[Senate Hearing 107-840]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-840
U.S. POLICY ON IRAQ
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 19, 23, 25, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
David S. Lyles, Staff Director
Judith A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
U.S. Policy on Iraq
september 19, 2002
Page
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense................... 15
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 35
Continue to Receive Testimony on U.S. Policy on Iraq
september 23, 2002
Shalikashvili, Gen. John M., USA (Ret.), Former Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff................................................ 122
Clark, Gen. Wesley K., USA (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe.............................................. 124
Hoar, Gen. Joseph P., USMC (Ret.), Former Commander in Chief,
United States Central Command.................................. 126
McInerney, Lt. Gen. Thomas G., USAF (Ret.), Former Assistant Vice
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force........................ 129
U.S. Policy on Iraq
september 25, 2002
Berger, Hon. Samuel R., Former Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs...................................... 177
Schlesinger, Dr. James R., Former Secretary of Defense, Secretary
of Energy, and Director of Central Intelligence................ 181
(iii)
U.S. POLICY ON IRAQ
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Byrd,
Lieberman, Cleland, Landrieu, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben
Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton, Warner, Thurmond, McCain, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Hutchinson, Sessions, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director, and Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
counsel, Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard
W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and Michael McCord,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
Republican staff director; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff
member; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; Patricia
L. Lewis, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie,
professional staff member; and Joseph T. Sixeas, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Daniel K. Goldsmith, Andrew Kent,
and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Brady King and
Sharon L. Waxman, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Christina
Evans, Erik Raven, and Craig E. Bury, assistants to Senator
Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman;
Marshall A. Hevron and Jeffrey S. Wiener, assistants to Senator
Landrieu; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn
Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator
Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric
Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Neal Orringer,
assistant to Senator Carnahan; William Todd Houchins, assistant
to Senator Dayton; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant to Senator
Warner; Bill Tuten, assistant to Senator Thurmond; Christopher
J. Paul, assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Robert Alan McCurry and James
Beauchamp, assistants to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders,
assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant
to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and
Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody. The Senate Armed
Services Committee meets this afternoon to continue our
hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq. The purpose of these
hearings is to give the administration an opportunity to
present its position on Iraq and to allow this committee to
examine the administration's proposal with administration
witnesses and experts outside the government.
We welcome Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers,
to the committee. Next week, the committee will hear from
former senior military commanders on Monday and from former
national security officials on Wednesday.
We begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a
tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region.
He has ignored the mandates of the United Nations and is
building weapons of mass destruction and the means of
delivering them.
Last week, in his speech to the United Nations, President
Bush rightfully declared that the Iraqi threat is, ``exactly
the kind of aggressive threat that the United Nations was born
to confront.'' The President reminded the world that Iraqi
aggression was stopped after the invasion of Kuwait, in his
words, ``by the might of the coalition force and the will of
the United Nations.'' The President called upon the United
Nations to act again, stating, ``My Nation will work with the
U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq
defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively
to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security
Council for the necessary resolutions.''
We, in Congress, applauded the President's efforts to
galvanize the world community through the United Nations to
deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Our actions now
in Congress should be devoted to presenting a broad, bipartisan
consensus in that critical effort. This does not mean giving a
veto to the U.N. over U.S. foreign policy. No one is going to
do that. It is an acknowledgment that Saddam is a world problem
and should be addressed in the world arena, and that we are in
a stronger position to disarm Iraq and even possibly avoid war
if Saddam sees the world at the other end of the barrel, not
just the United States.
Some have suggested that we also commit ourselves to
unilateral action in Iraq and that we do so now. In the middle
of our efforts to enlist the world community to back a U.N.
resolution or resolutions enforcing Iraqi compliance with
unconditional inspections and disarmament requirements, they
say that, although we told the U.N. that their role is vital
just a week ago, we should now say we are just fine in
proceeding on our own. I believe if we really mean it when we
say that we want the U.N. to be relevant, then we should not
act in a manner that treats them as irrelevant.
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, the United
Nations, at the urging of former President Bush and with the
full support of Congress, condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,
demanded that Iraq withdraw its forces, and, in November of
1990, passed a resolution authorizing member states to use all
necessary means to free Kuwait. Two months later, in January
1991, after debate and a close vote, Congress passed a
resolution authorizing the participation of U.S. Armed Forces
in that effort. The military campaign against Saddam Hussein in
1991 by the U.S.-led coalition was carried out with the active
participation of most of our NATO allies, the ground forces of
several Muslim nations, and the support and backing of
virtually every nation in the world.
U.N. resolutions paved the way for the establishment and
enforcement of the no-fly zones over Northern and Southern Iraq
and for the air and missile attacks on Iraqi facilities related
to weapons of mass destruction programs that it had in December
of 1998 following Iraq's expulsion of the U.N. weapons
inspectors.
The experience of the last decade teaches us that, in
dealing with Iraq, the United States has been able to work with
the world community through the United Nations. A go-it-alone
approach where we attack Iraq without the support and
participation of the world community would be very different.
It would entail grave risks and could have serious consequences
for U.S. interests in the Middle East and around the world.
If we go it alone, would we be able to secure the use of
air bases, ports, supply bases, and overflight rights in the
region important to the success of a military operation against
Saddam Hussein? If we go it alone, would we continue to enjoy
broad international support for the war on terrorism, including
the law enforcement, financial, and intelligence cooperation
that has proven to be so essential? If we go it alone, what
would be the impact on the stability of moderate Arab nations,
and what would be our future relationship with moderate Arab
and Muslim nations? If we go it alone without U.N. authority in
attacking Saddam, would he or his military commanders be more
likely to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations
in the region and against U.S. military forces in response than
would be the case if he faced a U.N.-authorized coalition,
particularly if that coalition included a number of Muslim
nations, as the coalition did during the Gulf War? If we go it
alone, would other nations use our action as a precedent for
threatening unilateral military action against their neighbors
in the future?
Members of this Senate Armed Services Committee are ever
mindful of the fact that confronting the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein could ultimately lead to committing U.S. military
forces, including ground forces, to combat. How and under what
circumstances we commit our Armed Forces to an attack on Iraq
could have far-reaching consequences for our interests
throughout the world and for the future peace and stability in
the Persian Gulf and Middle East.
I want to echo the statement that General Myers makes in
his prepared remarks. ``America's military is the most capable
and professional fighting force in the world.'' There is no
doubt in my mind--and there should be no doubt in Saddam
Hussein's mind--that, once committed, our Armed Forces will
prevail in any conflict. None of us seeks such a conflict, but,
if it comes, our military will have the full support of every
member of this body, whether they favor committing to a go-it-
alone approach at this time or not.
Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld, I read, with great interest, an account
of your testimony before the House yesterday. I was
particularly moved by your comments with regard to Israel, its
role in the 1991 episode, and the threats poised as a
consequence of this extraordinary unrest relating to Iraq.
I wrote the President a letter on August 2, a copy of which
went to you. I went to the floor of the Senate today and put
that letter in the record, expressing my deep concern about
this conflict and my compassion for the people of Israel who
have suffered these devastating losses. I would hope, in due
course, that could be taken into consideration, because I think
there's a connection between the unrest that is a consequence
of the tragic disputes between the people of Israel and the
Palestinian people and the options that we face as we examine
the problems in Iraq.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. I begin by
commending President Bush for the leadership he has shown on
the issue of the threat to the world, not just the United
States, posed by Saddam Hussein in his relentless drive to
manufacture and acquire weapons of mass destruction. We would
not be holding this hearing today--we, in all likelihood, would
not be having the full attention of the United Nations--had it
not been for the bold leadership given by President George Bush
together with the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Tony Blair,
who both brought attention to the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein to the whole world.
I commend you, Mr. Secretary, the Secretary of State, Colin
Powell, and others who have been in the very forefront of
bringing into sharp focus threats posed by the weapons of mass
destruction which he possesses today and which every single day
he is working to augment and build.
Mr. Chairman, on August 27, I wrote you, as a follow on to
our previous discussions, a letter requesting that the
committee hold these hearings on Iraq. You and I have concurred
on a series of hearings, the details of which are forthcoming.
We're going to go into this situation very carefully.
[The information referred to follows:]
August 27, 2002.
Chairman Carl Levin,
Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Carl: We have been regularly discussing the role of our
committee in the on-going debates in Congress and in the public on
Iraq. Together, we decided to defer setting a schedule for hearings on
Iraq until the Senate Foreign Relations Committee undertook an initial
exploration of policy-related considerations. Those hearings, which
were conducted on July 31 and August 1, turned out to be constructive
and beneficial.
Since the commencement of our recess on August 1, the crescendo of
debate on Iraq has reached an extraordinary level, with knowledgeable
people--many of whom have served in public office--rendering
conscientious, constructive opinions, with a growing diversity of
viewpoints.
The time has come, I think you will agree, for you and I to set a
schedule of hearings for our committee to explore the national security
implications of possible military action against Iraq. While any
schedule of hearings will follow our regular procedures for selecting
witnesses, I believe we should begin with administration witnesses--
preferably Secretary Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General
Myers.
As I look back on the 1990 and 1991 congressional activities
related to Iraq, the work of our committee was crucial. Sam Nunn, as
the chairman, and I, as the ranking member, held a series of hearings
throughout the fall and winter of 1990, leading up to the historic
debate on the Gulf War resolutions on January 10-12, 1991. As you may
recall, when our committee conducted a series of hearings in 1990
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, our first hearing was with
then-Secretary of Defense Cheney and then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
General Powell on September 11, 1990.
I was the principal author of the resolution to authorize the use
of force against Iraq, which passed by a mere five votes on January 12,
1991. Immediately following that vote, having satisfied itself that the
Senate had had a full and fair debate, all united in support behind the
President. This resolution is now being cited--as it was during the
previous administration--as one of the legal foundations for military
action against Iraq.
Our committee performed an essential role through its hearings in
1990 in developing the body of fact that was used during the Senate
floor debate and the public debate. It is important, subject to
protecting classification of certain facts, that the American people be
informed. Their support is essential.
While I cannot predict all that the Senate will do in the coming
weeks prior to adjournment, I believe that the issue of Iraq will be
central. Our committee, therefore, should convene a series of hearings
on Iraq, as soon as possible, to contribute to a full body of fact for
any Senate deliberations on this issue.
As I read and follow the debate, there appears to be a ``gap'' in
the facts possessed by the executive branch and the facts possessed by
the legislative branch. I am encouraged that the President and his
senior advisors have repeatedly stated that there will be
``consultations'' with Congress prior to the initiation of any military
action against Iraq. Our committee has an important role to play in
these consultations. We must act to provide the necessary facts so
individual members can make informed decisions.
Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, is, in my opinion,
not going to sit on the sidelines. It is essential, I believe, in this
extraordinarily complex foreign policy debate, that Congress step up
and assume its responsibilities, and share with the President and the
executive branch accountability to the public for such actions as may
be taken regarding military action against Iraq.
Speaking for myself, I do not contest the President's right, as
Commander in Chief under the Constitution, to initiate the use of
military force when U.S. interests are threatened. Through our 24 years
in the Senate, you and I have witnessed many Senate debates over the
War Powers Resolution and related issues, and those issues will not be
resolved now.
I do believe, as do a majority of members, that Congress has a
responsibility to add its voice to the debate on an issue involving the
use of U.S. military force. Hearings by our committee on Iraq are an
essential first step in exercising that responsibility.
We owe no less to the brave men and women of our Armed Forces, and
their families, who stand by, as always, to carry out the orders of the
Commander in Chief.
With kind regards, I am
Sincerely,
John Warner,
Ranking Member.
In 1990 and 1991, when I was privileged to be ranking
member of the committee, together with Senator Nunn as
chairman, our committee was critical in putting together a
record for the historic debate on the Senate floor early in
January. The committee held a series of nine hearings and two
closed briefings on the situation in the Persian Gulf in the
fall and winter of 1990, leading up to the debate on the Senate
floor on January 10, 11, and 12, 1991. Those hearings developed
the body of fact that was used during the Senate floor debate
and, indeed, the equally important public debate on Iraq. The
committee will fulfill that same important function today.
I was privileged to be an author of the resolution that was
debated on the floor, and it carried by a mere five votes. My
distinguished colleague to my right, Mr. Lieberman, was my
principal cosponsor on that resolution.
We started the committee hearings on Iraq on Tuesday with
testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence, George
Tenet, and the acting Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, Rear Admiral Jake Jacoby. It was a sobering, thorough
assessment that was given to all members of the committee, a
common base of knowledge about the clear and growing threat
that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States, to the region,
and to the entire international community. In particular,
Saddam Hussein's relentless pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver these weapons represents a
present threat and an immediate challenge to the international
community. Our President made that ever so clear in his speech.
We must end Saddam Hussein's continued defiance of the
clear pronouncements of the international community as
expressed in a series of 16 U.N. Security Council resolutions,
beginning with the resolution which mandated the council's
terms and conditions for how the war was to end.
I remind my colleagues that the Iraqis agreed in writing on
April 6, 1991, in a letter to the U.N. Secretary General from
the Iraqi Foreign Minister, to accept the cease-fire conditions
as embodied in U.N. Security Council Resolution 687.
Prior to that, we all watched as Iraqi generals, at the
direction of Saddam Hussein, met in a tent at the Safwan
Airfield in Iraq, with General Norman Schwarzkopf, the brave
commander who led the U.S. and coalition forces to victory, to
discuss the conditions for a ceasefire. Those conditions have
never been met.
It is now most appropriate that we hear from the Secretary
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on the role of
the Department of Defense--and particularly the men and women
in uniform--in implementing U.S. policy toward Iraq as that
evolves. Most important is the readiness of our Armed Forces
and their ability to carry out such military operations as may
be directed in the future.
Our President didn't go to the U.N. and declare war. He
went to the U.N. to say, ``It's time for you to become
accountable to your charter, to your forebears, to those who
conceived this organization, and to the world.''
One week ago, our President gave a historic speech at the
United Nations, challenging the U.N. to live up to its
responsibilities as stated in Article I of the U.N. Charter and
``to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace.''
In my view, President Bush's speech was clearly one of the
finest and most important speeches ever given by a head of
state to the August assembly of the United Nations. The speech
dramatically elevated the level of debate and the attention of
the world's leaders on Iraq's conduct and continued defiance of
the United Nations. It further challenged the nations of the
world to think long and hard about what they expect from the
United Nations. Is it to be effective and relevant and live up
to its Charter, or is it to be irrelevant and fall into the
dustbin of history, as did the League of Nations as the world
descended into darkness in the aftermath of World War I?
Of equal importance, the President's U.N. speech
articulated a clear, decisive, and timely U.S. policy on Iraq,
that is, to remove the threat before Iraq is able to use
weapons of mass destruction now in its arsenal and every day
being added to the arsenal. The U.S. is now firmly on a course
to accomplish this policy and invites the nations of the world
to join.
I remind my colleagues that the President's policy of
regime change is the same policy that Congress adopted with the
unanimous support of the Senate in October of 1998 and the
policy that President Clinton later endorsed and vigorously
defended.
Over the past several weeks, many Members of Congress and
many American citizens have expressed their hope for meaningful
consultations between Congress and the President, as well as
consultations with our allies and the United Nations. Our
President has done exactly that. It is now time for Congress to
express to the people of our Nation and to the world its
support squarely and overwhelming behind our President as he
leads the international community. The price of inaction is far
too great if the international community fails to confront this
danger now, once and for all.
By bringing his case to the U.N., President Bush clearly
demonstrated his belief that the effort to counter Saddam
Hussein is an international responsibility. The United States
strongly desires multilateral action. But if the U.N. fails to
act, the United States, like all other member nations under the
U.N. Charter, reserves unto itself the right to take whatever
action is necessary to protect our people and our Nation from
the threat of Saddam Hussein.
Predictably, the Iraqi regime has responded to the
President's speech with a tactical move designed to fracture
the consensus that was forming in the United Nations. It is
merely a trap, in my opinion, to buy more time for Saddam
Hussein to further delay compliance with international
mandates, as expressed in the 16 U.N. Security Council
resolutions. I shall not recite those resolutions, but just
place them in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Warner. How will we explain to the American people,
if, in the wake of a future attack on the United States or U.S.
interests, directly by Saddam Hussein or indirectly through
surrogate terrorists equipped and directed by him, that we knew
Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, that we knew he
intended to manufacture and acquire even more and to use these
weapons, and yet, at this time, we failed to act? Now, more
than ever before, Congress, as an equal branch of the
Government, must join our President and support the course he
has set. We have to demonstrate a resolve within our Nation and
internationally that communicates to Saddam Hussein that enough
is enough. He has to be convinced that American and
international resolve is real, unshakable, and enforceable if
there's to be hope of any progress of disarmament of his
weapons of mass destruction.
To the extent that Congress joins in support of our
President and sends that message unambiguously to the
international community, the United Nations, is the extent to
which the forthcoming resolution of the U.N. will resolve this
crisis.
I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Secretary Rumsfeld
and General Myers back before the committee.
I begin this afternoon by commending our President, President Bush,
for the leadership he has shown on the issue of the threat to the
world, not just to the United States, posed by Saddam Hussein in his
relentless drive to manufacture and acquire weapons of mass
destruction. We would not be holding this hearing today, not be
preparing for a full debate in the U.S. Senate, had not our President
focused the attention of the world on this threat to freedom. This is
not the United States against the Iraqi people; it is the free world
against Saddam Hussein.
Mr. Chairman, on August 27, I wrote you, as a follow-on to our
previous discussions, requesting that the committee hold a series of
hearings on U.S. policy on Iraq. I ask unanimous consent that the text
of my letter be made a part of the record of this hearing.
In 1990 and 1991, our committee's activities were critical to the
congressional action on the first Gulf War resolution, which authorized
the use of force against Iraq. Our committee held a series of nine
hearings and two closed briefings on the situation in the Persian Gulf
in the fall and winter of 1990, leading up to the historic debate on
the Senate floor on January 10-12, 1991. Those hearings developed the
body of fact that was used during the Senate floor debate and, indeed,
the equally important public debate on Iraq. Our committee will fulfill
that same important function again, together with other committees.
We started the committee's hearings on Iraq on Tuesday with
testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, and
the acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Rear Admiral
Jake Jacoby, on the situation in Iraq. It was a sobering, thorough
assessment that has given all members of the committee a common base of
knowledge about the clear and growing threat that Saddam Hussein poses
to the United States, to the region, and to the entire international
community. In particular, Saddam Hussein's relentless pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver these weapons,
represents a present threat and an immediate challenge to the
international community. We must end Saddam Hussein's continued
defiance of the clear pronouncements of the international community, as
expressed in a series of 16 U.N. Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR),
beginning with the resolution which mandated the Council's terms and
conditions for how the war was to end.
I remind my colleagues that the Iraqis agreed, in writing--on April
6, 1991, in a letter to the U.N. Secretary General from the Iraqi
Foreign Minister--to accept the cease fire conditions, as embodied in
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. Prior to that, we all watched as
Iraqi generals, at the direction of Saddam Hussein, met in a tent at
the Safwan Airfield in Iraq, with General Norman Schwarzkopf, the brave
commander who led the U.S. and coalition forces to victory, to discuss
the conditions for a cease fire. Those conditions have never been met.
It is now most appropriate that we hear from the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the role of
the Department of Defense--and particularly the men and women in
uniform--in implementing U.S. policy toward Iraq. Most important is the
readiness of our Armed Forces and their ability to carry out such
military operations as may be directed in the future.
One week ago today, our President gave an historic speech at the
United Nations, challenging the U.N. to live up to its responsibilities
as stated in article 1 of the U.N. Charter, ``. . . to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace.'' In my view, President Bush's speech was clearly one of the
finest and most important speeches ever given by a head of state to the
August assembly in the U.N. The speech dramatically elevated the level
of debate and the attention of the world's leaders on Iraq's conduct
and continued defiance of the U.N. It further challenged the nations of
the world to think long and hard about what they expect from the United
Nations--is it to be effective and relevant, and live up to its
Charter; or is it to be irrelevant and fall into the dustbin of
history, as did the League of Nations as the world descended into the
darkness of World War II?
Of equal importance, the President's U.N. speech articulated a
clear, decisive, and timely U.S. policy on Iraq--that is, to remove the
threat before Iraq is able to use its WMD arsenal. The U.S. is now
firmly on a course to accomplish this policy and invites the nations of
the world to join. I remind my colleagues that the President's policy
of regime change is the same policy that Congress adopted--with the
unanimous support of the Senate--in October of 1998, and the policy
that President Clinton later endorsed and vigorously defended.
Over the last several weeks, many Members of Congress and many
American citizens expressed their hope for meaningful consultations
between Congress and the President, as well as consultations with our
allies and the U.N. Our President has done exactly that. It is now time
for Congress to express to the people of our Nation and to the world
its support, squarely and overwhelmingly behind our President as he
leads the international community. The price of inaction is far too
great if the international community fails to confront this danger,
now, once and for all.
By bringing his case to the U.N., President Bush clearly
demonstrated his belief that the effort to counter Saddam Hussein is an
international responsibility. The United States strongly desires
multilateral action. But if the U.N. fails to act, the United States--
like all other member nations under the U.N. Charter--reserves unto
itself the right to take whatever action is necessary to protect our
people and our Nation from the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.
Predictably, the Iraqi regime has responded to the President's
speech with a tactical move designed to fracture the consensus that was
forming at the U.N. It is merely a trap to buy more time for Saddam
Hussein to further delay compliance with international mandates, as
expressed in 16 U.N. Security Council resolutions.
As we contemplate the vote we will be called on to cast in the
weeks ahead, it is important to remember what we know about Saddam
Hussein and his actions, to date:
We know Saddam Hussein is a tyrant who has ruthlessly
suppressed and murdered all opposition, dissident elements, and
potential political competitors since he assumed office in 1979
(he murdered 20 potential rivals in his own Ba'athist Party
within a month of taking power).
We know Saddam Hussein intends to dominate the region
and control significant portions of world oil production, as
demonstrated by his aggression against Iran in the 1980s, his
invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990, and his continuing
threats against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Kurds and
others.
We know Saddam Hussein has extensive stocks of
chemical and biological weapons.
We know Saddam Hussein is aggressively seeking nuclear
weapons capabilities on multiple fronts.
We know Saddam Hussein continues to develop a variety
of means to deliver his stockpile of weapons of mass
destruction, both conventional and unconventional.
We know Saddam Hussein has used such weapons on his
own people, using chemical weapons to kill 50-100,000 Kurds in
northern Iraq in 1988.
We know Saddam Hussein has used weapons of mass
destruction against another nation--even though the survival of
his regime was not in doubt--when he used chemical weapons
against Iranian soldiers multiple times between 1981 and 1986.
We know Saddam Hussein has successfully used denial
and deception techniques over the past decade to fool the world
and U.N. inspectors about the extent of his WMD efforts and
stocks.
I could go on and list other horrific conduct by Saddam, but I
think the point is clear--we know a great deal about this ruthless man
and his brutal regime; we cannot allow the threat to continue.
How will we explain to the American people--in the wake of a future
attack on the United States or U.S. interests, directly by Saddam
Hussein, or indirectly through surrogate terrorists equipped and
directed by him--that we knew Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass
destruction, that we knew he intended to manufacture and acquire even
more and to use these weapons--and yet, we failed to act.
Now, more than ever, Congress, as an equal branch of government,
must join our President and support the course he has set. We have to
demonstrate a resolve within our Nation and internationally, that
communicates to Saddam Hussein that ``enough is enough.'' He has to be
convinced that American and international resolve is real, unshakable
and enforceable if there is to be any hope of progress.
To the extent that Congress joins and supports our President and
sends that message unambiguously to the international community, is the
extent to which the forthcoming resolution of the United Nations will
resolve this crisis. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. I
would like to submit the written statements of Senator Kennedy
and Senator Landrieu.
[The prepared statements of Senator Kennedy and Senator
Landrieu follow:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
September 11, 2001, has irrevocably changed America's view of the
world. No American will ever forget watching a hijacked civilian
aircraft crash into the towers of the World Trade Center or seeing the
plume of smoke rise from the Pentagon in the aftermath of the terrorist
attack. No American will ever forget the sense of anger and
vulnerability that swept our Nation that day, when thousands of
innocent lives were suddenly, and senselessly, ended by those vicious
acts. Since then, the United States has conducted a war on terrorism,
defeating the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, disrupting the al Qaeda
operations in that country and supporting a new government there that
will give no refuge to terrorists. We know that the war on terrorism
will continue on many fronts, militarily and diplomatically.
Now our Nation and the international community are in the midst of
a debate about how best to address the threat posed by Iraq. There is
no doubt that Saddam Hussein's regime is a serious danger. I commend
President Bush for expressing America's willingness to work with the
United Nations to end that danger and prevent Iraq from using chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons to threaten other countries.
Working with the United Nations is the right course. The United
States is better off working with the international community, rather
than unilaterally, in dealing with the threat Hussein poses. We need to
do all we can to win the support of other nations.
As of today, many questions still remain unanswered: Is war the
only option? How much support will we have in the international
community? How will war affect our global war against terrorism? How
long will the United States need to stay in Iraq? How many casualties
will there be? Would our action make a wider and more dangerous war
more likely, especially if Saddam decides to use chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapons? Congress will continue to debate the issue and seek
answers to these and other questions. War must always be a last resort,
not the first resort.
I look forward to hearing from Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers
on these issues that are of deepest concern to all of us.
______
Prepared Statement by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
We cannot question that Saddam Hussein is a totalitarian leader who
poses an emerging threat to the United States and the Middle East. He
has shown no respect for the rule of law or civil order. Saddam Hussein
has a long history of destabilizing the Middle East--first by invading
Iran and second by invading Kuwait. Moreover, Saddam Hussein has and
will continue to pursue Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons programs--weapons he could use himself or peddle to our
terrorist enemies. Saddam has used weapons of mass destruction against
his own people and the Iranians, killing thousands. It could only be a
matter of time before he uses them, again, to cause havoc and mayhem in
the world. At this hearing, we are not here to question if Saddam
Hussein must go, but when and how.
Pursuing diplomatic means is very worthy to compel Iraq to readmit
weapons inspectors and disarm, but diplomatic means alone are
insufficient. All too often, we have seen Iraq thumb its nose to the
international community. Sixteen resolutions were passed before and
after the Gulf War. None was followed. Just 2 days ago, Iraq notified
the United Nations that Iraq would be willing to admit U.N. weapons
inspectors to return. Regrettably, Saddam Hussein has burned too many
bridges and his entreaties have lost all credibility. No purely
diplomatic resolution will ensure that Iraq allows inspectors full
access throughout the country to search for weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). No purely diplomatic resolution will guarantee that Iraq will
disarm and discontinue its pursuit and production of WMD. It would be
folly for the United Nations Security Council to support a resolution
that only requires Iraq to invite inspectors to return. If the future
is anything like the past, Saddam Hussein would only make a charade of
the inspections. Those inspectors would have everything but unfettered
access to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. With all diplomacy
involving Saddam Hussein, he must know that military force capable of
toppling his regime will bear down upon him if he does not fully
cooperate with inspectors wishing to dismantle his chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons programs.
Conversely, we simply cannot pursue war without diplomacy. To fight
alone would be unwise. We have an opportunity to install a paradigm
shift in the Middle East. This is an opportunity to make a real
difference to bring the American values of peace, democracy, and free
markets, as Tom Friedman has said, to Iraq and the region, if we use
our influence and our military might properly. We must embark on a
diplomatic path that unites those in favor of peace, democracy, and
free markets on a mission to use force, if necessary, to change the
regime in Iraq and demilitarize Iraq so that the Iraqi people can throw
off the chains of Saddam's oppression. Then, the Iraqi people will be
able to accept the notion that American ideals are ideals all people
want to share. With the proper diplomacy, the United States can build a
coalition--one just as large as the coalition created to fight the Gulf
War that also includes our Arab allies--to topple Saddam Hussein if he
does not allow for full inspections and disarmament.
For weeks and months the administration pursued a unilateral
approach that favored a call to arms with too little attention to
diplomacy. Last week, the President addressed the United Nations and
took a necessary step to create a balanced approach that will permit
the use of force if diplomacy is thwarted in Iraq. The administration
still has much work to do to convince the Security Council and a
coalition to support the authorization of force if Saddam Hussein does
not commit to full inspections and disarmament. The French, Russians,
and Chinese, who hold veto power on the Security Council, have not yet
endorsed military force as the stick-to-the-carrot of inspections.
Nevertheless, the administration should not give up easily to bring
these countries in line with our point of view. We should not simply
say that we can defeat Saddam Hussein on our own. Of course, America
can topple Iraq without our allies, but more harm than good could be
done by such actions. America will be seen as the bully, not the
protector of the world from despots and terrorists. We will not be, as
we have always been, the liberator of people without a voice.
Rather, we should redouble our diplomatic efforts in support. After
all, there have been successes in just a few days. For months Saudi
Arabia voiced objections to the American use of Saudi bases to strike
Iraq, but Saudi Arabia is now warming up to the use of their bases
after the President's address to the U.N. Diplomacy is creating the
consent to use force.
Again, I do not question if Saddam must disarm or be toppled; the
question is when we should do it. Quite frankly, we should be prepared
to use force if he does not respond to U.S. and international
diplomatic pressure. We should not wait for him to assemble a nuclear
weapon before taking it out of his hands. Saddam is analogous to the
drug dealer poisoning the neighborhood by selling drugs to the
residents. Saddam is capable of supplying al Qaeda, Hamas, and
Hezbollah with WMD to attack us and our allies, if he does not choose
to do it himself. Again, as he seeks a nuclear bomb, he is looking to
push an even more deadly drug. He should not be allowed to push his
brand of despotism any further.
Finally, we must take seriously how we will depose Saddam, if
necessary. The administration should work diligently to build a
coalition. Because if we invade Iraq, we will need to be there for the
long term. We cannot act alone and then expect to use diplomatic
efforts to gain support from the rest of the world. We will need the
world's military, economic, and political backing, and we must act now
to gain that partnership.
In closing, diplomacy and military force together will allow
America to reach its objectives in Iraq. Either alone will fail.
Secretary Rumsfeld, we now turn to you and General Myers
for your opening statements, and then when it comes back to us
we'll have rounds of 6 minutes each.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
I thank you for this opportunity to meet with you today. I have
submitted a rather lengthy statement where I set forth in some
detail what I believe to be the situation with respect to Iraq.
I request that it be made a part of the record, and I will just
make some brief remarks, nowhere near as long as an opening
statement.
Chairman Levin. We'll make your full statement part of the
record.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Last week we commemorated the 1-year
anniversary of the most devastating attack our Nation has ever
experienced, more than 3,000 people killed in a single day.
Today, I want to discuss the task of preventing even more
devastating attacks, attacks that could kill not thousands, but
potentially tens of thousands of our fellow citizens.
This is not an intelligence briefing. It is obviously an
open hearing, and my remarks will reflect those facts. Further,
I'm not here to recommend the use of force in Iraq,
multilateral or unilateral, or to suggest that the President
has made a decision beyond what he has told the United Nations
and the congressional leadership and, indeed, the American
people.
I am here to discuss Iraq, as requested by the committee
and by the President, and to try to address a number of the
questions that have come up during this national debate and
public dialogue that's been taking place.
As we meet, chemists, biologists, and nuclear scientists
are toiling in weapons labs and underground bunkers, working to
give the world's most dangerous dictators weapons of
unprecedented power and lethality. The threat posed by some of
those regimes is real, is dangerous, and is growing with each
passing day. We've entered a new security environment, one in
which terrorist movements and terrorist states are developing
the capacity to cause unprecedented destruction.
Today, our margin for error as a country is distinctly
different than before. In the 20th century, we were dealing for
the most part with conventional weapons that could kill
hundreds or thousands, generally combatants. In the 21st
century, we're dealing with weapons of mass destruction that
can kill potentially tens of thousands of people--innocent men,
women, and children.
We are in an age of little or no warning when threats can
emerge suddenly. Terrorist states are finding ways to gain
access to these powerful weapons, and in word and deed they
have demonstrated a willingness to use those capabilities.
Moreover, since September 11, we have seen a new means of
delivering these weapons: terrorist networks. To the extent
that they might transfer WMD to terrorist groups, they could
conceal their responsibility for attacks on our people.
So I submit, Mr. Chairman, that we are on notice that an
attack will likely be attempted. It's a question of when and by
what technique. It could be months or years, but it will
happen. If the worst were to happen, not one of us here today
would be able to honestly say that it was a surprise, because
it will not be a surprise. We have connected the dots as much
as is humanly possible before the fact. Only by waiting until
after the event could we have proof positive, and then it, of
course, would be too late.
The question facing us is this, what is the responsible
course of action for our country with our history and
tradition? Do we believe it is our responsibility to wait for a
chemical or biological or even nuclear September 11? Or is it
the responsibility of free people to take steps to deal with
the threat before we are attacked?
There are a number of terrorist states pursuing weapons of
mass destruction--Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, just to name
a few--but no terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate
threat to the security of our people than the regime of Saddam
Hussein in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, these facts about Saddam Hussein's regime
should be part of the record and of our country's
considerations. He has ordered the use of chemical weapons
against his own people, in one case killing 5,000 innocent
civilians in a day. His regime has invaded two of its
neighbors. It has launched ballistic missiles against four of
its neighbors. He plays host to terrorist networks. He
regularly assassinates his opponents, both in Iraq and abroad.
He has executed a member of his own cabinet, whom he personally
shot and killed. He has ordered doctors to surgically remove
the ears of military deserters. His regime has committed
genocide and ethnic cleansing in Northern Iraq. His regime, on
almost a daily basis, continues to fire missiles and artillery
at U.S. and coalition aircraft. He has amassed large
clandestine stockpiles of biological weapons, including
anthrax, botulism toxin, and possibly smallpox. He has amassed
large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons, including VX,
sarin, and mustard gas. His regime has an active program to
acquire nuclear weapons. His regime has dozens of ballistic
missiles and is working to extend their ranges, in violation of
U.N. restrictions. He has in place an elaborate organized
system of denial and deception to frustrate both inspectors and
outside intelligence efforts. His regime has diverted funds
from the U.N.'s Oil for Food Program, intended to feed starving
Iraqis, to fund weapons of mass destruction programs. He has
violated 16 U.N. resolutions, repeatedly defying the will of
the international community, without cost and without
consequence.
The President warned the United Nations last week that his
regime is a grave and gathering danger. It's a danger that we
do not have the option to ignore. President Bush made clear
that the United States wants to work with the U.N. Security
Council, but he made clear the consequences of Iraq's continued
defiance. ``The purpose of the United States should not be
doubted,'' he said, ``The Security Council resolutions will be
enforced or action will be unavoidable, and a regime that has
lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.''
The President has asked the Members of Congress to support
actions that may be necessary to deliver on that pledge. He
urged that Congress act before the recess. Delaying a vote in
Congress would send the wrong message, just as we are asking
the international community to take a stand and as we are
cautioning Iraq to reflect on its options.
It was Congress that changed the objective of U.S. policy
from containment to regime change by passage of the Iraq
Liberation Act in 1998 by, as I recall, a 10-to-1 margin in
both houses. The President is now asking Congress to support
that policy. A decision to use military force, potentially, is
never easy, and it's important that the issues surrounding this
decision be discussed and debated seriously.
In recent weeks, a number of questions have been surfaced,
many by Members of Congress and others. Some of the arguments
raised are important, and, in my prepared testimony, I've tried
to discuss in detail a number of those issues that have been
raised. Let me just touch on a few here this afternoon.
Now that Iraq has agreed to unconditional inspections, the
question goes, why does Congress need to act? Well, if we want
to measure the depth of their so-called change of heart, I
suggest we watch what they do, not what they say. On Monday,
they sent a letter indicating that they were ready to begin
cooperating with the U.N. Within hours, they began firing and
trying to shoot down coalition aircraft. There have been two
inspection regimes. They've thrown the ground inspectors out.
The air inspections, Operations Northern Watch and Southern
Watch, have been continuing with coalition pilots flying at
risk of their lives. Since delivering the letter promising
unconditional access, they have fired at coalition aircraft
somewhere between 15 and 20 times, which is a considerable
increase from the preceding period, before the letter.
I would add that today I'm told that the Iraqi Foreign
Minister up at the United Nations made a speech and added a
series of conditions to the unconditional proposal that had
been sent by letter 2 or 3 days ago. They suggest that the
inspections must operate within guidelines in a manner that
respects Iraqi sovereignty and security. That was the quotation
I was given, although I did not have a chance to listen to the
speech personally.
The point is that Iraq has demonstrated great skill at
playing the international community. When it's the right moment
to lean forward, they do. When it's the right moment to lean
back, they do. It's a dance. They go on for months, and,
indeed, they've gone on for years jerking the U.N. around. When
they find things are not going their way, they throw out a
proposal like this. The issue is not inspections; the issue is
disarmament. The problem is a lack of compliance. As the
President made clear in his U.N. address, we require Iraq's
compliance with all 16 U.N. resolutions.
Some have asked whether an attack on Iraq would disrupt and
distract from the U.N. global war on terror. The answer is no.
Iraq is part of the global war on terror. Stopping terrorist
regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key
objective of that war, and we can fight the various elements of
the global war on terror simultaneously, as General Myers will
indicate in his remarks.
Our principal goal in the war on terror is to stop another
September 11, or a weapon of mass destruction attack that could
make September 11 seem modest by comparison, and to do it
before it happens. Whether that threat comes from a terrorist
regime or a terrorist network is beside the point. Our
objective is to stop them.
Another question has been, ``What about a smoking gun?''
Well, Mr. Chairman, the last thing we want is a smoking gun. A
gun smokes after it has been fired, and the goal must be to
stop an attack of the type I have described before it happens.
As the President told the United Nations last week, the first
time we may be absolutely completely certain that a country has
nuclear weapons is when, God forbid, they are used. We owe it
to our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that
day from coming. If Congress and the world wait for a so-called
smoking gun, it's certain that they will have waited too long.
I suggest that anyone who insists on perfect evidence
really is thinking back in the 20th century, and they're still
thinking pre-September 11. On September 11, we were awakened to
the fact that America is now vulnerable to unprecedented
destruction. We have not, we will not, and we cannot know
everything that is going on in the world. Over the years,
despite our best efforts, intelligence has repeatedly
underestimated weapons capabilities of a variety of important
major countries. We've had numerous gaps of 2, 4, 6, 8, and, in
some cases, double-digit years between when a country of real
concern to us began a development program and when we finally
found out about it that many years later.
We do know that the Iraqi regime has chemical and
biological weapons of mass destruction, that they're pursuing
nuclear weapons, that they've a proven willingness to use those
weapons, and that they've a proven aspiration to seize
territory of their neighbors and to threaten their neighbors,
that they cooperate with terrorists networks, and that they
have a proven record of declared hostility and venomous
rhetoric against the United States. Those threats should be
clear to all.
The committees of Congress today are currently asking
hundreds of question and poring over tens of thousands of
documents trying to figure out what happened, why September 11
occurred. Indeed, they're asking who knew what and when did
they know it and why didn't somebody prevent that tragedy.
Well, if one were to compare the scraps of information that
the Government had before September 11 to the volumes of
information the Government has today about Iraq's pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction, his use of those weapons, his
record of aggression, and his consistent hostility toward the
United States, and then factor in our country's demonstrated
vulnerability after September 11, the case that the President
made in the United Nations, it seems to me, should be clear.
If more time passes, and the attack we're concerned about
were to come to pass, I would not want to have ignored all the
warning signs and then be required to explain why our country
failed to protect our fellow citizens from that threat.
We do know that Saddam Hussein has been actively and
persistently pursuing nuclear weapons for more than 20 years,
but we should be just as concerned about the immediate threat
from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons. They are much
simpler to deliver than nuclear weapons and even more readily
transferred to terrorist networks who could allow Iraq to
deliver them without Iraq's fingerprints on the attack.
If you want an idea of the devastation Iraq could wreak on
our country with a biological attack, consider the recent Dark
Winter exercise conducted by Johns Hopkins University. It
simulated a biological weapons attack in which terrorists
released smallpox in three separate locations in the United
States. Within 2 months, the worst-case estimate indicated that
1 million Americans could be dead and another 2 million
infected. It's not a pretty picture. Cut it in half. Cut it by
three-quarters. It's still a disaster.
Some have argued that Iraq is unlikely to use weapons of
mass destruction against us, because, unlike terrorist
networks, Saddam Hussein has a return address. Mr. Chairman,
there's no reason to have confidence that if Iraq launched a
WMD attack against the United States, it would necessarily have
a return address. There are ways Iraq could easily conceal
responsibility for a WMD attack. They could give biological
weapons to a terrorist network to attack us from within.
Suicide bombers are not deterrable. They end up dead, and,
therefore, the problem of being deterred is not something they
worry about.
We still do not know with certainty who was behind the 1996
bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, for example. We don't
know who was responsible for last year's anthrax attack.
Indeed, our consistent failure over the past two decades to
trace terrorist attacks to their ultimate source gives
terrorist states the lesson that using terrorist networks is an
effective way of attacking the United States with impunity.
Some ask, ``Why does he have to be overthrown? Can't we
just take out the capabilities that he has to threaten us?''
Well, the President has not made a decision. The problem with
doing that piecemeal is this. First, we simply do not know
where all or even a large portion of Iraq's WMD facilities are.
We do know where a fraction of them are. Second, of the
facilities that we do know, not all are vulnerable to attack
from the air. A good many are underground and deeply buried.
Others are purposely located near population centers--schools,
hospitals, mosques--where an air strike could kill a large
number of innocent people. The Iraq problem cannot be solved by
air strikes alone.
Some have asked whether military intervention in Iraq means
that the U.S. would have to go to war with every terrorist
state that's pursuing WMD. The answer is no. For one thing,
preventive action in one situation may very well produce a
deterrent effect in other states. After driving the Taliban
from power in Afghanistan, we've already seen a change in the
behavior of several states. Moreover, dealing with some states
may not require military action. Indeed, I think they would
not. In some cases, we see states where there is a good deal of
unrest within the country. Take Iran, where their women and the
young people are putting pressure on the small clique of
clerics who are running that country. In my view, it's
possible, at some point, that it could flip, just like it
flipped from the Shah to the ayatollahs. No one can promise
that, but it is at least impressive to see the stirrings that
are taking place in that country.
There is a place in this world for inspections, and they
tend to be effective if the target nation is actually willing
to disarm and they want to prove to the world that they are
doing so. They tend not to be as effective in uncovering
deceptions and violations when the target is determined not to
be disarmed. Iraq's record of the past decade shows that they
want weapons of mass destruction and that they are determined
to develop them.
Some people have suggested that if the U.S. were to act, it
might provoke Saddam Hussein's use of weapons of mass
destruction. That's a valuable point. There are ways to
mitigate the risk of a chem-bio attack, but they cannot be
entirely eliminated. It's true that there could be that risk in
a military action. But if Iraq is that dangerous, then it only
makes the case stronger; the longer one waits, the more deadly
his capabilities will be every month and every year.
Moreover, consider the consequences if the world were to
allow that risk to deter us from acting. We would then have
sent a message to the world about the value of weapons of mass
destruction that we would deeply regret having sent to other
countries.
The message the world should want to send is exactly the
opposite, that Iraq's pursuit of WMD has made it not more
secure, but less secure, that by pursuing those weapons they
have attracted undesired attention to themselves from the world
community. Saddam Hussein might not have anything to lose
personally, but those other people beneath him in the chain of
command would most certainly have a great deal to lose. Wise
Iraqis will not obey orders to use weapons of mass destruction.
Some have asked, ``Well, what's changed to warrant the
action now?'' Well, what has changed is our experience on
September 11. What's changed is our appreciation of our
vulnerability and the risk that the United States faces from
terrorist networks and terrorist states armed with weapons of
mass destruction. What's not changed is his drive to acquire
those weapons and the fact that every single approach that the
world community and the United Nations have taken has failed.
Mr. Chairman, as the President has made clear, this is a
critical moment for our country and for our world, indeed. Our
resolve is being put to the test. It's a test that,
unfortunately, the world's free nations have failed before in
recent history with terrible consequences. Long before the
Second World War, Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf indicating what he
intended to do, but the hope was that maybe he would not do
what he said. Between 35 and 60 million people died because of
a series of calculated mistakes. He might have been stopped
early at a minimal cost of lives had the vast majority of the
world's leaders not decided at the time that the risks of
acting were greater than the risks of not acting.
Today we must decide whether the risks of acting are
greater than the risks of not acting. Saddam Hussein has made
his intentions clear. He has used weapons of mass destruction
against his own people and his neighbors. He has stockpiles of
chemical and biological weapons, and he is aggressively
pursuing nuclear weapons. If he demonstrates the capability to
deliver them to our shores, the world would be changed.
We need to decide as a people how we feel about that. Do
the risks of taking action to stop that threat outweigh the
risks of living in the world as we see it evolving, or is the
risk of doing nothing greater than the risk of acting?
The question comes down to this: How will the history of
this era be recorded? When we look back on previous periods of
our history, we see that there have been many books written
about threats and attacks that were not anticipated. At Dawn We
Slept, The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, Pearl Harbor, Final
Judgment, Why England Slept--the list of such books is endless.
Unfortunately, in the past year, historians have already
started to add to that body of literature, and there are books
out on the September 11 attacks asking why they weren't
prevented. Each is an attempt by the authors to connect the
dots to determine what happened and why it was not possible to
figure out what was going to happen in the future.
Our job today--the President's, Congress, and the United
Nations, and, indeed, the free people of the world--is to try
to connect the dots before the fact, to try to anticipate
vastly more lethal attacks before they happen and to try to
make the right decisions as to whether we should take
anticipatory self-defense actions or preventive actions before
such an attack occurs.
Mr. Chairman, we're on notice, each of us. Each of us has a
responsibility to do everything in our power to ensure that
when the history of this period is written, the books won't ask
why we slept. We must ensure that history will instead record
that on September 11 the American people were awakened to the
impending dangers and that those entrusted with the safety of
the American people made the right decisions and saved our
Nation and the world from the 21st century threats.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would like to
just say that it's a pleasure to see Senator Thurmond here and
to have an opportunity to have him participate. This may very
well be my last hearing before you, given your decision to
retire. So it's a pleasure to see you, sir.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to meet with you today.
Last week, we commemorated the 1 year anniversary of the most
devastating attack our Nation has ever experienced--more than 3,000
innocent people killed in a single day.
Today, I want to discuss the task of preventing even more
devastating attacks--attacks that could kill not thousands, but
potentially tens of thousands of our fellow citizens.
As we meet, state sponsors of terror across the world are working
to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction. As we speak,
chemists, biologists, and nuclear scientists are toiling in weapons
labs and underground bunkers, working to give the world's most
dangerous dictators weapons of unprecedented power and lethality.
The threat posed by those regimes is real. It is dangerous. It is
growing with each passing day. We cannot wish it away.
We have entered a new security environment, one that is
dramatically different than the one we grew accustomed to over the past
half-century. We have entered a world in which terrorist movements and
terrorists states are developing the capacity to cause unprecedented
destruction.
Today, our margin of error is notably different. In the 20th
century, we were dealing, for the most part, with conventional
weapons--weapons that could kill hundreds or thousands of people,
generally combatants. In the 21st century, we are dealing with weapons
of mass destruction that can kill potentially tens of thousands of
people--innocent men, women, and children.
Further, because of the nature of these new threats, we are in an
age of little or no warning, when threats can emerge suddenly--at any
place or time--to surprise us. Terrorist states have enormous appetite
for these powerful weapons--and active programs to develop them. They
are finding ways to gain access to these capabilities. This is not a
possibility--it is a certainty. In word and deed, they have
demonstrated a willingness to use those capabilities.
Moreover, after September 11, they have discovered a new means of
delivering these weapons--terrorist networks. To the extent that they
might transfer WMD to terrorist groups, they could conceal their
responsibility for attacks. If they believe they can conceal their
responsibility for an attack, then they would likely not be deterred.
We are on notice; let there be no doubt that an attack will be
attempted. The only question is when and by what technique. It could be
months, a year, or several years. But it will happen. It is in our
future. Each of us needs to pause and think about that for a moment--
about what it would mean for our country, for our families--and indeed
for the world.
If the worst were to happen, not one of us here today will be able
to honestly say it was a surprise. Because it will not be a surprise.
We have connected the dots as much as it is humanly possible--before
the fact. Only by waiting until after the event could we have proof
positive. The dots are there for all to see. The dots are there for all
to connect. If they aren't good enough, rest assured they will only be
good enough after another disaster--a disaster of still greater
proportions. By then it will be too late.
The question facing us is this: what is the responsible course of
action for our country? Do you believe it is our responsibility to wait
for a nuclear, chemical or biological September 11? Or is it the
responsibility of free people to do something now--to take steps to
deal with the threat before we are attacked?
The President has made his position clear: the one thing that is
not an option is doing nothing.
There are a number of terrorist states pursuing weapons of mass
destruction--Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, to name but a few. But no
terrorist state poses a greater and more immediate threat to the
security of our people, and the stability of the world, than the regime
of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
No living dictator has shown the murderous combination of intent
and capability--of aggression against his neighbors; oppression of his
own people; genocide; support of terrorism; pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction; the use of weapons of mass destruction; and the most
threatening, hostility to its neighbors and to the United States--than
Saddam Hussein and his regime.
Mr. Chairman, these facts about Saddam Hussein's regime should be
part of this record and of our country's considerations:
Saddam Hussein has openly praised the attacks of
September 11.
Last week, on the anniversary of September 11,
his state-run press called the attacks ``God's
punishment.''
He has repeatedly threatened the U.S. and its
allies with terror--once declaring that ``every Iraqi
(can) become a missile.''
He has ordered the use of chemical weapons--Sarin,
Tabun, VX, and mustard agents--against his own people, in one
case killing 5,000 innocent civilians in a single day.
His regime has invaded two of its neighbors, and
threatened others.
In 1980, they invaded Iran, and used chemical
weapons against Iranian forces.
In 1990, they invaded Kuwait and are
responsible for thousands of documented cases of
torture, rape and murder of Kuwaiti civilians during
their occupation.
In 1991, they were poised to march on and
occupy other nations--and would have done so, had they
not been stopped by the U.S. led coalition forces.
His regime has launched ballistic missiles at four of
their neighbors--Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
His regime plays host to terrorist networks and has
directly ordered acts of terror on foreign soil.
His regime assassinates its opponents, both in Iraq
and abroad, and has attempted to assassinate the former Israeli
Ambassador to Great Britain, and a former U.S. President.
He has executed members of their cabinet, including
the Minister of Health, whom he personally shot and killed.
His regime has committed genocide and ethnic cleansing
in Northern Iraq, ordering the extermination of between 50,000
and 100,000 people and the destruction of over 4,000 villages.
His attacks on the Kurds drove 2 million refugees into
Turkey, Syria and Iran.
His regime has brought the Marsh Arabs in Southern
Iraq to the point of extinction, drying up the Iraqi marsh
lands in order to move against their villages--one of the worst
environmental crimes ever committed.
His regime is responsible for catastrophic
environmental damage, setting fire to over 1,100 Kuwaiti oil
wells.
His regime beat and tortured American POWs during the
1991 Persian Gulf War, and used them as ``human shields.''
His regime has still failed to account for hundreds of
POWs, including Kuwaiti, Saudi, Indian, Syrian, Lebanese,
Iranian, Egyptian, Bahraini and Omani nationals--and an
American pilot shot down over Iraq during the Gulf War.
His regime on almost a daily basis continues to fire
missiles and artillery at U.S. and coalition aircraft
patrolling the no-fly zones in Northern and Southern Iraq, and
has made clear its objective of shooting down coalition pilots
enforcing U.N. resolutions--it is the only place in the world
where U.S. forces are shot at with impunity.
His regime has subjected tens of thousands of
political prisoners and ordinary Iraqis to arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment, summary execution, torture, beatings, burnings,
electric shocks, starvation and mutilation.
He has ordered doctors to surgically remove the ears
of military deserters, and the gang rape of Iraqi women,
including political prisoners, the wives and daughters of their
opposition and members of the regime suspected of disloyalty.
His regime is actively pursuing weapons of mass
destruction, and willing to pay a high price to get them--
giving up tens of billions in oil revenue under economic
sanctions by refusing inspections to preserve his WMD programs.
His regime has amassed large, clandestine stockpiles
of biological weapons--including anthrax and botulism toxin,
and possibly smallpox.
His regime has amassed large, clandestine stockpiles
of chemical weapons--including VX, sarin, cyclosarin, and
mustard gas.
His regime has an active program to acquire and
develop nuclear weapons.
They have the knowledge of how to produce
nuclear weapons, and designs for at least two different
nuclear devices.
They have a team of scientists, technicians
and engineers in place, as well as the infrastructure
needed to build a weapon.
Very likely all they need to complete a weapon
is fissile material--and they are, at this moment,
seeking that material--both from foreign sources and
the capability to produce it indigenously.
His regime has dozens of ballistic missiles, and is
working to extend their range in violation of U.N.
restrictions.
His regime is pursuing pilotless aircraft as a means
of delivering chemical and biological weapons.
His regime agreed after the Gulf War to give up
weapons of mass destruction and submit to international
inspections--then lied, cheated and hid their WMD programs for
more than a decade.
His regime has in place an elaborate, organized system
of denial and deception to frustrate both inspectors and
outside intelligence efforts.
His regime has violated U.N. economic sanctions, using
illicit oil revenues to fuel their WMD aspirations.
His regime has diverted funds from the U.N.'s ``oil
for food'' program--funds intended to help feed starving Iraqi
civilians--to fund WMD programs.
His regime violated 16 U.N. resolutions, repeatedly
defying the will of the international community without cost or
consequence.
His regime is determined to acquire the means to
strike the U.S., its friends and allies with weapons of mass
destruction, acquire the territory of their neighbors, and
impose their control over the Persian Gulf region.
As the President warned the United Nations last week, ``Saddam
Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger.'' It is a danger to
its neighbors, to the United States, to the Middle East, and to
international peace and stability. It is a danger we do not have the
option to ignore.
The world has acquiesced in Saddam Hussein's aggression, abuses and
defiance for more than a decade.
In his U.N. address, the President explained why we should not
allow the Iraqi regime to acquire weapons of mass destruction and
issued a challenge to the international community: to enforce the
numerous resolutions the U.N. has passed and Saddam Hussein has defied;
to show that Security Council's decisions will not be cast aside
without cost or consequence; to show that the U.N. is up to the
challenge of dealing with a dictator like Saddam Hussein; and to show
that the U.N. is determined not to become irrelevant.
President Bush has made clear that the United States wants to work
with the U.N. Security Council to deal with the threat posed by the
Iraqi regime. But he made clear the consequences of Iraq's continued
defiance: `` The purposes of the United States should not be doubted.
The Security Council resolutions will be enforced . . . or action will
be unavoidable. A regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose
its power.''
The President has asked the Members of the House and the Senate to
support the actions that may be necessary to deliver on that pledge. He
urged that Congress act before the congressional recess. He asked that
you send a clear signal--to the world community and the Iraqi regime--
that our country is united in purpose and ready to act. Only certainty
of U.S. and U.N. purposefulness can have even the prospect of affecting
the Iraqi regime.
It is important that Congress send that message as soon as
possible--before the U.N. Security Council votes. The Security Council
must act soon, and it is important that the U.S. Congress signal the
world where the U.S. stands before the U.N. vote takes place. Delaying
a vote in Congress would send a message that the U.S. may be unprepared
to take a stand, just as we are asking the international community to
take a stand, and as Iraq will be considering its options.
Delay would signal the Iraqi regime that they can continue their
violations of the U.N. resolutions. It serves no U.S. or U.N. purpose
to give Saddam Hussein excuses for further delay. His regime should
recognize that the U.S. and the U.N. are purposeful.
It was Congress that changed the objective of U.S. policy from
containment to regime change by the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act
in 1998. The President is now asking Congress to support that policy.
A decision to use military force is never easy. No one with any
sense considers war a first choice--it is the last thing that any
rational person wants to do. It is important that the issues
surrounding this decision be discussed and debated.
In recent weeks, a number of questions have been surfaced by
Senators, Members of Congress, and former Government officials. Some of
the arguments raised are important. Just as there are risks in acting,
so too there are risks in not acting.
Those risks need to be balanced; to do so, it is critical to
address a number of the issues that have been raised:
Some have asked whether an attack on Iraq would disrupt and distract
the U.S. from the global war on terror.
The answer to that is: Iraq is a part of the global war on terror--
stopping terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
is a key objective of that war. We can fight all elements of this war
simultaneously.
Our principal goal in the war on terror is to stop another
September 11--or a WMD attack that could make September 11 seem modest
by comparison--before it happens. Whether that threat comes from a
terrorist regime or a terrorist network is beside the point. Our
objective is to stop them, regardless of the source.
In his State of the Union address last January, President Bush made
our objectives clear. He said: ``by seeking weapons of mass
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could
provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their
hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United
States. In any of these cases the price of indifference would be
catastrophic.'' Ultimately, history will judge us all by what we do now
to deal with this danger.
Another question that has been asked is this: The administration argues
Saddam Hussein poses a grave and growing danger. Where is the
``smoking gun?''
Mr. Chairman, the last thing we want is a smoking gun. A gun smokes
after it has been fired. The goal must be to stop Saddam Hussein before
he fires a weapon of mass destruction against our people. As the
President told the United Nations last week, ``The first time we may be
completely certain he has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid, he uses
one. We owe it to . . . our citizens to do everything in our power to
prevent that day from coming.'' If Congress or the world waits for a
so-called ``smoking gun,'' it is certain that we will have waited too
long.
But the question raises an issue that it is useful to discuss--
about the kind of evidence we consider to be appropriate to act in the
21st century.
In our country, it has been customary to seek evidence that would
prove guilt `` beyond a reasonable doubt'' in a court of law. That
approach is appropriate when the objective is to protect the rights of
the accused. But in the age of WMD, the objective is not to protect the
``rights'' of dictators like Saddam Hussein--it is to protect the lives
of our citizens. When there is that risk, and we are trying to defend
against the closed societies and shadowy networks that threaten us in
the 21st century, expecting to find that standard of evidence, from
thousands of miles away, and to do so before such a weapon has been
used, is not realistic. After such weapons have been used it is too
late.
I suggest that any who insist on perfect evidence are back in the
20th century and still thinking in pre-September 11 terms. On September
11, we were awakened to the fact that America is now vulnerable to
unprecedented destruction. That awareness ought to be sufficient to
change the way we think about our security, how we defend our country--
and the type of certainty and evidence we consider appropriate.
In the 20th century, when we were dealing largely with conventional
weapons, we could wait for perfect evidence. If we miscalculated, we
could absorb an attack, recover, take a breath, mobilize, and go out
and defeat our attackers. In the 21st century, that is no longer the
case, unless we are willing and comfortable accepting the loss not of
thousands of lives, but potentially tens of thousands of lives--a high
price indeed.
We have not, will not, and cannot know everything that is going on
in the world. Over the years, even our best efforts, intelligence has
repeatedly underestimated the weapons capabilities of a variety of
countries of major concern to us. We have had numerous gaps of 2, 4, 6,
or 8 years between the time a country of concern first developed a WMD
capability and the time we finally learned about it.
We do know: that the Iraqi regime has chemical and biological
weapons of mass destruction and is pursuing nuclear weapons; that they
have a proven willingness to use the weapons at their disposal; that
they have proven aspirations to seize the territory of, and threaten,
their neighbors; that they have proven support for and cooperation with
terrorist networks; and that they have proven record of declared
hostility and venomous rhetoric against the United States. Those
threats should be clear to all.
In his U.N. address, the President said ``we know that Saddam
Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his
country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left?'' To the
contrary, knowing what we know about Iraq's history, no conclusion is
possible except that they have and are accelerating their WMD programs.
Now, do we have perfect evidence that can tell us precisely the
date Iraq will have a deliverable nuclear device, or when and where he
might try to use it? That is not knowable. But it is strange that some
seem to want to put the burden of proof on us--the burden of proof
ought to be on him--to prove he has disarmed; to prove he no longer
poses a threat to peace and security. That he cannot do.
Committees of Congress currently are asking hundreds of questions
about what happened on September 11--pouring over thousands of pages of
documents, and asking who knew what, when, and why they didn't prevent
that tragedy. I suspect, that in retrospect, most of those
investigating September 11 would have supported preventive action to
pre-empt that threat, if it had been possible to see it coming.
Well, if one were to compare the scraps of information the
government had before September 11, to the volumes of information the
government has today about Iraq's pursuit of WMD, his use of those
weapons, his record of aggression and his consistent hostility toward
the United States--and then factor in our country's demonstrated
vulnerability after September 11--the case the President made should be
clear.
As the President said, time is not on our side. If more time
passes, and the attacks we are concerned about come to pass, I would
not want to have ignored all the warning signs and then be required to
explain why our country failed to protect our fellow citizens.
We cannot go back in time to stop the September 11 attack. But we
can take actions now to prevent some future threats.
Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent--
that Saddam is at least 5-7 years away from having nuclear
weapons.
I would not be so certain. Before Operation Desert Storm in 1991,
the best intelligence estimates were that Iraq was at least 5-7 years
away from having nuclear weapons. The experts were flat wrong. When the
U.S. got on the ground, it found the Iraqi's were probably 6 months to
a year away from having a nuclear weapon--not 5 to 7 years.
We do not know today precisely how close he is to having a
deliverable nuclear weapon. What we do know is that he has a sizable
appetite for them, that he has been actively and persistently pursuing
them for more than 20 years, and that we allow him to get them at our
peril. Moreover, let's say he is 5-7 years from a deliverable nuclear
weapon. That raises the question: 5-7 years from when? From today? From
1998, when he kicked out the inspectors? Or from earlier, when
inspectors were still in country? There is no way of knowing except
from the ground, unless one believes what Saddam Hussein says.
But those who raise questions about the nuclear threat need to
focus on the immediate threat from biological weapons. From 1991 to
1995, Iraq repeatedly insisted it did not have biological weapons.
Then, in 1995, Saddam's son-in-law defected and told the inspectors
some of the details of Iraq's biological weapons program. Only then did
Iraq admit it had produced tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and
other biological weapons. But even then, they did not come clean. U.N.
inspectors believe Iraq had in fact produced two to four-times the
amount of biological agents it had declared. Those biological agents
were never found. Iraq also refused to account for some three tons of
materials that could be used to produce biological weapons.
Iraq has these weapons. They are much simpler to deliver than
nuclear weapons, and even more readily transferred to terrorist
networks, who could allow Iraq to deliver them without fingerprints.
If you want an idea of the devastation Iraq could wreak on our
country with a biological attack, consider the recent ``Dark Winter''
exercise conducted by Johns Hopkins University. It simulated a
biological WMD attack in which terrorists released smallpox in three
separate locations in the U.S. Within 22 days, it is estimated it would
have spread to 26 states, with an estimated 6000 new infections
occurring daily. Within 2 months, the worst-case estimate indicated 1
million people could be dead and another 2 million infected. Not a nice
picture.
The point is this: we know Iraq possesses biological weapons, and
chemical weapons, and is expanding and improving their capabilities to
produce them. That should be of every bit as much concern as Iraq's
potential nuclear capability.
Some have argued that even if Iraq has these weapons, Saddam Hussein
does not intend to use WMD against the U.S. because he is a
survivor, not a suicide bomber--that he would be unlikely to
take actions that could lead to his own destruction.
Then why is Iraq pursuing WMD so aggressively? Why are they willing
to pay such a high price for them--to suffer a decade of economic
sanctions that have cost them tens of billions in oil revenues--
sanctions they could get lifted simply by an agreement to disarm?
One answer is that, as some critics have conceded, ``he seeks
weapons of mass destruction . . . to deter us from intervening to block
his aggressive designs.'' This is no doubt a motivation. But consider
the consequences if they were allowed to succeed.
Imagine for a moment that Iraq demonstrated the capacity to attack
U.S. or European population centers with nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons. Then imagine you are the President of the United
States, trying to put together an international coalition to stop their
aggression, after Iraq had demonstrated that capability. It would be a
daunting task. His regime believes that simply by possessing the
capacity to deliver WMD to Western capitals, he will be able to
prevent--terrorize--the free world from projecting force to stop his
aggression--driving the West into a policy of forced isolationism.
That said, it is far from clear that he would not necessarily
restrain from taking actions that could result in his destruction. For
example, that logic did not stop the Taliban from supporting and
harboring al Qaeda as they planned and executed repeated attacks on the
U.S. Their miscalculation resulted in the destruction of their regime.
Regimes without checks and balances are prone to grave miscalculations.
Saddam Hussein has no checks whatsoever on his decision-making
authority. Who among us really believes it would be wise or prudent for
us to base our security on the hope that Saddam Hussein, or his sons
who might succeed him, could not make the same fatal miscalculations as
Mullah Omar and the Taliban?
It is my view that we would be ill advised to stake our people's
lives on Saddam Hussein's supposed ``survival instinct.''
Some have argued Iraq is unlikely to use WMD against us because, unlike
terrorist networks, Saddam has a ``return address.''
Mr. Chairman, there is no reason for confidence that if Iraq
launched a WMD attack on the U.S., it would necessarily have an obvious
``return address.'' There are ways Iraq could easily conceal
responsibility for a WMD attack. They could deploy ``sleeper cells''
armed with biological weapons to attack us from within--and then deny
any knowledge or connection to the attacks. Or they could put a WMD-
tipped missile on a ``commercial'' shipping vessel, sail it within
range of our coast, fire it, and then melt back into the commercial
shipping traffic before we knew what hit us. Finding that ship would be
like searching for a needle in a haystack--a bit like locating a single
terrorist. Or they could recruit and utilize a terrorist network with
similar views and objectives, and pass on weapons of mass destruction
to them. It is this nexus between a terrorist state like Iraq with WMD
and terrorist networks that has so significantly changed the U.S.
security environment.
We still do not know with certainty who was behind the 1996 bombing
of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia--an attack that killed 19 American
service members. We still do not know who is responsible for last
year's anthrax attacks. The nature of terrorist attacks is that it is
often very difficult to identify who is ultimately responsible. Indeed,
our consistent failure over the past 2 decades to trace terrorist
attacks to their ultimate source gives terrorist states the lesson that
using terrorist networks as proxies is an effective way of attacking
the U.S. with impunity.
Some have opined there is scant evidence of Iraq's ties to terrorists,
and he has little incentive to make common cause with them.
That is not correct. Iraq's ties to terrorist networks are long-
standing. It is no coincidence that Abu Nidal was in Baghdad when he
died under mysterious circumstances. Iraq has also reportedly provided
safe haven to Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of the FBI's most wanted
terrorists, who was a key participant in the first World Trade Center
bombing. We know that al Qaeda is operating in Iraq today, and that
little happens in Iraq without the knowledge of the Saddam Hussein
regime. We also know that there have been a number of contacts between
Iraq and al Qaeda over the years. We know Saddam has ordered acts of
terror himself, including the attempted assassination of a former U.S.
President.
He has incentives to make common cause with terrorists. He shares
many common objectives with groups like al Qaeda, including an
antipathy for the Saudi royal family and a desire to drive the U.S. out
of the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, if he decided it was in his
interest to conceal his responsibility for an attack on the U.S.,
providing WMD to terrorists would be an effective way of doing so.
Some have said that they would support action to remove Saddam if the
U.S. could prove a connection to the attacks of September 11--
but there is no such proof.
The question implies that the U.S. should have to prove that Iraq
has already attacked us in order to deal with that threat. The
objective is to stop him before he attacks us and kills thousands of
our citizens.
The case against Iraq does not depend on an Iraqi link to September
11. The issue for the U.S. is not vengeance, retribution or
retaliation--it is whether the Iraqi regime poses a growing danger to
the safety and security of our people, and of the world. There is no
question but that it does.
Some argue that North Korea and Iran are more immediate threats than
Iraq. North Korea almost certainly has nuclear weapons, and is
developing missiles that will be able to reach most of the
continental United States. Iran has stockpiles of chemical
weapons, is developing ballistic missiles of increasing range,
and is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. The question is
asked: why not deal with them first?
Iran and North Korea are indeed threats--problems we take
seriously. That is why President Bush named them specifically, when he
spoke about an ``Axis of Evil.'' We have policies to address both.
But Iraq is unique. No other living dictator matches Saddam
Hussein's record of: waging aggressive war against his neighbors;
pursuing weapons of mass destruction; using WMD against his own people
and other nations; launching ballistic missiles at his neighbors;
brutalizing and torturing his own citizens; harboring terrorist
networks; engaging in terrorist acts, including the attempted
assassination of foreign officials; violating his international
commitments; lying, cheating and hiding his WMD programs; deceiving and
defying the express will of the United Nations over and over again.
As the President told the U.N., ``in one place--in one regime--we
find all these dangers in their most lethal and aggressive forms.''
Some respond by saying, OK, Iraq poses a threat we will eventually have
to deal with--but now is not the time to do so.
To that, I would ask: when? Will it be a better time when his
regime is stronger? When its WMD programs are still further advanced?
After he further builds his forces, which are stronger and deadlier
with each passing day? Yes, there are risks in acting. The President
understands those risks. But there are also risks in further delay. As
the President has said: ``I will not wait on events, while dangers
gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The
United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous
regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.''
Others say that overthrowing the regime should be the last step, not
the first.
I would respond that for more than a decade now, the international
community has tried every other step. They have tried diplomacy; they
have tried sanctions and embargoes; they have tried positive
inducements, such as the ``oil for food'' program; they have tried
inspections; they have tried limited military strikes. Together, all
these approaches have failed to accomplish the U.N. goals.
If the President were to decide to take military action to
overthrow the regime, it would be not the first step, it would be the
last step, after a decade of failed diplomatic and economic steps to
stop his drive for WMD.
Some have asked: why not just contain him? The West lived for 40 years
with the Soviet threat, and never felt the need to take pre-
emptive action. If containment worked on the Soviet Union, why
not Iraq?
First, it's clear from the Iraqi regime's 11 years of defiance that
containment has not led to their compliance. To the contrary,
containment is breaking down--the regime continues to receive funds
from illegal oil sales and procure military hardware necessary to
develop weapons of mass murder. So not only has containment failed to
reduce the threat, it has allowed the threat to grow.
Second, with the Soviet Union we faced an adversary that already
possessed nuclear weapons--thousands of them. Our goal with Iraq is to
prevent them from getting nuclear weapons. We are not interested in
establishing a balance of terror with the likes of Iraq, like the one
that existed with the Soviet Union. We are interested in stopping a
balance of terror from forming.
Third, with the Soviet Union, we believed that time was on our
side--and we were correct. With Iraq, the opposite is true--time is not
on our side. Every month that goes by, his WMD programs are progressing
and he moves closer to his goal of possessing the capability to strike
our population, and our allies, and hold them hostage to blackmail.
Finally, while containment worked in the long run, the Soviet
Union's nuclear arsenal prevented the West from responding when they
invaded their neighbor, Afghanistan. Does anyone really want Saddam to
have that same deterrent, so he can invade his neighbors with impunity?
Some ask: Why does he have to be overthrown? Can't we just take out the
capabilities he has that threaten us?
While the President has not made that decision, the problem with
doing it piecemeal is this: First, we do not know where all of Iraq's
WMD facilities are. We do know where a fraction of them are. Second, of
the facilities we do know, not all are vulnerable to attack from the
air. Some are underground. Some are mobile. Others are purposely
located near population centers--schools, mosques, hospitals, etc.--
where an air strike could kill large numbers of innocent people. The
Iraq problem cannot be solved with air strikes alone.
Some have argued that, if we do have to go to war, the U.S. should
first layout details of a truly comprehensive inspections
regime, which, if Iraq failed to comply, would provide a casus
belli.
I would respond this way: if failure to comply with WMD inspections
is a casus belli, the U.N. already has it--Iraq's non-compliance with
U.N. inspection regimes has been going on for more than a decade. What
else can one ask for?
The U.S. is not closed to inspections as an element of an effective
response. But the goal is not inspections--it is disarmament. Any
inspections would have to be notably different from the past. Given the
history of this regime, the world community has every right to be
skeptical that it would be. That is why, in 1998, the U.S. began to
speak of regime change.
Our goal is disarmament. The only purpose of any inspections would
be to prove that Iraq has disarmed, which would require Iraq to reverse
its decades-long policy of pursuing these weapons. Something they are
unlikely to do.
There are serious concerns about whether an inspections regime
could be effective. Even the most intrusive inspection regime would
have difficultly getting at all his weapons of mass destruction. Many
of his WMD capabilities are mobile and can be hidden to evade
inspectors. He has vast underground networks and facilities to hide
WMD, and sophisticated denial and deception techniques. It is simply
impossible to ``spot check'' a country the size of Iraq. Unless we have
people inside the Iraqi program who are willing to tell us what they
have and where they have it--as we did in 1995 with the defection of
Saddam's son in law, Hussein Kamel--it is easy for the Iraqi regime to
hide its capabilities from us.
Indeed, Hans Blix, the chief U.N. Weapons inspector, said as much
in an interview with the New York Times last week. According to the
Times, ``[Mr. Blix] acknowledged that there were some limitations to
what his team could accomplish even if it was allowed to return. Mr.
Blix said his inspectors might not be able to detect mobile
laboratories for producing biological weapons materials, or underground
storehouses for weapons substances, if the inspectors did not have
information about such sites from the last time they were in Iraq or
have not seen traces of them in satellite surveillance photography.''
When UNSCOM inspectors were on the ground, they did an admirable
job of uncovering many of Iraq's violations--which is undoubtedly why
Iraq had them expelled. But despite the U.N.'s best efforts, from 1991-
1995 Saddam was able to conceal some of his nuclear program and his
biological weapons program. Some aspects were uncovered after his son-
in-law defected and provided information that allowed inspectors to
find them. Even then, Iraq was able to hide many of those activities
from inspectors--capabilities he most likely still has today, in
addition to what he has developed in recent years.
There is a place in this world for inspections. They tend to be
effective if the target nation is cooperating--if they are actually
willing to disarm and want to prove to the world that they are doing
so. They tend not be as effective in uncovering deceptions and
violations when the target is determined not to disarm. Iraq's record
of the past decade shows the regime is not interested in disarming or
cooperating. Their behavior demonstrates they want weapons of mass
destruction and are determined to continue developing them.
Some ask: now that Iraq has agreed to ``unconditional inspections,''
why does Congress need to act?
Iraq has demonstrated great skill at playing the international
community. When it's the right moment to lean forward, they lean
forward. When it's a time to lean back, they lean back. It's a dance.
They can go on for months or years jerking the U.N. around. When they
find that things are not going their way, they throw out a proposal
like this. Hopeful people say: ``There's our opportunity. They are
finally being reasonable. Seize the moment. Let's give them another
chance.'' Then we repeatedly find, at the last moment, that Iraq
withdraws that carrot and goes back into their mode of rejecting the
international community. The dance starts all over again.
The issue is not inspections. The issue is disarmament. The issue
is compliance. As the President made clear in his U.N. address, we
require Iraq's compliance with all 16 U.N. resolutions that they have
defied over the past decade. As the President said, the U.N. Security
Council--not the Iraqi regime--needs to decide how to enforce its own
resolutions. Congress's support for the President is what is needed to
further generate international support.
Some have asked whether military intervention in Iraq means the U.S.
would have to go to war with every terrorist state that is
pursuing WMD?
The answer is: no. Taking military action in Iraq does not mean
that it would be necessary or appropriate to take military action
against other states that possess or are pursuing WMD. For one thing,
preventive action in one situation may very well produce a deterrent
effect on other states. After driving the Taliban from power in
Afghanistan, we have already seen a change in behavior in certain
regimes.
Moreover, dealing with some states may not require military action.
In some cases, such as Iran, change could conceivably come from within.
The young people and the women in Iran are increasingly fed up with the
tight clique of Mullahs--they want change, and may well rise up to
change their leadership at some point.
Some say that there is no international consensus behind ousting
Saddam--and most of our key allies are opposed.
First, the fact is that there are a number of countries that want
Saddam Hussein gone. Some are reluctant to say publicly just yet. But,
if the U.S. waited for a consensus before acting, we would never do
anything. Obviously, one's first choice in life is to have everyone
agree with you at the outset. In reality, that is seldom the case. It
takes time, leadership and persuasion. Leadership is about deciding
what is right, and then going out and persuading others.
The coalition we have fashioned in the global war on terror today
includes some 90 nations--literally half the world. It is the greatest
coalition ever assembled in the annals of human history. It was not
there on September 11. It was built, one country at a time, over a long
period of time. If we had waited for consensus, the Taliban would still
be in power in Afghanistan today. The worldwide coalition was formed by
leadership.
During the Persian Gulf War, the coalition eventually included 36
nations. But they were not there on August 2, 1990, when Saddam invaded
Kuwait. They were not there on August 5, when the President George H.W.
Bush announced to the world that Saddam's aggression ``will not
stand.'' That coalition was built over a period of many months.
With his U.N. speech, President George W. Bush began the process of
building international support for dealing with Iraq. The reaction has
been positive. We will continue to state our case, as the President is
doing, and I suspect that as he does so, you will find that other
countries in increasing numbers will cooperate and participate. Will it
be unanimous? No. Does anyone expect it to be unanimous? No. Does it
matter that it will not be unanimous? No. But does the U.S. want all
the support possible--you bet. Just as we have in the coalition
supporting the global war on terrorism.
The point is: if our Nation's leaders do the right thing, others
will follow and support the just cause--just they have in the global
war against terror.
Some say that our European allies may reluctantly go along in the end,
but that U.S. intervention in Iraq would spark concern in the
Arab world--that not one country in that regions supports us,
and many are vocally opposed.
That is not so. Saddam's neighbors are deathly afraid of him--and
understandably so. He has invaded his neighbors, used weapons of mass
destruction against them, and launched ballistic missiles at them. He
aspires to dominate the region. The nations of the region would be
greatly relieved to have him gone, and that if Saddam Hussein is
removed from power, the reaction in the region will be not outrage, but
great relief. The reaction of the Iraqi people will most certainly be
jubilation.
Some ask, but will they help us? Will they give us access to bases and
territory and airspace we need to conduct a military operation?
The answer is that the President has not decided to take military
action, but, if he does, we will have all the support we need to get
the job done. You can be certain of it.
Another argument is that military action in Iraq will be expensive, and
will have high costs for the global economy.
That may be true. But there are also dollar costs to not acting--
and those costs could well be far greater. Consider: the New York City
Comptroller estimates that the economic costs of the September 11
attacks to New York alone were between $83 and $95 billion. He further
estimated that New York lost 83,000 existing jobs and some 63,000 jobs
the city estimates would have been created had the attacks not
happened. One institute puts the cost to the national economy at $191
billion--including 1.64 million jobs lost as a direct result of the
September 11 attacks. Other estimates are higher--as much as $250
billion in lost productivity, sales, jobs, advertising, airline revenue
and the like. That is not to mention the cost in human lives, and the
suffering of those who lost fathers and mothers, sons and daughters,
sisters and brothers that day.
We must not forget that the costs of a nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons attack would be far worse. The price in lives would
be not thousands, but tens of thousands. The economic costs could make
September 11 pale by comparison. Those are the costs that also must be
weighed carefully. This is not mention the cost to one's conscience of
being wrong.
Some have suggested that if the U.S. were to act it might provoke
Saddam Hussein's use of WMD. Last time, the argument goes, he
didn't use chemical weapons on U.S. troops and allies because
he saw our goal was not to oust him, but to push back his
aggression. This time, the argument goes, the opposite would be
true, and he would have nothing to lose by using WMD.
That is an important point. The President made clear on March 13,
2002 the consequences of such an attack. He said: ``We've got all
options on the table because we want to make it very clear to nations
that you will not threaten the United States or use weapons of mass
destruction against us, our allies, or our friends.''
There are ways to mitigate the risk of a chem-bio attack, but it
cannot be entirely eliminated--it is true that could be a risk of
military action. But consider the consequences if the world were to
allow that risk to deter us from acting. We would then have sent a
message to the world about the value of weapons of mass destruction
that we would deeply regret having sent. A country thinking about
acquiring WMD would conclude that the U.S. had been deterred by Iraq's
chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and they could then
resolve to pursue those weapons to assure their impunity. The message
the world should want to send is the exact opposite. The message should
be that Iraq's pursuit of WMD has not only not made it more secure, it
has made it less secure--that by pursuing those weapons, they have
attracted undesired attention to themselves.
But if he is that dangerous, then that only makes the case for
action stronger--because the longer we wait, the more deadly his regime
becomes. If the world community were to be deterred from acting today
by the threat that Iraq might use chemical or biological weapons, how
will the U.N. feel when one day, Iraq demonstrates it has a deliverable
nuclear weapon? The risks will only grow worse. If we are deterred
today, we could be deterred forever--and Iraq will have achieved its
objective. Will the world community be deterred until Iraq uses a
weapon of mass destruction? Only then decide it is time to act.
But I would suggest that even if Saddam Hussein were to issue an
order for the use chemical or biological weapons, that does not mean
his orders would necessarily be carried out. Saddam Hussein might not
have anything to lose, but those beneath him in the chain of command
most certainly would have a great deal to lose--let there be no doubt.
He has maintained power by instilling fear in his subordinates. If he
is on the verge of losing power, he may also lose his ability to impose
that fear--and, thus, the blind obedience of those around him. Wise
Iraqis will not obey orders to use WMD.
If President Bush were to decide to take military action, the U.S.
will execute his order and finish the job professionally--Saddam
Hussein and his regime would be removed from power. Therefore, with
that certain knowledge, those in the Iraqi military will need to think
hard about whether it would be in their interest to follow his
instructions to commit war crimes by using WMD--and then pay a severe
price for that action. The United States will make clear at the outset
that those who are not guilty of atrocities can play a role in the new
Iraq. But if WMD is used all bets are off.
I believe many in the Iraqi Armed Forces despise Saddam Hussein,
and want to see him go as much as the rest of the world does. Those who
may not despise him, but decide they would prefer to survive, may
desert and try to blend into the civilian population or escape the
country. This is what happened in Panama, when it became clear that
Noriega was certain to be on his way out.
Some say that Saddam might succeed in provoking an Israeli response
this time--possibly a nuclear response--and that this would set
the Middle East aflame.
We are concerned about the Iraqi regime attacking a number of its
neighbors, and with good reason: Saddam Hussein has a history of doing
so. Iraq has attacked Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi
Arabia. Iraq is a threat to its neighbors. We will consult with all of
our allies and friends in the region on how to deal with this threat.
But the fact that they have blackmailed their neighbors makes the
case for action stronger. If we do nothing, that blackmail will
eventually become blackmail with weapons of mass destruction--with
significantly new consequences for the world.
Some have said the U.S. could get bogged down in a long-term military
occupation, and want to know what the plan is for a post-Saddam
Iraq?
That is a fair question. It is likely that international forces
would have to be in Iraq for a period of time, to help a new
transitional Iraqi government get on its feet and create conditions
where the Iraqi people would be able to choose a new government and
achieve self-determination. But that burden is a small one, when
balanced against the risks of not acting.
In Afghanistan, our approach was that Afghanistan belongs to the
Afghans--we did not and do not aspire to own it or run it. The same
would be true of Iraq.
In Afghanistan, the U.S. and coalition countries helped create
conditions so that the Afghan people could exercise their right of
self-government. Throughout the Bonn process and the Loya Jirga
process, a new president was chosen, a new cabinet sworn in, and a
transitional government, representative of the Afghan people, was
established to lead the nation.
If the President were to make the decision to liberate Iraq, with
coalition partners, it would help the Iraqi people establish a
government that would be a single country, that did not threaten its
neighbors, the United States, or the world with aggression and weapons
of mass destruction, and that would respect the rights of its diverse
population.
Iraq has an educated population that has been brutally and
viciously repressed by Saddam Hussein's regime. He has kept power not
by building loyalty, but by instilling fear--in his people, his
military and the government bureaucracy. I suspect that there would be
substantial defections once it became clear that Saddam Hussein was
finished. Moreover, there are numerous free Iraqi leaders--both inside
Iraq and abroad--who would play a role in establishing that new free
Iraqi government. So there is no shortage of talent available to lead
and rehabilitate a free Iraq.
In terms of economic rehabilitation, Iraq has an advantage over
Afghanistan. A free Iraq would be less dependent on international
assistance, and could conceivably get back on its feet faster, because
Iraq has a marketable commodity--oil.
Some have raised concerns that other countries elsewhere in the world
might take advantage of the fact that the U.S. is tied up in
Iraq, and use that as an opportunity to invade neighbors or
cause other mischief.
There is certainly a risk that some countries might underestimate
our capability to handle Iraq and stop their aggression at the same
time. But let there be no doubt: we have that capability.
Last year, we fashioned a new defense strategy, which established
that we will and do have the capability to near simultaneously:
Defend the U.S. homeland;
Undertake a major regional conflict and win
decisively--including occupying a country and changing their
regime;
If necessary, swiftly defeat another aggressor in
another theater; and
Simultaneously conduct a number of lesser
contingencies--such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.
The United States can do the above, if called upon to do so.
Another argument is that acting without provocation by Iraq would
violate international law.
That is untrue. The right to self-defense is a part of the U.N.
Charter. Customary international law has long provided for the right of
anticipatory self-defense--to stop an attack before it happens. In
addition, he is in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council
resolutions. Those concerned about the integrity of international law
should focus on their attention his brazen defiance of the U.N.
Some ask: What has changed to warrant action now?
What has changed is our experience on September 11. What has
changed is our appreciation of our vulnerability--and the risks the
U.S. faces from terrorist networks and terrorist states armed with
weapons of mass destruction.
What has not changed is Saddam Hussein's drive to acquire these
weapons. Every approach the U.N. has taken to stop Iraq's drive for WMD
has failed. In 1998, after Iraq had again kicked out U.N. inspectors,
President Clinton came to the Pentagon and said:
``If [Saddam] fails to comply, and we fail to act, or we take
some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more
opportunities to develop his weapons of mass destruction . . .
and continue to ignore the solemn commitment he made. . . . he
will conclude that the international community has lost its
will. He will conclude that he can go right on and do more to
rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. . . . The stakes
could not be higher. Some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll
use that arsenal.''
At the time, the U.S. massed forces in the Persian Gulf, ready to
strike. At the last minute, Iraq relented and allowed U.N. inspectors
to return. But predictably, they kicked them out again 10 months later.
They have not been allowed to return since. He has not only paid a
price for that defiance, he has been rewarded for his defiance of the
U.N. by increased trade from a large group of U.N. member nations.
If, in 1998, Saddam Hussein posed the grave threat that President
Clinton correctly described, then he most certainly poses a vastly
greater danger today, after 4 years without inspectors on the ground to
challenge his WMD procurement and development efforts. To those who
still ask--that is what has changed!
Some have asked what are the incentives for Iraq to comply--is there
anything the Iraqi regime could do to forestall military
action? Or is he finished either way?
Our objective is gaining Iraq's compliance. Our objective is an
Iraq that does not menace its neighbors, does not pursue WMD, does not
oppress its people or threaten the United States. The President set
forth in his speech what an Iraqi regime that wanted peace would do.
Everything we know about the character and record of the current Iraqi
regime indicates that it is highly unlikely to do the things the
President has said it must do. So long as Saddam Hussein is leading
that country, to expect otherwise is, as the President put it, to
``hope against the evidence.'' If Saddam Hussein is in a corner, it is
because he has put himself there. One choice he has is to take his
family and key leaders and seek asylum elsewhere. Surely one of the one
hundred and eighty plus counties would take his regime--possibly
Belarus.
Some ask does the U.S. needs U.N. support?
The President has asked the U.N. Security Council to act because it
is the U.N. Security Council that is being defied, disobeyed and made
less relevant by the Iraqi regime's defiance. There have already been
16 U.N. resolutions, every one of which Saddam Hussein has ignored.
There is no shortage of U.N. resolutions. What there is is a shortage
of consequences for Saddam's ongoing defiance of those 16 U.N.
resolutions. The President has made the case that it is dangerous for
the United Nations to be made irrelevant by the Iraqi regime.
As the President put it in his address last week, ``All the world
now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining
moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or
cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the
purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?''
But the President has also been clear that all options are on the
table. The only option President Bush has ruled out is to do nothing.
Mr. Chairman, as the President has made clear, this is a critical
moment for our country and for the world. Our resolve is being put to
the test. It is a test that, unfortunately, the world's free nations
have failed before in recent history--with terrible consequences.
Long before the Second World War, Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf
indicating what he intended to do. But the hope was that maybe he would
not do what he said. Between 35 and 60 million people died because of a
series of fatal miscalculations. He might have been stopped early--at a
minimal cost of lives--had the vast majority of the world's leaders not
decided at the time that the risks of acting were greater than the
risks of not acting.
Today, we must decide whether the risks of acting are greater than
the risks of not acting. Saddam Hussein has made his intentions clear.
He has used weapons of mass destruction against his own people and his
neighbors. He has demonstrated an intention to take the territory of
his neighbors. He has launched ballistic missiles against U.S. allies
and others in the region. He plays host to terrorist networks. He pays
rewards to the families of suicide bombers in Israel--like those who
killed five Americans at the Hebrew University earlier this year. He is
hostile to the United States, because we have denied him the ability he
has sought to impose his will on his neighbors. He has said, in no
uncertain terms, that he would use weapons of mass destruction against
the United States. He has, at this moment, stockpiles chemical and
biological weapons, and is pursuing nuclear weapons. If he demonstrates
the capability to deliver them to our shores, the world would be
changed. Our people would be at great risk. Our willingness to be
engaged in the world, our willingness to project power to stop
aggression, our ability to forge coalitions for multilateral action,
could all be under question. Many lives could be lost.
We need to decide as a people how we feel about that. Do the risks
of taking action to stop that threat outweigh these risks of living in
the world we see? Or is the risk of doing nothing greater than the risk
of acting? That is the question President Bush has posed to Congress,
to the American people, and to the world community.
The question comes down to this: how will the history of this era
be recorded? When we look back on previous periods of our history, we
see there have been many books written about threats and attacks that
were not anticipated:
At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor
December 7, 1941: The Day the Admirals Slept Late
Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment
From Munich to Pearl Harbor
While England Slept
The Cost of Failure
The list of such books is endless. Unfortunately, in the past year,
historians have added to that body of literature--there are already
books out on the September 11 attacks and why they were not prevented.
As we meet today, congressional committees are trying to determine why
that tragic event was not prevented.
Each is an attempt by the authors to ``connect the dots''--to
determine what happened, and why it was not possible to figure out that
it was going to happen.
Our job today--the President's, Congress' and the U.N.'s--is to
connect the dots before the fact, to anticipate vastly more lethal
attacks before they happen, and to make the right decision as to
whether we should take preventive action before it is too late.
We are on notice--each of us. Each has a solemn responsibility to
do everything in our power to ensure that, when the history of this
period is written, the books won't ask why we slept--to ensure that
history will instead record that on September 11, the American people
were awakened to the impending dangers--and that those entrusted with
the safety of the American people made the right decisions and saved
our Nation, and the world, from 21st century threats.
President Bush is determined to do just that.
Chairman Levin. We are delighted to have Senator Thurmond
with us, too. We join in your comments. It probably won't be
the last time that you'll be testifying before Senator Thurmond
retires, but, nonetheless, your sentiments are surely echoed by
all of us.
General Myers.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Myers. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
I would also like to take a minute to recognize Senator
Thurmond for his 48 years of service to our Nation as a Member
of Congress. He's been a champion for our Service men and women
now for five decades. I think we also ought to recognize his
service in the United States Army during World War II. That
service is legendary, and he's an example for all the men and
women in uniform today. Senator Thurmond, your departure will
mark not just the retirement of a great Senator, but it will
also mark the retirement of a prominent member of the greatest
generation, and we wish you, Senator, and your family, all the
best.
Mr. Chairman, I request that my prepared statement be
submitted for the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
General Myers. I will make some short introductory remarks
and then answer any questions you might have.
I don't think I can add anything to what Secretary Rumsfeld
has said on the threat that Iraq represents to America, our
interests, or our allies. So let me tell you that our Nation's
military forces are ready and able to do whatever the President
asks of them.
As a result of the support of Congress and the American
public, your Armed Forces have made dramatic strides in the
past decade, and I'll just cover three key areas. First, our
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance forces together
with our enhanced command and control networks have given our
joint war fighters a faster, more agile decision cycle than the
one we had a decade ago. For our war fighters, this means that
they have updated tactical information that is minutes to hours
old, vice days old.
Second, we have a much better power-projection capability.
The strong congressional support for programs such as the C-17
and the large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships has meant
that we can deploy and sustain the force much better.
Finally, our Nation's combat power has increased
dramatically over the past decade. For example, the Joint
Direct Attack Munition provides all of our bomber aircraft and
the majority of our fighter aircraft with a day-night all-
weather precision-attack capability. Our ground forces have
better and more accurate long-range weapons with the improved
Army tactical missile system and a faster multiple-launch
rocket system. Today we have sufficient forces to continue our
ongoing operations, meet our international commitments, and
continue to protect the American homeland.
At the same time, some key units are in high demand. The
mobilization of the Guard and Reserve have helped reduce the
stress on some of these key units. Any major combat operation
will, of course, require us to prioritize the task given to
such units.
While our military capabilities have improved over the past
decade, the foundation of our success remains our soldier,
sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen--and when I say
that, I also include our civilians and the Reserve component,
obviously, are all wrapped up in there. It's their superior
training, leadership, and discipline that are the core of our
effectiveness. In my view, these qualities are the reason that
our men and women in uniform enjoy respect and high regard of
other professional militaries around the world. It's also for
these reasons that our military forces are such effective
partners in coalition operations.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to be
here today to tell you that our Nation's joint forces can
accomplish whatever mission the Nation needs them to do.
[The prepared statement of General Myers follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF
I welcome the opportunity to share with you the nature of the
threat that the Iraqi regime presents to the United States, our forces
and our allies. I also welcome this chance to share with you what you
the improved capabilities our Armed Forces possess today.
iraq today
As it has for the past decade, the Iraqi regime remains a
significant threat to our interests and those of our allies. Despite
the presence of U.N. sanctions, Iraq has repaired and sustained key
elements of its offensive, conventional forces. Iraqi armed forces
maintain over 2,000 main battle tanks, more than 3,500 armored
personnel carriers, and more than 2,000 pieces of artillery. Today,
Iraqi ground forces have 23 divisions, to include 6 Republican Guard
divisions. Its Air Force operates over 50 key air defense radars and
has about 300 jet aircraft, to include a limited number of Mirage F-1s
and MiG-29 Fulcrum aircraft.
Since 2000, Iraq's air defense forces have engaged coalition forces
enforcing the U.N. mandated No-Fly Zones over Northern and Southern
Iraq more than 2,300 times. Since August of 2001, Iraqi hostile actions
have downed 3 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. In the last 2 weeks,
over 25 coalition aircraft enforcing the No-Fly Zones have been engaged
by Iraqi anti-aircraft and surface-to-air missiles.
Despite these hostile actions, in the aggregate, the regime's
military forces are down by roughly 50 to 60 percent, compared to 1990.
Poor morale is reportedly widespread in many units and the quality of
training is low. Iraqi forces employ aging weapon systems. Nonetheless,
Iraq continues to invest heavily in rebuilding its military, including
air defense systems and command and control networks. The Iraqi army
also has preserved some limited country-wide mobility for its armored
forces. The nature and type of these military forces are similar to the
offensive capability Iraq used to invade Iran, to invade Kuwait, to
attack the Kurds, and to crush popular uprisings against Saddam's
regime.
At the same time, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program
represents a greater threat to American lives, our interests and those
of our allies and friends. When U.N. inspection teams were forced to
leave Iraq in 1998, they documented that Iraq had failed to fulfill
U.N. disarmament mandates and to accurately account for its most
dangerous weapons. In response to ejecting those inspectors, the U.S.
and our coalition partners conducted Operation Desert Fox in December
1998. In 70 hours, the coalition dealt a limited blow to Iraq's WMD and
missile programs. At the time, we estimated that we set back its
programs by 6 months to a year. In the 4 years since, Iraq has
continued to develop chemical weapons, primarily mustard agent, the
nerve agent Sarin, and VX--an extremely potent nerve agent. Prior to
1991, Iraq produced at least 28,000 filled chemical munitions and
almost certainly many more.
Iraq has also invested heavily into developing biological agents.
After years of denying it had any offensive biological weapons, in
1995, the Iraqi regime admitted to the U.N. that it had produced more
than 30,000 liters of concentrated biological warfare agents. To put in
comparison, a year ago, trace amounts of anthrax infected 22 persons in
the U.S. and killed 5 Americans. UNSCOM estimated that Iraqi officials
were misleading and that Baghdad could have produced 2-4 times more
agents. Moreover, the U.N. was unable to account for nearly 200
biological bombs and missile warheads Iraq claims it destroyed in 1991.
Iraq retains the ability to deliver these chemical and biological
weapons with aircraft, artillery shells, or missiles. Two years ago, it
displayed an array of new missiles and has begun fielding them with its
military forces this year. These weapons, known as the Al Samoud and
Ababil-100 missiles, violate U.N. resolutions because they are capable
of reaching beyond the 150-kilometer range limit imposed on Iraqi
missiles and rockets.
With regards to nuclear weapons, Iraq continues to vigorously
pursue this capability. In 2000, the International Atomic Energy Agency
estimated that Iraq could have a nuclear weapon within 2 years. We do
not know definitively how long it will be until it creates an
operational nuclear capability. With foreign assistance, Iraq could
have such a weapon in a few years or much sooner if it is able to
obtain sufficient fissile materials from a foreign source.
But, we know, without any doubt, that Iraq values these clandestine
programs. Iraq has developed elaborate deception and dispersal efforts
aimed at preventing us and the rest of the world from learning about
its WMD capabilities. As a result, we do not know the exact location of
many of Iraq's WMD resources.
We also know that Iraq has demonstrated a willingness to use such
indiscriminate weapons. The regime has used WMD against the citizens of
Iraq and Iran. It has used Scud missiles against cities in Israel,
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and tried to hit Bahrain. In fact, Iraq has used
weapons of mass destruction more against civilians than against
military forces.
The Iraqi regime has also allowed its country to be a haven for
terrorists. Since the 1970s, organizations such as the Abu Nidal
Organization, Palestinian Liberation Front and Mujahadeen-e-Khalq have
found sanctuary within Iraq's borders. Over the past few months, with
the demise of their safe haven in Afghanistan, some al Qaida operatives
have relocated to Iraq. Baghdad's support for international terrorist
organizations ranges from explicit and overt support to implicit and
passive acquiescence.
Iraq is governed by a terrorist regime. From a military
perspective, Iraq's conventional forces and WMD programs represent a
threat to the region, our allies and U.S. interests.
u.s. military capabilities today
Our Nation's military forces enjoy the respect of the vast majority
of countries and their armed forces. This respect stems from our
forces' professional skills, superior intelligence assets, agile power
projection capability, unique C\2\ networks and the lethal combat power
that our Joint Team brings to the fight. As we have done in Operation
Desert Storm, in Bosnia, in Kosovo and most recently in Afghanistan,
our Armed Forces are always ready to integrate the military
capabilities of our allies and partners into a decidedly superior,
coalition force.
In a contest between Iraq's military forces and our Nation's Armed
Forces, the outcome is clear. Our joint warfighting team, in concert
with our partners, can and will decisively defeat Iraqi military
forces.
Many will remember the results of the last encounter between our
coalition forces and Iraq 11 years ago. Since then, U.S. combat power
has improved. Today, our Nation's joint warfighting team enjoys
improved intelligence, command and control, is more deployable and
possesses greater combat power. Let me briefly address each of these
areas.
In terms of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capability, our operations over Afghanistan demonstrated our improved
ability to observe the enemy. Our network of sensors, combined with the
improved flow of tactical information to commanders and warfighters at
all levels, have allowed us to react faster to a fluid battlefield
environment. In Operation Desert Storm, our only unmanned aerial
vehicle, the Pioneer, was limited to a 5-hour sortie and restricted to
line-of-sight from its command center. Today, Predator and Global Hawk
provide our forces day and night surveillance capability for extended
periods of time far over the horizon.
In a similar manner, our warfighters have more updated intelligence
for their mission. In Operation Desert Storm, pilots used target photos
that were often 2-3 days old. Determining accurate coordinates often
required 24 hours and was done exclusively in the rear echelon in the
United States. This process was good, but not as responsive as it
needed to be. Today, our aircrews have photos that are often only hours
old and can determine coordinates for precision engagement in just 20
minutes.
A critical component of the information needed by our warfighting
commanders is to monitor and detect the presence of chemical and
biological agents in the tactical environment. Today, our forces have
an improved ability to detect suspected Iraqi chemical and biological
agents.
Our command and control systems have also improved. Today, U.S.
Army ground commanders have vastly improved capabilities for tracking
the real-time locations of their tactical units. Our air operations
have undergone an improved ability to track key enemy forces, friendly
units, and to obtain faster assessment of the effects of our attacks.
The Joint Force Air Component Commander in Operation Enduring Freedom
repeatedly demonstrated the ability to re-task all aircraft while
airborne and strike emerging targets quickly, in some cases in as
little as 2 hours. Also, our Maritime Component Commanders can now plan
a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile mission in a matter of a few hours, when
a decade ago it required at least 2 days.
The Nation's ability to get to a crisis, with the right forces, to
execute operations on our timeline has improved over the past decade.
With the strong support of Congress, we invested in our deployment
infrastructure and equipment to allow operational units to deploy
faster and arrive better configured to fight. Since 1991, congressional
support of strategic power projection capabilities such as the C-17
aircraft, Large-Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) ship program and
both afloat and ground based, pre-positioned combat unit sets,
contribute significantly to our combat capability.
Additionally, we continue to work with the Nation's medical experts
at the Health and Human Services Department to ensure every member of
our Armed Forces will be fully prepared medically with immunizations
against potential biological threats. This September, we resumed
immunizations against anthrax for military personnel in select units.
These improvements allow our Nation's military to gather
intelligence, plan operations, deploy, and execute combat missions much
faster than 11 years ago. These improvements ensure that we have a
faster decision cycle than our opponent. These enhancements equate to
flexibility and agility in combat, which directly translates into a
superior force.
Equally dramatic has been our improvement in the combat power of
our forces. In Operation Desert Storm, only 18 percent of our force had
the ability to employ laser guided bombs (LGBs). Of the more than
200,000 bombs employed, only 4 percent were LGBs. Today, all of our
fixed-wing combat aircraft have a range of precision attack capability.
In addition, all of our bombers and 5 of our 7 primary air-to-ground
fighter weapon systems have all-weather precision attack capability
with the Joint Direct Attack Munition.
The results of these enhancements are measured in numerous ways.
For example, on the first night of our combat operations in
Afghanistan, we employed 38 fighter and bomber aircraft to attack 159
separate targets. All aircraft employed precision weapons. Had we
relied on a Operation Desert Storm equipped force, we would have needed
roughly 450 aircraft to gain the same level of destruction. In
Operation Desert Storm, we could not have afforded this size force
against so few targets. So in 1991, we used selected precision weapons
from F-111s, F-117s, and A-6s on key targets that had to be destroyed.
On the rest of the targets, we accepted a lower degree of damage. In
1991, our attacks required good weather between the aircraft and its
target. In Afghanistan, weather was often not a major factor.
The combat power of our Army and Marine forces has improved as
well. We have significantly improved the quality and quantity of Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) with wide-area and GPS aided missiles.
Our Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) has significantly improved its
fire rate. Our M-1 tanks continue to have the ability to identify and
destroy an Iraqi T-72 tank at twice the range that it can identify and
fire at our tanks. Our Bradley Fighting Vehicles, equipped with
upgraded fire control systems, now have the ability to fire accurately
while on the move. The addition of the Longbow to Apache helicopter
units has given those forces the ability to destroy twice as many enemy
vehicles in roughly half the time--with improved survivability.
Finally, some of our soldiers and marines now have the Javelin fire-
and-forget anti-tank system that adds a dramatic new weapon to their
fight.
Today, we have made similar improvements to virtually all aspects
of our joint team. Through tough, realistic training, our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen are a ready, capable
fighting force. Individually, these improvements are significant.
Combined, they reflect an improved joint warfighting team. We still
have much to do in regards to fully transforming our forces for the
21st century, but there should be no doubt that, if called upon, our
Armed Forces will prevail in any conflict.
Our Armed Forces are capable of carrying out our defense strategy.
We do have sufficient capability to conduct effective operations
against Iraq while maintaining other aspects of the war on terrorism,
protecting the U.S. homeland, and keeping our commitments in other
regions of the world. Our on-going operations require approximately 15
to 20 percent of our major combat units, such as carriers, fighter and
bomber aircraft, and heavy and light Army divisions. The chart below
reflects the major combat forces currently deployed to operations or
committed overseas.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Force Total Committed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AF Fighters................................... 1597 360
Bombers....................................... 115 10
Carriers...................................... 12 2
ARG/MEU....................................... 12 3
Heavy Divisions............................... 13 2
Light Divisions............................... 5 1
Armored Cav Rgt............................... 3 0
SF Groups..................................... 7 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are some unique units that are in high demand. Such
capabilities mainly involve command and control assets, intelligence
platforms, Special Operations Forces, Combat Rescue Forces, and similar
select units. Mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces has been key to
mitigating the current stress on some of these units. If our operations
on the war on terrorism are expanded, we will be required to prioritize
the employment of these enabling units. In this regard, our coalition
partners may facilitate our combined operations by having similar units
or forces. Where possible, we will leverage the best available
capability to the mission required.
We also have sufficient resources to logistically support our
combat operations. For example, our current stockpile of precision
weapons has been increased in recent months due to the solid support of
Congress and the tremendous potential of our Nation's industrial base.
Along with the significant improvements in deployability I mentioned
earlier, we continue to exploit the best of logistics information
technologies to ensure we know what the combat commander in the field
needs, where those supplies are located world-wide, and to track those
supplies from the factory or depot to the troops at the front.
Our military planning will include operations to facilitate
humanitarian assistance and civil affairs. Our efforts in Afghanistan
have demonstrated that these efforts can be as important as
conventional operations on the battlefield.
Our ability to accomplish our current missions is predicated on the
availability of funds for current operations. To continue Operation
Noble Eagle and to prosecute the War on Terrorism into fiscal year
2003, it is imperative that our Armed Forces have access to the full
$10 billion War Operational Contingency Reserve Fund that is part of
the fiscal year 2003 Defense Budget Request. Moreover, it is vital that
these funds be made available strictly for warfighting as requested, so
that our forces will have the maximum flexibility to react to dynamic
operational requirements and to address emerging needs, as they arise.
conclusion
For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs and I are confident that we can
accomplish whatever mission the President asks of our Armed Forces. We
are prepared to operate with our coalition partners. As before, we will
be prepared to operate in a chemical or biological environment. Every
day, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen have
dedicated their lives and their professional skill to protect American
lives and our interests worldwide. The men and women wearing the
uniform of our Nation have translated the technologies I described into
combat power that will allow us to protect our Nation and interests.
With the support of the American public and Congress, we will prevail
in any conflict.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Myers. As I indicated,
we'll have a round of 6 minutes, on the early-bird rule.
Secretary Rumsfeld, you said in June that because we have
underfunded and overused our forces, we find: we're short a
division; we're short aircraft; we've been underfunding aging
infrastructure facilities; we're short on high-demand, low-
density assets; the aircraft fleet is aging at a considerable
and growing cost to maintain; the Navy is declining in numbers;
and we are steadily falling below accepted readiness standards.
It's been pointed out by a number of people regularly, and
General Myers today, who testified that if our operations on
the war on terrorism are expanded, we'll be required to
prioritize the employment of enabling units.
Both of you have testified that we are stretched mighty
thin already, and I'd like you to explain, if you can, how we
can carry out this significant additional commitment with the
forces that we now have that are already stretched thin?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'd make four points. One is that the
executive branch and the legislative branch have, in the past
two periods, increased the budget of the Department of Defense
in a considerable amount.
Second, under the emergency authority of the President,
we've called up something in excess of 70,000 Reserves and some
20,000 stop losses of people who would normally have gotten out
who have not gotten out.
Third, we have been in the process of trying to move more
and more people in uniform out of activities that don't require
a person in uniform and back into things that do require people
in uniform.
Fourth, we have been drawing down our forces. For example,
in Bosnia, Kosovo, and in other parts of the globe where we
felt it was a static situation, we began moving them out in
ways in cooperation with our allies and our friends.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Myers, some have suggested that the U.S. military
invasion of Iraq would be a ``cakewalk.'' Give us your
characterization, if you would, of what we can expect.
General Myers. The senior leadership, civilian or military,
does not think that any combat operation is a cakewalk.
Certainly if the President were to ask us to conduct combat
operations in Iraq, that's certainly not how I would
characterize it. Anytime you put the lives of our sons and
daughters at risk, calling it a cakewalk is doing a disservice
to them and to the country.
What we do know--and it's in my written statement--that the
Iraqi forces over the past decade, for the most part, are less
effective than they probably were 10 years ago. That is in all
sectors like their command and control. They've done a lot of
work in fiber optics, so they're probably a little bit better
there along with their air defenses. Clearly in their weapons
of mass destruction, they have improved. They've had since 1998
to continue and increase their production of weapons of mass
destruction, and that would be one of the things you'd be
concerned about in a potential conflict.
On the other hand, as I mentioned in my opening statement,
the United States forces are much better, as well.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, in your judgment, is there any chance at all
that Saddam Hussein would open Iraq to full inspections and
disarmament if the alternative that he knew he faced was to be
destroyed and removed from power?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I suspect that anyone's guess on that
is as good as anyone else's. There certainly have been leaders
in the world--dictators particularly--who have seen their run
end and the game play out; they've taken their families and
some of their close supporters and gone and lived in another
country in some sort of asylum. That's, I supposed, a
calculation.
The other calculation would be to admit to the world that
for the last period of years he had been lying and he does, in
fact, have these capabilities, but say, ``That's all right, the
world can come in now.'' It would have to come in such large
numbers and so intrusively just to find the weapons of mass
destruction. They're so well buried, they're so well dispersed,
and they're in so many different locations that it would take a
massive intrusion into his country and his way of life. I just
don't know which choice he might take as an alternative.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree with the intelligence
community that the retention of power is Saddam Hussein's
number one goal?
Secretary Rumsfeld. He certainly is a survivor. I mean, he
killed people to get into the job in a coup, and he's managed
to kill off a lot of people to stay in there. I suspect that
one of the first things he thinks about when he gets up in the
morning is retaining power.
Chairman Levin. Is it the last thing he thinks about when
he goes to bed at night?
Secretary Rumsfeld. He seems to go to bed at night in a
different bed every night.
Chairman Levin. Wherever he goes to bed, do you believe,
with the intelligence community, that that is the first and
last thing he thinks about during the day?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I guess I'm not part of the
intelligence community. But there's no question, he's survived.
Chairman Levin. Given that you believe and testified that
agreeing to inspections is a dance or a ruse, is there any
purpose in a return of U.N. weapons inspectors?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I think that's really a question
for the President and Secretary Powell. Colin is working on
that with his U.N. colleagues, and the President, needless to
say, is addressing it with him and with the National Security
Council. The U.N. inspection program was much stricter in the
first period when it was called UNSCOM than it was more
recently when it was called UNMOVIC, and there have been a lot
of instances where they've walked back and weakened the
inspection program that existed in that earlier period.
There's no doubt in my mind that the inspection program
that currently is on the books wouldn't work, because it's so
much weaker than the earlier one. We know the earlier one had
some real successes and did end up destroying a good deal of
material. But we know that there were enormous quantities of
things that were unaccounted for.
One of the problems is that you get information from
defectors and people who are willing to tell you something.
Unless their families are outside of Iraq, they're not going to
tell you, because they're going to be killed and their families
are going to be killed. So it's a very complicated problem; I'm
not an expert on it, so the Department of State's working on it
with our U.N. colleagues.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. My time has expired.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, General Myers very forthrightly just said
that the conventional forces possessed by Saddam Hussein today
are somewhat less than he had in the 1990/1991 period--I think
we all agree with that--but that his inventory of weapons of
mass destruction has risen appreciably to a level far greater
than any he'd ever require for defensive actions to protect the
sovereignty of his country. So he's using them, or amassing
these weapons, in all likelihood, for offensive action and
possibly export. But as the calculus is made, should force be
needed--but I repeat, our President has said he didn't declare
war when he spoke out the U.N.; he's only seeking action by
them despite the loose talk about war. The point I wish to make
is if Saddam's conventional is down, is he more likely then to
have to resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction should
military action be taken? What are the increased risks to those
in uniform who undertake that action? Are we prepared?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll let General Myers comment on the
precautions that are taken so that men and women in uniform can
function in the event of such an attack.
To go the first part of your question, he can't do it
himself. He can't use weapons of mass destruction by himself.
He's running, he's moving around, and he's constantly looking
out for his own life. He would have to persuade other people.
It would be our task to do everything humanly possible to
explain to the Iraqi people that we recognize that the bulk of
the Iraqi people are hostages to a very vicious regime. If you
think back to Operation Desert Storm, the Gulf War, something
like 70,000 to 80,000 Iraqi soldiers surrendered in the first
three and a half days. Several hundred tried to surrender to a
newsman who didn't even have a weapon.
There are an awful lot of people who aren't very pleased
with the Saddam Hussein regime, and he has to use some of those
people to use weapons of mass destruction. We would have to
make very clear to them that what we're concerned about in Iraq
is the Saddam Hussein regime, and the regime is not all the
soldiers and it's not all the people, and that they ought to be
very careful about functioning in that chain of command for
weapons of mass destruction.
Senator Warner. Do we read in that there's a presumption
that he has delegated the authority to initiate the use of
those weapons, in all probability, to a level below him
involving one or more persons?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't want to get into that question
of command and control in that country. I will say this, that
you cannot physically do it yourself, just like the President
of the United States can't physically fly an airplane, make a
ship go from one place to another, launch a rocket, or drop a
bomb. You need other people. Those people I don't believe think
very highly of that regime.
Senator Warner. General Myers, as to the military analysis,
as the conventional forces come down, he has to rely on weapons
other than conventional to a greater degree, correct?
General Myers. Senator Warner, I think the answer is that
it's really unknowable how the regime would use weapons of mass
destruction, but you'd have to plan on worst case. You'd have
to assume they would be used.
We are somewhat better off than we were a decade ago. The
protective equipment has improved over time. It's still
cumbersome, more cumbersome than it should be, but it's much
better than it was a decade ago, and much better than when I
was wearing it out in the field.
We have better early warning and netting of our sensors
today, so better detection capability and to tell what kind of
attack we're under. Of course, one of the things you'd think
about doing would be attacking his delivery means or his
weapons of mass destruction. As the Secretary said, we don't
know where all of that is, so that would be problematic. But as
it develops, that would be one of the things that General
Franks would pay a lot of attention to. If he ever has do this,
he would pay attention to them getting ready with their weapons
of mass destruction.
Senator Warner. I think what you are saying is reassuring
and important to have as a part of this record.
I'd like to go to a second point. Of recent, there are
individuals who have expressed a knowledge that within the
Pentagon today there's considerable dissent, or whatever
quantum they said, among senior officers as to the advisability
of initiating the use of force in Iraq, should that become
necessary. I'd like to explore that.
I go back again to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which this
committee wrote and we carefully put in there many years ago,
that the views of senior officers can be shared with Congress.
Now, I remember 12 years ago, on September 11, 1990, in a
situation remarkably similar to the hearing we're having today,
I then asked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin
Powell, this question, quote, ``The law now provides for
individual members of the Joint Chiefs to express their views
if they have views inconsistent with those of the Secretary and
the Chairman.''
In this instance, I presume there is full consultation
among all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now, I can
understand, from my experience in the Pentagon during Vietnam,
the seniors were asked to give their different views. As a
matter of fact, it's some of those views that were given to
Secretary Laird, Secretary Schlesinger and others that resulted
in our policies in those days. I remember those meetings very
well. I think that's proper.
But I guess I'm probing to determine whether or not there's
any significant level of dissent which causes you trouble in
coming forward today and saying, ``We are prepared to undertake
such missions as may be directed by the President.''
General Myers. Senator Warner, I'll just keep it real
short. Absolutely not.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, anyone with any sense has concerns
about the use of force, because you simply do not put people's
lives at risk without have a darn good reason and having
thought it through. General Myers, General Pace, and I spend a
good deal of time looking at the things that can go wrong--the
down sides like what could be a problem, what could be a
difficulty, what is the worst case here, and the worst case
there. I don't know a single civilian or military person who's
involved in thinking about these problems in the Department of
Defense who doesn't have concerns. One would be a fool not to.
Senator Warner. Yes.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I read what you read in the paper. I
think it's inaccurate. I meet with the Chiefs. I meet with the
Vice Chiefs. I meet with the combatant commanders. I hear what
they say and I know what they think. I meet with civilian
leadership. My impression is that there are people across the
spectrum, both in the uniform and outside the uniform, and I
urge the committee to call up anyone you want and ask them
anything you want. Let's hear what they have to say.
Senator Warner. I think that's clear.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, in response to the earlier question, you
indicated that Saddam Hussein can't use these weapons of mass
destruction himself. He has to persuade other people and he
needs other people. Is it your intelligence now that he has
persuaded other people and that they are in a go mode, or
hasn't he done that at this time?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We have no way to know. My impression
is that if you asked any of those high level people today, they
would say they're totally loyal to their leader, and one will
not know until one gets to that moment.
Senator Kennedy. Well, I guess your answer then is, if he
says go, they'll go. Is what I'm just hearing back from you?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, you're misunderstanding me. What I
am saying is, if he says go, those people better think very
carefully about whether that's how they want to handle their
lives.
Senator Kennedy. Well, I want to join with those that
recognize the great danger of Saddam Hussein and commend the
President for going to the United Nations to try and find out a
way of dealing with these weapons of mass destructions. Clearly
there are risks if we take no action. We know that Saddam has
used the weapons before, but many analysts believe that
Saddam's on notice now and that he'll use these weapons only if
his regime is about to fall. In that case, he will use
everything at his disposal.
My question is, what is the basis of your judgment that
there's a higher risk if we don't go to war than if we do,
since many believe that Saddam will use the weapons of mass
destruction if his back is against the wall and his regime is
about to fall?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, let me reverse it. If the
argument goes ``one must not do anything because he has weapons
of sufficient power that they could impose destruction on us
that would be at an unacceptable level,'' then the next step
would be that, if that's the conclusion, then in 1 year, 2
years, 3 years, and he has even more powerful weapons, a
nuclear weapon, and longer-range capabilities, then he is able
to use those weapons of terror to terrorize the rest of the
world, including the United States. It's kind of like feeding
an alligator hoping it eats you last.
Senator Kennedy. Well, I'm asking the question. This might
not be 1 year, 2 year, 3 years; this may be in 1 month, 2
months, 3 months. It's, as I understand, a very real
possibility. Many of the analysts believe, that when his back
is up against the wall, he'll throw everything at us, including
weapons of mass destruction.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It's possible.
Senator Kennedy. It's very possible, you recognize. So it
is possible; we'll leave it at that. It is possible that he'll
use them.
Now, there's certainly a possibility that he'll use them
against Israel, as well. There is a possibility that Israel
would respond with nuclear weapons, as well. This isn't the
best nor the worst-case scenario, but all those are real
possibilities. What kind of situation do you see then, in terms
of Arab countries that may not have joined us in the war but
are joining us now in the war on terrorism? What's going to
happen, and how do you want to see this play out in terms of
the situation both in Iraq and what we're going to be left
with?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Those are all considerations that have
to be very carefully thought through by the President, the
Secretary of State, and others. We already do know that Saddam
Hussein is willing to use weapons of mass destruction, because
he's used chemicals on his own people and on the Iranians. This
is a man who isn't shy about using those things.
Senator Kennedy. So we shouldn't be shy to think that he
wouldn't use them if his back is against the wall, and we
wouldn't go in there not to win as you pointed out. We'd go in
there hard and fast to remove Saddam Hussein. Is that correct?
Or his regime.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That's right, if that decision is made.
Senator Kennedy. Whatever decision is made, those that are
going to be able to be in command and control of those weapons
of mass destruction will use them. That's why we'd be going in
there, to minimize the dangers of weapons of mass destruction.
As you pointed out, the weapons against his own people and
against the Iranians.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
Senator Kennedy. So what makes you believe that he wouldn't
use them if he knows that he's going down?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I didn't indicate that I believed he
would not use them. I said I did not know, and it would be a
function of how successful we were in persuading the Iraqi
people, who I am convinced large fractions want to be
liberated. That is a terrible life they have, and they're
frightened of this man.
Senator Kennedy. They've been unsuccessful.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That's right.
Senator Kennedy. It's just fear they've got. They've been
unsuccessful in doing it. Let me ask this question.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Could I answer on Israel?
Senator Kennedy. Good, go ahead.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is possible. He has fired missiles
at four of his neighbors. We know what he did to Israel in the
Gulf War. In my view, it was in Israel's interest to stay out
of the Gulf War. In my view, it would be overwhelmingly in
Israel's interest to stay out in the event that a conflict were
to occur prospectively.
With respect to the Arab countries you asked about, they
know what Saddam Hussein is. There isn't one of his neighbors
who doesn't want him gone. You've talked to them. We know that.
They live in the neighborhood, and he's about several times
stronger than they are, so they're careful about what they say
publicly. I don't blame them, but they have to know that he
threatens their regimes. He tries to occupy their countries. So
they would be enormously relieved if that clique running Iraq
were gone.
Senator Kennedy. Do you think there's more of a chance or
less of a chance for Saddam Hussein to make his weapons of mass
destruction more available to terrorist organizations or to al
Qaeda if we were to become involved in a war? Does that
increase the dangers of proliferation of these weapons or not?
How does this fit into your calculations?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In my view, the only way you can
prevent Saddam Hussein from providing weapons of mass
destruction to terrorist networks is to disarm Iraq and not
have them have those weapons while he's leading the country.
Senator Kennedy. Just one last point since my time is up.
If there were to be an attack on Israel, the Israelis have the
Arrow and the Patriot missiles to try to shoot those down.
However, those weapons may very well have bio-terrorism
material, so it isn't like shooting an explosive. The products
could very land in Israel, and I would imagine that that would
cause a serious kind of reaction, which would have been
different from the previous war, would it not?
Secretary Rumsfeld. What you have stated is a possibility.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Hutchinson.
Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General Myers, welcome. As I read the White
House discussion draft on a joint resolution that was sent
over, it just struck me that there is absolutely no more
serious or sober decision that Congress ever makes than voting
on a resolution like this that would authorize and stamp
approval upon the use of force. I appreciate that it was in
that spirit that General Myers spoke a moment ago that is a
very serious and sober discussion that we're having.
I appreciate the President's very forceful and convincing
case that he made before the United Nations that we must deal
sooner rather than inevitably later with Saddam Hussein and the
threat that he poses. I applaud his leadership in reminding the
world community about Saddam's long record of support for
terrorism, the pursuit of the use of weapons of mass
destruction, and the repression of his own people.
I believe that Saddam Hussein, in fact, does present a
clear and present danger, not only to the security of the
United States, but to his region and to the security of other
nations in that part of the world. You have made a very clear
case that he not only possesses weapons of mass destruction,
but continues to accumulate and grow those weapons. I think
that the doctrine of preemptive defense, as the President
outlined it, when the risk is high and the evidence is
overwhelming, becomes a moral imperative.
My constituents want to know--as Senator Kennedy pointed
out, as the Chairman has pointed out, and others--that there is
an enormous risk in going in when this dictator, this brutal
international outlaw, has weapons of mass destruction--I think
they want to know that by going in and taking that risk that
this world's going to be safer and that their children and
their grandchildren are going to have a safer and more secure
country and world to live in--the idea of inspectors, where
we're waiting 5 months or a year, and then we'll only not
really deal with the issue at hand, which is the destruction of
those weapons of mass destruction.
He has always sought to cause us to delay, to cause us to
dawdle. Mr. Secretary and General Myers, if we do nothing, and
5 years passes, what kind of arsenal, what kind of threat would
Saddam Hussein, at that point, pose for the world in which we
live?
General Myers. Five years hence--a lot of this is
hypothetical.
Senator Hutchinson. A lot of the questions have been
hypothetical today.
General Myers. Right.
Senator Hutchinson. Let's hypothesize that if we do
nothing.
General Myers. We're a long way out, though, and I think
you had the benefit of Mr. Tenet's testimony, as I mentioned,
and Admiral Jacoby.
Clearly, 5 years from now, where Iraq's interest in nuclear
weapons might finally materialize into a weapon, would create
considerably more strategic concern. There's already strategic
concern; it would just make a bad situation much, much worse if
he had that. We know he's continuing to produce chemical and
biological weapons. We have some idea of what they have, and I
think you were briefed on what kinds we think the regime has.
There are other ones out there that he doesn't have that in 5
years possibly he could find. Then you have to worry about the
delivery means. Right now, they think they have some missile
delivery means, interest in other ways to deliver them. By
then, who knows? There would be other, more easily obtainable
delivery means, cruise missiles and so forth, that could make
it a lot more problematic.
Senator Hutchinson. Mr. Secretary, do you have anything you
could add to that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes. If one looks at their capabilities
over the last decade, they declined for a period when the no-
fly zones were robust, when the economic sanctions had some
traction, and when inspectors were on the ground. In the last 4
years, there have been no inspectors on the ground, the
northern and southern no-fly zones have been less robust, and
the sanctions have dissipated. Their borders are porous. There
is no question but that they went down for a period in the
first part of the decade to the middle. By 1998, they were
starting to come back up. Their conventional and their weapons
of mass destruction capabilities are improving, and they're
improving every day, every month.
A great deal of this dual-use capability that's moving into
the country--massive numbers of dump trucks--they take the tops
off the dump trucks, and they put artillery on the back of it.
As General Myers mentioned, they're doing lots of things that
are not in the WMD category, like fiber optics.
General Myers. The last point I would make on Iraq's
capability 5 years from now is that there's a great danger
there that the nexus between those states that produce and
conduct research and development on weapons of mass destruction
and terrorist organizations will become a greater threat in the
future. We're dealing with a terrorist organization today, al
Qaeda, and there are other terrorist organizations that by then
could be just that much worse. I think it'll be easier to
conceal things and move things around.
Senator Hutchinson. So with great risk now, waiting could
be a much greater risk for our security and the world.
General Myers. I think that's certainly the potential.
Senator Hutchinson. Mr. Secretary, we have had discussions
before about protection against chemical and biological
weapons, and I wondered if you could comment on necessary
counter measures should Saddam utilize a weapon of mass
destruction--should military action by the United States be
required at some point.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I think General Myers commented
on the capabilities of our forces to deal with a WMD attack
that affected our forces or neighboring countries or staging
areas.
Senator Hutchinson. General Myers.
General Myers. The only thing I'd add to my previous
comments is that we are better off than we were 10 years ago,
both in warning and in our protection. I think we're better
able to handle emerging targets that might be related to WMD
delivery systems or movement of material. We've also just
started inoculations again for anthrax 3 days ago. I think the
steps that can be taken to protect our forces, no matter where
they are stationed, are much better than they have been and are
fairly robust.
Senator Hutchinson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hutchinson.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, may I clean up one item
in my comment to Senator Kennedy? I just ran through my head
that he mentioned the possibility that Israel might engage in a
nuclear response were they attacked. I would not want to leave
that hanging out there with the implication that I agree with
that.
Chairman Levin. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these
hearings.
Mr. Secretary, to your knowledge, did the United States
help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological weapons
during the Iran-Iraq war? Are we, in fact, now facing the
possibility of reaping what we have sown?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, certainly not to my knowledge. I
have no knowledge of United States companies or Government
being involved in assisting Iraq develop chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapons.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, let me read to you from the
September 23, 2002, Newsweek story. I read excerpts because my
time is limited.
``Some Reagan officials even saw Saddam as another Anwar
Sadat capable of making Iraq into a modern secular state just
as Sadat had tried to lift up Egypt before his assassination in
1981.
``But Saddam had to be rescued first. The war against Iran
was going badly by 1982. Iran's human wave attacks threatened
to overrun Saddam's armies. Washington decided to give Iraq a
helping hand. After Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad in 1983, U.S.
intelligence began supplying the Iraqi dictator with satellite
photos showing Iranian deployments. Official documents suggest
that America may also have secretly arranged for tanks and
other military hardware to be shipped to Iraq in a swap deal--
American tanks to Egypt, Egyptian tanks to Iraq. Over the
protests of some Pentagon skeptics, the Reagan administration
began allowing the Iraqis to buy a wide variety of ``dual-use''
equipment and materials from American suppliers. According to
confidential Commerce Department export-control documents
obtained by Newsweek, the shopping list included a computerized
database for Saddam's interior ministry, presumably to help
keep track of political opponents, helicopters to transport
Iraqi officials, television cameras for video-surveillance
application, chemical-analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic
Energy Commission, IAEC, and, most unsettling, numerous
shipments of bacteria, fungi and protozoa to the IAEC.
According to former officials, the bacteria cultures could be
used to make biological weapons, including anthrax. The State
Department also approved the shipment of 1.5 million atropine
injectors for use against the effects of chemical weapons, but
the Pentagon blocked the sale. Yet, the helicopters, some
American officials later surmised, were used to spray poison
gas on the Kurds.
``The United States almost certainly knew, from its own
satellite imagery, that Saddam was using chemical weapons
against Iranian troops. When Saddam bombed Kurdish rebels and
civilians with a lethal cocktail of mustard gas, sarin, tabin,
and VX in 1988, the Reagan administration first blamed Iran
before acknowledging, under pressure from congressional
Democrats, that the culprits were Saddam's own forces. There
was only token official protest at the time. Saddam's men were
unfazed, and Iraqi audiotape later captured by the Kurds
records Saddam's cousin, Ali Hassan al-Mujid, known as Ali
Chemical, talking to his fellow officers about gassing the
Kurds. `Who is going to say anything,' he asked, `the
international community? F-blank them!' ''
Now, can this possibly be true? We already knew that Saddam
was a dangerous man at the time. I realize that you were not in
public office at the time, but you were dispatched to Iraq by
President Reagan to talk about the need to improve relations
between Iraq and the U.S.
Let me ask you again. To your knowledge, did the United
States help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological
weapons during the Iran-Iraq war? Are we, in fact, now facing
the possibility of reaping what we have sown?
The Washington Post reported this morning that the United
States is stepping away from efforts to strengthen the
biological weapons convention. I'll have a question on that
later.
Let me ask you again. Did the United States help Iraq to
acquire the building blocks of biological weapons during the
Iran-Iraq war? Are we, in fact, now facing the possibility of
reaping what we have sown?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have not read the article. As you
suggest, I was, for a period in late 1983 and early 1984, asked
by President Reagan to serve as Middle East envoy after the 241
Marines were killed in Beirut. As part of my responsibilities,
I did visit Baghdad. I did meet with Mr. Tariq Aziz, and I did
meet with Saddam Hussein and spent some time visiting with them
about the war they were engaged in with Iran. At the time, our
concern, of course, was Syria and Syria's role in Lebanon,
Lebanon's role in the Middle East, and the terrorist acts that
were taking place. As a private citizen, I was assisting only
for a period of months. I have never heard anything like what
you've read. I have no knowledge of it whatsoever, and I doubt
it.
Senator Byrd. You doubt what?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The questions you've posed as to
whether the United States of America assisted Iraq with the
elements that you listed in your reading of Newsweek and that
we could conceivably now be reaping what we've sown. I doubt
both.
Senator Byrd. Are you surprised at what I've said? Are you
surprised at this story in Newsweek?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess I'm at an age and circumstance
in life where I'm no longer surprised about what I hear in the
newspapers and the magazines.
Senator Byrd. No, that's not the question. I'm of that age,
too, somewhat older than you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Not much.
Senator Byrd. How about that story I've read?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I see stories all the time that are
flat wrong. I just don't know.
Senator Byrd. What about this story? This story
specifically.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have not read it. I listened
carefully to what you said, and I doubt it.
Senator Byrd. All right. Now, The Washington Post reported
this morning that the United States is stepping away from
efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. Are we
not sending exactly the wrong signal to the world at exactly
the wrong time? Doesn't this damage our credibility in the
international community at the very time that we are seeking
their support to neutralize the threat of Iraq's biological
weapons program?
If we supplied, as the Newsweek article said, the building
blocks for germ and chemical warfare to this madman, this
psychopath, in the first place, how do we look to the world to
be backing away from this effort to control it at this point?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, Senator, I think it would be a
shame to leave this committee and the people listening with the
impression that the United States assisted Iraq with chemical
or biological weapons in the 1980s. I just do not believe
that's the case.
Senator Byrd. Well, are you saying that the Newsweek
article is inaccurate?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am saying precisely what I said, that
I didn't read the Newsweek article, but that I doubt its
accuracy.
Senator Byrd. I'll be glad to send you up a copy.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I was not in Government at that time,
except as a special envoy for a period of months, so one ought
not to rely on me as the best source as to what happened in
that mid-1980s period that you were describing.
I will say one other thing. On two occasions, when you read
that article, you mentioned the IAEC, which, as I recall, is
the International Atomic Energy Commission, and some of the
things that you were talking about were provided to them, which
I found quite confusing, to be honest.
With respect to the biological weapons convention, I was
not aware that the United States Government had taken a
position with respect to it. It's not surprising, because it's
a matter for the Department of State, not the Department of
Defense. If, in fact, they have indicated, as The Washington
Post reports, that they are not going to move forward with an
enforcement regime, it's not my place to discuss the
administration's position when I don't know what it is. But I
can tell you from a personal standpoint, my recollection is
that the biological convention never was anticipated that there
would even be thought of to have an enforcement regime, that an
enforcement regime where there are a lot of countries involved
who were on the terrorist lists who were participants in that
convention, that the United States has, over a period of
administrations, believed that it would not be a good idea,
because the United States would be a net loser from an
enforcement regime. But that is not the administration's
position. I just don't know what the administration's position
is.
Chairman Levin. We're going to have to leave it there,
because you are over time.
Senator Byrd. This is a very important question.
Chairman Levin. It is, indeed, but you're over time. I
agree with you on the importance, but you're over time,
Senator.
Senator Byrd. I know I'm over time, but are we going to
leave this question out there dangling?
Chairman Levin. Well, just one last question.
Senator Byrd. I ask unanimous consent that I may have an
additional 5 minutes.
Chairman Levin. No, I'm afraid we can't do that. Well, wait
a minute. Ask unanimous consent, I can't stop you from doing
that.
Senator Inhofe. I object. [Laughter.]
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Just one last question. Would that be all
right? Senator Byrd, if you could just take one additional
question.
Senator Byrd. Now, I've been in this Congress 50 years.
I've never objected to another Senator having a few additional
minutes.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I think that the Secretary should have a
copy of this story from Newsweek that I've been querying him
about. I think he has a right to look at that. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. Could somebody take that out to the
Secretary?
Senator Byrd. Very well.
Now, while that's being given to the Secretary, Mr.
Secretary, I think we're put into an extremely bad position
before the world today if we're going to walk away from an
international effort to strengthen the biological weapons
convention against germ warfare, advising our allies that the
U.S. wants to delay further discussions until 2006, especially
in the light of the Newsweek story. I think we bear some
responsibility.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, point of order.
Chairman Levin. Could we just have this be the last
question? If you would just go along with us, please, Senator
Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. I would only say, though, in all respect to
the Senator from West Virginia, we have a number of Senators
here, we have a limited time of 6 minutes each, and we're
entitled to have our 6 minutes. This should be a short question
if it's the last question.
Chairman Levin. If we could just make that the last
question and answer, I would appreciate it. The Chair would
appreciate the cooperation of all Senators.
Secretary Rumsfeld, could you answer that question, please?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll do my best. Senator, I just am
glancing at this, and I hesitate to do this because I have not
read it carefully, but it says here that, ``According to
confidential Commerce Department export control documents
obtained by Newsweek, the shopping list included.'' It did not
say that there were deliveries of these things. It said that
Iraq asked for these things. It talks about a shopping list.
Second, in listing these things, it says that they wanted
``television cameras for video-surveillance applications,
chemical-analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy
Commission, the IAEC,'' and that may very well be the Iraqi
Atomic Energy Commission, which would mean that my earlier
comment would not be correct, because I thought it was the
International Atomic Energy Commission. This seems to indicate
it's the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, may I say to my friend from
Oklahoma, I'm amazed that he himself wouldn't yield me time for
this important question. I would do the same for him.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask----
Senator Cleland. I yield my 5 minutes, Senator.
Senator Byrd. I thank the distinguished Senator.
Mr. Chairman, I ask the Secretary to review Pentagon
records to see if the Newsweek article is true or not. Will the
Secretary do that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It appears that they are Department of
Commerce records, as opposed to Pentagon, but I can certainly
ask that the Department of Commerce and, to the extent it's
relevant, the Department of State look into it and see if we
can't determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of some aspects of
this, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. We'll go one step further than that. I
think the request is that the Defense Department search its
records. Will you do that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We'll be happy to search ours, but this
refers to the Commerce Department.
Chairman Levin. We will ask the State Department and the
Commerce Department to do the same thing.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Fine. We'd be happy to.
[The information referred to follows:]
How Saddam Happened
newsweek--september 23, 2002
By Christopher Dickey and Evan Thomas; With Mark Hosenball, Roy Gutman
and John Barry
The last time Donald Rumsfeld saw Saddam Hussein, he gave him a
cordial handshake. The date was almost 20 years ago, December 20, 1983;
an official Iraqi television crew recorded the historic moment. The
once and future Defense secretary, at the time a private citizen, had
been sent by President Ronald Reagan to Baghdad as a special envoy.
Saddam Hussein, armed with a pistol on his hip, seemed ``vigorous and
confident,'' according to a now declassified State Department cable
obtained by Newsweek. Rumsfeld ``conveyed the President's greetings and
expressed his pleasure at being in Baghdad,'' wrote the notetaker. Then
the two men got down to business, talking about the need to improve
relations between their two countries. Like most foreign-policy
insiders, Rumsfeld was aware that Saddam was a murderous thug who
supported terrorists and was trying to build a nuclear weapon. (The
Israelis had already bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak.) But at
the time, America's big worry was Iran, not Iraq. The Reagan
administration feared that the Iranian revolutionaries who had
overthrown the shah (and taken hostage American diplomats for 444 days
in 1979-81) would overrun the Middle East and its vital oilfields. On
the theory that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, the Reaganites were
seeking to support Iraq in a long and bloody war against Iran. The
meeting between Rumsfeld and Saddam was consequential: for the next 5
years, until Iran finally capitulated, the United States backed
Saddam's armies with military intelligence, economic aid and covert
supplies of munitions.
Rumsfeld is not the first American diplomat to wish for the demise
of a former ally. After all, before the cold war, the Soviet Union was
America's partner against Hitler in World War ll. In the real world, as
the saying goes, nations have no permanent friends, just permanent
interests. Nonetheless, Rumsfeld's long-ago interlude with Saddam is a
reminder that today's friend can be tomorrow's mortal threat. As
President George W. Bush and his war cabinet ponder Saddam's
successor's regime, they would do well to contemplate how and why the
last three presidents allowed the Butcher of Baghdad to stay in power
so long.
The history of America's relations with Saddam is one of the
sorrier tales in American foreign policy. Time and again, America
turned a blind eye to Saddam's predations, saw him as the lesser evil
or flinched at the chance to unseat him. No single policymaker or
administration deserves blame for creating, or at least tolerating, a
monster; many of their decisions seemed reasonable at the time. Even
so, there are moments in this clumsy dance with the Devil that make one
cringe. It is hard to believe that, during most of the 1980s, America
knowingly permitted the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission to import
bacterial cultures that might be used to build biological weapons. But
it happened.
America's past stumbles, while embarrassing, are not an argument
for inaction in the future. Saddam probably is the ``grave and
gathering danger'' described by President Bush in his speech to the
United Nations last week. It may also be true that ``whoever replaces
Saddam is not going to be worse,'' as a senior administration official
put it to Newsweek. But the story of how America helped create a
Frankenstein monster it now wishes to strangle is sobering. It
illustrates the power of wishful thinking, as well as the iron law of
unintended consequences.
America did not put Saddam in power. He emerged after two decades
of turmoil in the 1960s and 1970s, as various strongmen tried to gain
control of a nation that had been concocted by British imperialists in
the 1920s out of three distinct and rival factions, the Sunnis, Shiites
and the Kurds. But during the cold war, America competed with the
Soviets for Saddam's attention and welcomed his war with the religious
fanatics of Iran. Having cozied up to Saddam, Washington found it hard
to break away--even after going to war with him in 1991. Through years
of both tacit and overt support, the West helped create the Saddam of
today, giving him time to build deadly arsenals and dominate his
people. Successive administrations always worried that if Saddam fell,
chaos would follow, rippling through the region and possibly igniting
another Middle East war. At times it seemed that Washington was
transfixed by Saddam.
The Bush administration wants to finally break the spell. If the
administration's true believers are right, Baghdad after Saddam falls
will look something like Paris after the Germans fled in August 1944.
American troops will be cheered as liberators, and democracy will
spread forth and push Middle Eastern despotism back into the shadows.
Yet if the gloomy predictions of the administration's many critics come
true, the Arab street, inflamed by Yankee imperialism, will rise up and
replace the shaky but friendly autocrats in the region with Islamic
fanatics.
While the Middle East is unlikely to become a democratic nirvana,
the worst-case scenarios, always a staple of the press, are probably
also wrong or exaggerated. Assuming that a cornered and doomed Saddam
does not kill thousands of Americans in some kind of horrific
Gotterdmmerung--a scary possibility, one that deeply worries
administration officials--the greatest risk of his fall is that one
strongman may simply be replaced by another. Saddam's successor may not
be a paranoid sadist. But there is: no assurance that he will be
America's friend or forswear the development of weapons of mass
destruction.
American officials have known that Saddam was a psychopath ever
since he became the country's de facto ruler in the early 1970s. One of
Saddam's early acts after he took the title of president in 1979 was to
videotape a session of his party's congress, during which he personally
ordered several members executed on the spot. The message, carefully
conveyed to the Arab press, was not that these men were executed for
plotting against Saddam, but rather for thinking about plotting against
him. From the beginning, U.S. officials worried about Saddam's taste
for nasty weaponry; indeed, at their meeting in 1983, Rumsfeld warned
that Saddam's use of chemical weapons might ``inhibit'' American
assistance. But top officials in the Reagan administration saw Saddam
as a useful surrogate. By going to war with Iran, he could bleed the
radical mullahs who had seized control of Iran from the pro-American
shah. Some Reagan officials even saw Saddam as another Anwar Sadat,
capable of making Iraq into a modem secular state, just as Sadat had
tried to lift up Egypt before his assassination in 1981.
But Saddam had to be rescued first. The war against Iran was going
badly by 1982. Iran's ``human wave attacks'' threatened to overrun
Saddam's armies. Washington decided to give Iraq a helping hand. After
Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad in 1983, U.S. intelligence began supplying
the Iraqi dictator with satellite photos showing Iranian deployments.
Official documents suggest that America may also have secretly arranged
for tanks and other military hardware to be shipped to Iraq in a swap
deal--American tanks to Egypt, Egyptian tanks to Iraq. Over the protest
of some Pentagon skeptics, the Reagan administration began allowing the
Iraqis to buy a wide variety of ``dual use'' equipment and materials
from American suppliers. According to confidential Commerce Department
export-control documents obtained by Newsweek, the shopping list
included a computerized database for Saddam's Interior Ministry
(presumably to help keep track of political opponents); helicopters to
transport Iraqi officials; television cameras for ``video surveillance
applications;'' chemical-analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy
Commission (IAEC), and, most unsettling, numerous shipments of
``bacteria/fungi/protozoa'' to the IAEC. According to former officials,
the bacteria cultures could be used to make biological weapons,
including anthrax. The State Department also approved the shipment of
1.5 million atropine injectors, for use against the effects of chemical
weapons, but the Pentagon blocked the sale. The helicopters, some
American officials later surmised, were used to spray poison gas on the
Kurds.
The United States almost certainly knew from its own satellite
imagery that Saddam was using chemical weapons against Iranian troops.
When Saddam bombed Kurdish rebels and civilians with a lethal cocktail
of mustard gas, sarin, tabun and VX in 1988, the Reagan administration
first blamed Iran, before acknowledging, under pressure from
congressional Democrats, that the culprits were Saddam's own forces.
There was only token official protest at the time. Saddam's men were
unfazed. An Iraqi audiotape, later captured by the Kurds, records
Saddam's cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid (known as Ali Chemical) talking to
his fellow officers about gassing the Kurds. ``Who is going to say
anything?'' he asks. ``The international community? F--them!''
The United States was much more concerned with protecting Iraqi oil
from attacks by Iran as it was shipped through the Persian Gulf. In
1987, an Iraqi Exocet missile hit an American destroyer, the U.S.S.
Stark, in the Persian Gulf, killing 37 crewmen. Incredibly, the United
States excused Iraq for making an unintentional mistake and instead
used the incident to accuse Iran of escalating the war in the gulf. The
American tilt to Iraq became more pronounced. U.S. commandos began
blowing up Iranian oil platforms and attacking Iranian patrol boats. In
1988, an American warship in the gulf accidentally shot down an Iranian
Airbus, killing 290 civilians. Within a few weeks, Iran, exhausted and
fearing American intervention, gave up its war with Iraq.
Saddam was feeling cocky. With the support of the West, he had
defeated the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran. America favored him as a
regional pillar; European and American corporations were vying for
contracts with Iraq. He was visited by congressional delegations led by
Sens. Bob Dole of Kansas and Alan Simpson of Wyoming, who were eager to
promote American farm and business interests. But Saddam's megalomania
was on the rise, and he overplayed his hand. In 1990, a U.S. Customs
sting operation snared several Iraqi agents who were trying to buy
electronic equipment used to make triggers for nuclear bombs. Not long
after, Saddam gained the world's attention by threatening ``to bum
Israel to the ground.'' At the Pentagon, analysts began to warn that
Saddam was a growing menace, especially after he tried to buy some
American-made high-tech furnaces useful for making nuclear-bomb parts.
Yet other officials in Congress and in the Bush administration
continued to see him as a useful, if distasteful, regional strongman.
The State Department was equivocating with Saddam right up to the
moment he invaded Kuwait in August 1990.
Some American diplomats suggest that Saddam might have gotten away
with invading Kuwait if he had not been quite so greedy. ``If he had
pulled back to the Mutla Ridge [overlooking Kuwait City], he'd still be
there today,'' one ex-ambassador told Newsweek. Even though President
George H. W. Bush compared Saddam to Hitler and sent a half-million-man
Army to drive him from Kuwait, Washington remained ambivalent about
Saddam's fate. It was widely assumed by policymakers that Saddam would
collapse after his defeat in Operation Desert Storm, done in by his
humiliated officer corps or overthrown by the revolt of a restive
minority population. But Washington did not want to push very hard to
topple Saddam. The gulf war, Bush I administration officials pointed
out, had been fought to liberate Kuwait, not oust Saddam. ``I am
certain that had we taken all of Iraq, we would have been like the
dinosaur in the tar pit--we would still be there,'' wrote the American
commander in Operation Desert Storm, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, in his
memoirs. America's allies in the region, most prominently Saudi Arabia,
feared that a post-Saddam Iraq would splinter and destabilize the
region. The Shiites in the south might bond with their fellow
religionists in Iran, strengthening the Shiite mullahs, and threatening
the Saudi border. In the north, the Kurds were agitating to break off
parts of Iraq and Turkey to create a Kurdistan. So Saddam was allowed
to keep his tanks and helicopters--which he used to crush both Shiite
and Kurdish rebellions.
The Bush administration played down Saddam's darkness after the
gulf war. Pentagon bureaucrats compiled dossiers to support a war-
crimes prosecution of Saddam, especially for his sordid treatment of
POWs. They documented police stations and ``sports facilities'' where
Saddam's henchmen used acid baths and electric drills on their victims.
One document suggested that torture should be ``artistic.'' But top
Defense Department officials stamped the report secret. One Bush
administration official subsequently told The Washington Post, ``Some
people were concerned that if we released it during the [1992
presidential] campaign, people would say, Why don't you bring this guy
to justice?' '' (Defense Department aides say politics played no part
in the report.)
The Clinton administration was no more aggressive toward Saddam. In
1993, Saddam apparently hired some Kuwaiti liquor smugglers to try to
assassinate former president Bush as he took a victory lap through the
region. According to one former U.S. ambassador, the new administration
was less than eager to see an open-and-shut case against Saddam, for
fear that it would demand aggressive retaliation. When American
intelligence continued to point to Saddam's role, the Clintonites
lobbed a few cruise missiles into Baghdad. The attack reportedly killed
one of Saddam's mistresses, but left the dictator defiant.
The American intelligence community, under orders from President
Bill Clinton, did mount covert actions aimed at toppling Saddam in the
1990s, but by most accounts they were badly organized and halfhearted.
In the north, CIA operatives supported a Kurdish rebellion against
Saddam in 1995. According to the CIA's man on the scene, former case
officer Robert Baer, Clinton administration officials back in
Washington ``pulled the plug'' on the operation just as it was
gathering momentum. The reasons have long remained murky, but according
to Baer, Washington was never sure that Saddam's successor would be an
improvement, or that Iraq wouldn't simply collapse into chaos. ``The
question we could never answer,'' Baer told Newsweek, ``was, `After
Saddam goes, then what?' '' A coup attempt by Iraqi Army officers
fizzled the next year. Saddam brutally rolled up the plotters. The CIA
operatives pulled out, rescuing everyone they could, and sending them
to Guam.
Meanwhile, Saddam was playing cat-and-mouse with weapons of mass
destruction. As part of the settlement imposed by America and its
allies at the end of the gulf war, Saddam was supposed to get rid of
his existing stockpiles of chem-bio weapons, and to allow in inspectors
to make sure none were being hidden or secretly manufactured. The U.N.
inspectors did shut down his efforts to build a nuclear weapon. But
Saddam continued to secretly work on his germ- and chemical-warfare
program. When the inspectors first suspected what Saddam was trying to
hide in 1995, Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, suddenly fled Iraq to
Jordan. Kamel had overseen Saddam's chem-bio program, and his defection
forced the revelation of some of the secret locations of Saddam's
deadly labs. That evidence is the heart of the ``white paper'' used
last week by President Bush to support his argument that Iraq has been
defying U.N. resolutions for the past decade. (Kamel had the bad
judgment to return to Iraq, where he was promptly executed, along with
various family members.)
By now aware of the scale of Saddam's efforts to deceive, the U.N.
arms inspectors were unable to certify that Saddam was no longer making
weapons of mass destruction. Without this guarantee, the United Nations
was unwilling to lift the economic sanctions imposed after the gulf
war. Saddam continued to play ``cheat and retreat'' with--the
inspectors, forcing a showdown in December 1998. The United Nations
pulled out its inspectors, and the United States and Britain launched
Operation Desert Fox, four days of bombing that was supposed to teach
Saddam a lesson and force his compliance.
Saddam thumbed his nose. The United States and its allies, in
effect, shrugged and walked away. While the U.N. sanctions regime
gradually eroded, allowing Saddam to trade easily on the black market,
he was free to brew all the chem-bio weapons he wanted. Making a
nuclear weapon is harder, and intelligence officials still believe he
is a few years away from even regaining the capacity to manufacture
enriched uranium to build his own bomb. If he can steal or buy ready-
made fissile material, say from the Russian mafia, he could probably
make a nuclear weapon in a matter of months, though it would be so
large that delivery would pose a challenge.
As the Bush administration prepares to oust Saddam, one way or
another, senior administration officials are very worried that Saddam
will try to use his WMD arsenal. Intelligence experts have warned that
Saddam may be ``flushing'' his small, easy-to-conceal biological
agents, trying to get them out of the country before an American
invasion. A vial of bugs or toxins that could kill thousands could fit
in a suitcase--or a diplomatic pouch. There are any number of grim end-
game scenarios. Saddam could try blackmail, threatening to unleash
smallpox or some other grotesque virus in an American city if U.S.
forces invaded. Or, like a cornered dog, he could lash out in a final
spasm of violence, raining chemical weapons down on U.S. troops,
handing out is bioweapons to terrorists. ``That's the single biggest
worry in all this,'' says a senior administration official. ``We are
spending a lot of time on this," said another top official.
Some administration critics have said, in effect, let sleeping dogs
lie. Don't provoke Saddam by threatening his life; there is no evidence
that he has the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
Countered White House national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, ``Do
we wait until he's better at it?'' Several administration officials
indicated that an intense effort is underway, covert as well as overt,
to warn Saddam's lieutenants to save themselves by breaking from the
dictator before it's too late. ``Don't be the fool who follows the last
order'' is the way one senior administration official puts it.
The risk is that some will choose to go down with Saddam, knowing
that they stand to be hanged by an angry mob after the dictator falls.
It is unclear what kind of justice would follow his fall, aside from
summary hangings from the nearest lamppost.
The Bush administration is determined not to ``overthrow one
strongman only to install another,'' a senior administration official
told Newsweek. This official said that the president has made clear
that he wants to press for democratic institutions, government
accountability and the rule of law in post-Saddam Iraq. But no one
really knows how that can be achieved. Bush's advisers are counting on
the Iraqis themselves to resist a return to despotism. ``People subject
to horrible tyranny have strong antibodies to anyone who wants to put
them back under tyranny,'' says a senior administration official. But
as another official acknowledged, ``a substantial American commitment''
to Iraq is inevitable.
At what cost? Who pays? Will other nations chip in money and men?
It is not clear how many occupation troops will be required to maintain
order, or for how long. Much depends on the manner of Saddam's exit:
whether the Iraqis drive him out themselves, or rely heavily on U.S.
power. Administration officials shy away from timetables and specifics
but say they have to be prepared for all contingencies. ``As General
Eisenhower said, Every plan gets thrown out on the first day of battle.
Plans are useless. Planning is everything,' '' said Vice President
Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby.
It is far from clear that America will be able to control the next
leader of Iraq, even if he is not as diabolical as Saddam. Any leader
of Iraq will look around him and see that Israel and Pakistan have
nuclear weapons and that Iran may soon. Just as England and France
opted to build their own bombs in the cold war, and not depend on the
U.S. nuclear umbrella, the next president of Iraq may want to have his
own bomb. ``He may want to, but he can't be allowed to,'' says a Bush
official. But what is to guarantee that a newly rich Iraqi strongman
won't buy one with his nation's vast oil wealth? In some ways, Iraq is
to the Middle East as Germany was to Europe in the 20th century, too
large, too militaristic and too competent to coexist peaceably with
neighbors. It took two world wars and millions of lives to solve ``the
German problem.'' Getting rid of Saddam may be essential to creating a
stable, democratic Iraq. But it may be only a first step on a long and
dangerous march.
Chairman Levin. We will also ask the Intelligence Committee
to stage a briefing for all of us on that issue so that Senator
Byrd has broached.
Senator Byrd. I thank the Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Byrd. I thank the Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Byrd, we will ask Senator Graham
and Senator Shelby to hold a briefing on that subject, because
it is a very important subject.
Senator Byrd. I thank the Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General Myers, thank you for your
leadership. The American people have been comforted with your
wisdom and judgment, your honesty and directness as we've moved
for months now since September 11. You've had a consistent
message about the danger of Iraq in recent months. There's been
no mystery about it. You've been open with the world, the
American people, and Congress of the United States. So it's
getting time for Congress to act. I appreciate the fact you are
asking for that, and I hope, as Senator Warner has noted, that
we take as many hearings as we need, that we debate it fully,
but we need to assert whether or not we're going to develop
support for the policies that have been articulated by the
President of the United States.
Mr. Secretary, I noticed that in the letter that Saddam
Hussein wrote that he would acquiesce on inspections, and he
said he would do it unconditionally. He also notes explicitly
that he subjects that openness to the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of the Nation of Iraq.
Now, I don't know precisely how legal historians would
account for it, but in 1991 it seemed to me that Saddam Hussein
basically sued for peace. He gave up his sovereign rights in
order to preserve his regime from destruction, and it was on
the eve of destruction. He said that he would renounce and stop
weapons of mass destruction, destroy those weapons, and we
could allow inspections to prove that he was telling the truth.
He did that because he virtually had no other choice. The U.N.
backed up his claim with resolutions, the United States
cooperated, and so forth.
But do you see, with the very document itself, this letter
in which he offers in one paragraph ``unconditional
inspections,'' and later on he says it's subject to his
territorial integrity and his sovereignty, that there is an
internal contradiction there?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, this is a matter that the
Department of State and Secretary Powell are dealing with, and,
therefore, I am not as current as I should be. I do see several
things that at least need exploration, and it may very well be
that one could characterize them as inconsistent. One is the
point you made; within the very four corners of the letter,
there seemed to be inconsistencies. It's a matter for Secretary
Powell to worry through with the Iraqis and the U.N.
Second, the speech that was made today by, according to my
materials, the Iraqi foreign minister contained at least the
conditions and qualifications.
Third, if Iraq has decided to be in a mode of allowing
inspections, there are two types. There are ground inspections
and air inspections. As I indicated in my opening statement in
the last three days since the letter you're referring to was
delivered, the Iraqis have fired on coalition air forces
somewhere between 15 and 20 times, at U.S. and British pilots,
who are enforcing U.N. resolutions and flying in the northern
and southern so-called no-fly zones.
Senator Sessions. I would agree that many indicators tell
us that this is, I believe as the Chairman indicated, more
likely a ruse than a sincere offer of inspections. That puts
the United Nations ultimately in a very important position.
They have a moral responsibility, in my view, not to dodge this
question. They have a moral and, really, legal responsibility
to confront what would appear to any fair observer a consistent
violation of the resolutions they passed and they approved for
the salvation of the Saddam Hussein regime.
So I feel strongly about that. I think the President
correctly, giving a decent respect to the opinions of mankind,
made his speech to the U.N. and stated his case, but I do
believe that ultimately one veto in the U.N. Security Council
shouldn't obstruct us from doing what we may have to do,
unfortunately, before it's over.
General Myers, are you satisfied with where we are in terms
of our military capabilities and our weaponry, such as our
smart weapons, to conduct this war effectively, if it so comes?
General Myers. Senator Sessions, from about a year ago from
last October until the end of this August--we have
approximately 10,000 more precision munitions than we had a
year ago, and we've--thanks to Congress' help--facilitized
industry to essentially produce at the highest rate they're
capable of. That rate will continue to increase, and I think we
don't get their highest rate for about another year yet. But we
watch that inventory very, very carefully. We watch where they
are. As I said earlier in my remarks, I think we have the right
equipment and, especially, the people to do the job.
Senator Sessions. Well, I thank you for that positive
report about the willingness and capability of our military
forces. They are the world's best people. Many Americans still
envision war as it has been in the past, soldiers charging
machine gun nests with hand grenades. I know your doctrine is
to avoid those kind of things as much as possible, to maximize
the military capability of our soldiers while minimizing their
risk. Thank you for what you do.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for pushing to transform our
military to make it even more capable in this new, modern world
of warfare.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Secretary, reflecting on his two tours
in Vietnam, Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote in his 1995
memoirs, ``Many of my generation, the career captains, majors,
and lieutenant colonels seasoned in that war vowed that when
our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce
in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the
American people could not understand or support.''
Mr. Secretary, as one of the young captains in that war, I
also cannot acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked
reasons that the American people cannot understand or support.
In his excellent book on the Vietnam War, Colonel Harry
Summers wrote, ``The first principle of war is the principle of
the objective. It's the first principle because all else flows
from it.'' He said, ``Prior to any future commitment of U.S.
military forces, our military leaders must insist that the
civilian leadership provide tangible, obtainable goals. The
objective cannot merely be a platitude, but must be stated in
concrete terms.''
Mr. Secretary, it does seem to me that in the wake of
September 11, our mission in this country, and certainly the
number-one mission of the United States military, is to go
after those who came after us September 11. That's been my
concern all along. As someone who grew up in a household where
my father had served at Pearl Harbor after the attack, I'm well
aware of this country's great response to that attack that day
of infamy, and it took us 3 years to ultimately shoot down the
man who planned that attack, Admiral Yamamoto. But we
ultimately found him, and we ultimately killed him.
It does seem to me our objective, our number one objective,
is to kill or capture Osama bin Laden and his terrorist cadre,
and that is what we ought to be about in our number one
objective in the use of American military force. My concern is
that the last time you testified before this committee, you
said you didn't know where Osama bin Laden was. It's painfully
obvious we have not captured or killed his terrorist cadre and
that they are still at large. We're still trying to roll up
their cells around the world, including in America today.
My concern, Mr. Secretary, is that we're shifting the
objective here. The President came to Congress last year and
got Congress unanimously to support--and I supported--going
after those who came after us. In his inimitable phrase I
remember, he said, ``We will bring them to justice, or justice
will come to them.'' Since that time, we've brought justice, in
many ways, to Afghanistan but we haven't nailed our number one
objective.
Mr. Secretary, is that still your number one objective in
terms of this war on terrorism?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, it seems to me that the number
one objective was not to find a person and kill a person. It's
not about retribution or retaliation. The task that the
President set out for the global war on terrorism was to put
pressure on terrorist networks and countries that provide a
safe haven for terrorist networks. That is what he has been
doing. With 90 countries cooperating, we have put a substantial
amount of pressure on al Qaeda. They are having much more
difficulty recruiting, retaining their people, planning, moving
between countries, and raising money.
Now, you're quite right, we don't know if Osama bin Laden
is dead or alive. We do know he's not active. We haven't heard
hide nor hair of him since December. That is not a surprise.
Finding one person is a needle in a haystack, and it's a big
world, and he may very well be alive. He may be incapacitated.
He may be dead.
But the truth is that regardless of what he is, his network
is in duress. It's difficult. It could commit a terrorist act
in some country--this country or another country--tomorrow, but
it is under pressure, let there be no doubt. That was what the
global war on terrorism was about.
The President described it as an iceberg, that much will be
happening below the surface of the sea. We've got wonderful
people, in uniform and out of uniform, in the Department of
Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State,
Department of Treasury, and in 90 countries working on this
problem. As you properly said, in the one case where there was
heavy kinetic activity, there's been substantial success. The
Taliban are gone. They're not training thousands of more
terrorists in Afghanistan to the great benefit of the world.
Therefore, I guess I would just say my number one priority
was to do what we're doing. The fact that Osama bin Laden may
or may not be alive does not mean that that is a failure at
all. Indeed, it's being quite successful in my view.
Senator Cleland. The military people that I talk to, both
on active duty and who have been on active duty, people that
are respected, are very concerned that if we have a major
military engagement in Iraq, it will only take away from what I
consider our number one military objective. How do you respond
to that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. As I said earlier, I think
you can find military people who feel that, and I think you can
find a lot of military people who don't feel that way. Partly,
it's whether or not you think dealing with the problems of
weapons of mass destruction potentially in the hands of
terrorist networks is part of the global war on terrorism.
I can't imagine suggesting that dealing with Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, as the President's
attempting to do, is a distraction from the global war on
terrorism. It's part of the global war on terrorism. That's my
view.
Senator Cleland. In terms of the objective in Iraq, is that
the objective from which all else falls or flows? Is the
objective the dismantlement, the dismembering, or the
elimination of his weapons of mass destruction manufacturing
sites? Then if we accomplish that, has the objective been
reached?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There is no question that that nexus is
worrisome and would be a critical element. If you did that, if
you were on the ground and--in whatever way, peacefully or not
peacefully--you were able to find all of the manufacturing,
storage, and weaponized capabilities involving chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons, and you still had that regime,
Saddam Hussein's regime, which we know intends to have those
weapons, is determined to have those weapons, you would have
accomplished the immediate problem. However, you would have
left in place a regime that would go right back, in my view, to
developing additional weapons and threatening its neighbors and
repressing its people.
So it seems to me if one were to, out of necessity, have to
get the weapons of mass destruction in the most difficult
possible way and the least desirable way, through force,
obviously, and you had done that, one would think that you
would care about--at least I would hope our country would
decide to care sufficiently about--the Iraqi people and the
neighbors there, that the government that replaced that regime
would be a government that would have a single country and
would not threaten its neighbors, would not have weapons of
mass destruction, and would provide reasonable opportunities
for the ethnic minorities that exist in that country, not
repress them.
Senator Cleland. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, in the first 5 years of the weapons
inspections in the 1990s, UNSCOM had considerable success in
detecting and dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
programs, including numerous sites. For example, there were
three clandestine uranium enrichment programs and a biological
weapons facility south of Baghdad. Obviously, later in the
decade, the inspections became increasingly ineffective and
eventually ceased. But at one point, over a number of years,
the inspectors did make considerable progress.
Your testimony today seems to dismiss altogether the use of
inspections. While all of us are understandably skeptical,
given Iraq's history, the knowledge that he will otherwise be
obliterated gives Saddam a powerful incentive to comply.
Shouldn't we at least pursue unfettered rigorous inspections
before resorting to military force?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I don't read my testimony to
be dismissive of the use of inspections. I think I said that
there is a place for inspections in our world. Unless there's a
government that is willing to allow unfettered inspections, has
made a decision to disarm, and offers assistance to that
process because their goal is to tell the world that they have,
in fact, done that, then inspections are very difficult.
Now, you're quite right. In the early period of UNSCOM,
there were significant successes in a number of instances
because of defectors helping them and cuing them as to where to
go to look. However, UNSCOM also announced--I believe it was
UNSCOM, before UNMOVIC--that they could not account for
enormous volumes of chemical and biological weapons. In their
report, as they demonstrated their successes, they
simultaneously demonstrated their failures and said, ``We can't
find them. We don't know where they are. We can't find
defectors to tell us where they are, and there's no way on the
earth that the Iraqi regime is going to be able to demonstrate
where they are.'' So it was a mixed picture.
I quite agree there's a role for inspections in our world,
but it seem to me that we've gone through 11 years, and one has
to approach it, as you suggest, with a good deal of caution. I
should add that the Iraqis have not offered unfettered
inspections.
Senator Collins. You have stated previously that there are
al Qaeda terrorists hiding in Iraq. I have two questions to
follow up on those statements. One, is there evidence that
Saddam Hussein or other high Iraqi officials are actually
sheltering members of al Qaeda? Second, is there evidence, any
evidence, that Saddam has conspired or is conspiring with
members of al Qaeda?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'd be happy to give you that
information in the closed session, which is supposed to follow
this one, but there is no question that there are al Qaeda in
Iraq in more than one location--there have been for a good long
period--and the implication or suggestion that a vicious,
repressive dictatorship that watches almost everything that
happens in this country could not be unaware of al Qaeda
operatives functioning in their country.
Senator Collins. The State Department, just last year,
issued a report listing the nations that are supporting
terrorism. The State Department said that, once again, Iran
remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2001.
What differentiates the activities of the regime in Iraq from
those in Iran, given that the State Department has placed Iran
ahead of Iraq as far as its support of terrorism and, in
addition, we know that Iran also is pursuing weapons of mass
destruction?
Secretary Rumsfeld. You're quite right, Senator, that both
countries have active chemical, biological, and nuclear
programs. There's also no question that the State Department
report is correct; the Iranians are currently harboring
reasonably large numbers of al Qaeda, and they're trying to
keep that information from the bulk of their population. The al
Qaeda are functioning in that country, both transiting and
located and operating.
Second, Iran is, without question, sending money and
weapons and people down to Damascus, Syria, down to Beirut,
Lebanon to engage in terrorist acts in that region, including
against Israel.
What's the difference? One difference is that there are 16
resolutions of the United Nations that Iraq has violated. The
international community has been told by Iraq that it's
irrelevant.
A second thing that's different is that as much as I would
like to see it, I do not believe that it's likely that in Iraq
you would have the people able to overthrow the government. In
the case of Iran, that country spun on a dime and went from the
Shah of Iran to the ayatollahs some years back.
If one looks at what's taking place there today,
particularly since President Bush's speech, ``The Axis of
Evil,'' where he spoke to the Iranian people and demonstrated
the world's concern about how they're being treated, they're
being ruled by a small clique of clerics, which the women and
the young people in that country don't like, and they have an
awareness of what's taking place in the rest of the world.
I do worry about their weapon programs. I do worry about
their proliferation. I also think there is at least a chance
that that country could change its regime from inside, and it
would be a wonderful thing for the Iranian people and the world
if it did.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
We have been in conflict and confrontation with Iraq for
over 10 years. It's been a process of thrust and parry. As you
point out in your testimony, they have been quite adroit
maneuvering, particularly diplomatically. It seems to me that
their strategy, today, is to invite, as quickly as possible,
inspectors into Iraq, to cooperate, although I would concede--
and I think you would agree--that the cooperation would be
self-serving, cynical, and transient. But that poses a real
problem to anyone contemplating operations against Iraq, that
such operations might be in the context of the presence of U.N.
inspectors in Iraq, who might even concede or admit or perceive
cooperation.
I want to ask two questions. First, are you familiar with
the authorization language that was sent up to us this
afternoon by the White House?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, I'm not. Someone handed it to me
when I walked up here.
Senator Reed. Let me read it.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You mean the resolution?
Senator Reed. I'll read it to you. ``The President is
authorized to use all means that he determines to be
appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United
Nations Security Council Resolutions referenced above, defend
the national security interests of the United States against
the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and
security in the region.''
[The information referred to follows:]
Would you read that, Mr. Secretary, to empower you to
conduct offensive operations, even if there are U.N. inspectors
in-country maintaining to the world that they are carrying out
the resolutions of the U.N.?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, the last thing I'm going to do
as Secretary of Defense is to try to interpret a resolution
that I've not read. I'm not a lawyer. It's a matter for the
Department of State and the White House that undoubtedly
drafted this. What it might or might not authorize is not for
me to say.
Senator Reed. Well, let me ask simply, do you have any
comments on the wisdom of such a potential scenario where we
would be attacking while the U.N. was in-country? Again, I
raise this issue, because I don't think it's that farfetched.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes.
Senator Reed. It seems to me what the Iraqis are trying to
do. U.N. inspectors in the country say they're getting
cooperation. We all understand it would take months in simply
administrative work in which the Iraqis could be quite,
``cooperative.'' What is the wisdom of an attack in that
situation?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, clearly, I can't read the Iraqis
minds, I have to admit that, but their ploy consistently has
been to delay, to pretend, and then to change their mind and
then to alter their position.
Now, you're right, that takes time, and time is to their
advantage. The longer the time is, the less likely there's
something going to happen. The more inspectors that are in
there, the less likely something's going to happen. The longer
nothing happens, the more advanced their weapon programs go
along. The longer things are delayed, the greater the
likelihood that world attention will turn elsewhere, and the
U.N. will once again go back into the mode that we've been in
for the last 11 years of being inattentive to those violations.
So I guess I agree with you with respect to the reason for
their offering the inspections, supposedly.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, I would suggest that that
might be a very likely scenario in which we would be
contemplating military action. I think it bears great study by
the administration.
General Myers, let me turn to a more operational question.
Throughout the afternoon, we've talked about the use of CBR--
chemical/biological/radiological weapons. Many times, the
response--and not just in this hearing, but others--is to point
to the facility of our military units to deal with these
weapons, and I acknowledge that. When we're buttoned up in
tanks, when we have protective suits on, we can mitigate the
threat dramatically. But it seems to me, based upon the
experience in the Gulf War--and you are a more astute observer
than I am--that our biggest vulnerability will be in the ports
of disembarkation, where it will take up to 30 to 60 days to
inflow the armor and the troops to marry up with armor to move
out in a ground attack. The one lesson that is compelling from
the Gulf War, at least I would suggest to the Iraqis, is, ``If
you let the United States build up, you'll lose every time, and
you'll lose decisively.'' This suggests the strong possibility
that they will use chemical and biological weapons against the
port of disembarkation in the region before we conduct ground
operations. Can you comment upon the probability of that and
the likelihood of that and to the extent that would disrupt our
operations?
General Myers. Well, absolutely, Senator Reed. It's very
hard to calculate the probability, so we assume worst case.
Without getting into a lot of the operational details, again,
the first thing you would do is try to attack whatever
infrastructure associated with WMD you could. That would be the
first thing you would do. We have already talked about some of
the passive defenses.
You would also have active defenses, in terms of PAC-3. The
PAC-3 missile was specifically designed for the slower missile-
delivery systems. Any other delivery systems, aircraft,
whatever, you'd work air defenses very hard to ensure they
wouldn't be a factor. Then you'd try to--and, again, I don't
want to tread too far into the operational details--make sure
that you don't have a single point of failure. You would take
steps to plan ahead so you could work around these issues.
There is no doubt--and I don't want to paint too rosy a
picture here--that weapons of mass destruction would be a
horrible thing to have on the battlefield. They could panic a
civilian population for sure, which would cause you problems
alone. It would slow down the fight. It can cause us problems
in logistics, as you mentioned. So, at least in this hearing,
if we were asked to do that, we would plan for worst-case and
then we would plan around that.
Senator Reed. My time is expired, and I don't require a
response, but I would assume there is significant collateral
damage to the civilian populations and others if these weapons
are deployed, and I assume that's correct.
General Myers. Well, it depends on how they're employed.
But, like I said, one of the things you'd worry about is panic
among the civilian population and then you'd have to try to
mitigate that some way, and it certainly would be a planning
factor.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would ask the Chairman if it is his wish that the
Intelligence Committee, which is meeting as we speak, and in
the midst of the ongoing September 11 investigation and in the
midst of being investigated by itself by the FBI, have a
hearing on a recent magazine article about something that
happened, allegedly, 20 years ago in regards to the U.S.
supplying materials to Iraq in reference to their capability
with weapons of mass destruction.
We might also ask them to have additional questions in
regards to the Oil for Food Program, which Saddam has used
billions, I think, to build up his weapons of mass destruction,
sanctions violations on the part of the French and the Russians
and, for that matter, China, which has also aided and abetted
that ability. I would hope that that hearing would include that
as well as speculation on something that happened 20 years ago.
I have a real quick question for General Myers. On page 8
of your testimony, you indicated we have made similar
improvements virtually to all aspects of our joint team. I
think we all know that this will be a an improved joint war
fighting team. The Secretary has also indicated that, as well.
I don't remember what page it was on, but he certainly made
reference to that.
During the recent challenge that we called the Millennium
Challenge 2002--I'm summing up here--there has been some
speculation that the Red Team effectively used what we call
asymmetric warfare to seriously impede the ability of the Blue
forces, which were our forces, to put forces ashore or to get
to the fight--i.e., the sunken fleet was resurrected and the
experiment simply continued.
My concern is that the techniques used by the Red force
under the command of Lieutenant General Van Ryper, a former
marine, might represent similar tactics used by Iraq in the war
against our forces. My question is, how prepared are we for an
enemy using techniques to defeat and circumvent our technology,
which we have, and all of the advantages that you have cited,
General, which I believe we have, and also the will of the
American fighting force, which I believe that we have, against
classic asymmetical warfare?
Let me just say the reason I'm asking this is that on the
authorizing committee here, and we're the appropriators, we
pushed awfully hard for the money for this exercise. A lot of
the services didn't want to do this. But General Van Ryper
succeeded in using cruise missiles in unique ways to overwhelm
the Navy's Aegis radar and sink the entire simulated Blue
armada of 16 ships. The Red team simply stood them up again.
Basically, despite a disparity in the technology sophistication
between the two sides, the U.S. forces proved susceptible to
the Somalis basic warfighting tools, which included the use of
smoke pots to disorient the American troops and the
communication via word of mouth and drum beating. That sort of
harkens back to Somalia.
Basically, the general said, ``I am warning against mirror
imaging the thinking of Iraqi leaders, Saddam Hussein, and his
lieutenants.'' Somehow you've got to get out of the Western
mind-set and, as much as you can, recognize you're dealing with
different cultures, different ways of thinking, different
warfare, i.e., asymmetrical warfare.
The Joint Forces Command has done no analysis on why the
Red Team has had such a great success. I know they will. I know
they'll report it to the Secretary, but I'm concerned about
this in regards to the American war fighter. Where are we in
this?
General Myers. Well, Senator Roberts, I have a great deal
of respect for General Van Ryper. I happened to go to a joint
war fighting course with him, matter of fact, a few years back.
Senator Roberts. Yeah, he spoke very highly of you when he
came into my office.
General Myers. So I hold him in high respect. Not to dwell
on the Millennium Challenge piece of this, but it was an
experiment where sometimes things had to be reset to try to
figure out and achieve the objectives we wanted to do.
Senator Roberts. But the war in Iraq, General, is not going
to be an experiment, and it's not going to be an exercise.
General Myers. I understand. I'm going to get to that.
Senator, I think the worst thing we can do is think we're
better than we are, and that's a big danger. I know that, in
this case, the Middle East, is clearly in General Frank's mind
all the time. We try to get Red Teams, people like General Van
Ryper, that look at various scenarios and try to think
differently than we think. We know it's a different culture. We
understand those sorts of things.
But I would say this, that I visited every location except
Camp Lejeune on Millennium Challenge, and I spent time at
Coronado, Nellis Air Force Base, and Norfolk, and I suspect you
probably did, too. I don't know for sure.
The thing that makes the difference--and that is not at the
tactical level but at the strategic level of what we were
trying to look at--was our decision cycle, not the specific
weapons. This was a scenario, of course, that was in the
future, so there were a lot of hypothetical weapons introduced.
But the thing we were really trying to investigate is, can we
make our decision cycle, our ability to think inside the enemy,
faster than any potential adversary? I think that was one of
the greatest outcomes, that we think we have ways to do that
and to be even better.
We're pretty good today. We found out we were pretty good
in Afghanistan. We still need improvement. We still need to
improve our joint war fighting. I'm not here to say that it's
perfect by any stretch of the imagination. But that was one of
the big outcomes of the Millennium Challenge that I think we
can all be very proud of that would probably translate very
well into future conflict.
Now, as you get down to specific weapons systems and
tactics and techniques, there are different issues there, but
it's the decision making, it's the planning ability, and the
ability to take information, and turn it very quickly and use
it again. These are things that we looked at very hard in
Millennium Challenge. Again, one of the things we have to guard
against is thinking we're better than we are, and I can
guarantee you General Tommy Franks doesn't think that, and I
certainly don't.
Senator Roberts. But if we think faster and we disrupt his
command and control, then that certainly would disrupt Saddam's
ability to launch the weapons of mass destruction, to draw
Israel into the race, or going to the scorched-earth policy, et
cetera, et cetera. If we think faster and disrupt his command
and control, then that is--in part--the answer, if not the
answer.
General Myers. Yes, sir. Yes, Senator, that's absolutely
right.
Senator Roberts. Okay, thank you.
My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
I would say to you and all the members of the committee
that if there are additional subjects that you would like to be
briefed on by the intelligence community--I use the word
``brief,'' not a ``hearing'' when I made reference to Senator
Byrd----
Senator Roberts. Right.
Chairman Levin. --that if there are subjects that are
relevant to your consideration of this issue, to you and all
members of the committee, please give me those subjects. I will
make the same request on your behalf as I did on Senator
Byrd's.
Senator Roberts. Yes, I had understood that you said a
``hearing,'' and that's why I said what I said. I'm sure every
member can go to the Intel Committee and get briefed on
precisely the question that the Senator brought up. I
appreciate the Chairman's answer.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, if our objective is regime change in Iraq,
and if, as Senator Reed just read the resolution that was just
sent up here today, that it is also to promote the peace and
stability in the region, could you share with the committee
what is the plan that, once you've taken out Saddam, we will
have a military presence there for quite awhile in order to
make sure that there is peace and stability in the region and
that there's not another Saddam that rises up that gives us the
same problem in the first place that we have?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Nelson, I think what I would
say is that the immediate objective is disarmament. I think a
case can be made that the policy of the United States
Government, including Congress, is regime change. But I think
the reason Congress came to that conclusion and the President
talks of regime change as a policy of the United States is
because it's, at this stage, so difficult to imagine
disarmament without regime change.
With respect to what might follow, the Department of State
has given thought to that. It's hard to know precisely. The
things that I sense broad agreement on in the international
community is that it would be enormously unhelpful if Iraq
would split up into multiple states, that it should be a single
country, that that's best for the region, that it be a
government that does not have weapons of mass destruction, does
not threaten its neighbors, and provides through some
mechanisms of elections and representation to assures that the
ethnic minorities in that country are treated properly and that
they're not repressed or disadvantaged.
Again, the President has not made a decision, but if one
assumes, as your hypothetical question does, that force is
used, disarmament takes some period of time. One would think
there would have to be a military presence, undoubtedly a
coalition presence or a U.N. presence for a period of time, and
it will take some time to find all of these locations because
there are so many and they're so well hidden.
Iraq's economic circumstance is quite different from
Afghanistan's in the sense that they do have substantial oil
revenues. Therefore, from a reconstruction standpoint and from
a recovery standpoint, one would think that during that period
where the disarming is taking place and by, presumably, an
international or coalition force of some sort, and, presumably,
Iraqis from inside the country and from outside the country
would have some sort of a mechanism whereby they would decide
what kind of a government or template would make sense. It was
the Afghan people that decided that, and I would think it would
be the same to Iraqi people. They will be liberated people and
they will have choices they haven't had for many, many years.
I would think that during that period, the economic
circumstance of not just that country but the neighboring
countries would be enormously benefitted. It has not been a
happy part of the world under his leadership.
Beyond that, I think part of it would be left to the
Department of State, part of it would be left to the Iraqi
people, and part of it would be left to some sort of an
international coalition that would be participating.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, you really have stirred
up MacDill and the Tampa area. I'm quoting from the Tampa
Tribune of a couple of days ago.
``Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on Monday ridiculed the
location of U.S. Central Command in Tampa while asserting that
a certain logic points toward a move closer to potential battle
zones near the Persian Gulf. General Tommy Franks, . . .
headquarters for war operations in Asia and the Middle East,
has been pressing for a move, Rumsfeld said. `Tom Franks has
been after me to do that ever since I arrived in the
department,' Rumsfeld said. `There's a certain logic to it.' ''
[The information referred to follows:]
Can you help unstir what's going on down there?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, you will not find a quote
anywhere that even begins to approximate ``Rumsfeld
ridiculing,'' notwithstanding what that, I'm sure, outstanding
newspaper had to say.
It is true that before I arrived back in the Pentagon in
January of last year, the Central Command has had a concern
about its location. This did not arrive with Tom Franks talking
to me; it preceded me. Is that correct, General?
General Myers. That's correct.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Part of the reason why I mentioned it
was due to the time zones. If you've got a command center that
is about six time zones away, it makes everything a little
harder. Our European Command is in Europe. Our Pacific Command
is in the Pacific, and our Central Command for that whole
region--Afghanistan and the Middle East and that whole portion
of the world--is in Tampa, Florida. That does not say anything
against Tampa, Florida, except that Tampa, Florida, happens not
to be located in the Central Command, just by happenstance,
well before I arrived. Tom Franks has, ever since I arrived,
raised this issue with me, and he is in the process of moving
some pieces so that he and some of his key people will be
capable of functioning in that part of the world.
Is that pretty close?
General Myers. Yes, sir. I think the intention is a forward
element. Senator Nelson, there was a lot of debate during the
high tempo combat in Afghanistan about where General Franks
should be, and I think this is part of that argument. But we're
talking about a forward element that General Franks could fall
in on from time to time.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is that what you're speaking of, a
forward element, or are you talking about a complete relocation
of the Central Command?
General Myers. Senator, I think now what is being discussed
is an element--the capability, the equipment, the
infrastructure--to fall in on from time to time. I think that's
the discussion now.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I'm obviously going to have to
visit with you on this. The political sensitivities is one
reason that it's not been located over in that area, which is
why we didn't have it, for example, in the Gulf War. General
Schwartzkopf had moved an element over there for the conduct of
that war, similar, General Myers, to what you're saying that is
being done here.
General Myers. I believe that's correct. I think it's still
being decided how permanent a forward element you would have,
how large it would be. From a military point of view, you'd
want to have some infrastructure there that people could use,
where you'd have the communications and so forth rather than
have to lay that in every time. It's terribly expensive to do
it that way.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will say Florida, of course, is host
to the Special Operations Command. It's host to the Naval
Aviation Training Command. I lived in Florida and was a pilot
in the Navy in the Southern Command. It is a state that's
hospitable to the military, and that's why there's a great deal
of military activity in the state, because they are so well
treated.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, just in closing, I'd
like to thank both of these gentlemen, because I'm sure they
had the input into the President's speech at the United Nations
in which he drew attention to the downed American pilot, Scott
Speicher, and of which I have visited with both of these
gentlemen ad infinitum, and of which is just going to be
another element that we're going to have to consider when we go
into Iraq.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have four things
I'm going to try to cover real quickly.
First of all, Mr. Secretary, I don't want people to
misinterpret at a future time the answer that you gave to the
initial question. That was a very good question by our
Chairman; how can we carry out the war with the readiness
problems that we have? Having chaired the Senate Armed Services
Subcommittee on Readiness, we have very serious problems, and I
wouldn't want your response to be interpreted in some way that
our Guard and Reserve are going to be able to take care of the
end-strength problems and all the others that we have.
I think I've heard you say in previous hearings that
historically in the 20th century during peacetime that the
average percentage of Gross Domestic Product has been some 5.7
percent to go to Defense. During wartime, it goes to 13.3
percent. It has been, in the last few years, less than 3
percent, only in this more optimistic budget we're in right now
it's 3.11 percent. So I'd just like to have you make a
statement that we need to do something about our overall
defense spending. You can no longer go after modernization at
the expense of readiness or RPM accounts at the expense of
National Missile Defense.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you're exactly right. There's
no question but that the Chairman and I and others have
testified before this committee and before the House discussing
the fact that our aircraft fleet is aging, that our
shipbuilding numbers are not at the levels they should be, and
that the housing situation for many of the men and women in
uniform is substandard.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You're exactly right. On the other
hand, my answer was correct to the Chairman that we are capable
of performing the kinds of tasks we're discussing here.
Senator Inhofe. I agree with both your answers.
Senator Reed brought up this new document that I had not
seen until the course of this particular committee hearing. But
I think it's important that we go back a bit. As Senator Nelson
said, that it was an excellent speech that the President made
before the United Nations. In that speech, he talked about
things that would have to happen to preclude his effort for a
preemptive strike. He said such things as, ``It will
immediately and unconditionally foreswear disclosure and
removal and destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range
missiles and all related material.'' He said, ``It will
immediately end all support of terrorism and act to suppress
it.'' All these were conditions that the President outlined.
In this document that I just read, he talks about other
things that have to take place. Somehow there seems to be some
percentage of our population, maybe at this table and
elsewhere, that if all of a sudden we decided that Saddam
Hussein was going to allow inspectors to come in, it would be
``unfettered,'' which he's already reneging on that. He has a
long history of lying about this, and he's never allowed this
to happen before. I see this as nothing more than a stall
tactic, a delay. This could delay it for maybe a month or 2
months or 6 months. Time is not our friend in this case, so
this has concerned me.
But even if he had some kind of a revelation and we
believed that what he said was true, there are still other
conditions that are listed here to which they would have to
comply. So I assume it's not just the weapons inspectors that
would keep us from wanting to do the preemptive strike. There
are other conditions that must be met.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I'm really at a disadvantage.
I have not had a chance to read the resolution. My
understanding is that this resolution was being worked on at
the White House with congressional leadership, number one.
Number two, it's my understanding that the resolution was being
fashioned in a way that it was as close as possible to a prior
resolution that existed in Congress.
Senator Inhofe. Well, let's forget about the resolution and
just say there are things that have to be done other than
weapons inspectors in order to satisfy us, such as the
President outlined in the report. This includes:
``unconditional,'' ``foreswear,'' ``disclosures,'' and ``remove
all.''
Secretary Rumsfeld. Clearly, the President's speech is the
driving document.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You're exactly right.
Senator Inhofe. Very good. Very good.
I would ask both of you to at least express a concern and
repeat something that you've stated before. I see us going into
another round of hand-wringing. This has disturbed me all
during the 1990s when things were happening with Osama bin
Laden--we remember the 1992 threat to some hundred servicemen
in Yemen, the 1993 Somalia incident that he took credit for,
and their initial attack on the World Trade Centers in 1993--we
sat around wringing our hands. Then Khobar Towers happened,
then Kenya and Tanzania, then the U.S.S. Cole, and we kept on
wringing our hands.
I want to read to you something that was stated by
President Clinton--in this case, I agreed with him--and that is
the risk and consequences of inaction. This was President
Clinton on August 20, 1998. He said, ``Countries that
persistently host terrorists have no right to be safeguards. It
will require strength, courage, and endurance. We will not
yield to this threat. We will meet it, no matter how long it
will take. This will be a long ongoing struggle between freedom
and fanaticism, between the rule of law and terrorism. We must
be prepared to do all we can do, as long as it takes.''
Later, he says, `` The risk from inaction to America and
the world would be far greater than action, for that would
embolden the enemies, leaving their ability and their
willingness to strike us intact.'' Do you think that applies
today?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think it's very well stated. I had
not heard the quotation, but he raises the very important point
that it is understandable that we talk about the risks of
action, because they're very real. But it is critically
important that we look at the risks of inaction.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If my
time is not expired, I do have a couple of further questions.
Chairman Levin. Well, it is now. [Laughter.]
You were very gracious before, so I can't deny you one more
question.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Chairman Levin. I'd like to, but I can't.
Senator Inhofe. I'm sorry?
Chairman Levin. I'd like to, but I can't. I don't have the
heart to do it. [Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. Senator Kennedy talked about how the people
of Iraq have been unsuccessful in overturning Saddam Hussein.
In 1996, there was a real effort by all the opposition groups
--not just the Kurds of the north, as some have said--and it
was their understanding at that time that the United States
would be joining them. So that was a mission that never did
take place.
As a result of our turning our backs and walking away,
thousands and thousands of Kurds in the north were killed,
along with others. Do you think, at that time, if we had had
the united front that was talked about, that we might not be
sitting here today worrying about Saddam Hussein?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, with the benefit of 20-20
hindsight, I'm sure we can look back over the years at any
number of incidences where, if things had been done
differently, the outcomes would have been better. Certainly
that was not a happy situation.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you. I appreciate your service, both
of you, to our country.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you.
General Myers. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Carnahan.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, too,
Mr. Secretary and General Myers, for your service and for your
patience today.
Last week at the United Nations, President Bush laid out a
scathing indictment of Saddam Hussein. He reminded us that
Saddam has ignored the world's command to disclose and destroy
all weapons of mass destruction, and he challenged the United
Nations to assert its authority and enforce its will.
Well, I agree with the President that Saddam Hussein cannot
be allowed to ignore these requirements and continue to develop
weapons of mass destruction. Some of our allies, however,
around the world say that the threat is not imminent or that
Saddam will not likely share his weapons with other terrorist
groups. Well, I think that is an unrealistic and risky
assumption.
After the attacks on our country last year and knowing that
al Qaeda is very actively seeking biological, chemical, and
nuclear weapons, we, in the United States, simply do not have
the luxury of waiting or hoping or leaving the future to
chance. We have a duty, not only to America, but to mankind to
make an affirmative response.
Earlier this year, 60 scholars, including former Senator
Moynihan, wrote a statement in response to the September 11
attacks, and he entitled it, ``What We're Fighting For, A
Letter From America,'' and this is part of what he had in
there: ``Reason and careful moral reflection teach us that
there are times when the first and most important reply to evil
is to stop it, and that is precisely what we must do.''
I ask that the full statement that I've made be made part
of the record, and I have a few questions.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Carnahan follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jean Carnahan
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you Secretary Rumsfeld and
General Myers for your continued service and commitment when our
country needs you most.
Last week at the United Nations, President Bush laid out a scathing
indictment against Saddam Hussein. He reminded us that Saddam has
ignored the world's command to disclose and destroy all of his weapons
of mass destruction. He challenged the United Nations to assert its
authority and enforce its will. I agree with the President that Saddam
Hussein cannot be allowed to ignore requirements and continue to
develop weapons of mass destruction.
For me, the primary question that we all have to answer is: ``How
great a risk would it be to our national security if Saddam Hussein
acquired a nuclear weapon?''
When you consider, in totality . . .
the intelligence that has been gathered,
Saddam's actions prior to and during the Gulf War,
Saddam's ouster of weapons inspectors in 1998,
the accessibility of terrorist groups in the Arab
world that could ally with Saddam, and
the horror and evil that terrorists are both willing
and eager to inflict on our people . . .
I come to the conclusion that the United States cannot accept the
risk of Iraq obtaining a nuclear weapon.
We have tried to disarm Saddam through weapon inspections. But when
he threw out the weapons inspectors, the world was unwilling to stand
up to him. We have tried to contain Saddam with sanctions. But the
world has been unwilling to enforce them. When presented with the
threat that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction what do some friends and
allies say?
``He is not an imminent threat.''
``He doesn't have the means to deliver the weapons beyond his
borders.''
``He won't give these weapons to terrorists.''
These are unrealistic and risky assumptions.
But after 3,000 of our citizens perished just over a year ago and
after we uncovered evidence that al Qaeda was actively seeking
biological, chemical, and nuclear capabilities we do not have the
luxury of . . .
waiting
or hoping
or leaving the future to chance.
We have a duty not only to America, but to mankind to make an
affirmative response.
For we are living in a different world than we did just over a year
ago.
We are fighting a different kind of war . . .
with no boundaries, no rules, no clear measure of
victory or defeat,
against an undefined enemy, that operates in the
shadows, and
will not be known to us until, perhaps, it is too
late.
We know that Saddam presents a clear threat to our security. We
have a duty to take action to remove that threat. Merely allowing
inspectors to re-enter Iraq will not do. We know that Saddam will
continue to hide the ball.
The danger is that we could find ourselves years from now in the
same situation as in 1998 . . .
with a broken down inspections system
and Saddam much further down the road toward obtaining
a nuclear weapon.
To meet his obligations, Saddam must do far more. He must admit
that he has weapons. . .
tell us where they are, and
destroy them under international supervision.
He must comply with all his other obligations under United Nations'
resolutions. I believe the case against Saddam is clear and strong. As
the President and the administration make their position known to the
rest of the world, I believe that we will gain many allies in this
effort. That eventually, we will take action to protect our citizens
and the rest of the world from unspeakable horrors.
Earlier this year, 60 scholars, including former Senator Moynihan,
wrote a statement in response to the September 11 attacks entitled
``What We're Fighting For: A Letter from America.'' In it, they stated:
``Reason and careful moral reflection . . . teach us that there
are times when the first and most important reply to evil is to
stop it.''
That is what we need to do.
Senator Carnahan. Mr. Secretary, before the United Nations
inspectors left Iraq in 1998, Iraq frequently played hide and
seek when it came to their weapons. They placed them in
presidential palaces or underground bunkers. The U.S. military
has far greater tools at its disposal than the inspectors, in
terms of being able to track down these weapons. Would you
comment on your concerns about the ability of the inspectors to
find all of the stockpiled chemical and biological weapons?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, Senator. The inspectors can be
very good--very good--at what they do. But if the Government of
Iraq is not going to cooperate, then it is just an enormously
complex and difficult job. There isn't any way to know how well
you've done, of certain knowledge, unless you get people
talking to you. In Saddam Hussein's Iraq, anyone who talks to
an inspector runs the risk of being killed, along with his or
her family and their relatives. You'd almost have to get
everybody out of the country that had any knowledge and
interrogate them outside and have them tell you. But then if
they ever wanted to go home, they'd be faced with the same
problem.
So the connection between disarming the weapons of mass
destruction and regime change is, to me, awfully tight. It's
very difficult to accomplish it without it.
Senator Carnahan. Yes, if Saddam Hussein does not have
access to weapons of mass destruction, how can we make sure he
doesn't have access to them if he remains in power?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, you'd have to have continuing
inspections, I suppose, and that would be just as difficult, as
long as he is resistant to the inspectors as he has over the
past decade rather than cooperative.
The model for successful inspectors is one where the
government is caught doing something, they're penalized, and
they decide that their life, their circumstance, and their
future is better not being penalized and being willing to give
up those weapons. But if the government isn't cooperative,
their ability to frustrate and to deny and deceive is
extensive.
Senator Carnahan. General Myers, it took several months to
mobilize a force that was ready to initiate Operate Desert
Storm. I understand that our current airlift and sealift
capabilities allow for us to deploy forces much more rapidly.
Could you describe the differences between our capabilities now
and those that we had during the Gulf War, and how the changes
might impact the speed with which we are able to position our
troops in the area?
General Myers. You bet. First of all, we have the C-17, and
it's gotten great support here in Congress. We don't have
enough of them yet, but we start to buy the correct number in
the 2003 budget. Its reliability, its cargo-carrying
capability, and, particularly, its ability to go into
relatively short airfields really enhances our airlift piece of
this equation.
The second part that I would mention is the shipping. As I
recall from Operation Desert Storm, we had to activate ships.
We had mechanical difficulties. It frustrated our ability to
move cargo, equipment, and personnel to the Gulf. Today, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, we have 17 of the 20 medium-
speed roll-on/roll-off ships already delivered. They were
delivered as of last year. My view is that this will make a big
difference in our ability to move supplies and equipment into
any region where the United States military might be asked to
go.
So I think we are much better postured in that respect than
we were a decade ago.
Senator Carnahan. In your prepared testimony, you mentioned
the use of immunizations and new detection equipment as part of
our effort to manage the threat of chemical and biological
attacks. Could you elaborate a little bit more on how our
troops are equipped to defend themselves against such
biological attacks?
General Myers. Absolutely. Any armed forces that we think
are going to be under the threat of weapons of mass destruction
will have their personal protective gear, which, as I said
earlier, has improved over time. The protective suits today
that they wear are lighter than they were previously. We have
good masks today that can protect against chemical and
biological elements. We also have decontamination sets today
that are new since a decade ago. Then we have warning systems
that are much better than we've had in the past for, not just a
local area, but wider area networks that we can put together.
None of this is going to help us counter weapons of mass
destruction. That would be, obviously, a terrible event if it
were to occur, for the reasons that I think I talked about
earlier, but we're reasonably well prepared.
Now, the other part of that is that if you think an
adversary is going to employ weapons of mass destruction, there
are lots of things that you can employ to discourage that. The
Secretary has talked about part of that. I think you can
communicate to those folks that have to carry out those acts
that this would not be in their best interests--that, after any
conflict, people that had been involved in the use of weapons
of mass destruction, employing them on civilian populations or
other people's armed forces, would be held under very high
scrutiny, and life would probably be pretty miserable for them
when the course of justice got through with them. So there's
that aspect of it.
There's also the aspect of defense. Before, I mentioned the
Patriot 3, which has recently been fielded. We know during
Operation Desert Storm that the Patriot had about a 50-percent
chance of hitting the incoming warhead, much improved now with
the Patriot 3 designed specifically for that type of threat. I
don't want to go into the classified numbers, but Patriot 3 has
very good capability today against Scud-type missiles and other
short-range missiles.
So I think if you put all that together, does it mean that
this is still not going to be a horrific event that we're going
to fight our way through? Is it going to slow us down?
Probably. Will it cause us to maybe change our plans in a
localized area? It could possibly. Any plan that we make
against any adversary takes that into account as best we can,
and we'll plan for the worst-case and protect our troops.
You mentioned immunizations. We have started to get into
the anthrax immunizations this week, and we'll continue those.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. I have the benefits of my colleagues'
questioning this afternoon, so I have a statement that I would
like to introduce into the hearing record. There is a question
at the conclusion of it, Mr. Secretary, and I want to preface
my remarks by just saying to both of you what enormous respect
I have for both of you, your professionalism, and your
dedication to our country. What you wake up every morning
having to think about, and think about during the day, night,
and just before you go to bed is an awesome responsibility and
one whose gravity and enormity you share with just a few others
in the administration, the President, the Vice President, and
others. I think your country is enormously in both your debt
for what you've undertaken, and I thank you and want to
acknowledge that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much.
General Myers. Thank you, sir.
Senator Dayton. I have enormous respect for the convictions
you bring, for the inevitable difficulty of the assessments
that you're making and that we are also, here in Congress,
being asked to make now during these times.
Based on what I have been able to learn, what I've been
told in these last really few days of information, it seems
clear to me that the menace of Saddam Hussein is real and
serious and that there's important elements that we cannot know
because of a lack of U.N. inspection that makes this even more
conjectural. So I take what you're facing and this Nation is
facing with enormous gravity, but I also think it has enormous
implications. It's not clear to me what is right at this time.
Mr. Secretary, yesterday before the House Armed Services
Committee, you said, ``The United States must act quickly to
save the potentially tens of thousands of citizens''--that's
the paraphrasing in the article.
What concerns me is your insistence and the
administration's insistence that the Senate rush to judgment on
these critical decisions, and that it's imperative that we do
so very quickly. We've already heard from others that if we
don't make those decisions, take those necessary actions that
are being requested, that we are unpatriotic, blind, cowardly
and/or irresponsible if we don't provide the blank check that's
requested in this resolution now to use by the President by
whatever means he determines is necessary and appropriate to
remove Saddam Hussein from power, which is a goal and objective
that I believe we all share.
I'm not a historian or a scholar, and it's maybe the
subject of some debate, but according to Congressional Research
Service analysis, the United States has never in its history
launched a preemptive attack against another country. I'll
quote from a report, and, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask that it
be introduced at the conclusion as part of the record. It says,
``The historical record indicates the United States has never
to date engaged in a preemptive military attack against another
nation, nor has the United States ever attacked another nation
militarily prior to its first having been attacked or prior to
U.S. citizens or interests first having been attacked, with the
singular exception of the Spanish-American War.''
The last 50 years, we've had our leaders confronting
dangerous leaders in other countries who possess the weapons of
mass destruction, ones that, in fact, we knew could bring
devastation to this country and to the world. Republican
presidents and congresses and Democratic presidents and
congresses approached these situations fraught with peril not
by starting a war, not by launching a preemptive attack or
initiating an invasion of another country, but by protecting
the country and preserving the planet by preventing war.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Dayton. This attack that's being contemplated would
most likely destroy Saddam Hussein. I don't doubt the enormous
military capabilities of our country and the courage of our
fighting men and women, as we've seen most recently in
Operation Enduring Freedom. But it would also, if the
historical record is as I've stated, destroy a 213-year
consistent foreign policy of this country and a 50-year or more
military principle of this Nation which has served us well. It
has not only protected our country and its people, it has
elevated our moral leadership around the world and contributed
enormously to the international stability and security of the
planet and the saving of the human race from the terrible
devastation of a nuclear holocaust.
This attack, if we undertook it, would be a shock to that
world order of enormous magnitude. It would have, I believe,
profound consequences for the future. There are other
countries, as you are well aware, around the world who are
developing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear
capabilities, and some of whom have governments who are
unfriendly, even hostile, to the United States, countries who
will inevitably experience leadership changes in the years
ahead, which may produce leaders even more ominous to the
United States' national security than we face today. If
preemptive attacks on those growing future threats are viewed
as our policy by other governments and nations around the
world, and if this becomes an actual precedent, I, again, think
we risk a dangerous destabilization of the international order
and a serious damage to the national security of the United
States.
So given the near-term and long-term consequences of these
decisions, as enormous as they are, again, I have difficulty
with the rush to judgment that we are told we must make or,
again, we are told we are unpatriotic or blind or cowardly or
irresponsible if we don't make this rush to judgment.
I have just a couple of more minutes, Mr. Chairman. Bear
with me, please.
Last September 2001, after the dastardly attack against the
United States, Congress acted swiftly, decisively and, in the
Senate, unanimously to support the President. We passed a
resolution that the President signed into law one week after
September 11 that gave the President the broad, sweeping
authority that he has used so well on behalf of this Nation.
However, I look back--and I was not here then--in 1998, there
was a very different timetable. In January that year, Iraq
refused an inspection of presidential sites by the U.N. Special
Commission to oversee the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction. President Clinton, then, requested a congressional
resolution, and on February 2, the Republican majority leader
responded. I'll just read some excerpts, and again, I ask that
it be put in the record, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
Senator Dayton. He stated, ``I had hoped that we could get
to the point where we could pass a resolution this week on
Iraq. But we have really developed some physical problems, if
nothing else''--skipping here--``So we have decided the most
important thing is not to move so quickly but to make sure that
we have had all the right questions asked and answered and that
we have available to us the latest information about what is
expected or what is going to be happening with our allies
around the world.''
It goes on: The Senate is known for its deliberate actions,
and the longer I stay in the Senate, the more I have learned to
appreciate it. It does help to give us time to think about the
potential problems and the risks and the ramification and to,
frankly, press the administration.
Despite our areas of agreement--Senator Daschle and I have
been working together making sure every word is sanitized in
the potential resolution--it is obvious we cannot get it done
this week, for physical reasons as much as anything else. I
remind my colleagues and the American people that it was 5
months after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, 5 months before
Congress passed a resolution authorizing the use of force to
expel him. In this case, we have a bipartisan effort, trying to
make sure that the right thing is going to be done and that the
right language is developed. Unlike what we had in the early
1990s when the Speaker and Majority Leader were working to
defeat the administration's policy, we now have a Speaker and a
Majority Leader and the Democratic leader and the minority
leader in the House all working together with the
administration to make sure that the language is right and that
the actions are right.
``Yes, more time may be needed for diplomacy and more time
to think about the long-term plans, but a point will come when
time will run out and action must go forward.'' Skipping ahead
again: ``But I just want to make that point clear today.''
``Nobody should interpret the fact that we don't vote on a
resolution today as meaning that we are not united in the
fundamental principles. We are. But we want to make sure that
when we do take military action, we have thought about all the
ramifications, and the resolution we come up with will have the
involvement of 100 Senators, with 100 Senators being present
and voting, and that every word is the appropriate word that
reflects the best interests of the American people.''
[The information referred to follows:]
Iraq
(senate--february 12, 1998)
Mr. Lott. Mr. President, I believe that Senator Daschle will join
me on the floor shortly because he and I would like to, in effect, have
a joint statement with regard to Iraq because we want the message to be
unambiguous, very clear to America and to our allies around the world,
and to Iraq about our attitude and what our intentions are with regard
to this very important matter.
I just had a call from Senator John Warner, who is in Russia today
along with Senator Carl Levin. They are escorting Secretary of Defense
Bill Cohen. They have already been to six countries since they were in
Germany. I believe perhaps even the Senator from Arizona, the Presiding
Officer, was there. They have gone throughout the Arab world, and now
they are in Russia.
He tells me that he believes that when they return, Secretary Cohen
and the two Senators will bring a great deal of helpful information to
the Senate and to the American people about what they have heard in the
Arab world and what they have heard from our allies in those areas'
meetings. They believe that they will be able to answer some of the
very important questions that Senators have been asking. So we will
look forward to their return.
I had hoped that we could get to the point where we could pass a
resolution this week on Iraq. But we really developed some physical
problems, if nothing else. Senator Warner and Senator Levin would like
very much to be a part of the discussion about what the situation will
be and how we should proceed on Iraq. They would like to be here. Other
Senators are necessarily not going to be able to be here beyond this
afternoon.
So we have decided that the most important thing is not to move so
quickly but to make sure that we have had all the right questions asked
and answered and that we have available to us the latest information
about what is expected or what is going to be happening with our allies
in the world.
I was noting, I say to Senator Daschle, that I just talked to
Senator Warner in Russia, and he was telling me that Secretary Cohen
and Senator Warner and Senator Levin are looking forward to coming back
and giving us a full report on their trip to the Arab world. Now they
are in Russia today.
Mr. President, I have no doubt that the entire world is watching
the current crisis between Iraq and the international community unfold.
This is another showdown caused by Saddam Hussein.
The Iraqi dictator has decided that his weapons of mass destruction
program is more important than the welfare of his own people. At a time
when we have been getting reports--in fact, we have seen children
suffering from malnutrition--this dictator has been building $1.5
billion in additional palaces. He has already endured 7 years of
sanctions so that he can develop biological, chemical, and nuclear
weapons--and the means to deliver them.
This is a very serious matter. For some time we--and I mean America
and our allies--have been working to develop a resolution on Iraq that
has broad bipartisan support and also one that would bring the
situation under control there by diplomatic efforts hoping to avoid
military action. But that has not happened yet.
I believe we are moving toward a consensus in the Senate on a
number of the key issues that must be addressed as we look to the
future. Here they are.
First of all, Saddam Hussein does pose a real threat to the region
and to the entire world. I believe the Senate recognizes that. I hope
that the American people recognize that. This is not a hypothetical
danger that has been dreamed up by some armchair strategists. There is
a long track record in this area of actions by Saddam Hussein. He poses
a clear and present danger without equal in the post-cold-war-world. He
is dangerous. He is a threat to his neighbors. He is a destabilizing
force in the whole region. Yes, he is actually a threat all over the
world including the United States. This is a man who has already
invaded two of his neighbors. Iraq has used chemical weapons inside and
outside its borders. It has launched missiles against Saudi Arabia and
against Israel. Hussein tried to murder former President George Bush in
1993.
Now, we should not make any mistake and think that a military
action, if it comes to that, is going to rehabilitate Saddam Hussein or
even eliminate him. He does not have any desire to join the civilized
world, apparently, and he has shown that he can survive even when the
whole world has concerns with his conduct and has taken unified action
to stop his aggression.
Second, I think there is a consensus in the Senate that military
force is justified if diplomatic actions fail in responding to the
threat that Saddam Hussein poses. The threat is serious and our
response must be serious.
Now, any military force that is used does entail risks, to our
military, to our allies and even to our country if there is an attempt
at retaliation. The American people need to understand that, and we
need to think about it carefully. We need to talk about the risks that
are involved. That is one reason why, when we bring up a resolution, if
it is necessary--and I assume it will be--we must make sure that every
Senator who wants to be heard can be heard.
I remember when we had a similar debate back in the early 1990s. I
think some 80 Senators spoke. Now, this time we won't have 500,000
troops amassed on the ground ready to go in, but it is still a very
serious matter, and I want to make sure that we don't try to restrict
Senators. In fact, we could not. Senator Daschle knows if we asked
unanimous consent to bring this resolution up today and vote on it in 4
hours, we would not get it; the Senate is known for its deliberate
actions. The longer I stay in the Senate, the more I have learned to
appreciate it. It does help to give us time to think about the
potential problems and the risks and the ramifications and to, frankly,
press the administration. I feel better this week than I did last week
because of the responses we are getting about how this is being thought
out and what would be the military action and what will be the long-
term plans to deal with Saddam Hussein. We are beginning to get some
answers now. I believe the administration is thinking harder about what
those answers should be because the Senate, Republicans and Democrats,
has raised these questions, not in a critical way, not in a threatening
way, but in an honest way of saying, have you thought about this? What
about this approach? Can we do more? I think that has served a very
positive purpose.
Some people have said to me, even back in my own State, `This is
not a threat to us. Let them deal with that over there.' Who? Who is
going to deal with it? If America does not lead, who is going to lead?
Nobody else.
Now, our allies can, should, and, I believe, will join us if action
is necessary. But we are going to have to lead the way. We are going to
have to make the tough decisions. People need to understand that this
threat could even apply to us. While it may be a direct threat of a
Scud missile in the region with a chemical warhead even, it could very
easily be a threat to Paris or some city in the U.S. involving anthrax
that's been produced by Saddam Hussein.
These are terrible things to even think about, but you are dealing
with a person who has already used terrible actions against his own
people. So he is not so far removed. We are the ones who have to
provide the direction. We have to make sure people understand it is a
threat to the whole world.
In my view, the decisive use of force against Iraq coupled with the
long-term strategy to eliminate the threat entails less risks in the
long run than allowing Saddam Hussein's actions and ambitions to go
unchecked. You cannot do it when you are dealing with a situation like
this. In the words of former Secretary of State Jim Baker, `The only
thing we shouldn't do is do nothing.' We cannot allow that to be the
result or what we do is nothing.
The administration has agreed with us that funding for the
operations in and around Iraq require supplemental appropriations. We
had very grave concerns by the Senator from Alaska, Mr. Stevens, and
Senator Domenici about how much will this cost? How is it going to be
paid for? We cannot continue to say `just take it out of your hide' to
the Pentagon; it is having an effect on morale, quality of life, on
readiness and modernization. We already have a very high tempo for our
military men and women in the Navy and Air Force. We are satisfied that
they now have made a commitment that they are going to come up and ask
for funding for both these purposes, in Bosnia and, if necessary, in
Iraq. These will be emergency requests so it will not come out of
necessary improvements in barracks or spare parts for aircraft, which
are very important.
There is a consensus on seriously examining now I believe long-term
policy options to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein. The
administration and Congress and our allies all look forward to dealing
with a post-Saddam regime. But the question is how to get there.
That is intended not to be a threat or say we should violate the
law; it is intended to start the discussion, start the thinking about
how can we increase these pressures. We have to have a strategy to deal
with whatever comes after the military option. Many things have been
suggested. Toughen sanctions--not loosen sanctions, toughen sanctions.
What about an embargo, what about expanding no-fly, no-drive zones?
What about the support of opposition forces?
There is a long list of suggestions, some that I will not even put
in the record here, but they are worth thinking about. Our model should
be the Reagan doctrine of rollback, not the Truman doctrine of
containment in this instance. I don't mean that as critically as it
sounds. It is just that there are two different doctrines, and the
doctrine here should be rollback, not containment.
Despite our areas of agreement that we have clearly reached--
Senator Daschle and I have been working together making sure every word
is sanitized in the potential resolution--it is obvious we cannot get
it done this week for physical reasons as much as anything else. I
remind my colleagues and the American people it was 5 months after
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, 5 months before Congress passed a
resolution authorizing the use of force to expel him. In this case, we
have a bipartisan effort, trying to make sure that the right thing is
going to be done and that the right language is developed. Unlike what
we had in the early 1990s when the Speaker and majority leader were
working to defeat the administration's policy, you now have a Speaker
and a majority leader and the Democratic leader and the minority leader
in the House all working together with the administration to make sure
that the language is right and that the actions are right.
Yes, more time may be needed for diplomacy and more time to think
about the long-term plans, but a point will come when time will run out
and action must go forward. When that comes, when U.S. Armed Forces are
sent into harm's way, by the President of the United States, they will
have the backing of the Senate and the American people. If the
President makes the decision to deploy military force against the
threat posed by Iraq, America will be united, united and praying for
the safety of our men and women in uniform, united in hoping casualties
are kept to a minimum, and united in hoping for and supporting a
successful effort.
I just want to make that point clear today. Nobody should interpret
the fact that we don't vote on a resolution today as meaning that we
are not united in the fundamental principles. We are. But we want to
make sure that when we do take military action, we have thought about
all the ramifications and the resolution that we come up with will have
the involvement of 100 Senators, with 100 Senators being present and
voting, and that every word is the appropriate word that reflects the
best interests of the American people.
So I am pleased to stand here this afternoon and make this
statement and to assure my colleagues that I will continue to work with
every Senator on both sides of the aisle to make sure we take the
appropriate action, if it is necessary, when we return week after next.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and I am looking forward to
hearing Senator Daschle's comments on this subject.
Senator Dayton. I would just go on to point out that it was
not until 6 months later, August 14, 1998, that President
Clinton signed a resolution that had been passed by Congress
along these lines and that it was one that did not, in fact,
authorize the use of force against Iraq. It urged the President
to take appropriate action. But 2 months later, on October 31,
1998, the so-called Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 was passed,
which stated--and references have been made to this today and
elsewhere--that it is the policy of the United States to
support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein
from power in Iraq, but it specifically did not authorize the
use of force to carry that aim out. In fact, the President was
attacked and criticized harshly by members of this body in
December of 1998 when he initiated the bombing of Iraq, which I
don't have time to go into.
But I just guess in light of all this the precedent in 1991
and 1998 was that this body take the caution and the care and
the deliberation necessary. What is it that overrides all of
that and is compelling us now to make a precipitous decision
and take precipitous action authorize precipitous actions?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Dayton, first, thank you for
your generous comments.
Second, it bothers me greatly to hear those words you've
used in a hearing that General Myers and I are participating
in. As you indicated, neither he nor I would ever use words
like you've repeated twice. Nor would the President, nor do I
believe anyone in the administration would, and I think any
implication to the contrary would be an enormous disservice.
I have no idea where you heard those words, but I would bet
a dollar to a dime that no one in this administration would say
that, and I can assure you I wouldn't, nor would I think it.
Senator Dayton. I take that as seriously as you do, sir.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The issues that you've raised are
important issues. The issues that the country is seizing are
important issues. They need to be talked about. They need to be
debated. They need to be discussed. I have raised this issue
repeatedly before this committee and elsewhere for over a year.
These are complicated questions. They are breaking new ground.
There is, in my view, nothing precipitous at all about
what's being discussed here. President Clinton discussed it
with a great deal of urgency. Eleven years have passed. I have
personally discussed it here and with members of the House and
with members of the Senate on numerous occasions.
We have moved into a new national security environment. It
is different. The history you cited is interesting. It is
important. It's relevant. But the circumstance we're in is
notably different than when that history was written.
I'd take slight exception, although it's maybe a matter of
semantics, but if you go back and think about the attack on
Afghanistan. Afghanistan didn't attack us; al Qaeda did. They
just happened to have been trained in Afghanistan, and we took
anticipatory self-defense. We took a preventive action. We made
a conscious decision that that country was a haven for those
people, and they were training thousands of them and sending
them all over the globe. They killed 3,000 of our people. So
when one asks what's happened, what's different? What's
different is 3,000 people were killed using admittedly unusual
techniques, but basically conventional techniques, not weapons
of mass destruction.
What's new is the nexus between terrorist networks like al
Qaeda and terrorist states like Iraq, Syria, Iran, and others,
and the fact that there are suicide bombers, who, if they start
using weapons of mass destruction, are going to impose damage
on our country and our friends and our allies around the world
that will not be 3,000 but 30,000 people dead. In answer to the
question what's different, what's happened, what's changed, I
would say that's changed.
Second, go back to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet
Union didn't stick missiles in Cuba. They didn't shoot missiles
at the United States from Cuba. They tried to. They got
started. President John F. Kennedy looked at it and allowed as
how he thought that wasn't a very good idea. What did he do? He
imposed a quarantine, a blockade, they used a euphemism for
international law reasons and called it a ``quarantine.'' That
was preemptive. That was not waiting to be attacked. That was a
decision that the risk to our country was sufficiently great
that that administration, with the support of Congress, made a
conscious decision to interject itself into it at great risk of
a nuclear exchange and stopped it, not after it happened, not
after people were dead, but before people were dead. Enormously
important.
You have an important responsibility. Everyone here today
has said this is a serious, critical judgment that each member
of the House and Senate is going to be making. Each one should
make it any way they feel best. They've got to do what they
have to do. They have to think, search their soul, and make a
judgment.
There are people today, as I have said earlier, in the
Intelligence Committee, trying to connect the dots about
September 11. How did it happen? What did we know? What
evidence did we have? What was the immediacy? What should
somebody have done? If we had had evidence on September 9 or
10, would I have favored an anticipatory self-defense? You bet.
Senator Dayton. That's what I'm asking in the question,
sir.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Right.
Senator Dayton. What evidence, because you're right and
there are times when a decision of that magnitude has to be
made that suddenly. As you said, President Kennedy did so with
full expectation at that time that it might very well result in
a nuclear holocaust. Again, I'm not a historian, but many would
say that's as close as we ever came to such. He was certainly
aware of the enormity of the decisions that were being forced
upon him by the events, and I guess I'm asking again the events
are forcing the rapidity of this decision upon us----
Secretary Rumsfeld. I accept that.
Senator Dayton. I accept that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. See, I don't see it as a rush to
judgment myself. It seems to me 11 years is a long time, 16
resolutions violated is a long time, and 4 years since the
inspectors were thrown out. Each year that goes by, those
weapon programs are developing further and further, and, let
there be no doubt, that's a fact.
Senator Dayton. I'm not aware that we've been discussing,
however, in the times we've been here and the like and you've
obviously had your attention focused elsewhere. Again, I don't
question at all the assessment of the seriousness of this.
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, I know you don't.
Senator Dayton. Until sometime in August, this Senator was
not aware of this kind of military initiative being seriously
contemplated for as soon as it was now being discussed.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, if you go back to President
Clinton's statement in 1998 or 1999----
Senator Dayton. But in the last year and a half that----
Secretary Rumsfeld. --it's hard to fashion a statement that
could have reflected a greater degree of urgency than the one
that was just read.
Chairman Levin. I think we're going to have to end this.
Senator Dayton. All right. I'm sorry. I guess I was over
time.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Could I finish my thought?
Chairman Levin. Yes, if you could just finish the thought,
because we want to get to Senator Akaka.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will.
If someone is looking for the kind of evidence that would
be used in a court of law to prove something beyond a
reasonable doubt, it isn't going to happen. The only certainty
we'll have is if, in fact, such an attack takes place, and
that's too late.
The task of connecting the dots before the fact is a whale
of a lot harder than doing it after the fact, and look how hard
it is for the Intelligence Committee to try to look at those
scraps of information and piece it together. Someone's going to
have to take the evidence that I've submitted, that the
President presented at the United Nations, that Secretary
Powell is presenting today, and think about it and ask, how do
we feel about moving into the 21st century, a world of weapons
of mass destruction, and moving away from where we had
traditionally, as you said, absorbed an attack, let it happen,
and then marshalled our forces and gone on, and knowing that we
were going to lose thousands of people? How do we live in the
21st century, when it isn't thousands, but potentially tens of
thousands? That is not an easy question. I don't suggest it is.
As far as I'm concerned, any member of the Senate or House can
vote any way they want and I will respect them and believe, in
my heart, that they reached down in their souls.
Senator Dayton. Thank you for your response. I just would
say the intent of our policy was not to absorb attacks and then
retaliate. It was to prevent attacks. I'll leave it with that,
but I agree with you that the world is a different place and
will continue to be.
Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
indulgence. I apologize to Senator Akaka.
Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I ask
that my full statement be placed in the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this series of hearings on the
possibility of war with Iraq. There is no more important constitutional
responsibility for Members of Congress than the decision to declare
war. The threshold for this decision has to be high. Before the lives
of America's youth are risked in a war against Iraq, a compelling case
has to be made as to why the threat is immediate, why American
interests are at stake, and whether the outcome is peace or more
instability.
The burden has to be on those advocating war to justify why
America's youth need to risk their future. We do not have a draft
today. Our sailors and soldiers are volunteers but they are not
mercenaries. We must take extra care to ensure that we do not endanger
unnecessarily the lives of those who serve today. This is especially
important because we will be asking American troops to do something
that the Iraqi people are unable or unwilling to do themselves: rid
Iraq of Saddam Hussein.
The need to justify such a course of action is particularly
critical in the case of Iraq because, first, President Bush is
advocating a pre-emptive strike against a potential threat to the
American homeland when, traditionally, America has never sought war by
striking first nor has America sought foreign entanglements, and,
second, because we will be embarking on a process of democratic nation-
building in a country and region of the world with little experience in
democracy.
Thomas Friedman in an article entitled ``Iraq, Upside Down,'' in
Wednesday's New York Times--and I ask unanimous consent that his
article be published in the hearing record following my comments--
disagrees with the argument that we should go to war with Iraq to get
rid of its weapons of mass destruction. He argues instead that
democracy building is a more important objective if we want to end the
cycle of hatred and poverty breeding generations of terrorists.
I agree with Mr. Friedman that this is an important objective and
perhaps should be our key objective, but it is an extraordinarily
difficult one. If we are going to succeed at it, we will not be able to
do it alone. It will require the active support and the willing
commitment of the international community. An American force occupying
Baghdad will not be sufficient. We have already seen in Afghanistan
that the limited deployment of American troops to isolated areas has
not established a permanent climate of security and stability in that
country. Just as a lasting peace in Afghanistan will require a long and
sustained commitment by the international community both in terms of
soldiers and humanitarian assistance, a similar peace in Iraq will
require an equal commitment.
For this reason, I believe that we must work to gain multilateral
support for our policy in Iraq. I commend the President for going to
the United Nations for a new resolution establishing firm conditions
and time lines for compliance by Saddam Hussein. Just as General Myers
indicates in his submitted testimony today that our joint war fighting
team will act ``in concert with our partners'' to defeat Iraq's
military, if we are going to engage in a policy of nation-building in
lands far from our shores, we are going to need as well to act in
concert with the international community.
I look forward to the testimony and the additional hearings that
the committee intends to hold on this subject.
[The information referred to follows:]
Iraq, Upside Down
the new york times--september 18, 2002
By Thomas L. Friedman
Recently, I've had the chance to travel around the country and do
some call-in radio shows, during which the question of Iraq has come up
often. There's what I can report from a totally unscientific sample:
Don't believe the polls that a majority of Americans favor a military
strike against Iraq. It's just not true.
It's also not true that the public is solidly against taking on
Saddam Hussein. What is true is that most Americans are perplexed. The
most oft-asked question I heard was some variation of: ``How come all
of a sudden we have to launch a war against Saddam? I realize that he's
thumbed his nose at the U.N., and he has dangerous weapons, but he's
never threatened us, and, if he does, couldn't we just vaporize him?
What worries me are Osama and the terrorists still out there.''
That's where I think most Americans are at. Deep down they believe
that Saddam is ``deterrable.'' That is, he does not threaten the U.S.
and he never has, because he has been deterred the way Russia, China,
and North Korea have been. He knows that if he even hints at
threatening us, we will destroy him. Saddam has always been homicidal,
not suicidal. Indeed, he has spent a lifetime perfecting the art of
survival--because he loves life more than he hates us.
No, what worries Americans are not the deterrables like Saddam.
What worries them are the ``undeterrables''--the kind of young Arab-
Muslim men who hit us on September 11, and are still lurking. Americans
would pay virtually any price to eliminate the threat from the
undeterrables--the terrorists who hate us more than they love their own
lives, and therefore cannot be deterred.
I share this view, which is why I think the Iraq debate is upside
down. Most strategists insist that the reason we must go into Iraq--and
the only reason--is to get rid of its weapons of mass destruction, not
regime change and democracy building. I disagree.
I think the chances of Saddam being willing, or able, to use a
weapon of mass destruction against us are being exaggerated. What
terrifies me is the prospect of another September 11--in my mall, in my
airport, in my downtown--triggered by angry young Muslims, motivated by
some pseudo-religious radicalism cooked up in a mosque in Saudi Arabia,
Egypt or Pakistan. I believe that the only way to begin defusing that
threat is by changing the context in which these young men grow up--
namely all the Arab-Muslim states that are failing at modernity and
have become an engine for producing undeterrables.
So I am for invading Iraq only if we think that doing so can bring
about regime change and democratization. Because what the Arab world
desperately needs is a model that works--a progressive Arab regime that
by its sheer existence would create pressure and inspiration for
gradual democratization and modernization around the region.
I have no illusions about how difficult it would be to democratize
a fractious Iraq. It would be a huge, long, costly task--if it is
doable at all, and I am not embarrassed to say that I don't know if it
is. All I know is that it's the most important task worth doing and
worth debating. Because only by helping the Arabs gradually change
their context--a context now dominated by anti-democratic regimes and
anti-modernist religious leaders and educators--are we going to break
the engine that is producing one generation after another of
undeterrables.
These undeterrables are young men who are full of rage, because
they are raised with a view of Islam as the most perfect form of
monotheism, but they look around their home countries and see
widespread poverty, ignorance and repression. They are humiliated by
it, humiliated by the contrast with the West and how it makes them
feel, and it is this humiliation--this poverty of dignity--that drives
them to suicidal revenge. The quest for dignity is a powerful force in
human relations.
Closing that dignity gap is a decades-long project. We can help,
but it can succeed only if people there have the will. But maybe that's
what we're starting to see. Look at how Palestinian legislators just
voted no confidence in Arafat; look at how some courageous Arab
thinkers produced an Arab Human Development Report, which declared that
the Arab-Muslim world was backward because of its deficits of freedom,
modern education and women's empowerment.
If we don't find some way to help these countries reverse these
deficits now--while access to smaller and smaller nuclear weapons is
still limited--their young, angry undeterrables will blow us up long
before Saddam ever does.
Senator Akaka. I want to commend Secretary Rumsfeld and
General Myers for what they're doing in trying to get us
through this and to come to some decision. My feeling has been
that we need to work to gain multilateral support for our
policy in Iraq. I want to take the time to commend the
President for going to the United Nations for a new resolution
establishing firm conditions and time lines for compliance by
Saddam Hussein.
Just as General Myers indicates in his submitted testimony
today, that our joint warfighting team will act in concert with
our partners to defeat Iraq's military, we are going to engage
in a policy of nation building in lands far from our shores. We
are going to need, as well, to act in concert with the
international community. I think we believe this and we're
seeking this, and we hope it will come to this before we make
our decision, or even after that.
Mr. Secretary, in the first Persian Gulf War, we did not
drive our forces into Baghdad, in part because we did not want
to get into conflict that could have been considered messy, of
nation building in a post-Saddam Iraq. In response to Senator
Nelson's question, you seemed, well, unclear as to what the
administration's post-conflict strategy would be. My question
to you is who is responsible in the administration for putting
these plans together? To the best of your knowledge, are these
being done?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, with all respect, I didn't
think I was unclear at all. I thought I was quite clear. The
answer to the question is that the President of the United
States is ultimately responsible, and he's assigned the
Department of State to establish a group of people to think
that issue through. What I was able to provide is the specifics
that have, thus far, been reasonably well thought through, and
then to acknowledge the reality of two things, two unknowns.
One is that the United States undoubtedly would not be doing it
alone. They'd be doing it either with the United Nations or
with an international coalition, and other people would have
voice in that. Second, maybe I'm old-fashioned, but I think the
Iraqi people ought to have a voice in it, as well.
I'm not omniscient. I can't look down on the earth and say,
well, this is how the U.N. would decide or this is how the
coalition would decide, or this is how the Iraqi people would
decide. I think that the lack of clarity reflects a respect for
the reality that exists.
Senator Akaka. General Myers, with the need for
multilateral support, some have indicated that we need that
kind of assistance. So my question is, can we defeat Iraq's
military forces without any direct support from our allies?
General Myers. Senator, obviously, depending on the type of
military operation you engage in, it's usually made easier by
support and help from allies, and we've had great support, so
far on the war on terrorism, particularly the Afghanistan
piece, but other pieces as well. In any potential conflict, it
would be desirable to have certain allies and partners be with
us, and they would all contribute, probably, in different ways.
I'm reminded of how the Japanese are contributing right now
to our war on terrorism by providing, at my last count, 48
million gallons of fuel oil to our U.S. Navy ships that are
using the Pacific to support the war on terrorism. So it might
range from that to combat troops to overflight to basing to
staging, anywhere we might need to prosecute this war on
terrorism. Certainly help from our friends, allies, and
partners is a desirable thing.
Senator Akaka. General Myers, switching to Afghanistan, has
an assessment been made concerning the impact on our troop
security in Afghanistan, their ability to continue the mission
of eliminating al Qaeda, and, on Afghanistan's stability if we
are forced to draw troops, intelligence, assets, and weapons
away from Afghanistan for a war in Iraq? If you can share this
assessment, I certainly would like to have a response.
General Myers. Sir, we've even taken a broader look than
that. As important as Afghanistan is, we've looked at the
defense strategy that came out of the Quadrennial Defense
Review and applied force structure to the tasks that are
outlined in that strategy. The conclusion was that we have
adequate force structure properly equipped to carry out the
defense strategy. That would certainly include our ongoing
operations in Afghanistan.
It's not so much an issue of the number of troops. We have,
in fact, modest numbers inside Afghanistan. I think today the
numbers are around 10,000, approximately. They'll probably go
up and down over time as units rotate in, as units rotate out,
as the need is there, as the need diminishes.
But you're right, there are some assets that are in short
supply, and I think I indicated that in my opening statement,
that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets have
historically been in short supply. We've tried to fix this
through our budget requests in recent years. In 2002, we've
made some headway there. You'll see some more requests for
those type of assets in 2003. We have to prioritize them today.
We have to prioritize them in peacetime, for that matter. We
have to prioritize them today when we're in the global war on
terrorism, and we'll have to prioritize them if we're asked to
do something else.
But our conclusion is that we have sufficient assets to do
whatever it is the President asks us to do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Chairman Levin. We'll limit the next round to one question
each, given the hour.
Mr. Secretary, in various ways here today you've really
signaled that you do not believe that inspections are a
possible way to achieve disarmament. You've signaled that in so
many different ways. You've said you don't see how it's
possible without regime change.
I asked you a question about whether or not there is any
chance at all that Saddam would open Iraq to full inspections
and disarmament if the alternative was that he knew he would be
destroyed, and you really did not answer that. You said that's
just sort of not your area, that the State Department and the
President are working that question.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Which question was that?
Chairman Levin. When I asked you, in your judgment, if
there is any chance at all that Saddam Hussein would open Iraq
to full inspections and disarmament if the alternative that he
knew he faced to doing that was that he would be destroyed and
removed from power.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Because he opened up to inspections?
Chairman Levin. Any chance. Any chance.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm sorry. I am still having trouble
with the question. You say, is there any chance that Saddam
Hussein would open up to inspections if he knew that, by
opening up to inspections----
Chairman Levin. No, if he knew that the alternative to
refusing to open up and disarm was that he would be destroyed.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Your guess is as good as mine.
Chairman Levin. Do you have a guess?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I really don't. I just don't know.
Chairman Levin. But my question is, is there any chance? Is
there any chance?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There's always a chance of anything.
The sky could fall.
Chairman Levin. It's about that. It's about that level of
chance, I gather.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't know. I honestly just don't
know. I mean, looking at it rationally, although I can't climb
in his head. But, looking at it rationally, there have been
plenty of dictators who have just up and left when things
looked bleak and they've gone to live in some nice country,
taken away all the money they've stolen, and there they are.
Chairman Levin. Then a moment ago, you said the only
certainty that we'll have relative to weapons is after an
attack.
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, I don't know.
Chairman Levin. After he uses them against us. After he
attacks.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Ah, I think what I said was that you
would gain perfect certainty as to what he would do after they
are used.
Chairman Levin. Not quite. You said the only certainty, the
only way that we can have any certainty about what he has is
after he uses them.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Unless you have disarmed him.
Chairman Levin. You see, you didn't add the ``unless.''
It's such an important point.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I apologize. Maybe it's late in
the day and I forgot to add it.
Chairman Levin. No, it's not a problem.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I forgot to add it, but obviously if
you've disarmed him, then you have perfect certainty on the
ground. I talked about that earlier today.
Chairman Levin. You do acknowledge that there's at least a
possibility that he could be forced to disarm before he
attacked?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course.
Chairman Levin. Without being attacked.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is possible. He could wake up
tomorrow morning and decide he should leave and go. It's
possible he could wake up tomorrow morning and be sincere about
inspections and invite everybody and change an 11-year behavior
pattern.
Chairman Levin. So there's a lot at stake here in terms of
whether we support a really good inspection regime and back it
up with a threat of authorized force from the U.N.
Secretary Rumsfeld. There is a lot at stake.
Chairman Levin. There's understandable skepticism coming
from you, and I think that's, again, understandable. But what
there isn't is the support for what I thought the President
asked at the U.N., which was, ``We want robust inspections. We
want disarmament.'' The message I'm getting from you today is,
``It ain't possible without regime change.'' That's the message
I'm getting.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I hope you'll find that my
testimony today is very much supportive of the President's
speech in the U.N. I think if you reread it, you'll find that
he was exactly where I am on what I've said today. He did not
rule out inspections. He didn't even mention the word
``inspections,'' to my knowledge. So I can't see any
inconsistency with it.
I think that it's important to recognize that it's the
Department of State that works with the U.N. on inspections and
not the Department of Defense and that I am certainly not the
world's leading expert. All I do is look at facts. When I get
asked a question by a member of the Senate, I answer it to the
best of my ability. If I get asked what's the pattern over the
last 11 years, the pattern is that the U.N. has been jerked
around consistently for 11 years. That's just the fact pattern.
Chairman Levin. I couldn't agree with you more. It's about
time the U.N. ends it. We support that effort in the U.N.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Let me see if I can clarify this line of
questioning, Secretary Rumsfeld. I think it's been a valuable
hearing, I'll state that here and now, by both the Secretary
and our Chairman, a very valuable hearing. You have indicated,
and I agree with you, that the inspection regime that is now
written up for Hans Blix and the one which Iraq has called upon
to be used is not likely to produce anything of value, and it
would be ineffective.
But I think where we need clarity is that Secretary of
State Colin Powell, very courageously, is trying to negotiate
with the Perm 5 and others, a blueprint of a regime for
inspections with specific timetables, specific missions,
specific dates, and an assumption of cooperation that could be
effective. If that were devised, voted on affirmatively by the
permanent members and others in the Security Council, it could
possibly bring about a beginning toward disarmament. Am I
correct in that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not know. The last time I talked
to Colin on this I was aware that others were proposing a
variety of resolutions for the United Nations, but it's not
clear to me that you're correct by suggesting that the United
States has that type.
Senator Warner. I've followed this as closely as I could.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You could be right.
Senator Warner. But I thought we were engaging the Security
Council in an effort to try and fashion a regime that the
Security Council, of which we are a permanent member, would
consider, ``All right, this should be given a try.'' Otherwise,
what is it we're negotiating up there right now?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The President's speech set out a
position that he believed was the correct one.
Senator Warner. I agree with our President.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Colin Powell's task is to then work
with the other members and try to achieve something that's as
close as possible to what the President set forth in his
remarks.
My understanding--and again, the Secretary of State is the
one dealing with this, not me--is that the last visibility I
had into this--and you were there--there were others proposing
a variety of resolutions or ideas, and it was in the discussion
stage. Some included inspection regimes, some did not. So I
think I answered you correctly when I said that, the last I
knew, they may very well be being discussed, but it is not
clear to me that it has been proposed by Secretary Powell. I
just do not know.
Senator Warner. All right. I don't have any information
above yours except that I listened to him, and I made a joint
appearance with him on Sunday. The Chairman and I appeared on
``Late Edition'' with him. I listened very carefully. Somehow I
got the impression we were seeking to explore the option by
which there could be a regime fashioned with very specific
things and the clause in it in a resolution would be that if
Iraq failed to meet all specifics in that resolution, then
member nations, understandably, could resort to such use of
force as they deem necessary to protect their security
interests.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think you're exactly right, that some
countries have proposed that and that that is part of the
discussion. It is just not clear to me that Colin did.
Senator Warner. Well, we'll put that to one side.
Then I ask this question as a follow-up. In the event that
a draft resolution is put forth at the Security Council, if any
member of the Perm 5 were to cast a veto--not abstain, but cast
a veto-- wouldn't that have the effect of forcing the hand of
those member nations which feel that their security interests
are at risk? Given the current conditions of Saddam Hussein and
his mass destruction weapon inventory, wouldn't that force
their hand to have no other option but to use force, and that
would, in all likelihood, be the United States and hopefully
Great Britain?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That would be a judgment for the
President, not me.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Last question.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Mr. Secretary, in your view, what must be
done by Iraq that would give us the necessary assurance that
our national security is not going to be a threatened by his
military capability? The inspections? I totally concur with
your concerns about them, along with his dodging and weaving
and delaying and the like. He has been duplicitous throughout
all these years, as you've said, so is there anything that
could be done that would give us the assurance necessary that
that threat had been removed or brought within the constraints
of the U.N. resolutions?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, there's no question but that
if Iraq were to comply with the U.N. resolutions, that they
would have disarmed. They would not have any of those programs.
They would also not be threatening their neighbors, they would
not be doing a host of other things that they do that are
represented in those resolutions. That is what this is about.
There's no question but that if, for whatever reason by
whatever mechanism, it was clear that they had disarmed, that
that would, I am confident, reassure the international
community and the United States.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Dayton, thank you.
Our witnesses, we want to thank you. We promised that you
would be out of here by 6 o'clock. I believe we have kept that
promise. We have kept you and us sort of on schedule. We are
very much appreciative of your presence. It's been a very
helpful hearing to us, and we stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
deployments and readiness
1. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, when you took office almost 2
years ago, you asserted that U.S. Armed Forces were overstretched,
negatively impacting readiness and morale. Your objective was to reduce
the number of deployments. A year and a half later, you still find this
problem. In June, you told this committee:
``Because we have underfunded and overused our forces, we find
we are short a division, we are short airlift, we have been
underfunding aging infrastructure and facilities, we are short
on high-demand/low density assets, the aircraft fleet is aging
at considerable and growing cost to maintain, the Navy is
declining in numbers, and we are steadily falling below
acceptable readiness standards.''
According to Newsweek and The New York Times, you issued a memo in
March to the service chiefs asserting:
``. . . `The entire force is facing the adverse results of the
high-paced optempo and perstempo' . . . We are past the point
where the Department can, without an unbelievably compelling
reason, make any additional commitments . . . It is time [to]
begin to aggressively reduce our current commitments.' ``(May
6, 2002, reported by Newsweek)
What steps have you taken since March to remedy the operational
tempo and readiness problem?
Secretary Rumsfeld. This issue is one of the most pressing
challenges facing the Department, and is receiving our close attention.
I have challenged everyone in the Department to examine every detail,
task, fellowship, and assignment that diverts military personnel from
performing their operational military duties. We are analyzing the
nature and extent of the additional requirements, and the Department's
ability to accommodate them by reprioritizing functions, using civilian
personnel, the Reserve components, or commercial enterprises to perform
other less critical duties. We are examining how to meet these
requirements from both near term and longer-range perspectives, such as
using technology to reduce the need for manpower in certain functions,
and reviewing our current missions and overseas presence.
We are challenging each arrangement in which a military individual
is working outside the Department of Defense. At the same time, we are
aggressively pursuing the congressionally-directed reductions of the
management headquarters activities in order to return military
personnel to operational duties. We are also examining current missions
and our overseas presence to determine whether there are areas in which
we can reduce the deployment burden on the force.
One of our recent initiatives is to relieve the stress on those
critical, specialized assets such as our Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS). We are working ways to use similar assets to meet
mission needs. For the AWACS, these include the Navy E-2C, the U.S.
Customs Service P-3, and the ground based Sentinel radar. We are also
working on ensuring we deploy these assets effectively. For example, if
we combine forward operating locations, we realize good savings in the
overhead requirements--logistics, staffing, force protection, spare
assets, etc. Obviously, this is dependent on the specific mission need,
but we've already identified a few places where we think this approach
will help.
We are robustly funding those critical readiness enablers, such as
spare parts and training, which underpin our combat power. We have also
invested in new technologies and systems to transform our forces to
meet future challenges. In summary, readiness remains a top priority of
the Department, and we will do whatever it takes to keep our military
forces the best in the world.
2. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, a war with Iraq would
certainly further exacerbate existing strains on the military. How will
you manage this additional commitment so it does not negatively affect
our ability to fight the al Qaeda network of terrorists, defend our
homeland, and conduct other overseas missions?
Secretary Rumsfeld. A conflict with Iraq would be part of the
global war on terrorism. Stopping regimes that support terror from
acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective of that war,
and we can fight the various elements of the global war on terror
simultaneously, including a conflict with Iraq if that should occur.
impact of operational tempo
3. Senator Levin. General Myers, in February you warned this
committee about the impact the war on terrorism was having on
operational tempo and readiness. You said:
``The war on terrorism had provided fresh validation of
previous readiness assessments. Our forward deployed and first-
to-fight forces remain capable of achieving the objectives of
our defense strategy. However, we remain concerned about the
effects of a sustained high operations tempo on the force,
strategic lift and sustainment shortfalls, and shortages of ISR
assets, as well as the challenges associated with WMD,
antiterrorism, and force protection. Additionally, in some
locations, we face operational limitations that may affect
mission success.''
Two months later, in a ``NewsHour'' interview you said:
``We came out of the starting blocks, if you will, for
Afghanistan at a full sprint. We're very concerned about
operational tempo and the impact it has on families and for the
Reserve component, for their employers. We're concerned about
the impact it has on equipment. That's sort of normal but we're
in increased operational tempo right now. So the services have
some concerns.''
What are the operational limitations on mission success in the
global war on terrorism that you were referring to in February?
General Myers. The global war on terrorism, especially operations
in Afghanistan and Homeland Defense, continue to expose operational
limitations. There are several assets and capabilities we have kept a
close eye on for some time now. Our low-density/high-demand assets,
including Airborne Warning and Control System and special-purpose C-
130s and helicopters, have been through a long period of surge
operations. Additionally, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
platforms, communications pipelines, strategic lift assets, and air
refueling capability (especially the KC-135s) have been stretched
during the current campaign. I am continually impressed at how our
military forces overcome such limitations with ingenuity and hard work.
4. Senator Levin. General Myers, do any of these limitations apply
to a potential war with Iraq, and, given these limitations, how would
an operation in Iraq affect our ability to fight the war on terrorism?
General Myers. The United States military is fully capable of
fighting the war on terrorism and addressing the threat from Iraq.
Certainly the shortfalls that affect operational readiness and
sustainability to this point will make a conflict in Iraq that much
more challenging. However, these limitations do not impact our
expectations for success in a potential Iraqi conflict. Contingency
planning staffs at United States Central Command and in the Pentagon
have been working tirelessly to maximize our military effectiveness,
with the assets and capabilities available.
As for operations in Iraq affecting the global war on terrorism, I
find it difficult to separate the two. Removing the Iraqi regime
contributes to the war on terrorism and contributes significantly to
the near- and long-term security of the Nation and the world.
5. Senator Levin. General Myers, you mention in your testimony that
``if our operations on the war on terrorism are expanded, we will be
required to prioritize the employment of . . . enabling units.'' How
would you do this? Which is a higher priority--fighting a war against
Iraq or fighting the war on terrorism?
General Myers. The United States military is fully capable of
fighting the war on terrorism and addressing the threat from Iraq.
If the question is, ``How does Iraq fit into the war on
terrorism?'' The answer is, removing the Iraqi regime contributes to
the war on terrorism. Iraq has been named by the State Department as a
state sponsor of terrorism. In fact, Iraq is a ``Charter Member'' of
the State Department's list, having been on that list since 1984. Iraq
has weapons of mass destruction and a proven willingness to use them.
They are also aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. If Iraq
were to give such weapons to terrorists, the attacks we suffered on
September 11 might be as President Bush said, ``merely a prelude to far
greater horrors.''
``Enabling Units'' consist of low-density/high-demand assets such
as special operations forces, some intelligence collection platforms,
and other unique capabilities. Prioritizing enabling units is a task
performed on a daily basis, in peacetime or times of conflict. If we
were to conduct military operations against Iraq, enabling units would
be employed based on priorities established by the Secretary of
Defense, just as they are now.
impact of attack on iraq on the war on terrorism
6. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, you pose a question in your
testimony about whether an attack on Iraq will disrupt and distract the
U.S. from the war on terrorism. You answer your own question by stating
that Iraq is a part of the global war on terror. Even if this is the
case, what impact would fighting in Iraq have on our ability to keep
fighting al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan, Yemen, Southeast Asia, and
other countries and regions?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Today, we have sufficient forces to continue
our ongoing operations, meet our international commitments, and
continue to protect the American homeland. At the same time, some key
units are in high demand. The mobilization of the Guard and Reserve has
helped to reduce the stress on some of the key units. Any major combat
operation will of course require us to prioritize the tasks given to
units. The foundation of our success remains our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen. Included in these forces are our
civilians and the Reserve component. Superior training, leadership and
discipline are the core of our effectiveness.
u.s. military strategy (quadrennial defense review)
7. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, your testimony points out
that last year you introduced a new defense strategy that has four main
components: defending the homeland, winning decisively in a major
regional conflict, swiftly defeating an aggressor in another theater,
and simultaneously conducting lesser contingencies.
It seems to me much of the strategy is being currently performed--
homeland defense, lesser contingencies, and the global war on
terrorism, which I would call a major contingency. Would you
characterize the global war on terrorism as a major contingency?
Secretary Rumsfeld. First let me be clear by saying that our
defense strategy has four defense policy goals: assuring allies and
friends, dissuading future military competition, deterring threats and
coercion against U.S. interests, and, if necessary, decisively
defeating any adversary. The four components that you mention reflect
the new force-sizing construct that supports these four defense policy
goals.
Winning the war on terrorism is the top priority of our Armed
Forces. It is the first war of a new era and our Armed Forces are
engaged to accomplish this mission. Because this war takes many forms,
and is being fought in many places and using different means, it is
unlike any other challenge we have faced. Some phases of our military
operations in this war could be considered lesser contingencies (e.g.,
our current operations in the Philippines), while others might take on
more significant dimensions.
8. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, we are here today to discuss
engaging in another major contingency, one in which we would presumably
aim to ``swiftly defeat'' our adversaries. Meanwhile, our ongoing war-
level effort, occurring in multiple regions, is not ending quickly--
indeed, you and others in the administration have speculated that it
might last 5 years or longer.
Are you planning any revisions to your strategy to reconcile it
with what we are currently doing--fighting a long war against an
amorphous foe and the possibility of another major contingency?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We are not planning revisions to the U.S.
defense strategy. We are changing--indeed transforming--practically
everything else we do to support the new strategy.
On September 11, we learned that the way America goes to war needs
to be assessed continuously. It is necessary to refresh our war plans
in order to respond to the threats from terrorists that we face today.
Last year, we fashioned a new defense strategy and force planning
construct, which requires that we have the capability to do the
following: defend the homeland, undertake a major regional conflict and
win decisively--including occupying a country and changing its regime,
if necessary--swiftly defeat another aggressor in another theater, and
simultaneously conduct a number of lesser contingencies such as Bosnia,
Kosovo, and Afghanistan. We are transforming our force as we fight the
war on terrorism and examining our war plans to ensure that they
support the strategy in the best way possible.
9. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, last June you testified that
one of the reasons for revising the previous administration's strategy
was that it was too ambitious. You said that the ``erosion in the
capability of the force means that the risks we would face today and
tomorrow are higher than they would have been when the two-MTW standard
was established.''
What has changed in the last year to make you believe that a force
that could not accomplish a two-war strategy then can be expected to do
so now?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Changing conditions have led to significant
changes to U.S. defense strategy. We have a broader set of challenges
facing us today and, therefore, are developing broader capabilities. We
also plan to fight wars differently. Our initial successes in
Afghanistan, for example, were the direct result of a new style of
warfare. Special Operations Forces leveraged long-range air power
launched from carriers in the Arabian Sea, land bases in the region,
and even the continental United States. These same forces used a
combination of intelligence assets to provide persistent surveillance
and indispensable human intelligence.
We are examining our plans and capabilities so as to fight
innovatively in other possible contingencies. For example, we recognize
that today you can have overwhelming force, conceivably, with lesser
numbers because the lethality is equal to or greater than before. It
has been a mistake to measure the quantity of forces required for a
mission and fail to look at the effectiveness of those forces.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
force strength
10. Senator Landrieu. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, it
would seem that lessons learned from previous U.N. inspectors in Iraq
would dictate that they will need military support to sustain their
efforts. Do you intend to increase the number of troops in the region,
even as the inspectors are performing their U.N. duties? If so, can you
sustain this buildup with even more troops committed if we go to war?
Would Iraq not see this buildup as an act of war?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. The United Nations Security
Council has not settled on the specific language of a new resolution on
the situation in Iraq. The United States government's position is that
the resolution should require immediate, unconditional and unrestricted
access to all areas in Iraq as a precondition of any agreement to
resume weapons inspections. As was the case with United Nations Special
Commission in the previous inspection commission, Iraq will also be
required to ensure the safety and security of the inspectors. A failure
to meet those conditions would then constitute another breach of Iraq's
obligations.
The United States military continues to maintain a significant
force presence in the region. That said, we do not intend to increase
the number of troops in the region for the purpose of providing support
to the weapons inspectors. Nonetheless, we retain the ability to change
our force posture in the region to be ready to deal with future changes
in the threat conditions.
11. Senator Landrieu. General Myers, your prepared testimony states
that the U.S. is currently using 15-20 percent of our major combat
units to sustain current operations. If the President directs the
military to assemble a force for an invasion, it will no doubt increase
this number.
If the U.S. should deploy troops with the intention of changing the
regime in Iraq, will our forces be able to address any contingencies
that may erupt in other parts of the world?
General Myers. The defense strategy resulting from the Quadrennial
Defense Review outlined missions that the military must be able to
conduct. Our forces are structured to respond to those worldwide
missions. We have an adequate force structure that is properly equipped
to carry out our strategy. We have sufficient capability to conduct
effective operations against Iraq while maintaining other aspects of
the war on terrorism, protecting the homeland, and keeping our
commitments in other regions of the world.
In any potential conflict, it is desirable to have allies and
partners contributing in different ways. Their support may be in the
form of combat troops, supplies, overflight rights or staging rights.
We will continue to work with our partners to execute the global war on
terrorism. This does require prioritizing some of our critical
resources that are in short supply. But the Joint Chiefs and I are
confident that we can accomplish whatever mission the President asks of
our Armed Forces.
deployment time-frame
12. Senator Landrieu. General Myers, one of the lessons that we
certainly learned during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm is that
it took nearly 6 months for the United States to position its forces in
Saudi Arabia. In that time, a still potent Iraqi army could have
crossed the border into Saudi Arabia and inflicted great damage on the
assembling American force. In your testimony, you made note of the fact
that the military has made great improvements in our ability to deploy
forces to a theater of conflict.
If the President should give you the green light to begin
assembling an invasion force for Iraq, how long would it take for the
U.S. to deploy the appropriately-sized force to the region?
General Myers. Improvements in mobility assets, deployment
infrastructure and pre-positioned combat unit sets contribute
significantly to our ability to deploy and execute combat missions much
faster than during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
Investments in strategic airlift and sealift power-projection platforms
have greatly improved the deployment responsiveness and sustainment
capability of our forces. Though I cannot comment on specific
deployment timelines for operational security reasons, I can assure you
that should the President give the authorization, our forces are
prepared to deploy swiftly and will be combat ready. With regard to
potential threats during the deployment phase, our planning process
takes them into account. We are prepared to execute the mission if it
is asked of us and are confident of victory.
iraqi troop movement
13. Senator Landrieu. General Myers, without getting into anything
classified, what sort of preparation, build-up, or troop movements are
you seeing by the Iraqis? Would you elaborate on some of the equipment
they received legally under sanctions, which they have modified to
become weapons transports?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
iraqi capabilities
14. Senator Landrieu. General Myers, in your prepared testimony,
you list the current capabilities of the Iraqi army. You stated that
Iraq currently has 2,000 tanks, 3,500 armored personnel carriers
(APCs), and 300 jet aircraft. There is no doubt in my mind that 10
years of economic sanctions have had an effect on the readiness of this
force, particularly in the inability of the Iraqi regime to acquire
spare parts for it military.
Do you have any estimates of what portion of the Iraqi army is
actually combat-ready and poses a threat to any American troops who may
be sent over there?
General Myers. During the last several years, Iraq has focused its
efforts in acquiring spare parts through smuggling and abuse of the oil
for food program to preserve its combat power. Emphasis has been placed
first on maintaining the combat capability of the Republican Guard,
then the Army's Armor and Mechanized formations, while his less capable
infantry units were forced to make do with less. The Iraqi Air Force
has also suffered, with pilots averaging less than 30 hours of flight
time per year. Many airplanes have mechanical difficulties. Where the
readiness of Iraq's ground forces has suffered the most is in its
combat support and combat service support sectors. Shortages of
everything from trucks, tires, batteries and uniforms are endemic.
These shortages are a major factor in limiting Iraq's offensive
capability but will not be so debilitating when Iraq is defending.
fighting the war
15. Senator Landrieu. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers,
recently Congressman Skelton quoted Carl von Clausewitz, who said, ``In
developing strategy, it is imperative not to take the first step
without considering the last.'' Along these lines, we have not yet
really concluded operations in Afghanistan and we are using our Special
Operators in Yemen, East Africa, and other locations. Do we have the
resources to win this war?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Yes, we have the resources to
win the war. Although it is true that our Special Operations (SO)
personnel and assets are heavily engaged worldwide, United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) carefully manages their
employment. USSOCOM is currently able to support existing and projected
requirements; however, we will have to very carefully manage SO
aircraft.
16. Senator Landrieu. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, do we
anticipate a war with Iraq as being a largely urban, ``door-to-door''
conflict? If so, will we be spreading our Special Operators too thin?
If we are forced into urban warfare, do we have enough foreign language
speakers to ensure our troops have the greatest chance of survival and
success at helping the people of Iraq understand our mission there and
at helping develop support for a democratic government?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Our conflict is with Iraq's
brutal and corrupt regime. It is not with the innocent people of Iraq
who have been suffering horribly under his tyrannical reign. America
acts not to conquer, but to liberate; we seek friendship with the Iraqi
people and offer to help them build a future of stability and self-
determination.
The Iraqi regime has committed gross human rights violations
against Iraq's citizens, including rape, torture, and genocide. He has
brutalized the Iraqi people. The regime has lost its legitimacy, not
only in our eyes but also, I believe, in the eyes of most Iraqis as
well.
However, should urban combat occur, the United States military is
up to the challenge. We train for it, we have planned for it, and we
are prepared for the possibility.
As for spreading our special operators too thin, again, the
President has not made a decision to use military force against Iraq.
Until such a decision has been made, discussion of troop movements and
dispositions would be premature.
17. Senator Landrieu. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, some of
Afghanistan's very basic ``lessons learned'' demonstrate a need for
better equipment, including backpacks that do not rip, more efficient
and lighter radios that would take less time to set up and break down
when calling in a position or an air strike, longer battery life for
radios and computers that would enable ground troops to communicate
longer with command centers and close air support aircraft, etc. Have
we resolved these problems?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. We continue to address and
resolve problems with our equipment. First, in a general sense, we all
are aware that the U.S. Armed Forces field the best equipment of any
armed force in the world, however, real world operations sometimes
uncover shortfalls in design or workmanship in our equipment that
wasn't predicted. Our feedback process is robust and allows us to
report material issues back to the procuring organizations to allow
them to find solutions. Let us take the Modular Lightweight Load-
bearing Equipment (MOLLE 2) backpack as an example of which you alluded
to. The MOLLE 2 incorporated design changes that were a direct result
of experience with the original MOLLE. The MOLLE 2 design is considered
a more capable backpack than its predecessor, but during its use in
Afghanistan some issues were acknowledged. The Marine Corps Systems
Command was quick to recognize this and issued a solicitation for an
improved MOLLE 2 backpack that will incorporate lessons learned from
Afghanistan.
For more complex weapons systems the process to address
deficiencies may require more time to resolve, but feedback mechanisms
are in effect at all of our procuring organizations that allow for
product shortfalls to be known. Technology insertion and spiral
development help us to make the necessary changes in our equipment as
we discover gaps in equipment capability.
18. Senator Landrieu. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, what is
our specific objective in Iraq? What will it cost us to achieve that
objective under the best and worst case scenarios?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. We want to see an end to:
The threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
The threat from Iraq to its neighbors and the region
The regime's sponsorship of terror
The oppression of the Iraqi people
As far as the issue of costs, we must reiterate the President has
made no decision whether to use military force against Iraq. If a
decision is eventually made to use military force, the costs incurred,
whatever they will be, must be weighed against the cost of not acting
at all--for example, against the danger that a nuclear-armed Iraq would
pose to the entire Middle East or that terrorists armed with WMD could
pose to the United States and our friends and allies.
19. Senator Landrieu. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, Iraq
has used chemical weapons against its own people, so it is a natural
assumption that it would not hesitate to use them on U.S. troops.
Why would the threat of massive retaliation, which worked well
during the Gulf War, not elicit the same fear from Iraq now? In
addition, anticipating their use of these weapons, our troops will be
spending much of their time in Mission Operation Protective Posture
(MOPP) 2 or higher, creating a difficult work environment. How do we
plan to compensate for the loss of manpower and loss of dexterity to
perform basic tasks while in higher MOPP levels?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. If war occurred, we would
seek by a variety of means to prevent or minimize Iraqi use of WMD
against us and coalition forces, as well as against neighboring
countries. We would seek to destroy Iraqi WMD and delivery systems and
to employ other active and passive countermeasures. We would also,
through our declaratory policy, make clear that any individual in the
Iraqi chain of command involved in implementation of an order to use
WMD would be held personally accountable. We believe that this would in
its own way contribute to deterrence.
As you mentioned, if our soldiers will spend a significant amount
of time in Mission-Oriented Protective Posture their ability to operate
will be degraded. It is imperative that we employ a strategy that
denies Iraq the ability to effectively employ these weapons systems. In
order to mitigate the Iraqi WMD threat and protect our forces in the
field, we will:
Identify, attack, and destroy his WMD delivery systems
to deny his ability to employ them against us and coalition
forces.
Employ Special Operations and conventional forces to
isolate chemical and biological production and storage
facilities to deny their use by Iraqi forces.
Employ active and passive defensive countermeasures,
i.e., theater missile defense, environmental surveillance, and
individual protection to protect the force.
Through aggressive 10 operations encourage members of
the Iraqi military not to employ WMD if ordered to do so.
Military leaders will be held accountable under international
law if they are involved in the employment of WMD.
long-term commitment to stabilize iraq
20. Senator Landrieu. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, in
planning for the inevitability of a very complex and long undertaking
of democratization in Iraq (which would logically follow a regime
change), how will we unite Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd factions to ensure a
foothold of democracy in the center of the Arab world?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. If a decision were to be made
to conduct military operations in Iraq, those operations would be only
one part of a unified U.S. Government and international effort. The
task of rebuilding Iraq would be one that the United States committed
itself to for the long-term, much like in Afghanistan. While there are
various factions in Iraq, as you have noted, all reports agree that
these factions are united in their desire to see the current Iraqi
regime go. The U.S. Government has made progress in encouraging their
cooperation. In particular, we are encouraging them to declare their
agreement on fundamental principles regarding Iraq's territorial
integrity, representative government, renunciation of WMD, and
commitment to peace with neighboring countries.
iraqi opposition groups
21. Senator Landrieu. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, the
Iraqi National Congress (INC) gave us a glimmer of hope that Saddam
Hussein would have been ousted by his people in 1992, but the coup
failed. Afterwards, the INC basically collapsed in 1994-1995 due to in-
fighting over the diverse goals of its member factions. Some INC
leaders feel that they could be militarily successful in the future
with additional resources and training. Can the opposition groups
topple Saddam with our assistance and without our mounting a full
invasion? If so, will we be able to provide the resources needed to
sustain democracy in Iraq by utilizing the INC, the Iraqi National
Accord (INA), or other factions which may emerge as opposition forces?
Secretary Rumsfeld. and General Myers. It would be presumptuous to
speak for the opposition group leaders as to their capabilities, but
the scenario you have laid out is not our current reality. As President
Bush stated, we are committed to seeing Iraqi regime disarmed of WMDs,
by one means or another. In this effort we are also committed to
cooperating with those opposition groups who are committed to this
goal.
immunizations
22. Senator Landrieu. General Myers, your prepared testimony cites
our improved ability to ensure that all of our forces will be medically
prepared with the proper immunizations before deploying to a theater of
conflict.
What regimen of immunizations would be necessary, and how would it
differ from the one given to troops deploying for Operations Desert
Shield/Desert Storm? If there are new drugs being administered, have
they been fully screened for the side effects they might have on our
troops, such as future birth defects? If there are side effects, will
your average private be informed of them?
General Myers. All Service members, even those not involved in a
deployment, are vaccinated against tetanus, diphtheria, influenza
(given annually), hepatitis A, measles and polio. All Service members
traveling overseas are protected by immunization against an array of
infectious-disease threats. All deployed personnel receive typhoid
vaccine. Personnel traveling to areas of higher risk will receive
anthrax vaccine to protect them against that known lethal threat. In
addition, U.S. Central Command requires personnel deploying to its area
of responsibility (AOR) to be current in yellow fever and meningococcal
immunizations. There are additional vaccination requirements specific
to individual Services and to certain military occupations (e.g.,
hepatitis B, varicella, pnuemococcal and rabies). For example, medical
personnel are required to have hepatitis B vaccination and personnel
without a spleen are required to have pneumococcal vaccination.
The Department of Defense is using vaccines to protect against the
same diseases as in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, although
we are now using several different products (hepatitis A vaccine,
inactivated polio virus vaccine, and typhoid vaccine) that are somewhat
different from the products used during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm (immune globulin, oral polio virus vaccine, and a
different form of the typhoid vaccine). Along with current American
public health practice, the military has switched to using inactivated
polio virus vaccine to prevent polio virus infections, and now uses
hepatitis A vaccine, which is much more effective and safer than immune
globulin in preventing hepatitis A infection. In addition, as noted
above, the Department of Defense is now immunizing troops in designated
higher threat areas against the threat of anthrax with the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA)-licensed vaccine.
The Department of Defense, along with other agencies of the Federal
Government, is examining the need for smallpox vaccination in order to
protect critical military capabilities.
There are a number of biological and chemical warfare threats for
which no FDA-licensed countermeasure has been developed thus far. In
some cases, vaccines or drugs have been developed, but not licensed.
When personnel deploy to theaters where the risk of exposure to
particular biological and chemical warfare agents is high and no FDA-
licensed countermeasure exists, we prepare for use of medical
countermeasures under what is known as an Investigational New Drug
(IND) protocol. If the decision is made to use any IND, we will follow
all applicable federal regulations, including only using protocols
approved by FDA. Use of an IND requires the informed consent of the
individual receiving the medication, unless a presidential waiver is
granted. A key part of any IND protocol is education and health risk
communication for those who will receive the countermeasure, even if
informed consent were to be waived by the President.
It is our responsibility and our practice to inform Service
members about the medical measures we use to protect them. It is our
policy that all deploying personnel receive a pre-deployment health
threat briefing that provides information on health threats and
countermeasures, to include applicable immunizations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
iraq's aftermath
23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, in the first Persian Gulf
War, we did not drive our forces into Baghdad in part because we did
not want to get into the messy job of nation-building in a post-Saddam
Iraq. Now we are proposing to do exactly that. What is the
administration's post-conflict strategy? Do you envision an Iraqi
opposition taking control of Iraq and, if so, which group, or do you
see Iraq being under a type of United Nations trusteeship?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The U.S. Government is encouraging the Iraqi
opposition groups to join together to promulgate a common set of
principles around which the Iraqi people can rally. How quickly these
opposition groups, joined by prominent Iraqis still residing in Iraq,
can coalesce into an effective force that can play a role in the
creation of a broad-based, representative government in Iraq remains to
be seen. In any case, it would be premature for me now to speculate on
the type of government that would exist in Iraq in the immediate
aftermath of a conflict, should one occur.
In any case, if regime change occurs, the U.S. will not abandon the
Iraqi people. We would seek, together with other concerned nations, to
assist the Iraqi people in getting back on their feet economically as
well as in establishing a broadly representative government.
24. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, in your statement before the
House Armed Services Committee on September 18, you raise our approach
to Afghanistan as an example of how we will bring democracy and
stability to Iraq. The situation in Afghanistan continues to be very
unsettled. How long are you planning to keep troops in Iraq following
Saddam's overthrow?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our desire would be to remain in Iraq
militarily for no longer than needed. The post-Saddam situation is
unknowable, but, before departing, the U.S. would work to ensure that a
new government is broadly representative, renounces WMD, poses no
threat to its people or its neighbors, and does not engage in
activities that pose a threat to international stability. Once again,
our intention is to stay militarily as long as necessary, but not a
minute longer.
gaining foreign support
25. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, in your statement before the
House Armed Services Committee on September 18, you said that there are
a number of countries who back getting rid of Saddam but are reluctant
to say so publicly. Are some of those countries asking or suggesting
that they would support military action if they received something in
return, such as substantial increases in foreign aid or some other type
of reward?
Secretary Rumsfeld. When friendly countries come on board to join
this possible coalition, they will do so because they agree that the
Iraqi regime is a threat to international peace and security. Some of
our friends may choose not to cooperate fully; however, others will.
The costs of a conflict--in terms of disruption of oil supplies,
among other things--may be borne disproportionately by some of our
friends, and we may wish to compensate them in some manner.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
iraqi capabilities
26. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, how
significantly has the Iraqi Ground and Air Order of Battle and
capabilities changed since we faced them in 1991? Based on those
changes, how differently will the United States need to proceed to
bring about a regime change and the destruction of the Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction program compared to our military tactics in 1991?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Compared to 1990, the Iraqi
regime's military forces are down by roughly 50-60 percent. The Iraqi
military also suffers from poor morale and low quality training.
However, Iraq continues to spend a considerable sum on rebuilding its
military, including air defense systems and command and control
networks.
The U.S. military, on the other hand, has improved substantially in
the past 12 years. We have considerably improved our intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities since Operation Desert
Storm. We have also substantially improved our command and control
capabilities. Our Nation's military can gather intelligence, plan
operations, deploy and execute combat missions much faster today than
12 years ago. In addition, in Desert Storm precision weapons were used
10 percent of the time. In Afghanstan, we used precision weapons about
60 percent of the time. Especially compared with the Iraqi military, we
are a truly superior force in every regard.
The tactics required for regime change and destruction of Iraqi WMD
would be different from those employed during Operation Desert Storm.
27. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, what is
your estimate of Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction? How
deployable are these weapons systems and how much of a threat do you
feel they pose to our military personnel? How much of a threat do they
pose to civilian populations in the region?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Iraq possesses a credible WMD
threat. Many of the delivery systems are mobile and pose a significant
threat to our forces in the field and present a very real threat to the
civilian populations in the region. It is our assessment that Iraq
could develop a crude nuclear weapon within 1 year, if Iraq obtained
fissile material from a foreign source. Iraq can quickly convert
legitimate facilities for biological warfare use and is capable of
producing a wide variety of agents including anthrax, botulinum toxin,
ricin gas, gangrene and aflatoxin. Iraq is researching, testing,
producing and weaponizing BW agents. Iraq possesses at least 6,000 CW
bombs, 15,000 artillery rockets capable of holding nerve agents and
between 100 and 500 metric tons of VX, cyclosarin, sarin and mustard
agents. Iraq possesses a small force of Al Hussein Scud-derivative
Medium Range Ballistic Missiles with an estimated range of 900 km, Al
Samoud Short Range Ballistic Missiles with an estimated range of 150km
and Ababil Short Range Ballistic Missiles with an estimated range of
150km, all capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons.
preparing for war
28. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, I was
surprised to hear President Bush's top economic advisor, Lawrence
Lindsey, estimate that the U.S. may have to spend between $100 billion
and $200 billion to fight Iraq. He obviously must have applied some
economic model based on the number of troops, ships, and airplanes that
may be used. Would you please discuss your estimates as to the number
of service members that may be required to attack and oust Saddam
Hussein? Does adequate logistical support or a logistical train exist
in the Persian Gulf region to support servicemen and women when we
choose to attack Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. While not going into the
specific operational details, should war be necessary, we will employ
sufficient force to win quickly and decisively. There are sufficient
number of Service members available, both active and reserve, to
support offensive operations in Iraq, as approved by the President. We
also have sufficient logistic facilities, supplies and equipment to
support our personnel who will deploy to the Persian Gulf region. Our
long-term presence in the Persian Gulf region has enabled us to
establish and maintain a mature logistic pipeline to support large-
scale military operations. Our en-route infrastructure is adequate to
support the air and sea lines of communication into and out of
Southwest Asia. As the President has noted, while the cost of a war
would be substantial, the cost of allowing Saddam to continue his reign
of terror and WMD buildup would ultimately be much more costly, both in
terms of loss of life and freedom and in financial costs.
29. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, there
have been press reports that our precision-guided munitions stockpiles
and personnel levels are inadequate with regards to strategy against
Iraq. Please discuss.
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Considering our worldwide
standing ordnance stockpiles, which contain a wide array of cruise
missiles, precision-guided munitions and more conventional ordnance,
and industry's ability to flex production, we are confident that we
have sufficient capacity to prosecute any potential action in southwest
Asia, while still retaining an adequate, but reduced, reserve for
future military engagements. However, during the period of highest use
last year, our expenditure rates exceeded production rates for select
precision-guided munitions such as the Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM). However, we have received supplemental funding to increase
munitions production rates and enhance industry's long-term production
capacity for both JDAM and the family of laser-guided bombs. In regards
to personnel levels, we do have adequate force structure, properly
equipped, to carry out strategy against Iraq. Activation of Reserves
and stop loss have increased our personnel strength to a level
sufficient to conduct effective operations against Iraq while
maintaining other aspects of the war on terrorism, protecting the
homeland, and keeping our commitments in other regions of the world.
30. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, it seems
that tankers are an issue. During an April 8, 2002 DOD news briefing
with both of you, General Myers, you said the following in response to
a reporter's question on the requirement for more tankers and leasing:
``Well, first of all, you're [right]--the fact is that tankers
are very, very important to us in our ability to mobilize and
deploy long distances.
The fleet is relatively healthy. These are older aircraft, but
they have lots of flying hours left on them. I'm talking about
the 135s now. They've been re-engined. We're putting new
avionics in the cockpit. There's been a lot of work done on
those particular aircraft to keep them modern with an ability
to fly in our air traffic control system both in the Pacific
and across the Atlantic to Europe. Having said that, there is a
fairly high percentage of these tankers that are in depot
maintenance for corrosion control; higher than you would want,
but that goes back to the design of the aircraft, and that's
just the way it is. We'll work our way through that.
Part of the last question--the last part of the question, where
we're talking about lease, that is an Air Force issue. The Air
Force is looking at that, and they have not brought that to me
or to the secretary.''
Does our military have an adequate number of aerial tankers to
support our Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force tactical aviation assets
that may be utilized in an attack against Iraq while continuing other
worldwide commitments?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. The increased demand for
tankers created by a post-September 11 environment, in which not only
are we tasked to support all overseas commitments but also our homeland
defense posture, increases the wear and tear on our existing tanker
fleet. The backlog of required maintenance, both depot and
organizational, is climbing rapidly for the 43-year-old KC-135, the
backbone of our refueling fleet. The bottom line is that we are working
our tankers very hard. As a result, the Air Force is pursuing remedies
to meet these increased requirements. Although our active and reserve
air refueling force will be stretched, we do have sufficient air
refueling tankers to support potential operations against Iraq and
sustain our most critical commitments at home and abroad.
russia's position
31. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, President
Putin has openly asserted Russia's right to take unilateral military
action against terrorists operating on Georgian territory. Can you
assure the committee that the United States will draw a red line
against a Russian invasion of Georgia?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. The U.S. Government has
consistently drawn a policy redline against Russian violation of
Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity. When Minister of
Defense Sergei Ivanov and Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov
visited Washington during the Consultative Group for Strategic Security
dialogue in late September, they met with President Bush and talked
extensively about this issue. It is my understanding that the President
and National Security Advisor Rice both explicitly stressed this U.S.
redline.
In addition, we believe the Georgians have taken tangible steps
toward addressing the instability in regions bordering Russia. Such
steps include their extensive police action in the Pankisi Gorge that
has succeeded in reinforcing governmental authority in the area. We
have on multiple occasions reinforced the importance of Russia and
Georgia coordinating effectively through information sharing and
effective orchestration of border monitoring efforts on their
respective sides of the border. We understand that Russia and Georgia
have now agreed to a number of measures to include joint border guard
patrols along their common border.
32. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, have you
talked to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, with whom you met
today, about Russia's attempts to openly subvert the Georgian state
through force of arms?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. We have not spoken directly
with Minister of Defense Ivanov on this subject; however the U.S.
Government has a redline policy against Russian violation of Georgian
sovereignty. We have conveyed this policy to the Russian Federation in
a very clear manner.
33. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, do you
find ironic reports suggesting America will wink at a Russian invasion
of its sovereign neighbor in return for Russia's support for our
military campaign in Iraq, when the military campaign against Iraq we
waged in 1991 was the result of Iraq's invasion of its own sovereign
neighbor Kuwait?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. These reports are
categorically untrue. There is no U.S.-Russian ``deal'' over Iraq and
Georgia. The U.S. Government has gone to great lengths to stress to
Russia that the situations in Georgia and Iraq are hugely different.
Unlike Iraq, Georgia is an emerging democracy that has supported the
global war on terrorism and has taken tangible steps to rid its
territory of international terrorists. It has in good faith attempted
to address Russia's concerns, to include information sharing and the
development of a joint border-monitoring regime. Georgia neither
possesses weapons of mass destruction, nor is it trying to acquire them
for use against others. It is in no way threatening other countries in
the region, but instead is acting constructively to address regional
problems. Also, the instability in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge is a direct
consequence of the fighting in Chechnya; therefore, the challenges
created as a result of that war have in many ways been forced upon
Georgia. We encourage the Russians and the Georgians to continue
working together to stabilize the region.
34. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, how would
the United States respond to an armed Russian ground and air invasion
of northern Georgia?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. We would certainly condemn
any such action. There is no legitimate rationale for Russian war in
Georgia. We respectfully decline to respond in open session to the
question of potential U.S. military responses to such an attack. Much
would depend upon the circumstances surrounding the invasion. Suffice
it to say that the U.S. Government has significant equities in the
region, to include U.S. military forces training Georgian troops. At a
minimum, there would be significant force protection issues associated
with such a development.
other foreign support
35. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, how would
you rate Saudi cooperation with the United States in the war on terror?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Saudi Arabia has been a close
ally in the war on terrorism. The leaders of the kingdom understand
that the atrocities committed on September 11 were also directed
against them and quickly pledged their help.
To facilitate Operation Enduring Freedom, the Saudi government gave
us all necessary overflight clearances. The Saudi government also broke
relations with the Taliban and has offered economic assistance to the
new Government of Afghanistan. The Saudis have supported the Pakistani
President, Pervez Musharraf. They have also assisted in blocking
financial assets linked to terrorism and have worked proactively to
ensure the stability of the world oil market.
36. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, do you
believe German Chancellor Schroeder's America-bashing campaign rhetoric
threatens our defense relationship with Germany?
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. We have had a strong and
close defense relationship with Germany for over 50 years. That
relationship has been based on shared interests and values that have
been promoted and protected bilaterally and through the NATO alliance.
There are particularly intensive and rewarding interactions between our
men and women in uniform. Germany has been an important contributor in
our efforts against terrorism, including in Afghanistan. While the
statements made during the campaign have not been helpful to our
efforts to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, the basic
interests of our two countries have not changed.
In terms of what we are currently hearing from the German Federal
Armed Forces, the comments made during the recent German election
campaign have had no impact upon the military-to-military relationship.
Senior military leaders on both sides understand the value and depths
of the relationship built over the past 50 years and wish to continue
undiminished cooperation. Remarks made during the election campaign
should not change the trust and friendship existing between both Armed
Forces.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum
force strength
37. Senator Santorum. General Myers, in your prepared testimony you
noted that there are some unique military units (command and control,
intelligence, Special Operations Forces, and combat rescue) that are in
high demand and that mobilization of the Reserve component has been key
to mitigating the current stress on these units. In conjunction with
the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, many reservists mobilized last
September will likely be required to remain in service for another
year. About 130,000 of the Nation's 1,250,000 Reserve forces have
served at one time or another during the past year, with 76,658
currently on active duty.
Can we effectively balance the needs of our military commanders to
have enough manpower to meet contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
those of our employers who depend on these skilled reservists to
perform duties associated with their civilian positions?
General Myers. The Reservists have been absolutely critical to our
success to date. They perform a wide range of missions, and bring
specialized skills to bear on the critical needs of our Armed Forces.
Reservists have been filling critical shortages as intelligence
analysts, special forces and civil affairs soldiers, as well as
providing logistic, transportation, and force protection support. We
will continue to require this support in Afghanistan, particularly in
the civil affairs arena. Should war occur with Iraq, we will need even
more of all the skills and capabilities we have used in Afghanistan. We
are currently examining all the ways we can meet these needs, not only
by using Reservists but also through the use of coalition assets.
Our Reservists' employers have been very supportive. While the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA)
provides important protections to our Reserve soldiers, our experience
has been that employers often go well beyond USERRA benefits. For those
Reservists and employers who have special requirements--and I have
expressed those needs--we have been sensitive and accommodating. In
fact, the Chief of the Army Reserve has a policy that no Reservist will
be involuntarily extended beyond 1 year on active duty. Despite this,
it is our experience that most will volunteer, or come enthusiastically
if called by the President.
In our planning and preparation for hostilities with Iraq, we are
carefully managing the numbers you cite above. For example, since you
posed this question, the number of Reservists on active duty has
decreased from 76,658 to approximately 60,000. The numbers are still
falling. We realize that it is important that these great Americans, or
as they are known in the Army, ``2x the Citizen,'' get back to their
families and jobs so that if they are needed again, they will be rested
and ready. For those who may be needed again, we are confident that
they and their employers will gladly step forward again to serve their
country.
38. Senator Santorum. General Myers, do we have enough of the right
personnel to be focusing on Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time?
General Myers. Our Armed Forces are capable of carrying out our
defense strategy. We have sufficient capability to conduct effective
operations against Iraq while maintaining other aspects of the war on
terrorism, protecting the homeland, and keeping our commitments in
other regions of the world.
Mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces has been key to mitigating
the current stress on some of our selected units that are in short
supply. If our operations on the war on terrorism are expanded, we will
be required to prioritize the employment of these enabling units. In
this regard, our coalition partners and allies may provide forces for
our combined operations. Where possible, we will match the best
available capability to the required mission.
39. Senator Santorum. General Myers, given our perstempo and the
demands placed on our Reserve component, have you seen any fall-off in
the numbers of persons who want to serve America through the Reserve
component?
General Myers. We have seen no marked changes in Reserve component
recruiting or retention over the past 12 months. It may be too soon to
tell if recent personnel tempo will negatively impact retention. We are
monitoring these trends closely.
urban and chemical warfare
40. Senator Santorum. General Myers, the Iraqi Republican Guard and
Special Republican Guard units are specially trained for urban warfare
and security operations. The last time U.S. forces were engaged in
urban fighting was in Somalia in 1993. Iraq may have concealed as much
as 660 tons of chemical agents, including the nerve gases VX and Sarin,
and mustard gas, a blister agent. At one time, Iraq had a robust
biological weapons stockpile which included botulinum, aflatoxin,
ricin, and anthrax.
Assuming that the U.S. is forced to fight house-to-house in
Baghdad, and assuming the Iraqi use of chemical weapons, are U.S.
forces sufficiently equipped and trained to prevail under these
conditions?
General Myers. Yes. Improvements in chemical protective masks,
chemical protective suits, advanced forced entry munitions, body armor
and night vision devices have greatly enhanced our forces' ability to
fight in urban and chemical environments. With regard to level of
training, urban and chemical warfare is routinely integrated into field
training and simulated exercises. I am confident that our level of
training is superior to the Iraqi Republican Guard and Special
Republican Guard units, and as the most highly trained and equipped
military in the world, we are well prepared to accomplish any and all
missions assigned.
41. Senator Santorum. General Myers, since U.S. medical personnel
haven't treated battlefield chemical casualties since 1917, how skilled
are U.S. medical personnel in delivering aid to military personnel
exposed to chemical or biological agents?
General Myers. The Department of Defense employs the most
technically proficient, professionally capable medical force ever
fielded in the history of warfare. Our ability to recognize and treat
battlefield casualties exposed to chemical or biological agents is
unsurpassed worldwide. The sophistication of our overall medical
capabilities in the weapons of mass destruction arena has been
significantly enhanced by training programs specifically designed by
our lead agents in the medical aspects of chemical and biological
defense--the U.S. Army's Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Disease (USAMRIID) and the Medical Research Institute of Chemical
Defense (USAMRICD)--to improve the clinical acumen of our healthcare
providers. These programs, offered globally through satellite feed or
on-site, have provided our medical force with the necessary skill sets
to effectively deal with casualty streams exposed to chemical or
biological agents.
42. Senator Santorum. General Myers, what advances in training and/
or technology have benefited U.S. forces in urban fighting since 1993?
General Myers. We will avoid fighting within urban areas whenever
possible. However, if forced to fight in urban areas, we will leverage
advances in information operations and situational awareness that will
enable us forces to mass overwhelming combat power against Iraqi
forces.
Lightweight body armor will better protect U.S. forces as they
operate in an urban environment. This armor will allow greater freedom
of movement and enhanced protection from direct fire, shrapnel, and
falling debris.
Improved command and control systems will provide greater
situational awareness for U.S. forces at all levels. This will enable
commanders to mass overwhelming combat power against enemies in an
urban environment.
Advances in night vision devices allow U.S. forces to better
operate during limited visibility. This will allow U.S. forces to
operate more freely at night and reduce exposure to enemy fires.
Additionally, use of enabling technologies such as unmanned robotic
vehicles will allow U.S. forces to minimize risk in urban areas.
strategy against iraq
43. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, military scholars note
that Saddam's power is built on direct control of his Armed Forces and
on minimizing the freedom of his regional commanders to maneuver. How
might our military operations benefit from Saddam Hussein's tight
central control in his self-appointed role as field marshal, and where
innovation and initiative are often discouraged?
Secretary Rumsfeld. By not establishing a system of decentralized
execution, the Iraqi military is susceptible to the lack of initiative
that is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Decentralized
execution is essential because no one commander can control the
detailed actions of a large number of units.
44. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, what type of U.S.
military strategy is best to counter such a command and control
arrangement?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In the Gulf War, we were able to sever the
commander's communications with the troops.
45. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, if Iraqi military leaders
fail to capitulate to U.S. forces and are destroyed, are there
indigenous forces that could be utilized to maintain the territorial
integrity of Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Indigenous forces would not be able to organize
themselves on a nation-wide basis quickly enough to maintain the
territorial integrity of Iraq if the current Iraqi military were to be
destroyed. Coalition forces would have to be prepared to provide this
security until the establishment of an Iraqi Government that renounces
WMD, poses no threat to its own people or to its neighbors, and does
not engage in activities that pose a threat to international stability.
kurdish and turkish relations
46. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, Turkey, a critical ally
that recently suppressed a long and bloody independence movement by its
own Kurdish community, has warned repeatedly that it will not tolerate
any move toward an independent Kurdish state on its border if Saddam's
regime falls. Turkey fears that establishment of a Kurdish state with
oil assets on its southeastern border would incite Turkish Kurds to
seek secession from Ankara. Turkish fears have been rekindled by the
Kurdistan Democratic Party's (KDP) moves to adopt its own flag and
create an independent army, courts, and ministries. How can the U.S.
leverage the assets of Iraqi Kurds in the north, but not anger the
Turkish Government?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The United States and Turkey have consulted
closely regarding events in northern Iraq. The United States remains
very cognizant and respectful of Turkish ``redlines.'' The Turkish
Government fully understands that the U.S. Government does not support
Kurdish independence nor ethnic-based federalism. The U.S. will conduct
its relations with Kurdish groups in a manner consistent with these
principles and with the goal of a unified, democratic Iraq.
47. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, can we be partners with
both the Government of Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish forces, or are
these mutually exclusive groups?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The United States has long worked with both
Iraqi Kurdish political parties and the Turkish Government. Indeed,
both the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the KDP maintain
offices in Turkey. The United States recognizes the security and
political concerns of both Turkey and the PUK and KDP. Our Turkish and
Iraqi Kurdish interests are not mutually exclusive.
48. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, will Iraqi Kurdish groups
support U.S. efforts to move against Saddam if the U.S. opposes an
independent Kurdish state?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Neither the PUK nor the KDP now seeks
independence. After suffering extraordinarily at the hands of Saddam
Hussein, Iraqi Kurds seek a democratic, parliamentary Iraq with checks
and balances to protect Iraq's minorities and ensure that minorities
enjoy rights the same as all Iraqis. The territorial integrity of Iraq
is a key principle of U.S. policy.
indigenous forces
49. Senator Santorum. General Myers, one of the lessons learned
from Afghanistan is that highly-skilled U.S. Special Operations Forces
(SOF) personnel were able to leverage indigenous fighters to increase
military power against enemy forces. Can we apply this or other lessons
learned in the military operations in Afghanistan to the situation in
Iraq?
General Myers. Yes, the use of SOF in Afghanistan was a textbook
case of unconventional warfare. Our SOF personnel were able to quickly
establish relationships and create alliances that focused varied ethnic
and cultural groups on the removal of a regime that was hostile to our
country and aided and abetted an evil force that planned and
implemented harm against the United States. We will definitely use this
same strategy when appropriate against all national and transnational
elements in our global war on terrorism.
50. Senator Santorum. General Myers, is there a viable indigenous
force that, in concert with U.S. SOF, can be leveraged to defeat
Saddam's military forces, control Iraq, and secure Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction capabilities?
General Myers. Yes, there are several indigenous groups with which
we can work. There are enough individuals that, with protection,
training, resourcing and other forms of support, can be organized into
an effective opposition force. The opposition force could potentially
assist in U.S. efforts to defeat Iraq's military forces and could form
the basis for either an Iraqi Government in Exile or an interim
provisional government that could be inserted to stabilize the country
of Iraq after a regime change.
51. Senator Santorum. General Myers, how do the political
objectives of these indigenous forces complicate U.S. efforts to
achieve a change in regime, while at the same time maintaining Iraq's
territorial integrity?
General Myers. It is our goal to maintain the territorial integrity
of Iraq. While there are various factions in Iraq, as you have noted,
all reports indicate that these factions are united in their desire to
see the Iraqi regime go. We feel this is excellent common ground upon
which indigenous forces can build consensus. The U.S. Government has
been and will continue to be supportive of Iraqi groups who oppose the
current Iraqi regime. It is our expectation that these groups will be
key participants in building a representative government worthy of the
Iraqi people.
oil
52. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, it is reported that the
U.S. is going to take elaborate measures to safeguard our access to oil
reserves in the event of a military conflict in the Middle East. The
Strategic Petroleum Reserve, with 578 million barrels of oil, could be
tapped in the event of a war or a national emergency. Recent news
accounts note that oil shipments into the Reserve have reached record
levels, about 150,000 barrels a day. With the U.S. importing 800,000 to
1 million barrels of oil a day from Iraq, do you believe that military
conflict with Iraq will cause a disruption in our energy consumption
endangering our economic security?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Secretary of Energy and the heads of other
relevant agencies are in a better position to answer your question.
However, it is my understanding that with the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve and the reserves of other nations, plus the willingness of
foreign producers to replace any lost supply, the United States can
weather any foreseeable disruption of supply emanating from a conflict
with Iraq without any significant effect on our economy.
53. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, would a comprehensive
``national energy policy'' provide better insurance against a
disruption in our importation of foreign oil?
Secretary Rumsfeld. This question should be directed to the
Secretary of Energy or anyone else involved in formulating U.S. energy
policy.
[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
CONTINUE TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON U.S. POLICY ON IRAQ
----------
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Armed Services Committee,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m. in room
SH-216, Senate Hart Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Cleland, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton,
Warner, Smith, Allard, Sessions, and Bunning.
Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director, and June M. Borawski, printing and documents clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; and
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
Republican staff director; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff
member; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; Carolyn
M. Hanna, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward,
professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional
staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member;
Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member; Carmen Leslie
Stone, special assistant; and Scott W. Stucky, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Thomas C. Moore,
and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Brady King,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator
Cleland; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn
Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Richard Kessler and
Eric Pierce, assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; Benjamin L.
Cassidy, assistant to Senator Warner; Ryan Carey, assistant to
Senator Smith; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert
Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders,
assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant
to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and
Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody. The Armed
Services Committee meets this afternoon to continue our
hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq. Last week we received
testimony from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the Acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Today we will hear from former senior military commanders,
all of whom have significant experience planning and conducting
military operations. Then this Wednesday we will hear from
former national security officials.
We welcome back to the committee this afternoon General
John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe; General Joseph Hoar, former Commander in
Chief, U.S. Central Command; and Lieutenant General Thomas G.
McInerney, former Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air
Force.
As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and before that,
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Shalikashvili
provided advice and exercised responsibility related to
operations in the Balkans, Northern Iraq, and elsewhere. He
also served as commander of Operation Provide Comfort in
Northern Iraq in 1991.
General Clark led the NATO-led Kosovo operation in 1999 as
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in his capacity as
Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, he oversaw Operation
Northern Watch in Iraq.
General Hoar, as Commander in Chief of Central Command, was
responsible for military-to-military relationships with a range
of states that comprise the Middle East and North Africa and
for operations conducted in Somalia and Rwanda.
Lieutenant General McInerney served as Assistant Vice Chief
of Staff of the Air Force and has considerable operational
experience planning and executing missions in the European and
Asian theaters of operation.
As I stated last week, we begin with the common belief that
Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and
stability of the Middle East. It is clear that the
international community must act to prevent his efforts to
build and possess weapons of mass destruction and the means of
delivering them.
The question before this Nation now is, what response is
likely to be most effective in achieving the goal of bringing
Iraq into compliance with United Nations (U.N.) mandates,
particularly destruction of its weapons of mass destruction,
and what response on our part is likely to entail the least
risk to U.S. national interests?
We look to our witnesses today to share with us their
thoughts on the administration's policy and to offer their
assessment of the risks associated with an attack on Iraq,
whether we attack with a U.N. mandate and with our friends and
allies, whether we attack alone, whether we attack now or after
we've exhausted other avenues for dealing with Saddam,
including inspections; if we attack, the most effective way for
our military forces to carry out their mission; and, after the
successful conclusion of a military mission, how long U.S.
forces will be required to remain in Iraq to ensure stability
in the region.
How and under what circumstances we commit our Armed Forces
to an attack on Iraq could have far-reaching consequences for
future peace and stability in the Persian Gulf and the Middle
East, for our interests throughout the world, and, indeed, for
the international order.
Each of our witnesses today knows well, personally, the
awesome responsibility of committing our forces to combat, and
so we look forward to their testimony.
First I'll call on Senator Allard. After I call on him for
an opening comment, we would then ask our witnesses if they
have opening comments that they would like to make. Then after
that I would recognize each of us in the early bird order for a
6-minute first round of questions.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to give
Senator Warner's statement on his behalf. He's not going to be
here at the start of the hearing. My understanding is he's
going to show up a little bit later, but I'd like to make it
plain that I associate my thoughts very closely with what he's
going to have to say in this opening statement.
So I'd like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in
welcoming these four distinguished former military officers
before our committee. All four of these gentlemen served our
Nation with great distinction. I applaud all of you for your
contributions you are making to this important Iraq debate and
for the service you continue to provide our Nation as
knowledgeable observers of our national security challenges and
needs.
Over the past several weeks, our President has courageously
focused world attention on the defiant, illegal conduct of this
brutal, ruthless dictator, Saddam Hussein. On April 6, 1991,
after having been expelled from Kuwait and decisively defeated,
Saddam Hussein accepted U.N. terms for the suspension of
military terms and promised he would comply with all relevant
U.N. Security Council resolutions, including disarming Iraq of
weapons of mass destruction and submitting to intrusive
inspections to verify this disarmament.
Eleven-and-a-half years later, we're still waiting for
Saddam Hussein to comply with international mandates, as
reflected in 16 United Nations Security Council resolutions. We
have over a decade of experience with his deceit and defiance.
The main thing Saddam Hussain has proved to the world in
the past 12 years is that he cannot be trusted under any
circumstances. I think General Clark had a very similar
experience with a dictator in Serbia who is now rightfully
behind bars.
Anytime the use of force is contemplated, those of us with
a role to play in making the decision to use force must proceed
with caution. Resorting to the use of force should be the last
step, but it is the step we must be willing to take, if
necessary. It is also a step those who threaten us must
understand that we are willing to take.
As we contemplate our vulnerabilities and those of our
allies in the post-September 11 war, it is clear that things
have changed. The concept of deterrence that served us well in
the 20th century has changed. Terrorists and terrorist states
that hide behind surrogates who are not deterred by our
overwhelming power, those who would commit suicide in their
assaults on the free world, are not rational and are not
deterred by rational concepts of deterrence. We are left with
no choice but to hunt down such threats to our national
security and destroy them.
The threat posed to the United States, the region, and the
entire world by Saddam Hussein is clear. We know he has weapons
of mass destruction. He is manufacturing and attempting to
acquire more. We know he has used these weapons before. We know
he will use them again. We should not wait for a future attack
before responding to this clear and growing danger. Saddam
Hussein has defeated the international community long enough.
He must be stopped.
Again, thank you for your participation in this process as
we develop a body of fact for an informed debate in the Senate
and for an informed public debate on U.S. policy toward Iraq.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.
General Shalikashvili, let us start with you. Again, thank
you so much, not just for being here today, but--and this
applies to all of you--for decades of service, patriotism,
loyalty, dedication, and contributions to this Nation.
General Shalikashvili.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI, USA (RET.), FORMER
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Shalikashvili. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Allard, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
very much for the opportunity to appear here before you today
and for the opportunity to make a few opening comments.
First, I must say that I'm not a stranger to war, for, I
guess, in some sense, I am a child of war. Before I was 10
years old, I had lived through the brutal occupation of the
country of my birth, the total destruction of my home town
during the 1944 Warsaw uprising, and, together with my family,
I joined the millions of refugees fleeing westward ahead of the
advancing Soviet armies.
Years later, like so many other young Americans, I
participated in a very different kind of war in the rice
paddies in the jungles of Vietnam.
I participated again still later, when, at the end of
Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein, with unbelievable
brutality, once again turned on his own people, the Kurds,
killing thousands and chasing the rest into the mountains of
Northern Iraq and Eastern Turkey. Without food, without water,
without medication, without shelter, the very young and the
very old were dying by the hundreds.
To stop this misery and the dying, I was asked by General
Powell and then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to organize a
military operation to rush emergency airdrops to the Kurds, to
remove Iraqi forces, if by force, when necessary, from the most
northern part of Iraq, and to establish a safe zone there so
some 700,000 Kurds could be returned to what was left of their
destroyed villages and homes. They had to protect them with a
no-fly zone, which, by the way, is still doing its job today.
Since then, as NATO Supreme Allied Commander and as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in one form or another,
I have been involved in military operations in the Balkans,
Haiti, Central Africa, and many other places. So I know
something about war, and I have seen firsthand Saddam Hussein's
brutality. That background has certainly shaped my views about
war.
We must be very careful about going to war, and do so only
when all other attempts to resolve the threat to us have
failed, and do so only with the support of the U.S. Congress
and the American people. But if, in the end, war is the only
way to deal with the threat, then we must to go into it united
and with all necessary resolve.
In the case of Iraq, there are, for me, three first-order
questions. First, do weapons of mass destruction in the hands
of Saddam Hussein pose a grave danger to us and to our friends
and allies, particularly those in the Middle East, but also in
Europe? To me, the answer is clearly yes.
Second, if, in the end, we are unable to eliminate these
weapons of mass destruction and any and all means to produce
more, if we are unable to do so through tough, unfettered
inspections or other non-military means, would use of force to
accomplish this be the right thing to do? Again, my answer is
yes.
Third, in my mind, has to do with timing. Since the threat
posed by these weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein has
existed for some time, what has changed to create this new
sense of urgency? Here, I believe that Secretary Rumsfeld has
it right. What has changed is September 11 and our new
realization of just how vulnerable we are to terrorist attacks
and the catastrophic damage terrorists with weapons of mass
destruction could inflict on the United States.
Now, since I believe that the urgency to move against Iraq
is justified, it is essential that the United States continue
the full-court press at the United Nations to get the kind of
resolution that would set up proper inspections and would
authorize the use of force to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction and its means to produce them if inspections
continue to be frustrated by Iraq or if they prove unsuccessful
in leading to the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction.
While the President must always retain the right to protect
the Nation with or without a United Nations Security Council
resolution, we must recognize that having the U.N. with us
would be a very powerful message to Iraq and to our friends and
allies and would make it much easier for a good number of them
to be able to join us. For that reason, we must continue to
persuade the other members of the Security Council of the
correctness of our position. We must not be too quick to take
no for an answer.
Now, clearly there are a number of issues and risks, large
and small, with using force against Iraq, and you have
discussed many of those here in previous hearings. But that is
always the case when it comes to war. There are always issues.
There are always risks. The question, therefore, is not whether
we have eliminated all those--that is seldom, if ever,
possible. Rather, the question is whether we have done the
detailed planning, political and military, to find work-arounds
for some, to minimize the effects of others, and to ensure that
our plan is flexible enough to handle the unexpected that
invariably is part of all combat operations.
But should, in the end, the President decide that the right
thing to do is to use force against Iraq, we must, as I said,
go united and with all the necessary resolve. I am confident
that our forces will be fully ready to do whatever will be
asked of them. But to assure that, we must not try to do this
on the cheap. We must not put our hope in some silver bullet or
hesitate to do the politically tough things, like, for
instance, calling up Reserves. Rather, we must be prepared for
the unexpected, and so we must go in with sufficient combat
power to ensure that under all circumstances, ours is the
decisive force. Or, as former Secretary of Defense Perry used
to say in hearings when we were debating the dispatch of
forces, ``We must ensure that we are always the biggest dog on
the block.'' Our troops deserve that.
By the way, they deserve a straightforward mission,
uncomplicated chain of command, and robust rules of engagement
that will allow them to get the job done and to protect
themselves at all times.
Wth that, let me stop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting
me make these comments. I'm ready to answer any questions you
might have.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General. We appreciate
your testimony.
General Clark.
STATEMENT OF GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, USA (RET.), FORMER SUPREME
ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE
General Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Allard,
distinguished members of the committee. I'm very happy to have
this opportunity to testify here, and I would like to associate
myself with remarks made by General Shalikashvili.
As NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in 1998, we saw
the beginning of a fourth war taking form in the Balkans. It
was the repression to be waged by Slobodan Milosevic against
his own people. We knew that, if we allowed this to go
unchecked and unchallenged, it would create a threat to
regional stability, it would undercut the progress we had made
in settling the war in Bosnia, and it was liable to ignite new
conflicts elsewhere. So we attempted to use diplomacy with
Milosevic, as we had over a number of years previously.
But we recognized that with Milosevic there was something
more that was needed. It was leverage. So we began to use
diplomacy backed by force. First there was the discussion of a
threat. Then there was the issuance of a threat. After the
threat was issued, Milosevic blinked, but his generals came
back and said, ``the West, NATO, perhaps the United States,
really doesn't have the stomach for this. Anyway, we can defeat
American air power because our friends have told us how to do
this.'' So after the failures at Rambouillet, we eventually did
turn to the use of force.
The use of force was successful. But what we found was that
the combination of international law, diplomacy, and American
and NATO air power gave us strategically decisive results
without, in the end, ultimately having to use overwhelming
military force. This was modern war.
Saddam Hussein does constitute a danger. He's calculating.
He's stubborn. We watched him from Europe. I watched him when I
was working on the Joint Staff. In 1994, he brought his forces
back to re-invade Kuwait. We blocked that. In 1997-1998, he
resisted the actions of the U.N. arms inspectors. The United
States was unable to muster the kind of majority and weight of
opinion in the United Nations to change the equation on the
ground in Iraq. Saddam Hussein has an irrational streak in
addition to his cunning and stubbornness, and he is probably
not ultimately deterrable, not with confidence.
The embargo that's left against him is crumbling step by
step. We watched it. It served well, as well as could have been
expected during that period, but it has ultimately crumbled. So
it's easy to see that, after September 11, there is much
greater concern about Saddam Hussein and a desire to bring to a
conclusion his violation of the U.N. Security Council
resolutions and international law, which he, himself,
accepted--namely, to give up his weapons of mass destruction.
I think that the move toward the United Nations is the
appropriate step. I think the President's strong statement and
the statements of members of the administration have provided
the leverage on which we should be able to build a coalition
and possibly even achieve a new resolution in the United
Nations. I think we're proceeding on a path of diplomacy backed
by force. I think it is the appropriate path.
But as we move ahead, I think we have to be very conscious
of the risks as well as the opportunities that are presented at
this point. So I think we need to be certain that we really are
working through the United Nations in an effort to strengthen
that institution in this process and not simply to check a
block. I think we have to do everything we can to build the
largest, strongest possible coalition. While we ultimately
might have to go with only a few allies, it will be much better
and much more effective if we have a much broader and stronger
coalition.
I think we need to be assured that we have done everything
we can do for what happens after our military success before we
begin that military operation, and that means planning for
post-conflict Iraq and all of the ramifications of that,
including the humanitarian assistance, the government, the
economic development, and so forth.
Then, with a military plan in hand, with allies, with
unified support, if there is no other recourse, then we would
use force as a last resort, ideally with the full blessing of
the United Nations, ideally in conjunction with a large
coalition. But we will have done everything we can at that
point to solve this problem in the way that's most conducive to
the world that we want to live in.
So I think it's not only the ultimate action that's
important here, it's how we get to that action.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Clark.
General Hoar.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH P. HOAR, USMC (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER
IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General Hoar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Allard,
distinguished members, for this opportunity to address the
committee.
First, I should say that I'm in favor of a regime change in
Iraq. What is at issue is the means and the timing. My view is
that we should slow down and be cautious and be sure we get it
right. This is not a time for hyperbole or a time to attack
people who have honest disagreements with the manner in which
we are going forward.
When I was a young officer, our government attempted to
define the nature of the upheaval that was going on in
Southeast Asia. Our government failed to define correctly the
nature of the Vietnam War, and we all know the result.
Today we are faced with a new war. It has been described as
a war on terrorism. Unfortunately, the use of that term
obscures the underlying problems that we face going forward.
War on terrorism is perhaps a useful slogan, but terrorism
is not an ideology or a political movement or a sovereign
country; it is a technique used to achieve either a political
or military result, not unlike strategic bombing. While I am in
no way condoning the activities of al Qaeda and the terrorist
attacks perpetrated against Americans over the last 5 years by
this group, it is still important to look beyond this activity
to find what are the causative factors, because the term
``terrorism,'' as a means of achieving political and military
ends, is merely a tactic. Fighting terrorism is, in fact, our
number-one priority, but it's only a portion of what needs to
be done if we are to emerge from this experience successfully.
The reality is that there are perhaps only 5,000 al Qaeda
members worldwide. I have just read recently that only about
200 are in the inner circle. Beyond that there are perhaps
10,000 to 20,000 supporters that materially, financially, or in
some way could be described as a support group for al Qaeda
terrorists.
What is at stake are the minds and hearts of the one
billion Muslims throughout the world. We know from attitudinal
surveys that they like Americans, American society, and
American culture. In fact, many of them would prefer to
emigrate to the United States.
Their quarrel with the United States is that they do not
trust our government. The reason for this is a pattern of
behavior perpetrated by the U.S. Government in South Asia and
the Middle East over the last 20 years. They believe the U.S.
Government has acted unilaterally, sometimes as a bully, and
has sometimes used other nations for its own interests and
abandoned them when the objective has been achieved. Most
importantly, they believe the U.S. has unjustly supported
Israel over the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian
people.
At the end of the day, the war on terrorism will be won
only when we convince one billion Muslims that we are, in fact,
a just society, that we support peace, justice, equality for
all people, that, in fact, we really are the ``Citty-on-the-
Hille.''
We will, in due course, defeat al Qaeda. We will do it
through a coordinated effort of a military action supported by
integrated intelligence, from our friends, international law-
enforcement operations, worldwide coordination to shut down
financial support that flows to the terrorists. But, at the end
of the day, it will be members of the worldwide Muslim
community that drive a stake in the heart of al Qaeda so that
it does not rise again.
There are three interrelated crises that need to be
addressed as we look to the future. The first is the operation
against al Qaeda. It seems, as we came up on the anniversary of
September 11, 2001, with ground-to-air missiles ringing the
Capitol and uncertainty about where and when we might be
attacked again by terrorists, that we need to continue, as our
primary effort, to defeat al Qaeda. This will require broad
support from our European allies and from our friends in the
Arab world. This is not the time to risk the loss of support
from so many countries shocked by the attacks of September 11
last year who have offered to help us and, indeed, provide it
on a daily basis. We have seen, recently, the results of that
support in success against al Qaeda in Morocco, Yemen, and
Pakistan, as well as Europe.
Second, as a matter of justice, but also as a means of
public diplomacy to ease the concern in the Muslim world, we
must step up to the Israeli-Palestinian problem and put
pressure on both sides to move to a peaceful solution.
Finally, there is the campaign against Iraq. To my
knowledge, and from the quotations attributed to people in and
out of government whom I greatly respect, there has not been a
case made to connect Iraq and al Qaeda. While we have known for
many years about the capabilities of the Iraqi government with
respect to chemical and biological weapons, there is still no
proof that a weaponized nuclear device has been produced, and
there is certainly no information, to my knowledge, that one
has been tested.
Last week, the President, at the United Nations, took a
step forward in speaking about the need for a new United
Nations Security Council resolution. This had an immediate
positive effect around the world, notably with the French
government and the government of Saudi Arabia. I believe that
we must move, with the approval of the United Nations, to take
the time to do the tough diplomatic work to gain support in the
Security Council for disarmament, and, failing disarmament,
then military action.
Allow me to speak briefly about my concerns regarding the
conduct of a military campaign against Iraq. There are people
in this city who believe that the military campaign against
Iraq will not be difficult, especially because of the enormous
advances of technology and the willingness of some groups in
Iraq to revolt once the campaign has begun. I am not as certain
that a campaign of this nature will take that course. I
certainly hope so.
One thing I am certain of is that there is a nightmare
scenario that needs to be planned for, and it's basically this.
The absolute lesson to be learned from the 1990-1991 Gulf War
was you do not take on the United States Armed Forces in the
open desert and expect to win. A joint force of Army, Navy,
Marines, Air Force, and Special Operations Forces is
unstoppable in that environment, because of our technological
advantages and our inherent mobility. The nightmare scenario is
that six Iraqi Republic Guard divisions and six heavy divisions
reinforced with several thousand anti-aircraft artillery pieces
defend the city of Baghdad. The result would be high casualties
on both sides, as well as in the civilian community. U.S.
forces would certainly prevail, but at what cost, and at what
cost as the rest of the world watches while we bomb and have
artillery rounds exploding in densely populated Iraqi
neighborhoods?
The risk of a military campaign against Iraq can be
measured in the lives of American men and women serving in
uniform. It is imperative that adequate preparations are made
so that regardless of what action the Iraqi government takes,
we can amass the appropriate forces to win decisively,
regardless of the circumstances, with minimum loss of American
lives and to the civilian population of Iraq.
Eleven years ago, the U.S. Government clearly defined a
military mission against Iraq. It was to liberate the state of
Kuwait from the occupation by Iraqi forces. What was overlooked
was the necessity for a companion political and economic plan,
generally described as war termination, that would have allowed
to move forward and create a situation where the Ba'athist
regime in Iraq would be overthrown. Failure to complete the
political and economic portion of the coalition's strategy has
resulted in our requirement to revisit this issue today.
I am reminded of the statement Shimon Peres made to me
several years ago. He said military victories do not bring
peace. You have to work twice as hard to achieve a peaceful
settlement.
There has been scant discussion about what will take place
after a successful military campaign against Iraq. The term
``regime change'' does not adequately describe the concept of
what we expect to achieve as a result of a military campaign in
Iraq. One would ask the question, ``Are we willing to spend the
time and treasure to rebuild Iraq and its institution after
fighting if we go it alone during a military campaign? Who will
provide the troops, the policemen, the economists, the
politicians, the judicial advisors to start Iraq on the road to
democracy? Or are we going to turn the country over to another
thug who swears fealty to the United States?''
We have heard the financial figures, that a war against
Iraq will cost $100 to $200 billion and that oil will rise to
something above $30 a barrel for some unknown period of time.
These figures seem to me to have an almost certain downward-
spiraling effect on our economy. The Gulf War cost $60 billion,
in 1991 dollars. The cost of that war was paid, for the most
part, by our friends, notably the kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Japan. Who will help us defray the cost of a
military action and the nation-building in Iraq?
In summary, I urge you to continue the dialogue, to
encourage the administration to do the hard, diplomatic work to
gain broad support for a just solution to the Iraqi problem. I
urge you to examine, in open and closed session, the
consequences of this contemplated action to be sure that the
cost in blood and treasure is consistent with the expected
outcomes and those unintended consequences that inevitably flow
from an undertaking of this magnitude.
I thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Hoar.
General McInerney.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. THOMAS G. McINERNEY, USAF (RET.), FORMER
ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
General McInerney. Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, thank you for this special
opportunity to discuss a war of liberation to remove Saddam's
regime from Iraq.
I will not dwell on the reasons why he should be removed.
Suffice it to say the President is correct, we must remove
threats such as those posed by Saddam Hussein, al Qaeda, and
other terrorist groups. We face an enemy that makes its
principal strategy the targeting of civilians and non-military
assets. We should not wait to be attacked with weapons of mass
destruction. We have not only the right, but the obligation to
defend ourselves by removing these threats. Iraq is part of the
war on terrorism and should be treated as such.
I will now focus on the way to do it very expeditiously
with minimum loss of life to both the coalition forces and the
Iraqi military and people themselves, and at the same time
maintaining a relatively small footprint in the region. Access
is an important issue, and we want to minimize the political
impact on our allies adjacent to Iraq that are supporting the
coalition forces.
Our immediate objective will be the following: Help the
Iraqi people liberate Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein and his
regime; eliminate weapons of mass destruction and production
facilities; complete military operations as soon as possible;
protect economic and infrastructure targets; identify and
terminate terrorism connections; and establish an interim
government as soon as possible.
Our longer-term objectives will be to bring a democratic
government to Iraq using our post-World War II experiences with
Germany, Japan, and Italy that will influence the region
significantly.
Now I would like to broadly discuss the combined campaign
to achieve these objectives, using what I will call ``blitz
warfare,'' to simplify the discussion. Blitz warfare is an
intensive 24-7 precision air-centric campaign supported by
fast-moving ground forces composed of a mixture of heavy,
light, airborne, amphibious, special, covert operations working
with opposition forces that will all use effect-based
operations for their target set and correlate their timing
forces for a devastating, violent impact.
This precision air campaign is characterized by many
precision weapons, over 90 percent, using our latest command
and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets, Joint STARS, Global Hawk, Predator, human intelligence,
signals intelligence, et cetera, in a network-centric
configuration to achieve less than 10 minutes for time-critical
targeting using the global-strike task force and naval strike
forces composed of over 1,000 land- and sea-based aircraft,
plus a wide array of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.
This will be the most massive precision air campaign in
history, achieving rapid dominance in the first 72 hours of
combat, focused on regime-change targets. These are defined as
targets critical to Saddam's control--for example, his command
and control and intelligence, integrated air defense system,
weapons of mass destruction, palaces, and locations that harbor
his leadership, plus those military units that resist or fight
our coalition forces.
All the military forces will be told, through the
opposition forces and their information operations campaign,
that they have two choices--either help us change the regime
leadership and build a democracy, or be destroyed.
In addition, commanders and men in weapons of mass
destruction units will be told that they will be tried as war
criminals if they use their weapons against coalition forces
and other nations.
In a multidirectional campaign, coalition forces will seize
Basra, Mosul, and most of the oil fields, neutralize selected
cores of Iraqi armies, and destroy the integrated air defense
zone, command and control, weapons of mass destruction, and
Iraqi air forces using stealth, SAM suppression, and air
superiority assets. This will enable coalition forces to
achieve 24-7 air dominance quickly--I believe within 24 hours--
which is critical to our success. Expansion of our beach heads
in the north, south, east, and west regions and the air heads
seized with alarming speed, will allow the opposition forces to
play a very significant role and decisively important role with
our special covert operations and the Iraqi army air force.
To determine the status, whether friend or foe, or if they
disarm themselves politically, that is their decision. The
opposition forces will communicate with the military
intensively to neutralize them, and also the Iraqi people,
letting them know that they are liberating them from 22 years
of oppression, and they are now controlling large amounts of
territory. Humanitarian missions will be accomplished
simultaneously with leaflet drops, et cetera: ``U.S. and other
coalition forces are helping us to liberate and change the
regime. You, the Iraqi people, must help us to do this quickly
with minimum loss of life.''
This information operations campaign must be well planned
and executed working closely with the opposition forces. This
means that the administration must move very quickly now to
solidify the opposition forces and set up a shadow government
with aggressive assistance and leadership from the United
States. I cannot overemphasize that this is about liberating
the Iraqi people. This is not an invasion by U.S. and coalition
forces. It is an enabling force.
In summary, the Iraqi forces we are facing are about 30
percent of those we saw in Operation Desert Storm, with no
modernization. Most of the army does not want to fight for
Saddam, and the people want a regime change. We are already
seeing increasing desertions from the regular army as well as
the Republican Guard. Let's help them to make this change and
liberate Iraq from this oppressor.
President Bush has accurately said, ``Inaction is not an
option.'' I am in support of this position. I also support an
international coalition to include the United Nations, if they
will be part of the efforts to remove this regime and his
weapons of mass destruction. However, realistically, I have no
confidence in Iraq allowing U.N. weapons inspectors to operate
there in a satisfactory manner.
Time is not on our side. Consequently, I urge Congress to
approve the President's draft resolution that was submitted
last week as soon as possible.
Mr. Chairman and members, again, my thanks. I await your
questions.
Chairman Levin. General McInerney, thank you very much.
Let's start with a first round of 6 minutes. At least three
of you placed high value on having a U.N. resolution to force
inspections with a ultimatum backed up by force, authorization
of force by member states if the ultimatum for open inspections
is not complied with. You made reference to it at the end of
your statement, General McInerney, but I think our other three
witnesses placed a great emphasis on the power of a U.N.
resolution--I believe, to use your words, General
Shalikashvili, that it would be a powerful message.
So I'd like to focus on the three of you who emphasize on
that particularly. Would a U.N. mandate resolution authorizing
force and authorizing member states to use force if inspections
that are unconditional are not allowed, followed by
disarmament--what specifically are the values--be more precise,
militarily, politically, or otherwise--in such a resolution to
be achieved? Would such a resolution not only have a better
chance of enforcing the inspections in the disarmament without
a war, but would it also, if it is obtainable, have less risks
to our long-term interest than would unilateral U.S. military
action without such a resolution?
General Shalikashvili, let me start with you.
General Shalikashvili. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that
such a resolution would, in fact, be a very powerful tool, and
I say that for a number of reasons.
First of all, we need to impress upon Saddam Hussein that
he's not just facing the United States, but that he's facing
the will of the majority of the world. We must also ensure that
we have made it possible for as many of our friends and allies
to join us, some of whom privately tell us they would do so,
but that it's very difficult to do so for political, internal
reasons, whatever, without the United Nations having spoken on
this issue. Some of them believe deeply that unless you're
directly attacked, that you should go to war only with the
sanction of the United Nations. Others just have that in their
culture.
Finally, I think it's important from a security point of
view, because every time we undermine the credibility of the
United Nations, we are probably hurting ourselves more than
anybody else. We are a global nation with global interests, and
undermining the credibility of the United Nations does very
little to help provide stability and security and safety to the
rest of the world where we have to operate for economic
reasons, political reasons, and whatnot.
I said at the beginning of this part of my statement that
we must, under no circumstances, ever create the impression
that the United States is not free to go to war to protect our
interests whenever the President so decides. But that is very
different than not trying to achieve the kind of resolution
that, in this case, we want, because I think it would make our
job easier, it would help the United Nations in the future,
and, thus, help us in the future, and it would surely have an
impact on how Saddam Hussein reacts to the current resolutions
that dictate that inspections and inspectors go back into Iraq.
So I see nothing but value added for the United States to
try our very best to get that kind of a resolution.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
General Clark.
General Clark. Mr. Chairman, at the end of World War II,
when the United States had a nuclear weapons monopoly and when
our gross domestic product was 50 percent of the world's
production, President Roosevelt, and later President Truman,
recognized that even with that strength, the United States, by
itself, wasn't strong enough, wasn't capable of handling all of
the world's problems in assuring peace and stability by itself.
So they sought to create an institution which would be better
than the defunct League of Nations, and they built the United
Nations.
President Truman said that the method of the United Nations
should be that right makes might. We've spent the 57 years
since then trying to develop international institutions that
would help strengthen America and help protect our interests as
well as the interests of people around the world, but we
recognized that a world in which nations are only regulated and
guided unilaterally in seeking their self interest is not a
world that's in our best advantage.
So, for that reason, I think it's very important, not only
that we've gone to the United Nations, but that we do
everything we possibly can do to strengthen the United Nations
to stand up to this challenge to make itself an effective
organization, to be able to cope with the challenge of Saddam
Hussein's defiance of its resolutions.
Beyond the issue of the United Nations and the
international institutions we seek to live in, I think going to
the United Nations has another very important benefit. In the
long-run, we're going to have to live with the people in the
Middle East. They're our neighbors. They're just like us. Many
of them have the same hopes and dreams. The more we can do to
diffuse the perception that America is acting alone, America is
striking out, America is belligerent, America is acting without
allies--the more we can do to diffuse that, the more we can do
to put that in the context of international institutions and
the support of the governments in the region, the greater
chance we have of reducing the recruiting draw of al Qaeda,
following through with a successful post-conflict operation in
Iraq, promoting a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and
promoting peaceful democratization in a number of moderate Arab
governments. So I think the long-term benefits of operating
through the United Nations are very high.
Finally, there's an immediate short-term benefit. It'll be
very useful to us to have allies. Many nations in that region
want us to go through the United Nations or be empowered by a
United Nations resolution. So I think if we can get that
resolution, it's to our near-term military advantage, and our
long-term advantage as a nation.
Chairman Levin. If you could just very briefly, General
Hoar, because I'm out of time, give us your thoughts?
General Hoar. Yes, sir. First of all, I absolutely endorse
the statements of my two colleagues.
I would say, first of all, with respect to the U.N., the
U.N. is us. It's not them. It's us. We are dues-paying members.
When we provide the leadership, as the President did recently,
we can see immediately what changes take place. The French
haven't changed their idea of how this ought to be done. If you
get a U.N. Security Council resolution, they'll be with us.
Many of the other Europeans feel the same way.
Since September 11, I've traveled to the Middle East five
times. I've been directly involved with the Middle East for the
last 15 years. While we've been paying attention,
understandably, to the terrorist attack against the United
States, in the Arab countries there is major consternation
about what is going on in the West Bank and in Gaza. The Arab
countries, while they are supporting us in private, have a
serious problem in convincing their populations that this is
the right thing to do. So I believe that we have to give them
top cover, as well, and we will do that with the United
Nations.
On an operational level, I would just point out that, for
example, if you can't bring Saudi Arabia into the coalition to
be able to use, at a minimum, air space, but, ideally, air
bases as well, the complications associated with carrying out a
military campaign grow exponentially.
We need them. We need a broad base. We need it for the
political reasons as well as the military reasons that we all
understand. It will make the whole job a great deal easier. In
the long run, as Wes said, in our relationship with these
countries in the future, it will expedite and ease our ability
to do business after the military campaign is over.
Chairman Levin. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it's commendable that all of you are cautious about
the use of force, and I agree with that. The use of force
should always be as a last resort. Sometimes there is the
first-strike argument that's made out there, and some say that
we should never be the first strike. Some are saying, well,
we've already been the victims of a first strike in the fact
that our friends and allies and ourselves were attacked during
the Persian Gulf War, then we had the attack with the Twin
Towers and the Pentagon.
Would you all agree that certainly one of our options
should be to act unilaterally, if necessary?
General Shalikashvili.
General Shalikashvili. Yes, I clearly agree that, under
certain circumstances, we have to act unilaterally. Otherwise,
we give the veto power to people who do not have any veto power
over our security.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
General Clark.
General Clark. I think that the United States always has
the option of acting unilaterally, but I'd say in this case
it's a question of what's the sense of urgency here and how
soon will we need to act unilaterally. So I think it's very
important that we recognize that, so far as any of the
information has been presented, as General Hoar has said,
there's nothing that indicates that, in the immediate next
hours, next days, that there's going to be nuclear-tipped
missiles put on launch pads to go against our forces or our
allies in the region. So I think there is, based on all of the
evidence available, sufficient time to work through the
diplomacy of this.
Senator Allard. General Hoar.
General Hoar. Yes, sir. I think Wes is spot on. I think we
have the time. We need to concentrate on al Qaeda. We have made
enormous strides here recently, and if we continue to do that,
with the help of other countries, we will be successful
quicker.
In addition to that, I think that we have the time to step
up to the public diplomacy requirement with respect to the
Israeli-Arab problem, which will facilitate our friends
supporting us when and if we go after Iraq. But I think those
two are preliminary steps.
Senator Allard. General McInerney.
General McInerney. Clearly, sir, we must have and do have
the authority to strike, unilaterally if we have to. In this
particular case, we're going to have enough allies even if the
U.N. doesn't come in.
But I think the important thing, in response to General
Clark and General Hoar, where I have a problem on time is,
unfortunately, September 11 showed that we have great
weaknesses in our intelligence system that we all did not
realize. This intelligence system--and they have very talented
people--has been focused on large nation-states. Having been
part of that intelligence system in several occasions in my
career, we have totally neglected the human intelligence that
takes years to build. Because of this, we have much more
ambiguity than we normally would. It's because of that
ambiguity that I see a time urgency.
Fortunately, this body and others deliberated and very
forcefully said in 1998 that we must act, and you did it as a
bipartisan body--a very strong signal.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Now, I have a question I'd like to direct to General Clark
and General Hoar. In this particular circumstance, what else do
you feel can be done diplomatically or economically or
otherwise that hasn't been done at this particular point in
time?
General Clark. Well, we're not on the inside. I'm certainly
not on the inside of what's going on in New York with the
United Nations or the consultations that are underway, but I do
know that in terms of building a coalition and putting together
the kind of diplomatic resolution that's required, it takes
multiple engagements with governments. So I think it takes a
strong commitment on the part of the President of the United
States to assure that this problem is addressed. I think we've
had that strong commitment. I think it takes a clear indication
that the United States has the capacity to address it
unilaterally, if need be. I think that indication is present.
Then I think the third requirement is that we have the
ingenuity and the patience to work on the coalition partners we
need and our allies from many different directions and many
different perspectives. We need to go to NATO. Have we gone to
NATO? NATO came to us after September 11 and said, ``This is a
violation of the North Atlantic Charter. This is Article V. We
want to work with you.'' This is a great opportunity for NATO
to come in. Have we done that? Secretary Rumsfeld's over there
today talking to NATO ministers.
So I think that's one indication. From NATO, you go back to
the United Nations. I think you make your case in front of all
of the Islamic organizations. You make it at various levels,
from the military level on up to the head of state level, and
you work it.
Senator Allard. General Hoar.
General Hoar. Let me just build on that, because I think
that's a great answer.
Senator Allard. Quickly, because I have one more question
I'd like to get in.
General Hoar. Put pressure on Russia. Russia has an
economic interest in Iraq. We still have a lot of leverage with
Russia. The President apparently has a very good relationship
with Mr. Putin. We can do more there.
China has been part of the problem with respect to movement
of, particularly, missiles through North Korea into Iraq. We
can put pressure on China.
We need to bring those two countries into the tent and work
with them and make them part of the solution, not make them
part of the problem.
Senator Allard. What happens if the United Nations decides
to do nothing?
General Clark, General Hoar, any of you?
General Clark. The United States is going to have to move
ahead with what it needs to do, but it's not, I think, going to
be an all-or-nothing situation. I think it's going to be very
important to salvage everything that can be salvaged from the
dialogue in the United Nations, to identify those nations that
are likely to go with us with something less than a full United
Nations resolution, to figure out how we can meet their needs.
In other words, I think that we're stronger, if we give
ourselves time to work this issue. We have to make it very
clear to Saddam Hussein, there's no doubt about what the
ultimate outcome for him is going to be. But the process is
all-important for the ultimate outcome for us and our interests
in the region.
Senator Allard. General Hoar.
General Hoar. Sir, as I said in my opening statement, there
are other priorities, too, that we need to continue to work on.
But, beyond that, I think it's important that we garner as much
support as we can over and above the United Kingdom's
commitment to support us so that----
Senator Allard. But what if the United Nations does
nothing?
General Hoar. I think then the decision has to be made
based on intelligence, and I don't think that the intelligence
that has been described in the open press supports that at this
moment, but I would defer to you gentlemen, in closed session,
to determine that. But, at this point, I think we have time.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your
service to our country and your service to us today. One of the
things we have in common is that we served in Vietnam as young
officers.
Secretary Powell served there. In his 1995 memoirs he wrote
this: ``Many of my generation, the career captains, majors, and
lieutenant colonels seasoned in that war, vowed that when our
turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in
half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American
people could not understand or support.''
I certainly feel that way. I guess you all feel that way.
That's one of the reasons we're all here, to make sure we don't
go half-cocked, half-baked here, and that the American people
understand that when we go to war, we need them, and we need to
be successful.
But one of the lessons I did learn out of that war is what
the British learned fighting guerrillas and terrorists in
Malaya, now known as Malaysia, a simple axiom of fighting
terrorists, and that is if the terrorist doesn't lose, he wins.
The fact that we haven't gotten Osama bin Laden and his
terrorist cadre put us on orange alert 1 year later. So the
terrorist still continues to win unless the terrorist loses.
Therefore, learning that lesson in Vietnam and seeing it
played out here in the wake of September 11, 1 year later, it
just reinforces my view that the number-one mission for our
Nation, for our military, is to make the terrorists lose, make
a specific terrorist group lose, namely the al Qaeda, which has
penetrated some 60 nations and was able to use less than
weapons of mass destruction, aircraft, against us and come in,
in effect, under the radar, under our intelligence scheme, and
do a lot of damage.
Gentlemen, does it seem to you that this is our number-one
war? We're already in a war. We've already had a congressional
resolution passed that authorized the President to take all
necessary means to take this al Qaeda out. Is that our number-
one military mission at this point?
General Shalikashvili.
General Shalikashvili. It is my understanding, Senator,
that the President was clear when he said that fighting this
war against terrorism is our number-one priority. I've thought
an awful lot about whether going after weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq is an unnecessary detraction from that
effort or whether it is, as the administration has claimed,
part of the war against terrorism, an attempt to potentially
deny terrorists those weapons of mass destruction that,
otherwise, Saddam Hussein might make available to them. You can
argue whether that's likely or not, but you cannot argue that
it cannot happen.
I concluded that it really falls under the same umbrella as
the overall war against terrorism. The war against terrorism
isn't just al Qaeda, it isn't just the terrorist groups in the
Phillippines and whatnot. It is also denying terrorists the
means of getting to weapons of mass destruction that then could
be used against us or against our friends and allies.
So your question to me is, for me, simple to answer. Yes,
the war against terrorism is our number one priority.
Considering using force to do away with the weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq is a necessary part of that war.
Senator Cleland. General Scowcroft has observed publicly
that he didn't think Saddam Hussein was engaged in spreading
his weapons of mass destruction to terrorists with a return
address of Baghdad. I just thought I'd mention that.
General Clark, your observations?
General Clark. I've been concerned that the attention on
Iraq will distract us from what we're doing with respect to al
Qaeda. I don't know all of the particulars today of how we
distribute our resources around the world. These are details
that are classified. They're handled by well-understood
processes. But it's been my experience, from commanding in
combat, that I would like every bit of intelligence I could
get, and we used a lot going after only that small part of
Europe which we were attacking in 1999 inside Yugoslavia and in
Kosovo.
So I think, as a minimum, that when one opens up another
campaign, there is a diversion of effort. The question is
whether the diversion of effort is productive or
counterproductive. There are forces operating in both
directions at this point. You can make the argument that
General Shalikashvili did, that you want to cut off all sources
of supply. The problem with that argument is that Iran really
has had closer linkages with the terrorists in the past, and
still does today, apparently, than Iraq does. So that leads you
to then ask, well, what will be the impact on Iran? That's
uncertain. If you could take these weapons out quickly, then it
would cut off that potential source of supply.
On the other hand, by lumping the two together, al Qaeda
and Saddam Hussein, it's also possible that we will have
incentivized Saddam Hussein now, as a last-ditch defense, to do
what he wouldn't have done before, which is, ``Go find me the
nearest members of al Qaeda. Here, take this sack and do
something with it.'' So it's not clear which way this cuts
right now.
But, at some point, we are going to have to deal with
Saddam Hussein, we are going to have to work against the
weapons of mass destruction, not only there, but also in the
case of Iran. Whether this is the right way, the right time to
do it depends, in large measure, on how we proceed. This is why
I underscore again and again the importance of diplomacy first
and going through the United Nations, because I think that
gives us our best way of reaching out to achieve this objective
with minimum adverse impact on the struggle against al Qaeda.
The longer we can reasonably keep the focus on al Qaeda, the
better that war is going to go, in my view.
Senator Cleland. If you took out Saddam Hussein and the
Ba'ath party, the secularist party, don't the Sunnis and the
Shiite Muslims make up the majority of the population in Iraq?
Wouldn't that give Iran a strong hand there, and we'd
ultimately end up creating a Muslim state, even under
democratic institutions?
General Clark. Yes, sir. I think that there's a substantial
risk in the aftermath of the operation that we could end up
with a problem which is more intractable than we have today.
One thing we're pretty clear on is that Saddam has a very
effective police-state apparatus. He doesn't allow challenges
to his authority inside that state. When we go in there with a
transitional government and a military occupation of some
indefinite duration, it's also very likely that if there is
still an effective al Qaeda, and there certainly will be an
effective organization of extremists, they will pour into that
country, because they must compete for their Iraqi people--the
Wahabis with the Sunnis, the Shias from Iran, working with the
Shia population. So it's not beyond consideration that we would
have a radicalized state, even under U.S. occupation in the
aftermath.
Senator Cleland. General Hugh Shelton was telling me about
a week ago, in his great North Carolina accent, which I
understand, that if Saddam Hussein were removed and the Ba'ath
party ousted, that the Kurds, the Shiites, and the Sunnis would
go at each other like banshee chickens.
General Hoar, what's our first priority, militarily? Is it
al Qaeda?
General Hoar. Our first priority has to be al Qaeda, and
the reason, Senator, is that we are dependent on our European
friends and the Arabs and the Muslims around the world. The
successes we've had in Morocco, Yemen, Pakistan, and Germany
have come as a result of the integrated intelligence of police
work. These are the kinds of things that we need. At the end of
the day, shutting down the money, using police to find these
independent cells around the world will make the difference. We
are absolutely dependent on the goodwill and cooperation of
these other countries, some of whom have large populations that
don't agree with American policies. So I think until we have
this under control, we should give it our number-one attention.
With respect to Iraq and the question that you asked Wes a
moment ago, in my time at CENTCOM, one of the major concerns
was always the fragmentation of Iraq if there had been an
internal breakup or it was done externally. Iraq is a creation
of the Ottoman Empire and British colonialism. It was never a
country of itself. As a result, it will always be susceptible
to that problem. The borders were drawn artificially, and we
live with that problem with Kuwait and Iraq today.
Senator Cleland. Thank you, sir.
General McInerney.
General McInerney. Senator, I clearly think that al Qaeda
is our top priority. It's not our only priority. I think that
people who think we can only handle this small operation miss
what the issue is.
The issue is, does Iraq, as a terrorist state, get weapons
of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists, just like he's
influenced the PLO? As soon as the President had this brilliant
speech last Thursday, what happens in Israel on Tuesday? There
is a direct connect between Saddam and other terrorist
connections.
Now, it may not be as clear as we would like, because
that's a problem of our intelligence system, and that's the
ambiguity that I was talking about before. That is the concern
that I have, his ability to get weapons of mass destruction.
I'm not worried about ICBMs. I'm worried about Ryder trucks out
here at North Capitol Street. That is the threat that is
included with al Qaeda, Saddam, and weapons of mass
destruction--terrorism, terrorist states, and weapons of mass
destruction. There's a deep ambiguity there that no one can
define accurately, and we must make some decisions, because you
can't react after a nuclear weapon goes off in this country.
It's too late. There are no fingerprints.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you Senator Cleland.
Senator Smith--do you want to speak, John?
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to wait
until a later opportunity after my colleagues. I'll follow on.
I appreciate the courtesy of Senator Smith.
Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Good afternoon, generals, and thank you all for your
service to your country.
General Hoar, I was listening to your comments very
carefully, and there was one chilling word that you used when
you said you ``think'' we have the time. I think that really
sums up the issue at hand, do we have the time or not? That's,
of course, right on the President's desk. As President Truman
said, ``The buck stops here,'' and it does, and it's a tough
call.
But I think if you go back to what General McInerney just
said, does anybody here deny that Saddam Hussein has the
capability to deliver some type of weapon of mass destruction
of some type--not any type, necessarily, but of some type to
the United States or to an ally? [No response.]
I assume no response means nobody differs with that.
So let me just go right to the heart of the issue, then. If
it's trying to build a military coalition, there are some who
say maybe a military coalition is not meaningful anymore, and I
don't know if I'm there yet, but there are some ominous signs--
what the Saudis are doing with restrictions on our bases, what
the Saudis are doing with funding al Qaeda, and, perhaps even
more troubling, the last few days of the election in Germany
where Schroeder, who just won a very close election, said,
``Bush wants to divert attention from his domestic problems.
It's a classic tactic. It's one that Hitler also used.'' Those
kinds of comments coming from a supposed ally in NATO are very
troubling.
I guess the question is, how much hope do you have that we
may not have to go it alone, so to speak? I realize there will
be a few that will always be with us. Israel will be there.
England will be there. I'm not quite sure, after that, who I
would count on, but I think I would count on those two.
But what is your assessment? I know you've all been there.
I know you're looking in now, but you were there. What is your
assessment of how deep and how bad this is this time in terms
of whether or not we're going to have the support of allies,
both in the Middle East as well as in Europe? I'll just go down
the table. General Shalikashvili, go ahead.
General Shalikashvili. There's no doubt in my mind at all
that coalitions are extraordinarily valuable and sometimes
essential to get the job done. In a conventional operation,
like potential conflict against Iraq, you'd talk about
overflight rights, you'd talk about basing rights, they were
talking about moving supplies, you're talking about
intelligence sharing. All of those, when you look at the
geography, are terribly important issues. While there are some
work-arounds to be able to do that without allies, it sure as
heck is extraordinarily useful to have them and, in some cases,
essential.
Look at our war against terrorism. Please don't hold me to
the number, but something in the back of my mind says that we
have some 90 nations that are assisting, in one form or
another, in our war against terrorism.
Those people who say the days of alliances and coalitions
are coming to an end, I think, don't look at the reality of it.
This administration has relied very much on coalitions, much
more so than, for instance, during Operation Desert Storm.
During Operation Desert Storm--and General Hoar would know the
number better--I think we had some 30 or 36 coalition partners.
Look at the number of coalition partners we have today in the
war against terrorism. Vastly greater.
Senator Smith. I would agree with you that having a
coalition would be obviously helpful and very important. I
guess the question really is, though, can we count on it? If
you looked at, especially, the Saudis. We know for a fact
they're funding al Qaeda. They encouraged some of the terrorist
acts by these martyr funds. You can't overlook that. This is
not 1991. I guess that's really my question.
General Clark, you probably could comment best on the
German situation, but it just seems to me that there's a little
piling on here. I think some have said that Schroeder won the
election because he piled on America a little bit, and maybe he
did.
So, those are the concerns that I have, not that I don't
want a coalition, but that I'm worried about whether or not
there will be one if I could just editorialize a little bit and
maybe just have the rest comment.
General Shalikashvili. I agree with you, and I would tell
you that we're going to have coalition partners in this. You
mentioned some of them. I think there will be many more.
How many we have depends, to a large extent, on how
successful we are in our diplomatic efforts to bring them
onboard and how successful we are in getting our partners on
the United Nations Security Council to go along with a strong
resolution that ultimately authorizes the use of force to
remove those weapons and the means to produce them, should we
be unable to do so through inspection or other diplomatic
means.
The answer is yes, we are going to have coalitions. We are
going to have more than are apparent now, because many of them
are probably reluctant to say anything now for internal
political reasons, but they will be there. If we are successful
in the United Nations, I think the number can be quite
extensive.
Senator Smith. I guess my time has expired. Could General
Clark just respond?
General Clark. I was in Germany last week, Senator. I met
with a lot of people in Germany. There's a lot of embarrassment
over the rhetoric in that election campaign. Nevertheless,
domestic politics is domestic politics, I guess, and it
certainly plays over there in a certain way based on a
perception of the United States and its activities in the
world.
But I'm convinced that, the election being over, when the
United States needs help from its European allies, it will get
that help. I would hope that we will go through the established
mechanisms and use the consensus engine of NATO in an effective
way to help us get a grip on the war on terror, to an extent we
haven't done yet, and also to help us deal with the problem of
Iraq. If we do that, of course, whenever you work with allies,
and they sign up to it, they want assurances from you about
what you're going to do, what you're going to bomb, how soon
you're going to do this. It is difficult, time consuming, and,
in some cases, restraining. But I think, as General
Shalikashvili made clear, the advantages are so overwhelming
that we really need to pursue that route in this case.
General Hoar. Sir, may I speak briefly about Saudi Arabia?
Senator Smith. It's up to the chairman. I'd like to hear--
--
Chairman Levin. I think not. If it's not an answer to that
specific question, I think----
General Hoar. Well, it is in response to the Senator's
comments.
Chairman Levin. Can you make them very brief?
General Hoar. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
General Hoar. Saudi Arabia has been a friend of this
country for 50 years. Saudi Arabia bankrolled 50 percent of the
war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. They paid $17
billion in the Gulf War. They paid $20 million a month every
month, month in and month out, to finance Operation Southern
Watch. They have, on the table, a peace proposal signed by 22
members of the Arab League, as a starter, to start the project
of peace in the Middle East. They have problems. There is no
question about it. They have not done everything that we want,
but neither have our European friends, either.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We're
certainly honored to have witnesses such as you who are
regarded as heroes of our country, militarily.
In the Persian Gulf, we had strong allied support,
including bases in several Arab states and participation by
their troops. Today, the degree of participation and the amount
of access to bases in the region seems to be in question, and
you've indicated that. I agree with the witnesses that we need
adequate preparation to reduce American casualties and that we
should not act in haste.
A study by the Army's Center of Military History suggests
that we might need to keep 100,000 troops in Iraq and 300,000
in Afghanistan if we're going to stabilize these countries.
General McNeil is quoted today saying that there are as many as
1,000 al Qaeda fighters still active in Afghanistan. I am
concerned that in focusing on an invasion of Iraq we may reduce
critical assets, including intelligence, that we need to
stabilize Afghanistan.
My question to you is, do you think there will be some
degradation of our military capabilities in Afghanistan if we
do attack Iraq in the next few months?
General Shalikashvili.
General Shalikashvili. It's very difficult for me to answer
that with any degree of specificity, because I have not asked
for and I have not been given a briefing on the operational
concepts that we intend to use in Iraq, if we were to go there.
Either way, it would not be very appropriate to discuss that in
open session.
But that said, all information I have is that our military
today is structured to be able to engage in one regional
contingency, to be engaged in one or more smaller types of
contingencies like we now have in Afghanistan. In my very
informal discussions with my colleagues still on active duty,
they are of the view that they have sufficient forces, and the
forces are ready enough to do so without any degradation of our
effort in Afghanistan, with perhaps the exception of some
enabling forces that would have to be brought in from the
Reserves, but it's too early to tell to what degree.
So they don't seem to express to me the concern that I had,
as well, and that you mention now, to what degree this will be
a detraction from our ability to handle our responsibilities in
Afghanistan.
Senator Akaka. General Clark, would you have a comment on
that?
General Clark. I think that there will be some spread of
command attention in terms of planning for one operation while
you're running another, but there are different headquarters to
handle it. There is a possibility that you'll lose access to
some intelligence collection means, depending on the numbers of
platforms available, and so forth, but I don't have that
information. There may be enough to meet everybody's minimum
needs here in these two theaters.
I think the real issue is whether there's synergy between
the two operations or not. There are arguments to be made on
both sides. There are those who say that if we go in to Iraq,
it will send a very strong message to those nations that are
playing both sides--countries like, for example, Yemen, where
we've had some difficulty gaining access--and it may send the
kind of message to Yemen that says, ``We're going to get rid of
al Qaeda right now. Turn 'em all over. Invite the Americans
in.''
On the other hand, if we go in unilaterally or without the
full weight of the international organizations behind us, if we
go in with a very sparse number of allies, if we go in without
an effective information operation that takes this through and
explains the motives and purposes and very clear aims and the
ability to deal with the humanitarian and post-conflict
situation, we're liable to super-charge recruiting for al
Qaeda.
So I think it's indeterminate at this point how much
synergy there is. It's not a given that there's synergy, but
there is a possibility of synergy between the two operations.
There's also a possibility of some fatal conflict between the
two operations.
Senator Akaka. General Hoar.
General Hoar. Yes, sir. When I was at Central Command,
there was always the question of priorities of certain
platforms and so forth. I think it's unavoidable that there
would be some deficiencies, but I'd prefer not to discuss that
in an open forum, and I'm sure the active-duty people could
give you a much better indication of the current status.
Senator Akaka. In the Persian Gulf War, we did not go all
the way to Baghdad and replace Saddam Hussein. If we are
planning to do so this time, most of you suggest that we should
be planning also for what we will do in Iraq afterwards.
General McInerney has suggested we need a shadow
government. Do you have any thoughts you can share with us
about what we should be doing now and who should be responsible
for developing a post-Saddam occupation strategy? Is there one
being designed at the present time?
General Shalikashvili.
General Shalikashvili. One of my colleagues mentioned that
perhaps a more difficult and equally important part of our
thinking should be devoted to what will happen after we go in,
as it is about how we get in and so on, and I fully agree with
that. Yet this is the most difficult thing to do, and it's most
difficult to pin the tail on a donkey as to who it is that is
responsible for it.
Surprisingly enough, in the open press, in the open
discussion that's all that I've access to, there's been very
little of that discussion. There's been very little about what
opposition forces there are, what political elements there are
to tie together these disparate groups between the north and
the center and the south. We've already talked about the
potential of them splintering, and none of us are really sure
whether that will happen or not. But there needs to be someone
worrying about it, and a blueprint needs to exist as to who
will do what.
I think we were very fortunate in Afghanistan that, in
fact, an interim government emerged that seemed to have a
modicum of support from its people, although we continually
worry about the independence of warlords. We should not count
on being lucky twice.
I wish I could tell you that I have heard somewhere on the
West Coast, where I now live, that this is all under control. I
do not have that confidence at all. But that doesn't mean that
something isn't ongoing. It surely is not the task of the
Defense Department. Yet, from Haiti to Bosnia and other places
where we went, invariably that part that should fall on the
civilian institutions to do fell back on the Defense
Department, because it's a kind of entity that you get your
hands around and you can order them to do something, and they
generally have the means to do something.
But to establish a government to ensure that the government
has the political support, that the security structures are
there, that the police forces are there, and all of the things
that we saw as very negative aspects of our previous operations
in the previous administration, someone needs to be taking care
of it. It must not be put on the hands of the Defense
Department.
Senator Akaka. General Clark.
General Clark. I just want to underscore everything General
Shalikashvili had to say on that. I think that it's a very
difficult task. I think it's really the critical task, in terms
of winning. I think it's the most difficult part of this
operation. It has not received adequate attention in public
discussion. Whether there have been decisions made on this or
not, I don't know. The track record in Afghanistan is that
we're more lucky than we are good there. There are still
enormous problems to be dealt with, particularly on the
reconstruction side. We know the military is not the right
institution to do this. We know from our experiences in Bosnia,
Haiti, and Kosovo that you can't just dump this on the United
Nations, that there has to be a support organization
established.
I go back to Vietnam, and we did have an organization in
Vietnam that did this. It was called Civil Operations
Revolutionary Development Support. It did some other things
that caused it to be discredited. But in terms of actually
covering a country and providing district-by-district,
province-by-province resources that could help in the
transformation of that country, this was an organization that
was very effective. It had a chain of command. It had
resources. It had transportation. It had communications. It had
a military cadre that was part of it, but it also had primarily
a civilian cadre. So if you needed an agricultural extension
element, you could get the Department of Agriculture to do it.
So it's the United States Government that has to take the lead
in planning this.
In the mid 1990s, we created an organization, a framework,
for this, Presidential Decision Directive--PDD-56, I think it
was--in which there was a mechanism for tasking each of the
agencies of government. Whether that's in place or not, I don't
know, but it is the most challenging part of this operation,
and the United States Government needs to take the lead before
it hands it off to the United Nations.
Senator Akaka. General Hoar.
General Hoar. Yes, sir. I think, as my colleagues have
said, this is the part of this operation that has received very
little attention. Given the failure in 1991 to have a war
termination plan that would allow us to have a set of
circumstances existent in Iraq that would be favorable to us,
it seems to me that we should not go down this road again.
What to do after we get to Baghdad seems to me a little
like what happens to the dog when he finally catches the car--
what are we going to do now? I would suggest to you that it's a
National Security Council issue, and it needs to be developed.
I hope that this committee and other committees would ask the
administration what their plans are after they get to Baghdad
and catch the car.
Senator Akaka. General McInerney.
General McInerney. Sir, I brought it up in my opening
comments, because I think it is extremely important. I think we
have great experience from World War II. I lived there as a
youth and watched how the U.S. military did that. I think
General Clark had a much tougher problem, or equally as tough,
in Bosnia and Kosovo. We've had experience. It is not one that
is above our skill level, and particularly because Iraq
probably has the best middle class, the most educated people--
they have over 2 million Iraqis that are in the United States
today that could go back, could help. Afghanistan, to me, is
much harder. But it clearly is one of the important questions
we must work on because it's that success that will determine
the whole success, I believe, on this war against terrorism.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Bunning.
Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to put
an opening statement in the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
Senator Bunning. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bunning follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jim Bunning
We are here today to deal with an issue of the utmost importance.
As elected representatives of this Nation, we have a responsibility to
protect our citizens from all threats. The President had laid out the
threat posed by Iraq. We must now decide what to do about it. It would
be best if we can act in concert with our allies, but the possible lack
of their support must never stop us from protecting our citizens. If we
knew about the plot before September 11, would we have waited until we
could get international agreement, or would we have done whatever was
necessary to prevent over 3,000 of our citizens from being murdered?
The answer is obvious. We must be forward thinking in admitting what
the threats are, and bold in ensuring that they are dealt with
permanently.
Saddam Hussein must know that there is no opportunity for
compromise. He must comply with every U.N. Security Council resolution,
or he will be destroyed. Anything less than that will only lead to more
delay and obstruction. Congress must stand behind the President, to
show the world that America is firm in its commitment to remove the
threat of the Iraqi regime to the world. I urge my colleagues to
support the President.
Senator Bunning. I thank all of the four generals for being
here and for their past service to our country. Thank you.
I'd like to ask a question of all four of you. Has anyone
here had a top secret classified briefing on the situation on
the ground in Iraq in the last 3 months?
General Shalikashvili. I have not.
General Clark. I have not.
General Hoar. I am unencumbered, sir.
General McInerney. No, sir, I have not.
Senator Bunning. Okay. I just wanted to make sure that the
opinions we are hearing are from your past experience. Is that
pretty accurate?
General Clark. Well, they're from the past experience, plus
everything we can get out of the day-to-day----
Senator Bunning. Reading in the newspaper.
General Clark.--information we're getting here and in----
Senator Bunning. Just like The New York Times and the plan
for what we had for Iraq? Okay, that's what----
General McInerney. I have, in fact, been in touch with
Iraqi dissidents, seen a war room here in Washington and a
number of other things, but that's not----
Senator Bunning. I just wanted to make sure of where we
were in relation to your background and your briefing on this
situation.
General Shalikashvili, tell me what you think is a ``proper
inspection''--you mention it in an earlier statement--for the
U.N. What is a proper inspection?
General Shalikashvili. I think it is an inspection that is
devoid of any interference by the Iraqi government, as all
previous inspections have been, one that has the best possible
chance of getting at the truth, how much and where their
equipment is.
But that, in itself, is not enough, because, as I think
we're all aware, finding out the truth is only the first step.
The second equally important step is being able to do away with
those weapons of mass destruction and all the means to produce
further weapons. That's the total package that I mean by
``proper inspection.''
Senator Bunning. Okay. Do you think there's any chance in
the immediate future of that type of an inspection being agreed
to by Iraq and the leader of Iraq, presently?
General Shalikashvili. There are two parts to my answer to
your question. The first part is that it's very difficult for
me to imagine that Saddam Hussein will have a change of mind
and somehow agree to that. But it is too early to be certain
that that is so.
The second part of my answer will be that in trying to get
that and trying to get that kind of an inspection system and
trying to encode that in a resolution that also allows the use
of force, should those such inspections not occur or be
unsuccessful, it is terribly important for us politically and,
in effect, operationally, because it brings with it, then, the
weight of the rest of the United Nations and our friends and
allies to our effort.
Senator Bunning. Thank you very much.
General Hoar, you mentioned the Gulf War and the amount of
casualties that might be expected in a war with Iraq in your
statement. Wasn't the same thing said by the military when we
were fighting the Gulf War prior to our successful completion
of that war?
General Hoar. I can tell you that during the Gulf War, I
had just left Central Command. I had been the Chief of Staff to
General Schwarzkopf and came back to Washington to be the
Operations Deputy for the Marine Corps. One Saturday, just
before the ground attack went down, General Al Gray and I went
down to Quantico to look at a simulation of casualties, and it
was determined that if the Iraqis used chemical weapons against
the two marine divisions as they penetrated that fortified
line, we could expect to have as many as 10,000 casualties.
There were very high estimates of casualties if weapons of mass
destruction were used.
But as we got closer to the day that the ground forces
kicked off, those operations that were conducted beyond the
wire to see what the Iraqis were doing led us to believe that
it was not going to be as difficult as was originally thought,
mainly because those divisions that were up against the wire
along the border had very poor morale and had been severely
degraded by the air attacks.
Senator Bunning. Yes, sir. Okay. You also mentioned that
there has been scant discussion on post-war Iraq.
General Hoar. Yes, sir.
Senator Bunning. Where do you get that information?
General Hoar. I read three newspapers a day and watch what
I see on the Internet. If it's out there, it certainly isn't in
the open press. It would seem to me, with all of the discussion
about military operations--inside-out, outside-in, who's going
to be involved--that we would hear something about post-
hostility activities.
Senator Bunning. Well, I hope that our military and our
State Department and those that are making contingency plans if
we do this would not give us a forward pass, so that everybody
in the United States would know exactly what we were going to
do after we liberated Iraq.
General Hoar. I would agree, sir, but I think there's a
good opportunity for closed session hearings so that this body
would be well aware.
Senator Bunning. Yes, I agree 100 percent on that.
General Clark, you said something about public discussion
on the war termination. What did you mean by ``public
discussion''? Do you mean between the military and the State
Department in top secret briefings, or--what are you talking
about?
General Clark. I think I'm talking about the same thing you
just asked General Hoar about, Senator, which is that, from
listening to everything, including the hearing that was held
last week with the Secretary of Defense, we're getting the
impression that the war planning is proceeding chronologically.
That is to say, how do you get the troops there? What do they
do when they cross the line of departure? How do they respond
when they move toward Baghdad? What about Baghdad? What we know
is that, to be successful, we have to do backward planning. In
this case, from the weapons of mass destruction----
Senator Bunning. Did you do that in Kosovo?
General Clark. Absolutely. We had a peace plan in place. We
knew the sectors--we knew who was going to participate before
we ever dropped the first bomb, and that was a big factor in
providing nations the assurance that they could join in with
us. That's why you not only----
Senator Bunning. Did that also have the contingency plan
that we would have on-the-ground troops stationed there for
whatever amount of years it takes?
General Clark. Well, we never specified how many years it
would take, and we haven't in this case, either. But we did
have the brigade sectors. We defined the American commitment
and the other national commitments. Yes, sir, we did.
Senator Bunning. Lastly--and I know my time is up--I have
an awful lot of confidence in General Colin Powell, our
Secretary of State, that he will be successful with our many
coalition partners, as our Secretary of State was during the
Gulf War in putting together a very large contingency.
Presently he had been very successful in the war on terrorism,
to get about 90 countries in a coalition. I agree with you 100
percent, we should do everything we can possibly do with the
United Nations. But then the buck stops on the President's
desk.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Bunning.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your very insightful testimony and for your
extensive service to the Nation. I was calculating, I think
there's over 100 years of experience in uniform at the table. I
don't want to make you feel old, but you represent quite a
distinguished group of witnesses.
General Hoar mentioned that the casualty estimates he saw
early on at Quantico, if CBR--chemical, biological, and
radiological weapons--were used, were in the thousands. In
1991, Saddam and the Iraqi military refrained from using those
weapons. Some people posit that was because he was assured,
directly and indirectly, that he would survive, Baghdad would
not be assaulted if he did not use them. That situation is
completely reversed.
So let me ask you, what is the likelihood in your
estimation that chemical and biological weapons would be used
against us in the buildup phase or the assault on Baghdad? What
would be the likely casualties that Americans would encounter,
and also the civilian collateral damage that would ensue?
General Shalikashvili.
General Shalikashvili. I certainly don't have any
intelligence information that would answer this issue. I would
tell you that any intelligence information on this issue, I
would hold very suspect anyway, because we're talking of
intentions, and intelligence isn't very good on that. But we
certainly cannot exclude the possibility that chemical weapons
would be used against our troops in that conflict. While you
can argue, and correctly so, that our defensive capabilities
are better than they were in 2001, that our detection systems
are better, that we now understand better, that to deal with
chemical attacks, you have passive defense, but also active
defense, and all the things that you're well aware of.
Nevertheless, if he were to use chemical weapons against
us, and that is a possibility, the casualties, in my judgment,
could be very high. Beyond that, I wouldn't trust anyone
assigning any numerical number.
Senator Reed. General Clark.
General Clark. I think that there's a possibility he will
attempt to use weapons of mass destruction. I think there's a
possibility he would attempt to use them before we would launch
our attack, when we stage our forces. I think there's also a
possibility he will use them against his own population, and,
in particular, against the Shia population in the south, in
order to create the kind of humanitarian catastrophe that could
be blamed on the United States and could degrade our ability to
act against him.
What the probabilities are is anybody's guess. My guess is
that it's under 50 percent, and perhaps well under that. Not
only will we be taking every action we can to prevent him from
doing that, but he will have to have a chain of command that's
willing to take those kinds of measures. I think, as we build a
coalition, as we make it very clear we're coming and what the
consequences of that entry will be, we'll be undercutting
pretty severely the morale of his armed forces and its ability
to execute its orders.
Senator Reed. Can I infer from your response that one of
the benefits of a U.N., at least, related coalition would be
that we would raise the threshold, in terms of his use of these
types of weapons?
General Clark. I think that's correct.
Senator Reed. That would be a significant advantage to our
troops and to the reconstruction.
General Clark. Absolutely.
Senator Reed. General Hoar.
Chairman Levin. Excuse me. Apparently General Shalikashvili
was nodding, and I think it's an important question. Did you
agree with that?
General Shalikashvili. Yes, I did.
Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you. Just for the record. Thank
you.
Senator Reed. General Hoar.
General Hoar. Yes, sir. I believe that one of the reasons
that Saddam Hussein didn't use chemical weapons during the Gulf
War was that Secretary of State Jim Baker met with the Iraqis
before the war began. While I'm not privy to what was said, I
am told that he threatened the Iraqis with catastrophe, not
further defined, should they use weapons of mass destruction.
We are now saying that, regardless of what happens on the
weapons, we're in favor of a regime change. We've all said that
here today. It seems to me that that reduces the possibility
that Saddam Hussein could not use the weapons in order to save
his skin. We've already told him that he's out of there once we
conduct this campaign. The Vice President has said that.
So I am not sure. I think that there is the possibility,
because there's little for him to lose.
Senator Reed. General McInerney.
General McInerney. I think, sir, that we have to plan that
he will. None of us know what the percentage is, so how do we
plan? Number one, in our intelligence operations (IO) campaign,
which I mentioned, as others have, we send the word, and we
have daily people coming out with communications, we know the
numbers of all their division commanders, who these people are,
that in that IO campaign, they are told that they will be tried
as war criminals by Iraqi justice, not ours--ours is too
loose--and the finality of the Iraqi justice system.
Number two, we want to preempt where these systems could
come from, as targets, and that's why this massive campaign is
focused on weapons of mass destruction with precision weapons.
Number three, that's why I don't favor a huge buildup. I
want small, fast-moving units that move through this--and in
their CVR outfits and they're moving fast.
I commanded a unit that delivered--had chemical weapons in
the days before we terminated their use. I can assure you,
trying to marshal that, plan for it, and the difficulties that
you get in trying to use it is not an easy task. If they
haven't been practicing a lot, I assure you, their readiness to
do it is poor--but we should still plan for the worst and hope
for the best.
Senator Reed. My time is expired. But there seems to be a
divergence, at least in my mind, between the testimony of our
Army generals and perhaps our Marine general. They're talking
about a heavy assault for any contingency that they face.
General McInerney is talking about light forces sweeping
quickly out----
General McInerney. I'm talking heavy, medium, light,
covert, airborne, all of them. It's not the size. Speed is more
important than size in this new warfare with this massive air
precision campaign simultaneously working. That is the
difference that we are talking about, and it's a good debate,
Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General. Gentlemen. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's very good
that we have these kind of hearings and we have it all out on
the table and talk about these issues, some of which we can't
talk about in public because of security reasons.
General McInerney, in this last attack by Saddam Hussein on
his own people--one quick question--during which he reportedly
killed as many as 5,000 Kurds with poison gas. Was that
delivered by aircraft, or do you know?
General McInerney. I think it was aircraft. General
Shalikashvili, do you remember? It was either aircraft or
artillery. I just can't remember, sir.
General Shalikashvili. To the best of my knowledge, it was
done by artillery, but this happened in the 1980s, and my
involvement with the Kurds was in 1991.
Senator Sessions. I am wrestling with the overall picture.
I know several----
General McInerney. But that was a village, as I recall.
That was not troops moving through rapidly, et cetera.
Senator Sessions. Right. I am wrestling, in general, with
where we are as a Nation and where we are as a world at this
point. I don't think you three gentlemen, who are heavily into
the multilateral mode, mean to be uncritical of the U.N. and
our European allies and other world allies for their behavior
so far with regard to enforcing or lack of enforcement of
resolutions that they have lawfully implemented and that Saddam
Hussein solemnly agreed to. That is a big problem.
Let me just refer, since I think it's a very august
publication and taking the issue very seriously, to The
Economist, the British publication. They note that, ``Iraq is
actually the best example there is of America following
multilateral procedures which an arrogant unilateralist called
Saddam Hussein proceeded to flout. The question then is what do
you do when international deals and procedures are broken? Sit
back and pretend it didn't happen?'' They go on to say that,
``At every stage, the multilateral approach has failed,'' after
itemizing these things, ``blocked by Iraq or by permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council, chiefly France and
Russia, those countries, China, and others have been
circumventing the sanctions.''
So let me ask, first, would anyone disagree that members of
the Security Council and/or other members of the U.N.--who
swear so much fealty to that organization--are, indeed,
undermining the very resolutions that we're concerned with
here?
General Shalikashvili. I would certainly not disagree with
you at all. I think all of us are guilty of that. The United
States, too, in the past, as a member of the Security Council,
has perhaps not been as strong and as vigorous in trying to
push for resolution of this issue.
Senator Sessions. General Clark, we're flying missions, and
have been for years, enforcing a no-fly zone in Iraq, which is
part of the conditions Saddam Hussein agreed to. He fires
surface-to-air weapons at us, and we drop bombs on him on a
regular basis. This has been going on for many years. Isn't
that a cause for concern here?
General Shalikashvili. Absolutely, but I will remind you
that the British are flying with us, the Turks are flying with
us, and, for--I don't know if today, still, but for the
majority of my time when I was still involved, the French flew
with us.
Senator Sessions. Well, the British and the Turks and the
United States are ready to do something, it appears.
General Clark, I'll just ask you to comment on it. This is
something you've been dealing with. You dealt with it in Kosovo
and in Europe, and we need to talk about it. ``Thus, the limit
to a purely multilateral approach''--I'm quoting from The
Economist here--``under the advent of the 1945 U.N. Charter, is
exposed. Beyond economic sanctions, which have already failed
or been scuppered by U.N. members, there is no enforcement
mechanism except American leadership.'' That is what is likely
to happen. There will be a multilateral process along the lines
described here. It will fail, and then America will invade.
Isn't that what we're doing? We're challenging the U.N. to
maintain its own credibility as we have to maintain our own
credibility here. The President has taken his case to the U.N.
He's lobbying nations individually, bringing them to Texas,
doing everything he can do. But ultimately, aren't we at a
point where we're going to have to either quit and go home or
take action?
General Clark. Well, I don't know that we're at that point
right now, Senator. I think it's----
Senator Sessions. Well, how much longer do you think----
General Clark. --clear that you have to----
Senator Sessions.--we need to wait?
General Clark. --look ahead and see. I think you need to
work through all options. When you're talking about American
men and women going and facing the risks we've been talking
about this afternoon, and if you're talking to the mothers and
the loved ones of those who die in that operation, you want to
be sure that you're using force and expending American blood
and lives and treasure as the ultimate last resort, not because
of a sense of impatience with the arcane ways of international
institutions or frustration from the domestic political
processes of allies.
So I'm not on the inside of those negotiations. I can't
tell you how much further they are. But I do know, from my
experience in working in Europe and inside NATO, that it takes
a lot of different twists sometimes, diplomatically, to get the
outcome you want.
Senator Sessions. What we have already is 16 resolutions. I
guess we can go for 1 more, but there's 16 U.N. resolutions out
there that Iraq is in violation of.
General Clark. I think we have two----
Senator Sessions. I will just say to you--my time is up--
that at some point I do believe the United States is justified
in acting. As I think Kissinger once said, ``Nothing clears the
mind so well as the absence of alternatives.'' The President's
basically put it out to the U.N., ``Either you act, or we are.
We will not concede this.'' Yes, we could lose troops. We lost
3,000 in New York last September. Hopefully, we haven't
forgotten that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Generals, I want to thank you all for
being here. This has been a long afternoon, but the breadth of
your experience and involvement in similar kinds of
circumstances is of great value and help to all of us, so I
want to thank all of you for your response. Obviously, you've
given these issues a great deal of thought, and it's extremely
valuable to us.
I share the feeling of those that have expressed that al
Qaeda is really where it's at right now. Saddam Hussein is
dangerous. He is a threat, but the questions come in to how
much of an immediate threat, where as we know al Qaeda
continues to be a threat.
I don't happen to be as sanguine as some about the
conditions in Afghanistan. There are a lot of reports that the
warlords are back and the tenuousness of that situation is very
real. I'm very concerned about where Pakistan is. Musharraf has
been courageous. But how much stability is there in a hornets'
nest filled with al Qaeda? The list goes on around the country.
I know that there are thoughtful, well-trained military
leaders who indicate that we can do it all. We can do it all.
But it seems to me, right now, unless the intelligence has
changed, that the intelligence that all of us have received is
that he doesn't have the nuclear weapon. He'd like to have it,
and if he is able to gain fissionable material, he can move
along with it in less than a year. But if not, it's going to
take him a few years to do it. That's basically what we've all
heard. So he doesn't have that. He has weapons of mass
destruction. So do the Iranians, as has been pointed out here.
We have to ask ourselves, as has been mentioned by the
members here, with this kind of activity, of military
intervention--and I want to come back to the manpower that you
all think is going to be there and, second, whether you do
believe that there's going to be a guerilla war. We've had many
of those that have testified that this will be different, and
that the Republican Guard would fight in the cities, because,
although they felt that his right to go into Kuwait was rather
tenuous, they feel now that we're after him. So I'll be
interested in what you thought about this.
But we have to balance the dangers of these weapons of mass
destruction. If you're talking about biological and chemical,
we ought to be scared to death about the dangers of
proliferation of nuclear material out of the Soviet Union.
We're about to spend $150 billion to do something--with loss of
life--over in Iraq, and we've spent less than a billion dollars
in trying to keep fissionable material away from the
terrorists. There's something wrong with our priorities here.
You talk about creating a climate and an atmosphere which
will provide enormous recruitment for al Qaeda. What's going to
happen if they do use them? The general said there is somewhat
less than 50 percent probability. That's still a pretty high
possibility of using some kind of weapon of mass destruction
against the Israelis. Prime Minister Sharon said they'll
retaliate. Are we going to be sanguine about the dangers of
even nuclear weapons in this? What is that going to mean? How
much of a danger is that in that region? Will the terrorist
groups that are in Iran start pumping out the weapons of mass
destruction to all these terrorist groups?
I think you've mentioned so many of these points which we
ought to be thinking about when we're looking at this, both
from a military perspective and from the real security
interests that we have.
In the short time that I have, I'm interested, just quickly
from all of you, in what you think is going to be necessary in
terms of the force levels. Second, what assessment you'd give,
that if this does turn out to be an urban battle--I'm glad Jim
Baker was able to talk Saddam Hussein out of using it. Why in
the world aren't we using him now to talk him out of it? He was
able to go over and have a conversation about it. The reason
Saddam Hussein listened to him is because of deterrence. That
was deterrence that dominated the whole relationship between
nuclear powers for 50 years.
We know what we would do with our backs against the wall.
We almost did it in the Cuban Missile Crisis. We know what the
United States would do. Why should we believe Saddam Hussein is
going to be different if he's pinned against the wall in Iraq
and using weapons of mass destruction? If there is going to be
a battle, in terms of urban warfare, where are we going? What
do you think will happen on that? If the panel could give their
answers to that, and then I think my time will be up.
Thank you.
General Shalikashvili. I think it's impossible, Senator
Kennedy, to give you a number of our forces that will be
necessary to get the job done without knowing exactly what job
they are going to be asked to do and understanding the concept
of operation. Any number that you can get probably has the same
validity as I remember before we went into Bosnia. We had this
discussion that it would take 400,000 people, because the
Germans needed that many.
So I will tell you, I am of the view that Saddam Hussein's
forces today are about half the strength that they were during
Operation Desert Storm and that they're probably less than half
as ready as they were during Operation Desert Storm. We are
certainly much smaller also, but we are--and I hope I'm not
overstating it--vastly more capable than we were at Operation
Desert Storm. So it would tell you that we probably should get
by with about half the forces we used in Operation Desert
Storm. But I wouldn't take it to the bank anywhere until you
know what the tasks are and you do what the military calls a
troop-to-task analysis and then add them all up and see how
many troops you need. Until you know the concept of operation,
you can't do that. So that's the best I can do for you.
Senator Kennedy. I think it's regime change. I won't--would
be the task, I expect. That's what we've been----
General Shalikashvili. But I supposed that an awful lot of
tasks--whether you do it with the hypothetical method that
General McInerney described or whether you do it in a more
conventional method, or whether you do this with special
operating forces or whatever. There are many different ways
that you could want to do that. Until you decide you cannot
compute how many troops it will take you.
I think if it gets to urban warfare, and the likelihood is
certainly great that it could, just like the likelihood is that
he could use weapons of mass destruction, it could get very
messy. The collateral damage could be very great, and our own
casualties could increase significantly.
Senator Kennedy. General Clark, my time is up. Maybe you
each would give just a brief comment.
General Clark. I think you need a large-sized force,
because I think you have to prepare for the worst-case
contingencies in this case. I don't think all those forces have
to be there necessarily at the outset. I think you want to move
for a very rapid campaign. I think you want to plan on urban
fighting, which means you want to try to attack the forces that
are in the urban area first, you want to try to prevent other
forces from reinforcing them, second, and then you want to get
your own forces in there to prevent the emergence of some kind
of a fortress Baghdad as rapidly as possible.
General Hoar. Sir, I hope that Tom McInerney's view of this
works. But if it doesn't, we have to be prepared to fight block
by block in Baghdad. As Wes says, I hope we can take the steps
early on to make sure that it doesn't happen. But you can't
have those people hanging out in North Carolina or in Georgia
waiting to go. They have to be in the theater ready to go so
you don't lose your momentum.
In urban warfare, you could run through battalions a day at
a time, one battalion, that are just combat-ineffective because
of casualties. This is very slow going. All our advantages of
command and control, technology, mobility, all of those things
are, in part, given up, and you are working with corporals and
sergeants and young men fighting street to street. It looks
like the last 15 minutes of ``Saving Private Ryan''. That's
what we're up against.
General McInerney. Sir, obviously I give a different
viewpoint. The way I look at it, number one, it'll take 30,000
to 50,000 U.S. ground forces, maybe not all there at the start,
and if you need more, you add. It'll be over 100,000, counting
the coalition forces, the Brits, opposition, different people.
Now, here is why I think this is important, where I'm
different. People must understand what a war of liberation is.
I just got an e-mail today from a Republican Guard general that
defected. The fact is, is the Republican Guards are not allowed
in Baghdad now, only the special Republican Guards. On February
14, Saddam killed 10 Republican Guard generals led by a three-
star. On the first of June, he arrested 85 officers. He's not
arresting lieutenants and captains. So he has a major problem,
and that's why this information operations campaign that
appeals to the army and the people that, ``We want to give you
a new nation''--and the fact is, that's why I think there will
not be urban fighting. Now, I could be wrong, but he won't let
the army in the cities now. When they do go in, it's only to
keep the cities quiet.
So that is why the view I give, versus others, is
different. One's a war of liberation, one's an invasion against
a well-entrenched foe that does not want to do that, and I
don't think there are many people in Iraq, as the Iraqis told
me, that want to die for Saddam.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, what a
pleasure it is to join together again. One of the great
privileges of serving on the Armed Services Committee is to
work with the men and women of the Armed Forces of all ranks. I
look back on memories shared with you on visits to your various
forward locations throughout the world in years past.
General Clark, I'm going to pick up on a wonderful theme
that you used. As soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, you
know full well you're ready to fight, you're trained to fight,
from your own experience that that's the last resort. All else
has to fail. We have in process now those steps, led by the
President. The world would not be in this posture today
focusing on this situation had not this President and his
Cabinet focused the attention on the danger, yes, to the United
States, but, indeed, the danger to the world.
But back to the steps he's taken. We've had a good
discussion here this morning about the United Nations. Now, in
some respects this shifts to the halls of Congress, and I
operate on the following basic premise. I was very much
involved in 1991. I happen to have had the privilege of being
the principal author of the 1991 resolution which went to the
floor and was debated for 3 days and 3 nights, and then, by a
mere five votes, carried by the Senate. We worked together in a
bipartisan way. Senator Lieberman, of this committee, was my
principal cosponsor.
We're now in the process of working a resolution that
Congress hopefully will pass here in a very short period of
time before we depart for our home states. I believe that, to
the extent that resolution is strong, it's unambiguous, and
there's no, should we say, daylight between the position of
Congress and the position of the President, the more likely we
can avoid use of military force, because it sends the strongest
possible signal to the entire world. Most specifically, Saddam
Hussein will read that resolution and see that the coequal
branches of government--the Executive and the Legislative--are
arm-in-arm determined, first to avoid conflict, and, if
necessary, only as a last resort, to utilize it.
Now, I asked you to take a look at the resolution, and I
will also insert it for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The White House,
Washington, September 19, 2002.
Dear Speaker Hastert, Leader Daschle, Leader Lott, and Leader
Gephardt, as a follow-up to your discussion yesterday morning with the
President, we enclose a suggested form of resolution with respect to
Iraq. We stand ready to meet with you or your staffs to discuss our
proposal.
As the President indicated to you, it is our hope that we can reach
early agreement on the proposal at the leadership level to allow you to
proceed to consider the resolution in your respective chambers as soon
as possible.
Sincerely,
Nicholas E. Calio,
Assistant to the President for
Legislative Affairs.
Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President.
The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
The Honorable Thomas A. Daschle,
Majority Leader,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
The Honorable Trent Lott
Minority Leader,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
The Honorable Richard A. Gephardt,
Minority Leader,
House of Representatives.
Washington, DC.
Joint Resolution
to authorize the use of united states armed forces against iraq.
Whereas Congress in 1998 concluded that Iraq was then in material
and unacceptable breach of its international obligations and thereby
threatened the vital interests of the United States and international
peace and security, stated the reasons for that conclusion, and urged
the President to take appropriate action to bring Iraq into compliance
with its international obligations (Public Law 105-235);
Whereas Iraq remains in material and unacceptable breach of its
international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess
and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability,
actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and
harboring terrorist organizations, thereby continuing to threaten the
national security interests of the United States and international
peace and security;
Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression
of its civilian population, including the Kurdish peoples, thereby
threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing
to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully
detained by Iraq, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized
by Iraq from Kuwait;
Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability
and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other
nations and its own people;
Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing
hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States,
including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush
and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and
Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the
United Nations Security Council;
Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility
for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests,
including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to
be in Iraq;
Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international
terrorist organizations, including organization that threaten the lives
and safety of American citizens;
Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001
underscored the gravity of the threat that Iraq will transfer weapons
of mass destruction to international terrorist organizations;
Whereas the United States has the inherent right, as acknowledged
in the United Nations Charter, to use force in order to defend itself;
Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use
weapons of mass destruction, the high risk that the current Iraqi
regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack
against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to
international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of
harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such
an attack, combine to justify the use of force by the United States in
order to defend itself;
Whereas Iraq is in material breach of its disarmament and other
obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, to
cease repression of its civilian population that threatens
international peace and security under United Nations Security Council
Resolution 688, and to cease threatening its neighbors or United
Nations operations in Iraq under United Nations Security Council
Resolution 949, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 678
authorizes use of all necessary means to compel Iraq to comply with
these ``subsequent relevant resolutions;''
Whereas Congress in the Authorization for Usc of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) has authorized the President
to use the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve full
implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665,
666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677, pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 678;
Whereas Congress in section 1095 of Public Law 102-190 has stated
that it ``supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals
of Security Council Resolution 681 as being consistent with the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (public Law 102-
1),'' that Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United
Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and ``constitutes a continuing
threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf
region,'' and that Congress ``supports the use of all necessary means
to achieve the goals of Resolution 688'';
Whereas Congress in the Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-338)
has expressed its sense that it should be the policy of the United
States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime
and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that
regime;
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take
action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism
against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint
resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-
40); and
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to use
force in order to defend the national security interests of the United
States;
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Further Resolution on
Iraq.''
SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
The President is authorized to use all means that he determines to
be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations
Security Council Resolutions referenced above, defend the national
security interests of the United States against the threat posed by
Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region.
Senator Warner. I sent copies there to you--just that last
paragraph. But I read, first, from the Constitution of the
United States. Each of you raised your arm more than once and
swore allegiance to defend the Constitution of the United
States. We do so here in the Senate. Article II states very
explicitly, ``The President shall be the Commander in Chief of
the Army and the Navy and of the militia of the several states
when called in to actual service of the United States.'' Very
clear. No one else. One man.
Then Section III of Article II, ``He, the President, shall,
from time to time, give Congress information of the state of
the union and recommend to their consideration such measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient.'' Here it is. This is
what he is now recommending to Congress, and it will be the
central focus of Congress for these next few days.
I do not find anything in this clear, declarative
expression that exceeds any authority that the Constitution
gives him. It is, in my judgment, a recitation of the authority
given in the Constitution, authority that each of you in your
roles, particularly as combat commanders, have exercised in the
past.
A simple question to you. You're citizens of this Nation.
Do you read this as going beyond the authority given to the
President in the Constitution in any way?
General McInerney.
General McInerney. Not at all, Senator.
Senator Warner. Who would like to go next? General Hoar.
General Hoar. Sir, I have just scanned this. I would prefer
a more limited view of time and place than what I read here as
an essentially open-ended commitment, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
General Clark, is this within the confines of the
Constitution, or does it go beyond it?
General Clark. I think that the last phrase in there is a
very, very sweeping phraseology, because it's not only
international peace and security in Iraq; it's the region. I
realize why that's in there, but I think that we will gain
power with this resolution and will gain effectiveness in our
military operation and in our public diplomacy the more tightly
we focus our efforts on the specific objectives that we seek.
So ``region'' is one of those terms--are we going to
restore international peace and security between the
Palestinians and the Israelis by this phraseology? What exactly
does it mean? So, therefore, what I would prefer to see--
Senator Warner. If I could come back to you later--my time
is running along. If Congress passes this in October, they go
home, they scatter to 50 States and parts of the world. If some
situation arose beyond a limitation such as some of you are
thinking about, what is the President to do? Bring us back? Is
there time to do it? He has to employ troops to take care of
that contingency. That's my concern.
General Shalikashvili.
General Shalikashvili. I am of the view that a resolution
from Congress is very important now to energize the United
Nations and tell them that we stand together, to energize our
allies that we are serious about it, we stand together, and to
send a strong message, as you said, to Saddam Hussein.
The wording of this is probably a matter for lawyers and
senators to pour over, and I'm not competent enough to tell you
whether it is too broad or not. On the surface of it, I align
myself with General Clark, because I think there needs to be a
clear understanding of what is meant by those words,
particularly that last sentence.
Senator Warner. Let me go back to that second subject
General Clark touched on, and that is NATO's role. We're about
to come up on another summit meeting. At the last, they
expanded their role. Frankly, I wasn't altogether pleased at
their decision to go beyond the parameters of that original
charter. But, nevertheless, they did.
I think they've done superb work in Kosovo and Bosnia--
they've turned their eyes away from this conflict between the
Palestinians and the people of Israel, and that concerns me. I
think there's a connection between that problem and the
planning of any operation, should force be necessary, in Iraq.
I have, of recent, written the President a letter suggesting
that we should ask the North Atlantic Council to consider
whether or not, given this expanded charter of NATO, NATO
peacekeepers should be used to help ease tensions between
Israel and the Palestinians. This will help ease overall
tensions in the region, and is in the interests of NATO and the
U.S. I have not yet received a response.
Now, before he departed, I gave the Secretary of Defense a
copy of the letter, and I'll share the letter with you, should
you be interested--suggesting that Europe is perceived as more
likened to the causes of the Palestinians; the U.S., more
likened, compassionate, for the cause of the people of Israel.
If we were brought in, in a peacekeeping role, the United
States and Europe, under the NATO banner, and only if the
Nation of Israel and the people of Palestine invited them in,
and we performed some peacekeeping functions, it seems to me
that might contain this situation during that period when the
operations in Iraq were to take place, if force is necessary.
Also, I must share a personal experience. I was in Tel Aviv
with three other Senators. We were there--Senators Stevens,
Inouye, Nunn, and myself--working on urging them to stay out of
the 1991 conflict. It was February 18, 1991--I remember the
date, because it happened to be my birthday--when the last scud
came into Tel Aviv. Indeed, the meeting adjourned very swiftly
when the scud fell, and the meeting resumed equally swiftly
after we received the ``all clear.'' But the point being, they
have indicated that that might not be the solution. As
complicated as the planning is with Iraq, that is a factor that
has to be taken into consideration. Were NATO there, there
might be a less likelihood that somehow the Israel-Palestinian
conflict would be touched by such conflict as we may find
coalition forces, hopefully, engaged in in Iraq.
So my question is, do you have any views on NATO
involvement, first, in possibly the role of peacekeeping at the
invitation of both nations in the current crisis that we're
watching unfolding, and to the extent that NATO should be
invited in consultation with regard to the planning,
particularly at the U.N., as it relates to Iraq?
General Clark.
General Clark. With respect to the second part of your
question, Senator, I would certainly favor bringing NATO in to
do planning for the Iraq operation. I think the NATO
organization is a good one. It's a consensus engine. Of course,
it means when you bring allies in, you have to listen to their
concerns, and that's difficult, and it's time consuming, and it
creates friction in operations. But I think, in this case, as
in Kosovo, the overwhelming results or the balance of the
results is that you need to listen to the allies, you need them
onboard. So I would strongly encourage that we bring NATO into
this operation.
With respect to the situation with the Israelis and the
Palestinians, as I've looked at this situation in the past, we
really need, as we have seen in other engagements--some kind of
a framework political agreement before you attempt to use
forces to impose a cease-fire, because----
Senator Warner. I carefully said not to impose a cease-
fire. The two factions would have to agree on some time of
cease-fire and invite NATO in, but that's the only force that
can move in 48 hours, the force that's constituted
internationally, the only force that's had the experience of
peacekeeping in the Balkans.
General Clark. I think you'd want to have the kind of an
agreement where you've taken the incentive away from the
Palestinian side to use terror, because if they still use
suicide bombers, NATO forces are going to be no more effective,
and probably less effective, than the Israelis in stopping
that, and they'll be held accountable for it. So I think we'd
want to avoid putting our forces, and our own American forces
into a situation where they can't win.
Senator Warner. If they were there, would it lessen the
likelihood that somehow Israel would get drawn into the
conflict, should force be used in the Iraq situation?
General Clark. It might, but I think we'll have forces
there in any case, with respect to the anti-missile defense
that we want to put in place in Israel. I would suspect we
would have that.
Senator Warner. General, do you have a view on first, the
Palestinian situation and then the Iraqi situation as it
relates to NATO?
General Shalikashvili. Some years before General Clark
served as Supreme Allied Commander, I had that job. One of the
lessons that I learned was that NATO essentially needs American
leadership to take actions, particularly those unusual actions
that you suggest. It needs more than just our leadership. It
needs our active participation. We have learned from the
Balkans that this notion that Europeans do something on the
ground and we fly overhead doesn't fly.
So that said, I think NATO should certainly be approached
on the Iraq issue. I think it will be extraordinarily useful if
a resolution were passed by the council ministers and to give
support to the operation in Iraq. I think it should be doable
if the United States wants to invest the political capital in
it.
As far as the Palestinian-Israeli issue is concerned, the
Europeans, in a way, are involved through the European Union,
but, in my judgment, not very constructively. So if, in fact, a
way can be found to bring this into NATO, where both the United
States and the European allies are involved, it might be
helpful.
But I'm afraid that General Clark is right, it would be
very difficult to bring NATO into this debate unless there were
already some political agreement.
Senator Warner. Well, my question was very carefully
phrased--they have to be invited in.
General Shalikashvili. That's right, that both sides would
like NATO to help----
Senator Warner. That's correct.
General Shalikashvili.--implement.
Senator Warner. Stop the fighting.
General Shalikashvili. Right.
Senator Warner. Maintain the peace so that then the
agreement could be worked through.
General McInerney, would you wish to make a comment?
General McInerney. I think, Senator, that the issue with
Palestine and Israel--we have different views on this. I don't
think that will be solved until Iraq comes down and that regime
is changed, because Iraq is fueling, with gasoline, the
Palestinian problem. I think it's directly related. It hasn't
been for years. But, in the last few years, it has been. NATO
is extremely important to us, I happen to believe, and most
generals are virtually internationalists, because we spend a
lot of time there. But the fact is, I don't think the NATO
process is fast enough and decisive enough, and all it does is
convolute the problem.
Clearly, I think, European members will be involved with
action against Iraq. I don't think it will be NATO. But
European nations, in the final analysis, will be involved with
us, in addition to the United Kingdom--I believe others will.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to ask a question regarding the resolution that's
been sent to us and contrasting that with the resolution that
was passed by Congress authorizing what became the Gulf War. I
was not aware until just a few moments ago that the author of
that resolution is present here, but it fits the basis of my
question, because I'm struck by what I consider to be the
wisdom of that resolution and its difference from the one that
we received last week. The President is requesting, in this
instance, very broad authority, which--I guess you have the
copy in front of you, and I have that for the record--and I'll
just say, parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I'm not a historian,
but I've been surprised to discover that in the last 50 years,
Congress has stopped declaring war, that we now pre-approve
these resolutions authorizing use of military force on some
restrained or unrestrained basis and sort of e-mail them down
to the Executive Branch. I don't quite understand what the
basis of that is, because the Constitution very clearly gives
Congress, and Congress alone, the responsibility and the
authority to declare war. But I'll leave that aside.
But it does, I think, give special weight to these
resolutions, because that's really become what Congress does,
and then the Executive Branch is tasked with making the very
momentous decisions of how to exercise that authority.
But in the case of the Gulf War, the resolution required
that the President, when he made a determination that military
force is necessary, before exercising that authority, should
provide to the Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore
of the Senate--in other words, Congress--his determination that
the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other
peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United
Nations Security Council resolutions cited in Subsection A,
and, two, that those efforts have not been and would not be
successful in obtaining such compliance.
I guess my question, gentlemen, is, in terms--the President
understandably wants to be unrestrained in terms of preparing
for military action if and when he determines that that is
necessary. This resolution will clearly give him that
authority. Are these kinds of conditions applied? How do they
impact the military planning, the buildup, the preparedness?
Are the kind of conditions that the 1991 resolution attached--
do those constraint, or do those prevent the military planning
and preparedness and buildup, or not?
I'd give each a you a turn and ask----
General Shalikashvili. Very briefly. I feel very
uncomfortable making judgments on this resolution having
glanced at it for 5 minutes. These are issues that need to be
debated by lawyers, by senators, by your staffs----
Senator Dayton. I'm really asking more in terms of the 1991
resolution.
General Shalikashvili. To the best of my understanding, I
do not see how a difference between that resolution in 1991 and
this one here, that somehow that resolution in 1991 unduly
constrained the military planning or that this one is necessary
to do the necessary planning to be able to do military
operations against Iraq.
I think the issue here is--and, again, I apologize to you,
because I ought to know better than comment on as important a
document as this after two glances at it. What seems to be the
issue is not whether you can plan against Iraq, but whether it
gives the President authority to go much beyond Iraq, should
circumstances arise. Again, constitutional lawyers have to
answer whether the President has that authority anyway, once
he's involved in military operations in the region and
something unexpected arises. But I'm way beyond my competence
on this issue.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
General Clark and others?
General Clark. It is a matter for Congress to determine. I
would hope that before we would use force, as authorized here,
we would have exhausted all other means. If there's a way of
incorporating that in the resolution, I think it makes the
resolution stronger, not weaker.
Senator Dayton. Does it impair the military planning and
preparedness?
General Clark. Not in the language that you just read. I do
think that, of course, the President, as the Commander in
Chief, always has the right to self defense from whatever that
threat may come from. But the more the planning is narrowed and
the more the focus of the operation is made clear and
circumscribed, the greater the ability of the United States
Government to win support for that operation and to offset the
countervailing propaganda that will come out against our aims
and purposes in the region. So I think it's in our own self
interest to have a very tightly focused, tightly worded
resolution authorizing the operation.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
General Hoar.
General Hoar. Yes, sir. As I said a moment ago, I'm not in
favor of one that is quite so broad. I would be much more
comfortable with the 1991 resolution, for all the reasons that
my colleagues point out. I would point out to you that the
military is not encumbered now in planning for this operation.
It's in the open press all the time. They're going apace to
make sure that when the President has the authority and he
tells them to execute, they'll be able to do it.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
General McInerney. Sir, I had read it, because, as a FOX
news military analyst, I was prepared to comment on the news on
it, so that's why I had a little advantage over General
Shalikashvili, but not over General Clark, of course.
[Laughter.]
The reason I feel it's important is--in its broadness--we
want to send a signal that there is trust between this august
body and this administration, and everybody knows it. You have
many ways to prevent an administration from moving out and
doing things. There's no doubt about it. But if you water this
down, you are going to send a signal out to al Qaeda--you may
not want to, but you're going to send it--you're going to send
it to Saddam and say, ``Well, we don't quite trust him. There's
a little waffling. We're not serious.'' Okay? I mean, he puts
us into the club that I call----
Senator Dayton. Wait, wait, General, let me ask--without
having it in front of you, but would the language I recited in
the 1991 resolution, would you consider that watering it down?
General McInerney. Since I didn't read that in great
detail--I heard what you said, but I read this in detail,
because, as I said, I was going to be quizzed on it on the air.
So I'm very comfortable with this broad language. I would have
been more comfortable if the language that you put out a year
ago against Afghanistan would have been broader. The President
and any administration's people always come back to you. You
control the purse strings.
The signal you want to send, Senator, is, ``This nation is
united.'' You want to send that to the U.N., because I happen
to believe--which is different than General Clark--this strong
signal, Mr. Chairman, will ensure that we have a better chance
of getting it through the U.N.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is
expired. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
each of you for your service to our Nation, in uniform and as
you continue to perform service to our Nation. Thank you very
much.
The way that our Armed Forces are currently structured and
as we approach the task of defeating Iraq in the near term, are
we going to be, at the same time, able to sustain the global
war against terrorism? What's your opinion on that? General
Hoar?
General Hoar. My view, of course, is that the global war on
terrorism will only be won through the close coordination with
our friends in Europe and, indeed, in the whole Muslim world,
because integrated intelligence from all sources, police work
as a cooperative effort, law enforcement working with other
friendly countries, and certainly the ability to shut down
finances are critical to our success at the end of the day. But
we have to have that kind of support for the some 90 countries
that are working actively with us today. I should point out to
you that the recent successes in Pakistan and Morocco and
Yemen, as well as Europe, are a good example of that
cooperation.
Senator Bill Nelson. So when the moms and dads come up to
me at home and say, ``How can we do a war in Iraq and, at the
same time, go against all the other bad guys?'' you don't have
any heartburn on this?
General Hoar. I do indeed, sir. I think that the war
against al Qaeda is the first priority. My colleague says we
can have more than one priority, and I agree with that, but
when it's your first priority, you don't do anything that
impairs your ability to execute the first priority.
We have a lot of people around the world in those 90
countries that don't agree with the way the United States
conducts foreign policy or their military policy, and those
countries have constituencies they must respond to. In my
judgment, we need to do the al Qaeda thing first.
General McInerney. Senator, here is my difference, and I
want to make it clear. I believe in this coalition. I believe
in the 90, but I don't want 5 or 10 or 20 to determine what we
do. We are the target. Let's go back. We are the target, and
they are coming after us, and there must be a sense of urgency.
So that's why I can assure you on the air side, the B-2s aren't
flying against al Qaeda right now, the B-52s aren't, the B-1s
aren't. It's a small effort with ground forces. The Third
Armored Division is not committed. The third corps is not
committed. There are a lot of forces that aren't. I think
there's an important role for the simultaneous nature to be
working on these fronts.
We can handle more. The campaign against al Qaeda has now
been moved mostly back into very good police and special
operations work. So that's why when we're talking about this
force and the signal we send, the rapidity of this campaign is
extremely crucial, because I think it will cut down the number
of recruits that go to al Qaeda. When Rome is strong, the
provinces are quiet.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Clark, you were about to say
something?
General Clark. I was going to say that I think it depends
on how we do it. I think it is clear already that we have
engaged this issue. This issue is on the table. Now, if we go
in with a strong coalition, if we go in with a U.N. resolution
behind us, if we go in with the fullest possible weight of
international law and international opinion, then I think it
can reinforce what we're doing against al Qaeda, even though
there will be some distraction on the part of the commanders
and the national leadership who are involved in the campaign.
But, on balance, you might get a reinforcement.
I think if it had gone the other way, if we had not gone to
the United Nations, if we had decided to iron horse this and go
in unilaterally at the outset, I think it would have distracted
us from our campaign. How it eventually turns out, I think, is
still up in the air right now.
General Shalikashvili. I think that militarily it should be
doable to engage both in a war against terrorism and to fight
the al Qaeda issue and to go into Iraq, as least that's what I
think the thinking of the military leaders in the Pentagon is,
to the point that I understand it. I agree with that, although
there might be some particular enabling capabilities that would
be stretched more than we would like.
But politically, it's different. Politically, how much it
would detract from our effort against al Qaeda in the war
against terrorism in the broader sense depends very much on how
successful we are in building a strong, large coalition, and
that, in turn, would be based on how successful we are in
getting a United Nations Security Council resolution
authorizing the use of force, should inspections prove
fruitless.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you for that.
General Hoar, you're a former commander of Central Command.
Last Thursday in front of this committee Secretary Rumsfeld
stirred up a hornets' nest when, in essence, he said--this is
the essence of his message; I'm not quoting him directly--that
he wants to move Central Command into the Central Command AOR.
We've had it outside of the area of the Central Command for
some period of time, even going back to the Gulf War, for a
specific reason. I would be very curious to hear your comments,
please.
General Hoar. Yes, sir. I've been directly associated with
Central Command since 1988 when I went down, first, as Norman
Schwarzkopf's chief of staff, and this has been a subject that
has been discussed perenially. I think that Norm Schwarzkopf
amply demonstrated the ability to go forward and set up and
operate on relatively short notice, if there was a requirement.
The truth of the matter is that the availability of
information is such that you could do it from Tampa. But any
commander that is worth his salt wants to be out on the ground
talking to the sergeants, corporals, lieutenants, and captains
that are flying the airplanes and doing the work out on the
ground and going out to the ships to see what's happening out
there. So if there is going to be a campaign, the theater
commander ought to be in the theater, and it appears to me that
the first steps have been taken for that. The ability to put a
couple of thousand people with their families, cars, cats, and
dogs, and all of the other things that it would take to make
that a permanent headquarters someplace in the region, is
another issue. While I'm not absolutely familiar with this
issue today, I would say that I would go very slowly on that
one. But clearly it can be done on very short notice if the
Secretary of Defense and the Commander in Chief decide that's
the best way to do it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Your colleague, General Zinni, agrees
with you. Here's a quote from General Zinni: ``It would be a
magnet for people who want to kill Americans overseas,'' with
regard to a large permanent headquarters. The temporary
headquarters--which is already underway, by the way--they've
moved 600 folks over to Qatar right now.
Mr. Chairman, I have one further question, but the blue
slip came.
Chairman Levin. Is it a brief question to one of our
witnesses, or a long question to all four of them?
Senator Bill Nelson. It's a brief question, but I'm
entirely happy to wait, if you'd like.
Chairman Levin. Everyone's been going over a little bit. No
reason why you shouldn't if you have one quick question. Try to
limit it to one of our witnesses, if you could.
Senator Bill Nelson. The Scott Speicher family is from
Jacksonville, and I have been in the middle of this. Now we
have a defector that said that he drove him to the hospital.
Even the Defense Department has said that they've moved his
position from killed in action to missing in action. There's
even some that are talking about changing his status to
prisoner of war.
You can't plan a war around a prisoner of war, but what
advice would you give to the senator who represents the family,
as we approach this Iraq campaign? It's a tough one.
General Shalikashvili. Since none of my colleagues are
volunteering, let me give it a stab, because certainly the
Speicher case was something that was very much on the table
when I was chairman.
We started out, at the time, when the Department of the
Navy had declared him as killed in action, and the first
thoughts were surfacing that maybe that was not the correct
step. So lots of discussion occurred whether we should send a
mission in to verify or not.
I come down at it, at this point, very simply. If there is
the slightest question whether one of our people could possibly
still be alive, then we need to do everything we can to verify
that and, if at all possible, obviously, gain his release.
I do not think that this is in conflict at all with perhaps
having to conduct combat operations against Iraq. We have found
ourselves very often in the past having prisoners of war in the
hands of our potential enemy when we entered into combat
operations, but there are an awful lot of channels, from the
international Red Cross to friends, that could help. Certainly
the Russians, with their relationship now with Iraq, all of
that ought to be put--if it isn't already--on full-court press
to try to resolve that issue. After all, there's a family
involved and a wife involved and children involved and parents
and so on. So we owe it to one of our own now that there is a
suspicion that he might be alive.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Let's just take 2 minutes each
on this next round. We're going to have a 2-minute round, if
that's agreeable with my ranking member, just for the second
round here.
If we put a major effort, as a number of you have
suggested, at the U.N. to get a resolution which sets out an
ultimatum, deadlines for unconditional inspections and
disarmament backed up by an authorization by the U.N. to its
member nations to use force to implement that resolution if
that is not complied with, assuming that major effort is made
and we get that kind of a resolution, is it your judgment that
that would provide the best chance, although it may not be a
great chance, but the best chance of obtaining Saddam's
capitulation or compliance with unconditional inspections?
Better than our going in unilaterally, for instance, with the
military mission of regime change?
Let me start with General Clark or General Shalikashvili.
General Clark. I think if we put that major effort in at
the United Nations, that's the important next step. We still
have the option of going in unilaterally after that for some
reason. But I think what we want to create is an all around
pressure on Saddam Hussein so he knows he has no alternative.
I would follow up that kind of a U.N. resolution with an
intrusive inspection process with a force that was stationed
there ready to intervene with specific redlines and so forth to
be able to put the complete pressure on. Ultimately it may take
a U.S. force going in, but how we do it is as important as the
fact of our doing it.
General Shalikashvili. I feel very strongly that a properly
worded United Nations Security Council resolution would be a
powerful tool to help us do what we want to do, which is to
disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. So I think,
yes, I do also believe that a properly worded resolution coming
from this body is a very important tool to help us get the job
done at the United Nations.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. My time is up. I'm not going to
ask the other two. We're going to stick to the 2-minute rule.
We have a vote coming in a few minutes.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do think that the resolution that we passed needs to be
strong and give the President substantial power to
comprehensively deal with this problem. If we constrain the
resolution, that will constrain his ability to negotiate with
the U.N., who are going to also negotiate a resolution,
wouldn't you say, General Clark?
General Clark. I would say that if you constrain it the
wrong way, you undercut the President and our purpose there,
yes. I think you need a strong resolution. I think you need a
prompt resolution. I think you need a resolution that gets the
very highest number of votes from this body.
That having been said, I think you want a resolution also
that makes it unambiguous what our purpose is and that doesn't
invite other objections that are extraneous to our purpose. So
I think you have to get the balance right.
Senator Sessions. Well, I agree. I think this resolution
would do that. I'm willing to listen to debate on it and see if
we can improve it, but I am not unhappy with the resolution, as
it's presently being proposed.
I would agree with you--all of you--on your concern about a
new Iraq. General McInerney, I think a liberation of Iraq is
exactly what we're doing. The French helped us liberate against
Great Britain--England at the time. So I think it's a
legitimate moral thing for us to do, and we do have an
obligation to try to do what we can to help put together a
government, which it seems we have been really very successful
in doing in Afghanistan. It's an extraordinarily difficult
country, would you not agree?
There has been some discussion about this, I know, with the
Defense Department. Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz was quoted in
The New York Times magazine this weekend in a feature on him,
on how important he thought it was.
I see great potential for good, not just for the children
of Iraq who will no longer be facing an embargo that makes life
difficult for them, but for the entire region. Would you
comment on the positives that could come out of a liberated
Iraq?
General McInerney. I think they're enormous. I think it is
the linchpin of our whole strategy in the Middle East. A year
after that, Iran will get rid of the mullahs. They're trying to
do that now. This signal that we send, and the jubilation that
you see in Baghdad, similar to Kabul, will change the whole
tenor of the world. The sum of all your fears will disappear. I
assure you. I get this from the Iraqi people that I'm talking
to.
Now, there are some that will say, well, some are good,
some are bad. The fact is, at least there's a communication.
I'm tremendously impressed with the Iraqi people. I have not
seen any country that doesn't flourish in a democracy. There's
something about freedom, when they know that they flourish. I
think that, as difficult as Bosnia was, the positives of that
are there. So I'm very optimistic, and then I think that the
signal goes out very clearly that this Nation is going to
combat terrorists wherever they are. I think you'll see things
in Palestine change very quickly.
Senator Sessions. Well, I hope the U.N. will get with us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. May I just say that
one of the people that I have learned a great deal from--he's
now deceased--is Colonel Harry Summers, who was the leading
analyst of the Vietnam War. He wrote an excellent book on
strategy of the Vietnam War in context. He looked at all the
basic principles of war that Clausewitz articulated in the 19th
century. Colonel Summers said, ``The first principle of war is
the principle of the objective. It is the first principle
because all else flows from it.''
That's my question of you. What is the objective? Is the
objective a regime of inspections that leads to disarmament, at
which point we probably have a chance to get more of our allies
onboard, probably have a good chance to get a Security Council
resolution that stiffens our hand in that objective? Or is the
objective regime change against a regime defender, a regime
survivor that possesses biological and chemical weapons, and,
when his regime is threatened, may, indeed, use them on us,
may, indeed, fire a SCUD or two on Israel, and now we know
Israel will attack? Does that unleash the dogs of war in the
Middle East? Who knows? What is the objective here?
We know today that the Third Infantry Division down at Fort
Stewart, Georgia, with thousands of young families, is going to
be the point coming out of Kuwait into Southern Iraq in terms
of the attack. What am I going to tell those young families is
the objective of the use of force in Iraq?
General Shalikashvili.
General Shalikashvili. Well, the fact that you ask the
question, I think, is an indication that, at least to your
satisfaction, the administration has not been clear on that.
Whether that, in their own minds, is clear or not, I don't
know.
To me, almost from the beginning the objective has been to
eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the ability
of Iraq to produce more of those. Unfortunately, we've had as
many people talk on Iraq and what our objective is and what it
isn't as there are people who like to talk. So the issue became
confused.
But I say this in all due respect to the administration.
The administration doesn't control all the voices that speak on
that. So it is very likely that those administration officials
who come and testify before you are very clear on what the
objective is. I can only tell you what I believe the objective
ought to be and what I think, from the very beginning, it was.
Senator Cleland. Thank you, sir.
General Clark.
General Clark. I think the objective is the enforcement of
the U.N. resolutions and the disarmament, or at least his
giving up the weapons and the capabilities for mass
destruction.
On the other hand, I think there is a problem that the
administration and some of its proponents bring up, and that is
as long as he attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction--
even if the inspections showed he had none--he would still be a
threat of acquiring them.
So I think we're put in a difficult position. So it's not
going to be possible to cut a deal and say, ``If you pass an
inspection, we'll forget about you as a problem.'' So I think
what we're committing ourselves to by going after the weapons
of mass destruction and by saying that we want intrusive
inspections to do this, is an indefinite regime of intrusive
inspections, with the burden of proof on Saddam Hussein to
prove a change of intent, rather than a simple, ``We'll check.
If we don't see anything, okay, you're free to continue on.''
So I think it's a very high standard, but I think it is
ultimately a disarmament.
Senator Cleland. Thank you, General Clark.
General Hoar.
General Hoar. Yes, sir. I think that the Secretary of State
had it right when he described disarmament as the objective.
However, unless I've misunderstood, I believe that the Vice
President of the United States said regime change. So I think
that there is disconnect.
But I would say that in my experience, when I was on active
duty and immediately thereafter, since the Gulf War, regime
change has always been the objective. In my judgment, we were
always prepared to move the goal posts if we had to. When some
colleagues and I, working with the Israeli government, were
looking for a way to bring Iraq into the multinational track on
the peace process, we were given a wave-off by people in the
government and told to stop.
Senator Cleland. Do you have any idea why President Bush,
in 1991, didn't pursue a regime change?
General Hoar. I'd rather not speculate on that. I would say
that adequate plans were not developed to make sure that it
happened.
General McInerney. Sir, I think the objectives are regime
change and to liberate the people of Iraq and eliminate the
weapons of mass destruction.
Senator Cleland. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. I say to my good friend from Georgia, if
you would look at the 1991 resolution, it gives authorization
to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to the United
Nations Security Council resolution. That resolution wasn't
explicit in the authority. That's why I do not want to see the
resolution that's before Congress by the President today
weakened.
General Clark, you and I are good friends. We can always
debate a little bit. When you said, ``I'd want as many votes as
possible,'' with all due respect, sir, I don't want to see us
reach the lowest common denominator and present a resolution
that doesn't have all the teeth that are in this one. I'd
rather have, again, a five-vote margin with a strong resolution
that this Congress will fall in behind as we march forward to
the U.N. under the McInerney doctrine. That was fairly clear.
My question is as follows to each of you. I sit here and
listen to this, ``Well, let's get the U.N. to have an intrusive
inspection regime.'' I don't know what scrap of evidence is
before us that Saddam Hussein is going to accept it, and,
indeed, he made pronouncements to the contrary of recent. But
then ``backed up by force.'' Question, specifically, what is
the composition of that force? Who puts it together? Who leads
it? Is NATO a candidate, General Clark?
Second, when they start kicking down doors and finding the
very evidence which confirms the indictment of the world
against him, is Saddam Hussein going to sit there twiddling his
thumbs, and the Republican Guards with their hand in their
pocket while this force roams around and finds the hidden
weapons of mass destruction?
What's the composition of the force? What nations are
represented? Who leads it?
General Shalikashvili, would you lead off on this?
General Shalikashvili. You put me in a tough spot, because
I never advocated----
Senator Warner. That's the second time today I've done it.
General Shalikashvili. Yes. Because I never advocated that
step that you are now addressing about being ``backed up by
force.''
Senator Warner. Well, it's talked about in all of the--
you've read about it a good deal.
General Shalikashvili. My view is we need to have a strong
resolution that permits unfettered inspections. If those
inspections do not produce the results that we want, which most
likely they will not, it has to authorize the use of force to
achieve the aim, which, in my judgment, is the disarmament of
Iraq.
Senator Warner. General Clark.
General Clark. The purpose of going through the inspections
up front is to build legitimacy that way for what you want to
do. The force that would enforce it is the same force that's
going to go in there and disarm him and do worse. I would hope
that NATO would be involved in that.
But, we've been talking all afternoon about how to muster
the diplomatic leverage to be able to get the job done with the
greatest power and the greatest coalition and reduce the
ancillary risks, and so I think that there is a step beyond
simply sending Hans Blix back in there with a hundred
inspectors to drive around that the United Nations could
authorize up front that would give us greater coercive leverage
against Saddam Hussein.
The closer we get to the use of force, the greater the
likelihood that we're going to see movement on the part of
Iraq, even though it's a very small likelihood. The more we
build up the inspections idea, the greater the legitimacy of
the United States' effort in the eyes of the world. So unless
there's information that we're not being presented that says we
have to take this action right now to go in and disrupt Saddam
Hussein--we can't wait a week, we can't wait four weeks, or
whatever--then it seems to me that we should use the time
available to build up our legitimacy. That's why I'm advocating
intrusive inspections.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
General Hoar.
General Hoar. Sir, I agree with my colleagues. I would just
point out that your questions about who's going to lead this
force and how big they are and what they're going to do, I
think, has an obvious answer. When you think through that, with
a country that may not have the greatest armed forces in the
world, but they're certainly capable of dealing a difficult
blow to a relatively small force, I think the purpose of the
coalition, of going through the U.N., going through the steps,
is that, at the end of the day, we will have a coalition that
agrees that we have exhausted all possibilities and it's time
to take action.
Senator Warner. Nothing in my question suggested that we
should do other than what we're doing now--the President has
gone to the U.N., followed up by the Secretary of State trying
to get it--but that there's this fabrication out there that
we're going to go in there with a new type of inspection regime
with teeth in it. Well, who are the teeth? I'm not sure that
there's a clear distinction between the teeth that they would
have to exercise and the follow-on, which could only take place
after there's a failure of the inspections, when the member
nations may use such force as they deem necessary to protect
their security rights.
General McInerney.
General McInerney. Senator, I would like to do all those
things that General Clark said. But the fact is, Saddam has
already responded. Saddam has already sent us back a letter
that he will not let us do anything that violates sovereignty.
Well, kicking someone's door down going in violates
sovereignty. Now we can go through that process.
The point is, in the final analysis, he's not going to do
it. Maybe I've gotten too pragmatic about it, but we've watched
him for a long time, and the only thing he understands and will
take action on is force. That, again, is why it's so important
that this body come forward with a very strong resolution--and
I agree with you, we're better to have a strong resolution with
four votes on it, on a majority, rather than a weak resolution,
because we send the wrong signal to the world.
Senator Warner. I agree. Cooperation is the key to any
inspection regime. I haven't seen a fragment of that
cooperation yet.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In June of this year, at West Point, the President
articulated what some view as a new doctrine on the right to
preemptive warfare. For some of you, this situation is perhaps
the first instance of that. Some advocates would say that in
the post-September 11 environment, that's an unavoidable
military option, and others say it would be an unprecedented
step with seismic consequences, in terms of future situations
of this type in the future.
Could you try to pierce the veil of the future and the
world situation? Do you think of this as a specific instance
that would not have a broader consequence? Or do you think that
this would be an instance, if it's viewed as a preemptive
attack, where it would be destabilizing in future
confrontations?
Any or all of you.
General Shalikashvili. I think words matter. In this
particular case, I think it is advantageous to build your case
on the fact that Saddam Hussein has violated a series of United
Nations resolutions and that he has particularly not allowed
the inspection regime that would lead to a disarmament of Iraq.
I say that because to take it the other way sets up a precedent
that we might not wish to have out there on the street unless
it's absolutely necessary. I'm not sure that, in this case,
it's absolutely necessary to build our case on this.
I clearly am concerned about this becoming a precedent-
setting event, and what do we then say to Pakistan or India,
who feel threatened, one by the other, long in advance of that
other country, in fact, having taken an action? There are other
cases where this could come and so destabilize the system that
we want to keep stable.
I recognize that, in some cases, it might be unavoidable to
use that as the cause for our actions. I think, so far, in our
discussion in the United Nations and in this resolution before
you, that kind of rationale has not been used, and I'm actually
happy that that rationale has not been used in that kind of
context.
Senator Dayton. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, but
could the other three have a chance to respond, if time
permits?
Chairman Levin. Yes, take one quick minute, if you would.
General Clark. I'd prefer to go after Saddam Hussein as
we're proceeding with the facts at hand. I am concerned about
enunciating a doctrine of preemption, especially the
pronouncement that it replaces deterrence and what the
implications will be for that. I think it's far better to work
through on the English case-law basis for changes in law than
by trying to make sweeping pronouncements like this.
In fact, we're proceeding pretty well on the basis of what
we had without calling this an instance of preemption. In all
of the other discussions we've had within the government, over
my experience--and there have been many of them where we've
talked about preemption--we've talked in terms of going after
specific facilities or specific capabilities. We've never
talked about preemptively taking down a regime and changing a
government, and I think that's a crucial distinction in this
case.
You also have the problem in preemption of what is the
imminence of the threat. Here, as we've discussed this
afternoon, it's indeterminate what the imminence of the threat
is. The most conclusive argument is that you can't trust the
intelligence anymore to give you any idea of what the imminence
of the threat is. That leads to a series of steps that we don't
want to pursue here in our country.
So I'm comfortable with where we are moving on Iraq, but I
don't see the need for bringing in this doctrine to it at this
point.
General Hoar. Sir, very briefly, I think that Iraq is not
in compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, and that
should be ample reason, if we need a reason, to go forward. I
share with General Shalikashvili the concern of the message
that this sends to other countries, particularly the example
that he used between India and Pakistan, but there are others,
as well.
Thank you.
General McInerney. Sir, I happen to believe in the
preemption policy. I don't think it's required in this
particular instance. I think deterrence, when you have
terrorism--weapons of mass destruction have changed the
calculus in terrorist states. They have changed the calculus.
So the President must make those decisions at the appropriate
time, not required in this, because there's 16 U.N. resolutions
that he's violated. But almost daily he fires on our airplanes
and coalition airplanes, which is an act of war. Anytime you
fire on a nation's airplanes it's an act of war. So there is
ample evidence for us to respond, and he continues to defy us
because we continue to accept it.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Let me thank each of our witnesses. Some of
you have come some distance. Others have made time available in
their schedule. In all cases, your schedules are heavy, for
good reason, because of the experience that you bring to this
issue and to a whole lot of other issues that you address.
Saddam is clearly a problem and a threat to the region and
to the world. I would just hope that the actions of this
country would be focused on uniting the world to force
compliance with disarmament in Iraq. Uniting the world, it
seems to me, has great pluses, both in terms of more quickly
achieving our goals militarily, should they be necessary, and
also avoiding some of the risks which are incumbent if we're
either proceeding unilaterally or being perceived as proceeding
unilaterally.
There may be some additional comments or questions that we
would like from you for the record, in which case we will get
to you within the next 48 hours.
Again, our thanks to all of you, and we will stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:42 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
U.S. POLICY ON IRAQ
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:44 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Cleland, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson,
Warner, Inhofe, Allard, Hutchinson, Sessions, and Collins.
Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard
W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Maren Leed,
professional staff member; and Peter K. Levine, general
counsel.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
Republican staff director; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff
member; L. David Cherington, minority counsel; Edward H. Edens
IV, professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional
staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff member;
Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Thomas L.
MacKenzie, professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas,
professional staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Daniel K.
Goldsmith, and Andrew Kent.
Committee members' assistants present: Brady King,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Marshall A. Hevron, assistant to
Senator Landrieu; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to
Senator Akaka; Peter A. Contostavlos and Eric Pierce,
assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; William Todd Houchins,
assistant to Senator Dayton; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant to
Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas
Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr.,
assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator
Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody. Senator Warner
is a few minutes away, but his staff says that he has no
objection to our beginning.
The Armed Services Committee meets this morning for the
fourth of our series of hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq. We
welcome back to the committee Dr. James Schlesinger, former
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of
Central Intelligence; and Samuel Berger, former Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs.
In their previous positions, our witnesses provided advice
to the presidents that they served regarding the use of
military force to further U.S. national security interests.
They helped shape a national security strategy based on these
interests and advised the presidents on its implementation.
Over the years, Dr. Schlesinger and Mr. Berger have also
provided advice to this committee on Iraq and on many other
issues.
Two days ago, three of the four former senior military
commanders who testified before the committee offered a strong
endorsement of the need for a multilateral approach to dealing
with Iraq. They stressed that working with the U.N. to achieve
a resolution regarding inspections and disarmament backed up by
the threat of the use of force by member states to compel
compliance would bring great political and military advantages.
General John Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the committee that, ``a U.N.
resolution authorizing the use of force would,'' in his words,
``be a very powerful tool.'' He went on to say that, ``we need
to impress upon Saddam Hussein that he's not just facing the
United States, but that he's facing the will of the majority of
the world. We must also ensure that we have made it possible
for as many of our friends and allies to join us, some of whom
believe very deeply that you should go to war only unless you
are directly attacked or with the sanction of the United
Nations.'' He added, ``every time we undermine the credibility
of the United Nations we are probably hurting ourselves more
than anybody else.''
The general told us that, ``we must, under no
circumstances, ever create the impression that the United
States is not free to go to war, but that is very different
than not trying to achieve the kind of resolution that, in this
case, we want. It would make our job easier, it would help us
in the future, and it would surely have an impact on how Saddam
Hussein reacts to the current resolutions.''
General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, commented that the President had made the right move by
going to the U.N., stating that, ``the President's strong
statement provides leverage to build a new coalition for
proceeding on a path of diplomacy backed by force. I think it's
the appropriate path.'' Then he added, ``we need to be certain
that we are really working through the United Nations in an
effort to strengthen the institution in this process, and not
simply `check a block.' '' He advocated taking the necessary
time to build the strongest coalition possible to plan for a
post-conflict Iraq, and then, if necessary, taking military
actions with our allies and with the blessing of the United
Nations.
General Joseph Hoar, former Commander in Chief of the U.S.
Central Command, testified that we should, ``take the time to
do the tough diplomatic work to gain support in the Security
Council for disarmament, and, failing disarmament, then
military action.'' General Hoar cautioned us to get the timing
and the means of going to war right, to consider the military
risks, and to plan for what comes next in Iraq after war.
I, too, believe that we should focus on mobilizing the
world community to give Saddam Hussein a clear ultimatum to
disarm and comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions or
face military action by a multinational U.N.-authorized
coalition of member states to compel compliance.
I also believe that we should not announce to the world at
this time that we will follow a unilateral go-it-alone policy
if the U.N. does not act. Telling friends and potential allies
at the time that we're seeking their support, but that it's
``our way or the highway,'' will divide the world, not unite
it. This doesn't mean giving the U.N. a veto over our actions.
No one I know of is willing to do that. But what the
multilateral approach does is keep the pressure on the U.N. to
act and not let them off the hook by signaling that we want to
be the world's police force.
We look to our witnesses today to share with us their views
on the administration's policy and to offer their advice on
what would be the best possible strategy for dealing with the
threat posed by Iraq.
Senator Warner, I know, is going to be here at any minute.
I think what I'll do, however, is call on the witnesses at this
point because we're going to have some votes in 45 minutes.
Then when Senator Warner comes, I would offer him the
opportunity of making his opening statement at some point where
it's not disruptive of the witnesses' presentation.
After the opening remarks by our witnesses and by Senator
Warner, we would then have a 6-minute round of questions
following the normal early bird procedure.
Mr. Berger.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL R. BERGER, FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Mr. Berger. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I
welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the critical
issues of Iraq faced by the United States and the international
community. I believe the Iraqi regime does pose a serious
potential threat to the stability of a combustible and vital
region of the world, and, therefore, to the United States.
Doing nothing, in my judgement, is not an acceptable option.
The challenge is to do the right thing in the right way,
enhancing, not undermining, the stability of the region and the
overall security of the United States.
It is important for us to be as sharply focused as we can
in an uncertain world about the nature of the threat. We have
focused a great deal on Saddam Hussein's capabilities, and
properly so, but capability is not the same as threat. That
also involves questions of intention and urgency. It is not
just the ``what,'' but also the ``why'' and the ``when.''
Threat is only half the equation for war. It must be balanced
against the ``how,'' the cost and risks of proceeding.
First, a few words about the ``what'' and the ``why.'' We
know Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons. He has for
nearly 20 years, as we know only so well from his use of them
against his own people and the Iranians. He has deadly
stockpiles of biological weapons. The possibility that Saddam
Hussein will use his biological and chemical weapons to attack
us directly or in concert with terrorists cannot be dismissed.
We must continually evaluate it in light of available
intelligence. However, it would be uncharacteristic for a man
who has placed the highest premium on self-preservation. There
would be a significant chance of detection followed, quite
simply, by his annihilation. It is certainly possible, but
perhaps no more so than the possibility that he will use these
weapons against our troops or our allies if we attack him.
It is his nuclear weapons capability that concerns me the
most. I believe Saddam Hussein's strategic objective was and
remains to assert dominance over the Gulf region. We stopped
him in 1991. Amazingly, he tested our will again in 1994,
moving troops in that direction. We deployed 30,000 U.S. forces
to the region, and he pulled back. This region is critical for
the United States and the world strategically and economically.
I believe that a nuclear Iraq can change its fundamental
dynamic, affecting how others behave toward us and toward
allies such as Israel and emboldening Saddam Hussein to
believe, rightly or wrongly, that he can attack his neighbors
and, because of his nuclear capability, we will hesitate.
Hussein maintains an active and aggressive nuclear weapons
program. Most analysts believe that for him to develop his own
capacity to produce fissile material, nuclear fuel, it will
require several years. Acquiring that nuclear fuel abroad could
enable him to produce a nuclear weapon in 1 or 2 years,
according to Prime Minister Blair's statement on Monday.
He has been seeking such material for many years. So far as
we know, there has not yet been any case where significant
quantities of weapons-grade fissile material have been
diverted. Experts such as the highly respected International
Institute for Strategic Studies have concluded that obtaining
this material remains a formidable challenge--not impossible,
but unlikely.
I emphasize this point not to suggest that the Iraqi
nuclear weapons program is not unacceptably dangerous to the
United States--indeed, I believe it is--but the trajectory of
his nuclear program affects the ``when'' of the threat
equation, whether we have time to proceed in a way that
isolates Saddam, builds a broader international coalition, and
minimizes, to the extent possible, the risks.
We most likely have the military power to do this virtually
alone, but shifting the world's focus back to Saddam's
intransigence will give us not only the power to act, but far
greater legitimacy if we do so. The extent to which the
legitimacy of our actions is recognized and accepted
internationally, that we act collectively and not largely
alone, is not an abstraction. It greatly reduces the risks of
any future military action. Those risks are just as real and
serious as the threat. They include inflaming an already
volatile region in a way that undermines governments such as
Jordan or Musharraf in Pakistan, and, worst case, leaves us
with a radical regime in Pakistan with a ready-made nuclear
arsenal. This increases the likelihood that a conflict breaks
along a dangerous Israeli-Arab fault line, diverting us from
the war against a terrorist threat that remains real and
virulent at a time when cooperation--military, intelligence,
and political--is essential, and undercutting burden-sharing in
what will certainly be a long, arduous task of maintaining
stability in Iraq and rebuilding after Saddam Hussein,
something that will not be easy or inexpensive.
That brings me to the essential question of how to go
forward. How should we proceed in a way that maximizes our
position?
First, I believe we should press forward, as Secretary
Powell is doing, for a United Nations Security Council
resolution that makes clear that the world, not just the United
States and Great Britain, expects compliance by Iraq with its
disarmament obligations within a fixed time period. It should
make clear that disarmament is Iraq's responsibility, not the
inspectors', requiring affirmative cooperation. Any resolution
should spell out what ``unfettered'' means--any site, any time,
without notice. It should clear away the cobwebs that
encumbered the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM),
vague notions about Iraqi sovereignty or special sites that
provide the Iraqi Government with a pretext for interference.
Yes, there are a string of broken resolutions, but we are
in an entirely new circumstance here contemplating a military
invasion of Iraq, and the world expects us to test the
nonmilitary option before we move to the military one. We also
owe that to the men and women who will be risking their lives
if we decide to do so.
Unfettered inspections, Mr. Chairman, may not be the path
to disarmament, but a serious effort to secure them is the path
to isolating Saddam and gaining broader international support
for what may be necessary if we fail, and we'd best obtain that
legitimacy up front, because if military action is undertaken,
we will be in Iraq for a long time.
Second, with such a resolution, I would urge the United
Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC), the new U.N. inspection organization, to move
expeditiously to test Saddam Hussein's intentions with hard
sites, not easy ones. What is at question is not whether U.N.
inspectors can find the needles in a haystack, but whether,
faced with the current situation, the Iraqi Government will
cooperate or obstruct.
Third, I hope that, as was done after September 11, the
draft congressional resolution submitted by the administration
can be sharpened and adopted in a bipartisan fashion.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we reserve the right to act
primarily by ourselves if we have to, but I don't think we are
at that point today, and doing so substantially increases the
risks that we will wind up with a regime that is less stable--
with a region that is less stable rather than more peaceful and
democratic. We can proceed in a strategic, methodical manner to
put Saddam Hussein in a corner, not us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berger follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Samuel R. Berger
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I welcome this opportunity
to discuss with you the critical issues of Iraq faced by the United
States and the international community.
I believe the Iraqi regime does pose a serious potential threat to
stability in a combustible and vital region of the world and,
therefore, to the United States. Doing nothing, in my judgment, is not
an acceptable option. The challenge is to do the right thing, in the
right way, enhancing not undermining the stability of the region and
the overall security of the United States.
It is important for us to be as sharply focused as we can in an
uncertain world about the nature of the threat. We have focused a great
deal on Saddam Hussein's capabilities, and properly so. But capability
is not the same thing as threat, which also involves questions of
intention and urgency. It is not just the ``what,'' but also the
``why'' and the ``when.'' Threat is only half the equation for war. It
must be balanced against the ``how''--the costs and risks--of
proceeding.
First, a few words about the ``what'' and the ``why.'' We know
Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons--he has for nearly 20 years
as we know only so well from his use of them against his own people and
the Iranians. He has deadly stockpile of biological weapons.
The possibility that Saddam Hussein will use his biological and
chemical weapons to attack us, directly or in concert with terrorists,
cannot be dismissed. We must continually evaluate it in light of
available intelligence. But it would be uncharacteristic for a man who
has placed the highest premium on self-preservation. There would be a
significant chance of detection, followed--quite simply--by his
annihilation. It is certainly possible, but no more so than the
possibility he will use these weapons against our troops or our allies
if we attack him.
It is his nuclear weapons capability that concerns me the most. I
believe Saddam Hussein's strategic objective was, and remains, to
assert dominance over the Gulf region. We stopped him in 1991.
Amazingly, he tested our will again in 1994, moving troops in that
direction; we deployed 30,000 U.S. forces to the region, and he pulled
back.
This region is critical for the U.S. and the world--strategically
and economically. I believe that a nuclear Iraq can change its
fundamental dynamic, affecting how others behave--toward us and toward
allies such as Israel--and emboldening Saddam Hussein to believe,
rightly or wrongly, that he can attack his neighbors and, because of
his nuclear capability, we will hesitate.
Hussein maintains an active and aggressive nuclear weapons program.
Most analysts believe that for him to develop his own capacity to
produce fissile material--nuclear fuel--will require several years.
Acquiring that nuclear fuel abroad--the ``wild card''--could enable him
to produce a nuclear weapon in 1 or 2 years, according to Prime
Minister Blair.
He has been seeking such material for many years. So far as we
know, there has not yet been any case where significant quantities of
weapons-grade fissile material has been diverted. Experts such as the
highly respected International Institute for Strategic Studies have
concluded that obtaining this material remains a ``formidable''
challenge--not impossible but ``unlikely.''
I emphasize this point not to suggest that the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program is not ``strategically unacceptably dangerous'' to us;
indeed, I believe it is. But the trajectory of his nuclear program
affects the ``when'' of the threat equation: whether we have time to
proceed in a way that isolates Saddam, builds a broader international
coalition and minimizes, to the extent possible, the risks.
We most likely have the military power to do this virtually alone.
But shifting the world's focus back to Saddam's intransigence will give
us not only the power to act but far greater legitimacy if we do so.
The extent to which the legitimacy of our actions is recognized and
accepted internationally--that we can act collectively and not largely
alone--is not an abstraction. It greatly reduces the risks of any
future military action.
Those risks are just as real and serious as the threat. They
include:
Inflaming an already volatile region in a way that
undermines governments such as Jordan or Musharraf in Pakistan
and--worst case--leave us with a radical regime in Pakistan
with a ready-made nuclear arsenal.
Increasing the likelihood that a conflict breaks along
a dangerous Israeli-Arab fault line.
Diverting us from the war against a terrorist threat
that remains real and virulent, at a time when cooperation--
military, intelligence, and political--is essential.
Undercutting burden-sharing in what will certainly be
a long, arduous task of maintaining stability in Iraq and
rebuilding after Saddam Hussein--something that will not be
easy or inexpensive.
This brings me to the essential question: the ``how'' of going
forward.
How should we proceed in a way that maximizes our position?
First, I believe we should press forward, as Secretary Powell is
doing, for a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolution that makes clear
that the world--not just the U.S. and Britain--expects compliance by
Iraq with its disarmament obligations within a fixed time period. It
should make clear that disarmament is Iraq's responsibility, not the
inspectors--requiring affirmative cooperation. Any resolution should
spell out what ``unfettered'' means--any site, any time without notice.
It should clear away the cobwebs that encumbered UNSCOM--vague notions
about Iraqi sovereignty or special sites that provide the Iraqi
government with a pretext for interference.
Yes, there are a string of broken resolutions. But we are in an
entirely new circumstance--contemplating a military invasion of Iraq--
and the world expects us to test the non-military option before we move
to a military one. We also owe that to the men and women who will be
risking their lives if we decide to do so.
Unfettered inspections may not be the path to disarmament. But a
serious effort to secure them is the path to isolating Saddam and
gaining broader international support for what may be necessary if they
fail. We better obtain that legitimacy up front, because if military
action is undertaken, we will be in Iraq for a long time.
Second, with such a resolution, I would urge UNMOVIC to move
expeditiously to test Saddam Hussein's intentions, with hard sites not
easy ones. What is in question is not whether UN inspectors can find
the needles in the haystack, but whether--faced with the current
situation--the Iraqi government will cooperate or obstruct.
Third, I hope that, as was done after September 11, the draft
congressional resolution submitted by the administration can be
sharpened and adopted in a bipartisan fashion.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we reserve the right to act primarily by
ourselves if we have to. But I don't think we are at that point today
and doing so substantially increases the risks that we will wind up
with a region that is less stable, rather than more peaceful and
democratic. We can proceed in a strategic, methodical manner to put
Saddam Hussein in a corner, not us.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Berger.
Dr. Schlesinger, welcome.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF ENERGY, AND DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank the
committee for its invitation to appear before you today to
discuss the question of United States policy toward Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, as the President has stated, this is a test
of whether the United Nations, in the face of perennial
defiance by Saddam Hussein of its resolutions and, indeed, of
his own promises will, like the League of Nations over half a
century ago, turn out to be simply another institution given to
talk.
For more than 11 years since the end of the Gulf War, the
record is replete with U.N. resolutions condemning Iraq for
``serious violations,'' ``continued violations,'' and
``flagrant violations.'' For that entire period, Saddam Hussein
has regularly and successfully played the game of defiance.
In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act approving
the use of force to bring Saddam Hussein into compliance.
Shortly thereafter, the Secretary General reached agreement
with Saddam Hussein in a memorandum of understanding that
promised, ``immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted
access.'' Failure to do so would result in, ``the severest
consequences.'' Some months later, Saddam Hussein excluded
American inspectors and, by October, had ceased cooperation
with U.N. inspectors entirely.
In September 2002, recognizing the growing pressure
stemming from the United States, Saddam Hussein has once again
informed the United Nations that he is willing to ``allow
unconditional return of the inspectors.'' His intention, quite
obviously, is, again, to repeat that all-too-familiar cycle. I
think it is clear, Mr. Chairman, in light of our previous
experience, that we should observe that old adage, ``once
burned, twice shy.''
Will the United Nations prove as feckless as the League of
Nations? Mr. Chairman, in 1935, Mussolini invaded Abyssinia.
The League of Nations took note of this challenge to the
international order. Day after day, week after week, the League
deliberated what to do. The sessions went on endlessly. After
each session, there was a press conference. After some weeks,
one of the reporters present summarized the situation as
follows: ``On the surface, very little is happening. But
beneath the surface, nothing is happening.'' [Laughter.]
Today, the United Nations faces a test of whether or not it
can act more effectively than did the League. The League failed
because its key members wanted it to fail. Endless talk at the
League was safe, while action under the League's auspices might
have been dangerous.
There are some members of the U.N. who have the same idea
today, that talk is safer than action. If there is to be a
difference, it will arise from a conviction in the United
Nations that the U.S. President and Congress are determined
that action will take place, either action by Saddam Hussein to
disarm or action under U.N. auspices to disarm him or, if
necessary, action outside the U.N. framework.
Mr. Chairman, discussion of this need for action has been
muddied up by the issue of preemption. To be sure, the
President at West Point used the word ``preemption'' in
connection with the longer term design of U.S. policy. Other
officials have from time to time used the phrase in connection
with Iraq.
Nonetheless, whatever the merits or the demerits of a
policy of preemption in the longer run, it has little to do
with Iraq. Preemption implies a surprise attack or preventive
war. Surely in the speculations about Iraq, the word
``surprise'' cannot be employed when one continuously reads
about our supposed war plans in the daily newspapers. In the
case of Iraq, preemption is limited to the obvious and rather
circumscribed meaning that if we are to deal with Iraq, we
should do so before Saddam Hussein acquires nuclear weapons in
number.
Iraq is a special case. We have been engaged in an ongoing
conflict with Iraq since 1990. Vigorous action in the course of
an ongoing conflict hardly constitutes preventive war. At this
time, U.S. and British aircraft are overflying the northern no-
fly zone and the southern no-fly zone. They are overflying some
60 percent of the country. Iraq has been firing anti-aircraft
artillery and surface-to-air missiles at our aircraft. Our
aircraft have attacked Iraqi air defenses and other targets.
Indeed, in recent months, Saddam's air defenses have shot down
three of our Predator aircraft. Moreover, the United States has
established a virtual protectorate for the Kurds who live in
Northern Iraq. Surely we can acknowledge that in these
conditions of ongoing and continued conflict, the word
``preemption'' does not really apply. Iraq, whatever the merits
or demerits of preemption for long-run policy, remains a
special case.
In an ongoing conflict, the issue of preemption appears to
be close to meaningless. Indeed, historically we have regarded
preemption as permissible, even in the far more difficult case
of the formerly neutral. In July 1940, less than a month after
the fall of France, Winston Churchill had the British fleet
attack the French, Britain's recent ally, at the naval base of
Mers-el-Kebir, killing 1,300 French sailors and sinking a
number of ships. Others escaped to British harbors, to join the
Free French, or to Toulon. More significantly, in November
1942, American troops landed in and occupied French North
Africa, then under the control of Vichy France. To be sure,
after our troops had entered French North Africa, we did
receive an invitation to come in. Thus, as the record suggests,
in time of war, restrictions on preemption are loosened.
I have gone into this issue at some length, Mr. Chairman,
for I fear that it has generated more heat than light, and
needlessly so. We must not allow conceptual disputes to obscure
the underlying reality. The United States has been for a decade
and is now deeply engaged in the conflict with Iraq. We should
like the support of other nations as we approach the decisive
moment. Strong backing of the President by Congress will elicit
stronger support from other nations at the U.N.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be happy to answer any
questions that you or other members of the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. James R. Schlesinger
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
I thank the committee for its invitation to appear before you today
to discuss the question of United States policy towards Iraq. The issue
before you is more than a test of the United Nations, it is equally a
test of the unity and resolve of the American government. The greater
the degree to which the President and Congress are united in purpose
with respect to Iraq, the greater is the likelihood that the United
Nations will take a firm and appropriate stand towards Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, as the President has stated, this is a test of
whether the United Nations--in the face of perennial defiance by Saddam
Hussein of its resolutions and, indeed, of his own promises--will, like
the League of Nations over half a century ago, turn out to be simply
another institution given only to talk. For more than 11 years, since
the end of the Gulf War, the record is replete with U.N. resolutions
condemning Iraq for ``serious violations,'' ``continued violations,''
and ``flagrant violations.'' For that entire period, Saddam Hussein has
regularly and successfully played that game of defiance. In 1998,
Congress adopted a strong resolution approving the use of force to
bring Saddam Hussein into compliance. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary
General reached agreement with Saddam Hussein in a Memorandum of
Understanding that promised ``immediate, unconditional, and
unrestricted access.'' Failure to do so would result in ``severest
consequences.'' Some months later, Saddam Hussein excluded American
inspectors, and by October had ceased cooperation with U.N. inspectors
entirely.
In September of 2002, recognizing the growing pressure stemming
from the United States, Saddam Hussein has once again informed the
United Nations that he is willing to ``allow unconditional return'' of
the inspectors. His intention, quite obviously, is again to repeat that
all too familiar cycle. I think it is clear, Mr. Chairman, in light of
our previous experience that we should observe that old adage, ``once
burned, twice shy!''
Will the United Nations prove as feckless as the League of Nations?
Mr. Chairman, in 1935, Mussolini invaded Abyssinia. The League of
Nations took note of this challenge to the international order. Day
after day, week after week, the League deliberated what to do. These
sessions went on endlessly. After each session, there was a press
conference. After some weeks, one of the reporters present summarized
the situation as follows: `` On the surface, very little is happening--
but beneath the surface, nothing is happening.''
Today the United Nations faces a test whether or not it can act
more effectively than did the League. The League failed because its key
members wanted it to fail--endless talk at the League was safe, while
action under the League's auspices might have been dangerous. There are
some members of the U.N. who have the same idea today, that talk is
safer than action. If there is to be a difference, it will arise from a
conviction that the U.S. President--and Congress--are determined that
action will take place: either action by Saddam Hussein to disarm, or
action under U.N. auspices to disarm him, or, if necessary, action
outside the U.N. framework.
Mr. Chairman, discussion of this need for action has been muddied
up by the issue of ``pre-emption.'' To be sure, the President at West
Point used the word, pre-emption, in connection with the longer-term
design of U.S. policy. Other officials have, from time to time, used
the phrase in connection with Iraq. Nonetheless, whatever the merits or
the demerits of a policy of pre-emption in the longer run, it has
little to do with Iraq. Pre-emption implies a surprise attack or
preventive war. Surely in the speculations about Iraq, the word
surprise cannot be employed when one continuously reads about our
supposed war plans in the daily newspapers. In the case of Iraq, pre-
emption is limited to the obvious, and rather circumscribed, meaning
that, if we are to deal with Iraq, we should do so before Saddam
Hussein acquires nuclear weapons in number.
Iraq is a special case. We have been engaged in an on-going
conflict with Iraq since 1990. Vigorous action in the course of an on-
going conflict hardly constitutes preventive war. At this time, U.S.
(and British) aircraft are overflying the Northern No-fly zone, and the
Southern No-fly zone. They are overflying some 60 percent of the
country. Iraq has been firing anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-
air missiles at our aircraft. Our aircraft have attacked Iraqi air
defense and other targets. Indeed in recent months, Saddam's air
defense forces have shot down three of our Predator aircraft. Moreover,
the United States has established a virtual protectorate for the Kurds
who live in Northern Iraq. Surely we can acknowledge that in these
conditions of on-going and continued conflict, the word pre-emption
does not really apply. Iraq, whatever the merits or demerits of pre-
emption for long-run policy, remains a special case.
In an on-going conflict, the issue of pre-emption appears close to
meaningless. Indeed, historically, we have regarded pre-emption as
permissible even in the far more difficult case of the formally
neutral. In July 1940, less than a month after the fall of France,
Winston Churchill had the British Fleet attack the French (Britain's
former ally) at the Naval Base of Mers-el-Kebir, killing 1,300 French
sailors and sinking a number of ships. Others escaped to British
harbors (to join the ``Free French'') or to Toulon. More significantly,
in November 1942, American troops landed in and occupied French North
Africa, then under the control of Vichy France. To be sure, after our
troops had entered French North Africa, we did receive an invitation to
come in. Thus, the record suggests that in time of war restrictions on
pre-emption are loosened.
I have gone into this issue at some length, Mr. Chairman. For I
fear that it has generated more heat than light--and needlessly so. We
must not allow conceptual disputes to obscure the underlying reality.
The United States has been for a decade, and is now, deeply engaged in
a conflict with Iraq. We should like the support of other nations, as
we approach the decisive moment. Strong backing of the President by
Congress will likely elicit stronger support from other nations in the
U.N.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to answer any questions that
you or other members of the committee may have.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger.
Senator Warner, do you have an opening statement?
Senator Warner. I will withhold and submit my statement for
the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
u.s. policy on iraq
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming these two
distinguished public servants before our committee. Both of these
gentlemen have served our Nation with great distinction, and continue
to do so. I especially want to welcome Dr. Jim Schlesinger back before
the committee. In addition to having served as a cabinet-level officer
in three different administrations, Dr. Schlesinger has been one of our
Nation's most productive citizens, as a professor, an economist, a
leader, and a gifted strategic thinker. I am fortunate to be able to
count him as a personal mentor and close friend.
We, as a Nation, are fortunate that these two gentlemen are
contributing to this important Iraq debate.
Over the past several weeks, our President has courageously focused
world attention on the defiant, illegal conduct of the brutal, ruthless
dictator Saddam Hussein. In 1991, after his defeat in the Gulf War,
Saddam Hussein accepted--in writing--U.N. terms for the suspension of
military operations and committed to comply with all relevant U.N.
Security Council Resolutions, including disarming Iraq of weapons of
mass destruction and submitting to intrusive inspections to verify this
disarmament. Eleven and a half years later, we are still waiting for
Saddam Hussein to comply with international mandates, as reflected in
16 United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The clear message
Saddam Hussein has communicated to the world for the past 11 years is
that he cannot be trusted, under any circumstances.
Our President is, rightfully, seeking a strong statement of
American and international resolve that clearly conveys to Saddam
Hussein that he has to comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions
and disarm himself of weapons of mass destruction now, or accept the
consequences of his actions. Clearly, a resolution from Congress
authorizing the use of force and a resolution from the United Nations
describing the consequences if he fails to comply will strengthen the
hand of the diplomats who are trying to resolve this matter without
force. Resorting to the use of force should be the last step, but it is
a step we must be willing to take--collectively with the support of the
United Nations, but alone, if necessary. It is also a step those who
threaten us and those who continually defy international will must
clearly understand that we are willing to take, and are authorized to
take, quickly and decisively, if necessary.
President Bush has asked Congress for a very strong resolution
authorizing the use of force. I support the President on this
resolution. We will have a debate in the Senate on this resolution and
while we may make minor adjustments to the precise language proposed by
the President, it is imperative that the final product clearly shows
that the President, Congress, and the American people are united and
willing to do whatever is necessary to end this longstanding and
growing threat to our national security, as well as regional and
international security.
The threat posed to the United States, the region, and the entire
world by Saddam Hussein is clear. The Prime Minister of Great Britain,
Tony Blair, laid out a compelling case before the House of Commons
yesterday: we know Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction; we
know he has used these weapons before; and, we know he will use them
again, and can do so on as little as 45 minutes notice.
President Bush called these revelations ``frightening.'' We cannot
wait for a future attack before we respond to this frightening and
growing danger. Saddam Hussein must be stopped--by military force, if
necessary.
Many have reacted as if this is a new crisis with Iraq. It is not a
new crisis. It is the continuation of a crisis that Saddam Hussein
initiated when he invaded Kuwait in 1990 and attempted to snuff out the
existence of an entire nation. This crisis has ebbed and flowed, most
recently in 1998 when Saddam Hussein expelled U.N. weapons inspectors.
We in Congress all agreed at that time that we must act to end this
menace to world peace. We did not solve the problem in 1998, however,
and now we must confront it again. Saddam Hussein has had 4 more years
to accumulate more of these terrible weapons. It is time to act--
forcefully--to end this crisis, once and for all.
Again, thank you for your participation in this process as we
prepare for deliberations in the Senate.
Chairman Levin. We'll go right to questions, and we'll
follow the procedure that I outlined before.
Let me ask both of you a question about the type of U.N.
resolution that would be the most constructive. Mr. Berger, can
you tell us how you feel the U.N. can act in a way which would
be the most effective, have the greatest chance of forcing
Saddam's compliance or capitulation without war, that would
then use the possibility of force if he does not comply? Could
you outline for us what that resolution would contain?
Mr. Berger. Mr. Chairman, I think that we should seek a
resolution which--as I say, in the current context, in the
context of the contemplation of military invasion of Iraq,
which is not the historical context--strongly reaffirms the
commitment of the international community, not just the United
States or the British, that Saddam Hussein should be in
compliance, particularly with his obligations for weapons of
mass destruction, number one.
Number two, it should impose upon him or reaffirm that this
is his affirmative obligation. It's not the obligation of
inspectors to find; this is the obligation of Saddam Hussein to
affirmatively comply.
Number three, in my judgment, it should spell out, to the
extent possible, what ``unfettered access'' means so there's no
question that some of the cobwebs that developed around UNSCOM
during the late 1990s, of concerns about Iraqi sovereignty and
other pretexts for obstruction were not what the United Nations
had in mind.
Now, it would be good if, in addition to that, the
resolution authorized all necessary means, the magical language
that explicitly authorizes military action. I don't think that
is necessary. I don't think that's essential. In 1998, we acted
pursuant to a Security Council resolution that talked about
severest consequences. I think it's the act of the
international community affirming in this context the
obligation to comply and the rights of the inspectors that, I
think, is what gives us the capability to build broader support
if there's noncompliance and to act with legitimacy in that
event.
Chairman Levin. Do you believe that, at this time, we
should notify the United Nations and the world that if the
United Nations does not act in the way that you've outlined,
that we would either keep the option open to act alone or, as
an alternative, notify them that we will act on our own if they
do not act, whether they authorize action and get the world to
pull together behind their action or not, or some other
approach? In other words, do we say at this time, ``Hey, we're
not going to give you a veto, but we're going to keep that
option open, on the one hand, to go it alone,'' or do we notify
them and decide right now that, ``Hey, if you don't act, we're
going to do it,'' or some other formulation?
Mr. Berger. I think that the United States always reserves
the option to act alone under extreme circumstances, and I
don't think that we can forego that option. I don't think that
it is particularly--and certainly that option lingers in the
wind, it's out there, but I don't think we necessarily help
ourselves at this stage by indicating that we're going to go
alone.
I think we ought to put the responsibility here where Dr.
Schlesinger has put it, on the Security Council, in the first
instance. I think there probably are members of the Security
Council who would like to see our nose bloodied by acting
largely alone and let them pick up the pieces. So let's leave
the burden there.
In the event that the Security Council doesn't act, I think
we have the time then to try to still build an international
coalition and act, to the greatest extent possible,
collectively.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Schlesinger, in your November 2001
National Interest article, you assert that, ``the bases in
Saudi Arabia are almost a necessity for successful action
against Saddam Hussein.'' The foreign minister of Saudi Arabia
recently stated that all members of the U.N. are bound by
Security Council resolutions, suggesting that if there is a
resolution, we would have access to the bases, but that without
a U.N. resolution, we could not count on, and indeed, he
suggested we could assume that there would not be--assistance
from Saudi Arabia and the use of our bases.
Is that your position still? Is there any change in that in
the last year or so, that bases in Saudi Arabia are almost a
necessity for successful action against Saddam Hussein?
Dr. Schlesinger. The conditions in the field have changed
somewhat, Mr. Chairman. As this committee is keenly aware, we
have built base structure elsewhere. It would be desirable for
us to be able to use Saudi bases, but it is no longer
essential. From other areas in the region, we could go into
Iraq.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. My time's expired.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome both of
our distinguished witnesses. We've had the pleasure, you and I,
of many years of association with these fine Americans who
continue their public service. Thank you.
First, to Mr. Berger. I look back on the Clinton
administration, and we worked together very closely. I remember
so well when Tony Blair was elected Prime Minister, the
President had him to Washington. I was privileged to be
involved in one of the first meetings that the President had
with the Prime Minister. My recollection is you had a close
working relationship with him. Am I correct on that?
Mr. Berger. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Warner. Yes. But I pick up this morning your
statement, ``nuclear weapons potential''--and we all recognize
it's a potential--``concerns me the most.'' Yet the Prime
Minister has reported in today's paper--says as follows, ``Iraq
could deploy nerve gas and anthrax weapons within 45 minutes of
an order from President Saddam Hussein or his son.'' Do I see a
difference in priorities between you and the Prime Minister?
Mr. Berger. No, I think what Prime Minister Blair is
describing there is Saddam's capabilities. I have no reason to
question that he's right. He also, I think, shares my view that
Iraq is a potential threat to the stability of the region and
the United States. But I don't think that necessarily goes to
what the probability is that he would launch a preemptive
attack. I think that is--with biological weapons--always a
possibility. It's something I think we have to continually
reevaluate. But I think it is also a distinct possibility that
he would launch a biological attack in response to our military
operation as well.
Senator Warner. Speaking for myself, having gone through a
series of briefings with my colleagues here, I'm gravely
concerned about his significantly enhanced inventory of weapons
of mass destruction in the two categories of biological and
chemical. Let's just dwell on the biological.
There's open testimony to the effect that Saddam has this
enhanced capability. It is mobile. To me, that indicates that
he could put small quantities in the hands of third parties in
the terrorist regime. Yesterday, the Secretary of Defense, in
open testimony, linked Iraq with al Qaeda. That could work its
way to the shores of the United States. Those small quantities
of biological weapons could be released in 45 minutes, or some
figuratively similar period. That's my main concern.
It seems to me our President has no alternative, as Prime
Minister Blair indicates, to initiate preemptive actions, if
that is necessary, to stop that transit. I mean, we're still
struggling here in this country to know who put anthrax in the
Senate. If this is put into the hands of the terrorist
organization worldwide, we may not be able to quickly link
Saddam Hussein directly to having perpetrated an attack on the
United States.
Therefore, I just want to get your consensus as to how
dangerous you think this biological threat is and the fact that
materials can be put into the hands of terrorists and readily
distributed and transported to our shores.
Mr. Berger. Senator, I, too, am concerned about Saddam's
biological capability and his continued efforts to enhance that
capability. I think that has to be a concern of the United
States. I think that the point I was making goes to whether we
have time--not years, not 5 years or 10 years--to try to do
this in a way that maximizes the extent to which we have
international support. I believe that we do have that time.
Senator Warner. But you had firsthand experience with this
inspection regime. You had to deal with it and make some tough
decisions when--in your phrase, ``unfettered inspections''--
fell apart. But that cooperation by Iraq is absolutely an
essential ingredient if the U.N. is to have any degree of
success over and above what was experienced in the previous 11
years. Am I not correct?
Mr. Berger. Absolutely.
Senator Warner. Do you see any indication from Iraq that
they are going to cooperate? Because to go down this path of
additional inspections without some strong indication that
they're going to cooperate, to me, is futile.
Mr. Berger. Well, I don't see any particular indication. As
I said in my statement, Senator Warner, I'm skeptical that an
inspection regime will result in disarmament without
cooperation. To me, an inspection regime could conceivably slow
down and disrupt his effort. But the most important reason for
us to seek a Security Council resolution that calls for and
describes ``unfettered inspections'' and then tests them in a
rigorous way is to gain the support of the international
community so that we're acting here in concert with others.
Senator Warner. Let me turn to Dr. Schlesinger's closing
comments with which I strongly associate myself, and that was
as he observed Congress now looking at a resolution and, at the
same time, the U.N. working on their resolution. Am I correct,
Dr. Schlesinger, in the summary, that the extent that the
congressional resolution is strong, clear, and decisive and
shows no difference between the course of action chartered by
the President and that by Congress supporting him through the
resolution, that is the extent to which we're most likely to
get a strong resolution in the United Nations. Have I stated
that correctly?
Dr. Schlesinger. You have stated it perfectly correctly.
Any clear signs of equivocation in U.S. policy will, I think,
weaken the willingness of the United Nations to have a strong
resolution.
Senator Warner. Your worry, Mr. Berger, was an interesting
one: let's get a congressional resolution sharpened. I accept
that word, ``sharpened.'' To me that makes it stronger and in
no sense weaker than what the President submitted to Congress.
Mr. Berger. Yes, Senator Warner. My view is that a more
focused resolution that has genuinely broad support shows
greater credibility than a broader resolution that has narrower
genuine support.
I'm not talking about what the number of votes may be.
Senator Warner. No, I understand that, but I liked your
word ``sharpened.'' To me that means more forceful. In no way
should we try and weaken any of the provisions that are
presently submitted to Congress by the President.
Mr. Berger. I think the draft--and the President was quite
clear this was a draft of the White House----
Senator Warner. Yes.
Mr. Berger.----that was submitted, I think is overly broad.
I think that we're talking here about something that could take
place for a very long time. We learned once before, many times
before, how important it is to have American public support for
the long haul. We ought to know that--the American people ought
to know what we're getting in for. Therefore, we ought to
describe that authority, I think, in a sharp way and a focused
way and ask the President, as President Bush Sr. did in 1991,
to come back to Congress before exercising that authority with
certain determinations, for example, with respect to what a
post-Saddam regime would look like.
Senator Warner. Well, I certainly accept, let's sharpen it.
Let's not dull the draft.
I thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. I want to thank both of you, as well, and
thank our leaders in the committee for giving us the
opportunity to listen to two experienced and thoughtful
individuals that have been so concerned about our security and
defense.
Obviously, as has been pointed out, Saddam is the danger,
and obviously the weapons of mass destruction are the basic
problem. But there's also al Qaeda and the strength of al Qaeda
out there. There's also what is happening in Afghanistan now
with the potential of deterioration in Pakistan, as Mr. Berger
pointed out, if Musharraf is displaced.
We have, according to the Secretary of Defense, some 90
nations that are cooperating with us now, giving us important
information and intelligence. This battle, I believe, is going
to go on and poses a very serious threat.
Now, my question is this. If we were to see the actions
that are going to be taken against Iraq--first of all, I
listened to Tony Blair yesterday. I didn't associate his
remarks with the actions of al Qaeda and the dangers of
terrorism, providing these weapons of mass destruction. I might
have missed something. I've listened carefully to the
intelligence reports. We don't have intelligence reports, at
least that I have seen, that say that Iraq is providing weapons
of mass destruction to al Qaeda now. If that happens, we ought
to know about it. I'm concerned that if Saddam Hussein's back
is against the wall, he may provide them. That's a danger.
But let me get back to my question. What are the
implications in the battle with al Qaeda between a United
Nations involvement in terms of Iraq and the United States
going alone? Is there a difference in terms of the kind of
cooperation we're going to have from the intelligence field and
from the military cooperation that we are receiving now in the
battle against al Qaeda? Will there be any differences, and how
should we measure it?
Mr. Berger. Senator, I think that there are two
implications here. That doesn't deny the fact that we have to
deal with Iraq, as I said earlier. But I think one is the focus
of decision makers, and the other is the support of the
international community.
We debate whether or not the military has the capability to
fight two wars. I'm not sure whether or not the senior
leadership of a government has the capability of fighting two
wars without some distraction. So question number one is
whether we lose focus here. That, obviously, will be a more
serious problem if we're acting largely alone, and, therefore,
in my judgement, with a much more serious burden to bear and
much more serious consequences.
The second reason why I think that it reinforces the notion
that we want to try to do this with the legitimacy that comes
from international support is that we're entering a phase of
the war against terrorism and the war against al Qaeda. I
believe al Qaeda remains a real threat, a clear and present
danger to the United States, a virulent threat. I believe that
we most likely will be attacked again, and we cannot lose that
sense of urgency.
We're now in a phase of this war which requires
cooperation: military cooperation, intelligence cooperation,
and political cooperation. Much of this involves rooting out
cells that are in third countries. We're not going to,
presumably, drop the Special Forces into Hamburg or the--
perhaps after the election, that might be, some people in the
White House may be discussing that.
So, I think it's extremely important that the world is
marching together on the major security threats that are not
only threats to the United States, but to the world.
Senator Kennedy. Dr. Schlesinger?
Dr. Schlesinger. Senator, you quite rightly point to the al
Qaeda problem. It will be with us for a long time. Al Qaeda has
been disrupted. It's on the run. It has lost its safe haven. It
has lost its training facilities, but it is still there, and it
will be for a long time. Pakistan, as Sandy Berger has
indicated, is a serious potential problem, and you've
reiterated that.
What would be the consequences of going into Iraq? It
depends upon the effectiveness of a move into Iraq. If we have
a quick success--and I pointed this out in the article that the
Chairman cited--in Iraq, we will be surprised at the number of
countries who are eager to help us. It just isn't politics.
We'd have a bandwagon at that point. If it is a botch, the
reverse will be true and we will not be in a position to arrest
a decay, let us say, in Pakistan.
A triumph of American and other arms will, as in November
of last year, alter public opinion in Pakistan. A failure or
semi-failure of American arms will lead to a revival of support
for Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. There are the risks that are
involved, and it depends how effective a campaign against Iraq
might be.
Senator Kennedy. In the strong likelihood of the
involvement of Israel in this conflict--we saw Prime Minister
Sharon indicate that if Israel was attacked, that, unlike the
previous conflict, they would respond. Given the kind of
information that Senator Warner pointed out, as Prime Minister
Blair mentioned, the 45-minute ability to be able to use
weapons of mass destruction, the real possibility of that kind
of activity, Israel's response--what additional kind of a risk
does that provide to this kind of endeavor in terms of both the
United States and the United Nations?
Mr. Berger. Senator Kennedy, first of all, if existentially
threatened, I think that the possibility of Saddam launching an
attack at Israel, perhaps a chemical or biological attack at
Israel, is very real.
Number two, I think that Israel, and perhaps any sovereign
democratic country attacked by chemical or biological weapons,
would be hard pressed not to respond. Whether it responds
conventionally or in some other fashion will be a judgment that
the Israelis will make. So I think they will respond. All the
more reason, it seems to me, to embark on this to the extent,
if it's at all possible, with the acceptance of the Arab world.
The Saudis have indicated that they will support or accept
something done with some form of a U.N. blessing. I don't know
that they really are--the language here is all that critical.
If we are seen as the United States and the British, I think
the danger, under the circumstances you've described, of this
situation breaking along an Arab-Israeli fault line is much
more serious. Under those circumstances, I think Dr.
Schlesinger's concern about effectiveness becomes more
difficult.
Senator Kennedy. Just to finish that thought, and the
impact of that kind of division on the war against al Qaeda,
would that have implications in terms of our ability to be more
effective in terms of the war against al Qaeda? Would this
diminish our ability if that were to happen?
Mr. Berger. Well, certainly we need support and cooperation
from countries in this region to fight the al Qaeda threat,
which is, in a sense, the cockpit of the crucible of this
threat. We're receiving that support from some, less from
others, but I would not want to see the situation evolve in a
way in which these countries believe that a hard anti-American
position was necessary for their survival.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Hutchinson.
Senator Hutchinson. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you for
holding this hearing today. I want to thank our distinguished
witnesses today for their contribution to this very important
national debate on how we address the threat that is posed by
Saddam Hussein and Iraq.
Mr. Berger, some of the issue is, from your testimony, the
currency of the threat, the immediacy of the threat, and you've
indicated that you believe that we have some time and that it
would be uncharacteristic of Saddam to attack us with
biological weapons. If I understood your testimony correctly,
it was based on, number one, his desire to survive, and number
two, the likelihood of detection and then subsequent
annihilation.
Following on what Senator Warner has said--I mean, we've
been waiting over a year now attempting to detect the source of
the anthrax attacks upon our country. Given Prime Minister
Blair's report yesterday to the British Parliament and the
dossier that they released that biological weapons could be
released within 45 minutes on the order of Saddam Hussein and
what I believe is a current link between Saddam Hussein and
terrorists--I mean, it is widely reported that some members of
al Qaeda have taken refuge in Iraq. Saddam has been an active
and vocal supporter of Palestinian extremists, provided
sanctuary for some of the most notorious terrorists over the
last 2 decades--that those links are already established.
So it seems to me if we wait until we know that he's
provided al Qaeda with biological weapons, then we've waited
too long, and that the immediacy or the currency of the threat,
I mean, that is at the very heart of this debate as to how
quickly the United States should move and how much time we
really have. Could you respond to that?
Mr. Berger. Well, first of all, Senator, I think the threat
is real. When I say that we have some time, I don't mean some
time to do nothing. I mean some time to begin to act in a way
that puts ourselves in the best position here to secure either
disarmament of Saddam--of Iraq, one way or the other. On that,
I think that we have enough time to vigorously seek the support
of the international community. If we obtain that support, or
at least acceptance or understanding of the nature of the
threat, I think the risks are much diminished.
The potential that Saddam Hussein would preemptively use
biological or chemical weapons against us or through a
terrorist is not something that can be dismissed. I believe
that is a possibility. But he would have to be fearful that we
would detect that, knowing that every intelligence resource of
the United States is trained on that.
Senator Hutchinson. Have we not done that over the last
year on the anthrax attacks?
Mr. Berger. Well, we have different intelligence bodies
working on those two matters. But that's for another committee,
I think.
I'm not saying that we would certainly be able to detect
it, but it would be something that he would have to take into
account, and I think that he would recognize that that would
result in annihilation.
If I could just say one last thing, he's had these weapons,
of course, for many years, he's had chemical weapons for 20
years, and has not used them preemptively. Again, I don't
suggest here, Senator, that this is not something that is a
real threat, something we should be genuinely concerned about.
It simply, in my judgment, does not mean we have to act here
without trying to lay the groundwork.
Chairman Levin. Senator Hutchinson, if you would just yield
for one moment, we have the first of two votes now that has
started. I'm going to leave and try to come back immediately
and then vote at the end of the second vote. After Senator
Hutchinson is completed, Senator Akaka would be next on our
side, and then Senator Sessions would be next. But we'll try to
keep this going.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I think Senator Collins was
ahead of me.
Chairman Levin. I'm just following the list here, and I'm
happy to change it. With the two of you in agreement, we'll put
Senator Collins first. I'm just reading what they give me.
Thank you, though, for saying that, Senator Sessions.
We're going to try to keep this going, in other words,
during these two votes.
Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Berger, you indicated, in talking about how much time
we have, that the U.N. resolution should have a time ultimatum.
Could you suggest what the time ultimatum ought to be for
compliance by Saddam Hussein?
Mr. Berger. Well, I'm not sure precisely. I would need to
have some conversations with U.N. envoy Hans Blix to determine
how much time it would take to get inspectors in there, get
them set up. I don't think that we ought to spend months and
months checking whether the cameras are still working. I think
that we ought to do what Richard Butler did in 1998 when the
inspectors went back in, which is to test it against a hard
site. So I think it's months. I don't know what exactly the
right number is.
Senator Hutchinson. Dr. Schlesinger, I didn't give you an
opportunity on this whole issue of the risk of Saddam Hussein
giving biological weapons to terrorist organizations and
whether we have time.
Dr. Schlesinger. Floating in this conversation has been
comparison of the risks of nuclear weapons against biological
or possibly chemical weapons. Nuclear weapons, if they can be
delivered, are, of course, the most dangerous, but we are some
period away from that, in all likelihood.
The advantages from the standpoint of a terrorist group, is
the ambiguity of biological weapons. If pressed, Saddam Hussein
may wish to exploit that ambiguity by passing it on.
On the question of time that you raise, there's another
dimension, which is what is the capacity of al Qaeda or
possibly other terrorist groups to exploit biological weapons
that have been put into their hands? As we saw earlier during
the campaign in Afghanistan, they were not yet ready to exploit
biological weapons, probably not even chemical weapons. As time
passes, it is quite possible that a revived al Qaeda will be in
a better position to exploit such weapons. For that reason, one
would like to diminish the time that might be available to them
or to Saddam in passing on such weapons.
Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger.
My time has expired, but I do want to say how much I also
associate myself with your remarks that a strong resolution
passed by Congress on a bipartisan basis strengthens our
position with the world community and the United Nations
immensely. I thank you for your testimony.
Thank you.
Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
I have some questions for the witnesses. We had a good
meeting on Monday with the panel of retired generals. We
discussed the need for a postwar strategy. Both General
Shalikashvili and General Clark stressed the importance of
thinking through, not only our warfighting strategy, but also
our peace strategy. General Clark commented that our peace
strategy in Kosovo was critical for the success of that
operation. I want to stress that comment.
My question is, what are your comments regarding a peace
strategy? What do you think are some of the key issues which
need to be thoroughly planned for the postwar period? Mr.
Berger, can you please comment on the reference made by General
Clark to our prewar and postwar strategy in Kosovo?
Mr. Berger. Well, in Kosovo, as in Bosnia, General Clark
has said, we used diplomacy and force together. Thereafter, the
international community, through the United Nations, through
other bodies, moved in in substantial fashion. While it's been
a slow process, we now largely have a peaceful and democratic
Balkans, which is quite an extraordinary phenomenon.
I think, in this case, we have to think, first of all,
about the territorial integrity and security of Iraq. There
could be incentive for the Kurds to move against oil fields,
which could precipitate the Turks moving in to the north. There
is obviously the risk of the Iranians doing the same in the
south.
So, number one, we would have to, I think, have a presence
there for some time to protect the territorial integrity of
Iraq.
Number two, this is not simply a case of getting rid of
Saddam and putting somebody else in his place. You have a
regime here throughout the government that has to be
essentially rooted out, replaced, and another civil structure
brought to bear, and that will take some time.
I think this is critical. I think the way we've handled
postwar Afghanistan is not extraordinarily encouraging. We've
not been willing to have an international countrywide presence,
as Prime Minister Karzai has asked for. Perhaps we're changing
that view now. Security is deteriorating in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan, I can assure you, is a lot less formidable a
problem than Iraq.
I think that it is incumbent on the administration to
discuss with Congress and the American people what our vision
is for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The factions, the opposition
groups, both inside and outside the country, tend to hate each
other almost as much as they hate Saddam Hussein. There has not
been a natural alliance there, so it's going to be difficult to
put together a coalition.
I don't think any of these things are insurmountable, but I
would, again, rather be doing this as an international
community with the United States playing a very active role
than the burden being almost entirely on our shoulders.
I think Dr. Schlesinger's right. If we win, some of our
friends, our erstwhile friends, will be happy to take the oil
part of that reconstruction, but they may not be as happy to
bear some of the less lucrative portions of the rebuilding
effort.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Schlesinger, you have a comment?
Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Senator. I was observing to Mr.
Berger that those two things can be tied together.
Let me disagree with Mr. Berger on one point. I don't think
that Afghanistan is that good an analogy. I agree with him that
the situation has deteriorated, but these two countries are
quite different. Historically, Iraq has been a secular country.
It has been a country of some degree of economic well-being and
cultural advancement. It would be, in a postwar world, easier
to work with such a country than with Afghanistan which has all
of the problems of a tribal structure with deep ethnic
divisions.
The first point I would make is that we must, as a
psychological point, appear to the Iraqi people as coming, as
the Secretary of State has said, to liberate them, not to
conquer them. In the course of that, we need to see to it that
the standard of living of the Iraqis, which, for a variety of
reasons, has been repressed, rises respectably and gradually,
and that way we can win internal support and begin to move
toward democratization of the country. That is a slow process,
by the way.
The second point is hinted at by Mr. Berger, and that is
that if we go in, the alliances change and attitudes change,
and we will be obtaining support and rewarding support that did
not exist prior to our going in.
Mr. Berger has mentioned the oil contracts. Those should be
a reflection of the need to raise the standard of living of the
Iraqi people over time, desires to deal appropriately--I use
that word advisedly--with the OPEC powers, and, at the same
time, to see to it that those who are obdurate in their
attitudes toward us are not rewarded.
Mr. Berger's comment on territorial integrity is quite
right. There are serious divisions. Over time, those divisions
could weaken or they could grow stronger. It is important for
us to reassure our Turkish allies that there will not be an
independent Kurdistan, that we need to see what kind of
federalized semi-autonomous structure can be built there so
that each of these communities can feel better. We need, as
your question implies, Senator, to be thinking very hard and
seriously now about how to deal with that--hypothetically--
post-victory condition in Iraq. The tendency is, ``focus on the
war and how we're going to win it.'' Very important. Critical.
But this is also critical.
Mr. Berger. Senator, may I add one point to what Dr.
Schlesinger said?
Senator Akaka. Yes.
Mr. Berger. I don't think the American people have been
prepared very well for this part of the deal. We see, a year
after September 11, with the most devastating attack on the
United States, the most searing experience that we have
undergone as a country, some might say, that it's easy to lose
attention, to lose focus. I think that the American people need
to sign up for the whole deal, and they can't sign up for the
whole deal if we're not talking about what's at the other side
of victory, which is--I think Dr. Schlesinger and I both
agree--costly, protracted, and not easy.
I think that we make a big mistake to enter into military
involvement without the American people not only knowing the
threat, but also having a clear picture of what the costs and
timetable of that involvement might be. I would hope the
administration would come forward with that. I would hope that
Congress would elicit that from the administration.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses. At
this time, I'd like to call for a recess, but briefly, and
we'll be back with you.
Thank you. [Recess.]
Chairman Levin. We'll come back to order. Again, our
apologies for the interruption here, but there were a couple of
votes on the floor of the Senate. As you're both old hands
around here, I think you can understand that problem.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome, and thank you very much for your
testimony this morning.
Mr. Berger, I'd like your comment on Dr. Schlesinger's view
that the best way for us to secure a strong United Nations
resolution is for Congress to first pass a strong resolution of
its own by a large bipartisan vote, since there's been much
discussion of which should come first.
Mr. Berger. In 1991, of course, it was the other way
around. In 1991, the Security Council resolution came before
the congressional resolution. I'm not sure the sequence is as
critical.
But, Senator, I would say this. I think that a narrower,
more focused resolution that truly has genuine bipartisan
support would do more for the credibility of the United States
than a broader resolution that does not have genuine bipartisan
support. That's not only measured in terms of what the vote may
be. There are a lot of reasons why people vote. But it seems to
me the President needs here to bring the country behind him on
this. I think he would be well advised to work with Congress to
focus this language in various ways so that there is genuine
bipartisan support.
Senator Collins. Do you have some specific suggestions for
changing the wording of the draft resolution submitted by the
administration?
Mr. Berger. I think there are three or four areas,
generally. There are some factual representations in the
beginning which I think are overreaching. I would certainly
narrow the authorization here to Iraq rather than the region. I
would put this in the context of complying with his obligations
on weapons of mass destruction. Although the American people,
I'm sure, are concerned about the prisoners in Kuwait, I don't
think they're prepared to go to war over them. I would find a
way to support the President's effort in the U.N. to gain a
resolution expressing the will of the international community.
I think, like the 1991 resolution, as President Bush Sr.
agreed, I would have the President come back to Congress before
exercising the authority with certain determinations,
particularly, for example, with respect to what a post-Saddam
Hussein regime would look like and what our plan would be for
such an enterprise, because I think that if we don't sign up
for the whole enchilada at the beginning, Senator, I can see
us, even if we are successful, losing interest, getting
deflected by another crisis and leaving Iraq actually as bad
off as it is now.
Senator Collins. Dr. Schlesinger, Mr. Berger and others
have raised concerns about the impact of a war in Iraq on
regional stability and what Iraq might look like post-Saddam.
In January, when I was in Turkey, the Chairman and many of us
met with Turkish leaders who are very concerned about the
impact on Turkey's stability if the United States were to
launch an attack on Iraq. Can you envision a scenario where we
might be worse off after removing Saddam Hussein?
Dr. Schlesinger. Senator, there's a risk whichever way one
goes. If one does not take action, there are risks. If one does
take action, there are risks. In the case of taking action, I
have emphasized earlier and I think in the article that the
Chairman cited, that we cannot abide failure. If we have a
failure out there, or even a semi-failure, we might be worse
off than otherwise. If we go in, we must be assured that this
is going to be a highly successful operation, that it will
change the psychology, not only in Iraq, but in the neighboring
countries.
I believe that Turkey will be with us under almost any
circumstances, and I think that, although it is frequently said
by people in the administration, as in prior administrations,
people will tell us things in private that they do not say in
public. That is always the case. I think that one will find
that the clearer the policy and the greater the success of the
policy, that others will be much more inclined to jump in
behind us.
Success has a thousand fathers. Failure is an orphan.
Senator Collins. Mr. Berger, I agree with you on the
importance of building international support for whatever
action we choose to take. I also agree on the importance of a
U.N. resolution. Nevertheless, given Iraq's past defiance of
numerous U.N. resolutions, do you see any realistic possibility
that Saddam would comply with yet another U.N. resolution? I
realize there's an argument to be made that we should go
through the process in order to build international support.
But, at the end of the day, is it realistic for us to think
that Iraq is ever going to comply with any U.N. resolution?
Mr. Berger. Senator Collins, I would not bet the ranch on
it, but I also would not totally rule it out. Let's recognize
here that we're dealing in a different set of circumstances in
which the international community, implicitly at least, is
saying that they're prepared to invade Iraq if he does not
comply. He does have a survival instinct.
So while I think we need to go through--we need to do this
for the reasons I said and you said--that is, I think this is a
way to build legitimacy and support, and I'm not overly
optimistic that we're suddenly going to have a deathbed
conversion--the fact of the matter is that this would be the
first time that he was literally on his deathbed, and there are
sometimes--that has a way of clarifying people's actions. So I
wouldn't rule it out.
Senator Collins. Dr. Schlesinger, it is said that nothing
so concentrates the mind as the knowledge that one will be hung
in a fortnight. Or whatever the expression is, picking up on
Mr. Berger's analysis. What is your judgment? Do you see any
possibility that Saddam, knowing what the alternatives would
be, might decide to comply?
Dr. Schlesinger. I think it's a theoretical possibility.
One cannot dismiss it out of hand, but one must look at the
nature of the man, the society that he has grown up in. Saddam
came to the top by participating in an assassination attempt
against a predecessor, General Kassim. From there, he fled to
Cairo. In 1962 or 1963, General Kassim threatened to go into
Kuwait to restore the ``19th province.'' Here was this man with
a death penalty on his head sending a cable from Cairo to
General Kassim saying, ``I'm all for you. I'm prepared to come
back and fight for Iraq.''
The nature of this man is that he is always going to be
looking for an out, and he has grown up in that kind of
society. So psychologically I don't think that one wants to bet
the ranch, as Mr. Berger has said.
Senator Collins. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I've often sought your
advice and guidance, and we do that today.
Let me just get right to the point here. For me, the
question is not so much whether to use force or not in Iraq.
The question is to what objective, for what purpose is that
force to be applied. As Colonel Harry Summers wrote in a
marvelous book on strategy, he took Clausewitz's basic
principles of war and applied them to the Vietnam War. You and
I and Dr. Schlesinger were on a program with Colonel Harry
Summers once. Colonel Harry Summers wrote that: ``The first
principle of war is the principle of the objective. It's the
first principle because all else flows from it.''
So instead of focusing on the means, I'm looking to the
ends here. As Clausewitz said, ``The leader should not take the
first step without knowing the last step he's going to take.''
So my question to you is, what do you consider the last
step here? We have three options, it seems to me. First is
destruction--destruction of the regime, which would involve the
destruction of a lot of lives: ours, theirs, civilians--and the
possible dismemberment of Iraq.
General Hugh Shelton told me that if Saddam Hussein was
removed from power, that the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shiites
would be fighting each other like banshee chickens. Not to
mention the possibility of Iran strengthening its hand in Iraq,
and we know Iran is still a threat in many ways to Israel
because it does provide tangible support to terrorists.
Destruction of the regime.
Second, deterrence, a la the old Soviet Union, which means
we allow them the weapons of mass destruction, but we deter
them by building our own and say, ``if you move into a
neighbor, you're toast.''
Then, finally, disarmament, which is what Tony Blair told
the Parliament, which is what General Clark has said to us the
other day was the goal, and General Shalikashvili said was the
objective. It does seem to me that the course of disarmament is
where we do have the greatest number of allies, the greatest
likelihood of getting our resolution through the Security
Council and the greatest support on Capitol Hill.
All else flows from the objective. Mr. Berger, is it not
true that the real objective here is not so much the
destruction of the regime or a regime change or the
dismemberment of Iraq, possibly, and creating civil war and
chaos there, but more the real objective is disarmament?
Mr. Berger. Senator, I believe that the objective is
disarmament, and in the sense that we ought to use every means
to see whether that can be achieved, short of war. If we have
inspectors who go in under unfettered--truly unfettered--
conditions and they do not have the cooperation of Saddam
Hussein, then it seems to me the purpose of war at that point
is regime change, which is why I think we have to put the
threshold very high. Once we embark on that, it seems to me it
is not--in 1998, we bombed known weapons of mass destruction
sites and we probably set his program back for some period of
time, but, as we know, not forever.
So I think our national interests would be served if we
could achieve the goal of disarmament. The threat of force may
be useful in doing that. But if we are actually then to go to
war because Saddam Hussein will not cooperate in disarming,
then I think the purpose of that war is a regime change.
Senator Cleland. Dr. Schlesinger?
Dr. Schlesinger. Senator, disarmament is that goal for
which we can attract the greatest international support, it
attracts that support because it's the lowest common
denominator. I think, as Congress stated in 1998, that given
Saddam's record, regime change must be an objective. As Mr.
Berger has said, if we go, we should move on to that.
Commenting on Clausewitz and all of that, first principles,
I wish the world were as simple as it was for Clausewitz. What
we had in Clausewitz is the notion of a nation fighting a
nation, one on one, or one against two. Here we are dealing
with, in the war on terrorism, a far more widespread and
complicated problem. What we see, basically, is a civil war
within the Muslim world in which a segment of that world now
targets the United States so that it is impossible for us to
focus simply upon a single nation. For that reason, that we are
engaged in a war on terrorism, I don't think that we can find
that last step that Clausewitz recommended to us.
Senator Cleland. I agree, and I agree with your principle
that if you're not going to win, don't go in.
Dr. Schlesinger. Yes.
Senator Cleland. Because once you commit militarily, you
put the prestige of the United States and, in many ways, maybe
the United Nations, on record, and you cannot fail, which is
why I'm interested in drawing the objective as tightly and as
firmly and as clearly as possible, particularly in terms of the
military objective.
I'd like to take you into that war on terrorism, though,
Dr. Schlesinger and Mr. Berger. It does seem to me that al
Qaeda, based on testimony from a number of generals and so
forth, is our number one objective and that if we look at the
principle of first things first, that is the war we're already
in. We've already passed a congressional resolution in that
regard.
Interestingly enough, there was an ad in the New York Times
today in the op-ed section. It's Osama bin Laden saying, posed
as Uncle Sam, saying in a sense, ``I want you to invade Iraq.''
He says, ``go ahead. Send me a new generation of recruits. Your
bombers will feed their hatred of America and their desire for
revenge. Americans won't be safe anywhere. Please attack Iraq.
Distract yourself from fighting al Qaeda. Divide the
international community. Go ahead. Destabilize the region.
Maybe Pakistan will fall. We want its nuclear weapons. Give
Saddam a reason to strike first. You might draw Israel into a
fight. Perfect. So, please, invade Iraq. Make my day.''
Your reaction, Mr. Berger?
Mr. Berger. I believe, Senator Cleland, that al Qaeda is
the most clear and present danger faced by the United States at
this moment. We have certainly disrupted it. We've not
destroyed it. I believe it continues to maintain its mission.
Its capabilities may be disrupted. There's a lot of work to be
done. Our staying power at this point may be as important as
our fire power.
That doesn't lead me to the view that we can ignore Iraq.
It leads me to the view that as we are doing what we have to do
on al Qaeda, we have to be moving forward to build
international legitimacy and support for what may be necessary
on Iraq. If seen in that kind of parallel sequence, I think
that makes the most sense to me.
Dr. Schlesinger. Osama bin Laden may feel that he will get
some relief if we divert our attention elsewhere, but it will
be temporary relief. The number of recruits that responds to
the colors, once again, depends upon the degree of success. A
clear victory in Iraq is likely to lead to a falling off of
support of al Qaeda rather than an increase in support of al
Qaeda.
It is important in the war on terrorism to recognize that
dealing with al Qaeda, a set of terrorist cells, does not lend
itself to victory in a traditional sense. It is going to be a
long, long struggle. We cannot abandon other elements of U.S.
foreign policy during this long struggle.
What we need to do is sustain the momentum in the war on
terrorism, and I believe that if we are successful--once again,
one must take a careful assessment of the success that we are
likely to achieve, military success--in that sense, that it
will sustain the image of the United States.
One final point. The President of the United States and
others have been saying: ``regime change, regime change, regime
change'' for some time. That is in the mind of the rest of the
world as a goal of U.S. policy. Indeed, it's the stated goal of
the U.S. Congress. If, once again, after all of the rhetoric
that we have employed on this subject, we back off and that
regime stays in power, many of our critics who are criticizing
us today for being too aggressive will turn right around and
say, ``You see? Osama bin Laden was right. The Americans are a
bunch of cowards. They're wimps. They cannot stand the sight of
blood. Therefore, despite their rhetorical objectives, they
never deliver.''
Incidentally, much of the population of Iraq will take that
view. They were disappointed in 1991. They have been
disappointed with our rhetoric recently. They were buoyed up,
many of them, in Iraq by the President's speech to the United
Nations. But the question in their minds is, ``Will the
Americans deliver? Will Saddam be toppled?''
Mr. Berger. Senator, can I add a point to that?
Senator Cleland. Sure.
Mr. Berger. Building on what Dr. Schlesinger has said, I
think whether we are successful is directly related to how we
proceed. I agree, a clear victory is what's necessary, but the
ability for a clear victory, it seems to me, is greatly
enhanced by the extent to which this is not seen in the region,
even in Iraq, as an American invasion.
Senator Cleland. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. We'll try a second round,
perhaps 4 minutes each in case others come by.
Senator Warner. How about 5 minutes?
Chairman Levin. We'll stick to the 4 minutes and then we'll
expand it for a third round in case others show up here.
Mr. Berger, you said that we don't help ourselves by saying
that we'll go it alone at this point. Why do you say that?
Expand on that.
Mr. Berger. I do believe, Mr. Chairman, that we have to
preserve that option, because there may be circumstances in
which the threat is such that we have to act even if others
don't. I think that there's enough smell of gunpowder in the
air already that the world gets it and understands that under
certain circumstances we may be compelled or feel compelled to
act alone.
But by saying, at this point, as we're working toward the
U.N. resolution--I understand there's a negotiating posture to
some degree--it really doesn't matter, we may be letting the
U.N. off the hook. I'm cynical enough to believe that there are
some members of the U.N., maybe even some members of the U.N.
Security Council, who will be very happy to let us do this,
hold our coat, let us either win and then come in and get the
oil, or lose and bring this big American hegemon down a couple
of notches.
I think we've contributed to that somewhat by putting out
this doctrine on preemptive attack in which we're now saying--
which tends to suggest, and I think Dr. Schlesinger referred to
this in his opening remarks--not quite in these terms, I don't
want to put words in his mouth--that Iraq is the rule, not the
exception. This is the template. We'll do it in Iraq, then
we'll do it in Iran, do it in Syria--of how the Chinese begin
to look at that.
So it seems to me that all this talk about ``it doesn't
matter'' is implicitly from the administration.
Chairman Levin. Doesn't matter----
Mr. Berger. Whether we have U.N. support or not. I think it
may be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask you this question, because you
used the word ``sharper,'' and Senator Warner picked up on
that. Is what you've just described a narrower focus?
Mr. Berger. Yes, I think it is a narrower focus, but it
still is authority to use force.
Chairman Levin. Is that a sharper focus? Is that what you
mean by ``sharper,'' narrower?
Mr. Berger. Yes.
Chairman Levin. There's some--I think----
Mr. Berger. I think, if you would prefer to call it
narrower----
Chairman Levin. Not me. I'm just asking you what you meant.
Mr. Berger.----and Senator Warner would prefer to call it
focused, and that's the way in which we can reach strong
bipartisan consensus on something, that's fine.
I think that my point is, this is not just about the
politics of a resolution. This is about whether the American
people are behind what we may have to do. This resolution could
get 99 votes because of the circumstances under which it's
being considered, but if many of those votes are not votes that
have behind them deep conviction, then we're not going to have
the kind of broad support. I think the President has more
credibility with a narrower resolution that truly and genuinely
has broad support, that alleviates some of the fears and
anxieties that some people have--I think we're in a stronger
position with that kind of resolution.
Dr. Schlesinger. I prefer to think of Sandy Berger as sharp
rather than narrow, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. Well, you used the word ``sharp.'' It's not
my use of the word. You used the word ``sharp,'' and I want to
see whether you mean by that ``narrow.''
Senator Warner. It's a good word, too. I liked it.
Chairman Levin. Yeah, I think Senator Warner is reading
something into that word which maybe you didn't intend.
Mr. Berger. I mean narrower and more focused.
Chairman Levin. Okay. The next question, then, has to do
with whether or not Iraq is likely to use weapons of mass
destruction and attempt to transfer those weapons if it has
nothing to lose, if it faces regime elimination. Is there much
doubt in your mind that Saddam, if he has nothing to lose and
he's cornered, would use everything he has, including weapons
of mass destruction?
Mr. Berger first, then Dr. Schlesinger, then my time is up.
Mr. Berger. I think that is a strong possibility, if not a
probability. I know Dr. Schlesinger said, if pressed, Saddam
Hussein may use biological and chemical weapons. I think that
if existentially threatened, that that is a distinct
possibility.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Schlesinger?
Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, this man's career, from the
days that he was plotting to assassinate General Kassim,
suggests that he is not going to go quietly into the night.
Saddam Hussein will try to make use of all of his assets.
The question--I think it's a much more significant
question--is, will we make clear to military subordinates that
if such weapons are employed in response to Saddam Hussein's
directive, that they will be tried as war criminals, whereas,
if they refrain, they have a good life in the future in Iraq? I
think that under the circumstances envisaged, particularly if
the initial attack on Iraq, should it come, is one that imposes
shock--that you will find that there are many people in the
military command who will refuse to execute such commands.
Chairman Levin. But they would execute them----
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, let me reassert your point that
Saddam Hussein, in all likelihood, will attempt to use those
weapons.
Chairman Levin. If attacked?
Dr. Schlesinger. If attacked. If attacked or if he thinks
that an attack is imminent and certain.
Chairman Levin. You made reference, by the way, Mr. Berger,
to the politics of the resolution. I must tell you that
triggers in me a very strong reaction. This is an issue of war
and peace. There is no place for politics or partisanship in
this issue.
There is a serious effort, I believe, by Senators to try to
reach the right conclusion, and--I want Senator Warner to hear
this--I take umbrage at the quoted statement of the President
last night that the democratically-controlled Senate is, ``not
interested in the security of the American people.'' I don't
know if that's an exact quote or not. That's what's in the
morning paper. But if that is an accurate quote, it seems to
me, it should be disowned by every Senator of whatever party.
There is an honest effort here to achieve the right answer
here for the security of this Nation. That is what we're all
about. That's what we struggle to do. That's what we're sworn
to do. There may be differences as to how best to achieve that
security. There are no differences on the interest to achieve
that security, the determination to achieve that security. I
just hope that's not an accurate quote. Can we just leave it at
that? I don't want to say that out of earshot of my dear
friend, Senator Warner, but I hope that's not an accurate
quote. I'll leave it at that.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You and I have
worked together on this committee, this is our 24th year. I
certainly do not in any way question the patriotism of our
colleagues on the other side of the aisle. We may have our
differences, but certainly they don't rest in any patriotism.
What we're trying to do here this morning is to work with
two extremely well-experienced, tried, tested, and true
patriots themselves to search for facts and their views that
can help guide the Senate and perhaps Congress as a whole as it
embarks on a very critical mission. Namely, it's been called
upon by the President--and I was there with you in the Cabinet
room when he asked us for this resolution. The draft is up
here. I'm not suggesting that we shouldn't consider language--
whether it's Democrat or Republican who might suggest changes,
but I do believe--I think Mr. Berger said it clearly--we should
move to sharpen rather than dull it. We have to be careful in
the process not to send a signal abroad, that, as Dr.
Schlesinger said, there are others who would love to seize upon
the opportunity to hold our coat and let us embark on this
mission.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Berger, I think, used those words.
Senator Warner. All right.
Mr. Berger. Well, again, when I say ``sharpen,'' I mean
focus this in a narrower way, Senator, that addresses the
essential threat and builds a true bipartisan consensus.
Senator Warner. I anticipate it will be bipartisan. While
we may have some differences, I know good colleagues and
friends on your side are who seeking to have it bipartisan, who
have discussed with me as late as an hour ago suggestions about
this amendment.
The next question I put to Mr. Berger is by no means a
political one, but I was fascinated with your phrase--and I've
picked up one or two excellent phrases you've made this
morning--``we have him on the deathbed this time.''
Now, I go back, then, to 1998, when you were very active in
this problem. On December 9, you made this statement: ``For the
last 8 years, American policy toward Iraq has been based on the
tangible threat Saddam Hussein poses to our country. That
threat is clear. Saddam's history of aggression and his recent
record of deception and defiance leave no doubt that he would
resume his drive for regional domination if he had the chance.
Year after year, in conflict after conflict, Saddam has proven
that he seeks weapons, including weapons of mass destruction,
in order to use them.''
Then on December 23--I remember that period very well,
because I used to confer with Secretary Cohen. He asked me to
come to his office on occasion, and we sat down like two old
friends because the burden was heavy on your administration at
that time. I remember on December 23, 1998, shortly after the
U.S. and Great Britain had carried out Operation Desert Fox--
that's the bombing we undertook because of the inspectors being
thrown out--you addressed the National Press Club. Let me quote
from that: ``If he''--that is, Saddam--``rebuilds his weapons
of mass destruction capabilities, we will come. We will come.
We have the obligation to do this. We have the will to do it.
We have the forces in the region that are ready to do it.''
Those are strong statements. Is there anything that has
changed? In my judgment, the change is that the situation is
worse than what the Clinton administration was faced with. If
those were your thoughts then, which were unequivocal and
clear, it seems to me, given the situation is more serious
today--I assume that you feel that, in terms of his weapons of
mass destruction capability, particularly biological and
chemical--that your statements would even be stronger.
That's why I seized upon the word ``sharpen,'' because I
felt that was a harkening back to these statements that you
felt worsened situations require for even sharper and stronger
action by Congress in support of the President.
Mr. Berger. Senator, I think that the determination that we
made after 1998 was that containment strategy, by itself,
probably was insufficient over the long term, that this was a
leaky vessel, and that it was hard to sustain a sanctions
regime for a decade. Therefore, we struck in December 1998 at
weapons of mass destruction targets and other regime-related
targets.
Senator Warner. But he hadn't provoked us then, and yet we
struck out.
Mr. Berger. Yes.
Senator Warner. That wasn't preemptive under the doctrine,
do you believe?
Mr. Berger. What I'm saying here today, Senator, is I
believe that if, ultimately, war is necessary here, the
objective should be regime change. But I believe that how we do
this, how we go about doing this, relates directly to how
effective we will be.
There is a great deal of anti-American feeling in the
region over the last 2 years that didn't exist before. I think
that we are dealing with a much more volatile region, and,
therefore, to the maximum extent possible, I think that we need
to act. I've said that in my statement. Doing nothing here is
not an option. But I think that we need to build international
support. I think that we have time to do that in a strategic
way.
Senator Warner. But don't you believe the steps taken by
the President going to the United Nations, the steps that have
been, are being taken, and will be taken by our Secretary of
State are consistent with what you've outlined?
Mr. Berger. I welcome the President going to the United
Nations. I wish he'd done it sooner. I think that's the right
step.
Senator Warner. So, thus far, we're on the right track.
Mr. Berger. Well----
Senator Warner. We haven't deviated yet.
Mr. Berger. I think that some of the context here is
clouding the situation. I think to put out a new national
security doctrine which says that we're no longer in the
business of deterrence, we're no longer in the business of
containment, essentially we're now in the business--our
fundamental national security doctrine is preemption--to do
that in the context of this discussion of Iraq, it seems to me
is a mistake.
Every President reserves the right to act preemptively
under the appropriate circumstances, but we're now saying to
the world Iraq is the rule, not the exception. I think Dr.
Schlesinger made a very clear case in his remarks: this is a
special case.
So I think we're making it more difficult for ourselves by
acting as if this is part of a larger plan which has the United
States moving around the world establishing a kind of a Pax
Americana.
Senator Warner. Describe the action that the President of
the United States took on December 9, when he initiated the
bombing of Iraq. Was that not preemptive, under the strict
technical interpretations of the doctrine? Saddam Hussein had
not used a weapon against any of our forces at that time,
except the interdiction of our aircraft from time to time. If
anything, that has worsened since that period. So, absent that,
wasn't that a preemptive strike?
Mr. Berger. I don't know what that word means in that
context.
Senator Warner. Well, a lot is being made about----
Mr. Berger. Senator, we made very clear that if he did not
cooperate with the inspectors that we would seek to use
military force to try to degrade his weapons of mass
destruction capability, and, in the course of doing that,
talked about long-term regime change as probably the necessary
end point.
So, whether that action was preemptive or not I think is
not the issue. The issue here, it seems to me, is how do we
maximize the chance that we will get a result here that either
disarms Iraq or eliminates Saddam Hussein with the least risk
to the United States, the least risk to the stability of the
region, and the greatest chance of success.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, could Dr. Schlesinger comment
on my question? The strike of December 9, 1998, it seems to me
that was preemptive, well founded. It didn't follow through,
regrettably, and achieve the goals, but it was clearly a
pattern of what we see today that the President is following.
Dr. Schlesinger. Senator Warner, as I indicated in my
remarks, whatever the merits, demerits, or necessity of a
change in national strategy, Iraq remains a special case.
We have been engaged in an ongoing military conflict with
Iraq for the past 11 years. Sometimes it sputters up and
sometimes it sputters down, but we have so engaged. Thus, I do
not think that we were preempting back then, but I don't think
that we would be preempting now.
The focus that Mr. Berger has made is, it's better to have
support and allies in the international community than not to
have that.
Senator Warner. I don't think anyone disagrees with that.
Dr. Schlesinger. But preemption does not enter into it.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I have a few more questions.
Chairman Levin. Go ahead.
Senator Warner. All right. Thank you very much.
Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Yes? You have a 12:20 departure.
Dr. Schlesinger. Could I give a couple of comments?
Chairman Levin. You can do what you wish. Yes.
Dr. Schlesinger. First, on the question that the Chairman
has raised with regard to the use of nuclear weapons, I commend
to the attention of the members of this committee an article
last week in The Washington Post by General Mick Trainor, a
former Marine general, who is an historian of the Gulf War. He
makes the point very forcefully that we have a good opportunity
to interfere in the execution of any Saddam orders by people
beneath him. I recommend that article.
Dr. Schlesinger. Second, on the question of sharpening----
Chairman Levin. Excuse me. That comment was not limited to
nuclear weapons? That was weapons of mass destruction?
Dr. Schlesinger. Yes, sir. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Dr. Schlesinger. He was not suggesting that Iraq now has
nuclear weapons. He's talking about the chemical and biological
weapons that we know that Iraq possesses.
Second, on the question of sharpening--if we are to sharpen
this resolution, I hope that it does not go to the point of
precluding any action outside of Iraq. The reason that I would
not like to see that precluded is our presence in the region
will change the strategic map of the region. We don't want to
give reassurance to neighbors that may be conducting terrorist
operations or harboring terrorist operations that they are
secure.
The third point is on this question of anti-Americanism.
The events of September 11 and Osama bin Laden crystalized what
was a latent anti-Americanism in the region. It flared up. In a
recent poll in Kuwait, 75 percent of the citizens of Kuwait
said that they admired Osama bin Laden. This is the same Kuwait
that we reflagged her vessels 2 decades ago and rescued just a
decade ago.
The point is, though, I would like very much for Middle
Easterners to think well of the United States. But if they
don't think well of the United States, I want them to have
respect for this country and recognize that killing Americans
is not something that can be done with impunity.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. I would just say those are not mutually
inconsistent goals, I take it. We could achieve both if we act
in a way which is aimed at achieving both?
Dr. Schlesinger. Yes, mine were general observations.
Senator Warner. Mr. Berger, I was very impressed with your
comments, and I agree with them, on the situation that Israel
is confronted with today, and that while they abstained from
direct military action in the Gulf period in 1990-1991, largely
at our request and those of our allies that were in the
coalition, there's a question mark, and certain statements have
been made to underline that question mark as to what they may
do to protect their sovereignty if they are now attacked.
That brings me to the question of the role of NATO. I
followed with great interest this subject of Secretary Rumsfeld
urging NATO to put together a force--that's fine--that can move
and move quickly and combat terrorism wherever it is in the
world.
But I go back to the moves that your administration, that
is, the Clinton administration, of which you were an integral
part, when NATO expanded its charter to go out of area--you
recall that very vividly, I think that was an initiative of
your administration. Well, then, we have now a conflict out of
area between Israel and the forces in Palestine, which are
against Israel--I say ``forces''--I don't think all the people
of Palestine are against Israel, but certainly certain forces
of terrorism are directed against Israel--and I have said then
and publicly a number of times on the floor of the Senate that
NATO should consider offering to provide peacekeepers in this
tragic conflict, but those peacekeepers would only go in under
the conditions that they're invited by the Government of Israel
and whatever structure of government remains in the Palestine
organization and that a ceasefire be put in place between the
two forces so that negotiations toward a lasting peace could be
undertaken.
It's a risk. There's no doubt about it. We could not
guarantee that if NATO peacekeepers came in, that the tragic
human suicide bombers would stop. But it seems to me it would
send a strong signal throughout the world that followed this
conflict that we are at least making a constructive effort to
enable the parties to begin a negotiation.
Now, the Europeans have had sympathies longstanding with
the Palestine faction. We have had longstanding sympathies with
the people of Israel and their struggle to maintain their
sovereignty and democracy. A NATO force would be composed of
some element of U.S. forces and a considerable element of
European forces, so there would be a merger of these two
dichotomies at this point into a force that comes solely at the
invitation to maintain the peace.
I feel that there's a linkage between that ongoing problem
of suicide attack, necessary counterattack by Israel, and on
and on it goes, and it festers the hatred throughout the
militant Muslim world against our country and what we're doing.
I think it factors into the difficult decisions as they relate
to Iraq.
Our President came out following the United Nations
Security Council resolution, which I think the vote was 14 to
0, with the abstention of the U.S., and was compelled to say
that he hoped that the conflict could stop and the actions of
the Israeli military could be modified in some way to end the
standoff between the Israelis and Palestinian Authority.
Have you a view on what role the United Nations could play
in the conflict that you described in your earlier remarks with
regard to Israel?
Mr. Berger. The United Nations or NATO, Senator?
Senator Warner. Excuse me, NATO. I misspoke.
Mr. Berger. Yes.
Senator Warner. I want to be very clear. NATO and what role
NATO may have in this preparation for such actions, whether
it's the Security Council resolution or the follow-on military
action or some force to enforce this unfettered inspection
regime which may evolve out of U.N. resolution.
Mr. Berger. Senator, I think that in the context of a
ceasefire and consent on both sides, peace----
Senator Warner. In the Israel-Palestinian conflict?
Mr. Berger. Right. That peacekeepers and perhaps NATO
peacekeepers are something that ought to be considered. My
concern, I believe quite honestly, Senator, that our
disengagement from the effort to build a ceasefire in recent
months compounds our problem in Iraq. We have always been a
steadfast ally of Israel. I hope we always will be. But we've
also always been engaged in the process of trying to diminish
violence and create a more stable peace.
The strategy of terror will not work. I think many
Palestinians, although not all, unfortunately, are coming to
that conclusion. But only the United States on the ground with
our sleeves rolled up is going to be able to create opportunity
out of exhaustion. I think the fact that we are not more active
in trying to do that makes the Iraq problem all the more
difficult, because it does tend to polarize views in the
region.
Senator Warner. So I judge that you feel if there are the
conditions I laid out--a ceasefire and an invitation for them
to come in--that the presence of the NATO peacekeepers could
contribute to the basis for negotiations over a period of time.
Mr. Berger. I think--with the consent of both sides.
Senator Warner. That's correct. That's integral.
What about the NATO forces in terms of being in
consultation with the Iraqi issue?
Mr. Berger. Well, I was disturbed to read one
administration official said he never even considered the idea
of asking NATO to be involved. Of course, in Kosovo, it was a
European issue, but it was the unity of NATO. Even Italy and
Greece, where public sentiment was overwhelmingly favorable to
the Serbs, it was the unity of NATO that ultimately defeated
Milosevic. So that obviously may be difficult to obtain in this
circumstance, but it does go, again, to legitimacy.
We acted with legitimacy, I believe, in Kosovo, even though
we didn't have a Security Council resolution, because we acted
in the context of 19 NATO members with diverse viewpoints.
Senator Warner. Dr. Schlesinger, your thoughts on, first,
my scenario in the Middle East, the Israel-Palestinian
conflict, the involvement of NATO by invitation, and second,
the consultation of NATO in regard to the ongoing events in
Iraq.
Dr. Schlesinger. On the first question, I have no objection
to the scenario that you laid out and the suggestions that NATO
might want to participate. NATO members have not been eager to
provide forces, as opposed to providing advice, and that is
always a problem.
This history of peacekeepers in the neighborhood of
Palestine and Israel, or in the neighborhood of Israel and her
Arab neighbors, is mixed. It was a success, of course, in the
Sinai, but that was because the Egyptians wanted it to be a
success. It's not clear to me that we have the basis there.
Senator Warner. They have been a success in Bosnia, NATO
forces, in Kosovo. NATO is a coalition that is in place, it is
ready to roll. It could be there in 72 hours.
Dr. Schlesinger. I'm not suggesting that NATO would not be
useful in the Middle East.
The other point that I would make is that, even though
these subjects do tend to overlap, Iraq and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict are separable. For many of the Arab
states, their inaction with regard to Palestine has been a
major contributor to the problem, and that's true over a period
of 50 years.
What we have seen since September 11 is a tendency to use
Israeli conduct toward the Palestinians as an excuse to
continue to avoid the responsibilities that other Arab states
might have toward the Palestinians. It has changed what had
previously been the antagonism to the United States as the
protector of regimes that were impure and that the Islamists
wanted to change into a new focus, or a renewed focus on
Israel-Palestine. So I think that it is important for us to
recognize that much of the antagonism to American policy is not
due to our support of Israel.
Senator Warner. One last quick question to the panel, Mr.
Chairman, and that is on the doctrine of preemption.
Mr. Berger. Well, let me just say that I agree with that
final statement by Dr. Schlesinger. I don't want there to be
any mistake about that. I agree with the final statement of Dr.
Schlesinger about it not being because of our support for
Israel. We've been supporting Israel since 1947.
Senator Warner. Yes.
Mr. Berger. Every President since Richard Nixon has been
deeply engaged in trying not only to support Israel, by not
only protecting it, but also by trying to reduce violence and
bring about some kind of a more durable peace.
Senator Warner. Well, I associate myself with those
remarks.
Dr. Schlesinger. For that, we get no credit. Madrid, Oslo,
the first President Bush's actions----
Senator Warner. Gentlemen, I associate myself with the
comments of Dr. Schlesinger and Mr. Berger.
Last question. The doctrine of preemption has gotten,
understandably, people stirred up. Our country has never
sought, in its 215-216 year history, to take a square foot of
land permanently from any other nation, and we have used our
Armed Forces, I think, judiciously through the years. But what
has changed is technology. As Tony Blair says, within 45
minutes they could begin to deliver weapons of mass
destruction.
The doctrine of preemption grew out of the state-sponsored
belligerencies where we then had time to declare war and go
through these motions. We haven't declared war since World War
II, but we have moved swiftly under a number of presidents to
intercede where our security interests were involved. Today,
cyber-security is reaching such a dangerous proportion that
cyber-terrorists could strike America in a matter of a minute's
time through our computer systems and shut down power grids and
shut down the flow of water and all kinds of things.
To me, this underlies the President's need to move out and
tell the American public and the world that we can't sit and
wait for the smoking gun, as did President Kennedy in the Cuban
Missile Crisis with that picture of that missile headed into a
position to be pointed against the United States. There may be
no one left here to see the smoke after the gun is fired.
So technology, in my judgment, underlies the need to change
our doctrine and to move more toward preemption where it has to
be done, and done quickly. Does anyone have a comment on that?
Dr. Schlesinger. I think your observation is unanswerable.
I think that the point of those who have raised questions has
been preemption does not conclude containment or deterrence,
that these are tools that work together.
Of course, whatever we have said in the past, when we
thought it necessary, we took action. President Reagan moved
into Grenada, not by consulting the British. Indeed, President
Kennedy, whom you just referred to, when he had that picture,
engaged in what was an act of war under international law: to
wit, the quarantine of Cuba. That is preemption, even though it
did not involve an exchange of fire. So over the past, when we
saw ourselves menaced, we were prepared to act.
I think the question here is, should we be emphasizing
preemption as our primary tool that displaces containment or
deterrence.
Mr. Berger. I think the option of preemption is one that
every president has had, must have, to act in circumstances
where the United States is immediately threatened. I think it
is counterproductive to elevate that to an organizing doctrine
or the organization doctrine of America's strategic policy, for
several reasons. Number one, I think it tends to lower the
threshold of use, because it puts governments on notice that
``you'd better use them or you're going to lose them.'' Number
two, I think it provides a rationale for other countries to act
against their perceived opponents and enemies saying ``this is
our doctrine of preemption.''
I think it changes the perception of the United States in
the world. I think that basically it says, to do this--to
articulate this now is to say that Iraq is the rule, not a
special case, as Dr. Schlesinger said; Iraq is the template. I
think that makes it much more difficult for the United States
in the world.
So, option? Absolutely. Option we've used in the past?
Absolutely. Organizing doctrine of American strategic policy? I
think it's counterproductive.
Senator Warner. Is there a difference between preemption,
the use of the doctrine of preemption against state versus non-
state? Like, September 11 was non-state, so far as we know. It
seems to me that should be unfettered, and it's to our
advantage to tell them we're going to use preemption against
non-state. Now, state, there is, I think, a debate, even though
I support the President's time frame.
Mr. Berger. I think it goes to the imminence of the threat
to the United States. It, again, ought not to be elevated to
the organizing principle.
Senator Warner. Dr. Schlesinger, I must remind you, the
clock's ticking. You said you have to leave.
Dr. Schlesinger. I will leave in 5 minutes, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions has a turn coming, so we
hope you'll save some time for his questions if they're
addressed to Dr. Schlesinger.
Senator Sessions. All right, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. I think, Dr. Schlesinger, if you want to
just quickly wrap that up, I don't want to stop you from doing
it, but make it quick.
Dr. Schlesinger. I agree with Senator Warner with regard to
terrorist organizations. We should tell them we will do
whatever we can to blunt your activities. If you are even
partially successful, we will continue to hunt you down
wherever you are.
With regard to the issue of nations, I think that you are
absolutely right on the facts, the administration is right on
the facts. It would be better to play this in a somewhat lower
key than we have.
Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. I think that sums up the point pretty
well. I agree with Senator Warner that it's good that the
President has raised preemption and made it quite clear we are
not going to sit by and allow ourselves to be vulnerable.
Dr. Schlesinger, I tend to agree with you that we don't
have to go to preemption in Iraq. We have such a continual
history of violation of U.N. resolutions and basically
continued warfare since 1991, we're in a state of conflict with
them.
My question is, the President has taken this issue to the
U.N. He has asked for their support and met with leaders around
the world. Iraq, feeling this pressure, playing its game again
it would appear. Iraq has written to the U.N. to say they would
unconditionally allow themselves to be inspected; however, in
that very document (Saddam Hussein's letter to the U.N.) they
state: ``The Republic of Iraq reiterates the importance of the
commitment of all states, members of the Security Council, and
the United Nations to respect the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political independence of Iraq.''
Well, any vigorous form of inspections, by its very
nature--I'll ask you two experts--aren't those inspections, by
their very nature, infringements of territorial integrity and
sovereignty?
Dr. Schlesinger. He has abandoned the question of
sovereignty. In fact, he is attempting to reassert the question
of sovereignty in principle. It just doesn't fly. As a general
proposition, we are going to see Saddam Hussein attempt to
evade, as he has in the past, the commitments into which he has
entered, and we are engaged in a game similar to that of Lucy
and Charlie Brown and the football, in that, will once again
this autumn we be fooled, as Charlie Brown is? I don't think we
will be, but in our quest for international support, the
international community may once again be fooled.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Berger, in your statement--I think
you were correct, you went to heart of it; you said we have to
have an honest commitment to inspections and a renunciation of
weaponry. I believe you used the word ``unfettered access.''
Would you agree that term contradicts this letter in which
Saddam Hussein continues to insist on his sovereignty and
territorial integrity?
Mr. Berger. Senator, as I said, one of the reasons why I
think a U.N. Security Council resolution is important is so
that the United Nations defines ``unfettered,'' not Saddam
Hussein, and we get rid of some of the cobwebs that grew up
around UNSCOM around this notion of sovereignty and special
sites. Let the U.N. say what ``unfettered'' is; let the
international community say, ``unfettered means anytime,
anyplace, anywhere.'' Then, having defined, as an international
community, what ``unfettered'' means, if Saddam does not comply
with that, it seems to me we are on much stronger ground.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Schlesinger, in that regard, you
expressed some pessimism or some concern, as I do, about
whether or not we can get clarity out of the U.N. on this
question. How do you see it playing out?
Let's say the inspections don't come unfettered, and what
do we do? How do we get to the point where we either act or not
act?
Dr. Schlesinger. We are, I believe, going to ultimately see
action. We prefer that action to be from the U.N. But if not,
we are going to see action. We do not have to advertise that or
blatantly say it, as Mr. Berger has indicated. But I think that
that is understood.
I think that it was a remark attributed to Samuel Goldwyn
that ``prediction is difficult, especially about the future.''
I always find it a little difficult to predict what is going to
come out of the United Nations. But it is clear that we must
have a clear understanding of what ``unfettered'' means, that
it does not mean that these palaces, or alleged palaces, of
Saddam Hussein are off-limits to the inspection. They can go
anywhere at any time, on demand.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Berger, how do you see events
unfolding? Any prospects for clarity out of the U.N., or will
it remain feckless?
Mr. Berger. I believe we could, I believe we can, Senator,
get a resolution from the United Nations Security Council that
reasserts, in this current context, the need for compliance,
particularly with the weapons of mass destruction disarmament
obligation, that calls for unrestricted inspections, and that
defines that in U.N. terms, not in Saddam Hussein terms.
I am actually less concerned about whether or not there is
the operative ``all necessary means'' language in the first
instance, because I think that getting that clear statement
from the international community now, today, in these terms
enhances our position. It puts Saddam with a clear choice.
Either he complies with the world or there will be consequences
of some nature.
Senator Sessions. On the question, Mr. Berger, of Israel,
several people have expressed concern about their situation.
Israel has made it clear that this would be a decision for the
United States, for it to go or no go, and they would be
prepared to accept the risks that that might occur. They're not
asking us not to go forward, are they?
Mr. Berger. As far as I know, Senator, they're not asking
us not to go forward with respect to Iraq, although I think
they are reserving, as a national decision, how they would
respond if they were attacked.
Senator Sessions. Yes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Before Dr. Schlesinger leaves, and I think
we're going to wind it up right now, let me thank both Dr.
Schlesinger and Mr. Berger. It's been a very useful, very
helpful hearing to this committee and I hope to Congress and
the country.
We would invite both of you, if you so chose, to give us
specific suggestions relative to any modifications in the
resolution that has been presented to us by the White House. I
think both of you have had some suggestions here. You may want
to give us some additional thought. Feel free to do so if you
wish and to submit those to this committee.
[The information referred to follows:]
Dr. Schlesinger. I have nothing to add to my testimony regrarding
the White House resolution on Iraq.
Mr. Berger. I have made some suggestions in my testimony on
proposed changes to the resolution. I am available to discuss more
specific language with any member of the committee at his or her
request.
Senator Warner. I'd just join you, Mr. Chairman, in your
observation. It's been an excellent hearing.
Chairman Levin. You have one more question? Okay. Senator
Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Would you care to hazard a guess as to
whether or not Saddam Hussein would, in fact, agree to
unfettered access?
Mr. Berger. I think, Senator, that the probability is that
he will not. He may agree to it. He may let the inspectors back
in. I think the probability is that he will interfere, but he
will have then interfered with a current statement by the
international community. I don't think you can rule out, as I
said earlier when you weren't here, the possibility that, under
these circumstances, where he is facing the potential of a
military invasion against him, that his instinct for self-
preservation may result in a different calculation. I don't
think that can be ruled out, but I think it not the most likely
course.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, again. You've been very patient,
and, as always, very helpful.
We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the committee adjourned.]