[Senate Hearing 107-806]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-806
THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
REDUCTIONS TREATY
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 25 AND AUGUST 1, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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83-759 PDF WASHINGTON : 2003
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
David S. Lyles, Staff Director
Judith A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The National Security Implications of the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty
july 25, 2002
Page
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense................... 7
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 19
The National Security Implications of the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty
august 1, 2002
Curtis, Charles B., President and Chief Operating Officer,
Nuclear Threat Initiative...................................... 52
Carter, Dr. Ashton B., Ford Foundation Professor of Science and
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University............................................. 60
Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, United States
Strategic Command.............................................. 87
Beckner, Dr. Everet H., Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration............. 91
(iii)
THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
REDUCTIONS TREATY
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THURSDAY, JULY 25, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Akaka, Bill
Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Warner, Inhofe, Allard, and
Sessions.
Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director; and Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member;
Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W.
Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Maren Leed, professional
staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; and
Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
Republican staff director; L. David Cherington, minority
counsel; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Mary Alice
A. Hayward, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member; George W. Lauffer, professional
staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member;
Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; and Scott W.
Stucky, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Dara R. Alpert, Daniel K.
Goldsmith, Andrew Kent, Thomas C. Moore, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Brady King,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; B.G. Wright, assistant to Senator
Byrd; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland;
Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani
Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; Peter
A. Contostavlos and Dan Shapiro, assistants to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Benjamin
L. Cassidy, assistant to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III, assistant
to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator
Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; Michele
A. Traficante, assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway
II, assistant to Senator Sessions; and Kristine Fauser,
assistant to Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The Armed Services
Committee meets this morning to consider the national security
implications of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty which
was signed between the United States and Russia on May 24. The
President sent the treaty to the Senate for its consideration
on June 20 and is seeking the Senate's advice and consent to
ratification of the treaty.
We are pleased today to have with us Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have both been involved in the
formulation of this treaty and in the thinking on U.S. nuclear
force structure that led to the level of nuclear forces that
are specified in the treaty.
I want to welcome you both back to our committee. I see you
are making really good progress in terms of your operation, Mr.
Secretary. We are delighted to see that. You have a new cast--
not a new cast of characters; it looks like the old cast of
characters here--but at least a new cast on your arm, and we
hope things are going well for you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. The Armed Services Committee has
traditionally held hearings on the military implications of
arms control treaties over the last few decades and provided
its views and recommendations to the Foreign Relations
Committee before that committee marks up a resolution of
ratification and reports to the full Senate.
While this committee does not have the leading role in
treaty consideration, we do have an important supporting role
to fulfill. This committee has held over 50 hearings on nine
arms control treaties since the early 1970s, focusing
particularly on the military or national security implications
of proposed treaties, matters that fall within this committee's
jurisdiction.
Our committee plans to hold two hearings on this treaty. In
addition to today's hearing, we will hold a second hearing on
August 1st to hear from the Commander in Chief of U.S.
Strategic Command and from the National Nuclear Security
Administration, and we will also hear from some outside
experts.
I believe that the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,
or ``SORT'' for short, is a positive step forward in U.S.-
Russian relations. I think it is particularly important to have
a treaty that is legally binding rather than a unilateral step
that is not binding on future administrations or, of course, on
the other party to the treaty. That also ensures that the
Senate fulfills its constitutional role in giving due
consideration of any treaty and providing advice and consent
before ratification.
I see this treaty as another positive step toward further
arms control and an important boost to our new relationship
with Russia. But there is much more work to be done to continue
improving mutual security with Russia, work that includes
further reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons, reducing
nuclear proliferation dangers, and improving confidence,
transparency, and cooperation with Russia.
I hope today's hearing will help us understand: what this
treaty is and what it is not; how the administration plans to
implement the treaty; how the treaty fits into our overall
security context; how the administration is thinking about our
nuclear forces; and what additional steps we can and should
take to further improve our security.
The treaty is certainly somewhat unusual. Its central
obligation is that both nations will reduce their operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700
and 2,200 some 10 years from now, apparently just for the 1 day
at that moment when the treaty then expires. Contrary to
numerous media reports, the treaty does not require reductions
in nuclear warheads stockpiles. It does not require elimination
of warheads. Under this treaty both sides must simply remove
warheads from land-based or submarine-based missiles and from
bombers.
Both sides are then free to keep every warhead so removed
and to store these warheads for possible redeployment. The only
limitations that will bind the United States and Russia are the
limitations on delivery systems under START I, at least until
2009. After 2009, when the START I treaty expires, it is not
clear what will happen.
The importance of this treaty is not so much what it does
or does not do, but rather the possibilities that it may hold
for the future. It is one step in a continual process of
improving the U.S.-Russia relationship and improving U.S.
security.
My focus is going to be on what it leads to for U.S. and
Russian nuclear weapons policy. Can this treaty provide an
opportunity for the United States to make real reductions in
nuclear weapons, not just the number of weapons deployed but
the total number of nuclear weapons? Can this treaty provide an
opportunity for the United States to rethink its nuclear
weapons employment policy so that nuclear weapons are seen as
weapons of last resort?
Can this treaty provide an opportunity to establish new
multilateral approaches to dealing with and reducing weapons of
mass destruction? Can this treaty be monitored or verified
effectively by either party, or is that not as important as it
used to be? Can this treaty provide an opportunity to improve
the lagging efforts to secure and destroy Russian chemical
weapons, biological materials, and excess strategic nuclear
weapons materials and delivery systems?
Can this treaty provide an opportunity to help Russia
account for and destroy in the near future its large number of
excess tactical nuclear weapons?
Let me now turn to Senator Warner for any opening statement
that he may have.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again I commend
you for calling this hearing because, as you said, our
committee has had a long history and played an important role
in those treaties of our Nation which directly affect our
national security. We look forward to the testimony from the
distinguished Secretary and Chairman.
Throughout its history, our committee has played a critical
role in assessing the national security impact and military
implications of arms control agreements negotiated by the
Executive Branch. It is right and proper for our committee to
once again be a key player as the Senate carries out its
constitutional responsibility of advice and consent to the
Moscow Treaty.
The Moscow Treaty in my judgment is the right agreement at
the right time, and I commend the President and all those who
worked with him to achieve this goal. It is a remarkable
document, both in the strength of its content and in its
departure--and I underline the word ``departure''--from the
commonly accepted strategic thinking and arms control wisdom
that prevailed during the Cold War era. This breakthrough
treaty, negotiated in a period of just several months, will
reduce nuclear arsenals from the present levels of about 6,000
strategic warheads to 1,700 to 2,200 operational strategic
warheads over the next decade.
This reduction, which amounts to about two-thirds of the
warheads in the Russian and U.S. arsenals, is the most dramatic
in strategic weapons history and in the history of arms control
agreements.
This treaty is also important in that it is the embodiment
of a new relationship between the United States of America and
Russia. President Bush and his administration again are to be
commended for these outstanding achievements.
This treaty is fully consistent with the policy goals that
President Bush laid out after he took office. In a landmark
speech at the National Defense University in May 2001,
President Bush called for a new strategic relationship with
Russia. I quote:
``Today's Russia is not yesterday's Soviet Union. This new
cooperative relationship should look to the future, not to the
past. It should be reassuring, rather than threatening. It
should be premised on openness and mutual confidence and real
opportunities for cooperation. I want to complete the work of
changing our relationship from one based on a nuclear balance
of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common
interests.''
President Bush has engaged President Putin on a regular and
intensive basis to move the Russian-American relationship
beyond the Cold War hostility to a relationship built on
openness, shared goals, and shared responsibility. I find that
prevalent throughout this treaty. The treaty we consider today,
therefore, is one measure of President Bush's extraordinary
success in building this new relationship.
Last December President Bush announced the intent to
withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and
restated his determination to dramatically reduce the U.S.
nuclear arsenal. The ABM Treaty in many technical ways limited
the options by which we could achieve our defenses, as well as
in the minds of many placed a limitation on this country to in
effect defend itself against incoming ballistic missiles. It
did serve a constructive role during the Cold War period, but
its mission has ended. It really had to be a part of the demise
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
I commend the President for his initiatives, for many
critics at the time believed that renewed hostility and a
renewed arms race with Russia could ensue if the U.S. exercised
its right, a right set forth clearly in that treaty, to
withdraw. Yet the opposite has happened. On December 13, 2001,
the same day that President Bush notified the Russian
Government of his intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and
dramatically reduce U.S. strategic nuclear forces, Russian
President Putin reciprocated by stating his intent to similarly
reduce Russian strategic nuclear arsenals.
President Putin urged that the U.S. and Russian strategic
reductions be formalized in a legally binding agreement. This
year on May 24, at the summit in Moscow, President Bush and
President Putin signed this landmark agreement that is the
subject of our hearing today and the subject before the Senate
for ratification.
I firmly believe that the President chose wisely when he
agreed to put these reductions in the form of a legally binding
treaty. This assures that the agreement will survive the
personal relationship between these two presidents and that it
has the weight of law behind it.
Yet this treaty is not like any that we have seen before.
It is the first arms control treaty to embody the post-Cold War
U.S.-Russian relationship. In negotiating this treaty, both
sides consciously rejected the Cold War mentality of distrust
and hostility that previously had required lengthy negotiations
and extensive legal structure and detailed verification regimes
to assure that both sides would abide by their obligations.
How many times, Mr. Chairman, did you and I and other
colleagues travel to Geneva and elsewhere in the world to watch
the slow progress of previous negotiations on arms control
agreements? I remember these trips so well.
Consequently, the Moscow Treaty lacks many of the features
of past bilateral arms control agreements, most of which were
signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty
does not establish interim warhead reduction goals or a
detailed schedule to achieve warhead reductions. It does not
define warhead ``counting rules,'' require destruction of
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or launchers, or include
limits or sub-limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or
launchers.
But there is an important way in which the Moscow Treaty is
similar to prior strategic arms control agreements. No arms
control treaty has ever required the destruction of nuclear
warheads. There are a number of important reasons for this,
which I expect we will explore in detail today in this hearing.
Some may argue that the simplicity of the Moscow Treaty is
a weakness. I respectfully disagree. I believe that the
simplicity of the treaty is its strength. This simplicity puts
the focus on the key element of any strategic arms control
agreement--deep reductions to strategic nuclear warheads. The
simplicity of the treaty allowed Russia and the U.S. to reach
an early agreement, avoiding the long, complex, arduous
negotiations characteristic of the Cold War era.
This simplicity allows both the U.S. and Russia the
flexibility within the numeric limits set by the treaty to
structure their forces consistent with each nation's security
requirements and to adapt to changes in the international
security environment. This flexibility is an essential feature
of U.S. policy in an era when strategic and tactical surprise
seem to be the only constant.
Yet I find that the doctrine ``Trust, But Verify,''
authored by Ronald Reagan, our former President, is quietly
present in the structures and foundations of this treaty. As
unique as the Moscow Treaty is, it also reflects the success
and the heritage of past arms control agreements. It is a
legally binding document. In order to achieve the required
reductions, nuclear warheads must be physically removed from
the launch platforms and otherwise rendered so that they cannot
be part of the operational structure for any near-term military
contingencies.
The treaty provides the mechanisms and atmosphere to assure
the compliance with its provisions and resolution of future
issues related to treaty implementation. The terms of the
Moscow Treaty, which recognize that the START I Treaty
verification regime remains in force and which establish a
Bilateral Implementation Commission, provide the basis for the
predictability, transparency, and confidence needed to assure
that both sides achieve the required reductions.
Some colleagues have raised concerns about the treaty, and
each of these concerns deserves full consideration. But I
remind my colleagues that many of these concerns must be
balanced against the reality that we are here after only 5
months of negotiations considering a treaty that reduces the
U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals by approximately two-
thirds--a major accomplishment.
Following a full examination of the treaty, I believe that
the Senate will promptly render its advice and consent to the
Moscow Treaty. This treaty in my view clearly advances the
national security interests of the United States, indeed the
interests of the world, and deserves the strongest of support
by the United States Senate. I ask that the statements of
Senators Thurmond and Santorum be placed in the record at this
time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statements of Senator Thurmond and Senator
Santorum follow:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond
Mr. Chairman, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
established the Committee on Armed Services and directed among other
issues that ``such committee shall also study and review, on a
comprehensive basis, matters relating to the common defense policy of
the United States . . .'' Today's hearing on the Strategic Offensive
Reduction Treaty, commonly known as the Moscow Treaty, is a reflection
of the mandate to review matters relating to the common defense policy.
I congratulate you and Senator Warner, our ranking member, for
scheduling this and the subsequent hearing on this important and
revolutionary treaty. I expect that the committee's report on the
treaty and its implications will be an important factor as the Senate
considers the ratification of the treaty.
Mr. Chairman, in his opening statement before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated: ``The
Moscow Treaty marks a new era in the relationship between the United
States and Russia. It codifies both countries' commitment to make deep
strategic offensive reductions in a flexible and legally binding
manner. It facilitates the transition from strategic rivalry to a
genuine strategic partnership based on the principles of mutual
security, trust, openness, cooperation, and predictability.'' For those
of us who lived through the Cold War, the words ``strategic partnership
based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness,
cooperation, and predictability'' automatically cause concern. However,
they represent the new world we live in. Russia is no longer our
archenemy; it is a partner in our efforts to achieve peace throughout
the globe and rid the world of the treat of terrorism. This partnership
is based on trust, openness, cooperation, and predictability.
I applaud President Bush for his aggressive approach toward
fostering this new relationship with Russia. The Moscow Treaty is a
prime example of this new philosophy. Not only does it call for the
reduction in strategic nuclear warheads from more than 6,000 to
approximately 2,000, but it also takes the approach that these
reductions will be made based on trust and cooperation rather than the
historic frameworks of prior treaties. In my judgement, this treaty is
consistent with our national security interests as outlined in the 2002
Nuclear Posture Review. It also ensures that the United States
maintains its flexibility to retain warheads in storage for future use
to upgrade and maintain the operational stockpile. While some criticize
the lack of a requirement to destory warheads, I believe it is a
sensible step to protect our strategic nuclear capability. Unlike
Russia, the United States is not able to build new warheads and must
rely on existing warheads to replace aging and unusable weapons.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished
panel. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers have never shirked from
telling it as it is. I expect that their testimony today will be
forthright and based on their best professional judgement.
______
Prepared Statement by Senator Rick Santorum
Chairman Levin and Senator Warner, thank you for scheduling this
important hearing. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, thank you both
for making yourselves available to offer testimony at this morning's
hearing.
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty will reduce U.S. and
Russian strategic nuclear weapons from approximately 6,000 weapons to
1,700-2,200 weapons by 2012. This agreement represents the largest
strategic nuclear arms reduction ever negotiated between the U.S. and
Russia.
It is difficult to imagine a better representative example of how
relations have changed between the United States and Russia than this
treaty. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty--also known as the
Moscow Treaty--reflects the historic shift that has taken place
following the end of the Cold War, and it highlights the strong
relationship and trust that exists between Presidents Bush and Putin.
Missing from the Moscow Treaty is the distrust underlying previous
U.S.-Soviet Union arms control agreements. This new level of trust
between the U.S. and Russia allowed the treaty to be negotiated in a
period of months--not years--and, at the same time, achieve historic
reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Because this treaty was
negotiated under a new U.S.-Russian paradigm of cooperation and trust,
missing are the long and detailed verification and accounting rules
that have been part of previous arms control treaties.
The reductions specified in the treaty, roughly a two-thirds
reduction in the level of strategic nuclear weapons, are indeed
historic. While some on the other side will express dissatisfaction
that nuclear warheads will not be destroyed under the Moscow Treaty, it
is worth noting that no strategic arms control treaty has ever required
dismantlement of nuclear warheads. The warheads that the U.S. will
retain in storage are a strategic hedge against the rise of a hostile
nuclear power and they will provide a strategic reserve for our aging
nuclear weapons strockpile.
As for the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, while the treaty does
not address these weapons, U.S. negotiators did raise this issue with
their Russian counterparts during Moscow Treaty negotiations.
Interestingly enough, the Russian delegation would not address limits
on tactical nuclear weapons during the negotiations.
Mr. Chairman, I believe the Moscow Treaty is a sound treaty that
reflects the progress, cooperation and trust that exists between the
U.S. and Russia. This is a treaty that is consistent with U.S. nuclear
doctrine contained in the recent Nuclear Posture Review, and it
provides a legal framework for substantial strategic nuclear arms
reductions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Secretary Rumsfeld.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
members of the committee. I am pleased to be here with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dick Myers, and we thank
you for this opportunity to discuss the Moscow Treaty.
Senator Warner, as you indicated, President Bush has been
determined from the outset of his administration to place the
U.S.-Russia relationship on a new footing. Certainly Secretary
Powell, Under Secretary of State John Bolton, and Under
Secretary of Defense Doug Feith have all worked closely to help
achieve this treaty.
I would like to abbreviate my prepared remarks, Mr.
Chairman, to cover some of the questions that have been posed
and have the entire statement included in the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I also would point out that there have
been naysayers that have insisted that establishing this new
relationship between the United States and Russia would be not
possible or at least extremely difficult. They looked at the
agenda of the President's promise to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty, his desire to build defenses to protect the U.S., our
friends and allies from ballistic missile attack, his
determination to strengthen the NATO alliance by making new
allies of old adversaries, and predicted that the U.S. and
Russia were on a bumpy, if not collision, course.
What a difference a year makes. Today the U.S.-Russian
relationship is stronger than perhaps at any time in the
history of our two countries. In a little over a year, the
President has defied the critics and set in motion a
transformation of the U.S.-Russian relationship, one that we
believe is designed to benefit the people of both our nations
and indeed the entire world.
The United States and Russia are working together to
develop new avenues of trade and economic cooperation. We are
working together to fight terrorism and to reduce the number of
deployed offensive nuclear weapons, weapons that are a legacy
of the past and which are no longer needed at a time when
Russia and the United States are basing our relationship on
cooperation rather than fear of mutual annihilation.
Of course, there is still a good deal of work ahead and
challenges to overcome. But we do have an opportunity to build
a new relationship for our peoples, a relationship that can
contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity for generations
of Russians and Americans.
But let there be no doubt. It will require a change in our
thinking, thinking in our bureaucracies, in the Duma, in
Congress, in the press, and in academic institutions. We seem
to have decades of momentum going in the opposite direction.
Habits built up over so many decades become ingrained and are
hard to break.
Here in the U.S., there are those who would have preferred
to see us continue the adversarial arms control negotiations of
the Soviet era, where teams of lawyers drafted hundreds of
pages of treaty text and each side worked to gain the upper
hand, while focusing on ways to preserve a balance of nuclear
terror.
Similarly, in Russia today there are those who are stuck in
the past, who look warily at the U.S. offers of greater
friendship and cooperation, preferring to keep us at arm's
length while continuing to associate with the old allies of the
former Soviet Union.
Russia and the United States entered this new century
saddled with two legacies of the Cold War, the adversarial
relationship to which we had both grown accustomed and the
physical manifestation of that adversarial relationship, the
massive arsenals of weapons that we built up. In the past year
we have made progress in dealing with both.
Last November at the Crawford Summit, President Bush
announced his intention to reduce the United States'
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by some two-
thirds, to between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons. Soon thereafter,
President Putin made a similar commitment. These announced
reductions are a reflection of that new relationship.
But what is remarkable is not simply the fact of these
planned reductions, but how they have happened. After a careful
review, President Bush simply announced his intention to cut
our operationally deployed nuclear warheads. President Putin
did the same. When they met in Moscow, they recorded these
unilaterally, announced changes in a treaty that will survive
their two presidencies, the Moscow Treaty which the Senate and
the Duma are now considering.
But it is significant that, while we consulted closely and
engaged in a process that had been open and transparent, we did
not engage in lengthy, adversarial negotiations in which the
U.S. and Russia would keep thousands of weapons we did not need
as bargaining chips. We did not establish standing negotiating
teams in Geneva, with armies of arms control aficionados ready
to do battle over every colon and every comma.
If we had done so, we would still be negotiating today.
Instead, we are moving directly toward dramatic reductions in
the ready nuclear weapons of our two countries and clearing the
way for a new relationship between our countries.
An illustration of how far we have come is this. This
[indicating] is the START Treaty. It is enormous. It was signed
in 1991 by the first President Bush and Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev. It is 700 pages long and it took 9 years to
negotiate. This [indicating] is the Moscow Treaty as concluded
by President Bush and President Putin. It is three pages long
and it took 5 or 6 months to negotiate.
Mr. Chairman, we are working toward the day when the
relationship between our two countries is such that no arms
control treaties will be necessary. That is how normal
countries deal with each other. The United States and Britain
both have nuclear weapons, yet we do not spend hundreds of
hours negotiating the fine details of mutual reductions in our
offensive weapons. We do not feel the need to preserve any
balance of terror between us. It would be a worthy goal for our
relationship with Russia to evolve along that path.
We would have made these cuts regardless of what Russia did
with its arsenal. We are making them not because we signed the
treaty, but because the transformation in our relationship with
Russia means that we do not need as many deployed weapons as we
once needed. Russia has made a similar calculation, and the
agreement we reached in Moscow is the result of those
determinations, not the cause of them.
That is also one reason why we saw no need to include
detailed verification measures in the treaty. There simply is
not any way on Earth to verify what Russia is doing with all of
those warheads. Neither side should have an interest in evading
the terms of the treaty since it codifies unilaterally-
announced reductions and gives both sides broad flexibility in
implementing those reductions.
Similarly flawed is the complaint that, because the Moscow
Treaty does not contain a requirement to destroy warheads
removed from missiles or bombers, that the cuts are somehow
reversible and therefore not real. Put aside for the moment
that no previous arms control treaty, not SALT, not START, not
the INF, ever required the destruction of warheads, and no one
offered objections to them on that basis.
This charge is based, I believe, on a flawed premise, that
irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons are possible. In
point of fact, I do not believe there is any such thing as
irreversible reduction in nuclear weapons. The knowledge of how
to build nuclear weapons exists in the world. There is no
possibility at all that that knowledge will be lost. Every
reduction is therefore reversible, given time and given money.
Indeed, when it comes to building nuclear weapons, Russia
has a distinct advantage over the United States. Today Russia
can and does produce both nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles. They have an open, warm production line for
each. The U.S. does not currently produce nuclear warheads. The
reason to keep rather than destroy some of those nuclear
warheads is to have them available in the event there is a
problem with the safety or reliability of some element of our
arsenal.
If we had pursued the path of traditional arms control as
some have suggested, we would not be proceeding with the
reductions outlined in this treaty. Rather, we would still be
at the negotiating table arguing over how to reconcile these
and other asymmetries between the United States and Russia.
Russia might, for example, have insisted that any agreement
take into account the size of the U.S. economy and our ability
to mobilize resources to develop new production facilities.
We might have argued, conversely, that Russia's proximity
to rogue nations allows them to deter these regimes with
tactical systems, whereas, because they are many thousands of
miles away from us, the U.S. distance from them requires more
intercontinental systems than Russia needs. This could have
resulted in a mind-numbing debate over how many non-strategic
systems should equal an intercontinental system or open the
door to a discussion of whether an agreement must include all
nuclear warheads, including tactical nuclear warheads, and so
on and so forth ad infinitum.
The approach we have taken is to treat Russia not as an
adversary, but as a friendly power. With the recently completed
nuclear posture review, the U.S. has declared that we are not
interested in preserving a balance of terror with Russia. As
our adversaries change, our deterrence calculus can and should
change as well.
That is why we are working to transform our nuclear posture
from one that was aimed at deterring the Soviet Union that no
longer exists to one designed to deter new adversaries,
adversaries that may not be discouraged from attacking us by
the threat of nuclear retaliation, just as the terrorists who
struck us on September 11 were certainly not deterred by the
massive U.S. nuclear arsenal.
Some have asked why in the post-Cold War world we need to
maintain as many as 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed
warheads. The U.S. nuclear arsenal remains an important part of
our strategy and it helps to dissuade the emergence of
potential or would-be peer competitors by underscoring the
futility of trying to sprint toward parity with us or, indeed,
superiority. I would add that it also assures our friends and
allies that our capability is sufficient, and in some instances
nations that have the ability to develop nuclear weapons,
because they are our friends and allies, recognize they have no
need to do so.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, our decision to proceed with
reductions as deep as the ones outlined in the Moscow Treaty is
premised on decisions to invest in a number of other critical
areas, programs that are funded and recommended in our 2003
budget. These include investments to improve U.S. intelligence
collection, analysis, processing, and dissemination, to protect
the U.S. homeland, including a refocused, revitalized missile
defense research and testing program, and capabilities to
detect and respond to biological attack, accelerate development
of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with new combat
capabilities, and produce fast, precision conventional strike
capabilities, convert four Trident nuclear submarines into
stealthy SSGN strike submarines that can carry cruise missiles
and special operations forces in denied areas, leverage
information technology to seamlessly connect U.S. forces in the
air, at sea, and on the ground, protect our information
networks, improve the survivability of U.S. space systems, and
develop a space infrastructure that assures persistent
surveillance and access.
Investments in these and many other transformational
capabilities in the 2003 budget should allow the U.S. over time
to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons and enact the deep
nuclear reductions contained in the treaty.
Others have asked why there is no reduction schedule in the
treaty. The answer quite simply is flexibility. Our approach in
the Nuclear Posture Review was to recognize that we are
entering a period of surprise and uncertainty, when the sudden
emergence of unexpected threats will be an increasingly common
feature of our security environment.
We were surprised on September 11, and let there be no
doubt we will have surprises in the future. Intelligence,
despite the efforts and despite how good we are at it, has
repeatedly underestimated the capabilities of different
countries of concern to us. We have historically had gaps in
our knowledge of as much as 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, in one case 13
years where something occurred in a major country with respect
to weapons of mass destruction that we did not know about until
many years later.
The only surprise is that so many among us are still
surprised. The problem is more acute in an age when the spread
of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of terrorist
states and potentially terrorist networks means that our margin
for error is significantly less than it has been. The cost of a
mistake could be not thousands of our innocent men, women, and
children, but hundreds of thousands of lives or even millions.
Because of our smaller margin for error and the uncertainty
of the future security environment, the U.S. will need
flexibility. This new approach to deterrence will help us to
better contribute to peace and stability and address the new
threats and challenges that we will face in the 21st century.
We have entered a period when cooperation between our
countries will be increasingly important to the security and
prosperity of both our peoples. We can work together to stop
the spread of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of
terrorist movements and terrorist states. We can work together
to try to support Russia's economic transformation and deeper
integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. This treaty is
merely one element of a growing multi-faceted relationship
between our two countries that involves not just security, but
also increasing political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and
other forms of cooperation.
The reductions characterized in this treaty will help
eliminate the debris of past hostility that has been blocking
our way as we build a new relationship. The treaty President
Bush has fashioned and the process by which he fashioned it, I
believe, are both models for future cooperation between our two
countries. We have achieved deep reductions and enhanced the
security of both our countries without perpetuating Cold War
ways of thinking that hinder a desire for better relations.
Mr. Chairman, I urge that the Senate advise and consent to
this treaty and approve a clean resolution of ratification.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld and the U.S.-
Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (The Moscow
Treaty) follow:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:
First, let me thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Moscow
Treaty. President Bush, Secretary Powell, Under Secretary of State John
Bolton, and Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, have worked closely
to achieve the treaty.
When President Bush took office last year, he made clear his
determination to transform the Russian-American relationship--to put
the hostility built up over so many decades behind us, and set our two
nations on a course toward greater cooperation.
Some naysayers insisted it could not be done. They looked at his
agenda--his promise to withdraw from the ABM Treaty; his desire to
build defenses to protect the U.S., its friends, and allies from
ballistic missile attack; his determination to strengthen the NATO
Alliance by making new allies of old adversaries--and predicted that
the U.S. and Russia were on a collision course.
Various commentators warned of an impending ``deep chill'' in U.S.-
Russian relations that would make it impossible to negotiate further
nuclear reductions with Russia. More than one foreign official
predicted that the President's approach would ``re-launch the arms
race.'' The Washington Post cautioned that the President's strategy
risked ``making the world less rather than more secure, and . . .
increasing rather than assuaging tension among the United States, its
allies and potential adversaries such as Russia.'' The New York Times
warned his approach ``may alienate the Kremlin and give rise to a
dangerous new arms race with Russia . . .''
What a difference a year makes.
None of the dire predictions came to pass. To the contrary, the
U.S.-Russian relationship is stronger than perhaps at any time in the
history of our two nations.
Far from a clash over NATO expansion, we have cemented a new NATO-
Russia relationship that will permit increasing cooperation between
Russia and the members of the Atlantic Alliance.
Far from causing a ``deep chill'' in relations, the U.S. withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty was greeted in Russia with something approximating
a yawn. Indeed, President Putin declared the decision ``does not pose a
threat'' to Russia.
Far from launching a new arms race, the U.S. and Russia have both
decided to move toward historic reductions in their deployed offensive
nuclear arsenals--reductions to be codified in the Moscow Treaty.
Indeed, President Putin chose to announce the Russian reductions on the
same day President Bush announced the U.S. intention to withdraw from
the ABM Treaty.
In little over a year, the President has defied the critics and set
in motion a transformation in U.S.-Russian relationship--one that is
designed to benefit the people of both our nations, and indeed the
entire world.
The record shows that it is a transformation that began before the
terrible events of September 11.
President Bush laid out his vision for a new relationship in a
speech at the National Defense University on May 1 of last year. When
he met President Putin for the first time a month later in Slovenia,
instead of the predicted fireworks, the two presidents emerged from
their discussions expressing confidence that our countries could put
past animosities behind them.
Not only had the meeting far exceeded his expectations, President
Putin declared, but he believed that ``Russia and the United States are
not enemies, do not threaten each other, and could be fully good
allies.'' President Bush announced they had both agreed that the time
had come ``to move beyond suspicion and towards straight talk; beyond
mutually assured destruction and toward mutually earned respect . . .
to address the world as it is, not as it used to be.''
Over the course of the past year, they put those words into action.
In the last 12 months, the Presidents of the United States and
Russia had more interaction and forged more areas of cooperation across
a broader range of political, economic, and security issues than at any
time in the history of our two Nations.
Today, the United States and Russia are working together to develop
new avenues of trade and economic cooperation. We are working together
to fight terrorism and deal with the new and emerging threats we will
both face in this dangerous new century. We are working together to
reduce the number of deployed offensive nuclear weapons--weapons that
are a legacy of the past, and which are no longer needed at a time when
Russia and the U.S. are basing our relations on cooperation, not fear
of mutual annihilation.
These are historic changes--changes of a breadth and scale that few
imagined, and many openly doubted, could be achieved in so short a
period time.
Of course, there is still a great deal of work ahead--and
challenges to overcome. Our success is by no means assured. But we have
an opportunity to build a new relationship for our peoples--a
relationship that can contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity
for generations of Russians and Americans. It is ours to grasp, or to
let slip away. But let there be no doubt--it will require a change in
our thinking in our bureaucracies, in the Duma and Congress, and in the
press and in academic institutions. We have decades of momentum going
in the opposite direction. We need to recalibrate our thinking and our
approaches.
In both our countries, there are those who are still struggling
with the transition. Tolstoy said, ``everyone thinks of changing the
world, but no one thinks of changing himself.'' There is a reason for
that. Change is not easy--none of us wakes up in the morning wanting to
change.
Habits built up over many decades become ingrained and are hard to
break. Here in the U.S., there are some who would have preferred to see
us continue the adversarial arms control negotiations of the Soviet
era--where teams of lawyers drafted hundreds of pages of treaty text,
and each side worked to gain the upper hand, while focusing on ways to
preserve a balance of nuclear terror. This is an approach that
President Bush rejected, insisting instead that we deal with Russia as
we deal with all normal countries--in a spirit of friendship, trust,
and cooperation.
Similarly, in Russia today there are those who are stuck in the
past--who look warily at American offers of greater friendship and
cooperation, preferring to keep us at arms length, while continuing to
associate with the old allies of the former Soviet Union--dictatorial
regimes characterized by political, religious, and economic
repression--the world's walking wounded.
But there are others in Russia who want to see her embrace the
future and take her rightful place in Europe--through increased
integration with the western industrialized democracies, and by
embracing political and economic freedom, and the higher standard of
living, domestic peace, and thriving culture that are the product of
free societies. Sometimes these divergent impulses can be found in the
same people.
Both of our nations have a choice to make--a choice between the
past and the future. Neither of us can make that choice for the other.
But each of us has an interest in the choice the other makes.
The question for us is: what can we, who choose the future, do to
support each other?
For those of us in the business of national defense, our task is an
important one: to clear away the debris of past hostility that has been
blocking our path into the 21st century.
Russia and the United States entered this new century saddled with
two legacies of the Cold War: the adversarial relationship to which we
had both grown accustomed and the physical manifestation of that
adversarial relationship--the massive arsenals of weapons we built up.
In the past year, we have made progress in dealing with both. Last
November, at the Crawford Summit, President Bush announced his
intention to reduce the United States' operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads by some two-thirds--to between 1,700 and 2,200
weapons. Soon after, President Putin made a similar commitment.
These announced reductions are a reflection of our new
relationship. When President Reagan spoke to the students at Moscow
State University in 1988, he told them, ``nations do not distrust each
other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each
other.'' Clearly, we do not distrust each other the way the U.S. and
Soviet Union once did.
But what is remarkable is not simply the fact of these planned
reductions, but how they have happened. After a careful review,
President Bush simply announced his intention to cut our operationally-
deployed nuclear warheads. President Putin did the same. When they met
in Moscow, they recorded these unilaterally announced changes in a
treaty that will survive their two presidencies--the Moscow Treaty
which the Senate and the Duma will now consider.
But it is significant that while we consulted closely, and engaged
in a process that has been open and transparent, we did not engage in
lengthy, adversarial negotiations in which the U.S. and Russia kept
thousands of weapons they did not need as bargaining chips. We did not
establish standing negotiating teams in Geneva, with armies of arms
control aficionados ready to do battle over every colon and comma.
If we had done so, we would still be negotiating today. Instead, we
are moving toward dramatic reductions in the ready nuclear weapons of
our two countries and clearing the way for a new relationship between
our countries.
An illustration of how far we have come in that regard is this:
[HOLDS UP START TREATY] This is the START I Treaty, signed in 1991
by the first President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. It
is 700 pages long, and took 9 years to negotiate.
[HOLDS UP MOSCOW TREATY]. This is the Moscow Treaty, concluded this
summer by President Bush and President Putin. It is 3 pages long, and
took 6 months to negotiate.
Mr. Chairman, we are working toward the day when the relationship
between our two countries is such that no arms control treaties will be
necessary.
That is how normal countries deal with each other. The United
States and Britain both have nuclear weapons, yet we do not spend
hundreds of hours negotiating the fine details of mutual reductions in
our offensive systems. We do not feel the need to preserve a balance of
terror between us.
It would be a worthy goal for our relationship with Russia to be
the same.
There are those who do not see the difference in the size of these
treaties as a sign of progress. To the contrary, they would have
preferred a voluminous, legalistic arms control agreement, with
hundreds of pages of carefully crafted provisions and intrusive
verification measures.
These critics operate from a flawed premise: that, absent such an
agreement, our two countries would both try to break out of the
constraints of this treaty and increase our deployed nuclear forces.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
During the Cold War, the stated rationale for arms control was to
constrain an arms race. But the idea of an arms race between the United
States and Russia today is ludicrous. The relationship between our two
countries today is such that the U.S. determined--unilaterally--that
deep reductions in our deployed nuclear forces are in the U.S.
interest.
We would have made these cuts regardless of what Russia did with
its arsenal. We are making them not because we signed a treaty in
Moscow, but because the transformation in our relationship with Russia
means we do not need so many deployed weapons. Russia has made a
similar calculation. The agreement we reached in Moscow is the result
of those determinations--not the cause of them.
That is also one reason we saw no need for including detailed
verification measures in the treaty. There simply isn't any way on
earth to verify what Russia is doing with all those warheads. Neither
side should have an interest in evading the terms of the treaty, since
it codifies unilaterally-announced reductions and gives both sides
broad flexibility in implementing them. Further, we saw no benefit in
creating a new forum for bitter debates over compliance and
enforcement. Today, the last place in the world where U.S. and Russian
officials still sit across a table arguing with each other is in
Geneva. Our goal is to move beyond that kind of Cold War animosity--not
to find new ways to extend it into the 21st century.
Similarly flawed is the complaint that, because the Moscow Treaty
does not contain a requirement to destroy warheads removed from
missiles or bombers, the cuts are reversible and therefore not
``real.'' Put aside for a moment the fact that no previous arms control
treaty--not SALT, START, or INF--has required the destruction of
warheads, and no one offered objections to them on that basis. This
charge is based on a flawed premise--that irreversible reductions in
nuclear weapons are possible. In point of fact, there is no such thing
as an irreversible reduction in nuclear weapons. The knowledge of how
to build nuclear weapons exists--and there is no possibility that
knowledge will be lost. Every reduction is therefore reversible, given
time and money.
Indeed, when it comes to building nuclear weapons, Russia has a
distinct advantage over the U.S. Today, Russia can and does produce
both nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles--they have
open warm production lines. The U.S. does not currently produce either
ICBMs or nuclear warheads. It has been a decade since we produced a new
nuclear weapon, and it would take us a number of years to begin
producing them again. In the time it would take us to re-deploy
decommissioned nuclear warheads, Russia could very likely produce a
larger number of new ones.
But the question is: why would we want to do so? Barring some
unforeseen and dramatic change in the global security environment--like
the sudden emergence of a hostile peer competitor on par with the old
Soviet Union--there is no reason why we would re-deploy the warheads we
are reducing.
The reason to keep, rather than destroy, some of those
decommissioned warheads is to have them available in the event there is
a problem with the safety or reliability of some element of our
arsenal. Since we do not have a warm production line, it would be
mindless for us to destroy all those non-deployed warheads, and then
have nothing for back up in the event we run into safety and
reliability problems--or a sudden, unexpected change in the global
security environment. Russia, by contrast, has little or no need to
maintain a reserve of warheads, since it has an active production
capability.
Mr. Chairman, if we had pursued the path of traditional arms
control, as some suggested, we would not be proceeding with the
reductions outlined in this treaty. Rather, we would still be at the
negotiating table, arguing over how to reconcile these and other
asymmetries between Russia and the United States.
We would have had to try to balance Russia's active
production capacity against the United States' lack of one.
Russia might have insisted that any agreement take
into account the size of the U.S. economy and our ability to
mobilize resources relatively quickly to develop new production
facilities.
We might have argued that Russia's proximity to rogue
nations allows them to deter these regimes with tactical
systems, whereas, because they are many thousands of miles away
from us, the United States' distance from them requires more
intercontinental delivery systems than Russia needs.
This could have resulted in a mind-numbing debate over
how many non-strategic systems should equal an intercontinental
system, or opened the door to a discussion of whether an
agreement must include all nuclear warheads--including tactical
warheads.
Russian negotiators might have countered that a U.S.
advantage in advanced, high-tech conventional weapons must be
taken into account.
So on and so forth, ad infinitum.
But the point is this: We don't need to ``reconcile'' all these
asymmetries, because neither Russia nor the U.S. has an interest in
taking advantage of the other by increasing its respective deployed
nuclear forces.
The approach we have taken is to treat Russia not as an adversary,
but as a friendly power. In so doing, we have been able to preserve the
benefits attributed to arms control--the dialogue, consultations, lower
force levels, predictability, stability, and transparency. But we have
done so without all the drawbacks: the protracted negotiations; the
withholding of bargaining chips; the legalistic and adversarial process
that, more often than not, becomes a source of bitterness between the
participants; and the extended, embittered debates over compliance and
enforcement of agreements.
The U.S. and Russia are moving beyond all that. We are working to
put that kind of acrimony and hostility behind us--and the adversarial
process that was both a cause and effect of that hostility.
Because Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, our
interests have changed. As enemies, we had an interest in each other's
failure; as friends we have an interest in each other's success. As
enemies we had an interest in keeping each other off balance; as
friends we have an interest in promoting stability.
When Russia and the U.S. were adversaries, our principal focus was
trying to maintain and freeze into place the balance of nuclear terror.
With the recently completed Nuclear Posture Review, the United States
has declared that we are not interested in preserving a balance of
terror with Russia. Today, the threats we both face are no longer from
each other--they come from new sources. As our adversaries change, our
deterrence calculus can and should change as well.
That is why we are working to transform our nuclear posture from
one aimed at deterring a Soviet Union that no longer exists to one
designed to deter new adversaries--adversaries that may not be
discouraged from attacking us by the threat of U.S. nuclear
retaliation, just as the terrorists who struck us on September 11 were
not deterred by the United States' massive nuclear arsenal.
With the Nuclear Posture Review, President Bush is taking a new
approach to strategic deterrence--one that combines deep reductions in
offensive nuclear forces with new conventional offensive and defensive
systems more appropriate for deterring the potential adversaries we
face.
Taken together, this ``New Triad'' of offensive nuclear forces,
advanced conventional capabilities, and a range of new defenses
(ballistic missile defense, cruise missile defense, space defense,
cyber defense) supported by a revitalized defense infrastructure, are
all part of a new approach to deterrence and defense--an approach
designed to increase our security, while reducing our reliance on
nuclear weapons.
Some have asked why, in the post-Cold War world, we need to
maintain as many as 1,700-2,200 operationally-deployed warheads. The
end of the Soviet threat does not mean we no longer need nuclear
weapons. To the contrary, the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains an important
part of our deterrence strategy, and helps to dissuade the emergence of
potential or would-be peer competitors, by underscoring the futility of
trying to sprint toward parity with us or superiority.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, our decision to proceed with reductions as
deep as the ones outlined in the Moscow Treaty is premised on decisions
to invest in a number of other critical areas--programs that are funded
in our 2003 budget request.
These include investments to:
Improve U.S. intelligence collection, analysis,
processing, and dissemination;
Protect the U.S. homeland, including a refocused and
revitalized missile defense research and testing program, and
capabilities to detect and respond to biological attack;
Accelerate development of UAVs with new combat
capabilities and produce fast, precision conventional strike
capabilities;
Convert four Trident nuclear submarines into stealthy
SSGN Strike Submarines that can carry cruise missiles and
Special Operations Forces into denied areas;
Leverage information technology to seamlessly connect
U.S. forces--in the air, at sea and on the ground;
Protect our information networks;
Improve the survivability of U.S space systems, and
develop a space infrastructure that assures persistent
surveillance and access.
Investments in these, and many other transformational capabilities
in the 2003 budget, will allow the U.S., over time, to reduce our
reliance on nuclear weapons and enact the deep nuclear reductions
contained in the Moscow Treaty. I urge the Senate to approve the 2003
defense budget as soon as possible.
Others have asked why there is no reduction schedule in the treaty.
The answer, quite simply, is flexibility. Our approach in the Nuclear
Posture Review was to recognize that we are entering a period of
surprise and uncertainty, when the sudden emergence of unexpected
threats will be increasingly common feature of our security
environment. We were surprised on September 11--and let there be no
doubt, we will be surprised again.
When Bob McNamara appeared before the Senate for his confirmation
hearings as Secretary of Defense, no one mentioned the word Vietnam.
When Vice President Cheney appeared before the Senate for his Senate
confirmation as Secretary of Defense, he did not, nor did any member of
the committee, mention the word Iraq. When I appeared before the Senate
Armed Services Committee for my confirmation hearings last year, no
one--including me--mentioned the word Afghanistan.
Intelligence has repeatedly underestimated the capabilities of
different countries of concern to us. We have historically have had
gaps in our knowledge of 4, 6, 8, and in at least one case 12 or so
years. It is simply not possible for intelligence to know everything
taking place in our world. The only surprise is that so many among us
are still surprised. This problem is more acute in an age when the
spread of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of terrorist
states--and potentially terrorist networks--means that our margin of
error is significantly less than it has been. The cost of a mistake
could be not thousands, but hundreds of thousands of lives--or even
millions.
Because of our smaller margin for error and the uncertainty of the
future security environment, the U.S. will need flexibility. Through
the Nuclear Posture Review, we determined the force levels and the
flexibility we will need to deal with that new world and then
negotiated a treaty that allows both deep reduction in offensive
weapons and the flexibility to respond to sudden changes in the
strategic environment.
We are working to develop the right mix of offensive and defensive
capabilities. If we do so, we believe the result will be that nations
are less likely to acquire or use nuclear weapons.
None of these changes is in any way a threat to Russia. Far from
it, this new approach to deterrence will help us to better contribute
to peace and stability, and address the new threats and challenges the
United States will face in the 21st century.
In many ways, Russia now faces the most benign security environment
it has enjoyed in more than 700 years. From the 13th century up till
the dawn of the 16th century, Russia was subjected to Mongol rule; in
the 17th century she was invaded by Poland; in the 18th century by
Sweden; in the 19th century by France; and in the 20th century by
Germany. Today, for the first time in modern history, Russia is not
faced with a foreign invader with its eye set on Moscow.
In the 21st century, Russia and the United States both face new and
different security challenges--the threats of terrorism and
fundamentalism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue
states. The difference is that these are threats our two nations have
in common--threats that we can face together.
This means that we have entered a period when cooperation between
our two countries will be increasingly important to the security and
prosperity of both our peoples. We can work together to stop the spread
of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of terrorist movements
and terrorist states. We can work together to support Russia's economic
transformation and deeper integration into the Euro-Atlantic
community--because a prosperous Russia would not face the same
pressures to sell rogue states the tools of mass destruction.
If one were to look down from Mars on Earth, one would see that the
world divides pretty neatly into countries that are doing well and
countries that are not doing well. The countries that are doing well
are the ones that have free political systems, free economic systems,
rule of law, transparency and predictability, and are integrated into
the world economy. They are the nations where there is growth and
opportunity.
If Russia hopes to attract foreign capital, or retain her most
gifted, best educated citizens, she must provide them with a climate of
economic opportunity and political freedom--a climate that is the
critical foundation on which prosperity, creativity and opportunity are
built.
We in the United States can encourage Russia--by working together
to put the past behind us, establish bonds of friendship between our
peoples. But, in the end, the choice, and the struggle, belong to the
Russian people.
This treaty is by no means the foundation of that new relationship.
It is merely one element of a growing, multifaceted relationship
between our two countries that involves not just security, but also
increasing political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and other forms of
cooperation.
These reductions in the nuclear arsenals of our two countries are a
step in that process. The reductions characterized in the Moscow Treaty
will help eliminate the debris of past hostility that has been blocking
our way as we build a new relationship. The Treaty President Bush has
fashioned--and the process by which he fashioned it--are both models
for future cooperation between our two countries. We have achieved deep
reductions, and enhanced the security of both our countries, without
perpetuating Cold War ways of thinking that hinder a desire for better
relations.
I urge the Senate to advise and consent to this treaty and to
approve a clean resolution of ratification.
I'd be pleased to respond to your questions. Any questions that
cannot be fully answered here, we will be pleased to answer in
classified session or later for the record.
______
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Secretary Rumsfeld.
General Myers.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Myers. Chairman Levin and Senator Warner and
distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for the
invitation to appear before you today. Before I begin my
remarks on the Moscow Treaty, I would like to thank you for
taking time to conduct the confirmation hearings for our
combatant commanders. I think you have one scheduled tomorrow.
We realize how busy you are, and we very much appreciate the
timely manner in which this committee always responds to our
requirements. Thank you.
It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the
Moscow Treaty. Mr. Chairman, I would first request that my
prepared statement be submitted for the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
General Myers. I will make some short introductory remarks
and then answer any questions that you and the committee might
have.
Mr. Chairman, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
I all support the Moscow Treaty. We believe it provides for the
long-term security interests of our Nation and we also believe
that it preserves our flexibility in an uncertain strategic
environment. Moreover, the treaty allows us to implement the
recommendations that came out of our Nuclear Posture Review.
As you consider the treaty's protocols, there are three key
aspects that I would like to briefly comment on. First, we
welcome the fact that with this treaty we will focus on
operationally deployed warheads. This enables us to preserve
critical conventional capabilities while we manage the
reduction in strategic nuclear warheads.
Second, the 10-year implementation schedule gives us
flexibility in terms of drawing down our forces. Security
imperatives over the next decade may change radically from what
we anticipate today.
Third, the treaty's provision that allows the U.S. to
withdraw with a 90-day notification requirement provides a
hedge against sudden changes in the global strategic
environment. We believe together these provisions enable us to
adjust our strategy, if necessary, both in the short and long
term to meet the Nation's security needs. These provisions also
allow us to make significant reductions in nuclear warheads and
continue a reduction process that has been ongoing for the past
3 decades.
Perhaps most important of all, this treaty forms the basis
for a new relationship with our Russian counterparts, putting
to rest the Cold War at last.
Mr. Chairman, the Secretary and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Myers follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF
It is an honor to appear before this committee and share with you
the implications of the Moscow Treaty on our Nation's defense. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff maintain that this treaty enhances the security
of our country, and that of the world, by making a dramatic reduction
in the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads while allowing the
U.S. to retain the flexibility to hedge against future uncertainty.
While the requirements of this treaty are fewer and more direct than
previous arms control agreements, there are a number of key provisions
to highlight.
The treaty requires the U.S. to reduce its strategic nuclear
warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads. From current levels, this
number reflects almost a two-thirds cut in our strategic arsenal. This
reduction is consistent with our conclusions in the recent Nuclear
Posture Review.
Furthermore, as we implement the treaty, the U.S. will include only
those warheads that are ``operationally deployed.'' As such, we will
derive the total number of warheads from the number of warheads on
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) deployed in their launchers,
the number of warheads on Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)
in their launch tubes onboard submarines, and nuclear weapons loaded on
heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas at heavy bomber bases.
We will not include the small number of spare strategic nuclear
warheads located at heavy bomber bases. We also will not include the
warheads associated with strategic systems that are non-operational for
maintenance actions, those warheads downloaded from SLBMs or ICBMS, or
those warheads nominally associated with the deactivated Peacekeeper
ICBMs. As a result, under the Moscow Treaty, we can reduce the
operationally deployed warheads, rather than weapon systems, allowing
us to make deep reductions in our strategic warheads while maintaining
conventional capabilities.
The U.S. also benefits from the Moscow Treaty's flexibility because
it allows the U.S. to store spare warheads rather than destroy them.
There are key benefits the U.S. gains from storing the removed nuclear
warheads. The U.S. cannot replace nuclear warheads in the near- or mid-
term as we are currently not manufacturing new nuclear warheads. As a
result, the storage of warheads will provide the U.S. a hedge against
future strategic changes. In addition, storing nuclear warheads
provides a hedge in case warhead safety or reliability becomes a
concern.
It is also important to note that the Moscow Treaty recognizes that
the START Treaty remains in effect. The START Treaty methodology
attributes a specific number of warheads to each type of delivery
system. The START methodology ``counts'' warheads even if the delivery
platform is in maintenance. The START methodology also counts warheads
even if there is not a warhead deployed in the delivery platform. Under
the Moscow Treaty, the U.S. will only count operationally deployed
warheads. The U.S. may remove a warhead to comply with the Moscow
Treaty but a ``notional'' warhead may still be counted under the START
Treaty as we fulfill our obligations under both treaties.
The Moscow Treaty also requires that the U.S. and Russia meet the
lowered force levels by December 31, 2012. This 10-year implementation
deadline maximizes flexibility for both parties and provides a mid-term
hedge against unforeseen events. If the strategic environment dictated,
we could temporarily raise the number of deployed warheads to address
an immediate concern while later still meeting the December 2012
deadline. Should such a temporary increase be necessary, however, U.S.
actions would remain within the START Treaty obligations.
Finally, the Moscow Treaty allows the U.S. to withdraw with 3
months notification. This provision allows the U.S. to exercise its
national sovereignty and respond to a more dramatic change in the
strategic environment.
The Moscow Treaty does not, however, include a number of protocols
common to previous arms control agreements. This lack of protocols
enhances our flexibility in implementing this accord. For example, the
Moscow Treaty will not limit delivery platforms nor does it require
delivery platforms to be destroyed. As a result, the U.S. will maintain
a significant flexibility to adjust future force structure. This
approach will allow us to remove all 50 Peacekeeper missiles. Likewise,
we may modify some Trident submarines from their strategic missions and
assign them to transformational missions that are more relevant to the
asymmetric threats we now face. Finally, this approach will allow the
U.S. to retain heavy bombers for their conventional role. Our
operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the vital capability that
conventional bombers provide our Combatant Commanders.
The Moscow Treaty has no requirement for an additional inspection
regime. START's comprehensive verification regime will provide the
foundation for confidence, transparency, and predictability in further
strategic offensive reduction. The Moscow Treaty will not subject the
U.S. to intrusive inspections in some of our most sensitive military
areas.
The Moscow Treaty allows the U.S. to make deep reductions in
strategic nuclear warheads while preserving our flexibility to meet
unpredictable strategic changes. The treaty finally puts to rest the
Cold War legacy of superpower suspicion. It reflects the new
relationship of trust, cooperation, and friendship with an important
U.S. partner.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Myers.
Secretary Rumsfeld, the treaty does not define the term
``operationally deployed,'' but that is the key to the treaty,
that it limits the number of operationally deployed warheads.
General Myers' printed testimony apparently gave us the
decision as to what we are going to do relative to that number.
On page 1 of his testimony he says that the number of warheads
will be counted if they are in launch tubes on submarines,
loaded on heavy bombers, or stored in weapons storage areas at
heavy bomber bases. I will just stop right there.
Have the Russians adopted a similar definition of
``operationally deployed'' since that is what we are looking at
here? I think you will agree we are not reducing the number of
warheads, we are reducing the number of operationally deployed
warheads, correct?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The treaty refers to operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
Chairman Levin. We have apparently concluded as to what we
will interpret that to mean. Do we know what the Russian
interpretation is? Is it similar to ours?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As I recall, the negotiations did not
insert in the treaty any precise definition. We have indicated
what we consider it to be, and there is no question but that
the Russians will be using something roughly approximating
that.
Chairman Levin. Have we had discussions, General Myers,
with the Russians as to what their interpretation of that
undefined phrase will be?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There were discussions.
General Myers. I think there were discussions on that.
Chairman Levin. Is there any understanding with the
Russians as to whether they will have a similar approach to it
that we will?
General Myers. My understanding is they are going to have a
very similar approach to how they count their warheads as we
do.
Chairman Levin. By the way, I did not announce this, but we
will have an 8-minute round based on the early bird rule.
In May 2000, when President Bush was a candidate, he talked
about removing weapons from high alert hair-trigger status. I
am wondering whether or not, Mr. Secretary, the Department is
going to implement that objective of removing weapons from high
alert status in the near future as part of our effort to reduce
the risks of accidental or unauthorized launch and to try to
build confidence between ourselves and Russia?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that that
subject was one that was discussed intermittently ever since
the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and that each side
has very different forces. We have our forces arranged
differently, they are targeted differently and have been. There
are asymmetries in how we are arranged. Each side has made
adjustments in how they are arranged over a period of 6, 8, 10,
12 years, I would guess.
If I could characterize our current situation, I think it
would be inaccurate to suggest that we are currently arranged
on what any rational person could characterize as a hair-
trigger arrangement. I am trying to think of precise changes in
answer to the question, General Myers, in the last year and a
half.
General Myers. We are in an open hearing here, so I have to
be somewhat careful, but one of the changes was to not have the
weapons targeted on specific targets or sites. That was one of
the changes, and I think that is all I want to say about it.
Chairman Levin. Are there any additional changes that were
contemplated in terms of alert status, as the President
indicated we would attempt to do?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Not as a part of this treaty.
Chairman Levin. Or otherwise?
Secretary Rumsfeld. You are asking is there anything
prospective that is planned?
Chairman Levin. Right.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Not that I know of.
Chairman Levin. I want to be very clear as to what the
treaty does. The treaty, as I understand it, does not reduce
the stockpile from the current level of 6,000 plus warheads, is
that correct?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The treaty does exactly what it
specifies and it does not address that subject. I can explain
about the stockpile.
Chairman Levin. No, just in terms of the number in our
stockpile, the treaty does not address the number?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It addresses operationally deployed
strategic nuclear weapons, as I indicated.
Chairman Levin. One of the achievements that we were so
anxious to obtain in the START II Treaty was the elimination of
Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRVed)
missiles, especially the SS-18, because of the potential
instability should the relationship change or for whatever
other reason. The Joint Chiefs hailed that achievement as a
longstanding goal and a major accomplishment for our security.
The Moscow Treaty does not prohibit MIRVed ICBMs, so Russia
can keep its SS-18s and place new MIRVed warheads on other
missiles like the SS-27. Is it now our position that we do not
care if Russia keeps the SS-18s or places MIRVed warheads on
other missiles, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That subject has come up and our view
is that our circumstance and Russia's circumstance are notably
different in many respects. Our geography is different, our
neighbors are different, the way we produce weapons is
different, the life of those weapons is different. I am sure
the targeting perspectives are quite different.
It had been, when we were engaged in what was characterized
as mutual assured destruction, that the subject of MIRVed
weapons became extremely important. It is in my view today a
subject that is much less important, and it is entirely
possible that the Russians may very well make a decision that,
given the asymmetries in our circumstance, they may want to
MIRV some portion of their force.
We have looked at that, and we are quite comfortable that
that does not create an instability in the relationship.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, let me chime in on that. To
add to what the Secretary said, I think that is absolutely
right. When the Joint Chiefs made their comments about the MIRV
and START II and so forth, we were still in a different
relationship than we have today with Russia. I think the
context of our treaty and the geopolitical environment we find
ourselves in makes that topic a lot less interesting than it
was in the Cold War days, when it was of interest and when we
were enemies.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Previous arms reduction treaties did not require
destruction of warheads, but they did require destruction of
delivery systems, which was, of course, critically important at
that time. The Moscow Treaty does not require the destruction
either of warheads or of delivery systems.
Now the question is what will we be doing with the
Peacekeeper? Is it our plan to eliminate the Peacekeeper
missiles and their silos, even though it is not required to do
so by treaty, General?
General Myers. The current plans, of course, are to
eliminate the Peacekeepers. There has not been a decision yet
on what to do with the silos, so that is in the future.
The warheads, because they are our most modern--the safest,
most secure type warhead we have--will be put on our other
land-based missiles, the Minuteman missile.
Chairman Levin. My final question. Secretary Rumsfeld, the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is coming to a halt
because of the inability to make the necessary certifications.
The Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Bill
that is in conference contains the legislative authority that
the administration requested, which is permanent authority for
the President to grant an annual waiver of the prerequisites of
the Freedom Support Act and the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Act. The House bill contains authority to grant waivers for 3
years.
I assume that you support the administration position
relative to permanent authority, so I will not ask you that.
But if you disagree with it, perhaps in your answer to the
question I am going to ask you, you could let me know that,
too.
Here is the issue. The permanent authority requested by the
administration to grant annual waivers of the prerequisites to
implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program does
not include an ability to waive the special prerequisites for
the Russian chemical weapons destruction program being carried
out under the CTR program. President Bush said that not only
did he support this important effort to destroy the Russian
chemical weapons, he actually wanted to accelerate it. But if
there is no authority to waive those special prerequisites for
the chemical destruction, then that program is going to be shut
down.
Will you be asking for waiver authority for the special
prerequisites for the Russian chemical weapons destruction
program?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The administration either has or will
be asking for that waiver authority with respect to the
chemical weapons destruction facility.
Chairman Levin. Do you support that request?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Indeed I do.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General, do you support that, too?
General Myers. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is quite interesting. I will read the one paragraph in
the treaty which in my judgment embraces what it is that is
before us today for discussion. It is Article I, very simple:
``Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads,
as stated by the President of the United States of America on
November 13, 2001, and as stated by the President of the
Russian Federation on November 13, 2001, and December 13, 2001,
respectively, so that by December 31, 2012, the aggregate
number of such warheads does not exceed 1,700-2,200 for each
Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition
and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the
established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.''
Now, for those of us who have had some exposure over many
years to these types of treaties and goals, it is
understandable. But to others who are beginning to absorb the
importance of this landmark document, I would like to clarify
with you one or two of the words used here so that we have a
legislative history, such that if future generations begin to
challenge what was intended at the time this language was
written at least there is the colloquy and the testimony
provided here this morning to clarify it.
My first question is, was there reason to not incorporate
the word ``operational'' with respect to the aggregate of the
weapons to end up in 2012, namely 1,700 to 2,200? In simple
forms, you take the existing inventory over the years between
now and 2012, you detached the warheads from certain systems,
you put them in storage, and the balance remain in an
operational status. Is that my understanding and your
understanding?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, first let me say that the
discussions took place between President Putin and President
Bush, they took place between Secretary Powell and Foreign
Minister Ivanov, and between Don Rumsfeld and Sergei Ivanov,
the Defense Minister of Russia, as well as at the Feith and
Bolton levels. You asked if there was any discussion about
something. There were so many meetings and discussions, I
really am not in a position to say precisely that.
I was trying to read what you were citing here. It was in
Article I?
Senator Warner. That is correct. In other words, it just
states that you will end up with such a number of warheads,
``the aggregate number of warheads does not exceed . . .'' Now,
those are in an operational status.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly, as defined by General Myers'
testimony.
Senator Warner. Fine. Now, the others are non-operational.
Can you describe--and the General can join in--what status they
are in?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Sure.
Senator Warner. In other words, I understand, and I think
the public following this do, they are detached.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
Senator Warner. But could you put them back on in an hour's
time? No.
Secretary Rumsfeld. No.
Senator Warner. A week's time? No.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Right.
Senator Warner. I think it is important----
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is.
Senator Warner.----to show how when they go to storage they
are really in a status that would not lend themselves to be
utilized in any regrettable and unfortunate rapid exchange
between the two nations of portions of its arsenals which are
operational.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You are correct. A non-deployed warhead
could be used in any number of circumstances and the
circumstances in our country would be different from those in
Russia, because Russia, for example, has an open production
line. So every day or week or month another warhead may be
coming off their production line. Where is it? Well, it is
where it is. It has just been produced and it now exists. Then
it goes someplace.
In addition, the Russian system is that they tend to remove
old warheads and they then are taken off and in some cases
refurbished and in some cases put in a queue to be destroyed,
and in some cases in the process of destroying them they
disaggregate them and they are in piece parts. So they may have
5, 10, 15 parts, and some of those parts would lend themselves
to be re-used, in which case they might then be refashioned
into restored or refurbished warheads.
The United States, quite to the contrary, we tend to make
these things in a way that they last much longer. We do not
have a pattern of changing them out anywhere near as rapidly as
does Russia.
Senator Warner. If I could interrupt, Mr. Secretary, with a
series of presidents we intentionally made the decision not to
build any new ones, in sharp contrast with Russia, which is
building new ones.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
Senator Warner. Therefore, we did have the requirement of
placing these in some type of status such that if there is a
deterioration in the operational warhead we could simply go
back and extract one from the inventory in storage and replace
it.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly. So therefore the answer to
your question with respect to Russia is that their warheads
that are not operationally deployed are in the following
categories at least: coming off a production line, in a queue
ready to be restored, stored for the purpose of use, and piece
parts waiting to be reassembled in some form or another.
In the United States, weapons that are not operationally
deployed would tend to be in the following categories--and
check me here, Dick Myers. We do not have anything coming off a
production line. We would have them away from a bomber base
some distance, because the ones not on a bomber but near a
bomber base would be considered operationally deployed. They
would be in a queue to be destroyed, or they would be held in
reserve in the event a phone rang one day and we were advised
that we had a class of weapons that were no longer safe or no
longer reliable, in which case we very likely would use ones
that were not operationally deployed and not in the queue to be
destroyed because they are no longer in good enough shape to be
used. They then would be used to replace anything that was seen
as being unsafe or unreliable.
Senator Warner. I would like to have the General amplify
that response and also give us, frankly, some hands-on examples
of when a weapon is removed pursuant to this treaty from an
operational status, stored, and then if it were required to go
back into a system, what are the steps required to re-integrate
it and the time involved?
General Myers. I would be happy to, Senator Warner. First
of all, let us keep in mind that we are not making warheads any
more. I put them in some bins in my mind, the way my mind
works, of what we would do with warheads that are not
operationally deployed. You would have an operational reserve,
spares for weapons that you have to change out that check out
bad during the numerous checks we do on operational weapons all
the time.
You would have a strategic reserve. If the environment
changes, you need some number, which has not been decided yet.
That is yet to be decided.
Then you need a reserve to cope with reliability issues. As
the Secretary said, we will count as operationally deployed
those weapons that are kept on the base with the bombers in the
weapons storage areas, because presumably you can upload those
in a matter of let us say hours. It would probably take you, to
generate all the bombers, a matter of days, but you could start
that process in a matter of hours.
Then you go to land-based component. Those weapons will be
stored in the weapons storage area at the base. We get to the
weapons fields, by land, but they can be many hours, up to 6
hours, away by vehicle. To upload weapons on a missile is a
pretty slow process because you have to secure the site before
you open the silo, then you have to open the silo, you have to
get the maintenance people on site, you have to bring the
weapons to the site and then install them on the missile.
Senator Warner. I would appreciate if you would amplify
that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Once the weapons installation process is complete, which
could take several hours by itself, the maintenance teams must
close the site and return all of the special vehicles and
equipment to the base. After weapons installation, the missile
combat crew, who is remotely located from the missile, must
transfer targeting data and run a series of commands, tests,
and calibrations to return the missile to full alert status.
The missile combat crew's actions could take as long as 12-16
hours. The entire process for one ICBM could take between 24 to
30 hours under current conditions. Actual minimum generation
times are classified and can easily be supplied to you upon
request.
Senator Warner. I want to just ask one last technical
question. The end date is 2012.
General Myers. Correct.
Senator Warner. There is no schedule. Theoretically, one
side could wait until perhaps the last year or two to reach its
entire reduction of inventory, thereby leaving the other side
at a disadvantage. What steps are in place to ensure that as
these drawdowns occur there is basic stability between the two
parties to the treaty so that one does not gain an advantage?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think the way to think about the
treaty is that these are really decisions that were made
unilaterally and then brought together in a treaty. The treaty
provides the flexibility so either side can do anything they
feel that is in their security interest during that period of
drawdown.
In the event that, as General Myers indicated, the world
environment changed, either side has the ability to level off
or not continue in a drawdown period. My guess is that there
will be an uneven drawdown. Their situation is quite different
from ours. Their weapons do age. They do have a problem of
moving them off, and they are on that path.
I do not think there could be a problem, but if there were
a problem all either side would have to do would be to have the
flexibility to make an adjustment that is in their security
interest. If the worse came to worst, there is a clause in the
treaty that permits, as there is with every treaty, either side
to pull out with notice.
Senator Warner. Let us hope that is not achieved.
But would that flexibility enable us--if we had drawn down
significantly further than Russia, and we noted that Russia was
not keeping pace, and our strategic analysts felt that there
was an instability in the balance--to restore to an operational
status some of the weapons taken down?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We have that flexibility, although one
would think that we would be wise enough as we go down--we do
have the verification provisions in the START Treaty between
now and 2009. So we are going to have national technical means
capable of knowing.
Senator Warner. I understand that.
My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers for
joining us this morning. I want to wish you well in all the
work you do for our great country.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir.
Senator Akaka. I also look at the treaty as giving us great
promise as we come out of the Cold War and the age of mutual
assured destruction. I look upon it as a beginning on a long
road toward true arms reduction and cooperation.
Unfortunately, this treaty does not explicitly establish a
timetable or verification process for warhead destruction, nor
does it address tactical nuclear weapons that are what might be
considered attractive to terrorists. During his testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Powell
indicated that this treaty is likely to be superseded by more
ambitious agreements that will answer many of our questions on
verification and questions on compliance. It has been noted
that it took 9 years to work out these details in START. If we
hope to have something in place when START expires in 2009 or 3
years later when SORT expires, I believe it is critical that we
start now.
I spent yesterday at the Governmental Affairs Committee
markup to determine the structure of the future Homeland
Security Department. Several times during the day my colleagues
asked, will this make the American people more secure? To make
America more secure, nuclear arms reductions must prevent
terrorists from acquiring nuclear material and nuclear weapons.
The most attractive kind of weapons for terrorists are tactical
nuclear weapons. SORT does not deal with tactical nukes, but
SORT is only the beginning. I want to continue to stress that.
What steps, Mr. Secretary, are we taking to address the
large number of Russian tactical weapons?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you are of course correct that
we do need to address the subject of transparency and
predictability or verification, as it is sometimes called, and
both sides have indicated that they do intend to begin
discussions fairly promptly that would pursue that issue. I
believe the treaty fashions a group of the two defense
ministers and the two foreign ministers who are supposed to
meet and begin to discuss those things. We have a meeting
scheduled already for September, even before the treaty has
been ratified by the United States Senate or the Duma.
Second, with respect to theater nuclear weapons, you are
also correct. That is a subject that has not been addressed
between the two countries. I have raised it in every meeting we
have been in. I think that what is important there--and the
Russians have many multiples more than we do of theater nuclear
weapons.
We believe that our interest is in gaining better awareness
as to what they have, and we do not have a good fix on the
numbers from an intelligence standpoint, nor have they been
forthcoming in discussing that.
Second, we think that some degree of transparency would be
helpful as to what they are doing by way of production, what
they are doing by way of destruction, what they are doing by
way of storage. You are quite right, there is no question but
that the security issue with respect to theater nuclear weapons
is a very serious one.
You can expect that we will continue to raise those
questions and bring the issue forward in the U.S.-Russia
discussions that are scheduled shortly.
Senator Akaka. I was so glad to see that part of the treaty
is the inclusion and establishment of a bilateral commission. I
believe that the bilateral commission is tasked to meet twice a
year. I feel that it is a most promising aspect of the treaty
because it will give us a chance to continue to talk with the
Russians, and I believe that this is one way of filling in the
details that we are asking ourselves.
My question is, when will the commission meet, and what are
the principal topics to be discussed?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think the way to characterize it is
that it will be somewhat different than prior bilateral
commissions or standing consultative commissions or arms
control type commissions. This group has as its purpose, I
believe the language suggests, a relatively narrow focus on
implementation of the treaty. It would probably be the other
group I mentioned, which would be the Secretary of Defense of
both countries and the Secretary of State of both countries,
that would discuss issues like theater nuclear weapons,
transparency, predictability, verification, and other aspects
of the relationship.
Senator Akaka. It is likely that Russia would have had to
reduce its nuclear stockpile to 1,200 to 1,500 warheads without
this treaty. I am concerned that Russia will feel forced to
maintain an arsenal of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads to match the
U.S. stockpile. Considering the state of Russian stockpile
stewardship, will Russia be able to safely maintain and secure
this larger number?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is a matter of priorities. Russia
has choices to make, like every country in the world does, and
they have to recognize the importance of preventing
proliferation. Any country that has weapons of mass destruction
has by definition a responsibility to manage them very
carefully. The power of these weapons is enormous, and it would
be inexcusable for any country not to establish a very high
priority on the security of such weapons.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First let me just say to both of the witnesses today how
thankful I am that we have you, General Myers, and you,
Secretary Rumsfeld, and the entire national security team at
the helm at this time that I really believe is the most
threatening time in our Nation's history.
One of the most compelling statements I have heard you
make, Secretary Rumsfeld, is when you talk about the margin of
error. It was kind of buried in your statement. You only
mentioned it at the very last, and I think that is something we
need to talk about over and over again. I would like to have
you at this time elaborate a little bit on the margin of error
today as opposed to the margin of error in the past against
conventional threats.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Inhofe, it is certainly
something that we worry about as much as anything, and it is
this. We have moved from a 20th century security environment to
a 21st century security environment. We have moved from a
period where we were facing the carnage that can result from
the use of conventional weapons, meaning hundreds and thousands
of people can die, into the 21st century where we are dealing
with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and we
are not talking about hundreds or thousands, we are talking
about the potential loss of hundreds of thousands or millions
of human beings as a result of the use of biological, chemical,
nuclear, or radiation weapons.
That is so different for the world, it is so different for
us. Not only has there been proliferation of these weapons, but
there has been proliferation of the denial and deception
techniques as to how people can hide those capabilities. It is
a big world, and regrettably, we know a great deal, but there
is a great deal we do not know. We keep finding that more
information is coming available to us and in fact it occurred
not today or yesterday, but 1, 2, 4, 5 years ago.
That says to me, as you point out, that our margin for
error is much less, that we are living in a period of little or
no warning, that we have to organize, train, equip, and manage
our affairs so that we can live in that world, a vastly more
dangerous world.
Senator Inhofe. I think that is very well said. Several of
us on this panel have expressed concern over the last 10 years,
in my case since 1994 when I came from the House to the Senate,
with the fact that they are getting so dangerously close in
some rogue nations to developing the capability. We know that
most of them have weapons of mass destruction. We know that
they have access and they are developing the missile means of
delivering those. Where they are I do not think we know
exactly, but we do know that there are three countries that
have missiles that will reach the United States and that those
countries, two of them anyway, are dealing, and trading
technology and systems with countries like Iraq, Iran, Syria,
Libya, and other countries.
What concerns me--during the discussion of today's meeting
I have not said very much about it--is how this relates to our
ability to have a missile defense system. In other words, we
know that when you talk about the margin of error, if on
September 11, the terrorists had had the weapon of choice, a
nuclear warhead on a missile, as opposed to what they had, how
devastating that would be.
Now, if for some reason the United States does not deploy a
missile defense system, will we still be able to comply with
the reductions that are stated in the Moscow Treaty?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, that is a good question, and
it is a question that is probably not knowable until we move
along. In the Nuclear Posture Review we did conceptualize a
somewhat modified treaty, not to say we are going to move away
from land-based, sea-based, and air-based strategic nuclear
weapons, but rather that if one looks at offensive weapons,
they would be both conventional and nuclear. Another leg of the
triad would be defensive capabilities, and a third would be the
infrastructure, and then coordinated by command control in the
center of that concept.
As I mentioned in my remarks, the proposals with respect to
1,700 to 2,200 are premised on some investments that need to be
made in missile defense, some investments that need to be made
in infrastructure, and the capability to manage our affairs
going forward. Fortunately, we have a good long period to
pursue our missile defense research and development program,
make judgments as to which are the most fruitful areas, and,
one would hope, be able to deploy missile defenses during that
period.
My guess is that there will be each year a calculation made
as to how we are doing with respect to all elements that were
considered in the Nuclear Posture Review.
Senator Inhofe. Conceivably, I would assume that we would
be able to make alterations in this treaty as time went by and
conditions changed also.
Secretary Rumsfeld. My guess is that we will be talking
starting in September on possible increments or additions or
changes.
Senator Inhofe. Let me read from your previous testimony. I
think this actually was in your statement today. You said:
``First, there simply is not any way on Earth to verify what
Russia is doing with all the warheads. Second, we do not need
to. Neither side should have an interest in evading the terms
of the treaty since it simply codifies unilaterally-announced
intentions and reductions, and it gives both sides broad
flexibility in implementing those decisions.''
Further in your statement, you said: ``In this century,
Russia and the United States both face new and different
security challenges, not exactly the same, but certainly the
threats of terrorism, fundamentalism, and the spread of weapons
of mass destruction to rogue nations are common.''
Now, as we move ahead into this treaty, how do you balance
this? We are trying to forge this relationship between Russia
and the United States. We all want that. Yet we want at the
same time to make sure that weapons that are taken from active
deployment do not fall in the hands of the wrong people. How do
you balance those two things?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think that a weapon, regardless of
where it is located, has to be maintained in a secure manner.
So I think the difference between those that are deployed or
those that are not deployed is really not so much the issue as
how wise we are in carefully managing weapons regardless of
their location.
Senator Inhofe. When you get into the issue of storage
versus destruction of warheads, it is well known that not all
of the warheads which will be removed from deployment will be
destroyed. A number of them, although the number has not really
been talked about, and it is not carved in stone yet, they
would be placed in storage. Mr. Secretary, would you give this
committee some examples as best you can in this forum of
situations that would cause the stored warheads to be
redeployed?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. I can think of three
circumstances. One would be that a judgment was made that a
category of weapons or some specific weapons were no longer
reliable and the stewardship of the stockpile came to the
conclusion that they are not reliable, there is a discussion
that takes place, then judgments are made as to how you can
remove something that is no longer considered reliable and what
do you replace it with.
A second would be that a judgment was made that some
category was not safe, a different issue, but an important
issue.
A third would be that, for whatever reason--anyone's
imagination is as good as mine--you move out 6, 8, 10 years in
this process and some significant change in the world situation
occurs in terms of something that affects the desired posture
with respect to nuclear weapons. Very likely, the two countries
would talk and make a judgment as to what one or both countries
think they ought to do about that changed security environment.
Senator Inhofe. I am surprised that I have time for my
fourth question, but I do. This will be real quick.
Chairman Levin. You do not have time, but if Senator Allard
is willing, please proceed with your question.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you. A short question. Thank you,
Senator Allard.
You had said on July 17, in your testimony, ``I think that
to go from a system that was totally untrustworthy and secret
and doing things underground, behind cloaks, as a way of life
to something where they let the sun shine in is not something
that you can do in 5 minutes.'' You elaborated on that, and my
question would be how long do you think it will take for the
Russians to arrive at a level of transparency that would make
you feel comfortable?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is a difficult question. If you
think about Russia's situation, it is a country that was a
superpower. It still is militarily in a sense. A number of
republics have departed the Soviet Union and left Russia. A
number of people have left, intelligent people, well-educated
people. There has been an outflow of brain power. They have
serious health problems. They have a military that is not being
funded at anywhere near the level it previously was funded. It
creates difficulties.
President Putin has clearly made a judgment to turn west
and to connect with the United States, to connect with Western
Europe, to begin that process of creating an environment in
Russia that is hospitable for investment. If you think about
it, decision makers all over the globe are deciding every day
where they want to put their money, where they invest, where
they want to build a plant, what countries they feel safe and
secure with.
To the extent Russia decides that they want to be
transparent, and they want to have those linkages with the
west, to create an environment that is hospitable for
investment and for enterprise, then they will become more
transparent. To the extent they, for whatever reason, decide
that they want to continue as their most important
relationships to be with Cuba or North Korea, Iraq or Syria,
the world's walking wounded, it seems to me that they are not a
very attractive place for investment, and they would be less
likely to be transparent.
So the President has made a decision. Not everyone in that
country has, but the President has, and his leadership has, and
they are pointing west. I think that is a good thing, and we
ought to try to do things that encourage it. We will see over
time. I am one of those people who likes to be careful. I am a
conservative person. So I will watch, and we will keep meeting
and encouraging transparency.
We are such an open system that the issue of predictability
and transparency is quite easy for us. They have historically
been a closed system, and it is going to take a culture change
in their military, it is going to take a culture change in
their bureaucracy.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Myers and Mr. Secretary, for sharing
your thoughts with us today. When we talk about our
international agreements, I think we tend to just focus on the
two parties to the agreement, for example the Moscow agreement,
Russia and the United States. But in reality there is a whole
different world out here. What I see happening is an interest
outside the agreement in other countries to try and develop a
nuclear capability. We know about Iran, Iraq. We know that one
of the motivating drives behind India and Pakistan, for
example, is they wanted to become a nuclear power so that
somehow or other they would have an enhanced image in the world
when they come to the negotiating table.
We have set limits on ourselves in this treaty of 1,700 to
2,200. How do you view this treaty and the limits that we have
placed in it as it compares to the progress of nuclear
technology to the rest of the world? I know you cannot talk
about specific numbers, but are Russia and the United States in
their program so much further ahead that we do not have to
worry about this for a century, or is it something that we do
not have to concern ourselves with in the next decade or 5
years? If you would give me a feel for that, I would appreciate
it for the record. Both of you could comment.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. Senator, when we went through
the many months of consideration, study, thought, debate, and
discussion with respect to our Nuclear Posture Review, we did
not only look at the U.S.-Russia relationship. We looked at the
entire world. We looked at the current situation. We looked at
trend lines. We projected out. The number 1,700 to 2,200, that
range, of course is not oriented simply to Russia. It is
oriented to what we see as the likely circumstances going
forward.
The number, as small as it is relative to the current
levels, is a large number. Seventeen hundred to twenty-two
hundred operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons is a
lot. The number was selected because of our conviction that it
would be desirable for us to be able to, in the first instance,
reassure our allies that we had that capability and that they
need not develop nuclear weapons; second, to leave no doubt in
other countries' minds that it would not be in their interest
to think they could sprint to parity or superiority. Our
numbers are sufficiently large that to do that would require a
substantial investment, a substantial period of time, and
therefore we felt that the number was appropriate, taking into
account our allies, potential adversaries, the entire world,
the current situation, and the trend lines we see.
Senator Allard. Now, when you put that together--and I will
ask General Myers--was Russia considered as an ally or a
potential adversary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, no, Russia was considered for what
it is, a country that is embarked on turning west, that has a
very large number of nuclear weapons.
Senator Allard. General Myers.
General Myers. The only thing I would add to that, and I
think it is very important, is that the term that came out of
the Nuclear Posture Review, where we said we were going to be
capabilities-based, not threat-based, pretty much exactly
answers the description that the Secretary put on the Nuclear
Posture Review.
It really was capabilities-based. We did not focus on any
one country, as we have in the past, frankly. So this is a new
era.
The other thing about the Nuclear Posture Review, it said
it is not just nuclear weapons that provide for deterrence and
our security posture. They are a very important part of it, and
we testified to that today. But there is also our non-nuclear
strike capabilities, which is in this new triad notion that
came out of the Nuclear Posture Review. There are the defenses,
both active and passive, and then there is the infrastructure,
which is our intelligence capabilities, our command and control
capabilities, the capabilities that DOE has, for that matter.
As the Secretary said, a lot of that is in the budget that
you have just looked at, and a lot of it will be in the 2004
budget as well, because they all have to come together to give
us the result we want, which is deterrence and national
security.
I would also add that the other thing I think that makes us
very comfortable about all this is the flexibility inherent in
the Moscow Treaty. The one cornerstone of that treaty is it
provides great flexibility.
Senator Allard. I do like the treaty, and I think it is a
good starting point. Right now we have some nonproliferation
programs with Russia. I think, if I remember correctly, they
are close to a billion dollars in what the President suggested
in his budget. One of the concerns that I have heard is how
that program proceeds is not so much a factor of how many
dollars we are putting in there, but the problem is access to
Russian facilities. Apparently that is a major obstacle to the
treaty nonproliferation efforts in Russia.
Can you comment as to how we will work this treaty along
the verification side if we have difficulty in accessing some
of these facilities?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course if you separate two things,
one is the security of nuclear weapons, and the other is the
nuclear threat, so to speak. We do have the START Treaty and
verification regimes. We do have national technical means. We
feel we can monitor within some range what is actually taking
place with respect to their deployed weapons.
With respect to their tactical nuclear weapons, their non-
deployed weapons, the weapons coming off production lines, the
weapons in a queue waiting to be destroyed, the weapons they
have in reserve, that is a very different thing. There is where
your point becomes terribly important. There is no question but
that Russia even today is not transparent. It is not clear.
They do not allow access. They have a very secretive approach
to a great deal of this.
It is a concern, and there have been a great many people in
Congress, in the Senate, in the House, and in the Executive
Branch over a good many years who have invested a lot of money,
the American taxpayers have invested a lot of money, trying to
improve their security and improve their destruction process.
There have been a great many meetings held and efforts made to
improve transparency, and we will continue them. But we are a
good distance from feeling comfortable.
Senator Allard. I would like to join my colleague from
Hawaii in the bilateral implementation commission. I think it
provides a good opportunity for dialogue on how we can improve
the discussion, continue with the discussions we have started
already. Your answer indicated that those discussions would be
going on at the highest level, secretaries of defense,
secretaries of state, which I think is a good sign that both
sides are going to take this seriously.
There is not a lot of detail in this agreement. It is just
a sentence stating that you are going to have the bilateral
implementation commission. Have you given any thought about how
these meetings will be run and the type of issues that may come
up in these discussions?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, Senator, there are really two
pieces to this follow-on relationship. One piece was contained
in the treaty and that is the bilateral commission. It is
really not a negotiating forum. It is more a forum to monitor
implementation of the treaty as such. The group you are
referring to was actually established outside the treaty. It
was established in a joint declaration that was issued
simultaneously, I believe, and it is the one that provides for
the meetings between the two ministers of defense and the two
secretaries of defense which I indicated are going to start in
September.
Senator Allard. I see.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is where the substantive
discussions with respect to verification, with respect to
transparency, with respect to theater nuclear weapons, these
other pieces of the relationship which are so important, will
take place.
Senator Allard. Who is going to make up the bilateral
implementation commission? What level are we going to have
there in that commission?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not know that the level has been
set. Let me just check. [Pause.]
It would probably be at the ambassadorial level, as opposed
to the under secretary or secretary level.
Senator Allard. I see. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.
Secretary Rumsfeld, one notable difference between this
treaty and virtually every other arms control treaty is the
withdrawal clause in Article IV. It says that either side may
withdraw upon 3 months notice to the other side, but it does
not mention anything about supreme national interest. Am I
correct in assuming that the intention, though, is not to make
it easy for either side to withdraw from the treaty for
convenience or without due consideration, but it is intended,
at least by us and hopefully by the Russians, that the
withdrawal option would only be exercised if there were some
serious change in the global security environment that
compelled us to withdraw?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Certainly the discussions that I have
been involved in with respect to that clause would reflect that
sentiment, that neither side is entering into a treaty lightly,
and neither side would depart from the treaty lightly. It would
have all kinds of implications politically and so forth.
Assuming our two countries stay on the paths they are on,
which are paths where our interests are converging rather than
diverging, in the event the world circumstance were to change I
would suspect that the two countries would sit down and discuss
that. They would give a good deal of thought to the ways in
which it has changed and how those changes conceivably might
affect one or even both parties as the case might be, and there
would be very thoughtful discussions about that. Certainly no
one would depart from the treaty lightly.
Chairman Levin. You made reference a number of times to the
different approach that we and the Russians take toward the
maintenance of nuclear weapons--right now they are assembling
new weapons. We are not. Ours have longer life than theirs do.
Does their assembly of new weapons create a security threat to
us or put us at some disadvantage?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I think the only way that
question can be answered is if one looks at the totality of our
activities. Clearly it is an asymmetry that they have an open
production line and we do not, and one could make the case that
that gives them an advantage. Is it an advantage that worries
me? No.
They also have weapons that last a shorter period. So it is
quite logical they would have an open production line if they
have weapons that are required to be moved out of the process
for safety or reliability reasons.
I think it is more useful to look at the totality of their
circumstance and the totality of our circumstance, recognize
there are a lot of differences and that we cannot expect to
have perfect symmetry between what we are doing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
You made reference to our ability to rely on the START
Treaty for the verification and transparency it provides. It
expires, however, in 2009 and that then creates a 3-year gap
between the expiration of that START Treaty and the date of
implementation of the Moscow Treaty, which has no mechanisms at
all for verification, transparency, or confidence.
Would it make sense then to extend the START Treaty to
continue those benefits that you have referred to at least
until the Moscow Treaty takes effect, if not beyond?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess that is a decision that others
would have to make. But from my standpoint, it does not seem to
me that it would be necessarily appropriate. I think that times
are changing, and there may very well be various ways to
achieve the kinds of transparency that would be appropriate
between our two countries. My personal view is that we ought to
sit down with Russia starting in September and get on with the
task of looking at what kinds of transparency arrangements are
appropriate.
I also want to see that theater nuclear weapons are brought
up on the table and talked about, again from the standpoint of
transparency less than the standpoint of numbers or controls
over them. But I guess I would not say that I think that would
necessarily be a good idea. My guess is we will find better
ideas than that.
Chairman Levin. Hopefully you are right. If we do not find
better ideas I would suggest you keep in mind the possibility
of the extension of that treaty. At least it provides some
verification and some confidence that otherwise would not exist
unless you can negotiate or agree upon, whatever word you folks
like--I guess you do not like ``negotiate.'' But in any event,
whatever understanding you can reach relative to that would be
helpful.
Secretary Rumsfeld, you have again today indicated the
heavy reliance that you place on missile defenses against long-
range missiles, arguing that a defense against long-range
missiles would make us more secure, just as we have a defense
against short-range missiles.
A recent article in The Washington Post indicated that we
are going to be telling the Indian Government that they should
not deploy a missile defense system, that they should not be
able to defend themselves against incoming missiles. Why are we
opposing another country's efforts to deploy a missile defense
system if we feel that a missile defense system to protect our
homeland would make us more secure?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not know the answer to your
question. I also do not know that The Washington Post article
is necessarily accurate. To the best of my recollection, I do
not believe that that issue has been raised, at least to my
level, within the administration. So it is not something that I
have had a chance to really address.
Chairman Levin. If it were accurate would you know about
it?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, goodness. There are always going to
be things that I am not going to know. Paul Wolfowitz handles
any number of things. He attends all kinds of meetings, my
deputy.
Chairman Levin. I did not mean you personally. I meant the
Defense Department.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, no. It may very well be that
someone in the Department knows something I do not know. I
certainly hope so. I hope they know a lot I do not know.
Chairman Levin. I am not going there, I can assure you
that. [Laughter.]
Would you let us know for the record what the position of
the administration is relative to India's, or any other
country's, efforts to deploy a missile defense to give them the
same kind of protection against incoming missiles that you feel
will make us more secure? Can you give us that for the record?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The what?
Chairman Levin. What the administration position is on
that, and also what your, here referring to the Department,
role has been or will be in that decision?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will be happy to. If we have a
position, I will be happy to give it to you, and I will give
you a response in any event.
[The information referred to follows:]
The President's stated policy is to design missile defenses capable
of protecting not only the United States and its forces, but also our
friends and allies. Generally speaking, we believe missile defenses
would be a stabilizing factor by dissuading offensive missile
acquisition and discouraging attacks and by providing new defensive
capabilities for managing crises. The Indian Government shares this
view as evidenced by their support immediately after the President's
May 1, 2001, speech at the National Defense University in which he
outlined his new approach to deterrence. More recently, we have engaged
in dialogue with India on the subject of missile defense. Our shared
sentiments were reflected in the Joint Statement issued after the 20-23
May 2002, meeting of the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group. Specifically,
the statement says that the U.S. and India have ``reaffirmed the
contribution that missile defenses can make to enhance cooperative
security and stability.''
I think that we are talking apples and oranges here. I
think the earlier questions that related to missile defense
were referring to ballistic missile defense and longer range. I
think that I have a vague recollection that the system that
India was interested in was the Arrow system, which was a
system developed jointly between the United States and Israel,
but it is basically an Israeli system, which is a shorter range
ballistic missile defense.
Chairman Levin. To give them a defense against missiles----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
Chairman Levin.----that could reach their homeland. That is
strategic defense for them.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You bet.
Chairman Levin. Or other countries, not just India.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes.
Chairman Levin. One final question, then I will be done, if
Senator Warner would----
Senator Warner. Oh, sure. The only thing I would ask, I
think you raised a very important question which you have now
clarified. It does relate to this article in the July 25 New
York Times. But we should also as a part of the response, I
would think, Mr. Chairman, want to know--the United States has
made a major financial contribution toward the research and
development of the Arrow system. We did it primarily with the
thought in mind to help our friends in Israel defend
themselves, given the lessons learned in the Gulf War.
But if there is a sale, how does that relate to our dollar
contribution? Indeed, we have before us in the conference a
significant item for further support, which this Senator from
Virginia has willingly supported. But it seems to me that is an
ancillary question.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I was just passed a note
saying that the administration has not yet developed a view
with respect to the Arrow system for India and that the
discussion would more likely focus on technology transfer as
opposed to the ability to defend oneself.
Chairman Levin. I am more interested in the ability to
defend oneself, frankly, the principle of it.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Right.
Chairman Levin. You have argued that we will be more secure
being able to defend against incoming long-range missiles. We
have defenses, and there has been strong support for defenses
in terms of short-range missiles, protecting our troops and our
allies. But the argument that has been debated relates to
whether or not we will be more secure, whether the world will
be more stable, if we install defenses against incoming long-
range missiles.
Put aside that argument for the moment without rearguing
that issue as to whether on balance unilateral deployment by us
will make us more secure. Lay that aside because the
administration argument is that the world will be more stable
and that we have a right to defend ourselves against an
incoming long-range missile. The question is: Do not any other
countries have that same right?
It is not the tech transfer issue that I am really into. I
am into the principle of it.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand.
Chairman Levin. Do we have a right the other countries do
not, and if so why? That is the question.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I do have one other question.
Senator Warner. Sure, why do you not go ahead.
Chairman Levin. I think I can complete it, and then I will
call on Senator Warner. I know we have a vote coming. I do not
want to use up all the time. I want to make sure you have
enough time for what questions you have.
Mr. Secretary, you have taken a very strong position
against media leaks. I must tell you it is a position that I
share. I find them astounding. One of, if not the most,
astounding leaks I have ever seen is the leak that you are
investigating now that relates to these alleged war plans.
I guess the question is this: The FBI is investigating a
leak which apparently came from somewhere in the intelligence
committees, either the House or the Senate, not the war plan
allegations, a different kind of a leak. Is the FBI going to
investigate that war plan leak for you? I mean really going
into it. The FBI is really looking into the intelligence
committee leak. They are even talking about the possibility of
doing lie detector testing.
I just want to know if you are involving the FBI, if there
is any accuracy to it--the fact that it appeared in the paper
does not mean that there is such a plan that exists. I do not
want to assume that. But since you have talked about looking
into that leak, you have understandably expressed your outrage,
and I totally agree with that outrage, will you involve the FBI
in the investigation of that particular egregious leak?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I asked the appropriate people in the
Department to advise and initiate an investigation of the leak
you are referring to. I am told that the Air Force has an
investigative unit that is functioning as executive agent for
that activity and they have initiated an investigation, and
part of it was to request the FBI to step in and do the
investigation.
I am also told that the FBI has to make decisions about
what they investigate and what they do not investigate, that it
is not within the control of the Department of Defense. I
suspect and hope that the FBI will decide that this is
something that they do want to participate in. If they do not,
why, I will probably encourage them.
Chairman Levin. Would you let us know the outcome of this
investigation?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Indeed.
Chairman Levin. Whatever that outcome is.
Thank you so much.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I think we have had an excellent hearing, and
it is very important from the standpoint of the responsibility
of this committee. We value greatly the work that has been done
by the Foreign Relations Committee, and I think this hearing
builds on those hearings such that we will have before the
Senate an adequate record for each Member to reflect on as he
or she casts this important vote with regard to advice and
consent.
Mr. Secretary, I think I can fire these questions rather
quickly, and also your responses I think can be
straightforward. At any time General Myers wishes to join,
please do so.
As we proceed with this historic reduction of weapons,
there should be no perception that we should in any way lessen
our approach led by our President toward strengthening missile
defense capabilities in this country, limited missile defense
programs, which he has initiated very boldly here during the
course of the administration. Do you agree with me on that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do.
Senator Warner. General.
General Myers. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. This committee has also dealt at length
with the stockpile stewardship program and the reliability of
our inventory. That program seems to grind on year after year,
and I presume that it is your judgment progress is being made.
Since we no longer do actual testing, we have to rely on
substitutes to give us the same information to assure that our
stockpile is reliable and that it is safe for the men and women
of the Armed Forces and civilians who must handle it, and
certainly those people that live in the environs of that
stockpile should have the confidence that it is safely stored.
That program receives no less emphasis, am I correct?
Secretary Rumsfeld. You are correct. It is receiving
emphasis, although it should be noted that there are from time
to time things that occur that may involve corrosion, that may
involve some other things as elements age in these weapons, and
we have to be attentive to that. We have to be alert to the
fact that we could very well arrive at a point where we are
advised that there is some non-trivial problem with respect to
safety or reliability.
But we are attentive to it, and the Department of Energy
is.
Senator Warner. I think you and the General pointed out
today that there are different approaches between Russia and
the United States in strategic forces, namely they build that
warhead to last for a period of time and, frankly, it is
discarded, dismantled, or otherwise. We build ours to last for
very long periods, in the hopes that we can just make minor
modifications as technology comes along.
That leads me to my next questions. The Moscow Treaty
reductions are consistent with the force structure you defined
in the Nuclear Posture Review, but the NPR also identified the
need for improved missile defenses--you have mentioned that--
and the revitalization of nuclear weapons infrastructure. That
means our ability to get into our existing operational weapons,
and those that are in storage where it is necessary, and make
those technical corrections to maintain their reliability.
There is going to be no less emphasis on that, am I
correct?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, and it is expensive. It is
important that we make those investments and that we recognize
the fact that these weapons will not last forever and that we
have to manage them and exercise appropriate stewardship over
them.
Senator Warner. Now, how important is it that the United
States maintain the ability to design and modify these nuclear
weapons as we draw down?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, it is important that we have
people who are trained, experienced, and capable of managing
that process, as well as seeing that we are prepared, in the
event we ever have to, to take the steps necessary to assure
that we have the appropriate deterrent. As the people that have
spent a good many years of their lives doing that age, retire,
and leave the scene, it is important that there be sufficient
activity, that new people are drawn into that process, and
those skills and capabilities are transferred to them.
Senator Warner. Mr. Secretary and General, in my next
question I am going to depart from the subject matter before us
here and bring up a subject which I have discussed privately
with both of you from time to time and one which I have on
several occasions over the past 6 weeks spoken on the floor of
the Senate. Our distinguished colleague who has just joined us
was the presiding officer when I addressed this subject late
last night on the floor.
It is my grave concern over the deteriorating situation in
the Middle East and what further might be done to try and bring
about a condition of stability, of cessation of hostilities,
such that meaningful discussions can go on toward a lasting
peace. It is a goal which you, Secretary Rumsfeld, have dealt
with for a good deal of your career. At one time you were the
President's special envoy in that region.
Several things brought this to mind very vividly to this
Senator. We celebrated the Fourth of July, and it was necessary
and prudent for our President and others to notify this Nation
of a heightened alert, and we thank God that nothing occurred
on that weekend. Since that time we have seen a repetition of
these suicide bombings, killing innocent persons in Israel. Now
we are witnessing a tragic use of military equipment where
there was loss of life of many children and innocent people in
the pursuit of trying to destroy an individual or individuals
which are clearly linked with this ongoing terrorism.
But I am not here to try and resolve that. What I am saying
is, are we considering all the options? I pose again here in
open session the option that I have had of asking the NATO
nations to consider whether or not their organization can be
brought to bear under certain conditions to help provide
stability. I am talking about an added peacekeeping role, such
as they are doing now in the Balkan region.
Should we not formally ask NATO to consider it from a
political standpoint as well as a military standpoint? NATO is
the one organization that has credibility in the world today,
that is ready to roll, and has the proven track record of
peacekeeping.
Now, clearly certain conditions have to be established
before they could be involved. One, a consensus among the NATO
nations that this problem is of sufficient magnitude to affect
their own vital security interests as it begins to spread and
fester. Second, they would have to be literally invited by both
the people of Palestine and the people of Israel through their
respective elective leadership. So it has to be by virtue of
invitation.
There also has to be an expression by both Palestinian
interests and Israeli interests that they will cooperate in
every way possible to maintain peace and stability once those
forces are in place.
Once that is established, it seems to me a lot of support
can flow to both sides to heal the wounds--economic assistance,
food, medicine to the Palestinian people. Once that is seen by
the people, I think it will bring about a cessation of those
cells that want to continue to foster suicide bombings, and
with the people of Israel, I think a great wave of relief that
they can once again walk the streets and the cafes and live a
life without fear. That would enable the diplomats, the leaders
of both nations, to sit down and conscientiously work out a
long-term peace arrangement.
I think that that step should be looked at along with
others. There may be better ideas. That is just one of this
particular Senator. Others have talked about it, others have
written about it. It is not entirely original with me. But I
think I have spoken to it perhaps more than any other member of
this body, in my firm belief that this very valuable asset of
NATO can be brought to bear to bring about peace, and maybe the
next Fourth of July there will be less hatred directed toward
this Nation.
We must not let an hour go by without studying what the
root causes are of the anger that is being unleashed against
the United States of America and our people. I think it is
vitally important that we look at this.
Europe is viewed as sympathetic to the Palestinian causes.
The United States is viewed as sympathetic to the Israeli
causes. That goes way back in history. But NATO bonds us as one
unit, as it has for the 50-plus years of its existence, and we
would go, not as the United States nor as Europe, but as NATO,
solely to preserve the condition of peace and stability, with
the cooperation of both sides, so that the talks can take place
and hopefully bring about a cessation of hostilities.
We cannot quantify the amount of anger generated toward
this country from that dispute, but clearly that ongoing tragic
chapter of killing and suffering is one of the root causes of
the anger being directed toward our Nation today, necessitating
a creation of a whole new Department of Homeland Defense,
necessitating the creation of a new command authority under
CINCNORTH, necessitating the barriers which guard every
entrance to the Capitol buildings here in the United States,
and all of the other steps that we are trying to take, whether
it is in our airports or in our homes and cities and villages,
to defend against terrorism.
No idea should go unexamined. I hope that you place some
credibility to it, at least enough to justify a study of this
concept and determine whether or not it is a feasible one.
I thank you for listening. If you have a response I would
be pleased to receive it.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much. I appreciate
having those thoughts.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
General.
General Myers. No, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, let me first commend you on
your continuing creative thinking, looking for solutions there.
We want to leave a few minutes here for Senator Nelson, so
I will, if it is all right, turn to him.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Yes, of course.
Chairman Levin. We have a vote coming up, I believe, in a
few minutes. But I want to again thank you for raising an issue
which should be on all of our minds at all times and applying
your usual creative and constructive approach to looking for
solutions.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning. You arrived apparently at the figure of 1,700
plus out of a determination that that is what it would take to
defend the interests of the United States. Can you share with
us why?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. If we need to do that in a classified
setting, then please so indicate.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We can do it one way here and one way
in a classified setting. But the fact is that the Chairman and
I, the senior military leadership, the senior civilian
leadership, the National Security Council, and over a period of
time the President spent many months, the better part of a
year, engaged in the Nuclear Posture Review analyzing the
subject. We look not just at Russia or China or any country
that currently has a nuclear weapon, but we looked at the
world, we looked at trend lines, and we came to a judgment that
the many thousands of weapons we currently have were not needed
and that in fact we could make deep reductions down to a range
of 1,700 to 2,200, and that we could do it regardless of what
Russia did with their weapons.
It was a number that was arrived at with an eye toward what
currently existed and what conceivably might exist. It was a
range that was arrived at as a way of reassuring our friends
and allies that we have and will have the kind of capability
necessary to provide a nuclear umbrella over them, which is a
way of dissuading them from thinking they need nuclear weapons,
which we do not believe they do; and second, a range that was
designed to dissuade other countries from thinking that the
number was so low that they could with a modest amount of
effort race and achieve parity or even superiority.
As low as 1,700 and 2,200 is compared to 6,000, it is still
a substantial number of nuclear weapons.
Senator Bill Nelson. Indeed it is, and I commend you for
it.
No doubt under the chairman's persistent questioning the
concerns have been expressed about the fact that the warheads
that will be taken off the ICBMs will not have been destroyed
on either side. That issue has been addressed by the chairman.
It is my understanding the chairman also addressed the question
of the tactical nuclear weapons and the destruction of them. In
this uncertain world of terrorism that we live in, I would like
to further address the question of fissile material, if you
would give us the value of your thoughts there for this
committee.
Secretary Rumsfeld. First to clarify the record here. You
said they will not be destroyed. There will be weapons
destroyed on both sides. There are weapons destruction programs
that exist in Russia and there are weapons destruction programs
that will exist here. So there will be some of them.
Not all of them, as you properly point out, will be
destroyed, nor should they. It would be irresponsible to
recognize the reality that we could have safety and reliability
problems with our stockpile and with our deployed weapons and
have no open production line and no capability to replace
unsafe or unreliable weapons. I cannot imagine anyone thinking
that it would be desirable to reduce or eliminate or destroy
all non-deployed weapons. It would be mindless to do that.
The question of tactical nuclear weapons, theater weapons,
you are quite right, we did discuss it. It is a worry. It is
something that I raise at every meeting with the Russians. We
have very little transparency into what they are doing. We do
worry about the security of those weapons. The fact that they
have many multiples more than we do does not concern me because
they have a different circumstance than we do. But I do believe
that we, as our relationship evolves, should gain better
visibility into what they are doing.
With respect to fissile material, it is something that the
world best worry a great deal about, and there are enough
countries with sizable appetites to develop nuclear weapons,
with programs and people available to them from other countries
who have competence and experience and knowledge in nuclear
weapon development, the proliferation of those technologies
among the so-called rogue states is extensive. One of the
pacing items is fissile material and any movement of that to
additional countries would indeed be a danger to the world.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your
comments. With regard to the reduction of weapons from 6,000 to
1,700, that is a reduction of over 4,000. How many of those are
needed to be kept in reserve, as you just suggested, to
replenish those that are actually deployed? Therefore, in an
ideal world how many would you destroy of that 4,000 plus?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is a number that we are
considering. It is not something that we will decide. It will
not be a fixed number. It very likely will be a number that
over the 10-year period of the treaty will change. It will
depend on what we learn from a safety standpoint, what we learn
from a reliability standpoint. It will depend on how much
investment is made and how long it would take us to be capable
of replacing weapons, since we do not have an open production
line like the Russians.
It also would be dependent on what we see evolving with
respect to the world security, what the security environment
is. It is hard to look at 3 or 4 years, let alone 8 or 10. But
as we move down and reduce our deployed weapons, there is no
question but that some will be destroyed and some will be
stockpiled, and what the number will be we simply do not know
yet.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is it the intent of the administration
that that will be the next item to negotiate with Russia, which
is what you just said, the destruction of the warheads that you
take off?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, it is unlikely. Each side has the
flexibility to do that which they wish to do, the way the
treaty is written. The most likely subjects for the United
States and Russia it seems to me are transparency,
predictability, theater nuclear weapons, but certainly not the
destruction of weapons.
We do worry about the security of weapons while they are
waiting to be destroyed or while they are waiting to be
redeployed or replace an unsafe or an unreliable weapon. That
is discussed.
Senator Bill Nelson. I certainly commend you on the
direction it is going, and I think it is a great breakthrough
which you have negotiated. I ask the obvious question, the
question that is begged, which is if you have taken weapons off
ICBMs that are also weapons that do not need to be in storage
for replacement, why would it not be to the interest of all
parties, including Russia, for an agreement to be reached to
destroy those weapons?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Because we do not need an agreement to
destroy them. We are each going to destroy--no one is going to
keep weapons they do not need. It costs a lot of money and
there is plenty of demand for the funds that are supplied to
the Russian military and the U.S. military. So you are not
going to have any advocates that I know of, certainly not in
the United States, desiring to keep weapons we do not need.
The question is figuring out what the world is going to
look like over the next decade and trying to look into the
future and say that we have confidence that we are not going to
have a whole class of weapons that are going to be unsafe. We
could get the phone call tonight: We are very sorry, Mr.
Secretary, but your stockpile is no longer safe or reliable, or
this whole category is no longer safe or reliable. Well, that
being the case, you darn well better have something you can
replace it with.
Senator Bill Nelson. Certainly, as you say, from the
standpoint of the United States we would want to destroy some
of those weapons. My concern, however, is looking at the old
Soviet Union and the modern day Russia, what is in their
interest? Unless there is an agreement to destroy with the
United States, what is in their interest to destroy? Given the
fact of the new world of terrorists that we live in, the less
weapons out there in storage the less weapons there are for
terrorists to get their hands on.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Fair enough. Any country that has
nuclear weapons or chemical or biological weapons has a
responsibility to see that they are managed safely. There are
always going to be weapons that are not deployed. Russia has no
interest in keeping weapons around that are not useful to them.
Their weapons age relatively rapidly compared to ours, as you
know well. That means that they are more likely to use new
production warheads than they are to use older warheads. They
are more likely to use piece parts of disassembled older
warheads that are still good and reassemble, I suspect.
We do not know. We do not have any visibility into this. We
know very little about what they are doing. We do not know
their production rate. We do not know their destruction rate.
We do worry about their security of them.
But we know of certain knowledge that they are making new
weapons, they are destroying weapons, they are holding weapons,
and they are dismembering weapons. No matter what stage they
are in, it is terribly important to all of us, including
Russia, that they be managed in a secure way.
Senator Bill Nelson. I certainly commend you. You are
moving along in what most objective observers would consider
the advancement of world peace. The note of caution that I
raise is: is there not some discussion that should be started
immediately upon the ratification of this treaty for the
destruction of those weapons in the Russian arsenal that are
not on top of their ICBMs? I add to that the tactical nuclear
weapons as well as the fissionable material.
The administration has come forth with a plan of 10 plus 10
over 10, $10 billion from us, $10 billion from our allies, over
10 years, a total of $20 billion. No less respected folks than
Senator Baker and Mr. Cutler in issuing the Baker-Cutler report
have said that at a minimum it should be $30 billion, and that
is of the highest priority in the Baker-Cutler report in their
conclusion of expenditures for protecting the interests of the
United States.
Would you comment, please, on that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I am not an expert on this
piece of it. The Department of State, the Department of Energy,
as well as the Department of Defense are involved in, I guess
it is called the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
My recollection is--and I hope someone will correct me if I
am wrong--that the taxpayers of the United States have already
spent something like $4 or $5 billion over a period of some
years for the destruction or management or security of Russian
nuclear weapons and materials. I am familiar with the 10 plus
10 over 10. What the right number is I do not know.
I think it is important for all of the countries of the
world to recognize that it is not just the United States that
has the obligation to destroy Russian nuclear weapons. Russia
has an obligation and they have to make priorities and choices,
and they have people who are potentially every bit as
vulnerable as anyone in the United States to the mismanagement
or mishandling or lack of security of their weapons. But so too
do the countries in Western Europe have an obligation or an
interest.
It seems to me that the 10 plus 10 that was negotiated, I
believe up in Canada very recently, was a useful thing to do.
Whether that is the right number, I cannot answer.
Senator Bill Nelson. May I say in conclusion that what I
have tried to articulate is of enormous concern to a number of
the Members of this body, not the least of which are the
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and one of the
senior members of that committee, Senator Lugar, whose name has
been etched in the history of this institution, having teamed
with Senator Nunn in trying to get their arms around the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
I would encourage you that, from your standpoint of defense
and protection of this country's interests, whenever you get
into those councils of government discussing this, that the
ultimate objective of lessening the proliferation possibility
is of enormous consequence to this country. For what it is
worth, I offer those thoughts to you, Mr. Secretary, and to
you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Let me very simply say that I share Senator Nelson's point.
When you read the Baker-Cutler report, as I have, it seems to
me you have to really think about their conclusion that the
greatest threat to our security is the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and the presence of nuclear weapons and
nuclear material on Russian soil because of the fact that they
are unable to secure it to the extent that it should be
secured. The contribution of Nunn-Lugar toward that end is
critical.
But nonetheless, the fewer nuclear weapons on Russian soil
and elsewhere, the quicker they are destroyed rather than being
stored, where they are much more readily available to theft or
to leakage or to some kind of an illegal sale, the safer we are
going to be.
So there is a relationship between the number of nuclear
weapons, whether they are destroyed or not, and the
proliferation issue. The Russians apparently wanted to destroy
weapons, not store them. We are the ones who decided that they
should be stored, not destroyed, as I understand the
discussions. I hope that over time, as Senator Nelson has
expressed, that we will find ways to destroy weapons, not just
store them. The world will be a lot more secure in my judgment
and the proliferation threat reduced if we can not just see
weapons stored on Russian soil, but actually see them destroyed
and put the resources into it that we apparently need to
contribute to make sure that, as long as those weapons are
there, that they are secured. That goes as well to the chemical
and biological issue.
On the other hand, it is clear this treaty is a significant
advance, and I think we all welcome it; we applaud it. We are
grateful for your contributions to it, both of you. The
perspective may be a little different on whether destruction or
storage is a greater contribution to our security, but
nonetheless the reduction in the number of deployed nuclear
weapons is a plus. The treaty is moving us in the right
direction, and not just in terms of nuclear weapons, but in
terms of the relationship between ourselves and Russia, which,
as you have pointed out, Secretary Rumsfeld, is so critically
important, and this contributes to it in a very significant
way.
I hope, General, that we will continue to have military-to-
military relations with Russia that are continually expanded.
We have had some good connections with them in Bosnia and other
places, but that effort also will continue apace. They may not
be a superpower now, but they have all of the ingredients to
return to superpower status. They have huge numbers of nuclear
weapons, they have all of the talent, capability, and resources
that are needed for a return to that status, and your military-
to-military relationship is frankly just as important as the
diplomatic discussions and relationship.
We thank you both for your presence, for your contribution
to this Nation's security, and we will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Thurmond
moscow treaty reduction schedule
1. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, although the ``Moscow
Treaty'' requires both parties to reduce deployed strategic warheads to
no more than 2,200 by 2012, there is no specific schedule to accomplish
this task. What are the Department's plans for achieving the 2012 goal?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Moscow Treaty imposes no reduction
timelines. Each party is free to carry out reductions in its own way,
provided that it meets the required force level on the specified date.
In terms of current U.S. planning, as the first step in reducing
strategic nuclear warheads, the United States plans to deactivate 50
Peacekeeper ICBMs from operational service, remove four Trident
submarines from strategic service, and no longer maintain the
capability to return the B-1 to nuclear service. In addition, Trident
D-5 and Minuteman missiles will be downloaded and some bombs removed
from heavy bomber bases to reduce the operationally deployed strategic
force to approximately 3,800 weapons by 2007.
Specific decisions about U.S. forces beyond 2007 have not yet been
made. It is anticipated that reductions beyond 2007 will involve
decreasing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads on ballistic missiles and lowering the number of operationally
deployed warheads at heavy bomber bases. These plans, however, will be
periodically assessed and may evolve over time.
russia's plans to reduce warheads
2. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, what do you know about
Russia's plans to reduce the number of warheads?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Russia did not state during the negotiations
how it intends to carry out its reductions, nor does the treaty require
that any specific procedure be followed. We anticipate that our
understanding of Russian plans will evolve as we move forward with
implementing the treaty, including as transparency is enhanced through
ongoing diplomatic consultations. I would note that the President's
original decision to reduce the number of our operationally deployed
strategic warheads was not dependent on any Russian decision to reduce
their own nuclear forces, and that we believe Russia has compelling
reasons of its own, unrelated to the Moscow Treaty, to wish to reduce
to the 1,700-2,200 range or even lower.
counting russian mirved warheads under the moscow treaty
3. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, some critics of the treaty
state that it disadvantages the United States since it does not address
MIRVs, which are one of Russia's strengths. How are MIRVed warheads
counted under the Moscow Treaty?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Moscow Treaty will not place new
restrictions on Russia's potential to deploy MIRVed ICBMs. It affords
Russia the same force planning flexibility that we ourselves require.
We are not overly concerned with hypothetical ``break-out'' scenarios
(as we were during the Cold War), as shown by the fact that we intend
to reduce to 1,700-2,200 warheads regardless of what the Russians do.
Regardless of whether Russia retains its SS-18 or SS-19 ICBMs or
builds a new MIRVed missile, Russia's deployment of MIRVs has little
impact on U.S. national security under current conditions. The issue of
Russian MIRVed ICBMs was considered in the Nuclear Posture Review and
during the treaty negotiations. Since neither the United States and its
allies nor Russia view our strategic relationship as adversarial, we no
longer view Russian deployment of MIRVed ICBMs as destabilizing to this
new strategic relationship.
If Russia retains MIRVed ICBMs, it will be required to have fewer
missiles than if each carried only one warhead. However, we do not
believe that Russia will retain its current inventory of MIRVed ICBMs.
Russia is already deactivating its 10-warhead rail-mobile SS-24 force
for age and safety reasons. We expect that most of the SS-18 heavy
ICBMs and six-warhead SS-19 ICBMs will reach the end of their service
life and be retired by 2012. Ongoing diplomatic consultations should
improve our understanding of how Russia plans to carry out its
reduction obligations. We expect that continued improvement in our
relationship with Russia will provide greater transparency into the
strategic capabilities and intentions of each party.
united states establishment of confidence-building measures
4. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, in a May 28, 2002, article
Senator Joseph Biden wrote that the United States should establish
confidence-building measures that would enable Russia to verify U.S.
compliance with the treaty. He apparently is concerned that Russia does
not have the means to verify our compliance with the treaty. Do you
agree with the Senator's concerns? If not, why not?
Secretary Rumsfeld. During the initial stages of the talks, we
exchanged ideas about possible transparency measures. The ideas of each
side were designed to implement the approach that it proposed the
treaty take in defining reduction obligations. However, once both
countries agreed that the treaty's reduction obligations should
preserve the flexibility for each side to make reductions in its own
way, it appeared to the United States that there was no immediate need
to work out transparency measures applicable to this context. Among
other things, START's verification measures would continue to be
available for some time. Russia, too, agreed that the Moscow Treaty
need not include such measures. Accordingly, no specific transparency
measures were negotiated.
We recognize that more contacts and exchanges of information could
be useful and that the parties could decide to develop additional
transparency in the future. However, we do not believe that any
specific new transparency measures are needed in order to implement the
Moscow Treaty.
verification of treaty
5. Senator Thurmond. General Myers, compliance verification is a
concern of both the proponents and opponents of the treaty. In your
professional judgment, are you satisfied that both Russia and the
United States have the means to verify compliance with the Moscow
Treaty?
General Myers. I agree with the assessment of the verification of
the Moscow Treaty contained in the ``Moscow Treaty: The Determination
Pertaining To Verification,'' submitted to Congress on June 24, 2002,
by the Secretary of State (in accordance with Section 306 of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Act). The Moscow Treaty was not constructed to
be verifiable within the meaning of Section 306, and it is not. The
Moscow Treaty recognizes a new strategic relationship between the
United States and Russia based on the understanding that we are no
longer enemies and that the principles which will underpin our
relationship are mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation, and
predictability. This understanding played an important role in our
judgments regarding verification. Our conclusion was that, in the
context of this new relationship, a treaty with a verification regime
under the Cold War paradigm was neither required nor appropriate.
START's verification regime, including data exchanges and inspections,
will continue to add to our body of knowledge over the course of the
decade regarding the disposition of Russia's strategic nuclear warheads
and the overall status of reductions in Russia's strategic nuclear
forces during the same period. We recognize, however, that more
contacts and exchanges of information could be useful and that the
parties could decide to develop additional transparency in the future.
The Consultative Group on Strategic Stability (CGSS) will meet in
September to begin this dialogue.
destruction of nuclear warheads
6. Senator Thurmond. General Myers, although I understand that
there are capacity limitations on our ability to dismantle warheads, is
there a military necessity for not dismantling warheads?
General Myers. Yes, there is a clear military necessity to not
dismantle all our nuclear warheads. Storing non-operationally deployed
nuclear warheads serves the United States interests in several ways.
First, they provide a responsive capability against unanticipated
changes in the international security environment. We need to retain
the flexibility to meet significant unforeseen challenges. Second, we
do not currently have the capability to produce nuclear warheads, but
our Russian counterparts--and other nuclear powers--do. Therefore,
stored warheads provide an operational reserve for surveillance and
testing replacements. Third, stored warheads provide a hedge against a
technical or catastrophic failure of a class of deployed warheads that
could affect safety or reliability and, ultimately, our national
security.
The exact number of weapons to be stored has not yet been
determined. However, the overall number of warheads in the stockpile
will be comprised of operationally deployed warheads; spares and
replacements to meet operational and surveillance testing requirements;
the number of weapons required to hedge against future uncertainties;
and a number to hedge against technical ``surprises'' that could render
a complete warhead family unusable.
security of russian warheads
7. Senator Thurmond. General Myers, although I believe Russia has
the means to appropriately secure its ``operationally deployed''
warheads, I am concerned about those warheads that are in storage. What
are your views on the security of Russia's nuclear warheads?
General Myers. I believe, as Secretary Rumsfeld has stated, that
any nation who possesses nuclear weapons has an obligation to properly
manage those weapons, to include safe and secure storage. I fully
support Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts to assist Russia in
improving the safety and security of its non-deployed nuclear warheads.
The United States is working to help Russia improve the security of its
fissile material through DOE's Material, Protection, Control and
Accounting (MPC&A) program and DOD's construction of a fissile material
storage facility at Mayak and DOE's many MPC&A projects. We plan to
also continue the support of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program
when the Moscow Treaty is in force, regardless of Russia's decisions on
how many warheads to eliminate. With assistance from the United States
and other countries, Moscow has taken steps to reduce the risk of
theft. Some risks remain even though Russia's nuclear security has been
improving over the last several years.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
REDUCTIONS TREATY
----------
THURSDAY, AUGUST 1, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m., room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Reed, Bill
Nelson, Bingaman, Warner, Inhofe, and Sessions.
Committee staff members present: Christine E. Cowart, chief
clerk; and Kenneth Barbee, security clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: L. David Cherrington,
minority counsel, and Brian R. Green, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Daniel K.
Goldsmith, and Thomas C. Moore.
Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Robert
Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; and Derek Maurer, assistant to
Senator Bunning.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. The hearing will come to order. The Senate
Armed Services Committee meets today to continue its hearings
on the military and national security implications of the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). The hearing this
morning will consist of two panels.
On the first panel, we are pleased to have Charles Curtis,
former Deputy Secretary of Energy and currently the President
and Chief Operating Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
and Dr. Ashton Carter, formerly the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy and currently the
Ford Professor of Science and International Affairs at
Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Gentlemen, it
is a pleasure to welcome you back to the committee today.
On the second panel, we will hear from Admiral James Ellis,
Commander in Chief of the Strategic Command, and Dr. Everet
Beckner, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs of the
National Nuclear Security Administration.
Previously, the committee heard testimony concerning the
Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty from Secretary Rumsfeld
and General Myers. As a follow-on to that hearing, we wanted an
opportunity to discuss the treaty and the broader context of
U.S.-Russian relations with witnesses outside of the
administration. Each of you has had substantial experience with
nuclear weapons and materials issues from both policy and
practical perspectives. We look forward to hearing from you on
the SORT and getting your views on a variety of issues,
including the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security
policy, current and future nonproliferation efforts, the future
course of U.S.-Russian relations, and other topics.
The SORT has no timetable for implementation, and no
milestones against which to measure and verify progress.
Neither does the treaty use or define the term ``deployed
strategic offensive nuclear weapons.'' These are the weapons
that will be reduced by the United States. Similarly, the
treaty does not define what weapons are to be reduced by Russia
or establish any timetable for those reductions.
As we discussed in our hearing last week, there are a
number of uncertainties associated with this treaty, including
its implications on the size of the stockpile and the future of
nuclear weapons.
However, the treaty is an important symbolic element of our
improving relationship with Russia. How the United States and
Russia view each other militarily is an important question.
These views could drive, in a large or small way, U.S. nuclear
planning and stockpile concerns, or they might have no impact
at all. This treaty is a starting point for shaping the future
nuclear weapons stockpile and further arms control, as well as
an important boost to our relationship with Russia.
But there is much more work to be done to continue
improving mutual security with Russia, work that includes
further reducing nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation
dangers, and improving confidence, transparency, and
cooperation with Russia.
We will conclude the first panel and proceed to the second
panel at approximately 10:15. We will start the second panel in
open session and then move to a closed session in SR-222,
Russell Senate Office Building.
Senator Bingaman, do you have any opening comments?
Senator Bingaman. Mr. Chairman, I do not, other than to
welcome the witnesses. I look forward to their testimony.
Senator Reed. Mr. Curtis and Dr. Carter, your prepared
statements will be included in the record.
Mr. Curtis.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES B. CURTIS, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING
OFFICER, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE
Mr. Curtis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Bingaman.
As you introduced me, I am the President of the Nuclear Threat
Initiative, which is a charitable organization dedicated to
reducing global threats from nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which is
sometimes referred to as the Treaty of Moscow, is a truly
remarkable document. I believe that it deserves the Senate's
endorsement. It should be ratified without amendment or, in my
judgment, without reservation.
But this treaty's true value is not so much in its
substance, which is sparse; its only legally binding part
deferred to the next decade. Indeed, its value is best seen in
the joint statement issued by Presidents Bush and Putin and the
foundation that the ancillary document provides for
transforming the U.S.-Russian relationship today and in the
years to come. So I would like to address my remarks today to
the steps required to bring about that transformation.
Former Senator Nunn, testifying last week before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, called the Moscow Treaty ``a good
faith treaty.'' It relies on an expressed faith in the common
vision of our leaders and in our two nations' closely parallel
strategic force plans. I agree that a treaty built on faith can
survive only by building on common interests and gaining the
trust that comes from transparency. If you never see someone do
what they say they will do, trust cannot grow. When trust
cannot grow, suspicions soon will, so I believe this treaty
must be followed with milestones and transparency mechanisms to
track progress.
While we are working on these trust-building transparency
measures, we must also work with urgency with Russia to ensure
accurate accounting and security of Russia's tactical nuclear
weapons. Indeed, gaining such accurate accounting and assured
security of these weapons will be the first serious test of the
new U.S.-Russian relationship.
We simply don't know with specificity how many tactical
nuclear weapons the Russians have, where they are, or how
secure they are. These weapons, as this committee knows, are
small enough to be man portable and powerful enough to destroy
a small city. In an age of terrorist threats, this dangerous
gap must be closed at the earliest possible date. The United
States and Russia should at the same time move to revise the
Cold War operational status of our nuclear forces.
President Bush spoke on this potentially dangerous
situation more than 2 years ago as a candidate for President.
Decrying what he called another unnecessary vestige of Cold War
confrontation, he said, ``the United States should remove as
many weapons as possible from high alert, high trigger status.
For two nations of peacekeeping, so many weapons on high alert
may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized
launch. As President, I will ask for an assessment of what we
can safely do to lower the alert status of our forces.'' Mr.
Chairman, I doubt the assessment that candidate Bush called for
has yet to be presented to President Bush. The recently
conducted Nuclear Posture Review, at least by public accounts,
dealt almost entirely with force structure issues and did not
separately discuss the alert conditions of weapons, or at least
options with respect to the alert conditions of weapons.
Similarly, the Treaty of Moscow does not explicitly address
operational conditions, but does so by indirection.
The U.S.'s use of the term ``operationally deployed
weapons'' to describe its commitments under the treaty implies
an extension of today's high alert conditions at least until
2012, and perhaps for the indefinite future. Is this a
potential risk for this Nation that it is willing to bear? This
committee knows, I believe, that this is a special concern of
Senator Nunn. It was when he chaired this committee. It remains
in his capacity as co-Chairman of the initiative on CERT, so
what may be done? Here's what Senator Nunn has suggested:
First, the President can and should direct the immediate
standdown of the forces as they become identified for reduction
under the treaty. This has a noble precedent. George Herbert
Walker Bush, when President in 1991, did the same thing on the
occasion of the signing of the first Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START).
Second, our two presidents should direct their military
leaders to meet and return in the near future with a developed
set of options to begin to stand down the remaining nuclear
forces to the maximum extent possible consistent with the
national security interests of each country. This is important
because the more time we build into our process for launching
missiles, the more time is available to gather data, exchange
information, gain perspective, and discover or avoid a mistake.
If we were smart enough at the height of the Cold War to be
able to begin reducing weapons, surely in the second decade
after the end of the Cold War we can be smart enough to find a
way to expand decision time with no loss of security. It is at
least worth a serious look.
Third, our two presidents should sweep away the
bureaucratic impediments to getting the Joint Early Warning
Center up and running. Countering the deterioration of Russia's
early warning and protection capability is in the security
interest of both countries. We must get on with the job.
Now, let me also say a word about the issue of warhead
dismantlement, which has been discussed in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and also before this committee. The treaty
does not require the dismantlement or destruction of warheads
or delivery systems. There are no force size limits in the new
treaty, only limitations on operationally deployed forces.
Eventually, under the evolving U.S. security relationship,
I expect we will need to address the actual size on our
respective strategic forces. Beginning with the dismantlement
of excess warheads we can begin this objective, build trust,
and also serve the larger goal of giving the world community
greater assurances that the United States and Russia are
actually reducing their forces. If asked, the Department of
Energy probably could set out an explicit schedule for
beginning the dismantlement of excess weapons. But we must
understand that while we can and should begin the dismantlement
process, the development of a bilateral warhead dismantlement
regime would be quite challenging, testing our available
technologies and classification barriers. It is a task that
must be examined in the context of U.S. strategies and plans
for maintaining the stockpile into the future in the absence of
a full warhead production capability.
I note here that Russia maintains multiple nuclear warhead
production facilities, while the U.S. currently has none still
operating. This asymmetry poses an inherent structural
complication for the negotiation of a 4-month dismantlement
regime. Therefore, while I agree that both sides should get
about the job of dismantling excess weapons, I don't believe
that securing an agreement on warhead dismantlement rises to
the same level of urgency as the other issues I have just
mentioned. Moreover, many of the treaty's specific compliance
issues discussed before the committee do not rise to the same
level of urgency of other issues at play in U.S.-Russian
dynamic, such as ensuring the security of weapons materials and
weapons know how and the destruction of chemical weapons and
biological weapons facilities.
The critical job in Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
started by this committee under Nunn-Lugar and extended in
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici must be unlocked, refocused, and
accelerated. Following through on this urgent agenda has to be
at the heart of U.S.-Russian security relationship. Expanding
on this agenda to engage a global coalition in the fight
against catastrophic terrorism is the next essential step in
realizing the full province of the real Russian-U.S. security
relationship. Should we fail to take this last and most
important step in providing for our security future, all
semblance of security will be lost.
September 11, if it taught us anything, taught us this: the
number of innocent people al Qaeda is willing to kill is not
limited by any political considerations or any spark of human
conscience. Their compassion for killing is limited only by the
power of the workings they have. We must keep the world's most
deadly weapons out of their hands. We know that terrorists are
seeking weapons of mass destruction. We also know where they
are looking to find them. In the post-Soviet period, Russia's
dysfunctional economy and eroded security systems combined to
undercut controls on the stocks of weapons, materials, and
know-how inherited from the Cold War. This dysfunction
increased the risk that they can throw to terrorist groups or
hostile forces. Considerable progress and improvements have
come through the Nunn-Lugar program and its projects, but we
have a long way to go in Russia still. Moreover, the
vulnerabilities reach well beyond Russia, and well beyond other
parts of the Former Soviet Union.
Last May, in the immediate aftermath of the summit, former
Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar co-hosted a conference of
Russian and American legislators, officials, and experts.
Senators Nunn and Lugar used this point in time to call for a
new effort to finish the job of CTR in Russia and the Former
Soviet Union, and to extend its principles beyond the United
States and Russia to include the whole world with Russia and
the United States linked in partnership sharing best practices
and lessons learned. They called it the Global Coalition
Against Catastrophic Terrorism. In Senator Lugar's words, ``we
have to make sure that every nation with nuclear, biological,
or chemical weapons capacity accounts for what it has, puts in
securities for what it has, and pledges that no other nation
will be allowed access. This security first agenda has to
energize the global coalition.''
We should include every nation that has something to
safeguard or that can make a contribution to safeguarding. This
vision we seek received dramatic endorsement with the recent G-
8 announcement that its member states were establishing a
global partnership against catastrophic terrorism and combining
for this purpose a $10 billion commitment from the United
States with a $10 billion pledge from the G-8 partners over the
next 10 years. I applaud President Bush's leadership and
success in achieving this pledge to unified action.
One of the most essential next steps in the U.S.-Russian
relationship, therefore, is to make the G-8 commitments real,
to follow up with diplomatic rigor and resources, and to begin
to extend that partnership beyond the G-8. Mr. Chairman, the
whole world is engaged in a new arms risk. Terrorists are
racing to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
we must together race to stop them. Reducing the numbers of
U.S.-Russian deployed or deployable strategic forces is
important. The Treaty of Moscow is important, and it should be
ratified. But if we are to have a secure future, we must first
win the race against catastrophic terrorism, and we must win it
on a global scale.
It is my hope that the Treaty of Moscow will be remembered,
therefore, more as a hinge of the U.S.-Russian relationship,
not an end point, but a turning point, leading towards a
transformed security relationship. If it serves this purpose,
and propels us on the course of action outlined above, it will
be truly historic and worthy of history's praise. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Curtis follows:]
Prepared Statement by Charles B. Curtis
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: thank you for inviting
me to offer my views on the national security implications of the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (sometimes also referred to as
the Treaty of Moscow) and discuss with you the opportunities it creates
to build a safer world.
I appear before you as the President of the Nuclear Threat
Initiative (NTI), a charitable organization dedicated to reducing the
global threats from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. NTI is
co-chaired by former Senator--and former chairman of this committee--
Sam Nunn and CNN founder Ted Turner. Two of your colleagues, Senators
Richard Lugar and Pete Domenici, sit on our Board as do two members of
the Russian Duma, former Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin and
former Ambassador Vladimir Lukin.
The testimony I offer today, however, represents my own views and
has not been cleared with our board.
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that Presidents Bush and
Putin signed in Moscow in May to reduce by two-thirds by 2012 the
operationally deployed nuclear weapons on both sides is truly a
remarkable document. I believe it deserves the Senate's endorsement.
But this treaty's true value is not so much in its substance, which is
admittedly sparse; its only legally binding part deferred to the next
decade. Instead, its value is best seen in the joint statement issued
by the two Presidents and the foundation this ancillary document
provides for transforming the U.S.-Russian relationship today and in
the next years to come. So I would like to address my remarks today to
the steps required to bring about that transformation.
Former Senator Nunn, testifying last week before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, called the Moscow Treaty a ``good-faith treaty.''
It relies on an expressed ``faith'' in the common vision of our leaders
and in our two nations' closely parallel strategic force plans. I agree
with that characterization. This treaty, unlike its predecessors, does
not have an elaborate text born of suspicion, but ten sentences based
on trust. Yet I believe a treaty built on trust can survive only with
continued investment in the trust relationship by building on common
interests, and gaining the trust that comes from transparency. If you
never see someone do what they say they will do, trust cannot grow.
When trust cannot grow, suspicions soon will.
What matters most is what happens next. As Sam Nunn has pointed
out, ``if this treaty is not followed with substantive actions, it will
become irrelevant at best--counterproductive at worse. A good faith
treaty, without follow-up, means that if relations improve, the two
sides may not need it. If relations turn bad, the two sides may not
(plan to) honor it.''
So I believe this treaty must be followed with milestones and
transparency mechanisms to track progress on the way to 2012. Toward
that end, it's important that the Department of Defense develop and
make public at the earliest possible date its own plans for reducing
our ``operationally deployed'' forces under this treaty. Russia should
do the same with its forces, and then both nations should follow with
agreed mechanisms specifically designed to allow both sides to monitor
these reductions. It is not, and will not, be enough for inspectors and
site visitors under START I to look over their shoulders and try to see
what's happening on the Russian or the U.S. side to build down forces
to meet the Treaty of Moscow commitments. Moreover, as the committee
has heard, even this indirect method of monitoring this treaty will be
lost in the last 3 years when START I expires.
We should act quickly in the Consultative Group for Strategic
Security to fill in these blind spots.
While we are working out these trust-building transparency
measures, we must work with Russia to ensure an accurate accounting and
the security of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear
weapons have never been covered in any treaties or agreements--and that
is an ongoing, decades-long mistake that we must correct immediately.
We don't know with any specificity how many tactical nuclear weapons
the Russians have, where they are, or how secure they are. These are
weapons small enough to be man-portable and powerful enough to destroy
a small city. In an age of terrorist threats, this dangerous gap must
be closed at the earliest possible date.
The United States and Russia should at the same time move to revise
the Cold War operational status of our nuclear forces. Today, the
United States and Russia have thousands of nuclear weapons on high
alert, the great bulk of which are ready to launch within minutes--
essentially the same posture we had throughout the Cold War.
President Bush spoke of this dangerous situation more than 2 years
ago as a candidate for President. Decrying what he called ``another
unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation,'' he said `` The United
States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-
trigger status. For two nations at peace, keeping so many weapons on
high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized
launch. As President, I will ask for an assessment of what we can
safely do to lower the alert status of our forces.''
I doubt that the assessment that candidate Bush called for has yet
to be presented to President Bush. The recently conducted Nuclear
Posture Review--at least by public accounts--dealt almost entirely with
force structure issues and did not separately discuss the alert
conditions of the weapons. Similarly, the Treaty of Moscow does not
explicitly address operational conditions, but by indirection, it does.
The U.S. side's use of the term ``operationally deployed weapons'' to
describe its commitments under the treaty implies an extension of
today's high alert conditions at least until 2012 and perhaps for the
indefinite future. As significant as the arms reduction numbers in the
treaty are, the world envisioned for 2012--two decades after the end of
the Cold War--is a world where the U.S. and Russia would still
collectively maintain several thousand nuclear weapons on high alert.
To echo President Bush's earlier quoted words: ``For two nations at
peace, keeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable
risks of accidental or unauthorized launch''--with the most
catastrophic of consequences, I might add. As Sam Nunn has long
advocated, we must take steps to reduce this danger. So what are the
next steps to take in this area?
First, the President can and should direct the immediate standdown
of the forces identified for reduction under the new treaty. Such an
action has a respected and successful precedent. President George
Herbert Walker Bush ordered a similar standdown of nuclear forces in
1991, when he directed the military to unilaterally standdown the
forces scheduled for reductions under the START I Treaty he had just
signed. The Russians soon followed this action with a reciprocal
commitment.
Second, our two Presidents should direct their military leaders to
meet and return in the near future--say 3 months from now--with a
developed set of options to begin to standdown the remaining nuclear
forces deployable within the Treaty of Moscow cap levels to the maximum
extent possible consistent with the national security of both
countries. This is important because the more time we build into our
process for launching missiles, the more time is available to gather
data, exchange information, gain perspective, discover an error, or
avoid a mistake. Expanding nuclear decision time may require still
unidentified force structure changes, deployment changes, and other
approaches. It is sure to be a complicated undertaking, but if we were
smart enough at the height of the Cold War to be able to begin reducing
nuclear weapons in a verifiable way, surely in the second decade after
the end of the Cold War we can find a way to expand decision time with
no loss of security.
Third, our two Presidents should sweep away the bureaucratic
impediments to getting the Joint Early Warning Center up and running.
Countering the deterioration of Russia's early warning and detection
capability is in the security interest of both countries. We must get
on with the job.
Let me also say a word about the issue of warhead dismantlement,
drawing upon my past governmental experience. The treaty does not
require the dismantlement or destruction of warheads or delivery
systems. There are no ``force size'' limitations in the new treaty,
only limitations on ``operationally deployed forces.'' Senators from
both sides of the aisle have been right to raise questions about this
matter. Eventually, under the evolving U.S.-Russian security
relationship, we will need to address the actual size of our respective
strategic forces. Beginning the dismantlement of excess warheads can
contribute to this objective, build trust, and also serve the larger
goal of giving the world community greater assurance that the U.S. and
Russia are actually reducing their forces. In the near-term, the
symbolism of the act is probably even more important than the actual
numbers of warheads destroyed. If asked, the Department of Energy
probably could set out an explicit schedule for beginning the
dismantlement of some excess weapons. Certainly, some level of excess
warhead elimination is already a part of the Department of Defense and
the Department of Energy's planning process.
But we must understand that while we can and should begin the
dismantlement process, the development of a bilateral warhead
dismantlement regime will be quite challenging, testing our available
technologies and classification barriers. It is a task that must be
examined in the context of U.S. strategies and plans for maintaining
the stockpile into the future in the absence of a full warhead
production capability. I note here that Russia maintains multiple
nuclear warhead production facilities while the U.S. currently has none
still operating. This asymmetry poses an inherent structural
complication to the negotiation of a formal dismantlement regime.
Therefore, while I agree that both sides should get about the job of
dismantling excess weapons, I don't believe that securing an agreement
on warhead dismantlement rises to the same level of urgency as other
issues. It is a logical next step if the two sides are eventually to
get to agreed force size limitations, but the time frame for action is
somewhat long term and certainly less immediate than that required for
the securing of tactical weapons and for reducing the alert status of
our remaining nuclear forces. Any ranking of next steps and any
guidance the Senate may wish to give on the subject should reflect this
ordering of priorities.
Moreover, many of the treaty specific compliance issues discussed
before the committee do not rise to the same level of urgency of other
issues at play in the U.S.-Russian dynamic, such as ensuring the
security of weapons materials and weapons know how and the destruction
of chemical weapons and biological weapons facilities. The critical job
in CTR started by this committee under Nunn-Lugar, and extended in
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici, must be unblocked, refocused, and accelerated.
Following through on this urgent agenda has to be at the heart of the
U.S.-Russian relationship. Expanding on this agenda to engage a global
coalition in the fight against catastrophic terrorism is the next
essential step in realizing the full promise of the new Russian-U.S.
security relationship. Should we fail to take this last and most
important step in providing for our security future, all semblance of
security could be lost.
September 11, if it taught us anything, taught us this: the number
of innocent people al Qaeda is willing to kill is not limited by any
political considerations, or any spark of human conscience--their
capacity for killing is limited only by the power of their weapons. We
must keep the world's most deadly weapons out of their hands.
I am afraid far too many do not understand how immediate the danger
is. Many Americans are aware that Osama bin Laden has said acquiring
weapons of mass destruction is ``a religious duty.'' But fewer
understand how far bin Laden has come in pursuing his so-called duty.
According to reports in the last several months, the following evidence
of al Qaeda activity has been uncovered since Taliban and al Qaeda
forces fled Afghanistan:
Rudimentary diagrams of nuclear weapons were uncovered
at a suspected safe house for al Qaeda in Kabul confirming that
al Qaeda was exploring ways to make low-grade, nuclear devices;
Material that could be used to make a radiological
bomb was found in an underground al Qaeda base near Kandahar;
Documents that include details of a biological and
chemical weapons program were uncovered at another al Qaeda
safe house;
At the same site, a memo was discovered, apparently
written by bin Laden's number two, saying: ``the destructive
power of (biological) weapons is no less than that of nuclear
weapons;'' and
Finally, a June 1999 memo was discovered by the Wall
Street Journal on the hard-drive of a computer left in Kabul by
al Qaeda. It recommended that the al Qaeda biological weapons
program seek cover and talent in educational institutions,
which the memo said ``allow easy access to specialists, which
will greatly benefit us in the first stage, God willing.''
We need to remind ourselves that these are just the documents they
left behind that we have recovered. We don't know what they took with
them, nor what they left behind that we have not found.
At the same time, we know not only that terrorists are seeking
weapons of mass destruction. We also know where they are looking to
find them.
As the committee is well aware, 10 years ago, when the Soviet Union
broke apart, it left a mind-numbing legacy of more than 20,000
strategic nuclear warheads, and enough highly enriched uranium and
plutonium to make 40,000-60,000 more, stored in over 250 buildings in
more than 50 sites distributed throughout the Russian Federation across
11 time zones.
Unofficial estimates of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons vary from
3,000 to 20,000 weapons, some of which pack the destructive power of
the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. As I said before, these weapons have
never been the subject of arms control regimes and are largely
unaccounted for. Russia also has 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons
awaiting disposition. The Shchuchye storage site alone houses almost 2
million rounds of chemical weapons--any one of which could be carried
away in a suitcase and every one of which is potent enough to take
hundreds and perhaps thousands of lives and create terror. Russia also
has an elaborate bio-weapons apparatus, and thousands of scientists who
know how to make weapons and missiles, but no longer have secure jobs
or secure futures.
In the post-Soviet period, Russia's dysfunctional economy and
eroded security systems combined to undercut controls on these weapons,
materials, and know how--and increased the risk that they could flow to
terrorist groups or hostile forces. Considerable improvements have come
through the Nunn-Lugar program, but we have a long way to go in Russia.
Moreover, the vulnerabilities reach well beyond Russia and other parts
of the Former Soviet Union.
Last May in Moscow, former Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar co-hosted
a conference of Russian and American legislators, officials, and
experts. The Moscow conference marked the 10-year anniversary of Nunn-
Lugar CTR. Nunn and Lugar used this point in time to call for a new
decadal effort to finish the job in Russia and the Former Soviet Union
and to extend the principles of CTR beyond the United States and Russia
to include the whole world, with Russia and the United States linked in
partnership, sharing best practices and lessons learned. They called it
a ``Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism.'' The approach was
described by Senator Lugar some months ago in the Washington Post: ``We
have to make sure that every nation with nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons capacity accounts for what it has, secures what it
has, and pledges that no other nation or group will be allowed
access.'' That simply stated mission should energize the world
community and provide the core basis for transforming the U.S.-Russian
security relationship.
A Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism must be grounded
on the central security realities of our new century: First, the
greatest dangers are threats all nations face together and no nation
can solve on its own. Second: The most likely, most immediate threat is
terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. Third: The best way to
address the threat is to keep terrorists from acquiring nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons.
How difficult it is for terrorists to acquire a nuclear weapon
depends on how difficult we make it. It becomes obvious from analyzing
the terrorist path to a nuclear attack that the most effective and
least expensive way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to secure weapons
and materials at the source. Acquiring weapons and materials is the
hardest step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for us to
stop. By contrast, every subsequent step in the process is easier for
the terrorists to take and harder for us to stop. Once they gain access
to materials, they've completed the most difficult step. That is why
defense against catastrophic terrorism must begin with securing weapons
and materials in every country and every facility that has them. A
single point failure in security anywhere in the world can have the
gravest of effects.
Members of the Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism
would include every nation that has something to safeguard or that can
make a contribution to safeguarding it, including our European allies,
Japan, China, India, Pakistan, and the many nations that host research
reactors using weapons-grade fuel.
Each member could make a contribution to the coalition's activities
commensurate with its capabilities. As with the coalition against al
Qaeda, this coalition would extend to wherever weapons of mass
destruction exist or might be made and wherever terrorist cells exist
that might build them, steal them, or use them. The cooperation would
extend from prevention, to include detection, protection, interdiction,
and response.
This vision received a dramatic endorsement with the recent G-8
announcement that its member states were establishing a global
partnership against catastrophic terrorism and combining for this
purpose a $10 billion funding commitment from the U.S. with a $10
billion pledge from our G-8 partners over a 10-year period. I applaud
President Bush's leadership and success in achieving this G-8 pledge to
unified action to combat catastrophic terrorism. Importantly, the G-8
commitment includes Russia in a full partnership role and acknowledges
that the most immediate and urgent work must begin in Russia. One of
the most essential next steps in the U.S.-Russian relationship,
therefore, is to make the G-8 commitments real, to follow up with
diplomatic rigor and resources, and to begin to extend the partnership
beyond the G-8 members.
To make the most of this opportunity to improve our security and
build a wider partnership against catastrophic terrorism, it is useful
to think of the whole world as being engaged in a new arms race.
Terrorists are racing to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons, and we must be racing together to stop them. Reducing the
numbers of U.S.-Russian deployed or deployable strategic forces at some
point in our still distant future is important. The Treaty of Moscow is
important and should be ratified. But if we are to have a future and be
secure in that future, we must first win the race against catastrophic
terrorism--and we must win it on a global scale.
It may be difficult to find champions for the most urgent and
pressing priority of building a global effort to prevent catastrophic
terrorism. If you pursue it and succeed completely, it won't make
anyone's life better, it will just keep millions of lives from becoming
infinitely worse. That is not the kind of message political leaders
like to highlight or voters like to hear. But, this is too serious an
issue for the standard political calculus. In the end, Mr. Chairman, we
all should imagine the awful aftermath of a terrorist nuclear attack on
the United States and imagine, if it happened, what steps we would wish
we had taken to prevent it. Then we should take those steps without
delay.
It is my hope that the Treaty of Moscow will be remembered more as
a hinge in the U.S.-Russian relationship; not an end point, but a
turning point, leading to a transformed security relationship. If it
serves this purpose and propels us on the course of action outlined
above, it will truly be historic and worthy of history's praise.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Curtis.
Dr. Carter.
STATEMENT OF DR. ASHTON B. CARTER, FORD FOUNDATION PROFESSOR OF
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF
GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator. It is a privilege to be
here and to offer you my views on the Moscow Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty. On one hand, it is easy to do,
because I, like virtually every other witness who has appeared
before Senate committees deliberating this matter, support the
treaty. I do so on the basis that it provides for the United
States to make changes in our nuclear forces that are desirable
anyway--on cost and strategic grounds--and does not require us
to change our military capabilities in significant ways. The
treaty, therefore, doesn't require us to make any difficult
tradeoffs in our own capabilities for those required in the
Russian Federation.
On the other hand, the treaty is correspondingly modest in
terms of the limits it places on the Russians. Senator Nunn has
pointed this out most elegantly in his recent testimony before
the Foreign Relations Committee, and I think Charlie Curtis has
as well in the statement he just made.
SORT addresses only a small subset of the overall Russian
nuclear capability, namely strategic weapons. It is silent on
the larger and more dangerous portion of the Soviet nuclear
legacy: tactical weapons, nuclear weapons, and fissile
materials. As far as strategic forces are concerned, as Senator
Nunn pointed out, it addresses numbers and is silent on hair-
trigger operational practices. I would be pleased to answer
questions about the SORT to the best of my ability, but there
is another dimension of this issue that I would like to address
squarely.
The SORT, while it makes a net contribution to our
security, positive in sign though small of magnitude, does not
point to the future or to the nuclear danger that most
threatens the Nation's security. That danger is the potential
acquisition by terrorists of nuclear weapons or fissile
materials, either from Russia or elsewhere. It has been a full
decade since the problem of loss of custody of nuclear weapons
or fissile materials replaced deterrence of Moscow as the
central objective of nuclear policy.
I was privileged to participate in the early deliberations
that led Senators Dick Lugar and Sam Nunn to create the Nunn-
Lugar CTR program--deliberations in which I remember Senator
Bingaman also being centrally involved. I later led that very
program at the Pentagon, and I conducted the Clinton
administration's Nuclear Posture Review with my counterparts in
the Joint Staff. We concluded even then, 8 years ago, that
traditional arms control is no longer the central tool for
dealing with the nuclear danger to the United States. The
Nuclear Posture Review instead focused on stabilizing a chaotic
Russia, expanding the Nunn-Lugar program, and ensuring that of
all the successor states to the Soviet Union only Russia ended
up with all the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons.
While traditional arms controllers criticized that at the
time, events have born out that it was the correct focus. By
any measure, the Nunn-Lugar program has been a tremendous
success. In May, I had the privilege of accompanying Senators
Lugar and Nunn together with Representatives John Spratt and
Chris Shays to sites in Russia where nuclear, chemical,
biological, and ballistic missile threats are being
systematically safeguarded or eliminated altogether. Senator
Bingaman, I would also add, accompanied the other senators and
representatives in the early part of that trip. His schedule
didn't permit him to travel to all of the sites.
These projects that we saw in May were just a gleam in our
eyes a decade ago. Now they are mature engineering projects. At
the G-8 summit, President Bush took an important step in
gaining pledges of other nations, which have just as much at
stake as we do in the so-called 10 plus 10 over 10 plan, and I
applaud that. But in a move that defies all understanding, the
Bush administration has taken a step that is bringing these
projects to a screeching halt.
This administration has failed to make the certifications
required by Congress, certifications that were made every year
by the Bush senior and Clinton administrations. This move
occurs 2 months after President Bush claimed that a new era in
U.S.-Russian relations has begun and 2 months after he signed
the new treaty. It occurs 11 months after al Qaeda proved that
there are no limits to its destructive urges, and considers
acquisition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction, in bin Laden's words, ``a religious duty.'' It
occurs 10 months after President Bush declared that keeping the
most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous
people to be his highest priority. This certification mistake
must be corrected quickly.
I understand that Senators Lugar and Levin have made some
progress in finding interim solutions to this problem. As
Senator Lugar has said, the engineers and program managers
running these valuable programs should not be made to suffer
the ``perils of Pauline'' every year. Russia is the largest
potential source of loose nuclear weapons and fissile material
for terrorists, but it is not the only one. Pakistan and India
built nuclear arsenals to deter their neighbors, but Pakistan's
political future, at the very least, is as uncertain as
Russia's was when the Soviet Union was crumbling.
Less well recognized is that scores of nations--from Serbia
to Ghana--have research reactors fueled by highly enriched
uranium in bomb-capable quantities. Plutonium remains in North
Korea, though under U.S. and international observation, and
even non-nuclear allies such as Japan and Belgium have large
repositories of weapons capable plutonium as a by-product of
their nuclear power program. These caches of fissile material
around the world pose an unacceptable long-term risk to human-
kind. Each is a sleeper cell of potential mass terrorism. Once
a terrorist fashions a bomb, a device like that will be
extremely difficult to detect.
I noticed, by the way, on the basis of my service on the
National Academies of Science panel, which recently reported
its results on science and technology as they apply to
terrorism, that a bomb would be very difficult to detect as it
passes through international borders and shipping containers.
Unlike its dangerous cousin bioterrorism, nuclear terrorism
cannot be countered with vaccines or antibiotics. Once the
material gets out, it is probably too late. The simple
technical fact is that nuclear terrorism can only be
effectively prevented at the source.
Nature, however, has not been totally unkind. Only
governments have produced uranium and plutonium. All these
materials are accordingly in the possession of governments, and
whatever their disagreements about the arsenals in their
possession, all governments should have a profound common
interest in ensuring that these materials do not fall into the
hands of terrorists. The Preventive Defense Project at Harvard
and Stanford, which I co-chair with former Secretary of Defense
William Perry, has in an impressive reprise of their invention
of CTR a decade ago, promoted the concept of a global coalition
against catastrophic terrorism. The coalition concept takes its
cues from the coalition against al Qaeda, and involves all
governments that perceive the common interests of keeping
fissile material away from terrorists, especially those that
have bomb-capable materials. It also calls for including Japan,
China, India, Pakistan, and the many nations I mentioned
earlier that host reactors using nuclear weapons capable fuel.
The coalition would seek to extend the reach of its
activities wherever in the world the means of nuclear terror
are harbored. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, as Charlie Curtis
mentioned earlier, sponsored a conference in Moscow, on May 27,
for American and Russian experts to define a specific agenda of
activities. I have appended the report of that conference and a
summary that I wrote to the Washington Post, and I would
request that both be entered into the record.
Senator Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Dr. Carter. The agenda called for action in prevention,
detection, protection, interdiction, and cleanup. For nuclear
terrorism, it focused on the following actions: first,
establishing common world class standards for inventory
control, safety, and security for weapons and weapons usable
materials, standards of the kind worked out between Russia and
the United States in the Nunn-Lugar program; second,
establishing progressively stronger measures of transparency to
demonstrate to others that the standards are being met; third,
providing assistance to those who need help in meeting the
coalition standards, the Nunn-Lugar program; fourth,
cooperating to provide effective border and export controls
regarding nuclear materials; and fifth, devising cooperative
procedures to define and regain control of bombs or fissile
materials if they are lost or seized by terrorists. One
possibility is a coalition version of the U.S. Department of
Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST); sixth, planning
and researching cooperative responses to a nuclear or
radiological explosion if, God forbid, one occurs, such as
mapping the contaminated area, addressing mass casualties,
administering public health measures or iodine pills, and
cleaning up contaminated soil; and seventh, cooperating on
forensic radio-chemical techniques to find the source of a
nuclear incident from its residue.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is clear to most
of us that the SORT agreement upon which you are deliberating
is probably the last of its kind. Its only parties are Moscow
and Washington. It covers only deployed strategic forces, which
were of paramount importance during the Cold War, but are but a
tip of the nuclear iceberg, and I would suggest that the
concept of a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism as
I have described, and Charlie Curtis described as well, is the
seed of the arms control of the 21st century.
The coalition concept addresses the single most urgent
problem of international security. It just might provide a big
tent for governments that have not participated in much arms
control of the 20th century style--China, India, and Pakistan--
since it is grounded in a deep and obvious common interest. The
United States and Russia should join and spearhead the
coalition. Moreover, doing so would be a fitting next step
after the SORT; and unlike the SORT, the new coalition concept
would provide Presidents Bush and Putin with an opportunity to
give substance to their oft-spoken desire to move to a
qualitatively new phase in relations.
The coalition approach would open up a new and vitally
important front on the war on terrorism. It would extend the
principles of the successful Nunn-Lugar program in a new way
from nuclear materials in Russia to nuclear materials
worldwide, from a U.S. funded program to wider international
participation, and from a focus on putting the Cold War behind
us to focusing on the 21st century's most riveting security
problem. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carter follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Ashton B. Carter
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a privilege to
appear before you to offer my views on the Moscow Treaty on Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).
On the one hand, it is easy to do so: I, like virtually every other
witness that has appeared before Senate committees deliberating on the
treaty, support it. I do so on the basis that the treaty provides for
us to make changes in our nuclear forces that are desirable anyway on
cost and strategic grounds, and it does not constrain our capabilities
in militarily significant ways. The treaty therefore does not require
us to make any difficult tradeoffs of our own capabilities for those
required of the Russian Federation. In terms of the limits it places on
the Russian arsenal, the treaty is correspondingly modest. Former
Senator Sam Nunn has pointed this out most elegantly in his recent
testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee. SORT addresses only a
small subset of the overall Russian nuclear capability--deployed
strategic weapons. It is silent on the larger and more dangerous
portion of the Soviet nuclear legacy--tactical nuclear weapons, reserve
weapons, and fissile materials. As far as the strategic forces are
concerned, Senator Nunn also pointed out that SORT addresses only
numbers and is silent on ``hair-trigger'' operational practices.
I would be pleased to answer questions about the SORT to the best
of my ability. But there is another dimension to this issue that I
would like to address squarely. The SORT, while it makes a net
contribution to our security--positive in sign if small in magnitude--
does not point to the future or to the nuclear danger that most
threatens the Nation's security. That danger is the potential
acquisition by terrorists of nuclear weapons or fissile materials,
either from Russia or elsewhere.
It has been a full decade since loss of custody of nuclear weapons
or fissile materials replaced deterrence of Moscow as the central
objective of U.S. nuclear policy. I was privileged to participate in
the early deliberations that led Senators Dick Lugar and Sam Nunn to
created the Nunn-Lugar CTR program. I later led that very program in
the Pentagon. I conducted the Clinton administration's Nuclear Posture
Review with my counterparts in the Joint Staff. We concluded even then,
8 years ago, that traditional arms control was no longer the central
tool for dealing with nuclear danger to the United States. The Nuclear
Posture Review instead focused on stabilizing a chaotic Russia,
expanding the Nunn-Lugar program, and on ensuring that only Russia
ended up with all the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. While traditional
arms controllers criticized that focus at the time, events have borne
out that it was the correct focus.
By any measure, the Nunn-Lugar program has been a tremendous
success. In May I had the privilege of accompanying Senators Lugar and
Nunn, together with Representatives John Spratt and Chris Shays, to
sites in Russia where nuclear, chemical, biological, and ballistic
missile threats are being systematically safeguarded, or eliminated
altogether. These projects were just a gleam in our eyes a decade ago,
and now they are mature engineering projects. At the G-8 summit,
President Bush took an important step in gaining the pledges of other
nations who have just as much at stake as we do to contribute to the
Nunn-Lugar program, in the so-called ``10 plus 10 over 10'' plan.
In a move that defies all understanding, however, the Bush
administration has taken a step that is bringing these projects to a
screeching halt. This administration has failed to make the
certifications required by Congress, certifications that were made
every year by the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations. This situation
occurs 2 months after President Bush proclaimed a ``new era'' in U.S.-
Russian relations and 2 months after he signed the new SORT arms
control treaty whose implementation would be accelerated by Nunn-Lugar;
it occurs 11 months after al Qaeda showed there are no limits to its
destructive urges and considers acquisition of nuclear weapons ``a
religious duty;'' it occurs 10 months after President Bush declared
that keeping the most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most
dangerous people to be his highest priority. The certification mistake
must be corrected, and quickly. I understand that Senators Lugar and
Levin have made some progress in arranging an interim solution to this
problem, and I hope Congress and the administration can find a more
lasting solution. As Senator Lugar has said, the engineers and program
managers running these valuable programs should not be made to suffer
the ``perils of Pauline'' every year.
Russia is the largest potential source of ``loose'' nuclear weapons
and fissile materials for terrorists, but it is not the only one.
Pakistan and India have built nuclear arsenals to deter their
neighbors, but Pakistan's political future, at the very least, is as
uncertain as was Russia's when the Soviet Union was crumbling and the
Nunn-Lugar program was begun. Less well recognized is that scores of
nations from Serbia to Ghana have research reactors fueled by highly
enriched uranium. Plutonium remains in North Korea, though under U.S.
and international observation. Even non-nuclear allies such as Japan
and Belgium have repositories of weapons-capable plutonium as a
byproduct of their nuclear power programs.
These caches of fissile materials around the world, we now must
realize, pose an unacceptable long-term risk to humankind. Each is a
``sleeper cell'' of potential mass terrorism. Once a terrorist fashions
a bomb, a device will be extremely difficult to detect as it passes
through international borders in, say, shipping containers. Unlike its
dangerous cousin bioterrorism, nuclear terrorism cannot be countered
with vaccines or antibiotics. Once the material gets out, it is
probably too late.
The simple technical fact is that nuclear terrorism can only be
effectively prevented at the source. But here Nature has been kind.
Highly enriched uranium and plutonium are difficult and conspicuous to
produce. Only governments have done so to date, and all these materials
are accordingly in the possession of governments. Whatever their
disagreements about the arsenals in their possession, all governments
should have a profound common interest in ensuring that these materials
do not fall into the hands of terrorists.
The Preventive Defense Project at Harvard and Stanford has
therefore worked to elaborate a concept put forward by Sam Nunn and
Dick Lugar, in an impressive reprise of their invention of CTR a decade
ago--the concept of a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism.
The coalition concept takes its cues from the coalition against al
Qaeda. The coalition would contain all governments that perceive the
profound common interest of keeping fissile materials away from
terrorists, especially those that have bomb-capable materials to
protect or that can make a contribution to safeguarding it, including
Europe, Japan, China, India, Pakistan, and the many nations that host
research reactors using weapons-capable fuel. Each member could make
contributions to the coalition's activities commensurate with its
capabilities and traditions. The coalition would extend the reach of
its activities wherever in the world the means of nuclear terror seek
harbor.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative sponsored a conference in Moscow on
May 27, 2002, where American and Russian experts defined a specific
agenda of activities for the coalition. I have appended the report of
that conference and a summary of the concept I wrote for The Washington
Post to this statement, and I would request that both be entered into
the record with my statement. The agenda called for a global coalition
to combat terrorism in all phases--prevention, detection, protection,
interdiction, and cleanup--focused on the following actions:
Establishing common, ``world-class'' standards for
inventory control, safety, and security for weapons and
weapons-usable materials--standards of the kind worked out
between Russia and the United States in the Nunn-Lugar program.
Establishing progressively stronger standards of
transparency, to demonstrate to others that standards are being
met.
Providing assistance to those who need help meeting
the coalition's standards.
Cooperating to provide effective border and export
controls regarding nuclear materials.
Devising cooperative procedures to find and regain
control of bombs or fissile materials if they are lost or
seized by terrorists. One possibility is a coalition version of
the U.S. Department of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team
(NEST)--a ``global NEST.'' Another possibility is to agree to
facilitate deployment of national NEST teams, in the way that
many nations deploy canine search teams to earthquake sites to
search for survivors.
Planning and researching cooperative responses to a
nuclear or radiological explosion, such as mapping the
contaminated area, addressing mass casualties, administering
public health measures like iodine pills, and cleaning up
contaminated soil.
Cooperating on forensic radio-chemical techniques to
find the source of a nuclear incident from its residue.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is clear to most of
us that the SORT agreement upon which you are deliberating is probably
the last of its kind. Its only parties are Moscow and Washington. It
covers only deployed strategic forces, which were of paramount
importance during the Cold War but are but a tip of the nuclear
terrorism iceberg. I would suggest that the concept of a Global
Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism is the seed of the arms
control of 21st century.
The coalition concept addresses the single most urgent problem of
U.S. national security and international security. It just might
provide a ``big tent'' for governments that have not participated much
in ``arms control'' of the 20th century style--especially China, India,
and Pakistan--since it is grounded in a deep and obvious common
interest. If the United States and Russia jointly spearhead the
coalition, it would be a fitting next step after the SORT and would
provide Presidents Bush and Putin with an opportunity to give substance
to their oft-spoken desire to move to a ``qualitatively new'' phase in
relations.
The coalition approach would open up a new and vitally important
front in the war on terrorism. It would extend the principles of the
successful Nunn-Lugar program in a new way--from nuclear materials in
Russia to nuclear materials worldwide, from a U.S.-funded program to
wider international participation, and from a focus on putting the Cold
War behind us to focusing on the 21st century's most riveting security
problem.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Curtis and Dr.
Carter, for your excellent testimony. Let me ask a few
questions and turn to my colleagues. First, with regard to the
SORT, you both realize that in its deliberations the Senate can
include conditions and understandings in the resolution of
ratification. I wonder if there is anything that you would
suggest either at this moment or if you need some time in
writing that might be properly included as a condition or
reservation or statement with respect to the SORT. Mr. Curtis?
Mr. Curtis. Mr. Chairman, I think I will take that
opportunity to submit it to the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Witness declined to respond in writing to the committee.
Senator Reed. Dr. Carter.
Dr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, I may give that some additional
thought, but one thing that comes to mind immediately that I
mentioned in my statement is that implementing this treaty on
the Russian side will be facilitated and accelerated by the
Nunn-Lugar program. It does seem to me that solving this
problem with certifications, which has so unfortunately held
things up this year and giving some permanent disposition to
that matter, ought to be part of the deliberation surrounding
this treaty.
Senator Reed. Following up on that, Dr. Carter, with
respect to the failure to certify, can you illuminate from your
own perspective what is going on?
Dr. Carter. I have the following impression, which is from
the outside looking in, and that is that the senior leadership
of the administration was in fact surprised to find that this
move had been taken. It arose at lower levels, and left them in
a situation where big projects that are under way, buildings
being built, sites being cleared, arsenals being prepared to
enter into the facilities where the weapons will be destroyed,
all this was coming to a halt because somebody did not feel a
certification that had been made for 10 consecutive previous
years could be made this year. It is also my understanding that
the senior leadership is trying to get on top of it, but that
is a view from the outside looking in.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Dr. Carter. One of the aspects of
the SORT of concern, and again I think it is quite clear that
it will be virtually unanimously adopted, is the presence of
reversibility. It is so easy to do nothing for any number of
years and simply let the treaty lapse. Any thoughts about
things that might be done to make these reductions in warheads
difficult to reverse? Mr. Curtis.
Mr. Curtis. Senators, in my formal testimony I suggested
that we should identify the forces that we intend to schedule
for meeting the reductions in the treaty, and that should be a
transparent document and planned for and monitored through the
transparency mechanisms that are yet to be developed under the
Bilateral Implementation Commission. I think that the Senate
could expect to see that schedule laid out and transparency
mechanisms put in place.
I would hope that the Senate would avail itself of the
understandings authority in its treaty ratification
responsibility, rather than making more formal reservations to
the treaty. I also think, as I called for in other testimony,
that we could lay out specific warheads and an explicit
schedule for this matter. If that were laid out, I think it
would help to build confidence in the relationship between the
two nations, and in the larger sense, give the world community
some assurance that both sides are actually reducing their
strategic forces. The vocabulary in this treaty is, of course,
curious, because it talks about reductions of arms, but the
substance of the treaty does not require that. It only
addresses operationally deployed weapons. There are two ways of
getting real meaning to reductions of arms. One of those is to
get about the dismantling process, and the other is to lay out
the schedule of how you are going to meet this treaty in a
transparent way. This is necessary so that the treaty is not a
single point in time some 12 years distant, but a treaty that
ushers in a plan that will build down these forces in the
interim between now and 2012.
I think that would help both sides trust that we are
actually serious about the intentions stated in this treaty,
which are very elegantly stated in what I call the vision
statement that is the joint statement of the two presidents
that will come between the treaty.
Senator Reed. Dr. Carter.
Dr. Carter. Two thoughts very briefly; first is that Mr.
Curtis suggested, and I wholeheartedly concur, that it will be
valuable for both sides to do what we arranged in the START I
context in the early 1990s, something called early
deactivation, whereby one undertakes to take off alert
immediately weapons slated for elimination under the treaty.
In our system, and, we learned, in the Ukrainian and
Kazakhstani systems through the Nunn-Lugar program, once you
deactivate, you stop maintenance and life extension programs
and you put yourself on a glide slope where it becomes more and
more difficult to have the weapon's life preserved.
The second thing, of course, is that if we continue the
Nunn-Lugar program, and continue to eliminate strategic
launchers the way we have done in Russia, that is a pretty
dramatic demonstration of irreversibility. I was in Kartaly,
Russia in May, and as I mentioned earlier we used 3,000 pounds
of explosives under the Nunn-Lugar program to blow up an SS-18
silo, and I will tell you it looks pretty irreversible even
from half a mile away on a viewing stand. You get that because
you have an understanding with the Russians and an agreement
which provides for it. You get it because you have some rules
in START for what destruction means. Above all, you get it
because you are in a cooperative mode under the Nunn-Lugar
program and you get to do it with your own hands and watch it
with your own eyes.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Bingaman.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much. Let me summarize
what I have gleaned in terms of concrete steps that we, our
administration, and our government could be taking right now to
actually follow through in dealing with some of these difficult
problems. One is the certification that is required under Nunn-
Lugar. That could be fixed today if the will were there in the
White House to fix it.
Second, is the publishing of the schedule of how we are
going to go ahead and comply with SORT. That is something that
we should be doing unilaterally, urging the Russians to do the
same thing unilaterally, but there is no requirement as I
understand it under SORT for some kind of mutual negotiation
before that occurs. Am I right about that?
Mr. Curtis. That is my understanding, Senator.
Senator Bingaman. So we could be publishing a schedule
about how we are going to go forth complying with SORT. A third
item that both of you mentioned is that President Bush could do
what his father did and order the immediate stand down of
forces that have been identified for reduction as soon as we
make that schedule or publish that schedule of reduction, which
I think would be a very positive step. Mr. Curtis, you referred
to the possibility of us moving ahead with dismantlement of
excess weapons, and you indicated the Department of Energy
probably could set out an explicit schedule for beginning the
dismantlement of some excess weapons. Could you elaborate on
the extent of the excess weapons you believe might be promptly
considered for dismantlement, both on our side and on the
Russian side, and any obstacles to getting this done if the
will were there to do it?
Mr. Curtis. Senator, I think that with the next panel you
will discover that there is probably already in the planning
process a schedule for weapons elimination, and they would be
the better witnesses. Some weapon types, the B-53 for example,
have been taken out of the stockpile. That is a 10 megaton
weapon that certainly can be scheduled for elimination, and it
would have important symbolic value. I believe the W-62 has now
been released as well. That can be scheduled for elimination.
What I have tried to say is that we should start to get
about this process and lay out an explicit schedule. It is
going to take a long time. Campaigns to eliminate warheads take
considerable planning time. Quite obviously, it has to be done
safely and carefully, and it also competes for occupying the
lines with the life extension program and refurbishment of
weapons. That is an ongoing part of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program, so I want to emphasize it is a complicated piece of
business, but it certainly is capable of being planned for and
laid out in considerable detail in an advanced schedule that
can give this committee and others confidence it will get the
job done.
Senator Bingaman. Dr. Carter, do you have any comment on
that?
Dr. Carter. I think your list is comprehensive and right
on. If I could add one item to it, Senator, I would like to
request that the administration show us a road map or begin the
process of discussion about what the next step is after this
treaty. As I indicated, and I think just about everybody that I
talked to agrees with me, this is the end of the road for the
Washington-Moscow style of arms control. One cannot conceive of
another treaty because one doesn't conceive of Washington and
Moscow together being the core of the nuclear problem going
forward.
As I said, even if we are just talking about Washington and
Moscow, we are working in a tiny corner of the arsenals,
deployed strategic weapons, and we have not addressed all the
rest. The big problem in the future is less nuclear weapons in
the possession of governments than nuclear weapons in the
possession of nongovernments. These are big things to think
about. To me, I am uncomfortable with the idea of marching
through the 21st century with just this treaty, which is so
clearly the end of the road.
Senator Bingaman. Let me ask each of you if you have any
additional thoughts as to how we move ahead with this problem
of getting an inventory of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia.
Is this something that we just continue to request the Russians
do, or are there things, concrete actions that we can take that
will facilitate or incentivize this and bring this about one
way or another? It seems to me ever since I have been hearing
about this set of issues and working with others here to deal
with it, the problem of not knowing the extent of the tactical
nuclear weapons arsenal in Russia has been one of the central
concerns. I do not see them as making progress in resolving it.
Do you have a plan on how we can get it resolved?
Dr. Carter. I do not know if ``plan'' is the right word--
perhaps concept. In 1994, when the Russian defense minister
came here and met with President Clinton in the Roosevelt Room,
we were pressing him on this very matter of a confidential
exchange of stockpile information, and the point he made then,
which I think essentially continues to animate the Russian
military, is that in this period of conventional weakness they
rely more on tactical nuclear weapons. They do not want to see
tactical nuclear weapons, therefore, swept up in the maw of
arms control and limited in this way. That is at least one
important reason why they are reluctant to do this.
I think that President Putin might be induced to engage in
some transparency regarding tactical nuclear weapons if one
changed the stage from U.S.-Russia arms control. Let us
initially talk about our tactical nuclear weapons not with some
idea of mutual reduction in mind, but instead in the context of
this coalition against catastrophic terrorism that I referred
to earlier. We might say to Putin, ``look, we, the United
States and you, have an important interest in getting everybody
else to explain what they have and protect what they have.''
We do not think the Indians and Pakistanis ought to have
nuclear weapons, but let us set that aside and say, ``if you
have it, protect it,'' and we will ask for transparency around
the world. In that context, Russia is really getting something
for divulging information about its own arsenal. It doesn't
need us to divulge what we have, and therefore it has no
incentive for data exchange in this bilateral context. It gets
back to my previous point about enlarging the scene here. We
are not going to get anything done in the axis between
Washington and Moscow anymore. The world's affairs do not run
in that axis anymore. They used to, and they do not now.
Mr. Curtis. If I could just add briefly, I am not sure I
share Dr. Carter's judgment that this is the end of the U.S.-
Russian negotiated agreement regime. The tactical weapons
certainly could be the subject of a bilateral agreement between
the two. Secretary Powell very clearly laid out before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there may be agreements
that would substitute for the Treaty of Moscow earlier than its
end point of 2012, or extensions thereafter. So there is
certainly within the contemplation of this agreement between
the two sides, the suggestion that there may be further
refinement of the U.S. security--Russian security relationship
through treaty means.
Second, as to your question on tactical nuclear weapons, I
think the process of establishing this consultative group for
strategic security, which involves the defense ministers of
both countries in periodic meeting, is an important procedural
mechanism for getting at this issue. Secretary Rumsfeld has
said that tactical nuclear weapons are going to be foremost on
that agenda.
I think Congress should not reinforce in any formal way
with this treaty a new U.S.-Russian security relationship, but
certainly reinforce that as a priority and a test, as I said in
my earlier remarks. If it lives up to its promise in the joint
statement, then the U.S. and Russia ought to be able to provide
for an accountability of tactical weapons as it has escaped
them in the past, so this will be an important test of that
relationship.
Obviously, there are things that might be engaged in this
that would involve a broader security relationship, but I don't
think it would be particularly useful to Secretary Powell and
Secretary Rumsfeld for me to suggest exactly how they should do
it.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you both very much.
Senator Reed. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. Dr. Carter and Mr. Curtis, it
is great to see you both. The questions that I came with this
morning run along the same lines as my colleagues. So maybe I
will begin by recounting a conversation I had with somebody
here recently on the Hill and get your reaction to it in broad
terms. This person said to me that the more he learned about
SORT, the more it seemed to him like an empty vessel. I think
that this feeling has grown here, although everybody believes
the treaty will be ratified overwhelmingly, if not unanimously.
Perhaps it has been implicit in the questions that have been
asked in your statements, but is this an empty vessel?
Mr. Curtis. I think it is a step, but this step alone would
not provide meaningfully for our security. This step must be
followed by other steps, which I have tried to lay out in my
testimony. I think, at least in Secretary Powell's testimony,
there is the suggestion that it is very much on his agenda that
there will be follow-on steps to this treaty. I think it is an
important step. It has symbolic value at the very least, which
in the world of U.S.-Russian relationships has always been, and
is maybe now, especially important. This treaty is clearly
important on the Russian side, and is important for us if it
propels us to redefine our relationship with Russia, so that it
becomes a genuine partnership. It is not yet a partnership, but
it must become a genuine partnership to address these security
concerns that are concerns of both nations and are indeed
concerns for global security. If that happens, then this treaty
will have a real historical value because of what it was a
catalyst to do.
Senator Lieberman. Dr. Carter.
Dr. Carter. I would agree with that. It is not an empty
vessel. I think it is an important step, and we all need to be
thinking and helping the administration figure out what the
next step is and where that next step might go. I also agree
with Mr. Curtis' comments about the symbolic value in Russia
and the meaningful partnership. I believe that in this context
the kind of coalition concept that I have been talking about in
regards to a U.S.-Russian partnership can become real.
We have talked a lot about partnership in the last decade.
I had a million meetings and attended summits and so forth in
which partnership was declared again and again. The question is
are we really partners, besides dismantling the Cold War, which
is an important task. This is a step in that direction.
Where else can we be partners with Russia? I think we can
also be partners in facing this problem of nuclear weapons that
are not ours or theirs, but somebody else's, because we share a
common interest in doing so. We have wrestled with these
problems of nuclear dangers for decades and have some thoughts
that others might be induced to share because we have the
technical knowledge about how to safeguard and destroy them. So
here's a topic where the United States and Russia might
actually have a substantive partnership and we might actually
benefit from working with Russia. If we could turn our arms
control dialogue with Russia from one about each other to one
about everybody, that opens up a whole new front of
constructive activity that would give real substance to
partnership.
Senator Lieberman. We still have to deal with one another,
and there is an oddity to that. It seems unconnected to the
present and the future, which is to say that the dominant
relationship in the world is no longer the Soviet- or Russian-
American relationship. The greatest security fears going
forward are more global than bilateral, and yet the fact is
that as a carryover from the Cold War, both Russia and the
United States still possess a disproportionate, overwhelming
percentage of strategic nuclear weapons.
So this is a holdover from the last century. You have to
deal with that, as well as reaching forward. In saying this was
the last treaty, I am sure you are not denying that reality.
Dr. Carter. No. I want to make clear that it is not my wish
that it be the last. It is my prediction, as I look out and see
how people stack up the priorities. I don't think having
another U.S.-Russian arms control agreement focused on just us
is going to make the cut. I would be happy to support such an
agreement if it could be negotiated. You are absolutely right.
As we march forward and deal with the problems of the 21st
century, we are not going to be able to do that successfully
unless we contend with this huge overhang. It involves nuclear,
chemical, biological, and ballistic missiles. There is a big
effort there, and that is what the Nunn-Lugar program is about.
Senator Lieberman. One of the several very hopeful articles
in the treaty, and one that is interesting to me, is article 3.
Article 3 states that for purposes of implementing this treaty,
the parties shall hold meetings of a Bilateral Implementation
Commission at least twice a year. Do you have any thoughts
about how the Senate might play an active role in giving some
substance and authority to that commission, perhaps as a
bilateral jump-off point to the global security concerns that
you have both been talking about, or attempting to focus on the
next phase of Russian-American nuclear threat reduction?
Mr. Curtis. Senator, there are two devices under the
treaty. One is the Bilateral Implementation Commission, and the
other is the consultative group for strategic security, which I
mentioned, that is composed of four minister level officials.
Obviously, the consultative group has the rank for policy.
I think the administration needs to address this, but I took
the bilateral commission to be more of a working group or
technical body.
Senator Lieberman. At a lower level?
Mr. Curtis. Yes, at a lower level. If the Senate wishes to
address the U.S.-Russian relationship, that should be charged
with the consultative group for strategic security.
Dr. Carter. I would agree with that. I would hope that the
Senate would so charge the consultative group. This is too
important a topic to drop, and the implementation of the
details of this agreement, while important, is not the whole
story.
Mr. Curtis. If I might add one thing, I think it is very
regrettable that the press and the political world have not
well noted what was accomplished in the G-8. The commitment to
unified action by the G-8, where Russia in the document is
identified as a full partner with the acknowledgment of the
work that is beginning in Russia on a six-point program, is a
very significant joining of interests of the G-8 members. The
recognition that that must be extended to the global community,
and of gaining that pledge of the $10 billion match of U.S.
funds to serve that partnership, is also a significant
accomplishment of this administration and should be well
credited. What we need to do is to build on that successful
effort, and encourage U.S.-Russian participation in that
context to expand it to the full dimension of a global
coalition of the kind that Senators Nunn and Lugar and Dr.
Carter have been discussing.
Senator Lieberman. I agree. Perhaps in the Senate's
consideration of SORT we can give more visibility and
encouragement to what came out of the G-8. Thank you very much
to both of you. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much for your excellent
testimony, Mr. Curtis and Dr. Carter. We will carefully
consider what you said and make some improvements in the
situation. Let me thank you both and release you, and ask if
the second panel could now come forward. [Pause.]
Let me now welcome the second panel, which consists of
Admiral Ellis, the Commander in Chief of United States
Strategic Command, and Dr. Everet Beckner, the Deputy
Admisistrator for Defense Programs NNSA. I expect nothing less
than insightful testimony today. Let me at this time turn to
Senator Warner for any opening comments.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you. I wish to welcome our witnesses.
I know them both, and I have known Admiral Ellis for many
years. I have vivid memories of times we shared together during
some pretty stressful chapters of the Balkan conflict when he
served as our NATO Commander, South with great distinction in a
great period of American history. I welcome you this morning
and once again thank you for your continued service in uniform
to our nation.
The hearing our committee held last week with Secretary
Rumsfeld and Chairman Myers confirmed my belief, and I think
all these reasonable perspectives, that this is an excellent
treaty. The Moscow Treaty represents a significant step forward
for the security of the world.
It is a very simple, straightforward treaty. I have had
some moderate experience in this area. I will state for the
record that I was with President Nixon in 1972 when we went to
Moscow to execute the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and
other arms control agreements. That is a long time ago. I
witnessed through these many years that I have been privileged
to serve in the Senate and prior thereto in the Department of
Defense in arduous negotiations that had to be undertaken with
the Soviet Union, subsequently Russia. But this time, two heads
in government got together and bridged old differences and
achieved this treaty, and I commend both our President and
President Putin.
In essence, this treaty reduces U.S. and Russian strategic
arsenals by two-thirds over the next decade. There are no
complicated accounting rules or detailed verification regimes.
The treaty recognizes the new relationship between the United
States and Russia, and allows both parties the flexibility to
decide how and when the required reductions are to be made.
Could the treaty have dealt with other issues? Of course. But
they had a mission and they kept their eye on that goal.
The Moscow Treaty establishes a firm foundation for our
future relations with Russia, a foundation that we will build
in years ahead. I still find implicit in this treaty the famous
Ronald Reagan doctrine, ``trust but verify.'' In my judgment,
there are sufficient verification procedures to protect both
parties to the treaty. I note that all who participated in our
committee's hearing last Thursday, Senators and witnesses
alike, acknowledged that the United States must continue its
efforts.
The Moscow Treaty is a strategic nuclear arms treaty, and
no one can reasonably expect diplomatic achievement to address
all these difficult issues. This treaty is one step in the
process of improving our security and relationships with
Russia. This treaty is not only built on a new relationship
with Russia, but it reinforces that relationship and provides a
sound basis on which to perceive further steps. We are here
today to explore and work out the detail and the merits of the
Moscow Treaty.
Our witnesses are uniquely qualified to comment on the
military implications of the treaty and the military
requirements that drove the treaty's structure and the reasons
for the flexibility provided in the terms of the treaty. Thank
you.
Senator Reed. Admiral Ellis.
STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to
be back with you, Senator Warner, and other distinguished
members of the committee. As the Senator so generously noted,
this is my third appearance before you on issues related to
national strategic nuclear issues in the last 8 months. It is a
pleasure to be back before you today to offer my views on the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.
As we all recall, on May 24, President Bush declared on
reaching this agreement that it was a historic and hopeful day
for Russia, America, and the world. I certainly share the
President's optimism and his hopes for the future. I certainly
support fully the President's goal of drawing down our
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the lowest
level consistent with national security needs.
In a real sense, this is a unique treaty, but it is the
right treaty at the right time. It codifies, as we all
understand, results of a process begun over a year ago in the
form of the Nuclear Posture Review, a process in which United
States Strategic Command was fully involved and whose inputs
were fully considered. As we all recall, the Nuclear Posture
Review proposed a dramatic two-thirds reduction in the levels
of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and also,
I think, more effectively addressed the broader issue of
deterrent requirements in the new construct in the new
international security environment and the challenges that our
Nation faces.
This treaty allows me, as the commander of the Nation's
strategic forces, the latitude to structure our strategic
forces to better support the national security pillars of
assuring our allies, dissuading those who might wish us ill,
deterring potential adversaries, and, if necessary, defending
the Nation. I am here to convey to you that in my judgment this
treaty provides me the ability to prudently meet those national
security needs and provide a range of deterrent options to the
Secretary and President for their consideration, should the
need arise.
Most importantly, it gives me the flexibility to deal with
the uncertainty that is an inherent part or consideration as we
look to the future. It gives me flexibility with regard to the
specific details of that drawdown, the composition of our
Nation's nuclear stockpile as we drawdown in size, the ability
to hedge against the possibility of technological surprise as
our stockpile ages in the future, the ability to deal with the
potential for a changing international security environment,
should it arise, and it also allows me the flexibility to take
the dual-use platforms, these strategic platforms that have
such important tactical applications, and transform them in
support of the Nation's security needs in a broader way. That
includes the conversion of SSBNs to SSGNs.
It includes the retaining of a bomber force that also
provides a very capable conventional capability that is so much
a part of our ongoing efforts in the global war on terrorism,
and will likely be a part of any future security challenges
that the Nation faces. Finally, it allows me to take missiles
and convert those to space launch applications should the need
arise.
I wish to thank the committee for the opportunity to appear
side-by-side with Dr. Beckner. As he notes in his statement,
and I in mine, our organizations are partners in the
challenging and promising journey ahead, and the NNSA and its
success is the key to our own success from a deterrent
perspective.
I express my continuing appreciation for the support this
committee has provided to the men and women of the United
States Strategic Command and its antecedent organizations who
have provided stewardship over the Nation's nuclear
capabilities.
I understand there is only one military commander who
directly oversees our Nation's strategic forces. I am humbled
that the task has been assigned to me, and I am honored to be
able to convey to you today my full support for the Moscow
Treaty and recommend its ratification as proposed. I thank you
for your consideration and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis follows:]
Prepared Statement by Adm. James O. Ellis, USN
Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of the
committee:
It is an honor to appear before you once again representing the
outstanding men and women of United States Strategic Command and our
Nation's strategic forces. You have asked me to share with you my
professional military assessment of the Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty. Earlier in the year, I
appeared before this committee to discuss the Nuclear Posture Review,
and I now welcome the opportunity to address this treaty which codifies
the President's decision to significantly reduce operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads. This historic treaty represents the most
recent milestone in a journey toward a new and more positive
relationship with Russia within a dramatically changed strategic
environment.
I am pleased to convey to you today my strong support for the
Moscow Treaty. The global security environment has evolved in new and
unexpected ways over the last 10 years. I believe that properly shaping
the strategic environment as we draw down our deployed stockpile over
the next ten years, and beyond, will require both constructive
engagement and increased adaptive flexibility in appropriately
structuring our strategic forces. This treaty is a step towards meeting
those national security needs. While recent events have highlighted new
dangers, on the positive side of the ledger our historical Cold War
enemy, the Soviet Union, has disappeared. Its place has been taken by a
renewed Russia, with the stated goal of transforming into a peaceful,
democratic, free-market nation. Today, as a Nation, we have more in
common with Russia than we have lingering differences, and for the
first time in my lifetime we face similar shared global challenges and
not each other. The Moscow Treaty acknowledges this new relationship
and the increasing trust and flexibility each nation seeks as we
address the changing security requirements of the 21st century.
military sufficiency
The Moscow Treaty will allow the United States to sustain a
credible deterrent with the lowest possible level of operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads consistent with our national
security requirements and obligations to our allies. This lower level,
1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, is
roughly one-third the level specified in the START Treaty. Our country
faces an array of security challenges that differ dramatically from our
Cold War past. The Moscow Treaty will permit me, as the commander of
our strategic forces, to prudently plan and anticipate a broad range of
possible scenarios. As we look to the future, our planning necessarily
includes adaptively positioning and posturing our strategic forces to
meet the unique deterrent and security challenges posed by rogue
states, non-state actors, and unknown adversaries yet to come. The
Nuclear Posture Review and the Moscow Treaty allow warhead reductions
reflective of our emerging relationship with Russia while enabling the
Department of Defense to plan and prepare for a broader range of
strategic options to present to the Secretary of Defense and the
President.
If unforeseen circumstances arise, either through a decline in the
safety and reliability of our aging stockpile or the emergence of
unexpected new threats, this treaty allows the United States to react
appropriately in response to our changing security needs. In short,
under the Moscow Treaty we can militarily meet our deterrence needs, be
prepared for a range of technological or security uncertainties, while
continuing to encourage a relationship of trust, cooperation, and
friendship with Russia that can lead to ever larger diplomatic,
economic, and security benefits for us all.
flexibility
From a military perspective, a primary benefit of this innovative
arms control agreement is its flexibility, which is achieved in several
new ways. The Moscow Treaty allows each side to determine an
appropriate pace for reducing operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads enroute to significantly lower codified levels. As we
implement the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and develop a broader range
of advanced conventional forces, new defenses, and renewed
infrastructure, we must be able to carefully draw down the right number
and mix of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads based on
actual and anticipated need. This approach acknowledges the
uncertainties associated with sustaining an aging stockpile, and
permits the best sequencing of life extension and dismantlement
programs according to military necessity and the capabilities of the
supporting Department of Energy infrastructure.
Under the Moscow Treaty the United States has the option of storing
those warheads not operationally deployed. As a result of decisions
made over a decade ago, the United States is the only nuclear power in
the world today that does not possess a nuclear warhead production
capability. From a military perspective, it is essential that we retain
the capability to respond to emerging threats or weapon safety and
reliability issues. Under these circumstances, the storing of an
appropriate number of non-deployed nuclear warheads provides an
important weapon reliability and contingency response capability that
will allow us to meet national security needs over the life of the
treaty.
While we will continue to follow START I counting rules, one
important aspect of this treaty is that the actual deployed warheads
are counted rather than assigning notional numbers to each potential
delivery platform. This construct allows the United States to retain,
reduce, or restructure critical dual-use weapons delivery platforms--
those that also can employ conventional weapons--so as to meet a
broader range of military requirements. Specifically, the provisions of
the Moscow Treaty will enable the United States to pursue
transformational concepts such as modifying Trident submarines for
conventional missions. The agreement will also permit us to properly
size and configure the bomber force, which continues to prove its value
in the skies over Afghanistan.
verification
A dramatic reflection of the emerging strategic relationship with
Russia is the absence of unique verification provisions in the Moscow
Treaty. The comprehensive verification regime of the START Treaty will
remain in force until at least December 2009, providing a solid
foundation for continued confidence-building and improved transparency.
But, in a real sense, the Moscow Treaty formalizes a weapon drawdown
that reflects the declared interest and intent of both parties.
Rather than unnecessarily focus on inspection and compliance, we
have an opportunity to forge a relationship, which may encourage even
further cooperation, transparency, and trust. At United States
Strategic Command, we are beginning important steps toward this goal in
order to complement the efforts of the Consultative Group for Strategic
Security created under the Joint Declaration on May 24, and the Moscow
Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission. As a new initiative, I
have recently added a senior State Department political advisor to my
staff, who will bring valuable experience and expertise to the Command
as we continue to work with our Russian counterparts. As part of the
Defense Department's engagement program, we have also reinvigorated the
Command's military-to-military security cooperation program and
submitted detailed 1, 5, and 10-year goals to incrementally broaden the
exchange of information, develop new relationships, and help preserve
strategic stability. When the United States Strategic Command and the
United States Space Command unite on October 1, 2002, the new unified
command will have the opportunity to expand this program to even wider
participation across the spectrum of global military missions.
This emerging and positive relationship will also permit the United
States and Russia to address issues and challenges that are important,
but appropriately not addressed in this treaty. Tactical nuclear
weapons remain a concern and will be addressed in future consultations
and engagements. The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense have
each indicated to the Senate they intend to use the upcoming
discussions with their counterparts to continue the dialogue on this
issue. In regards to the dismantlement of unneeded warheads, the
different approaches taken by both parties in pursuit of this shared
goal are appropriately reflective of their individual circumstances and
capabilities. Having chosen a decade ago to forego weapon production,
the United States' dismantlement effort is paced by long term stockpile
reliability and potential national security needs. Russia
simultaneously sustains an active production and disassembly capability
and has a broader range of weapon and nuclear material security
concerns. The continued support provided by the Nunn-Lugar CTR program,
as part of a larger international effort, remains essential to the
success of improved Russian counter-proliferation efforts.
conclusion
The Moscow Treaty is a positive milestone early in our strategic
journey toward a new partnership with Russia, and formalized the
decisions made by the nation's civilian leadership. As the Secretary of
Defense highlighted recently before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, this treaty provides all of the benefits attributed to arms
control agreements--dialogue, consultations, lower force levels,
predictability, stability, and transparency--without the need for
extensive and adversarial negotiations and debates over compliance and
enforcement issues. Under the Moscow Treaty, our nation can accomplish
its essential military force re-structuring, meet its anticipated
critical national security needs, and retain the ability to react to
the inevitable unexpected challenges yet to come. I fully support this
treaty.
As always, I must also express my appreciation for your continued
support of the men and women of United States Strategic Command and the
unique and essential contributions they continue to make to our
Nation's security.
Thank you, and I welcome your questions.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral Ellis.
Dr. Beckner.
STATEMENT OF DR. EVERET H. BECKNER, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Beckner. Senator Reed and members of the committee, it
is a pleasure to be here this morning to review the Moscow
Treaty and its implication for the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and its vital work to support a safe,
secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile.
Before proceeding, I ask that my entire written statement
be included in the hearing record.
Senator Reed. Without objection.
Dr. Beckner. I'd also like to take this opportunity to
thank the committee and the Senate for its strong support for
the President's 2003 request. The Senate bill will allow NNSA
to pursue its important national security mission in non-
proliferation, stockpile stewardship, and naval reactors.
The NNSA fully supports the terms of the proposed Moscow
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. It enhances national
security and international stability by making dramatic
reductions in the number of deployed nuclear warheads.
The treaty requires that both the U.S. and the Russian
Federation reduce strategic nuclear warheads to the level
between 1,700 and 2,000 warheads each by 2012. This is nearly a
two-thirds cut in the deployed U.S. strategic arsenal. This
reduction is consistent with conclusions reached by the
administration in the recent Nuclear Posture Review. The treaty
also provides the United States with the flexibility to
maintain a ``responsive force'' for use as a hedge against
unexpected changes to the international security environment or
technical issues arising in the smaller, deployed nuclear
weapons stockpile.
Key to ensuring the long-term safety, security, and
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile is NNSA's
Stockpile Stewardship Program and more specifically for
purposes of this hearing, its life extension work on various
weapons including at this time the W-87, the W-76, the W-80,
and the B-61. Life extension activities on the W-87 involve
structural upgrades. Work on the W-76 involves a comprehensive
overhaul of the warhead. We will also be requalifying the
weapon primary. For the W-80, we will be replacing the
trajectory sensing signal and neutron generators. For the B-61,
we will be refurbishing it. These developments were revalidated
by the Nuclear Posture Review.
While the total number of warheads to be refurbished in the
future stockpile may be less than currently planned,
maintaining the life extension schedule is vital to fulfilling
NNSA commitments to the Department of Defense, restoring lost
production capabilities, and recruiting and retaining technical
expertise needed for the long-term.
Once completed, it will ensure that these weapons will
remain safe, secure, and reliable in the U.S. nuclear deterrent
for an additional 30 years.
It is not unreasonable to think that as both countries
progress to lower numbers of operationally deployed strategic
warheads, the President may opt to retire and subsequently
dismantle warheads. Once that decision is made, the NNSA will
begin the detailed planning process needed to ensure that
Pantex and the Y-12 plants in particular can safely and
securely dismantle weapons. Planning for a dismantlement
campaign typically takes several years since we must safely and
securely handle the thousands of parts that will be generated
by the process. The industrial process at the plants have to be
defined, the hazards analyzed, and NNSA safety authorization
basis must be approved. Transportation, storage, and
disposition must be arranged, both for the weapons prior to
dismantlement, and for the waste streams resulting from the
dismantled activities.
The dismantlement begins with the arrival of the weapons at
the Pantex plant. Upon arrival, the weapon undergoes receipt
inspection. The dismantlement is complete when the weapon
primary High Explosive (HE) is separated from the special
nuclear material. The HE is disposed of at the Pantex plant by
burning consistent with environmental regulations.
The special nuclear material is handled through the
Material Disposition Program. Some special nuclear material
components may be retained for possible reuse in the future,
and subassemblies containing highly enriched uranium are
returned to the Y-12 plant. The pace of this disassembly work
at Pantex is slow because we have completed dismantlement of
the majority of the retired warheads. Ongoing dismantlement
work includes the W-79 and Army artillery shell that has been
under dismantlement for several years. In addition, the W-56
disassembly is under way and will continue through fiscal year
2005. The disassembly of the B-53 and some excess B-61
nonstrategic bombs will begin soon. The NPR reaffirmed that the
W-62 will be retired by 2009.
In conclusion, NNSA recommends that the Senate exercise its
advice and consent and ratify the proposed treaty on strategic
offensive reductions. The Moscow Treaty stands as an example of
the emerging relationship between the United States and the
Russian Federation, a relationship based on trust and
cooperation, rather than Cold War confrontation.
I will be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Beckner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Everet H. Beckner
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be
here this morning to review the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive
Reductions and its implications for the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and its vital work to support a safe, secure, and
reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. The NNSA fully supports the terms
of the Moscow Treaty because it enhances the U.S. national security and
international stability by making dramatic reductions in the number of
deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The treaty requires both the U.S.
and the Russian Federation to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads
to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012. This
represents nearly a two-thirds cut in the deployed U.S. strategic
arsenal. This reduction is consistent with the conclusions reached by
the administration in the recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The
treaty provides the United States with the flexibility to maintain an
important hedge against unforeseen changes in the international
environment or technical issues in the smaller, enduring nuclear weapon
stockpile. The NNSA strongly endorses Senate advice and consent to
ratification of the treaty as submitted.
policy overview
NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program is working today to ensure
that the Nation's nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, and reliable. NNSA
was an active participant in the Department of Defense's Nuclear
Posture Review. Several conclusions of the NPR are of particular
relevance to the NNSA.
First, nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, remain a key
element of U.S. national security strategy. The NPR reaffirms that
NNSA's science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program is necessary to
ensure the safety and reliability of the smaller, less diverse nuclear
stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. This includes surveillance
of our aging weapons, weapons refurbishment, chemistry and metallurgy
of materials aging, detailed understanding of weapons physics, and
development of additional diagnostic, and predictive tools for long-
term stewardship. It also includes refurbishments and Life Extension
Programs for the current stockpile, as required and coordinated with
the DOD. Several NNSA initiatives endorsed by the NPR include enhanced
test readiness and revitalization of advanced concepts work.
Second, more than any previous review, the NPR's concept of a New
Triad emphasizes the importance of a robust, responsive research and
development and industrial base. This calls for a modern nuclear
weapons complex, including planning for a Modern Pit Facility, and new
tritium production to provide the Nation with the means to respond to
new, unexpected, or emerging threats to U.S. national security in a
timely manner.
NNSA sees this as recognition of the importance of its mission,
facilities, and personnel. It is an enormous responsibility to maintain
the enduring stockpile and to dismantle warheads determined to be
excess to national security requirements. The NNSA and the DOD have
developed a credible, realistic plan to meet the President's direction
for a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile, all while reducing the
numbers of strategic warheads consistent with the NPR and the Moscow
Treaty.
life extension programs (lep)
A key element of ensuring a safe and reliable stockpile for the
next 30 years is the Life Extension Program for selected elements of
the nuclear stockpile. The NNSA has validated requirements from the
President through the joint NNSA/DOD Nuclear Weapons Council to extend
the service life of the W-87, W-76, and W-80 warheads and the B-61
strategic bomb. These requirements were revalidated by the Nuclear
Posture Review. The life extension work will involve the entire weapons
complex. The Kansas City Plant will manufacture the non-nuclear
components; Y-12 National Security Complex will refurbish the
secondaries; Savannah River Tritium Facility will supply the gas
transfer systems; Sandia National Laboratory will produce the neutron
generators and certify all non nuclear components; Pantex Plant will
serve as the central point for all assembly and disassembly operations
in support of the refurbishment work; and Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore will continue to certify nuclear warhead design performance.
The W-87 refurbishment is well underway, with over 60 percent of
the planned quantity complete and delivered to the Air Force. The
program achieved First Production Unit (FPU) in the second quarter of
fiscal year 1999. The ongoing work at Pantex enhances the structural
rigidity of the warhead. The warhead will be mated to the Minuteman III
missile following deactivation of the Peacekeeper missile. Life
Extension for the W-76 involves a comprehensive overhaul of the
warhead, including replacement of the arming, firing, and fuzing set.
We will also be requalifying the weapon primary. For the W-80, we will
be replacing the trajectory sensing signal and neutron generators, the
tritium bottles, and incorporating surety upgrades. For the B-61, we
will be refurbishing the secondary.
The Moscow Treaty does not alter our schedule to begin key LEPs
later this decade, although it will likely affect the total number of
warheads to be refurbished. Indeed, maintaining the First Production
Unit schedule is vital to fulfill NNSA commitments to the Department of
Defense, to fix known areas of concern; to drive the nuclear weapons
complex to restore lost manufacturing capabilities, and recruit and
retain technical expertise needed for the long term.
pantex plant overview
Located in the Texas panhandle, NNSA's Pantex Plant is the Nation's
only facility for the assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons. Over
the years Pantex has disassembled over 50,000 warheads in a safe,
secure, efficient, and environmentally sound manner. The plant covers
some 16,000 acres and employs some 3,000 people. For fiscal year 2003,
the administration has requested a total of $367 million for stockpile
stewardship related activities at the facility. Having a dedicated
facility like Pantex allows us to meet our responsibilities to maintain
the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile and dismantle excess nuclear
warheads while concentrating our efforts in areas such as nuclear
explosive safety and assembly/disassembly operations, but it does
present us with some capacity and infrastructure issues which we are
aggressively working to resolve.
The current approved work plan of Life Extensions, surveillance,
and dismantlements at Pantex, requires facility upgrades. Seventeen
bays where weapons with Insensitive High Explosives are worked on and
five cells where weapons with the more sensitive Conventional High
Explosives are worked on, will be refurbished in the next decade. Bays
differ from cells in that bays are designed to vent an explosion to the
atmosphere while protecting adjacent facilities from the blast, while
cells are designed to filter the explosion products through a
collapsing gravel bed, while also protecting the adjacent facilities
from the blast. To accomplish the workload, the plant will go to a two
shift operation, a third shift is impractical for most operations due
to the need for facility maintenance.
In addition to the facilities upgrades, over 100 new Production
Technicians, the people who do hands-on weapons work, will augment the
current force in the next decade. Employee training is an integral part
of operations at Pantex. Each technician must receive over 1,000 hours
of training in nuclear explosives safety and emergency procedures,
weapons certification, and radiation safety before being certified to
work on nuclear explosives.
Pantex does not have any excess storage capacity now or in the
foreseeable future, and has no plans to store any warheads on a long-
term basis for the Department of Defense. Of the 60 storage magazines
at Pantex, 36 are filled with plutonium pits. Most of these pits are
excess to national security needs and await further disposition. The
remaining magazines are mostly filled with warheads in the process of
evaluation, refurbishment, repair, or dismantlement. The DOD has
determined that it can accommodate storage for the warheads no longer
deployed, and does not need to rely on NNSA for long-term warhead
storage.
retirement/dismantlement process
Weapon retirements are directed in the annual Nuclear Weapons
Stockpile Memorandum (NWSM), which is approved by the President on the
recommendations of the Secretaries of Defense and Energy. The NWSM is
prepared by the Nuclear Weapons Council, through which the Navy and Air
Force express their nuclear stockpile needs and the DOE/NNSA and the
Department of Defense reach agreement on the nuclear stockpile to
recommend to the President. When a weapon system is retired it is
removed from the stockpile. The decision to retire is separate from a
decision to dismantle--retired weapons can be held indefinitely should
that be consistent with national priorities. The normal practice,
however, has been for the NWSM to authorize dismantlement after a
weapon is retired.
Planning for a dismantlement campaign typically takes several
years. The industrial processes at the Pantex and Y-12 plants need to
be defined, their hazards analyzed, and an NNSA-approved safety
authorization basis must be prepared. Transportation, storage, and
disposition must be arranged, both for the weapons prior to
dismantlement and for the waste streams resulting from dismantlement
activities.
The dismantlement process begins with the arrival of the weapon at
the Pantex Plant. Due to the limited storage space at the Pantex Plant
weapons normally remain at a DOD facility in the custody of the Navy or
Air Force until just before they are to be dismantled. Upon arrival at
the Pantex Plant the weapon undergoes a receipt inspection and is
placed into interim storage. Just prior to dismantlement it is verified
to be in a safe configuration through radiography of its critical
safety components. If the weapon has Insensitive High Explosive (IHE)
the entire dismantlement will take place in the bay. If the weapon has
Conventional High Explosive (CHE) the bay process will disassemble the
weapon to a point defined by safety considerations, and then the
partial assembly will be taken to a cell. Whether in a bay or cell, the
dismantlement is complete when the weapons primary high explosive is
separated from the Special Nuclear Material (SNM). The High Explosive
is disposed of at the Pantex Plant by burning, and the SNM is disposed
of through the Materials Disposition Program. Some SNM components may
be retained for possible reuse in future warheads and some
subassemblies containing Highly Enriched Uranium are returned to the Y-
12 plant for further disassembly.
NNSA has been working with Department of Defense to develop plans
for the size and composition of the future nuclear weapons stockpile.
The Moscow Treaty does not limit the size of the stockpile. Moreover,
within the overall warhead limits imposed by the Moscow Treaty, both
the U.S and Russia can determine for themselves the composition and
structure of their respective strategic forces.
Any plan to increase dismantlements prior to at least fiscal year
2014 would compete for resources with critical refurbishment or
evaluation work. Since reductions to the 1,700-2,200 level are up to
each country under the Moscow Treaty, so long as these levels are
achieved by December 31, 2012, NNSA prefers to retain flexibility in
setting any resulting disassembly schedules so as not to interfere with
ongoing refurbishments and surveillance activities.
Previous arms control treaties have not included a requirement to
specifically dismantle warheads, nor does the Moscow Treaty.
Disassembly of warheads is something the U.S. has always done on its
own terms, based on national security requirements and as resources
permit. While the pace of disassemblies at Pantex has slowed because we
have completed dismantlement of the majority of retired warheads, we
still have a busy dismantlement program. The W-79 (Artillery-Fired
Atomic Projectile) disassembly will be complete next year. The W-56
(Minuteman II) disassembly is underway and will continue at least
through fiscal year 2005. Disassembly of the B-53 (strategic bomb) and
some excess B-61 non-strategic bombs will begin soon. The NPR
reaffirmed that the W62 (Minuteman III) will be retired by fiscal year
2009.
As we deploy fewer strategic nuclear warheads, some may be deemed
excess to national security needs. It would then be NNSA's
responsibility to disassemble the excess warheads as resources and
workload priorities permit. Any decision to retire and dismantle
warheads would be made by the President, in the context of an NNSA
nuclear weapons complex that is fully engaged with warhead
refurbishments and that cannot make new warheads if needed until at
least the end of this decade.
nuclear weapon transportation
NNSA is also responsible for the transportation of nuclear weapons
and weapons-grade nuclear material within the U.S. Our transportation
system of SafeGuards Transporters, manned by Federal agents who also
guard the cargo, is fully engaged for the next decade. We are trying to
minimize the impact to the weapons program, but with limited assets,
and extensive agent training requirements, and plans by DOE's Office of
Environmental Management to consolidate nuclear material from Rocky
Flats, Hanford, and Idaho Falls, any additional moves will cause a
disruption in existing transportation plans.
device assembly facility
The Device Assembly Facility (DAF) is an NNSA facility at the
Nevada Test Site, which was originally envisioned for underground
nuclear test support, and for potential receipt and processing of
damaged nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear devices. With the halt of
underground nuclear testing in 1992, the primary mission for the Device
Assembly Facility is subcritical experiment support. NNSA, in the
coming weeks will issue a final Environmental Impact Statement relating
to a proposal to relocate the TA-18 criticality experiment activity
from the Los Alamos National Laboratory to the Device Assembly
Facility. This capability must be located in a relatively remote and
highly secure area. While warhead dismantlement at the Device Assembly
Facility is a possibility, the time and cost of starting up nuclear
explosive operations at what is essentially a new facility are not
easily predicted and would be substantial.
tritium supply
While the NPR will result in a smaller active stockpile of both
operationally deployed and augmentation forces, the future U.S. nuclear
stockpile--by warhead type, year, and readiness state--has not yet been
determined. This will be done in detail as part of the Nuclear Weapons
Council process and will enable NNSA to plan for the delivery of
sufficient tritium to meet all military requirements. Because stockpile
reductions will not be accomplished for several years, we do know that
there will be no near-term reduction in the immediate demand for
tritium. Thus, NNSA is continuing with its plan to begin tritium
production in commercial reactors in Fall 2003, and to complete
construction and begin operations of a new Tritium Extraction Facility
(TEF) at the Savannah River Site so that tritium can be delivered to
the stockpile in advance of need.
conclusion
In conclusion, NNSA recommends Senate advice and consent to
ratification of the proposed Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions.
The Moscow Treaty stands as an example of the emerging relationship
between the United States and the Russian Federation--a relationship
based on trust and cooperation rather than Cold War competition.
With Congress' continued strong support for the NNSA Stockpile
Stewardship Program we expect to be able to provide the Nation with a
safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Beckner. Thank you
both. Admiral Ellis, throughout the treaty, the key phrase
``operationally deployed'' seems to be the most significant
one. Could you explain what you think operationally deployed
means with respect to the classical weapons, Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and submarine operated bombs?
Admiral Ellis. Operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads in the context of treaty are those warheads actually
mounted on ICBMs located in their silos that are also mounted
on the submarine launch ballistic missiles in the tubes on
those platforms. In terms of bombers, are those weapons that
are actually loaded on bombers or located in the weapons
storage areas at bomber bases. It specifically does not include
a set of spares that may be located in the bomber WSAs. That is
the construct under which operationally deployed is defined.
Senator Reed. Would it include warheads on submarine launch
ballistic missiles not on submarines?
Admiral Ellis. No, sir. In fact, that is one of the
flexible elements of the treaty that includes those weapons
that are mounted on missiles and missiles that are in
submarines. As you are well aware, in overhead periods those
missiles are removed from submarines, and the warheads
themselves are demated.
Senator Reed. Given that definition for operationally
deployed, do you have any indication at this point when we will
reach the threshold of 1,700 or the limit of 2,200 missiles or
warheads.
Admiral Ellis. Certainly, the provisions of the treaty are
clear in that regard and the end state is well-defined. We will
certainly meet that goal for the treaty. Specific timelines and
drawdown, as I mentioned earlier, are an inherent part of the
flexibility. We have the option, as do the Russians, to adjust
that as our needs indicate. Clearly, we will be on a slope that
is appropriately matched to Dr. Beckner's capacity and to our
own strategic force planning over the 10-year period as we
drawdown to meet that objective.
Senator Reed. In regards to the Russians, what is their
equivalent of operationally deployed? Is that a mutual term,
which applies to both sides? Is there any equivalence?
Admiral Ellis. The approach that the Russians take to the
treaty, as you are aware, dictates that each nation is allowed
to approach this in a legitimate way to meet their own national
security needs. There was no definition other than that which I
have just given to you of operationally deployed in the Russian
context. But they are certainly free to follow the approach
that we are taking-as long as we consistently match the warhead
levels that have been defined in the treaty at the end state.
Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, your role is critical in terms
of scheduling the reduction of these warheads over the next 12
years or so. Are you participating in the development of the
schedule? You have indicated in your testimony that the
organizational decisions are issued by the President, but at
NNSA are you actively participating, based upon logistics as
much as policy, in what the schedule is?
Dr. Beckner. We certainly are actively engaged through
several mechanisms between the NNSA and the Department of
Defense, particularly through the Nuclear Weapons Council,
where we jointly obtain instructions as to the actions that we
should take. We have been involved in looking at the various
scenarios and at assessing our capabilities to work off the
warheads as they are released by the DOD. We have a fairly
aggressive plan in our 5-year planning documents that we have
submitted to Congress previously, as to the need and our intent
to enlarge the capacity, particularly at the Pantex Plant, to
accommodate dismantlement, as well as to conduct the life
extension programs, which are ongoing over this same period of
time.
Quite honestly, that has the potential for requiring a lot
of management attention to maximize the capability of the
plants over the next 10 years, because we do have a very
aggressive program to do life extension work on several of
those warheads. But to answer your question, yes indeed, we
have been involved.
Senator Reed. It seems to me, given the scope of what you
have described, that this presents budgetary challenges as well
as technical challenges as you go forward to accommodate the
treaty. Did your budget submissions support that?
Dr. Beckner. Our budget submissions were based upon first,
the life extension programs, to be certain that we have those
planned carefully over the 5-year period that we have
submitted, and second, to analyze on that basis the amount of
additional capacity we have for dismantlement so we know what
we can handle without difficulty.
If the instructions are developed later to pursue a more
aggressive dismantlement program, we have thought through how
we would do that. It would require some additional workforce,
particularly at Pantex and some additional expansion of bays
and cells, which is in the 2003 request. But we believe that
unless the workload was for some reason pushed to a very high
number during the middle part of this decade, we believe we can
handle it in fairly smooth fashion. It would require a little
bit of expansion. If people want a larger number of weapons
worked off earlier in time than we are presently requiring, we
would have some issues. We have some room now, between now and
about 2005, but from 2005 to 2012 or so we have a large
workload in the life extension program, so we will have to work
that out.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Dr. Beckner.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Senator Reed, one of my colleagues has a
scheduling conflict. I am going to remain throughout the
hearing, so I now defer to the Senator from Alabama.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, I
am not sure we have appreciated the historic nature of this new
treaty compared to the ABM Treaty. We had a number of people
that expressed opposition to moving from the ABM Treaty to a
new relationship. They felt that the ABM Treaty represented
some sort of cornerstone of our relationship with Russia. I
thought that was not true at the time, and spoke against that
concept. Just looking at these treaties it is just so stunning,
the difference in the nature of them.
The ABM Treaty, first of all, was between the United States
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and this one is
with the Russian Federation. There is a whole world of
difference. There it is dealing with the current, existing
entity, not a dead Soviet totalitarian empire. I think it is
important that any relationship we have with the people of
Russia need to be based on who these people are today, not the
way they were before. They have rejected the Soviet system, and
wish to move forward to a new and brighter day. I think that is
important for us to build this kind of relationship.
I noticed the language is significant. It says in the new
treaty, ``embarking on the path of new relations for a new
century and committed to the goal of strengthening their
relationships through cooperation and friendship, believing
that new global challenges and threats require the building of
a new foundation of strategic relations between the parties
desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on principles
of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and
predictability.'' Compare this to the preamble of the ABM
Treaty that says in the first paragraph, which is proceeding
from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating
consequences for all mankind ``considering that effective
measures to limit antiballistic missile systems would be a
substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic arms and
would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war
involving nuclear weapons.''
I would just ask you to comment. Doesn't this reflect a
tremendous change in the way we are seeing our relationship
with Russia?
Dr. Beckner. It would certainly seem so to me. I do not see
how you can draw any other conclusion.
Senator Sessions. I just think you are moving in the right
direction. This is a bold effort by the President that is
establishing a new relationship with a people and a nation that
we ought to be friends with, as opposed to the past when we
were facing a totalitarian regime that oppressed its people and
sought to oppress the entire world.
Something that troubles me is the question of dismantling
the weapons rather than destroying weapons. I am not troubled
with that concept. I think it is correct, because of this fact,
and let me ask you if I am correct. Is it true that the United
States does not have production capability for nuclear weapon?
That is, we do not have a production facility so if we needed
more in the future, we do not have the capability of producing
it?
Dr. Beckner. I think you need to look at that question in
detail because the only capability we do not have today for
specific components is the plutonium component, generally
referred to as the pit. That capacity was shut down at Rocky
Flats, just outside Denver, more than 10 years ago. We are in
the process of developing the capability to make a limited
number of pits at Los Alamos for a specific weapon program.
Beyond that, we have begun the process to contemplate and send
forward to Congress for approval at a future date the
construction and operation of the new pit manufacturing
facility. But that is easily 10 years in the future. Today, we
do not have a capability to make pits for new weapons if they
were required.
Senator Sessions. That is an essential component of it?
Dr. Beckner. Absolutely.
Senator Sessions. So for a decade or so we have a window
where it is problematic?
Dr. Beckner. That is correct. The only alternative you have
at this time, and for a number of years in the future, is to
find a way to reuse an existing pit or other full sections of
weapons or stay with what you have.
Senator Sessions. Isn't it true that most nations that have
nuclear capabilities to date have a nuclear production
capability?
Dr. Beckner. I think that is true. We probably do not know
everything about everything that is going on out there, but
certainly for the more prominent members that is true.
Senator Sessions. We are proceeding on the assumption that
we will dismantle rather than destroy the weapons. Is that a
decision that will be left within the discretion of the
President, or is it controlled by the treaty?
Dr. Beckner. It's my understanding that it would be at the
discretion of the President. The treaty does not specify what
we have to do with the parts after we take the weapons apart.
Senator Sessions. My concern simply is this: I don't think
we should leave ourselves in a circumstance where we have
limited substantially our nuclear weapons and we have frozen
ourself in that position. Therefore, we would in effect, be
saying to any nation in the world, ``if you develop any nuclear
weapons, you are the virtual equal of the U.S.'' I believe this
is important. We shouldn't destroy our weapons and not have the
world know that we could increase them if we were threatened.
Senator Reed. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed. I am going to be
very quick. I have come down with one question. Someone has
already asked it, so I will ask it a different way. We have had
so many of these hearings, I have run out of questions.
I find an analogous situation between this discussion today
and our old ABM discussion that just did not make any sense to
me. Maybe back in 1972, the ABM Treaty made sense to some
people. There certainly could be a persuasive argument that may
force necessity. But we are in a totally different situation
right now, and I see the same thing with this treaty.
Russia is now our ally. We do not have any kind of a
defense against a ballistic missile right now and so our
primary defense would be deterrent, and that is what we are
talking about today. We are talking about taking down these
things and we are doing this with one of our allies, and yet
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, China, and other countries do pose a
threat. This is fine if we waited until we had a national
missile defense system in place, at least for limited time.
Tell me where I am wrong?
Admiral Ellis.
Admiral Ellis. Senator, as I mentioned earlier in my
opening statement, this treaty codifies an in-depth analytical
effort in this regard for over a year. The analysis was part of
the Nuclear Posture Review that assessed the levels that are
the specified objective of the treaty, the 1,700 to 2,200
operationally deployed weapons. All of those issues that are
likely to confront the Nation in the foreseeable future, among
which you highlighted several important ones, were considered
in arriving at that number.
The considered judgment of those was, even though we all
know we are not capable of predicting with precision the future
10 years hence, that this range of weapons for the foreseeable
future and the flexibility inherent in this treaty, should that
turn out to be a much different future, will be more than
adequate to the Nation's national security needs. We can talk
more in closed session about the specific concerns you have,
but from a military perspective, I want to assure that all of
those issues were preeminent as we looked at reshaping the
Nation's strategic systems and the Nation's stockpile. We have
the provisions in the Nuclear Posture Review for continually
reassessing that as we proceed through the next decade to
ensure the conditions that were a part of our original
assessment still pertain as we move into this new control.
Senator Inhofe. It goes closely to what Senator Sessions
was asking also. This treaty, as I understand it, means we are
not going to be in a bad position should we want to manufacture
some of this equipment in another 10 years, when, in fact,
Russia is keeping that capability. We are all in that?
Admiral Ellis. Sir, that is exactly right, and that is the
reason for the term operationally deployed and for the
necessity for a stockpile that is larger than that number of
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. We have the
option to deal with those uncertainties in the future to
reconstitute that force or to adjust the slope of that drawdown
as appropriate to the international security environment.
Senator Inhofe. I am looking forward to working with both
of you. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Admiral, I just think we ought to look at
the background of this treaty. Russia is experiencing, and I do
not say this in any negative or pejorative way, an economic
decline of considerable proportions here. I think President
Putin has been addressing this.
That has just led to a shortage of funds across the board
for the Russian Armed Forces. They fully acknowledge this in
open forum, not in any classified material. Russia maintained
the readiness and safety requirements, which they as the
professional armed force desire in their own self-interests, as
well as the necessity to protect their own people. So that was
one of the driving forces, am I not correct here?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. We certainly understand, and you
mentioned in your opening statement that there are many
dimensions that have to be addressed in this new security
environment. This treaty is one essential element of that, but
there are other elements of our relationship with which you and
your colleagues are so familiar: CTR efforts.
Senator Warner. It is a composite of things, but the
concern over the fact that we are not dismantling, means I
think we ought to cover this somewhat. Russia, from its
inception as far back as I have gone in this business, has
followed one method of construction, namely that method which
would enable them to quickly replenish the warheads with brand
new ones, as opposed to our approach, namely to take the
existing warheads and work on them from time to time. Russia
currently is progressing on the construction of some new
warheads, am I not correct, gentlemen?
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. That is correct. We have taken a
fundamentally different approach.
Senator Warner. Our Nation is not, am I correct?
Admiral Ellis. That is correct.
Senator Warner. It seems understandable to me that we have
a reserve of these warheads to take parts from time to time to
maintain the readiness and safety of our own inventory. I don't
think the public or the rest of the world should look upon the
fact that we are not destroying these all immediately as means
by which to cheat or evade the purpose of this treaty.
There are more adequate monitoring methods in here if we
were to reincorporate these into our arsenal. We have to have
the warheads coming back in with the launch platforms. It is
just impossible to do it under any type of concealment. It
should add an element of insecurity to the treaty. Am I correct
in those observations? Do any of you wish to question or
amplify?
Admiral Ellis. You are exactly right, Senator. It is a fact
that one of the most significant considerations in shaping the
size of the stockpile is the sustainability and the reliability
issues that we have to deal with over the next decade or more,
as we prepare ourselves for the possibility we may encounter a
technical problem within our aging stockpile.
Senator Warner. I thank the witnesses, Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. The
subcommittee stands in recess and will reconvene for the closed
session.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follows:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
dismantlement
1. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, what is your top priority among
warhead refurbishment, surveillance, and dismantlement? Is that
priority related to the age of the stockpile?
Dr. Beckner. The mission of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) is to ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. Therefore, surveillance and
refurbishment are higher priorities than dismantlement. Surveillance of
weapons components through disassembly and inspection and the use of
advanced diagnostic tools is needed to ensure that we understand the
health of the stockpile as it ages. The refurbishments of the W87, W76,
B61, and W80, key elements of the enduring stockpile, are needed to
keep the stockpile viable over the long-term, especially in light of no
new warhead production. The high priority of refurbishments and
surveillance will become more important as the stockpile ages further
and the number of warhead types in the stockpile and the number of
operationally deployed strategic warheads is reduced; problems must be
found and corrected quickly. Though the activities tend to be age-
related, they are not necessarily driven exclusively by the age of a
particular weapon.
Dismantlement is also important, but it is generally not time-
critical. Currently, we are meeting a commitment to dismantle warheads
under a presidential nuclear initiative. When this work is complete,
there are no other similar commitments or treaties that require the
disassembly of warheads. The NNSA disassembles warheads that are excess
to national security needs on a schedule coordinated with the
Department of Defense, seeking minimal impact to support of the
enduring stockpile. Dismantlement is used to maintain a level
industrial workload.
2. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, do you believe it would be prudent
to suspend or reduce surveillance activities to increase the rate of
warhead dismantlement?
Dr. Beckner. No. I do not believe it would be prudent to suspend or
reduce surveillance activities to increase the rate of warhead
dismantlement. Warhead surveillance is absolutely essential to support
the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and should not be suspended or
reduced for the sake of dismantlements. Surveillance is needed to
ensure that we know the health of the stockpile and can assure its
reliability, safety, and security. Surveillance activities have
uncovered a number of problems in the stockpile which have been
corrected. Surveillance becomes more important as the stockpile ages
further and the number of operationally deployed strategic warheads is
reduced. Similarly, warhead refurbishment programs and other repairs to
maintain the safety and reliability of the stockpile cannot be
curtailed for warhead dismantlements.
3. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, when is the life extension program
for the W76 warhead scheduled? Do you believe, given the average age of
the W76, that the scheduled life extension program for this warhead is
both timely and prudent?
Dr. Beckner. The life extension program for the W76 warhead is
scheduled to deliver its first production unit in fiscal year 2007 with
sufficient units produced to give the DOD an initial operational
capability in fiscal year 2008. The refurbishment will focus on
replacement of the high explosives, detonators, organic materials,
replacement of cables, and addition of a new gas transfer system.
Given the average age of the W76, the life extension program, as
currently scoped and scheduled, is timed to optimize the design life
while correcting identified aging concerns before they can result in a
degradation to warhead quality and reliability. This schedule is also a
result of a significant amount of effort to coordinate this program
with other life extension programs and routine work within the NNSA
complex. The refurbishment plan is also synchronized with work the U.S.
Navy intends to perform on the Trident II missile.
4. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, how much of the workload at Pantex
will be absorbed by planned warhead life extension programs?
Dr. Beckner. The current production complex is limited in the
number of weapons that can be processed at the Pantex Plant, with the
work split among units undergoing surveillance, refurbishment, or
dismantlement. We plan to complete the disassembly of warheads already
retired by no later than fiscal year 2007. Retirements of the W62
Minuteman III warheads will begin in fiscal year 2006--decision
reaffirmed by the NPR--but no further decisions were made on
disassembly. Planned renovations of existing facilities at Pantex will
expand capacity sufficient to meet the anticipated NPR workload of
refurbishments, along with warhead surveillance. During the period
fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2010--when three refurbishments
(W80, W76, B61) are under way--there would be some reserve capacity
available to fix unanticipated problems in the stockpile, respond to
warhead production requirements, or insert dismantlement activity to
maintain a level workload.
5. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, how practical is the notion of
expanding the capacity to dismantle warheads by using the Device
Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test Site for this purpose?
Dr. Beckner. Using the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) for
dismantling warheads is not practical. The time and cost of starting up
nuclear explosive disassembly operations at this facility would be
substantial. DAF was originally envisioned for underground nuclear test
support, and for potential receipt and processing of damaged nuclear
weapons or improvised nuclear devices. With the cessation of
underground nuclear explosive testing in 1992, the primary mission for
the Device Assembly Facility was shifted to subcritical experiment
support. NNSA has issued a final Environmental Impact Statement
relating to a proposal to relocate the TA-18 criticality experiment
activity from the Los Alamos National Laboratory to the Device Assembly
Facility. If the NNSA decides to relocate TA-18, approximately half of
the DAF will then be taken over by those activities. Furthermore, we
must preserve some capability if it is necessary to resume nuclear
testing sometime in the future to meet U.S. national security
requirements.
safety requirements at pantex
6. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, it is my understanding that the
capacity at the Pantex facility to conduct warhead life extension
programs, surveillance, and dismantlements has been reduced during the
1990s. This is in large part due to new safety requirements and
practices, including issues concerning lightning and the maximum number
of warheads per room, which have slowed the weapon ``throughput'' rate
at Pantex. Would you please provide a general overview of the new
safety requirements and practices that have been adopted at Pantex.
Dr. Beckner. The NNSA is committed to supporting the Nation's
national security needs without compromising the safety of the worker,
public, or the environment. This commitment requires NNSA to strike a
reasonable balance between production requirements and increased safety
expectations. Pantex is moving towards a more quantitative, documented
safety analysis approach as required by 10 CFR 830 for both the nuclear
facilities at Pantex as well as the nuclear explosive operations
performed within. This transition is occurring while continuing plant
operations.
This formal, methodical approach of hazard analysis and control
selection has resulted in a better understanding of the overall safety
of the operation, and more and better controls. Some of these controls
are administrative in nature (such as lightning standoff and
limitations on the number of weapons within a facility). These measures
are necessary in order to compensate for what the current analysis is
telling us while allowing us to continue to operate. As the analysis is
further refined and/or engineering solutions are achieved, we will be
able to improve efficiency and capacity. It is important to emphasize
that NNSA working with the DNFSB has met all deliveries to the DOD
while improving safety at Pantex.
7. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, in general terms, to what extent
have the new safety requirements slowed down the nuclear weapon
``throughput'' rate at Pantex?
Dr. Beckner. It is difficult to determine the extent which weapon
``throughput'' rate is affected due to new safety requirements, since
it is dependent on several variables. One variable has been the
increased safety expectations, requirements, and practices. The 10 CFR
830 mandates a rigorous and defensible safety analysis of nuclear
operations, the result of which has been the introduction of new
controls at Pantex. Engineered safety controls are the most effective
way to increase safety.
Administrative controls are less effective than engineered controls
at improving safety but are easier and less expensive to implement in
the near-term. In order to continue operations while performing the
required safety analyses, some administrative controls (such as those
requiring facility standoff for lightning and fire concerns, ceasing
movement of nuclear explosives during lightning warnings and
limitations on the number of weapons that can be present in a facility
due to weapon interaction concerns) have reduced the available facility
``footprint'' or the available window of time for weapon processing.
The Pantex Plant is working through this by continuing to refine the
analyses and/or implementing engineered solutions (such as the enhanced
transportation cart) to improve process efficiency and plant capacity.
Ultimately, Pantex will have dramatically increased safety while
achieving product deliverables to the DOD efficiently.
8. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, what criteria are used to help
ensure our nuclear weapon process at Pantex is conducted in a safe
manner?
Dr. Beckner. Pantex is transforming its operations to ensure
compliance with 10 CFR 830. As a part of that activity, NNSA has
instituted the Seamless Safety for the 21st Century (SS-21) process at
the Pantex Plant. This process dictates a formal, organized approach to
planning, performing, assessing, and improving nuclear explosive
operations at the Pantex Plant. The SS-21 process focuses on designing
out hazards and includes integrating the weapon, facility, tooling,
testers, equipment, procedures, and personnel to form a safe,
efficient, and effective operating environment. This approach also
ensures that a safety basis is developed (or improved) and implemented
that defines the extent to which a nuclear explosives operation can be
safely conducted.
A set of design/performance criteria is integral to the SS-21
process. These criteria must be evaluated for implementation by the
project team assigned to implement SS-21 on a weapon program. These
criteria set a high standard and are used by the project team in
redesign of the procedures, equipment, facility, testers, and tooling
that minimizes the adverse impacts to the environment, and the safety
and health of the workers and the public.
9. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, in light of the other nuclear
warhead activities, do these safety requirements inhibit the ability to
increase the rate of warhead dismantlements?
Dr. Beckner. Safety is paramount in any nuclear warhead activity.
It is true that procedural and equipment changes have slowed production
of all activities, including dismantlements. Plans are underway to
increase production capability without compromising advances in
operations safety to meet planned surveillance and life extension. The
complexity of the warhead itself, the ease with which it can be
dismantled, the ability to ship units/components into and out of Pantex
and available resources are some of those factors.
deterrent capability
10. Senator Warner. Admiral Ellis, we have relatively few nuclear
warhead types deployed on our Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and bombers.
What would happen to the operational effectiveness of U.S. deterrent
forces if a serious problem were to develop in any one of our deployed
nuclear warheads or bombs?
Admiral Ellis. I am very confident, should a problem develop in any
one of our deployed warheads, that the flexibility designed into the
Moscow Treaty will allow the Nation to maintain a highly effective
nuclear deterrent.
We are the only nuclear power that cannot produce nuclear weapons
today, and as a result, we maintain a warhead reserve. This allows us
to have stockpile replacements in case of potential technical problems
or catastrophic failure in an entire class of warheads. Under the
provisions of the Moscow Treaty, this flexibility is preserved and the
United States will continue to retain a portion of our nondeployed
warheads in a reserve status to ensure a credible nuclear deterrent.
multiple warhead missiles
11. Senator Warner. Admiral Ellis, do you believe that a Russian
Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capability
poses a significant military threat to the United States?
Admiral Ellis. Although MIRVs represent a significant military
capability, in the stable and nonadversarial relationship we now enjoy
with Russia, MIRVd forces pose no significant increase in threat over
that posed by non-MIRVd forces.
Importantly, the threat any system poses to the United States is
measured in terms of both capability and a nation's will to use it. As
the friendship between the United States and Russia continues to grow,
the exact composition of the Russian force structure will diminish even
further in importance. Also, the provisions of the Moscow Treaty allow
the United States sufficient flexibility in force size and structure to
respond to any sudden, unexpected changes in the global security
environment.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
modern pit facility
12. Senator Sessions. Dr. Beckner, during the hearing we discussed
our Nation's lack of production capability to build new nuclear
weapons. Specifically, we discussed that the United States does not
have a current production capacity to manufacture more than a few
primaries, also known as ``pits.'' This is a much different status
compared to Russia, which has a current nuclear weapon production
capacity. Please explain with some specificity our current plan for
bringing a modern pit facility on line. In your response, please list
and explain each major step the NNSA must take to maintain our current
plan, and how long each step is expected to take.
Dr. Beckner. The current NNSA plan for bringing a modern pit
facility on line includes: (1) reestablishing the capability to
manufacture plutonium pits at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
(2) developing pit manufacturing technology, and (3) completing the
NEPA process and the design and construction of a modern pit facility.
NNSA remains on track to reestablish the capability to fabricate a
certifiable W88 pit in fiscal year 2003 followed by completion of both
a certified W88 pit and a limited W88 pit production capacity at LANL
in fiscal year 2007. Significant accomplishments to date include
manufacture of 15 development pits and completion of four subcritical
physics tests required to confirm pit performance without nuclear
testing. Based on these successes and continued congressional support,
I expect the program to meet these important national security
milestones.
Simultaneously in fiscal year 2003, the NNSA plans to proceed with
the NEPA process and a conceptual design of a Modern Pit Facility (MPF)
in fiscal year 2003. Site selection for an MPF is scheduled for fiscal
year 2004 and the conceptual design will be completed in fiscal year
2006 with final design completion and the start of plant construction
in fiscal year 2011. The present plan shows that the MPF will undergo
start-up manufacturing activities in 2018 and reach full production
capacity in 2020.
13. Senator Sessions. Dr. Beckner, in general terms, please discuss
the total cost estimate to bring a modern pit facility on line. If it
is helpful, describe the cost in comparison to other NNSA projects with
regards to size and scale.
Dr. Beckner. Nuclear facilities are difficult and costly to
construct because of safety and environmental considerations and the
extensive regulatory oversight. MPF is likely to require some 200,000
square feet and is expected to cost between $2-$4 billion. The other
major NNSA construction project similar in size and scope is the
National Ignition Facility at 280,000 square feet with a cost of $3.5
billion. We expect to have a better understanding of cost projections
for the MPF by 2006.
14. Senator Session. Dr. Beckner, in what year, or range of years,
do you plan to have an operating modern pit facility using NNSA's
current baseline, including a reasonable expectation of technical,
legal, budget, and other challenges which always face projects of this
size and magnitude?
Dr. Beckner. NNSA expects to begin physical construction of the MPF
in fiscal year 2011. The MPF will be completed and will undergo start-
up manufacturing activities in 2018 and reach full production capacity
in 2020. The 2020 date for an on line MPF includes time for technical,
legal, budget, and other challenges as you have suggested. The facility
will be capable of operating for up to 50 years.
15. Senator Session. Dr. Beckner, please explain how a modern pit
facility helps meet the vision of the new triad described in the
Nuclear Posture Review (January 2002), which first described the goal
and is now codified in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, to
reduce our Nation's nuclear stockpile to between 1,700 and 2,200
``operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.''
Dr. Beckner. The nuclear posture review concluded that we need to
build a new TRIAD. One element of that new TRIAD is the infrastructure
necessary to support the nuclear deterrent. A modern pit facility is a
key element of that infrastructure. A modern pit facility would allow
the construction of significant numbers of pits with a new design if a
need for them develops. The lack of an ability to produce new nuclear
weapons increases our requirements to retain inactive weapons, or to
furnish warheads for new weapon systems. Within foreseeable bounds for
numbers of nuclear warheads, a modern pit facility will be required
because we expect that all pits in the stockpile will eventually need
to be replaced. Modern plutonium pit science can only provide an
estimate for the lifetime of pits and accelerated aging techniques
remain to be proven. Therefore, the NNSA must have an operational MPF
no later than 2020 based on the current estimate of 45-60 years for pit
lifetime and the projected numbers of warheads that we must maintain.
[Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the committee adjourned to
closed session.]