[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PLUGGING THE GAPS IN BORDER SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 16, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-30
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
DON YOUNG, Alaska LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Wisconsin NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
DAVID DREIER, California JANE HARMAN, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York New York
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania NITA M. LOWEY, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
PORTER J. GOSS, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DAVE CAMP, Michigan District of Columbia
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida ZOE LOFGREN, California
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
PETER T. KING, New York BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
JOHN LINDER, Georgia DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN,
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona U.S. Virgin Islands
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada KEN LUCAS, Kentucky
KAY GRANGER, Texas JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
PETE SESSIONS, Texas KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York
JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff
UTTAM DHILLON, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director
MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
DAVE CAMP, Michigan, Chairman
KAY GRANGER, Texas, Vice Chairwoman LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
DON YOUNG, Alaska NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
DUNCAN HUNTER, California BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
LAMAR SMITH, Texas BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
ROBERT W. GOODLATTE, Virginia New York
ERNEST ISTOOK, Oklahoma PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
MARK SOUDER, Indiana BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
JOHN SWEENEY, New York CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas
CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Ex JIM TURNER, Texas, Ex Officio
Officio
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 22
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 6
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 24
The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 27
The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Virginia
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas................................................. 32
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas
Oral Statement................................................. 33
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Massachusetts..................................... 29
WITNESSES
The Honorable Robert Bonner, Commissioner, Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Tom Keefe, President, National Treasury Employees Union,
Local 137
Oral Statement................................................. 36
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
Mr. Tom Kuhn, President, American Federation of Government
Employees Union 2580
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Statement............................................. 42
Mr. Bill Pauli, President, California Farm Bureau Federation
Oral Statement................................................. 44
Prepared Statement............................................. 46
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Donna M. Garren, Ph.D. Vice President,
Scientific and Technical Affairs............................... 58
Prepared Statement of Mr. Thomas P. Kuhn......................... 60
PLUGGING THE GAPS IN BORDER SECURITY:
THE ONE FACE AT THE BORDER INITIATIVE
----------
Thursday, October 16, 2003
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:06 p.m., in
Room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dave Camp
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Camp, Granger, Dunn, Smith,
Goodlatte, Sanchez, Markey, Dicks, Cardin, Slaughter, Jackson-
Lee, Cox, ex officio, and Turner, ex officio.
Mr. Camp. The Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border
Security hearing will come to order. I would like to welcome
and thank all of those attending today's hearing.
Today's business is to receive testimony regarding the new
border security initiative announced by Secretary Ridge on
September 2, creating One Face at the Border; and the
subcommittee will first hear from Commissioner Robert Bonner in
his first public hearing on this new proposal. We will then
hear from a second panel comprised of the National Treasury
Employees, represented by Tom Keefe; the American Federation of
Government Employees, represented by Tom Kuhn; and the
California Farm Bureau Federation, represented by Bill Pauli.
Typically, in these hearings, to allow for more time for
witness testimony and questions, the Chair requests that the
members agree to a unanimous consent to waive opening
statements.
Is there any objection to unanimous consent to waive
opening statements?
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, I believe there are some people
on my side that wanted to do some opening statements.
Mr. Camp. All right. Seeing then an objection to the
unanimous consent, we will proceed with opening statements. And
under committee rule 3, any members present at the beginning of
the hearing may make a 3-minute opening statement, the Chair
urges members to make summaries of their statements and insert
their full statements into the record.
I do have a statement that I will insert into the record.
Prepared Opening Statement of Dave Camp, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security
The Homeland Security Act consolidated several border security
agencies in the DHS Directorate of Border and Transportation Security.
The success of the BTS Directorate requires effective and expedited
coordination of the transferred agencies, which is the purpose of the
One Face at the Border Initiative.
The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection houses the inspection
functions and we've called CBP Commissioner Bonner here to gather
additional information about the purpose and impact of the new
initiative.
This proposal aims to fully integrate the three separate inspection
positions, Customs, Immigration and Agriculture inspectors, into one
new CBP Officer cross-trained to successfully screen for all three
priority missions.
Historically, travelers entering the U.S. could make up to 3 stops,
with each inspection carried out by a separate DHS employee. CBP is
following through on a commitment to unify this system in order to
process travelers more rapidly and conveniently while simultaneously
identifying and addressing potential risks.
Merging the inspection forces of legacy Customs, INS, and APHIS has
the potential to greatly increase the law enforcement responsibilities
of the individual inspector at the border. These expanded
responsibilities include such diverse areas as: evaluating terrorist
threats; enforcing customs rules relating to commerce; enforcing
immigration laws; and inspecting food and agricultural imports for
insects and quarantine.
By utilizing one employee to perform all three primary inspection
functions, the Department hopes to deploy additional employees into
secondary inspection thus targeting our resources towards those
passengers and cargo with suspicious indicators.
Each year more than 500 million people legally enter the country
and over $1 trillion in trade crosses our borders. Searching for the
threats and security risks in that bulk of commerce and people is a
huge task. We have an unprecedented opportunity with the new Homeland
Security Department to change the way we do business. Now is the time
to develop and implement a comprehensive vision for border security.
Anytime something changes, there is concern and unease until it is
implemented and proven successful. Through multiple conversations that
I have had with the private sector and individual stakeholders in this
endeavor, I have not heard anyone say that this is a bad idea. In fact,
most people see initiatives like this as the foundation necessary for
effective homeland security.
Legitimate concerns have been expressed about losing some of the
expertise that our legacy inspectors have gained during their years of
service. Commissioner Bonner will be called upon to address those
questions today and I look forward to hearing more about the specific
details of the program, especially regarding on-the-job training and
mentoring.
I don't think that anyone would argue that this is going to be a
simple and easy transfer, but instead will require a lot of work and
dedication from both the legacy and new employees. The expertise and
skill from those currently on our front lines will be necessary for
mentoring and training the new CBP Officers. The force multiplying
potential of having one face at the border could be a great advantage.
The critical nature of the homeland security mission requires innovate
and comprehensive strategies that multiply our strengths and diminish
the risks.
The impact of this initiative is greater than its stated purpose.
The integration will set a standard and be a model for subsequent
homeland security initiatives and future DHS efforts to integrate its
legacy agencies. How this the One Face at the Border initiative is
carried out will lead the way for other much needed security reforms.
I would like to express my thanks and appreciate to Secretary Ridge
and Commissioner Bonner for their leadership in announcing and
implementing the One Face at the Border workforce.
I will conclude my remarks and enter my full statement for the
record.
With that, I would yield to the ranking member, Ms.
Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will just
summarize and also put my statement in for the record.
First of all, I thank you, Honorable Mr. Bonner, for coming
back before us. We are--I know that you have a lengthy
testimony today, so we are looking forward to hear what you
have to say.
Obviously, this hearing is about taking various tasks and
putting them all together and having one person do it pretty
much. And I would like to hear how we are going to get that
done, how it is coming along, and whether we are going to end
up with a jack of all trades, but an expert in none. I think
that is really the concern that many of us have.
Also, I was a little worried because I thought at first
that the agriculture entry piece was going to get shortchanged,
but I hope you will expand on the fact that there actually will
be some specialists who will still do the agricultural work and
scrutiny.
The reason that is so important to me, of course, is, my
home State of California's number one industry is agriculture.
We are always very concerned about people coming into our
country who might want to do us harm. But there are always
those people who seem to bring back plants or fruit or
something who, not really understanding, may bring that in with
them and do us even more harm, economic harm, by bringing in
pests and other diseases.
So I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses. I
am particularly going to look forward to the next panel also,
because we will have some people who have actually been on the
ground and who understand the limitations and the challenges of
trying to get the work done right on the front lines.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my statement for the
record.
Mr. Camp. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. Sanchez follows:]
Prepared Opening Statement of The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a
Representative in Congress From the State California, and Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank all of our witnesses for
coming here today. This is the second time Mr. Bonner has visited this
subcommittee and we are glad to have him back.
Today's hearing on the ``One Face at the Border'' Initiative is an
important one. The introduction of the new Department of Homeland
Security and the assimilation and reassignment of the duties of former
agencies within that department is what the ``One Face'' Initiative is
all about.
The department has taken on an ambitious task: To focus on stopping
potential terrorist activity while at the same time attempting to
streamline the immigration and customs process without losing any
expertise in the process.
Many of us are concerned that for one person to be expected to do
all the jobs of immigration, customs, and possibly agriculture
inspector--and do them well--might be unrealistic.
I am very happy to see that we have not only Commissioner Bonner,
but two inspectors, one former immigration and one former customs, to
give us their perspective. I always find that to get the full
information, it is best to ask both management and rank- and-file
opinions and I am happy to see that we will have that perspective
today.
``One Face'' is like a one-stop shop. In previous years, those
entering the US would go through immigration, then grab their luggage
and go through customs, and, if necessary, go though an agriculture
station.
The new initiative would combine primary customs, immigration, and
agriculture into one person--the Customs and Border Protection or CBP
officer. The traveler may be cleared to go after primary inspection by
the CBP officer, or may be referred to secondary inspection, where a
CBP officer would have more time to inspect them.
Compared to the old system, there is no marked difference between
the expertise and experience level between primary and secondary
inspectors.
There are specialists, such as canine and drug interdiction that
can be called in, but the old system was set up so that secondary
inspectors were those that had more expertise than those in primary.
This is not the case in the new system as I understand it.
One of the things I was gratified to see was the existence of the
CBP Agriculture Specialist. Mr. Pauli from the California farm bureau
is here. He was concerned, as was I, when initial reports indicated
that the scientific expertise formerly required of all USDA Agriculture
inspectors would be lost if all of them were replaced by CBP Officers.
I was relieved to find out that the ``One Face'' plan still calls
for CBP Agriculture Specialists, distinct from CBP Officers, who will
retain that specialized training that the USDA inspectors had.
My home state of California, after all, is the largest agricultural
producing state in the country. In our desire to prevent the country
from terrorists, we cannot forget that significant harm can be caused
to our economy if we fail to protect ourselves from agricultural
parasites and diseases.
I am looking forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today. I
hope that this initiative will be successful, and it is the intention
of this committee to help ensure that success.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. And I would now recognize Mr. Goodlatte for any
opening statement.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you also
for holding this important hearing. I would say that the
subject of this hearing is the reason why I requested to be put
on this committee and why as the chairman of the House
Agriculture Committee the Speaker of the House placed me on
this committee.
This is an extremely important issue. I am very interested
in hearing what Mr. Bonner has to say about the same subject
raised by the gentlewoman from California with regard to
agriculture, because in your testimony, Mr. Bonner, there are--
in the thousands of words, there are only 56 that relate to the
responsibility of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, which we were very concerned about when that agency
was split in two, part of it remaining in the Department of
Agriculture, part of it going over to the Department of
Homeland Security.
We understand the need for coordination at the border. We
think that the President's initiative, which I supported, is
important. But we also understand the exceedingly serious role
that Animal and Plant Health Inspection people play with regard
to this.
There are billions of dollars at stake here, there are
people's lives at stake here. The fact of the matter is, if
something like hoof and mouth disease, which the Department of
Agriculture has done a very good job of keeping out of this
country, were to get into the country, the damage to our
livestock industry would clearly be in the billions of dollars.
The same thing with BSE, a problem which occurred recently
as close as Canada.
And yet we are concerned about the training and the
requirements that need to be improved upon, the people who will
be hired to fill these multiple-role positions, inspecting not
only for animals and plants, but immigration and normal customs
duties as well.
We have been disappointed with the amount of information we
have received from the Department regarding this. We have on
more than one occasion requested that representatives of the
Department come to the Hill, most recently just prior to this
hearing, to be briefed. And we were told that the Department
staff were too busy.
We also requested to be briefed after this hearing, which
we thought was a little more open-ended, and we were again told
that the Department was too busy.
The Agriculture Committee will be following up on Chairman
Camp's hearing on this, and we will be pursuing this at great
length. But let me say when an event like hoof and mouth
disease comes into this country on the shoes of somebody who
visits a farm anywhere in the world where that disease is
rampant and is not properly inspected at the border and that
kind of a disease does come about, the answer of ``we were too
busy'' to consult with the people who have the ability to give
good advice on how to handle this will not be acceptable.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Prepared Statement for the Record of The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a
Representative in Congress From the State of Virginia
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. In that the
One Face at the Border initiative is already being implemented, I am
grateful for the opportunity this hearing and further oversight
hearings I intend to convene in the Agriculture Committee present to
ensure success of our new consolidated border inspection program.
I am generally supportive of the Administration's efforts to
streamlinegovernment programs by making more efficient use of limited
Federalresources. That said, the ``One Face at the Border'' initiative
leaves me witha number of questions, and quite frankly, a good deal of
concern regardingthe effectiveness of the new inspection model.
In particular, I am concerned that the proposal regarding training
and staffing levels as currently reflected in communications with DHS,
would be insufficient to protect American Agriculture against the
unintentional introduction of plant and animal pests and disease.
As I sit here today, I have a number of questions concerning the
proposed training program; the level of staffing by agricultural
specialists at passenger and cargo terminals; proposals from DHS on how
they intend to spend funds collected from Agricultural Quarantine
Inspection User Fees; and the amount of consultation that took place
between the DHS and the Department of Agriculture prior to DHS
announcing this new management initiative.
I am particularly concerned, Commissioner Bonner, with the
unwillingness of your staff to provide my committee with the answers to
questions we have raised on these topics.
DHS is a new department that combines existing agencies in new
ways. By definition they have a new mission. But contained in that
mission is an important function that's been going on for over a
hundred years: protecting agricultural production from the introduction
of foreign animal and plant diseases. Over the years, this function has
involved the investment of hundreds of millions in taxpayer dollars and
had countless man hours, education, and experience devoted to it. At
risk is a food production system which is truly priceless. Those with
experience in this field understand the old adage: ``An ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure.'' If an accidental introduction of
Foot and Mouth Disease were to occur, it would cost our economy tens of
billions of dollars. Compare this to the simple investment of time and
personnel to adequately safeguard against the introduction of such
foreign diseases and you can begin to understand our concern with this
new initiative. In our zeal to focus attention on the intentional
threat to America, we simply cannot neglect to protect ourselves from
the historical threats that continue.
There will be scant satisfaction from stopping a terrorist attack
on American agriculture if it is subsequently destroyed by neglecting
the commonplace animal and plant diseases that the agriculture
community faces everyday.
I know that agricultural quarantine inspection is in many ways a
new world for the legacy Customs managers and inspectors. These people
are at the beginning of a steep learning curve so I understand and
anticipate that they will face some hurdles from time to time. Many of
these hurdles can be minimized, or completely eliminated through
cooperation and dialogue which at this point, has been all too limited.
It is clear that in the recent meetings with senior officials in
the USDA as well as representatives of the agricultural sector,
Commissioner Bonner is becoming aware of the unique risks faced by
agriculture, not only from acts of terrorism, but the risks associated
with the unintentional introduction of a pest or disease that could
cost American agriculture millions, or even billions, of dollars.
Unfortunately, this new found understanding is not reflected in any
material we can find on the DHS web site nor in communications with the
Agriculture Committee. I am hopeful that this hearing represents a new
beginning in the discussion of DHS' management of the programs for
which they have been entrusted. I look forward to today's testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
And now I recognize the ranking member of the full
committee, Congressman Turner, for any opening statement.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too will file my
statement for the record, but let me say that I am very pleased
to see Commissioner Bonner here with us today. I know he works
very hard at the task that he has at hand. It is a very
challenging responsibility.
The questions that I hope will be addressed today are the
same that our ranking subcommittee chairwoman addressed,
because I have wondered whether it is possible to provide the
additional training necessary to perform these difficult
responsibilities at the border in such a way that one person
will be able to carry out all these inspection
responsibilities.
I also want to be sure that we are not rolling back the
level of training that for inspection agents at a time when
their capability, their training, is more important than ever
before. So I hope, Commissioner, you can reassure us with
regard to those issues.
I also want to say I was very pleased when I learned that
the Department will keep our agriculture inspectors separate
and distinct from the Customs and Border Protection officers.
There is, I think, very specialized training needed by the
agricultural inspection agents and I think that that decision
was a wise one.
I look forward to hearing from each of our panelists today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Prepared Statement of The Honorable Jackson-Lee, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Texas
I want to start by commending the United States Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) for its decision to implement the One Face
at the Border initiative. This program is long overdue. The debate
about consolidating ports of entry inspection functions began in the
early 1970s. In 1993, the General Accounting Office (GAO) convened a
panel to discuss various operational options for managing international
ports of entry. The results of this discussion were reported by J.
William Gadsby in testimony before the House Subcommittee on
Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture.
According to Mr. Gadsby, a GAO director, the panel members did not
believe that the dual management structure between the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Customs
Service was adequate. The panel members were concerned that this dual
system would not be able to handle the customs and immigrations service
demands that were likely to confront the government in the next 10 to
30 years. They believed that management benefits could be gained by
vesting responsibility with one agency. They expected the benefits to
include (1) an improved capability to think strategically about related
immigration and customs issues, and (2) clearer accountability for
border operations by having one spokesperson within the government for
issues surrounding the movement of people, goods, and services into the
United States.
These benefits and more will be derived from the One Face at the
Border initiative. Under this initiative, the previous separation of
the immigration, customs, and agriculture functions will be eliminated.
Thus, the need to undergo up to three separate inspections will be
eliminated. The unified inspection process will involve a single
primary inspector who will determine whether the individual needs to go
to secondary inspection for a more thorough screening and review by a
higher-level inspector.
Also, by utilizing one employee to perform all three primary
inspection functions, CBP will be able to deploy additional employees
to secondary inspection, which is where potentially dangerous
immigrants will be questioned.
It is vital for Congress to support the implementation of the One
Face at the Border initiative. We must make more resources available to
CBP. Among other things, our ports of entry are inadequately staffed,
and infrastructure needs have not been met. For instance, although all
of the ports at land borders have entry lanes, many of them lack the
facilities for exit lanes. If we want to improve border security at our
ports of entry, we must work with CBP to ensure adequate staffing,
infrastructure, and technology.
I am particularly concerned about maintaining adequate staffing
levels. The international airport at Houston, Texas, has had
recruitment and retention problems for many years. This has resulted in
an inability to maintain a full staff, and many of the inspectors are
recent hires who lack experience. The increased waiting time at
inspection lines is unacceptable.
CBP faces grave challenges. Recent government studies have revealed
serious inadequacies in the training of immigration inspectors. Among
other things, they have not received sufficient training in detecting
fraudulent documents. Also, complaints from my constituents indicate
that more work is needed to ensure that every inspection is done with
due respect for the dignity of the person being inspected. I know,
however, that CBP is addressing these and other problems in its new
training programs. I am particularly pleased with the emphasis that is
being placed now on such things as cultural awareness. Thank you.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. And seeing no additional requests for
time, we will begin.
Again, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here
and we will hear testimony from Commissioner Bonner first,
followed by questions. And then we will hear from the second
panel, followed by questions.
So we will begin welcoming back Commissioner Robert Bonner
of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. We have your
written statement, and we would ask you to summarize that in 10
minutes; and we look forward to hearing from you. Thank you for
being here.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, U.S.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, Ms. Sanchez and the other members of the
subcommittee, as well as Mr. Turner of the full committee.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today regarding
U.S. customs and now Customs and Border Protection, to testify
briefly on our efforts since 9/11 to improve border security,
including more recently our efforts to achieve ``One Face at
the Border,'' that is, one agency to manage and secure our
country's border.
A lot has been done to improve border security and I want
to touch on the fact that since 9/11, U.S. Customs, now Customs
and Border Protection, has taken many steps to literally
reinvent our borders and make them secure against the terrorist
threat, but to do so in a way that does not stifle the trade
and commerce that is so important to our economy. I want to
list some of these steps for this committee.
On 9/11 we had about 1,000 Customs inspectors and 500
Immigration inspectors at our northern border ports of entry.
Today, we have over 2,900 CBP inspectors at our northern
border. We have also increased the number of inspectors at our
Nation's seaports, airports and southern border crossing
points.
On 9/11, we had no large-scale X-ray-type machines on our
northern border. Today, we have 24 and we have them at all the
major crossings between Canada into the United States.
On 9/11, we had 45 large-scale X-ray-type machines deployed
mostly at our border with Mexico for drug detection purposes.
Today, we have 134 of these large, whole container, whole truck
X-ray-type machines deployed nationwide.
On 9/11, there were only 368 authorized positions for
Border Patrol agents on our northern border with Canada to
secure between the ports of entry, and I am pleased to say that
I am in the process of increasing that number to 1,000 Border
Patrol agents, and we will be there soon.
On 9/11, there was no Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism to better secure our supply chain of goods moving
into the United States in partnership with the private sector.
Today, there are 4,300 companies participating in the C-TPAT
program.
On 9/11, the Free and Secure Trade initiative, or FAST, did
not exist. That is a binational program with Canada. Today, it
is operational on 28 lanes, six major commercial crossings
between the U.S. and Canada, and we are about to begin
implementing the FAST program with Mexico at El Paso later this
month.
On 9/11, the Container Security Initiative did not exist.
Today, governments representing 19 of 20 foreign ports have
signed up to implement CSI, and CSI is already operational in
16 ports worldwide.
Since 9/11, Customs or Customs and Border Protection has
implemented the 24-hour rule so that we can get advanced
information on sea cargo containers destined for the United
State 24 hours before those containers are loaded at foreign
ports on a vessel. Soon we will have finalized regulations
requiring advanced electronic information for the other modes
of transportation--air cargo, rail and commercial trucks.
Since 9/11--by the way, with the help of Congress--Customs,
now Customs and Border Protection, implemented legislation in
November of 2001 that required air carriers to transmit to us
advanced information on international airline passengers to
better determine whether passengers pose a potential threat for
terrorism in advance of their arrival.
Since 9/11, working with Canada we expanded the NEXUS
program, a secure traveler program, from a small pilot project
to eight northern border crossing points. There are over 23,000
people that have been vetted and enrolled in the NEXUS program.
On 9/11, CBP did not have an automated risk management
system at the national level to identify potential terrorist
threats to our country. Shortly after 9/11, in October of 2001,
CBP staff established a National Targeting Center to do this.
It is now called the National Targeting Center of Customs and
Border Protection.
On 9/11, CBP had 3,800 personal radiation detectors
deployed. We now have over 8,000 deployed. All frontline
inspectors wear them.
On 9/11, CBP had no radioisotope identifiers and no portal
radiation detection monitors. We have deployed 300 isotope
identifiers and well over, I believe, 60 now, radiation portal
monitors, and we are steadily increasing that deployment.
On 9/11, our canines, as most of you know, our detection
dogs were trained to detect illegal drugs and currency. Today,
we have a canine training program for detecting explosives and
chemicals to be used as terrorist weapons.
I would be remiss if I did not note two critically
important steps that the President, with the support of
Congress, has taken to better secure our country against the
terrorist threat. Those are, the establishment of the
Department of Homeland Security, and within the Department of
Homeland Security, just a little over 7 months ago, the
creation of Customs and Border Protection. I will say that
under the Department, under the leadership of Secretary Ridge,
they will make our Nation safer and better able to deal with
our Nation's terrorist threat.
You know the priority mission of Customs and Border
Protection is to protect our country from this threat, but we
also have some very, very important traditional missions to
perform. U.S. Customs and Border Protection is creating what
Secretary Ridge has called ``One Face at the Border'' by
establishing one agency for our borders. In the past 7-1/2
months, since it was created, Customs and Border Protection has
made great strides toward unification. America's borders are
more secure than when our border responsibilities were
fragmented among four different agencies and three departments
of government, which was the case before March 1 of this year
and before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.
Now, I want to mention two steps that we have taken, only
two that we have taken, to unify Customs and Border Protection.
One of the important steps is the decision that all 18,000 CBP
inspectors, whether they be legacy immigration or customs or
agriculture, should have one uniform, not three different
uniforms. One Face at the Border certainly means one uniform at
our ports of entry, both internally so we identify as one
agency, and externally so the 200 million to 300 Million people
that arrive in the United States at our international airports
and across our land borders see that we do have one agency at
our border, not three different agencies and three different
uniforms.
And by the way, I have here today a Customs and Border
Protection inspector--Inspector Chausse, will you stand up?
This is the new uniform of Customs and Border Protection. And I
don't know--maybe you could step forward. You will see this is
worn by all legacy inspectors. We started rolling out this
uniform in August, and in 9 months we will have this uniform
deployed for all of the 18,000 inspectors at Customs and Border
Protection.
The patch on the sleeve, if you could turn sideways--he is
a very good model, isn't he? The patches, of course, have the
name of the agency, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and in
the center of the patch is the seal and the logo of the United
States Department of Homeland Security. That is a very
important unifying step.
You can sit down.
A second and very significant step was announced by
Secretary Ridge in early September, last month, and that is the
creation of the CBP officer position and a new agriculture
specialist position for Customs and Border Protection. Moving
to the new CBP officer, by the way, will--first of all, of
course, it is going to help us unify as one agency, rather than
three separate agencies at our ports of entry. More
importantly, in my judgment, we will be able to perform the
priority mission, the antiterrorism mission, the homeland
security mission more effectively.
We will be able to perform our traditional missions,
including our very important mission of protecting United
States' agriculture against diseases and pests, and traditional
missions historically of customs and immigration. We are going
to be able to perform those traditional missions more
effectively. And lastly we will be able to, with the CBP
officer position, eliminate the disparities of pay and overtime
that currently exist among the legacy inspectional work forces
in Customs and Border Protection.
We are no longer hiring for legacy Immigration inspectors
and Customs inspectors. We have begun training a new cadre of
CBP inspectional officers starting this month, who will be
equipped to handle all primary and secondary inspection
functions in both the passenger and cargo environment. We have
also established a CBP Agriculture Specialist position to
perform the highly specialized agriculture inspection function
at both passenger and cargo processing areas.
By the way, we will have--I know I spoke by phone with Mr.
Goodlatte, but we will have a number of Agriculture Specialists
that will be at least equal to the number of current
Agriculture Quarantine inspectors at our ports of entry; and we
will also have CBP officers who have received significant
training with respect to the agriculture protection function.
We have created a basic training program that will be
followed by post-basic-inspection training at port, classroom
training, and on-the-job training, and I will tell you that no
CBP officer will perform any duties until they are
appropriately and adequately trained to do them and we will
continue to rely on the expertise, which is extraordinary, of
18,000 current inspectional officers at our ports of entry.
I expect the first class of CBP officers will graduate from
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center next January, and
then in the Spring of 2004, current legacy immigration and
customs inspectors will be converted to CBP officers and
receive cross-training.
Current Agriculture Quarantine Inspection officers will
have an opportunity to become CBP officers or CBP agriculture
specialists. If they opt for CBP officers, they will be
backfilled in those positions as agriculture specialists.
We are moving out to achieve the President's and the
Secretary's goal of One Face at the Border, and that is one
unified, flexible and effective agency to better manage
security and control our country's borders. There is, of
course, much more to do and with the help of this
subcommittee--the full committee and this subcommittee--I hope
to do it.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying that I believe we
have forged a good relationship with this subcommittee. I look
forward to strengthening that relationship with the
subcommittee and the full committee, and I know that, working
together, I am confident that we can further protect and secure
our country's borders.
I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to take a
little bit more time than ordinary to summarize things, but I
would be happy to answer any questions that you, Mr. Chairman,
or any members of the subcommittee might have.
[The statement of Mr. Bonner follows:]
Prepared Statement of The Honorable Robert C. Bonner
Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez, Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for this opportunity to testify. I am pleased to appear
before you today to discuss U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, our efforts to achieve ``one face at the border,'' and our
work in improving border security since September 11, 2001.
Although over two years have passed since 9-11, that day remains as
vivid in all of our memories today as it was two years ago. We still
grieve for the 3,000 innocent people whose lives were cut short on that
day and for their families and loved ones. The horror and the anger
that we all felt as a result of the terrorist attacks on 9-11 have not
changed in the two years that have passed.
But today I will tell you about some of the things that have
changed.
DHS
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security is one very
important step--perhaps the most important step here at home--that
President Bush and our nation have taken to address the ongoing threat
of international terrorism, a threat that is likely to be with us for
years to come. With our federal government's prevention, preparedness,
and response capabilities now under one roof, in one department of
government, and with that department under the outstanding leadership
of Secretary Ridge, our nation will be--and already is--safer and
better able to deal with the terrorist threat.
BCBP
The creation of U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, or
``BCBP''--this new agency within the Department of Homeland Security's
Border and Transportation Security Directorate--is another
extraordinarily important step in addressing the terrorist threat. In
fact, the BCBP merger is a big part of the Department of Homeland
Security reorganization to better protect our Nation's borders. BCBP is
the largest actual merger of people and functions going on in the
Department of Homeland Security. Indeed, about one-fourth of the
personnel of DHS are in BCBP. That's not surprising considering how
important the security of our borders is to the security of our
homeland.
To create BCBP, on March 1, we took most of U.S. Customs and merged
it with all of the immigration inspectors and Border Patrol from the
former INS, the agriculture border inspectors from the Department of
Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. This means
that for the first time in our country's history, all agencies of the
United States Government with significant border responsibilities have
been unified into one agency of our government, one agency to manage
and secure our Nation's borders.
As U.S. Customs and Border Protection, we are creating, as
Secretary Ridge has called it, ``One Face at the Border,'' by
establishing one agency for our nation's borders. In the seven and a
half months since it was created, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
has made significant strides toward unification. And America's borders
are safer and more secure than we were when border responsibilities
were fragmented among different agencies in three different departments
of government, as they were before March 1, 2003, as they were before
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.
On day one, March 1, 2003, we designated one Port Director at each
port of entry and put in place a single, unified chain of command. And
in terms of an immediate increase in antiterrorism security, on day
one, all frontline, primary inspectors at all ports of entry into the
United States were equipped with radiation detection devices. Since
March 1, 2003, all inspectors have received antiterrorism training.
We have begun rolling out unified BCBP primary inspections for U.S.
citizens at international airports around the country. It is presently
operational in 8 major airports (Dulles, Houston, JFK, Newark, LAX,
Atlanta, Miami, San Francisco), and will be operational at ten
additional airports by the end of this month. By the end of this
calendar year, we will have 60 airports conducting unified primary
inspections for U.S. citizens. This a major step forward in eliminating
the process of travelers potentially having to ``run the gauntlet''
through three separate inspection agencies; separate questioning and
inspections for customs, immigration, and agriculture.
Although legacy customs and immigration inspectors for years have
been interchangeable at the land border ports of entry, this is the
first time unified primary is being done at our country's airports.
Significant cross-training is being provided to our frontline
inspectors to ensure effective implementation, as is counterterrorism
training is creating a better understanding of terrorist issues and
better referrals to the secondary area. Along with unified primary, we
are developing specialized immigration and customs antiterrorism
response teams and consolidating our passenger analytical targeting
units.
We have also begun rolling out a new BCBP uniform and patch for all
BCBP inspectors at our Nation's ports of entry, that will replace the
three different customs, agriculture, and immigration inspectional
uniforms and patches. The new uniform and patch represent our most
visible unifying symbols to the American public. The new uniform is
being implemented in four phases. In the first phase, completed as of
October 1, 2003, all BCBP managers and supervisors converted to the new
uniform. Other BCBP uniformed personnel will be phased in at various
points over the next nine months, with implementation scheduled to be
complete by July 31, 2004.
BCBP Officer
All of these things are helping us unify and become more effective
as an agency; however, our most significant step toward achieving ``One
Face at the Border'' was announced by Secretary Ridge last month on
September 2, 2003: the rollout of the new ``BCBP Officer'' position.
Starting this month, we will no longer be training legacy
``immigration'' or ``customs'' inspectors. We will be training a new
cadre of ``BCBP Officers,'' who will be equipped to handle all BCBP
primary and many of the secondary inspection functions, in both the
passenger and cargo environments. We will also be deploying BCBP
Agriculture Specialists to perform more specialized agricultural
inspection functions in both these environments.
Training is a very important component to the roll out of the BCBP
Officer. We have created a new 71-day basic course that provides the
training necessary to conduct primary processing and have a familiarity
with secondary processing of passengers, merchandise, and conveyances,
in all modes of transport--air, sea, and land. The new BCBP Officer
course was built from the 53-day basic Customs inspector course and the
57-day basic Immigration inspector course, with redundancies removed,
and with additions to address anti-terrorism and BCBP's role in
agriculture inspection. The training also supports the traditional
missions of the legacy agencies integrated in BCBP.
Our first BCBP Officers were hired on September 22, 2003, and they
have already started training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (FLETC). The first BCBP Officer class started training on
October 8, 2003, and two additional classes started yesterday. All of
our BCBP Officer classes for the months of October and November are
filled, for a total of 480 new BCBP Officers by the time their training
is complete. We are now in the process of filling our classes for
December.
In the spring of 2004, current legacy Customs and Immigration
inspectors will be converted to BCBP Officers and will begin cross-
training for their broadened responsibilities. Current Agriculture
Quarantine inspectors will have an opportunity to become BCBP Officers
or BCBP Agriculture Specialists.
We are moving out quickly to achieve the President's and the
Secretary's goal of ``One Face at the Border,'' that is, one unified,
flexible, and effective agency to better manage, control, and secure
our Nation's borders.
Priority Mission and Traditional Missions
The priority mission for our BCBP Officers and for our entire
agency is homeland security. For the unified border agency of our
country, that means detecting and preventing terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States. We are doing everything we
reasonably and responsibly can to carry out that extraordinarily
important priority mission.
But we are also continuing to carry out the traditional missions of
the predecessor agencies that make up U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. These missions include, among others:
seizing illegal drugs and other contraband at the U.S. border;
apprehending people who attempt to enter the United States
illegally;
determining the admissibility of people and goods;
protecting our agricultural interests from harmful pests and
diseases;
regulating and facilitating international trade;
collecting duties and fees--we collected over $23 billion last
year alone;
and enforcing all laws of the U.S., including trade and
immigration laws, at our borders.
Twin Goals
As U.S. Customs and Border Protection works to carry out its
priority antiterrorism mission and its traditional missions, we have
devised ways to do so without choking off the flow of legitimate trade
and travel, so important to our nation's economy and our openness as a
nation.
I learned the need to do this most graphically on September 12, 13,
and 14, 2001. On 9-11, U.S. Customs went to its highest level of
security alert--short of shutting down our borders. On September 12,
2001, wait times at our land borders skyrocketed from 10 to 20 minutes,
to 12 hours at many of our major land border entry points. The border
with Canada virtually shut down.
And the consequences for our ``just in time'' economy were quickly
apparent. Some U.S. auto plants began to shut down by September 14th.
To preserve the U.S. economy, indeed, the North American economy,
we needed to reinvent the border. We needed a more secure border
because of the terrorist threat. But we also knew that, as we added
security, we needed to ensure the continued movement of legitimate
cargo and people through our borders. That's why we have twin goals:
(1) increasing security and (2) facilitating legitimate trade and
travel.
We have learned that by using advance information, risk management,
and technology, and by partnering with other nations and with the
private sector, these goals don't have to be mutually exclusive. Since
9-11, we have developed ways to make our borders more secure that also
ensure the more efficient flow of legitimate trade and travel.
Today, I will tell you about some of the things U.S. Customs and
Border Protection has done in the past two years--and is continuing to
do today--to carry out those twin goals--things we've done and are
doing to ``reinvent the border.''
Staffing and Technology Increases
Before 9-11, we had about 1,000 customs inspectors and about 500
immigration inspectors on our shared 4,000 mile border with Canada.
Most of the lower volume border crossings were not open 24 hours a day.
There was no security when they were closed, other than an orange cone
in the road. An orange cone was all that stood in the way of someone
driving a vehicle from Canada into the United States on a paved
highway. That vehicle could have terrorists or terrorist weapons or it
could be a weapon--a car bomb.
That was unacceptable. So, right after 9-11, I directed that all
border crossings be staffed with two armed Customs inspectors 24x7.
Because I didn't want inspectors doing this forever--the 24x7 staffing
was a temporary measure--I mandated ``hardening'' and electronic
monitoring of our low volume northern ports of entry to prevent
unauthorized crossings. This meant installing gates, signs, lights, and
remote camera surveillance systems, which we have done.
I have received significant staffing increases for the northern
border, supported by the Administration. Today, we have over 2,900 BCBP
inspectors along the northern border, up from about 1,600 on 9-11. We
have also bolstered our staffing on the southern border. We know that
terrorists have and will use any avenue they can to enter our country.
Prior to September 11th, we had 4,371 inspectional staff at the
southern ports of entry. Today, we have almost 4900 standing ready to
protect us.
We also added sophisticated detection technology, such as large
scale x-ray type machines that can scan an entire tractor trailer truck
in a couple of minutes. There are now 24 such machines deployed at all
the significant commercial crossings between Canada and the United
States. There were exactly zero on 9-11. Nationwide, we have increased
the number of whole container x-ray-type machines from 63 on 9-11 to
134 today.
We know that securing the areas between the ports of entry is just
as important as adding security at the ports of entry. A chain, after
all, is only as strong as its weakest link. Terrorists, just like
others who seek to enter the U.S. illegally, may attempt to enter
through official crossings with phony documents, or they may attempt to
evade detection by crossing in areas between ports of entry.
BCBP's Border Patrol is responsible for patrolling those areas and,
using sophisticated sensor technology, detecting those who attempt to
illegally enter the U.S. between the ports of entry. Since March 1 of
this year, the Border Patrol is a part of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, and we are revising and refocusing the Border Patrol's
strategy--which had been principally focused on preventing the flow of
illegal aliens and drugs crossing between ports of entry on our border
with Mexico--to include an aggressive strategy for protecting against
terrorist penetration, at both our northern and southern borders.
On 9-11, there were only 368 authorized positions for Border Patrol
agents for the entire northern border. We are currently at 558. We have
selected an additional 220 positions, and the other 222 are in the
process of being selected. With the relocation funds from the 2003 War
Supplemental, we will meet our goal of having 1,000 agents on the
northern border by March 2004.
This staffing increase will better secure our border against
terrorist penetration. But we are doing more than just adding staffing.
We are adding sensors and other technology that assist in detecting
illegal crossings along both our northern and southern borders,
including Remote Video Surveillance (RVS) systems. These RVS systems
are real-time remotely controlled force enhancement camera systems,
which provide coverage along the northern and southern land borders of
the United States, 24 hours per day, 7 days a week. The RVS system
significantly enhances the Border Patrol's ability to detect, identify,
and respond to border intrusions, and it has a deterrent value as well.
There are currently 238 completed Remote Video Surveillance (RVS)
sites in operation; 170 along the southwest border and 68 along the
northern border. An additional 224 installations are in progress.
C-TPAT
One thing that was apparent as we confronted post 9-11 security
issues was that support of the private sector was essential. A
comprehensive border security strategy for our nation and for global
trade simply had to include the private sector, because they are the
ones who own the supply chain. We also knew that we could offer
something to the private sector in return for increased security:
expedited processing at the borders--air, land, and sea.
From those realizations, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism was born as an idea in November 2001. As many of you know, C-
TPAT is a partnership between Customs and Border Protection and the
trade community to implement security standards and best practices that
better protect the entire supply chain against exploitation by
terrorists--from foreign loading docks to our ports of entry. In
exchange, companies that meet our security standards get the fast lane
at and through our borders.
C-TPAT was launched in January 2002. Within one year, in January
2003, we had over 1,600 companies participating in the program. Today,
we have over 4,300 companies participating.
That number demonstrates that many businesses recognize their role
in, in fact, their responsibility to take part in, security efforts.
Even more importantly, it indicates that because of C-TPAT, trade is a
lot safer from terrorist exploitation.
Presently, BCBP has initiated the validation process for over 130
C-TPAT certified companies. These companies are in different stages of
their validation process with 100 scheduled to be complete by November
2003. Validations serve to determine the accuracy and effectiveness of
the companies' security profiles as applied to their supply chain, both
foreign and domestic.
BCBP is also coordinating with other agencies to look at
opportunities to leverage resources and technology, and to develop
policy that supports a comprehensive and coordinated approach to cargo
security. For example, TSA and BCBP are looking at the operational
feasibility of coordinating TSA's Known Shipper program to BCBP's C-
TPAT initiative in the air cargo environment. Although these programs
have distinct goals and objectives, information on shipper legitimacy
gained through Known Shipper may help to strengthen C-TPAT's foreign
and domestic supply chain security validation process; conversely, C-
TPAT certification helps ensure a greater degree of in-transit security
and integrity as cargo is transported through the supply chain.
FAST
Another important post 9-11 initiative--one that draws upon the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism--is the Free and Secure
Trade, or FAST program along our northern border with Canada. The way
the FAST program works is that importers, commercial carriers (i.e.,
trucking companies), and truck drivers enroll in the program and, if
they meet our stringent mutually agreed to security criteria, they are
entitled to expedited clearance at the border.
Participation in our C-TPAT program is required for those who want
to bring goods from Canada into the U.S. through the FAST lane and for
the trucking company also. Indeed, the truck drivers themselves must be
vetted as well for security.
FAST is operational in 28 lanes at six major commercial crossings
along the northern border. We are about to begin implementing a pilot
FAST program with Mexico on our southern border. On October 27, 2003, a
dedicated FAST lane will become operational in El Paso. If adequate
security is achieved with this FAST pilot project at El Paso,
particularly against drug smuggling, I expect that FAST will be
expanded to other major commercial crossings on our border with Mexico.
CSI
In the wake of 9-11, we realized that we had to begin pushing our
zone of security outward. We wanted our borders to be our last line of
defense against the terrorist threat, not our first line of defense.
This is the ``extended border,'' defense-in-depth concept, or what
Secretary Ridge has aptly called a ``Smart Border.''
C-TPAT and FAST are extended border initiatives. Another extended
border, smart border initiative, is CSI, the Container Security
Initiative. National security experts consider the vulnerability of
cargo containers to terrorist exploitation to be chilling, especially
the prospect that one of the seven million containers shipped to the
U.S. annually could conceal a weapon of mass destruction.
Given this vulnerable system, we needed to develop and implement a
program that would enable us to better secure containerized shipping--
the most important means of global commerce--against the terrorist
threat. That program, which I proposed in January 2002, is CSI.
Under CSI, BCBP has entered into bilateral partnerships with other
governments to identify high-risk cargo containers and to pre-screen
them before they are loaded on vessels destined for the United States.
It involves stationing small teams of U.S. Customs, now BCBP, personnel
at the foreign CSI ports to identify and target containers that might
pose a potential terrorist security risk.
The initial goal was to implement CSI at the top 20 ports in terms
of the volume of cargo containers shipped to the United States, because
those top 20 ports alone account for two-thirds, nearly 70%, of all
containers shipped to U.S. seaports, and because most cargo shipments
from high-risk countries are transshipped through these ports.
Today, governments representing 19 of those top 20 have signed up
to implement CSI. And we have actually already implemented CSI at 16
foreign seaports. These ports include 9 in Europe (Antwerp, Rotterdam,
Le Havre, Felixstowe, Genoa, La Spezia, Bremerhaven, Hamburg, and
Gothenburg, Sweden); 4 in Asia (Singapore; Hong Kong; Yokohama, Japan;
and Pusan, Korea); and the 3 Canadian ports of Vancouver, Montreal, and
Halifax.
With nearly all of the top 20 are on board, we have begun Phase 2
of CSI, where we are expanding beyond the top 20 to additional foreign
ports.
24-Hour Rule
A key to CSI's success, and the success of other Smart Border
initiatives, is advance information. For example, in order to identify
high-risk containers before they leave foreign ports, we need the
manifest information before the cargo is put on board those ships.
Last fall, I issued a rule, the so-called ``24-hour rule,'' that
required transmission of complete manifest information for sea cargo to
U.S. Customs 24 hours in advance of lading. Through that rule, BCBP is
getting information that allows us to identify containers we need to
take a closer look at--ones that raise security concerns.
Trade Act Proposed Regulations
And U.S. Customs and Border Protection has worked closely with the
trade community to develop regulations that will require advance
electronic information for the other modes of transportation--
commercial trucks, rail, and air cargo.
Our proposed regulations were published in late July. When final,
these regulations, like the 24-hour rule, will permit better risk
management for the terrorist threat, before cargo shipments reach the
U.S. border ports of entry.
Advance Passenger Information
Advance information is also critical to our efforts to identify
individuals who may pose a security threat. Before September 11th,
2001, air carriers transmitted some advance information on
international airline passengers to U.S. Customs on a voluntary basis.
In late 2001, we sought, and Congress enacted, legislation that would
make the transmission of advance passenger information mandatory.
U.S. Customs, now BCBP, implemented that legislation, and moved
aggressively to achieve compliance from all air carriers as soon as
possible. In less than a year, we achieved a 99% compliance rate. BCBP,
through our combined customs and immigration authorities, uses that
information to evaluate and determine which arriving passengers pose a
potential terrorist risk.
NEXUS and SENTRI
Since 9-11, BCBP has pressed forward with initiatives with both
Canada and Mexico that enable us to focus our resources and efforts
more on high-risk travelers, while making sure those travelers who pose
no risk for terrorism or smuggling, and who are otherwise legally
entitled to enter, are not delayed at our mutual borders.
Our program with Canada is the NEXUS program. Under NEXUS, frequent
travelers whose background information has been run against crime and
terrorism indices are issued a proximity card, or SMART card, which
allows them to be waived expeditiously through the port of entry. NEXUS
has expanded to eight crossings on the northern border, including ports
of entry at Blaine, Washington; Buffalo; Detroit; and Port Huron.
Approximately 50,000 people have enrolled in the program so far.
With Mexico, we have the SENTRI program. Like NEXUS, SENTRI is a
program that allows low-risk travelers to be processed in an expedited
manner through a dedicated lane at our land border with less delay.
SENTRI is currently deployed at 3 southwest border crossings: El Paso,
San Ysidro, and Otay Mesa.
US VISIT
Another new tool for border security and enforcement, with respect
to travelers entering and exiting our country, is the US-VISIT program
currently being developed. US-VISIT will capture point of Entry and
Exit information by visitors to the United States. This system will be
capable of using information, coupled with biometric identifiers, such
as photographs and fingerprints--to create an electronic check-in/
check-out system for people who come to the United States to work or to
study or visit. Through US-VISIT, all border officers at air and some
sea ports of entry will have the capability to access and review the
visa information, including the photograph, during a visa holder's
entry into the United States. BCBP is working with the US-VISIT office
in developing the training and implementation facets of the US-VISIT
system.
National Targeting Center
One of the greatest challenges--if not the single greatest
challenge--we face in the war on terrorism is determining who and what
to look at. BCBP has broad power to question and search every person,
vehicle, and shipment of goods entering the U.S. How do we sort out who
and what to look at, question, and inspect?
In October 2001, U.S. Customs established a National Targeting
Center--using automated risk management for the first time at the
national level--to help us meet the challenge of identifying potential
terrorist threats to our country. Remember, our priority mission is
detecting and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering
our country. Our National Targeting Center in Virginia is an essential
tool for carrying out our priority mission.
The Center gathers the advance electronic information I talked
about, and uses our Automated Targeting System for passengers and cargo
to identify what is high risk--to identify potential terrorists and
terrorist targets for follow up at U.S. ports of entry and CSI ports.
The National Targeting Center has given us the ability to locate
and eliminate terrorist threats before they become a reality, and it
did not exist on 9-11.
Comprehensive Strategy to Address Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism
One of the greatest terrorist threats is the threat of nuclear and
radiological terrorism--nuclear devices and RDDs, or so-called dirty
bombs. This threat, particularly the threat of nuclear devices, is
largely an external one--meaning someone would have to bring the device
across our borders and into this country.
This past year, BCBP developed a Comprehensive Strategy for
addressing that threat. Our plan focuses on several components, one of
which is maintaining a secure border at our ports of entry that is
capable of detecting potential nuclear and radiological devices.
BCBP's current deployment of radiation detection technology
includes: over 8,000 personal radiation detectors, or PRDs, over 300
radiation isotope identifiers; and over 60 radiation portal monitors
deployed. It should go without saying that we must and are continuing
to steadily increase our deployment of radiation detection technology,
but what we have today is a vast improvement over what we had on 9-11.
Chemical/Explosive Detection Dogs
Another terrorist threat is the threat of explosives and chemicals
that could be used as terrorist weapons coming across our borders. For
years, BCBP has used canines to detect illegal drugs and even cash, but
after 9-11, we began training dogs to detect explosives and chemical
weapons of mass destruction. These talented dogs are an important
resource in our antiterrorist efforts. And on 9-11, this resource did
not exist--we had no chemical/ explosive detection dogs at our ports of
entry.
Conclusion
The efforts I have talked about today are the result of this
Administration, this Congress, and the vision and leadership of the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge. The
creation of DHS and the unification of the border agencies within BCBP
are among the most significant of those efforts. They enable us to have
a more comprehensive and effective strategy as we press forward with
our many initiatives for protecting and securing America's borders.
Although I have only covered some of our efforts since 9-11, I hope
I have given you a sense of where we are today, as compared with where
we were two years ago. We have made great strides. America is safer.
Our borders are more secure against terrorists and their weapons of
terror than they were two years ago.
But our work is far from finished. There is much more to do. And
rest assured, I and all the men and women of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection are continuing to push full steam ahead. We are also working
hard to become the truly unified agency that we know we can and should
and will be--so that we can be the more effective, more efficient
agency that the American people expect and deserve.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by noting the important working
relationship BCBP has forged with this Subcommittee. I have had the
pleasure of meeting and talking with many of this Subcommittees'
members, including you, Mr. Chairman, on a number of issues. I am very
impressed with this Subcommittee's concern for, and expertise in, port
and border security. As an example, Congressmen Shadegg and Souder and
I have been in regular contact on a border security matter of mutual
concern and we have made good progress working together. I know from my
staff that the staff-to-staff relationship between BCBP and this
subcommittee is, as it should be, very strong. This is critically
important as we move forward and identify legislative and budgetary
initiatives that will further protect and secure our nation.
Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION ACADEMY'S NEW BASIC CBP OFFICER COURSE
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is creating ``One Face at
the Border'' by integrating people, processes, training and
technologies from three federal agencies with border responsibilities
into one unified border agency. Unified training is the foundation of
these integration efforts.
Beginning with the first class of CBP Officers in October 2003, the
CBP Academy now delivers a new basic training curriculum that provides
important knowledge and skills needed to perform the duties of this
critical frontline officer position. The comprehensive and integrated
basic CBP officer course provides the training necessary to support the
priority mission of CBP--detecting and prevention terrorists and
instruments of terror, including weapons of mass destruction, from
entering our country.
With the formation of CBP in the Department of Homeland Security,
three different inspectional workforces joined together at our nation's
ports of entry. Prior to that time, separate training was provided in
separate academies. Now, with the establishment of a unified frontline
officer, an integrated training course ensures that the CBP Officer is
fully equipped to carry out all of the functions of his or her
position.
What's new? For the first time, one basic course provides the
training necessary to conduct primary processing and have a familiarity
with secondary processing of passengers, merchandise, and conveyances,
in all modes of transport--air, sea and land. The 71-day CBP officer
course was built from the 53-day basic Customs inspector course and the
57-day basic Immigration inspector course, with redundancies removed,
and with additions to address anti-terrorism and CBP's role in
agriculture inspection.
The training also supports the traditional missions of the legacy
agencies integrated in CBP, which includes interdicting illegal drugs
and other contraband, apprehending or denying entry to people seeking
to enter the United States illegally, protecting U.S. agricultural and
economic interests from harmful pests and diseases, and regulating and
facilitating international trade and collecting revenue.
With the first graduation slated for early January 2004, the CBP
Academy expects to graduate approximately 300 CBP officers a month.
However, the training does not stop there. There is a comprehensive
technical and structured In-Port training program which is a
combination of classroom, computer-based and on-the-job training.
?
18
INTEGRATED CBP OFFICER COURSE
CBP Academy
Objective: Graduates will be proficient at the trainee level in
primary inspection operations and familiar with secondary
processing.
Duration: 71 days 111.8 weeks (based on 6 days per week).
Major Components (entire course focuses on priority mission of
anti-terrorism):
Anti-Terrorism Constitutional Border Search
Integrity Authority
Nationality Law Officer Conduct and
TECS/NAILS/NSEERS/ACS Professionalism
Grounds of Inadmissibility Non-Immigrant Classification /
Interviewing Techniques Processing
Agriculture Threats Immigration Classification /
Firearms Usage Processing
Physical Conditioning Document Examination
Practical Exercises Trade Processing
Inspection Technology General Inspection Procedures
Officer Safety and Basic
Enforcement
Arrest Techniques and Defensive
Tactics
First Aid/CPR
Identifying Drugs
In-Port Training Program (Post-Academy)
Objective: Graduates will be proficient at the trainee level in
secondary processing.
Duration: Estimate 30+ classroom 1 computer-based training days
and approximately 100 on-the-job training days during the first
year after completing the CBP Academy.
Major Components:
JT on Unified Primary--all modes (air, land and
sea)
Immigration Secondary--all modes
Immigration Secondary--sea crewmembers
Customs Secondary Passenger--all modes
Customs Secondary Cargo--all modes
Agriculture Secondary Cargo and Passenger--all
modes
Mr. Camp. Well, thank you very much, Commissioner, for your
testimony.
We will begin the questioning now. I just have a couple of
questions.
On a recent visit to the border, I was struck by the
discussion in terms of trying to find out what people did, that
were either a legacy customs individual or legacy immigration
individual, so I welcome the unifying of these positions.
What process did DHS use to determine that these functions
could be unified, and was there a working group or task force
set up that participated in this?
Mr. Bonner. Yes. First of all, at the very beginning,
shortly before March 1, which was the date the reorganization
began at Customs and Border Protection, I established a
transition team. The transition team is made up, by the way, of
individuals from all of the legacy agencies--legacy
Immigration, legacy Customs, legacy Agriculture. Among the
things the transition team was tasked to look at were unifying
symbols like uniforms and the like. A separate working group
was set up to take a look at, and study, the jobs that were
performed by the inspectional work force within CBP.
That group did do a rigorous analysis of the job
descriptions, the job duties, the similarities, by the way, in
the skills that are employed by all of the inspectional work
force. Different levels, different kinds of knowledge in terms
of different areas, but the skills, by the way, are very
similar, if not substantially the same.
In any event, it was based upon that analysis that we
concluded that you could have essentially an inspectional
officer for CBP, Customs and Border Protection, that could
perform, with appropriate and adequate training, multiple
functions.
I want to also say, by the way, there is some notion that
perhaps you train somebody to do all functions at all times,
but that is not the case at all. Each port of entry will make
an assessment as we go forward in terms of the needs of that
particular port of entry, and there are certainly going to be
specialized areas within the CBP officer. Let me name a couple.
Canines: We will continue to have a canine officer; that is
a specialized skill. A CBP officer that wants to go into that
will get some special further training to become a canine
officer.
The same for the analytical units for cargo and people.
So there will be some specialized areas and training that
will be given to CBP officers for some specific needs that we
have as we go forward.
Of course, we will also have the existing expertise of the
work force, which is 18,000 men and women, about 10,000 of them
are legacy Customs, 6,000 legacy Immigration and there are
about 1,500 Agriculture quarantine inspectors, plus 500 techs.
So that is the process.
We looked at it hard. By the way, we looked at it with an
open mind; we did not say whether this could or could not be
done. The conclusion is that it could be done, that you could
train for more multifunctionality, and this ultimately would
make us more effective not just for our traditional missions,
which it will, but also our homeland security mission.
Mr. Camp. I realize it is new, but what kind of feedback
are you getting on the unification of the responsibilities?
Mr. Bonner. First of all, I have had extensive discussions
with our people in the field. Many of these have been through
town hall meetings that I have had around the country, other
top management of Customs and Border Protection have had. We
received, through discussion and dialogue, a lot of feedback
that way.
We have had discussions with the trade community, with
other stakeholders, about this; and essentially we have made a
significant effort to explain what we are doing, how we are
doing it, what the rollout-type period is for it. And so we
have gotten a lot of feedback or input in that manner as well.
Mr. Camp. Okay. Thank you.
And now I will recognize Ms. Sanchez for any questions that
she may have. .
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being before us.
I have a question. I am trying to figure out what your
initial academy training does. From what I could read and from
what I understand, it is now a 71-day course. But before, when
you had Customs and Immigration--you had a Customs-only course
that lasted 53 days and an INS course that lasted 57 days; that
is 110 days. Now you only have 71 days.
So does that mean that you are cutting some things out,
that there was overlap on some? Why would the two separate ones
have so many days and this one be pared down?
Mr. Bonner. It is a good question. The reality is that we
are actually adding something to it. There was a lot of overlap
between training for legacy Immigration and legacy Customs.
There was 24 hours of that training devoted to the legacy
Customs inspector for Immigration training; and Immigration got
about 24 hours of Customs training in the old program. So there
was overlap in that sense, and I will tell you why in a minute.
There was overlap in terms of firearms training; and
practical exercises, training and the like, there was quite a
bit of overlap. And the reason for it is, when you start
thinking about Customs--legacy Customs or legacy Immigration
doing each other's functions for over 20 years, Customs
inspectors at the land border ports of entry have been doing
both--certainly primary for both Immigration and Customs
purposes; and Immigration inspectors at our land border have
been doing inspectional primary for both Customs and
Immigration purposes. That has been going on since the 1970s.
And so they are cross-designated to do that.
Now, as we are one agency, you do not need to have a
separate--with a CBP inspectional officer, you do not need to
have a separate training that would be cross-training people.
So that is the reason.
There was a lot of duplication and overlap in the training.
A lot of the skill sets that are--for which Immigration and
Customs inspectors are trained, and by the way even Agriculture
inspectors to some degree, a lot of the skill sets are the
same. How do you ask questions of people? How do you read
behavior? These are skills that both Customs and Immigration
inspectors have--they have now, by the way, and need to have,
and you have to train for this.
The reality is, we have a longer course because it is 71
days. It is longer than the legacy Customs or Immigration basic
courses were, significantly longer. We are adding some
antiterrorism training to that. We are adding some agriculture
training.
And the key thing here is to remember that it is not just
all basic training. That is the way it used to be for Customs
and Immigration; you got your basic training, and then you were
just out there. We have basic training, which is that 71 days,
which by the way translates into 3 months, 6 days a week at
FLETC. And then there will be post-basic training which will be
classroom--significant classroom training at the port, in-port
training as well as on-the-job training.
So we are doing--the key to part of this--a key component
is, frankly, a lot more training than either one of these
inspectional services were doing prior to the creation of
Customs and Border Protection and the CBP officer.
Ms. Sanchez. You mentioned earlier that there was a lot of
discrepancy going on between what the INS, legacy INS and
legacy Customs was being paid, et cetera. Going back to the 6-
day training week at the academy, I have been told that legacy
INS are being paid overtime for working the 6-day training, but
legacy Customs are not being compensated at all for that sixth
day.
Can you tell me if that is true? What is the intent to fix
it? Are we going to work on fixing that? Why the difference?
Mr. Bonner. First of all, I am glad you asked that. It is
true, there are disparities and there are significant
disparities in the pay and overtime systems between legacy
Customs and Immigration and legacy AQI inspectors, and we need
to get rid of those discrepancies. We cannot unify as an agency
until we get rid of them.
You mentioned one of them, and one of them is that under
the Customs overtime system, which is called COPRA, you are not
entitled to the FLSA kind of overtime, but the Immigration
inspectors are entitled to it. That is one discrepancy that
benefited legacy Immigration inspectors.
On the other hand, under COPRA, a Customs inspector can
credit up to one-half of his overtime to retirement; an
Immigration inspector cannot. So we need to eliminate these
disparities, and frankly, I don't think we will ever unify as
one agency until we do that.
And the CBP officer allows us to go to essentially one pay
and one overtime system; the question is, what is it? And I
have submitted that question to the Department of Homeland
Security HR design team to come up with options and
recommendations as soon as possible, but before the end of the
year to the Department of Homeland Security, so we can have
that decided.
Ms. Sanchez. And once you have that decided, will then the
old legacy go under the new system and everybody will be under
the new system? There is no problem with switching them over?
Mr. Bonner. There is a sequence to it, but the answer to
that is yes. We need to have this decided before the first CBP
officers graduate in January, and then in March we will convert
the legacy Customs and Immigration inspectors to CBP
inspectional officers, and we will have one system. And so it
will have been decided what that system is. And there will be
overtime, because we depend on overtime to be able to do our
job.
But what is the system? We need to have one system. And
right now, we do not. There are disparities, and it is unfair
and it is inequitable. And part of the CBP officer concept
actually gets us to essentially one pay and overtime system. It
helps us get there. And by March of next year, we will have one
pay and overtime system, and we won't have these kinds of
disparities that you just alluded to that occur right now, and
every day, because we have three different overtime systems.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bonner. It is a nightmare to administer, by the way.
Mr. Camp. I notice the chairman of the full committee is
here.
Would the chairman of the full committee seek to inquire
now?
Mr. Cox. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome. Thank you for your outstanding testimony. Let me
jump ahead to one of the witnesses that we are going to hear
from shortly, who is concerned with the capacity of your
officers to cross-train, as it were. Do you want to address
that?
Mr. Bonner. Yes, I do. I know there is a concern, and I
think Ms. Sanchez alluded to it. There is a concern, the jack-
of-all-trades-and-master-of-none concern.
First of all, we have to remember that we are not starting
from scratch here. We have 18,000 highly trained inspectors
that have a high level of expertise in the customs field, in
the immigration field, and in the agriculture field. So we are
not just starting everything over. That is number one.
Secondly--and we intend to and will continue to use that
expertise. We will be training a CBP officer, though, Mr.
Chairman, that we will begin rolling out in January, which will
be--by the way, we are talking about maybe 200 or 300 new CBP
officers a month that will graduate from the basic training
down at FLETC. And they will get some very good, solid basic
training in immigration and in customs procedures and the
background they need.
But they are also going to get additional training when
they go out to the field. And that is the proficiency training,
that is, the in-port classroom training, so that as you are
going to assign somebody, let's say to a particular function or
area, whatever that area or function might be, that you have
actually not only trained, but you have tested and certified
that they are capable of performing that function. And only
then do they get assigned.
So you are not training 18,000 people--inspectors to do
everything all at once. What you are doing is, you are training
them to have--certainly for the antiterrorism mission, you are
training them for the important traditional missions of Customs
and Border Protection, and then you have a corps officer which
you can--with additional training and mentoring and the like,
that will be--in my judgment will be capable of performing a
variety of functions that we will need for CBP. Whether that is
in Immigration or the Customs area or otherwise.
Mr. Cox. I am a strong supporter of what you are doing. I
think it is vitally important and vitally necessary. From the
standpoint of law-abiding U.S. constituents who come across our
borders, it is maddening to have to provide the same
information on similar forms to two different parts of the
Federal Government right as you go through the same port of
entry. And I think consolidating Customs and Immigration and
APHIS, something that has been an opportunity for a long time,
now the creation of the Department enables us to do.
I also can see that as we implement programs for biometric
identification of visitors to the United States, some of the
problems that I think very properly the Immigration inspectors
are complaining about, the complexity of their jobs, will
diminish. We have a primary lane and a secondary lane and we
refer the people from primary to secondary if they have an
irregular circumstance. It is very easy to imagine, if things
that are now pilot programs such as US-VISIT and FAST become
the norm rather than the exception, that the job of your
inspector is going to be almost entirely focusing on the
exceptions rather than focusing on the people who are law
abiding.
Right now we have it almost backwards. We spend a whole lot
of time making people stand in line, taking a lot of their
time, and looking at them when, in fact, we should be looking
for the needle, not the haystack.
Can you comment on whether my assumption is correct that
the expanded use of biometric identifiers will actually make
this concept more meaningful?
Mr. Bonner. Well, we are definitely moving there and it is
going to be helpful. Our whole approach, Mr. Chairman, has been
to better use advanced information, electronic information,
technology risk management to sort out the haystack, to narrow
down the haystack both for people and cargo coming into the
United States. Biometrics as US-Visit is implemented, is going
to be a very helpful tool to us, along with the other kinds of
automated information and technology that we use that permits
us to not only screen in advance, select in advance, but also
to screen faster and to have a faster process.
If I could add one other thing to that is very important:
As we have unified Customs and Border Protection in one agency,
let's look at some of the things that are already happening.
One is that since March 1, we are unifying the passenger
analysis units. Immigration had theirs at airports and Customs
had theirs, and obviously you want to merge these and marry
these together when you are using them for the antiterrorist
threat.
By the same token, as you narrow things down, cargo or
people of concern, you want to use joint secondary teams. You
do not want just an Immigration secondary that is looking at
somebody for admissibility purposes or a Customs secondary over
here that is looking at a potential terrorist threat for
purposes of searching for drugs or other things. You want both
of these expertises together and their authorities together.
We really need to go to the CBP officer to be more
effective in performing that priority homeland security
antiterrorism mission so they are more focused on it. It will
help us better perform our traditional mission because it gives
us a force multiplier, more people that know the broader
missions of the agency as well as their traditional missions.
Mr. Cox. It is abundantly clear that none of the legacy
agencies that have been folded into the Department of Homeland
Security had as their primary mission protecting against
terrorist attack on the United States. That is now the mission
of the Department and it is now your mission. And it seems to
me that if people are saying this is not the way we have done
it for the last 20 years, that that is essentially an
establishment of nothing because nothing about DHS is the way
we used to do it.
We are trying to change. We have got to change, and I
applaud you for your efforts. Working change in 22 legacy
agencies is going to be very difficult, but it is vitally
important because we have a new mission and we have to
accomplish it.
Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Mr. Dicks may inquire.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much for your testimony. And
being from Washington State, we just had a good trip out there
with Chairman Cox and Vice Chairman Dunn and had a chance to
talk to people about the NEXUS program and the FAST program.
This morning, I had a meeting with the director of our airport
in Seattle--.
Mr. Bonner. SEATAC.
Mr. Dicks. At SEATAC.
--and basically was told when we go into the VISIT program
we are going to have problems at the airports because you are
going to have to put in new equipment and reorganize how you do
this because of the biometrics. As I understand it, there has
not been a lot of dialogue between the Department of Homeland
Security and the airports on this subject and that there ought
to be.
In fact we are trying to arrange a meeting to have Ms.
Lindsey, the Director of Sea-Tac Airport, come down and talk to
somebody at DHS about this because she thinks this is going to
be a problem, just like the baggage has been a problem, in how
you work this out between the airport and the local officials.
And we had some problems out there this summer over in the TSA
area in terms of number of people or adequacy of people.
Do you have any comment on this? Is this your
responsibility of how US-VISIT is going to be done at airports
or is that somebody else's responsibility?
Mr. Bonner. The program itself, Mr. Dicks, is being handled
at the Department level within the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, and that is where the program is headed
up by Jim Williams.
That said, of course, Customs and Border Protection are
participating in the development and particularly the
practicalities of implementing US VISIT initially, as you know,
at our international airports, so that it can be implemented in
a way that does not result in significant wait times in terms
of processing people into the country-and so that there is a
meaningful exit, too, by the way. I know there are various
discussions as to how the exit part initially is going to be
done.
I have people at my agency that are participating with the
Department in terms of working on that issue both from an IT
issue, and also from a practical operational issue--how does it
work. I have not gotten a briefing in a week or two on it, but
there is some good work being done.
That said, I think it is very important--and I will take
this back--that we engage with the airport authorities, what
the plan is, how this is going to be implemented, and how we
are going to make this work to establish this capability by the
end of this year to be able to, at least with respect to some
or all nonimmigrants--I don't know exactly what the universe
will be there--can be part of those biometrically entered when
entering into the United States, and we will know when they
have exited.
But it is a big priority of the Department of Homeland
Security. The program is at that level essentially under the
overall oversight of Secretary Asa Hutchinson at the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Thank you very much.
Mr. Goodlatte may inquire.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Commissioner Bonner, your opening statement and some of the
answers that you have given have enlightened us a little bit
about our concerns, expressed by myself and Congresswoman
Sanchez, about agriculture, certainly far more than the very
paltry amount of information in your testimony.
However, I would again renew my concern that there are
numerous questions, far more than my 5 minutes here today are
going to allow me to get answers to and I must say, I am
concerned. When you called me, and I appreciated the call; and
in fact, at that time I raised with you the concern that we
needed to be briefed, and we still have not been briefed. And
it was especially disappointing when, after that, we asked for
a briefing even after this hearing, and we were told that you
would be too busy, not you personally, but your staff would be
too busy to brief the committee staff.
This is not something that is a recent problem. My
committee has had simple requests for information on the
specific topic of training for 5 weeks and questions on port
staffing levels since the first week in August. Can we get that
briefing?
Mr. Bonner. Absolutely. First of all, Mr. Goodlatte, after
we spoke I believe that there was a briefing of your staff or
the staff of the Agriculture Committee. But if we are remiss,
if we have not followed up on these things, you have my
assurance we will promptly follow up and get you the
information you need.
Frankly, I would welcome an opportunity to have further
briefings of your staff on any and all issues that you might
have. And beyond that, by the way, I am prepared at any time
personally to meet with you or whoever you think I should meet
with to provide you the answers to the legitimate questions
that you and others might have in terms of how we are going to
address in a way that improves and does not degrade the very
important mission of protecting American agriculture.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you. We will take advantage of that.
However, I must say that the input that we would like to
have in this process has been partially lost. And there is
nothing in the law that requires that input; however, I would
note that section 421(d)(3) of the Homeland Security Act
provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, may issue such
directives and guidelines as necessary to assure the effective
use of personnel to carry out the functions transferred. And
that is required under the law.
And I would ask you, how many such consultative meetings
between DHS and the U.S. Department of Agriculture occurred
prior to announcing the One Face at the Border initiative?
Mr. Bonner. I don't know if I can categorize. I know that
Jayson Ahern, Commissioner of Field Operations, which would
oversee the inspectional work force at the ports of entry, I
know he had discussions with Dr. Dunkle at Agriculture. I know
I personally outlined the concept of the CBP officer and the
agriculture--
Mr. Goodlatte. This was prior to the announcement of One
Face at the Border?
Mr. Bonner. Yes, when I say I did--and by the way, also
before the announcement, I did attempt to--by the way,
unsuccessfully, just before Secretary Ridge announced this, I
did attempt to reach Bobby Acord of the Agriculture Department.
As things turned out, it took several days before we were able
to connect, but I did give Bobby--.
Mr. Goodlatte. Let me interrupt you because I have a
limited amount of time here, a minute left to get to the
substance of this and the purpose for why we want these to
occur.
One of our grave concerns is the amount of training that
the CBP officers are receiving. Right now, all of the APHIS
inspectors at the border are required as prerequisite to have
extensive background, in fact, either comparable experience or
a B.S. degree in biology, and then after that they undergo a
10-week or 400-hour training session. And this compares to a
scant 16 hours of agricultural training with no scientific
prerequisites for new hires.
I understand that you have experience there, and we are
glad you have this, but the new hires have got to, on the spot,
recognize problems and ask the right questions before they ever
get to the agriculture specialists being involved. And I have
herewith, because I cannot go into it because my time has
expired--but I will ask, Mr. Chairman, that we make it a part
of the record-- examples of some of the products, some of them
very innocent looking, like a can of Heinz soup, which is an
import item coming into the country that is a banned product
for very specific scientific reasons. There is a risk of BSE in
that particular case.
But, in any event, it concerns me greatly that there is not
enough training going into these frontline individuals for what
is a very high-risk area in terms of the responsibilities that
they have to undertake, that is, agricultural inspection.
Mr. Bonner. Can I just make two quick points, very quickly?
One is, the CBP officer with both the basic training and
the import classroom training, it is contemplated, will have 90
hours of training in the agricultural protection mission. That
is number one.
Number two, there will be a number of Agriculture
Specialists that will be equal to the number of current AQI
inspectors, that will be trained--there may be a somewhat
longer training--it will be essentially the same training that
they currently get through the U.S. department of Agriculture
at the national center over in Maryland.
So you will have that corps, and then you will have CBP
officers who do have significant training in the agriculture
protection mission, so we will be able to perform that function
more effectively.
At over half of the ports of entry, there are not any
Agriculture inspectors. I hate to tell you this: There are no
AQI inspectors at over half of the ports of entry in the United
States. So we want a CBP officer in addition to the Ag
Specialists that are going to be better able to protect our
country against agriculture. I think we will be more effective,
not less effective.
Mr. Camp. Mr. Cardin may inquire.
Mr. Cardin. No questions.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Ms. Dunn may inquire.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, Commissioner. I see that you were sworn in on
the 24th of September, so I congratulate you on your strength
of character to hang in there, knowing that your job would
change a whole lot as a result of 9/11.
I wanted to ask you a couple of questions. First of all,
how have your responsibilities shifted since 9/11? And are you
well enough funded to be able, for example, to continue to pick
up the legacy responsibilities of the drug smuggling and other
things that were more of a focus before 9/11?
Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, the responsibility--
September 24th of 2001, I was sworn in as Commissioner of
Customs, and the responsibilities changed dramatically with 9/
11. Literally, we had to refocus U.S. Customs on the
antiterrorism/homeland security mission.
When you think about it, Customs--of course, with
Immigration--is the frontline at our borders in terms of
protecting our country; and Agriculture inspectors,
specifically with respect to agriculture diseases and pests.
And so certainly my whole responsibility turned dramatically
because it was clear to me from--and it was clear to me,
listening to the President, that I needed to refocus U.S.
Customs immediately and promptly on the antiterrorism, or what
we now would call the Homeland Security mission; and that is
what we have been doing, literally, since I hit the ground in
September of 2001.
Now, this does not mean, by the way, we drop all of the
traditional mission. We also have had to balance that. And we
have to balance that as we become Customs and Border Protection
with even more traditional missions which go from everything--
interdicting illegal drugs and protecting our country in that
sense to making sure that people that are illegally entering
our country are apprehended, that if they are not admissible
that those determinations are made.
From a budget point of view, this is the first year
actually--fiscal year 2004 that I will actually have a budget
for the entire Customs and Border Protection. For the last half
of 2003, part of that budget was someplace else which made
things difficult. But I think we have basically--without
getting into a lot of fine details, I do think that we have a
good budget that has been submitted by the President and
enacted by the Congress for fiscal year 2004, and I am
confident that we can do the mission.
Now, there may be some missions and initiatives as we go
forward that may be necessary, and I will bring those up as
appropriate to this subcommittee, to our Appropriations
subcommittee.
Ms. Dunn. Good. I am glad.
We will also be interested in being helpful to you as you
carry out what was required before 9/11 and what we are very
interested in having you focus on, the Department of Homeland
Security responsibilities.
I am from the State of Washington and many of my
constituents are those of neighboring districts, up north, who
move daily across the border into Canada. And I am interested
in how the NEXUS program is working, whether it is serving my
constituents and other Washington State constituents well.
Ms. Dunn. What can I tell them about this program, as you
initiate it, and the future of this program?
Mr. Bonner. NEXUS is working better in the State of
Washington than in any other place. We have over 35,000 people,
both U.S. and Canadian citizens who are enrolled in the
program, who provide information so their backgrounds could be
checked through criminal and terrorist indices in both Canada
and the United States, and who have submitted to a personal
interview by, usually, a U.S. customs and Border Protection
official and with the Canadians, and have been--we have made a
determination that they do not pose a risk to the terrorist or
even drug smugglers. And then they are enrolled in the program.
It is a model in the sense that I think you know at the
Peace Arch, which is part of the Blaine port of entry, and this
is one of the important things. We actually have a dedicated,
not just a NEXUS booth, but a lane that you can get into, so it
is truly a fast lane into the United States; and that has
helped us with enrollment. Overall, this is important because
the more people that we can get vetted, that we know are
trusted, that we do not have to look at every time they come to
the border entry point.
By the way, it may still be a random check once in a while,
but we can concentrate more of our efforts on people we do not
know anything about, or people who are Ahmed Ressams, who was,
as you know, an individual who was arrested and apprehended by
a U.S. customs inspector in early 2000, who was an Al-Qaeda
terrorist. So that is what we want to focus our effort on, and
these programs, like NEXUS, help us do that.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you for that answer.
There was a woman at U.S. Customs, a very alert woman; the
Canadians tried to take credit for that snatch, by the way.
Mr. Bonner. They had nothing to do with it. It was Diana
Dean.
Ms. Dunn. Good for you.
We have now got that on the record, finally, and we did
have a wonderful report of that by one of your Customs agents
in Seattle when we were there for our visit a couple of weeks
ago.
Let me ask you about something that my other committee,
Ways and Means, discussed because we, at least until now,
oversaw the Customs department; and in our discussion as to
what should go into the Department of Homeland Security, we
talked about whether we should separate out the revenue-raising
portions of Customs, the duty portions, for example, from the
rest of the responsibilities.
Do you have any impression on whether that would be a good
idea or a bad idea to do, as you move into--under Homeland
Security?
Mr. Bonner. I think that would be a serious mistake. There
are all sorts of connections and interconnections between,
let's say, the inspectors at the ports of entry and the trade
regulation and compliance function, as well as the trade
facilitation function. U.S. Customs, now Customs and Border
Protection, collected about $23, $24 billion last year in
revenue.
Most of that, 90 percent or thereabouts, are import duties
and the other 10 percent are fees of some sort that we are
collecting. So it is very sizable, and it is very much
interrelated; and I actually appreciated the fact that when the
Homeland Security legislation was enacted, it did permit
essentially for most of U.S. Customs to remain intact and our
management system intact, so that we could add pieces from
other agencies that had significant border responsibilities,
like the Immigration inspector program from the former INS that
was abolished on March 1, the Agriculture AQI inspection
program at our borders, and the entire Border Patrol, and by
doing that, we now--we do have one agency for the border.
But the trade functions and even the revenue functions are
interrelated with what Customs and Border Protection does, and
so I think it would be a mistake to split them all out. And I
am glad, by the way, that Chairman Thomas and the Ways and
Means Committee permitted the statute to be constructed in a
way where we could build a border--one agency for our border,
and that is what we have done under the Department of Homeland
Security.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Mr. Markey, you may inquire.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
This hearing room is a particularly fitting venue for
today, given the debate on the Iraq war supplemental going on
on the House floor and this committee, the work of this
committee. The mural on the back wall reminds us of the battle
that is still being waged in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
courage of our men and women in the Armed Forces whose valor
and determination keep our Nation secure.
The photo behind us of soldiers marching down a city street
reminds us that we need protection here on our Nation's Main
Street, as well, to safeguard the homeland from those who try
to perpetrate terrorist acts against Americans inside our
country.
My question for Mr. Bonner today relates to the efforts
that Customs is making to ensure that our homeland is secure.
On September 12, I wrote to Secretary Ridge to express my
concern about a shipment of depleted uranium that ABC News was
able to transport undetected from Jakarta to the Port of Los
Angeles. I have not yet received a response from the Department
and would like to take this opportunity to ask you to address
some of the questions I raised in my correspondence.
Media reports indicate that upon arrival at the Port of Los
Angeles on August 23, the shipment of depleted uranium from
Jakarta was screened by U.S. Customs inspectors. They did not
detect anything dangerous or suspicious inside the trunk using
radiation pagers and X-ray scanners, so they did not open the
crate. As you know, while depleted uranium is a harmless
substance, its chemical signature is similar to highly enriched
radium, which can be used to make radiological dirty bombs or a
nuclear explosive device that might be used against America.
My first question: Have you investigated how this shipment
was able to pass from Jakarta to Los Angeles without raising
the suspicions of Customs inspectors? And I will have follow-up
questions after that.
Mr. Bonner. Okay. First of all, it did raise the suspicions
of Customs inspectors. We had--through our automated targeting
system, we identified this container as potentially being a
container that posed a potential risk, based upon various
factors that go into our automated targeting system, and so it
was identified as a container that would get a security
screening.
Mr. Markey. So why wasn't the crate opened if it was
identified as a suspicious crate?
Mr. Bonner. Well, it was identified as posing a potential
risk, based upon a number of factors about the container. It
was given, and all containers that are identified as a
potential risk get, a minimum security inspection, which
includes running the container through a large-scale X-ray-type
machine, and running it also for potential radiation admission.
That was done with it. It was determined by the way that there
was nothing dangerous in the container that posed a threat and
in fact--in truth, in fact, there was nothing dangerous.
Mr. Markey. I am saying--.
Mr. Bonner. Just a minute, Mr. Markey.
There was nothing in the container that posed a threat.
Mr. Markey. No, I know that, but I am saying since the
radiation signature is very similar to highly enriched uranium,
did they determine that there was uranium in the container?
Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, it was depleted uranium.
Mr. Markey. Did they determine that there was uranium in
the container?
Mr. Bonner. Well, you said ``or a radiation signature
similar to highly enriched uranium''; and by the way, I take
issue with that. It does not--the depleted uranium is depleted
of most of its radiation source, so it is a very low-emitting
substance. It actually emits about as much radiation as a pile
of dirt, so it is not emitting a radiation signature that is
very easy to pick up, as opposed to highly enriched uranium,
which would emit--if it is not heavily lead-shielded, would
emit a radiation signature.
Mr. Markey. Was the evidence that you had previous
something that told you there could be uranium in that crate?
You said that it had been identified. Was the information you
had that there could be uranium?
Mr. Bonner. No. No. The information we had was based upon
an analysis of advance information that we get under the 24-
hour rule, which I described earlier in my testimony, which
gives us information about a container. We then run it against
a large database we have with respect to importers, shippers,
and other factors, including intelligence information; and we
determined--by the way, when we say it is a potential risk
container, that just means we haven't been able to rule that
container out as a risk.
Mr. Markey. I appreciate that. So you are saying you didn't
identify it as something which could potentially have uranium
in it?
Mr. Bonner. No, we thought it could potentially--have
potentially some sort of terrorist weapon, which could be
anything from a manpad to a nuclear device to the materials
that could make a nuclear device to just, potentially, ordinary
explosive material.
Mr. Markey. So you do not have a system to open those
crates that you believe pose a significantly higher risk?
Mr. Bonner. No. We do have a system, and the system is, if
there is something about the container, it is either emitting
radiation, or based upon the X-ray screening, there is an
anomaly, there is something that doesn't look right in terms of
what is advertised to be in the container, then we do a full
physical inspection of the container.
That was not the case with respect to the small amount of
depleted uranium, which was about the size of a Coke can that
was shipped by ABC News as a supposed test. I do not think it
was a valid test with respect to the capabilities of detecting,
let's say, a terrorist weapon.
Mr. Markey. Okay, so the Natural Resources Defense Council
says that without opening the crate, there is no way to tell
the difference between HEU, highly enriched uranium, and
depleted uranium without looking inside.
Do you disagree with that?
Mr. Bonner. I think highly enriched uranium which is not
lead-shielded emits significantly more gamma rays than depleted
uranium, so it is easier to read with a radiation detection
device from a greater distance. That is what I believe.
Mr. Markey. And do you have detection devices which would
pick up lower enriched uranium, or did that just go through?
Mr. Bonner. We are looking for highly enriched uranium that
you could make into a nuclear device--which, by the way, there
is a certain quantity that you would need that would displace a
certain amount of space; and if you are going to prevent it
from emitting, you have to have some significant lead shielding
of the material. And I think if you did all of those things, I
have a great deal of confidence that that kind of anomaly would
have been detected by the X-ray scan that was done in that
container.
If you are talking about a Coke can full of depleted
uranium, no, that is not necessarily going to be detectable,
but it does not pose any risk being--it is not a terrorist
weapon, it cannot be made into a terrorist weapon. And
frankly--.
Mr. Markey. No, I did know that. That is obvious.
Mr. Bonner. Yeah.
Mr. Markey. The question is, does it emit a radiation
signature, chemical signature that is something that should be
suspicious to you?
You disagree that it does not emit a chemical signature
which is something that should be suspicious to you? You
disagree with that; is that right?
Mr. Bonner. I am actually disagreeing with you on the level
of emission.
Mr. Markey. That is what I am saying.
Mr. Bonner. Okay.
Mr. Markey. Are you saying you do not agree that it emits a
signature which should cause any concern for any inspector? Is
that what you are saying?
Mr. Bonner. No. I am saying it emits an extremely low level
of radiation.
Mr. Markey. No. I am asking you.
Mr. Bonner. And is a sensitive device to pick up that
radiation.
Mr. Markey. But is it something that should be suspicious
and, as a result, looked at?
You are saying no?
Mr. Bonner. Well, if it is depleted uranium, no. Depleted
uranium is used for a lot of purposes.
Mr. Markey. Stop, please.
You don't know it is depleted uranium until you open the
crate. You have to first decide that the level of radiation
which is picked up, the chemical signature, is significant
enough to open the crate.
You are saying that this would not emit a chemical
signature significant enough to open the crate?
Mr. Camp. I will give the Commissioner time to answer the
question. The time has expired.
Mr. Bonner. I am not disputing you on the signature. I am
disputing you on the level of the emission that could be read
and on what distance it could be read.
We would almost have to go into a classified hearing if we
want to get into specific details on this.
Mr. Markey. All right.
Mr. Camp. Ms. Granger may inquire.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Very simple questions, and I apologize because I came in
late.
You said there would be 200, 300 graduating each month, and
I believe you said it started in January. Did I say that right?
Mr. Bonner. That is right.
Ms. Granger. What is your total number of CBP officers?
Mr. Bonner. Well, you know, eventually--first of all, that
is a hard question to answer because it says, what is the right
number of inspectional officers that we need.
But let's say we have 18,000 inspectional officers, right
now--.
Ms. Granger. All right.
Mr. Bonner. --so I would think at a minimum that given the
terrorist threat and given the traditional missions that we are
going to need ultimately, a number of CBP officers that is
equivalent to that.
Now, maybe--I do not want to box myself in here--a year or
two from now I may think we may need to increase that in
certain places, and I cannot do it through reallocation, but
generally speaking, over time, you would end up with having the
number of CBP officers that is equivalent to the total number
of inspectional officers that are at least legacy Customs and
legacy Immigration. That is, by the way, about 16,000 to
17,000.
Ms. Granger. And so do you have a time frame to say, this
is when we expect to have that done?
Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, there would be new CBP
officers that are being trained; and they are actually
starting--we have actually started the training--and they would
graduate in January, as I indicated. And there will be some
graduating classes; it will be around 300 a month, depending on
what our hiring needs are. But at the same time, in March of
next year, the plan would be to convert the legacy Immigration
and Customs inspectors to CBP officers and to provide, both
before and after that, some additional cross-training and
refresher training of the legacy work force, if you will,
inspectional work force. But at that point essentially all of
the inspectional work force, except for the Agriculture
Specialist, would be CBP officers.
Ms. Granger. Okay, and one other question: What will that
consolidation do in terms of the overall number of personnel at
ports of entry?
Mr. Bonner. Well, it will not affect it at all per se, by
the way, without prejudice to my right to decide that we need
more inspectors at a particular one port of entry and perhaps a
few less at another.
But this has nothing whatsoever to do--we would have
essentially, and as a generalization, the same number of
inspectors at, let's say, the San Ysidro port of entry or
Detroit or Pembina, North Dakota, or JFK Airport, L.A. seaport
or Seattle Seaport. You would have the same general number of
inspectors that you have, now.
What you have, though, is you have inspectors that have a
greater level of training and knowledge, both, as to the
homeland security/antiterrorism mission and to the general,
important, traditional missions that the agency as a whole must
perform.
I hope that--.
Ms. Granger. Yes.
Thank you.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson-Lee may inquire.
Mr. Bonner. We will be adding about 2,000, from 2002 to
2004, we are adding about 2,000, a little over 2,000 inspectors
to the work force, based upon where we were in fiscal year
2002.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the chairman very much, and the
ranking member.
This is a very important hearing and, Commissioner, I am
gratified for your presence here. I always would hope or always
would intend for Congress to be problem solvers, and certainly
your agency was created to solve our biggest problem or to be
part of the solution to our biggest problem that we are facing
in the 21st century, and that is of terrorists and terrorist
activities and horrific acts against the States.
So I apologize. There are two conflicting, or at least in
terms of my time, Immigration Subcommittee hearings that are
going on, in the Judiciary and this one; and you may have said
this already. But I would like to know specifically on this
question of fewer overall hours of training--in fact, I just
came through the international segment of my airport, Houston
Intercontinental; and I will put in a local plug and say, we
want you down there. I am going to personally invite you,
because we have had a continuing problem in backlogs with the
number of inspectors.
It is not their fault, if you will, but it is a tough job
with a high volume, and we have not been able to solve that; so
let me extend a direct invitation. I think we had that
invitation in before, and we have not been able to work out the
schedule, so I hope we will be able to do that.
But the idea of fewer hours of training. Tell me what your
vision is for this merged combination of Customs, Immigration
and Agricultural inspectors. What is the best result of what
you expect to have happen?
Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, I do not believe there will
be overall fewer hours of training. I believe there will be
more hours of training with the approach we are taking.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And tell me how so?
Mr. Bonner. Well, how so in two ways. First of all, the
basic CBP inspectional officer training will be 3 months, so I
mean, it is longer significantly than--and that is 6 days a
week, by the way, so it is significantly longer than the
current legacy Customs inspector training.
But there is a lot of overlap in the Customs and
Immigration training courses, so--we eliminated that, so I
think the training is going to be at basic--the basic
inspectional training is going to be in terms of hours; I think
it will be roughly equivalent to what it has been separately
now for the legacy Customs and Immigration basic training
academies.
Now--but in addition to that, we are going to post-in-port
classroom training when a CBP inspectional officer moves out to
a port of entry. There were going to be additional training
requirements and hours of training with respect to the mission,
which doesn't exist right now, by and large. There is on-the-
job training and there is occasional, sporadic classroom
training. But this will be a structured in-port classroom
training program which is going to be, also, a significant
number of hours, so at the end of the day, I fully expect that
CBP officers are going to be more highly trained than they
currently are.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Can I stop you?
Are they going to have the inherent knowledge where they
can address technical or out-of-the-box situations in this
combination? What is your vision for getting them gelling
together, working with at least a common understanding of the
procedures, the technical procedures, so that we have an
effective response to what we are trying to do, which I imagine
is maximizing personnel to get the most efficient operating
system that we can?
Mr. Bonner. Efficient and effective, but one of the things
to gel together is, of course, to put all of the inspectional
officers into one uniform, which we have done, and that will be
phased in over the next 8 or 9 months.
Another thing, though, is in terms of how do they get the
specialized knowledge that they are to going to need to perform
their function? Well, there is basic inspectional training. You
know, a new trainee has to be trained. They go from a GS-5 or
GS-7 to a GS-11, so there is a period of time with any new
trainee, where you need to provide on-the-job training, and as
I say, additional in-port classroom training modules.
And then, thirdly, in terms of the inherited sort of
expertise, we have 18,000 CBP Customs and Border Protection
inspectors that have a tremendous amount of expertise in the
Immigration area, the Customs area, and the Agriculture
protection mission area.
And lastly let me just say about more efficient, because I
know we have been--we discussed the Houston airport and the
wait times at the airport; and one of the key reasons for those
wait times has been the lack of what were INS or Immigration
inspector staffing at the primary booth. And so as you train,
by the way, new people to perform multiple functions, you can
have greater flexibility so that you can literally staff all of
the primary inspection booths with a CBP inspectional officer,
where we had not been able to do that in the past, so it makes
us more efficient too in performing missions.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me just conclude.
My time, Mr. Chairman--I would just like to conclude by
saying the topic in the Judiciary Committee is the issue of
these overstays. Now, that is after the fact, but one of the
problems that I see is that we need to refine and expedite the
distinction between perceived troublemakers, because we have
already defined them as troublemakers--and I use that term not
lightly because it has offended many of our friends and allies
from certain regions--and get a preapproval process that helps
move that process along in terms of people.
The other thing that I would like to raise in this
committee and raise with you as I conclude is that we need to
also deal on a southern border with the whole question of
smuggling, which I hope that maybe this merged group may have
some sensitivities to that.
I have a CASE Act, and I hope I will get a hearing in this
committee dealing with going at the nerve of smuggling so that
we sort of move that criminal aspect away, so that this merged
group can deal with the overall commerce and tourism that comes
about, that we should not be undermining in light of the fact
that we are all trying to fight terror; and I hope that I can
engage you in this issue and engage the chairman.
It is called the CASE Act. We have worked the FBI, Treasury
Department, law enforcement on incentives to getting informants
penalty enhancements, and an outreach program to educate people
about the travesty and tragedy of smuggling human cargo; and I
hope we will be able to present that to this committee.
I thank you very much.
Mr. Bonner. Yes. Happy to discuss that with you.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. And this concludes the questioning for
the Commissioner.
Again, I want to thank you for being here and all that your
doing and your time today.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Chairman, may I just add something?
Mr. Camp. Yes.
Ms. Sanchez. I am very concerned that this whole issue is
about the agriculture, again, because my State's main industry,
believe it or not, is agriculture.
Mr. Bonner. Well, it is in my State, too, Ms. Sanchez, by
the way.
Ms. Sanchez. I would really look forward to maybe getting a
personal briefing from your department, just to ensure that we
are getting our questions asked with respect to that particular
piece of the program.
Mr. Bonner. We will be happy to do that. We will make sure
that that happens.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. Thank you very much.
The second panel may come forward. We will have Mr. Tom
Keefe, President of the National Treasury Employees Union,
Local 137; Mr. Tom Kuhn, President of the American Federation
of Government Employees Union, Local 2580; and Mr. Bill Pauli,
President of the California Farm Bureau Federation.
Mr. Camp. Mr. Keefe, why don't we begin with you? We have
your written testimony, and I would ask that you briefly
summarize your statement in 5 minutes. There will be another
hearing, that is scheduled for this room, so we do need to be
done by 3:30.
So, Mr. Keefe, why don't you begin?
STATEMENT OF TOM KEEFE, PRESIDET, NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES
UNION LOCAL 137
Mr. Keefe. Thank you.
Chairman Camp, Ranking member Sanchez, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, I would like to thank the
subcommittee for the opportunity to testify on the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection's One Face at the Border
initiative.
I am a second generation Customs inspector, proudly
following in the footsteps of my father, who was a Customs
inspector until his death in 1982. My law enforcement career
spans 22 years.
In 1982, I started as a deputy sheriff and was a police
officer for 2 years. In 1984, I accepted a position as an INS
inspector, in Champlain, New York. To qualify for this
position, I was required to attend and successfully complete 20
weeks of Immigration officer basic training class at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia.
In 1989, I transferred to accept a position with the U.S.
Customs Service. I again was required to attend and
successfully complete a 9-week basic Customs inspector class at
FLETC.
In addition to my INS and Customs training at the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center, I have recently had the
opportunity to be a part of the DHS Human Resources Design
Team. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of OPM to
develop new resources--human resources systems for Federal
employees in the Department of Homeland Security in the areas
of pay, performance, management, job classification,
disciplinary matters, and labor-management relations.
As an employee representative from NTEU, the National
Treasury Employees Union, I was proud to serve on the DHS Human
Resources Design Team field group. From the extensive field
hearings and meetings of our design team, we developed 52 human
resources options that will eventually be sent to Secretary
Ridge and OPM Director James. I believe this collaborative
agency-employee process that was used for the DHS design team
worked very well, and I would suggest that a similar process
might be useful as the agency looks at challenges of
reorganizing its border inspections function.
As the subcommittee is aware, on September 2, 2003,
Secretary Tom Ridge announced the creation of the new CBP
officer position and the One Face at the Border initiative.
Under this plan, a new position, the Customs and Border
Protection officer, would combine the duties of legacy
inspectors from Customs, INS, and APHIS into a single frontline
border security position at the 307 official ports of entry
across the United States.
I and the legacy Customs employees that I work with believe
that combining the border protection responsibilities that were
held by three highly skilled specialists into one ``super
inspector'' raises some serious concerns. By utilizing one
employee to perform all three primary and secondary inspection
functions, will this agency lose the expertise that has made
the United States border inspection personnel second to none?
I would note that a specialist position will be established
within APHIS, and no specialist position will be created for
legacy Customs or INS inspectors. I truly hope that the lack of
a specialist position will not lead to the lack of specialists
in many critical Customs and INS functions performed at the
border. After 20 years as an inspector for both legacy Customs
and legacy INS, and as a participant of the DHS design team, I
believe we have a unique perspective to bring to this committee
as relates to this new Department of Homeland Security and its
implementation of the One Face at the Border initiative.
Prior to the creation of the CBP officers, legacy Customs
officers receive 9 to 10 weeks of intensive training on the
Customs Service rules and regulations alone. Under the new CBP
officer training guidelines, legacy inspectors such as myself
will be transitioning into the new position in the spring of
2004 by way of classroom training, CD-ROM, computer training
and on-the-job training.
While the new training will lead to a broader knowledge of
the INS, Customs and APHIS rules and regulations of entry for
passengers and those entering the United States, there is a
concern as to whether it will provide the specialized expertise
necessary to ensure the successful accomplishment of the
critical missions of the Department of Homeland Security.
Another aspect of the One Face at the Border initiative
that needs to be more scrutinized, and is lacking in detail, is
with regard to secondary inspections processed at ports of
entry. Currently, legacy Customs and INS inspectors and APHIS
inspectors are cross-trained as to the most basic Customs and
INS procedures for entry into the United States, for passengers
and goods.
However, if a legacy Customs inspector, for example, is
faced with a complicated visa situation, they have the ability
to send the passenger to a more intensive, secondary inspection
where an experienced legacy INS inspector can make the
determination as to the validity, say, of a particular visa. It
is unclear whether experts in visa issues or other Customs and
INS border protection matters will continue to be available for
secondary inspection.
I feel strongly that the specific expertise must be
maintained. Stationed at the 307 ports of entry across the
United States, legacy Customs inspectors, such as myself, K-9
enforcement officers and in-port specialists make up our
Nation's front line of defense in the wars on terrorism and
drugs, as well as facilitation of lawful trade into the United
States.
In addition, legacy Customs personnel are responsible for
ensuring compliance with over 400 in-port laws and regulations
for over 40 agencies, as well as stemming the flow of illegal
contraband, such as child pornography, illegal arms, weapons of
mass destruction, and laundered money.
Both the American public and the trade community expect our
borders to be properly defended with as little interference to
legitimate trade as possible. In order to do that, we must
maintain the expertise of legacy Customs Service personnel who
have successfully performed these functions in the past.
Again, I want to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity
to share my thoughts on this very important issue concerning
the CBP's One Face at the Border initiative, and I would be
happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. Keefe.
[The statement of Mr. Keefe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Keefe
Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez, distinguished members of the
Subcommittee; I would like to thank the subcommittee for the
opportunity to testify on the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection's
(CBP) ``One Face at the Border'' initiative.
I am a second-generation Customs inspector, proudly following in
the footsteps of my father, who was a Customs inspector until his death
in 1982. My law enforcement career spans 22 years. In 1982, I started
as a deputy sheriff and was a police officer for two years. In 1984, I
accepted a position as an INS inspector in Champlain, New York. To
qualify for this position, I was required to attend and successfully
complete 20 weeks of the Immigration Officer Basic Class (IOBTC) at the
Federal Law Enforcement Officer Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco,
Georgia. In 1989, I transferred to accept a position as a Customs
inspector. I again was required to attend and successfully complete a
9-week basic Customs inspector class at FLETC. In addition, over the
course of my Customs career I have also attended specialized training
for the Contraband Enforcement School in 1991 and Senior Inspector
training when I was promoted to Senior Customs Inspector in 1996 both
at FLETC.
In addition to my INS and Customs training at FLETC, I have also
recently had the opportunity to be a part of the DHS Human Resources
Design Team. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the Secretary
of Homeland Security and the Director of OPM to develop new human
resources (HR) systems for federal employees in the Department of
Homeland Security in the areas of pay, performance management, job
classification, disciplinary matters, and labor-management relations.
As part of the creation of the new DHS HR system, a design team
composed of DHS managers and employees, HR experts from DHS and OPM,
and representatives from the agency's three largest unions, including
NTEU, was assembled to develop a wide range of options for
consideration by Secretary Ridge and OPM Director James.
As an employee representative from NTEU, I was proud to have served
on the DHS Human Resources Design Team Field group. The Design team
held a number of field hearings, town hall meetings and focus group
meetings around the country. From the extensive field hearings and
meeting our design team developed 52 human resource options that have
been forwarded to a Senior Review Advisory Committee who will
eventually send final HR options to Secretary Tom Ridge and OPM
Director Kay Coles James. I believe the collaborative agency/employee
process that was used for the DHS Design team worked very well and I
would like to suggest that a similar process might be useful as the
agency looks at the challenges of reorganizing it border inspection
functions.
As the subcommittee is aware, on September 2, 2003, Secretary Tom
Ridge announced the creation of a new CBP officer position and the
``One Face at the Border'' initiative. Under this plan, a new position,
Customs and Border Patrol Officer (CBPO) would combine the duties of
legacy inspectors from Customs, INS and APHIS into a single front-line
border security position at the 307 official ports-of-entry across the
United States.
I and the legacy Customs employees I work with believe that
combining the border protection responsibilities that were held by
three highly-skilled specialists into a ``super inspector'' raises some
serious concerns. Each of the job responsibilities from the three
legacy inspection agencies is highly specialized and distinct. By
utilizing one employee to perform all three primary and secondary
inspection functions, will the agency lose the expertise that has made
the United States border inspection personnel second to none?
I would note that a ``specialist'' position will be established
within APHIS, but no ``specialist'' positions will be created for
legacy Customs or INS inspectors. I truly hope that the lack of a
``specialist'' position will not lead to a lack of specialists in the
many critical Customs and INS functions performed at the border.
CBP OFFICER TRAINING:
After 20 years as an inspector for both legacy Customs and INS and
as a participant in the DHS Design Team, I believe that I have a unique
perspective to bring to the committee as it relates to new Department
of Homeland Security and its implementation of the ``One Face at the
Border'' initiative. Prior to the creation of the CBP officer position,
legacy Customs inspectors received 12 weeks of intensive basic training
on Customs Service rules and regulations alone. Under the new CBP
officer training guidelines legacy inspectors, such as myself, will be
transitioning into the new positions in the spring of 2004 by way of
classroom training, CD-ROM computer teaching and on-the-job training.
The new training will lead to a broader knowledge of the INS, Customs
and APHIS rules and regulations of entry for passengers and goods
entering the United States but there is a concern as to whether it will
provide the specialized expertise necessary to ensure the successful
accomplishment of the critical missions of the Department of Homeland
Security.
Another aspect of the ``One Face at the Border'' initiative that
needs more thorough scrutiny is the lack of details as in pertains to
the secondary inspection process at ports of entry. Currently, legacy
Customs and INS inspectors are ``cross-trained'' as to the most basic
Customs and INS procedures for entry into the U.S. for passengers and
goods. However, if a legacy Customs inspector is faced with a
complicated visa entry situation at an airport or land border primary
inspection station they have the ability to send the passenger to a
more intensive secondary inspection station where an experienced legacy
INS inspector can make a determination as to the validity of a
particular visa. It is unclear whether experts in visa issues or other
specific Customs and INS border protection matters will continue to be
available for secondary inspection. I feel strongly that specific
expertise must be maintained.
Stationed at 307 ports-of-entry across the United States, legacy
Customs inspectors, such as myself, canine enforcement officers, and
import specialists make up our nation's first line of defense in the
wars on terrorism and drugs as well as the facilitation of lawful trade
into the United States. In addition, legacy Customs personnel are
responsible for ensuring compliance with over 400 import laws and
regulations for over 40 federal agencies, as well as stemming the flow
of illegal contraband such as child pornography, illegal arms, weapons
of mass destruction and laundered money.
As a current legacy Customs inspector I would like to briefly
discuss what the traditional missions of Customs include as well as our
newly added homeland security missions such as the Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), the Container Security
Initiative (CSI) and the 24-Hour Rule that requires advanced
transmission of accurate cargo manifest information to the CBP. Legacy
Customs employees are involved in both the trade facilitation/
enforcement and law enforcement missions of the Customs Service,
requiring a truly unique set of job skills.
Customs Border Security Mission:
In 2002, legacy Customs employees seized over 1.9 million pounds of
cocaine, heroin, marijuana and other illegal narcotics--including over
10 million tablets of Ecstasy, triple the amount seized in 1999.
Customs also processed over 500 million travelers last year, including
over 1 million cars and trucks and ships and these numbers continue to
grow annually. Legacy Customs personnel's border security missions
include examining hundreds of thousands of cargo containers every year
at our nation's airports, seaports and land borders for contraband as
well as weapons of mass destruction. Legacy Customs personnel interdict
more drugs, inspect more cargo and process more vehicles than any other
agency within the federal government.
Customs Trade Mission:
Legacy Customs inspectors, import specialists, and canine
enforcement officers work closely together to enforce trade and anti-
smuggling laws. When an inspector makes an illegal cash seizure at a
border crossing, the case is given to an agent for a follow-up
investigation to determine where the illegal funds came from and where
they were going. The interaction between the law enforcement and trade
facilitation missions of the Customs Service is also necessary to the
discovery of counterfeit goods and intellectual property piracy, as
well as terrorist activity.
Customs relies on the expertise of its trade enforcement personnel
to recognize anomalies as they review the processing of commercial
transaction information associated with the admissibility and entry of
imported goods. This process assists law enforcement in developing
targeting criteria as well as targeting suspect shipments and starting
investigations. In addition, the legacy Customs Service collects over
$20 billion in revenue on over 25 million entries involving over $1.3
trillion in international trade every year, providing the federal
government with its second largest source of revenue. Last year, the
Customs Service deposited over $22.1 billion into the U.S. Treasury.
Both the American public and the trade community expect the borders
to be properly defended with as little interference with legitimate
trade as possible, while at the same time being able to efficiently and
safely facilitate trade across that border. In order to do that, we
must maintain the expertise of legacy Customs Service personnel who
have successfully performed these functions in the past.
Again, I want to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to
share my thoughts on the very important issues concerning the CBP's
``One Face at the Border'' initiative. I would be happy to answer any
questions.
Mr. Camp. And now we will hear from Mr. Kuhn.
STATEMENT OF TOM KUHN, PRESIDENT LOCAL 2580, NATIONAL
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICES COUNCIL (AFGE/AFL-CIO)
Mr. Kuhn. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name
Thomas Kuhn. I am President of Local 2580 of the INS Council,
and I would like to take the opportunity to thank the members
for allowing me to present my views on the CBP officer.
My career began in 1973 as an inspector at Kennedy Airport.
The training I received at Kennedy allowed me to develop the
tools that I needed for the rest of my career. My next 19
years, I worked on land border, and in 1997 I was promoted to
special operations inspector and transferred to preclearance
operations in Canada. I have also served as an acting
supervisor and instructor and intelligence officer, and I
currently work in quality control.
Immigration inspectors graduate after 20 weeks of basic
training, and it takes 3 to 5 years before they are competent
to work secondary without a senior officer. Customs and
Immigration inspectors currently staff land border inspection
points. That works in view of the fact that no one other than
U.S. citizens, Canadians or Mexicans with border crossing cards
are handled along the primary line. Everyone is referred to
Immigration secondary, where documents are checked, people are
interviewed, and determinations are made as to the type of
visa. There are over 55 nonimmigrant visas in subcategories,
all with different requirements and durations. Immigration
inspectors at airports process all passengers with visas on the
primary line. Only passengers suspected of malfeasance are
referred to secondary and escorted there.
It takes at least a year before an inspector is proficient
at the primary line alone. When a new inspector starts working,
he makes many unnecessary referrals to secondary, due to the
fact there are numerous different passports, visas, green
cards, all with different security features. Many innocent
people are referred to secondary and they have long waits, miss
connecting flights and they are tremendously inconvenienced.
The airlines suffer a loss of revenue, the new officers are
also easily fooled by high quality false documents and
convincing liars.
I am an American and I am a New Yorker. I watched the World
Trade Center being built and I watched it come down, thanks to
media coverage, so I am fully aware of the need to stop
terrorists. But if we drive the airlines out of business or we
make it so difficult to enter the United States that the
tourists stay home, the tourists have won anyway--the
terrorists have won anyway.
On the other hand, in a world where terrorists destroy 100-
story buildings and kill thousands of people, the border is no
place to put someone's idea of efficiency over national
security. I can tell you that with one position our Nation will
not be safer. If the management of Customs and Border
Protection, which has limited immigration experience, plans to
make CBP officers jacks of all trades, they will be masters of
none and it will be a grave disservice to the security of the
country.
If, on the other hand, they plan on developing quality
primary officers from the new CBP officers and they develop new
CBP paths to specialize in Customs, the concept could work.
We must continue to have Customs and Immigration
specialists. Customs inspectors do a great job of examining
cargo, searching baggage for contraband and weapons of mass
destruction. Conversely, Immigration inspectors are experts at
interviewing people and examining documents. CBP officers will
never be as good as Customs and Immigration inspectors are
today. The terrorists depend on expert counterfeiters for
documents, the drug cartels are always developing new,
sophisticated methods of smuggling, and WMDs are a whole new
ball game.
The United States must have experts at the borders to stop
all violators. This is a war, and just as in a war we wouldn't
have F-15 pilots fly Apache helicopters, no one asked Customs
and Immigration inspectors to do each other's job.
Let us do what we are trained to do. I have in this bag,
this very large bag, volumes of immigration law, which every
inspector has to be competent in before he can successfully do
his job. We also have 30 volumes of BIA decisions, directives
and numerous other volumes which we need to know.
I don't know what Customs does, other than the basics. I
know how to--we have to look for drugs, we look for contraband,
we look for duty--things that were dutiable and we refer them
to Customs.
Conversely, they do the same things to us.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to submit for the record a
letter which I wrote in June of 2000, at the request of former
national council President Chuck. He appeared before a
congressional committee, and I bring to your attention the
closing paragraph:
``In closing, I can only hope that the Members of Congress
will answer the wakeup call of the two terrorists caught and
not wait to have another Pearl Harbor or Oklahoma City on their
watch. If Congress doesn't act, the only people that will be
surprised by a new terrorist attack will be the innocent
victims who depend on the government to protect them.''
The law enforcement community is aware of the problem and
knows that the only people who can help prevent another
disaster are the Members of Congress, the only ones who are
able to increase staffing for the level necessary to protect
our country.
In closing, I would just like to say, just as lawyers are
specialized in various fields of law, we must have specialized
CBP officers. They enforce the laws passed by Congress to
protect our citizens and as law enforcement officers they
deserve the enforcement pay and retirement. Most importantly,
we deserve to give the country the security it needs. The
security of the United States is the most important thing. We
cannot accept nor tolerate mediocrity.
Thank you, and I will answer any questions you have.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Kuhn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Kuhn
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Turner, Members of the Committee:
My name is Thomas Kuhn. I am President of Local 2580 of the
National Immigration and Naturalization Services Council (AFGE). I
would like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the
Committee for allowing me to present my views on the proposed Customs
and Border Protection Officer (CBP) position.
I will first provide you with a basic overview of my background and
experience. I began my career in 1973 with the Immigration &
Naturalization Service at Kennedy Airport. The training and experience
I received in the five years at Kennedy allowed me to develop the
primary, secondary, and investigative tools required for me to
competently perform my duties for the rest of my career. For the next
19 years duty assignments were land border inspection stations
In 1997 I was promoted to Special Operations Inspector and was
transferred to Preclearance Operations in Canada.
In addition to my inspection duties I also served as an instructor,
intelligence officer, adjudicator, and currently I am the quality
control officer for legacy Immigration at Montreal. As a special
operations inspector I have always received excellent or above ratings
and have received a number of awards and letters of commendation.
It is due to my education, training and experience that I am now
able to provide an informed recommendation about the newly proposed
Customs and Border Protection Officer. This new position as I
understand it is designed to replace the Immigration, Customs and
Agriculture Inspector with one person with 15 weeks of training, and
OJT for 6 months. Mr. Chairman, having given the issue a great deal of
thought, I do not believe that such a consolidation will work nor do I
feel the country will be safer for it
My training and education is a continual process in which a new
situation or question about the Immigration status of an individual
traveler brings about moment-by-moment developments.
The complexities that the Immigration Inspector encounters on a
daily basis are endless. There is no situation which is as simple as it
first seems. What should take several minutes to determine ? if an
individual is an American Citizen--can at times become an involved
investigatory process that can take hours or even days.
Congress has rewritten the immigration law three times in my career
and each and every time the repercussion at the front lines caused
untold delays and loss of man-hours. As an example a person born
outside the US in 1932 may not derive citizenship from a mother married
to a non-US citizen father. Yet if they were born with the same
circumstances in 1960 they would be citizens. And there are countless
other equally confusing examples of immigration law we must interpret.
When an immigration inspector graduates after 22 weeks of basic
inspector training it takes 3 to 5 years before they are competent to
work secondary without a senior officer with them.
US Customs and Immigration Inspectors currently staff land border
primary points. This works there due to the fact that no one other than
US citizens, Canadians, or Mexicans with a border crossing card, are
processed on the primary point of inspection. If a customs inspector
encounters anyone other than the above listed individuals, the traveler
is referred to immigration secondary where the arriving person?s
documents are checked, he or she is interviewed and a determination is
made as to the type of visa required. There are over 55 non-immigrant
visas and sub categories all with different requirements and duration
of stay.
Immigration Inspectors at international airports process all
passengers with visas on the primary line. Passengers suspected of
malfeasance are immediately escorted to secondary.
It takes at least one year before a new inspector is proficient at
primary alone.
When an inspector starts working he makes many unnecessary
referrals to secondary due to the fact that there are numerous
different issues of passports, visas, green cards etc all with
different security features. In many cases these innocent people have
long waits and often miss connecting flights causing tremendous
inconvenience and lost revenue to the airlines. The new officer is also
easily fooled by high quality false documents and convincing liars.
I am an American, a New Yorker. I watched the World Trade Center
being built from my office when I worked on Wall Street. I watched them
come apart thanks to media coverage. So I am fully aware of the need to
stop terrorists. But if we drive the airlines out of business, or make
it so difficult to enter the US that the tourists stay home, then the
terrorists have won anyway.
On the other hand, in a world where terrorists destroy 100 story
buildings and kill thousands of people, the border is no place to put a
bureaucrat's idea of efficiency over our national security. And while
this proposal may appear more `efficient' I can tell you here and now
our nation will not be safer for it.
If the management of Customs and Border Protection, which has
limited immigration experience, plans on making CBP officers ``Jacks of
all trades'' they will be ``Masters of none'' and it will be a grave
disservice to the security of the country.
If on the other hand they plan on developing quality primary
officers from the new CBP officers and then develop new CBP career
paths to specialize in immigration or customs the concept could work.
We must continue to have Customs and Immigration specialists.
Customs inspectors do a great job of examining cargo, searching
vessels, and baggage for contraband and WMDs. If I work until I retire
in six or seven years I will not be anywhere near as good as they are
today. Conversely Immigration Inspectors are experts in interviewing
people and examining documents. CBP officers will never be as
proficient as good Immigration Inspectors are today.
The terrorists and criminals depend on expert counterfeiters for
documents. The drug cartels are always developing new and more
sophisticated methods of smuggling drugs, and WMDs are a whole new
ballgame. The United States must have experts at the borders prepared
to stop all kinds of violators.
This is a war and just as in war we would not ask F-15 pilots to
fly Apache helicopters or B-52 pilots to fly stealth fighters. Don?t
ask Customs and Immigration inspectors to do each other?s job. Let us
do what we are trained to do.
1n 1988 when there was a proposal for the INS to take over all land
border responsibilities there was a local survey done in the Champlain,
NY area. At that time Customs manned 2/3 of the primary lanes of
traffic yet immigration inspectors made more that 2/3 of the referrals
that resulted in refusals of admission. It?s not that immigration
inspectors were smarter; it is that they were experts in immigration.
If you have doubts about the complexity and details of immigration
law that are required to be understood by Immigration Inspectors, let
me dispel it right now. On the desk in front of me are the volumes of
Immigration Law, Bureau of Immigration Appeals decisions and the
directives that an immigration inspector must be aware of to be
competent at his or her job. I do not believe it is possible for one
person to effectively perform this job and take on the responsibilities
of both customs and agricultural inspectors.
I have very little idea what customs inspectors have to know to be
fully able to do their job even though I am a cross-designated customs
inspector and have been for 20 years. I know the basics, find drugs,
what a tourist can bring back from abroad or what a visitor can bring
into the US. I have even made Customs seizures when I worked alone at
small northern ports but as to the rest of their job I have no idea. I
know they enforce laws for 36 different agencies, I know they enforce
marking regulations and copyright and trademark laws. They also collect
duties. Other than that I know very little after 20 years of working
side by side with customs.
Finally Mr. Chairman, I want to submit with my testimony a
letterwhich I wrote in June of 2000 at the request of former National
INS Council President Chuck Murphy. It concerns the issue of inadequate
staffing levels at U.S. ports of entry, a problem which continues to
this day. He submitted it to a Congressional committee when he appeared
before it. I would like to call your attention to one particular
paragraph in that letter:
``In closing I can only hope that the members of Congress will
answer the wake up call of the two terrorists caught and not wait until
we have another Pearl Harbor, or Oklahoma City on their watch. If
Congress does not act, theonly people surprised by a terrorist attack
will be the innocent victims whodepended on the government to protect
them. The law enforcementcommunity is aware of the problem and knows
that the only people who canhelp prevent a disaster are the members of
Congress. They are the only oneswho can increase the staffing to levels
necessary to protect our country''
In my view, the issue that needs to be addressed by DHS and
Congress is not the consolidation of existing positions at the border,
but the inability to attract and retain competent workers for the
existing positions. Low pay compared with other law enforcement
occupations, the fear of losing job protections and continuing morale
problems contribute to the high turnover rate among legacy immigration
inspectors. The failure to recognize customs and immigration inspectors
as law enforcement officers for purposes of retirement coverage is, and
will continue to be, a major reason for leaving.
Our nation needs a well trained, highly motivated work force in
order to protect our borders from the threat of terrorism. The current
division of responsibilities works well and allows us to pursue that
goal aggressively. The CBP officer will not function as effectively and
will not keep our nation safer from terrorists. These jobs are too
important. We cannot tolerate mediocrity. Thank you.
Mr. Camp. Mr. Pauli, you have 5 minutes to summarize your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF BILL PAULI, PRESIDENT, CALIFORNIA FARM BUREAU
FEDERATION
Mr. Pauli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Sanchez and Mr.
Goodlatte. It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon.
I am a farmer from California. I am President of the
California Farm Bureau.
Mr. Camp. Mr. Pauli, could you pull the microphone in front
of you?
Thank you.
Mr. Pauli. Thank you.
It is a pleasure to be here. I look forward to making the
following comments.
I have personally visited border crossings, airports, and
seaports. I have seen why there is a need to streamline
inspection protocols, as this initiative does, but it is
critical that it be done with utmost attention to the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service, APHIS, with their mission
of protecting plant and animal health to ensure a safe and
reliable food supply for the American consumer.
Therefore, in my testimony today I would like to first
thank the Bush administration for its diligence in protecting
our homeland; secondly, raise awareness for the agricultural
role of the new department; and third, express concerns with
the new streamlining concept.
Farm Bureau has worked closely with the Department of
Agriculture on homeland security issues and appreciates the
leadership of Secretary Veneman and Deputy Secretary Moseley.
The creation of the Homeland Security Council at USDA has
assisted in protecting our borders, our food supply, our
research and laboratory facilities and technology resources
from any intentional acts of terrorism. The quick and decisive
actions taken at USDA assured consumers that measures were in
place to protect the U.S. food supply from attack.
Californians, unfortunately, know how devastating either an
intentional or accidental introduction of foreign animal
diseases or exotic pests can be to our food supply. USDA and
the California Department of Food and Agriculture have spent in
excess of $200 million to control outbreaks of Exotic Newcastle
Disease, bovine tuberculosis and the Mexican Fruit Fly, all of
which come from outside our borders. Prevention is certainly
less costly than control and eradication.
In light of these recent pest disease outbreaks and a
projected $2 billion increase in U.S. agriculture imports this
year, we must strengthen security procedures for product
inspection, test control, eradication, and emergency
management.
Farm Bureau has supported increased resources to USDA's
APHIS to improve surveillance measures and accountability at
U.S. ports of entry, to prevent the introduction of foreign
plants and animal pests and diseases.
It is imperative, and I repeat, it is imperative that these
resources, including personnel training and quality control,
not be diminished under the proposed One Face at the Border
initiative, as proposed by the Department of Homeland Security.
The training of the new Customs and Border Protection officers
is the critical issue. It has become readily apparent to me,
since we issued our initial comments this morning from various
sources, that the issue about training is unclear.
Training is the heart of the issue and whether it is 16
days, as initially outlined by DHS, or whether it is 90 hours,
as they say it is now, the real question here is the amount of
training, the type of training, the type of officers, and their
background, so that they have adequate knowledge in order to
understand the issues that we have faced for years and years in
APHIS.
Training is the key. When APHIS border functions were
transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security, we were
given assurance that the integrity of these programs would
remain intact.
However, having One Face at the Border administering
Customs, Immigration and Agriculture programs could be a
daunting task. After all, the functions of ag inspectors alone
is very, very complex, ranging from cargo and containers
carrying potentially harmful insects to travelers carrying mud
from a foot and mouth disease-infected livestock operation.
While we appreciate the Commissioner's outreach to
agricultural stakeholders, we urge further dialogue between
DHS, the USDA, and the industry on the initiative, on the
further defining of DHS's responsibilities relating to food
safety and safe trade. Many questions remain--many, many
questions--such as, what about the collaborative efforts at the
various State-level departments of agriculture and how that
will be carried out?
Agriculture and consumers must be assured that food safety
will remain a priority under this department. To that end, Farm
Bureau and all of agriculture advocate the importance of
trained agricultural specialists at our Nation's points of
entry and strongly emphasize the need to ensure sufficient
staff resources for the new Customs and Border Protection
officers.
We commend this committee for holding this hearing. We look
forward to working with you, USDA and the Department of
Homeland Security to safeguard the U.S. food supply for both
intentional and unintentional accidents which will affect not
only production agriculture across the country, but will be to
the detriment of the U.S. consumer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to any
questions that you and the other members might have.
[The statement of Mr. Pauli follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bill Pauli
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. My name is
Bill Pauli. I am President of the California Farm Bureau Federation and
a member of the American Farm Bureau Federation Board of Directors. I
produce wine grapes and Bartlett pears in Mendocino County. Thank you
for the opportunity to present testimony on the ``One Face at the
Border'' concept proposed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Having personally visited border crossings and seaports, I have
seen why there is a need to streamline inspection protocol as this
initiative does, but it is critical that it be done with the utmost
attention to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
mission of protecting plant and animal health to ensure a safe food
supply.
Therefore, in my testimony today, I would like to first, thank the
Bush administration for its diligence in protecting our homeland,
secondly, raise awareness for the agricultural role of the new
department, and third, express concern with the new streamlining
concept.
Farm Bureau has worked closely with the Department of Agriculture
on homeland security issues and appreciates the leadership of Secretary
Veneman and Deputy Secretary Moseley. The creation of the Homeland
Security Council at USDA has assisted in protecting our borders, food
supply, research and laboratory facilities and technology resources
from any intentional acts of terrorism. The quick and decisive actions
taken at USDA assured consumers that measures were in place to protect
the U.S. food supply from attack.
Californians, unfortunately, know how devastating either an
intentional or accidental introduction of a foreign animal disease or
exotic pest can be to the food supply. USDA and the California
Department of Food and Agriculture have spent in excess of $200 million
to control outbreaks of Exotic Newcastle Disease, bovine tuberculosis
and the Mexican Fruit Fly--all of which came from outside our borders.
Prevention is certainly less costly than control and eradication.
In light of these recent pest/disease outbreaks and a projected $2
billion increase in U.S. agriculture imports this year, we must
strengthen security procedures for product inspections, pest control,
eradication, and emergency management.
Farm Bureau has supported increasing resources to USDA's Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service to improve surveillance measures and
accountability at U.S. points of entry to prevent the introduction of
foreign plant and animal pests and diseases. It is imperative that
these resources, including personnel, training and quality control not
be diminished under the proposed ``One Face at the Border'' initiative
by the Department of Homeland Security.
The training for the new Customs and Border Protection officers
would have to be extensive to know when a passenger, piece of luggage
or cargo container needs further inspection by agricultural
specialists.Sec. The traditional APHIS border inspectors were trained
intensively for eight weeks under Veterinary Services and the Plant
Protection and Quarantine Service. Many had an advanced degree in an
agriculture related field, were highly trained in animal and plant
disease identification and understood their movement. Under the initial
system proposed by DHS, the new Customs and Border Protection officers
would receive only 16 hours of training regarding agriculture. If DHS
expects to ensure effective protocols with minimal training via
secondary inspectors, how will the department meet the timing needs of
perishable commodities and live animals?
When APHIS border functions were transferred to the new Department
of Homeland Security, we were given assurances that the integrity of
the programs would remain intact. However, having ``one face at the
border'' administering customs, immigration and agriculture programs
could be a daunting task. After all, the function of ag inspectors
alone is very complex, ranging from cargo containers carrying
potentially harmful insects to a traveler carrying mud from a Foot and
Mouth Disease infected livestock operation.
While we appreciate Commissioner Bonner's outreach to agricultural
stakeholders, we urge further dialogue between DHS, USDA and industry
on this initiative and the further defining of DHS responsibilities
relating to food safety and safe trade. Questions remain, such as, will
DHS continue collaborative efforts with state-level departments of
agriculture?
Agriculture and consumers must be assured that food safety will
remain a priority under the department. To that end, Farm Bureau
advocates the importance of trained agriculture specialists at our
nation's points of entry and strongly emphasizes the need to ensure
sufficient staff resources for the new Customs and Border Protection
officers.
We commend this committee for holding this hearing and we look
forward to working with you, USDA and the Department of Homeland
Security to safeguard the U.S. food supply from both intentional and
accidental threats. Thank you.
Mr. Camp. Thank you for your testimony. And thank you all
for your testimony. I have a couple of questions for both Mr.
Keefe and Mr. Kuhn.
Tell me, what is your reaction to all of the added
resources in personnel that have been put on the border since
September 11? We had some pretty dramatic testimony about the
increases in resources and programs. Do you have any comment on
those?
Mr. Keefe. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank God. Thank God and
finally it happened.
I remember giving a brief discussion to the Northern Border
Coalition, a group of Congressmen that are interested in the
northern border, and I remember talking once--you know, I
always hear a lot about after September 11, we have done this.
Well, let me tell you something. A lot of the men and women I
work with were doing it before September 11.
And I used to sit on certain committees for the union to
negotiate things for the agency, and I would talk about
terrorism and preventing terrorist attacks and I would be
laughed at, but guess what?
Nobody is laughing anymore, and you know, we commend and we
are very grateful for the infusion of resources. It allows us
now to finally do our job. And I guess it is kind of--it is a
double-edged sword because it is also very frustrating, because
now we are doing our job, and like the gentleman from
California said, it is very daunting to look at this; whereas,
the resources given us--and I don't want to throw the baby out
with the bathwater here.
Some of this idea is good, some of this merging is good,
but the specialty has to remain; and it is now very daunting
for the men and women that I work with, almost paralyzing, to
think that we have to do all these functions.
Mr. Camp. Okay.
Mr. Kuhn, any?
Mr. Kuhn. I would agree that it is a good concept.
The extra manpower on the northern border has been a
tremendous help. I spent 19 years on the northern border, many
times working alone on our checkpoint, and there is not a whole
lot you can do when you are alone.
There are vehicles that come down that you would like to
really look at, but you don't back up 25 minutes away, so now
that we have two officers in a lot of these places, it gives
these officers a real feeling of protection for themselves.
Also, the knowledge that we are getting and some of the
tools we are getting is great. They are upgrading our computer
systems. Right now, if I want to run a full check on somebody,
I have to go in and out approximately nine different databases,
all with different passwords, and you know how frustrating and
complicated that gets. So it is a good idea, the improvements
are good, but as Mr. Keefe said, we have to maintain a certain
amount of expertise in the various fields.
Mr. Camp. Well, I certainly appreciate those comments and
what you and the members of your organizations are doing at the
border to protect and serve the United States and the people
who live here.
Tell me, it seems to me, in those smaller units, this
integration is actually a good thing because they are doing
everything anyway; and it seems to me, in the larger areas,
larger points of entry, that you are naturally going to have
some sort of specialization. And maybe I am misunderstanding,
but I didn't see anything that necessarily would prevent
further specialization in a unified agency. I mean, already the
Commissioner testified that there would be, for example, a K-9
unit with special training; and clearly there is the
Agriculture inspector that is going to be a specialist.
Is there something I don't know or is there something
preventing those who may have a particular expertise or the way
this will develop? In terms of One Face at the Border, the
functions will still have to occur. Is there something
preventing a specialization on behalf of an employee if they
want to go deeper into something?
Mr. Keefe. If I may, I agree with you, and I have heard
Commissioner Bonner speak on several occasions, and he seems to
be inching towards specialization, although not explicitly
saying so.
I think there would be a greater comfort level if he
explicitly said, for example, we are going to have secondary
legacy Customs people, secondary INS people that are proficient
and trained to do this--I think that would be a positive step
in selling this program--and a secondary APHIS inspector.
Because, as the gentleman said, APHIS, we are all different,
but APHIS is a very scientific background. And I can tell you,
in maybe even 20 years, while I may be able to have some
similar skill sets as my partner Mr. Kuhn, I am not
scientifically inclined--I don't have that vocation; and it is
very specific. So I think there is nothing prohibiting it, but
there is nothing that says it completely.
And if I may, Mr. Chairman, I would also like to comment on
what the full chairman said. I don't want to come across and I
know the people I represent don't want to come across; as we
have been doing this for 20 years, we don't want to change. As
Mr. Kuhn said, we welcome the change, but we think it should be
done in a constructive, positive way with employees who do the
job having some feedback; and up until this point, sir, we have
had none of that.
Mr. Camp. Okay. I appreciate your comments.
Ms. Sanchez may inquire.
Mr. Kuhn. Sir?
Mr. Camp. I am sorry. I didn't mean to cut you off.
Mr. Kuhn. I have a lot of airport experience that Mr. Keefe
doesn't have, and it is going to be a real problem at airports,
at the unified primary. At a land border, when a person comes
in who is not Mexican, Canadian or U.S., he is immediately
referred over to secondary where Immigration takes care of him.
When you come into an airport, everybody's done on primary,
and we issue I-94s, we determine whether the person is valid,
we give them the time frame they have. We have to question them
on what their intent is, are they coming for business, are they
a tourist, et cetera. Customs doesn't do any of that now, so
all of those 10,000 Customs inspectors will have to be brought
up to speed on that.
I have 30 years, and we still get into discussions on the
basic category of B-1 because it is getting so blurred with
international business. Is this gentleman a visitor for
business or does he need a different visa, a treaty trader or
an in-company transferee, or a work permit; and it is going to
be a real problem at the airports.
Mr. Camp. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess I am having a little bit of difficulty trying to
really understand how this works, this integrated one person
who is the primary, but that doesn't necessarily mean that
under the new system, there will be a secondary person--that is
actually more trained or more specialized is pretty much what I
really gathered from Mr. Bonner's testimony earlier and some of
the reading that I did. Is that correct?
Is that the understanding, Mr. Chairman, or the
understanding that you all have as to how this is going to
work. Or does anybody really know?
Mr. Kuhn. Well, what I have been told at town meetings is,
we are going to start rotating.
Ms. Sanchez. So you could end up being the secondary guy or
the primary guy.
Mr. Kuhn. And I could wind up being the Customs secondary
guy.
Do you have anything to declare? Yes. See the Customs
inspector.
Ms. Sanchez. Right. Right.
Do you have any comment to that, Mr. Keefe?
I mean, I am trying to understand because what I am getting
is that any of you will be placed in a place, so you could be a
primary guy or you could be a secondary guy and if you are
placed in a secondary position, you may not know the full stack
of books that you have in front of you and all the other
directives and court decisions that we have going on.
Mr. Keefe. Exactly. You have got it, ma'am, with one
exception.
He is correct when he says I have very little airport
experience. The only airport experience I had was coming down
here today. I don't work in an airport, and it is a different
world. We have had--as the Commissioner of Customs said, it is
called one-step inspection at the border, whereas Customs and
Immigration inspectors perform inspections of--primary
inspections on the border. I do it. It is one face. It has been
that way for 20 years. I don't need a high level of expertise
to do the primary screening. The skill sets are the same; the
questioning is the same.
Where it gets tricky is where you go into a matter that is
a little more detailed. And one of the things I said to
Commissioner Bonner at a town meeting in Buffalo is, physicians
have similar skill sets, doctors have similar skill sets, a
podiatrist and a cardiologist. When I get chest pains, I don't
want to go to a podiatrist. There is a reason for
specialization.
On the land border, if I have got a question on a primary
issue, I send it to secondary. It is almost a safety net. It is
a critical thing. It is a different world, though. You just
have to know the airports and land borders and, for that
matter, seaports. They are all different environments.
Ms. Sanchez. If--I am trying to also understand if we have
new people coming into the system and now are trained overall
as just a new Border Patrol--whatever the name of this is, the
new uniform guy, Oh, it is a new uniform--I don't know that it
is necessarily a good thing.
That is what I am trying to figure out.
How comfortable do the people who have already been doing
this for a long time feel as far as putting aside the, what
we--well, this is the way we have done it in Border or this is
the way we have done it in Customs or this is the way we have
done it in INS for a while.
How are they feeling about going through the new training?
Are they getting new training? Are they getting the same 71-
hour training course?
What do your colleagues--what kind of training do you think
you are going to get? Do you feel comfortable with that if you
are going from ``I have always done INS'' and looked at what
the backgrounds of people are, and now I have got to go and do
cargo; and I guess the same answer back from cargo to the
people. Because some people feel very comfortable doing cargo
and checking things, but they may not feel good about
questioning people about status, ``Are you really supposed to
be here in this country?''
Not that he would be more lenient, but they might be,
because confrontation over ``Are you supposed to be here?'' is
a lot different confrontation from ``You have got to leave that
pair of scissors there'' or ``We have got to take this away''
or ``You have got to pay an additional $30 because you didn't
declare this.''
It is a different kind of confrontation.
Ms. Sanchez. I guess I am trying to feel how are the
current employees feeling about all these changes going on?
Mr. Kuhn. As far as the training goes we had one videotape
put out so far on primary, and I reviewed it and there were
four major errors on the training video. I was asked by my
point director to review it before we put it out.
And with regard to how do the employees feel, we do the
same job, we need the same skill sets, but things are--with Mr.
Keefe's job, it is you find it or you don't find it. It is
physical, it is objective.
With integration we train more with the subjective. Your
answers come from interrogating the people, questioning the
people and trying to find out what a person's true intent is,
and one of the major problems is going to be when the
supervisors switch over. They are going to get a customs
supervisor, a hundred hours of training on integration, and
then I am going to have to try and convince him one way or the
other that, A, we should exclude this guy or, B, we should let
this guy go. And I believe I could snow it as supervisor if I
wanted to, and I believe there are some supervisors who no
matter what I said their mind would be made up even if they
were wrong. And it is going to be a problem.
Mr. Keefe. There is an incredible level where I work of
frustration and almost demoralization, and it is kind of ironic
considering as the chairman said, you know, how do we feel
about the staff. They feel very good about the staffing and the
recognition for the job we have done, and yet they almost feel
like their job is being kind of dumbed down, because they have
worked very diligently and have been very proficient and very
talented and have intercepted a lot of things, both of our--all
three of our legacy agencies.
As far as the new people, we don't know yet. They are just
starting to go with this training. So I am sure they will come
back, and they don't have anything to gauge it by. But most of
the journey people inspectors are very resentful, and again it
is not because they are resistant to the change. They are
resistant to the way the change was thrust upon them without
their input.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. And I guess I have one last
question for Mr. Pauli, and this, again, trying to understand,
because I didn't get to question the Commissioner as much as I
had hoped, and I will submit some questions for the record. But
you have studied this a lot more than I have and probably
almost any member on this committee because it is directly
going to effect you as a farmer and our Nation's agriculture.
Do you feel comfortable that in fact when there is
something coming across the border or when there is a person
coming through the airport or when there is a port person that
we are actually going to have a secondary agriculture person
there or there is going to be somebody that is trained up for
that more so under this system than what we currently have, Mr.
Pauli?
Mr. Pauli. Well, I hope it is apparent from my testimony
that we have real concerns about how this is going to really
work. We have questions about the training and the adequacy of
the training. We think there is potential holes, but we are
trying to keep an open mind, recognizing that clearly the
system is changing, but we are not completely comfortable at
this point by any means.
There again, on one hand the Department seems to be open
and trying to meet with us and talk with us about what they are
doing and why, and yet they don't seem to have all of the
answers yet. It is evolving, and that is why we are here today
to express our concern that we don't know some of the pieces.
We hope those will come together, but as the other two
gentlemen have stated, these are complex issues, and when you
get to the APHIS issues, they too are very, very complex. They
involve the type of personnel that have a background, desire to
be in these kinds of areas, these kinds of issues. They have a
background in agriculture. They understand these diseases and
these pests. They know where they come from. They know where to
look for them. And we are not convinced at this point that we
may or may not get there.
Ms. Sanchez. And lastly, how much time do you think you
have spent trying to understand this and doing meetings and
talking--trying to talk to some of the Department officials?
Mr. Pauli. Well, it is hard to quantify the amount of time,
but, I mean, there again--.
Ms. Sanchez. 10 hours, 50 hours?
Mr. Pauli. This has been an issue for over a year for us as
it has been coming forward, but APHIS has always been a concern
for us particularly in California and on the border states
because of the complex issues we face and the outbreaks of
various diseases and pests. There is not an easy answer to
detect or prevent these pests.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. The chairman of the full committee is
back if you would like to inquire.
Mr. Cox. I would like to thank the witnesses both for your
prepared testimony and for what you do every day when you are
not here. Mr. Pauli, congratulations to you on being appointed
to Governor Schwarzenegger's transition team. I hope that that
is a worthwhile experience. And Mr. Keefe--is it Kuhn? Mr.
Keefe and Mr. Kuhn, thank you very much for what you do at the
border and for the testimony that you provided to us.
I want to--first of all, I just want to express my support
for the concerns that have been raised about getting ag right.
I am a strong supporter of trying to consolidate our border
functions, but at the same time I think we have got to do it
right and particularly when it comes to ag we want to make sure
that--because that is science as compared to law, if you will.
It is not just a combination of two separate legal disciplines.
It is--we are now pitting humanities into sciences, and so we
need to make sure that we get this right. And I know the
chairman of the Agriculture Committee wants to get it right. I
know the Secretary wants to get it right, and so I think that
the concerns that you have raised with us are very valid ones,
and we want to continue our oversight and make sure this does
get done right.
Mr. Keefe and Mr. Kuhn have raised slightly different
issues than the APHIS issue, but I wonder if I could get the
benefit of, unless I am, Mr. Chairman, covering ground that has
already been covered at this hearing, get your take on the
APHIS aspects, because your testimony I think is very good
about the challenges that we face trying to combine customs and
immigration. But I would like to hear a little bit more about
your thoughts on the APHIS aspects, if you feel comfortable.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I did say a little bit about it
before you came in, and I think you hit it right on the head. I
mean, it is an almost an apples and oranges thing. It is a law
enforcement mindset from the people that I have worked in
within APHIS to a scientific approach to a job.
Again, you know, on the primary--our worlds are a little
different. I work at the land border. Mr. Kuhn works at an
airport. On the land border I am able to ask some routine
questions and do some routine examinations, and I feel a fairly
strong comfort level with the primary function performing APHIS
inquiries.
However, if you got into anything beyond that--and we are
not talking a lot of detail--I think that is where it gets very
problematic, because, again, it requires some level of
scientific study that I just don't have the benefit in my
education experience.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Kuhn, do you want to add to that?
Mr. Kuhn. Basically APHIS is just something that
immigration inspectors are aware of. We basically ask a few
basic questions, and we say, see the agriculture officer. I
don't have any scientific background that would lend itself to
becoming proficient, you know. I know what an orange is, an
apple is. I could probably tell if there was a bug crawling on
one of them, but other than that I don't have a whole lot of
experience in it.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Kuhn, I wonder if I could ask you about an
area--the area where you are most experienced, and that is
looking at documents that people bring with them as they try to
cross the border. We have had hearings recently in this
committee focused on fraudulent documents and their prevalence
and also not just fake documents but valid government-issued
documents that are fraudulently obtained.
The latter is of particular concern. The State of Maryland
right now is considering loosening its requirements for
issuance of a driver's license. Virginia since 9/11 went the
other way because the 9/11 terrorists sought out Virginia given
the laxity of the issuance of their IDs. California just had a
contest about this in the context of our gubernatorial
recollection, but, you know, very plainly even before the
legislature changed the law in California, there were big
problems at the DMV because the General Accounting Office went
in and easily obtained fraudulently issued licenses based on
the most obvious forgeries.
What can we do given that while we may fix one of these
problems in one State or another State, there is this seeming
proliferation of government-issued IDs that aren't any good?
What can we do to make sure that as you are looking at people
coming across the border, A, you don't have to keep in your
mind 147 different documents and what they are supposed to look
like and, B, protect you from the problem that just because it
is government-issued it might not be real. It might have the
guy's picture on it. It might be from the real state of the
union, but it is just not legit. What can we do to address this
problem?
Mr. Kuhn. Short of a U.S. citizen ID card which would be
issued by the Federal Government, it is an absolute nightmare.
Almost every county in the United States issues a different
type of birth certificate. It is no big problem to go to a
cemetery and see someone, you know, of your age who died at a
very young age. You get a birth certificate for that child. You
go get a driver's license, and you have the world. You have a
U.S. passport, which only gets a cursory examination in most
countries of the world. It is an absolute--you would have to
cross-reference all the birth certificates and death
certificates in the country to make sure that somebody can't
get a birth certificate for a dead person. You should probably
link all of the driver's license bureaus together.
Mr. Cox. And incidentally, we discovered in our hearings
that that is already done for commercial driver's licenses,
just not for everybody else.
Mr. Kuhn. Right. There was an issue made a short time ago
about some--I guess it was GAO inspectors that came through the
northern border and they presented counterfeit driver's
licenses, and it made press headlines that they got into the
country. We don't examine driver's licenses. A U.S. citizen
doesn't have to present anything. I talk to the person. If the
person is a U.S. citizen, I let them go. If I don't think he is
a U.S. citizen, then I really worry about documents.
So in the case of these guys coming through a land border
with a false driver's license, it is not a shock to us. We
don't check those documents. At airports we do, but at land
borders you don't.
Mr. Cox. Well, it is interesting. Our colleague Eleanor
Holmes Norton, who is one of the moving forces in making sure
we had this hearing on document fraud, described herself, and I
think fairly, as a civil libertarian, and she is coming more
and more to the view that we have got to have some sort of
biometric identifier as a matter of civil rights and civil
liberties, because right now what we are doing at the border is
you are sizing somebody up and deciding whether they are a
citizen. And obviously that kind of subjective approach is
going to work less well for people who look like they are from
some other country, and that is exactly what people from
various national ethic groups don't like about the way
government enforces the law.
Do you see any down--now, the purpose of a biometric of
course, whether it be a thumbprint or a hand print or a retina
or iris or facial, whatever you pick, the purpose of all of
this is to connect the document with the person and also to
make it much more difficult for people to generate fraudulently
obtained government documents in the first place.
Do you see resistance to biometrics in the workforce, or do
you see support for biometrics in the workforce, or do you just
have a whole host of opinions on it?
Mr. Kuhn. We welcome it. Anything that will aid us in
keeping out the people we need to keep out, we welcome. I don't
know of an immigration officer who wouldn't love to see a U.S.
ID card with a biometric in it. It is just something we really
need.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Chairman, as you know, our statute, the
Homeland Security Act, expressly forbids national identity
card, and I don't think we should go revisit that portion of
the statute, but I do think it is incumbent upon us to take a
look at minimum standards for those who do issue identification
in the United States of America and certainly for such national
interstate interests as boarding aircraft, buying weapons and
so on.
I yield back.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. Mr. Goodlatte may inquire.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also thank
Chairman Cox for his comments regarding agriculture. It is of
grave concern here, and I share his hope that we will through
coordination of efforts here achieve a better result, because
certainly anything can be improved upon; but less training and
less front line attention from agriculture folks concern us,
and we have had not only on our part but I think on the part of
the farm community and others as well a great deal of concern
about the lack of communication that has come forward to
explain exactly how this is going to work.
I have some exhibits we didn't have time for during the
first round of questions with Mr. Bonner, but I will take the
opportunity now, Mr. Chairman, and show you how complex some of
these things are. These are not apples or oranges. This is the
can of soup, Big Soup. It looks pretty innocent. It is not a
U.S. product. It is a product of England and it is a banned
product in the United States. It was seized at an airport by a
trained agriculture quarantine inspector. It includes lamb
ruminant, which is a risk for transmitting mad cow disease; and
as many know, BSE caused a very serious problem in Europe. We
have got to keep it out of the United States . It is heat
resistant, survives the canning process, and BSE is listed as a
select agent under the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection
Act. I hope 16 hours of training for the frontline person will
help to identify this innocent-looking thing as a problem.
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This is not even an agricultural product. It is a
handicraft, but it contains raw cotton, cotton litter and
cotton seed, and souvenirs such as stuffed toys and handicrafts
can contain prohibited agricultural materials. And the risk is
a number of insects and other disease-bearing items like pink
boll worm, golden nematode and something called flag smut that
I had never heard of before.
This is something called waniola jirardi. Its origin is
Madagascarian, and the problem is that this can be mistaken for
a small coconut and released. Coconuts are a municipal product,
but actually this is a palm nut that is an endangered species.
And the correct action is to authorize movement to the plant
inspection station. Plant diseases in violations of the CITES
regulations are the risk that is involved there.
This is a bonsai tree with silk flowers. The tree was
declared as artificial but is actually a live bonsai with the
leaves removed and replaced with silk flowers. Obviously the
risk is that this importation could harbor diseases, insects
and nematodes.
This one is boneless--if you can't read that, it is
boneless duck from Taiwan simply labeled as jerry fish.
Packaging can sometimes be misleading. At a glance this appears
to be labeled as a fish. Actually, this is boneless duck from
Taiwan. Animal products must be carefully examined to ensure
that they are what they appear to be, and the risk here is very
high. As many people from southern California know, we have
just been through a very devastating experience, a hundred
million dollar-plus problem with exotic Newcastle disease. That
is exactly what the risk is with this product.
And finally, we have this strange looking thing. This is a
decorative bird's nest made with rice straw. This is one of
many types of handicrafts made from prohibited rice and wheat
straw. These are typically declared as souvenirs, but the
problem with a number of fungal and bacterial diseases for
rice, another major California product, is very great.
So, Mr. Pauli, I would ask you, given the fact that if
these products are not caught, they could expose American
agricultural to tremendous risks of pests and diseases, do you
believe that the proposed training program for primary
inspectors at points of entry into the United States will be
sufficient to safeguard American agriculture?
Mr. Pauli. We believe the answer is no. We are hopeful,
because without additional training and fully understanding the
consequences that could occur to California and to American
agriculture, there has to be more than what they are currently
telling us and showing us, and we are anxious to find out what
that is.
I mean, in my comments I said initially on their Web site
they said they would receive 16 hours of training. I now
understand from them directly here today that that has been
increased to 90. We hope that it is going to be adequate. We
hope that it is enough detail. We hope that the personnel they
have, have the kind of MO to try to deal with the scientific
aspects of understanding these complex issues and the type of
materials that can come forward. We have major questions about
whether that is going to occur, and yet as Mr. Cox has said,
you know, we support many of the concepts here in terms of some
of the things that are necessary to streamline the process. It
is just a question of how much streamlining we are going to do
and how the process is going to evolve and how we can
adequately ensure that these issues that you brought up and
that I brought up are going to be addressed. And right now we
simply haven't been able to get the answers to feel comfortable
that those kinds of issues are going to be addressed.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you. Let me ask Mr. Keefe and/or Mr.
Kuhn, you are experienced on the border dealing with things
unrelated to APHIS. The APHIS inspectors have historically had
qualified degrees or extensive previous experience, then go
through not 16, not 90 but 400 hours of training before they
are put on the front lines. How do you feel about taking over
these responsibilities in addition to the other two? Do you
think that is sufficient training?
Mr. Keefe. No, sir. And I say so--and I enjoyed your
presentation, and I have seen similar things. And before this
new position, I was able to say I don't know and refer it to an
expert. Now I am going to say I don't know and refer it to
somebody that may know more or less than me.
So I feel very, very uncomfortable, because the one thing I
know about the APHIS function is if you really want to
critically harm this country and its economy, that is a good
way to do it, and you need a specialization that I know I do
not possess. So I feel--I, the people I work with, feel very
uncomfortable about that.
Mr. Goodlatte. So in other words, the training of the front
line person as well as the training and the placement of the
backup, the more specialized person, are both very critical.
I think we have, Mr. Chairman, an awful lot of unanswered
questions here that pose a tremendous amount of risk. If hoof
and mouth disease were to get into the United States, which we
spend a tremendous amount of time at our borders preventing and
so far have done successfully, it would be a multibillion
dollar problem. For that matter, BSE would be a multibillion
dollar problem for our livestock industry in the country. We
know of the different types of invasive species that get into
the country now and cause serious damage to a whole host of not
just agricultural products but also to our environment that we
have to deal with, and I am very concerned that more
information needs to come forward to convince us that we are
going to increase rather than decrease the expertise we have in
catching these things at the border. They are very tricky
problems, and the stories by which some exotic and invasive
species have gotten into the United States through very
unexpected means, those are not terrorist acts for the most
part. They are very innocent acts in many cases, but
nonetheless have equally if not greater devastation to our
economy and potentially to the health of people.
So I hope that the Department will be more forthcoming and
work with those who do have expertise in this area to design a
plan that does achieve their goal, which I agree with the
chairman is a worthwhile goal, at the same time assuring us
that the goal achieves its real purpose, which is to be more
effective in this area, not less effective.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. I want to thank again this panel and
the Commissioner for their testimony today. I note that some
members may have additional questions for this panel, and which
they may wish to submit into writing. Without objection, the
hearing record will remain open for 10 days for members to
submit written questions to these witnesses and to place their
responses in the record.
There being no further business, again, I want to thank the
subcommittee members and the witnesses for testifying here
today. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement for the Record of Donna M. Garren, Ph.D. Vice
President, Scientific and Technical Affairs
United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association (United) is a national
trade association representing member growers, shippers, packers,
processors, marketers and distributors of fresh produce in the United
States. United members provide the leadership to shape business, trade
and public policies that drive our industry. Working with thousands of
industry members, United provides a fair and balanced forum to promote
business solutions; helps build strong partnerships among all segments
of the industry, promotes increased produce consumption; and provides
scientific and technical expertise essential to competing effectively
in today's marketplace.
The dramatic impact of the terrorism attacks of September 11, 2001
has led to a new focus in public policy aimed at promoting greater
safety and security and preventing terrorist action. As our members
provide over 1,000 different fresh fruits and vegetables to American
consumers from both domestic growers and countries around the world, we
take seriously our responsibility for prevention, detection, and all
necessary actions to protect consumers from intentional contamination
of our products. However, our world has changed and the produce
industry must continue to change with it. Food security is a new issue
for the entire food industry as a whole and this issue must be
addressed to build a strong, safe and reliable food supply. Food
security systems should be risk-based and recognize and respond to new
risks as they arise, provide the same level of protection to consumers
whether produced domestically or abroad, efficiently steward new
technologies to the market; and effectively educate and communicate to
stakeholders throughout the supply chain. The attention to food safety
controls that operators in our industry have already proactively
implemented in their operations can have a significant impact on food
security.
While food security is a top priority for the produce industry,
presently, economic damages from invasive pests and disease now exceed
$120 billion annually. Toward this end, the fresh produce industry
supports expedited and aggressive actions by the federal government in
cooperation with the industry and stake holders at the state and local
levels to eradicate and protect the domestic market from an increasing
threat of exotic pests and diseases entering the United States. As a
result of globalization, federal government action is critically
important due to the increasing pathways for the movement and
introduction of foreign, invasive agricultural pests and diseases as
well as recent economic damages to the affected industries.
Increased importation of agricultural products into the United
States has also increased the risk of the introduction of plant pests
and diseases that threaten domestic production. Fruit imports increased
from 1.35 million metric tons in 1990 to 2.82 million metric tons in
1999. Imports of fresh citrus products alone increased from 101,000
metric tons in 1990 to 348,000 metric tons in 1999. Vegetable imports
increased from 1.90 million metric tons in 1990 to 3.73 million metric
tons in 1999. Fresh tomato imports have doubled during that period as
well. In addition, states such as California and Florida are seeing
record numbers of tourists and other visitors arrive each year. Some
330 million visitors entered California and Florida through airports,
seaports and highways in 1998, a combined increase of over 4.5 percent
over the previous year. These growth statistics only exacerbate the
problems surrounding efforts to control and eradicate invasive pests
and disease.
Recognizing the need to address this serious situation, we commend
the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for their
leadership in working with the private sector, including our industry,
to ensure that appropriate steps are in place to minimize the potential
of terrorist action to contaminate foods. However, let us keep in mind
the American food supply continues to be the safest in the world.
Continuing to ensure the safety and security of fresh fruits and
vegetables whether produced domestically or abroad is a top priority of
the entire produce industry. With this in mind, we have serious
reservations pertaining to the new activities and training of the new
CBP Officers and Agricultural Specialists.
While the intention and in concept creating a CBP corps of officers
who will present ``one face at the border'' to travelers and the
importing community is good, we have doubts that these individuals will
be adequately prepare to address invasive pests and disease issues. We
support the creation of the CBP Agriculture Specialist position which
will complement the work of the CBP Officers and be stationed at ports
with large volumes of cargo importation, particularly in those hubs
where the agriculture industry imports much of the flowers, fruits,
vegetables, meat, and other products of an agricultural interest.
However, the reality of most inspections and processing on the
``frontlines'' will be managed by CBP Officers whose background and
training will be seriously lacking for the identification of pests and
disease. Also, the CBP's belief that there will be a unified cargo
operation enabling a ``one-stop process'' for importers and that cargo
can be examined more quickly and thoroughly, is misguided. Speed of
inspections is secondary to thorough and accurate inspections.
In conclusion, United's members strongly support the goal of
strengthening the safety and security of our food and the public.
However, we must not neglect the federal government's responsibility of
protecting our nation's agricultural crops from invasive pests being
transported into this country. We need officials on the ``frontlines''
of our borders and ports to take seriously their role in this endeavor.
Thus, we recommend CBP work with the agricultural stakeholders to
better prepare the corps of new CBP officers to protect our nation's
agricultural industry. Thank you for the opportunity to comment. We
look forward to continuing to work together with the DHS, CBP, and USDA
on these important matters.
Prepared Statement of Thomas P. Kuhn
AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(afl-cio)
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE COUNCIL #117 BUFFALO
DISTRICT LOCAL NO.2580
January 23, 2000
The United States House of Representative
Washington, DC
Dear Representatives
I would like to take this opportunity to present my views on the
abdication of the Northern Border by the Immigration & Naturalization
Service. I have been an Immigration Inspector for twenty-eight years,
twenty of which I have spent in the Buffalo, NY district. In that time
there has been no increase in the number of non-user fee positions for
inspectors and only an increase of 19 user fee positions.
During that time traffic has risen dramatically, as has the
criminal activity in the area. The rise in traffic has been most
pronounced at the major Ports of Entry where the Interstate highway
system connects to the Canadian highway system. Traffic has increased
so much in Buffalo that they are proposing a second bridge to handle
the traffic. At Niagara Falls they have built a new inspection
facility, increasing from six to nineteen lanes but have not funded any
additional positions. As a consequence of these increases, the Buffalo
district has had to remove Immigration Inspectors from the following
Ports of Entry: Fort Covington, Chateaugay, Churubsco, Cannons Corners,
Jamison Line, Route 9B, and Route 276. All of these New York ports are
land ports on the Quebec border. They leave a seventy-mile section of
the Quebec border unprotected by Immigration Inspectors. Unlike the
southern border, there and no great deserts to act as a natural
barrier. In northern New York persons intent on breaking the law simply
drive through an unmanned section at the and then avoid the five or six
Border Patrol Agents assigned to monitor the area. Then they are in the
US to do whatever they want. It is no great surprise that one of
largest known Chinese smuggling ring was just broken in the Massena--
Fort Covington, NY area.
The Buffalo District encompasses a five hundred-mile border with
Canada; it also borders Canada's two largest cities, Toronto and
Montreal. Both of these cities have major organized crime presence.
Toronto has problems with the Asian gangs, the Russian underworld and
Jamaican Posses, while Montreal has had open motorcycle gang warfare.
Both of the suspected Algerian terrorists recently apprehended in
Washington State and Vermont lived in the Montreal area. The area
doesn't have large numbers of migrant workers transgressing the border
looking for work, as the southern border does. Instead it has a very
sophisticated criminal element, which is ruthless and extremely
dangerous to contend with. I can tell you from first hand experience
that there are times when Immigration or Customs Inspectors are forced
to work alone and man a road block against criminals who would not
hesitate to kill in order to complete their mission. I personally,
while stationed at Fort Covington, NY, have had to detain over twenty
motorcycle gang members alone while waiting for backup to arrive. The
only reason I was successful in detaining them is because they let me.
They could have killed me at any time but chose not to. I was not
important enough to them. They knew that even if backup arrived, the
worst that could happen is that they would be refused admission to the
United States and then they would ride to an unguarded section and
enter without inspection. In fact that may well have been their plan
all along; knowing how few patrol agents there, they show up in mass at
a small Port of Entry and when the inspector calls for backup they know
exactly where the Patrol will be. Then they enter the people or drugs
they had intended a few miles away.
There is no way the Buffalo District can complete it's mission of
securing five hundred miles of border with a total inspections
allocation of 113 FTE man years and 50 FTEO man years. There are no
professional law-enforcement agencies that can operate with one third
of its officers working part time. The Buffalo District needs at least
one hundred inspection personnel, along with the increased overtime to
support those numbers. As it stands now with Sunday and Holidays being
overtime days, the Service reduces to skeleton staffing on the days
when traffic is heaviest. The Service's small overtime budget further
exacerbates the already short staffing problems.
In closing I can only hope that the members of Congress will answer
the wake up call of the two terrorists caught and not wait until we
have another Pearl Harbor, or Oklahoma City on their watch. If Congress
does not act, the only people surprised by a terrorist attack will be
the innocent victims who depended on the government to protect them.
The law enforcement community is aware the problem and knows that the
only people who can help prevent a disaster are the members of
Congress. They are the only ones who can increase the staffing to
levels necessary to protect our country.
Sincerely
Thomas P. Kuhn
President Buffalo Local 2580