[Senate Hearing 107-1119]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-1119
AVIATION SECURITY AND TRANSITION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 25, 2002
__________
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Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on July 25, 2002.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Allen....................................... 9
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Statement of Senator Burns....................................... 8
Statement of Senator Cleland..................................... 11
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 12
Statement of Senator Ensign...................................... 16
Statement of Senator Fitzgerald.................................. 19
Statement of Senator Hollings.................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 10
Statement of Senator Kerry....................................... 6
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 16
Statement of Senator Smith....................................... 15
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 18
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 30
Statement of Senator Wyden....................................... 5
Witnesses
Coy, Craig P., Chief Executive Officer, Massachusetts Port
Authority...................................................... 79
Prepared statement........................................... 82
Davidson, Captain Edward M., Director, Flight Safety and Quality
Assurance, Northwest Airlines.................................. 62
Prepared statement........................................... 65
Dillingham, Gerald L., Ph.D., Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues, General Accounting Office.............................. 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Luckey, Captain Stephen, Chairman, National Flight Security
Committee, Airline Pilots Association.......................... 68
Prepared statement........................................... 70
Mineta, Hon. Norman Y., Secretary, Department of Transportation,
accompanied by: Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary,
Department of Transportation, and Admiral James M. Loy, Acting
Under Secretary of Transportation for Security................. 23
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Murkowski, Hon. Frank H., U.S. Senator from Alaska............... 19
Smith, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from New Hamsphire................. 21
Stephens, Richard D., Vice President and General Manager, The
Boeing Company, Homeland Security and Services................. 84
Prepared statement........................................... 86
Appendix
Francis II, Hon. Robert T., Executive Vice President, Farragut
International, LLC, prepared statement......................... 97
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to:
Admiral James M. Loy......................................... 98
Dr. Gerald Dillingham........................................ 100
Captain Edward M. Davidson................................... 101
AVIATION SECURITY AND TRANSITION
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THURSDAY, JULY 25, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ernest F.
Hollings, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
The Chairman. The Committee will come to order. We are
pleased to proceed now with our hearing on aviation security.
I want to congratulate Secretary Mineta in appointing
Admiral Loy to take over this Transportation Security
Administration, in that we're behind the curve. My record shows
that they've only, in a six-to-seven month period, employed
some 2,500 screeners. That's grossly, grossly inadequate, slow,
incompetent.
What we had, on course, was a mammoth task of privatizing,
as you were, publicly employing some 40-50,000, whatever,
screeners and securing these airports, and we even confirmed
the former head of the Transportation Security Administration
without a hearing. It was before Christmas, and we all wanted
to get going, hit the ground running. And instead, we've been
dragging our feet.
The Secretaries have showed us at every turn that we're
right on schedule, we're right on schedule, and I was a little
dismayed, Mr. Secretary, when, on the House side, you
complained for the lack of money. You can't catch this Congress
off base on homeland-security money. This Congress will fight
you trying to give it more money. Everybody knows we're at war
and that homeland security is front and center, and everybody
is voting for the money. So we hadn't heard, at this committee
level, of any lack of money.
However, one of the main things I want to touch on, because
I know Senator Burns and others have bills in with respect to
the pistols in the cockpit, and we have a bill that's at the
desk. It wasn't assigned to the Committee, but is at the desk.
And I want to reemphasize the intent and mission, Senator
Murkowski, that a commercial airliner would never be used again
as a weapon of mass destruction. And the only ones we know that
have ever done that successfully is the Israelis, the El Al
Airline.
In fact, where Senator Murkowski is seated, we were seated
just last September, a group of us senators on the Committee
with the chief pilot, and the chief pilot allowed that, look,
once that door is secured, it's never opened in flight. We find
those now that insist upon pistols, of course, contemplating an
insecure door, a penetrable door. In fact, our friend, George
Wills, says there's no such thing as an impenetrable door. I
refer him to El Al Airlines. It hasn't been penetrated in 30
years. They have not had a hijacking.
And that was one thing that this particular senator
emphasized even before Christmas with the Transportation
Security Administration. Look, let's--once can fall, get on.
They told me up in Massachusetts--Senator Kerry testified they
had a Kevlar door. The Delta folks--airlines, they had a plan
to do it and everything else like that. Try a penetrable door
alone. If the door can be broken into, then forget about these
pistols and everything else like that. The enemy are not
wandering minstrels. They are karate, judo experts. They'll
break in the door before you can ever get to your pistol
strapped in trying to fly a plane. You've really armed the
terrorists.
So let's begin, once and for all, to understand that the
door has got to be fixed, impenetrable and never opened in
flight. Once that's done, then we'll solve the problems of a
commercial airliner flying into the Empire State or the Sears
Building or into a nuclear power plant, we'll solve the problem
of guns in the cockpit.
The media is still asking me, ``Well, where is your
compromise? Would you go along with stun guns rather than''--
they don't understand the problem. The problem is to make sure
that a commercial airliner--now, these private planes, they can
run into a building, like down in Tampa, but they don't have
all that fuel and can really bring the World Trade Towers down
to the ground like occurred.
So the whole idea is, once that door is secure, the
intended terrorist knows that it's going right to the ground
and law enforcement are taking them off to the jail. Otherwise,
you don't have this 30 minutes after takeoff remain in your
seat, that 30 minutes before you land, take on your seat. I
have to fly a Charlotte connection. And coming back, trying to
make votes, I'm terrorized that somebody's going to stand up,
because the pilot warns if you stand up and leave your seat,
we're going to another airport. I'm going to miss the thing,
and I'm ready to knock them in the head and put them back in
their seat right away----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman.--because I'm trying to make votes up here.
We've got ridiculous rules. You don't have to have all the
planes flying around to shoot people down. The door is secure
and never opened in flight.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings,
U.S. Senator from South Carolina
Good morning. We created the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) last November to change entirely the way our nation provides
aviation security. We made fundamental changes, demanding a focus on
security and recognizing that as a country we were at war. We asked you
to create from nothing a well trained, motivated work force to screen
everything going on-board passenger aircraft, and to address other
parts of the aviation community--general aviation, cargo, flight
schools, for example--as quickly and effectively as possible. No one
here, and I think you would agree, wants to see these programs and
initiatives delayed.
In providing difficult deadlines, we wanted to make sure that
everyone understood that our security is a top priority. You have met
many of the early challenges, but many remain, and it must continue to
be a top priority. You have two pending deadlines looming--November 19
(screeners) and December 31 (explosive detection systems). I want you
to keep your foot on the gas pedal, and don't let up. Where there are a
few airports with specific problems, tell us--you have a mandate to get
the job done, and to do it right. The law gives you that ability and
direction.
Do not use the budget as an excuse--yes, the Supplemental cuts your
funding somewhat, but Mr. Danials asked for more than $219 million in
cuts. You received much of what you requested for this year.
You have told us all year you will make the deadlines, and we have
supported your efforts. You also told us ``No'' to guns. Now, I see
that you may ``reconsider''--under the original bill, we gave you
discretion to allow guns or even less than lethal weapons, tasers, in
the cockpit. You said no. I agree with you.
Under the Act, we also mandated that the cockpit doors be locked at
all times during flight except for authorized personnel. I want to
close the door and lock it for the entire flight. I understand, though,
that right now there are a series of measures on board to make sure
that if one pilot leaves the cockpit, the integrity of the cockpit is
not breached. That is a good first step, but as I look at new designs
for kevelar strips as a second door, or other relatively easy fixes to
the cockpit, I want you to order the deployment of those doors and
devices. If we had another billion to spend, which is the initial cost
of arming the pilots, we could spend it more wisely on new doors. To
ensure that terrorists are unable to take control of an aircraft I
introduced, S. 2497, a bill that requires cockpit doors remain closed
while in flight unless the plane is fitted with mantrap doors that
provide secure entrance and egress to the flight deck. My legislation
would bring us in line with the Israeli approach, a layered ``onion''
of security, that allows the pilots to focus on flying, and keeps
potential threats out of the cockpit.
You will need to lay out for us the time frames you envision to
hire all of the screeners--right now you have about 2,500 on payroll,
and another 4,000 about to be hired, as I understand it. You want to
have on board 35,000 by November. How do you get there? Can you get
there?
With respect to the December 31 deadline, you have bought about 800
of the 1100 explosive detection systems (EDS) and a substantial number
of the smaller trace detection units. We can not discuss the
differences in open session, but we all recognize there are substantial
differences in cost, time and personnel. You also will need to make
substantial changes to a number of airports, and have hired Boeing,
along with Siemons to carry out that mission. As I said, for some
airports, you may need some additional time--take it and do it right.
For others, deploy it, man it and run it.
It has been difficult to communicate with the TSA from the start,
and while I am certain that conditions will improve under Admiral Loy's
leadership, I must make it very clear that Congress wants to know the
truth. Congress is here and we are listening. We do not want to hear
that there is a problem implementing security from the airports or an
airline--we want to hear it from you. Far too much is at stake to play
games at a time like this.
There may have been some changes in the faces at TSA, but the
challenge remains the same--to develop a system of security which
justifiably restores the confidence of the American people. We continue
to expect this challenge to be met. I implore you to work with us, and
provide straightforward assessments of your efforts as you move
forward. Without proper communication, questions and doubts will
continue to shroud the TSA, and no doubt will hinder your ability to be
successful in this most important of missions.
The Chairman. I yield to Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
holding this very important hearing.
The Transportation Security Administration is at a crucial
point in its short history. The agency is working
simultaneously on several extremely challenging tasks. The TSA
must purchase and install thousands of pieces of explosive-
detection equipment, hire tens of thousands of passenger and
baggage screeners at 429 airports throughout the country, all
in the next few months. At the same time, it must build its own
massive organization from the ground up.
If these challenges were not enough, the President has
recommended that the TSA be moved to another entirely new
entity--the Department of Homeland Security. And as of last
week, the TSA now has a new acting leader, Admiral Loy, whose
accompanying Secretary Mineta today.
In the midst of all these efforts and transitions, the TSA
must come to grips with one of its most difficult jobs, dealing
with a Congress that's pulling the agency in different
directions. For example, some legislators are trying to move
the deadline for screening all bags using explosive-detection
equipment, while others are saying we must keep the pressure on
and not weaken our security measures.
The appropriators have substantially limited the total
number of TSA employees cutting the President's supplemental
funding request and using earmarks to tie up much of the rest
of the money.
Just two days ago, Secretary Mineta testified that the
amount of money Congress is providing in the Supplemental
Appropriations Act and the strings attached to that funding
will not support the mandates and timetables for aviation
security that Congress set up last year for TSA. We passed a
law authorizing certain funding. Again, the appropriators have
now undercut the authorization that was passed by the Senate by
a 98-to-nothing vote.
On top of it all, every sector of the aviation community
seems to be voicing one complaint or another about how security
is being handled. All of this is making it difficult for TSA to
do the job we gave it eight months ago to keep our aviation and
other transportation systems secure.
I hope that the first panel of witnesses will shed more
light on some of the issues that TSA faces in the coming weeks
and months. DOT and TSA have tried to do a good job, especially
given the circumstances, but it is evident that everything has
not gone as well as it should. The road ahead is likely to be
even rougher than the one already traveled. In that regard, I
know that the GAO will have some important observations about
where we stand today and what the future may hold.
Another issue being addressed today is the arming of
pilots. I'm sure that it is a very important issue, and we will
have a lot of discussion and debate about it, and I hope we can
resolve it. But I've got to tell you, Mr. Chairman, we should
be focusing on how we're going to implement the law that we
passed eight months ago, which is going to cost billions of
dollars, tens of thousands of employees, how we're going to
ensure the safety of every passenger in every plane in our
aviation system.
Eight months ago, members of Congress were unable to reach
a consensus on this contentious issue due, in part, to a lack
of sound information and analytical data on the issue as well
as the urgent need to pass the legislation. We placed the
authority for the ultimate decision with the TSA, which we
expected to objectively assess the potential benefits and
hazards of arming airline pilots.
At our last hearing on aviation security two months ago,
former Undersecretary Magaw announced that TSA would not
support the arming of pilots. That decision prompted the
introduction of several bills in Congress to explicitly allow
pilots to use firearms. The issue remains contentious, and
there seems to be little hard analysis on either side.
Even the GAO recently concluded that without additional
research, quote, ``The potential benefits, risks, and costs of
using weapons on aircraft cannot be fully determined.''
Therefore, I am anxious to hear from all our witnesses today on
this issue.
It's my genuine hope that Congress, the Administration, and
the aviation community can reach greater consensus and unity of
purpose in the area of aviation security. Assigning blame and
finger pointing are easy here in Washington. We shouldn't lose
sight of the stakes in this fight. Aviation has always been a
popular target for terrorists, and there is no reason to
believe that has changed. It's not easy to balance the need for
greater security with the efficient flow of air commerce that's
vital to the economy of our country, but the task will be made
more difficult unless we get a lot more direction and a lot
less infighting.
I thank our witnesses for being here. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Wyden?
STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and colleagues, the House of Representatives
is now poised to grant extensions of the deadlines with respect
to the aviation security requirements, and I want to make it
clear that I will strongly oppose any extensions unless they
are ones that strengthen the protections for passengers in the
public, rather than roll them back. Any modifications of the
law ought to make our system safer rather than less secure.
And I will tell you, I find it especially troubling that in
recent weeks the Administration has had to replace the director
of the Transportation Security Administration. I'm going to ask
Secretary Mineta this morning why that was done, because
clearly it does not send a message that the Administration is
on top of this issue if, in fact, at a crucial time, the head
of the Transportation Security Administration has to be
replaced, and I think we need to know what is going to be done
differently with a new head of that agency.
Finally, what it all comes down to is that there is an
indication that this issue is sliding back into the same
pattern of the last 15 years. For 15 years, the pattern has
been there would be a significant tragedy, there would be a
huge and understandable outcry from the American people, and
Congress would move ahead on reform. After that was done, there
was all kinds of backsliding, all kind of blame and finger
pointing. But, for one reason or another, the job didn't get
done.
I think--and I want reflect your comments, Mr. Chairman,
and those of Senator McCain's--the challenge now is to stay at
it until it's done right. And if that means staying through the
summer, working with the Administration on issues relating to
funding, working with the airports on the issues that they have
with respect to the realignments of their facilities and the
like, so be it. But I don't think excuses, either from the
Administration, from the airports, from the Congress or anyone
else are acceptable at this point, given the understandable
public concern.
I look forward to working with you and our colleagues on a
bipartisan basis.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kerry?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you
for holding this hearing, which is obviously important.
In the last weeks--months, I guess--Americans have lost
about $1.8 trillion of value in the marketplace. One of the
elements, certainly only one--there are many, many things going
on--but everybody would agree that the economy has been
sluggish, not where we want it to be and that one significant
component of it that remains affected is tourism, travel,
people aren't coming here from other countries. I hear this all
over the nation--tourist places.
People are scared, afraid of another act of terror in the
United States, afraid of travel. The full measure of travel in
our own country remains reduced. And you hear it all the way
down the economic food chain--taxicab drivers, limousines,
restaurants, theater, hotels, the people who do the linen for
the hotels, the people who work at them--all the way through
the economic food chain, America is impacted.
And back in September, when we first addressed this issue,
we knew we were not addressing just the issue of travel, or of,
airline safety. We were addressing the restoration of
confidence for the American people in our entire system.
I regret to say that this spectacle of the leaders of our
agencies, of our entire airport system, and, to whatever
degree, the Congress--and I take issue with you, Mr. Secretary,
that the Congress is responsible for not providing enough
money, because Mr. Daniels clearly cut significantly from the
supplemental, as we all know. If the issue were money, all we'd
have to do is really put it in front of this Committee, and
this Committee will take care of it in about ten minutes.
The fact is that there is disarray, in my judgment. And the
rhetoric of war is far outstripping the response or the results
in this sector and in other sectors. It is incomprehensible to
me that given the predicament of flying and what we are asking
Americans and anybody who gets on an airplane to do with
respect to baggage inspection, that we are not pushing this at
the rate that it ought to be pushed.
Now, I'm pleased to say that the CEO of the Massachusetts
Port Authority, Craig Coy, will be testifying on the second
panel. They've made enormous strides in turning MassPort around
since September 11th. They've turned the bureaucracy around,
and they've set some goals, and they're meeting them.
As a result of that effort, Logan Airport is becoming a
leader in aviation security, and I'm proud to say it has in
place a plan that will achieve one-hundred percent screening of
checked baggage by the year's end. And it's also becoming a
laboratory for emerging security technology. So I think it's
moving in the right direction, as are some other airports.
But I regret to say that--you know, when you go to war, you
go to war. Your purchasing procedures change. You accelerate.
Your hiring procedures change. You mobilize. And what we're
witnessing is, sort of, this incredible back-and-forth turf
struggle, political struggle, confusion, lack of leadership,
and our economy is going to suffer for it, and the American
people are going to suffer for it, and I regret that
enormously.
So, Mr. Chairman, I think this is the appropriate time to
have this hearing to measure whether we can do it. And may I
say we're not measuring this, I think, unfairly. At Mr. Magaw's
confirmation hearing and in subsequent public statements, the
Administration itself said, ``We're on track.'' Deputy
Secretary Jackson told this Committee, quote, ``Secretary
Mineta has given us a simple mandate with regard to these
deadlines. Let's figure out how to meet them, because they are
not negotiable.'' Secretary Mineta himself offered similar
statements as recently as May.
So now the rhetoric is changing, as I think everybody is
aware, and the TSA's ability to meet the deadline is in
question. Well, I think we have to demand a plan, a clear plan,
the money it takes, the time it takes, the people it will take,
and a specific date by which we can expect one-hundred percent
compliance. And I respectfully say to my colleagues, until we
do that, I think we're not going to be meeting the full measure
of responsibility with respect to the economy.
Finally, with respect to the weapons, you know, I
understand what our distinguished Chairman and my very, very
good friend is saying. I understand that. And he's absolutely
correct. If the doors are secure and there is a procedure, then
you shouldn't need it. But there are all kinds of scenarios in
airports and otherwise, even in the air, where who knows what
may develop. If this gives greater confidence--and that's what
we're really looking for here, is the question of confidence--
it's very hard to make the argument that a pilot with whom we
entrust a hundred-million-dollar-plus aircraft and several
hundred lives, the pilot, who is, in fact, in charge of
managing what has been turned into a weapon previously and
could ever, at any occasion, be a weapon again, that that
plane, which is, in and of itself, we now know, a weapon, can't
necessarily have a sidearm, which is also a weapon, for some
contingency.
And for those who argue that a properly trained pilot, many
of whom have military experience and background, all of whom
have enormous clearances and are supposed to be of the highest
level of responsibility, can't be an adjunct to an air marshal
or even to the police forces in an airport in order to deter
whatever violence, as we saw recently in Los Angeles, some mad
person might engage in. It's very hard to understand how we
can't set up a protocol of use and training that doesn't meet
that standard to maximize the confidence. Though I agree with
my colleague, if the door is locked, that contingency ought to
be taken care of, but who knows what other contingency may
arise.
So, Mr. Chairman, I hope we get this done. I think the
American people are growing impatient, and the spectacle is not
a pretty one.
The Chairman. If we can shorten our opening statements,
please, we have two distinguished colleagues waiting.
Senator Burns?
STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Burns. I'll keep mine very short, Mr. Chairman. I
just want to thank you for holding this hearing today.
Understanding the circumstances that surround this and, besides
that, we can--maybe we can put to bed some of the
misinformation that seems to swirl around this issue.
Seventy-nine percent of the public support a voluntary
program to arm pilots--79 percent. Fifty percent of those
people said they'd be willing to pay up to $20 more to have
armed pilots on the flight deck. And another 50 percent said
they'd switch from their current airline to an airline that had
pilots who had a deterrent on the flight deck. That's pretty
overwhelming, when we start taking a look and seeing where our
policy should be going.
Many foreign pilots already carry weapons in the cockpit
when they fly into the United States of America. We allow them
to do it through an FAA regulation and bilateral agreements we
have with those countries. S.2554 includes explicit
indemnification language that exempts the airlines from any
liability. Further, the cost to train a pilot is so much
affordable than those costs to train--similar to those costs to
train an air marshal. Furthermore, in the case of the air
marshal forced to fire, an intruder trying to break into the
cockpit, what is his target? What's behind that target? I would
suggest probably the pilots.
What about a double-door reconfiguration of aircraft that
some would suggest? That is not happening, and I have my doubts
whether it will happen on domestic flights in the United
States. What will be the cost to the airline if required
airlines to reconfigure their planes to a double door? What
would be the cost of revenue to airlines if they had to reduce
the number of seats on their aircraft? The consumer pays those
costs, leading to higher airfares.
Regarding the issue of hardening doors, Congress has
allocated $25 million to harden aircraft doors. At 35,000 per
aircraft in approximately 7,000 aircraft in the U.S., that's a
total cost of nearly $250 million. We haven't allocated enough
money. And we don't even have a hardened door yet. Testing
prototypes has led to failure. Sure, we can harden the door,
but we can still ram a food cart right through it, breaking it
down--not only the door, but also the frame of the door.
Now, we're only weeks away from the anniversary, and I
think what will happen today, Mr. Chairman, both pro and con on
this issue, we clear the air of some information, and logic
then will take us to where we want to be as a Congress and also
with the American people
So I thank you today for this hearing. I appreciate it very
much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Allen?
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing on aviation security. Many of the comments that have
been made by you and others, regarding the ramp up of the TSA--
are appropriate.
There are a couple of issues that I hope we'll address
here--the problems of building a new agency and flexibility for
different airports that have different security needs. Not
every airport is the same. The airports in Missoula are
different than Richmond, they're different than Dulles, and
different than Dallas/Fort Worth, and I hope that we'll discuss
that.
Another issue that I hope that Secretary Mineta will
address has to do with the question I asked--when we had a
hearing on aviation security in this Committee back in May. I
asked the Secretary about the situation at our nation's capital
airport, Reagan National Airport and the operation of general
aviation there. The Secretary assured this Committee that a
plan would be announced by the end of that month. Again, that
was May. We're still waiting for a plan. In fact, it's been
stated that they'll not allow general aviation into Reagan
National Airport. And I hope that--and I'm very eager to hear,
about the plans from the Department of Transportation and the
Transportation Security Administration to remedy this problem.
I think it's inexcusable that a solution has not been
identified to allow general aviation back at Reagan National
Airport.
On the other issue of this hearing, I look forward to
listening to witnesses on the issue or arming of pilots. We
have discussed a variety of different approaches for the last
nine months. You, Mr. Chairman, and I are in complete agreement
that the cockpits ought to be as secure as a vault. No one
should be able to get in. Unfortunately, that is not the
physical state of cockpits today.
In the May hearing, then-secretary of the TSA--Under
Secretary Magaw, when I asked him, ``Well, if the pilots on
September 11th, had firearms, would that have done any good?'',
he responded, ``Well, it could not have hurt.'' And then when
asking him--``What use would it be in the future,'' he could
not answer.
But we have to use some common sense. Maybe they can't
figure it out. While I think GAO reports may be relevant and
useful, I don't think we really need to rely on GAO reports to
try to quantify what we know would be beneficial.
The bill that was introduced by Senators Burns and Smith
addresses many of the concerns of pilot qualifications and the
training in a variety of different matters that I think are
very, very important. Indeed, I think probably the perfect
world on all of this is that the federal government would
withdraw its prohibition on pilots being armed with certain
qualifications and training and so forth and then let the
marketplace decide. I think the airlines that have pilots that
are armed would get more customers, because I think more of the
travelers--consumers--would feel safer.
That's the ideal, but that's not what we have here. We have
nothing other than the bill that Senator Burns and others have
proposed. And not only does it, in my view, address all the
qualifications, training, competence, and needs, it also
addresses the concerns of the air carriers' liability, and it
provides them a very strong shield in the event that the pilots
have to use, as flight-deck officers, a firearm.
So I'm very pleased to hear the testimony today. I've
studied this issue very carefully, listened to people on it,
and I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, and say this to Senators
Burns and Smith, thank you for your leadership.
And I want to sign on as a cosponsor to your bill, because
I think we need to move forward in this commonsense matter to
give the flying public greater assurances, and I think the
pilots can have the training, can do the job, and it's a last
line of defense that makes a great deal of sense, and I hope
we'll move forward on that matter, as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hutchison?
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm very pleased that we're having a hearing that is more
comprehensive than the House approach has been. I think it is
way out of line for the House to look at passing an extension
of the deadlines when we need to address all of the issues of
Transportation Security Administration.
We passed a landmark bill, and we gave the Department of
Transportation a monumental task. We need, through this
hearing, to get a mid-year update to see what we need to do to
refine the law, to address issues of concern. We need to hear
from Secretary Mineta and Deputy Secretary Jackson about the
problems so that we can address all of them in a comprehensive
way.
To suddenly say, in July, we're not going to have deadlines
for inspecting checked bags, is slightly irresponsible. I think
we need to ask, are we doing everything possible to screen
every checked bag? And if it's not with a piece of equipment,
then how are we going to backstop the lack of equipment?
I think we should be trying to meet the deadline. If we
need to prepare it a little, then we should address that in
September, but now is not the time to do that.
Second, what are we doing about cargo security? I think the
top of the airplane is pretty darn safe. We've got more air
marshals on flights. We've got a better cockpit configuration.
Passengers are ready to report anything that is amiss and, if
necessary, to take action. We have better screening, by and
large, throughout our system. But I think the bottom of the
aircraft needs to be addressed. So I want to pursue questions
about cargo and the trusted traveler program. We have a lot
left to do here.
I commend Secretary Mineta for replacing the head of TSA.
It is my understanding that he wasn't satisfied that we were
making enough progress. That's exactly what you do if you don't
think the head of an agency is being aggressive enough. And I
was concerned that Mr. Magaw did not even think a trusted
traveler program should be attempted. We must ensure safety and
security, but, at the same time, we can make those lines move
faster if we use common sense. And I think a trusted traveler
program is common sense.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing. And
mostly, Mr. Chairman, I would ask you if, when we have all of
the information in this midcourse correction opportunity, that
we would address it in a comprehensive way and not piecemeal
and take out a deadline here and a deadline there. I think we
need to address it in a comprehensive way.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Very good.
Senator Cleland?
STATEMENT OF HON. MAX CLELAND,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Cleland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm just sitting
here thinking about the difference in intensity between when
the Committee first met, right after September 11th, literally
with the smell of war in the air. I can remember, just a few
days after 9/11, the Committee held an important hearing that
showed that the market value of the entire United States
airline industry was little better than junk bonds. That is why
I supported the $15 billion aid package to American airlines
and the airline industry. I was willing to do whatever it took
to increase security for our airline passengers, because I knew
that was the only way to get people flying again, which, in
turn, is one of the key ways of restoring our economic health.
Now that I am concerned the smell of war has been replaced
by bureaucracy and by what we used to call in Vietnam ``wait a
minute vines.'' Wait a minute vines were always those things in
the jungle that just held you up. Every time you turned around,
there was one more wait a minute vine. And one of the things I
think has challenged us over the last nine months is a series
of wait a minute vines. Wait a minute, we don't have enough
money. Wait a minute, we don't have the regulations in place.
Wait a minute, we don't have the right person in charge. Wait a
minute, wait a minute, wait a minute.
The truth of the matter is, we're still at war. We still
have many of the same people out there who came after us on
September 11th. So I don't think we have time to wait a minute.
I think the intensity that we felt that week after 9/11 ought
to be present today, and we ought to do whatever it takes to
restore security for our airline passengers. I think that's the
only way we're going to get people back in the seats and get
America in effect flying again, flying in the air and flying
economically.
So, Mr. Chairman, I'm here to support whatever it takes
financially, legally, legislatively, to enhance the security of
our airline passengers. And representing the busiest airport in
the world, Hartsfield, and one of the major airline traffic
carriers in the world, Delta, I think it is in our economic
interest and our national security interest to do whatever it
takes to get this ball moving and get away from the wait a
minute vine.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Dorgan?
STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, I think that security issues
will always be more important than convenience issues, with
respect to air travel, and if people feel air travel isn't safe
and secure, they simply won't use it.
At the same time, while there's a tension between security
and convenience, if, ultimately, the security issues cause so
much inconvenience, people won't fly either. I mean it--I
landed at an airport on Monday of this week, and I think were
about 500-plus people waiting in line to go through security.
And you could see some of them were furious. That is something
unusual that happened at that airport, but the line stretched
way outside, and I'm sure a lot of people missed flights as a
result of that. And I'd bet you a lot of those people are going
to say, ``Well, if this is the way it's going to look at an
airport, I ain't gonna be here very soon again.''
But my point is, there is an urgency here--there's not
question about that--an urgency with respect to security
issues, and we ought to address it. I agree with Senator
Hutchison, let's not talk about extending deadlines until we
get down the road a ways and find out what we can do.
And also there's a tension between dealing with things on
an urgent basis and bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is not, by nature,
fast. So I think it's really important for us. It's important
for this industry and for the economy to get this right.
Let me make one final point. I just want to say thank you,
as well, to the DOT on one piece of information. You know,
after 9/11, they put in place rules with parking lots and so
on, and it was one-size-fits-all. And a 300-foot rule, for
example, Mr. Chairman, on short-term parking? Well, 300-foot
happened to take all the parking at Dickenson, North Dakota. I
mean, that's a small airport with commuter flights.
So we talked, and DOT made some adjustments and did the
right thing. You know, they've worked their way through some of
these things in a thoughtful way in certain areas, and I want
to say thanks to the folks who had the common sense to do that,
as well, because there's a lot to criticize, but there's also
some things to say thanks for thinking through them in a
thoughtful way.
Thanks, The Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer?
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can I put my
statement in the record? And I'd like to summarize.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
I wanted to thank you so much, and Senator McCain, for this
hearing and for you dedication to staying on this subject. It
is so important, and it's always on the front of my mind.
And we get closer to the anniversary of 9/11, and I do
believe that air travel is safer than it's been in a very long
time, but we have a long way to do. A long way to go. And this
is not the time to slow down our efforts, to skip deadlines or
anything else. We need to move forward.
I'm going to quickly run through the issues of concern. I
have strong doubts that the air marshal program is as robust as
it should be. The number of air marshals is classified, but DOT
must be held accountable on this issue.
Senator McCain helped me write the provision in the law
that says that air marshals shall be onboard all high-risk
flights, with priority given to nonstop long-distance flights.
There was a reason we wrote that, because those were the
flights that were targeted by the terrorists. It was the heavy
fuel load.
And all I can say is that Senator Burns and I have been
asking for a briefing on this issue for two full months, since
the last hearing we had in May. The briefing wasn't scheduled
until yesterday. And so I say to my Chairman and ranking
member, thank you for this hearing, because I don't think we
would have gotten it yet were it not for this hearing.
Second, our checkpoint screening is still inadequate. On
July 1, the press reported results of an investigation showing
that checkpoint screeners at 32 of the nation's largest
airports failed to detect weapons. Los Angeles and Sacramento
Airports had failure rates of 41 and 40 percent, respectively.
In other words, failure 40 percent of the time.
I learned, when I called those airports, on the heels of
that USA Today article, that they still had acting federal
security chiefs. Now Los Angeles has a full-fledged director,
and I'm very happy about that, but Sacramento does not, and
this is not good.
My call to that airport that day gave me little comfort.
The federal head of security at that airport had to read about
her airport's failure rate in the newspaper. She said she
didn't even know that was the failure rate, and she was
responsible for safety at that airport.
There are still vulnerable spots at the airports, as
Senator Kerry said. The breach of security at LAX ticket
counter, at the El Al ticket counter, is a key example. If El
Al Airlines, Mr. Chairman, didn't have two security guards who
were armed at the site of the incident, the death toll would
have been far more devastating.
I wrote to Mr. Magaw that day, urging him to help local
police provide security at these areas of our airport and to
use the National Guard until that could happen. I never
received a response to that letter, and there would good
comments in the paper that this was going to be done, but I got
an e-mail--when was it--did we get this?
Staff Member: The following week.
Senator Boxer.--the following week that said, no. No
commitment was made. Nothing's been done about expanding
security to the check-in counters.
Fourth, the installation of baggage detection machines may
not be completed. They must be completed, period.
Fifth, our security system needs to provide protection
against the use of fake IDs. I was troubled by a CBS news
investigation that showed people getting through security with
fake IDs. Mr. Chairman, the technology exists to fix this
problem, and it needs to be used. It's cheap. It's easy. It
must be used.
Sixth, the crews of our airlines need to be prepared as the
last line of defense against terrorist. Pilots need to know
what's happening in the cabin in real time. That means a video
camera in the cockpit so they know what's happening. It's like
your rearview mirror. Flight attendants need wireless
communication devices between the cabin and the cockpit. And
pilots who are fully trained and volunteer should be part of a
``guns in the cockpit'' program.
This is something I feel very strongly about, because the
military is under orders to shoot down a commercial flight if
it is hijacked. We have a layer of defense in our aviation
system, as Secretary Mineta has stated many times. Trained
flight attendants and pilot marshals would be an essential
layer, a last layer of defense.
And I do agree with Senator Hutchison that a trusted flyer
program should be on track. I myself have been frisked 15
times. Now, I don't care. It's fine. But the bottom line is,
it's a little bit of a waste of money for a five-foot-tall
grandma senator. You know?
[Laughter.]
Senator Boxer. So there's got to be a way that we can
concentrate on the bad actors.
So we need to get a lot done. Let's get it done, and let's
keep the pressure on, Mr. Chairman, because without you and
Senator McCain keeping the pressure on with this Committee, I'm
afraid we'll never have safe skies.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator from California
Good morning. Mr. Chairman, after checkpoint screeners at airports
in Los Angeles and Sacramento were ranked in the bottom five airports
for high failure rates earlier this month, I sent you a letter
requesting a hearing on aviation security--so we could get an update of
the implementation of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. I
appreciate your holding this hearing.
We are seven weeks away from the one year anniversary of the
September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
The terrorists hijacked four commercial jets--all of which were heading
to California--and 39 Californians on board the planes died.
As we get closer to that one year anniversary, I can say that air
travel today is more secure than it was last September. But, it is not
as secure as it could be. And, now is not the time to slow down or
delay our efforts to increase and improve aviation security. The job is
not done and it must be done.
First, in my opinion, we still don't have enough air marshals on
planes. I know the number of air marshals is classified for security
reasons. However, that does not give DOT the right not to be
accountable on this issue. I wrote the provision of the law that air
marshals shall be on board all high risk flights, with priority given
to non-stop, long-distance flights. Yet, Senator Burns and I have been
asking for a briefing on this issue for two months--since the last
hearing on aviation security in May. The briefing wasn't scheduled
until yesterday. I can't monitor DOT's progress on this issue if I have
to go through such as a hassle to get a briefing.
Second, our checkpoint screening is still inadequate. On July 1,
the press reported results of an investigation showing that checkpoint
screeners at 32 of the nation's largest airports failed to detect
weapons. Los Angeles and Sacramento airports had failure rates of 41
and 40 percent, respectively. I learned when I called those airports
that they still had acting federal security chiefs. Now, Los Angeles
has a full fledged director, but Sacramento does not and this is not
good. My call to that airport gave me little comfort. The federal head
of security at that airport had to read about her airport's failure
rate in the newspaper.
Third, there are still vulnerable spots at our airports. The breach
of security at a Los Angeles airport ticket counter earlier this month
is a key example. If El Al Airlines did not have two security guards at
the site of the incident, the death toll would have been far more
devastating. I wrote to Mr. Magaw urging him to help local police
provide security at these areas of our airport--and to use the National
Guard until that could happen. I never received a response and as far
as I can tell, no action has been taken by this Administration.
Fourth, the installation of baggage detection machines may not be
completed by the Congressionally mandated deadline of the end of this
year. While DOT has met the deadline to screen all checked baggage
either by bag-match, hand search, or bomb-sniffing dogs, we all know
that bag matching will do nothing to prevent a suicide bomber. We need
these machines, and the Administration needs to ensure that these
baggage detection machines are in place by the deadline. Period.
Fifth, our security system needs to provide protection against the
use of fake IDs. I was troubled by a CBS news investigation that showed
people getting through security with fake IDs. Therefore, I have
introduced legislation to provide for training of airline personnel in
the detection of fake IDs and to provide for the deployment of
technology at airport security checkpoints. I hope the Committee can
move my bill soon.
Sixth, the crews of our airlines need to be prepared as the last
line of defense against terrorists. Pilots need to know what's
happening in the cabin in real time. Flight attendants need wireless
communication devices between the cabin and the cockpit. And, pilots
who are fully trained and volunteer should be part of a guns in the
cockpit program. This is something I feel strongly about because the
military is under orders to shoot down a commercial flight if it is
hijacked. We have a layered defense in our aviation system. Trained
pilot marshals would be an essential layer.
I know that we have a lot to get done. We must fulfill our
responsibility to the American people and the traveling public.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Very good.
Senator Smith?
STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON SMITH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Gordon Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I must admit that I was leaning against the guns-in-the-
cockpit idea until, on a recent flight from Oregon to
Washington, we were supposed to change planes in Chicago, we
were deterred because of weather and sat on the ground for a
long time, and I took occasion to go and speak with the pilots,
and I asked them their opinion, because I truly have an open
mind on this question. And even still, I do. But they said
something I'll never forget. Senator Boxer just referred to it.
It was that, ``Senator, there are armed pilots already, but
they're armed with F-15s and F-16s. They have instructions to
shoot us down if we can't control our airplanes. We'd rather
take the first shot, if it comes to that.'' And I think that
that's the logic that really is important to remember in this
calculation. And I'm--I will admit I have some trepidation
about this, but we're dealing in a whole new world here.
And, finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to echo the thoughts
that--of my colleagues who have expressed some concern about
the efficiency of how we check in security. We need to spend
the money. We need to do the scans. We need to take the steps
that are necessary to improve efficiency, not sacrifice
security, but improve efficiency, or we will continue to retard
the tourist industry and the business of this nation in a way
that we have, frankly, difficulty calculating.
So I hope we will get on with that and keep the pressure
up, and it's good to be here, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your attention to this issue.
The Chairman. Very good.
Senator Nelson?
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I'm not going to make a
speech. I just am looking forward to the uniformity that the
department will insist on eventually in all of the
magnetometers, for example. Every time I go through the
magnetometer here at National, it never sets it off. But with
the same clothes on when I go through the magnetometer at the
Tallahassee Airport, it always set it off. In the Tampa
Airport, it depends, I suppose, on the weather, because some
days it'll set it off, and some days it doesn't. And so other
passengers are having that same kind of experience, and it'll
be good to have the uniformity.
I would just mention in passing also, on the overall issue
of airline safety, when we addressed this in our initial bill,
we put, in this Committee, a provision that said foreign flight
students would have background checks. When it got to
conference, it was altered that foreign flight students only
learning to fly aircraft of 12,500 pounds or more would have
background checks. And if what we're trying to do is to get at
the problem of the Mohammad Atta's, we need to change the law
so that it is foreign flight students, on any kind of training,
get background checks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Ensign?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and--for you and
Senator McCain, for holding this hearing.
Safety is very, very important. I think we all consider it
paramount. But we have to do this in a way that, first of all,
is reasonable. We've heard the deadlines. And if the deadlines
could be met, physically, they should be met.
And I'll give you an example, though. McCarron Airport,
cannot--no matter what they do, they cannot, because if they
have the machines there, they can't plug them in, because they
are waiting for a power substation to be built that will not be
online for at least three months, post-December 31st. So no
matter what the airport does, they cannot use the machines.
There are many other examples that we have around the
country where there are problems. So having a--you know,
keeping the pressure on, I think, is very, very important, but
we also have to do it in a way that allows these things to be
done to where they can be done. And sometimes taking a few
extra months to do something and doing it right and doing it
for the limited resources that we have--we do have--we don't
have unlimited resources, so I think that we need to do it
right.
It was mentioned the efficiency, you know, in--and having
the, you know, screening in a way with the trusted traveler
program. I'm glad to see that hopefully we're going to be going
toward that direction, because it is ridiculous--once again,
when you have limited resources, if you can take 15 to 20
percent of the people out of going through all of the security
checks that the general flying public has to go through, that's
efficient. That becomes more efficient, and it keeps those
business travelers.
Right now, if you're a business traveler, if you don't have
to make that short haul between San Francisco and Los Angeles,
you don't want to. You just don't want to. It's becoming--and
when these--the December 31st deadline comes, it's going to be
worse.
I want--some of the other concerns that I have--the 40-40-
20 rule. McCarron Airport did a study that if that goes into
effect, as is currently looking like it's going to, on Sunday
and Thursday--not on Thanksgiving, not on Christmas, not on
just the busy holidays, but every Thursday and Sunday are our
two busy days in and out of Las Vegas. We are the second-
busiest airport in the country when it comes to baggage check.
It's not like Dallas or Chicago, where a lot of through
passengers--Las Vegas--Los Angeles is number one, Las Vegas is
number two, the number of bags checked.
Southwest Airlines--current, with no increases in passenger
numbers, the average wait at the Southwest Airlines ticket
counter is going to be four hours and 18 minutes every Sunday
and every Thursday, with the--because of the 40-40-20 rules.
It's going to cause such a backup. What is that going to do to
our economy?
And I want to propose something, because of what happened
in Los Angeles. We're talking about security now. And you
talked about now wanting security at the ticket counter. What
we're going to do with this 40-40-20 rule is--on average,
there's going to be two to three thousand people in the
terminal now down at the ticket counter in Las Vegas. What
happens when somebody now takes a backpack bomb or a suitcase
bomb or an automatic weapon into that crowd? You've just
created a security problem where we're going to lose more
people than if they're blown up on an airplane.
And that's what I'm saying, is we need to think about what
we are doing here, overall. We can't just look at--you know,
the flying public thinks of this airplane crashed in--and
that's great television, and that scares the bejeebas out of
everybody. But we have to think what the--how a terrorist
thinks. A terrorist looks for the weakness in the system. Well,
if you back everybody up at the ticket counter, you've just
created another weakness in the system, and that's going to
stop airline travel just as fast as crashing an airplane would.
And that's why I think that we need to look at these
things. We need to work with the TSA. Keep the pressure on, put
the resources in. I agree. We need to put resources to make
sure that you have plenty of people that check in people and
get them through as efficiently as possible, because we want to
have a balance with security, as Senator Smith talked about,
and getting people through so that if people want to take a
tourist trip or if they want to take a business trip, that it
isn't a deterrent.
You know, because if you have an--even an average of an
hour wait--if you're taking a business trip, and I know I'm
going to sit in security for an hour every time, that's going
to be a deterrence against travel, Mr. Chairman.
So thank you for holding this hearing, and let's make sure
that we do this in a balanced way.
The Chairman. All right, thank you.
Senator Snowe?
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this extremely critical hearing. It comes at a very
significant time as we try to understand why we haven't been
able to be as effective as we should be in implementing many of
the enhancements to our aviation security program. Obviously,
the status quo before September 11th is now history. And I
don't think that we can ever think for a moment that we can
relax our standards and/or our deadlines. I think it sends
absolutely the wrong message.
As it is, I think the American public are getting a mixed
message. You know, we heard last year that the January 18th
deadline could not be met on baggage match. The bureau was
created, and the deadline was met. And I think that's
essentially the same reaction here today, is that we have to
send a message that we intend to meet those deadlines.
It seems to me that it's incongruous, at a time in which we
are proposing and will be voting on the first major
reorganization in more than 50 years to create the Department
of Homeland Security, to reorganize 160 agencies at
approximately $40 billion, and we're saying somehow we can't
meet these deadlines to uphold aviation security standards. We
can't vacillate.
I would hope that we will hear the can-do spirit here
today, and I'm pleased that Secretary Mineta has selected
Admiral Loy, because I do believe that he'll bring the same
can-do organizational and managerial experience to this agency,
as he did to the Coast Guard as commandant, because that's
precisely what we will need.
And what we'll also need is a plan, Mr. Chairman. We need a
plan. We need to know how the Administration is going to
approach the baggage screening and the federalizing of all of
the major airports across this country by the precise deadlines
that have been stated in law. We need a plan. Because,
obviously, if there is no plan, it's going to be virtually
impossible to meet those deadlines as each week passes by.
So I would hope that, here today, we will hear precisely
how the Administration intends to uphold these standards and
how we can help. And, obviously, we have a responsibility, as
well, to make sure that we're providing the--sufficient
resources for the Administration, for the Secretary, for the
Undersecretary of the Transportation Security Agency to meet
their responsibilities and obligations. It's a failure on our
part, as well, if we don't provide the necessary resources and
the funding that's essential to keep them on track to meet the
deadline.
We can't continue to lose weeks and months, because the
first deadline is rapidly approaching. So we have to help,
consistent with the obligations of the statute that we enacted,
to help the Secretary and the Undersecretary to meet their
responsibilities under law.
But I don't think that we can afford, as a nation, to send
this inconsistent, vacillating message--we can and we can't, we
don't know, it's going to be difficult--I mean, what kind of
message does that send? I mean, time is not on our side. Time
is our enemy. Time is our enemy. And this is a national
imperative that requires a national urgency on the part of each
and every one of us.
So I think we all have to help, recognizing there are some
challenges and hurdles to overcome, but that's why a plan is
essential, to understand exactly what they are, what the time
table is for manufacturing, the production of the screening
machines. How can we get these in place? Where are the
airports? Can they accommodate them? Are they prepared to
accommodate them? The number of screeners that are essential,
how are they going to begin to employ the thousands remaining,
as required by statute, the thousands that are remaining, both
on the checked baggage and also for security personnel at the
airports?
So we need to have a schedule and a program, because it's
only in that way that we're going to meet our obligations. But
I don't think that we can afford to take any chances by
suggesting here today that we should relax our standards.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Fitzgerald?
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER G. FITZGERALD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Fitzgerald. I have no opening statement, Mr.
Chairman, so we can--I'll spare everybody any more comments
from us.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Murkowski, Senator Smith, we appreciate your
patience, and we welcome you to the Committee.
Senator Murkowski?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK H. MURKOWSKI,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I've listened carefully to the presentations by my
colleagues, and one of the suggestions that came to mind for
Senator Ensign is if those lines in Las Vegas are four hours, I
suggest they move them over alongside the one-armed bandits,
because that might offset some of the economic loss.
[Laughter.]
Senator Murkowski. Seriously, Mr. Chairman, I'm here
specifically to talk about one issue, and that's the arming of
pilots, and I join with Senator Smith. And I want to point out
that we have to recognize that this is not necessarily the
answer. But, by the same token, it is a significant contributor
to responsible steps being taken from the standpoint of the
lines of defense that are traditional in evaluating, if you
will, the risk associated with riding on an aircraft.
Before September 11th, I think we all had little flashbacks
that we hoped there wasn't a mechanical problem--hoped there
wasn't a pilot error, hoped there wasn't an accident of some
kind. The exposure of terrorism was not in our mentality. It is
now.
And I think we have to recognize that we're going to
continue to have a certain risk in any form of transportation,
whether it is the train, the bus, or the airplane. You've got
the mechanical, you've got the accident, you've got the
terrorist. You can't reduce them all, so you have to keep a
balance.
And if this Congress thinks we're going to eliminate all
the risks associated with terrorism and the exposure, we're
wrong. We're not. We can reduce risk, but we can't eliminate
it. That's just the practical reality.
Now, the Chairman indicated his view relative to securing
the cockpit. Last weekend, I flew about 8,000 miles, and I flew
on three airlines. I flew on United, Northwest, and on Alaska.
And when you're sitting there for six or seven hours, and you
don't have much to do except read, you begin to take on little
projects. And one of the projects I took on was the entry and
exit into the cockpit and how the crew handled it. And it was
different with every airline.
One airline, with a Boeing, had taken it upon itself to
basically arm its own doors. They took conventional doors and
armed them with mesh and so forth. One of them had a procedure
that when there was an entry and exit in and out of the
cockpit, that the cart that goes up and down the aisles
carrying beverages would block the entry door, with the two
flight attendants. But there was an average of eight to twelve
entries and exits during the six-hour flight. They were
necessitated by providing the crew--the captain and the
copilot--with food, and obviously relief, because there's no
relief capabilities in the cockpit.
So unless you redesign the aircraft, you're going to have a
real problem with the idea of keeping that door closed through
the entire flight. It simply is not a practical alternative the
way aircraft are currently designed. I think we have to
recognize that.
Now, it seems to me that what has been presented here, from
the standpoint of lines of defense, and the realization that
the word out officially is if an aircraft is taken over by
terrorists, the United States Air Force, the military, has a
capability and the authority to shoot it down. Now, that's not
necessarily, nor should it be, the first and last line of
defense. You're going to find that cockpit crew fighting, under
whatever circumstances exist, if that door is penetrated. But
if you arm them, they at least have an opportunity to fight
back.
Now, all aircraft don't have sky marshals. Fewer have them
than we think. They all carry guns. They're armed. Now, logic
seems to dictate the reality that if you have a skyjacker that
comes in and takes over your aircraft, and you have a marshal
that has a gun, you have, obviously, the exposure for an event.
What's the difference in that event occurring there and also
having an additional backup in the cockpit? These pilots are
trained. Most of them are former military. They know how to
handle a pistol. They know the character associated with it.
In my state, Mr. Chairman, all our bush aircraft carry, in
either the luggage of the captain or in the cockpit, a sidearm.
It's for a number of purposes--if their aircraft goes down in a
wilderness area and so forth.
But I have yet to hear one good reason not to arm the
pilots. And, you know, the idea that we ought to do some other
thing, is fine. But the question, I think, that we should
resolve, is whether it's appropriate to arm the pilots. And I
have yet to hear a good reason for the pilots not to have that
additional capability, because, again, Mr. Chairman, if there
is a break into that cockpit, people will fight. They'll fight,
as they previously did in the hijacking. But give them an
opportunity when they hear that door banging open. Because
they're going to hear an entry. And then they will have an
opportunity to react. That reaction in a trained individual, I
think, could be a significant detriment.
I thank you for the opportunity to be with you this
morning. I wish you well on your deliberations.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Smith?
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB SMITH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding the hearing. I understand that my request for testimony
from four expert witnesses was denied by the Committee, but I
would like permission to submit written testimony on behalf of
those four witnesses.
The Chairman. Very good.
Senator Smith. That would be Patricia Friend, the
International President of the Association of Flight
Attendants, Captain Tracy Price, the chairman of the Airline
Pilots Security Alliance, Captain Phillip Buehl, chairman,
Committee for the Armed Defense of the Cockpit, and Ellen
Seracini, the wife of the late Captain Vic Seracini, who was
the pilot on the United Flight 175 that crashed into tower
two.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information referred to was not available at the time the
hearing went to press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I would just make another
request of you to allow Ellen Seracini to testify. It's a--
three or four minutes. She's come here at her own expense.
She's lived through this personally. So, again, I would make an
appeal to you to reconsider that request.
The Chairman. Well, we'll look and see. We've got a lot of
other witnesses. And as you have indicated, there are plenty
more witnesses that want to be heard. The flight attendants,
for example, have been left out, and we're possibly going to
have another hearing. So I would indicate at this point that
that's what she'll have to do, is appear at that hearing.
Go right ahead.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm honored to testify here on behalf of the pilots, flight
attendants, commercial airline passengers, and the American
people who support the idea of arming pilots. They--the pilots
and flight attendants and others are the experts, and their
testimony will speak for itself.
But I want to congratulate Senator Burns and Senator
Murkowski, Senator Boxer and others for--particularly those
three--for their leadership and cooperation as we work through
some issues in trying to get legislation that we could--that we
could move forward in an expeditious manner to get this
situation taken care of before another tragedy occurs, and they
have worked very hard with me in order to accomplish that.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the House passed,
overwhelmingly, a bill, 310 to something, and the
Administration now is beginning to change its mind,
fortunately. The American people are overwhelmingly in support
of it. Pilots are. Flight attendants are. And I appreciate the
fact that you have held this hearing, and I would hope that you
would allow for a markup of the bill so that we could deal with
this quickly--or a bill, if not this particular one.
I did speak with Ellen Seracini last week at a press
conference, as did other senators--Senator Burns was there, and
others--and her husband, Vic, supported, even before this
incident, obviously, armed pilots in the cockpit. And some say,
well, maybe had the pilots been armed on that day, we could
have prevented this tragedy. And I don't know the answer to
that, but I could ask this question for your consideration,
``How could it have been any worse if they had been armed?''
Our nation has suffered a great loss, and not only with the
pilots, but thousands of people on the ground and the flight
attendants, as well, and none of us want to see that happen
again. And I know, obviously, you don't either. But our
airline--armed pilots are the first line of deterrence and the
last lien of defense. It's been said here--I'm not going to
repeat all the comments, because they were all said very
eloquently, but, in particular, the eloquence of, I believe,
Senator Allen, when he talked--I'm sorry, maybe it was Senator
Smith, who talked about the fact that we have to shoot down a
commercial airliner. That is not a good option, believe me, and
I would rather take my chances with a pilot.
Once the pilot--once somebody breaches the cockpit, then
there's a struggle, at best. And we need to know that anybody
who comes through that door, or tries to come through that
door, will be stopped. Now, some argue that less than lethal
weapons are the answer. I would urge you to look at the tape
that is--a five or six minute tape that has been prepared by
the pilots, in terms of the effectiveness of stun guns and
tazers as opposed to lethal weapons, and you will see that they
are not the answer. They might be a supplement to a firearm,
but they're not a replacement. And a firearm is truly the
proper tool.
And let me also say, on marshals--we can't go into the
specifics of how many marshals are there, but obviously there
are not marshals on every flight. And cockpit doors are not
reinforced enough to block somebody from getting into the
cockpit. We shouldn't be even thinking about taking another
chance that something like this may happen again.
So these pilots would be trained. Some are already trained.
They will be trained, Mr. Chairman. And I believe the time is
now to pass legislation to allow armed pilots in the cockpits
before we have another incident turning an aircraft into a
weapon of mass destruction.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Smith.
And if there are not any further questions, Secretary
Mineta, we appreciate your patience, and please come forward
here with the Deputy Secretary Jackson and the administrator,
Admiral Loy. I'm glad to see Admiral Loy with clothes on.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I usually see him uniform.
Well, and Dr. Dillingham they had down there listed panel
two, but--from the GAO--with the first panel.
Secretary Mineta, I'll take my text from Senator Cleland,
``whatever it takes.'' That's the hearing we're having. We're
all on the same team, and you've found and listened now for the
past hour about all the flaws that we have, as 17 senators have
testified, let's hear your testimony and complete the thought,
``What do you need?'' Tell this Committee, because we haven't
heard about any needs. We've heard that everything was on
course, ``We're on schedule. We're going to comply with
deadlines.'' Now, the ox is in the ditch and we're behind the
curve, so tell us what you need.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN Y. MINETA, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ACCOMPANIED BY:
MICHAEL P. JACKSON, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, AND ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY,
ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION FOR
SECURITY
Secretary Mineta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing. And good morning to you, Mr. Chairman, as
well as Senator McCain and all the members of the Committee.
With me today is Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson and
Acting Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, James M.
Loy. Today Jim Loy makes his first appearance before the Senate
as acting head of the Transportation Security Administration,
which everyone has come to know as TSA. I know that you have
had the pleasure of working with Jim in his previous position
as Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. He is an
outstanding manager with impeccable credentials in security,
intelligence, law enforcement, and customer service. He has
deep operational skills and leadership focus. This is his first
week as acting undersecretary, so I would ask that you welcome
him to this large task.
This testimony is an opportunity to provide a status report
on our work, to build the TSA and to meet the vital objectives
that Congress set out for this new agency some eight months
ago. TSA's every step has appropriately been the focus of
intense scrutiny.
Now, there is a great deal of concern expressed in various
quarters about the difficulty of federalizing security at the
nation's 429 commercial airports. Some are urging Congress to
revise its mandated deadlines, which were spelled out in detail
last fall in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
legislation. Others seek earmarks or payments of non-federal
security costs that distract from TSA's core missions.
The Department of Transportation willingly took on the
responsibility to implement that law and its ambitious time
tables. I recruited a superb team that has met literally every
single one of the many tough congressional deadlines to this
point, tasks that in normal times would have been the work of
years of preparation. We have made tremendous progress, but
there is much more to accomplish.
Now, my full text of prepared remarks summarizes details of
how we are standing up the TSA to meet the mandates set by
Congress. We shouldered this task with enthusiasm for an
important reason. We are at war against remorseless,
determined, well-trained terrorists who seek to attack and
seriously damage our nation and our people. Without doubt, this
threat has not abated. Just the opposite. The threat is real.
The war is real.
So the questions that we meet here today to discuss are
profoundly important. President Bush has rightly urged the
American people to return to life as normal. He has encouraged
us to vacation with our loved ones, to conduct business as
usual, not to be covered by the evil ones. But make no mistake,
the TSA employees we are recruiting and training nationwide are
front-line troops in the war against terrorism.
Unlike the military troops that our nation sent to meet
this challenge abroad, at home we began TSA's deployment with a
blank slate and a clear command, ``Get the job done, and do it
this year. No excuses.'' And again, we accepted that mandate
willingly, because I am briefed and read the intelligence
reports on a daily basis, and I know that the threat is real.
Today, I will discuss TSA's challenges, seek your counsel,
report to you what we're doing, and tell you what's working and
what needs improving. The entire Department of Transportation
has been focused relentlessly on meeting the ambitious
deadlines and important mission established by Congress for the
Transportation Security Administration. We have made tremendous
progress, and we now have private-sector partners at work with
us at over 300 airports.
But the delay in approving emergency funding, the fact that
the President's emergency request has been cut by one third,
and the numerous new restrictions imposed on TSA have
dramatically undermined our ability to meet this goal. And let
me explain why.
Four months ago, President Bush asked Congress to approved
a $4.4 billion emergency supplemental to stand up this new
agency. Now, I recognize that's a lot of money, but that should
not be surprising, because the mandates set out in the ATSA
legislation are ambitious. And we set out to work in good
faith, launching the massive effort required to meet the
statutory plan, and we waited for the funding through May and
June and now July. In the meantime, TSA borrowed money,
renegotiated payment schedules with our vendors, deferred
purchase of explosive-detection equipment, and set back the
pilot testing of various security measures. Now TSA is
literally days away from running out of money to pay for the
ongoing work of screeners nationwide.
Now, we expected active congressional oversight, but we
also needed Congress' support to fund TSA and to do it in a
timely manner. The Administration's emergency supplemental
request was the amount that we needed to do the job--no more,
no less. Yesterday, Congress voted to cut $1 billion from the
$4.4 billion requested by President Bush, and then to impose
new restrictions on our ability to get the job done.
Here are the five facts about the emergency-supplemental
conference report. First, it eliminated $550 million right off
the top. Second, it places $480 million in a so-called
contingency fund that may not be available to TSA. Third, it
imposes $445 million in numerous earmarks not requested, nor
supported, by the Administration. Fourth, it limits the total
number of full-time TSA employees to 45,000, at least 20,000
employees short of what TSA needs to meet its statutory
mission. And, finally, report language severely restricts our
discretionary authority to manage TSA expenses in a cost-
effective manner. In short, TSA's budget was cut by at least $1
billion, and possibly up to $1.5 billion, and this is a
whopping 34 percent cut from the President's request.
Now, here's the dilemma that Congress has created. Congress
has not changed TSA's mission, the budget to do the job has
been radically diminished while new restrictions and mandates
are being imposed. There are a number of voices in Congress
calling for more resources or less, maintaining current law or
seeking flexibility and change in the present law.
What can be done? The amount of money Congress has approved
simply will not support the mandates and the timetables for
aviation security that Congress set last fall for TSA. Less
money with no flexibility means fewer TSA employees, less
equipment, longer lines at the airports, delays in reducing the
hassle factor at airports, and/or diminished security at our
nation's airports. These conflicting signals have forced us to
regroup and revise the TSA business plan. And to complete that
task will probably take several more weeks. It will involve
complex negotiations with our contractors and vendors and a
review of literally thousands of TSA commitments and plans.
We need adequate funds now to continue fighting the war on
terrorism and protecting the homeland. After the TSA
reevaluates and revises its business plan to reflect the impact
of the supplemental funding level, the Administration will
propose a significant budget amendment for fiscal year 2003 for
TSA. And even if approved, we are still confronted, however,
with a load that TSA cannot lift. Such funds will not arrive
prior to our having to make immediate changes to our existing
deployment schedule. Congress has given us a strict and
inflexible mandate and insufficient funds to meet it.
Now, I want to reiterate that we are not asking for a free
pass from rigorous oversight or criticism. That is expected.
Nor am I telling you that everything is perfect. Everything is
not tidy, but it is unreasonable to expect, from a massive
standup, the same type of certainty and stability that is
usually found in long-established programs.
I have been blunt today about the dilemma that TSA now
faces, but the circumstances demand no less. I know how
difficult your job is, and I understand the competing pressures
all of you face in making sound public policy. And, as a former
member, I come before you as one who loves this great
institution, the Congress of the United States. I am a lifelong
Democrat proudly serving an outstanding Republican President.
I close with this simple message. There are literally
thousands of committed TSA employees working furiously to
improve transportation security. Please support them in their
mission. Restore the money and allow us the discretion to
complete our work effectively. Give us the tools and the
flexibility that we need to build this young organization. We
will then be able to hand off to a new Department of Homeland
Security, led by a Cabinet colleague, who, like me, will
continue to work with you to strengthen the Transportation
Security Administration.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to submit my full
statement for the record.
The Chairman. It'll be included in the record.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Mineta follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of
Transportation, accompanied by: Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary,
Department of Transportation, and Admiral James M. Loy, Acting Under
Secretary of Transportation for Security
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and Members of the
Committee. With me today are Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson and
Acting Under Secretary James Loy.
Today Jim Loy makes his first appearance before the Senate as the
Acting head of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). I know
that you have had the pleasure of working with Jim in his previous
position as Commandant of the Coast Guard. He is an outstanding
manager, with impeccable credentials in security, intelligence, law
enforcement and customer service. He has deep operational skills and
leadership focus. This is his first week as Acting Under Secretary so I
would ask that you welcome him to this large task.
This testimony is an opportunity to provide a status report on our
work to build the TSA and meet the vital objectives that Congress set
out for this new agency just over eight months ago. TSA's every step
has, appropriately, been the focus of intense scrutiny.
There is a great deal of concern expressed in various quarters
about the difficulty of federalizing security at the nation's
commercial airports. Some are urging Congress to revise its mandated
deadlines, which were spelled out in detail last Fall in the TSA
legislation. Others seek earmarks or payments of non-federal security
costs that distract from TSA's core mission.
The Department of Transportation willingly took on the
responsibility to implement that law and its ambitious timetables. I
recruited a superb team that has met literally every single one of the
many tough Congressional deadlines to this point--tasks that in normal
times would have been the work of years of preparation. We have made
tremendous progress. There is much more to accomplish.
We shouldered this task with enthusiasm for an important reason: we
are at war against determined, well-trained terrorists who seek to
attack and seriously damage our nation and its people. Without doubt,
this threat has not abated. Just the opposite. The threat is real; the
war is real. So the questions we meet here today to discuss are
profoundly important.
President Bush has rightly urged the American people to return to
life as normal. He has encouraged us to vacation with our loved ones to
conduct business as usual, not to be cowered by the evil ones. But make
no mistake, the TSA employees we are recruiting and training nationwide
are frontline troops in the war against terrorism.
Unlike the military troops that our nation sent to meet this
challenge abroad, at home we began TSA's deployment with a blank slate
and a clear command: get the job done, and do it this year. No excuses.
Again, we accepted that mandate willingly, because I have read the
intelligence reports, I know the threat is very real.
Today I will discuss TSA's challenges, seek your counsel, report to
you on what is working, and tell you what needs improving. The entire
DOT has been focused relentlessly on meeting the ambitious deadlines
and important mission established by Congress for TSA. We have made
tremendous progress and we now have private sector partners at work
with us at over 300 airports.
But the delay in approving emergency funding, the fact that the
President's emergency request has been cut by one-third and the
numerous new restrictions imposed on TSA have dramatically undermined
our ability to meet this goal.
Let me explain why. Four months ago, President Bush asked Congress
to approve a $4.4 billion Emergency Supplemental to stand up this new
agency. That is a lot of money, but that should not be surprising
because the mandates set out in the TSA legislation are ambitious.
We set to work in good faith, launching the massive effort required
to meet the statutory plan. We waited for the funding through May,
June, and now July.
In the meantime, TSA borrowed money, renegotiated payment schedules
with our vendors, deferred purchase of explosive detection equipment,
and set back the pilot testing of various security measures. Now TSA is
literally days away from running out of money to pay for the ongoing
work of screeners nationwide. We expected active Congressional
oversight, but we also needed your support to fund TSA, and to do it in
a timely manner.
The Administration's Emergency Supplemental request was the amount
we needed to do the job. No more, no less. Yesterday, Congress voted to
cut $1 billion from the $4.4 billion requested by President Bush and to
impose new restrictions on our ability to get the job done. Here are
five facts about the Emergency Supplemental Conference report:
First, it eliminates $550 million off the top;
Second, it sets aside $480 million in a so-called
contingency fund that may not be available to TSA;
Third, it imposes $445 million in numerous earmarks not
requested or supported by the Administration;
Fourth, it limits the total number of full-time TSA
employees to 45,000--at least 20,000 employees short of what
TSA needs to meet its statutory mission; and
Finally, report language severely restricts my
discretionary authority to manage TSA expenses in a cost-
effective manner.
In short: TSA's budget was cut by at least $1 billion, possibly up
to $1.5 billion. That is a whopping 34 percent cut from the President's
request.
Here is the dilemma Congress has created. You have not yet changed
TSA's mission, yet the budget to do the job has been radically
diminished while new restrictions and mandates are being imposed. There
are a number of voices in Congress calling for more resources, or less;
maintaining current law, or seeking flexibility in the law.
What can be done? The amount of money Congress has approved simply
will not support the mandates and timetables for aviation security that
Congress set last Fall for TSA.
Less money with no flexibility means fewer TSA employees, less
equipment, longer lines, delay in reducing the hassle factor at
airports, and/or diminished security at our nation's airports. Frankly
these conflicting signals sent by Congress have forced us to regroup
and revise the TSA business plan. That will likely take several more
weeks. It will involve complex negotiations, and a review of literally
thousands of TSA commitments and plans.
We need adequate funds now to continue fighting the war on
terrorism and protecting the homeland. After the TSA reevaluates and
revises its business plan to reflect the impact of the supplemental
funding level, the Administration will propose a significant budget
amendment for FY 2003 for TSA. Even if approved, however, we are
confronted with a load TSA cannot lift. Such funds will not arrive
prior to our having to make immediate changes to our existing
deployment schedule.
Congress has given us a strict and inflexible mandate, and
insufficient funds to meet it.
TSA was poised for achieving tremendous success. We are managing
two massive roles simultaneously. First, in February, we assumed
responsibility for the contract screeners formerly employed by the
airlines. We integrated over 1,000 FAA security employees into the new
TSA organization. In the short term, TSA has significantly strengthened
these existing security systems with new tools and techniques. TSA is,
in other words, maintaining and improving the existing security system
while we systematically disassemble it.
Second, we are building from scratch an entirely new transportation
security organization to support core security tasks at 429 airports
nationwide. Today we are eight months into implementation, four months
from the one-year deadline for full Federal staffing of checkpoints,
and a little over five months from the deadline for installation of
explosive detection systems. My message to the DOT team has been
consistent and clear: we will do what it takes to meet all the
deadlines Congress set in the Act.
We have set up an unprecedented public-private partnership that is
supported by comprehensive services from three major contractors each
of whom is required contractually to complete their work by the
statutory deadlines--provided we have enough money to pay them. You are
going to hear from some of these colleagues later today. Our airport
rollout began in earnest within the last month with these firms being
deployed nationwide.
Screener hiring. We have contracted with NCS Pearson to recruit,
assess and hire about 55,000 passenger and baggage screeners at 429
airports. By the end of this week, we will have posted job vacancy
announcements for every airport in the country, and will soon receive
our one-millionth inquiry for employment with TSA. We have received
more than half a million applications, and completed the hiring process
for more than 6,500 screeners so far. By mid-August, we planned to be
hiring over 4,000 new screeners per week.
Screener training. We have developed a world-class training program
with the assistance of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and
leaders from the private sector. This program, which includes 40 hours
of classroom training and 60 hours of on-the-job training, is being
delivered by instructors from Lockheed Martin for passenger screeners,
and by Boeing for baggage screeners. We have ramped up to train more
than 5,000 screeners per week.
Overall project coordination and checkpoint re-design. Lockheed
Martin will upgrade screening checkpoints based on the model we tested
successfully at Pier C at BWI, a model that significantly decreases
wait times and prevents costly terminal evacuations. Lockheed is
already in place in about 250 airports. Their team has built a
sophisticated, automated system to track over 185,000 discreet tasks at
the 429 airports.
EDS installation. Boeing engineers are assessing airport facilities
submitting design plans, and will soon undertake needed construction.
As you have heard from your airport constituents, many of these
projects are complex, though absolutely necessary to meet the
requirements of the law. Boeing is already at work in about 150
airports. With this deployment, we are also implementing a four-part
plan to reduce the hassle factor of airport travel. It includes steps
to end gate screening, and new tools to identify selectees more
intelligently.
I am confident that, with funding, these plans would have enabled
us to complete the job you gave us. Now much of the program I've just
described will have to be thoroughly reevaluated in the next few weeks.
I want to reiterate that we are not asking for a free pass from
rigorous oversight or criticism--that is expected. Nor am I telling you
that everything is perfect. Everything is not tidy, but it is
unreasonable to expect from a massive stand-up the same type of
certainty and stability found in long-established programs.
I have been blunt today about the dilemma TSA now faces but the
circumstances demand no less. I know how difficult your job is, and
understand the competing pressures each of you faces in making sound
policy.
As a former Member, I come before you as one who loves this great
institution--the Congress of the United States. I am a lifelong
Democrat proudly serving an outstanding Republican President.
I close with a simple message. There are literally thousands of
committed TSA employees working furiously to improve transportation
security. Please support them and their mission.
Restore the money and allow us the discretion to complete our
security work effectively. Give me the tools and flexibility we need to
build this young organization. We will then be able to hand it off to a
new Homeland Security Department, led by a Cabinet colleague who, like
me, will continue to work with you to strengthen TSA.
The Chairman. We thank you and----
Secretary Mineta. And I'm happy to respond to your
questions.
The Chairman. Good.
Secretary Jackson, do you have a statement?
Mr. Jackson. No, sir, I do not.
The Chairman. How about Secretary Loy?
Admiral Loy. No, sir, I do not.
The Chairman. And--all right. I'm trying to find--since we
say that it's whatever it takes----
What about Dr. Dillingham? He doesn't have any statement
right now.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Whatever it takes--we want to get on and get
this $1 billion shy that you're talking about, Mr. Secretary,
and I'm trying to find out from this staff behind me--by gosh,
they have 480 and all of these other darn figures--are you
telling the truth on--or, to put it more politely, are you
accurate or inaccurate on this thing? Because you asked for
4.4, and the actual figure was 4.95 that the Transportation
Committee approved as of yesterday. We don't want to get along
with this here flexibility.
You haven't justified flexibility. We find needs at the
airport. We're--other needs and everything else. So this
Committee is not going along with flexibility. If you justify a
request, we're going to give it to you. But we're not going
along with this nebulous--just tell us what you need. That's
what I want to know. And have you got the figures now, or not?
Staff Member: I do.
The Chairman. What?
Staff Member: They got $3.85 billion.
The Chairman. You got $3.85 billion. Go ahead.
That's right. That cut was from the request by Mitch
Daniels. I suggest you talk to the OMB crowd.
Secretary Mineta. Well, with all due respect, Mr.
Chairman----
The Chairman. Yeah?
Secretary Mineta.--Mr. Daniels doesn't vote on these
numbers. It's the Congress. And----
The Chairman. Well, he carries--if you've been in the
Congress, for lord's sakes, don't give us that stuff. He says
the President's going to veto it unless you cut it. You know
good and well how these markups in conferences work. You've
been in the Congress--don't tell me he doesn't vote. He's got
the best vote at the table. He's got the President's vote.
So that was cut. And then they put in 445 earmarked funds
all for security, so that was--1 billion. But you put in the
480 contingency, so you--you want to still contend that you are
a billion shy. Is that correct?
Secretary Mineta. Yes, sir. Again, the $480 million
contingency is not available to us unless the President
exercises the $5.1 billion total contingency fund. So, to me--
I'm not going to count the $480 million. You know, it's like
what little I have at home to spend. And if it ain't there, I
can't spend it.
And so, again, in terms of trying to be responsible in our
stewardship of public funds, I cannot commit on the $480
million and even if I do, the $480 million will still not
handle the $445 million in earmarks that are in the
appropriations bill.
The Chairman. Well, let's say you've got 4.95. That's what
the Transportation Committee----
Secretary Mineta. No, sir.
The Chairman.--marked up. And you need 5.95? Is that what
you're----
Secretary Mineta. The 4.95, I believe, might have been what
was done yesterday.
The Chairman. Right.
Secretary Mineta. It's the fiscal year 2003 appropriations
level, not the fiscal year 2002 supplemental number.
The Chairman. So the 2002 supplemental needs how much
money?
Secretary Mineta. Four-point-four billion is what we
requested.
The Chairman. Well, how much more than--actually, the
President's going to sign the supplemental today. We passed it
yesterday. So how much more do you need? That supplemental
provides--how much did it provide?
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman.--3.85.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Yeah?
Senator Stevens. But he has 30 days to sign the declaration
of emergency. The money's not available until he signs----
The Chairman. Well, I'm just trying to find out for the
Committee just how much we've got to get for him. I mean, the
gentleman says he's been cut.
Secretary Mineta. But, again, Mr. Chairman, the 3.895
figure is the 4.4 billion figure, less the $550 million that
the Committee took off the top. And then they, as I say,
earmarked an additional $445 million, and the $445 million is
still taken from what we needed from TSA other things. We did
not ask for the $445 million in earmarks.
As an example, the $231 million for airport security or the
$125 million in port security funds, and there are a number of
other items. Those are important items, but they're--it takes
away from the $4.4 billion that we had requested originally
that were earmarked for things to make sure that we were going
to be able to comply with the November 19th date and the
December 31 date.
The Chairman. Let me yield to Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, could I ask, did Dr.
Dillingham have an opening statement? Doctor, did you have an
opening statement?
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, could we----
The Chairman. Go right ahead. I thought you all came up as
assistants to the Secretary. I'm trying to move the hearing
along. Let's hear you.
[Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Dr. Dillingham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
and Members of the Committee.
I'm pleased to be here this morning to provide testimony on
behalf of the General Accounting Office. My testimony is based
on our aviation security work that took place prior to and
immediately following 9/11 and our ongoing work for this
Committee.
I will be focusing on three areas. First, what has been
accomplished since 9/11? Second, what remains to be done to
strengthen transportation security? And, third, the challenges
and opportunities that TSA faces as we move forward.
Before offering my observations, I want to begin by
acknowledging the tremendous task that TSA and its employees
faced. Within a year, they would have to go from being
nonexistent to a fully functioning agency with tens of
thousands of employees charged with protecting the security of
the American traveling public. To accomplish all this in the
mandated time frames is an unprecedented undertaking. While
there certainly have been frustrations, the efforts of the DOT
TSA team are commendable.
Secretary Mineta has just referred to some of the TSA
accomplishments. We certainly agree that TSA has made progress
in meeting some of the deadlines mandated by the act to improve
security. It is also the case that TSA's initial difficulties
in hiring and training passenger screeners and providing for
the screening of checked bags with explosive-detection
equipment could make it extremely difficult to meet two key
deadlines by the end of the year.
TSA's experience with hiring passenger screeners at
Baltimore-Washington International Airport may be a preview of
things to come. In that case, not as many people showed up for
the job as was expected. Only about a third of the applicants
who had passed the initial screening and who were scheduled for
pre-hiring assessments reported for that assessment. And of
those who reported, only about a third passed the assessment.
As it currently stands, TSA will need to hire and train about
7,600 screeners per month to staff the commercial airports with
federal employees by the November 19th deadline.
In addition, assuming that enough EDS equipment can be
manufactured, purchased, and deployed to the airports, hiring
and training the estimated 20- to 30,000 checked baggage
screeners before the December 31st deadline may be very
difficult.
In the area of what remains to be done, perhaps the most
critical is the enhancement of systems for gathering,
processing, and using intelligence information. This will
require TSA to work with other agencies to identify potential
threats before they reach the airport, before they reach the
screener checkpoints, and certainly before they board aircraft.
Another critical security vulnerability is the cargo
carried by passenger aircraft. Twenty-two percent of all cargo
loaded in the United States in the year 2000 was carried by
passenger flights. Following Senator Hutchison, logic suggests
that there is little point to carefully screening every piece
of luggage if the cargo placed aboard the same flight is not
inspected.
General aviation has also been identified as a potential
threat area. General aviation includes more than 200,000 small,
privately owned planes, which are located in every state at
almost 18,000 airports. There are only a few new guidelines
related to general aviation. This leaves general aviation far
more open and potentially vulnerable than the commercial
sector.
Additionally, the undersecretary has discretion with regard
to such matters as how to further secure the cockpit, including
whether commercial pilots should be armed. These are now
subjects of pending legislation.
In the longer term, TSA's challenges include meeting the
responsibility for all modes of transportation and addressing
some government-wide challenges. And although TSA is
responsible for security in all modes of transportation, it has
initially focused primarily on strengthening certain aspects of
the aviation security system. And because of the push to meet
critical aviation security deadlines, TSA has not yet assumed
full responsibility for the security of other modes of
transportation.
TSA also has an opportunity to set a government-wide
standard by establishing an organizational culture where the
focus is on performance at every turn. The act requires the
undersecretary to establish a results-based management system
that sets measurable goals and standards. Ultimately, by
measuring performance in such a way, the undersecretary would
be able to quickly spot any problems TSA would have in carrying
out its mission. This would reduce the chance that terrorists
could exploit weaknesses at any point in the system.
Mr. Chairman, in the final analysis, if the question were
asked today, ``Is air travel more secure than it was on 9/11?''
I would answer yes, with a ``but.'' The fundamental long-term
challenge is when this Committee holds future hearings on the
subject. We hope that the answer to the question would be a
simple and emphatic yes, with no ifs, ands, or buts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dillingham follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical
Infrastructure Issues, General Accounting Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Nearly a year has passed since the terrorist attacks of September
11 turned commercial aircraft into missiles, killing thousands of
people, destroying billions of dollars' worth of property, and
realigning our national priorities. With these attacks, the safety and
security of the nation's civil aviation system assumed greater
importance, and efforts to strengthen the system were the subject of
much congressional attention. Through dozens of reports and testimonies
published since the early 1990s (see app. I), we have contributed to
the national discussion on aviation security and to the reforms enacted
last November in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (the
act).\1\ Among these reforms was the creation of the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), which was assigned responsibility for
security in aviation and other modes of transportation. The act also
set forth deadlines by which TSA was to implement specific improvements
to aviation security.
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\1\ P.L. 107-71, November 19, 2001.
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We are pleased to be here today to discuss TSA's progress in
enhancing aviation security and in implementing the act's provisions
for addressing security weaknesses in aviation and other modes of
transportation. Our testimony, which is based on our prior work as well
as our ongoing work for this Committee, includes observations about (1)
what TSA has done since September 11 to strengthen aviation security,
(2) what immediate challenges TSA faces to strengthen transportation
security, and (3) what longer-term challenges TSA can anticipate as it
organizes itself to enhance security in all modes of transportation.
In summary:
Since September 11, TSA has assumed responsibility for
aviation security and focused on meeting congressionally
mandated deadlines for strengthening aviation security. TSA's
accomplishments to date include developing plans and
implementing procedures for using federal workers to conduct
security screening at 429 commercial airports; hiring and
beginning to train almost 4,000 key security personnel; and
implementing more rigorous background checks of employees with
access to secure areas of airports. TSA faces an extraordinary
challenge in hiring and training 33,000 federal workers to
conduct passenger security screening by November 19. As of July
13, TSA had hired only 2,475. In addition, deploying explosive
detection systems to screen all checked bags by December 31
poses major challenges. Of approximately 1,100 explosive
detection systems and 6,000 explosive trace detection machines
TSA plans to purchase and deploy at 429 airports, only 200
explosive detection systems and 200 trace detection machines
were in use at 56 airports as of June 12, 2002. It is currently
uncertain whether, by December 31, TSA can purchase the
remaining equipment and hire enough staff to operate and
maintain the equipment, whether airports can complete and pay
for any modifications required to install the equipment, and
whether the equipment will operate as intended.
TSA faces immediate challenges in assuming responsibility
for security in other transportation modes, in improving
screeners' performance, and in addressing aviation security
issues not covered by the act's current-year deadlines. First,
while TSA has begun to coordinate and cooperate with DOT's
modal administrations and with other federal agencies, most of
the work with these agencies lies ahead. Second, other aviation
security challenges facing TSA include improving screeners'
ability to detect weapons and explosives and to conduct
screening in accordance with federal requirements. Recent TSA
tests showed, for example, that screeners at 32 of the nation's
largest airports failed to detect fake weapons and explosives
in almost a quarter of the tests, and observations by the DOT
Inspector General found that contract screeners were not
consistently following federal screening requirements. While
newly hired federal screeners are being trained to follow these
requirements, contract screeners are still conducting screening
at most U.S. airports and have not received upgraded training.
Third, other actions are required or have been proposed: for
example, the act requires TSA to improve cargo security, and
proposed legislation would require TSA to authorize the arming
of pilots.
TSA faces several longer-term challenges as it organizes
itself to protect the nation's transportation system. These
challenges include strategically managing the workforce,
controlling costs, and sharing threat information. TSA is
charged with creating a federal screener workforce to replace a
private workforce that had been plagued by performance and
retention problems. In addition, long-term attention to strong
systems and controls for acquisition and related business
processes will be critical both to ensuring TSA's success and
to maintaining its integrity and accountability. Such attention
includes establishing cost control mechanisms and monitoring
contractors' performance with respect to cost, schedule, and
quality. This is particularly important because of TSA's large
acquisition and personnel needs. Finally, the agency depends on
access to timely, accurate information about threats, but
information sharing among agencies that gather and maintain
such information has been hampered by organizational cultures
that make agencies reluctant to share sensitive information and
by outdated, incompatible computer systems.
Background
The task of securing the nation's aviation system is unquestionably
daunting. The enormous size of U.S. airspace defies easy protection.
Furthermore, given this country's hundreds of commercial airports,
thousands of planes, and tens of thousands of daily flights, as well as
the seemingly limitless means terrorists or criminals can devise to
attack the system, aviation security must be enforced on numerous
fronts. Safeguarding airplanes and passengers requires, at the least,
ensuring that perpetrators are kept from breaching security checkpoints
and gaining access to aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), which was responsible for aviation security before TSA was
created, developed several mechanisms to prevent criminal attacks on
aircraft, such as adopting technology to detect explosives and matching
boarding passes to identification cards at the gate to ensure that
passengers are positively identified before boarding a flight.
Despite the development of these preventative measures, we and
others often demonstrated that significant, long-standing aviation
security vulnerabilities existed. These vulnerabilities included
inadequate controls for limiting access to secure areas at airports,
failure to detect threats when screening passengers and their carry-on
bags before they board aircraft, and the absence of any requirement to
screen checked baggage on domestic flights. As we reported in May
2000,\2\ our special agents used counterfeit law enforcement badges and
credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports, bypassing
security checkpoints and walking unescorted to aircraft departure
gates. The agents, who had been issued tickets and boarding passes,
could have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto
aircraft. In addition, FAA's tests of screeners found that their
abilities to detect test threat objects located on passengers or
contained in their carry-on luggage declined during the 1980s and
1990s, and this problem persists today.
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\2\ See U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-OSI-0010, Security:
Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (Washington, D.C.: May 25,
2002).
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Over the years, plans were developed to address some of these
vulnerabilities, but they were not implemented promptly or at all. For
example, the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 authorized a
certification program that would have established performance,
training, and equipment standards for screening companies, but FAA
never issued final regulations for the program. In addition, many
initiatives were not linked to specific deadlines, making it more
difficult to monitor and oversee their implementation.
On November 19, 2001, the Congress passed the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, which created TSA within the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring
security in all modes of transportation. The act also shifted
responsibility for the security screening of air passengers and their
baggage from the airlines to the federal government, making TSA
responsible for overseeing screeners. Finally, the act established a
series of requirements for the new agency with mandated deadlines (see
app. II), the most important of which are:
to deploy federal screeners at 429 commercial airports
across the nation by November 19, 2002, and
to have explosive detection systems in place at these
airports for screening every piece of checked baggage for
explosives not later than December 31, 2002.
Recent proposals would move TSA to the proposed Department of
Homeland Security.
To help fund its security initiatives, the act authorized air
carriers to collect a fee for passengers of $2.50 per flight segment,
not to exceed $5.00 per one-way trip or $10.00 per round trip. In
addition, the act authorized the Under Secretary of Transportation
Security to impose a fee on air carriers if revenues from the new
security fee were insufficient to meet the needs mandated by the act.
For fiscal year 2002, TSA is seeking a total of $6.8 billion in
appropriated funds--$2.4 billion of which has already been appropriated
and an additional $4.4 billion in supplemental funding.
TSA Has Begun to Address Known Weaknesses in Aviation Security but Is
Having Problems Meeting Key Congressional Deadlines
TSA has begun addressing weaknesses in aviation security but may
encounter problems in meeting key congressional deadlines. In the 10
months since September 11, TSA has focused on meeting congressionally
mandated deadlines for assuming security responsibilities, upgrading
aviation security measures, and reporting to the Congress on its
progress. Among other accomplishments, TSA has assumed responsibility
for overseeing security screening at 429 commercial airports,
established qualifications for federal screeners, developed a plan to
hire and train federal screeners, contracted with companies that screen
passengers, and overseen the implementation of a variety of federally
approved methods to check all bags for explosives. As of July 13, 2002,
TSA had also hired about 4,000 staff, including nearly 2,500 passenger
screeners, 1,034 former employees of FAA, and 529 other staff. These
other staff included federal security directors for airports,
attorneys, program analysts, computer information technology
specialists, personnel specialists, and administrative staff. In
addition, TSA has made significant progress in expanding the federal
air marshals service.\3\ Finally, TSA has worked with airlines to
implement critical interim security measures, such as strengthening
cockpit doors.
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\3\ Because the number of federal air marshals is classified
information, their numbers are not included in the total for employees
hired by TSA.
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However, TSA has encountered problems in responding to the
congressional mandates that it federalize the screener workforce by
November 19, 2002, and provide for screening all checked baggage using
explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002.
Difficulties in Hiring and Training Passenger Screeners Pose Challenges
for TSA
Initial difficulties in hiring and training the passenger screener
workforce will make it challenging for TSA to meet the deadline for
federalizing this workforce. According to TSA's estimates, this effort
will involve hiring and training an estimated 33,000 passenger
screeners so that 429 commercial airports can be staffed with federal
screeners. TSA planned to hire 3,700 passenger screeners and
supervisory screeners during May and projected that it would then need
to hire and train more than 5,000 passenger screeners a month from June
through November. As of July, TSA had hired only 2,475 screeners in
total. Because of delays, the DOT Inspector General now estimates that
TSA will need to hire 7,600 passenger screeners each month to meet the
deadline.
TSA Faces Difficulties in Meeting Baggage Screening Deadline
TSA faces several challenges in trying to provide for screening 100
percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems by the end
of calendar year 2002. To accomplish this mandate, TSA plans to
purchase and deploy an estimated 1,100 bulk explosive detection systems
(EDS) and 6,000 explosive trace detection machines (trace devices). The
installation of the large EDS equipment may require significant
modifications to airports. As of June 12, 2002, 200 EDS and 200 trace
devices were being used at 56 airports to screen checked baggage. To
expedite installations at other airports, TSA has hired the Boeing
Service Company to (1) conduct site assessments at over 400 airports,
(2) submit proposals to TSA on what equipment each airport will have
and where that equipment will be installed, (3) modify facilities to
accommodate this equipment, (4) install and make the equipment
operational, (5) maintain the equipment, and (6) train approximately
30,000 screeners to operate the equipment. Given the magnitude of this
task, it is unclear whether enough bulk EDS machines can be
manufactured, deployed, and operationally tested and whether enough
staff can be hired and trained to use the bulk EDS and trace devices by
the deadline. Finally, the performance of the existing technologies for
detecting explosives has been less than optimal: for example, the
machines frequently sound false alarms. Furthermore, TSA's decision to
deploy a combination of bulk EDS and trace devices could have long-term
budgetary implications. Although funding is available for airports to
purchase the equipment, no specific funding has been provided for
airport modifications. These modifications are expected to cost
millions of dollars at some major airports. In addition, TSA's plan to
install bulk EDS in airport lobbies first and then to move them to the
baggage handling areas at certain airports will involve additional
costs. It is unclear how much this relocation will cost or who will pay
for it. Furthermore, the initial procurement costs may quickly be
overshadowed by the costs of the personnel needed to operate the
equipment, which might exceed $1.6 billion each year.
Given the cost of procuring, installing, and operating bulk EDS and
trace devices to examine all checked baggage, some security experts and
academicians have suggested that an alternative be considered. These
individuals advocate adopting a risk-based approach that would match
resources to risk levels by establishing a screening process that
begins with passengers and concludes with baggage. First, with the use
of computer-assisted passenger screening,\4\ they believe that
passengers could be sorted into different risk groups, such as those
who might represent a threat, those about whom little is known, and
those about whom enough is known to make them low risk. Second,
baggage-screening resources could be targeted according to risk. The
passengers who might represent a threat, for instance, could be
personally screened, and all available tools (such as explosive
detection equipment and manual searches) could be used to ensure that
no explosives were present in their checked baggage. The stated
advantage of such an approach is that fewer expensive bulk EDS may be
needed and the costs may be lower than TSA is projecting. In addition,
advocates believe that more cost-effective decisions can be made to
replace equipment as newer technologies become available. Conversely,
concerns have been raised by TSA and others that the suggested approach
increases the risk of not detecting explosives because, for the first
level of screening, it uses technology that can screen large numbers of
passenger bags quickly but may be less effective in detecting
explosives.
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\4\ Computer-assisted passenger screening is an automated procedure
that reviews data in airline passenger records to identify passengers
who might present a risk.
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Many Immediate Challenges Remain to Improve Transportation Security
Many immediate challenges remain for TSA to improve both the
security of other modes of transportation and to strengthen aviation
security in areas not covered by specific deadlines. TSA has not yet
assumed full responsibility for the security of other modes of
transportation, such as highways, railroads, mass transit, ports, and
pipelines; however, it has established a number of functions to
collaborate and communicate with the DOT agencies responsible for these
other modes, as well as with other government agencies. For example,
TSA officials told us that the agency has created a broad memorandum of
understanding with the U.S. Coast Guard that will serve as a template
for such agreements between TSA and other agencies, including the
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). In addition, other DOT modal agencies have various
initiatives under way to improve security during this transition
period. FTA has, for example, launched a multipart initiative to assess
the security of over 30 transit agencies, provide free emergency
preparedness and security training for transit agency personnel and
first responders, and make grants available for organizing and
conducting emergency response drills. Similarly, the U.S. Coast Guard
has acted as a focal point for assessing and addressing security
concerns for the nation's ports.
Other challenges also confront TSA as it attempts to strengthen
aviation security. Passenger screeners still fail to detect weapons and
other threat objects (e.g., knives, scissors, and sharp objects) at
unacceptable rates, and enhanced screening procedures are unevenly
applied among airports. In November 2001, staff from the DOT Inspector
General's office observed private contractors carry out screening at 58
security checkpoints and concluded that they were not consistently and
uniformly following FAA's screening requirements. For example, in some
cases screeners were not checking passengers' identification against
their boarding passes, were not adequately screening carry-on bags for
threat objects, and were not performing continuous random secondary
screening measures, such as manually searching carry-on items or using
wands to screen passengers. Recent TSA testing found that screeners at
32 of the nation's largest airports failed to detect fake weapons
(guns, dynamite, or bombs) in almost a quarter of the undercover tests
at screening checkpoints. Since TSA took over aviation security
responsibilities on February 17, 2002, discoveries of guns, knives, and
other potential weapons on passengers who had passed security
checkpoints have prompted evacuations at 124 airports and resulted in
631 flights being called back to terminals so that passengers could be
searched again.
Furthermore, the enhanced security procedures have contributed to
longer waits and congestion at airport terminals. TSA's goal is to
process passengers through security in 10 minutes or less, but airlines
have reported significantly longer waits during peak times at a number
of the nation's major airports. These conditions can discourage air
travel and adversely affect the travel industry.
Finally, the challenge of identifying and removing airport workers
who cannot meet new requirements for background checks continues. Last
October FAA ordered background checks on an estimated 750,000 airport
and airline employees with access to secured areas of airports. By
April 28, 2002, federal law enforcement officials had arrested or
indicted more than 450 workers at 15 airports for being in the United
States illegally or using phony social security numbers. These workers,
who were employed by private companies that clean airplanes, operate
airport restaurants, and provide other airport services, had security
badges giving them access to planes, ramps, runways, and cargo areas.
Completing these background checks will enhance aviation security.
Some other immediate challenges, such as the security of cargo and
general aviation, were discussed in the act itself, and more recent
legislative proposals have raised these and other outstanding aviation
security issues. To address these issues, bills have been introduced to
arm pilots, enhance cargo security, require background checks for all
foreign applicants to U.S. flight schools, prohibit the opening of
cockpit doors during flights, train airline personnel to conduct
passenger identification checks, make it a criminal penalty to
intentionally circumvent airport security, and provide whistleblower
protection for air carrier and airport security workers. (See app. III
for a summary of pending legislation on aviation security.) All of
these are complex and controversial issues. In moving forward, TSA must
work with stakeholders to assess the risks and vulnerabilities of the
various options and carefully weigh both the policy implications and
the implementation strategies required for their success, keeping in
mind the long-term implications of short-term decisions.
To illustrate the challenges and complexities TSA faces in
attempting to strengthen aviation security, we examined some of the
issues raised by proposals to arm pilots; establish a ``trusted
traveler'' program, which would use biometric identifiers to expedite
security checks; and enhance cargo security.
Arming Pilots
Last month, at the request of this Committee's Chairman, we
provided information on, among other things, reasons for and against
arming pilots and questions to be addressed if pilots were to be
armed.\5\
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\5\ Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots (GAO-02-
822R, June 28, 2002).
Proponents of arming pilots cited the potential deterrent
value of firearms, their usefulness as a last line of defense,
and past regulatory precedents, while opponents cited the moral
dilemma pilots would face if they were prohibited from leaving
the cockpit, as they would be by the legislation, when
passengers or crew members were being threatened in the cabin.
Opponents also said that arming pilots would introduce another
10,000 to 100,000 guns into our society, which they believe
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would have negative effects.
Questions to be addressed if pilots were to be armed
included (1) who would regulate and oversee pilots' carriage of
weapons; (2) what qualifications and training pilots would need
to carry weapons; (3) what types of weapons would be carried
and how they would be maintained, stored, and transported; (4)
what aircraft modifications would be required; and (5) how much
it would cost to arm pilots.
Trusted Traveler
TSA has not yet completed its evaluation of the benefits and
disadvantages of a trusted traveler program. Such a program, if
successfully implemented, could reduce airport waits and speed security
checks for passengers who voluntarily submit information about
themselves and undergo background checks. It could also minimize the
economic disruption caused by congestion at the terminal by allowing
airline and TSA staff to focus more attention on lesser known
passengers who could present greater security risks. However, such a
program has the potential to increase the system's vulnerability by
using reduced security measures for some passengers. If terrorists were
to steal the identities of trusted travelers, the consequences could be
particularly dire.
The trusted traveler concept presents many procedural questions
that would need to be answered before a decision could be reached on
implementing the program. Such questions include which passengers would
be eligible to enroll, what information would be collected, how
frequently their status would be updated, what entity would run the
program, and what biometric identifiers would be used to positively
identify the passengers.
Aviation Cargo Security
Both the act and recent legislative proposals have raised the
security of aviation cargo as an issue. The act requires that all cargo
transported in all-cargo aircraft be screened as soon as practicable,
but it is silent on how best to accomplish this screening. TSA has not
announced how it plans to meet this requirement, in part because it has
focused most of its efforts on meeting the deadlines for screening
passenger bags. Two recent legislative proposals (S. 2668 and S. 2656)
call for enhancing aviation cargo security by tightening the security
of the ``known shippers'' system--the major system currently used to
ensure aviation cargo security. The DOT Inspector General and others
have identified gaps in this program, which allows shippers who meet
DOT's requirements to ship their cargo without inspection. The proposed
legislation calls for investigating known shippers more thoroughly to
ensure they are who they say they are, establishing a documentary
``chain of custody'' for all shipments, and inspecting a greater
percentage of cargo than is currently done. These legislative proposals
are intended to address the most difficult problem in ensuring cargo
security--screening the vast amount of cargo without major disruptions
in service--by increasing the level of scrutiny on shippers, middlemen,
and recipients.
TSA Faces Longer-Term Institutional Challenges
TSA faces several longer-term challenges as it organizes itself to
protect the nation's transportation system. These challenges include
strategically managing its workforce, controlling costs, and sharing
threat information.
Strategic Human Capital Management Is Essential for Maximizing TSA's
Performance
A human capital strategy is critical for TSA, which may have a
workforce as large as 70,000. To assist agencies in managing their
human capital more strategically, GAO has developed a model of
strategic human capital management that identifies cornerstones and
related critical success factors that agencies should apply and steps
they can take.\6\ Our model is designed to help agency leaders
effectively lead and manage their people and integrate human capital
considerations into daily decision making and the program results they
seek to achieve. In ongoing work for this Committee, we are reviewing
aspects of TSA's implementation of results-oriented practices, such as
human capital management. Today we would like to share some preliminary
observations on TSA's progress in this area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human
Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA's success in protecting the nation's transportation system
depends in large part on its ability to recruit, train, and retain key
people. Our prior work on aviation security identified problems with
the training and retention of contract screeners. TSA has been charged
with hiring and training a federal screener workforce and has
encountered unexpected difficulty in doing so, especially in large
metropolitan areas. For example, at Baltimore-Washington International
Airport--the first of 429 airports to be staffed with federal passenger
screeners--TSA's hiring of screeners was delayed because high
percentages of applicants did not show up for or did not pass their
prehiring assessment. Only about a third of the qualified applicants
who were contacted to schedule an assessment reported for their
assessment, and of those who reported, only about a third passed. If
TSA experiences similar problems in trying to staff other airports,
then the hiring challenge facing the agency is daunting.
A critical success factor in human capital management is to tailor
human capital approaches to meet organizational needs by using the full
range of tools and flexibilities available to an agency under current
laws and regulations. The act allows TSA to use and modify the
personnel system established by FAA, which is exempt from many federal
personnel provisions. To meet its need for talented resources quickly,
TSA officials told us that they made use of flexibilities such as
temporary hiring authority, on-the-spot hiring authority, and the
authority to use detailees from other agencies and executives on loan
from the private sector. TSA is also basing its compensation system on
FAA's pay banding approach, which allows the agency to hire employees
anywhere within broad pay bands for their positions. For example, the
pay band for screeners ranges from $23,600 to $35,400 (from about $11
to $17 per hour).\7\ Pay banding is one approach that can support a
more direct link between pay and an individual's knowledge, skills, and
performance if an agency's performance management systems can support
this link.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Before TSA assumed responsibility for oversight of screening,
contract screeners' pay was much lower, ranging, for example, from $7
to $10 per hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another critical success factor is linking individual performance
to organizational goals. The act requires TSA to establish a
performance management system and performance agreements, with
organizational and individual goals for employees, managers, and
executives. TSA has made progress in setting up the performance
management system. The agency has drafted but not approved an interim
employee performance management system for the current fiscal year. The
system lays out the processes and procedures for establishing
performance agreements that include organizational and individual goals
and objectives, measuring and monitoring performance, determining
employees' development needs, and appraising and rewarding employees.
Until the interim system is approved, TSA has implemented a temporary
performance agreement for newly hired screeners and supervisory
screeners. The temporary performance agreement contains a general
description of duties and the manner in which the duties should be
performed; it does not include specific individual and organizational
goals. Finalizing a performance management system linked to
organizational goals is critical to motivating and managing staff,
ensuring the quality of screeners' performance, and, ultimately,
restoring public confidence in air travel.
Cost Controls and Contractor Oversight Are Critical for Ensuring TSA's
Success
Federal organizations have a stewardship obligation to acquire
goods and services at reasonable prices; expend federal tax dollars
appropriately; ensure financial accountability to the President,
Congress, and American people; and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
Long-term attention to cost and accountability controls for acquisition
and related business processes will be critical both to ensuring TSA's
success and to maintaining its integrity and accountability. Such
attention includes establishing cost control mechanisms and monitoring
contractors' performance with respect to cost, schedule, and quality.
This is particularly important because of TSA's large acquisition and
personnel needs.
TSA oversees many large-dollar contracts; however, according to the
DOT Inspector General, it could improve its controls over these
contracts, which total $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2002. For example,
TSA initially budgeted $2,500 per screener for background checks but
was able to reduce this estimate to $200 per screener after the
Inspector General expressed concern. This change is projected to save
the agency approximately $95 million in fiscal year 2002 alone.
According to the Inspector General, although TSA has made progress in
addressing certain cost-related issues, it has not established an
infrastructure that provides an effective span of control to monitor
contractors' costs and performance.
Cost controls are also important in establishing employee
compensation levels and controlling salaries. While pay banding can be
used to ensure that salaries are commensurate with position duties, it
should not be used to arbitrarily set salaries higher than comparable
positions in other agencies. For example, TSA is hiring law enforcement
officers from a number of other law enforcement agencies. TSA's
starting salary for most federal air marshals is $36,400, which is
supplemented by a 25 percent law enforcement pay differential that
raises it to $45,500. In contrast, the starting salaries for law
enforcement employees at the Defense Protective Service, the U.S.
Capitol Police, and the Federal Protective Service--where some of the
new federal air marshals previously worked--are capped at $37,000, in
part because they do not include this pay differential.
Further cost reductions due to efficiencies and economies of scale
may be possible if TSA is moved to the proposed Department of Homeland
Security. Costs reductions might be possible by consolidating
administrative, technical, or other types of staff. As a result, TSA
should exercise caution in staffing certain positions, such as creating
its own criminal investigative workforce, when such functions might be
merged with an already existing workforce. For example, under the
President's proposal, Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), which have a combined criminal investigative workforce
of about 5,000, would join TSA in reporting to an Under Secretary for
Border and Transportation Security.
Information Sharing and Coordination Among Agencies Are Crucial for
Threat
Identification and Response
Timely, accurate information about terrorists and the threats they
pose is vital to TSA's mission. Such information is gathered and
maintained by numerous law enforcement and other agencies, including
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), INS, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the State Department. Timely information
sharing among such agencies has been hampered by organizational
cultures that make agencies reluctant to share sensitive information
and by outdated computer systems that lack interoperability. For
example, INS, FBI, and the State Department all need the capacity to
identify aliens in the United States who are in violation of their visa
status, have broken U.S. laws, or are under investigation for criminal
activity, including terrorism. In the immediate aftermath of September
11, it was reported that the computerized database systems of INS and
State were incompatible, making data sharing difficult and cumbersome.
Increased coordination among agencies with responsibilities for
national security is called for in the act, as well as in proposals for
the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security. Specifically,
the act established a transportation security oversight board, which is
responsible for (1) facilitating the coordination of intelligence,
security, and law enforcement activities affecting transportation; (2)
facilitating the sharing of threat information affecting transportation
among federal agencies and with airlines and other transportation
providers; and (3) exploring the technical feasibility of developing a
common database of individuals who may pose a threat to transportation
or national security. The board includes representation from the DOT,
CIA, National Security Council, Attorney General, the Departments of
Defense and Treasury, and the Office of Homeland Security. Similarly,
proposals to create a new Department of Homeland Security include
provisions to share and coordinate intelligence information among many
federal agencies. Moving TSA and agencies with responsibility for
border protection, such as INS, into the proposed Department of
Homeland Security may provide the opportunity for increased information
sharing using state-of-the-art technology to manage threat information.
Closing Observations
Mr. Chairman, it is worth repeating the two central issues
confronting TSA as it strives to improve aviation security: it must
meet mandated deadlines and demonstrate results swiftly while it
creates a federal agency whose plans, policies, and procedures
generally ensure long-term success. Achieving either goal would be
challenge enough; to accomplish both simultaneously requires truly
extraordinary efforts. Carefully considering how it strategically
manages its large workforce, controls costs, and coordinates with other
agencies to share threat information will help it meet its mission both
now and in the future.
This concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer
any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have.
______
Appendix I
Selected GAO Reports and Testimonies on Aviation Security
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial
Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection
Equipment. GAO-02-713C. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002.
(CLASSIFIED)
Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation's Air
Transportation System. GAO-01-1164T. Washington, D.C.: September
26, 2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)
Aviation Security: Information on the Nation's Air Transportation
System Vulnerabilities. GAO-01-1174T. Washington, D.C.: September
26, 2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:
September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington,
D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20,
2001.
Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access
Security Improvements. GAO-01-1069R. Washington, D.C.: August 31,
2001.
Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access
Security Improvements. GAO-01-1068R. Washington, D.C.: August 31,
2001. (RESTRICTED)
FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing
Weaknesses. GAO-01-171. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2000.
Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in
Carriage of Weapons Regulations. GAO/RCED-00-181. Washington, D.C.:
September 29, 2000.
FAA Computer Security: Actions Needed to Address Critical Weaknesses
That Jeopardize Aviation Operations. GAO/T-AIMD-00-330. Washington,
D.C.: September 27, 2000.
FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other
Continuing Weaknesses. GAO/AIMD-00-252. Washington, D.C.: August
16, 2000.
Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners'
Performance. GAO/RCED-00-75. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000.
Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Serious Problems
Detecting Dangerous Objects. GAO/RCED-00-159. Washington, D.C.:
June 22, 2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)
Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, but Further
Action Is Required. GAO/AIMD-00-169. Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2000.
Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports. GAO-OSI-00-10.
Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000.
Aviation Security: Screener Performance in Detecting Dangerous Objects
during FAA Testing Is Not Adequate. GAO/T-RCED-00-143. Washington,
D.C.: April 6, 2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)
Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat
Terrorism. GAO/NSIAD-00-85. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2000.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security
System. GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-142. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
U.S. Customs Service: Better Targeting of Airline Passengers for
Personal Searches Could Produce Better Results. GAO/GGD-00-38.
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2000.
Aviation Security: Screeners Not Adequately Detecting Threat Objects
during FAA Testing. GAO/T-RCED-00-124. Washington, D.C.: March 16,
2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)
Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener
Performance Problems. GAO/T-RCED-00-125. Washington, D.C.: March
16, 2000.
Aviation Security: FAA's Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding
for Airport Security and to Certify Screening Companies. GAO/RCED-
99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 1999.
Aviation Security: FAA's Deployments of Equipment to Detect Traces of
Explosives. GAO/RCED-99-32R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.
Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight
Safety. GAO/AIMD-98-155. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1998.
Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-Term Attention Is
Needed. GAO/T-RCED-98-190. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 1998.
Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight
Safety. GAO/AIMD-98-60. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 1998. (LIMITED
OFFICIAL USE--DO NOT DISSEMINATE)
Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but
Completion Will Take Several Years. GAO/RCED-98-102. Washington,
D.C.: April 24, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. T-NSIAD-98-
164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998.
Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in
Identifying and Responding to Risks. GAO/RCED-98-6. Washington,
D.C.: February 27, 1998.
Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices.
GAO/RCED-97-111R. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997.
Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection
Devices. GAO/RCED-97-ll9R. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 1997.
Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing the
Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety
and Security. GAO/T-RCED-97-90. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 1997.
Aviation Security: Technology's Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities.
GAO/TRCED/NSIAD-96-262. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 1996.
Aviation Security: Oversight of Initiatives Will Be Needed. C-GAO/
TRCED/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 1996.
(CLASSIFIED)
Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed. GAO/T-RCED/
NSIAD-96-251. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 1996.
Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security. GAO/
TRCED/NSIAD-96-237. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 1996.
Aviation Security: FAA Can Help Ensure That Airports' Access Control
Systems Are Cost Effective. GAO/RCED-95-25. Washington, D.C.: March
1, 1995.
Aviation Security: Development of New Security Technology Has Not Met
Expectations. GAO/RCED-94-142. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 1994.
Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
International Challenges. GAO/RCED-94-38. Washington, D.C.: January
27, 1994.
Appendix II
Appendix III
The Chairman. Dr. Dillingham, I'm used to comptrollers
giving us audited figures. How much money, between now and the
end of the fiscal year, is needed, and how much do you have?
Dr. Dillingham. For?
The Chairman. How much do you intend to spend, or hope to
spend, between now and September the 30th, the end of this
fiscal year? And how much money do you have? I'm trying to get
to the shortage. We want to correct this.
Dr. Dillingham. I think that's--Secretary Mineta is
probably better able to answer that. I'm with the General
Accounting Office, not TSA.
The Chairman. But you don't have an accounting of the
figures at all.
Dr. Dillingham. No, sir. We have not looked at it.
The Chairman. Senator McCain?
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr.
Dillingham. It's very interesting figures that you do cite, and
I'd like to ask Secretary Mineta.
Secretary Mineta, Dr. Dillingham just stated that you have
to hire 7,600 people per month between now and the deadline for
screening and security, as I understand it. You're going to
have to hire and train 30,000 people to man the explosive-
detections systems. Are you going to be able to meet those
deadlines?
Secretary Mineta. In terms of our hiring program for both
passenger screeners and baggage screeners, there is a plan that
was devised. If I could just back up a little bit----
Senator McCain. You know, I don't have a lot of time----
Secretary Mineta. Okay. All right.
Senator McCain.--but I would appreciate----
Secretary Mineta. Well, then let me say----
Senator McCain. But take the time----
Secretary Mineta.--yes, we are on----
Senator McCain.--whatever time you need.
Secretary Mineta.--we are on schedule. In terms of the plan
that we had for hiring screeners, it's one of these programs
where you start out slowly, and then you start increasing the
number of people who are recruited, tested, trained, and
deployed. And we look at what we're doing on a regular
timetable basis, and we are on schedule to make sure that we
have a sufficient number of people on the 19th of November for
passenger screening and the number of people for baggage
screening by December 31.
Now, someone said, ``Well, we hear that there are only
2,500 screeners that have been hired so far.'' That is not
correct. It's well over double that figure. But again, what
we're doing is building up this force.
Dr. Dillingham is absolutely correct in terms of the people
we're recruiting and the people who then report to the
assessment center. Remember, to apply for a job, you either
dial 1-800, or you get onto the internet. And then, once they
do that, then we tell them to report to the assessment center.
And that's the percentages that Dr. Dillingham was talking
about.
Senator McCain. Dr. Dillingham----
Secretary Mineta. But we are on schedule right now,
Senator.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Dr. Dillingham, are you optimistic about their ability to
make those--meet those deadlines?
Dr. Dillingham. Senator McCain, I think the jury's really
still out. It is the case that the hiring has increased
significantly over the last few weeks. They're moving faster.
But it's also true that they're having a tremendous amount of
difficulty finding screeners in the big metropolitan areas, as
well as finding an appropriate number of female screeners to
match up with the searches of female passengers.
So a couple of weeks from now is a better time to see if
that prediction will hold true.
Senator McCain. Maybe we ought to have you back.
Mr. Secretary, what is the effect of the appropriators
putting a cap on the number of full-time employees that TSA can
have?
Secretary Mineta. Well, first of all, we have four major
contracts, in terms of recruiting for people to do site
assessments at airports for placement of equipment and where
are the check lines going to be. We have----
Senator McCain. My question is what is the effect----
Secretary Mineta. The effect is that, with the lack of
money, we are now going to have to tell these contractors,
``We're going to have to cut you off.'' And so that's why I say
if it's the NCS Pearson contract that's going out and
recruiting people, if we have to cut off that contract, we will
not have a sufficient number of people to be able to do the
screening for us. And that's what's going to happen to us, in
terms of each contract, whether it be for NCS Pearson to bring
people in, whether it's the Boeing Siemens contract that goes
out to the airports to do the site assessments, or the
Lockheed-Martin contract that does the hiring and the
training----
Senator McCain. So you will not be able to carry out your
assigned mission with this provision in the appropriations
bill.
Secretary Mineta. Given what our plan was and given where
we are with the supplemental appropriation, we will not be able
to hire the numbers that we planned to do.
Senator McCain. And, therefore, unable to carry out your
mission.
Secretary Mineta. The obligation----
Senator McCain. Did you want to add to that, Mr. Jackson?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir. We would struggle to get to the end
of this fiscal year under that 45,000 cap while hiring both
passenger screeners and baggage screeners. And the real
difficulty comes instantly in September. We are going to
project to go over that--over that 45,000 cap in our total
employment. This includes the air marshal program, and it
includes the overhead, it includes the support for ports and
other issues. So this is the entire TSA. Our hiring is going
to, in September, punch over that cap, and if we are operating
under a CR, for example, in October, we've hit the wall. We
have to just stop.
Senator McCain. Do you agree, Dr. Dillingham, with that
assessment?
Dr. Dillingham. As much as we've looked at the numbers, Mr.
McCain--or, Senator McCain, I'm sorry--we would agree with
that.
Senator McCain. Senator Ensign is going to voice this
concern to you far more emphatically than I will, but there is
a concern that if you meet these deadlines--suppose you had the
equipment, suppose you had the proper number of employees, you
still would have inordinate delays in major airports across
America--Sky Harbor, McCarron, et cetera. How do you respond to
that, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Mineta. Well, I guess, first of all, it goes
airport by airport. But I think, within the last probably
couple of weeks, we have said that there will be difficulty
with about 20 to 30 airports across the country.
Senator McCain. Well, then should there be some exemption
for them?
Secretary Mineta. That's something that we've talked about
in-house, and we haven't come to any determination between our
department and the White House on what we ought to be doing
on----
Senator McCain. Well, please keep us informed as soon as
possible----
Secretary Mineta. Oh, absolutely. I mean----
Senator McCain.--as to what decisions you make on that.
Well, I see that my time is expired, and I don't want to
overrun. But this is a--this is an important issue, obviously,
in major airports around America, and I hope you'll come to a
decision on that as quickly as possible.
Welcome, Admiral Loy. We appreciate your willingness to
serve and we appreciate your past service to the nation, and we
look forward to working with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Let the record show that the Committee was
furnished last evening an updated figure of TSA occupation
employees--certain directors, attorneys, law-enforcement
officers, and investigators. Under ``screeners,'' it said
screeners, 759; supervisory screeners, 1,725, for a total of
2,484. Mr. Secretary, that's where the record is as of--
furnished to the Committee, as of last evening.
Senator Wyden?
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I've made a priority to focus on the
performance of screeners at the airports, and particularly
through undercover audits. And it is very troubling to see the
results thus far. We, for example, have seen 30-40 percent
failure rates at airports, where apparently the testers didn't
even do anything fancy to conceal large weapons, and yet they
all seemed to get through.
And I guess I'd like to start by asking you, will the
results of these audits have consequences? What's been done to
date with respect to these airports with these huge failure
rates with respect to weapons getting by the screeners?
Secretary Mineta. Well, first of all, I want you to
recognize that probably 95 percent of the screeners that are in
the workforce right now were the ones who were there prior to
the 11th of September. Under the law, we took over all of the
contracts on the 17th of February from the screening companies.
We have three airports right now that are totally federalized
with federal employees.
Now, the report that was referred to in USA Today, that was
a leaked report that was conducted by our own TSA investigation
people. And so there are two responses: One is in terms of
overall, across the system, getting to everybody--the interim
security directors and the federal security directors at all of
the airports--in terms of the deficiencies that they're going
to have to pay attention to regarding their on-job training, to
tell their screeners what has to be improved. The second aspect
is the specific airport where those violations occurred, to go
ahead and make sure that they're corrected. And to the extent
that they're not corrected, or if we find a pattern of under-
performance, then those folks have been released. But----
Senator Wyden. Has that happened to date? I mean, what I
want to----
Secretary Mineta. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Senator Wyden. It has.
Secretary Mineta. Yes, sir.
Senator Wyden. How many airports, for example, did you put
in place changes with respect to making sure that screening
performance changed?
Secretary Mineta. Well, I can think of one FSD that we've
replaced. And, as I recall, that original report had four or
five airports, and----
Senator Wyden. Well, I will move on, but I'd like you to
furnish----
Secretary Mineta. Sure.
Senator Wyden.--for the record what have been the
consequences of these significant audit failures. I mean, this
is a very real problem, and I will tell you, I want to meet you
halfway, but you have to show us that there are consequences
when there has been failure.
Senator Wyden. Now, let me move.
Secretary Mineta. Do you want--do you want----
Senator Wyden. I'd like to ask about another----
Secretary Mineta. We'll submit it for the record.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, that'll be fine.
Set aside, for a moment, personalities and working style
and those sorts of issues. What was deemed not done on Mr.
Magaw's watch that concerned you? I'd like to know why you
replaced him and----
Secretary Mineta. Again, I think there----
Senator Wyden.--get that on the record.
Secretary Mineta.--are two things there. One is replacing
Mr. Magaw. Mr. Magaw submitted his resignation because of his
health. He had--I believe it was, four or five months ago, a
stent put in his--I guess it's----
Senator Wyden. Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Mineta.--I'm not sure what the----
Senator Wyden.--we know about his health problems. What----
Secretary Mineta. Okay. There was a problem----
Senator Wyden.--was not being done?
Secretary Mineta.--there was a problem in terms of his
health, and he submitted his resignation, because when you're
standing up this kind of an agency, this is a very long working
day, and he was, frankly, not up to working those long days.
And so, to the extent, then, that long days are not possible,
then his attention was not being put on the job.
Senator Wyden. So he was doing everything, in terms of the
specific functions and activities that you wanted, and the only
thing that concerned you was his health.
Secretary Mineta. No, there was performance issues.
Senator Wyden. What were those, Mr. Secretary? This is the
third time now I've asked the question.
Secretary Mineta. All right. Just as an overall, I would
say he was not engaged as a person who is in a leadership
position of a new, stand-up agency.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Loy, you're starting. What's going to
change? I mean, I am trying to get from the Secretary the
specifics, for example, about what happened during those first
six months, because I do think it was more than personalities
and health issues. And we all want to be sensitive to someone's
health concerns. But I want to know what policies specifically
are going to change now at the Transportation Security
Administrator on your watch. You're starting. What do you want
to change?
Admiral Loy. Senator Wyden, this is my third day on the
job. Each of these first two----
Senator Wyden. Tell us what you'd like to change.
Admiral Loy.--have been about a month long in the efforts
focused on exactly what your question is. I'm going to make a
concerted effort to communicate better with stakeholders. I
think there were some problems associated with reaching
airlines, with reaching airports, their directors, many of the
other stakeholders that are so important in this business, to
make this a collaborative effort to engage and produce the
security paradigm at our airports that we need to do.
Second, I think there are challenges associated with many
balls in the air at the same time. This team that has been put
together by the Secretary, Senator Wyden, really has a superb
business plan in place to get done what needed to get done, but
we also need to be responsive to the feedback that is
forthcoming, not only from the Congress, but from airport
directors on an individual basis. If there is a problem in an
airport, we need to engage that airport and have them feel that
their engagement on the other end is going to get something
accomplished.
Another issue is simply correspondence communication.
Senator Boxer, earlier in her opening statement, was concerned
about writing a letter and not getting an answer. Well, that's
not an adequate situation for us to engage in. So the simple
leadership and management skills associated with making, not
only a new organization stand up, but focusing on a mission
which is perhaps as important to this nation as any other is
going to get my full time and attention.
Senator Wyden. Is there a uniform list today on what items
passengers can carry onboard a plane? I am told by passengers
that they are told a variety of different things about what
they are allowed to carry onboard a plane. Could you tell us,
is there today a uniform list in this country for what
passengers can bring on?
Admiral Loy. Can or cannot?
Senator Wyden. Can.
Admiral Loy. I think the list is probably much more
discrete as it relates to what they cannot bring on, Senator
Wyden, but I will find that list for you and get it to you, or,
if there is a need to create one, we will do that.
Admiral Loy. Constancy throughout the--throughout each and
every one of those screeners saying the same thing to our
flying public is enormously important.
Secretary Mineta. Senator, if I----
Senator Wyden. My time----
Secretary Mineta.--if I might add?
Senator Wyden. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Mineta. One of the things that--for instance,
that we experienced recently--cigar cutters are allowed to go
onboard the airplane. Yet there is now a new cigar cutter
that's come out, and it looks like a bullet, and it has a very
sharp instrument inside. And so that cigar cutter is not
allowed on the airplane. And so there is a list, and, as the
Admiral has indicated, items are on the prohibited-list side,
in terms of length, but there are two lists.
Senator Wyden. Just on this point, there's a----
Admiral Loy. It's on the Web site, sir.
Senator Wyden.--you're saying there now is one list in this
country for what you can bring on and what you cannot bring on.
Mr. Jackson is shaking his head. I mean, this, Mr. Secretary,
is what troubles people. I mean, this should be--and I'm very
sympathetic to this point about cigar cutters. And certainly
the terrorists are not technological simpletons. They are
always going to be trying to find new approaches. But, for the
life of me, I can't figure why there isn't a list of what you
can bring on and what you can't bring on. And Mr. Jackson, as
far as his response, says that that list doesn't exist today.
Is that right, Mr. Jackson?
Mr. Jackson. Our approach has been the negative, what you
are prohibited from bringing on. The list of what you're
prohibited from bringing on is posted on our Web site, it's
communicated to our employees, and it's available at each of
the airports.
Senator Wyden. Everything else you can bring on.
Mr. Jackson. Well, a list of what you could bring on--a
book, a magazine, a fan to fan yourself in the plane--is as
vast as the imagination of the American people, and we're not
trying to limit what you can bring on. We're trying to say,
``Here are dangerous, prohibited items. Those cannot come on.''
As the Secretary has said, that list is constantly changing,
because the creativity of the bad guys is significant, as well.
Senator Wyden. My time is up. I'll just tell you that the
passengers are confused, and the airports are confused. I'm
going to look at your list. I'm anxious to work with you in a
cooperative way on it.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Burns?
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll move right
along here, because I'm not going to dwell on how the
department is getting along, because of the TSA.
I want to move into this--the question of armed pilots. So
shift gears here just a little bit, and I'd like to get some
answers from the Transportation Department. I want to know
right away that--we've noticed that recently the Administration
announced they would reexamine the existing policy for arming
pilots. I welcome that. Saying that it has a new director--and,
Admiral Loy, we welcome you, and we're heartily supportive of
you--if you have any thoughts on this--personal thoughts, or
whatever--and if you do, how long will it take you to make a
decision?
Admiral Loy. Sir, it was just two days ago that the
Secretary asked me to take on this review, which I will do. I
have already directed our technical center up in Atlantic City
to look at some possibilities, because I need to learn about
this and get up the learning curve very quickly. I can't----
Senator Burns. What's your personal feeling?
Admiral Loy. I think I would be remiss if I offered those.
I can say that on the--you know, on the upshot, I'm hesitant,
but I'm also being directed to conduct a review, and I will do
that. The--I am as concerned about elements in the House bill
as I am in the basic question, and I think that is worth
discussion with the Secretary and yourself, as well. But I----
Senator Burns. Well, we'll be looking forward to the----
Admiral Loy.--have to make this decision in the wake of the
review, and I want to be objective in that regard.
Senator Burns. Well, I think some of these cases, whenever
we start talking about homeland security, they have to be based
on--sometimes on gut feeling and----
Admiral Loy. Sure.
Senator Burns.--some of these things, and I think we'd
better start making these decisions right away. You probably
have some personal feelings on this, but I will not go into
that at this time.
Has the TSA reviewed the FBI's feasibility study on
cockpit-protection program and its research for its
determination viability of that program? I mean, I'm asking the
same--I'm asking the same question again. Is this study
underway?
Admiral Loy. I'm not sure if the FBI--let me----
Mr. Jackson. Senator, if I can interrupt, is this the study
on the non-lethal weapons that you're----
Senator Burns. On any kind of a weapon, I would imagine.
It's a----
Mr. Jackson. There is----
Senator Burns.--feasibility on cockpit protection.
Mr. Jackson. There is a National Institute of Justice study
with regard to----
Senator Burns. Is that the same thing?
Mr. Jackson. I don't know if that's the one you're
referring to, sir.
Senator Burns. Just on sidearms.
Mr. Jackson. Yes, there is----
Senator Burns. On sidearms.
Mr. Jackson.--there is a NIJ study on sidearms in the
cockpit. And what they have done is to issue--I believe it was
in April--a report relating to lethal weapons.
Admiral Loy. Non-lethal.
Mr. Jackson. Oh, I'm sorry, non-lethal. And so that's the
extent of what the National Institute of Justice--of the
Department of Justice--has provided us.
Senator Burns. Well, the--but have they done anything on
lethal weapons?
Mr. Jackson. I'll have to ask----
Secretary Mineta. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Jackson. Not to our knowledge, sir.
Admiral Loy. No, sir.
Senator Burns. The new congressionally mandated reinforced
cockpit doors are supposed to be installed and operational on
all commercial aircraft by April of 2003. Is there an FAA-
certified cockpit door available for installation right now?
Secretary Mineta. Yes, sir, there are, two doors for
certain classes of aircraft.
Senator Burns. On--for every make--for every make or model?
Secretary Mineta. Not for every make. Not for every make,
but there are two doors that would be applicable, as I recall,
for 737s, 727s, air bus----
Senator Burns. How many airliners are subject to that FAA
requirement for enhanced cockpit doors, do you know?
Secretary Mineta. They're all--all U.S. airlines, and that
totals about 6500 aircraft, plus all aircraft that come into
the United States from foreign ports--from foreign airlines
will have to comply with the April 9, 2003, date.
Senator Burns. Is that possible?
Secretary Mineta. Well, we just met with the Air Transport
Association the other day, and we didn't hear anything
differently, at least from the Air Transport Association
carriers.
Senator Burns. Well, now, it sounds like, to me--now, I
don't know if--if we go along the same--at the same pace that
we've been going on on the airport security and talking to the
people from Boeing and the people who make these airplanes, I
think that's--I think that you're pretty optimistic, maybe a
little overly optimistic, by April the 3rd. Now, we're only--
we're only nine months away, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Mineta. But, again, remember, this is not----
Senator Burns. Let the record show he's nodding his head.
Secretary Mineta. This is not a TSA--a TSA responsibility
in terms of doing the work. The doing of the work is still the
manufacturers and the airlines. And, in this instance, the
certification comes from FAA. FAA does the certification of the
redesigned cockpit area.
Senator Burns. Okay, now, let's just--if it's not--if it's
not your responsibility, it's the manufacturer's----
Secretary Mineta. Well, it's still our responsibility to
ensure this--within the department.
Senator Burns. Okay. Well, I'm saying----
Secretary Mineta. Not TSA.
Senator Burns.--I'm saying, then, in your own--in your own
estimation, are--will we make that deadline?
Secretary Mineta. Well, that's what we've been told.
Senator Burns. John Mica, the Chairman of the Aviation
Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure made--
currently 12 foreign airlines allow their pilots to carry guns
into the United States. How many foreign airlines do that
today. Do you know?
Secretary Mineta. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Burns. We've been told that Korean Airlines, SAS,
Lufthansa are allowed to carry weapons on the flight deck. And
you don't know how many of those you have agreements with?
Secretary Mineta. I do not.
Senator Burns. Well, I'm sitting here looking for some
information, and it doesn't sound like that we've got the
information that we're going to need. And I would tell you that
the study--and I think we've got to make these decisions right
away. It appears to me that even though it's optimistic, at
best, to complete our task at the airports, then we must act on
the next line of defense. And I would say, even--it may not be
on a permanent basis. Who knows? But I'm saying we've got to
move forward as a Congress and as a government to make sure
there is a first line of defense or maybe a second line of
defense. I do not like the F-16 and the F-15. I think we can do
better than that, asking the American people--that this is--
this is an alternative that we have. That--I think that that is
just absolutely outrageous. That is not my United States of
America. And--but I'm just--I'm just saying we have asked for
some reports, asking for briefings. We didn't get them until
this week. And we will continue to do so.
I have more questions, and I'm looking forward to the next
panel, because I want to hear some--I want to hear some meat
about this. We know what your challenge is, and we--and we're
probably pretty sensitive to your--to what you're trying to do,
but we talked about this--less than a year ago, we were talking
about this legislation.
Secretary Mineta. Senator Burns, one of the things that, as
Secretary of Transportation, I don't want to be caught in is
the same position with the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act. It's a great piece of legislation, but I don't want to be
in the position of having armed pilots and then all of a sudden
facing a bill of $850-to $900 million in terms of the startup
costs, the training, getting the weapons for 85,000 pilots, and
then incurring $250- to $260 million in annual costs to do
quarterly recurrent training.
No one, from what I can see, has really talked about the
cost. And having gone through my experience with the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act, I don't want to go down that
alley again.
Senator Burns. Well, I would suggest----
Secretary Mineta. I want people to recognize----
Senator Burns. Then I would suggest you stick around----
Secretary Mineta. Oh, that's--no, no, I'm----
Senator Burns.--and listen to the next panel----
Secretary Mineta. That's fine.
Senator Burns.--of testimony, because I think you'll find
you'll learn that we can do it a lot better and a lot cheaper.
Secretary Mineta. I learn all the time, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Hutchison?
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to talk about the screening of checked bags and the
measures that you're putting in place to assure the best
performance that we can possibly have in that area. And I would
like for you to talk about positive bag-match, and the fact
that it is not required on connecting flights. You do have a
pilot program in place, according to your testimony on our last
hearing, to see if it is feasible to do bag match on connecting
flights. So I want to know if that study has come back and what
you are doing in that area?
Secretary Mineta. First of all, that pilot program is going
on, and it would be one of the areas that I would look to for
implementation in order to meet the December 31 date. Maybe I
can have Deputy Secretary Jackson expand more on the pilot
program and inform you as to where we are on it.
Mr. Jackson. We did a test of two airlines--United and
American--in Chicago using hub connections, and they had
somewhat significantly different types of technology in place
to manage positive passenger bag-match for connections at those
two airports, and it gave us a highly automated test and a very
manual test. We have had a preliminary set of recommendations
to us. We're still in negotiations and discussions and an
assessment phase with the two affected airlines.
The punch line from their perspective is the implementation
of this procedure on a national basis would produce a
significant number of delays and disruptions to the schedule,
which would compel them to re-stack their schedules at major
hub airports in order to be able to implement this. They
pointed to the high cost of it. These are, I think,
historically the concerns of the airline industry. We're going
to have to balance, especially, the new circumstances that the
Secretary talks about, the tool kits that we're going to have
available to us to work the baggage-screening problem in light
of the $1 billion to $1.5 billion reduction that we're facing.
So it's an important part of our ongoing assessment. We
don't have a final conclusion. We are looking at it very
closely.
Senator Hutchison. If you have the money you need, and that
you are going to be able to hire the people you need, will you
be able to make a December 31 deadline for some form of
screening or checking checked bags on every flight?
Mr. Jackson. We have, in the budget that we proposed as
part of the $4.4 billion, a layered approach to this issue that
is divided into two parts--one, what's appropriate for the all-
cargo carriers; and, two, what's appropriate for the passenger
carriers that also carry cargo. A cornerstone of what we were
hoping for was a very material enhancement of the known shipper
programs, and we had asked for additional bodies--I believe 200
individuals--to work those types of audits, assessments and to
work the supply chain backwards to give us greater rigor and
discipline in managing that cargo work. We had asked for
technology in the airports, which we would use for walk-up
customers.
We're underway with the review at the postal service of
possibly trying to allow for screening of postal cargo over 16
ounces, and we've done a study with the postal service and with
the air carriers to evaluate those issues.
So there are multiple tracks to do this. There is no single
piece of technology, machine, or equipment that we could drop
on the table in the next few months that simply gives us the
same level of scrutiny in the same mechanized way that we are
trying to put in place relative to the bags. But we do believe
we can materially improve it, strengthen it, and that's an
ongoing commitment of TSA for the years to come, too.
Senator Hutchison. Well, do you think that you will be
able, by December 31, to have a sufficient coverage until you
get the actual machinery in place?
Mr. Jackson. Sufficient coverage is an elusive judgment. I
think that----
Senator Hutchison. Some coverage?
Mr. Jackson.--we are constantly trying----
Senator Hutchison. Some coverage?
Mr. Jackson. Coverage, yes. More coverage than today.
Better coverage than today. Is it going to satisfy us? No,
we're not going to be satisfied until we feel like we've
totally ``nailed'' this issue, but we have put very significant
steps in place, a plan in place to do this, and I would welcome
your further thoughts and assessment of that with us. That is
an area where we want to focus more attention and need to focus
more resources.
Senator Hutchison. Since you mentioned cargo, Senator
Feinstein and I have introduced a bill that would require cargo
inspection on all passenger flights and a strong chain of
custody for all cargo shippers. My bill would require a
comprehensive system for certifying the known shippers,
assigning an encrypted identifier to that known shipper. I
don't know if you've looked at my bill, but I would like to ask
you if you think we need to strengthen security in that area,
and, if you've looked at my bill, does it address all of the
issues in a comprehensive manner?
Secretary Mineta. We have looked at your bill, and, again--
I guess one of the big things that I want to make sure is that
specifications that we put out are general enough to be able to
be inclusive of vendors and yet be exclusive enough to do a
good job in terms of the security responsibility that we have.
And that's the nature of what we're looking at in your
legislation. And, frankly, I'm not sure, as we look at your
legislation, what ``encrypted identification'' means, and if
that is something that might become a sole-source kind of a
problem for us.
Senator Hutchison. Well, we're trying to have an identifier
that could not be tampered with or----
Secretary Mineta. And there are----
Senator Hutchison.--counterfeited.
Secretary Mineta. There are many ways of doing that, and
that is something that we want to pursue.
And, interestingly enough, if I might note, one of the
things that we wanted to do with transportation workers was to
start with an identification card for transportation workers,
and that would be encrypted. But we have now been precluded
from obligating any funds to pursue a transportation-worker
identification card. Now, frankly, that was a precursor to
seeing whether or not we would take that onto a trusted
traveler program. But we can't even now work on a
transportation-worker identification----
Senator Hutchison. Are you talking about language in the
Supplemental Appropriations bill?
Secretary Mineta.--card.
Secretary Mineta. Yes.
Senator Hutchison. All right. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would
just say I hope we're going to have a comprehensive bill. I
hope it will address cargo as well as these other screened-
baggage deadlines. I think it is incumbent on us to do that and
try to take away some of these barriers you're bringing up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Very good.
Senator Allen?
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The last time we were here, Secretary Mineta brought up
several different things, and Mr. Magaw was here in those days,
as well. There are two things I'm going to bring up, just to
get your mind ready. One is going to be the, in my view,
commonsense approach to providing a last line of defense
airplane security, and the other is going to be Reagan National
Airport.
As I had mentioned back then, in May, on American Airlines,
Flight 77, here you had one of the pilots, Captain Burlingame,
U.S. Naval Reserves, had fought in Operation Desert Storm, and
the question I posed was, well, if he had a firearm, would that
have not been helpful in deterring these terrorists from taking
over that aircraft? And the response was--``Well, things are
better now than they were then.'' But still, there are efforts
to continue to improve in a variety of ways. And I'm not going
to criticize you all for this ramp-up of the TSA. To me, it is
as if we're at halftime of a football game, and sometimes you
have to make adjustments and realize that some things weren't
going as planned, and I want to work with you to get that done,
and there's no reason to be beating you all up unnecessarily in
that regard.
But, I sense at least a difference in perspective on the
idea of arming pilots who are properly trained. You talked
about how elaborate the training was and all the precautions
and the safety for federal air marshals and is seems to me that
there is at least some sense or recognition that having pilots
properly trained with a firearm as a last line of defense is
something that--does have a valid, logical commonsense approach
to it.
Secretary Mineta. Well--and I think, from a commonsense
perspective, I want to look at whether or not we want lethal
weapons in the cockpit. Can it be non-lethal? And, in terms of
85,000 commercial airline pilots, do we give all of them arms?
Or do we put the arms in a safe in the cockpit itself? On the
other hand, if we're going to go non-lethal, then there are a
number of different technologies that exist, whether they be
tazers or going with----
Senator Allen. Stun guns, yeah.
Secretary Mineta.--the hard rubber bullets. And so, again,
that's something we want to explore. But I'm--I just want
everyone to keep in mind that there are costs associated with
this program, as with others. And I just want to make sure that
we are adequately funded to pursue whatever program we're going
to be adopting.
Senator Allen. Fine. I would say, Mr. Secretary, that all
of those considerations are fine. If we're going to be arguing
over costs when we're already spending billions of dollars on
security, it makes sense that this added sense of security is
very cost justified. I think it would give passengers a greater
sense of security, and I think it--I do think it ought to be
lethal----
Moreover, the issue of whether they're all locked up in the
cockpits or whether the pilots can carry them through the
airport and so forth is another matter, but that's not
necessarily addressed in the bill, other than the--bill, as I
understand it, the firearms would be in the cockpit, although
there could be situations, such as LAX, where, if somebody was
attacking--and John--Senator Ensign will bring this up--
hundreds and thousands of people--could feel safer knowing that
you see pilots going through airports. Right now, that
deterrent of armed employee is only at E1 A1. And if they had
gone and I'll not mention a domestic airline, but that person
could have emptied out every single one of his bullets in his
cartridge--and there would have been--many more people killed
on account of that. So if cost is a concern, I think we can
make a strong case that those lives lost were worth a great
deal more than the cost of arming pilots.
Now, on to Reagan National Airport. The last meeting, as
you recollect, you lifted my hopes in saying that a plan would
be announced for the reopening of general aviation at the end
of that month of May. Obviously, it continues to be completely
shut, other than for a few governors, I suppose, to general
aviation.
Secretary Mineta. And members of the House and Senate.
Senator Allen. And members of the House and Senate.
[Laughter.]
Senator Allen. Well, I would like to see it opened to more
than governors and a few members of the House and Senate.
It seems to me that you have the right attitude on it. I
know that Jane Garvey had similar sentiments, and I do want to
commend her for many years of outstanding service. And I
recognize you have conflicting people all together trying to
give you different types of information, and, if it were up to
some of them, Reagan National Airport would not even be open
today for commercial aviation.
What progress report can you give us at this hearing now,
in July, as to the prospects of having heightened specialized
security so that general aviation can, maybe at least on a
limited basis, return to Reagan National Airport?
Secretary Mineta. As you will recall, Senator--and I've
enjoyed working with you on this subject--I believe it was on
the 23rd of June that we were going to be opening up Ronald
Reagan National Airport, but in the interim, from the time of
the latter part of May to the time that--as we were getting
closer to opening it up to general aviation, I was starting to
see intelligence reports that said maybe we ought to take
another look at this.
And so last--I believe it was last Thursday or Friday--I
met with all of the general aviation groups and gave them the
opportunity to hear, not classified information, but
information that gave more life to the subject matter. And what
I would like to do, Mr. Chairman, is to offer to all of the
Committee members, if we could arrange a time, for a security
briefing, an intelligence briefing, of why I decided not to
move forward on opening up Ronald Reagan National Airport, and
I would be willing to do it for the Committee members or, you
know, who----
The Chairman. Yeah, we'll be glad to do it. We've got a
roll call on in five bells, Senator Allen, and I want to give
Senator Ensign a chance.
Senator Allen. Sure. Well, I would like to have that
briefing.
Secretary Mineta. We would be more than happy to set it up.
The Chairman. I think we ought to have another hearing here
after we come back in September.
Senator Ensign?
Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I had a couple of questions, then I'll try to sum up my
remarks so there's as much time to answer as possible. And,
Admiral Loy, if you want to--I don't know if you know anything
about these, but if you want to comment, I'd appreciate any
thoughts that you have.
If you're familiar with the 40-40-20 rule, I mentioned that
at the beginning. It's the step to--especially before some of
the bags are gone through. I just want to read you McCarron
Airport's statistics on this if the 40-40-20 rule goes into
effect, as is proposed. ``Currently, average''--or I'll just
read you the peak times. Peak times at McCarron Airport for
Southwest Airlines right now, a 43-minute wait at the ticket
counter. Under the 40-40-20 rule, that peak time goes to four
hours and 18 minutes. America West goes from an hour and 12
minutes to three hours and 54 minutes. Delta Airlines goes from
37 minutes to two hours and 23 minutes. And on and on.
They've come up with--or they've at least proposed several
other different scenarios. One would be a 70-30 rule where--to
just read briefly, ``70 percent of the bags would be ETD
screened, 30 percent of the bags are selectee or random-
selected, go directly to the EDS system, a hundred percent
exterior protocol applied to 70 percent, and average time per
bag would be about 30 seconds.''
Just to compare if that scenario was used instead, which
that should qualify--because the 40-40-20 was not in our
legislation; that was done administratively--the 70-30 peak
time at Southwest Airlines--actually, under this scenario,
because of modern technology that's going to be applied at the
airports, the peak time for Southwest will actually go down
from what it is today. Instead of going up to four hours and 18
minutes, it'll be an hour and 17 minutes. America West, instead
of being three hours, 17 minutes, will be about two hours and
11 minutes.
So all--bottom line is--and that's under current; that's
not under growing conditions. That's under current traffic
passenger counts. The question was asked, ``Are we better--do
we have better security today,'' and I think the answer is yes,
everybody agrees we have better security. To eek out that last
little bit, is it worth--and my question to the panel--is it
worth four-hour waits? And what would four-hour waits do to the
economy of a tourist destination?
Secretary Mineta. Well, first of all, let me indicate that
the charge we have--that we all have from the President's State
of the Union message was to win the war against terrorism, at
home and abroad, protect the homeland, and, thirdly, help
revive the economy. Again, all three of them fit Transportation
and TSA. And so we look at these things in terms of the impact
on the airport, impact on the airline, the passenger, right on
down the line.
And I'm willing to take a look at the benefit of the
airport's experience or yours or whomever's to select from
what's been said--a commonsense perspective--which way we ought
to be going. But, no, again, those are--we don't want to do
anything to impact adversely on tourism----
Senator Ensign. Well, and----
Secretary Mineta.--the airport, or the----
Senator Ensign.--it's not just affecting the economy. The
scenario that I pointed out--when you get those kinds of waits
in our airport, the crowds--now, you've just made vulnerable
point.
Secretary Mineta. Absolutely.
Senator Ensign. And so you've hurt security instead of
helped.
Secretary Mineta. No question about it. No question.
Senator Ensign. That's what I'm saying, is that if you look
at these--and that's why, Admiral Loy, I want you to take a
close look at some of the other alternatives that they've come
up with that would give us the security we need without
creating these huge long lines and--we already have a--even
with the lines that we have with this increased security, we
already have somewhat of a problem, but when they see thousands
of people waiting there, you know, and then--they're just going
to see we need security to get into the airport, and then you
just back--you just keep backing up the security checkpoints
and back up the vulnerability points.
Admiral Loy. Senator Ensign, absolutely I will look at it,
and those are unacceptable numbers, and we would never impose
those on McCarron. I'd like to think of that rule, by the way,
as 20-40-40 rule, as opposed to the other way around, based on
object searches first and then open bag and closed bag.
But when 36 million go to Las Vegas on an annual basis, and
18 million of them come and go through that particular airport,
we understand there are out-of-the-ordinary challenges with a
volume flow through McCarron. And at the same--to go to the
same point with respect to a power supply with respect to
machines on 12-31, we will be reasonable in terms of working
with the airport director and with the mayor and with whoever
is necessary to produce the right kind of a profile that is
appropriate for McCarron. And I look forward to getting back to
you, sir, with respect to this particular issue.
Secretary Mineta. Senator, let me ask about that power-
supply issue. Was that all being driven by security equipment?
Senator Ensign. Yes. Those are the EDS machines. Those are
the EDS machines that are necessary. In other words, if they
have them----
Secretary Mineta. And that's--and that's driving the
necessity for a new substation?
Senator Ensign. Yes. Yes, they have to do that. They have
to have that for the new substation.
Secretary Mineta. It's not because of other expansion and
other things going on?
Senator Ensign. No.
Secretary Mineta. Hard to imagine that.
Senator Ensign. Well, put it--put it this way. If they have
the new--I mean, they are in an expansion right now, but if
they--well, actually, they just finished some expansion--if
they have the machines--from what they tell me--I'm just going
on what they tell me; I'm not an expert on power supplies and
all that--if they had the machines on location today, they
could not plug them in.
Admiral Loy. Sir, one of the sources of the Secretary's
thought process there is, of $200 million set aside as an
earmark in the--you know, in the supplemental, that's $231
million that was--probably found its way in there as a result
of concerns expressed by airports or whomever is going to
benefit from those dollars. To the degree they are not
available to us to design that right security system, including
power plants, as appropriate, but let the--let the right player
be producing the dollars for the right segment of their
responsibility in that formula. That's where we need to go at
the other end of the day.
Senator Ensign. And just lastly, Mr. Chairman, I want to
make a strong push for the trusted traveler program. I know our
previous director was against the trusted traveler program,
because he thought somehow that that would, you know, benefit
the rich. It benefits everybody if you get people out of the--
you know, if you can actually make sure that they're secure,
but you get them out of the lines, that benefits the people
that are currently standing in lines, and so it just makes
common sense.
Admiral Loy. Absolutely, sir. There are very serious issues
associated with designing it right. And, as the Secretary was
proper to point out, our inability to press forward on the TWIC
Card is going to put an impediment in the process of gaining
progress toward a trusted travel program that I, too, agree is
a very sensible approach.
The Chairman. Very good, Mr. Secretary. And thank you and
the panel for your appearance here this morning before the
Committee.
Two things, one, we just got through marking up the
emergency supplemental. We thought we had done more than was
needed, in that the director of the Office of Management and
Budget, Mr. Daniels, cut us $250 million on the premise that,
look, you couldn't possibly spend it, and everything else of
that kind. Now, you appear before the Committee, and you say
you are a billion dollars shy in the next two months, between
now and September the 30th.
So the only remedy to that situation is if you can get
Mitch Daniel to ask us for another little emergency
supplemental singularly for this billion, we can pass it
through quickly, in 24, 48 hours, I can guarantee you, because
that was the attitude and mindset of the House member and
senators, bipartisan. Otherwise, on the 2003 budget that we
just reported out, we increased that some 150 million more than
the President requested, again. And so we're over here trying
to get you more money. The OMB Office is saying, ``Cut back.
Cut back. They can't even spend it.'' And let's get that
cleared up, because we've got to keep moving.
Secondly, with respect to--irrespective of how the fight
comes out about pistols, guns, stun guns or otherwise, we
cannot come off with a secure door. See if you can accelerate
that. If I was a pilot, other than guns and all this other kind
of argument and everything else like that, I would want that
proof positive, tried and tested system of keeping that door
absolutely secure in flight going right straight down to the
ground. Now, let's get and see if we can do it faster than
2003.
Delta is way ahead, some of these other airlines, to
protect their pilots, have got that in mind. But once that door
is secure, you don't have to worry about taking off from Reagan
and going into the White House. You don't have to worry about
going into these buildings, the Empire State or otherwise, you
don't have to worry about going into a power plant, you don't
have to worry about all this 30 minutes after takeoff, 30
minutes--that solves a heck of a lot of problems, and let them
have this intermural on guns. But once that door is secure,
they can shoot each other or whatever, take practice--or
whatever they want to do.
But I can tell you, if Secretary Mineta and Senator
Hollings were in that cockpit, and we were both strapped in,
and that door wasn't secure or even secure, we thought, and the
steward hollered that, ``He's got me by--he's choking me. Open
the door. Open the door.'' I'm sitting there. I'd say, ``Norm,
you open the door.''
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Because when you open that door, you might
get off one or two shots, but I can tell you those terrorists
are coming in, and they've got me, the pilot, and that plane is
going into another building. We're talking about real life.
Thank you all very much, and we asked the Committee to be
at ease to receive the second panel.
[Recess from 12:03 to 12:13 p.m.]
Senator Burns (presiding). Okay, here we go. Those outside
that want to come in, all aboard and get aboard. If you can't
get a board, get a plane.
[Laughter.]
Senator Burns. We have, on our second panel--and I was
hoping that we would get to them just a little bit--a little
bit quicker, but nonetheless, everybody wanted to talk about
airport security, and I want to talk about airplane security,
and we're going to do that.
We have with us Dr. Gerald--no, we've already taken--seen
him--Dr. Richard Stephens, vice president and general manager
of Homeland Security Services of the Boeing Company; Craig Coy,
CEO, Massachusetts Port Authority; Captain Steve Luckey,
chairman of the National Flight Security Committee; and Captain
Ed Davidson, director of Flight Safety at Northwest Airlines.
Can I trade you all your miles on your airline, Captain?
Captain Davidson. Any time, Senator.
Senator Burns. If I could do that----
We welcome you here this morning, and I'm going to start
with Captain Davidson, of Northwest Airlines, and I'm just
going to go that way, and then we'll have a little dialogue on
arming the pilots, if they so choose, on the flight deck of our
airliners.
Captain Davidson, welcome.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN EDWARD M. DAVIDSON, DIRECTOR, FLIGHT
SAFETY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE, NORTHWEST AIRLINES
Captain Davidson. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Hollings, Ranking Member McCain, Senator Burns,
and other members of this distinguished Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify today.
My name is Ed Davidson, and I have been a commercial
airline pilot for 24 years. For the past 13 years, I have
served as a captain for Northwest Airlines, and I am currently
the airline's director of Flight Safety and Quality Assurance.
My flying career, that includes more than 20,000 flight hours,
began with service in Vietnam as a U.S. Navy pilot. In 1994, I
retired as a commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve.
Mr. Chairman, I couldn't agree more with your opening
statement. Let's ensure that the cockpit door is the shield we
need so we can concentrate on our principal job, flying. And I
appreciate the chance today to explain why in the real world of
a cramped cockpit, where there is no margin for error,
permitting commercial pilots to carry and use lethal firearms
threatens the safety of the traveling public.
I'd like to explain how pending legislation undermines
Congress' original intent to use hardened cockpit doors as a
protective shield enabling flight crews to safely land a
threatened aircraft as quickly as possible. Simply put, S. 2554
raises more troubling safety questions than it provides
security answers.
At the outset, let me thank the Committee and the Congress
for your ongoing efforts to improve aviation security. Quick
passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of
2001, after the horrific events of September 11th, was a great
comfort to the traveling public and particularly those of us
who work onboard commercial aircraft.
Mr. Chairman, as a professional commercial airline pilot,
when I am on duty, my singular focus is and always must be the
safe operation of my aircraft. And I fully subscribe to the
view that my colleague, Captain Duane Worth, expressed in
testimony before this distinguished Committee last fall when he
said, and I quote, ``We can't be sky king and Wyatt Earp at the
same time,'' unquote. The two roles cannot coexist without
compromising a pilot's duty to safely operate his or her
aircraft.
Now, I understand that reasonable can differ on important
issues, and I respect the fact that some of my fellow
commercial pilots, including Captain Worth, whose position has
now changed, have a different view of this legislation. And I
believe congressional supporters of S. 2554 are certainly well-
intentioned. However, the unintended consequences of arming
pilots in a confined cockpit are too alarming and potentially
disastrous to disregard.
I have several concerns. First, this legislation completely
undermines Congress' intent to make hardened cockpit doors an
unbreachable line of defense so flight crews with a threatened
aircraft can safely land as quickly as possible. Second, it
compromises the safety of the cockpit. And, third, it
contradicts key provisions of last year's security law.
As Congress envisioned, the cockpit door has become a
significant line of defense. And, in fact, I feel much more
secure in the flight deck today as a result of hardened cockpit
doors, which are now being installed, and tough protocols that
severely restrict those times when the cockpit door can be
opened.
This bill, however, would create a dangerous breach. Having
a firearm in the cockpit creates a temptation, and more likely
an imperative, for flight crews to open the flight deck door in
dangerous and chaotic cabin situations. That is exactly the
wrong direction for this Congress to give flight crews. These
are precisely the times that the cockpit should remain closed
while the pilots land the aircraft as quickly as possible. Your
conclusion that hardened cockpit doors are the most effective
way to protect the cockpit remains valid today.
In case you haven't been in a cockpit of a commercial
aircraft, it's extremely cramped quarters. Pilots are literally
shoe-horned in among equipment and monitors from floor to the
ceiling. The legislation would add a lethal firearm to this
proverbial China shop. What happens if a firearm discharges in
the cockpit inadvertently or otherwise? Bullets could kill or
incapacitate members of the cockpit flight crew, or they could
strike one of the critical systems required for safe flight.
Mr. Chairman, I concede that these are worst-case
scenarios; however, I am trained, and I train other pilots, to
address worst-case scenarios. That is the most effective way to
ensure the passengers arrive safely at their destinations.
By no means, however, are these scenarios farfetched.
According to at least one study, 21 percent of police officers
killed with a handgun were shot with their own service weapon.
Struggles for control of firearms are not uncommon and, sadly,
neither are accidents involving firearms.
Contrary to the intent of heightened screening directives
in the new law, the legislation will lead to a proliferation of
firearms being carried into the sterile security areas of
airports and onboard aircraft. It could have the unintended
effect of drawing a road map where terrorists could procure
lethal weapons. Any pilot in uniform would be viewed as being a
potential repository of a lethal firearm.
Air marshals, on the other hand, do not present the same
threat, because they are anonymous. Onboard the aircraft, the
legislation would simply draw a road map straight to the
cockpit for terrorists seeking lethal weapons. Simply put,
there is not guarantee that firearms are brought to the airport
and into the cockpit will remain in the hands of the guys with
the white hats.
Before I conclude my remarks, I want to address a specific
argument that's been made by the proponents of arming pilots.
As a former Navy aviator and a commercial airline captain,
there is nothing I want more than to prevent a scenario in
which the military might be called upon to shoot down a
commercial aircraft. I would suggest, however, that the
objective of security legislation be to prevent any loss of
life onboard aircraft or on the ground resulting from
terrorism-related activity or our responses to it. We need to
carefully and thoughtfully heighten security without creating a
greater risk than the one we seek to address.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by again thanking you and
your senators for the opportunity to speak before you today,
and I certainly would be happy to take questions.
[The prepared statement of Captain Davidson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Edward M. Davidson, Director, Flight
Safety and Quality Assurance, Northwest Airlines
Chairman Hollings, Ranking Member McCain, and other Members of this
distinguished Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today. I appreciate the chance to explain why, in the real world of a
cramped cockpit where there is no margin for error, permitting
commercial pilots to carry and use lethal firearms threatens safety
more than it potentially will improve it. Moreover, I am grateful for
the opportunity to explain how the legislation undermines Congress'
intent to make hardened cockpit doors an impenetrable protective shield
for flight crews, and how it dangerously contradicts a flight crews'
first responsibility to give its undivided attention to safely land a
threatened aircraft as quickly as possible. Simply put, S. 2554 and
H.R. 4635 raise more troubling safety questions than they provide
security answers.
My name is Edward Davidson and I have been a commercial airline
pilot for 24 years. For the past 13 years, I have served as a Captain
for Northwest Airlines and I currently am its Director for Flight
Safety and Quality Assurance. I also presently serve as an Instructor
Pilot and Check Airman for the Airbus 320 aircraft and previously
served in a similar capacity on the MD-80, DC9 and B-727. My flying
career, that includes more than 20,000 flight hours, began with service
to our Country in Vietnam as a U.S. Navy pilot. In 1994, I retired as a
Commander in the U.S. Naval Reserve.
At the outset, let me thank the Committee and the Congress for your
ongoing efforts to improve aviation security. Quick passage of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 after the horrific
events of September 11 was a great comfort to the traveling public, and
particularly those of us who work onboard commercial aircraft. The
Committee's continuing vigilance to ensure the new security law is
fully and thoughtfully implemented is greatly appreciated.
Mr. Chairman, I am a professional commercial airline pilot. When I
am on duty, my singular focus is, and always must be, the safe
operation of my aircraft. Commercial pilots operate in an environment
where there is zero margin for error. It is a demanding profession
where the failure at any time to give one's undivided attention to the
safe operation of one's aircraft can have catastrophic consequences. I
fully subscribe to the view my colleague, Captain Duane Woerth,
expressed in testimony before this distinguished Committee last Fall--
``We can't be Sky King and Wyatt Earp at the same time.'' The two roles
cannot coexist without necessarily compromising a pilot's paramount
duty to safely operate his or her aircraft.
Reasonable people can differ on important issues. I respect the
fact that some of my fellow commercial pilots, including Captain
Woerth, whose position has changed, have a different view of this
legislation. I also believe Congressional supporters of S. 2554 and
H.R. 4635 are well-intended. However, the unintended consequences of
arming pilots in a confined cockpit are too alarming and potentially
disastrous to disregard. In my professional judgement, the reduction in
safety that undoubtedly will result from blurring the flight crews'
singular focus on the safe operation of its aircraft will make the
skies more dangerous rather than safer.
Let me now turn to the most significant and troubling unintended
consequences of this legislation that strongly cut against its
enactment. These include the fact the legislation (1) completely
undermines Congress' intent to make hardened cockpit doors an
impenetrable line of defense so flight crews with a threatened aircraft
can safely land the aircraft as quickly as possible at the nearest
airport feasible, (2) increases the probability of operational errors,
(3) compromises the safety of the cockpit and (4) undermines key
provisions of last year's security law.
First, the legislation undermines this Committee and Congress'
intent in the new security law to make secured cockpit doors the best
line of defense against an aircraft being commandeered for terrorist
purposes. Your conclusion that hardened cockpit doors are the most
effective way to protect the cockpit remains valid today. In fact, I
feel much more secure in the flight deck today as a result of hardened
cockpit doors which have been installed and tough protocols that
severely restrict when the cockpit door can be opened. As Congress
envisioned, the cockpit door has become a significant line of defense.
Importantly, relying on this approach, the goal of protecting the
cockpit has been accomplished in a manner that does not produce
unintended dangers for passengers, the aircraft itself and the flight
crew.
The legislation would create a dangerous breach in the hardened
cockpit door line of defense you championed last year. It also directly
contradicts a pilot's first priority to safely land a threatened
aircraft as quickly as possible at the nearest airport feasible which
hardening of cockpit doors was intended to facilitate. Specifically, by
having a firearm in the cockpit, it creates a temptation, and more
likely an imperative, for flight crews to open the cockpit door in
dangerous and chaotic situations. That is exactly the wrong direction
for Congress to give flight crews in such circumstances. Those are
precisely the times a cockpit door should remain closed and act as an
impenetrable shield so the pilots can safely land the aircraft as
quickly as possible. There is a more effective and safer alternative to
lethal firearms in the cockpit. It is reasonable cockpit door
protection which you identified and mandated last year, and it is a
prudent solution that is working.
Second, arming pilots will erode their ability to operate aircraft
at the same level of safety that exists today. Human performance
studies by NASA Ames Research and other academic bodies consistently
show that the more you add to a pilot's workload and create variances
from his or her normal routine, the higher the likelihood for human
error in all aspects of that pilot's performance. In a profession where
human mistakes today account for 60 percent of all air carrier
incidents and accidents, the safety of the traveling public demands
this potential negative impact of the legislation on operational errors
not be glossed over.
Mr. Chairman, despite all the high technology and automation in
today's commercial aircraft, humans operate them. The airline pilot's
job is a demanding one. Modern jet aircraft present complex systems and
management demands of their pilot operators in variable environments.
Workload is further intensified by adverse weather, heavy traffic
density and the need for accurate communications. Add to that mix
multiple time zones, complex reasoning and rapid decision-making with
life or death consequences and the result is a recipe for human beings
experiencing mental and physical stress. This is especially the case
during takeoff, approach, landing and abnormal operations or with
inoperative equipment. Like any human, airline pilots are the most
operationally reliable and least prone to error when experiencing only
a minimal to moderate workload.
Studies show time after time that human performance and error
reduction depend on the stability of the workload as much as the level
of workload. Workload stability is critical. This is why all airlines
attempt to stabilize workloads and decrease the likelihood of
unexpected demand on crews as much as possible by employing pre-
designed checklists and procedures and training on workload management
techniques. These safeguards are designed to decrease unexpected pilot-
required input and thereby create a structure intended to minimize the
occurrence of human operational errors. The effectiveness of these
measures has been impressive as accidents and incidents attributable to
pilot errors continue to decline substantially.
The potential addition of firearms to the flight deck turns these
efforts on their head. It would create workload instability and
sacrifice predictability by creating the opportunity for a whole new
series of demands on pilots. New decisions such as determining if a
life-threatening event is occurring, whether to open the cockpit door
to confront suspected air terrorists, and whether to draw the weapon
and on whom and when to fire undoubtedly would present a potentially
significant new and unpredictable increase in workload. Keep in mind,
these disruptions in workload stability occur at the very time a pilot
simultaneously is trying to safely operate the aircraft. To call the
magnitude of this adverse impact on routine workload management
overwhelming would be a gross understatement. In my judgment, the
resulting potential increase in operational errors could jeopardize
safe aircraft operations to a greater extent then the threat to the
flight deck crew, cabin crew and passengers this legislation is
intended to address.
Mr. Chairman, there are some pilots who might say carrying a
firearm is not a big deal. They also might dismiss my admonition and
say the red flag I raise today about negative cascading impacts on
operational errors is unwarranted. However, I believe it to be self-
evident and incontestable that carrying and potentially using a lethal
firearm in a crowded and potentially chaotic setting aboard a
commercial airliner while piloting that aircraft across the skies at
hundreds of miles per hour would undeniably add both stress and
instability to a pilot's workload. Common sense and scientific studies
confirm that scenarios such as this have the potential to impact
overall performance and increase the possibility of human error.
Authorizing a dual law enforcement role for a pilot, even if he or she
does not believe it is a big deal, has the high likelihood of
negatively impacting safety performance.
Third, there are potentially grave unintended consequences and
risks inherent in having a lethal firearm in the flight deck. For good
reason, there has been considerable discussion of the dangers of pilots
and highly trained air marshals discharging firearms in the passenger
cabin of commercial aircraft. The threat to innocent passengers of
being inadvertently shot must be considered very carefully. So too
should the potential harm to the structural integrity of the aircraft
if it is pierced by a bullet. Today, however, I would like to focus on
the area of aircraft I know best, the flight deck.
In case that you have not been in the cockpit of a commercial
aircraft, it is extremely cramped quarters. Pilots are literally shoe-
horned in among equipment and monitors from the floor to the ceiling.
The legislation would add a lethal firearm to this proverbial ``china
shop.'' This is where the unintended consequences of the legislation
become especially frightening.
What happens if the firearm discharges in the cockpit? Irrespective
of whether the gun is inadvertently discharged, accidentally fired
during a wrestling match with an inebriated passenger or deliberately
fired at an assumed attacker, every scenario is potentially ominous for
passengers and the survivability of the aircraft. Bullets could kill or
incapacitate all members of the cockpit flight crew rendering them
unable to fly the aircraft. They could pierce the flight deck windows
creating a potentially catastrophic cockpit decompression rendering it
impossible for the flight crew to control the aircraft. They could
strike one of the many multi-functional instruments putting at risk
numerous safety critical systems. Or, a stray bullet through the floor
could strike critical electronic navigation equipment located beneath
the flight deck.
Mr. Chairman, I concede these are worse case scenarios. I am
trained, and train others pilots, to address worse case scenarios. That
is the most effective way to ensure passengers arrive safely at their
destination. By no means, however, are these scenarios far-fetched.
According to at least one study, 21 percent of police officers killed
with a handgun were shot with their own service weapon. Struggles for
control of firearms are not uncommon. Sadly, nor are accidents
involving firearms.
As a Captain, given the delicate and cramped confines of the
cockpit, it is the last place on an airborne commercial aircraft where
I would want a wrestling match to occur, much less one involving the
potential for stray bullets being fired. The inherent risk that the
legislation compromises the safety of the cockpit reinforces my belief
the proposed legislative response may well create greater risk for
passengers, crews and innocent people on the ground than the threat it
is intended to address.
Finally, I wish to take the opportunity to identify implications of
the legislation that may inadvertently undermine the multi-layered
security system the new security law seeks to enhance. Specifically, I
am referring to the implications of the legislation for airport and
onboard security.
As I understand, the principal objective of the new security law
was to ensure the sterile areas in the air travel security chain are in
fact free of lethal and potentially lethal weapons that diabolical
people could use to wreak death and destruction. Yet, the legislation
pending before you could have precisely the opposite effect. In fact,
it could lead to a proliferation of firearms being carried in the
security sterile areas of airports and onboard aircraft. The Committee
should carefully consider both the ramifications this might have and
the consequences that might result from it.
As we tighten security at screening checkpoints to ensure lethal
weapons do not pass into security sterile airport areas beyond them,
the legislation could have the unintended effect of drawing a roadmap
where terrorists could procure lethal weapons inside the sterile area.
Any pilot in uniform would be viewed as being a potential repository of
a firearm. Air marshals do not present the same threat because they are
anonymous. Pilots could be followed and their flight bag could be
stolen or taken by force. If this seems unrealistic, just consider how
often you see pilots at airports put down their flight bag to use the
restroom or make a telephone call.
This legislation also has the potential to make airports armories
for pilot firearms. Where will pilots store their firearms? Do you
expect pilots to leave their weapons at the airport or take them to the
crew hotel? If the former, would it promote or rather threaten
passenger safety to have a stockpile of weapons stored at the airport?
I believe these are questions the Committee needs to carefully
consider.
Onboard the aircraft, security has been based on the premise that
we want to keep lethal weapons off aircraft. An exception to this
general rule was understandably made for air marshals who are highly
trained and, more importantly, singularly focused on law enforcement
responsibilities. This legislation dismisses this principle and in its
place welcomes lethal weapons onboard commercial aircraft under the
apparent belief that they would be used solely to protect passengers. I
wish we could make that assumption with certainty but we cannot.
Firearms can and do end up in the wrong hands. As I mentioned earlier,
one study shows that 21 percent of police officers killed with a
handgun were shot with their own weapon. Simply put, there is no
guarantee that firearms brought into the cockpit will remain in the
hands of the ``good guys'' and be used to protect passengers.
Like the airport scenario I described a moment ago, another area of
concern is that the legislation would inadvertently draw a roadmap
straight to the cockpit for terrorists seeking lethal weapons onboard
the aircraft. Whether or not a particular flight crew has volunteered
to participate in the program, there will be the general perception
that firearms may be available in the cockpit. In the spirit of
thwarting efforts by terrorists, we could inadvertently be presenting
them with an opportunity.
Before I conclude my remarks, I want to address a viscerally
powerful argument made by proponents of arming pilots. This is the
argument that if Congress fails to arm pilots it increases the risk
that the military will be called upon to shoot down a commercial
aircraft. As a former Naval aviator and a commercial airline Captain,
there is nothing I want more to prevent than that scenario. I would
suggest, however, that the Committee should broaden and reframe the
issue. The objective should be to prevent any loss of life onboard
aircraft or on the ground resulting from terrorism-related activity or
responses to it. If we put in place an unwise and dangerous measure
such as arming pilots with lethal firearms that leads to a wrestling
match in the cockpit and a resulting crash, loved one's of lost
passengers, crew and fatalities on the ground would grieve no less. We
need to carefully and thoughtfully heighten security without creating a
greater risk than the underlying one we seek to address.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by again thanking you for the chance
to testify today. Also, let me reiterate my appreciation to you,
Ranking Member McCain and this distinguished Committee for your
leadership and diligence on aviation security matters. I urge you to
very carefully consider the proposal before you that would permit
commercial pilots to carry and use lethal firearms. Upon full and
careful review, I believe the facts and serious questions that arise
will lead you to join me in concluding that S. 2554 should not be
enacted because it threatens air safety more than it potentially would
improve it.
The Chairman. Very good.
Captain Luckey?
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN STEPHEN LUCKEY, CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL FLIGHT SECURITY COMMITTEE, AIRLINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION
Captain Luckey. Yes, sir, good morning.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Burns, distinguished members of the
Committee, I'm Captain Steve Luckey, and I'm chairman of the
National Flight Security Committee of the Airline Pilots
Association. And in that capacity, I represent the security
interests of some 67,000 pilots that fly for 43 airlines in the
United States and Canada. I have submitted a written statement
for the record, by the way.
My comments today reflect the feelings of pilots beyond the
scope of this membership. And I guess disagreement is healthy.
We have a very different approach and a very different
viewpoint of the--addressing the threat.
Protecting the aircraft is a team effort. It's something
that both the flight attendants and the pilots need the proper
tools, and the training, and the tactile knowledge to
effectively address the threat. Today I want to address the
protection of the cockpit, the arming of pilots, a little bit
about verification, and also something about--address the cargo
security issue.
I'm confident that I can build a strong case for our
position and clear up many misconceptions regarding the armed-
pilots issue. First of all, we're not trying to put guns out
into society and arm the general population or anything like
that. What we're going to do is--what we're proposing to do is
to arm sworn federal law-enforcement officers that just happen
to be pilots. They will be there for the limited defense of the
cockpit proper. That weapon will not be used in any way, shape,
or form outside of the cockpit, and it will be used as a last
line of defense to get the aircraft on the ground in the event
of an intrusion.
It may be of interest to you that in the 1970s I was
selected and trained by the FBI as a pilot to carry firearms
onboard an aircraft. It was a very small program, very elite.
It was something that was requested by the president of our
airline. It was--I was trained by the FBI. It was approved by
the FAA at that particular time. It was not always a pleasant
experience. Custodial responsibility of a firearm--I've been
carrying it for many, many years--is definitely something
that's very serious. I thoroughly believed in the concept at
that time. I thoroughly support it now, and I believe that we
need it in this day more than we have ever needed it before.
We never recommended arming all the pilots. That's not what
we want to do. As a matter of fact, only probably a small
percentage would ever go through the process. It's--the
statistics indicate that about--somewhere between 75 and 80
percent of the people support it that fly. That's an
overwhelming majority of numbers. The public supports it, and
you heard the statistics today.
The pilots would go through a brief but very exacting
training program. The selection process would be very much like
that for the recruitment of any other federal agent. You would
go through a selection process. First of all, it's completely
voluntary. The volunteers would be subjected to an interview,
background check, and suitable training for that to see if
they're suitable for the particular task at hand.
Do we need this capability? I think we must be able to
predictably protect the cockpit from terrorist attack. We need
a central piece of emergency equipment. And that's all this is,
is a piece of emergency equipment. Its purpose is to defend
against a demonstrated threat, or the alternative is to be shot
down by an F-15 or F-16. I think we need something between that
door, which--there isn't a barrier in the world that cannot be
defeated by a dedicated individual who is willing to pay the
ultimate price to get through that barrier. That's been
demonstrated successfully many, many times.
I believe that the armed cockpit program will create a high
level of deterrence. I think it's efficient, and I think it's
relatively economical, when you look at the costs that we're
talking about here and the money and the budget and--been
mentioned this morning. Pilots are exceptionally well-suited
for the task, and the public definitely, overwhelmingly
supports this particular concept.
Some argue that the new doors, the federal air-marshal
program, the improvements in the security program negate the
need to arm aircraft. I disagree with that wholeheartedly. I
think that that's a misconception, and it's a very dangerous
thing, tactically, to assume something that this particular
element can very well address, and that is to ultimately
guarantee that, in the event that that door is breached--and
doors aren't always closed; they're opened--and if you look at
the Israeli concept, it's easy to see that the new proposed
door does not in any way address the Israeli tactical concept
of having the double doors with the mantrap concept in between,
and the submarine tactic whereby only one door is opened at any
one time. They have a marshal on every aircraft. We don't have
that luxury. We have them only on a small percentage. And they
also have a kill zone in front of that door. They're very
pragmatic. It's been my experience that we're not quite ready
to go there, where the Israelis are. They put the oil on the
squeak. We're not quite ready to do that.
All layers of security contain some level of--and these
levels need to be increased. They need to be more dedicated.
They need to be more finite as you approach that principal
point of protection, which is the cockpit. We have to, at all--
to use all methods and all capabilities and all tactics and all
tools to adequately address this threat. It's a very pervasive
issue, and, you know, it's something I've very passionate
about, as you can see.
Since 1987, ALPA has worked very hard to establish access
control verification in our system, and we've developed--worked
with a company in Minneapolis to develop a very economical
system to do this. The card's about 50 cents, and it costs less
than two cents per transaction. But we don't know right now
that the armed--the guys getting on the airplanes with guns are
who they say they are. The GAO study in 2000, you know, they
breached 19 federal buildings and, you know, two airports with
bogus IDs.
We are recommending that we establish an independent, not-
for-profit organization to handle this particular thing, like a
transportation-workers identification card, the TWIC. We also
strive for one level of security, that one level of security is
the same, it should be, on passenger or cargo aircraft. Cargo
aircraft are vulnerable right now. Terrorists have been known
to occupy containers and ship themselves onboard vessels.
There's nothing to prohibit that they couldn't do that on a
particular aircraft in our business. The known shipper concept
just doesn't quite--it's not enough to adequately address the
screening of cargo.
Thank you for allowing me to present the cockpit
perspective and helping us to acquire the tools, the training,
and the tactical knowledge to return to our families alive.
That's what we want to do. Eight pilots didn't make it on
September 11, 2001.
And I'd be happy to answer any questions. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Captain Luckey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Stephen Luckey, Chairman, National Flight
Security Committee, Airline Pilots Association
Good morning. I am Captain Stephen Luckey, chairman of the Airline
Pilots Association International's National Flight Security Committee.
ALPA is the nation's largest pilot union, representing more than 67,000
pilots who fly for 43 airlines in the U.S. and Canada. We are
appreciative of the Committee's interest in the subject of aviation
security and for soliciting our views on it.
It is no secret that the Transportation Security Administration is
struggling to perform the job that it has been assigned by Congress.
The tasks of building a new security agency and complying with the
numerous mandates given it are monumental. However, the work has been
greatly hampered by the agency's demonstrated unwillingness to
coordinate and work with the aviation industry on virtually anything.
The recent resignation of the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA's) Under Secretary, John Magaw, undoubtedly creates greater short-
term turmoil. However, we are hopeful that under the guidance of the
new Under Secretary, James Loy, the TSA will begin to initiate serious
efforts to build partnerships with the aviation industry that will lead
to genuine progress on needed security reforms.
In my testimony today, I would like to speak to three specific
issues that are important to our members, namely, the federal flight
deck officer program, access control and identity verification systems,
and cargo security.
Federal Flight Deck Officers
The subject of arming pilots is one that has generated significant
public debate and no small amount of misunderstanding. I am confident
that we can build a strong case for our position today, which ALPA was
the first to recommend to Congress last September, and at the same time
help to clear up some pervasive misconceptions surrounding this topic.
My further remarks contain rebuttals to some of the more common
arguments raised against arming pilots, but I would at this time like
to rebut the most politically charged argument voiced against this
program. That argument says that pilots should not be armed because
doing so would introduce tens of thousands of new weapons into our
society. This statement is both specious and misleading because the
individuals who will bear those arms will be sworn law enforcement
officers who are armed for the defense of their limited, cockpit
jurisdiction and, ultimately the protection of the passengers for whom
they are responsible. We doubt that the proponents of such an argument
have given due consideration to its full ramifications, but suffice it
to say that we see no point in comparing the arming of sworn federal
agents with the arming of the general population.
I would like to offer a perspective on the need for arming pilots
that perhaps you have not considered. Eight pilots were killed on
September 11th. The deaths of those eight pilots resulted in the
transfer of aircraft control from authorized crewmembers to terrorists
bent on destroying our country and its people. More than 3,000 people
were murdered, billions of dollars of property damage was incurred, the
nation's economy was rocked and is still suffering, thousands of people
were laid off, and billions of dollars of new spending will be
allocated to security both in this country and around the globe for
years to come--all because eight pilots were killed. It is obvious, or
should be, that protecting the flight deck and its occupants against
hijackers is now tantamount to protecting our national economy. We are
convinced that the ailing airline industry, which is still profusely
hemorrhaging red ink, could virtually disappear if another successful
attack is launched against us. If the airline industry takes another
downward spiral, it most certainly will harm hundreds of businesses as
well.
The real tragedy in all of this is that the hijackings of September
11th were avoidable. More than 40 years ago, during the height of the
Cuban hijacking crisis, we called for strengthening flight deck doors
and arming pilots, among other measures. In 1961, the FAA amended
federal aviation regulations, with Congressional support, to permit
pilots to be armed with the consent of their airline but the agency
removed that regulatory language in July 2001. Senate bill S. 2554 will
restore the framework of, and improve upon, what was so recently
removed from federal regulations.
An Ongoing Threat
To underscore the risks that we face, I would like to pose three
questions and follow them with the answers. First, is there still a
risk of terrorists assuming control of an airliner and crashing it into
a building? The answer that we are hearing from the Justice Department,
the Office of Homeland Defense, the TSA and numerous other sources is
an emphatic ``yes.'' Transport aircraft, regardless of whether they
carry passengers or cargo, must from now on be viewed as potential
human-guided missiles if they fall into the hands of a suicidal
terrorist. Osama bin Laden's henchmen were remarkably patient,
thorough, as well trained as any special operations unit in the world,
and employed surprise attacks to great advantage using relatively
innocuous weapons that they knew would go unchallenged through security
checkpoints. From their perspective, the operation was a great success,
not only in terms of damage, but also with respect to the amount of
global media attention their acts garnered. History has shown that
terrorists endeavor to repeat successes, so we must prudently assume
that our enemies are planning for yet another airliner attack.
Second, if terrorists board an aircraft with the intention of
hijacking it, will they be armed only with box cutters as they were
before? We think that the answer to that is ``probably not.'' The
element of surprise from a box cutter-type attack is gone and small
knives are now confiscated at security checkpoints, so we must assume
that terrorists will be armed with some other weapons, which could
include guns not taken through screening checkpoints and/or undetected
explosives.
We have an unfortunate habit in this country of preparing for the
type of security breach that most recently occurred--this is the
equivalent of locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen.
What we must do instead is address, to the best of our knowledge and
ability, all of the potential threats that exist, not just those that
we have most recently experienced. Many in the airline industry and
some in government seem to believe that we should not prepare to
counter anything but close-quarters combat by unarmed assailants. Such
tunnel vision is foolhardy and leaves us pitifully unprepared for the
various types of hijacking attempts that may well lie ahead.
Lastly, do we possess the will to do all that we can to avoid
another catastrophe? I can tell you without equivocation that many
pilots are willing and prepared to assume the responsibility for
training and carrying a weapon. They are willing to do so as both a
deterrent against hijacking attempts and as a means of preventing an
attempt from becoming successful. The U.S. House of Representatives has
demonstrated with its vote on H.R. 4635 that it is resolved to avoid
another catastrophe. We believe that the Senate should also take such a
stand, which will have a strong deterrent effect against future
hijackings and help restore the confidence of the traveling public in
aviation.
You may be interested to know that I am one of about a dozen pilots
selected in the mid-1970's to be trained by the FBI to carry a firearm
while performing my duties as a pilot. My airline's president and the
FAA approved that carriage to protect against the hijackings that were
prevalent then. From my personal experience, I can tell you that I did
not particularly enjoy being armed during the 15 years that I carried a
firearm--but it was a duty that I voluntarily undertook. The weapon was
worn at all times, which is an inconvenience, and there was definitely
an increased level of responsibility and restriction of my activity
that went with being armed. However, I thought that it was necessary to
be armed then, and I believe that it is even more necessary for
qualified and properly trained pilots to be armed now. We could wish
that our threat situation was such that it would be unnecessary for
pilots to be armed, but the events of September 11th and the ongoing
threat of further violence against airlines make it a necessity, in our
view.
Misconceptions
There are many misconceptions about the provisions of S. 2554,
although there are fewer now than when we first proposed the arming of
pilots. It should be common knowledge, but in case it is not, we have
never recommended arming all pilots or making the arming of pilots a
condition of employment. Rather, the federal flight deck officer
program requires that pilots:
Volunteer to participate. Only pilots who volunteer to
subject themselves to individual scrutiny, intense security
training, proficiency testing, and the responsibility that goes
with carrying a firearm would be allowed to enter the program.
Having carried a firearm on the flight deck, I know the
challenges that must be met in order to make this program work.
Stated another way, however, I know from firsthand experience
that arming pilots can work and that doing so in 2002 will
merely build on what has been done successfully before.
Be selected for training only after meeting strict, federal
qualification standards. Each pilot who volunteers to become a
federal flight deck officer would be professionally evaluated,
like other federal law enforcement officer candidates, to
determine aptitude for carrying and firing a weapon, exercising
judgment, using lethal force against an attacker, and other
abilities. We do not expect that everyone who desires to be
armed will be armed, due to the need to meet the very highest
law enforcement standards. However, many in our ranks are
former military and law enforcement officers, or have other
pertinent qualifications, and are quite familiar and
experienced with firearms. Those individuals will make
excellent candidates as federal flight deck officers.
Undergo training, provided by a federal law enforcement
agency, specific to protecting the flight deck. Candidates
should be provided approximately 48 hours of comprehensive
training on all subjects pertaining to defense of the flight
deck. These would include lessons on the law, the continuum of
force, firearms training from a seated position and at close
range, tactics and other related topics. We have recommended
setting the shooting proficiency standard at 100 percent,
higher than any law enforcement officer is required to meet.
Doing so will provide a very high confidence level by the TSA
and the flying public that the federal flight deck officer is
prepared to protect the flight deck in the safest manner
possible.
Be deputized as federal officers with jurisdiction
restricted to the flight deck. Pilots would be given
jurisdiction only to make arrests and take defensive actions
for acts of interference with, or assault upon, the flight crew
in the flight deck. Pilots will not be trained to nor tasked
with discharging their weapon in the cabin.
Reasons to Protect the Flight Deck with Federal Flight Deck Officers
Reasonable people may disagree about the need for arming pilots to
protect the flight deck, but we are convinced that very strong
arguments can be made in favor of creating the federal flight deck
officer program:
It would protect aviation's most important zone of
defense--the flight deck. The U.S. Secret Service provides
protection to VIPs using what they refer to as zones of
defense. A VIP is protected by the most concentrated forces
within the innermost zone. The flight deck is the inner, and
most important, zone of defense for aviation security. Security
measures are needed to protect the outer zones, such as
explosive detection equipment and better training, but they are
not a substitute for protecting the inner zone. Ultimately, if
a terrorist is able to penetrate other zones of defense and
enter the flight deck, the pilots need the proper resource--in
this case, a firearm--to respond forcefully and successfully to
such a life-threatening emergency.
It may prevent the need for a U.S. fighter airplane to
shoot down an airliner full of innocent passengers and
crewmembers. An illogical conundrum has been unintentionally
created by the Administration's failure to act decisively to
arm pilots. Pilots are not empowered to defend themselves
against hijackers, but our own fighter aircraft, sometimes
flown by military reserve airline pilots, will be dispatched to
shoot down an airliner if hijackers gain control of it. We
believe that our pilots should be provided the resources that
they need to defend themselves against terrorists so that they
and their passengers are at less risk of being shot down by our
own military.
It will create a high level of deterrence. Once terrorists
learn that the U.S. has decided to begin arming pilots,
commercial aviation becomes a much less inviting target, which
is exactly what is needed. Even if only a fraction of the
flights have one or more armed flight deck officers, terrorists
will be unable to determine which ones are not protected.
Ultimately, this deterrence will also reduce the likelihood
that a pilot will ever need to fire a weapon while on the
aircraft.
The program will be highly effective and efficient. The
flight deck officer program will not require the creation of a
new, paid workforce. We can think of no other countermeasure
against hijackings that comes close to the effectiveness and
efficiency of using pilots to defend their own workplace. No
one has a greater interest in doing so, and no one will take it
more seriously.
Pilots are exceptionally well-suited for protecting the
flight deck. We believe that no one is more highly qualified
for protecting the flight deck than pilots. Pilots are
undoubtedly the most highly scrutinized employees in the work
force, submitting to a battery of pre-employment evaluations, a
flight physical every six months, random drug and alcohol
testing, and a criminal history records check, among other
formal examinations. Additionally, pilots are constantly
interacting with and undergoing de facto monitoring by their
airline's management, their peers, FAA personnel, and others.
Pilots' high level of discipline, attention to detail and ability
to adhere to strict, standardized protocols lend very favorably to
proficiency in safe, firearms handling. Furthermore, many pilots have
former law enforcement or military backgrounds. We doubt that anyone is
prepared to raise a reasonable concern about arming an airline pilot
who formerly served as an FBI special agent or decorated special forces
operative--these are the kinds of individuals who are prepared to serve
as federal flight deck officers.
The public supports it. Numerous polls of the general
public have been taken to gauge support for arming pilots. Each
of the polls that we have seen has indicated a high level of
approval for letting pilots defend themselves in their
workplace. This is in spite of the fact that the citizenry has
little, if any, knowledge of the safeguards that will be built
into this program. Returning the airline industry to strong
profitability and growth depends on bringing passengers back to
the airplanes. Passengers are unlikely to return to pre-
September 11th traffic levels unless and until they are
confident about security. The passengers will not gain that
confidence until they see evidence that pilots express the view
that they are well equipped to counter any hijacking attempt.
Rebuttals to Arguments Against Arming Pilots
It has been our experience that the more an individual knows about
the federal flight deck officer program, the more likely they are to
support it. We have found this to be true even within our own ranks.
Those who are less familiar with the program have raised several
arguments against arming pilots that deserve to be addressed. Following
are a few of the more commonly raised arguments against a flight deck
protection program, and our answers to them.
New cockpit doors make arming of pilots unnecessary. The
newly designed, enhanced-security doors that are required by
the FAA are not yet installed on the U.S. airline fleet, and
that task will not be completed until at least April 2003.
Neither the current cockpit doors (with interim measures in
place to strengthen them) nor the new cockpit doors are
impenetrable, and we are convinced that a team of trained
terrorists could well decide to prove that point.
Furthermore, airliners will have only one hardened cockpit door--a
door which must be opened during flight to enable the pilots to use the
lavatory and gain access to the passenger cabin as required for other
purposes. Any passageway into the cockpit, no matter how well
fortified, still holds the potential of a threat to the flight deck.
It is worth noting that the respected airline El Al uses
two doors on all of its aircraft to protect the flight deck,
along with a team of air marshals on each flight and an armed
guard who protects an entrance zone in front of the door near
the passengers. Per El Al procedures, the doors are never
opened simultaneously to help ensure that unauthorized access
to the flight deck is denied. While we strongly support the
installation of a new, hardened flight deck door on U.S.
aircraft as an additional layer of security, we should not fool
ourselves into thinking that they are sufficient to protect the
flight crew under all circumstances.
The cost of arming and training pilots is too high. There
is no question that there will be some expense associated with
training pilots and equipping them with firearms. The program
that we envision would require 48 hours of intensive training
and recurrent proficiency training. However, from the research
that we have done on this issue, the cost of training and
equipping pilots to carry firearms is the most efficient and
cost-effective measure that the airlines can take to guard
against further hijackings, bar none. In fact, these costs will
be a mere fraction of the billions proposed for other, less
effective security enhancements. S. 2554 even proposes that the
government pay the cost of training, which relieves the
airlines from any cost concerns. Lastly, we must consider how
many billions of dollars have been drained, and will be
drained, from the national economy because airline pilots were
not armed on September 11, 2001.
Airlines face liability if an armed pilot makes a mistake.
This concern is satisfactorily addressed in S. 2554 by pre-
empting liability of the carriers and pilots for actions
relating to protection of the flight deck.
Pilots are too busy flying the aircraft to use a gun.
Pilots are trained to do numerous tasks simultaneously--
individuals who cannot do so are unable to become airline
pilots. One of the tasks that they must be prepared to perform
is using fire extinguishers if a fire breaks out in the
cockpit, regardless of other pressing duties. A suggestion that
pilots should ignore the fire and continue to fly the aircraft
would be ludicrous; yet some have suggested that pilots should
ignore terrorists breaking into the cockpit and continue to fly
the aircraft. To be blunt, it is very difficult to fly an
airplane when someone is actively trying to kill you, and
impossible if they are successful.
An accidental discharge could damage the aircraft and/or
injure someone. This country made a decision approximately 40
years ago that use of firearms by airborne federal officers was
necessary to protect against hijackings. Some of the arguments
that have been raised against arming pilots must, to be
consistent, also be raised against armed Federal Air Marshals
(FAMs), namely: bullets could pierce the fuselage and cause
rapid decompression; an accidental discharge could injure or
kill someone; or, an aircraft system could be damaged by
gunfire. We have, rightly so, made a decision to accept those
potential outcomes as manageable risks because there is a need
for an armed law enforcement presence onboard the aircraft. No
one has more knowledge of what can happen on the aircraft, nor
will anyone be more conscientious about using a firearm
onboard, than the pilot.
Further, contrary to Hollywood movie depictions of aircraft
exploding in midair as a result of the discharge of a firearm in the
cabin, virtually no danger exists that multiple gunshots could cause
rapid decompression of a transport-category aircraft. The shooting
proficiency that we recommend for the flight deck officer program
exceeds that of federal law enforcement agents in order to minimize the
possibility of a stray round hitting an innocent passenger or
crewmember. If a weapon did cause rapid decompression during a struggle
for control of the aircraft, that event would pale in comparison to the
plane crashing into a building and killing all on board.
Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) on airliners make arming pilots
unnecessary. ALPA has historically been a strong supporter of
the FAM program, and we envision the flight deck officer
program as an extension of the FAMs. However, the number of
FAMs is limited and will certainly never be sufficient to
provide protection on each flight. Furthermore, a large band of
terrorists could overpower the FAM team--difficult though that
might be--and turn its attention to the flight deck, using the
FAMs' weapons. Ultimately, the flight crew must be able to
defend the cockpit regardless of what other resources may be in
the cabin.
We need to keep guns out of airplanes. Incredibly, even a
former high-ranking transportation official recently expressed
this view on television. The truth is that law enforcement
officers carry many weapons on our airplanes every day of the
year with very few problems. Furthermore, a significant
percentage of our members are former military and/or law
enforcement officers who have defended this country and its
neighborhoods using firearms. To suggest that these brave men
and women should not be entrusted with lethal means to defend
the flight deck against a lethal threat is, intentional or not,
highly insulting to them. The argument to keep guns out of
airplanes is also nullified by our nation's decision to place
armed FAMs on flights, as we have already said. To reiterate
another previous point, the debate about arming pilots is
really one about arming sworn federal officers who are
responsible for flying the aircraft.
No more terrorist attacks like those experienced on
September 11th will occur. This sentiment is merely wishful
thinking and cannot be substantiated. In fact, the intelligence
community and the TSA strongly indicate that the threat to
aviation is still very high.
Federal Flight Deck Officer Program Specifics
S. 2554 recognizes that an evaluation of the specifics of this
program is needed, to include selection of the best alternative from
several feasible options in the areas of selection and training,
tactics, and weapon carriage and stowage. In anticipation of the
program's development, we would like to offer some preliminary
recommendations on these issues, some of which are addressed in the
pending bill.
Selection and Training
In concert with ALPA's One Level of Security goal, the
program should be available to every commercial airline pilot,
regardless of the size of the aircraft or whether it carries
passengers or cargo. No arbitrary limits should be placed on
the number of pilots allowed to fly armed.
Weapon custody policy should be designed to be as practical
as possible, while accomplishing the goal of effective lethal
force cockpit protection.
Pilots volunteering for the program should be chosen in a
manner similar to that used to select any federal law
enforcement officer, including suitability for application of
lethal force.
Training should include instruction on basic safety, weapon
maintenance, retention, liability, force continuum and other
appropriate subject matter, as is provided to federal law
enforcement agents.
Training should be limited to the scope of protecting the
flight deck.
The live-fire portion of training should be designed for
the surgical application of lethal force at distances
appropriate to protecting the flight deck.
Flight deck-specific Fire Arms Training Scenarios (FATS)
should be created to provide virtual shoot/no-shoot exercises
to help teach the student judgment concerning use of the
weapon.
Simunitions (i.e., high-tech paint balls shot from a
firearm) training, which is used by the FAM program, should be
provided for live ``perpetrator'' assaults in a cockpit
simulator using modified versions of the officer's actual
firearm. This realism would be an excellent tool for building
confidence and teaching judgment.
All training required by the program can be accomplished in
a week, with approximately 48 hours of instruction. A longer
program will pose increased scheduling difficulties for the
pilots and airlines involved.
The firearm should be individually issued and available for
training and proficiency. Pilots will be encouraged to maintain
proficiency on their own time. Shooting proficiency re-
qualification should be conducted at least annually, but semi-
annually or more frequently is preferred.
The care of the firearm should be the responsibility of the
individual, with the exception of parts replacement and other
periodic armory maintenance.
Tactics
The firearm is viewed as an additional, essential piece of
emergency equipment. The pilot should be trained to a
demonstrated level of proficiency.
The firearm will be deployed in the same fashion as any
other piece of emergency equipment. In accordance with standard
operating procedures, the pilot not flying (PNF) will be
responsible for responding to a terrorist attack and the pilot
flying (PF) will fly the aircraft.
The firearm will be used exclusively to defend the flight
deck.
Training will include different types of tactical
responses, to reflect the types of assaults that may be
encountered.
Lethal force will be used with surgical precision against
assailants who are at very close range. Multiple assailants
wearing some type of body armor will be expected and tactics
appropriate to defend against such individuals will be
deployed.
Weapon Carriage and Stowage
There are many types of holsters and other retention
devices available, depending on the selected tactical approach.
The chest pack appears to be a practical solution for rapid
deployment and comfort. There is an accommodation for an
additional magazine in this device.
The standard method of weapon custody by law enforcement
agencies calls for the individual to carry the weapon on his
person at all times. This may not be the most practical
approach for pilots, considering the limited scope of flight
deck protection and the implication of carrying the weapon
frequently while deadheading. ALPA has suggested that firearms
could be stored on the aircraft, in airline flight operations
areas or carried at all times. Airlines, with pilot input,
should determine what type of weapon carriage works best for
their operation. This may be dependent on the type of aircraft
flown and other variables.
FAMs use a locked box to store their weapons while laying
over on international flights. Such a storage paradigm may be
useful for airline pilots, who already store their flight bags
in operations facilities at overnight airports.
Protection against accidental discharges (ADs) is a primary
consideration and must be kept foremost in mind for purposes of
training, weapon selection and stowage decisions.
Most ADs occur when the status of the weapon is checked or
changed, primarily when loading and unloading. Maintaining the
weapon in operational status has historically proven to be the
safest option.
The firearm should be available for practice and
proficiency training for the pilot.
There are several options available to address the
challenges inherent in weapon carriage. There are devices that
render the weapon into non-gun status, plus locks and
containers designed to limit access to them by unauthorized
persons.
International operations require separate considerations.
Some or all of these may be solved by means of bilateral
agreements currently in place and used by FAMs.
Access Control and Identity Verification Systems
ALPA has been promoting the need for positive, electronic
verification of identity and electronic airport access control systems
since 1987--shortly after the downing of PSA flight 1771 by an armed,
disgruntled, former airline employee. This mass murder, which bore
similarities to the hijackings of September 11th, was attributable in
large measure to identity-verification inadequacies that have yet to be
addressed 14 years later.
At ALPA's urging, the FAA required approximately 200 of the largest
commercial airports to install computerized access control systems in
the late 1980's and early 1990's. However, in spite of the entire
aviation industry's arguments to the contrary, the agency failed to (1)
create a detailed set of performance standards for use by the airport
operator community and (2) provide for the access control and
identification needs of the transient airline employee population. As
confirmed by the GAO in a 1995 report, this mismanagement was, and
still is, expensive for the airports and airlines--the initial estimate
of about $170 million for access controls actually rose to more than
$600 million, and the figures continue to climb. There are also
numerous costs that are difficult or impossible to compute stemming
from the inefficiencies related to transient airline employee's lack of
access at airports.
In the mid-1990's, the FAA, at ALPA's urging and with congressional
funding, conducted a test of what came to be called the Universal
Access System (UAS). Two million taxpayer dollars were spent on those
tests involving two major airlines and four large airports. For all
practical purposes, those funds were wasted. Although the FAA completed
successful tests of the UAS and standards were finalized for the system
in 1998, there was no implementation by any airline of the system, per
stated congressional intent. This failure came as a result of an FAA
policy to leave UAS implementation to the sole discretion of the
carriers.
Although magnetic stripe technology was used as the basis for UAS
tests, there are now several advanced, mature technologies that could
be used to positively identify authorized personnel. FAA last year
completed a study of a smart card-based system for identifying armed
law enforcement officers. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has
begun the development of a multi-modal Transportation Worker
Identification Card (TWIC) system that is also based on the smart card.
Smart card technology is much more secure than magnetic stripe
technology and has the additional capability of storing an extensive
amount of data that can be used for both security and other types of
uses. We have identified a number of applications for these cards
within a UAS or TWIC system, including:
Armed Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) identity verification. It is
very disturbing that the TSA has failed to implement a system for
positively verifying the identity of armed LEO's who travel on
commercial aircraft. Because of this failure, it is impossible to know
with confidence that each person who brings a firearm onto our aircraft
are actually employed as a police officer, Federal Air Marshal or
federal agent. News reports indicate that Al Qaeda has a copy of the
GAO's 2000 report on access control deficiencies at federal office
buildings and airports, so they are aware of our system's weakness in
this regard. A smart card system, or its equivalent, is needed to
address this ongoing hazard.
Electronic manifest and positive passenger-bag match. Smart cards
could also be used effectively to create an electronic manifest for
each flight. The card would be presented by the traveler at the ticket
counter, at which time flight and baggage data for a particular flight
would be recorded on the card. The card would then be read at the gate
as the passenger boards to create a highly accurate manifest and log a
passenger onto the airplane.
This information could also be used in connection with a positive
passenger-bag match system to, among other things, (1) positively
identify each person and bag on the aircraft (2) reduce the potential
of boarding someone who has not been through screening (3) create a
strong deterrence against fraudulent ticketing, and (4) quickly
identify a bag(s) that must be removed in the event that its owner does
not board the flight.
Federal employee access control and identity verification. The
President's budget for FY 1998 called for adoption of ``. . . smart
card technology so that, ultimately, every Federal employee will be
able to use one card for a wide range of purposes, including travel,
small purchases, and building access.'' The General Services
Administration has facilitated significant progress toward that goal
for federal agency facilities. However, airports should also be
equipped to enable smart card access by the tens of thousands of new
federal employees of the TSA, current FAA and NTSB inspectors, and
others.
Positive access control for all employees who work at the airport,
not just non-transients. Airline pilots and other transient employees
currently rely on a very non-secure method of moving around airports,
which creates the potential for security breaches. Specifically, they
request airport-based, company employees to open doors for them as a
courtesy based on their possession of an airline ID card. As we know,
ID cards and uniforms can be fraudulently used to gain access, which
underscores the need for electronic verification.
Positive verification of identity at the screening checkpoint to
enable transient employees to be processed more quickly. Airline
passengers are enduring long lines at the security screening
checkpoint. These lines are made longer by the screening of pilots,
flight attendants and other individuals in positions of trust, who are
often screened several times a day. The lack of equipment for
positively identifying these individuals wastes limited screening
resources and further inconveniences the traveling public.
Identity verification of jumpseat riders. Use of the flight deck
jumpseat by commuting pilots is an absolute necessity in today's
airline environment. Unfortunately, that privilege has been severely
curtailed since shortly after the terrorist attacks because there is no
way to positively verify the jumpseat requester's identity and
employment status.
A platform for digital pilot licenses and medical information.
Consistent with a provision in the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act of 2001, we recommend that the UAS/TWIC card also be used by the
FAA for containing a pilot's license and medical information. ALPA is
working with FAA Flight Standards on this concept. Smart cards have
more than sufficient memory for this purpose and others that the
airlines may develop.
This past March, eight of the major aviation organizations,
including ALPA, wrote to the Director of the Office of Homeland
Security and the Under Secretary for Transportation Security to
recommend action on the TWIC program, which is languishing.
Specifically, we recommended the establishment of an independent, not-
for-profit organization of stakeholders--TSA, OHS, other government
agencies, airports, airlines, labor, equipment manufacturers, system
integrators, et al.--which would be tasked with the development and
testing of all necessary specifications, rules and principles, subject
to final approval by the government. This concept is analogous to the
coordinated entities which created the banking industry's ATM card
system and the ongoing efforts of the non-profit RTCA to develop
specifications minimum operating standards for commercial aircraft
avionics.
No response has been received to this letter to date, but we are
convinced that our recommendation to create a standards organization is
a very valid one. We are greatly concerned that the TSA's current
direction on TWIC will produce a massive government system that will be
very cumbersome, expensive and unresponsive to aviation's needs. We
strongly solicit the Committee's support in our endeavor to create a
policy and technical standards organization for the TWIC.
Cargo Security
A few years ago, ALPA embarked on a successful campaign to achieve
One Level of Safety for all commercial airlines. We are currently
promoting a similar objective, One Level of Security, to obtain an
equivalent security environment for all commercial operators,
regardless of the size of aircraft they fly or whether they transport
passengers or cargo. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act's
provisions were mainly directed toward passenger operators, however, we
believe that additional consideration needs to be given to cargo
operators. The TSA has noted that ``the events of September 11, 2001,
demonstrate the ability to use aircraft to endanger persons on the
ground. An aircraft so used is just as dangerous whether it holds cargo
or passengers.''
We believe that serious security vulnerabilities exist in the cargo
sector of the transportation system. The TSA recently required all-
cargo operators to adopt a security program, which is a step in the
right direction. However, those operators who had maintained a
voluntary security program under FAA oversight were ``grandfathered''
into a ``limited'' security program which provides the lowest level of
security cited in the regulations. Conspicuously absent in the limited
security program for cargo operators is any kind of requirement
governing acceptance and screening of cargo, as an example.
Some of our other primary concerns that are specific to cargo
security include:
Captain's authority. Some cargo operators allow their employees to
ride in seats located outside the flight deck as a means of saving
money on airfares, and as an employee benefit. The management of one
large cargo airline is currently challenging the captain's authority to
determine whether employees may be prohibited from carriage on his
airplane due to security concerns.
Carriage of employees and other personnel. Related to the issue of
captain's authority, cargo airlines may carry non-employees in the back
of the aircraft to perform certain duties. An example of such non-
employees would be animal handlers, who may board the aircraft with
firearms, large hypodermic needles and other items that could
conceivably be used against the flight crew. Some carriers' procedures
call for the captain to leave the door unlocked (on those aircraft that
have doors installed) when a flight crewmember leaves the flight deck
to visit the lavatory or galley. There are frequently no known, trusted
individuals onboard the aircraft to assist the flight crew by securing
the door in such cases.
Security Identification Display Area. The airport operators, in
consultation with passenger airlines and with the approval of the TSA,
creates SIDA boundaries inside of which everyone is required to wear an
identification badge and be subject to challenge if such badge is not
visible. Cargo operations are not normally included within the SIDA,
unless they happen to be conducted inside of passenger airline
operational areas. Access to these aircraft on isolated parts of the
airport is easily accomplished-- reports from our pilots indicate that
security monitoring, surveillance and screening procedures around cargo
aircraft are minimal at best. This creates the potential for terrorist
sabotage, hijackings, and other types of security violations.
Cargo screening. There is no requirement for items carried aboard
cargo airliners to be screened--these operators implement the ``known
shipper'' concept instead. This fact gives rise to the potential for
numerous ways in which security may be breached, which includes the
carriage of explosive devices. One scenario that we have envisioned is
for terrorists hidden in a container to be boarded on a cargo aircraft,
without knowledge of the crew. Another problem is that screening is not
conducted for chemical or biological agents, like anthrax. We are aware
of a shipment of a radioactive substance from Sweden to Louisiana
earlier this year that emitted radiation through its container at very
dangerous levels.
While we recognize the financial and logistical implications of
screening all cargo, there is surely a reasonable and practical
approach to enhancing this area of security that can be applied to
begin improving the status quo. Cargo operators that rely heavily on a
``known shipper'' concept as a single prevention and deterrence
strategy ignore the fact that such a system may be compromised by
fraudulently obtaining a bona fide customer account number.
Accordingly, we offer our support for S. 2656, a pending bill that
would require the TSA to develop and submit a detailed plan on cargo
security. We recommend that this bill include a provision for
consultation with pilots and others who have direct knowledge of cargo-
related security needs in the development of this plan. We also support
S. 2668, another pending bill that addresses the security of cargo
carried by passenger and all-cargo operators.
Pending Senate Bills
Following are some brief comments on several pending bills before
this Committee.
S. 1980, Training program for all airline personnel responsible for
checking passenger identification, and for other purposes--We
wholeheartedly endorse the concept of positive verification of
passenger's identification. However, there are so many forms of
identification, and so many ways to easily create fraudulent
credentials, that we believe that it is practically impossible to
create a training system that will produce the kinds of results that
are desired. A trusted traveler program, whereby an individual
voluntarily submits to background checks and identity verification, is
an alternative concept for this same objective and it is being pursued
by numerous airlines.
We also endorse the concept of using biometrics for identifying
passengers, but we believe that such technology should first be used
for employees, as they have much greater access to secured areas than
do passengers.
S. 2497, To prohibit the opening of cockpit doors in flight--In
order to comply with various federal aviation regulations, and meet
physiological needs, it is necessary for flight crews to open cockpit
doors while in flight. The bill's provision for a mantrap, therefore,
is certainly one that ALPA supports in order to enhance flight deck
security and the security of flight crewmembers.
S. 2554, Arming Pilots Against Terrorism and Cabin Defense Act of
2002. As discussed previously, ALPA fully supports this bill and urges
the Committee to ensure its passage by the full Senate.
S. 2642, Background checks of alien flight school applicants. We
support the intent of this bill to require background checks for alien
student pilots.
S. 2656, Cargo security. We support the intent of this bill, as
noted previously, and recommend the inclusion of a requirement for the
TSA to consult with affected pilot organizations in the development of
the security plan required in this bill.
S. 2668, Air cargo security act. ALPA supports the intent of this
bill, as noted previously.
S. 2686, Airport employee whistleblower protection. We endorse the
broadening of whistleblower protection to cover certain additional
classes of employers, including the federal government, of security
screeners.
Thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Coy?
STATEMENT OF CRAIG P. COY, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY
Mr. Coy. Yes, sir.
Chairman Hollings and Members of the Committee, for the
record, my name is Craig P. Coy, chief executive officer of the
Massachusetts Port Authority, owner and operator of Boston's
Logan International Airport.
The Transportation and Aviation Security Act, which you
passed last November, represents an extraordinary commitment by
this nation to the safety and security of everyone who travels.
In its scope and urgency, this new act, with its historic
mandate to screen every piece of baggage that goes on a
commercial airliner, belongs with those other celebrated
actions America has taken in our past when foreign attacks have
forced this nation to mobilize quickly for war.
As the new head of MassPort and Logan Airport, I took this
mandate for one-hundred percent baggage screening as a rallying
cry. It represents a stretch goal around which all of our
employees and the citizens of Boston can identify and point to
achieving with pride. Every airport is unique with it's own set
of circumstances. The MassPort board of directors and I
believed, in no uncertain terms, that we would lead the way.
And since I assumed this position at the Massachusetts Port
Authority about four months ago, my top priority has been to
make sure we are doing everything we can to work with the TSA
to encourage them to make--meet all of their mandates,
including the one-hundred percent baggage-screening program.
My analogy is that TSA was handed the ball on the baggage
screening. They've pitched the ball to us, and we've hit a long
shot to center field. We're running hard to first base. It's a
long way to home plate, and we're not yet sure we'll get there
to score the winning run. However, there's one thing I know. In
sports, in life, or in public policy, we will never succeed
unless we try.
This security precaution is long overdue, and the designing
and building a system to screen more than a billion pieces of
luggage that fly domestically every year is an enormous
challenge for this nation. I knew Logan would never have a
chance to make this deadline unless we committed one-hundred
percent to the effort. We put our best people on the project,
and we hired the very best consultants from around the world,
the same consultants, in fact, as those hired by the TSA.
Because of the role Logan played on the attacks on
September 11th, MassPort has been very aggressive on this
project. So rather than back away from the challenge, we asked
the TSA to accelerate our plans instead. We were polite, we
were professional, but we were persistent. We worked closely
with the TSA, early and often, maybe earlier and more often
than they really appreciated. We called them on their cell
phones and at home. We made numerous trips to Washington to
present our plan. When there wasn't a conference room
available, we rented one at a nearby hotel. And on June 14th,
Logan became the first major airport in the country to receive
federal approval for a baggage screening plan.
I can't say enough about the help we received from Senator
Kerry, Senator Kennedy, and the entire Massachusetts
congressional delegation in moving this project forward. I also
want to say that the cooperation MassPort has received from the
TSA in our joint efforts to make sure Logan meets this
important deadline has been outstanding, and it will only get
stronger with my friend, Jim Loy, at the helm.
George Nacara, the TSA security director for Logan, is
onboard, and our staffs could not be working more closely
together. Last week, we met together with two Massachusetts
firms that manufacture the screening equipment to impress upon
them the urgency of stepping up production. As local
Massachusetts companies, we are glad to have them as part of
our team, and they have assured us that they are fully
committed to making Logan's effort a success.
Once we got the go-ahead from TSA, we have pulled out all
the stops to have an in-line hold baggage screening system at
all our active terminals by December 31st. Because of Logan's
severe land constraints, high passenger volume, and the
advanced age of our facilities, it is arguably more difficult
to build these screening facilities at Logan than any airport
in the country.
What helped immensely was the comprehensive, complex
computer model that we used at the outset of the project that
allowed us to see how different baggage screening systems would
interact with the rest of the airport. Right from the start, we
were able to rule out the interim lobby solution because our
computer model showed us we simply didn't have the room.
We've also been able to design our facilities so they're
flexible enough to accommodate new systems as they evolve.
During peak times, Logan handles up to 5,000 pieces of luggage
an hour. As designed, the in-line baggage screening system will
accommodate both present and future capacity without delays at
the check-in lines.
On July 11th, just three weeks after getting TSA approval,
MassPort broke ground on a project that includes the renovation
of 11 bag rooms, major building additions at seven locations,
and the construction of five new substations to handle the
electric load.
Accelerated construction like this at an airport like ours
must be choreographed to perfection. To get the work done, we
are busing workers to secure areas, prefabricating sections
offsite, pre-purchasing materials, and performing other amazing
feats of engineering magic. My motto has always been, ``Every
person counts. Every act counts.'' But on this project, the
motto is, ``Every minute counts,'' because we none to spare.
For the most part, we will be running double shifts six days a
week and, at times, working around the clock all week long.
Another important benefit was the waiver we received from
the State on certain public procurement laws, which was
supported from Governor Swift on down. It paired the normal
two- or three-month bidding process down just to ten days, and
we're still doing competitive bids. Contractors bring a signed
copy of our proposed contract to the bid opening. And if they
are the low bidder, our construction manager signs the contract
right on the spot and they can start that day. In public
construction, this is unheard of.
Being first is a double-edged sword. There were no rules to
slow us down, which is a good thing; but neither are there
guidelines to help steer the way. And the schedule for
completing this monumental task leaves no room for error. Over
the next five months, MassPort will remain vigilant and
focused, because any slippage in the project can push the
completion date beyond the new year.
Progress on the whole baggage screening is just one of a
number of security firsts for MassPort. Again, because a group
of evil men stole two airplanes from Logan Airport on September
11th with 177 innocent people onboard, MassPort feels a special
obligation to be a national leader for airport security as well
as port security for our maritime facilities.
For the past several months, we've been working with the
TSA as one of 15 airports to establish security procedures and
protocols for all 439 commercial airports in this country.
Logan has also volunteered as a test site for the development
of promising new security technologies, including the first-in-
the-nation facial-recognition program, handheld wireless
devices that let security personnel access the National Crime
Information Center while walking the beat, as well as
technology that can detect fake passports and other bogus
identification.
MassPort is aggressively pursing these programs along with
the hundred percent baggage screening program. We are committed
to providing our passengers with the best possible security as
quickly as possible.
We have opened up our wallet, and we've spent a lot of
money to do the job right and to do it fast. Six days after
getting TSA approval for the baggage screening plan, and with
no written guarantee of federal reimbursement, MassPort
committed $100 million to complete the project. I do not want
to understate the enormous financial strain this unfunded
federal mandate puts on MassPort and all airports seriously
impacted by the attacks on September 11th. We will continue to
seek financial support for these federal mandates, but are
prepared to act now.
Already September 11th has forced MassPort to cut $51
million from our programs, layoff 15 percent of our workforce,
and in the midst of our most aggressive program--building
program in history, delay more than 37 percent of our capital
projects. Nevertheless, we believe strongly in the promises
made by this nation to the flying public when you passed and
the President signed the Transportation and Aviation Security
Act. We also fully support the new federal mandate to inspect
every piece of luggage that flies out of our airport.
MassPort has now stepped forward. It's done its part to
help the federal government meet this mandate. Critically
important to the continued success of this historic effort to
protect the safety and security of the people who use America's
airport is the assurance, which all airports need, that the
federal government's commitment remains just as strong.
Thank you for the honor and the privilege to be here, and I
will be happy to take your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Coy follow:]
Prepared Statement of Craig P. Coy, Chief Executive Officer,
Massachusetts Port Authority
Chairman Hollings and Members of the Committee.
For the record my name is Craig P. Coy, Chief Executive Officer of
the Massachusetts Port Authority, owner and operator of Boston's Logan
International Airport.
The Transportation and Aviation Security Act which you passed last
November represents an extraordinary commitment by this nation to the
safety and security of everyone who travels.
In its scope and urgency, this new act--with its historic mandate
to screen every piece of baggage that goes on a commercial airliner--
belongs with those other celebrated actions America has taken in our
past when foreign attacks have forced this nation to mobilize quickly
for war.
As the new head of Massport and Logan Airport, I took this new
mandate for 100 percent baggage screening as a rallying cry. It
represents a stretch goal around which all of our employees and the
citizens of Boston can identify and point to achieving with pride.
Every airport is unique, with its own set of circumstances. The
Massport Board of Directors and I believed in no uncertain terms that
we would lead the way.
Since coming to the Massachusetts Port Authority about three months
ago my top priority has been to make sure we are doing everything we
can to work with the TSA to encourage them to meet all their mandates--
including the 100 percent baggage screening program.
My analogy is that TSA was handed the ball on baggage screening.
They've pitched the ball to us and we've hit a long shot to
centerfield. We're running hard to first base. It's a long way to home
plate and we're not yet sure we'll get there to score the winning run.
However, there is one thing I know: in sports, in life, or in public
policy, we will never succeed unless we try.
This security precaution is long overdue, and designing and
building a system to screen more than a billion pieces of luggage that
fly domestically every year is an enormous challenge for this nation.
I knew Logan would never have a chance to make this deadline unless
we committed 100 percent to the effort. We put our best people on the
project and hired the very best consultants from around the world--the
same consultants, in fact, as those hired by the TSA.
Because of the role that Logan played on the attacks on September
11 Massport has been very aggressive about this project. So, rather
than back away from this challenge, we asked the TSA to accelerate our
plans instead.
We were professional and polite--but persistent. We worked closely
with the TSA, early and often--maybe earlier and more often than they
really appreciated. We called them on cell phones and at home.
We made numerous trips to Washington to present our plan. When
there wasn't a conference room available, we rented one in a nearby
hotel.
And on June 14, Logan became the first major airport in the country
to receive federal approval for a hold baggage screening plan.
I can't say enough about the help that we received from Senator
Kerry, Senator Kennedy, and the entire Massachusetts Congressional
Delegation in moving this project forward. I also want to say, that the
cooperation Massport has received from the TSA, in our joint efforts to
make sure Logan meets this important deadline, has been outstanding.
George Naccara, the TSA security director for Logan, is on board
and our staffs could not be working more closely together. Last week,
we met together with two Massachusetts firms that manufacture screening
equipment to impress upon them the urgency of stepping up production.
As local Massachusetts companies, we are glad to have them as part of
our team, and they have assured us they are fully committed to making
Logan's effort a success.
Once we got the go-ahead from the TSA, we have pulled out all the
stops to have an inline Hold Baggage Screening system at all our active
terminals by December 31.
Because of Logan's severe land constraints, high passenger volume,
and the advanced age of our facilities, it is arguably more difficult
to build these screening facilities at Logan than at any other airport
in the country.
What helped immensely was the comprehensive, complex computer model
we used at the outset of the project that allowed us to see how
different baggage screening systems would interact with the rest of the
airport.
Right from the start we were able to rule out an interim, lobby
solution because our computer models showed us we simply didn't have
the room. We have also been able to design our facilities so they are
flexible enough to accommodate new systems as they evolve. During peak
times, Logan handles up to 5,000 pieces of luggage an hour. As
designed, the inline bag screening system will accommodate both present
and future capacity without delays at the check-in lines.
On July 11, just three weeks after getting TSA approved, Massport
broke ground on a project that includes the renovation of approximately
eleven bag rooms, major building additions at approximately seven
locations, and the construction of five new substations to handle the
electrical load.
Accelerated construction like this, at an airport like ours, must
be choreographed to perfection. To get the work done we are busing
workers to secure areas, prefabricating sections offsite, pre-
purchasing materials, and performing other amazing feats of engineering
magic.
My motto has always been, every person counts, every act counts.
But on this project the motto is: every minute counts, because we have
none to spare. For the most part we will be running double shifts six
days a week, and at times working around the clock all week-long.
Another important benefit was the waiver we received from the state
from certain public procurement laws, which was supported from the
Governor on down. It pared the normal two to three month bidding
process down to just ten days. And we are still doing competitive bids.
Contractors bring a signed copy of our proposed contract to the bid
opening, and if they are the low bidder, our construction manager signs
the contract right on the spot so they can start that day. In public
construction, this us unheard of.
Being first is a double edge sword. There are no rules to slow us
down, which is a good thing. But neither are there guidelines to help
steer the way. And the schedule for completing this monumental task
leaves no room for error. Over the next five months Massport will
remain vigilant and focused because any slippage in the project can
push the completion date beyond the new year.
Progress on hold baggage screening is just one of a number of
security firsts for Massport. Again, because a group of evil men stole
two airplanes from Logan Airport on September 11 with 177 innocent
people on board, Massport feels a special obligation to be a national
leader for airport security, as well as port security at our maritime
facilities.
For the past several months, we have been working with the TSA as
one of 15 airports helping to establish security procedures and
protocols for all 439 commercial airports in this country.
Logan has also volunteered as a test site for the development of
promising new security technologies, including a first-in-the-nation
facial recognition program, hand-held wireless devices that let
security personnel access the National Crime Information Center while
walking the beat, as well as technology that can detect fake passports
or other bogus identification.
Massport is aggressively pursuing these programs along with 100
percent hold baggage screening. We are committed to providing our
passengers with the best possible security, as quickly as possible. We
have opened our wallet and spent a lot of money to do the job right and
do it fast. Six days after getting TSA approval for the baggage
screening plan, and with no written guarantee of federal reimbursement,
Massport committed $100 million to complete the project.
But I do not want to understate the enormous financial strain that
this unfunded federal mandate puts on Massport, and all airports,
seriously impacted by the attacks on September 11. We will continue to
seek financial support for these federal mandates, but are prepared to
act now.
Already, September 11 has forced Massport to cut $51 million from
our programs, lay-off 15 percent of our workforce, and, in the midst of
our most aggressive building program in history, delay more than 37
percent of our capital projects.
Nevertheless, we believe strongly in the promises made by this
nation to the flying public when you passed, and the President signed,
the Transportation and Aviation Security Act, We also fully support the
new federal mandate to inspect every piece of luggage that flies out of
our airport.
Massport has stepped forward and done its part to help the federal
government meet this mandate. Critically important to the continued
success of this historic effort to protect the safety and security of
the people who use America's airports is the assurance, which all
airports need, that the federal government's commitment remains just as
strong.
Thank you and I will be happy to take questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Stephens?
STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. STEPHENS, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL
MANAGER, THE BOEING COMPANY, HOMELAND SECURITY AND SERVICES
Mr. Stephens. Chairman Hollings and Members of the
Committee, I am Rick Stephens, vice president and general
manager of the Boeing Company's Homeland Security and Services
Business. I'm pleased to have the opportunity to present a
status of our team's work to deploy checked-bag screening
equipment to American airports.
The Boeing Company, its partner, Siemens, and our supplier
team understand very clearly that this is a national priority.
Success in completing this program will help strengthen
security in our transportation and support growth in both air
travel and our national economy.
Boeing was awarded the contract to install the explosive
detection systems and train baggage-screen employees on June
7th, 49 days ago. The task requires airport studies of
passenger movement, architectural designs, structural changes,
and the coordinated supply of 1100 EDS machines and
approximately 4600 explosive freight detecting devices.
Following completion of deployment tasks, the contract includes
five one-year options for support and continuous evaluation of
improvement.
Our team was in motion within hours following contract
award, responding to TSA planning and organizational requests.
One of our first actions was deploying survey teams to 66
airports on July 1st. Deployment has continued throughout July.
As of today, 153 airports have been or are being surveyed for
data such as passenger and baggage characteristics, existing
physical and operational conditions, and airport information
such as terminal area development plans, local building codes,
airline plans for operational areas, and preferences for future
operations. All designated U.S. airports will have received
site-assessment survey teams by August 21st.
Let me please describe our approach. We are collaborating
with airports, airlines, federal security directors, and other
TSA officials to develop effective checked-baggage screening
solutions for individual airports for implementation by the end
of the year. The challenge is not simply meeting a deadline; it
is providing the most secure and efficient checked-baggage
screening solutions within the time constraints established by
Congress.
A one-size-fits-all configuration for all airports is
clearly inappropriate. When you have seen one airport or when
you have not seen--you've only seen one airport. Each airport
terminal has different characteristics that will drive the most
appropriate solution.
A single approach for all airport terminals would result in
higher implementation costs and decreased levels of customer
service. The best way to avoid this outcome is for the Boeing
team to work closely with the airports and airlines throughout
the process. The first step in our approach is to send out a
site assessment team to meet with airport and airline officials
and other key stakeholders. The primary goal of the site
assessment team is to establish an EDS/ETD concept plan that
can be implemented by December 31st, 2002, and is acceptable to
the airlines, the airports, and the TSA.
Following the site assessment, design survey teams then
deploy to the airport to evaluate the design and construction
requirements. These teams will also meet with airport and
airline officials and other key stakeholders. Our data
collection is continuing. Analysis and assessments are underway
and will continue for some weeks yet.
Conditions, characteristics, and expectations at airports
have varied widely. I will try and generalize findings so far.
First, 160 days are left to complete the task by December 31st,
2002; 150 assessment teams have been mobilized; 153 assessments
are underway or completed. In addition, 33 airport assessment
site visits have been initiated this week.
Of the site-assessment tasks scheduled to have occurred to
this date, we have been delayed by one week or more in 18 tasks
due to weather and other factors. In order to maintain
schedule, 20 tasks have been accelerated, and we expect to be
back on schedule for the delayed tasks in the first week of
August.
The airlines have been eager to engage in the process. And
Boeing and TSA are engaging them and their representatives
through existing relationships and airline associations. Boeing
and our contractor team are completely committed to the
successful execution of our contract and to respond to the
needs of TSA, the Congress, and the American people.
Let me conclude on a more personal note. We, at the Boeing
Company, were deeply affected by the use of our products as
weapons of terror on September 11th. We realize the importance
of air travel security to our national security and to our
country's economic health. Boeing appreciates the significant
challenges ahead in equipment delivery, airport facilities
modification, and the implementation of full baggage screening
procedures. However, the safety of the American public and the
health of the airline industry demand that we press forward
with this task. We look forward to working together with all
stakeholders as we continue to do our work for the American
public.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to responding
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stephens follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard D. Stephens, Vice President and General
Manager, The Boeing Company, Homeland Security and Services
Chairman Hollings, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the
Committee, I am Rick Stephens, Vice President and General Manager of
The Boeing Company's Homeland Security and Services business. I am
appearing before you today in my capacity as the executive responsible
for the airport checked baggage Explosives Detection System (EDS) and
Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) equipment deployment contractor team
led by Boeing.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to present a status of our
team's surveys and preparations to deploy checked baggage screening
equipment to American airports. The Boeing Company, its' partner
Siemens and supplier team understand very clearly that this is a
national priority. Success in completing this program will help
strengthen security in air transportation, and support growth in both
air travel and our national economy. Boeing was awarded the contract by
the Department of Transportation on June 7, 2002 to install explosives
detection systems for screening checked baggage at all U.S. airports
with scheduled commercial service by December 31, 2002.
The contract, managed by the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), also calls for the training of baggage screening employees. This
task requires airport studies of passenger movement, architectural
designs, structural changes, and the coordinated supply of 1,100
explosives detection system (EDS) machines and approximately 4600
explosives trace detection (ETD) devices. Following completion of the
deployment task the contract includes five, one year options for
support and continuous improvement.
The Boeing team includes the Siemens Corporation, a world leader in
baggage handling systems and computed tomography technology; The
Preston Group, a Boeing subsidiary, and TransSolutions, both providing
aviation infrastructure simulation and modeling; CAGE Inc., which
develops cost-effective designs and operational policies for airports;
Flight Safety Boeing, AIS, and TMG for training delivery systems;
Turner Construction, supported by Hanscomb, will manage airport site
preparation; and aviation industry architectural and engineering firms
Leo A. Daly, Corgan Associates and DMJM Aviation.
Our contractor team was in motion within hours following contract
award responding to TSA planning and organizational requests. One of
the first actions was the planning for and deployment of survey teams
to 66 airports on July 1st. This process of planning and deployment has
continued throughout July. As of today 153 airports have been or are
being surveyed for data such as passengers and baggage characteristics,
existing physical and operational conditions, and airport information
such as terminal area development plans, local building codes,
airlines' plans for operations areas, and preferences for future
operations. All designated U.S. airports will have received site
assessment survey teams by August 21.
Let me describe our approach and the process:
First, our approach is to work collaboratively with airports,
airlines, Federal Security Directors, and other TSA officials to
develop effective checked baggage screening solutions for individual
airports for implementation by the end of the year. We understand that
the challenge is not simply meeting a deadline--it is providing for the
most secure and efficient checked baggage screening solutions within
the time constraints established by Congress.
A ``one-size-fits-all'' EDS/ETD configuration for all airports is
clearly inappropriate--each airport terminal has different
characteristics that will ``drive'' the most appropriate solution. A
single approach for all airport terminals would result in higher
implementation costs and decreased levels of customer service. The best
way to avoid this outcome is for the Boeing Team to work closely with
the airports and airlines throughout the process so that their in-depth
understanding of their terminal facilities and passenger
characteristics is incorporated in the planning process. In addition,
we know that a number of airports and airlines have already developed
100 percent checked baggage screening plans. We have and look forward
to continued review of any plans available.
The first step in our process has been to send out a site
assessment team to meet with airport and airline officials and other
key stakeholders. During this initial visit, the site assessment team
(1) gathered general information required to estimate EDS/ETD equipment
requirements and to develop preliminary concept plans, and (2) refined
the concept plans based on a thorough analysis of the operational data
and passenger characteristics collected. The primary goal of the site
assessment team has been to establish an EDS/ETD concept plan that can
be implemented by December 31, 2002 and is acceptable to the airport,
airlines, and the TSA.
Following the site assessment, design survey teams then deploy to
the airport to evaluate the design and construction requirements (e.g.,
mechanical, HVAC, electrical, structural) for the EDS/ETD concept plan
established by the assessment team. While on-site, the design survey
team reviews architectural, structural, electrical, mechanical, and
other considerations involved in the equipment installation. In
addition, the design survey team meets with airport and airline
officials and other key stakeholders to review the design and
construction drawings. Final construction drawings will be submitted
for their review prior to beginning the installation.
Given the technical complexity of this challenge the Boeing Team is
using state-of-the-art simulation models to help develop and refine
EDS/ETD concept plans and designs.
Simulation models for EDS/ETD concepts previously prepared by the
airports, if available, are used if possible as baselines for our
efforts.
Our data collection is continuing, analysis and assessments are
underway and will continue for some weeks yet. Conditions,
characteristics and expectations at airports have varied widely. But I
will try and generalize some findings so far as follows:
162 days are left to complete the task;
150 assessment teams have been mobilized;
153 airport assessments are underway or completed, and 10
assessment packs are under review by TSA prior to transmission
to those 10 airports;
In addition, 33 airport assessment site visits have been
initiated this week, and 49 assessment packs are being
delivered to TSA for future airport survey visits;
Of the site assessment tasks scheduled to have occurred to
this date we have been delayed by one week or more in 18 tasks
due to weather, flights in Alaska, and holiday/vacation
schedules of airport staff preventing their support of the
visit;
In order to maintain schedule, 20 tasks have been
accelerated and we expect to be back on schedule for the
delayed tasks in the first week of August.
The airlines have been eager to engage in program process,
and Boeing and TSA are engaging them and their representatives
through existing relationships and airline associations.
The Boeing team is fully engaged with the TSA in
performance of our contract.
Boeing and our contractor team are completely committed to
the successful execution of our contract in response to the
needs of TSA, the congress and the American people.
I will conclude this prepared testimony by relating a personal
note. We at The Boeing Company were deeply affected by having our
products used as weapons of terror on September 11. Boeing feels
obligated to take this mission on because of its importance to the
United States, the airline industry, to this country's airports, and to
the flying public. We realize the importance of air travel security to
our national security, and to our country's economic health. We are all
aware that the events of 9/11 have had a devastating effect on air
travel and the airline industry in particular. Every day we are made to
understand that a rise in costs and the hassle-factor associated with
increased air security will further hurt the industry. Boeing
appreciates the significant challenges ahead in equipment delivery,
airport facilities modification, and the implementation of full baggage
screening procedures. However, the health of the air travel industry
and the safety of the American public demand that we press forward with
this task, and no company is as well-suited to the job as Boeing. Our
knowledge of the air transport system, our understanding of and strong
relations within the airline industry, our expertise in complex systems
integration, and the specialized strengths of our team members give us
the capacity to accomplish this mission. We look forward to working
together with all stakeholders as we go to work for the American
public.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Go right ahead. We appreciate you presiding.
Senator Burns. Thank you very much for your testimony
today. And I'm going to--again, we've heard a lot of talk about
airport security. We didn't do TSA right. And I'm not going to
go down that debate with you today. But, nonetheless, we really
had an opportunity to do that.
I included an amendment in the TSA bill that would have put
the enforcement over in the Department of Justice, because I
felt like that's where it ought to be. That was stripped out in
conference.
And we've still got the situation with security of the
airplane after it gets off of the ground. No matter how good of
work you do, you've got screening weaknesses, and we know that.
It's all over the country. And as long as we've got those
weaknesses, I want the last line of defense.
Mr. Davidson, until 1987 pilots were allowed to carry
firearms in the cockpit. And you know what? With no training.
And since the inception of the aviation of--until 1987, there
have been recorded accidents of a pilot's accidentally
discharging a weapon. I want to bring that up.
Now, I've got a question for Mr. Luckey. This is a two-part
question. Can you please describe the FBI's cockpit protection
program and tell us what you think about the program? And, (b),
what is the cost of this program in comparison to the
statements that's been made by others?
Captain Luckey. First of all, sir, right after the 9/11
incident, I went down to Quantico, because that's where my
roots are in aviation security. I have greatest respect for the
capabilities of the FBI academy down there. I think they're the
finest law-enforcement group in the world. And they're charged
formally with crimes aboard aircraft and their enforcement.
I had a retired agent poll the Retired FBI Agents
Association, and we got a hundred affidavits from retired FBI
agents, 80-some percent of which supported arming the pilots in
the cockpit.
I then went down there and asked informally, and we were in
a hurry. I just took for granted that since I carried a firearm
in the 1970s and 1980s that this would be a normal deal.
This seemed like a no-brainer to me, so I went down there
to expedite the process and got a hold of some friends of mine
and asked them if it was feasible and what kind of a program
they would develop. So these people, who are experts--they do
this every day, they work in the firearms training unit down
there, they train law-enforcement groups all over the world--
they looked at this, and they took the regular agent criteria,
and we--they took the things out that we don't need. We don't
need felony warrants, felony arrests, investigations, driving.
All of those things, we took out. We left the most important
things in, starting with safety, going through the force
continuum, the law, all the tactical stuff. Terrorism is a
tactic. It's a method of attack. And we looked at that foremost
in what we needed to do to do this.
We figured out that within 48 hours, we could adequately
train a pilot to have all of the qualities of a federal agent
as long as he was limited to the environment of the cockpit.
The authority doesn't extend outside there; neither does the
tactical expertise.
We've heard all the arguments about distractions and
everything else. I mean, how can you fly, how can you function,
how can you think, how can you be safe when somebody's busting
down the door trying to kill you, or how do you fly when your
throat's cut? These are things that we really have to face in
this business.
So we looked at that. And I think it's a very good program.
We ran the cost of this thing right down to the coffee break.
Now, again, this wasn't an authorized program. This was
something that we did down there, very professionally. We did
it in a hurry, but we did it with great attention to detail.
And the costs--in answer to your second question, sir--were
about--I'd say in the neighborhood of 50 percent of what the
costs that I have seen here today.
I also might add that, sure there's 95,000 commercial
airline pilots in the United States. Only, say, 80 percent of
them support this program. Probably out of that, there's going
to be a much smaller number that are going to volunteer for
this. And out of our very strict recruitment and selection and
training process, I believe we're going to have in the
neighborhood of 25- to 30,000 pilots that we're looking at in
this thing, so the costs will be substantially lower, and it'll
be quality instead of quantity, sir.
Senator Burns. Should the airlines be allowed to opt out of
this program to arm pilots?
Captain Luckey. I think we have a problem with that. I
think if we do that, it's not going to exist, because they're
all going to opt out of it. They're broke. They don't have any
money, and they're afraid of the relative incurred costs. I
also think that if one airline decides to opt out and the other
one doesn't, then the public gets cheated out of a
standardization of the same level of security on all the
airlines. I think we deserve that.
The bill includes a lot of protections from liability, and
I think if a carrier gets into opting out, they're going to
have some influence on it, and they're going to lose that
protection for liability. I think these are very important
factors.
Senator Burns. As you know, the original House bill to arm
pilots was a two-year bill allowing 1400 pilots to carry
weapons, and it would be subject to repeal by the director of
the TSA after two years was up. Do we know what we need to know
about pilots carrying weapons at this point, or do we need
another pilot program?
Captain Luckey. When I was down at Quantico, we talked
about this, and we decided that that a good sample program
would be to take 50 airline pilots on this weekly--put them
through the weekly course we had--40 of which would be people
with a lot of prior experience, like myself and others, and the
special ops people and former policemen, former FBI agents--put
them in there with ten people who have never fired a weapon
before, are not really gun people, and the 40 could see how
these ten progressed, and we could see if this was an efficient
system, if it was cost effective and if the training were--it
was appropriate to our needs. The course would include
somewhere between 1,700 and 2,000 rounds of live fire,
simunitions, force continuums, FATS, or Firearms training
scenarios, for shoot/no-shoot drills, open-hand self-defense
tactics, and things germane to the mission exclusively.
And I think that they did an excellent job, and I think
that a study like this--it doesn't take months, years to do
something like this. We already know how guns work. They work
very well when they're--with the surgical application of lethal
force in this intimate tactical environment, it's very easy to
employ a weapon very effectively. And I think that this could
be--I think a test like this would be a very good one, and I
think it would be something where we could get our feet on the
ground and get our teeth into this one and see if it works.
Senator Burns. Captain Davidson, you used a figure awhile
ago that 21 percent of the--of our law enforcement people were
lost because of--because they were shot with their own weapon.
Our figures show 2.1 percent. Is that a correct figure, or are
we reading the wrong statistics?
Captain Davidson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Burns, I'm reading
from a submission, I think, that was made to this Committee,
perhaps, from the Violence Policy Center--I think it was made
to the Federal Aviation Administration--on the use of firearms
in commercial air flights. Their citation was 21 percent of
officers were killed with a handgun, and it was their own
service weapon.
Senator Burns. Well, it--the real figure is 2.1 percent.
We'll--and we'll take a look at that.
I would look at this--and I know there's--that not all
pilots are going to want to carry a firearm. What do you think
the value of a deterrent is? Do you think it acts as a
deterrent? Do you think--do you think having armed marshals on
an airplane is a deterrent?
Captain Davidson. Sir, is that for the older captain to
answer or the younger captain?
[Laughter.]
Senator Burns. I want to ask the younger captain right now,
you know, the one that has hair, you know.
[Laughter.]
Captain Davidson. Actually, I believe he is actually senior
to me.
Senator Burns. Okay.
[Laughter.]
Senator Burns. All right, you guys.
Captain Davidson. In answer to your question, Senator, we
think the question needs to be framed more along what the
Chairman mentioned in his opening remarks. To us, we are very
pleased with the fact that this Senate Committee and the Senate
and the Congress looked forward and was forward-thinking enough
to understand that the flight-deck door is the impenetrable
shield that we need to maintain the fact that we are going to
be able to control that aircraft from the time any problem
arises in flight until we can get it on the ground. We think
that is the way to move ahead in this industry, and that adding
the potential safety and cockpit distractions of firearms is
not in our best interests or in the interests of our passengers
and your constituents.
Senator Burns. I couldn't agree with you more on the door,
but it ain't there, and it's not gonna get there very quickly.
Mr. Luckey?
Captain Luckey. Yes, sir. In answer to that, let me throw
out a scenario here briefly. You know, I was an international
captain, as is Captain Davidson. Suppose we're three hours out
over the water, and all of a sudden the group of terrorists
that got under the aircraft through our porous security
systems, or a foreign one, were to take over the cabin of the
aircraft. They have three hours out there, and we don't have
any way to protect our cockpit. Do you think in three hours,
with the food carts and the capabilities and the innovation
that they have as specially trained tactical-operations people,
do you think the pilots would have a chance to defend that
cockpit without the appropriate tools, the tactical knowledge,
and the training to meet that challenge effectively?
Senator Burns. Are you asking me?
Captain Luckey. Well, yes, sir, anyone.
[Laughter.]
Captain Luckey. No, I--this is just food for thought. This
is--these are real scenarios that we face on a daily basis.
We're three hours out, we don't have any tools. It's kind of
tantamount to being down in the bad part of town and they did
away with lug wrenches because--made them illegal because there
was enough gas stations, and you ran out of gas--or not ran out
of gas--you had a flat tire, and you needed to change your
tire, but you didn't have a lug wrench. All the gas stations
are closed. So you decide to take a walk. And guess what
happens to you in the bad part of town? You get mugged, they
kill you, steal your car, strip it, just because you don't have
the lug wrench.
We need that tool. It's another piece of emergency
equipment that we desperately need to meet a demonstrated
challenge that's very real.
Senator Burns. Mr. Luckey, the training that they would
have to go through in order to carry a weapon----
Do you want to--have you got any questions?
The Chairman. Well, I'm going to have--when you get
through. Go ahead.
Senator Burns. The training that you--that was going to be
required in order for the captain to be authorized to carry
this weapon, do you do a psychological test?
Captain Luckey. Yes, sir.
Senator Burns. Physical test?
Captain Luckey. Yes, sir.
Senator Burns. Shoot or no shoot?
Captain Luckey. Yes, sir.
Senator Burns. Understanding the weapon?
Captain Luckey. Very much so, sir.
Senator Burns. Understanding the enemy?
Captain Luckey. Very much so.
Senator Burns. And what else needs to be done than what I
mentioned?
Captain Luckey. First of all, the mission safety, we start
out with that. We start out with custodial responsibility--in
other words, weapons retention.
In reality, the cockpit is the only tactical place on the
aircraft that favorably--favors the defender. In other words,
it's a channelized, narrow avenue of a predictable approach.
They can only go through that door one at a time. We're talking
about surgical application of lethal force probably at a
professional individual that's wearing body armor. That means
we have to do a specific shot in a specific critical area of
the body. This can be done much better in the cockpit because
of the intimacy of the very close range. This is like you're
reaching out and touching someone.
We train at five, ten, and fifteen feet, instead of seven
and fifty yards that the normal agents train at. Our
performance requirements exceed the federal agents. The federal
agents qualify at 80 percent. The program that I was
responsible in working with had a qualification score in excess
of 95 percent due to the tactical intimacy and the close
proximity of the target and the threat.
Senator Burns. Senator Hollings?
The Chairman. Let me, on behalf of the Committee, thank
each of the members of the panel. They've been very, very
helpful and very valuable to the Committee.
Captain Luckey, with respect to the emergency equipment or
having that one tool that's needed, you see, I've got a
different view of it. That's the door. My friend, Senator
Burns, says we're not going to have it. Well, we're not going
to have the pistols or anything else right there and the
training and where to put it and the money and everything else
like that. We're behind the curve.
But the whole idea is to make absolutely certain that that
plane cannot be used as a lethal weapon. And to do that, we
know of one airline--and I've sat right there where you are--so
that chief pilot, and he impressed me. That chief pilot of El
Al, he said, ``Senator, they can be assaulting my wife in the
cabin. I go straight to the ground.''
Now, the terrorists know that. They know that. And don't
give me any of this stuff about that's a small airline. I've
tried it out with pilots. Incidentally, my poll is about 50-50.
I fly every week. I probably fly more than you do, because I
know they ain't supposed to fly but half the month.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I have to fly every week, coming and going,
so I've got as many hours almost as a pilot. And I love the
pilots, and I love the planes, and I'm trying to figure out how
do we solve this problem, because, as is just stated, the first
line of defense is to shoot you down. That doesn't help us at
all. I can tell you right now. A lot of people are saying,
``I'm not getting on--I'm taking the--up to New York, because I
don't fool around with getting shot down and everything else,''
and then they worry about the White House, taking off from
Reagan, and they've got all of these other super-duper checks
and in your seat before and after and everything else of that
kind. And now we're onto a money argument. It solved as long as
you get that secure door. That's the emergency equipment.
And I want to make absolutely sure that the pilot doesn't
have a responsibility to open up that door. He's got a
responsibility only to fly and land it. That's what I want to
make absolutely sure. Once I've got that as fixed in El Al and
it's worked for 30 years and the door is impenetrable, then
I've solved all the problems, because let's--you've got the
pistols and you've got the training and you, and the Marines,
and everything else of that kind, whoopie, do it your way, and
you hear all that disturbance going on and everything else
going on back there, get a call in to the pilot, they say,
``Captain Luckey, come, come, come quick,'' and everything, are
you going to----
Captain Luckey. I'm not going back, sir.
The Chairman. You're not going back? Well, then you agree
with me. Keep the door locked and go down to the ground. Shoot,
you done solved--Senator Burns, I just won.
[Laughter.]
Senator Burns. You just won? Don't talk yourself out of it,
he's not----
The Chairman. We're through with this hearing.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. The man said he ain't going back.
Senator Burns. That's right. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to
remind you that they might got them double doors----
The Chairman. Oh, well, look----
Senator Burns. Wait a minute. Wait a minute, now. Let me
finish.
The Chairman.--both got to agree. We're going to----
Senator Burns. Oh, no, I agree on that.
The Chairman. We're going to----
Senator Burns. But I'm going to tell you something.
The Chairman. We've got to have a secure door.
Senator Burns. That's right. But I want to tell you, even
though I said they had the double doors and the reinforced
doors, their pilots carry a sidearm. They're armed.
The Chairman. You don't have the responsibility of opening
the door.
Senator Burns. Well, it doesn't make any difference, but
they've got a sidearm in case somebody takes a little bit of
explosive or a penetrative explosive site that can bust those
doors--and I've never seen one other than Fort Knox that you
can't do that. And my banker--of course, my banker keeps me out
of that safe all the time, but----
[Laughter.]
Senator Burns.--that's what I'm saying. He's not going to
go back there and take care of that situation either.
The Chairman. Captain Luckey is the nicest witness we've
had----
[Laughter.]
Senator Burns. I know. And Captain Davidson is not going to
go back there and take of that situation.
The Chairman. That's right.
Now, what the situation is, if you ever open that door, the
team now--they've got four and five member teams with these
Mohammad Atta's--and they're not coming with any--even card
cutters or anything else. They're coming with judo, they're
coming with all kind of karate and everything else like that. I
can get four to five fellows that can take over your plane if
you ever open that door.
I can't get in the door. We've got to agree to that, but if
I can start choking the stewardess and everything else so she's
hollering, ``Open the door,'' and then once you open the door,
with pistols, you might get the first of us--of the team, or
even the second one or whatever it is, but I can get hold of
that there plane, and I can keep the passengers and that little
small place from every getting back, I can tell you that. And
I've used that as a weapon of mass destruction, so I'm trying
my best not necessarily to get pistols or not get pistols; I'm
trying to get the door, because, either way, you've got to get
the door. If you don't--if you're not going to have a secure
cockpit----
And I want to relieve those pilots of that responsibility.
They've got the responsibility strictly to fly and take off and
land, and that's all. And, of course, we've got the bathroom
needs and everything else of that kind to work out, with
eyesight, television so you can look back and know that you
have to go to the ground as soon as possible and that kind of
thing, what's going on in the cabin.
Mr. Loy, when I heard your testimony--Mr. Coy, excuse me--I
turned to the staff behind me. I said, ``Is that fellow telling
the truth?'' I never heard such get up and go and dedication
and hard charging, and that's exactly what I asked the White
House for. They gave me a bureaucrat. I said this is really
tough. This isn't easy. You're going to have to take on about
50,000 people, you've got to get it geared up. We've got the
door, we've got the pilots, we've got the airports, we've got
the equipment. It's one royal headache, and what we need is a
hard charger. And I thank you very, very much, specifically
because that's the attitude. It's--we can't pass laws and get
the thing done right. Only you folks can get it done.
And that's what we're trying to do, is work with the
Committee. I agree with Senator Burns. I voted, too, for it to
go to the Justice Department, because I knew I could get some
hard chargers over there. I've had difficulties over here at
the Transportation Department getting anything moving.
And literally, that's the figure we had, and that's what
Mr. Daniel was telling us in the conference committee on the
emergency supplemental, ``They can't spend the money.'' And
here I'm having the Secretary coming up and saying, ``Oh, I
need--I'm already shy a billion dollars for the next two
months.'' Of course, you couldn't spend a billion dollars in
two months, but, I mean, that's his testimony. And then the
other committee is giving him 150 million more and that kind of
thing.
So each of you, you have really favored the Committee very
much with your patience and sticking with us this long.
Senator Burns, did you----
Senator Burns. Did you want to respond to that door
comment?
Captain Luckey. Yes, sir, if you don't mind.
Sir, with all due respect to your--and I respect your
opinion very much, and your work and your dedication to the
country over the years. But, sir, terrorism is a tactic. It's a
method of attack. Counter-terrorism is just that, as well, and
it's a method to repel an attack.
I think there's some misconception here that in our
tactical response--we have to open that door sometimes. And the
safety of flight--and I think Captain Davidson will agree with
me--we have to go back sometimes. We have to look at the wings,
we have to look at the control services, we have to listen to
noises, we have to do things that are only--they're specific to
the pilots. Nobody else could do this. We couldn't delegate
this responsibility to anyone else.
And in the event of an assault, we don't open that door to
get at the terrorists. We only utilize that piece of emergency
equipment in the event that door is defeated. And that door can
be defeated. Trust me, it can be defeated. There isn't a
barrier in the world that can't be defeated.
And when that door is opened, there's two methods of
response, tactically. One, of course, is for an explosive entry
that happens fast. The other, and this is probably 95 percent
of the occurrences--you're going to have some premonition, some
pre-indication or pre-warning so that you can take a tactical
position on that particular perpetrator.
So I think there's some misconception here in this door
thing. You know, I know a lot of things that the Israelis have
on their aircraft that we're not talking about in here today,
for obvious reasons. They've got some very, very specific and
very well-intended things that put the oil on the squeak, so to
speak. They don't spend a lot of money on WD-40 and throw it up
in the air and hope some of it lands on what's making the
noise. They put it right where it needs to be, and that's where
I'd like to see us go.
The Chairman. Mr. Coy?
Mr. Coy. Mr. Chairman, I would--not to comment on the door.
I don't want to get into that discussion.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Coy. But just to comment on your kind remarks, I would
be remiss if I didn't acknowledge that it wasn't just my work;
it was the work of the very hardworking employees at MassPort.
But if you're having any difficulty finding where to send
money, you may send it here, and I can guarantee you we'll
spend it.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. And, Mr. Luckey, I've been flying for a good
60 years, at least, and if I ever had the pilot coming back
looking to see whether the wing's fallen off or something like
that----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman.--I can tell you right now, I would try to get
that thing down on the ground and start saying my prayers. You
go from bad to worse, man.
[Laughter.]
Senator Burns. Well, then--no, really, seriously, Mr.
Chairman, how many pilots have you seen come back through there
and to be looking out the window?
The Chairman. Yeah, they do that. There are rules--again,
this is life and death.
Senator Burns. No, but I'm--what I'm going to tell you, a
lot of times when that pilot comes walking back through that
cabin----
The Chairman. Or they come back now to go to the bathroom.
Senator Burns. No, no. They coming walk back through there,
and they don't say nothing to anybody, ``Hi, how are you,'' but
they're looking at something. They ain't back there because
they want to be back there. Remember that.
Thank you very much. Great hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, very, very much.
The Committee will be in recess, subject to the call of the
chair.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert T. Francis II, Executive Vice
President, Farragut International, LLC.
I am pleased to submit this statement to the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation on the issue of permitting
firearms in the cockpits of U.S. commercial air carriers. My aviation
expertise and background comes from many years with the Federal
Aviation Administration and as Vice Chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board. That experience has led me to concentrate
on matters of aviation safety, particularly with respect to commercial
aircraft operations. Therefore, in the debate of weapons in the
cockpit, I will speak only to what I see as the over-arching aviation
safety issue: distraction of the flight crew from their primary safety
duties as a direct result of arming pilots. I have chosen not to deal
with issues such as custody, storage, international and local gun
restrictions, and criminal penalties and civil liability issues that
likely can be solved with some reasoned thought.
I have been thinking about the issue of weapons in the cockpit for
pilots for some time--beginning shortly after the tragic attacks on
U.S. civil aviation in September 2001. Attached to this statement is a
copy of an article written for Aviation Week and Space Technology
magazine and published in November 2001, outlining my concerns
regarding the unintended safety consequences of quickly-enacted
security measures taken shortly after the terrorist attacks.
There is always a fine balance in the cockpit: the predictability
of routine and safe operations delicately juxtaposed with the anarchy
of unexpected, emergency situations. Predictability is a hallmark of
our safe and efficient aviation system. Routine safety, and the
checklists and training that lead to it, provide time and skill to deal
with extraordinary and emergency situations that surprise us.
Distractions in the cockpit upset what is routine, what has been
trained, what will be the right decision and the safest action.
The University of Texas has performed hundreds of safety audits of
air carrier line operations over many years. An auditor sits in the
cockpit and observes a flight crew's performance, noting threats and
errors that occur during flight and actions taken to manage and resolve
them. Those audits confirm that distraction is a prime threat to
aircraft safety. It is a source of disarray that easily takes the crew
out of a predictable routine and may put the aircraft in an undesirable
and destabilized state.
Research has shown that human beings are not good at focusing on
more than one thing at a time. We are fairly good at moving our
attention back and forth between competing distractions. But we focus
only on one thing at a time, and are extremely vulnerable to mistakes
where we must monitor one thing and do another. We may not see, or may
see and correct, our mistakes until the distractions multiply and
become so pervasive that the only result is failure for at least one of
the tasks. The aviation community responds by providing a backbone to
capture and mitigate error--procedures, processes, and checklists--to
assist concurrent task management, ensuring routine, safe aircraft
operations in the normal course. These procedures enable flight crews
to mitigate the risk of short or even sustained interruptions; tasks
deferred because of interruptions and distractions are now out of
sequence and special attention is needed to return to routine
operations. Essentially, flight crews become quite adept at switching
focus and ultimately maintaining focus on one thing at a time until
distractions disappear.
If it is difficult to focus on more than one routine thing at a
time, it certainly is much more difficult to focus on more than one
extraordinary thing at a time. A crisis situation in the cabin of the
aircraft introduces several layers of distraction for a flight crew. I
believe that the introduction of weapons in the cockpit introduces
another, unnecessary and multi-layered distraction that increases the
total aviation safety risk. The safety equation is fragile at the best
of times. Weapons in the cockpit increase the risk to critical piloting
behavior and techniques. I sincerely believe that the armed defense of
the cockpit will seriously and adversely distract pilots from the
primary task of safely landing the aircraft. We should avoid making
decisions emotionally and blindly, without regard to the unintended
consequences of our actions on safety and ultimately security.
It may be true that weapons in the cockpit could have prevented the
use of commercial aircraft as terrorist tools on September 11, 2001. We
will never know that. However, arming pilots to prevent another such
attack--a likelihood that I find remote at best--is tantamount to
fighting last year's war. Characterizing weapons in the cockpit as the
last line of defense is illusory given our newly-acquired awareness of
the constant threat to civil aviation and our continued security
enhancements to our aviation security defenses. Arming pilots devalues
many of our security measures, most notably the hardened cockpit door
given the limited time that the door is open and the cockpit is
accessible. And when you add ingenious procedures, such as of flight
attendants blocking cockpit doors with carts during the short time that
the cockpit door is open and exposed, you have provided cockpit defense
without cockpit distraction.
Arming pilots likely will address only the very low probability of
the same or a similar horrific event--but admittedly, an event with
very high impact and dire consequences. On the other hand, arming
pilots certainly will facilitate a wide range of unanticipated events,
some of which may have trivial outcomes but which could culminate in
multiple and significant distractions with unknown outcome. Indeed,
arming pilots may skew the unknown outcomes in favor of opening a
strengthened cockpit door, exposing a sterile cockpit environment--
actions that could decrease both the safety and security of the
aircraft. In essence, a weapon could bias the critical decision-making
process during a now new and extraordinary phase of flight.
Instead of moving forward from the terrible events of September
11th, putting weapons in the cockpit seems to leave us in place. We all
admit that the terrorists can be patient and that the possibility of
infiltrating much of our society quietly and patiently is possible.
Arming pilots and locking the cockpit door ensures that we have placed
weapons in the hands of those in control of the aircraft--further
raising the bar of perfection for the aviation security and
intelligence community in this country. Instead, let's give our pilots
the chance to do what they do best, what we entrust them to do day-in
and day-out in our civil aviation system: fly the airplane.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to Admiral
James M. Loy
Question 1. There are several bills before Congress that attempt to
move the statutory deadline on the screening of all checked bags by
explosive detection systems by the end of this year.
What is the Administration's position on these provisions?
In other words, does the Administration support changing the
explosive detection deadline? If so, please explain why.
If the Administration is uncertain whether the deadline
should be moved, when can we expect a decision?
Answer. Congress' decision to cut the President's Emergency
Supplemental budget request for TSA by at least $1 billion has forced
us to launch a fundamental re-evaluation of what we can get done with
the money at hand.
TSA will cut some proposed projects, string out payments, and find
savings wherever possible. The Administration will also ask for
additional funds from Congress for TSA for the 2003 fiscal year, which
starts October 1.
We are evaluating whether we will have enough money to meet the
baggage screening mandate set by Congress. We hope we will be given
adequate funds in a timely manner, so that we can continue our work on
meeting the baggage screening mandate.
Question 2. Mr. Secretary, as you indicated, the conference
agreement on the Supplemental Appropriations bill cut the President's
request for TSA funding and tied up much of the money in earmarks or
contingency funds that may never show up. Also, the appropriators put a
cap on the number of full-time employees TSA may have.
Can some of your concerns regarding funding be addressed in
an appropriations bill for fiscal year 2003, or is the problem
of such an immediate nature that aviation security will be
adversely affected in the short run?
Answer. We do not believe that aviation security will be adversely
affected in the short run. We have carefully reviewed our immediate
requirements and believe we have sufficient funding to carry us into
October 2002. However, we may be operating under a continuing
resolution as we start fiscal year 2003, which would present a special
set of challenges.
The prorated share of our initial FY 2002 appropriation that we
could receive for some portion of the new fiscal year would not provide
a sustainable level of funding. We plan on working with the
Administration and the Appropriation Committees' staffs to craft a
customized continuing resolution that addresses these special concerns,
including substantial up-front costs as we move toward deployment
deadlines occurring in the first quarter of the new fiscal year.
Question 3. Is the TSA reconsidering its earlier decision regarding
the arming of pilots with guns? Please explain the rationale behind the
initial decision to not allow pilots to have access to firearms in the
cockpit.
Answer. The TSA is reviewing its decision regarding the arming of
pilots with guns. The initial decision was based on a detailed and
thorough analysis of the costs and benefits of arming pilots. Our
reasons for refusing to allow arming of pilots included the following:
Pilots should focus on safely flying and landing the plane.
We are implementing a revised strategy aimed at
protecting and securing the cockpit at all costs. This
strategy requires that pilots devote 100 percent of their
effort to controlling the aircraft and landing the aircraft
safely.
Other means are in place to secure the aircraft,
including the expansion of the Federal Air Marshal (FAM)
program and the hardening of aircraft cockpit doors and
bulkheads.
Allowing pilots to carry firearms on their persons creates
additional dangers.
Arming airline pilots introduces firearms held by non-law
enforcement officers into sterile areas.
Uniformed airline pilots are easily identifiable targets
for person seeking guns already in airport terminals,
secure airport concourses, airline gate areas, and onboard
aircraft.
Pilots would be responsible for the care, maintenance,
storage and security of the firearm at all times.
Storing firearms in the aircraft creates a host of
problems.
Assuming that firearms stored on the aircraft are for
collective use, no individual control or accountability
will exist for any weapon. Further, if a storage box
containing the firearm is left unlocked and accessible
during flight, the potential exists that it will
accidentally be left unlocked after the flight, potentially
exposing the weapon to numerous individuals.
If the pilot checks the readiness of the firearm in the
plane, there is a danger of an accidental discharge near
critical flight equipment or the wounding, disabling, or
death of crewmembers critical to the operation of the
aircraft
Logistically, limited space exists to secure storage
containers within the cockpit and the placement of the box
must be aligned to accommodate both the pilot and/or the
co-pilot.
Training pilots would be extremely time-consuming and
prohibitively expensive.
TSA estimates that the total cost of arming all eligible
pilots, including training, purchasing of equipment,
conducting background checks and overall program
management, would exceed 900 million dollars.
Training all eligible pilots would require approximately
3.540 sessions with 24 trainees per session at 148 sites,
52 weeks a year for 2 years.
Liability Issues.
The proposed legislation largely shields the air carriers
and pilots from liability. The United States would become
liable for certain acts of negligence despite having no
control over the air carriers and their pilots.
Question 4. Will the TSA make a decision in the near future
regarding the use of non-lethal weapons by pilots?
Answer. TSA is now conducting a technical review of the use of non-
lethal weapons. This review is a top priority for TSA's Office of
Aviation Operations and Office of Technology. The review will be
completed by the beginning of September.
Question 5. In the Statement of Managers for the supplemental
appropriations conference report, the appropriators earmark money for
the field testing of an aviation security technology that is clearly
not ready for such testing. Just this month, the National Research
Council (NRC) concluded an independent, objective assessment of this
technology, which is called Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis, or PFNA. The
NRC stated unequivocally that PFNA is not ready for airport deployment
or testing. Furthermore, only one company, Ancore Corporation of Santa
Clara, California, had developed this technology. This earmark is a
total waste of critical research money that should be contributing to
our effort to increase aviation security. Because this directive is in
the Statement of Managers, it will not become the law of the land. Do
you intend to comply with this misguided directive?
Answer. As a result of our own research and that of the NRC, TSA
does not plan to begin testing or deploying any PFNA technology at
airports.
TSA, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) have invested
considerable funds in recent years on PFNA technology for use as a
potential inspection system. We have worked with Ancore. to develop a
prototype PFNA system capable of demonstrating the feasibility of using
PFNA to search for small explosives in air cargo containers. This
technology is costly, and despite considerable financial support, only
one prototype system exists at this point.
Furthermore, while as an inspection technology PFNA provides
content rich information, it has not proven capable of detecting at
least one important kind of explosive at the threat mass and can take
from minutes to hours for scans, depending on the type of article
inspected. Because of these and other problems, we do not plan to
deploy any PFNA system at airports. However, TSA, working in
partnership with DOD and Customs, does plan to deploy a PFNA system at
a port of entry in Texas next year.
Question 6. The price tag for meeting the statutory deadlines
regarding passenger and baggage screening is dearly beyond what many
people initially envisioned when the law was enacted last year. in
light of this substantial expense, are we being shortsighted in the
effort to create a system that can provide a certain level of security
by the deadline but be obsolete in a short time?
In other words, are we truly going to have the world's most secure
airports or are some better options not being considered for the sake
of meeting deadline requirements.
Answer. We are using the best technology currently available and
are in no way compromising to meet deadline requirements.
We are purchasing and deploying magnetometers that
represent the latest generation of metal-detection
technology. These machines can better differentiate between
harmless metals, such as pocket change, and metals used in
the manufacture of firearms.
The EDS machines being installed are the best means to
detect explosives on the market today. We must continue to
aggressively deploy such equipment.
TSA will continue to sponsor research and monitor
technological developments to ensure that we make use of
the best technology available.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Dr. Gerald Dillingham
Question 1. The GAO has effectively laid out many of the pros and
cons of arming pilots. Do you have any suggestion as to how we can get
some hard data or analysis that we can use to judge this issue
objectively?
Answer. We are aware of one study, by the Boeing Company, on the
damage to aircraft that resulted from the use of firearms, but this
study does not address the ability of armed pilots to defend the
cockpit against a terrorist attack. While a few hundred pilots might be
armed to test their ability in this regard, we do not believe, given
the infrequency of terrorist attacks, that such an effort would yield
enough data to draw useful conclusions about the impact of arming
pilots on aviation security. Scenario testing might provide data on
matters such as pilots' reaction times, what might be hit by a seated
pilot attempting to turn around and fire a weapon in the cockpit, what
critical aircraft components might be damaged by stray bullets, and
what kinds of training would be most appropriate for pilots if they
were to be armed.
Question 2. Are you aware of any so-called ``next generation''
passenger or baggage screening technologies that show great promise for
improving security in the near future?
Answer. We are aware of one such technology called Argus. Argus is
a newer type of explosive detection equipment that is being tested by
TSA. The equipment is smaller and less expensive than the current bulk
explosive detection systems and may be able to screen a much greater
number of bags per hour.
Question 3. Is enough money being allocated to doing research and
development that may produce technologies or systems that will improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of aviation security efforts?
It is difficult to say whether there is enough money being
allocated to research and development. However, the Congress
appropriated $126 million for aviation security research in fiscal year
2002--more than twice as much as FAA received for this research the
previous year. Whether this is enough money depends in part on whether
the funds are being spent wisely on well-chosen projects. GAO has been
asked to examine TSA's funding of research and development on aviation
security and will be reporting on the projects TSA is funding and the
efficacy of its processes and procedures for selecting research
projects.
Question 4. What are some of the pros and cons of a trusted or
registered traveler program? If all air travelers must undergo some
level of screening, what would be gained by the passenger? Is avoiding
a more thorough, random screening an adequate incentive for travelers
to participate? And, given the logistics of establishing and
administering, is there a sufficient benefit in terms of security?
Answer. Proponents argue that a trusted or registered traveler
program would allow known travelers to move through the screening
process quickly, thereby allowing security personnel to focus their
resources on people who may pose greater security risks. Opponents
typically argue that such a program would create a vulnerability in the
aviation security system. After surveying the literature and completing
some preliminary research, GAO has identified little information on the
potential costs or benefits of a trusted traveler program. GAO has
begun a study on the logistics, costs, and benefits of such a program
and expects to report back soon.
Question 5. Some people in the aviation community claim that the
large, certified explosive detection systems (EDS) are too slow and
have a high false positive rate. In other words, some critics claim
that these systems are neither effective nor efficient, especially
given their cost and the perceived difficulty in installing them at
airports in a short time period. What is your objective assessment of
the current EDS machines?
Answer. Unquestionably, there are drawbacks to the use of bulk EDS
systems. The specifics of those drawbacks cannot be discussed in a
public forum. However, I believe they have a place in a layered
approached to security and can play a positive role in improving
aviation security. The cost-effective use of this equipment requires
careful consideration of the unique physical and operational
characteristics of individual airports. Moreover, the drawbacks of this
equipment can be minimized by developing protocols to resolve alarms
and expedite baggage flow during peak periods that also provide a high
level of security. Bulk EDS is the best technology currently available.
Question 6. Are there any lessons that TSA can learn from FAA's
past attempts to procure and deploy sophisticated technologies that may
be outdated or outmoded when they are finally up and running? Is TSA
committing any mistakes in its attempt to field explosive detection
equipment similar to ones committed by the FAA in its attempts to
modernize air traffic control equipment?
Answer. Yes, early in the ATC modernization program FAA attempted
what was referred to as the ``big bang'' approach. This involved trying
to put in place an entire system at once. Because of the variations in
facilities, human factor challenges, the tremendous amount of software
technologies involved, and the static nature of the systems, the
modernization experienced significant slippages in its deployment
schedule. By the time the program was restructured to accomplish its
goal in an incremental fashion, some of the original technologies were
outdated, and expensive interim solutions also had to be implemented.
TSA could very well be headed toward making similar mistakes. For
example, TSA is in the process of purchasing the current generation of
EDS for all major airports. By the time this process is complete, a
newer generation of technology--smaller, faster, and less expensive--
could very well be available. The current generation of EDS equipment
is not very easy to shift down to smaller airports because of its size
and how it is being integrated into airport operations. The current
generation is also designed so that it is less able to be used as a
platform for future upgrades than the new generation of EDS.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Captain Edward M. Davidson
Question 1. What is your position regarding the use of non-lethal
weapons such as TASER's?
Answer. Northwest takes the position that the primary
responsibility of the pilots in an airborne threat of any type is to
fly the aircraft as safely and expeditiously as possible to the nearest
airport where professional law enforcement officers can manage the
situation. The company does not endorse the use of any type of weapon
on the flight deck, as it will unavoidably distract pilots from that
duty.
A hand-held, non-lethal weapon such as the commercially available
TASER has been consistently shown to be ineffective against multiple
targets, has only one shot capability, is difficult to aim and fire
accurately and must have the battery pack continually recharged to work
with reliability. Additionally, recent high profile uses of the device
that have been captured on video show that the TASER does not always
subdue a suspect--particularly if the person is under the influence of
drugs or wearing heavy clothing. The devices are easily pilferable and
since they would not be provided to individual pilots, their security
at times when the aircraft is not occupied is not assured.
The cost of acquiring, certifying for flight deck installation,
maintaining and continually training pilots on the use of the device is
not reasonably expected to be offset by the risk of a breach of the new
enhanced cockpit door.
Question 2. Do you think September 11th would never have happened
if the pilots on the hijacked planes had been armed with guns?
Answer. No, there would have been no difference in the outcome.
The procedures in place industry-wide on September 11th required
pilots to acquiesce to hijacker's demands--not resist them. The
conventional wisdom at the time was that hijackers primarily wanted
either publicity for a political cause or transportation to another
country. Had lethal weapons been available to the pilots at the time
the likely outcome would have been their probable compromise and use
against the flight deck crew, cabin crew or passengers. As a result of
the September 11th tragedies, the current training provided to flight
deck crews in the event of an in-flight incident emphasizes the role of
the strengthened cockpit door as the primary line of defense. Aircrews
are directed to focus on landing the aircraft as expeditiously and
safely as possible. Armed resistance by a pilot will distract from that
industry-accepted plan and increase the time necessary to achieve
resolution of the incident.
A companion question could easily be ``would September 11th never
have occurred had currently installed hardened flight deck doors been
on the hijacked aircraft''? Clearly, the answer is the same. The
problem with this line of reasoning is that it presupposes a changed
philosophical attitude toward hijackers that was not present at the
time. We cannot evaluate the results of either supposition without
assuming a procedural change had been effected concurrently in how the
industry responded to hijackings in general. With the then existing
procedural practices for hijacking, these types of hypothetical
questions have little value and are merely exercises in second-
guessing.
Question 3. Do you have any hard data to support your view that the
risks of arming pilots outweigh the potential benefits?
Answer. Northwest believes that the risks of accidental discharge,
distraction to the crews from having to manage the logistics of the
weapon and potential for loss or theft vastly outweigh the risks of
future terrorist breach of the now hardened flight deck door.
We submit the following:
1. One study from 1989 reported in 1994 found that 21 percent
of professional law enforcement officers are killed with their
own weapon either during struggles with suspects or while
normally handling or cleaning the weapon.\1\ This high
percentage when applied to non-professional flight deck crews
may result in a number of accidental discharges in the
aircraft. Of concern are those that may occur on the flight
deck and damage critical navigation or flight control computer
systems. Of equal concern is an accidental discharge that may
wound or incapacitate a crewmember or compromise the structural
integrity of the cockpit windscreen.
\1\ Garen Wintemute, ``Homicide, Handguns and the Crime Gun
Hypothesis: Firearms Used in Fatal Shootings of Law Enforcement
Officers, 1980-1989'', American Journal of Public Health, 84 (April
1994) pg 561-564
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2. Poor lighting, night flight deck conditions, turbulence,
headset use and high background noise will limit the ability of
the pilot to use proper judgment on when and on whom to use
his/her weapon. Again, studies have shown that in the
experience of law enforcement officers, there is considerable
ambiguity present in most confrontations with suspects. This is
principally due to the dynamic conditions of the moment that
are not reproducible on the training range.\2\ These problems
are indicative of substantial risk that an armed pilot may
inadvertently fire on a passenger or fellow crewmember that may
only appear to be a physical threat to the aircraft--this is
particularly an issue at times of high stress and poor
environmental conditions.
\2\ Tony Lesce, ``Instinctive Shooting'', Police Marksman, January/
February 1994, pg. 12.
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3. The impact of distractions and interruptions to the airline
pilot's mental flow of flying the aircraft has been proven in
many studies to have an unsafe impact on follow-on actions. A
study by the NASA Ames Research Center has determined that `` .
. . uncertainties, intrusions and general distractions can
quickly sidetrack any pilot and lead to potentially disastrous
mistakes . . . so insidious are these effects that pilots will
often express amazement when an error is made.'' Further, Ames
determined that ``. . . flows and checklists cannot possibly
anticipate all operational demands and are not designed to
accommodate them.'' \3\ The inherent distraction of managing
the logistics of the lethal weapon and the potential for
immediate, decisive and short reaction time responses of side
arms can have a dangerous effect on a pilots ability to prevent
errors in flying the aircraft for some period during and even
after an event--even if the event is not related to a hijacking
or terrorist takeover of the aircraft.
\3\ Dr. Loukia Loukopoulos, ``Cockpit Interruptions and
Distractions: A line Observation Study'', Abstract pg. 5.
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4. An incident at Newark International Airport in July
underscores the potential for loss or theft of lethal weapons
by pilots while on duty. A Federal Air Marshal left his carry-
on bag unattended a few steps away while he recovered a checked
bag from the inbound luggage carousel. When he returned to the
spot where the carry-on had been left the bag was missing.
Inside were the Marshal's service weapon, considerable
ammunition and a Federal Marshal's badge. All were stolen. If
professionally trained law enforcement officers can
inadvertently lose their side arms it is reasonable to assume
that a significantly higher number of weapons could be stolen
or misplaced by airline pilots whose principal occupation is
not professional law enforcement. The increased number and ease
of recognition of uniformed pilots will only heighten this
possibility.
It is therefore clear that the safety risks represented by well
researched and documented problems seen in the use of handguns by law
enforcement professionals as well as the flight safety impact of pilot
distractions represents known, substantial risks that have a much
higher probability of occurrence than the unknown and largely anecdotal
assumptions regarding potential terrorist actions aboard aircraft.
I appreciate the opportunity to provide these answers to the
Committee and am available at any time for further discussions on this
vital flight safety issue.