[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EMERGENCY WARNING SYSTEMS:
WAYS TO NOTIFY THE PUBLIC IN THE
NEW ERA OF HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
of the
SUBCOMMITEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 22, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-58
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
David Dreier, California Barney Frank, Massachusetts
Duncan Hunter, California Jane Harman, California
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Sherwood Boehlert, New York Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Joe Barton, Texas York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Pete Sessions, Texas Ben Chandler, Kentucky
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
______
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response
John Shadegg, Arizona, Chairman
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin, Louisiana Ranking Member
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Jane Harman, California
Dave Camp, Michigan Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Peter King, New York Nita M. Lowey, New York
Mark Souder, Indiana Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Mac Thornberry, Texas Columbia
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Kay Granger, Texas Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Pete Sessions, Texas Islands
Christopher Cox, California, ex Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
officio Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Jim Turner, Texas, ex officio
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From
the State Arizona, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness and Response...................................... 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness and Response......................... 2
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 22
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 25
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 31
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From
the District of Columbia....................................... 33
The Honorable Curt Weldon, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 27
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. James. Dailey, Director of Homeland Security, Federal
Communications Commission:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Kathleen Henning, Certified Emergency Manager, International
Association of Emergency Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Reynold N. Hoover, Director of National Security
Coordination, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Panel II
Ms. Patricia McGinnis, President and CEO, Council for Excellence
in Government:
Oral Statement................................................. 51
Prepared Statement............................................. 53
Mr. Frank Lucia, Vice Chairman, Washington, D.C. Emergency Alert
System Committee Member, Public Communications & Safety Working
Group, Media Security and Reliability Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 45
Prepared Statement............................................. 47
Dr. Peter L. Ward, Founding Chairman, Partnership for Public
Warning, U.S. Geological Survey (Retired):
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Reynold Hoover Responses to Questions........................ 63
Mr. Frank Lucia Responses to Questions........................... 84
Ms. Patricia McGinnis Responses to Questions..................... 65
Dr. Peter Ward Responses to Questions............................ 68
EMERGENCY WARNING SYSTEMS:
WAYS TO NOTIFY THE PUBLIC IN THE
NEW ERA OF HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
Wednesday, September 22, 2004
House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness
and Response,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in
Room 2261, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Shadegg
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Shadegg, Weldon, Camp, Cox (ex
officio), Thompson, DeFazio, Lowey, Norton, Etheridge, Lucas
and Turner (ex officio).
Mr. Shadegg. Good morning. The committee will come to
order.
I would like to ask unanimous consent that opening
statements be limited to the subcommittee and full committee
chairman and the ranking members of the subcommittee and the
full committee. Is there any objection?
Without objection, so ordered.
You may not be aware of this, but September is National
Preparedness Month, an effort to heighten the importance of
American families and businesses to be better prepared for
emergencies, especially in this new era of Homeland Security.
As a part of that effort, today we will be focusing on the
emergency warnings communication system, that is, how we can
get the best information to the public on what steps they
should take to protect themselves in the event of an emergency.
You know, it was Paul Revere and his partner who is less
well known, Robert Newman, who pioneered unknowingly the first
emergency warning system in our country. Newman was the
individual who hung lanterns. Of course, Paul Revere was the
one who made the famous ride. One if by land and two if by sea,
as well as a midnight ride warning that the British were
coming, were effective means of spreading the word in the 18th
century. However, in the 21st century, in a new war on
terrorism and a new era of Homeland Security and technology, we
must look at the most modern and effective ways to get
emergency warnings to our citizenry.
Consider, for example, these statistics. There are 169
million cell phone users in the United States. There are 28
million high-speed Internet lines always on. There are 107
million households, well over 90 percent of those in the
country, that have telephone service, and there are over 11
million paging units in service. More and more, technology is
becoming ubiquitous, and it would be foolish not to capitalize
on these potential conduits for informing Americans about what
to do in an emergency so that they can make an educated
decision about how best to protect themselves.
Think about a potential release, for example, of a bio-
agent or a dirty bomb. Based on global positioning technology,
GPS technology, a cell phone user could receive a text message
based on which cell towers he was closest to advising him of
the event. Linked with plume modeling technology, an individual
could be advised further as to whether to shelter where they
are in place or to evacuate. And this sort of technology is
already put into place.
For example, the States of Washington and my home State of
Arizona have launched a multi-State AMBER alert web portal
which has the ability to notify thousands of subscribers
through e-mail, cell phones, pagers, and other devices that a
child has been abducted. Fourteen additional States are set to
join, including the State of Mississippi. This is a partnership
of State, law enforcement, private companies, and the broadcast
media.
But there are also questions when we start discussing
notification systems. Keep in mind, for example, that the
Emergency Alert System was never activated on September 11th.
We need to consider who will control the content of the
message? How will we know that it is completely accurate? Will
it be nimble enough in order to take action in a timely manner?
Will local law enforcement be willing to share information with
the media? Will there be information overload? And, what
happens if electricity is lost?
An efficient and effective all hazards alert system must
bring together all available information in an accessible and
reliable manner and disseminated to Americans in a timely
manner via multiple technologies. In our examination, it is
likely that we will learn that no single solution exists.
Rather, we will have to rely on multiple modes and built-in
redundancy.
Today, we will hear from Federal officials from the
Department of Homeland Security as well as the FCC, the Federal
Communications Commission; and we will be particularly
interested in what the Department is doing to coordinate and
build upon the message from seven different warnings systems
that currently exist for all hazards and emergency notice and
its latest emergency communication demonstration project in the
National Capital Region.
Our FCC witness will provide perspective on the
Commission's latest notice of proposed rulemaking on changes to
the Emergency Alert System as well as the role of the media. Do
local broadcasters have enough guidance from local, State, and
Federal Government to operate an effective warning system?
And our second panel will provide insight on what
technologies are available and other issues that should be
addressed when considering emergency communications systems.
I would now call upon the Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson, for
his opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join the Chairman in welcoming the witnesses to this
hearing, and I look forward to hearing your testimony on this
important topic.
When our hearing concludes today, I think it will be very
clear that our Nation does not have an effective warning
system. More than 3 years after the attacks of September 11th,
we still depend on a warning system that was created by
President Truman in the 1950s. And while it is true that this
system's technology has been upgraded over the years, the
simple facts are these: We are still dependent upon the
broadcast industry to distribute warnings; State and local
governments do not have the authority to require broadcasters
to distribute warning messages; and the current warning system
reaches only the limited audience that is listening to
broadcast radio or watching broadcasts on cable television at
the exact time that emergency announcement is made.
It seems to me when we face the very real threat of more
terrorist attacks within our homeland that this warning system
is wholly unsatisfactory and demonstrates a huge gap in the
administration's preparedness strategy. We can provide our
first responders with all the training and equipment they need,
but if we do not have an effective way to warn the public and
provide them with the information that will help them to
protect themselves and their families, we will fail in our
duties to save lives in the aftermath of the next attack.
This is not a new problem created by the September 11th
attacks. Numerous studies and reports have demonstrated that
our warning system is not adequate. Yet, even after 9/11,
nothing has been done to change the system.
Based on prior recommendations of several of today's
witnesses, we know what an effective warning system should do.
First, the system must distribute warnings through as many
communication channels as practicable, including telephone,
cell phone, and pagers. Second, the actual warning message must
be a single, consistent, and easily understood language that
can be used as a standard across all hazards and situations.
Finally, ownership of and accountability for the system must be
clear. Today, no one government agency is in charge of the
system, resulting in outdated warning plans, missing
communication links, and a lack of training and equipment for
emergency managers.
The administration must devote the resources to implement
these changes. We cannot wait for the next attack to
demonstrate the shortfalls of our warning systems. The Federal
Communications Commission has initiated this process by issuing
a notice of proposed rulemaking on the Emergency Alert System.
This notice raises some very important questions about the
adequacy of the current system and the alternative systems that
we should be considering. I hope the Commission uses this
opportunity to make real changes in the alert system and does
not simply patch an outdated approach to public warning.
Again, I thank the witnesses for appearing before this
subcommittee, and I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Shadegg. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Cox, is now
recognized for his opening statement.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you to the
Ranking Member.
Good morning to our witnesses. Let me, too, commend you for
your prepared testimony which you provided and for the wisdom
that I know you are about to share with us.
I will be brief. I agree with my colleagues that it is
imperative that our Nation address the question of how to
upgrade and modernize our emergency communication systems.
There are a lot of questions that attend to that. Of course, I
will always, forever have stuck in my mind the emergency
broadcast system test that we grew up with that puzzled us all.
What the hell is that thing for? Because it has never been
used. It is supposed to transmit Presidential messages to the
Nation in time of emergency, never used.
We can do a lot better than that. We are doing a lot better
than that. That system has been modernized and updated itself
several times. Now it is known as the Emergency Alert System.
But its origins are certainly reminders of another time and
another place when we didn't have anything like wireless or
digital or the Internet.
There are flaws in our current system. The Emergency Alert
System itself, as I mentioned, hasn't been used. So in addition
to upgrading the technology, we have got to ask ourselves, what
are the circumstances precisely under which we are going to use
these systems? Only half of the Nation's 14,000 broadcasters
are voluntarily carrying warnings and alerts through this
system. On September 11th, 2001, it wasn't activated, it wasn't
used. One wonders what kind of emergency is necessary before we
would find any use for that system. My home, California, has
never used the system to warn people when their lives and their
property are threatened by fires that are, if not predictable
entirely, that are certainly frequent occurrences.
This Emergency Alert System is probably the best known, but
there are seven distinct Federal warning and alert systems that
I hope we will discuss here this morning.
The national warning system operated by FEMA disseminates
emergency information to 22,000 national and regional State and
local emergency management offices. The National Weather
Service has several systems, weather alert systems, designed to
report through the news media. The AMBER alert web portal
provides actionable intelligence on a geographic basis to 32
States, two thirds of the country, to help them identify and
track missing children. Each of these systems is designed for
its own specific purpose, and I am quite certain that some
overlap and some redundancy is not only unavoidable but
desirable.
No single warning alert system is guaranteed to reach
everyone, and so we can ask this morning how much overlap ought
we to have in these systems. When we deploy them, are we
properly focused on questions such as what if the telephone
lines were done? What if the power lines are down? What if the
cable TV is disabled? What about people with disabilities? What
if you are hearing impaired? What if you are blind? How should
the alerts be tailored to avoid unnecessary panic?
We have discussed this in other hearings, in other ways,
with the national color coded warning system. Will frequent
warnings desensitize the public to actual danger? How should
instructions on what to do be effectively conveyed to the
public? When precisely should an alert be transmitted? Will the
Federal system provide more meaningful information than is
available through the 24/7 news media? And, if not, are we
wasting a lot of resources on some of these systems? What role
should the Department of Homeland Security play?
I know we are about to make some progress in answering
these questions at this morning's hearing, so let me close as I
began, by thanking you all for being here; and thank you, Mr.
Chairman and Mr. Thompson, for being here.
Mr. Shadegg. I thank the gentleman for his statement.
The Ranking Member of the full committee, Mr. Turner, is
not with us at the moment. Should he join us, I will be happy
to afford him an opportunity to make an opening statement.
At this point, I would like to introduce our first panel so
we can begin the testimony and proceed.
Our first witness, Mr. Reynold Hoover, is the Director of
the Office of National Security Coordination and the Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate within the Department of
Homeland Security; our second witness, Mr. Jim Dailey, is the
Homeland Security Director for the Federal Communications
Commission; and our third witness, Ms. Kathleen Henning, is a
Certified Emergency Manager and a member of the International
Association of Emergency Management.
You will each have 5 minutes to make your opening
statement. We won't hold you strictly to that. Your entire
written statement will be made a part of the record, and so you
will know that your full statement is in the record if you
choose to just summarize it in your oral statement.
Mr. Shadegg. With that, Mr. Hoover, would you begin?
STATEMENT OF REYNOLD N. HOOVER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY
COORDINATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Hoover. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Chairman Shadegg and members of the
committee. My name is Reynold Hoover. I am the Director of the
Office of National Security Coordination within the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, FEMA. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the role and
activities of the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA to
support the important mission of public alert and warnings.
I would like to ask, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that
my full written statement be included in the record.
FEMA, through our office, serves as the lead agent for the
Federal Government's Executive Branch Continuity of Operations
and Continuity of Government Programs. We also serve as the
executive agent for the development, operations, and
maintenance of the national-level Emergency Alert System known
as EAS and are responsible for implementation of the national
level activation of EAS tests and exercises. To carry out that
function, we serve as the EAS program manager within FEMA and
work in close cooperation with the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection, the IAIP, Directorate for All
Hazards Alert and Warning. I should also note that we work
closely with the Federal Communications Commission, the FCC,
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA,
which is a primary EAS user.
The Department is grateful for the alert and warning funds
Congress provided to IAIP this year and look forward to passage
of the President's 2005 budget which provides $2 million
additional dollars for EAS. Your funding will help provide
Americans with critical and timely information alerts and
warnings that will save lives and property.
This morning I would like to take a few moments to tell you
about EAS and the Department's efforts toward improving and
building our capability to provide a nationwide alert and
warning system.
The current EAS was established in 1994 and is essentially
a cascade, trickle-down distribution system from the FEMA
operations centers to 34 designated primary entry point, or
PEP, radio broadcast stations. At the request of the President,
we distribute a Presidential level message to the PEP stations,
which in turn rebroadcast the signal to monitoring stations
downstream which then broadcast the message over TV and radio.
This Presidential message is mandatory and must take priority
over other messages and must preempt other messages already in
progress. All other broadcasts of emergency messages are
voluntary. Nevertheless, State and local emergency managers
can, and do, activate the EAS for State and local alert and
warning messages such as AMBER alerts, hazardous material
incidents and weather warnings. NOAA and the National Weather
Service serve as the originator of emergency weather
information and play a significant role in the implementation
of EAS at the State and local levels.
But as efficient and useful as EAS has been, we in FEMA and
the Department of Homeland Security realize that the alert and
warning system that so many millions of people depend upon is
not everything to everyone all of the time. With the alert and
warning funding provided this year, FEMA and IAIP are making
great progress in our ability to reach more of the people more
of the time.
For example, we look forward to signing a cooperative
agreement with the Association of Public Television Stations to
launch a digital emergency alert system pilot project in the
National Capital Region. This pilot will demonstrate how the
capabilities of America's public broadcasters can be utilized
to dramatically enhance the ability to provide the American
people with critical and lifesaving information. This project
will also provide the Department with an improved mechanism for
distributing EAS and alert warning messaging via digital
television and satellite to an expanded range of retransmission
media such as cell phone service providers, computers, PDAs,
and other wireless devices.
Through the use of a geo-targeted alerting system which
uses reverse 911 technology, we will also test the ability to
provide targeted warning down to the individual household or
business. This proven technology will be conducted in the
National Capital Region in cooperation with NOAA's Forecast
Systems Laboratory and the Department of Homeland Security's
National Capital Region Office.
But while conducting proof of concept pilots, we are
simultaneously beginning to upgrade and expand the primary
entry point broadcast stations from a ground-based dial-up
system to satellite transmissions. This upgrade will ensure
their survivability in the event of a catastrophic attack on
the homeland.
We recognize that there is no single solution set that will
meet everyone's alert and warning requirements. That is why
FEMA, IAIP, and the Department has teamed up with NOAA, the
FCC, and the private sector to find the most appropriate
interoperable solutions to develop an Integrated Public Alert
and Warning System that we are calling IPAWS. We believe that
IPAWS, using digital technology in combination with upgraded
primary entry point EAS capabilities, will provide Federal,
State, and local emergency managers and leaders with the tools
they need to protect America from both manmade and natural
disasters.
Mr. Chairman, these are just a few of the examples of how
FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security have taken
seriously its responsibility to provide quick and accurate
dissemination of alert and warning information to our homeland
security partners and the American public. Thank you for your
invitation to speak, for your support of the Department's
mission, and for your interest in the Emergency Alert System;
and I will be pleased to answer what questions you may have.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Hoover follows:]
Prepared Statement of Reynold N. Hoover
Good afternoon, Chairman Shadegg and members of the Committee. I am
Reynold N. Hoover, the Director of the Office of National Security
Coordination (ONSC) within the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the role and activities of the Department of Homeland Security
and FEMA to support the important mission of public alert and warning.
FEMA, through my office, serves as the Lead Agent for the Federal
Executive Branch's Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Continuity of
Government (COG) programs, in accordance with Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 67, Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity
of Government Operations. We also serve as the Executive Agent for the
development, operations and maintenance of the national--level
Emergency Alert System (EAS) and are responsible for implementation of
the national level activation of EAS tests and exercises. To carry out
that function, we serve as the EAS Program Manager within FEMA and work
in close cooperation with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) Directorate for All Hazards Alert and Warning. I
should also note that we work closely with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) which generally prescribes EAS technical standards,
procedures and protocols, and the National Oceanic & Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) which is a primary EAS user.
The Department is grateful for the Alert and Warning funds Congress
provided to IAIP this year and look forward to passage of the
President's 2005 budget which provides 2 million additional dollars for
EAS. Your funding will help to provide Americans with critical and
timely information alerts and warning that will save lives and
property. This morning I would like to take a few moments to tell you
about the EAS and the Department's efforts toward improving and
building our capability to provide nationwide alert and warning.
The current EAS was established in 1994 and is essentially a
cascade, trickle down, distribution system from the FEMA Operations
Centers to 34 designated Primary Entry Point (PEP) radio broadcast
stations. At the request of the President, we distribute a Presidential
level message to the PEP stations, which in turn re-broadcast the
signal to monitoring stations down stream which then broadcast the
message over TV and radios. The system is designed to provide the
President the capability to transmit within ten minutes from any
location at any time. This Presidential message is mandatory, must take
priority over any other message and must preempt other messages in
progress. All other broadcasts of emergency messages are voluntary.
Nevertheless, State and local emergency managers can, and do, activate
the EAS for state and local public alert and warning messages--such as
AMBER alerts, hazardous material incidents and weather warnings. NOAA,
and the National Weather Service, serve as the originator of emergency
weather information, and play a significant role in the implementation
of EAS at the state and local level. While FEMA tests on a weekly basis
the connectivity to the 34 PEP stations, the national level EAS has
never been fully activated.
As you are well aware, the tragic events three years ago on
September 11th caused a paradigm shift in how we think about homeland
security and, in particular, alert and warning. As efficient and useful
as the EAS has been, we in FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security
realize that the alert and warning system that so many millions of
people depend upon is not everything to everyone all of the time. With
the alert and warning funding provided this year, FEMA and IAIP are
making great progress in our ability to reach more of the people, more
of the time. We believe in a very short period, using existing digital
and other cutting edge technologies, the Department will be able to
provide All Hazards alerts and warning to the greatest number of
people, all of the time. This includes persons with disabilities and
individuals for whom English is a second language.
For example, we look forward to signing a cooperative agreement
with the Association of Public Television Stations to launch a digital
emergency alert system pilot project in the National Capital Region.
This pilot will demonstrate how the capabilities of America's public
broadcasters can be utilized to dramatically enhance our ability to
provide the American people with critical, and lifesaving, information.
Utilizing open, non-proprietary architectures and applications, this
project will provide the Department with an improved mechanism for
distributing EAS and alert and warning messaging via digital television
and satellite to an expanded range of re-transmission media such as
cell phone service providers, computers, PDAs and other wireless
devices.
Through the use of a Geo-Targeted Alerting System (GTAS), which
uses reverse 911 technology, we will also test the ability to provide
targeted warning down to the individual household or business. This
proven technology will be conducted in the National Capital Region in
cooperation with NOAA's Forecast Systems Laboratory and DHS's National
Capitol Region Office.
While conducting proof of concept pilots for improving alert and
warning capabilities, we are simultaneously beginning to upgrade and
expand the Primary Entry Point broadcast stations from a ground-based
dial-up system to satellite transmission. This upgrade will expand the
location of entry point receiver stations and will ensure their
survivability in the event of a catastrophic attack on the homeland.
We recognize that there is no single solution set that will meet
everyone's alert and warning requirements, that is why FEMA, IAIP and
the Department has teamed up with NOAA, the FCC, and the private sector
to find the most appropriate interoperable solutions to develop an
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS). We believe that
IPAWS, using digital technology in combination with upgraded Primary
Entry Point EAS capabilities, will provide Federal, state and local
emergency managers and leaders with the tools they need to protect
America from both man--made and natural disasters. At the same time we
are aware of the concerns of our state partners who have invested in
their own alert and warning systems. With that in mind, IPAWS is
intended to be fully interoperable with those systems using common
alerting protocols
Mr. Chairman, these are just some examples of how FEMA and the
Department of Homeland Security has taken seriously its responsibility
to ensure the quick and accurate dissemination of alert and warning
information to our homeland security partners and the American public.
Thank you again for the invitation to speak, for your support of
the Department's mission, and for your interest in the Emergency Alert
System. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Shadegg. Mr. Dailey.
STATEMENT OF JAMES DAILEY, DIRECTOR OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Mr. Dailey. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
members of the subcommittee. I am James Dailey, Director of the
Enforcement Bureau's Office of Homeland Security at the Federal
Communications Commission, and I appreciate the opportunity to
come before you today to talk about the Emergency Alert System.
For over 50 years, the United States has had a mechanism in
place for the President to communicate with the public in the
event of a national emergency. Throughout this time, it has
been the FCC's responsibility to ensure that the broadcast
media had the capability to deliver Presidential emergency
notification. That mechanism is the Emergency Alert System.
In general, the Commission's rules prescribe technical
standards for EAS, procedures for radio and television stations
and cable systems to follow in the event EAS is activated, and
the EAS testing protocols. The current Emergency Alert System
requires radio, television, and cable systems to deliver a
Presidential activation of EAS, but their use of EAS and in
response to State and local emergencies, while encouraged, is
only voluntary.
Though the Cold War is behind us, we face a new homeland
security threat, and the Commission is acutely aware of the
importance to the American public of timely and effective
emergency warnings. Exciting changes are occurring in all
communications medium as the digital migration continues to
sweep across the technological landscape. As a result of these
changes, EAS has recently been the subject of extensive
examination. A broad range of issues have been raised by
citizens, the Commission's own Federal Advisory Committee, the
Media Security and Reliability Council, public and private
partnerships such as the Partnership of Public Warning, and our
Federal and State partners.
To ensure that we do our part to contribute an efficient
and up-to-date public alert and warning system, last month the
Commission released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The NPRM
seeks comment on whether EAS is the most effective way to warn
the American public of an emergency and, if not, how the system
can be improved.
In the NPRM, the Commission raises broad questions about
whether the technical capabilities of EAS are consistent with
the Commission's mission to ensure that public warning take
full advantage of current and emerging technologies. The NPRN
also addresses the issue of the permissive nature of EAS at the
State and local level and seeks comment on whether the
voluntary nature of State and local EAS participation is
appropriate in today's world.
Additionally, there are other various issues upon which the
Commission seeks comment. For example, what the respective
roles of the Federal departments and agencies involved in the
implementation of EAS should be, how the delivery pipeline for
public warning can be made more secure and how it can be
tested, how both emergency managers and the public can utilize
a public warning system in the most effective manner, and how a
public warning system can most effectively provide warnings to
the disabled community and communities for whom English is a
second language. Indeed, a key focus is how to reach each and
every citizen with the right emergency alert and warning
information at the right time.
The FCC has and will continue through the NPRM proceeding
to coordinate with DHS, FEMA, NOAA, and others. We anticipate
that our Federal partners will be active participants in the
proceedings. In addition to seeking comments from all
interested individuals and Federal entities, we specifically
seek the participation of State and local emergency management
agencies and other interested parties; and, finally, we seek
input from all elements of the communications sector interested
in developing a more effective alert and warning
infrastructure.
As Chairman Powell noted in his statement supporting the
EAS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the NPRN is, quote, one of
many vehicles by which we collectively explore the most
effective mechanism for warning the American public of an
emergency and the role of EAS as we move further into our
digital future, unquote.
We look forward to working with Congress, Federal, State,
and local emergency managers, industry, the public, and others
to ensure that we can provide such a warning system to the
American people. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
to appear before you today, and I will pleased to answer any
questions you and the members may have.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you very much, Mr. Dailey.
[The statement of Mr. Dailey follows:]
Prepared Statement of James A. Dailey
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF JAMES DAILEY'S STATEMENT
Since the Cold War era, the United States has had a mechanism in
place for the President to communicate with the public in the event of
a national emergency. Throughout this time it has been the FCC's role
to ensure that our licensees have the capability to deliver a
Presidential level activation. Under the current Emergency Alert
System, (known as EAS) all analog broadcast radio, television and cable
systems are required to deliver a Presidential level activation of EAS,
but their use of EAS in response to State and local emergencies, while
encouraged, is voluntary.
Though the cold war is behind us, we still face homeland security
threats and are acutely aware of the importance of timely and effective
warnings. In addition, there are exciting changes in our communications
medium as the digital migration continues to sweep across our country.
As a result of these changes, EAS has recently been the subject of much
examination. A broad range of issues have been raised by citizens, the
Commission's federal advisory group the Media Security and Reliability
Council, public/private partnerships such as the Partnership for Public
Warning, and our federal and state partners. To ensure that we do our
part to contribute to an efficient and technologically current public
alert and warning system that can alert each and every citizen the
Commission recently released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
that seeks comment on whether the current EAS is the most effective way
to warn the American public of an emergency and, if not, how the system
can be improved.
In the NPRM, the Commission raises broad questions about whether
the technical capabilities of EAS are consistent with the Commission's
mission to ensure that public warning take full advantage of current
and emerging technologies, particularly digital broadcast media. In the
NPRM, the Commission also addresses the issue of the permissive nature
of EAS at the state and local level and seeks comment on whether the
voluntary nature of the state and local EAS structure is appropriate in
today's world. Additionally, there are various miscellaneous issues
upon which the Commission seeks comment. For example, what the
respective roles of the federal government departments and agencies
involved in the implementation of EAS should be, how the delivery
pipeline for public warning can be made more secure and how it can be
tested, how both emergency managers and the public can use and respond
to a public warning system in the most effective manner, and how a
public warning system can most effectively provide emergency warnings
to the disabled community and communities for whom English is a second
language. Indeed, a key focus is how to reach each and every citizen.
The issues addressed in the NPRM have been coordinated with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, (FEMA), and with the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and its component, the National
Weather Service (NWS). The Commission values these agencies' continued
participation in our review of EAS.
As Chairman Powell noted in his statement supporting the EAS Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, the EAS NPRM is ``one of many vehicles by which
we collectively explore the most effective mechanism for warning the
American public of an emergency and the role of EAS as we move further
into our digital future.'' We look forward to working with Congress,
our colleagues at other Federal and State agencies, and the public to
ensure that we can provide such a warning system to our citizens.
Written Statement of James A. Dailey
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee:
Good morning. I am James A. Dailey, Director of the Enforcement
Bureau's Office of Homeland Security at the Federal Communications
Commission. I welcome this opportunity to appear before you to discuss
the Emergency Alert System (known as EAS).
As Chairman Powell recently testified before the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, the FCC is committed to play
our part in protecting our homeland and has designated Homeland
Security as one of the Commission's six strategic goals, with
particular attention to public safety and private sector readiness. The
Commission is well aware that an effective public alert and warning
system is an essential element of emergency preparedness, and that such
a system is impossible without effective private sector participation.
Accordingly, the Commission has been working with other Federal
agencies and the private sector to ensure that the American public is
provided with a robust, efficient and technologically current alert and
warning system. This morning, I will provide you with a brief history
of EAS and review the Commission's recent efforts to enhance and
improve the system.
BACKGROUND
Since the early days of the Cold War, it has been the policy of the
United States to ensure a mechanism exists whereby the President can
notify the American Public in the event of a national emergency. This
mechanism began in 1951 when President Truman established CONELRAD,
which stands for Control of Electromagnetic Radiation. This early
system had a two-fold purpose: one, to warn the public of an imminent
attack; and two, to limit broadcasting and thus restrict the ability of
enemy missiles to use broadcasters as targeting beacons. Subsequent
systems, such as CONELRAD's replacement, the Emergency Broadcast
System, established in 1963 by President Kennedy, and the current
Emergency Alert System were not designed to thwart attack, but were
still based on the perceived need to have a sole, last resort method
for the President to contact the American public in time of emergency,
when other communication channels may be unavailable. The national
Presidential message that is the foundation of EAS relies on delivery
through analog radio and television broadcast stations and wired and
wireless cable systems, and when activated, would override all other
broadcasts or cable transmissions, national and local, to deliver an
audio message from the White House. This system, mandatory at the
national level, is also available on a voluntary basis for states and
localities to deliver local emergency notification.
CURRENT OPERATION OF THE EAS SYSTEM
The Federal Communications Commission, in conjunction with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Weather
Service (NWS), implements EAS at the federal level. The respective
roles currently are based on a 1981 Memorandum of Understanding between
FEMA, NWS, and the Commission, on a 1984 Executive Order, and on a 1995
Presidential Statement of Requirements.
EAS mandates only delivery of a ``Presidential message'' and the
Commission's EAS rules primarily are concerned with the implementation
of EAS in this national role. In general, the Commission's rules
prescribe: (1) technical standards for EAS; (2) procedures for radio
and television broadcast stations and cable systems to follow in the
event EAS is activated; and (3) EAS testing protocols. Under the rules,
national activation of EAS for a Presidential message is designed to
provide the President the capability to transmit within ten minutes
from any location at any time, and must take priority over any other
message and preempt other messages in progress. Commission rules
mandate EAS obligations only for analog radio and television stations,
and wired and wireless cable television systems. Other systems,
including, for example, low earth orbit satellite systems, paging,
direct broadcast satellite (DBS), digital television (DTV), satellite
Digital Audio Radio service (satellite DARS), and In-Band-On-Channel
Digital Audio Broadcasting (IBOC DAB) currently have no EAS
requirements.
Activation of the national-level EAS rests solely with the
President. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act authorizes the President to make provisions for
emergency preparedness communications and dissemination of warnings to
governmental authorities and the civilian population in areas
endangered by disasters. This authority has been delegated to the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Undersecretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response as director of FEMA. FEMA acts as the White
House's executive agent for the development, operations, and
maintenance of the national level EAS and is responsible for
implementation of the national level activation of EAS, as well as EAS
tests and exercises. Further, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, through the National Weather Service, makes extensive
use of EAS to report weather and other emergencies.
EAS is essentially a hierarchal distribution system. FEMA has
designated 34 radio broadcast stations as Primary Entry Point (PEP)
stations. At the request of the President, FEMA distributes
``Presidential Level'' messages to these PEP stations. As the entry
point for national level EAS messages, the PEP stations are monitored
in turn by other stations in the hierarchical chain. Broadcast stations
and cable systems are required to monitor at least two EAS sources for
Presidential alerts, as specified in their state EAS plans. Initiating
an EAS message, whether at the national, state, or local level, is
accomplished via dedicated EAS equipment. The EAS equipment provides a
method for automatic interruption of regular programming and is capable
of providing warnings in the primary language that is used by the
station or cable system.
State Emergency Communications Committees and Local Emergency
Communications Committees, comprised of emergency management personnel
and volunteers from industry, may be established in each state and
territory to prepare coordinated emergency communications systems and
to develop state and local emergency communications plans and
procedures making use of the EAS protocol and other Public Alert and
Warning systems the state may use in combination with EAS. These
committees also establish authentication procedures and the date and
time of the required monthly EAS tests. FCC rules accommodate these
state and local alert codes--such as the Amber alert code adopted by
the FCC in 2002.
Along with its primary role as a national public warning system,
EAS--and other emergency notification mechanisms--are part of an
overall public alert and warning system, over which FEMA exercises
jurisdiction. EAS use as part of such a public warning system at the
state and local levels, while encouraged, is merely voluntary. Thus,
although Federal, state, and local governments, and the consumer
electronics industry are taking steps to ensure that alert and warning
messages can be delivered by a responsive, robust and redundant system,
at the state and local level the voluntary nature of EAS has resulted
in an inconsistent application of EAS as a component of an overall
public alert and warning system for the American public. The public
receive most of their alert and warning information through the
broadcaster's and cable systems' voluntary activations of the EAS
system on behalf of state and local emergency managers.
CURRENT ISSUES
The communications landscape is now drastically different from the
Cold War era when EAS and its predecessors were originally conceived.
Thus, the top down, one size fits all EAS approach may no longer be
appropriate. Also, the introduction of wireless and digital
technologies has broadened significantly the media through which public
alert and warning can be delivered.
Under Chairman Powell's leadership in the period after the tragic
events of 9/11, the Commission, through the Homeland Security Policy
Council, and more recently, the Enforcement Bureau's Office of Homeland
Security, has worked to provide leadership to the industries the
Commission regulates to evaluate and strengthen the Communications
infrastructure. One of the most visible results of this effort is the
Media Security and Reliability Council (known as MSRC), a Federal
Advisory Committee created by the Commission in March 2002, and
comprised of leaders from the radio, television, multi-channel video,
public safety and disabled communities.
In March 2004, the MSRC's Public Communications and Safety Working
Group reported on the efficacy of EAS as a public warning mechanism.
The Partnership for Public Warning (known as PPW), a not-for-profit,
public-private partnership incorporated in January 2002, with the goal
of promoting and enhancing effective, integrated dissemination of
public warnings, provided another analysis. Both MSRC's Working Group
and PPW advocate upgrading, not replacing, EAS. In particular, PPW
asserts that any new public warning system design should take advantage
of the existing EAS infrastructure and should be able to accommodate
existing EAS equipment, noting that it would be difficult to replace or
rebuild such a capability today at a reasonable cost.
RULEMAKING PROCEEDING
Based in large part on the recommendations of the MSRC Working
Group and PPW, the Commission, on August 4, 2004 adopted a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NRPM) to treat, in a comprehensive fashion, the
efficacy of EAS and the role of EAS as part of an overall public alert
and warning structure. The NPRM seeks comment on whether EAS as
currently constituted is the most effective and efficient public
warning system that best takes advantage of appropriate technological
advances and best responds to the public's need to obtain timely
emergency information. The NPRM also seeks comment on rules the
Commission may adopt to enhance the effectiveness of EAS. The
Commission encourages commenters to take into account MSRC's and PPW's
recommendations.
One of the central issues on which the Commission seeks comment is
the current role of EAS in an age when the communications landscape has
evolved from what it was when EAS predecessors--and EAS itself--were
originally conceived. In the NPRM, the Commission also seeks comment on
the future roles of the federal government departments and agencies
involved in the implementation of EAS.
The NPRM asks questions about the technical capabilities of EAS.
New technologies, such as digital television, cellular technology, and
personal digital assistants are rapidly redefining the communication
and broadcast landscape, making available to the public warning
technologies that are far more flexible and effective than the analog
mechanism currently employed by EAS. Because EAS relies almost
exclusively on delivery through analog radio and television broadcast
stations and cable systems, the NPRM asks whether EAS is outdated, how
it could be made more efficient, and whether it should it be phased out
in favor of a new model. Further, the Notice queries: If a new model
were to be adopted, what legal and practical barriers must be overcome
to ensure its implementation and effectiveness? What technologies
should serve as the basis for such a model? Alternatively, should EAS
requirements be extended to other services, such as digital TV, digital
audio broadcast, digital audio radio, or cellular telephones? The NPRM
also seeks comment on security issues relevant to EAS and on the
important question of how best to supply an effective public warning
system to the disabled community and non-English speakers.
The FCC already has begun--and will continue throughout this
proceeding--to coordinate with DHS and its component, FEMA, and the
Department of Commerce and its component, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's National Weather Service. We anticipate
these federal partners will be active participants in the proceeding.
In addition to seeking comments from all interested individuals and
federal entities on the issues raised in the NPRM, we specifically seek
the participation of state and local emergency planning organizations
and solicit their views. Finally, we seek input from all
telecommunications industries concerned about developing a more
effective EAS. Comments are due October 29, 2004; reply comments are
due November 29, 2004.
CONCLUSION
As Chairman Powell noted in his statement the EAS NPRM is ``one of
many vehicles by which we collectively explore the most effective
mechanism for warning the American public of an emergency and the role
of EAS as we move further into our digital future.'' We look forward to
working with Congress, our colleagues at other Federal and State
agencies, and the public to ensure that we can provide such a warning
system to our citizens.
The FCC is also aware that the Congress is taking an active
interest in the issue of public alert and warning, and would welcome
Congressional guidance in this area that would bring added certainty to
the industry. The Commission stands ready to provide whatever technical
assistance that the Congress would find helpful in this regard.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you
today. This concludes my testimony and I would be pleased to answer any
questions you or the other members may have.
Mr. Shadegg. Ms. Henning.
STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN HENNING, CERTIFIED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Ms. Henning. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Shadegg, and
Ranking Member Thompson and the distinguished members of the
committee for allowing me the opportunity to testify on
emergency warning for public responders and the public from the
perspective of emergency managers.
I am Kathleen Henning. I am President of K.G. Henning &
Associates. I am a board certified emergency manager. I have
recently retired from Montgomery County Maryland after 29 and a
half years of service as the emergency manager; and I am here
today to testify on behalf of the International Association of
Emergency Managers, Daryl Spiewak, our President, and the 2,800
city and county emergency managers that make up our
association. I appreciate your holding this hearing on what is
a very important issue to us, and I would like for my full
statement to be made a part of the record.
As they say, life is very short, and we should eat dessert
first, so I am going to actually begin my statement with some
of the things that I have put in my summary document.
There is clearly a role for the media, for government, for
private and public partnerships when it comes to emergency
warning, and we need to employ a comprehensive system, but we
also need to make sure that it is integrated and that it is
coordinated with State and local officials. While there are
sirens that may work for some communities around nuclear power
plants or chemical facilities, sirens are not going to be very
effective in other jurisdictions, in large communities with
multi-hazards. Weather radios--the NOAA weather radios work
very well in most of the country, but the problem is that the
citizens are not really using these radios to the best
advantage. We really need to have a concerted national effort
to get these important tools into vulnerable institutions such
as hospitals and nursing homes and our schools and essential
government facilities.
The EAS system clearly needs some work and has not been
effectively utilized across the country. We need to have
improved coordination with State and local officials, and we
need to have mandatory capabilities for overriding and putting
in emergency messages.
We are also challenged by the mobility of our communities
today. People move across jurisdictional lines. As responders,
we have to go across jurisdictional lines. So it is very
important that we take advantage of all the technologies that
are out there--the cell phones, the telephones, the reverse 911
systems, the automated notification systems, the blackberries
and other technologies that are out there and must be made
available on a 24/7 basis. We need to look at all of these
systems, but the systems, in order to be effective, have to be
reliable, effective, redundant, and appropriate to our
community needs.
Some of the things that we would like to emphasize in
looking at these systems are to make sure that we use an all
hazards approach and that we stay connected. After September
11th, we as a community looked at homeland security issues. We
need to stay connected with our Federal officials, need to stay
connected with our State officials, need to stay connected with
our local officials, need to stay connected, most importantly,
with the clients we serve, who are the citizens. We have to not
say ``what if'' but anticipate that there will be major
disruptions to power and have systems that can work despite
that.
We are facing new challenges. I was part of the EOC that
responded to the sniper attacks that affected Washington, D.C.,
and one of the things that was very important to us and that
was successful was getting messages out to the schools to make
sure that they could lock down quickly.
We have already experienced the problems of bioterrorism,
the anthrax attacks, for example. There were public health
officials who couldn't talk to other public health officials
directly across lines. And that is one of the areas, for
example, where you are not going to be very effective if you
are only using sound bites. You really are going to need to put
out more detailed information to be able to share that
information.
I have mentioned the mobility of our citizens and that FEMA
is asking us to look at warning issues through mutual aid
agreements and other plans. I think we need to improve our
public partnerships.
The State Director of Emergency Management in Florida,
Craig Fugate, said last year, you can purchase a lot of
equipment, you can train your emergency managers, but if you
can't reach the people at 3:00 in the morning, you are just not
going to effectively improve the outcome. And that is what we
need to do. We need to have a system that can reach our people
24 hours a day and that is integrated with State and local
officials.
I want to thank you very much for the opportunity to come
and testify today, and I am glad to answer any questions that
you have at the end of our statements. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you very much for your opening
statement.
[The statement of Ms. Henning follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kathleen Henning
Introduction
Thank you Chairman Shadegg and Ranking Member Thompson, and
distinguished members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity
to provide you with testimony on Emergency Warning Systems, and ways to
notify the public from the perspective of the Emergency Management
community.
I am Kathleen Henning, President of K.G.Henning & Associates, a
certified emergency manager, and retired Program Coordinator of
Montgomery County, Maryland Office of Emergency Management. I retired
last February as the Emergency Manager after 29 1/2 years of service to
the County. I am here today representing IAEM President Daryl Spiewak
of Waco, Texas, and the International Association of Emergency Managers
(IAEM). Currently, I am a member of the IAEM Governmental Affairs
Committee and I come before you today to represent the 2800 city and
county emergency management professionals in the 50 states and the U.S.
territories who are its core members. IAEM's members are responsible
for emergency preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery
activities and report to elected officials to ensure the public is
warned in times of emergency. We appreciate your holding this hearing
and focusing attention on this important issue.
All Hazards Approach
The International Association of Emergency Managers takes the
position that the focus for public alerts and warnings must maintain an
All-Hazards Approach. We have all been reminded of the importance of
warnings for hurricanes, floods, and tornadoes by Hurricanes Charley,
Francis, and Ivan. IAEM President Daryl Spiewak, CEM, reminds us that
in addition to dealing with these deadly and destructive storms, our
emergency managers continue to deal with other all hazard issues such
as extreme summer heat, wildland fires, power losses, early winter
storms, hazardous materials events, transportation and utility
disruptions, as well as terrorist threats and activities.
Need to Stay Connected
In a post September 11th world, where citizen populations and
public infrastructure may increasingly be targets for acts of violence,
it is critically important to remain connected to both federal and
local sources of information.
Disruptions to power and utilities, whether from severe weather--or
from threats to homeland security--require redundant emergency alert
and warning systems.
New Era of Homeland Security
Citizens are facing new challenges on the home front. During the
Sniper Attacks in the National Capital Region, Montgomery County,
Maryland, relied on a number of means to alert its citizens. The
Emergency Operations Center was activated as information was collected
and evaluated from Police and Fire officials. Especially important was
the existing emergency management partnership with the schools which
allowed rapid dissemination of alert information to school officials to
warn elementary and secondary schools to lock down. Federal Bureau of
Investigation officials and County Police held televised joint press
conferences to ensure information was shared among agencies and
consistent information was given to citizens. Citizens and government
officials relied on the broadcast industry for detailed coverage of the
unfolding event. In addition government officials used the media to
convey warnings about potential suspects and important safety
information. The Sniper Attacks demonstrated how coordination would be
handled across jurisdictional lines.
Bioterrorist Event
Similarly, in the event of a bioterrorist attack there would need
to coordination among health officials and various governmental
organizations. Quarantine and isolation measures might need to be
quickly implemented to stop the rapid spread of diseases such as
smallpox. Specific and detailed information would need to be promptly
delivered to millions of individuals for certain public strategies such
as quarantines to be effective.
Mobility and Interoperability Challenges
Warning information is important not only to the individuals in
harm's way, but also to their families, employers, and others who
travel through the area. Our citizens are highly mobile and often move
between jurisdictions. Information about what is happening in other
jurisdictions is also important to local responders. The efforts of the
Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency to increase the use of mutual aid agreements make it critically
important that there be a broader and more rapid sharing of emergency
information among the jurisdictions which may be involved. The need to
maintain readiness without compromising our capability to respond to
threats of terrorism means this information may need to be rapidly and
effectively exchanged in a secure environment among emergency
management organizations. Some communities have the capability to
provide warnings to their citizens from a broad range of hazards. But
statewide warning systems are often incomplete or non-existent. Part of
the warning system must include the ability of counties and large
cities to provide rapid information to smaller municipalities and
townships where appropriate. We need to expand our capability to
activate cell phones, pagers, Blackberries, and call telephones on a
twenty-four hour basis. As noted before, it is time to look to new
technologies to meet the needs of our citizens.
Tools of the Trade
Local governments through their Offices of Emergency Management are
accountable for warning the public of imminent danger and should have
the tools to do the job. These tools vary and may include: partnerships
with the National Weather Service and local broadcast stations; use of
the Internet and World Wide Web access alert systems; automated
notification systems; outdoor warning systems like sirens; and. when
needed--door-to-door notifications by Police, Fire and other public
safety officials. While sirens may work in some communities well versed
in a single hazard such as a nuclear power plant, a chemical plant, or
tornadoes, they are not effective for multiple hazards. A high degree
of public awareness is vital to the success of sirens. It is time to
look to new technologies to meet the needs of our citizens. Warning
systems need to be reliable, effective, redundant, and appropriate to
local needs with clearly devised messages. An integration of several
systems is still the most effective overall strategy for warning
systems.
NOAA Weather Radios and Vulnerable Groups
IAEM supports the partnership of NWS and the Emergency Alerting
System (EAS), but encourages improvements to the current system. NOAA
Weather Radio remains the NWS's primary input to EAS. The NWS provides
weather, hydrologic and climate forecasts and warnings for the United
States and its territories. Because we are linked so closely together
as a country, our economy is impacted by weather and events that happen
across state lines and on opposite sides of the country, and as such,
it is important to maintain this national information source. State and
local authorities want the ability to input messages for all types of
hazardous events on EAS and be able to remotely access the equipment at
all hours of the day. Craig Fugate, Director of Emergency Management
for the State of Florida has said ``You can purchase a lot of equipment
and do a lot of training for first responders, but if you can't warn
the public at 3:00AM, you haven't really improved the outcome of the
event.'' To support state and local officials, there is an immediate
need for mitigation and prevention funds to support the purchase of
NOAA Weather Radios for elementary and secondary schools, vulnerable
facilities, and for essential governmental buildings. Some communities
have used FEMA mitigation funds to purchase radios for schools
throughout their district while others, such as the State of Maryland,
used the FEMA mitigation funds to provide radios for schools throughout
the state. In Kansas City, Project Community Alert partnered with a
major grocery chain to sell over 30,000 radios to the community and
used mitigation funds for three Kansas and five Missouri counties to
purchase the radios for high risk facilities. We would like to see
these types of programs expanded with partnerships with private
industry to encourage the use of NOAA radios in all schools, day cares,
nursing homes, hospitals, public safety buildings, and general public
facilities. A concerted national commitment is needed to expand the use
of these radios in all occupied structures but especially in vulnerable
institutions and essential government buildings.
NOAA for Homeland Security Events
We would like to see the use of NOAA Weather Alert Radios as a
major method of alerting the public on homeland security events. The
Department of Homeland Security has been working with NOAA to designate
them as a means of public warning and we would encourage the expansion
and support of that project. Reaching vulnerable populations is
critically important. NOAA radios provide the added protection of round
the clock 24/7 immediate notice.
EAS
Emergency Managers need a fast, reliable way to inject messages
into the Emergency Alert System (EAS). At this time no single technical
solution has been federally mandated or funded to do this. Local
jurisdictions adopt warning systems customized to meet their own needs.
Decentralization has resulted in a lack of standardization of messages
and confusion in public awareness. But there can be benefits to
multiple interfaces. For example, using multiple interfaces with the
NWS's Weather Forecast Offices? Advanced Weather Interactive Processing
System (AWIPS) provides redundancy if a primary system goes down due to
hurricanes or other severe weather. Having multiple centers on
different servers can also provide a degree of protection from computer
viruses and hackers. Another issue for EAS is the need for improved
coordination and integration with state and local resources. While
Homeland Security would clearly dictate the need to activate the
system, there are numerous smaller events that warrant its use. Without
more frequent use and testing, the system's inadequacies will not be
corrected for use with homeland security. Improvements are needed for
Emergency Operations Center and Public Safety Dispatch center
installations, as well as training of personnel on its use.
Internet Access
Use of the Internet and World Wide Web is especially valuable in
the preparedness phase of an emergency to advise citizens to update
family emergency notification lists, restock disaster kits, and ensure
special needs are handled. More importantly state and local emergency
management and government websites provide specific and more detailed
information customized for local needs. This includes evacuation and
egress routes, site-specific data about environmental conditions, road
closings, or hazardous conditions. The Internet provides access to
Doppler Weather Radar, satellite imagery, and hazardous weather
conditions critical to the safety of first responders, if the
information can get to the responders in a timely fashion.
Media Role and Evacuations
There is a role for media broadcasters, especially in helping to
educate the public. A positive role is providing pre-event storm
messages to the public on the differences in meaning from weather
advisories, watches, and warnings. Similarly they can assist in
encouraging preparedness measures. However, during emergencies it is
critically important that the media carefully coordinate with local
officials for announcements about protective actions. This coordination
is vital to avoid confusing the public with contradictory messages on
important issues. In addition, images of newscasters standing on
beaches during high winds may send conflicting messages about the
safety of seeking shelter or following evacuation orders. Studies have
indicated that people consider a wide variety of factors in making
their evacuation decision. According to a study by Dr. Kirstin Dow
``the media--especially the Weather Channel--is viewed as the most
reliable information source? and is highly influential in making
evacuation decisions. This points out how important the partnership
must be between the media and city and county officials who are issuing
evacuation orders.
NWS IT Interface
Among the diverse strategies available for warning is the National
Weather Service's effort to implement a centralized point of collection
for non-weather related emergency messages. These would be broadcast
over existing NWS dissemination systems. The NWS is working on an All-
Hazards Emergency Message Collection System called HazCollect IT
system, expected to be released in the fall of 2005. HazCollect will
provide an IT interface between state and local systems such as EMnet
and the NWS Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System (AWIPS)
through FEMA's Disaster Management Interoperability Services.
Cable Access
Due the changes in viewing habits, more and more citizens now watch
cable and direct satellite programming, and it is equally important to
reach this audience with EAS messages. In the past IAEM has objected to
the practice of cable systems overriding broadcaster's programming of
state and local Emergency Alert System messages. Mandatory messages
would improve the early warning system.
Rural Communities
A great many communities across this country are sparsely
populated, rural, and with limited financial resources. Among the
resources they lack is a full-time dedicated emergency management
agency director and emergency alert systems capable of reaching
isolated populations. IAEM supports increases to the Emergency
Management Performance Grants (EMPG)--the only source of all hazard
federal funding supporting state and local government emergency
management personnel and organizations.
StormReady Program
The International Association of Emergency Managers supports the
NWS StormReady program, promoting adequate warning and alert systems,
effective Emergency Operations Centers, and prompt dispatch of public
safety resources. Encouraging communities to strive for StormReady
designation is a partnership which will help communities be better
prepared to save lives through emergency planning, effective warnings,
education, and awareness of severe weather conditions.
FCC
IAEM has not yet taken a position on the new regulations introduced
by FCC last month, but our members are reviewing the proposals.
Research and Development
There has always been a need for enhanced funding for research and
development for public warning capability. We believe it has to be
multi-faceted to be effective. We support research and development in
the various phases and elements of warning systems, but we do not want
it limited to promoting a single technology. Warnings need to be
reliable, effective, redundant, and appropriate to local needs and
flexible and adaptable to new technologies. We believe that having the
ability to integrate several systems is still the most effective
overall strategy, and research and development should look at the
integration issues as well.
Summary
There is clearly a role for the media, private sector, and
government, but those roles need to be coordinated and integrated.
While sirens may work in some areas, they would not be effective in
many other areas. Weather radios work well in most areas, but their use
by citizens is limited at best. A concerted national commitment is
needed to expand the use of NOAA radios in all schools, hospitals,
nursing homes, day and elder cares and other vulnerable institutions.
The EAS system needs work and improved integration with state and local
governmental entities. Today we are challenged by the mobility of our
population that moves across jurisdictions for homes, work, and
schools. We need to expand our capability to activate cell phones,
pagers, Blackberries, and call telephones on a twenty-four hour basis.
As noted before, it is time to look to new technologies to meet the
needs of our citizens. Warning systems need to be reliable, effective,
redundant, and appropriate to local needs with clearly devised
messages. IAEM supports an integration of several systems, in
coordination with state and local governments and organizations, as the
most effective overall strategy for warning systems.
Thank you again for the opportunity to participate in this
important hearing. I would be pleased to answer any question you have
and are available for any questions that you may have regarding this
presentation.
Mr. Shadegg. Mr. Hoover, let me begin with you.
I don't know if you referred to all of these, but I
understand FEMA has four pilot projects going on. I know you
mentioned the digital EAS pilot project in the Capitol region
with public television. There are three others, as I
understand: the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System
study, some $350,000; the EAS primary entry point satellite
network upgrade; and the Geo-Targeted Telephone Alert and
Warning System.
For consumers of this kind of information, how soon can we
expect these pilot projects to take us to the next step, that
is, the implementation of an improved warning system? As the
Ranking Member said, we are still dealing with somewhat of an
outdated, outmoded system, and it seems to me the American
people deserve to know not only that we are making progress but
what the time line for that progress is.
Mr. Hoover. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. And
we are making great progress, and I think you summed up
actually the four projects that we are doing.
There are two very critical things going on at the same
time. The first is this digital pilot that we are doing with
public television here in the National Capital Region. That is
a 6-month pilot; and we expect that the success of that pilot
will then be able to take it nationwide. So within the next 6
months we ought to be looking at is that system working to
provide us the digital backbone that the APTS has offered to
the Federal Government and to the Department of Homeland
Security basically free of charge to be good partners with us
in Homeland Security. That can then form the backbone of a
national digital system that is interoperable.
The other piece that is going on and is one of the findings
that the MSRC and also PPW, Partnership for Public Warning,
came up with was that we needed to improve and enhance the
current EAS system, that is, those 34 primary entry point
stations that I mentioned in my remarks. All of those folks
have said we don't need to create a new system, we need to
upgrade what we are doing. So with one of the four projects
that you mentioned is to start the upgrade from the dial-up
capability that we have now to a satellite-based system, and we
believe we will have that in place by the end of next year.
Mr. Shadegg. You mentioned in your testimony reverse 911.
Can you explain reverse 911 for the committee and the public?
Mr. Hoover. No.
Mr. Shadegg. That was the answer my staff gave me when I
asked that.
Mr. Hoover. Mr. Chairman, my understanding of the reverse
911, it builds on the capability to dial back to you from your
home, from your home phone number, similar to the caller ID.
And with my technical folks, maybe we can get you a much better
explanation.
But the specifics of what we are doing with this geo-
targeting capability takes the reverse 911 capability kind of
to the next level that we have--they have basically geo-coded
down to the individual household and business all of the phone
numbers in the area, and so we will be able to pinpoint
exactly, using plume modeling or any other model that is out
there, a telephone call back to somebody and give them a
particular warning or alert message. So we are very excited
about the technology that has already been proven and NOAA has
been demonstrating--I think in Houston is where they have used
it--and now we want to take that and try to integrate that into
the overall structure of the Integrated Public Alert and
Warning System.
Mr. Shadegg. AMBER alert has appeared to demonstrate pretty
stunning success so far. There have been 150 children
successfully recovered. Is AMBER alert the model for the future
in terms of these warning systems, or are there things that
should be taken from AMBER alert and expanded beyond that?
Mr. Hoover. I think the second part of your answer, Mr.
Chairman. AMBER alert is certainly one solution set that is out
there. And what we need, and I think the members have pointed
out, is we need to have a common alerting protocol so that as
whatever the messages are that are common across the board from
the State, from the local, and from the Federal Government as
we use the system, the model that the AMBER alert folks have
put forward, and certainly your State in Arizona with the AMBER
alert portal, certainly seems to be something we are interested
in; and we want to try to integrate a portal-like look to the
digital pilot that we are doing here in the National Capital
Region.
Mr. Shadegg. Mr. Dailey, is your role limited to setting up
the structure or are you active participants in creating the
system? And I guess I am thinking of specifically the ability
to use pagers, the ability to use this kind of a device for
notification, the ability to use cell phones for notification.
Mr. Dailey. We have multiple roles. The current system that
is mandated for the Presidential delivery is in the FCC rules.
The broadcasters must participate. They must install the
equipment. We inspect the broadcast stations on a random basis
to make sure the equipment is there and functional so that it
can be used by the President when needed. And, as you said, it
has never been used for that function. So when not used by the
President, it can be used on a voluntary basis. But the
equipment, the infrastructure is there.
So the questions that we ask in our Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking is, fundamentally, what do we need to do to mandate
or should we mandate participation in alert and warning at
various levels or can the marketplace forces and the community
forces be sufficient to provide an appropriate alert and
warning system?
Because we are really talking about several layers of alert
and warning. We have the Presidential or national alert warning
or, for the command structure of the country, a system whereby
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security can
address the Nation. Then you want an alert and warning system
that permits the governor the same option, and you want a
system that permits the mayor or the county emergency manager
or the county executive director to have that same option. So
you are talking about a layered system, and how we would
implement that and whether it needs to be mandated or not is
really the broad question.
Mr. Shadegg. Ms. Henning, although my time has expired, I
will try to get you in the second round. You are the consumer
on this panel who can tell us how these other gentlemen are
doing their jobs.
I would now call on Mr. Thompson, the Ranking Member, for
his questions.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would--Mr. Hoover, Mr. Dailey, you can choose which
one would want to go first, but since a lot of what we are
talking about came about because of 9/11, can you tell me why
we didn't have a Presidential alert on 9/11?
Mr. Hoover. The current EAS system was designed during the
Cold War; and I think, as one of the members pointed out, in
the 1950s it was designed to warn the Nation of an impending
nuclear strike on the country. It was designed to put the
President on a nationwide message to the country to tell them,
you know, that missiles are inbound or perhaps the missiles
have already struck and give critical information to the Nation
in time of emergency.
This September 11th attack--and I was not in the government
at the time. But the September 11th attack was not something
that the system was necessarily designed to use at the national
level but certainly could have been used at the State and local
level. There are provisions, as Mr. Dailey pointed out, for
State and local emergency managers to activate and use the
system, as well as the State governors could use the system if
they wanted to.
Mr. Thompson. Well, you know, some of us were directly
involved in it; and we saw no warning of any kind. And if
members of Congress didn't get any warning, you know, the
public is assuming that this system should work. And I guess
the question been answered.
The other part is, how many people actually got notified by
our emergency warning system on 9/11?
Mr. Hoover. Mr. Thompson, I don't know the answer to that,
but we can try to find the answer for you.
Mr. Thompson. Well, then I will take it another step. How
many could potentially have been warned under the existing
system?
Mr. Hoover. Mr. Thompson, under the existing system we
believe that we can reach at least 95 percent of the Nation.
Mr. Thompson. At 9/11.
Mr. Hoover. At 9/11, when the system that we currently
have, which is the system that we had in place on 9/11, the
system is designed through the 34 primary entry point stations
to reach 95 percent of the American public.
Mr. Thompson. But it is your testimony today that we didn't
use it.
Mr. Hoover. That is correct. We did not use it on September
11th at the national level.
Mr. Thompson. Well, that is kind of startling to have it
and not use it, and the public would assume--but we will go
forward. I understand that we put a working group together to
start looking at some of these issues around our emergency
warning system, and the White House report recommended that
this group be put together to do a single, consistent, easily
understood terminology, biohazards and situations. Had we put
that group together?
Mr. Hoover. I am not sure which group you are referring to,
but there have been a number of groups. The FCC has put
together a Media Security and Reliability Council that we have
been a part of to look at all of the issues surrounding
improving the EAS. And perhaps Mr. Dailey can talk a little bit
more on that.
I can tell you, from our perspective, we have brought
together members of the State and local government, we have met
with members of the media and our other partners within the
government, NOAA and IAIP, to develop what we believe is a very
useful and great potential solution to improving the current
state of the--
Mr. Thompson. Well, the specific report was a White House
report issued in 2000 that recommended a working group be
established. And my question is whether or not, to your
knowledge, was it ever established?
Mr. Hoover. No, I don't think so. But I will go back, and
we can check back on that.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. The report was entitled Effective
Disaster Warnings, and it was quite clear that certain things
ought to be handled.
The other issue speaks to the same White House report,
recommended that warnings should be delivered through as many
communication channels as practical so that the users who had
risks, inside or outside, at work, home, school, or shopping,
or in transportation--have we done that today?
Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir, we have. We are moving forward with
funding that was provided in the President's 2004 budget that
was $10 million dollars to IAIP. We have now developed the
capability to do that. We have not deployed that capability,
and we believe that using the digital backbone that the public
television service stations are offering to us, that we will be
able to do it.
Mr. Thompson. Just to follow up. How far are we from having
the system?
Mr. Hoover. We are within weeks of deploying a digital EAS
capability here in the National Capital Region, which will then
be able to reach the re-transmission medium. And I should point
out that we have also engaged the cell phone service providers
to be involved in that project so that we can not only talk to
folks or send messages out over the TV and radio but also call
you on your cell phone, your pager, your PDA.
Mr. Thompson. I understand. Capital Region. But what about
Mr. Cox in California?
Mr. Hoover. Mr. Cox in California does not yet have the
capability that we have--we are going to demonstrate here in
the National Capital Region. We believe that it will be
successful and that by the end of next year we will be able to
take that digital backbone and go nationwide with it.
Mr. Shadegg. By unanimous consent, the Ranking Member of
the full committee was to be afforded an opportunity to make an
opening statement. He has now arrived.
Mr. Turner, would you like to make any opening comments?
Mr. Turner. I am fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shadegg. The Chair would call upon the chairman of the
full committee, Mr. Cox, for questions.
Mr. Cox. Thank you.
I would just like to continue with Mr. Thompson's inquiry.
The digital capability that we are exploring is aimed in the
pilot project here in Washington at cell phones?
Mr. Hoover. Yes. Mr. Cox, what we are doing with the
Association for Public Television Stations and the public and
the digital capability that they are offering us is we are
trying to have an open architecture, non-proprietary system
that will be interoperable with State and local government and
other systems that States have already invested in.
Mr. Cox. Did you say 60 days is the length of the pilot?
Mr. Hoover. The pilot? Six months.
Mr. Cox. Six months. And will you demonstrate within a 6-
month period cell phone capability?
Mr. Hoover. Yes. We have been in active discussions with T-
Mobile, with Verizon and Nextel to be involved in and engaged
in the pilot project with us.
Mr. Cox. And do you know what happens if I am on a call?
Mr. Hoover. I do not.
Mr. Cox. Is this digital capability going to reach e-mail
devices?
Mr. Hoover. Yes.
Mr. Cox. And will the capability be demonstrated, for
example, on a Blackberry or on e-mail-equipped cell phones?
Mr. Hoover. Yes. And I should point out as well, we have
been in discussion with the Weather Channel, which has been a
great partner with FEMA over the years, in using some of their
capability. Because they also have that capability and have
demonstrated a nationwide capability to alert you on your cell
phone, on your pager, on your telephone of weather warnings in
your area. That is a subscription service, and we are very
interested in--next month in October--meeting with the Weather
Channel as a follow-up to integrate them into this as well.
Mr. Cox. How does the digital backbone open architecture
pilot address Ms. Henning's main point, that you have got to
reach people at 3:00 in the morning when they are asleep?
Mr. Hoover. Well, that is certainly one of the challenges.
And there are manufacturers that we are aware of that have
developed some capability--maybe Mr. Dailey can address that--
where that will turn on your television or turn on your radio
or shake the bed. And there is other technologies.
Mr. Cox. I was trying to make this an easy question. Most
people in America have telephones. Isn't that the good news?
Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cox. Can't we just call them?
Mr. Hoover. We can. And that is the reverse 911, that geo-
targeting technology.
Mr. Cox. Is that going to be part of this demonstration?
Mr. Hoover. Yes, it is.
Mr. Cox. So somebody can get a call at 3:00 in the morning
as part of this pilot?
Mr. Hoover. Potentially, yes, sir.
Mr. Cox. Hopefully not potentially, or we haven't
demonstrated much.
Now, on the existing system that was designed for the
President, my understanding is that legally, even though other
people can use this system, only the President can make it
mandatory. Is that right?
Mr. Hoover. Yes, that is correct. The Presidential message
is the only mandatory message that is required to be carried
over the system. But there are four priority messages. The
State governor has the capability to send a message as well.
But the Presidential message will always take priority.
Mr. Cox. When the governor decides to send a message, does
that also--is that also command and control? So it is not
discretionary for broadcasters?
Mr. Hoover. It is discretionary. Only the President's
message is a mandatory message.
Mr. Cox. I am just now thinking about a real emergency; and
if the ability to command the system is limited to the
President or his constitutionally designated successor and
there is something that happened to the President or the
President just happens to be carried someplace where he can't
access this, then we can't use it.
It is also limited to only 2 minutes. Isn't that right?
Mr. Hoover. No, the Presidential message, Mr. Cox, is an
unlimited message, and we do have the capability to reach
either the President or the statutory successor President from
anyplace to get that system activated.
Mr. Cox. Well, provided there is nothing wrong with him.
Mr. Hoover. Provided there is nothing wrong with the
President?
Mr. Cox. I mean, what you have got to operate here is
either the statutory succession process or you have got to have
the President constitutionally disabled. But anything short of
that and just that system is not going to work.
What I want to ask you is how much of that is a regulation
and how much of that can we clarify through executive action
and how much of it needs to be fixed by Congress?
Mr. Hoover. I would defer to Mr. Dailey to answer that
question.
Mr. Dailey. The short answer is I don't know. The basis of
the Emergency Alert System is a Presidential statement of
requirements that has been renewed over the years in which the
President requests to have the capability to address the public
within 10 minutes, and so the system is designed to do that.
Whether or not it will take legislation or changes in the
Presidential statement requirements to implement a more
enhanced or expanded service--
Mr. Cox. If you can get back to us, that is fine.
Mr. Dailey. Okay.
Mr. Cox. Now, the system is capable of being used
regionally. Under existing law and regulations, can the
President decide to use it regionally? Can we have a mandatory
use of the system that does not operate nationwide?
Mr. Hoover. I don't know the mechanics of that, Mr. Cox,
but we can find the answer--and maybe you do. I don't know, if
we turn it on at the national level, if that automatically
every station has to carry or if it can be regionalized.
Mr. Cox. My time has expired. I appreciate your answer and
look forward to the follow-up information.
Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important that the
President not be the only person in extremis who might be able
to issue these warnings, that there ought to be a process that
the President is comfortable with for this to operate without
interruption.
I also think it is very important, as we have found in so
many other hearings in this committee, that such a system be
able to operate regionally and that it not be a discretionary
system in that situation.
Mr. Shadegg. I think the regional operation is very, very
important.
Mr. Hoover, you mentioned the ability to remotely turn on
the television, and you actually touched on a topic that is
very sensitive. Whenever I want to reach my wife, she has her
cell phone off. And I have warned her that I am going to invent
a cell phone that I can turn on remotely so that when I need to
reach her I can remotely turn on her cell phone and reach her.
And, apparently, somebody is already working on that, so I need
to talk to those people.
Mr. Hoover. Mr. Chairman, if I may, my technical folks and
the guy that really runs the system tells me that the signal
can be--the EAS message can be regionalized when we turn it on.
Mr. Shadegg. I think most husbands in America would buy
this cell phone and give it to their wives to turn it on
remotely, because I am not the only husband who has this
problem.
The Chair would call on the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Etheridge, for questions.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not going to
turn the test the cell phone, turning it off or on. I have
enough trouble keeping mine off.
Thank you, and thank you all for being here.
Let me follow up on some of the questioning as it relates
to notification. Because we had a system in the 1950s that
hasn't been upgraded. It is quite obvious you wouldn't want to
drive a car--there aren't many on the road--built in the 1950s,
truthfully. My question is this. Because, as we deal with--our
country has changed dramatically since the 1950s. Languages
have changed, the ability to--are we looking at how we can send
this signal out in more than English, especially regionally,
where areas are changing dramatically in terms of patterns of
language?
Mr. Dailey. Yes, sir. That is one of the questions
specifically that we ask in our Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
is how we can address that.
Mr. Etheridge. Is that now being done currently, in the
current warning system?
Mr. Dailey. In the current warning system, the broadcast
stations--our rules permit them to broadcast alerts and
warnings in the primary language of the station. So we--
previously, it was--the anticipation was that everything would
be done in English. But we changed our rules years ago to
permit a primarily Spanish language station--to permit it to
carry its warnings in Spanish for its constituents.
Mr. Etheridge. Well, it seems to me, having had a radio
station at one time, it is very simple just to say to them when
they send the message out, because it is broadcast by the
Federal Government on emergencies--it seems to me to be a very
simple matter. When you send it in English, repeat it in
Spanish. That doesn't cost any money, right?
Mr. Dailey. Well, there has to be the capability to do that
conversion, which costs--I mean, you are talking about the
staff time to do it.
Mr. Etheridge. No, you misunderstand it. When you send it
out to the radio and media markets, when you send one signal
and you turn that signal on, the signal can be in English and
it can be in Spanish, if that be the language that is
predominant. That is not a problem, right?
Mr. Dailey. That is correct.
Mr. Etheridge. So why aren't we doing it?
Mr. Dailey. The primary alert warning system input is
spoken language, and so the simultaneous translation becomes
the technology issue.
Mr. Etheridge. That was not the issue. You can give it in
English, and then you can give it in Spanish. It seems to me
that is pretty simple. Would you agree?
Mr. Dailey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Etheridge. Who do we need to contact to get that done?
Mr. Dailey. I think we have to talk to the Emergency
Management Association. Ms. Henning may be able to comment on
that. Because the people who have the information and who have
the alert and warning are the people who can make that
conversion, control the content.
Mr. Etheridge. We are talking about apples and oranges
here. What I am talking about, when the message comes out to
the radio stations, the TV stations, the other media activate--
it is activated somewhere. You test it on a monthly basis.
Mr. Dailey. Yes.
Mr. Etheridge. It seems to me it is very simple. When they
read it, we could read it in English, and then we could read it
in Spanish. Could someone help me with that? I mean, I really
don't understand why that can't be done, because I have been on
the receiving end when it was activated.
Mr. Cox. Would the gentleman yield? I have a question.
If these are interruptions to normal programming, isn't it
a fair assumption that somebody who doesn't speak Chinese isn't
listening to a Chinese language station, or somebody who
doesn't speak Spanish isn't listening to that Spanish language
station? So that the approach, Mr. Dailey, I thought I heard
you say you were taking already, would make more sense, which
is that those messages get broadcast in the language that the
person was just listening to before you interrupted.
Mr. Etheridge. Reclaiming my time.
Mr. Chairman, I can agree with that. But when you are
watching TV, in many cases--TV is a different medium than
radio, because I would assume it would be on radio. But, on TV,
that may be the only one you have. And it is a very simple
matter, I think, to add it; and I hope you will check into that
and get back to me in writing. I will settle for that.
Ms. Henning, let me ask you a question. Because when the
Montgomery, Maryland, emergency problems were going on as it
was with the sniper, you were there and involved in that. Let
me give a couple questions and give you a chance to respond
before my time runs out.
During the attack, would you describe some of the obstacles
you had to overcome to get fast, accurate information to the
schools and to the parents? Because the whole community was
involved, but this was a group that was really on the edge. And
what did you do to overcome them?
And, secondly, what recommendations do you have to counties
and municipalities to change the communication you are sending
out that would really help make a difference? I think this is
one of those areas we tend to forget sometimes, and you have a
lot of people in an area that really don't get the information.
Ms. Henning. Thank you, sir.
On that day, it was a very difficult and very challenging
situation. The information came very quickly into our 911
center, and so we were able to put it out to the emergency fire
department, to police, and other public safety agencies into
the emergency operation center and through networks out to the
schools, so that the schools and the administrators were
getting the information.
But when you begin to talk about the information out to the
public, that was an entirely different issue. We were not able
to use the Emergency Alert System. It was not set up. The
equipment was not in full operation at the time. We made calls
from our public information office immediately to the broadcast
industries who started putting the information out, and we got
scrolls across the TV, and then the story was picked up. We
were able to utilize the ability of having frequent press
conferences to get the information out to the public and to
advise the public to take the protective measures.
It would have been extremely helpful had we had the ability
to put information out to pagers PDA devices cell phones, and
others devices, but we didn't have that capability coming out
of our 911 center, and we had to rely on what was going on in
the standard broadcast industry. It also meant that people who
were watching on the cable stations or who had the satellite TV
were not getting those messages, because a lot of that was not
being put out. So one of the things that we look for as State
and local emergency managers is to have the mandatory messaging
that will go out on a broad spectrum of media to help us out.
Mr. Shadegg. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The Chair would now call on the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon, for questions.
Mr. Weldon. I thank the Chairman.
I am going to take a different approach to my line of
questions, because the focus by my colleagues is on the
emergency warnings to public, and my line is going to deal with
two specific initiatives that have caused me a great deal of
frustration over the past dozen years that go to the first
responder community and then directly to the public.
The first deals with forest fires in America, a major
concern to our homeland. We spend a billion dollars a year in
responding to wild lands and forest fires--on average, we spend
$3 to $5 billion--and we lose the--loss of life, both
civilians, significant property, as well as to firefighters
themselves.
It was 8 years ago when I chaired the Defense R&D
Subcommittee that I led the reallocation of money to create a
program that used our classified and unclassified satellites
that are used to detect rocket launches to detect the immediate
start of a wild land forest fire the size of a quarter of an
acre. That program developed and was tested and became known as
FIRESAT. The Raytheon Corporation became a prime contractor. It
involved multi-agencies: Geological Survey, the Forestry
Service, Interior, NOAA.
In 2000, after the test was done on the program, the
Geological Survey abandoned the program for lack of funds.
America is still burning each year, billions of dollars going
up in smoke, requests for emergency appropriation measures
after the fact when, for a few million dollars, we could have
done the refined software to put the program in place.
I went to Joe Allbaugh when he headed FEMA 2 years ago and
said, Joe, NOAA is not moving on this. Neither is the
geological survey. He said, transfer the program to FEMA. I did
that legislatively. FEMA, despite tremendous opposition from
NOAA, took over the FIRESAT program.
Today, to my understanding, we still do not have the
program that was first designed 8 years ago to detect the start
of forest and wild lands fires which cost the taxpayers of this
country between $3 and $5 billion a year. My understanding
further is the software is sitting in boxes in Crystal City in
Raytheon's offices.
So my question to all of you and the second panel--and I
may not be here for that panel. I have, Mr. Chairman, the 20-
some page brief on this program which I will enter into the
record discussing both the strengths and the reforms necessary.
[Information is in the committee file.]
Mr. Weldon. If we are really concerned about notification
of emergency response, why have we still not put into place a
program that we have tested, that we know works, to give that
information when a satellite detects a fire the size of a
quarter of an acre to the first responder community to go put
it out and save the taxpayers billions of dollars? Why has that
not been done? Because a secondary benefit of that is, when you
notify the responder community, you could also notify the
public in that area. They can evacuate their homes. So it has a
secondary benefit.
My frustration is we talk a good game in this city, but
when it comes down to the substance of putting programs in
place, it just falls apart. It is like sand. It goes through a
screen, and no one wants to be held accountable for it. So that
is my first question.
The second one results from an experience I had with an
earthquake about 12 years ago, walking the freeway with the
chiefs of San Francisco and Oakland, and they were looking for
people that were allegedly still caught in cars and vehicles
between the freeways, and they were talking about the use of
dogs to detect people that were alive. And I said, why aren't
you using thermal imagers that you could shoot through the
crevices of the freeways? And the chiefs of Oakland and San
Francisco said to me, Congressman, what are thermal imagers? I
said, well, the Navy developed them 15 years ago to use to
detect bodies on our ships. Now they are in every fire
department in America. The chiefs of two of our largest
departments in America weren't even aware that technology
existed. So I came back and introduced legislation 12 years ago
to have FEMA create a program to give the incident command
officer a computerized ability to let the State and Federal
agency network know what needs he had or she had on the scene.
Chief Morris could have used that in Oklahoma city when he
came and faced an exposed rebar concrete structure, had a
massive rescue and didn't know where to go to get the engineers
to assist him.
To my knowledge, we still do not have a computerized
inventory that an incident commander on the scene of a disaster
can punch into with a PalmPilot or a laptop at the scene to
know where to go to get some kind of specialized equipment or
resources or consultation, that he doesn't know where to go.
So my question in both of these cases is this: Why haven't
we followed through on either of these and why aren't they in
place today? And I am not aiming this at this administration,
because the previous administration was just as derelict.
Mr. Hoover. Mr. Weldon, I think the only thing I can say to
you is I am familiar with the FIRESAT initiative. I was Chief
of Staff to Director Allbaugh when you came over and offered
that to us.
With regard to the thermal imaging, you know, I don't think
I have an answer for you on that one.
Mr. Weldon. Well, it is not just thermal imaging. It is any
kind of technology.
Well, what is the status of FIRESAT?
Mr. Hoover. I don't know. That is not something I deal with
anymore. And what I would like to tell you is that, with plume
modeling capabilities, with digital EAS and alert and warning
capabilities that we have and the reverse 911 technology, using
this geo-targeting, we think we can use that technology to warn
homeowners of impending wild land fires.
Mr. Weldon. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, the plume
modeling program was developed by Lawrence Livermore
Laboratories. I have seen it 8 years ago. Other labs have done
the same. You can't do plume modeling until you know where the
incident is. The plume modeling is helpful for the first
responder and for the incident commander, but the most
important thing is not to know where it is going to go, it is
to know when it starts. And that is a whole different topic.
What good is a plume model if you don't know where the fire is
when it occurs?
And so my answer, Mr. Chairman, is this subcommittee and
this committee ought to be holding the FEMA and the Homeland
Security agency accountable. We have the technology. It has
been developed. It has been tested. I put the document in the
record. And my question is, we are spending billions of dollars
after the fact and paying for these incidents. Why aren't we
providing a couple of million dollars to put into place in
front? Which is what Joe Allbaugh wanted to do when he headed
up FEMA. Thank you.
Mr. Shadegg. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The Chair would call upon the Ranking Member of the full
committee, Mr. Turner, for questions.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask both Mr. Dailey and Mr. Hoover to give us a
description of how much money is being applied in your agencies
to carrying out the paths that we are talking about here today.
What number of personnel, what kind of budget do you have, and
how much are you going to accomplish in fiscal year 2005?
Mr. Hoover. Mr. Chairman, within our office, within FEMA,
we are the program office for EAS, for the national level EAS.
I have a division that is--one of their primary functions is
the upgrade of the EAS and the PEP stations. We are using--
currently, we have allocated just over $4 million for several
projects that Chairman Shadegg outlined to upgrade and improve
the EAS system as well as, as I mentioned in my testimony, the
IPAWS, the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. There is
an additional $2 million that is in the President's 2005 budget
that is specifically earmarked for EAS upgrades. And I am not
sure what IAIP additional funding they in the 2005 budget for
alert and warning, but I understand there is some funding
there, and we can get you those numbers.
Mr. Dailey. Mr. Turner, as the regulatory agency we do not
do grant programs and we do not supply equipment, so there is
no specific funding for EAS enhancement. My office is a staff
of 18 people. One of our primary responsibilities is the EAS
program management, and so we are responsible for the rules and
regulations implementing EAS, but we have no particular grant
programs or any funding sources for implementation of EAS.
Mr. Turner. I was looking at a survey that was done by this
Media Security and Reliability Council, and I thought it was
interesting because the results of the survey seem to indicate
that our State activities in conveying the emergency messages
doesn't seem to work very well. I was reading a comment by the
State of New York State Communications Committee and they said
that when a test is done of the EAS system, that the message,
and I am quoting here, the message never made it more than 50
to 70 miles from Albany. Encoders were set incorrectly. The
control room was not manned. Broadcasters just weren't passing
the message along. The tests at the local level don't indicate
success at the State level. In theory there is a statewide
system, but in reality there is not.
Do you think that is a fair comment, Mr. Hoover?
Mr. Hoover. I think there are issues regarding the
reception capability of the EAS and I think we have known that
for some time, and we are now correcting that as we move from a
dial-up capability to satellite capability. And what we are
also doing is we are expanding the 34 primary entry point
stations so that there is a PEP station in every State, and we
would also like to expand it to having an entry point at the
emergency operation centers in all the States and Territories
as well.
Mr. Turner. But where are you going to get the funding to
do that? The budget numbers you shared with me, I believe you
said $4 million, doesn't seem like anywhere near the funding
necessary to accomplish what you just described.
Mr. Hoover. Well, for example, Mr. Turner, the upgrade to
the existing 34 primary entry point stations to a satellite
system is only costing us just over a million dollars, and that
is part of that initial $4 million. And as I mentioned, there
is another $2 million in the President's budget to continue
that upgrade, and we think we can do that with that $2 million
as well as the additional funding that IAIP has.
Mr. Turner. So you are saying that you can accomplish
everything you think we need to accomplish within the budget
that you have for 2005?
Mr. Hoover. Yes, I sure do.
Mr. Turner. And the system will be up and running?
Mr. Hoover. I would hope to have it up and running by the
end of 2005, and I think the key there is we are not building
any brand new infrastructure. We are building out, we are
improving and upgrading existing infrastructure, whether it is
EAS or using the digital backbone that public television is
offering us. So we are not having to build from scratch an
infrastructure. And once we get the signal in a digital format
into satellite the reception capabilities, and I am not a
technical guy, but the reception capabilities are endless for a
very small amount of investments.
Mr. Turner. I might ask, Ms. Henning, if you would comment
on the report that I referenced, and the quote I read from the
New York State Emergency Communications Committee.
Ms. Henning. Thank you, Congressman. In fact, tomorrow, as
I understand it, New York is having a press conference to talk
about EAS. I haven't had a chance to talk with the director
about the subject on that, but I understand that they have some
concerns. One of the things that we are most concerned about is
for the equipment to be able to reach out to all the various
areas, to urban and rural areas. And once we have the
capability and FEMA does provide the installation, there must
be training of the personnel for this, and there must be a very
simple installation process. Am I answering the question,
Congressman?
Mr. Turner. I mean are you saying there is needs at the
local level in order to implement this?
Ms. Henning. Absolutely, it is not going to end simply by
providing this equipment to the States. In order for this to
work to effectively, for the State to be able to talk to the
counties, to be able to talk to the cities, we are going to
have to look at improvements to the emergency operations
centers and the equipment that is there, and that means a
follow-up not only to the installation, but to providing the
training and other needs.
Mr. Shadegg. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Shadegg. Having made it just under the wire to question
this panel, the Chair would now call upon the gentlelady from
New York, Ms. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do apologize to
the panel for being delayed in another important event.
In its February 2004 report on emergency alert systems the
Partnership for Public Warning noted that no government agency
is in charge of the current EAS and recommended that the
Department of Homeland Security take the lead in creating an
effective national warning capability. Now, I am a New Yorker.
It is 3 years after 9/11, 3 years after 9/11 and we are still
asking these questions.
Why hasn't the Department played a greater role in
coordinating and advancing efforts to create a working and
useable national alert system? What is the Department in
conjunction with other relevant Federal agencies and
stakeholders doing to encourage the creation or updating of
State and local EAS plans? And what kind of enforcement exists
at the Federal level to ensure the development of State and
local EAS plans? Are there any Federal guidelines or standards
that exist to help State and local governments develop these
plans?
I must say, if my question is asked with a wide eyed glaze,
it is because I find this, as many other issues, extraordinary,
and my neighbors are absolutely concerned. They are worried. In
fact the messages from the administration are, as you know,
this could happen again, it could happen any day. We were lucky
that we got by the convention in New York, thank God, safely.
But perhaps you can answer this. I mean, why is it 3 years
later and we are still talking about standards? When are we
going to develop this. A lot of people walking around looking
very important, but who is doing it?
Mr. Hoover. Thank you for that question, and I would share
your concern in terms of a lot of folks were walking around
saying, you know, we need this, we need this, we need this. And
a lot of folks--it was talk and we weren't doing anything. I
can tell you that in the two and a half years that I have been
involved with EAS we have done a lot of things and we have made
some great progress in terms of upgrading and recognizing the
deficiencies.
Certainly the Partnership For Public Warning's report came
out and made a number of recommendations, and we think that we
are implementing a number of those recommendations with regard
to using digital technology, with regard to upgrading the
existing EAS capability in the PEP stations. We have active
involvement with the partner in the Media Security and
Reliability Council of the FCC. Our office, in answer to your
question who is responsible, I would say the Department of
Homeland Security is responsible, and more specifically my
office serves at the executive agent for the national level EAS
and we take responsibility for that and we take it very
seriously. And in fact last week I was in New York at Channel
13 and talked to the public television station folks up there
about a pilot that they are doing, along with the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency--it used to be the old NIMA--the
NGA folks where they are using some spectrums specifically for
two-way communications to first responders and looking at ways
that we might be able to integrate that in this digital pilot.
So specifically to New York we are looking and have been in
talks with Channel 13 in New York as part of this public
broadcasting initiative, and our office is responsible and we
think we are making some great progress.
Mrs. Lowey. If I could follow up, you said you have been in
this position two and a half years.
Mr. Hoover. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Lowey. I feel a real sense of urgency. Can you give me
an idea how long it will take to develop an efficient national
warning capability, or will it be like interoperability? We
still don't have the standards. The RFP still didn't go out.
The police, all the first responders, firefighters, still don't
have an adequate interoperable communications system. When will
this get done with your best estimation?
Mr. Hoover. Well, first of all, we already have in place a
national level emergency alert and warning system and that is
through the 34 primary entry point radio stations and we
believe that system works and is operational. The upgrades to
that are beginning within weeks in terms of upgrading the PEPs,
the primary entry point stations, and as well as demonstrating
the capability of using the digital broadcast capabilities that
public television brings to the table, and I would hope to see
great progress in that by the end of next year.
Mrs. Lowey. Is it correct that the system has never been
used?
Mr. Hoover. The national level EAS system has never been
activated, however--
Mrs. Lowey. How do you know it works?
Mr. Hoover. Because we test it every week from the FEMA
operations center to the primary entry point radio stations,
which is the first point of entry to the system. We test that
on a weekly basis.
Mrs. Lowey. Okay. Could you tell me what kind of
enforcement there is at the Federal level to ensure the
development of State and local EAS plans? Are there Federal
guidelines, standards, directives?
Mr. Dailey. The Commission's rules anticipate the
development of the State and local plans for the implementation
of EAS and when those plans are developed they are sent to me
personally and my staff reviews them and we sign off on the
plans and make sure that they comply with the national level of
requirements.
Mrs. Lowey. Excuse me. Are there requirements that the
States do it?
Mr. Shadegg. The time of the gentlelady has expired, so if
you could finish your question.
Mr. Dailey. They are not required.
Mrs. Lowey. Why not?
Mr. Shadegg. Maybe she didn't hear. The time of the
gentlelady has expired quite some time ago, more than a
question ago. So the Chair would call upon the gentlelady from
the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton, for questioning.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate this
hearing, regret that other business in the Capitol kept me from
being here earlier. This is an especially important issue all
across the country, but none--but there is no place much more
important than in this region with its tunnels, with its subway
systems, with the entire Federal presence here, for that
reason. An amendment that I sponsored was elaborated in the
Senate that requires the Department of Homeland Security to
have a special coordinator for the National Capital Region, and
that person is in place. I must say that that coordination was
deeply called into question--has been deeply called into
question, although I don't lay it at the feet of the
coordinator himself. It is clear that when checkpoints were put
in place along Pennsylvania Avenue and Constitution avenue
there was no coordination within the city, much less this
region, there was not even consultation with the local police
department, which has all the cops, by the way. So I am not at
all satisfied with the coordination aspect nor is the committee
that has jurisdiction over the Capitol Police, which is going
to have a hearing next week. I have called for a citywide
coordination plan so that the various sectors who have
independent control can know what one hand or the other is
doing. I think we are at terrible risk in the Nation's capital
because there is no coordination of all the security officials.
In light of that I am particularly interested in a pilot
project, a 6-month pilot, for a digital emergency alert system.
That obviously would help with the coordination problem that is
so plain in this region. I wonder if--I understand that it may
have been mentioned before I came in by Mr. Hoover. I would
like more details on that project. When will it start? If it is
6 months when does month one start? What technologies will be
demonstrated? I would like to know who specifically is involved
in--who are we talking about in this 6-month project? And I
would like to know whether they will be working with the
private sector, with State and local government. In other
words, how in the world does this work?
Mr. Hoover. Thank you, Ms. Norton, for the question, and
perhaps we can give you a more detailed briefing and I can give
you the kind of 30,000-foot view at this moment on--
Ms. Norton. Yeah. Just give me the 2-foot.
Mr. Hoover. Right. It is with--the pilot and we expect to
start within weeks, within the next couple of weeks. We are
just down to the final transfer of the funds actually to the
Association For Public Television Station, who is the primary
focus of our effort. We have through APTS brought in the
private sector. We have had some active discussions with T-
mobile, with Verizon and with Nextel in terms of having the
cell phone service providers involved. Our office that is
actually doing the coordination has worked with Ken Wall in the
National Capital Region Coordinating Office within the
Department to make sure that the Council of Governments is
involved and the emergency managers in the area involved, and
we are planning actually in October to have a kind of an
umbrella session to bring all of the players together to be
able to do that. I should also mention that the local public
television station is involved. Channel 4, the network
affiliate, and we have been in discussion with NBC to also be
involved in the pilot project as well.
So it is taking in a broad spectrum of the population of
not only the providers of but also the users because we want to
be able to reach you and to be able to test the capability on
as many retransmission mediums as possible.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shadegg. I want to thank this panel, both for your
written statements and also for your testimony here this
morning. It is very, very helpful. Obviously we could continue
this discussion at length. There is a lot of work to be done,
though I think it is very encouraging to see how many different
technologies are out there and are being explored to improve
the current notification system and the possibilities that lie
ahead, and I am glad we are making progress on those. And with
that this panel is excused, and I will invite our second panel
to join us.
That panel is composed of Dr. Peter Ward, the Founding
Chairman of the Partnership for Public Warning and a retired
member of the U.S. Geological Survey; Mr. Frank Lucia, Vice
Chairman of the Washington, D.C. Emergency Alert System
Committee and a member of the Public Communications and Safety
Working Group for the Media Security and Reliability Council;
and Ms. Patricia McGinnis, President and CEO of the Council for
Excellence in Government.
Welcome and thank you very much for your testimony here
today. We appreciate your input. Several of your organizations
have already been mentioned for their work in this area in the
questioning on the first panel. Now we get to talk to the
experts directly. So with that, Mr. Ward, Dr. Ward, would you
begin?
STATEMENT OF DR. PETER L. WARD, FOUNDING CHAIRMAN, PARTNERSHIP
FOR PUBLIC WARNING, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (RETIRED)
Mr. Ward. I would like to thank the committee and
especially Congressman Shadegg for calling us together to talk
about public warning, an issue of really key importance during
these troubled times. Warnings save lives. If you get people
information about what is happening or what is likely to happen
they can take action that will save lives, reduce loss, speed
recovery.
One of the problems we have, as you have gotten to earlier
here today, is the current warning systems, you put them all
together, are pretty ineffective. You can do different
estimates, but today if we needed to warn of a dirty nuclear
device being exploded right now on the Mall, we could only
reach at best maybe 30 percent of the people directly that
needed to know. And we would probably reach a lot of people
that didn't need to know. At night when there is a tornado
coming down on a community we can only reach perhaps a few
percent of those who need to know that that is in their path.
And again, we may wake up a lot of people who really don't need
to know.
So the problem is we don't have an adequate warning system
and it is not well focused. Now, my name is Dr. Peter Ward. I
have worked on warnings issues for more than 41 years of my
career, mostly 27 years as a Federal Government employee for
the United States Geological Survey, working on earthquakes and
volcano issues. I have also had the pleasure and opportunity to
work with a wide number of people, especially in the last few
years, on committees looking at warning issues.
The executive summaries of two of the critical reports are
in my written testimony and have already been mentioned today.
This red book, Effective Disaster Warnings, was written by
Federal employees from all the different Federal agencies and I
had the chance to chair that committee. And this was released
in 2000, after being approved by all of the Federal agencies
involved, and it is considered the foundation upon which to
build modern warning systems. Out of this has already come a
common alerting protocol and several other major steps forward
in developing warning systems and improvement to warning
systems.
Another major report is the National Strategy For
Integrated Public Warning Policy and Capability that came out
of the Partnership for Public Warning. It was put together by
experts from across the country to say what do we need to do to
go forward with this? How soon can we make changes?
All of these reports and many more come up with four
principle conclusions. First, we need to involve all the
stakeholders. There are many stakeholders in Federal, State,
local government in emergency planning and emergency response,
and in fact every one of us is a stakeholder when we are at
risk.
The second major requirement is we need to have national
standards, not only so we can communicate with each other, but
so that industry can build new pieces or build into existing
pieces of electronics the ability to receive those warnings.
Once we have those standards there are all kinds of
opportunities for industry to compete to do all kinds of new
things to deliver those warnings the last mile.
Third major conclusion is that technology is not the issue
here. It is not the problem. We are technology enabled. There
are all kinds of technologies out there that when properly
mobilized can get the warnings to the people at risk no matter
where they are, no matter what they are doing.
The fourth conclusion is the most important. The weakest
link currently in warning systems is the link between the
people who have warnings to issue, the officials with warnings
to issue, and the companies, organizations, groups that operate
systems that can deliver those warnings directly to the people
at risk.
What is needed here is a pipeline or a backbone, a place
where the warnings can be put in by the officials and that will
immediately disseminate those throughout, to all the different
dissemination groups. This pipeline or backbone needs to
consist of four key elements:
First a secure, reliable input from all official sources.
Obviously, we don't want the system to be misused by terrorists
or others.
Secondly, it needs a common alerting protocol, and the good
news is that one already exists under the OASIS standards. It
has been widely tested. It will need to be tested more, but
there is a digital protocol into which we can put the warning
information so it will go out in a standard way.
The third thing needed in this backbone or pipeline is a
multi-stranded pipeline that can actually get information out.
In the AMBER alert program I will talk about in a minute we are
using Internet. For All Hazard alert we have to be able to deal
with major catastrophic loss, and so the same information could
be sent out by State emergency operation communication
networks, by the Association of Public Television Stations, by
all these different groups. There are many ships of opportunity
in the communication world where without spending extra
government money we can distribute the warnings, the
information, and make sure that it is redundant enough that
during the worst catastrophes information is still getting out.
And finally, we need a wide variety of delivery mechanisms
that can take the warning from this pipeline and deliver it the
last mile to the users. Believe me, industry is teeming with
ideas. They say we need a standard and we need to have a
pipeline of information that we know is official and that we
have no liability in transferring that information to the
public. Once that exists industry will wow us. Already RCA
Television and other groups have televisions that will turn
themselves on when they receive a signal that there is a
warning that applies to that particular county where the
television is located, and will wake someone up in the middle
of the night if necessary.
This is just the tip of the iceberg. There are many other
devices out there, digital watches, for example, on the market
now that could easily warn you with that information.
Now, over the past 20 months we have developed a pipeline,
an example of this, how this pipeline could work that is for
AMBER alerts. It is operational in the State of Arizona and in
Washington State. Thirteen more States are being brought up in
the near future and 20 others are expressing a strong interest.
We simply say that this is a consortium of, many, many
different people, the State police, State broadcaster
associations, media, major corporations, emergency managers,
departments of transportation, border control. ESRI has offered
mapping software, Hewlett Packard, Intel, hardware and funds,
Symantech security to make sure it works right, Limelight
Networks and Proteus Digital Communications.
The capabilities are there and we have demonstrated we
could do it. So I am really here today to ask the help of
Federal people to not only work in your district and in your
State to improve warning, but that by working together we can
make very significant changes in public warnings in a very
short time.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Ward follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Peter L. Ward,
I wish to thank the subcommittee and specifically Congressman
Shadegg for calling this hearing to discuss public warning, an issue of
great importance to public safety and Homeland Security in America
today.
I personally have worked on public warning issues for 41 years and
was a senior leader at the United States Geological Survey for 27
years. I chaired a Committee of Federal government employees under the
Office of Science and Technology on warning and was founding Chairman
of the Partnership for Public Warning. I am convinced we can improve
current warning capability significantly in a very short time if we
work together.
Hundreds of very knowledgeable and talented people throughout our
society have sought ways to improve public warning over many years.
Their work has come to focus on what I will discuss today. The
fundamental problem is the need for teamwork among the wide variety of
stakeholders and I sincerely hope this Committee can help bring the
American people what they deserve and expect--timely, accurate,
official information to help them deal with natural and manmade
disasters. While the country has been fixated on terrorism since 9/11,
recent events remind us that Homeland Security also involves responding
to major, frequent, tragic natural disasters.
Warnings save lives. They empower citizens with knowledge of what
is happening or what is about to happen. People at risk can then make
wise decisions about what to do to reduce loss of life and property and
how to best deal with adversity. First responders can then decide on
the most effective ways to respond. The Media can provide more detail
from a basis of up-to-date knowledge.
Today, if we needed to warn people that a dirty nuclear device had
just been detonated on the Mall and that they should avoid downtown
Washington, we could only reach directly perhaps 30% of those who need
to know using all means of warning currently implemented. And the time
delay could be many minutes when every second counts. If we needed to
warn of a tornado in the middle of the night, we might only reach a few
percent of the people directly at risk. Also current warning systems
tend to warn more people not at risk than those directly at risk,
dulling their response to future warnings.
We live in the midst of a digital revolution where tens of millions
of our citizens carry cellular telephones and other devices that could
warn them no matter where they are or what they are doing. Many types
of electronic signals are being broadcast locally and from space that
could trigger a wide variety of electronic devices to warn people when
they are directly at risk. We are technology enabled. Technology is not
the problem.
It is a severe national problem that we are not using modern
technology effectively to save lives and reduce losses from natural and
manmade disasters in America. While I know there is a desire to do so,
I believe it is frustrating for all involved that collectively we have
not been able to make the simple fixes needed to solve this serious
problem.
So what is the problem? Simply put, the problem is teamwork--
getting the major stakeholders to work together. The need for teamwork
or ``unity of effort'' related to Homeland Security were highlighted
over and over in the recent 9/11 report.
An effective warning system involves most Federal Agencies,
thousands of State and local agencies, dozens of industries, thousands
of companies. An effective warning system sooner or later involves
every person and organization across the country that is at risk.
I am sure each of you has been visited by companies who have THE
solution for public warning. As founding Chairman of the Partnership
for Public Warning, I received many telephone calls from company
Presidents who said that we were irrelevant because they had already
solved the problem. It usually took only a few minutes to help them
realize that they had an important solution but that it was a small
part of the larger problem.
There are hundreds if not thousands of American entrepreneurs who
have developed impressive techniques for warning people. Technology is
not the problem. The problem is the lack of a national warning
infrastructure and the teamwork to implement it. When industry has a
place from which to received official warnings securely and reliably,
they can deliver those warnings in an impressive number of ways. You
will unleash the immense imagination and capabilities of American
industry when they can clearly see a market and when they can relay
real-time warnings with no liability for warning content.
In just a few years we could reach the point where your car radio
suddenly is interrupted or turns on to say:
``Major traffic accident 5 miles ahead at intersection of 495
and 50.'' Or
``Tornado 10 miles west heading toward you.'' Or
``Chemical explosion at 9:02 am near Metro Central. Stay at
least 5 miles away.''
This is not science fiction. This is all readily possible with
current technology, with good old American marketplace competition, and
with a national warning infrastructure.
What do I mean by a national warning infrastructure? This does not
need to be some big government program. This does not need to be some
massive pile of hardware built specifically for warning. We simply need
to utilize better public and private systems we already have. We need
to create a logical framework that will enable future systems being
built and maintained for other reasons to provide warning capability.
Warning messages are very low bandwidth. They require very few bits
and bytes of information. They can easily be multiplexed within digital
signals broadcast for quite different purposes. For example, the public
television stations of the Association of Public Television Stations
(APTS) are implementing a fully digital television broadcasting network
across the country. When finished, more than 95% of the American
population will be able to receive these signals. APTS has made many
presentations here on the Hill detailing its stations? offer to use a
small piece of their digital spectrum not only to carry warnings, but
to broadcast more detailed information about imminent disasters and
disasters under way. These signals could be received by much more than
televisions. These signals could be received by any type of electronics
in your pocket, on your wrist, in your home, in your car, at work, at
play. And this is just one example of a major national infrastructure
built and maintained for other reasons that can provide a national
warning infrastructure at no additional cost to Federal, State, or
Local governments or to the American people.
A national warning infrastructure needs to consist of four critical
components:
1. Secure reliable input from all official sources of warning
information.
2. Encoding of messages into a standard digital format or
protocol that can be readily distributed and processed by small
computers.
3. A multi-stranded pipeline or backbone that can instantly and
reliably send these messages to all types of delivery systems.
4. Wide varieties of delivery systems that can automatically
re-broadcast or address these messages to those directly at
risk and to others who need to know.
Many of these elements exist and a prototype national warning
infrastructure is already operating in the States of Arizona and
Washington and will soon be operating in a majority of States.
With cross-jurisdictional confusion on the Federal side, many
concerned people, local government organizations, and private companies
have banded together in a Consortium to implement an AMBER Alert Web
Portal that exponentially improves delivery of warnings of abducted
children and demonstrates clearly how each of the four critical
components for a warning infrastructure can be implemented and can work
together to improve warning systems immediately.
This consortium grew out of a pilot project led by the state of
Washington in partnership with several other states including Arizona.
It was started over 20 months ago with a combined investment in
technology and development of $4 million dollars. What is remarkable is
that all the key stakeholders State and local Police, the State
Broadcasters Associations, media, major corporations, Emergency
Managers, Departments of Transportation, Border Control agencies and
many others openly agreed to participate and all contributed
significant insight and have taken important leadership and ownership
in its development and now its success. (You have a recent Press
Release noting the successful activation and homecoming of a missing
child.).
Major corporations like ESRI have contributed dynamic mapping
software that plots in real time the region in which the abductor and
child could be located. Symantec has contributed the security software
and procedures to assure the system is not misused. Hewlett Packard and
Intel have contributed hardware and financial support. Limelight
Networks and Protus have contributed digital communications capability
that demonstrates capacity to manage a national alert network. The
AMBER Alert Consortium is based on a variety of agreements signed by
all parties on who is responsible for what and how the various pieces
all fit together. It has been very successful at building teamwork
among a large number of companies and organizations that have and
continue to contribute time, money and expertise. This has been done in
a way where all software and hardware is in the public domain and
controlled by the States.
The AMBER Alert Web Portal Consortium has been unanimously
supported by the National Alliance of State Broadcaster Associations
and is operational in both Arizona and Washington State. Final training
and implementation is underway in 12 additional States and many more
have expressed a desire to join. Most importantly, a number of States
and stakeholders in the process have expressed publicly that they are
looking forward to the expansion of the AMBER Alert Web Portal
Consortium to respond to other alerting needs since all the major
stakeholders are in place and the Portal was designed by its founders
to be scalable. This Consortium demonstrates clearly how technology and
teamwork locally and nationally can be combined successfully to
implement a National All-Alert Warning Infrastructure.
While I greatly admire what the AMBER Alert Web Portal Consortium
has done, I am not here today to promote any one system, I am here to
assist you in crafting a vision of how a public warning capability in
this country can be improved very rapidly with some leadership and with
contributions from a broad spectrum of players. The methods
demonstrated with AMBER Alerts can readily be scaled up to all-alert.
If we go back to the four critical components of a national warning
infrastructure:
1. Inputs: All-hazard public warning requires secure reliable
inputs from police, fire, emergency managers, Homeland
Security, the National Weather Service, the U.S. Geological
Survey, the U.S. Coast Guard, critical facilities such as
chemical or nuclear plants, and many other sources. The AMBER
Alert Consortium has demonstrated a secure format that enables
the official to initiate an alert directly from the incident or
information source.
2. Standard format: The Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) has been
developed under the OASIS standards process specifically for
transmitting all types of warning information. CAP is
implemented in Internet Protocol, the common communication
protocol used by nearly all digital electronics. The AMBER
Alert Consortium is CAP compliant.
3. Pipeline or backbone: This has been implemented over wired,
wireless, and satellite-based public Internet and private
networks. It can easily be implemented over State Emergency
Communication Networks, NOAA Weather Wire, NOAA Weather Radio,
the Emergency Managers Weather Information Network (EMWIN),
etc. The AMBER Alert Consortium has demonstrated that such a
digital signal sent via Internet or any land or satellite-based
digital network, can be used to directly trigger all Emergency
Alert System (EAS) encoders across the country and thus be
broadcast on all land-based radio and television transmitters
or by cable television. A national presidential message of
unlimited length can also be streamed in this way. The AMBER
Alert Consortium has tested such a network using Internet and
is pursuing the use of a satellite system used by most
commercial broadcasters to disseminate alerts.
4. Delivery Systems: These are already being provided by
numerous vendors including email, pagers, fax, auto-dial
telephone calls, auto-dial Short Message Service to cellular
telephones, digital signs along highways and in other
locations, websites, etc. Some NOAA Weather Radio receivers and
some new televisions can turn themselves on and set the volume
to announce warnings. New technologies such as wrist-watches
and pocket computers are being introduced that can relay
warning messages. Cell broadcast that can transmit warnings to
all cellular telephones within one or many cells is being
introduced in many states in 2004. All modern digital
electronics such as radios, televisions, portable music
players, computers, automobile navigation systems and such
could easily turn themselves on and announce warning
information specifically to those at risk once a standard
signal is available across the country. The AMBER Alert
Consortium has built this interconnectivity with these re-
broadcasters and is providing them live feeds for all their
different modes of communication. Industry is now beginning to
see a market and how they can receive a secure official stream
of warning information that they can relay without liability
for content.
Thus a National All-Alert Warning Infrastructure can rapidly
improve public warning and provide a smooth path to modernize the EAS
and other existing national warning capabilities.
The purpose of an alert or warning is to get the attention of
people at risk so that they can seek more detailed information and
decide on appropriate action. The AMBER Alert Consortium demonstrates a
web portal that contains all detailed information instantly after it is
available to officials. This information shows up not only on an
official website for each state, but is fed directly and automatically
onto the website of media and others who request the links as well as
news desks, emergency operation centers, etc. Thus a National All-Alert
Warning Infrastructure can not only improve delivery of warnings, but
can provide a continuing stream of official information as the crisis
develops. Different delivery systems could offer different levels of
detail as required by the user.
There is another very important function a National All-Alert
Warning Infrastructure could provide: instant notification of officials
nationwide or in any region. The system could address telephones,
pagers, faxes, email, etc. to any list of government officials. An
encrypted message could be broadcast nationally and as new receivers
are being developed, could be received and released only to authorized
officials within certain affinity groups. Many government agencies are
buying such service now, but the services are typically not compatible
between agencies. A National All-Alert Warning Infrastructure could
feed the information to these service providers for dissemination. With
appropriate planning, this means that in the future when most pieces of
electronics are capable of receiving and announcing warnings, these
same pieces of equipment when owned by legislators, first responders,
emergency managers, health officials, and such could announce to them
official messages not released to the general public.
Consider a scenario where terrorists planted a person infected with
smallpox on a major international airliner and infected people were
quickly scattered across the country. When the presence of the Small
Pox virus was identified, all appropriate officials across the country
could be notified instantly no matter whether at work, at home,
traveling, or enjoying recreation.
A warning distributed in standard digital format can readily be
used to trigger devices to warn the hearing or sight impaired. As new
receivers are built, they could easily turn the digital codes into any
language.
The options are many. The intent of the National All-Alert Warning
Infrastructure is to deliver official information instantly to service
providers who could disseminate the information to the people at risk.
Public warning can be improved exponentially if we work together
adopting some basic standards.
Finally, I would like to give you some background for what I have
explained today. This comes from a long history of studies and pilot
efforts by a wide variety of people. As I stated earlier, I personally
have worked on warning issues for 41 years and was a leader in the
United States Geological Survey for 27 years.
In the 1970's there was considerable scientific evidence that
earthquakes might be predictable and Congress established the National
Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program. I was fortunate to be able to do
much of the staff work in developing and implementing that program. As
Chief of the Branch of Earthquake Mechanics and Prediction, we worried
in considerable detail on how do you tell people that an earthquake
could occur soon that may kill 3,000 people, but we are only 5%
certain? What happens if you had warning information but failed to
release it? What happens if you release it, no earthquake occurs, but
significant loss resulted? These questions are quite similar to some
issues we face today with respect to terrorism. Physical and social
scientists worked intently on these issues. Many studies were done.
Since World War II, a vast body of knowledge and experience has been
developed on how to warn people in ways that they will take the most
appropriate action. Unfortunately little of this expertise has been
applied to Homeland Security issues.
In 1997 and 1998, I was fortunate to chair a working group under
the Subcommittee on Natural Disaster Reduction within the Office of
Science and Technology. We included the Federal government employees
most involved with and experienced with warnings in each of the
relevant Federal agencies. Our report ``Effective Disaster Warnings''
was reviewed by all relevant Federal Agencies before release. This
report has been widely acclaimed. It explains what exists and what
could exist. It is considered as the foundation upon which to build a
modern national warning system. Chapter 6 (The Universally Encoded
Digital Warning) was the basis for the Common Alerting Protocol, now a
national warning standard under the OASIS Standards Process.
The primary recommendation of this Federal working group was the
need for a Public/Private Partnership to move warning forward. In late
2001, after I had retired from Federal service, I heard of a group
interested in forming such a partnership. I ended up being the founding
Chairman of the Partnership for Public Warning. MITRE Corporation
contributed start-up money. I volunteered 60-80 hours of labor a week
for 18 months, and FEMA finally contributed some funds. Thus I
personally funded about one third of the effort. We established a board
of 16 trustees from leaders in warning in government, industry, and
academia. We met regularly and held several multi-day workshops
bringing together the people from across the country who were most
experienced in warning issues. We interfaced with the Office of
Homeland Security and all of the Federal Agencies with responsibilities
for warning. We talked with many on Capitol Hill and worked with the
Natural Hazards Caucus to put on a very well attended informational
luncheon on warning. We published several reports that have been well
received and that help us all focus on the key issues.
What I have presented today is a logical result of all of this
effort and much more on the part of those across the country who are
concerned with and experienced with public warning. There are thousands
who work hard to keep current systems working as best as possible, who
have worked on many committees to seek ways to improve current systems,
and who are eager to make our homeland safer through effective
warnings. Teamwork is not easy to build, but we all fervently hope you
will join us in this effort to save lives, reduce losses, and reduce
trauma from natural and manmade disasters throughout America.
ADDENDA:
Effective Disaster Warnings
Report by the Working Group on Natural Disaster Information
Systems
Subcommittee on Natural Disaster Reduction
National Science and Technology Council Committee on
Environment and Natural Resources
November 2000 (www.sdr.gov/NDIS_rev_Oct27.pdf)
Working Group on Natural Disaster Information Systems
Peter Ward -Chairman, Seismologist and Volcanologist,
U.S.Geological Survey
Rodney Becker -Dissemination Services Manager, National Weather
Service
Don Bennett -Deputy Director for Emergency Planning, Office of the
Secretary of Defense
Andrew Bruzewich -CRREL, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Bob Everett -Office of Engineering, Voice of America, International
Broadcasting Bureau, U.S. Information Agency
Michael Freitas -Department of Transportation/Federal Highway
Administration
Karl Kensinger -Federal Communications Commission, Satellite and
Radio Communications Division
Frank Lucia -Director, Emergency Communications, Compliance and
Information Bureau, Federal Communications Commission
Josephine Malilay -National Center for Environmental Health,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
John O'Connor -National Communications System
Elaine Padovani -National Science and Technology Council, Office of
Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
John Porco -Office of Emergency Transportation, Department of
Transportation
Ken Putkovich -Chief, Dissemination Systems, National Weather
Service
Tim Putprush -Federal Emergency Management Agency
Carl P. Staton -National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
NESDIS
David Sturdivant -Federal Communications Commission
Jay Thietten -Bureau of Land Management
Bill Turnbull -National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
John Winston -Federal Communications Commission
Executive Summary and Recommendations
People at risk from disasters, whether natural or human in origin,
can take actions that save lives, reduce losses, speed response, and
reduce human suffering when they receive accurate warnings in a timely
manner. Scientists are developing more accurate and more numerous
warnings as they deploy better sensors to measure key variables, employ
better dynamic models, and expand their understanding of the causes of
disasters. Warnings can now be made months in advance, in the case of
El Nin, to seconds in advance of the arrival of earthquake waves at
some distance from the earthquake. Computers are being programmed to
respond to warnings automatically, shutting down or appropriately
modifying transportation systems, lifelines, manufacturing processes,
and such. Warnings are becoming much more useful to society as leadtime
and reliability are improved and as society devises ways to respond
effectively. Effective dissemination of warnings provides a way to
reduce disaster losses that have been increasing in the United States
as people move into areas at risk and as our infrastructure becomes
more complex and more valuable.
This report addresses the problems of delivering warnings reliably
to only those people at risk and to systems that have been
preprogrammed to respond to early warnings. Further, the report makes
recommendations on how substantial improvement can be made if the
providers of warnings can become better coordinated and if they can
better utilize the opportunities provided by existing and new
technologies. Current warnings can target those at risk at the county
and sub-county level. The technology presently exists to build smart
receivers to customize warnings to the users'; local situation, whether
at home, at work, outdoors, or in their cars. It should also be
possible to customize the information for trucks, trains, boats, and
airplanes. The problem is to agree on standards and dissemination
systems.
Disaster Warnings: Technologies and Systems
Disaster warning is a public/private partnership. Most warnings,
including all official warnings, are issued by government agencies.
Most dissemination and distribution systems are owned and operated by
private companies. Liability issues make it problematic for private
entities to originate warnings. Public entities typically cannot afford
to duplicate private dissemination and distribution systems.
Effective warnings should reach, in a timely fashion, every person
at risk who needs and wants to be warned, no matter what they are doing
or where they are located. Such broad distribution means utilizing not
only government-owned systems such as NOAA Weather Radio and local
sirens, but all privately owned systems such as radio, television,
pagers, telephones, the Internet, and printed media. If warnings can be
provided efficiently and reliably as input to private dissemination
systems, and if the public perceives a value and desire to receive
these warnings, then private enterprise has a clear mandate to justify
the development of new distribution systems or modification of existing
systems. What if a warning-receiving capability were simply an added
feature available on all radios, televisions, pagers, telephones, and
such? The technology exists not only to add such a feature, but to have
the local receiver personalize the warnings to say, for example,
``Tornado two miles southwest of you. Take cover.'' What does not exist
is a public/private partnership that can work out the details to
deliver such disaster warnings effectively.
The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is the national warning system
designed primarily to allow the President to address the nation
reliably during major national disasters. All radio and television
stations (and soon all cable systems) are mandated by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to have EAS equipment and to issue
national alerts. The stations and cable systems may choose whether they
wish to transmit local warnings and they may also delay transmission
for many minutes. The warnings consist of a digital packet of
information and a verbal warning of up to two minutes in length. The
EAS interrupts normal programming or at least adds a ``crawl'' to the
margin of the television screen. Program producers and advertisers want
to minimize unnecessary interruptions. As a result, only a modest
percent of severe weather warnings issued by the National Weather
Service are relayed to citizens by available stations. The warnings
that are relayed may only apply to a small part of the total listening
area but are received by all listeners. When people receive many
warnings that are not followed by the anticipated events, they tend to
ignore such warnings in the future.
The information and technology revolutions now underway provide a
multitude of ways to deliver effective disaster warnings. Digital
television, digital AM radio, and FM radio offer the capability to
relay warnings without interrupting programming for those not at risk.
Techniques exist to broadcast warnings to all wireless or wired
telephones or pagers within small regions. Existing and planned
satellites can broadcast throughout the country and the world. The
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) systems are providing inexpensive
ways to know the location of receivers. The technology exists. The
problem is to implement standards and procedures that private industry
can rely on to justify development and widespread distribution of a
wide variety of receivers.
Recommendations
This report provides the background information to justify the
following recommendations:
1. A public/private partnership is needed that can leverage
government and industry needs, capabilities, and resources in order to
deliver effective disaster warnings. The Disaster Information Task
Force (1997) that examined the feasibility of a global disaster
information network has also recommended such a partnership. The
partnership might be in the form of a not-for-profit corporation that
brings all stakeholders together, perhaps through a series of working
groups, to build consensus on specific issues for implementation and to
provide clear recommendations to government and industry.
2. One or more working groups, with representatives from providers
of different types of warnings in many different agencies, people who
study the effectiveness of warnings, users of warnings, equipment
manufacturers, network operators, and broadcasters, should develop and
review on an ongoing basis:
A single, consistent, easily-understood terminology
that can be used as a standard across all hazards
andsituations. Consistency with systems used in other countries
should be explored.
A single, consistent suite of variables to be included
in a general digital message. Consistency withsystems used in
other countries should be explored.
The mutual needs for precise area-specific locating
systems for Intelligent Transportation Systems andEmergency
Alert Systems to determine where resources can be leveraged to
mutual benefit.
The potential for widespread use of the Radio
Broadcast Data System (RBDS) and other technologies thatdo not
interrupt commercial programs for transmitting emergency
alerts.
Cost effective ways to augment existing broadcast and
communication systems to monitor warninginformation
continuously and to report appropriate warnings to the people
near the receiver.
3. A standard method should be developed to collect and relay
instantaneously and automatically all types of hazard warnings and
reports locally, regionally, and nationally for input into a wide
variety of dissemination systems. The National Weather Service (NWS)
has the most advanced system of this type that could be expanded to
fill the need. Proper attribution of the warning to the agency that
issues it needs to be assured.
4. Warnings should be delivered through as many communication
channels as practicable so that those users who are at risk can receive
them whether inside or outside, in transportation systems, or at home,
work, school, or shopping, and such. Delivery of the warning should
have minimal effect on the normal use of such communication channels,
especially for users who will not be affected.
The greatest potential for new consumer items in the near future is
development of a wide variety of smart receivers as well as the
inclusion of such circuits within standard receivers. A smart receiver
would be able to turn itself on or interrupt current programming and
issue a warning only when the potential hazard will occur near the
particular receiver. Some communication channels where immediate
expansion of coverage and systems would be most effective include NOAA
Weather Radio, pagers, telephone broadcast systems, systems being
developed to broadcast high-definition digital television (HDTV), and
the current and Next Generation Internet.
A National Strategy for Integrated Public Warning Policy and Capability
Partnership for Public Warning, May 16, 2003
(ppw.us/ppw/docs/nationalstrategyfinal.pdf)
Executive Summary
Public warning empowers people at risk to take actions to reduce
losses from natural hazards, accidents, and acts of terrorism. Public
warning saves lives, reduces fear, and speeds recovery. Its success is
measured by the actions people take.
Warning is an important element of providing for public safety.
Public safety is a fundamental duty of municipal, county, and tribal
government and, for larger hazards, of state and Federal government.
Public safety is also the responsibility of citizens to take action not
only to protect themselves and their loved ones, but also to make
society safer through their jobs and community activity.
The American people believe that a public warning system exists.
While current warning systems are saving lives, they are not as
effective as they can be or should be. This document explains the
inadequacies of our national warning capability and charts a course for
improving current warning capability to provide what the American
people need and expect.
The National Weather Service issues the majority of public warnings
in the United States and has developed sophisticated warning procedures
and systems. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Weather Wire System operated by the Weather Service and the National
Warning System operated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) provide ways to collect and distribute warning information to
emergency managers and other key personnel nationwide. The Emergency
Alert System and NOAA Weather Radio provide ways to deliver warnings to
some of the people at risk. A wide variety of other warning systems
reach people at risk around critical facilities such as dams, chemical
plants, oil refineries, and nuclear facilities. Many private businesses
will deliver warnings to subscribers through telephones, wireless
devices, and email.
A basic concern with current public warning systems is that they do
not reach enough of the people at risk and often reach many people not
at risk. Few local emergency managers or first responders have
effective ways to input information and warnings directly into these
systems. Warnings from different sources are rarely available to all
warning systems in a given region. Many of the systems are not
interoperable. There are very few standards, protocols, or procedures
for developing and issuing effective and interoperable warnings.
Warnings from different sources use different terminology to express
the same issues of risk and recommended action. Even the national
Emergency Alert System has increasing inconsistencies and increasing
potential points of failure due to decreased funding, failure in some
localities to develop state and local plans for proper utilization, and
recent introduction of new codes in a non-standard manner.
All stakeholders involved in public warning should be represented
in developing an effective national public warning capability. The
Federal government needs to provide leadership, but cannot do it alone.
The primary responsibility for warning resides with county, municipal,
and tribal government, but they often need state and Federal
assistance. Scientists, intelligence experts, and other authorities
develop warning information on regional, national, and even
international scales. The news media relay and explain warnings, and
the broadcasters and cable operators operate the Emergency Alert
System. Industry plays a key role in developing, building, refining,
and operating warning systems. Certain industries also provide public
warnings around critical facilities. Many professional and trade
associations as well as nonprofit organizations and volunteers
represent the needs of various groups involved in delivery or
utilization of warnings.
Our national warning capability needs to be focused on the people
at risk at any location and at any hour, be universally accessible,
safe, easy to use, resilient, reliable, and timely. Numerous
technologies exist to do this and in many ways technology is the
easiest part of the solution. The bigger challenges are to provide
accurate, understandable, specific, and informative warnings and to
develop procedures and processes for collecting and disseminating those
warnings in standard and secure ways.
For warnings to be readily available to all people at risk, no
matter where they are or what they are doing, the warning capability
should be ubiquitous, but in an unobtrusive manner that respects
privacy and individual choice. This requires partnership and teamwork
among all the different stakeholders. An effective warning strategy
must enable industry to develop a wide range of market-based solutions.
Industry needs a clear statement of government intent and clearly
articulated standards that specify required interoperability for a
national warning capability. Industry will be naturally motivated to
augment basic interoperability with competitive capabilities and
refinements. Industry also needs an official stream of all-hazard
warnings that industry can deliver without liability for the content.
An effective warning strategy must also integrate efforts by government
not only to issue warnings but also to deliver them..
States, counties and municipalities have developed disparate alert
networks at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars; these networks
are not particularly effective, are not interoperable, and will be
difficult to consolidate. To alleviate this unduly expensive and
massive duplication of effort, national policy should be adopted
calling for partnership in linking all stakeholders and the public with
critical community-specific information that can be used to save lives
and reduce losses. A public/private partnership is needed to develop
the policies for and implementation of a national warning backbone that
will deliver a stream of all-hazard warning information using standard
terminology and procedures to a wide variety of warning delivery
systems for any region. Such a capability should leverage existing and
developing public and private network capabilities.
The President and Congress need to make public warning a national
priority, assign lead responsibility to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, appropriate the necessary funds to engage the suitable
stakeholders effectively to develop national standards and protocols,
and set deadlines for implementation. Public warning should also be
made a priority for other federal programs so that information is
gathered in a manner that will support this endeavor.
Working together in partnership, the stakeholders should assess
current warning capability, carry out appropriate research, and develop
the following:
A common terminology for natural and man-made hazards
A standard message protocol
National metrics and standards
National backbone systems for securely collecting and
disseminating warnings from all available official sources
Pilot projects to test concepts and approaches
Training and event simulation programs
A national multi-media education and outreach campaign
If we the stakeholders act now, each and every American at imminent
risk can have immediate access to warnings, knowledge of how to take
appropriate action, and a choice on selecting what information is
delivered and under what circumstances. Although this document deals
with national strategy, the authors of this draft feel it is important
to estimate initial costs required to bring it to fruition. A
significantly improved national public warning capability can be up and
running within two years, at a Federal outlay of no more than $15
million annually. The majority of initial Federal funding should be
used to initiate and support stakeholder involvement in developing
interoperable standards and procedures for an all-hazard warning
capability. Then state and local money can help in developing specific
details of local warning input and industry can play a major role in
developing consumer products for delivery of the warnings. Large
amounts of additional Federal funding should not be required. Thus the
strategy is that most federal government costs are up front. . .to
prime the pump.
Many key stakeholders are already making an investment and effort
and have laid the groundwork for a federal authority to step up to the
challenge. All stakeholders have a shared duty and obligation to act.
September 11th taught us that the unthinkable is no longer an excuse
for delay. Future tragedies--whether natural or man-made--are not a
matter of if, but when. Lives can be saved and losses reduced through
effective public warning. Americans expect their government to protect
them and believe an effective warning capability exists. However, an
effective warning capability does not exist, and it is only as matter
of time before our nation will come to wish it did.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you very much. Mr. Lucia.
STATEMENT OF FRANK LUCIA, VICE CHAIRMAN, WASHINGTON, D.C.
EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM COMMITTEE MEMBER, PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS
& SAFETY WORKING GROUP, MEDIA SECURITY AND RELIABILITY COUNCIL
Mr. Lucia. I thank the subcommittee and Congressman Shadegg
for the opportunity to participate in this hearing.
I retired from the FCC in January 2001, after a 36-year
career. My last 25 years were spent on public warning issues
and Federal Government preparedness. At the FCC I served as
Director of Emergency Communications and Senior Adviser, EAS. I
oversaw the technical operations of EBS and EAS and
participated in EAS State and local planning workshops across
the country. I was one of the government employees on the OSTP
committee and recently chaired the PPW committee that developed
the EAS assessment report.
Presently, I volunteer as a member of the Public
Communications and Safety Working Group of the FCC advisory
committee, the MSRC, as the EAS representative to PPW, and as
the Vice Chair of the Washington, D.C. EAS committee.
The key points of both the MSRC and PPW reports are that a
single Federal entity should be responsible for assuring that
public communications capabilities and procedures exist, are
effective, and are deployed for distribution of warnings to the
public by appropriate Federal, State and local government
personnel agencies and authorities; that lead responsibilities
are established at the Federal, State and local levels within
the overall discipline of emergency management; and that a
national uniform All Hazard risk communications warning process
is implemented from a public and private consensus on what best
meets the needs of the public, including people of diverse
language and/or with disabilities.
MSRC and PPW assert that effective delivery of emergency
information to the public should be achieved through a public-
private partnership that makes coordinated use of mass media
and other dissemination systems.
My written statement contains the specific recommendations
that were developed by MSRC and PPW.
My main concern is that EAS and the warning structure in
general are in need of resources so that they can become truly
effective to warn our citizens. Through the years, volunteers
have carried the load in developing EAS emergency plans.
However, no one has taken responsibility to see that emergency
management officials or other first responders know EAS is in
place and available to deliver emergency messages. We know of
no one who used EAS on 9/11, even though it was available. Very
few emergency managers are connected to EAS. They need to be
trained to use it. Some frustrated broadcasters set up the
AMBER program and persuaded local law enforcement to use the
idle EAS equipment to save abducted children. The remarkable
and near instant success of the AMBER alerts is clear evidence
about the efficacy of the EAS and the astonishing impact
broadcasters and cable operators offer by making their
audiences available.
Emergency personnel need tools to convey emergency messages
to the populace at risk. EAS, NOAA and all weather radio, the
common alerting protocol, the AMBER portal and other industry
systems need to be at their disposal to distribute warnings.
Presently the President's EAS message is transmitted by 34
primary entry point radio stations. These 34 radio stations can
reach only portions of the public. On air tests need to be
conducted to ensure that the message reaches every State and
local area.
Early warning has been proven to reduce the loss of life
and property. The National Weather Service provides excellent
service by transmitting early warning messages over their
communications assets. We need to extend similar capabilities
to all emergency managers at the State and local levels.
When EAS was established the Internet and cell phone usage
did not have a significant market share of the populace. These
and other new distribution systems can now provide access to
millions of our citizens. They all need to be connected to form
a total warning structure.
After the end of the Cold War, government resources in the
planning and warning area began to dwindle. The volunteer State
EAS chairs need assistance to hold workshops, to update their
plans, train industry personnel, refine test procedures and
ensure that EAS is integrated with other warning capabilities
at the State and local levels. States and localities need
assistance with emergency plan development, equipment and
training.
In today's environment the government at all levels must
have immediate and reliable communications with the public. It
is an important part of our Nation's defense.
[The statement of Mr. Lucia follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank Lucia
I thank the Subcommittee and Congressman Shadegg for the
opportunity to participate in this hearing.
I retired from the FCC in January 2001, after a 36-year career. My
last 25 years were spent on public warning issues and Federal
government preparedness. At the FCC, I served as Director of Emergency
Communications and Senior Advisor Emergency Alert System (EAS). I
oversaw the technical operations of Emergency Broadcast System (EBS)
and EAS and participated in EAS state and local planning workshops
across the country. I was one of the government employees on the OSTP
committee and recently chaired the Partnership for Public Warning (PPW)
committee that developed the EAS Assessment Report.
Presently, I volunteer as a member of the Public Communications and
Safety Working Group of the FCC Media Security and Reliability Council
(MSRC), as the EAS Representative to PPW, and as the Vice-Chair of the
Washington DC EAS Committee.
The key points of both the MSRC and PPW reports are that a single
federal entity should be responsible for assuring;
That public communications capabilities and procedures exist, are
effective, and are deployed for distribution of warnings to the public
by appropriate federal, state and local government personnel, agencies
and authorities,
That lead responsibilities are established at the federal, state
and local levels within the overall discipline of emergency management,
And that a national, uniform, all-hazard risk communication warning
process is implemented from a public and private consensus on what best
meets the needs of the public, including people of diverse language
and/or with disabilities.
MSRC and PPW assert that effective delivery of emergency
information to the public should be achieved through a public/private
partnership that makes coordinated use of mass media and other
dissemination systems. My written statement contains the specific
recommendations that were developed by MSRC and PPW.
My main concern is that EAS and the warning structure in general
are in need of resources so they can become truly effective to warn our
citizens. Through the years volunteers have carried the load in
developing EAS emergency plans. In establishing EAS, the broadcast and
cable industries complied with the FCC rules to install and test EAS
equipment at a cost of millions of dollars. They installed EAS and
special equipment at every broadcast station and cable system to make
possible instantaneous communication to the public about any critical
emergency. However, no one has taken responsibility to see that
emergency management officials or other first responders know the
system is in place and available to deliver emergency messages.
We know of no one who used EAS on 9-11 even though the EAS was
available. Very few emergency managers are connected to EAS and trained
to communicate the information that can save lives and property.
Some frustrated broadcasters set up the Amber program and persuaded
local law enforcement to use the idle EAS equipment to save abducted
children. The markable and near instant success of the Amber alerts is
clear evidence about the efficacy of the EAS system and the astonishing
impact broadcasters and cable operators offer by making their audiences
available.
Understandably, resources are needed to equip emergency personnel
with the tools needed to respond to a terrorist attack and other
disasters. However, they also need tools to convey emergency messages
to the populace at risk. EAS, NOAA Weather Radio, the Common Alerting
Protocol (CAP), the Amber Portal and other industry systems need to be
at their disposal to distribute warnings.
EAS was created to allow the President of the United States to
communicate with the public in an emergency. Because of the failure to
coordinate EAS at the state and local level, the efficacy of the system
to disseminate the President's message is undermined. Presently, the
President's message is disseminated by 34 Primary Entry Point (PEP)
radio stations. Those 34 radio stations can reach only portions of the
public; so the plan anticipates that other broadcasters and cable
operators will relay the president's message. Yet no on air tests have
been performed to insure that the message reaches every state and local
area.
Early warning has been proven to reduce the loss of life and
property. Casualties and property losses were greatly reduced as a
result of early warnings prior to the arrival of the recent hurricanes
and tornadoes. The National Weather Service provides excellent service
by transmitting early warning messages over their communications
assets. We need to extend similar capabilities to all emergency
managers at the state and local levels.
When EAS was established, the Internet and cell phone usage did not
have a significant market share of the populace. These and other new
distribution systems can now provide access to millions of our
citizens. They all need to be connected to form a total warning
structure.
After the end of the cold war, government resources in the planning
and warning area began to dwindle. The volunteer state EAS Chairs who
have been working developing EAS plans need assistance to hold
workshops to update their plans, train industry personnel, refine test
procedures, and insure that EAS is integrated with other warning
capabilities at the state and local level. States and localities need
assistance with emergency plan development, equipment and training.
In today's environment, government at all levels must have
immediate and reliable communications with the public. It is an
important part of out nation's defense.
MSRC Public Communications and Safety Committee Recommendations
1. A single Federal entity should be responsible for assuring:
public communications capabilities and procedures
exist, are effective, and are deployed for distribution of risk
communication and warnings to the public by appropriate
federal, state and local government personnel, agencies and
authorities.
lead responsibilities and actions under various
circumstances are established at Federal, State and Local
levels within the overall discipline of emergency management
a national, uniform, all-hazard risk communication
warning process is implemented from a public and private
consensus on what best meets the needs of the public, including
people of diverse language and/or with disabilities, including
sensory disabilities.
Effective delivery of emergency information to the public should be
achieved through a public/private partnership that makes coordinated
use of mass media and other dissemination systems to quickly reach
large numbers and diverse groups of the public at risk to deliver
emergency information to the public.
2. Consistent with best practices in emergency management and
business continuity planning, local and State governments and the media
should cooperate to create, review and update emergency communications
procedures, such as EAS, Amber plans and their components, to quickly
disseminate critical information to the largest possible audience.
Effective use should be made of current, emerging, and
legacy systems, including television, radio and weather radio
that includes EAS.
Local media must be included in the creation of the
communications and warning plan and understand their key role
in its successful implementation.
The skill set of both federal and local agency
participants should include training and process knowledge of
how to work with and the benefits of utilizing the media to
inform the public in a timely fashion during emergencies.
Emergency managers should have a working knowledge of how to
access EAS and other public warning systems.
Local media should assist government to create and
deliver more effective public education about emergencies and
preparedness.
Local Media should assist State and Local
government to develop a public education program that
includes actions that the public can take (and refrain
from) that will assist in the response to and recovery
from disasters.
State and Local public education programs
should be coordinated with Federal government programs
of public information and education.
Local media should agree to develop consistent
presentation guidelines to ensure that all emergency delivery
systems work well together to accurately deliver emergency
information to the entire community.
Government and local media should conduct regular
testing and rehearsals of emergency communications plans.
Appropriate policies for the judicious use of
Emergency Communications should be created to preserve public
confidence and the integrity and urgency of such
communications.
3. All local media should form emergency jurisdiction / market
cooperatives to assure delivery of local government emergency messages
in a coordinated way to all constituencies in the community.
Local media in each market should be encouraged to
create media pools for risk communication and warning; in
markets where pools exist, a working committee should take the
pool to the higher level of security, isolating it from the
traditional news coverage pool concerns.
Local media should consider the creation of an
Emergency Communications Coordinator position to serve as
single media point of contact for government and develop a
cooperative relationship with the local government lead agency.
State and Local government should consider equipping
their Emergency Operating Centers (EOCs) with the basic audio
and/or video equipment that allows them to provide feeds of
local government officials to the local media
Government and Media representatives from their technical staffs
should meet regularly to ensure that joint plans and procedures have
been implemented properly and that the supporting infrastructure is
maintained in good working condition.
Media and government jurisdictions should agree to
take pre-planned actions upon authenticated notice from
authorized government agencies, and incorporate these pre-
planned actions in overall emergency management training
exercises.
Local media and appropriate public safety and
other government agencies should establish local and
state emergency communication committees to plan well-
coordinated community responses for disasters.
Local media should engage in coordinated
activities to assure the flow of emergency information
using multiple languages and means to make this
information available to persons with disabilities in
their communities.
Pre-planned coordinated activities / roles appropriate
to local conditions for each media under various scenarios
(e.g. the type & number of delivery systems continuing to
function) should be created, developed, rehearsed and tested.
In particular, emergency communications plans
must take into account the probability of widespread
power outages when AM and FM radio is the only way to
communicate to battery powered receivers in the
community.
4. As the nation's current means to issue timely warnings through
mass media, the Emergency Alert System should be periodically tested,
upgraded as necessary, implemented and maintained at the local, state,
and national levels.
EAS equipment should be uniformly implemented to make
use of the latest EAS codes approved by the FCC.
Written State and local EAS plans should be brought up
to date with close participation by broadcasters and cable
operators.
Wired and wireless paths to EAS entry points from
warning sources designated in State and local EAS plans should
be in good working order.
State and Local EAS plans should consider the use of
the FM radio sub-carriers as a means of providing additional
entry points on a cost effective basis.
The Primary Entry Point system that gives the
President the ability to address the Nation through EAS should
be in good working order and be regularly reviewed and improved
if necessary in terms of reliability, reach and robustness.
Ongoing development of Presidential emergency
communication systems and procedures should be coordinated with
the ongoing development of new and legacy state emergency
communication systems and procedures, including EAS.
5. Research into development of alternative, redundant and/or
supplemental means of communicating emergency information to the public
should be accelerated.
An expanded government partnership with the media,
consumer electronics and computer industries should harness
free market innovation, foster competition, and enhance
interoperability to meet changing national warning needs.
The partnership should explore the use of
emerging new technologies to improve and / or
complement existing infrastructures and to leverage
emerging new infrastructures.
6. Local jurisdiction / market cooperatives should be encouraged to
share their locally developed best practices for coordinating their
efforts, delivering risk communications and warnings to their diverse
public constituencies, and joint continuity planning to maintain
communications under crisis conditions.
PPW EAS Assessment Report Recommendations
Based upon this assessment, the Partnership for Public Warning
makes the following recommendations regarding the future of the
Emergency Alert System:
The Department of Homeland Security should assume a leadership role
for creating an effective national public warning capability. DHS, in
concert with other appropriate federal agencies, should strengthen the
Emergency Alert System by doing the following:
1. Provide leadership and oversight as necessary to manage the EAS
system.
Evaluate and support the implementation of new and
emerging technologies, which provide greater bandwidth
capabilities and reach large segments of the population.
Ensure that any new technologies are backward
compatible with the existing EAS/SAME equipment at 15,000
broadcast stations, 10,000 cable head ends and 1,000 NWR
transmitters.
Integrate the EAS and NWR systems with the emergency
management community, by providing a cost effective, reliable,
and secure method of activating the EAS system by state and
local emergency management agencies.
Institute reporting requirements for system
activations to allow for the development of effective after
action and service assessment reports.
Develop and administer procedures and standards for
the requirement, analysis, evaluation, and approval of state
and local plans and a needs assessment of system equipment and
connectivity.
Require mandated compliance with EAS system upgrades
within 180 days of official notice or regulation adoption date.
Provide training resources for all EAS stakeholders
designed to insure that the EAS system is maintained in an
operational status, and that all participants are trained and
qualified as necessary to perform their role in the use of the
system.
Distribute and promote these resources through
course offerings at FEMA's Emergency Management
Institute, and by providing regional, state, and local
training workshops as necessary, including on-site
assistance.
Involve strategic partners in this training
effort such as NEMA. IAEM, SBE, NAB, SCTE, NCTA, and
state broadcaster associations.
Attend and participate in broadcast and cable
industry events and conventions to form a closer
alliance with the broadcast and cable communities.
Develop and administer an education initiative using
public service announcements to raise public awareness of the
role of the EAS system in public warning.
2. Strengthen and improve the PEP system.
Improve delivery methods to enhance system security,
reliability, and robustness.
Increase testing (to include on air tests as
necessary) to ensure that the PEP system is maintained in a
ready state.
Expand the reach of the system by adding PEP stations
and including major broadcast networks, national cable program
suppliers, and satellite based media outlets.
Implement policies and procedures at the activation
points to allow the use of the PEP system for the purpose of
public warning.
3. Update the existing Memorandum of Understanding that defines a
framework for a cooperative effort for developing and evaluating state
and local plans, to more accurately reflect current EAS capabilities
and to clearly delineate management and oversight responsibilities. As
appropriate, the MOU should also incorporate other federal and non-
federal agencies participating in the EAS.
4. Find avenues to provide appropriate federal government funding
and resources to support and operate the EAS and ensure that the
federal government does not impose un-funded mandates on state and
local governments, or the broadcast and cable communities. Study
incentives for industry to participate voluntarily.
5. Support a public private partnership to develop the standards,
policies and procedures to integrate the EAS into a comprehensive
national public warning capability.
Mr. Shadegg. I thank you very much, Mr. Lucia, for your
testimony. And now Ms. McGinnis.
STATEMENT OF PATRICIA McGINNIS, PRESIDENT AND CEO, COUNCIL FOR
EXCELLENCE IN GOVERNMENT
Ms. McGinnis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
members of the subcommittee for including me in this hearing. I
want to congratulate you on focusing on this important issue--
really getting to the heart of the matter to think about and
look at what would actually happen if we had to mobilize the
public in real time in an emergency. I think that is a great
test of our Homeland Security enterprise.
The Council for Excellence in Government is a nonprofit
organization which for 20 years has focused on two goals,
improving the performance of government and engaging citizens.
I think those are your goals in this hearing and in this
subcommittee.
Last fall we launched a very ambitious effort called
Homeland Security from the Citizens' Perspective. We looked at
the whole enterprise, Federal, State and local, public-private,
the volunteer and civic community from the bottom up, through
the eyes of ordinary citizens, and we did that by holding a
series of seven town hall meetings across the country in St.
Louis, Miami, San Diego, Houston, Fairfax Boston and Seattle.
In addition to having those conversations with hundreds,
actually thousands of citizens across the country, we conducted
a national poll based on what we heard from citizens to test
their ideas and gauge their concerns in terms of whether they
were representative of the whole country. We had experts from
the public and private sector in working groups looking at
citizens' concerns and ideas to help us produce this report,
which you have a copy of, called ``We the People: Homeland
Security from the Citizens' Perspective.''
The major finding of this work is very pertinent to what we
are talking about today, and that is that there is a tremendous
communications gap between government and citizens in homeland
security, and we think that citizens, the public, ultimately is
the most important and most untapped resource not only in an
emergency response situation, but also to help prevent and
prepare for emergencies. Repeatedly in the town halls, and this
was so powerful, we had State and local and Federal officials
together in conversations with the public, representatives from
both parties, very--this was a very constructive conversation.
They were very proud of the plans that they have come up with,
particularly at the local level, and the hard work that has
been done bringing different agencies together. And then when
we asked the people in the audience and in our polling in the
local areas if they were aware of these plans, if they had any
idea of what to do in an emergency, if they knew where to get
the information, and the answer is a resounding no. And that is
a huge issue.
And the thing that was striking in the moment of these
discussions was that the officials in charge were surprised by
that because the plans are on their Web sites. There is
information out there. A lot of information has been mailed to
people. But it is simply not user friendly. Everyone is not
going to a Web site. We have a huge communications gap. We
asked people how they would get their information in the
absence of knowing or thinking ahead of time about what to do,
and they say they would turn on the television first, and the
Internet for guidance. But if power is shut down, what would
they do, and how many people have battery powered radios and
who knows what stations to turn to if we need information
immediately. And, as we talked about before, how many of our
televisions, radios and other equipment can receive these
digital signals in the kind of emergency alert system that we
envision that would get information out in a very broad way in
real time?
Information sharing emerged as the top concern in every
single town hall meeting and the top recommendation of the
public. People want the government to have the tools necessary
to share information and communicate with them, and this gets
to both the issues of interoperability in terms of sharing and
analyzing the information and making decisions before you get
to a point where you can issue an instruction, an emergency
instruction. That has to be right because the information has
to be reliable. It has to be geographically specific. And then
you have to be able to get it out to everyone regardless of
language or location or disability.
We made a number of recommendations in four areas, and I
think they can serve as principles for your work. Collaborative
leadership, information sharing, engaging citizens in the
process and measuring readiness. And I am not going to go
through all those recommendations. You can read them. But I am
going to highlight a few.
We need an updated National Strategy for Homeland Security.
The National Strategy for Homeland Security was prepared in
2002. It is excellent but it has not been updated and needs to
be updated to provide a framework for State and local plans,
for workplace, school, hospital, other kinds of plans, and it
needs to be very specific in terms of goals, assignments of
responsibilities, performance measures, and the vulnerability
assessments which have to be part of that planning should
include examining emergency alert systems. The critical
infrastructure owned mostly by the private sector, should
definitely include private broadcasters and we should be
focused on their plans and coordinating them with the national
strategy. We need plans and we need to practice them.
In terms of information sharing, we have talked a lot, and
we absolutely agree that we need the standards and protocols so
that decisions can be made and communications with the public
can take place. We absolutely agree and made some
recommendations that information should be shared through many
channels. You really need to think from the perspective of a
citizen in terms of how they are going to get their
information. And so all the channels that we have talked about
from radio to television, to the Internet, to cell phones to
personal computers and--we need to have all of that.
In terms of engaging citizens, and this is a point I will
make generally and we have a lot of specific recommendations,
we think that citizens need to be part of building this,
understanding it and practicing it, because right now if you
have an emergency the response is likely to be quite chaotic
regardless of how effective even a digital emergency alert
system is if people aren't aware of what they are supposed to
be listening for and what they should do under a variety of
scenarios.
We suggested that local government should provide people
with information that is really boiled down, maybe to an index
card that gives them an idea of what they have to have and what
they should do and where they should turn in different
scenarios of emergencies. In some cases you would shelter in
place. In some cases you would evacuate. And if you think that
through ahead of time and talk with your family about it,
practice it in your schools, workplaces, et cetera, there is
going to be a lot more calm, ability to tune in, get the
instructions and follow them.
The readiness measure--
Mr. Shadegg. If you could wrap up as quickly as you can.
Ms. McGinnis. I will wrap up. I will just say that what we
are working on now is the notion of measuring readiness and
creating scorecards for a variety of institutions and actually
having a readiness index for the public.
Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. McGinnis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Patricia McGinnis
Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee for inviting
me here today to participate in this important discussion about
emergency warning systems and communicating with the public in this new
era of homeland security. I congratulate you on getting to the heart of
the matter--to look at what would actually happen--or not happen--in
the real time mobilization of the public as an emergency unfolds.
As a nonprofit organization, which for 20 years has focused on
improving the performance of government and engaging citizens, the
Council for Excellence in Government shares your concern about the
timely and effective communications with the public in emergency
situations.
In the fall of 2003, the Council launched an ambitious effort
called Homeland Security from the Citizens' Perspective. We looked at
the entire homeland security enterprise from the bottom up--through the
eyes of ordinary citizens. Our goals were to solicit ideas and
articulate a vision of safe and secure communities across the country,
and to identify the communications and actions necessary to get us
there.
To foster dialogue between citizens and leaders, we organized seven
town hall meetings across the country in St. Louis, Miami, San Diego,
Houston, Fairfax, Boston and Seattle. In doing so, we reinvented the
traditional town hall by adding interactive polling technology and the
internet to gauge citizens' views and encourage questions, feedback and
participation. We arranged to have many of the town hall meetings
broadcast live on radio and television, allowing countless others to
participate from home.
In tandem with these town hall meetings, we convened working groups
comprised of thought leaders from the public, private and nonprofit
sectors. They took the ideas and concerns from the town hall meetings
and provided guidance about approaches and solutions to achieve the
safety and freedom that citizens want. Our national poll amplified and
clarified what we heard both in the town hall meetings and in the
working groups.
A major headline of this work is the existence of a tremendous
communications gap between government and citizens, whom we believe are
the nation's most important and most untapped resource to help prevent,
prepare for and respond to a terrorist attack in this country.
Repeatedly in our town halls, we asked the audience whether they
were aware of their state, city, work, or school emergency plans. Time
and again, I saw the panelists--local and state homeland security
directors, police and fire chiefs, and federal officials too--quite
surprised that the people in their communities have little or no
awareness of their plans, how they
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Mr. Shadegg. Thank you very much. I want to thank each of
you for your testimony and for your written testimony as well.
I want to begin with you, Mr. Lucia, because quite frankly
I am a little confused. A great deal of the discussion here
today has been on the EAS system, and your points about needing
more resources were well taken. It was a system that was
created, as has been explained earlier here today, to warn
Americans of an impending nuclear attack. Quite frankly, over
time that became a remote possibility, quite fortunately, and
now I think we need a better system. Quite frankly, I think you
are right about needing more resources.
However, one of the things that I was concerned about is
that you made reference to the system not being activated as
often as it should be or not having been activated in the 9/11
incident except that as I understand it, and here is my
confusion, as I understand it, the current EAS system can only
be, I guess, activated or utilized by the President. And Mr.
Cox pointed out in his earlier questioning, it seems to me,
there ought to be a capability of regional activation. And I
think that is what you said in your testimony, is that correct?
Mr. Lucia. Yes. It is set up technically so that it can be
activated regionally. It depends on which of the 34 stations
are activated to bring the President's message. So it could be
done regionally. Using that method. FEMA can control which of
the 34 are going to put out the message.
Mr. Shadegg. But should it be able to be activated at a
much lower level? For example, the AMBER alert system can be
activated by a local police department when a child is
abducted.
Mr. Lucia. Right. The AMBER plans are excellent examples of
how you can take an originator who makes up a message, have
connection capability to the broadcasters and cable operators
in a given area and put on an AMBER alert instantly. There are
other systems that go with that, you know, the AMBER portal and
so forth.
But the problem is the local, State and local EAS plans are
now done voluntarily. And several years ago--and I keep going
back to the past--we had a program where we do workshops around
the country to develop these State and local plans and make
sure that they were effective. Now, they are still being done,
but I think there needs to be more government resources to lift
that planning program, you know, off of dead center and get
started again really.
Mr. Shadegg. Dr. Ward, in your testimony you said that
technology is not the problem, and I would agree with that. But
the weakest link is this link between people who have a warning
to put out and those who actually disseminate the warning, and
there are many mechanisms for the dissemination of the warning.
The question is how do you implement that? Would you agree that
there needs to be the capability of a regional warning?
Mr. Ward. Yes, there needs to be a capability of a regional
warning. There needs to be a capability of focusing that
warning on a specific region, not just which of the PEP
stations are activated but a specific geographic region. I
think one of the really remarkable successes of the AMBER Alert
Web Portal is the way it can focus on exactly the areas it
needs to go and how it can get these from either the State
police or from any patrolman on duty who can get approval from
the State police to enter that information can go out
immediately everywhere it needs to go.
Mr. Shadegg. I think this committee, this subcommittee, is
interested in actually taking action. I know the full committee
is interested in that. On that point is there a need for a
specific legislation? Mr. Cox in his earlier question said is
this an executive branch issue, or is this a legislative branch
issue? I think there is frustration here that we through the
AMBER alert model have a much better mechanism to notify
people, but we apparently don't have that for incidents that
don't involve the abduction of a child. The kind of incident of
9/11 I am not sure you would want to have issued an alert
nationwide. You certainly needed the more important alert
regionally, here for example, on Capitol Hill, during that gap
between the first three planes crashing and where the fourth
plane was going. You didn't necessarily need a national alert
but you certainly needed a regional alert, and I guess the
question is there something this committee or this Congress can
do to move the ball down the court?
Mr. Ward. As I said earlier, one of the biggest problems
everybody has identified is teamwork, the need to work
together. The fact is for local warnings, local people have the
responsibility to do it, and they want to do it. So the Federal
Government can't just tell them what to do, and one of the
problems with EAS is the fact that it is mandated on the
broadcasters, and while many of them do it very voluntarily and
want to do it, it is not evenly mandated. So I think what you
need to do from the Federal level is somehow empower the local
groups to solve this problem.
Again, I think the AMBER Alert Web Portal Consortium has
given us a model for how you can get all of the different
stakeholders involved. They put the agreements together as to
how to--who is going to be responsible for what; how is it
going to work. They then get the system going and it works very
nicely. So I think we do have an excellent pilot out there that
shows how we can get around all those different groups and get
them working together.
Mr. Shadegg. Now there was Federal legislation to get AMBER
Alert going. Is there a need for similar legislation here?
Mr. Ward. What there is a need for now, for example in the
AMBER area, is to expand that effort to be an All Alert, and
there is a need for Federal interest to do that. In talks with
FEMA there is definitely an interest there. It is a question of
going forward and getting it done.
Mr. Shadegg. So you think there is a need for Federal
enabling legislation to convert essentially AMBER Alert into an
All Hazards Alert so you could warn of anything, not just the
abduction of a child?
Mr. Ward. Yes. It is a question of exactly how much
legislation is required for the purpose of just getting forward
and getting the job done. I mean for very small amounts of
money this could be put nationally because you are not building
new things.
Mr. Shadegg. I think every member of this subcommittee
would like to see the job done, if not every Member of
Congress. I think one of the issues is that the American public
isn't consciously aware of how inadequate the warning system is
right now and even probably not consciously aware of the
importance, the increased importance of a warning system today
following 9/11 versus in the nuclear era.
My time has expired. The Chair would call upon the ranking
member, Mr. Thompson, for his questions.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with you on
the inadequacy of the system and just in the testimony of the
two panels we have heard a little bit about the inadequacy. Mr.
Hoover testified that we can notify 94 percent of the people in
this country with our existing system, and I have heard two
gentlemen say we can do about 30 percent.
So can you help me out so at least we will leave today with
some--
Mr. Ward. Let me first explain reverse 911. When you pick
up the telephone and dial 911, in the center for the 911 calls
your address is physically displayed on the screen. Now, this
requires a database that has to be updated. More than 10,000
telephone numbers change every day in the United States. There
is a major effort to keep that database operational. Anyway,
there is a database and of course cell phones add a whole other
problem here. But there is a database that links your phone
number to your physical location. You could use that to dial
out but if you--as soon as you start dialing thousands of
people you overload the switch system. As soon as you start
sending short messages service, messages to Blackberries and
cell phones you overload the switching system to get it out
there. You need to broadcast the information. Now, there are
hundreds of companies out there that will provide the service
of calling telephone numbers, sending faxes, sending e-mails.
What we are talking about in this pipeline is empowering all
those companies to do their thing, to do it any way they want.
But here is the official information, and they all will have it
instantaneously.
Mr. Lucia. With respect to the 90 percent, 30 percent, the
34 radio stations that are a part the PEP system, their signal
coverage is about 95 percent of the country. The problem comes
in when the volunteers develop a State EAS plan, they develop a
monitoring structure whereby all the stations and cable systems
in that State monitors in such a way to form like a pyramid so
that the governor can put messages into that system. Similarly
that State EAS entry point monitors a PEP station. So what you
need to do is to ensure that each of those PEP stations is
being monitored by each State EAS entry point, and then that
message can then flow down to all the stations and cable
systems in that State.
Mr. Thompson. So is that being done now?
Mr. Lucia. Well, some of the States have developed--can
reliably monitor those 34 PEP stations. Some State EAS entry
points cannot.
Now, Mr. Hoover said they were going to add more PEP
stations and they were going to put in a satellite system. That
would solve the problem of getting the EAS national message to
each of the State EAS entry points. The problem still exists
below in the State EAS plans there are a lot of communities
that need their own EAS structure, D.C. being one, and we are
working on a plan for D.C. right now. So cities like New York,
Chicago, St. Louis, they need to have State and local plans,
and not only include EAS. It has got to include all of these
systems working together because no one system can reach
everybody. So that is--
Mr. Thompson. So do we need to from a legislative
standpoint, in your opinion, and I will throw it out, just
mandate that operation in one agency, or--
Mr. Lucia. Well, it appears DHS is that agency. The only
question is the development of the State and local warning
plans, integrated plans. That is still a voluntary thing.
Mr. Thompson. Right.
Mr. Lucia. I don't--I mean, if--and when you do the plans
voluntarily, I think you get a better cooperation from all of
the industries. If you mandate it, I am not so sure it will be
done, but I am not so sure that--I don't know if the effects
would be as well taken by the State and local officials, if you
know what I mean.
Mr. Thompson. Well, if you were trying to get a uniform
systemSec.
Mr. Lucia. Correct.
Mr. Thompson. Mandating it wouldn't give you--
Mr. Lucia. Well, the national system is mandated. In other
words, the code that the President uses on the EAS system will
automatically take over all the EAS equipment that it sees,
that it gets to. All the other codes. Tornado warnings,
evacuations, all those codes presently in the FCC regulations
are used on a voluntary basis. The officials request the
broadcasters to put out a tornado, you know, the Weather
Service requests the broadcaster to put out a tornado warning.
The local emergency manager requests that the broadcaster put
out an evacuation order. But these are done on a voluntary
basis. And when you have a plan where the originator says,
well, do you agree with me, Mr. Broadcaster, that we should put
tornado warnings out and the broadcaster says, sure, I will do
it. So when you have that plan structure and when you have that
cooperation in advance, I think it works better that way. But
the question is, how do we get it done across the country that
way?
Mr. Ward. The only mandate that exists at the moment for
Federal agencies is to deliver the President's message. Both
the FCC and FEMA have that mandate. Nobody has the clear
mandate to make sure the public is warned.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Shadegg. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
Chair would call on the gentleman from California, the chairman
of the full committee, Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you. I wonder if any of our three witnesses
would care to describe with some particularity how the Internet
might be used as part of the digital warning system.
Mr. Ward. The AMBER Alert Web Portal that is now
operational in Arizona and Washington State is using the
Internet, and it is quickly confused. It is not just a Web
site. The information shows up on many Web sites. But that is
just the window into what is going on behind that. What happens
is there is a form that the local policeman can fill out. When
he hits return, it immediately goes out over the Internet to
hundreds of locations, to news desks, to--it can--we have shown
it could drive the EAS system. It can go anywhere you want to
go.
Mr. Cox. Well, I want to ask the question a little
differently, because I am obviously well aware of that. But
what we have been talking about here is how, for example, in
your own testimony, we can be driving along and our radio is
turned on and gives us a message, or our radio, if we had it
on, already is interrupted. Likewise that is the way our
emergency television broadcast system is going to work. What is
the Internet equivalent?
Mr. Ward. Well, what the Internet does is get the
information to the people that can operate those systems. It is
the pipeline from the warning originator to the people that
operate those systems. So, for example, it is through Internet
and other digital networks that would get it to the Association
of Public Television Stations that would broadcast it
nationwide. Or whatever--
Mr. Cox. Well, I understand how we can e-mail one another
essentially. But what I am asking is whether there is a real
time interruption capability that we could introduce for use on
the Internet or whether that is not envisioned by any of our
three witnesses.
Mr. Ward. No, you can send high speed messages immediately,
either by Internet or by all kinds of public and private
digital networks. That will immediately trigger these issues.
Now, if the Internet is clogged that is one reason you can't--
Mr. Cox. Mr. Ward, do you understand my question though?
Mr. Ward. Yes, I believe so.
Mr. Cox. Let's say that you have your computer turned on.
We will make this easier. It is already turned on and you are
actually using the Internet. You are viewing a Web site. Is
there any push technology that will pop something up on your
screen that anyone envisions that will provide this kind of
emergency warning in a comparable way to the example that you
gave in your own testimony about the driver going down the
highway whose radio is interrupted with this kind of a message?
Mr. Ward. Yes. Many of us now when we get e-mail a little
pop up comes up on the screen and says you have new e-mail.
That same capability could take over the screen and give you
that warning.
Mr. Cox. Now I know that is theoretically possible. Is
there anything in prospect that you know that anyone has
developed?
Mr. Ward. Yes.
Mr. Cox. Who is that?
Mr. Ward. I can't give you the name of the companies, but
many companies are working on that. Many networks are working
on it. It is--you can send it to the screen and there are
already over Internet systems that you can download that will
put it up there.
Mr. Cox. How is that going to work external to the computer
with nothing pre-installed?
Mr. Ward. The important part at the moment is that the
Internet is used to communicate that out and you are going--it
will eventually be built into the systems to be able to display
it in any way you want. Maybe not even display it on screen, to
give you sound. But what the Internet and all the digital
networks give us is the capability to get the information
there. When we have it there in standard ways, there are all
kinds of companies that can give us ways to sound that, to turn
it into words, to make it visible.
Mr. Cox. I think the question that Mr. Thompson put both to
the first panel and to this panel is getting us close to the
nub of the problem. We have the potential to reach almost
everyone in the country if time were not of the essence,
because so many people do have televisions. So many people do
have radios, and so on. But at any given moment they may not be
watching television. They may not be in the place where they
can listen to the radio. We are a good example right here in
this room. I mean we have got a screen up there. We have got
all sorts of wiring and broadcast capability right in this room
and none of it is turned on. So if we were to hear something
about an emergency, a dirty bomb has gone off in the Capital,
evacuate, it would have to be external to us, somebody would
have to come in the door and tell us or we would have to hear
the thundering herds rumbling down the hallway because they
have gotten their notification in some other way.
So the task is to take advantage, and I think much of your
testimony has touched on this, is to take the technologies that
is already deployed because we are all using so much of it so
often. You know, I have a cell phone in my pocket. Some of us
have pagers, some of us have Blackberries. There are all sorts
of other equipment, and get that message out to as many people
as possible right away, not through intermediation. If all we
are using the Internet for is to send an e-mail to somebody who
might broadcast it through some separate service that we are
not watching anyway, we haven't come close to solving this
problem, it seems to me.
Mr. Ward. There is already a system being demonstrated this
summer in several months across the country. It is operated by
the U.N. in Iraq and other areas that can broadcast a signal to
all cell phones, every cell phone, without knowing who the
people are, within a cell, within a specific geographic region.
Those are the kind of technologies that are readily available
to be implemented once we have the standard source of data
coming over the networks.
Mr. Cox. Now I am a little bit troubled by something you
said earlier, which is that we are going to overload the system
with SMS messages, and SMS are tiny bandwidth. But if that is
going to overload the system--you also said if you call
everyone on their cell phones that is going to overload the
system. Why is it then that you say this is readily available?
Mr. Ward. If you need to address an individual telephone,
it takes several seconds to do that through the network. If you
broadcast to all cell phones in the area without addressing a
telephone, you can get to all of them instantaneously.
Mr. Cox. It is going to overload the system. My time has
expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Shadegg. I cut off Ms. McGinnis, and in all fairness
even though you are the full committee Chair I think I have to
proceed. The Chair would call upon the gentlelady from the
District of Columbia for her questioning.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I had
indicated my own concern about this region. That really went to
implementation. I suspect that we probably have as good an
early alert system as you are going to find. I know you have a
lot of technology in this region, as you might expect. I am
interested that--I guess it was Mr. Ward said that the
technology is not the problem. There should be, you say, a
single Federal agency responsible for assuring that these
communication procedures exist throughout the country. I mean,
I would hope that that is what the Homeland Security Department
is there for. The notion that you have to recommend it at this
point is itself troubling. In this city we now have with the
region interoperability, we can talk all through the region. We
can talk deep into burning buildings and the rest of it. On
tomorrow the District of Columbia is going to demonstrate a
broadband digital wireless network, the first in the country,
that will really allow you to see, for example, inside a tunnel
if something is happening. They are leading a Spectrum
Coalition For Public Safety and are going to demonstrate this
tomorrow here in the Capitol.
So you know, you would think, technology seems to be
gathering steam. But let me show you where I think the
technology falls real short.
When the Orange alert came to the District of Columbia, the
Capitol Police and the security officials reverted to 19th
century technology, you know, closing up streets, closing up a
street, checkpoints. My grandfather entered the D.C. Fire
Department in 1902. That is exactly what he would have done. So
I wasn't very impressed with what they were doing to prevent a
disaster. And I think this notion of communication and early
warning goes far more to the notion that you want to prevent a
disaster from getting anywhere close to targeted areas than it
does to hey, you know, the British are coming, so everybody get
under your desks.
I asked the security officials here, the Sergeant at Arms,
both sides, the Capitol Police, whether there wasn't some
technology that could keep us from, you know, peering into--you
know, having checkpoints that lined cars up, peering into the
back of cars because I understand what they were after, and
they said no. I said I just don't believe that. The one, quote,
technology they used or tested after the Orange alert was very
low technology indeed. But it is rather interesting and common
sense that as--the way in which this would work is if there
were a large vehicle, like a truck coming toward the targeted
area, the Capitol, they could turn on lights red, they say, and
they tested this, and stop this truck or get to this truck. And
that is not exactly 21st century technology, but that is the
only thing they have shown us. I am very interested in whether
or not there is early warning technology that gets us
somewhat--that does not require that warnings and action be
taken as the event is about to occur.
Ms. Norton. So that we send the signal to everybody, baton
down your hatches.
I am interested in what you can tell me about technology or
methodology for, for example, an orange alert, or a situation
where you really want to communicate to people that--or use
technology to keep an area safe and communicate to people that
they should perhaps should not come into an area or should use
another area. I am not impressed, if this is a test of what we
do when we are trying to prevent an event, if what is happening
around the Capitol is a test. All I can say is I think we have
failed the test. And I would look to technology, I would look
to whether or not, for example, in place of a checkpoint, there
is some technology you could use that would allow cars to come
up, at least the average car if not the large cars, to come up.
I would look to some technology that could keep you from
closing streets.
And I wonder if in the work of any of you, you have seen
either technologies or methodologies that would in fact
safeguard such areas well in advance of the event through the
use of technology or other approaches.
Mr. Ward. The technology we need is for an emergency
manager or other authority, when they have the information,
whenever they get it, whether it is long before or just as it
is happening or whatever, to be able to get that to the people
who need to know it. That is the warning system we are talking
about.
And, again, we have that technology, but it is in many
scattered forms; it is not integrated into a system. And what
we are talking about is the need to have that system to
integrate it so that the emergency manager doesn't have to
worry about how the technology works, just knows that if they
put the information here they can designate exactly where that
information will go.
Ms. Norton. Does anyone else have any--for example, what we
have around the Capitol also, we have these pop-up, what do you
call it, barriers. That is good. But that means something is
coming right at you right now, I suppose; or it means that
maybe just trying to stop something in case something comes at
you. And, of course, we have the barriers that are around here.
But, again, you would think at this point there would be
some way to more quickly scan the kinds of vehicles you are
concerned about, the kinds of people you are concerned about.
And yet I really don't see any evidence of that anywhere. And
we are really stopping up the society. This is a commercial
society. Things need to go happen. Even if they don't have to
happen in the Capitol, they need to happen in the rest of the
world. I do not see much evidence of that in the use of
technology in particular.
Mr. Shadegg. Does anybody wish to respond?
Mr. Lucia. Well, the only thing I think I can offer is the
first responders have to have the capability to communicate
messages to the systems that will then notify the public. If
they need special systems to do that, like around, you know,
the nuclear plants or wherever, then that needs to be done;
because without it, they are not going to be able to get their
messages to the people at risk.
Mr. Shadegg. Ms. McGinnis, did you want to comment?
Ms. McGinnis. I think this is a subject for probably
another hearing, because it is a different sort of technology
that you are talking about in terms of scanning, you know,
devices that we are seeing now in airports and having to do
with baggage and cargo and that sort of thing.
But I guess the one thing I would offer in terms of
prevention is we recommended that there be a way, a simple way
for the public to report suspicious behavior into a system like
a 311 or a 911 system that would be received locally, but in
which the information would be shared, as appropriate, so that
it could be turned into an alert, if that were necessary, or
used by intelligence officials or others.
So it is not just getting information out to people in a
timely way, but it is also having a simple, well-organized
system to receive information and use it appropriately.
Mr. Shadegg. Mr. Ward, I want to clarify one point. In the
discussion with Mr. Cox, I think you had said that if you have
to dial every phone number, that that could overburden the
phone system and bring it down--as actually happened here in
the Capitol Hill area on 9/11 when our cell phones became
useless. And I understand the same would be true if you had to
dial a phone number for every single cell phone number.
What I understood your testimony, however, to be was that
there are systems in place--you mentioned in Iraq--where, by
not dialing each individual number but, rather, sending a radio
signal, you could in fact send a signal to all cell phones at
least without clogging the system. Is that correct?
Mr. Ward. Yes. It is actually a transmission from the cell
tower which dominates an area of a few miles. And any cell
phone within that, that is communicating with that tower, will
get that message immediately. That is one example. There are
many technologies to do that.
Mr. Shadegg. I want to conclude with one kind of question
and ask each of you to comment on it. To a certain degree, I at
least--and I think this may be true of other members of the
panel--feel some degree of frustration. All of us feel the
system is not adequate. All of us would like to see it be
better. We have heard encouraging testimony about the
technology that can make it better.
But if I understand the overall thrust of the testimony, it
is that while there is a Federal alert system, its
implementation requires voluntary work by local entities. And
in the sense that we don't have one right now that we can use
in the event of a next terrorist attack, it appears that at
least passing a bill at the Federal level won't solve the
problem. So that is somewhat frustrating for us because we are
here to solve problems. And we want to have a single mechanism
that will allow all Americans to be notified, whether it
requires a national notice or whether it requires a regional
notice, because there is a terrorist attack or a dirty bomb on
Capitol Hill or in north Phoenix where I live.
I guess my--given that circumstance--and let me give you
each an opportunity to say, if you can encourage this
subcommittee and the full committee to do one thing, would you
make a recommendation; and, if so, what would that be? For each
of you.
Mr. Ward. I should say on the National Strategy for Public
Warning, there is on page 29 a clear recommendation of what the
President and Congress should do and what Homeland Security
should do. Without going into all that, the biggest issue we
face is this frustration that you mentioned of getting people
to work together.
To me, having worked in this area for a long time and
talked to a lot of people that are frustrated that way, what we
are seeing in the Amber Web alert portal is a breath of fresh
air. It is a way of getting people to work together. And I am
really hopeful that we are going to find a way to move that
into all hazards, because it is a model that gets past this
frustration and gets the job done.
Mr. Shadegg. Mr. Lucia.
Mr. Lucia. Yes. Some States and local areas have developed
excellent local emergency plans. They are model plans. The
question is, how do we get the other States and localities to
model their plans after that, because each State and local area
is so unique, they have different assets? That is a question. I
mean, we could mandate it and say you are going to do it this
way?
Mr. Shadegg. Maybe financial incentives.
Mr. Lucia. Possibly. And also providing, let us say, if a
particular emergency manager doesn't have a radio system to get
into these systems, how do we get money to him so that he can
do that? Just these little things here and there, I think, can
add a lot of impetus to all the areas to develop plans.
Ms. McGinnis. I mentioned that the National Strategy for
Homeland Security is out of date. I think we need an up-to-date
national strategy with a clear goal around being able to reach
everyone in an emergency situation. And the measures, I think,
are pretty obvious. We could--you know, the performance
measures could be specified, roles and responsibilities for
State and local government; and you would see with that kind of
strategic approach funding that goes out to State and local
government focused on meeting those goals, achieving those
measures, and actually, you know, by a date certain, if time
frames are established, having a system that can reach
everyone.
Mr. Shadegg. That is certainly the goal and that is what we
need to do. Thank you very much for the testimony. The hearing
record will be remain open for 10 days. There may be additional
questions submitted by members who weren't able to attend. They
will be submitted to you, and we would appreciate your
cooperation in responding to those. Again, thank you very much
for your testimony. The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
FOR THE RECORD
Questions for the Record
From the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
For Reynold Hoover
September 22, 2004
In the Administration's fiscal year 2005 budget, you requested an
additional $2 million for Emergency Alert System (EAS) upgrades.
Specifically, you indicated that these funds would be used to enhance
communications linkages between the 34 Primary Entry Points and the
FEMA Operations Center.
Question 1(a): What is the total proposed FEMA budget for EAS for
fiscal year 2005, and what specific activities does this budget
support?
Answer: The total FEMA budget specifically designated for Emergency
Alert System (EAS) upgrades in fiscal year 2005 is $2.15 million. This
budget provides for satellite connectivity upgrades for the Primary
Entry Point (PEP) stations and for expanding the PEP network to all 50
states and four U.S. territories. In addition FEMA, in coordination
with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) will spend an
additional $18 million on other public alert and warning initiatives,
to include pilot programs and a compendium of studies to develop an
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) architecture. This
architecture will serve as a consolidated DHS roadmap for the future of
EAS and for public alert and warning and mass notification.
Question 1(b): How many full-time FEMA employees work solely on the
EAS?
Answer: FEMA's Office of National Security Coordination (ONSC),
provides Program Management for the EAS as well as for other public
alert and warning initiatives. This effort is directly linked and
coordinated with IAIP. While there are no full-time employees working
solely on the EAS, there are eight employees within ONSC who provide
support to the EAS. In addition, an integrated project team within FEMA
that includes our Information Technology Services Division and the
Response and Preparedness Divisions provide support to ONSC and the
EAS. Further, employees assigned to the FEMA Operations Center and
Alternate Operations Center are directly involved with EAS testing,
activation, and operation.
Question 1(c): Does FEMA provide any guidance to state and local
governments regarding EAS messages, or do your activities focus only on
``Presidential Alerts?''
Answer: As an ``all hazards'' agency, FEMA is not solely focused on
``Presidential Alerts'' and, while we serve as the Executive Agent for
the operation of the national-level EAS, we do provide guidance to
State and local emergency managers regarding a variety of alert and
warning systems, including outdoor warning systems.
Question 2: Why wasn't a Presidential Alert issued through the EAS
on September 11, 2001? This would seem to be exactly the type of
incident where use of the EAS would be necessary and appropriate.
Answer: The national level EAS assumes that the President will have
access to national media outlets during a crisis and that the System
would only be used as a Presidential contingency communications means
when other outlets are unavailable. On September 11, 2001, the national
level EAS was operational, but was not activated, because national news
outlets already were providing the latest information and the President
was able to use those media sources to communicate with the nation.
In 2000, the White House issued a report entitled ``Effective
Disaster Warnings.'' The report recommended that a working group of
Federal agencies should develop a single, consistent, easily understood
terminology that can be used as a standard across all hazards and
situations.
Question 3(a): Was this working group ever assembled, and has any
standard warning terminology been developed? If not, why not?
Answer: While this group was never established, DHS, including
FEMA, IAIP and the National Communications System, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and other Federal agencies have participated in
the activities of the Partnership for Public Warning (PPW), which
examined issues related to standard warning terminology. Many of the
recommendations on alert, warning and EAS improvements offered by PPW
and the FCC's Media Security and Reliability Council are under
consideration by DHS. We believe the recent launch of DHS's IPAWS;
combined with the FCC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on EAS, will help
address common alerting protocol recommendations.
Questions 3(b): Since September 11, has there been any effort to
develop specific messages that would inform the population of what
actions they should take in the event of a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear attack?
Answer: Yes. DHS has provided several sources for such information
to include, the www.Ready.Gov website and ``Are You Ready? An In-depth
Guide to Citizen Preparedness.'' These information resources, and
others that the Department has developed in consultation with the
private sector, provide the public with guidance on what to do before,
during, and after such attacks. Furthermore, the National Response Plan
(NRP) Incident Communications Emergency Policy and Procedures (ICEPP)
is the primary incident communications plan for use by the Federal
interagency community. It is used in conjunction with State and local
authorities to manage incident communications and Public Affairs
activities during domestic incidents. The NRP-ICEPP incorporates
specific incident communications guidance on operations in support of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or catastrophic incident scenarios.
This appendix will be used in conjunction with the NRP-ICEPP during
such incidents. It provides detailed information on Departmental and
Agency incident communications resources to support response
contingency plans.
The White House report also recommended that warnings should be
delivered through as many communication channels as practicable so that
those users who are at risk can get the message whether inside or
outside, at home, work, or school, while shopping or in transportation
systems.
Question 4: Has there been any effort to implement a national
warning system that could reach the public through multiple
communications systems, other than the EAS system?
Answer: Yes. DHS has several efforts underway to implement a
national warning system that could reach the public through multiple
communications systems, other than the legacy EAS. In coordination with
the FCC, NOAA, television and radio broadcasters, wireless service
providers and others, we are exploring the use of digital and other
cutting edge technologies that will enable the government to provide
``all hazards'' alerts, warnings, and Presidential messaging to the
greatest number of people all of the time. This includes persons with
disabilities and individuals for whom English is a second language. We
are confident that the IPAWS under development and undergoing pilot
testing in the National Capital Region will provide the backbone for a
national warning system that can reach the public through multiple
communications systems.
In addition, FEMA's Preparedness Division has several studies
underway to facilitate the design, development, implementation and
maintenance of a national warning system. These include the following:
``Outdoor Public Alerting System Guide'' dated December 2004; ``Public
Warning System Redevelopment Project'' in draft form; and ``Warning
America'' dated February 2004. These studies are being or will be
coordinated fully with the Office of National Security Coordination.
DHS and the Departments of Commerce and Education are conducting a
pilot program to distribute NOAA All Hazards Radios to public schools
in rural states and in top threat cities around the country. This pilot
will significantly improve our ability to provide alert and warning
messages to the nation.
Finally, the National Science and Technology Council, author of
``Effective Disaster Warnings'' will be revisiting the original report
this year and will take into account changes since the 2000 issuance.
We can likely all agree that in times of national crisis, reliable
and timely information is crucial. Most Americans presently get their
emergency information from the antiquated Emergency Broadcast System.
But in the event of a local or regional power failure, these
information sources are mostly unavailable. We should have the
capability to use a quick, accurate and versatile official
communications alternative that can focus in on specific neighborhoods
or cities, or be expanded if necessary to whole regions or the entire
country. Because of this need, Representative Meek, a member of the
Homeland Security Committee, introduce HR 2250, referred to as the
READICALL bill. The bill requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to
use existing resources--just like the present emergency broadcast
system using existing resources--to create a fast, efficient and
reliable emergency communications system based on the nation's public
telephone system, including cellular phones, on a 24 hour/365 days-a-
year basis. The system could only be activated by the Secretary of
Homeland Security, and only to keep the public informed of imminent or
current hazardous events or on measures that should be taken to
alleviate or minimize danger. The aim of the legislation is to keep our
citizens informed in the terrible event that there is a national,
regional, or local terrorist emergency and present sources of
communication are not simply available. Minutes can make a huge
difference in an attack or disaster; accurate information pin-pointed
to the affected area can make all the difference.
Question 5: Has anyone at FEMA or DHS researched or considered such
an emergency warning system? What are your initial thoughts on such a
system?
Answer: As a point of clarification, the current EAS replaced the
Emergency Broadcast System in 1997, and operates at the national level
from the FEMA Operations Center to 34 PEP stations across the country.
FEMA does agree that in times of national crisis, reliable and timely
information is crucial. Moreover, we take our responsibility to provide
critical, and life saving, information to our homeland security
partners and the public very seriously. In that regard, DHS has several
initiatives underway within the IPAWS program to examine how to best
use the nation's telecommunications systems to perform public alert and
warning missions. For example, we are working with wireless service
providers as part of the Digital Alert and Warning System pilot project
in the National Capital Region; and, we are working with NOAA to
demonstrate geo--targeted reverse--911 technology that will allow us to
call specific households or businesses in an impacted or threat area to
provide emergency information.
Responses from Patricia McGinnis, President and CEO, The Council for
Excellence in Government
To the Questions Submitted
By the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness
Select Committee on Homeland Security
United States House of Representatives
October 29, 2004
Questions from the Honorable Jim Turner, Ranking Minority Member
Question: You said in your statement that one of the biggest
findings of your report was a communications gap between government and
citizens, both in terms of planning that is going on and what
specifically the public should do in times of emergencies related to
terrorism. Despite 3 years of efforts by all levels of government to
tackle homeland security, why do you think this gap exists?
Response: Our May 2004 Hart/Teeter poll revealed that most
Americans felt safer then than they did two years ago. This is
partially the result of three years of visible efforts by all levels of
government to improve the homeland security posture of the country.
However, despite all the planning being done at the federal, state
and local government in coordination with first responders, our town
hall meetings in seven major cities and our national public opinion
poll confirmed that most citizens are not familiar with local emergency
plans or those in their workplaces or children's schools. As a father
in our San Diego town hall said, ``We were told by my son's school that
we should come up with a family evacuation plan. . .but it's hard to
come up with a plan when you don't know what the school plans to do in
the event of an emergency.''
Information about homeland security is available on many websites
but it can be remarkably difficult to find the emergency plans of most
local governments. To encourage dissemination and awareness, we have
recommended that information be marketed through many channels of
communication, including the media, schools, and workplaces.
Our Hart/Teeter poll also found first responders are aware of a
communications gap with citizens. A solid majority (60%) rated the
communication between their agency and citizens as only somewhat
effective and efficient. Fully 86% of first responders, however, say
there is a role for average citizens in homeland security. Marketing
information to the public is not a primary skill set of first
responders and government officials. The challenges we face require
unusual communication strategies and many trusted messengers.
Another reason for the communications gap is the low participation
in emergency preparedness drills. Nearly three in five Americans say
that neither they nor anyone in their family participated in an
emergency drill in the past year. Among those who have participated in
a drill, school are the most common location, workplace drill
participation is nearly as common at 18%. Just 3% of Americans have
participated in a drill with their family, and just 4% have
participated in a community drill.
The communication gap between governments and citizens shows the
real need for a concerted outreach strategy that not only informs the
public but actively seeks their participation in preparing for homeland
security.
Questions from the Hon. Bennie Thompson, Subcommittee Ranking Member
for Patricia McGinnis Responses
Question: Your recent survey and follow-up report found that more
than half (53%) of Americans say that they would turn on their
television to find information about preparing for a terrorist attack,
learn about the latest threats, and receive guidance on security
precautions. Given this information, would you recommend that any
changes to the warning system be focused on delivering messages via
television?
Public warning systems should recognize that citizens will
naturally rely on television to receive information in almost any
emergency or hazardous situation. Indeed, over half of the respondents
in our survey said they would rely on television for information about
what to do if there were a terrorist attack near them. One in five or
21 percent said they would rely on radio, followed by cell phones at 9
percent and landline phones at 8 percent.
But, what if they power is out, or for other reasons, access to
television is not possible. In addition to battery operated radios, new
communications systems are being deployed that can broaden the reach of
current warning systems. For instance, we learned that the Texas
Education Agency now has the ability to simultaneously communicate with
multiple people within the school district on various self-selected
communication devices. In addition, the system is capable of initiating
a voice-only alert via the public telephone network and interfacing or
connecting to other communication devices. Relying exclusively on
television for warnings may not be as timely as that provided by
instantaneous and on-the-spot information services delivered to mobile
phones, pagers, and other wireless communication devices.
We should move in the direction of having televisions, radios and
other communications devises equipped to receive digital signals of
emergency warnings.
Question: Based on the town meetings that you held around the
Nation, what preparedness information does the public want, and how
does the public go about gathering preparedness information?
We asked this specific Question as a part of our national public
opinion poll released in May 2004. The public wants easy to use
preparedness and incident response information on key threats: Bio-
terrorism, chemical attacks, and attacks on power plants, water
facilities and other critical infrastructure. In our poll, nearly half
of Americans put bioterrorism at the top of their list, chemical
weapons were second at 37 percent and a nuclear attack was third with
23 percent.
When asked to rank which potential targets remain a concern for
them 49 percent of Americans responded that an attack on a power plant
is their top concern followed by 46 percent of respondents worried
about an attack on airports or airplanes, and 44 percent listed water
facilities as a target of concern.
Our research showed that the public gathers preparedness
information from a variety of sources. Television was the number one
choice of citizens (53 percent) when asked where they would look first
if they wanted to find information on preparing for a terrorist attack,
learn about the latest threats, and get guidance on security
precautions. Three in ten (31%) of Americans when asked the same
Question said they would turn toward the internet. Young adults were
particularly likely to choose the Internet over television. Eight
percent of the public said they would choose the radio first and just 3
percent said they would open a newspaper first.
Following our recommendation, the Department of Homeland Security
made a step in the right direction by designating September as
``Emergency Preparedness Month''.
In our report, we made several recommendations on how communities
and organizations can be more proactive and creative in getting
preparedness information to the public. For example,
Schools could engage parents and students in their
emergency plans during ``back-to-school'' activities and PTA
meetings. Private employers should have up-to-date and
comprehensive workplace plans, kits and activities, which
should include: emergency information posted on employee
bulletin boards, periodic all-staff meetings to share
information, and an in-house alerting strategy to quickly
inform employees with evacuation procedures or other actions to
perform in an emergency.
Local governments should produce an index card of
critical information in a user-friendly format that can be
distributed in multiple languages, through many channels to
homes, workplaces, and schools.
State and local governments should include reporters
in homeland security training exercises as active participants.
Local officials should offer citizens a service that
will send homeland security information or alerts to cell
phones, email addresses, pagers and other personal
communication devices. This system should have the capacity to
ensure continuity of operations and the accurate and timely
flow of information in an emergency.
Members of Congress should include an emergency
preparedness ``at-a-glance'' card in their September
constituent newsletter.
Managers of privately owned critical infrastructure
facilities should communicate to citizens through ongoing
corporate affairs, advertising and marketing campaigns about
specific steps they have taken to secure their facilities.
Broadcast media organizations should partner with
business and local government to run public service
announcements about homeland security and emergency
preparedness.
Question: What information should the public receive in a warning
message? How tailored or specific should warning messages be in order
to be effective? Do the current warning systems provide enough
information for the public to take appropriate action in response to a
disaster, emergency, or act of terrorism?
The public should receive warnings that are specific to their
location, describe the threat with clear instructions about who should
do what, when, where and how.
Clearly, most current warning systems do not deliver detailed or
geographical specific information to the public, and not everyone has
access to our national emergency alert system. As we know from our
polling, the American public is worried about many different but
specific types of emergencies, bio-terrorism, chemical attacks, nuclear
attacks as well as attacks on critical infrastructure, and often these
are not covered by current warning messages.
Different types of emergencies require different actions by
citizens, but our older warning systems were not built with this in
mind. Would the average citizen know when it is better to shelter-in-
place instead of moving locations? Would they be comfortable enough
with detailed emergency plans distributed by their children's schools
to know that the school was keeping their children safe too? The
integration and coordination of threat specific emergency warning plans
is essential.
U.S. House of Representatives
Select Committee on Homeland
Washington, DC, October 27, 2004
Dear Chairman Cox,
This document is submitted in response to your letter of
October 13, 2004 containing several additional questions
concerning the oversight hearing entitled ``Emergency Warning
Systems: Ways to Notify the Public in the New Era of Homeland
Security,'' on Wednesday, September 22, 2004.
Attached are my answers to the questions supplied by the
Honorable Bennie Thompson, Subcommittee Ranking Member.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response. Thank you
especially for your strong continued interest in improving our
public warning capability in America.
Sincerely,
Dr. Peter L. Ward
Question: 1. In February of this year, the Partnership for Public
Warning assessed the EAS, and made a number of recommendations for
improvement. In particular, you recommended that DHS take the lead in
creating an effective national public warning capability. What
organization in DHS should take the lead on updating or replacing the
EAS? Should it remain a "national security" based system, or should it
be changed to better address the all- hazards nature of most warnings?
The national need is to upgrade public warning systems of which the
EAS is a part.
Approximately 75% of the public warnings typically issued each year
come from the National Weather Service and are for severe weather or
flooding. Approximately 15 to 20% relate to accidents or ongoing
hazards issued by first responders or emergency managers. The balance
includes missing children (AMBER Alerts) and many other hazards such as
volcanoes, earthquakes and such. Specific National Security Warnings
are likely to be less than 1% of the warnings issued based on current
experience.
Coordinating an effective National Warning System involves working
with most groups in DHS including:
Emergency Preparedness & Response (FEMA has the
deepest roots in the communities and with the emergency
managers and fire services)
Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection
Border & Transportation Security
Science & Technology
Coast Guard
Citizenship & Immigration Services
Homeland Security Advisory Council
National Infrastructure Advisory Council
It also involves close interaction with many other agencies
involved in warnings or regulating warning services including:
Federal Communication Commission
Department of Commerce/NOAA/National Weather Service
Department of Interior/US Geological Survey
Department of Agriculture/Forest Service
Department of Justice
Department of Transportation
Department of Health and Human Services/CDC and others
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Thus the overall responsibility for warning within DHS should rest
with a person or small office within the Office of the Secretary for
Homeland Security.
You also need to ask the question: What is the appropriate role of
the Federal government in national public warning?
(1) The primary responsibility for public warning lies with county,
city and tribal government and nearly all public warnings issued are
focused on very specific localities. Thus the primary role of the
Federal government is to support State and local government with
technical information from organizations such as the National Weather
Service and with intelligence information from law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. The Federal government may issue warnings, but
it is on behalf of local government where time is of the essence.
(2) The other primary role of the Federal government in public
warning is to assure that nationally standardized public warning
systems are available nationwide, that they are effective, and that
they are properly utilized.
These issues are addressed more fully in A National Strategy for
Integrated Public Warning Policy and Capability published by the
Partnership for Public Warning on May 16, 2003 (ppw.us/ppw/docs/
nationalstrategyfinal.pdf).
It is also important to realize that most infrastructure for
warning the public is and will be privately owned and operated. Thus
the Federal government needs to work closely not only with local
government but also with industry. Development of an effective public
warning system requires a public/private partnership. A top down
approach from Washington has not worked effectively in the past. The
Federal government needs to provide leadership by bringing the key
stakeholders together. Thus within DHS, it seems very appropriate to
establish a National Public Warning Advisory Committee.
As I explained in my testimony, a public/private partnership among
law enforcement, emergency managers, first responders, the nations
broadcasters and industry has already implemented the AMBER Alert Web
Portal warning system in two States and it will soon to be implemented
in 12 more States. The National Association of State Chief Information
Officers (NASCIO) has proposed to DHS to extend this approach to all-
hazard warning through a pilot project in the National Capitol Region
and Washington State over the next 6 months. I believe that such a
partnership working closely with DHS and other Federal agencies has the
best chance for significantly improving public warning capability
within the near future. As you know, Congressman Shadegg has introduced
an amendment included in the House version of the 9/11 bill supporting
this approach.
What roles should the FCC and the National Weather
Service play if DHS is the lead agency for the EAS and other
warning systems?
The FCC carries the big stick with respect to the communication
industries and infrastructure. They need to be involved in encouraging
and potentially regulating all types of warning capabilities, not just
EAS.
The National Weather Service issues most warnings and has an
excellent operational capability throughout the United States. They
need to play a major role and perhaps should assign an employee to work
with the warning coordinator or Office within DHS.
Do you believe legislation is required to clarify
responsibility and accountability for warnings? What would such
legislation do?
The primary reason for the poor warning systems existing today in
America is that no one agency has been assigned legislated
responsibility or has assumed it. While the FCC, FEMA, and NOAA/NWS
signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1981 for operation of EBS (now
EAS), all three agencies have reduced their involvement and funding
over the years citing their legislative mandates and priorities. Thus
legislation is required to assign and clarify responsibilities. The
content of the legislation needs to be discussed in detail but should
include:
A statement that an integrated public warning
capability is a national priority
Assign lead responsibility to the Secretary DHS for
ensuring that national public warning systems and procedures
exist, are effective, and are properly utilized to distribute
warnings and information for all types of hazards from all
official warning providers, to all potential warning
disseminators, and ultimately to all people directly at risk.
A statement that development of an effective public
warning system in America depends on a public/private
partnership between Federal, State, and local government and
industry.
Possibly establish a small office within the
Secretary's office or leave this for the Secretary to decide
Possibly establish a national advisory committee that
would involve the many stakeholders in warning systems
Discuss the need to coordinate with other Federal
agencies and what their roles might be
Describe what the relationship of the Federal warning
program should be in assisting the States, counties, and cities
who have the primary responsibility for public warning
Perhaps specify some characteristics of the national
warning capability
Provide appropriate funding for integrating public
warning policy and capability
The pilot project proposed by NASCIO will provide an excellent test
bed for refining such legislation.
Question: 2. The February report also recommended that the
Administration provide the necessary funding and resources to support
and operate the EAS system.
What is the appropriate level of funding to adequately
maintain the current EAS system, and how much funding would be
required to significantly upgrade the system to reach multiple
communications modes and to be regularly utilized for purposes
other than ``Presidential alerts?''
Proper maintenance and operation of EAS requires restoring the
roles that FCC and FEMA played in training locals and working with them
to develop warning plans. A minimal effort might involve approximately
$1 million per year and several times that could be spent wisely.
To upgrade public warning capability significantly within the
United States, the first step is to establish a digital national
warning infrastructure as outlined in my testimony. Those involved have
proposed to DHS (FEMA, Science and Technology, and the DHS CIO) through
the National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO)
to carry out a pilot project in the National Capitol Region and
Washington State within 6 months to demonstrate how such an
infrastructure would work and to evaluate issues that would need to be
resolved to expand nationally. That proposal requests $1.65 million.
Expansion to a national capability can probably be done for
approximately $10 million. Once this national warning infrastructure
exists, warning capability will be significantly improved. The next
step is to evaluate ways to improve specific technologies for
delivering warnings directly to the people at risk. The issue becomes
how much the government should fund versus what can be done through a
public/private partnership and in the competitive marketplace. With
clear national standards and a place for industry to receive official
warnings for delivery, warning capability could be built into a wide
variety of electronics as a way to sell new products. The government
could spend some millions of dollars to stimulate these activities or
some hundreds of millions to pay for them all.
Question: 3. Based on your work, are there any particular
technologies that would be best suited to improving the nation's
warning systems? Rep. Meek, a member of the Full Committee, has
introduced legislation that would implement a landline-based
interactive notification system that would convey national, regional,
and local emergency messages via the public switched telephone network
to wire-line telephone subscribers located in the specific geographic
areas affected by emergencies. Would this type of system be more
effective than the current EAS?
An effective public warning system needs to utilize all available
technologies:
The EAS reaches only people listening to the radio or
watching television broadcast from ground based transmitters.
Few people listen or watch many hours per day. More than 20%
receive television via satellite and satellite radio is
increasing in popularity. For EAS to work via satellite there
needs to be intelligence built into the receiver to relay only
warnings that apply to that specific location. Receivers could
be built that turn themselves on upon receipt of a warning.
Most homes and offices have wire-line telephones and
warning by telephone would reach a large number of people
during the evening and night at home and during the day at
work. But it would not reach people who are out and about. Many
modern telephone handsets do not work during a power failure.
Equipment similar to Caller ID devices could receive, display,
and sound an alarm for a warning without answering the phone.
These could be built into future telephones.
170 million Americans now have cellular telephone
service that may be the best way to reach them during the day.
Many have their handsets switched off at night. Cellular
telephones receive their signals from local transmitters so
broadcasting an alert to all cell phones within receiving
distance of a local transmitter is one of the most promising
technologies available currently for warning just the people at
risk. While this technology exists for most types of cell
phones, industry has not been supportive of implementation.
Internet is revolutionizing the way we share
information and programs are available to not only issue email
to a specific region but to push a warning directly onto your
screen and sound an alarm. This technology is most effective
for the 50% of Internet users in the US who are connected to
broadband Internet service typically 24 hours a day. Once a
warning has been issued, people often want more information.
Internet and an 800 number service are excellent sources.
NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) is a government sponsored
service with special receivers owned by up to 11% of the
population. Many of these receivers can turn themselves on to
broadcast a warning and one television manufacturer uses the
NWR signal to turn televisions on to broadcast a warning. Such
technology to turn on and sound a warning can easily be built
into all radio and television receivers when there are widely
accepted national standards.> Numerous other devices typically
carried by people could provide warnings including pagers,
pocket computers, digital wrist watches, and portable music
players.
Automobile navigation systems and On-Star type systems
could relay warnings.
Sirens and digital signs are two of the few ways to
reach people who are outside or at places of public gatherings
and not carrying some type of warning receiver.
All of these types of technologies and many more need to be
integrated into an effective national warning system using the approach
described in my testimony. No one system will be sufficiently
effective.
Question: 4. We can likely all agree that in times of national
crisis, reliable and timely information is crucial. Most Americans
presently get their emergency information from the antiquated Emergency
Broadcast System. But in the event of a local or regional power
failure, these information sources are mostly unavailable. We should
have the capability to use a quick, accurate and versatile official
communications alternative that can focus in on specific neighborhoods
or cities, or be expanded if necessary to whole regions or the entire
country. Because of this need, I introduced HR 2250, referred to as the
READICALL bill. My bill requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to
use existing resources--just like the present emergency broadcast
system uses existing resources--to create a fast, efficient and
reliable emergency communication system based on the nation's public
telephone system, including cellular phones, on a 24 hour/365 days-a-
year basis. The system could only be activated by order of the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and only to keep the public informed of
imminent or current hazardous events or on measures that should be
taken to alleviate or minimize danger. The aim of this legislation is
to keep our citizens informed in the terrible event that there is a
national, regional or local terrorist emergency and present sources of
communication are not simply available. Minutes can make a huge
difference in an attack or disaster; accurate information pin-pointed
to the affected area can make all the difference.
What are your initial thoughts on such a system?
In theory this seems like an excellent approach. In practice there
are some serious issues:
The primary problem is that the number of telephone calls that a
local telephone switch can handle per minute is severely limited.
Telephone systems are built to handle typical peak traffic loads but
can become overwhelmed even on Mother's Day and especially by computers
trying to dial every number in a region. It is hard to get specific
numbers of calls that could be dialed per minute because industry is
concerned about their liability if the phone system crashes. One
developer of telephone technologies claims they have a new approach
that they tested using a modern switch in a major city and were able to
dial 68,000 numbers every 30 seconds and to deliver a recorded 20
second message. Others have yet to be convinced that such rates are
achievable. It will take significant testing to establish which
techniques will work best and what rates they could achieve using the
variety of switches currently installed within the US.
A second issue is that most people are not near their wired
telephone for large parts of the day. A third issue relates to people
at work and how calls would be routed to large offices. A fourth issue
is that most modern telephone handsets require power and do not work
during major disasters involving power failures. A fifth issue is that
phone systems are typically overloaded as a major disaster unfolds,
which is why broadcast techniques tend to reach more people without
overloading the infrastructure.
Research and testing of this approach should be pursued. No one
system is the ultimate answer to public warning as discussed above, so
we need to pick a few good ones and push those forward.
5. What information should the public receive in a warning message?
How tailored or specific should warning messages be in order to be
effective? Do the current warning systems provide enough information
for the public to take appropriate action in response to a disaster,
emergency or act of terrorism?
Public warning delivered with little choice by the recipient,
should be limited to hazards that are life threatening or of major
financial impact. People should have the opportunity to request
warnings for less significant events.
The key characteristics of a public warning are:
A warning is a communication that directs attention to
new information about a hazard or threat for the purpose of
causing focused action that reduces harm.
A warning may alert people to an imminent hazard or
may notify them about a hazardous event that is in progress or
just happened.
A warning should communicate what, where, when, and
how severe the hazard is, how likely the hazard is to occur,
and what action is appropriate.
A warning needs to communicate clearly and succinctly
the risk people face, to motivate them to take specific action,
and to provide guidance as to what that action should be.
The success of a warning is measured by the actions
people take.
Public warning is a public good that is generally
delivered through privately-owned communication networks and
devices.
A warning is basically a terse ``heads up'' alert. A
warning ideally should specify places to get more information.
Current warning systems generally provide sufficient information
but there is room for improvement. The Homeland Security Advisory
System is not a warning system because it does not provide specific,
actionable information.
Responses From Fank Lucia for Questions From the Hon. Jim Turner,
Ranking Minority Member
Question: How many states actually have an existing plan to
implement the Emergency Alert System?
According to the February 12, 2003 report of the FCC Media Security
and Reliability Council (MSRC) Working Group, almost all states have
EAS plans on paper but the operational capability varies greatly. There
are very few emergencies that affect an entire state at the same time.
Most emergencies occur at the local level and that is where almost all
EAS activations occur. About 80% of the EAS activations originate from
the National Weather Service (NWS). The activations are received on the
EAS equipment at broadcast stations and cable systems via NOAA Weather
radio (NWR). Each EAS local area has an EAS Local Primary (LP), usually
a high power broadcast station. LPs transmit the EAS message to all of
the other broadcast stations and cable systems in the area. Each
broadcast station and cable system decides if they want to broadcast
the EAS message to their audiences. LPs are identified in EAS plans.
How many states have designated EAS coordinators to ensure that any
messages that are sent to the Primary entry stations are further
distributed throughout the EAS system nationwide? For example, if a
Presidential Alert had been sent out through the EAS on September 11th,
how confident are you that the Alert would have been distributed
throughout the New York City region?
According to the FCC EAS web site (www.fcc.gov/eb/eas), almost all
of the states have an EAS Chair. These individuals are dedicated
volunteers. It is imperative that the FCC encourages and recognizes
their efforts. They need to receive assistance from the federal
government, even if it is only expense assistance for their EAS
workshops.
As to September 11, the closest Primary Entry Point (PEP) station
to New York City is WABC (AM). Their transmitter is in Lodi, New
Jersey. The President's message would have been broadcast over the WABC
(AM) transmitter if FEMA could have connected with the EAS equipment at
the WABC (AM) transmitter site using the Public Switched Telephone
Network. If the President wanted his message to be sent only to the New
York region, then FEMA would have to successfully implement ad hoc
procedures to selectively activate the EAS equipment at WABC (AM).
Otherwise his message would go out to all 34 PEP stations assuming FEMA
established successful connectivity to them.
In addition to its PEP connection for national EAS messages, WABC
(AM) serves as one of the EAS Local Primary (LP) stations for the New
York City EAS Local Area. Many of the New York City radio and
television broadcast stations and cable systems monitor WABC (AM) on
their EAS equipment. LPs are the disseminators of local EAS messages.
Their importance to the local EAS system is critical. Local emergency
managers need to know about these LP stations and how to request EAS
activation through them. This information is specified in local EAS
plans. The plans need to be developed, maintained, and tested regularly
with local emergency managers. EAS plans need to be a part of a
comprehensive local emergency plan that includes other public
distribution systems such as the Internet, telephones, sirens, private
alerting systems, etc.
There are over 500 EAS local areas. They generally follow radio and
television market boundaries. A best guess is that less than 30% of the
500 local areas have EAS plans, and many of those are 5 years old or
older.
1. In February of this year, the Partnership for Public Warning
assessed the EAS, and made a number of recommendations for improvement.
In particular, you recommended that DHS take the lead in creating an
effective national public warning capability.
What organization in DHS should take the lead on updating or
replacing the EAS? Should it remain a ``national security'' based
system, or should it be changed to better address the all- hazards
nature of most warnings?
What roles should the FCC and the National Weather Service play if
DHS is the lead agency for the EAS and other warning systems?
Do you believe legislation is required to clarify responsibility
and accountability for warnings? What would such legislation do?
1. FEMA and its predecessor agencies had always assisted in the
administration of the old Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) and even
CONELRAD. They administered special programs set up to assist industry
with the development and implementation of warning systems. When EAS
replaced EBS in the mid 1990s, FEMA provided some assistance but
resources slowly dwindled.
Today, the FCC, FEMA, and NWS each have responsibilities to ensure
EAS works properly. The FCC inspects the EAS equipment at broadcast
stations and cable systems. NWS ensures its digital warning messages
over NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) are compatible with EAS equipment. FEMA
provides training and planning aids for state and local emergency
managers. FEMA also funds NAWAS facilities throughout the nation.
NAWAS, NWR and the EAS equipment form the three arms of the federal
warning capabilities at the local level. They need to be integrated
with public and private warning systems at the local level to form
integrated warning systems.
In 1981, the FCC, FEMA, NWS and the FCC National Industry Advisory
Committee (NIAC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to develop
EBS state and local plans. Over 400 local EBS plans were developed in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. The MOU needs to be updated to reflect
the capabilities of EAS. Legislation is needed to require an updated
MOU or some other governmental agreement document to develop EAS local
plans as part of a comprehensive integrated local warning plan. This
would insure the agencies work together and prevent lapses in
cooperation. A copy of the 1981 MOU is attached. It details the
responsibilities of each agency.
2. The February report also recommended that the Administration
provide the necessary funding and resources to support and operate the
EAS system.
What is the appropriate level of funding to adequately maintain the
current EAS system, and how much funding would be required to
significantly upgrade the system to reach multiple communications modes
and to be regularly utilized for purposes other than ``Presidential
alerts?''
2. I believe the 10 million dollars funded to FEMA in FY 2004 to
begin upgrades to warning systems is a good start. Congress needs to
oversee the funding to insure that EAS is being improved not only on
the national level but also at the state and local levels as well.
Additional funding is needed to assess the nation's existing warning
capabilities; correct deficiencies identified in the assessment;
provide equipment and training; develop state and local models of
integrated warning plans; assist states and local areas to develop
integrated plans; schedule planning workshops; assess the performance
of warning plans and assets before, during and after disasters; and
ensure that the plans and personnel training are up to date.
3. Based on your work, are there any particular technologies that
would be best suited to improving the nation's warning systems? Rep.
Meek, a member of the Full Committee, has introduced legislation that
would implement a landline-based interactive notification system that
would convey national, regional, and local emergency messages via the
public switched telephone network to wire-line telephone subscribers
located in the specific geographic areas affected by emergencies. Would
this type of system be more effective than the current EAS?
3. Any additional technologies to distribute warnings to the public
are always welcome. But they must fit into the overall integrated
warning plan. Since EAS was established, Internet and cell phone use
have mushroomed. These and other distribution systems need to be
integrated into the warning structure. Emergency managers need to be
trained in how to develop the warning messages that would be
distributed by an integrated interoperable warning system. Such a
system should include EAS, NWR, NAWAS, the Internet, telephone, sirens,
private systems, etc.
4. We can likely all agree that in times of national crisis,
reliable and timely information is crucial. Most Americans presently
get their emergency information from the antiquated the Emergency
Broadcast System. But in the event of a local or regional power
failure, these information sources are mostly unavailable. We should
have the capability to use a quick, accurate and versatile official
communications alternative that can focus in on specific neighborhoods
or cities, or be expanded if necessary to whole regions or the entire
country. Because of this need, I introduced HR 2250, referred to as the
READICALL bill. My bill requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to
use existing resources--just like the present emergency broadcast
system uses existing resources--to create a fast, efficient and
reliable emergency communication system based on the nation's public
telephone system, including cellular phones, on a 24 hour/365 days-a-
year basis. The system could only be activated by order of the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and only to keep the public informed of
imminent or current hazardous events or on measures that should be
taken to alleviate or minimize danger. The aim of this legislation is
to keep our citizens informed in the terrible event that there is a
national, regional or local terrorist emergency and present sources of
communication are not simply available. Minutes can make a huge
difference in an attack or disaster; accurate information pin-pointed
to the affected area can make all the difference.
What are your initial thoughts on such a system?
Because of their widespread use, cell phones and the Internet
should be part of an integrated warning system. Projects demonstrating
their capabilities should begin immediately.
With respect to system activation by the Secretary of Homeland
Security, presently only the President can activate the national level
EAS. Activation would be through the PEP system using a special code.
Upon receipt of the special code, EAS equipment throughout the nation
would override the programming of radio, television and cable
television for the President's message. The override would occur even
if a state Governor or local official were broadcasting an EAS message.
Whether special code authority should be extended to the Secretary of
Homeland Security is a question for discussion.
Most if not all EAS Local Primary stations have generators for
emergency power. WTOP, Washington, DC is one of the DC EAS Local
Primary stations. These Local Primary stations function well in
disasters, including power outages. During the recent hurricanes and
power outages, portable radios were the primary means of communication
with the public. Part of the problem is that the local EAS systems need
to be part of an integrated local system to reach citizens using other
communications devices such as cell phones and computers. Some of these
devices are capable of reaching very specific areas and even groups of
citizens. It begins at the local level.
5. What information should the public receive in a warning message?
How tailored or specific should warning messages be in order to be
effective? Do the current warning systems provide enough information
for the public to take appropriate action in response to a disaster,
emergency or act of terrorism?
5. Citizens at risk need timely and specific instructions. Consumer
devices should have the capability to be programmed by their users for
warning messages they want to receive. It is equally if not more
important that officials with emergency authority have the knowledge
and training to develop effective warning messages and access the
warning systems.
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[Information is in committee file.]