[Senate Hearing 107-1044]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-1044
SEAPORT SECURITY, LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION, AND VESSEL PILOTING
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 10, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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WASHINGTON : 2003
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGIA ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii GORDON SMITH, Oregon
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
RON WYDEN, Oregon OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
MAX CLELAND, Georgia SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held January 10, 2002.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 1
Witnesses
Back, Chief Johnny R., Chief Patrol Agent, New Orleans Sector,
U.S. Border Patrol............................................. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Casto, Admiral Roy, Commander, Eighth District, U.S. Coast Guard,
Accompanied by Captain Stephen Rochon, Captain of the Port of
New Orleans.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Grubbs, Captain Douglas J., Crescent River Pilots Association.... 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Hayden, Channing, President, Steamship Association of Louisiana.. 40
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Hecker, Robert S., Chief of Police, Harbor Police Department,
Port of New Orleans............................................ 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Hyatt, John T., Chairman, Port Liaison/Political Action Committee 54
Kaiser, Kenneth, Special Agent in Charge, New Orleans Field
Office, F.B.I.................................................. 34
Prepared statement........................................... 35
LaGrange, Gary, Director, Port of New Orleans.................... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Moran, Leticia, Field Operations Director, Gulf Customs
Management Center, U.S. Customs Service........................ 8
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Vitter, Hon. David, U.S. Congressman from Louisiana.............. 5
SEAPORT SECURITY, LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION, AND VESSEL PILOTING
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 10, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
New Orleans, LA.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:35 p.m., in the
Port of New Orleans Auditorium, Hon. John B. Breaux, Chairman
of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Surface
Transportation and Merchant Marine will please come to order.
Good afternoon everyone. I am delighted to be back at home.
We are appreciative of all the courtesies that we have been
extended by officials here in New Orleans with the Port of New
Orleans. We thank them very much.
We had an opportunity this morning to do some actual hands-
on inspection of both the port and some of our facilities and
also had a most enjoyable opportunity to board one of the ships
coming into the Port of New Orleans with the Coast Guard and
with the river pilots and some of the sea marshals working with
the United States Coast Guard as well. Maybe I should not say
this, but they actually let me take control of the ship, which
is probably a real hazard, but we did it under the careful
watch of the Coast Guard and river pilots who were onboard. It
is quite a thrill to have the personal experience of coming up
the river in this very busy port.
I am delighted that I am joined by my good friend and
colleague Congressman David Vitter, from this area, of course,
and also who serves this area very ably in the House of
Representatives, and he will have some comments to make on his
own. I am delighted he was able to participate with us and ask
questions if he would like.
This is the middle part of a 3-day trip in which I as
chairman of the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine have taken the opportunity to visit some of the
biggest and most outstanding ports in America to see how we are
doing, particularly after 9/11.
It is very clear that America is a different country since
September 11 when we had our terrorist attack. Security in all
parts of our lives needs to be looked at and considered. We in
the past have paid a great deal of attention to airports and
airline security, but it is certainly equally as important that
we pay attention to the security that we have at the ports of
our country, not only from the standpoint of criminal activity,
but also, obviously since 9/11, from the aspect of ports being
a potential target for terrorists. There is no port in America,
including this one, that would not be on a list of potential
terrorist heartaches if they wanted to do damage to the
economic structure of this country.
We had a hearing yesterday in Fort Everglades around Fort
Lauderdale in Florida and looked at their operations and what
they were doing. Their port is vastly different from the Port
of New Orleans in terms of the type of traffic that they have
and in terms of access to their ports. It is right on the
Atlantic, and it is a very short distance that they have to
protect, so it was interesting to see Fort Everglades in
comparison to our own port here in Louisiana, the Port of New
Orleans.
Tomorrow I will be in Houston looking at the Port of
Houston to see what they are doing and to see how we as a
Federal Government can be helpful in allowing them to become
more secure than they are today. We will probably have
additional field hearings on the West Coast looking at the
Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles and Seattle and Portland
and also on the East Coast in New York and Boston and possibly
Savannah.
This is an important endeavor because, as I said yesterday
in Florida, the intent of this Committee and Congress is not to
come down from Washington and tell port officials what they
ought to be doing. We're not trying to instruct them as much as
we are trying to work with them to try and create better
cooperation between the federal agencies that are involved in
port security and port regulation, including Immigration and
Naturalization Service, including Customs, including the Border
Patrol officers, the Coast Guard, and everybody else involved.
One of the things that I want to make very certain that we
ultimately end up with is some kind of a coordinated effort
dealing with port security. If everybody is in charge, then
generally no one is in charge. When you have Immigration and
Naturalization Service, when you have the FBI, when you have
Customs, when you have the Coast Guard, when you have the state
officials, and when you have the Sheriff's Department all being
concerned about port security at all of our ports around this
nation, then again sometimes there is a lot of overlap
confusion and there is not a clear line of responsibility. We
hopefully want to make sure that is being done properly.
I would just mention for the benefit of all of our guests
here in the audience that the U.S. Senate has adopted a bill
that I co-authored along with Senator Fritz Hollings and
Senator John McCain and Senator Bob Graham of Florida called
``The Port and Maritime Security Act.'' The legislation passed
the Senate Commerce Committee, which I serve on, unanimously;
and then passed the U.S. Senate unanimously. It is still
pending in the House. I am certain that the House will be
taking it up in the relatively near future, and in the not-too-
distant future we'll have a piece of legislation that the
President will be able to sign.
Let me just briefly outline what that legislation does.
Number one, it sets up local port security committees to better
coordinate the efforts, like I was talking about, state and
federal and local and private law enforcement officials.
It also mandates for the very first time that all ports
have a comprehensive security plan in place. It is very
important that there is a plan so that people know what to do,
when to do it, and how to do it before the inevitable happens
and they have to struggle to figure out how to put together a
plan. We want it in place early.
It requires ports to limit access to security-sensitive
areas, restrict firearms and other weapons, develop an
evacuation plan, and conduct background checks on employees
working in security-sensitive areas.
No longer will people be able to have free and unfettered
access to sensitive areas. Ports are clearly sensitive areas.
You no longer are going to be able, in my opinion, to just
allow anyone to drive into a port in a vehicle or car or truck
without having a specific purpose for being there and to be
identified as to what their purpose is in that particular area.
The bill would require ships to electronically send their
cargo manifest to a port before gaining clearance to enter and
prohibits unloading of improperly documented cargo.
It is very important that we in the Port of New Orleans
know what ships are coming into the Mississippi River, to know
who is onboard those ships, to know who the crew is onboard
those ships, and to know also what cargo is onboard those
ships.
Some cargo is much more sensitive than others in the sense
of being hazardous material verses soy beans as an example. We
need to know what cargo is on those ships before they enter
into the Mississippi River Transportation System. It also
creates an improved reporting of crew members and passengers
and imported cargo to better track suspicious activity.
It is interesting in Fort Everglades yesterday, which was
obviously a very large cruise passenger terminal that fights
with Miami to be the largest passenger terminal in the country.
We also have passenger ships calling on this port, and
hopefully many more in the future will also look at the Port of
New Orleans as its home--who is onboard those ships and making
sure that they leave the port with the same group of people
that came to the port on that ship. It is not an easy thing to
do.
We saw a wonderful example in Port Everglades yesterday
where every person that enters a passenger ship is
photographed, given an ID card, automatically thrown into a
computer, and then they call another port. They know who is off
the ship, and they know when every single passenger is back on.
It is a good system.
They also inspect 100 percent of the luggage that is being
put on a cargo passenger ship. I don't know whether we have a
system like that yet here. Maybe we can hear about that today.
Every single piece of luggage is x-rayed. That is more than is
being done currently on airlines, which we hope to get to 100
percent, x-raying of the checked luggage, which is now being
done on many cargo vessels.
The bill also creates a sea marshall program to more
specifically authorize the Coast Guard to board ships entering
our ports to make sure that everything on that ship is in
order. We had sea marshals with us this morning when we boarded
the ship that was a Chinese registered ship, so the program is
already here in New Orleans. We have some sea marshals that, in
addition to boarding the ship with a river pilot, we also have
sea marshals and the Coast Guard who are on those ships looking
around the ship to make sure that nothing suspicious is going
on that ship.
It also directly grants in the Senate bill--it authorizes
$703 million to local ports to upgrade security infrastructure
and to the U.S. Customs Service for new inspectors, agents, and
screening and detection equipment. That's an authorization--
Congressman Vitter and Senator Landreau serve Louisiana on the
Appropriations Committee and will play major roles in making
sure that what we authorize is ultimately, actually
appropriated. That's important. Those are direct grants to
local ports. The Port of New Orleans obviously can benefit
greatly from that type of assistance.
It also, in the Senate bill, guarantees up to $3.3 billion
in loans for ports to upgrade security infrastructure, which
would obviously make it much easier for a port to go into the
private market to finance infrastructure upgrading.
It also authorizes additional spending for research and
development of cargo inspection technology. It is obvious that
in the 21st century we can no longer depend on 1960's
technology to properly inspect the cargo. We only inspect about
2 percent of the cargo that enters into this country in ships.
That means 98 percent is currently not inspected.
Because of the good work of Customs and the INS and the
Coast Guard and local officials, we have been able to do an
incredibly good job of targeting ships that are suspicious and
actually stopping those from bringing in things that should not
be coming in. Just yesterday, and I hope they didn't do it
because of me, but they busted a large shipment of cocaine, the
Coast Guard working with Customs in Florida. That just happened
to take place the same day we were there. These are very
complicated procedures. I mean this stuff was welded into the
anchor room of the stern of the ship. The only way they found
it was to get in with cutting torches and cut open the bottom
of that ship's well to find out that they had millions and
millions of dollars of cocaine that had been welded into the
ship's structure. It is hard to find that just with a physical
inspection. You have to have information that is obtained in
different fashions and know that was being brought in. They're
doing a terrific job.
Let me finally mention that as we consider the overall
question of seaport security, we must also remember the bravery
and courage of all of our individuals, federal, state, and
local individuals who place their lives on the line to protect
our ports and make them more secure every day.
Just in October, as all of you are probably aware, Senior
Customs Inspector Tom Murphy lost his life and paid the
ultimate sacrifice while inspecting a vessel full of scrap
metal here in Louisiana at the Port of Gramercy. Lack of oxygen
in the hole, unbeknownst to the inspectors when they got there,
resulted in a very tragic accident by a person who is now
survived by his wife and five children. He served the U.S.
Customs Service for 26 years and did his job every day and paid
an ultimate sacrifice trying to just make sure that our ports
are more secure.
Those are the types of people that we have in this business
who are trying to increase port security. They are good people.
I think that we on the federal level need to make sure that
we're doing everything that we can in coordinating these
efforts. These hearings that we are having in Florida, New
Orleans and Houston and around the country hopefully will give
us better and greater information to do a better job with this
coming legislation.
With that, I want to recognize my good friend who has
joined us from, as we say in the Congress--we don't refer to
each other as senators or Congressman officially. In the Senate
if you call someone a Member of the House, you can have your
words taken down and stricken. We call them ``folks from the
other body.'' Like an out-of-body experience (laughter). Having
served in the House for 14 years, I think it is a pretty good
place to be and I am delighted that David Vitter has joined us.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER,
U.S. CONGRESSMAN FROM LOUISIANA
Mr. Vitter. Thank you very much, Senator. I would only say,
first, thank you for your courtesies in allowing me to sit with
the Committee in hearing and absorbing the testimony, which I
very much look forward to.
Second, I wanted to acknowledge and salute your leadership
on this issue. The Senate has been active on this issue even
before September 11. You have been very involved, and I want to
commend you for all of that work.
Third, I want to say that although the House has been
lagging on the issue compared to the Senate--I think that is
going to change, and I am very hopeful that is going to change.
I am introducing a comprehensive bill that is similar to
yours. I've spoken to the Coast Guard Subcommittee chairman,
and he is focusing on the issue, and I think we are going to
have markups in March and April and move toward a final bill on
the President's desk hopefully by mid-2002, if not sooner. I'd
like to see it sooner. I'm very hopeful about that, and thank
you again for your courtesy.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, David, for being with
us.
I'd like to welcome our first panel. We have Rear Admiral
Casto, who is obviously our commandant of the Eighth District
of the United States Coast Guard. He is accompanied by Captain
Stephen Rochon, who is the Captain of the Port, who is soon to
be Admiral somewhere.
I wish you could stay with us.
He has been a good friend and is now the Captain of the
Port of New Orleans.
Leticia Moran is a Field Operations Director for the Gulf
Customs Management Center of the U.S. Customs Service here in
New Orleans, which does a terrific job of running the Customs
program here. I would add that he has been of great help to me
on these incredibly important Louisiana interests in getting a
large shipment of Mardi Gras beads through Customs (laughter).
Take advantage of something that is very important to
Louisiana. Without her help, we wouldn't have been able to work
out that little detail.
Chief Johnny Back, who is the Chief Patrol Agent of the New
Orleans Sector of the United States Board Patrol.
We are delighted to have all three of you.
Admiral Casto, do you want to start it off?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROY CASTO, COMMANDER, EIGHTH DISTRICT,
U.S. COAST GUARD, ACCOMPANIED BY CAPTAIN STEPHEN ROCHON,
CAPTAIN OF THE PORT OF
NEW ORLEANS
Admiral Casto. Yes, sir. I guess I get to go first.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Vitter. Let me
start by thanking you for your leadership in this very
important area.
As Commander of the Coast Guard's Eighth District, I am
responsible for the prosecution of all Coast Guard missions
along the Gulf Coast--well, along the Gulf Coast from the West
Coast of Florida over to the Mexican Border--and across the
entire inland rivers system that stretches basically from the
Rocky Mountains in the West to the Appalachians in the East. I
appreciate the opportunity to highlight some of our efforts in
the important area of maritime homeland security in the wake of
the tragic attacks on September 11.
While port security and homeland security have long been
Coast Guard missions, at no time in my 35 years of service have
I seen it elevated to the priority amongst other important
Coast Guard missions that we have today, and rightfully so.
In the post-September 11 environment, protecting Americans
from terrorist threats requires constant vigilance across every
mode of transportation: air, land, and sea. This is especially
true of the maritime mode. Ensuring effective port and maritime
security is a national priority and a multi-agency
responsibility involving all the agencies and organizations
represented at these field hearings and many more.
The business of our seaports impact broadly across
America's heartland as well as along our coasts. The United
States has more than 95,000 miles of coastline, 25,000 miles of
inland, intercoastal, and coastal water ways, and 361 ports
containing more than 3,700 passenger and cargo terminals. This
commercial maritime transportation infrastructure fuels our
economy and under the Department of Transportation and Coast
Guard leadership has long been identified as a national
priority.
I am very proud of the job our Coast Guard men and woman
have been doing to deter potential future terrorist attacks in
the maritime arena. I'm also encouraged by the very close
working relationships that have developed among all of our
partners in this endeavor. These include state and local law
enforcement agencies, our sister armed services, other federal
agencies, the Marine Pilot Association, and various elements of
the industry.
These relationships are stronger than at any time that I
can recall, and together we are making a difference. But let
there be no doubt, securing our borders, our critical
infrastructure, and our waterways, and also providing for the
safety of our citizens in the maritime environment is an
enormous challenge for all of us.
In this Coast Guard district alone, we have over 1,200
miles of coastline and over 10,000 miles of inland navigable
rivers. We have 11 of the nation's top 20 ports in terms of
tonnage handled, including large petrochemical complexes in New
Orleans, Baton Rouge, Houston, Texas City, and Freeport to name
a few.
The Gulf area also provides 28 percent of all of the
nation's domestically produced petroleum and natural gas and 46
percent of the nation's imported petroleum. We have identified
nearly 400 pieces of critical infrastructure in this district,
nearly 20 percent of which lies between New Orleans and Baton
Rouge and Galveston and Houston. These facilities include the
petrochemical plants, critical rail and highway bridges,
nuclear generating plants, and cruise ship terminals.
A typical day in this district may see the arrival of over
150 major commercial vessels, half a dozen or more would be
what we call ``high-interest vessels.'' That would be, for
example, large cruise ships, U.S. Navy vessels, and liquid
hazardous gas carriers. We also have two strategic psilophyte
ports in this district from which critical supplies flow to our
forces fighting overseas.
We are using all of the resources and tools at our disposal
to provide the maximum possible Coast Guard presence and
deterrence on and around our waterways and working closely with
all of our partners to maximize all of our combined efforts.
We are also preparing to provide protection and response to
specific threats identified by the intelligence community. Our
tools include such things as vessel escorts and limited use of
sea marshals, as well as random security patrols in many of our
ports and around the critical offshore infrastructures,
including Louisiana offshore oil ports and oil and gas
production platforms that stretch far into the Gulf in the
petroleum lighting zones in the Gulf.
We are also working closely with the Coast Guard's
Intelligence Coordination Center and our partners maximizing
our awareness of what is going on in our waterways. I think you
saw some of our new technology demonstrated at the Vessel
Traffic Center this morning. This technology will significantly
improve our ability to monitor the lower Mississippi River from
the mouth up to Baton Rouge.
I hope this statement provides a snapshot of the homeland
security challenges in this district and how we are engaged in
meeting these challenges. I'll be happy to answer any questions
that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Casto follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Roy Casto, Commander, Eighth District,
U.S. Coast Guard, Accompanied by Captain Stephen Rochon, Captain of the
Port of New Orleans
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman. As Commander of Coast Guard's Eighth
District, I am responsible for the prosecution of all Coast Guard
missions along the Gulf Coast from Mexico to the West Coast of Florida,
and across the entire inland rivers system stretching basically from
the Rocky Mountains in the west to the Appalachians in the east.
Protecting America from terrorist threats requires constant
vigilence across every mode of transportation: air, land, and sea. The
agencies within the Department of Transportation, including the U.S.
Coast Guard Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Highway
Administration, and the Maritime Administration (MARAD), touch all
three modes of transportation and are cooperatively linked. This is
especially true of the maritime mode. Ensuring robust port and maritime
security is a national priority and an intermodal challenge, with
impacts in America's heartland communities just as directly as the U.S.
seaport cities where cargo and passenger vessels arrive and depart
daily. The United States has more than 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000
miles of inland, intracoastal and coastal waterways, serving 361 ports
containing more than 3,700 passenger and cargo terminals. This maritime
commerce infrastructure, known as the U.S. Marine Transportation
System, or MTS, has long been a Department of Transportation priority.
The U.S. MTS handles more than 2 billion tons of freight, 3 billion
tons of oil, transports more than 134 million passengers by ferry, and
entertains more than 7 million cruise ship passengers each year. The
vast majority of the cargo handled by this system is immediately loaded
onto or has just been unloaded from railcars and truckbeds, making the
borders of the U.S. seaport network especially abstract and vulnerable,
with strong, numerous and varied linkages direct to our Nation's rail
and highway systems.
I appreciate the opportunity to highlight some of our efforts in
the important area of Maritime Homeland Security, in the wake of the
tragic attacks on September 11. While Port Security/Homeland Security
have long been Coast Guard missions, at no other time in my 35 years of
service have I seen them elevated to the priority (amongst other
important Coast Guard missions) that we have today. And rightly so.
I am very proud of the job our Coast Guard men and women have been
doing to deter potential future terrorist attacks in the maritime
arena. I am also encouraged by our close working relationships that
have developed among all our partners in this endeavor. These include
state and local law enforcement agencies, our sister armed services,
other federal agencies, marine pilot associations and various elements
of industry. These relationships are stronger than at any other time I
can recall, and together we are making a difference. But, let there be
no doubt, securing our borders, our critical infrastructure and our
waterways and also providing for the safety of our citizens in the
maritime environment is an enormous challenge for all of us.
In this Coast Guard district alone, we have over 1,200 miles of
coastline, and over 10,300 miles of inland navigable rivers. We have 11
of the nation's top 20 ports in terms of tonnage handled, including
large petrochemical complexes in New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Houston,
Texas City, and Freeport. This Gulf area also provides 28 percent of
all the nation's domestically produced petroleum and natural gas and 46
percent of the nation's imported petroleum. We have identified nearly
400 pieces of critical infrastructure, nearly 20 percent of which lies
between the New Orleans to Baton Rouge and Galveston to Houston
corridors. These facilities include petrochemical plants, critical rail
and highway bridges, nuclear generating plants and cruise ship
terminals. A typical day may see the arrival of over 150 major
commercial vessels, 6-8 being what we would call high interest vessels
(large cruise ships, U.S. Navy vessels and liquid hazardous gas
carriers). We also have two strategic sealift ports from which critical
supplies flow to our forces overseas.
We are using all the resources and tools at our disposal to provide
the maximum possible Coast Guard presence and deterrence on and around
our waterways and working closely with our partners to maximize our
combined efforts. We are also preparing to provide protection and
response to specific threats identified by the intelligence community.
Our tools include vessel escorts and limited use of ``Sea Marshals,''
as well as armed random security patrols in many of our ports and
around critical offshore infrastructure (including the Louisiana
Offshore Oil Port and petroleum lightering zones). We are also working
closely with the Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center and our
partners maximizing our awareness of what is going on in our waterways.
I think you saw some of our new technology demonstrated at our vessel
traffic center this morning; this technology will significantly improve
our ability to monitor the Lower Mississippi River from the mouth to
Baton Rouge.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will
be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Ms. Moran.
STATEMENT OF LETICIA MORAN, FIELD OPERATIONS
DIRECTOR, GULF CUSTOMS MANAGEMENT CENTER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
Ms. Moran. Chairman Breaux, Congressman Vitter, thank you
for the invitation to testify and for providing me the chance
to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of the U.S.
Customs Services to address the terrorist threat and the
challenges that exist with vessel and cargo inspection at the
Port of New Orleans. I'd also like to thank you for recognizing
the dedication of our officers, especially Inspector Tom
Murray.
I am Leticia Moran, the Director of Field Operations for
the Gulf port area. I am responsible for oversight of the
inspection and control of international passengers,
conveyances, and cargo arriving and departing through the
seaports and airports in the Gulf area.
As a major participant in the protection of our nation's
ports, Customs has taken a lead role in efforts to deny entry
to the implements of terrorism into the United States. The
Customs Service enforces over 400 laws and regulations for more
than 40 different agencies. Naturally, the ports of entry in
the Gulf area are a major focus of these efforts.
While Customs is able to inspect only a relatively small
percentage of the massive volume of cargo entering the United
States each day, we rely on a careful, multi-layered targeting
approach to select goods for intensive examination. Our risk
management strategy incorporates the use of intelligence and
advance information from shippers, the deployment of
sophisticated technologies, and the skill and expertise of
Customs personnel to sift out suspicious goods from the vast
ocean of legitimate trade before they enter the commerce of the
United States.
In addition, under the direction of Commissioner Robert
Bonner, the agency is engaging the private sector in a new
Customs trade partnership to defend the entire length of the
product supply chain from penetration by terrorists or the
implements of terrorism. We were undertaking these new
initiatives with our international partners in an effort to
expand the perimeter of inspection away from the port of entry
and toward the point of origin.
The Customs Service also continues to build upon
established cooperative relationships with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Department of Agriculture, Coast Guard,
and other federal agencies, state and local authorities, and
port authorities within the Gulf area. Using a collaborative
approach, these agencies are employing targeting tools and
technology and risk management techniques to select people,
vessels, and cargo for increased inspection.
Trade and travel into the Gulf area continues to increase.
During fiscal year 2001, over 12,000 vessels and 135,000
containers entered through the eight seaports in our Gulf area
from Mobile, Alabama, to Lake Charles, Louisiana. Approximately
4,281 thousand containers alone arrive in the Port of New
Orleans. These numbers represent an increase of over 8 percent
compared to the same period last year.
Sea passenger counts, which include cruise ship passengers
and crew members, were over 150,000 in fiscal year 2001. This
represented a decrease of 6.9 percent from the previous year
mainly due to financial problems with one of our major cruise
ship lines. But due to major improvements by the Port at the
Julia Street Cruise Ship Terminal, we do expect cruise ship
vessel arrivals to increase through the Port of New Orleans
within the next 2 years. The Port Authority projections are
that cruise ship passengers will increase by 300 percent by
fiscal year 2003.
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, the
United States Customs Service immediately implemented a Level
One Alert for all personnel and ports of entry. This is our
highest state of alert calling for sustained, intensive anti-
terrorist operations. We remain at Level One Alert today.
Prior to September 11, a major threat in our area was
narcotics and its proceeds. After September 11, we have
refocused our resources to passengers, vessels, and cargo
arriving or departing from or to countries identified as high
risk for terrorists and the implements of terrorism.
We do not expect our changing priorities to have a negative
impact on our traditional law enforcement mission. To the
contrary, we expect, and we have seen mounting evidence to the
effect, that heightened counter-terrorist measures by the
Customs Service are strengthening our overall interdiction
efforts and are increasing drug seizures.
Customs in New Orleans immediately increased inspections on
all modes of transportation. Because of watch lists issued for
suspected terrorists, Customs increased inspections for air and
sea passengers both inbound and outbound through the Louis
Armstrong Airport and the Julia Street Terminal, and we work in
close coordination with both the INS and FBI to identify
suspects on the watch list.
We are also targeting and inspecting high-risk shipments
that could be used in terrorist attacks against our country.
Customs uses intelligence, data systems, and physical
inspection with high-tech equipment to identify which vessels
and containers to examine.
Along with our Office of Investigations, an intelligence
collection and analysis team has been established in New
Orleans. This interdisciplinary team's main mission is to
target high-risk vessels entering through our various seaports.
As a result, we have increased inspections of containers
utilizing a vehicle inspection system, which is a mobile
container x-ray system.
High-risk vessels and shipments have been inspected using a
multi-agency approach. During these inspections, the different
entities contribute their expertise and their resources. We are
conducting these inspections with Customs agents, K-9 teams,
the Louisiana National Guard, and Customs technology to include
x-ray equipment and radiation pagers.
The Coast Guard, FBI, Louisiana State Police, the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality, the Port Harbor Police,
and the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's bomb dogs have assisted us
in targeting and inspections. These inspections have resulted
in a closer working relationship among these different
agencies.
Our ports within the five-state area have also responded to
the threat on the northern border by sending personnel to
assist with inspections at Detroit and Port Huron. The Port of
New Orleans Contraband Enforcement Team also supports the
inspections of high-risk vessels at the seaports of Morgan
City, Baton Rouge, Gramercy, Lake Charles, Gulfport and
Pascagoula. Customs personnel will also be lending support at
the Super Bowl to be held later this month here in New Orleans.
From an overall perspective, the volume of trade and
traffic in our ports of entry have put immense pressure on our
ability to enforce the nation's laws while facilitating
international trade even before September 11. After September
11, our challenge has risen to a new level. Although we have
taken many steps to address these challenges, we still face
many more.
It is over 80 miles from the mouth of the Mississippi to
the city of New Orleans. On both sides of the river are
numerous private and public docks, anchorage locations, grain
elevators, and oil refineries. Providing security within this
area and up river takes a coordinated effort between the
different federal agencies, port authorities, and state and
local enforcement entities. Our industry partnerships with the
local trade community also play a large role in our enforcement
efforts.
We are working with Treasury and the Administration to
address the personnel and technology challenges. This
technology has to be able to detect the implements of terrorism
and has to be mobile to be able to address threats within our
geographical area. The technology also has to be the least
intrusive to be able to safeguard our employees and to protect
the integrity of legitimate shipments.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
testify. The U.S. Customs Service will continue to make every
effort possible, working with our fellow inspection agencies,
within the Administration, with Congressional leaders, and the
business community to address your concerns and those of the
American public. I would be happy to answer any questions you
might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Moran follows:]
Prepared Statement of Leticia Moran, Field Operations Director, Gulf
Customs Management Center, U.S. Customs Service
Chairman Breaux, thank you for your invitation to testify and for
providing me the chance to appear before you today to discuss the
efforts of the U.S. Customs Service to address the terrorism threat and
the challenges that exists with vessel and cargo inspection at the Port
of New Orleans, Louisiana.
My name is Leticia Moran. I am the Director, Field Operations for
the Gulf port area. I am responsible for oversight of the inspection
and control of international passengers, conveyances and cargo arriving
and departing through the seaports and airports in the Gulf port area.
As a major participant in the protection of our nation's ports,
Customs has taken a lead role in efforts to deny entry to the
implements of terrorism into the United States. The Customs Service
enforces over 400 laws and regulations for more than 40 federal
agencies. Naturally, the ports of entry in the Gulf area are a major
focus of these efforts.
While Customs is able to inspect only a relatively small percentage
of the massive volume of cargo entering the United States each day, we
rely on a careful, multi-layered targeting approach to select goods for
intensive examination. Our risk management strategy incorporates the
use of intelligence and advance information from shippers, the
deployment of sophisticated technologies, and the skill and expertise
of Customs personnel to sift out suspicious goods from the vast ocean
of legitimate trade before they enter the commerce of the United
States.
In addition, under the direction of Commissioner Robert Bonner, the
agency is engaging the private sector in a new Customs-trade
partnership to defend the entire length of the product supply chain
from penetration by terrorists or the implements of terrorism. And we
are undertaking new initiatives with our international partners in an
ongoing effort to expand the perimeter of inspection away from the port
of entry and towards the point of origin.
The Customs Service also continues to build upon established
cooperative relationships with the Immigration & Naturalization
Service, Department of Agriculture, Coast Guard and other federal
agencies, state and local authorities, and Port Authorities within the
Gulf area. Using a collaborative approach, these agencies are employing
targeting, tools and technology and risk management techniques to
select people, vessels, and cargo for increased inspection.
Trade and travel into the Gulf area continues to increase. During
FY 2001, over 12,000 vessels and 135,000 containers entered through the
8 seaports in our Gulf area from Mobile, Alabama to Lake Charles,
Louisiana. Approximately 4,200 vessels and 81,000 containers alone
arrived in the Port of New Orleans. These numbers represent an increase
of over 8 percent compared to the same period last year.
Sea passenger counts, which include cruise ship passengers and
crewmembers were over 150,000 in FY 2001. This represented a decrease
of 6.9 percent from the previous year, mainly due to financial problems
with one of our major cruise ship lines. Due to major improvements by
the Port at the Julia St. Cruise Ship Terminal, we do expect cruise
vessel arrivals to increase through the port of New Orleans within the
next two years. Port authority projections are that cruise ship
passengers will increase by 300 percent by FY 2003.
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
U.S. Customs Service immediately implemented a Level One Alert for all
personnel and ports of entry. This is our highest state of alert,
calling for sustained, intensive anti-terrorist operations. We remain
at Level One Alert today.
Prior to September 11, 2001, our major threat in our area was
narcotics and its proceeds. After September 11th, we have refocused our
resources to passengers, vessels, and cargo arriving or departing from
or to countries identified as high risk for terrorists and the
implements of terrorism.
We do not expect our changing priorities to have a negative impact
on our traditional law enforcement mission. To the contrary, we expect,
and we have seen mounting evidence to the effect that heightened
counter-terrorist measures by the Customs Service are strengthening our
overall interdiction efforts and are increasing drug seizures.
Customs in New Orleans immediately increased inspections on all
modes of transportation. Because of watch lists issued for suspected
terrorists, Customs increased inspections for air and sea passengers
both inbound and outbound through Louis Armstrong Airport and the Julia
St. Terminal, and we worked in close coordination with both the INS and
FBI to identify suspects on the watch list.
We are also targeting and inspecting high-risk shipments that could
be used in terrorist attacks against our country. Customs uses
intelligence, data systems and physical inspection with high tech
equipment to identify which vessels and containers to examine. Along
with the Office of Investigations, an Intelligence Collection and
Analysis Team has been established in New Orleans. This
interdisciplinary team's main mission is to target high-risk vessels
entering through area seaports. As a result, we have increased
inspections of containers, utilizing the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection
System (VACIS), a mobile container X-ray system.
High-risk vessels and shipments have been inspected using a multi-
agency approach. During these inspections the different entities
contribute their expertise and resources. We are conducting these
inspections with Customs agents, K-9 teams, Louisiana National Guard
and Customs technology to include the X-ray equipment and radiation
pagers. The Coast Guard, FBI, Louisiana State Police, Louisiana Dept of
Environmental Quality, Port Harbor Police and the Jefferson Parish
Sheriff bomb dogs have assisted us in targeting and inspections. These
inspections have resulted in a closer working relationship among these
different agencies.
Our ports within the five-state area have also responded to the
threat on the northern border by sending personnel to assist
inspections at Detroit and Port Huron. The Port of New Orleans,
Contraband Enforcement Team also supports the inspections of high-risk
vessels at the seaports of Morgan City, Baton Rouge, Gramercy, Lake
Charles, Gulfport and Pascagoula. Customs personnel will also be
lending support at the Super Bowl to be held later this month in New
Orleans.
From an overall perspective, the volume of trade and traffic in our
ports of entry has put immense pressure on our ability to enforce the
nation's laws while facilitating international trade, even before
September 11. After September 11, our challenge has risen to a new
level. Although we have taken many steps to address these challenges,
we still face many more.
It is over 80 miles from the mouth of the Mississippi to the City
of New Orleans. On both sides of the river are numerous private and
public docks, anchorage locations, grain elevators and oil refineries.
Providing security within this area and upriver takes a coordinated
effort between the different federal agencies, port authorities and
state/local law enforcement entities. Our industry partnerships with
the local trade community also play a large role in our enforcement
efforts.
We are working within Treasury and the Administration to address
the personnel and technology challenges. This technology has to be able
to detect the implements of terrorism and has to be mobile to be able
to address threats within our geographical area. The technology also
has to be the least intrusive to be able to safeguard our employees and
to protect the integrity of legitimate shipments.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to testify.
The U.S. Customs Service will continue to make every effort possible,
working with our fellow inspection agencies, within the Administration,
with Congressional leaders, and the business community to address your
concerns and those of the American people. I would be happy to answer
any questions you might have.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Ms. Moran.
Chief Johnny Back.
STATEMENT OF CHIEF JOHNNY R. BACK, CHIEF PATROL AGENT, NEW
ORLEANS SECTOR, U.S. BORDER PATROL
Mr. Back. Mr. Chairman, my name is Johnny Back. I am the
chief patrol agent for the New Orleans Sector of the United
States Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify here.
Senator Breaux. Pull that mike a little bit closer to you,
please.
Mr. Back. Is that better, sir?
I would like to take a brief moment to familiarize you with
the mission of the United States Border Patrol. The Border
Patrol is the uniformed enforcement arm of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. The primary mission of the Border
Patrol is the protection and prevention of smuggling and the
illegal entry of individuals into the United States between
ports of entry. In carrying out our mission, we coordinate our
efforts with INS immigration inspectors located at the ports of
entry. I am here today to discuss the operations conducted in
this Sector, primarily those operations closely related to the
September 11 security issues.
A potential threat to the United States is the entry of
persons associated with terrorist organizations via maritime
transportation. As security procedures at traditional arrival
sites in the United States are strengthened, criminals will
attempt to utilize alternate methods of entry. Individuals
could seek entry aboard a cruise line either as a passenger or
as a bonafide crewman onboard a commercial vessel, later to
jump ship. Of course, those who wish to do harm could also
attempt to make an illegal entry anywhere along the Sector's
800 miles of coastline. The job of the New Orleans Sector is
both to try to prevent illegal entries and to ensure that those
who do enter as crew are legitimate and depart with their
ships.
Our Sector has uniformed enforcement jurisdiction over a
seven-state area encompassing 592 counties and parishes and
approximately 362,000 square miles, including all of Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, and a
portion of the Florida panhandle. Along with our Sector's
headquarters in New Orleans, we have stations located in Lake
Charles, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Gulfport, Mississippi;
Mobile, Alabama; and Little Rock, Arkansas.
This area has two major seaports in New Orleans and Mobile
and 15 smaller seaports along the coast from Lake Charles
eastward to Port St. Joe, Florida. In addition, there are
numerous other deep and shallow water ports, anchorage
locations, and other access points for maritime traffic. At any
given time, there can be between several hundred and a few
thousand alien crewmen either berthed in or in immediate
transit through these ports and inland waterways. Each year the
Port of New Orleans hosts more foreign-flagged vessels than any
other U.S. port.
In addition, the Inter-Coastal Waterway traverses the
entire area east to west, and the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway
serves as an alternate shipping route between the Gulf of
Mexico and the Great Lakes. Both waterways handle vast amounts
of barge and small boat traffic, some of it crewed by foreign
nationals.
Many coastal areas in the western part of the Sector are
inaccessible by land transportation, and many others are
accessible only by a single road. Numerous locations along the
coast contain shrimp-drying docks, oil and gas platforms, and
sulphur mines that are accessible only by water or air
transportation, but which are prime clandestine landing sites.
Eastward from Mobile Bay to Apalachicola, Florida, there
are approximately 200 miles of beaches connected to Interstate
10 by modern access roads. In many places, deep water extends
to only a few yards offshore, and relatively large boats can
land people or contraband with relative ease. From many beach
areas, access to interstate bus lines or major airports is less
than an hour away.
Traditionally, operational activities conducted throughout
this Sector have supported INS's national immigration policies.
In our seven-state area, Border Patrol agents continue to
conduct immigration checks at public transportation hubs, such
as airports and bus stations, perform traffic checks, arrest
and prosecute alien smugglers, and respond to the requests for
assistance from other law enforcement agencies within the
Sector.
More recently, our priority has been focused on the
immediate border; that is, coastline integrity and security.
The New Orleans Sector is responsible for crewman control
operations along the Gulf of Mexico from the Texas state line
to Apalachicola, Florida, nearly 800 miles away.
Working hand in hand with the INS inspections offices of
the New Orleans and Atlanta district offices, we have realigned
our enforcement resources to maximize our deterrence
capabilities and manpower utilization. Officers share
information and operational developments on a daily basis. We
also closely monitor and adjust daily work schedules to provide
optimum coverage based on the latest developments.
To the greatest extent possible, all available agents have
been deployed to patrol and interdiction duties in close
proximity to our ports. This includes anchorages, docks, and
areas of shore offering concealment and escape routes for ship
jumpers. When possible, Border Patrol agents must review the
suspect vehicles prior to their departure. This gives us
advanced notification if desertions have, in fact, occurred and
holds the shipping agents and owners to a higher
accountability.
Recent enhancements to our enforcement arsenal include a
patrol helicopter equipped for over-water flights and outfitted
with infrared vision optics for night operations. In the coming
month, the Sector will also receive two new patrol boats
berthed in New Orleans and Mobile. These will dramatically
increase our on-water time and provide greater flexibility to
our patrol operations.
In addition to our physical efforts on the waterfront, our
efforts include cooperation with the United States Coast Guard
and the many harbor police departments, local law enforcement
agencies, and transportation companies located throughout the
area. This creates significant force multipliers that greatly
augment our own resources. The very real contributions these
agencies provide to our enforcement efforts are an important
component of our effectiveness. Although shipping is up, the
desertion rate has been cut in half since this time last year,
and the number of landed stowaways has decreased substantially
as well. Still, achieving real, meaningful control of this
coast remains a problem.
To deter illegal entries along the coast, Border Patrol
agents conduct routine marine patrols and work closely with a
variety of law enforcement and other agencies. Along the Gulf
Coast, there are many entities with law enforcement and
regulatory responsibilities to provide security, protection,
enforcement, and oversight of many communities located along
the Gulf Coast. Since the events of September 11, most, if not
all, of these entities have begun to reassess their current
operations to identify areas that are potential targets of
terrorism and weigh their options for minimizing risk with
their available resources.
A natural outgrowth of that process is the development of
the many cooperative efforts aimed at mounting a more efficient
defense. The New Orleans Border Patrol, along with the
district's immigration inspection officers, have made
commitments to participate in these endeavors to the maximum
amount possible. We are currently involved with multiple
interagency port security and anti-terrorism law enforcement
efforts in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.
Examples include the Port Users Committee in Pensacola, the
Port Security Task Force in Mobile, the Maritime Integrated
Program Team in Baton Rouge, as well as the Harbor Safety
Committee here in the New Orleans area. These groups, including
federal, state, county, and local law enforcement agencies, as
well as private industry security concerns, are working
together to combat the terrorist threat.
The systematic development and sharing of intelligence and
other relevant information is critical for successful counter-
terrorism measures. We believe that this type of cooperation
provides the greatest return on our resource commitments and is
vital to the establishment of a viable Gulf Coast security
initiative. It is a valuable aid to the Border Patrol's primary
mission of preventing the illegal entry of persons into the
United States. These efforts also bolster our commitment to the
Attorney General's directive to make combating terrorism a
priority of the Department of Justice.
Mr. Chairman, the agents of the United States Border
Patrol, the New Orleans Sector, are proud that we have been
given an opportunity to participate in such an important arena
in this nation's efforts to combat terrorism. We are absolutely
committed to accomplishing our mission to the best of our
ability. We look forward to expanding our already extensive
relationships and partnerships with all federal, state, county,
and local law enforcement agencies in our area of operations
and welcome the interest of the U.S. Congress in this matter.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Back follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chief Johnny R. Back, Chief Patrol Agent, New
Orleans Sector, U.S. Border Patrol
Mr. Chairman, my name is Johnny Back. I am the Chief Patrol Agent
for the New Orleans Sector of the United States Border Patrol,
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Thank you for the
opportunity to testify here today.
I would like to take a brief moment to familiarize you with the
mission of the United States Border Patrol. The Border Patrol is a
uniformed enforcement arm of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. The primary mission of the Border Patrol is the detection and
prevention of smuggling and the illegal entry of individuals into the
United States between ports-of-entry. In carrying out our mission, we
coordinate our efforts with INS Immigration Inspectors located at
ports-of-entry. I am here today to discuss the operations conducted in
this Sector, primarily those operations closely related to post-
September 11th security issues.
A potential threat to the United States is the entry of persons
associated with terrorist organizations via maritime transportation. As
security procedures at traditional arrival sites in the United States
are strengthened, criminals may attempt to utilize alternate entry
methods. Individuals could seek to arrive as a passenger aboard a
cruise line or make a legal entry into the U.S. in the guise of a
bonafide crewman on a commercial vessel, and later jump ship. Of
course, those who wish to do harm could also attempt to make an illegal
entry somewhere along the Sector's 800 miles of coastline.
The job of the New Orleans Sector on the coast is both to try to
prevent illegal entries, and to insure that those who do enter as crew
are legitimate and depart with their ships.
Sector Overview
Our Sector has uniformed enforcement operational jurisdiction over
a seven state area, encompassing 592 counties and parishes and
approximately 362,000 square miles including: Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, and a portion of the Florida
panhandle. Along with our Sector headquarters in New Orleans, we have
stations located in Lake Charles and Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Gulfport,
Mississippi; Mobile, Alabama and Little Rock, Arkansas.
This Sector has jurisdiction over two major seaports in New Orleans
and Mobile, and fifteen smaller seaports along the coast from Lake
Charles, Louisiana eastward to Port St. Joe, Florida. There are
numerous other deep and shallow water ports, anchorage locations, and
other access points for maritime traffic. At any given time there can
be several hundred to a thousand alien crewmen either berthed at, or in
immediate transit through, these ports and inland waterways. Each year
the port of New Orleans hosts more foreign flagged vessels than any
other U.S. port.
In addition, the Inter-Coastal Waterway traverses this entire area
east to west, and the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway serves as an
alternate shipping route between the Gulf of Mexico and the Great
Lakes. Both waterways handle vast amounts of barge and small boat
traffic, some of it crewed by foreign nationals. Many coastal areas in
the western part of the Sector are inaccessible by land transportation
and many others are accessible only by a single road. Numerous
locations along the coast contain shrimp drying docks, oil and gas
platforms and sulphur mines that are accessible only by water or air
transportation, and which are prime clandestine landing sites.
Eastward, from Mobile Bay to Apalachicola, Florida, there are
approximately 200 miles of beaches connected to Interstate 10 by modern
access roads. In many places deep water extends to only a few yards
offshore and relatively large boats can land people or contraband with
relative ease. From many beach areas, access to interstate bus lines or
major airports is less than an hour away.
Operations
Traditionally, operational activities conducted throughout the
Sector have supported INS's national immigration policies. In our
seven-state area, New Orleans Sector Agents continue to conduct
immigration checks at public transportation hubs--such as airports and
bus stations; perform traffic checks; arrest and prosecute alien
smugglers; and respond to the requests for assistance from other law
enforcement agencies across the Sector.
Most recently our priority has been focused on our immediate
border; that is, coastline integrity and security. The New Orleans
Sector is responsible for crewman control operations along the Gulf of
Mexico from the Texas state line to Apalachicola, Florida--a distance
of nearly 800 miles. Working hand in hand with the INS Inspections
Offices of the New Orleans and Atlanta District Offices we have
realigned our enforcement resources to maximize our deterrence
capabilities and manpower utilization. Officers share information and
operational developments on a daily basis. We also closely monitor and
adjust daily work schedules to provide optimum coverage based on the
latest developments.
To the greatest extent possible, all available Agents have been
deployed to patrol and interdiction duties in close proximity to the
ports. This includes anchorages, docks and areas of shore offering
concealment and escape routes for ship jumpers. When possible, Border
Patrol Agents review crews of suspect vehicles prior to their
departure. This gives us advance notification if desertions have
occurred and holds shipping agents and owners to higher accountability.
Recent enhancements to our enforcement arsenal include a patrol
helicopter, equipped for over-water flights and outfitted with modern
infrared vision optics for night operations. In the coming month, the
Sector will also receive two new patrol boats to be berthed at the New
Orleans and Mobile stations. These will dramatically increase our on-
water time and provide greater flexibility to our patrol operations.
In addition to our physical efforts on the waterfront, our efforts
include cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard and the many Harbor
Police Departments, local law enforcement agencies and transportation
companies located throughout the area. This creates significant force
multipliers that greatly augment our own resources. The very real
contributions these agencies provide to our enforcement efforts are an
important component of our effectiveness. The desertion rate has been
cut by half since this time last year, and the number of landed
stowaways has decreased substantially, as well. Still, achieving real,
meaningful control of this coast remains a challenge.
To deter illegal entries all along the coast, Border Patrol Agents
conduct routine marine patrols and work closely with a variety of law
enforcement and other agencies. Along the Gulf Coast there are many
entities with law enforcement and regulatory responsibilities to
provide security, protection, enforcement, and oversight of many
communities located along the Gulf Coast. Since the events of September
11, most, if not all of these entities have begun to reassess their
current operations to identify areas that are potential targets of
terrorism and weigh their options for minimizing the risk with their
available resources. A natural outgrowth of that process is the
development of many cooperative efforts aimed at mounting a more
efficient defense. The New Orleans Border Patrol, along with the INS
District's Immigration Inspections officers, have made commitments to
participate in these endeavors as much as possible. We are currently
involved with multiple inter-agency port security and anti-terrorism
law enforcement efforts in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida.
Examples include the Port Users Committee in Pensacola, Florida,
the Port Security Task Force in Mobile, Alabama, the Maritime
Integrated Program Team in Baton Rouge, as well as the Harbor Safety
Committee here in the New Orleans area. These groups, including
federal, state, county, and local law enforcement agencies, as well as
private industry security groups, are working together to combat the
terrorist threat.
The systematic development and sharing of intelligence and other
relevant information is critical for successful counter-terrorism
measures. We believe that this type of cooperation provides the
greatest return on our resource commitments and is vital to the
establishment of a viable Gulf Coast security initiative. It is a
valuable aid to the Border Patrol's primary mission of preventing the
illegal entry of persons into the United States. These efforts also
bolster our commitment to the Attorney General's directive to make
combating terrorism a priority of the Department of Justice.
Mr. Chairman, the Agents of the New Orleans Border Patrol Sector
are proud that we have been given an opportunity to participate in such
an important arena in this Nation's efforts to combat terrorism. We are
absolutely committed to accomplishing our mission to the best of our
ability. We look forward to expanding our already extensive
relationships and partnerships with all federal, state, county and
local law enforcement agencies in our area of operations, and welcome
the interest of the United States Congress in this matter. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am happy to take any
questions at this time.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Chief Back, and thank
all of the panel witnesses for being with us and for the help
and assistance that you have provided.
Let me start with you, Admiral Casto. The legislation that
has passed the Senate requires that for the first time ever all
of the ports in the United States have a comprehensive security
plan in place. Does the Port of New Orleans have a
comprehensive security plan?
Admiral Casto. I defer that to Captain Rochon being the
captain of the port.
Captain Rochon. Mr. Chairman, we don't have, per se, a
comprehensive security plan. There are a lot of plans that are
in the port already responsible for both the vessels and
facilities that normally were set up to respond to safety
related issues.
Senator Breaux. All of these were pre-9/11?
Admiral Casto. Pre-9/11, sir.
Senator Breaux. So if I asked the question, ``Who is in
charge of security in the Port of New Orleans?'' what is your
answer?
Captain Rochon. Well, my answer would be that it is a team
effort, sir. We and the Coast Guard have the primary
responsibility for port security, but we certainly----
Senator Breaux. Does that include shore side?
Captain Rochon. Adjacent to the water, yes, sir, not
beyond, adjacent. Beyond that, particularly for facilities like
let's say a refinery that's not right on the shore, the
refinery itself has security for their own facility. Anything
adjacent to the water is----
Senator Breaux. The point I made in the opening was that if
everybody's in charge, then no one's in charge. That is why the
legislation really requires a comprehensive plan. We have got
the Customs part which does some functions, the Border Patrol
does some functions, and I even have to ask you where is INS?
Are you part of INS?
Captain Rochon. Yes, we are.
Senator Breaux. You are part of INS. You are Border Patrol
Immigration and Naturalization Services. I also have the FBI. I
have the sheriff's department. I have the Border Patrol. I have
all of these institutions that have something to do with
security. I'm just concerned. I think that is why Congress has
said, ``Look, we have got to have a comprehensive plan.'' We
are not talking about everybody having their own little area of
responsibility and not coordinating it and not sharing
information. A lot of information agencies jealousy guard and
others don't get.
You know, like INS has that, but Customs can't have it. The
Coast Guard has it, but then the Border Patrol can't get it. It
is really very important to develop a comprehensive plan that
involves the private sector in the ports as well. I talked to
the port people about that. That is one thing that is
important.
One of the things that we saw this morning was the VTS
system, which I would congratulate really everyone. Congress
has been a major player in this, appropriating money for the
Vessel Traffic System here in New Orleans. They don't have one
of these in Port of New Orleans. I don't think they have one in
Houston.
Admiral Casto. Yes.
Senator Breaux. Do they have one? Well, it is not as good
as ours (laughter). They don't even have one in Port
Everglades. It is a terrific system. I'm convinced, just as an
amateur if you will, that the greatest threat of security at
the ports is not so much from a terrorist taking over a ship,
although that is a legitimate threat, but a greater threat is
like we had with the U.S.S. Cole where a very small vessel
pulled along side a Naval vessel and blew it from here to
kingdom come with loss of life, tragically, and it almost sank
a Naval vessel. Therefore, you have to know where these vessels
are at all points.
One of the things that we looked at today was that
apparently the IMO organization regulating international safety
has a phase-in for having transponders on ships that come into
this area or any area, but that some of those transponder
requirements are not going to be effective until the year 2007.
Some of those ships that if you are looking at with the VTS
system--I take it that if you do not have a transponder on it,
you are not getting back a reliable indication of where they
are or how fast they are going or what direction they are
going.
Admiral Casto. Unless they are in an area where it has
radar coverage.
Senator Breaux. That is something that I think we are going
to have to address. I think it is absolutely unacceptable in
today's modern age--and I'll ask you what you think about
this--the United States as a government should say that every
ship that calls on an American port should be equipped with a
transponder, so that the Vessel Traffic System can know where
that ship is, where it is going, what is the name, what is the
registration, and what type of cargo that it is carrying. The
year 2007 as the end completion date is far too long.
I mean cars have GPS systems on them for Christ's sake.
Every plane that lands at the Lakefront or lands at Armstrong
Airport has a transponder so they can know where that plane is
at all times within this area. There is no reason that we
should not have a faster date for requiring the same type of
transponder on ships that come into the port. Now, do you think
it would be helpful if that date was speeded up?
Admiral Casto. Yes, sir. I think that is pretty obvious. I
can tell you it is being worked on. That timetable that you saw
today was put together in the pre-September 11 environment. It
was put together in conjunction with the International Maritime
Organization, which is an agency under the auspices of the
United Nations. The Coast Guard has been working on a proposal
that will be presented at the IMO Intercessional Meeting coming
up I believe this spring. I may be wrong about that, but
sometime soon to accelerate that date to I believe it is going
to be 2004.
Senator Breaux. I tell you what, we are not going to wait
that long. There is nothing that will prohibit, I think,
Congress from requiring all ships calling on American ports to
have transponder equipment onboard. It does not cost that much
relatively speaking. The benefits I think greatly outweigh the
costs. You could have portable transponders on ships. When the
sea marshal or the river pilot boards the ship without a marker
and the ship doesn't have a transponder, we can give them one
or lease them one.
Admiral Casto. There is certainly precedent for that. If
you recall, being in Congress for quite a while, the Inclusion
Act back in 1990 I think it was or 1991 of the United States's
Unilateral Action, and I think if you take a look at the
history of what has developed since then, I think most of the
rest of the world will follow suit as well.
Senator Breaux. We are going to offer legislation as an
amendment which would require a greatly accelerated requirement
date for having that on them. Now, I take it that you
identified certain ships as--what do you call them, high-
interest?
Admiral Casto. High-interest vessels.
Senator Breaux. What leads to the decision to say that a
particular vessel is a high-interest vessel?
Admiral Casto. Certain categories. For instance, the Coast
Guard put into effect a new rule requiring 96 hours of every
vessel entering a U.S. Port that is over 300 gross tons, that
you had to report in 96 hours in advance. Cargo information,
crew list information, port of origin, as Ms. Moran mentioned,
peaks your risk base decision matrix, but typically, here you
might have a crew list coming in and a name gets compared on
the FBI's list. It may be the same name of somebody who's on
that list, and we've had that happen more than once. A name
that looks pretty unique to us, in Arabic I found is equivalent
to John Smith, so that is the kind of thing we look for. We
also look for cargo, in particular, hazardous gases, LNG, LHG,
that will automatically put that ship into the high-interest
vessel category.
Senator Breaux. Didn't I hear this morning that there are
incidences where the information on a ship is sent to a
facility in--West Virginia was it?
Admiral Casto. Yes, sir.
Senator Breaux. And that in some cases you do not have
information on the actual cargo in the ship coming into New
Orleans; isn't that correct?
Admiral Casto. That could be the case, yes, sir.
Senator Breaux. How is that possible? Where does that
information go?
Admiral Casto. The West Virginia facility really was
schooled up in the wake of September 11. We had found that not
all hazardous cargos had been identified through there. But we
have, on our own, working with the Customs people, the Port
Authority people, identified ships that are coming in with
hazardous cargos, and we put those into the HIV category.
Senator Breaux. Is it not possible, as someone said this
morning, that you can have ships coming into this port, and in
some cases, you do not know what is in the cargo?
Admiral Casto. It is possible, yes, sir. One of the things
that----
Senator Breaux. Why is that possible? Who is falling down
on that, we in Congress or is it the Coast Guard? Is it
Customs? How come somebody in West Virginia can know what the
cargo is on a ship on the Mississippi River, but you do not
know?
Admiral Casto. Let me go ahead and----
Captain Rochon. Mr. Chairman, we do know what comes in
because each vessel is required to give us a cargo manifest and
a crew list and a passenger list in 96 hours. The National
Maritime Center in West Virginia simply prepares that list and
shares it with the other agencies to make sure that crew or
that cargo matches whatever list that they are comparing to it,
the FBI and INS, but we know before that vessel comes in what
is in that cargo.
The only thing you may have heard this morning is that how
do we know for sure that what they reported is actually in that
container? That is where we may not know, and that is the thing
that we try to do by inspecting, working with Customs, the
containers that come in, but we do know, at least before that
vessel hits the U.S. territory waters, what they are reporting.
Senator Breaux. So what you are saying is that before a
ship comes into the Port of New Orleans we know what they have
told us is in the cargo?
Captain Rochon. Yes, sir.
Senator Breaux. But if they say it is general cargo and it
happens to be explosive cargo, we do not know that unless we
actually did a boarding of the ship and an actual physical
inspection of the ship?
Captain Rochon. That is possible that we do not always know
what is inside the container.
Admiral Casto. We fought that issue with drugs for a large
number of years.
Senator Breaux. I am not being critical. I'm just saying
you give me cause for concern that we may have a ship coming up
the river and maybe someone in China told us it was general
cargo and there may be fireworks on it. It could be something
hazardous. Is there any way to correct that?
Admiral Casto. Yes, there is, Mr. Chairman. Some of the
ways to do that are being looked at right now under the
auspices of the Secretary of Transportation looking to push our
borders out and do things like inspection of cargos and ships
where they are loaded in another country and to do things in a
risk-based way to identify trusted carriers. Sometimes we call
them ``frequent flyers.'' People who continue to make the same
trips over and over become trusted and then people that are out
of the ordinary. Those things are being looked at. I know there
is a study group under way under the Department of
Transportation looking for ways that we can make it better.
Senator Breaux. Congressman Vitter.
Mr. Vitter. I do not have any.
Senator Breaux. Let me ask just a couple more. Do you have
any zone restrictions in the Port of Orleans?
Captain Rochon. Right after 9/11, Mr. Chairman, we
established security zones at various areas up and down the
river. I have a major concern about the Naval vessels that we
establish Naval protection zones for and working with Navy
support activity and the Navy pretty heavily. We have
petrochemical plants all the way up--hundreds of them between
New Orleans and Baton Rouge, vessels, cruise ships. We also
have safety zones which, in effect, helps do the same thing. We
enforce those with Coast Guard assets, boats, Navy. Harbor
Patrol has been very helpful, Customs. We put Coast Guard
uniforms on some of the other platforms. There's been a
tremendous amount of interagency cooperation.
Senator Breaux. Is there a restricted zone around the high-
interest vessels?
Captain Rochon. Not per se, Senator. There is not a
restriction zone around the vessel itself.
Senator Breaux. Let me ask you, if I have a high-interest
vessel that is sitting somewhere up the river that is loaded
with particularly volatile materials, gasoline, diesel fuel,
propane, you name it, there is nothing that automatically
prohibits a small vessel from pulling up along side that vessel
and getting as close as they want to take a look at it?
Captain Rochon. There is no restriction or security zone
around that particular vessel, but----
Senator Breaux. Should there be?
Captain Rochon. We have 6 to 7 high-interest vessels that
come in per week.
Senator Breaux. How many?
Captain Rochon. Six to 7, sir, come into the port area, the
four major ports between Plaquemines, New Orleans, South
Louisiana, and Baton Rouge. That is a large number without the
resources to enforce that, which means boats and people. You
can set up a security zone, but if you do not have the
resources to enforce that security zone, then there is no good
in setting it up.
We try to work along with all of the other agencies,
including the facilities. The facilities do not have access to
do waterside security, so there is a resource issue involved
with that many vessels, but there is security. I mean we check.
There is no security plan, per se, that's in writing because
prior to 9/11 that was not even an issue, but there are armed
guards. Facilities have armed guards. We check their fencing,
their lighting.
Senator Breaux. There are no armed guards that are
patrolling the ship from the water?
Captain Rochon. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do have Coast Guard
patrol boats. We have Coast Guard helicopters that fly over,
but not 24-hours, 7 days a week. It is more----
Senator Breaux. There is not a station around a high-
interest vessel to prohibit other boats from coming up to it?
Captain Rochon. No, sir. There are not enough resources in
this area to handle that many vessels.
Senator Breaux. How are we doing on your search and rescue
operations? I know you had a lot of manpower diverted, people
diverted to the terrorism threat, and yet you still have an
obligation for an incredibly important search and rescue
mission as well as fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. How are you
able to handle any of this?
Admiral Casto. I can assure you that as homeland security
has been elevated, it has been elevated at the same place as
our search and rescue. Our search and rescue capabilities have
not been impacted by this, but I will tell you, sir, that our
law enforcement activities, while not entirely curtailed, are
approaching that.
Senator Breaux. The law enforcement?
Admiral Casto. Fisheries law enforcement in particular,
yes, sir.
Senator Breaux. Search and rescue has not been adversely
impacted, or you just have not had an incident maybe?
Admiral Casto. Oh, we have search and rescue at the top of
our priority list. We think search and rescue defines to a
large extent the full yarn of why the American public finds us
so valuable, and we have not, and I doubt that we will ever,
drop back and make search and rescue a secondary priority.
Senator Breaux. We have given you an awful lot of
assignments nationwide, and we hope that we also follow through
with adequate resources. Everything you do is incredibly
important. Now your responsibilities are even greater than they
have ever been before, really probably in the history of this
country. You are very important. And we want to make sure we
give you the adequate resource to get the job done.
Ms. Moran, do you have what you would consider to be
adequate physical operations within the port? One of the
problems they were telling me in the Everglades was people
coming off the ships--a little different here, because you have
so many passengers there. There are literally thousands and
thousands every day, that Customs did not consider have
adequate--along with INS--space within the port to really take
a look at all of the people coming off of these ships. Do you
have any kind of problems like that?
Ms. Moran. Well, we have been working very closely in the
last 2 years with the Port Authority on some of the
improvements that have occurred at the Julia Street Cruise
Terminal. As far as for the next couple of years because of the
increase, I think the staggering of them will help, because as
you know so many come in on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, those
are the busiest times, so we never ran out of space. At least
the last 2 years I have been here we never ran out of space.
Senator Breaux. Are there any other potential problems that
Customs faces in the Port of New Orleans that you need us to
know about?
Ms. Moran. Well, I think I discussed most of the issues
that we are involved in. I think, as I said, we have been
trying to support the northern border. We are supporting some
of the special events like the Super Bowl.
Senator Breaux. We talked at the last hearing, Congressman
Shaw and I, we had Immigration and Naturalization in and
Customs in, and Immigration is looking at the people coming in,
and Customs is looking at what the people coming in are
bringing in. So it was kind of like, you know, we suggested why
do we not just combine the two, and have one agency do both at
the same time? Of course, the two heads of the agency went
(indicating a gasp) when we talked about it.
[Laughter].
They did not like that suggestion, but really, you are
looking at what people bring in, and you are looking at people
who do come in, and she is looking at people, as to what the
people who are coming in bring in, and it looks like we could--
we have just so got many federal agencies, you know.
But anyhow, I thank the panel, David, if you have no
questions, we appreciate and look forward to continuing the
work with you. This is an ongoing thing. We are not here, the
Congress is not here to lecture or teach. It is more we are
here to learn what the problems are and how we can be helpful
and hopefully solve them. Thank you very much for your
presentations.
I would like to welcome up our second panel, which would be
the Port Director of New Orleans. Welcome back home, Gary
LaGrange, as Port Director of New Orleans; Chief Robert Hecker,
who is the superintendent of the Harbor Police Department; Mr.
Ken Kaiser is charge in the New Orleans Field Office of the
Federal Bureau of Investigations; Captain Douglas Grubbs of the
Crescent River Pilots Association; and Mr. Channing Hayden is
the president of the Steamship Association of Louisiana.
Gentlemen, we welcome you and are pleased that you are
here.
Mr. LaGrange, Gary, I am glad to have you before our
Committee and I am glad to have you back in New Orleans.
STATEMENT OF GARY LAGRANGE,
DIRECTOR, PORT OF NEW ORLEANS
Mr. LaGrange. Thank you, sir. The pleasure is all mine. It
is indeed a pleasure to be back, particularly among such a
distinguished panel, particularly ``Fast Break'' Bob Hecker,
who was on our U.S.L. basketball team when you and I were
there.
Senator Breaux. He is a little heavier than he used to be,
huh?
[Laughter.]
Mr. LaGrange. I think we all are.
Senator Breaux. That is right.
Mr. LaGrange. I am particularly elated how fitting it is to
be able to testify. I do not know how many people really
realize, but the American Association of Port Authorities last
year, the year 2001, which consists of all the ports in the
Western Hemisphere, North America and South America,
collectively made as their 2001 AAPA Port Person of the Year
Senator John Breaux, so I think it is really fitting that you
be conducting this here for the state. Thanks for taking care
of us.
Here at the Port of the New Orleans--we were talking a
little earlier--we are probably, if not the most diversified,
probably one of the most diversified ports in the entire world.
From a collective standpoint, including the Ports of Baton
Rouge, South Louisiana, New Orleans, Sacred Heart, and
Plaquemines, from Baton Rouge to the mouth of the river,
collectively, we are the largest port in the world, even bigger
than Rotterdam and Singapore. We are really proud of that. You
witnessed firsthand some of the traffic on the river today.
Mr. Chairman, the Port of New Orleans is pleased to be one
of three United States ports selected to host your seaport
security hearings. But let me also welcome you to the port, and
Congressman Vitter back home as well.
Prior to September 11, 2001, security certainly was not at
the top of our list in terms of priorities at any of the ports
in the United States, particularly here in New Orleans as well.
Needless to say, in less than 1 hour that morning it rose to
the top of the list really quickly. Protecting America's ports
is critical to both the nation's safety and vital to continuing
our economic development and growth, as we know.
America's ports handle more than 95 percent of the nation's
oversees trade by volume. Goods from every state in the nation
are transported through the United States ports to
international markets. Ports support the mobilization and
deployment of the United States Armed Forces and are the
departing points for millions of cruise passengers on an annual
basis.
From our offices here at the Port of New Orleans, we
observe an immense flow of commerce unmatched anywhere else in
the world. Each year, more than 427 million tons of foreign and
domestic waterborne commerce move through the consolidated
deepwater ports of Louisiana situated on the Lower Mississippi
River, as I said, between Baton Rouge and the Gulf of Mexico.
Ninety-one percent of America's foreign merchandise trade
by volume, two-thirds by value, and 21 percent of the nation's
foreign waterborne commerce pass through Louisiana's ports.
More than 229,000 barges, 2,300 oceangoing vessels operated
by more than 80 steamship lines serving U.S. trade from more
than 150 different countries call on the Port of New Orleans on
an annual basis.
The Port and the Mississippi River serves 42 states,
America's heartland, not to mention a good portion of the
Northeast as well, from a supply standpoint. The heartland
region currently produces 60 percent of the nation's
agricultural products. One shipment which you saw just recently
went to Cuba as part of a hurricane aid and relief program,
first one in 40 years. One-half of all of its manufactured
goods is produced and comes through the river, and 90 percent
of the machinery and transportation equipment manufactured in
the United States comes right through the port. Any disruption
of distribution in the Lower Mississippi, no matter how brief,
would seriously disrupt the nation's economy, at any point.
In addition to the flow of cargos such as grain, steel, and
coffee, nearly half a million cruise line passengers travel
through the Port of New Orleans each year. As you heard the
predictions a little earlier, we anticipate that is going to
grow by 300 percent, having just recently announced one of
Carnival's ships, the HOLIDAY, from San Juan is being projected
for 150 calls over the next 2 years, and Royal Caribbean just
announced 48 calls for two of its new vessels, and Carnival's
largest ship, the CONQUEST, will hopefully be here as of
November of this year. We face many of the same challenges as
the nation's airports and airlines. Working with the Customs
Service and Coast Guard, our Harbor Police Department has
responsibility to ensure a safe cruise environment.
Since September 11, America's ports have instituted
heightened security measures and have invested in increased
security measures. Determining the adequacy of these measures
and whether they can be sustained over an indefinite time
period, and at what cost, are the major issues facing ports, as
well as local and Federal Government agencies today.
These hearings on seaport security are being held to help
develop a national strategy policy for port security in
response to the threat of terrorism. The challenges we face
include the development of a port security measure that assures
to the greatest extent possible the safety and security of the
American people; the protection and the ongoing and efficient
operation of the nation's vital maritime transportation assets;
and that meets the needs and is sensitive to the unique
characteristics of America's ports, which are not all alike.
They are unique.
In addressing these issues and challenges, we here at the
Port of New Orleans have worked closely with other ports
throughout the Western Hemisphere under the auspices of the
American Association of Port Authorities.
We have deep security concerns, as well as proposed
legislation, and offer the following points with the purpose of
fine-tuning seaport security policies and assuring the
provision of adequate resources to effectively counter
terrorist threats to our nation's ports and waterways.
As noted, protecting America's ports is critical to the
nation's economic vitality and continued growth. Point one,
ports are a vital part of the nation's transportation
infrastructure. Ports handle 95 percent of U.S. overseas trade
by volume. International trade accounts for almost one-quarter
of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product. The port industry generates
more than 13 million jobs nationally. Ports support the
mobilization and deployment of U.S. Armed Forces. In the year
2000, more than 6 million North American passengers began and
ended their cruise vacations from a United States port.
Virtually all imported crude petroleum products arrive by
oceangoing vessels in U.S. ports. Ports enhance our quality of
life by providing consumers with a variety of product choices
and employment for importers and exporters as well.
The United States Coast Guard and Customs must take the
lead in protecting America's ports and inspecting vessels and
cargo. Ports are located on international borders, and the
Federal Government is responsible for approving and inspecting
both cargo and passengers moving out of public ports. The
Federal Government must provide those resources necessary to
assure that these agencies can carry out critical functions in
the provision of seaport security.
Meeting enhanced seaport security requirements is a shared
responsibility of both the ports and the Federal Government. We
accept that. Homeland security is the top priority of our
government, and protecting America's transportation system,
including public ports, is essential.
At the national level, the Federal Government must make
immediate and significant investments in enhanced intelligence
information, management, information technology, and domestic
and foreign ports assessments. Both the Coast Guard and the
Customs Service have indicated that information is required on
vessels calling at U.S. ports and cargo shipments.
Individual seaport security involves multiple state, local,
and Federal Government jurisdictions, as well as the private
sector. Numerous federal agencies share law enforcement
responsibilities at all seaports. Clearly, ports will not be
able to meet enhanced security requirements on their own, and
federal help will be needed to provide ports with the financial
assistance required to protect these vital transportation
links. We have seen a significant increase in security-related
costs here at the Port of New Orleans. These extra costs were
not budgeted. We pay for increased security with money that is
otherwise earmarked for our operations, construction,
maintenance, and marketing.
I would say one of the most salient points of the entire
issue, the most important and germane, is that immediate and
substantial funding is required for the development of
coordinated security and communication plans. In addition,
significant security enhancements are called for in the areas
of the provision of trained security personnel, controlling
access to port facilities and terminals, as well as physical
security measures such as perimeter fencing, gates, barriers,
identification/credentialing systems, cameras, and, of course,
lighting.
What is the cost of enhanced security for seaports, and
what is the appropriate federal response? In the Fall 2000
report to Congress, the Interagency Commission on Crime and
Security at U.S. Seaports estimated that enhanced security--
this is pre-9/11--would cost between $14 and $40 million per
port. This amount was calculated prior to September 11, as I
said, when port security resources were invested primarily in
preventing crime and cargo support.
As you probably heard yesterday, Senator, and more
recently, the Florida Ports Commission came up with a figure
since 9/11 of $80 to $100 million in investments. However, at
this time is it difficult for ports to provide specific cost
estimates for security enhancements because the nature and the
scope of these enhancements are still yet unclear, although
they are focusing more and more each day.
The Port of New Orleans and the AAPA are generally
supportive of current federal legislation to provide much-
needed federal financial support for public port authorities.
In fact, AAPA recommended many of the provisions included in
the Hollings Bill (S. 1214). This legislation provides ports
with $390 million, as you know, in cost-sharing grants and $166
million in low-interest, long-term loan guarantees for security
enhancements. However, we are concerned that security plans
included in this legislation advocate a cookie-cutter approach
that may not be effective for all ports, since all ports are
unique and different.
AAPA's 85 United States Public Port Authority members
include a wide variety of operational and organizational
structures. They include major container ports and smaller
specialty cargo and dry and liquid cargo ports. The Port of New
Orleans has an extraordinarily diversified cargo base,
including significant quantities of break bulk, containerized,
and liquid and dry bulk cargos, as well as the differing types
of facilities required to handle these cargos.
The organizational structure of ports vary as well. There
are operating ports, and then there are landlord ports. Some
ports provide security and others rely on local government or
the private sector to provide their security. The point here is
that different types of ports have different types of security
requirements, and federal legislation must have sufficient
flexibility to meet these very diverse needs.
We also strongly support the provision of increased federal
resources for port authorities, Customs, and the Coast Guard
beyond those authorized in the Hollings bill. Adequate funding
is essential to assure that our nation's ports remain open and
that commerce moves without interruption.
Our friends at Transport Canada have also undertaken an
initiative to enhance seaport security. Their primary objective
is to determine what measures ports have already taken to meet
security risks and determine what measures can be put in place
immediately or in the near term to enhance security. They are
also provided the necessary appropriations for those
improvements to the ports in Canada. To accomplish this,
Transport Canada has developed and distributed a security
checklist to Canadian ports to facilitate the risk assessment.
The United States ports are dealing with the financial
impact of providing security in this post-September 11 world.
The war against terrorism will not be brief, as you well know.
Enhanced port security is not an issue of the day. We are all
in it for the long haul. Port authorities welcome the benefits
provided in the Port and Maritime Security Act and certainly
Congressman Vitter is writing legislation which is soon to be
submitted and filed. This legislation will help us keep
America's ports open, safe, and secure.
Again, I want to thank you for being here today and taking
the time and for allowing us this forum.
[The prepared statement of Mr. LaGrange follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary LaGrange, Director, Port of New Orleans
Mr. Chairman, the Port of New Orleans is pleased to be one of three
United States ports selected to host seaport-security hearings. And,
also, let me also welcome you to the Port and City of New Orleans.
Prior to September 11, 2001, security was one of the many concerns
of this port and ports across the country. On the morning of September
11th, Homeland Security moved to front and center.
Protecting America's ports is critical to both the nation's safety
and vital to its continuing economic growth. America's ports handle 95
percent of the nation's overseas trade by volume--goods from every
state in the nation are transported through U.S. ports to international
markets. Ports support the mobilization and deployment of U.S. Armed
Forces; and are the departure points for millions of cruise passengers
annually.
From our offices here at the Port of New Orleans we observe an
immense flow of commerce, unmatched anywhere else in the world.
Each year, more than 427 million tons of foreign and
domestic waterborne commerce move through the consolidated
deepwater ports of Louisiana situated on the lower Mississippi
River between Baton Rouge and the Gulf of Mexico.
Ninety one percent of America's foreign merchandise trade by
volume (two-thirds by value), and 2l percent of the nation's
foreign waterborne commerce pass through Louisiana's ports.
More than 229,000 barges and 2,300 oceangoing vessels
operated by more than 80 steamship lines serving U.S. trade
with more than 150 countries call the Port of New Orleans.
The Port of New Orleans and the Mississippi River serves 42
states--America's Heartland. This heartland region currently
produces 60 percent of the nation's agricultural products, one
half of all of its manufactured goods and 90 percent of its
machinery and transportation equipment.
Any disruption of commerce on the lower Mississippi, no matter how
brief, would seriously disrupt the nation's economy.
In addition to the flow of cargoes such a grain, steel and coffee,
nearly a half million cruise line passengers travel through the Port of
New Orleans each year. Here we face many of the same challenges as the
nation's airports and airlines. Working with the Customs Service and
Coast Guard, our Harbor Police department has the responsibility of
ensuring a safe cruise environment.
Since September 11, America's ports have instituted heightened
security measures and have invested in increased security measures.
Determining the adequacy ofthese measures and whether they can be
sustained over an indefinite time period and at what cost, are the
major issues facing ports as well as local and federal government
agencies today. These hearings on seaport security are being held to
help develop a national strategic policy for port security in response
to the threat of terrorism. The challenges we face include the
development of a port security measures that assure to the greatest
extent possible the safety and security of the American people; that
protect the ongoing and efficient operation of this nation's vital
maritime transportation assets; and that meets the needs and is
sensitive to the unique characteristics of each of America's ports.
In addressing these challenges, we at the Port of New Orleans have
worked closely with other ports throughout the western hemisphere under
the auspices of the American Association of Port Authorities. We have
reviewed security concerns as well as proposed legislation and offer
the following points with the purpose of fine-tuning seaport security
policies and assuring the provision of adequate resources to
effectively counter terrorist threats to our nation's ports and
waterways.
As noted, Protecting America's ports is critical to the
nation's economic vitality and continued growth.
-- Ports are a vital part of the nation's transportation
infrastructure.
-- Port's handle 95 percent of U.S. overseas trade by volume.
-- International trade accounts for almost one quarter of the U.S.
Gross Domestic Product.
-- The port industry generates more than 13 million jobs.
-- Ports support the mobilization and deployment of U.S. Armed
Forces.
-- In 2000, more than six million North American passengers began
and ended their cruise vacations from U.S. port authorities.
-- Virtually all imported crude petroleum products arrive by
oceangoing vessels at U.S. ports.
-- Ports enhance our quality of life by providing consumers with a
variety of product choice and employment for importers and exporters.
The U.S. Coast Guard and Customs must take the lead in
protecting America's ports and inspecting vessels and cargo.
Ports are located on international borders and the Federal
Government is responsible for approving and inspecting cargo
and passengers moving out of public ports. The Gederal
Government must provide those resources necessary to assure
that these agencies can carry out these critical functions in
the provision of seaport security.
Meeting enhanced seaport security requirements is a shared
responsibility of ports and the Federal Government. Homeland
security is the top priority of our government, and protecting
America's transportation systems, including public ports, is
essential. At the national level, the federal government must
make immediate and significant investments in enhanced
intelligence and information management; information
technology; domestic and foreign ports assessments. Both the
Coast Guard and the Customs service have indicated that
information is required on vessels calling at U.S. ports and
cargo shipments.
Individual Seaport security involves multiple state, local and
federal government jurisdictions as well as the private sector.
Numerous federal agencies share law enforcement responsibilities at
seaports. Clearly, ports will not be able to meet enhanced security
requirements on their own and federal help will be needed to provide
ports with the financial assistance required to protect these vital
transportation assets. We have seen a significant increase in security
related costs here at the Port of New Orleans. These extra costs were
not budgeted. We pay for increased security with money earmarked for
other port operations such as construction, maintenance and marketing.
Most important, immediate and substantial funding is required for
the development of coordinated security and communications plans. In
addition, significant security enhancements are called for in the areas
of the provision of trained security personnel, controlling access to
port facilities and terminals as well as physical security measures
such as perimeter fencing, gates, barriers,
identificationlcredentialing systems, cameras and lighting.
What is the cost of enhanced security for seaports and what
is the appropriate federal response? The fall 2000 report to
Congress of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security at
U.S. Seaports estimated that enhanced security could cost
between $14 and $40 million per port. This amount was
calculated prior to September 11th when port security resources
were invested primarily in preventing crime and cargo support.
However, at this time it is difficult for ports to provide
specific cost estimates for security enhancements because the
nature and scope of these enhancements are unclear.
The Port of New Orleans and the AAPA are generally supportive of
current federal legislation to provide much needed federal financial
support for public port authorities. In fact, AAPA recommended many
ofthe provisions included in the Hollings Bill (S.1214). This
legislation provides ports with $390 million in cost-sharing grants and
$166 million in low-interest, long-term loan guarantees for security
enhancements. However, we are concerned that security plans included in
this legislation advocate a ``cookie cutter'' approach that may not be
effective for all ports.
AAPA's 85 U.S. public port authority members include a wide variety
of operational and organizational structures. They include major
container ports and smaller specialty cargo and dry and liquid bulk
cargo ports. The Port of New Orleans has an extraordinarily diverse
cargo base, including significant quantities of breakbulk,
containerized and liquid and dry bulk cargoes, as well as the differing
types of facilities required to handle these cargoes.
The organizational structure of Ports vary as well. There operating
ports and landlord ports. Some ports provide security and others rely
on local government or the private sector to provide security. The
point here is that different types of ports have different types of
security requirements and federal legislation must have sufficient
flexibility to meet these diverse needs.
We also strongly support the provision of increased federal
resources for port authorities, Customs and the Coast Guard beyond
those authorized in the Hollings bill. Adequate funding is essential to
assure that our nation's Ports remain open and that commerce flows
without interruption.
Our friends at Transport Canada have also undertaken an initiative
to enhance seaport security. Their objective is to determine what
measures ports have already taken to meet security risks and determine
what measures can be put in place immediately or in the near-term to
enhance security. To accomplish this, Transport Canada has developed
and distributed a security checklist to Canadian ports to facilitate
risk assessment.
U.S. Ports are dealing with the financial impact of providing
security in this post-September 11th world. The war against terrorism
will not be brief. Enhanced port security is not an issue dujour. We
are all in it for the long haul. Port authorities welcome the benefits
provided in the Port and Maritime Security Act. This legislation will
help us keep America's ports open, safe and secure.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Gary.
Chief Robert Hecker.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. HECKER, CHIEF OF POLICE,
HARBOR POLICE DEPARTMENT, PORT OF NEW ORLEANS
Chief Hecker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Robert
Hecker. I am the chief of police for the Harbor Police
Department for the Port of New Orleans. Before I get started, I
want to let you know, Mr. Chairman, we are especially glad to
see you here today because we heard that you were going to try
to climb a Jacob's Ladder from a port launch booth to the top
of your cargo vessel.
Senator Breaux. I did (laughter).
Chief Hecker. We are relieved to have you here, sir
(laughter). That is quite a difficult task.
Chairman Breaux, Congressman Vitter, thank you so much for
allowing us to testify here today. As I mentioned, my name is
Robert Hecker. I have a total of 34 years in law enforcement,
28 years with the New Orleans Police Department, and the last 6
years as Chief of Police with the Harbor Police Department.
The Port of New Orleans has a distinct advantage over most
of the other seaports in the country. Over 100 years ago, our
forefathers had the vision to create a police force
specifically designated to the port. The number of emergency
personnel has changed over the years, but currently our force
is comprised of 59 police officers and 11 firefighters.
The Harbor Police Force is a fully trained, commissioned
group of officers with arrest powers within the jurisdiction we
serve. We maintain our own police academy where our police
recruits are trained and post-certified. Our firefighters staff
the GENERAL ROY S. KELLY, our 95-foot multi-purpose emergency
response vessel, 24 hours a day.
Additionally, we maintain a marine division, which is a
group of police officers that staff the Harbor Police patrol
boat. Both vessels respond to various types of emergencies on
the Mississippi River and the Industrial Canal, usually
coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard. As a result of the
police presence at the Port, crime has been minimal throughout
its history. However, we realize we have a new challenge before
us. We now have to include in our mission the possibility that
terrorism may target our port. As a result, we have been
working on new strategies to address this potential threat.
We have always enjoyed an outstanding working relationship
with the surrounding local law enforcement departments and
federal entities, including the FBI, the U.S. Coast Guard, and
U.S. Customs. That was never more obvious than on the morning
of September 11, 2001. Shortly after the attacks, we all
realized the Port of New Orleans may very well be a target.
Within hours of the attack, members of the U.S. Customs and
U.S. Coast Guard met with me in my office to discuss and
implement emergency plans. The local FBI office requested that
we send an officer to be a member of their Emergency Command
Center, allowing to us share any incoming intelligence.
Since September 11, 2001, we have enhanced security
throughout the port utilizing paid overtime and redeployment of
some officers. One of the security concerns, of course, was our
cruise passenger terminal, which currently accommodates several
cruise lines and thousands of passengers per week. One of the
measures we implemented was to have a component of Harbor
Police officers to do a security sweep of the terminal prior to
the ships' arrival. We also utilized the GENERAL KELLEY's
emergency response vessel to conduct security sweeps from the
river side of the wharf. Our offices will then remain invisible
at the terminal throughout the time the cruise ships are at the
dock. Effective this past December, uniformed members of the
National Guard have been supplementing our officers at the
cruise terminal as well.
Immediately after September 11, we began a series of
meetings with all of the appropriate agencies to discus longer
term strategies. On November 8th, we called a town hall style
meeting for the Port community in response to the inundated
number of phone calls that I received in my office.
We invited representatives from all of the Port's tenants
and extended the invitation to those who frequent the Port. The
focus of the meeting was to provide up-to-date information to
the Port community and to solicit their assistance toward the
endeavors of the various agencies. The panel was comprised of
representatives from the FBI, U.S. Customs, U.S. Coast Guard,
Postal Inspector, Public Belt Railroad, INS, and local law
enforcement agencies.
Since September 11, we have created an anti-terrorism unit
within our department. I must admit that in my 34 years of law
enforcement experience, I never dreamed that I would have to
create such a unit. The officers assigned to this unit have
begun receiving the most up-to-date training on anti-terrorism
procedures and technology. They recently attended training at
Glencoe, Georgia, pertaining to seaport security. The officers
are now conducting threat and risk assessments at various
properties and sites throughout the Port. The documentation
will be accessible to all appropriate agencies and may be used
to fulfill any requirements of any grant applications as they
pertain to current legislation.
We have also assigned one of our detectives to be a member
of the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, again an invitation
from the FBI. When an emergency situation occurs, our detective
will be assigned to the task force until the emergency
subsides. We are also in the early planning stages of
assembling a committee comprised of local law enforcement, U.S.
Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs to further study security
measures at the Port.
The Harbor Police Department is primed to take a more
active role in the fight against terrorism as it relates to the
Port of New Orleans. The obvious advantages in having us do so
is that we already have an established department specifically
assigned to the Port, we maintain our own training academy, and
currently have an established working relationship with the
FBI, with U.S. Coast Guard, and with U.S. Customs. We meet with
the Port's tenants on a regular basis and can empower them to
become partners with law enforcement with the focus on crime
prevention and anti-terrorism.
With the constant presence of Harbor Police at the Port,
not only do they serve as a deterrent to potential terrorist
activity, but will be the first responders to any emergency.
Their training and equipment will be vital toward saving lives
and reducing chaos. It simply makes good sense to provide these
officers with the most advanced anti-terrorism training and
supply them with state-of-the-art equipment suitable for our
department.
Finally, we hope to be included in any federally sponsored
networking programs pertaining to information at the nation's
seaports. I believe we all would agree that additional
intelligence is one of the most vital components to the success
of the war on terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Chief Hecker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert S. Hecker, Chief of Police, Harbor Police
Department, Port of New Orleans
Robert S. Hecker,
Chief of Police,
Harbor Police Department,
Port of New Orleans,
New Orleans, LA.
Committee Members:
I have a total of 34 years of law enforcement experience; 28 years
with the New Orleans Police Department and the last 6 years as Chief of
Police with the Harbor Police Department.
The Port of New Orleans has a distinct advantage over most of the
other seaports in the country. Over 100 years ago, our forefathers had
the vision to create a police force specifically designated to the
Port. The number of emergency personnel has changed over the years, but
currently our force is comprised of 59 police officers and 11
firefighters. The Harbor Police Force is a fully-trained, fully-
commissioned group of officers with arrest powers within the
jurisdiction we serve. We maintain our own Police Academy, where our
police recruits are trained and post-certified. We have our own fleet
of vehicles and our own radio system. Our firefighters staff the
``General Roy S. Kelley,'' our 95-foot, multi-purpose Emergency
Response Vessel, 24 hours a day. Additionally, we maintain a Marine
Division, which is a group of police officers that staff the Harbor
Police Patrol Boat. Both vessels respond to various types of
emergencies in the Mississippi River and the Industrial Canal.
As a result of the police presence at the Port, crime has been
minimal throughout the history of the Port. However, we realize we have
a new challenge before us. We now have to include in our mission the
possibility that terrorists may target our Port. As a result, we have
begun working on new strategies to address this potential threat.
We have always enjoyed an outstanding working relationship with the
surrounding local law enforcement departments and federal agencies
including the FBI, U. S. Coast Guard and U. S. Customs. That was never
more obvious than on the morning of September 11, 2001. Shortly after
the attacks, we all realized the Port of New Orleans may be a target.
Within an hour of the attack, members of the U.S. Customs and the U. S.
Coast Guard met with me in my office to discuss and implement an
emergency plan. The local FBI Office requested we send an officer to be
a member of their Emergency Command Center, allowing us to share any
incoming intelligence.
Since September 11, 2001, we have enhanced security throughout the
Port utilizing paid overtime and the redeployment of some officers. One
of the security concerns was our cruise passenger terminal, which
currently accommodates several cruise lines and thousands of passengers
per week. One of the measures we implemented was to have a complement
of Harbor Police Officers do a security sweep of the terminal prior to
the ship's arrival. We also utilize the ``General Kelley'' Emergency
Response Vessel to conduct security sweeps from the river side of the
wharf. Our officers remain visible at the terminal throughout the time
cruise ships are at the dock. Effective December 2001, uniformed
members of the National Guard have been supplementing our officers at
the cruise terminal.
Immediately after September 11, 2001, we began a series of meetings
with all of the appropriate agencies to discuss long term strategies.
On November 8, 2001, we called a ``town hall'' style meeting for the
Port community. We invited representatives from all of the Port's
tenants and extended the invitation to those who frequent the Port. The
topic of the meeting was to provide up to date information to the Port
community and to solicit their assistance toward the endeavors of the
various agencies. The panel was comprised of representatives from the
FBI, U.S. Customs, U. S. Coast Guard, Postal Inspector, Public Belt
Railroad, INS, and the local law enforcement agencies.
Since September 11, 2001, we created an Anti-Terrorism Unit within
our department. The officers assigned to this unit have begun receiving
the most up-to-date training on anti-terrorism procedures and
technology. They recently attended training at Glynco, Georgia,
pertaining to seaport security. The officers are now conducting threat
and risk assessments at various properties and sites throughout the
Port. The documentation will be accessible to any appropriate agency
and may be utilized to determine approval for federal funding as it
pertains to the current Legislative action.
We have also assigned one of our detectives to be member of the
FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force. When an emergency situation occurs,
our detective will be assigned to the Task Force until the emergency
subsides. We are also in the early planning stages of assembling a
committee comprised of local law enforcement, U. S. Coast Guard and U.
S. Customs to further study security measures at the Port.
The Harbor Police Department is primed to take a more active role
in the fight against terrorism as it relates to the Port of New
Orleans. The obvious advantages in having us do so are that we already
have an established department specifically assigned to the Port, we
maintain our own training academy, and currently have an established
working relationship with the FBI, U. S. Coast Guard and U. S. Customs.
We meet with the Port's tenants on a regular basis and can empower them
to become partners with law enforcement with the focus on crime
prevention and anti-terrorism. With the constant presence of Harbor
Police at the Port, not only do they serve as a deterrent to potential
terrorist activity; but, they will be the first responders to any
emergency. Their training and equipment will be vital toward saving
lives and reducing chaos. It simply makes good sense to provide our
officers with the most advanced training in the field of anti-terrorism
and supply them with state of the art technological equipment suitable
for our department.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert S. Hecker,
Chief of Police.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Chief.
Ken Kaiser.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH KAISER, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, NEW
ORLEANS FIELD OFFICE, F.B.I.
Mr. Kaiser. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee. I am pleased----
Senator Breaux. Pull that mike closer.
Mr. Kaiser. I am pleased to appear before you today to
discuss the FBI's role in security at the New Orleans Seaport.
The New Orleans Division of the FBI is only one of several
different law enforcement and military agencies which has a
connection to the New Orleans Seaport. We have an outstanding
working relationship with our law enforcement departments,
whether it be federal, state, or local agencies. We also have
an excellent working relationship with the United States Coast
Guard and the Louisiana National Guard. Through this working
relationship, all matters of investigative interest are quickly
coordinated between the various agencies to ensure the most
effective response is provided.
Coordination among the various law enforcement agencies and
military units is enhanced by the FBI-sponsored Louisiana Joint
Terrorism Task Force, the United States Attorney's Office Task
Force on Terrorism, and the New Orleans Harbor Police Anti-
Terrorism Unit.
In the near future, the Harbor Police will assign an
officer to the Louisiana Joint Terrorism Task Force. All of the
members of the Louisiana Joint Terrorism Task Force have work
space assigned to them in the FBI office and report to work
there every day. They have required background checks and
clearances which make them an asset to the fight against
terrorism. Through this task force, all terrorism
investigations and issues are addressed in a coordinated
manner. Nearly all of the members of the Louisiana Joint
Terrorism Task Force have received formal terrorism training,
either through the FBI or their respected agencies.
To demonstrate the effective coordination between all
agencies, I'd like to note that within 2 hours of the September
11 terrorism attack on the United States, a Joint Operations
Center was established in the New Orleans FBI office. The Joint
Operations Center was staffed by representatives of over 20
agencies which were either part of the Joint Terrorism Task
Force or through some working relationship they had with the
FBI. The Joint Operations Center coordinated the investigative
activities of nearly 1,300 leads over the next 30 days. Many of
these leads had some impact on the New Orleans Seaport. Thanks
to the effort of all the investigative agencies, these leads
were cleared to their logical conclusion.
The FBI is keenly aware of the concerns of law enforcement
officers regarding their need for information to help them do
their job safely, efficiently, and completely. FBI Director
Mueller recently demonstrated his commitment to the effort by
establishing a new investigative coordination division within
the FBI. The new division includes an Office of Law Enforcement
Coordination which will be responsible for improving
information sharing with the state and local law enforcement
and public safety agencies. This is an area in which the FBI
can do and must do a better job. I share Director Mueller's
belief that our agency is but one entity and we need good
coordination with the other law enforcement entities. We must
all work together. Law enforcement is quite simply only as good
as its relationships. This concludes my prepared remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kaiser follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth Kaiser, Special Agent in Charge, New
Orleans Field Office, F.B.I.
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. An very
pleased to appear before you today to discuss the FBI's role in the
security at the New Orleans seaport. The New Orleans division of the
FBI is only one of several different law enforcement and military
agencies which has a connection to the New Orleans seaport. We have an
outstanding working relationship with our law enforcement partners,
whether it be a federal, state, or local agency. We also have an
excellent working relationship with the United States Coast Guard and
the Louisiana National Guard. Through this working relationship, all
matters of investigative interest are quickly coordinated between the
various agencies to ensure the most effective response is provided.
The coordination among the various law enforcement agencies and
military units is enhanced by the FBI sponsored Louisiana Joint
Terrorism Task Force (LAJTTF), the united states attorney's office task
force on terrorism, and the New Orleans Harbor Police Anti-terrorism
Unit. In the near future, the Harbor Police will assign an officer full
time to the LAJTTF. All members of the LAJTTF have work space assigned
to them in our FBI office and report to work there everyday. They have
the required background checks and clearances which make them an asset
in the fight against terrorism. Through this task force effort, all
terrorism investigations and issues are addressed in a coordinated
manner. Nearly all members of the LAJTTF have received formal terrorism
training either through the FBI or their respective agencies.
To demonstrate the effective coordination between all agencies, I
would like to note that within two hours of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attack on the united states, a joint operations center (JOC)
was established in the New Orleans FBI office. The JOC was staffed by
representatives of over twenty agencies which were either part of the
LAJTTF, or through some other established working relationship they had
with the FBI. The JOC coordinated the investigative activities of
nearly 1300 leads over the next thirty days. Many of these leads had
some impact on the New Orleans seaport. Thanks to the effort of all the
investigative agencies, these leads were cleared to their logical
conclusion.
The FBI is keenly aware of the concerns of law enforcement officers
regarding their need for information to help them do their jobs safely,
efficiently and completely. FBI Director, Robert S. Mueller recently
demonstrated his commitment to this effort by establishing a new
investigative coordination division within the FBI. This new division
includes an office of law enforcement coordination which will be
responsible for improving information sharing with state and local law
enforcement and public safety agencies. This is an area in which the
FBI can and must do a better job. I share Director Mueller's belief
that no one agency or entity at any level is strong enough to tackle
the myriad challenges that face law enforcement. We must work together.
Law enforcement is, quite simply, only as good as its
relationships.This concludes my prepared remarks. I would like to
respond to any questions you may have.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Kaiser, I thank you very much.
Captain Grubbs.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN DOUGLAS J. GRUBBS,
CRESCENT RIVER PILOTS ASSOCIATION
Captain Grubbs. Senator Breaux, Congressman Vitter----
Senator Breaux. Captain, just avoid touching the
microphone.
Captain Grubbs. Senator Breaux and Congressman Vitter, good
afternoon.
Senator Breaux. Turn it a little and face it toward you,
but just do not hold it.
Captain Grubbs. Senator Breaux, you were right. New
Orleans's VTS is much better.
I am Douglas Grubbs of the Crescent River Port Pilots
Association in New Orleans and head of the pilots' Vessel
Traffic System program. I also sit on the Lower Mississippi
Safety Advisory Committee and serve as the official liaison
between the pilots and the U.S. Congress.
Since September the 11, everyone involved in maritime
commerce along the Mississippi River has been on a heightened
alert, watching for suspicious activity or indeed anything out
of the ordinary. This heightened state of watchfulness must
translate into what Admiral Loy has termed a ``new normalcy.''
We cannot afford to drift into vulnerable complacency. This
means that emergency measures must become standard procedure;
that complete, accurate, real-time situational information must
be readily available to both operators and law enforcement
personnel; and that maritime personnel learn how to identify
and respond to that potential threat quickly and efficiently.
My purpose here today is to discuss how the current system
of vessel pilotage can be used to enhance our maritime security
and how Louisiana state pilots have and will continue to work
hand in hand with the Coast Guard and other state and federal
law enforcement agencies to safeguard the property, welfare,
and the lives of the people of Louisiana.
Effective port security requires a true partnership amongst
all entities, both public and private, who utilize and serve
this waterway. The Coast Guard and the pilots embarked in this
public and private partnership long before September the 11,
working together since 1990 to develop an AIS-based VTS system
here in New Orleans. Once fully developed, this system will
serve as a model for other ports around the nation and, in
fact, the world.
The combined ports of the Lower Mississippi River represent
the largest port complex in the world. Each year there are
about 400,000 total vessel movements along this 264 mile
stretch of commercial waterway extending from the Gulf of
Mexico to Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Approximately 37,000 of those
movements are deep-draft vessels carrying grain, coal, steel,
petrochemicals, and a host of other commodities and products
vital to both the domestic and international economies.
A terrorist attack along the Mississippi River would not
only endanger significant urban population centers and
commercial property, but it would also have a far reaching and
devastating impact around the world. The region's vulnerability
and importance would make it a very attractive target to anyone
seeking maximum impact from a single destructive act. Pilots
take this threat seriously and personally. We want to do
everything we can and cooperate in every way possible to ensure
that nothing like September 11 happens here.
A pilot onboard a vessel has immediate, first-hand
knowledge of the vessel's situation and is in the best possible
position to notice a potential problem while there is still
time to avert disaster. The Coast Guard relies upon pilots to
provide accurate and timely information about vessels and their
immediate surroundings. Today, pilots accomplish this task
using visual contact, radar, and VHF radios.
As you know, radar cannot see around points and bends and
VHF radios are prone to intermodulation interference. While
pilots are currently in the best position to relay this
information, they cannot afford to be distracted from their
immediate task, which often means navigating a heavily laden
vessel carrying hazardous cargo through congested stretches of
river with tricky currents and weather conditions. These
factors have and will continue to contribute greatly to both
pilots' and the Coast Guard's ability to maintain a careful and
protective watch over this critical stretch of waterway:
additional manpower, education, and enhanced technology.
After September 11, the captain of the Port instituted a
sea marshal program in which all arriving vessels are screened
through a high-interest vessel matrix. A team of armed sea
marshals boards each vessel, which by virtue of its cargo,
country of origin, or other factor, is deemed to merit special
attention. The sea marshals are specially trained Coast Guard
reservists who can respond immediately to potential threats.
During the month of Ramadan, these sea marshals rode high-
interest vessels all the way from the sea buoy to Baton Rouge.
Since then, the marshals have concentrated on the vessels in
the New Orleans Harbor. The pilots have worked closely with the
Coast Guard around the clock to facilitate the sea marshal
program by providing logistical support, housing, and
transportation. The Crescent River Port Pilots have also made
their extensive, comprehensive vessel database available to the
Vessel Traffic Center to facilitate cross-referencing vessel
movements.
River pilots have extensive expertise and experience
piloting vessels up and down this river, but we are not
terrorism experts, military tacticians, psychologists, or law
enforcement officers. In order to truly identify suspicious
activity, we need to know what to look for. We also need to
have a strategic plan in place that tells us how to respond
should a threat arise. Louisiana State pilots are very
concerned with education and have implemented one of the most
extensive continuing education programs in the country. We are
now working with the Louisiana State Police and the Coast Guard
to develop a pilot anti-terrorism course which will be
incorporated into our already existing continuing education
programs.
Education and additional manpower both rely upon human
observation and ability. In the best of all possible worlds,
critical situational information would be gathered and
disseminated automatically in real-time, reducing the
possibility of human error and mechanical limitations. That is
precisely the purpose of the AIS-based VTS system under
development here in New Orleans. This satellite-based
technology will be able to see around points and bends in all
weather and will use its own private FCC-assigned frequencies,
assigned to be far less subject to interference.
With minimal user input, this system will provide real-
time, accurate vessel information, including the ship's name,
the pilot's name, the ship's location, speed, heading, cargo,
etc., in both ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore mode to other
vessels, as well as to the Vessel Traffic Center and even Coast
Guard headquarters in Washington, D.C. In this way, both
operators and law enforcement officials will have real-time
access to all pertinent information regarding hazardous cargo
moving along the Lower Mississippi River.
This AIS technology will have an immediate impact on the
Coast Guard's ability to identify and track hazardous cargo
moving through the ports of the Lower Mississippi River. The
infrastructure is in place. The public and private partnership
between pilots and the Coast Guard has been tested, and it
works. The VTS is operational in its beginning stages, and the
AIS technology is ready to go. Once approved and budgeted, the
100 AIS transponders can be providing greater security to the
Lower Mississippi River.
I urge you to lend your support to the efforts of the
United States Coast Guard and the ports of the Lower
Mississippi River to provide the resources and technology to
make this river safe and secure.
[The prepared statement of Captain Grubbs follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Douglas J. Grubbs,
Crescent River Pilots Association
Good afternoon Senator Breaux and Members of the Committee. I am
Captain Douglas Grubbs of the Crescent River Port Pilots Association in
New Orleans and head of the pilots' Vessel Traffic System program. I
also sit on the Lower Mississippi Safety Advisory Committee and serve
as the official liaison between the Crescent Pilots' Association and
the United States Congress.
Since September 11, everyone involved in maritime commerce along
the Lower Mississippi River has been on heightened alert--watching for
suspicious activity, or indeed anything out of the ordinary. This
heightened state of watchfulness must translate into what Admiral Loy
has termed a ``new normalcy.`` We cannot afford to drift again into
vulnerable complacency. This means that emergency measures must become
standard operating procedure, that complete, accurate, real-time
situational information must be readily available to both operators and
law enforcement personnel, and that maritime personnel learn how to
identify and respond to potential threats quickly and efficiently.
My purpose here today is to discuss how the current system of
vessel pilotage can be used to enhance our maritime security and how
Louisiana State pilots have and will continue to work hand-in-hand with
Coast Guard and other state and federal law enforcement agencies to
safeguard the property, welfare and lives of the people of Louisiana.
Effective port security requires a true partnership among all the
entities, both public and private who utilize and serve this waterway.
The Coast Guard and the pilots embarked upon this public/private
partnership long before September 11, working together since 1990 to
develop an AIS-based VTS system here in New Orleans. Once fully
developed, this system will serve as a model for other ports around the
nation, and in fact, the world.
The combined ports of the Lower Mississippi River represent the
largest port complex in the world. Each year there are about 400,000
total vessel movements along this 264 mile stretch of commercial
waterway extending from the Gulf of Mexico to Baton Rouge.
Approximately 37,000 of those movements are deep draft vessels carrying
grain, coal, steel, petrochemicals and a host of other commodities and
products vital to both the domestic and international economies. A
terrorist attack along the Lower Mississippi River would not only
endanger significant urban population centers and commercial property,
it would also have far reaching and devastating impact around the
world. The region's vulnerability and importance could make it a very
attractive target to anyone seeking maximum impact from a single
destructive act.
Pilots take this threat seriously and personally. We want to do
everything we can, and cooperate in every way possible to insure that
nothing like September 11 happens here.
The pilot aboard a vessel has immediate, first-hand knowledge of
the vessel's situation and is in the best possible position to notice a
potential problem while there is still time to avert disaster. The
Coast Guard relies upon pilots to provide accurate and timely
information about vessels and their immediate surroundings. Today,
pilots accomplish this task using visual contact, radar and VHF radios.
As you know, radar cannot see around points and bends and VHF radios
are prone to intermodulation interference. While pilots are currently
in the best position to relay this information, they cannot afford to
be distracted from their immediate task--which often means navigating a
heavily laden vessel carrying hazardous cargo through congested
stretches of river with tricky currents and weather conditions.
Three factors have and will continue to contribute greatly to both
the pilots' and the Coast Guard's ability to maintain a careful and
protective watch over this critical stretch of waterway: additional
manpower, education and enhanced technology.
After September 11, the Captain of the Port instituted a sea
marshal program in which all arriving vessels are screened through a
High Interest Vessel matrix. A team of armed sea marshals boards each
vessel which, by virtue of its cargo, country of origin or other
factor, is deemed to merit special attention. The sea marshals are
specially trained Coast Guard reservists who can respond immediately to
potential threats. During the month of Ramadan, these sea marshals rode
High Interest Vessels all the way from the sea buoy to Baton Rouge.
Since then, the marshals have concentrated on vessels in the New
Orleans harbor.
The pilots have worked closely with the Coast Guard around-the-
clock to facilitate the sea marshal program by providing logistical
support, housing and transportation. The Crescent River Port Pilots
have also made their extensive and comprehensive vessel database
available to the Vessel Traffic Center to facilitate cross referencing
vessel movements.
River pilots have extensive expertise and experience piloting
vessels up and down this river, but we are not terrorism experts,
military tacticians, psychologists or law enforcement officers. In
order to identify truly suspicious activity, we need to know what to
look for. We also need to have a strategic plan in place that tells us
how to respond should a threat arise. Louisiana state pilots are very
concerned with education and have implemented one of the most extensive
continuing education programs in the country. Now we are working with
the Louisiana State Police and the Coast Guard to develop a Pilot Anti-
Terrorism course which will be incorporated into our already existing
continuing education program.
Education and additional manpower both rely upon human observation
and ability. In the best of all possible worlds, critical situational
information would be gathered and disseminated automatically, in real-
time, reducing the possibility of human error and mechanical
limitations. That is precisely the purpose of the AIS-based VTS system
under development here in New Orleans. This satellite-based technology
will be able to see around points and bends in all weather, and will
use it's own private FCC assigned frequencies thus being subject to far
less interference. With minimal user input, this system will provide
real-time, accurate vessel information, including the vessel's name,
the pilot's name, ship's location, speed, heading, cargo, etc., in both
ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore mode to other vessels as well as to the
Vessel Traffic Center and even Coast Guard headquarters in Washington,
D.C. In this way both operators and law enforcement officials will have
real-time access to all pertinent information regarding hazardous cargo
moving along the Lower Mississippi River.
This AIS technology will have an immediate impact on the Coast
Guard's ability to identify and track hazardous cargo moving throughout
the ports of the lower Mississippi River. The infrastructure is in
place. The public/private partnership between pilots and the Coast
Guard has been tested and it works. The VTC is operational in it's
beginning stages, and the AIS technology is ready to go. Once approved
and budgeted, 100 AIS transponders can be providing greater security to
the Lower Mississippi River within 90 days.
I urge you to lend your support to the efforts of the United States
Coast Guard and the ports of the Lower Mississippi River to provide the
resources and technology to make this River safe and secure.
Senator Breaux. Captain, thank you very much.
Mr. Channing Hayden.
STATEMENT OF CHANNING HAYDEN,
PRESIDENT, STEAMSHIP ASSOCIATION OF LOUISIANA
Mr. Hayden. Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vitter. I am
Channing Hayden, President of the Steamship Association of
Louisiana. Our organization represents steamship agents,
owners, and operators in all of Louisiana's major deep-draft
ports. We appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
Subcommittee and comment on seaport security, an issue of
national significance and concern.
My written testimony, which I will summarize this
afternoon, covers the following points:
(1) Everybody must talk the same language. For effective
coordination, the Federal Government must set standards to
ensure seamless communications between law enforcement agencies
and between the agencies and their commercial partners. It is
vital that law enforcement and commercial equipment, radios,
programs, databases, et cetera, talk the same language.
Supplies of information--that is, commercial operators--should
only be required to submit data once to a central
submissionsite on a standard form, and it should be usable by
all agencies for both security and commercial purposes.
Whenever possible, current reporting procedures should be used.
A good example of this is the Coast Guard changing its 24-hour
notice of arrival requirement to 96 hours. The system was in
place, and everyone involved knew what to do because they had
been doing it for years. With a little tweaking, the new
requirement was implemented almost without a hitch.
For effective coordination, we must minimize breakdowns in
communications. To do so, there must be a way to prove that the
data was timely submitted. We need the equivalent, if you will,
of a fax confirmation for all electronic data input. The
federal, state, and local law enforcement coordination should
aim for a McDonald's-like consistency in interpretation and
enforcement throughout the country. The only differences
allowed should be those caused by differences in the commercial
or physical situation of a given port. This approach allows law
enforcement's commercial partners to put company-wide
procedures in place and make their internal processes efficient
while supporting the security efforts.
(2) Expand the coordination loop. We respectfully suggest
that coordination should be expanded to include law
enforcement's commercial partners in seaport security. The
following groups must definitely be included in the
coordination efforts: port authorities; freight forwarders;
carriers; steamship agents; terminal operators; pilots; trade
associations representing these groups, such as AAPA; other
commercial interests, such as trucking, railroad, barges; and
other government agencies, such as FMC, MARAD.
These groups will provide some of the basic intelligence on
which law enforcement will rely. They will also provide
practical answers to seaport security issues and ways of
minimally impacting the import and export of cargo. Keeping
commercial entities in the loop minimizes the disruption that
will be inevitably required if their expertise has not been
considered in the initial decisionmaking process.
Because of the important role of the commercial
infrastructure in security, it must be kept in place.
Legislators and regulators must provide for steamship agents,
freight forwarders, port authorities, carriers, and other
commercial partners to offset their legitimate increased
security costs. There should be no unfunded mandates placed on
state, local, or commercial interests. No legislation or
regulation should make commercial operators the first line of
defense against terrorism. However, legislators and regulators
may improve the quality of commercial operators by verifying
their credentials and requiring individual licenses, bonds, or
both.
(3) Rely on the people, not on paperwork. Increased
security will only be achieved through sufficient federal,
state, and local government, and commercial personnel, not
through information gathering and reporting. In the past,
Congress has given law enforcement agents more work to do with
less people and resources with which to do it. We must reverse
this trend. We must stop dismantling Coast Guard, Customs, and
the other law enforcement agencies. The personnel strength of
federal, state, and local law enforcement must be increased
through increased funding. It is this view that causes members
of our industry who have reviewed S. 1214 to believe that it is
not adequately funded, and some would say woefully so.
Let me quickly add that the Coast Guard, Customs, and all
the other law enforcement agencies are doing their very best
with the people and funds that they have available. They could
do much more if they were given the resources needed to do the
job right. We cannot be halfhearted, uncommitted, or
underfunded in seaport security as we have been with drug
interdiction. As I understand the statistics, we stop about 5
percent of the illegal drugs entering the United States. We
must do a much better job with terrorism.
(4) Focus on imports. Many in our industry believe that our
initial focus should be on the coordination of law
enforcement's efforts to prevent security threats of import
cargo. The confidential specifics in this regard should come
from steamship agents, freight forwarders, carriers, and other
entities immediately involved with the import/export process.
One of the U.S. drug interdiction effort that has worked
well is the super carrier initiative which provides incentives
for vessel owners and operators to have active programs that
discourage drug smuggling aboard their vessels. Many believe a
similar program that discourages the use of vessels or their
cargos as terrorist weapons should be put in place. A super
port program, similar to the super carrier program, that
encourages foreign ports to foster U.S. security interests
should also be considered.
I would like to divert from my written comments, Mr.
Chairman, just to comment on two things from the last panel.
One, I would like to say that to the best of my knowledge the
technology is not available to electronically transmit
manifests from vessels at this time. Based on some of the
discussion we heard, that might not be necessary.
The other comment I would like to make applies to the
transponders, the VTS transponders. We believe and have always
believed that all vessels in the VTS area all the way down to
the smallest recreational vessels should carry a transponder. I
think given the current situation that would be even more
important. This would become the first cut on looking at what a
suspicious small vessel might be, one that doesn't have a
transponder.
With those additional remarks, Mr. Chairman, that concludes
my testimony, and I will be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hayden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Channing Hayden, President,
Steamship Association of Louisiana
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Channing Hayden. I am president of the Steamship
Association of Louisiana. Our organization represents steamship agents,
owners and operators in all of Louisiana's major deep-draft ports. We
appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee on the
matter of seaport security, an issue of national significance and
concern. As this Hearing focuses on the coordination of federal, state
and local law enforcement in providing seaport security, my testimony
covers the following points:
Everyone Must Talk the Same Language
Expand the Coordination Loop
Rely on People, Not Paperwork
Focus on Imports
Everyone Must Talk the Same Language
While this point is elementary, it is too important to overlook. It
cannot be stressed enough that effective law enforcement coordination
means that all communications equipment, radios and the frequencies on
which they operate, computers, programs, databases, etc., both
government and commercial, must speak the same language--that is be
able to communicate with each other. Many think that in this age of
electronic wizardry, we have seamless communications. Usually, that is
only true if everyone uses the same equipment, which does not often
happen. For effective coordination, the federal government must set
standards to insure seamless communications.
This requirement applies to law enforcement's commercial partners
as well. Commercial systems and law enforcement systems must be able to
communicate with each other. The basic information on which seaport
security depends comes from law enforcement's commercial partners.
Thus, it is vital that law enforcement and commercial equipment,
programs, etc., talk the same language.
Not only must basic communications be possible, it must be
efficient. Suppliers of information (commercial operators) should only
be required to submit data once, to a central submission site, on a
standard submission form, and should be usable for both security and
commercial purposes. For example, if steamship agents report vessel
arrivals, everyone who needs vessel arrival information, including, for
example, port authorities, should have access to the data and should be
required to obtain the information from the central source. The same is
true with freight forwarders providing information on shippers,
receivers and cargo.
Whenever possible, current reporting procedures should be used.
These are tested and refined procedures that have been in place, in
some cases, for years. A good example is the Coast Guard changing its
24-hour Notice of Arrival requirement to 96 hours. The system was in
place; and everyone involved knew what to do because they had been
doing it for years. So, with a little tweaking, a new reporting system
was implemented almost without a hitch.
For effective coordination, we must insure that breakdowns in
communications are held to a minimum. To do so, we must require the
electronic submission of data to be verifiable. Why? Because,
inevitably, there will be disputes over electronic data submission.
Agencies will fine those accused of not submitting timely information.
There must be a way to prove that the data was timely submitted. We
need the e-equivalent of a fax confirmation for all electronic data
input.
Finally, when legislation passes or regulations issue, federal,
state and local law enforcement coordination should aim for a
McDonald's-like consistency in interpretation and enforcement
throughout the country. The only differences allowed should be those
that account for differences in the commercial or physical situation of
a given port. This approach allows law enforcement's commercial
partners, some of whom are regional or national organizations, to put
company-wide procedures in place that make their internal processes
efficient while supporting the security effort. This does not happen
now. As noted above, the change to a 96- hour vessel Notice of Arrival
went smoothly. However, I have received reports from members that the
procedures and requirements placed on vessels based on this information
varies from port to port depending on local interpretation of the
national regulations.
Expand the Coordination Loop
We respectfully suggest that coordination should be expanded to
include law enforcement's commercial partners in seaport security. The
following groups must defiantly be included in the coordination effort.
1. Port Authorities
2. Freight Forwarders
3. Carriers
4. Steamship Agents
5. Terminal Operators
6. Pilots
7. Trade Associations representing these groups, such as AAPA,
etc.
8. Other commercial interests, such as trucking, railroad,
barges, etc.
9. Other government agencies, such as FMC, MARAD, etc.
These groups will provide some of the basic intelligence on which
law enforcement will rely. They will also provide practical answers to
seaport security issues in ways that minimally impact the import and
export of cargo. For example, some are suggesting the elimination of
``in bond'' movements of cargo from port of entry to inland points. Any
freight forwarder or carrier will immediately explain how eliminating
``in bond'' cargo movements will quickly and completely congest our
seaports. Keeping commercial entities in the coordination loop
minimizes the corrections that will inevitably be required if their
expertise is not considered in the initial decision-making process.
Because of the important role the commercial infrastructure will
play in the security effort, it must be kept in place. In doing so,
legislators and regulators must provide for steamship agents, freight
forwarders, port authorities and other commercial partners to offset
their legitimate, increased security costs. In that regard, at a
minimum, there should be no unfunded mandates placed on state, local or
commercial interests by legislation or regulation.
Further, no legislation or regulation should make commercial
operators the first line of defense against terrorism. These entities
do not have the expertise or training to do so. However, as vessel
pilots act as eyes and ears of law enforcement on foreign vessels in
U.S. ports, steamship agents, freight forwarders, terminal operators,
etc., should be considered law enforcement's eyes and ears to monitor
the import/export system. Legislators and regulators may consider
improving the quality of commercial operators by verifying their
credentials and requiring individual licenses, bonds or both.
Rely on People, not Paperwork
Increased security will only be achieved through devoting
sufficient federal, state and local government and commercial personnel
to the effort, not through information gathering and reporting. In the
past, Congress has given law enforcement agencies more work to do, but
less people and resources with which to do it. As a result, the
agencies have shifted more of their responsibilities on to their
commercial partners. For example, the lack of Customs' personnel has
forced Customs to require that steamship agents keep the import
documentation that Customs kept in the past. Now Customs randomly
audits and fines steamship agent for not maintaining this documentation
properly. This is certainly not the type of process that will provide
increased seaport security.
In addition, the ``do more with less'' mentality has forced
agencies to make their operations more efficient at the expense of
commercial operations. For example, the lack of manpower and equipment
has caused container inspections to be moved from the wharf to
centralized locations, a more expensive system for shippers. We must
reverse the trend of expecting our first line security team, our law
enforcement agencies, to do more with less. We must stop disassembling
our law enforcement agencies such as the Coast Guard, Customs, etc. We
must take a system-wide view, making sure the entire process is
efficient, not just one agency's part of it. The personnel strength of
federal, state and local law enforcement must be increased through
increased funding. It is this view that causes members of our industry
who have reviewed S. 1214 to believe it is not adequately funded, and
some would say woefully so.
We cannot rely on electronic data transfer and risk analysis to
provide seaport security. In some cases, for example manifests,
electronic data transfer capabilities do not exist. We can only achieve
effective seaport security if enough people are devoted to it. Let me
quickly add that the Coast Guard, Customs and other agencies are doing
their very best with the people and funds they have available. They
could do more, much more, if given the resources needed to do the job
right. My worst fear as a U.S. citizen is that our country's leadership
will lose its security focus as time heals the grievous wounds of the
September 11 attacks and return to our normal political bickering. We
cannot be as half-hearted, uncommitted or underfunded in seaport
security, or any homeland security issue, as we have been with drug
interdiction. As I understand the statistics, we stop approximately 5
percent of the illegal drugs entering the United States. We must do a
much better job against terrorism.
Focus on Imports
Preventing the export of material or technology that defeats our
security efforts is important. However, many in our industry believe
that the initial focus should be on the coordination of law
enforcement's efforts to prevent or eliminate the security threats of
import cargo. Specifics in this regard should come from steamship
agents, freight forwarders, carriers and other entities intimately
involved with the import/export process. Of course, this information
should be gathered on a confidential basis.
While I have been less than complimentary to the U.S. drug
interdiction efforts, one area of the program has worked well. The
``Super Carrier'' initiative provides incentives for vessel owners and
operators to have active programs that discourage drug smuggling aboard
their vessels. There are those in our industry who believe a similar
program that discourages the use of vessels or their cargoes as
terrorist weapons should be put in place. A ``Super Port'' program,
similar to the ``Super Carrier'' program, for foreign ports that
fosters U.S. security interests should also be considered.
Attached is an article, written by Mr. Theodore Prince, from the
January American Shipper magazine. The article discusses seaport
security issues and may be of interest to this Subcommittee. Mr.
Chairman, that concludes my testimony. I will be happy to answer any
questions.
Attachment
______
Printed in the January 2002 issue of American Shipper magazine
Theodore Prince
The road ahead
Predicting future events is impossible. But in the aftermath of
September 11, we must at least attempt to define the emerging
priorities the transportation industry faces in our changed world.
Even before September 11, the economy was troublesome.
Transportation carriers traditionally have been leading indicators of
economic times. They are usually the first to feel any economic
impact--good or bad. The economy shrank at a revised 1.1-percent annual
rate in the third quarter--the biggest contraction in gross domestic
product in 10 years. Many hope for a short and mild recession.
Companies have been aggressively cutting capacity, jobs, inventory and
expenses, while the government rapidly applies both monetary policy (10
interest rate cuts by the Fed) and fiscal policy ($70 billion in tax
cuts already approved for 2002 with further stimulus initiatives
likely).
The international economy is fraught with uncertainty. The U.S.
economy's slowdown has reverberated throughout the world. The eurozone
seems to tinker on recession. Economic stimulus by the euro's central
bank has not been forthcoming because inflation is not perceived to be
a threat. Japan is experiencing its fourth recession in 10 years, which
will probably force postponement of financial reforms promised by Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi--and trigger further problems later. Taiwan
and Singapore have followed the United States into recession and South
Korea is barely hanging on to recovery. The only growth in Asia is
occurring in China. Strengthened by joining the WTO, China is expected
to see 7 percent growth this year. It remains to be seen whether U.S.
recovery will resuscitate Asia's growth--or simply accelerate that of
China's.
Oil prices have brought transportation carriers some unexpected
good luck. After an initial price spike, oil has drastically decreased
in price, as OPEC has been unable to enforce production cutbacks. Some
economists, however, fear that this may be signaling impending
deflation. Additionally, retail price cuts and 0-percent financing are
harbingers of deflation. With industrial capacity at only 75 percent,
the long-term impact of overcapacity could be severe. Many
transportation carriers are struggling with the same problem of
overcapacity.
The future of inventory management also worries our industry. Over
the past 20 years, the logistics industry grew out of the changing
nexus between traditional transportation providers and their customers.
Just-in-time became a standard goal for almost all manufacturing
industries. A manufacturer had to be willing to run a factory with no
spare inventory, a practice requiring complete faith that parts would
be delivered promptly.
Transportation deregulation allowed carriers and customers to
customize their contracted services. Because JIT was meant to eliminate
inventory, customers no longer needed their own warehouses. Third-party
logistics companies took over inventory management and related tasks.
Supply chain management entered the general mainstream of business.
Build-to-order was the inevitable successor and concepts such as ``the
Dell model'' became corporate goals. Customer response was almost
immediate and little working capital was needed for work in progress.
Loss, damage and risk of obsolescence also decreased. The profit
improvement opportunity was significant.
The events of September 11 caused many supply chains to unwind.
(e.g., many automotive plants shut down due to lack of parts.) It
remains to be seen whether companies will develop new inventory
strategies. The reintroduction of buffer stocks represents a
significant change in practice, but companies may consider it necessary
in today's uncertain world. At least for the present, the low interest
rates established by the Fed should alleviate some increased carrying
costs.
The impact of inventory strategies to transportation companies will
come as customers plan for the coming year. Replenishment frequency
will have an impact on shipment size and optimal transportation
provider. Many wonder whether this will cause traffic to be rerouted
between modes (i.e., air to surface, less-than-truckload to truckload,
etc.) Air cargo will certainly be affected if passenger flight capacity
is withheld for security reasons. And the trucking industry may also
experience problems if they are unable to attract and retain sufficient
drivers to accommodate the slower transits--and the increased security
scrutiny.
Transportation will also be affected as companies review the
sourcing of components and consider alternatives for those that come
from politically sensitive areas--or have complex transit.
Documentation and security will face enhanced scrutiny. International
transit will be especially sensitive to regulatory compliance. Shoddy
paperwork will cause delivery problems. Shipments to and from certain
areas may become so difficult to handle that carriers may price
themselves out of the business.
All of these factors are probably good news for information
technology providers. Planning and execution tools are invaluable not
only for establishing a plan but also for changing the plan quickly if
necessary.
Many external factors determine the functionality of the
transportation industry. Security is clearly a major concern. The
current political climate in Washington is such that many legislators
are clamoring for transportation security legislation--especially acts
with their name. Yet, some of the legislation being drafted does not
seem to reflect an understanding of how transportation truly operates.
Pending legislation may actually impact availability of truck drivers,
drastically curtail hazardous material movement and repeal in-bond
movement of import cargo.
What about insurance specifically? Even with increased rates, some
parties have found themselves unable to obtain insurance. The trucking
industry has been particularly vulnerable to this problem. Some
carriers have greatly increased their deductibles in order to afford
premiums. But one or two accidents could bankrupt them. Shipping
companies and airlines must also face war risk insurance.
Infrastructure providers, such as ports and airports, must also
confront this problem. European airports have repeatedly warned that
they could be forced to close if governments don't assist them with
their coverage.
Our preparation for problems will largely determine our success.
Two weeks before September 11, the Intermodal Association of North
America discussed in a seminar the preparation for--and response to--
emergency situations. Most conversation centered on local trauma (i.e.,
a fire) or slowly developing weather (i.e., a hurricane.) It is now
clear that, like all of us, the transportation industry must be much
more thoughtful about contingency plans on a larger scope and scale--
and response in a shorter timeframe than we have usually thought in.
The world has changed and our industry will change with it.
Theodore Prince is senior vice president marketing and sales for
Optimization Alternatives Ltd. Inc.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Hayden, and thank all of the
members of the panel for their presentation.
Gary, or anybody can comment on this, if the federal
statute, which I take it now American Port Authorities
support--before, in the summer, I think the ports had a
position that was not in support of the legislation. I take it
now they have become supportive of the concept of the federal
statute.
Mr. LaGrange. Absolutely correct.
Senator Breaux. If the legislation were in effect today,
who would be in charge of putting together a comprehensive
security plan for the Port of New Orleans? If the legislation
today said we have to have a comprehensive security plan,
somebody is going to go out there and put it together. Where
are we going to start? Would it be the Coast Guard? Who is
going to start doing it? Do we have a concept on how we put
together that plan?
Mr. LaGrange. I will share in the answer, if you do not
mind, with the Chief. But absolutely, I think the Coast Guard--
it would be incumbent upon the Coast Guard hopefully to take
the lead, but it would be a very coordinated type of effort
that would have to happen between the local entities and the
Coast Guard specifically. We would hope that they would be the
point focus on that.
Senator Breaux. I am wondering if we might not have to
legislatively say who is in charge to do these plans, Or at
least spell out a comprehensive plan under the coordination of
the United States Coast Guard, maybe give some instruction with
directions about how the plan is to be implemented, because I
can see that with all the ports that we have got--how many
major ports have we got in the country?
Mr. LaGrange. One hundred and fifty.
Senator Breaux. One hundred and fifty ports at least----
Mr. LaGrange. In the United States, yes.
Senator Breaux.--and different groups putting together
different plans. I take it, if we had one coordinating agency
perhaps it would move the plans in the right direction.
I am interested, Chief Hecker, in Fort Everglades. They did
not have a Harbor Police. They had a sheriff's department
running around the port with a couple of center-console
vessels, which I did not think would be able to stop anything,
except maybe a drunk and a go-fast boat. We do not have that
here (laughter). Who does the Harbor Police work for?
Chief Hecker. For the Port of New Orleans.
Senator Breaux. So the Port has the responsibility for
funding the Harbor Police?
Chief Hecker. That is correct.
Senator Breaux. And how large is the Harbor Police here?
Chief Hecker. There are 59 police officers. What is unique
about the Harbor Police is that we, it is a disadvantage to
depend on private security for the obvious reasons, and as you
mentioned, when they bring in outside security, even police
officers, they do not have a vested interest or a strong
interest in securing the port. Those officers tend to rotate in
and out, where here you have a designated force, 59 police
officers, as I mentioned, and 11 firefighters every day
patrolling the port.
Senator Breaux. What kind of vessels do you have? Do you
have some boats that are out there on the water? Is it all
onshore? Tell me a little more about it.
Chief Hecker. Yes, sir. We have officers on land that
patrol and a fleet of Harbor Police vehicles. We utilize
scooters sometimes. We utilize bicycles sometimes around the
populated areas such as the cruise terminal and the Riverwalk
shopping center. Our fire boat is a 95-foot fire boat, 3,600
horsepower. Fire-fighting equipment can actually--it is an
automated system where one person can actually fight a fire, a
wheel house.
Senator Breaux. The responsibility for an explosion and
fire on a vessel that is within the harbor, the Port of New
Orleans, the Harbor Police would be the first to respond?
Chief Hecker. Well, we would be the first to respond
because we are one of the only firefighting boats available in
this area, especially one of that nature. I believe Saint
Bernard has a smaller fire boat, but when it comes to state-of-
the-art firefighting equipment, our fire boat is far ahead of
the pack and is probably----
Senator Breaux. In fact, I think you just donated one of
the old vessels to Puerto Rico, as I remember. What about
patrol vessels in the water?
Chief Hecker. We have one Harbor Police patrol boat. It is
a 20-foot Boston Whaler. Mainly, what that is used for is to
maintain clearance in the Industrial Canal. Shrimping tends to
be real popular in that area, and what happens is it is
illegal, and the shrimpers will congest the passageway, and the
cargo ships have a difficult time maneuvering past the shrimp
boats, who tend to refuse to get out of the way, so our Harbor
Police boat maintains a presence in that area and keeps that
passageway clear and also enforces the illegal shrimping laws.
However, that boat has been used in the Mississippi River.
Just recently we had a military vessel here that required a
presence on the riverside, and we used our police patrol boat
to maintain a security presence on the river as well. Those are
the two boats that we have currently right now, not to say that
we could not use additional boats.
Senator Breaux. I am always concerned about our shrimpers,
but generally they are not going to be a terrorist threat. The
greatest fear that I have now is the same thing that happened
to the U.S.S. Cole when a private vessel that is apparently
under Coast Guard regulation but is not restricted is just
pulling right along side a very large vessel. And you know, a
lot of people like to get as close as they can to a cruise ship
just to look at it. Pulling along side a cruise ship, not just
looking at it, but to blow it up, is a potential threat in
every port of this country that has cruise ships. I am
concerned that the comprehensive plan needs to address that. I
am really not satisfied with the Coast Guard's statement that
there are no restriction zones that are automatically in place
on a high-interest vessel that comes into this port.
Mr. LaGrange. We have imposed one around the cruise ships.
Chief Hecker. Yes, sir. I believe we have, I am not sure of
the length or amount, but we did impose a security zone around
a cruise ship when it is at the dock, so we have a security
zone there.
Senator Breaux. Is it enforced?
Chief Hecker. The Coast Guard cutter is usually visible in
that area. Now, again, our police patrol boat has been
maintained in the Industrial Canal, so we do not have a second
boat to utilize there. We generally depend on the Coast Guard
for enforcement of that body of water.
Mr. LaGrange. Shortly after 9/11--it does get violated
occasionally. It is not a hundred-proof. There was a kayaker
coming down who was leaving the country after 9/11, headed out
of Dodge, and had a little red box on the front of his kayak.
As it turned out, it was his lunch and a change of clothing or
something, but every now and again you will have one that will
penetrate.
Senator Breaux. I think it is obvious that in the Port of
New Orleans there is different traffic here. It is a great deal
commercial. There are not a lot of recreational boats like they
have in the Port of Miami or the Port of Everglades where you
have got literally thousands and thousands of recreational
boats, some of them yachts, some of them 35's or 45's. You have
all different sized vessels up and down there that are
privately operated. Here you have mostly commercially operated
in this stretch of the Mississippi, so it is a little bit
different.
I think that government cut in the Port of Miami, the
entire government cut is a restricted zone now. When one cruise
ship is in the port, there are no private vessels in the entire
government cut, which is the main exit out to the Atlantic
Ocean for the Port of Miami. Not a single private vessel can
come into that government cut if there is any single cruise
ship anywhere in the dock. The concern is preventing private
vessels from trying to examine a larger vessel. I am not sure
that would work. I mean, you cannot restrict that portion of
the river.
I think that a comprehensive plan is going to have to look
at creating zones around some of these vessels that are high-
interest vessels that are coming in there. I do not know. We do
need some more resources.
I mean, the Coast Guard has a vessel out here. You have got
one boat. And how many ships have you got coming in? Thousands.
Those are inadequate resources to address this post-9/11. That
is why this bill could be very helpful in terms of helping to
supply additional resources.
One Boston Whaler is not going to do the job if somebody is
intent on coming along side one of your ships and doing great
damage to it. It is not just to your ship, but the harbor. That
would stop traffic and commerce in the entire middle part of
the United States of America by sinking one ship. Not to
mention if it is being sunk under the Greater New Orleans
Bridge and collapsing the bridge, the economic effect on this
country would be devastating. The resources I think are going
to have to be greatly increased in light of 9/11.
Captain Grubbs. Mr. Chairman, even with the limitations of
the Mississippi River because of the currents, it has also got
its benefits. The benefits for security are that if the ship
industry, the pilots, the Coast Guard, and law enforcement
agencies got together and dedicated a few anchorages, not the
entire anchorage, a few slots, with radar control, the VTS,
cameras, the most vulnerable a ship would be would be anchored
in the middle of the night by itself with no surveillance. By
then we would have full VTS surveillance, and a ship along side
of a dock would meet the requirement of docks so they would
have camera surveillance outside of the ship.
Senator Breaux. I agree with that. I mean I do not want to
have anybody coming along and saying that Senator Breaux and
Congressman Vitter advocated every fast boat in Louisiana have
a transponder on it. I am not saying that, but there has got to
be certain areas and certain sensitive zones. We want to know
why those boats are out there. Here most of our traffic is
commercial. Obviously, we have some private boats and yachts
coming up and down the river, but most of them are already in
the Gulf or Lake Pontchartrain, and not traversing the
Mississippi River like they do in some ports around the
country. I think there has got to be a way. We want to know why
they are there. If we know who they are and why they are there,
that eliminates a lot of problems.
Mr. Hayden. Please remember, though, that while you are
saying a lot of these small--that we do not have a lot of
perhaps recreational boats, we do have a lot of small
commercial boats. Down in Venice there are a lot of small
boats, a lot of fishing boats, and a lot of offshore boats. It
is these people who should be--if they have businesses in the
VTS area, they need to have a transponder. They need to be
identified. Because if they are not identified, we do not know
who they are and what they are doing there. And let us face it,
if somebody is going to show up and try to do some trouble,
they are going to try to blend into whatever traffic that is
there, and the traffic that is there is fishing boats,
shrimping boats, and offshore boats.
Senator Breaux. Look at the size of the vessel that pulled
up along side of the U.S.S. Cole Naval vessel. It was a very
small vessel, and it almost sank it. It killed a large number
of sailors. The comprehensive plan ought to look at that.
I tell you, I think that we are going to certainly move on
federal legislation to require transponders in a much quicker
fashion on the vessels that are now scheduled to receive them
already, so you can find out where those vessels are.
Let us see. I have some other material. The relation, I
take it, with the Harbor Police and the Coast Guard is a good
one. Can it be improved? Has there been any difficulties in the
not sharing of information, or has there been any fight to see
who is going to do what?
Chief Hecker. You are correct, sir. It is a very good
relationship. I think the improvement could perhaps be in the
equipment, such as radio communications. I do not believe--we
cannot communicate with them from car to ship except for a
patrol boat to our police headquarters. The radio system could
probably be improved.
To go back to one other thing that you had asked Mr.
LaGrange, prior to 9/11 we were prepared to follow the
guidelines of the interagency commission on seaport security
and establish that committee that you spoke of with the Coast
Guard being in the lead and for us to play a support role and
be part of that committee, and establish the guidelines as far
as seaport security. We have taken the first steps to put that
committee together.
Senator Breaux. Is there a restricted access to the Port of
New Orleans now, and if so, how?
Chief Hecker. It varies. We are an open port, as you well
know. We have a flood wall that offers some security, and over
the past few years we have established four entry points to the
Uptown facilities. We are in the process of assessing how we
are allowing vehicles to come in there. Initially, we passed
out port decals, and anybody who had a port decal we would just
waive them in. We are taking another look at that to see if we
want to stop every vehicle coming in and do a more in-depth
check. There are other areas of the Port that we do not have
any checkpoints where literally vehicles or pedestrians can
walk right up to the facilities. We are assessing that as well.
Senator Breaux. I think that should not take a lot of
assessment.
Chief Hecker. Well, what the assessment is how are we going
to shore it up and how are we going to secure it. Do we assign
a person there for each driveway? Do we create some type of a
gate-armed security booth?
Senator Breaux. Mr. Kaiser, you are the FBI. What kind of
recommendation would you just offhand have with regard to
access to a public port like this, knowing that we want to make
sure people can get in and out of the Port in a relatively
unrestricted way, but at the same time I do not want and no one
wants anyone driving into the Port who is not there for a
legitimate reason? Is it your suggestion that we have
checkpoints?
Going into the Port of Fort Everglades, I was met by a
National Guard person with an M-16, plus the local sheriff's
deputies, going through a checkpoint before we could get into
the port. I take it we do not have anything like that right now
in the Port of New Orleans?
Mr. Kaiser. One of the things that has been discussed----
Senator Breaux. A little louder so we can make sure to get
it on the record.
Mr. Kaiser. One of the things that has been discussed among
various law enforcement agencies is possibly a smart card or
some sort of identification card that would enable people to
access where you pass the card through it and the gate goes up
and opens. That would, I think help us achieve that.
Senator Breaux. I think that with the ships--this was
really interesting, David. We went on the OCEAN PRINCESS. They
had a private security concern that has developed a card. And
every passenger onboard that ship when they walk on gets a
laminated card. They take their picture, and it is on that
card. Like what you have there, Gary. When you leave the ship,
you run it through the little computer, and it shows that you
are now off the ship and they are waiting for you to get back
on the ship so the ship can depart. I would suggest that.
perhaps the idea has been discussed, that people who regularly
use the port should have some type of identification which is
with a photo ID.
I am not certain that we are not moving to a situation in
this country where we have photo ID's. Everybody has a Social
Security card. Is there any problem putting your picture on
your Social Security card? I am not looking for a Big Brother
type of operation, but I mean, for the purpose of identifying
people, those types of things I think can be very helpful and
hopefully can be considered in our overall comprehensive plan.
Captain Grubbs, on the role of a pilot on a ship, I take it
has been navigation and safely bringing that ship from one
point to the next point and not to try and inspect the ship or
enforce any laws. Give me a little bit of something for the
record. We now have sea marshals onboard. Is that helpful? Can
they be doing something that your pilots are not doing? Does it
matter whether you are captaining your ship carrying hazardous
material versus captaining a ship that is carrying soybeans?
Captain Grubbs. For us it is all the same. We pilot every
ship with the same amount of credibility we pilot small ships
with hazardous cargo. Soybeans can blow up too. One of the
biggest explosions we had was with grain dust, so----
Senator Breaux. Whether it is potentially explosive or not,
from a navigation standpoint it is the same?
Captain Grubbs. But what has changed since 9/11 is not what
you do, not how you pilot the ship, because it is the same way.
It is what is around you a lot more. It is what is in your
surroundings. Who is the crew behind your back?
What bothered most of our pilots was those planes that
terrorists took over and cut the pilots' throats with a box
cutter or however they did it. We are not going to go into this
without knowing fully what is behind us. Most of our ships are
international crews, most of them are multilingual and
multinational. It would be easy to put a crew member on, steal
someone's identity, and stick them in there. I think it would
be less likely to have a conspiracy amongst the whole crew, but
it is likely to have one or two members that was planted into
the crew to do some damage. Like you said, we have big ships
here, 200,000, 300,000. They could blow the bottom of that ship
and cripple this entire area by the time you got that ship out
of the way, or blow the Huey P. Long Bridge with a boxcar,
bombing a boxcar. Or simply if you had someone coordinating it
from around Algiers Point at this stage of the river, and
instead of going hard left, he goes hard right, right into a
cruise ship with volatile cargo, with a northeast or east wind
you would kill a good part of New Orleans.
So these are the things that when we developed this anti-
terrorist force with the Coast Guard to put more restrictions
on, we just became a lot more aware, we better have a strategic
plan to try, before the guy cuts your throat with a box cutter,
to have that plan in action. Sea marshals would make a great
deal of difference on these HIV vessels. But it is all vessels.
That ship that hit the shopping center in New Orleans was a
computer glitch and did an awful lot of damage. If you put
someone into the crew that wants to do harm to this city, right
now you could easily do it before that pilot could correct that
action, turn around and change the rudder and have the captain
of the ship take over. A lot of this could be done quickly by
sea marshals, which I think would prevent all of that.
And some people are going to say, well, when does that ever
happen? I mean pilot programs, we have an incredible safety
record. It is like one incident in 1,100, and 70 percent of
those are engine failures or mechanical failures. When does
this happen? I mean how many times has a plane been flown into
the World Trade Center? So it would only take one time on a
chloride ship or one of these container ships to go hard right
into a cruise ship and kill a bunch of people. We have to be
sure to educate ourselves in this area, and that is what pilots
want to do.
Senator Breaux. I noticed that the bridge on the Chinese
registered vessel was not secure in the sense there was pretty
free access to it. It seemed to me that perhaps some
consideration can be given on HIV vessels, the high----
Captain Grubbs. High interest vessels.
Senator Breaux. High interest vessels, to require some type
of a secured bridge for the pilots and the sea marshals to work
in.
Captain Grubbs. I think that is an excellent point.
Senator Breaux. It would make it much more difficult if you
have four or five people on that bridge to take over. A river
pilot and a sea marshall, you know, all 20 people in the crew
could come up there and take over and do what you just
suggested. It seems to me some type of security on the bridge
may be important while it is in our area of influence.
Captain Grubbs. When it comes to the navigational aids,
yes, sir.
Senator Breaux. Somebody suggested in our Committee in
Congress about the state river pilots being documented by the
Coast Guard, which you are not now. Can you comment a little on
that?
Captain Grubbs. Oh, we are. Before we ever get to the level
that we are at, instead of a--it is a state commission, we have
to have a Coast Guard pilot license. So we have to have that
before we are ever voted on.
Senator Breaux. You have a license, but can you document
it?
Captain Grubbs. I look at that as being one and the same.
The federal pilots here, by way of a good relationship, They
have to have a federal license, the same as we have to pilot
these ships. We go out of state, unlimited pilots, unlimited
masters, and the state commission has repass the apprenticeship
program.
Senator Breaux. Anything else?
Mr. Vitter. I just have one followup on the VTS issue, and
I certainly agree with people's earlier comments that we need
to accelerate that effort. Captain, you and I had talked a
month or two ago, and you had some specific ideas about how to
accelerate that effort with some equipment sitting around being
unused, and other ways, at least on the local level, to
dramatically accelerate that effort. I was wondering if you
could share that with us for the record.
Captain Grubbs. Sure. The infrastructure is in place right
now, or at least for VTS. You could require transponders right
now, for Congress to appropriate the funds to acquire 100
transponders right now, and we would supply the logistics
requirements. We would put them on the ship, take them off the
ship, charge their batteries.
Senator Breaux. You have portable transponders?
Captain Grubbs. Portable transponders. That would push this
state-of-the-market technology further faster than it is going
right now. With transponders, at any one time we could have
maybe 300 ships in port at one time. Of those, ``X'' number are
HIV vessels. If we get together with the local shipping people
and we dedicate our resources, the pilot resources and the
Coast Guard's, to be able to put that on there, now we have got
the international standard. Houston, they are behind us. There
are no VTS's in most of those places.
What they are going to find out is because of what we have
done here in New Orleans, they could put a VTS base, AIS
together in even a small port for a fraction of what it would
cost in the past. Just transponders on one ship, whether it is
the ship-based model or a portable model, a small
infrastructure, even somebody's office here in New Orleans. We
have got the VTS in place. Let us get those transponders, and
we can put this technology in faster. Because there is a few
things that we have to do with AIS, but if we can get those 100
transponders and if we can get the resources of the Coast
Guard--said we. I think that is really what the department
should have done. It really is ``we.'' The Coast Guard can be
really good at that. If we can get the resources now and add a
few radar sites and add those transponders, this VTS is fully
operational, for safety, for anti-terrorism and for improving
the pilots' situation.
Mr. Vitter. Thank you. That is all I have.
Senator Breaux. I take it, Mr. Hayden, on behalf of the
Steamship Association, that you all do support the concept,
because you have talked about the transponders being on the
vessels?
Mr. Hayden. Yes, sir, we do, but our main concern is that
everyone in the VTS have the same requirements on them. I know
that is difficult for you, but if we have small vessels in the
area, private fishing vessels, whoever, they need to be part of
the system.
Senator Breaux. It is interesting on the requirements on
airplanes, I mean, a lot of private small planes, they do not
have to have a transponder, as I understand the latest
regulation, unless they are calling on a major airport where
they have a lot of traffic. I mean if they are landing in New
Orleans and they do not happen to have a transponder, they are
not going to let them come in. If they are landing maybe at a
smaller airfield and are only going to fly in and out to
somewhere up in the country area of the state, they do not have
to have that transponder. But if they are going to come to a
major airport they have got to have one, or you cannot let them
land. When you come to the Port of New Orleans or come into
this area, a transponder would be required because we want to
know where you are.
Mr. Hayden. But the other thing is, Senator, that you have
to have enough Coast Guard people and enough Coast Guard
equipment available so that if we have somebody that does not
have a transponder, you run out there and see what he is doing.
Senator Breaux. Well, this has been very helpful. In
addition to the two panels, we have a statement from John
Hyatt, who is Chair of the Port Liaison/Political Action
Committee of the International Freight Forwarders and Custom
Brokers Association, which was made part of our record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Prepared Statement of John T. Hyatt, Chairman,
Port Liaison/Political Action Committee
The International Freight Forwarders and Customs Brokers
Association of New Orleans (IFFCBANO,) is a non-profit association of
FMC-licensed international freight forwarders and U.S. Treasury-
licensed customs brokers. In existence since 1913, it comprises 50
firms. The customer base of member firms includes thousands of
importers and exporters in North America. Member firms handle import
and export cargoes moving through the Customs Service Port of New
Orleans encompassing the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Arkansas and Tennessee.
In examining the provisions of S. 1214 (Port and Maritime Security
Act of 2001,) we agree with the need for more security at United States
seaports. At the same time we cannot allow security concerns to
negatively impact the flow of goods in international trade, a very
important part of the economy in Southeast Louisiana. We note that
several House drafts of this legislation called for increased
examinations by U.S. Customs from its current 2 percent-under managed
``risk assessment,'' to 10 percent and even 100 percent.
The amount of congestion at ports as a result of such moves would
spell the end of international trade as we know it. Additionally,
suggestions that the ``in bond'' program be cancelled with all cargo
clearing at the first port of discharge would wreck havoc on many
businesses. A substantial amount of the cargo received and cleared at
New Orleans arrives from West Coast ports in bond via daily unit
trains: Union Pacific, Burlington Northern-Santa Fe or Kansas City
Southern railroads. To a lesser extant cargoes originating from
European points and discharging at ports east of the Mississippi arrive
via the CSX and the Norfolk Southern Railways.
There certainly are less intrusive ways in which to insure security
at U.S. seaports. These could include recognized exporters who will
undertake to adhere to certain security requirements when loading
containers for shipment to the United States.
Additionally, technology could greatly assist in tracking a
shipment to insure it has not been tampered with during the
transportation cycle via transponders (tags,) magnetic/electric based
RFID (radio frequency identification) technologies or EAS (Electronic
Article Surveillance) technologies. Mass-produced, the costs for such
security enhancements would be minimal, at the same time ensuring the
smooth flow of trade.
We understand suggestions have been made that as a trade off to
keeping the in bond program intact that Customs would have to receive
prior to discharge of cargo at any U.S. seaport a minimum of four (4)
data elements relating to each shipment: consignor, consignee,
description and first 6 digits of HTS#. This seems a reasonable
compromise that would satisfy security at the same time fostering trade
facilitation.
Finally, our Association views the adequate staffing of U.S.
Customs offices in this area as crucial to the new security
requirements, further economic development and attraction of more trade
through the region. With plans in progress for a state-of-the-art
container facility in the Napoleon Avenue area as a prelude to the
future Millennium Port, any further reduction of Customs personnel in
this area can only have negative impact. As facts to consider, at
current staffing levels, U.S. Customs has 25 percent fewer inspectors
than in 1999, consisting of 30 inspectors, 6 supervisors and 4 canines.
On the trade side there are 33 percent fewer import specialists
numbering 16, with 3 supervisors. Within the next 5 years a large
number of inspectors are scheduled for retirement and a number of very
senior import specialists are also reaching that point. Currently, with
the increased security requirements, about 75 percent of all inspectors
are working on weekends, a definite impact on overall morale. The Port
Director, has at times, been obligated to shuffle duties from the
import specialist to the inspection side. Some key points to bear in
mind about the Gulf CMC:
Although the number of entries processed in New Orleans
during FY 2000 was 55,000, as a Service Port, New Orleans
handles 17 other smaller ports, including the massive Federal
Express hub in Memphis.
Import Specialists process entries filed throughout these 17
ports, over 1.2 million entries last year, up 6.55 percent from
FY 1999.
New cruise ships to New Orleans beginning in February 2002
will greatly increase the number of passengers processed. This
year 214,000 air and sea passengers were processed.
Next year for sea alone, Customs will process approximately
300,000. Factoring in air passengers and seasonal charter
flights and the total should approach close to 425,000.
This new activity acts as a further drain on limited
resources.
Ten percent of inspectors are at any one time away on
temporary assignment or training.
The Louisiana Coast must be considered a ``border'' as well as the
land crossings. In our case, this border is much more ``porous,''
requiring additional surveillance. We should be beefing up the
inspection services of U.S. Customs and at the same time addressing the
crucial trade element. Adequately addressing staffing would be the
allocation of 15 additional personnel for the Inspection division and
15 for the Import Specialist division.
Although it will never be ``business as usual,'' in light of recent
events, we must not allow the terrorists to win by implementing
procedures in the name of security that would result in economic injury
especially to the vital international trade/transportation sector here
in the U.S. Gulf.
Senator Breaux. I will just conclude the hearing and thank
Congressman Vitter for his participating and for help in the
House on this major legislation. I want to thank everybody who
has been connected to our visit, which for me, obviously, is
coming back home for the trip. I thank all of the people who
have helped us in being welcomed, including all of the staff
behind us, who are professionals who know what they are doing.
We will be taking this information that we gained back to
Washington.
I think that what we have seen here in New Orleans,
particularly, this morning, was very valuable to me, to see the
VTS systems and to go with the Coast Guard and pilots and the
boarding arrangements as we got out there. It has been very
helpful to see how it actually works. I think that it has given
me a greater degree of a sense of security that we can feel
about the Port of New Orleans. There is still a lot of work
ahead, in all ports around the country. And hopefully, with the
Federal Government coordinating, we can provide the necessary
means to accomplish the goal of having as close to a 100
percent secured port as we possibly can.
With that, I will conclude the hearing of the Committee on
Commerce.
[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.]