[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS WITHIN
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE
AND BORDER SECURITY
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 5, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-47
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., North Carolina
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Pete Sessions, Texas
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
______
Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security
Dave Camp, Michigan, Chairman
Kay Granger, Texas, Vice Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez, California
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Don Young, Alaska Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Duncan Hunter, California Barney Frank, Massachusetts
Lamar Smith, Texas Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Robert W. Goodlatte, Virginia York
Ernest Istook, Oklahoma Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
John Shadegg, Arizona Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Mark Souder, Indiana Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
John Sweeney, New York Jim Turner, Texas, Ex Officio
Christopher Cox, California, Ex
Officio
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security............................................ 45
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Vice Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security............................. 1
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Committee
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on
Homeland Committee
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Oregon............................................ 35
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 30
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas 49
The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Massachusetts..................................... 45
The Honorable Louise McIntosh Slaughter, a Representative in
Congress From the State of New York............................ 39
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana........................................... 33
WITNESSES
Witnesses Prepared Statement..................................... 9
Mr. Jayson P. Ahern, Assistant Commissioner, Field Operations,
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection........................ 25
Rear Admiral David S. Belz, Assistant Commandant for Operations,
U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security.............. 6
Mr. Tom Blank, Assistant Administrator for Policy, Transportation
Security Administration........................................ 22
Mr. Charles E. Stallworth, II, Director, Air and Marine
Operations, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement...... 21
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS
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Wednesday, May 5, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:40 p.m., in
Room 210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dave Camp
[chairman of the subcommittee] and Hon. Kay Granger [acting
chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Camp, Granger, Goodlatte, Shadegg,
Souder, Cox, Sanchez, Markey, Dicks, Slaughter, DeFazio,
Jackson-Lee, and Turner.
Ms. Granger. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security hearing will come to order.
Today's hearing is on maritime security operations within the
Department of Homeland Security.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine maritime
security operations within the Department of Homeland Security,
with a focus on how DHS agencies--including the U.S. Coast
Guard, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Transportation
Security Administration--are working together to avoid
duplicative efforts and create greater efficiencies in
providing maritime and port security.
The subcommittee will hear from: Rear Admiral David H.
Belz, the assistant commandant for operations with the U.S.
Coast Guard; Mr. Jayson Ahern, the director of field operations
with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection; Mr. Charles
Stallworth, the director of the Office of Air and Marine
Operations for the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and Mr. Tom Blank, the assistant administrator for
policy at the Transportation Security Administration.
I thank you all for your participation. The chair would
like to remind members that we have a full panel of qualified
witnesses. And in order to allow sufficient time for their
testimony and questions, the chair will urge members to waive
opening statements or to give short statements and to submit
their full opening statements for the record.
The record will remain open for 10 days after the close of
the hearing. And members are advised that they will receive an
additional three minutes during the question time if they waive
their opening statement.
The chair will begin with a short opening statement.
The maritime arena encompasses over 95,000 miles of
shoreline and navigable waterways, 3.4 million square miles of
exclusive economic zones, over 350 seaports, 3,700 cargo and
passenger terminals and over 6 million cargo containers which
enter U.S. ports each year. Over 95 percent of overseas freight
enters through U.S. seaports. The loss of a strategic port
could be disastrous to the U.S. economy.
The Department of Homeland Security released its strategic
plan on February 24, 2004, which identifies broad objectives to
guide the development of the department in the coming years.
The DHS strategic approach is to identify and intercept threats
before they reach U.S. shores by conducting layered, multi-
agency maritime security operations.
Under the strategy, a key component for maritime security
is developing better maritime domain awareness. The Coast
Guard, CBP, ICE and TSA each have unique intelligence and
targeting capabilities. But currently, it is not clear how
information is shared or utilized in a complementary manner.
While progress has been made to improve maritime security
coordination, reports before Congress by the General Accounting
Office last September highlighted the fact that the Coast Guard
and TSA in particular may be duplicating their efforts in
collecting intelligence on incoming vessels. Integration and
coordination of the maritime security mission will help DHS
operational agencies mature into a cohesive organization that
effectively enhances homeland security while reducing overlap
and duplication of effort.
Specifically, DHS should focus on the integration and
coordination of the surveillance and interdiction functions
among ICE, CBP and Coast Guard, develop a consolidated
acquisition and maintenance program for air and marine assets
that includes the modernization needs of each service and
integrate access to date and targeting information. This
hearing will provide an opportunity for the committee to
seriously look for ways to improve maritime security by
strengthening the relationship between the Coast Guard, ICE,
CBP and TSA.
Again, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here.
And I will conclude my remarks and enter my full statement for
the record.
The chair now recognizes Ms. Sanchez, the ranking member of
the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security, for any
statement she may wish to make.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I would like to
thank our witnesses for appearing before us today.
I am going to apologize ahead of time because I have a
markup going on in one of my half committees. And I probably
will be running in and out. But we have various members--
seasoned members--here who can successfully question, I am
sure, our witnesses.
In my estimation, there is not one part of our nation's
critical infrastructure that is more important than our
nation's ports--important to our economy and also very
vulnerable. My district is very close to the Port of Los
Angeles/Long Beach, the third largest port in the entire world.
And we had a lockout about a year-and-a-half ago now at
Christmas which cost us about $2 billion a day for about 10
days. That was $20 billion. A significant portion obviously of
that commercial activity in California, but extended all the
way across the United States.
And it really taught us that our ports are really made to
try to move cargo as quickly as possible, but that we have a
lot of security vulnerabilities at our ports. With that in
mind, Ranking Member Turner, myself and several other members
of this committee will introduce a comprehensive port security
bill next week.
And the ideas in that bill will be from low tech to high
tech for our United States ports and also for our cargo that is
coming from international ports to our land. Also, the Coast
Guard is our lead agency in port and maritime security. And I
have a lot of questions to ask about that today.
Our bill authorizes many Coast Guard programs, including
port security grants, a long-range vessel tracking program,
faster implementation of deep water programs, the automated
identification system and upping the end strength of the Coast
Guard to 50,000 people. I am very proud of that piece of
legislation. And I know that if it becomes law, it will greatly
increase the security of our ports and, by extension, our
national security.
Each of the agencies represented here are important. They
have an important role to play in our ports and in our national
waters. A lot of our ports are still lacking the most basic
security measures: personnel access restrictions,
identification cards, et cetera.
We also need to secure the cargo that is coming within our
system. We have to improve the Container Security Initiative. I
think it is a good idea, but unless we devote the resources,
especially to personnel, we probably will not get the job done
right.
We also intend to strengthen Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT. And currently, there are 3,100
companies benefiting from that. But only 248 of those have gone
through the real on-site, hands-on verification inspections to
ensure that security is as good as it says it is on paper. I
think that is an unacceptable level.
There are many, many concerns I have. So I am really
looking forward to this hearing. And I will put the rest of my
comments into the record, Madam Chairman, so that we can move
on.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
Representative Souder, do you have an opening statement?
Seeing no requests for time, we will proceed.
I would again like to thank our witnesses for being here.
The Department of Homeland Security submitted one written
statement to describe the maritime missions of the four
agencies represented. Each witness will present an oral
statement further detailing their role in maritime security and
highlighting key initiatives.
Rear Admiral Belz, we will begin with your opening
statement. We will ask you to briefly summarize in five minutes
your statement.
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Loretta Sanchez
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'd like to thank our witnesses for
appearing here today. In my estimation, there is not one part of our
nation's critical infrastructure that is as vital to our economy, and
at the same time so vulnerable, as our nation's ports.
A successful attack on a U.S. port could not only cause immediate
loss oflife, but also severe economic damage. My district is very close
to the port of LA--Long Beach. The lockout of the longshoremen that
occurred in the fall of 2002 shut down that port and 28 other ports on
the West Coast for 11 days. It cost the U.S. economy over $1 billion
per day. The port system in this country was built with maximum
openness to ensure efficient moving of cargo, but there was virtually
no security. We have a long way to go and we need to get there fast.
With that in mind, Ranking Member Turner, myself, and several other
members of the Committee will introduce a comprehensive port security
bill next week. The ideas presented in the bill range from the low-tech
to high-tech, from U.S. ports to those overseas.
Of course, the Coast Guard is our lead agency in port and maritime
security, and I have many questions for them today too. Our bill
authorizes many Coast Guard programs, including port security grants, a
long-range vessel tracking system, faster implementation of the
Deepwater Program, the Automated Identification System, and upping the
end strength to 50,000 people.
I am very proud of this legislation. I know that if it becomes law,
it will greatly increase the security of our ports, and by extension,
the security of the entire country. Each of the agencies represented
here has an important role to play in securing our ports, and our
national waters. Many of our ports are still lacking the most basic
security measures, such as the installation of fencing and personnel
access restrictions at the ports themselves.
Next, we must secure cargo within the shipping system. We must
improve the Container Security Initiative, a program designed to
identify and inspect high-risk cargo while it is still at a foreign
port. This program might be a good idea, but it will be ineffective
unless we provide the resources, especially personnel, to do the job
right.
We also intend to strengthen the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism by requiring full inspections ofthe security practices ofthe
participants. Currently, there are 3100 companies benefiting from
CTPAT. Only 248 ofthose have gone through real onsite, hands-on
verification inspections to insure their security is as good as it says
it is on paper. This is unacceptable.
Another area of concern is that we still have not completed the
Maritime Intelligence Plan or the National Maritime Transportation
Security Plan required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act. I
would like to know who is responsible within the agency for development
of these plans. One aspect of the Maritime Transportation Security Plan
that I find extremely important is a plan to re-establish cargo flows
in the event of an attack or other disaster at a US port.
Re-routing cargo will be an extremely difficult task, and it is
important that DHS develops a robust. contingency plan in advance. We
cannot afford to be caught flatfooted. A ``shut everything down''
response similar to what happened to aviation and our borders after 9-
11 would be economically devastating.
Besides port security, another purpose ofthe hearing is to examine
the various maritime assets of the agencies here before us. We want to
make sure that these agencies are complimenting each other are not
duplicating efforts. I would also like to talk about what kind of
coordination you have with local law enforcement agencies.
We have a lot of ground to cover here. I thank you all for being
here and I look forward to hearing trom all of you on these issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Prepared Opening State of the Honorable Christopher Cox
Let me begin by commending Chairman Camp for holding this hearing
on maritime security operations, a high-priority issue in the
Department of Homeland Security. I also would like to welcome and thank
this distinguished panel for appearing before us today. You represent
the many operators within the Department of Homeland Security, who
courageously defend our nation everyday at great personal risk. This
point was highlighted in Iraq last week by the death of Coast Guard
Petty Officer Nathan Bruckenthal, who was deployed with Coast Guard
Forces to the Persian Gulf. Petty Officer Bruckenthal was killed in an
explosion, along with two U.S. Navy Sailors, when they intercepted a
terrorist suicide boat heading for an oil terminal in the Northern
Arabian Gulf. We honor these brave young men today, along with all the
men and women of the Department of Homeland Security who are on the
front lines in the Global War on Terror.
Today, we examine one of DHS's critical missions--maritime
security. Specifically, we will examine how the maritime security
qperations are being performed by the different agencies within DHS.
The Coast Guard, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) each have critical roles
to play to ensure that America's 95,000 miles of coastline and 361
major ports are secure from terrorism. The Department has made
significant progress in improving maritime security since September
11th. But, we all know, much remains to be done.
When the Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Border
Patrol were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security on March
1, 2003, they brought with them three distinct cultures, each with a
rich history of securing our borders and ports against such threats as
contraband smuggling and illegal narcotics and immigration. These
agencies must now work together in the new mission to our ports and
waterways against terrorism. Each of these agencies brings invaluable
expenence and expertise to the Department, and the Department must
harness this unique expertise as it implements a cohesive, integrated
maritime security strategy. In moving forward, the Department must
ensure that it is breaking down--not creating any new--stovepipes. The
tragic events of September 11th highlighted the overriding need to
``connect the dots'' to detect and deter terrorism in maritime
security. Terrorists, as we know from painful experience, will look to
exploit any gaps in our systems of defense. Our needs an integrated and
coordinated maritime security effort, which is precisely why the
Homeland Security Act transferred the agencies represented here today
to the new Department.
Currently, the Coast Guard, CBP, and ICE maintain and operate three
separate fleets of ships, boats, and aircraft. Today, these fleets
operate and perform the maritime security mission as separate entities
within the Department and maintain distinct chains-of-command,
operational planning, and performance measures.
In addition, the Coast Guard, CBP's Border Patrol, and ICE Air and
Marine Operations maintain three separate modernization, acquisition
and maintenance plans for their air and marine assets. The Department
should examine the separate air and marine asset modernization needs
and plans of the Coast Guard, CBP, and ICE, and consider ways to
consolidate efforts where missions and needs overlap. An integrated
modernization program could result in cost-savings to the government as
well as sharper focus on the security mission. It also could enable
Coast Guard, ICE, and CBP air, surveillance and maritime asset
operators to achieve other advantages and efficiencies, such as joint
training of employees, shared repair and maintenance facilities, and
increased communications interoperability.
Mr. Stallworth: Should ICE aircraft be able to land at a Coast
Guard Air Station for repair? Ahern: should the ICE Air and Marine
Operations Center be able to tell where all CBP aircraft are operating?
A Coast Guard aircraft should be able to engage in secure
communications with the ICE patrol boat on the waters below.
Another critical component of the overall maritime security mission
is port security. The U.S. has an $11 trillion economy and much of that
is driven by legitimate commerce traveling through U.S. ports. A
terrorist attack against a U.S. port would have far reaching impact.
Currently, there are three primary Federal agencies active in providing
security and enforcing Federal law at ports around the Nation--Coast
Guard, CBP and TSA. The Federal responsibilities include securing the
water and land perimeters of the port, targeting and inspection of
passengers and cargo entering the port, and intelligence gathering and
information sharing among Federal, state and local authorities. It is
imperative, in the event of an attack, that there be seamless
coordination of efforts among these agencies.
In the Fiscal Year 2005 budget, the President has requested nearly
$1.9 billion for DHS-wide port security efforts. That is on top of the
more than $500 million that we have distributed through the Port
Security Grant Program to assist the private sector with securing its
own facilities and infrastructures. But the private sector, too, needs
to share in the responsibility of securing our Nation's seaports,
because the Federal government cannot and should not bear this enormous
burden on its own.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and, again,
thanks them for taking the time to be with us this afternoon.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jim Turner
Thank you, Chairman Camp.
I welcome our witnesses. Thank you for appearing before us today.
Since September 11, 2001 many positive steps have been taken to
improve port and cargo security. For example, to address the security
weaknesses within our maritime transportation system, Congress passed
the Maritime Transportation Security Act. This comprehensive
legislation requires the development of various security measures to
reduce the vulnerability of our ports to terrorist attack.
Implementation of the legislation is underway.
In addition, the Department of Homeland Security has taken steps to
improve the security of vessels and cargo that arrive at our ports
every day. The Coast Guard requires vessels to submit cargo and crew
information 96 hours before arrival at a U.S. port, and escorts high
risk vessels as they transit our harbors. Customs and Border Protection
officers are stationed at overseas ports to identify high risk cargo
before it is shipped to the United States. The Transportation Security
Administration is testing various technologies with the goal of
developing ``best practices for cargo containers.
Nonetheless, we are still facing serious security gaps in port and
cargo security. Democrats on this Committee will issue a report which
details these security gaps, and plan to introduce legislation shortly
to better secure our maritime transportation system.
Right now cargo containers do not have strong tamper proof locks
and seals. Terrorists could exploit security this weakness to bring a
weapon of mass destruction into the country in a container. Yet, no
security standards for container locks or seals exist. The Department
of Homeland Security, however, has not set security standards for
container locks and seals. Our bill will intend to require the
Department to set security standards for cargo containers.
Containers are also vulnerable to sabotage as they are shipped
through the global supply chain. The Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection has partnered with industry through the ``C-TPAT''
(pronounced C-TEE-PAT) program to improve security. However--given the
way the program is currently being implemented--the majority of
participating companies are enjoying the benefits of reduced security
inspections without any assurance that security has actually been
improved. The security practices of these companies must be verified to
ensure that industry is keeping its end of the bargain. Our legislation
will require a deadline for DHS to complete such the security
verifications of C-TPAT companies.
Our national security requires that we screen every cargo
containers that comes into the United States for nuclear or
radiological materials. This is not happening today. Radiation portal
monitors are being deployed at our ports far too slowly. I have called
on the Department to expedite this program and would like to hear what
the current status is on the deployment of portal monitors at ports.
Our bill will set a deadline for the installation of portal monitors at
our seaports.
Many ports are in the process of complying with the security
measures required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act. These
measures will enhance security at our nation's 361 seaports. However,
they are costly to industry, and represent an unfunded mandate on the
private sector. The Coast Guard estimates that ports will spend about
$1.1 billion in the first year alone to comply with MTSA regulations.
Our bill will authorize a total of $537 million for port security
grants for next fiscal year, $491 million over the Administration's
request, to ensure port operators receive the support they need to
improve their security.
The security of our nation's ports also rests, in part, on the
ability of the U.S. Coast Guard to operate modem ships and aircraft
that can share critical information with each other, and other offices
of the Department. The ``Deepwater'' program aims to modernize the
Coast Guard's fleet, and improve its ability to share maritime security
information. However, at the current rate, it will take another 22
years to complete the program. Our legislation would accelerate the
completion to 10 years, giving the Coast Guard the tools it needs to
conduct its vital maritime homeland security missions.
Overall, Mr. Chairman, while steps have been taken to improve our
maritime security, more must be done. I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses how Congress can help them do this job of protecting our
seaports from a possible terrorist attack.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID S. BELZ, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Belz. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Good afternoon. And I appreciate the opportunity to be
here, distinguished members of the committee.
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss
maritime security operations within the Department of Homeland
Security. I am pleased to be joined here by my colleagues: Jay
Ahern at the CBP, Charlie Stallworth of ICE and Mr. Tom Blank
of TSA. It is a pleasure to be up here testifying with them.
The Coast Guard strongly engages in the department's ``one
team, one fight'' concept. We have many partnerships with other
government agencies in the performance of our 11th statutory
mission. Integration of all agencies involved in protecting the
homeland to promote operational efficiencies and improve
operational effectiveness is a basic tenet describing why the
Department of Homeland Security was established.
These partnerships act as a force multiplier so that
together we can achieve more than we could as disparate
components. We will continue to be committed to working closely
with our partner agencies. And we truly believe that the
standup of one department responsible for homeland security has
made America more secure today.
Events erupting in Haiti a few months ago provide a solid
example of the leaps forward all of our DHS agencies are taking
with regard to interagency cooperation. Under the direction of
Secretary Ridge, the Homeland Security Task Force Southeast was
stood up as part of Operation Able Sentry.
The team was comprised of many DHS agencies, including:
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border
Protection, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as well as
our own service. The task force was chartered by the secretary
to plan, prepare and conduct migrant interdiction operations in
the vicinity of Haiti due to the escalation of violence in that
country and the threat of a mass exodus of undocumented
migrants to the United States.
With America's awareness, prevention, protection, response
and recovery capabilities now under one roof in one department,
the level of communication and cooperation among the agencies
within our department is stronger than ever, even though many
of us had previously worked together before there was a DHS.
However, with a new department as our home, the component
agencies are moving swiftly together in a variety of venues.
Under the department's leadership, TSA, Customs and Border
Protection and the Coast Guard are working together to support
efforts to implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act
through interagency working groups addressing cargo security
standards, port security assessment, international port
security and the development of the National Maritime
Transportation Security Plan.
Given our unique blend of authorities, capabilities,
competencies and partnerships, both domestic and international,
the Coast Guard, in partnership with CBP, ICE and TSA, is
working on the development and implementation of the National
Maritime Transportation Security Plan as a feed into the
overarching, national plan being developed by TSA.
The Coast Guard's maritime strategy for homeland security
supports the President's national security strategy, the
national strategy for homeland security and the Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7 and is responsive to near-
term needs, while maintaining a strategic outlook on the
threats and opportunities of the future.
This maritime strategy is built upon a layered defense, a
time-honored means to enhance security in the U.S. ports and
waterways, while concurrently facilitating the smooth flow of
commerce. The collective result of the component agencies' of
DHS efforts is aimed at managing and reducing maritime security
risk.
Today, there is a developing interagency and joint surface
effort to develop a comprehensive national maritime domain
awareness or MDA plan and system architecture. The core of our
collective MDA efforts revolve around the development and
dissemination of accurate information, intelligence and the
targeting of vessels, cargoes, crews and passengers, extending
this well beyond our traditional maritime boundaries.
All DHS components are working hard to provide an effective
layered defense through collaborative efforts with
international partners to counter and manage security risks
long before they reach a U.S. port.
In regards to law enforcement, the Coast Guard has
longstanding successful working relationships with all federal
law enforcement agencies and additionally is now a member of
the national intelligence community. The Coast Guard
coordinates closely with Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Drug Enforcement
Agency and the joint interagency task forces in planning and
the conduct of counter-drug law enforcement operations.
One recent example highlights this heightened cooperation.
Just 2 weeks ago, a Customs and Border Protection-ICE maritime
patrol aircraft spotted a go-fast in the vicinity of Nicaragua.
After receiving word from the aircraft, two Coast Guard cutters
pursued the boat into Nicaraguan waters under the U.S.-
Nicaraguan bilateral drug law enforcement agreement.
The Coast Guard armed helicopter was embarked on one of the
cutters, disabled the vessel and the Coast Guard recovered over
2,000 pounds of cocaine. That could easily have been a
different kind of target.
Within the intelligence community, the Coast Guard is
working closely with the interagencies sitting here today to
ensure that intelligence products generated by the Coast Guard
are shared rapidly and accurately throughout the federal
government. That movement is crisp today. But we need to work
additionally to make the process flawless.
Furthermore, beyond sharing, the Coast Guard gets guidance
and direction from the Information, Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate at DHS. And we work closely with the
National Response Center to share threat information and
receive reports of suspicious activities from the maritime
industry and other maritime stakeholders.
U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection have
exchanged liaison officers at the National Targeting Center and
the National Maritime Intelligence Center. This exchange has
significantly enhanced information sharing as it relates to
cargo tracking and high-interest vessel tracking.
Additionally, the Coast Guard functions as the information
sharing and analysis center for the commercial maritime
industry in accordance with PDD 63 and has been doing so since
February 2003. Certain economies of scale and enhanced
operational effectiveness can and are being achieved through
the identification of overlapping DHS missionaries and
coordinated acquisition and/or application of operational
assets.
While the state of integration we have achieved to date
clearly cannot be characterized as complete, the ongoing
efforts to identify and exploit opportunities for integration
are diligent and promising. Some current initiatives include:
the Department of Homeland Security's Aviation Management
Council; the department's Boat Commodities Council; and the
Joint Requirements Council.
Benefits of an integrated DHS acquisition strategy have
already been realized. For example, CDP recently acquired some
response boats--small--through a larger Coast Guard purchase.
Additionally, DHS has recently decided to utilize the Coast
Guard's aviation logistics management information system
departmentwide in order to provide a framework to gather,
represent, process and distribute aviation information.
We have also learned from our partners here at the table.
As we speak, the Coast Guard is examining certain boat
maintenance concepts my colleagues here at the table have
instituted at Customs Air and Marine.
And we are examining relocation of certain national
response center activities through TSA's Transportation
Security Operations Center. All of us at this table have
participated in a DHS-led examination of our individual use of
force policies for synchronization. And the Coast Guard itself
is making some adjustments where appropriate.
Madam Chairman, I can truly report to you that the Coast
Guard is fully aligned with the department's maritime goals and
objectives. The Coast Guard will continue to work with our
partners at this table and with others outside DHS to
strengthen already solid agency partnerships, providing
increased effectiveness and efficiencies in accomplishing DHS
operations and the President's national strategy for homeland
security.
No single maritime stakeholder--whether it is government,
our government, industry or the private sector--can do this
alone. We clearly understand that.
We must continue to work together to improve the security
for our nation, for the maritime sector that is its economic
lifeblood and for the citizens of our country who deserve and
desire protection from terrorism without unreasonable
infringement on their freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to provide
testimony. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may
have.
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral David S. Belz, Jayson Ahern, Charles
E. Stallworth, and Tom Blank
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Committee. It is our pleasure to be here today to testify on maritime
security operations within the Department of Homeland Security.
Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the primary focus
within the maritime domain had been on safety, the environment, vessel
traffic management, and law enforcement. Most national and
international efforts revolved around the safe and efficient movement
of waterborne commerce, the interdiction of narcotics and illegal
migrants, and trade compliance. In the post September 11, 2001 era, we
recognize that any maritime conveyance could transport or constitute a
security threat. In this new environment, components of DHS involved in
maritime security have added to their existing efforts by deploying
resources to identify such threats, deter and/or prevent attacks,
respond, and recover from any maritime security incidents.
The challenge is significant:
Over 95% of overseas trade enters through U.S.
seaports;
Our seaports account for 2 billion tons and $800
billion of domestic and international freight each year;
Each year approximately 9 million sea containers enter
the U.S. via our seaports;
26,000 miles of commercially navigable waterways
serving 361 U.S. ports;
Strategic military value of many ports and waterways;
Seaborne shipment of approximately 3.3 billion barrels
of oil each year;
6 million cruise ship passengers travel each year from
U.S. ports;
Ferry systems transport 180 million passengers
annually;
Waterways support 110,000 commercial fishing vessels,
contributing $111 billion to state economies;
78 million Americans engaged in recreational boating;
Some 8,100 foreign vessels making 50,000 U.S. port
calls each year; and
Domestic and international trade is expected to double
in next 20 years.
Existing maritime smuggling networks can facilitate
the illicit movement of people and equipment into the U.S.,
particularly as legal points of entry are hardened.
While this Committee certainly needs no reminder, it is plainly
evident that a terrorist incident against our marine transportation
system could have a disastrous impact on global shipping, international
trade, and the world economy.
The world's oceans are global thoroughfares. A cooperative
international approach involving partnerships of nations, navies, coast
guards, law-enforcement agencies, and commercial shipping interests is
essential--with all parties acting collaboratively to confront broadly
defined threats to our common and interdependent maritime security. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently marked its first
anniversary and we are happy to report that operating with other
federal agencies sharing a common DHS mission perspective provides new
benefits to our nation's security daily.
We are committed to working with our partner agencies as one team
engaged in one fight, and truly believe having one Department
responsible for homeland security has made America more secure today.
Events in Haiti a few months ago provide an example of the leaps
forward we are taking with regard to interagency cooperation. Under the
direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Homeland Security
Task Force--Southeast was stood-up as part of OPERATION ABLE SENTRY.
The Coast Guard (CG) led task force was comprised of many agencies
chartered to plan, prepare, and conduct migrant interdiction operations
in the vicinity of Haiti due to the escalation of violence in that
country and the threat of a mass exodus of undocumented migrants.
Within the first days of interdiction operations, the task force
demonstrated impressive agility and synergy:
CG cutters, with Citizenship and Immigration Service
(CIS) asylum pre-screening officers and interpreters aboard,
interdicted 18 Haitian vessels with 1,076 undocumented
migrants;
CG and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Air
and Marine Operations (AMO) aircraft patrolled the skies
throughout the operating area; and CG, ICE, and Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) conducted coordinated patrols off the
Florida coast;
CG and ICE conducted a coordinated boarding of a boat
suspected of being hijacked off the coast of Miami; and
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also
deployed three Information and Planning Specialists to the task
force in support of contingency planning.
With our federal government's Awareness, Prevention, Protection,
Response and Recovery capabilities now under one roof, in one
department, the level of communication and cooperation among the sister
agencies of CG, TSA, ICE and CBP is stronger than ever. Under DHS and
BTS leadership, CBP, TSA and CG are working together to support efforts
to implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) through
interagency working groups addressing cargo security standards, port
security assessments, international port security and the development
of the National Maritime Security Plan.
Additionally, the sister agencies within DHS are forging strong
relationships in regards to acquisition management. DHS has established
a Strategic Sourcing Group and a series of commodity councils. The
purpose of the Strategic Sourcing Group is to assist in the successful
development, deployment and maintenance of sourcing strategies to
enhance DHS acquisition system and ensure commodities are acquired in
the most efficient and effective manner. The purpose of each council is
to develop long-term strategies for acquiring a commodity across the
department. Some councils that exist include Weapons & Ammunition,
Boats, Aviation, Training, Facilities, and Information Technology.
Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security
Since 9/11, Secretary Ridge and all DHS components have worked hard
to achieve DHS's strategic goals of Awareness, Prevention, Protection,
Response and Recovery. These strategy elements guide all that we do and
likewise represent key pillars of the maritime homeland security
strategy:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maritime Strategy for Homeland
DHS Strategic Goal Security
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Awareness Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prevention Build and administer an effective
maritime security regime--both
domestically and internationally
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protection Increase military and civil
operational presence in ports,
coastal areas, and beyond--
leverage State, Local and Private
Sector assets as well
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response Improve our response posture in the
event a security incident occurs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recovery Lead efforts to restore services
after acts of terrorism, natural
disasters or other
emergencies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS, pursuant to HSPD-7, is in the process of developing a National
Critical Infrastructure Plan that will identify and prioritize United
States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them
from terrorist attacks. This plan will be comprised of Sector Specific
Plans (SSPs), and TSA has been assigned primary responsibility for
developing the transportation specific SSP. The Transportation SSP will
discuss how federal and private-sector stakeholders will communicate
and work together; how important assets in the transportation sector
will be identified, assessed, and prioritized; how protective programs
will be developed; how progress in reducing risk will be measured; and
how R&D will be prioritized in the sector. In the Transportation
Sector, the SSP will further these efforts currently underway and help
ensure that they are systematic, complete, and consistent with the
efforts in the other 12 sectors.
In developing the transportation SSP, TSA is working under BTS
guidance and with partners in the U.S. Coast Guard, other BTS component
agencies and the Department of Transportation (DOT) and its modal
administrations. DHS will build on the foundation of the SSP to provide
overall operational planning guidance on transportation security. The
expanded SSP will ensure that modal security plans are integrated into
an effective concept of operations for management of the transportation
sector's security.
Given its unique blend of authorities, capabilities, competencies
and partnerships (domestic and international), the CG has been charged
with taking the lead on the development and implementation of a
comprehensive Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security. The CG's
Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security supports the President's
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the
National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) and is responsive to near-term needs
while maintaining a strategic outlook on the threats and opportunities
of the future. The maritime strategy is built upon a layered defense; a
time-proven means to enhance security in U.S. ports and waterways while
concurrently facilitating the smooth flow of commerce. The collective
result of our efforts is aimed at managing and reducing maritime
security risks.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 23465.001
Below is an update on the Department's recent accomplishments in
pursuit of each element of the maritime strategy with a particular
focus on the joint and individual efforts of the CG, TSA ICE/AMO and
CBP.
Awareness--Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
The core of our MDA efforts revolve around the development and
employment of accurate information, intelligence, and targeting of
vessels, cargo, crews and passengers--and extending this well beyond
our traditional maritime boundaries. All DHS components are working
hard to provide an effectively layered defense through collaborative
efforts with our international partners to counter and manage security
risks long before they reach a U.S. port--when effectively deploying
countermeasures becomes more difficult.
The goal is to know the difference between friend and foe, so that
legitimate commerce can move through our coastal and port areas
unimpeded while we interdict contraband cargo and illegal activities of
all types at sea before it becomes a threat on our shores. The key to
achieving this comprehensive domain awareness is our ability as a
department to obtain, synthesize and analyze the context around the
movement of goods and people. We are taking an interagency approach,
leveraging information technology, multiple information sources and
actively involving the private sector. Our ability to achieve better
MDA will allow us to better focus our protection and response efforts
on those trade transactions, individuals, and activities of interest. A
synopsis of our collective efforts is provided below:
The CG is leading the interagency and joint Service
effort to develop a comprehensive national MDA plan and system
architecture.
As directed by MTSA, the CG established an
International Port Security Program (IPSP) that is currently
working in concert with CBP, TSA and other Federal agencies to
identify foreign ports identified as posing a potential
security risk to international maritime transportation. TSA and
CBP have provided extensive assistance in developing this
program by sharing lessons learned and best practices from
TSA's Civil Aviation Security Liaison Officer (CASLO) program
and CBP's Container Security Initiative. The IPSP will begin
visiting selected foreign ports in July 2004 to measure the
degree of rigor with which foreign countries are administering
the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) International
Ship & Port Facility Security Code (ISPS).
The CG is researching technologies and systems that
are able to track vessels entering, departing or transiting
U.S. waters and track vessels bound for the U.S. from overseas
locations. The CG is currently working with IMO to develop
functional and technical requirements for long-range tracking
out to 2,000 nautical miles (approximate distance from shore a
vessel owner must transmit their 96-hour notice of arrival,
based on typical speed of advance). The U.S. will discuss and
attempt to forward an amendment that has been proposed to IMO
for this initiative in committee meetings over the next two
months.
The CG is establishing a network for receiving and
distributing Automatic Identification System (AIS) reports
(position, course, speed, cargo, etc.) from ships using
existing Vessel Traffic Services in nine of our nation's ports,
waterways, and coastal areas. This initiative will progress to
the other strategically significant U.S. seaports, and
ultimately extend to nationwide coverage.
The CG Intelligence Coordination Center, co-located
with the Office of Naval Intelligence at the National Maritime
Intelligence Center in Suitland, Maryland, established
COASTWATCH. Through this process, notice of arrival reports
from the National Vessel Movement Center are analyzed using law
enforcement and intelligence information and vessels of
interest are identified so that Coast Guard and other agencies
can appropriately respond to board those vessels before they
reach port, if necessary. The Coast Guard and CBP have
exchanged personnel to enhance data sharing between the CG
Intelligence Coordination Center's COASTWATCH (which gathers
and analyzes information on ship notice of arrival reports on
vessels, people, and certain dangerous cargoes approaching U.S.
ports) and CBP's National Targeting Center (cargo tracking)
process.
CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) is a 24x7
operation that supports the enforcement and regulatory missions
of various agencies through a network of liaisons, which
includes the TSA, CG, Department of Energy, and members of the
intelligence community. CBP Officers and Field Analysis
Specialists that are experts in passenger and cargo targeting
for air, sea, and land operations in the inbound and outbound
environments primarily staff NTC. The NTC staff develops
tactical targets from raw intelligence in support of the CBP
mission to detect and prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons
from entering the United States. NTC also supports CBP field
elements, including Container Security Initiative personnel
stationed in countries throughout the world, with additional
research assets for passenger and cargo examinations. NTC
personnel are also currently engaged in the support of
intradepartmental and interagency anti-terrorist operations,
while simultaneously providing support to CBP targeting
programs, policies, and initiatives. One example of CBP's
commitment to collaborative targeting efforts is the Food and
Drug Administration Prior Notice Center located at the NTC and
operational since December 11, 2003. There, CBP and Food and
Drug Administration personnel conduct joint targeting on a
round the clock basis in support of the Bio-Terrorism Act.
CBP is conducting national targeting and using
automated targeting tools to screen advance information and
other data to identify high-risk shipments. As a key component
of the DHS maritime security strategy, CBP's Automated
Targeting System (ATS) is a critical tool for performing
transactional risk assessments and evaluating potential
national security risks posed by sea, air, truck, and rail
cargo.
ICE/AMO is reviewing an upgrade to the Tethered
Aerostat Radar System (TARS) to provide an ocean surface track
capability along the Southern coast. Airspace data gathered by
TARS is integrated within the national surveillance picture at
the Air and Marine Operations Center in Riverside, California
which provides that data to NORAD, the U.S. Secret Service
Operations Center and the National Capital Region Coordination
Center.
ICE/AMO P-3 aircraft have provided the ability to
conduct hull-checks on incoming commercial vessels 200 nautical
miles from the ports to assist CG prioritization and
identification of in-bound targets.
A key component of AMO's integration capabilities, the
Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) at March, Air Reserve
Base in Riverside, California, integrates military and civilian
radar tracking data to provide actionable real-time
intelligence to AMO aircraft and vessels throughout the Western
Hemisphere. Other customers include the National Capital Region
Coordination Center (NCRCC), NORAD, the U.S. Secret Service
operations center and the Transportation Security Operations
Center. The establishment of an additional center with like
capabilities on the east coast is being investigated.
CG is using a risk management system to identify High
Interest Vessels for follow-up security boardings and when
necessary, due to risk, vessel escorts and positive control
boardings to ensure the safety of vessels during their transit
into U.S. ports.
In partnership with the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), the CG is establishing interagency prototype joint
harbor operations centers in select Navy homeports improving
both port security and force protection capabilities. Such
prototypes are underway in San Diego, California and Hampton
Roads, Virginia.
TSA will soon begin the prototype phase in developing
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC),
aimed at mitigating the threat of attacks to the national
transportation infrastructure. The TWIC prototype and
supporting measures will test how best to assess the risks of
transportation workers entering secure area of our national
transportation system. The President's FY 2005 request includes
spending authority to begin implementing the TWIC concept
within parameters that will be defined by the Administration
after completion of the prototype assessment.
Complementing the TWIC, the CG will continue
aggressive implementation of a Merchant Mariner Documentation
(MMD) Task Force plan, which ensures positive identity of
merchant mariners sailing on U.S. flag vessels and performs
appropriate security/background screening. In 2004, the CG will
provide for additional personnel support at Regional
Examination Centers, centralized security screening and
electronic fingerprinting capability.
The CG has established additional Maritime
Intelligence Fusion Centers on the east and west coasts for
both military intelligence and law enforcement sensitive
information. In addition, the CG established subordinate Field
Intelligence Support Teams (FISTs) in key ports. These teams
are actively engaged in Intel collection and first order
analysis in coordination with federal, state, and local
enforcement and Intel agencies. They are ``joint'' in the
broadest sense providing a critical top-down and bottom-up
information and intelligence.
In recognition that the threat in the post-September
11, 2001 strategic environment may seek to avoid hardened legal
points of entry by exploiting existing smuggling routes, ICE/
AMO marine personnel working closing with ICE Office of
Investigations conduct unique undercover and intelligence
gathering within high-threat, non-commercial maritime
communities and transit areas as well as commercial points of
entry.
Aside from the important initiatives above, we are seeing
consistent and steady improvements in our ability to integrate and
correlate information in the field such that we can effectively
respond. For example, on March 13, 2004 the Coast Guard Pacific Area
Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center advised CG Marine Safety Office
(MSO)/Group Los Angeles/Long Beach that a 728-foot foreign flagged
motor vessel with a cargo of crude oil was due into Los Angeles but
failed to file an Advance Notice of Arrival properly. The MSO/Group
responded and conducted a positive control boarding alongside ICE
personnel while the vessel was at anchor. The crew was detained onboard
due to improper visas. While we have much more work to do, our maritime
domain awareness is improving every day.
Prevention--Create and Oversee Maritime Security Regime
This element of our strategy focuses on both domestic and
international efforts and includes initiatives related to MTSA
implementation, IMO regulations such as the ISPS Code, as well as
improving supply chain security and identity security processes. Recent
accomplishments and future plans include:
The CG has established Area Maritime Security
Committees (AMSC), which assist in the development of Area
Maritime Security Plans nationwide, as required by the MTSA.
AMSCs will enhance maritime situational awareness and ensure
integrated maritime prevention and response operations among
the entire maritime community. CBP and TSA have designated
representatives assigned to the Area Maritime Security
Committees to assist CG Captains of the Port in addressing
cargo security issues.
The CG has completed Port Security Assessments (PSA)
at 19 of the 55 most significant military and economic ports in
the U.S. and will complete the assessments of all 55 strategic
ports by the end of calendar year 2004.
Final CG MTSA implementation Rules, drafted in
cooperation with TSA, CBP and the Maritime Administration
(MARAD), were published in October 2003 and security plans from
approximately 9,500 vessels and 3,500 facilities were due on
December 31, 2003. To date, approximately 99% have been
received. The CG will continue to aggressively pursue 100%
compliance, and has instituted a phased implementation of
penalties to ensure that all regulated facilities have
implemented approved security plans by the July 1, 2004
deadline.
The Coast Guard is actively involved with MARAD in the
development of maritime security competency standards and
security training curricula under Section 109 of MTSA.
The CG has met with approximately 60 countries
representing the vast majority of all shippers to the U.S.,
reinforcing a commitment to the ISPS code. For vessels subject
to MTSA, the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) amendments and the
ISPS Code, the CG is implementing strong Port State Control
measures to aggressively ensure foreign vessels have approved
plans and have implemented adequate security standards. The
measures include tracking performance of all owners, operators,
flag administrations, recognized security organizations,
charterers, and port facilities. Noncompliance will subject the
vessel to a range of control measures, which could include
denial of entry into port or significant delay. This aggressive
Port State Control regime will be coupled with the CG's inter-
agency IPSP, comprised of representatives from the Department
of State, Department of Defense, CBP, TSA, and MARAD, that will
assess both the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in
foreign ports and the foreign flag administration's
implementation of the SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code.
CBP's Container Security Initiative (CSI) enhances the
security of ocean-borne container traffic by placing multi-
disciplinary CSI teams alongside host government customs
officers to ensure that all shipments that pose a potential
risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign
ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United
States. CSI is currently operational at 18 foreign seaports and
the program will expand to 17 additional foreign ports in
calendar year 2004. Once CSI is fully implemented, nearly 80
percent of all cargo containers headed for the United States
will be prescreened prior to lading before they depart from
abroad.
In December 2003, DHS promulgated final regulations
implementing the Trade Act of 2002, requiring advance,
electronic manifest information for all modes of
transportation. This information will augment that received and
analyzed already at the National Targeting Center.
o For vessel operations CBP receives cargo declaration
information for all container vessels and non-approved
break bulk shipments 24-hours prior to loading the
vessel at the foreign port. With the implementation of
the Trade Act, CBP now requires this cargo information
in an electronic format via the Sea Automated Manifest
System (AMS). On March 4, 2004 all container vessels
must submit their cargo declaration information to CBP
electronically.
o The Trade Act also provides for all modes of
transportation, inbound and outbound, to require cargo
information electronically and in advance of arrival.
CBP is currently requiring the data electronically
inbound for vessel and is expanding the requirement to
the inbound air and land modes of transport over the
remaining months of 2004. CBP anticipates requiring
reporting of electronic outbound data in the beginning
of 2005 in cooperation with Census.
CBP's Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT). C-TPAT is an innovative government/private sector
partnership program that covers all sectors of the
international supply chain. The program calls upon the trade
community to systematically establish procedures to enhance
their existing security practices and those of their business
partners involved in their supply chains. C-TPAT strengthens
U.S. borders against acts of terrorism while facilitating the
legitimate flow of compliant cargo, conveyances and persons.
Currently, over 6,200 members of the international community
have demonstrated their commitment to security by partnering
with CBP through this program.
Finally, the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate is leading a multi-agency working group in efforts
both to augment the Department's current cargo supply chain
security programs and meet specific requirements under the MTSA
to develop a ``Secure Systems of Transportation (SST)'' and
appropriate performance standards for cargo containers. Under
this initiative, involved agencies, including TSA, CBP, CG and
the DHS S&T and IAIP Directorates, are reviewing cargo
programs, analytic tools, and other relevant resources within
the department in order to identify remaining supply chain
vulnerabilities and develop strategies to mitigate these
vulnerabilities.
To advance this initiative, BTS expects to be able to
harness the results of ongoing test-bed programs that are
examining currently available and new technologies and
processes to enhance security for global intermodal supply
chains and facilitate the flow of commerce. One of these is the
Operation Safe Commerce program, an initiative in which DHS,
DOT and the Departments of Justice, Commerce and State, are
working with business interests, the largest U.S. container
load centers and the maritime industry to develop and share
best practices for the safe and expeditious movement of
containerized cargo. Test results from OSC will also be joined
with those obtained by CBP in its testing of various Smart Box
technologies within C-TPAT supply chains, and technologies and
processes identified by the Science and Technology
Directorate's under its recently published Broad Agency
Announcement designed to solicit and test new technologies to
be applied to container tracking and intrusion detection.
Protection--Increase Operational Presence/Enhance Deterrence
Our collective efforts to increase operational presence in ports
and coastal zones will continue to build upon the layered security
posture established by the maritime security strategy. These efforts
focus not only on adding more people, boats and ships to force
structures but making the employment of those resources more effective
through the application of technology, information sharing and
intelligence support. Recent accomplishments and future plans include:
CG's Deepwater Program: A multi-year, performance-
based acquisition that will replace or modernize 90 Coast Guard
cutters, 200 fixed wing aircraft and multi-mission helicopters
and the communications equipment, sensors, and logistics
systems required to maintain and operate them. Deepwater will
greatly improve the Coast Guard's maritime presence starting at
America's ports, waterways, and coasts and extending seaward to
wherever the Coast Guard needs to be present or to take
appropriate maritime action. Deepwater provides the capability
to identify, interdict, board, and where warranted seize
vessels or people engaged in illegal/terrorist activity at sea
or on the ports, waterways, or coast of America. In FY04, the
Deepwater Program:
Commences urgent re-engining of Coast Guard's
fleet of short-range helicopters to ensure safe and
reliable operations;
Accelerates the development of the Fast
Response Cutter;
Begins construction of the first National
Security Cutter (frigate-size vessel about 425 feet
long);
Acquires an additional Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(MPA);
Completes design and shipboard integration of
Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VUAV);
Commences conceptual development of the
Offshore Patrol Cutter; and Delivers 4 Short Range
Prosecutors (cutter small boats) for use on the 123'
Patrol Boat.
CBP is employing Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII)
technology to screen shipments rapidly for anomalies. Deploying
NII technology to our land borders and seaports has increased
CBP's ability to detect conventional explosives, nuclear
weapons, and other terrorist weapons. NII equipment includes
large scale x-ray or gamma-ray imaging systems, portal
radiation monitors, and a mixture of portable and handheld
technologies to include personal radiation detection devices
that greatly reduce the need for costly, time-consuming
physical inspection of containers and vehicles.
CBP currently has 599 Personal Radiation Detectors
(PRD) and 60 Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices (RIID)
deployed at Border Patrol checkpoints nationwide. Radiation
detection equipment is being incorporated into our routine
roving patrol duties, marine operations and transportation
check assignments, which include airports and train check
operations.
DHS's priority undertaking is preventing weapons of
mass destruction from entering this country. The DHS goal is to
screen 100% of all arriving containers, trucks, trains, cars,
mailbags and express consignment packages with radiation
detection equipment. To achieve this goal, CBP has developed a
comprehensive risk management strategy for the deployment of
radiation portal monitors (RPM) throughout the country.
As of April 29, 2004, 269 RPMs have been deployed. The
vast majority of the deployed RPMs are at International Mail
Branches, Express Consignment Courier facilities and along
major Northern Border ports of entry. Presently, CBP has begun
deployment to our seaports. CBP has also deployed a large
number of handheld radiation detection technologies. Currently,
CBP has 321 radiation isotope identifier devices and over 9,418
personal radiation detectors to the field.
Prior to the attacks of 9/11, the CG had committed
less than 2% of its assets to active port security duty.
Immediately after 9/11, the CG surged nearly 60% of its assets
in immediate support of port security. Since then, the CG has
rebalanced asset deployments to provide roughly 28% of its
assets in coverage of port security a significant and steady
increase in operational presence.
CG Maritime Safety & Security Teams (MSSTs) provide
immediately deployable multiple-boat, law enforcement
capability that can be sustained over an extended period. Teams
are equipped to deploy (via land or air) to any location within
12 hours of notification. To date, eight of thirteen MSSTs have
been commissioned and the remainder will be operational by the
end of CY 2004.
CG is equipping helicopters with Airborne Use of Force
(AUF) and Vertical Insertion (VI) capability. This will enhance
the Coast Guard's ability to secure our oceans, ports,
waterways, and coastal areas against illegal drug, migrant, and
terrorist activity by providing capability to fire warning
shots and disabling fire and rapidly/covertly deploying
boarding teams aboard vessels at sea. The Coast Guard currently
has 8-armed MH-68 helicopters operating out of Jacksonville, FL
and will equip four HH-60J armed helicopters by April 2004.
TSA is implementing the ``synergy Project,'' to test
the long-term feasibility of screening and transferring
passenger baggage from seaport to airport, reducing the
congestion at airport security checkpoints caused by the influx
of large number of passengers disembarking from cruise ships.
This program is currently underway at the ports of Miami and
Vancouver.
Responding to threat assessments in and in support of
the Maritime Homeland Security Strategy, CG Stations Boston and
Washington, D.C. were created in Fiscal Year 2004.
Response and Recovery--Improve Response and Recovery Posture
Understanding the challenge of defending 26,000 miles of navigable
waterways and 361 ports against every conceivable threat at every
possible time, we are also aggressively working to improve our response
capabilities and readiness. While the above increases in operational
presence necessarily augment our collective response posture,
additional accomplishments and future plans include:
The Secretary announced on March 1, 2004 the approval
of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). It is the
Nation's first standardized management approach that will
provide a consistent nationwide template to enable federal,
state, local, and tribal governments as well as private-sector
organizations to work together effectively to prepare for,
prevent, respond to, and recover from a terrorist attack or
other major disaster. NIMS will ensure that all of our nation's
responders are working in support of ``one plan, one team, one
fight.'' For the first time, there will be standardized
procedures for responding to emergencies across the nation. A
NIMS Integration Center will also be established to identify
and share best practices on preparedness with state and local
authorities, provide consistent training to first responders
across the country, and conduct exercises involving many
different localities.
Continue deployment of Rescue 21--the CG's maritime
911 command, control and communications system in our ports,
waterways, and coastal areas. Nationwide implementation
continues during 2004. This system provides Federal, state and
local first responders with interoperable maritime
communications capability, greater area coverage, enhanced
system reliability, voice recorder replay functionality, and
direction finding capability. Rescue 21 represents a quantum
leap forward in communications technology.
ICE AMO has been developing and exercising the
capability to deliver via fast rope, incident response teams.
This capability will provide AMO the capability to deliver ICE
Office of Investigations and Federal Protective Service
Critical Response Teams to the scene of incidents with a much
shorter response time.
DHS agencies, including Emergency Preparedness &
Response, TSA CG, CBP, and the Office of Domestic Preparedness
are working closely with DOT's Maritime Administration (MARAD)
and other modal administrations to develop standards and
policies to enhance coordination of the recovery of the
transportation system in the event of a transportation security
incident. For example, TSA is working with MARAD to study the
impacts and lessons learned from the recent four-day closing of
the Mississippi River caused when a barge sank from hitting the
Greenville Bridge linking Mississippi and Arkansas.
DHS agencies routinely lead or participate in national
intermodal terrorism exercises, such as Operation Heartland,
United Defense and TOPOFF2, designed to enhance our ability to
prevent, mitigate, and respond to potential transportation
security incidents.
DHS's response and recovery organization was further strengthened
at the ``California Spill of National Significance 2004'' exercise (CAL
SONS 04), which was held 20-24 April 2004. CAL SONS 04 was a CG-
sponsored full-scale national exercise that posed two major marine
incidents off the coast of Southern California and required a
coordinated response by local, state and federal agencies, the
government of Mexico, industry partners and volunteer organizations.
CAL SONS 04 was guided by the Initial National Response Plan and
National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan. It
involved the broad range of response and recovery functions including
rescue, mobilization of people and resources, multi-level incident
management, tactical operations and testing of industry and agency
contingency plans. The CG's National Strike Teams, which have been
trained for Chemical, Biological and Radiological responses and were
instrumental in the response and recovery operations at the recent
Ricin incident in the Senate Office Building, were also deployed. This
exercise successfully showed the integration among the various command
centers including the Homeland Security Operations Center, the
Interagency Incident Management Group, the National Response Team, the
Coast Guard Headquarters Crisis Action Center and the local incident
command center.
In summary, DHS is taking a comprehensive approach to the needs of
maritime security. It cannot start and end at our maritime borders.
Rather, it will take an integrated and coordinated approach that
stretches from ports such as Miami and Los Angeles to Singapore and
Rotterdam.
Service to the Public--Effect on Commerce
In addition to Awareness, Prevention, Protection, Response and
Recovery a sixth strategic goal of the Department of Homeland Security
is Service. In this, we will strive to serve the public effectively by
facilitating lawful trade, travel and immigration.
The Department is sensitive to the impact that increased security
may have on commerce. The wide variety of security measures implemented
to date has had no significant adverse impacts on the flow of maritime
commerce. That said, we note that the cost to industry to comply with
MTSA regulations is estimated to be $1.5 billion in the first year and
$7.3 billion over the next 10 years. While we clearly understand that
the cost of these security regulations to the maritime industry is not
insignificant, a terrorist incident against our marine transportation
system could have a devastating and long-lasting impact on global
shipping, international trade, and the world economy. A terrorist act
that closed a major port could cost up to $2 billion per day in
economic loss to the United States.
The Department understands there will be short-term costs,
particularly for many smaller ports or companies with less existing
security. Nonetheless, as the industry owns the infrastructure that is
being protected, and benefits from that ownership, they should rightly
be involved in protecting their infrastructure. We are engaged with the
maritime industry to provide information on any available federal
funding. Thus far, the Department has awarded or made available a total
of nearly $500 million in port security grants over two years. There is
also a shared cost burden by the government. The Department of Homeland
Security, and its associated agencies, has spent hundreds of millions
of dollars to improve our capability to protect the Marine
Transportation System. However, the cost of securing America cannot be
left exclusively to the American taxpayer.
In addition, we are continuously seeking out technology and
procedural changes that will make our efforts not only more effective
and efficient but also less onerous on the vast majority of maritime
stakeholders who pose no threat to maritime security. As an example,
the CG is incorporating an option in the 96-hour vessel notice of
arrival (NOA) requirements to permit electronic submission of
information. This e-NOA submission method will allow for importation of
data into the CG's National Vessel Movement Center (NVMC) database, the
Ship Arrival Notification System (SANS), eliminating all but minimal
manual data entry. This will significantly enhance the processing and
identification of security and safety risks posed by vessels entering
our ports and move information to the field much more rapidly. By
merging CBP and CG vessel and people information requirements into the
e-NOA, the reporting burden on the maritime industry will be reduced.
When the e-NOA system is fully developed, vessel owners and operators
will have the option to use the e-NOA to satisfy CBP's Advance
Passenger Information Service (APIS) requirements as well as the CG's
NOA requirements.
The security requirements of the MTSA were developed with the full
cooperation of the private sector. We have developed the security
regulations to be performance-based, providing the majority of owners
and operators with the flexibility to implement the most cost-effective
operational controls, rather than more costly physical improvement
alternatives. By establishing consistent national and international
security requirements we will also be helping businesses by leveling
the playing field. Consistency helps business--consistency amongst
companies, states and countries. The Department will be vigilant in its
Maritime Homeland Security mission and will remain sensitive to the
impact of security measures on maritime commerce.
Conclusion
Our maritime security is first and foremost about awareness--
gathering and synthesizing large amounts of information and specific
data from many disparate sources to gain knowledge of the entire
domain. Maritime Domain Awareness and the knowledge it imparts will
allow maritime law enforcement and regulatory agencies to respond with
measured and appropriate action to meet any threat. However, it will
require the continued growth and development of strong partnerships not
the least of which is among the CG, TSA, ICE and CBP, state and local
agencies and our collective maritime stakeholders. No single maritime
stakeholder whether it is government, industry, or private sector can
do this alone. We must continue to work together to improve security.
This is never more important than now in our collective national
imperative to defend our nation and win the war against terrorism.
The men and women of DHS have accomplished a great deal in the past
year and we are each very proud of them. In the end, no amount of
planning or strategizing is worth the paper it is written on without
the dedicated effort of committed men and women who wake up every day
with the safety and security of their nation on their minds. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify before you today. We will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
JAYSON AHERN, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, FIELD OPERATIONS, BUREAU
OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Ahern. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman and members of
the committee. Thank you very much for the opportunity to
testify on maritime security and the progress United States
Customs and Border Protection continues to make in working in
concert with our partners: United States Coast Guard,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Transportation
Security Administration.
I am also very pleased to be here with my colleagues:
Admiral Belz, Mr. Blank and Mr. Stallworth. With our federal
government's prevention, preparedness and response capabilities
now under one roof in one department of government, and with
that department under the outstanding leadership of Secretary
Ridge, agencies charged with securing our borders are
positioned to meet this challenge with a unity of purpose and
combined resources.
CBP's primary mission is homeland security. This means
detecting and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from
entering the United States.
However, we are mindful of the fact that we must secure
America's borders in a way that does not stifle the legitimate
flow of travel and trade that is vital to the American economy.
For this reason, CBP is fully committed to supporting the
department's implementation of the Maritime Transportation
Security Act.
I would like to highlight a few of CBP's contributions in
this area. We have shared the responsibility for the
implementation of the act.
We support the Coast Guard in the port security
vulnerability assessments, both here at home and abroad, to
include the Coast Guard representatives joining with CBP in a
partnership to do the assessments overseas at our CSI ports;
assisting the Coast Guard in drafting guidance and sanctions
for non-compliant ports under the International Port Security
Program; and partnering with the Coast Guard and TSA to develop
a single set of regulations regarding the advance report of
crew member and electronic passenger manifests.
Speaking about the United States Border Patrol as part of
Customs and Border Protection, Border Patrol is responsible for
the interdiction enforcement and operations between our
nation's ports of entry. Their mission is to prevent the entry
of terrorists and implements of terrorism from illegally
entering the United States between our designated ports of
entry.
In direct support of that mission, CBP maintains a fleet of
102 boats located at 16 of the 21 Border Patrol sectors
nationwide. CBP Border Patrol agents routinely conduct drug
enforcement operations with the Coast Guard and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement marine units.
These interagency operations maximize each agency's unique
mission-specific capabilities in support of the common goal of
securing the homeland.
Examples include: joint maritime operations in the Great
Lake areas; participation with Coast Guard-led training
exercises for cold water survival and boat handling skills. As
mentioned by Admiral Belz, we are modernizing our fleet by
adding six new 25-foot response boats built on an existing
Coast Guard contract.
And lastly, CBP is part of the DHS Commodity Council,
tasked with developing processes and procedures to optimize
resources.
Protecting our seaports also places a great importance on
knowing what is in the sea containers prior to arriving in our
country. And I would like to talk about a few of those
measures.
It begins with the National Targeting Center, which is the
hub of our targeting efforts and sets the standards and defines
the processes for which containers we will look at coming into
this country. The NTC has established a range of liaisons with
other agencies responsible for securing the U.S. borders and
commerce, including the Coast Guard, TSA, Department of Energy,
Food and Drug Administration, the FBI and members of the
intelligence community.
The NTC also is fundamentally surrounded by an automated
targeting system, which gives us a very key component for
analyzing information and focusing our inspection efforts on
the potentially high-risk transactions and sorting through the
universe of 9 million containers that come into this country.
The Container Security Initiative certainly is an effort by
CBP to secure the ocean-borne container traffic by placing
multidisciplinary CSI teams alongside host country nation
customs officers to ensure that all shipments that pose a
potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at
the foreign ports before they are placed on a vessel destined
for the United States.
CSI currently is operational in 18 foreign ports and will
expand to 17 by the end of this calendar year, which will
account for about 80 percent of the container traffic destined
for this country.
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism currently
is focused with the trade community to identify security
standards to ensure the integrity of the entire supply chain.
We currently have members numbering over 6,200, including U.S.
importers, fair sea and rail carriers, trucking companies, U.S.
port authorities. And we recently began to add Mexican foreign-
based manufacturers.
These partners are also fulfilling their commitments to us
by now allowing us to have our validation teams go overseas and
actually begin to assess their protocols they have put in place
to ensure supply chain integrity. C-TPAT is also working with
five members of the partnership to go ahead and test the
container security devices so we can have smarter containers
and tamper-evident containers coming into this country.
And I would like to conclude by updating the status of our
non-intrusive inspection and radiation detection programs. Used
in combination with our other enforcement strategies, these
tools provide us with significant capacity to detect and deter
nuclear or radiological materials coming into this country.
Technologies deployed to our nation's sea, air and land
ports of entry include large-scale x-ray and gamma imaging
devices, as well as a variety of portable and hand-held
technologies. To date, CBP has deployed 148 large-scale imaging
systems nationwide, with 51 of those being positioned on both
coasts at our seaports.
To date, we are also deploying very quickly our nuclear and
radiological detection equipment at our ports of entry. To
date, we have 269 radiation portal monitors at sea ports, land
border ports and airports and air cargo environments.
And I think I will conclude at this point and be happy to
take any questions you might have later.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES STALLWORTH, II, DIRECTOR, AIR AND MARINE
OPERATIONS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATIONS AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Stallworth. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of the men and women of the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Air and Marine
Operations about the work we are performing to enhance the
maritime security mission.
The primary mission of ICE and the Department of Homeland
Security is to direct and address vulnerabilities in our
national security whether those vulnerabilities expose our
financial systems to exploitation or our borders to
infiltration. In close coordination with our counterparts at
Customs and Border Protection, the United States Coast Guard
and the Transportation Security Administration, ICE Air and
Marine Operations is uniquely situated to maximize our vast
jurisdictional and statutory authorities to continue to protect
our homeland.
ICE is the primary investigative arm of the Department of
Homeland Security. And the Office of Air and Marine Operations
has a longstanding history of protecting the borders of this
nation, including our maritime borders.
Air and Marine Operations enhances the capabilities of ICE
and the department with core competencies in air and marine law
enforcement, air and marine interdiction and airspace security.
As this hearing convenes, the men and women of ICE and Air and
Marine Operations are applying these core competencies to
secure our cities, borders and nation.
This mission is being accomplished both nationally and
internationally in partnership with other agencies within the
department. The Office of Air and Marine Operations has, for
many years, successfully performed these duties at the tip of
the spear, alongside the United States Coast Guard and the
Border Patrol.
Going beyond simply interdicting illicit cargo and
arresting criminals involved, ICE investigations in Air and
Marine Operations lend an enhanced ability to interdict and
investigate immigration and customs violations. For example,
our ability to target human smuggling alongside of narcotics
and weapons and other forms of smuggling and follow the illicit
money trail wherever it may lead places ICE in a unique
position to enforce our homeland security mission in ways never
before foreseen.
In the post-September 11, 2001, strategic environment,
illegal penetration of our borders and sensitive airspace could
be linked to or constitute the next actual attack. My esteemed
colleagues within DHS that are here with me today are partners
that we work with to counter these numerous threats to our way
of life.
However, we recognize that simply continuing the fight, as
our legacy agencies did, will not achieve the level of
protection we owe the American people. That is why Air and
Marine Operations, in coordination with the other agencies of
DHS, is continuing to work towards improving its capability to
deter, interdict and prevent airspace and border intrusion.
We created a national capital region branch that provides
24/7 airspace security coverage over the Washington, D.C. area.
Less than three miles away from where we sit now, at Ronald
Reagan Airport, Air and Marine Operations crews and their jet
interceptors and Black Hawk helicopters are on the ramp, ready
to launch at a moment's notice, to help secure the airspace, in
partnership with the U.S. Air Force units in this region.
In addition, Air and Marine Operations provided airspace
security coverage when the threat level is raised to orange
during events such as the State of the Union Address and the
Super Bowl and in support of Operation Liberty Shield.
Simultaneously working with ICE Investigations Division, the
men and women of Air and Marine Operations are continuing to
provide a deterrent force against the importation of weapons of
mass destruction and other instruments of terror into the
United States, disrupting narcotics smuggling and money
laundering organizations and enforcing embargos, trade
agreements and sanctions imposed by the United States
government against other entities.
Air and Marine Operations brings to the table capabilities
that enhance the investigative capabilities of ICE, while
supporting and acting as a force multiplier for other DHS
agencies.
Our air and marine capabilities are a critical and integral
part of the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to
conduct effective counter-terrorism, law enforcement and
counter-smuggling operations against seaborne threats. With
their unique law enforcement authority, our personnel,
operating aircraft and vessels, extend the department's
maritime domain awareness capability, while also providing an
unmatched capability for airspace domain awareness.
Employing a defensive strategy to push threats far from our
shores, we use our long-range P-3s to interdict, identify and
deter maritime and air threats as far from our borders as
possible.
At this time, I would like to conclude my comments and
reserve the time for your questions and my colleagues.
Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
Mr. Blank?
STATEMENT OF TOM BLANK, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR POLICY,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Blank. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman, Chairman Cox,
Representative Turner and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. It is an honor to appear here on behalf of TSA
this afternoon to discuss maritime security operations within
the Department of Homeland Security.
As my colleagues have already stated, the Department of
Homeland Security agencies are working closely together to
maximize government resources, ensure consistency among agency
initiatives and programs and avoid potential overlap in
carrying out our maritime security mission.
DHS, pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive
7, is in the process of developing a national critical
infrastructure plan that will identify and prioritize United
States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect
them from terrorist attack. This plan will be comprised of
Sector Specific Plans. And TSA has been assigned primary
responsibility for developing the transportation-specific SSP.
The transportation SSP will discuss how federal and private
sector stakeholders will communicate and work together, how
important assets in the transportation sector will be
identified, assessed and prioritized, how protective programs
will be developed, how progress in reducing risk will be
measured and how R&D will be prioritized in the sector. In the
transportation sector, the SSP will further these efforts
currently underway and help ensure that they are systematic,
complete and consistent with the efforts in the other 12
sectors.
In developing the transportation SSP, TSA is working under
Border and Transportation Security Directorate guidance and
with partners in the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the
Department of Transportation and its Modal Administration. DHS
will build on the foundation of the SSP to provide overall
operational planning guidance on transportation security.
The expanded SSP will ensure that modal security plans are
integrated into an effective concept of operations for
management of the transportation sector security. For example,
the Coast Guard, who is the lead DHS agency for maritime
security, is developing a national maritime transportation
security plan. That will become a critical component of the
transportation Sector Specific Plan.
As to TSA actions beyond the Sector Specific Plan, these
include development of a web-based, no-cost maritime
vulnerability assessment tool that is assisting port, vessel
and facility owners to complete vulnerability assessments
required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act. And to
date, TSA has received over 1,200 requests to use this tool.
TSA has implemented a synergy project designed to examine
the feasibility of implementing a cost-effective, functional
and secure system to screen and transfer cruise ship passenger
baggage from seaport to airport and reduce congestion at
airport security checkpoints caused by the influx of large
numbers of passengers disembarking from cruise ships. We are
testing this program currently in Miami and Vancouver.
TSA will soon begin the prototype phase of the
transportation worker identification credential, or TWIC. The
prototype will test the feasibility of bringing greater
uniformity to procedures for granting access to those who work
in the most sensitive and secure areas of our national
transportation system.
TSA personnel are assisting the Coast Guard in developing
the policies and procedures that will be used for the
international port security program and, to that end, have
provided the Coast Guard will examples and lessons learned from
the foreign airports audit program. Key TSA federal security
directors from around the country, as well as TSA headquarters
staff, serve on the Coast Guard's Area Maritime Security
Advisory Committee.
Working together under the leadership of VTS, we are
developing a more comprehensive framework for securing the
maritime cargo supply chain. This initiative will also assist
in meeting the missive requirements for secure systems of
transportation, emphasizing intermodal aspects of maritime and
cargo transportation.
We are reviewing cargo programs, analytical tools and other
relevant resources in order to identify remaining supply chain
vulnerabilities. The department expects the results of
Operation Safe Commerce will also help shape this framework.
Operation Safe Commerce is a pilot program at the largest
U.S. container load centers--Los Angeles/Long Beach, Seattle/
Tacoma and New York/New Jersey--that brings together private
business, ports, local, state and federal representatives to
analyze current security procedures for cargo entering this
country.
The program has functioned like a venture capital fund to
promote research and development for emerging technology and
business practice changes to monitor the movement and integrity
of containers through the supply chain. The OSC program
provided resources to find innovative ways to track and protect
cargo entering the United States from all over the world.
OSC will complete its work next year. Secretary Ridge has
awarded $58 million in OSC grants this year. And we expect to
fund an additional $17 million in OSC technology deployments
later this year.
With that, Madam Chairman, I will suspend.
Ms. Granger. I will recognize members for the questioning.
The five-minute rule will apply. It will be extended to eight
minutes for those who did not make opening remarks.
And as chair, I have a couple of questions.
Admiral Belz, first. The Coast Guard's Deepwater program
includes funding for unmanned aerial vehicles. Are there any
plans to expand the maritime mission of UAVs departmentwide?
Admiral Belz. Madam Chairman, the Coast Guard's program
with regard to maritime UAVS include both vertical UAVS and
kind of fixed-wing UAVs. Specifically with regard to Deepwater,
those assets are set out over time in a phased implementation
right now that would include primarily utilization within our
own deep water acquisition.
With regard to the other modal agencies, there is indeed
interest on the part of the UAVs. And I think there is, in
fact, a subgroup, a UAV subgroup at the department, to which I
believe all of us are partners that operate aircraft.
And I think there has been both testing on both the
maritime and land borders right now separately by the agencies.
But we are learning from each other.
Particularly in some cases, you actually have different
concerns in terms of that particular operating environment. So
although we are anxious to learn from each other, we are also
learning from the Department of Defense and others with regard
to the utilization of UAVs.
Clearly it is the way of the future. And particularly for
routine and persistent surveillance, this offers exciting and
promising opportunities for us.
I would perhaps also ask my colleagues to comment on that
with regard to their specific endeavors going on.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Ahern?
Mr. Ahern. Thank you. Currently, the Border Patrol is
actually employed a test that is in the Western Desert
Initiative as part of the Arizona Border Control Initiative
that is going on in Arizona currently.
Beginning June 1 and through the end of this year, we
actually--through the end of this fiscal year--we actually will
be doing a test between the ports of entry for the UAV project
just over land at this point in time. And we will be evaluating
that and feeding that into the departmental working group that
will be stood up.
But it is for land at this point. And they will be
operating about eight hours a day.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Stallworth?
Mr. Stallworth. The Office of Air and Marine Operations
conducted a 15-day test last November in Arizona, utilizing DOD
assets under our operational control under the Air and Marine
Operations Center control. And that 15-day test, resulted in
2,400 pounds of marijuana, three vehicles, 18 unaided
detections of violations and eight arrests of suspects and the
detention of 22 undocumented aliens. So we have utilized it,
tested it and found it to be operationally feasible and are
looking at ways to partner with our sister agencies and take
advantage of the technology.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Blank?
Mr. Blank. I have nothing to add, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
Now I call on Representative Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank all
of our witnesses for being here today.
One question that comes to my mind, Mr. Blank. The
Transportation Security Agency had a whole lot of work to do
around aviation security. The only thing I have noticed from my
notes that you are doing at the ports is trying to implement
this new transportation worker identification card.
And I understand there has been some confusion about it.
And people are wondering when it is going to be implemented to
try to improve security of those who work at the ports.
What would you think if the Congress just decided to get
you out of the business of worrying about port security and put
it in the hands of the Coast Guard, that handles 90 percent of
it right now?
Mr. Blank. I think every agency represented here brings a
certain subject matter expertise to achieving the overall
mission in the maritime sector that DHS was charged with
carrying out. TSA has a great deal of credentialing expertise.
We think the TWIC is going to make a significant
contribution to assuring that unescorted access to secure areas
of the transportation system, whether they be ports or other
maritime terminals or rail infrastructure, that we do not have
people getting in there that we do not want, want to get in
there.
We think our role in the big picture of developing the plan
under HSTD 7 is a significant contribution. And we think what
we have to do is make sure that we are focusing on the
intermodal nexus so that we do not have modal isolationism.
That is a TSA job, to look at how the whole program fits
together.
We think we have some responsibility and a contribution to
make in the area of supply chain security. Because, again, if
we were removed from having some responsibility in the maritime
sector, it might affect our capability to look at how the
maritime cargo supply chain links up with the rail supply
chain, links up with the surface trucking supply chain.
And so as we get the information and learning from
Operation Safe Commerce, we think the role that has been
designed for us is something that can make an effective
contribution. But we do recognize that the lead in the maritime
sector belongs to the Coast Guard. And we support that.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
I sometimes wonder if we would not do a more effective job
if we did not have several people with their different programs
being run by different folks. Obviously, we attempted, in
creating the Department of Homeland Security, to provide some
focus here.
But you have a little piece of it. Customs and Border does.
Coast Guard is. And I agree with it. Coast Guard traditionally
has had the lead role and should have.
Mr. Dicks. Will the gentleman yield just for an
observation? I am told that TSA has taken no steps to begin the
background check process which is required before a TWIC can be
issued to an individual or develop a distribution plan. Is
that, in fact, true?
Mr. Blank. We have the capability to do background checks
and will do so at the time the TWIC program is initiated. We
envision the background check. We are experienced in doing it
in the aviation sector.
We are currently beginning to do a background check that
will become more fulsome on hazmat truck drivers. But we would
not be taking steps to do background checks before we have our
technical infrastructure relative to the TWIC and get through
our prototyping of the technology phase.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you for yielding.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Ahern, you mentioned you have 269 radiation portal
monitors in place. But the reality is that less than 10 percent
of those are at our seaports.
The President's budget requested $43 million for purchase
of additional radiation portals so we can check these
containers as they come into our country for radiological or
nuclear material. By my estimate, in order to complete the task
of installing radiation portals, it would take something in the
neighborhood of $250 million more than the President requested
in his budget.
Am I in the ballpark?
Mr. Ahern. Those numbers are accurate. And I have
previously testified to those numbers before another committee.
Mr. Turner. If we could persuade the President and the
Congress to make our ports safe in the next fiscal year from
the fear of some radiological device getting in our country,
would you be able to implement that program with the additional
$250 million? Is there anything standing in your way, other
than funding, is what I am asking you?
Mr. Ahern. We have developed a project execution plan that
shows what we feel we need to execute the radiation detection
strategy throughout our ports of entry.
Mr. Turner. No, that is not what I asked you. I said: is
there anything standing in your way of doing it now except the
fact that the President has not asked for--I know the Congress
has yet to appropriate--the additional $250 million that would
allow you to get the task done? I know you have a plan and I
know it is over years. I am saying: could you do it next year
if we could persuade the Congress to fund it?
Mr. Ahern. We would have to go back and take a look at the
project execution plan to see if we could reconfigure the plan
to see if we could get it done by the end of 2005. But it
really would be funding-dependent. But we clearly do need the
additional funding to complete this plan as prepared.
Mr. Turner. So I think I am hearing you say that if we
could persuade the Congress and the President to ask for and to
appropriate the money, you could get the job done.
Mr. Ahern. We have a plan that could be executed.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, sir. One other inquiry, Mr. Ahern.
We are relying on this C-TPAT program--Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism program--to be sure that we have
containers coming into our country that we think are safe. And
there are 6,200 companies that have signed up with you to
participate in that program.
And yet, my information is that to date, we have only 248
of those companies' security measures validated. So that leaves
almost 6,000 that we have yet to verify that they are actually
complying with any kind of security standards.
What is it going to take to get that job done quicker? Will
the appropriations that you have requested allow those
verifications to be completed by the end of this next fiscal
year if you get the funds that the President has requested of
the Congress? Can you do it in this fiscal year?
Mr. Ahern. Out of the 6,200 C-TPAT we currently have in the
program, there are 3,100 that are certified. And out of the
universe of applications, we have a 15 percent rejection rate.
So 15 percent are not allowed in to be participants.
There are 3,100 that are certified. We have 700 validations
that are initiated, with 248 that are completed.
In the authorization or actually, in the initiative we put
forth for this year, we did actually receive funding for 157
positions for C-TPAT. At this point in the year, I have 41 of
those actually brought on board. And we are continuing to move
forward with bringing the additional validation specialists on
board, so that we can fulfill our responsibility to do the
overseas validations, as well as the domestic validations, of
the companies that are involved with C-TPAT.
Mr. Turner. So I am not sure I got an answer to my
question. If you get the appropriations that the President
asked for, can you complete the verification of these 6,200
companies by the end of the fiscal year 2005?
Mr. Ahern. I think it would be careless for me to give you
a number. I would have to process it out, congressman, to make
sure, as far as once we get our people on board, the capacity
to do those.
We believe that we have an adequate number with the
initiative money we have for this year bringing 157 on board.
Once we get them staffed up, I believe that would give us the
capacity to do what we need to do.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Chairman Cox for eight minutes.
Mr. Cox. I thank the chairwoman. And also, welcome to the
witnesses. Thank you for your forbearance during our floor vote
and for your outstanding testimony.
I also want to say, since most of our opening statements
were interdicted by the floor vote, that we recognize the
enormous contributions that the many operators within the
Department of Homeland Security that you represent are making
in the war on terrorism every day. The people that you
represent are defending our nation at great personal risk.
And I do not think there is any more eloquent testimony to
that fact than the death last week in Iraq of Coast Guard Petty
Officer Nathan Bruckenthal. He was, of course, deployed with
the Coast Guard forces to the Persian Gulf and was killed in an
explosion, along with two sailors, U.S. Navy sailors, when they
intercepted a terrorist suicide boat that was heading for an
oil terminal in the northern Arabian Gulf.
So we want to honor all of these men and women that you
represent today as we conduct this hearing on how we can make
constant progress in the effort.
I want to begin by asking how we can foster more jointness
in the mission that you have all taken from the legacy agencies
that you represent into this new Department of Homeland
Security.
I want to start, Mr. Stallworth, by asking you: should ICE
aircraft be able to land at a Coast Guard air station for
repairs?
Mr. Stallworth. Yes, sir. I believe they should be able to
and can land there. The question of repairs on aircraft is
whether or not the mechanics and others that are present are
certified to work on it.
And the main objective there would be to make sure that we
are all flying aircraft that are similar if they have the same
mission.
Mr. Cox. And are we building towards that? Are we building
towards shared repair and maintenance facilities?
Mr. Stallworth. We are in those places where we can. We are
looking at that right now.
We are looking at an air logistics or aviation logistics
management system right now that the Coast Guard operates
called ALMIS. We are going to have a test that actually starts
later on this month down in Corpus Christi, Texas, where we
have collocated organizations near the same facility.
And obviously, with us being legacy organizations which
were not joined at the hip, so to speak, for the past several
years, we have about--I think the number is 58 different types
of aircraft in the Department of Homeland Security, out of the
number being something in the neighborhood of 450 or so
aircraft total.
So we have some ways to go. But on the good side of that,
where we are looking at multi-role or maritime patrol aircraft,
we are looking at the same aircraft. The same thing for our
medium-lift helicopter; our Joint Requirements Council is
bringing those requirements together so that where it is
possible, where it meets our mission requirement and where we
can save on logistics and maintenance interoperability, we will
do those things and take those steps so that we have aircraft
that meet the multiple mission requirements of the agencies
where possible.
Mr. Cox. To pursue this jointness notion a bit further, Mr.
Ahern, should the ICE Air and Marine Operations Center be able
to tell where all CBP aircraft are operating?
Mr. Ahern. I think certainly as far as we need to make
certain that all aviation is coordinated so that we do not have
any mishaps or aviation safety concerns or a potential for
assets to be mustered to go ahead and respond to something that
really is a friendly aircraft in the area.
I believe that the Aviation Operations Management Council
is looking at this issue and should come to some resolution so
that there is a more efficient system for us. There has been
FAA transponders that have been put out for our Border Patrol
aircraft, that operate in the proximity of the border areas,
that provide the support to our interdiction operations in our
homeland security mission between the ports of entry.
But there certainly needs to be coordination for safety and
also for efficiency.
Mr. Cox. And Admiral Belz, should a Coast Guard aircraft be
able to engage in secure communications with an ICE patrol boat
in the water below?
Admiral Belz. Certainly, that is an outstanding capability
we do not have now. With our Deepwater acquisition, as we have
looked to examine our requirements on that particular major
acquisition, we are looking at how we are ensuring--you know,
we have that connectivity among our sister agencies here.
In many cases, we have that serendipitously. But we do not
have it as an organized effort.
And that certainly again was the genesis behind the
departmentwide initiative to stand up an Aviation Operations
Management Council. It has been going on now about six months.
And it is, I think, right about on pace in terms of the
issues that they are looking at, sir, which is some of the very
issues that you have raised here today.
Mr. Cox. And finally, Mr. Blank, to focus on possible
greater opportunities for jointness between TSA and the Coast
Guard, on the intelligence side, we have this recent report
issued by the GAO that found that Coast Guard and TSA may be
duplicating efforts in collecting intelligence information
about vessels and cargo. They recommended that we pursue that
opportunity.
According to the report, while the Secretary has delegated
primary responsibility to TSA for the new integrated maritime
information system, the Coast Guard's efforts in this area are
more extensive and better funded at the moment. And
furthermore, the integrated maritime information system is very
similar to the Coast Guard's Intelligence Information Center
Coast Watch Program that is already in place and has
considerable intelligence analysis capabilities.
Finally, GAO tells us that, to the extent there is
duplication, there is also an opportunity to create gaps
because the resources that are focused on duplicated efforts
are of course not focused on making sure that everything is
covered. What can we do to prevent either Coast Guard or TSA
from having these overlaps and to help the Department of
Homeland Security have a complete intelligence picture to
detect potential threats?
Mr. Blank. Mr. Chairman, we recognize what the GAO has
found. We recognize that the Coast Guard is the lead in
maritime intelligence. And the tool, the intelligence gathering
tool that you mentioned, we believe that what we have invested
in it may have some value applied to other modes of
transportation. And we are evaluating that at this time.
But we are no longer using that IMIS tool in the maritime
sector. We believe that we are probably a significant customer
for maritime intelligence, in that we need to have it so that
we can evaluate and analyze what it means across the broader
transportation sector, what it means at the nexus of various
other modes.
So we need it from an analysis perspective. But we have
recognized that there was overlap and there was a need to have
efficiencies. And so that IMIS product is no longer going
forward.
Mr. Cox. Madam Chairman, my time is expired. I would extend
to the panel members who have not addressed themselves to any
aspect of this question--for example, on this last question
which involved the Coast Guard--if any of you wishes to add the
other half or the rest of the picture or add more, I think that
is more than welcome. But otherwise, Madam Chairman, I yield
back.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Representative Dicks?
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. And I appreciate the testimony here
today. I had a chance--a sneak preview, Madam Chairman--
beforehand with some of the witnesses.
Mr. Ahern, I want to just ask you again on the record.
You know I have been concerned about Operation Safe
Commerce, which will be complete in August of 2004. And I want
you to say here on the record--give me the same assurances--
that you are going to use the findings of this as effectively
as you can when your agency takes this responsibility over.
Can you comment on that?
Mr. Ahern. Yeah, I would be happy to repeat what I stated
to you back in the preparation room. Certainly, Operation Safe
Commerce is very important to the Department of Homeland
Security. As I mentioned, I am one of the three co-chairs of
the executive steering committee.
TSA has the lead for the overseeing of the grants. One of
the things that clearly we want to do is make sure that beyond
just the management of the grant, that we get some operation
utility at the end of the test. We have $58 million invested in
this program. There are going to be 1,000 to 1,200 containers
that are actually going to be run through the Operation Safe
Commerce trade lanes. I believe there are 18 trade lanes
overall between the three load ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach,
Seattle/Tacoma, Congressman, and Newark.
It would make absolutely no sense for the Department of
Homeland Security to put $58 million out there and not do
operation and evaluation to be able to take some of this
technology or the procedures or the secure trade lane
understandings that we gain from this to employ them. We will
be doing the evaluation in partnership with--.
Mr. Dicks. So you do not see any conflict between that and
Commissioner Bonner when he announced the Smart Box initiative
request for information on technologies that can improve
container integrity. There is not going to be duplication here,
is there?
Mr. Ahern. I do not believe there is going to be a
duplication. And I would add, beyond just Safe Commerce,
Commissioner Bonner's comment about Smart Box and also the
Container Working Group. I think the department and the Border
and Transportation Security Directorate is taking an oversight
role to make sure there is not that redundancy and to make sure
that there is the appropriate level of coordination as we make
decisions for standardizing safe and secure trade lines.
Mr. Dicks. Admiral Belz, where are we on the national
maritime transportation security plan required by MTSA? When
will that be out?
Admiral Belz. The national transportation security plan,
sir?
Mr. Dicks. Yeah.
Admiral Belz. Sir, the effort, in terms of developing that
plan, is ongoing with a variety of pieces. And we are all
partners on that together.
I would have to provide a specific update on that for the
record, sir.
The initial timeline for the development of the National Maritime
Transportation Security Plan (NMTSP) spans two years with development
of the final plan by the end of CY 2005. The Coast Guard is using an
inter-agency development team, similar to the approach taken for
developing MTSA regulations. The initial national plan inter-agency
coordination meeting was held on February 11, 2004, and regular inter-
agency working group meetings commenced on April 22, 2004.
Mr. Dicks. All right. I hope the plan is going better. And
I think it is important that we have an overall strategy.
One of the concerns that I have--and I wanted to say this
here for the committee--is how are we going to pay for this? We
have decided that we would take care of the problems of the
airports pretty comprehensively. But there is a big question
mark about who is going to pay for port security.
And the ports obviously feel that the U.S. government
should pay for this. I believe that we cannot leave it unfunded
somehow.
We were talkings earlier about the lockout on the West
Coast just for a week. And all of a sudden, the economic
implications of not being able to get these containers into the
major ports on the West Coast and then to Chicago and to the
East Coast.
And if we do not have a program, if we do not have a funded
program that is credible, I think this becomes a major concern.
Now does somebody want to address that? How are we going to pay
for this?
Mr. Blank. Well, since TSA administers port security
grants, I will take a stab, but I know my other colleagues want
to as well.
Mr. Dicks. And the only monies come from Congress. The
Coast Guard, I believe, said there is a $7.5 billion
requirement; $1.5 billion each year. There is no money in the
budget for this. And every year, Congress has added the money
because this is such a gaping hole in our strategy.
Mr. Blank. There has been over $500 million appropriated.
You are quite right.
There is $46 or so million for fiscal year 2005. In fact,
the Federal Register today carries an announcement of the
request for proposals with regard to that money.
Mr. Dicks. I would just point out that the $46 million is
the first time anything has been requested by the
administration for port security. Is that not correct? And it
is not very much when you consider the $7.5 billion that the
Coast Guard says is required for port security.
Mr. Blank. I think what we have to recognize, congressman,
is that port security is clearly a shared responsibility
between the federal government, the state governments, local
governments and private businesses.
Mr. Dicks. But the other people are not stepping up to take
this responsibility on. They do not have the money either.
And if nobody funds it, that is what I am worried about. If
the ports do not do it, if the private sector does not do it
and if here at the federal level we can only do it minimally
because it is hard to keep adding money above the President's
budget request, this is going to be a gaping hole in our
overall security strategy.
If one bad container comes in on the West Coast in Los
Angeles, this thing goes off, you have a major disaster and
then the people say you cannot bring these containers in, the
economy in this country is going to be directly threatened. And
so I do not see how we can just let this go on without coming
up with some kind of a funding strategy.
Mr. Blank. We recognize what you are saying. But when I am
talking about the port security funds that TSA has
administered, until handing it off to another department, to
look at the whole resource level, you have to not only consider
the appropriated funds, but you have to put some total on the
resources that have come from federal, state, local and
private. And then you have to look at what is in various parts
of the Coast Guard and CBP budget and get a whole picture,
which is considerably more than what has just been put out as
port security grants.
Mr. Dicks. What about this? Are the Coast Guard numbers
solid, Admiral Belz? For port security, we need $1.5 billion
the first year and I think it is $7.5 billion over the next 5
years? 10 years?
Admiral Belz. We stand by those numbers. But I would agree
with my colleague, Tom Blank, that in many ways, some of the
benefits of this effort do, indeed-it has to be a shared
partnership between the private sector and the federal and the
state government.
Mr. Dicks. But if it does not get funded, are you concerned
personally that this is a major problem for us? If nothing
happens, if it is not picked up at the local level and the
federal government does not do it, are you concerned that this
is a major hole in our effort at homeland security?
Admiral Belz. If we do not get compliance, I would be
concerned because it is a balanced program. And we are
requiring that partnership. We think we are laying out the
standards.
So far, we are seeing that kind of evidence of compliance.
So I think over time, we have to continue to educate and push
for it, do our part and try to get industry to do their part,
educate, do the initiatives that make smart and efficient
utilization of federal assets. And then hopefully, we will see
some benefits accruing by the--.
Mr. Dicks. Can you make real progress without money?
Admiral Belz. No, sir. We cannot.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Representative Souder?
Mr. Souder. I have a number of narcotics questions, which
will not surprise any of you. The first question I have on the
container security initiative in Rotterdam. And when we visited
there, they were not checking for narcotics. And I wondered if
we have any, in this initiative, any requirement as we set this
up that there will be a checking for narcotics at Antwerp, at
Rotterdam and other ports as well, in the free clearance.
Mr. Ahern. I assume that question is directed to me,
congressman.
Mr. Souder. Yes.
Mr. Ahern. As far as the container security initiative, the
principal focus of it is to make sure that there is not a
weapon of mass destruction, explosive device, something that
could create devastating harm to this country, that could come
into one of our ports adjacent to a major city and be exploded
or remotely detonated. That is the principal of CSI.
As we are targeting, using our targeting systems, and it is
the same systems we use to target domestically, we are looking
for anomalies. We are looking for anomalies that would drive us
for doing our non-intrusive examination using the gamma imaging
device.
So as we are then looking for the anomalies inside the
containers, certainly the principal focus and will continue to
be the national security examination. But as they identify an
anomaly, they will continue to pursue that to determine what it
is.
And if that happens to be narcotics, that is fantastic. And
that is something that we then have the ability to start to
make a good enforcement decision for control delivery to
continue to explore much earlier in the transportation process,
versus being able to identify it at the point of discharge here
in the United States.
But the principal focus--I do not want to mislead anyone
here--the principal focus of CSI is for national security
examinations. But as we are targeting for anomalies, both in
the systems and the use of the technology, any anomaly could be
anything. And we pursue that to determine what it is, sir.
Mr. Souder. So they understand that an anomaly, if it does
not lead to a weapon of mass destruction, still is to be
pursued?
Mr. Ahern. I would say that is true.
Mr. Souder. And the Dutch understand that as well at
Rotterdam, which is our biggest port? Because it seemed to be
in the early stages, sometimes yes, sometimes no, as far as
willingness to cooperate. But the fact is if something is
precleared and it is moving in and once it is there, the odds
of it being checked again are less.
And as Elijah Cummings, the ranking member on my
subcommittee, points out, we have 30,000 deaths a year because
of narcotics versus the possibility of one from terrorism. And
if we push this offshore, we have to make sure we are checking
other things as well in that process and the anomalies in the
purchase orders and bill of lading and so on.
Mr. Ahern. I would tell you with absolute certainty, if we
were not comfortable that the examination was done to the level
of satisfaction by us overseas through the host country nation
customs authority, we would make that examination upon arrival.
Mr. Souder. Admiral Belz, we had some concerns early on, as
we went up to level orange, that boats were being pulled back
to the harbors because we had a shortage of people to protect
the maritime security of the United States. Are you to the
point yet--this somewhat is like the last question--how, if a
boat is in active drug interdiction in the Caribbean or in the
Eastern Pacific and San Diego or Houston or New Orleans or
Miami goes to code orange, does the boat abandon what they are
doing to be pulled back into port? How do you make those kind
of decisions?
Admiral Belz. Sir, we have come a long way since 9/11 with
regard to how we deal with that particular issue. I think the
department itself and all of us as partners have in fact
learned how to apply our resources better together to deal with
this full array of threats.
And particularly early on when we were early on looking at
the situation, we certainly used a different approach regarding
some operational tactics than we do today. And so over time,
even through our standup of code orange over several times now,
we have evolved both our strategy and our tactics in executing
that.
So as you will see concurrently, with regard to the drug
effort, the intelligence there has continued to develop very
well. I do not want to say we are lucky rather than good, but
we have seen concurrently some maturation of the effort with
regard to maritime intelligence, partnering with regard to
assets, again with colleagues sitting here at the table,
specifically with ICE and CBP on the land border. And our
integrated effort, largely working through the joint
interagency task forces, have allowed us to invest individually
less and achieve considerably more as a U.S. government.
So we have two things going on there. We have in fact been
supported by the Congress. And we have been supported through
the President's budget in building up the necessary assets more
in line with dealing with the homeland security issues--or as
we would call it, waterways and coastal security; less so at
the expense.
But at the end of the day, it is an issue of capacity. And
where we have to put those, oftentimes is a risk analysis of
where to best place those. But I think you would see it less
today than you did 2 years ago.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I would also ask--for the record,
because I have one additional question, but this can just be
for the record, because what you just said also was in a number
of the testimony, written testimony--would you provide the
committee with the narcotics drug seizures from the year before
the creation of the department from March 2002 to February 2003
and then what we have seized from March 2003 to February 2004;
basically March to March. There are lots of variables with
this. But I would like to be able to compare it as much as
possible and then look for the explanations for any deviation.
Mr. Stallworth, I had one question for you yet. There has
been a lot of discussion and in fact today, I have been
confused on the border. I remain somewhat confused today
precisely how the air and marine operations are--not to mention
the land operations--with the border patrol, what is the legacy
border patrol and legacy customs--and how you are structured.
Do you believe by putting you in one department that has
altered your function some, in particular its relationships
with narcotics and immigration?
Mr. Stallworth. One thing that it has done, it has altered,
it has given us the responsibility under Title 8 to handle and
see the immigration issue, even though we never turned around
or turned down immigration--illegal immigrations or
undocumented aliens. We always turn those over to border
patrol.
We have exactly the same procedure now, in that we call
them in to do that because they are the ground force that is in
place. The integration of our air and marine assets, most of
that comes through the integration of operations through the
Air and Marine Operations Center that essentially has
interagency people there focused on domestic, for the most
part, and arrival zones.
Mr. Souder. Can I interrupt you just a second? Did you say
you have had an increase in your assignments to immigration?
But you did not have it before? DO you mean you have had a
reduction in the drug interdiction mission?
Mr. Stallworth. No, sir. In fact, what we have had?and we
will provide you the same figures in the same time period you
just asked for from others. We will provide you that.
And I think what you will see is with the increased
emphasis on border sovereignty under U.S. sovereignty has been
an increase in all types of interdictions.
Immigrations or undocumented alien numbers have gone up.
And drug interdiction numbers have gone up, both from our
arrival zone or U.S. arrival zone and from our activities
outside of the U.S.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Representative DeFazio?
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Madam Chair.
A question to the Coast Guard about the automatic
identification system. I have been an advocate of this for some
time, essentially having a way of tracking vessels approaching
U.S. ports and critical areas. But my understanding is,
although we have a mandate in place now that we are going to
have AIS on all vessels over 65 feet by December 31, that it
will be transmitting data into many of our ports, that half of
our ports will not have a capability of receiving those signals
and actually tracking those, except at the ports where we have
the system that is called VTS.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marijuana
Period Cocaine Seized Seized in
in Pounds Pounds
------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 2002-Feb 2003..................... 95,507 30,447
------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 2003-Feb 2004..................... 174,107 20,456
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Can you comment on that and explain to me how we are going
to better utilize that information? Because I think it is key
that we be able to constantly track vessels of any size and be
able to use that data.
Admiral Belz. Certainly, the VAIS system, when fully
mature, will be able to provide us additional information
beyond the ports that we now have targeted--you know, the VTS
ports. But over time, that is just one piece of the puzzle.
There are other capabilities that, until we can build out
the fully built out system, we will be able to use other
sources of information.
There is no silver bullet with regard to any of these
particular pieces of intelligence or monitoring data that
alone, given the classes they apply to, given the state of the
international agreements and cooperation, given the state of
the implementation of other monitoring systems, that is the
entire point, sir, of the intelligence fusion that we bring
together.
So we have opportunities with partnering about sailing
dates, notice of arrivals, maritime surveillance, other assets,
even outside our own department, that bring together a
comprehensive picture of what is actually out there moving.
At the end of the day, we will continue to improve that
system.
Mr. DeFazio. What is the timeline we are looking at where
we will be able to utilize the data that will be available off
of these vessels in all our major ports, other than the VTS? Do
we have a plan if we have some money? Are we building out the
system?
Admiral Belz. We are working on a plan. And we are building
a plan; again, looking at constraints and needs, with regard
to--.
Mr. DeFazio. Meaning not having the funds to go forward.
Admiral Belz. Well, sir, there are many aspects to doling
out a secure safety regime. And I think our approach--again,
working within our department--has been to try to build out a
system consistent with growth and overlap so that we do not, as
has already been pointed out, leave some glaring gaps in some
areas while we entirely focus on building out a system
somewhere else that, in some cases, maybe does make the best
business case for ourselves.
So we think we are putting forth a balanced effort, taking
into account things that were in play already and things that
make sense within regards to support of both the international
community and ourselves, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. You mentioned the documentation of the
vessels, of foreign vessels in particular. I am not quite
certain where we are at in terms of piercing the veil of
obscure ownership.
Right now, Osama bin Laden could own quite a few
freighters. We would not know it because of the way the
international maritime industry is structured and the way we
allow it to go forward. Have we successfully negotiated a
change so we are going to actually know who owns these ships as
opposed to the post office box of some lawyer somewhere?
Admiral Belz. Well, sir, again, as you know, with regard to
foreign vessels arriving in our port, we are relying on
international cooperation. We have worked hard there for 2 or 3
years to gain that cooperation.
It is certainly necessary that we use this approach for the
larger body of commerce moving through. Most of the folks out
there are trying to be engaged in legitimate business.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. But the bottom line is we still have
not really pierced that veil of ownership.
Admiral Belz. Well, sir, I would not say that the veil has
not been pierced. We may not have it fully down. But I think we
are making good progress with regard to information sharing.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, I hope the Coast Guard will, as our
representative to the IMO, continue to push most aggressively
on that issue.
To Mr. Blank, on the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism, I just wanted to follow up on the questions that I
believe the ranking member was asking, which is we have 6,200
companies out there that want to get validated, is that right?
Mr. Blank. That is not TSA.
Mr. DeFazio. Oh, I am sorry. Okay. Right, okay. I am
confused. So there are 6,200 out there?
Mr. Ahern. There are 6,200 C-TPAT participants at this
point.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. So are we extending privileges to those
who have not yet been verified at this point in time, since we
have only verified somewhere around five percent of them?
Mr. Ahern. 3,100 get some level of privilege.
Mr. DeFazio. Without having been formally inspected?
Mr. Ahern. They have formally submitted a security
assessment, which we have reviewed in great detail. But we have
not gone and done the validations.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. They have given you a paperwork plan.
And you have not been on the ground to validate whether or not
they have actually implemented it. But it looks good on paper.
Do they all look kind of alike, like some consultant
provided them?
Mr. Ahern. No, we have not seen that.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. All right.
And again, following up on the ranking member's question,
it is not clear what the date objective is to have physically
inspected all 6,200. What date do we have in mind? By when will
we have inspected all of them--got the plan, looked at the
plan, gone out and verified the plan is in place and then also
be doing some sort of periodic follow up?
Mr. Ahern. As I stated, the answer is the same at this
point. We will have to go ahead and factor it out what the plan
will be once we get all 157 on board for the validations, how
long would it take us to get the universe of 6,200
participants.
Mr. DeFazio. So you are hiring 157 people. Where are you in
that process?
Mr. Ahern. Forty-one on board.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. Are all the others chosen and just
undergoing screening? You have the budget and we are well into
the budget year. Where are we at?
Mr. Ahern. We are very aggressively moving forward with
bringing the others on board. We want to make certain also that
as we bring them on that we have the plan rolled out to do the
validations and not just move to an aggressive move just to get
them on board. We want to make sure that we have the plan to
roll them out to do the validations in a very efficient way.
Mr. DeFazio. It is really critical that we are assured that
these are legitimate chain of custody situations with very
little opportunity for anything being interjected into the
system if we are going to essentially lower the probability
that they will undergo inspection.
I am just concerned at this point that some are operating
without even having had their paperwork verified. And I do not
know what led us to that conclusion.
But that causes me some concern. Perhaps maybe outside of
the public session, you could tell me why that is and what
assessments we have that just having the paperwork on those is
adequate to allow them to know that it is less likely that they
will be inspected.
Mr. Ahern. I would be happy to even answer that in the open
session, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. If you can answer quickly because my time is
expired here.
Mr. Ahern. I think one of the things that is very critical,
beyond just the security assessments that were submitted, they
went through all the law enforcement agencies we checked for
their histories. We also looked at their compliance history for
their importation record that they had over a number of years
with Customs.
So we made a lot of various determinations. We also had a
regulatory audit division that goes out and looks at their
corporate records as well, that is part of more of the
regulatory aspects and the financial aspects of the company for
commercial purposes.
So we took the totality of all those factors, as well as
now overlaying our layered enforcement systems with our
targeting. They still go through the same national targeting
system. They still can be subject to the enforcement screens
that we do, the non-intrusive gamma imaging technology as well.
And there still is a random factor to make sure that we are not
fooled by some of the assumptions we make with these companies
we put into these trusted carrier programs.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay, thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Granger. Thank you. The chair now recognizes
Representative Slaughter.
Ms. Slaughter. How are we doing? All right, there we are.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I want to thank you
gentlemen for coming today. I know it is terribly important for
us to be able to hear from you. And I know that things are
going so slowly at the agency and you need to be there. So we
are very appreciative of your time.
I do have a question I would like to ask for Mr. Blank.
This is something that has been brought up to me, Mr. Blank,
about the TWIC card. I know that there are two pilot projects
going on--one in Los Angeles and one in Philadelphia.
Understanding how you can evaluate how the programs are
going to go, but unfortunately, TSA has not taken any steps to
begin the background process. And that is going to be required
before you can issue any cards to any individual or even to
develop a distribution plan.
Ports are worried about the pace of the program because
their concern is it could be a conflict with the Coast Guard
port security regulations that require access control for
personnel. The ports do not want to spend thousands of dollars
on a TWIC card only to find it is in conflict with what the
Coast Guard does.
Could you give us some comfort on that?
Mr. Blank. We will be fully partnered with the Coast Guard
going forward. It is certainly not our intention to drive the
port authorities or other stakeholders at the ports to any
unnecessary expenditures.
For instance, as we envision the TWIC card, we have
completed our technology evaluation phase. We do have one of
the technologies that we think performed very well and is well
suited to access control.
But port authorities and others out there have invested in
some other technologies. And we are going to make sure that the
TWIC card accommodates those. So you may have a TWIC card that
will accommodate investments that have already been made.
And so we recognize that we have an obligation to not waste
people's money and investment. And we recognize that we have an
obligation to partner with the Coast Guard so that their
efforts mesh nicely with ours, not only in the area that you
mentioned in the port, but also with the Coast Guard's
responsibility for merchant seamen IDs as well.
Ms. Slaughter. Do you have any dates? Certainly, you are
going to begin background checks. Do you have some idea when
your cards are going to be issued?
Mr. Blank. AT this point, our primary focus is getting into
this prototype phase where we are going to make the system
work. We have to make some determinations yet as to what the
disqualifying crimes might be or the disqualifying background
information might be.
So we will have to go through a process to make that
determination. We will have to make that public and take
comment on it.
But in terms of an overall system to do background checks,
while we will have to work on that, it is something that TSA is
gaining experience with almost every day, whether it is the
hazmat truckers that we are getting to work on and people in
the aviation industry.
So it is not a new process.
Ms. Slaughter. I understand. It is just taking an
inordinately long time. And people are concerned.
Admiral Belz, I have a couple of questions for you, if I
may. I have been very much interested. I represent Niagara
Falls. And we are very concerned there about the falls and
national security.
We started talking to the Coast Guard in 2003, I believe,
about the feasibility of stationing Coast Guard HH-65A Dolphin
Helicopters there in the Niagara Falls region. As you know,
Governor Pataki is very interested in this. He has put money in
the budget to provide a facility for the Coast Guard.
And many of my colleagues and I have written to you
recently asking where we are with that, hoping that we have
made a good enough case because it is very important to us. And
we have not yet heard from you. I have a copy of the letter if
you would like to see it. If you do not have it, I can give you
one.
Can you give me the status of that request?
Admiral Belz. Ma'am, I have not specifically seen the
letter. But I am aware of it. And I know that we also share
your concern about the ability to place aviation assets
throughout the country.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 23465.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 23465.003
So we have looked at that. And I think our approach has
been generally to try to deploy assets there on a temporary
basis. And we certainly do that with regard to specific
intelligence.
Ms. Slaughter. We have had them on a temporary basis. We
believe though that this is an important enough area of the
country--a very busy entry port across to Canada--that we think
that they should be there permanently, which is what our
request is and why New York State is so interested in helping.
Admiral Belz. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Slaughter. What can you tell me about that request?
Admiral Belz. I can tell you that we are looking at it. We
are looking at it, as we do in all manner of resource requests,
it is a matter of balancing those requests, balancing those
sources, understanding the risks, looking at some options, what
really makes the most sense.
And I expect that we will provide an answer that will, at
the correct time, assessing the risk with regard to the plan to
continue to deploy on a temporary basis, I think is based on
everything we can gather. And it is a difficult decision.
It is a difficult decision to deal with concerns of the
Congress with regard to this issue because it is a significant
issue. There is no question that we have had assets over there
for a variety of reasons, beyond security.
Ms. Slaughter. Well, the security is critically important.
Without a threat assessment yet, to this day, it is very
difficult to really concentrate on the parts of the country
that obviously are pressure points.
And I think there is no question that that is one. So we
would very much like to have that answer.
And I wonder, Madam Chairman, if you would hold the record
open so we can get that response for me?
The Coast Guard has carefully assessed our aviation needs
throughout the Great Lakes. In doing so, we considered organic Coast
Guard surface and air forces and other public and even international
partners. We have preliminarily determined that temporarily deploying
to the Niagara region is sufficient in meeting projected mission
requirements. I certainly appreciate the offer of State assistance to
fund the construction of a hangar for a Coast Guard Air Facility.
However, the cost for Coast Guard aircraft and personnel needed to
support a permanent presence exceeds currently available Coast Guard
funding. We are confident that ``on demand'' and as necessary
deployments from regional Coast Guard air stations will continue to
meet our mission needs.
Ms. Granger. Yes, I will.
Ms. Slaughter. Thank you very much. Thank you, admiral. I
look forward to a response that is favorable to that district.
Thank you very much.
Admiral Belz. Thank you for the question.
Ms. Granger. Representative Sanchez?
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Again, gentlemen, I am sorry for having left. I have
several markups going on right now. And I hope that I am not
reiterating questions that somebody may have asked in my
absence.
I am interested in the fact that the TSA is the lead agency
for the restoration of the maritime transportation system in
the aftermath of a security incident at a port. The MTSA
requires, as part of a national maritime transportation
security plan, a plan to reestablish the flow of cargo.
When will DHS have a cargo contingency plan to ensure that
cargo flow will be established quickly in the event a port
suffers a terrorist attack, minimizing the economic damage? And
I know that you have had some efforts with an outreach program
to the private sector called Operation Restore. Can you tell me
what that effort is about and where you are with that?
And I guess I also have the question: why was TSA
designated the lead to do this task? And what role and what is
the coordination going on with respect to the Coast Guard and
the port on this issue of reestablishment of cargo lines once
there has been an incident?
Mr. Blank. I will begin and then I think Admiral Belz will
have some comment.
If you look at TSA's role in this maritime sector, whether
it is domain awareness, prevent, protect and so forth and
restore, our responsibilities tend to be in development of
plans, development of concepts of operations, looking at
methods of conducting a certain thing, as opposed to being
operational. These gentlemen's agencies are pretty much the
operational element.
And a great deal of what you are talking about here is
planning how to get the cargo lines established again. If a
piece of critical infrastructure is not available for whatever
reason, how do you reroute around that?
What is the plan? Where do you go? What will it take? What
is required?
So those kinds of things are falling into TSA's realm of
responsibility. But in terms of implementing that, we would be
most likely looking at these gentlemen's agencies to do that.
But whether it is the Sector Specific Plan under the
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 that will integrate
the national maritime security plan, along with all the other
modal plans; whether it is a national response plan, it will
also become a part of that. Oftentimes, the subject matter and
the content of the plans will come from these gentlemen's
agencies and we will coordinate and put that together.
But I think that is the rationale for why you see TSA
designated as the lead there.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. That is a good answer to one of the
parts. But then the question is: where are you along with
having actual plans for ports to reinstate the flow of cargo?
Mr. Blank. Every port is probably in a different state of
play. We are in the process of working as quickly as we can on
criticality assessments, doing the vulnerability assessments
with our partners, particularly at the Coast Guard, and
identifying what mitigation needs to be made on a port-by-port
basis.
But I cannot really characterize, as a whole.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you have any information with respect, for
example, Los Angeles/Long Beach, the largest port, the most
important port to our nation, which is 15 minutes away from
where I live?
Mr. Blank. I would have to get you that, congresswoman.
Ms. Sanchez. What about the issue with respect to Operation
Restore?
Mr. Blank. That one I am going to have to defer to my
colleagues, I believe.
Admiral Belz. I would have to provide that for the record.
I would like to make comment though with regard to facilitating
the return of commerce.
Ms. Sanchez. I would not expect that you would comment on
Operation Restore because that is a TSA program.
Admiral Belz. Right.
Ms. Sanchez. Not a Coast Guard program. But that is okay.
Mr. Blank. I would have to get you information for the
record, congresswoman.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. I see that my time is up. I will submit
the rest of my questions for the record. They are pretty
complicated.
Mr. Camp. [Presiding.] All right. Mr. Markey may inquire.
Mr. Markey. Last month when Richard Clarke's new book came
out, many in Boston were startled by a passage that appeared on
page 15 of the book that discussed Clarke's fears that since
terrorists had previously stowed away on LNG tankers entering
the Port of Boston, that such LNG tankers could be targeted by
Al-Qa`ida on September 11.
Since then, I have received a letter from DHS confirming
that individuals with terrorist affiliations came into the
country on LNG tankers or other Algerian flag ships. Both the
Coast Guard and the FBI have since provided me with classified
briefings on this matter.
While I cannot discuss the details of those briefings here,
the FBI has said publicly that they had no evidence to support
what DHS told me in the letter, in terms of their terrorist
affiliations before they arrived in America. I can also say
that there appears to be some significant discrepancies in the
information and with DHS', the Coast Guard's and the FBI's
assessment of the information.
Is there anything you can do here today to help clear up
the confusion that this produces for people in Boston who read
that the DHS says one thing and the FBI says another?
In other words, do you believe that Abdelghani Meskini and
the other terrorists or those affiliated with terrorists who
came off the boats in Boston were terrorists before they got to
America? Or did they only become terrorists after they came to
America? Could you tell us your conclusion on that subject?
Admiral Belz. Good afternoon, sir. I believe we have
provided essentially some of that information. I know it was an
extensive briefing yesterday.
And without going into classified sources, it is our view
that the latter was true, that this was an economic issue. We
saw some evidence of direction and movement afterwards. But
there was nothing specifically before.
And the reason I think some of this information continues
to be developed in one case and not the other is because we are
looking at the characteristic of building an intelligence
baseline on populations in general, as opposed to a specific
intelligence or investigation that may have an entirely
different purpose at the time, with the time sequencing
involved in that.
Mr. Markey. When that large a number of people all
subsequently are identified as part of one plot, that perhaps
it is more than coincidence than they did arrive with that in
mind and with a plan to execute, rather than all being
recruited individually after they got here, given the fact that
they all came in on the same tankers, although at different
times?
Admiral Belz. Well, sir, I can almost, without getting into
the specifics of this case, I can just say that you find a
convenient methodology to do something. And oftentimes, in
almost any venue you talk about, you use that until something
happens about it.
And I think as focus has been drawn to those particular
conveyances, we have seen a lot of change with regard to LNG
flow into Boston.
Mr. Markey. I just mean from a statistical probability
perspective, do you think it is likely, Admiral, that that many
people getting randomly off tankers in Boston at an LNG
facility would then all subsequently wind up being linked to
the millennium bombing plot at LAX?
Admiral Belz. I really had not had a chance to consider
that. I would say that, again, we have to take a look at the
broader perspective of the transits in and out of the port and
the entire population and then maybe read some kind of a
statistical analysis from that.
Mr. Markey. Director Stallworth and Admiral Belz, as you
know, we have recently learned that Abdelghani Meskini, a
terrorist arrested for his role in the millennium bombing, got
to the U.S. by stowing away on the Algerian LNG tanker that was
bringing LNG into my district in Everett, Massachusetts.
Another millennium bombing terrorist, Abdel Hakim Tizegha,
also reportedly entered the country by stowing away on an
Algerian flag ship. Over the past few days, I have had
classified briefings with both the FBI and the Coast Guard. And
there remain some answered questions.
While DistriGas has stopped using Algerian LNG because it
was able to get a better deal on gas shipped from Trinidad, it
turns out that numerous other Algerian flag ships entered the
country in the past 5 years. Earlier today, the Coast Guard
informed me that seven different Algerian vessels have called
34 times at 10 different U.S. ports.
We know from press reports that Abdelghani was arrested in
1999 and soon began cooperating with law enforcement
authorities and presumably told them that he had gotten into
the country on an Algerian LNG tanker. At what point were you
made aware that Algerian LNG tankers or other vessels might be
exploited by terrorists or non-terrorist stowaways trying to
enter the country?
Admiral Belz. Sir, you actually have better information
than I have for this hearing. And I would have to find the
specific date on that for the record.
In 1995, the Coast Guard first became aware of suspected
involvement in illicit non-terrorist activities (drug and alien
smuggling) aboard LNG tankers through Immigration Naturalization
Service (INS) and Customs (USCS) officials. Prior to September 11,
2001, appropriate steps were taken to ensure the safety and security of
LNG tankers during transit and operations into U.S. ports. This
included joint boardings with INS and USCS in response to law
enforcement information about drug and alien smuggling.
After September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard refocused its efforts on
potential terrorism vulnerabilities and immediate steps were taken to
expand the required notification of arrival to 96 hours, to centralize
notification and analysis of information, and to require submission of
crew and passenger information. LNG tankers were provided security
escort by Coast Guard vessels to enforce a safety zone around the
tanker during transit into and out of U. S. ports. Also, under a larger
security apparatus that was established, all LNG tankers were subjected
to increased pre-arrival vetting and security measures.
If derogatory information is discovered during the vetting process,
notifications are made to appropriate Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and interested law enforcement entities for appropriate action.
This effort has detected and provided advance warning about numerous
arriving crewmembers and other individuals identified in federal law
enforcement and immigration databases as criminal or security concerns.
In addition, several individuals wanted for questioning by federal
agencies about possible extremist associations have been identified in
advance notice of arrival and referred to the relevant agency for
investigation, but none have had direct links to terrorism.
Mr. Markey. What steps did you take to ensure that the
Algerian LNG tankers and other Algerian flag ships were
searched prior to docking to ensure that no other stowaways
were able to get into the U.S. using that route?
Admiral Belz. Sir, which timeframe are we speaking about,
sir?
Mr. Markey. After you were notified that Meskini or that
terrorists were using--or potential terrorists were using--that
as an avenue?
Admiral Belz. Sir, again, without the specific date in
front of me, as we have become aware of those specific events,
not just characteristic of those specific tankers, but the
targeting matrix that we have done since post-9/11 at the ITC
and the National Maritime Intelligence Center sets up a matrix
that includes a variety of things, specifically how many of
those have called on ports with regard to that. That matrix
alone, that would characterize it for a variety of different
tools in boarding.
And I would have to answer specifically with each case with
regard to that. It would be a standard protocol.
We work against a risk-driven matrix against that, but that
would be a heavy driver that would have suggested close
scrutiny and attention, not only by the Coast Guard, but with
our partners seated actually here at the table. As the Coast
Guard boards these vessels and gains control of them--because
in some cases, you do not know if the issue is stowaways and
moving people into the port or whether the issue becomes one of
taking that tanker and making it a weapon of mass destruction.
So we have a variety of mechanisms that we will put in
place with that. But I just do not happen to have the details
in front of me.
Mr. Markey. I understand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. The gentleman's time has expired. I have just a
couple of questions.
The past couple of weeks, we have spent a lot of time in
the subcommittee looking at the whole area of the ISAC--the
information sharing and analysis centers. It is really a model
for public-private partnership. And the maritime sector does
not have an ISAC.
My question is: would the development of an ISAC help
communication and coordination between the private sector and
the agency? And if so, which should be the lead federal agency
for the ISAC? And I would just like to get your thoughts on
that.
Admiral Belz. You want to start off?
Mr. Blank. We think ISACs are very valuable. We do not have
a real opinion as to who should be in the lead. But in this
sector, DHS acknowledges that Coast Guard is in the lead.
TSA's overriding concern is that the information that an
ISAC would produce be readily available to the surface ISAC
that we operate out of the Transportation Security Coordination
Center so that we have the opportunity to look at the
intermodal aspects of the analysis that that would produce. At
the current state of play with the Coast Guard in the lead for
the maritime sector, I would think that it is entirely possible
that the responsibility might go in that direction.
Mr. Camp. Do you think there is any confusion about who the
lead agency is in maritime, within DHS, for maritime and port
security?
Mr. Blank. I think that there is a full understanding
inside DHS that Coast Guard is in the lead for maritime and
port security.
Mr. Camp. I was thinking within the private sector.
Mr. Blank. I cannot really say. It is certainly possible
that there is. But you have to understand that, DHS being
barely a year old, consolidating 22 agencies, that there is a
lot of anxiety and concern as to how we get ourselves
organized, stand up, figure out our relationships.
But I do not think that any confusion out in the private
sector has had any detrimental effects up to this point. And it
is a priority for us to get those lines of communication open.
And certainly you are correct in suggesting that ISACs are a
good way to do that.
Mr. Camp. Anyone else wish to comment on that point?
Mr. Ahern. I think one of the things that is very important
is that we define the roles. I think it starts with a lot of
coordination at the department level. We have information
analysis infrastructure protection that begins the process for
us and as we now take it down to field levels.
I think as we look at what the roles of Coast Guard are in
Customs and Border Protection, there is a strong linkage,
certainly with Coast Guard getting the vessel information 96
hours out. That is run through their intelligence center.
There is then a sorting process where we link with them if
there is any concerns relative to the container traffic or the
crew on board that are manifested. We then run that through our
systems and collaborate with them and determine what joint
operations plans need to be made when these vessels come on
board--excuse me, come to ports of entry around this country.
I think it has come together in a very integrated fashion.
I think it is one that we need to continue to work on. But I
believe we are on the right track for having a well-integrated
intelligence fusion process.
Admiral Belz. Sir, I would like to just close with that. I
think it is evolving. I think there is wide recognition of the
role that each of us plays. And the Coast Guard has been
oftentimes, working through our department, providing some of
that very much detailed information, sharing information
through our routine contacts in the maritime industry.
So I think it has evolved nicely, particularly over the
heightened security period that we have exercised really since
the stand up of the department.
Mr. Camp. Before we break for these votes and conclude the
hearing, I have one last question. I do want to compliment you
and applaud the efforts on the recent events in Haiti and the
interagency coordination that went on there. I think that sort
of task force was a success.
And I wondered if that was a model that you were looking at
applying in other situations? And I think particularly the
integration of the various agencies that you discussed earlier,
if there is any comment on that particular point?
Admiral Belz. I will start off with a comment and I think
others may wish to contribute. But I think that particular
effort was well articulated in terms of division by the
Secretary. And I think in this particular case, with the kind
of issues we were facing, that I think his choice of how it was
organized and the competencies that we brought together and
given the environment and the kinds of things that we did, the
Coast Guard was in the lead of that, with strong support inside
CBP. The deputy for the Coast Guard director down there, task
force director, was in fact a border patrol officer, very well
integrated.
I think it is a good model. And I think the lead that
follows will be changing depending on the circumstances.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. And I would like to recognize Ms.
Jackson-Lee for her questioning.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
here because I think of the committees that are in this House,
this committee has one of the more important duties and
responsibilities.
I would almost compare it to the idea of the metaphor,
``While Rome burns, there are those who are playing music.''
And this is not condescending to suggest that America is not
concerned about homeland security. But by the very nature of
our community, the free democracy, most Americans are going
about their daily work while not having the full responsibility
of other things that you gentlemen have and that this Congress
and this particular committee has.
So I am sorry that I did not hear the fullness of your
testimony. I was in a meeting with the secretary of state. But
my questions still are pointed on the comprehensiveness of what
I believe your challenge is and where you are in completing it.
Coming from a community that houses one of the larger
ports--the Port of Houston--and also coming from the Gulf
Region, we are used to the vulnerabilities of water, if you
will. Even the Port of Houston, which is a civilian port, is I
believe vulnerable as to ingress and egress.
It is a man-made port that then leads into the Gulf. There
are many other waterways that you are familiar with, whether it
is New Orleans or whether it is the Pacific Coast, whether it
is the port in New York; there are enormous vulnerabilities.
I just heard my colleague speak about the Algerian tanker.
And as I have met with the international community, I have
called repeatedly, as a member of this committee, for what I
call an international homeland security strategy.
Because as I listened to some of your answers, I was
concerned that we may be operating in a vacuum. Even though you
have suggested a number of agreements--and I am talking to all
four of you?and I know that the Coast Guard certainly has its
international military relationships and I appreciate that.
But when we talk about 6,200--I believe these are either
6,200 vessels or 6,200 different ports--looking for
verification. What is the 6,200 number again?
Mr. Ahern. The 6,200 are participants in the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Right. And that is international.
Mr. Ahern. They are domestic companies as well as
international companies.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And 3,100, as I understand, with paperwork
and five percent that have been verified. In any event, it
gives you the dauntingness of the challenge. The USS Cole gives
us the dauntingness of the challenge.
So my question is--and I would like all of you to take a
brief moment to answer it--what is the focus of having an
international homeland security strategy on the issues you deal
with, particularly with other ports? You do not have to go into
the 6,200. I understand that. But let me leave that aside.
But particularly with the law enforcement aspects, the
knowledge of what is going on at other ports as they depart and
make departures into the United States, how comfortable are we
that we have our hands around the magnificence or the magnitude
of the problem?
Admiral why don't you start and then we will just go
quickly to the others?
Admiral Belz. Ma'am, I think you have exactly hit on the
kind of a strategy that all of us have embarked on in terms of
outreach with regard to the international to deal with this
issue. I think that the standards that the Coast
Guard has attempted to and has, in fact, successfully
implemented at IMO in trying to both lead by example and to
negotiate what are perceived to be reasonable approaches to
achieving the degree of security that we require on both
vessels and with regard to the crew and the assessments of the
foreign ports themselves, is actually a cooperative effort.
We have sought deliberately over the last 3 years to bring
forth the kinds of initiatives that are being understood in the
water community. And we have, in fact, been able to
successfully steer a development of an international ship code
that we will start to in fact enforce on our foreign carriers
coming into this port starting this upcoming month.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Ahern?
Mr. Ahern. I think certainly it does start internationally.
And we refer to a delayed approach. It does start overseas
internationally. And we are partnering with the Coast Guard,
with the international port security program.
I think it is also very important to note just on April 22,
Secretary Ridge signed an agreement with the European Union on
a rapid expansion of the container security initiative program
overseas to make sure that we do pick up the pace to get
additional countries within the EU as part of the container
security initiative program.
We have 18 operational ports. We want to get up to 35 by
the end of the year.
We also need to make sure that the foreign manufacturers
are doing their part to make sure that the supply chain is
secure and it has integrity. So it begins there as well.
Mr. Camp. I want to thank the gentleman for his testimony.
The gentlewoman's time is expired. And I want to thank the
witnesses for all of their testimony today.
And the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]