 12 and
the critical importance of investing more there, but I am glad
to see you have signed up in support of our scholarship program
to incentivize science, math, and engineering majors in college
to----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would note that I have cosponsored that
with you.
Chairman Boehlert. Public education. And I am glad to see,
and I will tell Dr. Caldwell that we have signed you up, too,
for increasing the NSF fellowship stipends, which are
desperately needed.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But we need some government service in
exchange for that.
Chairman Boehlert. And you and I are working on something
with NASA that will provide scholarships just along the lines
you are talking about. So this is a very complex issue. And it
requires a multitude of approaches to solve the problem. But we
can't ignore a very basic fact of life: in international
studies, when our youngsters in the fourth grade are compared
with their counterparts around the world in science and math
proficiency, they do about average. By the eighth grade, they
begin to fall back, and by the twelfth grade, sad to say, we
are down around 14 per 50. That is not good enough. If we don't
start with the youngsters at the beginning and inspire them and
incentivize them and provide the best possible faculty, then we
are never going to get them to fill those vacant chairs at our
great universities like Princeton. Princeton would welcome an
overflow of applicants from American citizens who want to come
to the Ivy hallowed halls of that great campus. Unfortunately,
they are just not getting enough applicants. With that, Mr. Wu.
Mr. Wu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I get to my
question, I share with my good friend from California a deep
concern about national security and having the best students
possible that we can in America and providing every educational
opportunity we can for Americans and for people from around the
world. I do have to say, however, that this requires a balance,
and it requires a careful balance. And when we go overboard in
a search for security, sometimes we damage our own national
security. If it had not been for the steps that Germany took in
the 1930's and Italy took in the 1930's, we would not have been
able to get the very able scientists that we did get in our
nuclear program, the Manhattan Project. And that was thanked
substantially to social programs, shall we say, in Germany and
Italy and elsewhere in Europe, which were countered to their
own security interests and thank God, which were helpful to
ours.
We are not strangers to being harmful to our own national
interests. The Chinese scientist, who is the father of the
People's Republic of China's rocketry program, was in the
United States and was driven out of the United States by
McCarthyism and was of great assistance--has been of great
assistance to the rocketry program in the PRC. That was an
unfortunate step, which this country took, and I would hate to
see that we engage in a pattern of conduct now, out of fear,
which would damage our national interests and help our
adversaries. It takes a careful balance, and I would encourage
this committee, this Congress, to proceed with that kind of
balance.
I just want to put in one plug for a bill, which
Congressman Cox of California, and I submitted together in the
last Congress on H1-B Visas. And it addresses some of the
concerns, which the gentleman from California mentioned, which
is to give additional educational opportunities to students who
are already here in the United States. As businesses bring in
new individuals on H1-B Visas, the bill would require them to
pay a fee to universities in an amount equivalent to the then
authorized amount of a grant for purposes of financial aide for
students in the United States. So the system is bring one in
now for a temporary fix, help educate someone here for a long-
term fix. And we intend to bring this legislation up again. I
think it is something that is positive--a positive step forward
in the H1-B program.
My question for the panel has to do with the appropriate
body for enforcement of our immigration laws, because it is my
concern that educational institutions are, in many respects,
uniquely unsuited as enforcement agencies. I think that they
have to cooperate in providing information, and that is
necessary and proper, but it seems to me that other agencies,
law enforcement agencies, the newly reconstituted INS--when I
was young and first in America, we used to go down and report
at the post office. But some form of commonly available
reporting site that is used to handling law enforcement and
processing papers seems to be a more appropriate place for
enforcement. I would like the panel to respond to that, please.
Ms. Jacobs. I would just say that I completely agree with
you, and I think most universities are very loath to put
themselves in a position where they would be in the enforcement
business. What we can do is provide all of the information that
the enforcing agency needs, but for us to actually do the
enforcement I think it would be virtually impossible.
Dr. Ward. Yeah, I would agree with that. It is obviously
the State Department should defend our borders in the way that
is being described here and that the INS should deal with any
infractions that occur from a policing point of view in the use
of the visa. The area that we have actually expressed the
deepest concern is being the idea of prohibiting certain
students from certain countries from going to certain courses
on our campuses. And the practicality of trying to do that, and
many of us have simply said, ``Look, we regret having to do
that. We would much rather these students not arrive in the
first place if we are being forced to police which classes they
go to.''
So I agree, but I also think that one of the challenges
here is to be slightly upbeat, if SEVIS would work, quite
frankly, it would be an absolutely dramatic improvement,
because we have the State Department, universities, and INS
appropriately connected. This is an interagency communication
challenge. And many of these delays are where we have got
different entities trying to communicate with each other, some
of them doing a good job, some of them doing an indifferent
job. And I think the real challenge here is the system is--the
system was broken before 9/11. We are trying to recreate a
system. We need to recreate a system, but it is a very
complicated process, and the expectation is of a perfect
outcome in less than nine months of planning I think was
greater than we should have anticipated. What I hope is that we
can have a dialogue as a result of these hearings, particularly
I think with Homeland Security, where I think many of the
problems really lie, so that the scientific community and the
security community can come together to talk to each other to
solve these problems. The communication structure is currently
not working well.
Mr. Wu. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr.
Gilchrest. You have got a couple--we have got six minutes and
50 seconds left, so----
Mr. Gilchrest. I will do it in one minute, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Gilchrest, you are recognized.
Mr. Gilchrest. When the students go here in the United
States and they get a break, they want to go home for a
holiday, for a funeral, or whatever, it has been my experience
that that is very difficult. But there seems to be no real
clear statute, because sometimes we get them back just by a
phone call either to Vermont, I am from Maryland, or to
Baltimore. So is there a very specific and do we need to fine
tune that so it is a little bit more clear if they go home for
a break or they go home for some special event, they can come
back because they are still attached to the university?
Ms. Jacobs. One of the things that we are trying to work
out with the other agencies involved in these clearances is a
way to make those clearances valid for a certain period of
time, so that would allow us that----
Mr. Gilchrest. I see.
Ms. Jacobs [continuing]. For people to go and----
Mr. Gilchrest. That is good.
Ms. Jacobs [continuing]. Come back.
Mr. Gilchrest. When someone applies for a visa to come to
the United States and have to show, you know, a tourist visa or
some other type of visa, they have to show that they are
financially able back home, otherwise they don't want them to
come into the United States with that visa. Does the same thing
apply for a student visa?
Ms. Jacobs. For student visas, what we are primarily
looking for is to make sure that they have the funding to cover
the educational costs in the U.S. But we would also be looking
for other indications of ties to that country that would--
Mr. Gilchrest. Sure.
Ms. Jacobs [continuing]. Have them go back home after their
studies.
Mr. Gilchrest. We--the--I guess I am not going to ask any
more questions about the SEVIS program, but I guess if we can
get that thing a little bit more efficient, my staff tells me
it is a disaster. So I guess that means there is a little bit
something wrong with it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you, Mr. Gilchrest. We have to
recess and answer a call to the House. And Dr. Tilghman, I
understand you have to depart. I would ask you and Dr. Ward, we
are going to give you a written assignment. We can do that on
occasion. But----
Mr. Hall. Can I make a statement to Ms. Tilghman?
Chairman Boehlert. In one moment you can. We would like to
ask you what you think on a practical basis we can do to
improve the visa situation. And then when we get what you give
us, we are going to share that with Ms. Jacobs and have her
respond. And we will share the response with you. The Chair
recognizes the distinguished gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall. From a standpoint of levity, I would say to all
three of you who are very intelligent and very educated, I have
read your background, I respect you and admire you. I just
don't like you, because you are the very type that almost
busted me out of school, because they graded on the curve.
But Ms. Tilghman, I go through Princeton--I didn't go
through Princeton, but I go through Princeton about once a week
on my way to McKinney, Texas, just about five miles north of
Princeton. God bless you and thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you all very much. We will be in
recess for approximately 15 minutes. Ms. Jacobs, Mr.--Dr. Ward,
can you stay?
[Recess.]
Chairman Boehlert. We will resume. Dr. Gingrey.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I almost
went out of turn just before we broke to vote, but I am kind of
glad that Mr. Rohrabacher went first, and he described himself
as the skunk in the lawn party, and I was going to play that
role. And I appreciate his comments.
Dr. Ward, and also the President of Princeton, maybe she
had to leave, you know, I want to mention a couple of things
and then ask for anybody's comment, particularly maybe Dr.
Ward's. But I think the Ranking Member, Mr. Hall, was right on
point in regard to the issue of the percentage of students in
our universities that are foreign, a preponderance, really, of
students. And Mr. Rohrabacher spoke to it as well. You know,
what I am concerned about is that the--our universities, for
different reasons, maybe it is athletic in some instances where
students, foreign students are recruited. And they take
positions that maybe our United States citizens students, whose
families, for generations, have been paying taxes and working
hard and going through our state--our public education system.
And yet they may just be a step away, just a step below some of
the applicants that we are talking about here, the brightest
and the best that are coming from other nations.
I suggest to you that, not to get too much into athletic
analogies, but if our university football teams, the starting
line on offense, if they average 290 pounds each rather than
330, or all of the skilled players could run the 40 in 4.6
rather than 4.4, we, the spectators, would hardly note a
difference. Now my son went to a petty school just down the
road from Princeton University, but he was not able to get in
Princeton, and it may be that he was just a step away. But he
has gone on and been a very successful graduate of Georgia
Institute of Technology, and I am proud of that. But I--my
point is, you know, I think the concern that Dr. Tilghman and
Dr. Ward have expressed about the brightest and the best and
the difficulty in getting them quickly into our universities
needs, at this point in time, to take a back seat to our
concern about national security.
And I, as a Member, am not particularly concerned that
there is a little bit of more red tape and a little bit longer
waiting period, and that the universities who recruit these
students, and sometimes student athletes, for their own
purposes, have to spend a little bit more time on due diligence
to make sure that they are abiding by the INS rules or
whatever. So I think that it is almost like 15 years ago when
we had a great concern about healthcare in this country. And
all of a sudden, we had 180-degree swing from indemnity plans
to managed care and HMO. Gradually, that pendulum is shifting
back, the patient bill of rights and other concerns over
abuses.
I would say to the--those who are concerned about the
waiting time and the red tape, it is time for a little
patience. You know, we are at a point in time in this country
where our security is more important that your convenience. And
I know that is a bit of an overstatement, but I would just like
to throw that out there. As I say, I realize I am a bit of a
skunk at the lawn party, but I would like to hear your comments
on that.
Dr. Ward. I think your comments are well taken. And I think
I have stressed in all my testimony this issue of balance and
that we are not really complaining about security but that the
SEVIS system, which we have supported consistently in higher
education, is not working well. And that is our concern that if
it is just perverse ineffectiveness that is part of our
security blanket, that is not a good idea. Let us make it work
well. So our complaints here are not about the necessity of
security, which we agree with, but the way it is being
implemented just seems to be unpredictable, which I think is a
problem, and sort of lax in the tradition of a businesslike
attitude in trying to do it. So I agree that patience, in terms
of delays under security are reasonable.
I think it is the unpredictability and what seems to many
of us, perfectly fixable, manageable, businesslike practices
that could be brought to bear on this, and then perhaps also
improve communication between different agencies. I think, for
example, higher education does seem to have worked out a
communications structure with State and with the Office of
Science and Technology Policy. It has been much harder for us
to develop one with INS where we understand what is being
expected of us. Sometimes the regulations are so unclear that
we don't know how to behave in a way that INS would want us to
behave. So I would agree that there has got to be some patience
and there will be some delays, but I think the experience of
SEVIS and the need to improve SEVIS is really almost
independent. In fact, if it was improved, it might be better
for security.
On your second point about foreign students, I do want to
stress that in aggregate, they actually pay for themselves that
while some do come and receive support, usually the very best
of them, and who often could go to other countries, as you
probably know. We often compete for the best with the European
Union, Australia, and New Zealand. And there is a marketplace.
And in fact, that marketplace may begin to resolve our problem,
because there is no question that Australia is now subsidizing
many of the foreign students who once came here, and in some
cases, actually paid their way.
So there is now an international market developing in
trying to get access to highly qualified, undergraduate
scientific talent where the U.S. will no longer have a virtual
monopoly on it. So we have to--that is something that we can
weigh, and it may be a good thing for those who want to see,
you know, more access for Americans. It could be a bad thing in
terms of access to quality out there.
But I do want to stress that in the aggregate, the--we make
money on foreign students. It is not--the taxpayer is not
paying for this. There is a billion-dollar gain to the economy,
not only through the tuition they pay for the services they
render, the business of their parents, and it is, I think,
around a $12 billion industry. The foreign student is an
industry. So while that doesn't justify the access of
foreigners versus domestic students, it is wrong to assume that
the taxpayers are picking up the bill. In fact, the $12 billion
input to the U.S. economy, I am sure, makes it, in fact, an
industry. And that is why Australia wants it.
Dr. Gingrey. You--I didn't explain it very well. You may
have missed my point. I know you are making money off of them.
There is no question about it. You are talking about grants to
the universities or you are talking about trips to the NCAA
Final Four. You are making money of them; there is no question
about that. But my point is that these American students, the
United States citizens who have been paying the taxes and that
went to our public schools and, you know, they miss the
opportunity. I am not--I wasn't suggesting that it wasn't--the
program wasn't paying for itself. Indeed it is. I am sure in
the athletic programs, in particular, it is all about the
program paying for itself with these investments in foreign
athletes.
Dr. Ward. Well----
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired. Ms.
Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like
to ask unanimous consent to put in the record an editorial and
news article from the San Jose Mercury News about this very
subject that I think Members will find interesting.
Chairman Boehlert. Without objection, so ordered.
[See Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record for the
information referred to.]
Ms. Lofgren. You know, in many ways, listening the to
questions and answers reminds me that this issue is a little
bit like the elephant. It depends on which part of the body you
are touching, because there are differences between the types
of foreign students that are coming here. Clearly, the foreign
students who were terrorists at the flight schools were one
category of students. There are fly-by-night university, there
is mediocre university, and then there is the MIT engineering
department. And they attract different types of students from
around the world.
What I would like to focus in on, and I was glad, Dr. Ward,
that you mentioned that this is actually a moneymaker for
American schools. I mean, I am a taxpayer. I have got two kids
going to college--or my son is just about to join, but the
foreign student tuition is very high for state schools. And the
University of California makes money off of their foreign
students. But I have a concern that we are losing out at the
very highest level of quality students, the students who have a
rare intelligence who are recruited by MIT, by Stanford, by
Harvard, by universities in the EU. They don't need to come
here. They can go other places. And if they go other places,
that has implications for our economy that are not good ones.
If you take a look at Silicon Valley, where I am from, and go
into any of the cutting edge technologies, it is a virtual UN
of the smartest people that have been produced by their various
countries. And we were lucky that they came here to become
Americans with us and get their inventions patented and get the
economy moving. That is a lot different than, you know, a
roomful of people punching out code in the back room that are
more or less fungible. I am talking about those rare
individuals. And because of our old visa, which is--needs to be
updated, in my judgment, those outstanding individuals get
lumped in with everyone else on H1-Bs when in fact it is a
category that is different.
I am concerned about the delays. I am concerned about
inefficiencies in this system. And I have long believed that if
we had better technology, we would be able to get ahead of some
of this--these issues. So Ms. Jacobs, I am interested, if you
could go through--do you have--do your officers have access to
SEVIS online in their--out in the field in the various
consulates?
Ms. Jacobs. They have access to SEVIS, all of the data that
INS--the former INS puts into SEVIS is given to our consulate
posts abroad. We do that through an interface that we have that
includes information on all of the visas that we issued or
denied around the world. But yes, when that information is
given to us, it gets out to the field.
Ms. Lofgren. And that is--and they have access to their
own--in their own computer terminal in their consulate offices?
That is good. Is there any paper given? If I am a student, and
I am coming in to get my F1 Visa, am I--is there any paper
exchange or is it all online?
Ms. Jacobs. Most of it is online. Actually, the main
purpose behind SEVIS is for us to verify the documents that the
student presents. We can check that to make sure that, yes, the
school issued that I-20, yes, this is the person it was issued
to. That is the main purpose. So it is a little bit of both.
Ms. Lofgren. Now the INS is still creating paper records on
some of these visa issues. How do you interface with the INS
when they are creating actually microfiche or paper records?
Ms. Jacobs. We share--this database I was talking about is
actually shared with immigration at the ports of entry, so that
when these students come in, if they need to be checked again
for some reason, the people in the secondary can actually pull
up that information right on their screens to check to make
sure, yes, this--the visa was issued to this person.
Ms. Lofgren. But it is no database if it is a paper record
that you can--how do you cope with that issue when the INS is
producing paper or microfiche?
Ms. Jacobs. Well, to the extend that we can automate things
and share it with them, I think that is pretty much how we are
addressing it right now.
Ms. Lofgren. I see. I have a concern and a question. I--
last summer, Chairman Sensenbrenner and I, different--separate
days, went over and met with Ph.D. candidates in engineering at
Stanford, and they were great kids and really smart. And they
said, ``You know, we are here, too. We want to be safe. So we
don't know why you want to investigate us, but fine,
investigate us. And we will go in, and we will meet with
whoever you want and tell you everything, but can we get a visa
so we can go back and forth?'' Because they can't go to
conferences in Germany. They can't go anywhere, because they
will get stuck abroad if they are from the Middle East. And
actually I think these kids were so far into their Ph.D.s that
they will probably stay, but we are going to lose those--their
younger brothers and sisters to competing universities in
Canada or Europe. Can you envision a system where you can
take--you could review students and really get a level of
confidence and then pre-approve them or give them a multiple
entry visa so that you know you wouldn't have to worry about
that group?
Ms. Jacobs. Many of them, actually, I think, do have
multiple entry visas, but for the ones that are subject to
these----
Ms. Lofgren. Well, these were--many of these were from--
Iranian students.
Ms. Jacobs. Uh-huh. One of the things that we are trying to
work out with the other agencies that are involved in this
process is to see if we can't make those clearances valid for a
certain period of time, so that that would allow the students
to do just that, to go back and come--return.
Ms. Lofgren. If I would, there is another problem, which is
many of these students have been here as undergraduates as
well, and actually, there is nothing to find out about them in
Iran. I mean, the only--you know, it is domestic. If you want
to look at them, every contact and every--they have grown up in
America as students. And doing the study in their home country,
where they were born, really yields no information whatsoever
about them. So really, we are not even safe the way we are
approaching this. I thank the Chairman for his diligence.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. The Chair now
recognizes Dr. Bartlett, who will assume the Chair, and for his
five-minute question period.
Dr. Bartlett [presiding]. Thank you very much. There is an
old adage that says it is an ill wind that blows no good. And I
would like to mention a positive aspect of the problem that we
are talking about today, and that is the fact that I guess more
than half of the students in these technical areas are not
citizens of this country. This represents, of course, an
enormous vote of confidence of the world in the quality of our
educational institutions, does it not? There are lots of
educational institutions they could have gone to. They chose to
come here. So that is a real positive aspect of this.
But I would hope that our schools would be so crowded with
our own qualified students that we would say, ``Gee, thanks for
applying, but there is no room for you here. You need to go
somewhere else,'' and that is not the case. And I would like to
talk about that for just a moment. As our nature of industrial
power, as you know, we spend a smaller percentage of our GDP on
basic research than any other power. We also spend a smaller
percentage of our money on R&D than any other major economic
power. The fact that most of the students in these departments
are foreign students is, in the short-term, a threat to our
economic superiority. We will not continue to be the world's
premiere economic power if we don't turn out the world's best
scientists, mathematicians, and engineers in adequate numbers.
I worked eight years for IBM. I left there, and they help
me set up my own company in 1975, so that tells you when this
happened. But we were concerned at IBM that we were going to
lose our superiority in computers, and the United States was
going to lose its superiority in computers if things didn't
change to Japan for a very simple reason. Every year, Japan was
turning out more and sometimes better scientists,
mathematicians, and engineers than we did in large enough
numbers that there is no way we, at IBM or the United States as
a whole, could continue to hold the edge in computers if that
continued to be true. In the longer run, this is another type
of national security threat.
The major reason for being here today is to talk about the
national security threat that is presented by students who
might apply to our schools. But in the long run, we will not
remain the world's superior--supreme economic power. We will
not remain the world's only superpower if we do not turn out
the world's best scientists, mathematicians, and engineers in
large enough numbers. So I am very concerned that for the
short-term our economic superiority is at risk with the longer-
term our military superiority is at risk.
Now you tend to get what you appreciate. And in this
country, the young people that go into these pursuits are
really not appreciated. The pretty girls won't date them. They
are called ``geeks'' and ``nerds'' when I was going to school.
And I have a Ph.D. in science, so I can speak from personal
experience. When I was going to school, we were called
``squares.'' I guess that is an old term now. But you know,
when the White House will summon a group of superior of
science, mathematics, and engineering students to the White
House to reward them the way we call a winning athletic team to
the White House, then I will believe that we are sufficiently
appreciating of these young people, which are really enormously
important to our future.
And my concern is what do we need to do in this country to
capture the imagination of our people and inspire our young
people to go into careers of science, math, and engineering.
For far too many years now, our young people have chosen to go
into careers where, at a minimum, you--a few people in those
pursuits could be considered commensals on our--with our
society. But they soon become parasitic, and I think today they
are clearly parasitic in our society. And these two pursuits
into which most of our bright young minds are going are
political science and law.
Now you know, we need some really good people in political
science and law, but we sure as heck need a whole lot of really
good people in these engineering and scientific areas. What can
we do to capture the imagination of our people and inspire our
young people to go into these pursuits?
Dr. Ward. That is a question for me. I think that there are
multiple answers. One of them, I think, clearly is what I was
hearing earlier, some incentives by--from scientific employment
that if you provide incentives for undergraduate, particularly
undergraduate. The big breakdown is high school and
undergraduate science education. Right at the beginning we seem
very strong. Right at the end we seem very strong. Even, in
spite of being significant numbers of foreign students, the
native students are also very good in those classes. So the
real issue is there is a supply breakdown. And my view is that
I think there is obviously the powerful symbolism of governors,
leaders of industry, recognizing scientific and technological
talent. But maybe real money would help. And I think it is at
the undergraduate level. That is where the breakdown occurs to
help people who have a tough time with calculus, a tough time
with physics and chemistry, and maybe move off to areas that
seem, to them, extensively a little easier. There has got to be
an undergraduate science incentive program, and perhaps also
summer programs for high school students in the sciences. So
there has got to be something which deals with this pipeline
where in the rest of the world, they manage to maintain a
larger number of people committed to mathematics, physics,
chemistry and to a less degree, biology than we are really able
to do in our system. And yet, at the outcome and at the
beginning, we are fired. And so I think it is a matter of
incentives that are needed.
Dr. Bartlett. Thank you. You tend to get what you
appreciate, what you reward. And I think that we need to show
these young people that not only is there a good job available
to them, but we really appreciate them in our society. I don't
think we are doing a very good job of that now. I just had a
son who graduated with a Ph.D. in chemical engineering from
Carnegie Mellon, so you know, I went through it a generation
ago, and now he has just gone through it. And so I am pretty
familiar with what goes on in these schools and spent 24 of the
best years of my life teaching.
Let us turn now to our next questioner, Mr. Bell.
Mr. Bell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like
to echo the statements of some of my colleagues who have spoken
previously, specifically Eddie Bernice Johnson of Dallas, who
sees this whole situation regarding visas and people having
trouble getting back into the country as a very serious problem
for her district, which is located in Dallas. Ms. Jackson Lee
and I both represent areas in the Houston area, and it is a
very serious problem in our districts as well.
I see this as sort of the situation of the pendulum
swinging, necessarily so, after September 11. Our world did
change. New security precautions had to be put into effect, and
I think all of us understand that. But what we are seeing now
in the Houston area is a situation where the pendulum has,
perhaps, swung too far, and we need to take steps to correct
it. I agree with Dr. Ward that the expansion of the Technology
Alert List has contributed to a serious backlog of visas. I
think you mentioned in your statement an estimated 25,000, and
Ms. Jacobs, if you have any reason to differ with that later, I
will certainly give you an opportunity.
But what is even more troubling, to me, is the number of
students and researchers who travel outside of the United
States, as we have heard today, albeit for academic, health, or
personal reasons and then encounter great difficulty re-
entering the country. This delay in visa renewal and
adjudication not only hinders critical scientific research and
progress, but it effects the patients under the care of these
stranded physicians.
I want to draw your attention to a specific instance. Back
in the Houston area--we have heard several specific instances
from different parts of the country today. Let me draw you to a
situation in Houston, which occurred at the University of Texas
Health Science Center. As we speak, there are two young doctors
stranded and unable to return to the University of Texas after
visiting relatives, one in Pakistan, and the other in Iran. And
as I understand it, the delay is due to ``administrative
processing''. Now I am still unclear as to what
``administrative processing'' means. Ms. Jacobs, again, I am
going to give you a chance to explain that a little bit later.
But it sounds like a great deal like bureaucratic
Neverneverland, one of those places that--a place a person goes
and never really gets a serious answer as to why their
application is not being processed.
UT and the Baylor College of Medicine are warning their
international researchers not to travel because they don't know
how long it will take for their visas to be revalidated.
Currently, there is no procedure in place to expedite the
process on any grounds, including emergencies. And as Dr. Ward,
I believe, stated in his testimony, we must come up with a
process by which existing physicians and researchers can
revalidate their visas before leaving the United States for
academic, health, or personal reasons.
This issue, obviously, has a flip side to it: patient care.
Since 9/11, the Texas Medical Center and various medical
centers across the United States, have seen a decline in
international patients. M.B. Anderson, a world-renowned cancer
treatment center located within the Texas Medical Center, has
taken the lead in a joint task force, along with many other
institutions across the Nation, including Duke University
Medical Center, Memorial Sloan-Kettering, and UCLA Medical
Center, just to name a few, in addressing the issue of
international patients' access to care in the United States. It
is through the suggestions and implementations of this working
task force that these world-renowned research institutions can
maintain their status as world leaders in medicine,
particularly in periods of heightened international tension,
and maintain, at the same time, their humanitarian
responsibility to the global community.
I urge my colleagues, especially those with major hospitals
and research institutions in their districts, to join this
collaborative effort to address this problem. It is my hope
that we in Congress can come together and develop a pragmatic
and expedient solution to this problem. I am committed to
working on it now, as I hope many others are, for time is of
the essence. And Ms. Jacobs, while I still have time, if we are
willing to commit our time and effort to fine tuning this
process, can you assure us that you will do the same? And what
are some of your plans to expedite this process, commonly
referred to as ``administrative processing'' that I mentioned
earlier in my statement?
Ms. Jacobs. The--I am happy to try to address all of those
issues. The administrative processing is a term that is often
used by the consular officers in the field when someone is
subject to one of these clearance processes that I talked about
earlier rather than calling it a name check or going into the
details that we have worked out with the other agencies back
here. We have always tried to put it in those terms, because it
really is processing that has to take back here, and the posts
are really not involved in that after they notify us or send in
the clearance request.
For our part, the State Department is working extremely
closely with the other agencies involved in this process. We
have tried to work with them on technological issues on trying
to make this whole process more automated. We have worked with
them on trying to get, you know--have them get additional
resources to process these cases. In the case of some agencies,
they actually--they have done that. It is working much more
smoothly now, because we have a system in place where we know
that if we don't back from them within a certain amount of
time, that it is okay, we can go ahead and issue the visa.
But we are very, very committed to trying to--I mentioned
earlier that a lot of these procedures were put into place in a
hurry after 9/11, because we were really under pressure to do
that. And it is time now, and we are doing that, to look at
these to try to make them as streamlined, as rational, and I
think what is probably the most important, predictable as
possible. And I am very committed to continue my work with that
in doing that, and I think the rest of the people in the visa
office who work on these issues are dedicated, as well, to that
goal.
Mr. Bell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. The Chair now recognizes
Ms. Jackson Lee. Oh, Mr. Honda was here earlier? All right.
Ladies before gentlemen.
Ms. Jackson Lee. First of all, I want to thank the kindness
of the Chairman and the kindness of the distinguished gentleman
from California. And I want to join and associate myself with
my distinguished colleague from Texas, my multiple colleagues
from Texas, Congressman Johnson and Congressman Bell, coming
from different cities.
I have a dual responsibility in this Congress. I serve as a
Ranking Member on the Immigration Claims Committee and have
watched this process now for a very long time, particularly
after 9/11 when I think it should be noted for the record that
a high percentage of the hijackers came in on student visas.
And as we well know, the visa process is a bifurcated process,
but the issues of visas is still through the State Department,
even as we have merged immigration responsibilities under
Homeland Security. But I think I was one of those who advocated
that the State Department retain the responsibilities of
granting visas.
As I say that, let me also say that even during this time,
I have indicated that immigration does not equate to terrorism.
And I believe it is appropriate for this Science Committee to
look at several issues. And I think it has awakened many
members on the question of K through 12 and what we are doing
in training our very own students and encouraging them and
providing the excitement that is needed to choose a world of
science, which I believe that science creates the work of the
21st century and centuries to come. And at the same time, I
think it is crucial that we monitor the agencies of government
that our civil liberties are protected, but as well that honest
and thoughtful and important work is not stymied and stifled
and medical research is not stymied and stifled because of the
fact that we are looking to protect our own homeland security.
Mr. Bell represents the medical center, but many of us in
Houston have components of the medical center in our
Congressional District. I have the honor of serving on the
Prostate Cancer Advisory Committee at M.B. Anderson, a hospital
that has benefited, not only from the talent here in this
country, but from the enormous research talent that has come to
help save lives here in America. The testimonies of individuals
who walked into that hospital and said that I was clearly
almost DOA. Because of some of the enormous research, the
cutting-edge research, the front-line research, this
individual, or many individuals that I have heard speak, have
been able to live life anew.
So my question to the remaining witnesses, and I appreciate
the presence of the President of Princeton. We have several
institutions in our respective districts that rely upon the
outstanding talent of international specialists, scientists,
and professors. This does not take away from this committee's
responsibility to fight like heck to get our young people right
in line with the excellent education that we have here and have
them become the scientists of the 21st and 22nd centuries
alongside of their colleagues and friends internationally. But
I need to hear from the State Department as to what we can do.
We will be having a hearing in our Committee, Judiciary, on
student tracking, which these universities are now facing. And
of course, we will be hearing a lot of concerns about that. But
I pointedly want to ask about what we can do in Congress to
assist you in balancing the responsibilities of one, getting
the talent, but not having the very unfortunate incident that
occurred in the Washington Think Tank when one of the
professors, either from India or Pakistan--not professors, but
researchers. And I believe it was in New York, literally
stopped on the streets and his colleagues in the Think Tank or
at the particular research entity were wondering what had
happened to him: had he been kidnapped? He was stopped in his
tracks and accosted by our law enforcement officers, and this
was a gentleman who was here for research purposes and
dialogue.
This is not a good image. What can we do? The Science
Committee has one concern. I am sure the International
Committee has--National Relations has one concern, Judicial has
another concern, but what can we do to enhance the line of
security versus a welcoming friendship to those who would bring
talent and interest to this nation? I ask both Dr. Ward and Dr.
Jacobs.
And might I just--as you answer that, just to--as a side
note, my enthusiastic support to H.R. 1297, which is not your
responsibility, but it has to with honoring the Columbia seven,
and I was not here. And it was marked up, and I just want that
for the record. Thank you.
Ms. Jacobs. On the visa side of your question, there is
something that Secretary Powell has often said, I think in
testimony here on the Hill and in other places, that what we
are really trying to accomplish, secure borders and open doors.
He is extremely committed to that, as are the rest of us. I
have talked a lot about the steps that we are trying to take to
make these clearance procedures that are in place as rational
and streamlined and transparent as possible. We will continue
to work with the other agencies involved. Some of the things
that you mentioned, I think it was a Pakistani professor, that
has more to do with the program, which is a registration for
foreign nationals already here in the United States. And that
is controlled by now the Department of Homeland Security.
But I think all of us--I don't think there is anyone
involved in this process who is intentionally trying to keep
legitimate visitors, scientists, academics, other people out of
this country. It--our goal is just the opposite, to try to
recognize those people, to recognize the people who are not a
high risk to this country and let them come in, because I think
we all appreciate the need for that free-flow of ideas, of
information. And certainly, this country is based on that, and
that is something that we continue. It is a value. It is a
national interest that we continue to support. And so if the
pendulum swung fairly high on the security side after 9/11, I
think it is slowly coming back, and I think that all of us
working together can get that proper balance.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you. Is Dr. Ward allowed to
answer, Mr. Chairman? Is Dr. Ward----
Dr. Ward. I have very little to add. I would just say that
perhaps the challenge is sometimes the culture of INS, in the
days before it went to Homeland Security, was often confused
between what I call enforcement and service. When you deal with
immigrants, when you are dealing with people who are legitimate
guests of the United States, the culture of the bureaucracy is
toward service. When we are dealing with security, we are
dealing with enforcement. I think one of the challenges is
sometimes one has to sort those two out. And if enforcement, as
may have necessarily happened in the last few months, takes
over the whole culture, the culture is one that is not going to
be very sensitive to individual rights. And I think mistakes
are going to be made because of the overwhelming power of that
enforcement mentality. But obviously, that is not the right
mentality if a person is a legitimate immigrant, somebody who
has legitimate reasons to be a guest here.
I would also say that communication is an issue, those
institutions that are my members that when the FBI, for
example, was interested in foreign student records, in some
universities, the FBI, the local police chief of the campus and
the university president actually talked about what--how it was
going to be done. In some cases, the university could provide
perfectly readily available public information to the FBI
without them having to seem to sort of reach in and grab it. In
other places, there was no communication, and without any
consultation with the college president, somebody who perhaps
was innocent, somebody who was perhaps guilty, was sort of
withdrawn in a rather crude way from the campus creating, of
course, a bad PR situation.
So the other thing is that we are not good at
communication, that when there is an enforcement issue and
there is a kind of academic tradition, and you throw these two
together, you have got to have very effective communication. As
far as I can see, it is just not there any longer.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman very much. I would
ask Ms. Jacobs if she could give me a letter in writing on the
delays that are presently in place, being the delays on dealing
with, particularly, individuals in science and research areas
coming into this country. I need to understand that better, and
I thank the Chairman for his indulgence. And I just say that
immigration really does not equate to terrorism, and we must
find a balance. Thank you.
Dr. Bartlett. Thank you. And the Chair now recognizes the
gentleman, Mr. Honda.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And just for the
record, let me just say that I agree with a couple of speakers
that getting to graduate school is an issue of meritocracy in
that our issues around K-12 education is falling short. And in
order to be able to have--and the encouragement beyond the 12th
grade to go into higher education in the sciences is an issue
for me.
The question I have to Ms. Jacobs is this. We talked about
backlogs of visas. And the backlogs of visas has been a pre-
existing situation prior to 9/11. And so I guess my question is
the process that we set up right now for review of visas, one
for new applicants and others for renewals who are--for those
who are here, are those different? And are those--can the
renewals be expedited for those who are here asking for
renewals, especially in the area of the sciences and the labs?
The other question is relative to the 9/11 where those who
were involved with the flying the planes into the World Trade
Center, they came in on student visas. I mean, everybody says
that. My question is----
Dr. Ward. If I might just correct the record, I believe one
came in on a student visa from outside of the country. Two were
issued after they already arrived in the country, after they
were dead.
Mr. Honda. Okay.
Dr. Ward. And the rest came on visitor visas.
Mr. Honda. Okay. So my question, relative to the visas, is
that are visas specific to certain kinds of schools and--so
that there is a distinction between applying for a student visa
to go to a flight school versus a higher education academic
institution? If there is a distinction, then it seems to me
that our overemphasis on what--you know, how these folks got
their visas to flight school could be tempered a little bit. So
those are my questions, and I would like to do some follow-up,
if I may.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. On the issue of whether visas are issues
for specific schools, prior to 9/11, there was no program in
place to distinguish between different types of schools. After
9/11, in fact, there is now more review of people going to
flight schools. But that did not exist before 9/11.
Mr. Honda. Okay. Mr. Chair, if I may interrupt for purposes
of clarification. If that is the case, there was no distinction
by schools. They--on the visa, then, they have to state what
schools they want to apply to so that--because I think that the
school is required to report back to the--to INS as to whether
the students did arrive or not, is that correct?
Ms. Jacobs. Right. Exactly. There is--well, with this new
tracking system, SEVIS, that we have been talking about, there
is a mechanism in place for doing that.
Mr. Honda. Okay.
Ms. Jacobs. Let me just add really quickly that most of the
people applying for student visas and for exchange visitor
visas, provided there is no problem with the case, those cases
are processed rapidly and the visas are often issued within a
day or two. In fact, I think that is true for the vast majority
of these applicants. Only about 2.5 percent, a little bit less
than 2.5 percent of all of the visas that we issue are subject
to these new security requirements or to the security
requirements that were in place before 9/11. And so we are not
talking about large numbers here. So when we talk about these
delays, I just want to make that very clear that really in the
big picture, in the big scheme of things, we are not talking
about large numbers.
Mr. Honda. So applicants for student visas outside of the
country will get an answer within a day or two?
Ms. Jacobs. In most instances, provided there is no----
Mr. Honda. In 98 percent of the cases.
Ms. Jacobs. I can't give you an exact percentage. I could
get back to you with that, but I would say in the vast
majority----
Mr. Honda. Okay.
Ms. Jacobs [continuing]. That is true. Now you had asked
about revalidating visas I--for people who are here. The vast
majority of student visa applications are adjudicated at posts
at the time the application is made. Only a very small
percentage of student visa applications are referred by posts
to Washington for additional security review. We do not have
precise figures as to what percentage of various categories of
visa applications are subject to security screening, but it is
safe to assume that the percentage is close to the overall
figure of 1.6 percent that applies to all categories of visas.
We are currently receiving responses within three weeks for
over 70 percent of cases subject to interagency security
screening.
Mr. Honda. For renewals.
Ms. Jacobs. We do renew visas for certain categories of
visas for people who are here in the U.S., primarily people who
are here in a business-related capacity. For students and
exchange visitors, we don't do that, so they are--if they need
a new visa, they are required to return--go outside of the
United States to get the visa.
Mr. Honda. Even if they are here?
Ms. Jacobs. If they are here, that is correct.
Mr. Honda. Okay. So they have to go back to their country
of origin?
Ms. Jacobs. If their visa has expired, yes. Now the visa
does not exactly equal the authorized state. That is sometimes
another confusion in that the visa simply allows the person to
travel to the United States. Once they get here, it is the
former INS, the border inspection people, that determine how
long that person can stay in the United States.
Mr. Honda. And for renewals?
Ms. Jacobs. For visa renewals, again, that would be done
overseas. Some of these people who come here may try to extend
their status or adjust their status, and that would be done
with the former immigration service here in the United States.
Mr. Honda. So if I were working for a national lab, would I
be on a visa or would I be on a green card?
Ms. Jacobs. You--it would depend on how you came in. If you
entered as a non-immigrant--you would have a visa in any case.
You need a visa to come into the United States. It could be a
non-immigrant visa; it could be an immigrant visa.
Mr. Honda. So if I were asking for a renewal and I have
been here for a few years, I have to go back to my country of
origin to renew my visa?
Ms. Jacobs. Yes.
Mr. Honda. Do you see that as a problem?
Ms. Jacobs. I am not sure if it is a problem. It may be a
problem for some people, but that is basically the way the
system works now where we have two different agencies involved
in taking care of people: one that helps them get here and one
that takes care of them once they arrive.
Mr. Honda. What assurances do you give applicants for
renewal that, you know--are there assurances you can give, I
mean, folks who are applying for renewals who are working, say,
at national labs that they will be able to come back if they
were in the countries that we supposedly have targeted as, you
know, high risk countries?
Ms. Jacobs. We can never give any type of guarantee or
assurances in advance that someone will get a visa. On the
clearance side, we can try to work to make a clearance valid
for a longer period of time so that that person doesn't have to
go through that clearance process again. But the person would
have to qualify for the visa in any case, you know, under the
various grounds of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Mr. Honda. Do you see this as a problem as far as retaining
and giving reassurance to those who are here already working
with this?
Ms. Jacobs. Well, I am not sure if it is a problem. It is
the way the law is written right now.
Mr. Honda. I understand how the--that you are saying that
the law is--how the law is written right now. I mean, there are
some laws that are--that we can--there is no way we counsel
folks or anything else like that. Let me ask a different
question. In your backlog, do you have an idea of how much of a
backlog you have on each category of renewals and new requests?
Ms. Jacobs. I think that most of the so-called backlogs,
the delays, are with cases that happened a few months ago. For
the most part now, people who are subject to clearances,
provided that there is no problem with the case, we are able to
get those processed within 30 days, some of them much more
rapidly.
Mr. Honda. Maybe I don't understand what is happening with
INS, but it has been my experience in my own district that we
have folks who had applied for visas that have been there, you
know, for a couple years or maybe more, and there is a backlog
there. Are you making a distinction of that kind of backlog
versus other backlogs?
Ms. Jacobs. Yes, sir. The----
Mr. Honda. Oh, okay.
Ms. Jacobs [continuing]. People who are dealing with
immigration are trying to adjust status, and there may be
backlogs with those requests.
Mr. Honda. Do you--have you guys gotten into not touching
paper and, according to--using technology to be able to process
some of these things?
Ms. Jacobs. Absolutely. We----
Mr. Honda. Where are you on that?
Ms. Jacobs. Well, I think that we have made a number of
advances over the years. I think that the State Department has
been in the forefront, actually, of using technology in visa
processing. We have developed Machine Readable Visas. We now
have a consolidated database that contains all of the records
of the visas that we have issued and visas that have been
denied. That is refreshed every five minutes. Every visa that
is issued around the world, every five minutes, that
information comes back into this database. We are actually
sharing that database now with the former INS, so I think it is
fair to say that we have made a number of advances, and we
continue to look for technological solutions to a lot of the
problems that we are talking about today.
Mr. Honda. Okay. I thank the Chair for his indulgence. If I
may ask one more question, do you have any benchmarks and goals
set up for your--for INS in terms of cleaning up all of the
backlogs in all of the categories, and if not, would you be
able to set one up?
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Well, for the State Department's part, we
are--we have set certain time limits within our own, you know,
organization within the State Department that handles--that
coordinates these visa clearances that if we don't have a
response within a certain number of days, we go back to the
other agencies to see what the status is. As far as Department
of Homeland Security and any backlogs that they might have with
adjustment of status and other cases, I am--I would imagine
they are taking steps to address that. I am--I just can't
really answer for them.
Mr. Honda. I thank you very much.
Dr. Bartlett. Thank you. I want to thank the witnesses very
much for your testimony. Just so the record can be clear,
again, roughly what percent of the students in our universities
in science, math, and engineering are foreign students?
Dr. Ward. I think maybe approximately half.
Dr. Bartlett. Okay. And what percent of those foreign
students elect to stay in this country and work in this country
after their education is completed?
Dr. Ward. About 30 percent.
Dr. Bartlett. About 30 percent choose to stay here? I would
just like to note a problem that our national labs have, and
that is that it is very difficult to get clearance for foreign
students. And there are really not enough graduates, citizens
in this country, to fill the vital needs in our national labs,
which is another fact that adds urgency to the challenge of
capturing the imagination of our citizens and the--encouraging
more of our young people to go into these careers.
I want to thank you very much for your testimony. The
Committee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Janice L. Jacobs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Visa
Services
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
Q1. LWhen do you expect the visa backlog to be cleared up and what will
be the average wait for a visa when things return to normal? What needs
to change to get the situation rectified?
A1. The vast majority of delays that affect visa cases are the result
of cases that are referred to Washington by consular officers for a
security advisory opinion. The Department's role in the interagency
clearance process to provide a security advisory opinion is essentially
one of being a clearing-house. We coordinate the clearances as the visa
applications are reviewed by other federal agencies. In most instances,
we receive replies from other agencies within 30 days. If an agency
files an objection, there may be an additional delay as that agency
locates and makes available the appropriate background information. We
do not foresee any shortening of that average turnaround of 30 days in
the near future given the resource base of our federal principal
partners in this endeavor.
Q2. LDr. Ward and Dr. Tilghman offered a number of recommendations on
how to improve the visa processing system. Please comment on the merits
and the feasibility of the following proposals:
Q2a.
LRequire State Department Consular Offices to collect
the SEVIS fee as part of the visa collection fee.
A2a. During the formation of SEVIS, the State Department met at the
Assistant Secretary level with former INS Commissioner Ziglar to
explore this possibility, but we mutually decided not to implement such
a collection scheme for a number of reasons.
First, such an approach likely would lead foreign governments to
regard any SEVIS fee as a visa fee and to impose reciprocal visa fees
on American students applying for visas to study overseas. In addition,
the $100 Machine Readable Visa (MRV) fee that is collected from all
non-immigrant visa applicants is, in almost all cases, collected by
local financial institutions on behalf of our embassies and consulates.
These arrangements were put in place because the personnel and resource
constraints under which our missions. in the field operate while
issuing millions of non-immigrant visas annually compel us to
``outsource'' as many visa support functions as possible, including the
collection of fees.
Our MRV collection arrangements have been carefully negotiated in
consultation with the U.S. Treasury. They involve the foreign financial
institutions receiving payments for their services from the fees
collected and remitting the balance of the fees to the U.S. Treasury
for credit to a Department of State appropriation, rather than
miscellaneous receipts, consistent with the Department's statutory
authority to retain the MRV fee to recover the costs of providing
consular services. It simply is not feasible for us to revisit these
arrangements; doing so would be a complex and difficult effort because
any SEVIS fee would have to be handled very differently than the MRV
fee.
Q2b.
LRequire the State Department to use the SEVIS
system--not their own system--to ensure real time access to
data.
A2b. We have available in our Consolidated Consular Database (CCD) over
400,000 SEVIS records that have been ``pushed'' from the DHS SEVIS
database over the existing data share link between the two agencies. We
developed this process so that the SEVIS data will be available to
consular sections to support and integrate with the visa adjudication
system and not duplicate available automation.
Consular officers can access records in CCD for the purpose of
electronic.verification, and CCD will record SEVIS information as part
of the electronic visa record. Having SEVIS information reported to the
existing State-DHS data share, system is critical as well to meeting
the statutory requirement to report the issuance of all ``F'' (academic
students), ``M'' (vocational students), and ``J'' (exchange program
visitors) visas to DHS.
We plan to make SEVIS directly available to consular sections in
the near future. However, we do not view this direct access as a
substitute for the requirement that SEVIS data be integrated into our
visa adjudication data stream for adjudication, record keeping and
reporting purposes. Rather direct access to SEVIS will serve as an
information resource that will grow more valuable over time as SEVIS
entries mature into long-term. student and exchange visitor case files.
Q2c.
LCreate a visa revalidation process for foreign
students and--scholars already in the U.S., thereby ensuring
their ability--to return to the U.S. in a timely manner after a
short visit abroad.
A2c. Our regulations do not permit revalidation of student visas in the
U.S. These visas must be applied for at our overseas posts. The State
Department has no capacity within the United States to conduct visa
interviews for alien students and scholars in the United States who
wish to leave the U.S. and who require issuance of a new visa to
return. We will, however, explore the possibility with interested
Washington agencies of having visa clearances be valid for longer
periods of time to allow students and scholars to travel in and out of
the country during that time period.
Q2d.
LAs colleges and universities are in a unique position
to understand both the needs of students and scholars and the
vulnerabilities of the current system, encourage the State
Department to work with colleges and universities to develop a
more effective and efficient visa screening process.
A2d. The Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs and Educational and
Cultural Affairs both enjoy positive, fruitful working relationships
with the educational community as well as with exchange visitor program
sponsors. We are engaged in a very active exchange on the many issues
that affect the issuance of visas to students and scholars. However, we
continue to view federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies as
the primary experts on the effectiveness of meeting national security
objectives through the visa screening process. They have access to
classified information from sensitive sources and methods that the
academic community cannot duplicate even with the best of intentions.
Q3. LMany and perhaps most of the scholars caught in our visa limbo are
from China, Russia and India, which, not coincidentally, are the source
of most of our foreign students. These countries present some risks but
they're not at the epicenter of terrorism. Can we do something to help
ease the path of these students and especially of well-known scholars
from these countries?
A3. The focus of the interagency review process is broader than
counter-terrorism. Risk assessment takes into account other issues such
as hostile intelligence activity and unauthorized access to sensitive
technology, and affects all nationalities. When submitting a case for
Washington interagency review, a consular officer identifies a specific
reason or concern. Cases are not submitted simply because a visa
applicant from one of the countries noted above intends to pursue a
scientific program.
As the risk assessment of U.S. federal agencies changes, we so
advise consular officers. Our goal is that the identification by
consular officers of visa applications for interagency review is done
on a targeted basis and is keyed to genuine intelligence and law
enforcement concerns.
Q4. LAll of our questions come down to fundamental issues of attitude.
Does the State Department view students and scholars primarily as
potential terrorists who may have to be let in for other reasons or as
important resources that need to be filtered to ensure that terrorists
don't slip in?
A4. As stated in the testimony, while seeking to ensure the security of
our nation, we do recognize the valuable contributions that students
and scholars provide this country. When adjudicating visas, consular
officers are governed by the language of the relevant statutory grounds
of ineligibility in the Immigration and Nationality Act, against which
consular officers consider every visa application. Grounds of
ineligibility are far broader than terrorism and other national
security issues. All determinations made by consular officers are done
strictly within the terms of relevant laws and regulations, and riot
based on any preconceived notions with respect to nationality or
proposed activity in the United States. When adjudicating visas,
consular officers also follow security-related clearance procedures
established by interested Washington agencies. We continue to work
through the interagency process to make these clearance procedures as
rational, transparent, and predictable as possible.
Q5. LShouldn't the U.S. have a.better system of collecting statistics
on visa processing so that we could have a clear picture of when
backlogs are starting to develop? Is the State Department or any other
agency taking any action in that direction?
A5. We are improving our ability to collect and analyze statistics. We
are developing the capability to track the case load of pending
security advisory opinion (SAO) requests at any given post, through the
Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). We are also developing CCD
reports to track visa workload at posts where processing has slowed due
to factors such as a sharp increase in applications or limited
workspace.
The Visa Office, using these reports, will be able to review cases
pending more than a certain number of days, to determine whether the
interagency clearance process is falling behind. Most clearance delays
on cases that were submitted to Washington by consular officers for
interagency screening, however, are the result of holds placed on
specific cases by other government agencies, over which the Visa Office
has no control. The Visa office will use the reports to monitor the
process and bring to the attention of other agencies evidence of
backlogs within their holdings.
The Visa Office will work closely with CA's Executive office to
ensure that appropriate resources are brought to bear to speed
processing for cases delayed by an increase in visa workload at a
particular post or other unanticipated factors due to changing
political and economic conditions.
Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Q1. LWould it make sense for consular officers to have available, at
the time they consider the visa requests of foreign graduate students,
information from the university that has accepted them for attendance
regarding the educational programs they will be entering? The
university would be able to provide a better judgment about the
relationship of the research area student will be involved in to the
Technology Alert List than would the consular officer, who is not
technically trained and has only a brief interview with the student. Is
there a mechanism that would allow universities to provide consular
officers with information about prospective students and their areas of
study.
A1. It is already standard practice for student visa applicants to
present evidence of their planned course of study, in support of their
applications. The objective of the interagency review process that
affects some student cases is to have the benefit of the unique
expertise of federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Much of
the information available to such agencies is highly classified and
would not be known to administrators or educators at U.S. academic
institutions.
Q2. LYou indicate in your testimony that you are meeting with the
Department of Homeland Security and OSTP to work out the details for
establishing the Interagency Panel on Advanced Science and Security--
IPASS--which is intended to increase the involvement of federal
scientific experts to work with intelligence and law enforcement
representatives to advise the State Department on science related visa
applications. What is the schedule for IPASS implementation? What
effect will IPASS have on the lead time for security screening for visa
applications?
A2. A schedule for IPASS implementation has not yet been established.
All participants in interagency discussions of IPASS have emphasized
that any procedures established should not increase the lead time
required for security screening of visa applications.
Q3. LThe GAO in its October 2002 report, ``Border Security,'' (GAO-03-
132NI) found that most of the consular officers they interviewed
believed that more comprehensive guidance and training would help them
to use the visa process as an anti-terrorism tool to detect
questionable applicants. The GAO report recommended that the State
Department develop more comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and
standards on how consular officers should use the visa process as a
screen against potential terrorists, and also recommended revamping and
expanding consular training. What is the State Department's response to
these recommendations?
A3. The Department has taken the cited GAO report very seriously and is
moving quickly to improve and expand guidance to our officers in the
field, as well as training. The Bureau of Consular Affairs issued a
visa processing ``roadmap'' (State 039275, 11 February 2003) to provide
comprehensive guidance to our posts on balancing national security
concerns with the desire to facilitate legitimate travel, provide
timely customer service, and manage visa workload. We have followed up
with Standard Operating Procedure cables (nine sent to date) to ensure
that our posts are working consistently and understand what is expected
of them. Consular supervisors have been reminded of their
responsibility to provide guidance to line officers on issuance and
refusal criteria.
Consular training has expanded the Basic Consular Course with new
sessions on counter terrorism, as well as expanded training on visa
fraud and malfeasance, on ethics, and on interviewing skills. One
hundred and twenty eight experienced consular officers have received
specialized, highly technical training in advanced consular name-
checking techniques in order to make the best possible use of our
enormous CLASS database. Plans are also underway to provide training to
Ambassadors, DCMs, and Principal Officers to better supervise consular
officers and to enhance the skills of consular managers. In addition,
the basic consular course will be expanded in October 2003 from 26 to
31 days, in part to make room for a new two-day module on analytic
interviewing techniques.
Questions submitted by Representative Mark Udall
Q1. LYou indicate, in your testimony that the State Department is
engaged in significant outreach to federal partners to work out
problems in the visa review process to improve the predictability for
the scientific and academic communities about visa processing. Please
provide some details about the kinds of actions you are contemplating
that will, in your words, ``rationalize the clearance process in light
of today's national security threats and reestablish rational,
transparent clearance procedures that focus on those applicants who
present the highest risk.''
A1. The Department has had regular and frequent contact with the
Homeland Security Council, the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy, DHS, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement
agencies.
With regard to counter-terrorism interagency reviews, State is
engaged in an active dialogue with appropriate federal partners to
revise the threat assessment now available to consular officers. The
criteria are classified and will remain so. We cannot therefore provide
specific examples of how it is being rationalized.
With regard to issues related to sensitive technology, the
Department participates regularly and frequently in interagency
meetings convened by the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy. The proposed Interagency Panel on Advanced Science Studies
(IPASS) grew out of these meetings. When fully implemented, IPASS will
review visa applications of individuals seeking to pursue uniquely
available advanced scientific studies in the United States and advise
the Department whether the proposed course of study will evade or
violate any laws prohibiting the export from the United States--of
goods, technology, or sensitive information. The WH-OSTP and the
Consular Affairs bureau of the Department continue to convene meetings
to work out details of the IPASS process. Members of the scientific and
academic communities participate actively in these meetings, to the
extent allowed by their level, if any, of security clearance. The
public will see some of the changes attributed to interagency
consultations as the technology alert list, an unclassified document,
is revised and disseminated.
Q2. LThe automated, web-based Student Exchange and Visitor Information
System (sic) (SEVIS) is now in place, and information on students and
exchange visitors must have been entered in the system when they
applied for a visa. Is it true that consular officers do not have
online access to SEVIS? If not, will this be done in the near term, and
what are the implications for delays in visa approvals until online
access is available?
A2. At this time, consular officers do not have direct access to SEVIS.
Rather, SEVIS data is made available to consular officers through
integration with our Consolidated Consular DataBase (CCD) so that the
data becomes a component of our visa information for adjudication,
record keeping, and reporting purposes. At this time, over 400,000
SEVIS records appear in the CCD. The flow of SEVIS records into the CCD
continues to experience technical glitches due to lack of conformity
with the interface control agreement between DHS and State. These data
glitches affect disproportionately, though not solely, dependent
records. State and DHS data technicians cooperate in an ongoing effort
to identify potentially troubled SEVIS files and correct them before an
individual visa applicant is disadvantaged. In other cases, DHS has
located, corrected if necessary, and forwarded SEVIS files to State
only after an individual visa application has alerted us to the
existence of a particular record.
We plan to make SEVIS directly available to consular sections in
the near future. However, we do not view this direct access as a
substitute for the requirement that SEVIS data be integrated with our
CCD system. Rather, direct access to SEVIS will serve as an information
resource that will grow more valuable over time as SEVIS entries mature
into long-term student and exchange visitor case files.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by David Ward, President, American Council on Education
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
Q1. LWhat are the greatest obstacles to the full implementation of a
real-time student tracking system?
A1. The greatest obstacle to the full implementation of the SEVIS
system remains the technological glitches within the system. Without
properly vetting and dealing with these technological flaws, the influx
of records that will be created between now and August 1st will most
likely stress the system and cause further delays. Additionally, the
batch processing feature, which schools need to submit large amounts of
data, works intermittently at best. This significantly limits the
ability of schools to input records a timely fashion.
It is also of concern that contrary to promises, SEVIS does not
provide real-time access to data. SEVIS was designed to link schools,
the State Department and the INS in real time. However, some embassies
and consulates find that it takes a week or longer for them to access
data entered into SEVIS. Without timely consular access to the SEVIS
data, a student may not apply for a visa. These delays cause confusion
and frustration for embassies, students and schools.
Finally, the INS has not provided adequate training to campus
officials or even to its own staff. Regional INS officials have not
been adequately trained and therefore often provide different answers
to the same questions. The SEVIS Help desk can answer only technical
questions about the system but is unable to answer regulatory
questions.
Q1a. LWhat are the most useful steps that the government can take to
improve SEVIS?
A1a. We feel that the Federal Government and Congress could implement
several measures right know which would greatly improve efforts to
implement a real-time SEVIS system:
LICE (formerly the INS) should provide adequate
training to the field office and port of entry staff to ensure
that they are providing consistent information to visa holders
and institutions. Additionally, the SEVIS help desk should be
able to provide regulatory guidance to institutions.
LSEVIS should be thoroughly tested for technological
flaws as quickly as possible before institutions begin entering
foreign student record for the Fall of 2003.
LThe State Department consulate offices should collect
the SEVIS fee as a part of the visa collection fee. This
maintains SEVIS as an electronic system and streamlines the
process for the consular offices and for the foreign student.
LCampuses--specifically Designated School Officials
(DSOs)--should be given broader access to SEVIS in order to
correct clerical errors in the initial form.
LThe State Department should use the SEVIS system to
ensure real time access of data. Currently, the State
Department runs the SEVIS data through their own system instead
of using the secured Internet-based interface. In some
instances, this has caused data loss.
Q2. LWhat are the greatest obstacles to a predictable visa
adjudication?
A2. In the last 18 months, visa delays for students and scholars have
become more extensive and unpredictable for several reasons. First, the
State Department has increased the number of subjects on the Technology
Alert List significantly. It now encompasses virtually every area of
contemporary science and engineering. Blanket areas like ``civil
engineering'' have now been added to the list. Second, last summer the
State Department imposed stricter review procedures for visa
applications flagged for review in the Visa Mantis process. Under the
stricter procedures, a visa application that a consular officer refers
to Visa Mantis must be reviewed by appropriate government agencies and
must receive a security advisory opinion before a visa decision can be
made. There is no time limit on how long a review can take. This causes
uncertainty for those students and scholars applying for their visas
who are trying to plan their travel arrangements around a program start
date.
Q2a. LWhat are the most useful steps the government could take to
improve the visa processing system?
A2a. In our opinion, a process by which existing student and scholar
visa holders can revalidate their visas before leaving the U.S. for
academic, health, or other personal reasons would significantly reduce
the impact of visa processing delays because students and scholars
would be able to continue their studies, teaching, and research
uninterrupted while their visas are being processed.
Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Q1. LThere have been reports of problems with the implementation of the
automated, web-based computer system for tracking international
students and exchange visitors, the Student Exchange and Visitor
Information System (SEVIS). How would you characterize the efforts
being made to sort out the problems and deficiencies of the system?
Q1a. LWhat actions that should be taken that are not being taken?
Q1b. LTo what extent is there collaboration and communication between
the users of SEVIS and the office within the Department of Homeland
Security responsible for implementing SEVIS?
A1a,b. ICE and the SEVIS staff have begun a weekly conference call with
members of the higher education community to address outstanding issues
with SEVIS. Additionally, there is a regular conference call addressing
technical issues for the software vendors. Other than the four regional
workshops that were sponsored by ACE, we are not aware of efforts by
the Department of Homeland Security to educate or begin a dialogue with
the campus DSOs. The SEVIS help desk sends upgrade and technical
correction e-mails to users. This is primarily a reactionary
communication in response to problems with the system.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Shirley M. Tilghman, President, Princeton University
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
Q1. LWhat are the greatest obstacles to the full implementation of a
real-time student tracking system? What are the most useful steps the
government could take to improve SEVIS?
A1. There are numerous technical limitations and glitches associated
with the SEVIS student tracking system, namely the difficulties
associated with batch data transfer, the periodic slowness of the
system, and security breeches related to retrieval of data. But the
greatest obstacles to full implementation of the SEVIS system include
the inexperience of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the
relative lack of communication between DHS, the State Department and
institutions of higher education; and the lack of adequate numbers of
SEVIS support staff who are trained in both the technical details of
SEVIS as well as immigration policy and practice.
The most useful steps the government could take to improve SEVIS
would be to:
1. LIdentify the individual at DHS who will be responsible for
managing the SEVIS system and require that individual to meet
with higher education representatives to discuss the current
limitations of the SEVIS system and to develop a strategy and
timeline to upgrade and fix the system;
2. LFully staff the SEVIS help centers with individuals trained
not only to answer technical questions related to SEVIS but
also to answer questions about immigration policy and practice;
3. LEnsure that data entered into the SEVIS system is uploaded
in real-time so that the system provides accurate data to all
who access the system including consular officials;
4. LImprove the batch processing capabilities of SEVIS and
provide institutions with the software required to facilitate
batch transfer of data, thereby eliminating the need to
purchase and upgrade costly proprietary software;
5. LProvide additional support staff and extend help desk hours
during peak college and university enrollment periods;
6. LEliminate all paper and ensure that SEVIS is a completely
paper-free system;
7. LDevelop and implement an appropriate fee collection
procedure and ensure that the fee collection system is
paperless;
8. LMake sure that contractors hired to certify institutions
and provide technical support are properly trained and closely
monitored by DHS.
Q2. LWhat are the greatest obstacles to a predictable visa adjudication
process? What are the most useful steps the government could take to
improve the visa processing system?
A2. The greatest obstacles to a predictable visa adjudication process
are the lack of public information regarding the security review
process, the lack of detail within the Technology Alert List regarding
potential technology transfer threats, and the lack of predictability
related to the length of time required for visa adjudication. Most
troublesome to institutions of higher education is the lack of
predictability regarding re-entry visa adjudication for those students
and scholars who are already in the U.S., but who wish to attend a
professional meeting or family event abroad and then return to the U.S.
We are also concerned about the conflict between immigration policies
that require students to leave the U.S. after they complete their
education and the country's interest in retaining highly skilled
international students in the U.S. workforce following the completion
of their academic training.
The most useful steps the government could take to improve the visa
processing system include:
1. LEncourage on-going dialogue between DHS officials and
higher education representatives to discuss concerns regarding
current and proposed immigrant and non-immigrant student and
exchange visa programs, policies and procedures;
2. LEstablish a deadline for the Department of Homeland
Security to sign the Memorandum of Understanding with the
Department of State regarding immigration services procedures
and policies;
3. LEstablish a deadline by which the Department of Homeland
Security must develop and publish its policies and procedures
regarding immigrant and non-immigrant visa services;
4. LExtend the period of time for which a non-immigrant visa
applicant's security clearance is valid and implement a pre-
certification program so that non-immigrant students and
scholars already in the U.S. on a valid non-immigrant visa can
travel abroad and re-enter the U.S. without undergoing
additional security reviews or related delays;
5. LEngage the scientific community in refining the Technology
Alert List so that the list includes specific techniques or
areas of potentially harmful technology transfer rather than
entire fields of study or fundamental research techniques;
6. LSeek help from academic institutions, professional
societies and scientific communities in developing and
implementing appropriate training materials to instruct
consular officials on how to use the Technology Alert List in
adjudicating visa applications;
7. LAllow any student with a valid non-immigrant student visa
to participate in any undergraduate course on campus and
eliminate the need for institutions of higher education to
police course enrollments;
8. LProvide information via the SEVIS tracking system as to the
current status of an individual's visa application so that the
institution can track the process of the application for any
given student or scholar;
9. LWork to reduce the visa backlog and develop procedures and
time limitations to ensure that visa applications will be
processed and within a predictable period of time.
Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Q1. LThere have been reports of problems with the implementation of the
automated, web-based computer system for tracking foreign students and
exchange visitors, the Student Exchange and Visitor Information System
(SEVIS). How would you characterize the efforts being made to sort out
the problems and deficiencies of the system? What actions should be
taken that are not being taken?
A1. There have been considerable efforts to correct the problems and
deficiencies of the SEVIS system and multiple system patches have been
developed and delivered to upgrade SEVIS; however, each time a patch is
developed to correct the SEVIS system, institutions using batch data
delivery software must wait for the commercial software provider to
develop a corresponding patch which must then be installed. We are
certain that eventually, and perhaps sooner rather than later, we will
be required to purchase costly software upgrades or new software to
continue delivering batch data to the SEVIS system. The Federal
Government's inability to beta-test the SEVIS system prior to its
implementation has meant that institutions of higher education have had
to invest significant financial and personnel resources in a system
that was launched prematurely and therefore has numerous technical
problems in addition to being laborious and unpredictable. Even with
the current patches in place, the SEVIS system remains deficient in
accepting data via batch transfer, the speed with which the SEVIS
system accepts and processes data is extremely unpredictable, and the
process for correcting data entry errors is quite cumbersome.
According to representatives of the State Department, there has
been a great deal of communication between the Office of Consular
Affairs and the Department of Homeland Security in an effort to correct
the technical limitations of the SEVIS system. Notably, there has been
progress made in correcting the technical problems that prevented some
records from the SEVIS system from being uploaded to the Consolidated
Consular Database utilized in the consular offices.
There have been several incidents reported by SEVIS users who
erroneously received data from another institution, or whose data was
erroneously sent to another institution, when attempting to access
student records. While these security breeches have been reported by
various institutions via the news media, there has not been official
notification on the part of the Department of Homeland Security when
such an error or security breech has occurred. Similarly, there has
been no explanation offered by DHS as to how these data errors occurred
or how the system will be corrected to prevent additional security
breeches. Erroneous distribution of confidential student records is of
great concern to institutions of higher education and we are interested
in knowing more about how DHS will correct this problem and notify the
appropriate institutions in the event of a future security breech.
We are also experiencing a great deal of difficulty obtaining
assistance when we have questions regarding SEVIS or immigration
policy. While SEVIS does operate a help-line, it is understaffed and
the wait time for help can be lengthy. When one does finally reach a
help-line representative, those individuals are trained only in the
technical details of the SEVIS system and not in the policy and
regulatory guidelines of the non-immigrant student and exchange visitor
visa program. So while most of our questions have both policy and
technical elements, the SEVIS help-line can only address technical
questions. We have not been successful in identifying individuals at
DHS who can answer our policy questions and the State Department has
removed information on VISAS Mantis and VISAS Condor from its web site
pending DHS review of the programs. We hope that as DHS moves forward
it will provide much greater access to information and support services
than is currently available to institutions of higher education.
We are extremely concerned that the SEVIS system will fail as
colleges and universities attempt to enter over a million new students
and scholars into the SEVIS system prior to the 2003-2004 academic
year. We hope that DHS is working now to test the limits of the SEVIS
system and develop a back-up plan in the event that the system fails
during peak academic enrollment seasons.
Q2. LTo what extent is there collaboration and communication between
the users of SEVIS and the office within the Department of Homeland
Security responsible for implementing SEVIS?
A2. While there had been no communication between the Department of
Homeland Security and SEVIS users prior to the March hearing, we are
quite encouraged by the very positive communication the higher
education community has had with both the State Department and the
Department of Homeland Security subsequent to the hearing. Since the
hearing, representatives of the higher education community, including a
small group of university presidents, have had the opportunity to meet
with DHS Secretary Ridge, DHS Undersecretaries McQueary and Hutchinson,
and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Janice Jacobs. We are certain
that each of these key government officials has a very clear
understanding of our concerns and that each of the relevant departments
is working toward solutions that will promote our mission of advancing
research and education while also preserving our collective interests
in national security. We look forward to continuing the dialogue with
these individuals and feel that all signs point toward a very
productive working relationship henceforth.
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material for the Record
IN AMERICA'S INTEREST: WELCOMING INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS
REPORT OF THE STRATEGIC TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ACCESS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At a time when efforts to counter the global threat of terrorism
have highlighted the importance of building ties and friendships around
the world, the United States needs a comprehensive strategy to enhance
the ability of legitimate international students to pursue educational
opportunities here. Such is the conclusion of a task force established
by NAFSA: Association of International Educators to examine the issue
of international student access to higher education in the United
States.
In its report, ``In America's Interest: Welcoming International
Students,'' the Strategic Task Force on International Student Access
identifies the major barriers to the ability of prospective
international students to access U.S. higher education, and sets forth
a strategic plan to address each of them.
The Continuing Importance of International Students
The task force report affirms that openness to international
students serves long-standing and important U.S. foreign policy,
educational, and economic interests. The terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, presented new challenges for screening visa applicants more
carefully to keep out those who wish us harm. At the same time, the
terrorist threat also highlights the importance of building friends and
allies across the world to better counter such global threats. The task
force report therefore restates the case for encouraging and enabling
legitimate international students to study in the United States. The
task force believes strongly that international education is part of
the solution to terrorism, not part of the problem.
Barriers to International Student Access
The U.S. position as the leading destination for international
students has been eroding for years in the absence of a comprehensive
national strategy for promoting international student access to U.S.
higher education. In this strategic vacuum, four barriers, which impede
access, remain unaddressed. The principal barriers are (1) the failure
of the relevant U.S. government agencies to make international student
recruitment a priority and to coordinate their recruitment efforts, and
(2) burdensome U.S. government visa and student-tracking regulations.
Lesser barriers are (3) the cost of U.S. higher education, and (4) the
complexity of the U.S. higher education system.
A Strategic Approach to Promoting International Student Access
The task force recommends that the U.S. government, in consultation
with the higher education community and other concerned constituencies,
develop a strategic plan for promoting U.S. higher education to
international students, based on a national policy that articulates why
international student access is important to the national interest. In
the context of such a strategic plan, the task force makes the
following recommendations for addressing each of the four barriers to
international student access cited above.
A Comprehensive Recruitment Strategy
A recruitment strategy must be developed that specifies the roles
of the three federal agencies that share responsibility for
international student recruitment--the Departments of State, Commerce,
and Education--and provides for coordination of their efforts. Such a
strategy must rationalize and create an effective mandate for the State
Department's overseas educational advising centers, resolve issues of
responsibility and coordination in the Commerce Department, and provide
a clear mandate for the Department of Education.
Removing Excessive Governmentally Imposed Barriers
Three broad actions are required to remove governmentally imposed
barriers that unnecessarily impede international student access to U.S.
higher education. First, immigration laws affecting international
students must be updated to reflect twenty-first century realities,
particularly by replacing the unworkable ``intending immigrant'' test
set forth in section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act with
a standard that focuses on whether or not the applicant is a legitimate
student. Second, a visa-screening system is needed which permits
necessary scrutiny of visa applicants leading to decisions within
reasonable and predictable periods of time. Third, the Administration
must strive to implement the Congressionally-mandated student
monitoring system in a way that maintains the attractiveness of the
United States as a destination for international students without
sacrificing national security.
Addressing Issues of Cost
Issues of cost must be addressed through innovative and expanded
loan, tuition exchange, and scholarship programs for international
students. Scholarship assistance, through the Agency for International
Development, should be directed at countries or regions--such as
Africa--where the United States has a strong foreign policy interest in
providing higher education opportunities but where the cost of a U.S.
higher education is an insurmountable barrier. A financial aid
information clearinghouse should be developed to help international
students understand the options available to them.
Addressing Complexity With a Marketing Plan
A marketing plan should be developed that sends a clear, consistent
message about U.S. higher education and that transforms the complexity
of the U.S. higher education system from a liability to an asset. A
user-friendly, comprehensive, sophisticated, Web-based information
resource is needed, through which international students will be able
to understand the multiple higher education options available to them
in the United States.
Conclusion
Rather than retreating from our support for international student
exchange--and forgoing its contribution to our national strength and
well being--we must redouble our efforts to provide foreign student
access to U.S. higher education while maintaining security. The task
force calls on the U.S. government, academe, the business community,
and all who care about our nation's future to step up to the task of
ensuring that we continue to renew the priceless resource of
international educational exchange.
Note: The report can be found online at www.nafsa.org/
inamericasinterest
NAFSA: Association of International Educators, 1307 New York
Avenue, N.W., Eighth Floor, Washington, DC 20005-4701; Tel: 202-737-
3699; Fax: 202-737-3657; http://www.nafsa.org
Biography for Marlene M. Johnson
Marlene Johnson is Executive Director and CEO of NAFSA: Association
of International Educators. As head of the world's largest professional
association dedicated to international education, Johnson has
spearheaded a national effort to promote the establishment of an
international education policy for the United States. Under her
leadership, the international education community has captured the
attention of leaders at the highest levels, resulting in a presidential
memorandum and congressional resolutions calling for a national policy.
Johnson's leadership experience is diverse and spans three decades
of work in business, government, and nonprofit management. As
Minnesota's Lieutenant Governor from 1983 to 1991, she was an outspoken
advocate of international educational exchanges at all levels of
learning and supported visitor and professional exchanges to build ties
between the state and the rest of the world. She was instrumental in
the establishment of an entrepreneurship program for Czech women at The
College of St. Catherine in Minnesota.
In 1993, Johnson accepted an appointment by the Clinton
Administration to serve as Associate Administrator at the General
Services Administration. In the course of her career, Johnson also
founded and operated a marketing and communications company and served
as vice president for people and strategy at a large furniture
producer.
A dynamic and successful grassroots organizer, she has held
leadership positions at the World Press Institute, the National
Association of Women Business Owners, and the National Council of Women
Executives in State Government. She currently serves on the board of
AFS Intercultural Programs, the Girls Scouts Council of the Nation's
Capital and the Communications Consortium Media Center. Johnson is a
member of the executive committee of the Alliance for International
Educational and Cultural Exchange and serves on the American Council on
Education's Commission on International Education and the advisory
council for the University of Minnesota's Center for Human Ecology.
NAFSA: Association of International Educators seeks to increase
awareness of and support for international education and exchange in
higher education, government, and the community, believing that
citizens with international experience and global awareness are crucial
to U.S. leadership, competitiveness, and security. Of the important
role of international education--a field that spans study abroad,
scholarly and citizen exchanges, and international students studying in
the United States--Johnson has said: ``International education must be
part of the national strategy that guides our engagement and leadership
in the world. It is one of our most effective tools for fostering
cooperation and understanding among nations.''