[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY (BTS) BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2005
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE
AND BORDER SECURITY
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 17, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-41
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., North Carolina
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Pete Sessions, Texas
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
______
Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security
Dave Camp, Michigan, Chairman
Kay Granger, Texas, Vice Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez, California
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Don Young, Alaska Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Duncan Hunter, California Barney Frank, Massachusetts
Lamar Smith, Texas Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Robert W. Goodlatte, Virginia York
Ernest Istook, Oklahoma Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
John Shadegg, Arizona Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Mark Souder, Indiana Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
John Sweeney, New York Jim Turner, Texas, Ex Officio
Christopher Cox, California, Ex
Officio
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security............................................ 1
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security............................. 3
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 25
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, Ranking Member, Select Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 5
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 25
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Massachusetts..................................... 30
The Honorable John Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arizona............................................... 23
The Honorable Lamar S. Smith, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 18
WITNESS
The Honorable Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary, Border and
Transportation Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Record
Questions Submitted by The Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart......... 37
Questions Submitted by The Honorable Mark Souder................. 38
Questions Submitted by The House Select Commitee on Homeland
Security, Majority Staff....................................... 42
Questions Submitted by The House Select Commitee on Homeland
Security, Minority Staff....................................... 56
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY (BTS) BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
Wednesday, March 17, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Infrastructure
And Border Security,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:37 a.m., in
Room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dave Camp
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Camp, Smith, Diaz-Balart,
Goodlatte, Shadegg, Cox (ex officio), Sanchez, Markey, Jackson-
Lee, and Turner (ex officio).
Also Present: Delegate Christensen.
Mr. Camp. The Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border
Security hearing will come to order. Today's business is to
receive testimony regarding the fiscal year 2005 budget request
for the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, BTS,
mission and its various programs. The subcommittee will hear
from Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security
from the Department of Homeland Security, the Honorable Asa
Hutchinson.
Secretary Hutchinson, thank you for testifying today about
your Directorate's fiscal year 2005 budget request. We
appreciate your time and the effort that went into preparing
your testimony. We look forward to the opportunity to ask you
some specific questions regarding the BTS budget and how
various programs and funding will impact the strategic
objectives of the Department.
At this time, the Chair would urge--to allow sufficient
time for testimony and questions will urge Members to give
short opening statements and to submit their full statements
for the record.
[The statement of Ms. Jackson-Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement for the Record of the Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee,
a Representative in Congress From the State of Texas
Thank you, Chairman Camp and Ranking Member Sanchez for your
diligence in holding today's hearing in order to allow this body to
assess the President's Fiscal Year 2005 Budget proposal for the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Border and Transportation
Security (BTS) Directorate. This hearing is very critical in light of
the March 11 bombing of a Madrid subway and the loss of over 200 lives.
In the wake of the events that have occurred in Madrid yesterday,
it is critical to note that, in our own spending for the Department of
Homeland Security, there has been no effort to increase funding or to
authorize new railroad security legislation. This means that a whole
mode of mass transportation represents a major source of threat
vulnerability-yet another reason for us to believe that we are not as
safe as we need to be, over two years after the tragic 9/11 incidents.
While it is true that because there are some 1.5 million trips per
day on commuter rails and passenger trains alone, it will be extremely
difficult to institute airline-like security measures, we are charged
with having the foresight to initiate rail security improvement
programs before an incident such as the Madrid bombings occurs. Our
critical infrastructure can no less withstand the impact of region-wide
blackouts than it could a series of explosions as occurred in that
situation. In Houston, the new MetroRail system counted 558,000 riders
in January, its first month. During the four-day Super Bowl weekend,
rail riders outnumbered bus riders, even after the city shut down
service during some nighttime hours because of safety concerns for
crowds. Without the installation of rail security equipment and the
hiring of DHS-rail security staff, this new light rail system will
represent a major source of vulnerability for Houston.
Therefore, the Fiscal Year 2005 Budget proposal needs to be
severely scrutinized for its shortfalls relative to rail security.
Several years ago, we debated the desirability of dividing the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into two bureaus,
an enforcement bureau and a benefits bureau. I expressed concern about
the possibility that the enforcement bureau would become the focus of
most of our resources to the detriment of the benefits bureau. We no
longer debate whether INS should be divided into different bureaus for
enforcement and benefits purposes. The establishment of the Department
of Homeland Security has made that separation a reality. On the
enforcement side, we have the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and,
on the benefits side, we have the Bureau of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigrant Services (USCIS).
I wish I could say that I was wrong, that my fears were unfounded,
but my fears were not unfounded. The enforcement bureaus are receiving
most of our resources to the detriment of the benefits bureau. The
fiscal year 2005 request for the two enforcement bureaus is $10,214
million, whereas the fiscal year 2005 request for the benefits bureau
is only $1,711 million. In other words, the Administration is proposing
to spend 6 times more on enforcement than on benefits. The real
disparity, however, can be seen more clearly in the increases that
these amounts represent. The Administration is requesting an increase
of $538 million for the enforcement bureaus but only is requesting a
$58 million increase for the benefits bureau. In other words, for every
additional dollar the Administration is requesting for the benefits
bureau, it is requesting 9 dollars for the enforcement bureaus.
I am not opposed to providing sufficient funding for the
enforcement bureaus. My concern is that the Administration is not
requesting adequate resources for the benefits operations. The Bureau
of U.S. Citizenship and Immigrant Services (USCIS) has not been able to
keep up with its work load. USCIS has a backlog of more than 6 million
benefits applications.
The Texas Service Center presently is working on visa petitions
that U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents filed for unmarried
sons and daughters on October 30, 1998. These applications sit for more
than 5 years before anyone begins to work on them. Such delays do not
just affect the people in other countries who are the subjects of the
petitions. The petitioners who file family-based and employment-based
visa petitions are lawful permanent residents and citizens of the
United States and American employers. In fact, when such a petition is
denied, the foreign person who is the subject of the petition does not
have standing to file an appeal. The right to the immigration benefit
lies with the American petitioner, not with the alien who is the
subject of the petition.
Despite this crisis, the Administration's proposed fiscal year 2005
budget for USCIS only allocates $140 million for backlog reduction.
Even with the addition of the $20 million USCIS expects to receive from
increased processing fees, this is not sufficient to eliminate the
backlog. The magnitude of the backlog problem can be seen in the fact
that during the 3-year period from fiscal year 2001 through 2003,
USCIS's reported operating costs exceeded available fees by almost $460
million. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2001, the number of pending
applications increased by more than 2.3 million (about 59 percent) to
6.2 million at the end of fiscal year 2003. This increase occurred
despite additional appropriations beginning in fiscal year 2002 of $80
million annually to address the backlog.
Meanwhile, $340 million is allocated for the US-VISIT program,
which may turn out to be a waste of resources that could have been used
elsewhere, such as for reducing the benefits applications backlog. The
stated objective for US-VISIT is to enhance the nation's security while
facilitating legitimate travel and trade through our borders. According
to a September 2003 report (GAO-03-1083) from the General Accounting
Office (GAO), US-VISIT is a very risky endeavor, the potential cost of
the program is enormous, and it may not be able to measurably and
appreciably achieve its goals.
I am not sure that US-VISIT will increase the security of our
borders even if it is fully and successfully implemented. US-VISIT only
screens foreign visitors seeking admission on the basis of nonimmigrant
visas, it does not screen nonimmigrant visitors from the 27 countries
participating in the Visa Waiver Program or anyone who presents a green
card, and it will be years before the system is fully operational at
all of the land borders.
I believe that we need to pay more attention to benefits operations
and that we much use our resources more wisely.
Thank you.
Mr. Camp. The hearing record will remain open for 10 days
after the close of the hearing. Members are advised they will
receive an additional 3 minutes during the questioning time if
they waive their opening statement.
I will at this point submit my statement for the record,
and ask the Ranking Member Congresswoman Sanchez if she has an
opening statement.
Ms. Sanchez. I actually do. And thank you, Mr.Chairman.
And the statement is actually quite long, but I am going to try
to skip to a couple places to get it on the record, and I will
submit the full thing.
Again, welcome, Secretary Hutchinson. As you and I were
speaking earlier, I think I mentioned to you that I think,
quite frankly, that you have the most difficult job of anybody
over at DHS, maybe in the entire administration, because there
is just so much to oversee in this entire area of Customs and
Border Protection and infrastructure, et cetera. So you
certainly have a lot of people under you, 110,000 people
stationed all over the country and around the world.
Your Directorate also has a broad mission, and even though
you have a request of $19.6 billion in the budget, I really
believe that it is not enough, it is really not enough to get
done what we hope that you can get done in this coming year. I
think you need more resources. I think that within the
different categories you might need to spread them over
differently, and I hope that is some of the dialogue that we
can have today.
One of the areas of particular mission that I would like
you to address either in questions or during your testimony is
the whole issue of the TSA, the Transportation and Security
Administration, funding, mostly because we see a lot, almost
all, of the budget being spent on the airports; and yet under
the jurisdiction of that, of course, is quite a few other areas
including rail security. And given what we see happen in Madrid
just in the last week, obviously that is a hot topic, and there
are questions about what are we doing as a Nation to protect
ourselves in mass transit and on rail systems. And I think you
only have about 2 percent of your total request going towards
some of that.
The other issue, of course, is also what are you doing in
the port system? And the last area of concern are the new
regulations or the discussion going on about just what type of
civil employment employees within your Directorate actually
have. And I will ask those questions. But I hope you will
address or give us some idea of the outline that you see with
respect to hire and fire and some of the nontraditional
grievance procedures that employees under your direction might
have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Does the Ranking Member Mr. Turner have an opening
statement?
Mr. Turner. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Hutchinson, welcome. Good to have you with us
once again. We are all very much aware that we are meeting here
less than a week after the devastating explosions in Madrid
that killed 200 and injured over 1,500 rail passengers, and our
thoughts are still and our hearts go out to those victims and
their families. It is again a reminder of how vulnerable we all
are no matter where we may live around this globe.
It appears from all information I have heard, and you, I am
sure, can verify this, that Al-Qa`ida was the culprit in this
brutal attack. And it also, I think, serves as an ominous
warning sign once again to us and this country that we must be
ready and prepared to deal with whatever may come next to our
people. You would have thought maybe that we wouldn't need a
reminder, obviously we are 2-1/2 years after September 11th of
2001, but it did strike me as somewhat disturbing when I looked
at the House Budget Committee's proposal that Chairman Nussle
is laying out that reduces the President's budget request for
homeland security by some $887 million over the next5 years.
Many of my colleagues, all of the Democrats on this committee,
wrote to Chairman Nussle yesterday urging him to reverse those
cuts, and, in fact, call for increases, in spending for
security for the American people.
Many of those areas where we urged additional funding
clearly fall under your umbrella, Mr. Secretary and your
Department, of course, has about 60 percent, I think, of all
the employees of the Department of Homeland Security.
It is clear we have made progress in the last year in
border and transportation security, and I commend you on your
efforts and your leadership, Mr. Secretary, but there are some
concerns that I want to raise with you and hope you will have
the opportunity to address them in your statement.
In light of the attacks in Madrid, I think it is important
for us to focus renewed emphasis upon rail security. As you
know, we have 140,000 miles of train routes in this country,
500 Amtrak stations, and 500 major urban transit operators. Ten
million trips are made on trains and subways every day in these
United States.
While the TSA requests 5.3 billion for next fiscal year in
your budget request, only 147 million, as I read it, or less
than 3 percent of the total, is dedicated to modes of
transportation other than airplanes. This striking disparity
indicates to me that we are not placing enough emphasis on
trail, trucking, buses, ferries, and other forms of
transportation that clearly represent vulnerabilities.
I recognize that the Department has a $50 million grant
program outside of TSA for rail and transit security, but
estimates of what is truly needed across the country range
upwards of $2 billion. That includes funding for items such as
sensors, communications equipment, security cameras, which I
understand you feel constitute the right approach to rail and
transit security. This area obviously has not been a core
concern of the Department nor of the Congress, and I think this
must change.
You mentioned during an interview this week that perhaps we
need to make greater investments in this area, and I certainly
agree. And I hope you will share your thoughts with us on what
additional efforts you believe the Department needs to make
beyond what may be in the President's budget to do a better job
of security transit systems.
Beyond rail security, I am concerned about other
transportation issues. The TSA budget for next year is an $892
million increase over the current level, and yet almost all of
this increase is devoted to airport screening operations.
Funding is flat, for example, for air cargo screening and
technology development, and there appears to be no new
initiatives in this critical area. Air cargo only undergoes, as
we all know, random searches which are often conducted by
shippers whose security practices are not regularly verified by
the Department. I think it is important for us to come to
grips, and perhaps if you could help us on this, give us some
date by which you feel we will be able to screen all of our
cargo that travels on passenger planes with us every day.
Another issue that gives me concern is the current pace of
installing these radiation portals at our Nation's major border
crossings. These portals are very valuable in helping to detect
weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Camp. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Turner. I will try to follow up, Mr. Secretary, on the
other items I have in my remarks as we get into your questions.
But thank you very much.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Are there any other requests for opening statements?
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Yes. I would recognize the Ranking Member for her
comment.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank you for
your recent pledge to work with me to schedule hearings that
address budget details from the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate component agencies, such as TSA and
Customs and Border Protection. And I ask for unanimous consent
to submit the letter from me to you with requests for that and
your response. And there are copies for the members here of the
committee to have, if they would like.
Mr. Camp. Without objection, those letters will be
submitted to the record.
[The information follows:]
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security,
Washington, DC, March 10, 2004
Hon. Dave Camp,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: As we approach the upcoming
authorization legislation for the Department of Homeland
Security, the Democratic members of our subcommittee are
concerned that the Select Committee has not yet heard from a
sufficient number of witnesses to properly guide our
authorization process.
In light of this fact and pursuant to Rule 4 of the
Committee Rules, we request that additional witnesses be added
to the hearing of the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border
Security tentatively scheduled for Wednesday, March 17 at which
Under Secretary Hutchinson is expected to testify. We
respectfully request that officials from the Transportation
Security Administration, United States Coast Guard, Office of
Domestic Preparedness, Bureau of Immigration and Customs
enforcement, and Bureau of Customs and Border Protection be
called to testify about the agencies' budget submissions. As
provided by Rule 4, these witnesses could either appear
following Under Secretary Hutchinson or on a separate ``day of
hearing.''
We realize this change could make for a long hearing, but
it is our strong feeling that we must hear from these witnesses
in order to get the information we need to make the proper
choices as we go forward with the authorization process.
Very truly yours,
Loretta Sanchez, Ranking Member.
Benjamin Cardin, Representative.
Norm Dicks, Representative.
Sheila Jackson-Lee, Representative.
Bill Pacrell, Representative.
Peter DeFazio, Representative.
Barney Frank, Representative.
Edward Markey, Representative.
Louise Slaughter, Representative.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security,
Washington, DC, March 10, 2004
Ms. Loretta,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border
Security, Washington, DC.
Dear Ms. Loretta: Thank you for contacting me with your
request to invite additional witnesses to the Border and
Transportation Security Budget hearing on March 17, 2004. As
you know, on February 13, 2004, we sent a joint invitation
letter requesting that Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson appear
before our Subcommittee on that date and did not request any
additional witnesses.
As the head of the BTS Directorate, Undersecretary
Hutchinson is accountable for the entire BTS budget request and
can be expected to answer questions on the range of issues
cited in your letter. Given the shortage of dates available to
hold hearings, it is in the best interest of the Committee to
move forward with our agenda and build budget and authorization
components into those hearings. Your request for testimony from
Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Transportation Security Administration, and the
U.S. Coast Guard is duly noted and I pledge to work with you on
upcoming hearings to make sure that these agencies are
represented.
I understand that there is concern that, due to the size of
the BTS Directorate and the number of different programs,
Members will not have sufficient time to address each issue. If
time permits, please be assured that I will extend the
questions for a second round during the hearing to give Members
additional time to question the witness. Additionally, I will
work with you to ensure that any outstanding issues are
addressed in upcoming hearings.
Again, thank you for your request. I appreciate your hard
work and dedication as a Member of the Subcommittee and I look
forward to working with you to move the agenda of the
Subcommittee forward as we conduct oversight of the Department.
Sincerely,
Dave Camp,
Chairman.
------
Mr. Camp. And seeing no additional requests for time, I
think we can proceed and welcome Under Secretary Hutchinson. We
have received your written testimony, and ask that you would
briefly summarize your statement in 5 minutes. Thank you for
being here. You may begin.
STATEMENT OF ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER SECRETARY, BORDER AND
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman
Sanchez, Ranking Member Turner, Congressman Smith. I am very
pleased to be with you today and the other members of the
committee.
I want to, first of all, express my appreciation to the
partnership that I believe that we have developed with this
committee and with the Department on the ongoing security needs
and assessments of where we are in Homeland Security. And we
could not get the job done without your support, confidence,
and counsel.
I do believe that we have accomplished a great deal in the
last year together in enhancing security in every arena, and
the President's 2005 budget that is the subject of this hearing
reflects the continued enhancements of security. It includes a
10 percent increase overall in the Directorate of Border and
Transportation Security.
And if you look back on some of the things that we have
accomplished that led to the 2005 budget, we have consolidated
our border security efforts under one face at the border where
Immigration, Customs, Agriculture are combined together into
one effective organization. We have expanded the Container
Security Initiative, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism Program, protecting the supply chain in our supply
routes of cargo coming into our country. We have enhanced
substantially, as we have acknowledged, aviation security with
increasing the effectiveness of the Federal air marshals,
increasing the baggage screening, checking the names of master
air crew lists, and additional measures in aviation security.
We have implemented new technologies from US-VISIT to the
SEVIS, which identifies and tracks foreign visitors and
students, made those programs effective. We have enhanced air
cargo inspections. We have increased the work on pursuing the
illegal hiring of undocumented workers, and we have complied
with the congressional requirements to develop visa security
programs, which also gives the greater capability of looking at
people who come into our country to make sure they do not pose
a security risk.
The 2005 budget builds upon these initiatives by increasing
the CSI initiative, Security Container Initiative, by $25
million, increasing the funding for the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism Program, increasing the amounts
for the National Targeting Center that will allow us to do more
effective risk assessments.
One of the topics that has been mentioned today is what we
are doing in rail and transit security, and as was mentioned,
we certainly have looked at what has happened, the tragedy in
Madrid. We obviously naturally look at what our vulnerabilities
are in our transit systems here in the United States.
And it is important to note that this is not the first time
we have looked at transit security. We are working very
aggressively in this arena in which we allowed $115 million in
grants since May of last year for enhancing security in the
transit arena. We have in combination with that issued $894
million in Urban Area Security Grants, some of which of that
money can be used for enhancing the security of our transit and
rail systems. In addition, the 2005 budget, of course, builds
upon that with a $1.45 billion amount being provided for the
Urban Area Security Grants.
But to give you a flavor for how we deal with this whenever
we see an incident like what happened in Madrid, we, first of
all, handle, from an operational standpoint, making sure that
we are in communication and provide information to the major
transit systems in the major cities. I personally talked with
chiefs of police, the transit operators and got an
understanding of what we are doing to enhance security, to make
sure that is done; increase law enforcement presence, expanding
the use of explosive detection equipment, public announcements,
awareness as to the danger and what they can do to alert us to
unattended packages. And many of them also instituted transit
riders.
We have through the TSA the Maritime and Land Security
Division, which is working with the rail security and the
transit authorities to enhance security through best practices,
through pilot projects, and we are going to continue to build
upon that. We look forward to working with you to see other
means in which we can make sure that our transit riders and our
passengers and the rail are secure, and that we continue our
efforts to secure the borders of the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Hutchinson.
[The statement of Mr. Hutchinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of The Honorable Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary for
Border and Transportation Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am honored and pleased to appear before the Committee to present
the President's fiscal year 2005 budget for the Border and
Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate. I want to thank you for your
strong support of BTS components, especially for the resources you
provided in fiscal year 2004, and look forward to working with you in
the coming months on our fiscal year 2005 budget.
The $16 billion BTS request represents a 10 percent increase in
resources over the comparable fiscal year 2004 budget, and reflects the
Department's strong and continued commitment to the security of our
homeland. The fiscal year 2005 budget is a $1.5 billion increase over
fiscal year 2004, and it includes funding for new and expanded programs
in border and port security, transportation security, immigration
enforcement, and training.
The Border and Transportation Security Directorate made great
strides during the first year of operations. Over 110,000 employees and
a budget of $14 billion were reassembled and brought under BTS. The
Directorate was quickly established and successfully began operations
on March 1, 2003--bringing together the legacy agencies and programs
that now make up BTS--Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), and the United
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)
program. Customs, border, immigration, transportation security and
training activities have been rejuvenated under their new agencies,
increasing the effectiveness of our dedicated employees. BTS continues
to create new ways to enhance security by sharing information and
intelligence and by coordinating operations within the Department among
levels of governments, and horizontally across agencies and
jurisdictions. Through the hard work of our dedicated and talented
employees, America is more secure and better prepared than we were one
year ago.
In addition to the stand-up of the Directorate, we have achieved
many results since our creation, including:
providing fused and enhanced security coordination
among our components and other federal, state and local
security providers and stakeholders, especially during
Operation Liberty Shield and the recent holiday season,
including the establishment of the Transportation Security
Coordination Center (TSCC) to coordinate intelligence sharing
and command and control activities for our national
transportation sector;
strengthening border security through the ``One face
at the border'' initiative, which is cross-training officers to
perform three formerly separate inspections--immigration,
customs, and agriculture--allowing us to target our resources
toward higher risk travelers;
expanding the container security initiative (CSI) and
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) to provide
improved security to the global supply chain;
instituting new cutting edge systems, like US-VISIT,
to identify and track foreign visitors and students, recording
the entry and exit of foreign visitors to strengthen our
immigration system;
safeguarding air travel from the terrorist threat by:
increasing the presence of Federal Air Marshals, establishing a
Federal Flight Desk Officer program, instituting 100 percent
checked baggage screening, issuing new regulations for enhanced
air cargo security, expanding the use of explosives detection
canine teams, checking names of master cockpit air crew lists,
and streamlining and training federal passenger and baggage
screeners deployed at airports across the Nation;
eliminating potential weaknesses in security by
suspending transits without visa (TWOV);
negotiating an agreement with the European Union with
respect to Passenger Name Record (PNR);
negotiating a memorandum of understanding with the
Department of State to ensure a coordinated and increasingly
effective visa issuance process; and
establishing a visa security office to provide
oversight and guidance on Section 428 of the Homeland Security
Act, including establishing two offices in Saudi Arabia to
review 100 percent of visa applications;
standing up a SEVIS tiger team to process foreign
students during the summer 2003 back-to-school season; and
effecting improvements in security capabilities,
capacity, training, and infrastructure.
Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request
The Fiscal Year 2005 budget for the Directorate builds upon the
significant investments and accomplishments effected and in progress.
Strengthening Border and Port Security
Securing our border and transportation systems continues to be an
enormous challenge. Ports-of-entry (POE) into the United States stretch
across 7,500 miles of land border between the United States and Mexico
and Canada, 95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable rivers, and an
exclusive economic zone of 3.4 million square miles. Each year more
than 500 million people, 130 million motor vehicles, 2.5 million
railcars, and 5.7 million cargo containers must be processed at the
border and POE.
In fiscal year 2003, CBP processed 412.8 million passengers and
pedestrians arriving in the U.S.--327 million at land borders, 70.8
million at international airports, and 15 million at sea ports. The
fiscal year 2005 CBP budget seeks $2.7 billion for border security
inspections and trade facilitation at ports of entry and $1.8 billion
for border security and control between ports of entry.
During fiscal year 2005, we will continue to strengthen our border
and port security. The CBP budget seeks an overall increase of $223
million to maintain and enhance border and port security activities,
including the expansion of pre-screening cargo containers in high-risk
areas and the detection of individuals attempting to illegally enter
the United States illegally.
Specifically, the budget includes an increase of $25 million for
the Container Security Initiative (CSI) which focuses on pre-screening
cargo before it reaches our shores, and an increase of $15.2 million
for Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). C-TPAT
focuses on partnerships all along the entire supply chain, from the
factory floor, to foreign vendors, to land borders and seaports. As of
late January 2004, nearly 3,000 importers, 600 carriers, and 1,000
brokers and freight forwarders are participating in C-TPAT, surpassing
the Department's original goal of participation of the top 1,000
importers.
As well as continuing development for secure trade programs, the
budget also seeks an increase of $20.6 million to support improvements
for the National Targeting Center and for multiple targeting systems
that focus on people, cargo and conveyances. These systems use
information from diverse sources to provide automated risk assessments
for arriving international air passengers, shipments of goods to our
country, and land border passenger traffic.
The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US-VISIT) program's goals are to enhance the security of our citizens
and our visitors; facilitate legitimate travel and trade across our
borders; ensure the integrity of our immigration system; and respect
the privacy of our welcomed visitors. US-VISIT represents a major
milestone in our efforts to reform our borders. We deployed the first
increment of US-VISIT on time, on budget, and met the mandates
established by Congress, including biometric capabilities ahead of
schedule. The budget seeks a total of $340 million in fiscal year 2005,
an increase of $12 million over the fiscal year 2004 level for the
program. As of late February, over 1.5 million foreign nationals had
been processed for entry, generating 125 watch list alerts, and
resulting in 51 criminals apprehended. The 2005 funding will further
strengthen border security, and enable modernization of border
management systems and capabilities. Specifically, funding will be used
to expand the entry system to 115 land POEs, beyond the busiest 50 that
will be covered by the US-VISIT program in fiscal year 2004. Funding
will also be used to expand implementation of an exit solution at our
air and seaports. Alternatives are being developed and tested, and will
be implemented at 80 airports and 14 seaports in fiscal year 2004.
Within the BTS component budgets, over $100 million is included for
detection systems, a critical element in the war on terrorism. The CBP
budget seeks an increase of $64.2 million to enhance land-based
detection and monitoring of movement between ports, and $10 million to
deploy and operate unmanned aerial vehicles. In order to protect the
homeland against radiological threats, the CBP budget seeks $50 million
for radiation detection monitors and equipment. The ICE budget request
includes an increase of $28 million to increase the flight hours of P-3
aircraft by 200 percent. In addition to providing vital detection and
monitoring capabilities in the source and transit zones containing
mountainous terrain, thick jungles and large expanses of water, the P-3
provides an important capability for domestic airspace security
missions.
Improving Aviation Security
We have made great strides in rebuilding and reinvigorating of our
aviation transportation security system. We have made significant
investments in baggage screening technology--over $2 billion to
purchase and install Explosives Detection Systems machines (EDS) and
Explosives Trace Detection machines (ETD) to the nation's airports--and
established a robust technology research and development program. We
have deployed 45,000 federal passenger and baggage screeners at the
Nation's airports, expanded the National Explosives Detection Canine
Team program, and trained pilots to be Federal Flight Deck Officers.
The fiscal year 2005 TSA budget seeks an increase of $892 million
to enhance transportation security, a 20 percent increase over the
comparable fiscal year 2004 level. Specifically, to strengthen
interwoven, concentric layers of transportation security, the budget
requests increases of $20 million for credentialing systems (i.e.,
Transportation Worker Identification Credential, Hazardous Materials
transporters, and foreign student pilots); $25 million for operating
the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening II System; and $113
million to and improve screener performance through training and the
deployment of information technology. A substantially improved air
cargo security and screening program was implemented last year, and the
$85 million request sustains funding to continue program enhancements
and associated air cargo screening technology research and development.
We are providing another $400 million for EDS equipment to improve
airport operational efficiency.
Enhancing Immigration Security and Enforcement
The ICE budget request of $4 billion, which is an increase of $300
million over the fiscal year 2004 level, seeks to strengthen
immigration security and enforcement. Comprehensive immigration
security and enforcement extends beyond efforts at and between the
ports-of-entry into the United States. It extends overseas, to keep
unwelcome persons from arriving in our country, and removing persons
now illegally residing in the United States. Pursuant to section 428 of
the Homeland Security Act, and the Memorandum of Understanding between
the Departments of Homeland Security and State, the ICE fiscal year
2005 budget request of $14 million includes an increase of $10 million
to support a new visa security unit (VSU). The BTS personnel stationed
at overseas posts, including Saudi Arabia, will continue to work
cooperatively with U.S. Consular Officials to enhance security and the
integrity of the visa process.
As announced on January 7, 2004, the Administration is committed to
enhanced immigration integrity and border security. My Directorate will
be working to implement a program that meets those goals, while
benefiting the economy. Current ICE immigration enforcement programs
and the enhancements in the fiscal year 2005 ICE budget request support
and are consistent with a number of elements in this initiative,
particularly worksite enforcement. Specifically, the fiscal year 2005
request includes an increase of $23 million to more than double the
number of investigations currently performed by ICE--providing an
additional 200 investigators. With these resources, ICE will be able to
facilitate the implementation of the President's temporary worker
program initiative by establishing a traditional worksite enforcement
program that offers credible deterrence to the hiring of unauthorized
workers.
The request also includes nearly a $100 million increase for the
detention and removal of illegal aliens. Detention and Removal of
illegal aliens present in the United States is critical to the
enforcement of our immigration laws, and the requested funding will
expand ongoing fugitive apprehension efforts, the removal from the
United States of jailed illegal aliens, and additional detention and
removal capacity.
As part of our overall immigration enforcement strategy, ICE will
continue to analyze data generated through the Student and Exchange
Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and US-VISIT program to detect
individuals who are in violation of the Nation's immigration laws and
pose a threat to homeland security. The fiscal year 2005 budget
requests $16 million to support these compliance efforts.
Immigration fraud poses a severe threat to national security and
public safety because it enables terrorists, criminals, and illegal
aliens to gain entry and remain in the United States. An aggressive,
focused, and comprehensive investigations and prosecutions program will
detect, combat and deter immigration fraud. The $25 million included in
the fiscal year 2005 budget will provide stable funding to the benefits
fraud program by replacing funding previously provided through the
Immigration Examinations Fee Account.
Building Departmental Infrastructure
The fiscal year 2005 request includes an increase of $5 million for
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to support our security
program enhancements and capability sustainment. The FLETC not only
serves federal client groups, but also provides training to state and
local law enforcement providers. In addition, to enhance global law
enforcement efforts, FLETC develops and offers a curriculum that
includes international applications.
Conclusion:
Our homeland is safer and more secure than it was a year ago,
thanks in part to the dedicated and talented team we have in BTS which
excels at coordinating and effecting cross-component activities.
Through their efforts, and with the support of our partners in
government and the public and private sectors, we will continue to
substantially improve our nation's security. I thank the Congress for
its support, which has been critical to bringing us to this point. With
your continued support for our fiscal year 2005 budget, we will
continue to improve the security of our nation.
I am grateful to be here today to outline our efforts for a safer
and more secure America. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you
today, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Camp. It is clear that this budget makes significant
progress in smart security initiatives and programs. And I
think implementing prescreening programs such as Nexus, FAST,
and C-TPAT, which really help commercial truckers, travelers
who cross the border frequently and with some regularity--I
think that helps us move these low-risk cargo and travelers
through ports of entry and allowing the resources to be applied
to high-risk and sort of unknown.
My question to you is can you just expand a little bit on
these preclearance programs and what might be happening in
terms of facilitating legitimate trade and travel in terms of
your Department?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the President's 2005 budget builds
upon these initiatives that gives us more information in
advance of when the cargo leaves the foreign ports. We have
obviously implemented the 24-hour rule, which requires
information of those cargo shipments before they leave the
foreign ports.
The budget provides for $25 million to enhance the National
Targeting Center, and this is money that will allow us to more
effectively take the information that we get, analyze it, and
target those at-risk shipments that should have physical
inspections. We first, of course, invest in nonintrusive
inspection equipment, and if that points out some anomalies, we
take it a step further with a physical inspection. And it was
actually a $20 million increase for the National Targeting
Center. It is a $25 million increase for the Container Security
Initiative. We have continued to expand from the megaports to
the second tier of ports where we can deploy our personnel to
help screen with our foreign counterparts those shipments that
might pose a risk to us.
A big part of it is the partnership with industry, where we
have 5,000 partners that have signed up to enhance their own
security in the supply chain, and we are going to build upon
that.
Mr. Camp. Are you looking at ways to have greater
participation in these programs, such as additional enrollment
centers or facilities, expanding dedicated lanes, adding
programs at other points of entry? And I think particularly in
the container initiative, I know that there has been a great
effort in adding as many ports as possible. If you could talk a
little bit about the progress that you have made there, I think
that would be interesting to the committee.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, we are working to expand the
dedicated lanes for our FAST, which is Free And Secure Trade
lanes, for those commercial trucks that have their drivers and
their companies with background checks, with added security
measures, where they could move through those dedicated lanes
more rapidly. And we are expanding those lanes, Nexus on the
northern border, and we are expanding that technology on the
southern border as well. We will be continuing that rollout
where you have infrastructure investment and the expansion of
those lanes.
In terms of the enrollment centers that you mentioned, we
are trying to make those accessible to those that want to
utilize this and make them efficient with our Canadian
counterparts for the processing of those. I would be happy to
get the specific number that we will be expanding to this
coming year, but we are working very diligently to expand the
number of those dedicated lanes.
Mr. Camp. I think we are all very interested in the
integration and coordination of the various marine functions
that are in the Department of Homeland Security. Do you have
some insight in how you are evaluating, developing the best
strategy to maximize these resources? And does that include the
acquisition of equipment, aircraft, detention machines, boats
and that sort of thing?
Mr. Hutchinson. That is very important. And in reference to
our air assets, we have a Joint Procurement Committee in which
the Coast Guard, the Customs, Border Patrol, or ICE look at
acquiring additional air assets. They are to coordinate through
that Joint Procurement Committee to make sure we are not
duplicating. And if there is some ability to achieve greater
leverage by bringing those procurement bidding process
together, we will do that.
But in addition, operationally, I just came back from the
Arizona border, Congressman Shadegg's territory down there, and
we rolled out our Arizona Border Patrol Initiative. One of the
very important parts of it is having an integrator there that
will integrate the coordination of the various assets that are
used in patrolling the border. So we are doing operationally as
well as from a procurement standpoint.
Mr. Camp. There has been a great deal of discussion
regarding the Homeland Security Department's plans to develop a
regional structure for Customs and commerce issues. And I
understand there has been an announcement of 7 to 10 regional
directors positioned around the country to be points of contact
in the event of an emergency. Is this a priority in the 2005
budget, the regional structure? And how would those regional
centers differ from Customs management centers that are
currently in place?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the Customs management centers, of
course, are solely focused on the organizations of Customs and
Border Protection. And, of course, the regional concept would
be DHS, which would include all 22 agencies that would be a
part of DHS, and would give a regional director, through acting
on behalf of the Secretary, the capability to coordinate the
operations of those various Homeland Security agencies,
particularly in the event that there was an incident or a
crisis to manage. But it would also help to facilitate
communication with our State and local counterparts, carrying
out exercises and training programs more efficiently.
That program of regions was mentioned in the President's
2004 budget. We continue to support that. We are working very
diligently to make sure we have the right strategy and waiting
to move forward with this before it is actually announced to
the public and implemented. But we are getting much closer to
getting a working model of that regional concept.
Mr. Camp. I think the concern is that all Federal policies
and laws be enforced uniformly in that kind of a system. Do you
have any management controls or policies in place to help
ensure that?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the first goal would be to make sure
that there is the national policy that is implemented, so you
don't want to wind up having, you know, regional directors
determining various regional policies in terms of implementing
our national strategy.
So it will be a national strategy that will have
operational flexibility. And I think that might be what you are
getting at, that they will have the flexibility to design
operations consistent with what is needed in that particular
region. And I think that is what has been somewhat missing in
the past. So national policies, but regional flexibility in
operations.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
The gentlewoman from California, the Ranking Member, may
inquire.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And again, thank you, Asa, for being before us.
The first question I have for you has to do with the
Transportation Security Administration, which has a mission of
securing all modes of transportation, and the recent GAO report
that talked about the lack of clarity or relationship between
the transfer of all of this happening between TSA and
Department of Transportation. In fact, quoting them, they said:
The roles and the responsibilities of TSA and DOD and
Transportation Security have yet to be clearly delineated,
which creates a potential for duplicating or conflicting
efforts as both entities move forward with their security
efforts.
And it also said: DOT and TSA have not yet formally defined
their roles and responsibilities in securing all the modes of
transportation.
And in talking to staffs, we sort of get this, well, that
is not ours, that is theirs. Everybody is pointing, but--a lot
of it, but we are not getting answers about who is doing what.
And I think it is reflective of the fact that we spend $92
million a week, I think--is that true--a week on airport
screening under TSA, but you only spent $115 million in all
grants for public transit in the past year.
So I would like you to give me your idea of where you are
in defining the roles of what you are going to take care of and
what DOT is going to take care of, or not, if they are not
really the ones that are supposed to do that, and a breakdown
of the spending and the priorities for securing the different
modes of transportation. What is the plan that you have in
mind? How far along are you with that plan? What are the
negotiations you have with DOT? What can we anticipate; again,
going back to this whole issue that Americans are asking, what
are you doing about rail? And, you know, everybody reacts to
the latest thing that happens. First it was the airports, then
it was the rails. Who knows what it will be next. So we have to
have a plan. And who is in charge is basically what I am
asking.
Mr. Hutchinson. We have a very good working relationship
with the Department of Transportation. And certainly you could
look at it that there is some areas of jurisdiction that you
could say is covered by both. But I think the line of authority
is very clear that the Homeland Security focuses on the
security of our transportation system and is ultimately
responsible.
We work in conjunction in carrying out that mission with
the capabilities of the Department of Transportation, and they
in turn have the lead in the safety area, which is somewhat to
be distinguished from the security aspect. But they are clearly
complementary of each other, so there is that close working
relationship. But as we have the responsibility for the
security of our transportation system, we utilize the
capabilities and the strengths of the Department of
Transportation.
Now, in reference to what our strategy is and the other
modes of transportation, you are absolutely correct that there
is much more invested in aviation security, substantially
because Congress clearly defined exactly what we do in aviation
security, and it was a comprehensive solution with 100 percent
inspection of passengers and bags.
Ms. Sanchez. Asa, I don't anticipate we are going to do 100
percent inspection of anything really on our mass transit. We
have just, you know, millions of riders every single day who
use this. But I think America wants to know, we want to know,
you know, what kind of priority do you have? When I looked at
the $115 million that are given in grants, they are pretty
open, and they are pretty wide in interpretation on what you
can spend them on. So is there a grand plan?
Are we just leaving it up to each transit system?
And when we talk to the transit system, they are telling
us, you know, we need tons more money for keeping this system
safe, and it is really a funding problem. And, you know, I used
to work in Transportation. I don't know what the fare box
recovery rate is these days, but it is probably 40 cents or
less on the dollar. So they really are strapped for money.
So what is the grand plan? I mean, are you working with
them on this? Are you working with Transportation? How do we
know where to put the funds and what we need?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, we are absolutely working with them.
And the grant money, I believe, has been effectively used and
targeted with the transit authorities. It is very important
that they help develop the solutions that is unique to their
security requirements. The security requirements for the
transit system in New York City might be different than the
security requirements that are needed in Los Angeles or
Chicago. And so there has to be some flexibility there.
What we are doing is very substantial through the
investment in biosensors, through the development of new
security measures that minimize the risk and the damage that
could come out, insisting upon assessments that are being made
that are actively being conducted, and making security
judgments and applications based upon those assessments.
The TSA has a substantial investment in making sure that
there is training. We have had exercises that brought together
these authorities to look at our appropriate responses. But
there is a different solution than what is in the aviation
arena. As you pointed out, we have a very open system, and I
don't think that the American public would expect to have that
same solution of 100 percent screening. So we are looking at
better ways of doing it, whether it is based upon intelligence
applying a specific solution, maybe it is a screening response.
The law enforcement presence is critical, and the explosive
detection capability that we are building in these transit
systems is an important response as well.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one real quick, quick
question here, please?
Mr. Camp. The gentlewoman's time has expired, but I will
let her ask one more question.
Ms. Sanchez. Any response to the fact that TSA's budget
only puts 2 percent towards rail?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think it reflects the distinction in
solutions, and that is an appropriate investment. As we
continue to development this, it might need to grow, but at the
present time, when you are looking at not doing 100 percent
screening, but partnering with the local governments and
transit authorities, that is the right approach. And that
amount does not include the hundreds of millions of dollars
that have been invested in grants through the Office of
Domestic Preparedness.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me.
Mr. Camp. The gentleman from Texas Mr. Smith is recognized
for 8 minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hutchinson, I would like ask my first question on
behalf of a Texas colleague, Pete Sessions, who is not a member
of this committee, but who has very much of an interest in your
answer. And the question is this: TSA apparently is refusing to
help Dallas-Fort Worth Airport pay for explosive detection
equipment on a 90-to-10 ratio as they are required to do by
law. Apparently TSA is agreeing to pay on a 75/25 percent
reimbursement ratio, but is not providing the 90 percent of the
cost of that type of equipment. Why is that?
Mr. Hutchinson. The original congressional mandate was 75/
25, and that is the basis on which our agreements were entered
into and the plans were made. I believe it was the FAA
reauthorization bill changed that formula to 90/10. Obviously,
that is problematic because we have moved forward on a 75/25
basis, and you are going to--we are not going to be able to
cover as many airports with the on-line solution. And so we
want to cover the maximum number of airports.
So, obviously we will follow the law, but we are asking
that Congress look at taking that back to a 75/25 ratio.
Mr. Smith. I can understand the rationale, but if Congress
does not change the law, then you would expect to reimburse at
the stated 90/10 ratio.
Mr. Hutchinson. We would fully comply with the law,
whatever the law would require.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And I would also like to ask you, and this is a tough
question, and I am not sure that there is an easy answer, but
is it possible, with the current funding levels, for you all to
accomplish two goals? The first goal is to keep delays at the
border of border crossers and the adverse economic impact that
might accrue to a minimum at the same time you are protecting
our homeland.
Now, those are sometimes conflicted goals, and obviously
the top priority is to protect the homeland. But is your
proposed funding sufficient to accomplish those two goals?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes. The funding that we have at present
and with the request in the 2005 budget allows us to balance
those two objectives, using technology, new systems, to move
commerce and add to security primarily through the US-VISIT
program, that, as you are very familiar with on the southern
border, we are having to comply with the requirement for the 50
busiest land ports. And we are making appropriate adjustments
from the airport solution to the land borders so we don't clog
the borders, but we can add a measure of increased security.
Now, we are also, through the FAST lanes, the sentry lanes,
where you have the dedicated travelers with security background
checks, with a laser card that can move through more rapidly,
we are expanding the number of those dedicated lanes.
Obviously, that is measured out as to how fast we go. I think
we are at the right pace.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Secretary, to follow up on that point I just
made, Homeland Security and protecting our homeland, I
understand that the Department of Homeland Security is
considering exempting the holders of border crossing cards from
the US-VISIT program. I could understand that if we had readers
available at the border to check the identity of those using
the border crossing cards. At this point we do not. Apparently
they are used secondarily in certain instances. But how could
we be considering exempting all those individuals from a
security check if those readers are not in place?
And let me add to that that I heard recently that there was
a pilot program set up that did check the identities of those
with the border crossing cards. And in this small pilot
program, there were 350 individual whose IDs were not valid. So
when you have that kind of a security gap, that kind of a
security loophole, how can we afford to give a pass to
individuals and not check their identities?
Mr. Hutchinson. You are correct. We absolutely have to have
the readers deployed. I would say that the border crossing
cardholders are subjected to a security check. They have their
biometrics taken; they are run through our terrorist data
bases; they have background checks, and they are issued the
card. But it is also important to read those cards when they
come through to verify identity. The readers I have given
direction to be deployed. It is not just the reader, but it is
the system that backs that up, and those should be in place by
the end of June.
Mr. Smith. So you are saying, if I understand you
correctly, that the border crossing cardholders will not be
exempt from the US-VISIT program until there are readers
available to check each one of those individuals?
Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct. Now, I mean, timingwise of
course we are making decisions really for the end of the year.
And so any exemption for the border crossing cardholders from
US-VISIT will be an end-of-the-year solution. And before then
we will have the readers all in place.
Mr. Smith. And the readers will not be used secondarily?
They will be used for every individual coming through?
Mr. Hutchinson. No. The readers will be deployed in
secondary inspection. So if an inspector has a question about
the identity of a border crossing card, it will be referred to
secondary inspection.
Mr. Smith. That still, in my mind, leaves a security gap
when you are not checking each individual with a reader, as we
saw from the pilot program. And I am just afraid that that is
an invitation to some individuals to use a false ID to get into
the country very easily.
Mr. Hutchinson. You are certainly correct that the most
ideal system would be to have those readers at every primary
inspection point. It would just be really impossible to have
the flow of people that is necessary at the ports of entry and
to do it in a fast enough fashion under the present development
of that technology.
Mr. Smith. It seems to me that--and this may be a budget
question. It seems to me that if you had the funds for a
sufficient number of readers, you would not delay entry, but
you would increase security. So is it a budget problem that
we--is that the reason that we don't have enough readers?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I am not sure we have enough readers
for every lane at primary inspection. So it might partly be
budget, but the primary issue, whether you are talking about
US-VISIT or whether you are talking about the border crossing
card readers, that means every person who comes through, you
take their biometric. And if you added, you know, 60 seconds
for everyone to take that and have it entered and read, it
would just really exacerbate the lines.
Mr. Smith. What percentage of the individuals coming across
using the border crossing cards would you expect to check on
that secondary level with the readers?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think that it would be significant, and
it would be sufficient, because the inspectors have got the
best judgment. Well, first of all, you have got a photograph
that you can compare to compare identity. If there is any
question, they go into secondary. And second, I am sure you
take a random sample and some verifications so that there would
be a huge security value when those readers are in place.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas. The
gentlewoman may inquire for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the distinguished chairman.
And to the Secretary, thank you very much for your presence
here. And let me acknowledge my colleagues and particularly the
presence of Congresswoman Donna Christensen.
If I might, Mr. Secretary, just to offer a few remarks
preceding my series of questions. I have filed most recently
H.R. 3918, which is the Comprehensive Immigration Fairness Act
of 2004. The focus is, I think, to deal head on with one of the
singular issues that we are debating, and that is the question
of the documentation or the existence of the illegal aliens in
the United States. I think the administration and Congress will
agree that the number varies from 8 million to 14 million. It
may be just a little bit more.
I am concerned as we begin this debate that we don't look
very carefully at the President's good intentions, but maybe
the down side of what he has now created, and that is a
guesswork program, proposal, or announcement with no teeth or
no actual, if you will, process engaged.
And I raise this point because you indicated you have just
come back from Arizona--most of us have focused our attention
on the Arizona border, the California border, and the Texas
border--with what I understand is a sizeable increase of
individuals coming across the border who are now suggesting
they are coming because of amnesty. There are two things that
happen there. One, its jeopardizes their safety and their
quality of life as well as those who are on the border. Two, it
misrepresents what many of us have for many years advocated,
and that is earned access to legalization which allows hard-
working, tax-paying individuals in this country to access
legalization through a process. Mine in particular, 5 years of
presence here, taxpaying, a job, no criminal record, et cetera.
That is a defined steady process for access to legalization.
Now we have representation that there is something called
amnesty or guest worker program, and look what you have.
My question to you is what--in addition to this border--
expanded border program that you are having, are there
resources in fiscal year 2005 that you are directing towards
this enhanced effort? Is this a temporary effort?
And, two, on the policy question, will you engage with us
on the fact that a represented amnesty program does nothing but
undermine those who are already in line and also those who are
here trying to access legalization and for a variety of reasons
have not been able to do so?
Let me throw two other questions out to you. The other
again is again on the US-VISIT program. I visited that with
Chairman Cox and others at Miami International, and, of course,
I studied my Houston Intercontinental Airport in terms of its
process and how it works. Certainly the staff that are there
are very diligent. My question, of course, is that the US-VISIT
program, about 360 million will go through land ports of entry.
The question is that is five times more that goes through
airports and seaports, and whether or not we have the resources
to collect the data and then enforce it on the basis of that
kind of travel.
And the other point--and the last point tracks
Congresswoman Sanchez's question. Certainly in the backdrop of
the terrible disaster of Spain, my question is how we will
design both policy and resources to look closely at some
process, some method that answers the question of railway
security, does not--I don't believe that we have the capacity
to encompass every aspect of railway security, particularly
both commercial and passenger. But my question to you is are we
beginning to study this question because we have a real and
serious problem? And I thank you for your presence here.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Congresswoman. And, first of
all, I would emphasize that the President's temporary worker
program principles that were outlined is not an amnesty
proposal. The President has made that absolutely clear. And
from an old rule of law guy, I believe that it offers a new
approach that is different than the immigration reform
proposals in the past, and it would certainly increase the
security of our borders and our Nation.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And I think, as you know, it is being
represented as an amnesty program because it is not geared
towards earning access to citizenship.
Mr. Hutchinson. In reference to the apprehensions, I see
across the border that they are declining, and there hasn't
been any uptick as a result of any announcements. The only area
that it has increased, and certainly a concern, is in the
Arizona border arena where 40 percent of the illegal crossings
occur in our Nation. And I think, though, that that is a
reason, of course, for the Arizona Border Patrol Initiative.
You asked about the resources. Those are built into the
base, except for the technology that we are piloting there
including the unmanned aerial vehicles. And there is a request
in the 2005 budget to continue the exploring and piloting of
UAV projects. And so that is an important part of the
President's request.
When it comes to rail security, we have done a great deal
in that arena, and I think that is important for the American
people to understand is that we didn't get a wakeup call last
week; we were fully aware of what needs to be done in rail
security; we have invested in that. It is a different system.
We are going to continue to work in that. Intelligence is a
very important part of it. The better our intelligence is, the
more we can target our resources and our protective measures,
and that really is critical when you are looking at a system
that has been historically wide open. But we are doing much,
and we will do more.
Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The gentleman from Arizona may inquire for 5 minutes.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Under Secretary, good to see you again. We enjoyed the
same flight out from Arizona yesterday, and I want to thank you
for coming to Arizona. I want to applaud you for the Arizona
Border Control Initiative. I think it is a step in the right
direction, and at least I would like to believe it is in
response to our trying to point out to you the serious problem
we have on the Arizona border. As you just noted, 40 percent of
all of the traffic so far as the statistics show right now are
coming across the Arizona border, and I appreciate your putting
resources behind that initiative.
I also want to thank you for Operation ICE Storm. I don't
know if you have noticed the daily press in Arizona, but
literally that has had a tremendous impact in terms of
disclosing safe houses where coyotes are stashing human cargo
and making neighborhoods unsafe and flaunting our law. And I
appreciate that.
I have a series of questions which I would like to get
through before having to go vote. First, when originally
announced, Operation ICE Storm was a temporary program that was
to last, I think, until the end of this fiscal year. I know
that a portion of the positions in Operation ICE Storm have now
been made permanent; something close to a third of those
positions have been made permanent. Do you know what the plan
is for Operation ICE Storm as we go forward? Has a decision
been made that it will end at the end of 2004, or is it still
an open question?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, first of all, ICE Storm has been
enormously successful, and for that reason we have continued
the programs and folded it in as part of our ABC Initiative.
The whole initiative will be evaluated October 1, and at that
point we will see what adjustments should be made and what
should be continued on a permanent basis. And I want to
acknowledge that this whole initiative came about as a result
of congressional education, including your own, invitations to
the border, showing us what is needed there. So it certainly is
in response to your efforts.
Mr. Shadegg. Well, and the Secretary himself was down
there, spent a day on the border with Senator McCain and
Congressmen Colby and Flake and myself, and I would like to
believe that was helpful as well.
I believe you just answered this question, but I want to
nail it down for sure. You have the funding for the ABC
Initiative in your 2005 budget and adequate for you to proceed?
Mr. Hutchinson. The answer is yes. But it is a very
significant investment from a Department standpoint, and it
certainly puts a strain because of that investment. We find the
money to make it work because we have the challenge that is
there, but it is supported in the 2005 budget in every respect.
Mr. Shadegg. I am going to put these next two questions to
you jointly and let you kind of pick amongst them.
Well, first let me tell you, I understand that the Hermes
450 UAV has been selected for the program. I would like to sit
down with you at some point in the near future and discuss that
particular selection. I did go look at the Predator in
operation and tried to make a separate visit to see a second
UAV that was available. I am extremely pleased that you are
going to put UAVs on the border, but I would like to be
educated on why the Hermes was picked over its competitors.
Two questions. One, a lot of people say America isn't safer
today. Some would likely contend that. I would like to hear
your comments on why you believe that, kind of the highlights;
if you were convincing somebody America is safer, what you
would point to as kind of the top, ``Here are the most
important things we have done to make America safer in the last
year.''
And, second, with specific reference to biometrics, do you
not believe that at some point in time there is going to be a
need to, in fact, make biometrics a part of the entry process
for every visitor?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, I think biometrics is our future for
border entry, but also for our foreign counterparts. I think
there has been a huge wakeup call even in Madrid as to border
security. And not just the United States is moving to
biometrics, but internationally we are trying to move together.
We are moving much more rapidly and setting the pace.
But going back to Congressman Smith's questions, we are
limited now, but as technology develops, we will be able to do
more, and we will probably be able to do it eventually at the
primary points. But we are not there yet.
Mr. Shadegg. And the ``not there yet,'' I guess from your
answer, is it takes too much time.
Mr. Hutchinson. Time, absolutely. Time and the technology
has not developed sufficiently enough, but there are ways that
we can do more. Technology is continuing to develop in this
way. So that is our objective, and we are balancing commerce
and security, but every step of the way we are enhancing
security.
You asked--and thank you for the question--as to why
America is safer. First of all, first the United States VISIT,
US-VISIT, that allows us to have the biometric capability of
confirmation that has allowed us to prevent over 100 criminal
aliens trying to enter the country illegally that very well
could have been a terrorist.
By the fact that we have increased our border capability in
terms of security, more surveillance, more sensors, also in
terms of aviation security, clearly we are more secure with the
layered approach that we have. The fact that the American
public feels confidence in what we are doing even in a time of
heightened alert, they continue flying because they believe in
what we are doing.
So all across the board from aviation to the organizational
changes that we have made that enhance security at our borders
where it is a--the communication with our State and local
counterparts, sharing intelligence. When we had the incident in
Madrid, intelligence was immediately out to the people that
needed to have it. So I could go on, but obviously there is
much more that needs to be done, but a substantial amount has
been accomplished.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
With unanimous consent, the gentlewoman from the Virgin
Islands may inquire for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr.Chairman, and I realize
time is of the essence. I want to ask two questions, and I want
to thank you for the response that I get from the bureaus that
are in the Virgin Islands when we run into difficulty and need
some adjustments. But I want to talk about the continuing
efforts to secure the borders of the U.S., as you mentioned in
your opening statement, on the territorial areas.
The Virgin Islands represents about 200 miles of pretty
much unprotected border, and I would like to know what my
constituents and I can expect in the 2005 budget to help us to
secure those--that open border, where a recent trip to the
Virgin Islands showed some increases in contraband and people
coming through as you tighten up on the western side.
But I also want to ask a question about my Pacific
territories. You may know that we have a special relationship
with three independent governments in the Pacific known as the
Freely Associated States, Palau, Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia, and under our relationship with
them, they have the right to freely migrate to the U.S. and its
territories. We also have many defense obligations to maintain
the security of that region. Collectively these 3 governments
cover some 3 million square miles of ocean that can be used as
points of entry into the U.S.
Does the Department of Homeland Security have personnel and
resources devoted to the challenges of homeland security
presented to us by our unique relationship with these three
governments? Are we working with them and providing them with
assistance in border security, immigration and the maritime
security issues?
So basically the question is for the Virgin Islands and
these Pacific independent governments, are we on the radar
screen? Is there funding in the 2005 budget to help with our
issues?
Mr. Camp. Mr. Secretary, I am going to have to recess the
committee for a couple minutes. I know the Chairman is on his
way back, and we will continue when he comes back, but there is
a vote on. So we will recess for just a few minutes.
Mr. Hutchinson. I will get you a better answer then.
Mr. Camp. I see Mr. Cox has just walked in. We will not
recess the subcommittee, and Mr. Cox will take the gavel.
Mr. Cox. [Presiding.] Mr. Secretary, please give me a
response.
Mr. Hutchinson. First of all, I am grateful for our
partnership, and always the information that you have been able
to provide me, and for the cooperation we have had with the
Virgin Islands on security issues. And the funds that are
available through our grant programs, it is my understanding
that those apply to the territories just like the State and
local governments, and so there is a funding mechanism for the
security steps that can be taken, obviously based upon the
security needs and the security plans that are in place.
And then in reference to the vast territories and the vast
ocean that separates us by distance, those--you know, the
United States Coast Guard has jurisdiction in those areas,
Customs and border protection, and they are certainly more
limited in those far-away areas, but they do have
responsibility. We are trying to make sure that we fulfill our
duties in reference to those. I would be happy to get you more
specific answers, but we do certainly consider that as an
important area of our responsibility.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. And for the Virgin Islands, we
have been taking great advantage of the grants that are
available, but we don't have a Border Patrol in place, and we
feel that that is a real critical piece of homeland security
not just for the Virgin Islands, but for the Nation, as we are
a thoroughfare for people coming from mainland China and the
Middle East as well.
Another question about airports. There are some airports
that have that they have had some MOUs with the Department of
Homeland Security that would help them in terms of funding to
do the renovations and put whatever was needed in place to be
able to meet that 100 percent baggage screening, and I don't
want to be specific, but some of those airports are not
receiving any funding to assist them, and they are going to
have a lot of difficulty in meeting that requirement. What can
you tell us in terms of how are those airports going to be able
to do that 100 percent screening without your support, or do
you have some support to give them?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, it is a challenge to the airports.
You know, we put the equipment in place, but they want to be
able to put it into a system and have to make renovations to
accomplish that. We call it the on-line system. And that is the
purpose of the LOIs, or the letters of intent, that allow that
funding, and whether it is 75/25 or 90 to 10, we have to
prioritize those projects. And we are working through the
highest priority, the volume, the largest airports, and as soon
as we are able budgetwise and systemwide to do it, we will move
to the other airports that are certainly in need of this as
well.
Mrs. Christensen. Mr.Chairman, I would like to get a report
up of which are the airports that have been designated as top
10 or what the priorities are, because as you know, there is
some airports that don't seem to be on the priority list. By
nature of their being large hubs and the number of planes that
go through there, it should be on the priority list, and they
don't seem to be getting that funding.
Mr. Cox. Well, Secretary Hutchinson, if you will consider
that a formal request from Mrs. Christensen and respond to it,
we would most appreciate it.
Mr. Hutchinson. We would be happy to.
Mr. Cox. The Chair would recognize himself for questions
for just a moment and add my welcome to those of the other
members of the committee. We appreciate your coming before us
once more this time to talk about your budget, which is going
to have grown from $14 billion to $16 billion. The 10 percent
1-year increase that you are proposing is substantial, but
particularly are large in comparison to what is occurring
elsewhere throughout the executive branch, what Congress is
looking at for the next fiscal year's budget. So we are
preparing to entrust you and the Department with a great deal
more resources not only than you have had, but that anyone else
is going to be getting, because the mission of homeland
security is important, and that is why this hearing is
important. We want to find out both through this dialogue and
also with our follow-up questions exactly where that money
might go and what our priorities ought to be.
I want to ask you a very broad-brush question about your
Directorate and also the Directorate of IAIP. The information
that we are now gathering in the wake of the Madrid bombings is
starting to paint a picture that we have seen before. Just as
before September 11th, we had some information on some of the
people that ultimately were involved in bombing the World Trade
Center and Washington and killing people in Pennsylvania
midflight. Here in this case in Spain, we also now have in
custody people seemingly complicit or perhaps the planners of
this bombing, planners or participants in it, who were within
our grasp beforehand, and they seem to be connected to alQaeda.
It suggests the importance of connecting the dots.
This one connection that we have been able to draw in
particular between Jamal Zougam and the 9/11 planners, Yarkas
who is in custody, is particularly disturbing. Of course,
Zougam's apartment had been searched by Spanish authorities in
August of 2001, August 10th, just a month before the September
11 bombings, and what we discovered in his apartment were,
first, phone numbers of other Al-Qa`ida suspected members in a
cell that was purportedly organized by Yarkas, who is now in
custody in Spain for allegedly planning the September 11th
bombings. We discovered a tape in his apartment that showed
jihadists in Dagastan. So obviously this international
connection to international Wahhabists, to Al-Qa`ida, to the
very same people that we have been tracking all along rears its
head again.
It suggests to me, and I am just one Member, albeit the
Chairman, that the resources that we might devote in Spain to
hardening the train system, to putting armed guards everywhere
and trying to search everyone who goes on to the train and so
on, as expensive as that would be, would not be as well spent
as resources connecting these dots, because we had some of
these people--we almost had them, and had we connected the dots
just a little bit better, we might have stopped this. Zougam
was not one who was indicted by Judge Garzon, so he was at
large, but we put him on our terrorist list here, and that
group is on our terrorist list, and it is somebody who we meant
to be keeping track of.
So I want to ask you as you take these enormous new
resources, 10 percent bump in a $14 billion, how much of them
can we expect will be devoted to this effort of connecting the
dots? How much of it should go on in your Directorate, and
alternatively, how much of it should go on in IAIP?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the analytical part of intelligence
should be conducted in IAIP. That is their responsibility for
the analysis. We are a customer of theirs. We are also a source
for them. Where we fit into the intelligence picture is that
through the 110,000 employees, the inspectors, the agents in
our arena, we work informants, we collect intelligence, and we
provide that immediately to our intelligence counterparts in
IAIP for their analysis. And so we are both a supplier of
intelligence as well as a customer of their analysis. And it
has been very effective, and it certainly improves every day.
I think your point is that--I certainly agree with--that we
have to invest in intelligence, and that analysis pays huge
dividends to us. We obviously continue having to recognize that
there is going to be not a perfect system, and so we have to
have the layered security that will complement and supplement
their efforts.
Mr. Cox. Thank you. My red light is on. We have a brief
opportunity for further questions if any Member would like to
do so.
Ms. Sanchez. Yes, Mr.Chairman.
Mr. Cox. The gentlelady from California Ms.Sanchez is
recognized.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr.Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, yesterday you announced the Arizona Border
Control Initiative, and you stated that the initiative is
designed to achieve control of the Arizona border by deterring,
detecting, arresting and prosecuting all cross-border illicit
trafficking by combining the assets from several agencies,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, CBP, Transportation
Security Administration and other Federal agencies.
You also indicated that the initiative would transfer 260
Border Patrol agents and CBP officers permanently or
temporarily. I think you said 200 per minute and 60 temporary
transfers.
My questions are how long will this initiative last? Is the
260 figure an annual amount, or is it just cumulative over
whatever time period you are thinking of doing this?
And the real reason I am asking this is maybe for you to
identify if you have a plan that tells us where these 260
agents are coming from. The biggest concern that I have is that
we saw a tripling of agents up on the northern border because
of the requirements of the Patriot Act, but those all came from
the southern border predominantly, meaning it left open areas
like Laredo very, very understaffed in Texas. And so the
question is where are you going to get these agents from? Where
are you moving them from? And, you know, what is that going to
do to our Border Patrol?
Mr. Hutchinson. The initiative will go through October1,
when it will be evaluated and a determination made then whether
it needs to be beefed up, modified, what adjustments should be
made at that point.
Ms. Sanchez. It starts from now to October 1st?
Mr. Hutchinson. Correct. And it will be--for example, the
200 agents will be in place gradually between now and June1,
where they will be fully deployed. You are correct that 60 of
those are BORSTAR agents that are temporary assignments, but
200 Border Patrol agents are permanent assignments to the
Arizona initiative. These come from not other areas that were
diminishing, but based upon the new resources that Congress--
capability Congress has given to us, it will be balanced
between experienced agents and new agents that will be going
out into the field.
So this is a great opportunity for us, and we will enhance
those as necessary to get the job done.
Ms. Sanchez. So it is a combination of experienced agents
and new agents. Where are these experienced agents--they are
still coming off from--you are taking them from somewhere.
Mr. Hutchinson. Right, but the FTEs or the actual positions
are new allocations that have been given to us. We will fill
those in part by experienced agents that will be back-filled in
another area with new graduates that will go out in the field.
Ms. Sanchez. So, in other words, in the fiscal year 2004
budget, we have new positions for Border Patrol, and those
new--those full-time equivalents will be where you are taking
these 260 from basically?
Mr. Hutchinson. That's correct.
Ms. Sanchez. Will the increased resources be placed along
the Arizona-Mexican border--with increased resources being
placed along the Arizona-Mexican border, don't you think that
it is going to push some of these smugglers to other crossing
routes? I mean, we experienced that in the California side,
where we clamped down heavily and ended up pushing everything
out to Nogales and some of the other areas.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, and that is the--hopefully this is
the last squeeze by effective border enforcement in California,
and, more effective in Texas, it has squeezed and pushed the
traffic organization to Arizona. So we are addressing that last
frontier there.
But secondly, we recognize as we increase our efforts
there, there will be the possibility that they are going to try
to try different routes. So we are going to be flexible,
measure that, and if they do try new routes in different areas,
we will have the flexibility to respond to that. So we are
going to look for that squeeze and if it does, in fact, happen.
Ms. Sanchez. And my last question with respect to the
Arizona issue is that the Federal Government--you are currently
placing vehicle barriers to protect some of the Department of
Interior lands where we see smugglers regularly drive across
them. Has the placement of the barriers been completed? And do
you intend to pay for additional barriers along the 200-plus
miles that we have between Arizona and Mexico that is also DOI
land?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes. That is a very effective tool. We
continue to look at that, particularly in protecting the
Department of Interior lands. I will say that Larry Parkinson
was there with me representing the Department of Interior. They
are a strong partner. They are adding personnel as well, and
that capability with the other agencies really adds to the
initiative, but we are continuing to look at the deployment of
those type of barriers.
Ms. Sanchez. And I see that my time is up, so thank you,
Mr.Secretary, and thank you, Mr.Chairman, for allowing another
set of questions.
Mr. Cox. The gentlelady's time is expired.
Does the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands have further
questions?
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. I just wanted to ask one
question and then make a point.
The Department of Homeland Security, your Directorate
obviously has a great commitment to port security, but the
budget request of $566 million is less than--$566 million less
than what the Coast Guard estimates ports will have to spend to
improve their security.
So could you just talk about how you are going to ensure
the security of our ports when we are so far short of what the
Coast Guard has estimated we need to have in place?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the estimate that is being referred
to is one estimate of security enhancements that very well will
be needed in our ports. This is a shared responsibility, and so
it is not our judgment that we ought to fund 100 percent of all
of the port security enhancements. We do a share, but also the
private sector has a responsibility as well, and so they are
investing substantially to complement what we are doing in
security.
Coast Guard's 2005 budget includes $1.75 billion for ports,
waterways and coastal security. So there is many layers to it
in addition simply to the grant funding that we are putting
in--.
Mrs. Christensen. So you are saying that between the
private sector, the Coast Guard and your Directorate, we will
come close to approaching what is really needed?
Mr. Hutchinson. We will certainly come closer by that
combined effort. You know, and those figures are rather rough
estimates as to what is needed. Clearly, more is needed. We
pick up some of the slack, but the private sector does as well.
Mrs. Christensen. And since we are talking about budget and
your budget needs, are you satisfied that what is in your
budget is sufficient for your contribution to this effort?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think it reflects a very good balance as
to the shared responsibility.
Mrs. Christensen. I just wanted to go back to the
territories that are freely associated with the United States
just for a moment to say that these are independent countries
in a free associated agreement with the United States. So they
don't necessarily fall within our grant programs and will
require some additional work with them to adjust those
agreements and to make the assistance available to them as they
are a part of the larger U.S. family and provide entry into our
country.
Mr. Hutchinson. I will be happy to work with you on looking
at that more closely.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
Mr. Cox. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized.
Mr. Markey. Thank you very much, and welcome back, Mr.
Secretary. Thank you for coming.
I sent a letter to Secretary Ridge to request information
about the Department's efforts to strengthen rail security, and
I would like to take this opportunity to ask you a few
questions about this pressing homeland security issue. Does the
Department of Homeland Security intend to establish voluntary
security guidelines that transit operators may or may not
choose to implement? Will the Department of Homeland Security
require that operators implement specific security enhancements
in response to the vulnerability of public transportation
systems to attacks by terrorist groups?
Mr. Hutchinson. Could you give me an example of what you
are speaking of?
Mr. Markey. In terms of?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, when you say voluntary security
guidelines versus mandatory security guidelines.
Mr. Markey. Will there be a duty for the transit operators
to implement standards established by the Department of
Homeland Security, or it will be left totally to the discretion
of any of these railroads or transit systems, subway systems in
the United States as to whether or not they will enhance
security? Which is the policy which the Department will choose
in order to increase the security on the rails of the United
States?
Mr. Hutchinson. We have the authority to implement
mandatory security requirements. We are not in a position to do
that now. We are choosing to make sure that we have the right
assessments, the right judgments of what security measures are
in place, and that we evaluate it in the right way. That is an
option that we would certainly look at whenever--if we
determine that--if the private sector or our transit partners
are not moving rapidly enough when they have the capability to
do so, and that when we have the right judgment as to what that
security measure should be.
Mr. Markey. And what is your guideline for finishing the
assessments of what is needed and what your recommendations
will be? What have you laid out in your deadlines?
Mr. Hutchinson. I believe that the assessments are
substantially complete in terms of the review of the security
requirements. We have, in fact, deployed a substantial number
of security measures in accordance with the assessments that
have been done, and we will continue to review those.
Mr. Markey. So will the assessments be done in the next
month or 6 months?
Mr. Hutchinson. I will have to get back with you on the
specific time frame as to how many have already been completed,
which ones remain to be done.
Mr. Markey. So, for example, just, you know, put a little
bit of a highlight on it, as you know, both the Fleet Center in
Boston and the Madison Square Garden Democrat and Republican
conventions will be situated on top of transit systems. So I
know there will be some security put in place in those two
venues, but I think the whole country deserves to know that
there is some nonvoluntary system that is being put in place.
And towards, you know, exploring this a little bit further,
given the funding shortfalls that many of these transit systems
are facing anyway, how would we expect them, short of having
larger grants from the Federal Government, to implement safety
guidelines?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, and that is exactly the reason you
want to be careful about doing the mandatory requirements,
because, for example, Amtrak, not exactly financially wealthy,
and we want to make sure if you put requirements on, that they
are appropriate, and that they meet the security needs, and
that they are manageable. That is also the reason, of course,
we gave $115 million in rail security grants last year, and we
will continue through the urban area security grants to have
more funds available.
Mr. Markey. Are you going to increase your request for
fiscal year 2005, for this coming fiscal year; are you going to
increase your request for additional security funds for transit
and railroads across the country?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the budget is, of course, as
submitted. Obviously if there is a determination that more
funds are needed and appropriate, then that determination will
be given, but at this time there is not any plan that I am
aware of that will increase--make a budget amendment request.
Mr. Markey. So in the aftermath of the terrible tragedy in
Spain, your administration has yet to reevaluate whether or not
there should be an increase in funding for railway security
built into this year's budget?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think the fair characterization would be
that even prior to the tragedy in Spain, this administration
effectively evaluated what we are doing in rail security, got
ahead of the curve in the assessments, in the investment, and
submitted a budget that anticipated what needs to be done in
that area. As we get additional intelligence, we will continue
to evaluate that.
Mr. Markey. But as of this moment, you are convinced that
the work that you had already done has provided sufficient
funds or has sufficient funds budgeted that will deal with the
security issues that you have identified on transit in the
country?
Mr. Hutchinson. It is a very appropriate start. More needs
to be done. We are aggressively pursuing that, looking at the
right requirements and completing all of the assessments, and
then also continuing to invest in those security measures.
Mr. Markey. I would recommend honestly we double the
security; $115 million is not going to be enough.
Have radiation portals been installed in all ports of U.S.
entry? That would be my final question.
Mr. Hutchinson. The radiation portals have been installed
in 2004 in 408 locations. Radiation portal monitors in 528.
Number, specifically, the units that have been deployed, in
2005, we will deploy an additional 465 portal monitors and 206
radiation isotope identification devices, and that will
continue until there is 100 percent coverage.
Mr. Markey. So are you talking about the personal radiation
devices there, or are you talking about the actual portals
that--.
Mr. Hutchinson. The personal radiation devices will be
5,000 of those deployed this year, 1,000 next year. So what I
was speaking of will be the large portal monitors.
Mr. Markey. Mr.Chairman, I see the red light is on.
Mr. Cox. I appreciate it--.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr.Secretary.
Mr. Cox.--your attention, and I recognize the gentlelady
from California.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. Thank you. God, it is so great when
other people don't show up. We get more lines of questions.
I wanted to talk about just the discomfort that is
happening among a lot of the employees in your Directorate. As
I mentioned earlier, you are probably in charge of about
110,000 of them, and I know that the border officers, for
example, are nervous about the new tasks that they are being
asked to do in one phase of the border initiative, because
former Customs inspectors, for example, are required to know
the details about immigration and agricultural laws, but they
only have minimal training in these additional areas.
So one of my questions was, you know, are you monitoring
the uncomfortableness of your employees, because, of course, we
want them to do a good job; and what are you hearing from them,
because many of us are hearing that they are just having a hard
time with this?
I also wanted to have you talk a little bit about the
latest plans for your new pay and personnel system. The
budget--for example, your budget asks for $100 million to
design a new personnel system that appears in its current form
to take away existing rights and guarantees afforded to these
employees, and in DHS it would eliminate across-the-board
annual raises and allow department managers to decide a
worker's annual raise based solely on performance. And while in
theory that sounds good, I am worried that maybe it gives
managers a little bit too much unchecked authority. So I want
to hear about that.
And in the light of actually these front-line personnel
putting their lives on the line in some cases every single day
that they go out and do their work, isn't $100 million a lot to
spend on a pay system when maybe we could be using it on
salaries for front-line personnel, considering we have so many
shortages going on?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, in reference to the overall morale, I
think it is very good. Any time there is uncertainty or change,
that causes some discomfort, and that is understandable.
We have worked very hard to get information quickly to the
employees. Secretary Ridge, myself and other leaders of the
Department have conducted numerous town meetings where we have
heard from them. They have raised issues, and so many of them
have to do with some of the disparity in pay for doing the same
work for the different 22 agencies that came together, and you
mentioned the $100 million. I will have to check to make sure
because that is really in a different directorate, but it was
my assumption that some of that would be for helping to
accomplish some of the pay disparity. So I think there is more
to it than simply what is going to be needed from a technical
standpoint.
One of the great motivators and morale boosters that the
inspectors had was the implementation of US-VISIT, because they
saw new technology, new capability because of their new
mission, and it has really been a boost for them in the work
that they do.
Ms. Sanchez. Can you tell me, speaking about US-VISIT, have
we been able to catch a terrorist yet with US-VISIT? I know we
have gotten a lot of criminals, but have we gotten the
terrorists? I mean, because it is an elaborate program, and as
you know, we have only done one small portion of what is going
to take a lot of funds and a lot of effort, and to some people
who have been talking to me about all this cyber situation,
that, you know, it is a pie in the sky. So have we caught a
terrorist yet from it?
Mr. Hutchinson. That is a very, very important question,
and let me address that. We have not, and that should not be
the measure of US-VISIT. US-VISIT was mandated by Congress
before 9/11, and the original design of it was not to catch
terrorists, but was to have an effective entry-exit system, to
give integrity to our immigration system.
We have the added security benefit because we can deter,
detect terrorists and criminals that might come in. So I think
that it has to be measured by a much different standard going
back to the integrity of the system as well as the deterrent
value and obviously the checks that we have whenever we bring
the people in.
Ms. Sanchez. And last let me ask you about a new provision
in the personnel regulations that would essentially allow an
employer to reassign a worker from one part of the country to
the other without any input from the worker.
Why are we taking away the employees' options for
reassignment? I mean, a lot of them have families, and they
prefer a particular area. Why is that so--why is there such a
great deviation in that from our regular personnel system that
we have in other departments?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, first of all, the personnel
regulations were put out for the purpose of getting comment,
and employee comment will be very important in the evaluation,
determination of which direction we go.
But in terms of reassignment, when you are dealing with
responding to higher threat levels, emergencies, national
security issues, we have to have the capability to effect
reassignments without having to do collective bargaining or
discussions prior to that.
Now--so that is the logic and concern in that arena, but we
obviously want to be sensitive to the employees' concerns. I
don't think there have been any instances where, you know, they
have been redeployed without the appropriate communication and
safeguards being in place.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr.Chairman. I see that the red
light has come on.
Mr. Cox. Thank the gentlelady.
I want to thank Secretary Hutchinson for being here with
us. As you can see, we have a vote on the floor. You have
gotten some questions today about rail, naturally in light of
Madrid, and I know that in particular the cooperation that IP
has had with America's railroads and our public transit
authorities lies without your direct responsibility. It is
outside your directorate. But I want to give you an opportunity
to answer generally the question of whether there is going to
be an international lessons learned effort focused on Madrid
and whether the Department of Homeland Security will be
inferring from what we learn in Madrid ways to update our
protocols for rail, particularly passenger rail in America?
Mr. Hutchinson. Certainly it requires us to look very
closely at it. One, I have communicated with the Ambassador
from Spain offering our technical assistance and having a
transportation team that will go--security team that will go
over and look at this together. I think that there will be some
dialogues with all of the European countries on enhancing rail
security, what more we ought to do, cooperation, best
practices. And so there is going to be an increased
concentration on that.
From our standpoint I think we were, again, ahead of the
curve, have done a great deal, but the immediate reaction was
let's see what more we can do, because clearly that is
something that the terrorists have used very effectively in
Spain.
You know, we are working closely with our colleagues in
infrastructure protection and coordinating. We have some very
substantial efforts going on right now in terms of additional
steps that can be taken, evaluation, some more aggressive than
others, policy decisions that will have to be made in that
regard. But we expect that this will be a very robust effort,
combining our efforts in border transportation security with
what they are doing in IAIP.
Mr. Cox. I am very pleased to hear that, and we thank you
very much for the time and help that you provided to the
committee this morning.
The Chair notes that some Members may have additional
questions for our witness, which they may wish to submit in
writing. Without objection--I am sorry. Mr.Turner is here. I
want to recognize the Ranking Member. I didn't realize that you
had come here, and we have made heroic efforts to make sure you
had another opportunity. So the Ranking Member is recognized--
Ranking Member of the full committee, the gentleman from Texas,
is recognized.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr.Chairman. I will be brief,
because I think we have 10 minutes before the vote concludes.
Mr.Secretary, we have talked before about radiation
portals. You have received to date $206 million to purchase and
install these radiation portals at our ports of entry. You have
asked for $43 million for the next fiscal year. By my
calculation it will take another $247 million to install
radiation portals at all of our border crossings, rail hubs,
airports, et cetera. I am disappointed that that is not in the
President's request, and I just wanted to know if the Congress
could secure the support to get the additional $247 million,
would you be able to complete the installation of these portals
more rapidly, and particularly would you be able to do it prior
to the fourth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, which is, I
think, the date by which it will occur now based on the funding
that is being requested--the rate of funding that is being
requested?
Mr. Hutchinson. I will be happy to look very carefully at
the time line for completion of 100 percent deployment. I have
before me the deployment schedule for the radiation portal
monitors, the radiation isotope identification devices and the
other radiation detectors, and we have in 2004 a plan to deploy
528 radiation portal monitors. This is a very aggressive
schedule. In 2005, we have 165 that are scheduled to be
deployed as well as 206 isotope identification devices. So I am
happy to look at where that leaves us as far as the final
completion. I will report back to you, but that is what is
scheduled for 2004 and 2005 in deployment.
Mr. Turner. It just seems to me it would make common sense
to try to get that job done quicker, and if you would look at
that and see what it would take. Obviously I want to be sure
that if we push for the additional funding, that you can expend
it in a more rapid fashion.
Mr. Hutchinson. I think that is certainly a relevant
consideration as to what could be our procurement and
deployment schedule.
Mr. Turner. You know, there is no question that if we don't
do this faster, that by September of 2005, the fourth
anniversary of 9/11, we still won't have our southern borders
protected, nor all of our rail hubs, nor all of our airports,
nor all of our smaller ports of entry. And if we plan to do it,
if that is the goal, it seems that that would be a prudent and
wise investment.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr.Chairman.
Mr. Cox. I thank the gentleman.
And for the final time, I want to thank Secretary
Hutchinson. Your willingness to stay with us throughout the
morning and the afternoon is very much appreciated.
The record will remain open in this hearing for 10 days for
Members to submit open questions and to place their responses
in the record.
Mr. Cox. There being no further business, I want to thank
all the subcommittee members who were here during the hearing.
The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions Submitted for Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson
Questions Submitted by the Hon. Lincoln Diaz-Balart
Thank you for coming before our panel today. In your testimony you
list the elimination of potential weaknesses in security by suspending
the Transit Without Visa (TWOV) program as one of the Department's
successes.
While I believe the suspension of the TWOV program may have in fact
increased security, I still remain concerned about its counterpart, the
International to International (ITI) program.
I believe that your office has realized the significant economic
impact that the cancellation of this program had on South Florida as
demonstrated through the temporary relief provided through the
reopening of the satellite transit lounge at MIA. However, this
temporary solution has only partially mitigated the situation and has
not provided a sustainable solution.
During a recent CODEL to Miami we engaged DHS officials and staff
from Washington, D.C. and Miami on this issue. It was my understanding
that the Department would be releasing guidelines for a new version of
the ITI program this month. However, through our conversations in
Miami, it appeared that there was a lack of communication between DHS,
MIA, and the private sector companies directly involved in this
process.
Under Secretary Hutchinson, has there been additional communication
among all of the parties involved, including the private sector? If so,
do we still expect to see this new program rolled out this month, and
if we do, has it been modified from its original draft, which did not
reflect the concerns of the airport or the private industry experts?
Answer: To clarify this issue, prior to August 2003, there were two
transit programs available to travelers. The former Transit Without
Visa (TWOV) and International-to-International (ITI) programs allowed
an alien to transit through the United States without a nonimmigrant
visa while en route from one foreign country to a second foreign
country with one or two stops in the United States. Under the TWOV
program, a passenger seeking to transit through the United States was
admitted as a transit passenger by a DHS inspector and departed the
Federal Inspection Service (FIS) area. A TWOV passenger was permitted
to make one additional stop in the United States.Under the ITI program,
the ITI passenger was inspected by a DHS inspector but was not admitted
to the United States and did not leave the secure FIS area.
On August 7, 2003, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs published regulations
suspending the TWOV and ITI transit programs. The suspensions were
based on specific, credible intelligence that certain terrorist
organizations had identified these programs as a way to gain access to
aircraft without first obtaining a visa in order to: (1) take over the
aircraft to use as a weapon of mass destruction, or (2) to simply cause
damage to the aircraft; or to abscond during their layover in the
United States in order to gain illegal entry to the United States. In
August and September 2003, the DHS Border and Transportation Security
Directorate (BTS) conducted field visits and held meetings with airline
industry and the Departments of State (DOS) and Transportation (DOT) on
the possible reinstatement of a security-enhanced transit program. On
September 22, 2003, the public comment period concerning the suspension
of the TWOV and ITI programs expired.
DHS took the seventeen comments (one duplicate) received, including
those from the State of Florida and Miami International Airport,
regarding this proposed rule into consideration when formulating the
new Air Transit Program (ATP).
BTS and CBP have met with carriers and industry representatives to
solicit their opinions on the program. DHS and other agencies have
worked to formulate a proposal for the new ATP which is currently under
review within the Administration.
Questions Submitted by the Hon. Mark Souder
1. What is the strategic vision for the Directorate of Border and
Transportation Security? Do you believe you have adequate resources to
accomplish that vision in the near and long term? If not, what
additional resources do you require to meet your goals?
Answer: The strategic vision for the Directorate of Border and
Transportation Security is to be ``a unified and innovative enforcement
team, working as one to isolate terrorism Working in partnership with
our components and with the U.S. Coast Guard, we will:
Promote new security ideas and opportunities;
Balance security with civil liberties and free trade;
Develop a unified and engaged BTS team within the
broad DHS effort;
Streamline operational and administrative procedures;
and
Build coalitions and partnerships.
Our fiscal year 2005 budget requested 8 additional FTE and funding
to support the initial requirements of the staff of the Office of the
Under Secretary. As the organization of the Directorate and the
Department evolves, we will work within the Administration to request
additional resources when necessary.
2. I understand that in some locations where both the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection and Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement operate, they maintain independent fleets of aircraft.
Considering the overlap along mission lines to interdict ``weapons of
mass destruction'', illicit narcotics and illegal migrants, has any
thought been given to ``co-locating'' these air assets? The obvious
benefit of such an arrangement would be: elimination of two separate
hangars and equipment plant; two separate maintenance and fuel
contracts; two separate aircrew training and certification programs,
and so forth. Do you have any philosophical disagreement with the
merits of ``colocating'' ICE and CBP air assets?
Answer: In fiscal year 2005, the air and marine assets within ICE
and CBP will be consolidated within CBP. Efforts are underway to manage
that consolidation to ensure the maximum operational and cost
efficiencies.
3. Late last year I met with CBP Commissioner Bonner to discuss the
status of a special unit of Native Americans called the Shadow Wolves.
In the legacy Customs Service they worked to detect narcotics smuggling
along the Arizona border within the Tohono O'Odham Indian Reservation.
Upon creation of the Department of Homeland Security they were
transferred from ICE to CBP. During my discussion with Commissioner
Bonner, he told me that the Shadow Wolves would continue their
traditional mission.
Can you update us on the current status of the Shadow
Wolves?
Answer: The unit remains intact and follows the Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) mission of preventing terrorists and terrorists'
weapons from entering the United States.
What steps have been taken to ensure that they Shadow
Wolves preserve their unique identity and the vital mission of
tracking/interdicting illicit narcotics?
Answer: There have been no changes to the CPO's mission of
tracking/interdicting illicit narcotics. Narcotic seizures by the CPO's
continue to be turned over to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE).
During a Native American conference sponsored by Customs
and Border Protection last year, during one of the breakout sessions,
there was some discussion given to expanding the Shadow Wolf concept to
other Native American reservations with a border nexus. Has this
concept been expanded yet?
Answer: The Shadow Wolf/CPO concept is still being explored and
discussed amongst the tribes and Border Patrol Sectors. In the interim,
the Border Patrol and some of the tribes are continuing to work on
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) and joint operations.
Cooperation continues with quarterly meetings to discuss issues,
concerns, and strategies.
4. I have visited the Air and Marine Operations enter (AMOC) in
Riverside, California. That facility receives radar inputs and
correlates intelligence and data on air traffic from virtually every
conceivable source, and is one of the most impressive facilities I have
visited in the government. AMOC is a ``critical'' center, unique in
that it is the only facility in the federal government with all these
capabilities under one roof.
Why aren't other BTS flight activities communicated and
de-conflicted through AMOC? I understand, for example, that CBP
aircraft frequently fly ``low and slow'' along the border, without
notifying the AMOC. As a result, the AMOC scrambles ICE aircraft to
intercept the suspicious aircraft, which results in needless
expenditure of taxpayer money.
Answer: During Liberty Shield operations, Office of Air and Marine
Operations (AMO) used AMOC to coordinate flying operations of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). This effort was built upon AMOC's existing
coordination with the DoD and FAA. This effort was a step in the right
direction for coordination of DHS law enforcement aviation operations.
A more permanent concept of operations is being developed in concert
with the Department's Aviation Management Council, to minimize the
possibility of intercepting other agency's aircraft. AMOC indeed has
the capabilities to support and enhance other DHS/BTS air activities.
As the primary command and control facility for the AMO, AMOC truly has
the ``big picture,'' integrating multi-source radar inputs, the
capability to track ``Blue Forces,'' and streamline coordination with
multiple interagency partners in the course of their respective
missions. AMOC has access to FAA flight plans, aircraft registration
and air movement data, as well as specifically designed law enforcement
databases. Recent modernization funding will allow AMOC to create a
common operating picture that encompasses a wide portion of the Western
Hemisphere.
To enhance the tracking of ``friendly'' aircraft AMO is developing
a new SATRACK capability. Servers, with the ability to process all
SATRACK formats, are being incorporated into the AMOC's radar display.
Once installed and operational it will be as simple as inputting the
tracking code, specific for each aircraft, from any agency into the
server. This upgrade will allow the AMOC to follow and de-conflict CBP
aircraft that frequently fly ``low and slow'' along the border.
I understand that AMOC sends its radar picture of the
National Capital Region to a new inter-agency airspace security office
called the National Capital Region Coordination Center. I understand
the AMOC is the only source for this and there isn't a backup. Are you
reviewing this?
Answer: AMOC is currently a single point of transmission; the air
picture and data feeds in the NCRCC are slaved from the AMOC's system.
We are reviewing this, and are studying the addition of high-end
servers, communications suites and supporting telecommunications
infrastructure to support the Air and Marine Operations functions for
the National Capital Region, which could be developed as an independent
facility and serve as a limited back-up capability for the AMOC.
However, the NCRCC as a whole has four different agencies supplying/
piping radar and communications data into the facility.
Are you considering any technological or personnel
upgrades for the facility to enhance its capabilities against narcotics
trafficking, alien smuggling and securing restricted airspace?
Answer: The AMOC has currently been funded to upgrade its servers.
This upgrade will increase its capacity to accept all the available
radar feeds nationwide, some 400 plus radars. Additionally, software
has been developed and tested to provide AMOC with radar data from all
20 FAA Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs), to include the
correlated flight plans and air movement data from the 20 ARTCCs.
FAA Terminal Approach Radars will also be integrated into the AMOC.
Advanced communications suites have been procured to replace the
current aging and inadequate communications console. AMO is studying
the feasibility of a satellite based communication infrastructure that
will dramatically increase nationwide radio coverage and save the costs
of expanding and maintaining hundreds of ground based radios.
AMOC personnel have served as a primary operations entity at the
NCRCC since the facility opened in January 2003. Fifteen Full time
Equivalents (FTE) on AMOC's existing Table of Organization have been
permanently reassigned to address staffing the NCRCC. The backfill/
permanent return of these FTE to their original locations will be
addressed within future resource allocation initiatives.
Now that AMO and AMOC have moved from ICE to CBP, the staffing
issues will be revisited in a broader context as part of the transition
process. We anticipate that the staffing decisions will be concluded by
the end of the transitioin process on September 30, 2005.
5. Within DHS, Mr. Hutchinson, you have more armed law enforcement
employees under your command than anyone else. Inherent in that
distinction are significant management, policy and oversight
responsibilities to promote accountability, competent weapons use and
maintaining a ``zero tolerance'' for excessive force incidents.
Terrorists and narcotics cartels have demonstrated their lethality all
over the world. DHS agents and officers deserve to be sufficiently
equipped and empowered to address this threat. It will not suffice to
be ``out-gunned'' during an encounter with terrorists or drug
traffickers, as the Los Angeles Police Department discovered during the
North Hollywood bank robbery.
What are your plans to standardize a system of centralized
inventory management for BTS weapons, to prevent the kind of
accountability issues recently experienced by FBI?
Answer: We have engaged in collaborative efforts within the
Department, the Federal Government, and industry to develop the best
practices and procedures in asset management. With the implementation
of eMerge2, the Department will standardize the accountability of all
assets, to include the weapons inventory. The Department is finalizing
the Management Directive for Personal Property Management that defines
the policy regarding the accountability and physical inventory
requirements for personal property, including weapons. The policy
includes the requirement for an annual physical inventory and
reconciliation of all firearms. Also, the Department is conducting a
pilot program to evaluate the accountability and effectiveness of using
radio frequency identification to track and monitor firearms.
How will your system of accountability mesh with the
remaining armed employees of DHS, such as those in the Secret Service?
Answer: The Department established a Personal Property Management
Council and consolidated various personal property systems, procedures
and policies over the past year. With the implementation of eMerge2, we
will migrate our asset records to one software solution to provide
total asset visibility that will enable us to effectively reduce the
cost of managing the Government's personal property while increasing
accountability. The procedures and systems put in place will be
deployed throughout the Department.
What are your plans for a new ``use of force'' policy? When
will this new policy be published?
Answer: The DHS use of force policy was signed and effective July
2004. It was developed by a committee which had representation from all
DHS law enforcement components.
Does your fiscal year 2005 funding include any initiatives
to ann your employees with a ``standard'' Department firearm?
Answer: No. There are no additional funds requested in the fiscal
year 2005 budget above that which is contained in each component's
base, to recapitalize a standard DHS firearm. The DHS Commodity Council
for Weapons and Ammunition is analyzing Department-wide requirements to
determine more efficient and effective strategies for the acquisition
of this commodity area. Their initial effort identified a strategy to
acquire known DHS requirements for a family of pistols under a
specification agreed to by many of the organizational elements in the
Department. On August 24, 2004 the Department awarded two contracts for
handguns that can be accessed by all DHS organizational entities.
Additional categories of weapons and ammunition are being analyzed by
the Commodity Council to determine the need for strategic sourcing.
6. I understand BTS Officers frequently pursue vehicles and vessels
loaded with contraband that refuse to stop, and perform airspace
security missions against small and slow aircraft. These high-risk
enforcement operations can easily escalate to a situation where lethal
force is required. What legislative assistance do you need to indemnify
your officers involved in this type of situation?
Answer: We must unquestionably prepare and support our law
enforcement personnel for the potential use of lethal force in their
day to day environment, as well as for the possible but unintended
results of their actions. The law enforcement officers, tasked by their
organization and the nation to prevent or mitigate to the best of their
ability a terrorist strike, will be faced with the options of allowing
the terrorist to strike where and when chosen with planned maximum
devastation, or applying the use of lethal force against the assailant.
These Officers, acting within the scope of employment and in compliance
with Departmental policies and procedures, should be protected from
unwarranted lawsuits and liability. To this end the Department is
exploring possible options, similar to other agencies, that would grant
immunity or provide indemnification in certain circumstances.
7. The fiscal year 2005 budget for CBP includes $10 million for
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). You announced the Arizona Border
Control (ABC) Initiative yesterday in Tucson. I understand your
directorate will test the Hermes UAV. I also understand your
directorate tested a Predator UAV in the Southwest last fall, which
culminated in several interdictions, seizures and arrests. Will the
requested funding be used for UAVs capable of fulfilling the multitude
of BTS missions?
Answer: The requested funding is specific to border security
operations for which CBP is the lead agency. The funding will provide
for further testing and evaluation of UAVs in general, and the needs of
BTS and other DHS components will be considered during this project.
What will be the concept of operation (CONOP) for this new
resource?
Answer: The pilot project we are conducting is designed to help us
develop a CONOP over the life of the program. The intent is to operate
in both interdiction and intelligence gathering missions to evaluate
VAV technology in such roles. Specific CONOPS will be developed based
on lessons learned during this test and evaluation.
At the conclusion of this latest test, will UAVs become a permanent
tool within BTS to combat illicit narcotics smuggling and migrant
activity?
Answer: Once the evaluation is completed, we will have a better
understanding of how UAVs may be integrated into our border security
operations on a long-term basis. The pilot program will determine the
best type of platforms and sensor packages to use, where they will be
most beneficial, and for what specific roles they are best suited.
8. In the establishment of DHS, it was recognized that counter-
narcotics is an important and necessary mission for the Department. In
the Homeland Security Act, the Department was organized to include a
dedicated Counter-narcotics Officer on the Secretary's staff who is to
ensure adequate focus of homeland security resources to the counter-
drug mission. This Counter-narcotics Officer is also designated as the
U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) and reports to the Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) on the overall national
interdiction effort. As the Under Secretary of BTS, you oversee some of
the major agencies involved in the counternarcotics effort.
In your view, how is the set up of one individual with two
lines of authority working?
Answer: The counternarcotics officer (CNO) serves in multiple roles
as ONDCP Director of Intelligence, as United States Interdiction
Coordinator, and as DHS counternarcotics officer. Given the division of
CN responsibilities between BTS and other DHS entities, the DHS CNO
serves a useful and valuable role in coordinating CN matters between
BTS and those other non-BTS DHS agencies. The CNO also serves an
extremely valuable function in providing recommendations to the DHS
Secretary about development of departmental CN priorities, especially
as they impact BTS agency responsibilities. The addition of the USIC
position to the CNO has provided an opportunity for that office to
serve as a bridge to non-DHS agencies on CN that would otherwise not
exist; a bridge that has been extensively employed on behalf of DHS
during the start up of the Department.
What is your relationship with the Counter-narcotics
Officer?
Answer: I meet regularly with the CNO, and two of my staff are
located in his office These actions help ensure the closest
coordination possible on counternarcotics issues.
Do you feel DHS has the resources necessary to adequately
attack the current drug threat while being vigilant to other DHS
responsibilities?
Answer: The Administration and Congress have provided excellent
support to the BTS components in support of all threats to homeland
security. Many of the capabilities that provide border and
transportation security are used to support the counter-narcotics
mission. For example, the same resources used in the Container Security
Initiative (CSI) enhance the ability to prevent and detect importation
of illegal narcotics. Additional border patrol and CBP officers, as
well as ICE agents perform their work in a multifaceted fashion,
finding illegal substances and goods and looking for links between
narcotics-related crime and terrorism. The same sensor systems and
platforms that perform border security, like our AMO and Border Patrol
aircraft, also detect and interdict illegal narcotics. In support of
these continuing efforts, our fiscal year 2005 request included a
number of systems that are multi-dimensional and support both missions:
$28 million for increased AMO P-3 flight hours to interdict narcotics
in the source and transit zone as well as fly CAP over cities during
heightened alert periods, $64 million for Border Patrol surveillance
and sensor technology; $25 million for CSI; $20 million for targeting
systems enhancement which help identify shipments requiring inspection;
$15M for Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) which
strengthen the supply chain; $10 million for development and testing of
UAVs; and $340 million for US-VISIT, which identifies travelers, some
of which have warrants for outstanding narcotics charges. All of these
initiatives received fiscal year 2005 appropriations at the level of
the request.
Questions Submitted by the House Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Majority Staff
Criminal Intelligence Collection and Analysis
1. How do BTS agencies analyze their collection of criminal and
other intelligence, as well as share it within BTS or with other DHS
and Federal agencies? What is the role of IA/IP? Do the BTS agencies
and IA/IP have interoperable communication and data systems?
Answer: The Directorate of Border and Transportation Security (BTS)
prepares a Daily Operations Report each day of the week. The BTS
distributes the reports to Federal, state, and local law enforcement.
The report encompasses significant operational events involving the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS). Items include
submissions from the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Federal
Protective Service (FPS), and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). Submissions include noteworthy Homeland Security
items such as the arrest or removal of terrorist organization members,
financiers, and operatives. The report provides biographical
identifiers such as names, dates of birth, passport numbers,
nationality, associates, etc. State and local law enforcement agencies
have used this information to supplement their intelligence/homeland
security operations. The report also highlights events, efforts, and
trends concerning airport screening and organized criminal activities
such as narcotics and alien smuggling. A report typically is from five
to seven pages and includes a list of acronyms and definitions.
Information sharing is one of the critical mission areas that the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has set as a priority for better
preparing the homeland. The DHS Office of Information Analysis (IA), in
conjunction with other DHS entities, prepares warning products and
distributes them to federal, state, local, tribal, major city, and
private sector officials. These products, which include both Homeland
Security Information Bulletins and Threat Advisories, allow DHS
officials to communicate threats and suggested protective measures to
regions and/or sectors of concern, within each threat level.
Additionally, unclassified information is shared through a daily
Homeland Security Operations Morning Brief and the weekly joint DHS-FBI
Intelligence Bulletin. The Office of State and Local Government
Coordination also coordinates bi-weekly conference calls with all of
the Homeland Security Advisors in all the states and territories to
help relay important departmental information as well as respond to
queries from advisors. The Department has also paid for and established
secure communication channels to all of our state and territorial
governors and their state emergency operations centers. This investment
in communication equipment included secure VTC equipment along with
Stu/Ste telephones. DHS has also worked to ensure every governor has
been cleared to receive classified information and are working with the
Governors and their Homeland Security Advisors to provide security
clearances for five additional people who support the Governors'
Homeland Security mission. This provides DHS an avenue for
disseminating classified information directly to the location that
needs the information. Lastly, one of the primary ways in which DHS is
improving its communication with its constituents is through the
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and specifically through
the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES). Using this
network, federal, state, and urban area homeland security advisors will
be able to communicate with each other and with DHS, as will federal,
state, and urban Emergency Operations Centers, and the National Guard
and the state adjutant generals. Once connected, user groups will have
access both to communication streams with each other and DHS, as well
as to DHS warning products distributed by IA.
All DHS entities (along with all IC members) share information with
IAIP, which analyzes and distributes the information to State,
territorial, tribal, local and private sector entities. IAIP receives
this information not only through the described reports, but also
through BTS representation in IA and the HSOC. The IAIP performs
analysis and shares information to support its own mission and to
provide information that meets the needs of other intelligence
consumers.
US-VISIT
2. DHS submitted the fiscal year 2004 expenditure plan for US-VISIT
to Appropriations several weeks ago. The fiscal year 2005 request is
$340 million, which is a $12 million increase. How will this funding be
allocated in order to implement US VISIT at the 50 largest land border
ports of entry?
Answer: The fiscal year 2004 Expenditure Plan included resources
for implementing US-VISIT functionality in secondary inspection at the
50 largest land border ports of entry to meet the statutory requirement
of December 31, 2004. The Expenditure Plan for fiscal year 2005
includes funding to pilot US-VISIT functionality in entry and exit
lanes for selected ports of entry.
3. What is the ``end vision'' for the US-VISIT system? How and when
does DHS anticipate reaching that objective?
Answer: US-VISIT has begun the effort to create a strategic plan
that will establish an overall vision for immigration and border
management and identify the mechanisms necessary, including technology,
facilities, and data necessary to achieve the vision. Fundamental to
this vision is ensuring that appropriate information is available to
decision makers (e.g. consular officers, border officers,
investigators, immigration adjudicators, intelligence entities) in real
time. However, to introduce immediate security improvements, we have
focused on an incrementally developing and deploying capabilities. US-
VISIT faced some significant challenges, especially in the early days,
but has overcome those challenges by phasing-in improvements over the
past two years.
The end vision of the US-VISIT Program is to deploy end-to-end
management of integrated processes and data on foreign nationals
traveling to the United States covering their interactions with U.S.
officials before they enter, when they enter, while they are in the
U.S., and when they exit. This comprehensive view of border management
leads to the creation of a ``virtual border'' and will set the course
for improved business processes across the Government stakeholder
community for management of information on foreign visitors.
US-VISIT Program responsibilities begin when a foreign
national petitions for entrance, applies for a visa at a
consular office, or applies for enrollment in an expedited/
trusted traveler program. The US-VISIT Program will support
pre-entry processes by using collected biographic, biometric,
and previous travel and visa information to authenticate unique
identity, match against watch lists, and support the issuance
of travel documents.
During the inspection process, machine-readable, tamper-
resistant travel documents will be read, biometrics collected,
and information regarding a foreign national's U.S. travel and
immigration will be available for decision-making purposes.
Foreign national visitors who appear on watch lists, whose
identities cannot be verified, or who attempt entry using
fraudulent documents will be efficiently sent to secondary
inspection for further processing.
The US-VISIT program will keep track of changes in foreign national
visitor status as well as identify visitors who have overstayed their
visas. This information will be reported to agencies, such as U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, for appropriate action.
As foreign national visitors leave the U.S., their exit will be
recorded. Entry and exit records will be matched and visa compliance
will be determined and maintained along with travel history.
The data acquired by the US-VISIT Program should prove increasingly
useful as it accumulates. Initially, this data will be used to develop
resource and staffing projections for Ports of Entry and regional
facilities. As more entry and exit information becomes available, the
US-VISIT Program will enable traffic, travel, and traveler analysis.
Travel and traveler analysis will contribute to foreign national risk
assessment and intelligence.
When the vision is fully realized the US-VISIT Program will
contribute to the border management goals and will provide our citizens
and visitors with a more expeditious and secure border-crossing
process.
The US-VISIT end vision will be achieved incrementally over the
next several years. The priorities in fiscal year 2003-2005 are to meet
the legislative mandates and demonstrate initial progress toward
achievement of performance goals for national security, facilitation of
trade and travel, and supporting immigration system improvements. In
fiscal year 2006, US-VISIT will complete satisfaction of its
legislative mandates. At this point, US-VISIT will have delivered an
interim capability that addresses the first set of requirements levied
on the program. However, the most crucial and challenging need of the
program-that of transforming border management through the delivery of
an endto-end, fully integrated set of processes and systems supporting
interoperability across the stakeholder community-will only be in its
early stages.
Transforming border management will require work on several fronts.
First, it means reengineering the processes to fully address creation
of the virtual border, development of integrated inspection processes
that leverage access to integrated traveler data, and enhancement of
analytical capabilities to support risk analysis and decision-making.
Second, it means tackling the challenging task of consolidating,
replacing, and retiring aging legacy systems. Modernizing the systems
supporting US-VISIT will require coordination of and collaboration on
system decisions across the border management community including DoS,
CBP, ICE, USCIS, DOJ, DOT, and Commerce. The need to improve system
performance, interoperability, and data sharing along with reducing O&M
costs will influence those decisions. Finally, it means ensuring that
US-VISIT monitor the international environment and the potential
threats and implement capabilities to address gaps in coverage of
travelers and entry points; identify opportunities to integrate
additional information sources, systems, and processes together to
extend the web for border management; and apply new technology where it
can help address mission goals.
US-VISIT will continue to work with its Federal stakeholders
through its Advisory Board to guide the course set for the Program
using the Board to identify issues that will require coordination and
policies that need to be defined.
4. In view of the prospect that few, if any, of the 27 Visa Waiver
Program countries can comply with the October 26, 2004, deadline to
begin issuing biometric passports, what steps does BTS expect to take?
Answer: All visa waiver program (VWP) countries had to certify by
October 26, 2004 that they have a program to issue biometrically
enhanced passports in order to continue in the VWP. Most, if not all,
of the VWP countries have informed the U.S. that they will not be able
to issue International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) compliant
passports by October 26, 2005 due to technical and other factors. The
Administration requested a two-year extension in order to allow the
countries time to meet the requirement. A one-year extension was
granted. As part of the decision to request the extension deadline, and
in order to provide enhanced security, as of September 30, 2004, all
VWP travelers will be enrolled in thru US-VISIT.
5. What additional security measures are anticipated for persons
holding Border Crossing Cards as US-VISIT comes into effect on the
southern border?
Answer: In response to congressional mandate, US-VISIT will take an
incremental approach to implementing enhanced security measures at land
border Ports of Entry (POEs). Currently, Border Crossing Card holders
who request a stay longer than 30 days (extended from 72 hours this
summer) or anticipate traveling beyond the 25 mile limit (75 miles in
Arizona) are required to provide biographic information regarding their
stay using a paper process (Form 1-94). By December 31, 2004, US-VISIT
will be deployed in the Secondary Inspection area of the 50 busiest
land POEs, including 34 on the southern border. . With the deployment
of US-VISIT travelers processed through secondary inspection will have
an additional requirement to provide biometric information (digital
photograph and fingerprints unless exempt by policy), which will
provide the following additional security benefits:
1. Improved traveler identification at Secondary Inspection
locations through use of biometrics.
2. A traveler's identity to be can be established and verified
using biometrics.
3. Improved document validation at Secondary Inspection
locations through expanded access to Department of State visa
data.
4. Improved threat analysis and determination of admissibility
through enhanced access to biometric Watch Lists at Secondary
Inspection locations.
5. The ability to present additional information to the CBP
officer in Secondary, which will allow the officer to view more
information in the same amount of time resulting in a more
informed decision regarding admissibility.
6. I-94 Data will be made available to all Ports of Entry and
authorized users within hours rather than the current process
which can take weeks.
US-VISIT intends to expand this capability to all land POEs by
December 31, 2005.
Customs and Border Protection
Cargo Security
6. The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $50 million for radiation
detection monitors. Is this funding for ``next generation'' or will it
be used to purchase and deploy machines at remaining land and sea ports
of entry?
Answer: The Department of Homeland Security anticipates that the
$50 million request in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request
for radiation detection equipment will be utilized for next-generation
technology deployment. DHS's Science and Technology Directorate is
working closely with Customs and Border Protection, Office of Field
Operations, to ensure that CBP has the best available radiation
detection technology.
7. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) helps
to ensure security of cargo all along the supply chain. Under this
program, companies sign an agreement with CBP to conduct a
comprehensive self-assessment of their supply chain security and to
improve that security using C-TPAT security guidelines. Companies that
meet security standards receive expedited processing through ports of
entry, again enabling CBP to focus on higher risk shipments. As of
August 2003, over 3900 companies are participating in C-TPAT to improve
the security of their supply chains. Based on current rates of
enrollment, this number is expected to reach 5000 companies enrolled by
the end of fiscal year 2004. Were there standards and best practices
developed for assessment and validation purposes of C-TPAT companies?
If so, who developed them and how?
Answer: There are specific security recommendations for each sector
of C-TPAT membership. These recommendations were developed by CBP, with
substantial input from the trade community, and based upon our 20 years
of anti-smuggling / industry partnership expenence.
What plans does BTS have order to ensure the continued integrity of
the companies screened and subject to less scrutiny at our ports of
entry?
Answer: C-TPAT Validations enable CBP to review the security
measures and procedures of the member's supply chain for effectiveness,
efficiency and for accuracy. Each Validation is customized based on the
member's business model and according to the security profile approved
by CBP.
Will DHS consider such options as random screening of ALL
cargo containers, including C-TPAT company's containers?
Answer: C-TPAT members are not exempt from CBP examinations.
8. The fiscal year 2004 budget request for CTPAT was 17.9 million
with 79 Full Time Employees (FTEs). The fiscal year 2005 request
represents a 111 increase in funding and 138 additional personnel. How
will the additional funding and staff be allocated?
Answer: The fiscal year 2004 appropriated amount for C-TPAT was
$14.1 million with 79 fulltime equivalents (FTEs), or 157 new
positions. The fiscal year 2005 request of $15.215 million represents
an increase in funding to cover an additional 60 FTEs, or 120 new
positions. The requested funding will be used for expenses associated
with the new positions, validations, equipment, training and outreach.
Is any funding directed toward engaging importers to join
the program?
Answer: An appropriate amount of funding will be utilized to engage
all sectors of CTPAT membership, including importers, for outreach and
recruiting purposes.
How much will go into validating applicants?
Answer: The primary responsibility of our Supply Chain Specialists
is to conduct validations. For this reason, the majority of our travel
money will be used for validating certified members.
What is the timeline for completing those validations?
Answer: Over 700 validations have been initiated with over 240
completed. Our goal for the current calendar year is to have completed
a total of 400 validations.
9. The fiscal year 2005 budget provides funding to hire 100
additional supply chain specialists to validate C-TPAT companies.
Currently there are 23 employees doing this work. There are roughly
5,000 companies in the program with 141 validations complete and over
700 in the process. What is the goal for completing the validation of
the 5,000 companies once additional staff is hired? Will the
approximately 120 FTEs provide some growth capacity for the program? At
the same time that we are trying to complete the validations, we are
trying to expand participation.
Answer: The validation process enables U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and the C-TPAT participant to jointly review the
participant's security procedures to ensure that security measures are
being effectively executed. The validation process also promotes an
exchange of information on security issues by both CBP and the company,
and the sharing of ``best practices'', with the ultimate goal of
strengthening the partnership and the security of the international
supply chain.
Over 700 validations have been initiated with over 240 completed.
Our goal for the current calendar year is to have completed a total of
400 validations.
The 120 new positions requested in fiscal year 2005 will also
enable growth capacity for CTPAT and will allow CBP to meet current
mandates, including conducting validations, performing trade outreach
and antiterrorism training. In addition, the 120 positions will allow
C-TPAT to continue to enable trade by improving supply chain security
and increasing supply chain performance. This optimizes the internal
and external management of assets and functions while at the same time
enhancing security in order to prevent the introduction of implements
of terrorism into legitimate trade entering the U.S.
10. Will CBP preserve its Customs Management Centers with their
existing organization and command structure?
Answer: The organizational structure was reviewed in fiscal year
2004. CBP, within the Office of Field Operations, will maintain 20
Directors of Field Operations--DFO's (formerly called Customs
Management Center Directors) in their field organizational structure
providing operational oversight to the ports of entry under their
jurisdiction. The CBP Field Offices will remain in the same 20 cities
where the Customs Management Centers were located.
Port Security
11. How are the respective DHS functions at seaports (i.e. Coast
Guard, ICE, CBP and TSA) coordinated? What steps is the Department
considering to integrate these functions?
Answer: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is implementing
an integrated and collaborative process among Federal, state, local and
private partners to gain the greatest intelligence about the people,
cargo and vessels operating in the maritime domain and most effectively
protect our ports and maritime infrastructure.
The principal coordination mechanism at the seaport level is the
Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC), authorized by the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA). The Coast Guard Captain of the Port
(COTP) directs the AMSC as the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator
(FMSC). Local DHS and other federal agency representatives, including
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), are on
each committee. Forty-three AMSCs have been chartered across the
country with emphasis on advance security measures and plans to deter
threats and provide a strong framework for response and recovery in the
event of attack. Under the AMSCs, Federal, state, local and private
authorities work together as a team to maintain and enhance security.
This type of teamwork enables the entire maritime community to rapidly
respond to both general and specific threats. Increased communication,
teamwork and coordination is an example of the public and private
sectors working together to secure our homeland. As a result, the
leadership team, the responders, and the organizations are in place and
working together to ensure security in our ports.
In the intelligence arena, the COASTWATCH program is the only
national level DHS node systematically fusing intelligence and law
enforcement data to identify and warn of potential security and
criminal threats in the commercial maritime realm far in advance of
their arrival.COASTWATCH's screening is focused on identifying specific
ships, people or cargo that DHS may wish to investigate for security or
significant criminal concerns prior to even nearing the port.
COASTWATCH results and warnings are shared widely with Coast Guard
operational commanders, the FBI, the Department of Defense (DoD), other
intelligence agencies, and our DHS sister agencies, including CBP, TSA,
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
On a daily basis, the Coast Guard, CBP and ICE work together to
ensure a coordinated effort to screen and evaluate safety and security
risk posed by vessels intending to enter a U.S. port. The Coast Guard
and CBP have collaborated on a joint effort to enhance the Coast
Guard's electronic notice of Arrival (e-NOA) system in order to meet
both the CG and CBP's mandatory submission requirements for vessel,
crew, passenger, and certain cargo information. Once completed, the e-
NOA will allow vessels to electronically submit the required CG / CBP
NOA information to one consolidated location. The e-NOA will reduce the
burden on industry by offering an easy-to-use, consolidated submission
method that will meet both the CG and CBP requirements thereby removing
duplicate reporting requirements. Furthermore, development of this
joint system will significantly enhance the processing and sharing of
information between DHS agencies, increase identification of security
and safety risk posed by vessels entering a U.S. port and increase our
overall MDA. The Coast Guard and CBP are in the field testing phase of
this process and anticipate the system should be available for full use
by the maritime industry in the fall of 2004.
The Coast Guard is enhancing its command centers in 40 locations
and is offering other DHS agencies and port partners the opportunity to
leverage our investment by either collocating their command and control
elements in our command center, or by participating on an ``as
necessary'' basis. We are establishing communications interoperability
with other agencies and, as our level of Maritime Domain Awareness
increases through the implementation of better sensors and intelligence
systems, the Coast Guard will be sharing portions of their Common
Operational Picture with our local, state and federal partners.
With our federal government's Awareness, Prevention, Protection,
Response and Recovery capabilities now under the roof of a single
department, the level of communication and cooperation among the sister
agencies of Coast Guard, TSA, ICE and CBP is stronger than ever. CBP,
TSA and CG are working together to support and align efforts to
implement MTSA through interagency working groups addressing cargo
security standards, port security assessments, international port
security and the development of the National Maritime Security Plan.
Border Patrol
12. How does CBP plan to incorporate Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) into border surveillance programs? How will these be coordinated
with aerial surveillance programs of the ICE Air and Marine Division)?
How will surveillance data be shared among CBP, ICE and other agencies?
Answer: CBP is working through the DHS UAV Executive Steering Group
and UAV Working Group to ensure maximum interoperability and
commonality is achieved across all of DHS. The DHS VAV Executive
Steering Group provides oversight and direction to the DHS UAV Working
Group. The members of the UAV Working Group include Coast Guard,
Science and Technology, and Border and Transportation Security (CBP,
ICE and TSA). CBP, within the working group, is currently participating
in an analysis of alternatives (AoA) for aerial surveillance needs
within DHS. Once this report is complete the group will begin a process
to establish a DHS-wide concept of operations (CONOP). At the
conclusion of the AoA, BTS will determine the need for UAVs as a
permanent asset for BTS in a CONOP. It is likely that UAVs will support
other current and emerging sensing technologies to monitor the U.S.
borders between ports of entry. The CONOPS for UAVs will identify
unique needs and requirements stemming from each components missions
and ensure that redundancy and overlaps are minimal. It will further
ensure that systems procured and deployed on behalf of the DHS are
interoperable, and that efficiencies are sought. Any data or
information of interest to the security of the United States that is
developed during the UAV test programs will be shared via existing
intelligence and investigative mechanisms. The recent movement of AMO
from ICE to CBP will enhance the development of the use of UAV's for
border security programs.
13. How will CBP and ICE coordinate expedited removal of illegal
aliens detained at the southern border who are not Mexican? Has BTS
adopted new removal procedures to support its Arizona Border Control
Initiative Are their comparable procedures in place for non-Canadians
detained at the northern border?
Answer: On August 11, 2004, DHS published a Notice in the Federal
Register enhancing its ability to apply expedited removal (ER) between
the ports of entry on the northern and southern borders of the United
States. The enhanced ER authority is a border control measure, and for
that reason, it will be applied only to those aliens who have been in
the United States for less than 14 days and are apprehended within 100
miles of the border. The enhanced ER is primarily directed at ``third
country nationals'' who are not citizens of Mexico or Canada. ER will
not be immediately extended to all land borders. It will first be
extended between the ports of entry in the Laredo and Tucson border
sectors and may be implemented in other border locations as needed. CBP
and ICE are working together to ensure those aliens placed in ER are
removed quickly. As for Canada, the United States and Canada have a
longstanding repatriation agreement that covers the repatriation of
third country nationals who have crossed the United States/Canadian
border. The United States and Canada have also entered into a ``safe
third'' agreement that requires (with significant exceptions) asylum-
seekers who have crossed the border to return to Canada and pursue
their asylum claim there. The ``safe third'' agreement was entered in
December 2002; a notice of proposed rule-making was issued on March 8,
2004, and the agreement will be implemented in the future.
14. How is BTS integrating and coordinated CBP, ICE and related
operations for the Arizona Border Control Initiative?
Answer: Border Patrol Tucson Sector Chief (David Aguilar) was
originally designated as the Border and Transportation Security (BTS)
Integrator for the execution of the ABC Initiative. Upon his promotion
to Chief, Border Patrol, the newly appointed Tucson Sector Chief,
Michael Nicley has taken over the role of Integrator. The Deputy is Mr.
Phillip Crawford of ICE. The Integrator and Deputy Integrator have a
combined planning staff in Tucson, Arizona. The Integrator provides the
multiple federal, state, local and Tribal agencies as well as the
public with a single point of contact for issues related to the
initiative. The Integrator maintains frequent direct communication with
the BTS Operations Staff for the purpose of rapidly sharing information
between Headquarters and the multiple agencies on scene. These
communications facilitate coordination on cross-cutting issues and
assist BTS in maintaining situational awareness of the progress of the
operation.
Transportation Security Administration
Air Security
15. What planning activities are in place to study airport demand
characteristics for the future and allocate screener staffing and
resources accordingly for fiscal year 2005 and beyond?
Answer: TSA is in the process of conducting a needs assessment to
determine the optimal number of screeners at each airport. To ensure
the project's success, TSA has partnered with the aviation industry to
form the U.S. Commercial Aviation Partnership, which is studying trends
in aviation and providing better forecasting to TSA regarding changes
that are expected in traffic patterns and airport demand. The needs
assessment effort will also draw on TSA's operational experience. TSA
believes that both precise forecasting and an operational record are
critical enablers of an accurate needs assessment to ensure that
resources are allocated in the most optimal manner in fiscal year 2005
and beyond.
Additionally, the Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) has been
tasked by Secretary Ridge to perform a Systems Engineering study of
Civil Aviation Security. Under Phase I of that study, staffing levels
have been obtained for representative alternative configurations for
checked baggage, checkpoint, and air cargo screening. Under Phase II of
that study, to be completed over the next several months, system-wide
staffing estimates will be obtained for these alternatives. However, it
is not intended that the S&T study will establish optimal staffing
levels on an airport-by-airport basis.
16. How will information technology tools like threat image
projection (TIP) be used to improve staffing allocations, training, and
so on at screener checkpoints? Have any justification studies been done
to show the long term payoffs derived from the up front costs of
implementing TIP and any other IT initiatives?
Answer: Threat Image Projection (TIP) is a valuable training and
performance monitoring tool but is not used to determine airport-by-
airport staffing allocations. The expanded 2400-image TIP library is
used as a key performance measurement of screener effectiveness and to
identify specific strengths and weaknesses in threat object recognition
and identification. TIP performance information is used locally by the
Federal Security Director to tailor weekly recurrent training for
screeners based on the areas that are identified for improvement.
National level trend data based on the new expanded TIP library is
being compiled and analyzed, and national TIP performance standards
will be issued once data integrity is assured. Analysis of TIP data is
showing a nationwide improvement in identification of threats of
approximately 2 percent per month. The Transportation Security Lab is
developing the functional requirements for the next generation of TIP
capable x-rays to include adaptive learning technology that reacts to
the strengths and weaknesses of the individual screener in selecting
the type of threat objects presented by increasing the difficulty as
the screeners' performance improves.
TSA believes that TIP is a critical element of its overall plan to
continuously improve screener performance, but has not yet conducted a
long-term payoff analysis quantifying its benefits. Federal Security
Directors have tools available to them to improve the management and
scheduling of screeners. Tools such as Kronos for time & attendance and
Sabre for screener scheduling provide real-time information which
enables the FSD at each airport to forecast periods of peak demand for
screening. Additionally, TSA uses more split shifts and part-time
screeners to maximize the operational flexibility available to FSDs
when scheduling screeners to satisfy varying levels of demand. These
applications are important tools that assist TSA in creating additional
capacity and greater efficiencies in the scheduling of screeners.
17. How does the funding for canine teams and the number of canine
teams for air cargo operations compare to the numbers of canine teams
and funding for operations inside the airport terminal? Has the pilot
program to study canine inspections of U.S. mail been continued/
expanded, and if so does this fall under the air cargo canine
operations or airport terminal canine operations?
Answer: TSA is currently authorized to deploy 341 explosives
detection canine teams at the Nation's airports. These teams are
trained, employed and their performance evaluated in airport terminals,
cargo operations, vehicles/parking lots along with narrow and wide body
aircraft. Based on each airports unique security requirements, the
teams are employed in both general airport and cargo operations areas
as needed. The total authorized number of canine teams nationwide is
determined by each individual airport's canine team's work load and
mission requirements. As an example, Miami International Airport would
have a larger canine team work load than Boise International Airport.
The TSA Explosives Detection Canine Team Program is a cooperative
partnership with participating airports and airport law enforcement
agencies. Currently, TSA provides partial reimbursement at $40,000 per
canine explosives team to support explosives detection operations at
each participating airport for costs associated with the teams, such as
salaries, canine food and veterinary care. Under our current
reimbursement guidelines, we have allocated a percentage of this figure
from cargo funds and a percentage from aviation funds. These
reimbursement percentages are based on the percentage of time canine
teams are deployed for air cargo and airport terminal operations. As
new teams are authorized, funded, and dedicated to cargo screening
operations, these percentages may change.
In early 2002, TSA, the United States Postal Service (USPS), and
the aviation industry, agreed that additional security screening
measures needed to be identified and developed before resuming the
transport of mail on passenger aircraft. In June 2002, TSA's National
Explosives Detection Canine Team Program conducted Operational Test &
Evaluation (OT&E) pilot testing at six (6) major airports with the
assistance from the USPS and airline industry to determine and
demonstrate the canine teams' ability to detect actual explosive
targets within packages that simulated Priority Mail products that were
independently introduced into actual mail. An additional purpose of the
pilot testing was to compare the throughput capabilities of both X-Ray
and canine resources under operational conditions. The results were
successful. Consequently, in November 2002, TSA established canine
screening operations for priority mail, in excess of 16 ounces, through
partnership agreements with USPS and the airline industry at 10
airports within the 48 contiguous states and at San Juan, PR and
Honolulu, HI. By the end of fiscal year 2004 over 23,000,000 packages
will have been successfully screened by TSA-certified explosives
detection canine teams. The pilot program to study canine inspections
of U.S. mail falls under the air cargo operations.
TSA is currently conducting additional Canine Cargo Pilot OT&E
testing in two phases:
Phase I, tested various explosive targets/distracters
that were introduced into multiple cargo configurations at six
major airports. All testing was conducted under actual cargo
operations and various weather conditions. The OT&E is complete
and the preliminary results are promising. The final report is
expected in the coming weeks.
Phase II, OT&E started in June 2004 and was completed
on schedule in August 2004. The tests were conducted at six
major airports where expanded explosive detection investigation
took place using multiple cargo airline containers, airline
ground support equipment and USPS rolling stock equipment
configurations under actual cargo/mail operations and
environments. Testing evaluated TSA-certified canine teams'
ability to screen larger volumes of mail placed inside USPS
``rolling stock'' equipment containers, which hold larger
volumes of bags/boxes. The final test results will be analyzed
and recommendations will be proposed for both cargo and mail,
in excess of 16 ounces, screening operations at other major
airports using TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams
along with other system technologies for mail and cargo
transported on passenger aircraft.
Railway Security
18. How are the responsibilities related to rail and transit
security divided between the TSA and the FTA? Are there mechanisms in
place to eliminate duplication of efforts, or do some of these
responsibilities need to be further clarified by Congress?
Answer: DHS, DOT and component agencies including TSA, FTA, FRA and
RSPA coordinated very closely on initiatives relating to rail and
transit security, including the issuance of educational materials and
security directives establishing a new baseline of security for transit
and passenger rail operators after attacks on transit systems in Moscow
and Madrid earlier this year and during both planning for and operation
of short-term protective initiatives undertaken for various national
special security events (NSSEs) this summer, including the two national
conventions, and the period of time leading up to the elections. This
coordination involved the identification and allocation of resources,
assets and responsibilities. In addition, DHS and DOT have collaborated
very closely on initiatives designed to improve the security posture of
rail operators and shippers that transport Toxic by Inhalation (TIH)
chemicals, and the major population centers through and near which such
chemicals are shipped. DHS and DOT are also actively engaged in
discussions regarding both a transit-specific Memorandum of
Understanding to articulate DHS component (TSA, IAIP) and DOT modal
administration (FTA) responsibilities for securing public
transportation systems--responsibilities that are shared with the local
system owners and operators, and an overarching MOU which will set
forth very clearly how the two departments and the component agencies
will communicate and cooperate with regard to specific initiatives
designed to strengthen security in the transportation sector.
In general, on December 17, 2003, the President issued Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7), which established that the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation
will ``collaborate on all matters relating to transportation security
and transportation infrastructure protection.'' HSPD-7 ``establishes a
national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and
prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and
to protect them from terrorist attack.'' Under HSPD-7, the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security has the lead role in coordinating
protection activities for ``transportation systems, including mass
transit, aviation, maritime, ground/surface, and rail and pipeline
systems,'' while DOT is responsible for promoting the safety,
efficiency, effectiveness, and economic well-being of the nation's
transportation systems. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
responsible under HSPD-7 for developing a National Critical
Infrastructure Protection Plan. TSA has been assigned primary
responsibility for coordinating the development of the Transportation
Sector Specific Plan among the various federal agencies with
responsibilities in the transportation sector, including DOT and its
modal administrations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S.
Coast Guard, and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate, among others.
DOT and its component modal administrations have subject matter
expertise, substantial relationships, and frequent interactions with
stakeholders and federal agencies involved in the entire Transportation
Sector. For these reasons, and pursuant to HSPD-7, TSA collaborates
closely with DOT's modal administrators, including the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), on
transportation sector security. In partnership with other component
agencies of DHS and in coordination with DOT modal administrations and
state, local and private sector partners, TSA leverages existing
security initiatives; coordinates the development of national
performance-based security standards and guidance; develops security
plans; assesses security vulnerabilities and identifies needed security
enhancements; identifies areas where regulations may be necessary to
improve the security of passengers, cargo, conveyances, transportation
facilities and infrastructures; and identifies areas where better
compliance with established regulations and policies can be achieved.
TSA is currently developing modal-specific security plans to flesh out
additional details of each of the transportation modes encompassed
within the Transportation Sector Specific plan. TSA is working with DOT
modal administrators in developing these plans.
19. What level of coordination of transit security efforts is
currently taking place between the TSA, state and local transit
authorities and Amtrak?
Answer: TSA works closely with FTA, state and local transit
authorities and Amtrak on a regular basis. Before and since the
issuance of the Security Directives (SD) on May 20, 2004, TSA has been
in close communication with the FTA and FRA, and transit agencies and
passenger rail operators throughout the nation. TSA's SDs have assisted
in ensuring that best practices implemented by a number of the nation's
largest transit systems both prior to and after the Madrid and Moscow
attacks, due greatly to the significant effort undertaken by FTA in the
wake of 9/11 to undertake comprehensive vulnerability assessments of
major transit systems, are implemented consistently through all the
nation's commuter rail and transit systems. Additionally, TSA, IP and
FTA are coordinating very closely to conduct additional criticality
assessments of the top rail-based mass transit assets.
TSA has initiated a project aimed at providing comprehensive
security reviews of all owners and operators in the rail and transit
environment. TSA meets with stakeholders to review and assess security
plans and to ensure that baseline security measures have been addressed
for different threat levels.
FTA and TSA receive and share information on threats and
intelligence through the Surface Transportation ISAC (Information
Sharing and Analysis Center) managed by the Association of American
Railroads (AAR). TSA has also sponsored a tabletop exercise at Union
Station Washington, DC involving stakeholders, emergency responders and
enforcement agencies in implementing the station's Emergency Response
Plan.
TSA, AMTRAK, and Federal Railroad Administration coordinated to
institute a passenger and carry-on baggage-screening prototype for
explosives in a rail environment called the Transit and Rail Inspection
Pilot (TRIP). Phase I was conducted in partnership with DOT, Amtrak,
MARC and Washington's Metro from May 4 to May 26 at the New Carrollton,
MD, station. Phase II was conducted in conjunction with AMTRAK between
June 7 and July 5 at Washington, D.C.'s Union Station, and Phase III
was conducted from July 19 to August 20 and involved a partnership
between DHS, DOT and the State of Connecticut's Shoreline East Commuter
Rail.
Additionally, TSA, in coordination with the Department of Defense
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), initiated a project at Amtrak's
30th Street Station in Philadelphia. The objective of the TSWG funded
Mass Transit Video Surveillance project is to develop and deploy an
integrated monitoring, detection, and alerting system with the ability
to distinguish, track, and display anomalous human behavior in
multiple-stream video feeds for the identification of possible
terrorist attacks in a mass transit setting. The system is to be
adaptable for monitoring a variety of mass transportation venues,
including mass transit subway stations, light rail stations, bus
terminals, tunnels, and bridges, and testing is expected to commence in
late fiscal year 2004.
20. What is the current status of TSA's planned threat based
security management system for all modes of transportation, and
specifically for passenger rail security? How does this system address
passenger rail security?
Answer: Consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7,
governing protection of critical infrastructures, TSA is developing a
national transportation security strategy that focuses on awareness,
prevention, response, recovery, restoration of services, and restoring
public confidence. In partnership with other component agencies of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), modal administrations of the
Department of Transportation (DOT) and industry stakeholders, TSA is
working to assess security vulnerabilities and identify needed
enhancements to the rail system and related infrastructure, develop
national performance-based security standards and guidance to assess
and improve the security of passengers, cargo, conveyances,
transportation facilities and infrastructures; and ensure compliance
with established regulations and policies. This information will be
incorporated into the Transportation Sector Specific Plan (SSP), part
of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan pursuant to
HSPD-7. The SSPs articulate and seek to better define and improve how
federal and privatesector stakeholders communicate and work together;
how important assets in the transportation sector are to be identified,
assessed, and prioritized; how protective programs will be developed;
how risk reduction will be measured; and how R&D will be prioritized.
TSA and DOT Modal administrations are building the foundation of the
SSPs to create modal security plans, including mass transit and rail,
to provide overall operational planning guidance on transit and rail
security. Development of the Transportation and other SSPs is nearly
complete. Development of the modal plans will leverage the interagency
working groups formed to develop the SSP, and is also underway.
Efforts in rail transit security over the past two years have
focused on greater information sharing between the industry and all
levels of government, assessing vulnerabilities in the rail and transit
sector to develop new security measures and plans, increasing training
and public awareness campaigns, and providing greater assistance and
funding for rail transit activities.
TSA will continue to assess the risk of terrorist attacks on non-
aviation transportation modes, assess the need for passenger, cargo,
and supply-chain standards and procedures to address those risks, and
ensure compliance with established standards and policies. The
following are some of the activities and initiatives DHS has/will
implement in partnership with TSA to strengthen security in surface
modes:
Issued Security Directives (SD) to ensure that best
security practices are implemented throughout the industry. The
SDs establish 16 mandatory protective measures for commuter and
transit passenger rail, inter-city train, and regional
services.
Ensure compliance with security standards for commuter
and rail lines and better help identify gaps in the security
system in coordination with DOT, with additional technical
assistance and training provided by TSA;
Study hazardous materials (HAZMAT) security threats
and identify best practices to enhance the security of
transporting HAZMAT.
Conducted a pilot program to test the new technologies
and screening concepts to evaluate the feasibility of screening
luggage and carry-on bags for explosives at rail stations and
aboard trains;
Develop and implement a mass transit vulnerability
self-assessment tool;
Continue the distribution of public security awareness
material (i.e., tip cards, pamphlets, and posters) for
motorcoach, school bus, passenger rail, and commuter rail
employees;
Increase passenger, rail employee, and local law
enforcement awareness through public awareness campaigns and
security personnel training;
21. When does TSA expect to complete (a) name-based checks and (b)
criminal background checks for the Transportation Worker Identification
Card (TWIC) Program? Does TSA intend to prioritize categories of
workers for background checks?
Answer: The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
Prototype Phase has begun in three regional areas: LA / Long Beach, CA;
Delaware River and Bay; and the State of Florida. Participation in the
TWIC Prototype Phase is voluntary and expected to include not more than
200,000 people. TSA intends to complete name-based checks on prototype
participants against lists of known/suspected terrorists in all three
regions during the Prototype Phase, but will not make a decision on
conducting criminal background checks until after the prototype is
complete. Florida, which is a TWIC Prototype Phase participant, will
continue to conduct criminal background checks under that state's
current statutory authority. This background check is a state
requirement and not a federal or TWIC requirement.
In conducting the Prototype, TSA and transportation stakeholders
intend to further evaluate background check approaches and their
ability to meet the TWIC program's three goals of improving security,
enhancing commerce, and protecting individuals' privacy. Planning for
full implementation continues and will be significantly affected by the
results and lessons learned in Prototype. This planning process will
include a detailed review of the schedule for implementation, which
will establish a timeline for completion of name based and criminal
background checks for transportation workers.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Federal Air Marshals
22. Does BTS expect that requiring air marshals on flights by foreign
carriers to the United States would necessitate significant new
resources, e.g. for training and liaison with foreign governments and
airlines? How can BTS vet and certify foreign air marshals to ensure
they have right level of training and professionalism?
Answer: The US Government does not require air marshals on foreign
air carrier flights transiting to/from the United States. On Dec 28,
2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued an
Emergency Amendment (EA) making reference to placing foreign air
marshals on flights to/from/over flying the U.S. ``where necessary''
when threat information warranted such action. The EA did not stipulate
that foreign air marshals were required, only that they may be
required. However, this did prompt many foreign governments to
reexamine their need for air marshals. As a result, the U.S. Federal
Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has received numerous requests for FAMS
provided air marshal training. If the US Government eventually requires
air marshals on foreign flights, then, the FAMS can expect to see an
escalation of foreign requests for training. The U.S. Government does
not certify foreign air marshal programs nor is the U. S. FAMS vetted
or certified by any foreign entity. Those countries that have air
marshals transiting the U.S. have been allowed to do so by the
Department of State (DOS) and the TSA. The DOS relies on TSA's input as
to whether permission (through a visa) should be granted.
Temporary Worker Initiative
23. Is USCIS' Basic Pilot Program for employer verification an
appropriate model for the President's proposal? How might this be
linked with the ICE Worksite Enforcement Program to develop an
effective long term, nationwide program? (Note: P.L. 108-156 mandates
expansion of the Basic Pilot Program at a projected cost of about $5.0
million more than the current $6.0 million budget.)
Answer: The concept behind the Basic Pilot Program can be an
integral and effective part in ICE's overall Worksite Enforcement/
Critical Infrastructure Protection strategy. The capability of
legitimate employers to easily verify employment authorization will
help to reduce the number of opportunities for undocumented aliens who
gain employment in the United States through the presentation of
fraudulent documents. As the program expands throughout the United
States, ICE may use it to supplement its enforcement plan as an after
action tool. For example, recent ICE operations have focused on the
reduction of vulnerabilities to the nation's economy and critical
infrastructure. As ICE reviews employers and employees in these areas,
the employers may be enrolled in the Basic Pilot Program to assure that
future employees are authorized for employment. This will reduce the
need for ICE to continue to scrutinize a particular industry.
Given its expanded use and potentially growing role, it will be
important to re-evaluate the technology incorporated in the Basic Pilot
Program to ensure that it will continue to provide a fool-proof tool
for employers.
ICE Detention and Removal
24. As the pace of ICE enforcement and removal activity quickens
(with the $186 million increase in fiscal year 2005 programs), at what
point will the number of detained aliens exceed the capacity of DHS to
hold them or keep track of them?
Answer: Currently, ICE detains 23,000 aliens, on average, per day.
However, ICE estimates that there is a potential requirement for
detaining upwards of 36,000 aliens, on average, per day. Because
detention is very expensive and because not all aliens must be detained
in order to maintain effective control over them, DHS / ICE is
developing more cost-effective alternatives to detention. Alternative
to detention initiatives include electronic monitoring and intensive
community supervision.
For fiscal year 2004, DHS / ICE is piloted eight intensive
supervision sites, each with 200 participants. The fiscal year 2005
budget includes funding ($11 million) to double the capacity at each of
those sites and to add one new site. These enhancements allow for the
controlled supervision of 3,400 low threat-risk aliens nationwide. Use
of detention alternatives for low risk aliens allows for increased
detention of higher risk aliens and results in better security for US
citizens. This initiative received appropriations in fiscal year 2005
at the level of the request.
It is difficult to estimate the precise point at which the number
of detained aliens will exceed DHS' ability to either hold or keep
track of them. Currently, DHS / ICE effectively detains or supervises
approximately 1 million aliens nationwide. Clearly, initiatives such as
alternatives to detention expand DHS's ability to control non-detained
aliens, while initiatives such as expedited removals and institutional
removals speed the process of deporting removable aliens and thereby
reduce overall requirements for detention and tracking.
25. Do the MOUs with Florida and Alabama on local enforcement of
immigration laws provide a boilerplate for expanded interior
enforcement? Does ICE plan any new MOU's as provided by the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and other
legislation?
Answer: Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(I&NA) affords ICE and state and local law enforcement agencies an
opportunity to address specific criminal activity and security concerns
when dealing with foreign nationals residing in the United States. The
Section 287(g) Program serves as a force multiplier for both ICE and
the participating state/local agency.
The required Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is used to establish
the parameters by which the cross-designated officers will use their
ICE immigration authority. This allows both parties to address the
public safety concerns in their geographical areas covered by the MOU.
ICE is currently developing MOUs with the Commonwealth of Virginia
and Los Angeles County, under 287(g). ICE does not actively pursue or
solicit state and/or local enforcement agencies to participate in the
287(g) Program. The state and/or local political entity must initiate a
request to DHS/ICE to participate in the 287(g) Program.
ICE Air and Marine Operations (AMO)
26. How have AMO's operations and responsibilities changed since 9/
11, and what resource demands have these changes entailed? How are
these needs being met?
Answer: In the post-9/11 strategic environment, a new national
requirement for airspace and marine security has been identified and
entrusted to AMO. This includes new missions such as airspace security
over Washington, D.C., designated National Security Special Events,
Continuity of Government operations and the launch of five new Northern
Border Branches. This is a significant and rapid expansion of
operations and responsibilities beyond AMO's legacy customs
interdiction mission.
AMO covers the most pressing tasks and missions today by surging
its personnel, resources and force structure that are still mainly
sized against the pre-9/11 legacy missions. Supplemental appropriations
have met some of the additional costs associated with the expansion in
AMO missions and responsibilities. AMO is presently revalidating
requirements and identifying the force structure and capital equipment
needed to complete its transition into a force enabled to cover fully
all of the new air and marine missions beyond its legacy Customs
interdiction role.
27. What plans are there to economize or integrate BTS and Coast
Guard air and marine assets--e.g., capital acquisitions and facilities,
support and maintenance programs?
Answer: In fiscal year 2005, BTS air and marine assets will be
consolidated within the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
Efforts are underway to manage that consolidation to ensure the maximum
operational and cost efficiencies.
While this consolidation proceeds, the Department will continue to
review additional operational and cost efficiencies that can be gained
between CBP and Coast Guard air and marine personnel, programs and
equipment. The Department manages this ongoing review through the
Aviation Management Council which provides the leadership and oversight
on joint DHS Aviation policy, operations, procedures, requirements,
sourcing strategies and asset management to support the needs of the
Department. This group is currently engaged in drafting a Department-
wide Aviation Concept of Operations for review by the DHS Joint
Requirements Council.
Similarly marine assets continue to be reviewed by the Department's
Vessel Commodity Council. Although CBP and USCG have very different
marine missions, efficiencies may be gained by consolidating hull
designs and/or outboard engines, and standardizing maintenance
procedures on similar platforms and equipment. Furthermore, other
actions are being taken, for example: CBP is currently co-located with
USCG at their Niagara facility; also, upon delivery of the SAFE Boats
purchased from a Coast Guard contract, CBP plans to co-locate with USCG
and ICE at their facilities in Bellingham, WA, and is exploring
consolidated maintenance facilities with both USCG and ICE in
Brownsville, TX; and CBP is in the process of scheduling
representatives from the Coast Guard to provide an unbiased look at CBP
boat operations (in selected sectors) and offering best practices for
consideration.
28. What will be the effect of the proposed threefold increase in
flight hours on the AMO's aging P-3 surveillance aircraft? When will
DHS need to start replacing or refitting these aircraft?
Answer: The flying constraint has primarily been adequacy of
operations and maintenance funding. AMO's current P-3 inventory is
capable of flying the requested increased flight hours. With minor
manning augmentation, it will be very achievable to meet the increased
and expanded mission requirements.
Recapitalizing or modernizing to meet the P-3 specific mission
capability is part of AMO's deliberate modernization plan. This plan
will be reviewed by both the Department's Aviation Management Council,
and the Joint Requirements Council vis-a-vis all the other DHS aviation
requirements. Once that review is complete a recapitalization plan will
be developed.
29. When will DHS submit to Congress its ``Assessment of Aviation
Operations and Support?'' Will it conduct a similar review of AMO, CBP
and Coast Guard maritime operations to assess benefits of integrating
those activities?
Answer: The ``Assessment of Aviation Operations and Support'' has
been conducted with the assistance of Booz-Allen-Hamilton. The
Department has already initiated many of the recommendations stemming
from the report. The Assessment of Aviation Operations and Support
results have been made available to the Government Accountability
Office to aid in their engagements pertaining to the Review of the DHS
Efforts to Share Assets. Once the full report has been reviewed and
accepted throughout the Department it will be available for
distribution.
30. What are DHS recommendations for closing gaps in low-level
surveillance by Tethered Aerostat Radars (TARS)? How should this
coverage be assured over the long term? Has DHS made an assessment of
any new technology or systems which can fulfill this role?
Answer: TARS is a critical component in the interdiction of
airborne threats to the U.S. and forms part of our last line of border
defense. It is the only fixed system that provides low-level radar
coverage of air targets, and can provide some surveillance of maritime
and land targets.TARS currently provides the nation's most effective
surveillance system against multiple threats, and serves many national
objectives including homeland security; countering illicit traffickers
(air, land and sea); air sovereignty; air traffic control, and flight
safety. TARS is the only sensor system that can provide detection and
monitoring (D&M) of multiple airborne threats (drug smuggling,
terrorism, air-delivered WMD) on the southern approaches to the US--
especially the southwest border.
Counterdrug D&M was made the statutory responsibility of DOD in the
1989 Defense Authorization Act. Specific responsibility for funding and
operation of TARS was assigned to DOD by separate statute in 1992. We
believe that this critical system, by roles, missions, and governmental
functions was properly assigned to DOD by Congress. DOD should retain
responsibility for this critical system.
The Department of Homeland Security is a strong advocate for TARS
and supports a complete TARS border surveillance system, until new
technologies are developed to meet this operational requirement. This
system would support air, land and sea surveillance requirements of
Border Patrol, U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Air and Marine Operations
and other DHS components as well as DoD.
DHS is exploring new technology to meet border security mission
requirement. The border security mission will be supported through a
variety of systems. Sensors such as TARS, UAVs, rotary and fixed wing
aircraft, and ground-based equipment and personnel to operate and
maintain these systems must be coordinated and aligned against the
highest critical vulnerabilities and threats. TARS is one critical and
cost-effective element of this system.UAVs hold promise in some
applications.
Overseas Programs (ICE and CBP)
31. What plans does ICE have for expanding the reach of the Visa
Security Program (mandated by P.L. 107-296, Section 428) to countries
other than Saudi Arabia?
Answer: DHS plans to open additional overseas visa security offices
during fiscal year 2005. DHS, in consultation with DOS Bureau of
Consular Affairs, has identified the next priority sites based on a
risk assessment. To extend the reach of the program, these next offices
will cover defined geographic regions. As well, DHS is exploring the
concept of ``rapid response teams'' that would deploy to posts for
short periods of time to provide advice and training to the consular
officers on emerging threats and various methods to enhance their
adjudication activities.
32. What value-added can VSP officers bring to overseas functions
beyond what is already covered by Department of State officers (who
themselves receive training in security procedures with DHS assistance
under terms of a DHS-State MOU)? To what extent will VSP officers play
a liaison role to build up cooperation with their host country law
enforcement counterparts?
Answer: Each department has a separate focus, responsibility, and
area of expertise. Visa Security Officers (VSOs) focus on visa issues
and individual applicants that raise national and homeland security
concerns, whereas Consular Officers manage the day-to-day adjudication
of visa applications while also keeping security a high priority. VSOs
bring extensive subject matter expertise to this process, including
knowledge of immigration law, counter terrorism, document analysis,
investigations, intelligence research and dissemination, interviewing
and fraud detection. VSOs are seasoned, highly skilled officers with
experience in criminal enforcement outside, at, and within the border,
including potential abuses of the visa process. As law enforcement
officers, VSOs are best equipped to interpret, evaluate, and apply this
information. VSOs will coordinate with other law enforcement
authorities and appropriate DHS headquarters components to gather
information necessary to refuse visas to individuals who pose security
concerns, and to investigate abuses of the visa system. At post, VSOs
will participate in the terrorist lookout committee and other relevant
groups, and will build relationships with the u.S. law enforcement
community,. VSOs will assist with intelligence research, investigative
activity, risk assessment, and other collaborative law enforcement
efforts.
33. What plans does DHS have for the reported ``Immigration
Security Initiative,'' i.e. placing CBP inspectors at foreign hub
airports to pre-screen U.S.-bound passengers? Have the concerned
foreign governments agreed to this and, if so, with what conditions?
How many inspectors might be required, and does the fiscal year 2005
budget cover this program?
Answer: The Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), formerly known as
the Immigration Security Initiative (ISI) began a pilot program on June
26, 2004, with the deployment of four U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) Officers to Schiphol Airport, the Netherlands. After
the advice and consent of CBP's international partners in customs and
immigration, CBP Commissioner Bonner renamed this program from ISI to
IAP. A second effort began at Warsaw's Chopin Airport on September 15,
2004, with the deployment of five CBP Officers.
The IAP is based on a concept that is recognized and endorsed by
the International Air Transport Association/Control Authority Working
Group (IATA/CAWG). In fact, IATA/CAWG developed a code of conduct for
the Immigration Liaison Officer (ILO). Other like-minded countries,
Canada, United Kingdom, Australia and the Netherlands have similar
programs in place.
The number of officers needed depends on the flight and passenger
volume at each location. At major overseas hubs many U.S. bound flights
depart within a narrow time frame. Therefore, there will be a need for
more officers at those locations.
Congress added $2 million in fiscal year 2005 to expand the program
to new locations.
34. How can BTS leverage its resources for greater effectiveness of
its overseas personnel? For example, can VSP officers carry out pre-
inspection tasks on behalf of CBP? How has BTS organized its component
units overseas to ensure that they are coordinated and can complement
one another?
Answer: The structure of the DHS international organization is
currently under review. BTS in particular is considering ways to better
share resources and responsibilities and to improve coordination and
communication among overseas components.
35. What plans does BTS have to attract qualified personnel and
build up a cadre of officers with the necessary functional, linguistic
and international expertise as mandated in Section 428 of the Homeland
Security Act?
Answer: BTS has developed a staffing model for the visa security
offices overseas and has defined selection criteria for Visa Security
Officers (VSOs). These criteria include: law enforcement expertise,
including investigations; counterterrorism experience; fraud document
detection training and experience; knowledge of immigration law;
experience working overseas in a diplomatic and interagency
environment; and language capabilities. The law enforcement career
tracks within the BTS components of ICE and CBP provide a large
available cadre of personnel with these types of functional expertise,
including experience working overseas. BTS has been very successful
recruiting volunteers to serve in the program and will continue to tap
this highly skilled pool of personnel. Once selected, the officers will
receive mission-specific training that refreshes functional skills and
prepares VSOs to serve in this unique capacity. BTS will continue to
address the government-wide shortage of language-qualified personnel by
providing significant language training to the VSOs.
Counter-Narcotics
36. In the Homeland Security Act, the Department was organized to
include a dedicated Counter-Narcotics Officer on your staff who is to
ensure adequate focus of homeland security resources to the counterdrug
mission. This Counter-Narcotics Officer is also designated as the U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) and reports to the Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) on the overall national
interdiction effort. How effective has this dual position been? What
organizational relationship is there between the positions of the
Undersecretary and the Counter-Narcotics Officer? Does the Department
of Homeland Security have the resources necessary to attack the current
drug threat while keeping up with its other responsibilities?
Answer: The position of DHS Counternarcotics Officer was created as
an advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security, not part of BTS
staff. The current CNO serves in multiple roles as ONDCP Director of
Intelligence, as United States Interdiction Coordinator, and as DHS
counternarcotics officer. I meet regularly with the CNO, and two of my
staff are located in his office. These actions help ensure the closest
coordination possible on counternarcotics issues.
Questions Submitted by the House Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Minority Staff
1. According to recent testimony from Dr. Randy Null and additional
discussions with TSA staff, there are 30--40 airports that would see
security and efficiency benefits by implementing in-line screening
systems. However, TSA has signed Letters of Intent with only eight
airports, and does not plan to expand to significantly more airports.
What is the Department's plan for implementing Letters of Intent at
more airports, especially at those that aren't currently able to
electronically screen all checked baggage?
Answer: While numerous airports have expressed interest in entering
into an LOI for an in-line baggage screening solution, TSA continues to
use its available funding for EDS installation work at airports that
have yet to achieve, or cannot maintain, compliance with the 100
percent electronic screening requirement at all airports. TSA is
working with airports that will not be able to maintain compliance with
the 100 percent electronic screening requirement because of increased
passenger loads, increased and/or additional air carrier service, and/
or airport terminal modifications and expansions. The President's
Budget for fiscal year 2005 supports previously issued 8 LOIs for 9
airports, and assumes a 75/25 cost share formula as set in the
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003. TSA also provides support
to some airports that have not received an LOI, by providing additional
funding to install equipment to accommodate increased passenger loads
and new air carrier service. Although 8 LOIs have been issued, TSA
continues to evaluate situations where an in-line solution makes sense
from the standpoint of security, efficiency, and reduced staffing
needs.
2. Congress has instituted a cap of 45,000 TSA screeners. Recent
reports indicate that many airports are understaffed, which leads to
detection equipment going unused; transfer of screeners away from
baggage checkpoints to passenger checkpoints, leaving too few screeners
inspecting checked baggage, and an increase in delay times. Do you
believe that 45,000 screeners is the optimal workforce size? Would you
support a detailed study of how many people are needed to appropriately
conduct airport screening?
Answer: TSA is committed to providing strong security and the best
possible customer service while working within the 45,000 screener cap
set by Congress. TSA is creating a more flexible workforce, better
coordinating airline schedules and passenger load with staffing needs,
increasing the proportion of part-time to full-time screeners, and
strategically using its mobile National Screener Force to meet seasonal
fluctuations in workload. TSA expects to have a parttime screener
workforce of close to 20 percent by the end of 2004. Part-time
screeners create additional operational flexibility when scheduling
screeners to satisfy varying levels of demand. As a result of reducing
excess capacity at periods of lower demand, TSA is seeking to make more
FTEs available to the system as a whole during peak periods.
In the short-term, TSA is also revising its screener allocation
methodology which will be completed in 2004.\1\ The approach calls upon
modeling capabilities and actual operational experience. The revised
allocation will not be similar to the right-sizing that occurred last
year, but rather will be modest adjustments based on items such as
forecasted air travel, hours of operation, baggage screening areas,
passenger checkpoint lanes, types of equipment and screener Standard
Operating Procedures as well as FSD input and involvement. TSA is
shaping the airport's screener staffing levels based on direct input
from FSDs and will regularly monitor these numbers to ensure staffing
levels are appropriate based on work force needs.
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\1\ After the date of this hearing, TSA completed its revisions of
the allocation of screeners. The numbers were announced on May 14, 2004
and reflect a modest adjustment to a workforce already functioning for
the last six months at the 45,000 full-time equivalent cap.
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Simultaneously, TSA is in the process of conducting a needs
assessment to determine the optimal number of screeners at each
airport. This is a longer-term project that will evaluate many
different factors and variables need to be weighed in order to complete
a thorough study that can be used for all airports across the country.
To ensure the project's success, TSA has partnered with the aviation
industry to form the U.S. Commercial Aviation Partnership, which is
studying trends in aviation and providing better forecasting to TSA
regarding changes that are expected in traffic patterns and airport
demand. The needs assessment effort will also draw on TSA's operational
experience. TSA believes that both precise forecasting and an
operational record are critical enablers of an accurate needs
assessment to ensure that resources are allocated in the most optimal
manner.
3. Why is the operations budget of the Federal Air Marshal Service
being cut in this request? If it is because Secret Service and other
federal law enforcement officers are substituting on some flights, what
level of training are those officers receiving to act as air marshals?
Answer: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to view
the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) as a fundamental component of
our national security plan and overall counter-terrorism efforts. The
services provided by the FAMS are integral to our efforts to instill
and sustain public confidence in our civil aviation system and for
providing an expanded law enforcement capability in our skies that
previously did not exist. In fact, within the span of roughly two and a
half years the FAMS has fielded a trained work force of literally
thousands of FAMSs to protect America's citizens and interests in our
commercial air transportation system.
In this same time, DHS has also worked with the Congress to invest
in, develop and implement a layered security plan that encompasses the
coordinated efforts of an entire spectrum of Federal, State and local
agencies. These agencies are working together to provide an array of
intelligence, enforcement and protection services to our civil aviation
system, our borders and to other areas vital to the nation. Under this
strategy, we have established mechanisms and programs designed
specifically to complement one another. For example, DHS has invested
in cutting edge technology for airport and baggage screening
activities; we have hardened cockpit doors; we have established a
Federal flight deck officer training program; and we are continuously
working to apply the latest intelligence information in shaping our
decision-making and response to terrorist threats.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request reflects this layered approach.
Not only does it include a request that represents a 32 percent
increase over the fiscal year 2003 level but it also includes a $600
million request for TSA to increase aviation security and a $10 million
dollar request for Science & Technology efforts to supports the FAMS.
The Department is evaluating ways to best leverage the law
enforcement resources of other ICE programs and federal law enforcement
agencies in general, in improving our aviation security/counter-
terrorism efforts. These initiatives include the Mission Surge Program,
which pairs Federal Air Marshals with ICE agents during peak threat
periods, and the Force Multiplier Program (FMP). Through the FMP,
participating agencies are provided a computer based training to
prepare Federal law enforcement officers to react within the unique
aircraft environment in fan in-flight crisis. Participating Federal law
enforcement officers traveling in their normal course of business are
not replacements for Federal Air Marshals. However, the FMP is intended
to allow FAMS planners to better manage and allocate Federal Air
Marshal resources and otherwise improve coverage of priority flights of
interest.
4. The GAO recently reported that the CAPPS II systems had met only
one of eight requirements and that several management and program
objectives were still undeveloped. What is the Department's timeline
for initial operating capability, full operating capability, and
deployment of the CAPPS II system? What specific activities will be
supported with the increased funding requested for fiscal year 2005?
Answer: After a lengthy review, DHS has announced the creation of
the new Secure Flight program, which will serve as the next generation
domestic airline passenger passenger prescreening program. Secure
Flight will shift responsibility for conducting airline passenger pre
screening from the airlines to TSA by checking domestic airline
passenger name records against the consolidated terrorism watch list
maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and applying a
modified version of the CAPPS I rules currently operated by the Air
Carriers.
Secure Flight will only be implemented after it has undergone
rigorous and complete testing to ensure that it effectively strengthens
the security of travel by air, adequately protects passenger privacy,
and enhances the free flow of commerce. Testing, using historical
passenger name record information is slated to begin no later than
December 1, 2004. Secure Flight is expected to be operational in fiscal
year 2005. TSA will ensure that GAO has access to applicable
information regarding Secure Flight.
TSA would spend the $60 million requested for fiscal year 2005 in
the following manner:
TSA would spend the $60 million requested for fiscal year 2005 in the
following manner:
Secure Flight Testing...................................... $5.25M
Commercial Data Testing.................................... 2.50M
Air Carrier Interface...................................... 15.50M
Secure Flight Operations................................... 17.00M
Physical Infrastructure.................................... 13.25M
Technical Services......................................... 6.50M
5. Provide funding levels for NEXUS and SENTRI programs for fiscal
year 2003, 2004 and 2005. Please include vendor cost estimates on
upgrade and maintenance as well as any estimates on equipment cost for
expansion of NEXUS, and creation of enrollment centers.
Answer: The information follows. CBP has been unable to identify
any appropriated funding for SENTRI.
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
Current Budget & Projections Fiscal Year 2003 2004 2005
Budget Budget Budget
NEXUS........................................................ $5,600,000 0 0
SENTRI....................................................... 0 0 0
Budget Requirements..........................................
NEXUS Fiscal Year 2005
Maintenance.................................................. $3,000,000
Marketing.................................................... 500,000
Pilot Programs............................................... 1,000,000
New Sites.................................................... 3,000,000
Miscellaneous Expenses 1,000,000
(training/signage/travel/etc.).............................
Enhanced Enrollment Process.................................. 2,000,000
Total........................................................ $10,500,000
SENTRI-VehicIe Fiscal Year 2005
SENTRI Expansion............................................. $8,400,000
SENTRI Maintenance........................................... 3,300,000
Marketing.................................................... 1,000,000
Application Processing Center................................ 5,000,000
Total........................................................ $17,700,000
SENTRI Pedestrian Fiscal Year 2005
Pedestrian SENTRI Expansion.................................. $7,800,000
Pedestrian SENTRI Maintenance (not required.................. 0
1st year)..................................................
Total........................................................ $7,800,000
NEXUS/SENTRI-Marine Fiscal Year 2005
Expansion.................................................... $6,000,000
Maintenance 0
(not required 1st year)....................................
Marketing.................................................... 1,000,000
Total........................................................ $7,000,000