    [Senate Hearing 107-806]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 107-806

         THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
                               REDUCTIONS TREATY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                           JULY 25 AND AUGUST 1, 2002

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     JOHN WARNER, Virginia
    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    MAX CLELAND, Georgia                 BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
    JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    MARK DAYTON, Minnesota               SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
    JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico            JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

                         David S. Lyles, Staff Director
                  Judith A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                               C O N T E N T S

                                   __________

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

         The National Security Implications of the Strategic Offensive
                               Reductions Treaty

                                 july 25, 2002

                                                                       Page

    Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense...................     7
    Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff....    19

         The National Security Implications of the Strategic Offensive
                               Reductions Treaty

                                 august 1, 2002

    Curtis, Charles B., President and Chief Operating Officer,
      Nuclear Threat Initiative......................................    52
    Carter, Dr. Ashton B., Ford Foundation Professor of Science and
      International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
      Harvard University.............................................    60
    Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, United States
      Strategic Command..............................................    87
    Beckner, Dr. Everet H., Deputy Administrator for Defense
      Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration.............    91

                                     (iii)

         THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
                               REDUCTIONS TREATY

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JULY 25, 2002

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Akaka, Bill
    Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Warner, Inhofe, Allard, and
    Sessions.
        Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
    director; and Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    counsel; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member;
    Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W.
    Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Maren Leed, professional
    staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; and
    Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
    Republican staff director; L. David Cherington, minority
    counsel; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Mary Alice
    A. Hayward, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock,
    professional staff member; George W. Lauffer, professional
    staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member;
    Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; and Scott W.
    Stucky, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Dara R. Alpert, Daniel K.
    Goldsmith, Andrew Kent, Thomas C. Moore, and Nicholas W. West.
        Committee members' assistants present: Brady King,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; B.G. Wright, assistant to Senator
    Byrd; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland;
    Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani
    Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; Peter
    A. Contostavlos and Dan Shapiro, assistants to Senator Bill
    Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Benjamin
    L. Cassidy, assistant to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell,
    assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III, assistant
    to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator
    Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; Michele
    A. Traficante, assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway
    II, assistant to Senator Sessions; and Kristine Fauser,
    assistant to Senator Collins.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The Armed Services
    Committee meets this morning to consider the national security
    implications of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty which
    was signed between the United States and Russia on May 24. The
    President sent the treaty to the Senate for its consideration
    on June 20 and is seeking the Senate's advice and consent to
    ratification of the treaty.
        We are pleased today to have with us Secretary of Defense
    Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have both been involved in the
    formulation of this treaty and in the thinking on U.S. nuclear
    force structure that led to the level of nuclear forces that
    are specified in the treaty.
        I want to welcome you both back to our committee. I see you
    are making really good progress in terms of your operation, Mr.
    Secretary. We are delighted to see that. You have a new cast--
    not a new cast of characters; it looks like the old cast of
    characters here--but at least a new cast on your arm, and we
    hope things are going well for you.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. The Armed Services Committee has
    traditionally held hearings on the military implications of
    arms control treaties over the last few decades and provided
    its views and recommendations to the Foreign Relations
    Committee before that committee marks up a resolution of
    ratification and reports to the full Senate.
        While this committee does not have the leading role in
    treaty consideration, we do have an important supporting role
    to fulfill. This committee has held over 50 hearings on nine
    arms control treaties since the early 1970s, focusing
    particularly on the military or national security implications
    of proposed treaties, matters that fall within this committee's
    jurisdiction.
        Our committee plans to hold two hearings on this treaty. In
    addition to today's hearing, we will hold a second hearing on
    August 1st to hear from the Commander in Chief of U.S.
    Strategic Command and from the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, and we will also hear from some outside
    experts.
        I believe that the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,
    or ``SORT'' for short, is a positive step forward in U.S.-
    Russian relations. I think it is particularly important to have
    a treaty that is legally binding rather than a unilateral step
    that is not binding on future administrations or, of course, on
    the other party to the treaty. That also ensures that the
    Senate fulfills its constitutional role in giving due
    consideration of any treaty and providing advice and consent
    before ratification.
        I see this treaty as another positive step toward further
    arms control and an important boost to our new relationship
    with Russia. But there is much more work to be done to continue
    improving mutual security with Russia, work that includes
    further reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons, reducing
    nuclear proliferation dangers, and improving confidence,
    transparency, and cooperation with Russia.
        I hope today's hearing will help us understand: what this
    treaty is and what it is not; how the administration plans to
    implement the treaty; how the treaty fits into our overall
    security context; how the administration is thinking about our
    nuclear forces; and what additional steps we can and should
    take to further improve our security.
        The treaty is certainly somewhat unusual. Its central
    obligation is that both nations will reduce their operationally
    deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700
    and 2,200 some 10 years from now, apparently just for the 1 day
    at that moment when the treaty then expires. Contrary to
    numerous media reports, the treaty does not require reductions
    in nuclear warheads stockpiles. It does not require elimination
    of warheads. Under this treaty both sides must simply remove
    warheads from land-based or submarine-based missiles and from
    bombers.
        Both sides are then free to keep every warhead so removed
    and to store these warheads for possible redeployment. The only
    limitations that will bind the United States and Russia are the
    limitations on delivery systems under START I, at least until
    2009. After 2009, when the START I treaty expires, it is not
    clear what will happen.
        The importance of this treaty is not so much what it does
    or does not do, but rather the possibilities that it may hold
    for the future. It is one step in a continual process of
    improving the U.S.-Russia relationship and improving U.S.
    security.
        My focus is going to be on what it leads to for U.S. and
    Russian nuclear weapons policy. Can this treaty provide an
    opportunity for the United States to make real reductions in
    nuclear weapons, not just the number of weapons deployed but
    the total number of nuclear weapons? Can this treaty provide an
    opportunity for the United States to rethink its nuclear
    weapons employment policy so that nuclear weapons are seen as
    weapons of last resort?
        Can this treaty provide an opportunity to establish new
    multilateral approaches to dealing with and reducing weapons of
    mass destruction? Can this treaty be monitored or verified
    effectively by either party, or is that not as important as it
    used to be? Can this treaty provide an opportunity to improve
    the lagging efforts to secure and destroy Russian chemical
    weapons, biological materials, and excess strategic nuclear
    weapons materials and delivery systems?
        Can this treaty provide an opportunity to help Russia
    account for and destroy in the near future its large number of
    excess tactical nuclear weapons?
        Let me now turn to Senator Warner for any opening statement
    that he may have.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again I commend
    you for calling this hearing because, as you said, our
    committee has had a long history and played an important role
    in those treaties of our Nation which directly affect our
    national security. We look forward to the testimony from the
    distinguished Secretary and Chairman.
        Throughout its history, our committee has played a critical
    role in assessing the national security impact and military
    implications of arms control agreements negotiated by the
    Executive Branch. It is right and proper for our committee to
    once again be a key player as the Senate carries out its
    constitutional responsibility of advice and consent to the
    Moscow Treaty.
        The Moscow Treaty in my judgment is the right agreement at
    the right time, and I commend the President and all those who
    worked with him to achieve this goal. It is a remarkable
    document, both in the strength of its content and in its
    departure--and I underline the word ``departure''--from the
    commonly accepted strategic thinking and arms control wisdom
    that prevailed during the Cold War era. This breakthrough
    treaty, negotiated in a period of just several months, will
    reduce nuclear arsenals from the present levels of about 6,000
    strategic warheads to 1,700 to 2,200 operational strategic
    warheads over the next decade.
        This reduction, which amounts to about two-thirds of the
    warheads in the Russian and U.S. arsenals, is the most dramatic
    in strategic weapons history and in the history of arms control
    agreements.
        This treaty is also important in that it is the embodiment
    of a new relationship between the United States of America and
    Russia. President Bush and his administration again are to be
    commended for these outstanding achievements.
        This treaty is fully consistent with the policy goals that
    President Bush laid out after he took office. In a landmark
    speech at the National Defense University in May 2001,
    President Bush called for a new strategic relationship with
    Russia. I quote:
        ``Today's Russia is not yesterday's Soviet Union. This new
    cooperative relationship should look to the future, not to the
    past. It should be reassuring, rather than threatening. It
    should be premised on openness and mutual confidence and real
    opportunities for cooperation. I want to complete the work of
    changing our relationship from one based on a nuclear balance
    of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common
    interests.''
        President Bush has engaged President Putin on a regular and
    intensive basis to move the Russian-American relationship
    beyond the Cold War hostility to a relationship built on
    openness, shared goals, and shared responsibility. I find that
    prevalent throughout this treaty. The treaty we consider today,
    therefore, is one measure of President Bush's extraordinary
    success in building this new relationship.
        Last December President Bush announced the intent to
    withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and
    restated his determination to dramatically reduce the U.S.
    nuclear arsenal. The ABM Treaty in many technical ways limited
    the options by which we could achieve our defenses, as well as
    in the minds of many placed a limitation on this country to in
    effect defend itself against incoming ballistic missiles. It
    did serve a constructive role during the Cold War period, but
    its mission has ended. It really had to be a part of the demise
    of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
        I commend the President for his initiatives, for many
    critics at the time believed that renewed hostility and a
    renewed arms race with Russia could ensue if the U.S. exercised
    its right, a right set forth clearly in that treaty, to
    withdraw. Yet the opposite has happened. On December 13, 2001,
    the same day that President Bush notified the Russian
    Government of his intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and
    dramatically reduce U.S. strategic nuclear forces, Russian
    President Putin reciprocated by stating his intent to similarly
    reduce Russian strategic nuclear arsenals.
        President Putin urged that the U.S. and Russian strategic
    reductions be formalized in a legally binding agreement. This
    year on May 24, at the summit in Moscow, President Bush and
    President Putin signed this landmark agreement that is the
    subject of our hearing today and the subject before the Senate
    for ratification.
        I firmly believe that the President chose wisely when he
    agreed to put these reductions in the form of a legally binding
    treaty. This assures that the agreement will survive the
    personal relationship between these two presidents and that it
    has the weight of law behind it.
        Yet this treaty is not like any that we have seen before.
    It is the first arms control treaty to embody the post-Cold War
    U.S.-Russian relationship. In negotiating this treaty, both
    sides consciously rejected the Cold War mentality of distrust
    and hostility that previously had required lengthy negotiations
    and extensive legal structure and detailed verification regimes
    to assure that both sides would abide by their obligations.
        How many times, Mr. Chairman, did you and I and other
    colleagues travel to Geneva and elsewhere in the world to watch
    the slow progress of previous negotiations on arms control
    agreements? I remember these trips so well.
        Consequently, the Moscow Treaty lacks many of the features
    of past bilateral arms control agreements, most of which were
    signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty
    does not establish interim warhead reduction goals or a
    detailed schedule to achieve warhead reductions. It does not
    define warhead ``counting rules,'' require destruction of
    strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or launchers, or include
    limits or sub-limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or
    launchers.
        But there is an important way in which the Moscow Treaty is
    similar to prior strategic arms control agreements. No arms
    control treaty has ever required the destruction of nuclear
    warheads. There are a number of important reasons for this,
    which I expect we will explore in detail today in this hearing.
        Some may argue that the simplicity of the Moscow Treaty is
    a weakness. I respectfully disagree. I believe that the
    simplicity of the treaty is its strength. This simplicity puts
    the focus on the key element of any strategic arms control
    agreement--deep reductions to strategic nuclear warheads. The
    simplicity of the treaty allowed Russia and the U.S. to reach
    an early agreement, avoiding the long, complex, arduous
    negotiations characteristic of the Cold War era.
        This simplicity allows both the U.S. and Russia the
    flexibility within the numeric limits set by the treaty to
    structure their forces consistent with each nation's security
    requirements and to adapt to changes in the international
    security environment. This flexibility is an essential feature
    of U.S. policy in an era when strategic and tactical surprise
    seem to be the only constant.
        Yet I find that the doctrine ``Trust, But Verify,''
    authored by Ronald Reagan, our former President, is quietly
    present in the structures and foundations of this treaty. As
    unique as the Moscow Treaty is, it also reflects the success
    and the heritage of past arms control agreements. It is a
    legally binding document. In order to achieve the required
    reductions, nuclear warheads must be physically removed from
    the launch platforms and otherwise rendered so that they cannot
    be part of the operational structure for any near-term military
    contingencies.
        The treaty provides the mechanisms and atmosphere to assure
    the compliance with its provisions and resolution of future
    issues related to treaty implementation. The terms of the
    Moscow Treaty, which recognize that the START I Treaty
    verification regime remains in force and which establish a
    Bilateral Implementation Commission, provide the basis for the
    predictability, transparency, and confidence needed to assure
    that both sides achieve the required reductions.
        Some colleagues have raised concerns about the treaty, and
    each of these concerns deserves full consideration. But I
    remind my colleagues that many of these concerns must be
    balanced against the reality that we are here after only 5
    months of negotiations considering a treaty that reduces the
    U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals by approximately two-
    thirds--a major accomplishment.
        Following a full examination of the treaty, I believe that
    the Senate will promptly render its advice and consent to the
    Moscow Treaty. This treaty in my view clearly advances the
    national security interests of the United States, indeed the
    interests of the world, and deserves the strongest of support
    by the United States Senate. I ask that the statements of
    Senators Thurmond and Santorum be placed in the record at this
    time.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statements of Senator Thurmond and Senator
    Santorum follow:]
                  Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond
        Mr. Chairman, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
    established the Committee on Armed Services and directed among other
    issues that ``such committee shall also study and review, on a
    comprehensive basis, matters relating to the common defense policy of
    the United States . . .'' Today's hearing on the Strategic Offensive
    Reduction Treaty, commonly known as the Moscow Treaty, is a reflection
    of the mandate to review matters relating to the common defense policy.
    I congratulate you and Senator Warner, our ranking member, for
    scheduling this and the subsequent hearing on this important and
    revolutionary treaty. I expect that the committee's report on the
    treaty and its implications will be an important factor as the Senate
    considers the ratification of the treaty.
        Mr. Chairman, in his opening statement before the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated: ``The
    Moscow Treaty marks a new era in the relationship between the United
    States and Russia. It codifies both countries' commitment to make deep
    strategic offensive reductions in a flexible and legally binding
    manner. It facilitates the transition from strategic rivalry to a
    genuine strategic partnership based on the principles of mutual
    security, trust, openness, cooperation, and predictability.'' For those
    of us who lived through the Cold War, the words ``strategic partnership
    based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness,
    cooperation, and predictability'' automatically cause concern. However,
    they represent the new world we live in. Russia is no longer our
    archenemy; it is a partner in our efforts to achieve peace throughout
    the globe and rid the world of the treat of terrorism. This partnership
    is based on trust, openness, cooperation, and predictability.
        I applaud President Bush for his aggressive approach toward
    fostering this new relationship with Russia. The Moscow Treaty is a
    prime example of this new philosophy. Not only does it call for the
    reduction in strategic nuclear warheads from more than 6,000 to
    approximately 2,000, but it also takes the approach that these
    reductions will be made based on trust and cooperation rather than the
    historic frameworks of prior treaties. In my judgement, this treaty is
    consistent with our national security interests as outlined in the 2002
    Nuclear Posture Review. It also ensures that the United States
    maintains its flexibility to retain warheads in storage for future use
    to upgrade and maintain the operational stockpile. While some criticize
    the lack of a requirement to destory warheads, I believe it is a
    sensible step to protect our strategic nuclear capability. Unlike
    Russia, the United States is not able to build new warheads and must
    rely on existing warheads to replace aging and unusable weapons.
        Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished
    panel. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers have never shirked from
    telling it as it is. I expect that their testimony today will be
    forthright and based on their best professional judgement.
                                     ______

                  Prepared Statement by Senator Rick Santorum
        Chairman Levin and Senator Warner, thank you for scheduling this
    important hearing. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, thank you both
    for making yourselves available to offer testimony at this morning's
    hearing.
        The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty will reduce U.S. and
    Russian strategic nuclear weapons from approximately 6,000 weapons to
    1,700-2,200 weapons by 2012. This agreement represents the largest
    strategic nuclear arms reduction ever negotiated between the U.S. and
    Russia.
        It is difficult to imagine a better representative example of how
    relations have changed between the United States and Russia than this
    treaty. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty--also known as the
    Moscow Treaty--reflects the historic shift that has taken place
    following the end of the Cold War, and it highlights the strong
    relationship and trust that exists between Presidents Bush and Putin.
        Missing from the Moscow Treaty is the distrust underlying previous
    U.S.-Soviet Union arms control agreements. This new level of trust
    between the U.S. and Russia allowed the treaty to be negotiated in a
    period of months--not years--and, at the same time, achieve historic
    reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Because this treaty was
    negotiated under a new U.S.-Russian paradigm of cooperation and trust,
    missing are the long and detailed verification and accounting rules
    that have been part of previous arms control treaties.
        The reductions specified in the treaty, roughly a two-thirds
    reduction in the level of strategic nuclear weapons, are indeed
    historic. While some on the other side will express dissatisfaction
    that nuclear warheads will not be destroyed under the Moscow Treaty, it
    is worth noting that no strategic arms control treaty has ever required
    dismantlement of nuclear warheads. The warheads that the U.S. will
    retain in storage are a strategic hedge against the rise of a hostile
    nuclear power and they will provide a strategic reserve for our aging
    nuclear weapons strockpile.
        As for the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, while the treaty does
    not address these weapons, U.S. negotiators did raise this issue with
    their Russian counterparts during Moscow Treaty negotiations.
    Interestingly enough, the Russian delegation would not address limits
    on tactical nuclear weapons during the negotiations.
        Mr. Chairman, I believe the Moscow Treaty is a sound treaty that
    reflects the progress, cooperation and trust that exists between the
    U.S. and Russia. This is a treaty that is consistent with U.S. nuclear
    doctrine contained in the recent Nuclear Posture Review, and it
    provides a legal framework for substantial strategic nuclear arms
    reductions.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
        Secretary Rumsfeld.

       STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
    members of the committee. I am pleased to be here with the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dick Myers, and we thank
    you for this opportunity to discuss the Moscow Treaty.
        Senator Warner, as you indicated, President Bush has been
    determined from the outset of his administration to place the
    U.S.-Russia relationship on a new footing. Certainly Secretary
    Powell, Under Secretary of State John Bolton, and Under
    Secretary of Defense Doug Feith have all worked closely to help
    achieve this treaty.
        I would like to abbreviate my prepared remarks, Mr.
    Chairman, to cover some of the questions that have been posed
    and have the entire statement included in the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I also would point out that there have
    been naysayers that have insisted that establishing this new
    relationship between the United States and Russia would be not
    possible or at least extremely difficult. They looked at the
    agenda of the President's promise to withdraw from the ABM
    Treaty, his desire to build defenses to protect the U.S., our
    friends and allies from ballistic missile attack, his
    determination to strengthen the NATO alliance by making new
    allies of old adversaries, and predicted that the U.S. and
    Russia were on a bumpy, if not collision, course.
        What a difference a year makes. Today the U.S.-Russian
    relationship is stronger than perhaps at any time in the
    history of our two countries. In a little over a year, the
    President has defied the critics and set in motion a
    transformation of the U.S.-Russian relationship, one that we
    believe is designed to benefit the people of both our nations
    and indeed the entire world.
        The United States and Russia are working together to
    develop new avenues of trade and economic cooperation. We are
    working together to fight terrorism and to reduce the number of
    deployed offensive nuclear weapons, weapons that are a legacy
    of the past and which are no longer needed at a time when
    Russia and the United States are basing our relationship on
    cooperation rather than fear of mutual annihilation.
        Of course, there is still a good deal of work ahead and
    challenges to overcome. But we do have an opportunity to build
    a new relationship for our peoples, a relationship that can
    contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity for generations
    of Russians and Americans.
        But let there be no doubt. It will require a change in our
    thinking, thinking in our bureaucracies, in the Duma, in
    Congress, in the press, and in academic institutions. We seem
    to have decades of momentum going in the opposite direction.
    Habits built up over so many decades become ingrained and are
    hard to break.
        Here in the U.S., there are those who would have preferred
    to see us continue the adversarial arms control negotiations of
    the Soviet era, where teams of lawyers drafted hundreds of
    pages of treaty text and each side worked to gain the upper
    hand, while focusing on ways to preserve a balance of nuclear
    terror.
        Similarly, in Russia today there are those who are stuck in
    the past, who look warily at the U.S. offers of greater
    friendship and cooperation, preferring to keep us at arm's
    length while continuing to associate with the old allies of the
    former Soviet Union.
        Russia and the United States entered this new century
    saddled with two legacies of the Cold War, the adversarial
    relationship to which we had both grown accustomed and the
    physical manifestation of that adversarial relationship, the
    massive arsenals of weapons that we built up. In the past year
    we have made progress in dealing with both.
        Last November at the Crawford Summit, President Bush
    announced his intention to reduce the United States'
    operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by some two-
    thirds, to between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons. Soon thereafter,
    President Putin made a similar commitment. These announced
    reductions are a reflection of that new relationship.
        But what is remarkable is not simply the fact of these
    planned reductions, but how they have happened. After a careful
    review, President Bush simply announced his intention to cut
    our operationally deployed nuclear warheads. President Putin
    did the same. When they met in Moscow, they recorded these
    unilaterally, announced changes in a treaty that will survive
    their two presidencies, the Moscow Treaty which the Senate and
    the Duma are now considering.
        But it is significant that, while we consulted closely and
    engaged in a process that had been open and transparent, we did
    not engage in lengthy, adversarial negotiations in which the
    U.S. and Russia would keep thousands of weapons we did not need
    as bargaining chips. We did not establish standing negotiating
    teams in Geneva, with armies of arms control aficionados ready
    to do battle over every colon and every comma.
        If we had done so, we would still be negotiating today.
    Instead, we are moving directly toward dramatic reductions in
    the ready nuclear weapons of our two countries and clearing the
    way for a new relationship between our countries.
        An illustration of how far we have come is this. This
    [indicating] is the START Treaty. It is enormous. It was signed
    in 1991 by the first President Bush and Soviet President
    Mikhail Gorbachev. It is 700 pages long and it took 9 years to
    negotiate. This [indicating] is the Moscow Treaty as concluded
    by President Bush and President Putin. It is three pages long
    and it took 5 or 6 months to negotiate.
        Mr. Chairman, we are working toward the day when the
    relationship between our two countries is such that no arms
    control treaties will be necessary. That is how normal
    countries deal with each other. The United States and Britain
    both have nuclear weapons, yet we do not spend hundreds of
    hours negotiating the fine details of mutual reductions in our
    offensive weapons. We do not feel the need to preserve any
    balance of terror between us. It would be a worthy goal for our
    relationship with Russia to evolve along that path.
        We would have made these cuts regardless of what Russia did
    with its arsenal. We are making them not because we signed the
    treaty, but because the transformation in our relationship with
    Russia means that we do not need as many deployed weapons as we
    once needed. Russia has made a similar calculation, and the
    agreement we reached in Moscow is the result of those
    determinations, not the cause of them.
        That is also one reason why we saw no need to include
    detailed verification measures in the treaty. There simply is
    not any way on Earth to verify what Russia is doing with all of
    those warheads. Neither side should have an interest in evading
    the terms of the treaty since it codifies unilaterally-
    announced reductions and gives both sides broad flexibility in
    implementing those reductions.
        Similarly flawed is the complaint that, because the Moscow
    Treaty does not contain a requirement to destroy warheads
    removed from missiles or bombers, that the cuts are somehow
    reversible and therefore not real. Put aside for the moment
    that no previous arms control treaty, not SALT, not START, not
    the INF, ever required the destruction of warheads, and no one
    offered objections to them on that basis.
        This charge is based, I believe, on a flawed premise, that
    irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons are possible. In
    point of fact, I do not believe there is any such thing as
    irreversible reduction in nuclear weapons. The knowledge of how
    to build nuclear weapons exists in the world. There is no
    possibility at all that that knowledge will be lost. Every
    reduction is therefore reversible, given time and given money.
        Indeed, when it comes to building nuclear weapons, Russia
    has a distinct advantage over the United States. Today Russia
    can and does produce both nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear
    delivery vehicles. They have an open, warm production line for
    each. The U.S. does not currently produce nuclear warheads. The
    reason to keep rather than destroy some of those nuclear
    warheads is to have them available in the event there is a
    problem with the safety or reliability of some element of our
    arsenal.
        If we had pursued the path of traditional arms control as
    some have suggested, we would not be proceeding with the
    reductions outlined in this treaty. Rather, we would still be
    at the negotiating table arguing over how to reconcile these
    and other asymmetries between the United States and Russia.
    Russia might, for example, have insisted that any agreement
    take into account the size of the U.S. economy and our ability
    to mobilize resources to develop new production facilities.
        We might have argued, conversely, that Russia's proximity
    to rogue nations allows them to deter these regimes with
    tactical systems, whereas, because they are many thousands of
    miles away from us, the U.S. distance from them requires more
    intercontinental systems than Russia needs. This could have
    resulted in a mind-numbing debate over how many non-strategic
    systems should equal an intercontinental system or open the
    door to a discussion of whether an agreement must include all
    nuclear warheads, including tactical nuclear warheads, and so
    on and so forth ad infinitum.
        The approach we have taken is to treat Russia not as an
    adversary, but as a friendly power. With the recently completed
    nuclear posture review, the U.S. has declared that we are not
    interested in preserving a balance of terror with Russia. As
    our adversaries change, our deterrence calculus can and should
    change as well.
        That is why we are working to transform our nuclear posture
    from one that was aimed at deterring the Soviet Union that no
    longer exists to one designed to deter new adversaries,
    adversaries that may not be discouraged from attacking us by
    the threat of nuclear retaliation, just as the terrorists who
    struck us on September 11 were certainly not deterred by the
    massive U.S. nuclear arsenal.
        Some have asked why in the post-Cold War world we need to
    maintain as many as 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed
    warheads. The U.S. nuclear arsenal remains an important part of
    our strategy and it helps to dissuade the emergence of
    potential or would-be peer competitors by underscoring the
    futility of trying to sprint toward parity with us or, indeed,
    superiority. I would add that it also assures our friends and
    allies that our capability is sufficient, and in some instances
    nations that have the ability to develop nuclear weapons,
    because they are our friends and allies, recognize they have no
    need to do so.
        Indeed, Mr. Chairman, our decision to proceed with
    reductions as deep as the ones outlined in the Moscow Treaty is
    premised on decisions to invest in a number of other critical
    areas, programs that are funded and recommended in our 2003
    budget. These include investments to improve U.S. intelligence
    collection, analysis, processing, and dissemination, to protect
    the U.S. homeland, including a refocused, revitalized missile
    defense research and testing program, and capabilities to
    detect and respond to biological attack, accelerate development
    of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with new combat
    capabilities, and produce fast, precision conventional strike
    capabilities, convert four Trident nuclear submarines into
    stealthy SSGN strike submarines that can carry cruise missiles
    and special operations forces in denied areas, leverage
    information technology to seamlessly connect U.S. forces in the
    air, at sea, and on the ground, protect our information
    networks, improve the survivability of U.S. space systems, and
    develop a space infrastructure that assures persistent
    surveillance and access.
        Investments in these and many other transformational
    capabilities in the 2003 budget should allow the U.S. over time
    to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons and enact the deep
    nuclear reductions contained in the treaty.
        Others have asked why there is no reduction schedule in the
    treaty. The answer quite simply is flexibility. Our approach in
    the Nuclear Posture Review was to recognize that we are
    entering a period of surprise and uncertainty, when the sudden
    emergence of unexpected threats will be an increasingly common
    feature of our security environment.
        We were surprised on September 11, and let there be no
    doubt we will have surprises in the future. Intelligence,
    despite the efforts and despite how good we are at it, has
    repeatedly underestimated the capabilities of different
    countries of concern to us. We have historically had gaps in
    our knowledge of as much as 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, in one case 13
    years where something occurred in a major country with respect
    to weapons of mass destruction that we did not know about until
    many years later.
        The only surprise is that so many among us are still
    surprised. The problem is more acute in an age when the spread
    of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of terrorist
    states and potentially terrorist networks means that our margin
    for error is significantly less than it has been. The cost of a
    mistake could be not thousands of our innocent men, women, and
    children, but hundreds of thousands of lives or even millions.
        Because of our smaller margin for error and the uncertainty
    of the future security environment, the U.S. will need
    flexibility. This new approach to deterrence will help us to
    better contribute to peace and stability and address the new
    threats and challenges that we will face in the 21st century.
        We have entered a period when cooperation between our
    countries will be increasingly important to the security and
    prosperity of both our peoples. We can work together to stop
    the spread of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of
    terrorist movements and terrorist states. We can work together
    to try to support Russia's economic transformation and deeper
    integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. This treaty is
    merely one element of a growing multi-faceted relationship
    between our two countries that involves not just security, but
    also increasing political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and
    other forms of cooperation.
        The reductions characterized in this treaty will help
    eliminate the debris of past hostility that has been blocking
    our way as we build a new relationship. The treaty President
    Bush has fashioned and the process by which he fashioned it, I
    believe, are both models for future cooperation between our two
    countries. We have achieved deep reductions and enhanced the
    security of both our countries without perpetuating Cold War
    ways of thinking that hinder a desire for better relations.
        Mr. Chairman, I urge that the Senate advise and consent to
    this treaty and approve a clean resolution of ratification.
    Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld and the U.S.-
    Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (The Moscow
    Treaty) follow:]
                 Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:
        First, let me thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Moscow
    Treaty. President Bush, Secretary Powell, Under Secretary of State John
    Bolton, and Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, have worked closely
    to achieve the treaty.
        When President Bush took office last year, he made clear his
    determination to transform the Russian-American relationship--to put
    the hostility built up over so many decades behind us, and set our two
    nations on a course toward greater cooperation.
        Some naysayers insisted it could not be done. They looked at his
    agenda--his promise to withdraw from the ABM Treaty; his desire to
    build defenses to protect the U.S., its friends, and allies from
    ballistic missile attack; his determination to strengthen the NATO
    Alliance by making new allies of old adversaries--and predicted that
    the U.S. and Russia were on a collision course.
        Various commentators warned of an impending ``deep chill'' in U.S.-
    Russian relations that would make it impossible to negotiate further
    nuclear reductions with Russia. More than one foreign official
    predicted that the President's approach would ``re-launch the arms
    race.'' The Washington Post cautioned that the President's strategy
    risked ``making the world less rather than more secure, and . . .
    increasing rather than assuaging tension among the United States, its
    allies and potential adversaries such as Russia.'' The New York Times
    warned his approach ``may alienate the Kremlin and give rise to a
    dangerous new arms race with Russia . . .''
        What a difference a year makes.
        None of the dire predictions came to pass. To the contrary, the
    U.S.-Russian relationship is stronger than perhaps at any time in the
    history of our two nations.
        Far from a clash over NATO expansion, we have cemented a new NATO-
    Russia relationship that will permit increasing cooperation between
    Russia and the members of the Atlantic Alliance.
        Far from causing a ``deep chill'' in relations, the U.S. withdrawal
    from the ABM Treaty was greeted in Russia with something approximating
    a yawn. Indeed, President Putin declared the decision ``does not pose a
    threat'' to Russia.
        Far from launching a new arms race, the U.S. and Russia have both
    decided to move toward historic reductions in their deployed offensive
    nuclear arsenals--reductions to be codified in the Moscow Treaty.
    Indeed, President Putin chose to announce the Russian reductions on the
    same day President Bush announced the U.S. intention to withdraw from
    the ABM Treaty.
        In little over a year, the President has defied the critics and set
    in motion a transformation in U.S.-Russian relationship--one that is
    designed to benefit the people of both our nations, and indeed the
    entire world.
        The record shows that it is a transformation that began before the
    terrible events of September 11.
        President Bush laid out his vision for a new relationship in a
    speech at the National Defense University on May 1 of last year. When
    he met President Putin for the first time a month later in Slovenia,
    instead of the predicted fireworks, the two presidents emerged from
    their discussions expressing confidence that our countries could put
    past animosities behind them.
        Not only had the meeting far exceeded his expectations, President
    Putin declared, but he believed that ``Russia and the United States are
    not enemies, do not threaten each other, and could be fully good
    allies.'' President Bush announced they had both agreed that the time
    had come ``to move beyond suspicion and towards straight talk; beyond
    mutually assured destruction and toward mutually earned respect . . .
    to address the world as it is, not as it used to be.''
        Over the course of the past year, they put those words into action.
        In the last 12 months, the Presidents of the United States and
    Russia had more interaction and forged more areas of cooperation across
    a broader range of political, economic, and security issues than at any
    time in the history of our two Nations.
        Today, the United States and Russia are working together to develop
    new avenues of trade and economic cooperation. We are working together
    to fight terrorism and deal with the new and emerging threats we will
    both face in this dangerous new century. We are working together to
    reduce the number of deployed offensive nuclear weapons--weapons that
    are a legacy of the past, and which are no longer needed at a time when
    Russia and the U.S. are basing our relations on cooperation, not fear
    of mutual annihilation.
        These are historic changes--changes of a breadth and scale that few
    imagined, and many openly doubted, could be achieved in so short a
    period time.
        Of course, there is still a great deal of work ahead--and
    challenges to overcome. Our success is by no means assured. But we have
    an opportunity to build a new relationship for our peoples--a
    relationship that can contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity
    for generations of Russians and Americans. It is ours to grasp, or to
    let slip away. But let there be no doubt--it will require a change in
    our thinking in our bureaucracies, in the Duma and Congress, and in the
    press and in academic institutions. We have decades of momentum going
    in the opposite direction. We need to recalibrate our thinking and our
    approaches.
        In both our countries, there are those who are still struggling
    with the transition. Tolstoy said, ``everyone thinks of changing the
    world, but no one thinks of changing himself.'' There is a reason for
    that. Change is not easy--none of us wakes up in the morning wanting to
    change.
        Habits built up over many decades become ingrained and are hard to
    break. Here in the U.S., there are some who would have preferred to see
    us continue the adversarial arms control negotiations of the Soviet
    era--where teams of lawyers drafted hundreds of pages of treaty text,
    and each side worked to gain the upper hand, while focusing on ways to
    preserve a balance of nuclear terror. This is an approach that
    President Bush rejected, insisting instead that we deal with Russia as
    we deal with all normal countries--in a spirit of friendship, trust,
    and cooperation.
        Similarly, in Russia today there are those who are stuck in the
    past--who look warily at American offers of greater friendship and
    cooperation, preferring to keep us at arms length, while continuing to
    associate with the old allies of the former Soviet Union--dictatorial
    regimes characterized by political, religious, and economic
    repression--the world's walking wounded.
        But there are others in Russia who want to see her embrace the
    future and take her rightful place in Europe--through increased
    integration with the western industrialized democracies, and by
    embracing political and economic freedom, and the higher standard of
    living, domestic peace, and thriving culture that are the product of
    free societies. Sometimes these divergent impulses can be found in the
    same people.
        Both of our nations have a choice to make--a choice between the
    past and the future. Neither of us can make that choice for the other.
    But each of us has an interest in the choice the other makes.
        The question for us is: what can we, who choose the future, do to
    support each other?
        For those of us in the business of national defense, our task is an
    important one: to clear away the debris of past hostility that has been
    blocking our path into the 21st century.
        Russia and the United States entered this new century saddled with
    two legacies of the Cold War: the adversarial relationship to which we
    had both grown accustomed and the physical manifestation of that
    adversarial relationship--the massive arsenals of weapons we built up.
        In the past year, we have made progress in dealing with both. Last
    November, at the Crawford Summit, President Bush announced his
    intention to reduce the United States' operationally deployed strategic
    nuclear warheads by some two-thirds--to between 1,700 and 2,200
    weapons. Soon after, President Putin made a similar commitment.
        These announced reductions are a reflection of our new
    relationship. When President Reagan spoke to the students at Moscow
    State University in 1988, he told them, ``nations do not distrust each
    other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each
    other.'' Clearly, we do not distrust each other the way the U.S. and
    Soviet Union once did.
        But what is remarkable is not simply the fact of these planned
    reductions, but how they have happened. After a careful review,
    President Bush simply announced his intention to cut our operationally-
    deployed nuclear warheads. President Putin did the same. When they met
    in Moscow, they recorded these unilaterally announced changes in a
    treaty that will survive their two presidencies--the Moscow Treaty
    which the Senate and the Duma will now consider.
        But it is significant that while we consulted closely, and engaged
    in a process that has been open and transparent, we did not engage in
    lengthy, adversarial negotiations in which the U.S. and Russia kept
    thousands of weapons they did not need as bargaining chips. We did not
    establish standing negotiating teams in Geneva, with armies of arms
    control aficionados ready to do battle over every colon and comma.
        If we had done so, we would still be negotiating today. Instead, we
    are moving toward dramatic reductions in the ready nuclear weapons of
    our two countries and clearing the way for a new relationship between
    our countries.
        An illustration of how far we have come in that regard is this:
        [HOLDS UP START TREATY] This is the START I Treaty, signed in 1991
    by the first President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. It
    is 700 pages long, and took 9 years to negotiate.
        [HOLDS UP MOSCOW TREATY]. This is the Moscow Treaty, concluded this
    summer by President Bush and President Putin. It is 3 pages long, and
    took 6 months to negotiate.
        Mr. Chairman, we are working toward the day when the relationship
    between our two countries is such that no arms control treaties will be
    necessary.
        That is how normal countries deal with each other. The United
    States and Britain both have nuclear weapons, yet we do not spend
    hundreds of hours negotiating the fine details of mutual reductions in
    our offensive systems. We do not feel the need to preserve a balance of
    terror between us.
        It would be a worthy goal for our relationship with Russia to be
    the same.
        There are those who do not see the difference in the size of these
    treaties as a sign of progress. To the contrary, they would have
    preferred a voluminous, legalistic arms control agreement, with
    hundreds of pages of carefully crafted provisions and intrusive
    verification measures.
        These critics operate from a flawed premise: that, absent such an
    agreement, our two countries would both try to break out of the
    constraints of this treaty and increase our deployed nuclear forces.
    Nothing could be further from the truth.
        During the Cold War, the stated rationale for arms control was to
    constrain an arms race. But the idea of an arms race between the United
    States and Russia today is ludicrous. The relationship between our two
    countries today is such that the U.S. determined--unilaterally--that
    deep reductions in our deployed nuclear forces are in the U.S.
    interest.
        We would have made these cuts regardless of what Russia did with
    its arsenal. We are making them not because we signed a treaty in
    Moscow, but because the transformation in our relationship with Russia
    means we do not need so many deployed weapons. Russia has made a
    similar calculation. The agreement we reached in Moscow is the result
    of those determinations--not the cause of them.
        That is also one reason we saw no need for including detailed
    verification measures in the treaty. There simply isn't any way on
    earth to verify what Russia is doing with all those warheads. Neither
    side should have an interest in evading the terms of the treaty, since
    it codifies unilaterally-announced reductions and gives both sides
    broad flexibility in implementing them. Further, we saw no benefit in
    creating a new forum for bitter debates over compliance and
    enforcement. Today, the last place in the world where U.S. and Russian
    officials still sit across a table arguing with each other is in
    Geneva. Our goal is to move beyond that kind of Cold War animosity--not
    to find new ways to extend it into the 21st century.
        Similarly flawed is the complaint that, because the Moscow Treaty
    does not contain a requirement to destroy warheads removed from
    missiles or bombers, the cuts are reversible and therefore not
    ``real.'' Put aside for a moment the fact that no previous arms control
    treaty--not SALT, START, or INF--has required the destruction of
    warheads, and no one offered objections to them on that basis. This
    charge is based on a flawed premise--that irreversible reductions in
    nuclear weapons are possible. In point of fact, there is no such thing
    as an irreversible reduction in nuclear weapons. The knowledge of how
    to build nuclear weapons exists--and there is no possibility that
    knowledge will be lost. Every reduction is therefore reversible, given
    time and money.
        Indeed, when it comes to building nuclear weapons, Russia has a
    distinct advantage over the U.S. Today, Russia can and does produce
    both nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles--they have
    open warm production lines. The U.S. does not currently produce either
    ICBMs or nuclear warheads. It has been a decade since we produced a new
    nuclear weapon, and it would take us a number of years to begin
    producing them again. In the time it would take us to re-deploy
    decommissioned nuclear warheads, Russia could very likely produce a
    larger number of new ones.
        But the question is: why would we want to do so? Barring some
    unforeseen and dramatic change in the global security environment--like
    the sudden emergence of a hostile peer competitor on par with the old
    Soviet Union--there is no reason why we would re-deploy the warheads we
    are reducing.
        The reason to keep, rather than destroy, some of those
    decommissioned warheads is to have them available in the event there is
    a problem with the safety or reliability of some element of our
    arsenal. Since we do not have a warm production line, it would be
    mindless for us to destroy all those non-deployed warheads, and then
    have nothing for back up in the event we run into safety and
    reliability problems--or a sudden, unexpected change in the global
    security environment. Russia, by contrast, has little or no need to
    maintain a reserve of warheads, since it has an active production
    capability.
        Mr. Chairman, if we had pursued the path of traditional arms
    control, as some suggested, we would not be proceeding with the
    reductions outlined in this treaty. Rather, we would still be at the
    negotiating table, arguing over how to reconcile these and other
    asymmetries between Russia and the United States.

             We would have had to try to balance Russia's active
            production capacity against the United States' lack of one.
             Russia might have insisted that any agreement take
            into account the size of the U.S. economy and our ability to
            mobilize resources relatively quickly to develop new production
            facilities.
             We might have argued that Russia's proximity to rogue
            nations allows them to deter these regimes with tactical
            systems, whereas, because they are many thousands of miles away
            from us, the United States' distance from them requires more
            intercontinental delivery systems than Russia needs.
             This could have resulted in a mind-numbing debate over
            how many non-strategic systems should equal an intercontinental
            system, or opened the door to a discussion of whether an
            agreement must include all nuclear warheads--including tactical
            warheads.
             Russian negotiators might have countered that a U.S.
            advantage in advanced, high-tech conventional weapons must be
            taken into account.

        So on and so forth, ad infinitum.
        But the point is this: We don't need to ``reconcile'' all these
    asymmetries, because neither Russia nor the U.S. has an interest in
    taking advantage of the other by increasing its respective deployed
    nuclear forces.
        The approach we have taken is to treat Russia not as an adversary,
    but as a friendly power. In so doing, we have been able to preserve the
    benefits attributed to arms control--the dialogue, consultations, lower
    force levels, predictability, stability, and transparency. But we have
    done so without all the drawbacks: the protracted negotiations; the
    withholding of bargaining chips; the legalistic and adversarial process
    that, more often than not, becomes a source of bitterness between the
    participants; and the extended, embittered debates over compliance and
    enforcement of agreements.
        The U.S. and Russia are moving beyond all that. We are working to
    put that kind of acrimony and hostility behind us--and the adversarial
    process that was both a cause and effect of that hostility.
        Because Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, our
    interests have changed. As enemies, we had an interest in each other's
    failure; as friends we have an interest in each other's success. As
    enemies we had an interest in keeping each other off balance; as
    friends we have an interest in promoting stability.
        When Russia and the U.S. were adversaries, our principal focus was
    trying to maintain and freeze into place the balance of nuclear terror.
    With the recently completed Nuclear Posture Review, the United States
    has declared that we are not interested in preserving a balance of
    terror with Russia. Today, the threats we both face are no longer from
    each other--they come from new sources. As our adversaries change, our
    deterrence calculus can and should change as well.
        That is why we are working to transform our nuclear posture from
    one aimed at deterring a Soviet Union that no longer exists to one
    designed to deter new adversaries--adversaries that may not be
    discouraged from attacking us by the threat of U.S. nuclear
    retaliation, just as the terrorists who struck us on September 11 were
    not deterred by the United States' massive nuclear arsenal.
        With the Nuclear Posture Review, President Bush is taking a new
    approach to strategic deterrence--one that combines deep reductions in
    offensive nuclear forces with new conventional offensive and defensive
    systems more appropriate for deterring the potential adversaries we
    face.
        Taken together, this ``New Triad'' of offensive nuclear forces,
    advanced conventional capabilities, and a range of new defenses
    (ballistic missile defense, cruise missile defense, space defense,
    cyber defense) supported by a revitalized defense infrastructure, are
    all part of a new approach to deterrence and defense--an approach
    designed to increase our security, while reducing our reliance on
    nuclear weapons.
        Some have asked why, in the post-Cold War world, we need to
    maintain as many as 1,700-2,200 operationally-deployed warheads. The
    end of the Soviet threat does not mean we no longer need nuclear
    weapons. To the contrary, the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains an important
    part of our deterrence strategy, and helps to dissuade the emergence of
    potential or would-be peer competitors, by underscoring the futility of
    trying to sprint toward parity with us or superiority.
        Indeed, Mr. Chairman, our decision to proceed with reductions as
    deep as the ones outlined in the Moscow Treaty is premised on decisions
    to invest in a number of other critical areas--programs that are funded
    in our 2003 budget request.
        These include investments to:

             Improve U.S. intelligence collection, analysis,
            processing, and dissemination;
             Protect the U.S. homeland, including a refocused and
            revitalized missile defense research and testing program, and
            capabilities to detect and respond to biological attack;
             Accelerate development of UAVs with new combat
            capabilities and produce fast, precision conventional strike
            capabilities;
             Convert four Trident nuclear submarines into stealthy
            SSGN Strike Submarines that can carry cruise missiles and
            Special Operations Forces into denied areas;
             Leverage information technology to seamlessly connect
            U.S. forces--in the air, at sea and on the ground;
             Protect our information networks;
             Improve the survivability of U.S space systems, and
            develop a space infrastructure that assures persistent
            surveillance and access.

        Investments in these, and many other transformational capabilities
    in the 2003 budget, will allow the U.S., over time, to reduce our
    reliance on nuclear weapons and enact the deep nuclear reductions
    contained in the Moscow Treaty. I urge the Senate to approve the 2003
    defense budget as soon as possible.
        Others have asked why there is no reduction schedule in the treaty.
    The answer, quite simply, is flexibility. Our approach in the Nuclear
    Posture Review was to recognize that we are entering a period of
    surprise and uncertainty, when the sudden emergence of unexpected
    threats will be increasingly common feature of our security
    environment. We were surprised on September 11--and let there be no
    doubt, we will be surprised again.
        When Bob McNamara appeared before the Senate for his confirmation
    hearings as Secretary of Defense, no one mentioned the word Vietnam.
    When Vice President Cheney appeared before the Senate for his Senate
    confirmation as Secretary of Defense, he did not, nor did any member of
    the committee, mention the word Iraq. When I appeared before the Senate
    Armed Services Committee for my confirmation hearings last year, no
    one--including me--mentioned the word Afghanistan.
        Intelligence has repeatedly underestimated the capabilities of
    different countries of concern to us. We have historically have had
    gaps in our knowledge of 4, 6, 8, and in at least one case 12 or so
    years. It is simply not possible for intelligence to know everything
    taking place in our world. The only surprise is that so many among us
    are still surprised. This problem is more acute in an age when the
    spread of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of terrorist
    states--and potentially terrorist networks--means that our margin of
    error is significantly less than it has been. The cost of a mistake
    could be not thousands, but hundreds of thousands of lives--or even
    millions.
        Because of our smaller margin for error and the uncertainty of the
    future security environment, the U.S. will need flexibility. Through
    the Nuclear Posture Review, we determined the force levels and the
    flexibility we will need to deal with that new world and then
    negotiated a treaty that allows both deep reduction in offensive
    weapons and the flexibility to respond to sudden changes in the
    strategic environment.
        We are working to develop the right mix of offensive and defensive
    capabilities. If we do so, we believe the result will be that nations
    are less likely to acquire or use nuclear weapons.
        None of these changes is in any way a threat to Russia. Far from
    it, this new approach to deterrence will help us to better contribute
    to peace and stability, and address the new threats and challenges the
    United States will face in the 21st century.
        In many ways, Russia now faces the most benign security environment
    it has enjoyed in more than 700 years. From the 13th century up till
    the dawn of the 16th century, Russia was subjected to Mongol rule; in
    the 17th century she was invaded by Poland; in the 18th century by
    Sweden; in the 19th century by France; and in the 20th century by
    Germany. Today, for the first time in modern history, Russia is not
    faced with a foreign invader with its eye set on Moscow.
        In the 21st century, Russia and the United States both face new and
    different security challenges--the threats of terrorism and
    fundamentalism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue
    states. The difference is that these are threats our two nations have
    in common--threats that we can face together.
        This means that we have entered a period when cooperation between
    our two countries will be increasingly important to the security and
    prosperity of both our peoples. We can work together to stop the spread
    of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of terrorist movements
    and terrorist states. We can work together to support Russia's economic
    transformation and deeper integration into the Euro-Atlantic
    community--because a prosperous Russia would not face the same
    pressures to sell rogue states the tools of mass destruction.
        If one were to look down from Mars on Earth, one would see that the
    world divides pretty neatly into countries that are doing well and
    countries that are not doing well. The countries that are doing well
    are the ones that have free political systems, free economic systems,
    rule of law, transparency and predictability, and are integrated into
    the world economy. They are the nations where there is growth and
    opportunity.
        If Russia hopes to attract foreign capital, or retain her most
    gifted, best educated citizens, she must provide them with a climate of
    economic opportunity and political freedom--a climate that is the
    critical foundation on which prosperity, creativity and opportunity are
    built.
        We in the United States can encourage Russia--by working together
    to put the past behind us, establish bonds of friendship between our
    peoples. But, in the end, the choice, and the struggle, belong to the
    Russian people.
        This treaty is by no means the foundation of that new relationship.
    It is merely one element of a growing, multifaceted relationship
    between our two countries that involves not just security, but also
    increasing political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and other forms of
    cooperation.
        These reductions in the nuclear arsenals of our two countries are a
    step in that process. The reductions characterized in the Moscow Treaty
    will help eliminate the debris of past hostility that has been blocking
    our way as we build a new relationship. The Treaty President Bush has
    fashioned--and the process by which he fashioned it--are both models
    for future cooperation between our two countries. We have achieved deep
    reductions, and enhanced the security of both our countries, without
    perpetuating Cold War ways of thinking that hinder a desire for better
    relations.
        I urge the Senate to advise and consent to this treaty and to
    approve a clean resolution of ratification.
        I'd be pleased to respond to your questions. Any questions that
    cannot be fully answered here, we will be pleased to answer in
    classified session or later for the record.
                                     ______

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Secretary Rumsfeld.
        General Myers.

       STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
                            CHIEFS OF STAFF

        General Myers. Chairman Levin and Senator Warner and
    distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for the
    invitation to appear before you today. Before I begin my
    remarks on the Moscow Treaty, I would like to thank you for
    taking time to conduct the confirmation hearings for our
    combatant commanders. I think you have one scheduled tomorrow.
    We realize how busy you are, and we very much appreciate the
    timely manner in which this committee always responds to our
    requirements. Thank you.
        It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the
    Moscow Treaty. Mr. Chairman, I would first request that my
    prepared statement be submitted for the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
        General Myers. I will make some short introductory remarks
    and then answer any questions that you and the committee might
    have.
        Mr. Chairman, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
    I all support the Moscow Treaty. We believe it provides for the
    long-term security interests of our Nation and we also believe
    that it preserves our flexibility in an uncertain strategic
    environment. Moreover, the treaty allows us to implement the
    recommendations that came out of our Nuclear Posture Review.
        As you consider the treaty's protocols, there are three key
    aspects that I would like to briefly comment on. First, we
    welcome the fact that with this treaty we will focus on
    operationally deployed warheads. This enables us to preserve
    critical conventional capabilities while we manage the
    reduction in strategic nuclear warheads.
        Second, the 10-year implementation schedule gives us
    flexibility in terms of drawing down our forces. Security
    imperatives over the next decade may change radically from what
    we anticipate today.
        Third, the treaty's provision that allows the U.S. to
    withdraw with a 90-day notification requirement provides a
    hedge against sudden changes in the global strategic
    environment. We believe together these provisions enable us to
    adjust our strategy, if necessary, both in the short and long
    term to meet the Nation's security needs. These provisions also
    allow us to make significant reductions in nuclear warheads and
    continue a reduction process that has been ongoing for the past
    3 decades.
        Perhaps most important of all, this treaty forms the basis
    for a new relationship with our Russian counterparts, putting
    to rest the Cold War at last.
        Mr. Chairman, the Secretary and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Myers follows:]
               Prepared Statement by Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF
        It is an honor to appear before this committee and share with you
    the implications of the Moscow Treaty on our Nation's defense. The
    Joint Chiefs of Staff maintain that this treaty enhances the security
    of our country, and that of the world, by making a dramatic reduction
    in the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads while allowing the
    U.S. to retain the flexibility to hedge against future uncertainty.
    While the requirements of this treaty are fewer and more direct than
    previous arms control agreements, there are a number of key provisions
    to highlight.
        The treaty requires the U.S. to reduce its strategic nuclear
    warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads. From current levels, this
    number reflects almost a two-thirds cut in our strategic arsenal. This
    reduction is consistent with our conclusions in the recent Nuclear
    Posture Review.
        Furthermore, as we implement the treaty, the U.S. will include only
    those warheads that are ``operationally deployed.'' As such, we will
    derive the total number of warheads from the number of warheads on
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) deployed in their launchers,
    the number of warheads on Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)
    in their launch tubes onboard submarines, and nuclear weapons loaded on
    heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas at heavy bomber bases.
    We will not include the small number of spare strategic nuclear
    warheads located at heavy bomber bases. We also will not include the
    warheads associated with strategic systems that are non-operational for
    maintenance actions, those warheads downloaded from SLBMs or ICBMS, or
    those warheads nominally associated with the deactivated Peacekeeper
    ICBMs. As a result, under the Moscow Treaty, we can reduce the
    operationally deployed warheads, rather than weapon systems, allowing
    us to make deep reductions in our strategic warheads while maintaining
    conventional capabilities.
        The U.S. also benefits from the Moscow Treaty's flexibility because
    it allows the U.S. to store spare warheads rather than destroy them.
    There are key benefits the U.S. gains from storing the removed nuclear
    warheads. The U.S. cannot replace nuclear warheads in the near- or mid-
    term as we are currently not manufacturing new nuclear warheads. As a
    result, the storage of warheads will provide the U.S. a hedge against
    future strategic changes. In addition, storing nuclear warheads
    provides a hedge in case warhead safety or reliability becomes a
    concern.
        It is also important to note that the Moscow Treaty recognizes that
    the START Treaty remains in effect. The START Treaty methodology
    attributes a specific number of warheads to each type of delivery
    system. The START methodology ``counts'' warheads even if the delivery
    platform is in maintenance. The START methodology also counts warheads
    even if there is not a warhead deployed in the delivery platform. Under
    the Moscow Treaty, the U.S. will only count operationally deployed
    warheads. The U.S. may remove a warhead to comply with the Moscow
    Treaty but a ``notional'' warhead may still be counted under the START
    Treaty as we fulfill our obligations under both treaties.
        The Moscow Treaty also requires that the U.S. and Russia meet the
    lowered force levels by December 31, 2012. This 10-year implementation
    deadline maximizes flexibility for both parties and provides a mid-term
    hedge against unforeseen events. If the strategic environment dictated,
    we could temporarily raise the number of deployed warheads to address
    an immediate concern while later still meeting the December 2012
    deadline. Should such a temporary increase be necessary, however, U.S.
    actions would remain within the START Treaty obligations.
        Finally, the Moscow Treaty allows the U.S. to withdraw with 3
    months notification. This provision allows the U.S. to exercise its
    national sovereignty and respond to a more dramatic change in the
    strategic environment.
        The Moscow Treaty does not, however, include a number of protocols
    common to previous arms control agreements. This lack of protocols
    enhances our flexibility in implementing this accord. For example, the
    Moscow Treaty will not limit delivery platforms nor does it require
    delivery platforms to be destroyed. As a result, the U.S. will maintain
    a significant flexibility to adjust future force structure. This
    approach will allow us to remove all 50 Peacekeeper missiles. Likewise,
    we may modify some Trident submarines from their strategic missions and
    assign them to transformational missions that are more relevant to the
    asymmetric threats we now face. Finally, this approach will allow the
    U.S. to retain heavy bombers for their conventional role. Our
    operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the vital capability that
    conventional bombers provide our Combatant Commanders.
        The Moscow Treaty has no requirement for an additional inspection
    regime. START's comprehensive verification regime will provide the
    foundation for confidence, transparency, and predictability in further
    strategic offensive reduction. The Moscow Treaty will not subject the
    U.S. to intrusive inspections in some of our most sensitive military
    areas.
        The Moscow Treaty allows the U.S. to make deep reductions in
    strategic nuclear warheads while preserving our flexibility to meet
    unpredictable strategic changes. The treaty finally puts to rest the
    Cold War legacy of superpower suspicion. It reflects the new
    relationship of trust, cooperation, and friendship with an important
    U.S. partner.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Myers.
        Secretary Rumsfeld, the treaty does not define the term
    ``operationally deployed,'' but that is the key to the treaty,
    that it limits the number of operationally deployed warheads.
    General Myers' printed testimony apparently gave us the
    decision as to what we are going to do relative to that number.
    On page 1 of his testimony he says that the number of warheads
    will be counted if they are in launch tubes on submarines,
    loaded on heavy bombers, or stored in weapons storage areas at
    heavy bomber bases. I will just stop right there.
        Have the Russians adopted a similar definition of
    ``operationally deployed'' since that is what we are looking at
    here? I think you will agree we are not reducing the number of
    warheads, we are reducing the number of operationally deployed
    warheads, correct?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The treaty refers to operationally
    deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
        Chairman Levin. We have apparently concluded as to what we
    will interpret that to mean. Do we know what the Russian
    interpretation is? Is it similar to ours?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. As I recall, the negotiations did not
    insert in the treaty any precise definition. We have indicated
    what we consider it to be, and there is no question but that
    the Russians will be using something roughly approximating
    that.
        Chairman Levin. Have we had discussions, General Myers,
    with the Russians as to what their interpretation of that
    undefined phrase will be?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. There were discussions.
        General Myers. I think there were discussions on that.
        Chairman Levin. Is there any understanding with the
    Russians as to whether they will have a similar approach to it
    that we will?
        General Myers. My understanding is they are going to have a
    very similar approach to how they count their warheads as we
    do.
        Chairman Levin. By the way, I did not announce this, but we
    will have an 8-minute round based on the early bird rule.
        In May 2000, when President Bush was a candidate, he talked
    about removing weapons from high alert hair-trigger status. I
    am wondering whether or not, Mr. Secretary, the Department is
    going to implement that objective of removing weapons from high
    alert status in the near future as part of our effort to reduce
    the risks of accidental or unauthorized launch and to try to
    build confidence between ourselves and Russia?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that that
    subject was one that was discussed intermittently ever since
    the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and that each side
    has very different forces. We have our forces arranged
    differently, they are targeted differently and have been. There
    are asymmetries in how we are arranged. Each side has made
    adjustments in how they are arranged over a period of 6, 8, 10,
    12 years, I would guess.
        If I could characterize our current situation, I think it
    would be inaccurate to suggest that we are currently arranged
    on what any rational person could characterize as a hair-
    trigger arrangement. I am trying to think of precise changes in
    answer to the question, General Myers, in the last year and a
    half.
        General Myers. We are in an open hearing here, so I have to
    be somewhat careful, but one of the changes was to not have the
    weapons targeted on specific targets or sites. That was one of
    the changes, and I think that is all I want to say about it.
        Chairman Levin. Are there any additional changes that were
    contemplated in terms of alert status, as the President
    indicated we would attempt to do?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Not as a part of this treaty.
        Chairman Levin. Or otherwise?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. You are asking is there anything
    prospective that is planned?
        Chairman Levin. Right.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Not that I know of.
        Chairman Levin. I want to be very clear as to what the
    treaty does. The treaty, as I understand it, does not reduce
    the stockpile from the current level of 6,000 plus warheads, is
    that correct?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The treaty does exactly what it
    specifies and it does not address that subject. I can explain
    about the stockpile.
        Chairman Levin. No, just in terms of the number in our
    stockpile, the treaty does not address the number?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. It addresses operationally deployed
    strategic nuclear weapons, as I indicated.
        Chairman Levin. One of the achievements that we were so
    anxious to obtain in the START II Treaty was the elimination of
    Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRVed)
    missiles, especially the SS-18, because of the potential
    instability should the relationship change or for whatever
    other reason. The Joint Chiefs hailed that achievement as a
    longstanding goal and a major accomplishment for our security.
        The Moscow Treaty does not prohibit MIRVed ICBMs, so Russia
    can keep its SS-18s and place new MIRVed warheads on other
    missiles like the SS-27. Is it now our position that we do not
    care if Russia keeps the SS-18s or places MIRVed warheads on
    other missiles, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That subject has come up and our view
    is that our circumstance and Russia's circumstance are notably
    different in many respects. Our geography is different, our
    neighbors are different, the way we produce weapons is
    different, the life of those weapons is different. I am sure
    the targeting perspectives are quite different.
        It had been, when we were engaged in what was characterized
    as mutual assured destruction, that the subject of MIRVed
    weapons became extremely important. It is in my view today a
    subject that is much less important, and it is entirely
    possible that the Russians may very well make a decision that,
    given the asymmetries in our circumstance, they may want to
    MIRV some portion of their force.
        We have looked at that, and we are quite comfortable that
    that does not create an instability in the relationship.
        General Myers. Mr. Chairman, let me chime in on that. To
    add to what the Secretary said, I think that is absolutely
    right. When the Joint Chiefs made their comments about the MIRV
    and START II and so forth, we were still in a different
    relationship than we have today with Russia. I think the
    context of our treaty and the geopolitical environment we find
    ourselves in makes that topic a lot less interesting than it
    was in the Cold War days, when it was of interest and when we
    were enemies.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Previous arms reduction treaties did not require
    destruction of warheads, but they did require destruction of
    delivery systems, which was, of course, critically important at
    that time. The Moscow Treaty does not require the destruction
    either of warheads or of delivery systems.
        Now the question is what will we be doing with the
    Peacekeeper? Is it our plan to eliminate the Peacekeeper
    missiles and their silos, even though it is not required to do
    so by treaty, General?
        General Myers. The current plans, of course, are to
    eliminate the Peacekeepers. There has not been a decision yet
    on what to do with the silos, so that is in the future.
        The warheads, because they are our most modern--the safest,
    most secure type warhead we have--will be put on our other
    land-based missiles, the Minuteman missile.
        Chairman Levin. My final question. Secretary Rumsfeld, the
    Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is coming to a halt
    because of the inability to make the necessary certifications.
    The Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Bill
    that is in conference contains the legislative authority that
    the administration requested, which is permanent authority for
    the President to grant an annual waiver of the prerequisites of
    the Freedom Support Act and the Cooperative Threat Reduction
    Act. The House bill contains authority to grant waivers for 3
    years.
        I assume that you support the administration position
    relative to permanent authority, so I will not ask you that.
    But if you disagree with it, perhaps in your answer to the
    question I am going to ask you, you could let me know that,
    too.
        Here is the issue. The permanent authority requested by the
    administration to grant annual waivers of the prerequisites to
    implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program does
    not include an ability to waive the special prerequisites for
    the Russian chemical weapons destruction program being carried
    out under the CTR program. President Bush said that not only
    did he support this important effort to destroy the Russian
    chemical weapons, he actually wanted to accelerate it. But if
    there is no authority to waive those special prerequisites for
    the chemical destruction, then that program is going to be shut
    down.
        Will you be asking for waiver authority for the special
    prerequisites for the Russian chemical weapons destruction
    program?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The administration either has or will
    be asking for that waiver authority with respect to the
    chemical weapons destruction facility.
        Chairman Levin. Do you support that request?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Indeed I do.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General, do you support that, too?
        General Myers. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is quite interesting. I will read the one paragraph in
    the treaty which in my judgment embraces what it is that is
    before us today for discussion. It is Article I, very simple:
    ``Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads,
    as stated by the President of the United States of America on
    November 13, 2001, and as stated by the President of the
    Russian Federation on November 13, 2001, and December 13, 2001,
    respectively, so that by December 31, 2012, the aggregate
    number of such warheads does not exceed 1,700-2,200 for each
    Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition
    and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the
    established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.''
        Now, for those of us who have had some exposure over many
    years to these types of treaties and goals, it is
    understandable. But to others who are beginning to absorb the
    importance of this landmark document, I would like to clarify
    with you one or two of the words used here so that we have a
    legislative history, such that if future generations begin to
    challenge what was intended at the time this language was
    written at least there is the colloquy and the testimony
    provided here this morning to clarify it.
        My first question is, was there reason to not incorporate
    the word ``operational'' with respect to the aggregate of the
    weapons to end up in 2012, namely 1,700 to 2,200? In simple
    forms, you take the existing inventory over the years between
    now and 2012, you detached the warheads from certain systems,
    you put them in storage, and the balance remain in an
    operational status. Is that my understanding and your
    understanding?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, first let me say that the
    discussions took place between President Putin and President
    Bush, they took place between Secretary Powell and Foreign
    Minister Ivanov, and between Don Rumsfeld and Sergei Ivanov,
    the Defense Minister of Russia, as well as at the Feith and
    Bolton levels. You asked if there was any discussion about
    something. There were so many meetings and discussions, I
    really am not in a position to say precisely that.
        I was trying to read what you were citing here. It was in
    Article I?
        Senator Warner. That is correct. In other words, it just
    states that you will end up with such a number of warheads,
    ``the aggregate number of warheads does not exceed . . .'' Now,
    those are in an operational status.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly, as defined by General Myers'
    testimony.
        Senator Warner. Fine. Now, the others are non-operational.
    Can you describe--and the General can join in--what status they
    are in?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Sure.
        Senator Warner. In other words, I understand, and I think
    the public following this do, they are detached.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
        Senator Warner. But could you put them back on in an hour's
    time? No.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. No.
        Senator Warner. A week's time? No.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Right.
        Senator Warner. I think it is important----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. It is.
        Senator Warner.----to show how when they go to storage they
    are really in a status that would not lend themselves to be
    utilized in any regrettable and unfortunate rapid exchange
    between the two nations of portions of its arsenals which are
    operational.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. You are correct. A non-deployed warhead
    could be used in any number of circumstances and the
    circumstances in our country would be different from those in
    Russia, because Russia, for example, has an open production
    line. So every day or week or month another warhead may be
    coming off their production line. Where is it? Well, it is
    where it is. It has just been produced and it now exists. Then
    it goes someplace.
        In addition, the Russian system is that they tend to remove
    old warheads and they then are taken off and in some cases
    refurbished and in some cases put in a queue to be destroyed,
    and in some cases in the process of destroying them they
    disaggregate them and they are in piece parts. So they may have
    5, 10, 15 parts, and some of those parts would lend themselves
    to be re-used, in which case they might then be refashioned
    into restored or refurbished warheads.
        The United States, quite to the contrary, we tend to make
    these things in a way that they last much longer. We do not
    have a pattern of changing them out anywhere near as rapidly as
    does Russia.
        Senator Warner. If I could interrupt, Mr. Secretary, with a
    series of presidents we intentionally made the decision not to
    build any new ones, in sharp contrast with Russia, which is
    building new ones.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
        Senator Warner. Therefore, we did have the requirement of
    placing these in some type of status such that if there is a
    deterioration in the operational warhead we could simply go
    back and extract one from the inventory in storage and replace
    it.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly. So therefore the answer to
    your question with respect to Russia is that their warheads
    that are not operationally deployed are in the following
    categories at least: coming off a production line, in a queue
    ready to be restored, stored for the purpose of use, and piece
    parts waiting to be reassembled in some form or another.
        In the United States, weapons that are not operationally
    deployed would tend to be in the following categories--and
    check me here, Dick Myers. We do not have anything coming off a
    production line. We would have them away from a bomber base
    some distance, because the ones not on a bomber but near a
    bomber base would be considered operationally deployed. They
    would be in a queue to be destroyed, or they would be held in
    reserve in the event a phone rang one day and we were advised
    that we had a class of weapons that were no longer safe or no
    longer reliable, in which case we very likely would use ones
    that were not operationally deployed and not in the queue to be
    destroyed because they are no longer in good enough shape to be
    used. They then would be used to replace anything that was seen
    as being unsafe or unreliable.
        Senator Warner. I would like to have the General amplify
    that response and also give us, frankly, some hands-on examples
    of when a weapon is removed pursuant to this treaty from an
    operational status, stored, and then if it were required to go
    back into a system, what are the steps required to re-integrate
    it and the time involved?
        General Myers. I would be happy to, Senator Warner. First
    of all, let us keep in mind that we are not making warheads any
    more. I put them in some bins in my mind, the way my mind
    works, of what we would do with warheads that are not
    operationally deployed. You would have an operational reserve,
    spares for weapons that you have to change out that check out
    bad during the numerous checks we do on operational weapons all
    the time.
        You would have a strategic reserve. If the environment
    changes, you need some number, which has not been decided yet.
    That is yet to be decided.
        Then you need a reserve to cope with reliability issues. As
    the Secretary said, we will count as operationally deployed
    those weapons that are kept on the base with the bombers in the
    weapons storage areas, because presumably you can upload those
    in a matter of let us say hours. It would probably take you, to
    generate all the bombers, a matter of days, but you could start
    that process in a matter of hours.
        Then you go to land-based component. Those weapons will be
    stored in the weapons storage area at the base. We get to the
    weapons fields, by land, but they can be many hours, up to 6
    hours, away by vehicle. To upload weapons on a missile is a
    pretty slow process because you have to secure the site before
    you open the silo, then you have to open the silo, you have to
    get the maintenance people on site, you have to bring the
    weapons to the site and then install them on the missile.
        Senator Warner. I would appreciate if you would amplify
    that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Once the weapons installation process is complete, which
    could take several hours by itself, the maintenance teams must
    close the site and return all of the special vehicles and
    equipment to the base. After weapons installation, the missile
    combat crew, who is remotely located from the missile, must
    transfer targeting data and run a series of commands, tests,
    and calibrations to return the missile to full alert status.
    The missile combat crew's actions could take as long as 12-16
    hours. The entire process for one ICBM could take between 24 to
    30 hours under current conditions. Actual minimum generation
    times are classified and can easily be supplied to you upon
    request.

        Senator Warner. I want to just ask one last technical
    question. The end date is 2012.
        General Myers. Correct.
        Senator Warner. There is no schedule. Theoretically, one
    side could wait until perhaps the last year or two to reach its
    entire reduction of inventory, thereby leaving the other side
    at a disadvantage. What steps are in place to ensure that as
    these drawdowns occur there is basic stability between the two
    parties to the treaty so that one does not gain an advantage?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I think the way to think about the
    treaty is that these are really decisions that were made
    unilaterally and then brought together in a treaty. The treaty
    provides the flexibility so either side can do anything they
    feel that is in their security interest during that period of
    drawdown.
        In the event that, as General Myers indicated, the world
    environment changed, either side has the ability to level off
    or not continue in a drawdown period. My guess is that there
    will be an uneven drawdown. Their situation is quite different
    from ours. Their weapons do age. They do have a problem of
    moving them off, and they are on that path.
        I do not think there could be a problem, but if there were
    a problem all either side would have to do would be to have the
    flexibility to make an adjustment that is in their security
    interest. If the worse came to worst, there is a clause in the
    treaty that permits, as there is with every treaty, either side
    to pull out with notice.
        Senator Warner. Let us hope that is not achieved.
        But would that flexibility enable us--if we had drawn down
    significantly further than Russia, and we noted that Russia was
    not keeping pace, and our strategic analysts felt that there
    was an instability in the balance--to restore to an operational
    status some of the weapons taken down?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. We have that flexibility, although one
    would think that we would be wise enough as we go down--we do
    have the verification provisions in the START Treaty between
    now and 2009. So we are going to have national technical means
    capable of knowing.
        Senator Warner. I understand that.
        My time is up.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers for
    joining us this morning. I want to wish you well in all the
    work you do for our great country.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Akaka. I also look at the treaty as giving us great
    promise as we come out of the Cold War and the age of mutual
    assured destruction. I look upon it as a beginning on a long
    road toward true arms reduction and cooperation.
        Unfortunately, this treaty does not explicitly establish a
    timetable or verification process for warhead destruction, nor
    does it address tactical nuclear weapons that are what might be
    considered attractive to terrorists. During his testimony
    before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Powell
    indicated that this treaty is likely to be superseded by more
    ambitious agreements that will answer many of our questions on
    verification and questions on compliance. It has been noted
    that it took 9 years to work out these details in START. If we
    hope to have something in place when START expires in 2009 or 3
    years later when SORT expires, I believe it is critical that we
    start now.
        I spent yesterday at the Governmental Affairs Committee
    markup to determine the structure of the future Homeland
    Security Department. Several times during the day my colleagues
    asked, will this make the American people more secure? To make
    America more secure, nuclear arms reductions must prevent
    terrorists from acquiring nuclear material and nuclear weapons.
    The most attractive kind of weapons for terrorists are tactical
    nuclear weapons. SORT does not deal with tactical nukes, but
    SORT is only the beginning. I want to continue to stress that.
        What steps, Mr. Secretary, are we taking to address the
    large number of Russian tactical weapons?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you are of course correct that
    we do need to address the subject of transparency and
    predictability or verification, as it is sometimes called, and
    both sides have indicated that they do intend to begin
    discussions fairly promptly that would pursue that issue. I
    believe the treaty fashions a group of the two defense
    ministers and the two foreign ministers who are supposed to
    meet and begin to discuss those things. We have a meeting
    scheduled already for September, even before the treaty has
    been ratified by the United States Senate or the Duma.
        Second, with respect to theater nuclear weapons, you are
    also correct. That is a subject that has not been addressed
    between the two countries. I have raised it in every meeting we
    have been in. I think that what is important there--and the
    Russians have many multiples more than we do of theater nuclear
    weapons.
        We believe that our interest is in gaining better awareness
    as to what they have, and we do not have a good fix on the
    numbers from an intelligence standpoint, nor have they been
    forthcoming in discussing that.
        Second, we think that some degree of transparency would be
    helpful as to what they are doing by way of production, what
    they are doing by way of destruction, what they are doing by
    way of storage. You are quite right, there is no question but
    that the security issue with respect to theater nuclear weapons
    is a very serious one.
        You can expect that we will continue to raise those
    questions and bring the issue forward in the U.S.-Russia
    discussions that are scheduled shortly.
        Senator Akaka. I was so glad to see that part of the treaty
    is the inclusion and establishment of a bilateral commission. I
    believe that the bilateral commission is tasked to meet twice a
    year. I feel that it is a most promising aspect of the treaty
    because it will give us a chance to continue to talk with the
    Russians, and I believe that this is one way of filling in the
    details that we are asking ourselves.
        My question is, when will the commission meet, and what are
    the principal topics to be discussed?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I think the way to characterize it is
    that it will be somewhat different than prior bilateral
    commissions or standing consultative commissions or arms
    control type commissions. This group has as its purpose, I
    believe the language suggests, a relatively narrow focus on
    implementation of the treaty. It would probably be the other
    group I mentioned, which would be the Secretary of Defense of
    both countries and the Secretary of State of both countries,
    that would discuss issues like theater nuclear weapons,
    transparency, predictability, verification, and other aspects
    of the relationship.
        Senator Akaka. It is likely that Russia would have had to
    reduce its nuclear stockpile to 1,200 to 1,500 warheads without
    this treaty. I am concerned that Russia will feel forced to
    maintain an arsenal of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads to match the
    U.S. stockpile. Considering the state of Russian stockpile
    stewardship, will Russia be able to safely maintain and secure
    this larger number?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. It is a matter of priorities. Russia
    has choices to make, like every country in the world does, and
    they have to recognize the importance of preventing
    proliferation. Any country that has weapons of mass destruction
    has by definition a responsibility to manage them very
    carefully. The power of these weapons is enormous, and it would
    be inexcusable for any country not to establish a very high
    priority on the security of such weapons.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First let me just say to both of the witnesses today how
    thankful I am that we have you, General Myers, and you,
    Secretary Rumsfeld, and the entire national security team at
    the helm at this time that I really believe is the most
    threatening time in our Nation's history.
        One of the most compelling statements I have heard you
    make, Secretary Rumsfeld, is when you talk about the margin of
    error. It was kind of buried in your statement. You only
    mentioned it at the very last, and I think that is something we
    need to talk about over and over again. I would like to have
    you at this time elaborate a little bit on the margin of error
    today as opposed to the margin of error in the past against
    conventional threats.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Inhofe, it is certainly
    something that we worry about as much as anything, and it is
    this. We have moved from a 20th century security environment to
    a 21st century security environment. We have moved from a
    period where we were facing the carnage that can result from
    the use of conventional weapons, meaning hundreds and thousands
    of people can die, into the 21st century where we are dealing
    with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and we
    are not talking about hundreds or thousands, we are talking
    about the potential loss of hundreds of thousands or millions
    of human beings as a result of the use of biological, chemical,
    nuclear, or radiation weapons.
        That is so different for the world, it is so different for
    us. Not only has there been proliferation of these weapons, but
    there has been proliferation of the denial and deception
    techniques as to how people can hide those capabilities. It is
    a big world, and regrettably, we know a great deal, but there
    is a great deal we do not know. We keep finding that more
    information is coming available to us and in fact it occurred
    not today or yesterday, but 1, 2, 4, 5 years ago.
        That says to me, as you point out, that our margin for
    error is much less, that we are living in a period of little or
    no warning, that we have to organize, train, equip, and manage
    our affairs so that we can live in that world, a vastly more
    dangerous world.
        Senator Inhofe. I think that is very well said. Several of
    us on this panel have expressed concern over the last 10 years,
    in my case since 1994 when I came from the House to the Senate,
    with the fact that they are getting so dangerously close in
    some rogue nations to developing the capability. We know that
    most of them have weapons of mass destruction. We know that
    they have access and they are developing the missile means of
    delivering those. Where they are I do not think we know
    exactly, but we do know that there are three countries that
    have missiles that will reach the United States and that those
    countries, two of them anyway, are dealing, and trading
    technology and systems with countries like Iraq, Iran, Syria,
    Libya, and other countries.
        What concerns me--during the discussion of today's meeting
    I have not said very much about it--is how this relates to our
    ability to have a missile defense system. In other words, we
    know that when you talk about the margin of error, if on
    September 11, the terrorists had had the weapon of choice, a
    nuclear warhead on a missile, as opposed to what they had, how
    devastating that would be.
        Now, if for some reason the United States does not deploy a
    missile defense system, will we still be able to comply with
    the reductions that are stated in the Moscow Treaty?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, that is a good question, and
    it is a question that is probably not knowable until we move
    along. In the Nuclear Posture Review we did conceptualize a
    somewhat modified treaty, not to say we are going to move away
    from land-based, sea-based, and air-based strategic nuclear
    weapons, but rather that if one looks at offensive weapons,
    they would be both conventional and nuclear. Another leg of the
    triad would be defensive capabilities, and a third would be the
    infrastructure, and then coordinated by command control in the
    center of that concept.
        As I mentioned in my remarks, the proposals with respect to
    1,700 to 2,200 are premised on some investments that need to be
    made in missile defense, some investments that need to be made
    in infrastructure, and the capability to manage our affairs
    going forward. Fortunately, we have a good long period to
    pursue our missile defense research and development program,
    make judgments as to which are the most fruitful areas, and,
    one would hope, be able to deploy missile defenses during that
    period.
        My guess is that there will be each year a calculation made
    as to how we are doing with respect to all elements that were
    considered in the Nuclear Posture Review.
        Senator Inhofe. Conceivably, I would assume that we would
    be able to make alterations in this treaty as time went by and
    conditions changed also.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. My guess is that we will be talking
    starting in September on possible increments or additions or
    changes.
        Senator Inhofe. Let me read from your previous testimony. I
    think this actually was in your statement today. You said:
    ``First, there simply is not any way on Earth to verify what
    Russia is doing with all the warheads. Second, we do not need
    to. Neither side should have an interest in evading the terms
    of the treaty since it simply codifies unilaterally-announced
    intentions and reductions, and it gives both sides broad
    flexibility in implementing those decisions.''
        Further in your statement, you said: ``In this century,
    Russia and the United States both face new and different
    security challenges, not exactly the same, but certainly the
    threats of terrorism, fundamentalism, and the spread of weapons
    of mass destruction to rogue nations are common.''
        Now, as we move ahead into this treaty, how do you balance
    this? We are trying to forge this relationship between Russia
    and the United States. We all want that. Yet we want at the
    same time to make sure that weapons that are taken from active
    deployment do not fall in the hands of the wrong people. How do
    you balance those two things?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I think that a weapon, regardless of
    where it is located, has to be maintained in a secure manner.
    So I think the difference between those that are deployed or
    those that are not deployed is really not so much the issue as
    how wise we are in carefully managing weapons regardless of
    their location.
        Senator Inhofe. When you get into the issue of storage
    versus destruction of warheads, it is well known that not all
    of the warheads which will be removed from deployment will be
    destroyed. A number of them, although the number has not really
    been talked about, and it is not carved in stone yet, they
    would be placed in storage. Mr. Secretary, would you give this
    committee some examples as best you can in this forum of
    situations that would cause the stored warheads to be
    redeployed?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. I can think of three
    circumstances. One would be that a judgment was made that a
    category of weapons or some specific weapons were no longer
    reliable and the stewardship of the stockpile came to the
    conclusion that they are not reliable, there is a discussion
    that takes place, then judgments are made as to how you can
    remove something that is no longer considered reliable and what
    do you replace it with.
        A second would be that a judgment was made that some
    category was not safe, a different issue, but an important
    issue.
        A third would be that, for whatever reason--anyone's
    imagination is as good as mine--you move out 6, 8, 10 years in
    this process and some significant change in the world situation
    occurs in terms of something that affects the desired posture
    with respect to nuclear weapons. Very likely, the two countries
    would talk and make a judgment as to what one or both countries
    think they ought to do about that changed security environment.
        Senator Inhofe. I am surprised that I have time for my
    fourth question, but I do. This will be real quick.
        Chairman Levin. You do not have time, but if Senator Allard
    is willing, please proceed with your question.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you. A short question. Thank you,
    Senator Allard.
        You had said on July 17, in your testimony, ``I think that
    to go from a system that was totally untrustworthy and secret
    and doing things underground, behind cloaks, as a way of life
    to something where they let the sun shine in is not something
    that you can do in 5 minutes.'' You elaborated on that, and my
    question would be how long do you think it will take for the
    Russians to arrive at a level of transparency that would make
    you feel comfortable?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That is a difficult question. If you
    think about Russia's situation, it is a country that was a
    superpower. It still is militarily in a sense. A number of
    republics have departed the Soviet Union and left Russia. A
    number of people have left, intelligent people, well-educated
    people. There has been an outflow of brain power. They have
    serious health problems. They have a military that is not being
    funded at anywhere near the level it previously was funded. It
    creates difficulties.
        President Putin has clearly made a judgment to turn west
    and to connect with the United States, to connect with Western
    Europe, to begin that process of creating an environment in
    Russia that is hospitable for investment. If you think about
    it, decision makers all over the globe are deciding every day
    where they want to put their money, where they invest, where
    they want to build a plant, what countries they feel safe and
    secure with.
        To the extent Russia decides that they want to be
    transparent, and they want to have those linkages with the
    west, to create an environment that is hospitable for
    investment and for enterprise, then they will become more
    transparent. To the extent they, for whatever reason, decide
    that they want to continue as their most important
    relationships to be with Cuba or North Korea, Iraq or Syria,
    the world's walking wounded, it seems to me that they are not a
    very attractive place for investment, and they would be less
    likely to be transparent.
        So the President has made a decision. Not everyone in that
    country has, but the President has, and his leadership has, and
    they are pointing west. I think that is a good thing, and we
    ought to try to do things that encourage it. We will see over
    time. I am one of those people who likes to be careful. I am a
    conservative person. So I will watch, and we will keep meeting
    and encouraging transparency.
        We are such an open system that the issue of predictability
    and transparency is quite easy for us. They have historically
    been a closed system, and it is going to take a culture change
    in their military, it is going to take a culture change in
    their bureaucracy.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Myers and Mr. Secretary, for sharing
    your thoughts with us today. When we talk about our
    international agreements, I think we tend to just focus on the
    two parties to the agreement, for example the Moscow agreement,
    Russia and the United States. But in reality there is a whole
    different world out here. What I see happening is an interest
    outside the agreement in other countries to try and develop a
    nuclear capability. We know about Iran, Iraq. We know that one
    of the motivating drives behind India and Pakistan, for
    example, is they wanted to become a nuclear power so that
    somehow or other they would have an enhanced image in the world
    when they come to the negotiating table.
        We have set limits on ourselves in this treaty of 1,700 to
    2,200. How do you view this treaty and the limits that we have
    placed in it as it compares to the progress of nuclear
    technology to the rest of the world? I know you cannot talk
    about specific numbers, but are Russia and the United States in
    their program so much further ahead that we do not have to
    worry about this for a century, or is it something that we do
    not have to concern ourselves with in the next decade or 5
    years? If you would give me a feel for that, I would appreciate
    it for the record. Both of you could comment.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. Senator, when we went through
    the many months of consideration, study, thought, debate, and
    discussion with respect to our Nuclear Posture Review, we did
    not only look at the U.S.-Russia relationship. We looked at the
    entire world. We looked at the current situation. We looked at
    trend lines. We projected out. The number 1,700 to 2,200, that
    range, of course is not oriented simply to Russia. It is
    oriented to what we see as the likely circumstances going
    forward.
        The number, as small as it is relative to the current
    levels, is a large number. Seventeen hundred to twenty-two
    hundred operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons is a
    lot. The number was selected because of our conviction that it
    would be desirable for us to be able to, in the first instance,
    reassure our allies that we had that capability and that they
    need not develop nuclear weapons; second, to leave no doubt in
    other countries' minds that it would not be in their interest
    to think they could sprint to parity or superiority. Our
    numbers are sufficiently large that to do that would require a
    substantial investment, a substantial period of time, and
    therefore we felt that the number was appropriate, taking into
    account our allies, potential adversaries, the entire world,
    the current situation, and the trend lines we see.
        Senator Allard. Now, when you put that together--and I will
    ask General Myers--was Russia considered as an ally or a
    potential adversary?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, no, Russia was considered for what
    it is, a country that is embarked on turning west, that has a
    very large number of nuclear weapons.
        Senator Allard. General Myers.
        General Myers. The only thing I would add to that, and I
    think it is very important, is that the term that came out of
    the Nuclear Posture Review, where we said we were going to be
    capabilities-based, not threat-based, pretty much exactly
    answers the description that the Secretary put on the Nuclear
    Posture Review.
        It really was capabilities-based. We did not focus on any
    one country, as we have in the past, frankly. So this is a new
    era.
        The other thing about the Nuclear Posture Review, it said
    it is not just nuclear weapons that provide for deterrence and
    our security posture. They are a very important part of it, and
    we testified to that today. But there is also our non-nuclear
    strike capabilities, which is in this new triad notion that
    came out of the Nuclear Posture Review. There are the defenses,
    both active and passive, and then there is the infrastructure,
    which is our intelligence capabilities, our command and control
    capabilities, the capabilities that DOE has, for that matter.
        As the Secretary said, a lot of that is in the budget that
    you have just looked at, and a lot of it will be in the 2004
    budget as well, because they all have to come together to give
    us the result we want, which is deterrence and national
    security.
        I would also add that the other thing I think that makes us
    very comfortable about all this is the flexibility inherent in
    the Moscow Treaty. The one cornerstone of that treaty is it
    provides great flexibility.
        Senator Allard. I do like the treaty, and I think it is a
    good starting point. Right now we have some nonproliferation
    programs with Russia. I think, if I remember correctly, they
    are close to a billion dollars in what the President suggested
    in his budget. One of the concerns that I have heard is how
    that program proceeds is not so much a factor of how many
    dollars we are putting in there, but the problem is access to
    Russian facilities. Apparently that is a major obstacle to the
    treaty nonproliferation efforts in Russia.
        Can you comment as to how we will work this treaty along
    the verification side if we have difficulty in accessing some
    of these facilities?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course if you separate two things,
    one is the security of nuclear weapons, and the other is the
    nuclear threat, so to speak. We do have the START Treaty and
    verification regimes. We do have national technical means. We
    feel we can monitor within some range what is actually taking
    place with respect to their deployed weapons.
        With respect to their tactical nuclear weapons, their non-
    deployed weapons, the weapons coming off production lines, the
    weapons in a queue waiting to be destroyed, the weapons they
    have in reserve, that is a very different thing. There is where
    your point becomes terribly important. There is no question but
    that Russia even today is not transparent. It is not clear.
    They do not allow access. They have a very secretive approach
    to a great deal of this.
        It is a concern, and there have been a great many people in
    Congress, in the Senate, in the House, and in the Executive
    Branch over a good many years who have invested a lot of money,
    the American taxpayers have invested a lot of money, trying to
    improve their security and improve their destruction process.
    There have been a great many meetings held and efforts made to
    improve transparency, and we will continue them. But we are a
    good distance from feeling comfortable.
        Senator Allard. I would like to join my colleague from
    Hawaii in the bilateral implementation commission. I think it
    provides a good opportunity for dialogue on how we can improve
    the discussion, continue with the discussions we have started
    already. Your answer indicated that those discussions would be
    going on at the highest level, secretaries of defense,
    secretaries of state, which I think is a good sign that both
    sides are going to take this seriously.
        There is not a lot of detail in this agreement. It is just
    a sentence stating that you are going to have the bilateral
    implementation commission. Have you given any thought about how
    these meetings will be run and the type of issues that may come
    up in these discussions?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, Senator, there are really two
    pieces to this follow-on relationship. One piece was contained
    in the treaty and that is the bilateral commission. It is
    really not a negotiating forum. It is more a forum to monitor
    implementation of the treaty as such. The group you are
    referring to was actually established outside the treaty. It
    was established in a joint declaration that was issued
    simultaneously, I believe, and it is the one that provides for
    the meetings between the two ministers of defense and the two
    secretaries of defense which I indicated are going to start in
    September.
        Senator Allard. I see.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That is where the substantive
    discussions with respect to verification, with respect to
    transparency, with respect to theater nuclear weapons, these
    other pieces of the relationship which are so important, will
    take place.
        Senator Allard. Who is going to make up the bilateral
    implementation commission? What level are we going to have
    there in that commission?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not know that the level has been
    set. Let me just check. [Pause.]
        It would probably be at the ambassadorial level, as opposed
    to the under secretary or secretary level.
        Senator Allard. I see. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.
        Secretary Rumsfeld, one notable difference between this
    treaty and virtually every other arms control treaty is the
    withdrawal clause in Article IV. It says that either side may
    withdraw upon 3 months notice to the other side, but it does
    not mention anything about supreme national interest. Am I
    correct in assuming that the intention, though, is not to make
    it easy for either side to withdraw from the treaty for
    convenience or without due consideration, but it is intended,
    at least by us and hopefully by the Russians, that the
    withdrawal option would only be exercised if there were some
    serious change in the global security environment that
    compelled us to withdraw?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Certainly the discussions that I have
    been involved in with respect to that clause would reflect that
    sentiment, that neither side is entering into a treaty lightly,
    and neither side would depart from the treaty lightly. It would
    have all kinds of implications politically and so forth.
        Assuming our two countries stay on the paths they are on,
    which are paths where our interests are converging rather than
    diverging, in the event the world circumstance were to change I
    would suspect that the two countries would sit down and discuss
    that. They would give a good deal of thought to the ways in
    which it has changed and how those changes conceivably might
    affect one or even both parties as the case might be, and there
    would be very thoughtful discussions about that. Certainly no
    one would depart from the treaty lightly.
        Chairman Levin. You made reference a number of times to the
    different approach that we and the Russians take toward the
    maintenance of nuclear weapons--right now they are assembling
    new weapons. We are not. Ours have longer life than theirs do.
    Does their assembly of new weapons create a security threat to
    us or put us at some disadvantage?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I think the only way that
    question can be answered is if one looks at the totality of our
    activities. Clearly it is an asymmetry that they have an open
    production line and we do not, and one could make the case that
    that gives them an advantage. Is it an advantage that worries
    me? No.
        They also have weapons that last a shorter period. So it is
    quite logical they would have an open production line if they
    have weapons that are required to be moved out of the process
    for safety or reliability reasons.
        I think it is more useful to look at the totality of their
    circumstance and the totality of our circumstance, recognize
    there are a lot of differences and that we cannot expect to
    have perfect symmetry between what we are doing.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        You made reference to our ability to rely on the START
    Treaty for the verification and transparency it provides. It
    expires, however, in 2009 and that then creates a 3-year gap
    between the expiration of that START Treaty and the date of
    implementation of the Moscow Treaty, which has no mechanisms at
    all for verification, transparency, or confidence.
        Would it make sense then to extend the START Treaty to
    continue those benefits that you have referred to at least
    until the Moscow Treaty takes effect, if not beyond?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess that is a decision that others
    would have to make. But from my standpoint, it does not seem to
    me that it would be necessarily appropriate. I think that times
    are changing, and there may very well be various ways to
    achieve the kinds of transparency that would be appropriate
    between our two countries. My personal view is that we ought to
    sit down with Russia starting in September and get on with the
    task of looking at what kinds of transparency arrangements are
    appropriate.
        I also want to see that theater nuclear weapons are brought
    up on the table and talked about, again from the standpoint of
    transparency less than the standpoint of numbers or controls
    over them. But I guess I would not say that I think that would
    necessarily be a good idea. My guess is we will find better
    ideas than that.
        Chairman Levin. Hopefully you are right. If we do not find
    better ideas I would suggest you keep in mind the possibility
    of the extension of that treaty. At least it provides some
    verification and some confidence that otherwise would not exist
    unless you can negotiate or agree upon, whatever word you folks
    like--I guess you do not like ``negotiate.'' But in any event,
    whatever understanding you can reach relative to that would be
    helpful.
        Secretary Rumsfeld, you have again today indicated the
    heavy reliance that you place on missile defenses against long-
    range missiles, arguing that a defense against long-range
    missiles would make us more secure, just as we have a defense
    against short-range missiles.
        A recent article in The Washington Post indicated that we
    are going to be telling the Indian Government that they should
    not deploy a missile defense system, that they should not be
    able to defend themselves against incoming missiles. Why are we
    opposing another country's efforts to deploy a missile defense
    system if we feel that a missile defense system to protect our
    homeland would make us more secure?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not know the answer to your
    question. I also do not know that The Washington Post article
    is necessarily accurate. To the best of my recollection, I do
    not believe that that issue has been raised, at least to my
    level, within the administration. So it is not something that I
    have had a chance to really address.
        Chairman Levin. If it were accurate would you know about
    it?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, goodness. There are always going to
    be things that I am not going to know. Paul Wolfowitz handles
    any number of things. He attends all kinds of meetings, my
    deputy.
        Chairman Levin. I did not mean you personally. I meant the
    Defense Department.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, no. It may very well be that
    someone in the Department knows something I do not know. I
    certainly hope so. I hope they know a lot I do not know.
        Chairman Levin. I am not going there, I can assure you
    that. [Laughter.]
        Would you let us know for the record what the position of
    the administration is relative to India's, or any other
    country's, efforts to deploy a missile defense to give them the
    same kind of protection against incoming missiles that you feel
    will make us more secure? Can you give us that for the record?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The what?
        Chairman Levin. What the administration position is on
    that, and also what your, here referring to the Department,
    role has been or will be in that decision?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I will be happy to. If we have a
    position, I will be happy to give it to you, and I will give
    you a response in any event.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The President's stated policy is to design missile defenses capable
    of protecting not only the United States and its forces, but also our
    friends and allies. Generally speaking, we believe missile defenses
    would be a stabilizing factor by dissuading offensive missile
    acquisition and discouraging attacks and by providing new defensive
    capabilities for managing crises. The Indian Government shares this
    view as evidenced by their support immediately after the President's
    May 1, 2001, speech at the National Defense University in which he
    outlined his new approach to deterrence. More recently, we have engaged
    in dialogue with India on the subject of missile defense. Our shared
    sentiments were reflected in the Joint Statement issued after the 20-23
    May 2002, meeting of the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group. Specifically,
    the statement says that the U.S. and India have ``reaffirmed the
    contribution that missile defenses can make to enhance cooperative
    security and stability.''

        I think that we are talking apples and oranges here. I
    think the earlier questions that related to missile defense
    were referring to ballistic missile defense and longer range. I
    think that I have a vague recollection that the system that
    India was interested in was the Arrow system, which was a
    system developed jointly between the United States and Israel,
    but it is basically an Israeli system, which is a shorter range
    ballistic missile defense.
        Chairman Levin. To give them a defense against missiles----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
        Chairman Levin.----that could reach their homeland. That is
    strategic defense for them.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. You bet.
        Chairman Levin. Or other countries, not just India.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. One final question, then I will be done, if
    Senator Warner would----
        Senator Warner. Oh, sure. The only thing I would ask, I
    think you raised a very important question which you have now
    clarified. It does relate to this article in the July 25 New
    York Times. But we should also as a part of the response, I
    would think, Mr. Chairman, want to know--the United States has
    made a major financial contribution toward the research and
    development of the Arrow system. We did it primarily with the
    thought in mind to help our friends in Israel defend
    themselves, given the lessons learned in the Gulf War.
        But if there is a sale, how does that relate to our dollar
    contribution? Indeed, we have before us in the conference a
    significant item for further support, which this Senator from
    Virginia has willingly supported. But it seems to me that is an
    ancillary question.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I was just passed a note
    saying that the administration has not yet developed a view
    with respect to the Arrow system for India and that the
    discussion would more likely focus on technology transfer as
    opposed to the ability to defend oneself.
        Chairman Levin. I am more interested in the ability to
    defend oneself, frankly, the principle of it.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Right.
        Chairman Levin. You have argued that we will be more secure
    being able to defend against incoming long-range missiles. We
    have defenses, and there has been strong support for defenses
    in terms of short-range missiles, protecting our troops and our
    allies. But the argument that has been debated relates to
    whether or not we will be more secure, whether the world will
    be more stable, if we install defenses against incoming long-
    range missiles.
        Put aside that argument for the moment without rearguing
    that issue as to whether on balance unilateral deployment by us
    will make us more secure. Lay that aside because the
    administration argument is that the world will be more stable
    and that we have a right to defend ourselves against an
    incoming long-range missile. The question is: Do not any other
    countries have that same right?
        It is not the tech transfer issue that I am really into. I
    am into the principle of it.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand.
        Chairman Levin. Do we have a right the other countries do
    not, and if so why? That is the question.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        I do have one other question.
        Senator Warner. Sure, why do you not go ahead.
        Chairman Levin. I think I can complete it, and then I will
    call on Senator Warner. I know we have a vote coming. I do not
    want to use up all the time. I want to make sure you have
    enough time for what questions you have.
        Mr. Secretary, you have taken a very strong position
    against media leaks. I must tell you it is a position that I
    share. I find them astounding. One of, if not the most,
    astounding leaks I have ever seen is the leak that you are
    investigating now that relates to these alleged war plans.
        I guess the question is this: The FBI is investigating a
    leak which apparently came from somewhere in the intelligence
    committees, either the House or the Senate, not the war plan
    allegations, a different kind of a leak. Is the FBI going to
    investigate that war plan leak for you? I mean really going
    into it. The FBI is really looking into the intelligence
    committee leak. They are even talking about the possibility of
    doing lie detector testing.
        I just want to know if you are involving the FBI, if there
    is any accuracy to it--the fact that it appeared in the paper
    does not mean that there is such a plan that exists. I do not
    want to assume that. But since you have talked about looking
    into that leak, you have understandably expressed your outrage,
    and I totally agree with that outrage, will you involve the FBI
    in the investigation of that particular egregious leak?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I asked the appropriate people in the
    Department to advise and initiate an investigation of the leak
    you are referring to. I am told that the Air Force has an
    investigative unit that is functioning as executive agent for
    that activity and they have initiated an investigation, and
    part of it was to request the FBI to step in and do the
    investigation.
        I am also told that the FBI has to make decisions about
    what they investigate and what they do not investigate, that it
    is not within the control of the Department of Defense. I
    suspect and hope that the FBI will decide that this is
    something that they do want to participate in. If they do not,
    why, I will probably encourage them.
        Chairman Levin. Would you let us know the outcome of this
    investigation?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Indeed.
        Chairman Levin. Whatever that outcome is.
        Thank you so much.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I think we have had an excellent hearing, and
    it is very important from the standpoint of the responsibility
    of this committee. We value greatly the work that has been done
    by the Foreign Relations Committee, and I think this hearing
    builds on those hearings such that we will have before the
    Senate an adequate record for each Member to reflect on as he
    or she casts this important vote with regard to advice and
    consent.
        Mr. Secretary, I think I can fire these questions rather
    quickly, and also your responses I think can be
    straightforward. At any time General Myers wishes to join,
    please do so.
        As we proceed with this historic reduction of weapons,
    there should be no perception that we should in any way lessen
    our approach led by our President toward strengthening missile
    defense capabilities in this country, limited missile defense
    programs, which he has initiated very boldly here during the
    course of the administration. Do you agree with me on that?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I do.
        Senator Warner. General.
        General Myers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. This committee has also dealt at length
    with the stockpile stewardship program and the reliability of
    our inventory. That program seems to grind on year after year,
    and I presume that it is your judgment progress is being made.
    Since we no longer do actual testing, we have to rely on
    substitutes to give us the same information to assure that our
    stockpile is reliable and that it is safe for the men and women
    of the Armed Forces and civilians who must handle it, and
    certainly those people that live in the environs of that
    stockpile should have the confidence that it is safely stored.
        That program receives no less emphasis, am I correct?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. You are correct. It is receiving
    emphasis, although it should be noted that there are from time
    to time things that occur that may involve corrosion, that may
    involve some other things as elements age in these weapons, and
    we have to be attentive to that. We have to be alert to the
    fact that we could very well arrive at a point where we are
    advised that there is some non-trivial problem with respect to
    safety or reliability.
        But we are attentive to it, and the Department of Energy
    is.
        Senator Warner. I think you and the General pointed out
    today that there are different approaches between Russia and
    the United States in strategic forces, namely they build that
    warhead to last for a period of time and, frankly, it is
    discarded, dismantled, or otherwise. We build ours to last for
    very long periods, in the hopes that we can just make minor
    modifications as technology comes along.
        That leads me to my next questions. The Moscow Treaty
    reductions are consistent with the force structure you defined
    in the Nuclear Posture Review, but the NPR also identified the
    need for improved missile defenses--you have mentioned that--
    and the revitalization of nuclear weapons infrastructure. That
    means our ability to get into our existing operational weapons,
    and those that are in storage where it is necessary, and make
    those technical corrections to maintain their reliability.
        There is going to be no less emphasis on that, am I
    correct?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. No, and it is expensive. It is
    important that we make those investments and that we recognize
    the fact that these weapons will not last forever and that we
    have to manage them and exercise appropriate stewardship over
    them.
        Senator Warner. Now, how important is it that the United
    States maintain the ability to design and modify these nuclear
    weapons as we draw down?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, it is important that we have
    people who are trained, experienced, and capable of managing
    that process, as well as seeing that we are prepared, in the
    event we ever have to, to take the steps necessary to assure
    that we have the appropriate deterrent. As the people that have
    spent a good many years of their lives doing that age, retire,
    and leave the scene, it is important that there be sufficient
    activity, that new people are drawn into that process, and
    those skills and capabilities are transferred to them.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Secretary and General, in my next
    question I am going to depart from the subject matter before us
    here and bring up a subject which I have discussed privately
    with both of you from time to time and one which I have on
    several occasions over the past 6 weeks spoken on the floor of
    the Senate. Our distinguished colleague who has just joined us
    was the presiding officer when I addressed this subject late
    last night on the floor.
        It is my grave concern over the deteriorating situation in
    the Middle East and what further might be done to try and bring
    about a condition of stability, of cessation of hostilities,
    such that meaningful discussions can go on toward a lasting
    peace. It is a goal which you, Secretary Rumsfeld, have dealt
    with for a good deal of your career. At one time you were the
    President's special envoy in that region.
        Several things brought this to mind very vividly to this
    Senator. We celebrated the Fourth of July, and it was necessary
    and prudent for our President and others to notify this Nation
    of a heightened alert, and we thank God that nothing occurred
    on that weekend. Since that time we have seen a repetition of
    these suicide bombings, killing innocent persons in Israel. Now
    we are witnessing a tragic use of military equipment where
    there was loss of life of many children and innocent people in
    the pursuit of trying to destroy an individual or individuals
    which are clearly linked with this ongoing terrorism.
        But I am not here to try and resolve that. What I am saying
    is, are we considering all the options? I pose again here in
    open session the option that I have had of asking the NATO
    nations to consider whether or not their organization can be
    brought to bear under certain conditions to help provide
    stability. I am talking about an added peacekeeping role, such
    as they are doing now in the Balkan region.
        Should we not formally ask NATO to consider it from a
    political standpoint as well as a military standpoint? NATO is
    the one organization that has credibility in the world today,
    that is ready to roll, and has the proven track record of
    peacekeeping.
        Now, clearly certain conditions have to be established
    before they could be involved. One, a consensus among the NATO
    nations that this problem is of sufficient magnitude to affect
    their own vital security interests as it begins to spread and
    fester. Second, they would have to be literally invited by both
    the people of Palestine and the people of Israel through their
    respective elective leadership. So it has to be by virtue of
    invitation.
        There also has to be an expression by both Palestinian
    interests and Israeli interests that they will cooperate in
    every way possible to maintain peace and stability once those
    forces are in place.
        Once that is established, it seems to me a lot of support
    can flow to both sides to heal the wounds--economic assistance,
    food, medicine to the Palestinian people. Once that is seen by
    the people, I think it will bring about a cessation of those
    cells that want to continue to foster suicide bombings, and
    with the people of Israel, I think a great wave of relief that
    they can once again walk the streets and the cafes and live a
    life without fear. That would enable the diplomats, the leaders
    of both nations, to sit down and conscientiously work out a
    long-term peace arrangement.
        I think that that step should be looked at along with
    others. There may be better ideas. That is just one of this
    particular Senator. Others have talked about it, others have
    written about it. It is not entirely original with me. But I
    think I have spoken to it perhaps more than any other member of
    this body, in my firm belief that this very valuable asset of
    NATO can be brought to bear to bring about peace, and maybe the
    next Fourth of July there will be less hatred directed toward
    this Nation.
        We must not let an hour go by without studying what the
    root causes are of the anger that is being unleashed against
    the United States of America and our people. I think it is
    vitally important that we look at this.
        Europe is viewed as sympathetic to the Palestinian causes.
    The United States is viewed as sympathetic to the Israeli
    causes. That goes way back in history. But NATO bonds us as one
    unit, as it has for the 50-plus years of its existence, and we
    would go, not as the United States nor as Europe, but as NATO,
    solely to preserve the condition of peace and stability, with
    the cooperation of both sides, so that the talks can take place
    and hopefully bring about a cessation of hostilities.
        We cannot quantify the amount of anger generated toward
    this country from that dispute, but clearly that ongoing tragic
    chapter of killing and suffering is one of the root causes of
    the anger being directed toward our Nation today, necessitating
    a creation of a whole new Department of Homeland Defense,
    necessitating the creation of a new command authority under
    CINCNORTH, necessitating the barriers which guard every
    entrance to the Capitol buildings here in the United States,
    and all of the other steps that we are trying to take, whether
    it is in our airports or in our homes and cities and villages,
    to defend against terrorism.
        No idea should go unexamined. I hope that you place some
    credibility to it, at least enough to justify a study of this
    concept and determine whether or not it is a feasible one.
        I thank you for listening. If you have a response I would
    be pleased to receive it.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much. I appreciate
    having those thoughts.
        Senator Warner. Thank you.
        General.
        General Myers. No, sir.
        Senator Warner. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, let me first commend you on
    your continuing creative thinking, looking for solutions there.
        We want to leave a few minutes here for Senator Nelson, so
    I will, if it is all right, turn to him.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
    Yes, of course.
        Chairman Levin. We have a vote coming up, I believe, in a
    few minutes. But I want to again thank you for raising an issue
    which should be on all of our minds at all times and applying
    your usual creative and constructive approach to looking for
    solutions.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning. You arrived apparently at the figure of 1,700
    plus out of a determination that that is what it would take to
    defend the interests of the United States. Can you share with
    us why?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If we need to do that in a classified
    setting, then please so indicate.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. We can do it one way here and one way
    in a classified setting. But the fact is that the Chairman and
    I, the senior military leadership, the senior civilian
    leadership, the National Security Council, and over a period of
    time the President spent many months, the better part of a
    year, engaged in the Nuclear Posture Review analyzing the
    subject. We look not just at Russia or China or any country
    that currently has a nuclear weapon, but we looked at the
    world, we looked at trend lines, and we came to a judgment that
    the many thousands of weapons we currently have were not needed
    and that in fact we could make deep reductions down to a range
    of 1,700 to 2,200, and that we could do it regardless of what
    Russia did with their weapons.
        It was a number that was arrived at with an eye toward what
    currently existed and what conceivably might exist. It was a
    range that was arrived at as a way of reassuring our friends
    and allies that we have and will have the kind of capability
    necessary to provide a nuclear umbrella over them, which is a
    way of dissuading them from thinking they need nuclear weapons,
    which we do not believe they do; and second, a range that was
    designed to dissuade other countries from thinking that the
    number was so low that they could with a modest amount of
    effort race and achieve parity or even superiority.
        As low as 1,700 and 2,200 is compared to 6,000, it is still
    a substantial number of nuclear weapons.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Indeed it is, and I commend you for
    it.
        No doubt under the chairman's persistent questioning the
    concerns have been expressed about the fact that the warheads
    that will be taken off the ICBMs will not have been destroyed
    on either side. That issue has been addressed by the chairman.
    It is my understanding the chairman also addressed the question
    of the tactical nuclear weapons and the destruction of them. In
    this uncertain world of terrorism that we live in, I would like
    to further address the question of fissile material, if you
    would give us the value of your thoughts there for this
    committee.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. First to clarify the record here. You
    said they will not be destroyed. There will be weapons
    destroyed on both sides. There are weapons destruction programs
    that exist in Russia and there are weapons destruction programs
    that will exist here. So there will be some of them.
        Not all of them, as you properly point out, will be
    destroyed, nor should they. It would be irresponsible to
    recognize the reality that we could have safety and reliability
    problems with our stockpile and with our deployed weapons and
    have no open production line and no capability to replace
    unsafe or unreliable weapons. I cannot imagine anyone thinking
    that it would be desirable to reduce or eliminate or destroy
    all non-deployed weapons. It would be mindless to do that.
        The question of tactical nuclear weapons, theater weapons,
    you are quite right, we did discuss it. It is a worry. It is
    something that I raise at every meeting with the Russians. We
    have very little transparency into what they are doing. We do
    worry about the security of those weapons. The fact that they
    have many multiples more than we do does not concern me because
    they have a different circumstance than we do. But I do believe
    that we, as our relationship evolves, should gain better
    visibility into what they are doing.
        With respect to fissile material, it is something that the
    world best worry a great deal about, and there are enough
    countries with sizable appetites to develop nuclear weapons,
    with programs and people available to them from other countries
    who have competence and experience and knowledge in nuclear
    weapon development, the proliferation of those technologies
    among the so-called rogue states is extensive. One of the
    pacing items is fissile material and any movement of that to
    additional countries would indeed be a danger to the world.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your
    comments. With regard to the reduction of weapons from 6,000 to
    1,700, that is a reduction of over 4,000. How many of those are
    needed to be kept in reserve, as you just suggested, to
    replenish those that are actually deployed? Therefore, in an
    ideal world how many would you destroy of that 4,000 plus?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That is a number that we are
    considering. It is not something that we will decide. It will
    not be a fixed number. It very likely will be a number that
    over the 10-year period of the treaty will change. It will
    depend on what we learn from a safety standpoint, what we learn
    from a reliability standpoint. It will depend on how much
    investment is made and how long it would take us to be capable
    of replacing weapons, since we do not have an open production
    line like the Russians.
        It also would be dependent on what we see evolving with
    respect to the world security, what the security environment
    is. It is hard to look at 3 or 4 years, let alone 8 or 10. But
    as we move down and reduce our deployed weapons, there is no
    question but that some will be destroyed and some will be
    stockpiled, and what the number will be we simply do not know
    yet.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is it the intent of the administration
    that that will be the next item to negotiate with Russia, which
    is what you just said, the destruction of the warheads that you
    take off?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. No, it is unlikely. Each side has the
    flexibility to do that which they wish to do, the way the
    treaty is written. The most likely subjects for the United
    States and Russia it seems to me are transparency,
    predictability, theater nuclear weapons, but certainly not the
    destruction of weapons.
        We do worry about the security of weapons while they are
    waiting to be destroyed or while they are waiting to be
    redeployed or replace an unsafe or an unreliable weapon. That
    is discussed.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I certainly commend you on the
    direction it is going, and I think it is a great breakthrough
    which you have negotiated. I ask the obvious question, the
    question that is begged, which is if you have taken weapons off
    ICBMs that are also weapons that do not need to be in storage
    for replacement, why would it not be to the interest of all
    parties, including Russia, for an agreement to be reached to
    destroy those weapons?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Because we do not need an agreement to
    destroy them. We are each going to destroy--no one is going to
    keep weapons they do not need. It costs a lot of money and
    there is plenty of demand for the funds that are supplied to
    the Russian military and the U.S. military. So you are not
    going to have any advocates that I know of, certainly not in
    the United States, desiring to keep weapons we do not need.
        The question is figuring out what the world is going to
    look like over the next decade and trying to look into the
    future and say that we have confidence that we are not going to
    have a whole class of weapons that are going to be unsafe. We
    could get the phone call tonight: We are very sorry, Mr.
    Secretary, but your stockpile is no longer safe or reliable, or
    this whole category is no longer safe or reliable. Well, that
    being the case, you darn well better have something you can
    replace it with.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Certainly, as you say, from the
    standpoint of the United States we would want to destroy some
    of those weapons. My concern, however, is looking at the old
    Soviet Union and the modern day Russia, what is in their
    interest? Unless there is an agreement to destroy with the
    United States, what is in their interest to destroy? Given the
    fact of the new world of terrorists that we live in, the less
    weapons out there in storage the less weapons there are for
    terrorists to get their hands on.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Fair enough. Any country that has
    nuclear weapons or chemical or biological weapons has a
    responsibility to see that they are managed safely. There are
    always going to be weapons that are not deployed. Russia has no
    interest in keeping weapons around that are not useful to them.
    Their weapons age relatively rapidly compared to ours, as you
    know well. That means that they are more likely to use new
    production warheads than they are to use older warheads. They
    are more likely to use piece parts of disassembled older
    warheads that are still good and reassemble, I suspect.
        We do not know. We do not have any visibility into this. We
    know very little about what they are doing. We do not know
    their production rate. We do not know their destruction rate.
    We do worry about their security of them.
        But we know of certain knowledge that they are making new
    weapons, they are destroying weapons, they are holding weapons,
    and they are dismembering weapons. No matter what stage they
    are in, it is terribly important to all of us, including
    Russia, that they be managed in a secure way.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I certainly commend you. You are
    moving along in what most objective observers would consider
    the advancement of world peace. The note of caution that I
    raise is: is there not some discussion that should be started
    immediately upon the ratification of this treaty for the
    destruction of those weapons in the Russian arsenal that are
    not on top of their ICBMs? I add to that the tactical nuclear
    weapons as well as the fissionable material.
        The administration has come forth with a plan of 10 plus 10
    over 10, $10 billion from us, $10 billion from our allies, over
    10 years, a total of $20 billion. No less respected folks than
    Senator Baker and Mr. Cutler in issuing the Baker-Cutler report
    have said that at a minimum it should be $30 billion, and that
    is of the highest priority in the Baker-Cutler report in their
    conclusion of expenditures for protecting the interests of the
    United States.
        Would you comment, please, on that?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I am not an expert on this
    piece of it. The Department of State, the Department of Energy,
    as well as the Department of Defense are involved in, I guess
    it is called the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
        My recollection is--and I hope someone will correct me if I
    am wrong--that the taxpayers of the United States have already
    spent something like $4 or $5 billion over a period of some
    years for the destruction or management or security of Russian
    nuclear weapons and materials. I am familiar with the 10 plus
    10 over 10. What the right number is I do not know.
        I think it is important for all of the countries of the
    world to recognize that it is not just the United States that
    has the obligation to destroy Russian nuclear weapons. Russia
    has an obligation and they have to make priorities and choices,
    and they have people who are potentially every bit as
    vulnerable as anyone in the United States to the mismanagement
    or mishandling or lack of security of their weapons. But so too
    do the countries in Western Europe have an obligation or an
    interest.
        It seems to me that the 10 plus 10 that was negotiated, I
    believe up in Canada very recently, was a useful thing to do.
    Whether that is the right number, I cannot answer.
        Senator Bill Nelson. May I say in conclusion that what I
    have tried to articulate is of enormous concern to a number of
    the Members of this body, not the least of which are the
    Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and one of the
    senior members of that committee, Senator Lugar, whose name has
    been etched in the history of this institution, having teamed
    with Senator Nunn in trying to get their arms around the
    proliferation of nuclear weapons.
        I would encourage you that, from your standpoint of defense
    and protection of this country's interests, whenever you get
    into those councils of government discussing this, that the
    ultimate objective of lessening the proliferation possibility
    is of enormous consequence to this country. For what it is
    worth, I offer those thoughts to you, Mr. Secretary, and to
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Let me very simply say that I share Senator Nelson's point.
    When you read the Baker-Cutler report, as I have, it seems to
    me you have to really think about their conclusion that the
    greatest threat to our security is the proliferation of weapons
    of mass destruction and the presence of nuclear weapons and
    nuclear material on Russian soil because of the fact that they
    are unable to secure it to the extent that it should be
    secured. The contribution of Nunn-Lugar toward that end is
    critical.
        But nonetheless, the fewer nuclear weapons on Russian soil
    and elsewhere, the quicker they are destroyed rather than being
    stored, where they are much more readily available to theft or
    to leakage or to some kind of an illegal sale, the safer we are
    going to be.
        So there is a relationship between the number of nuclear
    weapons, whether they are destroyed or not, and the
    proliferation issue. The Russians apparently wanted to destroy
    weapons, not store them. We are the ones who decided that they
    should be stored, not destroyed, as I understand the
    discussions. I hope that over time, as Senator Nelson has
    expressed, that we will find ways to destroy weapons, not just
    store them. The world will be a lot more secure in my judgment
    and the proliferation threat reduced if we can not just see
    weapons stored on Russian soil, but actually see them destroyed
    and put the resources into it that we apparently need to
    contribute to make sure that, as long as those weapons are
    there, that they are secured. That goes as well to the chemical
    and biological issue.
        On the other hand, it is clear this treaty is a significant
    advance, and I think we all welcome it; we applaud it. We are
    grateful for your contributions to it, both of you. The
    perspective may be a little different on whether destruction or
    storage is a greater contribution to our security, but
    nonetheless the reduction in the number of deployed nuclear
    weapons is a plus. The treaty is moving us in the right
    direction, and not just in terms of nuclear weapons, but in
    terms of the relationship between ourselves and Russia, which,
    as you have pointed out, Secretary Rumsfeld, is so critically
    important, and this contributes to it in a very significant
    way.
        I hope, General, that we will continue to have military-to-
    military relations with Russia that are continually expanded.
    We have had some good connections with them in Bosnia and other
    places, but that effort also will continue apace. They may not
    be a superpower now, but they have all of the ingredients to
    return to superpower status. They have huge numbers of nuclear
    weapons, they have all of the talent, capability, and resources
    that are needed for a return to that status, and your military-
    to-military relationship is frankly just as important as the
    diplomatic discussions and relationship.
        We thank you both for your presence, for your contribution
    to this Nation's security, and we will stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Thurmond
                        moscow treaty reduction schedule
        1. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, although the ``Moscow
    Treaty'' requires both parties to reduce deployed strategic warheads to
    no more than 2,200 by 2012, there is no specific schedule to accomplish
    this task. What are the Department's plans for achieving the 2012 goal?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Moscow Treaty imposes no reduction
    timelines. Each party is free to carry out reductions in its own way,
    provided that it meets the required force level on the specified date.
        In terms of current U.S. planning, as the first step in reducing
    strategic nuclear warheads, the United States plans to deactivate 50
    Peacekeeper ICBMs from operational service, remove four Trident
    submarines from strategic service, and no longer maintain the
    capability to return the B-1 to nuclear service. In addition, Trident
    D-5 and Minuteman missiles will be downloaded and some bombs removed
    from heavy bomber bases to reduce the operationally deployed strategic
    force to approximately 3,800 weapons by 2007.
        Specific decisions about U.S. forces beyond 2007 have not yet been
    made. It is anticipated that reductions beyond 2007 will involve
    decreasing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear
    warheads on ballistic missiles and lowering the number of operationally
    deployed warheads at heavy bomber bases. These plans, however, will be
    periodically assessed and may evolve over time.

                       russia's plans to reduce warheads
        2. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, what do you know about
    Russia's plans to reduce the number of warheads?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Russia did not state during the negotiations
    how it intends to carry out its reductions, nor does the treaty require
    that any specific procedure be followed. We anticipate that our
    understanding of Russian plans will evolve as we move forward with
    implementing the treaty, including as transparency is enhanced through
    ongoing diplomatic consultations. I would note that the President's
    original decision to reduce the number of our operationally deployed
    strategic warheads was not dependent on any Russian decision to reduce
    their own nuclear forces, and that we believe Russia has compelling
    reasons of its own, unrelated to the Moscow Treaty, to wish to reduce
    to the 1,700-2,200 range or even lower.

            counting russian mirved warheads under the moscow treaty
        3. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, some critics of the treaty
    state that it disadvantages the United States since it does not address
    MIRVs, which are one of Russia's strengths. How are MIRVed warheads
    counted under the Moscow Treaty?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Moscow Treaty will not place new
    restrictions on Russia's potential to deploy MIRVed ICBMs. It affords
    Russia the same force planning flexibility that we ourselves require.
    We are not overly concerned with hypothetical ``break-out'' scenarios
    (as we were during the Cold War), as shown by the fact that we intend
    to reduce to 1,700-2,200 warheads regardless of what the Russians do.
        Regardless of whether Russia retains its SS-18 or SS-19 ICBMs or
    builds a new MIRVed missile, Russia's deployment of MIRVs has little
    impact on U.S. national security under current conditions. The issue of
    Russian MIRVed ICBMs was considered in the Nuclear Posture Review and
    during the treaty negotiations. Since neither the United States and its
    allies nor Russia view our strategic relationship as adversarial, we no
    longer view Russian deployment of MIRVed ICBMs as destabilizing to this
    new strategic relationship.
        If Russia retains MIRVed ICBMs, it will be required to have fewer
    missiles than if each carried only one warhead. However, we do not
    believe that Russia will retain its current inventory of MIRVed ICBMs.
    Russia is already deactivating its 10-warhead rail-mobile SS-24 force
    for age and safety reasons. We expect that most of the SS-18 heavy
    ICBMs and six-warhead SS-19 ICBMs will reach the end of their service
    life and be retired by 2012. Ongoing diplomatic consultations should
    improve our understanding of how Russia plans to carry out its
    reduction obligations. We expect that continued improvement in our
    relationship with Russia will provide greater transparency into the
    strategic capabilities and intentions of each party.

          united states establishment of confidence-building measures
        4. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, in a May 28, 2002, article
    Senator Joseph Biden wrote that the United States should establish
    confidence-building measures that would enable Russia to verify U.S.
    compliance with the treaty. He apparently is concerned that Russia does
    not have the means to verify our compliance with the treaty. Do you
    agree with the Senator's concerns? If not, why not?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. During the initial stages of the talks, we
    exchanged ideas about possible transparency measures. The ideas of each
    side were designed to implement the approach that it proposed the
    treaty take in defining reduction obligations. However, once both
    countries agreed that the treaty's reduction obligations should
    preserve the flexibility for each side to make reductions in its own
    way, it appeared to the United States that there was no immediate need
    to work out transparency measures applicable to this context. Among
    other things, START's verification measures would continue to be
    available for some time. Russia, too, agreed that the Moscow Treaty
    need not include such measures. Accordingly, no specific transparency
    measures were negotiated.
        We recognize that more contacts and exchanges of information could
    be useful and that the parties could decide to develop additional
    transparency in the future. However, we do not believe that any
    specific new transparency measures are needed in order to implement the
    Moscow Treaty.

                             verification of treaty
        5. Senator Thurmond. General Myers, compliance verification is a
    concern of both the proponents and opponents of the treaty. In your
    professional judgment, are you satisfied that both Russia and the
    United States have the means to verify compliance with the Moscow
    Treaty?
        General Myers. I agree with the assessment of the verification of
    the Moscow Treaty contained in the ``Moscow Treaty: The Determination
    Pertaining To Verification,'' submitted to Congress on June 24, 2002,
    by the Secretary of State (in accordance with Section 306 of the Arms
    Control and Disarmament Act). The Moscow Treaty was not constructed to
    be verifiable within the meaning of Section 306, and it is not. The
    Moscow Treaty recognizes a new strategic relationship between the
    United States and Russia based on the understanding that we are no
    longer enemies and that the principles which will underpin our
    relationship are mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation, and
    predictability. This understanding played an important role in our
    judgments regarding verification. Our conclusion was that, in the
    context of this new relationship, a treaty with a verification regime
    under the Cold War paradigm was neither required nor appropriate.
    START's verification regime, including data exchanges and inspections,
    will continue to add to our body of knowledge over the course of the
    decade regarding the disposition of Russia's strategic nuclear warheads
    and the overall status of reductions in Russia's strategic nuclear
    forces during the same period. We recognize, however, that more
    contacts and exchanges of information could be useful and that the
    parties could decide to develop additional transparency in the future.
    The Consultative Group on Strategic Stability (CGSS) will meet in
    September to begin this dialogue.

                        destruction of nuclear warheads
        6. Senator Thurmond. General Myers, although I understand that
    there are capacity limitations on our ability to dismantle warheads, is
    there a military necessity for not dismantling warheads?
        General Myers. Yes, there is a clear military necessity to not
    dismantle all our nuclear warheads. Storing non-operationally deployed
    nuclear warheads serves the United States interests in several ways.
    First, they provide a responsive capability against unanticipated
    changes in the international security environment. We need to retain
    the flexibility to meet significant unforeseen challenges. Second, we
    do not currently have the capability to produce nuclear warheads, but
    our Russian counterparts--and other nuclear powers--do. Therefore,
    stored warheads provide an operational reserve for surveillance and
    testing replacements. Third, stored warheads provide a hedge against a
    technical or catastrophic failure of a class of deployed warheads that
    could affect safety or reliability and, ultimately, our national
    security.
        The exact number of weapons to be stored has not yet been
    determined. However, the overall number of warheads in the stockpile
    will be comprised of operationally deployed warheads; spares and
    replacements to meet operational and surveillance testing requirements;
    the number of weapons required to hedge against future uncertainties;
    and a number to hedge against technical ``surprises'' that could render
    a complete warhead family unusable.

                          security of russian warheads
        7. Senator Thurmond. General Myers, although I believe Russia has
    the means to appropriately secure its ``operationally deployed''
    warheads, I am concerned about those warheads that are in storage. What
    are your views on the security of Russia's nuclear warheads?
        General Myers. I believe, as Secretary Rumsfeld has stated, that
    any nation who possesses nuclear weapons has an obligation to properly
    manage those weapons, to include safe and secure storage. I fully
    support Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts to assist Russia in
    improving the safety and security of its non-deployed nuclear warheads.
    The United States is working to help Russia improve the security of its
    fissile material through DOE's Material, Protection, Control and
    Accounting (MPC&A) program and DOD's construction of a fissile material
    storage facility at Mayak and DOE's many MPC&A projects. We plan to
    also continue the support of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program
    when the Moscow Treaty is in force, regardless of Russia's decisions on
    how many warheads to eliminate. With assistance from the United States
    and other countries, Moscow has taken steps to reduce the risk of
    theft. Some risks remain even though Russia's nuclear security has been
    improving over the last several years.

        [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

         THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
                               REDUCTIONS TREATY

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, AUGUST 1, 2002

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m., room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Reed, Bill
    Nelson, Bingaman, Warner, Inhofe, and Sessions.
        Committee staff members present: Christine E. Cowart, chief
    clerk; and Kenneth Barbee, security clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    counsel, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: L. David Cherrington,
    minority counsel, and Brian R. Green, professional staff
    member.
        Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Daniel K.
    Goldsmith, and Thomas C. Moore.
        Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to
    Senator Reed; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill
    Nelson; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Robert
    Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II,
    assistant to Senator Sessions; and Derek Maurer, assistant to
    Senator Bunning.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. The hearing will come to order. The Senate
    Armed Services Committee meets today to continue its hearings
    on the military and national security implications of the
    Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). The hearing this
    morning will consist of two panels.
        On the first panel, we are pleased to have Charles Curtis,
    former Deputy Secretary of Energy and currently the President
    and Chief Operating Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
    and Dr. Ashton Carter, formerly the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for International Security Policy and currently the
    Ford Professor of Science and International Affairs at
    Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Gentlemen, it
    is a pleasure to welcome you back to the committee today.
        On the second panel, we will hear from Admiral James Ellis,
    Commander in Chief of the Strategic Command, and Dr. Everet
    Beckner, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs of the
    National Nuclear Security Administration.
        Previously, the committee heard testimony concerning the
    Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty from Secretary Rumsfeld
    and General Myers. As a follow-on to that hearing, we wanted an
    opportunity to discuss the treaty and the broader context of
    U.S.-Russian relations with witnesses outside of the
    administration. Each of you has had substantial experience with
    nuclear weapons and materials issues from both policy and
    practical perspectives. We look forward to hearing from you on
    the SORT and getting your views on a variety of issues,
    including the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security
    policy, current and future nonproliferation efforts, the future
    course of U.S.-Russian relations, and other topics.
        The SORT has no timetable for implementation, and no
    milestones against which to measure and verify progress.
    Neither does the treaty use or define the term ``deployed
    strategic offensive nuclear weapons.'' These are the weapons
    that will be reduced by the United States. Similarly, the
    treaty does not define what weapons are to be reduced by Russia
    or establish any timetable for those reductions.
        As we discussed in our hearing last week, there are a
    number of uncertainties associated with this treaty, including
    its implications on the size of the stockpile and the future of
    nuclear weapons.
        However, the treaty is an important symbolic element of our
    improving relationship with Russia. How the United States and
    Russia view each other militarily is an important question.
    These views could drive, in a large or small way, U.S. nuclear
    planning and stockpile concerns, or they might have no impact
    at all. This treaty is a starting point for shaping the future
    nuclear weapons stockpile and further arms control, as well as
    an important boost to our relationship with Russia.
        But there is much more work to be done to continue
    improving mutual security with Russia, work that includes
    further reducing nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation
    dangers, and improving confidence, transparency, and
    cooperation with Russia.
        We will conclude the first panel and proceed to the second
    panel at approximately 10:15. We will start the second panel in
    open session and then move to a closed session in SR-222,
    Russell Senate Office Building.
        Senator Bingaman, do you have any opening comments?
        Senator Bingaman. Mr. Chairman, I do not, other than to
    welcome the witnesses. I look forward to their testimony.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Curtis and Dr. Carter, your prepared
    statements will be included in the record.
        Mr. Curtis.

     STATEMENT OF CHARLES B. CURTIS, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING
                   OFFICER, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE

        Mr. Curtis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Bingaman.
    As you introduced me, I am the President of the Nuclear Threat
    Initiative, which is a charitable organization dedicated to
    reducing global threats from nuclear, chemical, and biological
    weapons. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which is
    sometimes referred to as the Treaty of Moscow, is a truly
    remarkable document. I believe that it deserves the Senate's
    endorsement. It should be ratified without amendment or, in my
    judgment, without reservation.
        But this treaty's true value is not so much in its
    substance, which is sparse; its only legally binding part
    deferred to the next decade. Indeed, its value is best seen in
    the joint statement issued by Presidents Bush and Putin and the
    foundation that the ancillary document provides for
    transforming the U.S.-Russian relationship today and in the
    years to come. So I would like to address my remarks today to
    the steps required to bring about that transformation.
        Former Senator Nunn, testifying last week before the Senate
    Foreign Relations Committee, called the Moscow Treaty ``a good
    faith treaty.'' It relies on an expressed faith in the common
    vision of our leaders and in our two nations' closely parallel
    strategic force plans. I agree that a treaty built on faith can
    survive only by building on common interests and gaining the
    trust that comes from transparency. If you never see someone do
    what they say they will do, trust cannot grow. When trust
    cannot grow, suspicions soon will, so I believe this treaty
    must be followed with milestones and transparency mechanisms to
    track progress.
        While we are working on these trust-building transparency
    measures, we must also work with urgency with Russia to ensure
    accurate accounting and security of Russia's tactical nuclear
    weapons. Indeed, gaining such accurate accounting and assured
    security of these weapons will be the first serious test of the
    new U.S.-Russian relationship.
        We simply don't know with specificity how many tactical
    nuclear weapons the Russians have, where they are, or how
    secure they are. These weapons, as this committee knows, are
    small enough to be man portable and powerful enough to destroy
    a small city. In an age of terrorist threats, this dangerous
    gap must be closed at the earliest possible date. The United
    States and Russia should at the same time move to revise the
    Cold War operational status of our nuclear forces.
        President Bush spoke on this potentially dangerous
    situation more than 2 years ago as a candidate for President.
    Decrying what he called another unnecessary vestige of Cold War
    confrontation, he said, ``the United States should remove as
    many weapons as possible from high alert, high trigger status.
    For two nations of peacekeeping, so many weapons on high alert
    may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized
    launch. As President, I will ask for an assessment of what we
    can safely do to lower the alert status of our forces.'' Mr.
    Chairman, I doubt the assessment that candidate Bush called for
    has yet to be presented to President Bush. The recently
    conducted Nuclear Posture Review, at least by public accounts,
    dealt almost entirely with force structure issues and did not
    separately discuss the alert conditions of weapons, or at least
    options with respect to the alert conditions of weapons.
    Similarly, the Treaty of Moscow does not explicitly address
    operational conditions, but does so by indirection.
        The U.S.'s use of the term ``operationally deployed
    weapons'' to describe its commitments under the treaty implies
    an extension of today's high alert conditions at least until
    2012, and perhaps for the indefinite future. Is this a
    potential risk for this Nation that it is willing to bear? This
    committee knows, I believe, that this is a special concern of
    Senator Nunn. It was when he chaired this committee. It remains
    in his capacity as co-Chairman of the initiative on CERT, so
    what may be done? Here's what Senator Nunn has suggested:
        First, the President can and should direct the immediate
    standdown of the forces as they become identified for reduction
    under the treaty. This has a noble precedent. George Herbert
    Walker Bush, when President in 1991, did the same thing on the
    occasion of the signing of the first Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty (START).
        Second, our two presidents should direct their military
    leaders to meet and return in the near future with a developed
    set of options to begin to stand down the remaining nuclear
    forces to the maximum extent possible consistent with the
    national security interests of each country. This is important
    because the more time we build into our process for launching
    missiles, the more time is available to gather data, exchange
    information, gain perspective, and discover or avoid a mistake.
    If we were smart enough at the height of the Cold War to be
    able to begin reducing weapons, surely in the second decade
    after the end of the Cold War we can be smart enough to find a
    way to expand decision time with no loss of security. It is at
    least worth a serious look.
        Third, our two presidents should sweep away the
    bureaucratic impediments to getting the Joint Early Warning
    Center up and running. Countering the deterioration of Russia's
    early warning and protection capability is in the security
    interest of both countries. We must get on with the job.
        Now, let me also say a word about the issue of warhead
    dismantlement, which has been discussed in the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee and also before this committee. The treaty
    does not require the dismantlement or destruction of warheads
    or delivery systems. There are no force size limits in the new
    treaty, only limitations on operationally deployed forces.
        Eventually, under the evolving U.S. security relationship,
    I expect we will need to address the actual size on our
    respective strategic forces. Beginning with the dismantlement
    of excess warheads we can begin this objective, build trust,
    and also serve the larger goal of giving the world community
    greater assurances that the United States and Russia are
    actually reducing their forces. If asked, the Department of
    Energy probably could set out an explicit schedule for
    beginning the dismantlement of excess weapons. But we must
    understand that while we can and should begin the dismantlement
    process, the development of a bilateral warhead dismantlement
    regime would be quite challenging, testing our available
    technologies and classification barriers. It is a task that
    must be examined in the context of U.S. strategies and plans
    for maintaining the stockpile into the future in the absence of
    a full warhead production capability.
        I note here that Russia maintains multiple nuclear warhead
    production facilities, while the U.S. currently has none still
    operating. This asymmetry poses an inherent structural
    complication for the negotiation of a 4-month dismantlement
    regime. Therefore, while I agree that both sides should get
    about the job of dismantling excess weapons, I don't believe
    that securing an agreement on warhead dismantlement rises to
    the same level of urgency as the other issues I have just
    mentioned. Moreover, many of the treaty's specific compliance
    issues discussed before the committee do not rise to the same
    level of urgency of other issues at play in U.S.-Russian
    dynamic, such as ensuring the security of weapons materials and
    weapons know how and the destruction of chemical weapons and
    biological weapons facilities.
        The critical job in Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
    started by this committee under Nunn-Lugar and extended in
    Nunn-Lugar-Domenici must be unlocked, refocused, and
    accelerated. Following through on this urgent agenda has to be
    at the heart of U.S.-Russian security relationship. Expanding
    on this agenda to engage a global coalition in the fight
    against catastrophic terrorism is the next essential step in
    realizing the full province of the real Russian-U.S. security
    relationship. Should we fail to take this last and most
    important step in providing for our security future, all
    semblance of security will be lost.
        September 11, if it taught us anything, taught us this: the
    number of innocent people al Qaeda is willing to kill is not
    limited by any political considerations or any spark of human
    conscience. Their compassion for killing is limited only by the
    power of the workings they have. We must keep the world's most
    deadly weapons out of their hands. We know that terrorists are
    seeking weapons of mass destruction. We also know where they
    are looking to find them. In the post-Soviet period, Russia's
    dysfunctional economy and eroded security systems combined to
    undercut controls on the stocks of weapons, materials, and
    know-how inherited from the Cold War. This dysfunction
    increased the risk that they can throw to terrorist groups or
    hostile forces. Considerable progress and improvements have
    come through the Nunn-Lugar program and its projects, but we
    have a long way to go in Russia still. Moreover, the
    vulnerabilities reach well beyond Russia, and well beyond other
    parts of the Former Soviet Union.
        Last May, in the immediate aftermath of the summit, former
    Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar co-hosted a conference of
    Russian and American legislators, officials, and experts.
    Senators Nunn and Lugar used this point in time to call for a
    new effort to finish the job of CTR in Russia and the Former
    Soviet Union, and to extend its principles beyond the United
    States and Russia to include the whole world with Russia and
    the United States linked in partnership sharing best practices
    and lessons learned. They called it the Global Coalition
    Against Catastrophic Terrorism. In Senator Lugar's words, ``we
    have to make sure that every nation with nuclear, biological,
    or chemical weapons capacity accounts for what it has, puts in
    securities for what it has, and pledges that no other nation
    will be allowed access. This security first agenda has to
    energize the global coalition.''
        We should include every nation that has something to
    safeguard or that can make a contribution to safeguarding. This
    vision we seek received dramatic endorsement with the recent G-
    8 announcement that its member states were establishing a
    global partnership against catastrophic terrorism and combining
    for this purpose a $10 billion commitment from the United
    States with a $10 billion pledge from the G-8 partners over the
    next 10 years. I applaud President Bush's leadership and
    success in achieving this pledge to unified action.
        One of the most essential next steps in the U.S.-Russian
    relationship, therefore, is to make the G-8 commitments real,
    to follow up with diplomatic rigor and resources, and to begin
    to extend that partnership beyond the G-8. Mr. Chairman, the
    whole world is engaged in a new arms risk. Terrorists are
    racing to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
    we must together race to stop them. Reducing the numbers of
    U.S.-Russian deployed or deployable strategic forces is
    important. The Treaty of Moscow is important, and it should be
    ratified. But if we are to have a secure future, we must first
    win the race against catastrophic terrorism, and we must win it
    on a global scale.
        It is my hope that the Treaty of Moscow will be remembered,
    therefore, more as a hinge of the U.S.-Russian relationship,
    not an end point, but a turning point, leading towards a
    transformed security relationship. If it serves this purpose,
    and propels us on the course of action outlined above, it will
    be truly historic and worthy of history's praise. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Curtis follows:]
                    Prepared Statement by Charles B. Curtis
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: thank you for inviting
    me to offer my views on the national security implications of the
    Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (sometimes also referred to as
    the Treaty of Moscow) and discuss with you the opportunities it creates
    to build a safer world.
        I appear before you as the President of the Nuclear Threat
    Initiative (NTI), a charitable organization dedicated to reducing the
    global threats from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. NTI is
    co-chaired by former Senator--and former chairman of this committee--
    Sam Nunn and CNN founder Ted Turner. Two of your colleagues, Senators
    Richard Lugar and Pete Domenici, sit on our Board as do two members of
    the Russian Duma, former Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin and
    former Ambassador Vladimir Lukin.
        The testimony I offer today, however, represents my own views and
    has not been cleared with our board.
        The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that Presidents Bush and
    Putin signed in Moscow in May to reduce by two-thirds by 2012 the
    operationally deployed nuclear weapons on both sides is truly a
    remarkable document. I believe it deserves the Senate's endorsement.
    But this treaty's true value is not so much in its substance, which is
    admittedly sparse; its only legally binding part deferred to the next
    decade. Instead, its value is best seen in the joint statement issued
    by the two Presidents and the foundation this ancillary document
    provides for transforming the U.S.-Russian relationship today and in
    the next years to come. So I would like to address my remarks today to
    the steps required to bring about that transformation.
        Former Senator Nunn, testifying last week before the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee, called the Moscow Treaty a ``good-faith treaty.''
    It relies on an expressed ``faith'' in the common vision of our leaders
    and in our two nations' closely parallel strategic force plans. I agree
    with that characterization. This treaty, unlike its predecessors, does
    not have an elaborate text born of suspicion, but ten sentences based
    on trust. Yet I believe a treaty built on trust can survive only with
    continued investment in the trust relationship by building on common
    interests, and gaining the trust that comes from transparency. If you
    never see someone do what they say they will do, trust cannot grow.
    When trust cannot grow, suspicions soon will.
        What matters most is what happens next. As Sam Nunn has pointed
    out, ``if this treaty is not followed with substantive actions, it will
    become irrelevant at best--counterproductive at worse. A good faith
    treaty, without follow-up, means that if relations improve, the two
    sides may not need it. If relations turn bad, the two sides may not
    (plan to) honor it.''
        So I believe this treaty must be followed with milestones and
    transparency mechanisms to track progress on the way to 2012. Toward
    that end, it's important that the Department of Defense develop and
    make public at the earliest possible date its own plans for reducing
    our ``operationally deployed'' forces under this treaty. Russia should
    do the same with its forces, and then both nations should follow with
    agreed mechanisms specifically designed to allow both sides to monitor
    these reductions. It is not, and will not, be enough for inspectors and
    site visitors under START I to look over their shoulders and try to see
    what's happening on the Russian or the U.S. side to build down forces
    to meet the Treaty of Moscow commitments. Moreover, as the committee
    has heard, even this indirect method of monitoring this treaty will be
    lost in the last 3 years when START I expires.
        We should act quickly in the Consultative Group for Strategic
    Security to fill in these blind spots.
        While we are working out these trust-building transparency
    measures, we must work with Russia to ensure an accurate accounting and
    the security of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear
    weapons have never been covered in any treaties or agreements--and that
    is an ongoing, decades-long mistake that we must correct immediately.
    We don't know with any specificity how many tactical nuclear weapons
    the Russians have, where they are, or how secure they are. These are
    weapons small enough to be man-portable and powerful enough to destroy
    a small city. In an age of terrorist threats, this dangerous gap must
    be closed at the earliest possible date.
        The United States and Russia should at the same time move to revise
    the Cold War operational status of our nuclear forces. Today, the
    United States and Russia have thousands of nuclear weapons on high
    alert, the great bulk of which are ready to launch within minutes--
    essentially the same posture we had throughout the Cold War.
        President Bush spoke of this dangerous situation more than 2 years
    ago as a candidate for President. Decrying what he called ``another
    unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation,'' he said `` The United
    States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-
    trigger status. For two nations at peace, keeping so many weapons on
    high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized
    launch. As President, I will ask for an assessment of what we can
    safely do to lower the alert status of our forces.''
        I doubt that the assessment that candidate Bush called for has yet
    to be presented to President Bush. The recently conducted Nuclear
    Posture Review--at least by public accounts--dealt almost entirely with
    force structure issues and did not separately discuss the alert
    conditions of the weapons. Similarly, the Treaty of Moscow does not
    explicitly address operational conditions, but by indirection, it does.
    The U.S. side's use of the term ``operationally deployed weapons'' to
    describe its commitments under the treaty implies an extension of
    today's high alert conditions at least until 2012 and perhaps for the
    indefinite future. As significant as the arms reduction numbers in the
    treaty are, the world envisioned for 2012--two decades after the end of
    the Cold War--is a world where the U.S. and Russia would still
    collectively maintain several thousand nuclear weapons on high alert.
    To echo President Bush's earlier quoted words: ``For two nations at
    peace, keeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable
    risks of accidental or unauthorized launch''--with the most
    catastrophic of consequences, I might add. As Sam Nunn has long
    advocated, we must take steps to reduce this danger. So what are the
    next steps to take in this area?
        First, the President can and should direct the immediate standdown
    of the forces identified for reduction under the new treaty. Such an
    action has a respected and successful precedent. President George
    Herbert Walker Bush ordered a similar standdown of nuclear forces in
    1991, when he directed the military to unilaterally standdown the
    forces scheduled for reductions under the START I Treaty he had just
    signed. The Russians soon followed this action with a reciprocal
    commitment.
        Second, our two Presidents should direct their military leaders to
    meet and return in the near future--say 3 months from now--with a
    developed set of options to begin to standdown the remaining nuclear
    forces deployable within the Treaty of Moscow cap levels to the maximum
    extent possible consistent with the national security of both
    countries. This is important because the more time we build into our
    process for launching missiles, the more time is available to gather
    data, exchange information, gain perspective, discover an error, or
    avoid a mistake. Expanding nuclear decision time may require still
    unidentified force structure changes, deployment changes, and other
    approaches. It is sure to be a complicated undertaking, but if we were
    smart enough at the height of the Cold War to be able to begin reducing
    nuclear weapons in a verifiable way, surely in the second decade after
    the end of the Cold War we can find a way to expand decision time with
    no loss of security.
        Third, our two Presidents should sweep away the bureaucratic
    impediments to getting the Joint Early Warning Center up and running.
    Countering the deterioration of Russia's early warning and detection
    capability is in the security interest of both countries. We must get
    on with the job.
        Let me also say a word about the issue of warhead dismantlement,
    drawing upon my past governmental experience. The treaty does not
    require the dismantlement or destruction of warheads or delivery
    systems. There are no ``force size'' limitations in the new treaty,
    only limitations on ``operationally deployed forces.'' Senators from
    both sides of the aisle have been right to raise questions about this
    matter. Eventually, under the evolving U.S.-Russian security
    relationship, we will need to address the actual size of our respective
    strategic forces. Beginning the dismantlement of excess warheads can
    contribute to this objective, build trust, and also serve the larger
    goal of giving the world community greater assurance that the U.S. and
    Russia are actually reducing their forces. In the near-term, the
    symbolism of the act is probably even more important than the actual
    numbers of warheads destroyed. If asked, the Department of Energy
    probably could set out an explicit schedule for beginning the
    dismantlement of some excess weapons. Certainly, some level of excess
    warhead elimination is already a part of the Department of Defense and
    the Department of Energy's planning process.
        But we must understand that while we can and should begin the
    dismantlement process, the development of a bilateral warhead
    dismantlement regime will be quite challenging, testing our available
    technologies and classification barriers. It is a task that must be
    examined in the context of U.S. strategies and plans for maintaining
    the stockpile into the future in the absence of a full warhead
    production capability. I note here that Russia maintains multiple
    nuclear warhead production facilities while the U.S. currently has none
    still operating. This asymmetry poses an inherent structural
    complication to the negotiation of a formal dismantlement regime.
    Therefore, while I agree that both sides should get about the job of
    dismantling excess weapons, I don't believe that securing an agreement
    on warhead dismantlement rises to the same level of urgency as other
    issues. It is a logical next step if the two sides are eventually to
    get to agreed force size limitations, but the time frame for action is
    somewhat long term and certainly less immediate than that required for
    the securing of tactical weapons and for reducing the alert status of
    our remaining nuclear forces. Any ranking of next steps and any
    guidance the Senate may wish to give on the subject should reflect this
    ordering of priorities.
        Moreover, many of the treaty specific compliance issues discussed
    before the committee do not rise to the same level of urgency of other
    issues at play in the U.S.-Russian dynamic, such as ensuring the
    security of weapons materials and weapons know how and the destruction
    of chemical weapons and biological weapons facilities. The critical job
    in CTR started by this committee under Nunn-Lugar, and extended in
    Nunn-Lugar-Domenici, must be unblocked, refocused, and accelerated.
    Following through on this urgent agenda has to be at the heart of the
    U.S.-Russian relationship. Expanding on this agenda to engage a global
    coalition in the fight against catastrophic terrorism is the next
    essential step in realizing the full promise of the new Russian-U.S.
    security relationship. Should we fail to take this last and most
    important step in providing for our security future, all semblance of
    security could be lost.
        September 11, if it taught us anything, taught us this: the number
    of innocent people al Qaeda is willing to kill is not limited by any
    political considerations, or any spark of human conscience--their
    capacity for killing is limited only by the power of their weapons. We
    must keep the world's most deadly weapons out of their hands.
        I am afraid far too many do not understand how immediate the danger
    is. Many Americans are aware that Osama bin Laden has said acquiring
    weapons of mass destruction is ``a religious duty.'' But fewer
    understand how far bin Laden has come in pursuing his so-called duty.
    According to reports in the last several months, the following evidence
    of al Qaeda activity has been uncovered since Taliban and al Qaeda
    forces fled Afghanistan:

             Rudimentary diagrams of nuclear weapons were uncovered
            at a suspected safe house for al Qaeda in Kabul confirming that
            al Qaeda was exploring ways to make low-grade, nuclear devices;
             Material that could be used to make a radiological
            bomb was found in an underground al Qaeda base near Kandahar;
             Documents that include details of a biological and
            chemical weapons program were uncovered at another al Qaeda
            safe house;
             At the same site, a memo was discovered, apparently
            written by bin Laden's number two, saying: ``the destructive
            power of (biological) weapons is no less than that of nuclear
            weapons;'' and
             Finally, a June 1999 memo was discovered by the Wall
            Street Journal on the hard-drive of a computer left in Kabul by
            al Qaeda. It recommended that the al Qaeda biological weapons
            program seek cover and talent in educational institutions,
            which the memo said ``allow easy access to specialists, which
            will greatly benefit us in the first stage, God willing.''

        We need to remind ourselves that these are just the documents they
    left behind that we have recovered. We don't know what they took with
    them, nor what they left behind that we have not found.
        At the same time, we know not only that terrorists are seeking
    weapons of mass destruction. We also know where they are looking to
    find them.
        As the committee is well aware, 10 years ago, when the Soviet Union
    broke apart, it left a mind-numbing legacy of more than 20,000
    strategic nuclear warheads, and enough highly enriched uranium and
    plutonium to make 40,000-60,000 more, stored in over 250 buildings in
    more than 50 sites distributed throughout the Russian Federation across
    11 time zones.
        Unofficial estimates of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons vary from
    3,000 to 20,000 weapons, some of which pack the destructive power of
    the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. As I said before, these weapons have
    never been the subject of arms control regimes and are largely
    unaccounted for. Russia also has 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons
    awaiting disposition. The Shchuchye storage site alone houses almost 2
    million rounds of chemical weapons--any one of which could be carried
    away in a suitcase and every one of which is potent enough to take
    hundreds and perhaps thousands of lives and create terror. Russia also
    has an elaborate bio-weapons apparatus, and thousands of scientists who
    know how to make weapons and missiles, but no longer have secure jobs
    or secure futures.
        In the post-Soviet period, Russia's dysfunctional economy and
    eroded security systems combined to undercut controls on these weapons,
    materials, and know how--and increased the risk that they could flow to
    terrorist groups or hostile forces. Considerable improvements have come
    through the Nunn-Lugar program, but we have a long way to go in Russia.
    Moreover, the vulnerabilities reach well beyond Russia and other parts
    of the Former Soviet Union.
        Last May in Moscow, former Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar co-hosted
    a conference of Russian and American legislators, officials, and
    experts. The Moscow conference marked the 10-year anniversary of Nunn-
    Lugar CTR. Nunn and Lugar used this point in time to call for a new
    decadal effort to finish the job in Russia and the Former Soviet Union
    and to extend the principles of CTR beyond the United States and Russia
    to include the whole world, with Russia and the United States linked in
    partnership, sharing best practices and lessons learned. They called it
    a ``Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism.'' The approach was
    described by Senator Lugar some months ago in the Washington Post: ``We
    have to make sure that every nation with nuclear, biological, or
    chemical weapons capacity accounts for what it has, secures what it
    has, and pledges that no other nation or group will be allowed
    access.'' That simply stated mission should energize the world
    community and provide the core basis for transforming the U.S.-Russian
    security relationship.
        A Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism must be grounded
    on the central security realities of our new century: First, the
    greatest dangers are threats all nations face together and no nation
    can solve on its own. Second: The most likely, most immediate threat is
    terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. Third: The best way to
    address the threat is to keep terrorists from acquiring nuclear,
    biological, and chemical weapons.
        How difficult it is for terrorists to acquire a nuclear weapon
    depends on how difficult we make it. It becomes obvious from analyzing
    the terrorist path to a nuclear attack that the most effective and
    least expensive way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to secure weapons
    and materials at the source. Acquiring weapons and materials is the
    hardest step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for us to
    stop. By contrast, every subsequent step in the process is easier for
    the terrorists to take and harder for us to stop. Once they gain access
    to materials, they've completed the most difficult step. That is why
    defense against catastrophic terrorism must begin with securing weapons
    and materials in every country and every facility that has them. A
    single point failure in security anywhere in the world can have the
    gravest of effects.
        Members of the Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism
    would include every nation that has something to safeguard or that can
    make a contribution to safeguarding it, including our European allies,
    Japan, China, India, Pakistan, and the many nations that host research
    reactors using weapons-grade fuel.
        Each member could make a contribution to the coalition's activities
    commensurate with its capabilities. As with the coalition against al
    Qaeda, this coalition would extend to wherever weapons of mass
    destruction exist or might be made and wherever terrorist cells exist
    that might build them, steal them, or use them. The cooperation would
    extend from prevention, to include detection, protection, interdiction,
    and response.
        This vision received a dramatic endorsement with the recent G-8
    announcement that its member states were establishing a global
    partnership against catastrophic terrorism and combining for this
    purpose a $10 billion funding commitment from the U.S. with a $10
    billion pledge from our G-8 partners over a 10-year period. I applaud
    President Bush's leadership and success in achieving this G-8 pledge to
    unified action to combat catastrophic terrorism. Importantly, the G-8
    commitment includes Russia in a full partnership role and acknowledges
    that the most immediate and urgent work must begin in Russia. One of
    the most essential next steps in the U.S.-Russian relationship,
    therefore, is to make the G-8 commitments real, to follow up with
    diplomatic rigor and resources, and to begin to extend the partnership
    beyond the G-8 members.
        To make the most of this opportunity to improve our security and
    build a wider partnership against catastrophic terrorism, it is useful
    to think of the whole world as being engaged in a new arms race.
    Terrorists are racing to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological
    weapons, and we must be racing together to stop them. Reducing the
    numbers of U.S.-Russian deployed or deployable strategic forces at some
    point in our still distant future is important. The Treaty of Moscow is
    important and should be ratified. But if we are to have a future and be
    secure in that future, we must first win the race against catastrophic
    terrorism--and we must win it on a global scale.
        It may be difficult to find champions for the most urgent and
    pressing priority of building a global effort to prevent catastrophic
    terrorism. If you pursue it and succeed completely, it won't make
    anyone's life better, it will just keep millions of lives from becoming
    infinitely worse. That is not the kind of message political leaders
    like to highlight or voters like to hear. But, this is too serious an
    issue for the standard political calculus. In the end, Mr. Chairman, we
    all should imagine the awful aftermath of a terrorist nuclear attack on
    the United States and imagine, if it happened, what steps we would wish
    we had taken to prevent it. Then we should take those steps without
    delay.
        It is my hope that the Treaty of Moscow will be remembered more as
    a hinge in the U.S.-Russian relationship; not an end point, but a
    turning point, leading to a transformed security relationship. If it
    serves this purpose and propels us on the course of action outlined
    above, it will truly be historic and worthy of history's praise.
        Thank you.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Curtis.
        Dr. Carter.

    STATEMENT OF DR. ASHTON B. CARTER, FORD FOUNDATION PROFESSOR OF
     SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF
                     GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator. It is a privilege to be
    here and to offer you my views on the Moscow Strategic
    Offensive Reductions Treaty. On one hand, it is easy to do,
    because I, like virtually every other witness who has appeared
    before Senate committees deliberating this matter, support the
    treaty. I do so on the basis that it provides for the United
    States to make changes in our nuclear forces that are desirable
    anyway--on cost and strategic grounds--and does not require us
    to change our military capabilities in significant ways. The
    treaty, therefore, doesn't require us to make any difficult
    tradeoffs in our own capabilities for those required in the
    Russian Federation.
        On the other hand, the treaty is correspondingly modest in
    terms of the limits it places on the Russians. Senator Nunn has
    pointed this out most elegantly in his recent testimony before
    the Foreign Relations Committee, and I think Charlie Curtis has
    as well in the statement he just made.
        SORT addresses only a small subset of the overall Russian
    nuclear capability, namely strategic weapons. It is silent on
    the larger and more dangerous portion of the Soviet nuclear
    legacy: tactical weapons, nuclear weapons, and fissile
    materials. As far as strategic forces are concerned, as Senator
    Nunn pointed out, it addresses numbers and is silent on hair-
    trigger operational practices. I would be pleased to answer
    questions about the SORT to the best of my ability, but there
    is another dimension of this issue that I would like to address
    squarely.
        The SORT, while it makes a net contribution to our
    security, positive in sign though small of magnitude, does not
    point to the future or to the nuclear danger that most
    threatens the Nation's security. That danger is the potential
    acquisition by terrorists of nuclear weapons or fissile
    materials, either from Russia or elsewhere. It has been a full
    decade since the problem of loss of custody of nuclear weapons
    or fissile materials replaced deterrence of Moscow as the
    central objective of nuclear policy.
        I was privileged to participate in the early deliberations
    that led Senators Dick Lugar and Sam Nunn to create the Nunn-
    Lugar CTR program--deliberations in which I remember Senator
    Bingaman also being centrally involved. I later led that very
    program at the Pentagon, and I conducted the Clinton
    administration's Nuclear Posture Review with my counterparts in
    the Joint Staff. We concluded even then, 8 years ago, that
    traditional arms control is no longer the central tool for
    dealing with the nuclear danger to the United States. The
    Nuclear Posture Review instead focused on stabilizing a chaotic
    Russia, expanding the Nunn-Lugar program, and ensuring that of
    all the successor states to the Soviet Union only Russia ended
    up with all the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons.
        While traditional arms controllers criticized that at the
    time, events have born out that it was the correct focus. By
    any measure, the Nunn-Lugar program has been a tremendous
    success. In May, I had the privilege of accompanying Senators
    Lugar and Nunn together with Representatives John Spratt and
    Chris Shays to sites in Russia where nuclear, chemical,
    biological, and ballistic missile threats are being
    systematically safeguarded or eliminated altogether. Senator
    Bingaman, I would also add, accompanied the other senators and
    representatives in the early part of that trip. His schedule
    didn't permit him to travel to all of the sites.
        These projects that we saw in May were just a gleam in our
    eyes a decade ago. Now they are mature engineering projects. At
    the G-8 summit, President Bush took an important step in
    gaining pledges of other nations, which have just as much at
    stake as we do in the so-called 10 plus 10 over 10 plan, and I
    applaud that. But in a move that defies all understanding, the
    Bush administration has taken a step that is bringing these
    projects to a screeching halt.
        This administration has failed to make the certifications
    required by Congress, certifications that were made every year
    by the Bush senior and Clinton administrations. This move
    occurs 2 months after President Bush claimed that a new era in
    U.S.-Russian relations has begun and 2 months after he signed
    the new treaty. It occurs 11 months after al Qaeda proved that
    there are no limits to its destructive urges, and considers
    acquisition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
    destruction, in bin Laden's words, ``a religious duty.'' It
    occurs 10 months after President Bush declared that keeping the
    most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous
    people to be his highest priority. This certification mistake
    must be corrected quickly.
        I understand that Senators Lugar and Levin have made some
    progress in finding interim solutions to this problem. As
    Senator Lugar has said, the engineers and program managers
    running these valuable programs should not be made to suffer
    the ``perils of Pauline'' every year. Russia is the largest
    potential source of loose nuclear weapons and fissile material
    for terrorists, but it is not the only one. Pakistan and India
    built nuclear arsenals to deter their neighbors, but Pakistan's
    political future, at the very least, is as uncertain as
    Russia's was when the Soviet Union was crumbling.
        Less well recognized is that scores of nations--from Serbia
    to Ghana--have research reactors fueled by highly enriched
    uranium in bomb-capable quantities. Plutonium remains in North
    Korea, though under U.S. and international observation, and
    even non-nuclear allies such as Japan and Belgium have large
    repositories of weapons capable plutonium as a by-product of
    their nuclear power program. These caches of fissile material
    around the world pose an unacceptable long-term risk to human-
    kind. Each is a sleeper cell of potential mass terrorism. Once
    a terrorist fashions a bomb, a device like that will be
    extremely difficult to detect.
        I noticed, by the way, on the basis of my service on the
    National Academies of Science panel, which recently reported
    its results on science and technology as they apply to
    terrorism, that a bomb would be very difficult to detect as it
    passes through international borders and shipping containers.
    Unlike its dangerous cousin bioterrorism, nuclear terrorism
    cannot be countered with vaccines or antibiotics. Once the
    material gets out, it is probably too late. The simple
    technical fact is that nuclear terrorism can only be
    effectively prevented at the source.
        Nature, however, has not been totally unkind. Only
    governments have produced uranium and plutonium. All these
    materials are accordingly in the possession of governments, and
    whatever their disagreements about the arsenals in their
    possession, all governments should have a profound common
    interest in ensuring that these materials do not fall into the
    hands of terrorists. The Preventive Defense Project at Harvard
    and Stanford, which I co-chair with former Secretary of Defense
    William Perry, has in an impressive reprise of their invention
    of CTR a decade ago, promoted the concept of a global coalition
    against catastrophic terrorism. The coalition concept takes its
    cues from the coalition against al Qaeda, and involves all
    governments that perceive the common interests of keeping
    fissile material away from terrorists, especially those that
    have bomb-capable materials. It also calls for including Japan,
    China, India, Pakistan, and the many nations I mentioned
    earlier that host reactors using nuclear weapons capable fuel.
        The coalition would seek to extend the reach of its
    activities wherever in the world the means of nuclear terror
    are harbored. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, as Charlie Curtis
    mentioned earlier, sponsored a conference in Moscow, on May 27,
    for American and Russian experts to define a specific agenda of
    activities. I have appended the report of that conference and a
    summary that I wrote to the Washington Post, and I would
    request that both be entered into the record.
        Senator Reed. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Dr. Carter. The agenda called for action in prevention,
    detection, protection, interdiction, and cleanup. For nuclear
    terrorism, it focused on the following actions: first,
    establishing common world class standards for inventory
    control, safety, and security for weapons and weapons usable
    materials, standards of the kind worked out between Russia and
    the United States in the Nunn-Lugar program; second,
    establishing progressively stronger measures of transparency to
    demonstrate to others that the standards are being met; third,
    providing assistance to those who need help in meeting the
    coalition standards, the Nunn-Lugar program; fourth,
    cooperating to provide effective border and export controls
    regarding nuclear materials; and fifth, devising cooperative
    procedures to define and regain control of bombs or fissile
    materials if they are lost or seized by terrorists. One
    possibility is a coalition version of the U.S. Department of
    Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST); sixth, planning
    and researching cooperative responses to a nuclear or
    radiological explosion if, God forbid, one occurs, such as
    mapping the contaminated area, addressing mass casualties,
    administering public health measures or iodine pills, and
    cleaning up contaminated soil; and seventh, cooperating on
    forensic radio-chemical techniques to find the source of a
    nuclear incident from its residue.
        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is clear to most
    of us that the SORT agreement upon which you are deliberating
    is probably the last of its kind. Its only parties are Moscow
    and Washington. It covers only deployed strategic forces, which
    were of paramount importance during the Cold War, but are but a
    tip of the nuclear iceberg, and I would suggest that the
    concept of a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism as
    I have described, and Charlie Curtis described as well, is the
    seed of the arms control of the 21st century.
        The coalition concept addresses the single most urgent
    problem of international security. It just might provide a big
    tent for governments that have not participated in much arms
    control of the 20th century style--China, India, and Pakistan--
    since it is grounded in a deep and obvious common interest. The
    United States and Russia should join and spearhead the
    coalition. Moreover, doing so would be a fitting next step
    after the SORT; and unlike the SORT, the new coalition concept
    would provide Presidents Bush and Putin with an opportunity to
    give substance to their oft-spoken desire to move to a
    qualitatively new phase in relations.
        The coalition approach would open up a new and vitally
    important front on the war on terrorism. It would extend the
    principles of the successful Nunn-Lugar program in a new way
    from nuclear materials in Russia to nuclear materials
    worldwide, from a U.S. funded program to wider international
    participation, and from a focus on putting the Cold War behind
    us to focusing on the 21st century's most riveting security
    problem. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Carter follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Dr. Ashton B. Carter
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a privilege to
    appear before you to offer my views on the Moscow Treaty on Strategic
    Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).
        On the one hand, it is easy to do so: I, like virtually every other
    witness that has appeared before Senate committees deliberating on the
    treaty, support it. I do so on the basis that the treaty provides for
    us to make changes in our nuclear forces that are desirable anyway on
    cost and strategic grounds, and it does not constrain our capabilities
    in militarily significant ways. The treaty therefore does not require
    us to make any difficult tradeoffs of our own capabilities for those
    required of the Russian Federation. In terms of the limits it places on
    the Russian arsenal, the treaty is correspondingly modest. Former
    Senator Sam Nunn has pointed this out most elegantly in his recent
    testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee. SORT addresses only a
    small subset of the overall Russian nuclear capability--deployed
    strategic weapons. It is silent on the larger and more dangerous
    portion of the Soviet nuclear legacy--tactical nuclear weapons, reserve
    weapons, and fissile materials. As far as the strategic forces are
    concerned, Senator Nunn also pointed out that SORT addresses only
    numbers and is silent on ``hair-trigger'' operational practices.
        I would be pleased to answer questions about the SORT to the best
    of my ability. But there is another dimension to this issue that I
    would like to address squarely. The SORT, while it makes a net
    contribution to our security--positive in sign if small in magnitude--
    does not point to the future or to the nuclear danger that most
    threatens the Nation's security. That danger is the potential
    acquisition by terrorists of nuclear weapons or fissile materials,
    either from Russia or elsewhere.
        It has been a full decade since loss of custody of nuclear weapons
    or fissile materials replaced deterrence of Moscow as the central
    objective of U.S. nuclear policy. I was privileged to participate in
    the early deliberations that led Senators Dick Lugar and Sam Nunn to
    created the Nunn-Lugar CTR program. I later led that very program in
    the Pentagon. I conducted the Clinton administration's Nuclear Posture
    Review with my counterparts in the Joint Staff. We concluded even then,
    8 years ago, that traditional arms control was no longer the central
    tool for dealing with nuclear danger to the United States. The Nuclear
    Posture Review instead focused on stabilizing a chaotic Russia,
    expanding the Nunn-Lugar program, and on ensuring that only Russia
    ended up with all the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. While traditional
    arms controllers criticized that focus at the time, events have borne
    out that it was the correct focus.
        By any measure, the Nunn-Lugar program has been a tremendous
    success. In May I had the privilege of accompanying Senators Lugar and
    Nunn, together with Representatives John Spratt and Chris Shays, to
    sites in Russia where nuclear, chemical, biological, and ballistic
    missile threats are being systematically safeguarded, or eliminated
    altogether. These projects were just a gleam in our eyes a decade ago,
    and now they are mature engineering projects. At the G-8 summit,
    President Bush took an important step in gaining the pledges of other
    nations who have just as much at stake as we do to contribute to the
    Nunn-Lugar program, in the so-called ``10 plus 10 over 10'' plan.
        In a move that defies all understanding, however, the Bush
    administration has taken a step that is bringing these projects to a
    screeching halt. This administration has failed to make the
    certifications required by Congress, certifications that were made
    every year by the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations. This situation
    occurs 2 months after President Bush proclaimed a ``new era'' in U.S.-
    Russian relations and 2 months after he signed the new SORT arms
    control treaty whose implementation would be accelerated by Nunn-Lugar;
    it occurs 11 months after al Qaeda showed there are no limits to its
    destructive urges and considers acquisition of nuclear weapons ``a
    religious duty;'' it occurs 10 months after President Bush declared
    that keeping the most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most
    dangerous people to be his highest priority. The certification mistake
    must be corrected, and quickly. I understand that Senators Lugar and
    Levin have made some progress in arranging an interim solution to this
    problem, and I hope Congress and the administration can find a more
    lasting solution. As Senator Lugar has said, the engineers and program
    managers running these valuable programs should not be made to suffer
    the ``perils of Pauline'' every year.
        Russia is the largest potential source of ``loose'' nuclear weapons
    and fissile materials for terrorists, but it is not the only one.
    Pakistan and India have built nuclear arsenals to deter their
    neighbors, but Pakistan's political future, at the very least, is as
    uncertain as was Russia's when the Soviet Union was crumbling and the
    Nunn-Lugar program was begun. Less well recognized is that scores of
    nations from Serbia to Ghana have research reactors fueled by highly
    enriched uranium. Plutonium remains in North Korea, though under U.S.
    and international observation. Even non-nuclear allies such as Japan
    and Belgium have repositories of weapons-capable plutonium as a
    byproduct of their nuclear power programs.
        These caches of fissile materials around the world, we now must
    realize, pose an unacceptable long-term risk to humankind. Each is a
    ``sleeper cell'' of potential mass terrorism. Once a terrorist fashions
    a bomb, a device will be extremely difficult to detect as it passes
    through international borders in, say, shipping containers. Unlike its
    dangerous cousin bioterrorism, nuclear terrorism cannot be countered
    with vaccines or antibiotics. Once the material gets out, it is
    probably too late.
        The simple technical fact is that nuclear terrorism can only be
    effectively prevented at the source. But here Nature has been kind.
    Highly enriched uranium and plutonium are difficult and conspicuous to
    produce. Only governments have done so to date, and all these materials
    are accordingly in the possession of governments. Whatever their
    disagreements about the arsenals in their possession, all governments
    should have a profound common interest in ensuring that these materials
    do not fall into the hands of terrorists.
        The Preventive Defense Project at Harvard and Stanford has
    therefore worked to elaborate a concept put forward by Sam Nunn and
    Dick Lugar, in an impressive reprise of their invention of CTR a decade
    ago--the concept of a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism.
        The coalition concept takes its cues from the coalition against al
    Qaeda. The coalition would contain all governments that perceive the
    profound common interest of keeping fissile materials away from
    terrorists, especially those that have bomb-capable materials to
    protect or that can make a contribution to safeguarding it, including
    Europe, Japan, China, India, Pakistan, and the many nations that host
    research reactors using weapons-capable fuel. Each member could make
    contributions to the coalition's activities commensurate with its
    capabilities and traditions. The coalition would extend the reach of
    its activities wherever in the world the means of nuclear terror seek
    harbor.
        The Nuclear Threat Initiative sponsored a conference in Moscow on
    May 27, 2002, where American and Russian experts defined a specific
    agenda of activities for the coalition. I have appended the report of
    that conference and a summary of the concept I wrote for The Washington
    Post to this statement, and I would request that both be entered into
    the record with my statement. The agenda called for a global coalition
    to combat terrorism in all phases--prevention, detection, protection,
    interdiction, and cleanup--focused on the following actions:

             Establishing common, ``world-class'' standards for
            inventory control, safety, and security for weapons and
            weapons-usable materials--standards of the kind worked out
            between Russia and the United States in the Nunn-Lugar program.
             Establishing progressively stronger standards of
            transparency, to demonstrate to others that standards are being
            met.
             Providing assistance to those who need help meeting
            the coalition's standards.
             Cooperating to provide effective border and export
            controls regarding nuclear materials.
             Devising cooperative procedures to find and regain
            control of bombs or fissile materials if they are lost or
            seized by terrorists. One possibility is a coalition version of
            the U.S. Department of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team
            (NEST)--a ``global NEST.'' Another possibility is to agree to
            facilitate deployment of national NEST teams, in the way that
            many nations deploy canine search teams to earthquake sites to
            search for survivors.
             Planning and researching cooperative responses to a
            nuclear or radiological explosion, such as mapping the
            contaminated area, addressing mass casualties, administering
            public health measures like iodine pills, and cleaning up
            contaminated soil.
             Cooperating on forensic radio-chemical techniques to
            find the source of a nuclear incident from its residue.

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is clear to most of
    us that the SORT agreement upon which you are deliberating is probably
    the last of its kind. Its only parties are Moscow and Washington. It
    covers only deployed strategic forces, which were of paramount
    importance during the Cold War but are but a tip of the nuclear
    terrorism iceberg. I would suggest that the concept of a Global
    Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism is the seed of the arms
    control of 21st century.
        The coalition concept addresses the single most urgent problem of
    U.S. national security and international security. It just might
    provide a ``big tent'' for governments that have not participated much
    in ``arms control'' of the 20th century style--especially China, India,
    and Pakistan--since it is grounded in a deep and obvious common
    interest. If the United States and Russia jointly spearhead the
    coalition, it would be a fitting next step after the SORT and would
    provide Presidents Bush and Putin with an opportunity to give substance
    to their oft-spoken desire to move to a ``qualitatively new'' phase in
    relations.
        The coalition approach would open up a new and vitally important
    front in the war on terrorism. It would extend the principles of the
    successful Nunn-Lugar program in a new way--from nuclear materials in
    Russia to nuclear materials worldwide, from a U.S.-funded program to
    wider international participation, and from a focus on putting the Cold
    War behind us to focusing on the 21st century's most riveting security
    problem.
        Thank you.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Curtis and Dr.
    Carter, for your excellent testimony. Let me ask a few
    questions and turn to my colleagues. First, with regard to the
    SORT, you both realize that in its deliberations the Senate can
    include conditions and understandings in the resolution of
    ratification. I wonder if there is anything that you would
    suggest either at this moment or if you need some time in
    writing that might be properly included as a condition or
    reservation or statement with respect to the SORT. Mr. Curtis?
        Mr. Curtis. Mr. Chairman, I think I will take that
    opportunity to submit it to the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Witness declined to respond in writing to the committee.

        Senator Reed. Dr. Carter.
        Dr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, I may give that some additional
    thought, but one thing that comes to mind immediately that I
    mentioned in my statement is that implementing this treaty on
    the Russian side will be facilitated and accelerated by the
    Nunn-Lugar program. It does seem to me that solving this
    problem with certifications, which has so unfortunately held
    things up this year and giving some permanent disposition to
    that matter, ought to be part of the deliberation surrounding
    this treaty.
        Senator Reed. Following up on that, Dr. Carter, with
    respect to the failure to certify, can you illuminate from your
    own perspective what is going on?
        Dr. Carter. I have the following impression, which is from
    the outside looking in, and that is that the senior leadership
    of the administration was in fact surprised to find that this
    move had been taken. It arose at lower levels, and left them in
    a situation where big projects that are under way, buildings
    being built, sites being cleared, arsenals being prepared to
    enter into the facilities where the weapons will be destroyed,
    all this was coming to a halt because somebody did not feel a
    certification that had been made for 10 consecutive previous
    years could be made this year. It is also my understanding that
    the senior leadership is trying to get on top of it, but that
    is a view from the outside looking in.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Dr. Carter. One of the aspects of
    the SORT of concern, and again I think it is quite clear that
    it will be virtually unanimously adopted, is the presence of
    reversibility. It is so easy to do nothing for any number of
    years and simply let the treaty lapse. Any thoughts about
    things that might be done to make these reductions in warheads
    difficult to reverse? Mr. Curtis.
        Mr. Curtis. Senators, in my formal testimony I suggested
    that we should identify the forces that we intend to schedule
    for meeting the reductions in the treaty, and that should be a
    transparent document and planned for and monitored through the
    transparency mechanisms that are yet to be developed under the
    Bilateral Implementation Commission. I think that the Senate
    could expect to see that schedule laid out and transparency
    mechanisms put in place.
        I would hope that the Senate would avail itself of the
    understandings authority in its treaty ratification
    responsibility, rather than making more formal reservations to
    the treaty. I also think, as I called for in other testimony,
    that we could lay out specific warheads and an explicit
    schedule for this matter. If that were laid out, I think it
    would help to build confidence in the relationship between the
    two nations, and in the larger sense, give the world community
    some assurance that both sides are actually reducing their
    strategic forces. The vocabulary in this treaty is, of course,
    curious, because it talks about reductions of arms, but the
    substance of the treaty does not require that. It only
    addresses operationally deployed weapons. There are two ways of
    getting real meaning to reductions of arms. One of those is to
    get about the dismantling process, and the other is to lay out
    the schedule of how you are going to meet this treaty in a
    transparent way. This is necessary so that the treaty is not a
    single point in time some 12 years distant, but a treaty that
    ushers in a plan that will build down these forces in the
    interim between now and 2012.
        I think that would help both sides trust that we are
    actually serious about the intentions stated in this treaty,
    which are very elegantly stated in what I call the vision
    statement that is the joint statement of the two presidents
    that will come between the treaty.
        Senator Reed. Dr. Carter.
        Dr. Carter. Two thoughts very briefly; first is that Mr.
    Curtis suggested, and I wholeheartedly concur, that it will be
    valuable for both sides to do what we arranged in the START I
    context in the early 1990s, something called early
    deactivation, whereby one undertakes to take off alert
    immediately weapons slated for elimination under the treaty.
        In our system, and, we learned, in the Ukrainian and
    Kazakhstani systems through the Nunn-Lugar program, once you
    deactivate, you stop maintenance and life extension programs
    and you put yourself on a glide slope where it becomes more and
    more difficult to have the weapon's life preserved.
        The second thing, of course, is that if we continue the
    Nunn-Lugar program, and continue to eliminate strategic
    launchers the way we have done in Russia, that is a pretty
    dramatic demonstration of irreversibility. I was in Kartaly,
    Russia in May, and as I mentioned earlier we used 3,000 pounds
    of explosives under the Nunn-Lugar program to blow up an SS-18
    silo, and I will tell you it looks pretty irreversible even
    from half a mile away on a viewing stand. You get that because
    you have an understanding with the Russians and an agreement
    which provides for it. You get it because you have some rules
    in START for what destruction means. Above all, you get it
    because you are in a cooperative mode under the Nunn-Lugar
    program and you get to do it with your own hands and watch it
    with your own eyes.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Senator Bingaman.
        Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much. Let me summarize
    what I have gleaned in terms of concrete steps that we, our
    administration, and our government could be taking right now to
    actually follow through in dealing with some of these difficult
    problems. One is the certification that is required under Nunn-
    Lugar. That could be fixed today if the will were there in the
    White House to fix it.
        Second, is the publishing of the schedule of how we are
    going to go ahead and comply with SORT. That is something that
    we should be doing unilaterally, urging the Russians to do the
    same thing unilaterally, but there is no requirement as I
    understand it under SORT for some kind of mutual negotiation
    before that occurs. Am I right about that?
        Mr. Curtis. That is my understanding, Senator.
        Senator Bingaman. So we could be publishing a schedule
    about how we are going to go forth complying with SORT. A third
    item that both of you mentioned is that President Bush could do
    what his father did and order the immediate stand down of
    forces that have been identified for reduction as soon as we
    make that schedule or publish that schedule of reduction, which
    I think would be a very positive step. Mr. Curtis, you referred
    to the possibility of us moving ahead with dismantlement of
    excess weapons, and you indicated the Department of Energy
    probably could set out an explicit schedule for beginning the
    dismantlement of some excess weapons. Could you elaborate on
    the extent of the excess weapons you believe might be promptly
    considered for dismantlement, both on our side and on the
    Russian side, and any obstacles to getting this done if the
    will were there to do it?
        Mr. Curtis. Senator, I think that with the next panel you
    will discover that there is probably already in the planning
    process a schedule for weapons elimination, and they would be
    the better witnesses. Some weapon types, the B-53 for example,
    have been taken out of the stockpile. That is a 10 megaton
    weapon that certainly can be scheduled for elimination, and it
    would have important symbolic value. I believe the W-62 has now
    been released as well. That can be scheduled for elimination.
        What I have tried to say is that we should start to get
    about this process and lay out an explicit schedule. It is
    going to take a long time. Campaigns to eliminate warheads take
    considerable planning time. Quite obviously, it has to be done
    safely and carefully, and it also competes for occupying the
    lines with the life extension program and refurbishment of
    weapons. That is an ongoing part of the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program, so I want to emphasize it is a complicated piece of
    business, but it certainly is capable of being planned for and
    laid out in considerable detail in an advanced schedule that
    can give this committee and others confidence it will get the
    job done.
        Senator Bingaman. Dr. Carter, do you have any comment on
    that?
        Dr. Carter. I think your list is comprehensive and right
    on. If I could add one item to it, Senator, I would like to
    request that the administration show us a road map or begin the
    process of discussion about what the next step is after this
    treaty. As I indicated, and I think just about everybody that I
    talked to agrees with me, this is the end of the road for the
    Washington-Moscow style of arms control. One cannot conceive of
    another treaty because one doesn't conceive of Washington and
    Moscow together being the core of the nuclear problem going
    forward.
        As I said, even if we are just talking about Washington and
    Moscow, we are working in a tiny corner of the arsenals,
    deployed strategic weapons, and we have not addressed all the
    rest. The big problem in the future is less nuclear weapons in
    the possession of governments than nuclear weapons in the
    possession of nongovernments. These are big things to think
    about. To me, I am uncomfortable with the idea of marching
    through the 21st century with just this treaty, which is so
    clearly the end of the road.
        Senator Bingaman. Let me ask each of you if you have any
    additional thoughts as to how we move ahead with this problem
    of getting an inventory of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia.
    Is this something that we just continue to request the Russians
    do, or are there things, concrete actions that we can take that
    will facilitate or incentivize this and bring this about one
    way or another? It seems to me ever since I have been hearing
    about this set of issues and working with others here to deal
    with it, the problem of not knowing the extent of the tactical
    nuclear weapons arsenal in Russia has been one of the central
    concerns. I do not see them as making progress in resolving it.
    Do you have a plan on how we can get it resolved?
        Dr. Carter. I do not know if ``plan'' is the right word--
    perhaps concept. In 1994, when the Russian defense minister
    came here and met with President Clinton in the Roosevelt Room,
    we were pressing him on this very matter of a confidential
    exchange of stockpile information, and the point he made then,
    which I think essentially continues to animate the Russian
    military, is that in this period of conventional weakness they
    rely more on tactical nuclear weapons. They do not want to see
    tactical nuclear weapons, therefore, swept up in the maw of
    arms control and limited in this way. That is at least one
    important reason why they are reluctant to do this.
        I think that President Putin might be induced to engage in
    some transparency regarding tactical nuclear weapons if one
    changed the stage from U.S.-Russia arms control. Let us
    initially talk about our tactical nuclear weapons not with some
    idea of mutual reduction in mind, but instead in the context of
    this coalition against catastrophic terrorism that I referred
    to earlier. We might say to Putin, ``look, we, the United
    States and you, have an important interest in getting everybody
    else to explain what they have and protect what they have.''
        We do not think the Indians and Pakistanis ought to have
    nuclear weapons, but let us set that aside and say, ``if you
    have it, protect it,'' and we will ask for transparency around
    the world. In that context, Russia is really getting something
    for divulging information about its own arsenal. It doesn't
    need us to divulge what we have, and therefore it has no
    incentive for data exchange in this bilateral context. It gets
    back to my previous point about enlarging the scene here. We
    are not going to get anything done in the axis between
    Washington and Moscow anymore. The world's affairs do not run
    in that axis anymore. They used to, and they do not now.
        Mr. Curtis. If I could just add briefly, I am not sure I
    share Dr. Carter's judgment that this is the end of the U.S.-
    Russian negotiated agreement regime. The tactical weapons
    certainly could be the subject of a bilateral agreement between
    the two. Secretary Powell very clearly laid out before the
    Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there may be agreements
    that would substitute for the Treaty of Moscow earlier than its
    end point of 2012, or extensions thereafter. So there is
    certainly within the contemplation of this agreement between
    the two sides, the suggestion that there may be further
    refinement of the U.S. security--Russian security relationship
    through treaty means.
        Second, as to your question on tactical nuclear weapons, I
    think the process of establishing this consultative group for
    strategic security, which involves the defense ministers of
    both countries in periodic meeting, is an important procedural
    mechanism for getting at this issue. Secretary Rumsfeld has
    said that tactical nuclear weapons are going to be foremost on
    that agenda.
        I think Congress should not reinforce in any formal way
    with this treaty a new U.S.-Russian security relationship, but
    certainly reinforce that as a priority and a test, as I said in
    my earlier remarks. If it lives up to its promise in the joint
    statement, then the U.S. and Russia ought to be able to provide
    for an accountability of tactical weapons as it has escaped
    them in the past, so this will be an important test of that
    relationship.
        Obviously, there are things that might be engaged in this
    that would involve a broader security relationship, but I don't
    think it would be particularly useful to Secretary Powell and
    Secretary Rumsfeld for me to suggest exactly how they should do
    it.
        Senator Bingaman. Thank you both very much.
        Senator Reed. Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you. Dr. Carter and Mr. Curtis, it
    is great to see you both. The questions that I came with this
    morning run along the same lines as my colleagues. So maybe I
    will begin by recounting a conversation I had with somebody
    here recently on the Hill and get your reaction to it in broad
    terms. This person said to me that the more he learned about
    SORT, the more it seemed to him like an empty vessel. I think
    that this feeling has grown here, although everybody believes
    the treaty will be ratified overwhelmingly, if not unanimously.
    Perhaps it has been implicit in the questions that have been
    asked in your statements, but is this an empty vessel?
        Mr. Curtis. I think it is a step, but this step alone would
    not provide meaningfully for our security. This step must be
    followed by other steps, which I have tried to lay out in my
    testimony. I think, at least in Secretary Powell's testimony,
    there is the suggestion that it is very much on his agenda that
    there will be follow-on steps to this treaty. I think it is an
    important step. It has symbolic value at the very least, which
    in the world of U.S.-Russian relationships has always been, and
    is maybe now, especially important. This treaty is clearly
    important on the Russian side, and is important for us if it
    propels us to redefine our relationship with Russia, so that it
    becomes a genuine partnership. It is not yet a partnership, but
    it must become a genuine partnership to address these security
    concerns that are concerns of both nations and are indeed
    concerns for global security. If that happens, then this treaty
    will have a real historical value because of what it was a
    catalyst to do.
        Senator Lieberman. Dr. Carter.
        Dr. Carter. I would agree with that. It is not an empty
    vessel. I think it is an important step, and we all need to be
    thinking and helping the administration figure out what the
    next step is and where that next step might go. I also agree
    with Mr. Curtis' comments about the symbolic value in Russia
    and the meaningful partnership. I believe that in this context
    the kind of coalition concept that I have been talking about in
    regards to a U.S.-Russian partnership can become real.
        We have talked a lot about partnership in the last decade.
    I had a million meetings and attended summits and so forth in
    which partnership was declared again and again. The question is
    are we really partners, besides dismantling the Cold War, which
    is an important task. This is a step in that direction.
        Where else can we be partners with Russia? I think we can
    also be partners in facing this problem of nuclear weapons that
    are not ours or theirs, but somebody else's, because we share a
    common interest in doing so. We have wrestled with these
    problems of nuclear dangers for decades and have some thoughts
    that others might be induced to share because we have the
    technical knowledge about how to safeguard and destroy them. So
    here's a topic where the United States and Russia might
    actually have a substantive partnership and we might actually
    benefit from working with Russia. If we could turn our arms
    control dialogue with Russia from one about each other to one
    about everybody, that opens up a whole new front of
    constructive activity that would give real substance to
    partnership.
        Senator Lieberman. We still have to deal with one another,
    and there is an oddity to that. It seems unconnected to the
    present and the future, which is to say that the dominant
    relationship in the world is no longer the Soviet- or Russian-
    American relationship. The greatest security fears going
    forward are more global than bilateral, and yet the fact is
    that as a carryover from the Cold War, both Russia and the
    United States still possess a disproportionate, overwhelming
    percentage of strategic nuclear weapons.
        So this is a holdover from the last century. You have to
    deal with that, as well as reaching forward. In saying this was
    the last treaty, I am sure you are not denying that reality.
        Dr. Carter. No. I want to make clear that it is not my wish
    that it be the last. It is my prediction, as I look out and see
    how people stack up the priorities. I don't think having
    another U.S.-Russian arms control agreement focused on just us
    is going to make the cut. I would be happy to support such an
    agreement if it could be negotiated. You are absolutely right.
        As we march forward and deal with the problems of the 21st
    century, we are not going to be able to do that successfully
    unless we contend with this huge overhang. It involves nuclear,
    chemical, biological, and ballistic missiles. There is a big
    effort there, and that is what the Nunn-Lugar program is about.
        Senator Lieberman. One of the several very hopeful articles
    in the treaty, and one that is interesting to me, is article 3.
    Article 3 states that for purposes of implementing this treaty,
    the parties shall hold meetings of a Bilateral Implementation
    Commission at least twice a year. Do you have any thoughts
    about how the Senate might play an active role in giving some
    substance and authority to that commission, perhaps as a
    bilateral jump-off point to the global security concerns that
    you have both been talking about, or attempting to focus on the
    next phase of Russian-American nuclear threat reduction?
        Mr. Curtis. Senator, there are two devices under the
    treaty. One is the Bilateral Implementation Commission, and the
    other is the consultative group for strategic security, which I
    mentioned, that is composed of four minister level officials.
        Obviously, the consultative group has the rank for policy.
    I think the administration needs to address this, but I took
    the bilateral commission to be more of a working group or
    technical body.
        Senator Lieberman. At a lower level?
        Mr. Curtis. Yes, at a lower level. If the Senate wishes to
    address the U.S.-Russian relationship, that should be charged
    with the consultative group for strategic security.
        Dr. Carter. I would agree with that. I would hope that the
    Senate would so charge the consultative group. This is too
    important a topic to drop, and the implementation of the
    details of this agreement, while important, is not the whole
    story.
        Mr. Curtis. If I might add one thing, I think it is very
    regrettable that the press and the political world have not
    well noted what was accomplished in the G-8. The commitment to
    unified action by the G-8, where Russia in the document is
    identified as a full partner with the acknowledgment of the
    work that is beginning in Russia on a six-point program, is a
    very significant joining of interests of the G-8 members. The
    recognition that that must be extended to the global community,
    and of gaining that pledge of the $10 billion match of U.S.
    funds to serve that partnership, is also a significant
    accomplishment of this administration and should be well
    credited. What we need to do is to build on that successful
    effort, and encourage U.S.-Russian participation in that
    context to expand it to the full dimension of a global
    coalition of the kind that Senators Nunn and Lugar and Dr.
    Carter have been discussing.
        Senator Lieberman. I agree. Perhaps in the Senate's
    consideration of SORT we can give more visibility and
    encouragement to what came out of the G-8. Thank you very much
    to both of you. Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much for your excellent
    testimony, Mr. Curtis and Dr. Carter. We will carefully
    consider what you said and make some improvements in the
    situation. Let me thank you both and release you, and ask if
    the second panel could now come forward. [Pause.]
        Let me now welcome the second panel, which consists of
    Admiral Ellis, the Commander in Chief of United States
    Strategic Command, and Dr. Everet Beckner, the Deputy
    Admisistrator for Defense Programs NNSA. I expect nothing less
    than insightful testimony today. Let me at this time turn to
    Senator Warner for any opening comments.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you. I wish to welcome our witnesses.
    I know them both, and I have known Admiral Ellis for many
    years. I have vivid memories of times we shared together during
    some pretty stressful chapters of the Balkan conflict when he
    served as our NATO Commander, South with great distinction in a
    great period of American history. I welcome you this morning
    and once again thank you for your continued service in uniform
    to our nation.
        The hearing our committee held last week with Secretary
    Rumsfeld and Chairman Myers confirmed my belief, and I think
    all these reasonable perspectives, that this is an excellent
    treaty. The Moscow Treaty represents a significant step forward
    for the security of the world.
        It is a very simple, straightforward treaty. I have had
    some moderate experience in this area. I will state for the
    record that I was with President Nixon in 1972 when we went to
    Moscow to execute the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and
    other arms control agreements. That is a long time ago. I
    witnessed through these many years that I have been privileged
    to serve in the Senate and prior thereto in the Department of
    Defense in arduous negotiations that had to be undertaken with
    the Soviet Union, subsequently Russia. But this time, two heads
    in government got together and bridged old differences and
    achieved this treaty, and I commend both our President and
    President Putin.
        In essence, this treaty reduces U.S. and Russian strategic
    arsenals by two-thirds over the next decade. There are no
    complicated accounting rules or detailed verification regimes.
    The treaty recognizes the new relationship between the United
    States and Russia, and allows both parties the flexibility to
    decide how and when the required reductions are to be made.
    Could the treaty have dealt with other issues? Of course. But
    they had a mission and they kept their eye on that goal.
        The Moscow Treaty establishes a firm foundation for our
    future relations with Russia, a foundation that we will build
    in years ahead. I still find implicit in this treaty the famous
    Ronald Reagan doctrine, ``trust but verify.'' In my judgment,
    there are sufficient verification procedures to protect both
    parties to the treaty. I note that all who participated in our
    committee's hearing last Thursday, Senators and witnesses
    alike, acknowledged that the United States must continue its
    efforts.
        The Moscow Treaty is a strategic nuclear arms treaty, and
    no one can reasonably expect diplomatic achievement to address
    all these difficult issues. This treaty is one step in the
    process of improving our security and relationships with
    Russia. This treaty is not only built on a new relationship
    with Russia, but it reinforces that relationship and provides a
    sound basis on which to perceive further steps. We are here
    today to explore and work out the detail and the merits of the
    Moscow Treaty.
        Our witnesses are uniquely qualified to comment on the
    military implications of the treaty and the military
    requirements that drove the treaty's structure and the reasons
    for the flexibility provided in the terms of the treaty. Thank
    you.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Ellis.

    STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
                    UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to
    be back with you, Senator Warner, and other distinguished
    members of the committee. As the Senator so generously noted,
    this is my third appearance before you on issues related to
    national strategic nuclear issues in the last 8 months. It is a
    pleasure to be back before you today to offer my views on the
    Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.
        As we all recall, on May 24, President Bush declared on
    reaching this agreement that it was a historic and hopeful day
    for Russia, America, and the world. I certainly share the
    President's optimism and his hopes for the future. I certainly
    support fully the President's goal of drawing down our
    operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the lowest
    level consistent with national security needs.
        In a real sense, this is a unique treaty, but it is the
    right treaty at the right time. It codifies, as we all
    understand, results of a process begun over a year ago in the
    form of the Nuclear Posture Review, a process in which United
    States Strategic Command was fully involved and whose inputs
    were fully considered. As we all recall, the Nuclear Posture
    Review proposed a dramatic two-thirds reduction in the levels
    of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and also,
    I think, more effectively addressed the broader issue of
    deterrent requirements in the new construct in the new
    international security environment and the challenges that our
    Nation faces.
        This treaty allows me, as the commander of the Nation's
    strategic forces, the latitude to structure our strategic
    forces to better support the national security pillars of
    assuring our allies, dissuading those who might wish us ill,
    deterring potential adversaries, and, if necessary, defending
    the Nation. I am here to convey to you that in my judgment this
    treaty provides me the ability to prudently meet those national
    security needs and provide a range of deterrent options to the
    Secretary and President for their consideration, should the
    need arise.
        Most importantly, it gives me the flexibility to deal with
    the uncertainty that is an inherent part or consideration as we
    look to the future. It gives me flexibility with regard to the
    specific details of that drawdown, the composition of our
    Nation's nuclear stockpile as we drawdown in size, the ability
    to hedge against the possibility of technological surprise as
    our stockpile ages in the future, the ability to deal with the
    potential for a changing international security environment,
    should it arise, and it also allows me the flexibility to take
    the dual-use platforms, these strategic platforms that have
    such important tactical applications, and transform them in
    support of the Nation's security needs in a broader way. That
    includes the conversion of SSBNs to SSGNs.
        It includes the retaining of a bomber force that also
    provides a very capable conventional capability that is so much
    a part of our ongoing efforts in the global war on terrorism,
    and will likely be a part of any future security challenges
    that the Nation faces. Finally, it allows me to take missiles
    and convert those to space launch applications should the need
    arise.
        I wish to thank the committee for the opportunity to appear
    side-by-side with Dr. Beckner. As he notes in his statement,
    and I in mine, our organizations are partners in the
    challenging and promising journey ahead, and the NNSA and its
    success is the key to our own success from a deterrent
    perspective.
        I express my continuing appreciation for the support this
    committee has provided to the men and women of the United
    States Strategic Command and its antecedent organizations who
    have provided stewardship over the Nation's nuclear
    capabilities.
        I understand there is only one military commander who
    directly oversees our Nation's strategic forces. I am humbled
    that the task has been assigned to me, and I am honored to be
    able to convey to you today my full support for the Moscow
    Treaty and recommend its ratification as proposed. I thank you
    for your consideration and look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by Adm. James O. Ellis, USN
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of the
    committee:
        It is an honor to appear before you once again representing the
    outstanding men and women of United States Strategic Command and our
    Nation's strategic forces. You have asked me to share with you my
    professional military assessment of the Strategic Offensive Reductions
    Treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty. Earlier in the year, I
    appeared before this committee to discuss the Nuclear Posture Review,
    and I now welcome the opportunity to address this treaty which codifies
    the President's decision to significantly reduce operationally deployed
    strategic nuclear warheads. This historic treaty represents the most
    recent milestone in a journey toward a new and more positive
    relationship with Russia within a dramatically changed strategic
    environment.
        I am pleased to convey to you today my strong support for the
    Moscow Treaty. The global security environment has evolved in new and
    unexpected ways over the last 10 years. I believe that properly shaping
    the strategic environment as we draw down our deployed stockpile over
    the next ten years, and beyond, will require both constructive
    engagement and increased adaptive flexibility in appropriately
    structuring our strategic forces. This treaty is a step towards meeting
    those national security needs. While recent events have highlighted new
    dangers, on the positive side of the ledger our historical Cold War
    enemy, the Soviet Union, has disappeared. Its place has been taken by a
    renewed Russia, with the stated goal of transforming into a peaceful,
    democratic, free-market nation. Today, as a Nation, we have more in
    common with Russia than we have lingering differences, and for the
    first time in my lifetime we face similar shared global challenges and
    not each other. The Moscow Treaty acknowledges this new relationship
    and the increasing trust and flexibility each nation seeks as we
    address the changing security requirements of the 21st century.
                              military sufficiency
        The Moscow Treaty will allow the United States to sustain a
    credible deterrent with the lowest possible level of operationally
    deployed strategic nuclear warheads consistent with our national
    security requirements and obligations to our allies. This lower level,
    1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, is
    roughly one-third the level specified in the START Treaty. Our country
    faces an array of security challenges that differ dramatically from our
    Cold War past. The Moscow Treaty will permit me, as the commander of
    our strategic forces, to prudently plan and anticipate a broad range of
    possible scenarios. As we look to the future, our planning necessarily
    includes adaptively positioning and posturing our strategic forces to
    meet the unique deterrent and security challenges posed by rogue
    states, non-state actors, and unknown adversaries yet to come. The
    Nuclear Posture Review and the Moscow Treaty allow warhead reductions
    reflective of our emerging relationship with Russia while enabling the
    Department of Defense to plan and prepare for a broader range of
    strategic options to present to the Secretary of Defense and the
    President.
        If unforeseen circumstances arise, either through a decline in the
    safety and reliability of our aging stockpile or the emergence of
    unexpected new threats, this treaty allows the United States to react
    appropriately in response to our changing security needs. In short,
    under the Moscow Treaty we can militarily meet our deterrence needs, be
    prepared for a range of technological or security uncertainties, while
    continuing to encourage a relationship of trust, cooperation, and
    friendship with Russia that can lead to ever larger diplomatic,
    economic, and security benefits for us all.
                                  flexibility
        From a military perspective, a primary benefit of this innovative
    arms control agreement is its flexibility, which is achieved in several
    new ways. The Moscow Treaty allows each side to determine an
    appropriate pace for reducing operationally deployed strategic nuclear
    warheads enroute to significantly lower codified levels. As we
    implement the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and develop a broader range
    of advanced conventional forces, new defenses, and renewed
    infrastructure, we must be able to carefully draw down the right number
    and mix of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads based on
    actual and anticipated need. This approach acknowledges the
    uncertainties associated with sustaining an aging stockpile, and
    permits the best sequencing of life extension and dismantlement
    programs according to military necessity and the capabilities of the
    supporting Department of Energy infrastructure.
        Under the Moscow Treaty the United States has the option of storing
    those warheads not operationally deployed. As a result of decisions
    made over a decade ago, the United States is the only nuclear power in
    the world today that does not possess a nuclear warhead production
    capability. From a military perspective, it is essential that we retain
    the capability to respond to emerging threats or weapon safety and
    reliability issues. Under these circumstances, the storing of an
    appropriate number of non-deployed nuclear warheads provides an
    important weapon reliability and contingency response capability that
    will allow us to meet national security needs over the life of the
    treaty.
        While we will continue to follow START I counting rules, one
    important aspect of this treaty is that the actual deployed warheads
    are counted rather than assigning notional numbers to each potential
    delivery platform. This construct allows the United States to retain,
    reduce, or restructure critical dual-use weapons delivery platforms--
    those that also can employ conventional weapons--so as to meet a
    broader range of military requirements. Specifically, the provisions of
    the Moscow Treaty will enable the United States to pursue
    transformational concepts such as modifying Trident submarines for
    conventional missions. The agreement will also permit us to properly
    size and configure the bomber force, which continues to prove its value
    in the skies over Afghanistan.
                                  verification
        A dramatic reflection of the emerging strategic relationship with
    Russia is the absence of unique verification provisions in the Moscow
    Treaty. The comprehensive verification regime of the START Treaty will
    remain in force until at least December 2009, providing a solid
    foundation for continued confidence-building and improved transparency.
    But, in a real sense, the Moscow Treaty formalizes a weapon drawdown
    that reflects the declared interest and intent of both parties.
        Rather than unnecessarily focus on inspection and compliance, we
    have an opportunity to forge a relationship, which may encourage even
    further cooperation, transparency, and trust. At United States
    Strategic Command, we are beginning important steps toward this goal in
    order to complement the efforts of the Consultative Group for Strategic
    Security created under the Joint Declaration on May 24, and the Moscow
    Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission. As a new initiative, I
    have recently added a senior State Department political advisor to my
    staff, who will bring valuable experience and expertise to the Command
    as we continue to work with our Russian counterparts. As part of the
    Defense Department's engagement program, we have also reinvigorated the
    Command's military-to-military security cooperation program and
    submitted detailed 1, 5, and 10-year goals to incrementally broaden the
    exchange of information, develop new relationships, and help preserve
    strategic stability. When the United States Strategic Command and the
    United States Space Command unite on October 1, 2002, the new unified
    command will have the opportunity to expand this program to even wider
    participation across the spectrum of global military missions.
        This emerging and positive relationship will also permit the United
    States and Russia to address issues and challenges that are important,
    but appropriately not addressed in this treaty. Tactical nuclear
    weapons remain a concern and will be addressed in future consultations
    and engagements. The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense have
    each indicated to the Senate they intend to use the upcoming
    discussions with their counterparts to continue the dialogue on this
    issue. In regards to the dismantlement of unneeded warheads, the
    different approaches taken by both parties in pursuit of this shared
    goal are appropriately reflective of their individual circumstances and
    capabilities. Having chosen a decade ago to forego weapon production,
    the United States' dismantlement effort is paced by long term stockpile
    reliability and potential national security needs. Russia
    simultaneously sustains an active production and disassembly capability
    and has a broader range of weapon and nuclear material security
    concerns. The continued support provided by the Nunn-Lugar CTR program,
    as part of a larger international effort, remains essential to the
    success of improved Russian counter-proliferation efforts.
                                   conclusion
        The Moscow Treaty is a positive milestone early in our strategic
    journey toward a new partnership with Russia, and formalized the
    decisions made by the nation's civilian leadership. As the Secretary of
    Defense highlighted recently before the Senate Foreign Relations
    Committee, this treaty provides all of the benefits attributed to arms
    control agreements--dialogue, consultations, lower force levels,
    predictability, stability, and transparency--without the need for
    extensive and adversarial negotiations and debates over compliance and
    enforcement issues. Under the Moscow Treaty, our nation can accomplish
    its essential military force re-structuring, meet its anticipated
    critical national security needs, and retain the ability to react to
    the inevitable unexpected challenges yet to come. I fully support this
    treaty.
        As always, I must also express my appreciation for your continued
    support of the men and women of United States Strategic Command and the
    unique and essential contributions they continue to make to our
    Nation's security.
        Thank you, and I welcome your questions.

        Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral Ellis.
        Dr. Beckner.

     STATEMENT OF DR. EVERET H. BECKNER, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
       DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Dr. Beckner. Senator Reed and members of the committee, it
    is a pleasure to be here this morning to review the Moscow
    Treaty and its implication for the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) and its vital work to support a safe,
    secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile.
        Before proceeding, I ask that my entire written statement
    be included in the hearing record.
        Senator Reed. Without objection.
        Dr. Beckner. I'd also like to take this opportunity to
    thank the committee and the Senate for its strong support for
    the President's 2003 request. The Senate bill will allow NNSA
    to pursue its important national security mission in non-
    proliferation, stockpile stewardship, and naval reactors.
        The NNSA fully supports the terms of the proposed Moscow
    Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. It enhances national
    security and international stability by making dramatic
    reductions in the number of deployed nuclear warheads.
        The treaty requires that both the U.S. and the Russian
    Federation reduce strategic nuclear warheads to the level
    between 1,700 and 2,000 warheads each by 2012. This is nearly a
    two-thirds cut in the deployed U.S. strategic arsenal. This
    reduction is consistent with conclusions reached by the
    administration in the recent Nuclear Posture Review. The treaty
    also provides the United States with the flexibility to
    maintain a ``responsive force'' for use as a hedge against
    unexpected changes to the international security environment or
    technical issues arising in the smaller, deployed nuclear
    weapons stockpile.
        Key to ensuring the long-term safety, security, and
    reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile is NNSA's
    Stockpile Stewardship Program and more specifically for
    purposes of this hearing, its life extension work on various
    weapons including at this time the W-87, the W-76, the W-80,
    and the B-61. Life extension activities on the W-87 involve
    structural upgrades. Work on the W-76 involves a comprehensive
    overhaul of the warhead. We will also be requalifying the
    weapon primary. For the W-80, we will be replacing the
    trajectory sensing signal and neutron generators. For the B-61,
    we will be refurbishing it. These developments were revalidated
    by the Nuclear Posture Review.
        While the total number of warheads to be refurbished in the
    future stockpile may be less than currently planned,
    maintaining the life extension schedule is vital to fulfilling
    NNSA commitments to the Department of Defense, restoring lost
    production capabilities, and recruiting and retaining technical
    expertise needed for the long-term.
        Once completed, it will ensure that these weapons will
    remain safe, secure, and reliable in the U.S. nuclear deterrent
    for an additional 30 years.
        It is not unreasonable to think that as both countries
    progress to lower numbers of operationally deployed strategic
    warheads, the President may opt to retire and subsequently
    dismantle warheads. Once that decision is made, the NNSA will
    begin the detailed planning process needed to ensure that
    Pantex and the Y-12 plants in particular can safely and
    securely dismantle weapons. Planning for a dismantlement
    campaign typically takes several years since we must safely and
    securely handle the thousands of parts that will be generated
    by the process. The industrial process at the plants have to be
    defined, the hazards analyzed, and NNSA safety authorization
    basis must be approved. Transportation, storage, and
    disposition must be arranged, both for the weapons prior to
    dismantlement, and for the waste streams resulting from the
    dismantled activities.
        The dismantlement begins with the arrival of the weapons at
    the Pantex plant. Upon arrival, the weapon undergoes receipt
    inspection. The dismantlement is complete when the weapon
    primary High Explosive (HE) is separated from the special
    nuclear material. The HE is disposed of at the Pantex plant by
    burning consistent with environmental regulations.
        The special nuclear material is handled through the
    Material Disposition Program. Some special nuclear material
    components may be retained for possible reuse in the future,
    and subassemblies containing highly enriched uranium are
    returned to the Y-12 plant. The pace of this disassembly work
    at Pantex is slow because we have completed dismantlement of
    the majority of the retired warheads. Ongoing dismantlement
    work includes the W-79 and Army artillery shell that has been
    under dismantlement for several years. In addition, the W-56
    disassembly is under way and will continue through fiscal year
    2005. The disassembly of the B-53 and some excess B-61
    nonstrategic bombs will begin soon. The NPR reaffirmed that the
    W-62 will be retired by 2009.
        In conclusion, NNSA recommends that the Senate exercise its
    advice and consent and ratify the proposed treaty on strategic
    offensive reductions. The Moscow Treaty stands as an example of
    the emerging relationship between the United States and the
    Russian Federation, a relationship based on trust and
    cooperation, rather than Cold War confrontation.
        I will be happy to answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Beckner follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Dr. Everet H. Beckner
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be
    here this morning to review the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive
    Reductions and its implications for the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) and its vital work to support a safe, secure, and
    reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. The NNSA fully supports the terms
    of the Moscow Treaty because it enhances the U.S. national security and
    international stability by making dramatic reductions in the number of
    deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The treaty requires both the U.S.
    and the Russian Federation to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads
    to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012. This
    represents nearly a two-thirds cut in the deployed U.S. strategic
    arsenal. This reduction is consistent with the conclusions reached by
    the administration in the recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The
    treaty provides the United States with the flexibility to maintain an
    important hedge against unforeseen changes in the international
    environment or technical issues in the smaller, enduring nuclear weapon
    stockpile. The NNSA strongly endorses Senate advice and consent to
    ratification of the treaty as submitted.
                                policy overview
        NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program is working today to ensure
    that the Nation's nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, and reliable. NNSA
    was an active participant in the Department of Defense's Nuclear
    Posture Review. Several conclusions of the NPR are of particular
    relevance to the NNSA.
        First, nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, remain a key
    element of U.S. national security strategy. The NPR reaffirms that
    NNSA's science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program is necessary to
    ensure the safety and reliability of the smaller, less diverse nuclear
    stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. This includes surveillance
    of our aging weapons, weapons refurbishment, chemistry and metallurgy
    of materials aging, detailed understanding of weapons physics, and
    development of additional diagnostic, and predictive tools for long-
    term stewardship. It also includes refurbishments and Life Extension
    Programs for the current stockpile, as required and coordinated with
    the DOD. Several NNSA initiatives endorsed by the NPR include enhanced
    test readiness and revitalization of advanced concepts work.
        Second, more than any previous review, the NPR's concept of a New
    Triad emphasizes the importance of a robust, responsive research and
    development and industrial base. This calls for a modern nuclear
    weapons complex, including planning for a Modern Pit Facility, and new
    tritium production to provide the Nation with the means to respond to
    new, unexpected, or emerging threats to U.S. national security in a
    timely manner.
        NNSA sees this as recognition of the importance of its mission,
    facilities, and personnel. It is an enormous responsibility to maintain
    the enduring stockpile and to dismantle warheads determined to be
    excess to national security requirements. The NNSA and the DOD have
    developed a credible, realistic plan to meet the President's direction
    for a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile, all while reducing the
    numbers of strategic warheads consistent with the NPR and the Moscow
    Treaty.
                         life extension programs (lep)
        A key element of ensuring a safe and reliable stockpile for the
    next 30 years is the Life Extension Program for selected elements of
    the nuclear stockpile. The NNSA has validated requirements from the
    President through the joint NNSA/DOD Nuclear Weapons Council to extend
    the service life of the W-87, W-76, and W-80 warheads and the B-61
    strategic bomb. These requirements were revalidated by the Nuclear
    Posture Review. The life extension work will involve the entire weapons
    complex. The Kansas City Plant will manufacture the non-nuclear
    components; Y-12 National Security Complex will refurbish the
    secondaries; Savannah River Tritium Facility will supply the gas
    transfer systems; Sandia National Laboratory will produce the neutron
    generators and certify all non nuclear components; Pantex Plant will
    serve as the central point for all assembly and disassembly operations
    in support of the refurbishment work; and Los Alamos and Lawrence
    Livermore will continue to certify nuclear warhead design performance.
        The W-87 refurbishment is well underway, with over 60 percent of
    the planned quantity complete and delivered to the Air Force. The
    program achieved First Production Unit (FPU) in the second quarter of
    fiscal year 1999. The ongoing work at Pantex enhances the structural
    rigidity of the warhead. The warhead will be mated to the Minuteman III
    missile following deactivation of the Peacekeeper missile. Life
    Extension for the W-76 involves a comprehensive overhaul of the
    warhead, including replacement of the arming, firing, and fuzing set.
    We will also be requalifying the weapon primary. For the W-80, we will
    be replacing the trajectory sensing signal and neutron generators, the
    tritium bottles, and incorporating surety upgrades. For the B-61, we
    will be refurbishing the secondary.
        The Moscow Treaty does not alter our schedule to begin key LEPs
    later this decade, although it will likely affect the total number of
    warheads to be refurbished. Indeed, maintaining the First Production
    Unit schedule is vital to fulfill NNSA commitments to the Department of
    Defense, to fix known areas of concern; to drive the nuclear weapons
    complex to restore lost manufacturing capabilities, and recruit and
    retain technical expertise needed for the long term.
                             pantex plant overview
        Located in the Texas panhandle, NNSA's Pantex Plant is the Nation's
    only facility for the assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons. Over
    the years Pantex has disassembled over 50,000 warheads in a safe,
    secure, efficient, and environmentally sound manner. The plant covers
    some 16,000 acres and employs some 3,000 people. For fiscal year 2003,
    the administration has requested a total of $367 million for stockpile
    stewardship related activities at the facility. Having a dedicated
    facility like Pantex allows us to meet our responsibilities to maintain
    the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile and dismantle excess nuclear
    warheads while concentrating our efforts in areas such as nuclear
    explosive safety and assembly/disassembly operations, but it does
    present us with some capacity and infrastructure issues which we are
    aggressively working to resolve.
        The current approved work plan of Life Extensions, surveillance,
    and dismantlements at Pantex, requires facility upgrades. Seventeen
    bays where weapons with Insensitive High Explosives are worked on and
    five cells where weapons with the more sensitive Conventional High
    Explosives are worked on, will be refurbished in the next decade. Bays
    differ from cells in that bays are designed to vent an explosion to the
    atmosphere while protecting adjacent facilities from the blast, while
    cells are designed to filter the explosion products through a
    collapsing gravel bed, while also protecting the adjacent facilities
    from the blast. To accomplish the workload, the plant will go to a two
    shift operation, a third shift is impractical for most operations due
    to the need for facility maintenance.
        In addition to the facilities upgrades, over 100 new Production
    Technicians, the people who do hands-on weapons work, will augment the
    current force in the next decade. Employee training is an integral part
    of operations at Pantex. Each technician must receive over 1,000 hours
    of training in nuclear explosives safety and emergency procedures,
    weapons certification, and radiation safety before being certified to
    work on nuclear explosives.
        Pantex does not have any excess storage capacity now or in the
    foreseeable future, and has no plans to store any warheads on a long-
    term basis for the Department of Defense. Of the 60 storage magazines
    at Pantex, 36 are filled with plutonium pits. Most of these pits are
    excess to national security needs and await further disposition. The
    remaining magazines are mostly filled with warheads in the process of
    evaluation, refurbishment, repair, or dismantlement. The DOD has
    determined that it can accommodate storage for the warheads no longer
    deployed, and does not need to rely on NNSA for long-term warhead
    storage.
                        retirement/dismantlement process
        Weapon retirements are directed in the annual Nuclear Weapons
    Stockpile Memorandum (NWSM), which is approved by the President on the
    recommendations of the Secretaries of Defense and Energy. The NWSM is
    prepared by the Nuclear Weapons Council, through which the Navy and Air
    Force express their nuclear stockpile needs and the DOE/NNSA and the
    Department of Defense reach agreement on the nuclear stockpile to
    recommend to the President. When a weapon system is retired it is
    removed from the stockpile. The decision to retire is separate from a
    decision to dismantle--retired weapons can be held indefinitely should
    that be consistent with national priorities. The normal practice,
    however, has been for the NWSM to authorize dismantlement after a
    weapon is retired.
        Planning for a dismantlement campaign typically takes several
    years. The industrial processes at the Pantex and Y-12 plants need to
    be defined, their hazards analyzed, and an NNSA-approved safety
    authorization basis must be prepared. Transportation, storage, and
    disposition must be arranged, both for the weapons prior to
    dismantlement and for the waste streams resulting from dismantlement
    activities.
        The dismantlement process begins with the arrival of the weapon at
    the Pantex Plant. Due to the limited storage space at the Pantex Plant
    weapons normally remain at a DOD facility in the custody of the Navy or
    Air Force until just before they are to be dismantled. Upon arrival at
    the Pantex Plant the weapon undergoes a receipt inspection and is
    placed into interim storage. Just prior to dismantlement it is verified
    to be in a safe configuration through radiography of its critical
    safety components. If the weapon has Insensitive High Explosive (IHE)
    the entire dismantlement will take place in the bay. If the weapon has
    Conventional High Explosive (CHE) the bay process will disassemble the
    weapon to a point defined by safety considerations, and then the
    partial assembly will be taken to a cell. Whether in a bay or cell, the
    dismantlement is complete when the weapons primary high explosive is
    separated from the Special Nuclear Material (SNM). The High Explosive
    is disposed of at the Pantex Plant by burning, and the SNM is disposed
    of through the Materials Disposition Program. Some SNM components may
    be retained for possible reuse in future warheads and some
    subassemblies containing Highly Enriched Uranium are returned to the Y-
    12 plant for further disassembly.
        NNSA has been working with Department of Defense to develop plans
    for the size and composition of the future nuclear weapons stockpile.
    The Moscow Treaty does not limit the size of the stockpile. Moreover,
    within the overall warhead limits imposed by the Moscow Treaty, both
    the U.S and Russia can determine for themselves the composition and
    structure of their respective strategic forces.
        Any plan to increase dismantlements prior to at least fiscal year
    2014 would compete for resources with critical refurbishment or
    evaluation work. Since reductions to the 1,700-2,200 level are up to
    each country under the Moscow Treaty, so long as these levels are
    achieved by December 31, 2012, NNSA prefers to retain flexibility in
    setting any resulting disassembly schedules so as not to interfere with
    ongoing refurbishments and surveillance activities.
        Previous arms control treaties have not included a requirement to
    specifically dismantle warheads, nor does the Moscow Treaty.
    Disassembly of warheads is something the U.S. has always done on its
    own terms, based on national security requirements and as resources
    permit. While the pace of disassemblies at Pantex has slowed because we
    have completed dismantlement of the majority of retired warheads, we
    still have a busy dismantlement program. The W-79 (Artillery-Fired
    Atomic Projectile) disassembly will be complete next year. The W-56
    (Minuteman II) disassembly is underway and will continue at least
    through fiscal year 2005. Disassembly of the B-53 (strategic bomb) and
    some excess B-61 non-strategic bombs will begin soon. The NPR
    reaffirmed that the W62 (Minuteman III) will be retired by fiscal year
    2009.
        As we deploy fewer strategic nuclear warheads, some may be deemed
    excess to national security needs. It would then be NNSA's
    responsibility to disassemble the excess warheads as resources and
    workload priorities permit. Any decision to retire and dismantle
    warheads would be made by the President, in the context of an NNSA
    nuclear weapons complex that is fully engaged with warhead
    refurbishments and that cannot make new warheads if needed until at
    least the end of this decade.
                         nuclear weapon transportation
        NNSA is also responsible for the transportation of nuclear weapons
    and weapons-grade nuclear material within the U.S. Our transportation
    system of SafeGuards Transporters, manned by Federal agents who also
    guard the cargo, is fully engaged for the next decade. We are trying to
    minimize the impact to the weapons program, but with limited assets,
    and extensive agent training requirements, and plans by DOE's Office of
    Environmental Management to consolidate nuclear material from Rocky
    Flats, Hanford, and Idaho Falls, any additional moves will cause a
    disruption in existing transportation plans.
                            device assembly facility
        The Device Assembly Facility (DAF) is an NNSA facility at the
    Nevada Test Site, which was originally envisioned for underground
    nuclear test support, and for potential receipt and processing of
    damaged nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear devices. With the halt of
    underground nuclear testing in 1992, the primary mission for the Device
    Assembly Facility is subcritical experiment support. NNSA, in the
    coming weeks will issue a final Environmental Impact Statement relating
    to a proposal to relocate the TA-18 criticality experiment activity
    from the Los Alamos National Laboratory to the Device Assembly
    Facility. This capability must be located in a relatively remote and
    highly secure area. While warhead dismantlement at the Device Assembly
    Facility is a possibility, the time and cost of starting up nuclear
    explosive operations at what is essentially a new facility are not
    easily predicted and would be substantial.
                                 tritium supply
        While the NPR will result in a smaller active stockpile of both
    operationally deployed and augmentation forces, the future U.S. nuclear
    stockpile--by warhead type, year, and readiness state--has not yet been
    determined. This will be done in detail as part of the Nuclear Weapons
    Council process and will enable NNSA to plan for the delivery of
    sufficient tritium to meet all military requirements. Because stockpile
    reductions will not be accomplished for several years, we do know that
    there will be no near-term reduction in the immediate demand for
    tritium. Thus, NNSA is continuing with its plan to begin tritium
    production in commercial reactors in Fall 2003, and to complete
    construction and begin operations of a new Tritium Extraction Facility
    (TEF) at the Savannah River Site so that tritium can be delivered to
    the stockpile in advance of need.
                                   conclusion
        In conclusion, NNSA recommends Senate advice and consent to
    ratification of the proposed Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions.
    The Moscow Treaty stands as an example of the emerging relationship
    between the United States and the Russian Federation--a relationship
    based on trust and cooperation rather than Cold War competition.
        With Congress' continued strong support for the NNSA Stockpile
    Stewardship Program we expect to be able to provide the Nation with a
    safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Beckner. Thank you
    both. Admiral Ellis, throughout the treaty, the key phrase
    ``operationally deployed'' seems to be the most significant
    one. Could you explain what you think operationally deployed
    means with respect to the classical weapons, Intercontinental
    Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and submarine operated bombs?
        Admiral Ellis. Operationally deployed strategic nuclear
    warheads in the context of treaty are those warheads actually
    mounted on ICBMs located in their silos that are also mounted
    on the submarine launch ballistic missiles in the tubes on
    those platforms. In terms of bombers, are those weapons that
    are actually loaded on bombers or located in the weapons
    storage areas at bomber bases. It specifically does not include
    a set of spares that may be located in the bomber WSAs. That is
    the construct under which operationally deployed is defined.
        Senator Reed. Would it include warheads on submarine launch
    ballistic missiles not on submarines?
        Admiral Ellis. No, sir. In fact, that is one of the
    flexible elements of the treaty that includes those weapons
    that are mounted on missiles and missiles that are in
    submarines. As you are well aware, in overhead periods those
    missiles are removed from submarines, and the warheads
    themselves are demated.
        Senator Reed. Given that definition for operationally
    deployed, do you have any indication at this point when we will
    reach the threshold of 1,700 or the limit of 2,200 missiles or
    warheads.
        Admiral Ellis. Certainly, the provisions of the treaty are
    clear in that regard and the end state is well-defined. We will
    certainly meet that goal for the treaty. Specific timelines and
    drawdown, as I mentioned earlier, are an inherent part of the
    flexibility. We have the option, as do the Russians, to adjust
    that as our needs indicate. Clearly, we will be on a slope that
    is appropriately matched to Dr. Beckner's capacity and to our
    own strategic force planning over the 10-year period as we
    drawdown to meet that objective.
        Senator Reed. In regards to the Russians, what is their
    equivalent of operationally deployed? Is that a mutual term,
    which applies to both sides? Is there any equivalence?
        Admiral Ellis. The approach that the Russians take to the
    treaty, as you are aware, dictates that each nation is allowed
    to approach this in a legitimate way to meet their own national
    security needs. There was no definition other than that which I
    have just given to you of operationally deployed in the Russian
    context. But they are certainly free to follow the approach
    that we are taking-as long as we consistently match the warhead
    levels that have been defined in the treaty at the end state.
        Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, your role is critical in terms
    of scheduling the reduction of these warheads over the next 12
    years or so. Are you participating in the development of the
    schedule? You have indicated in your testimony that the
    organizational decisions are issued by the President, but at
    NNSA are you actively participating, based upon logistics as
    much as policy, in what the schedule is?
        Dr. Beckner. We certainly are actively engaged through
    several mechanisms between the NNSA and the Department of
    Defense, particularly through the Nuclear Weapons Council,
    where we jointly obtain instructions as to the actions that we
    should take. We have been involved in looking at the various
    scenarios and at assessing our capabilities to work off the
    warheads as they are released by the DOD. We have a fairly
    aggressive plan in our 5-year planning documents that we have
    submitted to Congress previously, as to the need and our intent
    to enlarge the capacity, particularly at the Pantex Plant, to
    accommodate dismantlement, as well as to conduct the life
    extension programs, which are ongoing over this same period of
    time.
        Quite honestly, that has the potential for requiring a lot
    of management attention to maximize the capability of the
    plants over the next 10 years, because we do have a very
    aggressive program to do life extension work on several of
    those warheads. But to answer your question, yes indeed, we
    have been involved.
        Senator Reed. It seems to me, given the scope of what you
    have described, that this presents budgetary challenges as well
    as technical challenges as you go forward to accommodate the
    treaty. Did your budget submissions support that?
        Dr. Beckner. Our budget submissions were based upon first,
    the life extension programs, to be certain that we have those
    planned carefully over the 5-year period that we have
    submitted, and second, to analyze on that basis the amount of
    additional capacity we have for dismantlement so we know what
    we can handle without difficulty.
        If the instructions are developed later to pursue a more
    aggressive dismantlement program, we have thought through how
    we would do that. It would require some additional workforce,
    particularly at Pantex and some additional expansion of bays
    and cells, which is in the 2003 request. But we believe that
    unless the workload was for some reason pushed to a very high
    number during the middle part of this decade, we believe we can
    handle it in fairly smooth fashion. It would require a little
    bit of expansion. If people want a larger number of weapons
    worked off earlier in time than we are presently requiring, we
    would have some issues. We have some room now, between now and
    about 2005, but from 2005 to 2012 or so we have a large
    workload in the life extension program, so we will have to work
    that out.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Dr. Beckner.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Senator Reed, one of my colleagues has a
    scheduling conflict. I am going to remain throughout the
    hearing, so I now defer to the Senator from Alabama.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, I
    am not sure we have appreciated the historic nature of this new
    treaty compared to the ABM Treaty. We had a number of people
    that expressed opposition to moving from the ABM Treaty to a
    new relationship. They felt that the ABM Treaty represented
    some sort of cornerstone of our relationship with Russia. I
    thought that was not true at the time, and spoke against that
    concept. Just looking at these treaties it is just so stunning,
    the difference in the nature of them.
        The ABM Treaty, first of all, was between the United States
    and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and this one is
    with the Russian Federation. There is a whole world of
    difference. There it is dealing with the current, existing
    entity, not a dead Soviet totalitarian empire. I think it is
    important that any relationship we have with the people of
    Russia need to be based on who these people are today, not the
    way they were before. They have rejected the Soviet system, and
    wish to move forward to a new and brighter day. I think that is
    important for us to build this kind of relationship.
        I noticed the language is significant. It says in the new
    treaty, ``embarking on the path of new relations for a new
    century and committed to the goal of strengthening their
    relationships through cooperation and friendship, believing
    that new global challenges and threats require the building of
    a new foundation of strategic relations between the parties
    desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on principles
    of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and
    predictability.'' Compare this to the preamble of the ABM
    Treaty that says in the first paragraph, which is proceeding
    from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating
    consequences for all mankind ``considering that effective
    measures to limit antiballistic missile systems would be a
    substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic arms and
    would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war
    involving nuclear weapons.''
        I would just ask you to comment. Doesn't this reflect a
    tremendous change in the way we are seeing our relationship
    with Russia?
        Dr. Beckner. It would certainly seem so to me. I do not see
    how you can draw any other conclusion.
        Senator Sessions. I just think you are moving in the right
    direction. This is a bold effort by the President that is
    establishing a new relationship with a people and a nation that
    we ought to be friends with, as opposed to the past when we
    were facing a totalitarian regime that oppressed its people and
    sought to oppress the entire world.
        Something that troubles me is the question of dismantling
    the weapons rather than destroying weapons. I am not troubled
    with that concept. I think it is correct, because of this fact,
    and let me ask you if I am correct. Is it true that the United
    States does not have production capability for nuclear weapon?
    That is, we do not have a production facility so if we needed
    more in the future, we do not have the capability of producing
    it?
        Dr. Beckner. I think you need to look at that question in
    detail because the only capability we do not have today for
    specific components is the plutonium component, generally
    referred to as the pit. That capacity was shut down at Rocky
    Flats, just outside Denver, more than 10 years ago. We are in
    the process of developing the capability to make a limited
    number of pits at Los Alamos for a specific weapon program.
    Beyond that, we have begun the process to contemplate and send
    forward to Congress for approval at a future date the
    construction and operation of the new pit manufacturing
    facility. But that is easily 10 years in the future. Today, we
    do not have a capability to make pits for new weapons if they
    were required.
        Senator Sessions. That is an essential component of it?
        Dr. Beckner. Absolutely.
        Senator Sessions. So for a decade or so we have a window
    where it is problematic?
        Dr. Beckner. That is correct. The only alternative you have
    at this time, and for a number of years in the future, is to
    find a way to reuse an existing pit or other full sections of
    weapons or stay with what you have.
        Senator Sessions. Isn't it true that most nations that have
    nuclear capabilities to date have a nuclear production
    capability?
        Dr. Beckner. I think that is true. We probably do not know
    everything about everything that is going on out there, but
    certainly for the more prominent members that is true.
        Senator Sessions. We are proceeding on the assumption that
    we will dismantle rather than destroy the weapons. Is that a
    decision that will be left within the discretion of the
    President, or is it controlled by the treaty?
        Dr. Beckner. It's my understanding that it would be at the
    discretion of the President. The treaty does not specify what
    we have to do with the parts after we take the weapons apart.
        Senator Sessions. My concern simply is this: I don't think
    we should leave ourselves in a circumstance where we have
    limited substantially our nuclear weapons and we have frozen
    ourself in that position. Therefore, we would in effect, be
    saying to any nation in the world, ``if you develop any nuclear
    weapons, you are the virtual equal of the U.S.'' I believe this
    is important. We shouldn't destroy our weapons and not have the
    world know that we could increase them if we were threatened.
        Senator Reed. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed. I am going to be
    very quick. I have come down with one question. Someone has
    already asked it, so I will ask it a different way. We have had
    so many of these hearings, I have run out of questions.
        I find an analogous situation between this discussion today
    and our old ABM discussion that just did not make any sense to
    me. Maybe back in 1972, the ABM Treaty made sense to some
    people. There certainly could be a persuasive argument that may
    force necessity. But we are in a totally different situation
    right now, and I see the same thing with this treaty.
        Russia is now our ally. We do not have any kind of a
    defense against a ballistic missile right now and so our
    primary defense would be deterrent, and that is what we are
    talking about today. We are talking about taking down these
    things and we are doing this with one of our allies, and yet
    Iran, Iraq, North Korea, China, and other countries do pose a
    threat. This is fine if we waited until we had a national
    missile defense system in place, at least for limited time.
    Tell me where I am wrong?
        Admiral Ellis.
        Admiral Ellis. Senator, as I mentioned earlier in my
    opening statement, this treaty codifies an in-depth analytical
    effort in this regard for over a year. The analysis was part of
    the Nuclear Posture Review that assessed the levels that are
    the specified objective of the treaty, the 1,700 to 2,200
    operationally deployed weapons. All of those issues that are
    likely to confront the Nation in the foreseeable future, among
    which you highlighted several important ones, were considered
    in arriving at that number.
        The considered judgment of those was, even though we all
    know we are not capable of predicting with precision the future
    10 years hence, that this range of weapons for the foreseeable
    future and the flexibility inherent in this treaty, should that
    turn out to be a much different future, will be more than
    adequate to the Nation's national security needs. We can talk
    more in closed session about the specific concerns you have,
    but from a military perspective, I want to assure that all of
    those issues were preeminent as we looked at reshaping the
    Nation's strategic systems and the Nation's stockpile. We have
    the provisions in the Nuclear Posture Review for continually
    reassessing that as we proceed through the next decade to
    ensure the conditions that were a part of our original
    assessment still pertain as we move into this new control.
        Senator Inhofe. It goes closely to what Senator Sessions
    was asking also. This treaty, as I understand it, means we are
    not going to be in a bad position should we want to manufacture
    some of this equipment in another 10 years, when, in fact,
    Russia is keeping that capability. We are all in that?
        Admiral Ellis. Sir, that is exactly right, and that is the
    reason for the term operationally deployed and for the
    necessity for a stockpile that is larger than that number of
    operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. We have the
    option to deal with those uncertainties in the future to
    reconstitute that force or to adjust the slope of that drawdown
    as appropriate to the international security environment.
        Senator Inhofe. I am looking forward to working with both
    of you. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Admiral, I just think we ought to look at
    the background of this treaty. Russia is experiencing, and I do
    not say this in any negative or pejorative way, an economic
    decline of considerable proportions here. I think President
    Putin has been addressing this.
        That has just led to a shortage of funds across the board
    for the Russian Armed Forces. They fully acknowledge this in
    open forum, not in any classified material. Russia maintained
    the readiness and safety requirements, which they as the
    professional armed force desire in their own self-interests, as
    well as the necessity to protect their own people. So that was
    one of the driving forces, am I not correct here?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. We certainly understand, and you
    mentioned in your opening statement that there are many
    dimensions that have to be addressed in this new security
    environment. This treaty is one essential element of that, but
    there are other elements of our relationship with which you and
    your colleagues are so familiar: CTR efforts.
        Senator Warner. It is a composite of things, but the
    concern over the fact that we are not dismantling, means I
    think we ought to cover this somewhat. Russia, from its
    inception as far back as I have gone in this business, has
    followed one method of construction, namely that method which
    would enable them to quickly replenish the warheads with brand
    new ones, as opposed to our approach, namely to take the
    existing warheads and work on them from time to time. Russia
    currently is progressing on the construction of some new
    warheads, am I not correct, gentlemen?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. That is correct. We have taken a
    fundamentally different approach.
        Senator Warner. Our Nation is not, am I correct?
        Admiral Ellis. That is correct.
        Senator Warner. It seems understandable to me that we have
    a reserve of these warheads to take parts from time to time to
    maintain the readiness and safety of our own inventory. I don't
    think the public or the rest of the world should look upon the
    fact that we are not destroying these all immediately as means
    by which to cheat or evade the purpose of this treaty.
        There are more adequate monitoring methods in here if we
    were to reincorporate these into our arsenal. We have to have
    the warheads coming back in with the launch platforms. It is
    just impossible to do it under any type of concealment. It
    should add an element of insecurity to the treaty. Am I correct
    in those observations? Do any of you wish to question or
    amplify?
        Admiral Ellis. You are exactly right, Senator. It is a fact
    that one of the most significant considerations in shaping the
    size of the stockpile is the sustainability and the reliability
    issues that we have to deal with over the next decade or more,
    as we prepare ourselves for the possibility we may encounter a
    technical problem within our aging stockpile.
        Senator Warner. I thank the witnesses, Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. The
    subcommittee stands in recess and will reconvene for the closed
    session.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follows:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
                                 dismantlement
        1. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, what is your top priority among
    warhead refurbishment, surveillance, and dismantlement? Is that
    priority related to the age of the stockpile?
        Dr. Beckner. The mission of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) is to ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapons
    stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. Therefore, surveillance and
    refurbishment are higher priorities than dismantlement. Surveillance of
    weapons components through disassembly and inspection and the use of
    advanced diagnostic tools is needed to ensure that we understand the
    health of the stockpile as it ages. The refurbishments of the W87, W76,
    B61, and W80, key elements of the enduring stockpile, are needed to
    keep the stockpile viable over the long-term, especially in light of no
    new warhead production. The high priority of refurbishments and
    surveillance will become more important as the stockpile ages further
    and the number of warhead types in the stockpile and the number of
    operationally deployed strategic warheads is reduced; problems must be
    found and corrected quickly. Though the activities tend to be age-
    related, they are not necessarily driven exclusively by the age of a
    particular weapon.
        Dismantlement is also important, but it is generally not time-
    critical. Currently, we are meeting a commitment to dismantle warheads
    under a presidential nuclear initiative. When this work is complete,
    there are no other similar commitments or treaties that require the
    disassembly of warheads. The NNSA disassembles warheads that are excess
    to national security needs on a schedule coordinated with the
    Department of Defense, seeking minimal impact to support of the
    enduring stockpile. Dismantlement is used to maintain a level
    industrial workload.

        2. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, do you believe it would be prudent
    to suspend or reduce surveillance activities to increase the rate of
    warhead dismantlement?
        Dr. Beckner. No. I do not believe it would be prudent to suspend or
    reduce surveillance activities to increase the rate of warhead
    dismantlement. Warhead surveillance is absolutely essential to support
    the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and should not be suspended or
    reduced for the sake of dismantlements. Surveillance is needed to
    ensure that we know the health of the stockpile and can assure its
    reliability, safety, and security. Surveillance activities have
    uncovered a number of problems in the stockpile which have been
    corrected. Surveillance becomes more important as the stockpile ages
    further and the number of operationally deployed strategic warheads is
    reduced. Similarly, warhead refurbishment programs and other repairs to
    maintain the safety and reliability of the stockpile cannot be
    curtailed for warhead dismantlements.

        3. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, when is the life extension program
    for the W76 warhead scheduled? Do you believe, given the average age of
    the W76, that the scheduled life extension program for this warhead is
    both timely and prudent?
        Dr. Beckner. The life extension program for the W76 warhead is
    scheduled to deliver its first production unit in fiscal year 2007 with
    sufficient units produced to give the DOD an initial operational
    capability in fiscal year 2008. The refurbishment will focus on
    replacement of the high explosives, detonators, organic materials,
    replacement of cables, and addition of a new gas transfer system.
        Given the average age of the W76, the life extension program, as
    currently scoped and scheduled, is timed to optimize the design life
    while correcting identified aging concerns before they can result in a
    degradation to warhead quality and reliability. This schedule is also a
    result of a significant amount of effort to coordinate this program
    with other life extension programs and routine work within the NNSA
    complex. The refurbishment plan is also synchronized with work the U.S.
    Navy intends to perform on the Trident II missile.

        4. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, how much of the workload at Pantex
    will be absorbed by planned warhead life extension programs?
        Dr. Beckner. The current production complex is limited in the
    number of weapons that can be processed at the Pantex Plant, with the
    work split among units undergoing surveillance, refurbishment, or
    dismantlement. We plan to complete the disassembly of warheads already
    retired by no later than fiscal year 2007. Retirements of the W62
    Minuteman III warheads will begin in fiscal year 2006--decision
    reaffirmed by the NPR--but no further decisions were made on
    disassembly. Planned renovations of existing facilities at Pantex will
    expand capacity sufficient to meet the anticipated NPR workload of
    refurbishments, along with warhead surveillance. During the period
    fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2010--when three refurbishments
    (W80, W76, B61) are under way--there would be some reserve capacity
    available to fix unanticipated problems in the stockpile, respond to
    warhead production requirements, or insert dismantlement activity to
    maintain a level workload.

        5. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, how practical is the notion of
    expanding the capacity to dismantle warheads by using the Device
    Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test Site for this purpose?
        Dr. Beckner. Using the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) for
    dismantling warheads is not practical. The time and cost of starting up
    nuclear explosive disassembly operations at this facility would be
    substantial. DAF was originally envisioned for underground nuclear test
    support, and for potential receipt and processing of damaged nuclear
    weapons or improvised nuclear devices. With the cessation of
    underground nuclear explosive testing in 1992, the primary mission for
    the Device Assembly Facility was shifted to subcritical experiment
    support. NNSA has issued a final Environmental Impact Statement
    relating to a proposal to relocate the TA-18 criticality experiment
    activity from the Los Alamos National Laboratory to the Device Assembly
    Facility. If the NNSA decides to relocate TA-18, approximately half of
    the DAF will then be taken over by those activities. Furthermore, we
    must preserve some capability if it is necessary to resume nuclear
    testing sometime in the future to meet U.S. national security
    requirements.

                         safety requirements at pantex
        6. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, it is my understanding that the
    capacity at the Pantex facility to conduct warhead life extension
    programs, surveillance, and dismantlements has been reduced during the
    1990s. This is in large part due to new safety requirements and
    practices, including issues concerning lightning and the maximum number
    of warheads per room, which have slowed the weapon ``throughput'' rate
    at Pantex. Would you please provide a general overview of the new
    safety requirements and practices that have been adopted at Pantex.
        Dr. Beckner. The NNSA is committed to supporting the Nation's
    national security needs without compromising the safety of the worker,
    public, or the environment. This commitment requires NNSA to strike a
    reasonable balance between production requirements and increased safety
    expectations. Pantex is moving towards a more quantitative, documented
    safety analysis approach as required by 10 CFR 830 for both the nuclear
    facilities at Pantex as well as the nuclear explosive operations
    performed within. This transition is occurring while continuing plant
    operations.
        This formal, methodical approach of hazard analysis and control
    selection has resulted in a better understanding of the overall safety
    of the operation, and more and better controls. Some of these controls
    are administrative in nature (such as lightning standoff and
    limitations on the number of weapons within a facility). These measures
    are necessary in order to compensate for what the current analysis is
    telling us while allowing us to continue to operate. As the analysis is
    further refined and/or engineering solutions are achieved, we will be
    able to improve efficiency and capacity. It is important to emphasize
    that NNSA working with the DNFSB has met all deliveries to the DOD
    while improving safety at Pantex.

        7. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, in general terms, to what extent
    have the new safety requirements slowed down the nuclear weapon
    ``throughput'' rate at Pantex?
        Dr. Beckner. It is difficult to determine the extent which weapon
    ``throughput'' rate is affected due to new safety requirements, since
    it is dependent on several variables. One variable has been the
    increased safety expectations, requirements, and practices. The 10 CFR
    830 mandates a rigorous and defensible safety analysis of nuclear
    operations, the result of which has been the introduction of new
    controls at Pantex. Engineered safety controls are the most effective
    way to increase safety.
        Administrative controls are less effective than engineered controls
    at improving safety but are easier and less expensive to implement in
    the near-term. In order to continue operations while performing the
    required safety analyses, some administrative controls (such as those
    requiring facility standoff for lightning and fire concerns, ceasing
    movement of nuclear explosives during lightning warnings and
    limitations on the number of weapons that can be present in a facility
    due to weapon interaction concerns) have reduced the available facility
    ``footprint'' or the available window of time for weapon processing.
    The Pantex Plant is working through this by continuing to refine the
    analyses and/or implementing engineered solutions (such as the enhanced
    transportation cart) to improve process efficiency and plant capacity.
    Ultimately, Pantex will have dramatically increased safety while
    achieving product deliverables to the DOD efficiently.

        8. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, what criteria are used to help
    ensure our nuclear weapon process at Pantex is conducted in a safe
    manner?
        Dr. Beckner. Pantex is transforming its operations to ensure
    compliance with 10 CFR 830. As a part of that activity, NNSA has
    instituted the Seamless Safety for the 21st Century (SS-21) process at
    the Pantex Plant. This process dictates a formal, organized approach to
    planning, performing, assessing, and improving nuclear explosive
    operations at the Pantex Plant. The SS-21 process focuses on designing
    out hazards and includes integrating the weapon, facility, tooling,
    testers, equipment, procedures, and personnel to form a safe,
    efficient, and effective operating environment. This approach also
    ensures that a safety basis is developed (or improved) and implemented
    that defines the extent to which a nuclear explosives operation can be
    safely conducted.
        A set of design/performance criteria is integral to the SS-21
    process. These criteria must be evaluated for implementation by the
    project team assigned to implement SS-21 on a weapon program. These
    criteria set a high standard and are used by the project team in
    redesign of the procedures, equipment, facility, testers, and tooling
    that minimizes the adverse impacts to the environment, and the safety
    and health of the workers and the public.

        9. Senator Warner. Dr. Beckner, in light of the other nuclear
    warhead activities, do these safety requirements inhibit the ability to
    increase the rate of warhead dismantlements?
        Dr. Beckner. Safety is paramount in any nuclear warhead activity.
    It is true that procedural and equipment changes have slowed production
    of all activities, including dismantlements. Plans are underway to
    increase production capability without compromising advances in
    operations safety to meet planned surveillance and life extension. The
    complexity of the warhead itself, the ease with which it can be
    dismantled, the ability to ship units/components into and out of Pantex
    and available resources are some of those factors.

                              deterrent capability
        10. Senator Warner. Admiral Ellis, we have relatively few nuclear
    warhead types deployed on our Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
    (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and bombers.
    What would happen to the operational effectiveness of U.S. deterrent
    forces if a serious problem were to develop in any one of our deployed
    nuclear warheads or bombs?
        Admiral Ellis. I am very confident, should a problem develop in any
    one of our deployed warheads, that the flexibility designed into the
    Moscow Treaty will allow the Nation to maintain a highly effective
    nuclear deterrent.
        We are the only nuclear power that cannot produce nuclear weapons
    today, and as a result, we maintain a warhead reserve. This allows us
    to have stockpile replacements in case of potential technical problems
    or catastrophic failure in an entire class of warheads. Under the
    provisions of the Moscow Treaty, this flexibility is preserved and the
    United States will continue to retain a portion of our nondeployed
    warheads in a reserve status to ensure a credible nuclear deterrent.
                           multiple warhead missiles
        11. Senator Warner. Admiral Ellis, do you believe that a Russian
    Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capability
    poses a significant military threat to the United States?
        Admiral Ellis. Although MIRVs represent a significant military
    capability, in the stable and nonadversarial relationship we now enjoy
    with Russia, MIRVd forces pose no significant increase in threat over
    that posed by non-MIRVd forces.
        Importantly, the threat any system poses to the United States is
    measured in terms of both capability and a nation's will to use it. As
    the friendship between the United States and Russia continues to grow,
    the exact composition of the Russian force structure will diminish even
    further in importance. Also, the provisions of the Moscow Treaty allow
    the United States sufficient flexibility in force size and structure to
    respond to any sudden, unexpected changes in the global security
    environment.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                              modern pit facility
        12. Senator Sessions. Dr. Beckner, during the hearing we discussed
    our Nation's lack of production capability to build new nuclear
    weapons. Specifically, we discussed that the United States does not
    have a current production capacity to manufacture more than a few
    primaries, also known as ``pits.'' This is a much different status
    compared to Russia, which has a current nuclear weapon production
    capacity. Please explain with some specificity our current plan for
    bringing a modern pit facility on line. In your response, please list
    and explain each major step the NNSA must take to maintain our current
    plan, and how long each step is expected to take.
        Dr. Beckner. The current NNSA plan for bringing a modern pit
    facility on line includes: (1) reestablishing the capability to
    manufacture plutonium pits at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
    (2) developing pit manufacturing technology, and (3) completing the
    NEPA process and the design and construction of a modern pit facility.
        NNSA remains on track to reestablish the capability to fabricate a
    certifiable W88 pit in fiscal year 2003 followed by completion of both
    a certified W88 pit and a limited W88 pit production capacity at LANL
    in fiscal year 2007. Significant accomplishments to date include
    manufacture of 15 development pits and completion of four subcritical
    physics tests required to confirm pit performance without nuclear
    testing. Based on these successes and continued congressional support,
    I expect the program to meet these important national security
    milestones.
        Simultaneously in fiscal year 2003, the NNSA plans to proceed with
    the NEPA process and a conceptual design of a Modern Pit Facility (MPF)
    in fiscal year 2003. Site selection for an MPF is scheduled for fiscal
    year 2004 and the conceptual design will be completed in fiscal year
    2006 with final design completion and the start of plant construction
    in fiscal year 2011. The present plan shows that the MPF will undergo
    start-up manufacturing activities in 2018 and reach full production
    capacity in 2020.

        13. Senator Sessions. Dr. Beckner, in general terms, please discuss
    the total cost estimate to bring a modern pit facility on line. If it
    is helpful, describe the cost in comparison to other NNSA projects with
    regards to size and scale.
        Dr. Beckner. Nuclear facilities are difficult and costly to
    construct because of safety and environmental considerations and the
    extensive regulatory oversight. MPF is likely to require some 200,000
    square feet and is expected to cost between $2-$4 billion. The other
    major NNSA construction project similar in size and scope is the
    National Ignition Facility at 280,000 square feet with a cost of $3.5
    billion. We expect to have a better understanding of cost projections
    for the MPF by 2006.

        14. Senator Session. Dr. Beckner, in what year, or range of years,
    do you plan to have an operating modern pit facility using NNSA's
    current baseline, including a reasonable expectation of technical,
    legal, budget, and other challenges which always face projects of this
    size and magnitude?
        Dr. Beckner. NNSA expects to begin physical construction of the MPF
    in fiscal year 2011. The MPF will be completed and will undergo start-
    up manufacturing activities in 2018 and reach full production capacity
    in 2020. The 2020 date for an on line MPF includes time for technical,
    legal, budget, and other challenges as you have suggested. The facility
    will be capable of operating for up to 50 years.

        15. Senator Session. Dr. Beckner, please explain how a modern pit
    facility helps meet the vision of the new triad described in the
    Nuclear Posture Review (January 2002), which first described the goal
    and is now codified in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, to
    reduce our Nation's nuclear stockpile to between 1,700 and 2,200
    ``operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.''
        Dr. Beckner. The nuclear posture review concluded that we need to
    build a new TRIAD. One element of that new TRIAD is the infrastructure
    necessary to support the nuclear deterrent. A modern pit facility is a
    key element of that infrastructure. A modern pit facility would allow
    the construction of significant numbers of pits with a new design if a
    need for them develops. The lack of an ability to produce new nuclear
    weapons increases our requirements to retain inactive weapons, or to
    furnish warheads for new weapon systems. Within foreseeable bounds for
    numbers of nuclear warheads, a modern pit facility will be required
    because we expect that all pits in the stockpile will eventually need
    to be replaced. Modern plutonium pit science can only provide an
    estimate for the lifetime of pits and accelerated aging techniques
    remain to be proven. Therefore, the NNSA must have an operational MPF
    no later than 2020 based on the current estimate of 45-60 years for pit
    lifetime and the projected numbers of warheads that we must maintain.

        [Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the committee adjourned to
    closed session.]