[Senate Hearing 107-1113]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-1113
FUTURE OF AIRPORT SECURITY--
DYNAMIC NEW TECHNOLOGIES
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 5, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
90-128 WASHINGTON : 2005
_________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free
(866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail
Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
Mark Buse, Republican Staff Director
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican General Counsel
----------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana CONRAD BURNS, Montana
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
RON WYDEN, Oregon OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
MAX CLELAND, Georgia SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina GORDON SMITH, Oregon
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on November 5, 2001................................. 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Witnesses
Barclay, Charles M., President, American Association of Airport
Executives..................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Doubrava, Richard J., Managing Director, Air Transport
Association.................................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Garvey, Hon. Jane F., Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Planton, Jeff, Senior Vice President, Federal Group, EDS......... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Siedlarz, John E., Vice Chairman of the Board, International
Biometric
Industry Association........................................... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Selldorff, John, President, Honeywell Automation and Control
Solutions...................................................... 33
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Yura, Michael T., Ph.D., Director, West Virginia University
Forensic
Identification Program......................................... 46
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Appendix
Huddart, Martin, General Manager, Recognition Systems, Inc.,
prepared statement............................................. 57
FUTURE OF AIRPORT SECURITY--
DYNAMIC NEW TECHNOLOGIES
----------
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Morgantown, WV.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12 p.m., in
courtroom 165, West Virginia University College of Law, Law
Center--Evansdale Campus, Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman
of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Rockefeller. I want to thank everybody for being
here. I would like to start off with a statement, as Chip and
Jane Garvey know, we sometimes do in Congress. Thank you very
much for being here. Thanks very much for being with the only
university in the country that offers undergraduate degrees in
something that we're going to be talking about. I want to thank
President Hardesty and the university for making this
opportunity available to us, for hosting what is a meeting of
the Senate Aviation Subcommittee, which I have the honor to
chair, for this very important hearing on technologies that can
be deployed to improve our aviation security situation, which
is obviously a matter of overwhelming importance.
For years, the State of West Virginia, and West Virginia
University in particular, have been quietly establishing
themselves as a leader in perhaps the most promising of
security technologies, so-called biometrics or human
identification devices. West Virginia University houses the
Center for Identification Technology Research, which is a
university/industry cooperative research center under the
auspices of the National Science Foundation. I think most West
Virginians would not necessarily know that, but it is true, and
it is profoundly important.
West Virginia is home to the U.S. Army's Biometrics Fusion
Center in Bridgeport, West Virginia, and throughout the region
there are a number of related security companies, some of which
have participated in the impressive technology expo, which I
hope you have all had a chance to see, and will be continuing
during the afternoon outside of this room.
Many of our witnesses, including most especially one of my
favorite Americans, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey, have
traveled quite a ways to be here. You all have. I think you
will find the surroundings here and the people here very much
relevant to your work.
We in Congress have spent the last 6 weeks working to
improve security at airports. That should not come as a
surprise. Unfortunately, the House of Representatives last week
rejected the far-reaching aggressive bill put forward by the
subcommittee in the Senate that I serve on, and by the full
Senate by a vote of 100-to-0 and passed, as I say, unanimously.
This, to be honest, is a real setback for security from my
point of view and I think from any reasonable point of view.
But if we all keep the safety of the American people first in
our minds, I'm sure that in the conference committee, which I
think will start on Wednesday, that we will be able to reach
some kind of an agreement and get aviation security at work in
the airports as soon as possible. Because changes since
September 11 have not been that dramatic, particularly in the
smaller airports.
In the meantime, we have to begin to explore the role that
technology can play in addressing security challenges. Prior to
September 11, our best intelligence sources believed that a
terrorist attack using airplanes as missiles and airports as
launching pads was something that was associated with Hollywood
movies, but certainly nothing more than that. And certainly not
worth spending millions and, more to the point, maybe billions
of Federal dollars to prevent such a scenario from taking
place.
Now, obviously, all of that has changed and changed
forever. Today, we have to think much more comprehensively and
much more creatively than we have in the past. And there is a
lot of instinct within us as Americans--not because we are not
afraid of the future, but there is a great instinct in America
now to hold on to what it is we have been doing, and our way of
doing business. And the whole concept of making changes and
trying out things which are new, putting in concept two ideas
or an idea which may bring in some conflicting aspect to it,
all this is something that generally we try to avoid when we're
in a peacetime situation.
Well, we are not. We are in a war on the international
level, and some would argue that we are in a modified war on a
domestic level also. So we have to be able to monitor and to
share in real time information about who is getting on a plane,
what are they bringing with them, who has access to airport
security areas and also to aircraft, and ultimately whether all
of those people really are who they claim to be.
Last Tuesday, Secretary Mineta was quoted as saying that
``an unacceptable number of deficiencies continue to occur at
the Nation's airports.'' And he's quite correct. Appropriately,
and very rightly, in my view, he expressed a willingness to
ground aircraft, to ground them again and close entire
concourses of major airports if the situation does not improve.
Hence, the pressure on the Congress to pass legislation which
can begin to be implemented and which gathers the confidence of
the American people so they'll get back on airplanes.
Technology in the hands of well-trained, highly skilled
professionals who are accountable should allow us to address
these problems. And we must address them as quickly as possible
if we're going to restore that confidence to the traveling
public and the financial health to an industry which we
suddenly have discovered is a Behemoth of an economic factor in
our American economic life; that is, the airline industry.
[The prepared statement of Senator Rockefeller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senator from West Virginia
Good morning. First, I want to thank President Hardesty and West
Virginia University for hosting this hearing. I also want to express my
appreciation to Jane Garvey and the other witnesses for coming to West
Virginia today. West Virginia is on the cutting edge of technology that
is critical to making major security improvements that we all recognize
must be put into place immediately. Administrator Garvey will not only
have an opportunity to talk about the challenges we all face, but also
learn what West Virginia can offer to the Nation's security.
As many of you know, we have spent the last month trying to figure
out how to improve security at airports. Jane Garvey has been leading
the way for the Administration. The attacks of 9/11 were not a failure
of the FAA. The FAA controllers throughout this country and the flight
crews did a remarkable job rerouting and landing all of the planes
across the entire Nation. The controllers in New York that watched and
listened to the attack in horror also must be commended. Prior to 9/11,
everyone was searching for explosive devices being placed onboard a
plane. Today, we want to know who is getting on a plane, who has access
to airport security areas and aircraft, and if they do--are those
people who they claim to be? Technology can be deployed to answer these
questions.
Last Tuesday, Secretary Mineta stated that ``an unacceptable number
of deficiencies continue to occur'' at the Nation's airports,
threatening to close entire concourses if necessary. Technology, in the
hands of well-trained, highly skilled, professionals, can address these
concerns.
Airport security is a multi-layered process. Airports, for example,
are responsible for the airport perimeter and the facility. Air
carriers today are responsible for screening passengers and baggage.
Focusing first on the airport--every airport has a series of doors
that provide access for airport and air carrier personnel. Airports
also have different types of gates that limit access for catering
trucks and other vehicles. No one wants anyone without a legitimate
reason to have access to baggage areas, catering services, or
airplanes. Technology can tell us who should have access and close
those doors to prevent unauthorized access.
Focusing on passenger screening--we want to know who is getting on
planes, and are those people who they say they are. Currently, security
screening begins at check-in. All passengers are questioned to
determine if a dangerous item has been passed to them unknowingly.
Additionally, computer-assisted passenger prescreening (CAPPS) software
uses classified criteria to identify certain ``selectees'' for more
intense scrutiny.
If a passenger checks baggage, it may be screened for explosives
using x-ray equipment, but the availability, use and cost of this
equipment are all problems that need to be addressed. To protect
against bombings, the positive passenger-bag matching (PPBM) procedure
matches passengers and their bags. Bags whose owners do not actually
board the aircraft are removed.
The most visible part of the screening process is the security
checkpoint--where passengers and their carry-on bags are screened.
Passengers themselves walk through metal detectors, and carry-on bags
are screened by equipment that displays an x-ray image of the bag
contents. Operators who see suspicious objects in the image hand search
bags as a backup procedure.
We need to ensure that security information is available on a real-
time basis. Prior to 9/11, we were headed for gridlock at airports
throughout the country. Now, we are looking for people to fly, but that
will change and we must have systems in place that can expedite
passenger processing or long lines will be the norm, and not the
exception.
There are a number of technologies that we know can be deployed. We
want these technologies deployed today so that we can positively
identify people getting onboard planes and track persons obtaining
access to sensitive areas. Specifically, we will examine the role of
biometrics and other related technologies.
This is a national problem and we in West Virginia want to help
solve it. The State of West Virginia is in the forefront of biometrics
technology. WVU houses the Center for Identification Technology
Research, a National Science Foundation University/Industry Cooperative
Research Center and we are home to the U.S. Army's Biometrics Fusion
Center. In addition, several security product companies are based in
West Virginia.
Our first panel will set the stage and indicate the role technology
can play in airport security. The FAA has been concerned about
unauthorized access for years. The American Association of Airport
Executives and the Air Transport Association have long advocated
greater emphasis on security and understand the advantages of
biometrics and related technologies. The International Biometrics
Industry Association will describe how the industry is meeting this
challenge. WVU will describe the State's participation in the
biometrics field. Honeywell and EDS will give us the industry
perspective.
I cannot overemphasize how important this hearing is. We are trying
to address a problem that is widely recognized, not only by the
aviation security community but also by the public. Our economy depends
on air travel. The country must be assured that air travel is safe.
Until we are able to convince people that previous holes in security
have been fixed, they will continue to be reluctant to commit
themselves with the same level of confidence as before the events of 9/
11.
Our first panel will set the stage and give us a sense of
the activities underway at the FAA, the airports, and among the
major airlines to improve security and to deploy available
technologies.
The FAA, embodied by Jane Garvey, has been concerned about
unauthorized access for years without a great deal of public
support or private support. And the FAA has a new task force
focusing on security research and development and can give us a
sense of the financial commitment that we need to make as a
Nation to deploy security technologies throughout the system.
The American Association of Airport Executives, which is
Chip Barclay, and the Air Transportation Association--and in
terms of the whole security aspect of it, the top guy is Mr.
Doubrava--have long advocated greater emphasis on security. The
airport professionals all do that. And they understand the
practical advantages of biometrics and related technologies.
On the second panel, we will focus on the security
technology industry itself and related research. The
International Biometrics Industry Association, West Virginia
University, Honeywell, and EDS will tell us both what's
possible today and what's in the works for deployment in the
future.
And with that, let me invite Administrator Garvey to begin
our testimony today. And thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. JANE F. GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and it is a
real pleasure to be here this morning. And I want to echo your
statements about the president of this university. We are
really delighted to be here, and I know when you asked us to
attend, you spoke so enthusiastically about the wonderful work
the university does in biometrics. And we are just delighted to
be here, a number of us from the FAA, to see that firsthand. So
we appreciate the opportunity to be with you this afternoon.
I'd like to begin by talking a bit about what we've done
with the wonderful support we've seen from Congress--in your
committee in particular, Mr. Chairman--over the last several
years. You've invested about $440 million, and that's been
money, I think, that's been absolutely critical in the area of
security. It's been used to purchase and deploy explosive
detection systems, explosive trace detection devices, and
threat image projection like x-ray machines.
Certainly, in the days and in the weeks ahead, we will be
working very closely with the Congress to complete action on
our budget for the next fiscal year. Certainly, I think that,
particularly after the days of September 11, the role of
technology will be a significant factor in the development of
any new aviation security bill. And we certainly look forward
to working with you and other members of the committee as you
prepare to go to Congress. As you know, there are two
manufacturers of certified EDS products, and that's a really
important technology.
Senator Rockefeller. EDS?
Ms. Garvey. Explosive detection systems. So that's an
important technology for us. One of the manufacturers, as you
may know, had some operational difficulty. But we are very
encouraged by improvements that the vendor has made to the
software and the hardware. And this week, for example, we have
a team of IG inspectors as well as FAA inspectors who are in
Dallas/Fort Worth assessing those improvements. We really want
to see competition out there. So having EDS manufacturers who
are certified and with equipment that works well is very
important to us. We're pleased to see some improvement for that
manufacturer.
We are also aggressively pursuing other technologies that
need to be deployed. For example, we have three vendors under a
grant program at our task center developing a smaller version
of EDS, and that, I think, is very promising for some of the
smaller regional airports. And we're working with them to move
their schedules forward. They're just in the early stages, and
we'd like to see them aggressively move those schedules
forward.
Like many Members of Congress, we've received thousands of
ideas and suggestions since September 11. In response to one of
the recommendations made by the Rapid Response Team convened by
Secretary Mineta, we were tasked to work with both government
and private sector technical experts to identify beneficial
security technologies that are ready for deployment, as well as
those technologies that merit accelerated development.
On October 25, we had our first meeting, our first security
research and advisory committee. And I might add that these are
made up of experts from universities, experts from
manufacturing companies, from Boeing, from NASA; really from
both across government and in the academic world. The committee
will evaluate over a thousand recommendations that have been
made to the FAA.
I've asked for a report of initial short-term
recommendations by the end of this month so we will have a
sense of what can be deployed quickly by the end of this month.
And then we've also asked that the advisory committee provide a
report to identify promising longer-term technology, and I will
look forward to the discussions later in the afternoon from
some of the other panelists who have some information on other
technologies.
In addition, we're sponsoring our third international
aviation security technologies symposium in Atlantic City later
this month. The symposium will be important in helping to
identify those technologies that can help meet the challenges
we face.
I think it's important to know that aside from the
technologies that are certified by the FAA, there are a variety
of technologies currently available either if an individual air
carrier or an individual airport wants to use them. Some of
those technologies I know are going to be on display here, and
I am very eager to see them at the close of this session.
We know, for example, that the airport in Charlotte, North
Carolina has tested and has evaluated iris recognition as a
means to verify airport personnel. We understand that was a
very successful pilot program that they ran.
Chicago and San Francisco are similarly testing hand and
fingerprint technology for employee verification. We certainly
think that this whole area of biometrics is very promising,
exceedingly important, and we really are encouraging folks to
pursue that even more aggressively.
Some of the technologies hold great promise, but they also
pose some significant challenges for all of us. Our goal,
certainly, is 100 percent screening of all passengers, baggage,
and airport and airline personnel. Certainly it will require an
increased level of commitment by the entire industry, certainly
by Congress, by the airlines, by airports, and by the American
public.
Mr. Chairman, again I want to thank you for having us here
today, and we look forward to working with you and the
Subcommittee as we move forward on what is an absolutely
critical and important issue. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Garvey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jane F. Garvey, Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration
Chairman Rockefeller, Senator McCain, Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the availability of
security-related equipment and the status of the development of future
technologies. In the aftermath of the tragedy that occurred on
September 11, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), like the rest
of the government, is rethinking how we approach security. The
assumptions and strategies that were the basis of aviation security a
few short weeks ago are being reassessed. No matter what overall
direction and strategies we finally adopt, I want to assure you that
the employees of the FAA continue to work tirelessly to identify and
implement needed changes.
At the outset, I would like to take a moment to discuss our most
recent initiatives to ensure that all viable security technologies are
being adequately considered, and that there is a plan in place to
quickly take advantage of those promising technologies that can assist
us in our fight against terrorism. In response to one of the
recommendations made by the rapid response teams convened by Secretary
Mineta in the aftermath of September 11, the FAA was tasked with
working with both government and private sector technical experts to
identify beneficial security technologies that are ready for
deployment, as well as those technologies that merit accelerated
development. We will identify technologies that we can deploy, both
short term and long term, which can significantly augment the screening
of passengers, checked luggage, cargo, and airport and airline
employees.
On October 25, the FAA convened its security research and advisory
committee, chaired by John Klinkenberg, Vice President for Security for
Northwest Airlines, to work toward our security goals. This committee
will evaluate over 1,000 recommendations made to the FAA by various
industry sources. I have asked that the committee provide me with a
report on its initial recommendations by the end of November. I expect
the report to identify the most promising technologies for providing
early security benefits to the flying public, as well as their
suggested implementation strategies. Likewise, the report will identify
promising longer term technologies that are worthy of accelerated
development.
In addition to the efforts of the advisory committee, the FAA is
sponsoring its third International Aviation Security Technology
Symposium in Atlantic City, New Jersey from November 27 through
November 30. This symposium will feature numerous sessions on diverse
security topics including human factors, deployment of new explosives
detection equipment, emerging technologies, aircraft hardening
initiatives, cargo screening, and integrated security systems.
Attendees will have the opportunity to view, first hand, vendors'
security technologies. The symposium, which is also sponsored by the
National Safe Skies Alliance, Airports Council International, Air
Transport Association, and the American Association of Airport
Executives, was planned before the terrorist attacks, but it is now
that much more critical to identifying those technologies that can help
meet the challenges we face in our approach to aviation security.
With that said, I would like to provide a broader overview of our
efforts to enhance security through technology. The goal of aviation
security is to prevent harm to aircraft, passengers, and crew, as well
as support national security and counter-terrorism policy. How we
achieve that goal now requires that we take a comprehensive look at how
airport screening is undertaken from workforce, technology, and
procedural standpoints. The Administration is looking at all options
and has not ruled out any alternative at this time.
Four years ago, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security (the Commission) issued 57 recommendations, the majority of
which focused on improving aviation security. Most importantly, the
Commission acknowledged that aviation security was a national issue
that required a national focus and reliable funding. In the area of
security technology, it was recommended that FAA deploy existing
security technologies, establish standards for developing technologies,
and work with other government agencies and industry to develop new
technologies. Thanks to Congressional support of these recommendations,
the FAA has spent $445 million in the past 5 years to purchase
explosives detection systems (EDS), explosives trace detection (ETD)
devices and threat image projection (TIP) ready x-ray machines. In
fiscal year 2002, we planned to spend an additional $97.5 million.
One-hundred-fifty EDS machines have been installed at airports
across the country and we are working to deploy over 20 more in the
coming months. In addition, we need to work with the companies that
manufacture the systems to see how quickly they can produce more
systems for continued deployment. Products of two EDS vendors have been
certified and variations of these products are currently going through
the certification process. Prior to September 11, EDS was primarily
used to screen checked bags belonging to persons identified by the
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS). CAPPS allows
the air carrier to focus EDS screening on a manageable number of
passengers, for example, those whom we cannot discount as potential
threats to civil aviation, based on parameters developed within the
counter-terrorism community and reviewed by the Department of Justice
to ensure the methods of passenger selection are non-discriminatory.
CAPPS also selects passenger bags on a random basis for additional
screening. In the aftermath of September 11, FAA has committed to
increasing the number of passenger bags that are randomly screened.
Furthermore, EDS machines are now running continuously at those
airports to which they have been deployed, CAPPS has been adjusted and
passengers and their carry-on items are being screened on a continuous
basis at the boarding gate.
In addition to EDS, FAA is currently purchasing ETD devices from
the three vendors with FAA approved products. These devices can detect
the presence of explosive materials in a passenger's checked or carry-
on bags. Eight-hundred-nineteen ETD devices have been installed in 175
airports across the country.
Another tool available to test and measure screener proficiency is
software technology, known as the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system,
installed on conventional x-ray machines. TIP electronically inserts
images of possible threats (e.g., a gun, a knife, or an explosive
device) on a x-ray monitor. The monitors show the image as if it were
within a bag being screened. Its purpose is to provide training, keep
screeners alert, and measure screener performance. High scores
detecting TIP images equate to a high probability of detecting actual
bombs and dangerous weapons. Not only can TIP data be potentially used
to assess screener performance over time, but the results can also be
used to analyze any correlation between performance and experience. New
images will be added to the FAA-approved TIP library being installed on
the x-ray machines at the checkpoints to improve screener vigilance and
training. To date, 732 of these units have been deployed to 71 U.S.
airports for checkpoint screening.
Aside from those technologies approved by the FAA, there are a
variety of technologies in various stages of development. As is the
case with other areas in which the FAA has regulatory oversight, FAA
sets a security standard airlines and airports must meet. It is routine
in the airline industry for individual carriers or airports to exceed
FAA standards in certain areas and I think we need to look at how that
approach might be incorporated with respect to aviation security.
Although, FAA does not currently require airports or airlines to have
EDS, if they do have the equipment, they must use it. We are working
hard to ensure that carriers and airports that now want these systems
will be able to obtain them, but to date it has been more expedient to
encourage their use than to mandate their use by regulation. We also
need to determine whether other security technologies currently in
development can be effectively used by airlines and airports. For
example, there are a number of backscatter technologies, chem/bio trace
detection, and portal screening technologies that are in different
stages of development. Iris and fingerprint identification technologies
are currently being tested in the operational environment. The Rapid
Response Team recently recommended that we should move to a greater use
of positive identification technologies. We are considering this
recommendation and we are working with industry to see whether and how
all of these efforts can be incorporated into airline and airport
operations to improve aviation security, while upholding America's
steadfast commitment to the protection of civil rights.
Just to make sure that we are not missing anything that is out
there, FAA issued an announcement that appears on our web site
requesting information about any product or technology that could be
helpful in improving aviation security. As you can imagine, this
requires sorting through a great deal of information. So, while there
does not appear to be a single technology that addresses all of our
security concerns, we are committed to working through the various
options available to us.
The Secretary of Transportation and I are doing everything in our
power to bring the nation's air transportation system back into full
operation with the highest levels of safety possible. Last week,
Secretary Mineta directed FAA special agents to crack down on airport
and air carrier security deficiencies by taking decisive steps
including clearing concourses, re-screening passengers, and even
holding flights where appropriate. This action reflects both the
Department's and the FAA's unyielding commitment to civil aviation
security and the restoration of public confidence in the nation's air
transportation system. It is clear that through constant vigilance, the
application of new technologies and procedures, and with the help of
its national and international partners, that the FAA will succeed in
its civil aviation security mission.
Because civil aviation exists in a dynamic environment, the FAA
must develop a security system that optimizes the strengths of a number
of different technologies. This system must be responsive to the means
of attack and must be able to anticipate future risk to the civil
aviation environment. In a democracy, there is always a balance between
freedom and security. Our transportation systems, reflecting the value
of our society, have always operated in an open and accessible manner,
and we are working hard to ensure that they will do so again.
This concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Administrator Garvey. We're
very grateful to you for, in what must be an unbelievably
hectic schedule, taking your time to come here. It is very
important.
Mr. Charles Barclay, as I indicated, is President of the
American Association of Airport Executives. We welcome you. His
nickname is Chip. I have to call him that because I do not know
how to say Charles. But we are very glad you are here.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES M. BARCLAY, PRESIDENT,
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES
Mr. Barclay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here as well and want to begin by thanking
you and your very professional staff for all their help getting
the security bill done in the Senate. We look forward to
getting the bill done as well in the conference.
And we also appreciate the response for the small
communities, both the air service issues and, now more
recently, the reimbursement of the security costs since
September 11. It is a really major issue in the smaller
communities, and we appreciate your leadership on that.
Since September 11, we all know that we have got to do a
better job in three areas. We've got to put more security on
airplanes. But more importantly, to try to keep bad things from
happening in the air, we have to provide a better perimeter
around parked aircraft, which is a big part of my members'
jobs. And we have to apply a more professional screening
process for both passengers and baggage. And that is what I
would like to talk about in terms of technology.
But first I'd like to say that technology is very important
for getting greater security, but it's also important for
getting convenience back into the system. If we continue to
have 2-hour lines at airports on each end of a business trip,
that makes a 1-day business trip totally impractical in our
system. The economics won't work if we don't get that
convenience, together with security, back in the system. The
only way we can process 700 million passengers and 2 billion
bags is to do a better job of applying technology for our
security concerns. The screening process is not really my
members' part, but we think it's a critical element of getting
back to that convenient system and getting more security. There
are three ways you can really use technology in screening
people and baggage. One, you can look for bad people with
facial recognition; with better matching of lists that's been
talked about from various security agencies; and with a variety
of other ways. We can look for bad things with the EDS machines
Jane was talking about: X-rays and body scans. While there's
some great technology out there, it is still very hard to find
a needle in a haystack when you're dealing with 700 million
people.
Senator Rockefeller. And that's just the United States?
Mr. Barclay. Just in the U.S. The third way is to let non-
threats identify themselves. In fact, technology works well
when we interview someone once and allow that person to get a
voluntary smart credential. We were talking about the
terminology we used on the Rapid Response Team. It's not a
travel card, it's just a credential. If you ask people to give
us a lot of information once and a biometric, you can then use
that positive identification to determine who is not a risk and
screen these people quickly while you apply most of your
intensive resources on people you don't know anything about who
are coming into the system. So people would still have an
option to get the smart credential, a heavy investigation once,
then get greater convenience every time you fly.
If you're uncomfortable with giving information or you're
not in the group you want to treat as low risk, then you're
going to get a different process at the airport and get much
greater intensity in screening you and your bags. And that is
also a way to really have a threat assessment to know where we
should apply our resources first while we're ramping up this
new security system.
The other part that's more directly affecting my members is
employee background verification and using that information to
make sure that the right people are on the ramps and around the
perimeters of airplanes while they're parked. We strongly
support Administrator Garvey's call to get all employees who
have access to secure areas full criminal history checks. It's
done here in West Virginia, as a matter of fact. We need to get
those criminal history record checks and get them done quickly.
She said that that needs to be done within 9 months. We are
strong supporters of that.
We're also doing the best we can to help the FAA. We think
it's very important to have a copy of that raw data that also
comes in here to the FBI so the airports can use that database
for all the people that are cleared. You want to use that over
and over again. Rather than just having a card swipe and a PIN
to access the name, you have a card swipe and a biometric,
either a fingerprint or iris recognition. A number of the other
biometric technologies can be very good for making sure we've
got the people that we know and we've checked out having access
to parked airplanes.
So one of the points that I'd like to leave you with is
that we do need to put greater security and convenience back
into the system. I would also like to make the point that there
are really two threats to our system right now, and either one
could shut it down. One of those threats is that we don't do
enough in adding security to get public confidence back so that
we get all the people back flying who should be. The danger is
that you won't have enough people on the airplane.
The other danger that we have in front of us is moving too
quickly in so many areas and trying to apply so much technology
at once that we bottleneck the system and don't put enough
people on airplanes. That can also bring the system down and
feed into the goal that the terrorists had on September 11.
So we think we need to add technology. We need to do it
smart. We need to approach the highest threats first as we get
these new systems in place, and at the same time, keep air
transportation running in the United States.
Thank you very much for having me here. It's been a real
pleasure.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barclay follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles M. Barclay, President,
American Association of Airport Executives
Chairman Rockefeller and Members of the Senate Commerce
Subcommittee on Aviation, thank you for inviting me to participate in
the hearing today on aviation security. I am testifying today on behalf
of the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE). AAAE
represents the men and women who manage the primary, commercial
service, reliever and general aviation airports. I appreciate this
opportunity to discuss ways that we can use new technology to improve
aviation security.
The tragedy of September 11 has changed air transportation forever.
We never designed our aviation security system to withstand a threat
from teams of special operations-type forces, comprised of suicide
pilots, trained for years, with the goal of using the plane as a bomb.
It is still hard to believe such people exist, but now that we know
they do, airport and aircraft security must be hardened to defend
against this and other potential threats that, in the past, we would
have labeled as unreasonable. A military-type threat requires a near-
military defense. This job would be easier if we could focus on
security alone, but we cannot. Changes must both increase security and
permit aviation to operate efficiently as public transportation.
Airports, airlines and general aviation must begin to plug the
security holes, one by one, despite the complexity, cost and daunting
magnitude of the job. While the costs and complexities are huge, they
pale in comparison to the greatest threat to our system's future. The
800-pound gorilla of problems is today's lack of public confidence in
air transportation safety, and the concomitant revenue impact that
attitude has on all aviation businesses. Surveys released at the end of
October showed only one-third of the public have a high level of
confidence in aviation security. Our industry cannot survive and
perform its essential economic role unless we turn that perception
around--and soon.
Air transportation is the safest form of transport in history. More
people have traveled farther and more safely by air than any other
system invented. Yet, we still cannot expect the system to regain the
broad public confidence lost on September 11 until we make significant,
systemic improvements in security. I do not believe the public demands
an unachievable ``perfection'' in air travel, but they are demanding
more security onboard the aircraft, more professional screening of
passengers and baggage and better perimeter control around parked
aircraft.
The Administration, airlines, airports, and Congress are already
taking the necessary first steps to improve aviation security.
Immediately after the terrorist attacks occurred on September 11, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) closed our nation's commercial
airspace system and issued two emergency amendments that included
several security initiatives. As all of you know, airports and airlines
were required to implement these new security measures before the FAA
allowed them to resume their operations. Airports, for instance, were
immediately required to deploy more law enforcement officials and K-9
units, increase security inspections throughout their facilities,
strengthen access control measures and remove all vehicles parked near
their terminal buildings.
With the possibility of additional terrorist attacks in the United
States, the Administration has taken additional actions to improve
aviation security. The President announced his decision to deploy
National Guard personnel to about 420 airports nationwide, and the FAA
issued additional emergency amendments requiring airports to implement
even more security measures. Last week, Secretary of Transportation
Norm Mineta said the FAA also plans to crack down on security screening
failures at airports around the country and consider re-screening
passengers, emptying concourses and holding flights if necessary.
Congress is also taking legislative steps to improve aviation
security and restore public confidence in our aviation system. The
Senate Commerce Committee, under the guidance of Chairman Hollings,
Ranking Member McCain, Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Rockefeller and
Ranking Member Hutchison, drafted a bipartisan bill that the Senate
unanimously approved just 1 month after the terrorist attacks. The fact
that Committee members and staff were able to draft an aviation
security bill and usher it through the Senate in only a few weeks is a
testament to your hard work and dedication. All of you deserve to be
commended for the leadership you have provided in the past several
weeks.
Much of the debate that has occurred in Congress on aviation
security has focused on those responsible for screening passengers and
their carry-on baggage, cockpit security and Federal air marshals. In
light of the hijackings that occurred in September, it is now more
important than ever that we improve the training, testing, and the
proficiency of those individuals conducting the screening of passengers
and baggage. Hiring competent screeners, strengthening cockpit security
and deploying more Federal air marshals will certainly help improve
aviation security. These actions may solve part of the problem, but we
must use new technology to ensure that the hijackings and terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11 will not happen ever again.
Just a few days after the terrorist attacks, Secretary Mineta
formed two teams to examine ways to improve airport and aircraft
security. I served on the Rapid Response Team on Airport Security,
which issued its report on October 1. We concluded that new
technologies must be deployed more widely to augment aviation security
and that there is an urgent need to issue ``smart credentials'' to
facilitate expediting the processing of passengers. I think there are
many new technology options that Congress and the Administration should
explore in an effort to enhance security at our nation's airports. The
Senate Commerce Committee included several new technology provisions in
the Senate-passed aviation security bill, and I would like to take a
moment to outline a few other proposals for your consideration.
Technology can be effectively used in three ways: (1) to find
dangerous ``things;'' (2) to find dangerous people; or (3) to verify
the identity of people who do not present a risk. The first two are
relatively difficult even with good technology due to the large number
of people and bags being processed in air transportation--they amount
to finding the proverbial needle in a haystack. The third, however, is
relatively easy with today's technology as long as we come to agreement
on the criteria of a low-risk profile, and it makes the haystack
smaller for application one and two.
use smart credentials to identify passengers
At the top of my technology list is a ``smart credential'' as
called for in the Rapid Response Team report. We cannot run an
efficient public transportation system if we try to treat all 700
million passengers a year like potential terrorists. We need a
voluntary system that allows frequent travelers to provide enough
information on themselves, so government and industry can agree they
belong in a ``low-risk'' pool.
In return, a so-called ``smart card'' with biometrics can confirm
identity and provide access to an expedited screening process. The
system can then concentrate its resources for rigorous screening on
passengers who do not qualify to be listed as ``low-risk,'' or
passengers we do not know anything about (including those individuals
simply uncomfortable with providing information on themselves).
Such a voluntary database of passengers can reside either in or out
of government control, but the Federal Government must be involved in
validating the criteria for information used in this process. I think
smart credentials are key to identifying those who may be potential
threats to aviation security, and I am pleased that the aviation
security bill passed by the Senate calls for the Department of
Transportation (DOT) to study options for improving positive
identification of passengers including the use of biometrics and smart
cards.
deploy explosive detection systems at more airports
There are many innovative technologies that make it easier for
screeners to identify explosives and other dangerous weapons. While
these systems are commonly viewed as only as effective as the trained
personnel who operate them, they are an increasingly essential facet of
the aviation security equation. The integration of a new generation of
Explosive Detection Systems (EDS), as called for by the 1996
Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, has been an
important addition to our efforts to improve the security of our
aviation system.
As with any new technology, planning and training are critical to
realizing the potential of explosive and other weapons detection
systems. Today, forty-six airports around the country are using new
generation explosive detection systems. These and other new
technologies must be integrated into the nation's airports at a much
quicker pace and with increased attention to the resources, training
and infrastructure requirements necessary for their effective use.
use new technology to tighten access to secure areas in and
around airport terminals
In addition to improving the screening process for passengers and
baggage, we need to do a better job of controlling access to secure
areas in and around airport terminals. Last year, the DOT Inspector
General highlighted the shortcomings in access control technology and
procedures at some airports around the country. Airport operators take
this issue seriously, and we need to continue to improve procedures and
deploy new technology to tighten the perimeter of secure areas. It is
critical that we use new technology such biometrics and smart cards to
control these access points. However, we should be aimed at developing
a universal database to all airport and airline employees with secure
area access, rather than airport-by-airport individual databases.
use biometric fingerprint technology to expedite criminal history
record checks
Just as we need to have well-trained screeners, we must also focus
on eliminating undesirable behavior that can nullify even the best
technology used to control secure areas. Toward that goal, it is
essential that we concentrate our efforts on ensuring that only those
persons who have undergone thorough criminal history record checks are
granted access to secure areas.
Last year, Senator Hutchison introduced S. 2440, the Airport
Security Improvement Act of 2000. Like many on this Committee, we
strongly supported that legislation because it called on the FAA to
work with air carriers and airport operators to strengthen procedures
to prevent unauthorized access to secure areas of airports and
commercial aircraft. The bill, which was enacted into law last year,
requires criminal history record checks for new security screeners and
others who have access to secure areas in the top 20 most at risk
airports. The legislation requires criminal history record checks for
new employees at other airports to be phased-in over 3 years. It also
requires the FAA to expand and accelerate the Electronic Fingerprint
Transmission Pilot program.
Administrator Garvey recently announced that the FAA will order
criminal history record checks on all workers who have access to secure
areas of airports and commercial aircraft now rather than phasing those
checks in over the next few years. The Senate Commerce Committee also
included a provision in the Senate-passed aviation security bill that
would require criminal history record checks within 9 months. Since
airports, airlines and vendors employ approximately 600,000 to 750,000
people, airports will need electronic fingerprint assessment technology
to expedite these criminal history record checks. Only a small number
of airports currently have biometric fingerprint systems to speed
criminal history checks. Once airports submit these fingerprints
electronically to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), it is
imperative that the agency have the necessary resources to conduct
their background checks in timely manner.
After the FBI conducts a criminal history record check on a
potential new employee, airports are limited in their ability to
disqualify that person by a very specific list of criminal convictions.
That list, which airports use to determine who is allowed access to
secure areas at airports, should be broadened to include other criminal
convictions and other acts that may pose a threat to aviation security.
Since various Federal agencies such as the U.S. Customs Service keep
records of persons with a propensity to commit criminal acts and or
terrorism, airports should be able to submit the name of potential new
employees to a single entity to determine whether that person is on one
of those Federal watch lists. Further, airports should have the option
to go beyond the Federal requirements and perform background or
criminal history checks on any airport employee.
exploit other breakthrough technologies
As I mentioned previously, the Rapid Response Team on Airport
Security concluded that new technologies must be deployed more widely
to augment aviation security. Specifically, we recommended that the FAA
establish an Aviation Security Technology Consortium to identify and
test new security-related technologies at our Nation's airports. We
also recommended that the Department of Defense expedited the review of
classified technologies with potential application to aviation security
with a view to identifying and, consistent with national security
requirements, declassifying applications likely to be of value.
disseminate intelligence to a designated airport security coordinator
New technology requires good intelligence. The FBI, Central
Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies each play their own
part in monitoring, identifying and assessing threats to national
security. Some of the information processed by the intelligence
community identifies potential threats to the safety of civil aviation,
and intelligence officials share some of this information with offices
in the DOT and FAA. However, very little of this critical data is
shared with the front line airport and airline personnel responsible
for implementing security procedures.
Aviation security needs to be among the top priorities of the
intelligence agencies responsible for identifying terrorist threats.
Coordination of intelligence dissemination with the Secretary's Office
of Intelligence and Security, appropriate FAA staff and finally airport
security coordinators will dramatically increase the likelihood that
real threats to the system are met with real local response and
preparedness.
As a direct result of the recommendations from the 1996
Presidential Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, aviation
security consortia were formed and vested with the authority to work
cooperatively with Federal regulators to meet the goals of increased
aviation security. This increase in the level of effective
communication and cooperation has steadily improved the baseline of
aviation security. With the events that occurred last week, this type
of government and industry cooperation is particularly important.
Airport security professionals play a key role in developing,
implementing and maintaining effective security measures, and their
input should be used as we develop new ways to increase aviation
security.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one final point. As we discuss
ways to use new technology to improve aviation security in the future,
I hope we will not lose sight of the fact that airports are taking a
number of steps to improve aviation security right now. Those Federal
mandates, which I described earlier in my testimony, have resulted in
significant cost increases for the nation's airports. These new
security requirements are important to our efforts to enhance aviation
security and absolutely necessary given the horrific events that
occurred in September.
Although the Senate-passed aviation security bill authorizes funds
to reimburse airports for their new security costs, it unfortunately
does not include the necessary appropriations. I hope Members of the
Senate Commerce Committee will work to ensure that airports in their
respective states and throughout the country receive the reimbursement
they need to comply with the new security initiatives imposed by the
FAA. As you move forward later this week and next to the conference on
the aviation security bills passed by the House and Senate, we look
forward to working with you and your talented staff to craft a final
product that enhances the security at airports and airlines across the
country and instills the confidence in the American traveling public to
fly in the safest, most secure system in the world.
Chairman Rockefeller and members of the Senate Commerce Committee
Subcommittee on Aviation, thank you again for inviting me to
participate in the hearing today on aviation security. All of us at
AAAE look forward to working with you and others in the aviation
industry during the days and weeks ahead on ways we can use new
technology to enhance aviation security.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Chip.
Our third witness is Mr. Richard Doubrava, who is the
Managing Director of Security for the Air Transport
Association. You're an expert, and I look forward to hearing
from you.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD J. DOUBRAVA, MANAGING
DIRECTOR, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
Mr. Doubrava. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller. On behalf of
the Air Transport Association and our member carriers, I'd like
to thank you for the opportunity to participate in this
important meeting hosted by the West Virginia University.
Senator Rockefeller. Can you turn that mike up a little
closer to you?
Mr. Doubrava. Representing an industry that is absolutely
reliant on the development and application of new technologies,
we take special interest in the subject matter under discussion
today.
Since the tragic events of September 11, the industry, in
concert with the Federal Government, has undertaken a number of
steps to enhance aviation security.
Recent Congressional passage of antiterrorism legislation
in association with the pending House-Senate conference to
reconcile differing approaches to Federalize the aviation
security screening programs, are moving us closer to a more
national approach to homeland security.
Let me also commend you, Senator, for your leadership in
these vital areas by your service on the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation in the U.S. Senate as
well.
As we move forward as a Nation to determine the outlines of
our homeland security, technology will play an important part
in the efforts to enhance the Nation's security baseline.
Our challenge is to deploy technology in a sound and
rationalized way while also recognizing that no single
technology nor security procedure can provide a foolproof
security system. The public expects an aviation security system
that effectively deploys a variety of technology applications
and operating procedures capable of addressing all
vulnerabilities. This system must also be adaptable in order to
adjust to varying and changing threats.
For purposes of our discussion today, I shall focus on some
of the immediate goals of the industry which will depend
greatly on the application of appropriate technologies.
Computer assisted screening which permits the application
of technology and associated procedures on identified
individuals is the central component of any effective aviation
security system and our efforts to protect the traveling public
from terrorism. Such a system must be rigorous and have the
full array of intelligence resources available to filter
individuals under the protection and oversight of our national
government.
It is not enough to focus on searching for threat items; we
must refocus our attention on those individuals that threaten
our national and aviation security. Here the government must
utilize the latest in technology applications to collect,
harmonize, and process all necessary data to scan and identify
passengers for whom additional security scrutiny is necessary.
Another area where appropriate technology can benefit the
aviation security process is the creation of a voluntary
program to permit the use of a universal travel card using a
``smart card'' approach by travelers after having appropriate
background checks completed and verified. The program would
greatly enhance the current airport security process by
permitting designated ``pre-cleared'' individuals to utilize
enhanced security processes based on their completed security
background checks. Fingerprint technology and other forms of
biometric devices could be used to support such a program.
Another area of concern is the ability to prevent
unauthorized access to secure airport and air carrier areas by
limiting access to only those individuals permitted to be in
such areas. We believe that current technology can be utilized
to confirm and verify the identity of such personnel throughout
the operational and secure areas of the airport environment.
We believe that the Federal Government should determine the
necessary parameters of such a program to deploy it on a
national basis. We do not want to repeat the hodgepodge
approach taken in the late 1980s and early 1990s to the Airport
Security Access Program. The important intent of this program
was undermined by a location-by-location approach that did not
meet the needs of the air carriers for standardization and
dramatically increased industry costs. Further, this would give
additional confidence to the public in an area of repeated
expressed concern.
Such programs could be readily expanded to include flight
crews, law enforcement officers, and other specific entities
needing to move through the national aviation system. Funding
for such a program must be allocated on a Federal basis as part
of our Nation's homeland security efforts.
Failure to do so will leave the industry and the airport
community dependent on limited resources and multiple
approaches which undermine the intent and integrity of such a
system.
For purposes of brevity, I will not address the challenges
of passenger, baggage, and cargo screening. The industry is
committed to working with Congress and the Administration in
these complex areas. These issues will continue to be a major
focus as we move forward together to find solutions to these
complicated technology issues.
I do want you and the Subcommittee to know that the air
carriers are working closely with Secretary Mineta and
Administrator Garvey in aggressively pursuing solutions to some
of these challenges. We are actively participating in
finalizing recommendations of the special Rapid Response Teams
created after the tragic events of 9/11, and are certain that
many of them will be implemented in the timeframe set out by
the President and Secretary Mineta.
We also commend FAA Administrator Garvey for her active
efforts and constructive approach with the airline industry in
the days since September 11. Under her direction, a special
task team has been created to identify and review every
available aviation security technology to determine what areas
within the aviation environment could benefit from such
applications. I am honored to participate in this effort, and
look forward to casting a wide net for new ideas and approaches
to aviation security.
Senator Rockefeller, in closing, let me summarize a few of
our thoughts. Our Nation is involved in a complex and
challenging war against those who seek to terrorize and murder
innocent Americans for their own distorted personal goals.
Civil aviation is a primary target for such actions since
it reflects the ability of people and ideas to move freely
throughout the world. Such freedom of movement and thought is a
threat to these dark forces of hate and terror. It is incumbent
upon our national government to move quickly and judiciously to
strengthen aviation security and make it a national priority--
not just today, but in the weeks, months, and years ahead.
We stand ready to work with you and your colleagues in the
Congress and the Administration to accomplish this task.
Through our combined efforts and commitments, we are more
likely to prevent future acts of aviation terrorism and
reassure the American people that our system is as safe and
secure as we can make it.
I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might
have at this time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Doubrava follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard J. Doubrava, Managing Director,
Air Transport Association
Senator Rockefeller, on behalf of the Air Transport Association and
its member airlines,\1\ I would like to thank you for the opportunity
to participate in this important hearing here in Morgantown, West
Virginia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Airborne Express, Alaska Airlines, Aloha Airlines, America West
Airlines, American Airlines, American Trans Air, Atlas Air, Continental
Airlines, Delta Air Lines, DHL Airways, Emery Worldwide, Evergreen
International Airlines, FedEx Corporation, Hawaiian Airlines, JetBlue
Airlines, Midwest Express Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Polar Air
Cargo, Southwest Airlines United Airlines, United Parcel Service
Airlines, US Airways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representing an industry that is absolutely reliant on the
development and application of new technologies, we take special
interest in the subject under discussion today.
Since the tragic events of September 11, the industry, in concert
with the Federal Government, has undertaken a number of steps to
enhance aviation security. These include:
Installation of new security devices to strengthen cockpit
doors on nearly 100 percent of aircraft fleet.
Implementation of a domestic Federal Air Marshal (FAM)
program.
Expansion of CAPPs screening program to 100 percent of all
passengers and coordination with Federal agency watchlists.
Deployment of the National Guard troops to the nation's
airports.
Revalidation of air carrier employee identification media
and match against FBI watchlist.
Additional and Ongoing Security Enhancements to the FAA
air carrier and airport programs.
Further, recent Congressional passage of anti-terrorism legislation
in association with the pending House-Senate conference to reconcile
differing approaches to Federalize the aviation security screening
program are moving us closer to a more national approach to
``homeland'' security. Let me also commend you Senator Rockefeller for
your leadership in these vital areas by your service on the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and in the U.S.
Senate as well.
Our members believe that a unified Federal security program
utilizing the government's resources and expertise including a strong
intelligence capability is critical to enhancing aviation security. In
addition, a standardized approach to air carrier and airport security
programs will further strengthen these efforts as well. At the heart of
these efforts is the subject of your hearing today--``Dynamic New
Technologies.''
As we move forward as a Nation to determine the outlines of our
``Homeland Security'', technology will play an important part in
efforts to enhance the nation's security baseline. Our challenge is to
deploy technology in a sound and rationalized way while also
recognizing that no single technology nor security procedure can
provide a foolproof security system. The public expects an aviation
security system that effectively deploys a variety of technology
applications and operating procedures capable of addressing all
vulnerabilities. This system must also be adaptable in order to adjust
to varying and changing threats.
For purposes of our discussion today, I shall focus on some of the
immediate goals of industry which will depend greatly on the
application of appropriate technologies.
Computer assisted screening which permits the application of
technology and associated procedures on identified individuals is the
central component of any effective aviation security system and our
efforts to protect the traveling public from terrorism. Such a system
must be rigorous and have the full array of intelligence resources
available to filter individuals under the protection and oversight of
our national government.
Only a unified Federal approach reaching across the jurisdictional
lines of the FBI, CIA, INS, U.S. Customs and other agencies will
succeed. Congress and the Administration will need to address the
outstanding appropriate legal issues to insure that such a program is
applied in a fair, but rigorous manner. It is not enough to focus on
searching for threat items; we must refocus our attention on those
individuals that threaten our national and aviation security.
Here the government must utilize the latest in technology
applications to collect, harmonize and process all necessary data to
scan and identify passengers for whom additional security scrutiny is
necessary.
Another area where appropriate technologies can benefit the
aviation security process is creation of a voluntary program to permit
the use of a universal travel card using a ``smart card'' approach by
travelers after having appropriate background checks completed and
verified. This process would greatly enhance the current airport
security process by permitting designated ``pre-cleared'' individuals
to utilize enhanced security processes based on their completed
security background checks. Fingerprint technology and other forms of
biometric devices could be utilized to support such a program.
This could be accomplished by the use of a variety of technologies
readily available which are secure and tamper-proof. Clearly, the
current security clearance process in place at our nation's airports
since the tragic events of 9/11 could be greatly enhanced by
eliminating the need to treat every passenger as a high risk
individual. Our security program should focus efforts on those that
could pose a threat to aviation security readily identify and expedite
those known not to be such.
Another area of concern is the ability to prevent unauthorized
access to secure airport and air carrier areas by limiting access to
only those individuals permitted to be in such areas. We believe that
current technology can be utilized to confirm and verify the identify
of such personnel throughout the operational and secure areas of the
airport environment.
We believe that the Federal Government should determine the
necessary perimeters of such a program and deploy it on a national
basis. We do not want to repeat the hodgepodge approach taken in the
late 1980s and early 1990s to the Airport Security Access Program. The
important intent of this program was undermined by a location-by-
location approach that did not meet the needs of the air carriers for
standardization and dramatically increased industry costs. Further,
this would give additional confidence to the public in an area of
repeated expressed concern.
Such programs could be readily expanded to include flight crews,
law enforcement officers and other specific entities needing to move
through the national aviation system. Funding for such a program must
be allocated on a Federal basis as part of our nation's ``homeland
security'' efforts. Failure to do so will leave the industry and
airport community dependent on limited resources and multiple
approaches which undermine the intent and integrity of such a system.
For purposes of brevity, I will not address the challenges of
passenger, baggage and cargo screening. The industry is committed to
working with the Congress, and the Administration in these complex
areas. These issues will continue to be a major focus as we move
forward together to find solutions to these complicated technology
issues.
I do want you and the Committee to know that the air carriers are
working closely with Secretary Mineta and Administrator Garvey in
aggressively pursuing solutions to some of these challenges. We are
actively participating in finalizing recommendations of the special
Rapid Response Teams created after the tragic events of 9/11 and are
certain that many of them will be implemented in the timeframe set out
by the President and Secretary Mineta.
We also commend FAA Administrator Garvey for her active efforts and
constructive approach with the airline industry in the days since
September 11. Under her direction, a special task team has been created
to identify and review every available aviation security technology to
determine what areas within the aviation environment could benefits
from such applications. I am honored to participate in this effort and
look forward to casting a wide net for new ideas and approaches to
aviation security.
Senator Rockefeller, in closing let me just summarize a couple of
thoughts. Our Nation is involved in a complex and challenging war
against those that seek to terrorize and murder innocent Americans for
their own distorted personal goals. Civil aviation is a primary target
for such actions since it reflects the ability of people and ideas to
move freely throughout the world. Such freedom of movement and thought
is a threat to these dark forces of hate and terror. It is incumbent
upon our national government to move quickly and judiciously to
strengthen aviation security and make it a national priority--not just
today, but in the weeks, months and years ahead.
We stand ready to work with you and your colleagues in the Congress
and the Administration to accomplish this task. Through our combined
efforts and commitment we are more likely to prevent fixture acts of
aviation terrorism and reassure the American people that our system is
as safe and secure as we can make it.
I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might have at
this time.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you very much, Dick.
Administrator Garvey, let me just--or to all of you, pose a
philosophical question. When people listen to your testimony
and they hear a lot of technology, goes along with thinking
about the future, people say, now, wait a second. You know,
this is the way my life has been. And somebody starts messing
around with that, that gets into my privacy and that begins to
upset my life, and I don't like that. And then without
necessarily thinking about the whole broad picture, some people
would say, well, I don't want to make those changes. And what
I'd like to do is just--when I took off from Washington last
night and flew to Pittsburgh, I was selected out at random.
Ms. Garvey. Our system is working.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rockefeller. It was about time it happened. And I
was really gone through, which I was very happy about. I
thanked people--not under bated breath, but I thanked them all
the way through that they were doing it.
Now, what got me through in all cases was this. It is my
Senate identification card. United States Senator J.
Rockefeller. And oh, by the way, this was given to me 17 years
ago when I was in the Senate. Now, my question is--this could
be forged. It isn't, but it could be. And, you know, life has
changed. So why is it that the American public can hear about
words like smart card or biometrics or all kinds of things
which imply a different way of doing things--you know, a 2-hour
waiting line--although those can be cut down in length if we do
the right things--inconvenience, change of lifestyle, ways of
doing things, putting off business travel.
Why is it that, in your view, people should be able to
think at least as much about their own personal security and
the security of their friends and children and country people
as well as the inconvenience and the so-called invasion of
privacy? I mean, we're facing that on the Internet. We are
facing that everywhere. But as soon as you say ``invasion of
privacy,'' people start backing off from what could be very
intelligent solutions to make their lives much safer. How do we
deal with that problem?
Ms. Garvey. Well, this is--and Chip and I were talking
about this coming down. I think one way to deal with it is,
first of all, on a voluntary basis. Here, for example, we were
thinking about airport security, and Chip spoke about the real
challenges about having a safe system, but not having it so
inconvenient that people won't travel. So if it were
voluntarily, first and foremost, to get a card that is a smart
card--as Chip said, give more information--and if you do that
and if you're part of that system, then you can be processed
through in a more efficient way. I think that might be one way
to begin so that people become more comfortable with it.
And I certainly acknowledge the challenges that are there.
You don't want to take it so far that you really do invade
people's privacy. But I've also been struck in talking with
people at airports--and I've done a lot of that lately--that
people are willing to sacrifice some of those issues that in
the past maybe were considered very sacred. And they'll say,
``You know what? I'm really concerned about my security now,
and I would be willing to perhaps answer questions that I might
not have been asked--might not have wanted to answer in the
past.''
So I think voluntarily is the first way to begin to give
people a level of comfort and also to see that it really can
work. And then I think a constant re-examining of the privacy
issues, because I think they can be solved. They're not easy,
but I think they can be solved.
Mr. Barclay. I think there is public confusion because
we've talked about both mandatory and voluntary systems, and an
awful lot of people start talking about mandatory systems,
which we do need for employees and you might consider for
foreign nationals or people on visas or people you think are a
higher threat of some kind.
But the bulk of those 700 million people can be handled
well. Look at all of us who belong to frequent flyer programs,
where we voluntarily give away lots of information on ourselves
in return for benefits, including convenience.
We need to separate the notion of mandatory systems, which
employees are going to have to put up with, from the voluntary
pool database that doesn't even have to reside in government.
It could reside in industry, because it's voluntary.
Government's got to be part of it because they've got to agree
we're collecting the right factors and criteria that allow you
to identify someone as a low risk or a non-threat to the
system.
But we should give people a choice, like they have at the
grocery store. Fewer than seven security threats come through
this line here. If we don't know anything about you and you
have a basketfull of security threats, you're going to go
through the slower line and you're going to get much more
rigorous screening. And that's particularly important in the
early days when we have limited resources and we have to keep
things moving. You've got to figure out how to get at those
highest threat folks first.
The CAPPS system is currently making that attempt. I think
the Chicago incident of this weekend is a good story about
CAPPS, because it caught that person, and it got them more
vigorous screening. And that's where the items he had on him
were discovered.
So we've got to figure out ways to apply technology to
reduce the threat. If you want to find a needle in a haystack,
start with a small haystack. And we can reduce the size of the
haystack we're searching with other technologies like facial
recognition and matching up names and things. We can also make
that haystack smaller by letting all of us who are willing to
volunteer to do so. And then our only technology challenge is
verifying you've got Barclay every time it says that's Barclay
coming through. Technology is great for doing that.
Mr. Doubrava. Senator, I agree. I think the challenge for
us is, first of all, to make the process as streamlined as
possible for those individuals that decide they want to be in
the voluntary program. One of the events I already went through
was the issue of the Immigration and Nationalization Service
trying its pass. But the processes hadn't been thought through
and made easily accessible to those individuals that wanted to
use it. So it broke down just on the concept of use and the
ability to easily access the program to begin with, prior to
the application process.
But if we state to frequent flyers out there, if you take
the members of frequent flyer groups, if you take the traveling
business people, if you expand that to multi-trip individuals,
the process will begin to support itself. But we've to make
sure that we get it right from the beginning. Because if you
lose that kind of confidence in the process you may not and see
enhancements as a result of being able to utilize that, and
you're not going to get anywhere.
It's absolutely paramount that what we do is focus our
attention on individuals and individuals' belongings and items.
Because the universe of what we're trying to do now, even under
the most trying circumstances, is prone to failure, because we
do not have personnel adequate for every program in every area.
You really have to focus that. And so by this voluntary
program, begin with those individuals who have a primary
interest in the program, then expand it beyond that so that it
works in the event that the primary people go.
Senator Rockefeller. Well, let me follow up on that for a
second with a question which I was bound to ask at some point
anyway. One of the things that, it has never once in my life
occurred to me that a West Virginian is any less important than
somebody from New York or California. But it has often occurred
to me that when it comes to programs of various sorts, that
West Virginians sometimes get included and sometimes do not.
So again, we use the word ``voluntary.'' And I can foresee
a situation wherein, let's say, O'Hare and San Francisco and
Denver and Louisiana, et cetera, and Miami, all of these--all
of these, they have the money--which I want to talk about with
you, Administrator Garvey--but they have the money to do those
things or the money is made available to them because they are
high-profile, high-volume airports with a lot of people going
through them.
In States like West Virginia--and there are many like us--
where you may have relatively few airplanes landing and
therefore, much less, you know, bodies, obviously, that then to
me says that voluntary is sort of like in a sense confining the
good technology stuff that really cuts down on security risks
to the larger airports. And says, all right, you in West
Virginia, you are going to have to wait until there is proof
out the American people accept it or we have the money to pay
for it. Because some of these systems not only are tremendously
expensive, not only to buy, but also to install. And then the
people have to be ramped up to handle all of this.
So you know, as I'm interested in healthcare, I always
point out that 81 percent of the counties in America have no
health plans. And, you know, there is an awful lot of rural
America. Those folks who did the September 11 thing entered
through Maine. And so this word ``voluntary,'' and yet how does
it not conflict, if you see it that way, with the rights--the
citizenship rights of small States and small airports?
Ms. Garvey. Chip may have a different answer, but I was
thinking more of voluntary on an individual basis. In other
words, if I elect to be part of a program, then I can be part
of it. If I'm feeling that my civil liberties are threatened or
whatever, then I don't have to be. I wasn't thinking that it
would be voluntary necessarily on the part of the airports. I'm
just assuming that all the airports and airlines are going to
want to do this. And I may be wrong on that.
Senator Rockefeller. Well, I was thinking about the second
as opposed to----
Ms. Garvey. OK. And I was thinking of the individual
saying, well, I am a frequent flyer and I do not mind at all. I
will give you whatever information you want. I am sort of the
same way that you are, that if I am selected and my bag is
opened, I am pleased with that, because I do not feel
threatened by that. I am delighted because I think somebody is
really taking this seriously.
Senator Rockefeller. A lot of people in rural areas do not
fly as much.
Ms. Garvey. Yes.
Senator Rockefeller. You know, they do not go city to city
or go across the world as much. They are not as comfortable
with the concept of making themselves a voluntary commitment.
But even that is not what I was talking about. It was a
question of how you get that machinery, the detection
mechanisms--as far as what you are talking about--into smaller
airports, so that we are not treated in a second class sense,
which to this Senator is pretty important.
Mr. Barclay. Let me add that the beauty of biometrics for
the individual is how inexpensive they are, both for the
readers and the cards. As long as we do it as an open
technology and think about it in advance, the issue of
passenger screening is very, very inexpensive to get done. And
a lot of us who travel a lot, will wind up paying a fee to get
the card at one time.
But you will always have an option in the system. The
aviation system is almost exactly as you were pointing out in
healthcare: 90 percent of the traffic is in the top 75
airports. But we have 500--or 450 more airports that have the
security procedures in place. So there are a lot of places with
very small volume. There, the advantage of streaming quickly
through a very small airport is probably not as great as it is
at some of these other places like Baltimore, which has 2-hour
lines almost every morning these days. So the incentives may
not be quite as high. It depends on how often you travel.
But we are going to give everyone in the system a different
path to go if they have not bothered to get one of these
biometric cards for themselves. I really think the economics of
that work wonderfully for the system. And in fact, the price is
coming down all the time. The more people we get in the system,
the cheaper and cheaper it will get. So that part of the system
is going to be set up well.
I think part of your question may go to the issue of
baggage screening, where a lot of people are in favor of having
100 percent screening of all bags in the system with EDS
machines. Each one is $1.2 million. There you do wind up having
many multiple numbers of those machines at a number of airports
when you have it set up. That is going to be a huge burden at
smaller airports, and that's one we have to address as a
national issue, not a local issue. So I do think there is a mix
of the economics here that would work.
Senator Rockefeller. Which brings us to funding. Jane, you
were about to say something. You go ahead and say it.
Ms. Garvey. Well, go ahead.
Senator Rockefeller. One of the things that scares me a lot
is that we are, as a society, going to decide, with what has
happened after September 11 with the prospect of more of this
happening, we are already now almost certainly in a budget
deficit situation for next year, kind of taking us back to the
1980s.
And then if other things happen, let us say it is the power
grid or let us say it is the port authority, or it is the
bridges or whatever it might be, it is a tremendous demand on
resources. You know, the Nation--everything that I was working
on--not--and I do not mean this literally, but the focus of
what I was literally working on every day in committees up
until September 11 is now off to the side. And that does not
mean that I am not fighting for healthcare and all kinds of
other things. But they are not being paid a great deal of
attention to right now, because everything is national
security.
When it comes to national security, whether it is CIA or
the FBI, the shortage, the enormous numbers of people needed to
protect ports, railroads, airports, whatever, that money
becomes a problem. Money is a problem. We are already in a
recession. Now we may be in quite a deep recession. It may last
for a while.
You are, Administrator Garvey, in an uncomfortable
position--and I know this because everybody who works in any
administration, Republican or Democratic, is that you have to
toe the line, so to speak, for the Office of Management and
Budget. They basically tell you what you can spend. You know a
whole lot better what you need and what the American people
need for security, than they do. But they have to make the
numbers balance according to their objectives.
And so I want to do the best I can to coax out of you a
sense of what you think this business of making America's
airports and airplanes safe is probably going to cost, and then
some sense of what you feel may be allocated for that. And I do
not want to get you in trouble.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Garvey. Well, it wouldn't be the first time. Actually,
I think you can divide into two buckets to start with. If you
think about the explosive detection equipment, as Chip said, it
is about $1 million per machine. We had always been getting
about $100 million a year over the last several years, and that
is the pace we have been staying at.
The manufacturers are now saying that they believe they can
ramp up to almost 80 a month, so that is a significantly higher
number. So that number for us would be much higher, and it
would certainly be much higher than the $100 million that we
have gotten in the past. So if we stay at the pace that--I am
just, again, going by what the manufacturers say, if you say
80--I hope your math is better than mine, you can check it--if
it is $1 million a machine, 80 a month, figure out the math.
Mr. Doubrava. It is over $100 million.
Ms. Garvey. Definitely, yes. So it is quite a bit higher
than we have had in the past.
The other piece is the whole area of research and
technology. And I mentioned the work that this Subcommittee was
doing for us in evaluating all of those wonderful technologies
that may be out there. And they are looking at the airport, the
perimeter of the airport, they are looking at that. They are
looking at the smart card idea. They are looking at things
having to do with background checks, biometrics.
The number that we have talked about internally just to get
that even started is close to--million. I mean, these are very
expensive ventures here. So if you think in terms of the EDS,
which is a higher number; if you think in terms of research and
technology. But again, I think one way to approach that might
be to say, let us think of two or three airports and run a
pilot program, run a model program and see how that works. And
that might be a way to gain some traction, gain some
understanding without taking it on full bore.
And then the third area is the whole area of the Federal
Marshal program. Again, we are still working with those
numbers, but we have always had a very small program. We have
ramped up considerably in that one area. We have heard a lot of
interest, both from Congress and the American public, wanting
to have more Federal Air Marshals available. So we are
certainly willing to ramp up in that area, and that would be a
significantly higher number. Again, I think based on--and that
is probably something that we would have to talk about in a
classified situation since we do not generally review it in
public. So I would say the EDS technology, the research and
development, and then finally the Federal Air Marshals are the
biggest areas.
Senator Rockefeller. On an average pre-September 11 day,
you have what, 7,000 airplanes?
Ms. Garvey. On an average day?
Senator Rockefeller. Yes.
Ms. Garvey. Nationally--well actually at one time, at a
given time, there is about 35,000 per day.
Senator Rockefeller. Thirty-five thousand.
Ms. Garvey. Yes, commercial aircraft. If you are talking
about flights. Yes, flights.
Mr. Barclay. Commercial aircraft.
Ms. Garvey. Yes, flights. He said 7,000, and that means at
one given time.
Mr. Barclay. Commercial flights.
Ms. Garvey. So during that time, that was exactly the
number on the screen.
Senator Rockefeller. OK. So if you would have, let us say,
30--and the figures can be bandied around--but when it started,
say 32 trained sky marshals, and you have got to take that--
well, not to 35,000 flights, but depending on their hours, et
cetera----
Ms. Garvey. Right. And also working----
Senator Rockefeller. And that is an enormous----
Ms. Garvey. That is a big, big number. And also working
very closely with the FBI and saying where are the greatest
threats, you know, and what--and that is, again, very close
collaboration with the FBI. And, you know, I think someone
mentioned here this morning, among panelists I know we talked
about it, there is no one single solution. You have to look at
it as a whole integrated package.
The fact of the matter is the airlines have done a good job
in reinforcing the doors. They moved very quickly after
September 11 and have reinforced, I believe at this point, all
of the cockpit doors for the commercial fleet. And that is
wonderful news.
So that is one part of the equation, one part of the
solution. Now, Federal Air Marshals, more Federal Air Marshals,
is another key point. Smart cards that Chip and you were
talking about--I mean, all of those things have to be factored
in as part of an integrated solution.
Senator Rockefeller. Mr. Doubrava.
Mr. Doubrava. Well, I think the Administrator focused on
the challenge, and Senator, you know that from your experience.
Senator Rockefeller. That was smoothly done, Administrator.
Mr. Doubrava. But the biggest challenge, of course, is that
we are not going to be able to use 100 percent application of
every program, EDS, or--we are going to have to design a
program based on threat, based on finding streamlined processes
to get people out of the situation. I mean, clearly, we are all
uncomfortable with the fact that elderly individuals are being
screened robustly.
And those are the types of things that we have to find some
solutions for, because as we move forward, we are not going to
be able to deploy EDS--certainly not with the financial
liability that we all have--at 100 percent of the airports
within 2 or 3 years. And clearly, one of the things that
concerns us is the technological leaps that need to take place.
We certainly would not want to spend all those resources
initially on a first generation or first generation-and-a-half
technology. Because clearly, we are going to get a better
mousetrap; we always do. We have got to work through those
processes. But we really do not want all those resources used
in an immediate deployment with the current technology that we
have in that particular environment. So I think that is the big
challenge for all of us.
Senator Rockefeller. Let me comment on that and ask a
question of the three of you. I understand that, I agree that
one size fits all is not particularly American. On the other
hand, voluntary, which is particularly American, also says that
some will be safer before others. So there is an inherit
conflict.
In other words, as we are discovering what are the best
technologies--and I want to get to biometrics in a moment--but
what are the best ways of securing people's safety as they
board, and the perimeters of airports and the whole, you know,
catering service, everything--as you do things on a--not
voluntary as to personal information, but you put some things
out there to see if they work, and you test them and you try
them. In the meantime, there are a lot of airports that are not
getting the advantage of any of those, because you are probably
going to be trying those at the larger airports, because you
almost have to. Am I right or wrong?
Ms. Garvey. Well, when we looked at the EDS deployment, we
laid out in the last couple of weeks where we would like to see
it go. We tried very hard not to use that category X. But
frankly, we have got a lot of equipment out there in category
X.
But we tried also to recognize that in smaller airports
like Portland, for example. I mean, if it is clear that those
are your points of vulnerability, then that is very exposed to
terrorists and others. So we have tried to lay it out with
small airports and mid-sized airports as well, both with the
idea that we want to try to get it in as many different places
in the system as we possibly can. So we actually tried to
approach it that way.
I certainly know the Congress and your Committee has always
been interested in making sure both in the AID program and
other programs we have had professional air services that the
needs of the smaller airports are attended to. And I hope to be
able to do that.
Senator Rockefeller. It is not just a question of coming
from the perspective of smaller airports. It's a question of
national security.
Ms. Garvey. That is right.
Senator Rockefeller. That is one thing that is always said
about terrorists: They look for the weakest link, and that is
why they went to Portland, Maine. And that is where this whole
process of the Twin Towers, you know, began. The World Trade
Center. So I do worry about that.
Now, the question I wanted to ask you was a little bit of
what I asked you before, and that is: It is a little bit like
in the situation that we are in, where you have international
terrorism going on, horrendous television photographs,
catastrophic discussions. And what happens is two things. One
is that many of these are quite probably true. And second, it
scares people. And I found that one of the things I do a lot of
since September 11 is simply get on the radio talk shows and
try to both be truthful with people about the fact that we are
not talking about just one country here. We are talking about
probably 60 countries that have terrorists that have angst
toward this country for various reasons and are kind of
planning on doing something about it, perhaps. And that that is
a very serious problem.
On the other hand, you want people to be calm. So you have
to both tell the truth, and in a sense say: I think we are
going to be OK here in West Virginia. You cannot be absolutely
sure, but you want people to be calm. Because once the American
people get afraid or fearful of something, they will back off
or hunker down or they will fulfill the prophecies that the
terrorists want. We won't travel. We won't buy. We won't go
out. We'll sit indoors and play checkers or something.
Then my question is: How do you take words like
biometrics--which I think is the future, not just in aviation,
but in a whole lot of other things. I think it's one of the
most exciting. I can say that it is a retinal scan, which is
the dark part of the middle of your eye, which is unlike--there
are no two out of the 6-, 7-, 8-billion people in the world
that would be the same. Or your thumbprint, or your facial
thing, or the sound of your voice. Nothing--nothing--there are
no two alike in the world. And you measure those.
Now, on the one hand, you are asking people to do
something, if and when we come to this--which I think we will--
which, in a sense, invades their history or their privacy;
which perhaps puts up in their mind, well, then they now will
know everything about me, whether I have diabetes or whether I,
you know, got a D-minus on my French exam in the third grade or
whatever.
But on the other hand, it is for their protection. It is
for their protection for their safety, it is so that they feel,
in fact, better about living their life, more secure about
doing what they want to do. But you can only accomplish that
through--and then you use the word ``smart cards.'' And people
get nervous. Well, what does a smart card do to my life? What
does that mean?
So this whole question of how you integrate the positive
concept of a more secure America, less vulnerable to what we
went through on September 11, and then on the other hand,
again, a little bit of invasion or apparent invasion of
privacy. Now, we did that with credit cards. When credit cards
started out, they were very unpopular. This was many years ago.
And as it became more secure and people developed confidence in
it, the whole credit card industry soared. In fact, it soared
out of sight and probably is helping to increase our debt
hourly.
But nevertheless, once people trusted it, then they saw
that it was in their interest. Now, my question is: To me,
biometrics is great. It is a great thing for security. Frankly,
it is a great thing for West Virginia, for this university,
which obviously I care about. But more importantly, it is a
good thing to protect our people. And how do you work the
psychology, as you throw out EDS and smart cards, all kinds of
things, that you do not drive people away from what, in fact,
is in their own interest. If you see it that way?
Mr. Barclay. I just think that the American people are real
smart, and I think they are seeing it for themselves. You know,
if you are Germany or Japan, you can run your country with
roads and railroads because those countries are geographically
small. Germany is only twice the size of Wisconsin. We have
this huge country. If we do not have an airport or air traffic
control system that operates efficiently, moves people quickly,
moves them safely and securely, our economy is not going to
move.
So you start with that explanation, and you get down to the
things we need to do to provide security. You then admit that
nothing is perfect. People break out of jail. We know lots
about that. Human beings are clever, and we are now combating a
force of special ops teams, suicide pilots who are trying to
break into our system and are trying to figure out their way
around any system we put in place.
So you are never going to get perfect. But I think the
American public, the folks I talk to, want to see us get
serious about better perimeter security, better security on the
airplanes, better screening. They are not looking for
perfection.
And the good news on the money side is, people are willing
to pay more. All the surveys say that people are willing to pay
more on the ticket. If you combine that together with the
national security interest in getting some more money out of
the funds that we are making available for this new world we
are living in, we can get there.
These are not impossible things we are talking about doing.
The technology is there and off the shelf. We can, at the same
time, build public confidence by saying we are doing everything
we can possible to make this as safe as it reasonably can be.
You should get back about running the business of this country.
Part of your job as citizens is to accept that no system is
perfect, but air transportation is the safest form of
transportation in the history of mankind. We move more people
greater distances than anything else by far. We know we have
lost public confidence since September 11. But we are going to
move to get that back. We have got the systems. I think that is
a message in itself.
Senator Rockefeller. I want to ask each of you if you have
any other comments you want to make, but I want to get in a
little plug before I do that.
I don't think it is by accident that whether you are
talking about The Washington Post, the ABC poll, or CNN poll,
or whatever it is, that it is either 82 or 86 percent of the
American public says that they want to see screeners in
airports made--not Federal in the sense of bigger government,
but made Federal in the sense they become part of the law
enforcement process. They become accountable to the law
enforcement process.
And the reason that they are not, in a sense, contracted
out as we do, is partly because as life gets more complicated
and the world increases its danger, that building into their
lives the databases that involve the CIA, the FBI, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, all to protect who are
the good guys and who are the bad guys so that you can separate
out the bad guys and be much more secure about them, is
terribly important.
And the American people are saying very directly, unless we
see those screeners made a part of the law enforcement process
within the Department of Justice, we are going to be slow to
get back on airplanes. Is that not correct?
Mr. Barclay. I agree that is what the surveys have all
shown a preference for.
Senator Rockefeller. So that was careful.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rockefeller. Chip. Jane, I will not ask you. Dick,
I will ask you.
Mr. Doubrava. Senator, I think that, as you know, the
industry, our members firmly believe in the federalization
approach. We did not push for that position on either bill,
simply because we know that at the end of the day, you all will
give us what we need. And the important thing is that if we
move forward with this conference committee, we are anxious for
you all to do your work so that we can get about doing ours.
And we look forward to doing that.
Senator Rockefeller. Let me just ask each of you if you
have any other points that you would like to make.
Ms. Garvey. I'd like, if I could, Mr. Chairman, to go back
to your comment about the concern about the privacy. And I was
thinking as you were speaking, we probably all need to do a
better job of really laying that out for the American people.
Because I think Chip is right. This is a smart group of people,
and when it is very clear what the tradeoffs are--and people
understand they need to trade off in life. And so I think we
need to do a better job of that.
And I was also thinking as we look at the research and
development and look over the next several weeks on the most
promising technologies, particularly those that are ready to be
deployed, the more we can get out there in whatever manner
works, whether it is with all the Federal dollars or a
combination of public and private, I think the more we can get
out there to really demonstrate to people how effective these
technologies can be, I think that is in all of our interests.
But also speaking more directly as you did about the tradeoff
and the analogy with the credit card company, which I have not
followed until today, I think is a good analogy. We probably
need to continue with a little bit of that message.
Senator Rockefeller. OK. I will just close this panel with
my thanks to you and also tell you that I am really in absolute
shock that virtually 2 months after September 11, almost 2
months after September 11, that we have not passed an aviation
security bill. And I think our conference starts on Wednesday.
And you said Congress ends up doing the right thing. Actually,
I have never heard anybody say that before.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rockefeller. But we had better. We had better on
this one. Thank you all very, very much.
Please come forward. The first is Jeff Planton, who is
Senior Vice President of EDS, which is Electronic Data Systems
out of Herndon, Virginia. Mr. John Selldorff, who is President
of Automation and Control Solutions, Honeywell, and that is out
of Minneapolis. And Mr. John Siedlarz, who is the incoming
Chairman of the International Biometric Industry Association.
So he is very important to us. And that is out of Moorestown,
New Jersey. And then also Dr. Michael Yura, who is our own, who
is a Ph.D and Director of the Forensic Identification Program
here at West Virginia University.
Gentleman, I look forward to your testimony. Why do we not
start with you, Mr. Planton.
STATEMENT OF JEFF PLANTON, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
FEDERAL GROUP, EDS
Mr. Planton. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller. I am Jeff
Planton, Senior Vice President of Electronic Data Systems. I
think Administrator Garvey and I probably are going to confuse
some people because I will refer to my company as EDS, not to
be confused with explosive detection systems.
Senator Rockefeller. I know. We all understand that
explosives and EDS are quite different operations.
Mr. Planton. EDS appreciates this opportunity to present
our views to this subcommittee on a subject of great importance
to both EDS and our clients. Because EDS clients include the
Federal Aviation Administration, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, domestic and international airports, and some of the
largest airlines in the world, aviation security is a critical
issue to us as well.
Many of the conveniences airline travelers once enjoyed
have been suspended. The challenge faced by the industry going
forward is to find a way to first stabilize and then
continuously improve the efficiency of security processes.
The EDS approach focuses on two different areas: the
passenger and the airport. For passengers, EDS recommends a
process where the government or other central entity is
responsible for evaluating passengers. Is an individual a
threat? While airlines are responsible for identifying and
authenticating passengers, is an individual who they say they
are?
EDS recommends enhancing physical inspections of travelers
and bags and implementing a centralized passenger evaluation
system similar to the current CAPPS system, except that it is
managed centrally and incorporates law enforcement watch lists.
We feel that biometric identification systems--implemented
by airlines, but sanctioned by the government--could be used to
speed the check-in process for frequent travelers. Having once
registered with a system where foolproof identities were
provided, a traveler can authenticate his or her identity in
seconds at a biometric checkpoint. Viable biometric
technologies today include fingerprint scanning, hand geometry,
facial recognition.
While the current FAA-mandated CAPPS system is a great
start, regulators, airlines, unions, and associations agree
that improvements are warranted. EDS recommends a centralized
passenger evaluation capability. With a centralized capability,
government entities responsible for aviation security would
have greater control over evaluation criteria, could quickly
alter these criteria when appropriate, and instantaneously
alert airlines to potential threats.
Further, this system would be a logical platform for
comparison of passengers to the law enforcement watch list.
Armed with this information, personnel at security checkpoints
would know who to look for and could prepare for the
appropriate response.
In the airport environment, key issues to be addressed
around the airport security environment include: All the right
personnel in the right place at the right time, all the right
assets in the right place at the right time, all airport and
airline employees should be issued biometrically-enabled smart
cards following a rigorous background check. These smart cards
could replace current identification cards, and by requiring a
biometric match, any stolen or lost cards could be rendered
useless immediately.
Senator Rockefeller. Could you just explain again for our
audience here the right definition of the word ``smart card''?
Mr. Planton. If I can. And this is for you. This is a
sample of a CAC card being given and issued to the U.S. Defense
Department. On this card there is a computer chip. This card
has 32 KB of memory on it. On these 32 KBs, we can a store a
biometric template which, in a fingerprint--I would take my
fingerprint. It would scan it. It would then read onto the
chip. At that point, I have both my fingerprint template and,
of course, the original finger. I carry that with me. If I put
it down on a reader, it reads my fingerprint and the template
so it shows that I am the same person.
On this particular card, we normally have a chip. We have
got two different bar codes that can be used for information
and the magnetic strip also. We have three different storage
mechanisms. There are four different storage mechanisms on this
sample card right now. We can start with a magnetic strip to
use today's technology, and put the biometric on the chip for
tomorrow's technology; and as we migrate, we go away from the
magnetic strip on to the biometric chip. And I will leave this
for you, sir.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you.
Mr. Planton. OK. As I said, also, lost or stolen cards. If
I lose this card today, nobody can use it even if they have a
PIN number like you do today, magnetic strips and PIN numbers.
Without this finger, this card is useless, because I carry the
biometric with me. Today, all I need is the magnetic strip and
the PIN number, and I can get in anywhere. Pretty much like our
ATM card.
In a process similar to that used for passengers and
employees, airport assets and vehicles entering the airport
perimeter could also be determined as ``known'' and
``unknown.'' Again, this permits security resources to focus on
a smaller number of unknown entities. The system involved could
be tagging vehicles with radio frequency ID cards, or RFIDs,
which are recognized by airport systems.
Technology will be critical to the total solution while
preserving convenience, privacy, and fiscal responsibility. At
the core of the security system will be information technology.
This robust system will have to process data real time, will
have to be linked to airports, airlines, and governments around
the world. This system will require a secure, solid
infrastructure.
Few of the technologies that have been mentioned today are
new. EDS is issuing millions of smart cards for the U.S.
Department of Defense. Israel's Ben Gurion airport utilizes
biometric systems to expedite check-ins for thousands of
passengers every day. Credit card systems evaluate and
authorize millions of transactions using information captured
at point-of-sale devices around the world.
In conclusion, secure airport terminals and tarmacs by
identifying, verifying, and authenticating personnel,
equipment, and shipments at critical points in the security
process. Conduct rigorous background checks of employees,
deploy a biometrically-enabled smart card system, employ radio
frequency technology, enhance scanning capability.
Enhance passenger security by using an evaluation database
and employing biometric technologies. Implement centralized
evaluation and law enforcement watch list databases, deploy an
opt-in biometrically-enabled smart card system to increase
proportion of ``known'' passengers, implement alternative
security processes for ``unknown'' passengers.
Thank you for this opportunity, and I will be glad to
answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Planton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeff Planton, Senior Vice President,
Federal Group, EDS
Good morning. I am Jeff Planton, Senior Vice President with the EDS
Federal Group in Herndon, Virginia. EDS appreciates the opportunity to
present our views to this subcommittee on a subject of great importance
to both EDS and to our customers.
After the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history, the Federal
Government, airports and the airline industry are grappling with short-
and long-term approaches to passenger safety. Because EDS clients
include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), domestic and international airports and
some of the largest airlines in the world, aviation security is a
critical issue for us as well.
Almost immediately after September 11th, we put together a team
representing every element of the aviation industry and critical
technologies, including biometrics, smart cards, information security,
and complex data management. This team has identified an approach to
aviation security that encompasses the passenger experience, airport
environment and the underlying infrastructure.
current situation
First, we should address the current situation. Many of the
conveniences airline travelers once enjoyed have been suspended.
Vehicle parking near terminals is severely restricted. Only ticketed
passengers are allowed beyond security checkpoints. In-depth checks are
being conducted before passengers are given permission to board planes.
Once on the plane, passengers and baggage are again checked and
accounted for.
All these restrictions are necessary to ensure security. At the
same time, they add costs and constrict the flow of passengers through
airports. While most Americans have accepted delays and longer lines
thus far, many question how long this acceptance will last. The
challenge faced by the industry going forward is to find ways to
stabilize and then continuously improve the efficiency of security
processes. In designing new security systems, a distinction must be
drawn between security processes for handling passengers and those for
airport and airline personnel.
passenger experience
For the passenger, EDS recommends a process where the government or
other central entity is responsible for evaluating passengers, while
airlines are responsible for identifying and authenticating passengers.
EDS would utilize an ``opt-in'' process to increase the number of
``known'' travelers. Increasing the number of known travelers
accomplishes a number of things: first, it expedites the process for
the known traveler by providing dedicated queues and automated kiosks,
second it improves the process for the ``unknown'' travelers because
the known persons are removed from their queues, third it increases
security for all because security resources can be focused on a smaller
universe of ``unknowns''. In addition to this opt-in process, EDS
recommends enhancing physical detection equipment for all travelers and
bags and implementing a centralized passenger evaluation system, which
is similar to the current CAPPS system, except that it is managed
centrally and incorporates law enforcement watch lists.
Of course, the goal of these security processes is to address these
fundamental questions:
Are they who they say they are?
Are they a threat to security?
Are they carrying anything illegal?
are passengers who they say they are?
Rigorous proof of identity will be an essential component of the
check-in. Reviewing identity documents and manually checking security
databases will be one of the most time-intensive stages of the new
security process.
Because of this, we feel that biometric identity systems--
implemented by airlines, but sanctioned by the government--could be
used to speed the check-in process for frequent travelers. It is not
inconceivable that voluntary biometric registration will become a
central component of future premium flyer programs. Viable biometric
technologies today include hand geometry, fingerprint scanning and
facial recognition.
Having once registered with a system where full proof of identity
was provided, a traveler can authenticate his or her identity in
seconds at a biometric checkpoint. EDS has such a system in place today
at Ben Gurion International Airport in Israel. It allows registered
Israeli citizens to authenticate their identities with a magnetic card
and a hand scan, shaving up to 2 hours off the wait at passport
control. Currently, 15 percent of the passengers at Ben Gurion utilize
this voluntary authentication system. Plus, the system can be
implemented rather quickly--the initial phase of the Ben Gurion system
was implemented in just 3 months.
are specific individuals a threat to security?
While the current FAA-mandated CAPPS system is a great start,
regulators, airlines, unions and associations agree that improvements
are warranted. EDS recommends a centralized passenger evaluation
capability, likely implemented and managed by the government. With a
centralized capability, government entities responsible for aviation
security would have greater control over evaluation criteria, could
quickly alter these criteria when appropriate and could instantaneously
alert all airlines of potential threats. Further, this system would be
a logical platform for the comparison of passengers to law enforcement
watch lists.
This kind of system is not new. In fact, EDS is currently operating
a pre-screening system similar to this for a number of U.S. airlines--
processing approximately 70 million passengers annually. Given that a
number of airlines already utilize this system and the FAA has rights
to much of the intellectual property already, EDS feels that this
version of CAPPS would be the logical foundation of a national
passenger evaluation capability. For similar reasons, we also feel that
such a system could be up and running quickly in perhaps 6 to 9 months
depending on final requirements and funding arrangements.
Additional capabilities are also recommended. This centralized
system should be integrated with airport security systems. Lists of
high-risk passengers could be downloaded to airport systems; minimally
each day--providing security personnel with a much-needed advantage.
Armed with this information, personnel at security checkpoints would
know for whom to look and could prepare the appropriate response.
are they carrying anything illegal?
Having evaluated passengers at the time of booking and then
authenticated their identity at check-in, the next task is to ensure
that they are not carrying anything illegal. Much of this task will
fall to the security personnel and detection equipment at security
checkpoints. Additional security would come from screening of all
checked baggage and the ability to track checked baggage throughout the
process.
Bar code technology and radio frequency identification devices
(RFIDs, like toll tags on highways) permit the tracking of baggage
through the airport. Using these devices personnel would know whether a
specific bag arrived at a plane when it should have. If it did not,
then they could determine where the bag was removed from the process
and why. This form of electronic tracking would also facilitate the
positive matching of baggage to those actually boarding an aircraft. If
a person's bag was loaded, but the passenger did not board, then this
technology would allow personnel to quickly locate and remove the
unattended checked baggage.
airport environment
Key issues to be addressed around the airport security environment
include:
Are the right personnel in the right places at the right
time?
Are the right assets in the right place at the right time?
are the right people in the right places at the right time?
Similar biometric systems that are used for known passengers could
be used for airport and airlines employees as well. Just as known
passengers ``enroll'' in the system, all airport and airline employees
would be issued biometrically-enabled smart cards following a rigorous
background check. These smart cards could replace current
identification cards, which can be stolen and/or easily forged.
Requiring a biometric match would render any stolen or lost card
useless and smart cards are all but impossible to forge.
Using smart card technology, specific personnel could be permitted
access to specific locations at specific times. For example, an aircrew
might only be allowed access to a particular gate for a specific
flight. This is far different from universal access processes currently
used at most airports, which allow anyone with the correct code access
to secure terminal areas or tarmacs at any time. RFID (or radio
frequency identification) technologies could also be imbedded into
smart cards and notify authorities if an unauthorized individual is
attempting to enter a restricted area.
are the right assets in the right place at the right time?
In a process similar to that used for passengers and employees,
airport assets and vehicles entering the airport perimeter could be
determined as ``known'' or ``unknown''. Again, this permits security
resources to focus on a smaller number of unknown entities.
EDS recommends the deployment of systems such as those currently
used on the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico. These systems involve
tagging vehicles with RFID devices similar to toll tags, which are
recognized by airport systems. It is even possible to tie a specific
employee to a specific vehicle, providing greater assurance that a
given vehicle is where it is supposed to be.
To improve security around items such as catering trucks, it would
be possible to utilize certain supply chain technologies that track
inventory throughout a production process. Particular shipments are
inspected and sealed at their point of origin (perhaps a catering
kitchen). Tracking technologies could verify that a shipment remained
sealed throughout the transport process and would prompt security
personnel to respond in the event that a seal was broken or even if a
shipment strayed from an assigned path.
at the core of security systems: information technology
A great deal of attention and energy has been devoted to physical
security processes. This is necessary and very important, and will
continue to be a key component of the security screening process.
However, technology will be critical to a total solution that enhances
security while preserving convenience, privacy and fiscal
responsibility. Such an information system will have to process data
real-time and will have to be linked to airports, airlines and
governments around the world. Robust systems permitting central data
management with greatly distributed data collection are required. This
system will require a solid infrastructure and no possibility of
downtime. And without question, access to it and to the information it
contains must be secure.
While the integrated system described above is not currently in
place, none of the individual technologies described are new. EDS is
issuing millions of biometrically enabled smart cards for the U.S.
Department of Defense. EDS pre-screens millions of passengers using its
client-server system every year. Israel's Ben Gurion Airport utilizes a
biometric system to expedite check-in for thousands of passengers every
day. Credit card systems evaluate and authorize millions of
transactions using information captured at point of sale devices around
the world. And, supply chain systems track the production of millions
of products in the U.S. and abroad.
Beyond the individual solutions, the scale and scope of this system
would not be unprecedented, either. While integration of such disparate
databases and complex technologies on a global scale might be new to
airports and the airline industry, global service providers like EDS
already have extensive experience creating and running comparable
systems in other industries.
conclusion
The challenge is to stabilize and then improve the efficiency of
the aviation security processes. It is important to address both
security processes for handling passengers and those for airport and
airline personnel.
Secure airport terminals and tarmacs by identifying, verifying and
authenticating personnel, equipment and shipments at critical points in
the security process.
Conduct rigorous background checks of employees.
Deploy a biometrically enabled smart card system.
Employ radio frequency (RF) technology.
Install scanning equipment.
Enhance passenger security by implementing an evaluation database,
emphasizing biometric technologies.
Implement centralized evaluation and law enforcement watch
list database.
Deploy an ``opt-in'' biometrically enabled smart card
system to increase proportion of ``known'' passengers.
Implement alternative processes for ``unknown''
passengers.
Thank you for this opportunity to present this testimony. I am
happy to answer any questions you might have.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you very much.
Mr. Selldorff.
STATEMENT OF JOHN SELLDORFF, PRESIDENT,
HONEYWELL AUTOMATION AND CONTROL SOLUTIONS
Mr. Selldorff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
to testify before you today on the important issue of airport
security technologies. I would like to thank you also for your
past leadership on critical aviation issues, and we look
forward to working with you in the future as we address the
problems that lie ahead.
Honeywell is a diversified global technology and
manufacturing leader. We have an unusually broad perspective on
airport and aviation safety. Among our core businesses, we are
a leading international provider of aircraft safety
communications, and guidance control systems and products;
including systems to alert flight crew and ground authorities
of an airborne emergency, collision avoidance, and improved
flight data and cockpit voice recorders. We also manufacture
Spectra, the lightest weight ballistic material made, which can
be used to harden and make bulletproof cockpit doors.
On the ground, we are a global expert in control
technologies for buildings, homes, and industry. Honeywell has
designed and installed control systems providing security, life
safety, energy, and building control management in more than
200 airports, from San Francisco and Miami to Moscow and Hong
Kong.
Today I will talk briefly about the current U.S. approach
to airport security and threat-detection systems; I will
outline safety-enhancement opportunities incorporating existing
technologies; and I will discuss what needs to change to ensure
that airport workers, passengers, and airline crews can move
through our Nation's airports with a minimum of risk.
Every modern airport relies on multiple control systems,
from video surveillance and access control systems to equipment
that manages lighting, fire detection and protection, and
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning. In most U.S.
airports, these systems run independently of each other and are
managed by different departments. The purchasing decisions for
these stand-alone systems also tend to be made separately based
on two primary factors: basic functionality and lowest initial
price.
The result of the current approach is that the typical
domestic airport's key operational systems don't communicate
with each other. There is little or no integration among the
various security and safety-related systems in an airport, let
alone with the building's critical operational systems.
These types of airport systems have been adequate in the
past. But in this new environment, we need solutions that
provide multiple layers of protection, incorporating threat-
detection and response capabilities from the time someone
approaches the facility and passes through security, to when
they approach the aircraft and other secured areas. Airports
need early warning tools to avert problems at the earliest
possible opportunity, or lacking that, to respond quickly to
contain damage and risk.
The answer does not lie in individual technologies; it
resides in the integration of current and emerging systems. It
is possible today to tie together virtually every aspect of an
airport's operation into a single, powerful management
solution, in effect, casting a tightly woven, protective net
over the airport and its occupants. Such systems not only
integrate video surveillance, access control, fire, emergency
evacuation, and other types of safety-related systems, they
also link critical operational systems that control such
functions as lighting, heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning. The systems can be programmed to automatically
take certain actions in the event of an incident, across a
variety of functions.
Say that an unauthorized person enters an area containing
critical building equipment. The access control system sounds
an alarm on the staff's workstation and indicates where the
breach has occurred. On the same screen, the video surveillance
system displays live footage of the area so security staff can
determine an appropriate response. At the same time, other
types of building management systems would be alerted and
automatically respond based on preprogrammed instructions.
Depending on the situation, perhaps the ventilation units would
shut down and doors in the area automatically lock.
Integrated solutions also can provide data from human
resources such as employee photo and work schedules as well as
other databases for known criminals. The result is to turn raw
information into intelligence that the facility operators and
its systems can act upon. For instance, based on employees'
work schedules, the access control system can limit entry to
only those employees who are scheduled to work or travel on
that plane.
As biometric technologies such as facial recognition become
more prevalent, they will be able to communicate with airport
personnel databases to prevent the use of stolen access cards.
In an integrated system, the access control system will be able
to compare the card code to the face or fingerprint stored in
the employee's file and deny access to anyone other than that
particular worker.
An integrated system that included access to FBI and other
law enforcement databases would provide an additional and much-
needed security enhancement. Armed with the images and
backgrounds of known terrorists, an airport's security system
could proactively identify potential threats and facilitate a
response before any damage is inflicted.
Integrated systems are not just a possibility; they are a
reality at a growing number of airports outside the United
States. Currently, 70 percent of the airport systems that
Honeywell has installed are outside the United States, in
facilities that seek to capitalize on the benefits that
integration provides.
There are several reasons why international airports are
adopting integration technologies. One, of course, is more
experience with terrorists. In fact, the European Union
encourages the use of integrated security systems in its member
country airports. Elsewhere, the Sydney, Australia, Kingsford
Smith Airport installed a 100-camera digital video surveillance
system that integrates to a security management system in
preparation for the 2000 Olympic Games, while also setting the
groundwork for future passenger growth.
Airports outside the United States are utilizing integrated
systems for broader, long-term business reasons. Such systems
increase staff productivity and effectiveness. Through their
ease of use and centralized, comprehensive control
capabilities, they reduce energy costs by permitting automatic,
timed control of equipment. At the Munich Airport, for example,
a comprehensive control solution allows operators to activate
runway lights, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning in
specific gate areas, and even baggage carousels, based on
flight schedules.
Airports outside the United States generally view their
building systems as a long-term investment. They tend to select
systems based not on initial price, but on the systems' ability
to lower the facility's life-cycle costs. And they look beyond
current functionality, seeking flexible systems that will
accommodate new technologies and support business changes.
The current situation presents both a short-term challenge
and a long-term opportunity. It is critical that we place the
best technologies and procedures throughout our Nation's
airports. Integrated solutions should be deployed wherever
possible.
The industry will continue to come forward with new
technologies and ideas to enhance airport security and avert
emergencies. But the Federal Government must play a leadership
role in creating and implementing this security plan. Standards
must be developed and mandated that provide a security
framework that is adaptive based on a given airport's usage.
The Federal Government must lead the effort to create these
national standards so that safety and risk-mitigation
capabilities are consistent from airport to airport. Equally
important, it needs to implement policies that will streamline
the certification, regulatory, and procurement processes so
solutions can be fielded quickly.
The FAA has projected that in the next 20 years, domestic
passenger enplanements will double, and commercial aircraft
operations will increase by 47 percent. Clearly, the time to
put more stringent airport security measures in place is now.
We must take steps to rebuild the confidence of the American
flying public and provide them with airports that are truly
safe and secure.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
Subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Selldorff follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Selldorff, President,
Honeywell Automation and Control Solutions
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify before you
today on the important issue of airport security technologies. I would
like to thank you also for your past leadership on critical aviation
issues that affect every citizen in this country and we look forward to
working with you and other members of the Committee as we address the
problems that lay ahead.
By way of background, Honeywell is a diversified global technology
and manufacturing leader. We have an unusually broad perspective on
airport and aviation safety. Among our core businesses, we are a
leading international provider of aircraft safety, communications and
guidance control systems and products--including systems to alert
flight crew and ground authorities of an airborne emergency, collision
avoidance and improved flight data and cockpit voice recorders. We also
manufacture Spectra, the lightest weight ballistic material made, which
can be used to harden and make bulletproof cockpit doors.
On the ground, we're a global expert in control technologies for
buildings, homes and industry. Honeywell has designed and installed
control systems providing security, life safety, energy and building
control management in more than 200 airports, from San Francisco and
Miami to Moscow and Hong Kong.
Today, I will talk briefly about the current U.S. approach to
airport security and threat detection systems. I will outline safety-
enhancement opportunities incorporating existing technologies. And I'll
discuss what needs to change to ensure that airport workers, passengers
and airline crews can move through our nation's airports with a minimum
of risk.
airport security systems today
The events that began unfolding Sept. 11 have changed the rules.
Across every aspect of American society, the policies, procedures and
systems that once seemed adequate now are called into question--and
often found in need of change. That is true of how U.S. airport
security systems are planned and implemented as well.
Every modern airport relies on multiple control systems, from video
surveillance and access control systems to equipment that manages
lighting, fire detection and protection and heating, ventilation and
air conditioning. In most U.S. airports, these systems run
independently of each other and are managed by different departments.
The purchasing decision for these stand-alone systems also tend to be
made separately, based on two primary factors: functionality (e.g., how
well does this system provide video surveillance) and lowest initial
price.
The result of the current approach is that the typical domestic
airport's key operational systems don't communicate with each other.
There is little or no integration among the various security and
safety-related systems in an airport, let alone with the building's
critical operational systems. If an incident occurs, airport management
cannot obtain a timely, single view of what is happening. Instead, they
need to go into multiple systems. In other words, once the access
control system indicates a security breach, the operator must enter a
separate closed-circuit-TV surveillance system to view the intruder and
what he or she is doing. Responding to the incident often requires
multiple steps as well.
These types of airport systems have been adequate in the past. But
in this new environment, we need solutions that provide multiple layers
of protection, incorporating threat-detection and response capabilities
from the time someone approaches the facility and passes through
security, to when they approach the aircraft and other secured areas.
Airports need early warning tools to avert problems at the earliest
possible opportunity--or, lacking that, to respond quickly to contain
damage and risk.
integrated systems that help prevent and contain incidents
Much attention has been given to such security technologies as
biometrics and facial recognition systems. Yet these need to be part of
a comprehensive solution needed to keep our airports safe.
The answer doesn't lie in individual technologies; it resides in
the integration of current and emerging systems. It is possible today
to tie together virtually every aspect of an airport's operation into a
single, powerful management solution, in effect casting a tightly
woven, protective net over the airport and its occupants. Such systems
not only integrate video surveillance, access control, fire, emergency
evacuation and other types of safety-related systems; they also link
critical operational systems that control such functions as lighting,
heating, ventilation and air conditioning.
In this integrated management solution, the airport's systems
communicate and work together. The systems can be programmed to
automatically take certain actions in the event of an incident, across
a variety of functions. The solution also provides management with a
single centralized view of the building's operations, enhancing
intelligence during an incident while strengthening overall facility
management day-to-day.
Integrating an airport's systems provides a higher and more
effective level of operational control, less opportunity for human
error, greater responsiveness in the event of a problem and less public
exposure to risks. Let me give you an example of what I mean.
Say that an unauthorized person enters an area containing critical
building equipment. The access control system sounds an alarm on the
staff's workstation, and indicates where the breach has occurred. On
the same screen, the video surveillance system displays live footage of
the area, so security staff can determine an appropriate response. At
the same time, other types of building management systems would be
alerted and automatically respond, based on pre-programmed
instructions. Depending on the situation, perhaps the ventilation unit
shuts down, and doors in the area automatically lock.
using database information for better decisions
Integrated solutions also can incorporate data from human resources
such as an employee's photo and work schedule as well as other
databases for known criminals. The result is to turn raw information
into intelligence that the facility's operators and its systems can act
upon. For instance, based on employees' work schedules, the access
control systems can limit entry to only those employees who are
scheduled to work or travel on that plane.
As biometric technologies such as facial recognition become more
prevalent, they will be able to communicate with airport personnel
databases to prevent the use of a stolen access card. In an integrated
system, the access control system will be able to compare the card code
with the face or fingerprint stored in the employee's file, and deny
access to anyone other than that particular worker.
An integrated system that included access to FBI and other law
enforcement databases would provide an additional and much-needed
security enhancement. Armed with the images and backgrounds of known
terrorists, an airport's security system could proactively identify
potential threats and facilitate a response before any damage is
inflicted.
integrated systems currently in use outside the united states
Integrated systems aren't just a possibility. They are a reality at
a growing number of airports outside the United States. Currently 70
percent of the airport systems that Honeywell has installed are outside
the United States, in facilities that seek to capitalize on the
benefits that integration provides.
There are several reasons why international airports are adopting
integration technologies. One, of course, is more experience with
terrorists. In fact, the European Union encourages the use of
integrated security systems in its member countries' airports.
Elsewhere, the Sydney, Australia, Kingsford Smith Airport installed a
100-camera digital video surveillance system that integrates to a
security management system in preparation for the 2000 Olympic Games,
while also setting the groundwork for future passenger growth.
In addition, airports outside the United States are utilizing
integrated systems for broader, long-term business reasons. Such
systems increase staff productivity and effectiveness, through their
ease of use and centralized, comprehensive control capabilities. They
reduce energy costs by permitting automatic, timed control of
equipment. At the Munich Airport, for example, a comprehensive control
solution allows operators to activate runway lights, heating,
ventilation and air conditioning in specific gate areas and even
baggage carousels, based on flight schedules.
And finally, such systems help deliver operational efficiencies.
With key systems and databases linked together, airport management gets
a full, real-time view of all operations. Operators have the
information they need to improve the building's performance and the
power to make facility-wide adjustments based on changing needs or
single events.
These are the types of long-term benefits that airports can and
should seek to capture. Airports outside the United States generally
view their building systems as a long-term investment. They tend to
select systems based not on initial price, but on the systems' ability
to lower the facility's lifecycle costs. And they look beyond current
functionality, seeking flexible systems that will accommodate new
technologies and support business changes.
a flight plan for u.s. airport security
The current situation presents both a short-term challenge and a
long-term opportunity. We need to establish a flight plan, if you will,
to improve the safety and effectiveness of U.S. airports. And we need
to do it now.
Honeywell agrees with the recommendations outlined in the U.S.
Department of Transportation's Airport Security Challenge Report. Those
recommendations must be implemented as soon as practicable. In
particular, we strongly support the establishment of an Aviation
Security Technology Consortium of public and private sector individuals
to identify, sponsor and test new security-related technologies at our
Nation's airports. Honeywell would be honored to participate in such an
association.
It is critical that we place the best technologies and procedures
throughout our nation's airports. Integrated solutions should be
deployed whenever possible. For maximum return on investment, they
should improve operations as well as safety. They should be built on
non-proprietary languages and certifications to avoid dependence on
specific technologies or manufacturers. And they must be designed to be
future-proof.
The industry will continue to come forward with new technologies
and ideas to enhance airport security and avert emergencies. But the
Federal Government must play a leadership role in creating and
implementing this airport security flight plan. Standards must be
developed and mandated that provide a security framework that is
adaptive based on a given airport's usage (international versus
domestic versus private). Standards that take into account the
technologies, the systems and appropriate databases needed to create a
comprehensive, cohesive, holistic airport security management plan.
The Federal Government must lead the effort to create these
national standards, so that safety and risk-mitigation capabilities are
consistent from airport to airport. Equally important, it needs to
implement policies that will streamline the certification, regulatory
and procurement processes, so solutions can be fielded quickly.
The FAA has projected that in the next 20 years, domestic passenger
enplanements will double, and commercial aircraft operations will
increase by 47 percent. Clearly, the time to put more stringent airport
security measures in place is now. We must take steps to rebuild the
confidence of the American flying public, and provide them with
airports that are truly safe and secure.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you very much.
I have just got to interject one thought here. Initially,
you said that some international airports are using it, that
ought to, should it not, be of some comfort to the American
people? In other words, those that have dealt with these kinds
of problems before on a relatively routine basis, as opposed to
we in this country who have not, have opted toward much tougher
technological and, ultimately, much safer solutions. That
should be some comfort, I would think, to the American people.
Yes, sir.
STATEMENT OF JOHN E. SIEDLARZ, VICE CHAIRMAN
OF THE BOARD, INTERNATIONAL BIOMETRIC INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION
Mr. Siedlarz. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the privilege
of appearing before the Subcommittee today for the biometrics
industry. I sat with rising excitement during the initial
committee discussion because of both the increasing recognition
for the role of biometrics and the acceptance of its
capabilities and what it might provide. And of course, your
known support for the industry and the work that is going on
here in West Virginia, we appreciate that very much.
Some 3 years ago, four small businesses engaged in
biometrics with different kinds of technologies put aside their
aggressive competitiveness for a short period to form the
Association. The Association has grown today to over 20
companies, and it is growing even more as we speak. And one of
the reasons we did that at the time is because even though the
biometric industry has been emerging for some 25 years, dating
back to the late 1960s and early 1970s, the truth of the matter
is that we recognize that the need for public advocacy and
public education is still true today, for many of the points
that you raised about it in your discussions of the early
industry still apply.
It's good to note that of the four companies that were
represented at the time, brought together with the foresight of
Mr. Bill Wilson from California, who headed then-RSI,
Incorporated, who is with us today and who deals with hand
recognition technology, joined me and my company with Iris
Recognition Technology, then IriScan, and now Iridian
Technology, and Identix, with the fingerprint, represented
today by Mr. David Shipman. And also Visionics, facial
recognition, represented today by Frances Zelazny.
So those four companies, as I said, put aside the
differences that we saw we had, to emphasize the fact of the
similarities that we had to bring to the public and the Nation
what we thought was important, and has become even more
important since 9/11.
I have separately submitted a written statement for the
record, a letter which describes the IBIA position regarding
the role of biometrics in a comprehensive aviation security
program. It offers specific recommendations for consideration
by the Subcommittee and the Congress in the ongoing work to
improve the security of our air transportation system. With
your permission, I would like to offer some brief comments that
amplify our scope and hopefully provide additional perspective
on the use of biometrics in commercial aviation operations
under the threat of international terrorism.
Terrorism, and indeed all criminal activity, thrives in an
environment of ambiguity and false identity. Rights that we
have come to expect as Americans, such as privacy and freedom
to travel, are exploited and corrupted by those who would have
us live in fear, with the intent to cripple our society and our
economy. Without surrendering those rights--and I would like to
return to that issue--we need to fight back effectively and
deny them the opportunity for such exploitation.
In my first 20-year career as an Air Force officer, I was
deeply involved in the design and implementation of security
programs for military aviation. We believed then that a world
of difference separated our needs from that of commercial
aviation. I believe that that world of difference was
dramatically narrowed on September 11.
There are fundamental similarities in the goals of aviation
security in each sector, as well as unique characteristics. We
can learn from those similarities, which include the following:
One, protect the air crews, aircraft, and servicing personnel
by effectively denying access to the tarmac to those who are
not authorized to be there. Reliable real time identification
is required to achieve that goal.
Two, protect the terminal and the facilities that service
and control the air operations, and the public that needs
access by the effective surveillance in key areas and screening
and controlled access in critical areas. Identification and
authentication, properly integrated, is required to achieve
that goal.
Three, protect the traveler by positive controls of baggage
and boarding process, and positive identification of those who
use the transportation system, especially those who cross our
borders. Biometric technology in its varied forms is capable
today, as it was not many years ago when I dealt with it first,
of providing both a surveillance and positive identification
component of these necessary security program elements. It is
necessary to match the technology to the application, because
no single technology can do it all. I return to that. One size
does not fit all.
To those who say that the technology is not free of error
in all applications, I would say, if not this, what? All
current nonbiometric designs and methods to solve the
identification need do not work, incapable of any acceptable or
realistic percentage of success. And they are measured against
technology that now can demonstrate performance up to the 99
percent level in proper integrations.
To those who say we cannot identify a terrorist until he is
enrolled in a biometric database, I say, if not now, when?
Some biometrics can make effective use of existing
databases, and all of those who enter the United States should
begin to enroll right now. To those who say it will take time
to build a database for full effectiveness in antiterror
operations, I say that the database controlling access to the
tarmac, for the protection of air crews, aircraft, servicing
personnel, facilities and the public can be accomplished very
quickly.
Finally, to those who say that privacy, civil liberties,
and convenience must all be sacrificed to achieve these goals,
I say that you are wrong, and that your good intentions should
be directed to working with the industry to minimize the impact
and achieve reasonable results. If we cannot use effective
technology that is capable of protecting our identity while
removing the cloak of the imposter, then we will be held
hostage as a society crippled by fear, intimidation, and
ignorance. That is a society in which privacy and civil liberty
and freedom of movement become meaningless concepts.
Privacy and biometrics, I would add, Mr. Chairman, are not
incompatible. I have carried a military identification card for
some 43 years. Aside from being proud of that, adding on a
biometric template, whether that be iris or fingerprint or
facial or whatever that happens to be, simply makes that card
secure. It does not really add a single degree of personal data
to the card. But it does say for once--and for the first time,
I should say, in 42 years--that is my card.
And the same way for your card that you showed earlier to
the panel with regards to a guarantee that that card belongs to
you and not to anyone else. That is fundamentally the
difference. It is possible to separate personal identities from
biometric information so cleanly, so effectively that a
reasonable compromise certainly can be worked to make sure that
those rights and those privileges are still preserved.
Senator Rockefeller. Can I just interject something here? A
lot of people when they hear about cards and the availability
of data through cards, automatically think, well, you know,
whatever health problems or my D-minus in the third grade in
French or whatever are going to become public knowledge. In
other words, the whole concept of telemarketing as opposed to
what it is that you are doing this for. Could you help us
understand that telemarketing is not what we are talking about
here?
Mr. Siedlarz. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I think
sometimes the aggravation we see over this privacy issue is
that we see a little more concentration on protecting our
privacy against telemarketing than we would in some of the
areas that we are concerned with here. But in any event, I hope
I can.
Let us think of it this way: We like to say sometimes in
the industry that biometrics can make a dumb card smart and a
smart card good. I think it is important to understand that if
you have a smart card without biometrics, you have a card that
can contain data. That data could be medical information. It
could be political information. It could be financial
information. It could be almost any other information.
If someone gets access to that card and has the methodology
to extract that data, because there is no protection from them
to do so, then yes, that may be a serious threat to the privacy
of the information that is stored on that card.
If the card is nothing more, like most credit cards, than
the vehicle to get to a central database which has the
extensive information, then that is something of another
matter. Those might be referred to as dumb cards, but they
still, in fact, make the translation from how you are
effectively using it in a transaction to where that information
is really stored. But that is essentially the difference
between the two cards, if I properly understood your question.
Senator Rockefeller. And in any event, we are facing
precisely the same set of problems as we deal with the
Internet.
Mr. Siedlarz. Absolutely. Absolutely. And biometrics, as
you know, have a major role there in terms of protection of
identity and the security of transactions; knowing who, in
fact, is initiating the transaction and who is receiving it,
with appropriate encryption and other protective devices in
between to protect the data.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you.
Mr. Siedlarz. Yes, sir. Well, that concludes my testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Siedlarz follows:]
Prepared Statement of John E. Siedlarz, Vice Chairman
of the Board, International Biometric Industry Association
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting the biometric industry to offer its views at this important
proceeding. My name is John E. Siedlarz. I am the founder of IriScan,
now Iridian Technologies. I am also Vice Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the International Biometric Industry Association (IBIA),
and I represent IBIA here today. IBIA is based in Washington, DC and
advocates the collective interests of leading manufacturers and
developers of biometric technology.
My company was one of the four charter members of IBIA. All three
other charter members are represented here today. They include
Visionics, whose Chief Executive is Joseph Atick, represented today by
Frances Zelazny; Identix, represented today by David Chapman; and
Recognition Systems, represented today by Martin Huddert, Chief
Executive Officer, and Bill Wilson, Managing Director. Bill is also
Chairman of the Board of IBIA.
threats to aviation
Terrorism, and indeed all criminal activity, thrives in an
atmosphere of anonymity and false identity. Freedom to travel, a
treasured benefit in our democratic society, is exploited and corrupted
by those who would threaten all movement, all travel, creating the
image of imminent danger in the attempt to impose fear on our
population and cripple the economy. We need to deny them that
opportunity without sacrificing our rights of travel in a free society.
Piecemeal, hurried, and reactive measures for aviation security may
provide a temporary solution to a specific problem, but a well designed
and comprehensive security program is necessary to deter and detect
threats over the long-term fight against international terrorism. No
program will be complete without an effective component for
identification of all participants in the travel process, as well as an
efficient tool to deny access and travel to those who threaten that
process. Biometric technology can be that effective component.
biometric technology
Biometrics are defined as the automatic identification or identity
verification of an individual based on physiological or behavioral
characteristics. The authentication of identity is accomplished by
using computer technology in a non-invasive way to match patterns of
live individuals in real time against enrolled records. Examples of the
patterns used for biometric identification include those made from the
image of a fingerprint, the geometry of the hand, and unique patterns
in a person's iris, voice, signature, or face. It is important to note
that most biometric applications do not store the actual image of the
feature being measured. Instead, biometrics secure systems and protect
an individual's identity by converting the measurement into an
encrypted file. This biometric record cannot be reverse engineered to
determine a person's age, sex, race or other sensitive information.
Likewise, it cannot be used to steal someone's identity.
With these characteristics, biometrics are the only technologies
that can offer an effective response to the need for authentication as
a primary component of increased security without sacrificing
convenience. The U.S. Government has been an early adopter of
biometrics, first using the devices to control access to highly
sensitive facilities such as nuclear power plants and weapons
facilities. Now, use of biometrics is expanding to protect networks
against intrusion by hackers, to secure records from identity theft, to
ensure benefits are disbursed to the lawful recipient, and to protect
borders.
In parallel with its efforts to work with the Government to develop
and refine self-contained applications for biometric technology, the
industry has worked diligently to establish the standards needed for
true interoperability. In cooperation with the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, IBIA has created a registry that enables any
biometric device to be recognized on a network. The industry and
government also have worked together to publish rules on how biometrics
are to be integrated into computer operating systems. This is an
exceptionally important advancement for several reasons:
It allows multiple biometrics to be accommodated;
It allows the quick adoption of new biometric technologies
as they are developed in the future;
It permits the rapid exchange of information for record
checks; and
It enables users to voluntarily share biometric
information that has been acquired by other sources, such as employers,
airlines, and government agencies.
On a broader scale, the industry and its research and academic
partners, including West Virginia University, are working on new
initiatives to marshal the resources of the biometric community for the
common good. Such initiatives would focus on the critical need for an
identification component in the security programs that protect the
national infrastructure, including the aviation industry.
biometrics and aviation security
In the air transport environment biometric solutions are used to
handle such diverse tasks as automating immigration clearance processes
for arriving international passengers, and preventing unauthorized
people from gaining access to sensitive areas of the airport. This
real-world experience has proven that biometric technologies perform
reliably, and that they can measurably improve the security of U.S.
airports, help make air travel as safe as possible, and deter criminals
from entering the U.S. via the commercial air transport system. There
are three specific applications of biometric technology that can be
used to achieve a new level of security. They are:
Controlling employee and air crew access;
Identifying suspected terrorists and other people whose
presence signals a danger to the airport premises and the traveling
public; and
Simplifying the often cumbersome process of identifying
legitimate travelers.
controlling access
Federal Aviation Regulations require airports to adopt physical
access controls that prevent unauthorized parties from getting through
airside security or gaining access to aircraft ramp areas, baggage
rooms, and other sensitive airport facilities. Some controls are
staffed, such as entry gates and terminal security checkpoints.
Others--including most doorways in an airport--are accessed by having
the employee swipe a card through a reader and enter a personal
identification number (PIN). Aviation security experts have identified
this process as a major vulnerability, since badges and PINs can be
stolen or loaned to an imposter.
Leading airports have recognized this situation and replaced the
PIN with biometrics. San Francisco and Chicago O'Hare now use hand
geometry and finger imaging, respectively, to control employee access
through unstaffed doorways. Unless the employee has been enrolled in
the system, he or she cannot operate the doorway. More importantly,
enrolled employees--some 55,000 workers in the system at O'Hare--cannot
pass on this identity to someone else, and the biometric information
cannot be borrowed and used by an unauthorized party. Advanced versions
of biometric access control systems combine the technology with
sophisticated software that can limit users to certain doorways at
certain times, and can track who accesses which door at what time.
Another kind of biometric access control system is being used to
screen USAirways crewmembers as they pass through airside security
checkpoints in Charlotte. In this trial, over 6,000 enrolled airline
employees clear controls through a fully automated process that uses
iris recognition technology.
securing the terminal
Preventing terrorists from compromising airport access control
systems is an important step that can significantly reduce our
vulnerability to attacks, especially those that are designed to take
over commercial aircraft and use them as tools for destruction. Another
application of biometric technology can help to reduce a second
threat--that which is caused by a security risk who is posing as a
regular traveler.
Law enforcement and intelligence authorities may have the name and
photograph of a suspected terrorist, but they do not have an efficient
way of linking the person's identity to someone who is traveling under
a false name. Face recognition technology, because of its unique
surveillance capability can help reduce this threat. Used alone, or in
conjunction with other highly accurate authenticators, it can be a
valuable tool for preliminary identification of a threat. This
biometric operates in conjunction with the closed circuit video camera
systems that are installed at most airports. Images of travelers are
acquired by the cameras and converted into a template that is an
encrypted digital representation of the image. The template can then be
used to instantly compare the ``live'' images of travelers against an
index of suspects.
This technology works under some very challenging circumstances.
Face recognition systems that have been tested on city streets have
produced a significant drop in crime rates through detection and
deterrence. In an airport environment, having this capability could
help overcome the challenge faced by law enforcement authorities of
knowing where terrorists will be, and of recognizing them when they are
there.
identifying travelers
The new security requirements have made it less convenient for most
travelers. Airlines are advising customers to show up 2 to 3 hours in
advance of flight time to contend with significantly longer queues--
particularly those for airside security checks--even though the system
is running well below pre-September 11 capacities. Under these
conditions, customers are unlikely to return soon unless something is
done to alleviate the bottlenecks in the system.
Biometric technology offers several opportunities to do exactly
that. The clearest demonstration of this capability is in border
control, where biometrics have been used in this sensitive national
security application to routinely admit pre-registered passengers. The
U.S. has had such a system in place since 1993, as have Canada, Israel,
the Netherlands, and Singapore. The question is how we take these low
volume trials and efficiently convert the lessons learned into a
comprehensive system that both tightens security and improves service
levels. Fortunately, the tools are in place to accomplish this goal:
the technologies are reliable, standards are in place, and we are
convinced there are ways to accomplish this objective at reasonable
cost without having to resort to a national identity card.
There are a number of air terminal processes that can be both
automated and made more secure by turning to biometrics. Under the new
procedures adopted after September 11, passengers are now required to
produce a photo identification card at check-in, security clearance,
and again at the gate. By enrolling passengers in a biometric-enabled
system, all three processes can be significantly streamlined: instead
of waiting in line at check-in, passengers can use self-service kiosks
to obtain tickets and boarding passes; at security checkpoints and
boarding gates where biometric readers are installed, a passenger's
identity can be verified without having to again show a boarding pass,
ticket, or ID card. This is not just more convenient for the traveler;
it also reduces the chance of human error in security screening tasks,
and provides a real opportunity to be more efficient in how queues are
managed for everyone using the system.
recommendations
Biometric technologies can be a critical component of an air
transport system that offers both improved security and better service
under the exceptionally difficult conditions the industry faces today.
There are a number of steps that Congress can take to ensure that this
vision becomes a reality.
employee identification and terminal security
The Federal Aviation Regulations at 14 C.F.R. Section 107.14 call
for an employee access control system that ``. . . shall provide a
means to differentiate between persons authorized to have access to
only a particular portion of the secured areas and persons authorized
to have access only to other portions or to the entire secured area.''
While this section calls for the means to ``differentiate between
persons,'' it do not mandate the explicit use of biometric technologies
for positive identification of workers who have access to sensitive
areas of the airport. As noted above, Chicago O'Hare and San Francisco
have been aggressive in interpreting the intent of the regulation and
have installed biometric devices to make certain that only authorized
individuals could pass through secure portals. These systems measurably
improve physical security and simplify the administration of security
systems. IBIA recommends that Congress amend Title 49, Subtitle VII of
the United States Code to require positive biometric identification of
all people who are given access to secure airport areas.
Security checkpoint processing for aircrews can also be improved
through the adoption of biometric verification technologies. Earlier
efforts to standardize crew ID systems throughout the U.S. air
transport system have not come to fruition, largely due to questions
about harmonizing the format and features of aircrew identification
documents. With advances in network-based biometric systems, airports
and airlines are now able to simplify identification without having to
standardize or reissue ID cards. We therefore highly recommend that
gaps in security that could be caused by aircrew imposters be
eliminated by mandating the use of biometrics for positive
identification at airport gates, airside security checkpoints, and
other vulnerable locations.
Intercepting potential threats at an airport is a daunting task.
Using biometrics in employee- and aircrew-identification systems can
reduce the scope of the problem, but many vulnerabilities remain. Face
recognition technology can help law enforcement officers overcome this
challenge by giving them a tool that can help locate the 1 person in
10,000 who may pose a risk to facilities, aircraft and travelers. We
urge Congress and the Federal Aviation Administration to mandate the
deployment of this necessary equipment.
traveler identification and aircraft security
To implement a broad system of biometric controls for air
travelers, we propose a closer partnership between airlines, the FAA
and Federal law enforcement authorities to implement programs for
trusted travelers. The objective of this effort would be to streamline
clearances for many U.S. citizens and others with proper documentation.
The projects would have the effect of implementing the voluntary Travel
ID Card proposal that was advocated by the Department of Transportation
Rapid Response Team for Airports last month. Traveler participation
would not be mandatory, and by law the program would not be tied to a
specific card that could be demanded for purposes other than travel.
A first step would be to offer the new process to a traveler who
possesses a government-issued identification document such as a U.S.
passport, Permanent Resident Card, or other secure document defined by
law. The applicant would enroll in the program through a participating
airline. Biometric information would be captured from the applicant and
securely stored for later use at locations such as check-in, security
clearance, and boarding. The FAA or other appropriate Federal agency
such as the proposed Transportation Security Administration would be
charged with conducting checks against law enforcement systems, with
costs for this activity to be paid by the traveler in the form of a
user fee. Travelers who clear this vetting process would be given
access to a streamlined security system with dedicated lanes and
special handling procedures. To enable airline-related services to be
offered using the same business processes, the participating airline
would be responsible for issuing the card that would provide the link
to the secure biometric information.
As noted by those who have supported the Travel ID Card concept,
many details need to be worked out before all necessary elements of the
system could be put in place. We recommend that this should be the
responsibility of a Commission that would be appointed by Congress to
promptly examine the issues and recommend specific legislation that
would be required to implement the concept. Given the critical need for
this coordinated effort, we recommend that the Commission, if
authorized by Congress, should issue its report within 120 days of
enactment.
This recommendation for a public-private partnership fits well with
other cooperative efforts that are well underway. Notably, the multi-
stakeholder Simplifying Passenger Travel (SPT) initiative sponsored by
the International Air Transport Association also recommends the
widespread use of biometrics for travelers. SPT programs should help
the U.S. to identify a broader range of bona fide travelers who have
been enrolled in biometric control systems that are implemented here
and in other countries. Meanwhile, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) continues to make progress in standardizing the use
and storage of biometrics on passports to make conterfeiting, identity
theft, and imposter fraud more difficult for those will ill-intent.
Senator Rockefeller. Dr. Yura, I hope that you will say
some good things about West Virginia University here.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL T. YURA, Ph.D., DIRECTOR,
WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM
Dr. Yura. Me too. Senator Rockefeller and Members of the
Subcommittee, my fellow panelists, President Hardesty and guest
colleagues and the significant technology expertise present
here in this room, I really appreciate the opportunity to speak
with you concerning biometrics and its role at West Virginia
University. We greatly appreciate your interest in biometrics
and the opportunity to share with you and the Aviation
Subcommittee information about our efforts here in West
Virginia.
I am currently director of the Forensic Identification
Program for West Virginia University. The primary impetus for
the development of this Forensic Identification Program that is
here was that there were no programs like it, within the State
of West Virginia, the United States, or throughout the world
that specifically train individuals and grant degrees in the
area of forensic identification. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation----
Senator Rockefeller. I'm sorry. Repeat what you said
because you're speaking a little bit softly. I want to make
sure you are clear. That the only undergraduate degree in----?
Dr. Yura. Forensic identification.
Senator Rockefeller. Forensic identification offered in the
country is offered here?
Dr. Yura. Yes, sir.
Senator Rockefeller. And only here.
Dr. Yura. Yes, sir.
Senator Rockefeller. That is pure propaganda.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Yura. The programs that we offer here are both in
forensic and investigative science and biometrics. And the
impetus for this program came from--at the request of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, seeing the void in terms of
the training in technology and granting degrees in this area.
Michael, Deputy Director of the division is here today, and we
thank you for the insight that they had in recommending that
these were technologies that need to be developed, and
educational programs. We thank you very much for that.
Our biometric programs include areas of emphasis in sensors
and circuits, signal processing, statistics, software systems,
and DNA and molecular biology. These programs have begun to
address the current and future needs of individuals with
increased scientific expertise in forensic identification
technologies and forensic sciences.
The use of advanced identification technologies for
commercial, forensic, military, and security industries has
created a significant need for scientifically trained persons
with technical skills in computer science, engineering,
biometrics, and the natural sciences.
The biometric program at West Virginia University is housed
in the College of Engineering and Mineral Resources within the
Lane Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering.
This program within the forensic identification program is
supported directly under the Provost and Vice President of
Academic Affairs.
Just to step aside for a moment, the reason I am saying
that is because President Hardesty and Dr. Lang took this
program and said, this is a multidisciplinary program. It is
going to be under the Provost's office so we can then stretch
across the university and take the expertise from our medical
center, from our arts and sciences, as well as engineering, and
mold them together to fit the needs; which is I think a new
concept and is working very well, and is a prototype for a new
type of degree.
The biometric program efforts are supported by some
significant honors and activities. WVU was recently listed as a
Center of Excellence in Information Assurance Education by the
National Security Agency. We were recently awarded money for
student scholarships and the creation of a new laboratory in
support of information assurance from the Department of
Defense. We are also involved in the creation of a certificate
program in Information Assurance and Biometrics for the
Biometric Management Office of the U.S. Army as the lead agency
in Biometrics for the Defense Department.
We have also developed a Memorandum of Understanding with
the Biometric Foundation, a non-profit arm of the International
Biometric Industry Association for the purpose of conducting
cutting-edge research and development in biometrics for
commercial and government applications.
Effectively addressing the breadth of biometric
identification system research from the life sciences to the
computing and statistical sciences represents a significant
interdisciplinary challenge. The concept of our Center for
Identification Technology Research, often referred to as CITeR,
was developed by WVU with its academic partners to establish
the first comprehensive academic center to serve the growing
biometric identification technology research and education
needs. While here at WVU, CITeR's organization is a virtual
multiuniversity center, drawing upon interdisciplinary faculty
expertise at WVU, Michigan State, Marshall, and San Jose State
University in order to enable it to address every technical
aspect of biometric systems, from sensor devices through
software and systems. Dr. Larry Hornak, the director of that
center is here with us today also.
CITeR was funded for planning, and its operational center
proposal is pending with the National Science Foundation to
become the first National Science Foundation/Industry/
University Cooperative Research Center addressing the area of
biometrics. The goal of CITeR and NSF is to serve the needs of
its members by advancing the performance of biometric systems
through cutting-edge research and enabling technology,
interdisciplinary training of scientists and engineers, through
its biometrics research, and the facilitation of the transfer
of new biometric technology to the private as well as
government sectors.
During the planning panel last April, there were
programmatic areas where outlines--in the area of sensing and
analysis, signal and image processing, pattern recognition, and
statistical design. Out of that a list of studies currently on
are listed. I will mention a few of them. A study on life
detection in biometric devices; a study of multimodal biometric
systems by Michigan State in cooperation with WVU; two
collaborative projects between WVU and San Jose State seeking a
mathematical framework for estimation of population sizes for
biometric system testing; as well as a study of issues in
large-scale biometric authentication infrastructure at WVU.
The Forensic Identification Program and its biometric
information assurance program, as well as our broad activity in
homeland security efforts in education, training, research, and
development are at the disposal of any branch of the U.S.
Government, as well as the critical industries such as the
airline industry, in promoting passenger safety and preventing
domestic terrorism. We greatly appreciate the opportunity to
serve the people of the United States.
I would like to make one other additional comment. Your
extensive involvement with the Veterans Administration, we feel
in working with different groups to apply this same technology
for the protection of medical records and we mentioned earlier,
this is enabling technology. So not only are you talking about
perimeter security and access, but also limiting the amount of
people who have access to those records. We feel that it is
really a critical piece of our broad mission here at WVU to
support those efforts as well.
Senator Rockefeller. And that is by knowing where anybody
is at any given time.
Dr. Yura. Certainly, as well as identifying those persons
who have the right to have access to that and limiting that
information. Thank you, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Yura follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael T. Yura, Ph.D., Director,
West Virginia University Forensic Identification Program
Senator Rockefeller and Members of the subcommittee, I greatly
appreciate the opportunity to speak with you concerning biometrics and
its role at West Virginia. We greatly appreciate your interest in
biometrics and the opportunity to share with you and the Aviation
Subcommittee information about our efforts here in West Virginia.
I am currently the Director of the Forensic Identification Program
at West Virginia University. The primary impetus for the development of
the forensic identification program was that there is currently no
program within the State of West Virginia, the United States, or
throughout the world that specifically trains individuals and grants
degrees in the area of forensic identification. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) in response to this major training and educational
void requested that West Virginia University (WVU) develop degree
programs in Forensic Identification with an academic major in Forensic
and Investigative Science and Biometrics. The Biometric major includes
areas of emphasis in Sensors and Circuits, Signal/Image Processing,
Statistics, Software Systems, and DNA/Molecular Biology. These new
programs will begin to address the current and future need for
individuals with increased scientific expertise in identification
technologies and forensic sciences.
The use of advanced identification technology for commercial,
forensic, military, and the security industries has created a
significant need for scientifically trained persons with technical
skills in computer science, engineering, biometrics, and the natural
sciences.
The Biometric Program at West Virginia University is housed in the
College of Engineering and Mineral Resources within the Lane Department
of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering. This program within the
Forensic Identification Program is supported directly under the Provost
and Vice President for Academic Affairs. The Biometric Program efforts
are supported by some significant honors and activities. WVU was
recently listed as a Center of Excellence in Information Assurance
Education by the National Security Agency (NSA). We were recently
awarded money for student scholarships and the creation of a new
laboratory in support of Information Assurance from the Department of
Defense. We are also involved in the creation of a certificate program
in Information Assurance/Biometrics for the Biometric Management Office
(BMO) of the U.S. Army as the lead agency in Biometrics for the
Department of Defense. We have also developed a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Biometric Foundation, a non-profit arm of the
International Biometric Industry Association (IBIA) for the purpose of
conducting cutting edge research and development in biometrics for
commercial and government application.
Effectively addressing the breadth of biometric identification
system research from the life sciences to the computing and statistical
sciences represents a significant interdisciplinary challenge. The
concept of the Center for Identification Technology Research or
``CITeR'' was developed by WVU with its academic partners to establish
the first comprehensive academic center to serve growing biometric
identification technology research and education needs. While based at
WVU, CITeR's organization is that of a virtual multi-university center,
drawing upon interdisciplinary faculty expertise at WVU, Michigan State
University, Marshall University, and San Jose State University in order
to enable it to address every technical aspect of biometric systems
from sensor devices and biosignals through software and systems. CITeR
was funded for planning, and it's operating center proposal is pending
with the National Science Foundation to become the first NSF Industry-
University Cooperative Research Center addressing the area of
biometrics. The goal of CITeR as an NSF Industry/University Cooperative
Research Center is to serve the needs of its members by advancing the
performance of biometric systems through cross-cutting research of new
enabling technologies, interdisciplinary training of scientists and
engineers through its biometrics research, and the facilitation of the
transfer of new biometrics technology to the private and government
sectors through its membership.
During the Center's first Planning Conference held in April of this
year at WVU and facilitated by the NSF, prospective center members
working with faculty participants from the four universities defined
CITeR's initial portfolio of research. CITeR's research activities and
capabilities span four programmatic areas that cover the functionality
of biometric systems. These four research areas are Sensing and
Analysis, Signal and Image Processing and Pattern Recognition,
Statistical Design and Evaluation, and Biometrics in Information
Assurance. At the April planning meeting, nine projects were presented
to prospective center members ranging from biosensors to automated
dental record identification systems. From this set, five projects were
selected to form CITeR's initial research portfolio. Briefly, these
five are:
A Study of Liveness Detection in Biometric Devices that
will look at extending previous work at WVU in the area of spoof
detection in fingerprint biometric systems,
A Study of Multimodal Biometric Systems by Michigan State
University looking at the optical design of systems using multiple
biometrics,
Two collaborative projects between WVU and San Jose
State--one seeking to develop a mathematical framework for Estimation
of population sizes for biometric system testing and the second
developing the framework for a study of Template Aging, and
A study of Issues in Large-Scale Biometric Authentication
Infrastructure by WVU which explores the role of biometrics in the
assurance of information in large-scale information systems.
The Forensic Identification Program and it's Biometric effort in
education, training, research, and development are at the disposal of
any branch of the U.S. Government as well as the critical industries
such as the airline industry in promoting passenger safety and
preventing domestic terrorism. We greatly appreciate the opportunity to
serve the people of the United States.
Thank you.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you.
I want to go right back to something that was said here in
West Virginia, and that is that small airports--and you
mentioned international is the other. They are what we have.
And we have more flights from some, very few flights from some.
But they are us and they are many other States. So we treat
them preciously. If you are given--and I do not know who I am
asking this--if you were given a small airport, and let us say
about 30- to 60,000 planes a year, and asked to deploy the best
possible, cost-effective and available technology, what would
you do and what would it be likely to cost to cover it?
Mr. Planton. I will start with that. We have employed EI
situations in the Ben Gurion airport. We started with the
prototype that took 90 days to implement and four kiosks. It is
very scalable. And when you're talking about small airports and
large airports, you are talking about scalability. A small
airport might only take one kiosk, and we're talking in the
40,000 or more range. And then as we get to large airports, we
scale the kiosks. That, coupled with the process at the
airports, could secure that airport just as well as any larger
airport.
Senator Rockefeller. Then you better explain for all of us
the full range of what a kiosk provides.
Mr. Planton. A kiosk is just what we build to put the
biometric and smart card technology in. And it is demonstrated
out in the hallway. What we do is, you put your smart card into
the kiosk with your biometrics imprinted on the smart card. In
Ben Gurion, there is hand geometry and facial recognition that
will scan your face and your hand, match it with who you are on
the smart card, and allow you to prove who you say you are.
That would be a known passenger who has already been
through a background investigation so that we can move them
through the airport expeditiously. What we want to do is take
the known passengers everybody is talking about out of the mix.
If we have 100 percent passengers and we take 40 percent of
the frequent flyers out of those lines and move them through
and expedite them through the security process because we have
already done the background investigation--we know through the
smart card and biometrics on the smart card who they are--then
we are going to benefit both the frequent flyers going through
the airport, but we also reduce the line from 100 to 60 for the
unknown passengers. Which are going to be let on the airplane
if they pass the rigorous security checks, but they will take
longer to do that.
In the airport in Israel, 15 percent of all passengers are
now using the system to go through the airport. And instead of
standing in an over-an-hour line, they can go through the
security system in about 15 seconds.
Senator Rockefeller. That's a big--it's a big deal, isn't
it? In other words, for people to see it that way. On the one
hand, it appears to be data going out of there; but on the
other hand, instead of waiting for 2 hours, I can go through in
15 seconds.
Mr. Planton. We put the booths to enroll in sight with
people standing in line, which promotes those people standing
in line to go enroll. We also use the bank card technology now,
so they will not have to carry multiple cards. Because if you
see the credit cards coming out of our financial institutions
are the smart cards, there is no reason for it not to be on the
credit card also. And in carrying that, we allow them to go
from their carrying one, to carrying the two cards, to putting
it on their bank card.
Senator Rockefeller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Siedlarz. Mr. Chairman, I think that was well presented
here. I'd like to turn my focus to the last aspect of your
question. You mentioned earlier today the situation involving
coming through the Portland, Maine airport as opposed to JFK.
And I think the thing that we to have to think about nationally
is that anything you do with a small airport in West Virginia
better be a small version of what you do in the big airports.
Because to the fellows that we are really worried about, the
ones who have found their way in through the system, they are
traditionally going to use the weakest link.
To focus entirely on the convenience issue--which is not
being suggested here, I understand. But If we focus entirely on
this security issue and the ability to identify these people,
we can focus on different solutions for the large environment,
and certainly we have to address scale.
If we focus on different solutions for a variety of
environments from big to small, then we are going have a
system. There has got to be a compatibility in a comprehensive
program and similarity in terms of what they encounter, what
anyone encounters when they have to get through the air
transportation system and how that system should be structured.
Senator Rockefeller. And this is sort of an awkward
question to ask, but I will ask it. If you were a terrorist,
Mr. Siedlarz, would you not intuitively look for the weakest
link?
Mr. Siedlarz. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Senator Rockefeller. Why would you take on LaGuardia or JFK
if you can take on a small airport?.
Mr. Siedlarz. That's precisely my point, Mr. Chairman. I
mean, if you equip a tiny airport with a totally inadequate
security system, they are going to find that airport. And they
are not going to go through the big airport. Now, you might
argue that well, for ports of entry or for crossing borders,
you know, you can only go through a certain number of airports.
But they are not all the same size either. And once again, you
have to have some similarity in application and comprehensive
approach or else you're going to have a flaw.
Senator Rockefeller. And to follow on that, there was a
point that I have made and others have made that one size
doesn't fit all. That doesn't preclude the fact that
inconsistencies of approach within airports dilute
effectiveness.
Mr. Siedlarz. Absolutely.
Senator Rockefeller. So in fact, I'm speaking against
myself. In other words, not a one size, but a one approach or a
one set of criteria eventually for all is, in fact, the only
secure way to do it.
Mr. Siedlarz. Yes, sir. I think that you're talking about
somewhat of a similarity integrated design. All details may not
be the same because you have to deal with scale. And the cost
won't be the same. But yes, there has to be a basic similarity
in terms of the evenness, a level playing field with regard to
security or else you are wasting your money.
Senator Rockefeller. To any of you, I have this tremendous
faith in biometrics, so I guess I am not a very objective or
neutral person.
Mr. Siedlarz. You are perfectly objective.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rockefeller. But explain to me, first of all the
word iris, for example, has been used a lot here. And I'm
trying to think of how long ago it was that I learned that the
iris is the very darkest part of the eye, and the answer is not
very long ago. And this is what I meant to be doing. So that
this is new. Anything that is new scares people.
And particularly, there was one of the displays out there
where you put your hand on something. I was very comfortable to
do that, because what I found was, in fact, not just the
nature--this was not just a fingerprint or a thumbprint, but it
is my hand. And that is, if I had received, let us say, playing
baseball or--that's not very good in my case--but something, a
subskin wound 30 years ago, it would show up. It is there.
So it is another form of identification which nobody else
can replicate except this particular hand. That gave me a
feeling of security. Why is it, then, that biometrics, a new
word--and it may not be--concerns people, if it does? As
opposed to comforts people because it protects people.
Mr. Siedlarz. Well, as the industry guy, I will take a shot
at that. And if I can, Mr. Chairman, let me correct a small
inconsistency. People are confused between iris recognition and
retinal scans. They are two very different things. The retina
is the tissue in the back of your eye. You have to look through
the pupil to read it. And the iris is not quite your
definition. It is the colored portion that surrounds the pupil.
Senator Rockefeller. Black.
Mr. Siedlarz. The black part is the pupil, and the colored
portion that surrounds the pupil is the iris.
Senator Rockefeller. OK.
Mr. Siedlarz. But more directly, I think it essentially
comes from an unfamiliarity, with regards to the national view
or people's view or the population view, unfamiliarity with
biometrics. And it is remarkable in a way, because after all,
one biometric, even though it has been done manually for a
couple of hundred years, is the fingerprint, which almost
everybody is associated with or is familiar with. What we have
found in more recent years--and biometrics have been under
development for some 25 to 30 years, as I mentioned earlier.
But it did not reach great popularity until the last 10 years
because of the cost and because of the reliability, both of
which have been dramatically improved. And they are, in fact,
proven systems today. This is not exploratory technology any
longer. But not enough of the everyday public has seen the
technologies in widespread deployment. When they have, I might
add, in banking systems, in ATMs, things like that, they have
accepted them. And in fact, the large majority have found them
exciting and useful. And a means for avoiding carrying six or
seven plastic cards and PINs and all these other things that
you have to remember in today's complex society. So it is a
selling campaign and an advocacy that is needed here to make
sure they understand the true properties of the technology.
Senator Rockefeller. We have, Mr. Planton and Mr.
Selldorff, in West Virginia, both the research and
undergraduate training which is being done here. And we have a
testing facility run by the U.S. Army, a huge FBI center. It is
not far away. We are a State which over the past 75 to 100
years has always been fighting uphill. Depending on natural
resources and all kinds of things, our people have left. I
remember 5 or 6 years ago was the first time in 40 years our
population had not declined. It went up by a thousand. I
rejoiced. That is what Las Vegas gets in an hour. It makes a
difference to me. I was happy. And so if we have those types of
capacities here, and in that two of the exhibitors outside, at
least, are already doing business in West Virginia, should this
not be an opportunity for West Virginia to tap, as they say--I
hate the word, but, you know, leading-edge, cutting technology,
which is of supreme importance to the security of the people of
our country? Now, if that is not a loaded question, I have
never heard one. But I am asking it nevertheless.
Mr. Planton. First of all, I married a girl from
Parkersburg, West Virginia. Five girls and their mother were
all graduates of West Virginia University. I spent a lot of
time in section 227 at the stadium over there rooting for the
West Virginia Mountaineers. So I'm very comfortable with this
question.
You have started a program here with great insight into the
future. Dr. Yura, you are citing the effect of technology, I
think you were referring to, with the biometric security
technology, with great insight also. And as a corporation, we
are looking at that a lot. I believe that anytime you have a
great research university like you have here, that is where
technology starts. It is where it is tested. It is where it's
fostered. It's where it's proven.
When we implement solutions, we are looking for proven
technology, and it comes out of a university system. You have a
great university here with great presentation. And yes, you
should have high tech in this State in Morgantown, West
Virginia. And, in fact, you do.
Mr. Siedlarz. I could only add to that, Mr. Chairman. I
think the work that is being done by the university, by West
Virginia University, is enormously important, not only for the
industry. We should generally focus on the very small companies
with very good technology, but who independently just do not
have the resources and level of commitments in, other than
spirit, to be able to achieve some of the end results that they
would like to see with their technologies.
But working this in combination with a great institution
like West Virginia, I think communicates a message to the
people as well. It is not the message of just business trying
to--or government for that matter--trying to translate to its
constituency the value of the technology and getting over the
technophobes and all the other things that they worry about. It
shows that academics are appreciating and recognizing the
important growth of an entirely new industry.
And at the same time, you know, creating the basis for the
growth of that industry by providing the trained resources that
we are going to need as it grows and as it goes forward.
Senator Rockefeller. I do not even dare call on you, Dr.
Yura.
Dr. Yura. I would like to make a comment if you do not
mind. The biometrics as an enabling technology is exciting and
the window of opportunity is tremendous. But whether in terms
of airlines or other issues, the integration of these
technologies is really critical. But my fear is that someone
will just say I will just wrap this advice and we will take a
piece of that, and it does not work because it is not
integrated. And I hope in the future both airlines and others
that--and of course, we at WVU would like to assist in that
process, to make sure that these are integrated systems rather
than just individual technologies. Because if they are not
integrated, it gives biometrics a bad name that has nothing to
do with biometrics. It is an enabling technology and in
support, to make sure we really appreciate that.
Senator Rockefeller. I understand that. But it also brings
me back to an earlier point, and that is that when they talk
about doing things on a voluntary basis, that is very
comforting. It also means it is often very likely not to happen
because of cost or inconvenience or somebody that was not
aggressive enough. As opposed to causing them--and I never
would use the word ``mandatory'' again since the Clinton health
care bill.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rockefeller. But I thought it was a good bill. And
it brings the pressure--I mean, there has to at some point be a
pressure, does there not, from the Federal Government as well
as from others, from the industry in terms of, yes, making sure
that we don't take a little piece here and a little piece
there, but that we get after the business of doing it and
deploying it all over the country, as they have in
international airports. I mean, there is a kind of a fine mix
here of making it voluntary so that we're not pushed too hard
by it, or it costs too much for it, but also by saying this has
got to happen. And we will not make the mistakes if we can
possibly help it, but it has got to happen. So there is some
balance there that we are in the process of still seeking.
Dr. Yura. One of the beautiful things, I think, about
people in West Virginia, just as a group of individuals----
Senator Rockefeller. I can't hear you very well.
Dr. Yura. One of the advantages, I think, of people of West
Virginia in terms of doing things like this--if I pulled out my
driver's license and I had my voluntary fingerprints in that
driver's license. I think there is approximately 82 or 85
percent of all West Virginians volunteer to put their
fingerprint on their driver's licenses.
Senator Rockefeller. But at the same time, when you mention
the concept of a smart card, there are a lot of people who say,
now, wait a second. This automatically, then, becomes
intrusive. And you are saying automatically it does not become
intrusive. And so this dichotomy has to be dealt with, doesn't
it?
Dr. Yura. Well, I think a lot of individuals who are
concerned about safety and privacy issues and so on, that they
recognize the need. I think there are a lot of people who would
volunteer because of some of the surveys indicated by the
earlier panel, and that's a start. And I think as we start,
we'll have to move to a system people will comply with.
Senator Rockefeller. And all of this within the context of
the world did change on September 11, and will not be the same
again for a long, long time.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you. I want to thank those of
you who came here also with exhibits, which the public had a
chance, and hopefully still has a chance, to look at outside.
It is very, very appreciated. I think this is, in terms of
aviation, a huge subject. And I think that generally in terms
of technology and its role in how we conduct our lives in the
future. And also information, availability of information
versus the restrictions of privacy, and the tension between
those two becomes very important. We do not want people coming
from this country or into this country who should not be here
and are here with--either here already or coming with
malevolent intent.
And it is the government's first job and responsibility to
protect the American people. That is absolutely--that is our
basic responsibility. And on the other hand, we cannot--if
somebody has, you know, diabetes and they are looking at trying
to get a job, and all of a sudden that diabetes is revealed,
and a potential employer sees that they have diabetes and says,
well, you cannot have a job, we do not want that, either.
So we have a lot to figure out in a very short time in this
country. You have helped us, and I thank you all very, very
much. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Martin Huddart, General Manager,
Recognition Systems, Inc.
Good morning. My name is Martin Huddart and I am General Manager of
Recognition Systems, Inc. I am pleased to be here today to discuss
technology innovations and solutions that can enhance security at
America's airports.
Recognition Systems, Inc. (RSI) is based in Campbell, California,
the heart of the Silicon Valley, and was founded in 1986. It is a
pioneer in the application of biometric systems. Our primary technology
is Hand Geometry. The company's HandReaders have been installed in high
security environments around the United States and worldwide for more
than a decade. Today, there are more than 60,000 RSI HandReaders around
the world, reading millions of hands every day.
RSI is a subsidiary of the Ingersoll-Rand Company, a diversified
industrial manufacturer and a world leader in security and safety.
Together, IR and RSI provide integrated security solutions--including
hardware, biometrics and electronic technologies, software
applications, maintenance and consulting services--to commercial and
industrial markets and customers in the United States and around the
world. Our products, technologies and security solutions can be found
in over 90 percent of the nation's nuclear power facilities, at major
airports and other high-security environments, including prisons,
military bases, sports arenas, hospitals, government buildings, border
crossings and universities.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, one task is
certain: we must significantly increase and improve the security of our
air transportation infrastructure, and we must do so quickly. President
Bush and Congress have proposed a number of solutions, and much of the
subsequent debate has focused on issues of how we can better
professionalize and supervise security personnel at airports. These are
important initiatives. But we should also recognize there is a critical
role for technology to play in providing enhanced security at U.S. and
international airports. This was endorsed by the Secretary of
Transportation's Rapid Response Task Force on Airport Security,
established in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The Task Force
recommended in its report of October 1 that airports take immediate
action to better incorporate technologies into security procedures used
to identify passengers, airport workers and crews, and for improved
detection of arms, explosives and baggage screening. The Task Force
also recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
establish a public-private sector consortium to identify, sponsor and
test new security-related technologies for our nation's airports.
the role of biometrics in airport security
Biometric systems lie at the core of technologies that can provide
improved security at U.S. airports. Biometrics is the science of using
physical characteristics to identify an individual. Modern biometrics
systems were developed in the mid-1970s. Early commercial products were
expensive and therefore limited to very high security applications,
such as nuclear facilities and laboratories. In recent years,
inexpensive microprocessors and advanced imaging electronics have
greatly reduced the cost of biometric devices, while increasing their
accuracy. These changes have made biometrics increasingly common in
commercial applications. Today, thousands of businesses from daycare
centers to college dorms use biometrics for their access control needs,
as well as for accurate personnel time and attendance monitoring.
Our hand geometry technology was specifically designed to be used
in high-volume environments, where access must be tightly controlled
and there is a need to provide forgery-proof identification procedures.
Our technology has been engineered to work reliably in difficult
security environments such as airports, which demand rock-solid
performance even in outdoor applications. The accuracy, reliability,
durability and successful track record of biometric hand reading
technology is unparalleled in the industry.
Biometric hand readers simultaneously analyze over 31,000 points
and instantaneously record over 90 separate measurements of an
individual's hand--including length, width, thickness and surface
area--to verify that the person using the device is really who he or
she claims to be. The hand reader compares this information with a
``template'' of the individual's hand that has been previously stored
in the reader, on a server or on a card. Once the person has been
identified as a valid user, a door can be opened, or access can be
provided to an air operations area or to boarding a plane. The reading
and verification process takes less than a second.
proven vs. experimental technologies
Members of Congress and Federal and local aviation authorities are
presently being inundated with proposals for new technologies that can
be incorporated into the nation's air transportation system. This
includes many different biometric systems, including hand, iris,
fingerprint, facial and voice recognition.
While there is no disagreement that technology can enhance security
at our nation's airports, we must also understand this is not the time
to experiment with new and unproven systems. Only those technologies
that have already been proven in the airport and travel environment,
and which have an established reputation for reliability, should be in
the forefront of our decision-making process as we consider how to
proceed in the weeks and months ahead.
Decision-makers must understand that the different biometric
technologies being discussed in today's new airport security
environment are in various stages of development and not all have the
same record of reliability and performance. Hearings like this are
important for policymakers in Washington and airport officials around
the country to better understand the scope of existing and new
technologies, and to see and compare first-hand the relative advantages
and disadvantages of different technology solutions.
We also feel it important to point out that we should not be
looking for the one biometric technology that solves all the
identification needs of our transportation system. This does not exist;
there is no silver bullet. What should be done is to take the best of
breed and apply them appropriately.
RSI participated in a demonstration of biometric security
technologies sponsored on October 27 by Rep. Jim Matheson (D-UT) at
Salt Lake City International Airport, which will serve as the gateway
to tens of thousands of U.S. and foreign visitors attending the Winter
Olympic Games in February. RSI demonstrated how our biometric
HandReaders, when used with smart card technology, can be an integral
part of an airport's integrated security system.
One fact is well established and should be clear: Of all the
biometric systems currently in use, hand readers are the technology
that today best meets the essential tests of performance and
reliability in airport environments for employee access and high volume
passenger verification.
It is important that the FAA, as the Federal agency with overall
jurisdiction and responsibility for aviation security, take the lead in
determining specific airport security technology standards to be
adopted for individual airports. To facilitate this effort, Rep.
Matheson and Rep. Mike Honda (D-CA) have introduced H.R. 3101, which
would direct the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
to develop standards and measures for aviation security technologies.
The FAA would fund and carry out a pilot program in at least 20 U.S.
airports to test and evaluate the effectiveness of various existing,
new and emerging aviation security technologies, and then report on
their findings and recommendations. These pilot projects will provide
an opportunity to compare and evaluate different biometric systems.
We certainly support these pilot programs, but also know that they
will take time. And time is our enemy. So we must have a short-term as
well as a long-term strategy for the use of biometrics to enhance the
security of America's transportation infrastructure.
the short-term goal: improved airport access control
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) already directs U.S.
airports to insure that only authorized individuals are allowed access
to flight operations areas. Most airports implement this directive by
using card-based access systems to control access to high-security
areas. However, card-based systems are an inadequate technology to
control access. These systems can only positively or negatively
identify the card, not verify that it belongs to the individual using
it. By contrast, a biometric system can truly verify the person.
For 9 years, San Francisco International Airport (SFO) has been
using RSI's HandReaders to meet the difficult challenge of securing
access to sensitive areas of the facility. More than 30,000 airport
employees are enrolled in the system which spans the entire airport and
protects more than 180 doors. SFO has demonstrated the reliability of
RSI's hand geometry technology in the airport environment over several
years of use.
Using biometric hand readers to control airport-wide access not
only enhances security, it provides confidence to airport employees by
demonstrating that a major and obvious security need is being
successfully addressed. It also increases confidence of the traveling
public who can see this technology layer in place throughout the
facility. This is not a pilot or demonstration project; it is a
permanent, proven solution that lies at the core of SFO's security
infrastructure. Therefore, with confidence, we can deploy our
technology at every U.S. airport now and the enhanced security we
provide at SFO can blanket the rest of our nation's airports.
To this end, current regulations governing access demand that only
authorized people be allowed access. A clarification to this regulation
(FAR 107.14a) is needed to ensure that it is being followed with the
full and clear intent of the regulation, and calls for the use of
biometrics to achieve this goal.
a longer-term goal: automated aircraft boarding systems
In the wake of September 11, Americans have experienced more
complex and time-consuming security procedures at U.S. airports. Media
reports have focused on passengers who have confronted long and slow-
moving lines at airport security checkpoints. Most Americans recognize
the need for new and improved security improvements and so far have
been patient with the inconveniences they cause. But the reality is
that the traveling public will soon demand ways to automate this new,
higher level of security. This will be particularly the case with
business travelers who need to fly frequently, and to whom long delays
have an economic consequence.
One approach to this problem is for U.S. airports to segregate
passengers into ``high risk'' and ``low risk'' categories. This allows
airport security personnel to focus their time, attention and resources
on a relatively small number of ``high risk'' passengers. By doing so,
security processes can be eased for individuals who have been pre-
determined to be at ``low risk,'' and who make up the bulk of the
traveling public.
This type of system has been in place for 7 years as part of a
pilot program of the Immigration and Naturalization System (INS). It is
called INSPASS. Frequent travelers have a background check performed
and upon passage of this they are entered into the program. A kiosk at
U.S. immigration control is used to allow the INSPASS user to insert
their identification card and enter appropriate flight information.
Their identity is then confirmed by using an RSI HandReader. The live
template of the user's hand is instantly compared with the template
that has been previously stored in a secured government database. If
the templates match, the individual can proceed. Over 23,000
transactions take place each month at nine separate North American
airports.
A similar program is in use at Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion International
Airport, one of the world's busiest air terminals and a facility
recognized and respected around the world for its high level of
security. RSI HandReaders are used in a system designed by Electronic
Data Systems Corporation (EDS) that allows Israeli citizens and
frequent international travelers to use an automated inspection and
identification kiosk. Travelers use a credit card for initial
identification; then the system instantly verifies their identity with
a HandReader. The system prints a receipt that allow travelers to
proceed.
Ben Gurion's biometric identification system has reduced long
waiting times at security checkpoints. The automated inspection and
identification process takes about 20 seconds to complete. By contrast,
passport control lines at Ben Gurion can take up to an hour. The
project was initially offered only to frequent travelers, but has
recently been made available to all Israeli citizens. Nearly 80,000
Israeli citizens have enrolled in the program, and the system is now
processing about 50,000 participants each month. In 2002, a similar
biometric border crossing system will be installed at the Israeli/
Palestinian border to verify the identity of 50,000 people who cross
the Gaza Strip every day.
Developing a similar system here in the United States was one of
the core recommendations of the Secretary of Transportation's Rapid
Response Team on Airport Security. The Rapid Response Team concluded
``there is an urgent need to establish a nationwide program of
voluntary, pre-screening of passengers, together with the issuance of
`smart' credentials, to facilitate expedited processing of the vast
majority of air travelers and to enable security professionals to focus
their resources more effectively.'' (Recommendation No. 16).
We are confident that a similar system could be developed for U.S.
airports and the Federal Government and Congress should provide the
leadership necessary to implement this concept. To this end, we
recommend that the U.S. Department of Transportation conduct a study of
options for improving positive identification of passengers at check-in
counters and border crossings through the use of ``smart cards'' and
biometrics, in an effort to determine the feasibility and cost of such
a program and a schedule for requiring air carriers to put it in place.
using biometrics to verify immigration and visa status at u.s. airports
Biometrics can also play an important role in addressing
shortcomings in the nation's immigration and visa systems. America's
open borders have created ample opportunity for terrorists to enter the
United States. Each year, more than 300 million individuals cross our
borders. While for the most part these border crossings are legitimate
citizens and visitors, the U.S. lacks the ability to track border
crossings, or even to accurately confirm the identity of individuals
entering or leaving the country.
Legislation introduced in the U.S. Senate on October 25 by Senator
Diane Feinstein (D-CA) and Senator Jon Kyl (R-AR) seeks to improve the
ability of immigration officials to identify foreign visitors at U.S.
airports and other border crossings by using biometric technologies.
The legislation would develop a new biometric ``SmartVisa'' card that
foreign nationals would swipe upon their entry and exit to the United
States. To ensure that these cards correctly identify the individual
who is authorized to use them, the bill would authorize funding for INS
to deploy biometric card readers and scanners at all U.S. airports,
seaports and land border crossings.
Here again, a similar system is already in operation in Israel. The
Israeli Government is using RSI HandReaders in its BASEL border-
crossing project. Paired with Visionic's facial scanning technology,
this dual biometric system is designed to verify the identity of more
than 50,000 individuals who daily cross the Israeli-Palestinian border.
In an area of the world where citizens live with the fear of terrorism
every day, and where there exists a need to manage border crossings
with extraordinary reliability and accuracy, the fact that the Israeli
Government has chosen RSI HandReaders for this task should serve as a
positive endorsement that this system represents the best available
technology for use in U.S. airports.
conclusion
As our Nation moves forward following the tragic events of
September 11, the overriding security issue will be to better manage
people and access within the complex environment of a commercial
airport. Technology, even sophisticated biometrics, cannot replace
improved training for security personnel and heightened human
monitoring and vigilance. We know that even the most careful baggage
screener can grow tired after hours on the job. And the most careful
worker can mistakenly lose an ID card or a key. But a biometric hand
readers will not fall asleep on the job; it will never take a day off;
it won't allow airport employees to ``piggy-back'' behind authorized
workers; and it won't ``loan'' its ID card or access code to cousins,
friends or co-workers.
For these reasons, biometric hand readers offer a valuable solution
to enhancing security for Americans who depend on our air
transportation system and who today, and tomorrow, need to be reassured
that those charged with the responsibility of providing for the
public's safety have evaluated and utilized every available technology
to do so.
Thank you.