[Senate Hearing 107-1069]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-1069
AVIATION SECURITY--NEXT STEPS
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 10, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
Mark Buse, Republican Staff Director
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on Decenber 10, 2001................................ 1
Statement of Senator Cleland..................................... 1
Witnesses
Bevan, Dr. Thomas, Director, Georgia Institute of Technology..... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Brooks, Colonel, Atlanta Police Department....................... 51
DeCosta, Benjamin R., Aviation General Manager, Hartsfield
Atlanta International Airport.................................. 14
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Duncan, Richard, Hartsfield International Airport................ 50
Jackson, Michael P., Deputy Secretary of Transportation,
Department of Transportation................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Kalil, Thomas, Senior Vice President, Customer Service, AirTran
Airways, Inc................................................... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Macginnis, Kevin D., Member, Aviation Security Committee, Delta
Pilots Master Executive Council, Air Line Pilots Association,
International.................................................. 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Planton, Jeff, Senior Vice President, Electronic Data Systems
(EDS') U.S. Government Group................................... 44
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Selvaggio, John, Senior Vice President, Airport Customer Service,
Delta Air Lines, Inc........................................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
AVIATION SECURITY--NEXT STEPS
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MONDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Atlanta, GA.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:16 a.m. in
room 2306, Richard B. Russell Federal Building, Atlanta,
Georgia, Hon. Max Cleland, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAX CLELAND,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Cleland. The Senate Commerce Committee will come to
order.
We are delighted to have all of you present today. Let me
just say that as a member of the Commerce Committee and the
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and the Subcommittee on
Aviation, it has been quite a ride since September 11. Our
transportation infrastructure has taken a hit, particularly our
airlines. And this being the site of the busiest airport in the
world, we wanted to come here and see how we were progressing
and what we needed to do to stay on track with the new aviation
security law.
One of the wonderful people we have with us today is Deputy
Secretary of Transportation Michael Jackson. Michael, we are
delighted that you came south and we thank you very much. Give
Secretary of Transportation Norm Mineta our best regards. He
has got a tough job and he is a distinguished American and a
great friend. We would love for you to convey our thanks to him
for letting you come.
I have a basic opening statement that I would like to share
with you and then we will get into the testimony. We will try
to conclude today by noon. We will ask all of our panelists to
try to keep their remarks to about 5 to 8 minutes. We are not
going to be too rigid in that regard because we want you to
share with us how you are coming along. I would like to lead
off by again giving thanks to everybody who came today.
We have on the books now a landmark aviation security bill
that was passed originally by the Senate 100 to 0, which is a
historic moment in and of itself, and a bill was later passed
by the House. The conferees basically adopted about 98 percent
of the Senate bill and it was signed into law by the President.
This historic piece of legislation was enacted in response to
the events of September 11 when, as you know, terrorists
commandeered U.S. commercial jets filled with passengers and
used them as weapons of mass destruction.
It was an act of war on America's citizens. On that day of
infamy, there were more casualties at the World Trade Center,
the Pentagon and on the four hijacked jets than there were at
Pearl Harbor.
The terrorist attacks of September 11 have precipitated a
sea change in attitude on how we view our homeland security.
Homeland security, aviation security are now part of our
national security. There is no such thing as business as usual
any more.
Immediately after the events of 9/11, the Federal Aviation
Administration and the U.S. Department of Transportation took
steps to tighten aviation security around the country. U.S.
airlines and airports put in place security safeguards and
Congress passed the most sweeping aviation security bill in
history.
Every commercial airport will now have a Federal security
manager and the manager will conduct an immediate assessment of
safety procedures at the busiest airports in the country. We
will have strict uniform national standards for the hiring and
training and job performance of the men and women who are on
the front lines of ensuring that our airports and airplanes are
not only the safest in the world, but also the most secure.
Because of this legislation, every airport screener must now be
a U.S. citizen. He or she must pass a criminal background check
and he or she must perform well in their job. If they do not,
they can be fired immediately.
Cockpit doors are already being fortified. The number of
air marshals on airplanes are already being increased and
international flights are now providing the U.S. Customs
Service with passenger lists before they can land in this
country.
Testifying today will be Deputy Secretary of Transportation
Michael Jackson, the No. 2 official at the Department of
Transportation. Until the new Under Secretary for Security is
sworn in, Mr. Jackson has oversight over the security of our
aviation system. I might add that Mr. Jackson once taught
political science at the University of Georgia. Go Dogs!
[Laughter.]
Senator Cleland. Therefore, he will have a bulldog approach
to security.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cleland. Today, the Committee will hear from the
Deputy Secretary on the national status of our aviation
security in light of the September 11 events, how the new
aviation security law is being implemented, and the transition
challenges we face.
We are also fortunate to have panelists from Georgia Tech
and EDS, who will discuss the latest technologies to shore up
security throughout the entire U.S. aviation system, from
cockpits to off-limits airport areas.
Hartsfield, the world's busiest airport, Delta with its
world headquarters in Atlanta and AirTran are key not just to
Georgia's economy, but to our national aviation system as well.
We will hear from panelists from each of these Georgia giants,
who will tell us what security measures they have put in place
since 9/11.
I will caution that our panelists cannot divulge certain
information about measures they have already undertaken and
will undertake which could compromise national security by
benefiting those who wish America harm.
Representing Hartsfield will be its General Manager Mr. Ben
DeCosta, who will address the incident of November 16 when an
individual breached security at the Atlanta Airport. The
security breach triggered the total evacuation of Hartsfield
and a temporary halt of incoming and outgoing air traffic. That
action caused a ripple effect of delays and flight
cancellations. I might add that I have first-hand knowledge of
those delays since I spent some quality time on the tarmac of
about three and a half hours marooned along with 60 other
aircraft due to this incident. It was a scary time; the initial
reports were that the individual had a gun. We were all on the
tarmac there, no aircraft was allowed to leave Hartsfield or to
be boarded at Hartsfield. The only aircraft allowed to land at
Hartsfield were those running out of gas. It was a very tense
time. We forget that, but I can remember being in that aircraft
and we all did not know exactly what was happening until hours
later.
I would like to stress that despite those delays, the
system here at Hartsfield worked. Hartsfield correctly followed
the FAA directive put in place after September 11 that required
airport lockdown until airport security could be assured. The
November 16 incident revealed a glaring loophole in the system:
an intentional security violation aboard an aircraft actually
is a Federal crime. But a willful breach of an airport security
checkpoint is punishable only by local criminal penalties and
Federal civil penalties.
Just as we have at last stepped up to the plate to assure
greater uniformity and greater accountability through
Federalizing the airport security workforce, I believe it is
the responsibility of Congress to address this shortcoming in
our Federal laws. Accordingly, later today, I will introduce
legislation to make willful violations of airport security
checkpoints a Federal crime. We should send the message loud
and clear that airport business is serious business, that if
you come to a U.S. airport for mischief or for folly, you will
pay the consequences. During this hearing, I hope to get input
on my bill from our panelists and suggestions on how we can
best deter such action in the future.
We have an outstanding line up of panelists today who are
here to address the all-important issue of aviation security
which, as we have recently learned in the most painful way, is
a matter, as I said earlier, of national security.
I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished
panelists and I would like to now recognize the Honorable
Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Transportation.
Mr. Jackson, welcome.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. JACKSON, DEPUTY SECRETARY
OF TRANSPORTATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Jackson. Senator Cleland, thank you for making me
welcome. It is great to be back in Georgia and I will try to
combine the bulldog determination with a little bit of that
technical ingenuity that Georgia Tech is famous for and get a
well-rounded approach to these aviation security issues.
Senator Cleland. That is a good political answer.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Jackson. I learned quickly from you, sir.
Senator Cleland. That is right.
Mr. Jackson. Senator, what I would like to try to do today
is just do a quick overview and with your permission, I would
like to submit my prepared remarks for the record.
Senator Cleland. No objection, so ordered.
Mr. Jackson. Then I will talk about two things--just a
summary of the points that you made and one layer of more
detail about the measures that we have taken since September 11
to improve aviation security, and then talk a little bit about
how we are going to implement this new landmark legislation on
aviation and transportation security, and be happy then to
answer any questions that you might have about the particulars.
Last week, President Bush visited the aircraft carrier
Enterprise to thank some of our men and women in uniform for
the job that they were doing on the anniversary of Pearl
Harbor, when he remembered service to our country of the World
War II generation, and he said, ``We are commissioned by
history to face freedom's enemies.'' And Senator, I think you
are absolutely right to say that the war against terrorism is
ongoing and will be fought across transportation network of
aviation and other transportation modes to make sure that we
protect the country against the type of incursions that we
witnessed on September 11.
I would like to tell you just briefly, to reinforce what
you were saying, that we have put in place since September 11
very dramatic efforts to improve aviation security. This new
landmark legislation, which the Commerce Committee pushed
forward and advocated, is a substantial set of tools which will
increase our capacity to improve transportation security. We
must do two things. We must have world class security and world
class customer service. We have to be able to make the airline
system work well for the passengers. Our customers, as we
launch this new system of aviation security under Federal
management and with Federal employees, must understand that the
taxpayers who are using the airline system are our customers
and we are committed to providing world class security without
compromise, while trying to make certain that we move the
system in an effective and safe, efficient fashion.
Right after the events of the 11th, we did a series of
things, really putting into place over 50 specific actions over
the course of several weeks. On the first afternoon when the
Secretary of Transportation ordered all of the aviation system
down to the ground and stopped, to protect and assess what we
were facing, we faced a series of incremental steps to put our
system back together and put it up in increased security. And
over the last 3 months, we have repeatedly added measures and
assessed the ones that we initially deployed.
I believe that the airline industry did a magnificent job
that day and I would be remiss not to say today that the
industry, the men and women who worked on the airplanes, who
worked on the ground to make that work efficiently, were real
heroes that day also and I certainly believe that the air
traffic control staff at FAA worked in great harmony with them
to do the same.
So after we got them down, to get them back up and do it
with enhanced security. We fundamentally put in place measures
that worked with airports and with airlines.
Let me say just a little bit of an overview about some of
the highlights of both and then we will--I would be happy to
answer any questions about specific measures as I go through
it.
On the airport side, we basically took the passenger--a
process map of the passenger experience at the airport and
looked at each point of entry and along the way introduced
measures that would tighten up and strengthen security. We put
manpower, technology and processes in place to increase
security at airports. We worked with our airport partners who
helped us figure out how to do some of these things in a more
effective fashion and we have refined the tools that we
initially put in place over the last several months.
At the checkpoints where you come in, there are new
measures. On the ground, to provide a barrier against possible
bomb, we created a zone. We limited and then refined the
process of using curb side check-in. We have placed limits on
checked bags and the processes that we are using to move them
through the system. We have put a significant number of process
changes in at airport checkpoints, at checkpoints where we move
passengers through the screening process, new staff from the
airlines, National Guard deployments, new procedures to be used
and new tools to be deployed at those checkpoints.
In the restricted areas of the airport and the secure
zones, we have put a whole series of processes in place to
manage the security operation more effectively, including
screening at the baggage points and screening at the gates of
departure. So we have gone back behind the scenes of airport
operation and done a variety of other things as well. We have
put restrictions on the people who work at airports, they must
go through the same check-in process and screening process. We
put in place new rules substantially to enhance the background
checking that is conducted and required for working at
airports. We have looked at vendors who service airplanes in
catering and other services and provided stricter controls over
access.
We have looked at a variety of things on the aircraft
themselves and the airlines have really done terrifically well
at the door hardening exercise of putting bars and locks on
doors to provide that strong barrier against incursions through
the cockpit.
So with a variety of these tools, we have tried to
reinforce, enhance, improve aviation security. There is much
work to be done still. We have this new tool of the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act to help us. So maybe I could
take just a few moments to explain what this Act does and how
we awre proceeding to implement it.
Essentially, the Act provides a new Under Secretary of
Transportation reporting directly to Secretary Mineta the tools
and the resources to Federalize the screening process for
passengers and bags at 429 airports nationwide. We are going to
put into place a substantially enhanced team of people and a
substantially enhanced technology deployment to look for
explosives and to test access to the secure zone and to the
aircraft. We are going to continue to put money into technology
innovation that will strengthen the cockpit security on board
and we will have broad authorities granted to us by Congress to
regulate the safety and security of the aircraft and the
airports.
So this is a very large undertaking. As you know, Senator
by the end of next year, we will have deployed at airports
nationwide this new Federal force and we will have put a
considerable amount of new technology into improving airport
security.
Let me talk just a moment about how we are going to try to
do that. First, there is an important point about how we are
going to take this in a deliberate fashion, but a fashion that
understands the urgency of what we have to do. We are going to
pull together from the private sector, from across the Federal
Government and from within the Department of Transportation the
best minds tehat we can find. We have been planning and putting
in place a transition team since before passage of the
legislation so that upon its passage, we would have the tools
and the process to handle this.
We have organized and put in place some process management
techniques that have been used in the private sector
continuously with large corporations and in some of the large
deployments of forces in war time and peace time in the Federal
Government. As you know, this is an unprecedented deployment of
many, many thousands of individuals to airports around the
country, but we have put in place a very firm process of how to
do it.
I would like to describe just a few components of that
process, if I could. First of all, the leader of this team on a
day-to-day basis will be the new Under Secretary for
Transportation Security and the Secretary and the President are
working closely and with great focus on getting us a fine
individual to run this new operation.
In the meantime, we have established a war room with a
process executive that we have appointed to manage the overall
processes that we have put in place. We have a series of about
a dozen go-teams that are looking at specific problems. For
example, how do we get explisive detection machines into
airports in the 1-year time period provided for by the law.
There is not enough of them if we just manufacture them in the
current process, and putting them in is a complex process as
well. So we have borrowed some folks from some of the Defense
Department agencies who have done this type of work, we have
borrowed folks from the private sector, we have taken a team of
people internally and we are mapping out that process right
now.
Similarly, there are about another eight to nine to ten of
these go-teams working on various aspects of significant
problems or issues that must be captured and dealt with
quickly.
On top of that, we are using classical process mapping
techniques to look at four categories of vulnerability--the
passengers, air cargo, facilities and people who work in the
facilities. So what we will do is we will map out from the time
someone makes a reservation on the process side of passengers,
for example, to the time that they finish their trip and we
look at each point along the way from the reservation system to
the arrival at the airport, check-in, screening, departure at
the gate, experience on the airline. And we are putting in
place tools and staff to address the vulnerabilities at each
point along that process map. Then we will go to airports
around the country with that basic process map and look through
the specifics of that airport and make certain that we have
refined it, adjusted it and worked it.
I had the pleasure of spending several hours last night at
Hartsfield, it is my second trip to Hartsfield within the last
4 or 5 months and we had a terrific walk-through of security
challenges and processes and issues there. We are going to be
mapping that type of process all around the country.
I think one of the cornerstones as we take on passengers,
cargo, people who work at airports and the infrastructure is
going to be something that you mentioned, Senator, the Federal
security managers. Federal security managers are the person
representing the Federal Government at each of these airports
that owns in their guts, in their hearts, in their minds, the
security requirements that the Federal Government must address.
We have some terrific people working for us in the FAA who are
doing these jobs today, but we will be competing as we move
into this new environment with Federal management for the best
people possible to put in each of these airports and we will be
training them carefully and supporting them with tools to make
this work.
I would just say one last thing, try to talk about at the
highest level how we manage this transition. We are looking at
it really in three phases. In the first phase, we have, through
the early part of next year, essentially the ongoing operation
managed by airlines who contract out to third parties for
security at airports and this process worked on conjunction
with the ongoing responsibility for airport authorities.
In a second phase, beginning late January and proceeding
for several months, the Federal Government will literally
contract with those same third parties. No one is guaranteed to
have the same job, you have to prove that you can meet the
Federal standards. But we will have Federal officials
overseeing these third party contracts. We will put in place
new training requirements, we will put in place new eligibility
requirements for people who are going to be hired after that
transition period. And we will work through, during those
several months, a transition to the third phase in which we
deploy Federal workers to manage these jobs.
And so with this broad overview we will be managing the
transition from what we have today to the new and substantial
responsibilities we have ahead of us.
Senator, I look forward to working very closely with the
Committee and with you personally as we manage this transition.
We are committed to these two twin goals--world class security,
world class customer service. We can do this, it is not easy,
but we are going to do it and we are going to nail it just
right.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary
of Transportation, Department of Transportation
Senator Cleland and Members of the Committee: It is a pleasure for
me to be here in Atlanta today; I was given a very special tour of
Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport after I landed there last
night, and was particularly impressed with the baggage operations at
the world's busiest airport. These are quite impressive, and will serve
as a model for us.
My statement today is devoted to the most pressing issue facing the
Department of Transportation today: security, particularly for our
aviation system. To describe our ongoing and planned efforts in this
area, I have organized my statement as follows:
A description of the actions we have taken in the wake of
the tragic events of September 11 to immediately improve safety
throughout the Nation;
A description of how we are responding to the Congress'
leadership in passing landmark aviation and transportation security
legislation, and are already implementing key provisions of that Act;
and
An overview of our approach to standing up the new
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), a massive undertaking
that will require a sustained effort for at least the next year.
ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11
The tragic events of September 11, in addition to being an attack
on our very way of life, were a multi-pronged assault on a critical
component of our economy: the Nation's air transportation system. To
restore confidence in the system and provide a safe environment for the
traveling public, the Department, under the leadership of Secretary
Mineta, took the following actions immediately to improve security at
our Nation's airports and airlines:
Increased patrols on and around airports;
Increased terminal inspections, typically using highly
trained canine teams;
Instituted more intensive random ID checks throughout the
airport: at the ticket counter, the screening checkpoint, and the
departure gate;
Increased monitoring of vehicular traffic and removal of
unauthorized vehicles;
Allowed only ticketed passengers and authorized
individuals beyond screening checkpoints; and
Instituted a zero tolerance policy at all security
checkpoints, a policy that resulted in the intensive precautions taken
here at Hartsfield a few weeks ago.
In addition, we have tightened our security procedures with respect
to the Nation's air carriers in the following ways:
Steadily increased the number of Federal air marshals on
domestic flights;
Adjusted CAPPS criteria for more intensive screening of
all passengers to identify potential threats;
Discontinued off-airport check-in;
Required thorough inspection of all employee IDs;
Required thorough inspection of all aircraft, including
the interior and the galley, each day before passenger boarding begins;
and
Imposed new restrictions on jumpseat flights.
In the wake of Sept. 11, we also sought and received advice from
experts in the fields of airport and aircraft security, law
enforcement, and airline and airport operations--the Secretary's Rapid
Response Teams. These efforts resulted in two reports--reports that
identified critical areas where DOT should focus its attention and
which provided specific recommendations as to how aviation security
could be improved.
DOT ACTION ON KEY PROVISIONS OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY LEGISLATION
As you know, the recently enacted Aviation and Transportation
Security Act requires the Department to not only stand up a new agency,
but also to make significant changes in our method of securing the
Nation's transportation system. The Act provides great new tools to
accomplish this, and to that end we have taken the following steps in
the 3 weeks since President Bush signed the bill:
Reduced operational access points at airports;
Added Federal law enforcement officers at airports;
Overseen a large deployment of National Guard troops at
more than 400 airports;
Increased distribution of name alerts;
Required continuous use of all hand-wand metal detectors,
explosive detection systems, and hand-checking of baggage, which means
that even passengers not selected by CAPPS are subject to random
search;
Strengthened cockpit doors on nearly the entire US fleet,
and put in place additional procedures to guard the flight deck; and
Issued a final rule requiring all individuals with access
to secure areas of airports, all screeners and all screener supervisors
to be fingerprinted and undergo a criminal history record check if it
has not been done in the past; and
Established a link to the Office of Homeland Security and
other Federal agencies to assist us in protecting the aviation system.
In addition, (1) we are close to completing the development of
improved qualifications and training for screeners that will
immediately improve security and form the basis for hiring high-quality
TSA screeners next year; (2) we are working closely with the Nation's
airlines to put a system in place for screening all checked baggage by
mid-January, as the Act requires; and (3) we are assessing the
airlines' current contractual arrangements with screening companies so
that we may assume this responsibility on time next February.
STANDING UP THE TSA
The job of standing up the TSA, a new Federal agency that will have
sweeping powers, more than 30,000 employees, and the mission of
protecting the Nation's entire transportation system, represents an
almost unprecedented undertaking. As you would expect, President Bush,
Governor Ridge, and Secretary Mineta have taken intense interest in the
work we are doing. I would like to take this opportunity to briefly
describe that work.
Secretary Mineta has appointed me to head up a special task force
charged with standing up the new agency, identifying all of our
statutory requirements, and developing a modern approach to securing
the transportation system. To complete the thousands of tasks that must
be undertaken to open the doors of the TSA next year, we are following
a time-tested process management approach that successful private
sector companies around the world use every day to execute large-scale
transactions, mergers, or critical activities. This approach has the
following important attributes:
It enables us to prioritize our work according to the
real-time needs of the system and the mandates of the statute: we have
formed teams consisting of the leading experts from inside and outside
the government to address issues on a very short timeframe, such as the
60-day checked baggage requirement;
It allows us to develop a structure for the new agency
that meets the needs of all the actors in transportation, at every
level of every organization, and at every site in every mode: we have
started now to develop plans for recruiting, hiring, training, and
deploying thousands of screeners, Federal agents, air marshals, and
other critical players;
It keeps our focus on the most important aspects of
transportation security and the agency itself--processes and functions:
techniques are in place to develop processes targeted to optimum
protection of the transportation system, while ensuring that every
function required of us, and even some that aren't, are included in the
TSA.
I would like to take this opportunity to say that restoring the
public's confidence in the safety of our transportation system, and
taking the necessary steps to promote and sustain safety over the long
term is an open, inclusive effort that will consider, first and
foremost, the requirements of passengers and industry, and will solicit
the input of all who wish to contribute. In fact, a key aspect of our
day-to-day operations is our cooperation with industry and
communication with the Congress.
It is important to reiterate as well that the Government's efforts
are not just the work of one agency--far from it. For example, in just
the few weeks since the bill was enacted, we have already solicited the
assistance of the Departments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, the Office
of Personnel Management and, of course, all parts of the Department of
Transportation.
In closing, let me say that although we have all been deeply
impacted by the events of September 11--a direct hit on the
transportation system we work every day to improve--the Federal
Government, led by the Congress, President Bush, and Secretary Mineta,
has risen to the occasion. I have tried to capture this response in my
testimony here today, and look forward to discussing it further should
you or other Members of the Committee have any questions. Thank you for
your time and for hosting me in this great city.
Senator Cleland. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Jackson, I
appreciate that. I think that is a very positive and healthy
attitude--world class security and world class customer
service. You know, the airlines are in the customer service
business. They are in the security business but they are also
in the customer service business. One of the reasons I
supported the federalization of the checkpoints, the 700
checkpoints at those more than 429 airports, was the
professional level that we could get nationwide, a uniform
professional standard.
I have also recommended to Secretary Mineta and to the
President in several letters--and I will mention to you today--
to consider a very great asset to the Federal Government, here
in Georgia, in terms of training Federal law enforcement
officials. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, better
known as FLETC, is down at Glynco, down in Brunswick, Georgia.
They train Secret Service people, they train Customs people,
they train Border Patrol. They are the world class facility for
training Federal law enforcement personnel. And I've suggested
in my correspondence to the President and to Secretary Mineta
that they either have those airport screeners trained there or
train the trainers there, so then you could send those out
around America to train the workforce. The point is, I think
you have a built in asset here that I just recommend that you
seriously consider it, because those people every day focus on
training Federal law enforcement personnel and they have for
years.
Also, that center is familiar with the intricacies of all
the other Federal law enforcement personnel that are out there,
which is the point of one of my questions here.
In the scenario of attacks, a terrorist attack, biological
attack, one of the things I am picking up on the Armed Services
Committee and on the Governmental Affairs Committee and in
testimony by Senator Nunn when he talked about his
participation in an exercise called Dark Winter which was run
by Johns Hopkins in June about a smallpox attack on America,
that in the early phases of an attack, it is somewhat, shall we
say, bureaucratic chaos. That the challenges are coordination,
cooperation and communication.
I hope that in this legislation, we have outlined layers of
authority and established in effect a protocol so that the
system can deal with an attack or a breach of security and so
forth. In other words, when something happens, everybody knows
what their role is. The problem with say a terrorist attack or
a biological attack or chemical attack is there is certain
chaos if you do not have an established protocol. Now there are
60 different agencies as a minimum in the Federal Government
that are in charge of, in effect, a piece of homeland security.
We are just zeroing in on one of them here--aviation security.
But in that Federal security manager at the airport, I am
kind of curious--and you may not be there yet in your mindset--
but it does help, and one of the principles of war I have
learned through the years is unity of command, that when
something bad happens, people know what the chain of command
is, they know who to go to, they know who to report to, they
know who to communicate with, coordinate with and so forth.
In your mind, do you see that Federal security manager at
airports in America in charge of other Federal entities? Here
at Hartsfield, we have got INS, we have got the Customs
Service, we have got the FBI, you know, we have a lot of folks
in addition to the APD, the Atlanta Police Department. So at
least there is a large Federal presence here. Do you see that
Federal security manager, if maybe not in charge, then at least
the lead dog, the team leader that when something happens, the
protocol is established that that person is immediately
notified and everybody knows that that is the person to go to
and then there is a protocol established as to who does what to
whom.
But I suggest that to you because in this whole world of
response, one of the things I have learned is if there is unity
of command and coordination already established in a protocol,
that people know what to do. How does that match with some of
your thinking about the role of the Federal security manager,
who is a DOT employee answerable up the chain to the Deputy
Secretary for Transportation Security?
Mr. Jackson. I think you have got the same vision that the
Secretary and I have as well, that this job is unique in that
it must not only coordinate the security operation of the
airport, but it must help us draw together all the Federal
agencies who are working with the airport and to have this
unity of command. It does not mean this person is going to be
in the chain of command of the Customs Service, but it means
that at the airport, this individual has to make certain that
the Customs Service is able to have the type of access and have
the type of plan necessary to react and that it is coordinated
well with all the rest of the components of the Federal
Government working at airports and with our local colleagues
who are managing the airports and the airlines who are
operating their networks out of these airports. So it is
someone who must be--I am afraid I have to confess this one--
this one has to be a bulldog in this process. They have to say
I have it on my plate to understand the full spectrum of
things.
I will tell you that since the events of the 11th and the
creation of the Homeland Security Office at the White House, I
have seen a tremendous amount of coordination. I have worked
for three Presidents now and four Cabinet Secretaries and had a
stint in the White House, and the cooperation among agenciees
that I am seeing in these last few months is very intense and
just unparalleled in the experience that I have seen in the
executive branch. People are really working together. I will
tell you just one short example of this. After the events of
the 11th, we needed to expand dramatically our Federal air
marshal program to put armed, undercover, trained agents in the
air. And we borrowed professional law enforcement officers from
all around the Federal Government--from Treasury, Customs,
Secret Service, from the FBI, from Inspector Generals, from
Fish & Wildlife, people who were trained and qualified to use
firearms. So we are seeing tremendous cooperation. We have work
to do to make sure that the chain of command scenarios are in
place so that everybody knows how to pass information in the
event of an incident.
I will just say to you that FLETC is a part of our plan to
be able to train and deploy the large number of Federal law
enforcement officers who will be working at airports and the
Federal air marhals that will be flying in aircraft. They have
tremendous experience and talent and I met last week with the
senior Treasury Department officials who oversee that program
operation. We have had numerous meetings with FLETC, they are
part of the team.
Senator Cleland. That certainly is good to hear. I have
been down there and they are just a great national asset.
Mr. Jackson. That is a fact.
Senator Cleland. And one that I think an agency like yours
in a situation like this where you have to ramp up so fast,
that you need the best and the brightest that have been doing
it a long time, then I commend them to your attention. I
appreciate your meeting with them.
One of the things I would like to commend you on is your
concept of multiple points of security, we will call it. I have
had briefings--we have had briefings on the Commerce Committee
from El Al and their whole concept of security--airport
security, aviation security--has to do with layers of security,
like peeling an onion.
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.
Senator Cleland. Starting, shall we say, at an outer
perimeter and working more and more inward to, in effect, that
moment when that individual boards the aircraft. And in your
description of some of your own analysis of the pressure
points, the checkpoints, where are we the most vulnerable,
where do we need to strengthen.
And I think that layer of security concept will really give
us the redundancy that we need. As a young Signal Corps
lieutenant going on active duty in the Army in the mid-1960's,
I had a Colonel tell me something very wise. He said,
``Cleland, the secret is the reliability of redundancy''. So in
many ways, layering security, not just duplicative security,
but layering various checkpoints, seems to be a concept that
appears to work. El Al is a small airline. Our challenge here
is a huge country, a huge aviation community and as of
September 10, 650 million passengers a year and growing.
Mr. Jackson. Yes.
Senator Cleland. We had testimony earlier this year that we
were going to have a billion people--a billion passengers
flying in the next 4 or 5 years. Up until September 11, the
challenge was where to put them all, enough air space, enough
air traffic controllers, enough aviation traffic systems,
enough capacity on the ground to handle it.
But I will say that I think the key to confidence in flying
again is the extent to which we are able to be successful in
our security. I say we, now that aviation security is
equivalent to national security, and now that in effect we, the
Federal Government, are in charge, I feel like I am part of
your team as well.
Mr. Jackson. I feel that way too.
Senator Cleland. And I hope so. We on the Commerce
Committee take our oversight role very seriously, which is one
of the reasons why we are having this initial aviation security
hearing.
Let me just ask you, talk to me a little bit about your
understanding of how technology can help facilitate security.
Obviously we have a greater role in terms of security, various
checkpoints, layers and so forth; yet, there is technology out
there that can expedite, speed up lines, waiting, whatever,
pre-existing IDs, counterfeit-proof IDs, various things. Just
tell me a little bit about some of the things that you are
initially exploring in terms of technology. We have some
examples of technology facilitation out in the lobby, but tell
us a little bit about what you are looking at.
Mr. Jackson. Well, I visited with interest the display of
technology that we had out here with us today and the range of
things that we are looking at is extraordinarily broad. We have
put out a special request from the Department asking for
technical ideas that can address various component parts of
this problem and we had over 500 really top-notch ideas from
major corporations, from individuals who had a great idea, and
everything in between. They were for security screening
devices, they were for biometric device deployment, they were
for tools that we can use on board airplanes to increase the
security of cockpits and the security of the flight crews that
work aboard our aircraft.
So we are really not stopping anywhere, but assessing
around the globe and across the country what the best minds can
bring to the table. We have a short-term job to do, but we are
not looking at this as just deploy forces and get it over with
and sigh and say, ``Oh, I did my job, I checked my box''. That
is not our attitude at all. We are in this for the long haul.
The threat is here for the long haul. We want to innovate
aggressively but intelligently, we want to spend the taxpayers'
money wisely, we are going to be spending an awful lot of it.
So the technology component is just an indispensible
portion of what we have to do to provide this what we are
calling systems of systems, the integration of multiple
redundant and useful systems along the way that will increase
the probability that the bad guys are not going to be able to
do their work.
Senator Cleland. Let us talk about identification of the
bad guys. One of the reasons that I supported a national
professional, in this case Federal, system was because it was
obvious that aviation security and national security were
inextricably linked and that in effect our Federal management
of aviation security had to be linked into an intelligence data
base that in effect was an early warning system. If Interpol
picked up something in Stockholm, then we in Atlanta were ready
for them when they landed here, or at least on the alert and
that when they started coming through the system, then the
professional system began examining and tracking this person.
My understanding is that under the new law, we run a
background check on international passengers through the
Customs Service.
Mr. Jackson. Right now, we have already implemented early
the provision that you are speaking of, which requires
passenger manifests to be provided to the Customs Service in
advance of passengers arriving for a flight into the United
States. And the Customs Service is then able to take an
integrated watch list and compare the passenger manifest
against those watch lists. So that has already been implemented
by the Customs Service in conjunction with this series of
measures that the Congress has authorized.
We had earlier at the Transportation Department, early
afterwards, looked, for example, at the flight deck crews of
foreign registered aircraft coming into the United States and
have put in place some additional measures to be able to make
sure that we know who are flying the aircraft into the United
States, what their background is, establish their credentials
and to work through that. Some of the work in this area is
something that I could not talk about in an open forum, but it
is to say that we are looking at the full spectrum of
passengers and crews as we bring this new security system on
line.
We are also, I think, working much more focused with
lessons learned from the 11th, to integrate various different
watch lists and data base of information, data bases of
information, from agencies, both domestic and from our allies
abroad.
Senator Cleland. Thank you. I understand that the new law
directs the head of the FAA to establish pilot programs in at
least 20 airports to test and evaluate new technologies for
airport security. Hartsfield is the busiest airport in the
world and you have had an initial glimpse at some of this. I do
not ask for a judgment now, but could Hartsfield be one of
those airports that you might consider that would be in that
top 20 to test run, to test out some of your new technologies
for airport security?
Mr. Jackson. We are going to put in place--a competitive
grant program is going to be the vehicle by which we run these
pilot programs and it will be very important for the large
airports with the significant volume and the complexity of
issues to be active participants in that grant program so we
can deploy the high end solutions to make sure that we have
tested them rigorously. I can just say without having announced
the details of the program that we would be delighted to work
with Hartsfield should they wish to apply for some of this
pilot experience with us.
Senator Cleland. I am sure Ben DeCosta and his staff have
heard that. And with that, I think it would be a good idea to
take about a 5-minute break and go to our second panel.
Mr. Jackson, thank you very much for your willingness to
come and be with us today. This is the first aviation security
hearing after passage of the aviation security bill and I am
sure it will not be the last. Thank you for working with us.
I will say, just a commendation to those incredible people
from Norm Mineta on down, as soon as the events of September 11
unfolded, the United States Department of Transportation and
the FAA and the pilots of America, the air traffic control
people, everybody involved in the aviation system did an
amazing thing. Within 2 hours, they landed every aircraft in
America safely. And who knows but what that might have
prevented another mishap and have saved lives. So that was an
incredible achievement and yet our task is even greater now, to
secure the nation's airways so that our public can get back to
flying again, which is what we all want to do.
Thank you, Mr. Jackson, for being with us.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you very much.
Senator Cleland. We will take a 5-minute break.
[Recess.]
Senator Cleland. We will come back to order here. We will
have our panelists take their seats, if you will. Thank you
very much for coming, gentlemen.
We would like to lead off today with Mr. Ben DeCosta, who
is on the front lines of aviation security here, running the
busiest airport in the world. We are delighted to have him here
today and some members of his security team, Colonel Brooks and
Richard Duncan.
Mr. DeCosta, would you like to share with us some thoughts?
STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN R. DECOSTA, AVIATION GENERAL MANAGER,
HARTSFIELD ATLANTA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Mr. DeCosta. Good morning, and thank you. It is a pleasure
being here with you. We very much appreciate the focus and
emphasis that you have given airport security.
As you mentioned in your opening remarks, Hartsfield is the
largest economic generator in the southeast and the busiest
airport in the entire world. I appreciate this opportunity to
participate in this hearing on these matters of immense
importance.
I have abbreviated my testimony for the purposes of this
hearing and would like to request that the entire testimony be
submitted for the record.
Senator Cleland. No objection, so ordered.
Mr. DeCosta. Few topics are as important to our Nation
right now as airport security. In the aftermath of September
11, it is essential that we do all we can to bolster the
security at our nation's airports and restore the confidence of
the traveling public.
As the world's busiest airport, more than 80 million
passengers annually pass through our gates. We want to do
everything we can to ensure the safety of those passengers and
visitors.
Security has always been and will continue to be a top
priority at Hartsfield. In 1999, the Atlanta City Council
encoded Federal security regulations into our city ordinances
which has allowed Hartsfield to assess fines and other
penalties against companies and individuals who violate our
security rules.
For more than 2 years, Hartsfield has given employees
financial incentives also to challenge workers in secured areas
who lack proper identification and our security checkpoints are
among the world's most effective with some of the lowest error
rates in the nation, despite the fact that we screen tens of
millions of people every year. Security, therefore, has always
been of high importance to us at Hartsfield.
In the wake of September 11, we have redoubled our efforts
to make the airport secure and also to reassure the traveling
public. We have fully implemented each and every Federal
security regulation and measure and bolstered them with
security reinforcements from the Atlanta Police Department,
from Federal law enforcement agencies and from neighboring
municipalities such as Clayton County.
We have welcomed the deployment of the Georgia Sky Guards
to help monitor security screening operations. Here in the
audience today is Colonel Bill Thomas, who is the leader of the
National Guard at Hartsfield. Currently, National Guardsmen are
employed at checkpoints and on the concourses. Their presence
enhances the confidence of the traveling public.
We also welcome enactment of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act and the subsequent creation of a
Transportation Security Agency. We are confident those measures
will further enhance our security efforts and we are hopeful
they will be effective in securing additional funding for
airport security.
In your opening remarks, and I have heard you say that
September 11 has really hurt the airlines and the aviation
industry. I would just like to remind everyone that the
airports have also been hurt with increased expenses and
lowering of our revenues.
As you know, funding for enhanced security is of utmost
importance. Hartsfield has devoted tremendous resources to
fully implement the new security measures, even as revenues
have fallen due to reduced air travel. We are allocating more
than one million dollars per month on increased law enforcement
alone. Unlike air carriers, airports have not received Federal
funding to offset the increased costs of doing business in a
post-September 11 world. We need your help to ensure that
airports receive funds earmarked specifically for enhanced
security. In the past, security projects have had to compete
for funds with other airport improvement projects. We would
like to see airport funding remain at current levels while
Congress creates a separate program to fund aviation security
improvements.
Airports are the major hubs of our nation's transportation
system and it is essential that we invest in security of those
facilities and the safety of those who visit them.
The Aviation, Transportation and Security Act, combined
with the necessary funding, will make tremendous in-roads in
bolstering airport security. The Act, however, contains
deadlines that the Transportation Security Agency, air carriers
and airports may find difficult to meet. Some say the deadlines
are impossible. Most notable are the requirements to screen 100
percent of checked bags within 60 days and the deployment of
explosive detection systems within 1 year. Obtaining the
necessary personnel to meet the 60-day requirement could be
very, very problemmatic. There are also concerns about the
physical requirements--that means the facilities, terminal
facilities--and the lack of facilities to accomplish the
deployment of these explosive detection devices. My staff
anticipates that we would need somewhere north of 60 such
machines to satisfy the peak demands at Hartsfield. Our
engineers and planners are reviewing space requirements,
facility designs and other issues to support the installation
of new equipment as it becomes available.
We applaud provisions of the Act that will add $2.50 to
every flight to pay for security. Again, we hope Congress will
restrict the use of those funds to airport security
requirements. As you know, we currently collect funds to
support Federal inspections at our airports. However, we have
faced a challenge of low Federal staffing levels during peak
international travel times. This is true of both INS and
Customs staffing. We cannot afford to face those obstacles when
it comes to the federalization of checkpoint screening.
Hopefully, the new funds will provide for sufficient
numbers of Federal screeners to ensure that the traveling
public will spend less than 10 minutes in line at any security
screening point. Again, echoing what Mr. Jackson said, world
class security and world class customer service. Our customers
are demanding faster, better and more secure services at ticket
counters, security screening areas and other areas of the
airport. We hope that the Transportation Security Agency will
embrace customer service as one of its security cornerstones.
It is obvious they will, since Secretary Mineta has said so.
Finally, Section 114 of the Act must be expanded to punish
individuals who violate security rules and regulations at
airports. Currently, the Act increases penalties for
individuals who assault or intimidate security personnel at
airports or on aircraft; however, there are no Federal
penalties imposed on individuals who commit other serious
security breaches. A recent breach in our security apparatus,
for instance, revealed that there are no Federal penalties for
such breaches of security.
Airports are being asked to bolster security and taxpayers
and travelers are being asked to spend billions for additional
security measures to ensure the safety at our airports and yet,
flagrant, willful violations of those security measures
apparently are not against the law. We at Hartsfield believe
that they ought to be. We agree with you, Senator Congress must
enact tough Federal penalties that will deter individuals from
breaching airport security. Such breaches are a threat to the
safety of thousands of passengers and visitors. They destroy
public confidence in security systems taxpayers and travelers
have spent billions of dollars to erect. Security breaches
inconvenience thousands while costing millions of dollars in
flight delays and lost productivity. They ought to be against
the law and there ought to be strong penalties for those who
violate airport security.
I would like to thank you again for allowing Hartsfield to
join you in this important hearing. We are proud of our efforts
to increase security while maintaining our ability to provide
quality customer service. We appreciate your focus, Senator
Cleland, and that of the Committee on this important topic and
for your efforts to help enhance security at our nation's
airports. We look forward to working with the Committee and the
Federal agencies to help re-establish the public's trust and
confidence in safe and efficient air travel.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DeCosta follows:]
Prepared Statement of Benjamin R. DeCosta, Aviation General Manager,
Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport
Good Morning, I am Ben DeCosta, the Aviation General Manager for
Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport. I would like; to thank
Senator Cleland and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation for holding this hearing to shed light on this critical
issue. Few topics are as important to our Nation right now as airport
security. In the aftermath of September 11, it is essential that we do
all we can to bolster the security of our nation's airports and to
restore the confidence of the traveling public. As the world's busiest
airport, more than 80 million passengers annually pass through our
gates. We want to do everything we can to ensure the safety of those
passengers and visitors.
Security has always been a priority at Hartsfield, and we have been
very proactive in the implementation and enforcement of aviation
security rules. In October 1999, we implemented two programs aimed at
improving employee security awareness and compliance with rules. Our
first program focused on security compliance and enforcement, while the
other program focused on rewarding individuals for actively
participating in our security program. We asked the Atlanta City
Council to integrate into the City's Aviation Code the Federal Aviation
Regulation's individual responsibility provisions. This ordinance
allows me to assess monetary and other penalties against companies and
individuals for violating security rules. As a result of this
ordinance, we have seen a much higher level of compliance with security
rules by airport employees.
Additionally, we instituted the Hartsfield Harry Program to reward
employees for taking an active role in airport security. Hartsfield
Harry encourages airport and airline employees to challenge personnel
found on the ramp without proper identification. Our security staff
conducts tests throughout the airport to monitor compliance with
security regulations. If an employee challenges ``Harry,''--a security
staffer who has entered a secured area without wearing proper
identification--that alert employee receives a $25 check and becomes
eligible for a quarterly drawing that awards $500 to the winner. Our
compliance and enforcement program and Hartsfield Harry Program are two
examples of our commitment to creating a safe and secure environment
for the traveling public and airport employees.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 tragedy, we have reviewed our
security posture and have fully implemented all necessary security
measures to further enhance our security program. On September 11, we
increased our law enforcement support by 300 percent, thanks to the
tremendous support received from the city of Atlanta Police Department,
Federal law enforcement agencies and other local municipalities. In
fact, the Clayton County Police Department is actively patrolling the
outer perimeter of the airport. The mutual aid received from these
agencies allowed us to quickly evacuate the airport, search the
terminal building and prepare the airport for the reception of
passengers on September 13, 2001. We also welcomed the deployment of
the Georgia Sky Guards to assist in the monitoring of security
screening operations. We were pleased when Guardsmen were given
authority to support our law enforcement efforts in other areas of the
airport, such as on the concourses.
The airport community has responded positively to our increased
security awareness through its involvement in the Airport Security
Consortium. Our consortium, under the leadership and direction of our
Aviation Security Manager, Richard Duncan, is meeting regularly to
review security directives and assess their impact on airport
operations. The consortium motto is ``Security is Everybody's
Business;'' therefore, it insists on the complete involvement of all
partners while implementing security measures. The consortium developed
plans for revalidating security badges, searching incoming vehicles and
reducing the number of access portals while maintaining our ability to
provide quality customer services to our passengers and employees. We
have devoted a tremendous amount of resources to ensure the full
implementation of the additional security requirements, even though our
revenues have decreased as a result of the reduced air travel. We are
spending more than a million dollars per month on increased law
enforcement coverage. Unlike the air carriers, airports have not
received Federal funding to offset the increased cost of doing business
in a post September 11th environment. We need your help to ensure that
airports receive access to funds above the usual entitlement levels. If
we were forced to use entitlement funds for special security needs, we
would be forced to cut improvements needed elsewhere. We need a special
security grant to offset the increased cost of security and unfunded
mandates.
We welcomed the enactment of the Aviation Security and
Transportation Act and the subsequent creation of the Transportation
Security Agency. We hope that the agency will streamline the process
for airports to receive Federal funds for airport security
improvements. In the past, security projects have competed with other
highly visible and important airport improvement projects for the same
pot of money. I would like to see the airport entitlements remain at
the current level while Congress creates a similar entitlement program
that would fund aviation security improvements. Since airports serve as
the linchpin of our national transportation and commerce system, we
must ensure that our Nation contributes to the cost of creating and
maintaining a secure and safe environment.
Although the Act is good in itself; it contains some extremely
ambitious deadlines for the Transportation Security Agency, air
carriers and airports. Most notable are the requirements to screen 100
percent of checked bags within 60 days and the deployment of explosive
detection systems within 1 year. I'm not sure if the agency or air
carriers can obtain the necessary personnel resources to meet the 60-
day requirement. I have heard some discussions concerning the use of
National Guard soldiers to fill the gap while the agency hires
employees and acquires equipment to meet these challenges.
Additionally, I'm concerned about the physical requirements and the
lack of facilities to accomplish these objectives. After a recent
briefing from the Federal Aviation Administration's new equipment
integration team, my staff anticipates we would need 40 or more
explosive detection system machines to satisfy our peak demands. Our
engineers and planners are reviewing space requirements, facilities
designs and other issues to support the installation of the new
equipment: as it becomes available.
The 60-day requirement for 100-percent bag screening will be
difficult, if not impossible, to meet at this airport. Positive bag
matches, hand searches and the use of K-9 teams are not real
alternatives for solving this challenging task. We simply don't have
the space necessary for positive bag matching and hand searches of this
magnitude. Additionally, our K-9 teams must be available to respond to
law enforcement concerns.
We applaud the provisions of the Act that will add $2.50 to flight
segments to pay for security. We also hope that Congress will restrict
the use of these funds to airport security requirements only. As you
know, we currently collect funds to support Federal inspections
stations; however, we have faced the challenge of low Federal staff
levels during peak international travel periods. We cannot afford that
kind of challenge with security screeners; it is critical that we have
sufficient staffing for screening stations. We hope that the collected
funds would provide significant Federal screeners to ensure that the
traveling public will spend less than 5 minutes in line at a security
screening area. Our customers are demanding faster, better and more
secure services at ticket counters, security screening areas and other
areas of the airport. We hope that the Transportation Security Agency
would embrace customer service as one of its policy cornerstones.
Section 114 of the Act must be expanded to punish individuals who
violate security rules and regulations at airports. Currently, the Act
increases penalties for individuals who assault or intimidate personnel
performing security duties at airports. However, there are no Federal
provisions to punish individuals who commit other serious security
violations. When a football fan bolted down an escalator recently
without subjecting himself to the screening process, we had to evacuate
and re-screen all passengers at the airport. This process took over 3
hours, interrupted the travel plans of tens of thousands of customers
and cost the air transportation system millions of dollars. After
finding the individual, it was very disheartening to learn that he had
not violated a Federal law. Airport operators must have the support and
backing of the Federal penal system to ensure that individuals are
punished for failing to comply with Federal security rules. We must
have security deterrence that discourages individual violators. We
believe that a Federal law against airport security infractions would
send the right message to the general public.
Finally, Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport would like to be
one of the 20 airports selected to test and evaluate new and emerging
technology, including biometrics, for providing access control and
other security protections for secured areas of airports. If the
technology works at the world's busiest airport, it will work at other
airports, too.
In closing, I would like to thank the committee for choosing
Atlanta as the site for this hearing. We are proud of our efforts to
increase security while maintaining our ability to provide quality
customer service to our customers. We have devoted the necessary
resources to implement the new security directives at considerable
expense of the city of Atlanta. We believe that airports must get some
help from Federal agencies to continue the same level of support for an
undetermined period of time. Furthermore, we will continue to work with
all entities to help re-gain the public's trust in the aviation
industry as the Transportation Security Agency assumes its role at this
airport.
Thank you again for allowing Hartsfield to join you in this
important hearing. We are proud of our efforts to increase security
while maintaining our ability to provide quality customer service. We
appreciate your focus, Sen. Cleland, and that of the committee on this
important topic, and for your efforts to help enhance the security of
our nation's airports. And we look forward to working with the
committee and Federal regulatory agencies to help re-establish the
public's trust and confidence in safe and efficient air travel.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. DeCosta, you are
doing a great job with a real world class mission here.
May I just say thank you for your support of legislation
that I will introduce this afternoon when I get back to
Washington to make it a Federal crime to deliberately breach
security at an American airport. As I have said, I was out
there on the tarmac and went through that experience and
believe me, those of us on the aircraft would have had the
penalty a little bit tougher. But I think that is the right way
to go and thank you for your support.
May I say that the $2.50 passed in the aviation security
law will go to buttressing our aviation security. It is fenced
off and it will go to that purpose. Additionally there were
other monies, about $1.5 billion, in the aviation security bill
that will go to airports for your enhanced security and we just
finished with the Defense appropriations bill Friday night
about midnight and there is another $200 million there for
airport security.
So there is going to be some monies coming down the pipe.
The $1.5 billion I understand is on a competitive grant basis.
So Mr. Jackson here invited you to apply for some of that.
Mr. DeCosta. We certainly will and intend to.
Senator Cleland. You and your staff will be aware of that.
May I just recognize Mr. Robert Hightower, the Georgia
Commissioner of Public Safety, who is with us today and the
Governor's designee in leading homeland security here in
Georgia, and Gary McConnell who is no stranger to challenges
and difficult situations and disasters and attacks, mostly in
terms of nature's revenge on us in terms of tornadoes and
hurricanes and so forth--Gary McConnel, head of GEMA, we are
glad to be with all of you.
Let me just go back, Mr. DeCosta, to that incident on
November 6 when an individual caused a mass evacuation at
Hartsfield when he intentionally breached airport security.
Hartsfield correctly followed FAA procedure in temporarily
halting incoming and outgoing air traffic. The incident did
cause long delays and flight cancellations.
Can you tell me what, if anything, do you believe can be
done to ensure that a similar breach does not happen in the
future?
Mr. DeCosta. Well, we have taken many steps. We had many
lessons learned that day and have taken procedural, process
steps, management steps to ensure that it does not happen
again. We have employed some technology also. The public has
heard us use the word Code Orange. We have strengthened our
Code Orange procedures to ensure that it is far less likely
that it would ever happen again.
As I said to the Airport Consortium, which is a group made
up of the airlines, my own staff, the FAA and other tenants,
that our goal, our objective is to make sure that that never
happens again at Hartsfield. It is a tall order. Under the zero
defect, zero tolerance policy where any breach could result in
evacuation of the airport, we are taking every step to avoid
that eventuality. What people do not realize is that those
thousands of people who had to be evacuated from the airport
were themselves, at least those who were frail, were put in
harm's way by what we had to do.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. And I certainly hope
that the implementation of the aviation security bill and the
increased penalty, which I hope to get through the Congress,
will certainly help in that regard. Thank you very much.
Mr. John Selvaggio, Senior Vice President of Airport
Customer Service with Delta, is here today. Thank you very
much, John, for representing Delta. We would like to hear from
you.
STATEMENT OF JOHN SELVAGGIO, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, AIRPORT
CUSTOMER SERVICE, DELTA AIR LINES, INC.
Mr. Selvaggio. Senator Cleleand, thank you for this
opportunity to appear today before the Committee to discuss
aviation security. I am John Selvaggio, Senior Vice President
of Airport Customer Service. My responsibilities include
customer service functions at Delta's 163 airports worldwide
and related security functions.
We are delighted that the Committee is holding this
hearing, especially here in Atlanta, the home of Delta Air
Lines and the site of Hartsfield Atlanta International, the
world's busiest airport. We are also proud of the role you
played, Senator Cleland, in sponsoring and passing the most
comprehensive aviation security legislation in our nation's
history. This landmark Act will build on the many comprehensive
security programs established after the September 11th tragedy.
It centers, appropriately, on a Federal, unified system. The
Federal Government and the aviation industry have an enormous
challenge in implementing the new law, but we are confident
that we can deliver a safer and more secure system.
The Act transfers all security functions and activities to
the Federal Government under the new Transportation Security
Administration. We wholeheartedly support this change and Delta
will work cooperatively to hand over these responsibilities,
including passenger and bag screening to the Federal
Government.
Senator Cleland, we are pleased to see your proposed
legislation to make willful violations of airport security a
Federal criminal offense. Secretary Mineta has stated that we
must have zero tolerance of security breaches and we agree.
Your legislation addresses a void in our criminal statutes and
will prevent future violations of airport security, especially
of the kind that crippled Atlanta Hartsfield a few weeks ago.
The American public and the Congress are demanding to know
what measures are being taken to ensure that aviation security
is increased. I am pleased to report to you today much has been
done and there is a lot more to come.
Senator Cleland, since September 11, the U.S. aviation
industry has worked assiduously with the Federal Government to
undertake the following:
Carrying Federal air marshals (FAM's) on an
increased number of flights.
Fortified cockpot doors.
Conducting random physical searches of airline and
airport personnel.
Increasing airline staff to oversee security in
airports.
Conducting random physical searches and hand wand
or pat down passengers at security checkpoints and boarding
gates.
Restricting carry-on baggage to one checked bag
and one personal item for all flights.
Cooperating with various governmental agencies in
sharing passenger information.
Comprehensive searches.
Using advanced technology, (AT) and explosive
detection system technology (EDS) extensively which provide
comprehensive explosive detection, in many of the country's
largest airports.
Expanded searching of both checked and carry-on
luggage.
Conducting extensive random screening of all
checked and carry-on luggage.
These steps have dramatically improved our industry's
security and these measures have, in our view, helped restore
public confidence in our system. However, with the passage of
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, additional steps
will be taken to further enhance aviation security.
As the Federal Government moves to implement the new
security program, we must keep the customer in mind. This means
refraining from constructing a security system that is so
cumbersome and onerous that the traveling public begins to see
air travel as a burden, rather than as a convenience. To this
end, we are fully supportive of working with the government to
develop a Trusted Passenger Program, which with laser-like
precision, will focus additional security measures on those
that warrant it most, while minimizing inconvenience for the
majority of passengers who are not perceived to be a threat.
Our customers at Hartsfield should not have to wait in line
for hours to pass through a security checkpoint. We are pleased
to see that Secretary Mineta is planning to establish customer
performance standards. We applaud Secretary Mineta's statement
that his goal in passenger screening is ``No weapon, no
waiting.'' The Secretary stated,
``We will strive to develop a screening process that
prohibits weapons or other banned materials in airport sterile
zones without requiring a wait of longer than 10 minutes at any
security checkpoint for passsengers using U.S. airports.''
The new system must focus more on people and less on
things. We need to be smarter in processing passengers and
baggage and learn from the screening programs currently
employed by the Customs Service and INS. We must meet that goal
in order to retain a vibrant, stable and customer-focused air
transportation system.
Senator, we face a national challenge, the likes of which
we have not seen in our lifetime. Like the generations before
us that made this country great by making it safe and secure, I
know we are up to this challenge.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to share Delta's
testimony with this Committee. I would be glad to answer any
questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Selvaggio follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Selvaggio, Senior Vice President,
Airport Customer Service, Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Senator Cleland, thank you for this, opportunity to appear today
before the Committee to discuss aviation security. We are delighted
that the Committee is holding this hearing, especially here in Atlanta,
the home of Delta Air Lines and the site of Hartsfield Atlanta
International, the world's busiest airport.
We are also proud of the role you played, Senator Cleland, in
sponsoring and passing the most comprehensive aviation security
legislation in our nation's history. This landmark Act will build on
the many comprehensive security programs established after the
September 11 tragedy. It centers, appropriately, on a federally unified
system. The Federal Government and the aviation industry have an
enormous challenge in implementing the new law, but we are confident
that we can deliver a safer and more secure system.
The Act transfers all security functions and activities to the
Federal Government under the new Transportation Security Agency. We
wholeheartedly support this change and Delta will work cooperatively to
hand over these responsibilities, including passenger and bag
screening, to the Federal Government.
Senator Cleland, were pleased to see your proposed legislation to
make willful violations of airport security a Federal criminal offense.
Secretary Mineta has stated that we must have zero tolerance of
security breaches. We agree. Your legislation addresses a void in our
criminal statutes and will prevent future violations of airport
security, especially the kind that crippled Atlanta Hartsfield a few
weeks ago.
The American public and the Congress are demanding to know what
measures are being taken to ensure that aviation security is increased.
I am pleased to report to you today much has been done and there is a
lot more to come.
Senator Cleland, since September 11, the U.S. aviation industry has
worked assiduously with the Federal Government to undertake the
following:
Carrying Federal Air Marshals (FAM's) on an increased
number of flights
Fortifying cockpit doors
Conducting random physical searches of airline and airport
personnel
Increasing airline staff to oversee security in airports
Conducting random physical searches and hand wand pat
downs of passengers at security checkpoints and boarding gates
Restricting carry-on baggage to one checked bag and one
personal item for all flights
Cooperating with various governmental agencies in sharing
passenger information
Comprehensive aircraft searches
Using advanced technology (AT) and explosive detection
system technology (EDS) extensively, which provide comprehensive
explosive detection, in many of the country's largest airports
Expanded searching of both checked and carry on baggage
Conducting extensive random screening of all checked and
carry-on luggage
With the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
additional steps will be taken to further enhance aviation security.
As the Federal Government moves to implement the new security
program, we must keep the customer in mind as we move forward. This
means refraining from constructing a security system that is so
cumbersome and onerous that the traveling public begins to see air
travel as a burden, rather than a convenience. To this end, we are
fully supportive of working with the government to develop Trusted
Passenger Programs which, with laser-like precision, will focus
additional security measures on those that warrant it most, while
minimizing inconvenience for the majority of passengers who are not
perceived to be a threat. Our customers at Hartsfield should not have
to wait in line for hours to pass through a security checkpoint. We are
pleased to see that Secretary Mineta is planning to establish customer
performance standards.
The new system must focus more on people and less on things. We
need to be smarter in processing passengers and baggage and learn from
the programs currently employed by the Customs Service and INS.
We applaud Secretary Mineta's statement that his goal in passenger
screening is ``No weapons, no waiting.'' The Secretary stated,
``We will strive to develop a screening process that
prohibits weapons or other banned materials in airport sterile
zones without requiring a wait of longer than 10 minutes at any
security checkpoint for passengers using U.S. airports.''
We must meet that goal in order to retain a vibrant, stable and
customer-focused air transport system.
Senator, we face a national challenge the likes of which we have
not seen in our lifetime. Like the generations before us that made this
country great by making it safe and secure, I know we are up to this
challenge.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to share Delta's testimony
with this Committee. I would be glad to answer any questions you might
have.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Selvaggio.
Do you feel that air travel is safer and more secure today
than it was September 10?
Mr. Selvaggio. I think to be perhaps a bit redundant, we
have enacted so many new layers in the fabric of security, that
it is vastly safer today than it was on September 10.
Mr. Jackson mentioned several of the things we did. In my
testimony, I also did. But I would like to point out that we
have really put a lot of attention on the people. We have
ensured that all Delta people and the contractors who service
us on the ramp are inspected. We have revalidated all of our
employee identification badges, including comparing all the
names with the FBI watch list. We mentioned that we fortified
cockpit doors on our airplanes. In addition to that, Delta has
also introduced a prototype of a video system on board the
airplane which enables the crew to see what is going on inside
the aircraft.
But essentially, our mission is that, you know, we want to
ensure that the passenger screening process scrutinizes those
passengers who we know the least about and we try to direct our
efforts there.
Senator Cleland. Do you think that the federalization of
our system, the unified system, with its intelligence-gathering
capability and intelligence-sharing capability will indeed be
able to do exactly what you suggest, focus more on passengers
rather than on things?
Mr. Selvaggio. We think that is a very noble objective. We
have got great technology today that can help us take a
passenger from the time they book--you mentioned an example of
a passenger boarding an aircraft in Sweden, Stockholm I think,
and having the United States get a heads up while they are en
route. We believe that we can start that process when a
passenger books a reservation. We think that we have the
technological capabilities to determine if that is a trusted
passenger or not. We know that the resources available include
the FBI watch list as well as other law enforcement data bases
as well as Federal Government and airline data bases, and we
think that if you can combine the data bases and the wealth of
information we have with the technology we have, we think that
we can go a long way to improving security before the customer
or the passenger even gets to the airport.
Senator Cleland. How do you think you are going to fare
with the challenge of checking all checked baggage that goes in
the belly of an aircraft within the next year, having December
31 as that deadline? How do you think you will be able to meet
that?
Mr. Selvaggio. We believe it is going to be extremely
challenging and that the screening process will have to include
some element of increasing the computer assisted profiling
system that we have today. We plan to use every means available
from the sniff dogs to hand searching bags as well as the EDS
machines that are available. However, as Mr. DeCosta mentioned
at the Atlanta airport, for example, we are dreadfully short of
the number of machines it would take. We are also very mindful
of the fact that we do not want to make the system so
burdensome for the customer that the customer will look for
other means of travel.
We are very aware that a good portion of our business
travel here in Atlanta uses aircraft in lieu of driving. So if
the cumbersome--if it becomes too cumbersome to check in an
airport, we are concerned that people will drive. So we have to
use every ability, every means we have to enhance this process
and try to get that 10-minute check-in delay to be the maximum
we can live with.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
Mr. Tom Kalil, Senior Vice President of Customer Service is
with us today representing AirTran and we are just delighted to
have you here, Mr. Kalil. Some words, please.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS KALIL, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, CUSTOMER
SERVICE, AIRTRAN AIRWAYS, INC.
Mr. Kalil. Thank you very much, Senator Cleland. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear at this very important
hearing.
As a veteran of some 42 years of service in the airline
industry, I want to thank you, Senator, on behalf of AirTran
Airways, for your important work on the Aviation Subcommittee.
We appreciate your tireless efforts to ensure the safety of our
national air transportation system and we thank you for
conducting this important hearing today here in Atlanta. I also
would like to thank Secretary Jackson for his leadership on
security and so m any other key issues affecting
transportation.
Senator, AirTran Airways is the second largest carrier at
Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport. We flew more than 7.5
million passengers last year and we are proud of the role of
AirTran in providing affordable and efficient air service to
the traveling public in 36 cities.
I am also pleased to report to you today that despite the
unprecedented challenges since September 11, AirTran is well
positioned to succeed. We are among the very few airlines which
are actually bigger today than we were on September 10th. We
have increased our capacity by about 5 percent because we
believe we can succeed in bringing our service to markets where
service has been curtailed or abandoned by other carriers. We
are particularly focusing our growth in small- and medium-sized
markets.
Our ability to succeed is largely the results of the
sacrifice and hard work of our employees. Shortly after
September 11, our pilots and mechanics, through a combination
of pay reductions and work rule changes, voluntarily reduced
payroll costs by almost 20 percent. Our corporate officers and
other levels of management made similar sacrifices. That effort
preserved our ability to survive and compete and it largely
prevented mandatory layoffs. The compensation reduction for our
pilots and mechanics has been restored, although pay cuts for
corporate officers and management remain in place.
I should add, Senator, that your strong support and
successful enactment of the Aviation Safety and Stabilization
Act was essential. Without the funding and the expectation of
loan guarantees, I can assure you that most major and regional
carriers could have been in bankruptcy by now, and the national
economy would be in genuine chaos.
However, we still have a way to go. Airlines will not
regain their full passenger loads and levels of service until
and unless the public has complete confidence in their safety
and their convenience when they fly.
At AirTran Airways, the security and safety of our
passengers has always been our No. 1 priority and we have
redoubled those efforts since September 11th.
We are proud of the fact that AirTran Airways was the first
carrier in the Nation to complete the installation of FAA-
approved cockpit door protection systems. Those doors cannot be
rammed in, pulled open, or otherwise breached by a passenger.
In addition, AirTran will be offering voluntary self-defense
training to our flight attendants to provide additional
security for our passengers and staff in the aircraft cabin.
We are also proud that AirTran in Atlanta and thrutout our
entire system fully trained all of our own employees in the
security measures that were enacted after September 11, and we
contract no employees to do that. The FAA has been very pleased
with our results and have commended our personnel on a number
of occasions.
As we have seen from the exhibits today, technology is an
important component of security. We are reviewing a number of
promising new options ranging from new explosive and weapons
detection devices to biometric identification cards for airport
personnel and crew. We hope that the new retina scanning and
fingerprint identification systems can be deployed. Later this
identification could be extended to passengers who volunteer
for security background check in order to receive expedited
security screening at airports.
Senator, at AirTran, we believe there are three pillars to
good security. No. 1 is the requirement for highly professional
personnel with the best possible training and supervision. No.
2 is the best and most reliable security equipment and
facilities. No. 3 is a consistent, comprehensive and workable
Federal security plan.
The heart and soul of the system is the quality and
training of our people. No matter how good our equipment and
procedures may be, they are only as good as the people who
operate them.
Technology is vitally important, particularly because it
makes the system faster. People were patient during the busy
Thanksgiving travel period, but patience will wear thin over
time. Reliable technology--particularly the increased
automation of our systems--is mandatory if we are going to
bring passengers back to flying.
We must keep in mind that our current security systems are
operating on the basis of a 15 to 20 percent reduction in
capacity imposed by most airlines. When those capacity
reductions are restored, we must be able to safely accommodate
the increased volume of passengers and bags without increasing
security delays.
In all respects, we must have a consistent, national
system. An FAA security inspector in Dallas or Denver must
impose the same high standards as one in Miami or Myrtle Beach,
because we are only as strong as our weakest link. Our general
impression from pilots and crew members is that security
practices are inconsistent from airport to airport.
Finally, Senator Cleland, I hope that Congress will revisit
the issue of how to pay for this system. With the imposition of
the new $2.50 security fee per flight segment, taxes and fees
now comprise as much as 26 percent of the price of a ticket.
This is as much as a 35 percent increase in the cost of ticket
taxes to passengers. We know from our own experience that these
marginal increases have a clear and negative impact on
stimulating air travel.
Senator, that concludes my remarks and again, I thank you
for the opportunity to appear at your hearing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kalil follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Kalil, Senior Vice President,
Customer Service, AirTran Airways, Inc.
Senator Cleland, members of the commerce committee staff, and
guests, I appreciate the opportunity to appear at this important
hearing.
As a veteran of some 42 years of service in the airline industry, I
want to thank you, Senator, on behalf of AirTran Airways for your
important work on the Aviation Subcommittee. We appreciate your
tireless efforts to ensure the safety of our national air
transportation system, and we thank you for conducting this hearing in
Atlanta. I also would like to thank Secretary Jackson for his
leadership on security and so many other key issues affecting
transportation.
Senator, AirTran Airways is the second-largest carrier at
Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport. We flew more than 7.5 million
passengers last year, and we are proud of the role of AirTran in
providing affordable and efficient air service to the traveling public
from 36 cities.
I am pleased to report to you that, despite the unprecedented
challenges since September 11, AirTran is well positioned to succeed.
We are among the very few airlines that are actually bigger today than
on September 10. We have increased our capacity by about 5 percent
because we believe we can succeed in bringing our service to markets
where service has been abandoned or curtailed by other carriers. We
particularly are focusing our growth in small and medium sized markets.
Our ability to succeed is largely the result of the sacrifice and
hard work of our employees. Shortly after September 11, our pilots and
mechanics, through a combination of pay reductions and work rule
changes, voluntarily reduced payroll costs by almost 20 percent. Our
corporate officers and other levels of management made similar
sacrifices. That effort preserved our ability to survive and compete,
and it largely prevented mandatory lay-offs. The compensation
reductions for pilots and mechanics have been restored, although pay
cuts for corporate officers and management remain in place.
I should add, Senator, that your strong support and the successful
enactment of the aviation safety and stabilization act was essential.
Without the funding and expectation of loan guarantees, I can assure
you that most major and regional carriers could have been in bankruptcy
by now, and our national economy would be in genuine chaos.
However, we still have a way to go. Airlines will not regain their
full passenger loads and levels of service until and unless the public
has complete confidence in their safety and their convenience when they
fly.
At AirTran Airways, the security and safety of our passengers has
always been our No. 1 priority, and we have redoubled those efforts
since the tragedies of September 11.
We are proud of the fact that AirTran Airways was the first carrier
in the Nation to complete the installation of FAA-approved cockpit door
protection systems. Those doors cannot be rammed in, pulled open, or
otherwise breached by a passenger. In addition, AirTran will be
offering voluntary self-defense training to our flight attendants to
provide additional security for our passengers and staff in the
aircraft cabin.
We also are proud that AirTran was the first carrier in Atlanta to
fully train our own personnel in the new FAA security procedures. We
hire no contract employees to conduct security checks--all of those
personnel are AirTran employees. The FAA has been very pleased with our
results and commended our personnel on a number of occasions.
As we have seen from the exhibits today, technology is an important
component of security. We are reviewing a number of promising new
options, ranging from new explosive and weapons detection devices to
biometric identification cards for airport personnel and crew. We hope
that the new retina scanning and fingerprint identification systems can
be deployed. Later, this identification could be extended to passengers
who volunteer for a security background check in order to receive
expedited security screening at the airport.
Senator, at AirTran we believe there are three pillars to good
security. No. 1 is the requirement for highly professional personnel
with the best possible training and supervision. No. 2 is the best and
most reliable security equipment and facilities. No. 3 is a consistent,
comprehensive, and workable Federal security plan.
The heart and soul of the system is the quality and training of our
people. No matter how good our equipment and procedures may be, they
are only as good as the people who operate them.
Technology is vitally important, particularly because it makes the
system work faster. People were patient during the busy Thanksgiving
travel period, but patience will wear thin over time. Reliable
technology--particularly the increased automation of our systems--is
mandatory if we are to bring all of our passengers back to flying.
We must keep in mind that our current security systems are
operating on the basis of the 15 to 20 percent reductions in capacity
imposed by most airlines. When those capacity reductions are restored,
we must be able to safely accommodate the increased volume of
passengers and bags without increasing security delays.
In all respects, we must have a consistent, national system. An FAA
security supervisor in Dallas or Denver must impose the same high
standards as one in Miami or Myrtle Beach because we are only as strong
as our weakest link. Our general impression from our pilots and crews
is that security practices are inconsistent from airport to airport.
Finally, Senator Cleland, I hope that the Congress will revisit the
issue of how to pay for this system. With the imposition of the new
$2.50 security fee per flight segment, taxes and fees now comprise as
much as 26 percent of the price of a ticket. That is as much as a 35
percent increase in the cost of ticket taxes to passengers. We know
from our own experience that these marginal increases have a clear and
negative impact on stimulating air travel.
Senator, that concludes my remarks, and again, I thank you for this
opportunity and for calling this hearing.
Senator Cleland. Well, thank you, Mr. Kalil, I appreciate
that statement, and you are right, we have to be sensitive to
the ticket price. That is something that we have to always pay
attention to.
Let me just ask you a question: How do you think AirTran is
going to be able to handle the requirement of checking all
checked baggage by December 31 of next year, for explosive
devices?
Mr. Kalil. We will very aggressively pursue the acquisition
of whatever technology we need, training of our people, and we
feel extremely confident that while it is going to be
difficult, it is going to be costly, that we will be in a
position to implement at the time it is required to do so.
Senator Cleland. OK, thank you very much for that
commitment.
Now we move to the technology of dealing with the challenge
of increased world class security, world class customer
service. Dr. Bevan, is it? Tom Bevan is Director, Georgia Tech
Center for Response Technologies--and if we ever needed a
technological response to help out our country, it is right
now, Doctor. He is with Georgia Tech, the Georgia Tech Research
Institute. Thank you for being here with us, we are glad to
hear from you.
STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS BEVAN, DIRECTOR, GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
Dr. Bevan. Thank you for inviting me to participate in this
hearing. I want to especially commend you, Senator Cleland, for
your many statements regarding issues pertaining to terrorist
threats to our country and for organizing this hearing.
I would like to summarize my prepared remarks and have the
text incorporated into the record, if I could.
About 3 years ago, with help from yourself, the Georgia
delegation and the U.S. Marine Corps, Georgia Tech started a
center to deal with weapons of mass destruction to get
technologies into the hands of first responders and others who
were going to have to deal with those kinds of incidents. We
did not know where the terrorists would strike or how, but the
feeling was that the first responders were always going to be
on the line and that was a good place to start.
In addition to working on technologies, we also tried to
address policy and training issues so we have some experience
there to fall back on, particularly the command and control
issues and that arena.
So we started from the grassroots. We now have 50 regional
partners and some of them are here today, including GEMA, the
CDC and GMAG, the Georgia Mutual Aid Group. Last year, about a
year ago today, we demonstrated six technologies that might be
useful to deal with weapons of mass destruction incidents. By
weapons of mass destruction, I also include high-explosive
chem-bio weapons.
When 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks occurred, we
have broadened our initiative now to expand it to some other
areas, first in aviation security and airport security, and I
will show you some technologies that we picked out that we
think might be useful there. We are also working with the CDC
on two projects; one dealing with air intake to buildings,
trying to protect first the CDC buildings and then other
buildings, including commercial buildings. Some of the same
techniques there also apply to protecting air intakes in
airplanes and airports, which are potential targets.
And then we are also working with the CDC on using advanced
technology to improve epidemiology so that it becomes near real
time and of course that is important for aviation safety
because in a biological weapons attack using an infectious
agent that could create in an airport or an airplane, could
create a big epidemiology problem that has to be solved
quickly.
And then finally, we are looking at what basic research
areas really need to be attended to--things like technology
that can help us build better composites for aircraft doors and
so forth.
Before I show you some of these technologies, I wanted to
make a couple of points. One is the existence of these
technologies, the technologies exist to help. And just as we
found in the first responder situation, a lot of them have been
overlooked by government funding agencies. They tend to not
meet military specifications for what they want, but yet they
are still quite useful. So there are technologies out there in
existence. The other is that technology can be used to foster
communications and cooperation between various organizations,
particularly the information technologies.
But we need to do a better job right now of getting some of
these technologies transitioned, out the doors of universities
and not-for-profits where they have been developed typically
with Federal money--to get them out the door and into the hands
of users. Given the slowdown in the economy, there is not a lot
of risk capital around to accelerate that process.
So that is the third point I would make, the government
needs to perhaps step in and try to help facilitate tech
transfer here.
So I will talk to you about four--these are representative
technologies in four areas I will talk about. The first area is
the sensor technology. One would like to sense very quickly
chemical, biological, radiological, high-explosive materials.
This technology really started--is about 12 years old, it has
been sponsored by the State of Georgia for inspection of wash
water off of chickens looking for salmonella infection. The
idea is that the same sort of mechanisms might be useful for
anthrax or other types of biologicals.
And then the other area is from the environmental industry.
We have gotten very little money from military or other folks
until last year. So the sensor we figure, the piece parts are
about a hundred bucks as opposed to some sensors that might be
used which are $100,000 and might need a Ph.D. to operate. This
one is very simple. The piece parts are a laser, the same laser
that is in your CD-Rom reader in your computer, it costs about
ten bucks, on a one-piece part basis; a glass slide which has a
chemically sensitive coating and the laser light goes through
that slide; and then a readout device. This is a CCD readout
device. Right now we are actually cannibalizing those from web
cameras that we can buy for 40 bucks at Radio Shack. So the
technology--it took us 12 years to get to make it simple, I
should also hasten to say.
So the technology is there and what essentially happens is
that this chemically sensitive coating can get exposed to a
chemical or biological agent and when it does, there is a
chemical reaction that occurs. That chemical reaction actually
changes the speed of light through the wave guide, which is
this glass slide here. When that occurs, we can sense that with
a readout device. A light goes on and you can tell not only
what type of agent it is but also get an instantaneous readout
of its concentration.
We think that technologies like this--and Georgia Tech is
also developing some five other technologies which are more
basic further down the road for implementation--technologies
like this might be incorporated in an aircraft or in airports
looking for these kind of agents. So that is the sensor arena.
In a couple of the exhibits here in the physical security
arena, one of the things you would like to do is reinforce the
doors of cockpits. The ideal material for that are composites,
plastics, and we are looking into what we should be doing
there, particularly for reinforced plastics.
One of the things you would like to do is you would like to
have iron bars on the cockpit, reinforce the composites or the
door with essentially bars of metal. The problem with that is
they are too weighty, they are too heavy. So we have developed
some materials here that are extruded that have almost the same
properties, if you tried to puncture them or bend them, as
solid bars, but they are honeycombed with cellular materials
that brace each other and, therefore, make it very lightweight
as well as very strong. So we are continuing to work in those
kinds of materials and I have actually talked to some folks
here in the airline industry that are interested in coming to
work with us on that.
The next piece of technology is a filter that looks like it
is full of jello. It is actually not jello, it is a substance
called hydro-jells or sol-jells and these are polymers that are
impregnated with water and other materials so that they can
catch particulate matter, say anthrax-sized particulate matter.
They also have some other nice properties in that they capture
and hold chemicals, particularly volatile or organic chemicals.
One of the strategies one might use if you are a terrorist and
want to attack an air conditioning system, air intake, is to
fill it full of volatile organics or cyanide that would clog up
conventional carbon filters, which are the kinds that are in
gas masks essentially. And then you follow that with, you know,
nice things like nerve agents that would kill a lot of people.
So essentially, the idea is you clog up the filters and then
you get stuff through them that would hurt people.
This has some nice properties in that it captures volatile
organics but it captures a lot of them. It has a lot of reserve
and would help to address that type of attack.
So that is some of the physical security issues.
The other area is information technology and you had a
hearing on Wednesday to talk a little bit about information
technology. What we did with our first responders is we--they
respond in the form of an organization called an incident
command post at one of these chem-bio events. The case in New
York City, they had some 24 of them, primarily because they had
communications problems. You ideally would like to have one
that coordinates everything. But what we did with them was we--
it is now possible with wireless local area networks and
wireless wide area networks to get communications from
individual firemen, even those in the hot zone with chem-bio
agents, to get communications to and from them using these
portable devices. Right now, this one is actually communicating
with a local area network hub which is out in the hall, so I
can get information to and from this Palm Pilot. It's
essentially a standard Palm, this is all commercial off-the-
shelf technology--a Palm Pilot type machine with a wireless
card.
Now applications for airports and in airplanes are--we
believe we could give these to security people to exchange
information, not only collect information around the airports
about potential threats, but also tell them--keep them informed
throughout the airport in more than you could do just through a
radio. So it's both a data collection method as well as giving
orders out. You know, our friend that ran down the escalator
the wrong way, well it made me a little angry because I was
sitting in one of the 60 other airplanes with my 87-year-old
mother and she was having a hard time. But the idea is that if
that kind of event occurs, we can alert all the security
people, get a description and try to get him before he gets off
the train.
Senator Cleland. Right.
Dr. Bevan. This also contributes to the information fusion
situation where you have data bases, and we have talked about
some of those, of potential terrorists. We can also contribute
data collected from airports and from the airplanes to those
data bases to try to get early detection.
Senator Cleland. Do you just want to summarize?
Dr. Bevan. Yes.
Dr. Bevan. There is just one other technology I wanted to
talk about and that is training technology. We are going to
have to train about 30,000 new Federal employees. There are
web-based training technologies that could help that we have
either used or pioneered over the years. And also a side
benefit from that is you get uniformity across all of the
population you are trying to train. A lot of that technology is
available commercially. So that is yet the fourth category.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Bevan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Thomas Bevan, Director,
Georgia Institute of Technology
Thank you for inviting me to participate in this hearing. I want to
especially commend you, Senator Cleland, for your many statements
regarding issues pertaining to terrorist threats to our country and for
organizing this hearing on aviation and airport security. I also thank
you for your longstanding support of Georgia Tech and our efforts to
address the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
About three years ago, Georgia Tech formed the Center for Emergency
Response Technology, Instruction and Policy (CERTIP) in order to
address the needs of first responders in coping with terrorist attacks
involving weapons of mass destruction including chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear and high-explosive (CBRNE) agents. We started
with first responder issues because, while it was unclear how
terrorists would attack or how our governmental agencies would respond,
it was certain that local first responders would have to bear the brunt
of any attack.
Over the past three years CERTIP has successfully demonstrated
innovative, affordable, near-term technologies for first responders
with the help of over 50 regional and national partners, the US Marine
Corps and the Georgia Congressional delegation. We work directly with
first-responders to identify requirements and test prototypes for rapid
feedback to the developers. Our list of partners feature the US Marine
Corps Systems Command, US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, National
Guard Bureau, Centers for Disease Control, Georgia Mutual Aid Group,
CBIRF, Georgia Emergency Management Agency, Grady Hospital, the Atlanta
Fire Department and the National Institute of Urban Search and Rescue.
In November 2000, during ``Project Atlanta'' we staged a chemical agent
exercise on the Georgia Tech campus and successfully demonstrated many
new technologies to deal with such incidents. I will show you several
of these today because they also apply to aviation and airport safety.
The events of September 11th 2001 revealed that the terrorists had
the will to exploit weaknesses in our aviation security and the
willingness to sacrifice their lives to use weapons of mass destruction
in the form of high explosive jet fuel. Shortly after that date,
Georgia Tech launched its Homeland Defense Initiative to expand the
scope of the Center's activities beyond immediate first responder
issues. We are continuing to identify technologies that can be fielded
in the near-term but are also attempting to identify basic research
areas that can provide solutions in the long-term. We are looking at
how we can contribute to counter-terrorism in the areas of
intelligence, law enforcement, emergency management, military support,
firefighting/hazardous materials, medicine, environment and
transportation. For example, we are now considering how to approach
fusion of many disparate information databases for aviation safety and
early detection of biological warfare attack, the latter with the CDC.
Which brings us to aviation and airport safety.
To summarize the threat: airports and airplanes provide potentially
lucrative targets for terrorists, particularly those with the
capabilities to use weapons of mass destruction. Airports and airplanes
contain dense concentrations of people--an ideal target for weapons of
mass destruction. Airports and airplanes are particularly lucrative for
spreading biological warfare agents, especially contagious agents where
large numbers of people can be exposed to contagious diseases. Finally,
there are psychological impacts of attacking airports and airplanes
because many people have the shared experience of spending time in
these locations.
This morning, I want to make three points regarding aviation and
airport safety. The first point is that technologies exist or can be
developed to improve counterterrorism and emergency response in
aviation safety. Technologies will not solve all of our problems--
safety requires dedicated, competent, trained people and appropriate
government policy which encourages cooperation. I will show you some
examples of existing and emerging technology today.
Second, aviation counterterrorism and emergency response require a
new kind and level of cooperation between many organizations at many
levels of government and in the private and not-for-profit sectors.
Government needs to set and enforce policies and create incentives,
which will encourage cooperative planning, materiel standardization,
joint training and joint emergency response. For example, one of the
main tenets in our CERTIP effort has been to bring all of the
organizations, military and civilian, together to plan how to work
together in CBRNE emergency response. At the grass roots, those
responsible to prevent and deal with CBRNE terrorist incidents
cooperate in spite of unclear, ambiguous government policy and
organization. As in other counterterrorism areas, there now needs to be
a top-down examination of policy and organization to insure cooperation
in aviation and airport safety. We also need to focus on training for
command and control of diverse organizations.
Third, we must invent mechanisms to get state-of-the-art and future
technologies out of universities and not-for-profits and into the hands
of users. I am speaking of a technology transfer initiative with the
scope of a Manhattan Project. Currently the government funds university
and not-for profit research and it also does a good job of funding
government laboratories and for-profit corporations in order to keep
essential development and manufacturing capabilities available for
national defense needs. But with business as usual it often takes
nearly 20 years to get new technologies fielded. We should establish
the capability to coordinate national research efforts on a much
broader scale and to connect near-term successes with the users--
military and civilian--as quickly as possible. Furthermore, agencies
need appropriate levels of funding and discretion to fund and field
promising research. Georgia Tech has acted as a catalyst to get many
new technologies into the hands of users in record time so we know that
barriers exist. University and not-for-profit consortia, centers of
excellence and proper funding are needed to encourage the emergence of
these technologies.
For the purposes of this session, I will categorize some key
aviation/airport security technologies in to four areas: (1) Sensors
for CBRNE agents, (2) Physical Security, (3) Information Technology for
communications and data exchange and (4) Training.
(1) Sensors are needed to detect CBRNE agents which might be used
to attack aviation, airports and passengers. While there are many
sensor technologies under development, I want to show you one in
particular. Opto-electronic interferometric sensor technologies have
been under development by Georgia Tech for the environmental and food
processing industries for about 12 years. The current technology
provides the means to field an affordable, small, lightweight, low-
power device that can detect and identify agents rapidly at low
concentrations. The current device consists of three components: a
small low-power laser, a planar optical waveguide with chemically
sensitive coatings and a CCD camera readout. The total cost of the
components, even in low quantities, is less than $100. Light is
provided by the laser, which is channeled through the waveguide. The
waveguide has up to 75 individual interferometers. Each interferometer
has two light channels, which are directed together or interfered, at
the end of the waveguide to produce an interference pattern. One of
these two channels is painted with a chemical, which reacts with the
chemical of interest. When this occurs, the speed of light through that
channel is changed and the interference pattern starts to shift,
identifying the chemical and providing its concentration. Last year,
Georgia Tech CERTIP demonstrated that this technology could detect and
discriminate sarin chemical agent surrogates. This year we set out to
detect biological agent surrogates but after the anthrax letters were
discovered the US Marine Corps requested that we begin to demonstrate
the ability to detect anthrax.
Other sensor technologies under development at Georgia Tech include
the capability to field laboratory-grade instrumentation using very
small components. Another sensor technology has already demonstrated
the capability to detect cocaine in small quantities for the US Customs
Service and could be tuned to other chemicals.
(2) Technologies for physical security include both hardware and
software. For example, Georgia Tech is developing materials which could
provide cockpit or airport doors, which are more resistant to
penetration. These include composite materials, linear cellular alloy
reinforcements and nano-fiber reinforced materials, which are even
stronger and resist penetration. More advanced ``shape-shifting''
materials that swell in response to electrical or thermal energy, can
seal doors in the doorway but provide rapid opening.
Georgia Tech CERTIP is also partnering with the CDC and Auburn
University on the Air Intake Protection Program to develop sensors (the
opto-electronic sensor, described above, is being used) and filtration
systems to protect CDC buildings from attack. Obviously, the results of
the Air Intake Protection Program could be used to protect commercial
and private buildings, as well. Georgia Tech also has interest in
developing materials to absorb cargo hold explosions and avoid
penetration of vital systems in aircraft.
Off-the-shelf and developing software systems and techniques can
analyze passenger information to look for suspicious patterns of
behavior (assisted by realtime inputs from wireless information
technology, see below). Another software technology provides the means
for identifying potential terrorists involves face recognition. Face
recognition technology can be enhanced with a model of the human visual
system called GTVision. GTVision is an engineering model, which
captures the state-of-the-art in our knowledge of human vision from the
eyeball through the brain. It is recognized as a world-class model by
the US and UK military and is used by the military to develop
camouflage patterns and predict human visual performance. This model
also functions as a pattern recognition algorithm that can be used to
identify people through facial features or could be used for biometric
recognition systems.
(3) Information technology is one of America's strengths and
should be used to provide survivable, interoperable and convenient
communications and data exchange. This was pointed out in recent
hearings in which you participated.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy in New York City, the Internet
was the only communication that survived besides the runner. Cell phone
service was clogged and then stopped working. Because many of the
responding units did not have the same radios or use the same radio
frequencies, radio communication was chaotic. Runners were used to
transmit information between the 24 incident command posts. Twenty-four
command posts, rather than one were set up because of communication
difficulties. In addition to improving phone and radio emergency
communications through dedicated bandwidth, we ought to exploit the
Internet and area networks for data, picture and voice communications.
One can imagine that a major airport incident or airline destruction
with terrorist origins would present the same sorts of communications
issues that I just described. But such technology can also be used to
prevent such incidents through realtime collection and correlation of
passenger information that can detect and identify potential
terrorists.
Some of the capabilities now available which would address aviation
safety are local wireless area networks (LAN), and hand-held or laptop
computers connected to these wireless LANS for local communications.
These technologies are affordable because of economies of scale; future
offices and homes will all be using wireless data communications to
avoid the current maze of wires and to improve mobility. Such
configurations can also be easily connected to the Internet or other
wide area network (WAN) for communications from an airplane or airport
to sources of data, expertise and help. Such configurations are not
susceptible to telephone jams or radios which cannot transmit or
receive on the same frequencies; they are also less susceptible to
radio interference. LANs will work as long as local power is available
and could be powered by emergency generators. Internet II will provide
dedicated bandwidth for emergency data transmission. Data formats and
protocols are standard around the world, so any organization responding
to an emergency could be easily interoperable.
Last November, Georgia Tech CERTIP demonstrated the use of local
wireless networks, laptops and handheld computers, and Internet
connectivity to improve communications at a simulated CBRNE incident.
All of the first responders at the incident site could exchange data
through the LAN and could communicate with anyone in the world using an
Internet hook-up. Most of the data we chose to transmit were medical
data but any type of data could be exchanged. For example, airports and
airplanes can use such information technology configurations for
realtime collection and analysis of passenger data to detect potential
terrorists and to coordinate emergency response with local, state and
Federal response organizations. Passenger screeners can easily enter
information on the results of passenger searches through handheld
computers; airport personnel can contribute information about
suspicious activities.
Information technologies can also assist in tracking down those
exposed to biological agents. Georgia Tech CERTIP, in collaboration
with the CDC and Dekalb County Public Health Service is planning to
demonstrate the use of information technology to accelerate the
epidemiological investigation of infections diseases, starting with
West Nile virus. But such techniques could also be used to help stop
the spread of biological agents such as smallpox.
(4) Training of personnel is a key issue in aviation safety. Recent
law will require the Department of Transportation to hire large numbers
of passenger screeners and air marshals. Fortunately, there are
commercial and emerging instructional technologies which can help train
these new employees. Georgia Tech has gained experience with such
technologies to aid learning on our campuses and to help other
organizations. For example, web-based training is now a reality for
many employees in many places including large-scale DOD systems.
Given the accessibility of the World Wide Web to corporate and
government entities, this avenue for delivering training holds promise
not just for conveying content in an interactive manner, but also for
maintaining electronic records of trainee performance.
With access to streaming video and other bandwidth-intensive
applications, it is now possible to generate on-line simulations that
can test the responses of individuals and groups to multiple scenarios
at multiple points in each scenario. Such structured exercises can be
used to teach trainees how to respond to routine and exceptional
events, and how to distinguish easily between them. The fact is that
the web is worldwide means that the physical location of the trainee is
of no consequence with respect to accessing the training materials.
Also, because technology-mediated learning allows for individualized
tutoring applications, any trainee who needs extra practice with or
exposure to the training materials can be easily accommodated. The
testing module itself can be configured to perform diagnostic analyses
that will inform learners of their weaknesses and advise them on steps
they can take to improve their performance that are consistent with
individual learning styles. These applications can be easily customized
to the needs of individual learners. Finally, a web-based application
can be archived so that competency levels of trainees can be easily
surmised from the archival records.
Again, thank you Senator Cleland for your support of Georgia Tech
and homeland defense.
Senator Cleland. Well, thank you very much, Doctor, and
Georgia Tech, I am sure, will be called upon in the coming
years to be extremely helpful here because this is one area
where technology can be of tremendous help.
This trusted passenger concept where you have people
willing to go through a background check or have their
fingerprint ID'd or retina scanned or whatever it is, and they
carry that technology with them on their person. Do you see
potential for that technology to be helpful in the customer
service area of expediting this security check?
Dr. Bevan. Yes, I think smart cards with information on
them to help, in combination with biometrics, can give you very
good confirmation that that is the person he says he is or she
says she is. The thing we have to do is work--the concern from
a sociologic point of view, we have a very strong streak in
America of not wanting to have national ID cards, we do not
like that very much and we do not want to appear to also have a
two-tiered system of security--one for some people and one for
another.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
And now we get to our pilots. We do not get very far
without the pilot cranking that engine up and saying we are
ready to go. Mr. Kevin Macginnis is with the Air Line Pilots
Association and the Delta Master Executive Council and we are
glad to have your statement, please.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN D. MACGINNIS, MEMBER, AVIATION
SECURITY COMMITTEE, DELTA PILOTS MASTER EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Macginnis. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is Kevin
Macginnis and I live in Peachtree City, Georgia, I fly for
Delta Air Lines as a co-pilot on the MD-88. I am based in
Atlanta and fly extensively out of Atlanta Hartsfield
International Airport. I am a member of the Aviation Security
Committee of the Delta Pilots Master Executive Council of the
Air Line Pilots Association.
Captain Stock Coleman, who is my boss, regrets not being
able to be here today. He is currently over in Tel Aviv
attending a security conference held by El Al Air Lines.
You have my written statement for the record and I would
like to briefly highlight some of the key elements.
When President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act into law, the foundation was laid for the creation
of an aviation security system that provides real security with
the lowest possible degree of intrusive procedures. We applaud
the U.S. Senate for your expeditious and unanimous support of
this important legislation.
As we develop a structure that will stand on this
foundation, we pledge the continued support of over 60,000
professional aviators who are members of the Air Line Pilots
Association.
When I fly to any of the hundreds of commercial airports
across the country, I communicate with air traffic controllers
who use common phraseology in their transmission and follow
procedures that are national in scope. A clearance to make an
instrument approach, for example, means the same thing in
Portland, Maine as it does in Portland, Oregon.
Aviation security, however, is a different matter. Prior to
the 11th of September, the level of security varied
considerably from airport to airport on the basis of what has
been called local perceived threat. As we continue the
regulations and construct them, that will implement the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, let us recognize that
a terrorist who enters our system in Albany, Georgia presents
no less of a threat to the national security than a terrorist
who enters the system in Albany, New York. We must begin from
the premise that the concept of local perceived threat is a
dead letter.
We urge the creation of one level of security that applies
at every airport and air carrier nationwide. There should be no
difference in the security standards that are applied at small
airports and those that apply at large ones. There should be no
difference between the security standards that apply to small
airlines and those applied to large ones. We should also
understand that a Boeing 777 from Delta Air Lines and a Federal
Express DC-10 would make equally lethal terrorist missiles.
Therefore, there should be no difference between the security
standards that apply to passenger operations and those that
apply to cargo operations.
There is an Irish toast that goes, ''Here is to those who
love us; and for those who do not, may the good Lord turn their
hearts. But if he does not turn their hearts, may he turn their
ankles, so that we will know them by their limping.``
We should allow our security personnel to better focus
their efforts in screening of people who are unknown by
reducing the level of scrutiny that is applied to people we
already know and trust. When I report to work at any airport in
the country, I am likely to spend a fair amount of time in a
long line only to have my flight kit emptied and my overnight
bag searched, just to make sure that I am not carrying anything
that I could use to commandeer the airplane upon which I am
legally assigned second in command.
Of course, the security personnel who search my bags
certainly have no independent way to verify that I am who I say
I am. If we did not know better, we would assume that there was
not any simple way to separate the wheat from the chaff,
pilots, flight attendants, ramp workers and law enforcement
officers from the general public. But the truth is that the
technology exists today for a combined computer chip and
biometric verification system that could be implemented
expeditiously and economically.
A system could be implemented that would allow me access to
a secure area based on a swiped card and a fingerprint scan
that would generate my picture and employment status on a
security monitor that would be monitored by a security officer
and that would happen both at the gate and when we come through
security.
Many of my colleagues and I became airline pilots after we
served long military tours where we held top secret clearances
and were entrusted with weapons of mass destruction. We passed
extensive background checks then and again when we were hired
by Delta.
We also need a way to know that the baggage in the cargo
hold contains no device that is intended to cause destruction
of the aircraft, its passengers and its crew. Until such time
as we are able to implement this universal baggage screening,
we urge the creation of an inexpensive photo manifest in order
to quickly remove any bag in the event its owner does not
board. Aviation safety is based in part on multiple
redundancies, so that if one system fails, there is a backup to
prevent a catastrophe. In the cockpit, we have two altimeters,
two air speed indicators and two yokes. The aircraft has two
hydraulic systems, two engines, two air/ground safety sensors.
The ultimate redundancy in aviation security must include
both an impregnable cockpit and the ability of the flight crew
to respond to a threat in the gravest extreme. If we are
prepared to scramble U.S. fighter jets to intercept a
commandeered commercial passenger aircraft, ought we not
provide the crew with equipment and training that is sufficient
to eliminate a threat short of destruction of the aircraft?
Thank you very much for the opportunity to share the views
of the Air Line Pilots Association this morning and I will be
happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Macginnis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin D. Macginnis, Member, Aviation Security
Committee, Delta Pilots Master Executive Council, Air Line Pilots
Association, International
I am Kevin Macginnis, a member of the Aviation Security Committee
of the Delta Pilots Master Executive Council of the Air Line Pilots
Association, International. I also serve as Chairman of the Aviation
Security Committee of ALPA Council 44. Council 44 represents more than
4,000 Atlanta-based Delta pilots. ALPA represents 67,000 airline pilots
who fly for 47 U.S. and Canadian airlines. We are sincerely
appreciative of the opportunity to appear before the Committee to
present our views on the important subject of aviation security.
ALPA has been at the forefront of the effort to create a more
secure airline travel system. We are pleased, therefore, that the
President, on November 19, 2001, signed into law P.L. 107-71, the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which contains many of the
provisions we had urged be adopted.
This hearing is most timely, in that it concerns the actual
implementation of that law's numerous provisions and other initiatives.
Congress' oversight role will be critically important to prevent a
repeat of some of the FAA's regulatory missteps in years past. One
example of such a misstep was the agency's failure to produce major
security regulations in a timely manner--revised CFR 14 Parts 107 and
108 were published this summer, 10 years after revisions began! We are
hopeful that the new DOT Under Secretary's office will produce NPRMs
and final rules in a more expeditious fashion.
For many years, ALPA has promoted One Level of Safety for all air
carriers carrying passengers or cargo in the United States. We,
therefore, strongly support One Level of Security during the
implementation of Federal security-related regulations. Instituting a
single security level, by definition, means the abolition of today's
sundry security levels and practices for airlines and airports based on
perceived threat. A terrorist-guided missile, in the form of a fully
loaded airliner, can take off from any commercial airport in the
country and wreak havoc on unsuspecting innocents virtually anywhere
below. A suicidal bomber can affect a terrorist attack as decisively on
an airplane departing from Des Moines as one leaving from Dulles. There
is no difference between a fully loaded B-747 cargo airplane and a
fully loaded B-747 passenger airplane in terms of their use as
terrorist missiles. Each of our recommendations is made in this
context.
Following are some specific initiatives we believe need to be
addressed in the implementation of the new law.
EMPLOYEE AND PASSENGER IDENTIFICATION
ALPA has been promoting the need for positive, electronic
verification of identity and electronic airport access control systems
since 1987--shortly after the downing of PSA flight 1771 by an armed,
disgruntled, former airline employee. This mass murder, which bore
similarities to the hijackings of September 11th, was attributable in
large measure to identity-verification inadequacies that have yet to be
addressed 14 years later.
At ALPA's urging, the FAA required approximately 200 of the largest
commercial airports to install computerized access control systems in
the late 1980's and early 1990's. However, in spite of the entire
aviation industry's arguments to the contrary, the agency failed to (1)
create a detailed set of performance standards for use by the airport
community and (2) provide for the access control and identification
needs of the transient airline employee population. This mismanagement
was, and still is, expensive for the airports and airlines--the initial
estimate of about $170 million for access controls actually rose to
more than $600 million, and the figures continue to climb. There are
also numerous costs that are difficult or impossible to compute
stemming from the inefficiencies related to transient airline
employee's lack of access at airports.
In the mid-1990's the FAA, with ALPA's urging and congressional
funding, performed a test of what came to be known as the Universal
Access System (UAS). Two million taxpayer dollars were spent on those
tests involving two major airlines and four large airports. For all
practical purposes, those funds were wasted. Although the FAA completed
successful tests of the UAS and standards were finalized for the system
in 1998, there has been no implementation by any airline of the system,
per stated congressional intent. This failure came as a result of an
FAA policy to leave UAS implementation to the sole discretion of the
carriers.
Although magnetic stripe technology was used as the basis for UAS
tests, there are now several advanced, mature technologies that could
be used to positively identify authorized personnel. The FAA is
expected to complete a study of its recent tests of a Memory Chip Card
(MCC) system for identifying armed law enforcement officers in the near
future. This technology is much more secure than magnetic stripe and
has the additional capability of storing an extensive amount of data
that can be used for both security and other types of uses.
The FAA has stated that these same readers could also be used by
airlines for issuance of MCC cards to their employees. ALPA is
recommending that the airlines use the MCC, or an equally secure
technology or technology combination (e.g., smart card with biometric
reader), as the means for performing several important functions,
including the following:
1. Positive access control for all employees who work at the
airport, not just non-transients. Airline pilots and other transient
employees currently rely on a very non-secure method of moving around
airports, which creates the potential for security breaches. Namely,
they request airport-based, company employees to open doors for them as
a courtesy based on their possession of an airline ID card. As we know,
ID cards and uniforms could be fraudulently used to gain access, which
underscores the need for electronic verification.
2. Positive verification of identity at the screening checkpoint to
enable transient employees to be processed more quickly. Passengers are
enduring long lines at the security screening checkpoint. These lines
are made longer by the screening of pilots, flight attendants and other
individuals in positions of trust, who are often screened several times
a day. The lack of equipment for positively identifying these
individuals wastes limited screening resources and further
inconveniences the traveling public.
3. Identity verification of jumpseat riders. Use of the jumpseat by
commuting pilots is an absolute necessity in today's airline
environment. Unfortunately, that privilege has been severely curtailed
since shortly after the terrorist attacks because there is no way to
positively verify the jumpseat requester's identity and employment
status.
4. A platform for digital pilot licenses and medical information.
Consistent with language in the Act, we recommend that the same card,
or type of card, be used by the FAA for containing a pilot's license
and medical information. ALPA is working with FAA Flight Standards on
this concept. Smart cards have more than sufficient memory for this
purpose and others that the airlines may develop.
One important aspect of access control systems and UAS is the need
for specifying a single set of performance standards to be used by all
equipment suppliers and system integrators. Different types of
technologies, used by different airports and airlines, can be
incorporated into the aviation security system if interoperability is a
requirement for all of them. RTCA, an aviation standards organization,
may be useful in helping to create such standards.
In concert with the new security law's provisions regarding
passenger identification, several organizations are promoting ``smart''
cards for passengers to be read at the screening checkpoint.
Conceptually, such individuals would be processed more quickly than
those without a card at a special lane created for this purpose. ALPA
supports this recommendation provided that the passengers voluntarily
submit to a thorough background check and, if possible, a criminal
history records check, in order to receive this card. The background
check should be updated at least annually in order to retain it.
Evidencing the importance of this issue, nine of the 33 DOT Rapid
Response Team (RRT) recommendations relate to the subject of employee
and passenger identification and access control, namely: Aircraft
Security Report recommendations 7 and 8; and, Airport Security Report
recommendations 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 16. A copy of these recommendations
is included with my statement.
We recommend that the government amend CFR 14 FAR Parts 107 and 108
to accomplish the following:
1. Identify a single performance standard that will be used by
access control equipment providers and integrators, the airlines and
airports to create a universal access system.
2. Require airlines and airports to create such a universal access
system that incorporates, at a minimum, the following features: (1) can
be used by any transient airline employee at any U.S. airport where
they operate (2) requires the carriage of only one piece of media
(e.g., smart card) (3) positively identifies pilots for jumpseat-riding
purposes (4) allows the bearer to open all access-controlled doors to
which they have authorized entry (5) allows the electronic storage of
pilot license and medical certificates, and (6) is used as the
principal means of processing transient employees through the security
screening checkpoint.
3. Establish a provision within FAR Part 108 that will allow the
creation of a ``trusted passenger'' identification and security
screening checkpoint methodology aimed at increasing security and
checkpoint throughput.
HIRING CRITERIA AND PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
The foundation of a good security system for any entity, public or
private, is a sound set of hiring criteria. Non-trustworthy employees
cost time, money, and in the most extreme cases, can be life-
threatening. The aviation industry has failed in several respects to
ensure that only the most trust-worthy individuals are hired into
critical, security-sensitive positions.
Background checks, consisting mostly of employment verification,
have been used by the aviation industry for a number of years. These
checks have more recently been supplemented by criminal history records
investigations when a lapse in employment has occurred or there is some
other questionable matter associated with an applicant's past.
It is our recommendation that criminal history records checks be
performed on all new employee applicants to help ensure that only the
most ethical and trustworthy employees be allowed within airport secure
areas. Unfortunately, the issue of background and criminal history
checks is greatly complicated by non-U.S. citizens and those who have
been U.S. citizens for only a short time.
Accordingly, we recommend that the government amend CFR 14 FAR 107
and 108 to require mandatory pre-hire criminal history records check
for all applicants who are U.S. citizens. An Interpol criminal history
records check should be performed on all applicants who are either not
U.S. citizens, or have not been U.S. citizens for at least 10 years. We
endorse the Act's specific provisions for screener hiring standards.
Performance standards for baggage screening can best be tested and
monitored through use of the Threat Image Project System, or TIPS. TIPS
intermingles images of bags containing threat objects at random with
the x-ray or EDS images of real bags. Screeners are required to
identify the threat objects in a TIPS image, just as they do in a real
bag, and their results are quantified and logged by computer.
Performance of screeners has been shown to substantially improve with
TIPS technology and it should be made a mandatory component of all
baggage screening equipment.
EMPLOYEE TRAINING
Pilots at many U.S. airlines view the security training that they
receive from their companies as boring, irrelevant, and unrealistic--
much of it is repetitive from year to year and may largely consist of
watching video tapes. Accordingly, ALPA wholeheartedly endorses the new
provision contained in the Act that calls for the government and
industry to develop ``detailed guidance for a scheduled passenger air
carrier flight and cabin crew training program to prepare crew members
for potential threat conditions.'' We recommend that new regulations
also provide for security training of all-cargo pilots, who have
special requirements in this regard.
An Air Transport Association (ATA) working group has recently
developed, with our input, a very brief response to the RRT on Aircraft
Security recommendation number 12. That response, however, does not
fulfill the requirements of the Act for a number of reasons, not the
least of which is that it does not identify an adequate response to
acts of air piracy. ALPA has scheduled a meeting to occur in a few days
with FBI, FAA, Secret Service, and other government and industry
organizations to develop a new ``Common Strategy'' that can be used for
training airline personnel on air piracy strategies. A revised Common
Strategy is needed to develop many of the training elements that
Congress has identified.
We recommend that FAR Part 108 be amended to specifically require
that airlines incorporate all of the program elements identified in the
Act, plus any additional elements that may be identified during the
rulemaking process.
BAGGAGE AND CARGO SCREENING
ALPA endorses the new security bill's provisions to require
security screening of all checked bags loaded onto passenger-carrying
aircraft and the screening of cargo and mail on cargo aircraft. The
potential for carrying a bomb-laden bag onto an aircraft is very real
and needs to be addressed expeditiously.
The new security law provides the Under Secretary with a 1-year
study period for reporting on the screening requirements applicable to
aircraft with 60 or fewer seats used in scheduled passenger service. We
recommend that all baggage of all airline passengers be screened,
regardless of the size of aircraft on which they fly. Also, as we
understand the Act, there will be some passengers who travel on small
aircraft from certain points of origin without benefit of security
screening who will be charged as much as $5.00 for security services on
a one-way trip. This situation may be as the result of an oversight,
but it is one that deserves the attention of Congress.
We recommend that Congress quickly take this issue up and provide
legislation that will ensure that everyone who travels on U.S.
commercial aircraft, and pays a security fee, is provided the same
level of security.
ALPA has for several years promoted the concept of creating an
electronic passenger and baggage manifest. Similar to the problem of
employee identity verification, the airlines are not currently capable
of positively determining who has boarded their aircraft. This is
demonstrated when aircraft leave the gate with an inaccurate manifest;
we know of one airline that routinely allows flights to leave the gate
with up to a two-person error. As another example, after one accident
last year, an airline CEO made a public request for assistance in
identifying the passengers on his own aircraft! The security
ramifications are also substantial--unless we know that the person
boarding the aircraft is the same one who bought the ticket, we cannot
positively determine that the individual has been through the security
checkpoint.
Currently available technology can be applied to this problem in
order to create an inexpensive photo manifest of boarding passengers
and their checked bags. The photo manifest will enable airlines to,
among other things, (1) positively identify each person and bag on the
aircraft (2) reduce the potential of boarding someone who has not been
through screening (3) create a strong deterrence against fraudulent
ticketing (4) quickly identify a bag(s) that must be removed in the
event that its owner does not board the flight (5) create an accurate
passenger manifest that can be used in the event of an accident or
other tragedy and, (6) if tied to appropriate data bases, identify
those of possible criminal intent.
ADDITIONAL MEASURES IN THE AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
I would like to turn your attention now to the need for additional
regulations for implementing certain provisions of the Act. ALPA has
been heavily involved in the development of, and responses to, the
security recommendations of the DOT Rapid Response Teams (RRTs), and I
would like to address the status of some of those recommendations as
part of this discussion.
Aircraft Cockpit Hardening
We are encouraged by the rapid move toward full, voluntary fleet
compliance with Special FAR 92-2, which FAA recently issued. Today,
nearly every U.S. passenger airliner has been modified to provide
better, although temporary, security of the flight deck. Modification
of the cargo fleet, although allowed by SFAR 92-2, was not supported by
FAA funding, as was the case with the passenger aircraft fleet. As a
result, modifications to cargo airlines' cockpit doors lag those of the
passenger aircraft. It is important that cargo aircraft cockpit doors
be strengthened for several reasons, including (1) cargo aircraft are
subject to air piracy, just like passenger aircraft (2) security
protecting cargo aircraft is nearly always less stringent than for
passenger aircraft (3) cargo flight crews are often required by their
companies to board additional, non-screened employees or couriers,
about whom the pilots may know little or nothing, in seats outside the
cockpit door.
The process to institute permanent cockpit door design changes
referred to in the Act and in DOT aircraft security RRT's
recommendations two, three, and four has already begun. A recent
regulatory proposal by the ATA would provide for improved security of
passenger airliner flight decks. Once again, however, the proposal does
not include cargo carrier aircraft. The RRT recognized the need for
improvements to both types of transport aircraft doors when they
specified, ``retrofit of the entire US fleet'' in their
recommendations.
Furthermore, the ATA proposal stops short of requiring complete
protection against gunshots, grenades, and other explosive devices. The
design standards proposed for new aircraft provide such protection
calling for ``hardening'' of cockpit floors, ceilings, and bulkheads,
but retrofit of that protection is not addressed in the ATA proposal.
This is a serious issue--many aircraft in the fleet today, thus exempt
from regulations covering new designs, will likely be flying for
decades to come. The number of aircraft of new design will be miniscule
by comparison.
We note that the Act legislates ``such other action, including . .
. flight deck redesign, as may be necessary to ensure the safety and
security of the aircraft.'' This language is consistent with aircraft
security RRT recommendations two, three and four--to provide one level
of security for every U.S. airliner, regardless of whether it is being
flown today or still on the drawing board, for both passenger and cargo
aircraft alike.
We recommend that new Federal regulations address the need for
enhanced flight deck security on today's fleet of aircraft, not just
those aircraft of tomorrow.
The Act also calls for an investigation by the Administrator for
determining a means of securing the flight deck of smaller passenger
aircraft that do not have a door and a lock. These aircraft are
particularly vulnerable, because many of them do not even have a flight
attendant who can help prevent, or alert the pilots to, a security
problem. New regulations should be developed that will ensure one level
of security in this area.
Cabin Monitoring and Emergency Warnings
The Act provides for the use of ``video monitors and other devices
to alert pilots in the flight deck to activity in the cabin.'' The
industry has held discussions about two related RRT recommendations,
and there are numerous vendors with products that will address them,
from the simple to complex. We recommend implementing regulations that
are broad enough to allow airlines some latitude in selecting those
products and systems that will work best for a given type of aircraft
in the company's fleet. Pilot input should be solicited in the
development of any such security enhancements, as they will be the
ultimate end-user of them.
Even though video monitors may have a role in our aircraft cabins,
we are duly concerned about the ultimate, improper use of any video
recording. The recent television airing of recordings made during the
struggle aboard United flight 93 on September 11th demonstrates that
some within the media will not respect human dignity or decorum on a
voluntary basis. We are adamantly opposed to any new type of audio or
video recording device on aircraft unless all appropriate legal
protections are in place in advance to prevent such recordings from
misuse by the media, airlines, or government agencies.
Defensive Capabilities for Pilots
ALPA is most pleased that Congress agreed with the need for
providing pilots a means of voluntarily arming themselves with lethal
force. The Act's language in this area leaves considerable flexibility
in how it may be implemented. We are currently studying this subject
and intend to create a set of recommendations on what types of weapons
should be carried, how the weapons should be transported, training
curriculum and other related subjects. We plan to promote our views to
the office of the new Under Secretary and appropriate FAA offices for
their consideration in developing regulations.
We would note two specific omissions in the Act regarding carriage
of lethal weapons by pilots. First, there is no provision in the Act
for an exemption from liability in the event that a pilot uses a lethal
weapon in self-defense. Second, the Act does not create a Federal
exemption from State laws for interstate carriage of weapons. We call
on Congress to write new legislation aimed at addressing both of these
requirements.
Regarding non-lethal defensive capabilities, discussions are
ongoing with others in government and industry on the best means of
providing such to both pilots and flight attendants. The discussions
are not yet mature enough for regulations, consistent with the Act's
provision for a study by the National Institute of Justice on this
matter.
Passenger Volunteers to Provide Emergency Services
We endorse the Act's provisions for passengers to volunteer their
services in the event of an emergency. This security enhancement is one
that ALPA has promoted for several years. The Act's language, however,
is very narrow in that it limits the volunteers to law enforcement
officers, firefighters and emergency medical technicians. Notably
absent are others, such as doctors, bomb technicians, and able-bodied
individuals, who could provide useful services in the event of various
types of emergencies.
We recommend that Congress broaden the scope of this legislative
language to include additional categories of volunteers. We also
recommend that these individuals, if they pass requisite background and
criminal records checks, be identified as volunteers via future
``trusted passenger'' cards. The information about their special
abilities could be stored on a smart card that would be read by airline
personnel and, eventually, be transmitted to the captain for his use as
necessary.
Aviation Security Programs for Air Charters
ALPA endorses the Act's provision for air charter security
programs. Under current regulations, large commercial aircraft can be
operated with little or no security provisions because of their charter
status. Clearly, new regulations are needed to ensure that the same
level of security for scheduled operations is provided for non-
scheduled operations.
OTHER ISSUES
Last, I would like to bring to your attention a couple of other
issues that are not included in the Act, but we believe they are worthy
of your consideration.
INS Deportees
ALPA has a long-standing concern about the use of airline aircraft
to transport Immigration and Naturalization Service deportees out of
this country. While the INS has, in our opinion, taken some steps to be
more responsible with these ``voluntary'' deportations on our aircraft,
the potential for problems still remains. In our view, anyone who is
required to leave the country involuntarily is a security risk; they
are traveling against their wishes to a destination where they may face
prison or other hardships. A natural incentive is created for these
individuals to try to escape or alter their travel destination. Many of
the deportees carried aboard our aircraft have some type of criminal
records and it is not uncommon for them to also have medical problems
that are not conducive to passenger health. Buttressing these concerns
are actual instances of sexual assaults, lewd behavior and other
problems.
Under INS regulations, no escorts are provided for deportees unless
they are deported in groups of 10 or more. We recommend that the INS
find other means of deporting these individuals without subjecting the
traveling public to potential for harm. Alternatively, deportees should
not travel on commercial aircraft unless they are escorted by two or
more individuals who are assigned to control them from the moment of
boarding until disembarking.
We recommend that Congress address this matter immediately with
legislation aimed at eliminating the INS' deportation deficiencies.
Security Information
Aircraft Security RRT recommendation number 13 recommends that each
airline develop a delivery system or procedure to provide government
security advisories to crewmembers in a timely manner. Currently, many
pilots receive no timely security information at all. Some airlines,
which can legally provide information from security directives to
pilots because of their ``need to know,'' instead withhold that
information.
A regulation needs to be added to CFR 14 FAR Part 108 to require
that airlines provide captains with all appropriate information about
new security provisions, potential areas of threat, and other related
subjects.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I would be
pleased to address any questions that you may have.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Macginnis.
Several cockpit issues--first of all, I think the airlines
have dealt well with the cockpit security issue. You mentioned
that your boss was going to El Al--to Tel Aviv. El Al is a
small airline, so I am not sure you could exactly replicate
this, but in terms of cockpit security, they have actually two
doors to the cockpit. It is almost like a submarine airlock
where you enter an outer door, you come in, that outer door is
then electronically and/or manually locked and then you enter
the cabin and in effect the pilots and the co-pilots have
access to the bathroom and so forth through the inner secure
sanctum area. They never go outside into the cabin. So once
they are in, they are in and nothing will get them out. And
their job is to land the aircraft, that is the El Al standard.
The air marshals which are on every El Al flight, their job is
to control the cabin.
I know that is maybe a little bit much, but in your
opinion, in regard to the security of the cockpit door, are you
pretty much comfortable with where we are now or do we need to
do more?
Mr. Macginnis. Yes, sir, we are very comfortable where we
are now. New standards are being developed for an improved
cockpit door that would be more beneficial and give us more
safety features than we currently have in place now. Obviously
we have more sky marshals that are flying on our flights today.
That is also an added benefit there. But there is still more
that needs to be done, including the voluntary arming of flight
crew members.
Senator Cleland. Yes, I want to get to that in just a
minute.
Redundancy--do we need two transponders? You mentioned the
duality of things in the cockpit. Part of the challenge on
September 11 was that the hijackers turned the transponder off.
The FAA, in effect, had to play a passive role and could not
really track these aircraft and even if they were able to call
upon an F-15, they were not able to track them. As you fly in
American airspace, do we need some transponder that is on all
the time so that the FAA is able to find an aircraft wherever
it is in the sky?
Mr. Macginnis. We currently have transponders that once we
basically take off to landing, that track us throughout the
skies, our every movement. However, the incident on September
11, they were able to turn that off. There is technology now
that prevents that system from being turned off in the event of
an emergency.
Senator Cleland. That is good to know.
Now, stun guns in the cockpit. How do the pilots feel about
weapons, stun guns, that kind of thing in the cockpit?
Mr. Macginnis. My prior experience as an FBI officer
working on operation safety task forces, you come up with
operational procedures for each weapon that you use. With the
stun guns, the current operation procedure is that you have two
officers that have lethal force standing by in case the stun
gun does not work.
The Air Line Pilots Association is similar to that of the
FAA requirement having a fire extinguisher in the aircraft. We
have a fire extinguisher up in the cockpit; in case there is a
fire, one person flies the airplane and the other one puts out
the fire. If an intruder were to come through that cockpit
door, we would have one person to fly and we would like to have
the fire power to put out that fire if that person ever came
through.
Senator Cleland. Thank you. Well, thank you very much for
your testimony and thank you very much for your work.
Mr. Planton, thank you very much for your patience. Mr.
Jeff Planton is a Senior Vice President, EDS (Electronic Data
Systems).
Mr. Planton. Yes.
Senator Cleland. Now there is an acronym EDS that has to do
with demolitions or identifying----
Mr. Planton. Explosion detection system, yeah.
Senator Cleland. So you are not the explosion
identification people.
Mr. Planton. No, we are not.
Senator Cleland. You are the Electronic Data System.
Mr. Planton. And we usually make that distinction in these
hearings.
Senator Cleland. Thank you and welcome.
STATEMENT OF JEFF PLANTON, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, ELECTRONIC
DATA SYSTEMS (EDS') U.S. GOVERNMENT GROUP
Mr. Planton. Thank you. I guess I can say good afternoon
officially, Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Yes, sir.
Mr. Planton. My name is Jeff Planton and I am Senior Vice
President of EDS's U.S. Government Group and I am based out of
Herndon, Virginia.
We appreciate the opportunity to present our views to this
Subcommittee and on the subject of great importance to our
country, to our company and to our customers.
Following the worst threat and terrorist asttacks in U.S.
history, the Federal Government, airports and the airline
industries are grappling with short and long-term solutions to
improve and enhance passenger safety.
Since September 11, EDS has been involved at many levels
with our government and private sector clients, which include
the Federal Aviation Administration, Immigration &
Naturalization Service, domestic and international airports and
some of the largest airlines in the world. Immediately after
September 11, EDS assembled a team representing every element
of the aviation industry and critical technologies including
biometrics, smart cards, information security, complex data
management and airline specific systems.
Our team has identified an approach to aviation security
that encompasses the passenger experience, the airport
environment and the underlying infrastructure. Today's
testimony covers the passenger experience and portions of that
recommended infrastructure.
First, we should address the current situation. Industry
capacity has been cut by 20 percent--80,000 employees have been
laid off, hundreds of aircraft have been parked and orders for
new aircraft delayed or canceled. In order for Americans to get
back into the skies, they need to feel better about what has
been done to improve airline safety.
The good news is, with sufficient assurances of safety and
service, pent up demand could quickly outpace recent capacity
cuts and we could return to new levels of what we saw before
September 11. To achieve this, we must improve existing
physical security with a balanced approach of innovative
processes and proven technologies.
To date, priority has been given to physical security
measures such as National Guard troops in airport terminals and
more rigorous searches at checkpoints and gates. These visible
measures appear to be improving passenger confidence; however,
these advances in passenger confidence have been offset by
declines in customer service and convenience. The traveling
public has been very patient with increasingly intrusive and
time-consuming searches, but they are starting to complain
about pat-downs and even requirements to unbutton clothing at
gate areas. Clearly this is not a system that is a viable long-
term solution.
To stimulate air traffic near the pre-tragedy volumes, we
must stimulate and address confidence and convenience. The
Aviation and Transportation Security bill references solutions
that help us accomplish these objectives. Among other things,
the bill calls for trusted passenger programs, improved baggage
management processes and enhanced passenger pre-screening
systems. We fully support these initiatives because they
address fundamental security questions--who they are and who
they say they are; are they a threat to security; and are they
carrying anything illegal. They also leverage proven
technologies that can be rolled out quickly.
In a new era of suicide terrorists, positive identification
of passengers is as important as the detection of bombs and
weapons. Currently, traditional identification documents like
drivers license or passports are the only means of validating
identity of passengers. Yet these documents are easily stolen
or forged. Recognizing this, we now have to treat all
passengers as high risk. This means more random searches, more
inconvenience for law-abiding citizens and perhaps worst of
all, more wasted time for security personnel who should be
focused on truly high-risk passengers.
EDS joins other industry partners and other aviation
associations in recommending opt-in process to increase the
number of known or trusted travelers. Increasing the number of
known travelers accomplishes a number of things--first, it
expedites the process for the known traveler by providing
dedicated queues and automated kiosks. Second, it improves the
process for the unknown traveler because the known persons are
removed from their queues. And third, it increases security for
all because security resources can be focused on a smaller
universe of unknowns.
The cornerstone of the trusted traveler program is a
voluntary biometric identity system. These systems could be
used to speed check-in and process for frequent travelers, who
represents as much as 50 percent of the flying public. Having
once registered with the system, where full proof of identity
was provided and a background investigation successfully
completed, a traveler would be issued a smart card. With this
card, the passenger can authenticate his or her identity in
seconds at a biometric checkpoint using biometric technologies
such as fingerprint scanning, hand geometry or facial
recognition.
EDS has such a system in place today at Ben Gurion
International Airport in Israel which is considered the safest
airport in the world. It allows registered Israeli citizens to
authenticate their identities with a magnetic card in a
biometric technology, saving up to 2 hours off the wait at
passenger control. Currently 15 percent of the passengers at
Ben Gurion utilize this voluntary authentication system, plus
the system can be implemented rather quickly. The initial phase
of the Ben Gurion system was implemented in just 3 months.
While the current FAA-mandated computer-aided passenger
prescreening, CAPS, is a great start, the regulators, airlines,
unions and associations agree that improvements are warranted.
EDS recommends a centralized passenger evaluation system that
will objectively evaluate the level of risk that each
individual poses to the transportation system. With a
centralized system, risk criteria could be changed near real
time and could instantaneously alert all airlines of the
potential threat. Further, this system would be the foundation
for comparison of passengers to law enforcement watch lists.
This kind of system is not new. In fact, EDS currently is
operating a similar prescreening system for a number of U.S.
airlines, processing approximately 70 million passengers
annually. Given that number of airlines already utilizing the
system, EDS feels that a version of CAPS is the logical
foundation for a national passenger evaluation capability and
could be deployed in about 6 to 9 months, depending on final
requirements and funding arrangements.
EDS also recommends a flight risk management solution that
aggregates individual risks into an overall flight or airport
risk situation. This solution would provide airports with
information on when to escalate security measures.
As the Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires,
all checked bags should be screened, using expolsive detection
equipment, EDS.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Planton. However, after 100 percent screening is
achieved, systems must be implemented to ensure the integrity
of those bags. Once a bag has been cleared of explosive
materials, it needs to be secured, either by sealing the bag
itself or sealing it within a luggage container. After being
sealed, the bags or containers could be tracked and tracked
throughout the airport using bar codes or radio frequency
identification devices, RFID tags like the tags you put in the
window of a car. Using this technology, airports and airline
personnel would know whether a specific bag that arrived at the
plane should have arrived. If it did not, they could determine
where the bag was removed from the process and why. This form
of electronic tracking also facilitates a positive bag match to
those actually boarding the aircraft and allows personnel to
quickly locate that bag and remove it from unattended checked
baggage. This same system could be used to secure and monitor
cargo and mail.
A number of baggage identification, sortation or
reconciliation systems are in place today, both here in the
United States and around the world. Many rely on bar code
technology, although RFID bag systems are being piloted by
several airlines today. Further, RFID is proven technology
frequently used in other industries, especially assisted in
tracking and monitoring vehicles, inventories and managing
supply chains.
A great deal of attention and energy has been devoted to
physical security processes. This is necessary and very
important and will continue to be the key component of a
security screening process. However, technology will be
critical to the solution that enhances security while
preserving the convenience, privacy and fiscal responsibility.
It is imperative that a solution to aviation security be
approached from an enterprise perspective. Such an information
system will have to process real time data, must be accessible
to airports, airlines, governments around the world, robust
systems permitting central data management with greatly
distributed data collection required. This system will require
a solid infrastructure with no possibility of down time, and
without question, access to it and the information it contains
must be secure.
While the integrated system described above is not
currently in place, none of the individual technologies
described are new. EDS is issuing hundreds of thousands of
biometrically enabled smart cards for the U.S. Department of
Defense. EDS prescreens millions of passengers using its client
server CAPS system every year. Ben Gurion International Airport
utilizes a biometric system to expedite immigration of
thousands of passengers every day. Credit card systems evaluate
and authorize millions of transactions using information
captured at point of sale devices around the world and supply
chain systems track millions and millions of products in the
United States and abroad. Beyond the individual solutions, the
scale and scope of the system would not be unprecedented
either.
While integration of such disparate data bases and complex
technologies on a global scale might be new for airports and
the airline industry, global service providers like EDS already
have extensive experience creating and running comparable
systems in other industries.
The challenge is to restore the confidence and the
convenience at the same time. Logic dictates that restoring one
without the other will not solve any of the problems we face
and the solutions I have described today would complement
physical security enhancements and compensate for the negative
impact on services. By implementing these solutions, we will
restore confidence to the flying public and get Americans back
in the skies.
Thank you very much and I will answer any questions you
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Planton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeff Planton, Senior Vice President,
Electronic Data Systems (EDS') U.S. Government Group
``Next Steps in Aviation Security: Restoring Confidence and
Convenience''
Good morning. My name is Jeff Planton and I am a Senior Vice
President of EDS' U.S. Government Group based in Herndon, Virginia EDS
appreciates the opportunity to present our views to this subcommittee
on a subject of great importance to our country, our company and our
customers.
Following the worst terrorist attacks in U.S. history, the Federal
Government, airports and the airline industry are grappling with short-
and long-term solutions to improve and enhance passenger safety. Since
September 11th, EDS has been involved at many levels with our
govornment and private sector clients, which include the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), domestic and international airports and some of the
largest airlines in the world.
Immediately after September 11th, EDS assembled a team representing
every element of the aviation industry and critical technologies,
including biometrics, smart cards, information security, complex data
management and airline-specific systems. Our team has identified an
approach to aviation security that encompasses the passenger
experience, airport environment and the underlying infrastructure.
Today's testimony covers the passenger experience and portions of the
recommended infrastructure.
CURRENT SITUATION
First, we should address the current situation. Industry capacity
has been cut by 20 percent, 80,000 employees have been laid off,
hundreds of aircraft have been parked and orders for new aircraft
delayed or canceled. In order for Americans to get back into the skies,
they need to feel better about what's been done to improve airline
safety. The good news is with sufficient assurances of safety and
service, pent-up demand could quickly out-pace recent capacity cuts and
we can return the air traffic to levels that we saw before September
11th. To achieve this, we must improve existing physical security
enhancements with a balanced approach of innovative processes and
proven technologies.
To date, priority has been given to physical security measures such
as National Guard troops in airport terminals and more rigorous
searches at checkpoints and gates. These visible measures appear to be
improving passenger confidence. However, these advances in passenger
confidence have been offset by declines in customer service and
convenience. The traveling public has been very patient with
increasingly intrusive and time-consuming searches, but they are
starting to complain about pat downs and even requirements to unbutton
clothing in gate areas. Clearly, this is not a system that is viable
long-term.
To stimulate air traffic nearer to pre-tragedy volumes, we must
simultaneously address confidence and convenience. The Aviation and
Transportation Security Bill references solutions that help us
accomplish these objectives. Among other things, the bill calls for
trusted passenger programs, improved baggage management processes and
enhanced passenger pre-screening systems.
We fully support these initiatives because they address the
fundamental security questions:
Are they who they say they are?
Are they a threat to security?
Are they carrying anything illegal?
They also leverage proven technologies and can be rolled out
quickly.
ARE THEY WHO THEY SAY THEY ARE?
In a new era of suicide terrorists, positive identification of
passengers is as important as the detection of bombs and weapons.
Currently, traditional identification documents, like drivers licenses
or passports, are the only means of validating the identity of
passengers, yet these documents are easily stolen or forged.
Recognizing this, we now have to treat all passengers as ``high-risk''.
This means more random searches, more inconvenience for law-abiding
citizens and, perhaps worst of all, more wasted time for security
personnel who should be focused on truly high-risk passengers.
EDS joins other industry partners and other aviation associations
in recommending an ``opt-in'' process to increase the number of
``known'' or ``trusted'' travelers. Increasing the number of known
travelers accomplishes a number of things. First, it expedites the
process for the known traveler by providing dedicated queues and
automated kiosks. Second, it improves the process for the ``unknown''
travelers because the known persons are removed from their queues. And
third, it increases security for all because security resources can be
focused on a smaller universe of ``unknowns''.
The cornerstone of the trusted traveler program is voluntary
biometric identity systems. These systems could be used to speed the
check-in process for frequent travelers, which represent as much as 50
percent of the flying public. Having once registered with a system
where full proof of identity was provided and background investigation
successfully completed, a traveler, would be issued a smart card. With
this card, the passenger can authenticate his or her identity in
seconds at a biometric checkpoint, using viable biometric technologies
such as fingerprint scanning, hand geometry, or facial recognition.
EDS has such a system in place today at Ben Gurion International
Airport in Israel which is considered the safest airport in the world.
It allows registered Israeli citizens to authenticate their identities
with magnetic card and biometrics technologies, saving up to 2 hours
off the wait at passport control. Currently, 15 percent of the
passengers at Ben Gurion utilize this voluntary authentication system.
Plus, the system can be implemented rather quickly--the initial phase
of the Ben Gurion system was implemented in just 3 months.
ARE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS A THREAT TO SECURITY?
While the current FAA-mandated Computer Aided Passenger Pre-
Screening System (CAPPS) is a great start, regulators, airlines, unions
and associations agree that improvements are warranted. EDS recommends
a centralized passenger evaluation system that will objectively
evaluate the level of risk that each individual pose to the
transportation system. With a centralized system, risk criteria could
be changed near real-time and could instantaneously alert all airlines
of potential threats. Further, this system would be the foundation for
the comparison of passengers to law enforcement watch lists.
This kind of system is not new. In fact, EDS is currently operating
a similar prescreening system for a number of U.S. airlines--processing
approximately 70 million passengers annually. Given that a number of
airlines already utilize this system, EDS feels that this version of
CAPPS is the logical foundation of a national passenger evaluation
capability and could be deployed in 6 to 9 months depending on final
requirements and funding arrangements.
EDS also recommends a Flight Risk Management Solution that
aggregates individual risks into an overall flight or airport risk
situation. This solution would provide airports with information on
when to escalate security measures.
ARE THEY CARRYING ANYTHING ILLEGAL?
As the Aviation Transportation and Security Act requires, all
checked baggage should be screened using explosive detection equipment.
However, even after 100 percent screening is achieved, systems must be
implemented which ensure the integrity of the baggage.
Once a bag has been cleared of explosive materials, it needs to be
secured--either by sealing the bag itself or sealing it within a
luggage container. After being sealed, the bags or containers could be
tagged and tracked throughout the airport using bar code or radio
frequency identification devices (RFID's like toll tags on highways).
Using this technology, airport and airline personnel would know whether
a specific bag arrived at a plane when it should have. If it did not,
then they could determine where the bag was removed from the process
and why. This form of electronic tracking also facilitates the positive
matching of baggage to those actually boarding an aircraft and allows
personnel to quickly locate and remove the unattended checked baggage.
This same system could be used to secure and monitor cargo and mail.
A number of baggage identification, sortation and reconciliation
systems are in place today, both here in the U.S. and around the world.
Many rely on bar code technology, although RFID baggage systems are
being piloted at several airlines today. Further, RFID is a proven
technology frequently used in other industries--especially to assist in
tracking and monitoring vehicles, inventories and managing supply
chains.
AT THE CORE OF SECURITY SYSTEMS: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
A great deal of attention and energy has been devoted to physical
security processes. This is necessary and very important, and will
continue to be a key component of the security screening process.
However, technology will be critical to a total solution that enhances
security while preserving convenience, privacy and fiscal
responsibility. It is imperative that a solution to aviation security
be approached from an enterprise perspective. Such an information
system will have to process data real-time and must be accessible to
airports, airlines and governments around the world. Robust systems
permitting central data management with greatly distributed data
collection are required. This system will require a solid
infrastructure and no possibility of downtime. And without question,
access to it and to the information it contains must be secure.
While the integrated system described above is not currently in
place, none of the individual technologies described are new. EDS is
issuing hundreds of thousands of biometrically enabled smart cards for
the U.S. Department of Defense. EDS pre-screens millions of passengers
using its client-server CAPPS system every year. Israel's Ben Gurion
Airport utilizes a biometric system to expedite immigration for
thousands of passengers every day. Credit card systems evaluate and
authorize millions of transactions using information captured at point
of sale devices around the world. And, supply chain systems track the
production of millions of products in the U.S. and abroad.
Beyond the individual solutions, the scale and scope of this system
would not be unprecedented, either. While integration of such disparate
data bases and complex technologies on a global scale might be new to
airports and the airline industry, global service providers like EDS
already have extensive experience creating and running comparable
systems in other industries.
IN CONCLUSION
The challenge is to restore confidence and convenience at the same
time. Logic dictates that restoring one without the other will not
solve the problems we face. The solutions I've described today would
compliment physical security enhancements and compensate for the
negative impacts on service. By implementing these solutions, we will
restore the confidence of the flying public and get Americans back in
the skies again.
Thank you for this opportunity to present this testimony. I am
happy to answer any questions you might have.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Planton. I was
just sitting here thinking, it is fascinating what is evolving
out of our effort to, as Michael Jackson said, balance world
class security with world class convenience and customer
service.
The 15 percent at Ben Gurion----
Mr. Planton. Yes.
Senator Cleland [continuing]. Choose, shall we call it for
want of a better term, the trusted passenger route. If we had
such a system in America, what is your guess of how many people
would voluntarily sign up?
The reason I ask that, I fly, you know, every Friday and
every Monday to come back here and I fly all the time. And I
see a lot of the same people on the flight. I mean there are a
lot of business travelers out there. These are not first time
flyers; these are frequent flyers.
I cannot help but think that maybe that number might be
higher in the United States. What is your guess?
Mr. Planton. As I stated, frequent flyers for some airlines
account up to 50 percent of their passengers. I would believe
that the United States, Americans, would opt in for convenience
sake. That benefits us two-fold. It moves frequent travelers,
yourself, through security, but also shortens the line for non-
frequent travelers like the individuals taking that once in a
lifetime vacation who have never flown before--that shortens
that line, and we have seen that at the Israeli Ben Gurion
Airport. We have also seen that at our immigartion checkpoints
along the Mexican border with some of the systems that we
piloted with the INS.
Senator Cleland. Thank you. And it seems too with our web
technology and so forth, that for a lot of people, getting a
reservation over the web if there would be a way to preapply
for something like that and do a lot of the checks and so forth
even for the non-frequent flyer. I do not know. I think we are
getting into a fascinating world where our telecommunications,
our data bases, our intelligence capabilities and so forth can,
as the gentleman said, Mr. Selvaggio, focus more and more on
the passenger rather than on who has tweezers and who has a
stitching needle.
One final question and we will wrap it up--oh, actually our
two guests here, Colonel Brooks and Richard Duncan, since you
are really the people in charge of security here, you ought to
be allowed to make a statement here. Mr. Duncan, do you want to
go first, if you care to say anything?
STATEMENT OF RICHARD DUNCAN, HARTSFIELD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for allowing me to speak. I believe
Mr. DeCosta has really stated the position for Hartsfield.
However, I personally would like to thank you for taking the
lead on the aviation security and especially for drafting the
legislation for prosecuting those who violate security. As a
security manager, I constantly have to work with the policies
and procedures, but when we have a violation and there is
nothing to fall back on for that particular individual, it
really is disheartening for the staff to work with.
We are constantly looking at our procedures and trying to
make sure that we are providing the quality services while
maintaining security that everyone expects of us.
Thank you.
Senator Cleland. Thank you, Mr. Duncan.
Colonel Brooks, is it?
STATEMENT OF COLONEL BROOKS, ATLANTA
POLICE DEPARTMENT
Colonel Brooks. Senator Cleland, thank you for inviting----
Senator Cleland. And you are with the APD, Atlanta Police
Department.
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir, I am with the Atlanta Police
Department. I am the Precinct Commander at Hartsfield.
I just wanted to assure you that I have met with Mr. Keith
Varner, the Solicitor General at Clayton County, last week and
we are aggressively pursuing criminal charges against the
individual who breached our security. So we are pursuing State
charges on that, but it would certainly help if there was
something on the Federal level that we could pursue also.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. I intend to introduce
that legislation this afternoon.
Wrapping it up, let me just thank you all. But one final
question--a year from now, if we meet together again in
December of 2002, is it your opinion that we will be presiding
over a much--not only a much improved aviation security system,
but really a superior security system to that basically it is
available around the world?
Colonel Brooks, you want to take a stab at that? Yes or no.
Colonel Brooks. Since September 11, we have seen a vast
improvement in security systems and law enforcement at
Hartsfield--I can speak for Hartsfield. I think a year from
now, we are going to see an entirely different aviation
industry, security just being a part of that. And I think we
will see a vast improvement in that timeframe.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. I concur that we will see major improvements
within the systems and I think everyone really would have to
start thinking a little bit differently from what we think
about airport security because when we think of airport
security, we think only of the checkpoint, but there are a lot
of other layers of security that we have been dealing with in
trying to assure that everyone understands those things that
are associated with it. From the parking lot all the way to the
aircraft, we are building layers of security and reinforcing
security throughout the airport.
Senator Cleland. Thank you.
Mr. DeCosta.
Mr. DeCosta. I echo the sentiments of my colleagues. I
think that with the attention that is being given to this
nationwide from Congress, Federal agencies and every airport
manager in the country are focused on security in a much
different way now, as compared to before. Our commitment to
meet the challenge will make sure that we have the safest
system in the entire world.
Senator Cleland. Thank you.
Mr. Selvaggio.
Mr. Selvaggio. I can say that every airline executive is
also committed to security in a way that we have never even
thought of before. So the commitment from airline executives is
universal and I think yes, it will be better a year from now
and I think a key is technology and it is technology that we
have seen in evaluating the customer that would like to move to
a trusted passenger program and it is also the technology that
we are going to deploy in examining and screening baggage.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kalil.
Mr. Kalil. Yes, sir, I believe this industry will be--a
year from today will certainly be more focused on security than
it ever was in the past. I do agree we have to marry that
enhanced security with enhanced customer service and I think
the trusted customer concept is the way to go. One of the
things that we have tried to do is instill that sensitivity for
security down to every single employee in the company because
it is the people on the front lines that really ensure that our
security is what it should be.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, sir.
Dr. Bevan.
Dr. Bevan. Yes, I think there are a number of technologies,
commercial off-the-shelf technologies that could help us in the
next year. Beyond that, I am a little concerned that there are
technologies that are available that will not get developed and
we will need them to continue to improve our security and
improve the system as we go along. In other words, we should
not, after a year, rest on our laurels and say it is all over
with. This is a long-term kind of struggle and I am sure there
are other technological improvements that could help.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
Mr. Macginnis.
Mr. Macginnis. Senator, we thank you and you are the leader
in this industry right now, we applaud you once again for
taking the initiative and introducing this bill so we do have
some security measures to start with. We pledge the support of
the Air Line Pilots Association in helping you.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Planton.
Mr. Planton. Thank you for your time today. I do believe we
will have a secure national airspace system a year from now. We
will see our Federal workforce trained and implemented, and my
job in EDS is to take what we know now and apply it to the
airline system and leverage that across the United States.
Thank you.
Senator Cleland. Thank you all very much. And of course all
of this is designed to enhance the confidence and security of
the American public in flying again in not only the numbers we
saw before September 11, but in greater numbers.
Thank you all very much. Let me just say that the wonderful
staff on this Committee deserve the credit for putting this
together. I would like to thank my associate, Jane Terry, and
her wonderful work with the Commerce Committee; Sam Whitehorn,
Gael Sullivan and Mike Reynolds for being with us today.
We will call the Committee to an end. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, the Committee was adjourned at 12:26 p.m.]