[Senate Hearing 107-1029]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-1029
BUS AND TRUCK SECURITY AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LICENSING
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGIA ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
Mark Buse, Republican Staff Director
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican General Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii GORDON SMITH, Oregon
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
RON WYDEN, Oregon OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
MAX CLELAND, Georgia SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held October 10, 2001.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cleland..................................... 3
Statement of Senator Ensign...................................... 18
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 2
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 23
Statement of Senator Smith....................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 20
Witnesses
Acklie, Duane W., Chairman of the Board, American Trucking
Association.................................................... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Clapp, Joseph, Administrator, Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.............. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Claybrook, Joan, President, Public Citizen, and Program Co-Chair,
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety.......................... 55
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Engleman, Ellen, Administrator, Research and Special Programs
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.............. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Gleason, Keith, Director, Tankhaul Division, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters....................................... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Pantuso, Peter, President and CEO, American Bus Association...... 33
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Sheridan, Ralph F., President and CEO, American Science and
Engineering, Inc............................................... 51
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Sullivan, Paul, Lieutenant, Massachusetts State Police,
Commercial Vehicle Enforcement Division........................ 44
Prepared statement........................................... 46
BUS AND TRUCK SECURITY AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LICENSING
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John B.
Breaux, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. The Subcommittee will be in order. I thank
our witnesses for being with us this morning, and Senator
Cleland and other Members will be joining us shortly.
We will begin our hearing with a few opening comments of
our Members. This Subcommittee hearing is a continuation of a
series of hearings on security in the transportation area that
the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation has embarked upon.
We will continue to examine the security of both passenger rail
systems and transportation systems in general, as well as
freight transportation as well. Of particular concern, I think,
are reports that terrorists may have been seeking licenses to
drive trucks containing hazardous materials.
On October 4, a federal grand jury in Pittsburgh indicted
20 people on charges of fraudulently obtaining commercial
driver's licenses, including licenses to haul very dangerous
hazardous materials. In September, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation arrested an individual linked to Osama bin Laden
who had a hazardous materials driver's license issued by the
State of Michigan.
While we require employment and criminal background checks
for aviation employees, we do not require such background
checks for truck drivers who are seeking licenses to haul
hazardous materials. We could potentially look at requiring
companies that are hauling hazardous materials to create
security plans, including verifying the identification of their
drivers picking up the hazardous material cargo. We might also
need to more closely track the transportation entity, the
movement of the most dangerous materials, including the use of
electronic tags or satellites.
Other potential steps might include increasing funding for
hazardous material handling and training programs, and creating
potential federal penalties for the hijacking of trucks
carrying hazardous materials, particularly on the interstate
system.
These issues surrounding the hazardous materials that truck
driver licensing, border enforcement and bus safety are
obviously very difficult to solve. There are no easy answers.
We want to increase safety and security, obviously, but not
jeopardize the convenient travel of American citizens and the
free movement of goods that are the livelihood of a strong
economy.
With regard to border issues at the Mexican and Canadian
border crossings, law enforcement, intelligence, customs, truck
safety and immigration functions, all coverage must be better
coordinated by the relevant federal agencies, and coordinating
the sharing of their information and responsibilities at the
border is a very important step of stopping terrorism and
making sure that foreign trucks are safe on American roads.
With regard to bus safety, on October 3, the driver of a
Greyhound bus was attacked, as we all know, in Tennessee,
resulting in the deaths of six passengers. While the attacker
was not linked to any terrorist organization, it was an
important reminder that our transportation system outside of
aviation also is vulnerable.
In 1999, we passed the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act
following a charter bus accident in Louisiana, outside of New
Orleans, on Mother's Day of 1999, in which 22 people were
killed. The driver was found to have several medical problems.
He had marijuana in his system at the time of the accident, and
in my opinion should be behind bars and not behind the wheel of
a bus.
Legislation strengthened the enforcement of bus safety by
increasing the fines and requiring more monitoring of the motor
carriers, but some parts of that legislation along with bus-
related parts of TEA-21 in 1998, still have not been
implemented by the Transportation Department.
We need to know from the Transportation Department what we
have done to address these issues, and what we plan to do in
the near future to increase bus safety. We may seek to increase
the coordination between bus drivers and the local police
departments, create more stringent licensing requirements for
bus drivers so they are trained to handle the threats, to
create remote check in for buses at airports, and help bus
companies better screen their baggage and verify their
passenger identification.
In conclusion, it is not clear what type of precautions
would be truly effective and possible to implement. It would be
a logistic impossibility to have law enforcement check every or
even most of the 800,000 shipments of hazardous materials or
the millions and millions of truck movements annually. Every
conceivable precaution could potentially be defeated, and
precautions that made one transportation mode less vulnerable
may simply shift the threat to more vulnerable targets.
The goal is to strike a balance between safety and security
versus the free flow of goods and people that drive our just-
in-time economy. I look forward to the panel members and their
suggestions and thoughts, and welcome our witnesses to our
Committee, and would recognize our distinguished Republican
Ranking Member, Senator McCain, for any comments he might have.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator McCain. I want to thank you, Senator Breaux, for
having this hearing. It is a very important one. During the
past 4 weeks, we have been working in a bipartisan manner to
address the Nation's most pressing needs in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks. Part of the effort is focused
on the survival of the aviation industry, and rightly so. Our
Nation, our citizens and our economy cannot afford further
deterioration of this critical segment of the transportation
industry, and we cannot afford to leave other sectors of our
transportation system vulnerable to attack.
As we have noted in previous hearings, transportation
systems are the target of 40 percent of terrorist attacks
worldwide. That is why it is necessary for the Government to
play a key role in assessing potential security threats to our
Nation's transportation system. We must ensure that we have
taken every reasonable precaution to safeguard critical
infrastructure, and that procedures are in place to protect
people and property in the event of actual terrorist attacks.
In that effort, this Committee has been conducting a series
of hearings to gain information we need to help us evaluate
potential security risks and determine how best to respond to
those potential risks. In addition to addressing aviation, we
have considered rail and maritime security, and today we will
be addressing bus and truck security issues.
I am proud of the work conducted by this Committee, and
commend the Chairman and the Subcommittee Chairman for holding
these important hearings on transportation safety and security.
Again, Chairman Breaux, thank you for holding this hearing.
I look forward to hearing from all of today's witnesses, and
hearing their recommendations as to how we can best address the
security of bus and truck transportation.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Senator.
Any comments, Senator Cleland?
STATEMENT OF HON. MAX CLELAND,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Cleland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Some 9 billion
tons of cargo are transported annually by the trucking industry
and the passenger buses around America carry some 774 million
passengers per year, double the amount of passengers carried
domestically by the airlines and rail combined. Given the large
dependence of Americans on these means of transportation, Mr.
Chairman, I think it is time and appropriate for Congress to
dedicate its time and resources to review the vulnerability of
these modes of transportation.
I mentioned at last week's hearing on port and rail safety
that Anthony Cordesman, a terrorism expert at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies here in Washington, said
``he expects any future attacks by the terrorists will use
different tactics and the next time they attack it will not be
using aircraft. It could be mass transit, or it could be public
utilities, historical sites, or the media. Tightening security
in one area will tend to push terrorists into other directions,
but one act of mass terrorism does not predict the next
occurrence.''
A balance obviously must be struck between all modes of
transportation to ensure all available resources are not overly
committed to only one form of transportation. I would like to
find out today what the bus and truck industry need and what
they need to ensure safety, security, and integrity.
I will say that I have been encouraged to hear individual
efforts by trucking companies. There is a trucking company in
Georgia--Mr. Wayne Smith of Felton Pearson Company in Georgia
handles several types of cargo transports. In order to ensure
the integrity of his loads, his driers back up their loaded
trailers to other trailers so that access to the cargo by
outsiders is virtually impossible. This protective measure
seems obvious and easy for any trucking company to do. Mr.
Smith also commits his own resources to do criminal background
and reference checks on his drivers.
The Department of Transportation I believe has a role here
to provide correct centralized access to information on CDL
drivers, and I would like to learn more today on how the
Department plans to work with the states to gather and provide
this information, and what additional resources may be needed
in order to meet this goal. I pledge my full efforts to work
with all of you to ensure the safest roadways for the traveling
public.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Senator Cleland, and I welcome
our first panel of witnesses, Administrator Joseph Clapp, of
the Motor Carrier Safety Administration at DOT, and
Administrator Ellen Engleman, Research and Special Programs
Administration, also with DOT.
We know that you folks are relatively brand new on the job,
and welcome right into the fire, and we hope you have a long
and distinguished career at the Department of Transportation--
and these are difficult times. You are not responsible for
everything that happened for the last 10 years, or even the
last 10 months, but this is your duty now, and this is your
job, and we want to hear from you as to where you think we are,
and where you think we are headed.
Mr. Clapp, you are first.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH CLAPP, ADMINISTRATOR, MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Clapp. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members of
the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today.
Senator Breaux. Joseph, get that mike real close to you so
we can all hear.
Mr. Clapp. I also appreciate that you favorably reported my
nomination to be the first Administrator of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration. I know that when you established
this agency in 1999, you did not do so lightly, but rather
because you believed it was an important step to improved motor
carrier safety. I personally applaud your decision.
I have been asked why I would choose to come out of
retirement, a retirement that I frankly thoroughly enjoyed, to
accept this appointment. I would like you to know the answer,
which is twofold. One is the great respect that I have for
Secretary Norman Mineta. He is a great American, as I am sure
you know. The other is the admiration I have for the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration and what it does.
Very early in my career as a young safety director at that
time for Ryder Tank Line, I went through what today we would
call a compliance review. The result of that experience was to
gain genuine respect for the sincerity and the dedication of
the so-called bureaucrats with whom I came into contact from
the state level right on through to Washington. More
importantly, I can tell you that as result of that review, I
was a better safety director and my company was a better
company.
FMCSA is focused, as I am now, on continuing to improve
motor carrier safety. We will do so with continued emphasis on
compliance. We conduct over 10,000 compliance reviews each year
now, more than double the level of 2 years ago, when you
created this agency. We are working with our state partners to
give greater emphasis to the driver's side of the safety
equation, and to increase the security of their commercial
driver's license systems. At the same time, we expect the
states to maintain the very substantial level of roadside
vehicle inspections, which are now over 2 million a year.
Meanwhile, the events of September 11 have necessitated an
additional focus. The credible threat of terrorism directed
toward our transportation system requires that we take
deliberate action to prevent, prepare for, and respond to
violence. Secretary Mineta has challenged each modal
administrator to establish a new definition of normal in
transportation security. We must achieve this new level of
vigilance while maintaining the mobility that underpins our
country's economic strength.
FMCSA's first actions have been directed at the areas of
greatest potential risk: hazardous materials transportation and
passenger carriage. Right now, virtually our entire field
organization is engaged in visiting hazardous materials
carriers to review with them the need for appropriate security
measures in the light of the new reality. Company officials are
asked to assess their operations to identify all potential
vulnerabilities and to take immediate steps to tighten
procedures. Special emphasis is given to conducting thorough
background checks on drivers and being alert for suspicious
behavior.
This major effort necessarily means some reduction, as of
the moment, in the number of regular compliance reviews that
our safety inspectors would otherwise be performing. I believe
this is nonetheless the correct priority for our people at this
critical time. If we believe there is serious failure on the
part of the carrier safety program, we will, of course,
respond. Our enforcement partners, I am happy to say, in the
states are stepping up security measures as well.
The lead Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP)
agency in each state has been asked to place greater priority
on hazmat enforcement at the roadside. In addition, driver-only
inspections are increased, and states are conducting commercial
driver's license information system inquiries on hazmat
drivers.
FMCSA has been cooperating with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other law enforcement agencies to check on
drivers with hazardous materials endorsements. In the past 2
years, our agency has substantially increased its scrutiny of
state licensing agencies and made recommendations to states to
prevent fraud. Last year, we made more than $15 million
available to states to evaluate and improve their licensing
systems.
Since September 11, over-the-road bus companies and other
commercial passenger carriers have actively worked with our
agency to heighten security by reviewing baggage and ticketing
procedures, and consulting with security professionals.
Greyhound is to be particularly commended for its swift
response last week, when one of its bus drivers was attacked in
Tennessee.
We are continuing to work with the bus industry to ensure
that its security needs are met. FMCSA will continue to find
ways to improve security in the days ahead. I look forward to
working with this Subcommittee to build a safer, more secure
motor carrier system.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clapp follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph Clapp, Administrator, Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. Good morning. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). FMCSA has a critical role in
protecting the security and safety of highway transportation, and I am
very proud to serve the Administration and our country in these
challenging times. I want to express my particular appreciation for the
Senate Commerce Committee's recent efforts in the consideration of my
nomination.
The Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine is
highly respected for decades of strong leadership in motor carrier
safety, from the creation of Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program
(MCSAP)--the foundation of our safety partnership with the states--to
the establishment of the FMCSA. I look forward to working closely with
the Subcommittee over the months ahead as we take vigorous action to
ensure the safety and security of our Nation's highways.
The recent attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon using
hijacked airliners remind us all that we must respond to a new kind of
terrorism--one that is well financed, well organized, and utterly
ruthless. The credible threat of increasing terrorism directed toward
our Nation's transportation systems requires that we take immediate
action to prevent, prepare for, and respond to violence--the nature and
magnitude of which was once inconceivable.
FMCSA employees in our New York office near the World Trade Center
were eyewitnesses to the first attack and were evacuated from their
building. Our New Jersey staff was quickly on the scene in the
Meadowlands helping coordinate the movement of emergency and rescue
equipment into lower Manhattan. Members of the New Jersey Motor Truck
Association voluntarily brought in thousands of pieces of heavy-duty
equipment, flatbeds, refrigerated trucks, cranes, dump trucks,
earthmovers, and front-end loaders, to help rescue efforts.
In the hours after the crisis, FMCSA closely collaborated with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies,
first to help identify activity related to the events of September 11,
then to investigate any other leads that might be related to terrorist
activity. FMCSA's Rapid Response team alerted state enforcement
officials and transport and hazardous materials associations across the
country to be on the alert.
Secretary Mineta has challenged each modal administration to
establish a new definition of ``normal'' in transportation security. We
must maintain a new level of vigilance, while maintaining the mobility
that underpins our country's economic strength.
Commercial vehicles--buses and trucks of all types--present unique
security challenges. There are more than 7.5 million vehicles and
approximately 10.5 million holders of Commercial Driver's Licenses
(CDLs) widely dispersed throughout the country. Almost 2.5 million of
the drivers who have CDLs have an endorsement that allows them to
transport hazardous materials. It is relatively easy to acquire a truck
or bus, even on a temporary basis, and each vehicle has a large cargo
capacity. Trucks and buses are highly mobile with easy access to key
national sites and population centers.
Our agency's first actions have been focused on the areas of
greatest potential risk, hazardous materials transportation and
commercial passenger carriers. FMCSA and RSPA have coordinated their
actions.
On September 26, FMCSA directed its credentialed staff in each
State's Division Office and every Resource Center to conduct Security
Sensitivity Visits to hazardous materials carriers throughout the
country to urge heightened vigilance. Companies we meet with are asked
to assess their operations to identify all possible potential
vulnerabilities--and take immediate steps to tighten procedures.
Particular emphasis is given to conducting thorough background
checks on drivers and being alert for suspicious behavior from drivers,
including applicants, shippers, consignees or the public. Company
officials are being urged to conduct thorough interviews when hiring
new drivers and verify U.S. citizenship or immigration documents for
employees. Factors such as gaps in employment, frequent job shifts, and
criminal history are to be considered.
Companies are asked to review their own security procedures,
looking at who has access to their facilities and storage areas, and
the adequacy of protection. Carriers are urged to know their business
partners, their vendors, their service providers, and their shippers.
FMCSA is urging all carriers to avoid transporting particularly
hazardous materials near high population centers, whenever possible,
and reinforcing the need to strictly follow en route security measures.
We are urging companies to take advantage of technical innovations that
can improve security and communication, such as satellite tracking,
surveillance systems, and cell phones as well as state of the art
locks, seals, alarms, and engine controls.
Enhanced communications systems provide another window of
opportunity for companies to tighten security. A good communications
network can help detect patterns of activities that when taken alone
may not seem significant but when taken as a whole may cause concern.
Security messages and training should be regularly and widely provided
to employees and should be comprehensive, covering overall company
security, specific security procedures, and the employee's personal
role in security.
In addition to directly contacting carriers, each FMCSA State
Director and Field Administrator has been asked to contact trucking
associations and other trade associations involved with hazardous
materials. Associations are asked to contact their members and share
detailed suggestions for improving security.
Our enforcement partners in the states are stepping up security
measures as well. The lead MCSAP agency in each state has been asked to
place greater priority to hazardous materials enforcement at the
roadside. States are stepping up ``driver only'' (Level III)
inspections and conducting Commercial Driver's License Information
System (CDLIS) inquiries on all hazardous materials drivers.
FMCSA has been cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and other law enforcement agencies to check on drivers who hold
licenses to transport hazardous materials. In the past 2 years, our
agency has substantially increased its scrutiny of state licensing
agencies to root out corruption in commercial licensing. We have been
involved in the current investigation of a fraudulent hazardous
materials licensing scheme in Pennsylvania.
Even before September 11, states were cooperating with FMCSA in
stepped up examination of their licensing procedures. This started when
cases of fraud emerged in Illinois and Florida. Last year FMCSA
conducted a special review of operations in Illinois and Florida and
issued recommendations on specific actions these and all states could
take to prevent fraud. State employees and private individuals within
states have been our most fertile source of tips on fraudulent
licensing schemes. We have encouraged each state to review its
procedures and spot test its systems to detect fraud. During fiscal
year 2001, FMCSA made more than $15 million available to states to
evaluate and improve the systems. A similar level of funding has been
requested for fiscal year 2002.
Fraudulent licensing schemes come in many forms--from use of a
language interpreter, who actually provides answers to the test taker,
to third party testers who pass on the basis of fees paid, to licensing
personnel who take kickbacks. FMCSA now reviews a third of the state
CDL programs each year to see if they are complying with federal
requirements. In this process, FMCSA points out state procedures or
practices that may make their programs particularly susceptible to
fraud. For example, we discovered that one state gives discretionary
authority to a desk clerk to override checks of CDLIS for license
applicants without consulting supervisors.
Since the events of September 11, over-the-road bus companies and
other commercial passenger carriers and their related trade
associations are cooperating with FMCSA to heighten security by
reviewing baggage checks and ticketing procedures, consulting security
professionals, and, as much as possible, avoiding locations that might
pose security risks to passengers.
Last week, at 4 a.m., a disturbed passenger on a Greyhound bus
viciously attacked the bus driver causing a crash that tragically took
six lives. Although the incident is not believed to be related to
terrorist activity, it highlights how we must anticipate what we never
before could have imagined. Greyhound is to be highly commended for
their quick, aggressive action to suspend operations to ensure further
episodes would not occur if terrorism was involved. The Department of
Transportation provided Greyhound with appropriate intelligence and
security support to expedite its resumption of service.
FMCSA is evaluating the additional measures that will be needed to
protect security in the passenger carrier industry.
While the focus of this hearing is security, before I conclude my
remarks, I want to underscore for you my personal lifelong interest in
motor carrier safety. I believe my background in industry will be an
asset in helping the FMCSA meet its safety goals. When I was in the
industry and its trade association, I was an early supporter of
measures Congress passed into law, such as the Commercial Driver's
License, random drug testing, and significant increases in roadside
inspections. All are now responsibilities of the agency I now head. I
understand the business of this industry which is so vital to this
country's well being. A core element of that understanding is the
absolute requirement for sharing the highways safely and with due
regard to the rights of those who travel alongside commercial vehicles.
I very much hope that I may make a contribution to building a safer
and better motor carrier system. To do that, I will engage parties
throughout the spectrum, from carriers to truck inspectors, and from
safety advocates to safety directors--to listen and to learn. One of my
priorities will be seeing that a Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety
Advisory Committee is established as soon as possible. I believe an
advisory committee could be a real resource for the agency, potentially
providing guidance and expertise in matters of security as well as
safety.
Again, I look forward to working closely with this Subcommittee in
the months ahead, and I would be happy to answer any questions that you
may have.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Administrator Clapp.
Administrator Engleman.
STATEMENT OF ELLEN ENGLEMAN, ADMINISTRATOR,
RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION
Ms. Engleman. Thank you, each and every member and staff,
for the opportunity to appear before you to talk about this
critical topic that faces us and our Nation. I want to express
my sincere and personal appreciation to the Committee for the
opportunity, and to share with you my sincere sympathy with the
families and the victims of the events of September 11.
The possibilities that we now face were driven by a
deliberate attack that none of us could have really imagined
prior to September 11, and the Research and Special Programs
Administration within the Department of Transportation has
worked diligently to respond and prepare for our new public
safety and security reality.
The RSPA mission has always been focused on public safety.
We administer comprehensive and national programs through our
offices of Pipeline Safety, Hazardous Materials Safety, and the
Office of Emergency Transportation. Our job is to protect
people, property, and the environment from harm or damage that
would result from accidents or events that include the result
of transportation of hazardous materials from damage of oil or
natural gas pipelines, and to respond to emergency
transportation issues that result from natural or manmade
events.
We traditionally, however, focused on the likelihood of an
accidental event, and our job was to minimize the consequences.
Fortunately, we have proactively addressed security concerns of
all areas under our jurisdiction since September 11. Within 30
minutes of the first attack on the World Trade Center,
Transportation Secretary Mineta ordered the activation of the
Crisis Management Center, the CMC, which is part of RSPA's
Office of Emergency Transportation.
The CMC is in direct communication with emergency
responders on a regional basis. Their job is to acquire,
assess, and analyze emergency communication and response
activities in support of the Secretary. The Center has
representatives from all nine transportation divisions, or
modes as we call them, which includes FAA, transit, highways,
rail, maritime, motor carriers, pipeline, and the Coast Guard.
We also have general counsel, public affairs, and intelligence
security functions.
We gathered information in real time and created immediate
situation reports to the Secretary. The CMC was manned on a 24-
7 basis, and has remained fully operational since September 11.
In addition, the Office of Emergency Transportation immediately
responded to support the federal response plan activities with
FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
We coordinated, facilitated, and provided, where necessary,
all transportation to support FEMA, including the movement of
the urban search and rescue teams, personnel, equipment,
supplies, including blood and provisions to New York City and
the Pentagon sites.
Last, this office directly supported individual activities
of the Coast Guard and FAA, Federal Aviation Administration.
On September 11, RSPA's Office of Pipeline Safety
immediately issued a security bulletin to over 1,000 pipeline
owner operators. OPS personnel made immediate telephone contact
with major pipeline operators to ensure that they understood
and adhered to the security issues. OPS personnel contacted all
the state pipeline safety programs to provide them with
security information. On September 14, the Office of Pipeline
Safety requested that operators continue to strengthen their
security efforts, and that emergency security measures remain
in place until further notice. We continue to be in close and
immediate communication with the pipeline owner operators.
RSPA's Office of Hazardous Material Safety worked closely
with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and issued
a safety alert to ensure that security measures were in place
within the hazardous materials transportation community, the
manufacturing industries, and the local and state governments.
A working group of representatives from several of the
Department's operating administrations are conducting an
assessment for the security of hazardous materials. I am
pleased to announce that last night we received final approval
and review of our proposed hazmat reauthorization proposal that
will be sent over today by Secretary Mineta. We look to
reauthorize the DOT hazmat program to increase inspection
authority and to look and demand any requirements for security
and safety.
Last, RSPA is focused on risk and vulnerability assessment.
We need to identify and are identifying our current procedures,
authorities, determining necessary improvements, refinements,
and responses to public security and safety issues. We are
reviewing all current regulatory and administrative tools that
we can use to increase security.
We have issued a broad agency announcement for research and
development of transportation infrastructure security
technologies, and are an integral participant in the total
National Infrastructure Security Committee. RSPA's Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center is an acknowledged
leader in transportation security and analysis, and has a
leadership role in developing physical security-related
programs currently involved with the Federal Transit
Administration, the Bureau of Printing and Engraving, and even
the U.S. Capitol Police.
The Transportation Safety Institute in Oklahoma has been
developing critical safety and education training programs for
multimodal application, and is specifically reviewing all
programs to incorporate and develop security applications.
While I have highlighted what RSPA has been doing since
September 11, many of our daily activities in promoting public
safety have not changed. With 2.1 million miles of pipeline,
and over 800,000 shipments of hazardous material every day, as
Senator Cleland said, 4 billion tons annually, RSPA's role in
pipeline safety and packaging and shipping of hazmat materials
is critical. Many hazardous material shipments may be innocent
paint, or aerosol containers. However, for those materials that
would provide for a harmful platform, we will work closely to
ensure that these shipments are identified, labeled, packaged,
prepared for shipment, and shipped in a safe manner.
We share regulation for nuclear materials transportation
with the Department of Energy. We work with the Federal
Aviation Administration to keep unauthorized hazardous material
shipments out of passenger aircraft. We cooperate with the
Federal Motor Carrier Administration on development of minimum
requirements for driver's licenses for commercial vehicles and
authorizations to transport hazardous materials. However,
issuing commercial driver's licenses is a function of the
individual states, and under federal motor carrier rules.
My personal commitment as a member of this administration
and as a Navy Reserve officer is quite simple--not on my
watch--and that is what we are doing each and every day.
Each RSPA employee is dedicated to the safety and security
of the American public. We are continuing to evaluate and
implement additional measures, and we will continue to work
with pipeline, hazardous material, and the emergency
transportation communities towards those mutual goals. We offer
our full support to this Subcommittee and to the Committee as a
whole, and thank you again for the opportunity to begin this
discussion to protect the American people.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Engleman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ellen Engleman, Administrator, Research and
Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you on this critical
topic of concern for our entire Nation. I want to express my
appreciation to the Members of this Committee for their interest and to
share with them my sincere sympathy for the families and friends of the
victims of the tragedy of September 11th. The possibilities we now face
are driven by a deliberate attack that most could not have imagined
prior to September 11th. The Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA) has worked diligently to respond to the events of
September 11 and prepare for our new reality concerning public safety
and security.
The RSPA mission has always been focused on public safety. RSPA
administers a comprehensive, national series of programs through the
offices of pipeline safety, transportation of hazardous materials and
the office of emergency transportation. Our job is to protect people,
property and the environment from harm or damage that would result from
accidents or events resulting from the transportation of hazardous
materials, from damage by oil or natural gas pipelines and respond to
emergency transportation issues resulting from natural or manmade
events.
Our safety programs traditionally focus on the likelihood of
``accidental'' events in order to minimize the consequences when
incidents occur. Fortunately, RSPA has also proactively addressed
security concerns for all areas under our jurisdiction.
In less than 30 minutes after the first attack on the World Trade
Center, Transportation Secretary Mineta ordered the activation of the
Crisis Management Center (CMC) which is part of RSPA's Office of
Emergency Transportation. The CMC is an inter-modal communication
center that is in direct communication with regional emergency
responders to acquire, assess and analyze emergency communication and
response activities in support of the Secretary. The CMC includes
representatives from all 9 transportation modes, including Federal
Aviation, Transit, Highways, Rail, Maritime, Motor Carriers, Pipelines,
and Coast Guard, as well as general counsel, public affairs and
intelligence/security functions. We gathered information in ``real
time'' via our AIM (Activation Information Management System) reporting
system and created immediate hourly (sometimes more often) situational
reports for the Secretary. The CMC was immediately manned on a 24/7
basis and has remained fully operational since September 11th.
In addition, the Office of Emergency Transportation immediately
responded to support ESF-1 (Emergency Support Function under the
Federal Response Plan) activities with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and coordinated, facilitated and provided, when
necessary, all transportation support for FEMA. This included movement
of the urban search and rescue teams and other personnel, equipment,
supplies, including blood and provisions, to the New York City and
Pentagon sites. Lastly, this office directly supported individual
activities of the Coast Guard and Federal Aviation Administration.
On September 11th, RSPA's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS)
immediately issued a security bulletin to over 1,000 pipeline owner/
operators. OPS personnel made immediate and individual telephone
contact with all major pipeline operators to ensure that communication
was open and viable between our offices and that they understood and
adhered to the security issues. Additionally, OPS personnel contacted
all of the state pipeline safety programs to provide them with security
information. On September 14, RSPA's Office of Pipeline Safety amended
the security bulletin and requested that the operators continue to
strengthen their security efforts and that emergency security measures
remain in place until further notice. RSPA is pro-actively working with
the pipeline industry to increase security awareness and individual
measures and continues to be in close and immediate communication with
pipeline owner/operators.
Responding to the increased level of transportation security,
RSPA's Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, in coordination with the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, issued a hazardous
materials safety alert to ensure that adequate security measures are in
place when transporting hazardous materials. This alert was distributed
throughout the hazardous materials transportation community,
manufacturing industries and state and local governments. The office
also established an intermodal working group composed of
representatives from several of the Department's operating
administrations. The working group is conducting a multi-modal
assessment of the existing security measures in place for the
transportation of hazardous materials by all modes to see which ones
may need to be strengthened or revised.
Last, RSPA is focused on risk and vulnerability assessment,
identifying current procedures and authorities and determining
necessary improvements, refinements and response to public security and
safety issues. We are reviewing all current regulatory and
administrative tools that can be utilized to support increased security
responsibilities, have issued a Broad Agency Announcement for Research
and Development of Transportation Infrastructure Security Technologies
and are an integral participant in the Department's intermodal National
Infrastructure Security Committee. The Volpe Transportation Center, a
key member of the RSPA team, is an acknowledged leader in
transportation security analysis and programs. The Volpe Center has a
leadership role in developing programs related to physical security
issues for the Federal Transit Administration, the Bureau of Printing
and Engraving and the U.S. Capitol Police prior to and in concurrence
with the events of September 11th. The Transportation Safety Institute
in Oklahoma City has been developing critical safety education and
training programs for multimodal application and is specifically
reviewing all programs to support security issues.
These are just a few highlights of what the Research and Special
Programs Administration has been doing since the September 11th
terrorist attack on America. Many of our daily activities in promoting
the public safety have not changed since September 11th. With 2.1
million miles of pipeline and over 800,000 shipments of hazardous
material every day, equaling 4 billion tons annually, RSPA's role in
promulgating rules and regulations concerning pipeline safety and the
packaging and shipping of hazmat materials is critical. It must be
noted, that from a security perspective, many of the shipments
classified as hazardous materials may be as innocent as paint or
aerosol containers. However, for those materials which would provide
for a harmful platform, RSPA works closely to ensure that hazardous
material shipments are identified, labeled and packaged for shipment in
a safe manner. For instance, we share regulation of nuclear materials
transportation with the Department of Energy. We work with the Federal
Aviation Administration to develop measures to keep hazardous materials
out of passenger aircraft. We cooperate with the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration on the development of minimum requirements for
commercial drivers licenses and drivers authorized to transport
hazardous materials. However, RSPA is not responsible for issuing
commercial drivers licenses. This is a function of the individual
states in adherence to Federal Motor Carriers rules.
My personal commitment and that of each RSPA employee is to the
safety and security of the American public. RSPA continues to evaluate
and implement additional measures and will continue to work with the
pipeline, hazardous material and emergency transportation communities
towards those mutual goals. We offer our full support to this
Subcommittee and the Committee as a whole and we thank you again for
the opportunity to meet with you today and respond to your questions,
concerns or comments.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, both administrators,
for being with us.
If you look at all that you have on your plate, Mr. Clapp,
you may continue to wonder why you came out of retirement. My
staff and I sent you a list of things that Congress, when we
did the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, said we
want you to do meaning your office. While the Motor Carrier
Office had been dealing with highways, Congress felt we ought
to have a separate agency to deal particularly with safety, and
that time Congress ordered a number of studies and rulemakings,
regarding jobs to be completed by the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration.
I have got 2\1/2\ pages of things that Congress said needed
to be done, commercial vehicle driver identifier, national
uniform system of permits for interstate motor carriers
transporting hazardous materials, regulations dealing with the
transportation of hazardous materials, trying to improve the
flow of driver history, very important, medical certificates to
make sure that people who drive commercial vehicles have an
updated medical certificate.
My information tells me that none of them have been
completed. Now, I know you are brand new, and you were not here
when we did all of this, but it is your office, and what can
you tell this Committee and this Congress, and I hate to say
it, but that is deplorable. What is your expression on why it
has not been done?
Mr. Clapp. Well, thank you, Senator. I believe we have
replied for the record with respect to where each rulemaking
called for by MCSIA stands. The review that I have been able to
do since last Thursday when I first joined the agency convinces
me that every one of the rulemakings is, in fact, in progress
in one way or the other. They are certainly not all final, and
I agree with you about that.
In general, what has happened at the agency with respect to
rulemaking is the creation of a dedicated division within the
agency for the purpose of carrying out the rulemaking activity.
These folks are solely dedicated to that purpose. They have
created--and I believe my first official act will be to create
a directive, that they have created a handbook which lays out
all the procedures.
Senator Breaux. You do not need a handbook. You need a
hammer. I mean, really, you need to get in there and break some
china. You have got to tell them that these things are
incredibly important. These medicals, that situation in New
Orleans, when we had the hearings, we had 22 people die, and
the gentleman that was driving a bus at that time should never
have been behind the wheel.
He was high on marijuana, he was taking Benedryl, and could
not see straight. He was suffering from congestive heart
failure and bad kidneys. He had gotten out of the hospital less
than 8 hours before he went to work and killed 22 people, and
so Congress as a result of that created your administration,
and we requested updated medical certificates on people who
drive commercial vehicles.
You have been there since Thursday. This is not your fault,
but I would say, do not go back and publish a manual. Go in
there and call them in and say, what are you going to do and
when are you going to do it, and Congress is going to be all
over me and all over us if it is not done. It is not a manual
that needs to be issued, it is strong leadership and direction.
Do you disagree with that?
Mr. Clapp. I agree with it completely. As a matter of fact,
Senator, you also created and put in place a Regulatory
Ombudsman. That person is on board. That person meets weekly
with all of the people involved in rulemaking, and it is a team
process at this point, and we also have installed a tracking
system for the rulemaking. In fact the new medical procedures,
the medical form, is a final rule that was issued last year.
The kind of guidance that is given to physicians examining
drivers now is much more direct and much more easily
understandable than the guidelines that were in existence at
the time of that bus accident, which I am absolutely sure broke
your heart, as it broke mine, to read about it and see what
happened.
I could not agree with you more, and I agree with you on
the leadership.
Senator Breaux. What can you tell this Committee and the
Congress about the situation in Pennsylvania? Just this October
4, the federal grand jury in Pittsburgh returned 16
indictments, and I think the same grand jury has also returned
20 separate indictments, charging 20 individuals from a number
of states, basically for buying commercial licenses allowing
them to carry hazardous materials on the highways of this
country.
The people named in the indictment, not to cast any
unnecessary concepts about who they are and where they are
from, but almost all of them are from the Middle East, and are
Iraqi refugees in this country, every single one of them, and I
am sure they are decent people trying to become American
citizens, but it raises the concern when you have 16
indictments, all Iraqi refugees, all receiving permits to carry
hazardous materials in this country.
Now, those licenses are issued under the authority of the
Department of Transportation. Can you assure the American
public that changes are in place that can help the states do a
better job in this particular area? I mean, obviously, if you
had someone illegally selling licenses, and that is always a
problem, however in this time of extra needed security, what
actions can we at the Federal Government help states do to
prevent this from ever happening again?
Mr. Clapp. That is a good question, Senator. In fact, the
agency has been quite active since fraud cases became known.
For example, in Illinois and in Florida, FMCSA pulled together
an expert panel that went through those cases. As a result,
they have issued a series of recommendations to all the states
for ways in which they can tighten up, and must tighten up,
their CDL processes, including those for hazmat.
The two most common issues that are found are the ones that
apparently were involved here, wherein somebody was essentially
selling licenses, that is to say, fraud, and the other is the
utilization of interpreters for folks who cannot take the test
in English. That is a vulnerability which has to be addressed.
Both of those states have, in fact, taken action to address
that. Many other states, as a matter of fact, have also
prepared action plans for deficiencies found in their
operations, and our agency follows up to see that those time
lines are met.
In addition, we audit the states at least once every 3
years, or more often if a problem is found with respect to the
compliance. Our own people have been sent back to school to
learn more about the way those compliance reviews should be and
must be conducted, and additionally have also contracted for
systems help to deal with the systems sides of those reviews.
Senator Breaux. Well, thank you, Mr. Clapp. You are brand
new, and I want to repeat that. You have been here since
Thursday.
Mr. Clapp. I am getting old fast.
[Laughter.]
Senator Breaux. You have been here since Thursday, so
obviously everything that has been done or not done properly is
not your responsibility in the past, but we need strong
leadership in this position. That is why Congress created the
administration you are in charge of. We want to work with you
to make sure that these things get done in a timely fashion.
Our Ranking Member, Senator Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON SMITH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. This is the second that we have held on surface
transportation security. Last week we addressed maritime and
rail security, and I appreciate your leadership on these
important issues. I would ask that my opening statement be
included in the record.
Senator Breaux. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gordon Smith, U.S. Senator from Oregon
Last week, our Subcommittee held a hearing on Rail and Maritime
security. Today, we will focus our attention on motor carrier security
issues, including the driver's licensing process for transporting
hazardous materials.
Bus and truck transportation safety and security involve a wide
range of complex issues and vulnerabilities. For example, we all were
saddened to learn of the recent attack on a Greyhound bus driver that
resulted in a fatal crash in Tennessee. The first reports had many of
us wondering if the attack was linked to terrorist acts. The FBI
quickly concluded that the act was criminal, but not an act of
terrorism. But clearly, this incident has added to our already
heightened sense of concern over transportation safety and security.
As we discussed last week, 40 percent of terrorist attacks
worldwide are targeted at transportation. It is the duty of all of us
to ensure that every reasonable thing is being done to prevent further
disruptions to the transportation of passengers and cargo.
I want to welcome two new Department of Transportation (DOT)
Administrators who will testify today. This marks Administrator Clapp's
first appearance before our Committee. In fact, Administrator Clapp was
officially sworn in just last Friday. He holds the distinction of
serving as the first Administrator of the department's newest agency,
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA).
Today is also Administrator Engleman's first appearance as the
Research and Special Programs (RSPA) Administrator, although she has
had the chance to appear before us once before during her confirmation
hearing in June. Administrator Engleman was sworn in just two weeks
ago.
I am going to go out on a limb and forewarn the Administrators that
they will likely face tough questioning today. Many of us have been
very frustrated over the lack of timely rulemakings on the part of both
of your agencies. This Committee will be very interested to hear how
you plan to lead your agencies to help improve upon that less than
stellar rulemaking performance.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on what steps the bus
and truck industries have taken, and what additional steps will be
proposed, to ensure the safety and security of both cargo and
passengers in our Nation's transportation system.
Senator Smith. Mr. Clapp, in looking with the Chairman at a
long list of people who have gotten fraudulent licenses to move
this material, where did that occur? Was this one individual
selling it to these people?
Mr. Clapp. Good morning, Senator. Were you referring to the
same case in Pennsylvania? From what I understand, my
information has been more limited than I would like because of
the fact that it is an ongoing grand jury investigation, but my
impression of that is that it was one individual. I could be
wrong.
Senator Smith. And have the people who acquired these
licenses been arrested?
Mr. Clapp. They have been--again, I know what I know, which
is that they have been indicted. I cannot vouch for whether
they have all been arrested.
Senator Smith. On the buses, are you contemplating a
procedure to check baggage and screen passengers before people
get on buses?
Mr. Clapp. We are contemplating those procedures, along
with many other things. That is part of it. We have had two
meetings in the last 2 weeks with folks from the bus industry
to review what can be done and what would be required to
achieve various levels of security.
We are all, of course, having to struggle with this new
balance between economic development, personal and economic
mobility, and security. In the case of the bus industry, as you
can well imagine, those are the folks that serve the
hinterland, and they do not all come through a large central
terminal like Reagan National Airport, so the problems are
similar, but in some ways they are much more daunting.
We are continuing to ask those folks for additional
specific recommendations, and of course, you will hear from
them later this morning.
Senator Smith. Mr. Clapp, I wonder if you have a mechanism
to ensure that state procedures for hazardous material
licensing or transportation of these, have you got a procedure
to evaluate the states right now that you pursue?
Mr. Clapp. The states' procedures for----
Senator Smith. For verifying the standards they have to
meet currently.
Mr. Clapp. Yes. The states issuing commercial driver's
licenses, including the various forms of endorsement, of which
hazmat is one, have to meet standards that are put out by this
agency, yes.
Senator Smith. Are there any states that are not doing
that?
Mr. Clapp. Senator, not that I am aware of right now, but
that, of course, is part of our ongoing oversight of the
states.
Senator Smith. Are you contemplating additional standards,
or adding some things to this licensing procedure that you are
going to require of the states?
Mr. Clapp. In the light of September 11, and with regard to
hazardous materials, that is certainly a possibility, one of
many.
Senator Smith. As far as you know, all of the people who
obtained these fraudulent licenses from Iraq, are they all
arrested and in custody, or moved out of this country?
Mr. Clapp. I do not know that for certain, Senator.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Breaux. I would suggest you follow that case very
closely. Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a few
questions and then submit the rest of my questions for the
record, please.
Mr. Clapp, I know there has been some problems with issuing
commercial driver's license regulations. When do you think we
could expect these regulations to be issued?
Mr. Clapp. Thank you, Senator. We have three rulemakings in
progress with respect to implementing the additionally,
frankly, assistance you provided for us in MCSIA, the 1999 Act.
The first rulemaking having to do with being those violations
which occur in, for example, a personal automobile, something
other than a commercial vehicle, which in the past did not make
it onto the driver's record, that rulemaking has gone out. The
comment period has closed, and we expect to have the final rule
by the end of the year.
Another rulemaking combined some 14 other different items
that were touched on in MCSIA, for example, the elimination of
masking of certain types of violations from the record, or from
a state being allowed to permit a hardship license for the
operation of a commercial motor vehicle, and a number of other
issues, including sanctions on the states for failure to live
up to the standards they are supposed to.
That notice of rulemaking has gone out. The comment period
I think closes before the end of this month, and it is our plan
to have that rule--and I hope I do not misspeak, but I think
the final rule should be out early next year. That will be
combined with the final piece, which is to combine the
requirement for the medical certificate actually to be combined
with the CDL.
Senator Cleland. I understand that the USDOT has asked
state and local agencies to increase their inspection of
driver's documentation, including a review of all hazmat
licenses issued within the past 2 years. I have been told by my
state, the Georgia Department of Motor Vehicle Safety, that we
are experiencing some problems in Georgia. I am sure similar
agencies across the Nation are having difficulties complying
with this request because of apparently incomplete databases
for hazmat licensing that can be used nationwide.
Do you have any idea what efforts you are undertaking in
the DOT in general to ensure that state and local agencies have
the information needed to check the validity of hazmat
licenses?
Mr. Clapp. Senator, our request to the states specifically
post-September 11, was to have our motor carrier safety action
program partners--which in most states are the law enforcement
the highway patrol folks--that perform 2 million plus
inspections each year, which include vehicles and drivers, to
try to do absolutely as many vehicle and driver inspections of
vehicles transporting hazardous materials at this time, as well
as to do a great many driver--only checks.
In addition, we shared with the FBI, at their request, the
entire centralized data list of licenses that have hazardous
materials endorsements. I am not, frankly, aware of the
specific question that you just asked, and if you do not mind,
I am going to ask that we get back to you on that.
Senator Cleland. That will be fine.
Ms. Engleman, the USDOT administers the emergency
preparedness grants program which helps state and local
governments train police and firefighters to respond to an
emergency involving hazardous materials.
Certainly, we have come over the last few weeks to a new
appreciation of our police and firefighters as first
responders. Currently, this emergency preparedness grants
program is funded at $12 million, but that amount of money can
train only about 123,000 emergency personnel a year. That is
out of a pool of some 3 million, and so we are not making much
of a dent there.
I also understand that grants to local governments are
small, ranging from about $100,000 to $300,000. In fact, I read
in the Washington Post last week that Washington, D.C. is
supposed to have a fire department team to respond to a
chemical or biological attack, but its members rarely train,
and are used instead for routine fire-fighting.
I have learned that over the last 2 years there has been a
surplus of funds for this program totalling about $15 million.
Do you know whether or not the Department has asked for full
access to the surplus in order to fund its fiscal year 2002
budget request?
Ms. Engleman. Thank you, Senator, for the question. In
response, the grant program that you reference is part of the
Office of Hazardous Material Safety, and is a key partnership
role that we have with the states. The amount of money you
reference is actually around $12 to $14 million is capped, if
you will, by the authorization for the original grant program,
which I believe dates back to 1991.
The fees, in reference to the surplus that you identified,
are the additional fees that have resulted from the collection
from carrier fees that we charge. The carrier fees are based on
carriers who transport poisonous materials, flammable
materials, explosives and the like. The fees range from about
$250 to $2,000, and that is what generates the income to
provide for those grants.
In reference to your question, as to the surplus itself, we
do not have access to that surplus, if you will, because we are
limited by the statutory authority for the grants. The grant
program is a terrific program, because it leverages our
resources, and while we may only directly work with
approximately 120,000, that is actually a leverage, because
many of the folks we work with are organizations that then
continue to have the information flow, the education, the
training, and the like, and that training is based on planning
and emergency response training.
Senator Cleland. I am informed by staff that the
authorization for that program has expired, therefore the
limitations do not apply any more, but we would like for you to
submit for the record what you would need from the Congress in
order to access the surplus funding for fiscal year 2002.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ensign.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Engleman, I have a few questions, and I know that the
NRC is mainly responsible for setting the regulations with
regard to the shipment of radioactive materials. However, after
September 11, I think that all of us are taking a fresh look at
the way that any type of hazardous, whether they are
radioactive or other types of hazardous materials are shipped
across our highways, our railways, in light of that, and I have
a quote that was from a report back in the 1980's at the
direction of the NRC.
At the time, they had not recommended strengthening
regulations because--I will read this quote. It says, ``it has
not been a pattern of terrorist groups in the past to kill
large numbers of people or cause large numbers of lingering
death. Terrorist groups have typically used violent means to
make a political statement. Terrorists want a lot of people
watching, not a lot of people dead.''
Obviously, things have changed, and in the past the actual
shipment, because they were going through places and maybe the
types of shipments, or where they would be, this threat was not
taken as seriously as maybe it is taken today. In light of
that, does your agency need more authority on regulating with
the NRC the shipment of, let us say, especially radioactive
waste, and also, should we put in that, because if one of these
things is, some kind of an explosive device is put on any of
these shipments that goes through a highly populated area,
obviously it causes that much more damage.
Terrorist activity does not have to necessarily kill. It
could be very disruptive, let us say, in Chicago, going through
some of the heavily traveled freeways. You shut those things
down, and you would shut them down for a long time. What that
would do just to the City of Chicago--I guess the question is,
do we need armored, or do we need armed personnel traveling
with some of these shipments? Do you need more regulation? I
guess what are you doing overall to look at this situation?
Ms. Engleman. Thank you, sir. The scenario you propose is,
indeed, what I would call one of the scary ones.
What we are working on is both intermodally within the
Department of Transportation, as well as interagency, because
many of our activities are in conjunction with, for instance,
the Department of Energy and others. We immediately put
together a task force which has been meeting daily, by the way,
with daily reports on progress to determine where we were as
far as administration and regulations, what we could do, and
what we should be doing, in other words, to determine the
strategic gaps we need to fill.
Some of the items that you suggested are on the table, if
you will, as part of the portfolio of possibilities. What we
are trying to determine at this point is the best response, not
the reactive or first response. I think it is critical that we
continue to balance security and safety with mobility and
economic vitality, and that critical balance is what we are
focused on right now to ensure that we present a final
recommendation that is not quick fix, but a long-term solution
that can incorporate our needs of our daily lives.
Senator Ensign. One of the reasons that I brought this up,
and I would like you to consider when you are studying this, is
that Senator Murkowski was reported in the press the other day
about his feeling that something like Yucca Mountain is needed
more now because of the nuclear waste being stored at
facilities around the country.
But if that nuclear waste is at various facilities around
the country, that is not nearly as vulnerable to causing the
kind of damage as if that nuclear waste is being shipped
through large cities, and in your discussion with the other
agencies, I would request that this be a topic of conversation,
because what you were just talking about, balancing, I think
that we do need to study the risks versus what the rewards
would be for having it in one place, and is it in fact a
greater risk to allow some of these shipments of some of these
hazardous materials, more than keeping it on site and keeping
it guarded where it is.
Ms. Engleman. Yes, sir, and indeed that is the focus of the
group that Secretary Mineta has formed, which we have called
the National Infrastructure Security Committee, and this is, as
I said, intermodal, and has outreach to the other agencies. I
will certainly take those suggestions back to the Committee,
and I actually believe we are working on several of those
possibilities now.
Senator Ensign. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, and I
have some other questions I will submit in writing.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Snowe.
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Clapp and Ms. Engleman, Mr. Clapp, your office issued
some security talking points with respect to transporting
hazardous materials, and also more than 400 field officials
have been visiting various sites of motor carriers that are
responsible for the delivery of hazardous waste.
My question to you is this. Many of these recommendations
and talking points are suggestions, or recommendations. I would
like to have a clearer picture on exactly what has changed with
respect to regulations that are being put in place that would
be mandates, as opposed to suggestions, ones that you have
identified that are so serious, so important in the aftermath
of what occurred on September 11, there must be requirements.
For example, on commercial driving licenses, why should
there not be a mandate for requiring of motor carriers a
criminal background check, rather than just being suggested?
Obviously, not only what occurred in Pennsylvania, but also, a
Boston taxicab driver also had a commercial driver's license
for hazardous materials as well, and then they followed up with
his roommates in Detroit, and they also had driver's licenses
to transport such materials and to drive commercial trucks, so
obviously the system needs to be rectified, and I am just
wondering what issues you have determined are so critical that
they should be mandates rather than suggestions?
Mr. Clapp. Good morning, Senator. Good question. Prior to
September 11, and in my case prior to last Thursday, the
regulations on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
and RSPA as well were primarily aimed at preventing accidents
that could create the loss of life and injuries. Much less
focus before September 11 had to do with things that are caused
on purpose instead of accidents. It is a whole new ball game
after September 11.
It was our agency's view, and to the great credit of my
predecessor, who is with me today and continues to be our
Acting Deputy Administrator and Chief Safety Officer, to
immediately put our field force to work going to the carriers
face-to-face and reviewing what you have correctly identified
as not only compliance with Federal regulations, but also
rather specific recommendations.
Now that the name of the game--that is bad terminology, but
anyway, what we have to do is security as opposed to safety. In
addition to that, we are working with the task force that my
colleague had described with you today with regard to what has
to be done for the future with respect to improved
transportation security. In that regard, of course, we also
expect to be involved with the Transportation Security Agency,
which I understand the Senate is in the process of considering
right now.
All of those things are on the table, and additional
recommendations for regulations and other actions on our part,
will come out of that in the very near future.
Some regulations already apply with respect to securing the
vehicle, attending the vehicle, et cetera, depending on the
degree of hazard. It is not as though there are no regulations
in place now. There are regulations in place now, but in
addition, we thought it was very advisable to get out in the
field. Frankly, the report I am getting back is 100 percent
cooperation on the part of not only the carriers that we have
gone to see who are actually anxious for the information and
the exchange, but also cooperation from our state law
enforcement partners.
Senator Snowe. But will you be making recommendations in
the future about what should be mandates? How soon are we
talking about here? Would not some of these issues be crystal
clear? I mean, why not have expanded background checks, make
that a requirement, criminal background checks, obviously
identify the lapses in the system. I realize they were obtained
fraudulently, but there obviously were not any checks and
balances in the system.
Some of those 20 people were from seven different states,
so how were they able to obtain those licenses? Apparently, we
do not have the checks and balances in our system to prevent
that.
I think there are some things that ought to be done
immediately, especially when we are talking about transporting
hazardous materials, and in terms of the training as well, and
the security clearances should be much more stringent and rigid
than they are currently, and I would hope that we could move to
put those mandates in place immediately.
Why is that not possible?
Mr. Clapp. Thank you, Senator. Well, I suggest that is what
we are doing, but just to address one example of that which
seems clear, for example, is the expanded, perhaps criminal
background checks for persons applying for hazmat endorsements.
It may well be that it is a different type of background
check than what we would normally think of as a criminal
background check. For example, the persons, again, who, for
want of a better term, appear to be of Middle Eastern origin
who are involved, had no criminal records whatsoever. I am
sorry, I am speaking of the hijackers at this point--had no
criminal record, so it is probably going to wind up being a
different type of background check than the one that first
comes to mind, and we need to work those out.
Senator Snowe. But many of them had expired visas.
Mr. Clapp. Exactly.
Senator Snowe. Again, so it gets back to another problem,
another dimension to the problem, but if there had been some
probing one would have discovered that, and that gets back to
the sharing of information. Do you have a database for all of
these individuals who have possessed these licenses, and
driving hazardous materials?
Mr. Clapp. The national commercial driver's license system
is the national database for that, yes, and frankly, Senator, I
appreciate your suggestions. This is a new time in the world
for all of us, and frankly we would like to have them.
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Senator Snowe.
While Senator Rockefeller is getting ready, let me ask a
question or two to Ms. Engleman. Let us talk about the trans-
Alaska pipeline that somebody shot a hole in, either
intentionally or accidently, but regardless we had a rupture,
with an estimated 6,800 barrels, or 285,600 gallons of oil that
were spilled. Are you familiar with that incident, I take it?
Ms. Engleman. Yes, sir. I was on duty when the call came
in.
Senator Breaux. What I am interested in is not so much
actually what happened, as why it took so long? What is your
information? Number one, are we supposed to have monitoring
systems on the trans-Alaska pipeline? We are supposed to have
automatic shutoff valves and leak detection systems that are
supposed to automatically give us information that something is
wrong somewhere, and where it is wrong.
This incident was discovered by a helicopter. It appears
the system did not work.
Ms. Engleman. No, sir, I do not believe the system did not
work, per se. As you know, there are hundreds of miles of
pipeline in the Alaska pipeline, and the leak was detected
fairly quickly by the overflight of the helicopter. I do not
have a working technical familiarity with all of the safety
valves and procedures that are involved in the Alaska pipeline,
but I will be more than happy to get back additional
information to you on that.
Senator Breaux. Is it not a fact that the leak continued
for several days after detected? That seems to be engineeringly
unacceptable.
Ms. Engleman. Sir, if I may, as I said, interestingly
enough I was working at the CMC, the Crisis Management Center
when that call came through. The reason that the leak continued
is that first of all the FBI was not able to immediately secure
the area.
The person in question was shooting. There were some issues
as to whether there were other people involved in trying to
secure the area to allow the TAPS personnel to have a safe
environment to go in, so that was the initial issue of being
able to secure the area to provide the repair. The repair
equipment and supplies were on-site and immediately available.
The pipeline, when the area was secure, was shut down.
However, the continuation of the leak was based on the pressure
within the pipeline. There was a small hole about, less than 1/
2 inch, and yet because of the pressure within the pipeline, it
did spew out and cause the spillage as you indicated.
Fortunately, the ground was frozen and it was in a dry creek
area, and so the containment of the spill, we were actually
able to recover a significant amount of it, and will continue
on our cleanup activities.
I am very proud of the pipeline staff that works for the
Office of Pipeline Safety at RSPA, because of their capability
and immediate communication with us at headquarters, and also
through the regional offices were working with the Joint
Pipeline Office in Alaska and working concurrently with their
activities for it.
I do believe the responsiveness to this incident was
immediate and direct, and as quickly as the event would allow,
given that there were additional security issues for the field
personnel themselves. I am happy to say that as of 7 a.m. on
Sunday morning the pipeline was permanently repaired, and that
we are finishing up and continuing to work on cleanup
activities.
Senator Breaux. I appreciate the difficulties, because it
was a criminal situation and they had to secure the area. The
fact is after several days it continued to leak. Is there not,
to your knowledge remote automatic shutoff valves to shut down
the pipeline when it has been ruptured? Don't those things
occur automatically, just as if a well blows out it is an
automatic shut valve? What happened there?
Ms. Engleman. Sir, it is my understanding that even with
the shutoff of the pipeline something which is called residual
flow occurred, which was the product within the pipeline itself
will continue to flow, and that there is pressure within the
pipeline that caused the product around the leak to continue to
spill. This is part of my education in learning more about the
technical aspects of it. However, from a security perspective,
this is another part of the larger wakeup call we as a Nation
have received as far as the security and safety implications.
Senator Breaux. It is a serious concern. The possibility
that if somebody could take a 30-06 rifle and shoot holes
through the Alaska pipeline resulting in multiple oil leaks,
will not only damaging the environment, but shutting off a
critical supply of oil to the Lower 48.
Ms. Engleman. Yes, sir, that is a vulnerability, and it is
a significant vulnerability that we are addressing, and
literally daily communication and planning procedures with
TAPS, with the Alaska pipeline personnel, and our own office.
Senator Breaux. I would like to get a report from your
office as to exactly what happened, and particularly in the
continuing oil flow for several days after it was discovered,
and why the automatic system did not work better.
Senator Rockefeller.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Rockefeller. I do not know to whom I address the
question, so I will just ask it. In West Virginia, part along
the Ohio River part along the Kanawah River, we have a lot of
chemical plants, with an issue of security.
West Virginia has a lot of security to worry about. The
Coast Guard visited and I think the plants took that as doing
something about security. The fact is that they are all
incredibly vulnerable from the Ohio River, and probably are not
doing very much about it. When I asked what they were doing
about security, are people getting in and out of your gates,
they said, generally speaking--not all of them are increasing
their security by about one, from two to three.
Now, I do not know whether that is two to three over 24
hours, or two to three over 8 hours, or whatever, but my point
is that you are dealing with plant managers who are engineers,
they are trained as engineers. They report to people who are in
distant places, because we do not have a lot of headquarters in
West Virginia, and they have to get budgets for what they do.
I asked them, can you take action before you get budget
approval? They said yes, but then we have to justify it, and if
you know sort of the mentality of a plant manager who is
probably going to be around for 2 or 3 years and then move on,
maybe even to some place like Louisiana--perish the thought.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rockefeller. My general impression, to be very
honest, is that they were not really up on security, that they
were not really focused on it, and that their capacity to deal
with it in the future was not energized, so my question to you
is not just about trucks, vehicles, rental, whatever, getting
in and out, but what do you do--and here I think I also speak
for John Breaux from Louisiana.
What are you doing, if anything, with the chemical
industry? They strike me as an industry very much subject to
potential attack, and very much sort of structured, in terms of
how their organizations are run, not to deal with effectively.
Ms. Engleman. Sir, if I may respond on behalf of the hazmat
office, we work very closely with the American Chemistry
Council, for instance, which represents about 95 percent of the
producers of hazardous material, which would include such
manufacturers as you referenced, and working with them to work
on security identification issues, especially since September
11.
I have also tasked the Transportation Safety Institute,
which is based in Oklahoma City, which is in charge of----
Senator Rockefeller. Let me just stop you there. You say
you work very closely with the American Chemical Association.
What does that mean? I know hundreds of American trade
associations, and the relationship between what I or you might
discuss with them and what happens along the Ohio River could
be a decade. When you say you have done that, I check it off
the list, but what do you talk to them about, and what do they
say they would do? What is their state of awareness?
Ms. Engleman. Thank you, sir. The relationships we have
with the trade associations both, and the individual
manufacturers, is a part of what we have, is a COHMED program,
which is a cooperative hazardous material education program,
and when we say we work with them closely, that means truly
monthly, weekly, sometimes daily, direct communication with the
personnel.
Our staff has a high level of degree of personal
relationships with the members. It is not just attending
conferences or workshops and the like, but actually day to day
direct activity many times, and one of the things we have done
since September 11 is to be in personal communication with
these organizations, and to help them to determine what their
current security alert status is, what their strategic gaps
are, and to support them as we identify our own.
So we are looking to find a mutual response that will
support the security goals, and yes, be balanced by the
individual needs for economic vitality and the differences of
cost versus the need, which is a part of any business decision
from a private sector entity, of course, but we are working to
deliberately and in a dedicated fashion to determine strategic
gaps, and to help our partners in industry and local and state
government to fill those gaps.
Senator Rockefeller. Well, let me be more specific. I asked
them if any of their security at the gates, which is your
territory, for going in and coming out. I asked if any of them
carry sidearms, and they said no, and I asked don't you think
they should, and most of them said no, and that just struck me
as interesting. It is sort of getting into the point of a
generic interest in increasing security as opposed to the
specific actions required to have it mean anything.
If the National Guard and the airports now have something
at their side or over their shoulder, that makes a difference,
and so do you get into that level of specificity with them, or
is it kind of a general sense of contact. Are CEO's and people
in the upper levels that can make these decisions, or will make
them, or will not make them.
If they send their public relations people, the Government
relations people, they are often more or less helpless in the
entire process. They do not have much to say about what goes
on, so who are you talking to?
Ms. Engleman. Thank you, sir. Through our----
Senator Rockefeller. I understand you have not been here a
long time, and I am a nice person.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Engleman. I know you are, sir, and as a 2-week veteran
I will do my best to respond to your question, if I may, in
three parts.
First of all, what you have identified truly is our new
reality from post September 11 versus pre-September 11, when we
again were based on the accidental release of hazardous
material, rather than the deliberate release of hazardous
materials, so all of our safety precautions prior to 9/11 were
based on the safety/accident response, versus a deliberate act.
Having our wakeup call, we are now looking at it in a totally
new fashion for all of our activities.
Second, when you asked them, who do we work with, the
hazardous materials staff in our organization, the professional
level of expertise is very significant as to their personal
relationships, as well as former relationships. We are working
with field personnel, we are working with the individual
general managers, as you say, it is not just a formal-level
meeting with the CEO's and the like. However, I do have great
faith in the industry partners and their organizations to help
get the message down all the way to the troops, if you will.
And third, if I may respond, some of the suggestions you
make are on the table, and when I say on the table, we are
looking at the alpha on for what type of security arrangements
need to be done, what is the real-life applications and
implications of some of these suggestions.
Again, we do not want to be first to market with these
ideas, but best to market and determining long-term solutions
that still meet the immediate needs.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Clapp, Ms. Engleman, thank you very
much for being with us. Again, you both are brand new on the
job, and so the things that we are pursuing are not things that
you all have really dealt with, but there are some things that
need to be done, and need to be done in a very urgent manner.
The situation in Pennsylvania is too much to be a
coincidence. Sixteen fraudulently listed commercial licenses
enabled people to carry hazardous material in this country. On
October 4 they were indicted, and I hate to think what would
happen had we missed them. The people who worked to get them
ought to be congratulated, however we should have a system that
raises flags.
Thank God they were caught, arrested and indicted, and off
the highways of this country. That is an incredibly serious
situation. I just think it is not a coincidence.
So thank you all very much. We will now hear from industry,
and invite up the first panel, Mr. Duane Acklie, Chairman of
the Board of American Trucking Association, Mr. Peter Pantuso,
President and CEO of American Bus Association, Mr. Keith
Gleason, Director of the Tankhaul Division of the Teamsters,
Lieutenant Paul Sullivan, Massachusetts State Police, Joan
Claybrook, President of Public Citizen, and Program Co-chair
for Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, and Mr. Ralph
Sheridan, President and CEO of the American Science and
Engineering, Inc.
Ladies and gentlemen, we thank you for coming, and if we
can clear the room as quickly as possible so the next panel can
take their seats, Mr. Acklie, on behalf of the truckers we have
you first on the list. We would be glad to hear from you again.
STATEMENT OF DUANE W. ACKLIE, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, AMERICAN
TRUCKING ASSOCIATION
Mr. Acklie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Duane Acklie. I
am Chairman of Crete Carrier Corporation in Lincoln, Nebraska,
and also the Chairman of the American Trucking Association.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, we thank you for
your interest in this very important subject. There were
certain statements made by the Chairman and Members of this
Subcommittee, and we can only tell you that we agree with all
of those statements, and we take this matter extremely
seriously.
I would also tell you, we were very proud of our industry
after the cowardly terrorist attacks, when we saw our drivers
there with the policemen and the firemen and the rescue
efforts, and what our members did throughout the Nation in
volunteering their services to transport medical supplies, food
and so forth, for the rescue efforts.
The day after the attack, I drove to Kansas City from
Lincoln because there was no airline service, and I will tell
you I saw flags on many of the trucks, and it only gave us a
good indication that we really have a committed industry to
this Nation.
I have prepared testimony that has been passed out to all
of you, and I will try to focus on what our industry has been
doing, and what it will continue to do, three suggestions that
we have to you, and will try to cover anything that might be
helpful to you.
I would first like to say, when this came up, that the
American Trucking Association established a web site to be able
to communicate to the members of our industry the importance of
security, the importance of taking another look at security.
In addition to that, for almost 20 years we have had a
Safety and Security Council which has focused on many of the
same things that we have talked about today, and it is
something our industry has always taken very seriously. In
large part we took it seriously because it affects our pocket
books in cargo theft, and we took it seriously because of our
commitment.
Let me first tell you that the carriers that belong to the
American Trucking Association have always and continue to do
background checks, available through the systems that is
available to them. We do not think it is always enough, and I
will get into that with my three recommendations.
We also design and designate specific drivers for specific
types of loads. In other words, there is a high security if it
is a hazmat load. We study these and route them. We also are
instructing and continue to instruct our drivers not to stop at
roadside to give assistance unless it is a case of clear
emergency, because by stopping, they subject themselves to the
hijack.
We also emphasize to all trucking employees, not only
drivers, that to stay alert and to remain aware of their
surroundings at all times, especially when transporting hazmat.
We have established at ATA the last couple of years, and work
with the various states, a watch program. Most of our vehicles
in all of our companies, 5,000 to 6,000 vehicles are equipped
with Qualcomm, so we have satellite, and we can immediately, if
we see a situation out there that is suspicious, we can
immediately report that, and we do report it.
We also advise drivers transporting hazmat to certainly
avoid the highly populated, and I mentioned give them specific
routing, verify seal integrity to make sure the cargo is
intact, checking to make sure that the cargo has not been
tampered with, or something additional put on the truck. In our
own company, we use what we call an enforcer seal. It is one
basically, unless you take a torch, you cannot cut off, and it
has been used by a lot of the industry where it comes around
the rods that open the door, and the two doors basically cannot
be taken or opened without a torch.
We also are advising our drivers, supervisors, and
managers, and we have all done this, on any suspicious
shipments, any suspicious contact that we have, and we are also
asking them to report immediately any suspicious activity to
local communities, and to the local law enforcement agencies.
In regard to this, criminal background checks, particularly
on those hauling hazmat, seems to us to be very important. One
of our recommendations to you is on criminal background checks,
we do the very best we can, we get a DAC report, those things,
but the national crime database is not available to us. We
believe--in our own family we are also in the banking business.
We can get that information on our employees if they are
employed by a bank, but we cannot get that information if they
are employed by a truck line, and so we would like to see the
access to the national crime information database.
We would also like to say to you that we believe that we
need increased criminal penalties and fines for cargo theft, a
uniform statistical reporting on cargo theft, and also the
funding to allow this to be done.
Some 20-plus years ago I was asked to testify, or to visit
with a group in regard to cargo theft, and I said to them at
that time, if one of our bank drive-ins was robbed of $2,000 I
would have--and I will ask just a few more minutes, if I may,
to finish, please--I would have two to three FBI agents
immediately. If we had a cargo theft amounting to hundreds of
millions of dollars, it would take several days before we got
any response from the FBI.
The FBI does a wonderful job, but they certainly do not
have the resources, and it has not been given any priority. I
know today they have so many commitments, but I would have to
tell you that as we get back to normal, it is one of those
things that we need to do, and I suspect on security we will
never get back to normal, but we must have the funding to allow
the Bureau to take a look at the various things that are
necessary to investigate that theft.
In addition to that, I asked our own people in regard to
the, before I came here, the trucks crossing the border, and
also the stops that are being made by state agencies now to
check them. They all agree that what is being done should be
done. We are seeing particularly heavy emphasis on our trucks
crossing from Mexico into the United States. We are also seeing
many of our drivers who are stopped for no reason other than
just to check. They all believe that this is proper, and they
are doing the proper thing, but we believe that there is
technologies under development that can help that, and I set
that forth in my statement.
In addition, of course, those are the three things we think
need to be done to improve security. The databases, of course,
for criminal checks, of potential drivers and drivers,
something very important. Many years ago, before the Congress
outlawed the polygraph, we used the polygraph to check every
driver, and I will tell you that it was very effective.
We had a driver who came to us that had a number of years
driving for a very good trucking company, and it showed
deception. The polygraph examiner went back later and did some
checking on that, and found out that person was wanted for
murder, but that device was taken away from us. We do not have
a national database, and we would ask you to please do
something about it.
Senator Breaux. Please summarize, Mr. Acklie, if you can.
Mr. Acklie. I am pleased with what this Subcommittee is
doing. The American Trucking Association and the trucking
industry stand ready to do anything they can to help.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Acklie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Duane W. Acklie, Chairman of the Board,
American Trucking Association
I. Introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of this Subcommittee. My name
is Duane Acklie, and I am Chairman of Crete Carrier Corporation, a
trucking company based in Lincoln, Nebraska. I am also Chairman of the
American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA), with offices located at
2200 Mill Road, Alexandria, Virginia 22314. ATA is the national trade
association of the trucking industry. Through the affiliated state
trucking associations, affiliated conferences and other organizations,
ATA represents more than 30,000 trucking companies based throughout
these United States. I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to speak to
this Subcommittee today on behalf of ATA.
Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the U.S.
trucking industry has continued to work hard to support America's goals
of keeping our country and our economy moving forward. I am very proud
of this industry's efforts to keep America moving. In fact, on the
morning of September 11, while the members of ATA staff were able to
view from the windows of the ATA building the smoke rising from the
attack on the Pentagon, from the opposite side of the ATA building in
Alexandria, Virginia, they were able to see trucks on the Capital
beltway continuing to move America.
As Members of this Subcommittee know, motor carriers are a critical
component of the United States' economic strength, with 9 billion tons
of freight transported by intercity and local trucks, representing 68
percent of the total domestic tonnage shipped. The trucking industry
generates revenues of $606 billion annually, equaling almost 5 percent
of our GDP, and a figure that represents nearly 87 percent of all
revenues generated by our Nation's freight transportation industry.
As in all other sectors of our country's economy, the horrific
attacks have heightened security concerns in the trucking industry, and
even more so after it was recently reported by the FBI that some
suspected terrorists had obtained commercial driver's licenses (CDLs)
to operate large trucks. It appears that motor carriers involved in
transporting hazardous materials (hazmats) may have been, or may be,
targeted for hijackings or theft for use in potential acts of
terrorism. Obviously, this is a major concern to our industry, and I
commend you for holding this hearing today to identify ways to address
these very real threats.
In my testimony today, I will communicate ATA's longstanding
involvement in trucking security issues, including issues associated
with the transportation of hazmats and sensitive military freight. I
will also recommend several potential legislative improvements to
enhance security in the trucking industry.
II. ATA's Involvement in Transportation Security and Related Issues
Security
ATA and its members have long been actively involved in providing
safe and secure transportation of goods on behalf of customers and
their consumers. Since 1982, ATA has maintained a Council of members
dedicated to advancing security and loss prevention issues. The name of
this organization has undergone numerous changes since its inception,
and today is known as the Safety & Loss Prevention Management Council
(Safety Council). The Safety Council has two committees, the Security
Committee and the Claims and Loss Prevention Committee, that have
addressed many trucking security issues, including driver and vehicle
security, cargo security, and facility security. The committees consist
of security directors, many of whom are former law enforcement
personnel, from a broad array of America's leading motor carriers. The
committees publish guidelines and educational materials to assist motor
carriers enhance the security of their operations.
In addition to the security issues, ATA has also been very active
in ensuring the safe and secure transportation of hazmats and sensitive
military freight.
Hazardous Materials and Military Freight
As the Subcommittee is aware, in order for a truck driver to
transport hazmats for a motor carrier, that driver must obtain a valid
CDL and a hazmats endorsement. Both the CDL and the hazmats endorsement
qualification are set forth in federal regulations. However, the
respective licensing and testing is done by the individual state. Thus,
the hazmats licensing for drivers is beyond the control of motor
carriers. However, the transportation of hazmats must comply with the
federal hazmats regulations, which are adopted and enforced by the
states. Therefore, motor carriers involved with transportation of
hazmats do work with the states, and their respective permit and
registration programs if applicable, to increase transportation safety
and prepare for incident emergency response.
Certain classes of hazmats are more highly regulated than others.
For instance, high-level nuclear wastes from power plants are closely
monitored by several federal agencies, including the Department of
Energy (DOE) and Department of Transportation (DOT). Transportation of
this material is highly regulated, and motor carriers involved in its
movement are pre-screened and approved by DOE. In fact, the trucking
industry played an integral role in the development of the Commercial
Vehicle Safety Alliance's (CVSA) Level VI enhanced radioactive
transporter inspection criteria, which is specifically designed to
afford a high level of driver, vehicle, and load scrutiny prior to the
truck leaving the shipper's facility.
Military shipments are another category of specific concern.
Military shipments of Security Risk Category I and II, Arms, Ammunition
and Explosives (SRC I & II, AAE), are highly regulated, as are lesser
Class I explosive shipments of the Department of Defense (DOD). Prior
to transporting these materials, motor carriers must be approved by the
DOD, and after approval, they are closely monitored. Drivers are
carefully selected and must successfully complete security background
checks. Motor carrier terminals must meet certain levels of security as
prescribed by the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). And,
shipments of SRC I & II AAE must be transported directly from point of
origin to destination with minimal delay.
Since October 2000, ATA has worked closely with MTMC through ATA's
Government Traffic Policy Committee (prior to October 2000, the now-
defunct Explosive Carriers Conference of the ATA performed that task)
on a number of issues regarding safety and security of DOD shipments.
Deliberations continue on MTMC's newest policies and procedures for
transportation of SRC I & II AAE, including the recently proposed
standards for motor carrier terminals. ATA has provided MTMC valuable
information on possible security concerns and related solutions. The
trucking industry views these measures as paramount to the safe and
efficient transportation of these materials, and will continue to work
with MTMC to see that AAE shipments securely arrive at their proper
destination.
ATA is also working with Sandia Laboratories in the gathering of
information for its Department of Justice (DOJ) study entitled the
``Chemical Plant Vulnerability Assessment Project.'' This study, which
examined the vulnerability of chemical plants that produce chemicals of
mass destruction to terrorist attack and included the transportation
chain, was presented to the ATA Safety Council's Hazardous Materials
Committee in September 2001. ATA's Committee Members provided
information to Sandia Laboratories earlier in the year concerning
transportation security issues of these types of hazmats.
The safe, efficient and secure movement of hazmats is of great
importance to the trucking industry. Through work with DOT, CVSA, MTMC,
Sandia Labs, and a multitude of associations whose members are major
producers of chemicals and hazmats, ATA and its members have
demonstrated that secure transportation of hazmats is a primary
concern. ATA will continue to work with interested parties to ensure
transportation of hazmats remains one of the safest transportation
activities in the world.
International Land Borders
As the Members of this Subcommittee are probably aware, on
September 11, ports of entry at our international land borders were put
on Level 1 Alert, resulting in extreme crossing delays on, and severely
hampering delivery of, parts and equipment for just-in-time deliveries
at manufacturing operations.
It is important to note that high-security environments are not new
for motor carriers that participate in cross-border operations with
Canada and/or Mexico. The trucking industry has established security
controls in their operations in conjunction with manufacturers, brokers
and with federal law enforcement agencies. For instance, the trucking
industry, in a joint effort with U.S. Customs, developed in 1995 the
Land Border Carrier Initiative Program (LBCIP). This program was
designed to counter the smuggling of illegal drugs via commercial land
carriers and land conveyances. The LBCIP provides background
information on drivers and trucking companies moving cargo across the
U.S. Southwest border. According to U.S. Customs, over 1,000 trucking
companies are approved and participating in this program and over 6,000
drivers have been certified by Customs (via background checks) to
participate in the program. In return for participating in the LBCIP,
motor carriers are able to expedite the movement and clearance of their
goods through a program known as Line Release.
Joint industry-government efforts, such as the LBCIP and others,
like the Business Anti- Smuggling Coalition (BASC), have allowed the
trade community and law enforcement agencies to share information and
improve security for cross border trucking operations. Such joint
efforts will continue to work well into the future to eradicate the
flow of illegal cargo entering the United States.
III. The Trucking Industry's Support in the Aftermath of September 11th
Assistance in Relief Efforts
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the trucking industry
worked around the clock in support of the relief efforts in New York
and Washington by delivering critical cargo to the rescue workers and
assisting in the coordination efforts. For example, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency worked closely with the New Jersey Motor
Transport Association to coordinate truck efforts in and around New
York City. Emergency responders and trucking executives coordinating
the recovery applauded trucking for its rapid response after the
attacks.
As part of their support efforts, trucking companies delivered all
types of supplies and equipment to the attack sites including medical
supplies, earth moving equipment, communications equipment, emergency
generators, mobile lighting trucks for nighttime rescue work,
respirators, coveralls, protective gloves, blankets, and thousands of
pounds of food and drinks. In addition, many dump truck drivers showed
up to volunteer their services working 12-hour shifts.
Additional Security Measures Taken by the Trucking Industry
Motor carriers throughout the trucking industry took a number of
measures to increase the security of their operations immediately
following the attacks. Some motor carriers have re-evaluated their
overall security procedures for pick-up and delivery, for their service
locations, terminals and loading-dock facilities, for dispatch
operations to vehicles in cities and on the road. In addition to
requesting their personnel to be extremely alert and to report any
suspicious activity to law enforcement personnel, other examples of
actions taken include:
Initiating new background checks through systems available
to motor carriers;
Designating specific drivers for specific types of loads and
studying the specific routes to be used;
Instructing drivers not to stop or render assistance except
in the case of a clear emergency, and alerting drivers of
possible ploys to obtain vehicles for hijacking purposes;
Emphasizing to all trucking company employees, not only
drivers, to stay alert and remain aware of their surroundings
at all times, especially when transporting hazmats;
Advising drivers transporting hazmats to, whenever possible,
avoid highly populated areas, and use alternate routes if
feasible to avoid such areas.
Verifying seal integrity at each and every stop. Notifying
central dispatch immediately if the seal is compromised.
Advising drivers to notify supervisors/managers of any
suspicious shipments, and if deemed necessary, to contact local
police or law enforcement authorities to request inspection of
shipment under safe practices.
These are just a few of the measures that trucking companies around
the country took to enhance their operational security for not only on-
the-road operations, but also at terminals and other facilities.
ATA Work with DOT and Other Federal Agencies
In addition to the emergency relief efforts that many ATA members
have made, and the additional security measures that have been taken as
mentioned above, ATA staff has also worked closely with federal
officials to collect information requested by the federal government,
and to disseminate critical security-related information to trucking
companies throughout the country. For example, in the hours and days
immediately following the attacks, DOT officials turned to ATA staff to
provide information on trucking company security programs. ATA was more
than happy to share the requested information with DOT officials. Bush
Administration officials also requested that ATA provide information on
diesel fuel supply and pricing throughout the country. Once again, ATA
staff delivered the information. ATA also assisted the DOT in
communicating information to hazmats transporters throughout the
country on the agency's upcoming security sensitivity visits. In fact,
ATA established an emergency information clearinghouse on its website,
that it continues to update as additional information becomes
available. ATA continues to stand ready to assist DOT, the FBI, and any
other government agency that needs assistance in these unprecedented
times.
IV. Legislative Remedies to Increase Security in Trucking
Relying on the expertise of its members, ATA is recommending the
following specific legislative proposals to enhance the security of
goods being transported by motor carriers.
Criminal Background Checks
While ATA and its members did not envision the evil wrought on
September 11 when the ATA Board of Directors in 1999 directed the ATA
staff to pursue cargo theft deterrence legislation that would enable
motor carriers to obtain criminal background information on all current
and prospective employees, such legislation would be an effective step
in addressing the threats we now know await.
The possibility of a truck being used as a weapon of mass
destruction, while unthinkable before, is now a reality. In fact, as I
mentioned earlier, the FBI's investigation has determined that several
detainees suspected of involvement had fraudulently obtained CDLs.
Numerous other industries with employees who have a demonstrated impact
on public security or are in a position of public trust have been
authorized by statute to access national crime information databases to
search criminal history records corresponding to fingerprints or other
identification information. The list includes federally chartered banks
and credit unions through the American Bankers Association, child care
providers, nuclear facility operators, nursing facilities, home health
care agencies, and airports. Motor carriers are a glaring omission.
A scenario in which a truck driver or motor carrier warehouseman
could wreak the same level of destruction as the September 11
perpetrators wrought through air transport means is no longer hard to
imagine. Yet, although ATA has sought authorization from Congress to
allow motor carriers to conduct criminal background checks of employees
and potential employees, the trucking industry remains without this
basic tool. Many of our responsible members use what services are
currently available through outside vendors to conduct cumbersome
county-by-county criminal background checks. However, all agree that it
is simply not feasible to conduct a nationwide check under the present
scheme. ATA stands willing to work with this Congress to enact
legislation that would enable motor carriers to access national crime
information databases to conduct nationwide criminal background checks.
Moreover, ATA supports federal efforts to enhance interoperability and
communications between various federal criminal history and immigration
databases, which would assist in screening out potential threats.
Cargo Theft
It is no secret that cargo theft losses in our country have a
severe economic impact on the trucking industry, the shipping public,
businesses of all sizes and on consumers. The losses being suffered by
our industry from pilferage, theft and hijackings continue to be
substantial, with figures ranging from $10 billion to $12 billion
annually. Therefore, for a number of years the trucking industry has
looked for various means to reduce and control the losses caused by
such illegal acts.
The lax penalties associated with, and insufficient resources
devoted to, cargo theft have made it increasingly appealing to criminal
elements as a source of funding. Further, some of the goods carried on
behalf of America's producers and manufacturers may be diverted for
sinister purposes. While, in ATA's view, the costs to the economy of
cargo theft were significant enough to justify enactment of cargo theft
legislation back in 1999, the security need, as highlighted by recent
events, overshadows any monetary costs.
In addition to allowing motor carriers to conduct criminal
background checks, ATA stands ready to work with Congress on a
legislative proposal that would: (1) increase the criminal penalties
and fines for cargo theft; (2) require uniform statistical reporting on
cargo theft; and (3) provide increased funding local, state, and
federal multi-jurisdictional task forces that have proven effective in
combating cargo theft. Further, in view of the possible threat posed to
the public by stolen commercial motor vehicles, the legislation should
establish a mechanism within DOT to allow for immediate, around-the-
clock reporting of the theft. DOT should establish a toll-free hotline
to receive reports from motor carriers of commercial vehicle thefts and
then disseminate that information to federal, state, and local law
enforcement personnel nationwide on a timely basis. Today, no such
mechanism exists.
In other words Mr. Chairman, secure cargo means peace of mind. ATA
looks forward to working with the Members of this Subcommittee to
improve the ability of motor carriers to get the information they need
about potential employees, and in arriving at a solution to help
eliminate the high cost that cargo theft represents to our Nation's
economic wellbeing.
Now, I would like to turn your attention to two other specific
areas in which the trucking industry plays crucial roles: international
cargo movements, and commercial driver's licenses.
Border Infrastructure for International Cargo Movements
We would also ask the Subcommittee to look at technologies under
development that can facilitate enforcement efforts while at the same
time expedite the movement of cargo across our borders. One such system
being designed presently by U.S. Customs is the International Trade
Data System (ITDS). The ITDS concept is simple: Traders and carriers
submit commercially based, standard electronic data records through a
single federal gateway for the import or export of goods. As a single
information gateway, ITDS distributes these records to the affected
federal trade agencies, such as U.S. Customs, INS, and the DOT, for
their selectivity and risk assessment. In standardizing the process,
ITDS reduces the confusion and complexity of international trade, and
speeds the processing of goods, equipment and crews across our borders.
ITDS also benefits the government by providing more current and
accurate information for revenue, public health, safety and security
activities, and statistical analyses, as well as significantly reducing
data processing development and maintenance costs.
We would urge the Subcommittee to look at infrastructure needs of
our ports of entry, in conjunction with other Senate Committees and
Subcommittees with oversight of border agencies, to establish
appropriate levels of human resources in addition to investments in
technology infrastructure, such as the ITDS. Both Canada and Mexico,
our largest and second largest trading partners respectively, play a
critical role in our economic wellbeing through our economic
interdependence. We cannot overlook the critical link that motor
carriers play in the success of our increasing trade flows within North
America. Therefore, we must continue to find solutions that will
continue to allow us to move the legal commodity flows among our three
Nations, while at the same time improve our security relationships
between the trade community and law enforcement agencies at our
borders.
Commercial Driver's License Issues
With the full support of the motor carrier industry, the U.S.
Congress, DOT and the states have been instrumental in establishing a
generally successful CDL program. However, the fact that suspected
terrorists have illegally obtained CDLs with hazardous materials
endorsements should be a wake up call for all of us.
While the federal and state governments have done a good job
putting the regulations, programs, and information systems in place to
administer the program, the level of effort to actively monitor and
oversee the personnel charged with administering the program has not
been sufficient. The suspected terrorists illegally obtaining CDLs, and
the number of recent CDL-related scandals in several states, is
evidence that more oversight is needed, particularly as it relates to
CDL testers and examiners. More federal personnel should be dedicated
to program evaluation and oversight, possibly including dedicated
federal CDL program personnel in each state. The states licensing
agencies should also consider increasing their program oversight
staffs, to work in greater cooperation with federal CDL oversight
personnel. Congress should consider authorizing additional DOT
positions for this function, and should also consider establishing a
dedicated (and state matching) CDL grant program to provide additional
financial assistance to states for greater program oversight.
An additional and more specific security-related issue concerning
the CDL program is the collection and use of a driver's Social Security
Number (SSN) by state licensing agencies. As part of the federally-
required and state administered CDL program, state licensing agencies
are required by DOT to collect SSNs on the CDL application. And, many
states use the driver's SSN as the driver's state license number on the
CDL document. The SSN is one of several ways that states uniquely
identify truck drivers, which is an important aspect of the CDL
program. With identity theft apparently playing a role in the recent
attacks, ATA believes that the industry, the states and the federal
government must consider ways to safeguard and even enhance personal
identification methods. Clearly, however, we should not make it more
difficult for the industry and the states to track the identities of
truck drivers--which is what would occur if recently sponsored
legislation on SSNs was passed by the Congress. ATA stands ready to
work with DOT and the Congress to enhance truck driver identifiers, and
calls upon Members of Congress to reject legislation that would do away
with SSNs as personal identifiers on driver licenses.
V. Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, ATA members understand they are entrusted with the
secure transportation of goods that keep America moving forward. Law
enforcement has frequently been a strong ally in ATA's longstanding
efforts to ensure the security of cargo on America's highways and
across our international borders. We look forward to continued
cooperation with those authorities charged with securing our Nation
against future terrorist threats. ATA understands the role trucking
must play to ensure our national security in this newly changed
landscape. The trucking industry asks that Congress consider its
proposals which will allow the trucking industry to better fulfill its
role to safely and securely transport our Nation's freight. I am
pleased that this Subcommittee and the full Commerce Committee have
expressed strong interest in advancing our industry's security
proposals.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much. Mr. Pantuso.
STATEMENT OF PETER PANTUSO, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
AMERICAN BUS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Pantuso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership
in convening this meeting today. The American Bus Association
is the national trade association for the private intercity
motorcoach industry. Nearly all of our members provide charter
services, tour services, sightseeing, commuter, and
approximately 100 of our members provide intercity regular
route scheduled service.
Our operator members are large and small. Most of them
operate fewer than five motorcoaches in the country. They
provide local, regional, national services, and they are
saddled with a variety of operational challenges. The
motorcoach industry and the companies we represent provide
services to 774 million passengers a year, and while compiling
the best safety record of any mode of commercial
transportation, and at the same time providing affordable
transportation and public transportation to more than 4,000
communities in the United States.
Since the September 11 terrorist attack on the United
States and a criminal assault on a Greyhound bus last week,
members of the ABA have worked hard to instill a greater sense
of security to our customers. ABA members have increased
security in and around their bus facilities and terminals, they
have used additional personnel, they are doing additional
surveillance, adding cameras, looking at baggage coordination.
The ABA staff and representatives from some of our bus
companies have met with FMCSA officials. We met with
Administrator Clapp, as he noted. We formed a security
committee as part of our Bus Industry Safety Council, and while
we do not know the full extent of the security needs of the
motorcoach industry in the U.S., we know that the motorcoach
industry is part of a ground transportation networking system,
and we believe that a federally funded task force of the ground
transportation providers, both public and private, should be
formed to undertake research responsibilities and report those
findings back to Congress and to the administration.
The bus industry is a fluid system. It is very accessible
from many, points. Bus companies provide services in and out of
terminals, and they all have different security challenges than
operators providing charter services, tour services, or
sightseeing. It will be almost impossible to apply a one
solution fits all to the industry, when it comes to security.
It is readily apparent to me and to the industry that the
bus transportation system will also require some federal
financial support to ensure that the traveling public is
protected from attacks of any type. The use of a bus as a
weapon of mass destruction may not be likely. The larger threat
is that a bus could serve as a target for terrorist activities.
As I noted earlier, the industry is one of small
businessmen and women. No bus operator has the wherewithal to
fund a host of security upgrades, which will add financial
pressure to an industry that is already reeling from the sharp
declines in travel and in tourism. Since September 11, many
charter and tour operators have reported business losses to the
association and to other motorcoach associations of between 20
and 80 percent. None of the security fixes that we have been
able to identify in the very short term, and that we have
studied, could be called easy, quick solutions, or inexpensive.
The Federal Government should provide some financial aid to
States to develop a competitive grant program that private,
over-the-road bus companies could apply for, and to enhance
security in their operations, there should be a nationwide bus
transportation support program which would look at system-wide
or industry-wide approaches.
The security issue in our industry can easily be divided
into three categories. There are bus operations, bus
facilities, and buses themselves. Company employees and bus
terminal vendors might be subject to background and criminal
security checks. Commercial drivers' licenses serve in the role
of security checks. Now it focuses only on safety.
There is a need to do training to train bus drivers and to
train other transportation personnel to recognize and respond
to security threats. An industry task force could also compile
best practices for countering terrorist threats to the
industry, but again, the development of any best practices is
further complicated by the fluid nature of bus operations and
facilities.
When we talk about facilities, or we talk about terminals
in the motorcoach industry, especially in rural parts of the
country,in many cases they are little more than stops, or gas
stations, or drug stores, or storefronts. Most bus passengers
on charters, tours, commuter shuttles, sight-seeing, make
numerous stops on their journey, and any security practice will
need to be flexible if we are to include as many types of bus
operations as possible.
Larger terminals may require secured waiting areas for
ticketed passengers. There may be a national communication
system from the bus to law enforcement officials, and besides
these steps, the issue of use of equipment to screen passengers
and to screen luggage placed on board coaches should be
addressed and examined.
Again, there are over 4,000 communities served by intercity
buses, and as I said, many of the stops are storefronts, or
stops along the side of the road. Many of the storefronts have
immediate street access through multiple doors and gates. The
cost, the dimension, the weight of a traditional terminal-style
scanner may be inappropriate for most locations and for most
customers.
Another approach that could be implemented is an
identification or a trip itinerary for all passengers. Most
companies currently do not have such a system in place, and
this would be a prime area for immediate federal assistance and
investment. Other possibilities could be protecting the driver
area, or installing engine kill switches on buses to immobilize
them when the switch is activated.
In light of the threats that have taken place on the United
States just a month ago, it seems almost trite to say that
these and other issues should be decided quickly. The intercity
bus industry will do everything it can to assist during this
time of crisis. We look forward to working with the
administration, and we certainly look forward to working with
this Committee.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pantuso follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Pantuso, President and CEO,
American Bus Association
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Peter J.
Pantuso and I am the President and CEO of the American Bus Association.
The ABA would like to thank you Mr. Chairman for your leadership in
convening this hearing and we appreciate the opportunity to testify on
this urgent matter. The ABA is the national trade association for the
intercity motorcoach industry. It is comprised of approximately 3400
member companies that operate buses and provide related services to the
motorcoach industry. Our members operate 40-45 foot touring style
coaches with baggage bays under a passenger compartment. Nearly all of
the operator members provide charter, tour or commuter service and some
100 of ABA member companies provide regular route scheduled service.
The American motorcoach industry is large, diverse and ever changing.
Our operator members are large and small; provide local, regional and
national services; and are saddled with a variety of operational
challenges. Greyhound, the largest scheduled service member provides
service to 2,500 destinations and 25 million passengers a year. Coach
USA, the Nation's largest motorcoach company operates over 4,000
coaches, while most of the industry operates fewer than 10
motorcoaches. DOTS Motorcoaches, one of our smaller members provides
service to and from Daytona Airport. Still other members provide
service to communities with no other form of intercity transportation.
Another 2,500 ABA members include representatives of the travel and
tourism industries, and the manufacturers and suppliers of products and
services for the motorcoach industry.
All together, ABA members provide all manner of bus service to 774
million U.S. passengers annually. A number that is more than double the
number of passengers carried by all the U.S. airlines and Amtrak
combined. In fact, we move more people in two weeks than Amtrak moves
in a year. We move this many passengers while compiling the best safety
record of any mode of commercial transportation. Last year there were
three fatalities on intercity buses. The country's intercity bus
industry provides affordable public transportation to over 4,000
communities nationwide. The bus industry is a critical link in the
Nation's transportation chain. Since the September 11th attack on New
York City and Washington, D.C. our members have provided service from
airports to other destinations including service to Amtrak and commuter
rail stations as well as to other bus terminals; aiding military
mobilization by providing transportation to military personnel under
contract with United States armed forces; emergency transportation
service for police and fire rescue efforts in New York City and free
motorcoach service to those who wished to attend the memorial services
for the fallen New York City police and fire fighters. These services
are provided primarily by an industry of small businessmen and women.
Since the September 11th terrorist attack on the United States and
the criminal assault on a Greyhound bus in Tennessee on October 3rd,
members of the ABA have worked hard to enhance the safety of the
traveling public and instill a greater sense of security in our
customers. ABA members have increased security both in and around bus
terminals though the use of additional personnel, greater use of
surveillance cameras, baggage coordination programs to match passengers
with baggage, providing buses with the ability to communicate threats
to terminals or offices and, in Greyhound's operations, the use of hand
held sensing devices three of its larger terminals. In addition, the
industry is taking steps to evaluate the need and desirability of
further security measures.
The week after September 11th saw the ABA staff begin an intensive
series of discussions to review bus operations from a security
standpoint. These discussions led to meetings including representatives
from bus operators and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) officials. In the 4 weeks since the attack ABA has formed a
security committee within the Bus Industry Safety Council (BISC) to
evaluate security measures now in use by one or more carriers for their
fitness for any segment of the industry. I would like to focus my
testimony on ABA's preliminary assessment on the state of the
industry's security and how it may be improved in the shortest possible
time.
Let me begin with one inescapable fact. We don't know the full
extent of the vulnerability of the bus transportation system or fully
understand what it would take to close the gaps in the security net.
While criminal activity such as that on the Greyhound bus on October
3rd is troublesome but fortunately rare, I am aware of no incident in
which a bus in the United States has been used for terrorist activity.
Nor has any law enforcement official ever informed ABA of such a
threat. However, the bus industry's sterling safety record does not
justify complaisance.
While we do not know the extent of the security needs of the United
States motorcoach industry; we do know that the motorcoach industry is
part of the ground transportation network and in the case of the
scheduled service fixed route operations, the industry generally
provides operator access to facilities and terminals. For that reason,
I believe that a federally funded task force of the ground
transportation industry--intercity and metro transit, charter and tour
operators, manufacturers, labor, federal transportation and security
officials and law enforcement personnel--should be formed to undertake
this responsibility. The task force should have a mandate to report to
the Congress and the Administration on the state of the service
transportation system and should identify areas where security can be
improved throughout the ground transportation system.
Assessing the threat will not be easy. The bus industry is a fluid
system accessible from many points. Bus companies providing scheduled
service out of terminals will have different security challenges than
operators that provide charter and tour service that take pre-formed
groups sightseeing, boarding passengers at schools or clubs, and both
types of operators will have different problems from those operators
who pick up passengers on street corners or hotel lobbies providing
commuter service or airport shuttles. It goes without saying that it
will be impossible to apply one security solution to the entire
industry.
It is readily apparent to me that the bus transportation system
will require federal financial support to ensure that the traveling
public is protected from attacks of any type. This is so for at least
three reasons. First, as I stated earlier, the industry is one of small
businessmen and women. In some years, the profit for the entire
industry does not reach $40 million dollars. No bus operator has the
wherewithal to fund a host of security upgrades. Second, heightened
security concerns will add financial pressure to an industry already
reeling from the sharp downturn in travel and tourism brought on by the
events of September 11th. Since the attacks, in the sightseeing,
charter and tour portion of the industry, it is estimated that
customers may have cancelled about 500,000 trips a day and
approximately 20,000 jobs in that segment of the industry have been
lost or idled. Most charter and tour operators report losses of between
20 and 80 percent of their pre-September 11th revenue. Moreover, the
fall season is ``peak'' season for most of our members that operate
charter and tour service. It is a time when seniors frequently travel.
Without the cushion the autumn brings, many companies will be out of
business in January and February when there are no tours and there is
no money in the bank and cash flow is non-existent. (By contrast
however, the scheduled service business seems fairly level as compared
to pre-September 11th levels). While the regular route segment was not
hurt as badly by the September 11th attacks and the October 3rd event,
these actions may cause decreases in that segment as well. Third, none
of the security ``fixes'' that we at ABA have studied can be called
easy, cheap or quick.
With these facts in mind we have some preliminary recommendations
for the Committee. To begin, the federal government should provide some
financial aid. I see the need for two types of support. First, I
recommend the establishment of a security program similar to the
federal Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP). This program
would provide money to the states for a competitive grant program that
private, over-the-road bus companies could apply for to enhance
security in their operations. Second, I recommend that there be a
nationwide bus transportation support program, which would focus on
funding the system wide approaches, like those I will suggest for the
bus industry.
In speaking for and of the bus industry, I believe the security
issue can be usefully divided into three categories: bus operations,
bus terminals and the buses themselves, with my initial focus on fixed
route scheduled service. I begin with bus operations because this is
the largest category of issues and it also encompasses parts of the
other categories. An issue that should be studied is whether there is a
need to strengthen security practices relating to bus and
transportation facility employee recruitment. Company employees and bus
terminal vendors might be subject to criminal background and security
checks. Related to this is the issue of whether identification cards
should be required of employees and inspected by security personnel.
Many companies have indicated that they are beginning this process, in
part to provide added comfort to their customers. A third issue is
whether the process of obtaining a Commercial Drivers' License (CDL)
should also include security checks and the information shared with
state and federal law enforcement officials.
The need for training of bus and other transportation personnel to
recognize and respond to security threats is another matter that should
be considered in the security review we propose. There has been no
formal or industry-wide training in the area of threat recognition,
particularly vulnerable areas or evacuation procedures. Such training
could be available to everyone in the industry including owners, safety
directors, drivers, mechanics, transportation police officials, as well
as reservation clerks, and baggage handlers.
The industry task force also needs to address the compilation of
the best practices for countering terrorist threats. We must know what
practices have worked for those Nations and transportation facilities
that have dealt with such problems. Best practices would give us some
idea of how security could be enhanced in what circumstance; namely,
whether security would be enhanced by uniform policies concerning
weapons on buses; controls on package express service; rules for access
to airports by motorcoach shuttle operators or the use of passenger
manifest lists to identify passengers (e.g., Greyhound's TRIPS program)
utilizing intercity regular route service.
The development of best practices is further complicated by the
fluid nature of bus operations and facilities. Some terminals are
little more than stops at gas stations, drug stores, etc. Most bus
passengers are on charters, tours, shuttles or commuter trips. Any
security practices will have to be flexible to include as many types of
operations as possible. We need to work cooperatively with all
transportation modes to determine these practices and give their use
the widest possible distribution. The federal government must play a
critical role here by not only creating the task force we are
proposing, but also funding efforts at which there can be exchanges of
ideas on these matters.
One area that warrants particular concern is the vulnerability of
transportation terminals. In addition to training terminal personnel,
thought should be given to providing terminals with emergency
communications capabilities tied to law enforcement agencies. Larger
terminals may require secured waiting areas for ticketed passengers.
One approach may be to have a system of ``wanding'' the passengers and
their carry-on baggage in these areas. These areas would also be off-
limits to those without tickets. The development of best practices
guidelines for terminals and for handling baggage and package express
would be of some help.
Besides these steps in terminal security, the question of the use
of equipment both to screen passengers and to screen baggage placed on
board motorcoaches should be addressed. Although it is an issue that
should be examined, there are reasons why metal detectors may have
limited usefulness in the bus industry. First, there are over 4,000
communities served by intercity buses, many of which have gas stations,
drug stores, or hotel lobbies that also serve as bus terminals. Second,
most terminals have immediate street access through multiple doors and
gates. Third, the cost, dimensions and weight of such scanners make
them inappropriate in most terminals. It may be that alternative
security measures, along the lines of those described above, will be
more effective in bus terminals. Another issue for consideration is the
use of bomb sniffing dogs in and around the largest terminals.
The use of the bus as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) may not be
likely. Larger commercial vehicles with larger compartments for storage
are more likely to be used as WMDs. The larger threat is that the bus
could serve as a target for terrorist activities. Besides the issues of
driver documentation and baggage handling, another issue is whether the
bus itself needs to be made safer. One strong possibility is a
communications system in each bus that would allow the driver to tie
into police, emergency or mobilization efforts with a communication
that provides automatically the location of the bus. The ABA agrees
with the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) that such
communications systems would be effective in preventing or limiting bus
hijackings and other incidents. The technology for such a system
exists, but vendors have not found it cost-effective to develop the
system itself. Another technological issue that may yield some benefit
is the use of cameras on buses, perhaps with remote monitoring. federal
leadership in developing this system is needed.
Another approach that could be implemented is a wider installation
of a system like the Greyhound TRIPS system, which provides name
identification and trip itinerary for all passengers. Currently,
Greyhound has a system in place to collect passenger names in locations
that account for 85 percent of its passenger traffic, but few, if any,
of the carriers that interline with Greyhound have such a system
because the infrastructure costs are too high. This would be a prime
area for an immediate federal investment.
Two other possibilities that appear to require some research are
efforts to enhance motorcoach safety. This may be possible by
protecting the driver by compartmentalizing the driver area. Research
into the possibility of the installation of an engine ``kill'' switch
on buses to immobilize them when the switch is activated should also be
undertaken. The feasibility and use of such technology and the possible
re-engineering of buses are expensive and longer-term ideas. Again,
federal cooperation will be required for our industry if any of these
ideas prove worthy.
The issue of research is one that crosses all lines in our quest to
make travelers' safer. There are advantages to the federal government
funding research into or facilitating the dissemination of promising
security applications to the transportation modes. New applications
such as detectors that are effective against non-metal weapons and
plastic explosives and the use of biometric identification systems are
now available. Whether such devices are appropriate or necessary is an
issue for resolution, as well as the issue of whether off-the-shelf
baggage scanners and metal detectors would be effective. In addition,
the quest for security should be ongoing. The bus industry taskforce I
mentioned earlier or an office within FMCSA could be required to
coordinate and facilitate the dissemination of the research to the
terminal operators, bus operators and law enforcement agencies who will
need it.
The federal government should also begin to look at ways in which
bus transportation can supplement air transportation, particularly
given the delays now inevitable in air travel. Some ideas from the
perspective of the bus industry are: essential bus service, similar to
essential air service, to rural communities; and expansion of existing
federal preemption of state controls over bus operations to reach the
operation of regular route services within a state; MCSAP or FTA
security grants or small business administration loans to operators to
make security upgrades; or the federal government underwriting the
``war risk'' clause in bus operators' insurance policies, which is
being used to cancel bus operators' insurance and ending service.
Another way to allow buses to supplement existing service is the
establishment of a communications link between localities needing
service. Regulatory barriers should not now stand in the way of
expeditiously offering new motorcoach services that the public may
demand.
In light of the terrorists' attacks on the United States just a
month ago, it seems almost trite to say that these, and other issues,
must be decided quickly. There is nothing more important to the
national interest today. The intercity bus industry will do everything
that it can to help the country through this crisis. Working together
with the federal government and the other modes of transportation, I
have every confidence that we will provide security for the American
traveling public. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
be here. I will answer any question the Members of the Committee have
for me.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Pantuso.
Mr. Gleason.
STATEMENT OF KEITH GLEASON, DIRECTOR, TANKHAUL DIVISION,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
Mr. Gleason. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Subcommittee. My name is Keith Gleason. I am Director of the
Tankhaul Division for the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters. On behalf of our president, James Hoffa, I want to
thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the
important topic of safety and security in the trucking
industry.
While hazardous cargo is prevalent in all sectors of the
trucking industry, with more than 800,000 shipments each day,
my testimony will focus on the tankhaul sector. It accounts for
only 5 percent of cargo transport in the United States, but its
loads of chemicals, explosives, petroleum products, liquified
gases, and poisons are some of the most dangerous and volatile
on our Nation's highways. Even the media has picked upon that--
recent news accounts of detailed attempts by purported
terrorists attempting to obtain hazardous material transport
permits.
While that may be true, there is much potential for
somebody to merely steal a truck, than to go through the
process of obtaining the proper commercial driver's license and
hazardous material endorsements, although that route itself is
fairly easy to follow. Example: the Teamsters Union conducts a
4-hour course for a commercial driver's license for drivers in
hazard awareness training in preparation for a driver to take a
written test to obtain a hazardous endorsement. Most companies
merely put their drivers in a room and show them a 1-hour
video, which does not even address security issues.
It is clear from the events of last month that training for
the hazmat endorsement should be more rigorous and contain a
segment outlining security procedures, where the driver ought
to be aware of his surroundings to secure his truck and to
adequately park and take other special precautions to keep his
load from becoming a weapon for a terrorist. That might also
require a review of the route taken by tankhaul trucks.
A recent trip to Houston reminded me of another serious
problem in our industry. A good percentage of our chemical
loads are preloaded. That is, they are loaded at a plant, then
transported some 5 to 10 miles away by city drivers to a
holding lot or staging area, where they sit, 50 to 100 tanks,
not secured, sitting in an unattended, unfenced lot, waiting
for long haul drivers to pick up their loads.
Carriers need to implement better security at their
terminals and holding lots. In fact, on that trip I talked to
the drivers--it was just a week ago--and I asked them if there
in fact were loaded chemical trailers sitting in the lot. They
told me that they were. I asked them if they were attended.
They said they were not. I asked if they had fifth-wheel locks,
or fifth-wheel pinlocks on the trailers, and they looked at me
like, we never do that, so it is something that really needs to
be addressed.
Drivers must also be alert. Some trucks are electric start,
where a key is needed, where other trucks are air-start. You do
not need a key. You just push a button. Of course, many drivers
do not lock their cabs.
How many of you have seen a truck dispensing its 10,000
gallons of gas at a service station, the driver is at the back
of the truck, opening the fill cap to a lid on a 30,000 gallon
underground tank, which, by the way, is not secure either, and
the cab door is wide open. All someone would have to do is take
off with the truck, or worse yet, light a flare and toss it at
the opening of the underground tank. The tank truck holds as
much gasoline as a commercial airliner, and the potential for
destruction is great.
Last week, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
issued an alert to hazmat haulers, calling on them to develop a
transportation security plan. It recognized that the employee
is the first line of defense in security, but can also be a
security risk. That is true.
The tankhaul industry has undergone dramatic changes in the
last 5 years. Unprecedented mergers and acquisitions by the
major carriers have caused the industry to become dominated by
a few large tank carriers. The driving population for the most
part is not characterized by owner operators. That means that
many companies are relying on drivers that they do not know.
Unionized companies are good at screening people to make
sure they have the proper license and endorsement. In most
cases there is a probationary period, and with high wages and
good benefits there is experience that comes with longevity,
because that person is working toward a 25 or 30-year pension,
but it is more difficult to capture and screen the universe of
owner-drivers who are, more often than not an employee of the
tank carrier.
Another area of concern is port truck drivers. The
Teamsters Union is trying to organize them. They are some of
the lowest paid drivers in the country. Many of them are recent
immigrants who can barely scratch out a living hauling the
containers from our Nation's ports. The turnover rate is
extremely high, and right now they are all owner-operators.
They have no employer, per se, to check their driving record,
to question their employment history and experience, or to
confirm that they have valid licenses, permits, or other
documentation. They drive into the ports, pick up a container,
perhaps one loaded with hazardous materials, and then proceed
on to their destination, we hope. That situation is ripe for
compromise.
Another segment I mentioned earlier is the less-than-
truckload carriers. These carriers consolidate smaller
shipments into one trailer. While they may be only carrying a
few drums of hazmat, it does not take much to cause a serious
with the accident. The Teamsters is therefore working with the
Motor Freight Carriers Association, which represents union
trucking companies, to form a labor-management task force to
examine safety and security issues in that segment of the
industry.
Finally, we cannot afford to neglect our borders,
particularly given the administration's push to allow Mexican
trucks to travel beyond commercial zones into the interior of
the United States. Of the 4 million trucks that crossed the
U.S.-Mexican border in 2000, less than 1 percent were
inspected. Twenty-five percent of those Mexican trucks are
carrying hazardous material. A small number of inspectors and
lack of permanent inspection facilities is even more cause for
concern since the events of September 11.
The DOT's Inspector General has repeatedly recommended a
minimum of 140 inspectors at the border crossings. We sit here
without a transportation appropriations bill passed that would
provide a source of funding for additional inspectors and
facilities, when in 2\1/2\ months a Mexican truck carrying
toxic chemicals or explosives could be traveling anywhere in
the United States. That makes no sense at all.
It would be wrong to allow thousands of untrained,
unregulated, uninspected, inexperienced drivers to travel the
highways of our country when we are just beginning to figure
out how to improve the safety and security of our own industry.
In fact, with the concern raised recently regarding the minimum
wages the baggage inspectors are paid, how is it that Mexican
drivers who make an average of $1 to $2 an hour would be safe
to enter our borders and travel our highways?
In summary, Mr. Chairman, the trucking industry was
deregulated in the early 1980's. As a result, the tank truck
industry was impacted the hardest. Today, in a nonregulated
industry, shippers set the rates they pay for the shipment of
their loads, leaving carries to compete for the business on an
uneven playing field. Consequently, this results in carriers
competing on the backs of the employees. Of the approximately
100,000 tank truck operators driving on our Nation's highways,
the vast majority are underpaid and overworked. As a result,
these drivers do not have the time nor the proper rest, let
alone the time that is necessary for safety precautions that
must be taken in the transportation and delivery of the
products they haul.
I urge this Committee, Mr. Chairman, to not only
investigate the safety measures that must be implemented in the
industry, but also the regulatory measures that need to be
implemented that would assure that our Nation's drivers are
more highly compensated, experienced, and trained in all
aspects, including safety and security, while performing their
very dangerous jobs.
Thank you very much for having the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gleason follows:]
Prepared Statement of Keith Gleason, Director, Tankhaul Division,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Keith Gleason and I am Director of the Tank Haul
Division of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. On behalf of
our General President, Jim Hoffa, I want to thank you for the
opportunity to appear here today to discuss the important topic of
safety and security in the trucking industry. The events of September
11th should cause all of us to take a different look at the everyday
procedures that we use to transport cargo, especially hazardous
materials, and to make sure that dangerous loads do not fall into the
hands of those that can do harm to the people of the United States.
While hazardous cargo is prevalent in all sectors of the trucking
industry, with more than 800,000 shipments each day, today I would like
to concentrate on the tank haul sector. While it accounts for only
about 5 percent of truck cargo transport in the U.S., its loads of
chemicals, explosives, petroleum products, liquefied gases and poisons
are some of the most dangerous and volatile on our highways. That's not
to say that we should not be concerned about the few drums of hazmat
that may be contained in a less-than truckload trailer. The Teamsters
Union, however, believes that many of the same safety and security
procedures should be adopted industry-wide, and I will attempt to give
you some suggestions from a truck driver's viewpoint.
Currently, there are about 10,000 Teamster members in the Tank Haul
Division, employed at 159 different companies. The liquid, gas and dry
bulk transport industry has undergone dramatic changes in the last 5
years. Unprecedented merger and acquisition activity by the major
companies has caused the industry to become dominated by a few large
tank carriers. Its driving population has become one characterized by
owner-operators as carriers attempt to build in flexibility and de-
unionize the workforce. That means that many companies are relying on
drivers that they don't know, instead of employee drivers who often
times are a more stable workforce with higher pay and less turnover.
Recent news accounts have detailed attempts by purported terrorists
to obtain hazardous materials transport permits. We believe that there
is as much potential for someone to merely steal a truck than to go
through the process of obtaining the proper commercial drivers license
(CDL) and hazardous materials endorsement--although that route itself
is fairly easy to follow. The Teamsters Union conducts a 4-hour course
for drivers in hazard awareness training in preparation for a driver to
take a written test to obtain his hazmat endorsement. Some companies
merely put their drivers in a room and show them a 1-hour video. That
video does not even address security issues. But it is clear from the
events of last month that training for the hazmat endorsement should be
more rigorous and contain a segment outlining security, where the
driver is taught to be aware of his surroundings, to secure his truck
and load adequately when parked, and to take other special precautions
to keep his load from becoming a weapon for a terrorist. That might
also require a review of routes taken by tank haul trucks and other
carriers hauling hazardous materials that takes them away from
population centers, for example.
A trip to Houston last week reminded me of another problem in the
industry. A good percentage of chemical loads are pre-loaded. That is,
they are loaded at a plant and transported, sometimes 5 to 10 miles
away by city drivers, to a holding lot or staging area, where they sit,
50 to 100 tanks, often in an unattended, unfenced lot, waiting for
long-haul drivers pick up the loads. That particular practice should be
reviewed and carriers should implement better security at their
terminals and holding lots.
Some trucks are electric start, where a key is needed, while other
are air start. You don't need a key. You just push a button. Of course,
many drivers don't lock their cabs, especially when they are preparing
to unload or running into a bathroom at the local service station. How
many of you have seen the tank truck dispensing its 10,000 gallons of
gas at the service station? The driver is at the back of the truck
opening the fill cap lid to a 30,000 gallon underground tank, which by
the way isn't secure either, and the cab door is flung open. All
someone has to do is take off with the truck or worse yet, light a
flare and toss it. That tank haul truck holds as much gasoline as a
commercial airliner and in some cases even transports jet fuel to
airports. It's easy to figure out what the results could be.
Many other hazardous material classifications, including chemicals
such as chlorine, pose a potential threat as well. Chlorine is a common
chemical transported by truck that is both an irritant and an
asphyxiant. If a load of chlorine were ignited, it would pose a
significant health threat to the nearby population as well as
presenting a gas hazard for emergency responders. Other chemical loads
could be dumped into a reservoir or other water supply, and liquid gas
loads like oxygen and hydrogen could be ignited near population
centers.
The potential for destruction is great. But how do we combat this
possibility? Let's start with the driver. The Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration (FMCSA) last week issued an alert to trucking
companies carrying hazardous materials, calling on them to develop a
transportation security plan. It recognized that the employee is the
first line of defense in security, but can also be a security risk.
Unfortunately, owner-operators dominate the tank haul industry.
Unionized companies are good at screening people to make sure they have
the proper license and endorsement. In most cases there is a
probationary period. And, with high wages and good benefits, there is
experience that comes with longevity, because that person is working
toward a 25 or 30-year pension. The same cannot be said for owner-
operators, who can hire their brother-in-law, cousin or a friend to
drive their truck one day. Let me make it clear that I am not
suggesting that owner-operators necessarily pose a greater security
risk. What I am saying is there is less control, less frequent contact
with the carrier, and greater turnover. It would be difficult to
capture and screen that universe of drivers.
Most trucking companies require drivers to disclose their criminal
records on employment applications. Therefore, those with serious
convictions cannot get jobs driving even if they have a CDL and
hazardous materials endorsement. Of course, anyone that is likely to
commit a terrorist act isn't going to volunteer that information
readily. Even with criminal background checks, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to check the record of a recent immigrant who hasn't been
in the country very long. Certainly, any suspicious applicants should
be carefully scrutinized, but to subject a 10 or 20-year driver with a
spotless employment record to a criminal background check is not only a
waste of time, but also a waste of precious law enforcement resources.
Quite frankly, it would be almost impossible to perform thorough
criminal background checks on the universe of drivers that carry
hazmat.
Let me mention a couple other areas of concern. One is where the
Teamsters Union is actually trying to organize drivers--in the ports. I
know that the Subcommittee heard testimony last week on port security,
but one security issue that was not addressed was that pertaining to
the movement of containers out of the port terminals. Port truck
drivers are some of the lowest paid truck drivers in the country. Many
of them are recent immigrants who can barely scratch out a living
hauling the containers from our Nation's ports. The turnover and
bankruptcy rates are extremely high, and right now they are all owner-
operators. They have no employer, per se, to check their driving
record, to question their employment history and experience, or to
confirm that they have valid licenses, permits or other documentation.
They drive into the ports, pick up a container, perhaps one loaded with
hazardous materials, and then proceed onto their destination, we hope!
Similar to low paid airline security screeners, the situation in the
ports is ripe for compromise and, in fact, is putting the public at
risk. During March 2001, the FMSCA placed additional emphasis on the
safety of shippers of hazardous materials. The FMSCA conducted 4,822
inspections at among other locations, dockside, intermodal facilities
and roadsides and found 1,112 violations (a 23 percent violation rate)
of federal hazmat regulations. In addition, during 2000 in the Oakland-
San Francisco area, the Coast Guard working with the Federal Railroad
Administration inspected 39 intermodal containers and found 15
violations. The situation there is ripe for compromise. We're trying to
bring some stabilization to this segment of the industry, but it hasn't
been easy.
Another segment that I mentioned earlier is the less-than-truckload
carriers. These are carriers that consolidate many smaller shipments
into one trailer load. While they may only be carrying a few drums of
hazmat as a portion of their entire manifest, it doesn't take much to
poison a water supply or cause a spill that requires large areas to be
evacuated. The Teamsters Union is working with the Motor Freight
Carriers Association, which represents our six biggest union trucking
employers, to form a Labor-Management Security Task Force to examine
safety and security issues in that segment of the industry. It's a
bigger job in some ways, because these smaller amounts may not get the
attention they deserve. They do, however, add up to almost half a
million shipments a year for the MFCA companies.
Finally, we cannot neglect our borders. Terrorists have already
been caught trying to smuggle explosives into the United States from
Canada in a plot to bomb a major U.S. target during the Millenium
celebration. While I am unfamiliar with the amount of hazardous
materials that move between the U.S. and Canada, I am certain that a
fair amount does. This poses an additional threat to the United States.
Now, greater scrutiny of cargo coming from both Mexico and Canada has
caused even longer lines of trucks waiting at the borders. While this
may be an inconvenience to those manufacturers waiting for ``just-in-
time'' deliveries, we cannot and should not relinquish our sovereign
right to protect our borders from dangerous cargo.
Better border security calls for a greater inspection presence at
both borders, particularly at the U.S.-Mexico border where 25 percent
of the trucks crossing into the United States from Mexico carry
hazardous materials. The emergence of chemical plants in the
Maquiladora region has increased hazmat traffic from Mexico to the U.S.
significantly. While the focus on Capitol Hill recently has been on the
safety of Mexican trucks, it is clear that the attention must now be on
what they carry and who is driving them. The current restriction on
Mexican trucks to travel only into the U.S. commercial zones is in
danger of being lifted by this Administration, despite overwhelming
opposition to that action by both Houses of Congress.
The U.S. only inspects 1 percent of the Mexican trucks crossing
into the United States. The small number of inspectors and the lack of
permanent inspection facilities is even more cause for concern since
the events of September 11. The Department of Transportation's
Inspector General has repeatedly recommended a minimum of 140
inspectors at the border crossings. We sit here now without a
Transportation Appropriations bill passed that would provide a source
of funding for additional inspectors and facilities, and we're
potentially two and one-half months away from a Mexican truck carrying
toxic chemicals, explosives or other volatile hazardous materials being
able to travel anywhere in the United States. That makes absolutely no
sense at all.
Even more frightening is the fact that the database to identify
Mexican drivers is severely underpopulated. There is no way to verify
the driving record of most Mexican drivers. Add to that the fact that
CDLs can be purchased or fraudulently obtained fairly easily in Mexico.
I would also suggest that hazardous materials endorsement requirements
are severely lacking in that country as well.
The Teamsters Union does not believe that it would be prudent to
allow thousands of additional hazmat carrying trucks to roam the
country while we wrestle to get a handle on how to improve the safety
and security of our own trucking industry. The Administration is dead
wrong to continue to push to lift the current moratorium on Mexican
trucks. I would further maintain that if Mexico's President, Vicente
Fox, is such a good friend of our President, then he should respect the
security issues that the U.S. government is dealing with today and will
not continue to push this issue at this time.
Mr. Chairman, the FMCSA has made several good recommendations for
improving security in the trucking industry. The Teamsters Union and
its member drivers stand ready to assist in this effort. I would
encourage all employers in the transportation industry to involve your
employees in formulating your new safety and security plans. Make your
employees feel a part of what you are trying to accomplish. They are
the first line of defense and are the eyes and ears of your security
network. They can be valuable allies in this fight to avert further
terrorist activities in the United States.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today, and I will
answer any questions the Subcommittee may have.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much.
Lieutenant Paul Sullivan is next.
STATEMENT OF PAUL SULLIVAN, LIEUTENANT,
MASSACHUSETTS STATE POLICE, COMMERCIAL VEHICLE ENFORCEMENT
DIVISION
Lieutenant Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding
this hearing on the important issue of bus and truck security
and hazmat licensing. I will confine my remarks to the problems
that we are experiencing in the enforcement field with the
licensing problems as they relate to hazardous materials
vehicles.
Now, as a representative of the 10,000 certified inspectors
that Mr. Clapp referred to as assisting his 400 agents in the
field, let me say that we do not hold ourselves out as
intelligence experts, but we do have concerns about the CDL
program in this country, how the driver first acquires his
license, and what information is available about him when he is
operating on the highway is critical to those in law
enforcement. While there is much we can learn from face-to-face
interaction with the drivers, we also need as much information
about his driving history to make an appropriate decision for
either safety or security reasons.
Let me also interject here what we advocate today on behalf
of law enforcement is equally important to the bus and truck
industry as well. In a very real sense, motor carriers and bus
companies are the first line of defense, and can only make
judgments about hiring a particular driver based on timely and
accurate information.
In my written statement, I have commented at length about
the weaknesses of the CDL program that unfortunately extend
across the board. This, of course, includes the hazardous
materials and passenger endorsements. The reason for the
weakness is structural. Although there are minimal national
standards, there is still too much flexibility among the states
in terms of how they administer the program.
We at this time need more than recommendations. Key
components of the CDL programs are the testing and examination
procedures which in some states are administered by a third
party examiner without strictly uniform procedures covering the
qualifications and activities of these examiners. It is not too
difficult to imagine what problems might result, such as the
recent case where drivers obtained hazardous materials licenses
when they should not have been able to do so.
Another key component of the CDL program is how the data on
the driver, once he has entered the system, is shared among the
state licensing and law enforcement agencies. A recent pilot
program in my own State of Massachusetts pointed out these
weaknesses only too clearly. As is often the case today, the
technology is there to address the problems. The question is
how to apply it or make it apply so law enforcement can make
sure that an unsafe or undocumented driver is not operating on
our highways.
I think we need to look at the solutions to these problems
in the short and the long term. In the short term, it should be
mandatory that the state licensing examiners perform a criminal
background check on anyone applying for a CDL to haul hazardous
materials and/or passengers. CVSA, the organization that I am
currently president of, manages a special program with the
Department of Energy for the safe transportation of radioactive
shipments, and in the contract as mandated by the Secretary of
Energy a criminal background check is performed on all drivers
of these shipments.
We also need to consolidate our databases to either
supplant or augment the commercial driver's license system. As
part of the new effort, a new watch list for CDL drivers with
hazardous materials and passenger endorsements will be created.
It would track persons on national, state, and FBI wanted
lists, and send a red flag to commercial vehicle enforcement
personnel when such drivers are encountered at the roadside.
In the long term, the CDL program needs to be restructured.
There is a need to institute more rigorous and uniform federal
standards for testing, examination, administration, and data
collection and dissemination. The pilot CDL self-assessment
program in Massachusetts has given us some very specific
examples of where the data collection and dissemination
programs need to be reformed, and we also call for the
implementation of the commercial driver's license provisions of
the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999. They must be
accelerated.
Also, commercial vehicle enforcement activities need to be
on par with the motor vehicle administration policies in each
state. Safety and security must outweigh customer convenience.
These two functions need to be balanced and integrated as much
as possible to ensure seamless program administration and
implementation.
In my written statement, I comment at length about the use
of technology to enhance security and safety with respect to
the CDL program. I believe this technology can be implemented
now, and can be the driving force behind needed institutional
reforms and border safety strategies.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I want to stress that the very
nature, structure, and mission of the Commercial Vehicle Safety
Alliance, which is uniformity, reciprocity, safety,
compatibility, allows us to take collective action to train for
and implement whatever new procedures are necessary to deal
with the current national emergency and protect our highways
and the traveling public.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant Sullivan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul Sullivan, Lieutenant, Massachusetts State
Police, Commercial Vehicle Enforcement Division
I. Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is Paul Sullivan
and I am a Lieutenant with the Massachusetts State Police, Commercial
Vehicle Enforcement Section. Recently, I was elected as President of
the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, an organization of commercial
vehicle enforcement agencies and industry representatives in the U.S.,
Canada, and Mexico.
We thank you for holding this hearing on bus and truck security and
haz-mat licensing issues. I will confine my oral statement to the
primary issue you have asked me to address--the licensing issue and
problems as they relate to hazardous materials transporters. In the
statement submitted for the record, I also have touched on other issues
affecting the changing role of truck and bus safety and security
enforcement in light of the tragic events of September 11. And I have
commented on possible steps to make our borders and the country more
secure through a better use of technology.
The roles of motor carrier safety enforcement agencies have changed
in the last several weeks, primarily due to the assignment of officers
to various security details and toward efforts to identify and protect
potential terrorist targets.
I also preface my remarks this morning by saying that the other
members of the enforcement agencies that belong to CVSA and I, do not
hold ourselves out as intelligence experts. But, the very nature,
structure and mission of the Alliance, which includes industry
representation, allows us to take collective action to learn, train
for, and implement whatever new procedures are necessary to deal with
the national emergency and protect our highways and the traveling
public. With approximately 10,000 CVSA Certified Inspectors all over
North America, we can mobilize a large community on short notice and
stand ready to work with the Congress and the Administration to
implement any measures deemed appropriate to enhance the security of
our transportation network and those who drive on it.
Before discussing the specifics on the licensing issues, I want to
point out that since the FBI notification of the potential hazardous
materials transportation threat, my state and all U.S. enforcement
jurisdictions have been conducting an increasing number of Level III
inspections (driver-only) of hazardous materials haulers, especially
those near fuel farms and in densely populated locations. In addition
to a CDL check, these inspections include a more than usual interview
of the driver. If, based on these actions, we feel it is warranted we
do a crosscheck of the FBI's NCIC database. We also are providing what
assistance we can to help the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration's Security Sensitivity Visits with respect to certain
hazardous materials transporters.
II. Licensing Issues
We don't know all of the specific details regarding those
individuals who fraudulently obtained CDLs in Pennsylvania to haul
hazardous materials. We understand that the FBI investigation is still
taking place. But, no matter what kind of a program is in place,
dishonesty and fraud on the part of administrative personnel are always
possible. The only thing any of us can do at this point is to examine
the entire CDL structure and address those weaknesses that result in
someone obtaining a CDL who should not be driving a commercial vehicle
on our highways whether for highway safety or national security
reasons.
The primary tenet of the Commercial Drivers License program, which
was fully implemented in 1992, is that each commercial driver--
nationwide--have only one license and one driving record. In large
part, this goal has been achieved. But as we now know, this goal is
much too limited and does not meet current needs, especially in terms
of what we must now do to address national security needs.
A. Examination And Testing Weaknesses--Discussion
The CDL Program is a national program and, as such, needs
leadership and direction at the federal level. The CDL Program's
primary focus to date has been on the administrative side, making sure
customer lines are short and people are able to receive licenses with
limited effort and intrusion. With few exceptions, in most states, the
agencies administering commercial vehicle licensing are not the
enforcement agencies (the lead MCSAP agencies). Since the enactment of
the CDL law, the states, despite some federal requirements, have
largely been able to execute their own approaches to implementing the
various components of the CDL Program. The result has been
inconsistencies in testing, examination, administration and
ultimately--data.
The current requirements for federal endorsements to the CDL:
double/triple trailers, passenger, tank vehicle, and hazardous
materials provide only basic guidelines on knowledge areas and
suggestions for additions to the knowledge and skills tests. There are
requirements for the knowledge and skills tests, but, once again, they
are guidelines and address the minimums. For testing procedures,
methods and examiner qualifications, they are even less prescriptive.
Although there is much commonality in content, CDL licenses vary from
state to state, especially in format and layout and how they meet the
tamperproof requirement. To add to the confusion, states are allowed to
implement their own endorsements and restrictions to the CDL if they so
choose.
The CDL knowledge and skills test requirements provide a
performance benchmark for what is to be expected of a new commercial
driver and there are efforts to tighten this up. On this point,
however, there is a disconnect between the knowledge and skills tests
and the training and instruction being delivered at the driver training
schools. Because the tests don't necessarily reflect the real world,
training schools often have difficulty in structuring their curricula--
do we teach to pass the test or teach to operate the vehicle?
Additionally, there are some variances around the country for
delivering the skills and road tests because of physical facility
limitations. And, in many cases there are valid reasons for this.
However, the location of facilities sometimes seems to be determined by
economics more than safety. We also feel that the federal guidelines on
the various endorsements do not go far enough to properly gauge whether
a driver can, or should be, driving these types of vehicles, especially
a newly licensed CDL driver.
Thus, the CDL problems primarily exist: (1) in the ways the tests
are administered, (2) the examiners, and (3) the aftermath of the
license issuance as it relates to data collection, judicial actions and
information sharing among jurisdictions, which will be discussed in
more detail in the post-testing section of this statement.
The states, federal government, industry, and the Congress have had
a heightened awareness of some inadequacies in the system, most of
which are known quantities and led to many of the CDL-related
provisions in the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999. More
resources have been allocated to deal with these issues at both the
state and federal levels and the federal government has begun to take a
more visible role. Unfortunately, many of the MCSIA provisions have not
yet been implemented and most of the deficiencies remain.
For specific recommendations addressing the above licensing
weakness in the CDL program, especially with respect to hazardous
materials endorsements, see Section IV.
B. Post-testing program weaknesses lead to safety and security
weaknesses--Discussion
The process and administrative inconsistencies do not ensure the
safety and security we need, particularly in light of the September 11
events and in the days since. These inconsistencies manifest themselves
in ways that degrade safety and security. Evidence of this fact is
found in a pilot project the Commonwealth of Massachusetts just
completed with CVSA with funding support provided by FMCSA. This
project, the CDL State Self Assessment, evaluated compliance with laws
and regulations governing the issuance and management of commercial
driver licenses through analysis of data in our information systems. It
also measured the linkage between the records of licensing and
enforcement actions to records of commercial drivers' crashes. The
following are a few examples of results from the Massachusetts pilot:
Some states are posting fewer than 50 percent of the serious
and disqualifying convictions sent to them by Massachusetts via
CDLIS.
License numbers are improperly transcribed more than 10
percent of the time on inspections and citations.
There were uneven responses from driver history queries
requested from other states (ranged from 53 to 95 percent in
the states checked).
The Commonwealth achieved much lower conviction rates for
the most serious (and most dangerous) violations than for less
serious violations.
The 1 percent of drivers who were driving while suspended
accounted for 5 percent of at-fault crashes.
Drivers who were convicted of serious offenses were involved
in at-fault crashes almost 40 percent more often than the
baseline drivers were.
These results indicate: (1) problem drivers are getting involved in
more crashes than the average driver, and (2) much of the data
necessary to identify these drivers is not making its way through the
system. CVSA hopes for continued support from FMCSA to conduct more
Self-Assessments with the states in order to gather more data and to
help our members identify areas that focus their resources more
effectively.
The world has become more reliant on technology. As a result of
compartmentalized and non-uniform approaches in CDL processes,
administration, and technology application, effective data collection,
exchange and utilization have become problematic. The information
systems and linkages that have been set up to gather and distribute
this data (and at a minimum level) are patched together and not as
robust as they need to be for several reasons:
Information technology is not what it should be.
1. LThere is not a single source that is able to consolidate
and distribute all information on commercial drivers. The
information resides in multiple systems, and a human does the
only actual integration of sources. This could be a police
officer by the side of the road or in an inspection station, or
a judge making a sentencing decision, or by a company making an
employment decision.
2. LThe number of information systems and linkages, as well as
the multiple data entry and format approaches, results in
less reliability and accuracy of the data;
opportunity for errors and for intrusion; and
more costs for maintenance and upkeep.
3. LThe ability of accurate and timely data to be transmitted
over such systems is not acceptable, both from a systems and
communications perspective
Administrative weaknesses abound.
4. LThe CDL administrative processes and requirements are not
uniform across the states, thereby leaving open too many
opportunities for error and unwanted penetration, as well as
oversight difficulties (especially for Third Party Testing and
Examination)
5. LLegal obstacles exist to accessing certain pieces of
information on individuals, most notably for privacy protection
purposes. This limits the ability of people who could use the
information for important security uses, such as potential
employers, from having access to critical safety and security
information.
6. LThe number of institutions involved is staggering and is
not being coordinated in a manner that puts proper emphasis on
safeguards for safety and security
We believe the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
has done the best it could in developing recommended standards,
procedures, and guidelines for use by licensing organizations in their
member jurisdictions, given the fact that these procedures and
standards are not promulgated by law or regulation. In fact, except for
making sure that state information systems perform core data processing
functions, there is no program to either enforce or verify compliance
with these AAMVA standards, procedures, and guidelines. The approach to
date has not been able to properly service the community's needs for
safety and security.
For specific recommendations addressing the above post-testing and
information sharing weakness of the CDL program, see Section IV.
III. Other Safety and Security Considerations
A. Increased Role of Motor Carrier Safety Enforcement
As I mentioned earlier, most CVSA enforcement member jurisdictions
have undertaken additional responsibilities since September 11 that are
over and above the usual motor carrier safety activities. Many are
using their personnel to guard airports, water supplies and other
federal and state government facilities, not to mention increasing
their basic motor carrier safety activities with respect to hazardous
materials haulers. As an example of some of the additional initiatives
being implemented, many of our members are conducting Level III
inspections (driver-only), and, upon enhanced interrogation if it is
warranted, cross checking the CDL with the FBI's NCIC database.
B. Better Use of Technology and Federal Agency Information Coordination
In addition to tightening up requirements within the CDL Program, a
major tool to ensure greater safety and security of truck and bus
transportation will be the use of information technology with respect
to the driver, the vehicle, the carrier and its ownership, and the
cargo including information on the shipper. Only with technology can we
achieve these goals and yet maintain the efficiency of our commercial
transportation system.
For the driver, this could mean more consideration for the use of a
``smart'' CDL to store more than the just the basic information it has
to date. A ``smart'' CDL could include more detailed information on the
driver as well as information on the cargo. We also need to make
greater use of the biometric identifiers (retina scan, thumbprint,
digital photographs, and signature/voice recognition). The costs and,
in some cases, reliability of such technologies has thus far been a
deterrent to adoption.
Further, consideration should be given to better use of the
existing safety and security data, including;
A method to rapidly deliver easy-to-use, more complete
information about the driver to the police officer on the road;
A method to more easily deliver a complete view of the
appropriate safety and security information to a potential
employer; and
It also would be appropriate to deliver more timely,
complete, and readable information about a driver's record to
judges and prosecutors.
For better information on the shipper, the motor carrier and the
cargo itself, the use of an electronic freight bill can be used along
with a unique numbering and verification system (such as bar coding)
for tracking/tracing capabilities.
For the vehicle, there could be devices installed that would
facilitate vehicle identification, tracking and communication. Sensors
can be integrated to identify potential security and/or integrity
breaches, and communicate in real-time with the driver, carrier and
shipper. However, we do need to be sensitive to the fact that
information about cargo, origins, destinations, and location of
vehicles is considered sensitive business information and needs to be
treated with appropriate respect.
To act on security breaches and/or mitigate hazardous materials and
other incidents, emergency responders, medical and law enforcement
personnel can be connected to this network and be notified in real time
of problems and of the necessary equipment and personnel to deploy
All of these technologies, to one degree or another, are being used
or have been tested by either the DOD, INS, CUSTOMS, or DOT (FMCSA,
FRA, FTA, FAA, RSPA, and FHWA) as well as some motor carriers and
shippers who now use electronic freight bills, GPS systems,
transponders and other related technologies. It is now important to
link these technologies and share the relevant information among
appropriate federal and state enforcement agencies for safety and
security purposes. The side benefit of such a technology approach would
be to facilitate border operations at land and sea crossings to address
the safety and security transportation and immigration concerns
revolving around NAFTA.
The issue then arises as to who will have the authority to mandate,
or implement, the use of the above technologies, not to mention the
coordination and sharing of the information. Perhaps this will be the
role of the new Office of Homeland Security? Without a regulatory body
such as the ICC, it would appear that FMCSA and the state motor carrier
safety enforcement agency personnel as represented in CVSA are the only
groups available to reach truck and bus companies as well as the driver
for both safety and security purposes.
IV. Recommendations
Based on the above and the collective wisdom of the Alliance
members, we offer the following recommendations to the Congress and the
Administration
1. LStreamline the CDL Program and institute more rigorous
and uniform federal standards for testing, examination,
administration, data definitions, collection and archival.
2. LCommercial vehicle enforcement (the lead MCSAP agency in
each state) needs to be at least on an even keel with the Motor
Vehicle Administration in the state. Customer convenience is
important. And so is safety and security. These two functions
need to be balanced and integrated as much as possible to
ensure for seamless program administration and implementation.
3. LAccelerate implementation of MCSIA commercial driver
provisions, but make sure adequate resources are provided to
the states and federal government for implementation.
4. LHave state licensing personnel perform criminal
background checks on the spot on drivers attempting to acquire
CDLs with hazardous materials or passenger endorsements. Couple
this with a photo ID requirement as well.
5. LCreate an authoritative information consolidated database
(a new national central database to supplant or augment CDLIS)
for commercial driver information and provide the means to
deliver this information to the appropriate users, enforcement
and employers alike.
6. LProvide a means for the industry to help police itself by
making certain information available to motor carrier employees
responsible for making personnel decisions. Encourage motor
carriers to investigate new customers, work with and monitor
their shipper's practices for ensuring safety and security.
7. LDevelop a strategy for addressing the security concerns
in the rental and leasing business. Anyone can buy materials
from a local hardware store and rent a truck at the local gas
station to create a situation on the highway that is similar to
September 11.
8. LCreate a ``watch list'' for CDL drivers with hazardous
materials and passenger endorsements. This list would track
wanted criminals and others on national, state, and local FBI
wanted lists and send a red flag to commercial vehicle
enforcement personnel when such drivers are encountered at the
roadside. Ideally, it would integrate NCIC data and other FBI
and intelligence information relevant to terrorist activities.
9. LProvide commercial vehicle law enforcement personnel with
the appropriate resources for the technology, training, and
personnel to do their job effectively. We are not intelligence
experts, but we need to be equipped with the proper knowledge
and tools to assist those who are.
10. LImplement appropriate measures and provide persons
coming in contact with drivers the appropriate training to look
for and identify identity and document fraud.
11. LMake sure the Homeland Security Office has strong
representation from the transportation sector and is afforded
the proper authority, in consultation with state and local
authorities, to implement appropriate measures to protect our
transportation network against future terrorist acts.
12. LImplement a surface transportation technology safety and
security strategy for entry into the country through seaports
and land crossings that address both prevention and response
and include the monitoring of hazardous materials and passenger
movements and mitigating problems in the event of an incident
or attack. Such a strategy would include:
LVerification/certification of load and driver at the
time of departure and throughout the shipment lifecycle;
LIntegrate biometric identifiers with the CDL and
provide technologies with reading capability to enforcement.
Work with industry to develop a strategy for providing this
capability to consignees--to verify load and driver at the time
of arrival
LMonitoring and tracking capability of vehicles and
drivers enroute to the fleets and shippers;
LException-based reports to law enforcement in the
event of a security breach, package integrity problem (i.e.
hazardous materials release), and if a driver strays from the
intended route of travel;
LIntegrate emergency response and automated collision
notification information (E-911) in the event of an incident or
accident; and
LWireless network and centralized data center for
real-time data capture and communications capability--access
made available on a need to know basis to both industry and
enforcement
13. LDevelop and implement a nationwide public education and
outreach campaign to make people more aware of these issues and
how best to deal with any problems they may encounter. The same
should be done for those involved in the transportation
industry.
We understand that there are clear economic ramifications to what
we are suggesting and that many competing ideas are on the table. We
also understand that as a Nation we have to be measured in our
responses. Along with the airline industry, the truck and bus
industries are the lifeblood of our economy. Most drivers who hold a
commercial driver's license truly are professionals and as such, should
be treated with the respect and dignity they deserve. As a Nation we
need to do more to protect and promote this professionalism. Tightening
up the CDL Program is a very big and important first step.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. CVSA
appreciates the opportunity to be invited to present our views and
suggestions. It is our strong belief that the most effective way to
increase both transportation safety and security on our Nation's
highways is to focus on those who are most able to effect change--the
drivers and law enforcement personnel on the ground in cooperation with
motor carrier management and, hopefully, shippers.
Senator Breaux. Thank you. We will take Mr. Sheridan next.
STATEMENT OF RALPH F. SHERIDAN, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
AMERICAN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING, INC.
Mr. Sheridan. Thank you. Since the cold war, we functioned
as the world's policeman with relative impunity from homeland
attack. We have not protected the police station, however, and
today we are just beginning to understand the consequences of
our vulnerability in terms of economics, and in particular to
the transportation sector.
A formerly discounted theory of well-financed, well-trained
terrorists committing their lives en mass to accomplish their
mission is today's horrific reality. Aviation was simply the
vector of choice for that event. It could have easily have been
an attack on a military base here or overseas. It could have
been an attack on another federal building. It could have been
a breach at a port, or a border, or an attack on a highly
visible corporate facility such as in the entertainment
industry.
Regular highway cargo and air freight could also have been
involved. The delivery mechanism for achieving mass destruction
could have been a sea container going in transit and intermodal
by rail or highway with a global positioning device activated
on it that could be activated by a cell phone and detonated at
will by a terrorist. This is one horrific nightmare for which
we are woefully unprepared.
We all recognize that the transportation sector is a crime-
ridden environment, which makes it more vulnerable to a
terrorist breach. The latest facts from the National Cargo
Security Council indicate that we lose some $12 to $15 billion
a year in cargo theft. We believe, however, that there are
important advances in technology that can be applied to this
national security challenge, and help restore trust in the flow
of commerce in the transportation sector.
Today, X-ray scanning technology exists to inspect quickly
and nonintrusively trucks and sea containers, to examine the
contents for explosives or weapons of mass destruction based on
radioactive materials. American science and engineering is
delivering this technology to ports and borders around the
world. Other companies also have an array of technologies that
may have application for port and border protection, and for
truck security.
AS&E technology was developed during the cold war to scan a
Russian missile in a railroad car leaving a Russian missile
factory, to count the warheads and the size of the rocket
motor, to determine whether it complied with the terms of the
INF treaty. This technology was further enhanced and developed
for Lockheed for scanning Trident missiles for the Navy for
quality control.
In the mid-1990's, this technology was funded by the
Department of Defense for the counterdrug technology program,
initially for deployment on the Southwest border for scanning
trucks.
Today, we have nine fixed-site systems on the border
between California and Texas, and 16 mobile truck x-ray
systems. Another six mobile truck x-ray systems will be
delivered between now and the end of March to U.S. Customs,
again for scanning trucks.
In addition, here in Washington the Federal Protective
Service has a mobile x-ray system that scans all of the trucks
entering into the Ronald Reagan Building to protect against a
1993 type World Trade Center bombing. We have deployed for the
U.S. Navy a mobile x-ray system in Bahrain at the U.S. Naval
Base that scans all the trucks coming on that base to protect
against an El Qabar type truck bombing.
AS&E uses two types of x-ray technology simultaneously,
transmission x-rays, which are traditional. They penetrate the
cargo and they show density. The second, Z Backsatter, which is
our proprietary patented technology, has two functions. One is
the identification of organic materials, specifically drugs and
explosives, and second the photographic quality of sharp and
form for ease in object identification of contraband, weapons,
or trade fraud, which is very important in identifying weapons.
This technology is now being deployed extensively in the
Middle East by our allies to detect weapons and explosives, to
protect against an attack by extremists Islamic elements. It is
used in South Africa, the United Kingdom, and Hong Kong to
protect against cigarette and alcohol smuggling, illegal alien
smuggling, and other forms of trade fraud, and in Mexico the
Attorney General's Office has 10 mobile search x-ray systems
stopping trucks at highway checkpoints looking for drugs,
weapons, and stowaways, so this technology is deployed today,
and is very possible to use.
Why is this of value? The events 4 weeks ago prove that we
are woefully unprotected from sophisticated terrorist
programmed attacks. The public and business, their confidence
has reached a new low point. Insurance companies are suggesting
that they will not cover the transportation sector for acts of
terrorism. A great opportunity exists for a Government-industry
partnership to diminish the vulnerability of transportation
infrastructure to terrorist crimes.
There is a collateral benefit from improved transportation
security. Seaports and land borders are havens for criminal
activity and smuggling and cargo theft. By tightening the
portals of our country, we will also address associated
transportation crime, drug-smuggling, and trade fraud, which
costs this country tens of billions of dollars each year.
I have three recommendations. First is to commit bold
funding for the deployment of nonintrusive inspection
technologies at ports, borders, and truck weigh stations, with
a long-term goal of 100 percent confirmation of the contents of
trucks and containers. Inspection technologies could be
integrated with information technology with video surveillance
of container loading, and industry shipper participation in
verification so we know what is in those containers.
We would also fund additional R&D to enhance the
effectiveness and speed of these technologies, with the goal of
reducing the hassle factor to the transportation sector.
Finally, sanitize ports and borders by instituting
background checks on all personnel having routine access, with
the intent of weeding out criminal elements. Coast Guard
Commander Steven Flynn, who is an expert on homeland defense
and cargo transportation, stated that we can have no
integrity--let me restate this. He stated that if there is no
integrity in the transportation infrastructure, security, there
will be no flow of commerce.
There are already suggestions this week by Attorney General
John Ashcroft that we are vulnerable to additional attacks. No
one knows what is actually in sea containers arriving in our
country. We are clueless as to the threats breaching the
Canadian border. It is time to make strong and fundamental
changes that will protect the integrity of our borders against
committed terrorists and restore the flow of commerce.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheridan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ralph F. Sheridan, President and CEO,
American Science and Engineering, Inc.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee:
On September 11, 2001, a new form of global terrorism evaded the
existing aviation security regimen in three airports, rendering
obsolete previously held strategies for counter terrorism protection.
The formerly discounted theory of well-financed, well-trained
terrorists committing their lives en masse to accomplish their mission
is today's horrific reality. Aviation was simply the vector of choice
for that event. The delivery mechanism for achieving mass destruction
could have been a sea container going intermodal by rail or highway.
Regular highway cargo and airfreight could also have been involved.
While the transportation infrastructure is enormous, we also know that
it is a crime-ridden environment, which makes it more vulnerable to a
terrorist breach. There are, however, important new advances in
technology that can be applied to this national security challenge.
Today, X-ray scanning technology exists to inspect, quickly and
non-intrusively, trucks and sea containers to examine the contents for
explosives or weapons of mass destruction based on radioactive
materials. American Science and Engineering is delivering this
technology to ports and borders around the world. Other companies also
have technologies that may have application for port and border
protection. AS&E's technology was developed originally for Cold War
application to scan missiles through railcars to confirm compliance
with the INF treaty process. Later, it was applied to the scanning of
Trident missiles to assure quality compliance. In the 1990's, this
technology was funded for the specific application of truck examination
to detect drugs crossing the southwest border. Today, there are 9 AS&E
fixed site inspection systems along the Mexican Border and 16
MobileSearch TM, truck mounted systems, deployed by U.S.
Customs to scan for drugs. In addition, here in Washington a
MobileSearch system scans all trucks entering the Ronald Reagan Federal
Office Building to protect against a 1993 type World Trade Center
bombing. This technology is also stationed at the U.S. Naval Base in
Bahrain scanning all trucks entering the base in search of explosives.
AS&E uses two technologies simultaneously to inspect cargo--
traditional transmission X-rays that penetrate the cargo and show
density. The second, Z ' Backscatter, has two functions: (1)
the identification of organic materials, specifically drugs and
explosives, and (2) the photographic quality of shape and form for ease
in object identification of contraband, weapons or trade fraud.
This technology is now being deployed extensively in the Middle
East by our Allies to detect weapons and explosives that could be used
by extremist Islamic elements to attack governments. It is also used
for detection of trade fraud, cigarette and alcohol smuggling, and
illegal stowaways in South Africa, the United Kingdom and Hong Kong. In
Mexico, the Attorney General's Office has invested in 10 MobileSearch
systems to stop trucks at highway intersections looking for drugs,
weapons and stowaways.
Why is this of value? The events of 3 weeks ago prove that we are
woefully unprotected from sophisticated terrorists' programmed attacks.
The public is demanding that we protect them. Insurance companies are
suggesting they will not cover transportation sectors for acts of
terrorism. A great opportunity exists for a government/industry
partnership to diminish the vulnerability of the transportation
infrastructure to terrorist crimes.
Recently, U.S. Coast Guard Commander Stephen Flynn wrote in the New
York Times that ``We must find a way to reduce the potential of our
global transport lifelines to be conduits for terrorism. There needs to
be a far greater international cooperation in policing transnational
flows of people and goods.''
There is a collateral benefit. Seaports and land borders are havens
for criminal activity in smuggling and cargo theft. By tightening the
portals to our country, we will also address associated transportation
crime, drug smuggling and trade fraud, which costs this country
billions of dollars each year. Clearly, implementation of mass
screening programs for cargo will be expensive. There is, however, a
clear benefit--the reduction of smuggling and cargo theft that plagues
this industry.
The technology is available and demonstrated. The benefit is not
only in restoring public trust, but also in hardening our borders and
ports against terrorist acts. The shipping and cargo industry also
stands to benefit greatly by the reduction in cargo crime, which is a
huge drain on our economy and directly affects the pocketbooks of all
Americans. I ask this Committee to consider three recommendations:
1. LCommit bold funding for the deployment of non-intrusive
inspection technologies at ports, borders, and truck way
stations with a long-term goal of 100 percent confirmation of
the contents of trucks and containers. Inspection technologies
should be integrated with information technology systems, video
surveillance of container loading, and industry shipper
participation in verification.
2. LFund additional R&D efforts to enhance the effectiveness
and speed of these and new technologies to reduce the hassle
factor on the transportation sector.
3. LSanitize ports and borders by instituting background checks
on all personnel having routine access with the intent of
weeding out criminal elements.
Recently, Attorney General John Ashcroft warned of potential
additional attacks. No one knows what is actually in sea containers
arriving in our country. We are clueless as to the threats breaching
the Canadian border. It is time to make strong and fundamental changes
that will protect the integrity of our borders against committed
terrorists.
Thank you.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Sheridan.
Ms. Claybrook.
STATEMENT OF JOAN CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT,
PUBLIC CITIZEN, AND PROGRAM CO-CHAIR, ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY AND
AUTO SAFETY
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
to testify. I am testifying on behalf of Advocates for Highway
and Auto Safety, a coalition of consumer health, safety and law
enforcement organizations and insurance companies and Public
Citizen, and I will submit some items for the record to shorten
my statement.
Recent events have tragically brought to light the terrible
cost of lax oversight, uneven or weak enforcement, and gaps in
the protective regulations that we need. We have learned again
that the Nation's safety interests and our security interests
are inextricably intertwined.
With all due respect to Mr. Clapp, I must say that this is
not something new. We have 5,000 people a year killed on the
highway in large truck crashes. Two years ago, this Committee
created the agency he now heads. It was the wakeup call, it
seems to me, to the Federal Government that this should be a
priority, and using a manual as their major effort it seems to
me is useless unless it has one entry which says, action now.
We put at risk our firefighters, our police, our health
care assistants when we do not take account of the safety and
security needs of this Nation, and creating an advisory
committee is also to me a big waste of time. There used to be a
Federal Truck Safety Advisory Committee that had mostly
truckers on it, and it resisted all the regulations, many of
which we have detailed in our written testimony, that are so
desperately needed.
According to a report on chemical terrorism by the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry of the CDC, rather
than creating and transporting weapons, terrorists are very
likely to exploit regulatory vulnerabilities in commercial and
private transport of hazardous chemicals, which provide ready-
made weapons, including explosives, poisons, and nuclear
materials.
Potentially harmful industrial chemicals such as chlorine
and ammonia are widely available for use in farming,
manufacturing, water processing, and other purposes, and can be
purchased through the Internet anonymously, on the web from
sites like chemdeals.com by commercial carriers. Certain
chemicals are exempt from federal requirements concerning
placarding, shipping papers, and emergency telephone numbers,
when they are delivered within 150 miles of a farm, or, for
certain chemicals that are transported in amounts below certain
thresholds.
For example, the 4,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate
fertilizer that was used to destroy the Federal Building in
Oklahoma City was only one-quarter the amount that is exempted
in our current rules, a whopping 16,090 pounds, and that is
when it is used for intrastate travel. Shippers of agricultural
chemicals have lobbied the Congress before for additional
exemptions, and we appreciate the support of this Committee in
opposing that.
It turns out that in addition to lax oversight concerning
the purchase of chemicals, there are very few checks on who may
open shop as a commercial carrier for hazardous materials, or
who may obtain a license to become a commercial driver,
including for the transport of hazardous materials.
In general, our current safety policies make it too easy to
gain motor carrier operating authority, too easy to obtain and
keep a commercial driver's license, too easy to qualify for
driving or transporting hazardous materials which can be used
for terrorist actions, and too easy to mask violations
contained in past driving records and motor company carrier
operations.
Monitoring of activities is also very difficult, because
data acquisition and retrieval at both the federal and state
levels about past motor carrier operations and the commercial
driving records of operators of large trucks and buses is poor,
unreliable, or nonexistent, despite repeated direction by the
Congress to the Department of Transportation and to the states
to quickly build sound databases on company and driver
performance.
In fact, news reports have disclosed that some members and
associates of the terrorist network responsible for the events
of September 11 obtained commercial driver's licenses,
including hazardous material endorsements, by both legal and
illegal means.
There are also shockingly few checks upon where trucks
carrying hazardous materials may drive, including driving
routes that are close to population centers, and there is
little data and oversight by the Federal Government and the
States about the amounts and location of hazardous materials
that are in circulation each day. Despite growing concern and
repeated congressional mandates to fill major gaps in the
regulations applicable to commercial carriers, the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration and its predecessor in the
Federal Highway Administration sat on their hands for a decade.
The following partial list of safety regulations with
security implications were directed by Congress to be
accomplished but DOT is long past the statutory deadlines, some
as long ago as 1991, but rather than protect the public it
accommodated the trucking industry and other transportation
interests.
The agency has failed to complete key rulemakings mandated
by Congress. In 1988, the agency was first given a mandate to
issue a rule regarding a unique identifier, for example, a
fingerprint, to assure the identity of commercial motor vehicle
operators. Congress reiterated this goal in 1998, in TEA-21,
and directed the Secretary to complete the rulemaking by
December 1998, but there has been no action on this issue since
1991.
In fact, we looked through the agency's semiannual
regulatory agenda, and for most of these items it says, under
consideration.
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act
of 1990 directs the DOT to adopt safety permit regulations for
motor carriers transporting class A or B explosives, liquified
natural gases, hazardous materials that are extremely toxic
upon inhalation, or highway route-controlled radioactive
materials. The deadline for action was November 1991. The
agency issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in June 1993, and
since has done nothing.
In 1990, the DOT was also directed to institute a
nationally uniform system of permits for hazardous materials
transportation within 3 years of the conclusion of a study by a
working group. The working group issued its report 3 years
late, in 1996, documenting widespread defects in state
permitting practices which negatively impact safety. The agency
published two notices reviewing the report. It has done nothing
else since.
In 1994, the DOT was charged with specifying, by January
1999, the minimum safety information that new or prospective
employers must seek from former employers during the
investigation of a new hire driver's employment record. In
1998, TEA-21 modified the direction to provide protections for
commercial driver privacy. Since the agency's NPRM--that is the
notice of proposed rulemaking--in 1996, there has been no
further rulemaking to date.
TEA-21 in 1998 allowed DOT 1 year to review procedures by
the states to determine whether the current system of new
driver training and licensing, which provides very minimal
guidelines for the states, accurately measures an applicant's
knowledge and skills, and to investigate the benefits of a
graduated licensing system which requires on-road experience
before a driver is allowed to earn extra endorsements, such as
the one for hazardous materials.
An information collection notice was published by the
agency in July 1999, but the review required by Congress has
not been completed, and therefore has been no further action by
DOT.
Other rules that are more recently overdue include a rule
disqualifying a driver's CDL if the driver is convicted of a
serious offense in a noncommercial motor vehicle. The final
mandate for this rule is now over a year late. DOT is also
tardy on a rule for new motor carrier entrants, a crucial area
here, particularly if you are a terrorist forming a new
company, including consideration of a safety proficiency exam
to establish minimum requirements for the applicant motor
carriers, including foreign carriers, to ensure their knowledge
and ability to comply with federal safety standards and require
a safety review of their operations.
Under the current system, new motor carriers are able to
set up operations by completing a paper application and paying
$300, and can remain in operation as long as 18 months before
any federal safety review, and often these are done late. We
believe that this is an outrageous oversight, and that an on-
site safety review should be conducted prior to any grant of
operating authority in order to ascertain whether a carrier is
able to comply with U.S. safety standards.
In addition, the proposed rules put forward by the
administration concerning inspections and tracking data for
cross-border trucking with Mexico-domiciled carriers has been
widely viewed as wholly inadequate to protect the public from
both safety and security risks. Congress has therefore
thankfully stepped up and passed the Murray-Shelby amendments,
which fill many of the oversight gaps in the DOT rulemaking
proposals, and we appreciate the support for that.
As discussed more fully in my testimony, however, some of
these measures still do not go far enough, and others should be
considered for application by our domestic safety regulatory
program, such as the requirement for an initial onsite review
by DOT before any operating authority is granted to any new
carrier, foreign or domestic.
Other good ideas, such as equipping hazardous materials
carriers--with the GPS review technology are also basic
improvements which need to be made a part of in the federal
regulatory structure.
These are just a few examples of the agency's systematic
failures, and there are many more. In short, the agency charged
with assuring the Nation's motor carrier safety time and time
again has flouted its mandates and ignored crucial deadlines
for key safety and security initiatives. Congress must
aggressively oversee the agency's near-term rulemaking by
reiterating deadlines, ordering Inspector General or General
Accounting Office investigative reports, conducting oversight
hearings on particular rules, and building the record on the
agency's inability to honor the will of the Congress and
protect the American public.
If the agency continues to be moribund, Congress should
even consider the step of taking this power away from the
Department of Transportation. Vital public safety and security
interests are at stake, and action on these crucial items I
have mentioned today is imperative for both the public, the
Congress, and the DOT.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen, and
Program Co-chair, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee on Surface
Transportation and Merchant Marine, for the opportunity to testify
before you today on the urgent topic of improved transportation safety
and security for the people of the United States. My name is Joan
Claybrook, President of Public Citizen. Today, I am testifying on
behalf of Public Citizen and Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
(Advocates). Advocates is a coalition of consumer, health, safety, law
enforcement, insurance companies and organizations working together to
reduce motor vehicle deaths and injuries on our highways. Both Public
Citizen and Advocates have a long history of working with this
Committee on improving motor carrier safety.
The tragic events of September 11th have placed needed attention on
the fact that a carefully forged intersection of security and safety
needs in all modes of transportation is long overdue. This is
particularly true in the arena of commercial transportation of freight
and passengers by motor carriers. As a Nation, we have been lax in
adopting the kinds of stringent policies for safety oversight and
approval of domestic motor carrier operations that would provide a
ready basis for ensuring both the safety and security of people, cargo
and institutions in the U.S. In large measure, many of these
shortcomings in safety and security are the direct result of the
chronic failures of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) to fulfill explicit Congressional mandates to conduct
rulemaking and issue regulations in a timely manner that would improve
federal and state safety oversight and provide important data on motor
carrier operations.
In general, our current safety policies also make it too easy to
gain motor carrier operating authority, too easy to obtain and keep a
commercial driver's license (CDL), too easy to qualify for driving or
transporting hazardous materials which can be used for terrorist
actions against the U.S. Also, it is too easy to maintain anonymity
about past driving records and motor carrier company operations. Data
acquisition and retrieval at both the federal and state levels about
past motor carrier operations and commercial driving records of the
operators of trucks and buses is poor unreliable, or nonexistent
despite the repeated direction by Congress to the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) and the states to quickly build sound data banks
on company and driver safety performance, especially the records on
safety oversight reviews, individual vehicle inspections, and traffic
and criminal conviction records of drivers holding intrastate or
interstate licenses for the operation of commercial motor vehicles. In
fact, the FMCSA has failed to issue dozens of safety standards mandated
by Congress in seven different statutes since 1988 and is delinquent on
almost another dozen. Clearly, Congress must demand immediate action by
this agency and its new director, Mr. Cleggs.
These deficiencies in safety regulation can be readily exploited to
pose security threats. Under existing regulations, a terrorist
organization could set up a new trucking company in the U.S. or Mexico,
and obtain operating authority in the U.S. for an 18 month period
without any federal or state safety review or security check simply by
paying a fee. Drivers for such a company could obtain CDLs and
authority to transport hazardous materials essentially by taking
written exams with only a minimal on-the-road test for safety
proficiency, with no criminal background check or review for security
purposes, and with only the most rudimentary check of the driver's
prior three-year state driving record. After obtaining a hazardous
materials endorsement in addition to their CDL, these drivers can
legally drive semi-trailers carrying up to 80,000 pounds of placarded
hazardous materials on nearly all roads and through all cities in the
U.S. These materials include common, deadly gases like ammonia,
chlorine, arsine, and phosphine, which if released would form a cloud
that would cling close to the ground and cover as many as 40 square
miles.
The potential danger from hazardous materials is enormous because
of the huge amounts transported on a daily basis. According to the most
recent figures published by DOT, in 1998 there were an estimated
800,000 daily hazardous materials shipments in the U.S., constituting
over 3 billion tons of hazardous materials shipped annually. The
Changing Face of Transportation, U.S. DOT (2000). Since there is no
adequate state or national reporting hazardous materials system, these
figures are derived from indirect sources and most likely represent a
gross under reporting of total hazardous materials shipments and
tonnage. DOT also reported that in 1997 over one-quarter (28.4 percent)
of all hazardous materials was transported by truck. Id. Likewise, the
vast majority (86 percent) of the more than 14,000 annual hazardous
materials incidents reported each year between 1993 and 1997 involved
highway vehicles, i.e., trucks. Transportation Statistics Annual Report
1999, U.S. DOT (1999). Again, due to the inadequacies of the hazardous
materials incident reporting system, these figures significantly
underreport actual incidents. Thus, shortcomings in motor carrier
safety regulations have particular importance with respect to the
transportation of hazardous materials.
These serious shortcomings are magnified by even more severe
deficiencies at our shared foreign borders with Canada and Mexico. The
pending FY 2002 DOT Appropriations bill (H.R. 2299), as passed by the
Senate, goes a long way towards imposing more stringent safety controls
at our southern border which will naturally assist and improve security
procedures. Nevertheless, Congress should consider strengthening
several provisions of the legislation which may still allow for abuse
and exploitation by Mexico-domiciled motor carriers. In addition, some
of the provisions authored by Senator Murray (D-WA) and Senator Shelby
(R-AL) directed at improving the southern border, with appropriate
strengthening, may also be necessary to consider for application to our
northern border with Canada.
Domestic Motor Carrier Safety and Security Deficiencies
Chronic deficiencies in motor carrier law, regulation, and safety
oversight practices simultaneously erode both highway safety and
domestic security needs in the U.S. In most cases, these shortcomings
are the result of a persistent failure to act on the part of the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) in response to
Congressional directives which, in some instances, stretch back to the
late 1980s. Many important safety regulations have not been adopted
despite Congressional timetables. These rules, if issued, would provide
a solid trunk on which to graft the branches of U.S. security policies
in critical areas of need. The following is a brief review of some of
the major issues which affect both motor carrier safety and security in
the U.S.
Defects In the Current Commercial Driver License (CDL) Program Permit
Abuses
It is far too easy to obtain a CDL in the U.S. No training or prior
certification of any kind is needed to apply for and obtain a license
to operate a truck or bus in interstate commerce. It is even easier in
most states to obtain a license to operate a truck or bus solely
intrastate. In fact, in some states a chauffeur's license or, in some
instances, even an ordinary passenger vehicle operator's license, is
sufficient to operate a smaller commercial motor vehicle for hire.
Moreover, a not-for-hire rental even of a tractor-trailer is possible
in a number of states without having any kind of CDL.
Testing for a CDL requires no instruction and many applicants are
self-taught, have prepped with the aid of mail-order courses, or have
been given a few lessons by a truck or bus driver they know. No
certification of any kind, such as the demonstration of having passed a
federally-approved training course, has to be presented to take a
multiple choice paper examination for the basic interstate CDL. The
driving part of the test is often brief and perfunctory. Many drivers
admit that they learn how to operate a truck only through their
employment experience. This results in inexperienced drivers when they
first take to the road carrying freight throughout the U.S.
Special endorsements, such as the additional authorization to haul
placardable quantities of hazardous materials, are, again, simply
``knowledge'' tests. The applicant does not need to demonstrate any
driving skills, but only answer a set of written questions about
hazardous materials transport.
Another key shortcoming of the federal CDL rules is the lack of a
requirement for a commercial license for drivers operating trucks less
than 26,001 pounds gross vehicle weight. There are millions of single-
unit trucks weighing between 10,001 and 26,000 pounds operating in
interstate commerce with drivers who have no CDLs, are not subject to
mandatory drug and alcohol testing, and for whom the states often have
patchy, unreliable driver records of traffic and other violations and
convictions.
The time has come for the U.S. DOT to place more rigorous
requirements on the ability to obtain and renew a CDL. Specifically,
Advocates and Public Citizen support extending the CDL requirement to
vehicles weighing between 10,001 and 26,000 pounds. This action would
trigger the application of the same data collection requirements for
larger truck commercial license holders which are currently in
development pursuant to Congressional direction in both the
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century of 1998 (TEA-21) and the
Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (MCSIA).
Let me turn now to other areas of safety oversight which directly
affect the kind of information and approval procedures that are needed
to increase the safety and security of the American people.
Both Safety and Security Needs Require the Use of a Commercial Driver
Unique Identifier
Advocates and Public Citizen believe that there is a crucial, unmet
need for absolutely secure, reliable, continuing identification of
drivers to prevent unauthorized, illegal uses of the interstate CDL. A
question lurking in the background is whether such a unique identifier
ought also to be required even for licenses allowing intrastate-only
commercial motor vehicle transportation. The Truck and Bus Safety and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1988 directed the Secretary to issue
regulations not later than December 31, 1990, establishing minimum
uniform standards for a biometric identification system to ensure the
identity of commercial drivers operating vehicles weighing more than
26,000 pounds. In 1998, Congress subsequently amended the requirement
in TEA-21 to remove the mandate that commercial drivers specifically
shall have biometric identifiers and substituted the requirement that
CDLs contain some form of unique identifier after January 1, 2001, to
minimize fraud and illegal duplication. The Secretary was directed to
complete regulations on this new legislative mandate by December 9,
1998 (180 days after enactment). However, there has been no action on
this issue and the agency lists it as ``Next Action Undetermined'' in
its latest semi-annual regulatory agenda.
The Previous Employment Records and Safety Performance History of New
Commercial Drivers Are Still Not Being Provided to Employers
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Authorization Act of 1994,
directed the DOT Secretary to specify the minimum safety information
that new or prospective employers must seek from former employers
during the investigation of a driver's employment record. However, the
FMCSA has issued only a notice of proposed rulemaking in 1996 and
Congress, in the 1998 TEA-21, gave the provision a new statutory
deadline of January 1999. Congress also modified the rulemaking charge
to the Secretary to include protection for commercial driver privacy
and to establish procedures for the review, correction, and rebuttal of
inaccurate records on any commercial driver. The new TEA-21 provision
went so far as to also protect previous employers against liability for
revealing safety performance records in accordance with the regulations
issued by the Secretary.
Unfortunately, this crucial regulation which has both major safety
and security applications has received no further rulemaking action
since 1996, and the FMCSA has missed the deadline for completing
rulemaking by almost 2 years. In addition, many trucking companies have
demonstrated an unwillingness to supply such information even under a
``hold harmless'' provision in federal law. The FMCSA should
immediately issue a final rule to require that prospective employers
request such information and that previous employers transmit that
information under penalties for refusal. A collateral issue is whether
revelation of any services problem posing a threat to others should be
shared with all enforcement and security oversight authorities after
the individual has the opportunity to rebut any accusations. In light
of recent events, and the published reports that alleged terrorists
sought to obtain CDLs and hazardous materials endorsements, criminal
background checks for CDL applicants, and additional, appropriate
security investigation of CDL holders who seek hazardous materials
endorsement, should be required as part of the FMCSA final rule.
Performance-Based Commercial Driver License Testing and Training Would
Provide Important Data on Operator History, Qualifications, and
Competence
TEA-21 required the Secretary to complete not later than one year
following enactment of the bill, that is, by June 9, 2000, a review of
the procedures established and implemented by the states pursuant to
federal law governing the CDL to determine if the current system for
testing is an accurate measure of an applicant's knowledge and skills.
The review also required the FMCSA to identify methods of improving
testing and licensing standards, including the benefits of a graduated
licensing system (allowing for expanded driving privileges over time).
A notice proposing an information survey was published in the Federal
Register on July 19, 1999. However, the review mandated by Congress to
be completed more than a year ago remains undone and there has been no
further published action on the graduated licensing survey.
Advocates and Public Citizen believe that this issue has important
security implications for the safety of the American people. As
indicated earlier in this testimony, applicants can easily take a CDL
test in many states with no required instruction and little actual
driving experience, pass the test, and be awarded a CDL for
unrestricted truck operation in interstate commerce. We are strong
supporters of mandatory driver entry-level and special endorsement
training to secure a CDL, to transport of hazardous materials, and to
operate Longer Combination Vehicles and school buses. We believe that
drivers should not only receive federally-required training, but also
undergo lengthy periods of restricted driving privileges to determine
their safety and competence. A graduated licensing program with
mandatory training certification from recognized, federally-approved
driver training institutions as a prerequisite for gaining a CDL not
only would provide for better, safer drivers, but it also would provide
sustained information on every CDL candidate at each stage of training,
certification, and graduated licensing.
Serious Offenses by Commercial Drivers in Non-Commercial Motor Vehicles
Need To Be Recorded and Accessed By Enforcement Authorities
The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (MCSIA) directs
the Secretary to issue regulations by December 9, 2000, providing for
the disqualification of an applicant for a CDL if the driver has been
convicted of a serious offense in a non-commercial motor vehicle
resulting in license revocation, cancellation, or suspension, and of a
drug or alcohol offense involving a non-commercial motor vehicle. The
FAA was long chastised for not enacting similar rules for pilots as
well. The final regulation must specify the minimum disqualification
period.
A notice of proposed rulemaking was issued on May 4, 2001. A final
rule on this mandate is now more than nine months overdue. In
combination with current state practices that mask or expunge driver
violations after only a few years which under this statutory
requirement would disqualify a commercial driver, driver conviction
records for CDL holders are patchy and incomplete. Most states maintain
official driving records for only three years and many states regularly
mask or expunge a commercial driver's record for convictions which
otherwise would have triggered CDL suspension or disqualification.
Having complete, long-term records of commercial driver violations in
both commercial and non-commercial vehicles would provide necessary
information about serious offenses, including criminal offenses,
committed by current or potential CDL holders or about applicants who
previously had CDLs that they allowed to expire for a time without
immediate renewal.
There Currently are No New Motor Carrier Entrant Requirements that Test
a Company's Safety Proficiency and Fitness to Carry Freight or
Passengers
As was pointed out in the beginning of this testimony, it is far
too easy for carriers to apply for and be granted interstate operating
authority to haul freight and passengers in the U.S. The Secretary is
directed in the MCSIA of December 1999 to require through regulation
that each owner and each operator granted new operating authority shall
undergo a safety review within the first 18 months after the owner or
operator begins motor carrier operations. This timeframe for evaluating
the safety of all new motor carriers is triggered by a requirement for
the Secretary to initiate rulemaking to establish minimum requirements
for applicant motor carriers, including foreign motor carriers, to
ensure their knowledge of federal safety standards. The Secretary is
also directed to consider requiring a safety proficiency examination
for motor carriers applying for interstate operating authority.
The FMCSA has continued since enactment of the MCSIA in December
1999 to award new operating authority to applicant motor carriers
without any safety fitness evaluations. Also, there has been no
rulemaking to establish minimum requirements for new entrants to
demonstrate their safety knowledge and no public consideration of the
need for a safety proficiency test. The FMCSA, however, has proposed
the 18-month safety review for Mexico-domiciled motor carriers in its
proposed rulemaking of May 3, 2001, to implement the North American
Free Trade Agreement. The requirements for domestic new carriers should
be no less than for Mexican new entrants.
Essentially, motor carriers can presently gain domestic operating
authority without any evaluation of the operating history of the
company, of the drivers in the company's employ, or the quality of its
safety management and equipment. Only the payment of federal fees is
necessary. The key question here is whether evaluation of the company
and its safety practices should occur after it already has operated for
up to a year and a half, or whether a safety fitness evaluation and
other information which also could have security value should be a
threshold requirement before any award of operating authority is
granted.
The Murray-Shelby provisions included in H.R. 2299, now in
conference, would require both initial and subsequent safety evaluation
of foreign carriers to ensure that they have adopted adequate safety
practices before they are even allowed to operate on U.S. roads.
Advocates and Public Citizen believe that Congress should consider
requiring an initial safety evaluation of domestic carriers as well,
including successful performance on a safety proficiency examination,
as a basis for considering awards of conditional operating authority.
Permanent operating authority should be made contingent upon a
subsequent acceptable onsite safety review after a year-and-a-half of
operating under an award of temporary operating authority.
In this regard, we believe that, at a minimum, the prior history of
a company which may have been previously incorporated but went out of
business should be investigated at the time that an application for
operating authority is submitted. Moreover, a preliminary safety
evaluation of the company and its drivers should be accomplished before
temporary operating authority is granted for a maximum of a year and a
half. Following that period, a second, complete safety fitness review
should be performed to determine if the company should be awarded
permanent operating authority. Also, a safety proficiency test should
be mandatory at the time of initial operating authority application.
All of these prudent and reasonable actions were directed by Congress
but continue to languish at FMCSA. If the agency would implement these
rules, both the safety and the security of motor carrier operators
would be significantly improved.
Exempted Quantities of Highway Transported Hazardous Materials are Too
Generous and Could be Used to Harm the United States
The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), a modal
administration within U.S. DOT, issued a final rule in January 1997
conforming most intrastate shipper and carrier hazardous materials
transportation to the federal Hazardous Materials Regulations. This
action was directed by Congress in the Hazardous Materials Uniform
Transportation Safety Act of 1990. However, RSPA adopted broad
exemptions in its final regulation to respond to concerns about the
burdens of hazardous materials transportation compliance for intrastate
agricultural interests, especially for farmers. We believe that these
exemptions, whatever their merit when first adopted, need Congressional
review to determine if they require modification. Let me cite some of
the reasons.
In its final rule, RSPA provided extensive exemptions for
agricultural motor carrier hazardous materials transport, including
waivers of requirements for shipping papers, placarding, emergency
telephone numbers, and hazardous materials training for motor vehicle
transport of hazardous materials within 150 miles of a farm. Moreover,
specific exemptions were also granted in the rule for intrastate-only
transportation by farmers of maximum quantities of certain hazardous
materials, including 16,094 pounds of ammonium nitrate fertilizer in
bulk packaging, 502 gallons of certain liquids or gases, and 5,070
pounds of other kinds of agricultural products. Other exemptions were
permitted for small quantities of what are often flammable fuels and
gases, or toxic chemicals, as incidental ``materials of trade'' used in
the course of daily business. RSPA also allowed non-specification cargo
tanks and bulk packaging of certain weights to be exempted from federal
requirements governing hazardous materials transport in order to reduce
economic burdens. In order to further reduce such burdens, RSPA
permitted, without restrictions, additional packaging exemptions to be
enacted at the discretion of the states and issued a further notice
delaying the effective date of compliance from July to October 1998 to
facilitate state legislative action to enact such exemptions.
It is necessary to re-examine these exemptions from hazardous
materials transportation requirements, including the maximum permitted
amounts of hazardous materials and ``materials of trade'' which both
directly and indirectly can be used to inflict damage at specific
targets in the U.S. If you recall, about 4,000 pounds of ammonium
nitrate fertilizer was used to destroy the federal building in Oklahoma
City. This is only one-quarter the maximum amount currently exempted
under RSPA regulation. Not only are these items susceptible to being
used as weapons against people and institutions, but the data system at
the state levels for documenting the purchase and movement of these
hazardous materials by highway is exceedingly poor and unreliable.
The FMCSA has Failed to Implement a Congressionally Mandated Safety
Fitness Permit for the Transportation of Certain Hazardous
Materials
In this connection, I would also like to point out that the same
1990 federal hazardous materials legislation directs the Secretary to
adopt stronger federal motor carrier safety permit regulations for
motor carriers transporting Class A or B explosives, liquefied natural
gases, hazardous materials that are extremely toxic upon inhalation, or
highway route-controlled radioactive materials in both intrastate and
interstate commerce. Most importantly, the law allowed permits to be
granted only on the basis of a carrier successfully completing a safety
fitness finding for carrying these hazardous materials. A less than
``Satisfactory'' rating on the safety test would automatically result
in the denial of the permit application. Implementation of the permit
program would also produce a reliable data bank of information on the
operations of motor carriers transporting these specific hazardous
materials.
The deadline for final regulations was November 16, 1991. A notice
of proposed rulemaking was issued on June 17, 1993, but the FMCSA has
since taken no further action. The topic is listed in the agency's most
recent semi-annual regulatory agenda (May 14, 2001) as ``Next Action
Undetermined.'' This long overdue rulemaking needs to be completed
expeditiously to ensure that a hazardous materials safety fitness
requirement weeds out motor carriers that are unable to comply with the
important federal requirements for safely transporting the specific
hazardous materials specified in the 1990 legislation. Congress should
re-examine whether the list of what are considered ``high-risk''
hazardous materials should be expanded to include other hazardous
materials, especially those which might be used to threaten or harm
Americans.
Furthermore, Advocates is convinced that appropriate regulation of
hazardous materials transportation should include a requirement that
hazardous materials carriage must be limited to trucks equipped with
Global Positioning System (GPS) technology that permits real-time
location tracking of hazardous materials loads. Moreover, holders of
CDLs with a hazardous materials endorsement should have biometric
identifiers and be required to use computerized smart cards in order to
access and operate vehicles carrying hazardous materials.
In addition, current routing regulations for non-radioactive
hazardous materials highway transportation are too sketchy and
inadequate. The federal requirements do not require states even to have
highway routing criteria for non-radioactive hazardous materials and
they continue to allow loads of hazardous materials to be transported
on most roads and through major metropolitan areas across the Nation
regardless of population or traffic density. In fact, the burdens
imposed on the states by the Federal Highway Administration to justify
alternative, diversionary routes for public and environmental
protection have a chilling effect on the willingness of state and local
public authorities to tell trucking concerns hauling hazardous
materials to use longer, safer routes. Congress should place much
tighter restrictions on the routing of hazardous materials transported
by trucks and direct the states, pursuant to Congressionally directed
federal regulations, to ensure uniform action throughout the Nation, to
adopt safer alternate routings for certain kinds of hazardous materials
which will lower the risks of spills or of terrorist actions which can
adversely affect sensitive environmental areas and dense population
centers.
A National Uniform System of Permits for Hazardous materials Carriers
is Urgently Needed to Enhance Safety and to Improve Reporting
and Data Collection
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990
directed the Secretary to institute a nationally uniform system of
permits necessary for motor carrier transport of hazardous materials.
The date of the final regulation was linked by Congress to a report of
a working group on what actions were needed to accomplish this. The
group, however, issued its recommendations 2\1/2\ years late on March
15, 1996, which was more than 5 years ago.
Despite the fact that the report documents widespread defects in
state permitting practices that directly affect the safety of and data
on hazardous materials movements by motor vehicle, two notices
reviewing the report have been issued to date, in 1996 and in 1998,
without any indication of agency willingness to institute the uniform
permitting system directed by law 11 years ago. No further action has
been taken by the FMCSA to date. It is clear from an examination of the
report that there is no reliable national database of information about
the number of hazardous materials shipments, the quantity of what is
transported, its nature, or its exact origins and destinations. State
permitting practices do not currently keep complete, long-term records
accurately indicating these and other facets of hazardous materials
transportation. The national uniform permitting system is long overdue
for implementation by DOT. Congress should consider the need to place
more stringent data collection and retrieval requirements on
intrastate-only highway transport of hazardous materials, especially
any continuing exemptions for certain quantities of specific materials.
Data Systems Identifying Motor Carriers and Drivers at Both the State
and Federal Levels are Unreliable and Incomplete
Congress has recognized in both TEA-21 and in the Motor Carrier
Management Information System (MCMIS) that motor carrier data systems
are incomplete and inadequately linked among states, and between the
states and the federal government. Timely, accurate information on
motor carriers, including inspection results, Out of Service Orders,
carrier and driver violations either do not exist in many cases or
cannot be retrieved quickly by one state from another state.
Congress may want to consider accelerating the program of data
collection and analysis improvements that it called for in Section 225
of the MCMIS. The advent of a central data repository with rapid access
by both safety oversight and security authorities is crucial to
protecting the welfare of the American people. Currently, the
legislation calls for primary responsibility in setting up the state
system of data collection and reporting, and communication of those
data to the federal government, to be vested in the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Although NHTSA is very
knowledgeable about the creation and operations of data systems,
current resources at the agency and the amount of funding originally
authorized in Section 225 may not enable rapid development and
implementation of the data system. The provision presently has no
timeline for putting the data system in place. Advocates believes that
a deadline is necessary for getting the system up and running, and that
$5 million each year is not sufficient for ensuring rapid acceleration
and implementation.
Border Commercial Transportation Safety and Security
Advocates and Public Citizen believe that U.S. cross-border motor
carrier freight and passenger transportation must be subjected to a far
higher level of intense, detailed security oversight to ensure U.S.
domestic safety against potential terrorist threats. Implementing
enhanced border security oversight simultaneously involves onsite motor
carrier fitness evaluation. There is no bright line separating motor
carrier security concerns from safety issues.
Motor Carrier Safety Fitness and Driver Checks Proposed in H.R. 2299
Should Apply to Mexico-Domiciled Carriers Only Operating Within
the Border Zone
It is crucially important that the pending Murray-Shelby provisions
in H.R. 2299, requiring more rigorous motor carrier safety evaluations,
be enacted into law as soon as possible. The Murray-Shelby provisions
provide for full safety reviews performed on-site for all Mexican
carriers applying to operate beyond the border commercial zones, with a
required finding of ``Satisfactory'' before conditional authority is
granted and again before granting permanent authority. This avoids the
pitfalls of the current FMCSA proposed rules which require only paper
applications to determine whether a Mexico-domiciled motor carrier is
granted operating authority without any actual on-site safety
evaluation.
However, this section as well as others in the bill apply a number
of important safety requirements with security implications only to
Mexican carriers operating beyond the current commercial zones. Without
on-site safety reviews for all Mexico-domiciled carriers, it is
impossible for safety and security authorities to determine the
legitimacy of the companies applying for commercial zone-only operating
authority.
For example, another section of the Murray-Shelby provisions
requires electronic verification of every Mexico-domiciled motor
carrier driver's license status and validity at border crossing points,
but only for carriers operating beyond the border zone. Congress should
extend this policy and practice to cover all foreign drivers of all
Mexico-domiciled carriers crossing into the U.S. Additionally, much
more careful coordination and verification of licensure is needed with
the government of Mexico to validate a driver's Licencia Federal de
Conductor before a driver attempts to cross into the U.S. Advocates and
Public Citizen are concerned with drivers presenting at border
checkpoints fraudulent Mexican licenses that have been forged or
exchanged. The U.S. should also work with the Mexican government to
adopt for Mexican licenses an unambiguous driver identifier, such as a
biometric identifier, to ensure license validity and non-
exchangeability. In addition, insurance coverage should be verified at
the border.
There are other examples of requirements in the Senate-passed DOT
Appropriations bill dealing with motor carrier inspection and driver
checks that Congress may want to consider extending to Mexico-domiciled
carriers operating only within the border zone. These include the
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) decal, the requirement for a
distinctive registration number of Mexican motor carriers, and the U.S.
insurance requirement. Right now, these provisions apply only to those
Mexico-domiciled carriers that will operate outside the border zone.
Congress Should Consider Directing the FMCSA to Rescind Operating
Authority of Foreign Motor Carriers that Have Serious Safety
Violations
Congress should also strengthen the Murray-Shelby provisions to
require that certain specified, serious violations involving dangerous
or illegal operations by a foreign motor carrier will result in a
lifetime exclusion from grants of U.S. operating authority. For
example, transporting undeclared, highly toxic, radioactive, or
explosive hazardous materials, using drivers with no valid Mexican
driver licenses, or transporting hazardous materials or passengers
without insurance could be regarded as violations so serious as to bar
a company for life from operating in the U.S. A difficulty with
enforcing such a prohibition, of course, is that a company may dissolve
but re-incorporate with essentially the same managers, practices, and
drivers as before and begin to engage in the same abuses that triggered
the original ban on its operating authority.
These recommendations are the minimum steps necessary to gain
uniformity in coverage of Mexico-domiciled motor carriers. They will
ensure improved data gathering and verification procedures for both
enhanced safety and security of Mexico-domiciled motor carriers.
Furthermore, measures such as those addressing driver license
validation and unique driver identifiers, may also be necessary to
implement at our northern border with Canada.
Foreign Motor Carrier Transportation of Hazardous Materials is Poorly
Enforced and Oversight By Federal Authorities Must Be
Strengthened
Let me know turn to a pressing issue of public safety and security
that Congress may need to evaluate in depth. Strengthened safety and
security measures are especially imperative in the area of hazardous
materials transportation across both our northern and southern borders.
Unfortunately, we have systemic weaknesses in our oversight and control
of hazardous materials movements across our borders.
It has been well-documented for many years that Mexico-domiciled
motor carriers chronically fail to adhere to U.S. hazardous materials
transportation regulations with regard to proper containerization,
shipping papers accurately portraying the materials being hauled, and
correct display of required placards. Also, Mexico-domiciled carriers
repeatedly attempt to transport hazardous materials that cannot be
brought into the U.S. by truck or cannot be legally disposed of here.
According to information from the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance,
the FMCSA, and the U.S. General Accounting Office, past inspections at
the U.S. southern border have shown that the overwhelming majority of
Mexico-domiciled carriers are not complying with Environmental
Protection Agency, RSPA, and FMCSA requirements for transportation of
approved hazardous materials in the border zone. Also, any hazardous
materials carriers which appear to have proper shipping papers and
placards are often waved through border check points without inspectors
actually verifying that the materials on board match shipping papers or
external placards, or that there is not other, illegal hazardous
materials or contraband being transported.
This is especially worrisome because the proposed FMCSA paper
certifications do not require Mexico-domiciled motor carriers to
demonstrate that they are knowledgeable about, and actually able to
comply with, U.S. hazardous materials regulations. At no point in the
proposed application process does a Mexico-domiciled carrier have to
attest that it intends to carry hazardous materials. If, subsequent to
a grant of temporary operating authority, a carrier decides to
transport hazardous materials, nothing compels the carrier to reveal
that fact right away.
Moreover, the application process has no requirement that the
carrier, if subsequent to a grant of operating authority begins to
carry hazardous materials, immediately notify the FMCSA to demonstrate
its knowledge of the considerably more demanding requirements for doing
so. This is a major safety and security shortcoming in the application
process. Advocates and Public Citizen also point out that if a foreign
motor carrier registers with the RSPA to carry hazardous materials, as
is currently required, the form is used only for the purpose of
collecting federal hazardous materials transportation fees - it does
not ask for any demonstration by a carrier that it is knowledgeable
about the requirements for, or is proficient in, the safe transport by
highway of hazardous materials. In addition, this registration with the
RSPA is not sent to the FMCSA.
This means that the FMCSA can become aware of a carrier's decision
to carry hazardous materials only when: (1) the foreign carrier has one
or more of its trucks undergo inspections; (2) the carrier undergoes a
later safety compliance review which, for new entrants, can be up to 18
months following an initial award of operating authority; or, (3) the
foreign carrier files an updated MCS-150 carrier census form every two
years, a requirement only recently adopted by the FMCSA.
As for the last mentioned action, acknowledging hazardous materials
transportation on a census form only flags the agency of the bare-bones
fact that the carrier now transports hazardous materials. The
acknowledgement does nothing more than simply note a change in
services. Even then, there is no requirement directing the foreign
carrier separately to demonstrate its proficiency in and knowledge of
the safety requirements for transporting hazardous materials. It is
therefore crucial that at the initial point of contact with a Mexico-
domiciled motor carrier applying for U.S. operating authority (i.e.,
the preliminary on-site safety evaluation called for in the Murray-
Shelby provisions in H.R. 2299), each applicant carrier attest to its
intention to carry hazardous materials and demonstrate its proficiency
in understanding and applying U.S. laws and regulations packaging and
transporting hazardous materials. In addition, any motor carrier
deciding to transport hazardous materials after an initial award of
temporary operating authority or a final award after the 18-month
probationary period, must be required to re-apply immediately for a new
award of operating authority.
If such a carrier fails to make such an application and is found to
be transporting hazardous materials without specific operating
authority to do so, its rights to operate in the U.S. should be
immediately terminated and it should be penalized. A renewed award of
operating authority should be contingent upon satisfactory testing of a
carrier's proficiency in safely transporting hazardous materials and a
full inspection of its facilities, equipment, drivers, and management
practices for transporting legal hazardous materials in the U.S. These
requirements should be made part of the completed rulemaking by the
Federal Highway Administration to implement the hazardous materials
federal safety permit system originally directed by Congress in the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990.
I would like to emphasize again that many of these considerations
for improved safety and security should be scrutinized for application
to Canadian motor carriers as well.
Mexico and Canada Must Share Inspection and Security Oversight
Responsibilities
It is clear that most of the security oversight apparatus that
needs to be implemented at our borders, including personnel,
procedures, and facilities, naturally interface with motor carrier
safety oversight actions. Both facilities and personnel can share
certain surveillance and safety oversight responsibilities that often
will simultaneously provide both security risk appraisal and safety
evaluation of motor carrier cross-border traffic. This points up the
unarguable need for the rapid construction and operation of fixed
inspection stations at every U.S. border crossing point both in Mexico
and in Canada as well in order to conduct full (Level 1) inspections
and detailed security checks. Also, it is obvious that the criticisms
of both the U.S. Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector
General and the U.S. General Accounting Office about the lack of motor
carrier inspectors being on-duty at most border crossing points during
all hours of open border point operation have to be met with quick
action to ensure that no truck or bus comes across our border without
being inspected both by Customs officials and motor carrier safety
inspectors.
I also would like to emphasize here in closing that the task of
simultaneously improving both safety and security at our borders and
inside the U.S. cannot be a unilateral task undertaken only by the U.S.
Foreign governments sharing borders with the U.S. need to dramatically
strengthen their systems of validating the motor carriers and
commercial drivers incorporated and licensed in Canada and Mexico both
to guarantee their safety fitness and to ensure that freight and
drivers that are found to be security risks are not granted permission
to conduct motor carrier operations. To date, the government of Mexico,
in particular, has chronically failed to hold up its end of the bargain
in establishing its own demanding safety approval regime to ensure that
only safe commercial vehicles and drivers reach our southern border
asking for entry into the U.S.
The Dangers of Nuclear Waste Transportation Must be Addressed
On September 12, Energy Secretary Abraham suspended Department of
Energy nuclear shipments, acknowledging that radiological shipments are
potential terrorist targets.
If the proposal for a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada
moves forward, a large number of commercial nuclear waste shipments
will take place over a period of approximately 30 years, constituting
the largest nuclear waste transportation project in history. The
shipments would number between 30,000 and 100,000, depending on if the
mode of transportation is road or rail.\1\ Because a rail line to the
site does not exist and the cost of building it would be approximately
1 billion dollars, it is likely that the casks will travel by highway,
necessitating the larger number of shipments. Although the Department
of Energy (DOE) has not released the exact transportation routes,
studies by the State of Nevada and the DOE disclose that 43 states
would be directly impacted.
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\1\ ``Risky Transit--The Federal Government's Risky and Unnecessary
Plan to Ship Spent Nuclear Fuel and Highly Radioactive Waste on the
Nation's Highways and Railroads,'' A report by the Nevada Agency for
Nuclear Projects found at http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news2001/
nn11313.pdf (10-05-01).
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A report by DOE showed that 109 communities with populations over
100,000 would be affected by shipments, increasing the threat of a
terrorist attack in an urban setting.\2\ Also, as part of the 1986
Environmental Assessment for the Yucca Mountain repository site, the
DOE conducted a study that found that a severe accident in a rural area
involving a high-speed impact would be devastating. They calculate that
it would be difficult to fight fire involving fuel oxidation that would
contaminate a 42-square-mile area, require 462 days to clean up and
cost $620 million
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\2\ ``Nevada Potential Repository Preliminary Transportation
Strategy Study 2,'' TRW Environmental Safety Systems, Inc (DOE's
management and operations contractor for Yucca Mountain project),
February 1996.
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In reality, because the transportation casks have never had full-
scale testing, no one knows the true consequences of an accident or
attack. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sponsored a study in
1987 by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. This study,
commonly referred to as the ``Modal Study,'' used computer modeling to
predict cask responses to accident conditions. The study was inadequate
and the conditions that were used in the computer analysis did not
represent real-life scenarios.\3\
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\3\ ``Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway
Accident Conditions,'' prepared by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in
1987.
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The NRC is planning to update the 1987 spent fuel transportation
study. This study should fully explore the risk associated with
different types of potential attacks, including high-impact accidents
involving various types of fuel. As the state of Nevada told the NRC in
1998, ``It is imperative that the Commission factor into its
regulations the changing nature of threats posed by domestic
terrorists, the increased availability of advanced weaponry and the
greater vulnerability of larger shipping casks traveling across the
country.''
In March 2000, the NRC released a study prepared by Sandia National
Laboratory, ``Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates,''
that updates the baseline 1977 study on radioactive material
transports. The report is very optimistic about the risk for nuclear
accidents and says that the older study overstates the potential risk.
However, the new report does not even discuss risks associated with
some type of terrorist attack on a nuclear shipment and it
underestimates accident probability and consequences. Sandia also
prepared this report without permitting stakeholder comments on the
draft.
In short, to assure the safety and security of the public, Congress
should instruct the DOE and the NRC to take account of all potential
risks and their full consequences in evaluating and regulating the
transport of nuclear waste.
The Impact on Firefighters and Police of Motor Carrier Safety and
Security Deficiencies
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we want to say a word about the firefighters
and police who must deal with safety and security problems. The world
now knows the enormous sacrifice these brave individuals make when
disasters occur because of their incredibly brave response in New York
and the terrible deaths and injuries they suffered. What the public may
not know is that this kind of personal sacrifice occurs every day all
over the United States in large communities and small. But the cost and
burden on our state and local officials to respond to emergencies
involving individuals intent on causing harm or with access to
hazardous materials must be considered as the Congress and the
Department of Transportation makes decisions about what precautions to
require in granting operating authority in the United States and at the
border, in driver licensing, in hazardous materials permitting, and in
the imposition of penalties to deter future misbehavior. Often times
these individuals, many of whom are volunteers, do not receive adequate
training to cope with these sorts of emergencies. Moreover, many of the
departments are understaffed and lack adequate equipment for coping
with an accident involving hazardous materials. Finally, they are put
at greater peril when the vehicles they are dealing with have not been
properly placarded. If we take precautions to prevent the problems we
are discussing today, our fire fighters and police will be exposed to
far less personal and unnecessary risk, as of course will the public.
Often when these risks occur one by one across the country and not in
one massive tragedy, they escape public and press attention and,
unfortunately, government willingness to be the federal cop on the
regulatory beat, fully enforcing the law. As you consider your
responsibilities in preventing future tragedies, be they large
disasters or affecting a small number of people each day, we urge you
to remember that 5,300 Americans are killed each year by large trucks
on our highways, and that without strong safety and security measures
that we know should be adopted, we are inviting terrorists and short-
sighted individuals to wreck harm on innocent people.
That completes my testimony. I am prepared to respond to any
questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Ms. Claybrook, and thank all
members of the panel for being with the Committee this morning,
and your testimony. I think, Ms. Claybrook, in following up on
your concerns about the Department of Transportation and the
Motor Carrier Safety Administration, I also hope they got the
message that this Committee was telling them that their actions
are totally unacceptable.
Administrator Clapp has just been there since Thursday, but
he has a terrific job on his hands to get these things moving.
What we have now is totally unacceptable. In fact, I think with
regard to the patch quilt type of operation we have among the
States, that there ought to be some federal standards in
issuance of these commercial driver's licenses. Apparently,
from Mr. Sullivan's testimony and others, there is a huge
amount of flexibility among the various states as to how they
set their requirements for the right to have a commercial
driver's license in the state.
Can I have your thoughts, and I almost hate to say we ought
to have another federal requirement, because we have yet to
implement the ones we passed 2 years ago so adding more, if
they do not implement them, I do not know what the heck we are
going to do. Perhaps we ought to consider the requirement that
there be background checks, criminal background checks on
people who drive on the interstate highways, particularly when
you are driving a hazmat truck loaded with something that is
potentially very dangerous.
We could have all the safety requirements we want, but
behind all safety is a driver. A truck can be as safe as we can
possibly make it, and Mr. Sheridan can provide all the
scientific information about what is in the cargo, but
ultimately it goes back to the driver, his qualifications, his
ability, his training or her training in all of these instances
to determine whether that is a safe means of transportation. He
or she is the captain of the truck, the captain of the ship,
just like the captain of a plane or the captain of a ship
transporting passengers.
So the question is, and I did not realize this, but
apparently there is not a federal requirement for a criminal
background check. Is there a federal requirement on drug-
testing, could I have some comments on this, Mr. Pantuso?
That classic case in New Orleans--and I keep going back to
it. I do not want to, but it is the obvious--this person should
not have been driving a bus. If they had had a criminal
background check, a medical check, a drug check, he would not
have been there, and maybe 22 people would not have lost their
lives. What is wrong with having a federal requirement that
these things be done before someone gets a commercial driver's
license?
Mr. Pantuso. Absolutely nothing, Mr. Chairman. It is
something we would support. We supported it in our testimony,
and you heard others here support it, especially in view of the
New Orleans accident. There is also an issue of collecting data
and collecting information on the driver. There may not be a
criminal problem. It may be something that has blemished the
driving record, and that blemish should follow the driver and
follow his CDL wherever he or she goes.
Senator Breaux. Staff is telling me there is, in fact, a
regulation in place, in effect for drug-testing for drivers
now. Mr. Acklie.
Mr. Acklie. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there is.
Senator Breaux. Does everyone have to follow it regardless
of what state they are in?
Mr. Acklie. At the time they get the CDL, of course, they
have to have, and at the time of employment they have to have,
and there is random tests also that are administered, so they
try to catch it.
Apparently what happened in the case that you referred to
is that person probably had the check and did not get caught on
a random check, so it probably goes to retesting.
Mr. Pantuso. Again, Mr. Chairman, it goes to the issue
sharing information among juridictions and agencies. It goes to
the liability concerns the carriers have in sharing with one
another. In the situation of the driver in New Orleans, he did
fail a drug test with another company that he was not working
for but applied to work for, and that information was never
passed on to Custom Coach, the company that ultimately had the
accident, so there is a gap in the information-sharing that
needs to be plugged.
Ms. Claybrook. One of the things the Congress gave this
agency was the responsibility of doing this, but also gave the
employers liability protection so that they could communicate
information about past records. Without liability protection,
employers do not do this. I think it is a two-sided issue here.
In addition to the drivers, of course, it is the companies. The
companies have an enormous responsibility here to make sure
that they keep track of the drivers, and that the drivers are
safe, and the records of the drivers.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Acklie, on that point Ms. Claybrook is
making, suppose someone comes to your company and applies for
employment. You ask him if he is a terrorist and he checks the
box that says no, you than ask him if he is a criminal and he
checks the box that says no. Is there any way, or requirement,
that your company can get information that he has a previous
history of perhaps being fired from other trucking companies,
or has been in trouble? How do you check?
I mean, it is easy to check the box no, I am not a bad guy,
but then again no one is going to admit that he is any of these
things. How would an employer looking at an individual to be
hired know that this individual does not have a history, in
fact, of drug abuse and/or criminal record, or had been fired
three or four times from a previous employer?
Mr. Acklie. Mr. Chairman, that is really a good question.
It really comes to the crux of a lot of what needs to be done.
First of all, there really is a very difficult time to do that,
because we can do the local checks and so forth, but as I said,
we cannot access the federal database, even though if we ran a
home for children, and so forth like that, you can check the
database of employees, and the bank employees and so forth. We
cannot access.
What we do is, we check DAC, which is a commercial service
that tries to check for us, and you also have the employers,
sir, who, basically the information we can get from another
employer is eligible for rehire or not eligible for rehire.
Basically, everybody is scared to give somebody else--because
they are afraid to be sued, and so basically if you come to our
company, what you are going to get is, you are going to get if
we have discharged somebody for--let us say, if they were on
the random violation, and we found they were using drugs, we
will say not eligible for rehire, but it is such a thing that
we are all scared. We do need that legislation. We do need to
be able to access that criminal database, and what you said is
exactly right.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Gleason, give me some thoughts from the
Teamsters. The driver is a real key in all of this, knowing he
is a good, competent, trained driver that has not had a history
of criminal record, and of course obviously, in trying to find
all of this information, you also have individual rights that
need to be protected, but also the public has a right to be
protected and a right to expect that people who are handling
hazardous cargo or large trucks, buses, or airplanes, or ships
or anything else, are people that are qualified, trustworthy to
do so. What are the Teamsters thoughts on this?
Mr. Gleason. For initial background checks we find most of
our carriers do perform background checks. They are pretty
extensive. I think they continue to perform those background
checks.
Senator Breaux. Pull that mike just a little bit closer.
Mr. Gleason. They continue to perform those background
checks once an employee is hired and serve a probationary
period.
What we do find that is a problem is a lot of the carries
that they hire owner-drivers that are not their employees, and
are not insured through the carrier, which there are not
necessarily any background checks performed.
Senator Breaux. I saw that point in your testimony, and
observed what you were saying about the owner-operator
situation. Would the Teamsters support or not support, or do
you know right now, what Mr. Acklie is suggesting? When a bank
hires individuals, or a children's home hires individuals, that
they are able to get information from all of their previous
employers about their history to help them in determining
whether they are a suitable employee for them. Is your
inclination to support that type of ability to get that
information or not?
Mr. Gleason. I think there needs to be serious discussion
with respect to how the background checks would be performed,
what criteria would be used. There is concern with respect to
what kind of criminal information would this qualified driver,
who would have access to the information, how the employer or
potential employer could use that information.
For example, if you have got a driver, let us say you are
talking about doing background checks and a driver has been
employed for 10 or 15 years with a carrier, that carrier goes
out of business, he is reemployed some place else, the guy has
an impeccable driving record, and somebody looks at a criminal
background check, maybe 20, 25 years previously he had had a
conviction for shoplifting, how is that type of background
information going to be used against this employee, so we would
have a concern with what criteria we would use in developing a
background check.
Senator Breaux. It seems to me there is a potential for
people who are getting commercial driver's licenses, it would
seem that employers of individuals in the transportation
industry that have had to dismiss an employee, for instance,
for a violation of a DWI or something associated directly with
the job, that the capacity to put that information into a
national system should exist. So when someone else looks to
hire that person, they can type in John Breaux's name, and a
history of his previous employment. If I were to be fired
because of one of these things, at least it would come up on
the Internet, and I would say, look, that is a red flag. I am
going to find out about this person a little bit further.
If he was a truck driver and was fired because of a DWI, is
this the type of person I want to hire? I mean, I am not sure
that is possible, to get that kind of information, but it seems
that today, in the day of computers, that it would be helpful.
Mr. Gleason. With respect to drivers that are discharged
because of positive test results for either drug or alcohol use
on the job, or off the job, if they are convicted and
ultimately lose their job, when the CDL licensing requirements
were adopted several years ago they were supposed to, and in
fact they do, once you have tested positive, your CDL
privileges are supposed to be suspended, and prior to being
reemployed, somewhere else, the federal agency is supposed to
be in control of when you get your driving privileges back.
Quite frankly, that enforcement portion of the law has not
been effective. They just have not policed it the way they need
to police it.
Senator Breaux. Ms. Claybrook, you had a comment.
Ms. Claybrook. I was just going to say that you have
directed the Motor Carrier Safety Administration and its
predecessor agency, to develop a unique identifier for drivers,
like a fingerprint, so that there could not be confusion over
finding the records of drivers. The data systems that you have
directed be improved have not been improved.
There is another directive that has not been carried out;
to check the noncommercial driving records. That is, if you are
caught for DWI in your car and you have a commercial driver's
license, that you can check against that, so there are a number
of directives you have already given the agency to undertake
this.
I would also like to say that there needs to be better
coordination between the Motor Carrier Safety Administration
and RSPA, because the only way that the Motor Carrier Safety
Administration can become aware of a carrier's decision to
carry hazardous materials is if they undergo an inspection, or
the carrier has a later compliance review, but in fact, if a
carrier never says they are going to carry hazardous materials
and then changes its mind, it then notifies RSPA, who never
notifies the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, so
there are lots of communications and data issues and record
issues that have been inadequately carried out by this agency
that I think would solve a lot of the problems that you have.
There is another requirement in TEA-21 of 1998 to create a
motor carrier safety information system, which they have done,
but it is totally inadequate at this time.
Senator Breaux. Well, you heard the first panel. I was
asking Mr. Clapp, I have got 2\1/2\ pages of things that
Congress required that have not been done. Some of these things
we required them to do the last time I think address some of
the concerns we have today.
Ms. Claybrook. Exactly right, and even though they were not
designed purely for security, when you improve safety, you
improve security. They are totally intermixed, so these
requirements, if they were carried out, we would have a far
safer transportation system.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Acklie, Ms. Claybrook in her testimony
says that under existing regulations a terrorist organization
could set up a new trucking company in the U.S., or in Mexico,
and obtain operating authority in the United States for a year
and a half period, without any federal or state safety review
or security check, simply by paying a fee. Is that possible?
Mr. Acklie. What I think she was referring to is, before
they are analyzed for the safety of that organization, but keep
in mind you do not even have to apply. In the Oklahoma
situation, if you remember, the people just went and rented a
truck and they drove it, and that is all there was to it, so we
not only have, Mr. Chairman, the situation where there is some
time lapse now--it can be as long as 18 months.
I think the Federal Highway Administration--excuse me, the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration attempts to do is
to get somebody out there immediately, but the statute I think
gives them, or the regulations give them 18 months to do it,
but they attempt to get on a new carrier. They get out there
almost immediately, sir.
Senator Breaux. What were you referring to, Ms. Claybrook?
Ms. Claybrook. I was referring to the fact that you could,
before there is any safety evaluation of a company, an on-site
inspection or anything else, a company could apply for and get
the authority to enter in the trucking business, up to 18
months and sometimes longer. If they are not inspected on a
timely basis, which often is the case, you can operate without
any safety review by the Federal Government, and you can carry
hazardous materials, so I think that this is a situation which
needs to be corrected.
In the testimony that we gave on the Mexican trucks, we
urged that there be on-site safety reviews in Mexico before you
get the first authority to operate in the United States. We
believe the same should apply to companies in the United
States, and for the Mexican companies, that is in the Murray-
Shelby bill. It requires that. I think that should be required
as well for U.S. companies.
I would say one other thing, Mr. Chairman, and that is that
in the creation of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration legislation of 1999, you put in a requirement
for certified motor carrier safety auditors to help expand the
capacity of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,
and we were very concerned about this, because we were
concerned about third parties doing the Federal Government's
job, but in view of the lax enforcement and the long time that
it has taken, we believe that that section should be fully
implemented. It is one of the other rulemakings that has not
yet been completed by the agency.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Sheridan, I am really interested in the
things you have talked about from the science standpoint, and I
am sure there are other companies that do similar things, and I
am sure you think you do them the best, but thank you for being
with us.
Basically, the technology can allow us to take a look,
particularly at containers, and determine whether there are
explosives in containers. I mean, I have always been fascinated
in a sense by how difficult it is, when you have a large ship
coming into the Port of New Orleans or the Port of Long Beach,
or any of our major ports, which literally has maybe a couple
of thousand containers on it, I mean, there is almost no way
for us with any degree of certainty to know what is in each one
of those containers without opening them up and doing a
physical inspection, and I take it that science is moving in
the direction of allowing us to have a better degree of
security about what is in containers, either on trucks or on
ships, that move around our country.
Mr. Sheridan. That is correct, Senator. In the case of
looking for explosives, we are looking for at least 200 pounds
of an ammonium nitrite fuel oil type explosive, because that is
the critical mass necessary to have true destructive power as a
truck bomb.
Senator Breaux. And that technology from what I understand
can work regardless of the mode of transportation, whether it
is a train, whether it is a truck, whether it is a boat, or
what-have-you?
Mr. Sheridan. That is correct, and there are some other
complementary technologies. Ancore is a company that can detect
specifically for the presence of certain types of explosives,
but it is a nonimaging technology, so it winds up being single-
purpose. We can detect both explosives and at the same time
look for drugs, or look for weapons.
Senator Breaux. How would you quantify the extent of the
use of this modern, 21st-Century technology with regard to its
utilization? It is a hard thing to say 100 percent coverage
will be every truck, plane, and ship having this sophisticated
detection system in place. I mean, that is not possible. How
much of it is being used? Is it just beginning to be used?
Mr. Sheridan. It is just beginning to be used today. Her
Majesty's Customs has a goal of scanning every truck coming off
a ferry. Why? Because they have a problem with both illegal
aliens and with cigarette smuggling. Cigarette smuggling is
costing them $4 billion a year, and they have something close
to 50,000 illegals coming into the country.
Here in the U.S., we are scanning less than 5 percent of
the containers coming across the border from Mexico. That is
truly insufficient.
Senator Breaux. How much is it?
Mr. Sheridan. Less than 5 percent, and it varies from port
of entry to port of entry. For seaports, it is less than 1
percent of all containers are inspected coming into seaports
today.
Your question was, it is possible to scan all containers?
The answer today is no, but what you can begin to do is create
a program where you only scan those where you do not is in the
contents. Customs has a program called the BASC program, which
is the Business Antismuggling Coalition, where they work with
shippers such as Mattel, such as Delco, Sara Lee, where they do
the inspection and certify that the contents of the container
are as shown on the manifest, and those get expedited clearance
so you do not have to focus on those. You only have to focus on
the containers where you do not know their origin, or they are
suspect.
Countries such as Peru, interestingly enough, are very
aware of this problem, and they, before President Fujimori lost
his position, they wanted to inspect all containers outgoing
and attach an electronic image of what was in the container
with the manifest, so when they got to Miami, or they got to
Long Beach, they would receive expedited clearance. That is
what we are talking about over the long term.
Senator Breaux. Well, it is a gigantic undertaking, to be
able to know what is coming into our ports from around the
world.
There is a story today in the London Times of intelligence
agencies across the world examining Osama bin Laden's
multimillion pound shipping interests. He maintains a secret
fleet under various flags of convenience, allowing him to hide
his ownership and transport goods, arms, drugs, and recruits
with little official scrutiny.
Three years ago, nobody paid much attention to a crew
unloading a cargo from a rusty freighter tied up to the dock in
Mombasa, Kenya. The freighter was part of Osama's merchant
fleet, and the crew was delivering supplies for the team of
suicide bombers who weeks later blew up the U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania Osama's shipping interests came open at the
trial of the bombers, but until now, security services have
been slow to track down even how many vessels he operates.
It really points out the seriousness nature of our port
security and shipping security, and you know, your drivers who
pick up a container, pick up cargo from a port not knowing
where it is coming from, are clearly at risk until we get a
better handle on all of this.
Mr. Sheridan. Internationally, Senator, Nigeria has just
announced it intends to go to 100-percent inspection of sea
containers. Why? Because smuggling is so high going into their
country, and Saudi Arabia, the Port of Jedda, they inspect 100
percent by hand. They are soon going to be moving to x-ray
inspection.
Senator Breaux. Well, of course, smuggling illegal
cigarettes is one thing. Smuggling tons of explosives for
terrorist purposes is quite another.
Well, I think this panel has been very good. I appreciate
very much your suggestions. I think you and your industry are
doing an excellent job of trying to move towards better
drivers, safer drivers, and more inspections.
I think one of the things we have seen is a lack of
movement on the part of our own Government just in keeping what
we required them to do the last time we addressed these issues,
and that certainly has to change, and will change.
So thank you very much for working with the Committee, and
this Subcommittee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the Subcommittee adjourned.]