[Senate Hearing 107-1051]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-1051
SEAPORT SECURITY, CARGO INSPECTION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
TRANSPORTATION
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 11, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
89-679 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
----------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AND MERCHANT MARINE
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii GORDON SMITH, Oregon
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachussetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
RON WYDEN, Oregon OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
MAX CLELAND, Georgia SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on January 11, 2002................................. 1
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 4
Witnesses
Allen, Vice Admiral Thad W., Commander, Atlantic Area, U.S. Coast
Guard.......................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Edmonds, James T., Chairman, Port of Houston Authority Board of
Commissioners.................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Hinton, Jim, Corporate Manager of Community Safety and Health,
Merisol USA and Security Chairman of the East Harris County
Manufacturers Association...................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Kice, Michael, Corporate Safety and Environmental Director, P&O
Ports North America, Inc....................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Lampson, Hon. Nick, U.S. Representative from Texas............... 5
Pipkin, Sam, Chairman, Channel Industries Mutual Aid (CIMA)...... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Trotter, Robert, Director of Field Operations for East Texas,
U.S. Customs Service........................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Appendix
Duffy, George E., President and Chief Executive Officer, Navios
Ship
Agencies Inc................................................... 41
SEAPORT SECURITY, CARGO INSPECTION,
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION
----------
FRIDAY, JANUARY 11, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation
and Merchant Marine,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Houston, TX.
The Subcommittee met at 1:30 p.m., in Courtroom III,
University of Houston Law Center, the Hon. John B. Breaux,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. The Subcommittee on Surface Transportation
and Merchant Marine will please come to order.
Good afternoon to all of our guests and to our witnesses
who will be appearing before our panel this afternoon. My name
is Senator John Breaux, and I am from your neighboring State,
over in Louisiana. I am very delighted to be able to be here in
Houston this afternoon with my colleague in the U.S. Senate,
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, who I serve with on the Senate
Commerce Committee and this Subcommittee, and my good friend
Congressman Nick Lampson, who is on the Transportation
Committee over on the House side, which has jurisdiction over
this subject matter over in the House of Representatives.
I want to thank and express my appreciation to the
University of Houston for allowing us to use their wonderful
facility this afternoon to have this hearing. I would also like
to express my appreciation and thanks to all of those who have
helped make our Subcommittee's trip to Texas as easy and as
pleasant as it has been so far, and particularly the
commissioners and officials of the Port of Houston, who hosted
us this morning on a visit throughout the port.
We actually boarded a vessel and toured port facilities. I
was not totally surprised to note that Port of Houston's vessel
was larger than the Port of New Orleans' vessel; I sort of
expected that. You have got to have a bigger boat than we have
and you have a world-class port here in Houston.
The Subcommittee has spent the last 3 days touring three of
the major ports in this country to talk about port security. We
were in Port Everglades in Florida the day before yesterday. We
had a field hearing there and then moved our Subcommittee to
New Orleans, where we toured the Port of New Orleans and met
with local officials and Federal officials as well, to
understand what their concerns and problems and priorities are
in the area of port security.
And today, we conclude our Subcommittee's 3-day trip here
at the Port of Houston to hear about your concerns and what we
as a Federal Government can do to help ensure greater security
to the port systems of this great country.
America is a different country since September 11 in terms
of how we look at security and our concerns about security. In
the past, much of the concerns about ports has been the
question of drug smuggling, the question of crime at the ports.
But today, there is also a third addition, and that is the
dangers from potential threats from terrorists which,
obviously, would look at the ports of this country as a
potential target if they were inclined to pick one area in
which they could inflict severe damage if they were so
inclined.
Like my port in New Orleans, your port in Houston is a
multi-purpose port with a lot of hazardous materials that come
in and exit that port everyday and lot of very volatile
materials are imported and stored in your port facility and are
surrounded by a very populated area--much like the Port of New
Orleans is, as well. So I think that the fact that we are
looking at this issue today is extremely important.
We in the Congress have begun to address this issue.
Incidentally, it was done before 9/11, when we introduced a
bill that I had originally sponsored along with others on the
Senate Commerce Committee, and have been joined by Senator
Hutchison in her sponsorship. That really started us looking at
port security from the standpoint of not terrorism, but,
basically, looking at it from the question of what we do with
criminal activity and drug smuggling. The bill obviously was
expanded and changed and modified after 9/11 in order to
address the question of terrorism.
Just as a quick outline, I would like to say that the bill
basically does a number of things, and we want to hear what you
think about it. We are here not to tell you what to do but to,
rather, listen to your ideas and thoughts and suggestions to
try and incorporate those ideas into the legislation. We are in
this together. It is not just the Federal Government. It is not
just State Government or local government. It is not just the
Coast Guard. It is all of us.
One of the things we want to make sure of is that there is
a comprehensive plan that allows all of us to work together and
to have someone in charge; when everyone is in charge, more
times than not, no one is in charge, so it is very important
that we have a system that allows us to coordinate our activity
in this very important area.
The Port and Maritime Security Act, as I said, has already
passed the U.S. Senate, but is not too late to change it. Nick
and I were talking about his efforts in the House and how they
are going to be working on it in his Committee. And things that
we did not catch in the Senate can be added in the House--or
changed or modified--and go to conference with the Senate.
The legislation basically requires that the local port will
have security committees established to do this coordination
that I was speaking of to make sure that the ports are looking
at how they are going to coordinate their activities. It
mandates for the first time ever that all ports in this country
have a comprehensive security plan. Some ports do not. Some
ports have plans that deal with drug smuggling but not the
question of security and access to the ports and who is in
charge of the ports in terms of security.
The bill would require not a plan coming out of Washington
but, rather, a plan that is developed at the local level for
the particular needs of that particular port; the needs of the
Port of New Orleans may not fit the Port of Houston. So having
the Coast Guard as the lead in trying to develop a
comprehensive security plan for each port is part of our
legislation. It requires ports to limit activity to sensitive
areas within their ports.
I happen to believe that we no longer can have free and
unfettered access by anyone at any time and any place to enter
into sensitive areas within a port. Times have changed, and I
think the needs and requirements are going to be different.
It requires that ships electronically send their cargo
manifests to a port before they gain clearance to the port. We
want to know what is on those ships, who is on those ships and
what they are carrying before they gain access to our ports. We
want to improve the reporting of crew members and passengers
and imported cargo on those ships and want to have more
information and better data in that regard.
The bill creates a Sea Marshal program, which we worked
with yesterday in New Orleans, boarding a ship with a Coast
Guard Sea Marshal that accompanies River Pilots when they join
the ship outside of the port. River Pilots are not law
enforcement people; they are navigators and Captains of the
ship that is under their command. But you need someone on that
vessel when it enters a port's zone in order to ensure that
what they say they are carrying they are and who they say they
are, they in fact are those people. Sea Marshals can help
provide that assurance.
It also recognizes that ports have some economic problems
trying to meet these new security requirements. The legislation
has authorized $703 million of grants to local ports like the
Port of Houston and like the Port of New Orleans to help the
ports around the country with extra money that they are going
to need in order to establish new security arrangements within
their ports.
In addition, it provides $3.3 billion in loans to seaports.
They are Government-guaranteed loans which would allow the port
to, maybe if they need to, borrow money at a better rate of
return in order to, in fact, improve some of their security
personnel requirements within the port.
The final thing it does is to authorize additional spending
for research and development of cargo inspection technology.
Millions and millions of cargoes come into our ports every day,
and very little of that is inspected. We need to do a better
job.
Less than 2 percent of the cargo that comes into the United
States is actually inspected. We don't necessarily know what is
in the millions and millions of containers that come into our
ports every day, and we need to do a better job. That is
expensive, that is tough and that is difficult.
If we opened every container that came into the Port of
Houston and physically inspected it, that would stop traffic in
this port and almost destroy the viability of this port. If we
want to know if there are better ways other than that to find
out what is in it, I think the answer is yes. Admiral Allen and
I were talking earlier about perhaps knowing more about what is
put into the container before it gets to this country in order
to better find out whether in fact it is being loaded properly
at the port that it is originating from.
So that is sort of a summary of what the legislation does.
We want to hear from some of the folks that will be with us. I
think that this morning's visit was very, very helpful, and I
cannot thank my colleagues from Texas enough to express my
appreciation in helping them and playing a leadership role. I
know that Kay has done that in the Commerce Committee, where we
serve together, in this area. And it has been a pleasure to
work with her.
I sort of jokingly said that I was happy to come over to
Texas to see what she has been doing with all of the things
that she has stolen from Louisiana and see how they are using
it over here. But they are a very friendly rival. And it is a
pleasure to join her and have her join us here in her State of
Texas.
So, Senator Hutchison, any comments? Let me get back my
stuff.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. I told Senator Breaux earlier that I
knew he was coming over here to steal ideas to take back to New
Orleans.
Senator Breaux. I am trying to take the port back.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hutchison. Seriously, I do want to thank Senator
Breaux. Senator Breaux is Chairman of the Surface
Transportation and Merchant Marine Subcommittee of the Commerce
Committee. I was the Chairman before he was and really loved
that Subcommittee. Now I am the Ranking Member of the Aviation
Subcommittee, and worked with Senator Breaux on the Aviation
Security bill. But now, I think, we must start being proactive
on transportation security rather than responding to crises.
We are definitely in response mode on aviation, but I think
we can do better in port, rail, and highway security if we will
look ahead to see what our vulnerabilities are. That is exactly
what the bill that I am co-sponsoring with Senator Breaux will
do, and that is: Ask the ports from around the country to
submit a plan. We will have in the bill the authorization for
funding to help the ports implement the plans that they submit
after they are approved.
I think there are two good things that can happen from
this. One is we will know what the local authorities need.
Second, I think when we see all the different plans, it might
help give us ideas for other areas where we can improve safety.
I think this can be a learning tool for all of us to use, but
the bottom line is we are trying to be proactive and close the
loop-holes before someone harms us.
I am very pleased that we are being hosted by the
University of Houston Law School; this is one of our great law
schools in the State. I am very pleased that they were able to
accommodate us and make us part of their ongoing outreach
effort.
Let me say that I think it is important to look at the Port
of Houston in a different way from many of our other ports. And
that is--of course, we are the largest in foreign tonnage.
Therefore, security is going to be paramount. Also, we have the
largest fuel refining facility in the United States right in
this area, and I think it becomes a national security issue to
protect our energy supply.
I am very concerned about the effect of any kind of
disruption of our energy supply on our overall economy.
Everyone knows that in order to win the war on terrorism, we
must have a robust economy. Protecting our energy supply and
our petrochemical plants as a part of that is another reason
that we need to focus on security at the Port of Houston.
I am very pleased in the tour of the port we had this
morning. I have taken it before, as I am sure every self-
respecting Texas office-holder would have, but I am always
amazed, because I always find something new, and I see how much
our port has grown through the years. I think that what we saw
today--just in observation, there are some things that we can
do to improve port security here and I know will be part of the
plan submitted by the Port of Houston.
I would like to thank the Chairman for bringing the hearing
here. I again want to thank the Port of Houston for hosting us
this morning and for doing the great job that they always do.
We are very pleased to have the Admiral from the Coast Guard,
who is responsible for this area which is so very important to
us, and the Customs office and all of those who are affected by
port security. Thank you all for being here; we look forward to
learning from you here today.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
And now, we will hear any comments that Congressman Nick
Lampson might have.
Nick, good to have you.
STATEMENT OF HON. NICK LAMPSON,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS
Representative Lampson. Thank you, Senator Breaux.
First of all, I want to certainly thank Senator Breaux and
Senator Hutchison for allowing me to participate in the Surface
Transportation and Merchant Marine Subcommittee field hearing
on seaport security here in Houston. I really commend both of
you on your leadership and the work that you have done in the
Senate in Washington for our Nation. And I am particularly
pleased that you came to Houston, and let this be at least one
of your three stops.
The 9th Congressional District stretches from----
Senator Hutchison. We saved the best for last.
[Laughter.]
Representative Lampson. Indeed. We will double-team you if
necessary to get anything back that you try to take away from
us. You know, there are a lot of people who say, ``Senator,
there are more people in Port Arthur that are Cajun than there
are of those in Lake Charles.''
[Laughter.]
Senator Breaux. That may be true, but they always come
back.
Representative Lampson. They like it so far.
This district that I represent stretches from here in
Houston over to the Galveston/Texas City area and up the
coastline of the Texas/Louisiana border at Beaumont and Port
Arthur. And there are six ports within the congressional
district and a number of other ports in very close proximity to
the congressional district.
As a Member of the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, I can tell you that we are indeed working hard in
Congress to ensure that our ports and our waterways are safe
and secure, especially in light of the tragic events of
September 11. And I know that this outstanding group of
witnesses is working hard, also, and I look forward to hearing
what they have to say today.
On September 24, the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee requested that the Secretary of
Transportation establish a rapid-response team to develop ways
to reduce the vulnerability of our seaports to terrorist
attacks. And, specifically, the Committee leadership asked
Secretary Mineta to provide suggestions for immediate action
that may be necessary to improve seaport security.
On December 6, in his testimony before the House
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, the
Secretary spoke of the need to identify ports of national and
strategic significance and perform full-scale vulnerability
assessments. And I agree that this is an essential factor of
our Nation's maritime security response to the new threats that
we are facing.
As you know, Southeast Texas houses a significant portion
of our Nation's petrochemical industry. In the wake of
September 11, leaders of the petrochemical industry and the
maritime industry have been working with port personnel and
law-enforcement agencies to institute higher security measures
and to ensure the continued safety and security of our ports.
One only needs to look at the example of Texas City--and
that is right in the yard of which Kay Bailey Hutchison grew
up--where more than 500 people died after two freighters
containing ammonium-nitrate fertilizer exploded in 1947, to
understand the deadly consequences of inaction.
Both the Port of Beaumont and the Port of Texas City handle
high volumes of hazardous materials from the petrochemical
industry; in addition, the Port of Beaumont is home to a
military traffic management and control facility that handles
large volumes of military cargo. And the Port of Galveston
operates as a hub for the cruise ship industry in Southeast
Texas, and it is also at considerable risk to terrorist attacks
given its high passenger volume.
Well, some of the things that I hope from the gentlemen who
are going to make their presentations today have to do with the
resources specifically of the Coast Guard. And I understand
that just in that area out of Sabine Pass, where there have
been 110 or so Reservists, we are now down to about 10. Only 10
or so remain.
Whether or not the Coast Guard does indeed have adequate
resources to continue to do patrol, boarding of ships and all
the other duties that go to this both law-enforcement and
military agency must be determined. Will the Coast Guard have
the ability to continue to rely on local governments, which
this bill speaks to, through its cooperation?
***[Recording cuts off briefly here; portion missed.]***
twice in the last month to escort a naval vessel going into the
Port of Beaumont because they did not--because the Coast Guard
did not have the adequate facilities available or the resources
on the Gulf Coast in comparison to the East and West coasts of
our country? All of that has to do with adequate funding and
adequate planned cooperation, again, as this bill will speak
to. And I look forward to hearing from you on those matters.
Those words are just to underscore, I guess, the importance
of maintaining vigilant oversight over our Nation's ports. The
terrorist attacks on the 11th of September highlight the need
to institute high levels of cooperation in security from the
Federal to the local level, and it isn't an issue which can be
addressed separately by law enforcement or by port personnel;
it is indeed an issue which requires a great deal of
cooperation from all parties involved.
I applaud the Senators for their recognition of the
importance of port security as a national security issue, and I
look forward to working with them in improving, providing, and
maintaining security at our Nation's ports. Thank you.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Congressman Lampson,
for your participation and help.
With that, we would like to welcome up the panel that will
be presenting testimony, followed by questions from those of us
up here. First would be Vice Admiral Thad Allen. Admiral Allen
is the Admiral in charge of the Coast Guard for the entire Gulf
of Mexico, as well as for the entire Atlantic coast of the
United States. He is accompanied by Captain Kevin Cook, who is
Captain of the Port here in the Port of Houston.
Then we will have Mr. Robert Trotter, who is Director of
Field Operations for East Texas for our Customs Service.
I am using one of your pens.
Mr. Jim Edmonds, today's Chairman of the Port of Houston--
of the Port Authority, thank you for your courtesies to us so
far.
Mr. Mike Kice, who is Vice President of P&O Ports here in
Texas; Mr. Jim Hinton, East Harris County Manufacturers
Association; and, also, Mr. Sam Pipkin, who is Chairman of
Channel Industries Mutual Aid--CIMA--here in Houston. Thank
you, gentlemen, all, for being with us.
And we will start, I guess, with your statement, Admiral
Allen.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN, COMMANDER, ATLANTIC
AREA, U.S. COAST GUARD
Vice Admiral Allen. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I have a
prepared statement for today's hearing, but, with your
permission, I will submit that for the record and make a few
quick comments. I realize I am the third Coast Guard witness in
a row, and I would much rather engage in some other discussion
and hit the points that you and the other panel members have
asked about. And I think it is important that we have that
dialog here today.
Senator Breaux. Thank you. You are the highest ranking one,
however.
[Laughter.]
Vice Admiral Allen. I would like to make just a couple of
points and some acknowledgements if I could to kick off today's
event. The first thing I would like to talk about is
leadership--and you have stated that often in the past few
weeks, Mr. Chairman--regarding port security and what we need
to do in the ports post-9/11.
Before 9/11, there was a lot of leadership in the ports,
but it was more focused on individual activities and processes.
We were looking at cruise ships. We were looking at port State
control regimes. We were looking at environmental response. We
were looking at certain facilities. And we were doing a good
job. And those all came from various mandates, some stemming
back to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 or before.
What happened on 9/11 was that we had a general quarters
call; everybody had to come up on deck. We searched where we
needed to. We closed the ports of New York. We closed
Washington around the Potomac, Baltimore and their harbor and
so forth.
What is needed now is leadership. And I appreciate what the
Committee has done, especially S. 1214, in putting forward a
paradigm on how we can pull together what were previously
disparate activities of the port and put them under a holistic
approach. We have a good model to do that. The Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 in its implementation has been a major success in
reducing spills and increasing the environmental security of
our ports.
Many of the provisions in the proposed legislation mirror
the process that we use to increase the environmental security
of our ports. I think that is important to understand. And I
appreciate the leadership of the Senate. And we look forward to
working with the House as a final vote comes to fruition.
I would also like to thank Secretary Mineta, the Secretary
of Transportation, for his work in crafting the final Senate
version of this bill.
The transportation system in this country is very complex;
it is multi-modal. Cargo flows not only impact ports; there are
rails, surface and air, and we need to understand that from a
multi-modal standpoint. The new Transportation Security
Administration is being stood up, and I think there are a lot
of opportunities to look at these across the modes, though we
are going to be talking about ports today and the maritime
security aspects of our transportation system.
But I think we understand that containers--and we have
talked about this--move through many different modes. And I
think the Transportation Security Administration is poised to
take a good look at that. And I look forward to Secretary
Mineta's leadership in that regard.
At a lower level, I think you can be happy here in the Port
of Houston. Captain Kevin Cook was here on 9/11. He took some
very fast, persuasive and decisive actions in the hours
following the events. A lot of that had to do with his great
relationships here in the port with all the stakeholders and
their ability to come to a consensus on what needed to be done.
And this involved increasing security at the facilities
themselves and requiring more information from the vessels that
were arriving.
In fact, some of the actions that Captain Cook took here in
the Port of Houston presaged the national events that were to
take place several days later, including better information on
arrivals of ships, cargo and personnel, that were associated
with that.
So I think the real issue right now is: Post-9/11, how do
we take all the good things that were going on in the ports
before then and take a holistic look at the ports as it relates
to security? The Commandant and I both believe that the Coast
Guard as the lead Federal Agency in the maritime environment
has a key leadership role to play. As we did with the
implementation of OPA 90, we think it is a responsibility that
we can shoulder--working with our other modes in the Department
of Transportation and the Transportation Security
Administration.
We are prepared to move forward with the provisions that
are included in the Senate version of the bill. And we look
forward to working with the House as we craft the complete
piece of legislation. And I look forward to answering any
questions that we had that were generated by the briefs this
morning. A lot of the information is included in my statement,
and I will not repeat it here.
I would like to make a couple of acknowledgements because
the great efforts of Captain Cook and Captain Thompson, the
group commander from Galveston who is behind me, don't happen
alone. And the great work in this port has to do with the great
partnerships that exist in it.
I would just like to acknowledge the port authorities in
Texas City and Houston, the local industry leaders at Texas
Waterway Operators, the Houston Marine Association, the
HOGANSAC Port Security Committee, the Houston Police
Department, which put aviation units in the area to help us,
the Galveston County Sheriff 's Office and the Jefferson County
Sheriff 's Office, who have actually put boats on the water to
work with us.
We appreciate that really good support from the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, who diverted NMFS
agents from the National Marine and Fisheries Service to put a
boat on the water 6 hours a day to help us, the Texas General
Land Office, the local FBI regional office, Customs/INS and the
Houston Pilots and, also, the Galveston and Texas City Pilots.
This is one team, one fight. This is something that no one
agency can be successful at by themselves. And the final
solutions to these problems are going to have to be crafted at
the port level with all of the stakeholders being involved, but
we certainly understand and recognize the Coast Guard's
leadership role and are prepared to execute that.
[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commander,
Atlantic Area, U.S. Coast Guard
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished guests to this Field
Hearing of the Subcommittee. As the Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic
Area, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss port security and especially the maritime transport of
hazardous materials.
Protecting America from terrorist threats requires constant
vigilance across every mode of transportation: air, land, and sea. The
agencies within the Department of Transportation, including the U.S.
Coast Guard Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Highway
Administration, and the Maritime Administration (MARAD), touch all
three modes of transportation and are cooperatively linked. This is
especially true of the maritime mode. Ensuring robust port and maritime
security is a national priority and an intermodal challenge, with
impacts in America's heartland communities just as directly as the U.S.
seaport cities where cargo and passenger vessels arrive and depart
daily. The United States has more than 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000
miles of inland, intracoastal and coastal waterways, serving 361 ports
containing more than 3,700 passenger and cargo terminals. This maritime
commerce infrastructure, known as the U.S. Marine Transportation
System, or MTS, has long been a Department of Transportation priority.
The U.S. MTS handles more than 2 billion tons of freight, 3 billion
tons of oil, transports more than 134 million passengers by ferry, and
entertains more than 7 million cruise ship passengers each year. The
vast majority of the cargo handled by this system is immediately loaded
onto or has just been unloaded from railcars and truckbeds, making the
borders of the U.S. seaport network especially abstract and vulnerable,
with strong, numerous and varied linkages direct to our Nation's rail
and highway systems.
With more than 100 petrochemical waterfront facilities, Houston is
the second largest petrochemical complex in the world. Major
corporations such as Exxon-Mobil, Shell, Saudi ARAMCO, Stolt Nielson,
Odfjell Tankers, Sea River and Kirby Marine have national or
international headquarters in Houston. Leading trade associations such
as INTERTANKO and the Chemical Carriers Association also have a
substantial presence here. Three important Federal Advisory Committees,
the Houston-Galveston Navigational Safety Committee (HOGANSAC), the
Chemical Transportation Advisory Committee and the National Offshore
Safety Advisory Committee are key players in the Port as well.
In terms of maritime traffic and cargo, the Port of Houston ranks
first in the U.S. for its number of ship arrivals and total cargo
tonnage. Houston handles over 50 percent of all containerized cargo
arriving at Gulf of Mexico ports. Additionally, more than 50 percent of
the gasoline used in the U.S. is refined in this area.
With approximately 7600 deep draft ship arrivals each year, the
Coast Guard maintains a very robust Port State Control program in the
Houston-Galveston area. This national program was established to
eliminate the operation of substandard foreign ships in U.S. waters
because over 90 percent of U.S. cargo is carried by foreign-flagged
ships. Since the Port of Houston accommodates such a large number of
tankers carrying crude oil, refined products and chemical cargoes, the
Port State Control program monitors the safe carriage of hazardous
materials in bulk.
As part of other coordinated efforts pre-September 11th, Marine
Safety Office Houston-Galveston was inspecting a limited number of
container, per week and conducted at least one Multi-Agency Strike
Force Operation involving the U.S. Customs Service, Department of
Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and
Houston Police Department. This level of activity is not atypical when
compared to other ports handling high volumes of oil and hazardous
materials in bulk.
On September 11th, port centered activity and emphasis shifted from
environmental protection and vessel/cargo safety to maritime security.
The Captain of the Port Houston-Galveston required additional safety
and security measures to be taken by ships transiting the zone and by
waterfront facilities located within an established area. These
measures included:
(1) Expanding the existing regulatory requirement for submission of
an Advance Notice of Arrival for vessels over 1600 gross tons to
include crew information and the vessel's last three ports of call.
(2) Ships carrying bulk liquefied hazadous gases were surrounded
with a 500 yard moving safety zone excluding all watercraft less than
fifty feet in length from approaching. The vessels were required to
transit in daylight only, with a Coast Guard escort. Once moored, these
ships were required to maintain roving security patrols oil deck and
their receiving facilities were to provide continuously manned
waterfront security.
(3) Chemical and oil tankers were required to provide roving
security patrols on deck while moored, and their receiving facilities
were to provide continuously manned waterfront security. Additionally,
chemical carriers were required to provide a cargo stowage plan before
arrival and departure.
(4) Barges carrying liquefied hazardous gas were required to notify
the Captain of the Port 24 hours in advance of any movement, and to
provide a cargo stowage plan. Facilities where barges were moored were
to provide continuously manned waterfront security.
(5) Before conducting cargo transfer operations, waterfront
facilities were required to provide the Captain of the Port with
written affirmation that: there was a current list of authorized
personnel with facility access; positive control had been established
at entrances; a security plan was in place to include daily perimeter,
barrier and lighting checks; vehicles were prohibited from parking
within 100 yards of moored vessels; and, continuously manned waterfront
security was in place.
(6) Further general security recommendations including a Port
Physical Security Survey Checklist, were also provided by the Captain
of the Port.
Thanks to longstanding professional relationships between the Coast
Guard, local officials and industry managers in the port, all of these
measures were readily accepted and implemented.
The Captain of the Port in Houston-Galveston assumed operational
control and established coordinated activities of the MSO, MSU
Galveston, Group Galveston, VTS Houston-Galveston, offshore Coast Guard
cutters, patrol boats and Navy-provided 170, patrol craft.
Additionally, a limited Sea Marshal program was tested. As a result of
this harnessing of resources, from September 11 through December 18,
2001, units under their direction conducted 820 car patrols, 675 boat
patrols, 118 air patrols, and 141 boardings of High Interest Vessels.
Additionally, 73 vessels were escorted in and out of the Port and sea
marshals were assigned to 47 particularly important vessel movements.
As part of an interagency cooperative effort, many other Federal and
State agencies contributed to homeland security efforts in the region.
The Houston Police Department conducted 354 air patrols of the harbor
during this same period. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration used their locally assigned boat to assist in harbor
patrols. Texas Parks and Wildlife provided a part time boat for similar
work in Galveston. Finally, the Texas General Land Office stepped in to
handle responses to minor oil spills in the area, thus freeing Coast
Guard pollution responders for port security assignments.
To provide a heightened awareness of activities in the maritime
domain, VTS Houston-Galveston established an electronic linkage of its
port radar picture with the radar systems aboard the Coast Guard
cutters and Navy patrol craft operating offshore. Thus, the operational
commander had a better understanding of vessel positions and movements
both in the port and its offshore approaches. This capability enhanced
the Captain of the Port's ability to coordinate security boardings with
a minimal disruption of normal traffic flow. I am optimistic about the
results of this initiative and will continue to exploit other existing
systems to help achieve a better understanding of vessel, cargo and
crew movement in and out of ports throughout the Atlantic Area.
In addition to the additional safety and security measures, the
Captain of the Port began closer, more frequent contact with the local
FBI, INS, U.S. Customs Service, and Houston Police Department to share
intelligence and to coordinate response planning for a terrorist
incident. A Port Security subcommittee has also been formed under
HOGANSAC. This subcommittee has had three meetings involving key port
stakeholders such as facility operators, shipping companies, steamship
agents, other Federal agencies and local law enforcement in planning
the way ahead for port security in the ports of Houston and Galveston.
The Coast Guard has long recognized the importance of the Port of
Houston and the surrounding Gulf Coast area. We have a solid record and
sound programs to deal with the marine transport of hazardous
materials, particularly with respect to safety and environmental
protection. In the Port of Houston, much has been accomplished since
September 11th to heighten port security to ensure the safe marine
transport of hazardous materials, thanks to the efforts of the entire
port community, the shipping industry, State and local governmental
agencies, and other Federal agencies including the Coast Guard. Just as
we worked in the past to ensure the safe marine transport of hazardous
materials and the protection of the marine environment, I am confidant
that we can continue to work together to improve homeland security. Our
joint goal must be to develop and institutionalize viable maritime
security arrangements as a cultural imperative, as has already been
accomplished with marine safety and environmental protection.
Mr. Chairman, for over 210 years, the Coast Guard has been tasked
to protect our Nation. In 1787, Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist
Paper Number 12, ``A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the
entrances of our ports, might at a small expense, be made useful
sentinels of our laws.'' We're proud to be a part of the continued
national strategy to keep our homeland secure. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Admiral Allen.
Next we will hear from Mr. Robert Trotter.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT TROTTER, DIRECTOR OF FIELD OPERATIONS FOR
EAST TEXAS, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
Mr. Trotter. Thank you, Chairman Breaux, Senator Hutchison
and Congressman Lampson. I also have a statement for the
record. And, following the Admiral's suit, I would like to move
quickly through my prepared comments and then would be glad to
entertain some questions.
My name is Robert Trotter; I am the Director of Field
Operations for East Texas. I am responsible for oversight of
the inspection of international passengers, conveyance and
cargo arriving and departing through the seaports and airports
in East Texas.
I would like to take time, also, Senator, just to introduce
three other Customs officials who came today to show you the
kind of support that we have: One is Mr. Al Pena--Al is our
special agent in charge of U.S. Customs' Office of
Investigations, the agents that actually do the undercover work
for us; Mr. John Babb, who you met and did a good job this
morning on our cruise, and; Mr. Don Pearson. Don is in charge
of our Air and Marine Division. And so this shows you kind of
our look at how important this meeting is today--and your
Subcommittee's look-see at the importance of the seaport
activity.
As you know, we participated in the Inter-agency Committee
on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports. And we do support that.
The U.S. Customs Service takes support of that. We also are
very appreciative of what we see in your proposals of Senate
bill 1214.
I would like to touch base on those, briefly, questions
that you asked: Who is in charge of the port? What we do with
containers, information management--because I think that is
extremely critical--technology, and then end with staffing and
just touch on that briefly. And then I will pass on to the next
spokesman.
As you know, the Customs Service originated with the First
Continental Congress in 1789. So we have been around for 213
years defending our borders, and we take our job very
seriously. We have worked with people in this room, as well as
people at the national and State level on these very same
issues.
September 11 came as a shock to us, as to everyone else. We
closely formed ranks with the Coast Guard and with other
Federal law enforcement agencies to step up to ensure that we
provided the necessary security to the port. We provided people
on airport security detail at the airport in Houston, as many
Customs officers did.
We provided seaport security. We are on what we call Alert
Level 1 status, and we have been, which is our highest level of
status, which means that we are putting all of the possible
resources that we can get toward doing the best job possible to
ensure not only the security of the airports and the seaports
but, also, processing the cargo and the passengers that come to
the port daily. That, as you know, is the other side of the
equation.
You spoke at lunch about the steel anti-dumping duties that
may be imposed. The Customs Service, of course, is in charge of
imports and exports into the United States, and that is a large
job, as well as the security.
What we have found and what we are fortunate to say is that
the Coast Guard is in charge of the port, we look to the Coast
Guard for their leadership as the security of the port, and we
look to ourselves for the containers. And I wanted to mention
that Commissioner Bonner has stated that he very much wants to
look at containers, where they originate, the ports of origin,
and what happens to that container from the very beginning to
the very end. He is enlisting a program as we speak to involve
the trade. As you all know, the trade is a very large part of
this security effort, not only the carriers, but the importers
and exporters.
What we need, to do that job even better than we do it
today, is better information. And you touched on that better
manifest information. That is critical to us.
As you know, we have a multi-layered approach of doing
analytical work to look at the shipments that are coming into
the United States. And the more information we have, the better
we can utilize our automated technology to do the screening.
And you mentioned 2 percent, and that is just about how
many we examine in this port: Just about 2 percent. We do a
little bit better with high-risk, but just about 2 percent is
national. People look at that and say, ``Geez; Well, what about
the other 98 percent?'' And that is a good question, and
sometimes we do not have complete answers for the other 98
percent.
But we feel that with what we have now with staffing and
the information that is provided to us and our automated
capability we are doing a good job in screening high risk out,
because, as you mentioned, we do not want to deter people from
using the seaports in Houston, and we do not want to needlessly
bother or add additional costs to people who use the Customs
Service or export or import.
How do we go about doing that? With the 7,313 vessels in
the Port of Houston last year, how do we go about doing a
better job? One thing I wanted to talk to you a little bit
about is technology. You asked about technology. I am holding
my hand here; for those of you who can see, this is a radiation
detector. And what this does is warn our inspectors and today
just about all of our inspectors have these on their belts. I
have got one today.
And this will read Radiation for the inspector if they come
across a radiation leak in a piece of cargo or, actually on
people. Sometimes people come through our airports and these
things go off and our inspectors do not know why. But it is
radio-isotopes that they have swallowed for medical purposes.
And that is how sensitive these things are.
So something this simple, like $1,500 a copy, that we can
put on our inspectors and--ensures their safety. Plus the
technology lets us know if there is radiation. And you think,
Well, radiation is just in weapons of mass destruction. But
that may not be.
You talked about steel. A lot of steel that is scrap from
the former Soviet Union contains radiation because they used it
in certain projects. And we do not want that imported into the
United States. So technology, like pagers, assist us--we not
only use technology of this size. We use larger technology: X-
ray equipment, fixed X-rays and mobile X-rays. And they have
really increased our efficiency. They permit us to process
containers. We can normally de-van and examine a container--it
takes about 4 hours, and that is working about full time on it.
In our port, we can do about 30 of those a day, and we get
about 1,100. With technology, we can expand that. And that
really is where we see the best investment for us: Better
information; better technology.
And I also just want to address just very quickly the
staffing issue. As you all know, we are like the other
agencies. We have been placed in a difficult position with
Alert Level 1 since 9/11, but we see some hope coming down the
pike. We see what Congress has pulled together for us. We are
working with the Administration and with Treasury to get more
resources out to the field so they can be utilized to process
cargo and passengers and legitimately focus on our enforcement
efforts.
One thing I just want to close in saying and that has been
so interesting to us: We thought when we transitioned perhaps
as--our main job is narcotics and currency. As we transitioned
into anti-terrorism, we thought we might lose some of that edge
that we had. But we have actually found--and our statistics are
bearing this out--that we are doing better now in currency and
narcotics than we were before. So that is a real good sign for
us and a real good signal for the Nation.
I would just like to leave that on a high note, sir. And we
will be glad to answer any questions that come our way.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Trotter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert S. Trotter, Director of Field Operations
for East Texas, U.S. Customs Service
Chairman Breaux, Senator Hutchinson, thank you for your invitation
to testify and for providing me the chance to appear before you today
to discuss the efforts of the U.S. Customs Service to address seaport
security and the challenges that exist at the East Texas seaports,
including improvements that we are making in our cargo inspection
system to better protect the American people and our Nation's critical
infrastructure.
My name is Robert Trotter. I am the Director, Field Operations for
East Texas. I am responsible for oversight of the inspection and
control of international passengers, conveyances and cargo arriving and
departing through the seaports and airports in East Texas.
As a major participant in the protection of our Nation's borders,
Customs has taken a lead role in efforts to deny entry to the
implements of terrorism into the United States through our seaports.
The Customs Service enforces over 400 laws and regulations for more
than 40 Federal agencies. Naturally, the seaports in East Texas are a
major focus of our efforts. Our security and anti-terrorism efforts
must be balanced against the need to assure the smooth flow of
legitimate trade and travel.
While Customs is able to inspect only a relatively small percentage
of the massive volume of cargo entering the United States each day, we
rely on a careful, multi-layered targeting approach to select goods for
intensive examination. Our risk management strategy incorporates the
use of intelligence and advance information from shippers, the
deployment of sophisticated technologies, and the skill and expertise
of Customs personnel to sift out suspicious goods from the vast ocean
of legitimate trade before they enter the commerce of the United
States.
In addition, under the direction of Commissioner Robert Bonner, the
agency is engaging the private sector in a new Customs-trade
partnership to defend the entire length of the product supply chain
from penetration by terrorists or the implements of terrorism. And we
are undertaking new initiatives with our international partners in an
ongoing effort to expand the perimeter of inspection away from the port
of entry and toward the point of origin.
The Customs Service also continues to build upon established
cooperative relationships with the Immigration & Naturalization
Service, the Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard. Using a collaborative
approach, we are employing targeting and risk management techniques to
select people, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, cargo and containers for
increased inspection.
During Fiscal Year 2001, 7,313 vessels entered the Port of Houston.
Many examinations of their cargo were conducted utilizing the Vehicle
and Cargo Inspection System known as VACIS.
Since December 1, 2001, the Port of Houston has made 21 currency
seizures totaling $493,453, most as a result of Operation Oasis in
coordination with the Office of Investigations.
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the U.S.
Customs Service immediately implemented a Level One Alert for all
personnel and ports of entry. This is our highest State of alert,
calling for sustained, intensive anti-terrorist operations. We remain
at Level One Alert today.
We do not expect our changing priorities to have a negative impact
on our traditional law enforcement mission such as drug seizures. To
the contrary, we expect, and we have seen mounting evidence to the
effect that heightened counter-terrorist measures by the Customs
Service are strengthening our overall interdiction efforts.
Customs plans the deployment of, Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII)
technology such as mobile and relocatable x-ray and gamma ray systems
that are capable of detecting anomalies in commercial cargo and
conveyances. Most of this technology is scheduled for deployment to
address the smuggling threat we face at high-risk air, sea and land
border ports of entry. The Houston seaport currently utilizes
stationary VACIS and mobile x-ray van technology and is deploying
additional VACIS equipment for full container x-ray to address suspect
shipments throughout the Houston area including outlying docks.
Working with the U.S. Coast Guard, classroom training in hazardous
materials recently was updated for Houston Customs officers. In
addition, many Customs inspectors wear sensitive radiation detection
devices that audibly alert them to the presence of radiation.
The Houston Customs Port. Office took the initiative immediately
following September 11, 2001, to demand advance vessel crew lists,
since the identification of crewmembers that may be security risks is
tantamount to good border security. The Customs Intelligence Collection
and Analysis Team (ICAT) in Houston performs research to conduct
enforcement queries against a variety of Federal law enforcement data
bases. Members of a multi-disciplinary enforcement team interview
potential matches and identify suspects. The obtainment of advance
vessel crewmember lists has subsequently become the responsibility of
the USCG at the National Vessel Movement Center.
In addition, the Customs Port office has refocused its Subject
Matter Experts (SME's) to identify new importers and any commodity that
could be used as a Weapon of Mass Destruction. The Houston Customs Port
Office is also actively working in partnership with the trade industry
to obtain more accurate and complete vessel manifest data in areas such
as consignee, shipper and commodity description.
The vast volume of trade and traffic at the East Texas seaports has
put immense pressure on our ability to enforce the Nation's laws while
facilitating international trade, even before September 11th. After
September 11th, our challenge has risen to a new level. Although we
have taken many steps to address these challenges, such as the planned
delivery of a mobile VACIS, we still face many challenges.
We are working within Treasury and the Administration to address
these challenges. For example, we are developing threat assessments and
a longerterm perimeter security strategy for dealing with them to
secure our homeland defenses, including the East Texas seaports. In
considering such a long-term plan, several core areas will need to be
addressed. We are developing and deploying Non-Intrusive Inspection
(NII) technology to detect the implements of terrorism. We are also
enhancing our Industry Partnership Programs to enable the trade,
transportation, and business communities to assist us in securing the
supply chain for commercial cargo and conveyances as envisioned by the
Commissioner of Customs.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to testify.
The U.S. Customs Service will continue to make every effort possible,
working with our fellow inspection agencies, within the Administration,
with Congressional leaders, and the business community to address your
concerns and those of the American people. I would be happy to answer
any questions you might have.
Senator Breaux. All right.
Jim Edmonds.
STATEMENT OF JAMES T. EDMONDS, CHAIRMAN,
PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
Mr. Edmonds. Thank you, Senator. I will follow their lead;
I have 30-some-odd pages I wanted to read to you, and I will
submit them.
Senator Breaux. Thank you.
Mr. Edmonds. Let me just say briefly that we are pleased
that you are here.
And thank you, Senator Hutchison, for arranging this to be
in Houston; it is special to us that you would come to Houston.
I am going to say a few things about the Port of Houston,
some of which you have heard before, but bear with me, if you
will. It is the eighth largest port in the world, and it is the
largest port in the United States in foreign tonnage. And that
is important from the standpoint that we realize what makes up
this port.
It is a very mixed-use port. And because it is the largest
petrochemical complex in the United States and, arguably, in
the world, it is a port that has certain vulnerabilities and a
port that has certain requirements placed upon it for security.
And so it is important to us that you are here today.
If you look at the Port of Houston from the Port
Authority's standpoint, we do about a 1.1 or 1.2 million
containers a year. We believe that containerization is indeed
the wave of the future. I have read numerous places that by
2020, 90 percent of the world's cargo will be shipped in a
container.
I showed you a bit ago the map, and we saw Bay Port. And if
we are permitted this summer and at build-out, Bay Port will be
able to accommodate 2.5 million containers. We own 1,100 acres
of land on Pelican Island in Galveston, and that will
eventually be the third container port for the Port of Houston.
There are 500--within a 500-mile radius of Houston, there
are 30 million people. This slice of the United States is one
of the fastest growing. And we are at the mouth of the market
place. And as we continue to feed that market with product,
more and more containers will come to this port. We already
enjoy about 63 percent of the container market share in the
gulf.
What is happening in ports is very much what has happened
in airports. If you look at Atlanta and Chicago and Dallas, you
have collection points that redistribute goods or people.
The same thing is happening in ports.
There will eventually be five of what are called load-
center ports: The one in Seattle and Tacoma, one in LA and Long
Beach, one in New York and New Jersey, something on the south
Atlantic and one in the gulf. And we believe the one in the
gulf will be the Port of Houston, and that will basically be a
container port that redistributes containers throughout the
central part of the United States. For that reason, security
alone is extremely important to us.
Your visit here is very timely. And I commend you and thank
you for the leadership that you have shown this Senate and the
bill that you have passed. We have looked at the bill, and it
is an important bill that allows us to develop in more detail a
security plan; we are a port that is conscientious of that,
aware of it, and we have looked at that issue for many years.
And we have redoubled our efforts since 9/11.
The folks that are to my right and left are the key players
in this, and the port is the sponsoring waterway, but the U.S.
Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs and CIMA--these folks--have
day-in-and-day-out responsibility.
And it has been our observation that the U.S. Coast Guard
and the U.S. Customs are under-manned, that they are under-
staffed, and they need more money in their budgets to provide
what is happening in this world because, from now on, our lives
are changed. And as we go forward to try to continue to move
cargo to meet customer demand, we have to do that in a world of
heightened security.
So thank you, again, for the leadership you have shown. We
look forward to working with you. We want to do everything we
can to be supportive of you and to work with you to make sure
that this is the safest port in the United States.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Edmonds follows:]
Prepared Statement of James T. Edmonds, Chairman,
Port of Houston Authority Board of Commissioners
Good Afternoon. My name is James Edmonds and I am the Chairman of
the Port of Houston Authority Board of Commissioners.
As you know, four months ago today, the United States was the
victim of a horrendous act of terrorism.
Although the Port of Houston had strong security in place, we--like
so many others--have since looked for ways to fine tune our policies
and procedures.
It is a testament to this port that since September 11th, our
business has not slowed. To use a familiar term, we're moving full
steam ahead. The events of this time, however, have been sobering and
we have redoubled our efforts to provide a safe and secure business
environment for our customers and our employees. I think what you will
hear today will bear that out.
The Coast Guard, the US Customs Service, the Houston Pilots, our
private industry partners, state and local governments and everyone
else involved in port security have created an atmosphere of
cooperation that is unparalleled in my experience.
The Port of Houston has not received any threats. Nevertheless,
protecting this vital economic engine and even more importantly the
thousands of people who work here or live near the Port is a
responsibility we don't take lightly.
The Port of Houston is home to the Nation's largest petrochemical
complex, the Nation's number one port in foreign tonnage and second
largest port in total tonnage. The Port of Houston ranks as the eighth
largest port in the world with an annual economic impact of $7.7
billion and is responsible for the employment of 205,000 people.
This port, like others around the Nation, is an important financial
center of commerce for not only Houston, but for the entire region.
Yesterday marked the 101st anniversary of the Lucas gusher at
Spindletop, which started the Texas Oil Boom. This area has grown from
a sleepy trading village on a bayou to a major international city, the
energy capital of the world and a hub of international commerce in
those 101 years.
This city and region were built on energy and to ensure its
continuation, we must protect our employees, neighbors and investments.
And the Federal Government role is vital in accomplishing this task.
However, a balance must be struck between securing our port and
allowing efficient movement of cargo. I believe the Senate took the
first big steps toward that end last month.
Thanks to the leadership of the Senators here today, the Port and
Maritime Security Act of 2001 passed the Senate and will now be
considered by the House. This act will provide $390 million in grants
over 5 years to ports for security assessments and infrastructure.
Additionally, I want to thank you for adding $93 million to the
Homeland Security package to immediately fund security assessments and
infrastructure. The Port of Houston Authority looks forward to working
with the new Transportation Department's Transportation Security
Administration to implement this new program.
I believe the Senate has passed a good bill . . . one that will
allow local flexibility--since no two ports are the same. It funds
security assessments done by a local team and it provides funding for
ports to improve security infrastructure.
The Port of Houston Authority has sharpened security at the Port
since September 11th, through additional police patrols, heightened
security awareness, increased gate security, fence line patrols, and
other measures.
The best security measure though has been the increased cooperation
between the Port Authority and all of our partners on the channel. The
Houston Pilots, for instance, have become the eyes for port security.
From their vantage point high in the wheelhouse of ships, they can spot
suspicious activities and report those to the Coast Guard.
The Channel Industries Mutual Aid group and the East Harris County
Manufactures Association share security procedures and responses
channel-wide with all of our partners.
But there are specific things that we believe could be of great
benefit to this task:
Clear communications between the port, local government
officials and policing units, the Coast Guard and the businesses along
the Channel.
Additional security measures at our port terminals. For
example more security cameras (and the manpower to oversee them). And
we would like to see the technology available utilized more, like
additional x-ray machines for Customs.
The Coast Guard needs more people. That's just a simple
fact. They are stretched beyond what any agency should endure.
To deal with hazardous materials, we need more vapor
detection equipment.
These, among other things, are all within our reach. Let's get them
in action.
I believe the Port of Houston is a safe port. However, we will
always look for and embrace new and better ways of protection and
prevention. This hearing is another step toward maintaining and
increasing the safety of the port.
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to speak today.
Senator Hutchison, again thank you for thinking of us and bringing
Senator Breaux to Houston. I appreciate both of you for your leadership
on this issue and I offer my assistance to you as this Subcommittee
continues its work on port security. Thank you.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Jim, very much.
Mike Kice.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KICE, CORPORATE SAFETY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTOR, P&O PORTS NORTH AMERICA, INC.
Mr. Kice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Subcommittee Members for allowing me to have this opportunity.
My name is Mike Kice, and I am the Corporate Safety and
Environmental Director for P&O Ports North America. I
apologize, but our local manager and vice president thought
this might be more appropriate for me because I am a little bit
more knowledgeable on hazardous materials.
If you think that I am confused about that, I am currently
living, 13 years in New Orleans, 9 years in Houston and 4 years
in Port Neches, so I do not know which side of the table I am
on.
We are--P&O Ports is a marine terminal operating and
stevedoring company with current operations in 22 ports on the
East Coast and Gulf Coast of the United States. Our operations
include: large container terminals, container stevedoring,
passenger ship terminal operations, ro-ro operations, discharge
and loading of break bulk cargos of all natures--steel is a
major commodity of that--handling of export dock-site frozen
cargos in Gulfport, bagged goods in Lake Charles--many--all
types of the full range of dry cargo.
These operations vary overall from location to location. In
New York, we perform port authority-type operations for the
passenger ship terminal. The city of New York owns the
terminal, and we actually perform all the lease requirements
and do all the management of it. So we actually act kind of as
a private industry but are doing port authority-type work.
In Baltimore, we provide terminal management to the Port of
Baltimore for their container terminals, and we do ro-ro
stevedoring. In Norfolk, we are a pure tackle stevedore, where
we just load and unload the ship. The port runs the operation
there, terminal offsite.
In New Orleans, we lease from the port both container and
general cargo facilities. In Lake Charles, we handle the bagged
goods. And we are--here in Houston, we are assigned freight
handling at City Docks 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29, and we have empty
container repair facilities, as well as stevedoring, at both
the City Docks and at Barbour's Cut.
Hazardous cargo is a segment of the goods which are
transported through our facilities in containers, ISO tanks and
in break bulk packaging. Hazardous cargo is currently the most
regulated of our cargos that we handle. The Coast Guard, the
DOT Research and Development, EPA, OSHA, Customs, ATF, the IMO
international regulations and local regulations require
different types of procedures and extensive documentation and
assignments of responsibilities throughout the operation. To
date, the overall system has worked very well in protecting the
American public.
With the recent events, security aspects for all cargo and,
especially, hazardous cargo should be enhanced. By
incorporating an additional, what I would like to call
``security personnel awareness'' that gives us emphasis with
each step of the cargo movement process, the overall goal of
safety and security and the efficient handling of cargo is
maintained.
To me security awareness is a function of our employees'
day-to-day process. We have incorporated security in part of
our safety meetings, in our daily gang-way meetings that we
have, and we are starting to incorporate that into our daily
inspection systems. So we are incorporating it in with our
entire operation, and, by this means, I think, we are
increasing the overall awareness for the whole package.
Training. We have increased training somewhat from an
awareness standpoint, trying to show our supervisors and our
longshoremen basically what to look for and, if they do see
something, to report it up through the chain so we can take it
to the appropriate authority that is needed.
The physical aspects of security, such as property fencing,
X-rays and other technological inspections, gate access, law
enforcement and the improved information-sharing review is
being well addressed in your legislation. I believe that if
additional security monitoring is needed for hazardous general
cargos, then a technological inspection of hazmat cargo and
containers should be utilized. The option of additional opening
of hazmat containers on a regular basis should be reviewed from
a safety aspect.
We could be if we--on the general basis of opening and
closing every container of hazmat cargos, we could be exposing
the inspectors, both governmental and private industry, to
additional risks, which may have very little return. Opening a
container of hazardous materials does not ensure that the cargo
inside the actual package is the exact commodity--just by
looking in the door. You would have to open it up, take it out,
put it back in, do a re-blocking and re-bracing. And this can
be extremely time-consuming and expensive and doesn't
necessarily ensure what the cargo is, because you would have to
do extensive testing, which is not real handy in the field, to
do that, to ensure that.
When--inspections of cargo need to be performed, I think,
at both the load and discharge source, meaning at the port of
origin and the port of--along those lines. The Coast Guard
currently inspects containers for structural integrity and
documentation. Customs Service does some inspections on their
process. And many lines employ the National Cargo Bureau for
random stowage issues. I believe that some aspects of security
could be added to the existing functions as they are doing
them, which would cover many of the points that are being
addressed, and it does not have to reinvent the rule for that
process.
The documentation system. From P&O Ports, the following are
approximate percentages of our overall containers that have
labeled cargo transiting our terminals: In Newark, we run the
PNCT. Approximately 4 percent of our containers there are
labeled containers; in Baltimore, 2; in New Orleans, currently,
it is about 7 percent, and, last year, it was 10. Those are the
terminals we actually run. So that is about how much of our
aspect of labeled cargo is.
At each location, we preview the units at the entry from a
safety aspect and make sure that documentation is per
regulations. We have standard working procedures to ensure the
safe handling of cargo and provide a higher awareness to these
units.
As additional costs arise with the enhanced ``New
normalcy'' for security, our position has been outlined by
NAWE, the National Association of Waterfront Employers, as far
as cost is concerned. As to what has been done since--what have
we done since 9/11? Well, we actually--the New York passenger
ship terminal was taken away from us and was turned into an
emergency response area for the city of New York. FEMA
domiciled there. The city emergency response--the mayor
actually started using our terminal manager's office. So we are
now very involved with that.
And with that aspect, the ships that had been going to New
York actually moved over to Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore and
Norfolk areas, and we moved people--our trained supervision
from New York down to the different areas to help them with
that. And we moved our X-ray machines and our magnometers and
things along those lines to assist with that operation. So we
have been active in that site.
On each local area, we have participated in any types of
forums that we could go to. The captain of the port in--well,
basically, in Newark, what they have--they formed a little
committee with--inspecting all of the stakeholders. And we have
participated at every one of their functions. With New Orleans,
Captain Roshon has come down and actually gone through our
terminal with us. We have done--we have tried to get our
longshoreman and our supervisors better aware of what is going
on. Here in Houston, they have done a very good job of
participating with the port on the port security aspects of
that site.
We have had--within our own company, we have had individual
meetings and discussions with our own people and tried to give
them a little bit of advice of what they should be looking for
as eyes and ears--just for the people working on it, what to
look for and try to--if something is there, send it back up.
We have actually had a--we have been involved with a bomb
threat in Gulfport since 9/11. And that turned out to be very--
nothing there. And we had an anthrax issue here in the Port of
Houston which turned out to be nothing. But our emergency
action plans and our different procedures worked with the
process. So they worked very well.
I would make--if I could, I have one--a couple of
suggestions. One of them is on MSDS. As the world is getting
more into computerization and there is less paper work involved
with the thing, the MS--Material Safety Data Sheet is a very
important document that we are not having in our hands as much
as we used to. There might be a way of having that positioned
as a red address on the manifest or cargo documentation as it
comes through all the procedures.
So if something does happen, which has happened in the
middle of the night, we would be able to have the ready access
to that actual document. There is nothing like having the piece
of paper in your hands in the middle of the night.
Being a port with the--you have described the grants and
loans. And as privatization is taken further along and as we do
different operations, I am not exactly sure how the--if private
industry will have any--be able to have participation in the
grants and the loans system or not, especially for those areas
where we do basically governmental functions, as in the
passenger ship terminal where we do port authority-type things.
And my other thing is that we have excellent emergency
response plans, hazmat procedures and safety procedures. And as
part of the security what we need to do is tweak those further
and add onto them, not try to re-invent the entire wheel, but
to add that segment to it and make it an overall better
process. And I apologize for not having details of our
operations, but I thank you very much for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement by Mr. Kice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Kice, Corporate Safety and Environmental
Director, P&O Ports North America, Inc.
Mr. Chairman and Subcommittee Members, thank you for this
opportunity for us to participate in these important hearings on Port
Security.
My name is Mike Kice, and I am the Corporate Safety and
Environmental Director for P&O Ports, North America. P&O Ports is a
marine terminal operating and stevedoring company with current
operations in twenty-two (22) Port locations on the East and Gulf
Coasts of the United States. Our operations include: large container
terminal operations, container stevedoring, passenger ship terminal
stevedoring, ro-ro operations, auto discharge and loading, break bulk
cargo--terminal and stevedoring, export of dock-side frozen cargo,
steel discharge to dock and barge, and bagged goods operations and the
full range of dry cargo operations.
These operations vary in overall involvement from location to
location. In New York, we perform port authority-type functions to
onboard stevedoring at the passenger ship terminal. In Baltimore, we
provide marine terminal management to the Port of Baltimore for major
container terminals as well as container/ro-ro stevedoring. In Norfolk,
only pure tackle stevedoring is done. In New Orleans, we lease from the
port both container and general cargo facilities. In Lake Charles, we
handle bagged rice goods. In Houston, we are assigned the freight
handling at City Docks 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 and have empty container
repair facilities, as well as stevedoring operations both at the City
Docks and Barbours Cut Terminal.
Hazardous cargo is a segment of the goods, which are transported
through our facilities in containers, ISO tanks and in break bulk
packaging. Hazardous cargo is currently the most regulated of our cargo
handled. The Coast Guard, DOT Research and Development, EPA, OSHA,
Customs, ATF, IMO (international) and most local governments have
required forms of regulations and procedures with extensive
documentation and assignment of responsibilities. To date, the overall
system has worked very well in protecting the American public.
With the recent events, security aspects for all cargo, and
specifically hazardous cargo should be enhanced. By incorporating
additional ``security personnel awareness'' emphasis with each step of
the cargo movement process, the overall goal of safety, security and
the efficient handling of cargo is maintained. To me ``security
awareness'' is a function of our employee's clay to day operations, and
should be included in our daily inspections of the work area, and as a
subject of gang way and regular safety meetings. Training in what to
look for, awareness of our general surroundings, participation in
forums with the Coast Guard, Ports, etc., is essential. The physical
aspects of security such as property fencing, x-rays, other
technological inspections, gate access, law enforcement, etc., and the
improved information sharing-review is being well addressed in your
legislation.
I believe that if additional security monitoring is needed for
hazardous general cargo's then the technological inspection of hazmat
cargo and containers should be utilized. The option of additional
opening of hazmat containers on a regular basis should be reviewed from
a safety aspect. We could be exposing inspectors (both governmental and
private industry) to additional risks with very little return. Opening
containers of hazardous material does not ensure the cargo inside the
actual package is the exact commodity without extensive testing which,
may not be practical in the field. When inspections are required they
need to be performed at the load or discharge source. Opening the back
door of a container reveals only those packages which are visible, and
moving any cargo inside will require removal of blocking and bracing
securing and then reloading and resecuring of the cargo, causing extra
expense and extra safety exposure for limited returns. The Coast Guard
currently inspects containers for structural integrity and
documentation. Customs does some inspection of hazmat containers, and
many lines employ the National Cargo Bureau for random stowage issues.
I believe some aspect of security could be added to the existing
functions, as well as enhancing the documentation system. For P&O Ports
NA, the following are approximate percentages of overall containers
that have labeled cargo transiting our terminals. Newark: 4 percent;
Baltimore: 2 percent; New Orleans: currently 7 percent, last year 10
percent.
At each location, we preview the units at entry from a safety
aspect and ensure that documentation is per regulations. We have
standard working procedures to ensure the safe handling of the cargo
and provide a higher awareness to those units.
As additional costs arise, with the enhanced ``new normalcy'' for
security, our position has been outlined by NAWE (National Association
of Waterfront Employers)
As to what we have done since 9-11, the New York Passenger Ship
Terminal was taken back by the city to house facilities and personnel
that had been domiciled in the World Trade Center, including FEMA and
other government agencies. Vessels scheduled to enter the terminal were
rerouted to alternate locations, mainly Boston, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, & Norfolk. P&O Ports provided trained supervision and
security equipment (x-ray and magnetometers) to those locations to
assist operations. We have encouraged each port location to participate
with the area security aspects and attend as many security meetings and
educational forums as practical. In Houston, we meet frequently with
Port security and operations staff to discuss and plan safety and
security matters. We remain on a heightened sense of alert. In Newark,
we have participated in the weekly port authority security forums,
which included Coast Guard, Customs, Port Police, Waterfront
Commission, and many others. We have had individual meetings and
discussions with local Coast Guard Units and law enforcement, etc, and
I think, more importantly, we have encouraged and promoted the
``general awareness'' eyes & ears concept to our supervision and to
much of our labor.
I would like to thank you again for this opportunity to present
comments and apologize for not having more exact numbers, but I hope
these general aspect comments have been beneficial.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mike.
Jim Hinton.
STATEMENT OF JIM HINTON, CORPORATE MANAGER OF
COMMUNITY SAFETY AND HEALTH, MERISOL USA AND
SECURITY CHAIRMAN OF THE EAST HARRIS COUNTY
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Hinton. Thank you, Senators and Congressman Lampson. I
am pleased to be here on behalf of the East Harris County
Manufacturers Association. I chair their security committee,
which is primarily made up of the corporate directors of the
corporations. And most of those people are retired FBI agents
and police chiefs. They are FBI agents that the current office
here in Houston supplies us--the Coast Guard, the Harris County
Sheriff 's Department, the DPS and a lot of other numerous
people with extensive law-enforcement experience.
While my comments will refer to the ship channel area, they
will really hold true for most all of our complexes within the
State of Texas. We have 125 companies that we represent in East
Harris County Manufacturers. We employ about 30,000 people in
this area, and, last year, we contributed about $4 billion to
the Harris County economy. Statewide, the petrochemical and
refining sites employ more than 100,000 Texans.
And as you can see, we have a mammoth investment in people
and in assets for which we are responsible. And we have a real
commitment to our employees, our communities and our
shareholders to operate in a safe and environmentally
responsible manner such as never before.
Today, we are examining security here. And in the
petrochemical and refining industry, we see security as an
integral part of our overall safety program. Our safety
performance in our petrochemical industry is 4 times better
than all the rest of the manufacturing companies that operate.
In addition, our security operations played significant safety
roles as integral parts of our emergency response operations by
providing traffic control and liaison with law enforcement.
The cornerstone of effective security is knowledge and
intelligence about potential threats, and that allows that
threat to be intercepted, and it allows the target of that
threat to be properly prepared. In fact, it may be our only
weapon against those threats. And I must say on behalf of the
chemical industry here that the Federal Agencies, the State
organizations, the local agencies and the Coast Guard did a
great job and are continuing to do a good job of keeping us
informed when we need to know information.
On September 11, we wasted no time in moving to a level of
high alert as the events unfurled. We began to revisit
potential threat scenarios. We have done worst-case scenarios
for years--and probable cause scenarios--but those changed when
we had the 9/11 incidents. So we have looked at those types of
incidents. Now we move rapidly to prepare for these new
threats.
We moved aggressively to establish better information-
sharing mechanisms with the Federal, State and the local
officials. We immediately activated our emergency operations
centers. We closed gates and buildings and temporarily locked
down facilities, allowing no one to enter or exit. The number
of security officers was increased. And in many cases, we have
hired off-duty, uniformed sheriff 's deputies, constables, DPS
officers and municipal officers to supplement our regular plant
security.
And I must say that I would agree with the statement made
awhile ago, that the Coast Guard has done a wonderful job with
the limited resources that they have, but they do need more
people and more vessels to be able to help us control our
waterside plants.
We turned away mail and delivery vehicles. We issued calm-
but-firm warnings to employees to increase their awareness of
any activities that might be out of the ordinary, and they
responded. We remained in close contact with the local police
departments, the Coast Guard and other Government Agencies. We
monitored radio and television networks. And those of us who
were so equipped monitored the police radio frequencies to
determine what was happening.
Those of us that have waterside property--and there are a
lot of us--immediately followed the Coast Guard bulletins in
addition to putting armed officers on our docks. Captain Cook
put out an immediate order on September 12 that we would have
those guards on our docks when we had vessels in there. And I
must admonish that he did a great job in doing that.
Portable lighting was installed to unlighted perimeter
fencing. Emergency response plans were reviewed.
Sometime after September 11, the plants have re-opened to
essential operations only, but with the extensive vehicle
searches--and those are going on today--and tightened employee
and contractor identification procedures. We have increased our
video monitoring, motion detection and lighting. We have
instituted mail inspections. We have restricted deliveries and
provided bio-terrorism response training to emergency plant
responders.
We have reviewed and revised our crisis management plans.
We have adjusted traffic flows and erected concrete barriers at
certain plant entrance points. Rail tank cars are being moved
inside the fence-line if that is at all possible. We are
requiring our carriers to perform background checks more
extensively on their drivers.
We are permitting cleaning crews to only work during
regular business hours, and not at night. We have increased
communications with the plant communities.
We have added second drivers to some shipments of certain
chemicals, thus requiring direct transit, so that they do not
have overnight delays and sleep in rest areas or have to sit
outside the parking lot somewhere sleeping. So we have added
two drivers to a lot of hazardous materials trucks so that they
keep rolling and they come right on into the plants or where
ever they are going.
We are reviewing distribution routes. And where possible,
we have changed some of those.
Please remember that in the spirit of good security, there
are some things that we are doing right now that we certainly
cannot put out in the public, but we do remain on high alert.
While specific actions may vary from plant to plant, these
examples are representative of the actions the petrochemical
and refining industry is now taking:
We have formed the East Harris County Manufacturers
Security Committee. And that committee is looking at the best
practices across the country in the area of security among the
plants. I also serve on the American Chemistry Council's
Security Committee, and we are working closely with them for
our neighboring plants in other States. In this way, we are
better able to communicate. We also are working with the Port
Security Committee, and we serve on that committee.
So we have a well-rounded communications effort among all
of us in the ship channel area. These heightened security
measures will continue indefinitely with periodic reviews and
modifications with guidance from law enforcement and other
organizations with which we regularly communicate.
Security in the face of these threats is derived from
planning and executing security strategies. Our industry has an
advantage in this area because we have a long-standing
expertise in risk management. We have spent many years
instituting progressively more sophisticated safety and
security programs.
The petrochemical and refinery plants are critical
components of our economy; what happens to our business affects
almost every aspect of American life. It is in the best
interest of our members and the American people that our
facilities operate safely and securely so we can continue to
provide the vital products that make our lives better, safer
and healthier. And you can be assured that we will continue to
do that. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hinton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jim Hinton, Corporate Manager of Community Safety
and Health, Merisol, USA and Security Chairman of the East Harris
County Manufacturers Association
I'm Jim Hinton and I am Corporate Manager of Community Safety and
Health for Merisol USA. I am here today representing the East Harris
County Manufacturers Association (EHCMA).
I chair the security committee, which is made up of security
professionals from the industry who are, in many cases, retired FBI
agents; retired police chiefs; current FBI agents from the Houston
office; the Coast Guard; Harris County Sheriffs Department and DPS;
Harris County Office Of Emergency Management; and others--all of whom
have numerous years of law enforcement or security experience.
While many of my comments refer to the Houston Ship Channel
industries, they are typical of petrochemical and refining plants and
complexes in other parts of the state. The 120 companies that make up
EHCMA: employ more than 30,000 people in the area; and last year
contributed more than $4 billion to Harris County's economy through
PAYROLLS, TAXES AND PURCHASES.
Statewide, petrochemical and refining sites employ more than
100,000 Texans and account for 27 percent of the value added by the
entire Texas manufacturing sector. As you can see, we have a mammoth
investment in people and assets for which we are responsible. Our
commitment to our employees, our communities, and our shareholders to
operate in a safe and environmentally responsible manner has never been
greater. Today, we are examining security.
In the petrochemical and refining industry, we see security as an
integral part of our overall safety program. Our safety performance is
4 times better than all the rest of the manufacturing industry in this
country. In addition, security operations played significant safety
roles as integral part of emergency response operations by providing
traffic control and liaison with law enforcement. The cornerstone of
effective security is knowledge and intelligence about potential
threats that allow the threat to be intercepted and allows the target
of that threat to be properly prepared. In fact, it may be our best
weapon. I must say that the Federal agencies and the State and local
agencies have done a good job keeping us informed.
On September 11, we wasted no time in moving to a level of high
alert as the events unfurled. We began to revisit potential threat
scenarios. We have done worst case scenarios in our plants for a long
time, but now our definitions of probable worst cause scenarios have
changed, and we moved rapidly to prepare for these new threats. We
moved aggressively to establish better information sharing mechanisms
with Federal, state, and local officials.
We immediately activated our emergency operations centers.
We closed gates and buildings and temporarily locked down
facilities, allowing no one to enter or exit.
The number of security officers was increased. In many
cases, off-duty-uniformed sheriff 's deputies, deputy constables, DPS
officers and municiple police officers were hired to supplement regular
plant security personnel.
We turned away mail and delivery vehicles.
We issued calm but firm warnings to employees to increase
their awareness of any activities that might be out of the ordinary.
We remained in close contact with our police and fire
departments, the Coast Guard and other government agencies.
And we monitored radio and television networks.
Those that were so equipped monitored police and fire
frequencies to stay abreast of local activities.
Those with waterside property exposure immediately
followed the Coast Guard bulletins in addition to putting armed
officers on their docks.
Portable lighting was installed to unlighted perimeter
fencing.
Emergency response plans were reviewed.
Sometime after September 11 the plants have:
Reopened to essential operations only, but with extensive
vehicle inspections and tightened employee and contractor
identification procedures.
Increased video monitoring, motion detection and lighting.
Instituted mail inspections and restricted deliveries.
Provided bio-terrorism response training to plant
emergency responders.
Reviewed and revised crisis plans.
Adjusted traffic flow and erected concrete barriers at
certain plant entrance points.
Rail tank cars are being moved inside the fence-line if
possible.
Requiring carriers to perform background checks on their
drivers.
Permitting cleaning crews to only work during business
hours.
Increased communications with plant communities.
Adding second drivers to shipments of certain chemicals
thus requiring direct transit so that overnight layovers are not
required.
Reviewing distribution routes and, where possible.
Please remember that in the spirit of good security we cannot make
public all the things we are doing in this regard.
So what about today?
We remain on high alert.
While specific actions may vary from plant to plant, these examples
are representative of the actions the petrochemical and refining
industry is taking. We have formed the East Harris County Manufacturers
Security Committee and this committee is looking at best practices in
the area of security among the plants. I serve on the American
Chemistry Councils Security Committee on the national level and also
the newly formed Port Security Committee. In this way we are able to
better coordinate security activities.
These heightened security measures will continue indefinitely with
periodic reviews AND modifications with guidance from law enforcement
agencies and other organizations with which we're regularly
communicating. Security in the face of these threats is derived from
planning and executing security strategies. Our industry has an
advantage in this area because of our longstanding expertise in risk
management. We have spent many years instituting progressively more
sophisticated safety and security programs. The Petrochemical &
Refining Plants is a critical component of the economy. What happens to
our business affects almost every aspect of American life. It is in the
best interest of our members and the American people that our
facilities operate safely and securely so that we can continue to
produce vital products that make our lives better, safer, healthier,
you can be assured that we will continue to do so. Thank you.
I will be happy to answer any questions.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Hinton.
Mr. Sam Pipkin.
STATEMENT OF SAM PIPKIN, CHAIRMAN,
CHANNEL INDUSTRIES MUTUAL AID (CIMA)
Mr. Pipkin. Senators, Congressman, thank you very much.
I am Sam Pipkin; I am employed by ATOFINA Petrochemicals
and am current Chairman of the Channel Industries Mutual Aid
organization.
And, like he said, our main objective is emergency
preparedness and response. The organization shares fire-
fighting, rescue, hazardous material handling and emergency
medical support between its member organizations in the Houston
Ship Channel area.
While CIMA itself does not deal with the maritime
transportation of hazardous materials, some of our member
companies do on a day-to-day basis. And it is because of this
that our organization has the ability to provide the expertise
to handle the situations which may arise either in the maritime
situation or on the highway.
CIMA's role since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
on the United States remains unchanged; we regularly review our
security procedures as they relate to emergency response
incidents, and the main thing is the security of our
responders, the plants and the citizens of the community.
It was--CIMA was formed in 1955, and we have maintained
close working relationships with a lot of these gentlemen and
organizations that are at the table before you today, with
municipalities, Government Agencies, FBI, the Port of Houston,
Harris County Office of Emergency Management and local LEPCs.
We work real close with those groups.
We have a--our communications are ongoing. Our contacts are
updated yearly, as well as--24-hour access numbers are updated
on a regular basis and shared.
The success of CIMA is its pool of highly trained and
skilled responders from the 100-plus industry member companies
and area governments coupled with a well-maintained pool of
some 200 pieces of specialized equipment--rescue, foam pumpers,
ambulances and command vans--which are supported by and owned
by the members of the organization. We also have a
sophisticated radio system which covers some 500-square miles.
Our CIMA responders continue to hone their skills through
regularly scheduled classroom and simulated emergency training,
drills, planning exercises and post-incident reviews. We try to
participate with the Coast Guard, with the city of Houston and
various agencies on this type of activity. Its charter of
providing cooperative assistance and expertise in an emergency,
natural or man-made, is unaffected by the events of September
11. However, like so many others, CIMA goes about its business
with a keener awareness of preparedness than before September
11.
CIMA is currently--we are currently working with the Texas
Forest Service on the State Emergency Response Plan Annex F
Appendix 5, which deals with multiple industrial emergency
situations in one area of the State or spread out over the
State at the same time.
A concern that CIMA has is that as member companies
downsize their organizations, we are also adversely affected
because of the loss of trained personnel in particular skill
areas which are necessary to maintain the organization at its
current level. We are currently looking for funding to train
more personnel in these specialized areas such as shipboard
fire-fighting and heavy rescue and other hazmat areas, as well
as to update and expand our current radio system to cover an
even larger area.
And we are also working with the State of Texas for
providing an indemnification agreement among the State to where
if this--if we have to go anywhere else in the State, it would
cover us and take care of our personnel.
So I am happy to be with this group. And we do work very
closely with the Coast Guard and the port on these areas.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pipkin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sam Pipkin, Chairman, Channel Industries
Mutual Aid (CIMA)
Channel Industries Mutual Aid (CIMA) is a mutual aid cooperative,
which has as its main objective that of emergency preparedness and
response. The organization shares fire fighting, rescue, hazardous
material handling and emergency medical support between its member
organizations in the refining and petrochemical industry and
municipalities in the Houston Ship Channel area.
While CIMA itself does not deal with the maritime transportation of
hazardous materials some of our members do on a day-to-day basis. It is
because of this that the organization has the ability to provide the
expertise should an emergency develop with a hazardous cargo on either
the waterways or roadways.
CIMA's role since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the
U.S. remains unchanged, although it regularly reviews security issues
as they relate to emergency response incidents that could involve CIMA.
The safety of emergency responders, plant personnel and the public is
CIMA's highest priority.
After the terrorist attack, due to its vast networking
capabilities, CIMA did serve as a focal point for bringing together
both the Security and emergency response personnel in the ship channel
area. Since that time the East Harris County Manufacturers Association
(EHCMA) has served as the coordinator for the security activities of
area industry.
Since it was formed in 1955, CIMA has maintained close working
relationships with industry, municipalities and government agencies,
including the FBI, U.S. Coast Guard, Port of Houston, Harris County
Office of Emergency Management, Local Emergency Planning Committees
(LEPCs) and local police and fire departments. CIMA is well connected
with these and other organizations that could come into play in the
event of a CIMA-caliber incident. Communications are open and ongoing--
contact lists and 24-hour access numbers are regularly updated and
shared.
The success of CIMA is its pool of highly trained and skilled
responders from the 100-plus industry member companies and area
governments coupled with a well-maintained pool of more than 200 pieces
of specialized equipment, including rescue trucks, foam pumpers,
ambulances, command vehicles which are contributed individually by the
member organizations and a sophisticated radio system that can cover
500 square miles.
CIMA responders continue to hone their skills through regularly
scheduled classroom and simulated emergency training, drills, planning
exercises and post-incident reviews. Its charter of providing
cooperative assistance and expertise in an emergency--natural or man-
made--is unaffected by the events of September 11. However, like so
many others, CIMA goes about its business with a keener awareness of
preparedness than before September 11.
CIMA is currently working with the Texas Forest Service on the
State Emergency Response plan Annex F Appendix 5 which deals with
multiple industrial emergency situations in one area or state wide at
the same time. Another concern that CIMA has is that as member
companies downsize their organizations we are also adversely affected
because of the loss of trained personnel in particular skill areas
which are necessary to maintain the organization at its current level.
We are currently looking for funding to train more personnel in
specialized areas such as shipboard fire fighting and heavy rescue as
well as to update and expand our current radio system to cover an even
larger area. We are working with the state to provide indemnification
for Mutual Aid organizations that are asked to assist in other areas of
the state.
More information about CIMA is available at www.cimatexas.org.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Mr. Pipkin.
And I thank all members of the panel for their testimony
and for being with us. You have been very helpful, and the
ideas and information that you have provided are very, very
important.
Let me give you an example of the magnitude of what we are
talking about in this port or the Port of New Orleans or a
number of other ports when you are dealing with the products
that you have here: Hazardous material, petroleum products,
liquified natural gas, liquified propane-type of products that
we have coming in here.
One medium-sized dead-weight tanker, or a 100,000-ton or
110,000-ton tanker, would carry as much of those materials in
one ship as it would take a 70-mile-long train to carry the
same amount, or a 90-mile-long convoy of trucks to carry the
same amount of hazardous, potentially explosive materials--as
one medium-sized tanker does coming into this port or the Port
of New Orleans every day.
As another example, a medium-sized container ship can carry
as many as 2,500 or more containers in one just medium-sized
container ship. And you are trying to be the largest container
port in the gulf; New Orleans is also trying to do the same
thing. I mean these containers are growing, and it is going to
be a bigger business, but this gives you an example.
One medium-sized container can carry up to 60,000 pounds,
30 tons, of the material in one container. If you compare that
60,000 pounds in one container--Tim McVey used 15,000 pounds of
explosives to blow up the Federal courthouse in Oklahoma City.
And one container can do as much as 60,000 pounds of
explosives. If someone wanted to stick that in the container,
instead of household goods, and that would be one container on
one ship, and the ship may have 3,000 containers.
So the magnitude of the potential that we are dealing with
is absolutely incredible, and that is why all of this is so
important. This is serious, serious stuff. Now I will ask
Captain Cook because he is local to the port.
Does the Port of Houston have in place a comprehensive
security plan now?
Captain Cook. We do not, Senator. We have the bits and
pieces, like Admiral Allen was talking about, that were
constituted together and worked--the port worked well together
for a variety of things, but we do not have a comprehensive
security plan right now.
Senator Breaux. If this legislation were to become law
tomorrow and the Coast Guard were to be put in charge of
developing a comprehensive plan, what would have to be done, in
your opinion?
Captain Cook. Well, I think that the architecture that is
actually laid out in your bill would build upon the success
that we have had with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 with the
various area committees, the Coast Guard Federal on-scene
coordinator, versus the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator.
Those types of titles would be interchangeable. I think the way
the port community looks to the Coast Guard for leadership as
far as environmental safety and security would very naturally
fit into that role. So----
Senator Breaux. Any idea how long such a plan would take to
put into place and develop?
Captain Cook. I was stationed at another port when the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 became effective and we tried to
implement it in 1992. And it was my experience in the Port of
Norfolk that it took about 3 years before the real inter-
connectivity that was needed to move forward was in place. But
right from the get-go, you know, the essential ingredients of
meetings and discussing priorities were taking place.
So I think it would be shorter because we have experience
now, but I think we would probably be looking at a year before
we would be looking at a real forward-moving group.
Senator Breaux. One of the things that gives me as an
outsider looking in a sense--although I am on the Committee
that has to write the legislation but am still an outsider--is
that the biggest threat is not so much the Captain of a ship
coming in doing violence to the port, although that is a
potential--you know, one tanker coming in with liquid propane
gas headed for one of the facilities on the shore with the
intent of doing violence would be very, very dangerous indeed.
But I think that with the River Pilots and the sea marshals
on the decks escorting those ships in, that risk is a lot less.
The thing that gives me greater concern is a similar type of
situation that happened with the USS Cole, a NATO vessel or a
military vessel, at anchor in a port where a very small vessel
pulls up alongside of it--a very small vessel--and blows a huge
hole in the side of the ship, and killing American sailors.
If that same incident occurred next to a 3,000-person
passenger ship or, worse than that, a ship with hazardous
material in it, the consequences would be catastrophic.
Therefore I feel very strongly that controlling access to the
port, knowing that you have to have access and entrance and
exit is the nature of a port, but--the importance of knowing
who is in the port at any one time is incredibly important.
Now, I looked at the vessel traffic system in New Orleans.
You have a vessel traffic system here, but it is not automated,
and you--it is covered by radar, line of sight, observation, I
guess, and what have you. It would seem to me that you would
lose knowledge of where some of these vessels are at some time
while they are in the Port of Houston. Right?
Captain Cook. Well, Senator, we have both radar and
television cameras. So especially in the riverine section of
the ship channel that you were in today, we have nearly 100-
percent television coverage in that area. And like I--we had an
earlier discussion about the communication aspect with the
Pilots. That is--really our biggest ticket to visibility of the
ship is our continual communication with the Pilots that are on
board and the required check-points. And the communication that
takes place allows us to know where it is, in addition to our
electronic tracking through radar and TV cameras.
Senator Breaux. But if a Pilot lost control of the bridge,
he wouldn't be talking to you?
Captain Cook. That is right, sir.
Senator Breaux. I think it is important that we have a
system that has the ability to look into an automated system
that shows you the steer of the ship, the direction of the
ship, where it is located when it is anchored, as well as
coming into the port and out of the port. We have an
international maritime organization agreement that is going to
require transponders on ships coming into ports. The last phase
of those transponders is not until the year 2007.
And a transponder on board a vessel would allow a traffic
safety system to see that vessel coming in every time it hits
the Port of Houston and track it when it is anchored, as well
as when it is moving. And it would be able to indicate on that
system the cargo, the crew and just about everything you need
to know about that ship. Every airplane that lands at Hobby or
every airplane that lands at Intercontinental, regardless of
its size--it could be a Cessna 150--has to have a transponder
in it. And it is going to call on the airport.
We have cars with GPS systems on them. For the life of me,
I cannot understand why we cannot require that a ship loaded
with hazardous material perhaps does not have a relatively
simple transponder on it to let the port authorities know where
it is at all times while it is moving and while it is sitting
in port. Would that not be helpful?
Captain Cook. Yes, sir. We look forward to the automated
information system, whenever it is implemented. And we would
look forward----
Senator Breaux. Well, 2007 is too late, and we cannot wait
that long. Let me ask about the--some other things I had. Let
us see.
On the port, Jim, do you have what you would consider to be
limited access to the port whereby every person coming in is
stopped and every truck is required to identify itself in some
fashion?
Mr. Edmonds. Yes, sir.
Senator Breaux. How does that work?
Mr. Edmonds. We have had gate security all along for port
properties. Since 9/11, we have enhanced our security at the
gates, we check cargos inbound and outbound, we have increased
our patrols by about 35 or 40 percent, we have spent more time
patrolling our fence-lines, and we have stationed people in our
facilities around the clock. So we have done the best we can
with the manpower we have. We have----
Senator Breaux. Well, when a truck hits the gate at the
Port of Houston----
Mr. Edmonds. Yes, sir?
Senator Breaux [continuing]. What ensures for your benefit
or the port's benefit that that truck is supposed to be in the
port?
Mr. Edmonds. If it is a container, for example, the officer
checks the bill of lading and walks around to the back of the
container and actually visibly checks that bill of lading that
is posted on the back of the container and verifies then the
best he or she can that that is what is in that box.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Hinton or maybe one of you gentlemen
talked about how what is on the ships is obviously very
important. And you get a cargo manifest. But an awful lot of
the time, I mean, you will have an FAK destination, Freight of
All Kind, general cargo.
Mr. Edmonds. Yes, sir.
Senator Breaux. I mean, that cannot be very helpful in
letting you really know what is on that ship. If I wanted to do
violence, I would just put ``Freight of all Kind'' on every
document I would submit to you, and you would not really know
what ``Freight of all Kind'' means, would you?
Mr. Kice. If you are lucky enough to have serviced that
steamship line before and you have had that experience, you
might know some of it. But you have an exposure there for those
new customers, new people, coming in that you have never
serviced before. You might not have an historical base for it.
So yes, you would have difficulty with that FAK.
Senator Breaux. OK. One other point, and then I will turn
to my colleagues. Some of the ports that we have seen have
zones--security zones that are established around high-interest
vessels and have an absolute prohibition of anybody coming up
alongside that vessel while it is traversing through the port,
while it is anchored at the port and what have you. We do not
want little vessels coming up to a cargo ship just to look at
how big the ship is, or worse, going up to a passenger cruise
ship to try to see who is on the ship, because we do not know
what they are doing there any more.
And, you know, they may be harmless and just visitors, but
they may be something else. So do we have----
Admiral maybe you can tell me about it. But do we have--I
saw an awful lot of big ships out there. And I am not saying
you--we are any better in New Orleans, because I do not think
we are. But some of them are pretty volatile ships. I did not
see any little vessels around any of those ships saying, ``Stay
away from this boat.''
From the standpoint of the harbor police or the sheriff 's
deputies or the Coast Guard, I did not see any single vessel
monitoring access to those vessels that were in the port today.
Is there?
Vice Admiral Allen. I will take a shot and let Captain Cook
follow up. The Coast Guard has the statutory authority to
establish security zones around vessels and around facilities
from anything that might become a threat to the port itself.
Once those security zones are established, they can be
enforced, and they carry criminal and civil penalties
associated with them.
The problem with any security zone that you establish is
that it is only effective if you can enforce it, you know, if
there is a cop on the beat, if you will, to step in and say,
``Leave the zone or you are going to be arrested,'' or, ``You
are subject to the seizure of your boat.'' So we do have the
statutory authority to create those zones. The question is: Do
you have the resources to enforce the zone. Just like with
putting up a ``No trespassing'' sign, if there is no police
officer there, it will be willfully violated.
Now, they have security zones in the Port of Houston, and I
will let Captain Cook address those. Some of those absolutely
restrict small boats from coming around certain sensitive areas
of the port and certain sensitive facilities, but it is not 100
percent.
I would make the comment, though, that it gets back to what
we talked about earlier, and that is that all the stakeholders
in the port bear some responsibility for throwing resources at
this problem. And to the extent that their facilities are on
the waterways and there are vessels calling, there is some
inherent responsibility for organic protection in addition to
what the Coast Guard can put out there in establishing security
zones. And I would pass it to Captain Cook now.
Senator Breaux. Well, let me ask that question after I hear
about what we are doing here. But other than the Coast Guard,
what other law-enforcement vessels do we have in the Port of
Houston?
Vice Admiral Allen. Well, in Houston, I think we have----
Senator Breaux. No. I am asking----
Vice Admiral Allen. Oh. I am sorry.
Mr. Edmonds. We have no--the Port Authority has none. We
have fire boats, but we have no law----
Senator Breaux. You have no harbor police?
Mr. Edmonds. No, sir.
Senator Breaux. You have no sheriff 's deputies?
Mr. Edmonds. Not on--we have sheriff 's deputies that have
water capability, but they are not on a regular patrol basis.
Senator Breaux. Captain.
Captain Cook. Just a follow-on from the security zone
question, sir. The riverine section in the highly
industrialized section of the Houston Ship Channel is a
security zone, as well as the Port of Texas City. And we
picked--those very highly industrialized areas are prohibited--
through my authority as Captain of the Port, recreational
vessels and fishing--recreational fishing vessels, also, from
using those waterways.
We have random patrols, where we try and target the--where
we think the highest risk is in and around the LPG-handling
facilities and some of the other petrochemical facilities, but
we are not there 24 hours a day. We have gotten reports of
pleasure boaters in these security zones. And we have an
immediate-response boat ready to go 24 hours a day, and they
have gone out and challenged the owners of the boat. And in
almost every case, people just were not aware that that had
become a security zone, despite our efforts to advertise it.
But we have not solved the problem, Senator, of how to make
this iron-clad. And we just depend on all of the different eyes
and ears that are out on the channel looking for anomalies,
knowing clearly that those areas are now off limits to pleasure
boaters and small fisherman, and reporting that to us so we can
take action.
Senator Breaux. But you do not have the personnel now to do
that?
Captain Cook. We do not have enough personnel to be out
there 24 hours a day, sir.
Vice Admiral Allen. Mr. Chairman, in many instances right
after 9/11, we surged and actually put a 7-by-24 presence in
many ports around the country. And we got into a problem of
sustainability. When it gets to the issue of all-hands-on-deck
for general quarters, the longer you stay there, all of a
sudden, you start to attrit your long-term capability. And we
have had to back off from that.
So within the resource base we have got, we are out there
addressing the problem and are responding to insurgence of the
security zones, but right now, we are not resourced for a 7-by-
24 presence.
Senator Breaux. You cannot do it by yourself. Now, the
purpose is to help, I mean, and every port has got the same
type of concerns about, ``This is a new world we live in.'' And
it has got to be looked at differently because the risk is
substantial if we do not, you know, do everything we possibly
can.
And I think this legislation is aimed at helping. It is
aimed at helping by providing financial resources and guidance,
to allow ports to do things that they cannot afford to do now
or did not think that they should be doing up until 9/11.
So we are all in this together. I mean we do not know all
the answers, certainly, in Washington. And we want to hear from
you and hear where the holes might be in these security zones
and then figure out what we can do to help you solve the
problem. And we are all in it together, and we have got to
solve the problems together.
Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to turn to an issue that I think is unique to the Port of
Houston, and that is the hazardous materials and the chemical
materials, that are unique here because of our chemical
complex, and ask Mr. Pipkin if the volume of hazardous
materials entering and exiting the Port of Houston has changed
measurably and which way after September 11.
Mr. Pipkin. I do not--I really cannot answer that question
for you, Senator. I would have to, I guess, turn to Chairman
Edmonds to see if he could answer that, because I am not sure
about that answer.
Mr. Edmonds. I can answer that, Senator. I know that from
the Port Authority standpoint, our volumes are off about 7 or 8
percent this year. And as was mentioned earlier, most of that
is in steel.
Senator Hutchison. Well, let me just ask Mr. Pipkin, and
perhaps anyone else could jump in, as well.
What do you think specifically needs to be done to improve
security for hazardous cargo, as opposed to general cargo? What
can we do specifically to put the added safeguards on that type
of cargo so that everyone will feel more secure?
Mr. Pipkin. From an emergency response standpoint, like Mr.
Kice said, it is the MSDS sheets being available, because that
is basically----
Senator Hutchison. To know what is in there?
Mr. Pipkin [continuing]. What my group deals with is
emergency response, to know what is there and what is in the
ship or what is in the container as it comes in and out.
Senator Hutchison. What about tougher standards for
identification of personnel, like the biometric technology that
we are talking about using at airports? What about a higher
standard for licensing for carriage of hazardous materials or
security clearances? Is there anything like that, that could be
added specifically for hazardous materials that is not being
done now?
Mr. Kice. I think the bill addresses many of those points
with the heightened security-sensitive areas. And I would
consider, you know, a hazardous material to be part of that
concept because we already--as the terminal operators, we do
that. This--and our longshoremen--the company longshoremen will
do that.
If we have a general container that comes in and it is a
general cargo container but he sees a placard on the side, he
is naturally just going to put a little bit more effort into
it, be a little bit more aware of the entire thing.
Senator Hutchison. But nothing specifically coming from
your industry that would be suggestions that we should follow?
Mr. Kice. I think the new technologies of X-rays and that
type of thing would be really the advantageous way of doing
that. And I do not want to be--but we do not want to open up
every container--at least from private industry's side--
because, when you open up a container of hazardous materials,
you are usually exposing more people to it. And you are
exposing--the more you handle anything, the more chance you
have got of--how can I say it without screwing it up.
So we do not want to do that. I think the aspect of the
higher technologies, the X-rays, the gamma machines, the
sniffing-type things, the bomb detections--that type of aspect
is really appropriate for this type of activity.
And the other thing is: We currently do many, many
different functions with hazardous materials. The Coast Guard
and Customs--we are doing inspections for different aspects.
Build in a higher degree of this safety, as we do in our normal
course of business. That will--if nothing else, that would get
the message out to the other people that we are watching it
better, we are being more intensive, you know, and we are
developing systems. And in addition to the higher technology, I
think that would make significant improvements.
Senator Hutchison. In the private sector, have you seen a
slowing of ingress and egress after September 11 because of
heightened security? Has that been a problem?
Mr. Kice. Do you mean like coming into a terminal--in and
out of a terminal?
Senator Hutchison. Yes.
Mr. Kice. Miami had at one point an hour delay just driving
from the--over the bridge by people driving into the port. Yes,
there has been some activity like that. It has been cleaned up.
In Newark, we had a high degree of slowness coming up
immediately thereafter. It is improving now; the people are
more comfortable with the heightened awareness. And with that
come the systems that are set up, and people are more tolerable
and understanding what is going on, just the same as--like with
the airports, I think.
When I started flying at the end of September, it was long,
long lines. The lines now are much shorter because we have
learned how to do things better.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Edmonds, do you see that as
particularly unique to the Houston Port?
Mr. Edmonds. Before I try to answer that question, I was
handed a note to answer your first question. There has been a
small increase in hazmat cargo since 9/11, not a decrease.
Senator Hutchison. OK.
Mr. Edmonds. I think part of what has to be considered here
is the comment the Chairman made earlier, that no two ports are
the same, the comment that you are making here. I am proud that
since 9/11, we have not had an interruption in service in the
Port of Houston. All cargos have come, and they have gone. That
is important to us because of the $7.76 billion we put into our
local economy and the 205,000 jobs that we generate annually.
So the balance has to be struck on how we make these ports
safe and how we do the administrative and technological things
to make sure that we have safe cargo and the ability to
maintain that safety without interrupting the economic flow.
At Barbour's Cut, the U.S. Customs does have a gamma-ray
machine. It is somewhat of a tedious process, but it would be
nice to have two or three more of them; it is a very thorough
way to find out what is in those containers, you know. But that
is a manpower and funding issue, again.
Finding ways to have other kinds of technological
capabilities, I think, is something we have to do. It is just
like going in an airport now; it is a little slower process.
Senator Hutchison. Well, one of the things that we are
going to need to know before we finalize our Homeland Security
Program is: What are we going to need in added machinery and in
Coast Guard manpower?
I was going to ask the Admiral if the Coast Guard is
preparing a Homeland Security plan that would address the issue
of added personnel. We were just talking about having to back
off of your 24-hour capabilities, but added manpower would
certainly bring back the optimum security standards.
So, are you preparing such a plan?
Vice Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am. Let me comment on that, but
let me first make a comment on queues because I think it is
important as a follow-on.
Since 9/11, we are issuing daily situation reports out of
our district offices. And one of the things we are trying to
track is how long we are holding up vessels to put either sea
marshals or boarding teams on them, because there is a real
impact on them.
We closed the Port of New York on Tuesday, 9/11, and we re-
opened it on Thursday. At that point, there were 10 days left
of heating oil in Albany, New York, and only a couple of days
left of refined products up in the Northeast. So we know that
when you increase security in a port, there is also an effect
on the economic flows. So we are tracking that, and we are
mindful of that and how we are managing business on a day-to-
day basis. So getting those queues down is very, very important
to us.
In looking at where we need to be in long-term plans for
maritime security, the Commandant has used the term, and I have
heard it repeated in the room here a couple of times today:
What is the new normalcy? What is that new standard of care
that we need in ports for port security?
And a lot of it has to do with, do we go from being just a
boat-house down in Galveston with a boat that can respond to
SAR--what we call a B-zero boat that is just standing by ready
to go--or do you want to increase that presence: the cop on the
beat that is available to enforce the security zones and so
forth? We are working with the Administration on a multi-year
plan to do that.
One of our problems is: If we are given resources today, it
is very difficult to grow the Coast Guard fast because, the way
we access officers and enlisted people, there is a limit to how
quickly we can grow. That has been taken into account, and that
has been factored. And we are working with the Administration
right now.
One of the most important things that happened for us was
the relief that we got in the supplemental, the $209 million,
that allowed us to sustain the reserved funding we had this
year. We have looked forward to in the second half of the year
being able to sustain that, also.
But we are working on a multi-year plan that will be
factored into the overall transportation strategy. We will
include what the Transportation Security Administration is
going to be involved with, too. And I might add that there is
going to be a directed effort by them on containers.
Senator Hutchison. Just a last follow-up question. I would
assume that you are looking at technology. One of the great
things about the Houston Port, it seems to me, is the limited
access.
I do not know if other ports are more complicated, but with
just a few access points into a secure area, surely technology
would save you from having to have as much manpower. It would
at least be a manpower projector so that if you heard the bell
go off of an unauthorized, unregistered ship, you could send
someone out, but you would not have to have someone on patrol
until you heard the sound.
Vice Admiral Allen. You make an excellent point. The term
we use is Maritime Domain Awareness; it is understanding what
is out there. And when you get to the point where you are
having to respond to an incursion to a security zone or you get
into consequence management like we were in 9/11, you have
already lost the game to some extent.
My admiral's definition of consequence management is, ``The
sum of all failures.'' You have got to get further out ahead of
that curve, and if you have got to get to the point where you
are embarking containers someplace in Europe and you are
ensuring at that point that they are loaded correctly and you
are creating some kind of a technologically-advanced electronic
bond system that can verify the integrity of that container
and, also, track it where it is going, that is how you are
going to address the problem.
Senator Hutchison. Well, that came up today when we were on
our tour, as well. It should be fairly easy to know if a ship
is telling you the truth when they tell you where their last
port was if you have an embarkation information-gathering
system or exchange of information or some way to verify. If a
ship tells you their last port was Rotterdam but you don't
verify it and it was really Somalia, then you would want to
know that and be able to verify it, which should be fairly
simple.
Vice Admiral Allen. Those protocols and technology exist in
the aviation world today, and there is no reason they cannot be
transferred to the maritime sector.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Breaux. Thank you.
Congressman Lampson.
Representative Lampson. Mr. Chairman, I will take just a
minute to cover a couple of relatively small points.
Sam, you made the comment about the need for paper to
understand what might be--and know quickly what might be on a
ship.
Mr. Pipkin. Yes.
Representative Lampson. With the use of GPS and
transponders and that kind of technology, would not that be
even more readily available than having to print out a piece of
paper from someplace? And you could get it from whatever
facility you wanted to look at it.
Mr. Pipkin. Exactly.
Representative Lampson. And that capability already exists
and is in place in some branches of the military. Would GPS--
and I guess Mr. Trotter is probably the one to ask.
At what point might it be feasible for us to put GPS on
every container?
Mr. Trotter. Well, I think we are a lot closer to that than
we used to be. A problem with GPS now, for example, Lo-jack
vehicle tracking system--everybody understands what that is--
with cars, stolen cars. And if you have been to Miami, you know
how many cars get stolen and get shipped through those ports.
And that is a concern of ours. We are interested in stolen cars
that are going out of the ports.
But the problem is--when you get it into a big container
yard and you literally have thousands or tens of thousands of
containers, it is not nearly enough focused now so that you can
go and say, ``It is in this container.'' You may know it is in
a 300-yard radius--well, that may be OK for a cop who is
chasing a car down the road. He may say, ``Well, yes, that is
my car.'' But when you put it in the arena that we deal in, on
vessels or in container yards, it has to be more narrowly
defined.
We are working on instances to do that. We have some
undercover techniques that permit that to be done today, but it
is very expensive. And it has not yet gained as wide
applicability. But as things are now, the more technology is
built and they get cheaper, I think we could reach that. And
that certainly is one of the goals that Commissioner Bonner has
talked about in his supply chain: Know what gets stuffed in
that container in the foreign ports, and know what comes out at
our end.
Also, Congressman Lampson, I just would say that Secretary
O'Neill--Treasury Secretary O'Neill has made it very clear to
us that we need to be concerned about the trade of and the
commerce of the United States. So I think you have heard that
from everybody up here. That is definitely a concern of ours.
We want to be thorough, but we want to move the commerce of the
United States.
Representative Lampson. Is NASA working on any of that
technology?
And would you, Mr. Chairman, comment on what NASA did do
for the Port of Houston in trying to help you better control
and keep access to ships coming into the port? Has NASA been--
--
Senator Breaux. I do not know that.
Mr. Kornegay, can you answer that question?
Mr. Kornegay. Yes, sir, I can. We are working with NASA on
the low-visibility capabilities.
And NASA does have the technology you are talking about,
Congressman, where they put an instrument on the ship--
actually, the Pilot puts it on board the ship. It is about a
15-pound computer, and it tells him the exact position of the
ship and the heading of the ship so that he knows where he is
at all times. We also need the transponder information so that
he can see the other ship coming from the other direction.
Representative Lampson. Thank you. That has got to be
developed more. And we have had a wonderful asset in NASA that
is working on it.
And one final point for the Coast Guard. Is there not a
mandate to create a guideline for our ports to use in
developing security procedures? Either the Department of
Transportation or the Coast Guard has----
Senator Breaux. This legislation will do that. I do not
know if there is anything in existence now.
Representative Lampson. I thought that there had been some
requirement.
Senator Breaux. I do not know.
Representative Lampson. OK.
Vice Admiral Allen. For some portions of activities in
harbors, they are planning guidance and protocols that have
been set up. What is interesting is that our captains of ports
currently have the statutory authority to do this, but the
statutory authority they have would allow them to create a
solution in their own ports. The intent of the legislation and
what you really need is a level playing field across all the
ports in the country so you are doing it the same way instead
of creating economic disincentives.
Representative Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Nick.
And, Kay Bailey, thank you for making our Subcommittee
visit a very productive one. I think that what we have heard
today has been helpful. I mean, again, I think that the focus
of what we are trying to do in the Congress, the House and in
the Senate, is to be partners with the ports. And every port is
different, and every port has different requirements and
different needs.
I would imagine that while the comprehensive security plans
that will be developed will have a great deal in common, there
will also be a need to the port that it applies to, because
they all are very different in terms of what you need. There
are financial needs that you have that are not going to be able
to be handled, I think, by the individual ports without some
Federal involvement; our legislation does do that, and I think
that is another important statement, as well.
We have gotten some good ideas here, you know. And I think
that you are indeed a great port here in the Port of Houston,
and we want to continue that reputation and be helpful and be
partners with you to the extent that we possibly can.
With that, this will conclude the Subcommittee on
Transportation's hearing.
[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of George E. Duffy, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Navios Ship Agencies Inc.
My name is George E. Duffy. I am President and Chief Executive
Officer of Navios Ship Agencies Inc. We operate in multiple ports
throughout the United States (East Coast, Gulf, West Coast, and the
U.S. Great Lakes). Our company represents over 300 vessel owners,
operators, and charterers located worldwide. We handle general cargo;
steel; dry bulk cargo; oil and chemical vessels, and we also handle
both imports and exports. We deal with all U.S. Government agencies
that are involved in the shipping and movement of both imported and
exported commodities.
With the testimony yesterday, you have heard from the U.S. Coast
Guard, U.S. Customs, U.S. Immigration, Border Patrol, as well as the
F.B.I. and the Port of New Orleans on the need for increased security
at our ports. I want to go into a little more detail because I feel the
bill that you have helped author does not have sufficient funding to
allow these agencies to properly perform their new mission.
There must be one central coordinating agency. It is my
recommendation that it should be the U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. Coast
Guard has already implemented the 96-hour Vessel Arrival Notification,
and is feeding that information to U.S. Customs, U.S. Immigration,
F.B.I., and other Federal agencies. This information must also be made
available to the local ports' authority and other local agencies on a
need-to-know basis. This will prevent duplicate reporting, and it will
centralize and standardize the information required to be submitted.
Even with the present 96-hour notification, many U.S. ports have
established additional requirements. They have different restrictions
on vessels and/or barge movements. This needs to be standardized so
that we have one law, one informational reporting format, and that all
ports subscribe to that program.
Another area of concern is the communications issue. All of these
agencies need to have communications (radio, telephone, and computers)
that operate on the same program and frequencies. This system will not
work if these agencies (Federal, state, and local) cannot talk to each
other or access Ecom data. In the past, in the New Orleans area we
found that emergency response units, Police, Fire Departments, EMT's
and other local and Federal Government agencies during practice
exercises could not communicate with each other. Jefferson Parish, St.
Bernard Parish, and Orleans Parish were all on different radio
frequencies. The U.S. Coast Guard operates on marine frequencies. Most
of the local agencies including the Harbor Police do not have that
availability. The Harbor Police of the Port of New Orleans have two (2)
vessels, a fire rescue boat and a small harbor patrol boat, which have
marine communications. But, the officers patrolling the harbor area do
not have marine radio availability. Therefore, additional equipment
must be purchased to give the agencies the tools that they need to help
secure the port area.
The U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs, U.S. Department of Immigration,
Border Patrol, and the U.S. Corps of Engineers have all been subjected
to serious cutbacks over the past decade. Insufficient equipment,
manpower shortages, and antiquated technology must be overcome rapidly.
We feel that the funding of Senate Bill 1214 is way short of what is
needed to bring these Federal agencies up to a ready position to
prevent terrorist activities.
The U.S. Coast Guard's sea-marshal program needs to be expanded.
This can only be done by increased manning to the 8th Coast Guard
District. This problem is not isolated to New Orleans; it is a national
problem. You may have heard of the incident whereby the U.S. Border
Patrol moved 200 agents from the Canadian boarder to the Mexican
boarder to fill gaps in that area. This created additional burdens on
the Northwestern states. To fill these gaps, the states had to employ
the National Guard to protect this country. This is why this is so
critical. I know it is very difficult for these agencies to be
straightforward, but we all know and deal with them. They do an
outstanding job with the minimal resources they have at hand.
The U.S. Congress has mandated the Vessel Traffic System for the
Port of New Orleans. This is not mandated for all U.S. ports. The
transponder system has not reached the technology level required. I
want to point out to you that the portable transponder weighs 18
pounds. There is also a need for a laptop computer, which adds extra
weight. This may be an interim solution for ocean-going vessels, but
this, again, would be port specific. The transponder must be mandated
for all vessels operating on our waterway system. This includes tugs,
push boats, crew boats, supply boats, and commercial fishing boats.
This is the only way this system will work effectively.
We have seen numerous problems with transponder technology. It does
not provide the information that was referenced yesterday (vessel name,
cargo, etc). IMO standards must be supported so that this transponder
will be universal and operating in all U.S. and foreign ports.
I know that the offshore industry has taken a position that their
vessels should not be required to have these transponders. The deep
draft vessel interests disagree. If we do not know where these vessels
are, it presents a serious threat to the ocean-going vessels, and does
give us full VTS coverage (VTS is designed as an Aid to Navigation).
Thence, the VTS system fails. An example of this would be that if
someone loaded an offshore supply vessel (no transponder) in Venice and
sailed into Southwest Pass and then steered itself into the side of a
large tanker or chemical carrier. We would now have a major catastrophe
with insurmountable damage to the U.S. economy with a potential
complete closure of the Mississippi River. This would be similar to the
incident with the USS Cole.
This would be a very easy and simple scenario to look at, and
without VTS, the offshore supply vessel would not have been
identifiable. Without the required transponder, neither the Coast Guard
nor the River Pilots would know where these vessels were located. We
fully support a VTS system, but, once again, it has to be mandated to
all shallow draft and deep draft vessels for VTS to be an aid in
fighting terrorism.
In reviewing Senate Bill 1214, we find that this bill contains new
rules on documentation and requirements of the shipping agents, freight
forwarders, brokers, owners, operators, and charterers of vessels. The
language in the bill is directed mainly toward export rather than
import. We feel the most serious terrorist threat that could come would
be from imported cargo. Besides vessel hijacking potentials, we feel
that containers will provide the most accessible form for smuggling
terrorist materials. Expertise is needed from U.S. Customs, U.S.
Customs Brokers and Freight Forwarders, and the maritime interests to
ensure that proper documentation and present laws established by U.S.
Customs are not amended to the point of being unworkable. The present
system works well. One of the major problems has been the cutback of
U.S. Customs' manpower related to marine vessel activity. The number of
U.S. Customs' port inspectors has been greatly reduced over the past
ten (10) years. The documentation required for the vessels (manifests,
Bills of Lading, commercial invoices) flow to U.S. Customs in the entry
in the cargo process of cargo. Moving up the timeframe for reporting
may cause serious problems on short voyages. Documentation is made in
the port of origin and then sent by courier to the U.S. port agents/
Customhouse brokers to initiate the cargo process with the present U.S.
Coast Guard's 96-hour reporting cargo information is provided.
All vessels carrying hazardous materials must have a hazardous
cargo manifest. That is filed with U.S. Customs as well as with the
U.S. Coast Guard. With respect to all documentation, there still leaves
the potential of misrepresentation. This is where U.S. Customs and
other intelligence agencies and maritime's experience will play a vital
role. Well-established reputable and honest shippers and receivers of
cargo can be impacted because of lack of security at foreign ports.
Your emphasis on the ``superport'' program is where our first line of
defense must be established. Cooperation with foreign government, their
security forces and their port authority is absolutely essential in
defeating the terrorist threat by vessels and/or containers or other
cargo carrying equipment placed on board vessels. This is where we need
to start immediately.
Containers could be scanned in foreign ports prior to being loaded
on a vessel to ensure that the content of that container is what is
listed on its Bill of Lading, and then eventually on its manifest. In
turn, U.S. Customs can do a secondary scanning at the first port of
arrival with their new VACIS system. As you well stated yesterday, less
than 3 percent of our inbound containers are inspected. U.S. Customs
does not have sufficient VACIS units or manpower to accomplish these
objectives.
The maritime industry supports changes in the present laws for the
security of this country. The problem arises when the changes are
overly burdensome, and will not effectively produce the end results
that you and Congress are striving for.
U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Immigration/Border Patrol are important
parts of this security picture. Once again, they are under-funded, and
do not have adequate manpower or equipment to comply with the mandates
from this proposed law. We feel that the dollar value that you have
assessed for these agencies falls drastically short of what will be
needed to make them effective.
In the hearing yesterday, you asked Admiral Casto and Captain of
the Port, Stephen Rochon, about security areas around sensitive
vessels. Their response was that they have not been imposed, and the
main reason was that they do not have the equipment or manpower to
enforce them. I agree with them, but I also wanted to alert you to some
of the things that have been imposed by the terminals along the river
regarding the required stores and spare parts for vessels. Prior to
September 11th, we could deliver by truck across the facilities berth,
spares and stores, which included food that are supplied by the local
ship chandler in this area to the vessels. Numerous spare parts are
flown in to be delivered to the vessel, and these come in all sizes. A
number of facilities now are prohibiting the delivery across their
docks. Therefore, the owners and vessel operators now must deliver by
launch service to these vessels while berthed at the facilities. If
restrictive zones are implemented, this must be taken into
consideration. There is also the delivery of fuel (bunkers), diesel
oil, and water by barge to these vessels while berthed at these
facilities. These must also be considered prior to imposing restrictive
zones.
You spoke about closure of the Port of New Orleans for security
purposes. The main port area is secure. The problem arises in other:
areas where the river area is open for tourism and recreational
activities. The Riverwalk, Moonwalk, Waldenburg Park, and paved levee
systems along the river are all open to the public. These give an open
access to the Mississippi River and the bridges that cross the river,
the terminals and facilities, vessels, and barges. This provides a
different problem to the local authority. Patrols along these unsecured
areas need to be increased. This will help deter any attempt to strike
a vessel from these unsecured areas.
In summary, we support your efforts, and stand ready to assist you
on any areas that you may want clarification. We must accomplish our
mission to prevent terrorist activity through workable and practical
law changes and finances to the agencies assigned this task.