    [Senate Hearing 107-807]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 107-807

                    IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES
    =======================================================================

                                 JOINT HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                          ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                                      AND

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               FOREIGN RELATIONS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                   __________

                                 JULY 24, 2002

                                   __________

     Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
                     and the Committee on Foreign Relations

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                   COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
                                 second session

                      JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont, Chairman
    MAX BAUCUS, Montana                  BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
    HARRY REID, Nevada                   JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
    BOB GRAHAM, Florida                  JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
    BARBARA BOXER, California            GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    RON WYDEN, Oregon                    MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island
    HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York     ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
    JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey           PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
                     Ken Connolly, Majority Staff Director
                     Dave Conover, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                    JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
    PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland           JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
    CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
    JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
    RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
    PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota         BILL FRIST, Tennessee
    BARBARA BOXER, California            LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
    ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey     GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
    JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West         MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
        Virginia

                       Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
                Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                 JULY 24, 2002
                               OPENING STATEMENTS

    Chafee, Hon. Lincoln, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island    71
    Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from the State of
      Wisconsin......................................................    93
    Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska.......    78
    Jeffords, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont..1, 100
        Reports:
            American Way to the Kyoto Protocol....................... 24-68
            Clean Energy: Jobs for America's Future..................  3-24
    Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of
      Connecticut....................................................   102
    Sarbanes, Hon. Paul S., U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland..    69

                                   WITNESSES

    Connaughton, James, Chairman, White House Council on
      Environmental Quality, Washington, DC..........................    74
        Prepared statement..........................................209-288
        Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords......   288
    Dernbach, John C., Professor, Widener University Law School......    89
        Article, Synthesis...........................................   335
        Prepared statement...........................................   300
    Horner, Christopher C., Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise
      Institute......................................................    91
        Prepared statement...........................................   304
    Strong, Hon. Maurice, Chairman, Earth Council Institute Canada,
      Toronto, Ontario, Canada.......................................    87
        Prepared statement...........................................   292
        Supplemental testimony.......................................   298
    Turner, Hon. John F., Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
      Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs,
      U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.......................    71
        Prepared statement...........................................   103
        Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords.....108-209

                              ADDITIONAL MATERIAL

    Articles:
        Investing in Health: Fighting Infectious Disease for
          Sustainable Development....................................   205
        Modern Developments in the Treaty Process....................   307
        Synthesis, John Dernbach.....................................   335
    Lists, Attendees to world environmental summits................109, 119
    Policy Books, Global Climate Change...........215-246, 250-266, 266-288
    Report, Working for a Sustainable World.........................125-201
    Statements:
        Global Climate Change, President George W. Bush............211, 246
        Reisman, Jon.................................................   333

                                     (iii)

                    IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 2002

                                           U.S. Senate,
                     Committee on Environment and Public Works,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in
    room 406, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. James M. Jeffords
    [chairman of the Committee on Environment and Public Works],
    presiding.
        Present from the Committee on Environment and Public
    Works:: Senators Jeffords, Chafee, and Corzine.
        Present from the Committee on Foreign Relations: Senators
    Sarbanes and Feingold.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S. SENATOR FROM
                          THE STATE OF VERMONT

        Senator Jeffords. This hearing will come to order.
        I am glad to be here with my distinguished co-chair from
    the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Sarbanes, for this
    joint hearing. I appreciate his willingness to explore today's
    topic and the fact that he has joined me as a cosponsor of S.
    556, the Clean Power Act. I would also like to applaud him for
    his work to bring some truth and sanity to America's accounting
    nightmare. Good luck.
        The United States is an economic and military superpower,
    perhaps the lone superpower. But as the old adage goes, with
    great power comes great responsibility. We are able to project
    great might far beyond our borders. We are also capable of
    contributing to environmental and natural resource damage far
    beyond our borders and far in excess of other countries.
        The question is, are we acting responsibly to curb negative
    impacts abroad and at home?
        Are we being good global neighbors and, at a minimum,
    keeping our word?
        It seems that we may be keeping our literal word, given the
    very broad language in many of the agreements, but, in
    practical terms, it seems that we are not trying very hard to
    keep up with the spirit of some of our commitments.
        The time is ripe for Congress to review how the
    Administration is implementing our environmental agreements and
    commitments. Leaders of many countries will be meeting in
    Johannesburg, South Africa, in late August at the World Summit
    on Sustainable Development. The occasion is the tenth
    anniversary of the United Nations Conference on Environmental
    Development held in Rio. I am pleased to note that the
    Secretary General of that conference, Mr. Maurice Strong, is
    here today to give us an historical perspective on the event
    and its lasting effect.
        The conferees will be met by a very different U.S.
    delegation in South Africa. The previous Bush Administration
    provided extensive support to the Rio Earth Summit and brought
    many new initiatives to the negotiating table. But this
    Administration is likely to send a smaller and lower level
    delegation and has sought to narrow the scope of its
    discussions. This has apparently included an effort to keep the
    global climate change off the agenda.
        I am troubled by the Administration's approach to global
    warming, especially in light of the Sense of Congress approved
    by the Foreign Relations Committee and made part of the Senate-
    approved Energy Bill in April. That resolution says the United
    States should take responsible action to ensure significant and
    meaningful reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases from all
    sectors. But it does not appear that responsible action is
    taking place and emissions continue to grow.
        As my friend Senator Chafee pointed out during our
    committee's markup on the Clean Power Act, the Administration's
    Climate Action Report says, ``A few ecosystems such as alpine
    meadows in the Rocky Mountains and some Barrier Islands are
    likely to disappear entirely in some areas. Other ecosystems
    are likely to experience major species shifts.''
        Our treaty commitment says, ``The ultimate objective of the
    Framework Convention on Climate Change is to stabilize
    greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at the level
    that will prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
    climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a
    timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to
    climate change.'' Since these ecosystems are likely to
    disappear entirely because of the man-made global warming and
    will not able to adapt naturally, it appears that we have
    entered into a zone of ``dangerous interference.''
        Since these are real threats of serious or irreversible
    damage, the lack of full scientific certainty about cause and
    effect should not be used as an excuse for not reducing
    emissions now. That is our commitment. Instead of acting to
    reduce emissions, the Administration's approach guarantees that
    greenhouse gas emissions will rise. According to Mr.
    Connaughton's recent testimony, there is no question about
    that.
        This kind of inaction does not compact with our commitments
    under the Framework Convention and the Sense of Congress,
    common sense, or the National Environmental Policy Act, NEPA.
    In 1969, NEPA became law. It was probably the first adoption of
    a sustainable development philosophy by a government in the
    world. To paraphrase it, it says, ``It is the continuing policy
    of the Federal Government to use all practicable means and
    measures to create and maintain conditions under which man and
    nature can exist in productive harmony and fulfill the social,
    economic, and other requirements of present and future
    generations of Americans.''
        Unfortunately, the Administration seems to have lost sight
    of these future generations of Americans. Economic development
    that does not factor in the environment of quality of life of
    those future generations is not sustainable. The Administration
    and other opponents of the Kyoto Protocol claim that the
    actions that significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions cost
    too much now. They need to look at the long term. They also
    need to look at the many studies that have been done that show
    a net positive impact of reducing emissions.
        I ask unanimous consent that the two studies by Tellus
    Institute and a list of other studies be placed in the record.
        [The referenced documents follow:]
                      [World Wildlife Fund, October 2001]
                    Clean Energy: Jobs For America's Future
                        a study for world wildlife fund
    (By Alison Bailie, Stephen Bernow, William Dougherty, Michael Lazarus,
    Sivan Kartha, Tellus Institute and Marshall Goldberg, MRG & Associates)
    Acknowledgments
        We wish to thank Katherine Silverthorne, Kathleen Sullivan, Brooks
    Yeager and Freda Colbert of WWF for their assistance on this report. We
    thank Hal Harvey, Marcus Schneider and Eric Heitz of Energy Foundation
    for their help in supporting our modeling capabilities. The energy
    efficiency analyses and inputs to our modeling effort for buildings,
    industry and light duty vehicles were provided by ACEEE (Steve Nadel,
    Howard Geller, Neal Elliott and Therese Langer) and John DeDicco of
    Environmental Defense. Modifications to the NEMS model, particularly as
    related to renewables in the electricity sector, were made at Tellus
    with important input from Alan Nogee, Deborah Donovan and Steve Clemmer
    of Union of Concerned Scientists; Laura Martin, Tom Petersik, Alan
    Beamon, Zia Haq, and Jeff Jones of EIA; and other experts including
    Walter Short of NREL, Jack Cadogan of ORNL, Dan Entingh of Princeton
    Economic Research, Inc., Etan Gummerman, Lawrence Berkeley Labs,
    Francis Wood of OnLocation, Inc., and Michael Brower. We also wish to
    thank Francisco de la Chesnaye and Reid Harvey of USEPA, who provided
    important data on non-CO2 gases, and Kevin Gurney, who
    provided useful insights on land-based carbon. We also thank Skip
    Laitner for his ongoing input and insight.
    About the Tellus Institute
        Founded in 1976 as a nonprofit research and policy organization,
    Tellus addresses a broad range of environment and resource issues. The
    Institute's staff of 50 scientists and policy analysts is active
    throughout North America and the world. Internationally, Tellus works
    closely with the Stockholm Environment Institute, hosting SEI's Boston
    Center since 1989. The transition to a sustainable world must occur at
    many levels. Tellus contributes to this goal through its work on global
    scenarios, regional and national strategies, community sustainability
    and industrial ecology. Projects focus on such areas as energy, water,
    waste, transportation, and integrated sustainability planning. This
    institutes diverse sponsors--foundations, governments, multilateral
    organizations, nongovernmental organizations and business--reflect this
    varied program.
                               executive summary
        Over the past three decades national energy policy has been the
    subject of intense debate and policy innovation. Americans were
    buffeted by oil embargoes and price increases in the 1970's, enjoyed
    low energy prices in the 1980's, and today face the consequences of
    electricity deregulation, energy supplier market power and regional
    price spikes. To meet these challenges the public and policymakers have
    called for the expansion of policies to ensure that energy services
    remain readily available and affordable, while protecting public health
    and the environment. These policies, which helped to produce the low
    energy prices of the 1990's, include appliance efficiency standards,
    energy-saving building codes, vehicle fuel efficiency and tailpipe
    emissions standards, clean air legislation, and caps on pollution from
    power plants. Over the 30-year period during which these policies have
    been in effect, the United States has reduced its energy per unit Gross
    Domestic Product by about one-third, even though the economy grew by
    160 percent.
        In order to create a responsible, forward-looking energy policy,
    the United States will need to examine a number of important issues.
    Will the policy help meet America's energy needs? Will it enhance
    national security? Will it contribute to a strong economy? Will it help
    meet America's needs for a safe and healthy environment? In order to
    begin to answer these questions, World Wildlife Fund commissioned the
    Tellus Institute to consider the potential impacts of implementing a
    broad suite of clean energy policies over the next 20 years.
        Our national choices regarding the production and use of energy
    have serious implications for our environment. At every step of the
    process, from extraction, to refining, to transport and combustion,
    fossil fuels have negative impacts on land and water-based ecosystems.
    In addition to these well-known effects, it is now clear that
    overreliance on fossil fuels is a major cause of climate change.
    Because we consider climate change one of the greatest global threats
    to biodiversity, we chose to consider a suite of policies that would
    address our energy needs while reducing our dependence on fossil fuels
    and decreasing emissions of greenhouse gases. We call this suite of
    policies the Climate Protection Scenario.
        This study analyzes the employment, macroeconomic, energy and
    environmental impacts of implementing the Climate Protection Scenario.
    These policies were compared with a base case based on Energy
    Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2001).
    Climate Protection Scenario
        Buildings and Industry Sector
            Building Codes
            Appliance and Equipment Standards
            Tax Credits
            Public Benefits Fund
            Research and Development
            Voluntary Measures
            Cogeneration for Industrial and District Energy
        Electric Sector
            Renewable Portfolio Standard
            NOx/SO2 Cap and Trade
            Carbon Cap and Trade
        Transport Sector
            Automobile Efficiency Standard Improvements
            Promotion of Efficiency Improvements in Freight Trucks
            Aircraft Efficiency Improvements
            Greenhouse Gas Standards for Motor Fuels
            Travel Demand Reductions and High Speed Rail

        Implementing these policies would help address many of our most
    pressing concerns about energy supply, the economy, employment, energy
    security, and the environment. We found that they would lead to net
    increases in employment over the next 20 years. They would reduce our
    dependence on oil and other fossil fuels, thereby greatly increasing
    our energy security. Household energy bills would decrease despite a
    small increase in the price of electricity. And, we could mitigate
    climate change and other air pollution problems. A more detailed
    description of the benefits can be found in the findings section below.
        The benefits of implementing the Climate Protection Scenario would
    be spread widely across all States and all sectors of the economy--
    including construction, transportation, motor vehicles, manufacturing,
    services, retail trade and agriculture. However, some industries within
    the energy sector would not share in the economic benefits from this
    transition, as the economy's reliance on carbon-intensive fossil fuels
    would decline. This suggests that while there would be widespread gains
    to workers throughout the economy, it would be necessary to provide
    assistance and support in order to ensure a just transition for workers
    who would otherwise be displaced during the beginning of this
    transition.
                                    findings
        If Congress were to implement the policies outlined in WWF's
    Climate Protection Scenario, the United States could reap the following
    benefits:
          A net annual employment increase of over 700,000 jobs in
    2010, rising to approximately 1.3 million by 2020;
          An 8.5 percent decline in carbon emissions between 2000
    and 2010, as opposed to the approximately 20 percent increase projected
    in the base case, and a 28 percent decline between 2000 and 2020 rather
    than a 36 percent increase;
          Twenty percent of the electricity generation needed in
    2020 would come from wind, solar, biomass and geothermal energy;
          Oil consumption would decline by approximately 8 percent
    between 2000 and 2020, rather than increase by about 31 percent,
    thereby saving money and reducing the vulnerability of citizens and our
    economy to oil price shocks;
          Overall dependence on the consumption of fossil fuels
    would decline more than 15 percent between 2000 and 2020, rather than
    increasing by 40 percent as in the base case;
          Households and businesses would accumulate savings of
    over $600 billion by 2020;
          GDP would be about $43.9 billion above the base case in
    2020;
          Energy-related emissions of air pollution would be
    dramatically reduced--by 2020, emissions of sulfur dioxide would be
    virtually eliminated, while nitrogen oxide emissions would be almost
    halved, and emissions of fine particulates, carbon monoxide, volatile
    organic compounds and mercury would be substantially reduced;
          An additional $51.4 billion in wage and salary
    compensation by 2020 relative to the base case;
          Each State would experience a positive net job impact,
    rising to about 140,000 in California by 2020; and
          Electricity sales from central station power stations
    would be about half of projections for 2020, owing to the policy of
    promotion of more efficient equipment in homes and offices and the use
    of waste heat in combined heat and power plants in buildings and
    factories.
                                  introduction
        Over the past three decades national energy policy has been the
    subject of intense debate and policy innovation. Americans were
    buffeted by oil embargoes and price increases in the 1970's, enjoyed
    low energy prices in the 1980's, and today face the consequences of
    electricity deregulation, energy supplier market power and regional
    price spikes. To meet these challenges the public and policymakers have
    called for the expansion of policies to ensure that energy services
    remain readily available and affordable, while protecting public health
    and the environment. These policies, which helped to produce the low
    energy prices of the 1990's, include appliance efficiency standards,
    energy-saving building codes, vehicle fuel efficiency and tailpipe
    emissions standards, clean air legislation and caps on pollution from
    power plants. Over the 30-year period during which these policies have
    been in effect, the United States has reduced its energy per unit Gross
    Domestic Product by about one-third, even though the economy grew by
    160 percent.
        In order to create a responsible, forward-looking energy policy the
    United States will need to examine a number of important issues. Will
    the policy help meet America's energy needs? Will it enhance national
    security? Will it contribute to a strong economy? Will it help meet
    America's needs for a safe and healthy environment? In order to begin
    to answer these questions, World Wildlife Fund commissioned the Tellus
    Institute to consider the potential impacts of implementing a broad
    suite of clean energy policies over the next 20 years.
        Our national choices regarding the production and use of energy
    have serious implications for our environment. At every step of the
    process, from extraction, to refining, to transport and combustion,
    fossil fuels have negative impacts on land and water-based ecosystems.
    In addition to these well-known effects, it is now clear that
    overreliance on fossil fuels is a major cause of climate change.
    Because we consider climate change one of the greatest global threats
    to biodiversity, we chose to consider a suite of policies that would
    address our energy needs while reducing our dependence on fossil fuels
    and decreasing emissions of greenhouse gases. We call this suite of
    policies the Climate Protection Scenario.
        This study analyzes the employment, macroeconomic, energy and
    environmental impacts of implementing the Climate Protection Scenario.
    These policies were compared with a base case based on Energy
    Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2001).
    Climate Protection Scenario
        Buildings and Industry Sector
            Building Codes
            Appliance and Equipment Standards
            Tax Credits
            Public Benefits Fund
            Research and Development
            Voluntary Measures
            Cogeneration for Industrial and District Energy
          Electric Sector
            Renewable Portfolio Standard
            NOx/SO2 Cap and Trade
            Carbon Cap and Trade
        Transport Sector
            Automobile Efficiency Standard Improvements
            Promotion of Efficiency Improvements in Freight Trucks
            Aircraft Efficiency Improvements
            Greenhouse Gas Standards for Motor Fuels
            Travel Demand Reductions and High Speed Rail
        A detailed description of the policies can be found in Annex A.
        By implementing this suite of policies we can bring together the
    various strands connecting our energy, environment, climate, and
    economic policies into a coherent and harmonious strategy. The expected
    employment, energy and economic, and environmental impacts are
    discussed in separate sections below. A detailed description of the
    methodologies applied can be found in Annex B.
                    i. employment and macroeconomic impacts
        The study finds that implementation of the Climate Protection
    Scenario could lead to a net annual employment increase of over 700,000
    jobs by 2010, increasing to about 1.3 million by 2020, while increasing
    overall national GDP and incomes. These benefits are spread widely
    across all sectors of the economy--including construction,
    transportation, motor vehicles, manufacturing, services, retail trade
    and agriculture. The benefits derive from using our energy resources
    more efficiently and cost-effectively, commercializing cleaner
    technologies, and recycling the revenues of an electric sector carbon
    cap and permit trade system to households and businesses. Each State
    would enjoy net increases in employment; incomes and economic output as
    benefits are likely to be spread widely across the country.
        As the economy's reliance on carbon-intensive fossil fuels
    declines, some industries within the energy sector would not share in
    the economic benefits from this transition. This suggests that while
    there would be widespread gains to workers throughout the economy, it
    would be necessary to provide assistance and support that ensured a
    just transition for workers who would otherwise be displaced during the
    beginning of this transition. One source of financial resources for
    this assistance could be a portion of the revenues derived from the
    government auction of carbon permits. At the same time, energy
    suppliers could offset some potential employment losses by moving
    aggressively into the energy efficiency and renewable energy businesses
    and assisting their work forces in transitioning to these new fields.
    For example, with electric sector restructuring, some existing
    utilities and suppliers could shift toward providing energy-efficiency
    services and alternative energy. Similarly, natural gas and oil
    suppliers could shift toward providing alternative fuels such as those
    derived from biomass, wind, and solar resources.
    National Impacts
        Estimation of the macroeconomic impacts of the climate protection
    policies was based on the incremental investments and savings required
    to implement the policies found in the July 2001 study. The analysis
    tracks expenditures on more efficient lighting, high efficiency motors,
    more efficient automobiles and many other energy-using technologies
    that reduce consumption of high carbon fuels. These expenditures create
    incomes and jobs for the manufacturers and workers who produce the
    equipment and for the industries and workers who supply and service
    those producers. They also reduce the energy bills of offices, firms
    and households who utilize the more efficient technologies. The savings
    on energy bills will create additional income and jobs in the
    industries and services in which these new savings are spent.

        The set of policies analyzed here gives rise to large energy
    savings, positive job impacts and new opportunities that far exceed the
    losses that would occur in the traditional energy supply sectors. The
    analyses also take account of recycling back to households and business
    the revenues derived from government auction of carbon permits to
    electricity suppliers.
        Figures 1a, 1b and 1c show the positive macroeconomic impacts of
    the Climate Protection Scenario--overall increases above base case in
    jobs, in incomes per household (a benefit in addition to household
    energy bill savings) and in GDP. By the year 2020, there would be an
    additional $400 per household increase in annual wage and salary
    earnings ($51.4 billion total), while about 1.3 million net new jobs
    would be created, relative to the base case. At the same time, GDP is
    projected to be about $43.9 billion above the base case in 2020. Major
    contributions to increases in annual wage and salary earnings arise
    from purchases of energy efficient equipment and the spending of net
    energy bill savings by businesses and households. While these increases
    are significant, the impacts are relatively small in comparison to
    overall economic activity. For instance, increasing the nation's GDP by
    $43.9 billion in 2020 represents only 0.4 percent of the $11.8 trillion
    (1998$) projected GDP for that year.
        Table 1a shows that by 2010 there could be a net job increase of
    almost 750,000 jobs, with a net increase in annual wage and salary
    compensation of about $220 per household ($26 billion total) and a $23
    billion net increase in GDP. Table 1b reveals that by 2020 these
    figures could grow to a net job increase of slightly more than 1.3
    million jobs, a net increase in annual wage and salary compensation of
    about $400 per household ($51 billion total) and a net increase in GDP
    of $44 billion.

       Table 1a: Macroeconomic Impacts of Policy Scenario by Sector, 2010
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Net Change in Wage
                                     ---------------------------------------
                                        Net Change and Salary
                                     ---------------------------  Net Change
                                                   Compensation     in GDP
                                        In Jobs      (Million      (Million
                                                      1998$)        1998$)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Agriculture.....................       18,600          $160         $530
    Other Mining....................        6,900          $420         $880
    Coal Mining.....................     (10,100)        ($990)     ($2,090)
    Oil/Gas Mining..................     (26,900)      ($2,280)     ($9,040)
    Construction....................      353,200       $10,440      $14,990
    Food Processing.................        2,700          $110         $210
    Other Manufacturing.............       52,500        $3,980       $6,020
    Pulp and Paper Mills............        2,800          $240         $390
    Oil Refining....................      (2,600)        ($260)       ($780)
    Stone, Glass, and Clay..........       14,100          $750       $1,260
    Primary Metals..................       11,800          $940       $1,360
    Metal Durables..................       30,400        $2,140       $3,520
    Motor Vehicles..................       36,500        $2,810       $4,610
    Transportation, Communication,         21,500        $1,100       $2,240
     and Utilities..................
    Electric Utilities..............     (18,400)      ($1,900)    ($10,070)
    Natural Gas Utilities...........     (16,700)      ($1,520)     ($5,510)
    Wholesale Trade.................        5,600          $350         $640
    Retail Trade....................       14,400          $290         $510
    Finance.........................       31,600        $2,380       $4,890
    Insurance/Real Estate...........      (5,900)        ($160)     ($1,110)
    Services........................      191,900        $5,730       $8,080
    Education.......................        3,800          $140         $140
    Government......................       27,200        $1,180       $1,550
        Total.......................      744,900       $26,050      $23,220
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

       Table 1b: Macroeconomic Impacts of Policy Scenario by Sector, 2020
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Net Change in Wage
                                     ---------------------------------------
                                        Net Change and Salary
                                     ---------------------------  Net Change
                                                   Compensation     in GDP
                                        In Jobs      (Million      (Million
                                                      1998$)        1998$)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Agriculture.....................       63,100          $620       $2,120
    Other Mining....................       11,200          $870       $1,830
    Coal Mining.....................     (23,900)      ($2,340)     ($4,940)
    Oil/Gas Mining..................     (61,400)      ($5,210)    ($20,600)
    Construction....................      340,300       $10,460      $15,030
    Food Processing.................       16,100          $750       $1,380
    Other Manufacturing.............       77,900        $9,360      $14,160
    Pulp and Paper Mills............        5,000          $570         $950
    Oil Refining....................      (6,300)        ($650)     ($1,910)
    Stone, Glass, and Clay..........       24,800        $1,630       $2,750
    Primary Metals..................       18,600        $2,190       $3,180
    Metal Durables..................       42,000        $4,670       $7,670
    Motor Vehicles..................       54,300        $5,090       $8,350
    Transportation, Communication,         50,500        $3,320       $6,750
     and Utilities..................
    Electric Utilities..............     (35,100)      ($5,180)    ($27,540)
    Natural Gas Utilities...........     (26,200)      ($3,080)    ($11,180)
    Wholesale Trade.................       12,400        $1,030       $1,890
    Retail Trade....................      190,300        $4,410       $7,680
    Finance.........................       42,100        $4,570       $9,410
    Insurance/Real Estate...........       11,900          $350       $2,420
    Services........................      394,600       $13,080      $18,460
    Education.......................       33,200        $1,330       $1,340
    Government......................       78,900        $3,550       $4,660
        Total.......................    1,314,300       $51,390      $43,860
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    State-By-State Employment Impacts
        The preceding analysis suggests that implementing the Climate
    Protection Scenario policies would result in substantial net employment
    gains at the national level. Yet, estimates of State-level impacts
    provide important additional insight into the benefits of such a policy
    initiative.
        The detailed distribution of the national employment impacts across
    the States is difficult to predict. However, it is likely that the
    large net benefits found in tables 1a and 1b will be rather widely and
    evenly distributed across the States, largely owing to the widespread
    effects of respending the energy savings. The results of our indicative
    analysis of the State-level employment are given in table 2.

                                              Table 2: Job Impacts by State
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            State               Net Job Gain 2010  Net Job Gain 2020
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    01......................................  Alabama.........................             13,100             22,600
    02......................................  Alaska..........................              2,800              5,000
    04......................................  Arizona.........................             11,200             19,900
    05......................................  Arkansas........................              7,500             13,200
    06......................................  California......................             77,400            141,400
    08......................................  Colorado........................             10,000             17,700
    09......................................  Connecticut.....................              7,800             14,100
    10......................................  Delaware........................              2,200              3,800
    11......................................  District of Columbia............              1,600              3,500
    12......................................  Florida.........................             37,000             66,800
    13......................................  Georgia.........................             21,300             38,300
    15......................................  Hawaii..........................              2,700              5,000
    16......................................  Idaho...........................              3,500              6,200
    17......................................  Illinois........................             31,900             56,400
    18......................................  Indiana.........................             20,900             36,000
    19......................................  Iowa............................              8,300             14,700
    20......................................  Kansas..........................              7,100             12,500
    21......................................  Kentucky........................             11,500             19,300
    22......................................  Louisiana.......................             19,200             32,900
    23......................................  Maine...........................              3,700              6,600
    24......................................  Maryland........................             12,500             22,000
    25......................................  Massachusetts...................             14,500             26,700
    26......................................  Michigan........................             29,800             51,000
    27......................................  Minnesota.......................             13,400             24,000
    28......................................  Mississippi.....................              7,200             12,600
    29......................................  Missouri........................             15,100             26,600
    30......................................  Montana.........................              2,300              4,000
    31......................................  Nebraska........................              4,700              8,500
    32......................................  Nevada..........................              5,300              9,100
    33......................................  New Hampshire...................              2,800              5,000
    34......................................  New Jersey......................             20,200             36,200
    35......................................  New Mexico......................              4,200              7,100
    36......................................  New York........................             38,000             68,200
    37......................................  North Carolina..................             22,400             38,900
    38......................................  North Dakota....................              1,900              3,300
    39......................................  Ohio............................             34,600             59,900
    40......................................  Oklahoma........................              8,200             13,700
    41......................................  Oregon..........................              8,600             15,600
    42......................................  Pennsylvania....................             31,600             55,500
    44......................................  Rhode Island....................              2,100              3,900
    45......................................  South Carolina..................             11,500             20,000
    46......................................  South Dakota....................              2,000              3,500
    47......................................  Tennessee.......................             17,100             29,800
    48......................................  Texas...........................             71,500            123,400
    49......................................  Utah............................              5,700             10,300
    50......................................  Vermont.........................              1,600              2,800
    51......................................  Virginia........................             18,500             32,100
    53......................................  Washington......................             16,600             29,700
    54......................................  West Virginia...................              3,800              6,000
    55......................................  Wisconsin.......................             14,900             26,300
    56......................................  Wyoming.........................              1,700              2,600
                                              Total...........................            744,900          1,314,300
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Some of these State-level employment impacts are associated with
    the direct expenditures made for more efficient equipment and renewable
    technologies and fuels. Although manufacturers and venders of relevant
    products and services may not be uniformly spread across the States,
    they are rather widely dispersed. For example, manufacturers of
    advanced power plants, including gas turbines, natural gas combined
    cycle systems, combined heat and power units and fuel cells are located
    in many regions of the country. Manufacture of more efficient and
    alternative-fuel automobiles is likely to continue to be located
    largely with current manufacturers. Petroleum companies with experience
    in industrial chemistry can play a role in providing cellulosic ethanol
    or other synthetic fuels. Biomass fuels for transport and power
    generation will come from States that could provide biomass feedstock.
    In some States, farms could become sites for wind electric generators
    and derive income from these facilities.
        While these energy-related purchases can stimulate local economic
    activity and jobs, the major drivers of the overall national employment
    increases are the net energy-bill savings to households and businesses,
    which tend to be spent on myriad other purchases across the economy.
    This spending occurs broadly across all sectors, with much of it local.
    In those States that supply fossil fuels, losses to these industries
    and related businesses would be more than offset by gains in other
    sectors of those State's economies, owing to the expenditures on more
    efficient equipment and cleaner energy resources and re-spending of
    energy bill savings. Thus, the national job increases--in construction,
    services, education, finance, government, miscellaneous manufacturing,
    agriculture and other sectors--would likely be widespread throughout
    the country.
        While this analysis indicates that there would be overall
    employment benefits at the State as well as the national level, some
    industries could face near-term losses before they could adapt to new
    energy markets or before the benefits of the energy efficiency measures
    were fully realized. Some of the savings realized from implementing the
    policies could be used for assistance in a just transition for affected
    workers and communities.
        States such as Texas, which are large energy producers and have
    relatively low energy prices compared with the national average, still
    enjoy large benefits. As table 2 indicates, the State of Texas, which
    currently leads the Nation in total energy consumed and is second only
    to California in total energy expenditures, could expect to have a net
    gain of about 120,000 jobs in 2020 if these national energy policies
    were adopted.
                               ii. energy impacts
        In this section we analyze expected impacts of the Climate
    Protection Scenario policy package on energy consumption, energy
    prices, and household and business energy budgets.
        Figure 2a shows how the Climate Protection Scenario policies affect
    our dependence on the consumption of fossil fuels, which declines by
    more than 15 percent between 2000 and 2020, rather than increasing by
    40 percent as in the base case. Oil consumption itself declines by
    about 8 percent between 2000 and 2020 instead of increasing by 32
    percent, largely from improved efficiency in vehicles and other
    transportation modes, thereby saving money and reducing vulnerability
    of citizens and our economy to oil price shocks. While most of this
    reduced fossil fuel dependence results from policies that induce energy
    efficiency, figure 2a also shows that the policy case increases the use
    of renewable energy, which roughly doubles from current levels instead
    of remaining essentially constant.

        Figure 2b shows how electricity sales from central station power
    stations would be less than half of projections for 2020, owing to the
    policy of promoting more efficient equipment in homes and offices and
    using waste heat in combined heat and power plants in buildings and
    factories. Electricity sales would decline by 33 percent from 2000 to
    2020 rather than increase by 45 percent. By 2020, electricity purchases
    by residential, commercial and industrial consumers would be 55 percent
    below business as usual and 20 percent of the remaining generation
    would come from wind, solar, biomass and geothermal energy.
        Figures 3a and 3b show how the policies affect natural gas prices
    and the costs to households for electricity. Natural gas prices would
    decline to about 25 percent lower than the base case by 2020. All
    sectors would enjoy declines in their electricity bills, owing to
    greater efficiency, even though prices per unit of power would increase
    in moving to cleaner generation. By 2020 residential consumers would
    pay about $24 less per month.

        Figures 4a and 4b show that net savings to households and business
    would be substantial, reaching more than $600 billion combined by 2020.

                           iii. environmental impacts
        Virtually every step in the process of supplying energy from fossil
    fuels damages the environment. Drilling, mining and pipeline
    installation can disrupt whole ecosystems. Transportation of fossil
    fuels results in spills, threatening wildlife and human communities
    that depend on the natural environment. Fossil fuel combustion emits
    pollutants that cause global warming, acid rain and smog. Smog and
    other air pollutants can exacerbate lung disease and cause crop, forest
    and property damage. Acid rain acidifies the soil and water, killing
    plants, fish and animals that depend on them. The impacts of global
    warming pose the greatest global threat to biodiversity.
        These environmental threats could be mitigated by a proactive
    effort to direct our energy supply system away from its current
    dependence on fossil fuels and toward increased energy efficiency and
    renewable energy technologies. However, current U.S. policies point in
    the opposite direction. The fossil fuel and nuclear industries continue
    to benefit from both direct and indirect subsidies from taxpayers,
    citizens and the environment, while cleaner energy resources and more
    efficient technologies are required to prove themselves in a not truly
    competitive marketplace. Despite the proven economic and environmental
    track record of energy efficiency, renewables, and pollution
    limitations, the administration's energy plan and the House of
    Representative's energy legislation continue to promote fossil fuels at
    the expense of the environment and the economy.
        The policies in the Climate Protection Scenario begin to reduce our
    dependence on fossil fuels and would thereby dramatically change the
    trajectory of U.S. carbon emissions from their current rapidly rising
    path to a downward trajectory needed for long-term climate
    stabilization. Figure 5 shows that between 2000 and 2010, carbon
    emissions would decline by 8.5 percent rather than increase by the 20
    percent projected in the base case. The July 2001 study shows that the
    Kyoto Protocol target could be met by implementing these cost-effective
    policies, reducing non-energy related greenhouse gases and utilizing
    international trading mechanisms. Under the Climate Protection
    Scenario, by 2020 carbon emissions would be 47 percent below business
    as usual and 19 percent below 1990 levels.

        At the same time, the proposed policies would virtually eliminate
    emissions of SO2 and reduce NOx emissions by almost 30
    percent, as shown in figures 6a and 6b below. In addition, the proposed
    policies would substantially reduce emissions of fine particulates,
    carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds and mercury.

                                    ANNEX A
                                    policies
        This study examines a broad set of national policies that would
    increase energy efficiency, accelerate the adoption of renewable energy
    technologies, and shift to less use of carbon-intensive fossil fuels.
    The policies address major areas of energy use in the buildings,
    industrial, transport, and electrical sectors. Analyses of the
    investment costs and energy savings of policies to promote energy
    efficiency and cogeneration in the residential, commercial, and
    industrial sectors were taken primarily from the American Council for
    an Energy Efficient Economy (1999; 2001).
        Below we group these policies into the particular sector where they
    take effect, and describe the key assumptions made concerning the
    technological impacts of the individual policies. Unless otherwise
    indicated, each of the policies is assumed to start in 2003.
        As explained further in the methodology discussion in the next
    section, we adapted the Energy Information Administration's 2001
    Reference Case Forecast (EIA 2001) to create a slightly revised ``base
    case.'' Our policies and assumptions build on those included in this
    base case forecast (i.e., we avoid taking credit for emissions
    reductions, costs, or savings already included in the EIA 2001
    Reference Case). When taken together, the policies described in this
    section represent a Climate Protection Scenario that the United States
    could pursue to achieve significant carbon reductions.
    Policies in the Buildings and Industrial Sectors
        Carbon emissions from fuel combustion in the buildings (including
    both residential and commercial) sector account for about 10 percent of
    U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, while emissions from the industrial
    sector account for another 20 percent. When emissions associated with
    the electricity consumed are counted, these levels reach over 35
    percent for buildings and 30 percent for industry. We analyzed a set of
    policies that include new building codes, new appliance standards, tax
    incentives for the purchase of high efficiency products, a national
    public benefits fund, expanded research and development, voluntary
    agreements, and support for combined heat and power.
    Building Codes
        For this policy, we assume that DOE enforces the commercial
    building code requirement in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) and
    that States comply. We also assume that relevant States upgrade their
    residential energy code to either the 1995 or 1998 Model Energy Code,
    voluntarily or following adoption of a new Federal requirement.
    Furthermore, we assume that the model energy codes are significantly
    improved during the next decade, and that all States adopt mandatory
    codes that go beyond current ``good practice'' by 2010. To quantify the
    impact of these changes, we assume a 20 percent energy savings in
    heating and cooling in buildings in half of new homes and commercial
    buildings.
    New Appliance and Equipment Efficiency Standards
        For this policy, we assume that the government upgrades existing
    standards or introduces new standards for key appliances and equipment
    types: distribution transformers, commercial air conditioning systems,
    residential heating systems, commercial refrigerators, exit signs,
    traffic lights, torchiere lighting fixtures, ice makers, and standby
    power consumption for consumer electronics. We also assume higher
    energy efficiency standards for residential central air conditioning
    and heat pumps than was recently allowed by the Bush Administration.
    These are measures that can be taken in the near term, based on cost-
    effective available technologies.
    Tax Incentives
        This policy provides initial tax incentives for a number of
    products. For consumer appliances, we assumed a tax incentive of $50 to
    $100 per unit. For new homes that are at least 30 percent more
    efficient than the Model Energy Code, we assumed an incentive of up to
    $2,000 per home; for commercial buildings with at least 50 percent
    reduction in heating and cooling costs relative to applicable building
    codes, we applied an incentive of $2.25 per square foot. For building
    equipment such as efficient furnaces, fuel cell power systems, gas-
    fired heat pumps, and electric heat pump water heaters, we assumed a 20
    percent investment tax credit. Each of these incentives would be
    introduced with a sunset clause, terminating them or phasing them out
    in approximately 5 years, to avoid their becoming permanent subsidies.
    National Public Benefits Fund
        Electric utilities have historically funded programs to encourage
    more efficient energy-using equipment, assist low-income families with
    home weatherization, commercialize renewables, and undertake research
    and development (R&D). Such programs have typically achieved
    electricity bill savings for households and businesses that are roughly
    twice the program costs (Nadel and Kushler, 2000). Despite these
    successes, electric industry restructuring, deregulation, and
    increasing price competition have caused utilities to reduce these
    ``public benefit'' expenditures over the past several years. In order
    to preserve such programs, 15 States have instituted public benefits
    funds that are financed by a small surcharge on all power delivered to
    consumers.
        This study's policy package includes a national-level public
    benefits fund (PBF) fashioned after the proposal introduced by Sen.
    Jeffords (S. 1333). The PBF would levy a surcharge of 0.2 cents per
    kilowatt-hour on all electricity sold, costing the typical residential
    consumer about $1 per month. This Federal fund would provide matching
    funds for States for approved public benefits expenditures. In this
    study, the PBF is allocated to several different programs directed at
    improvements in lighting, air conditioning, motors, and other cost-
    effective energy efficiency improvements in electricity-using
    equipment.
    Expand Federal Funding for Research and Development in Energy Efficient
            Technologies
        Federal R&D funding for energy efficiency has been a spectacularly
    cost-effective investment. The DOE has estimated that the energy
    savings from 20 of its energy efficiency R&D programs has been roughly
    $30 billion so far--more than three times the Federal appropriation for
    the entire energy efficiency and renewables R&D budget throughout the
    1990's (EERE, 2000).
        Tremendous opportunities exist for further progress in material-
    processing technologies, manufacturing processing, electric motors,
    windows, building shells, lighting, heating/cooling systems, and super-
    insulation, for example. EPA's Energy Star programs have complemented
    and amplified the impact of Federal R&D, by labeling and certifying to
    increase consumer awareness of energy efficiency opportunities. R&D
    efforts should be increased and EPA should be allocated the funds to
    broaden the scope of its Energy Star program, expanding to other
    products (refrigerators, motors) and building sectors (hotels,
    retailers), and the vast market of existing buildings that could be
    retrofitted. In this study, we assume that increased funding to expand
    research and development efforts in industry (e.g., motors), buildings
    (e.g., advanced heating/cooling), and transport (e.g., more fuel-
    efficient cars and trucks) will lead to more energy-savings products
    becoming commercially available.
    Industrial Energy Efficiency through Intensity Targets
        There is great potential for cost-effective efficiency improvements
    in both energy-intensive and non-energy intensive industries (Elliott
    1994). For example, an in-depth analysis of 49 specific energy-
    efficient technologies for the iron and steel industry found a total
    cost-effective energy savings potential of 18 percent (Worrell, Martin,
    and Price 1999). In this study, we assume Federal initiatives to
    motivate and assist industry to identify and exploit energy efficiency
    opportunities. Government agencies would provide technical and
    financial assistance, and expand R&D and demonstration programs. In
    addition to these carrots, government may need to brandish a stick in
    order to induce a large fraction of industries to make serious energy
    efficiency commitments. If industry does not respond to the Federal
    initiatives at a level sufficient to meet progressive energy efficiency
    targets, a mandatory, binding energy intensity standard should be
    triggered to ensure the targets are attained.
    Support for Co-generation
        Cogeneration (or, combined heat and power--CHP) is a super-
    efficient means of coproducing two energy-intensive products that are
    usually produced separately--heat and electricity. The thermal energy
    produced in cogeneration also can be used for (building and process)
    cooling or to provide mechanical power. While CHP already provides
    about 9 percent of all electricity in the United States, there are
    considerable barriers to its wider cost-effective implementation
    (Elliott and Spurr, 1999). In this study, we assume the adoption of
    policies to establish a standard permitting process, uniform tax
    treatment, accurate environmental standards, and fair access to the
    grid to sell or purchase electricity. Such measures would help to
    unleash a significant portion of the enormous potential for CHP. In
    this study, we assumed 50 GW of new CHP capacity by 2010, and an
    additional 95 GW between 2011 and 2020. With electricity demand reduced
    by the various energy efficiency policies adopted in this study,
    cogenerated electricity reaches 8 percent of total remaining
    electricity requirements in 2010 and 36 percent in 2020.
    Policies in the Electric Sector
        A major goal of U.S. energy and climate policy will be to
    dramatically reduce carbon and other pollutant emissions from the
    electric sector, which is responsible for more than one-third of all
    U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. We analyzed a set of policies in the
    electric sector that include standards and mechanisms to help overcome
    existing market barriers to investments in technologies that can reduce
    emissions. Three major policies--a renewable portfolio standard, a cap
    on pollutant emissions, and a carbon cap and trade system--were
    analyzed as described below.
    Renewable Portfolio Standard
        A Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is a flexible, market-oriented
    policy for progressively increasing the use of renewable energy
    resources and technologies for electricity production. An RPS sets a
    minimum requirement for the fraction of total electricity generation to
    be met by renewable electricity in each year, and requires each
    supplier of electricity to meet the minimum either by producing that
    fraction in its mix or by acquiring credits from suppliers that exceed
    the minimum. The market determines the portfolio of technologies and
    geographic distribution of facilities that meet the national target at
    least cost. This is achieved by a trading system that awards credits to
    generators for producing renewable electricity and allows them to sell
    or purchase these credits. Thirteen States--Arizona, Connecticut,
    Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
    Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin--already have Renewable
    Portfolio Standards. Senator Jeffords has introduced a bill (S. 1333)
    that would establish a national RPS.
        The RPS provides strong incentives for suppliers to design and site
    the lowest cost, highest value and most reliable renewable electricity
    projects. It also provides assurance and stability to renewable
    technology vendors, by guaranteeing markets for renewable power and
    allowing them to capture the financial and administrative advantages
    that come with planning in a more stable market environment. Yet it
    still maintains a competitive environment that encourages developers to
    innovate. Finally, by accelerating the deployment of renewable
    technologies and resources, the RPS also accelerates the learning and
    economies of scale that will allow renewable resources and technologies
    to become increasingly competitive with conventional technologies. This
    is particularly important, as the demands of climate stabilization in
    coming decades will require more renewable energy than we can deploy in
    the next two decades.
        In this study, we have applied an RPS that starts at a 2 percent
    requirement in 2002, grows to 10 percent in 2010, and to 20 percent in
    2020, after all efficiency policies are included. Wind, solar,
    geothermal, biomass, and landfill gas are eligible renewable sources of
    electricity, but environmental concerns exclude municipal solid waste
    (owing to concerns about toxic emissions from waste-burning plants) and
    large-scale hydro (which raises environmental concerns and need not be
    treated as an emerging renewable resource as it already supplies nearly
    10 percent of the nation's electricity supply). We also assume a
    subsidy to grid-connected solar photovoltaic electricity generation, in
    order to introduce a small amount of this technology into the
    generation mix. The purpose of this is to induce technology learning,
    performance improvement and scale economies to help achieve increased
    technology diversity and another zero emissions option for the longer
    term. The level is kept small so that cost and price impacts are
    minimal.
    Tightening of SO2 and NOx Emission Regulations
        The Clean Air Act Amendments currently require minimal to modest
    emissions reductions through 2010 and no reductions after that. Yet,
    despite the improvements brought about by the Clean Air Act and its
    amendments, recent studies have confirmed that SO2 and NOx
    continue to damage lake and forest ecosystems, decrease agricultural
    productivity and harm public health through its impact on urban air
    quality (Clean Air Task Force, 2000.)
        In this study, we assume a tightened SO2 cap-and-trade
    system that reduces sulfur dioxide emissions to roughly 40 percent of
    current levels by 2010 and to one-third of current levels by 2020. We
    also impose a cap-and-trade system on NOx emissions in the summertime,
    when NOx contributes more severely to photochemical smog. This system
    expands the current cap-and-trade program, which calls on 19 States to
    meet a target in 2003 that then remains constant and includes all
    States with a cap that is set first in 2003 but decreases in 2010,
    relative to 1999 levels. The cap results in a 45 percent reduction from
    current annual electric sector NOx emissions by 2010 and 83 percent by
    2020.
    Carbon Cap-And-Trade Permit System
        This study assumes that a cap-and-trade system for carbon dioxide
    emissions is introduced in the electric sector. The cap is set to
    achieve progressively more stringent targets over time, starting in
    2003 at 2 percent below current levels, increasing to 12 percent below
    current levels by 2010 and 30 percent below by 2020. A progressively
    more stringent target reduces demand for coal, and hence both
    combustion-related air pollution and mining-related pollution of
    streams and degradation of landscapes and terrestrial habitats.
        In the SO2, NOx, and CO2 trading systems,
    permits are distributed through an open auction, and the resulting
    revenues can be returned to households (e.g., through a tax reduction
    or as a rebate back to households). Recent analyses suggest that an
    auction is the most economically efficient way to distribute permits,
    as it would meet emissions caps at lower cost than allocations based on
    issuing grandfathered allowances or equal per kWh allowances (Burtraw,
    et al. 2001). Implementing such auctions for the electric sector also
    could set the stage for an economy-wide approach to carbon reduction in
    future years based on auctioning. In this study, the price of auctioned
    carbon permits reaches $100 per metric ton carbon.
        With a cap-and-trade system in place for CO2, SOx and
    NOx, this scenario reduces multiple emissions from power plants in a
    manner similar to proposals currently under consideration in Congress.
    The reductions in these three pollutants are as deep as those imposed
    in four pollutant bills, and are achieved within a comparable
    timeframe. (The Department of Energy's NEMS model unfortunately does
    not explicitly track mercury, making it impossible to compare the
    results of this study to the mercury requirement in S. 556 and H.R.
    1256.)
    Policies in the Transport Sector
        Another goal of U.S. energy and climate policy will be to reduce
    oil use, carbon emissions and pollution from the transport sector,
    which is responsible for about one-third of all U.S. greenhouse gas
    emissions. We analyzed a set of policies in the transportation sector
    that include improved efficiency (light duty vehicles, heavy duty
    trucks and aircraft), a full fuel-cycle GHG standard for motor fuels,
    measures to reduce road travel, and high speed rail.
    Strengthened Fuel Economy Standards
        Today's cars are governed by fuel economy standards that were set
    in the mid-1970's. The efficiency gains made in meeting those standards
    have been entirely overwhelmed by increases in population and driving,
    as well as the trend toward gas-guzzling SUVs. When the fuel economy
    standards were implemented, light trucks only accounted for about 20
    percent of personal vehicle sales. Light trucks now account for nearly
    50 percent of new vehicle sales; this has brought down the overall fuel
    economy of the light duty vehicle fleet, which now stands at its lowest
    average fuel economy since 1981. If the fuel economy of new vehicles
    had held at the levels for vehicles sold in 1981, rather than tipping
    downward, American vehicle owners would be importing half a million
    fewer barrels of oil each day.
        In this study, we introduce a strengthened Corporate Average Fuel
    Economy (CAFE) standard for cars and light trucks, along with
    complementary market incentive programs. Specifically, fuel economy
    standards for new cars and light trucks rise from EIA's projected 25.2
    mpg for 2001 to 36.5 mpg in 2010, continuing to 50.5 mpg by 2020. This
    increase in vehicle fuel economy would save by 2020 approximately twice
    as much oil as could be pumped from an Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
    oil field over its entire 50-year lifespan (USGS, 2001). Based on
    assessments of near-term technologies for conventional vehicles, and
    advanced vehicle technologies for the longer-term, we estimate that the
    2010 CAFE target can be met with an incremental cost of approximately
    $855 per vehicle, and the 2020 CAFE target with an incremental cost of
    $1,900. \1\ To put these costs in perspective, the fuel savings at the
    gasoline pump for these more efficient vehicles would be two to three
    times these incremental costs over the vehicle's lifetime. \2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \1\Assuming a mean value at a market price of oil of $20/barrel.
         \2\ Assuming a retail price of gasoline of $1.50/gallon, a 10-year
    life of the vehicle, and 12,000 miles per year.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Improving Efficiency of Freight Transport
        We also assume policies to improve fuel economy for heavy-duty
    freight trucks, which account for approximately 16 percent of all
    transport energy consumption. Improvements such as advanced diesel
    engines, drag reduction, rolling resistance, load reduction strategies,
    and low friction drivetrains would increase the fuel economy, and thus
    decrease the oil requirements, of freight trucks. Many of these
    technologies are available today while others, such as advanced diesel
    and turbine engines, have been demonstrated technically but are not yet
    commercially available.
        To accelerate the improvement in heavy duty truck efficiency, we
    have assumed expanded R&D for heavy duty diesel technology, vehicle
    labeling and promotion, financial incentives to stimulate the
    introduction of new technologies, efficiency standards for medium-and
    heavy-duty trucks, and fuel taxes and user-fees calibrated to eliminate
    the existing subsidies for freight trucking. Together, it is estimated
    that these policies could bring about a fuel economy improvement of 6
    percent by 2010, and 23 percent by 2020, relative to today's trucks.
    Improving Efficiency of Air Travel
        Air travel is the fastest growing mode of travel, and far more
    energy intensive than vehicle travel. One passenger mile of air travel
    today requires about 1.7 times as much fuel as vehicle travel. \3\ We
    assume policies to improve the efficiency of air travel, including R&D
    for efficient aircraft technologies, fuel consumption standards, and a
    revamping of policies that subsidize air travel through public
    investments.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \3\ Assuming typical vehicle load factors of 0.33 for autos and
    0.6 for aircraft.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We assume that air travel efficiency improves by 23 percent by
    2010, and 53 percent by 2020, owing to a combination of aircraft
    efficiency improvements (advanced engine types, lightweight composite
    materials, and advanced aerodynamics), increased load factor, and
    acceleration of air traffic management improvements (Lee et al., 2001;
    OTA, 1994; Interlaboratory Working Group, 2000). This is in contrast to
    the base case in which efficiency increases by 9 percent by 2010 and 15
    percent by 2020. While we assume that air travel can reach 82 seat-
    miles per gallon by 2020 from its current 51, it is technologically
    possible that far greater efficiencies approaching 150 seat-miles per
    gallon could be achieved, if not in that time period then over the
    longer term (Alliance to Save Energy et al., 1991).
    Greenhouse Gas Standards for Motor Fuels
        Transportation in the United States relies overwhelmingly on
    petroleum-based fuels, making it a major source of greenhouse gas (GHG)
    emissions. We introduce here a full fuel-cycle GHG standard for motor
    fuels, similar in concept to the Renewable Portfolio Standard for the
    electric sector.
        The policy assumed in this study requires a 3 percent reduction in
    the average national GHG emission factor of fuels used in light duty
    vehicles in 2010, increasing to a 7 percent reduction by 2020. Expanded
    R&D, market creation programs, and financial incentives would
    complement this policy. Such a program would stimulate the production
    of low-GHG fuels such as cellulosic ethanol and biomass-or solar-based
    hydrogen.
        For this study, we assume that most of the low-GHG fuel is provided
    as cellulosic ethanol, which can be produced from woody matter from
    agricultural residues, forest and mill wastes, urban wood wastes, and
    short rotation woody crops (Walsh et al., 1997; Walsh et al., 1999). As
    cellulosic ethanol can be coproduced along with electricity, we assume
    that electricity output reaches 10 percent of ethanol output by 2010
    and 40 percent by 2020 (Lynd, 1997). We assume that the price of
    cellulosic ethanol falls to $1.40 per gallon of gasoline equivalent by
    2010 owing to the accelerated development of the production technology,
    and remains at that price thereafter (Interlaboratory Working Group,
    2000).
    Improving Alternative Modes to Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled
        The amount of travel in cars and light duty trucks continues to
    grow due to increasing population and low vehicle occupancy. Between
    1999 and 2020, the rate of growth in vehicle miles traveled is
    projected to increase in the base case by about 2 percent per year. The
    overall efficiency of the passenger transportation system can be
    significantly improved through measures that contain the growth in
    vehicle miles traveled through land-use and infrastructure investments
    and pricing reforms to remove implicit subsidies for cars, which are
    very energy intensive. We assume that these measures will primarily
    affect urban passenger transportation and result in a shift to higher
    occupancy vehicles, including carpooling, vanpooling, public
    transportation, and telecommuting. We consider that the level of
    reductions of vehicle miles traveled that can be achieved by these
    measures relative to the base case are 8 percent by 2010 and 11 percent
    by 2020.
    High Speed Rail
        High speed rail offers an attractive alternative to intercity
    vehicle travel and short distance air travel. In both energy cost and
    travel time, high-speed rail could compete with air travel for trips of
    roughly 600 miles or less, which account for about one-third of
    domestic air passenger miles traveled. Investments in rail facilities
    for key intercity routes (such as the Northeast corridor between
    Washington and Boston, the east coast of Florida between Miami and
    Tampa, and the route linking Los Angeles and San Francisco) could
    provide an attractive alternative and reduce air travel in some of the
    busiest flight corridors (USDOT, 1997). High-speed rail can achieve
    practical operating speeds of up to 200 mph. Prominent examples include
    the French TGV, the Japanese Shinkansen and the German Intercity
    Express. An emerging advanced transport technology is the MAGLEV system
    in which magnetic forces lift and guide a vehicle over a specially
    designed guideway. Both Germany and Japan are active developers of this
    technology.
        In this analysis we have taken the USDOT's recent estimates of the
    potential high speed rail ridership which, based on projected mode
    shifts from air and automobile travel in several major corridors of the
    United States, reaches about 2 billion passenger miles by 2020 (USDOT,
    1997). While this level of high speed rail ridership provides
    relatively small energy and carbon benefits by 2020, it can be viewed
    as the first phase of a longer-term transition to far greater ridership
    and more advanced, faster and efficient electric and MAGLEV systems in
    the ensuing decades.
                                    ANNEX B
                     methodology: economic impacts analysis
        The overall energy and economic analysis starts with a business-as-
    usual energy-economic forecast based on the U.S. Department of Energy,
    Energy Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook for 2001.
    This base case reflects a continuation of existing energy consumption
    and technology trends and policies, and presumes no efforts are taken
    to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
        Employment impacts from the policy scenarios were computed as net
    incremental impacts in specified future years. They are derived from
    the changes in expenditures on energy:

      . . . operating costs and fuel costs--brought about by investments in
        energy efficiency and renewable technologies in each sector. The
        net impacts of these changes on the nation's economy were computed
        from the following: 1) the net changes in employment; 2) the net
        changes in wage and salary compensation, measured in millions of
        1998 dollars; and 3) the net changes in Gross Domestic Product
        (GDP), also measured in millions of 1998 dollars.

        The analysis used data derived from IMPLAN (IMpact Analysis for
    PLANning), a widely used input-output (I-O) model that analyzes
    interactions between different sectors of the economy. IMPLAN was used
    to track the changes in each sector's demand and spending patterns, as
    caused by shifts in fuel consumption and energy technology investments
    owing to the policies, and the shifts induced in other sectors' levels
    of output (and the inputs required).
        The results of these interactions are captured through appropriate
    sectoral multipliers (jobs, income, and GDP per dollar of output). For
    each benchmark year (2010 and 2020), each change in a sector's spending
    pattern is matched to an appropriate sectoral multiplier. The
    analytical approach used here is similar to that in Geller, DeCicco and
    Laitner (1992); Laitner, Bernow and DeCicco (1998); Goldberg et al.
    (1998); and Bernow et al. (1999). These reports offer a more in-depth
    discussion of methodological issues.
        Input-output models were initially developed to trace supply
    linkages in the economy. Thus, the impacts generated from the policy
    scenario depend on the structure of the economy. For example, I-O
    models can show how increasing purchases of more efficient lighting
    equipment, more efficient cars, high efficiency motors, modular
    combined heat and power plants, or biomass energy not only directly
    benefit their respective producers, but also benefit those industries
    that provide inputs to the manufacturers. I-O models also can be used
    to show the benefits from indirect economic activity that occur as a
    result of these transactions (e.g., banking and accounting services)
    and the re-spending of energy bill savings throughout the economy.
    Therefore, spending patterns for energy have an effect on total
    employment, income (i.e., wage and salary compensation), and GDP.
        For each sector of the economy, multipliers were used to compute
    the impacts of the incremental expenditures. These multipliers
    identified the employment or economic activity generated from a given
    level of spending in each sector. Changes in expenditures were matched
    with appropriate multipliers. For instance, employment multipliers show
    the number of jobs that are directly and indirectly supported for each
    one million dollars of expenditure in a specific sector.
        For this analysis, a job is defined as sufficient wages to employ
    one person full-time for 1 year. The employment multipliers for key
    sectors of the economy are listed in table A.1, below.
        The analysis in this study includes several modifications made to
    the methodology of merely matching expenditures and multipliers. First,
    an assumption was made that 85 percent of the efficiency investments
    would be spent within the United States. While local contractors and
    dealers traditionally carry out upgrades of energy efficiency, this
    analysis recognizes that foreign suppliers and contractors may also be
    involved.
        Second, we made an adjustment in the employment impacts to account
    for future changes in labor productivity in specific sectors. Utilizing
    data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Economic and Employment
    Projections 1988, 1998, and 2008, we developed productivity trends for
    our analysis. These trends suggest that productivity rates are expected
    to vary widely among sectors. Annual productivity gains are forecast to
    range from 0.4 percent annually in the construction sector (which will
    experience a large influx of employment as those sectors become more
    important to the economy) to 7.4 percent annual productivity gain in
    oil and gas mining. These factors are given in table A.2, below.
        Third, we assumed that 80 percent of the investment upgrades would
    be financed by bank loans carrying an average 10 percent real interest
    rate over a 5-year period. No parameters were established to account
    for changes labor participation rates or for changes in interest rates
    as less capital-intensive technologies (i.e., efficiency investments)
    are substituted for conventional supply strategies. Although the higher
    cost premiums associated with the efficiency investments might be
    expected to increase the level of borrowing in the short term, and
    therefore, interest rates, this could be offset somewhat by avoided
    investments in new power plant capacity, exploratory well drilling, and
    new pipelines. Similarly, while a demand for labor may tend to increase
    the overall level of wages (and potentially lessen economic activity),
    the employment benefits from the scenario are relatively small compared
    with the national level of unemployment.
        Fourth, for the residential and commercial sectors, it was assumed
    that program and marketing expenditures would be required to help
    promote market penetration of efficiency improvements due to the
    dispersed nature of the decisionmakers and the need for greater efforts
    toward market transformation. This was set at 15 percent of the
    efficiency investments for those sectors. No program or marketing
    expense was included for the industrial sector or transportation
    sector. We assume market penetration is naturally occurring in the
    industrial sector as decisionmakers adopt cost-effective and more
    efficient processes and older, less efficient equipment is replaced
    with newer, higher efficiency models. In the transportation sector
    efficiency improvements are assumed to be a part of all new vehicle
    purchases.
        Finally, the analysis took account of the fact that the electric
    sector carbon cap-and-trade system would involve government auctioning
    of carbon allowances to electricity suppliers. This was modeled by (1)
    assuming purchases of the requisite allowances by utilities from the
    government; (2) payments for the corresponding higher costs of
    electricity by households and businesses; and (3) a return of the
    revenues collected by the government to households and businesses.
        These results should be taken as indicative, as there are always
    limits to such a modeling exercise. The analyses do not account for
    feedback through final demand reductions, input substitution owing to
    price changes, feedback from inflation, and the constraints on labor
    and money supplies. They also assume that available labor, plant and
    materials are not fully utilized. Thus, for example, they assume that
    there is unemployment in those existing or potential skill areas, for
    which demand could be induced by policies that shift expenditures to
    nonenergy commodities. This is contrary to many other economic models,
    which in effect assume that there is full employment, and that the
    shift in expenditures from energy to other commodities would not create
    new jobs. Their view would be that the shift in expenditures would
    provide largely counter-recessionary jobs, but not many sustained job
    increases. Yet, it is well known that there is structural as well as
    business-cycle unemployment. Moreover, economic activity in some
    sectors such as construction (which enjoys the largest amount of
    induced jobs in our analysis) where job entry is impeded by cyclical
    and unstable demand and expectations, could experience sustained
    increases if a sustained path of increased final demands were
    established as they are in our policy scenarios.
        In addition, while the models used for the energy analyses capture
    some policy-induced technology innovation, this is limited primarily to
    the electric sector. The I-O analysis also does not include the
    potential productivity benefits that could stem from the investments in
    new and more efficient equipment, and associated changes in
    organization, know-how and inter-industry interactions. Industrial
    investments that improve energy efficiency could be accompanied by
    improved product quality, lower capital and operating costs, increased
    employee productivity, easier and less costly environmental compliance,
    and entry into niche markets (see, e. g., Elliott et al. 1997; Laitner
    1995; OTA 1994; Porter and Van Linde 1995). Even under full employment,
    energy policies that improve the efficiency of the economy could
    increase incomes per worker. Finally, such job-inducing policies could
    help counteract recessionary business cycles. It would be valuable to
    develop tools and refine the analyses to account for some of these
    factors and obtain a more detailed characterization of the results.
        For the State-by-State employment impacts, we developed indicative
    estimates of the distribution of the approximately 1.3 million net
    national jobs gained by 2020 across the 50 States and the District of
    Columbia. Absent a more detailed analysis of each individual State or
    region, we allocated the national job impacts by weighting the key
    variables to create an overall State-by-State assessment. This estimate
    reflects the significant energy and economic differences across the
    States. The key variables used in this assessment were differences in
    energy prices; the level of energy consumed for each dollar of economic
    activity in the State; the number of energy-related jobs as a percent
    of total State employment; and the number of State jobs as a percent of
    national employment. The results are presented in table 2, which shows
    a positive net job impact in each State, ranging up to a high of about
    140,000 in California by 2020.

                                    Table A.1
               Employment Multipliers for Select Economic Sectors
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Sector                             Multiplier
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Agriculture................................................         27.3
    Coal Mining................................................          9.9
    Oil/Gas Mining.............................................          8.2
    Other Mining...............................................         10.4
    Construction...............................................         18.1
    Food Processing............................................         16.9
    Pulp and Paper Mills.......................................         11.6
    Oil Refining...............................................          6.9
    Stone, Glass, and Clay.....................................         13.2
    Primary Metals.............................................         12.8
    Metal Durables.............................................         13.1
    Motor Vehicles.............................................         10.6
    Other Manufacturing........................................         13.3
    Transportation, Communication, and Utilities...............         13.9
    Electric Utilities.........................................          5.2
    Natural Gas Utilities......................................          6.6
    Wholesale Trade............................................         13.4
    Retail Trade...............................................         29.2
    Finance....................................................         10.7
    Insurance/Real Estate......................................          8.1
    Services...................................................         22.9
    Education..................................................         28.9
    Government.................................................         18.0
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                    Table A.2
         Labor Productivity Rates for Select Economic Sectors Employment
                     Multipliers for Select Economic Sectors
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Sector                                Rate
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Agriculture................................................  1.6 percent
    Coal Mining................................................  5.2 percent
    Oil/Gas Mining.............................................  7.4 percent
    Other Mining...............................................  2.4 percent
    Construction...............................................  0.4 percent
    Food Processing............................................  1.0 percent
    Pulp and Paper Mills.......................................  3.0 percent
    Oil Refining...............................................  3.3 percent
    Stone, Glass, and Clay.....................................  2.2 percent
    Primary Metals.............................................  4.0 percent
    Metal Durables.............................................  4.7 percent
    Motor Vehicles.............................................  2.0 percent
    Other Manufacturing........................................  4.7 percent
    Transportation, Communication, and Other Utilities.........  2.5 percent
    Electric Utilities.........................................  2.5 percent
    Natural Gas Utilities......................................  1.5 percent
    Wholesale Trade............................................  3.0 percent
    Retail Trade...............................................  1.4 percent
    Finance....................................................  3.7 percent
    Insurance/Real Estate......................................  0.8 percent
    Services...................................................  1.1 percent
    Education..................................................  1.0 percent
    Government.................................................  0.4 percent
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

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                                     ______

    [From the Tellus Institute and Stockholm Environment Institute--Boston
                               Center, July 2001]
    The American Way to the Kyoto Protocol: An Economic Analysis to Reduce
                                Carbon Pollution
                        a study for: world wildlife fund
    (By Alison Bailie, Stephen Bernow, William Dougherty, Michael Lazarus,
                                 Sivan Kartha)
    Acknowledgements
        We wish to thank Jennifer Morgan, Katherine Silverthorne and Freda
    Colbert of WWF for their assistance on this report. We thank Hal
    Harvey, Marcus Schneider and Eric Heitz of Energy Foundation for their
    help in supporting our modeling capabilities. The energy efficiency
    analyses and inputs to our modeling effort for buildings, industry and
    light duty vehicles were provided by ACEEE (Steve Nadel, Howard Geller,
    Neal Elliott and Therese Langer) and John DeDicco of Environmental
    Defense. Modifications to the NEMS model, particularly as related to
    renewables in the electricity sector, were made at Tellus with
    important input from Alan Nogee, Deborah Donovan and Steve Clemmer of
    Union of Concerned Scientists, Laura Martin, Tom Petersik, Alan Beamon,
    Zia Haq, and Jeff Jones of EIA, and other experts including Walter
    Short of NREL, Jack Cadogan of ORNL, Dan Entingh of Princeton Economic
    Research, Inc., Etan Gummerman, Lawrence Berkeley Labs, Francis Wood of
    OnLocation, Inc., and Michael Brower. We also wish to thank Francisco
    de la Chesnaye and Reid Harvey of USEPA, who provided important data on
    non-CO2 gases, and Kevin Gurney, who provided useful
    insights on land-based carbon.
    1. Executive Summary
        This report presents a study of policies and measures that could
    dramatically reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions over the next two
    decades. It examines a broad set of national policies to increase
    energy efficiency, accelerate the adoption of renewable energy
    technologies, and shift energy use to less carbon-intensive fuels. The
    policies address major areas of energy use in residential and
    commercial buildings, industrial facilities, transportation, and power
    generation.
        This portfolio of policies and measures would allow the United
    States to meet its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol Together when
    combined with steps to reduce the emissions of non-CO2
    greenhouse gases and land-based CO2 emissions, and the
    acquisition of a limited amount of allowances internationally. This
    package would bring overall economic benefits to the United States,
    since lower fuel and electricity bills would more than pay the costs of
    technology innovation and program implementation. In 2010, the annual
    savings would exceed costs by $50 billion, and by 2020 by approximately
    $135 billion.
        Currently, the Bush Administration is promoting an energy strategy
    based on augmenting fossil fuel supplies. This strategy does not help
    the United States shift away from diminishing fossil fuel supplies, it
    does not enhance U.S. energy security, and it does not reduce the
    environmental impacts of energy use. America needs an energy policy
    that takes us forward into the 21st Century by making climate change
    mitigation an integrated part of the plan.
        Far from being the economically crippling burden that the Bush
    Administration alleges, ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and ambitiously
    reducing greenhouse gas emissions could initiate a national
    technological and economic renaissance for cleaner energy, industrial
    processes and products in the coming decades. In the United States, we
    therefore face an important challenge. We can embrace the challenge of
    climate change as an opportunity to usher in this renaissance,
    providing world markets with the advanced technologies needed to
    sustain this century's economic growth. Or we can be followers, leaving
    other more forward-looking countries to assume the global leadership in
    charting a sustainable path and capturing the energy markets of the
    future.
    Policies and measures
        The climate protection strategy adopts policies and measures that
    are broadly targeted across the four main economic sectors: buildings,
    electricity generation, transportation, and industry. The policies
    considered for residential and commercial buildings include
    strengthened codes for building energy consumption, new appliance
    efficiency standards, tax incentives and a national public benefits
    fund to support investments in high efficiency products, and expanded
    research and development into energy efficient technologies. For the
    electric sector, policies included a market-oriented ``renewable
    portfolio standard'', a cap on pollutant emissions (for sulfur and
    nitrogen), and a carbon emissions permit auction. In the transport
    sector, policies are adopted to improve the fuel economy of passenger
    vehicles, freight trucks, and aircraft through research, incentives,
    and a strengthened vehicle fuel efficiency standards. Policies are also
    modeled to set a fuel-cycle greenhouse gas standard for motor fuels,
    reduce road travel through land use and infrastructure investments and
    pricing reforms, and increase access to high speed rail as an
    alternative to short distance air travel. In the industry sector,
    policies are adopted to exploit more of the vast potential for
    cogeneration of heat and power, and to improve energy efficiencies at
    industrial facilities through technical assistance, financial
    incentives, expanded research, and demonstration programs to encourage
    cost-effective emissions reductions.
    Results
        Energy use in buildings, industries, transportation, and
    electricity generation was modeled for this study using the U.S.
    Department of Energy's National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). The NEMS
    model version, data and assumptions employed in this study were those
    of EIA's Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2001), which also formed the basis
    for the Base Case. We refined the NEMS model with advice from EIA,
    based on their ongoing model improvements, and drawing on expert advice
    from colleagues at the Union of Concerned Scientists, the National
    Laboratories and elsewhere.

                                             Table ES. 1 Summary of results.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                   2010                      2020
                                                       1990\1\     2010 Base     Climate     2020 Base     Climate
                                                                      Case      Protection      Case      Protection
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    End-use Energy (Quads).........................         63.9         86.0         76.4         97.2         72.6
    Primary Energy (Quads).........................         84.6        114.1        101.2        127.0         89.4
    Renewable Energy (Quads)
        NON-HYDRO..................................          3.5          5.0         10.4          5.5         11.0
        Hydro......................................          3.0          3.1          3.1          3.1          3.1

    Net GHG Emissions (MtCe/yr)....................        1,648        2,204        1,533           --         ----
        Energy Carbon..............................        1,338        1,808        1,372        2,042        1,087
        Land-based Carbon..........................           --           --          -58           --         ----
        Non-CO2 Gases..............................          310          397          279           --         ----
        International Trade........................           --           --          -60           --         ----

    Net Savings\2\
        Cumulative present value (billion $).......           --           --         $105           --         $576
        Levelized annual (billion $/year)..........           --           --         $113           --          $49
        Levelized annual per household ($/year)....           --           --         $113           --         $375
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Under Kyoto, the base year for three of the non-CO2 GHGs (HFCs, PFCs, SF6) is 1995, not 1990, and the 1995
      levels for these emissions are reported here.
    \2\ Savings are in 1999 $. The 2010 savings include $2.3 billion costs per year ($9 billion cumulative through
      2010) of non-energy related measures needed to meet the Kyoto target. Costs are not included in 2020 since
      these measures policies do not extend past 2010.

        Table ES. 1 provides summary results on overall energy and
    greenhouse gas impacts and economic impacts of the policy set for the
    Base Case and Climate Protection Case for 2010 and 2020. The policies
    cause reductions below in primary energy consumption that reach 11
    percent by 2010 and 30 percent in 2020, relative to the Base Case in
    those years, through increased efficiency and greater adoption of
    cogeneration of heat and power (CHP). Relative to today's levels, use
    of non-hydro renewable energy roughly triples by 2010 in the Climate
    Protection Case, whereas in the Base Case it increases by less than 50
    percent. Given the entire set of policies, non-hydro renewable energy
    doubles relative to the Base Case in 2010, accounting for about 10
    percent of total primary energy supplies in 2010. When the electric
    sector RPS is combined with the strong energy efficiency policies of
    this study, the absolute amount of renewables does not increase
    substantially between 2010 and 2020 because the percentage targets in
    the electric sector have already been met. A more aggressive renewables
    policy for the 2010-2020 period could be considered (ACEEE, 1999).

        The reductions in energy-related carbon emissions are even more
    dramatic than the reductions in energy consumption, because of the
    shift toward lower-carbon fuels and renewable energy. Since 1990,
    carbon emissions have risen by over 15 percent, and in the Base Case
    would continue to rise a total of 35 percent by 2010, in stark contrast
    to the 7 percent emissions reduction that the United States negotiated
    at Kyoto. In the Climate Protection case, the United States promptly
    begins to reduce energy-related carbon emissions, and by 2010 emissions
    are only 2.5 percent above 1990 levels, and by 2020, emissions are well
    below 1990 levels. Relative to the Base case, the 2010 reductions \3\
    amount to 436 MtC/yr.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \3\Throughout this report we refer to U.S. emissions target for
    the year 2010 to mean the average of the 5 year period from 2008 to
    2012.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Energy-related carbon emissions are the predominant source of U.S.
    greenhouse gas emissions for the foreseeable future, and their
    reduction is the central challenge for protecting the climate. However,
    because the United States has made only minimal efforts to reduce
    emissions since it ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on
    Climate Change, it may not be able to meet it's Kyoto obligation with
    net economic benefits based solely on reductions in energy-related
    carbon dioxide emissions. Therefore, in order to meet the Kyoto target,
    the Climate Protection case also considers policies and measures for
    reducing greenhouse gases other than energy-related carbon dioxide.
        In the Climate Protection case, land-based activities, such as
    forestry, changes in land-use, and agriculture, yield another 58 MtC/yr
    of reductions. (This figure corresponds to the upper limit for the use
    of land-based activities in the current negotiating text proposed by
    the current President of the U.N. climate talks Jan Pronk.) Methane
    emissions are also reduced, through measures aimed at landfills,
    natural gas production and distribution systems, mines, and livestock
    husbandry. The potent fluorine-containing greenhouse gases can be
    reduced by substituting with non-greenhouse substitutes, implementing
    alternative cleaning processes in the semiconductor industry, reducing
    leaks, and investing in more efficient gas-using equipment. In total,
    the Climate Protection case adopts reductions of these other greenhouse
    gases equivalent to 118 MtC/yr by 2010.
        All together the reduction measures for energy-related carbon (436
    MtC/yr), land-based carbon (58 MtC/yr), and non-carbon gases (118 MtCe/
    yr) amount to 612 MtCe/yr of reductions in 2010. Through these
    measures, the United States is able to accomplish the vast majority of
    its emissions reduction obligation under the Kyoto Protocol through
    domestic actions. This leaves the United States slightly shy of its
    Kyoto target, with only 60 MtC/yr worth of emissions allowances to
    procure from other countries though the ``flexibility mechanisms'' of
    the Kyoto Protocol--(Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation, and the
    Clean Development Mechanism). The Climate Protection case assumes that
    the United States will take steps to ensure that allowances procured
    through these flexibility mechanisms reflect legitimate mitigation
    activity. In particular, we assume that United States restrains its use
    of so-called ``hot air'' allowances, i.e, allowances sold by countries
    that received Kyoto Protocol targets well above their current
    emissions.
        In addition to greenhouse gas emission reductions, the set of
    policies in the Climate Protection case also reduce criteria air
    pollutants that harm human health, cause acid rain and smog, and
    adversely affect agriculture, forests, water resources, and buildings.
    Implementing the policies would significantly reduce energy-related
    emissions as summarized in Table ES. 2. Sulfur oxide emissions would
    decrease the most--by half in 2010 and by nearly 75 percent in 2020.
    The other pollutants are reduced between 7 and 16 percent by 2010, and
    between 17 and 29 percent by 2020, relative to Base case levels in
    those years.

                               Table ES. 2: Impact of policies on air pollutant emissions
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                   2010                      2020
                                                         1900      2010 Base     Climate     2020 Base     Climate
                                                                      Case      Protection      Case      Protection
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CO.............................................         65.1         69.8         63.8         71.8         59.8
    NOx............................................         21.9         16.5         13.9         16.9         12.0
    SO2............................................         19.3         12.8          6.2         12.7          3.3
    VOC............................................          7.7          5.5          5.1          5.9          4.9
    PM10...........................................          1.7          1.5          1.3          1.6          1.3
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The complete Climate Protection package--including measures to
    reduce energy-related, land-related, and non-carbon greenhouse gas
    emissions, as well as modest purchases of allowances--provides a net
    economic benefit to the United States. It also positively affects
    public health, by reducing emissions of the key air quality-reducing
    pollutants, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide,
    particulates, and volatile organic compounds. By dramatically reducing
    energy consumption, the Climate Protection strategy reduces our
    dependence on insecure energy supplies, while enhancing the standing of
    the United States as a supplier of innovative and environmentally
    superior technologies and practices.
    2. Introduction
        The earth's atmosphere now contains more carbon dioxide than at
    anytime over the past several hundred millennia. This precipitous rise
    in the major greenhouse gas, due to the combustion of fossil fuels
    since the dawn of the industrial age and the clearing of forests, has
    warmed the globe and produced climatic changes. What further changes
    will occur over the coming decades depends on how society chooses to
    respond to the threat of a dangerously disrupted climate. A concerted
    global effort to shift to energy-efficient technologies, carbon-free
    sources of energy and sustainable land-use practices, could keep future
    climate change to relatively modest levels. If, on the other hand,
    nations continue to grow and consume without limiting GHG emissions,
    future climate change could be catastrophic.
        Dramatic climate change could unleash a range of dangerous
    physical, ecological, economic and social disruptions that would
    seriously undermine the natural environment and human societies for
    generations to come. Fortunately, a variety of effective policies,
    which have already been demonstrated, would mobilize current and new
    technologies, practices and resources to meet the challenge of climate
    protection. Strong and sustained action to reduce the risk of climate
    change could also reap additional benefits, such as reducing other air
    pollutants and saving money, plus help to usher in a new technological
    and institutional renaissance consistent with the goals of sustainable
    development. Here we focus on the U.S., which emits almost one-fourth
    of global carbon dioxide emissions. As a Nation, we have both the
    responsibility and the capability to take the lead in climate
    protection, and can directly benefit from actions taken. Recently,
    however, the Bush Administration has gravely disappointed the
    international community, proposing an energy strategy that is devoid of
    significant steps to protect the climate.
        This report presents a study of policies and measures through which
    the United States could dramatically reduce its greenhouse gas
    emissions over the next two decades, while spurring technological
    innovation, reducing pollution, and improving energy security. The
    study is the latest in a series to which Tellus Institute has
    contributed, dating back to 1990, which have shown the economic and
    environmental benefits of energy efficiency and renewable energy
    resources. It updates and refines America's Global Warming Solutions
    (1999), which found that annual carbon emissions could be reduced to 14
    percent below 1990 levels by 2010, with net economic benefits and
    reductions in air pollution.
        Unfortunately, since that study, and indeed over the past decade
    since the Framework Convention on Climate Change was ratified by the
    U.S., the promise of these technologies and resources has gone largely
    unfulfilled, and little has been done to stem the tide of rapidly
    growing energy use and carbon emissions. This delay and paucity of
    action has rendered even more difficult the goal of reaching our Kyoto
    Protocol emissions target of 7 percent below 1990 levels by 2010.
    Nonetheless, the present study shows the substantial carbon reduction
    and other benefits that could still be achieved by 2010 with sensible
    policies and measures, even with this delayed start, and even greater
    benefits over the following decade. The policy and technological
    momentum established through 2020 would set the stage for the further
    reductions needed over the longer term to ensure climate stabilization.
    The Risk of Climate Change
        The world's community of climate scientists has reached the
    consensus that human activities are disrupting the Earth's climate
    (WGI, SPM, 2001; NAS, 2001; Int'l Academies of Science, 2001). Global
    emissions of CO2 have steadily risen since the dawn of the
    industrial age, and now amount to about 6 billion tons of carbon
    released annually from fossil fuel combustion and 1 billion tons
    annually from land-use changes (mainly burning and decomposition of
    forest biomass). Without concerted efforts to curb emissions,
    atmospheric carbon dioxide levels would be driven inexorably higher by
    a growing global population pursuing a conventional approach to
    economic development.
        While it is impossible to predict with precision how much carbon
    dioxide we will be emitting in the future, in a business-as-usual
    scenario annual emissions would roughly triple by the end of the
    century. By that time, the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide
    would have risen to three times pre-industrial levels (IPCC WGI, 2001).
    The climatic impacts of these rising emissions could be dramatic.
    Across a range of different plausible emissions futures explored by the
    IPCC, global average temperatures are calculated to rise between 3 to
    10 degrees Fahrenheit (1.5 to 6 degrees Centigrade), with even greater
    increases in some regions (IPCC 2001). Such temperature changes would
    reflect a profound transformation of the Earth's climate system, of the
    natural systems that depend upon it and, potentially, of the human
    societies that caused the changes.
        The potential consequences of such climate change are myriad and
    far-reaching. Sea level could rise between 3.5 to 35 inches (9--88
    centimeters) (IPCC WGI, 2001), with severe implications for coastal and
    island ecosystems and their human communities. Hundreds of millions of
    people in the United States and abroad live in coastal regions that
    would be inundated by a 17 inch (44 cm) rise in sea level. Most of
    these regions are in developing countries that can scarcely afford to
    expend resources on building dikes and resettling communities. Climate
    disruption would also entail more frequent, prolonged, and intense
    extreme weather events, including storms and droughts, the timing,
    conditions and character of which would remain unpredictable.
        Under the stresses courted by continuing current energy practices,
    climate and ecological systems could undergo very large and
    irreversible changes, such as a shift in the major ocean currents.
    Global warming itself could increase the rate of greenhouse gas
    accumulation, uncontrollably accelerating global warming and its
    impacts. For example, a thawing of the arctic tundra could release
    methane at rates far beyond today's anthropogenic rates, and a warming
    of the oceans could shift them from a net sink to a net source of
    carbon dioxide.
        Moreover, large and irreversible changes could occur very rapidly.
    Recent scientific evidence from pre-historic ice cores shows that major
    climate changes have occurred on the time scale of about a decade
    (Schneider 1998; Severinghaus et al. 1998). Rapid change could cause
    additional ecological and social disruptions, limiting our ability to
    adapt. This could render belated attempts to mitigate climate change
    more hurried, more costly, less effective, or too late. Consequently,
    early and sustained action, across many fronts, is needed to effect the
    technological, institutional and economic transitions to protect global
    climate and the ecological and social systems that depend on climate
    stability.
    Protecting the Climate
        The carbon dioxide already released by human activities will linger
    in the atmosphere for a hundred years or so. This carbon has already
    changed the climate, and will continue to do so as long as it remains
    in the atmosphere. But the degree of climate change to which we're
    already committed pales in comparison to the disruption that humankind
    would wreak if it continues to recklessly emit more carbon.
        An aggressive strategy to curb emissions might limit warming to
    less than 2 degrees F over the next century (on top of the 1.0 degrees
    C that has already occurred over the past century). A temperature
    increase of about 0.2 degrees F per decade would still exceed natural
    variability, but would occur gradually enough to allow many, though not
    all, ecosystems to adapt (Rijsberman and Swart, 1990). To be sure, this
    goal would not entirely eliminate the risks of disruptive climate
    change. Warming in some areas would significantly exceed 2 degrees F,
    the rising sea level would inundate some coastal areas, and changing
    rainfall patterns could make some regions more prone to drought or
    floods. A more ambitious stabilization target might well be warranted,
    but we suggest this goal as an illustration of what might be an
    environmentally acceptable and practically achievable climate
    protection trajectory.
        To achieve this goal, CO2 concentrations would have to
    be stabilized at approximately 450 ppm, which is about 60 percent above
    pre-industrial concentrations. This would require keeping total global
    carbon emissions within a budget of 500 billion tons of carbon over the
    course of the 21st century, whereas a business-as-usual trajectory
    would have us emitting about 1,400 billion tons. Annual global carbon
    emissions from fossil fuels would have to be at least halved by the end
    of the century, from today's 6 billion tons/yr to less than 3 billion
    tons/yr, and deforestation would need to be halted, in contrast to a
    business-as-usual trajectory which grows to 20 billion tons/yr. With a
    growing global population, this implies a decrease in the annual per
    capita emissions from today's 1 ton to about 0.25 tons, whereas the
    business-as-usual per capita emissions grow to almost 2 tons. Figure
    2.1, which shows these two radically different emissions trajectories,
    conveys the ambitiousness of this target.

     Figure 2.1: Global carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion (1890-
         2100)--Business-as-usual trajectory (IPCC IS92a scenario) and
                trajectory for climate stabilization at 450 ppm
        The industrialized countries are responsible for about two-thirds
    of global annual carbon, at more than 3 tons per-capita, with the
    United States at 5.5 tons per capita, while on average developing
    countries emit only 0.5 tons per capita. Even if emissions in the
    developing countries were to vanish instantly, implying a nightmarish
    devolution of their economies, the industrialized world would still
    need to almost halve its emissions in order to protect the climate.

    Figure 2.2: Carbon emissions for stabilization of GHG concentrations at
         450 ppm, broken out by developing and industrialized countries
        Figure 2.2 shows the global carbon trajectory for stabilization at
    450 ppm, as shown in Figure 2.1, broken out into emission paths for
    both the industrialized and developing countries. In this illustrative
    allocation, emissions converge to equal per capita emissions (?0.25 tC
    per capita) by the end of the 21st century. Clearly, it is essential
    that the industrialized countries begin early and continue steadily to
    decrease their emissions on a trajectory to meet these climate
    protection requirements. Industrialized countries on the whole would
    have to roughly reduce their per capita emissions ten-fold, and the
    United States in particular would have to reduce by more than a factor
    of twenty.
        Emissions from the developing countries could grow in the near
    term, as they undergo economic development and transition toward
    advanced, efficient and low-carbon technologies, and then decline
    rapidly during the latter half of the century. Ultimately, the
    developing countries would need to halve their per capita emissions
    relative to today's levels, notwithstanding the considerable economic
    growth that they are expected to realize over this century. This would
    involve economic development predicated upon use of energy technologies
    and energy resources that would entail a ``leap-frogging'' over the
    fossil-based economic development that has occurred in the
    industrialized countries directly to cleaner energy sources. Such a
    transition would require concerted technology and institutional
    cooperation, with associated financial assistance, among developing and
    industrialized countries.
        Stabilization and equalization would thus be served by a dual
    technological transition in which the industrialized countries can take
    the lead, by demonstrating their commitment to addressing a problem for
    which it bears primary responsibility, and fostering the first wave of
    technological innovation from which both developing and industrialized
    countries could benefit.
    The Kyoto Protocol
        Although only a first small step, the Kyoto Protocol offers a
    pivotal opportunity to shift away from the climate-disrupting path down
    which the world is now headed, and onto a climate-protecting path. It
    is well understood that the Kyoto Protocol is the basis for future
    emissions reductions as well. If it enters into force, the Kyoto
    Protocol will legally bind industrialized countries that ratify it to
    specific GHG reduction targets, to be attained during the during the 5
    year ``budget period'' from 2008 to 2012. For the United States, the
    target is 7 percent less than the 1990 emission levels. The limit is 6
    percent for Japan, 0 percent for Russia, and an average of 8 percent
    for the European Union countries. Across all industrialized countries,
    the emissions budget is 5 percent below 1990 emissions rate, whereas
    the business-as-usual emissions rate is projected to increase by
    approximately 20 percent by 2010.
        The Kyoto Protocol offers a number of options to lower the cost of
    meeting their targets. Many of these so-called ``flexibility
    mechanisms'' were included at the request of the United States in
    Kyoto. They allow countries to carry out projects that reduce carbon
    emissions (or enhance carbon absorption) from biological stocks such as
    forests and possibly agricultural land, or can reduce emissions of GHGs
    other than carbon. \4\ Countries can also undertake GHG mitigation
    projects in other countries \5\ and acquire credits for the resulting
    reductions, or can simply purchase excess carbon allowances from
    countries that surpass their targets. \6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \4\The GHGs that are covered by the Kyoto Protocol include carbon
    dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
    hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perflourocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur
    hexaflouride (SF6).
         \5\''Joint Implementation'' (JI) is the relevant mechanism if the
    host country is an industrialized country with a target, and ``Clean
    Development Mechanism'' (CDM) if the host country is a developing
    country.
         \6\Purchase of allowances is known as ``Emissions Trading''.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, these flexibility mechanisms should be implemented with
    caution, lest they undermine effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. Given
    its modest reduction targets relative to the much deeper reductions
    ultimately needed for climate protection, the main purpose of the
    Protocol is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by launching a global
    transition in technologies and infrastructure for energy production and
    use. The first budget period should end with a decisive shift away from
    conventional energy investments, real progress in institutional
    learning and technological innovation, and momentum to deepen and
    expand these changes over the longer term. An over-reliance on the
    flexibility mechanisms may permit too slow a start, and too weak a
    signal, to motivate this fundamental transition.
        Excessive use of the flexibility mechanisms could undermine the
    needed transition in several ways. First, the emissions trading system
    is in danger of being severely diluted by cheap carbon allowances from
    the Russian Federation and Ukraine, whose negotiated targets are far
    above the emission levels they will reach by 2010 even without
    reduction efforts. Second, inadequate rules for credits from project-
    based mechanisms could generate ``free-rider'' credits that reflect
    inflated estimates of their mitigation value, thereby undermining the
    Protocol's targets. Third, mitigation activities that rely on
    biological sequestration strain our current technical ability to
    reliably measure carbon changes, are based on uncertain science, and
    take pressure off of fossil fuel reduction. Perhaps more importantly,
    institutions are not yet in place to ensure that such projects do not
    harm biodiversity and human communities.
        The attraction and rhetoric of solutions that lie outside the
    borders of the industrialized countries is misguided at this time. To
    be sure, there are important opportunities to help developing countries
    advance along a sustainable, low carbon path. But unfettered use
    overseas options, justified by lower short-term costs for the
    industrialized countries, would be a head-in-the-sand approach to the
    long-term responsibility of climate protection. The quantity of such
    offsets should be limited and their quality guaranteed. Procedures
    should be established to help ensure that the various flexibility
    mechanisms help protect the climate and advance sustainable
    development. These include consistency with local ecological, cultural,
    economic conditions and constraints, guaranteed public participation in
    project design, certification and review, strong ecological and social
    criteria, human and institutional capacity-building goals, strong and
    equitable relationships for technology cooperation, and acceptable
    procedures for monitoring, verification and accreditation of offset
    actions and transactions. Until then it is premature to rely on the CDM
    for more than a very small part of the required emissions reductions.
        If the United States relies too heavily on the flexibility
    mechanisms, it could forego opportunities to reap the co-benefits of
    decreasing carbon emissions at home. These include the reduced health
    and ecological damages resulting from decreased emissions of mercury,
    fine particulates and other pollutants, and the improvements in
    technologies, skills and productivity accompanying deployment and use
    of more advanced technologies and practices. It could also find itself
    in a poorer position to meet the stricter emissions reduction
    commitments expected for subsequent budget periods. The Nation could
    become a follower rather than a leader in advanced technologies in
    domestic and world markets. Thus, it could miss the opportunity
    provided by the Kyoto Protocol for a national technological and
    economic ``renaissance'' with cleaner energy, processes and products in
    the coming decades.
    3. Policies
        This study examines a broad set of national policies that would
    increase energy efficiency, accelerate the adoption of renewable energy
    technologies, and shift to less carbon-intensive fossil fuels. This
    policy package contrasts sharply with the Bush Administration's energy
    strategy, which heavily focuses on fossil fuels and lacks any
    significant effort to protect the climate. The policies address major
    areas of energy use in the buildings, industrial, transport, and
    electrical sectors. Analyses of the investment costs and energy savings
    of policies to promote energy efficiency and co-generation in the
    residential, commercial, and industrial sectors were taken primarily
    from the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (1999; 2001).
        Below we group these policies into the particular sector where they
    take effect, and describe the key assumptions made concerning the
    technological impacts of the individual policies. Unless otherwise
    indicated, each of the policies is assumed to start in 2003.
        As explained further in the methodology discussion in the next
    section, we adapted the Energy Information Administration's 2001
    Reference Case Forecast (EIA 2001) to create a slightly revised ``base
    case.'' Our policies and assumptions build on those included in this
    base case forecast (i.e., we avoid taking credit for emissions
    reductions, costs, or savings already included in the EIA 2001
    Reference Case). When taken together, the policies described in this
    section represent a Climate Protection Scenario that the United States
    could pursue to achieve significant carbon reductions.
    3.1. Policies in the Buildings and Industrial Sectors
        Carbon emissions from fuel combustion in the buildings (including
    both residential and commercial) sector account for about 10 percent of
    U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, while emissions from the industrial
    sector account for another 20 percent. When emissions associated with
    the electricity consumed are counted, these levels reaches over 35
    percent for buildings and 30 percent for industry. We analyzed a set of
    policies that include new building codes, new appliance standards, tax
    incentives for the purchase of high efficiency products, a national
    public benefits fund, expanded research and development, voluntary
    agreements and support for combined heat and power.
    Building codes
        Building energy codes require all new residential and commercial
    buildings to be built to a minimum level of energy efficiency that is
    cost-effective and technically feasible. ``Good practice'' residential
    energy codes, defined as the 1992 (or a more recent) version of the
    Model Energy Code (now known as the International Energy Conservation
    Code), have been adopted by 32 States (BCAP 1999). ``Good practice''
    commercial energy codes, defined as the ASHRAE 90.1 model standard,
    have been adopted by 29 States (BCAP 1999). However, the Energy Policy
    Act of 1992 (EPAct) requires all States to adopt a commercial building
    code that meets or exceeds ASHRAE 90.1, and requires all States to
    consider upgrading their residential code to meet or exceed the 1992
    Model Energy Code.
        This policy assumes that DOE enforces the commercial building code
    requirement in EPAct and that States comply. We also assume that
    relevant States upgrade their residential energy code to either the
    1995 or 1998 Model Energy Code either voluntarily or through the
    adoption of a new Federal requirement. Furthermore, we assume that the
    model energy codes are significantly improved during the next decade
    and that all States adopt mandatory codes that go beyond current ``good
    practice'' by 2010. To quantify the impact of these changes, we assume
    a 20 percent energy savings in heating and cooling in buildings in half
    of new homes and commercial buildings.
    New Appliance and Equipment Efficiency Standards
        The track record for electricity efficiency standards is
    impressive, starting with the National Appliance Energy Conservation
    Act of 1987 and continuing through the various updates that were
    enacted in early 2001 for washers, water heaters, and central air
    conditioners. These standards have removed the most inefficient models
    from the market, while still leaving consumers with a diversity of
    products. An analysis of Department of Energy figures by the American
    Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, estimates nearly 8 percent of
    annual electricity consumption will be saved in 2020 due to standards
    already enacted (Geller et al. 2001). However, many appliance
    efficiency standards haven't kept pace with either legal updating
    requirements or technological advances. The Department of Energy is
    many years behind its legal obligation to regularly upgrade standards
    for certain appliances to the ``maximum level of energy efficiency that
    is technically feasible and economically justified.''
        In this study, we assume that the government upgrades existing
    standards or introduces new standards for several key appliances and
    equipment types: distribution transformers, commercial air conditioning
    systems, residential heating systems, commercial refrigerators, exit
    signs, traffic lights, torchiere lighting fixtures, ice makers, and
    standby power consumption for consumer electronics. We also assume the
    higher energy efficiency standards for residential central air
    conditioning and heat pumps than was allowed by the Bush
    Administration. These are all measures that can be taken in the near
    term, based on technologies that are available and costeffective.
    Tax incentives
        A wide range of advanced energy-efficient products have been proven
    and commercialized, but have not yet become firmly established in the
    marketplace. A major reason for this is that conventional technologies
    get ``locked-in''; they benefit from economies of scale, consumer
    awareness and familiarity, and already existing infrastructure that
    make them more able to attract consumers, while alternatives are
    overlooked though they could be financially viable once mass-produced
    and widely demonstrated. Initial, temporary tax incentives can help
    usher advanced alternatives into the market place, which--once
    established--can proceed to gain significant market share without
    further subsidy.
        In this study, we consider initial tax incentives for a number of
    products. For consumer appliances, we considered a tax incentive of $50
    to $100 per unit. For new homes that are at least 30 percent more
    efficient that the Model Energy Code, we considered an incentive of up
    to $2,000 per home; for commercial buildings with at least 50 percent
    reduction in heating and cooling costs relative to applicable building
    codes, we applied an incentive equal to $2.25 per square foot.
    Regarding building equipment such as efficient furnaces, fuel cell
    power systems, gas-fired heat pumps, and electric heat pump water
    heaters, we considered a 20 percent investment tax credit. Each of
    these incentives would be introduced with a sunset clause, terminating
    them or phasing them out in approximately 5 years, so as to avoid their
    becoming permanent subsidies. Versions of all of the tax incentives
    considered here have already been introduced into bills before the
    Senate and/or House. \7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \7\The bills include those introduced by Senators Murkowski and
    Lott (S. 389); Bingaman and Daschle (S. 596), Smith (S. 207), Hatch (S.
    760), and Representative Nussle (H.R. 1316).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    National Public Benefits Fund
        Electric utilities have historically funded programs to encourage
    more efficient energy-using equipment, assist low-income families with
    home weatherization, commercialize renewables, and undertake research
    and development (R&D). Such programs have typically achieved
    electricity bill savings for households and businesses that are roughly
    twice the program costs (Nadel and Kushler, 2000). Despite the proven
    effectiveness of such technologies and programs, increasing price
    competition and restructuring have caused utilities to reduce these
    ``public benefit'' expenditures over the past several years. In order
    to preserve such programs, 15 States have instituted public benefits
    funds that are financed by a small surcharge on all power delivered to
    consumers.
        This study's policy package includes a national level public
    benefits fund (PBF) fashioned after the proposal introduced by Sen.
    Jeffords (S. 1369) and Rep. Pallone (H. 2569) in the the 106th
    Congress. The PBF would levy a surcharge of 0.2 cents per kilowatt-hour
    on all electricity sold, costing the typical residential consumer about
    $1 per month. This Federal fund would provide matching funds for States
    for approved public benefits expenditures. In this study, the PBF is
    allocated to several different programs directed at improvements in
    lighting, air conditioning, motors, and other cost-effective energy
    efficiency improvements in electricity-using equipment.
    Expand Federal funding for Research and Development in Energy Efficient
            Technologies
        Federal R&D funding for energy efficiency has been a spectacularly
    cost-effective investment. The DOE has estimated that the energy
    savings from 20 of its energy efficiency R&D programs has been roughly
    $30 billion so far--more than three times the Federal appropriation for
    the entire energy efficiency and renewables R&D budget throughout the
    1990's (EERE, 2000). At a time when energy issues are in the forefront
    of the national debates, such R&D efforts should be increased and
    should be thought of as a remedy for the real energy crises engendered
    by continued fossil fuel dependence--climate change, environmental
    damage, and diminishing fossil fuel supplies.
        Tremendous opportunities exist for further progress in material-
    processing technologies, manufacturing processing, electric motors,
    windows, building shells, lighting, heating/cooling systems, and super-
    insulation, for example. The EPA's Energy Star programs have also saved
    large amounts of energy, building on the achievements of R&D efforts
    and ushering efficient products into the marketplace. By certifying and
    labeling efficient lighting, office equipment, homes and offices,
    Energy Star has helped foster a market transformation toward much more
    efficient products and buildings. Currently, roughly 80 percent of
    personal computers, 95 percent of monitors, 99 percent of printers, and
    65 percent of copiers sold are Energy Star certified (EPA, 2001; Brown
    et al, 2001). In light of these successes, EPA should be allocated the
    funds to broaden the scope of its Energy Star program, expanding to
    other products (refrigerators, motors) and building sectors (hotels,
    retailers), and the vast market of existing buildings that could be
    retrofitted. In this study, we assume that increased funding to expand
    research and development efforts in industry (e.g., motors) buildings
    (e.g., advanced heating/cooling), and transport (e.g., more fuel
    efficient cars and trucks) will lead to more energy-savings products
    becoming commercially available.
    Industrial Energy Efficiency through Intensity Targets
        There is remarkable quantity of untapped, cost-effective energy
    efficiency potential in today's industrial facilities (Elliott 1994),
    and some corporate managers have shown impressive initiative in moving
    to realize that potential. In 1995, Johnson and Johnson set a goal of
    reducing its energy costs 10 percent by 2000 through adoption of ``best
    practices'' in its 96 U.S. facilities. Building on this work, in 2000
    Johnson & Johnson pledged to reduce global warming gases by 7 percent
    below 1990 levels by the year 2010, with an interim goal of 4 percent
    below 1990 levels by 2005.
        In 1998, British Petroleum announced it would voluntarily reduce
    its carbon emissions to 10 percent below 1990 levels by 2010,
    representing almost a 40 percent reduction from projected emissions
    levels in 2010 given ``business-as-usual'' emissions growth (Romm
    1999). And in September 1999, DuPont announced it would reduce its GHG
    emissions worldwide by 65 percent relative to 1990 levels, while
    holding total energy flat and increasing renewable energy resources to
    10 percent of total energy inputs, by 2010. DuPont appears to be on
    track for achieving earlier commitments to reduce energy intensity 15
    percent and total GHG emissions 50 percent, relative to 1990 levels, by
    2000 (Romm 1999). Companies as diverse as Alcoa, Kodak, Polaroid, IBM
    and Royal Dutch Shell also find it cost-effective to establish
    worldwide greenhouse gas reduction targets. The practices these
    companies are developing make them better prepared for an economy that
    places a value on carbon reductions.
        There is substantial potential for cost-effective efficiency
    improvement in both energy-intensive and non-energy intensive
    industries (Elliott 1994). For example, an in-depth analysis of 49
    specific energy efficiency technologies for the iron and steel industry
    found a total cost-effective energy savings potential of 18 percent
    (Worrell, Martin, and Price 1999).
        We consider in this study Federal initiatives to motivate and
    assist industry to identify and exploit energy efficiency
    opportunities. Government agencies can support industry by providing
    technical and financial assistance, and by expanding Federal R&D and
    demonstration programs.
        In addition to these carrots, government may need to brandish a
    stick in order to induce a large fraction of industries to make serious
    energy efficiency commitments. If industry does not respond to the
    Federal initiatives at a level sufficient to meet certain energy
    efficiency targets, a mandatory, binding energy intensity standard
    should be triggered to ensure the required targets are attained.
    Support for Cogeneration
        Cogeneration (or, combined heat and power--CHP) is a super-
    efficient means of co-producing two energy-intensive products that are
    usually produced separately--heat and power. The technical and
    economical value of CHP has been widely demonstrated, and some European
    countries rely heavily on CHP for producing power and providing heat to
    industries, businesses, and households. The thermal energy produced in
    co-generation can also be used for (building and process) cooling or to
    provide mechanical power.
        While CHP already provides about 9 percent of all electricity in
    the United States, there are considerable barriers to its wider cost-
    effective implementation (Elliott and Spurr, 1999). Environmental
    standards should be refined to recognize the greater overall efficiency
    of CHP systems, for example by assessing facility emissions on the
    basis of fuel input, rather than useful energy output. Non-uniform tax
    standards discourage CHP implementation in certain facilities.
    Moreover, utility practices are generally highly hostile to prospective
    CHP operators, through discriminatory pricing and burdensome technical
    requirements and costs for connecting to the grid.
        In this study, we consider the impact of introducing policies that
    would establish a standard permitting process, uniform tax treatment,
    accurate environmental standards, and fair access to electricity
    consumers through the grid. Such measures would help to unleash a
    significant portion of the enormous potential for CHP. In this study we
    assumed 50 GW of new CHP capacity by 2010, and an additional 95 GW
    between 2011 and 2020. With electricity demand reduced by the various
    energy efficiency policies adopted in this study, co-generated
    electricity reaches 8 percent percent of total remaining electricity
    requirements in 2010 and 36 percent percent in 2020.
    3.2. Policies in the Electric Sector
        A major goal of U.S. energy and climate policy will be to
    dramatically reduce carbon and other pollutant emissions from the
    electric sector, which is responsible for more than one-third of all
    U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. We analyzed a set of policies in the
    electric sector that include standards and mechanisms to help overcome
    existing market barriers to investments in technologies that can reduce
    emissions. Three major policies--a renewable portfolio standard, a cap
    on pollutant emissions, and a carbon cap and trade system--were
    considered as described below.
    Renewable Portfolio Standard
        A Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is a flexible, market-oriented
    policy for accelerating the introduction of renewable resources and
    technologies into the electric sector. An RPS sets a schedule for
    establishing a minimum amount of renewable electricity as a fraction of
    total generation, and requires each generator that sells electricity to
    meet the minimum either by producing that amount of renewable
    electricity in its mix or acquiring credits from generators that exceed
    the minimum. The market determines the portfolio of technologies and
    geographic distribution of facilities that meet the target at least
    cost. This is achieved by a trading system that awards credits to
    generators for producing renewable electricity and allows them to sell
    or purchase these credits. Thirteen States--Arizona, Connecticut,
    Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
    Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin--already have RPSs, and
    Senator Jeffords introduced a bill in the 106th Congress (S. 1369) to
    establish a national RPS.
        The RPS provides strong incentives for suppliers to design the
    lowest cost, most reliable renewable electricity projects, and to
    identify niche applications and consumers where the projects will have
    the greatest value. It also provides assurance and stability to
    renewable technology vendors, by guaranteeing markets for renewable
    power, allowing them to capture the financial and administrative
    advantages that come with planning in a more stable market environment.
    Yet it still maintains a competitive environment that encourages
    developers to innovate. Finally, by accelerating the deployment of
    renewable technologies and resources, the RPS also accelerates the
    learning and economies of scale that allow renewables to become
    increasingly competitive with conventional technologies. This is
    particularly important, as the demands of climate stabilization in
    coming decades will require more renewable energy than we can deploy in
    the next two decades.
        In this study, we have applied an RPS that starts at a 2 percent
    requirement in 2002, grows to 10 percent in 2010, and to 20 percent in
    2020, after all efficiency policies are included. Wind, solar,
    geothermal, biomass, and landfill gas are eligible renewable sources of
    electricity, but environmental concerns exclude municipal solid waste
    (owing to concerns about toxic emissions from waste-burning plants) and
    large-scale hydro (which also raises environmental concern and need not
    be treated as an emerging energy technology as it already supplies
    nearly 10 percent of the nation's electricity supply).
        As a modest addition to the RPS we provide a subsidy to grid-
    connected solar photovoltaic electricity generation. The purpose of
    this subsidy is to introduce a small amount of this technology so that
    it can play a role in the generation mix, seeking to induce technology
    learning, performance improvement and scale economies, and ultimately
    increased fuel diversity and another zero emissions option for the
    longer term. The level is kept small so that costs and price impacts
    are minimal.
    Tightening of SO2 and NOx Emission Regulations
        Acid rain and urban air pollution remain serious problems in the
    United States. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments attempted to address
    these problems, by introducing a cap-and-trade system to roughly halve
    the electric sector's SO2 emissions by 2000, and imposing
    technology-specific standards for NOx emissions. Compliance with the
    SO2 standard proved markedly cheaper than initially
    expected; initial estimates were mostly based on investments in
    ``scrubbers'' but the discovery of large low-sulfur coal reserves in
    the Wyoming basins and a sharp decline in the cost of rail transport
    resulted in lower costs.
        Despite the improvements brought about by the Clean Air Act and its
    Amendments, recent studies have confirmed that SO2 and NOx
    continue to harm lake and forest ecosystems, decrease agricultural
    productivity and affect public health through its damaging affects on
    urban air quality (Clean Air Task Force, 2000). The Clean Air Act only
    calls for minimal reductions in the cap by 2010 and no reductions after
    that.
        In this study, we tighten the SO2 cap so as to reduce
    sulfur emissions to roughly 40 percent of current levels by 2010 and
    one third of current levels by 2020. We also impose a cap-and-trade
    system on NOx emissions in the summertime, when NOx contributes more
    severely to photochemical smog. This system expands the current cap and
    trade program, which calls on 19 States to meet a target in 2003 that
    then remains constant, to include all States with a cap that is set
    first in 2003 but decreases in 2010, relative to 1999 levels. The cap
    results in a 25 percent reduction of annual NOx emissions by 2003, and
    a 50 percent reduction by 2010.
    Carbon Cap-And-Trade Permit System
        This study introduces a cap-and-trade system for carbon in the
    electric sector; with the cap set to achieve progressively more
    stringent targets over time, starting in 2003 at 2 percent below
    current levels, increasing to 12 percent below current by 2010 and 30
    percent below by 2020. Restricting carbon emissions from electricity
    generation has important co-benefits, including reduced emissions of
    SO2 and NOx, as discussed above, fine particulate matter,
    which is a known cause of respiratory ailments, and mercury, which is a
    powerful nervous system toxin and already contaminates over 50,000
    lakes and streams in the United States. A progressively more stringent
    target also reduces demand for coal, and hence mining-related pollution
    of streams and degradation of landscapes and terrestrial habitats.
        In the SO2, NOx, and CO2 trading systems,
    permits are distributed through an open auction, and the resulting
    revenues can be returned to households (e.g., through a tax reduction
    or as a rebate back to households). Recent analyses suggest that an
    auction is the most economically efficient way to distribute permits,
    meeting emissions caps at lower cost than allocations based on
    grandfather allowances or equal per kWh allowances (Burtraw, et al.
    2001). Implementing such auctions for the electric sector will also
    clear the way for an economy-wide approach in future years based on
    auctioning. In this study, the price of auctioned carbon permits
    reaches $100 per metric ton carbon.
        While not specifically targeted by the trading programs, the
    operators of the 850 old ``grandfathered'' coal plants built before the
    Clean Air Act of 1970, which emit 3-5 times as much pollution per unit
    of power generated than newer coal power plants, will likely retire
    these plants rather than face the cost of purchase the large amount of
    credits necessary to keep them running. When the Clean Air Act was
    adopted, it was expected that these dirty power plants would eventually
    be retired. However, utilities are continuing to operate these plants
    beyond their design life, and have in fact increased their output over
    the last decade. By subjecting these old plants to the same
    requirements as newer facilities, as has been done or is being
    considered in several States including Massachusetts and Texas,
    operators would be obliged to modernize the old plants or to retire
    them in favor of cleaner electric generation alternatives.
        With a cap and trade system in place for CO2, SOx and
    NOx, this scenario reduces multiple emissions from power plants, in a
    manner similar to that adopted in the Four Pollutant Bill currently
    before the House (H.R., 1256) and the Senate (S. 556). The reductions
    in these three pollutants are as deep as those imposed in the Four
    Pollutant bills, and are achieved within a comparable timeframe. (The
    Department of Energy's NEMS model unfortunately does not explicitly
    track mercury, making it impossible to compare the results of this
    study to the mercury requirement in the Four Pollutant Bill. \8\)
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \8\On December 15, 2000, the EPA announced that mercury emissions
    need to be reduced, and that regulations will be issued by 2004.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    3.3. Policies in the Transport Sector
        Another goal of U.S. energy and climate policy will be to reduce
    carbon emissions from the transport sector, which is responsible for
    about one-third of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. We analyzed a set
    of policies in the transportation sector that include improved
    efficiency (light duty vehicles, heavy duty trucks and aircraft), a
    full fuel-cycle GHG standard for motor fuels, measures to reduce road
    travel, and high speed rail.
    Strengthened CAFE Standards
        Today's cars are governed by fuel economy standards that were set
    in the mid-1970's. The efficiency gains made in meeting those standards
    have been entirely wiped out by increases in population and driving, as
    well as the trend toward gas-guzzling SUVs. When the fuel economy
    standards were implemented, light duty trucks only accounted for about
    20 percent of vehicle sales. Light trucks now account for nearly 50
    percent of new vehicle sales; this has brought down the overall fuel
    economy of the light duty vehicle fleet, which now stands at its lowest
    average fuel economy since 1981. If the fuel economy of new vehicles
    had held at 1981 levels rather than tipping downward, American vehicle
    owners would be importing half a million fewer barrels of oil each day.
        We introduce in this study a strengthened Corporate Average Fuel
    Economy standard for cars and light trucks, along with complementary
    market incentive programs. Specifically, fuel economy standards for new
    cars and light trucks rise from EIA's projected 25.2 mpg for 2001 to
    36.5 mpg in 2010, continuing to 50.5 mpg by 2020. This increase in
    vehicle fuel economy would save by 2020 approximately twice as much oil
    as could be pumped from Arctic National Wildlife Refuge oil field over
    its entire 50-year lifespan (USGS, 2001). \9\ Based on assessments of
    near-term technologies for conventional vehicles, and advanced vehicle
    technologies for the longer-term, we estimate that the 2010 CAFE target
    can be met with an incremental vehicle cost of approximately $855, and
    the 2020 CAFE target with an incremental cost of $1,900. To put these
    incremental costs in perspective, they are two to three times less than
    the fuel savings at the gasoline pump over the vehicle's lifetime. \10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \9\Assuming a mean value at a market price of oil of $20/barrel.
         \10\Assuming a retail price of gasoline of $1.50/gallon, a 10-year
    life of the vehicle, and 12,000 miles per year.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Improving Efficiency of Freight Transport
        We also consider policies to improve fuel economy for heavy duty
    truck freight transport, which accounts for approximately 16 percent of
    all transport energy consumption. A variety of improvements such as
    advanced diesel engines, drag reduction, rolling resistance, load
    reduction strategies, and low friction drivetrains offer opportunities
    to increase the fuel economy of freight trucks. Many of these
    technologies are available today while other technologies like advanced
    diesel and turbine engines have been technically demonstrated but are
    not yet commercially available.
        To accelerate the improvement in heavy duty truck efficiency, we
    have considered measures that expand R&D for heavy duty diesel
    technology, vehicle labeling and promotion, financial incentives to
    stimulate the introduction of new technologies, efficiency standards
    for medium- and heavy-duty trucks, and fuel taxes and user-fees
    calibrated to eliminate the existing subsidies for freight trucking.
    Together, it is estimated that these policies could bring about a fuel
    economy improvement of 6 percent by 2010, and 23 percent by 2020,
    relative to today's trucks.
    Improving Efficiency of Air Travel
        Air travel is the quickest growing mode of travel, and far more
    energy intensive than vehicle travel. One passenger mile of air travel
    today requires about 1.7 times as much fuel as vehicle travel. \11\ We
    consider here policies for improving the efficiency of air travel,
    including R&D in efficient aircraft technologies, fuel consumption
    standards, and a revamping of policies that subsidize air travel
    through public investments.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \11\Assuming typical load factors of 0.33 for autos and 0.6 for
    air.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We assume that air travel efficiency improves by 23 percent by
    2010, and 53 percent by 2020. This is in contrast to the Base Case
    where efficiency increases by 9 percent by 2010 and 15 percent by 2020,
    owing to a combination of aircraft efficiency improvements (advanced
    engine types, lightweight composite materials, and advanced
    aerodynamics), increased load factor, and acceleration of air traffic
    management improvements (Lee et el, 2001; OTA, 1994; Interlaboratory
    Working Group, 2000). While we assume that air travel can reach 82
    seat-miles per gallon by 2020 from its current 51, it is
    technologically possible that far greater efficiencies approaching 150
    seatmiles/gal could be achieved, if not in that time period then over
    the longer term. (Alliance to Save Energy et al, 1991).
    Greenhouse Gas Standards for Motor Fuels
        Transportation in the United States relies overwhelmingly on
    petroleum-based fuels, making it a major source of GHG emissions. We
    introduce here a full fuel-cycle GHG standard for motor fuels, similar
    in concept to the RPS for the electric sector. The standard is a cap on
    the average GHG emissions from gasoline, and would be made
    progressively more stringent over time. Fuel suppliers would have the
    flexibility to meet the standard on their own or by buying tradable
    credits from other producers of renewable or low-GHG fuel.
        The policy adopted in this study requires a 3 percent reduction in
    the average national GHG emission factor of fuels used in light duty
    vehicles in 2010, increasing to a 7 percent reduction by 2020. The
    policy would be complemented by expanded R&D, market creation programs,
    and financial incentives. Such a program would stimulate the production
    of low-GHG fuels such as cellulosic ethanol and biomass-or solar-based
    hydrogen.
        For this modeling study, we assume that most of the low-GHG fuel is
    provided as cellulosic ethanol, which can be produced from agricultural
    residues, forest and mill wastes, urban wood wastes, and short rotation
    woody crops (Walsh et al 1998; Walsh, 1999). As cellulosic ethanol can
    be co-produced along with electricity, in this study we assume that
    electricity output reaches 10 percent of ethanol output by 2010 and 40
    percent by 2020 (Lynd, 1997). Due to the accelerated development of the
    production technology for cellulosic ethanol, we estimate that the
    price falls to $1.4 per gallon of gasoline equivalent by 2010 and
    remains at that price thereafter (Interlaboratory Working Group, 2000).
    Improving Alternative Modes to reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled
        The amount of travel in cars and light duty trucks continues to
    grow due to increasing population and low vehicle occupancy. Between
    1999 and 2020, the rate of growth in vehicle miles traveled is
    projected to increase in the Base Case by about 2 percent per year. The
    overall efficiency of the passenger transportation system can be
    significantly improved through measures that contain the growth in
    vehicle miles traveled through land-use and infrastructure investments
    and pricing reforms to remove implicit subsidies for cars, which are
    very energy intensive.
        We assume that these measures will primarily affect urban passenger
    transportation and result in a shift to higher occupancy vehicles,
    including carpooling, vanpooling, public transportation, and
    telecommuting. We consider that the level of reductions of vehicle
    miles traveled that can be achieved by these measures relative to the
    Base Case are 8 percent by 2010 and 11 percent by 2020.
    High Speed Rail
        High speed rail offers an attractive alternative to intercity
    vehicle travel and short distance air travel. In both energy cost and
    travel time, high speed rail may be competitive with air travel for
    trips of roughly 600 miles or less, which account for about one-third
    of domestic air passenger miles traveled. Investments in rail
    facilities for key inter-city routes (such as the Northeast corridor
    between Washington and Boston, the East cost of Florida between Miami
    and Tampa, and the route linking Los Angeles and San Francisco) could
    provide an acceptable alternative and reduce air travel in some of the
    busiest flight corridors (USDOT, 1997).
        High speed rail can achieve practical operating speeds of up to 200
    mph. Prominent examples include the French TGV, the Japanese
    Shinkansen, and the German Intercity Express. An emerging advanced
    transport technology is the maglev system in which magnetic forces lift
    and guide a vehicle over a specially designed guideway. Both Germany
    and Japan are active developers of this technology.
        In this analysis we have taken the DOT's recent estimates of the
    potential high speed rail ridership which, based on projected mode
    shifts from air and automobile travel in several major corridors of the
    United States, reaches about 2 billion passenger miles by 2020 (DOT,
    1997). While this level of HRS ridership provides relatively small
    energy and carbon benefits by 2020, it can be viewed as the first phase
    of a longer-term transition to far greater ridership and more advanced,
    faster and efficient electric and MAGLEV systems in the ensuing
    decades.
    4. Methods and Assumptions
        The modeling for this study was based primarily on the National
    Energy Modeling System (NEMS) of the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy
    Information Administration (DOE/EIA) (EIA, 2001). The NEMS model
    version, data and assumptions employed in this study were those of
    EIA's Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2001), which also formed the basis for
    the Base Case. We refined the NEMS model with advice from EIA, based on
    their ongoing model improvements, and drawing on expert advice from
    colleagues at ACEEE and the Union of Concerned Scientists, the National
    Laboratories and elsewhere. \12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \12\More detailed discussions of the approach taken for sectoral
    policy analyses upon which this study was based can be found in Energy
    Innovations (EI 1997), the Energy Policy, Special Issue on Climate
    Strategy for the United States (1998), and Bernow et al. (1998 and
    1999).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The NEMS model takes account of the interactions between
    electricity supply and demand (aggregated residential, commercial and
    industrial), taking account of the mix of competitive and still
    regulated pricing in the United States. It accounts for the feedback
    effects between electricity market and power plant construction
    decisions, as well as the links between fuel demands, supplies and
    prices.
        Our use of NEMS for this project focused on the Electricity Market
    Module (EMM), complemented by the Oil and Gas Supply Module (OGSM). The
    EMM starts with the detailed fleet of existing power plants in the 13
    electric sector regions of the U.S, and also represents power imports
    from neighboring Canadian regions. It makes dispatch, construction,
    interregional purchase and retirement decisions based upon the regional
    electricity demands and the cost and performance characteristics of
    existing and new electric supply options, adhering to national
    pollutant caps and any State-level RPS requirements. It also takes
    account of cost reductions of new power plants with increased units in
    operation (learning and scale economies). The OGSM tracks changes in
    prices of natural gas and petroleum fuels based on changes in their
    demand.
        Analyses of the costs and demand impacts of policies to promote
    energy efficiency and cogeneration in the residential, commercial, and
    industrial sectors were taken primarily from American Council for an
    Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE, 1999; ACEEE, 2001). The electric
    generation, fuel, emissions and monetary savings from these policies
    were obtained using NEMS, to take account of all of the interactive and
    feedback effects described above. NEMS was used also to obtain the
    interactive effects of the policies affecting electricity demand and
    those, such as renewable, carbon and emission standards, which affect
    the electricity supply mix.
        For example, we used information from ACEEE to lower the fuel and
    electricity demand within NEMS based on policies in the demand sectors.
    We ran NEMS to determine the new mix of electricity generation (based
    on changes in both electricity demand and the electricity sector
    policies). This resulted in decreased demand for oil and gas, leading
    to lower prices. NEMS iterates internally between energy supply and
    demand to seek a consistent solution.
        Analyses of the policy impacts in the transportation sector took
    account of vehicle stock turnover, fuel-efficiencies and travel
    indices, and were benchmarked to the structure, data and baseline
    projections of the AEO2001. Following assumptions for light
    duty vehicle efficiency in ACEEE (2001) and other sources (DeCicco,
    Ross and An, 2001), we accounted for both autonomous and policy-induced
    vehicle efficiency improvement, shifts between transport modes, and
    changes in demand for transport services.
    5. Results
        Carbon dioxide emissions in the United States have been rising over
    the past decade, and now exceed by more than 15 percent the 1990
    emission rate of 1338 MtC/yr (EIA, 2001b). The U.S. Department of
    Energy (EIA, 2001a) business-as-usual scenario projects that these
    emissions will to continue to rise to 1808 MtC/yr in 2010--a 35 percent
    increase above 1990 levels. This is in stark contrast to the emissions
    limit that the United States negotiated at Kyoto--a 7 percent decrease
    below 1990 levels.
    5.1. Overview of Results
        Table 5.1 provides summary results on overall energy and carbon
    impacts, pollutant emissions impacts, and economic impacts for the Base
    and Climate Protection cases for 2010 and 2020. The portfolio of
    carbon-reducing policies and measures composed for this Climate
    Protection scenario brings the United States a long way toward meeting
    its Kyoto target, reducing carbon emissions from today's level to 1372
    MtC/yr by 2010--but still 2.5 percent above 1990 levels. Reductions
    continue beyond 2010, and national emissions are reduced to 1087 MtC/yr
    in 2020, well below 1990 levels.

                                              Table 5.1 Summary of results.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                   2010                      2020
                                                       1990\13\    2010 Base     Climate     2020 Base     Climate
                                                                      Case      Protection      Case      Protection
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    End-use Energy (Quads).........................         63.9         86.0         76.4         97.2         72.6

    Primary Energy (Quads).........................         84.6        114.1        101.2        127.0         89.4

    Renewable Energy (Quads)
        Non-Hydro..................................          3.5          5.0         10.4          5.5         11.0
        Hydro......................................          3.0          3.1          3.1          3.1          3.1

    Net GHG Emissions (MtCe/yr)....................        1,648        2,204        1,533           --         ----
        Energy Carbon..............................        1,338        1,808        1,372        2,042        1,087
        Land-based Carbon..........................           --           --          -58           --         ----
        Non-CO2 Gases..............................          310          397          279           --         ----
        International Trade........................           --           --          -60           --         ----

    Net Savings\14\................................
        Cumulative present value (billion $)                  --           --         $105           --         $576
        Levelized annual (billion $/year)..........           --           --          $13           --          $49
        Levelized annual per household ($/year)....           --           --         $113           --         $375
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Under Kyoto, the base year for three of the non-CO2 GHGs (HFCs, PFCs, SF6) is 1995, not 1990, and the 1995
      levels for these emissions are reported here.
    \14\ Savings are in 1999 $. The 2010 savings include $2.3 billion costs per year ($9 billion cumulative through
      2010) of non-energy related measures needed to meet the Kyoto target. Costs are not included in 2020 since
      these measures policies do not extend past 2010.

        Overall, the national policies and measures were estimated to
    achieve an 11 percent reduction in primary energy use by 2010, and a
    nearly 30 percent reduction by 2020, while maintaining the same level
    of energy services to consumers. The use of renewable energy is doubled
    in 2010 relative to the Base case and remains roughly at that level
    through 2020.\15\ The policies would also produce reductions in air
    pollutant emissions owing to reduced fossil fuel consumption and
    greater use of renewable energy. This is most evident for
    SO2 for which 2010 levels in the Climate Protection case are
    almost half of Base case levels, due in great part to the effect of the
    more stringent cap in the electric sector.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \15\This takes account of the percentage levels required by the
    Jeffords Bill for the electric sector (10 percent renewables by 2010,
    and 20 percent by 2020). However, when this RPS is combined with the
    strong energy efficiency policies of this study, the absolute amount of
    renewables in the electric sector does not increase substantially
    between 2010 and 2020 because the percentage targets have already been
    met. A more aggressive renewables policy for the 2010-2020 period could
    be considered (ACEEE, 1999).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The analysis showed that national savings in energy bills would
    exceed the net incremental investments in more efficient technologies
    and expenditures for low carbon fuels. By 2010, the average savings
    exceed the additional costs of new equipment by $13 billion per year,
    or nearly $113 per household.
    5.2. Sectoral Impacts
        Figures 5.1a and 5.1b compare the carbon trajectories for the Base
    and Climate Protection scenarios, and shows the carbon reductions
    obtained by the policies to reduce energy-related carbon emissions.
    Carbon emissions reductions can be reported by where they are emitted
    (i.e., by source, 5.1a) or by the sectors to which the policies are
    directed (i.e., by policy, 5.1b).
        Thus, for example: the refinery emissions reductions owing to
    decreased transportation oil use are attributed to the transport
    policies, while the refinery emissions reductions owing to decreased
    industrial oil use are attributed to the industrial policies; the
    electric generation emissions reductions and emissions increased onsite
    fuel use, owing to increased CHP are attributed to the industrial
    policies.
        The first graph, Figure 5.1a, shows the emissions reductions in the
    sectors of their origin, that is, in which the combustion of fossil
    fuels occurs. Thus, it shows emissions from onsite fossil fuel
    combustion in buildings, industry, transportation and electricity
    production. The largest reductions arise in the electric sector, owing
    to the enduse energy efficiency policies that reduce demand, plus the
    emissions and renewables policies for power supply that change the
    generation mix for electricity generation. Figure 5.1b shows the
    reductions from the various sectoral policies.

        Table 5.2 summarizes the cost of saved carbon for each policy for
    2010 and 2020. These costs were computed by summing the incremental
    annualized capital costs, administrative costs, incremental O&M and
    fuel costs, and subtracting O&M and fuel cost savings. A 5-percent
    discount rate was used for both costs and carbon emissions. \16\
    Overall, the cost of saved carbon for the Climate Protection policy
    package results in net savings of $115/tC in 2010, and $576/tC in 2010.
    The net savings for the demand policies more than offset the
    incremental costs of saved carbon for the electric supply policies.
    Details regarding the impact of the policies within the sectors are
    summarized in the following sections.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \16\Carbon emissions are discounted based on the presumption that
    they will have a commodity value within some form of tradable permits
    regime.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Building and Industrial Sectors
        The efficiency improvements in residential and commercial
    buildings, induced through enhanced building codes, strengthened
    standards for appliances and equipment, tax incentives, as well as
    policies to encourage CHP, leads to a decrease in net electricity usage
    of 19 percent by 2010 and nearly 50 percent by 2020. Despite the
    additional natural gas required to fuel CHP in buildings, onsite fuel
    use declines by 3 percent in 2010 and 10 percent in 2020, relative to
    the Base case. The net impact is a decline in carbon emissions by
    nearly one-third in 2010, and two-thirds by 2020, relative to the Base
    case.
        Industrial energy efficiency measures undertaken largely through
    voluntary measures and tax incentives, cause the industrial sector to
    reduce it's direct energy consumption by 9 percent in 2010 and 14
    percent in 2020 in the Climate Protection case relative to the Base
    case. In addition, largely because of the aggressive introduction of
    cogeneration, net electricity consumption is lower dramatically, by 30
    percent in 2010 and 70 percent in 2020. The combined impact of these is
    that carbon emissions due to the industrial sector are lower by 26
    percent in 2010 and 46 percent in 2020, relative to the Base case.

                   Table 5.2. Carbon reductions, net costs, and cost per saved carbon in 2010 and 2020
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2010                               2020
                                               ---------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Cumulative                         Cumulative
                                                              Net Cost    Cost of                Net Cost    Cost of
                                                   Carbon     (present     saved      Carbon     (present     saved
                                                Savings MtC/   value)     carbon   Savings MtC/   value)     carbon
                                                     yr        billion    (1999)$       yr        billion    (1999)$
                                                               (1999)$    per tC                  (1999)$    per tC
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Buildings & Industry Sectors
        Appliance standards...................           29       -$24      -$315           45       -$84      -$256
        Building Codes........................            7        -$5      -$353           13       -$23      -$244
        Voluntary measures....................           61       -$50      -$229           78      -$112      -$179
        Research and design...................           21       -$18      -$257           37       -$53      -$186
        Public Benefits Fund..................           50       -$29      -$224           73      -$101      -$187
        Tax Credits...........................            4        -$4      -$292            7        -$8      -$152
        CHP and DES...........................           21       -$53      -$611           33      -$151     -$554,
            Subtotal..........................          193      -$183      -$301          285      -$533      -$121

    Electric Sector
        RPS
        NOx/SO2 Cap and Trade
        Carbon trading                            see below  ..........  ........    see below
            Subtotal..........................          147       $140       $258          180       $258       $188

    Transport Sector
        Travel Reductions.....................           29       -$50      -$496           37      -$126      -$495
        LDV efficiency improvements...........           38       -$19      -$270          136      -$149      -$296
        HDV efficiency improvements...........            8        -$3      -$179           33       -$22      -$214
        Aircraft efficiency improvements......           10        -$3      -$106           28       -$14      -$129
        Greenhouse Gas Standards..............           11         $4       $136           22        $11       $99,
            Subtotal..........................           95       -$71      -$283          255      -$301     -$279,
            TOTAL.............................          436      -$114       -$82          721      -$576      -$124
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Across both sectors, the policies result in combined fuel and
    electricity savings of 9.6 quads in 2010 and 24.6 quads by 2020. The
    cumulative investment in efficiency measures to achieve these savings
    is $80 billion by 2010 and $365 billion by 2020 (discounted 1999$).
    Electric Sector
        The policies in the buildings and industrial sectors lead to major
    reductions in the total amount of electricity required from the
    nation's power stations. This impact is illustrated in Figure 5.2a and
    shows that energy efficiency measures entirely displace growth in
    electricity demand after 2005. Relative to today's level, electricity
    demand declines 15 percent by 2010 and 35 percent by 2020.
        In addition to this reduced demand for electricity, the mix of
    fuels used to generate electricity changes dramatically, as shown in
    Figure 5.2b. The electric sector policies shift the generation mix away
    from a heavy reliance on coal, and avoid the rapid buildup of natural
    gas generation, by relying much more on renewable energy and,
    especially, cogeneration. Cogeneration grows from roughly 300 TWh today
    to 660 TWh in 2010, and 1260 in 2020, whereas in the Base case
    cogeneration increases modestly to 380 TWh in 2010 and 440 TWh in 2020.
    Non-hydro renewable energy consumption increases almost five times by
    2010 over the Base case, and remains roughly at this level through
    2020.
        While effective at reducing carbon emissions, the electric sector
    policies do so at a net economic cost, increasing the average unit cost
    of electricity by about 2 cents / kWh in 2010. This effect diminishes
    over time as the electric sector is able to respond to the new policies
    and electricity demand reductions lead to fewer new power plants; by
    2020, the electricity price is only about 1 cent / kWh higher than the
    base case. This price increase primarily reflects the fact that
    continued operation of existing coal plants, and construction and
    operation of new ones, remain economically attractive in the emerging
    price competitive restructured industry. In part, this is because the
    use of coal for electricity generation doesn't include environmental
    externalities.

        By 2010, a total of 4.3 quads of fossil fuel reductions are
    achieved at power stations, and 6.5 quads by 2020. The cumulative
    investment to achieve these savings and greater utilization of
    renewable energy is $166 billion by 2010 and $333 billion by 2020
    (discounted 1999$). Although the costs per unit of electricity
    increase, measures for demand-side efficiency lead to an overall
    decrease in endusers' electricity bills, and in the overall costs of
    electricity services.
    Transportation
        The vehicle efficiency and transportation demand management
    initiatives in the Climate Protection case result in energy savings of
    4.6 quads in 2010, and 12.6 quads by 2020 (12 percent in 2010 and 28
    percent in 2020, respectively, relative to the Base case). Carbon
    emissions fall slightly more relative to the base case (13 percent in
    2010 and 31 percent in 2020) due to the small shift to less carbon-
    intensive fuels (specifically, cellulosic ethanol). By 2010, ethanol is
    contributing about 2 percent of transport fuel demand, and 4 percent in
    2020. As in other biomass-intensive industries, this enables the co-
    production of electricity, thereby increasing the carbon benefits of
    this measure to the extent that it displaces fossil-fuel derived
    electricity. Reduced fuel production also adds to the carbon benefits,
    because it reduces emissions from refineries.
        The cumulative investment to achieve these savings and greater
    utilization of renewable energy is $52 billion by 2010 and $213 billion
    by 2020 (discounted 1999$). The transport efficiency measures result in
    net savings, because fuel cost savings offset the slight increase in
    investment costs. These net savings more than offset the cost of the
    transportation fuel carbon content standard--which is the only net-cost
    transportation policy considered here. The overall net economic benefit
    achieved by the entire set of transportation policies provides an
    opportunity to pursue the carbon content standard, which begins a
    process of progressive technological improvement that is a critical
    element of obtaining the much deeper carbon emissions reductions in the
    transport sector needed later.
    5.3. Air Pollution Reductions
        A variety of air pollutants, associated with the use of fossil
    fuels, can cause or exacerbate health problems and damage the
    environment. Reducing use of fossil fuels would reap important local
    health benefits by lowering the amount of air pollutants inhaled.
    Recent scientific findings confirm that pollutants such as fine
    particulates, carbon monoxide, ozone (formed by a mix of volatile
    organic compounds and nitrogen oxides in presence of sunlight) can lead
    to health damages, including premature death. Research shows that small
    children and the elderly are particularly at risk from these emissions
    (Dockery et al., 1993; Schwartz and Dockery, 1992).
        The policies would reduce national, regional and local pollution,
    owing to reduced fossil fuel use, providing important environmental
    benefits and health benefits, especially for small children and the
    elderly. Table 5.3 summarizes the impacts of the policies on criteria
    air pollutant emissions. Sulfur-dioxide emissions are about 52 percent
    lower in 2010 than the Base case, and about 68 percent below 1990
    levels. Nitrogen oxides are 16 percent lower in 2010, and about 37
    percent below 1990 levels. Particulates are about 13 percent lower in
    2010, and about 24 percent below 1990 levels. Carbon monoxide emissions
    are about 9 percent lower in 2010, and about 2 percent below 1990
    levels. Finally, volatile organic compounds are about 7 percent lower
    in 2010, and about 33 percent below 1990 levels.

                                Table 5.3: Impact of policies on air pollutant emissions
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                   2010                      2020
                                                                   2010 Base     Climate     2020 Base     Climate
                                                                      Case      Protection      Case      Protection
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CO.............................................         65.1         69.8         63.8         71.8         59.8
    NOx............................................         21.9         16.5         13.9         16.9         12.0
    SO2............................................         19.3         12.8          6.2         12.7          3.3
    VOC............................................          7.7          5.5          5.1          5.9          4.9
    PM10...........................................          1.7          1.5          1.3          1.6          1.3
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Figure 5.3 shows the impacts of the Climate Protection policies
    over time. The large reductions in particulates emissions arise from
    the substantial decrease in coal generation in the policy cases.
    Sulfur-dioxide decreases in the baseline projections arising from the
    cap/trade provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, are
    augmented by the policies. Similarly, baseline declines in nitrogen
    oxides, volatile organic compounds and carbon monoxide, which arise
    from tailpipe emissions standards as new cars enter the fleet, are
    augmented by the policies that affect vehicle travel patterns.
        The reductions in nitrogen, sulfur, and carbon are similar to those
    introduced in the Four Pollutant Bill currently before the House and
    the Senate. The Climate Protection scenario achieves the required
    levels of reduction a few years earlier (for carbon) or later (for
    nitrogen and sulfur) than the Four Pollutant Bill's 2007 target date,
    with substantially deeper reductions continuing thereafter.
    5.4. Economic Impacts
        The portfolio of policies and measures considered here is a very
    aggressive package that goes a long way toward meeting the U.S. Kyoto
    Protocol obligation and continues to reduce emissions beyond the
    initial target period. Despite the ambitiousness of this package and
    the impressive carbon impacts, it would bring net economic benefits to
    the United States.
        Figure 5.4 shows the benefits and costs at similar levels up to
    2010 but benefits significantly outpacing costs in later years,
    reflecting in part the longer term benefits of reduced costs as new
    technologies are commercialized and as the system adjusts to the new
    policies. The costs derive from additional investments in more
    efficient lighting, high efficiency motors, more efficient automobiles,
    and other technologies that reduce the reliance on high carbon fuels.
    The savings derive from the avoided fuel costs. Both the additional
    investment and the net savings create additional income and jobs in the
    industries and services (and their suppliers) in which these funds are
    spent.
        Figures 5.5 (demand side policies) and 5.6 (supply side policies)
    provide additional details regarding the costs effectiveness of the
    policies in 2010 and 2020. These figure indicate the allocation of
    costs and benefits between equipment investments and fuel savings and
    between demand and supply sectors. The policies in the demand sector,
    where large savings exist for energy efficiency measures, are very
    cost-effective, and yield substantial net benefits. Fuel and O&M
    savings are over 3 times the investment costs the in 2010 and about two
    and half times in 2020, yielding cumulative discounted net benefits of
    $259 billion and $844 billion, respectively, in those years.

        On the other hand, the supply sector policies are not cost-
    effective on their own and result in net costs. These costs, in
    capital, fuel, and O&M, are due to moving from coal generation to
    cleaner fuels like renewables and natural gas. The result is that
    cumulative discounted net costs for electric sector policies reach of
    $144 billion in 2010 and $268 billion in 2020.

        When all policies are combined, the cumulative savings exceed the
    costs by $114 billion in 2010, and by 2020 the net benefits amount to
    approximately $576 billion. While the savings estimated here are
    significant, they are relatively small in comparison to overall
    economic activity. For instance, the annual net savings in 2010 of $48
    billion is a small fraction of the $13.2 trillion projected GDP in that
    year.

    6. Achieving Kyoto
        The foregoing analysis addressed policies to curb emissions of
    carbon dioxide from energy use in the U.S. Energy-related
    CO2 emissions are the predominant source of U.S. greenhouse
    gas emissions for the foreseeable future, and their reduction is the
    central and ultimate challenge for protecting the climate. However,
    because of its delayed and weak emissions mitigation policies
    heretofore, and delayed ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the United
    States may not be able to rely solely on energy sector policies and
    technologies to meet its Kyoto obligation of emissions 7 percent
    reduction below 1990 levels with no net economic cost. As our analysis
    has shown, such efforts, if aggressively pursued, would slow our growth
    in energy sector CO2 emissions from a projected 35 percent
    to 2.5 percent above 1990 levels by 2010 and still achieve a small net
    economic benefit. This would be a major accomplishment, but would still
    leave us 128 MtC/yr short of achieving a target of 1244 MtC/yr by 2010,
    if the Kyoto target were confined only to the domestic energy sector. A
    tighter carbon cap for the electric sector could increase domestic
    energy-related emission reductions to meet the Kyoto requirement, but
    this would incur incremental costs that could eliminate the net benefit
    and lead to a modest overall net cost.
        Of course, there is more to the Kyoto agreement. The Kyoto targets
    cover six gases--methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons
    (PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) and carbon
    dioxide (CO2) . The use of these gases is currently growing,
    due to the ongoing substitution of ozone depleting substances (ODS)
    with HFCs, and to a lesser extent, to growth in CH4 emissions from
    livestock and coal and natural gas systems, in N20 from fertilizer use,
    and in PFC emissions from semiconductor manufacture (EPA, 2000).
        The U.S. commitment requires emissions of all six gases, in
    aggregate, to be reduced to 7 percent below their baseline levels. \17\
    When all of the six ``Kyoto gases'' are considered, baseyear emissions
    amount to 1680 MtCe/yr, making the--7 percent Kyoto reduction target
    equal to 1533 MtCe/yr, as shown in the third column of Figure 6.1. The
    projected 2010 emissions for all six gases is 2204 MtCe/yr (first
    column), thus the total required reduction is expected to be 672 MtCe/
    yr. The energy-CO2 policies described in the previous
    sections yield 436 MtCe/yr in reductions by 2010 (second column),
    leaving the United States with 236 MtCe/yr additional reductions to
    achieve from other policies and measures.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \17\These gases can be controlled interchangeably, using 100 year
    Global Warming Potentials (GWP), so long as the total carbon-
    equivalents (Ce) are reduced to 93 percent of their baseline levels. In
    contrast to the main three gases (CO2, CH4, and N2O), which
    have a 1990 base year, the high GWP gases have a base year of 1995.

        The Kyoto agreement provides us with several options for obtaining
    the additional 236 MtCe/yr of reductions. Two of these options involve
    domestic reductions: the control of non-CO2 gases (``multi-
    gas control'') and the use of ``sinks'' or biotic sequestration,
    through the land use, land use change and forestry options allowed
    under the Protocol. The other options involve obtaining credits and
    allowances from international sources. Under the Kyoto Protocol,
    countries can purchase credits and allowances through the Clean
    Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation, or Emissions Trading
    (ET) to offset domestic emissions exceeding our 7 percent reduction
    target. This section examines how we might meet the Kyoto target
    through the use of these options, and what the costs and other
    implications might be.
    6.1. Domestic options Article 3.3/3.4 and Sinks
        GHG emissions and removals from land use and land use change and
    forestry (LULUCF) are a subject of great controversy and scientific
    uncertainty. The Kyoto Protocol treats LULUCF activities in two
    principal categories: afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation
    under Article 3.3, and ``additional human-induced activities'' such as
    forest and cropland management under Article 3.4. Different
    interpretations of these two articles can have widely varying impacts
    on the U.S. reduction commitment. \18\ For instance, the U.S. estimate
    of business-as-usual forest uptake during the first commitment period
    is 288 MtCe/yr. If fully credited as an Article 3.4 activity, this
    uptake could provide credit equal to more than 40 percent of the U.S.
    reduction requirement, with no actual mitigation effort. However, the
    vast majority of countries do not interpret the Protocol as allowing
    credit for business-as-usual offsets, and therefore believe they should
    be excluded.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \18\For instance, different accounting methods and rules have been
    considered regarding: a) what constitutes a forest; b) which biotic
    pools and lands are counted; c) which activities are considered
    eligible for crediting under Article 3.4; and d) uncertainties in
    measuring above and below ground carbon stocks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The starting point of our LULUCF analysis is the assumed adoption
    of the ``consolidated negotiating text'' of Jan Pronk, President [of
    COP6], as issued on June 18, 2001. \19\ The so-called ``Pronk text''
    reflects an attempted compromise among various parties on a number of
    contentious issues. The most relevant here is the proposal for Articles
    3.3 and 3.4. \20\ In short, the Pronk text would cap total U.S.
    crediting from Article 3.4 activities and afforestation and
    reforestation projects in the CDM and JI at roughly 58 MtCe/yr. \21\
    Domestic forest management activities would be subject to an 85 percent
    discount. Thus, if one assumes the U.S. estimate above, the Pronk rules
    would result in 42 MtCe/yr of essentially zero-cost credit for forest
    management activities that are expected to occur anyway. \22\ In
    addition, agricultural management (e.g. no-till agriculture, grazing
    land management, revegetation) would be allowed under a net-net
    accounting approach that would allow the United States to count another
    expected 10 MtCe/yr of business-as-usual, i.e. zero-cost, credit toward
    the cap. In sum, the Pronk proposal translates to 52 MtCe/yr of
    ``free'' carbon removals, and another 6 MtCe/yr that could be accrued
    through new domestic forest or agricultural management activities. \23\
    Based on a recent summary of LULUCF cost estimates, we assume that this
    relatively small amount of offsets could be purchased for $10/tCe. \24\
    A total of 58 MtCe/yr of LULUCF credit would therefore be available to
    help meet the reduction requirement of 236 MtCe/yr remaining after
    having adopted the energy-related CO2 policies described
    above.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \19\See ``Consolidated negotiating text proposed by the
    President'', as revised June 18, 2001, FCCC/CP/2001/2/Rev.1, http://
    www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6secpart/02r01.pdf
         \20\Our assumption of Pronk conditions is a matter of ``what if''
    analysis, rather than a tacit approval. The Pronk text may be
    insufficient in a number of ways, but the analysis and critique of the
    Pronk text is not the focus of this report.
         \21\The Pronk text would prohibit first commitment period
    crediting of CDM projects that avoid deforestation.
         \22\This figure is drawn from the Annex Table 1 of the April 9
    draft of the Pronk text, which adopts Pronk adopts the accounting
    approach for Article 3.3. activities suggested by the IPCC Special
    Report of LULUCF. This approach yields an Article 3.3 debit of 7 MtCe/
    yr from net afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation activity,
    which under the Pronk approach could be offset fully by undiscounted
    forest management activities. Thus the 42 MtCe/yr estimate is based on
    85 percent x (288--7) MtCe/yr.
         \23\The Pronk proposal also allows this cap to be filled through
    afforestation and deforestation activities in the CDM.
         \24\Missfeldt and Haites (2001) use a central estimate of 50 MtCe/
    year at $7.50/tCe for CDM afforestation and reforestation projects.
    They also assume the availability of 150 MtCe/year at $15/tCe for
    Article 3.4 sinks in Annex B countries. Note however that the Pronk 85
    percent discount on forest management projects would, in principle,
    increase their cost accordingly (by 1/.15 or 6.7 times). However, given
    the relatively small quantity (6 MtCe) that could be purchased, lower
    cost opportunities in cropland management or the CDM should more than
    suffice.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Multi-gas control
        Multi-gas control is a fundamental aspect of the Protocol, and its
    potential for lowering the overall cost of achieving Kyoto targets has
    been the subject of several prominent studies (Reilly et al, 1999 and
    2000). Table 6.1 shows baseline and projected emission levels for the
    non-CO2 gases. \25\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \25\USEPA (1999, 2000) expects voluntary Climate Change Action
    Plan (CCAP) activities to reduce 2010 methane and high GWP gas
    emissions by about 10 percent and 15 percent, respectively, reductions
    that are not included in their 2010 projections shown in Table 1.
    Instead these reductions are embodied in both their and our cost
    curves.

                      Table 6.1. Baseline and Projected Emissions for non-CO2 Kyoto Gases (MtCe/yr)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          7
                                                Base   percent
                       Gas                      Year    Below   Projected   Reductions             Sources
                                               (1990/    Base      2010    Required \1\
                                                 95)     Year
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Methane..................................     170      158       186          28     (EPA 1999)
    Nitrous Oxide............................     111      103       121          18     (Reilly et al 1999b; EPA
                                                                                          2001a)
    High GWP Gases (HFC, PFC, SF6)...........      29       27        90          63     (EPA 2000)
        Total................................     310      288       397         109
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ These are the reductions that would be needed if each gas were independently required to be 7 percent below
      its base year level.

        Methane emissions are expected to grow by only 10 percent from 1990
    to 2010, largely because of increased natural gas leakage and venting
    (due to increased consumption), enteric fermentation and anaerobic
    decomposition of manure (due to increased livestock and dairy
    production). Methane from landfills, which accounted for 37 percent of
    total methane emissions in 1990, are expected to decline slightly as a
    consequence of the Landfill Rule of the Clean Air Act (EPA, 1999),
    which requires all large landfills to collect and burn landfill gases.
        Several measures could reduce methane emissions well below
    projected levels. USEPA estimates that capturing the methane from
    landfills not covered by the Landfill Rule, and using it to generate
    electricity, is economically attractive at enough sites to reduce
    projected landfill emissions by 21 percent (USEPA, 1999). At a cost of
    $30/tCe, the number of economically attractive sites increases
    sufficiently that 41 percent of landfill emissions can be reduced.
    Similarly, USEPA has constructed methane reduction cost curves for
    reducing leaks and venting in natural gas systems, recovering methane
    from underground mines, using anaerobic digesters to capture methane
    from manure. and reducing enteric fermentation by changing how
    livestock are fed and managed.
        We have used a similar USEPA study to estimate the emissions
    reductions available for the high GWP gases (USEPA, 2000). Table 1
    shows that the high-GWP gases, while only a small fraction of baseline
    emissions (first column), are expected to rise so rapidly that they
    will account for majority of net growth in non-CO2 emissions
    relative to the 7 percent reduction target (last column). In many
    applications, other gases can be substituted for HFCs and PFCs, new
    industrial process can implemented, leaks can be reduced, and more
    efficient gas-using equipment can be installed. For instance, minor
    repairs of air conditioning and refrigeration equipment could save an
    estimated 6.5 MtCe/yr in HFC emissions by 2010 at cost of about $2/tCe.
    New cleaning processes for semiconductor manufacture could reduce PFC
    emissions by 8.6 MtCe/yr by 2010 at an estimated cost of about $17/tCe.
    In all, USEPA identified 37 measures for reducing high GWP gases, a
    list which is likely to be far from exhaustive given the limited
    experience with and data on abatement methods for these gases.
        The major source of nitrous oxide in the United States is the
    application of nitrogen fertilizers, which results in about 70 percent
    of current emissions. Given the tendency of farmers to apply excess
    fertilizer to ensure good yields, effective strategies for N2O
    abatement from cropping practices has thus far been elusive. Thus,
    aside from measures to reduce N2O from adipic and nitric acid
    production (amounting to less than one MtCe/yr), and from mobile
    sources as a result of transportation policies (see below), we have not
    included a full analysis of N2O reduction opportunities (USEPA, 2001).
        Relying largely on recent USEPA abatement studies (1999, 2000,
    2001b), we developed the cost curve for reducing non-CO2
    gases depicted in Figure 2 below. \26\ In addition to what is covered
    in the USEPA studies, we assumed that:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \26\The result is a cost curve that is similar and more up-to-date
    than that used in widely cited multiple gas studies (Reilly et al,
    1999a; Reilly et al, 1999b; EERE, 2000).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Only 75 percent of the 2010 technical potential found in
    the USEPA studies would actually be achieved, and that policies and
    programs needed to promote these measures would add a transaction cost
    of $5/tCe.
          The savings in 2010 fossil fuel use resulting from the
    policies and measures implemented in the energy sector will yield
    corresponding benefits for several categories of non-CO2
    emissions. In particular, we assumed that a) reduced oil use in the
    transport sector (down 14 percent) will lead to a proportional decrease
    in N2O emissions from mobile sources \27\; b) reduced natural gas
    demand (down 13 percent) will result in proportionately fewer methane
    emissions from leaks and venting; and c) reduced coal production (down
    49 percent) will lead to decreased underground mining and its
    associated emissions. \28\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \27\A similar assumption is used by European Commission (1998).
    Approximately 15 percent of N2O emissions are a byproduct of fuel
    combustion, largely by vehicles equipped with catalytic converters
    (USEPA, 2001a).
         \28\We assume that coal production is a proportional to coal use
    (i.e. we ignore net imports/exports). USEPA expects that the marginal
    methane emissions rate will increase with production as an increasing
    fraction is expected to come from deeper underground mines (USEPA,
    1999).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Figure 6.2 shows that domestic options, taken together, are
    insufficient to reaching the Kyoto target. The line on the left is the
    ``supply curve'' of non-CO2 abatement options, and the line
    on the right is the reduction requirement after both energy-related and
    Article 3.3/3.4 sinks are accounted for. Under current conditions (only
    9 years left until 2010), the supply of remaining domestic options
    appears insufficient to satisfy demand. This gap ranges from 107 MtCe/
    yr at $10/tCe to 60 MtCe/yr at $100/tCe as shown. Therefore, to meet
    our Kyoto obligations, we are now in a situation of looking to the
    international market to fill this gap.
    6.2 International options
        The Kyoto Protocol creates are two principal types of greenhouse
    gas offsets in the international market: the purchase of surplus
    allowances from countries that are below their Kyoto targets and the
    creation of carbon credits through project-based mechanisms, CDM and
    JI.

    Emissions allowance trading/hot air
        The combination of emission targets based on circa 1990 emissions
    and the subsequent restructuring and decline of many economies in
    transition (EITs) means that these countries could have a large pool of
    excess emissions allowances, typically referred to as ``hot air''.
    Estimates of available hot air during the first commitment period range
    from under 100 MtCe/yr to nearly 500 MtCe/yr, largely from Russia and
    Ukraine. \29\ This source of offsets could fulfill a significant
    fraction of the U.S. demand for additional reductions at very low cost
    (depending upon the level of competing demands of other Annex 1 parties
    for these allowances). \30\ We assume however, that relevant actors in
    government and/or private sector charged with meeting emissions
    obligations will effectively limit the use of hot air. Relying heavily
    or entirely on hot air would be poor climate policy; as hot air
    supplants legitimate mitigation activity. It is also bad public
    relations; hot air has a stigma arising from years of negotiations
    controversy. Therefore, we assume that hot air will constitute no more
    than 50 percent of all international trading, and we assume a maximum
    availability of 200 MtCe/yr, based on a recent analysis (Victor et al,
    2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \29\A range of 100-350 MtCe/yr is cited in Vrolijk and Grubb,
    2000. Missfeldt and Haites, 2001 use a base estimate of approximately
    240 MtCe/yr, with high estimate of 480 MtCe/yr. For this analysis, we
    assume the availability of 200 MtCe/yr, based on a recent analysis by
    Victor et al (2001).
         \30\Since these credits are a form of windfall credits, it has
    been suggested that these economies could help protect the
    environmental integrity of the agreement by dedicating the income from
    ``hot air'' sales to energy projects that will bring about additional
    emissions reductions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CDM and JI
        CDM and JI projects, can be an important part of a comprehensive
    climate policy, providing they truly contribute to sustainable
    development in the host countries and create genuine, additional GHG
    benefits. It is reasonable to expect that the U.S. Government and other
    stakeholders will want to develop the CDM and JI market in order to
    involve developing countries, engage in technology transfer, develop
    competitive advantages, and prepare for future commitment periods.
        With the rules yet to be established on critical issues like
    additionality and baselines for CDM \31\,and with a limited
    understanding of CDM/JI markets and transaction costs at high volumes
    of activity, cost and volume estimates for CDM and JI remain highly
    speculative. As with all GHG mitigation analysis exercises, both
    bottom-up and top-down methods can be used to develop such estimates.
    We have examined the data and literature for both approaches in coming
    up with a rough, aggregate cost curve for CDM and JI.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \31\CDM projects are required to be ``additional'' emissions
    reductions but rules have not been agreed to which would determine what
    is additional. In addition, credits will be given based on reductions
    in comparison to a baseline. A methodology for establishing baselines
    is also the subject of ongoing negotiations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A bottom-up CDM/JI cost assessments can examine emerging project-
    based GHG trading markets--private broker transactions, the Prototype
    Carbon Fund (PCF), the Dutch ERUPT program, GEF activity, and so on--to
    get a sense of current ``real-world'' prices and transaction costs.
    However, the size of this market remains very small in comparison with
    the total flows that are likely once CDM and JI are underway. \32\ The
    type of activities being undertaken today, such as the first PCF
    project, a landfill gas capture effort in Latvia, could well represent
    ``lowhanging fruit'' that would be unable to supply the several
    hundreds MtCe/yr of CDM and JI activity that are expected under some
    Kyoto compliance scenarios (Missfeldt and Haites, 2001; Grubb and
    Vrolijk, 2000).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \32\For instance, anecdotal evidence suggests that the current
    international GHG emission credit market is at about $25 million in
    transactions per year. In addition the PCF and ERUPT have committed
    another $225 million over the next few years. This figure compares with
    the $10-20 billion/year market (about 400-500 MtCe/year at $20-40/tCe)
    that some analysts project under CDM alone (Missfeldt and Haites,
    2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To get a better sense of the costs of projects available at higher
    volumes, these ``early project'' estimates can be combined with non-
    Annex B ``country studies''--the many national GHG abatement studies
    performed with support from UNEP, UNDP, U.S. Country Studies, and other
    bilateral and national programs. A study by the Dutch Energy Foundation
    (ECN, et al., 1999) provides a good example of such an analysis.
    Extrapolating from GEF projects along with 25 country studies, this
    study found that 440 MtCe/yr of non-Annex 1 reductions could be
    available at less than $22/tCe.
        However, the uncertainty related to these bottom-up studies is
    fundamentally quite high. National studies typically exclude a
    significant number of abatement options due to sheer lack of data,
    resources, or necessity. At the same time, abatement costing studies
    may understate transaction and barrier removal costs, especially those
    specific to CDM and JI projects. For instance, transaction costs for
    project preparation, baselines, certification, and monitoring and
    evaluation could also change from current levels, once the CDM and JI
    markets take off and clear rules are established. Finally, the ultimate
    approach adopted for deciding on project additionality and baselines
    could have a major impact on the size and shape of the market.
        Similarly, the possibility of limited crediting lifetimes, or
    discounting of carbon reductions in future projects years, as proposed
    by some, could increase the effective cost per tCe. In a recent
    analysis, Bernow et al. (2000) illustrated how different approaches to
    standardizing baselines could lead to differences in additional power
    sector activity (tCe) of a factor of 4. These types of considerations
    are rarely included in CDM/JI analyses, either bottom-up or top-down.
        Many climate policy assessments rely on CDM and JI cost curves
    developed by a handful of ``top-down'' modelers. Ellerman and Decaux
    (1998) applied the MIT-EPPA computable general equilibrium model to
    develop parameterized cost curves for five non-Annex 1 regions, which
    have since been widely used (Reilly et al, 1999; Haites, 2000; Krause
    et al, 2001; Missfeldt and Haites, 2001; Grutter, 2001). Applications
    of the ABARE-GTEM model have been used in a similar manner (Vrolijk and
    Grubb, 2000; Grutter, 2001; EMF, 1999). While compared with bottom-up
    studies, the EPPA and GTEM model runs provide more comprehensive
    assessments of reduction potential and cost from an economy-wide
    perspective, they do a poorer job of reflecting the dynamics of
    project-based investments.
        It turns out that the GTEM, EPPA, and bottom-up ECN studies, do
    yield rather similar results. At $20/tCe, the total CDM potential under
    the GTEM run is 470 MtCe/yr, while under EPPA it is 480 MtCe/yr, and as
    noted above, and for ECN et al (1999), the figure is closer to 440
    MtCe/yr. \33\ Given the small differences, we adopt the GTEM results,
    since they provide a fuller CDM curve, include multiple gases, and
    provide a cost curve for JI investments as well.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \33\The EPPA and GTEM figures are drawn from the CERT model
    described in Grutter, 2001. The EPPA scenario used here includes only
    CO2, while the GTEM scenario includes all gases. All of
    these studies exclude sinks, which is largely consistent with the
    implications of the Pronk proposal.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    6.3 Combining the options
        There are two ways to combine the available options to meet our
    Kyoto target. We can prioritize which options to rely on more heavily,
    based on their strategic advantages and co-benefits, as we have done
    for energy/CO2 policies. Or we can simply seek lowest-cost
    solution for the near term. A long-term climate policy perspective
    argues for the former approach. For example, rules and criteria for JI,
    and especially CDM, should be designed so that additionality,
    sustainability, and technology transfer are maximized. Ideally, our
    cost curves for CDM and JI would reflect only investments that are
    consistent with those criteria. However, our current ability to reflect
    such criteria in quantitative estimates of CDM and JI potential is
    limited. \34\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \34\We did briefly examine the potential contribution of a CDM
    fast track for renewables and efficiency, as embodied in the Pronk
    text. Applying the power sector CDM model developed by Bernow et al
    (2001), we found that a carbon price of $20/tCe would induce only 3
    MtCe/yr of new renewable energy project activity by 2010. At a price of
    $100/tCe, this amount rises to 18 MtCe/yr. Given that a large technical
    potential for energy efficiency projects exists at low or negative cost
    per tCe, fast track efficiency projects (under 5 MW useful energy
    equivalents according to Pronk text) could significantly increase the
    amount available at lower costs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It is possible to model priority investment in the domestic
    reductions of non-CO2 gases by implementing some measures
    that are higher cost than the global market clearing carbon price. Just
    as energy/CO2 measures like a Renewable Portfolio Standard
    can be justified by the technological progress, long-term cost
    reductions, other co-benefits that they induce, so too can some non-
    CO2 measures. While we have not attempted to evaluate
    specific policies for nonCO2 gases as we have for
    CO2, we have picked a point on the non-CO2 cost
    curve, $100/tCe, to reflect an emphasis on domestic action. At $100/
    tCe, domestic non-CO2 measures can deliver 118 MtCe/yr of
    reductions, still about 60 MtCe/yr short of the Kyoto goal, to which we
    must turn to the international market.
        To model the global emissions trading market, we used the CDM/JI
    cost curves, and hot air assumptions described above, together with
    assumptions regarding the demand for credits and allowances from all
    Annex B parties. \35\ This model yields market-clearing prices and
    quantities for each of the three principal flexible mechanisms: CDM,
    JI, and ET/hot air. \36\ The results are shown in Table 6.2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \35\For the estimated demand for CDM, JI, and ET/hot air from
    other Annex 1 parties, we used a combination of EPPA and GTEM cost
    curves.35 (Reilly et al, 1999b, and Ellerman and Decaux, 1998; Vrolijk
    and Grubb, 2000; Grutter, 2001).
         \36\Our approach is similar to that used in a few other recent
    studies (Grutter, 2001; Haites, 2000; Missfeldt and Haites, 2001;
    Krause et al, 2001; Vrolijk and Grubb, 2000).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The first row of the table shows that 93 MtCe/yr are available at
    net savings or no net cost, over half from the non-additional or
    ``anyways'' forest management and other Article 3.4 sinks activities
    implicit in the Pronk text. Another 77 MtCe/yr of non-CO2
    gas savings are available as we climb the cost curve from $0-100/tC
    (second row). The net result is that nearly $1.8 billion per year is
    invested in technologies and practices to reduce non-CO2 GHG
    emissions by 118 MtCe/yr in 2010. Another $60 million per year is
    directed toward the 6 MtCe/yr of expected additional sinks projects
    allowed under the Pronk proposal. The third row shows that of the 60
    MtCe/yr of international trading, half comes from CDM projects, and
    much of the rest from hot air. The model we use estimates a market-
    clearing price of about $8/tCe for this 60 MtC/yr of purchased credits
    and allowance, amounting to a total annual cost of less than $500
    million. \37\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \37\The market clearing price is lower here than in other similar
    studies, due in large part to a much lower U.S. demand for
    international trade, which results from of our aggressive pursuit of
    domestic abatement options and the fact that we assume that domestic
    policies and investments should be done as a matter of sound energy and
    environmental policy (i.e. they are price-inelastic).

                        Table 6.2: Reductions available in 2010 up from various sources (in MtCe)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Domestic Options        International Trade
                                                         --------------------------------------------------
                                                           Non-CO2                                 Hot air    Total
                                                            gases     Sinks      CDM       JI       (ET)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Amount available at < or = $0/tCe (MtCe)............        41        52  ........  ........  ........        93
    Amount available at $0-$100 (MtCe)..................        77         6  ........  ........  ........        83
    Amount available at $8 (MtCe).......................  ........  ........        30         6        25        60
    Annual costs ($Million).............................    $1,783       $60      $235       $48      $196    $2,322
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        In summary, of the 672 MtCe/yr in total reductions needed to reach
    Kyoto by 2010, nearly 65 percent comes from energy sector
    CO2 reduction policies, 18 percent from domestic non-
    CO2 gas abatement, 9 percent from domestic sinks, and 9
    percent from the international market. The net economic benefits
    deriving from the energy-related carbon reductions reach nearly $50
    billion/yr in 2010. The total annual cost for the 35 percent of 2010
    reductions coming those last three options--non-CO2 control,
    sinks, and international trading--is estimated at approximately $2.3
    billion, making the total package a positive economic portfolio by a
    large margin. Had we taken the other approach noted at the beginning of
    the section--aiming for the lowest near-term compliance cost--we would
    rely more heavily on international trading. We modeled this scenario,
    and found that it would nearly double the amount of international
    trading, and lower the overall annual cost to $0.9 billion, and reduce
    the amount of non-CO2 control by over 40 percent. This
    additional benefit is minor in comparison to the economic and
    environmental benefits of the entire policy portfolio.
    7. Conclusions
        This study shows that the United States can achieve its carbon
    reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol--7 percent below 1990 levels
    for the first budget period of the Protocol. Relying on national
    policies and measures for greenhouse gas reductions, and accessing the
    flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol for a small portion of its
    total reductions, the United States would enjoy net economic savings as
    a result of this Climate Protection package. In order to achieve these
    reductions, policies should be implemented as soon as possible to
    accelerate the shift away from carbon-intensive fossil fuels and toward
    energy efficient equipment and renewable sources of energy. Such action
    would lead to carbon emission reductions of about 24 percent by 2010
    relative to the Base Case, bringing emissions to about 2.5 percent
    above 1990 levels. Furthermore, emissions of other pollutants would
    also be reduced, thus improving local air quality and public health.
        Adopting these policies at the national level through legislation
    will not only help America meet its Kyoto targets but will also lead to
    economic savings for consumers, as households and businesses would
    enjoy annual energy bill reductions in excess of their investments.
    These net annual savings would increase over time, reaching nearly $113
    per household in 2010 and $375 in 2020. The cumulative net savings
    would be about $114 billion (present value 1999$) through 2010 and $576
    through 2020.
        Greenhouse emissions in the United States are now about 15 percent
    higher than they were in 1990. Together with the looming proximity of
    the first budget period, and a realistic start date no earlier than
    2003 for the implementation of the national policies, reductions in
    energy-related carbon would have to be augmented by other greenhouse
    gas reduction options in order to reach the Kyoto target. In total, the
    Climate Protection case in 2010 includes 436 Mtc/yr energy-related
    carbon reductions, 58 MtC/yr domestic land-based carbon reductions, 118
    MtC/yr reductions in domestic non-carbon greenhouse gases, and 60 MtC/
    yr in allowances purchased through the ``flexibility mechanisms'' of
    the Kyoto Protocol.
        While implementing this set of policies and additional non-energy
    related measures is an ambitious undertaking, it represents an
    important transitional strategy to meet the long-term requirements of
    climate protection. It builds the technological and institutional
    foundation for much deeper long-term emission reductions needed for
    climate protection. Such actions would stimulate innovation and
    invention here in the United States while positioning the United States
    as a responsible international leader in meeting the global challenge
    of climate change.
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                    Appendix 1: Energy and Carbon Summaries

                   Appendix 2. Modeling Global Carbon Markets
        We first construct an aggregate Annex 1 demand curve for
    international emissions reductions from CDM, JI, and ET/hot air. This
    demand curve represents how short, at a given price, Annex 1 countries
    are from meeting their Kyoto target using only domestic options (energy
    sector CO2, non-CO2 gas, and Article 3.3/
    3.4options). We can then compare this demand curve with the supply
    curve for CDM, JI, and ET/hot air (based on the assumptions described
    above) to find the market-clearing price. Our approach is similar to
    that used in a few other recent studies (Grutter, 2001; Haites, 2000;
    Missfeldt and Haites, 2001; Krause et al, 2001; Vrolijk and Grubb,
    2000).
        To create the Annex 1 demand curve, we combine a U.S. demand
    curve--the ``additional required reductions'' line in Figure 6.2 minus
    the cost curve or amount available from non-CO2 measures at
    a given price--with estimated demand for CDM, JI, and ET/hot air from
    other Annex 1 parties, excluding EITs. We estimate the non-US demand
    using a combination of EPPA and GTEM cost curves. \38\ There is a
    resulting asymmetry in this approach, since the non-US cost curves we
    use do not embody the aggressive pursuit of domestic energy sector
    reductions found in our analysis for the United States. As a result the
    total demand for and use of international trading, as well as the
    resulting market clearing price, is significantly higher than it would
    be were we to have looked at a similarly aggressive approach in all
    Annex 1 countries. The result is shown in the figure at right.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \38\The first scenario is based on EPPA cost curves (Reilly et al,
    2000 and Ellerman and Decaux, 1998) and RIIA 1990 emission estimates
    (Vrolijk and Grubb, 2000), and yields an estimated 2010 demand from
    Annex II countries of 507 MtC. The second scenario uses GTEM results
    and assumed 1990 emissions reported via personal communication from the
    model developers, and yields an estimated 2010 demand from Annex II
    countries of 344 MtC. As found in Grutter (2001).

                                   __________
     A Partial Listing of Studies Showing a Positive Economic Benefit from
                       an Innovation-Led Climate Strategy
    Barrett, James P., J. Andrew Hoerner, Steve Bernow, and Bill Dougherty,
                2002. Clean Energy and Jobs: A Comprehensive Approach to
                Climate Change and Energy Policy, Center for a Sustainable
                Economy, Washington, DC.
    Bernow, Stephen, Karlynn Cory, William Dougherty, Max Duckworth, Sivan
                Kartha, Michael Ruth, 1999. America's Global Warming
                Solutions, Washington, DC: World Wildlife Fund.
    Energy Innovations, 1997. Energy Innovations: A Prosperous Path to a
                Clean Environment. Washington, DC: Alliance to Save Energy,
                American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Natural
                Resources Defense Council, Tellus Institute, and Union of
                Concerned Scientists.
    Geller, Howard, Stephen Bernow, and William Dougherty, 1999. Meeting
                America's Kyoto Protocol Target: Policies and Impacts,
                Washington, DC: American Council for an Energy-Efficient
                Economy, November.
    Hanson, Donald, and Skip Laitner, 2000. ``An Economic Growth Model of
                Investment, Energy Savings, and CO2 Reductions:
                An Integrated Analysis of Policies that Increase
                Investments in Advanced Efficient/Low-Carbon
                Technologies,'' by Proceedings of the 93rd Air & Waste
                Management Association Annual Meeting, Salt Lake City, June
                18-22, 2000.
    Interlaboratory Working Group on Energy-Efficient and Clean-Energy
                Technologies, 2000. Scenarios for a Clean Energy Future,
                prepared for Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable
                Energy, U.S. Department of Energy.
    Koomey, Jonathan G., R. Cooper Richey, Skip Laitner, Robert J. Markel,
                and Chris Marnay, 2001. ``Technology and greenhouse gas
                emissions: An integrated scenario analysis using the LBNL-
                NEMS model,''. In Richard Howarth and Darwin Hall, editors,
                Beyond a Doubling: Issues in the Long-term Economics of
                Climate Change, Elsevier Publishing.
    Laitner, John A. ``Skip'', Stephen Bernow and John DeCicco, 1998.
                ``Employment and Other Macroeconomic Benefits of an
                Innovation-Led Climate Strategy for the United States,''
                Energy Policy. Volume 26, Number 5, pages 425-432. April.
    Laitner, Skip, Kathleen Hogan, and Donald Hanson, 1999. ``Technology
                and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: An Integrated Analysis of
                Policies that Increase Investments in Cost Effective
                Energy-Efficient Technologies,'' Proceedings of the
                Electric Utilities Environment Conference, Tucson, AZ,
                January.
    Laitner, John A. ``Skip'', 1997. ``WYMIWYG (What You Measure is What
                You Get): The Benefits of Technology Investment as a
                Climate Change Policy,'' a paper given to the 18th Annual
                North American Conference of the USAEE/IAEE, San Francisco,
                CA. September 7-10.
    Peters, Irene, Stephen Bernow, Rachel Cleetus, John A. (``Skip'')
                Laitner, Aleksandr Rudkevich, and Michael Ruth, 2001. ``A
                Pragmatic CGE Model for Assessing the Influence of Model
                Structure and Assumptions in Climate Change Policy
                Analysis,'' in Lawrence A. Kreiser, editor, Critical Issues
                in International Environmental Taxation, CCH Incorporated,
                Chicago, IL..
    Sanstad, Alan H., Stephen J. DeCanio, and Gale A. Boyd, 2000.
                ``Estimating Bounds on the Economy-Wide Effects of the CEF
                Policy Scenarios,'' Energy Policy 29 (2001) 1299- 1311.
    Tellus Institute, 1997. Policies and Measures to Reduce CO2
                Emissions in the United States: An Analysis of Options for
                2005 and 2010. Boston, MA: Tellus Institute.
        Senator Jeffords. There is no question that we must be
    concerned with threats of today, like the thousands of people
    dying prematurely every year from power plant pollution. But we
    cannot let the press of quarterly reports or the hunt for
    short-term profits prevent us from acting to reduce the threats
    of tomorrow. That is especially true in the case of terrorism
    or global warming where we have been presented with credible
    information about the threats.
        As some of my colleagues know, I have a special interest in
    the U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification and pressed hard
    for its ratification. Senator Helms was instrumental in moving
    that treaty and I want to thank him for his work and that of
    his staff in helping me and others get that agreement approved.
    That treaty addressed land degradation in some of the most
    impoverished areas of the world. It is designed to encourage
    participatory democracy and stakeholder involvement. I look
    forward to seeing the implementation of that treaty.
        I have an interest in ratifying and implementing the
    Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. I have introduced
    legislation maintaining the spirit of that treaty, and I hope
    we will be able to get that moving as soon as the U.S. can
    participate in the ``Conference of Parties'' and the review
    committee.
        There seems to be a general good news regarding chemicals
    that harm the ozone layer. From all indications, the Montreal
    Protocol has been a success, though I gather there are some
    additional amendments coming soon. I will be interested to
    learn how our efforts have reduced that ozone hole.
        There is less clear news on the status of the Convention of
    Biologic Diversity, which was signed in 1993 but which has been
    not sent to the Senate for confirmation and ratification.
        I would also appreciate hearing an update from our
    witnesses on the progress made toward the implementation of the
    Basel Convention regarding the International Transportation of
    Hazardous Waste.
        Finally, I would note something that is a little different
    between international agreements and our more conventional
    environmental laws. They often seem to be missing performance
    criteria or include very weak commitments. Unfortunately, in
    the case of climate change, even when commitments are minimal,
    such as reporting on the policies and measures we have adopted
    and achieved in 1990 levels, we have failed. So I would urge
    our negotiators to push for more specific environmental laws
    using targets and timetables. That will make it easier for the
    Senate to know whether the treaties we have ratified are
    succeeding. Also, I believe the result will be better for the
    environment and sustainable development.
        I want to thank you for being with us here today. I now
    turn to my good co-chairman friend, Senator Sarbanes.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL S. SARBANES, U.S. SENATOR FROM
                         THE STATE OF MARYLAND

        Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Senator Jeffords. I
    am very pleased to join my colleague, Senator Jeffords, in this
    joint hearing between the Environment and Public Works
    Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the
    very important issue of the review of the implementation of
    environmental treaties.
        Senator Jeffords, as we all well know, has been a very
    strong advocate of the need to protect our environment across
    the range of issues. I certainly want at the very outset to
    thank him for his leadership. The country, not just the
    country, in a sense the world, and I am going to make reference
    to this later, these environmental issues know no national
    boundaries, and we are all extremely grateful to him.
        I also want to thank him for suggesting this idea of a
    joint hearing undertaken by the two committees. Joint hearings
    can I think provide a useful opportunity to examine issues that
    cut across committee jurisdiction, and I think they also serve
    to encourage Members of Congress as well as the Administration
    and private sector to think about the wider implications of the
    issues with which we are wrestling. That is obviously one of
    our purposes here today.
        Treaties are often negotiated over many months, indeed,
    even longer, and in many cases in a very painstaking way. So
    when they come into force many people heave a sigh of relief
    that the process has been completed. Of course, we review the
    treaties in the Foreign Relations Committee and we try to
    carefully examine them, and then once we ratify them we think
    well that is over and done with. But the fact of the matter is
    that once the treaty is ratified, the process has only begun.
    And what really matters, in addition to adopting the treaty to
    begin with, is how governments, including our own, actually
    implement the treaties.
        This hearing will examine a number of environmental
    treaties that the United States has ratified. Just to mention a
    few, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
    the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
    Layer, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
    Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, the North American Agreement
    on Environmental Cooperation, and the U.N. Convention to Combat
    Desertification, which Senator Jeffords made reference to. I do
    not think that treaty would ever have been approved but for his
    efforts.
        We will ask witnesses from the Administration and private
    sector specialists for their appraisal of our Government's
    implementation of these various treaties. For example:
        Are we living up to our commitments under these treaties?
        Are we providing sufficient resources, both financial and
    technical, to help developing countries meet their commitments
    under these treaties?
        What are the success stories?
        Where are we falling short, and what can be done to ensure
    that we do a better job?
        What are the international ramifications of a failure on
    our part to meet our commitments under these treaties?
        I look forward to hearing our witnesses address some of
    these important questions.
        The protection of the environment is something that I think
    we have come to understand is a matter of the first priority,
    hopefully here in the Congress, certainly across the country.
    In fact, I am inclined to think that the country is often ahead
    of the Congress and ahead of the Administration on this very
    important issue. Not only do we have an obligation to ensure
    that our Government is honoring its environmental commitments,
    but we should encourage our Government to play a leading role
    in assisting others around the world to help them meet their
    commitments. We constantly brag that we are first, and we ought
    to be first in this regard, as well as in other respects.
        Environmental problems, as we all know, have no boundaries.
    An environmental problem halfway around the globe can have
    adverse consequences for our own families here in the United
    States. Similarly, an environmental problem here in this
    country can affect the lives of millions of people overseas.
    The Chernobyl nuclear accident, to take but one example, had
    consequences far, far beyond the boundaries of where the event
    occurred.
        So I think this is an important joint effort here by the
    two committees and I want to again thank Senator Jeffords for
    suggesting this. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
        Mr. Chairman, I ought to say at the outset, because of my
    involvement in the other bill to which you made reference, I do
    not know that I am going to be able to stay through the morning
    but I certainly wanted to be here at the outset. I may have to
    leave, maybe I can get back. But this is certainly a very
    important initiative and I thank you for it.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you for being here. Your presence
    makes this a much more rewarding situation for the hearing, but
    I do understand that you have got a few little problems you are
    dealing with.
        Senator Chafee.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
                         STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

        Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Senator Jeffords, for
    holding the hearing. As Senator Sarbanes said, certainly the
    world is looking at us as to how we are going to act on these
    treaties and are we going to be a responsible member of the
    global community on these environmental issues which have such
    immense ramifications for future generations.
        We hold a certain place in the world after the fall of the
    Berlin Wall and are kind of at the top of the heap. With that
    comes enormous responsibility. We have to exercise it on these
    treaties that have been negotiated over many, many months. It
    is my thought that we have the responsibility to protect our
    world for future generations. And whether it is global warming
    or desertification or the health of our fisheries, the onus is
    on us. Everybody is looking at us to see, are we going to be a
    leader? Are we going to be a country that all around the world
    people look at and say they are doing the right thing, they are
    protecting these valuable resources? That not only are they
    consuming resources at an enormous rate in the United States of
    America, but they are looking ahead and trying to do the right
    thing for many, many generations.
        So thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing
    today.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you, Senator Chafee. It is a
    pleasure to have you with us.
        Now on our first panel the first witness is John F. Turner,
    the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and
    International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S.
    Department of State, Washington, DC, and the other member of
    our panel is Mr. James Connaughton, Chair of the White House
    Council on Environmental Quality, Washington, DC.
        Welcome. It is a pleasure to have you with us.
        Mr. Turner, please proceed.

     STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. TURNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE
    BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC
                   AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Mr. Turner. Chairman Jeffords, Chairman Sarbanes, Senator
    Chafee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you
    today with my colleague, Jim Connaughton, to review the U.S.
    implementation of some important environmental treaties
    initiatives.
        I believe the United States has a strong record on global
    environmental issues. And as one who has been involved in
    conservation most of my career, I want to pause and thank each
    one of you for the dedication and commitment, leadership you
    have given to domestic and international environmental affairs.
    But I am proud of the leadership our country has shown to
    spearhead the negotiation agreements and their subsequent
    implementation on issues ranging from ozone depletion to
    stemming illegal trade in endangered species. As an example of
    this continuing leadership, the President just recently
    submitted to the Senate an important treaty between the United
    States and Russia that would strengthen the conservation of our
    shared polar bear resources.
        The State Department plays an important role in
    negotiating, coordinating, and monitoring the implementation of
    environmental agreements and then working through the
    interagency and international processes to ensure U.S.
    interests are served. Often, however, as you realize, other
    agencies within our Government are actually responsible for
    implementation of some of these treaties.
        In addition to my written statement submitted for the
    record, I would just like to briefly describe our efforts
    related to five agreements the United States currently is
    implementing.
        First, the Montreal Protocol. As you are aware, during the
    1980's, indeed, the United States led a global effort to
    negotiate an agreement to phaseout the production and
    consumption of substances that deplete the ozone layer and
    threaten human health with the deliberating effects of skin
    cancer and cataracts. Over the last 15 years, the
    implementation of the Protocol and its subsequent amendments
    have yielded remarkable progress in protecting the
    stratospheric ozone layer by phasing out much of the
    consumption and use of ozone depleting substances on a global
    scale. The protocol does include a multilateral fund to provide
    financial and technical assistance to developing countries to
    assist them in meeting their own obligations under the treaty.
    As the largest contributor to the fund, the United States has
    made available over $350 million to the fund since the
    beginning.
        The second treaty I would like to discuss is the Convention
    on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
    Flora, known as CITES. CITES conservation goals are to restrict
    international trade in endangered species, and assist countries
    toward a sustainable management of species through
    international trade.
        CITES Parties regulate wildlife trade through controls and
    regulations on species listed in three distinct appendices. In
    addition, each Party must appoint a CITES management authority
    and scientific authority. Of course, for the United States it
    is the Fish and Wildlife Service at the Department of Interior
    that provides us with the management authority and scientific
    authority for CITES. That agency also plays a major law
    enforcement role in its implementation.
        With regard to implementation, the U.S. implements CITES
    primarily through regulations developed under the Endangered
    Species Act and also under the Lacey Act. The United States is
    proud of its record in implementing CITES. We are at the
    forefront of CITES Parties in fulfilling these obligations.
        Third, I would like to just briefly touch on the U.N.
    Framework Convention on Climate Change, which I know you are
    very interested in. The Framework Convention creates a broad
    global framework for addressing the challenge of climate
    change. My colleague, Jim Connaughton, will discuss the overall
    approach of this Administration to address this serious global
    challenge. Let me just briefly refer to a portion of this
    strategy where I believe the United States is demonstrating
    superb leadership.
        In the two major announcements of President Bush on our
    policy regarding global climate change, he committed us to
    intensifying efforts with other nations to address the
    challenge of climate change. Toward this end, the United States
    has initiated a series of bilateral climate change
    relationships with important partners, including, and I would
    like to mention them, Australia, Central America, the European
    Union, Canada, China, India, Italy, and Japan. We have
    discussions underway on additional relationships with Brazil,
    Mexico, Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, and the
    Ukraine. Including the U.S.' participation, these relationships
    would represent 78 percent of the total greenhouse gas
    emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels around the world.
        Fourth, let me just mention the North American Agreement on
    Environmental Cooperation, commonly referred to as the NAFTA
    environmental side agreement. This serves as an important
    framework for cooperation among the three North American
    governments on a wide range of environmental efforts. Among
    other things, the NAFTA side agreement established the
    Commission on Environmental Cooperation, the CEC, which
    coordinates such cooperation.
        This agreement has promoted strong cooperation among the
    three countries on a number of important environmental issues,
    achieved primarily through the implementation of the CEC work
    program funded at the level of $9 million annually where each
    party contributes equally. These include the promotion of
    enforcement and compliance with environmental laws, protecting
    children's environmental health, protecting animal species that
    migrate throughout North America, and minimizing the use of
    persistent toxic chemicals such as DDT.
        Fifth, and last, Mr. Chairman, let me just touch on the
    U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification, CCD. Indeed, I would
    like to thank you, Senator Jeffords, for your leadership in the
    ratification of this important global measure. As you are
    aware, this Convention arose out of the 1992 Earth Summit. The
    purpose of the Convention is to combat desertification and
    mitigate the effects of drought on arid and semi-arid lands
    through effective local, national, regional, and global action.
        The Convention's central objective is to promote the
    sustainable use of dry lands worldwide, but especially in
    Africa, and to make more efficient use of aid resources,
    thereby helping to solve Africa's and other affected regions'
    chronic hunger problems and availability of fresh water. Many
    of the principles used in the U.S. over the past 70 years have
    been incorporated in the language of the CCD.
        In conclusion, let me observe that while significant
    progress in protecting the environment has been made, we are
    all aware that enormous challenges lie ahead. And as you have
    noted, Chairman Jeffords, the upcoming World Summit on
    Sustainability in Johannesburg, South Africa, provides the
    United States with a unique opportunity to take stock of our
    past accomplishments and to build on them in helping to advance
    economic and social environmental stewardship.
        We have learned a great deal since Rio. WSSD gives the
    United States a chance again to demonstrate its leadership, to
    create a new paradigm that stresses sound economic policy,
    national capacity for good governance, anti-corruption,
    transparency, the role of science, poverty reduction, and sound
    environmental stewardship. Working with our international
    friends and allies, the Bush Administration is committed to the
    success of the Johannesburg Conference to ensure we all work
    together to build a positive legacy of natural resources
    sustainability for current and future generations of the global
    citizenry.
        Thank you Chairmen. I would be happy to respond to any
    questions you may have later on.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much.
        Now we will hear from Mr. Connaughton, Chairman of the
    White House Council on Environmental Quality. Please proceed.

    STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES CONNAUGHTON, CHAIR, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL
                        ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

        Mr. Connaughton. Thank you Chairman Jeffords, Chairman
    Sarbanes, Senator Chafee. I want to note at the outset, Mr.
    Chairman, your reference to NEPA. Certainly, I share your view
    that NEPA was the original sustainable development statute. And
    the fact that it has been adopted by I think more than 50
    countries worldwide and the legacy that that articulation of
    what sustainable development is about is sort of a test case
    for the beginnings of American leadership in this area.
        Of particular note in that statute, and I think we had
    talked about this a little bit during my confirmation hearing,
    is the concept of man and nature living together in productive
    harmony. That is an important concept. And this hearing today,
    actually bringing together the Senate Environment and Public
    Works Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, I think is
    a key important next step as we get various committees of
    jurisdiction looking across their lines, as we must, consistent
    with your statement, to figure out how to better integrate our
    environmental and our social objectives into our other policies
    and into other activities. That is really what was behind the
    spirit of NEPA. And I think that is why today's hearing is so
    important and useful, because it then turns, Chairman Sarbanes,
    on what you referenced, that the largest questions before us
    are the questions of implementation: are we implementing at the
    domestic level and equally, and perhaps today even more
    importantly, at the international level; and where are the
    important places where we can make meaningful progress on
    implementing these documents that were so hard worked over. So
    I look forward to our discussion today.
        What I want to do is briefly spend some time talking about
    where we are with implementation of the U.N. Framework
    Convention on Climate Change and then throw in just a little
    aside on the world summit, my own view with respect to the
    upcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development.
        With respect to climate change, President Bush has
    committed the Nation to ambitious, yet realistic, goals that
    are based on a set of six principles that largely derive from
    the framework that we have set out in that Convention. First
    is, consistency with the long-term goal of stabilizing
    atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases at a level that
    would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system.
    This, of course, refers to the fundamental long-term obligation
    under the Convention, to which the President has reaffirmed our
    Government's strong commitment. Second is that we should
    proceed with measured actions as we learn more from the science
    and build on it. Third is the concept of flexibility, to adjust
    to new information and take advantage of new technology. Fourth
    is ensuring continued economic growth and prosperity without
    which we actually cannot make the kinds of investments that we
    will need to over the near-to mid-term to achieve our
    greenhouse gases emission reduction goals. We need to pursue
    market-based incentives that will spur technological
    innovation. And finally, and very importantly, is the concept
    of global participation along the lines that my good colleague
    John Turner just described. We need to find ways to engage the
    developing countries in a constructive path, on a path whereby
    they, too, can make meaningful progress together with their
    international partners.
        The President has set a goal, a near-term goal, which is
    committing the Nation to an immediate goal of reducing
    America's greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our
    economy by 18 percent in the next 10 years. This goal is
    comparable to the kinds of emission reductions that countries
    participating in the Kyoto Protocol expected to achieve. We
    believe that this way of articulating progress is a means by
    which we can open a dialog with developing countries because it
    is consistent with their need for economic growth, but to do it
    in the kind of efficient and more productive way that we
    ourselves continue to demonstrate leadership on in the United
    States of America.
        Importantly, it will set us on a path to slow the growth of
    our emissions. Our emissions are growing. Emissions around the
    world are growing. A key first step in making meaningful
    progress on climate change is to, in fact, slow that growth
    significantly and, as science justifies, to stop the growth in
    emissions, and then reverse that growth. This will require a
    sustained commitment and significant investment and effort from
    our Nation's farmers, small businesses, workers, industries,
    and, most important, individual citizens. In recent time, the
    largest growth in emissions have resulted from the actions of
    individual citizens in their homes, in their transport, in
    their commercial activities. We need to be working on
    incentives and education and other methods, we have a whole
    series of programs, by which to engage the American citizens of
    the whole toward this effort.
        The President's policy recognizes that meaningful progress
    depends on the development and deployment of new technology.
    That is key. We all recognize that. There is a large
    international consensus on that. We need to advance the science
    further because there are key gaps in our knowledge that can
    help us make smart policy choices in the near-and mid-term. We
    need to develop and promote energy efficiency, conservation,
    and sequestration technologies and practices in addition to
    building on international cooperation.
        What I would like to do is just quickly run through the
    various components, and I will just take a minute to do that.
    The President's fiscal year budget calls for a $700 million
    increase in our Federal effort in regard to climate change.
    That will support a $4.5 billion program of research on climate
    science and energy technology and create significant new
    incentives that will help advance those technologies and deploy
    them. That is unmatched in the world. We are committed to a
    program of up to $7.1 billion over the next 10 years that is
    dedicated to technology development and the incentives to
    deploy that technology. That, too, is unmatched in the world.
        Senator Jeffords, you were a strong supporter of a strong
    conservation title in the Farm Bill, as was the Bush
    Administration. That will unleash up to $49 billion, a
    significant portion of which is going to enable and incentivize
    our farmers on their working lands and our ranchers on their
    working lands to engage in the kind of sequestration activities
    and smarter land management that we would like to see while not
    putting them off their property. We far outmatch anything along
    those lines in the rest of the world.
        That said, I want to note that we have the upcoming World
    Summit on Sustainable Development coming up in Johannesburg. We
    have a real opportunity to forge the kinds of partnerships that
    will in fact implement the rich tapestry and body of
    international norms and international treaties and laws that we
    have all committed to over the last couple of decades. We are
    looking forward to really setting off a dialog around which we
    can in fact make meaningful progress on each of those
    commitments and come up with real partnerships that can
    demonstrate measurable success. So, again, we look forward to
    talking to you about that today. Thank you.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you both.
        Senator Corzine, do you have a brief statement you would
    like to make?
        Senator Corzine. I will have one for the record, but thank
    you. I appreciate your holding the hearing.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
        Mr. Turner, President Bush attended the Earth Summit in
    1992. I understand that more than 100 heads-of-state plan to
    attend the World Summit in Johannesburg. Will the President
    lead the United States delegation to the World Summit?
        Mr. Turner. Senator, there is obviously considerable
    interest around the world as to who will head the U.S.
    delegation. All I can tell you is that decision has not been
    made yet. I can tell you that the commitment to make the World
    Summit a success has captured the interest of the White House,
    the National Security Council, cabinet members, and the
    agencies. So we are committed to see that we have a dynamic and
    bold agenda as we go to Johannesburg. But the decision on who
    would lead the delegation has not yet been made.
        Senator Jeffords. I just hope the President can because I
    think it would be very, very helpful to the world.
        Mr. Connaughton, in preparation for the Earth Summit of
    1992, CEQ held a series of regional public conferences around
    the United States and compiled extensive documentation based on
    the concerns presented at these public meetings. What
    comparable effort has CEQ undertaken in preparation for the
    World Summit?
        Mr. Connaughton. I will speak to the process point and then
    turn to the substance point. We are jointly working with the
    State Department and have coordinated a fairly extensive
    interagency process to ensure that as we get to the World
    Summit we actually have broad agency participation in that
    effort. That is the immediate process and we have been working
    on that.
        In terms of the outreach, the first Rio Summit actually was
    critical in setting the agenda and setting the numerous areas
    in which we needed to make meaningful progress. Whether it is
    reducing the number of people without access to safe drinking
    water, whether it is reducing the number of people without
    access to clean, reliable, affordable energy sources, issues
    such as biodiversity and the like, all of those have unfolded
    in the last 10 years through quite extensive both national and
    international dialog. So where we are today is very different
    from where we were 10 years ago, and where we are today is with
    this very complete agenda, whether it is Agenda 21, or whether
    it is the Millennium Goals. We have this very rich agenda. If
    anything, the level of outreach on an agency-by-agency basis,
    and certainly with the State Department through our
    international fora, we have more fora engaged in the subject of
    sustainable development than anyone might have in fact imagined
    in 1990.
        Our effort, and certainly CEQ's push, what we are trying to
    emphasize is can we in fact forge the kind of partnerships with
    respect to these commitments that have now developed and that
    we have held ourselves to, can we forge the kind of real
    concrete partnerships where 2 years from now, 3 years from now,
    5 years from now we can actually say that with respect to our
    commitment, for example, on access to safe drinking water we
    have real plans toward making meaningful progress on each of
    those goals. And so that is where my office has come in and
    will stay diligent on that, because also I think it is
    important to emphasize with the World Summit, just as Rio was
    not the end of the conversation, it was actually the beginning
    of the conversation, we would like to see this World Summit be
    the beginning of a very new and hard emphasis on really
    implementing our goals toward lifting the world out of poverty
    and assuring for them the kind of quality of life that we enjoy
    here in America.
        Senator Jeffords. Mr. Connaughton, the Framework Convention
    commits the United States and all the Parties to reporting
    detailed information on its policies and measures ``with the
    aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels
    of these man-made emissions of greenhouse gases.'' Which of the
    programs outlined in the Administration's Climate Action Report
    aims to return our emissions to the 1990 levels, and by when?
        Mr. Connaughton. The Action Report, which, as you know,
    Senator, goes on at great length, outlines more than 60 Federal
    programs and mentions numerous activities at the State and
    local level, all of which are oriented toward mitigating
    greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, we have an extensive
    program of research and development and technology deployment,
    not just on the pure technology side, for example, in
    sequestration and how we can capture carbon, but also in the
    land management side of things in terms of how we can better
    utilize our natural resources and the acreage that we have in
    the United States toward meeting our Nation's agricultural and
    wood products and other needs.
        That set of programs covers every sector of the economy. It
    includes a range of mandatory measures, a range of voluntary
    measures, a range of incentive-based measures. And, again, when
    you sort of line it up program for program, it is a level of
    effort that far outpaces much of what the rest of the world is
    currently doing.
        In terms of a timeline of when, we cannot set one. I think
    the non-binding aim of the Framework Convention was not met by
    the United States or by most of the rest of the developed
    nations of the world. I think we need to set ourselves on a
    realistic course, consistent with economic growth, by which we
    can all make meaningful progress toward that long-term goal of
    stabilization of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
        Senator Jeffords. I am sorry, but the question is, which
    ones aim at 1990?
        Mr. Connaughton. The entire package aims at reducing the
    growth in our greenhouse gas emissions, Senator. There is no
    particular silver bullet program by which we could achieve that
    goal.
        Senator Jeffords. Senator Chafee.
        Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator Jeffords. I have a
    little bit of business. Senator Hagel, a member of the Foreign
    Relations Committee, asked me to submit for the record his
    opening statement.
        Senator Jeffords. It will be accepted, without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]
     Statement of Hon. Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska
        Mr. Chairman--Thank you for holding this hearing. This is an
    opportunity for the Administration to discuss the progress that has
    been made on these five environmental treaties, all of which have been
    ratified by the U.S. Senate.
        Of course, much of the talk today is also likely to focus on a
    treaty that was signed by President Clinton but never submitted to the
    Senate, the Kyoto Protocol.
        I would like to remind my colleagues of a bit of Senate history on
    this issue.
        Tomorrow will mark the 5-year point since the Senate voted
    unanimously to provide President Clinton and Vice President Gore with
    clear advice regarding the Kyoto Protocol. It is unfortunate that the
    Clinton Administration ignored the Senate's 95-0 vote on S.Res. 98, or
    the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, but the conditions outlined in that
    resolution remain the guideposts for U.S. international climate change
    policy.
        I would also remind my colleagues, and this frequently gets
    forgotten in the discussion, perhaps even more significant than the 95-
    0 vote was that the Byrd-Hagel Resolution had 65 bipartisan cosponsors.
        As we know, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution was very clear. It called on
    the President not to sign the Kyoto Protocol, or any other
    international climate change agreement, unless two minimum conditions
    were met.
        First, S. Res. 98 directed the President not to sign any treaty``.
    . . unless the protocol or agreement also mandates new specific
    scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for
    Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period.'' The
    message was simple. Yet as we know, the Kyoto Protocol does not include
    a single developing nation. These are the very nations, such and China
    and India, that will soon lead the world in manmade greenhouse
    emissions. Any treaty that exempts them from participation is folly.
        Second, the Resolution stated the President should not sign any
    treaty that``. . . would result in serious harm to the economy of the
    United States.'' The Kyoto Protocol would have legally bound the United
    States to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions to 7 percent below 1990
    levels by the years 2008 to 2012. As President Bush stated in February,
    this would have cost the U.S. economy $400 billion and resulted in the
    loss of 4.9 million jobs.
        The Clinton Administration never submitted it to the Senate for
    debate and consideration. I suspect it is because they knew what is
    still true today--if put to a vote in the Senate, the Kyoto Protocol
    would face resounding defeat.
        Other nations are also reconsidering their early ardent advocacy
    for the Kyoto Protocol. Japan has ratified the treaty, but has no
    enforceable plan to meet its obligations. The same is true for the
    European Union. Australia has joined the United States in saying it
    will not ratify the protocol. Canada and Russia have not made final
    commitments to ratification.
        The Kyoto Protocol is collapsing under the weight of the reality of
    its economic consequences.
        Does that mean the United States should turn its back on
    international efforts to address potential climate change? No, that
    would be irresponsible.
        In his February 14 announcement of the Administration's climate
    change policies, President Bush stated, ``I intend to work with
    nations, especially the poor and developing nations, to show the world
    that there is a better approach, that we can build our future
    prosperity along a cleaner and better path.''
        he Administration has backed up the President's words with funding
    and tangible international cooperation. I'm sure the witnesses here
    today will expand on these efforts and I look forward to their
    testimony.
        Next month, nations will gather for the World Summit on Sustainable
    Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. We should stay focused on
    science, programs and resources that enhance international cooperation
    to produce tangible environmental benefits for all nations. Not worn-
    out debates over dead treaties.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Chafee. Thank you. Mr. Turner, to follow up on the
    Summit in Johannesburg, what are the goals that we will be
    setting out for us as we attend this summit? What do we hope to
    accomplish?
        Mr. Turner. Senator, I think we are committed to success.
    And then you are asked the question, how will we measure
    success? I think we will measure success by getting some
    commitments to concrete actions by the world community to make
    a difference in places around the world. By that, I think the
    United States is advancing themes based on the need for good
    governance, the need to increase the total flow of resources to
    eradicate poverty and lift the quality of people's lives. We
    need concrete commitments. In fact, the United States is
    working on deliverables in the following areas. The three most
    important seem to be: Access to energy. We have great
    opportunities in providing clean energy technology. It is
    inexcusable that we have almost 2 billion people today without
    access to fresh water. So I think water will be a priority.
    Third, the problem of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases.
    So, health, fresh water, and energy would be the top three
    areas for deliverables. We are also working on packages in
    forestry, oceans and fishery biodiversity, food security, and
    education. We feel this package helps invest in people, it
    helps build a platform which will not only help economic growth
    but environmental sustainability.
        So I think our opportunity is to get beyond lofty rhetoric,
    the negotiation of text, and get into real partnership
    commitments. We have an ongoing dialog with other countries,
    both developed and developing, trying to forge these
    partnerships, a dialog with the nonprofit community both
    domestically and internationally, and business groups to see if
    for the first time we can build on a continuum offered us by
    the Doha Conference on Trade, the Monterrey Conference, to
    increase the total flow of resources to impoverished areas of
    the world. Johannesburg is an opportunity to bring this all
    together with real concrete commitments. The United States, I
    have to say, is really leading that international effort right
    now to forge those commitments.
        Senator Chafee. Very good goals to have for the conference.
    I support them and wish you good luck at building consensus
    with other nations around the world. Certainly health and fresh
    water and curtailing the spread of infectious diseases are a
    good place to start and help build an economy. So I will
    certainly be supportive of those efforts.
        Mr. Connaughton, in your statement you talk about measured
    actions as we learn more from science. I am curious as to when
    does the science finally convince the Administration to take
    action. Where is the Administration on global warming in
    relation to the science? Is it a little apprehensive of it at
    this point, or beginning to come to the point of this is an
    issue that needs aggressive action?
        Mr. Connaughton. Where we are with the science is there is
    a significant scientific enterprise that has produced a number
    of projections that are sufficient to give us cause for action.
    The issue is are we calibrating our action to the current state
    of the science. I believe the President's plan does precisely
    that in terms of taking us to the next step of slowing the
    growth in emissions and yet not taking us so far down the road,
    given the uncertainties of the science, that we are actually
    having significant detrimental effects on jobs, the American
    workers, which is important, and it is not just American
    workers, but it is the kinds of effects that you would see with
    quite restrictive actions in other countries of the world.
        So when is the science done? We have had a couple of
    decades of scientific enterprise. We are looking at many more
    decades, funded with the U.S. carrying the largest share of
    that funding, in which we have to stay on top of this. Our
    research effort in climate change, again, it is unmatched in
    the world and it far outpaces our research in many other areas
    of more immediate consequence to people in the United States of
    America. But it is important enough to stay up with the
    science.
        What we are trying to do, though, is we are trying to get a
    more focused management program to some of that spending, not
    all of it, but some of that spending so it can actually begin
    to answer some of the more difficult questions that help us
    design programs that would be meaningful. We need to know more
    about some of the effects of, for example, the effects of
    aerosols, the effects of clouds, the effects of changes and
    adaptations to climate. We need to know more about that in
    order then to develop the kinds of policies that do not lead us
    to significant economic mistakes. Because, of course, if we put
    our economy further into reverse, we actually will not get the
    kinds of investments we need to make the progress toward that
    next generation of capital that we need to deploy to get new
    capital stock, to get the new cars everybody wants, to get more
    efficient manufacturing, and, importantly, more efficient homes
    and more efficient commercial enterprises, because that is
    where the real growth is.
        Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.
        Senator Jeffords. Senator Corzine.
        Senator Corzine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
    take a little bit of what you just said, Mr. Connaughton, and
    ask whether you think that some of the capital investment that
    I think we all think is important for generating economic
    growth is somewhat inhibited because there is an uncertainty
    and a conflict between what we sense are requirements of our
    international obligations and both the political debate that we
    have in America about climate change and the uncertainty that
    seems to revolve around what certainly I read in our
    international requirements. For instance, I would cite under
    Article 3.3 of the Convention, talking about the Framework
    Convention on Climate Change, ``Parties should take
    precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent, or minimize the
    causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects where
    there are threats of serious or irreversible damage. Lack of
    full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
    postponing such measures.''
        Sometimes it does not feel that our policies are taking
    into account what we have as mandates, at least in some sense,
    from our international conventions. I would think as an
    investor in dealing with some of these needs that people might
    be confused, particularly as they see increasing evidence
    published that some of these considerations, particularly with
    regard to carbon, are a serious problem.
        How is the United States resolving this sort of dilemma of
    debate that exists in the context of what our international
    obligations are? Not only yourself, but Mr. Turner as well, I
    would like to hear your comments on that.
        Mr. Connaughton. First, I think that the President's
    announcement on February 14 was a key next step in providing
    further clarity that you describe, Senator, in terms of making
    clear at least what this Administration's expectation is on the
    greenhouse gas side of the equation in terms of a realistic but
    still ambitious goal for further efficiency and productivity in
    our economy. That is our expectation.
        The second component of that, which has to do with perhaps
    the investment uncertainty you describe, is we look very
    closely at the approach that certainly Senator Chafee
    championed, that numerous members of the Senate championed,
    toward not just getting our information flows better in terms
    of improving our registry of reductions in the various sectors,
    but also to create a credible crediting system by which those
    who do make investments today have some high level of assurance
    that those investments will be recognized in whatever a future
    policy could hold, whether it is an incentive-based policy,
    whether it is a market-based policy, which we would emphasize
    as the better path forward, or through even additional
    mandatory programs that might come to the fore in terms of
    where we are falling short of real action.
        Senator Corzine. Is the White House supporting the
    Brownback-Corzine amendment on registry of carbon dioxide
    emissions?
        Mr. Connaughton. We do not support that because we do not
    think there is a need for at this time a mandatory reporting
    element. We think enhancing the registry is a great idea. I
    would think creating----
        Senator Corzine. As you know, it is not mandatory for the
    first 5 years as long as we meet some kind of reduction
    standards, and would not become mandatory if people met those
    standards.
        Mr. Connaughton. I am aware of that and that is our point
    of departure.
        Mr. Turner. Senator, I want to respond and just offer some
    reflections of a trip I just returned from. China was my first
    trip and a real learning experience, where we completed some
    high level dialog with China on a diverse array of
    environmental issues, and then I was able to travel through
    China. China, to me, was a great reflection on the broader
    approach and its justification that the United States is taking
    in engaging countries like China and India and others that will
    represent a significant amount of emissions.
        I was impressed in going to China that that is a country on
    the move economically. To improve the lives of their citizens,
    their energy consumption is going to go up exponentially. Their
    technology and science is extremely poor, and they are the
    first to admit that. The emission of greenhouse gas is
    significant. They are making a significant effort but the
    utilization is not good and not efficient. So there is an
    excellent opportunity for the United States to take science, to
    take technology and partnership with them.
        I went to one of the poorest regions in China where they
    have some significant desertification and erosion, over-
    grazing, dust issues. They admit it, as our science admits it,
    that the dust is now coming all the way across the United
    States from the Mongolian-Tibetan plains of China.
        We have been accused of being isolated on global climate. I
    submit the absolute opposite is true. The United States in fact
    is leading the effort to engage the developing world in this
    dialog and approach to collective strategies on climate. That
    impact has significant opportunities to address this serious
    issue. We need to do much more in our international efforts,
    but the United States is really leading, trying to get the
    attention of the President's commitment to engage other nations
    in this whole effort on climate.
        Senator Jeffords. What did you mean by trying to get the
    President's attention?
        Mr. Turner. No, excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I mean in trying
    to follow through on the President's appropriate commitment of
    the United States. Part of our strategy is to work with other
    nations, engage other nations in approaches to the serious
    issue of climate. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Senate voted,
    and the President concurred, that one of the failings of the
    Kyoto process was we were leaving out too many countries,
    members of the world community that not only today emit a lot
    of greenhouse gases, but the potential for significant
    increases in the future based on old technology really has
    frightening ramifications for where we go in climate. So I am
    proud of what we are doing to engage other countries,
    especially the developing countries.
        Senator Jeffords. I am very interested in this. I was in
    China and I started an organization dealing with more efficient
    use of energy. They sent some men over who looked at China's
    incredible need. To just improve the technology, they could
    reduce their emissions immensely. What does the United States
    intend to do to try to get these countries to be more efficient
    in their use and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions?
        Mr. Turner. Senator, obviously, in our discussion with
    other countries, their needs and interests are different. But
    it is a spectrum going from providing science and technology,
    which seems to be the biggest need, to, as Mr. Connaughton
    referred to, the need for more information; i.e., climate
    research. We have committed to a global climate research
    system. And, again, the United States is leading that effort to
    answer many of the legitimate questions that we still have out
    on climate change, and we are partnering with other countries
    in setting up global monitoring stations. I visited a very
    remote one we put up in China. So science and technology,
    global research, looking at opportunities to comment together
    and work on global policy.
        Japan, as an example, we have three working groups on
    research, science and technology, and how together we can go
    out and help developing countries, and then looking at future
    markets, which is business opportunities for both countries. In
    India, for an example, Mr. Chairman, India, it is astounding to
    me that we have 600,000 women dying each year from indoor air
    pollution from the use of pre-industrial fuel use, poorly
    ventilated stoves. So India's need for new types of energy for
    basic heating and so forth, that is unique to India.
        So each country has unique opportunities for the United
    States to take its research, its technology, engage the private
    sector, engage the nonprofit community, engage the academic
    community. There are so many significant needs out there in the
    world that I think it will be an opportunity for the United
    States to contribute significantly to where we go in the coming
    decades on climate change.
        Mr. Connaughton. Senator, if I might add.
        Senator Jeffords. Yes.
        Mr. Connaughton. The Monterrey consensus by which we are
    trying to create harder criteria for countries we think can be
    successful is also important to this overall enterprise. We
    need to create the kind of economic, social, and political
    environment in some of the developing world in some of these
    larger developing countries by which we can actually get the
    kind of long-term investment that we enjoy in the United
    States, which, as you know, tends to deliver the better
    technologies. If you are in an unstable environment, if you are
    in an environment where capital is not protected, if you are
    not engaged in the international trade world by which you have
    to become competitive on efficiency and productivity grounds,
    you just will not get those kinds of investments that will turn
    things around faster.
        So I do not want to leave off the other programs that do
    not necessarily obviously have the effect that we are
    discussing in terms of the environmental dimensions of that.
    But from an environmental perspective and also from a
    greenhouse gas perspective, those agendas are really critical
    toward making real progress on a much shorter time line in some
    of these countries toward environmental protection. And it
    opens the door for the kinds of very rich dialogs we have going
    on right now, but it will open the door for even more
    consequential dialog as we are able to share technical
    capacity, share regulatory mechanisms, the ones that work, the
    ones that do not work, and maybe help them leapfrog through
    some of our lessons as we now get to a more streamlined, more
    market-based system of addressing some of our issues.
        Senator Jeffords. A question for both of you. What are the
    top three U.S. substantive priorities for the Summit of clear
    sustainable development outcomes? What do you think the Summit
    will achieve in terms of real sustainable development results
    at home and abroad?
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, I think I would answer that in a
    couple of ways. The top three sectoral areas that we have
    opportunities to make commitments in are I think, as I
    mentioned, in the area of fresh water, health, and the
    availability of energy. A more thematic approach, I think it is
    an opportunity to implement the realization that taking care of
    the environment starts with taking care of people, the
    opportunity for the United States to reduce poverty around the
    world. And third, I think we have an opportunity to change the
    way we have traditionally done assistance around the world, and
    not just economic assistance for developing nations, but to in
    fact incorporate a new theme where we help countries help
    themselves with better ruling capacity, help them invest in
    their own people, help them encourage entrepreneurship and
    involvement of the private sector.
        So I think we have an opportunity to build a new paradigm
    of partnerships out around the world.
        Senator Jeffords. Mr. Connaughton, why do you believe that
    the more environmentally sound EPA straw proposal on
    multipollutant legislation was rejected by the White House?
        Mr. Connaughton. That was an initial straw proposal that
    then went through extensive analysis, economic analysis,
    feasibility analysis, toward what we think is a quite strong
    proposal, a 70 percent reduction in the three criteria
    pollutants, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and mercury, but is
    also one that is attainable. We can go quite far, Senator, as
    you know, but we can do it in a way that keeps us within the
    realm of not having an impact on consumers, making
    unprecedented strides in terms of the environmental protections
    that that would deliver and do it on a timeline by which the
    economic community can actually make investments toward these
    leapfrogging efforts and give them the long-term certainty with
    their investments where they can actually do some significant
    capital planning. So there were a number of factors that came
    into our policy that led us to a different place, but not a
    markedly different place.
        I would also note, and I want to emphasize because it comes
    up frequently, the issue of coal. Coal represents 50 percent of
    electricity generation today. Coal is affordable, it is
    reliable, and it is here, it is domestically secure. But what
    we need to do is we need much cleaner coal-fired generation.
    The way you do that is to create the right kind of incentives,
    and we have got a lot of money on the table toward clean coal
    technologies as part of our climate policy as well as part of
    our air policy, but you also then need to create the kind of
    timelines so that the plants can turn over in a way that makes
    sense to business investors so that they will actually invest
    in the application of these technologies. As you know, Senator,
    it is quite exciting the technologies that are potentially
    available. If we create the right timeframe, make the levels
    economically reasonable, we think we can spur the investment
    toward the application of those technologies, the broad
    application, which then preserves a role for coal even as we
    continue with a more diversified energy system.
        We need more nuclear, we need more natural gas, we have to
    look to solar wind and some of these other renewable
    technologies in which we have quite a strong commitment. But we
    should not lose sight of the incentive we have, not just for
    the United States, because if we can advance coal technologies
    in the United States, then we can take them to places like
    China where they are not going to be creating massive wind
    farms to address their energy needs. And they are putting in a
    lot of baseload capacity. It would be really helpful for us to
    take our success here and take it international.
        So a whole lot of factors went into it and we really did
    try to look at this holistically and consistent with our
    overall energy and economic goals. We think we hit the right
    balance.
        Senator Jeffords. Mr. Turner, is the U.S. prepared to agree
    to seek higher appropriations in the outyears to replenish the
    global environmental facility GEF in order to leverage other
    donors?
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, the President
    committed us to I believe $178 million on the GEF, realizing
    this is an important outreach especially in developing
    countries. So for the first time we recommended catching up
    with our arrears and adding in $70 million for the first time.
        Currently, the third replenishment negotiations are under
    way and we plan to participate in those in a dialog with the
    world community to see where the world wants to go next. The
    focus of the GEF is extremely important to the United States.
    But I am pleased that we made a significant increase in our
    request to the Congress on the GEF. The consideration of the
    next round is under review.
        Senator Jeffords. I am pleased to hear that. It seems like
    this would be necessary to fully implement the Convention to
    Combat Desertification and the Stockholm Convention on
    Persistent Organic Pollutants and the prior informed consent
    Convention. So I appreciate that information.
        For both of you. The Senate-passed Sense of Congress on
    Climate Change, Section 1001 of the Energy Policy Act of 2002,
    says the U.S. should take responsible actions to ensure
    significant and meaningful reductions in emissions of
    greenhouse gases from all sectors, and take part in
    international negotiations that lead to U.S. participation in a
    fully binding climate change treaty. Is the U.S. presenting
    anything at the World Summit in terms of clear targets and
    timetables for addressing climate change and reducing emissions
    consistent with this?
        Mr. Connaughton. With respect to the World Summit, first
    off, climate change will be discussed but it is not an agenda
    for action because just a few short weeks later the Conference
    of the Parties will be meeting again. And so there is a
    separate international meeting to continue to carry out the
    discussions under the Framework Convention and under the Kyoto
    Protocol.
        With respect the first point, I think the answer to that is
    yes, we are moving forward with the kind of international
    bilateral and multilateral process that Assistant Secretary
    Turner outlined for you to, in fact, re-engage, since we are
    not participating in the Kyoto Protocol, engage outside of that
    particular forum to come up with common strategies, again, not
    just domestically but with our international partners,
    including other countries who may or may not become part of the
    Kyoto Protocol. So we are not waiting for decisions on that to
    take the kind of action that that resolution urged.
        We remain guided by the precursor resolution that we need
    to have an approach that does not significantly impact the
    economy, and also an approach that does engage developing
    countries, which were the two key pieces that were missing. So
    we remain guided by that as well. And we are looking forward to
    seeing significant progress. I would note that the President's
    commitment of an 18 percent reduction in greenhouse gas
    intensity, that alone in 2010 would result in 100 million
    metric tons avoided from business as usual, which is quite a
    consequential amount of tons of carbon avoided. We think that
    also is consistent with the spirit of the Senate resolution.
        Senator Jeffords. As you both know, I have deep concerns
    over the way we are handling the results of pollution from our
    power companies. Have you been involved in any of the decisions
    related to the release of the New Source Review documents to
    the Congress or in discussions of adopting a new policy and
    providing less information to Congress? That is kind of a
    little nasty question.
        Mr. Connaughton. First of all, yes, the New Source Review
    policy was the--EPA was directed under the National Energy
    Plan, in consultation with the Department of Energy, to prepare
    the report on the impacts of the New Source Review program on
    electricity supply. So that was a joint exercise between the
    two agencies in which the various White House offices, as part
    of our interagency process, we were apprised of its progress
    and where that was heading.
        In terms of the recommendations that came from EPA, there
    too, consistent with other processes, EPA kept us informed of
    where that was going. We had extensive interagency
    conversations about the various recommendations that EPA was
    considering. The end product was produced by EPA and then was
    received back into the interagency process to see what it
    meant.
        When EPA's regulatory proposals to implement the
    recommendations are complete, those will come over to the
    Office of Management and Budget and, consistent with our
    traditional processes, those will receive interagency review as
    well, as do all other significant regulations, and we expect to
    be a part of the review of the regulations at that time.
        In response to your final point, the dig on information, we
    understand you had information requested out to EPA and they
    got some information to you and others not to you on quite the
    timeframe you expected. But it is my understanding that the
    large body of that has made it up to the committee. And so
    while I suppose we could talk about timelines for getting it to
    you, it is my understanding it has made its way to you. So, if
    there is more to discuss on that, I would be happy to do what I
    can and talk to EPA.
        Senator Jeffords. I cannot tell you how disturbing it is
    with that particular issue, which is a life-saving issue, as
    you well know, that we have had such troubles in that regard.
    So I appreciate that.
        There are other Senators who could not be here today
    because of their busy schedules, and thus they will have the
    opportunity to submit questions to you to be responded to in
    writing. So I just want to let you know that. I also want to
    thank you very much for being here today and candidly
    participating in our question and answer period.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time, and
    Chairman Sarbanes, and your interest in giving the
    Administration the opportunity to discuss a very important
    subject matter, and that is the implementation of our
    international obligations. So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Connaughton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you both.
        We will now move on to our next panel. Our first witness is
    the Honorable Maurice Strong. He is a native of Canada and
    resides in Buckhorn, Ontario. Mr. Strong has long-standing ties
    with the private and public sectors and has served in an
    impressive array of business, government, and nongovernmental
    organizations. Currently, Mr. Strong is a Special Advisor to
    the Secretary General of the United Nations, President of the
    Council for the University for Peace, a Senior Advisor to the
    President of the World Bank, and Chairman of the Earth Council.
    Mr. Strong was the Secretary General of the 1992 United Nations
    Conference on Environment and Development, and the 1972 United
    Nations Conference on the Human Environment, and subsequently
    became the Executive Director of the United Nations
    Environmental Program.
        Mr. Strong, thank you for traveling all the way from Canada
    to be here with us today. Let me introduce the other two on the
    panel and then we will start with you for a statement.
        The second member of the panel is Mr. John Dernbach. He is
    a professor of law at Widener University Law School. He is
    editing a book, ``Stumbling Toward Sustainability,'' that
    assesses progress the U.S. has made on the sustainable
    development in the past 10 years and recommends the next steps.
    Welcome. We look forward to hearing from you.
        Also, we have Christopher Horner, who serves as a Senior
    Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and as Counsel
    of the Cooler Heads Coalition. That sounds like what we need.
        Please proceed, Mr. Strong.

       STATEMENT OF HON. MAURICE STRONG, CHAIRMAN, EARTH COUNCIL
               INSTITUTE CANADA, TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA

        Mr. Strong. Distinguished Chairman, Senator Jeffords,
    Senator Feingold, ladies and gentleman. First let me
    congratulate you, Senator Jeffords, on your leadership on these
    issues and say what a privilege it is for me to have the
    opportunity of testifying before these two important committees
    of the U.S. Senate as you consider issues which are at the
    center of my own life interests and concerns. It is
    particularly encouraging to know that you are addressing these
    issues at a time when the position of the United States of
    America in respect to these issues has never been more
    important to the human future.
        The United States has been at the center of the movement to
    develop since the first Stockholm Conference first put these
    issues on the international agenda an international regime of
    cooperation and of institution-building to deal with the
    dilemma which Stockholm revealed. The fact that through our
    economic life we are impinging on the resource environmental
    and life systems on which the future of all life on earth and,
    indeed, our economic welfare also depend.
        And as we move toward the World Summit on Sustainable
    Development in Johannesburg that will meet next month, these
    issues have special importance. Because if we fail at that
    conference to re-ignite the momentum that we achieved at Rio de
    Janeiro 10 years ago, I do not know when that momentum is
    likely to be rejuvenated. So I am deeply encouraged by these
    hearings and pleased and grateful at the opportunity you have
    provided to hear some views. Those views are primarily
    reflected, Mr. Chairman, in my written presentation. I have to
    say, I got your invitation when I was down in Central America,
    so I had to do it rather hurriedly. But I do hope they will
    help to amplify some of the comments I will now make briefly.
        The recent retreat by the United States from much of its
    long stand role as the leading driver of these issues, as
    particularly evidenced by its withdrawal from the Kyoto
    Protocol of the Climate Change Convention, threatens the
    progress that has been made in collaborative management of our
    environmental problems in the past thirty years and the
    prospects for further progress that is so essential for our
    future. And let me say, Senator, I probably have spent as much
    time in my life in the United States as I have in my home
    country. I think I have paid more taxes here than I have in my
    home country.
        Senator Jeffords. We appreciate that very much.
        Mr. Strong. So I come here as a friend and admirer of all
    things American. My comments are expressions of my concern, not
    to be taken as criticism, but expressions of concern that I
    believe reflect the concerns of many Americans and people
    throughout the world concerning the nature of the U.S. position
    on these issues. They have indeed cast a cloud over prospects
    for the World Summit on Sustainable Development which will
    convene next month in Johannesburg.
        What the United States does or fails to do matters,
    Chairman, as you so well know, and that is why you have
    convened these hearings. It matters immensely. Not only in
    substance, but in example. As the most powerful nation in the
    world, indeed you are a nation that gives a signal to others.
    Therefore, any withdrawal of your commitment to international
    negotiating processes and to the agreements that have been
    reached over so many years really does undermine the very
    fabric of international cooperation and the international legal
    system, which the United States itself and the whole world owes
    it a great debt of gratitude, Senator, for its leadership in
    these past thirty years in developing that framework. It is
    still far from perfect. We cannot allow it to slip back.
        So I am really encouraged by these hearings that you are
    focusing now on the whole process by which the United States,
    yes, and others, have performed under existing commitments and
    decisions of past conferences. There is a whole spectrum I do
    not need to elaborate. There are agreements reached at
    conferences and ratified by fora such as the General Assembly
    of the United Nations.
        In Rio we made considerable progress. Yes, we did not do
    everything that we had hoped for. But we did make very
    significant progress. And the United States and others really
    signed on to some very important agreements: the agreement on
    climate change, the Convention on Climate Change, the Framework
    Convention; the Convention on Biodiversity, both of which has
    now been ratified by the United States; the Convention to
    Combat Desertification, which you, Senator Jeffords, have taken
    such an important leadership role in. And so we very much hope
    now that there will be a renewal in that leadership.
        I was pleased to hear Administration officials here, who I
    know, presenting the case for continued strong support for so
    many of these issues, but frankly not all of the ones where
    U.S. leadership is important.
        I see my time has lapsed, so I would be delighted to expand
    on any of these concerns in the question period. And again
    thank you, Senator Jeffords.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much.
        Next is Professor John Dernbach. He is a Professor of law
    at Widener University Law School. He is editing a book,
    ``Stumbling Through Sustainability,'' that assesses progress
    that the U.S. has made on sustainable development in the past
    10 years and recommends next steps. Welcome, Professor.

     STATEMENT OF JOHN C. DERNBACH, PROFESSOR, WIDENER UNIVERSITY
                               LAW SCHOOL

        Mr. Dernbach. Thank you, Chairman Jeffords, Senator
    Feingold. It is a delight to be here. I appreciate the
    opportunity to discuss U.S. adherence to its sustainable
    development commitments, particularly those made at the Earth
    Summit in 1992. As you mentioned, I am the editor of a 32-
    chapter book on U.S. sustainable development efforts in this
    past 10 years. The book is being published this week by the
    Environmental Law Institute here in Washington. The book's 42
    contributors come from universities and law schools,
    nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and State
    Government. They are respected experts in their fields.
        What I would like to do is briefly review some of the
    book's findings and then share some of its basic
    recommendations in a little greater detail.
        The U.S. has, unquestionably, begun to take some steps
    toward sustainable development, largely because of our
    environmental and conservation laws. Yet, on balance, the
    United States is now far from being a sustainable society, and
    in many ways is farther away than it was at the time of the
    Earth Summit in 1992.
        International leadership begins at home. With 5 percent of
    the world's population, the United States was in 1992
    responsible for about 24 percent of the world's energy
    consumption and almost 30 percent of the world's raw materials
    consumption. Since the Earth Summit, materials use has
    increased 10 percent, primary energy consumption has increased
    21 percent, and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions have
    increased by 13 percent. Over and over, the books contributors
    found increases in materials and energy efficiency, and in the
    effectiveness of pollution controls for individual sources,
    were outweighed by increases in consumption and increases in
    pollution related to the manner in which things were made.
    Despite a significant increase in municipal waste recycling in
    the past decade, for example, U.S. generation and disposal of
    municipal solid waste per capita have been growing since 1996.
        According to Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson, ``four
    more planet Earths'' would be needed for ``every person in the
    world to reach present U.S. levels of consumption with existing
    technology.'' Yet the U.S. standard of living, equated with
    high levels of consumption and the ``good life,'' is widely
    envied and emulated throughout the world.
        In this and in many other ways, though not all ways, the
    United States has not exercised the kind of leadership
    necessary for sustainable development. My sense is that we are
    often unwilling to face such issues because we do not feel like
    we have the tools. The book provides an issue-by-issue roadmap
    for sustainable development in the United States and ways that
    would enhance prosperity and protect and restore our
    environment.
        For starters, the Federal Government should adopt and
    implement a national strategy for sustainable development, with
    specific goals and priorities, to harness all sectors of
    society to achieve our economic, social, environmental, and
    security goals. The strategy would lead to a stronger, more
    prosperous America with higher quality of life because we would
    be pursuing these goals in ways that support each other in
    greater and greater degrees over time, rather than undermine
    each other. The strategy could be modeled on that of the
    European Union or States such as Oregon and New Jersey, and
    specifically address climate change, biodiversity,
    international trade, and other major issues. The President
    could get the process started with an appropriate Executive
    Order to Federal agencies under the Government Performance and
    Results Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. An
    executive-level entity would be needed to coordinate and assist
    in the implementation of the strategy. A counterpart entity in
    Congress would also be helpful. A set of indicators to measure
    progress in achieving goals would make the strategy more
    effective and meaningful.
        In addition, the United States needs to recognize that its
    substantial consumption levels, coupled with domestic
    population growth, have serious environmental, social, and
    economic impacts. Americans also need to understand that human
    well-being can be maintained and enhanced by more efficient and
    effective use of materials and energy and by less polluting
    means of production. There are a variety of legal and policy
    tools available to deal with this, including a number of policy
    and legal tools that have been applied at the State level,
    including renewable energy portfolio standards, Senator, as you
    know, and smart growth legislation. Northern European countries
    are also experimenting with a shift in taxes on materials and
    energy, on one hand, they are shifting some of the tax to there
    from labor and income, on the other hand. And there is some
    very interesting research on that.
        The U.S. needs to take a stronger and more constructive
    role internationally, not only on terrorism but on the broad
    range of issues related to sustainable development. Congress
    should repeal or modify laws, policies, and subsidies that
    encourage unsustainable development. Protection of natural
    resources and the environment must focus more holistically on
    the resources to be protected, and on understanding those
    resources. Finally, transportation, public health, and other
    social infrastructure and institutions should be designed and
    operated to further economic, environmental, and security goals
    at the same time.
        We know what we need to do, and we also know why. The
    challenge I think is to deliver on what we know. Thank you.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much.
        Our next witness is Christopher Horner. He serves as Senior
    Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and is counsel
    to the Cooler Heads Coalition. We need you. Welcome.

    STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER C. HORNER, SENIOR FELLOW, COMPETITIVE
                          ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

        Mr. Horner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold, for
    your interest. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before
    this joint panel on what is a very important topic. The scope
    of the hearing is broad, as evidenced by the Administration's
    testimony regarding all of its efforts and all of the treaties
    we have committed to. So I am going to limit my testimony to
    the propriety or impropriety of the U.S. implementing or, more
    accurately, amending the Rio Treaty, the U.N. Framework
    Convention on Climate Change, by adopting or ratifying the
    Kyoto Protocol.
        For whatever specific reasons, be they economic growth,
    failure to foresee the energy requirements of the new economy,
    or other, the U.S., like many nations, failed to meet its Rio
    targets, the specific numerical target of 1990 greenhouse gas
    emission levels, although not our funding targets and other
    efforts we did implement successfully. Now some advocates
    assert, because the U.S. has not met its Rio goal, we must
    commit to even greater, that is, more unrealistic, mandatory
    reductions, that is, Kyoto. Attempting instead to comply with
    the initial treaty seems the more appropriate response, for
    several reasons.
        Rio went into force in March 1994. President Clinton did
    not request, nor did Congress enact, independent legislation
    implementing Rio, which was not an inherently self-implementing
    treaty. Authority and precedent make clear that responsibility
    for proposing such programs lies with the White House. If our
    non-binding Rio obligations in fact bound the U.S. to achieve
    specific reductions, contrary to contemporary Senate and
    Executive assertions of U.S. intentions, then the Executive
    interpretation of Rio Article 4 specifically throughout the
    1990's was actually incorrect, and is responsible. The pending
    question is apparently, does the U.S. respond by attempting to
    meet such Rio promises, or by making further, even deeper,
    binding promises?
        Skipping specific pursuit of the U.S.' Rio promises, in
    favor of Kyoto's binding commitments even greater than those we
    have failed to attain, seems highly illogical. Compounding this
    of course is that precisely 5 years ago tomorrow, happy
    anniversary, the Senate unanimously spoke to what it recognized
    was an unacceptable drift away from the U.S.' Rio stance
    adamantly opposed to binding commitments. The Senate, seeing
    what was developing, asserted its ``advice'' pursuant to
    Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, passing Byrd-Hagel
    S. Res. 98 unanimously.
        Subsequent to and despite this advice, U.S. negotiators
    clearly disregarded both major Byrd-Hagel recommendations:
    Kyoto did not require developing countries to share our
    commitments, and even the Clinton White House economic advisors
    have recanted their refutations of the Kyoto cost estimates.
        Since then, nothing has emerged to indicate that Kyoto does
    not still violate both key Byrd-Hagel conditions, and it is
    likely that very few Senators, though new members have arrived,
    have amended their position against a treating causing
    ``serious economic harm.'' However, Clinton Administration
    officials did admit that they began working on the plan for
    binding commitments within 1 year after Rio went into effect.
        Kyoto, too, is clearly intended to be a similar step in a
    ``treaty hopping'' campaign; even the models on which it is
    based predict an undetectable climatic impact, at a cost to the
    U.S. of up to $400 billion annually, according to EIA, yet
    maybe 1/30th of what its proponents seek. Rio and Kyoto offer
    differing commitments but purport ``the same ultimate
    objective.'' The U.N. IPCC has said that this means reducing
    greenhouse gas emissions by as much as 60 to 80 percent, which
    of course wildly exceeds Kyoto's specified ambitions.
        As such, the U.S. should require, prior to and as part of
    ratifying any further agreements, express acknowledgement not
    only of the actual ``ultimate goal,'' but that it is committed
    to its practical requirements, in this case up to ``30
    Kyotos.'' In this case, to a degree, I agree with Professor
    Dernbach, which is we need to set out specifically where we are
    going and what this requires. Now, I do not agree entirely with
    the Professor's testimony, but in concept, if this is where we
    are going, we need to expressly set it out in advance, now
    given that knowledge has changed, the interpretation of the
    ultimate goal has changed.
        Such treaty hopping agendas illustrate the importance of
    Senate treaty ``reservations,'' or the Senate's second bite at
    the ``advice'' apple. This comes of course during the
    ``consent'' function, which function the U.S. negotiators
    unfortunately eviscerated. After agreeing to terms incompatible
    with Byrd-Hagel, the Administration also accepted Kyoto's
    prohibition on reservations, or the Senate's ability to specify
    the specific understandings or conditions of the U.S.
    commitment. This despite the Senate having also forewarned the
    Administration about this in advance of Kyoto.
        In summation, President Bush ought to match his assertions
    of having ``reject'' Kyoto with the requisite submission to the
    U.N. to that effect, as was done regarding the International
    Criminal Court. In the absence of that, the White House must at
    minimum assist resolution of the ambiguous U.S. role in Kyoto--
    we sent that letter to the U.N. for a reason. Signatures carry
    responsibilities--by requesting the Senate disapprove of the
    treaty. In the absence of that, the Senate should recognize
    that there is no reverse equivalent of the ``presentment
    clause'' regarding treaties. Only protocol, not any
    constitutional prohibition, impedes Senate consideration of a
    signed treaty. Certainly given the imperative rhetoric
    surrounding Kyoto, if President Bush insists on continuing the
    U.S.' ambiguous role, the Senate should take matters into its
    own hands and decide the fate of the treaty.
        That resolution should by definition, for the process
    problems I identified, be rejection of Kyoto. Otherwise, by
    accepting this double indignity of ignoring advice and
    prohibiting reservations, this body would condone Executive
    circumvention of the Senate's constitutional treaty role. Thank
    you.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you for that advice. I appreciate
    it.
        Senator Feingold.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR
                      FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN

        Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
    pleased to be here today. I think the idea of having the
    Foreign Relations and Environment and Public Works Committees
    come together to conduct oversight of the implementation of
    U.S. commitments under the environmental treaties that the
    Senate has ratified is both a good idea and it is long over-
    due. So I think you, as I frequently feel toward this Chairman.
        The United States was among the principal architects of
    each of the agreements we are examining today. U.S. negotiators
    worked hard to develop and craft these agreements and ensure
    our Government and our interests were well-represented. The
    Senate then ratified these agreements with the view that
    desertification, ozone depletion, global climate change, trade
    in endangered species, and sustainable development through
    trade were important national and global issues. I am
    concerned, given our history and leadership, about the growing
    perception internationally that the United States is backing
    away from our international environmental commitments. I am
    pleased that the Administration testified on this. I am eager
    to hear more because I suspect that much of the ongoing
    diplomatic effort on these agreements may be under-reported in
    the press.
        Nonetheless, I believe that there is a serious perception
    problem, and one that needs remedied. It is my view that unless
    the United States exercises leadership for sustainable
    development in all relevant international forums, it will
    continue to miss many opportunities to improve environmental
    and social conditions worldwide, and it will perpetuate a
    perception that the United States does not keep its sustainable
    development commitments.
        As the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Africa of the
    Foreign Relations Committee--excuse me, as the Chairman of the
    subcommittee, thanks to Senator Jeffords----
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Feingold. I used to be the Ranking Member. That is
    why I said I thank him a lot. But I have had the opportunity to
    see first-hand how valuable the provisions of these agreements
    are to the people of Africa, where nearly one-quarter of dry
    lands are moderately or severely desertified, ozone level
    changes only exacerbate that problem, and endangered species
    contribute significantly both culturally and economically to
    many African states.
        These issues cut across borders and affect entire regions.
    One of the primary benefits, in my view, of U.S. participation
    in these agreements is the opportunity to take advantage of
    multilateral coordination to address these problems.
        So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And if you would permit, I
    have just a couple of questions.
        Senator Jeffords. Please proceed.
        Senator Feingold. Let me first say that I was pleased to
    come here because of the importance of the hearing. But I am
    particularly thrilled because Professor Dernbach is a friend of
    mine who I have not seen in about thirty years. We debated
    against each other in high school. He is one of the smartest
    guys I have ever met. I think we each won some, is that fair to
    say, John?
        Mr. Dernbach. Something like that, yes.
        Senator Feingold. I have admired his work on environmental
    issues from afar. He is a wonderful choice to have before the
    Committee, and a native of our great State of Wisconsin.
        Let me ask a question first of Mr. Strong. You mentioned in
    your statement a concern that I share, as I have just
    indicated, that the perception that the United States' efforts
    on environmental issues is dwindling and that it is affecting
    our bilateral relationship. Would you share for the record the
    effects you have observed with our closest neighbor, Canada.
        Mr. Strong. Yes. Thanks, Senator. I do not of course speak
    for Canada, but I have less reticence to express my concerns
    about the Canadian position that I do here in this Senate about
    the U.S. position. I have to say that your sum of the retreat,
    what I have called retreat from leadership, and of course it is
    not an across-the-board retreat on every issue, has spilled
    over to Canada.
        We have a very serious national controversy now about
    whether Canada should or should not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
    That is probably the most significant single impact. Of course
    the decision of the United States has immense influence, and
    there are immense constituencies in the industry in which I
    used to be, the energy industry, there is quite strong
    resistance, though not across-the-board resistance. Our Prime
    Minister has committed his government to ratify, but the
    provinces in Canada have significant rights and some of them,
    particularly Alberta and even Ontario, where I live, have come
    out against that. So they have not made their decision. But
    there is no question that on this issue and so many others,
    what the U.S. does influences Canada.
        And to just add to that, there is significant public
    concern about the current U.S. position on some of these
    issues. The polls in Canada show, as I believe they do here in
    the United States, a higher degree of public concern than is
    expressed yet at the top political levels.
        So, yes, what the U.S. says and does matters in Canada. But
    it also I have to say, as one who spends a lot of my time
    outside of this continent, it matters everywhere.
        Senator Feingold. Professor Dernbach, I think you would
    agree that U.S. concern over cost of compliance contributes
    significantly to the current difficulties with the Kyoto
    Protocol. I believe you looked at this issue in some detail.
    Would you share with the committee some of the economically
    beneficial actions we have taken to implement our commitments
    under the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and just
    highlight briefly some opportunities for further meeting our
    current commitments at low-cost, even if the U.S. Government
    does not actually ratify Kyoto.
        Mr. Dernbach. A lot of the positive things that have been
    done on climate change in the last 10 years have occurred at
    the State level. There is actually a fairly large number of
    legal and policy tools that have been employed at the State
    level--tax credits metering, which would allow somebody with a
    big windmill to sell their excess electricity back to the grid;
    renewable energy portfolio standards that require electricity
    providers to scale-up the amount of renewable energy that they
    provide on a fairly steady basis. There are many, many of those
    kinds of tools out there that are being used.
        What is particularly interesting about State use of those
    tools is the justifications the States use, justifications that
    you do not hear in the national climate debate. Let me share
    what I mean by that.
        At the State level, there is a lot of conversation about
    creating jobs, developing technology, protecting poor people
    from the adverse effects of fossil fuel price fluctuations,
    reducing other pollutants, and strengthening the economic base
    of the State. Climate change is almost incidental in a lot of
    those discussions, even though reducing greenhouse gases is
    surely one of the results.
        I think that what that suggests is that if we look hard at
    the various types of things that States have been doing,
    looking at the effects of those, you could fashion I think a
    fairly potent, fairly effective, fairly economically beneficial
    package of legislation to deal with climate change at the
    Federal level that would create jobs, develop technology,
    enhance our export markets, would attract capital investment,
    would drive down costs of renewable energy and make electricity
    a lot more affordable for other folks, among many, many other
    things.
        So, in sum, the experience of the States on climate change
    suggests a very different way of thinking about both the
    benefits and the costs of climate change than a lot of the
    conversation that I hear at the national level.
        Senator Feingold. Thank you, Professor Dernbach. It is good
    to see you again. And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
    your generous amount of time.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you for coming. We appreciate your
    presence here. It is important.
        Let me now turn to some questions. Mr. Strong, what do you
    see as the major differences between preparations for Rio and
    Johannesburg, and what has impeded the current process?
        Mr. Strong. Mr. Chairman, part of the difference of course
    is the change of political climate. The preoccupation of the
    United States and other countries with the war against
    terrorism, the economic implications of the downturn, I think
    this has all created a more difficult climate. Also, I think
    there has been perhaps a less extensive involvement of the
    various constituencies, the civil society constituencies, et.
    cetera. And most of all, I would say the cloud cast over the
    Summit by the recent actions of the United States that have
    been reported here both internationally and domestically which
    signal a significant backing away, should I say, of the kind of
    leadership that the world community has looked to the United
    States for for so much of the thirty years since Stockholm put
    the issue on the agenda.
        There is a response to that. For the first time, as you
    know, Senator, some of the traditional friends of the United
    States which have always followed its leadership in the past,
    even when they were a little uncomfortable about it, are not
    necessarily now following its leadership on these issues. As
    you know, the European Union and Japan, despite controversies,
    have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. We still have not got enough
    to make that 55 percent. I hope my own country will weigh in on
    that. The position of Russia is still not certain. But this has
    cast a cloud.
        Now it is true that the United States, as the
    Administration officials have said, are doing some very good
    work in some very good areas. But on the more fundamental
    issues that literally affect the future of our civilization and
    of our economies, there is a huge concern that Johannesburg
    will actually see some slippage from the performance under the
    commitments reached at Rio and before.
        So I see Johannesburg as a very, very important milestone,
    not, Senator, because conferences solve everything, but because
    they provide the gathering point where you can either breakdown
    in your attempt to move forward or you can actually move
    forward. At the moment, the signs are very, very disconcerting.
    I believe that if we lose the opportunity of Johannesburg to
    move ahead on these issues that literally we will face threats
    to our security and our economy over time even greater than
    those that we face from the horrendous terrorist acts.
        May I mention one other thing, sir. In my statement, I
    would like just to call your attention to a couple of specific
    suggestions that I will not elaborate here. But my conviction
    is that the reason for slippage fundamentally in our
    commitments is motivation. That is why I am spending so much of
    my time on the motivational issues. What are they? One is the
    economic motivation, the whole system of fiscal measures,
    taxes, policies, regulations by which governments incent the
    behavior of corporations and industries. And in all countries,
    including this, they are heavily skewed to continue to incent
    unsustainable behavior. I believe it is quite possible for
    those measures to meet their primary objectives without having
    the same consequences. And I think if this body could even
    initiate a review of that whole system, in a sense do an
    environmental performance review on fiscal tax subsidy
    policies, et. cetera.
        The second motivational aspect is moral and ethical. That
    becomes very, very important and it is deeply important for
    America which is based on values. A distinguished American,
    David Rockefeller, headed the group that has drafted the Earth
    Charter, a statement of basic moral and ethical principles
    designed to guide the conduct of nations and peoples toward the
    earth and toward each other. That we hope the U.S. will
    support. It does not have to agree to it in a formal manner,
    but we hope that the United States delegation will recognize
    it. Your Conference of Mayors and many U.S. organizations
    representing literally several millions of Americans have
    endorsed this. We would like to see, sir, America recognize
    this because, again, our moral and ethical values are at the
    root of the way in which we set our priorities and the way in
    which we respond to this challenge.
        This country's history and its example has been based on
    its commitment to moral and ethical values. Therefore, I am
    hopeful and encouraged that you are going to rise to that. And
    this hearing certainly underscores and reinforces that, sir. I
    am sorry I took a little long to respond to your question, but
    I do feel strongly, as I know you do, about these issues.
        Senator Jeffords. Very excellent statement. I am taking it
    under careful advisement. Thank you.
        Mr. Horner?
        Mr. Horner. I would like to distinguish Rio and
    Johannesburg and possibly break new ground for me and praise
    the Administration for what they are doing in preparation for
    Johannesburg. First, with Rio we had a cue of treaties that had
    been developed over years that were to be culminated in Rio. We
    do not really face that now. We face, as the Administration
    witnesses testified, talking more about details, actual
    implementation, the state of implementation, next steps. And I
    do applaud what the Administration is trying to do regarding
    good governance, saying in essence capacity-building, which is
    a term used in the environmental treaty context quite a bit, we
    will pay countries to be ready to receive what they will
    receive under the treaties. We are trying to build capacity for
    good governance through economic and judicial reforms,
    openness, to say are you ready to take this environmental and
    general foreign aid and not have it go down the rat hole, for
    which I applaud them.
        Now they did get off track with handling environmental
    issues very poorly, including again recently, May-June, and
    with that submission their efforts at focusing on known
    problems that purportedly would be worse under, for example,
    climate change. They redirected the focus back to climate
    change, but they were doing very well in advancing it toward
    safe drinking water, the world's number one environmental
    threat, which purportedly would be worse. But for a cost of a
    year of Kyoto you could make significant advances in that.
    AIDS, infectious diseases, they need to get the dialog back
    where it was.
        They have made progress. The focus on good governance,
    capacity-building for receiving this aid so we can have actual
    environmental improvement for environmental aid, it is the
    right direction. I just hope they stay focused.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
        Mr. Dernbach, what is your prognosis for the World Summit?
    And what follow-up activities are needed?
        Mr. Dernbach. My hope for the World Summit is that we come
    out of it with specific targets and timetables, not just for
    the social issues, as important as the social issues are, but
    also for environmental issues. And what I mean by targets and
    timetables are the kinds of things that have been suggested by
    a great many organizations including the OECD, which is to say
    by a certain date we achieve a certain result, either
    internationally or regionally or nationally. Without targets
    and timetables, you have goals with no deadline that are in
    some basic way as a result not goals at all. So that is what I
    would hope would come out of the World Summit.
        But beyond that, and I think this is the important message
    from the book, is that what we do for sustainable development
    is not just what we agree to or do not agree to in
    Johannesburg, it is what we do at home. That is why the book is
    overwhelmingly directed at the United States and actions that
    decisionmakers in the United States ought to be making at the
    national level, State level, the local level, corporation
    decisionmakers, deans in colleges and universities, businesses
    and others. And that is what I hope will really come out of
    Johannesburg, that it will provide a kind of lift, if you will,
    to the Rio process, engage people on the importance of
    reconciling our environmental goals with our social, economic,
    and security goals.
        Senator Jeffords. Mr. Horner?
        Mr. Horner. I just want to get back to leadership I guess,
    in following on Professor Dernbach's comments. We need to
    recognize that for all intents and purposes the Bush position,
    despite bad-mouthing Kyoto, is indistinguishable from the
    Clinton-Gore position on Kyoto. For twenty-five months after
    signing the treaty for which it was open for ratification, they
    never sent it to the Senate. My thesis in my testimony is that
    is not necessary. But they did not do it. President Bush will
    not send it apparently. Neither would withdraw from it. One
    bad-mouths it, one talks a good game about killing it, though
    not really doing it. One talked a good game about pursuing it,
    though not really doing it. The position is indistinguishable.
        Leadership, of course, does not mean abandoning your own
    perspective, and the U.S. certainly has its own perspective on
    this, in large part it is because it would be the most greatly
    impacted by the treaty. So I think the Administration and the
    U.S. as a whole deserves to maintain its own perspective
    without others claiming that it has abandoned leadership by not
    doing what everybody else has done.
        Senator Jeffords. Mr. Strong, comments?
        Mr. Strong. I would like also, Mr. Chairman, to see some
    other initiatives. Energy was one of the issues that our
    friends from the Administration highlighted. It is at the heart
    of so many issues. I come from the energy industry myself and
    so I feel very deeply about that. One of the particular
    initiatives that I believe the United States could put on the
    table that would totally in line with I believe the general
    approach of this Administration is to call for the creation of
    a consultant group on clean energy, modeled very much on the
    consultant group on international agriculture research which
    did so much in the last quarter century so to relieve the
    prospect of an eminent food shortage in the world. And it is
    not even an incorporated entity. It is a mechanism that brings
    private and public interests together around the table to
    determine priorities for research and development, particularly
    in the developing world, and how to mobilize the funds to
    permit the developing countries, in particular, to afford the
    best available technologies. And it is not a new organization,
    but it is a very effective mechanism. I believe it would be
    entirely feasible for the United States to champion the
    establishment of such a thing.
        I think you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, about the importance
    of the global environment facility, of closing that gap that
    must be closed, that must be closed almost immediately to
    permit the replenishment to take place. That would also give
    prospects and morale for Johannesburg a boost.
        And then, finally, one initiative that I believe could
    emanate from this Senate, and that is we understand that you
    are to receive a report from the General Accounting Office soon
    setting out the U.S., and I am not sure if it covers others,
    performance under existing agreements. This could provide I
    suggest, Mr. Chairman, the basis for establishment of a regular
    monitoring process with reports coming out each year or 2
    years, very much like the State Department reports on human
    rights and one or two other things, which would highlight the
    performance of the United States and others in respect of the
    commitments that they have already put in place. It would be a
    fairly easy thing to do based on the report of the General
    Accounting Office, which I think is on its way. It is just one
    modest suggestion, sir, of how in a practical way there are
    still a lot of things that you could do working toward those
    larger issues.
        Most of all, sir, I am concerned that it really give people
    a new sense that their leaders really are responding to this
    challenge, that there is real movement, that there is a new
    spirit of international cooperation, and international faith in
    the United States as the leader of that cooperation.
        Senator Jeffords. Any final comments?
        Mr. Horner. I would like to say in the spirit of that,
    although the State Department offers me a tortured definition
    of the term ``Parties to Kyoto,'' the United States can let
    other ratifying Parties have what they claim to want. If the
    U.S. withdraws, we have 55 percent because 55 percent of X is
    now 55 percent of a much smaller number. It takes a very
    difficult interpretation of the Kyoto Protocol to read
    otherwise. If that is what they want, if some people truly
    believe that will help save the Planet, while we have not
    arrived at that position, we ought to withdraw and let them
    have what they want. If the other sides offer the
    interpretation of, well, we cannot have this go into effect
    against us yet, that would be interesting, but it would also
    likely bring negotiations back to a sane plane.
        I hope we all remember when these negotiations fell apart.
    They were in the Hague in 2000. The U.S. elections had occurred
    but had not been decided. Pause, wait for comment. Some members
    of the Foreign Relations Committee were there. I saw Senator
    Kerry. The EU refused to take yes for an answer because they
    saw desperation in our eyes. They changed the definition of
    ``sinks'' from ``sinks shall be used'' to ``but not really,''
    and then ``but not really if you are the U.S. but certainly if
    you are Russia,'' giving them millions of more dollars but
    making it very difficult for us to at least initially even
    comply. They fell apart in November 2000 and they have not
    recovered since.
        I believe if this is something the Administration really
    wants to negotiate, that is, a Byrd-Hagel compliant binding
    agreement, the place to start is by withdrawing from Kyoto,
    have the other Parties decide if they want it to go into effect
    against themselves, or interpret it otherwise and say we are
    going to now start renegotiating with you but this time in a
    little better faith. Because what happened in the Hague really
    defies a good faith explanation.
        Senator Jeffords. Mr. Dernbach?
        Mr. Dernbach. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
    holding this hearing. I think this is an incredibly important
    issue. There is a lot more at stake here than the
    environmental, and there is a lot more at stake here than any
    specific environmental issue.
        If we have learned anything in the last couple of decades,
    it is that the environment is connected to everything else that
    we care about--peace and security, economic development,
    national governance, and social well-being. We now face an
    enormous problem of environmental degradation around the world
    and a growing gap between the rich and the poor. The problems
    are quite real and they are not going to go away. Put a little
    different way, poverty and environmental degradation are deeply
    destabilizing because they stifle or reduce opportunities and
    quality of life for many, many people.
        The next fifty years global population is projected to
    increase by 3 billion. The global economy is likely to grow by
    four or five times. As difficult as things now are, as
    challenging as the domestic and international situation now is,
    environmental degradation and the gap between the rich and the
    poor are likely to get worse and greater if we continue with
    business as usual. The question that I would leave is whether
    that should be our legacy for our children and our
    grandchildren.
        There are things that we can do. We know we can do them. We
    ought to know that we need to do them. And I want to
    congratulate you again for holding a hearing to focus on these
    questions. Thank you so much.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank all of you for your really
    excellent presentations. I was listening very strongly and I
    just feel concerned, as you do, that we must change our ways if
    we are going to be the leader that this Nation should and must
    be as we move into the future.
        And I want to especially thank all of those that are
    attending here who have been very, very entertaining in the
    sense of looking very interested, and I believe you all are. If
    I asked a show of hands, how many agree with the last
    presentations that were made here?
        [No response.]
        Senator Jeffords. Nobody?
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Jeffords. I just wanted to check on you.
        Thank you everyone. It has been a very interesting and
    enlightening morning. We were pleased to have you all here.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committees were adjourned,
    to reconvene at the call of their respective Chairs.]
        [Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
      Statement of Hon. James M. Jeffords, U.S. Senator from the State of
                                    Vermont
        I'm glad to be here with my distinguished co-chair from the Foreign
    Relations Committee for this joint hearing. I appreciate his
    willingness to explore today's topic, and the fact that he has joined
    me as a sponsor of S. 556, the Clean Power Act. I would also like to
    applaud him for his work to bring some truth and sanity to America's
    accounting nightmare.
        The United States is an economic and military superpower, perhaps
    the lone superpower. But, as the old adage goes, with great power comes
    great responsibility. We are able to project great might far beyond our
    borders. We are also capable of contributing to environmental and
    natural resource damage far beyond our borders and far in excess of
    other countries. The question is, are we acting responsibly to curb
    negative impacts abroad and at home?
        Are we being good global neighbors and, at a minimum, keeping our
    word? It seems that we may be keeping our literal word, given the very
    broad language in many of the agreements. But in practical terms, it
    seems that we're not trying very hard to keep up with the spirit of
    some of our commitments.
        The time is ripe for Congress to review how the Administration is
    implementing our environmental agreements and commitments. Leaders of
    many countries will be meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, in late
    August at the World Summit on Sustainable Development. The occasion is
    the 10th anniversary of the United Nations Conference on Environment
    and Development held in Rio.
        I'm pleased to note that the Secretary General of that Conference,
    Mr. Maurice Strong, is here today to give us some historical
    perspective on that event and its lasting effect.
        The conferees will be met by a very different U.S. delegation in
    South Africa. The previous Bush Administration provided extensive
    support for the Rio Earth Summit and brought many new initiatives to
    the negotiating table.
        But this Administration is likely to send a smaller and lower-level
    delegation and has sought to narrow the scope of the discussions. This
    has apparently included an effort to keep global climate change off of
    the agenda.
        I am troubled by the Administration's approach to global warming,
    especially in light of the Sense of Congress approved by the Foreign
    Relations Committee and made part of the Senate approved energy bill in
    April. That Resolution says the United States should take responsible
    action to ensure significant and meaningful reductions in emissions of
    greenhouse gases from all sectors.
        But it doesn't appear that responsible action is taking place and
    emissions continue growing. As my friend Senator Chafee pointed out
    during our Committee's markup of the Clean Power Act, the
    Administration's Climate Action Report says, ``A few ecosystems, such
    as alpine meadows in the Rocky Mountains and some barrier islands, are
    likely to disappear entirely in some areas. Other ecosystems . . . are
    likely to experience major species shifts . . .''
        Our treaty commitment says, ``The ultimate objective of the
    Framework Convention on Climate Change is to stabilize greenhouse gas
    concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous
    anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should
    be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt
    naturally to climate change. . . .''
        Since these ecosystems are likely to disappear entirely because of
    manmade global warming and will not be able to adapt naturally, it
    appears that we have entered the zone of ``dangerous interference.''
    Since these are real threats of serious or irreversible damage, the
    lack of full scientific certainty about cause and effect shouldn't be
    used as an excuse for not reducing emissions now. That is also our
    commitment.
        Instead of acting to reduce emissions, the Administration's
    approach guarantees that greenhouse gas emissions will rise. According
    to Mr. Connaughton's recent testimony, there is``. . . no question
    about that.''
        This kind of inaction doesn't comport with our commitments under
    the Framework Convention, the Sense of Congress, common sense or the
    National Environmental Policy Act (or NEPA). In 1969, NEPA became law.
    It was probably the first adoption of a sustainable development
    philosophy by a government in the world. To paraphrase, it says:``. . .
    it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all
    practicable means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions
    under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill
    the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
    generations of Americans.''
        Unfortunately, the Administration seems to have lost sight of those
    future generations of Americans. Economic development that does not
    factor in the environment or quality of life of those future
    generations is not sustainable.
        The Administration and other opponents of the Kyoto Protocol claim
    that actions to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions cost too
    much now. They need to look at the long term. They also need to look at
    the many studies that have been done that show a net positive impact of
    reducing emissions.
        I ask unanimous consent that two such studies by the Tellus
    Institute and a list of other studies be placed in the record.
        There is no question that we must be concerned with the threats of
    today, like the thousands of people dying prematurely every year from
    power plant pollution. But, we can't let the press of quarterly reports
    or the hunt for short term profits prevent us from acting to reduce the
    threats of tomorrow. That's especially true in the case of terrorism or
    global warming, where we have been presented with credible information
    about the threat.
        As some of my colleagues know, I have a special interest in the
    U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification and pressed hard for its
    ratification. Senator Helms was instrumental in moving that treaty and
    I want to thank him for his and his staff's efforts in helping me and
    others get that agreement approved. This treaty addresses land
    degradation in some of the very impoverished parts of the world. It is
    designed to encourage participatory democracy and stakeholder
    involvement. I look forward to seeing how implementation is going.
        I also have an interest in ratifying and implementing the
    Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. I have introduced
    legislation maintaining the spirit of that treaty. I hope we'll be able
    to get that moving soon so the U.S. can participate in the Conference
    of Parties and the Review Committee.
        There seems to be generally good news regarding chemicals that harm
    the ozone layer. From all indications, the Montreal Protocol has been a
    success, though I gather there are some additional amendments coming
    soon. I'll be interested to learn how our efforts have reduced the
    ozone hole.
        There is less clear news on the status of the Convention on
    Biological Diversity, which was signed in 1993 but has not been sent to
    the Senate for ratification. I would also appreciate hearing an update
    from our witnesses on the progress toward implementation of the Basel
    Convention regarding the international transportation of hazardous
    waste.
        Finally, I would note something that is a little different between
    international agreements and our more conventional environmental laws.
    They often seem to be missing performance criteria or include very weak
    commitments.
        Unfortunately, in the case of climate change, even when commitments
    are minimal, such as reporting on the policies and measures we have
    adopted to achieve 1990 levels, we have failed.
        So, I would urge our negotiators to push for more specific
    environmental goals, using targets and timetables. That will make it
    easier for the Senate to know whether the treaties we have ratified are
    succeeding. Also, I believe the result will be better for the
    environment and sustainable development.
        Thank you.
                                   __________
     Statement of Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, U.S. Senator from the State of
                                  Connecticut
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing today on an
    essential topic--our nation's implementation of our international
    commitments on the environment. I regret that I am unable to attend
    today, but I must preside over the markup of the homeland security bill
    in the Governmental Affairs Committee.
        Ten years ago, the world took a dramatic step toward a sustainable
    future when it convened the Earth Summit in Rio De Janeiro during the
    tenure of the first President Bush. The Summit resulted in several of
    our most critical environmental agreements, including the Conventions
    on Climate Change and Biodiversity.
        Unfortunately, as we prepare for the next ``Earth Summit'' a decade
    later, this Bush Administration does not appear to have taken as
    aggressive an approach to our global commitment to environmental
    protection as its predecessor did. In fact, we appear to be going to
    the summit in Johannesburg with little more than a plan to delay
    enforceable action on the planet's critical needs.
        The most visible--and most integral--of the Rio agreements for our
    sustainable future may be the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
    Change. As is well-known by now, however, this Administration has
    abdicated our nation's leadership on the issue, withdrawing from the
    Kyoto Protocol and offering no alternative path forward. That's
    disturbing enough. But now we also appear ready to distract the world's
    attention from addressing this problem.
        As I understand it, the United States has affirmatively stated to
    the world community that President Bush will not attend the conference
    in Johannesburg next month if the climate change treaty is discussed.
    It is one thing to ignore this pressing problem domestically, as
    President Bush's business-as-usual proposal is essentially doing. But
    it is entirely another to ask the rest of the world to put it aside as
    well.
        Luckily, in lieu of executive leadership, we have other branches
    and levels of government that can act, and are acting. The Environment
    Committee recently passed the Clean Power Act, legislation limiting the
    release of greenhouse gases from power plants. Governor Gray Davis of
    California just this week signed legislation limiting greenhouse gas
    emissions from motor vehicles. And many other proposals are in the
    works. The world understands we need to move ahead on this issue, the
    States understand we need to move ahead on this issue, and American
    citizens understand we need to move ahead on this issue. It is time for
    the President to understand.
        I therefore call on him to attend the Johannesburg summit and take
    the climate change issue on, head on. Perhaps, when he does, he will
    see the light.
                                   __________
     Statement of John F. Turner, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans
    and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department
                                    of State
    Introduction
        Chairmen Jeffords and Sarbanes, and other members of the
    Environment and Public Works Committee and the Foreign Relations
    Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to
    review U.S. implementation of environmental treaties. The United States
    has a strong record on global environmental issues. We are a leader in
    addressing environmental challenges on the international level, having
    spearheaded efforts to negotiate environmental agreements on issues
    ranging from ozone depletion to stemming illegal trade in endangered
    species. Just a few weeks ago, the President submitted to the Senate an
    important treaty between the United States and Russia that would
    strengthen the conservation of our shared polar bear population through
    a coordinated sustainable harvest management program.
        In the case of toxic chemicals, the Administration submitted to
    Congress this spring, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
    Pollutants (POPs) and additional legislation that would allow the
    United States to implement this agreement, in addition to a regional
    agreement POPs agreement and a treaty on Prior Informed Consent. These
    multilateral agreements affirm the U.S. commitment to cooperate with
    other countries on global health and environmental challenges. My
    distinguished colleague, Jim Connaughton, just discussed the enormous
    challenges we face addressing climate change and how the Bush
    Administration intends to tackle the problem while ensuring our economy
    continues to grow.
        These treaties are just a few examples of environmental agreements
    that serve as noteworthy tools in our foreign policy arsenal. The
    Department of State plays an important role in monitoring the
    implementation of these agreements and working inter-agency and
    international processes to ensure U.S. interests are served. For
    illustrative purposes, we would like to describe our efforts related to
    the following five agreements we have ratified and currently are
    implementing--the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
    Ozone Layer; the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
    Species (CITES); the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change; the
    North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation; and the U.N.
    Convention to Combat Desertification.
    The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
        During the 1980's, the United States led a global effort to
    negotiate an agreement to phaseout the production and consumption of
    substances that deplete the ozone layer. Scientific evidence showed
    that strong steps were needed to protect human health from the
    debilitating effects of ozone depletion, such as increased incidence of
    skin cancer and cataracts. These global efforts resulted in the
    adoption of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
    Layer in September 1987, which was ratified by the United States in
    1988, and has now been ratified by 182 other countries.
        Over the last 15 years, implementation of the Montreal Protocol and
    its subsequent amendments has yielded remarkable progress in protecting
    the stratospheric ozone layer by phasing out the consumption and use of
    ozone depleting substances on a global scale. The United States has met
    its obligations under the Montreal Protocol by phasing out
    chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl
    chloroform.
        Although the State Department is the lead agency responsible for
    coordinating our participation in the Protocol, the Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA) is the principal entity responsible for
    domestic implementation of the Protocol, under authority provided by
    the Clean Air Act. (The Clean Air Act specifically authorizes EPA to
    take steps necessary to ensure that our domestic regulations are
    consistent with our obligations under the Protocol.) Additionally, the
    Department of Justice and EPA have played an important role by
    identifying and prosecuting individuals engaged in illegal smuggling of
    ozone-depleting substances, making the United States a world leader in
    these law enforcement activities.
        The Protocol also includes provisions to establish a Multilateral
    Fund to provide financial and technical assistance to developing
    country Parties to assist them in meeting their obligations under the
    Protocol. As the largest contributor to the Multilateral Fund, the
    United States has made available over $340 million to the Fund since
    its inception.
    Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
            and Flora (CITES)
        CITES, called by some the Washington Convention, concluded on March
    3, 1973 in Washington, DC. and entered into force on July 1, 1975. As
    of July 1st of this year, 158 Parties have adopted the Convention.
        CITES conservation goals are to: monitor international trade in
    endangered species; maintain those species in an ecological balance;
    and assist countries toward a sustainable use of species through
    international trade. The contracting Parties to CITES recognize that
    international cooperation is essential for the protection of wild flora
    and fauna.
        CITES Parties regulate wildlife trade through controls and
    regulations on species listed in three appendices. Appendix I lists
    species threatened by extinction which are or may be affected by trade.
    Trade in Appendix I species is allowed only in exceptional, non-
    commercial circumstances and only with permits from both the exporting
    and importing country. Appendix II species include species which, while
    not now threatened with extinction, may become so unless trade in such
    specimens is subject to strict regulation. Export permits are required
    from the country of export, and both exporting and importing countries
    must monitor the use of those permits. Trade in Appendix III species
    requires a certificate of origin and an export permit based on a
    finding of legal acquisition and satisfaction of preparation and
    shipping conditions. Listing or de-listing of species in Appendix I or
    II requires consideration by the Conference of the Parties of species
    proposals submitted by Parties. To succeed, such proposals must gain a
    two-thirds majority in a vote of the Parties. Individual Parties can
    list species under their jurisdiction in Appendix III for the purpose
    of preventing or restricting exploitation or if they deem a need for
    cooperation in controlling the trade. A Party may take a reservation to
    the listing of a species on Appendix I or II within 90 days of the vote
    and anytime after the addition of a species to Appendix III. As the
    trade impact or other threats to a species increase or decrease,
    species may be shifted between, added to, or removed from these
    Appendices.
        CITES also regulates international trade through a system of import
    and export permits that are required before specimens leave a country.
    Each Party must appoint a CITES Management Authority and a CITES
    Scientific Authority. The Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the
    Interior, is the Management Authority and Scientific Authority for
    CITES for the United States and also plays the major law enforcement
    role. The Management Authority is responsible for issuing permits and
    implementation of the trade controls of the convention, as well as
    maintaining records of trade in specimens in the Appendices. The
    Scientific Authority is responsible for making scientific findings on
    whether trade will be detrimental to the survival of a species and for
    monitoring the export permits granted against the actual level of trade
    for a species. CITES also requires law enforcement capability to
    enforce the CITES provisions and penalize illegal trade.
        With respect to implementation, the U.S. implements CITES primarily
    through regulations developed under the Endangered Species Act as well
    as enforces it through other existing laws such as the Lacey Act. The
    United States ensures compliance through extensive regulatory systems;
    Washington based policy, scientific and permitting offices; and
    enforcement personnel at designated CITES ports. These are administered
    by the Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of Interior and/or the
    Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Department of Agriculture.
        The United States is proud of its record in implementing its CITES
    obligations. We are at the forefront of CITES parties in fulfilling
    these obligations. CITES studies have recognized these accomplishments.
    For example, one determined that the United States has effective
    national legislation implementing CITES obligations, and another found
    that the United States was effectively controlling the trade in tigers
    and tiger parts. A strong and professional staff at the Fish and
    Wildlife Service, together with good coordination with the State
    Department, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and other
    agencies, have made this notable success possible.
    UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
        Negotiations that led to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
    Change (UNFCCC) began in Chantilly, Virginia, in February 1991 at the
    invitation of President George H.W. Bush. The negotiations concluded on
    May 9, 1992, in New York where the convention was adopted. It was
    subsequently opened for signature at the June 1992 U.N. Conference on
    Environment and Development (UNCED). The UNFCCC entered into force on
    March 21, 1994, after ratification by 50 Parties. The United States
    ratified the UNFCCC on October 15, 1992, becoming the first
    industrialized Nation and the fourth Nation overall to do so. As of
    July 2002, the UNFCCC has 186 Parties.
        The UNFCCC creates a broad global framework for addressing the
    challenge of climate change. It establishes an objective, commitments
    for different groups of countries, and a set of institutions to enable
    governments to consider and adopt appropriate actions and to monitor
    the Convention's implementation. The Convention groups countries into
    two annexes. Annex I lists most members of the Organization for
    Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) plus the states of Central
    and Eastern Europe as well as several states of the Former Soviet
    Union. Prior to the year 2000, Annex I Parties were to adopt policies
    and measures aimed at returning their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990
    levels. Annex II lists a smaller subset of Annex I Parties who agreed
    to provide financial resources to assist developing countries in
    implementing their Convention commitments.
        The ultimate objective of the Convention is to achieve
    stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
    level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human-induced]
    interference with the climate system. The Convention's objective
    further provides that: ``Such a level should be achieved within a time-
    frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate
    change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable
    economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.''
        All Parties to the Convention are committed to respond to climate
    change and to cooperate in various ways toward this end. In particular,
    each Party is required to prepare and submit a national inventory of
    its emissions by sources and removals by sinks (forests and other
    natural systems that remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere) of
    greenhouse gases. Each party is also required to prepare a national
    communication describing the steps it is taking to implement the
    Convention. The United States submitted its Third National
    Communication (the U.S. Climate Action Report) to the Convention's
    secretariat in May 2002.
        In addition, the Convention requires that all Parties:

          Formulate national or regional programs containing
    measures to mitigate climate change;
          Promote the development and diffusion of technologies
    that control, reduce or prevent greenhouse gas emissions;
          Promote sustainable management and conservation of sinks
    and reservoirs of greenhouse gases;
          Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of
    climate change;
          Take climate change considerations into account to
    minimize adverse effects of steps taken to mitigate or adapt to climate
    change on the economy, on public health, and on the quality of the
    environment by carefully considering climate change actions;
          Promote and cooperate in research, systematic observation
    and the development of data archives related to the climate system so
    as to further understanding and reduce uncertainties about the causes,
    effects, magnitude and timing of climate change and the consequences of
    response strategies;
          Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt
    exchange of scientific and other information related to the climate
    system and the consequences of response strategies, and
          Promote and cooperate in education, training and public
    awareness related to climate change.

        Annex I Parties have more extensive requirements under the
    Convention to report on the steps they are taking to address climate
    change and, as noted, prior to the year 2000 they were to aim to return
    their emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels. Annex II Parties
    have certain additional requirements under the Convention. They agreed
    to provide financial assistance to developing country Parties to help
    them meet their Convention commitments, and they agreed to assist
    developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the
    adverse effects of climate change in meeting the costs of adaptation to
    those adverse effects. Annex II Parties also agreed to assist other
    Parties, particularly developing country Parties, with technology
    transfer and access to environmentally sound technologies and know-how.
        The Global Environment Facility serves as an operating entity of
    the Convention's financial mechanism. All Annex II Parties contribute
    to the Global Environment Facility, including the United States. In
    addition, however, developed country Parties may also provide financial
    resources related to the implementation of the Convention through
    bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels. The U.S. Climate
    Action Report contains detailed information both with respect to U.S.
    contributions to the GEF as well as with respect to the other means
    through which the United States is meeting its obligations under the
    Convention.
        The work of the Convention takes place in two subsidiary bodies--
    the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the
    Subsidiary Body for Implementation--which meet normally twice a year to
    prepare for an annual meeting of the Conference of the Parties, the
    supreme body under the Convention. The subsidiary bodies held their
    most recent session from June 3-14 in Bonn, Germany, the seat of the
    Convention's secretariat. The 8th Conference of the Parties will take
    place from October 23 to November 1, 2002, in New Delhi.
        Negotiations to strengthen the commitments of Annex I Parties began
    in 1995, following a decision--the so-called ``Berlin Mandate''--taken
    at the first session of the Conference of the Parties. In July 1997,
    the Senate adopted the Byrd-Hagel Resolution by a vote of 95-0 urging
    the administration to sign no agreement that would harm the U.S.
    economy or that did not contain specific scheduled quantified
    commitments for developing countries. In December 1997, Parties to the
    Convention adopted the Kyoto Protocol at their third session. The
    United States signed the Kyoto Protocol on November 12, 1998. The
    previous administration never subsequently sent the Protocol to the
    Senate for advice and consent, maintaining that the Kyoto Protocol was
    a ``work in progress'' and that key developing countries would need to
    agree to ``meaningful participation'' for the United States to ratify
    it.
        After taking office in 2001, President Bush announced that the
    United States would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol because it would harm
    the U.S. economy and it contained no commitments for 80 percent of the
    world. At the same time, the President indicated that each Nation must
    decide whether to ratify the Kyoto Protocol based on an assessment of
    its national interest and that the United States would not interfere
    with the decisions of other nations in this regard. As of July 2002, 74
    nations and one regional economic integration organization (the
    European Union) had ratified or acceded to the Kyoto Protocol.
    Collectively, these countries represent 36 percent of the 1990 carbon
    dioxide emissions of the Convention's Annex I Parties. Under its terms,
    the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force once 55 Parties to the
    Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted
    for at least 55 percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990
    of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of
    ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
        President Bush has made two major announcements of U.S. policy
    regarding global climate change--on June 11, 2001, and on February 14,
    2002. Both of these announcements call for intensified efforts with
    other nations to address the challenge of climate change. Toward this
    end, the United States has initiated a series of bilateral climate
    change relationships with important partners, including: Australia,
    Central America (CONCAUSA), the European Union, Canada, China, India,
    Italy and Japan. Discussions toward additional climate change
    relationships have begun or are contemplated also with: Brazil, Mexico,
    the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa and
    Ukraine.
        These bilateral climate change relationships range from those
    devoted largely to undertaking cooperative science and technology
    projects to those that may focus more on the exchange of information
    and views related to climate change policy. Along this continuum--from
    S&T projects at one end to policy at the other--each relationship
    usually involves a particular mix of the two. In the case of Japan, for
    example, we have three working groups focused on: (1) S&T cooperation;
    (2) developing countries; and (3) market mechanisms.
        Both with our continued, active participation under the UNFCCC and
    in our bilateral relationships that complement and enhance our
    multilateral cooperation, we are seeking to build relationships that
    will enable us and others to address the long term challenge of climate
    change on a balanced and measured basis, consistent with the need to
    ensure the continued economic prosperity for our citizens and our
    Nation.
    North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
        The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),
    commonly referred to as the NAFTA environmental side agreement, serves
    as an important framework for cooperation among the three North
    American governments on a wide range of environmental affairs. Among
    other things, the NAAEC established the Commission on Environmental
    Cooperation (CEC), which coordinates such cooperation. The United
    States remains committed to the agreement, which has been in force
    since 1994, and to the North American environmental cooperation that
    takes place under it.
        The Commission established by the agreement is composed of a
    Council, a Secretariat and a Joint Public Advisory Committee. The
    Council is the governing body, and is composed of representatives of
    the governments. The three environment ministers represent their
    governments on the Council. The EPA Administrator is the designated
    U.S. representative on the Council and EPA has lead responsibility for
    managing the interagency process that develops U.S. positions and
    guides our participation in the CEC. The Department of State works
    closely with EPA and maintains responsibility on all questions
    regarding the interpretation of the agreement. We play an active role
    in implementation of the NAAEC and in developing work through the CEC.
        The NAAEC is notable for a high degree of citizen participation. A
    trilateral Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) participates in CEC
    deliberations, including direct interaction with the Council. The
    governments each appoint five members to the JPAC, who represent a wide
    array of stakeholders from industry, academia, and nongovernmental
    organizations. Each country also maintains governmental and/or non-
    governmental domestic advisory bodies. The structure of the CEC has
    produced fluid communication among our countries that has enhanced
    significantly our broader relationships.
        The NAAEC also contains a public submission process in which
    citizens may submit claims to the Secretariat regarding the failure of
    a government to enforce its environmental laws and the Council may
    direct the development and release of a ``factual record'' concerning
    the claim in response.
        The NAAEC has promoted strong cooperation among the three countries
    on a number of important environmental issues, achieved primarily
    through implementation of the CEC work program funded at US$9 million
    annually with equal contributions by the Parties. These include
    promotion of enforcement of and compliance with environmental laws,
    protecting children's environmental health, protecting animal species
    that migrate throughout North America, and minimizing the use of
    certain persistent toxic chemicals such as DDT. Trilateral cooperation
    under the NAAEC has provided an impetus for the development of certain
    types of environmental legislation, particularly the new mandatory
    Pollutant Release and Transfer Register in Mexico.
        The United States has fully complied with our obligations under the
    NAAEC. Unlike some other environmental agreements that call for very
    specific actions or the achievement of specific targets in a designated
    timeframe, the NAAEC sets up a general framework for cooperation, which
    is then developed and implemented over time through the CEC. This has
    proven to be an effective framework for promoting environmental
    cooperation within North America.
    The U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification
        The U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) arose out of
    the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro at which African countries
    argued that the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
    Convention on Biological Diversity did not address their major
    concern--desertification. Desertification--the degradation of dry
    lands--is not limited to Africa: it affects millions of people
    inhabiting one quarter of the world's land area from the American west,
    to the Aral Sea in Russia, to Argentina and the islands of the
    Caribbean, Indonesia and the Mediterranean.
        The United States played a key role in negotiating the UNCCD--a
    role which is a natural outgrowth of the United States' experience
    during the Dust Bowl of the 1930's and our long-standing concern about
    desertification in developing countries, particularly in Africa.
    Negotiations on the CCD concluded in June 1994 and the Convention
    entered into force in December 1996.
        The purpose of the Convention is to combat desertification and
    mitigate the effects of drought on arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid
    lands through effective local, national, regional and global action,
    particularly in Africa. The Convention's central objective is to
    promote the sustainable use of drylands worldwide, but especially in
    Africa, and to make more efficient use of aid resources, thereby
    helping to solve Africa's and other affected regions' chronic hunger
    problems. The CCD employs a unique grass-roots approach, emphasizing a
    ``bottom-up'' approach with strong local participation in
    decisionmaking.
        Under the Convention, the United States, with approximately 40
    percent of our landmass considered arid, semi-arid or dry sub-humid and
    therefore susceptible to the processes of desertification, is an
    affected Party. As an affected Party, the United States is required to
    have strategies to address desertification. Given our extensive system
    of land management strategies, practices and programs, no changes were
    or are required in our domestic policies or programs for the U.S. to
    meet this obligation under the Convention. (The Convention acknowledges
    that Parties may implement their obligations through ``existing or
    prospective'' arrangements). Many of the principles used successfully
    in the U.S. over the past 70 years have been incorporated in the
    language of the Convention. All Parties are required to submit reports
    to the Secretariat of the CCD on activities undertaken in support of
    the CCD, on a timetable determined by the Conference of the Parties.
    The first U.S. Report on Activities Undertaken in Support of the U.N.
    Convention to Combat Desertification was officially submitted July 3,
    2002.
        The United States is also required to provide support for
    developing country efforts to combat desertification, including by
    providing financial resources, although the Convention does not impose
    a specific amount or timing with respect to this requirement.
        The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead
    U. S. government agency implementing the CCD overseas. The Department
    of the Interior (Bureau of Land Management) and the Department of
    Agriculture also carry out program activities in support of the
    implementation of the Convention. Bilaterally and regionally, the
    United States works with affected developing country Parties, local and
    international non-governmental organizations, and multilateral
    development banks on anti-desertification program activities, including
    education, community development, and capacity building, with the goal
    of empowering local people to combat desertification by identifying
    needs and solving problems themselves. An important aspect of CCD
    implementation is the dissemination of technology and scientific and
    technical information. The U.S. has made and will continue to make an
    important contribution in this area, given our 70 years of experience
    combating desertification in the American West.
    Looking Ahead
        While significant progress in protecting the environment has been
    made, enormous challenges lie ahead. The upcoming World Summit on
    Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa, provides
    the United States with a unique opportunity to take stock of our past
    accomplishments and to build on them in helping to advance economic and
    social growth and environmental stewardship. We have learned a great
    deal since the Rio Earth Summit. WSSD gives us a chance to create a new
    paradigm that stresses sound economic policies, national capacity for
    good governance, anti-corruption, transparency and the role of science.
    The Bush Administration is committed to its success.
                                     ______

       Responses of James F. Turner to Additional Questions from Senator
                                    Jeffords
        Question 1. Please provide a complete list of the status of all
    environmental treaties that the United States has signed and ratified
    (or only signed) since 1945, including all dates of signature and
    ratification. Please note the environmental treaties since 1945 that
    the United States has neither ratified nor signed.
        Response. The State Department does not maintain a separate data
    base of environmental treaties, and is in the process of compiling the
    requested information from the official records.

        Question 2. What is the best way for the public to determine
    whether the United States is complying with its international
    environmental agreements?
        Response. One useful method is to review the obligations contained
    in the agreements and consider what steps the United States has taken
    with respect to each such obligation. In some cases the latter will
    involve considering a wide range of U.S. Government programs and
    activities.

        Question 3. Your boss, Ms. Dobriansky, and others in the
    Administration have been quoted as saying ``Sustainable Development
    begins at home.'' What exactly does that mean and how is it measured?
        Response. The Administration uses the phrase ``sustainable
    development begins at home'' to describe a provision in the agreement
    reached at the U.N. Conference on Financing for Development in
    Monterrey, Mexico in March this year, specifically, ``Each country has
    primary responsibility for its own economic and social development . .
    .'' We advocate that development be sustainable, and that to achieve
    this sustainable development, nations must practice good domestic
    governance. Good domestic governance is characterized by robust
    democratic institutions (including a popularly elected legislature and
    an independent judiciary); effective measures to combat corruption;
    adherence to the rule of law (i.e., fair and consistent application of
    law); public participation in decisionmaking; and the use of sound
    science to guide those government decisions to the extent possible. A
    country that is not committed to these goals, including being good
    stewards of its natural resources, cannot expect development to occur
    optimally, because the full range of development resources, both
    domestic and foreign, will not be mobilized and effectively used to
    foster economic and social development and environmental protection.
    International cooperation and development assistance will continue to
    play an important support role. However, the commitment to sustainable
    development, and to establish the needed framework to promote such
    development must begin domestically.

        Question 4. One of the purposes of the World Summit is to re-
    energize efforts at the national level in regard to sustainable
    development and the implementation of Agenda 21. What domestic actions
    is the Administration considering as followup to Johannesburg?
        Response. The Administration plans to continue efforts to implement
    Agenda 21 through a number of mechanisms including innovative public-
    private partnerships. The Council on Environmental Quality, the
    Environmental Protection Agency, Department of the Interior, Department
    of Commerce, Department of Agriculture and other government agencies
    are actively working with the public and private sectors to ensure that
    sustainable development is a priority? at the national level.

        Question 5. Could you please provide a list for the record of the
    U.S. delegation representatives that will be attending, and the list of
    U.S. delegation representatives that attended the Rio Earth Summit?
        Response. We have attached a provisional list of the U.S.
    delegation to the World Summit on Sustainable Development and a list of
    the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Conference on Environment and
    Development (the Earth Summit) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
          united states delegation to the world summit on sustainable
            development, johannesburg, august 26--september 4, 2002
    Ex Officio Head of Delegation
    The Honorable Colin L. Powell
      Secretary of State
    Representatives
    The Honorable Paula J. Dobriansky
      Under Secretary for Global Affairs
      Department of State

    The Honorable John F. Turner
      Assistant Secretary for Oceans and
        International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
      Department of State

    Alternate Representatives
    The Honorable Claude A. Allen
      Deputy Secretary
      Department of Health and Human Services

    The Honorable Robert G. Card
      Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment
      Department of Energy

    The Honorable James L. Connaughton
      Chairman
      Council on Environmental Quality
      Executive Office of the President

    The Honorable Linda J. Fisher
      Deputy Administrator
      Environmental Protection Agency

    The Honorable Cameron R. Hume
      United States Ambassador
      Pretoria

    The Honorable Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
      Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere
      National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
      Department of Commerce

    Jonathan A. Margolis
      Director
      Office of Policy Coordination and Initiatives
      Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
    Affairs
      Department of State

    Richard T. Miller
      Deputy Assistant Secretary
    Bureau of International Organization Affairs
    Department of State

    The Honorable James R. Moseley
      Deputy Secretary
      Department of Agriculture

    The Honorable Andrew S. Natsios
      Administrator
      Agency for International Development

    Anthony F. Rock
      Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International
      Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State

    The Honorable Sichan Siv
      Ambassador
      United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council
      United States Mission to the United Nations

    The Honorable Peter S. Watson
      President and Chief Executive Officer Overseas Private Investment
    Corporation

    The Honorable Christine Todd Whitman
      Administrator
      Environmental Protection Agency

    Senior Advisers
    Alan Hecht
      Council on Environmental Quality
      National Security Council
      Executive Office of the President

      Donald K. Steinberg
      Deputy Director
      Office of the Policy Planning Staff
      Department of State

    Advisers
    Kate Almquist
      Special Assistant
      Office of the Administrator
      Agency for International Development

    Christo Artusio
      Office of Global Change
      Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
    Affairs
      Department of State

    Deborah M. Atwood
      Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary
      Department of Agriculture

    The Honorable Judith E. Ayres
      Assistant Administrator for International Affairs
      Environmental Protection Agency

    Adela Backiel
      Director of Sustainable Development
      Department of Agriculture

    Janice F. Bay
      Deputy Assistant Secretary
      Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
      Department of State

    John Beale
      Deputy Assistant Administrator
      Environmental Protection Agency

    Karin Berry
      Senior Policy Analyst
      Department of Energy

    Robert Blair
      Office of International Health Affairs
      Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
    Affairs
      Department of State

    Evan T. Bloom
      Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans and International
    Environmental and Scientific Affairs
      Office of the Legal Adviser
      Department of State

    The Honorable Richard A. Boucher
      Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Department Spokesman
      Department of State

    Marcel Bouquet
      Interpreter
      Office of Language Services
      Department of State

    Sarah K. Brandel
      Office of Ocean Affairs Bureau of Oceans and International
      Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State

      William J. Brennan
      Deputy Assistant Secretary
      National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Department of
    Commerce

    Gayleatha Brown
      Counselor for Political Affairs
      United States Embassy
      Pretoria

    Lori Brutten
      Office of Policy Coordination and Initiatives
      Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
    Affairs
      Department of State

    Steven Buckler
      Counselor for Administrative Affairs
      United States Embassy
      Pretoria

    Jeffry Burnam
      Deputy Assistant Secretary
      Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
    Affairs
      Department of State

    Stephanie Childs
      Senior Adviser
      Office of the Under Secretary for International Trade
      International Trade Administration Department of Commerce

    Brent Christensen
      Economic Officer
      United States Embassy Beijing

    Cynthia Church
      Deputy Press Secretary
      Department of State

    Karen Clark
      Department of the Interior

    Lawrence E. Clark
      Associate Chief
      Natural Resource Conservation Service
      Department of Agriculture

    Gerald Clifford
      Deputy Assistant Administrator
      Office of International Activities
      Environmental Protection Agency

    Sally D. Collins
      Associate Chief
      United States Forest Service
      Department of Agriculture

    William E. Craft
      Director
      Office of Multilateral Trade Affairs
      Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
      Department of State

    Jonathan Crock
      Office of the Ambassador-at-Large For War Crime Issues
      Department of State

    The Honorable Patrick M. Cronin
      Assistant Administrator
      Agency for International Development

    Wayne D'Angelo
      Advance Director
      Environmental Protection Agency

    John Davison
      Deputy United States Representative to the Economic and Social
    Council
      United States Mission to the United Nations

    Jill Derderian
      Environment, Science and Technology Officer
      United States Embassy
      Pretoria

    Stewart Devine
      Advance Line Officer
      Executive Secretariat
      Department of State

    Joseph Martin Dieu
      Coordinator for the World Summit on Sustainable Development
      Office of International Activities Environmental Protection Agency

    Dirk Dijkerman
      United States Agency for International Development Director
      United States Embassy
      Pretoria

    Larisa Dobrianaky
      Deputy Assistant Secretary
      Department of Energy

      James R. Dunlap
      Executive Assistant
      Bureau of African Affairs
      Department of State

    Dennie Ege
      Office of International Conferences
      Bureau of International Organization Affairs
      Department of State

    Virginia L. Farris
      Public Affairs Officer
      United States Embassy
      Pretoria

    Joseph Ferrante
      Assistant to the Administrator
      Environmental Protection Agency

    Cory A. Firestone
      Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental, and Scientific
    Affairs
      Department of State

      The Honorable Emil Frankel
      Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy
      Department of Transportation

    The Honorable Jendayi E. Frazer
      Special Assistant to the President And Senior Director for African
    Affairs
      National Security Council
      Executive Office of the President

    Joseph Freedman
      Associate General Counsel
      Environmental Protection Agency

    William M. Frej
      Director for Development Issues
      National Security Council
      Executive Office of the President

    William R. Gaines
      Coordinator for International Affairs
      Office of Science and Technology Policy
      Executive Office of the President

    The Honorable David Garman
      Assistant Secretary for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
      Department of Energy

    Isabel N. Gates
      Office of the Executive Director
      Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
    Affairs
      Department of State

    Joanne B. Giordano
      Deputy Assistant Administrator
      Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs
      Agency for International Development

    Virginia Green
      Vice President
      Investment Policy
      Overseas Private Investment Corporation

    Jeff J. Grieco
      Chief
      Multimedia Communications Division ``Bureau for Legislativeand Public
    Affairs
      Agency for International Development

    Joseph B. Ham
      Trade Specialist
      Department of Agriculture

    Robert K. Harris
      Attorney Adviser
      Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans and International
    Environmental and Scientific Affairs
      Office of the Legal Adviser
      Department of State

    John J. Hartley, II
      Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs
      United States Embassy
      Pretoria

    Jennifer A. Haverkamp
      Assistant United States Trade Representative for Environment and
    Natural Resources
      Office of the United States Trade Representative Executive Office of
    the President

    Richard Helm
      Counselor for Agricultural Affairs
      United States Embassy
      Pretoria

    Leonard A. Hirsch
      Adviser
      Smithsonian Institution

    Teresa D. Hobgood
      Bureau of Oceans and International
      Environmental and Scientific Affairs
      Department of State

    Ronald Neil Hoffer
      Environmental Protection Agency

    The Honorable Jeffrey Holmstead
      Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation
      Environmental Protection Agency

    Heather Hopkins
      Legislative Program Specialist
      Congressional Liaison Division
      Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs
      Agency for International Development

    Robert P. Hopkins
      Director
      External Affairs
      National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
      Department of Commerce

    Chase M. Huntley
      Analyst
      Natural Resources and Environment
      General Accounting Office

    Kelly A. Johnson
      Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
      Environment and Natural Resources Division
      Department of Justice

    The Honorable Walter H. Kansteiner
      Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
      Department of State

    Roy S. Katayaina
      Adviser
      Agency for International Development

    Craig Kelly
      Executive Assistant
      Office of the Secretary
      Department of State

    Carol Kramer-LeBlanc
      Adviser on Food Security
      Foreign Agricultural Service
      Department of Agriculture

    Luisa Joy G. Labez
      Senior International Affairs Analyst
      General Accounting Office
      Washington, DC.

    Karen T. Levine
      United States Representative to the United Nations Environment
    Program
      United States Embassy
      Nairobi

    Herbert Levitan
      National Science Foundation

    Frances C. Li
      National Science Foundation

    Clay Lowery
      Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Debt, Development and
    Quantitative Policy Analysis
      Department of the Treasury

    James A. Mahoney
      Vice President
      Engineering and Environment
      Export-Import Bank of the United States

    Joe Martyak
      Associate Administrator for Communications, Education and Media
      Environmental Protection Agency

    Jan L. McAlpine
      Office of Ecology and Terrestrial Conservation
      Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
    Affairs
      Department of State

    John McCutcheon
      Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
      Department of Energy

    Elizabeth McLanahan
      International Affairs Specialist
      Department of Commerce

    Thomas K. McNeil, Jr.
      Personal Assistant to the Administrator
      Environmental Protection Agency

    James Metzger
      Military Adviser to the Secretary of State and
      Special Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

    Gillian Milovanovic
      Deputy Chief of Mission
      United States Embassy
      Pretoria

    Linda V. Moodie
      Chief
      Application and Information Services Branch
      International and Interagency Affairs Office
      National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
      Department of Commerce

    Franklin Moore
      Director
      Global Center for the Environment
      Agency for International Development

    Melinda Moore
      Deputy Director
      Office of Global Health Affairs
      Department of Health and Human Services

    Sahar Moridani
      Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
      Department of State

    The Honorable Everett L. Mosley
      Inspector General
      Agency for International Development

    Jacob Moss
      Special Assistant
      Environmental Protection Agency

    The Honorable Constance Berry Newman
      Assistant Administrator
      Bureau for Africa
      Agency for International Development

    Rachel Nugent
      National Institutes of Health
      Department of Health and Human Services

    Elisha Nyman
      Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Global Affairs
      Department of State

    Jennifer M. O'Connor
      Adviser
      Department of Agriculture

    Richard Parker
      Assistant to the Deputy Secretary
    Department of Health and Human Services

    The Honorable Elizabeth Anne Peterson
      Assistant Administrator
      Bureau for Global Health
      Agency for International Development

    C. Anne Pence
      Executive Assistant
      Office-of the Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural
    Affairs
      Department of State

    Brett Pomainville
      Office of Policy Coordination and Initiatives
      Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
    Affairs
      Department of State

    Susan Povenmire
      Office of Public Diplomacy
      Bureau of Oceans and International
      Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State

    The Honorable Pierre Prosper
      Ambassador-at-Large for War Crime Issues
      Department of State

    Scott C. Rayder
      Chief of Staff
      Office of the Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere
      National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Department of
    Commerce

    Henry David Reese
      Environmental Protection Specialist
      Department of Transportation

    Daniel Rochberg
      Office of Policy Coordination and.Initiatives
      Bureau of Oceans and International
      Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State

    Peter Roussopoulos
      Adviser on Sustainable Development
      United States Forest Service
      Department of Agriculture

    James W. Rubin
      Assistant Chief
      Policy, Legislation and Special Litigation
      Department of Justice

    Aaron Salzberg
      Office of Policy Coordination and Initiatives
      Bureau of Oceans and International
      Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State

    Brenda Scarborough
      Advance Communications
      Executive Secretariat
      Department of State

    Walter Gary Sharp
      Congressional Relations Adviser
      Bureau of Legislative Affairs
      Department of State

    Betsi Shays
      Adviser
      Peace Corps

    Marysue Shore
      Senior Adviser to the President and Director of, African Affairs
      Overseas Private Investment Corporation

    The Honorable Eimny B. Simmons
      Assistant Administrator
      Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade
      Agency for International Development

    Daniel Smith
      Deputy Executive Secretary
      Department of State

    Dean Thompson
      Advance Line Officer
      Executive Secretariat
      Department of State

    Griffin M. Thompson
      Director
      Office of Energy, Environment and Technology
      Center for the Environment
      Agency for International Development

    Eileen Ramira Travoto
      Deputy Assistant Administrator
      Environmental Protection Agency

    Michael C. Trulson
      Office of Environmental Policy
      Bureau of Oceans and International
      Environmental and Scientific Affairs Department of State

    David J. van Hoogstraten
      Office of Environmental Policy
      Bureau of Oceans and International
      Environmental and Scientific Affairs
      Department of State

    Darci L. Vetter
      Office of the United States Trade Representative
      Executive Office of the President

    Harlan Watson
      Office of Global Change
      Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
    Affairs
      Department of State

    Eric B. Wilson
      Senior Program Analyst
      Bureau of Indian Affairs
      Department of the Interior

    William Stanley Wilson
      Senior Scientist
      National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service
      National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
      Department of Commerce

    Whitney Witteman
      Office of International Conferences
      Bureau of International Organization Affairs
      Department of State

    Private Sector Advisers
    Geraldine Barrows
      Special Assistant
      Office of the Mayor
      Hempstead, New York

    Manley A. Begay
      Director
      Native Nations Institute
      Navajo Tribe
      Tucson, Arizona

    George D. Carpenter
      Director of Corporate Sustainable Development
      Procter and Gamble Company
      Cincinnati, Ohio

    Richard Coombe
      Chair and Chief Executive Officer
      Watershed Agricultural Council
      Walton, New York

    Dianne Dillon Ridgely
      Director
      The Center for a New American Dream
      Iowa City, Iowa

    Daniel Esty
      Director
      Yale Center on Environmental Law and Policy
      Yale Law School
      New Haven, Connecticut

    The Honorable James A. Garner
      Mayor
      Hempstead, New York

    Hank Habicht
      Chief Executive Officer
      Global Environment and Technology Foundation
      Annandale, Virginia

    Lauren Inouye
      Stanford Institute for International Studies
      Center for Environmental Science and Policy
      Washington, DC.

    John Klink
      Montecito, California

    F. Sherwood Rowland
      National Academy of Sciences
      Irvine, California

    Chris Tucker
      Actor and Comedian
      Los Angeles, California
    UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION TO THE WORLD SUMMIT ON
       SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT JOHANNESBURG, AUGUST 26--SEPTEMBER 4, 2002
    Members of the House of Representatives
    The Honorable Thomas H. Allen
      House of Representatives

    The Honorable Earl Blumenauer
      House of Representatives

    The Honorable James C. Greenwood
      House of Representatives

    The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich
      House of Representatives

    The Honorable George Miller
      House of Representatives

    The Honorable Christopher Shays
      House of Representatives

    Congressional Staff
    Sara Elizabeth Barth
      Legislative Assistant
      Office of Senator Barbara Boxer
      U.S. Senate

    Janine Benner
      Legislative Assistant
      Office of Congressman Earl Blumenauer
      House of Representatives

      Floyd DesChamps
      Senior Professional Staff Member
      Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
      U.S. Senate

    Greg Dotson
      Counsel
      Committee on Government Reform and
      Office of Congressman Henry A. Waxman
      House of Representatives

    Deb Fiddelke
      Press Director
      Office of Senator Chuck Hagel
      U.S. Senate

      Kenneth W. Flanz
      Deputy Legislative Director
      Office of Senator Michael D. Crapo
      U.S. Senate

    Amy A. Fraenkel
      Counsel
      Committee On Commerce, Science and Transportation
      U.S. Senate

    Richard Frandsen
      Senior Counsel
      Committee on Energy and Commerce
      House of Representatives

    Stephen E. Moody
      Legislative Assistant
      Office of Congressman George Miller
      House of Representatives

    Maurice A. Perkins
      Professional Staff member
      Committee on Foreign Relations
      U.S. Senate

    Eric Pfuehler
      Administrative Assistant
      Office of Congressman David Bonior House of Representatives

    Johanna F. Polsenberg
      Legislative Fellow
      Office of Congressman Sam Farr
      House of Representatives

    Tiffany Anne Prather
      Legislative Fellow
      Committee on Environment and Public Works
      U.S. Senate

    Paul L. Oostburg Sanz
      Deputy Chief Counsel
      Committee on International Relations
      House of Representatives

    Dallas Scholes
      Counsel/Legislative Assistant
      Office of Senator Michael Enzi
      U.S. Senate

    Alison Leigh Taylor
      Chief Counsel
      Committee on Environment and Public Works
      U.S. Senate

        The following Congressional Staff spouse will accompany the
    delegation: Jacqueline Kae DesChamps.

        Question 6. What measures should we look at to determine whether
    U.S. programs and resources are achieving the goals of Agenda 21?
        Response. There are a number of measures that could be considered
    to evaluate our progress in achieving the goals of Agenda 21. The body
    of international environmental agreements to which the United States is
    a party provides one important measure. Beyond U.S. participation in
    and implementation of treaties and conventions, however, is an
    important body of domestic activities undertaken by both the U.S.
    Government and the private sector to advance sustainable development
    objectives. Examples of government activities include enactment and
    implementation of Brownfields legislation (to promote cleanup and reuse
    of contaminated land) and TEA-21 (which, among other things, promotes
    sustainable transportation) and voluntary policy initiatives such as
    the U.S.-led International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI), the U.N.
    Forest Forum (which is developing a set of indicators for the
    sustainable management of the world's most endangered forest
    resources), and the Arctic Council (which has identified and
    implemented voluntary measures to reduce toxic chemicals that pose a
    particular bioaccumulation risk in animals and humans in polar
    regions). Voluntary measures implemented by the private sector in the
    United States, such as the Energy Star program for energy efficient
    appliances and the adoption of clean production technologies and
    methods, have also contributed significantly to achievement of the
    goals of Agenda 21.

        Question 7. The Administration has strongly promoted the concept of
    concrete ``partnerships,'' or Type II initiatives, including ones on
    sustainable energy and clean water. What is the status of these efforts
    and does the Administration plan to provide new financial resources for
    such partnerships? How will the Administration guarantee that voluntary
    partnerships will deliver real progress for sustainable development,
    especially if they are not designed to implement specific international
    agreements with targets and timetables? How can the Administration
    guarantee that any partnerships that involve corporations are carried
    out in a responsible manner if there is no independent oversight
    framework?
        Response. The United States is proposing four ``signature''
    partnerships that have been created as a result of preparations for
    WSSD. These are in the fields of energy, water, hunger and forests.
    These partnerships are ``coalitions of the willing'', voluntary in
    nature and open to those governments, NGO's, private sector entities,
    and civil society groups who wish to participate. In other words, they
    do not require the negotiation of an international treaty, but rather
    are invitations to cooperate to achieve a shared goal. We would expect
    that each partnership would identify its goals and periodically provide
    a report on its progress. Such reports should be accessible and open to
    the public. The Commission on Sustainable Development could be used as
    the forum in which partnerships provide their reports, further
    increasing transparency and thereby accountability. The Administration
    plans to finance these partnerships through existing resources.

        Question 8. The Administration has (rightly) been very strong on
    the importance of ``good governance'' to sustainable development. The
    President announced in a speech at the Inter-American Development Bank
    on March 14 that the United States will increase its core development
    assistance by 50 percent over the next 3 years, resulting in a $5
    billion annual increase over current levels. These additional funds
    will go to a new Millennium Challenge Account that will fund
    initiatives to help developing nations improve their economies and
    standards of living. The Millennium Challenge Account will set criteria
    for how the additional $5 billion the United States has pledged will be
    allocated. But ``good governance'' does not come cheap. How does the
    Administration propose to assist countries to bring about ``good
    governance,'' as opposed to rewarding countries exhibiting it? How much
    of U.S. aid is currently spent on ``good governance''?
        The Federal Government currently funds many programs that promote
    good governance across in almost every developing country of the world.
    U.S. assistance for governance programs was over $1.5 billion in fiscal
    year 02 for programs supporting, among other things; policy training
    for civil servants and elected officials, government information
    management, promotion of civil society groups, election monitoring,
    anti-corruption, judicial and prosecutorial. capacity-building, women's
    and workers' rights, public-private partnerships, and food security.
    These programs, among many others, will continue within the framework
    of existing development assistance.
        Tbe MCA will be a new account that will supplement, not replace,
    existing programs. The MCA will assist countries that have made a
    commitment to ruling justly, investing in people, and promoting
    economic freedom. MCA funds will be distributed in flexible and
    innovative ways so that they can have a maximum impact on economic
    growth and poverty reduction. Country ownership is a critical component
    of the MCA. The uses of the funds will be determined by full engagement
    with recipient countries. We will partner with, not dictate to, MCA
    countries.
        Competition for the MCA will inspire non-recipient countries to
    improve their performance on governance. Countries that do improve
    their performance will be in a position to compete for MCA funding in
    the future. Existing U.S. Government programs can help those countries
    that are willing to engage in serious policy reform.

        Question 9. What are the criteria for the Millennium Challenge
    Account? Why is it proposed to announce these after WSSD? What will be'
    the role of environmental measures in the criteria? What environmental
    criteria will apply to expenditure of the funds?
        Response. The Administration is still evaluating criteria to
    determine how funds from the Millennium Challenge Account would be
    disbursed. We are consulting with development partners in developed
    countries as well as with potential developing country recipients as we
    develop these criteria. This thorough process, which began immediately
    after the Financing for Development Summit in Monterrey in March, is
    independent of the timetable for WSSD.

        Question 10. What effect has the U.S. farm bill had on U.S.
    negotiating capacity and leverage, particularly with respect to the
    issue of reducing environmentally harmful subsidies? How has this
    affected U.S. credibility?
        Response. The United States is strongly committed to an ambitious
    outcome reducing global trade distortions in agriculture through the
    WTO. As Ambassador Zoellick has made clear, our strategy in pursuing
    this goal rests on a three-legged stool consisting of the new U.S.
    proposal for the Doha WTO negotiations to reduce agricultural
    subsidies, the U.S. Farm Bill, and trade promotion authority.
        Many, particularly in the international community, have exaggerated
    the provisions in the U.S. Farm Bill and claimed it throws into
    question our true interest in seeking reduced agricultural subsidies.
    But the bottom line is that domestic support under the farm bill is
    entirely consistent with WTO obligations. Under WTO rules, the United
    States is allowed to provide up to $19.1 billion annually in ``trade-
    distorting'' support. The Farm Bill, for the first time, was
    consciously drafted with these limits in mind. Not only did Congress
    consider how support under the farm programs would be counted against
    the U.S.-allowed support level, but also it included an unprecedented
    ``circuit breaker'' mandating the Secretary of Agriculture to modify
    programs to ensure compliance with U.S. international obligations.
        If other countries agree with the U.S. Government that world
    agricultural tariffs and subsidies are too high, we urge them to join
    us at the negotiating table. Congress has just renewed the President's
    trade promotion authority, and we believe a successful conclusion to
    the WTO negotiations will ensure congressional support for necessary
    modifications to our domestic agricultural programs required under any
    new WTO commitments.
        Regarding environmentally harmful subsidies, it is worth noting
    that the farm bill pays directly for conservation programs that are
    important to the Americanpublic. This reflects our consistent stand
    that it is important for governments to support farmers and rural
    communities in ways that are targeted, transparent, and non-trade
    distorting. By setting these examples, the farm bill, if anything,
    strengthens the Administration's ability to work toward the
    environmental objectives laid out in the Trade Promotion Authority act.

        Question 11. Please list all the new ``Type I'' commitments--the
    more conventional negotiated declarations and action plans--that the
    United States intends to enter into at WSSD.
        Response. The text is still under negotiation. The final outcomes
    will be determined in Johannesburg. We will supply you with the final
    Johannesburg Plan of Action and political declaration after the Summit
    has ended. We note that any Type I outcomes will not be ``commitments''
    in a legal sense because the WSSD outcomes. will all be non-binding.

        Question 12. Explain the linkage between the Type I and Type II
    initiatives. Aren't strong Type II partnerships connected to having
    some type of concrete framework?
        Response. The international community has already agreed to a large
    number of goals, targets and timetables. For example, the United States
    strongly supports the internationally agreed Millennium Declaration
    goals. In our view, partnerships are clearly linked to such goals in
    that partnerships are one of the main mechanisms through which to
    implement such goals.

        Question 13. How many Type II partnerships is the United States
    proposing for WSSD? Where is the full list? What government agencies
    and private companies are to be involved?
        Response. While the major Type II partnerships under development
    for WSSD are still under active review, they are outlined in the
    response to question 7. Broad inter-agency teams composed of relevant
    U.S.G agencies are working on these efforts. We welcome the broad
    participation of business, NGO's, and other major groups in such
    partnerships. We plan to continue building partnerships well after the
    Johannesburg Summit has finished: this is not a process that ends with
    the Summit.
        Please see the attached list of our Type II partnerships.
         united states delegation to the united nations conference on
      environment and development (unced) rio de janeiro, june 3-14, 1992
    Representative
    The Honorable William K. Reilly
    Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency

    Alternate Representatives
    The Honorable Curtis Bohien
    Assistant Secretary for Oceans'and International Environmental and
    Scientific Affairs
    Department of State

    The Honorable J. Michael Davis
    Assistant Secretary for Conservation and Renewable Energy
    Department of Energy

    The Honorable Michael R. Deland
    Chairman
    Council on Environmental Quality
    Executive Office of the President

    The Honorable Robert Grady
    Associate Director for Natural Resources, Energy and Science
    Office of Management and Budget
    Executive Office of the President

    The Honorable Richard H. Melton
    Ambassador
    United States Embassy
    Brasilia

    The Honorable Edward J. Perkins
    Ambassador
    Permanent, Representative of the United States to the United Nations
    New York

    The Honorable Ronald W. Roskens
    Administrator
    Agency for International Development

    The Honorable Robert J. Ryan, Jr.
    Coordinator for United Nations Conference on Environment and
    Development Preparations
    Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
    Department of State

    The Honorable Michael K. Young
    Deputy Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs
    Department of State

    Advisers
    Meredith Attwell
    Office of Legislative Management
    Bureau of Legislative Affairs
    Department of State

    Maureen Bannon, Lieutenant Commander, USN
    Office of the Representative for Oceans Policy Affairs
    Office of the Secretary
    Department of Defense

    Susan Biniaz
    Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans,
    International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Office of the Legal
    Adviser
    Department of State

    Patricia Bliss-Guest
    Associate Director for International Law and Policy
    Council on Environmental Quality
    Executive Office of the President

    Thomas A. Campbell
    General Counsel
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
    Department of Commerce

    Nancy O'Neal Carter
    Coordinator for Population Affairs
    Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
    Department of State

    Ed Cassidy
    Deputy Chief of Staff and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy
    Office of Policy, Management and Budget Department of the Interior

    Stephanie J. Caswell
    Office of Ecology, Health and Conservation
    Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
    Department of State

    Melinda Chandler
    Attorney-Adviser
    Office of Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
    Office of the Legal Adviser
    Department of State

    David Cottingham
    Director
    Office of Ecology and Conservation
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
    Department of Commerce

    Anthony A. Das
    Director
    Office of Public Communications
    Bureau of Public Affairs
    Department of State

    Christine L. Dawson
    Special Adviser for Environmental Issues
    Office of the Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs
    Department of State

    Michael S. Delello
    Special Assistant
    Office of the Secretary
    Department of Energy

    Susan F. Drake
    Office of Environmental Protection
    Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
    Scientific Affairs
    Department of State

    Milton K. Drucker
    Office of International Commodities
    Energy, Resources and Food Policy,
    Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
    Department of State

    L. Val Giddings
    Office of Biotechnology Biologics and Environmental Protection
    Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
    Department of Agriculture

    Alan D. Hecht
    Deputy Assistant Administrator for International Activities
    Environmental Protection Agency

    Matthew P. Hennesey
    Director
    Office of Multilateral Development Banking
    Department of the Treasury

    Twig Johnson
    Director
    Office of Environment and Natural Resources
    Bureau of Research and Development
    Agency for International Development

    Gerald L. Kamens
    Office of Policy Analysis and Resources
    Directorate for Policy
    Agency for International Development

    Mark P. Kindall
    Office of International Activities
    Environmental Protection Agency

    Stephen Klein
    U.S. UNCED Coordination Center
    Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
    Affairs.
    Department of State

    Jeffrey D. Kovar
    Attorney-Adviser
    Office of Legal Adviser
    Department of State

    William Lake
    Consultant to the Administrator
    Environmental Protection Agency

    Gary L. Larsen
    International Forestry
    Forest Service
    Department of Agriculture

    The Honorable Thomas E. Lovejoy
    Assistant Secretary for External Affairs
    Smithsonian Institution
    Washington, DC.

    John P. McGuinness
    Office of Technical Specialized Agencies
    Bureau of International Organization Affairs
    Department of State

    The Honorable Jonathan Moore
    Ambassador
    United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the
    United Nations
    New York

    Carol Ann Petsonk
    Director
    Office of Environmental Affairs
    Office of the United States Trade Representative
    Executive Office of the President

    Eleanor W. Savage
    Director
    Office of Ecology, Health and Conservation
    Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
    Department of State

    John P. Schmitz
    Deputy Counsel to the President
    Executive Office of the President

    R. Tucker Scully
    Director
    Office of Ocean Affairs
    Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
    Department of State

    Jeff N. Sirmon
    Deputy Chief for International Forestry
    United States Forest Service
    Department of Agriculture

    Zell Steever
    U.S. UNCED Coordination Center
    Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
    Department of State

    Linda Strachan
    Special Assistant for Congressional Relations
    Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
    Department of State

    Scott B. Styles
    Office of Legislative Management
    Bureau of Legislative Affairs
    Department of State

    Neal A. Walidrop III
    Office of Global Change
    Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
    Department of State

    Harlan Watson
    Acting Assistant Secretary for Water and Science and Science Adviser to
    the Secretary
    Department of the Interior

    Dr. Frank E. Young
    Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health (Science and Environment)
    Public Health Service
    Department of Health and Human Services

                                     ______

     subject: congressional delegation to the united nations conference on
      environment and development (unced) rio de janeiro, june 3-14, 1992
        1. The following individuals comprise the United States
    Congressional Delegation to UNCED:
    A. Members of the Senate
    The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr. (Chairman of the Senate Delegation)
    U.S. Senate

    The Honorable John N. Chafee (Vice Chairman of the Senate Delegation)
    U.S. Senate

    The Honorable Max Baucus
    U.S. Senate

    The Honorable Bob Graham
    U.S. Senate

    The Honorable John Kerry
    U.S. Senate

    The Honorable Frank H. Lautenberg
    U.S. Senate

    The Honorable Claiborne Pell
    U.S. Senate

    The Honorable Larry Pressler
    U.S. Senate

    The Honorable Steve Symms
    U.S. Senate
    The Honorable Paul Wellstone
    U.S. Senate
    The Honorable Timothy B. Wirth
    U.S. Senate
                   b. members of the house of representatives
    The Honorable George Miller (Chairman of the House Delegation)
    U.S. House of Representatives

    The Honorable Anthony C. Beilenson
    U.S. House of Representatives

    The Honorable Ben C. Blaz
    U.S. House of Representatives

    The Honorable Cardiss Collins
    U.S. House of Representatives

    The Honorable Robert W. Davis
    U.S. House of Representatives

    The Honorable Edward F. Feighan
    U.S. House of Representatives

    The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
    U.S. House of Representatives

    The Honorable Bill Green
    U.S. House of Representatives

    The Honorable Dennis N. Hertel
    U.S. House OF Representatives

    The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
    U.S. House of Representatives

    The Honorable James H. Scheuer
    U.S. House of Representatives

    The Honorable Gerry Sikorski
    U.S. House of Representatives

    The Honorable Robert C. Torricelli
    U.S. House of Representatives

    The Honorable Jolene Unsoeld
    U.S. House of Representatives
        1
        c. congressional staff supporting the paragraphs 1 and 2 above:
    Unclassified
    Daniel P. Beard
    Staff Director
    Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Nancy M. Carman
    Staff Consultant
    Committee on Foreign Affairs
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Carol Doherty
    Senior Staff Assistant
    Committee on Foreign Affairs
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Susan Fagan
    Legislative Assistant
    Office of Senator Symms
    U.S. Senate

    David B. Finnegan
    Majority Counsel
    Committee on Energy and Commerce
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Susan R. Fletcher
    Specialist, Environmental Policy
    Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division
    Congressional Research Service
    Library of Congress

    Gamier Jaszczaks, Colonel, USAF
    Air Force Liaison Office
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Roy Kienitz
    Professional Staff
    Committee on Environment and Public Works
    U.S. Senate

    Jessica Laverty
    Minority Counsel
    Committee on Energy and Commerce
    U.S. House of Representatives

    John A. Lawrence
    Administrative Assistant
    Office of Congressman Miller
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Eileen Lee
    Staff Director
    Subcommittee on Environment
    Committee on Science, Space and Technology
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Kathleen McGinty
    Legislative Assistant
    Office of Senator Gore
    U.S. Senate

    Thomas O. Melius
    Professional Staff for Fish and Wildlife
    Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Julia Moffett
    Professional Staff
    Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Charly Moore
    Counsel
    Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Frank Norton, Colonel, USA
    Army Liaison Office
    U.S. Senate

    John Robert Nunnally, Major, USAF
    Air Force Liaison Office
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Joseph C. Pallone, Major, USA
    Army Liaison Office
    U.S. Senate

    Jan Paulk
    Director
    Office of Interparliamentary Services
    Office of the Secretary of the Senate
    U.S. Senate

    Steven N. Polansky
    Professional Staff
    Committee on Foreign Relations
    U.S. Senate

    Marl A. Ronash
    Press Secretary
    Office of Senator Gore
    U.S. Senate

    Joan Teague Rose
    Staff Assistant
    Committee on Agriculture
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Dr. Artie L. Shelton, Colonel, USA
    Army Liaison Office
    U.S. Senate

    Steven J. Shimberg
    Minority Staff Director and Counsel
    Committee on Environment and Public Works
    U.S. Senate

    Russell J. Wilson
    Minority Staff Consultant
    Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East
    Committee on Foreign Affairs
    U.S. House of Representatives

    Daniel Weiss
    Director for Public Affairs
    Committee on Interior and Public Affairs
    U.S. House of Representatives

        2. Following Congressional spouses will accompany the delegation:
    Tipper Gore, Virginia Chafee, Nuala Pell, Harriett Pressler, Loretta
    Symms, Wren Wirth, Adele Graham, Ann Blaz, Nadine Feighan, Paul Pelosi
    and Emily Scheuer.

        Question 14. How and what is the United States commitment to WEHAB
    (Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture, and Biodiversity)? What specific
    actions will we take in these areas?
        Response. WEHAB refers to the acronym that Secretary General Kofi
    Annan proposed as priority areas for the Johannesburg Summit. We
    support all five of the areas identified: water, energy, health,
    agriculture, and biodiversity. The development assistance programs run
    by USAID, USDA, EPA and other Federal agencies clearly reflect an
    emphasis in these areas, as a survey prepared by USAID with input from
    over 15 U.S. agencies indicates. Please see the attached document,
    ``Working for a Sustainable World: Government Initiatives to Promote
    Sustainable Development.''

        Question 15. The United States, with other nations, has subscribed
    to the UN's Millennium Development Goals on the alleviation of poverty,
    access to safe drinking water, health and education, etc. But in the
    preparatory meetings leading up to WSSD, the United States has been
    isolated in remaining resolutely opposed to international efforts to
    set out how these Millennium Development Goals are to be achieved. Why
    is there a gap. between rhetoric and reality?
        Response. The United States strongly supports efforts to implement
    the internationally agreed Millennium Development goals. In our view,
    based on our 60 years of development experience, partnerships are the
    most effective way to implement those goals. The United States has
    taken the lead in pursuing partnerships and pushing this effort
    forward. We hope that other countries will join us in focusing on the
    implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. We have prepared a
    compendium of success stories in water and energy, for example, which
    details how partnerships in these sectors has led to concrete, on-the-
    ground results improving the lives of individuals. (Please see the
    attachment referred to in question 14). We have emphasized this view
    throughout the preparatory process leading up to WSS]J.

        Question 16. To what extent, financially or otherwise, will the
    U.S. Government support President Mbeki's New Economic Partnership for
    African Development (NEPAD)?
        Response. NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, was
    adopted by African heads of State in October 2001. The United States
    and others have welcomed NEPAD for its African origins and emphasis on
    good economic and political governance, including peer review and
    monitoring. The real test of NEPAD will be whether the bold rhetoric is
    reflected in concrete action and change. The objectives set out in
    NEPAD are consistent with the President's Compact for Development
    initiative, which emphasizes aid effectiveness through performance-
    based development assistance, accountability, measurable results, and
    local ownership.
        In response to NEPAD, the United States and its G-8 partners
    developed an Action Plan for Africa in which we committed to enter into
    enhanced partnership, including providing additional resources, with
    countries whose performance reflects the NEPAD commitments.
    Specifically, our efforts will focus on countries that demonstrate a
    commitment to good governance and the rule of law, investing in their
    people, and pursuing policies that promote democracy, spur economic
    growth, and alleviate poverty.

        Question 17. How effective has the NAFTA environmental side
    agreement the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
    (NAAEC)--been at protecting the environment? Where could it be
    improved?
        Response. The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
    (NAAEC) has proven to be a useful tool for protecting the environment.
    Pursuant to the NAAEC, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
    (CEC) was established and has evolved into an effective international
    environmental institution. The CEC consistently demonstrates the
    benefits of continental cooperation in addressing the environmental
    components of liberalized trade, serving as a complement to the NAFTA.
        The implementation of the NAAEC has led to environmental
    achievements' including:
          The phase-out and reduction of toxic chemicals in North
    America, including DDT;
          The protection of biodiversity through the North American
    Bird Conservation Initiative, Species of Common Conservation Concern,
    North American Marine Protected Areas Network, and the bilateral U.S.-
    Mexico Wildlife Without Borders program; the sharing of environmental
    management information through the North American Biodiversity
    Information Network; and
          The development of micro-financing partnerships to
    promote pollution prevention for small and medium-sized businesses; the
    promotion of sustainable agricultural practices for small scale
    producers; and the establishment by Mexico of a Pollutant Release and
    Transfer Register.
        The NAAEC provides members of the public with avenues for input
    through several advisory bodies and a public submission process. As a
    result, the CEC has become an important forum for cooperation,
    including public dialog and participation.
        Over time, the CEC's cooperative work program has significantly
    expanded and, gained momentum in addressing a wide array of
    environmental issues of continental concern. At the same time, the
    CEC's resource base has remained constant since its inception in 1995
    at $3 million from each country annually. As such, the effectiveness of
    this unique international environmental institution might be vastly
    improved by increased funding and/or more focused work on priority
    activities. In another area, the parties are working to strengthen
    communication and cooperation between trade and environment officials
    as envisioned in NAAEC Article 10(6), which calls for cooperation
    between the CEC and the NAFTA Free Trade Commission ``to achieve the
    environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA. . . .''.

        Question 18. The United States has a good record with respect to
    promoting the Export Credit Agencies in the Organization for Economic
    Cooperation and Development. Where do things stand on ECAs?
        Response. The United States has led the effort to strengthen
    environmental guidelines for official Export Credit Agencies (ECA5),
    both at the G-8 and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
    Development (OECD) Working Party on Export Credits and Credit
    Guarantees (ECG).
        We have made progress, but the current OECD proposal, ``Common
    Approaches to the Environment'', falls short of our objectives of
    securing a clear commitment on the part of ECAs to adhere to a minimum
    set of common environmental standards and credible transparency
    provisions, modeled on current World Bank standards. While our Export-
    Import Bank has had environmental guidelines since 1995, only a few of
    our competitors have standards that even approach the quality of Em-Im
    Bank's. Others in the OECD insist that ECAs focus now on implementing
    the ``Common Approaches'' that some Members said they would implement
    on a voluntary basis at the November 2001 meeting, and then review our
    respective experiences in 2003. Although we see the 2003 review as an
    important opportunity to apply lessons learned to strengthening and
    standardizing guidelines for ECAs, we do not intend to let this matter
    rest, and will continue to take every opportunity to make progress.

        Question 19. National laws are not able to address the striking
    decline in the world's fishing stocks and the overall biomass of the
    world's oceans in that portion of the earth's surface beyond any
    national jurisdiction. What commitments are you prepared to make
    regarding the creation and enforcement of international standards to
    prcitect this area of the high seas from unsustainable mining
    activities and fishing practices, such as bottom trawling and unwanted
    by-catch problems that cause massive destruction of marine life?
        Response. Under this Administration, the Department of State is
    taking a lead role in efforts to strengthen both the rules governing
    the conservation and management of living marine resources in areas
    beyond national jurisdiction, and the enforcement of those rules.
        In recent years, a new international framework has been established
    to accomplish this goal. Much of this work has focussed on global
    instruments such as the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, the FAO Compliance
    A9reement and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing.
    Together, these and other recent agreements provide an effective
    toolbox for addressing issues such as overfishing, bycatch of non-
    target species, excess capacity of fishing fleets, lack of enforcement
    of existing rules and other problem areas.
        It is now up to the United States and other countries that support
    the principles embodied in these agreements to work for their effective
    implementation at the regional and sub-regional levels through existing
    and newly created regional fisheries management organizations. This is
    not an easy task. Most international fisheries organizations operate by
    consensus, giving great weight to those who oppose serious efforts to
    effect necessary changes. However, we are committed to making every
    possible effort to promote sustainable fishing practices on fish stocks
    in areas both within and beyond national jurisdiction.
        One area where much work needs to be done is the area of bycatch
    and discards of small fish as well as other non-target fish species and
    other species including sea turtles and sea birds. Bycatch of sea birds
    and sea turtles in commercial longline fisheries, in particular, are
    issues that require more international attention. Again, this is
    difficult in that affected fleets may oppose conservation efforts that
    could adversely impact their operations. Because we have limited market
    leverage or other ways to compel action, we must work with other
    nations and their fishing industries to convince rather than coerce.
    Industry involvement and cooperation will be vital if we are to
    identify and introduce the technological solutions that will be
    necessary to address these issues.
        As part of this process, the Western Pacific Regional Fisheries
    Management Council, based in Honolulu, will convene this November the
    Second International Fishers Forum (IFF2). The conference will bring
    together representatives from the fishing industry, governments and the
    environmental and academic communities to address these and other
    issues. We strongly support this effort and will look carefully at the
    results of that meeting to identify possible next steps by Governments
    to mitigate sea bird and sea turtle bycatch in longline fisheries.
        As to mining activities on seabed areas beyond the jurisdiction of
    any nation, the United States participates as an observer in the
    International Seabed Authority (ISA). The ISA is a body created by the
    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which the United
    States is not yet a party. The ISA has completed Regulations on
    Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules, which include
    measures to protect the marine environment from mining activities.
    Through its role as observer, the United States has worked hard to
    develop measures that are consistent with U.S. interests.

        Question 20. One of the significant outcomes of the Rio Earth
    Summit was the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, which
    President George Herbert Walker Bush signed and which the U.S. Senate
    subsequently ratified unanimously in a voice vote.' The Kyoto Protocol
    gives effect to the objectives agreed to in the Climate Convention, and
    it is likely to enter into force sometime this year, perhaps at WSSD.
    The current Administration has said it does not support the Kyoto
    Protocol'. Nevertheless, the United States is still a Party to the
    Climate Convention. At the hearing, Mr. Connaughton admitted that the
    United States has not fulfilled its commitments to report to the United
    Nations on policies and measures to achieve 1990 levels of emissions.
    What steps will the Administration take to rectify this noncompliance?
        Response. The United States is in compliance with its commitments
    to report on its policies and measures under Article 4 of the
    Convention. The United States has submitted detailed information on our
    policies and measures, in accordance with the procedures under the
    Convention. Most recently, policies and measures are' detailed in the
    U.S. Climate Action Report, the third National Communication from. the
    United States to the Convention, submitted in May 2002. Concerning the
    non-binding ``aim'' of returning emissions to their 1990 levels, this
    aim refers to the year 2000, not the time period beyond 2000.

        Question 21. Please explain how the Administration's policies on
    climate change are consistent with our commitments under and the spirit
    of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
        Response. The Framework Convention's commitments relate principally
    to:
          Support for research and systematic observation;
          Promotion of education, training, and public awareness;
          Various forms of cooperation among Parties;
          For Annex I Parties (which includes the United States),
    adoption of policies and measures on the mitigation of climate change,
    as well as reporting on such policies and measures;
          For Annex II Parties (which includes the United States),
    support for developing countries in terms of financial resources and
    environmentally sound technologies.
        The Administration's policies implement all applicable commitments
    under the Convention. Most recently, the U.S. national communication,
    submitted in May 2002, detailed U.S. policies and measures to address
    climate change.
        The Administration's climate change policies involve extensive
    cooperation with other Convention Parties, are consistent with U.S.
    commitments under the Convention, and are designed to be economically
    sustainable. They represent a significant contribution to the global
    effort to address climate change both under the UNFCCC and elsewhere.
          The Administration's greenhouse gas intensity goal and
    the measures we will be taking over the next 10 years is both ambitious
    and reasonable, and is in line with past administration forecasts of
    the domestic reductions likely to be achieved under the Kyoto Protocol,
    and forecasts of other countries' efforts with respect to climate
    change policies.
          The Administration's commitment to climate change-related
    research and development is unmatched in the world, and represents what
    is truly a unique contribution toward a longterm climate change
    approach that is consistent with sustainable development. The
    President's National climate Change Technology Initiative confirms
    America as the leader in technology and innovation within the climate
    change area. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget proposal dedicates
    nearly $1.8 billion to fund basic scientific research on climate change
    and $1.3 billion to fund research on advanced energy and carbon
    sequestration technologies. The Administration has substantially
    increased funding for climate-related technical assistance to
    developing countries.
        Overall, the President's fiscal year 2003 budget seeks $4.5 billion
    in total climate spending--an increase of nearly $700 million. To the
    extent that there could be said to be a ``spirit'' of the Convention,
    the Administration's efforts are fully compatible with that spirit.

        Question 22. In view of the recent EPA study that substantiated the
    fact' that global warming is occurring, and the even more recent study
    by Alaskan scientists published in the Washington Post on Friday, July
    19, 2002 that the Alaskan glaciers are melting at over twice the rate
    previously supposed, and the very real national security interest that
    the United States has in ceasing its dependence on foreign oil, will
    this Administration commit at the WSSD to increase its international
    cooperation to reduce the generation of greenhouse gases?
        Response. The Secretary General of the United Nations has outlined
    five priority areas for the Summit: water and sanitation, energy,
    health, agriculture, and biodiversity. The United States is actively
    pursuing concrete initiatives to the Summit that are in line with these
    priorities, namely on water, agriculture, health, energy, oceans and
    forests. Climate change is not one of the Summit's priority areas,
    because the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change serves as the
    internationally agreed forum for addressing climate change. The
    Administration is pursuing ambitious steps to address climate change
    domestically, and is actively engaging in cooperative activities with
    countries around the world. For example, the President's plan seeks to
    continue the process of developing new technologies while nurturing the
    growth' of the economy. To this end, the President is creating the
    National Climate Change Technology Initiative, which will confirm
    America as the leader in technology and innovation within the climate
    change area. Furthermore, the President's fiscal year 2003 budget
    proposal dedicates $1.7 billion to fund basic scientific research on
    climate change and $1.3 billion to fund research on advanced energy and
    sequestration technologies. Overall, the President's fiscal year 2003
    budget seeks $4.5 billion in total climate spending--an increase of
    nearly $700 million. This level of commitment is unmatched in the
    world.

        Question 23. Has the United States or its representatives,
    officially or unofficially, discouraged countries from bringing climate
    change initiatives or issues to the World Summit for consideration?
        Response. The United States has not discouraged countries from
    bringing climate change initiatives or issues to the World Summit on
    Sustainable Development. The United States delegation has engaged
    constructively on a substantial amount of text on a variety of climate
    change issues occurring in the Plan of Implementation. Most of the
    climate change-related text in the draft Plan of Implementation has
    been agreed.
        Several delegations have put forward textual proposals that have
    the effect of asking the United States to endorse the Kyoto Protocol,
    or to take on new climate-related commitments in the WSSD. The United
    States does not support the Kyoto Protocol', and we have indicated to
    those delegations that we cannot support text that is contrary to our
    national position. The United States also has not agreed to additional
    climate change commitments at WSSD because the internationally agreed
    forum for negotiating climate change commitments is the U.N. Framework
    Convention on Climate Change. The Eighth Conference of the Parties to
    the Convention (COP-8) will take place in October 23--November 1, 2002.

        Question 24. Throughout the process, many governments have
    complained that the United States has turned a blind ear/eye to Rio.
    The Secretary General thinks that recognition of the Rio Principles
    will be key for successful implementation in Johannesburg. How will we
    recognize and implement the ``spirit of'' the Rio Principles?
        Response. We strongly support the principles of Rio, and would like
    to see these principles reaffirmed within the Johannesburg Plan of
    Action.

        Question 25. What is the Administration's position on the Corporate
    Accountability Convention that many non-governmental organizations have
    called for?
        Response. We strongly support efforts to promote corporate
    responsibility.
        We believe such efforts are best accomplished at the national level
    through a combination of government regulations and oversight along
    with voluntary corporate standards and practices implemented by the
    public sector, elected officials, and the private sectors in respective
    countries, not by a new multilateral treaty negotiation.

        Question 26. The President has announced that he will ask Congress
    for an extra $5 billion in overseas aid. Right now., the United States
    spends about 0.1 percent of its GDP on aid--the lowest percentage of
    any industrial country and below the average of 0.39 percent. Even with
    the increase, we'll still be the lowest in the world. Why is that?
        Response. Excluding the Administration's new commitment of $5
    billion for the Millennium Challenge Account, Official Development
    Assistance is being increased by 10 percent in fiscal year 2002. If the
    Administration's fiscal year 2003 budget request is approved, funding
    for HIV/AIDS over the past 2 years will have increased by 73 percent,
    funding for education will have increased by 65 percent and funds
    focused on Sub-Saharan Africa will have increased by 30 percent,
    reaching $1 billion for the first time. In our view, how funds are
    spent is more important than increased funding, which represents only
    part of solution to address sustainable development. The Administration
    believes that' assistance is most effective when it reinforces peace
    and stability, domestic governance, investments in people through
    health and education and private sector development.
                                     ______

       Investing in Health: Fighting Infectious Disease for Sustainable
                                  Development
                                   key action
        The Bush Administration is building upon recent announcements of
    efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.
          In June, President Bush announced a new $500 million
    Mother-and-Child HIV Prevention Initiative for Africa and the
    Caribbean,
          The U.S. pledge of $500 million to the Global Fund to
    Fight HW/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria represents approximately one-
    fourth of all commitments to date.
        Goal: To have, by 2015, halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of
    HP//AIDS, the scourge of malaria and other major diseases that afflict
    humanity. (United Nations Millennium Declaration)
        Description: This multi-year initiative will:
          Enhance technical assistance for Global Fund application
    development and project implementation.
          Strengthen surveillance and monitoring, research,
    prevention, and care activities.
          Expand efforts to combat mother-to-child transmission of
    HIV/AIDS.
          Pursue global partnerships and increased investment in
    fighting HP//AIDS, TB, and Malaria.
    Resources
        U.S. resources for international HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
    malaria, including meeting the President's pledge to the Global Fund
    are:
          $1.1 billion committed in fiscal year 2002
        ?  $1.2 billion requested for fiscal year 2003
        Partners
        The United States works with a wide array of partners including
    governments, international organizations, private corporations,
    foundations, faith-based groups and non-governmental organizations.
        South Africa Housing Initiative
                                   key action
        ?The United States will commit $15 million in support of the
    construction of 90,000 homes in South Africa over the next 5 years.
    This initiative, announced by the United States Overseas Private
    Investment Corporation (OPIC), builds on a 10-year legacy of
    strengthening housing finance for South Africa's poor begun by the
    United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
        Home ownership and community building are inextricably linked.
    According to the National Department of Housing of South Africa, one of
    the factors contributing to the deficit in construction of low-income
    housing is insufficient sources of construction financing, particularly
    for middle-to low-income wage earners.
        Under the South Africa Housing Initiative, construction financing
    will be made available for contractors constructing homes for middle-to
    low-income families. Under this Initiative, a for-profit U.S. sponsor
    will work with a South African Bank which, in turn, will be able to
    lend the equivalent of $20 million to the NTJRCHA Equity Services
    (NES), a for-profit entity operating under the National Urban Housing
    Association (NURCHA) of South Africa.
        The South Africa Housing Initiative is expected to stimulate South
    Africa's construction sector through loans to for-profit builders,
    contractors, and sub-contractors, and to efficiently expand employment,
    skills, and training in an essential sector of the economy of South
    Africa.
        Over the past 10 years, USAID has underwritten $90 million in
    private sector loans to enable South African banks to make available
    $250 million in housing loans to benefit 110,000 needy households.
    USAID has also financed considerable urban infrastructure (water,
    sewers, and roads) to enable the construction of new neighborhoods. The
    new OPIC initiative broadens this support for the transition of middle-
    to low-income households to homeownership and so contributes to long-
    term sustainable development for South Africa. Moreover, the delivery
    of potable water through the construction of new homes and the
    establishment of new housing communities for 90,000 households and
    almost 500,000 South Africans will contribute to improved health and
    achievement of Millennium Declaration goals.
        Resources
          The United States will commit $15 million in support of
    this important initiative.
        Oceans
        White Water to Blue Water. This initiative, involving U.S.
    Government agencies, the UK, France, and Spain, Caribbean governments,
    the Caribbean Environment Program, other international organizations,
    non-governmental organizations, and the private sector, emphasizes a
    cross-sectoral approach to ecosystem management beginning with upstream
    sectors (watersheds, inland forests, agricultural areas, and population
    centers) and extending through wetlands, mangrove swamps and coral
    reefs into the ocean. The initiative aims to improve capabilities of
    coastal States to manage coastal-marine ecosystems and to promote
    regional coordination among the partners to make best use of resources.
    The initial focus will be on the Wider Caribbean region.
        Geographic Information and Learning
          Geographic Information for Sustainable Development. This
    initiative brings together U.S. Government agencies, non-governmental
    organizations, the private sector, and academia to improve the quality
    and availability of data needed to understand better and monitor the
    environment. Recent applications of data from satellite earth
    observation systems, the Global Positioning System, Geographic
    Information Systems, and data base management can help decisionmakers
    address sustainable development problems in Africa, including food
    security, sustainable' agriculture, natural resource management,
    disaster mitigation, and poverty alleviation. More than 100 GISD-
    related projects are currently underway In Africa. The initiative
    already has funded 15 projects in the areas of Upper Niger, East
    African Great Lakes, Kenya-Tanzania coast, and the Limpopo-Zambezi
    Basin.
          My Community, Our Earth. This partnership involves
    partners such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National
    Geographic Society, the Association of American Geographers, the
    Environmental Systems Research Institute (a geographic information
    system and mapping company), and the U.N. Environmental Programme. The
    partnership is using maps, images, and graphs to help secondary,
    college, and university students worldwide learn about sustainable
    development issues such as biodiversity, deforestation, pollution, food
    production, fresh water supply, health, rural development, and
    urbanization. It aims to increase awareness about the value of
    geographic information systems technology, especially satellite images.
    Nearly 500 volunteer mentors have registered to help over 2000 students
    from more than 90 countries develop projects.
        Biodiversity
          Shade Coffee. This partnership helps small-to medium-
    scale coffee producers produce more profitable, high-quality coffees
    (organic, shade-grown, or ``Bird Friendly'' coffees), thereby promoting
    conservation while meeting rural development needs. The Commission for
    Environmental Cooperation, which is supported by the United States,
    Canada, and Mexico, is facilitating establishment of a North American
    sustainable agriculture debt facility that would make strategic credit
    guarantees/interventions to enhance the ability of small-scale
    producers groups, conservation groups, and private investors to
    collaborate more effectively at the local and international levels.
    Shade Coffee partners include the U.S. Agency for International
    Development (USAID), U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Department
    of Agriculture, the Smithsonian Institution's Migratory Bird Center,
    Conservation International, Rainforest Alliance, Specialty Coffee
    Association of America, and Starbucks Coffee.
          Invasive Alien Species. This initiative aims to
    understand the vectors and processes by which invasive alien species
    are introduced and to develop mechanisms for detection, rapid response,
    and mitigation. Partners include the governments of Australia, New
    Zealand, Norway, and South Africa; the Global Invasive Species Program;
    the U.S. Departments of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and State; the
    Environmental Protection Agency; USAID; the Smithsonian. Institution;
    many U.S. universities; State and local management authorities; and
    non-governmental organizations.
          Biological Diversity Informatics. This partnership seeks
    to develop and expand availability of user-friendly, internet-based
    access data that will allow users to link, integrate, analyze, and
    visualize existing data and ongoing research pertaining to species
    distribution. Partners include the U.S. National Invasive Species
    Council, Global Diversity Information Facility, Inter-American
    Biodiversity Information Network, North American Biodiversity
    Information Network, U.S. Department of the Interior, Smithsonian
    Institution, the Universities of California and Kansas, Conservation
    International, and the International Union for the Conservation of?
    Nature and Natural Resources.
        Agriculture and Natural Resources
          Building-a Partnership for Global Exchange of
    Conservation Stewardship Practices. This partnership seeks to build
    capacity in agriculture and natural resource conservation and
    stewardship practices for sustainable agriculture and forest and
    watershed management. A worldwide network will facilitate global peer-
    to-peer learning and exchanges for short-term, on-the-ground,
    community-and watershed-based activities, such as integrated land,
    water and coastal management; land restoration and rehabilitation;
    individual and community capacity building; and enterprise development.
    This public/private partnership, initiated by the U.S. Department of
    Agriculture, will increase the application of agriculture and natural
    resource conservation practices, exchange of integrated resource
    management approaches, and community participation in local
    decisionmaking.
        Principles of Sound Science in Decision-Making
          Strengthening Science-Based Decision-Making. This
    partnership brings together the Environmental Protection Agency, the
    U.S. National Academies of Science, the American Chemistry Council, and
    others in an effort to develop and strengthen linkages between science
    and decisionmakers in developing countries so that policy decisions can
    be based on the best available knowledge and so that research
    priorities can take into account the needs of decisionmakers.
        Health
          Netmark: A Public-Private Partnership for Sustainable
    Malaria Prevention. This partnership, involving USAIr, works with
    country governments and the commercial private sector to promote
    effective use of insecticide-treated bednets for the prevention of
    malaria. At the heart of Netmark is an innovative use of public-sector
    funds to reduce and eliminate the barriers to expanded commercial
    investment in the manufacture and distribution of insecticide-treated
    bednets. Netmark activities are underway in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal,
    and Zambia and there are plans to expand the partnership to other
    countries in Africa and elsewhere.
          Controlling Tuberculosis in High HIV Prevalence
    Populations. Under the new WHO/ Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS
    strategic framework to decrease the burden of the intersecting
    epidemics of tuberculosis and HP//AIDS, the Uni?ed States and the
    government of Japan will work with partners to improve coordination on
    TB prevention and control (intensified case-finding and cure) and
    interventions against HIV (and therefore indirectly against
    tuberculosis).
          Universal Flour Fortification. This public-private
    partnership seeks to replicate a successful iodized salt fortification
    model and address selected major remaining micronutrient deficiencies
    through fortification of flour with iron, folic acid, and other
    appropriate micronutrients. The partnership involves the U.S.
    Departments of Health and Human Services and Agriculture; the
    Australian, Canadian and U.S. Wheat Boards; the North American Millers'
    Association; the North American Grain Exports Association; and others.
          Health Promotores. This partnership will share
    experiences and best models related to community health outreach and
    education using lay community members in underserved areas. The
    promotores concept derived from Mexico and Latin American countries and
    is currently being pursued in U.S.-Mexico border communities. Partners
    include the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Health
    Resources and Services Administration, Environmental Protection Agency,
    the government of Mexico, and the University of Arizona.
          Children's Environmental Health Indicators. This
    initiative proposes the creation of an international forum of
    governments, U.N. agencies, intergovernmental and nongovernmental
    organizations, the private sector, and communities to advance a global
    effort to create children's environmental health indicators. This may
    involve proposing modifications to the existing data collection surveys
    in the U.N. system to incorporate children's environmental health,
    which may include developing, testing, and promoting the use of
    indicators.
    Education
          Africa Education Initiative. This Presidential
    initiative, which was announced in June 2002, will provide $200 million
    over the next 5 years to train more than 160,000 new teachers and
    provide in-service training for more than 260,000 existing teachers in
    Africa, partner with historically black colleges and universities in
    America to provide 4.5 million more textbooks and other learning tools
    for children in Africa, provide 250,000 scholarships for African girls,
    and increase the role of parents in their children's education by
    working to make school systems more transparent and open to reforms
    from parents.
          Global Food for Education. This multilateral school
    feeding pilot program may help as many as seven million school
    children, especially girls. The 2002 Farm Bill provides $100 million in
    fiscal year 2003 to continue the pilot program. The United States is
    reviewing the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the program in
    meeting its educational and food aid objectives.
    Sustainable Tourism
          Vilanculos Coastal Wildlife Sanctuary. The Overseas
    Private Investment Corporation is helping to finance this $10 million
    coastal and wildlife eco-tourism project in Mozambique's Bazaruto
    Archipelago. Backed by the Global Environmental Facility, the
    International Finance Corporation, and the International Union for the
    Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, the Sanctuary has
    followed world standards with regard to social and environmental
    issues. The project will provide economic development from tourism and
    job creation, and community development, including a health clinic,
    school, and housing.
    Transport
          Nacala Port and Railway Network. The Overseas Private
    Investment Corporation will provide financial assistance up to $35
    million to a U.S. project sponsor to develop and rehabilitate the
    railway corridor through Malawi and Mozambique and to refurbish the
    exiting port at Nacala. This will provide a less expensive alternative
    to Durban, South Africa, for moving goods to and from landlocked
    countries and enhance agricultural productivity and exports by reducing
    transport costs.
                                   __________
      Statement of James L. Connaughton, Chairman, White House Council on
                             Environmental Quality
        Mr. Chairmen, Senator Smith, Senator Lugar and Members of the
    Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee
    today to discuss the Bush Administration's strategy to address the
    important, long-term, and highly complex challenge of global climate
    change. I am pleased to share this panel with my colleague Mr. Turner.
        President Bush has committed the Nation to ambitious, focused and
    meaningful goals, programs and initiatives that provide a sensible and
    constructive path forward. The President's strategy is predicated on
    ensuring the strength and growth of the American economy, building on
    our nation's tremendous and demonstrated record of leadership in
    science and the promise of continued American technological innovation.
    As the President stated over a year ago: ``We will act, learn, and act
    again, adjusting our approaches as science advances and technology
    evolves.'' He elaborated on this point this past February: ``[G]lobal
    climate change presents a different set of challenges and requires a
    different strategy [from policies designed to reduce air pollution].
    The science is more complex, the answers are less certain, and the
    technology is less developed. So we need a flexible approach that can
    adjust to new information and new technology.'' The flexible path
    toward long term progress that I will outline for you today sharply
    contrasts with the view of some that the only acceptable policy
    approach is near term, legislated restrictions that will needlessly
    hurt our economy and cost American jobs.
        The President committed the Nation to an immediate goal of reducing
    America's greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our economy
    by 18 percent in the next 10 years. This will set America on a path to
    slow the growth of our greenhouse gas emissions and, if science
    justifies, to stop and then reverse the growth of emissions. I would
    emphasize that achieving this ambitious, yet realistic, national goal
    will require a sustained commitment and significant investment and
    effort from our nation's farmers, small businesses, workers,
    industries, and citizens that rivals the hard gains in efficiency and
    productivity we have earned over the last several decades.
        To achieve this goal, the Administration is actively engaged and
    moving forward on many fronts, looking at every sector of our economy,
    with the recognition that meaningful progress depends on the
    development and deployment of new technology. With the continued
    support of Congress, we are advancing climate science, developing and
    promoting energy efficiency, conservation, and sequestration
    technologies and practices, pursuing near term greenhouse gas
    mitigation programs and expanding international cooperation.
        The President has reaffirmed America's commitment to the goal of
    stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that
    will prevent dangerous interference with the climate. At the same time,
    the President noted that given current scientific uncertainties, no one
    knows what that level is. This underscores the importance of the
    President's focus on science and technology.
        The President has called for nearly $700 million in additional
    funding for the Federal Government's commitment to climate change in
    Fiscal Year 1903--a 17 percent increase from last year--to support a
    $4.5 billion program of research on climate science and energy
    technology, mitigation incentives and programs, and international
    technology transfer and outreach. This commitment is unmatched in the
    world. The President's recent Report to Congress on Federal Climate
    Change Expenditures details the numerous programs that this funding
    will support. And there is a Cabinet-level effort to bring more
    effective, high level management and focus to this significant
    investment of public resources.
        Importantly, the President's request includes $555 million in clean
    energy tax incentives, the first part of a $4.6 billion commitment over
    the next 5 years, reaching $7.1 billion over the next 10 years. These
    incentives will spur investments in and purchases of renewable energy--
    including solar, wind, and biomass--as well as advanced hybrid and fuel
    cell vehicles, cogeneration, and landfill gas conversion. We also are
    promoting clean coal technology, as well as nuclear power--which
    produces no greenhouse gas emissions--and are working to safely improve
    fuel economy for our cars and trucks. And we are advancing the prospect
    of breakthrough technologies, such as the promise of zero-emission fuel
    cell vehicles through the Department of Energy's Freedom Car
    Initiative.
        Under the recently enacted Farm bill and existing authorizations,
    we will invest up to $47 billion in the next decade for conservation on
    our farms and forest lands. Not only will this partnership with farmers
    and small land owners help protect the water and air, and secure and
    enhance habitat for wildlife, it will also provide opportunities to
    store significant quantities of carbon in trees and the soil, and
    promote other activities to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.
        We also are making substantial progress on the effort to create
    world-class standards for measuring and registering greenhouse gas
    emissions reductions, with organizations receiving transferable credits
    for the reductions in emissions they secure. At the same time, we are
    making progress on the President's challenge to businesses to further
    reduce their emissions. EPA's Climate Leaders Program is well underway.
    We look forward to seeing new commitments and even greater reductions.
        These are simply a few significant examples of more than 60 Federal
    programs--some mandatory, some incentive-based, some voluntary--that
    will help to slow the growth in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions over the
    next decade and beyond.
        The President's strategy has also created a new framework for
    expanding international cooperation. We are investing $25 million in
    climate observation systems in developing countries, increasing funding
    for tropical forest conservation to $50 million, and providing $178
    million for the Global Environmental Facility next year, which includes
    a substantial $70 million payment for arrears incurred during the prior
    administration. The President's fiscal yea4r 2003 budget also requests
    $156 million in funding for USAID climate change programs. And in the
    past year alone, the Administration has entered into bilateral
    agreements with Japan, Australia, Canada, Italy, the European Union,
    CONCAUSA, China and India on climate change science, energy and
    sequestration technology, and policy approaches.
        The President's climate change strategy is the product of an
    ongoing, combined working group of the National Security Council, the
    Domestic Policy Council and the National Economic Council. Our actions
    have been and will continue to be guided by the six principles that the
    President outlined last June:
        1. Consistency with the long-term goal of stabilizing
    concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that
    will prevent dangerous interference with the climate system,
    recognizing that we currently do not know what that level is;
        2. Measured actions, as we learn more from science and build on it;
        3. Flexibility to adjust to new information and take advantage of
    new technology;
        4. Ensuring continued economic growth and prosperity for the United
    States and the world;
        5. Pursuing market-based incentives and spurring technological
    innovation; and
        6. Global participation, including developing countries.
        The Bush Administration's strategy for action and progress--a solid
    policy framework, a meaningful national emissions reduction goal, and a
    suite of policies to achieve that goal--is calibrated to the actual
    state of scientific knowledge and guards against costly and misdirected
    policy errors. Commentary that continues to equate action on climate
    change with acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol ignores the bipartisan
    record of opposition to its approach. The Kyoto Protocol would have
    cost our economy up to $400 billion and caused the loss of up to 4.9
    million jobs, risking the welfare of the American people and American
    workers. And without the participation of the world's developing
    countries, many of which will experience rapid growth in coming
    decades, it represented an ineffective policy response to this global
    challenge.
        President Bush's philosophy--which ties our benchmark for progress
    with economic growth--represents a careful balancing that promises
    significant emissions reductions over the course of the next decade,
    while preserving the strength of the American economy. Only sustained
    economic growth, both here and abroad, will allow for the significant
    new investments in energy and sequestration technologies that will be
    needed to address this long term challenge.
        Again, thank you for inviting me today. I would be pleased to
    answer any questions that you may have and ask that the written
    material accompanying my testimony be entered into the record.
                                   Appendices
             1. statement of president george bush (june 11, 2001)
                                              THE WHITE HOUSE
                                  Office of the Press Secretary
                                    For Immediate Release June 11, 2001
                 president bush discusses global climate change
    The Rose Garden
    11:10 A.M. EDT
        President George W. Bush. Good morning. I've just met with senior
    members of my administration who are working to develop an effective
    and science-based approach to addressing the important issues of global
    climate change.
        This is an issue that I know is very important to the nations of
    Europe, which I will be visiting for the first time as President. The
    earth's well-being is also an issue important to America. And it's an
    issue that should be important to every Nation in every part of our
    world.
        The issue of climate change respects no border. Its effects cannot
    be reined in by an army nor advanced by any ideology. Climate change,
    with its potential to impact every corner of the world, is an issue
    that must be addressed by the world.
        The Kyoto Protocol was fatally flawed in fundamental ways. But the
    process used to bring nations together to discuss our joint response to
    climate change is an important one. That is why I am today committing
    the United States of America to work within the United Nations
    framework and elsewhere to develop with our friends and allies and
    nations throughout the world an effective and science-based response to
    the issue of global warming.
        My Cabinet-level working group has met regularly for the last 10
    weeks to review the most recent, most accurate, and most comprehensive
    science. They have heard from scientists offering a wide spectrum of
    views. They have reviewed the facts, and they have listened to many
    theories and suppositions. The working group asked the highly respected
    National Academy of Sciences to provide us the most up-to-date
    information about what is known and about what is not known on the
    science of climate change.
        First, we know the surface temperature of the earth is warming. It
    has risen by .6 degrees Celsius over the past 100 years. There was a
    warming trend from the 1890's to the 1940's. Cooling from the 1940's to
    the 1970's. And then sharply rising temperatures from the 1970's to
    today.
        There is a natural greenhouse effect that contributes to warming.
    Greenhouse gases trap heat, and thus warm the earth because they
    prevent a significant proportion of infrared radiation from escaping
    into space. Concentration of greenhouse gases, especially
    CO2, have increased substantially since the beginning of the
    industrial revolution. And the National Academy of Sciences indicate
    that the increase is due in large part to human activity.
        Yet, the Academy's report tells us that we do not know how much
    effect natural fluctuations in climate may have had on warming. We do
    not know how much our climate could, or will change in the future. We
    do not know how fast change will occur, or even how some of our actions
    could impact it.
        For example, our useful efforts to reduce sulfur emissions may have
    actually increased warming, because sulfate particles reflect sunlight,
    bouncing it back into space. And, finally, no one can say with any
    certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of warming, and therefore
    what level must be avoided.
        The policy challenge is to act in a serious and sensible way, given
    the limits of our knowledge. While scientific uncertainties remain, we
    can begin now to address the factors that contribute to climate change.
        There are only two ways to stabilize concentration of greenhouse
    gases. One is to avoid emitting them in the first place; the other is
    to try to capture them after they're created. And there are problems
    with both approaches. We're making great progress through technology,
    but have not yet developed cost-effective ways to capture carbon
    emissions at their source; although there is some promising work that
    is being done.
        And a growing population requires more energy to heat and cool our
    homes, more gas to drive our cars. Even though we're making progress on
    conservation and energy efficiency and have significantly reduced the
    amount of carbon emissions per unit of GDP.
        Our country, the United States is the world's largest emitter of
    manmade greenhouse gases. We account for almost 20 percent of the
    world's man-made greenhouse emissions. We also account for about one-
    quarter of the world's economic output. We recognize the responsibility
    to reduce our emissions. We also recognize the other part of the
    story--that the rest of the world emits 80 percent of all greenhouse
    gases. And many of those emissions come from developing countries.
        This is a challenge that requires a 100 percent effort; ours, and
    the rest of the world's. The world's second-largest emitter of
    greenhouse gases is China. Yet, China was entirely exempted from the
    requirements of the Kyoto Protocol.
        India and Germany are among the top emitters. Yet, India was also
    exempt from Kyoto. These and other developing countries that are
    experiencing rapid growth face challenges in reducing their emissions
    without harming their economies. We want to work cooperatively with
    these countries in their efforts to reduce greenhouse emissions and
    maintain economic growth.
        Kyoto also failed to address two major pollutants that have an
    impact on warming: black soot and tropospheric ozone. Both are proven
    health hazards. Reducing both would not only address climate change,
    but also dramatically improve people's health.
        Kyoto is, in many ways, unrealistic. Many countries cannot meet
    their Kyoto targets. The targets themselves were arbitrary and not
    based upon science. For America, complying with those mandates would
    have a negative economic impact, with layoffs of workers and price
    increases for consumers. And when you evaluate all these flaws, most
    reasonable people will understand that it's not sound public policy.
        That's why 95 members of the U.S. Senate expressed a reluctance to
    endorse such an approach. Yet, America's unwillingness to embrace a
    flawed treaty should not be read by our friends and allies as any
    abdication of responsibility. To the contrary, my administration is
    committed to a leadership role on the issue of climate change.
        We recognize our responsibility and will meet it--at home, in our
    hemisphere, and in the world. My Cabinet-level working group on climate
    change is recommending a number of initial steps, and will continue to
    work on additional ideas. The working group proposes the United States
    help lead the way by advancing the science on climate change, advancing
    the technology to monitor and reduce greenhouse gases, and creating
    partnerships within our hemisphere and beyond to monitor and measure
    and mitigate emissions.
        I also call on Congress to work with my administration to achieve
    the significant emission reductions made possible by implementing the
    clean energy technologies proposed in our energy plan. Our working
    group study has made it clear that we need to know a lot more.
        The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change commences to
    stabilizing concentrations at a level that will prevent dangerous human
    interference with the climate; but no one knows what that level is. The
    United States has spent $18 billion on climate research since 1990--
    three times as much as any other country, and more than Japan and all
    15 nations of the EU combined.
        Today, I make our investment in science even greater. My
    administration will establish the U.S. Climate Change Research
    Initiative to study areas of uncertainty and identify priority areas
    where investments can make a difference.
        I'm directing my Secretary of Commerce, working with other
    agencies, to set priorities for additional investments in climate
    change research, review such investments, and to improve coordination
    amongst Federal agencies. We will fully fund high-priority areas for
    climate change science over the next 5 years. We'll also provide
    resources to build climate observation systems in developing countries
    and encourage other developed nations to match our American commitment.
        And we propose a joint venture with the EU, Japan and others to
    develop state-of-the-art climate modeling that will help us better
    understand the causes and impacts of climate change. America's the
    leader in technology and innovation. We all believe technology offers
    great promise to significantly reduce emissions--especially carbon
    capture, storage and sequestration technologies.
        So we're creating the National Climate Change Technology Initiative
    to strengthen research at universities and national labs, to enhance
    partnerships in applied research, to develop improved technology for
    measuring and monitoring gross and net greenhouse gas emissions, and to
    fund demonstration projects for cutting-edge technologies, such as
    bioreactors and fuel cells.
        Even with the best science, even with the best technology, we all
    know the United States cannot solve this global problem alone. We're
    building partnerships within the Western Hemisphere and with other
    like-minded countries. Last week, Secretary Powell signed a new
    CONCAUSA Declaration with the countries of Central America, calling for
    cooperative efforts on science research, monitoring and measuring of
    emissions, technology development, and investment in forest
    conservation.
        We will work with the Inter-American Institute for Global Change
    Research and other institutions to better understand regional impacts
    of climate change. We will establish a partnership to monitor and
    mitigate emissions. And at home, I call on Congress to work with my
    administration on the initiatives to enhance conservation and energy
    efficiency outlined in my energy plan, to implement the increased use
    of renewables, natural gas and hydropower that are outlined in the
    plan, and to increase the generation of safe and clean nuclear power.
        By increasing conservation and energy efficiency and aggressively
    using these clean energy technologies, we can reduce our greenhouse gas
    emissions by significant amounts in the coming years. We can make great
    progress in reducing emissions, and we will. Yet, even that isn't
    enough.
        I've asked my advisors to consider approaches to reduce greenhouse
    gas emissions, including those that tap the power of markets, help
    realize the promise of technology and ensure the widest-possible global
    participation. As we analyze the possibilities, we will be guided by
    several basic principles. Our approach must be consistent with the
    long-term goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the
    atmosphere. Our actions should be measured as we learn more from
    science and build on it.
        Our approach must be flexible to adjust to new information and take
    advantage of new technology. We must always act to ensure continued
    economic growth and prosperity for our citizens and for citizens
    throughout the world. We should pursue market-based incentives and spur
    technological innovation.
        And, finally, our approach must be based on global participation,
    including that of developing countries whose net greenhouse gas
    emissions now exceed those in the developed countries.
        I've asked Secretary Powell and Administrator Whitman to ensure
    they actively work with friends and allies to explore common approaches
    to climate change consistent with these principles. Each step we take
    will increase our knowledge. We will act, learn, and act again,
    adjusting our approaches as science advances and technology evolves.
        Our administration will be creative. We're committed to protecting
    our environment and improving our economy, to acting at home and
    working in concert with the world. This is an administration that will
    make commitments we can keep, and keep the commitments that we make.
        I look forward to continued discussions with our friends and allies
    about this important issue.
        Thank you for coming.
                                     ______

       2. policy book accompanying presidential statement (june 11, 2001)

           3. statement of president george bush (february 14, 2002)
                                              THE WHITE HOUSE
                                  Office of the Press Secretary
                                For Immediate Release February 14, 2002
            remarks by the president on climate change and clean air
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
    Silver Spring, Maryland
    2:05 P.M. EST

        The President: Thank you very much for that warm welcome. It's an
    honor to join you all today to talk about our environment and about the
    prospect of dramatic progress to improve it.
        Today, I'm announcing a new environmental approach that will clean
    our skies, bring greater health to our citizens and encourage
    environmentally responsible development in America and around the
    world.
        Particularly, it's an honor to address this topic at NOAA, whose
    research is providing us with the answers to critical questions about
    our environment. And so I want to thank Connie for his hospitality and
    I want to thank you for yours, as well. Connie said he felt kind of
    like Sasha Cohen--I thought for a minute he was going to ask me to talk
    to his mother on his cell phone.
        I also want to tell you one of my favorite moments was to go down
    to Crawford and turn on my NOAA radio to get the weather. I don't know
    whether my guy is a computer or a person. But the forecast is always
    accurate, and I appreciate that. I also want to thank you for your hard
    work, on behalf of the American people.
        I appreciate my friend, Don Evans's leadership. I've known him for
    a long time. You're working for a good fellow, if you're working at the
    Commerce Department, or at NOAA. And I want to thank Spence Abraham and
    Christie Todd Whitman for their service to the country, as well. I've
    assembled a fabulous Cabinet, people who love their country and work
    hard. And these are three of some of the finest Cabinet officials I've
    got.
        I want to thank Jim Connaughton, who is the Chairman of the Council
    on Environmental Quality. He's done a fabulous job of putting this
    policy together, a policy that I'm about to explain. But before I do, I
    also want to thank some Members of Congress who have worked with us on
    this initiative. I want to thank Bob Smith and George Voinovich, two
    United States senators, for their leadership in pursuing multi-
    pollutant legislation; as well as Congressmen Billy Tauzin and Joe
    Barton. And I want to thank Senator Chuck Hagel and Larry Craig for
    their work on climate issues. These Members of Congress have had an
    impact on the policies I am just about to announce.
        America and the world share this common goal: we must foster
    economic growth in ways that protect our environment. We must encourage
    growth that will provide a better life for citizens, while protecting
    the land, the water, and the air that sustain life.
        In pursuit of this goal, my government has set two priorities: we
    must clean our air, and we must address the issue of global climate
    change. We must also act in a serious and responsible way, given the
    scientific uncertainties. While these uncertainties remain, we can
    begin now to address the human factors that contribute to climate
    change. Wise action now is an insurance policy against future risks.
        I have been working with my Cabinet to meet these challenges with
    forward and creative thinking. I said, if need be, let's challenge the
    status quo. But let's always remember, let's do what is in the interest
    of the American people.
        Today, I'm confident that the environmental path that I announce
    will benefit the entire world. This new approach is based on this
    common-sense idea: that economic growth is key to environmental
    progress, because it is growth that provides the resources for
    investment in clean technologies.
        This new approach will harness the power of markets, the creativity
    of entrepreneurs, and draw upon the best scientific research. And it
    will make possible a new partnership with the developing world to meet
    our common environmental and economic goals.
        We will apply this approach first to the challenge of cleaning the
    air that Americans breathe. Today, I call for new Clean Skies
    legislation that sets tough new standards to dramatically reduce the
    three most significant forms of pollution from power plants, sulfur
    dioxide, nitrogen oxides and mercury.
        We will cut sulfur dioxide emissions by 73 percent from current
    levels. We will cut nitrogen oxide emissions by 67 percent. And, for
    the first time ever, we will cap emissions of mercury, cutting them by
    69 percent. These cuts will be completed over two measured phases, with
    one set of emission limits for 2010 and for the other for 2018.
        This legislation will constitute the most significant step America
    has ever taken--has ever taken--to cut power plant emissions that
    contribute to urban smog, acid rain and numerous health problems for
    our citizens.
        Clean Skies legislation will not only protect our environment, it
    will prolong the lives of thousands of Americans with asthma and other
    respiratory illnesses, as well as with those with heart disease. And it
    will reduce the risk to children exposed to mercury during a mother's
    pregnancy.
        The Clean Skies legislation will reach our ambitious air quality
    goals through a market-based cap-and-trade approach that rewards
    innovation, reduces cost and guarantees results. Instead of the
    government telling utilities where and how to cut pollution, we will
    tell them when and how much to cut. We will give them a firm deadline
    and let them find the most innovative ways to meet it.
        We will do this by requiring each facility to have a permit for
    each ton of pollution it emits. By making the permits tradable, this
    system makes it financially worthwhile for companies to pollute less,
    giving them an incentive to make early and cost effective reductions.
        This approach enjoys widespread support, with both Democrats and
    Republicans, because we know it works. You see, since 1995 we have used
    a cap-and-trade program for sulfur dioxide pollution. It has cut more
    air pollution, this system has reduced more air pollution in the last
    decade than all other programs under the 1990 Clean Air Act combined.
    And by even more than the law required. Compliance has been virtually
    100 percent. It takes only a handful of employees to administer this
    program. And no one had to enter a courtroom to make sure the
    reductions happened.
        Because the system gives businesses an incentive to create and
    install innovative technologies, these reductions have cost about 80
    percent less than expected. It helps to keep energy prices affordable
    for our consumers. And we made this progress during a decade when our
    economy, and our demand for energy, was growing.
        The Clean Skies legislation I propose is structured on this
    approach because it works. It will replace a confusing, ineffective
    maze of regulations for power plants that has created an endless cycle
    of litigation. Today, hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on
    lawyers, rather than on environmental protection. The result is
    painfully slow, uncertain and expensive programs on clean air.
        Instead, Clean Skies legislation will put less money into paying
    lawyers and regulators, and money directly into programs to reduce
    pollution, to meet our national goal. This approach, I'm absolutely
    confident, will bring better and faster results in cleaning up our air.
        Now, global climate change presents a different set of challenges
    and requires a different strategy. The science is more complex, the
    answers are less certain, and the technology is less developed. So we
    need a flexible approach that can adjust to new information and new
    technology.
        I reaffirm America's commitment to the United Nations Framework
    Convention and its central goal, to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse
    gas concentrations at a level that will prevent dangerous human
    interference with the climate. Our immediate goal is to reduce
    America's greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our economy.
        My administration is committed to cutting our nation's greenhouse
    gas intensity--how much we emit per unit of economic activity--by 18
    percent over the next 10 years. This will set America on a path to slow
    the growth of our greenhouse gas emissions and, as science justifies,
    to stop and then reverse the growth of emissions.
        This is the common sense way to measure progress. Our Nation must
    have economic growth--growth to create opportunity; growth to create a
    higher quality of life for our citizens. Growth is also what pays for
    investments in clean technologies, increased conservation, and energy
    efficiency. Meeting our commitment to reduce our greenhouse gas
    intensity by 18 percent by the year 2012 will prevent over 500 million
    metric tons of greenhouse gases from going into the atmosphere over the
    course of the decade. And that is the equivalent of taking 70 million
    cars off the road.
        To achieve this goal, our Nation must move forward on many fronts,
    looking at every sector of our economy. We will challenge American
    businesses to further reduce emissions. Already, agreements with the
    semiconductor and aluminum industries and others have dramatically cut
    emissions of some of the most potent greenhouse gases. We will build on
    these successes with new agreements and greater reductions.
        Our government will also move forward immediately to create world-
    class standards for measuring and registering emission reductions. And
    we will give transferable credits to companies that can show real
    emission reductions.
        We will promote renewable energy production and clean coal
    technology, as well as nuclear power, which produces no greenhouse gas
    emissions. And we will work to safely improve fuel economy for our cars
    and our trucks.
        Overall, my budget devotes $4.5 billion to addressing climate
    change--more than any other nation's commitment in the entire world.
    This is an increase of more than $700 million over last year's budget.
    Our Nation will continue to lead the world in basic climate and science
    research to address gaps in our knowledge that are important to
    decisionmakers.
        When we make decisions, we want to make sure we do so on sound
    science; not what sounds good, but what is real. And the United States
    leads the world in providing that kind of research. We'll devote $588
    million toward the research and development of energy conservation
    technologies. We must and we will conserve more in the United States.
    And we will spend $408 million toward research and development on
    renewables, on renewable energy.
        This funding includes $150 million for an initiative that Spence
    Abraham laid out the other day, $150 million for the Freedom Car
    Initiative, which will advance the prospect of breakthrough zero-
    emission fuel cell technologies.
        My comprehensive energy plan, the first energy plan that any
    administration has put out in a long period of time, provides $4.6
    billion over the next 5 years in clean energy tax incentives to
    encourage purchases of hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, to promote
    residential solar energy, and to reward investments in wind, solar and
    biomass energy production. And we will look for ways to increase the
    amount of carbon stored by America's farms and forests through a strong
    conservation title in the farm bill. I have asked Secretary Veneman to
    recommend new targeted incentives for landowners to increase carbon
    storage.
        By doing all these things, by giving companies incentives to cut
    emissions, by diversifying our energy supply to include cleaner fuels,
    by increasing conservation, by increasing research and development and
    tax incentives for energy efficiency and clean technologies, and by
    increasing carbon storage, I am absolutely confident that America will
    reach the goal that I have set.
        If, however, by 2012, our progress is not sufficient and sound
    science justifies further action, the United States will respond with
    additional measures that may include broad-based market programs as
    well as additional incentives and voluntary measures designed to
    accelerate technology development and deployment.
        Addressing global climate change will require a sustained effort
    over many generations. My approach recognizes that economic growth is
    the solution, not the problem. Because a Nation that grows its economy
    is a Nation that can afford investments and new technologies.
        The approach taken under the Kyoto protocol would have required the
    United States to make deep and immediate cuts in our economy to meet an
    arbitrary target. It would have cost our economy up to $400 billion and
    we would have lost 4.9 million jobs.
        As President of the United States, charged with safeguarding the
    welfare of the American people and American workers, I will not commit
    our Nation to an unsound international treaty that will throw millions
    of our citizens out of work. Yet, we recognize our international
    responsibilities. So in addition to acting here at home, the United
    States will actively help developing nations grow along a more
    efficient, more environmentally responsible path.
        The hope of growth and opportunity and prosperity is universal.
    It's the dream and right of every society on our globe. The United
    States wants to foster economic growth in the developing world,
    including the world's poorest nations. We want to help them realize
    their potential, and bring the benefits of growth to their peoples,
    including better health, and better schools and a cleaner environment.
        It would be unfair--indeed, counterproductive--to condemn
    developing nations to slow growth or no growth by insisting that they
    take on impractical and unrealistic greenhouse gas targets. Yet,
    developing nations such as China and India already account for a
    majority of the world's greenhouse gas emissions, and it would be
    irresponsible to absolve them from shouldering some of the shared
    obligations.
        The greenhouse gas intensity approach I put forward today gives
    developing countries a yardstick for progress on climate change that
    recognizes their right to economic development. I look forward to
    discussing this new approach next week, when I go to China and Japan
    and South Korea. The United States will not interfere with the plans of
    any Nation that chooses to ratify the Kyoto protocol. But I will intend
    to work with nations, especially the poor and developing nations, to
    show the world that there is a better approach, that we can build our
    future prosperity along a cleaner and better path.
        My budget includes over $220 million for the U.S. Agency for
    International Development and a global environmental facility to help
    developing countries better measure, reduce emissions, and to help them
    invest in clean and renewable energy technologies. Many of these
    technologies, which we take for granted in our own country, are not
    being used in the developing world. We can help ensure that the
    benefits of these technologies are more broadly shared. Such efforts
    have helped bring solar energy to Bangladesh, hydroelectric energy to
    the Philippines, geothermal electricity to Kenya. These projects are
    bringing jobs and environmental benefits to these nations, and we will
    build on these successes.
        The new budget also provides $40 million under the Tropical Forest
    Conservation Act to help countries redirect debt payments toward
    protecting tropical forests, forests that store millions of tons of
    carbon. And I've also ordered the Secretary of State to develop a new
    initiative to help developing countries stop illegal logging, a
    practice that destroys biodiversity and releases millions of tons of
    greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.
        And, finally, my government is following through on our commitment
    to provide $25 million for climate observation systems in developing
    countries that will help scientists understand the dynamics of climate
    change.
        To clean the air, and to address climate change, we need to
    recognize that economic growth and environmental protection go hand in
    hand. Affluent societies are the ones that demand, and can therefore
    afford, the most environmental protection. Prosperity is what allows us
    to commit more and more resources to environmental protection. And in
    the coming decades, the world needs to develop and deploy billions of
    dollars of technologies that generate energy in cleaner ways. And we
    need strong economic growth to make that possible.
        Americans are among the most creative people in our history. We
    have used radio waves to peer into the deepest reaches of space. We
    cracked life's genetic code. We have made our air and land and water
    significantly cleaner, even as we have built the world's strongest
    economy.
        When I see what Americans have done, I know what we can do. We can
    tap the power of economic growth to further protect our environment for
    generations that follow. And that's what we're going to do.
        Thank you.
     4. policy book accompanying presidential statement (february 14, 2002)
                               executive summary
        ``Addressing global climate change will require a sustained effort,
    over many generations. My approach recognizes that sustained economic
    growth is the solution, not the problem--because a Nation that grows
    its economy is a Nation that can afford investments in efficiency, new
    technologies, and a cleaner environment.''
                                      President George W. Bush.
        The President announced a new approach to the challenge of global
    climate change. This approach is designed to harness the power of
    markets and technological innovation. It holds the promise of a new
    partnership with the developing world. And it recognizes that climate
    change is a complex, long-term challenge that will require a sustained
    effort over many generations. As the President has said, ``The policy
    challenge is to act in a serious and sensible way, given the limits of
    our knowledge. While scientific uncertainties remain, we can begin now
    to address the factors that contribute to climate change.''
        While investments today in science will increase our understanding
    of this challenge, our investments in advanced energy and sequestration
    technologies will provide the breakthroughs we need to dramatically
    reduce our emissions in the longer term. In the near term, we will
    vigorously pursue emissions reductions even in the absence of complete
    knowledge. Our approach recognizes that sustained economic growth is an
    essential part of the solution, not the problem. Economic growth will
    make possible the needed investment in research, development, and
    deployment of advanced technologies. This strategy is one that should
    offer developing countries the incentive and means to join with us in
    tackling this challenge together. Significantly, the President's plan
    will:
          Reduce the Greenhouse Gas Intensity of the U.S. Economy
    by 18 Percent in the Next Ten Years. Greenhouse gas intensity measures
    the ratio of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to economic output. This
    new approach focuses on reducing the growth of GHG emissions, while
    sustaining the economic growth needed to finance investment in new,
    clean energy technologies. It sets America on a path to slow the growth
    of greenhouse gas emissions, and--as the science justifies--to stop and
    then reverse that growth:
          In efficiency terms, the 183 metric tons of emissions per
    million dollars GDP that we emit today will be lowered to 151 metric
    tons per million dollars GDP in 2012.
          Existing trends and efforts in technology improvement
    will play a significant role. Beyond that, the President's commitment
    will achieve 100 million metric tons of reduced emissions in 2012
    alone, with more than 500 million metric tons in cumulative savings
    over the entire decade.
          This goal is comparable to the average progress that
    nations participating in the Kyoto Protocol are required to achieve.
          Substantially Improve the Emission Reduction Registry.
    The President directed the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with
    the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the
    Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to propose
    improvements to the current voluntary emission reduction registration
    program under section 1605(b) of the 1992 Energy Policy Act within 120
    days. These improvements will enhance measurement accuracy, reliability
    and verifiability, working with and taking into account emerging
    domestic and international approaches.
          Protect and Provide Transferable Credits for Emissions
    Reduction. The President directed the Secretary of Energy to recommend
    reforms to ensure that businesses and individuals that register
    reductions are not penalized under a future climate policy, and to give
    transferable credits to companies that can show real emissions
    reductions.
          Review Progress Toward Goal and Take Additional Action if
    Necessary. If, in 2012, we find that we are not on track toward meeting
    our goal, and sound science justifies further policy action, the United
    States will respond with additional measures that may include a broad,
    market-based program as well as additional incentives and voluntary
    measures designed to accelerate technology development and deployment.
          Increase Funding for America's Commitment to Climate
    Change. The President's fiscal year 1903 budget seeks $4.5 billion in
    total climate spending--an increase of $700 million. This commitment is
    unmatched in the world, and is particularly notable given America's
    focus on international and homeland security and domestic economic
    issues in the President's fiscal year 1903 budget proposal.
          Take Action on the Science and Technology Review. The
    Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Energy have completed their
    review of the Federal Government's science and technology research
    portfolios and recommended a path forward. As a result of their review,
    the President has established a new management structure to advance and
    coordinate climate change science and technology research.
          The President has established a Cabinet-level Committee
    on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration to oversee this
    effort. The Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Energy will lead the
    effort, in close coordination with the President's Science Advisor. The
    research effort will continue to be coordinated through the National
    Science and Technology Council in accordance with the Global Change
    Research Act of 1990.
          The President's fiscal year 1903 budget proposal
    dedicates $1.7 billion to fund basic scientific research on climate
    change and $1.3 billion to fund research on advanced energy and
    sequestration technologies.
          This includes $80 million in new funding dedicated to
    implementation of the Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI) and the
    National Climate Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI) announced last
    June. This funding will be used to address major gaps in our current
    understanding of the natural carbon cycle and the role of black soot
    emissions in climate change. It will also be used to promote the
    development of the most promising ``breakthrough'' technologies for
    clean energy generation and carbon sequestration.
          Implement a Comprehensive Range of New and Expanded
    Domestic Policies, Including:
          Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, Cogeneration, and
    New Technology. The President's fiscal year 1903 budget seeks $555
    million in clean energy tax incentives, as the first part of a $4.6
    billion commitment over the next 5 years ($7.1 billion over the next 10
    years). These tax credits will spur investments in renewable energy
    (solar, wind, and biomass), hybrid and fuel cell vehicles,
    cogeneration, and landfill gas conversion. Consistent with the National
    Energy Policy, the President has directed the Secretary of the Treasury
    to work with Congress to extend and expand the production tax credit
    for electricity generation from wind and biomass, to develop a new
    residential solar energy tax credit, and to encourage cogeneration
    projects through investment tax credits.
          Business Challenges. The President has challenged
    American businesses to make specific commitments to improving the
    greenhouse gas intensity of their operations and to reduce emissions.
    Recent agreements with the semi-conductor and aluminum industries and
    industries that emit methane already have significantly reduced
    emissions of some of the most potent greenhouse gases. We will build
    upon these successes with new agreements, producing greater reductions.
          Transportation Programs. The Administration is promoting
    the development of fuel-efficient motor vehicles and trucks,
    researching options for producing cleaner fuels, and implementing
    programs to improve energy efficiency. The President is committed to
    expanding Federal research partnerships with industry, providing
    market-based incentives and updating current regulatory programs that
    advance our progress in this important area. This commitment includes
    expanding fuel cell research, in particular through the ``FreedomCAR''
    initiative. The President's fiscal year 1903 budget seeks more than $3
    billion in tax credits over 11 years for consumers to purchase fuel
    cell and hybrid vehicles. The Secretary of Transportation has asked the
    congressional leadership to work with him on legislation that would
    authorize the Department of Transportation to reform the Corporate
    Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program, fully considering the recent
    National Academy Sciences report, so that we can safely improve fuel
    economy for cars and trucks.
          Carbon Sequestration. The President's fiscal year 1903
    budget requests over $3 billion--a $1 billion increase above the
    baseline--as the first part of a 10-year (2002-2011) commitment to
    implement and improve the conservation title of the Farm Bill, which
    will significantly enhance the natural storage of carbon. The President
    also directed the Secretary of Agriculture to provide recommendations
    for further, targeted incentives aimed at forest and agricultural
    sequestration of greenhouse gases. The President further directed the
    Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Environmental
    Protection Agency and the Department of Energy, to develop accounting
    rules and guidelines for crediting sequestration projects, taking into
    account emerging domestic and international approaches.
          Promote New and Expanded International Policies to
    Complement Our Domestic Program. The President's approach seeks to
    expand cooperation internationally to meet the challenge of climate
    change, including:
          Investing $25 Million in Climate Observation Systems in
    Developing Countries. In response to the National Academy of Sciences'
    recommendation for better observation systems, the President has
    allocated $25 million and challenged other developed nations to match
    the U.S. commitment.
          Tripling Funding for ``Debt-for-Nature'' Forest
    Conservation Programs. Building upon recent Tropical Forest
    Conservation Act (TFCA) agreements with Belize, El Salvador, and
    Bangladesh, the President's fiscal year 1903 budget request of $40
    million to fund ``debt for nature'' agreements with developing
    countries nearly triples funding for this successful program. Under
    TFCA, developing countries agree to protect their tropical forests from
    logging, avoiding emissions and preserving the substantial carbon
    sequestration services they provide. The President also announced a new
    agreement with the Government of Thailand, which will preserve
    important mangrove forest in Northeastern Thailand in exchange for debt
    relief worth $11.4 million.
          Fully Funding the Global Environmental Facility. The
    Administration's fiscal year 1903 budget request of $178 million for
    the GEF is more than $77 million above this year's funding and includes
    a substantial $70 million payment for arrears incurred during the prior
    administration. The GEF is the primary international institution for
    transferring energy and sequestration technologies to the developing
    world under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
    (UNFCCC).
          Dedicating Significant Funds to the United States Agency
    for International Development (USAID). The President's fiscal year 2003
    budget requests $155 million in funding for USAID climate change
    programs. USAID serves as a critical vehicle for transferring American
    energy and sequestration technologies to developing countries to
    promote sustainable development and minimize their GHG emissions
    growth.
          Pursue Joint Research with Japan. The U.S. and Japan
    continue their High-Level Consultations on climate change issues. Later
    this month, a team of U.S. experts will meet with their Japanese
    counterparts to discuss specific projects within the various areas of
    climate science and technology, to identify the highest priorities for
    collaborative research.
          Pursue Joint Research with Italy. Following up on a
    pledge of President Bush and Prime Minister Berlusconi to undertake
    joint research on climate change, the U.S. and Italy convened a Joint
    Climate Change Research Meeting in January 2002. The delegations for
    the two countries identified more than 20 joint climate change research
    activities for immediate implementation, including global and regional
    modeling.
          Pursue Joint Research with Central America. The United
    States and Central American Heads of Government signed the Central
    American-United States of America Joint Accord (CONCAUSA) on December
    10, 1994. The original agreement covered cooperation under action plans
    in four major areas: conservation of biodiversity, sound use of energy,
    environmental legislation, and sustainable economic development. On
    June 7, 2001, the United States and its Central American partners
    signed an expanded and renewed CONCAUSA Declaration, adding disaster
    relief and climate change as new areas for cooperation. The new
    CONCAUSA Declaration calls for intensified cooperative efforts to
    address climate change through scientific research, estimating and
    monitoring greenhouse gases, investing in forestry conservation,
    enhancing energy efficiency, and utilizing new environmental
    technologies.
        NATIONAL GOAL
        The President set a national goal to reduce the greenhouse gas
    intensity of the U.S. economy by 18 percent over the next 10 years.
    Rather than pitting economic growth against the environment, the
    President has established an approach that promises real progress on
    climate change by tapping the power of sustained economic growth.
          The President's Yardstick--Greenhouse Gas Intensity--is a
    Better Way to Measure Progress Without Hurting Growth. A goal expressed
    in terms of declining greenhouse gas intensity, measuring greenhouse
    gas emissions relative to economic activity, quantifies our effort to
    reduce emissions through conservation, adoption of cleaner, more
    efficient, and emission-reducing technologies, and sequestration. At
    the same time, an intensity goal accommodates economic growth.
          Reducing Greenhouse Gas Intensity by 18 Percent Over the
    Next Ten Years is Ambitious but Achievable. The United States will
    reduce the 183 metric tons of emissions per million dollars GDP that we
    emit today to 151 metric tons per million dollars GDP in 2012. We
    expect existing trends and efforts in technology improvement to play a
    significant role. Beyond that, our commitment will achieve 100 million
    metric tons of reduced emissions in 2012 alone, with more than 500
    million metric tons in cumulative savings over the entire decade.
          Focusing on Greenhouse Gas Intensity Sets America on a
    Path to Slow the Growth of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and--as the
    Science Justifies--to Stop and Then Reverse That Growth. As we learn
    more about the science of climate change and develop new technologies
    to mitigate emissions, this annual decline can be accelerated. When the
    annual decline in intensity equals the economic growth rate (currently,
    about 3 percent per year), emission growth will have stopped. When the
    annual decline in intensity exceeds the economic growth rate, emission
    growth will reverse. Reversing emission growth will eventually
    stabilize atmospheric concentrations as emissions decline.
          As We Advance Science and Develop Technology to
    Substantially Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Long Term, We Do
    Not Want to Risk Harming the Economy in the Short Term. Over the past
    20 years, greenhouse gas emissions have risen with economic growth, as
    our economy benefited from inexpensive, fossil-fuel based--and
    greenhouse gas emitting--energy. While new technologies promise to
    break this emission-economy link, a rapid reduction in emissions would
    be costly and threaten economic growth. Sustained economic growth is
    essential for any long-term solution: Prosperity is what allows us to
    dedicate more resources to solving environmental problems. History
    shows that wealthier societies demand--and can afford--more
    environmental protection.
          The Intensity Based Approach Promotes Near-Term
    Opportunities to Conserve Fossil Fuel Use, Recover Methane, and
    Sequester Carbon. Until we develop and adopt breakthrough technologies
    that provide safe and reliable energy to fuel our economy without
    emitting greenhouse gases, we need to promote more rapid adoption of
    existing, improved energy efficiency and renewable resources that
    provide cost-effective opportunities to reduce emissions. Profitable
    methane recovery from landfills, coal mines and gas pipelines offers
    another opportunity--estimated by the EPA at about 30 million tons of
    carbon equivalent emissions. Finally, carbon sequestration in soils and
    forests can provide tens of millions of tons of emission reductions at
    very low costs.
          The Intensity Based Approach Advances a Serious, but
    Measured Mitigation Response. The President recognizes America's
    responsibility to reduce emissions. At the same time, any long-term
    solution--one that stabilizes atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
    gases at safe levels--will require the development and deployment of
    new technologies that are not yet cost-effective. The President's
    policy balances the desire for immediate reductions with the need to
    protect the economy and to take advantage of developing science and
    technology.
    The President's Goal is Ambitious and Responsible
          Reducing Greenhouse Gas Intensity by 18 Percent Over the
    Next Ten Years is Comparable to the Average Progress that Nations
    Participating in the Kyoto Protocol are Required to Achieve. Our goal
    translates into a 4.5 percent reduction beyond forecasts of the
    progress that America is expected to make based on existing programs
    and private activity. Forecasts of the average reductions required by
    nations implementing the Kyoto Protocol range from zero to 7 percent.
          While Producing Results Similar to What the Kyoto
    Protocol Participants Are Required to Achieve on Average, the
    President's Approach Protects the Economy and Develops Institutions for
    a Long-Term Solution. The focus on greenhouse gas intensity separates
    the goal of reducing emissions from the potential economic harm
    associated with a rigid emission cap. By measuring greenhouse gas
    emissions relative to economic activity, we have a solid yardstick
    against which we can measure progress as we pursue a range of programs
    to reduce emissions. As we develop technologies to produce more goods
    with fewer greenhouse gas emissions, this yardstick does not penalize
    economic growth.
          Greenhouse Gas Intensity Is a More Practical Way to
    Discuss Goals with Developing Countries. The close connection between
    economic growth, energy use and greenhouse gas emissions implies that
    fixed appropriate emission limits are hard to identify when economic
    growth is uncertain and carbon-free, breakthrough energy technologies
    are not yet in place. Such targets are also hard to identify for
    developing countries where the future rate of emissions is even more
    uncertain. Given its neutrality with regard to economic growth,
    greenhouse gas intensity solves or substantially reduces many of these
    problems.
    Enhanced National Registry for Voluntary Emissions Reductions
        The Administration will improve the current Federal GHG Reduction
    and Sequestration Registry that recognizes greenhouse gas reductions by
    non-governmental organizations, businesses, farmers, and the Federal,
    State and local governments. Registry participants and the public will
    have a high level of confidence in the reductions recognized by this
    Registry, through capture and sequestration projects, mitigation
    projects that increase energy efficiency and/or switch fuels, and
    process changes to reduce emissions of potent greenhouse gases, such as
    methane. An enhanced registry will promote the identification and
    expansion of innovative and effective ways to reduce greenhouse gases.
    The enhanced registry will encourage participation by removing the risk
    that these actions will be penalized--or inaction rewarded--by future
    climate policy.
          Improve the Quality of the Current Program. A registry is
    a tool for companies to publicly record their progress in reducing
    emissions, providing public recognition of a company's accomplishments,
    and a record of mitigation efforts for future policy design. This tool
    goes hand-in-hand with voluntary business challenges, described below,
    by providing a standardized, credible vehicle for reporting and
    recognizing progress.
          Although businesses can already register emission
    reductions under section 1605(b) of the 1995 Energy Policy Act,
    participation has been limited.
          The President directed the Secretary of Energy, in
    consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Agriculture,
    and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to
    propose improvements to the current voluntary emissions reduction
    registration program within 120 days.
          These improvements will enhance measurement accuracy,
    reliability and verifiability, working with and taking into account
    emerging domestic and international approaches.
          Protect and Provide Transferable Credits for Emissions
    Reduction. The President directed the Secretary of Energy to recommend
    reforms to ensure that businesses and individuals that register
    reductions are not penalized under a future climate policy, and to give
    transferable credits to companies that can show real emissions
    reductions. These protections will encourage businesses and individuals
    to pursue innovative strategies to reduce or sequester greenhouse gas
    emissions, without the risk that future climate policy will
    disadvantage them.
          Background on Current Registry Program. The Energy Policy
    Act of 1992 directed the Department of Energy (with EIA as the
    implementing agency) to develop a program to document voluntary actions
    that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases or remove greenhouse gases
    from the atmosphere.
          Under the Energy Policy Act, EIA was directed to issue
    ``procedures for the accurate reporting of information on annual
    reductions of greenhouse gas emissions and carbon fixation achieved
    through any measures, including fuel switching, forest management
    practices, tree planting, use of renewable energy, manufacture or use
    of vehicles with reduced greenhouse gas emissions, appliance
    efficiency, methane recovery, cogeneration, chlorofluorocarbon capture
    and replacement, and power plant heat rate improvement.''
          In 1999, 207 companies and other organizations,
    representing 24 different industries or services, reported on 1,722
    projects that achieved 226 million metric tons of carbon dioxide
    equivalent reductions--equal to 3.4 percent of national emissions.
    Participating companies included Clairol, AT&T, Dow Chemical, Johnson &
    Johnson, IBM, Motorola, Pharmacia, Upjohn, Sunoco, Southern, General
    Motors and DuPont.
          EIA released a February 2002 report demonstrating that
    this program continues to expand. In 2000, 222 companies had undertaken
    1,882 projects to reduce or sequester greenhouse gases. These achieved
    269 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent reductions--equal
    to 3.9 percent of national emissions.
          A number of proposals to reform the existing registry--or
    create a new registry--have appeared in energy and/or climate policy
    bills introduced in the past year. The Administration will fully
    explore the extent to which the existing authority under the Energy
    Policy Act is adequate to achieve these reforms.
    Progress Check in 2012
        The domestic programs proposed by the President allow consumers and
    businesses to make flexible decisions about emission reductions rather
    than mandating particular control options or rigid targets. If,
    however, by 2012, our progress is not sufficient, and sound science
    justifies further action, the United States will respond with
    additional measures that may include a broad, market-based program, as
    well as additional incentives and voluntary measures designed to
    accelerate technology development and deployment.
                              domestic initiatives
    Summary
        Key domestic initiatives to contribute to achieving our goal:
          Tax Incentives for Renewables and Cogeneration. The
    Administration's fiscal year 2003 budget proposal seeks $4.6 billion in
    clean energy tax incentives over the next 5 years. These tax credits
    will spur investments in renewable energy (solar, wind, and biomass),
    hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, cogeneration, and landfill gas. As
    directed in the National Energy Policy, the Secretary of the Treasury
    will work with Congress to extend and expand the production tax credit
    for electricity generation from wind and biomass, to develop a new
    residential solar energy tax credit, and to encourage cogeneration
    projects through investment tax credits.
          Business Challenges. The President challenges American
    businesses and industries to reduce emissions. Already, agreements with
    the semi-conductor and aluminum industries, and industries that emit
    methane, have dramatically reduced emissions of some of the most potent
    greenhouse gases. We will build on these successes, with broader
    agreements and greater reductions.
          Transportation Programs. The Administration is promoting
    the development of fuel-efficient motor vehicles and trucks,
    researching options for producing cleaner fuels, and implementing
    programs to improve energy efficiency. The President is committed to
    expanding Federal research partnerships with industry, market-based
    incentives and updating current regulatory programs that advance our
    progress in this important area. The Administration has expanded fuel
    cell research, such as the ``FreedomCAR'' initiative, and the
    President's 1903 budget seeks more than $3 billion in tax credits over
    11 years for consumers to purchase fuel cells and hybrid vehicles. The
    Secretary of Transportation has asked the congressional leadership to
    work with him on legislation that would authorize the Department of
    Transportation to reform the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
    program, fully considering the recent National Academy Sciences report,
    so that we can safely improve fuel economy for cars and trucks.
          Carbon Sequestration. The President's fiscal year 1903
    budget requests over $3 billion--a $1 billion increase above the
    baseline--as the first part of a 10-year (2002-2011) commitment to
    implement and improve the conservation title of the Farm Bill, which
    will significantly enhance the natural storage of carbon. The President
    also directed the Secretary of Agriculture to provide recommendations
    on further, targeted incentives for forest and agricultural
    sequestration of greenhouse gases. The President further directed the
    Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Environmental
    Protection Agency and the Department of Energy, to develop accounting
    rules and guidelines for crediting sequestration projects, taking into
    account emerging domestic and international approaches.
    Incentives and Programs for Renewables and Industrial Cogeneration
        The President's fiscal year 1903 budget proposes providing $4.6
    billion in clean energy tax incentives over the next 5 years ($7.1
    billion over 10 years) for investments in renewable energy (solar,
    wind, and biomass), hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, co-generation,
    landfill gas conversion, and ethanol. These incentives are important to
    meeting the nation's long-term energy supply and security needs, and
    reducing pollution and projected greenhouse gas emissions. These clean
    energy tax incentives include:
          New 10 Percent Tax Credit for Co-Generation (Combined
    Heat and Power Systems). The President has proposed a new 10 percent
    tax credit for investments in combined heat and power systems between
    2002 and 2006. The credit will encourage investments in highly
    efficient CHP projects and spur innovation in improved CHP
    technologies. No income tax credits are currently available for
    investment in CHP property.
          Cogeneration. Combined heat and power (CHP), also known
    as ``co-generation'', is a highly efficient form of electric generation
    that recycles heat which is normally lost under traditional power
    combustion methods. CHP captures the heat left over from industrial
    use, providing a source of residential and industrial heating and air
    conditioning in the local area around the power plant. CHP systems
    achieve a greater level of overall energy efficiency, thereby reducing
    energy consumption, costs, and carbon emissions.
          EPA Combined Heat and Power Partnership. The new tax
    credit would enhance efforts underway by the Environmental Protection
    Agency to streamline the permitting process for cogeneration plants,
    promote their location in brownfields and other industrial sites, and
    clarify how companies can use cogeneration to stay in compliance with
    Clean Air Act pollution standards. On October 5, 2001, in partnership
    with 17 Fortune 500 companies, city and State governments and
    nonprofits, EPA announced the Combined Heat and Power Partnership.
    Current CHP projects of the founding partners represent more then 5,800
    megawatts of power generating capacity, an amount capable of serving
    almost 6 million households. The projects annually reduce carbon
    dioxide by more than 8 million tons; the annual energy savings equal 19
    million barrels of oil. A similar program by the Department of Energy
    challenges the heat and power industry to double usage of cogeneration
    in the United States by 2010.
          First-Ever Tax Credit for Residential Solar Energy
    Systems. The President has proposed a new 15 percent tax credit for
    individuals who purchase photovoltaic equipment or solar water heating
    systems used in a residence, up to a maximum credit of $2,000 for each
    type of equipment. Currently, no credit is available for non-commercial
    purchases of solar energy equipment. The credit would be available for
    photovoltaic equipment purchased between 2002 and 2007, and for solar
    water heating equipment purchased between 2002 and 2005. This credit
    will encourage businesses and homeowners to invest in solar power
    systems.
          Expanded Tax Credit for Electricity Produced from Wind or
    Biomass. The President has proposed extending and modifying the tax
    credit for electricity produced from wind or biomass. Currently, wind
    energy accounts for 6 percent of renewable electricity generation and
    0.1 percent of total electricity supply. Advances have helped cut costs
    by more than 80 percent during the last 20 years. This proposal would
    help make electricity produced from wind and biomass competitive with
    other sources of electricity supply. The proposal would:
          Extend for 3 years (2002-2004) the present 1.7 cent-per-
    kilowatt hour credit for electricity produced from wind and closed-loop
    biomass (plants grown exclusively to produce electricity); and
          Expand eligible biomass sources to include certain
    biomass from forest-related resources, agricultural and other sources.
    For existing biomass facilities, the credit for electricity produced
    from new sources is 1.0 cent-per-kilowatt hour for 3 years (2002-2004)
    of production. For coal fired facilities, electricity produced from co-
    firing biomass from new sources is 0.5 cent-per-kilowatt hour for 3
    years of production (2002-2004).
          Tax Credit for New Methane Landfill Projects. The
    President has proposed encouraging the development of a new alternative
    source of energy by providing tax credits for energy produced from
    landfill gas. The credit would be approximately 1.0 cent-per-kilowatt
    hour (or the equivalent in dollars per million metric BTU) for energy
    produced from methane from landfills regulated by the EPA to collect
    and flare methane, and 1.5 cents-per-kilowatt hour for unregulated
    landfills. The credit would be available for energy produced from new
    facilities through 2010.
          New Tax Credit for New Hybrid or Fuel-Cell Vehicles. The
    President has proposed a new temporary tax credit of up to $4,000 for
    the purchase of new hybrid vehicles and up to $8,000 for the purchase
    of fuel cell vehicles between 2002 and 2007. These credits would be
    available for all qualifying light vehicles, including cars, minivans,
    sport utility vehicles, and light trucks. The tax credits will
    encourage the purchase of highly fuel-efficient vehicles that
    incorporate advanced automotive technologies and will help to move
    hybrid and fuel cell vehicles from the laboratory to the highway.
          Increased Funding for Geothermal Energy. The President's
    2003 budget proposal for the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) supports
    alternative, non-fossil fuel energy development. The budget includes an
    increase for USGS to investigate the nature and extent of geothermal
    systems and produce updated assessments of available geothermal energy
    resources in selected regions of the United States. The near-term focus
    of this effort will be in the Great Basin region, where most of the
    public land available for geothermal leasing lies. This region
    encompasses most of Nevada and large portions of California, Oregon,
    Idaho, and Utah. Available data indicate the presence of a substantial
    undeveloped geothermal energy resource that could be tapped to help
    provide for the growing energy requirements of the western United
    States.
          Increased Funding for Renewable Energy Resources on
    Public Lands. The President's 1903 budget proposal calls for a major
    effort by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to increase its renewable
    energy activities in support of the President's National Energy Policy.
    In 2003, BLM will encourage the study, exploration, and development of
    renewable energy resources from public lands. Emphasis will be directed
    to advancing the use of geothermal, hydropower, wind, solar, and
    biomass resources.
    Business Challenges
        The President challenged American businesses and industries to
    reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Already, agreements with the semi-
    conductor and aluminum industries, and with industries that emit
    methane, are dramatically reducing emissions of the most potent
    greenhouse gases. The President's plan will build on these successes,
    with broader agreements and greater reductions.
    Company Challenges
          EPA's ``Climate Leaders'' Initiative: EPA will launch a
    new, voluntary Climate Leaders program with a group of major companies
    including: Florida Power and Light, GM, Lockheed Martin, Miller Brewing
    Company, Bethlehem Steel, Interface Inc., SC Johnson and Holcimus Inc.
    These companies have agreed to test new greenhouse gas reporting
    guidelines as the basis for agreeing to targets in the future. Each
    participant will establish an individual goal for reducing greenhouse
    gas emissions, and will voluntarily report those emissions. The Climate
    Leaders program provides a significant opportunity to achieve the
    greenhouse gas intensity reductions set forth in this policy through a
    voluntary approach. In the coming months, the Administration will
    aggressively pursue additional corporate partners representing a wider
    spectrum of the U.S. economy.
    Sector Challenges
          Semiconductors: On March 13, 2001, EPA and the
    Semiconductor Industry Association signed a new voluntary agreement,
    the PFC Reduction Climate Partnership. Under this partnership, the
    industry agreed to reduce emissions of perfluorocarbons (PFCs) by 10
    percent from 1995 levels by the end of 2010. The expected reduction of
    13.7 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2010 alone is
    comparable to taking 12 million cars off the road. PFCs have, on
    average, 10,000 times the potency of carbon dioxide over 100 years, and
    persist in the atmosphere 2,000 to 50,000 years.
          Aluminum: Twelve of the 13 U.S. primary aluminum
    producers, representing 96 percent of the U.S. primary aluminum
    production capacity, have joined EPA's Voluntary Aluminum Industrial
    Partnership. Companies participating in this program have committed to
    make reductions in two potent PFCs, tetrafluoromethane (CF4) and
    hexafluoroethane (C2F6). The program met its 2000 goal to reduce PFC
    emissions from U.S. primary aluminum smelting by 45 percent--equivalent
    to 1.8 million metric tons of carbon--using cost-effective approaches
    that make economic and environmental sense for the partners.
          Methane: Because of the potency of methane relative to
    carbon dioxide, a ``methane-first'' strategy for greenhouse gas
    mitigation is cost-effective. A variety of U.S. industry and government
    partnerships have reduced methane emissions, and they are expected to
    hold emissions at or below 1990 levels through and beyond 2010.
    Partners in EPA's methane programs are projected to maintain emissions
    below 1990 levels through 2010.
          EPA's Natural Gas STAR program includes companies
    representing 40 percent of the U.S. natural gas production, 72 percent
    of transmission company pipeline miles, 49 percent of distribution
    company service connections, and 23 percent of processing throughput.
    This partnership has achieved significant reductions. In 2000, EPA
    estimates a reduction in methane emissions of 4 million metric tons of
    carbon equivalent, and projects for 2010 a reduction of 6 million
    metric tons of carbon equivalent.
          EPA's Coalbed Methane Outreach Program (CMOP) encourages
    industry to reduce methane emissions from underground coal mines. The
    program provides technical assistance to mining companies on
    technologies for recovered methane. EPA estimates that CMOP reduced 2
    million metric tons carbon equivalent in 2000.
          In the agriculture sector, USDA and EPA have partnered on
    the Ag-STAR program and the Ruminant Livestock Efficiency Program
    (RLEP), which focus on reducing methane emissions. The overall impact
    of these two programs on greenhouse gas emissions has been small on a
    national scale, but program stakeholders in the agricultural community
    have demonstrated that the practices can reduce greenhouse gas
    emissions and increase productivity.
    Improving Fuel Economy
        Developing new technologies to improve the energy efficiency of
    transportation in the United States will be a key element in achieving
    future reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Cars, trucks, aircraft
    and other parts of the nation's transportation system are responsible
    for about one-third of the carbon dioxide emissions in the United
    States. The Administration is currently promoting the development of
    fuel-efficient motor vehicles and trucks, researching options for
    producing cleaner fuels, and implementing programs to improve energy
    efficiency. The President is committed to the expansion and improvement
    of Federal research partnerships with industry, market-based
    incentives, and reforming current regulatory programs that advance our
    progress in this important area.
          The ``FreedomCAR''--Advancing Hydrogen-Based Fuel Cells.
    On January 9, 2002, Energy Secretary Abraham, with the heads of General
    Motors, Ford Motor Co. and the Chrysler arm of DaimlerChrysler,
    announced a new partnership, FreedomCAR (Cooperative Automotive
    Research), to promote the development of hydrogen as the primary fuel
    for cars and trucks. The ``FreedomCAR'' program embraces the long-term
    strategic goal of developing a new breakthrough technology--the
    hydrogen-powered fuel cell--with a vision of ultimately eliminating our
    reliance on foreign oil.
          The Department Of Energy's Public-Private Projects for
    Low-Cost, Breakthrough Fuel Cell Technology. In August 2002, Energy
    Secretary Abraham announced new partnerships, totaling $500 million,
    with Honeywell, Siemens, Westinghouse Power Corporation, Delphi
    Automotive Systems, Battelle, Cummins Power Generation, and McDermott
    Technologies. The partnerships build upon President Bush's commitment
    to fuel cell research and cutting edge technologies. The goal of this
    initiative is to cut the costs of fuel cells to as low as one-tenth the
    cost of currently marketed systems and to one-third the cost of the
    more advanced concepts now beginning to reach commercial readiness.
          Tax Credits for New Hybrid or Fuel Cell Vehicles. The
    President has proposed a new temporary tax credit of up to $4,000 for
    the purchase of new hybrid vehicles and up to $8,000 for the purchase
    of fuel-cell vehicles between 2002 and 2007. These credits would be
    available for all qualifying light vehicles, including cars, minivans,
    sport utility vehicles, and light trucks. The tax credits will
    encourage the purchase of highly fuel-efficient vehicles that
    incorporate advanced automotive technologies and will help to move
    hybrid and fuel cell vehicles from the laboratory to the highway.
          Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE). A key
    recommendation of the President's National Energy Policy directed the
    Secretary of Transportation to review and provide recommendations on
    establishing updated CAFE standards, with due consideration of the July
    2001 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report. The NAS report included
    several recommendations pertaining to options for structuring the CAFE
    system, including permitting manufacturers to trade fuel economy
    credits.
          The Administration supports increasing automobile fuel
    economy and encouraging new technologies that reduce our dependence on
    imported oil, while protecting passenger safety and jobs.
          On February 1, 2002, Transportation Secretary Mineta
    asked the congressional leadership to ``work . . . on legislation that
    would authorize the Department of Transportation to reform the CAFE
    program, fully considering the NAS report. Possible reforms include:
    (1) adopting fuel economy targets that are dependent on vehicles
    attributes, such as vehicles weight, that inherently influence fuel use
    and have minimal adverse safety consequences; (2) utilizing market-
    based incentives, such as trading of fuel economy credits, to obtain
    fuel savings at the lowest possible cost to consumer while providing
    continuous incentives for additional fuel economy enhancement; (3)
    encouraging development and implement of new technologies; and (4)
    establishing realistic, long-term targets and deadlines to increase
    economy safely while providing greater long-term product planning for
    vehicles manufacturers.''
          On July 10, 2001, Transportation Secretary Mineta urged
    Congress to lift the appropriations ban on new rulemaking of CAFE
    standards by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
    (NHTSA) ``to improve vehicle fuel efficiency standards.'' In December
    2001, Congress responded by lifting the ban, and last week NHTSA
    initiated a public review process for safely improving the fuel economy
    of new light truck standards for model year 2005 through 2010, and for
    reforming the CAFE program.
          Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS). The Department
    of Transportation's National Highway Transportation Safety
    Administration (NHTSA) will finalize this year a rule requiring the
    installation of tire pressure monitoring systems (TPMSs) in all new
    cars and light trucks. Properly inflated tires improve fuel efficiency
    and reduce maintenance costs. NHTSA estimates that the annualized
    benefits range from $120-480 million in fuel savings and $75-165
    million in reduced tread wear. NHTSA predicts TPMS will save between
    .31 and 1.27 million metric tons of carbon equivalent per year when
    applied to the entire on-road fleet. That reflects between 128 and 528
    million gallons of gasoline per year.
          First-Ever EPA Agreement with Ford to Develop High-
    Efficiency Auto Technology. In September 2001, EPA agreed to license to
    the Ford Motor Company a unique, high-efficiency ``hydraulic hybrid''
    technology that has the long-term potential to reduce energy
    consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. The first application of this
    technology, planned for model year 2005, will result in a minimum 30
    percent improvement in vehicle fuel economy; the second phase, planned
    for as early as year 2009, should double the fuel economy of selected
    new vehicles. This is the first-ever licensing agreement between EPA
    and an automobile company involving vehicle powertrain technology.
    Promoting Domestic Carbon Sequestration
        In the agriculture sector, activities including fertilizer use,
    animal waste management and on-farm fuel use account for 148 million
    metric tons of carbon equivalent emissions, about 8 percent of total
    U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget
    requests $3 billion above the base-line over 10 years (2002-2011) for a
    new, conservation-focused Farm Bill that will enhance the natural
    storage of carbon dioxide.
        Increased Funding for USDA's Conservation Programs:
          The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) assists farm
    owners and operators to conserve and improve soil, water, air and
    wildlife resources by removing environmentally sensitive land from
    agricultural production and keeping it under long-term resource-
    conserving cover. Currently, USDA estimates that the CRP removes nearly
    34 million acres of environmentally sensitive cropland from production,
    which generates long-term environmental benefits, including the annual
    savings of about 15 million metric tons of carbon emissions per year.
    The CRP would expand to 40 million acres, saving roughly 19 million
    metric tons of carbon per year. The Administration's fiscal year 1903
    budget proposes an increase of $89 million over the fiscal year 1902
    enacted level.
          The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) helps
    producers make beneficial and cost-effective changes to cropping and
    grazing systems; improve manure, nutrient and pest management, and
    implement conservation measures to improve soil, water, and related
    natural resources. USDA estimates that the EQIP program (in combination
    with conservation technical assistance) provides assistance to farmers
    for planning and implementing soil and water conservation practices and
    removes roughly 12 million metric tons of carbon per year. The
    Administration's fiscal year 2003 proposes an increase of $800 million
    over the fiscal year 1902 enacted level.
          The Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) has enrolled just over
    1 million acres to date. Under current authority, the program is capped
    at 1,075,000 acres, and has already reached that level this year.
    Estimated soil carbon sequestration resulting from conversion of
    cropland on wetland soils to grassland or forest by 1997 (1.4 million
    acres) has resulted in carbon sequestration rates of over 2 million
    metric tons of carbon per year. The Administration has supported a
    version of the Farm Bill that would expand the WRP to 2.225 million
    acres, saving roughly 4 million metric tons of carbon per year. The
    Administration's fiscal year 1903 proposes an increase of $176 million
    over the fiscal year 1902 enacted level.
          The Forest Stewardship Program provides technical and
    financial assistance to nonindustrial, private forest owners. About 147
    million hectares of U.S. forests are nonindustrial, private forestlands
    and provide many ecological and economic benefits and values. These
    forests provide about 60 percent of our nation's timber supply, with
    increases expected in the future. The acceleration of tree planting on
    nonindustrial, private forestlands and marginal agricultural lands can
    help meet resource needs and provide important ancillary benefits that
    improve environmental quality, such as wildlife habitat, soil
    conservation, water quality protection and improvement, and recreation.
    Additionally, tree planting and forest management increases uptake of
    carbon dioxide and the storage of carbon in living biomass, soils,
    litter, and long-life wood products. The Forest Service, in cooperation
    with State forestry agencies, manages both programs, and estimates that
    these programs provide 700,000 metric tons of carbon reductions per
    year. The Administration's fiscal year 1903 budget proposes an increase
    of $16 million over the fiscal year 1902 enacted level.
                promote new and expanded international policies
    Summary
        The President's approach will actively pursue the integration of
    our domestic goals and policies with those of other nations. The
    President has submitted provisions in the fiscal year 1903 budget
    includes:
          Tripling Funding for ``Debt-For-Nature'' Programs.
    Building upon recent Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) agreements
    with Belize, El Salvador, and Bangladesh, the President's fiscal year
    1903 budget request of $40 million to fund ``debt for nature''
    agreements with developing countries nearly triples funding for this
    highly successful program. The President also announced a new deal with
    the Government of Thailand, which will preserve important mangrove
    forest in Northeastern Thailand in exchange for debt relief worth $11.4
    million.
          Investing $25 Million in Climate Observation Systems in
    Developing Countries. In response to the National Academy of Sciences'
    recommendation for better observation systems, the President has
    allocated $25 million and challenged other developed nations to match
    the U.S. commitment.
          Expanding Technology Transfer and Capacity Building in
    the Developing World:
          Fully Funding the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The
    President's fiscal year 1903 budget requests $178 million for the GEF,
    a $77 million increase, which includes a substantial $70 million
    payment for arrears incurred during the prior Administration. These
    funds will support transfer of advanced energy and sequestration
    technologies to the developing world.
          Dedicating Significant Funds to the United States
    Administration on International Development. The President's 1903
    budget requests $155 million in funding for USAID climate change
    programs. USAID serves as a primary vehicle for transferring American
    energy and sequestration technologies to developing countries to
    promote sustainable development and minimize their GHG emissions
    growth.
          Building on International Cooperative Agreements:
          Joint Research with Japan. The U.S. and Japan continue
    their High-Level Consultations on climate change issues. Later this
    month, a team of U.S. experts will meet with their Japanese
    counterparts to discuss specific projects within the various areas of
    climate science and technology, to identify the highest priorities for
    collaborative research.
          Joint Research with Italy. The U.S. and Italy have
    identified more than 20 joint climate change research activities for
    immediate implementation and more topics for further development in
    critical areas of global and regional climate modeling, atmospheric
    studies related to climate, carbon cycle research, low-carbon
    technologies and other related areas.
    Increased Funding for Tropical Forest Conservation
        The Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) reflects America's
    commitment to preserving tropical forests worldwide. Created in 1998
    and reauthorized in 2001 with broad bipartisan support, the program
    offers eligible countries the opportunity to reduce their debt to the
    United States while preserving their tropical forests. TFCA encourages
    and empowers local communities and nongovernmental organizations to
    develop and implement grassroots solutions to conservation problems.
    Grants from the local fund can be used to support a wide range of
    activities, such as training programs to increase the capacity of
    individuals and organizations involved in forest conservation areas;
    restoration of forested areas; and the protection of parks and other
    protected areas. The President's 2003 budget proposal seeks $50 million
    in funding for tropical forestry conservation, of which $40 million may
    be used for TFCA.
        Estimates of the carbon sequestration value of tropical forests
    suggest a wide range of values. The World Resources Institute estimates
    that carbon sequestration value ranges from 6 to 72 tons per acre of
    rainforest. The 1995 IPCC report further analyzed the global potential
    for carbon storage. Slowing tropical deforestation on 700 million
    hectares (nearly the size of the US, but only 17 percent of the global
    forest area) could store 60 to87 million gigatons of carbon in 55
    years. Annual carbon storage could be over two gigatons by 2050, about
    14 percent of projected emissions.
          Agreements During the Bush Administration. TFCA
    agreements have been negotiated with Belize, El Salvador, and Thailand
    during this administration.
          Leverage. The four TFCA agreements to date--Bangladesh,
    Belize, El Salvador, and Thailand--generate approximately $40 million
    in forest conservation funding at a cost of $19.2 million.
          Bangladesh. Debt reduction agreement signed September 12,
    2000; saves Bangladesh $10 million in hard currency payments and will
    generate $8.5 million in local currency interest payments for tropical
    forest conservation of Sundarban mangrove forests, which shields the
    coastline from typhoons and provides habitat for the last genetically
    viable population of Royal Bengal tigers.
          Belize. In August, 2001, the U.S. and Belize concluded a
    ``debt-for-nature'' agreement to protect 23,000 acres of tropical
    forests. The agreement leveraged $1.3 million in private finds raised
    by The Nature Conservancy.
          El Salvador. Debt reduction agreement signed July 12,
    2001; Tropical Forestry Agreement signed September 14, 2001. Reduced
    country's official debt to the U.S. by $3 million, generating $14.3
    million for tropical forest conservation in local currency interest
    payments. Initial target of TFCA funds will be reforestation of
    hillsides.
          Thailand. Debt reduction agreement signed September 19,
    2001; agreement was approved by the Thai Cabinet on February 12, 2002.
    Debt agreement saves Thailand's $11.4 million in hard currency payments
    and will generate $9.5 million for conservation activities. Initial
    targets for TFCA funds include reforestation projects in northeastern
    Thailand, protection of mangrove forests.
    Expanding Technology Transfer and Capacity Building in Developing
            Countries
        The President' fiscal year 1903 budget significantly expands
    funding for current programs that transfer advanced energy and
    sequestration technologies to developing countries, and provide
    technical assistance and training to their citizens. Eighty-one percent
    of the growth in global carbon emissions from fossil fuel use in 1990-
    2010 is expected to come from developing countries, according to
    projections by the Energy Information Administration. Reducing this
    projected, exponential growth of emissions in developing countries
    therefore must be a critical element of any rational policy to address
    global climate change. First, the ``breakthrough'' technological
    advances achieved under the President's National Climate Change
    Technology Initiative will benefit all nations, and will not be
    confined to applications in the United States. Second, America will
    increase its commitment to helping the developing world gain access to
    advanced energy efficiency and sequestration technologies, by
    reinvigorating and expanding support for existing technology transfer
    programs.
          Investing $25 Million in Climate Observation Systems in
    Developing Countries. In response to the National Academy of Sciences'
    recommendation for better observation systems, the President has
    allocated $25 million and challenged other developed nations to match
    the U.S. commitment.
          Fully Funding the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The
    U.S. contribution to the GEF and leading a robust, multinational 5-year
    replenishment commitment.
          The Administration's Fiscal Year 1903 budget requested
    $178 million in funding for the GEF, a 77 percent increase over the
    fiscal year 1902 enacted level of $100.5 million. It includes $107.5
    million to fully fund the first installment of the U.S. pledge of $430
    million to the GEF's ``Third Replenishment'' (GEF-3) for 2003-2006. The
    fiscal year 1903 budget also includes $70 million to clear one-third of
    the $211 million arrears balances incurred by the United States during
    the last Administration.
          The GEF fulfills a critical role in improving the
    environment globally, particularly in financing developing countries'
    ability to address environmental issues relating to climate change,
    biodiversity conservation, and land degradation. The GEF, operating as
    the United Nation's Framework Convention on Climate Change's primary
    ``financial mechanism,'' funds the extra costs (over normal development
    costs) of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in energy and other
    projects. The GEF's project portfolio has demonstrated a wide range of
    approaches to promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy, often
    through initiatives in partnership with the private sector. GEF grant
    projects are implemented at the country level through the World Bank,
    U.N. Development Program, U.N. Environment Program and regional
    development banks.
          Since beginning regular operations in 1994, the GEF has
    designed and implemented over 800 projects in 160 countries. The GEF
    has committed $3.2 billion to date, leveraging well over $8 billion
    from other sources. Co-financiers include the developing countries
    themselves, bilateral aid agencies and other multilateral financial
    institutions, NGO's and the private sector. Leveraging for clean energy
    projects is often as high as $5 from other sources for every GEF
    dollar. U.S. companies are the largest beneficiaries of contracts
    extended for GEF projects, securing 30 percent of all contracts.
          Recent examples of highly successful GEF projects
    include:
          Mexico. The Mexico High Efficiency Lighting Project under
    which Mexican consumers and businesses have installed almost 40 percent
    more efficient lights than originally projected;
          India. The India Alternate Energy Project promoting
    investment in 41 megawatts of wind power through the provision of low-
    market loans, stimulating massive followup investment with wind power
    now supplying 850 megawatts of energy in India;
          Brazil. The Brazil Biomass Power Commercial Demonstration
    Project promotes the use of high-efficiency agricultural byproducts as
    fuel for electric power and agro-industry process heat;
          China. The Chinese Coalbed Methane Project demonstrates
    technologies in Chinese coal mines for capturing clean-burning methane
    as fuel;
          Latvia. The Latvia Solid Waste Management and Landfill
    Gas Recovery project ($25 million total, with $5 million from GEF) will
    harness landfill gas for electricity production and facilitate
    separation of recyclable materials;
          Philippines. The project supports the connection of a
    grid-connected power plant on Mindanao which combines solar and
    hydroelectric power;
          Bangladesh. The Rural Electrification and Renewable
    Energy Development project promotes solar energy in rural areas
    implemented by established Bangladeshi institutions and is expected to
    provide solar power to as many as 130,000 additional rural households;
          Ecuador. The Renewable Energy for Electricity Generation,
    Renewable Electrification of the Galapagos Islands project is aimed at
    reducing Ecuador's energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by
    introducing solar and wind energy to the Galapagos Archipelago, and is
    expected to provide wind and solar re-powering of village mini-grids on
    three islands serving more than 5,000 people; and
          Kenya. The Ormat Olkaria III Geothermal Power Development
    project will provide GEF financing for the first private sector
    financed and managed geothermal electric project in Africa and among
    the first private power projects in Kenya and East Africa.
          Dedicating Significant Funds to United States Agency for
    International Development (USAID). The President has maintained a
    strong commitment to technology transfer and capacity building in
    developing countries by requesting $155 million dedicated to climate
    change in the USAID fiscal year 1903 budget.
          Following up on the recently concluded Technology
    Cooperation Agreement Pilot Project (TCAPP), USAID is working with
    partners in Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, the Philippines, and Southern Africa
    to implement projects and activities designed to encourage the
    accelerated adoption of energy efficiency and renewable energy
    technologies and practices in several key sectors.
          Brazil. Technology cooperation efforts are focused on the
    development of new sustainable, energy efficient and renewable energy
    technologies to meet the development needs in the Northeast region.
    This effort provided startup financing for rural energy entrepreneurs
    through a combination of enterprise development services and startup
    financing.
          Philippines. Technology cooperation efforts are
    supporting national goals to expand rural electrification by using
    renewable energy sources such as, wind power.
          Southern Africa. USAID is supporting activities designed
    to promote the widespread use of solar water heaters in selected areas.
    Program-wide efforts also include a focus on the development and
    dissemination of outreach and communication tools in an effort to
    encourage information sharing.
          The Cairo Air Improvement Project (CAIP) is a $60 million
    USAID program that is designed to reduce vehicular emissions, such as
    particulates and lead. The CAIP is reducing air pollution by:
          operating a vehicle emission testing, tune-up, and
    certification program and promoting the conversion of diesel-fueled,
    public sector, municipal bus fleets to compressed natural gas; and
          reducing the concentration of air pollution from
    smelters.
          Building on International Cooperative Agreements:
          Joint Research with Japan. The U.S. and Japan continue
    their High-Level Consultations on climate change issues. Later this
    month a team of U.S. experts will meet with their Japanese counterparts
    to discuss specific projects within the various areas of climate
    science and technology to identify which of the highest priority
    opportunities to pursue.
          Joint Research with Italy. The United States and Italy
    convened a ``Joint Climate Change Research Meeting'' in Rome on January
    22-23, 2002, following upon a pledge of President Bush and Prime
    Minister Berlusconi to undertake joint research on climate change. This
    pledge recognized the need to draw on sound science and the power of
    technology to reduce the uncertainty associated with future global
    climate and environmental challenges. The two sides identified more
    than 20 joint climate change research activities for immediate
    implementation and more topics for further development in critical
    areas of global and regional climate modeling, atmospheric studies
    related to climate, carbon cycle research, low-carbon technologies and
    other related areas. The climate science research activities for
    immediate implementation will improve the capability to understand,
    monitor and predict climatic variations and their impacts. In addition,
    the technology research activities for immediate implementation will
    contribute to the development of advanced low carbon technologies to
    limit net emissions of greenhouse gases.
          Pursue Joint Research with Central America. The United
    States and Central American Heads of Government signed the Central
    American-United States of America Joint Accord (CONCAUSA) on December
    10, 1994. The original agreement covered cooperation under action plans
    in four major areas: conservation of biodiversity, sound use of energy,
    environmental legislation, and sustainable economic development. On
    June 7, 2001, the United States and its Central American partners
    signed an expanded and renewed CONCAUSA Declaration, adding disaster
    relief and climate change as new areas for cooperation. The new
    CONCAUSA Declaration calls for intensified cooperative efforts to
    address climate change through scientific research, estimating and
    monitoring greenhouse gases, investing in forestry conservation,
    enhancing energy efficiency, and utilizing new environmental
    technologies.
                        enhanced science and technology
    Summary
        The President's policy builds on his June 11 commitments to global
    climate science and technology: 1) fully fund high-priority areas for
    climate change science over the next 5 years; and 2) strengthen
    technology research at universities and national labs, to enhance
    partnerships in applied research, develop improved technology for
    measuring and monitoring gross and net greenhouse gas emissions, and
    fund demonstration projects for cutting-edge technologies, such as
    bioreactors and fuel cells.
          Increase Support for America's Commitment to Climate
    Science and Technology Initiatives. The Administrations fiscal year
    2003 budget seeks an additional $700 million for climate change
    programs, bringing total climate spending up to $4.5 billion per year.
    This commitment to climate change research and development is unmatched
    in the world, and is particularly notable given America's focus on
    domestic and international security issues in the fiscal year 1903
    budget. A key element of this effort is dedicated to funding for the
    Climate Change Research Initiative and the National Climate Change
    Technology Initiative. These initiatives are core components of the
    President's 1903 budget. They are designed to fund high-priority
    research to address major gaps in our current understanding of climate
    science and to promote the development of the most promising
    ``breakthrough'' technologies for clean energy generation and carbon
    sequestration.
          The Climate Change Research Initiative. The U.S. will
    spend $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2003 for basic research on climate
    change, $40 million of which is dedicated to leverage other funding to
    address major gaps in understanding the carbon cycle and the role of
    black soot.
          The National Climate Change Technology Initiative. The
    U.S. will spend $1.3 billion on climate change technologies, of which
    $40 million will be spent on development and deployment of advanced
    energy and sequestration technologies critical to long-term emission
    reduction.
          The President Has Established a New High-Level Committee
    on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration (CCCSTI). This
    Committee consists of the Secretaries of Commerce, Energy, State,
    Agriculture, Interior, Health and Human Services, Defense, and
    Transportation, EPA Administrator, OMB Director, NEC Director, NASA
    Administrator, NSF Director and CEQ Chairman. The Executive Director of
    the committee will be the Director of the Office of Science and
    Technology Policy. The functions of the CCCSTI include but are not
    limited to: 1) providing recommendations concerning climate science and
    technology to the President; 2) recommending the movement of funding
    and programs across agency boundaries; and 3) coordination with the
    Office of Management and Budget on the Committee's recommendations. The
    Chair of CCCSTI is responsible for the final review of recommendations
    to the Climate Change Panel. Research will continue to be coordinated
    through the Nation Science and Technology Council in accordance with
    the Global Change Research Act of 1990.
    Climate Change Research Initiative
        On June 11, 2001, the President announced a new commitment to
    developing a science-based climate change policy, and a new commitment
    to funding research on ``breakthrough technologies'' that will help
    meet the long-run climate change challenge. To study areas of
    scientific uncertainty and identify priority areas where investments
    can make a difference, the President created the Climate Change
    Research Initiative (CCRI). The CCRI promotes a vision focused on the
    effective use of scientific knowledge in policy and management
    decisions, and continued evaluation of management strategies and
    choices.
        The President's fiscal year 1903 budget requested $40 million for
    CCRI to be shared among five agencies (NOAA, NSF, NASA, DOE, and USDA).
    This investment will focus on answering key questions recently
    identified by the National Academy of Sciences in its 2001 report,
    ``Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions.'' The CCRI
    will improve the integration of scientific knowledge, including
    measures of uncertainty, into effective decision support systems and
    will adopt performance metrics and deliverable products useful to
    policymakers in a short timeframe (2-5 years).
        Specific priorities identified for fiscal year 2003 include:
          Understanding the North American Carbon Cycle. An
    intensive research effort will be focused on understanding North
    American terrestrial and oceanic carbon sources and sinks, to improve
    monitoring techniques, reconcile approaches for quantifying carbon
    storage, and elucidate key controlling processes and land management
    practices regulating carbon fluxes between the atmosphere, land, and
    the ocean. This effort will develop automated carbon dioxide and
    methane sensors, and improve ground-based measurements and inventories
    of forest and agricultural lands.
          Developing Reliable Representation of the Global and
    Regional Climatic Forcing by Atmospheric Aerosols. Aerosols and
    tropospheric ozone play unique but poorly quantified roles in the
    atmospheric radiation budget. CCRI investments will implement plans
    developed by the interagency National Aerosol-Climate Interactions
    Program to define and evaluate the role of aerosols that absorb solar
    radiation, such as black carbon and mineral dust. Proposed activities
    include field campaigns (including aircraft fly overs), in situ
    monitoring stations, and improved modeling and satellite data algorithm
    development.
          Investing in Computer Modeling. The continued development
    and refinement of computer models that can simulate the past and future
    conditions of the Earth's climate system is important for providing
    more accurate projections of future climate change. NOAA will establish
    a Climate Modeling Center within the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics
    Laboratory (GFDL) at Princeton, New Jersey, to focus on model product
    generation research, assessment, and policy applications.
          Ensuring High-Quality, Long-Term Climate Data Records.
    This is a long-term effort to develop high fidelity climate data
    records from satellite observing systems. Initial work will target
    calibration and validation of instruments planned for the National
    Polar-orbiting Operational Environment Satellite System (NPOESS) to
    ensure a smooth transition and guarantee climate-quality data.
    National Climate Change Technology Initiative
        On June 11, 2001, the President announced a new commitment to
    developing a science-based climate change policy, and a new commitment
    to funding research on ``breakthrough technologies'' that will help
    meet the long-run climate change challenge. To advance and bring focus
    to technologies that offer great promise to significantly reduce
    greenhouse gas emissions, the President created the National Climate
    Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI). The President charged the
    Secretaries of Commerce and Energy, working with other agencies, to:
          Evaluate the State of U.S. Climate Change Technology
    Research and Development and Make Recommendations for Improvement. The
    U.S. Government funds many different technologies that can help
    mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Some are designed to improve energy
    efficiency or create opportunities to switch to fuels, products, and
    processes that emit lower amounts of greenhouse gases. Others enhance
    carbon removal or storage in terrestrial, ocean, and geological sinks,
    or explore innovative concepts and breakthrough technologies.
          Provide Guidance on Strengthening Basic Research at
    Universities and National Laboratories, Including the Development of
    Advanced Mitigation Technologies that Offer the Greatest Promise for
    Low-Cost Reductions of Greenhouse Gas Emissions. There are many
    scientific and technological challenges regarding costs, environmental
    impacts, and public acceptability that must be resolved before climate
    change mitigation technologies can reach their full potential. Federal
    research efforts can help meet these challenges.
          Develop Opportunities to Enhance Private-Public
    Partnerships in Applied Research and Development to Expedite Innovative
    and Cost-Effective Approaches to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions. The
    U.S. Government has established partnerships with the private sector to
    advance technologies that mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. It is
    critical to enhance this role and ensure that partnerships with
    industry are directed toward the most mutually beneficial outcomes.
          Make Recommendations for Funding Demonstration Projects
    for Cutting-Edge Technologies. Cutting-edge technologies hold the
    promise of significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
          Evaluate Improved Technologies for Measuring and
    Monitoring Gross and Net Terrestrial Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Private
    sector investors are reluctant to participate in projects without
    reliable and credible quantification of the uncertainties associated
    with different land management practices. Cost-effective measurement
    systems will not only increase the attractiveness of agricultural
    greenhouse gas projects to investors, but can also provide valuable
    information to individual farmers and ranchers optimizing the use of
    fuel, fertilizers, and other substances.
        The President's fiscal year 1903 Budget requests $40 million within
    the Department of Energy to begin work on NCCTI. Specific research
    areas are being identified through an interagency review process. The
    NCCTI will build on an existing base of research and development in
    climate change technologies, primarily at the Department of Energy, the
    Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Agriculture. A
    complete report on the findings and recommendations of the NCCTI will
    be issued soon.
               addendum to the global climate change policy book
        The Global Climate Change Policy Book distributed with the
    President's February 14th speech on Clear Skies and Global Climate
    Change included several calculated statistics:
          2002 emission intensity: 183 metric tons of carbon
    equivalent emissions per million dollars GDP
          2012 emissions intensity: 158 metric tons of carbon
    equivalent emissions per million dollars GDP
          2002-2012 decline in emission intensity based on current
    forecasts with existing policies and efforts: 14 percent
          Expected emission reductions in 2012 resulting from the
    President's commitment to reduce intensity by 18 percent: more than 100
    million metric tons carbon equivalent
        This document and accompanying spreadsheet describes the data used
    to produce these numbers.
        Three primary forecasts underlie these intensity and emission
    reduction estimates: real GDP, energy-related carbon dioxide emissions,
    and other carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions. The sources of
    these forecasts are described below, followed by an explanation of the
    calculated intensities and emission reductions.
        Real GDP forecasts (spreadsheet row 28) are based on the Annual
    Energy Outlook 2002, published by the Energy Information Administration
    in December 2001. In turn, these are based on the DRI-WEFA July 2001
    Trend Growth scenario. Although these forecasts were made before
    September 11 and before the exact nature of last year's recession was
    clear, the forecast growth of 38 percent over 2002-2012 matches the
    recent forecasts published in the 2003 Budget of the U.S. Government.
    Real GDP forecasts are converted from 1996 dollars to 2001 dollars
    (spreadsheet row 29) using the implicit GDP deflator, published in the
    National Income and Product Accounts.
        Forecasts of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions (spreadsheet
    row 25) are also based on the Annual Energy Outlook 2002. These
    emissions are derived from the use of fossil fuels forecast by the
    National Energy Modeling System developed by the Energy Information
    Administration, incorporating the economic growth assumptions described
    above.
        Forecasts of other carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions
    (spreadsheet row 26) are based on two sources. The projections begin
    with 1999 inventories reported in Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the
    United States 1999, published by the Energy Information Administration.
    Future emission levels are estimated using growth rates derived from
    reports published by the Environmental Protection Agency: Addendum to
    the U.S. Methane Emissions 1990-2020: Inventories, Projections and
    Opportunities for Reductions, Climate Action Report 2001, U.S. High GWP
    Gas Emissions 1990-2010: Inventories, Projections, and Opportunities
    for Reductions.
        There are two alternative forecasts provided on the accompanying
    spreadsheet. The first (spreadsheet row 39) is based on similar growth
    rates, but using inventories published in Draft Inventory of U.S.
    Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2000. The second (spreadsheet
    row 44) is based on inventories and projections in the Climate Action
    Report 2001 and uses growth rates estimated to include existing
    policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gases.
        Greenhouse gas intensity is computed as the ratio of total
    greenhouse gas emissions (spreadsheet rows 27, 40 and 45) to real GDP
    (spreadsheet row 29). This is multiplied by 1000 to convert to units of
    metric tons carbon equivalent (mtce) per million dollars of GDP.
        The intensity decline is measured as one minus the ratio of 2012
    greenhouse gas intensity to 2002 greenhouse gas intensity. For example,
    in the reference case intensity declines from 183 to 158 mtce/$million.
    14 percent = 1--158/183.
        Emission reductions from business as usual are computed by first
    determining the emissions implied by the President's goal.
    Specifically, forecast GDP in 2012, multiplied by (1--18 percent),
    multiplied by intensity in 2002, and divided by 1000 (the latter
    converts from thousands to millions of tons). In the reference case,
    this works out to 14,459 x 0.82 x 183.3 / 1000 = 2173 million metric
    tons of carbon. This is then subtracted from forecast emissions in
    2012, 2279, to yield the reported estimate of 106 million tons of
    reductions.
        Note that the exact intensity goal in 2012 will not be known until
    accurate inventory data for 2002 is available as a basis for the 18
    percent decline. The exact emission goal will then depend on the
    eventual GDP level in 2012.
    References
    Annual Energy Outlook 2002. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/
    Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 1999. http://
                www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/gg00rpt/
    Climate Action Report 2001. http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/
                publications/car/index.html
    Draft Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2000.
                http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/publications/emissions/
                us2002/index.html
    Addendum to the U.S. Methane Emissions 1990-2020: Inventories,
                Projections and Opportunities for Reductions. http://
                www.epa.gov/ghginfo/pdfs/final--addendum2.pdf
    U.S. High GWP Gas Emissions 1990-2010: Inventories, Projections, and
                Opportunities for Reductions. http://www.epa.gov/ghginfo/
                reports/index.htm
    Table A20.
    Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook 2002, page 13.
    Table S-14.
    Table A19.
    Table 1.
    Table 5-2.
    Exhibit 1.4
                                     ______

                                 [July 9, 2002]
           report to congress on federal climate change expenditures
      ``The challenge is to act in a serious and sensible way, given the
                           limits of our knowledge.''
                       President George W. Bush, June 11, 2001.
    Introduction
        The following is a detailed account of Federal spending and
    performance goals for climate change programs and activities, both
    domestic and international, as included in the President's fiscal year
    2003 Budget. This report is being provided in response to Section
    559(b) of Public Law 107-115, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
    Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002.
        On February 14, 2002, President Bush announced a new national goal
    to reduce the ``greenhouse gas intensity'' of the American economy by
    18 percent during the next decade. Achieving this goal will require an
    enhanced and sustained national effort to develop and deploy advanced
    energy and sequestration technologies, while maintaining a strong
    American economy. As reflected in the United Nations Framework
    Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to which the United States is a
    party, global climate change represents a serious, long-term challenge
    for all of the nations of the world. The Administration has proposed a
    comprehensive plan for achieving meaningful progress in tackling this
    challenge. Progress will be achieved by relying on a range of
    significant investments in reducing the fundamental scientific
    uncertainties associated with anthropogenic climate change, advancing
    the development and introduction of energy-efficient and renewable
    technologies, and incentivizing emissions reductions throughout our
    economy. The budget information presented in this Report reflects the
    Administration's intensified focus and prioritization of meeting our
    international commitments under the UNFCCC and responsibility to the
    American people for preserving a strong American economy.
        The President's fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes $4,475 million.
    This figure is $653 million, or 17 percent, higher than fiscal year
    2002 enacted for spending programs and tax policies related to or
    associated with climate change. The Budget request for climate change
    programs is the highest level ever, though some programs were reduced
    to eliminate unrequested earmarks or certain projects approaching
    commercialization that are more properly now funded by the private
    sector. Other higher priority programs were increased. At this level,
    the United States leads the world in climate change research, and has
    invested nearly $20 billion in such research over the past decade.
    However, in its June 2001 Report, Climate Change Science: An Analysis
    of Some Key Questions, the National Research Council concluded that
    major challenges still remain to meaningfully improve our current
    understanding of the science of global climate change:

        ``Making progress in reducing the large uncertainties in
    projections of future climate will require addressing a number of
    fundamental scientific questions relating to the buildup of greenhouse
    gases in the atmosphere and the behavior of the climate system. Issues
    that need to be addressed include: a) the future usage of fossil fuels;
    b) the future emissions of methane; c) the fraction of the future
    fossil-fuel carbon that will remain in the atmosphere and provide
    radiative forcing versus exchange with the oceans or net exchange with
    the land biosphere; d) the feedbacks in the climate system that
    determine both the magnitude of the change and the rate of energy
    uptake by the oceans, which together determine the magnitude of and
    time history of the temperature increases for a given radiative
    forcing; e) details of the regional and local climate change consequent
    to an overall level of global climate change; f) the nature and the
    causes of the natural variability of climate and its interactions with
    forced changes; and g) the direct and indirect effects of the changing
    distributions of aerosols. Maintaining a vigorous, ongoing program of
    basic research, funded and managed independently of the climate
    assessment activity, will be crucial for narrowing those
    uncertainties.''

        ``Because there is considerable uncertainty in our current
    understanding of how the climate system varies naturally and reacts to
    emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols, current estimates of the
    magnitude of future warming should be regarded as tentative and subject
    to future adjustments (either upward or downward).''

        And recently, the U.S. Climate Action Report 2002 to the United
    Nations stressed:

        ``One of the weakest links in our knowledge is the connection
    between global and regional predictions of climate change. The National
    Research Council's response to the President's request for a review of
    climate change policy specifically noted that fundamental scientific
    questions remain regarding the specifics of regional and local
    projections (NRC 2001). Predicting the potential impacts of climate
    change is compounded by a lack of understanding of the sensitivity of
    many environmental systems and resources B both managed and unmanaged B
    to climate change.''

        The Report notes the ``considerable uncertainty'' about the science
    of global climate change, including the uncertainty regarding natural
    climate variability and the role of aerosols, and ``recognize[s] that
    definitive prediction of potential outcomes is not yet feasible.'' The
    Report does not identify new risks, but rather provides a complete
    review of the numerous, often conflicting ``what if'' scenarios of
    potential impacts of climate change, both dire and beneficial. This
    Report makes clear that models, such as those used by the prior
    Administration's 2000 National Assessment, cannot yet be relied upon to
    make Aaccurate predictions of the specific changes in climate that will
    occur over the next hundred years.''
        The Administration's fiscal year 2003 budget request to Congress
    includes the initial response to President Bush's direction last June
    for a Climate Change Research Initiative (``CCRI'') to address many of
    these major gaps in our current understanding of global climate change.
    Specific CCRI priorities will focus on improving our understanding of
    the North American carbon cycle and the role of aerosols and
    tropospheric ozone in climate change, enhancing computer modeling of
    climate and developing high quality, long term climate observation
    data. The Administration will continue to determine where financial
    resources in the climate change portfolio can be redirected from lower
    priority work to higher priority projects that address specific areas
    of research identified by the National Research Council.
        Additionally although not included in this Report, the recently
    enacted Farm Bill will significantly expand conservation programs on
    farm and forest lands, accompanied by expanded carbon sequestration
    services. See Addendum B.
        In addition to describing our investments in global climate
    science, the programs and tax policies in this report represent one way
    to inventory a set of programs and tax policies associated with energy
    use, carbon sequestration and climate change. Funding generally falls
    into four major program areas.
        U.S. Global Change Research Program. The United States Global
    Change Research Program (USGCRP) seeks to provide a sound scientific
    understanding of both the human and natural forces that influence the
    Earth's climate system. The information produced by USGCRP's scientists
    is used by national and international policymakers to inform decisions
    on global change issues. The fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes $1,714
    million for the USGCRP, an increase of $44 million over fiscal year
    2002 enacted. See Table 2 for detailed information about the USGCRP.
        In addition to the USGCRP, the fiscal year 2003 Budget requests $40
    million for the new Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI), which
    was created by the President to advance and bring focus to and leverage
    climate change research spending. The CCRI complements the existing
    USGCRP. CCRI funding will be shared among five agencies (NOAA, NASA,
    NSF, USDA, DOE), and the program will adopt performance metrics and
    deliverable products useful to policymakers in a short timeframe (2 to
    5 years). It will enhance observation and monitoring systems and
    improve the integration of scientific knowledge, including measures of
    uncertainty, into effective decision support systems. See Table 3 for
    information about the CCRI.
        Technology Research, Development and Deployment. The programs in
    this category have the effect of stimulating the development and use of
    renewable energy technologies and energy efficient products that can
    help improve energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The
    fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes $1,757 million in discretionary
    spending and tax incentives, an increase of $539 million over fiscal
    year 2002 enacted. In addition to programs administered by the
    Department of Energy (DOE), this category also includes programs within
    the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of
    Agriculture (USDA). See Tables 4-5 for detailed information about the
    programs and tax proposals in this category.
        In June, 2001, the President committed the United States to work
    within the United Nation's framework to develop an effective and
    science-based response to the issue of global climate change. He noted
    that the United States is a leader in innovation and technology and
    that technology offers great promise to address this issue. As part of
    this commitment, he created a National Climate Change Technology
    Initiative. The National Climate Change Technology Initiative
    integrates a number of interdependent facets of the technological
    component of this approach to the global climate change issue: applied
    research and development; supporting basic research carried out by
    universities and national laboratories; partnering with industry and
    others, including international partners, in order to move technologies
    into the marketplace; promoting cutting-edge technologies through
    demonstration projects; and measuring and monitoring greenhouse gas
    emissions, inventories and flows. This Initiative will provide a
    framework for guiding the technology component of climate change
    related Federal R&D.
        International Assistance. International assistance programs support
    developing country efforts to address climate change through
    improvements in energy efficiency, renewable energy, land use changes
    and forestry practices. The fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes $211
    million, an increase of $32 million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for
    climate change programs administered by the U.S. Agency for
    International Development and to support the Secretariat of the
    Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel
    on Climate Change. See Table 6 for information on international
    assistance programs related to climate change, and Appendix A for
    obligations and expenditures by country and activity for the Agency for
    International Development as requested in Section 559 (b)(2) of Public
    Law 107-115.
        Other Climate-Related Programs. There are several programs that
    have multiple environmental benefits including their contribution to
    improving energy efficiency and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The
    programs identified in this category include: DOE's Weatherization and
    State Energy Grants; DOE programs that promote cleaner coal and natural
    gas combustion, and nuclear energy R&D; and; U.S. contributions to the
    Global Environment Facility (GEF). GEF funding helps address trans-
    border environmental problems like international water pollution,
    biological diversity conservation, and climate change. The GEF's
    climate change projects are related to the U.N. Framework Convention on
    Climate Change, not the Kyoto Protocol. The fiscal year 2003 Budget
    proposes $807 million, an increase of $20 million over fiscal year 2002
    enacted, for the programs in this category. See Table 7 for more
    details on these programs.
                 summary of federal climate change expenditures

                      Table 1. Programs and Tax Policies Related to Climate Change--FY 2003 Budget
                              (Budget authority and tax incentives; in millions of dollars)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    FY 2001      FY 2002      FY 2003    Change 2002-
                                                                     Actual      Estimate     Proposed       2003
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Directly Related Programs & Policies:.......................
        U.S. Global Change Research Program.....................        1,728        1,670        1,714          +44

        Climate Change Research Initiative......................           --           --           40          +40

        Technology Research, Development and Deployment:........
            Spending Programs...................................        1,176        1,218        1,202          -16
            Tax Incentives \1\..................................           --           --          555         +555
            National Climate Change Technology Initiative\2\....           --           --           --           --

        International Assistance................................          177          179          211          +32

    Other Climate-Related Programs:.............................
        DOE--Weatherization & State Energy Grants...............          191          275          316          +41

        DOE--Fossil Energy R&D (cleaner coal & natural gas).....          274          442          398          -44

        DOE--Nuclear Energy R&D (NERI)..........................           34           32           25           -7

        Treasury B Global Environment Facility \3\..............           41           38           68          +30
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            TOTAL \4\...........................................        3,603        3,822        4,475         +653
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\The cost of the five energy tax incentives related to climate change included in the President's fiscal year
      2003 Budget is $4.6 billion over 5 years; $7.1 billion over 10 years.
    \2\ The National Climate Change Technology (NCCTI) will build on an existing base of research and development in
      climate change technology, primarily at DOE, EPA, and USDA. The President's fiscal year 2003 Budget requests
      $40 million for NCCTI within the DOE budget. Specific research areas are being identified through an
      interagency review process.
    \3\ The total fiscal year 2003 request for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is $177.8 million.
      Approximately 38 percent of total GEF funding from all sources supports climate-related projects (e.g.
      expanding clean energy production and efficient energy use). The GEF, which also provides funding for other
      global environmental concerns, does not allocate funds by project type.
    \4\ Total may not add due to rounding. Total adjusted to eliminate double counts.

                      u.s. global change research program

                                Table 2. By Agency/Appropriation Account--FY 2003 Budget
                                (Discretionary budget authority; in millions of dollars)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    FY 2001      FY 2002      FY 2003    Change 2002-
                                                                     Actual      Estimate     Proposed       2003
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Department of Health and Human Service:.....................
        National Institutes of Health...........................           54           60           68           +8

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration:..............
        Science, Aeronautics, and Technology....................        1,176        1,090        1,109          +19

    Department of Energy:.......................................
        Science (Biological & Environmental Research)...........          116          120          126           +6

    National Science Foundation:................................
        Research and Related Activities.........................          181          188          188            0

    Department of Agriculture:..................................
        Agricultural Research Service...........................           29           30           30            0
        Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension                 4            9           17           +8
         Services...............................................
            Research and Education..............................            4            9           17           +8
        Economic Research Service...............................            1            1            1            0
        Forest Service..........................................
            Forest and Rangeland Research.......................           17           17           17            0
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--USDA......................................           51           57           65           +8

    Department of Commerce:.....................................
        National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration                    93          100          100            0
         Operations, Research, and Facilities...................

    Department of the Interior:.................................
        U.S. Geological Survey Surveys, Investigations, and                27           28           28           -2
         Research...............................................

    Environmental Protection Agency:............................
        Science and Technology..................................           23           21           22            +

    Smithsonian Institution:....................................
        Salaries and Expenses...................................            7            7            7            0
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            TOTAL\1\............................................        1,728        1,670        1,714          +44
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Total may not add due to rounding.

                       climate change research initiative

                                Table 3. By Agency/Appropriation Account--FY 2003 Budget
                                  (Discretionary budget authority; dollars in millions)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    FY 2001      FY 2002      FY 2003    Change 2002-
                                                                     Actual      Estimate     Proposed       2003
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Department of Commerce:.....................................
        National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration                    --           --           18          +18
         Operations, Research, and Facilities...................

    National Science Foundation:................................
        Research and Related Activities.........................           --           --           15          +15

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration:..............
        Science, Aeronautics, and Technology....................           --           --            3           +3

    Department of Energy:.......................................
        Science (Biological & Environmental Research)...........           --           --            3           +3

    Department of Agriculture:..................................
        Forest Service/Natural Resources Conservation Service\1\           --           --            1           +1
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            TOTAL...............................................           --           --           40          +40
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Based on $500,000 for the Forest Service and $500,000 for the Natural Resources Conservation Service.

        U.S. Global Change Research Program. Much of the U.S. investment in
    research on climate and other global environmental changes is
    coordinated through the U.S. Global Change Research program (USGCRP).
    The USGCRP has existed for more than a decade, and provides funding at
    nine different agencies for fundamental research on natural and human-
    induced changes in the global environment, with the goal of attaining a
    more complete understanding of global climate change to better respond
    to the challenges it presents. The fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes
    $1,714 million for the USGCRP, an increase of $44 million over the
    fiscal year 2002 enacted level.
        Climate Change Research Initiative. In addition to the USGCRP, the
    fiscal year 2003 Budget requests $40 million for the new Climate Change
    Research Initiative (CCRI), which was created by the President to
    advance and bring focus to climate change research. The CCRI
    complements the existing USGCRP. CCRI funding in fiscal year 2003 will
    be shared among five agencies (NOAA, NASA, NSF, USDA, DOE), and the
    program will adopt performance metrics and deliverable products useful
    to policymakers in a short timeframe (2 to 5 years). It will enhance
    observation and monitoring systems as well as improve the integration
    of scientific
        knowledge, including measures of uncertainty, into effective
    decision support systems. CCRI funding in 2003 will focus on two main
    areas: reducing the uncertainties in climate science, and supporting
    policy and management decisions. In the first category, specific
    priorities include understanding the North American carbon cycle,
    developing reliable representation of global and regional climatic
    forcing by atmospheric aerosols, and investing in computer modeling. In
    the second category, specific priorities include developing tools for
    risk management under uncertainty and ensuring high-quality, long-term
    climate data records.
                            energy policy proposals

                                         Table 4. Tax Incentives--FY 2003 Budget
                                         (Revenue effect in millions of dollars)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                         Total 2003-
                                            2003         2004         2005         2006         2007          07
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Homes.............................
        Provide tax credit for                   -6           -7           -8          -17          -24          -62
         residential solar energy
         systems......................

    Renewable Energy..................
        Extend the tax credit for              -227         -303         -212         -143         -146        -1031
         electricity produced from
         wind and biomass for 3 years;
         expand eligible biomass
         sources to include certain
         biomass produced from forest-
         related resources,
         agricultural sources, and
         other specified sources......

    Transportation....................
        Provide tax credit for                  -80         -181         -349         -530         -763        -1903
         purchase of certain hybrid
         and fuel cell vehicles.......

    Industry..........................
        Provide tax credit for energy           -34          -59          -86         -120         -140         -439
         produced from landfill gas...
        Provide tax credit for                 -208         -235         -238         -296         -139        -1116
         combined heat and power
         property.....................
                                       -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
        TOTAL\1\......................         -555         -785         -893        -1106        -1212        -4551
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Total may not add due to rounding.

        Energy Policy Proposals B Tax Incentives. The President is
    proposing $4,551 million in clean energy tax credits over 5 years ($7.1
    billion over 10 years) for investments in renewable energy (solar,
    wind, and biomass), hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, co-generation, and
    landfill gas conversion. (see Table 2). These incentives are important
    to meeting the nation's long-term energy supply and security needs,
    reducing pollution, and projected greenhouse gas emissions. The
    following is an explanation of the clean energy tax incentives proposed
    in the fiscal year 2003 Budget.
    Homes
          Tax credit for residential solar energy systems. Current
    law provides a 10-percent investment tax credit to businesses for
    qualifying equipment that uses solar energy to generate electricity; to
    heat, cool or provide hot water for use in a structure; or to provide
    solar process heat. No credit is available for nonbusiness purchases of
    solar energy equipment. The Administration proposes a new tax credit
    for individuals who purchase photovoltaic equipment and solar water
    heating systems for use in a dwelling unit that the individual uses as
    a residence. Equipment would qualify for the credit only if used
    exclusively for purposes other than heating swimming pools. An
    individual would be allowed a cumulative maximum credit of $2,000 per
    residence for photovoltaic equipment and $2,000 per residence for solar
    water heating systems. The credit for solar water heating equipment
    would apply only if placed in service after December 31, 2001 and
    before January 1, 2006, and to photovoltaic systems placed in service
    after December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 2008.
    Renewable Energy
          Tax credit for electricity produced from wind or biomass.
    Current law provides taxpayers a 1.5 cent-per-kilowatt hour tax credit
    (adjusted for inflation after 1992) for electricity produced from wind,
    ``closed-loop'' biomass, and poultry waste. Biomass refers to trees,
    crops and agricultural wastes used to produce power, fuels or
    chemicals. The electricity must be sold to an unrelated third party and
    the credit applies to the first 10 years of production. The current tax
    credit covers facilities placed in service before January 1, 2002,
    after which it expires. The new proposal would:
          Extend current biomass credit. This proposal would extend
    for 3 years the 1.5 cent-per-kilowatt hour biomass credit for
    facilities placed in service before January 1, 2005.
          Expand definition of eligible biomass. This proposal
    expands the definition of eligible biomass to include certain forest-
    related resources and agricultural and other sources for facilities
    placed in service before January 1, 2002. Electricity produced at such
    facilities from newly eligible sources would be eligible for the credit
    only from January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2004. The credit for
    such electricity would be computed at a rate equal to 60 percent of the
    generally applicable rate. Electricity produced from newly eligible
    biomass co-fired in coal plants would be eligible for the credit only
    from January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2004.
    Transportation
          Tax credit for hybrid and fuel cell vehicles. Currently,
    a 10 percent tax credit up to $4,000 is provided for the cost of a
    qualified electric vehicle. A qualified electric vehicle is a motor
    vehicle that is powered primarily by an electric motor drawing current
    from rechargeable batteries, fuel cells, or other portable sources of
    electric current. Electric and hybrid vehicles have the potential to
    increase energy efficiency as well as reduce air pollution and
    greenhouse gas emissions. To encourage the purchase of such vehicles
    the Administration is proposing the following tax credits:
          A credit of up to $4,000 for qualified hybrid vehicles
    purchased after December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 2008. The
    amount of the credit would depend on the percentage of maximum
    available power provided by the rechargeable energy storage system and
    the amount by which the vehicle's fuel economy exceeds the 2000 model
    year city fuel economy.
          A credit of up to $8,000 for new qualified fuel cell
    vehicles purchased after December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 2008.
    A minimum credit of $4,000 would be provided, which would increase as
    the vehicle's fuel efficiency exceeded the 2000 model year city fuel
    economy, reaching a maximum credit of $8,000 if the vehicle achieved at
    least 300 percent of the 2000 model year city fuel economy.
    Industry
          Tax credit for energy produced from landfill gas.
    Taxpayers that produce gas from biomass are eligible for a credit equal
    to $3 per barrel-of-oil equivalent. To qualify, the gas must be
    produced domestically from a facility placed in service before July 1,
    1998 and sold to an unrelated person before January 1, 2008. The new
    proposal would extend the credit to fuel produced from landfill methane
    produced from a facility in service after December 31, 2001 and before
    January 1, 2011. The credit for fuel produced at landfills subject to
    EPA's 1996 New Source Performance Standards/Emissions Guidelines would
    be limited to two-thirds of the otherwise applicable amount if any
    portion of the facility for producing fuel at the landfill was placed
    in service before July 1, 1998, and beginning on January 1, 2002, in
    all other cases.
          Tax credit for combined heat and power property. Combined
    heat and power (CHP), also known as co-generation, is a highly
    efficient form of electric generation that recycles heat which is
    normally lost under traditional power combustion methods. CHP captures
    the heat left over from industrial use, providing a source of
    residential and industrial heating and air conditioning in the local
    area around the power plant. CHP systems achieve a greater level of
    overall energy efficiency, thereby reducing energy consumption, costs,
    and carbon emissions. No income tax credit is available for investment
    in CHP property. The Administration is proposing a new 10 percent
    investment credit for qualified CHP systems placed in service after
    December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 2007.
                technology research, development and deployment

                               Table 5. Program Details by Agency/Account--FY 2003 Budget
                                (Discretionary budget authority; in millions of dollars)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    FY 2001      FY 2002      FY 2003    Change 2002-
                                                                     Actual      Estimate     Proposed       2003
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Department of Energy (DOE)..................................
        Energy Supply...........................................          375          393          408          +15
            Renewable Energy Resources R&D......................        (370)        (386)        (408)        (+22)
            Nuclear Energy......................................          (5)          (7)          (0)         (-7)
        Energy Conservation R&D.................................          619          640          588          -52
        Fossil Energy R&D (sequestration R&D)...................           18           32          588          -52
        Science.................................................           35           35           35            0
        Energy Information Administration.......................            3            3            3            0
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
        Subtotal--DOE...........................................        1,050        1,103        1,088          -15

    Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).......................
        Environmental Programs & Management.....................           96           89           91           +2
        Science and Technology..................................           27           26           17           -9
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
        Subtotal--EPA...........................................          123          115          108           -7

    Department of Agriculture (USDA)............................
        Forest Service..........................................            3            0            1           +1
        Forest and Rangeland Research Agricultural Research                 0            0            5           +5
         Service................................................
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
        Subtotal--USDA..........................................            3            0            6           +6
            TOTAL \1\...........................................        1,176        1,218        1,202          -16
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Total may not add due to rounding.

        Technology Research, Development and Deployment. The fiscal year
    2003 Budget proposes $1,202 million in discretionary funding, a
    decrease of $16 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted, for research,
    development, and deployment of renewable energy technologies and energy
    efficient products that help reduce the use of fossil fuels and U.S.
    greenhouse gas emissions. Better methods to measure and monitor carbon
    dioxide in soils and from forests are also funded. Table 5 provides a
    detailed accounting by agency of the technology programs in this report
    related to energy efficiency, conservation, renewable energy, and
    carbon sequestration. The reduction in funding reflects a decrease in
    conservation R&D for technologies that can be picked up by the private
    sector and a shift of conservation funds to weatherization grants. The
    following sections highlight selected agency programs.
    1. Buildings
        The buildings sector is responsible for about 33 percent of U.S.
    greenhouse gas emissions.
        Most of the emissions result from the electricity needed to run
    appliances and equipment in buildings, such as heating, ventilation,
    and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment. The budget includes programs
    within DOE and EPA designed to develop highly efficient new appliances
    and HVAC systems, and to more rapidly deploy energy efficient products
    for buildings and homes throughout the marketplace. The following is a
    summary of the major activities by agency in the buildings sector:
          DOE Building Technology Program. The budget includes $93
    million for DOE's building technology and related activities, a
    decrease of $12 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted. DOE has been
    working with industry to define technology ``roadmaps'' toward more
    efficient buildings, and is using that process to guide its R&D
    programs.
        One major component is the Building America program, which creates
    partnerships with traditional housing developers and manufacturers of
    industrialized housing to demonstrate how new technologies can be
    integrated into homes cost-effectively and to disseminate that
    knowledge to other builders. DOE works with States to encourage them to
    voluntarily upgrade their commercial and residential building energy
    codes to require greater energy efficiency in all new construction.
    DOE's Rebuild America program is the centerpiece of a newly
    consolidated Community Energy Program--community partners in Rebuild
    America have committed to improving the energy efficiency of building
    space.
        DOE also funds significant research on more efficient building
    equipment and appliances, such as advanced lighting, heat pumps,
    chillers, and commercial refrigeration. DOE develops and promulgates
    energy efficiency standards for many categories of appliances and also
    develops testing methodologies used to set standards and to provide
    efficiency rating labels. (DOE's rating and labeling programs are
    performed in partnership with the Federal Trade Commission.) Standards
    and test procedure development will continue for a variety of
    appliances and will continue to support the joint EPA-DOE Energy Star
    program.
          EPA Buildings Programs. The budget proposes $50 million,
    an increase of $1 million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for EPA's
    ENERGY STAR partnerships (including ENERGY STAR Labeling and the ENERGY
    STAR Buildings Program). EPA will work toward the goal of offsetting
    about 24 percent of the growth in greenhouse gas emissions above 1990
    levels expected by 2010 in this sector.
        EPA will actively promote its new buildings benchmark tool and work
    with building owners and mangers to benchmark a total of 29,000
    buildings nationwide. EPA will expand its public sector work to
    increase the number of partnerships with schools and universities and
    State and local governments to over 1,200. EPA will also continue to
    actively recruit new small businesses and organizations into ENERGY
    STAR with the goal of reaching over 7,000 participants in 2003. EPA
    will continue to play a key role in advancing the efficiency of the
    Federal Government by enhancing the ability of agencies to procure
    energy efficient products as well as assist agencies in benchmarking
    and labeling their high-performing buildings.
    2. Transportation
        Cars, trucks, aircraft, and other parts of the Nation's
    transportation system emit about one third of the total anthropogenic
    U.S. greenhouse gases. A range of new technologies should make it
    possible for Americans to continue to enjoy the best personal
    transportation in the world while significantly reducing greenhouse gas
    emissions. Furthermore, many communities are developing innovative ways
    to reduce congestion and transportation energy needs by improving
    highway designs and urban planning, and by encouraging mass transit.
          DOE Transportation Technology Programs. The budget
    proposes $223 million, a decrease of $30 million from fiscal year 2002
    enacted (excludes $53 million in biofuels R&D funded in Renewable
    Energy Resources and included in the electricity sector below). DOE's
    Office of Transportation Technologies (OTT) funds research,
    development, and deployment of technologies that can significantly
    alter current trends in oil consumption. Commercialization of
    innovative vehicle technologies and alternative fuels presents an
    opportunity for reducing reliance on oil. These advanced technologies
    could also result in dramatic reductions in criteria pollutants and
    greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector. DOE funds
    research and development for advanced power-train technology (direct-
    injection) engines, hybrid-electric drive systems, advanced batteries,
    fuel cells, and light weight materials and for alternative fuels
    (including ethanol from biomass, natural gas, methanol, electricity,
    and biodiesel). About half of OTT's R&D funding supports FreedomCAR, a
    new partnership with the auto industry that builds on the technical
    successes of its predecessor (Partnership for a New Generation of
    Vehicles or PNGV), and improves on management and focus.
        DOE also funds research to improve the engine efficiency of heavy-
    duty truck engines while reducing oxides of nitrogen emissions to near-
    zero levels. This research includes both fuel injection/combustion
    research and exhaust after-treatment for particulates and nitrogen
    oxide. This research will be complemented by R&D to reduce parasitic
    loses from aerodynamic drag and rolling resistance (including computer
    aerodynamic modeling of new truck body designs); and to make greater
    use of lower-weight, high-strength materials for all classes of trucks.
          EPA Transportation Programs. The budget proposes $22
    million, a decrease of $9 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted, for
    EPA's clean automotive technology initiative and activities that
    promote partnerships with State and local governments and
    transportation authorities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and air
    pollution. The reduction in EPA funding reflects a shift in emphasis
    from PNGV to the new Freedom CAR program managed by DOE. The funding
    requested will enable EPA to continue its work under Cooperative
    Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) with the automotive
    industry covering both SUVs and urban delivery vehicles. The successful
    technology development patented by EPA, the hydraulic hybrid vehicle
    technology, will help to lay the foundation for cost-effective
    commercialization of high fuel economy, low emission vehicles for
    delivery to market between 2005 and 2010.
        Funding will also continue EPA's work with companies and State and
    local governments on transportation improvements that reduce vehicle
    emissions and congestion. Additionally, EPA will develop projects to
    reduce diesel idling time at truck stops and along highways. EPA will
    partner with States and manufacturers of idling control devices to help
    install idle control technologies on trucks and at truck stops that
    could save one gallon of diesel fuel for each hour a vehicle idles.
    3. Industry
        Programs in the industry sector support Federal research efforts to
    develop innovative technologies and production methods which can help
    businesses achieve productivity gains and prosper in a competitive
    marketplace while leading to major reductions in emissions of
    greenhouse gases. Many technologies can help reduce emissions.
          DOE Industry Technology Program. The budget proposes $138
    million, a decrease of $11 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted, for
    DOE's industrial research and related programs. Key DOE industry
    programs include:
          Industries of the Future. This DOE program works
    cooperatively with the nation's most energy-intensive industries--such
    as aluminum, glass, chemicals, forest products, mining, and steel--on
    developing technologies that increase energy and resource efficiency.
    Promising collaborative efforts include improvements in the process of
    making steel, pulp and paper, and other energy-intensive products that
    could dramatically increase efficiency, lower greenhouse gas emissions,
    and improve competitiveness.
        The Industries of the Future/Crosscutting program supports work
    that has benefits across many industry sectors. The Integrated
    Materials program supports development of a range of other advanced
    materials with special properties, such as intermetallic compounds,
    metal-matrix composites, and inorganic membranes. Assistance to
    innovative industries will continue with expanded NICE3 and Inventions
    and Innovations programs that support the development of energy-
    efficiency and pollution/waste control technologies. The Industrial
    Assessment Centers will continue to perform energy and waste-management
    audits at small and medium sized businesses. The Best Practices
    programs provide technical expertise and information products to
    businesses of all sizes on how to use motors, compressed air and steam
    in an integrated system context. The program also provides plant-wide
    energy assessments, documented energy savings case studies, and helps
    to accelerate the adoption by industry of the best available and
    emerging technologies and best practices.
          EPA Industry Programs. The budget proposes $26 million,
    an increase of less than $1 million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for
    EPA's programs in the industrial sector focusing on reducing carbon
    dioxide emissions and continuing the successful initiatives to reduce
    methane emissions and emissions of the high global-warming potential
    gases. EPA's goals for these efforts are to: 1) greatly enhance the
    rate of energy and resource efficiency improvements in industry between
    now and 2010 (working with DOE); 2) cost-effectively return emissions
    of methane to 1990 levels or below by 2010; 3) cost-effectively limit
    emissions of the more potent greenhouse gases (HFCs, PFCs, SF6); and 4)
    facilitate the use of clean energy technologies and purchases of
    renewable energy.
          Stewardship Programs for the Reduction of Potent
    Greenhouse Gases. EPA will continue its programs to reduce the more
    potent greenhouse gases, including methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
    perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). EPA will expand
    partnerships with the magnesium industry and with the electric power
    industry to reduce emissions of SF6 and will work with the
    semiconductor, aluminum, and chemical industries to reduce HFC and PFC
    emissions.
          Methane Programs. EPA will continue its programs to
    reduce emissions of methane, a gas with more than 20 times the heat
    trapping capability as carbon dioxide. EPA will work with the natural
    gas industry, the coal mining industry, the waste management industry,
    and the agricultural industry to promote cost-effective reductions of
    methane emissions resulting in a return of methane emissions to 1990
    levels or below by 2010. This program has significant potential to
    achieve cost-effective and meaningful greenhouse gas emission
    reductions in the American economy.
          ENERGY STAR for Industry. EPA's ENERGY STAR for Industry
    (formerly Climate Wise) program will continue to work with individual
    partnership companies. EPA will enhance and expand the ENERGY STAR
    program for industry by developing energy and related productivity
    benchmarks of industrial plant performance for five U.S. industries.
          Combined Heat and Power. EPA's Combined Heat and Power
    (CHP) program is currently funded at about $1 million per year and will
    continue to promote efficient systems that generate heat and
    electricity simultaneously at greatly improved conversion efficiencies
    over single purpose units. This program, unveiled in the fall of 2001
    with 18 partners, currently has more than 50 partners and is expected
    to grow to 100 partners by the end of 2003. This program is expected to
    facilitate about 20 CHP projects in 2001 across the industrial and
    commercial sector yielding about 450 MW of power and to facilitate an
    additional 35 projects in 2003 yielding about 850 MW. This effort could
    double the capacity of U.S. combined heat and power systems employed by
    commercial, industrial, and institutional buildings, and in communities
    throughout the Nation. EPA will work to identify and eliminate the
    regulatory and institutional barriers that are currently preventing
    more rapid dissemination of this important technology.
    4. Electricity
        The generation of electricity in the U.S. is responsible for more
    than a third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The budget funds
    programs in renewable energy technologies. The key DOE programs in this
    sector are:
          DOE Renewable Energy Resources Programs. The budget
    proposes $408 million, an increase of $22 million over fiscal year 2002
    enacted, for DOE's renewable programs. These include varieties of solar
    energy (generating electricity either through concentrated heat or
    photovoltaics), biomass power, wind energy, geothermal power,
    hydropower, and hydrogen production and storage.
          Solar Energy. Over the past 20 years, Federal R&D has
    resulted in a 80 percent cost reduction in solar photovoltaics. DOE
    will maintain R&D of the next generation photovoltaic cells;
    manufacturing R&D; research in buildings-integrated applications; and
    fund efforts to develop new, unconventional technologies.
          Biopower. Biomass represents a tremendous renewable
    resource whose use can help strengthen our energy security, protect the
    environment, and enhance our rural economy. DOE is testing and
    demonstrating biomass co-firing with coal; developing advanced
    technologies for biomass gasification; developing and demonstrating
    small modular systems; and conducting R&D to help develop
    ``biorefineries'' of the future.
          Wind. Use of wind energy is growing very fast.
    Technologies under development by DOE and its partners can enable a
    twentyfold or more expansion of usable wind resources, and make wind
    energy economically viable without the need for Federal incentives.
    Wind R&D will now focus on advancing the technology so it can be used
    in low wind speed areas, greatly enhancing the potential use of this
    renewable energy source.
          Geothermal. Geothermal represents a huge renewable
    resource which could provide 25,000-50,000 megawatts of generating
    capacity from currently identified hydrothermal resources if technology
    existed to develop these resources at a reasonable cost. DOE's R&D
    program focuses on exploration and drilling to enable industry to
    locate and characterize new geothermal fields at reduced risk, and to
    access deeper resources with lower drilling costs. DOE also supports
    advanced technology in heat conversion and power systems for
    application to a broad range of geothermal resources. Researchers work
    in partnership with U.S. industry to establish geothermal energy as an
    economically competitive contributor to the U.S. energy supply. DOE's
    R&D program and activities to reduce barriers to development will allow
    geothermal energy to supply electrical power and heat to homes and
    businesses across the country.
          Hydropower. DOE is funding the development of a new
    generation of hydropower turbines that will kill far fewer fish than
    current designs do, and will also maintain higher levels of dissolved
    oxygen in the water, which keeps river ecosystems healthier. Hydropower
    is an important form of zero-carbon electricity generation for the
    Nation.
          Hydrogen. DOE will continue to fund its research on low-
    cost hydrogen production and storage, prerequisites to the widespread
    use of hydrogen as a fuel. The program now looks toward the Proton-
    Exchange Membrane (PEM) fuel cells being developed for hybrid vehicles
    and for cogeneration in buildings as the first significant markets for
    hydrogen, which will be ready within 5 years. More than half of the
    hydrogen budget supports the new FreedomCAR public-private partnership.
        The program funds R&D on thermal (steam and advanced auto-thermal
    reforming) production on hydrogen from both natural gas and biomass,
    and on methods to use either algae and bacteria or photocatalytic
    techniques to produce hydrogen. The hydrogen storage research program
    is exploring a number of novel adsorption mechanisms, including carbon
    nanotubes and improved metal hydrides. DOE's Technology Validation
    effort is funding demonstrations of prototype fuel cells, a fueling
    station for vehicles, and onsite storage systems for solar production
    of hydrogen. The latter includes a reversible electrolyzer/fuel cell
    that can produce hydrogen from electricity while the sun is shining,
    and electricity from hydrogen when it is dark.
          Deployment. DOE funds the Renewable Energy Production
    Incentive (REPI), which provides payments to public and non-profit
    utilities in lieu of renewable energy tax credits. Public and non-
    profit utilities are not eligible for these tax credits because they
    pay no taxes. DOE's International Renewable Energy program provides
    technical assistance to developing countries and U.S. industries to
    help them put together climate change projects. The program also funds
    market and trade development activities and works with other agencies
    to incorporate solar and renewable energy into disaster-relief
    programs.
          Transmission and Distribution. DOE funds development of
    advanced storage systems to supply ultra-high power quality to
    sensitive loads, smooth the power output form distributed generation
    sources including intermittent renewable sources, and enhance the
    reliability of the transmission and distribution systems. DOE also
    addresses power grid reliability, and efficient electricity market
    operation issues by developing real-time measurement and control
    systems for electric grid management. This work also investigates the
    use of load management techniques to mitigate emergency power shortages
    and price spikes. In order to promote and facilitate the integration of
    distributed sources into the grid, DOE funds development of uniform
    interconnection standards for distributed power generation, and funds
    studies to identify barriers to the wider use of distributed
    generation.
          High Temperature Superconductivity. DOE supports
    industry-led projects to capitalize on recent breakthroughs in
    superconducting wire technology, aimed at developing devices such as
    advanced motors, power cables, and transformers. These technologies
    would allow more electricity to reach the consumer without an increase
    in fossil fuel input.
          Distributed Energy Resources. DOE has combined the
    development of Distributed Energy Resources (distributed generation,
    energy storage and load management) into one office to lead the
    seamless integration of these technologies into the distribution
    system, the power grid, competitive markets, and the individual
    customer site. The office is supporting work to increase the
    efficiency, and reduce the cost and emissions of advanced natural gas-
    driven microturbines, fuel cells, and reciprocating engines, and
    developing advanced high temperature materials to improve their
    performance. High system efficiencies are achieved from these sources
    by linking them into building combined heat and power systems with
    advanced absorption heat pumps, chillers and desiccant systems that are
    also being developed in the program.
    5. Carbon Sequestration
        Carbon dioxide can be sequestered (stored) through changes in both
    forestry and agricultural practices. These programs focus on methods to
    capture and store carbon dioxide, measure and monitor carbon in soils
    and from agricultural practices, and to improve estimates of carbon
    fluxes from forests.
          DOE Carbon Sequestration Science Programs. The budget
    proposes $35 million, the same level as fiscal year 2002 enacted, for
    DOE carbon removal programs in the Office of Science. DOE's programs
    include research into the feasibility of capturing and storing carbon
    dioxide in underground geological structures and in the deep ocean.
          DOE Fossil Energy Carbon Sequestration Programs. The
    budget proposes $54 million, an increase of $22 million over fiscal
    year 2002 enacted, for DOE fossil energy carbon sequestration programs.
    Carbon sequestration is potentially one of the lowest cost approaches
    for significantly reducing or perhaps virtually offsetting greenhouse
    gas emissions. The purpose of the fossil energy program is to develop
    and demonstrate technically, economically, and ecologically sound
    methods to capture and reuse, store or permanently isolate carbon
    dioxide from the environment. The program goal is to make available
    sequestration options starting in 2015 at a cost of no more than $10
    per ton of carbon (or about two tenths of a cent in the cost of
    electricity). When linked with new advanced clean coal power
    technologies now under development, the program will enable the
    deployment of clean coal power plants with essentially zero emissions.
        The principal thrust of the carbon sequestration program is to
    develop the applied science and new technologies for addressing the
    cost-effective management/sequestration of carbon emissions from the
    production and use of fossil fuels. The program primarily selects
    research topics and projects through competitive solicitations
    involving industry, university, and national laboratory performers.
    Close collaborations with other DOE, government, industry, and
    international organizations are maintained providing an integrated
    approach to advancing the science and technology of carbon
    sequestration.
          EPA Carbon Removal Programs. The budget proposes $2
    million, about the same level as fiscal year 2002 enacted, to allow EPA
    to enhance efforts to better quantify the associated environmental co-
    benefits that result from carbon sequestration. These benefits include
    improving soil quality, reducing soil erosion, improving water quality,
    providing wildlife habitat, and enhancing other environmental and
    conservation goals. EPA will continue to collaborate with USDA to
    address the misperceptions regarding carbon sequestration and to ensure
    that this important mitigation option is developed in an
    environmentally sound and economically efficient way. EPA and USDA will
    identify and develop specific opportunities to sequester carbon in
    agricultural soils, forests, other vegetation and commercial products.
          USDA Technology Research. The budget proposes
    approximately $6 million to strengthen basic climate change technology
    research and to develop methods for measuring carbon in soils. USDA's
    Agricultural Research Service (ARS) will develop methods to manage
    crops, soils, and grazing systems to achieve the best balance of
    agricultural productivity, resource conservation, and carbon
    sequestration. Work will also focus on methods for managing livestock
    to minimize methane emissions. The Forest Service will support the
    development of measuring tools and monitoring technologies to improve
    estimates of carbon fluxes from forests.
                            international assistance

                                    Table 6. International Climate Change Assistance
                                (Discretionary budget authority; in millions of dollars)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    FY 2001      FY 2002      FY 2003    Change 2002-
                                                                     Actual      Estimate     Proposed       2003
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Agency for International Development:.......................
        Development Assistance (DA).............................          112          110          109           -1
        Economic Support Fund (ESF).............................           --           12            6           -6
        Assistance for the Independent States of the Former                31           32           27           -5
         Soviet Union (FSA).....................................
        Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States                13           10            8           -2
         (AEEB).................................................
        International Disaster Assistance (IDA).................           --            4            5           +1
        Development Credit Authority (DCA)......................            1           --           --           --
        Tropical Forest Conservation\1\.........................           --           --           50          +50
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--AID.......................................          157          167          205          +38

    Department of Treasury......................................
        Debt Restructuring Tropical Forest Conservation\2\......           13            5           --           -5

    Department of State.........................................
        International Organizations and Programs................            7            7            6           -1
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Total\3\............................................          177          179          211          +32
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Prior to the fiscal year 2003 Presidents Budget request, funding for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act
      (TFCA) was appropriated to the Treasury Department.
    \2\ In fiscal year 2002, an additional $20 million in existing balances may be used.
    \3\ Total may not add due to rounding.

        U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The budget
    proposes $205 million, an increase of $38 million over fiscal year 2002
    enacted, for USAID's climate change programs and for tropical forest
    conservation. The goal of USAID's climate change programs are to
    promote development that minimizes the associated growth in greenhouse
    gas emissions and reduces vulnerability to climate change. To
    accomplish this goal, USAID works in developing and transition
    countries to implement ``win-win'' solutions that provide climate-
    related benefits while also meeting development objectives in the
    energy sector, urban areas, forest conservation, agriculture, and
    disaster assistance. These solutions include activities that: 1)
    promote the transfer of clean energy technologies; 2) measure
    reductions in greenhouse gas emissions; 3) promote carbon capture
    through improved land use; 4) support countries to participate more
    effectively in the U.S. Framework Convention on Climate Change; and 5)
    assess vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and increase
    adaptive capacity. Although USAID works on climate change issues in
    more than 40 countries, the Agency has focused its climate change
    activities in three sub-regions: Central Africa, Central America and
    Central Asia, and eight countries: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
    Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and Ukraine.
        The President's fiscal year 2003 budget proposal seeks $50 million
    in funding for tropical forest conservation, of which $40 million may
    be used for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA). One purpose of
    this initiative is to enable developing countries to play an increased
    role in addressing the world's climate change problem through storing
    carbon in forests. The main elements of the initiative will be: (1)
    remote sensing and developing capacity to monitor deforestation and
    enable local governments to better control illegal and destructive
    logging in their countries; (2) addressing the problem of illegal and
    destructive logging practices, working with governments, non-
    governmental organizations and private industry; and (3) addressing
    deforestation through the use of the Tropical Forest Conservation Act
    as well as other innovative funding mechanisms such as commercial debt
    for nature swaps under the Foreign Assistance Act Title I, Chapter 7
    authority and new partnerships with U.S. industries and non-
    governmental organizations (NGO's).
        Department of State. The budget includes $6 million to support the
    work carried out by the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework
    Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel
    on Climate Change (IPCC). The Secretariat is responsible for work
    related to the Convention and oversees the consideration of
    communications submitted by countries. The Panel's assessment efforts
    provide information on the scientific and technical underpinnings of
    domestic and international policies to combat the threat of global
    climate change, and its findings influence policy options available
    within and between countries.
                         other climate-related programs

                             Table 7. Other Climate Change-Related Programs--FY 2003 Budget
                                       (Budget authority; in millions of dollars)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    FY 2001      FY 2002      FY 2003    Change 2002-
                                                                     Actual      Estimate     Proposed       2003
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Department of Energy........................................
        Energy Conservation R&D Weatherization & State Energy             191          272          316          +41
         Grants.................................................
        Fossil Energy R&D (cleaner coal/natural gas)............          274          442          398          -44
        Energy Supply:..........................................
            Nuclear Energy R&D (NERI)...........................           34           32           25           -7
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--DOE.......................................          499          749          739          -10

    Department of the Treasury..................................
        International Development Assistance Global Environment            41           38           68          +30
         Facility\1\............................................
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Total\2\............................................          540          787          807          +20
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\The total fiscal year 2003 request for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is $177.8 million. Approximately
      38 percent of total GEF funding from all sources supports climate-related projects (e.g. expanding clean
      energy production and efficient energy use). The GEF, which also provides funding for other global
      environmental concerns, does not allocate funds by project type.
    \2\ Total may not add due to rounding.

        Other Climate-Change Related Programs. The fiscal year 2003 budget
    includes $807 million, an increase of $20 million over fiscal year 2002
    enacted, for several programs in which there is, or can be, significant
    greenhouse gas co-benefits. These include programs that have multiple
    environmental benefits, including reducing fossil fuel use or improving
    energy efficiency. The programs in this category include:
          DOE--Low Income Weatherization and State Energy Grants.
    The budget proposes $316 million, an increase of $41 million over
    fiscal year 2002 enacted, for programs that facilitate energy
    efficiency investments at the State and local level. These programs
    provide energy conservation services, such as insulation, to low-income
    Americans, reducing energy costs for consumers, improving health and
    safety, and reducing carbon emissions. The State Energy Program
    provides grants that enable States to tailor energy efficiency programs
    to local needs and leverage non-Federal resources.
          DOE--Cleaner Coal and Natural Gas Efficiencies. The
    budget includes $398 million, a decrease of $44 million from fiscal
    year 2002 enacted, to support DOE's R&D effort to help industry develop
    advanced technologies to produce and use coal, and gas resources more
    efficiently and cleanly. federally funded development of clean, highly
    efficient gas-fired and coal-fired generating systems aims to reduce
    gas emission rates, while reducing electricity costs compared to
    currently available technologies. Programs also include efforts to
    discover effective, efficient, and economical means of sequestering
    carbon dioxide.
          DOE B Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI). The
    budget proposes $25 million, a decrease of $7 million from fiscal year
    2002 enacted, to continue investigator-initiated research and
    development at universities, national laboratories, and industry to
    advance nuclear power technology. NERI research and development focuses
    on proliferation-resistant reactor and fuel technologies, high
    performance/efficient reactor technology, advanced nuclear fuels, and
    new technologies for the minimization and management of nuclear waste.
          Department of the Treasury B Global Environment Facility
    (GEF). See Addendum A.
           detailed accounting of federal climate change expenditures

    Table 8. Programs and Tax Policies Related to Climate Change--By Appropriation Account/Line Item--FY 2003 Budget
                              (Budget authority and tax incentives; in millions of dollars)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    FY 2001      FY 2002      FY 2003    Change 2002-
                                                                     Actual      Estimate     Proposed       2003
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Programs and Tax Policies Directly Related to Climate Change
    U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP)................
    Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)...............
        National Institutes of Health (NIH).....................
        National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences.....            9           10           11           +1
        National Eye Institute..................................           14           17           18           +1
        National Cancer Institute...............................           31           34           39           +5
        National Institute of Arthritis & Musculoskeletal & Skin            *            *            *            *
         Diseases...............................................
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--HHS/NIH\1\................................           54           60           68           +8

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration...............
        Science, Aeronautics, and Technology....................        1,176        1,090        1,109          +19

    Department of Energy........................................
        Science (Biological & Environmental Research)...........          116          120          126           +6

    National Science Foundation.................................
        Research and Related Activities.........................          181          188          188            0

    Department of Agriculture (USDA)............................
        Agricultural Research Service...........................           29           30           30            0
        Cooperative State Research, Education, & Extension
         Services...............................................
        Research and Education..................................            4            9           17           +8
        Economic Research Service...............................            1            1            1            0
        Forest Service..........................................
        Forest and Rangeland Research...........................           17           17           17            0
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--USDA......................................           51           57           65           +8

    Department of Commerce......................................
        National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration                    93          100          100            0
         Operations, Research, and Facilities...................

    Department of the Interior..................................
        U.S. Geological Survey Surveys, Investigations, and                27           28           28            0
         Research...............................................

    Environmental Protection Agency.............................
        Science and Technology..................................           23           21           22           +1

    Smithsonian Institution.....................................
        Salaries and Expenses...................................            7            7            7            0
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--USGCRP\2\.................................        1,728        1,670        1,714          +44
    ================================================================================================================
    Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI)
    Department of Commerce......................................
        National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration                     0            0           18          +18
         Operations, Research, and Facilities...................

    National Science Foundation.................................
        Research and Related Activities.........................            0            0           15          +15

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration...............
        Science, Aeronautics, and Technology....................            0            0            3           +3

    Department of Energy........................................
        Science (Biological & Environmental Research)...........            0            0            3           +3

    Department of Agriculture (USDA)............................
        Forest Service..........................................
        Forest and Rangeland Research...........................            0            0            1           +1
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--CCRI......................................            0            0           40          +40
    ================================================================================================================
    Technology Research, Development and Deployment
    Department of Energy (DOE)..................................
        Energy Supply...........................................
            Renewable Energy Resources R&D......................          375          393          408          +15
            Nuclear Energy......................................          (5)          (7)          (0)         (-7)
        Energy Conservation R&D.................................          619          649          588          -52
        Fossil Energy R&D (sequestration R&D)...................           18           32           54          +22
        Science (Basic Science).................................           35           35           35            0
        Energy Information Administration.......................            3            3            3            0
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--DOE.......................................        1,050        1,103        1,088          -15

    Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).......................
        Environmental Programs and Management...................           96           89           91           +2
        Science and Technology..................................           27           26           17           -9
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--EPA.......................................          123          115          108           -7

    Department of Agriculture (USDA)............................
        Forest Service..........................................
        Forest and Rangeland Research...........................            3            0            1           +1
        Agricultural Research Service...........................            0            0            5           +5
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--USDA......................................            3            0            6           +6
                                                                 ===================================================
            Subtotal--Technology Research, Development and              1,176        1,218        1,202          -16
             Deployment\3\......................................
    Revenue Effect of Tax Proposals.............................            0            0          555         +555
    ================================================================================================================
    International Assistance
    Agency for International Development (AID)..................
        Development Assistance (DA).............................          112          110          109           -1
        Economic Support Fund (ESF).............................           --           12            6           -6
        Assistance for the Independent States of the Former                31           32           27           -5
         Soviet Union (FSA).....................................
        Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States                13           10            8           -2
         (AEEB).................................................
        International Disaster Assistance (IDA).................           --         4 D5           +1
        Development Credit Authority (DCA)......................            1           --           --           --
        Tropical Forest Conservation\4\.........................           --           --           50          +50
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--AID\5\....................................          157          167          205          +38

    Department of Treasury......................................
        Debt Restructuring......................................
        Tropical Forest Conservation\6\.........................           13            5           --           -5

    Department of State.........................................
        International Organizations and Programs................            7            7            6           -1
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--International Assistance\7\...............          177          179          211          +32

    Other Climate Change-Related Programs
    Department of Energy........................................
        Energy Conservation R&D.................................          191          275          316          +41
        Weatherization & State Energy Grants....................          274          442          398          -44
        Fossil Energy R&D (cleaner coal & natural gas)..........
        Energy Supply...........................................
            Nuclear Energy R&D (Nuclear Energy Research                   499          749          739          -10
             Initiative (NERI)).................................
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--DOE.......................................          499          749          739          -10

    Department of the Treasury..................................
        International Development Assistance, Multilateral                 41           38           68          +30
         Assistance, International Financial Institutions--
         Global Environment Facility\8\.........................
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------
            Subtotal--Other Climate Change Programs\9\..........          540          787          807          +20
                                                                 ===================================================
            Total--All Programs and Tax Policies\10\............        3,603        3,822        4,475         +653
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Table 8 is a detailed listing of Federal climate change expenditures by agency with account level information as
      provided in the President's fiscal year 2003 Budget Appendix. All numbers represent budget authority unless
      otherwise noted. The line items in the Program and Financing schedule in the Budget Appendix use obligations,
      not budget authority, so the numbers may not be comparable.
    * less than $500,000
    \1\ Subtotal may not add due to rounding.
    \2\ Subtotal may not add due to rounding.
    \3\ Subtotal may not add due to rounding.
    \4\ Prior to the fiscal year 2003 Budget request, funding for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) was
      appropriated to the Treasury Department.
    \5\ Subtotal may not add due to rounding.
    \6\ In fiscal year 2002, an additional $20 million in existing balances may be used.
    \7\ Subtotal may not add due to rounding.
    \8\ The total fiscal year 2003 request for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is $177.8 million.
      Approximately 38 percent of total GEF funding from all sources supports climate-related projects (e.g.
      expanding clean energy production and efficient energy use). The GEF, which also provides funding for other
      global environmental concerns, does not allocate funds by project type.
    \9\ Subtotal may not add due to rounding.
    \10\ Total may not add due to rounding. Total adjusted to eliminate double counts.

                                   Addendum A
           global environment facility (gef)--fy 2003 budget request
        The fiscal year 2003 Budget requests $107.5 million for the GEF for
    the first of four annual payments under the third GEF replenishment
    (GEF-3) and $70.3 million to clear one-third of the U.S. arrears to
    GEF-2. The clean energy portion of the GEF portfolio B its climate
    change focal area B accounts for about 38 percent of its financial
    commitments, which is about $68 million for climate-related activities
    in fiscal year 2003.
    Background on the Organization
        The GEF was created in 1991, before any climate convention or
    protocol existed, to specialize in trans-border environment problems,
    of which climate is only one. In addition to climate change, GEF
    funding is focused on international water pollution and overfishing;
    better forestry, wildlife management, and biological diversity
    conservation; and phasing out use of ozone-depleting chemicals (in
    Eastern Europe, to complement Montreal Protocol Fund work in developing
    countries).
        The 1992 Climate Convention (the ``1992 Convention'') provided that
    there should be a ``financial mechanism'' to: (1) help developing
    countries evaluate, quantify, and report publicly on their greenhouse
    gas emissions; and (2) make investments in cleaner development in
    developing countries. In 1994, more than 3 years before conclusion of
    the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. and other countries chose the GEF as the
    institution to run the financial mechanism of the Climate Convention,
    in part to avoid creating new institutions. The GEF was by far the best
    existing institution for the job.
        By 1995, donors had concluded a first GEF replenishment that
    extensively restructured the GEF and improved its operational
    effectiveness. This restructuring also cemented a governance structure
    in which donors exercise much more power than in the 1992 Convention or
    in any standard ``UN-configured'' institution.
    GEF Operations
        The GEF focuses on innovative, cost-effective and generally small
    projects that can be duplicated elsewhere with financing from non-GEF
    sources. Since beginning regular operations in 1994, the GEF has
    designed and initiated over 1,047 investment and capacity building
    projects in over 161 countries that are now being implemented by
    developing countries with the help of three agencies--the World Bank,
    the U.N. Development Program, and the U.N. Environment Program. GEF has
    committed about $3.7 billion to date, leveraging over $15 billion from
    other sources. Cofinanciers include the developing countries
    themselves, bilateral aid agencies, the GEF's three implementing
    agencies and other multilateral financial institutions, and, in some
    cases, private sector investors and non-governmental organizations.
    Leveraging for clean energy projects is significant: $799 million in
    cofinancing was leveraged in association with $86 million in GEF grants
    in fiscal year 2002. GEF operations take two forms: (1) technical
    assistance to help developing countries frame more environmentally
    sound policies in key sectors such as energy production and land
    management; and (2) direct investments to demonstrate innovative
    technology projects, such as rural solar power, that countries then can
    copy on a larger scale.
    No Projects That Are Kyoto-Specific
        The GEF predates both the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 1992
    Convention, and the Protocol places no new obligations on the GEF as
    the Convention's financial mechanism. With regard to development
    finance, the Protocol is related to the GEF through the Protocol's
    umbrella, the 1992 Convention, since the GEF acts as the financial
    mechanism for the Convention; it simply underscores existing 1992
    Convention agreements on financial assistance for developing countries:
          Supporting developing country reporting requirements
    under the 1992 Convention; and
          Providing the extra cost over normal development costs of
    reducing greenhouse gas emissions in energy or other projects. For
    example, the GEF covers only the incremental cost of a clean wind power
    plant relative to a regular oil-fired plant of identical capacity.
    GEF Climate Change-Related Clean Energy Activities
        The GEF supports five categories of climate-change related
    projects, all but one focused on the energy sector. The first category
    is small activities (generally costing about $350,000) to assist
    countries in preparing reports required under the 1992 Convention.
    These reports provide detailed inventories of countries' greenhouse gas
    (GHG) emissions and sources (power plants, etc.), their GHG ``sinks''
    (forests,etc.), and policies and programs that affect GHG emissions
    (energy pricing policies, etc.).
        The four other categories, briefly illustrated with project
    examples below, all support clean energy development, usually combined
    with capacity-building for good policies and effective institutions.
    These programs make sense on their own terms and are all initiatives
    the U.S. has been pursuing domestically for years. None of them is
    directed by the Protocol.
        The GEF already undertakes systematic annual portfolio performance
    evaluation. Criteria include quality of overall project management,
    financial management, policy impacts, country capacity development,
    civil society engagement, and pollution abatement. For example, for
    energy efficiency projects, evaluators compare investments in efficient
    equipment following the GEF intervention to a baseline scenario of
    efficiency investments. An extensive effort to update and improve
    measurement criteria at both project and program levels for climate
    change activities has been concluded. These measurements are now being
    used to ensure projects and programs achieve their objectives.
    Promoting Energy Efficiency and Conservation
        The GEF's Mexico High Efficiency Lighting Project aimed to reduce
    energy waste and power plant pollution by proving the commercial
    viability of energy efficient lighting. $10 million from GEF leveraged
    over $13 million in initial cofinancing. Since the project's
    completion, its long-term impacts have outstripped all expectations.
    Mexican consumers and businesses have installed almost 40 percent more
    efficient lights than the GEF's most optimistic projections. The
    project's success also convinced Mexico to expand dramatically energy
    efficiency programs in other locations and sectors.
    Promoting Renewable Energy
        In Sri Lanka, a GEF project has succeeded in supplying electricity
    by employing renewable technologies and demonstrating the advantages of
    such technologies to rural households and the country in general. This
    $5.9 million GEF grant has leveraged $49.4 million in cofinancing,
    including $24.2 million from the World Bank. Approximately 30 megawatts
    of mini-hydropower has been added to the grid through private
    developers, and a total of 8,800 households have been provided with
    electricity through village hydropower and solar photovoltaic power.
    The aim is to provide for the replication of such renewable energy
    schemes by private businesses in Sri Lanka and many other countries.
    Lowering the Long-Term Cost of Advanced Clean Energy Technologies
        The Brazil Biomass Power Commercial Demonstration Project uses
    high-efficiency technology to use agricultural byproducts as fuel for
    electric power and agro-industry process heat. A $40.5 million GEF
    investment leverages $82 million, mostly from Brazilian public and
    private sources. The project should help increase economies of scale
    for this promising technology and thus help it become commercially
    viable. By conservative estimates, biomass power could supply clean
    electricity to 100 million rural people, particularly needed in Africa
    and South Asia.
    Clean Fossil-Fuel Combustion and Other Short-Term Measures
        The GEF's $10 million Coal Bed Methane Project demonstrated at
    three sites a wide variety of techniques and technologies that Chinese
    coal mines can employ to reduce methane emissions and capture clean-
    burning methane as a fuel. It also spawned landmark policy and
    institutional reforms, including the creation of the China United Coal
    Bed Methane Corporation, that support replication of coal-bed methane
    recovery. The Chinese Ministry of Coal has since negotiated agreements
    with BP-Amoco and other companies for coal-bed methane projects. Based
    on the GEF's early work, the Asian Development Bank, Asia-Pacific
    Economic Cooperation, and the China United Coal Bed Methane Corporation
    are all working to expand coal-bed methane development in China.
                                   Addendum B
                        highlights of the 2002 farm bill
        Over the next 10 year we will invest $47.2 billion for conservation
    on our farms and forest lands, partnering with farmers and small land
    owners to protect the water and air, provide habitat for wildlife, and
    storing carbon in trees and the soil. The 2002 Farm Bill reauthorizes
    and increases funding for most USDA conservation programs. These
    programs will provide a range of environmental benefits, including
    improved air, soil, and water quality and wildlife habitat. Activities
    implemented through a number of USDA conservation programs can result
    in positive greenhouse gas benefits by reducing emissions and enhancing
    terrestrial carbon sequestration.
        For example, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP)
    program is expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by providing
    incentives that encourage the voluntary adoption of conservation
    practices on working lands and waste management systems for livestock
    operations such as methane capturing technologies. A new provision of
    EQIP, the Conservation Innovations Grant Program, could be used to
    promote carbon sequestration practices by leveraging private and public
    sector investments. In addition, reserve programs, such as the
    Conservation Reserve Program, are expected to have sizable greenhouse
    gas benefits, by sequestering carbon through vegetation growth and
    improved soil conditions.
        Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) provides technical
    assistance, cost-sharing, and incentive payments for conservation
    practices on working lands. The 2002 Farm Bill increased funding for
    EQIP and increased the flexibility of the program by allowing
    exceptions to the maximum cost-share amount of 75 percent, removing
    restrictions on eligibility based on operation size, and expanding
    options for contract lengths.
        While both crop and livestock producers are eligible, funding is
    prioritized for livestock producers with 60 percent of program funding
    targeted for conservation practices on livestock operations (up from 50
    percent in the 1996-2001 Farm Bill).
        The Conservation Innovation Grants program is a new provision under
    EQIP that allows the Secretary to make grants to governmental and non-
    governmental entities, as well as persons, to leverage investment in
    conservation activities. Projects funded through this program may
    include market-based pollution credit trading, adoption of best
    management practices, or carbon sequestration.
        The 2002 Farm Bill provides for direct spending for regular EQIP
    activities and the Conservation Innovation Grants program of $5.8
    billion in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funding for fiscal years
    2002-2007. Funding is scheduled to increase steadily starting at $400
    million in 2002 and $700 million in 2003, increasing each year to a
    maximum of $1.3 billion annually by fiscal year 2007. This represents a
    substantial increase from the 1996 Farm bill authorization of $200
    million per year. Additional CCC funding is provided for a new EQIP
    provision targeting ground and surface water conservation at $310
    million over fiscal year 2002-2007 and an additional $50 million is
    provided for water conservation activities in the Klamath Basin as soon
    as possible.
        Reserve Programs compensate landowners for taking environmentally
    sensitive land out of production.
          Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is a voluntary program
    where the government offers annual rental payments and cost-share
    assistance to farmers in exchange for taking land out of production and
    establishing an approved vegetation cover. The 1996 Farm Bill
    authorized a maximum enrollment of 36.4 million acres in the CRP. The
    2002 Farm Bill reauthorizes the program and increases the enrollment
    cap to 39.2 million acres. Additional provisions allow for automatic
    extension of expiring contracts. In addition, 2002 Farm Bill provisions
    permit some management practices to continue on CRP lands (i.e., haying
    and grazing, and placement of wind turbines). Spending for this program
    is estimated to increase by $1.5 billion over 10 years.
          Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) is
    authorized under the CRP but is administered through a State-Federal
    partnership and targets State-specific as well as National agricultural
    environmental problems. Because the CREP is authorized under the CRP,
    acres enrolled under CREP count toward the CRP enrollment cap. The
    estimated costs of the CREP are incorporated in the estimate above.
          Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) provides easements or
    restoration cost-share agreements to producers who agree to restore
    wetlands on agricultural lands. The 1996 Farm Bill authorizes a maximum
    area of 1.075 million acres. The 2002 Farm Bill increases the total
    enrollment acreage to 2.275 million acres, with a maximum annual
    enrollment set at 250,000 acres per year. Spending for this program is
    estimated to increase by $1.5 billion over 10 years.
                                   appendix a
                   u.s. agency for international development

                                           Global Climate Change Funding (GCC)
                                                 (Dollars in thousands)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE    Reporting    FY 2001      FY 2002      FY 2003
                BUREAU/COUNTRY                       NAME            Category  Obligations    Estimate     Proposed
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Africa (AFR).........................
        Guinea...........................  Increased use of                3         1,000        2,000        2,000
                                            Sustainable Natural
                                            Resources Mgmt
                                            Practices.
    Madagascar                             Biologically Diverse            3         2,500        2,500        2,500
                                            Ecosystems Conserved.
    Malawi                                 Sustainable Use,                3         2,000        1,000        1,000
                                            Conservation, & Mgmt
                                            of Renewable Natural
                                            Resources.
    Mali                                   Increased Value-Added           3         1,000        1,500           --
                                            of Specific Economic
                                            Sectors.
                                           Accelerated Economic            3            --           --        1,500
                                            Growth.
    Mozambique                             Increased Rural                 3         2,000        2,000        2,000
                                            Household Incomes.
    Senegal                                More effective                  3            --        1,000        1,000
                                            Management of Services
                                            & Resources.
    South Africa.........................  Improved Capacity to            1           500           --           --
                                            Implement Economic
                                            Policy.
                                           Housing and Municipal           1         2,500        3,000        3,000
                                            Services.
    Uganda                                 Expanded Opportunities          3         3,500        2,500        2,500
                                            for Rural Sector
                                            Growth.
    AFR/Regional/SD                        Central Africa Regional         3         3,000        3,000        3,000
                                            Program for
                                            Environment (CARPE).
                                           (CARPE) Climate                 5            --           --          500
                                            Monitoring & Observing.
                                           FEWS Climate Monitoring         5         1,000        6,000        6,000
                                            and Observing.
    Western Africa Regional Program......  Food Security, ENV and          3         1,000           --           --
                                            Natural Resource Mgmt
                                            Strengthened.
                                           Climate Monitoring and          5            --           --          500
                                            Observing.
    Initiative for Southern Africa.......  Increased Regional              3            --          500          500
                                            Cooperation in Natural
                                            Resource Mgmt.
                                           Climate Monitoring and          5            --           --          500
                                            Observing.
    Regional Economic Dev. Service Office  Climate Monitoring and          5            --           --          500
     (REDSO/E).                             Observing.
                                          --------------------------------------------------------------------------
        TOTAL AFR........................                                           20,000       25,000       27,000

    Asia and the Near East (ANE)
    Afghanistan..........................  Climate Monitoring and          5            --           --        1,000
                                            Observing.
    Bangladesh...........................  Improved Performance of         1         1,000        3,470        3,470
                                            the Energy Sector.
                                           Improved Performance of         1            --        1,500        1,500
                                            the Energy Sector.
    Egypt................................  Mgt. of Env. and                1            --        7,280        1,155
                                            Natural Resources in
                                            Targeted Sectors
                                            Improved.
    India................................  Increased Environmental         1         2,843        6,050        6,050
                                            Protection in Energy,
                                            Industry, & Cities.
                                           Increased Environmental         1            --        3,000        3,000
                                            Protection in Energy,
                                            Industry, & Cities.
    Indonesia............................  Energy Sector                   1         3,823        3,130        3,130
                                            Governance
                                            Strengthened.
    Nepal................................  Increased Private               1         2,000        2,200        2,200
                                            Sector Participation &
                                            Investment in
                                            Hydropower.
    Philippines..........................  Protection of                   1         2,997        3,000        3,000
                                            Productive Life
                                            Sustaining Natural
                                            Resources.
    USAEP................................  U.S. Asia Environmental         1         4,100        2,000        3,100
                                            Partnership.
    SARI/E...............................  South Asia Regional             1         3,900        2,900        2,900
                                            Initiative--Energy
                                            Program.
    ANE/Regional.........................  Program Development &           1            --          150          150
                                            Learning.
                                           Climate Monitoring and          5            --           --        1,000
                                            Observing.
        TOTAL ANE........................                                           20,663       34,680       30,655

    Latin American and the Caribbean
     (LAC)
    Bolivia..............................  Sustainable Forest              3         4,527        4,550        5,764
                                            Management and Parks.
    Brazil...............................  Env & Socioeconomically         3         2,500        1,465        2,840
                                            Sustainable
                                            Alternatives for Sound
                                            Land Use.
                                           Clean and Efficient             1         2,368        1,000        1,000
                                            Energy Production and
                                            Use.
    Dominican Republic...................  Sustainable Forestry...         3         1,492        1,500        1,500
    Ecuador..............................  Conserving Ecuador's            3         3,688        3,057          850
                                            Forests.
    Guatemala............................  Conserving and                  3           570          600          450
                                            Sustainable Using
                                            Forests.
    G-CAP (Central America)..............  Improved Management in          3           510          415          595
                                            the Mesoamerican
                                            Biological Corridor.
                                           Improved Management in          1         1,300          230          230
                                            the Mesoamerican
                                            Biological Corridor.
                                           Improved Management in          5         1,050          180          580
                                            the Mesoamerican
                                            Biological Corridor.
    Honduras.............................  Protecting Honduran             3         3,691        2,600        4,800
                                            Forests.
    LAC Regional.........................  Improved Conservation           3           964        4,636        2,800
                                            of the Region's
                                            Biological Resources.
    Mexico...............................  Protecting Tropical             3         4,164        3,365        4,765
                                            Forest.
                                           Renewable Energy,               5           600          400          500
                                            Energy Efficiency.
                                           Fires..................         1         1,421        1,750        1,500
    Nicaragua............................  Improving Park                  3         4,970        4,723        1,129
                                            Management.
    Panama...............................  Conserving Forests.....         3           240           --           --
    Paraguay.............................  Conserving Paraguay's           3         1,000        1,000        1,000
                                            Sub-Tropical Forests.
    Peru.................................  Improved Environmental          3         1,621           --           --
                                            Management.
                                           Strengthen                      3            --        1,227        1,500
                                            Environmental
                                            Management.
                                          --------------------------------------------------------------------------
        TOTAL LAC........................                                           36,676       32,697       31,803

    Europe and Eurasia (E&E)
    Albania..............................  Growth in Number of             1         1,500          750          500
                                            Self-Sustaining
                                            Private Enterprises.
    Bulgaria.............................  Special Initiatives....         3         1,200          500          500
                                           Accelerated Development         1            --          400          450
                                            & Growth of the
                                            Private Sector.
    Croatia..............................  Growth of a Dynamic and         1            --          500           --
                                            Competitive Private
                                            Sector.
    Romania..............................  Economically                    1         1,100        1,900        1,500
                                            Sustainable and
                                            Environmentally Sound
                                            Energy Sector.
    CEE Regional.........................  Economically                    1         7,576        5,726        4,901
                                            Sustainable and
                                            Environmentally Sound
                                            Energy Sector.
                                           Increased Environmental         3           932           --          215
                                            Mgmt Capacity to Sppt
                                            Sustainable Ec Growth.
                                           Increased Environmental         1           214           --           87
                                            Mgmt Capacity to Sppt
                                            Sustainable Ec Growth.
                                          --------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Sub-total Europe.................                                           12,522        9,776        8,153

    Armenia..............................  Economically                    1         4,750          590        5,100
                                            Sustainable and
                                            Environmentally Sound
                                            Energy Sector.
                                           More Sustainable Water          1            --          300          500
                                            Management for
                                            Enhanced Env Quality.
    Georgia..............................  Economically                    1         6,860       14,500        6,400
                                            Sustainable and
                                            Environmentally Sound
                                            Energy Sector.
    Kazakhstan...........................  Improved Management of          1         2,000        1,000          500
                                            Critical Natural
                                            Resources, including
                                            Energy.
    Kyrgyzstan...........................  Improved Management of          1           750          650        1,500
                                            Critical Natural
                                            Resources, including
                                            Energy.
    Moldova..............................  Private Enterprise              1         4,575        4,575        5,150
                                            Growth Creates Jobs
                                            and Generates Income.
    Russia...............................  Accelerated Development         1           400          883          718
                                            and Growth of Private
                                            Enterprises.
                                           Cross-Cutting Programs.         3         1,600        2,717        2,282
    Tajikistan...........................  Improved Management of          1            --           20           30
                                            Critical Natural
                                            Resources, including
                                            Energy.
    Turkmenistan.........................  Improved Management of          1            10          200          200
                                            Critical Natural
                                            Resources, including
                                            Energy.
    Ukraine..............................  Economically                    1         8,284        3,475        3,275
                                            Sustainable and
                                            Environmentally Sound
                                            Energy Sector.
                                           Increased Env Mgmt              1         1,645          460
                                            Capacity to Support
                                            Sustainable
                                            Development.
    NIS Regional.........................  Economically                    1         1,060          935          935
                                            Sustainable and
                                            Environmentally Sound
                                            Energy Sector.
                                           Increased Environmental         1           940          340          340
                                            Mgmt Capacity to Spt
                                            Sustainable Ec Growth.
                                          --------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Sub-total Eurasia................                                           31,229       31,830       27,390
                                          ==========================================================================
            TOTAL E&E....................                                           43,751       41,606       35,543

    Economic Growth, Agriculture & Trade
     (EGAT).
    EGAT/ENV.............................  Office of Environment           3         8,324        7,626        7,626
                                            and Natural Resources.
    EGAT/ENV.............................  Office of Environment           1            --           --           --
                                            and Natural Resources.
    EGAT/ENV.............................  Office of Environment,          1        16,000       12,000       10,000
                                            Energy and Technology.
    EGAT/ENV.............................  Global Climate Change..         1         3,000        2,575        1,000
    EGAT/ENV.............................  Global Climate Change..         5            --          900          750
    EGAT/ENV.............................  Global Climate Change..         3         3,000          500          325
    EGAT/EGAD............................  AFS....................         3         2,022        2,775        2,775
    EGAT/EGAD............................  AFS....................         3         3,000        3,000        3,000
                                          --------------------------------------------------------------------------
        TOTAL EGAT.......................                                           35,346       29,376       25,476

    Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian
              Assistance (DCHA)
    DCHA/OFDA............................  Worldwide Climate              --         4,000        5,000
                                            Monitoring and
                                            Observing 5.
                                          --------------------------------------------------------------------------
        TOTAL DCHA.......................                                            4,000        5,000
    Tropical Forest Conservation (A).....                                         [13,000]      [5,000]       50,000

    Development Credit Authority (DCA)...
    Bulgaria (B).........................  1......................       625            --           --
                                          --------------------------------------------------------------------------
        TOTAL DCA........................                                              625           --           --
            TOTAL USAID..................                                          157,061      167,359      205,477
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (A) Before the fiscal year 2003 Request, funding for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act was appropriated to
      the Treasury Department. In fiscal year 2002, up to an additional $20 million in existing Treasury Department
      balances may be used. The bracketed amounts are not included in AID's totals.
    (B) Development Credit Authority is a competitive program funded by transfer authority. The fiscal year 2001
      level is the subsidy amount obligated. The leveraged amount through fiscal year 2000 is $22.3 million.
    FY 2002 Legislative Reporting Categories
    1) Activities that promote the transfer and deployment of United States clean energy technologies: Under USAID's
      Climate Change Program, technology transfer is promoted to assist developing countries to achieve sustainable
      growth and development but is not tracked as an individual goal within the program. USAID's energy-related
      climate change programs demonstrate U.S. technologies and/or work to address the policy, legal and regulatory
      barriers that limit clean technology deployment.
    2) Activities to assist in the measurement, monitoring, reporting, verification, and reduction of greenhouse gas
      emissions: USAID does not currently separate measuring, monitoring, reporting and verification of GHG
      emissions from the energy and land use sector activities in which these occur. All of the activities that
      assist with technology transfer and carbon capture promote the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
    3) Activities/programs to promote carbon capture and sequestration measures
    4) Activities/programs to help meet such countries' responsibilities under the Framework Convention on Climate
      Change: The spending for this category has not been formally tracked under USAID's Climate Change Program. It
      has been tracked as a performance indicator of program results and information concerning results through
      fiscal year 2000 and can be provided upon request.
    5) Activities to develop assessments of the vulnerability to impacts of climate change and response strategies

                                     ______

      Responses of James Connaughton to Additional Questions from Senator
                                    Jeffords

        Question 1. What measures should we look at to determine whether
    U.S. programs and resources are achieving the goals of Agenda 21?
        Response. One measure of accomplishment is the ratification and
    implementation of new multilateral environmental agreements. The Bush
    Administration has submitted the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
    Organic Pollutants (POPs) and implementing legislation is to the Senate
    for its advice and consent. This convention seeks the ultimate
    worldwide elimination of certain persistent organic pollutants.
    Implementing legislation on two related international agreements have
    also be sent to the Congress: 1) The Protocol to the Convention on
    Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Persistent Organic
    Pollutants, an earlier agreement similar to POPs which covers a
    slightly different set of chemicals already controlled in the U.S., and
    therefore applies only to the U.S., Europe and Canada; and 2) The
    Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PlC) Procedure for
    Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade,
    which requires exporters to obtain the prior informed consent of
    importing countries and to provide safety information on health effects
    of hazardous substances and pesticides. Another important treaty
    concluded and ratified by the United States since Rio is the Deserts
    Convention (which deals with dry land management and desertification).
        The international community has also developed a number of programs
    and other implementation measures to be undertaken by governments, the
    private sector and NGO's. These include the U.S.-led international
    Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI), which now has a large number of
    participating countries, the U.N. Forum on Forests, which has made
    significant progress in developing a set of criteria and indicators for
    the sustainable management of the world's most endangered forest
    resources, and the Arctic Council, which as a group has identified and
    implemented measures to reduce toxic chemicals which pose a particular
    bioaccumulation risk in animals and humans in polar regions.
        Programs implemented by U.S. industry often in partnership with
    government and NGO's, such as the Energy Star program for energy
    efficient appliances and the adoption of clean production technologies
    and methods have also contributed significantly toward achieving the
    goals set out in Agenda 21.
        Sustainable development criteria related to Agenda 21 are being
    utilized in the reporting of program performance by U.S. Government
    departments and agencies. Goals for particular programs are drawn from
    specific chapters and sections of Agenda 21. An example is the goal of
    USAID's protected area work in Latin America, which addresses Section
    15.5g of Agenda 21 by seeking to preserve biological diversity. Agenda
    21 will continue to provide a broad framework as the U.S. executes
    targeted results-oriented programs that are designed to address local
    situations.

        Question 2. We understand that earlier this year 41 American
    environmental leaders, including the heads of almost all of the major
    U.S. environmental groups, wrote to President Bush urging him to commit
    to attending the Johannesburg Summit and to reasserting American
    leadership on a range of critical global environmental issues. Their
    letter sets out a number of recommended actions. Has the Administration
    considered these recommendations and taken concrete actions on any of
    them?
        Response. The Bush Administration greatly appreciates having heard
    from this group. I have, met with many of the NGO leaders who signed
    the letter to discuss these and other issues. The Administration is
    also working with many NGO's in preparing our deliverables for the
    World Summit. We have taken actions on implementing several
    international environmental agreements (as described above) At the
    recently completed talks for replenishment of the Global Environmental
    Facility (GEF) the U.S. pledged a significant increase in funding to
    help developing countries mitigate environmental problems with
    potential global impact. The United States pledged $500 million over
    the next 4 years for the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The
    commitment is a 16 percent increase over its contribution to the
    previous replenishment. This in turn will help leverage about $2.2
    billion in total new donor contributions. My office and other agencies
    discussed the importance of this funding with several groups who I
    understand are complimentary of our ultimate decision and leadership.

        Question 3. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
    Change commits the United States to working to achieve stabilization of
    greenhouse gases at concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
    would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
    system. Please provide the Administration's definition of what
    phenomena would indicate or constitute ``dangerous anthropogenic
    interference.'' (For example, does that mean more frequent and more
    destructive hurricanes, excessive wildfires, anomalous droughts, etc.?)
        Response. The objective of the Framework Convention, set out in
    Article 2, does not impose commitments on Parties. It does provide that
    the long term stabilization level ``should be achieved within a
    timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate
    change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable
    economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.''
        The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change notes in its Third
    Assessment Report that the question of what would constitute dangerous
    anthropogenic interference is one that it cannot answer, because danger
    is a function of the degree to which effects are negative and the
    degree to which those effects are unacceptable. The latter, as noted in
    the Third Assessment Report, is a value judgment. (IPCC Working Group
    II Third Assessment Report, page 917).
        At this point, it not possible to make such a judgment. There
    remain substantial uncertainties in critical areas with respect to
    climate behavior, as well as natural and socio-economic impacts. These
    include, among other things:
          feedbacks in the climate system that determine the
    magnitude and rate of future increases; future usage of fossil fuels
    and future emissions of methane;
          how much carbon is sequestered by oceans and other sinks
    and how much remains in the atmosphere;
          the details of regional climate change resulting from
    global climate change;
          the nature and causes of the natural variability of
    climate, its interactions with forced changes, and the direct and
    indirect effects of aerosols;
          the ability of humans and ecosystems to adapt to changing
    climate conditions.
        The Administration is taking measured and serious steps to respond
    to the challenge of climate change, by taking significant short-term
    measures to reduce the projected growth in global emissions, both
    through enhanced domestic policies and technology transfer to
    developing countries, and by substantially increasing our nation's
    investment in science and technology. By so doing, we can both reduce
    remaining uncertainties and prepare ourselves to address climate change
    in a manner that also ensures our continuing prosperity. We believe
    that these steps are fully consistent with the United States'
    commitments under the Framework Convention.
        The President committed the Nation to an immediate goal of reducing
    America's greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our economy
    by 18 percent in the next 10 years. This will set America on a path to
    slow the growth of our greenhouse gas emissions and, if. science
    justifies, to stop and then reverse the growth of emissions. To achieve
    this goal, the Administration is actively engaged and moving forward on
    many fronts, looking at every sector of our economy, with the
    recognition that meaningful progress depends on the development and
    deployment of new technology. With the continued support of Congress,
    we are advancing climate science, developing and promoting energy
    efficiency, conservation, and sequestration technologies and practices,
    pursuing near term greenhouse gas mitigation programs and expanding
    international cooperation.
        The President has called for nearly $700 million in additional
    funding for the Federal Government's commitment to climate change in
    Fiscal Year 1903--a 17 percent increase from last year--to support a
    $4.5 billion program of research on climate science and energy
    technology, mitigation incentives and programs, and international
    technology transfer and outreach. This commitment is unmatched in the
    world. The President's recent Report to Congress on Federal Climate
    Change Expenditures details the numerous programs that this funding
    will support.
        Importantly, the President's request includes $555 million in clean
    energy tax incentives, the first part of a $4.6 billion commitment over
    the next 5 years, reaching $7.1 billion over the next 10 years. These
    incentives will spur investments in and purchases of renewable energy--
    including solar, wind, and biomass--as well as advanced hybrid and fuel
    cell vehicles, cogeneration, and landfill gas conversion. We also are
    promoting clean coal technology, as well as nuclear power--which
    produces no greenhouse gas emissions--and are working to safely improve
    fuel economy for our cars and trucks.

        Question 4. Please identify the early warning system that the
    Administration supports domestically and internationally that is
    designed to detect when ``dangerous anthropogenic interference'' (as
    defined in response to the previous question) has begun to occur.
        Response. The United States is involved in a variety of research
    activities designed to enhance our understanding of the climate system.
    Together, these will help reduce the significant remaining
    uncertainties identified last year by the National Academy of Science's
    in Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions, and
    provide better understanding of potential impacts associated with
    greenhouse gas emissions.
        The Administration has requested $1.7 billion in basic scientific
    research, under the U.S Global Change Research Program and the
    President's Climate Change Research Initiative in fiscal year 2203,
    which is roughly half of the world's research budget, and more than
    Japan and the 15 member states of the European Union combined. This
    includes funding for the Climate Change Research Initiative, which is
    designed to focus on information that can be developed within 2 to 5
    years to assist the nation's evaluation of optimal strategies to
    address global change risks.
        In addition, the Administration is leading the way in the
    revitalization of a comprehensive global observation system, which is
    critical to understanding climate change. This includes greater
    emphasis on climate observation and monitoring systems here and abroad.
    As part of his climate change policy, the President committed $25
    million to improve observing and monitoring capability in developing
    countries. These investments will help to better understand current
    conditions as well as improve future projections at the global level.

        Question 5. The Framework Convention commits the United States and
    all the parties to reporting ``detailed information on its policies and
    measures . . . with the aim of returning individually or jointly to
    their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and
    other greenhouse gases.'' When will the United States comply with that
    commitment?
        Response. The United States submitted detailed information on our
    policies and measures, in accordance with the procedures under the
    Convention. Most recently, policies and measures are detailed in the
    Climate Action Report submitted as the third National Communication
    from the United States to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
    Change, submitted in May 2002.
        You mention as a ``commitment'' the Framework Convention's aim of
    returning to 1990 levels by the end of the last decade. This is not an
    obligation under the Convention, but rather is stated as a general
    objective. The last Administration ultimately found this general aim
    unachievable, as did virtually all of the developed country parties of
    the Convention. Article 4 of the Convention does, however, contain a
    number of specific commitments, with which the United States has fully
    complied. This includes the requirement for us to develop methodologies
    for assessing our greenhouse gas emissions and making that information
    publicly available. It includes the adoption of policies specifically
    aimed to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and to develop programs to
    adapt to climate change that may occur, whether natural or human
    influenced. It commits us to develop and disseminate new technologies
    to reduce or prevent emissions, looking at all sectors. It commits us
    to promote the effective management and conservation of sinks in the
    agricultural and forestry sectors. It commits developed nations to
    provide assistance to developing nations to help them comply with their
    own obligations under the Convention. Finally, it commits all nations
    to report periodically to the United Nations on their compliance with
    these obligations, which the Bush Administration did recently through
    its Climate Action Report.

        Question 6. Has the United States or any of its representatives,
    officially or unofficially discouraged countries from bringing climate
    change initiatives or issues to the World Summit for consideration?
        Response. No. The United States delegation has engaged
    constructively on a substantial amount of text on a variety of climate
    change issues occurring in the Johannesburg Plan of Action. Most of the
    climate change-related text in the draft Johannesburg Plan of Action
    has been agreed upon. In addition the partnerships the U.S. will
    discuss in the areas of energy, agriculture and forests will also be
    quite consequential to the issue of greenhouse gas mitigation, even as
    they are directed at near-term poverty reduction and human health
    imperatives.
        Several delegations have put forward textual proposals that have
    the effect of asking the United States to endorse the Kyoto Protocol,
    or to take on new climate-related commitments in the WSSD. The United
    States will not be a Party to the Kyoto Protocol, and we have indicated
    to those delegations that we cannot support text that is contrary to
    our national position. The United States does not intend to agree to
    additional climate change commitments at WSSD. The internationally
    agreed forum for negotiating climate change commitments is the U.N.
    Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Eighth Conference of the
    Parties to the Convention (COP-8) will take place October 23-November
    1, 2002, in New Delhi, India.

        Question 7. The Canadian government has put forward a Type I
    partnership entitled ``Health and Environment: Moving from Knowledge
    and Experience to Action.'' The purpose of this initiative is to
    synthesize existing information on environmental health linkages and
    build on the capacity of developing countries to apply this knowledge,
    in a manner consistent with local conditions, to planning and
    policymaking at the national level. Will the U.S. support the Canadian
    initiative and if so, what resources is the U.S. planning to offer to
    ensure its success?
        Response. The United States is currently considering the Canadian
    proposal. In general, the proposal parallels work that is supported by
    the Health and Environment Ministerial of the Americas, which was
    agreed to by the United States and all the governments of the Western
    Hemisphere. Further, the Canadian proposal supports the data sharing
    initiatives underway through the North American Commission for
    Environmental Cooperation.
        One key issue that remains to be resolved is whether this should be
    categorized as a Type I or Type II initiative. As a Type II initiative,
    the United States may support the initiative. Type II partnership does
    not require the consensus of each Nation participating in the WSSD. If
    the Canadian proposal were to become a Type II partnership, current
    U.S. Government funding levels could support this activity. The United
    States will continue to work with the Canadian Government with a goal
    to coming to agreement in support of the proposal.

        Question 8. I have heard that EPA and other agencies are in the
    process of developing a number of Type II partnership proposals that
    the U.S. delegation in Johannesburg will announce. Specifically, I
    understand that EPA is developing initiatives on drinking water/
    sanitation, clean air, and children's environmental health. What can
    you tell us about the status of these proposals? Will new financial
    resources be earmarked in future budgets to ensure that these
    initiatives add value to existing development assistance and make a
    meaningful and lasting contribution to the WSSD process?
        Response. We are in the final stages of designing partnerships
    proposals which we will announce in Johannesburg and discussed with
    prospective additional partners. All the partnerships will be based on
    current appropriated funding and are within the budget targets for
    fiscal year 04. The Administration will brief appropriators in Congress
    on the proposals before the World Summit. EPA and other agencies have
    participated in preparing the partnerships, especially in water.
    Specifically regarding children's health, EPA is exploring with USAID
    and the Department of Health and Human Services to develop a proposal
    for children's environmental health indicators. EPA is also consulting
    with the World Health Organization on possible collaboration.

        Question 9. Given that EPA is a lead agency on a number of
    initiatives and proposals, will EPA Administrator Whitman participate
    personally in the WSSD and if so, what will her role be?
        Response. EPA Administrator Whitman is scheduled to participate in
    the WSSD. She and several other high-level delegates from her agency
    will actively engage with their counterparts, work to forge lasting
    partnerships on U.S. development priorities, and identify opportunities
    for collaboration beyond the WSSD.

        Question 10. How is the United States affected by the fact that we
    don't have a true environment minister?
        Response. The Bush Administration has accorded Cabinet Rank status
    to the Administrator of the EPA. The U.S. EPA Administrator is
    recognized as a peer among her international ministerial colleagues.
                                   __________
       Statement of Maurice F. Strong, Chairman, Earth Council Foundation
        Distinguished Chairman, Honorable Senators, ladies and gentlemen.
    First let me say what a privilege it is for me to have the opportunity
    of testifying before these two important committees of the U.S. Senate
    as you consider issues which are at the center of my own life interests
    and concerns. It is particularly encouraging to know that you are
    addressing these issues at a time when the position of the United
    States of America in respect of them has never been more important to
    the human future.
        We face an ominous paradox as the evidence of our destructive
    impacts on the earth's environment and life-support systems has become
    more compelling while there has been a serious loss of momentum in the
    political will to deal with them. The United States is at the center of
    this dilemma. Thanks largely to the leadership of the United States the
    world community has made impressive progress in its understanding of
    environment issues and their inextricable relationship with the
    economic development processes to which they give since the first
    global conference on the human environment convened by the United
    Nations in Stockholm in 1972 put the environmental issue on the
    international agenda. The world has looked to the United States for
    leadership in its national policies and legislation and in development
    of the system of international cooperation, conventions and agreements
    through which governments have sought to cooperate in managing issues
    that even the greatest nations cannot manage alone.
        The recent retreat by the United States from its long standing role
    as the leading driver of these issues, as particularly evidenced by its
    withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol of the Climate Change Convention,
    threatens the progress that has been made in collaborative management
    of our environmental problems in the past 30 years and the prospects
    for the further progress that is so essential to our common future.
    This has cast a cloud over prospects for the World Summit on
    Sustainable Development which will convene next month in Johannesburg,
    South Africa and the unique opportunity it provides to give new impetus
    and momentum to the processes of international cooperation which the
    effective management of these issues requires. Thus your hearings are
    especially timely and important.
        If I now speak candidly of some of the concerns I share with many
    others as to the position of the United States on the issues you are
    now addressing I do so not as a critic but as a long standing and
    committed friend of the United States with a deep affinity and
    admiration for the values and qualities that have made this such a
    great nation. Sharing these concerns as to the unilateral withdrawal by
    the United States of its support for international agreements and
    negotiating processes in which it has been such an active and
    influential participant, is not in any way to question its right to do
    so. Indeed it is understandable that with a new Administration and
    Congress the United States would take a new look at and bring new
    perspectives to bear on these issues, also that in its preoccupation
    with the war on terrorism and other urgent issues it is taking your
    Government some time to develop its position on these matters.
        I have great confidence in the sound instincts and values of the
    American people which in poll after poll affirm the continuing priority
    they accord to the environment issue and that through the processes of
    American democracy this will ultimately be reflected in the actions and
    policies of their Government. At the same time I must confess my deep
    concern as to the signals that have emerged thus far of the nature and
    the direction of the changes that are now in process.
        It is particularly germane that this hearing is focusing on the
    international agreements and negotiating processes to which the United
    States is a party. These are perhaps the best indicators of the current
    State of political will toward international environmental cooperation
    and the prospects of revitalizing and strengthening it.
        Let me review briefly the larger context in which I view the
    importance of your consideration of these issues.
        At the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in
    Stockholm in 1972, the first global intergovernmental environmental
    conference, we lost our innocence. We recognized that much of what we
    had been doing in pursuit of our economic goals had, however
    inadvertently, been producing environmental damage and social
    dichotomies, which were undermining our quality of life and prospects
    for the future. The eyes of the more developed countries were opened to
    the very different perspectives and priorities of the majority of the
    world's people living in developing countries where the daily struggle
    for relief from poverty and progress toward a better life through
    development are the overriding priorities. As Prime Minister Indira
    Gandhi in her memorable statement to the Conference stated, in
    developing countries ``poverty is the greatest polluter''.
        The Declaration and Plan of Action agreed following intense
    negotiations at Stockholm recognized in a number of important respects
    the need to create a positive synthesis between the environment and
    economic development.
        It is, after all, through our economic behavior and practices that
    we have our impacts on the environment and these impacts affect our
    social as well as our physical environment. From this insight has
    emerged the concept of sustainable development, the process by which we
    bring the economic, environmental and social dimensions of the
    development process into appositive synthesis. Sustainable development
    should therefore be seen as the means by which our security, prosperity
    and well being can become secure and sustainable rather than as an end
    in itself.
        Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair said recently, ``you don't have
    to be an expert to realize that sustainable development is going to
    become the greatest challenge we face this century''.
        The Stockholm Conference gave rise to a proliferation of
    initiatives--establishment in virtually all countries of environmental
    agencies, policies and regulations; a broad range of international
    treaties and agreements and an explosion in the number of environmental
    non-governmental organizations and citizen movements as well as a major
    expansion of the environmental programs of international organizations.
    The United Nations General Assembly in December 1972, based on the
    Conference's recommendation, established the United Nations Environment
    Program as the centerpiece of the emerging global network of
    environmental actors to lead the process of following up and
    implementing its results.
        Since 1972 we have learned a great deal more about the nature and
    the causes of our environmental dilemma and have made notable progress
    in developing the technologies, the tools and the capacities to manage
    these problems successfully. Indeed there have been many individual
    success stories which demonstrate that it is possible to bring our
    economic life into a positive balance with our environmental and social
    systems through the transition to a sustainable development pathway.
        By the mid-1980's some of the momentum generated by Stockholm had
    subsided. Progress toward achieving the environmental objectives set
    there was lagging. In response the United Nations General Assembly
    decided to establish a World Commission on Environment and Development
    headed by Norway's former Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. The
    Commission's report in 1987, Our Common Future, made a compelling case
    for sustainable development as ``the only secure and viable pathway to
    the future of the human community''. With the political impetus
    generated by the Brundtland Commission, the U.N. General Assembly
    decided to convene on the 20th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference
    in 1992 a Conference on Environment and Development and accepted the
    invitation of Brazil to host it.
        Now known as the ``Earth Summit'' the Conference held in Rio de
    Janeiro in 1992 brought together more heads of government that had ever
    before assembled as well as an unprecedented number and range of civil
    society actors and media representatives. The Earth Summit agreed on a
    Declaration of Principles building on the Stockholm Declaration, a
    comprehensive program of action--``Agenda 21''--to give effect to these
    principles and Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity which
    provided the framework for continuing negotiations following Rio. It
    also mandated a negotiating process that led to the completion since
    then of the Convention to Combat Desertification.
        As you know the United States has ratified the Climate Change
    Convention and the Desertification Convention and in spite its
    withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol it is still bound by its adherence
    to the Climate Change Convention to reduce its green house gas
    emissions. Although it has now opted to do this outside of the Kyoto
    Protocol the world community continues to look to the United States for
    the kind of parallel actions that will correspond to and hopefully
    exceed, the targets and timetables provided for by Kyoto.
        While the results of the Earth Summit inevitably fell short in some
    important respects of the ambitious expectations that we had for it,
    the agreements it produced nevertheless provided the basic foundations
    and guidelines for the transition of the world community to a
    sustainable development pathway. And the fact that there were agreed by
    virtually all world governments, most of them at the level of their
    leader, gave them a high degree of political authority. Nevertheless,
    as I cautioned in my closing remarks to the Conference, it did not
    guarantee their implementation. Unfortunately, this proved all too
    prophetic.
        Agenda 21 provides a comprehensive road-map for the transition to a
    sustainable development pathway. Although it does not carry the force
    of law the fact that it was agreed by all the governments of the United
    Nations, most of them at the level of their heads of State or
    Government, gives it a high degree of political authority. While its
    implementation has thus far been and on the whole disappointing, it has
    nevertheless served as a basis for the adoption of their national
    Agenda 21 by a number of governments of which China was one of the
    first. It has also inspired the establishment of local Agendas 21 by
    more than 3000 cities and towns throughout the world and such important
    industries as the tourism and travel and the road transport industries.
    It is particularly important that at Johannesburg governments re-affirm
    their commitment to Agenda 21 and to strengthening and building on it
    in those areas in which it is still inadequate or incomplete.
        The risks to the future of the earth's environment and life-support
    systems identified in Stockholm and elaborated in Rio de Janeiro
    remain, while the forces driving them persist--increased population
    concentrated in those countries least able to support it, and even
    greater increases in the scale and intensity of the economic activities
    which impact on the environment. These have reached a point in which we
    are literally the agents of our own future; what we do or fail to do,
    will in the first decades of this new millennium in all probability,
    determine the future course of human life on earth. It is an awesome
    responsibility the implications of which we have not yet recognized.
    Certainly they have not yet been reflected in our policies and
    priorities.
        As an optimist I continue to believe that the necessary change of
    course is possible. But as a realist I am deeply concerned that despite
    all the knowledge we have gained and progress we have made we have
    still not demonstrated the degree of political will or sense of
    priority that such a transition requires.
        The transition to a sustainable development pathway is, I submit,
    as essential to the future of the human community today as it was
    before the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, on New
    York and Washington. The preoccupation with the ominous consequences of
    these horrendous acts is understandable and, indeed, necessary. But we
    must not allow this to sidetrack or undermine our efforts to achieve
    economic, environmental and social sustainability and security.
        The tragic events of September 11th dramatically brought home to us
    that the phenomena we now refer to as globalization, which has opened
    up so many new and exciting opportunities, has also united us in facing
    a new generation of risks, imbalances and vulnerabilities. Risks to our
    personal security, the security of our homes, offices and communities
    and, more fundamentally, risks to the earth's' life-support systems on
    which the survival and well being of the entire human family depends.
    These risks and vulnerabilities are inextricably linked through the
    complex, systemic processes of globalization by which human activities
    are shaping our common future. They cannot be understood or dealt with
    in isolation. Nor can they be managed alone by any nation, however
    powerful. Indeed, they require a degree of cooperation beyond anything
    we seem yet prepared to accept.
        Stockholm, in its historic Declaration stated that ``to defend and
    improve the human environment for present and future generations has
    become an imperative goal for mankind--a goal to be pursued together
    with, and in harmony with, the established and fundamental goals of
    peace and of worldwide economic and social development''. It thus
    pointed up the systemic linkages between the environment and the issues
    of peace and security, economic and social development through which
    human activities are shaping our common future.
        In a 1973 Foreign Affairs article I stressed that the principal
    insight arising from the Stockholm Conference was the need for a
    ecological, systemic approach to the management of the issues through
    which we are impacting on our own future. This is essential to our
    understanding and management of the broader complex of issues and
    processes that we now generally refer to as globalization.
        The September 11th, 2001 tragedy demonstrated dramatically the
    vulnerabilities of even the most advanced and powerful of societies to
    destructive attacks, however misguided, by relatively small groups of
    alienated people. This underscores the need for international
    cooperation, not only to conduct the war against terrorism, but also to
    deal with the whole complex of issues integral to the globalization
    process. These include eradication of poverty, environmental
    protection, notably the risk of climate change, meeting the development
    and security needs of developing countries, and redressing the gross
    and growing imbalances that divide rich and poor and nourish the
    enmities and frustrations that are the seedbeds of conflict.
        Peace and security are an indispensable pre condition to
    sustainability and overcoming poverty. War and violent conflict produce
    devastating damage to the environment. And the human costs of such wars
    and conflicts go far beyond the immediate deaths and suffering that
    result from them in destroying and undermining the resources on which
    even larger numbers of people depend for their livelihoods. This
    essential link between peace and sustainable development is the reason
    that United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan undertook to
    revitalize the University for Peace headquartered in San Jose, Costa
    Rica, and that it has established a strategic partnership with the
    Earth Council to re-enforce its capacities in the field of
    environmental security.
        International cooperation is as indispensable to the effective
    management of the other elements of the globalization process as it is
    to the prevention of terrorism. But cooperation based on coercion will
    not long be effective. Sustainable cooperation requires a true sharing
    in the decisionmaking and in responsibilities on the part of the
    majority of nations which can only be achieved if the major nations of
    the world take the lead. We regret the retreat from multi-lateral
    cooperation on these issues on the part of the United States which has
    performed such immensely valuable service to the world community in
    leading it so effectively through most of the period since World War
    II. No individual Nation in the position to replace the United States
    in this role and while we continue to hope for and expect the return to
    leadership on the part of the United States, we cannot afford at this
    critical time to allow a leadership vacuum to prevail which would put
    at risk the very future of life on earth as we know it. There are some
    encouraging first signs of the emergence of a new configuration of
    leadership in the ratification by the European Union, and Japan of the
    Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention despite its repudiation
    by the United States. I look to my own country, Canada, to do so too.
        The need for new and revitalized leadership is reinforced by the
    sobering realization that much of what has been agreed in the past has
    not been implemented and there is a disturbing tendency even to back-
    track on past agreements. It is important to be reminded that Principle
    21 of the Stockholm Declaration in affirming the right of States to
    develop their own resources in accordance with their own environmental
    policies, have the ``responsibility to ensure that activities within
    their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
    other States or of areas beyond their limits of national
    jurisdiction''. Implementation of this principle would in itself
    require those States which are contributing disproportionately to the
    deterioration of the global environment, as for example in continuing
    to produce more than their share of green house gas emissions, to take
    the measures required to reduce their impacts. This responsibility is
    at the very heart of the challenge to the new generation of leadership
    which must be faced at Johannesburg.
        The power and the influence of the United States in today's world
    is unrivaled and indeed without precedent in history. This gives the
    United States a freedom of action not enjoyed by other nations. Other
    nations are not in a position to hold the United States accountable for
    the performance of its obligations under international law.
    Nevertheless when it does act unilaterally it inevitably pays a cost in
    terms of the resentment and reluctance of others to cooperate on other
    issues of importance to the United States. It is important to note that
    already there is clear evidence that even traditional friends of the
    United States have not followed it in opting out such important
    international agreements as the Kyoto Protocol, the Land Mines
    Convention and the International Criminal Court. This is a departure
    from their longstanding practice of following the U.S. lead even in
    instances where they are not entirely comfortable with it.
        The unprecedented power of the United States carries with it
    unprecedented responsibility, particularly at a time when the human
    future depends on the actions we take or fail to take in this
    generation. When the United States acts selectively to carry out its
    international obligations or to force other nations to carry out theirs
    it serves to undermine the credibility and effectiveness of
    international law which is the indispensable foundation for world
    peace, security and order. As the principal architect of the system of
    international treaties, conventions and agreements which constitute the
    current imperfect but indispensable international legal regime and the
    only Nation capable of insisting on enforcement, what the United States
    does or fails to do is an immense and often decisive influence on the
    behavior of other nations. The world community must be grateful to the
    United States for having for most part exercised its responsibility
    admirably. But in those instances in which it has not done so or has
    insisted only selectively on enforcement by others of their
    international obligations, this is an understandable cause of concern,
    even dismay, on the part of other nations for its weakening effect on
    the entire process of international law and prospects of its equitable
    enforcement.
        In drawing the lessons of our experience in the last 30 years, it
    is clear that we have made a great deal of progress, notably in
    improving but by no means resolving, the more immediate and visible
    environmental conditions in the more industrialized countries.
    Impressive improvements have been effected in the environmental
    performance of industry and in development of technologies which
    promise solutions to most problems as, for example, the prospect of
    emission-free motor vehicles and the transition to a hydrogen-based
    energy economy. At the same time, developing countries have become more
    aware of and concerned with the environmental problems which inhibit
    their own development. These problems exact immense human and economic
    costs, produce deteriorating conditions in their cities, and
    destructive exploitation of the natural resources on which future
    development depends. They undermine the immense challenge of meeting
    their growing needs for water and ensuring its quality, prevention and
    care of destructive and debilitating diseases, and most of all their
    primary need to lift their people out of the quagmire of poverty. Yet
    developing countries which are custodians of most of the world's
    precious biodiversity resources are expected to care for them with only
    sporadic and limited support from industrialized countries. As their
    economies grow they will contribute increasingly to the more remote and
    less visible global problems for which the industrialized countries are
    largely responsible, notably the risk of climate change which affects
    the interests and the future of all nations.
        Despite progress on many fronts, the environmental health of the
    earth which was first diagnosed at Stockholm has deteriorated overall
    since then while the forces driving it persist-increased population,
    primarily concentrated in developing countries, and even greater growth
    of the world economy. The benefits have been largely concentrated in
    industrialized countries, even as newly developing countries, notably
    China, are now accounting for an increasingly large share of the global
    economy.
        As their economies grow, developing countries are finding that the
    environmental impacts of their development are undermining the purposes
    of development and exacting a heavy cost in terms of impacts on their
    natural resources, human health and productivity. At the Stockholm
    Conference developing countries made clear their willingness to
    participate in international environmental cooperation insisted that
    they required ``new and additional resources'' to enable them to do so.
    This has been a constant refrain in all international fora in which
    these issues are discussed and negotiated since then.
        One of the most disappointing trends since the Earth Summit in 1992
    has been the lack of response by OECD countries to the needs of
    developing countries for the additional financial resources which all
    governments at Rio agreed were required to enable them to make their
    transition to a sustainable development pathway and to implement
    international agreements. What has been particularly discouraging is
    that progress toward meeting with these needs has been further set back
    since Rio as a number of donors have reduced their Official Development
    Assistance. Thus the commitment by the United States and others at a
    recent United Nations Conference in Monterrey to increase their
    assistance is a welcome signal. This should not be seen as charity but
    as a necessary investment in our own environmental security. An
    especially urgent priority is to complete agreement on replenishment of
    the Global Environment Facility, the only new source of funding the
    environmental needs of developing countries to result from the Earth
    Summit.
        With the reductions in Official Development Assistance we must be
    more innovative in motivating private capital--now the principal source
    of financial flows to developing countries-to contribute more to
    meeting their environmental and sustainable development needs.
        We have for the first time in history the capacity to meet these
    monumental challenges. Indeed, on a global basis we are the wealthiest
    civilization ever and have the capacity to produce wealth at an
    unprecedented rate. It is clearly a question of how we set our
    priorities for the use of our wealth. Business leaders at Rio made the
    point that our current approach to setting those priorities is not
    sustainable-that we must ``change course''. And I am convinced that if
    we do not make this change of course in the first years of this new
    millennium the prospects for the world's future will be ominous indeed.
        Much of what we must do to meet these formidable challenges has
    already been articulated and agreed at Stockholm, Rio and various other
    international for a and affirmed in a variety of international
    agreements. But implementation depends on motivation and this is at the
    heart of our current dilemma. Most of the changes we must make are in
    our economic life. The system of taxes, subsidies, regulations and
    policies through which governments motivate the behavior of individuals
    and corporation continues to incent unsustainable behavior.
        At the deepest level, all people and societies are motivated by
    their moral, ethical and spiritual values. To build on these a set of
    basic moral and ethical principles which are broadly acceptable is
    certainly not easy. But a process that has taken several years and
    involved millions of people around the world has succeeded in producing
    a ``peoples'' Earth Charter as a major contribution to establishing the
    moral and ethical foundations for sustainable development.
        I am pleased to say the United States has been deeply involved in
    the Earth Charter movement. The distinguished, American Professor
    Steven Rockefeller, chaired the committee which drafted the Charter in
    cooperation with people of different faiths and beliefs throughout the
    world. Some 500 organizations in the United States have joined with
    thousands around the world which have contributed to and/or endorsed
    the Earth Charter. These include the Humane Society of the United
    States, the National Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation,
    the Orion Society, the Sierra Club, the World Resource Institute, the
    Yale University School of Forestry and Environmental Studies and the
    United States Conference of Mayors as well as dozens of individual
    cities and towns.
        The environmental movement has its roots in the concerns and
    initiatives of people well before it moved on to the agendas of
    governments. Today the primary impetus to environmental action and
    responsibility comes from civil society, with the support of scientists
    and the increasingly constructive engagement of industry. The alarm
    bells being sounded by some sectors of industry as to the high costs to
    economy of environmental measures, notably the reductions in greenhouse
    gas emission called for under the Kyoto Protocol, are countered by the
    increasing in evidence that such measures open up more new
    opportunities for industry than they negate.
        Surely we must accept that the benefits of environmental security
    and sustainability are well worth and indeed less expensive that the
    ultimate costs of inaction. The United States has long accepted the
    high costs of maintaining its military strength and indeed this has
    produced an important economic spin-offs as for example in driving
    United States leadership in development and application of new
    technologies. I am convinced that in applying the same approach, the
    costs of environmental security would produce even more opportunities
    and benefits to the economy.
        What, then, can be expected from the Johannesburg Summit? First and
    foremost there must be no retreat from the agreements reached at
    Stockholm, Rio de Janeiro and other international fora and the many
    legal instruments to which they gave rise. Indeed it is important that
    there be a strong re-affirmation by governments in Johannesburg of
    their commitments to these past agreements and to implementing and
    building on them in the post-Johannesburg period. In this respect, the
    position of the United States will be pivotal.
        An a priori requirement for this is the successful completion of
    agreements on the issues that were left on resolved in the final
    preparatory meeting in Bali, Indonesia. It is now too late in the
    process to seek consensus on new initiatives but not too late to place
    new initiatives on the table in Johannesburg. These could include:
          A commitment to strong support for United Nations
    Secretary General Kofi Annan in strengthening the capacities and
    coordination of the organizations, programs and agencies of the United
    Nations which deal with the environment, poverty alleviation, and
    sustainable development.
          A call for the establishment of a Consultative Group on
    Clean Energy (CGCE), or similar entity, drawing on the successful
    experience of the Consultative Group on International Agriculture
    Research (CGIAR). Its purpose would be to provide an international
    consultative mechanism, not a new organization, to facilitate private-
    partnerships in identifying priorities for research and development of
    sustainable energy technologies, particularly those most relevant to
    the needs and interests of developing countries. It would also help
    mobilize and deploy the financial and technological assistance required
    to ensure their availability to developing countries under conditions
    conducive to their adoption and use.
          A call for governments to undertake a review of the
    system of fiscal, tax and other incentives, regulations and policies
    through which they motivate the behavior of individuals and
    corporations to provide positive incentives for environmentally and
    socially sound and sustainable development.
          Recognition of the Earth Charter as an important
    expression of the commitment by civil society of the world and ethical
    basis for sustainable development.
        The convening of this hearing by your two extremely important and
    influential committees demonstrates your deep sense of the interest in
    and responsibility of the United States for its position on these
    issues. Recognizing that their fundamental nature does not lend itself
    to quick or easy solutions, there are none-the-less some very practical
    measures which you could undertake to make an important contribution to
    resolving them. You are, I understand, about to receive a report by the
    General Accounting Office of the current status of existing
    international agreements and their implementation. These could provide
    the basis for mandating a continuing process of monitoring, adherence
    to and performance under such agreements by the United States and
    others. The results could be incorporated in periodic reports very much
    like the reports that the State Department issues in respect of human
    rights. Such a monitoring and reporting system would provide an
    important stimulus to implementation of both the letter and the spirit
    of these agreements.
        Developing countries face very special constraints both in
    negotiating and implementing international agreements because of their
    lack of sufficient financial resources to support the professional and
    technical expertise that this requires. Yet their active participation
    in and adherence to these agreements is essential to their
    effectiveness. A very modest investment by the United States in
    supporting the strengthening by developing countries of their own
    capacities to negotiate and service, these agreements would represent
    an important contribution to alleviating one of the main obstacles to
    negotiating and implementing them effectively. It would also require
    only a very modest investment to increase support for the international
    secretariats which are responsible for the servicing of such
    agreements. Of course, others would follow the U.S. lead if it were to
    take such initiatives. This could be a small but important step toward
    the revitalization of U.S. leadership.
        If the United States were to take a lead in presenting or
    supporting such initiatives it would have an immense impact on
    prospects for success at Johannesburg.
        This threats face in common from the mounting dangers to the
    environment, resource life-support systems on which all life on Earth
    depends are as great or greater than the risks we face of conflicts
    with each other. The revitalization of the system of international
    cooperation of which the United States was the primary architect is the
    only feasible basis on which we can manage the risks and realize the
    immense potential for progress and fulfillment for the entire human
    family which is within our reach.
        All people and nations have in the past been willing to accord high
    priority to the measures required for their own security. We must give
    the same kind of priority to civilizational security and
    sustainability. This will take a major shift in the current political
    mind-set. If this seems unrealistic in today's political context we
    should recall that history demonstrates that what seems unrealistic
    today becomes inevitable tomorrow. Necessity will compel this shift
    eventually the question is can we really afford the costs and the risks
    of waiting. Most of all we need the renewed leadership of this great
    nation. I commend you for this encouraging manifestation that this
    renewal is well under way.
       Supplemental Testimony Provided by Maurice Strong, Earth Council
                                   Institute
    the integration of animal protection and rights into our environmental
                                    concerns
        It is important that the United States provide leadership and
    support to binding international agreements that protect animals and
    their environment. Fundamental principles such as transparency, binding
    dispute resolution, enforcement measures, and the precautionary
    approach should always be supported and advanced by the United States
    when such principles are absent from multi-lateral environmental
    agreements.
        Moreover, where there is evidence of the pernicious and ever-
    growing practice of ``vote-buying'', one country providing foreign aid
    to developing countries in exchange for favorable votes, the United
    States is in the best position to put an end to such egregious
    practices. For nothing more quickly undermines a treaty and erodes
    international cooperation than when one country exacts another's
    allegiance in return for financial aid.
        While progress in protecting animals has been made--and the United
    States should be congratulated for its contribution to this--enormous
    challenges still lie ahead. There are several key agreements that the
    United States has yet to ratify and others where it and others need to
    work harder in order to prevent the weakening of significant gains
    already achieved.
    International Whaling Commission (IWC)
        There has been subtle erosion of The United States' strong anti-
    whaling position over the last several years. It is imperative that the
    United States become a leader once again in the fight to protect whales
    from an inhumane commercial slaughter. The U.S. Delegation to the IWC
    should continue to make all efforts to prevent the lifting of the
    commercial whaling moratorium and institute tough measures against
    those countries that continue to kill whales and undermine the
    agreement. Further, I would strongly urge the United States to advocate
    a global whale sanctuary, as it is the only way to ensure that whales
    will be a part of our future.
    Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)
        In 1997, despite opposition from a large coalition of animal and
    environmental protection organizations, U.S. Legislation was passed
    that weakened the definition of the well-known and trusted dolphin-safe
    label. The new label, if implemented, will allow the chasing, harassing
    and encircling of dolphins with nets as a method of catching tuna and
    still be labeled as dolphin-safe. As a result, dolphins will get caught
    in these nets and drown. If the label is weakened, consumers will feel
    betrayed when they learn that the dolphin-safe label no longer means
    what is stated on the can. The United States should not, I submit, be
    promoting a weakened dolphin-safe label to appease the fishing industry
    of another country. Rather the U.S. Delegation to the IATTC should be
    protecting dolphins and U.S. consumer concerns by arguing for the non-
    encirclement of dolphins by all countries participating in the
    Convention and fishing in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.
    Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
            and Flora (CITES)
        The United States has continued to take a leadership role in
    implementation of the CITES treaty, both domestically and abroad. The
    next Conference of the Parties, scheduled for 315 November 2002, will
    consider several proposals submitted by the United States, that, if
    passed, will enhance protection from international commercial trade for
    species ranging from turtles to seahorses to cacti. The United States
    is expected to oppose proposals to allow international commercial trade
    in the meat and blubber of minke and Bryde's whales (proposed by Japan)
    and hawksbill sea turtle shells (proposed by Cuba).
        However, there is deep concern that United States may waiver from
    its long-standing position in opposition to the international elephant
    ivory trade. With United States support, CITES banned the international
    ivory trade in 1.989 after a decade of widespread poaching reduced wild
    African elephant herds from 1.2 million to about 600,000. The ban
    succeeded in stopping the precipitous population decline. However,
    renewed poaching and illegal trade have taken a toll on elephant
    populations. In 1997, CITES allowed Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia to
    sell, as a one-time experiment, almost 50 metric tons of ivory to
    Japan. Subsequently, some countries noted an increase in poaching and
    illegal trade. Between 1 January 2000 and 21 May 2002, a minimum of
    11.9 tons of ivory, 2542 tusks, and 14,648 pieces of ivory were seized
    worldwide, representing over two thousand dead elephants. During. the
    same period of time, a minimum of 965 African elephants and 39 Asian
    elephants were poached. Clearly, more control over elephant poaching
    and illegal ivory trade is needed instead of a renewal of the legal
    ivory trade. That is why Kenya and India have submitted a proposal, to
    be considered at the upcoming CITES meeting, to stop all international
    commercial trade in elephants and their parts and products. In
    contrast, five southern African countries (Zimbabwe, South Africa,
    Namibia, Zambia and Botswana) have proposed that CITES allow them to
    sell 87 metric tons of elephant ivory in the international
    marketplace--the tusks of approximately 11 thousand dead elephants.
    Four of these countries have also asked to be allowed to sell an
    additional 13,000 metric tons of ivory in the international marketplace
    each year. Finally, two of these countries have also asked to trade in
    ivory for non-commercial purposes, such as ivory souvenirs.
        It is important that the United States, which has led opposition to
    the international ivory trade since 1989, oppose the proposals of
    Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Botswana to sell ivory in
    the international marketplace and support the proposal of Kenya and
    India to halt elephant trade. A return to a legalized international
    ivory trade would spell doom for elephants.
    Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW)
        The SPAW protocol protects ecosystems, habitats, and endangered and
    threatened species residing in the Wider Caribbean region. SPAW is an
    international Agreement which paves the way for the greater
    coordination and protection of animals and their habitat. It is of deep
    concern that the United States has not ratified the Agreement. SPAW was
    adopted in 1990 and came into force in 2000, and though the United
    States has signed the Protocol, it has not ratified. The United States
    must ratify the Protocol and participate in its evolution to ensure
    that it offers the highest possible protection for animals and their
    habitats.
    Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)
        The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
    Animals (also known as CMS or the Bonn Convention) aims to conserve
    terrestrial, marine and avian migratory species throughout their range.
    It is a small number of intergovernmental treaties concerned with the
    conservation of wildlife and wildlife habitats on a global scale. Since
    the Convention's entry into force in November 1983, its membership has
    grown steadily to include 80 Parties from Africa, Central and South
    America, Asia, Europe and Oceania. Parties to CMS work together to
    conserve migratory species and their habitats by providing strict
    protection for the endangered migratory species listed in Appendix I of
    the Convention; by concluding multilateral Agreements for the
    conservation and management of migratory species listed in Appendix II;
    and by undertaking co-operative research activities.
        There is great potential for cooperative international conservation
    in the CMS. However, the problem is that the United States is not a
    member. There is much work that needs to be done to protect migratory
    species and unless the United States ratifies the CMS this country will
    be missing out on--a valuable opportunity to fully utilize this
    Agreement to protect such a wide range of species.
    Trade and the Environment
        United States leadership in international trade and economic issues
    as they relate to animal welfare and the environment is essential.
    Unquestionably, these issues are intertwined with international trade
    and economic issues. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is in the midst
    of negotiations concerning the overlap between multilateral
    environmental agreements and international trade rules. These
    negotiations are important and must be given the necessary attention
    and resources to ensure a successful outcome. Members of the WTO are
    also engaged in serious negotiations concerning agricultural reform and
    increased market access for agricultural products. In the context of
    these negotiations the European Union proposed that animal welfare be
    addressed. I understand that the United States has yet to give its full
    support to this proposal. I strongly urge Members of Congress to engage
    the Administration on this issue and work toward the shared goal of
    including animal welfare in the agricultural negotiations.
                                   __________
      Statement of John C. Dehrnbach, Professor of Law, Widener University
        Committee Chairmen Jeffords and Biden, Subcommittee Chairman
    Sarbanes, and members of the Committees: good morning. Thank you for
    the opportunity to discuss U.S. adherence to its sustainable
    development commitments, particularly those made at the Earth Summit in
    Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
        I am the editor of a 32-chapter book on U.S. sustainable
    development efforts in the 10 years since the Earth Summit, entitled
    Stumbling Toward Sustainability. The book is being published this week
    by the Environmental Law Institute. The book's 42 contributors come
    from universities and law schools, nongovernmental organizations, the
    private sector, and State government. They are respected experts in
    their fields.
        A list of chapters and authors is attached to this statement. The
    book's synthesis, which pulls together the major themes of the book and
    summarizes each of the chapters, is also attached.
    Ten-Year Assessment: U.S. Made Little Progress
        The U.S. has unquestionably begun to take some steps toward
    sustainable development, largely because of our environmental and
    conservation laws. Yet, on balance, the United States is now far from
    being a sustainable society, and in many respects is farther away than
    it was at the time of the Earth Summit in 1992. Unlike many other
    developed countries, the United States has not used a strategic process
    to move the country toward a sustainable future and has not educated
    the American people about the opportunities and challenges of
    sustainable development.
        With 5 percent of the world's population, the United States was at
    the time of the Earth Summit responsible for about 24 percent of the
    world's energy consumption and almost 30 percent of the world's raw
    materials consumption. Since the Earth Summit, materials use has
    increased 10 percent, primary energy consumption has increased 21
    percent, and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions have increased by
    13 percent. Over and over, increases in materials and energy
    efficiency, and in the effectiveness of pollution controls for
    individual sources, were outweighed by increases in consumption.
    Despite a significant increase in municipal waste recycling in the past
    decade, for example, the U.S. generation and disposal of municipal
    solid waste per capita have been growing since 1996. According to
    Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson, ``four more planet Earths'' would
    be needed for ``every person in the world to reach present U.S. levels
    of consumption with existing technology.'' Yet the U.S. standard of
    living-equated with high levels of consumption and ``the good life''--
    is widely envied and emulated throughout the world.
        The United States has not exercised the kind of international
    leadership necessary to encourage or support sustainable development
    around the world. U.S. law and policy continue to encourage
    unsustainable development in a variety of ways, including subsidies and
    fragmented local decisionmaking that encourages sprawl. As a whole, the
    condition of America's natural resources and ecosystems has not
    improved, and appears to have deteriorated slightly, over the past
    decade. Our infrastructure and social support systems continue to cause
    environmental degradation and underserve the poor.
    National Sustainable Development Strategy is Needed
        The Federal Government should adopt and implement a national
    strategy for sustainable development, with specified goals and
    priorities, to harness all sectors of society to achieve our economic,
    social, environmental, and security goals. The strategy would lead to a
    stronger, more prosperous America with higher quality of life because
    we would be pursuing these goals in ways that support each other in
    greater and greater degrees over time, rather than undermining each
    other. The strategy could be modeled on that of the European Union or
    States such as Oregon and New Jersey, and specifically address climate
    change, biodiversity, international trade, and other major issues.
        The President could get the process started with an appropriate
    executive order to Federal agencies under the Government Performance
    and Results Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. An
    executive-level entity would be needed to coordinate and assist in the
    implementation of the strategy. A counterpart entity in Congress would
    also be helpful. A set of indicators to measure progress in achieving
    goals would make the strategy more effective and meaningful.
        In addition, the U.S. needs to recognize that its substantial
    consumption levels, coupled with domestic population growth, have
    serious environmental, social, and economic impacts. Americans also
    need to understand that human well-being can be maintained and enhanced
    by more efficient and effective use of materials and energy. A shift in
    taxes from labor and income, on one hand, to materials and energy
    consumption, on the other, would encourage both greater efficiency and
    reduced negative environmental impacts. A variety of other legal and
    policy tools that have successfully been used at the State level to
    reduce environmental effects of consumption and for other purposes are
    also available, including renewable energy portfolio standards and
    smart growth legislation.
        The U.S. needs to take a stronger and more constructive leadership
    role internationally, not only on terrorism but on the broad range of
    issues related to sustainable development. Congress should repeal or
    modify laws, policies, and subsidies that encourage unsustainable
    development. Protection of natural resources and the environment must
    focus more holistically on the resources to be protected, and on
    understanding those resources. Transportation, public health, and other
    social infrastructure and institutions should be designed and operated
    to further economic, environmental, and social goals at the same time.
        In virtually every area of American life, a few people and
    organizations are exercising leadership for sustainability. The United
    States would take a large and decisive step toward sustainability if
    individuals, businesses, educational institutions, local and State
    governments, Federal agencies and others would simply adopt and build
    on the leading sustainability practices of their counterparts. A
    properly conceived and implemented strategy would lead to that result.
        These and other recommendations are set out in detail in the book.
    They provide an issue-by-issue roadmap for sustainability in the United
    States.
    Toward a Brighter Future for Our Children and Grandchildren
        We now face growing environmental degradation around the world and
    a growing gap between rich and poor. These are related problems, and
    they hinder or undermine everything else we care about--security,
    economic development, social well-being, and even effective governance.
    Put differently, poverty and environmental degradation are deeply
    destabilizing because they stifle or reduce opportunities and quality
    of life for many, many people.
        In the next 50 years, global population is projected to increase by
    three billion people, and the global economy is likely to grow by four
    or five times. As difficult as things now are, environmental
    degradation and the gap between rich and poor are likely to get much
    worse if continue business as usual. Should that be our legacy for our
    children and grandchildren?
        We know what we need to do to move toward sustainability, and we
    also know why. As Americans, we are called to face these challenges,
    and to seize this opportunity.
                                  Attachment 1
                       (Environmental Law Institute 2002)
                        stumbling toward sustainability
                           (John C. Dernbach, Editor)
                                  introduction
    Synthesis
        I. Who Cares?
    1. Sustainable Development: Now More Than Ever, John C. Dernbach,
        Professor of Law, Widener University
        II. Consumption and Population
    2. Production and Consumption of Materials
    Amit Kapur, Doctor of Forestry and Environmental Studies Candidate,
                Center for Industrial Ecology, School of Forestry and
                Environmental Studies, Yale University
    Thomas E. Graedel, Clifton R. Musser Professor of Industrial Ecology
                and Director, Center for Industrial Ecology, School of
                Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University
    3. Production and Consumption of Energy
    Lynn Price, Deputy Group Leader, International Energy Studies Group,
                Environmental Energy Technologies Division, Lawrence
                Berkeley National Laboratory
    Mark D. Levine, Division Director, Environmental Energy Technologies
                Division, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
    4. Population
    Anne H. Ehrlich, Policy Coordinator, Center for Conservation Biology,
                Stanford University
    James Salzman, Professor of Law, American University, Washington
                College of Law
        III. International Trade, Finance, and Development Assistance
    5. International Trade
    Sanford E. Gaines, Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center
    6. Official Development Assistance
    Royal C. Gardner, Professor of Law and Director of Graduate and
                International Studies, Stetson University College of Law
    7. Development Assistance and Poverty
    James Gustave Speth, Dean and Professor of Environmental Policy and
                Sustainable Development, School of Forestry and
                Environmental Studies, Yale University
    8. Private Finance
    Frances Seymour, Director, Institutions and Governance Program, World
                Resources Institute
    Lisa Dreier, Graduate Student, University of California, Berkeley
    Lily Donge, Social Research Analyst, Calvert Asset Management Company
        IV. Conservation and Management of Natural Resources
    9. Fresh Water
    Robert W. Adler, Professor of Law, Wallace Stegner Center for Law,
                Resources and the Environment, University of Utah College
                of Law
    10. Oceans and Estuaries
    Robin Kundis Craig, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University
                School of Law
    11. Air Pollution
    David M. Driesen, Professor of Law, Center for Global Law and Practice,
                Syracuse University College of Law
    12. Climate Change
    Donald A. Brown, Director, Pennsylvania Consortium for
                Interdisciplinary Environmental Policy
    13. Biodiversity and Endangered Species
    A. Dan Tarlock, Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of
                Law
    14. Forestry
    Robert L. Fischman, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-
                Bloomington
    15. Agriculture
    John H. Davidson, Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School
                of Law
    16. Land Use
    Patricia E. Salkin, Professor of Government Law, Associate Dean, and
                Director, Government Law Center, Albany Law School
        V. Waste and Toxic Chemicals
    17. Toxic Chemicals and Pesticides
    Lynn R. Goldman, Professor of Environmental Health Sciences, Bloomberg
                School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University
    18. Lead
    K.W. James Rochow, Project Director, Alliance to End Childhood Lead
                Poisoning
    19. Hazardous Waste and Superfund
    Joel A. Mintz, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law
                Center
    20. Brownfields Redevelopment
    Joel B. Eisen, Professor of Law and Director, Robert P. Merhige Jr.,
                Center of Environmental Law, University of Richmond Law
                School
    21. Municipal Solid Waste
    Marian R. Chertow, Director, Industrial Environmental Management
                Program, School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale
                University
    22. Radioactive Waste
    James D. Werner, Director, Reprocessing Policy Project, and Senior
                Policy Advisor, Missouri Department of Natural Resources
        VI. Nongovernmental Actors
    23. Public access to information, participation, and justice
    Frances Irwin, Fellow, World Resources Institute
    Carl Bruch, Staff Attorney, Environmental Law Institute
    24. Business and Industry
    William L. Thomas, Senior Attorney, Pillsbury Winthrop, LLP
    25. Sustainability as a Religious and Ethical Concern
    Dieter T. Hessel, Director, Program on Ecology, Justice, and Faith
        VII. Education
    26. Kindergarten Through Twelfth Grade
    Carmela M. Federico, Associate Director, Sustainability Education
                Center
    Jaimie P. Cloud, President, Sustainability Education Center
    Jack Byrne, Project Director, Center for a Sustainable Future
    Keith Wheeler, Director, Center for a Sustainable Future
    27. Higher Education
    Wynn Calder, Associate Director, University Leaders for a Sustainable
                Future and the Center for Respect of Life and Environment
    Richard M. Clugston, Executive Director, University Leaders for a
                Sustainable Future, Center for Respect of Life and
                Environment, and Earth Charter USA Campaign
        VIII. Institutions and Infrastructure
    28. Transportation
    F. Kaid Benfield, Senior Attorney and Director of Smart Growth and
                Transportation Policy, Natural Resources Defense Council
    Michael Replogle, Transportation Director, Environmental Defense
    29. Medical and Public Health Services
    Edward P. Richards III, Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
                School of Law
        IX. Governance
    30. Local Governance
    Jonathan D. Weiss, Professorial Lecturer in Law and Executive Director,
                Center on Sustainability and Regional Growth, George
                Washington University Law School
    31. State Governance
    John A. Pendergrass, Staff Attorney, Environmental Law Institute
    32. National Governance
    John C. Dernbach, Professor of Law, Widener University
                                   __________
        Statement of Christopher C. Horner, Senior Fellow, Competitive
                              Enterprise Institute
        Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this
    joint panel on a topic of great importance. The scope of today's
    hearing is broad, so I focus my testimony upon the propriety of the
    U.S. agreeing to amend the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
    (UNFCC, or Rio Treaty), by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.
        For whatever specific reasons (economic growth, failure to foresee
    the energy requirements of the ``new economy'', or other), the U.S.,
    like many nations, failed to meet its voluntary Rio targets.
        Now some advocates assert, ``Because the U.S. has not met its Rio
    goal, we must commit to even greater mandatory reductions (Kyoto)''.
    Attempting instead to comply with the initial treaty seems the more
    appropriate response, for several reasons.
        Rio went into force in March 1994. President Clinton did not
    request, nor did Congress enact, independent legislation implementing
    Rio, which was not an inherently self-executing treaty. Authority and
    precedent make clear that responsibility for proposing such programs
    lies with the White House. If our ``non-binding'' Rio obligations in
    fact ``bound'' the U.S. to achieve specific reductions--contrary to
    contemporary Senate and Executive assertions of U.S. intent--then the
    Executive interpretation of Rio Article 4 throughout the 1990's was
    actually incorrect, and is responsible. The pending question is
    apparently: does the U.S. respond by attempting to meet such Rio
    promises, or by making further, even deeper, binding promises?
        Skipping specific pursuit of the U.S.' Rio promises, in favor of
    Kyoto's binding commitments even greater than those we've failed to
    attain, seems highly illogical. Compounding this of course is that,
    precisely 5 years ago tomorrow, the Senate unanimously spoke to what it
    recognized was an unacceptable drift away from the U.S. Rio stance
    adamantly opposed to binding commitments. The Senate, seeing what was
    developing, asserted its ``Advice'' pursuant to Article II, Section 2
    of the U.S. Constitution, passing S. Res. 98.
        Subsequent to and despite this Advice, U.S. negotiators clearly
    disregarded both major Byrd-Hagel recommendations: Kyoto did not
    require developing countries to share our commitments, and even the
    Clinton White House economic advisors have recanted their refutations
    of the Kyoto cost estimates.
        Since then, nothing has emerged to indicate that Kyoto does not
    still violate both key Byrd-Hagel conditions, and it is likely that
    very few Senators have amended their position against a treaty causing
    ``serious economic harm.'' However, Clinton Administration officials
    did admit that they began working on the plan for binding commitments
    within 1 year after Rio went into effect.
        Kyoto, too, is clearly intended to be a similar step in a ``treaty
    hopping'' campaign: even the models on which it is based predict an
    undetectable climatic impact--at a cost to the U.S. of up to $400
    billion annually--but instead may be 1/30th of what its proponents
    seek. Rio and Kyoto offer differing commitments but purport ``the same
    ultimate objective.'' The U.N. IPCC has said this means reducing GHG
    emissions by as much as 60-80 percent, which wildly exceeds Kyoto's
    specified ambitions.
        As such the U.S. should require, prior to and as part of ratifying
    any further agreements, express acknowledgement not only of the actual
    ``ultimate goal'', but that it is committed to its practical
    requirements, in this case up to ``30 Kyotos''.
        Such ``treaty hopping'' agendas illustrate the importance of Senate
    treaty ``reservations'', or the Senate's second bite at the ``Advice''
    apple. This comes of course during the ``Consent'' function, which
    function the U.S. negotiators unfortunately eviscerated. After agreeing
    to terms incompatible with Byrd-Hagel, the Administration also accepted
    Kyoto's prohibition on reservations, or the Senate's ability to specify
    the specific understandings or conditions of the U.S. commitment. This
    despite the Senate also having forewarned the administration about this
    in advance of Kyoto.
        In summation, President Bush ought to match his assertions of
    having ``rejected'' Kyoto with the requisite submission to the U.N. to
    that effect, as was done regarding the International Criminal Court. In
    the absence of that act, the White House must at minimum assist
    resolution of the ambiguous U.S. role in Kyoto by requesting the Senate
    disapprove of the treaty. In the absence of that, the Senate should
    recognize that there is no reverse equivalent of the ``presentment''
    clause, regarding treaties. Only protocol, not any constitutional
    prohibition, impedes Senate consideration of a signed treaty. Certainly
    given the imperative rhetoric surrounding Kyoto, if President Bush
    insists on continuing the U.S.' ambiguous role the Senate should take
    matters into its own hands, and decide the fate of this agreement.
        That resolution should by definition be rejection of Kyoto.
    Otherwise, by accepting this double indignity of ignoring advice and
    prohibiting reservations, this body would condone Executive
    circumvention of the Senate's constitutional treaty role.
        As part of my testimony for the record, I include an article I have
    prepared for the Federalist Society, though still in draft form,
    addressing relevant issues surrounding the propriety of ratifying
    Kyoto, and recommending courses for withdrawal or otherwise pursuing
    clarification of the U.S.' ambiguous treaty status. Thank you again for
    the opportunity to appear.
        In Rio in 1992 the U.S. made, and the Senate unanimously ratified,
    various commitments regarding reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
    both thematic and with a specific emission target (1990 levels).
        See, e.g., http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/eunc3.pdf. The EU,
    which under Kyoto has negotiated a ``bubble'' such that it could pool
    its increases and ``reductions'', announced in May that it met its Rio
    target. It said it had reduced greenhouse gases by 3.5 percent below
    1990 levels in 2000. This is commonly attributed to the ending of coal
    subsidies in Great Britain in their push to replace coal with gas,
    shutting down East German industry and that Europe did not match the
    U.S.' decade-long economic expansion. Russia, e.g., met its target by
    regressing economically.
        As the party charged with ``making'' treaties the Executive is
    responsible for meeting, or at minimum proposing legislation to affect,
    treaty commitments. President Clinton proposed a Btu tax, though not
    expressly in pursuit of Rio. It failed once and did not emerge again.
    He instituted his Climate Action Plan, which with minor recent
    modifications continues to this day with more than 50 voluntary
    programs, though a quick search of Thomas revealed no implementing
    legislation. Congress did appropriate money in response to proposals by
    the Executive. See, e.g., ``Treaties and Other International
    Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate'', S. Rpt. 106-71, p.4.
        ``Implementation The executive branch has the primary
    responsibility for carrying out treaties and ascertaining that other
    parties fulfill their obligations after treaties and other
    international agreements enter into force, but the Senate or the entire
    Congress share in the following phases.'' ``Treaties and Other
    International Agreements'', p. 12. ``A question that may be raised
    under U.S. law is whether or not Congress has a duty to implement a
    treaty which is in force internationally, but which requires additional
    legislation or implementation or an appropriation of funds to give
    effect to obligations assumed internationally by the United States.
    When implementation of a treaty requires domestic legislation or an
    appropriation of funds, only the Congress can provide them.'' Id. at
    pp. 166-67.
        The FRC Report continues, ``The extent of congressional obligation
    to implement a treaty under U.S. law has not been resolved in
    principle. FN 61 According to an often-cited authority, Congress has
    generally responded to a sense of duty to carry out what the treaty-
    makers promised, to a reluctance to defy and confront the President
    (especially after he can no longer retreat), to an unwillingness to
    make the U.S. system appear undependable, even ludicrous . . .''' Id.
    at 167, quoting Henkin, Louis. Foreign Affairs and the United States
    Constitution. 2d ed. 1996, pp. 205-206. The referenced FN 61 says in
    pertinent part, ``[F]ailure to implement an internationally perfected
    treaty would constitute a violation of obligations assumed by the
    United States under international law. See Memorandum of April 12,
    1976, by Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, as quoted in
    U.S. Department of State. Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law
    1976. 1977, p. 221.'' This begs the question: ``to precisely what
    extent was the ``non-binding'' Rio binding?
        Addressing the question, above (FN 5), prior to ratification,
    ``[t]he [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee made clear, in other
    words, its view that ``[t]he final framework convention contains no
    legally binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions . . .''
    While these statements may not be as legally binding as a formal
    condition to the Senate's ratification of the 1992 Convention [ed:
    reservations were prohibited by Rio's terms], it is doubtful that any
    administration could ignore them.'' ``Global Climate Change: Selected
    Legal Questions about the Kyoto Protocol'', p. 4. CRS Report for
    Congress (March 29, 2001), citing in part 138 CONG. REC. 33521 (Oct. 7,
    1992)(statement of Sen. McConnell).
        To avoid future such uncertainty, in S.Res. 98 (105th Cong., 1st
    Sess., adopted at 143 CONG. REC.S. 8138 (daily ed. July 25, 1997)), the
    Senate ``stated the view that any agreement which would require Senate
    advice and consent should be accompanied by a detailed analysis of its
    economic impact and of any legislation and regulations necessary to
    implement the agreement.'' See CRS Report at p. 6, FN 25.
        ``In mid-1997, as these negotiations were underway, the Senate
    passed S. Res. 98 [ed.: ``Byrd-Hagel,'' S.Res. 98 105th Congress (105-
    54 July 21, 1997)], which stated that the Senate would not approve any
    agreement on binding reductions in greenhouse gases that did not
    include commitments by developing countries as well as developed/
    industrialized countries, or that would result in harm to the U.S.
    economy. The administration has not transmitted the Kyoto Protocol to
    the Senate because, among other reasons, developing countries have to
    date not been willing to consider making binding commitments regarding
    their greenhouse gas emissions.'' ``Treaties and Other International
    Agreements'', p. 276.
        The operative language is as follows: ``Resolved, That it is the
    sense of the Senate that--
        (1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to,
    or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention
    on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997,
    or thereafter, which would--
        (A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
    emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
    agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or
    reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within
    the same compliance period, or
        (B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United
    States''.
        ``Economists from the Clinton White House now concede that
    complying with Kyoto's mandatory reductions in greenhouse gases would
    be difficult--and more expensive to American consumers than they
    thought when they were in charge.'' USA Today, 12 June 2001.
        In 1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rafe Pomerance
    asserted that ``the administration has been working on this policy for
    more than a year'', quoted in Nature, 25 July 1996.
        See, Testimony of Dr. Sallie Baliunas to the Senate Committee on
    Environment and Public Works, at http://www.techcentralstation.com/
    1051/envirowrapper.jsp?PID=1051-450&CID=1051-031302C.
        U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,
    Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting. ``Impacts of the Kyoto
    Protocol on U.S. Energy markets and Economic Activity.'' Washington,
    DC. October 1998.
        ``Yet the climate simulations lead to the conclusion that the Kyoto
    reductions will have little effect in the twenty-first century (15),
    and `30 Kyotos' may be needed to reduce warming to an acceptable
    level.'' James Hansen, Makiko Sato, Reto Ruedy, Andrew Lacis, and
    Valdar Oinas, ``Global warming in the twenty-first century: An
    alternative scenario,'' Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences,
    August 29, 2000.
        Hansen was citing Malakoff, D. (1997) Science 278, 2048.
        ``[S]tabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
    atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
    interference with the climate system.'' See, e.g., Rio Article 2.
        See ``Treaties and Other International Agreements,'' at 274.
        The President manifested that this is how the United States makes
    ``its intention clear to not become a party to the treaty,'' as
    required by ``customary'' law and the Vienna Convention Article 18.
    ``[S]ignature by the U.S. does impose an obligation on the U.S. under
    international law to refrain from actions that would undermine the
    Protocol's object and purpose. That obligation continues to apply until
    such time as the U.S. ratifies the Protocol or makes clear its intent
    not to do so.'' ``Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about
    the Kyoto Protocol'', CRS Report for Congress (March 29, 2001).
        Though it has not yet done so, precedent indicates the Senate can
    also effect this outcome by passing a Sense of the Senate expressing
    disapproval of a signed, not ratified treaty. See, ``Withdrawal,'' in
    attached article.
                                     ______

                [Prepared for the Federalist Society July 2002]
                   MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TREATY PROCESS
     recent developments regarding advice and consent, withdrawal, and the
        growing role of nongovernmental organizations in international
       agreements with particular examination of the 1997 kyoto protocol
    (By Christopher C. Horner, Esq., Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise
                  Institute; Tyler Dunman, Research Assistant]
                     introduction to the treaty process\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ This paper attempts to clarify common misunderstandings about
    the treaty process, particularly as involve the United States and
    ambiguities arising from inconsistent treatment of various treaty
    commitments. Certain assertions made herein, for example regarding the
    history of Kyoto and specifically certain negotiating developments, are
    not formally documented but based upon the author's observations
    attending these negotiations, both as an attorney representing a
    nongovernmental organization, and writing on the proceedings for
    various publications.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Treaties are agreements between nations, or States. They range from
    bilateral agreements to multilateral pacts including each of the 189
    member states of the United Nations. Throughout history treaties have
    addressed all manner of international discourse, from rules of military
    engagement to mutual defense and termination of hostilities, creating a
    U.N. and a European Union, international border delineation, liability
    in international transportation, establishing trade terms and
    intellectual property protections.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ See various definitions, FN 53, infra. Treaty topics even range
    to taxation of foreign motor vehicles and unification of road signals.
    For the compendium of ``[e]very treaty and every international
    agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations'', see
    http://untreaty.un.org/. For a selection of treaties signed, though not
    necessarily ratified by the United States, see http://usinfo.state.gov/
    usa/infousa/laws/ tradeagr.htm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As such treaties, or ``conventions'' with amendments thereto called
    ``rounds'', protocols, etc. which are typically discrete treaty
    agreements requiring independent ratification, are the manner by which
    states formalize codes for their relationships, both civil and
    criminal.\3\ Depending on their nature treaties are therefore properly
    viewed either as contracts, in that they establish civil procedures, or
    as establishing the equivalent of laws applicable to the parties.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ The latter actually involves sanction by a supranational body
    of private entities and individuals acting on behalf of a state. For
    such matters agreements have created ad hoc bodies, for example the
    International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (see http://
    www.un.org/icty/index.html), and the International Criminal Tribunal
    for Rwanda (see http://www.ictr.org/), both under auspices of the U.N.
    Security Council.
        \4\ For a compendium of treaties addressing ``Penal Matters,'' see
    http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/ englishinternetbible/partI/
    chapterXVIII/chapterXVIII.asp.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In modern practice states have increasingly turned to treaties to
    address matters not clearly involving international discourse such as
    trade or conduct on the high seas but establishing norms of purely
    domestic behavior. States, which under the Constitution have no treaty
    power,\5\ have nonetheless waded into areas which are the subject of
    modern treaties, negotiating international agreements addressing topics
    such as the theory of ``man-made global warming''.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 10: ``No State shall
    enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation . . . No State shall,
    without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or
    Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power . . .''
        \6\ For discussion of a recent example, see ``New England Governors
    Pledge to Implement Kyoto, Violate Constitution'', Jon Reisman,
    Downeast, Coastal Press, July 16, 2002. Reisman is an associate
    professor of economics and public policy at the University of Maine at
    Machias.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, also addressing that theory of man-made
    global warming is exemplar of efforts addressing (principally) domestic
    activities.\7\ It does claim a purported global phenomenon as its basis
    and the bulk of the world's recognized states as parties, but
    selectively commits certain developed nations to reduce domestic energy
    use emissions. Given current technology, for the foreseeable future
    Kyoto thereby effectively rations and redistributes particular domestic
    economic activity by instituting this selective cap, in perpetuity and
    not indexed for economic or population growth. As such, Kyoto is
    arguably in truth an economic instrument by which foreign competitors
    hope to mitigate U.S. competitive advantages.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Kyoto also imputes emissions to covered states from activities
    in international airspace and waters, even national security and
    international peacekeeping missions despite an initial U.S. effort to
    exclude the latter.
        \8\ ``This is about international relations, this is about economy
    about trying to create a level playing field for big businesses
    throughout the world. You have to understand what is at stake and that
    is why it is serious.'' European Union Commissioner for the Environment
    Margot Wallstrom, quoted by The Independent (London), March 19, 2002,
    p. 14.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Cornell University Professor of Law Jeremy Rabkin writes:
        ``In 1929 Chief Justice Hughes of the U.S. Supreme Court--who had
    already served as a justice on the Permanent Court of International
    Justice--reaffirmed the doctrine that the treaty power cannot be
    invoked as a mere pretext for altering domestic policies:
        ``[T]he treaty making power was intended for the purpose of having
    treaties made relating to foreign affairs and not to make laws for the
    people of the United States in their internal concerns through the
    exercise of the asserted treaty-making power.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ Rabkin, ``Why Sovereignty Matters,'' (1998 AEI Press), p. 22,
    citing Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, vol.
    23 (1929), pp. 194-6.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Nonetheless, agreements such as Kyoto now proliferate. In this
    context, it seems fair to paraphrase Clausewitz on war: treaties are
    the extension of politics by organized state lobbying.
        Treaties purporting to involve binding commitments are enforceable
    against parties to the agreement.\10\ Disputes over compliance or
    implementation of the bulk of treaties, best characterized as civil
    agreements, are heard before the International Court of Justice.\11\
    ``The Court has two functions: to render judgments on disputes
    submitted to it by States and to furnish advisory opinions on questions
    referred to it by authorized bodies.''\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Not all treaties purport binding commitments. The parent
    agreement of the principal case study cited herein (Kyoto), is the
    United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The
    UNFCCC was typical of treaties merely expressing mutual goals, or
    ``promises'' of voluntary undertakings (in this case, voluntary
    commitments to attempt to reduce man-made ``greenhouse gases'', or
    GHGs).
        \11\ ``The Court, in existence since 1946, serves as the successor
    to the Permanent Court of International Justice established by the
    League of Nations and derives its mandate from a Statute which forms an
    integral part of the Charter of the United Nations.'' http://
    www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/specil.htm#icj. For text, see http://
    www.un.org/Overview/Charter/contents.html.
        \12\ Id. The Permanent International Court of Justice was
    established with the chartering of the United Nations (http://
    www.un.org/aboutun/charter/). The United States withdrew its August
    1946 accession to this court in October 1985 in response to an
    unfavorable verdict in an action brought against it by Nicaragua. For
    the text of the declaration see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. l,
    p. 9. That does not resolve the matter but actually leaves the U.S.
    status regarding this treaty as rather ambiguous, also. The
    implications of this move, regarding proper venue for pursuit of
    actions by (or against) the United States is a topic more appropriate
    for a separate paper.
        Recently, sufficient signatory nations submitted ratification
    instruments of the Rome Treaty to bring into effect a permanent
    International Criminal Court (ICC)(http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/
    romefra.htm), and questions persist over the potential application of
    its terms not merely against ratifying nations but others--specifically
    the U.S.--whose, e.g., troops assigned to U.N. peacekeeping duty may be
    deemed by parties to Rome to have transgressed to the detriment of
    ratifying nations. The United States signed the Rome Treaty, but
    rescinded its signature, as detailed, infra.
        For the panoply of international legal bodies see http://
    www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/specil.htm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Originally, the Framers conceived of treaties not as the creation
    of laws, but more contracts between states bearing the force of
    law.\13\ Time and intervening ``criminal'' agreements, of course, have
    further clouded this assessment.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Still, this apparent view of a discipline not properly in the
    exclusive realm of the executive or legislative realm was a factor in
    bifurcating the roles in treaty accession. See esp. Hamilton in
    Federalist No. 75.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A body of international common or ``customary'' law evolved to
    assist in treaty interpretation. This body of law was purportedly
    codified by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.\14\ In
    the pursuit of enforcing such agreements, canons of statutory and
    contractual construction recognized domestically by an individual state
    may offer insight and even guidance as to what a party intended, but do
    not strictly apply.\15\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ ``The United States views most of the Vienna Convention as
    codifying customary international law.''
        ``Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about the Kyoto
    Protocol'', p. 3, FN 9. CRS Report for Congress (March 29, 2001). See
    also, e.g., http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/international.html. For
    text, see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. See FN 76
    infra for a discussion regarding who accedes to Vienna's terms. See
    also http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/
    chapterXXIII/treaty1.asp, for signatories and ratifications,
    reservations, and related details.
        \15\ Vienna Articles 31 and 32 open the door for such
    considerations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Individual agreements obtain their popular name, typically, from
    the site of some meaningful level of agreement, e.g., Ghent, Vienna,
    Rome, Kyoto.\16\ Occasionally a treaty is popularly characterized by
    its formal name, e.g., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (or
    GATT, agreed to in 1947, subsequently the subject of further rounds,
    e.g., its 8-year ``Uruguay Round,'' etc.).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ For a listing of such popular names, see http://
    untreaty.un.org/English/sample/SimpleSample.asp.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The agreed-to language emerging from organic treaty negotiations
    can, though does not universally, rise to the level of an enforceable
    treaty. That is, it can but does not always include sufficient detail
    to make it a ``meeting of the minds''. Even treaties open for
    ratification are not necessarily completed to the point of offering
    sufficient detail for coherent, uniform understanding and compliance.
    Indeed, states have ratified treaties including Kyoto despite numerous
    negotiations remaining to define what was actually agreed. The obvious
    problems associated with this phenomenon are discussed briefly, in
    ``Ratification'', infra. Regardless of whether the treaty terms declare
    the document open for ratification, such language is occasionally
    merely a starting point, or near thereto.\17\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ For a roadmap of how the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty
    Section, views the various stages of the treaty process, see http://
    untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyHandbook/hbframeset.htm. Specifically,
    see Kyoto, http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/treaties/
    l07a01.pdf), the basic treaty structure agreed to at the ``Third
    Conference of the Parties'' to the UNFCCC, or COP-3, the details of
    which were to be worked out at subsequent COPs. Since Kyoto, five COPs
    have taken place with another scheduled for October 2002, narrowing the
    treaty's broad assertions each time (with one exception; see discussion
    November 2000 Hague discussions in ``Ratification'', infra). The treaty
    was open for signature between March 1998 and March 1999. Kyoto has
    been open for ratification since March 1999. It goes into effect when
    ratification instruments are submitted by covered, or ``Annex I''
    countries (of which there are 36), representing 55 percent of 1990 GHG
    emissions.
        By the end of July 2002, 75 countries had submitted ratification
    instruments representing 35.8 percent of the covered 1990 GHG
    emissions, despite the necessity of negotiations to craft a document
    with sufficient detail to be enforceable. 55 of the 75 ratifying states
    are among the 140 states bearing no emission reduction obligations
    (whose tanks include large industrial players China, Mexico, Brazil,
    India, South Korea, Indonesia). This does leave Kyoto 19.2 percent shy
    of the 55 percent threshold to come into force, leaving solely Russia
    (17.4 percent) or the United States (36.1 percent) as determinative of
    Kyoto's fate.
        It is logical that countries with actual obligations proceed more
    deliberately given the undefined terms threaten real impact on them.
    Further, with treaty effectiveness at hand, recent COP negotiations
    indicate that remaining covered non-ratifying signatories are driving
    hard bargains to minimize the initial economic harm--or maximize
    initial economic gain, as the case may be. For example, due to its
    unique circumstances Russia stands to make quite a large sum from
    Kyoto. Upon becoming indispensable to Kyoto's fate, Russia secured
    larger allowances for sale of valuable ``sinks'' (see FN112, infra),
    and recently added debt forgiveness to their list of requirements in
    return for their determinative ratification.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The initial level of agreement is typically manifested by
    publication of the terms agreed, and listing the agreeing parties.\18\
    This is an at best a symbolic practice. That is, a state not
    ``agreeing'' to a document at its inception does not impede it from
    subsequently following the treaty's terms toward accession. Indeed,
    numerous countries not even signing, for example the Kyoto Protocol,
    ratified it nonetheless.\19\ It is theoretically possible, though not
    in the case of the United States, for a treaty to impose legally
    enforceable obligations at the ``agreement'' stage, given that some
    states' constitution permits such commitment by executive signature
    alone.\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ See Decision1/CP.3 of the Conference of the State Parties to
    the Convention at its third session (UNEP, UNFCCC). The U.S. State
    Department asserts that it agreed to Kyoto (``Treaty Actions'' page).
    ``Environment--Climate Change Amendments to Annex I of the Framework
    Convention on Climate Change of May 9, 1992. Adopted at Kyoto Dec. 11,
    1997. Entered into force Aug. 13, 1998. (http://www.state.gov/www/
    global/legal--affairs/treaty--actions.html).
        The Vienna Convention speaks to the process issue in Article 9,
    ``Adoption of the text'':
        ``1. The adoption of the text of a treaty takes place by the
    consent of all the States participating in its drawing up except as
    provided in paragraph 2.
        2. The adoption of the text of a treaty at an international
    conference takes place by the vote of two-thirds of the States present
    and voting, unless by the same majority they shall decide to apply a
    different rule.''
        \19\ ``Parties that have not yet signed the Kyoto Protocol may
    accede to it at any time.'' http://unfccc.int/ resource/convkp.html#kp.
    For examples of non-signatory ratifications, see http://
    untreaty.un.org/. Curiously, however, in response to a June 2002
    inquiry by the author as to the U.S. status under Kyoto given the
    ambiguity between President Bush's verbal ``rejection'' and the absence
    of a withdrawal, the Secretary General of the UNFCCC asserted the
    following: ``Simple signature does not affect entry into force which
    depends entirely on ratifications/accessions. Signature qualifies the
    signatory State to proceed to ratification, acceptance or approval.''
    This belies that several nations ratified Kyoto without signing the
    document. Further, the author's follow-up request as to whether this
    indicates the UNFCCC does not recognize the Vienna Convention has gone
    unanswered to date.
        \20\ See Vienna Article 12, ``Consent to be bound by a treaty
    expressed by signature'':
        ``1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by
    the signature of its representative when:
        (a) the treaty provides that signature shall have that effect;
        (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were
    agreed that signature should have that effect; or
        (c) the intention of the State to give that effect to the signature
    appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed
    during the negotiation.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The U.S. Constitution is more typical in that it requires a level
    of legislative concurrence with an executive treaty commitment for the
    treaty to be binding.\21\ The U.S. Constitution requires Senate
    ``advice and consent'' to any treaty prior to it coming into effect
    against the U.S., both the language and application of which having
    created tensions between our Constitution and international law. Treaty
    commitments inherently cede some level of sovereignty by transferring
    accountability to a supranational authority without the safeguards of
    our system, developing binding policy without the U.S. Constitution's
    checks and balances.\22\ Therefore these agreements, the permissibility
    of which was authorized by the Constitution, also inherently create
    tensions with its framework.\23\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2. Vienna acknowledges
    such requirements, recognizing exchange of instruments, ratification
    (also called acceptance or approval), accession, and deposit of
    instruments. See Vienna Articles 13, 14, 15 and 16 respectively.
        \22\ For example, ``the current version of [the North American Free
    Trade Agreement (NAFTA)] allows private litigants to challenge certain
    U.S. trade measures before a supranational panel, the decisions of
    which cannot be reviewed but must still be enforced by U.S. domestic
    courts.'' Rabkin at 4, citing NAFTA reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
    Art. 1904. Further, ``the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and its
    successor, NAFTA, already provide for appeals by private parties from
    U.S. administrative proceedings to supranational tribunals''. Rabkin at
    18. This latter reality clearly conflicts with Article III, Section 2,
    Clause 1: ``The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
    Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the Untied States,
    and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority''.
        Modern legal scholarship on the treaty power is thus reasonably
    analogized to the shift of authority away from states to the Federal
    Government that began with the New Deal in the 1930's. See Rabkin for a
    discussion of the comparison of diminution of constitutional limits on
    Federal power, and the treaty power.
        \23\ For example, the Constitution not only recognized ``a law of
    nations'' (in granting Congress the power to remedy offenses against
    same, Article I Section 8). The Framers provided treaties parity with
    the ``supreme law of the land'' (Article VI), or Federal statutes,
    despite that treaty bodies to which the U.S. accedes clearly may assume
    authorities and create rules in conflict with domestic law (not to
    mention the Constitution)(see Jay in Federalist No. 64).
        Vienna Article 27 offers the provocative assertion: ``Internal law
    and observance of treaties: A party may not invoke the provisions of
    its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.
    This rule is without prejudice to article 46.'' The latter provision
    tempers the friction somewhat, enabling a U.S. constitutional defense:
    `` Invalidity of Treaties, Article 46, Provisions of internal law
    regarding competence to conclude treaties:
        1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by
    a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal
    law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its
    consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its
    internal law of fundamental importance.
        2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to
    any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal
    practice and in good faith.''
        This paper does not explore such tensions and what areas treaties
    may permissibly seek to resolve, instead restricting its discussion to
    the treaty process. For a detailed discussion on this and limitations
    on the treaty power, see Rabkin.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Treaty negotiations formally involve only participant states,
    although in multilateral negotiations a (not quite) quasi-formal role
    exists for interested--and U.N. approved--third parties. These
    nongovernmental organizations, or NGO's, if approved obtain credentials
    and participate in the summits in an informal capacity.\24\ They are
    provided access to negotiators, attendance in plenary and subsidiary
    body sessions, and briefings denied the public but have no voting or
    formal negotiating role. NGO's are, in short, lobbying organizations.
    The UN's system is akin to a more controlled (i.e., subjectively
    selective) version of the pre-1995 U.S. Congressional practice of
    issuing special passes allowing special access.\25\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ Controversy has arisen in recent years over the reluctance of
    particular U.N. bodies to accommodate or even recognize groups less
    inclined to support particular treaty efforts. Such groups are
    typically fairly characterized as ``conservative'' advocacy groups. See
    FN 34, infra.
        \25\ See http://www.ngo.org/. The UN-sponsored NGO interface is the
    NGO Network, which happens to be sponsored by the U.N. It asserts the
    goal of NGO's is to ``more effectively partner with the United Nations
    and each other to create a more peaceful, just, equitable and
    sustainable world for this and future generations.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        There are four necessary stages prior to a treaty taking binding
    effect against the United States. This is typical of most systems, with
    minor exceptions. These stages are, in this order: agreement;
    signature--a discrete window for which is provided by each treaty;
    ratification--also provided for in each treaty;\26\ and submission of
    ratification instruments.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ International law and individual treaties recognize
    differential requirements, from unilateral power of binding commitment
    in an executive to some version of legislative approval. See Vienna,
    e.g., Article 14.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Also relevant are post-ratification requirements--is a treaty self-
    implementing, or does it require implementing legislation?--and
    withdrawal--at what point is a commitment real enough that withdrawal
    is required, and how is it effected at various relevant stages?
        This paper examines this process and certain implications arising
    from the stages of treaty agreement. It particularly explores unsettled
    questions regarding modern application of ``advice and consent'',
    including the scenario where an executive eschews ``advice'', what
    requirements exist of the U.S. post-signature but prior to Senate
    ``consent'', must a president transmit a treaty to the Senate before
    the Senate may attempt ``consent'', and which branch of government may
    withdraw us at what stage, and how? It also examines the burgeoning
    role of NGO's in the treaty process.
        Thus discussion occurs principally in the context of the Kyoto
    Protocol. That unique agreement is signed, but not ratified.\27\
    President Bush assures Americans that by his being unhappy with the
    U.S. signature on the document the U.S. has ``rejected'' it, yet the
    signature remains unmolested. Compare this with the Rome Treaty, the
    Administration's rhetorical ``rejection'' of which was identical yet
    followed by formal expression of this position to the U.N. consistent
    with Vienna Article 18.\28\ Also, the Bush State Department has in fact
    actually rejected a request to submit an instrument to the same effect.
    Kyoto's highly charged politics, and the treaty-status limbo those
    political pressures have yielded begs so many questions that it
    provides an excellent vehicle to study the relative commitments
    accompanying each step.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ One need not look beyond the ``environmental'' context to find
    numerous such agreements, e.g., various individual Protocols to the
    1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the Basel
    Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
    Wastes and their Disposal, the Convention on Environmental Impact
    Assessment in a Transboundary Context, and so on. The relevant inquiry,
    as discussed herein in the Kyoto and Rome contexts, is what risk does
    an ambiguous status regarding a particular instrument pose.
        \28\ See letter to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, http://
    www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            role of nongovernmental ngo's in the treaty process\29\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ For a comprehensive assessment of NGO participation, see
    Sheehan, ``Global Greens'' (Capital Research Center, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Treaty negotiations occur at formal summits, as well as intervening
    subsidiary body and preparatory sessions, all of which when conducted
    under the auspices of the United Nations do not limit participation to
    potential signatory states. Nongovernmental organizations, representing
    any conceivable interest group so long as approved by the United
    Nations, are permitted a quasi-formal role.\30\ According to the U.N.
    Department of Public Information (DPI), NGO Section:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \30\ Generally, and the DPI disclaimer, supra, notwithstanding,
    members of accredited NGO's are accorded preferred access and
    privileges not available to the public, to facilitate interaction with
    U.N. operations, which interaction can vary based on the subject matter
    discipline involved. See http://www.ngo.org/ index2.htm, link to ``NGO
    Access to UNHQ''. Indeed, UNDPI/NGO asserts: ``The Department of Public
    Information and NGO's cooperate regularly. NGO's associated with DPI
    disseminate information about the U.N. to their membership, thereby
    building knowledge of and support for the Organization at the
    grassroots level. This dissemination includes: Publicizing U.N.
    activities around the world on such issues as peace and security,
    economic and social development, human rights, humanitarian affairs and
    international law; Promoting U.N. observances and international years
    established by the General Assembly to focus world attention on
    important issues facing humanity.'' See http://www.ngo.org/index2.htm,
    link to ``applications for associative status with DPI''. The general
    public is not permitted access to functions. A state's delegation,
    however, may include parties who do not have negotiating authority and
    who need not even hold some governmental post, though they are afforded
    full access, and limited participation. Senator Al Gore was a member of
    the United States delegation to Rio, from which perch he vocally
    criticized the delegation. Also, NGO participation is feasible, for
    example, in bilateral negotiations, if the parties agree.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``A non-governmental organization is any non-profit, voluntary
    citizens' group which is organized on a local, national or
    international level. Task-oriented and driven by people with a common
    interest, NGO's perform a variety of services and humanitarian
    functions, bring citizens' concerns to Governments, monitor policies
    and encourage political participation at the community level. They
    provide analysis and expertise, serve as early warning mechanisms and
    help monitor and implement international agreements. Some are organized
    around specific issues, such as human rights, the environment or
    health. Their relationship with offices and agencies of the United
    Nations System differs depending on their goals, their venue and their
    mandate.
        Over 1,500 NGO's with strong information programmes on issues of
    concern to the United Nations are associated with the Department of
    Public Information (DPI), giving the United Nations valuable links to
    people around the world. DPI helps those NGO's gain access to and
    disseminate information about the range of issues in which the United
    Nations is involved, to enable the public to understand better the aims
    and objectives of the world Organization.''\31\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \31\ See http://www.ngo.org/index2.htm, link to ``applications for
    associative status with DPI''. This dynamic began, according to UNDPI,
    ``The importance of working with and through NGO's as an integral part
    of United Nations information activities was recognized when the
    Department of Public Information was first established in 1946. The
    General Assembly, in its resolution 13 (I), instructed DPI and its
    branch offices to ``' . . . actively assist and encourage national
    information services, educational institutions and other governmental
    and non-governmental organizations of all kinds interested in spreading
    information about the United Nations. For this and other purposes, it
    should operate a fully equipped reference service, brief or supply
    lecturers, and make available its publications, documentary films, film
    strips, posters and other exhibits for use by these agencies and
    organizations.' In 1968, the Economic and Social Council, by Resolution
    1297 (XLIV) of 27 May, called on DPI to associate NGO's, bearing in
    mind the letter and spirit of its Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May
    1968, which stated that an NGO``. . . shall undertake to support the
    work of the United Nations and to promote knowledge of its principles
    and activities, in accordance with its own aims and purposes and the
    nature and scope of its competence and activities''. Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The process for becoming an accredited NGO is subjective, offering
    the United Nations discretion in who or what group it allows for what
    purpose(s). Recently, on an ad hoc basis, the relevant accrediting body
    has requested information on financial donors and required proof of an
    international presence as conditions precedent of selective (and, to
    the author's knowledge, exclusively ``conservative'') NGO's.
        UNDPI criteria for NGO's to become associated with DPI are as
    follow:
        ``Organizations eligible for association with DPI are those which:
          Share the ideals of the U.N. Charter;
          Operate solely on a not-for-profit basis;
          Have a demonstrated interest in United Nations issues and
    proven ability to reach large or specialized audiences, such as
    educators, media representatives, policymakers and the business
    community;
          Have the commitment and means to conduct effective
    information programmes about U.N. activities by publishing newsletters,
    bulletins, and pamphlets; organizing conferences, seminars and round
    tables; and enlisting the cooperation of the media.''\32\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \32\ See http://www.ngo.org/index2.htm, ``applications for
    associative status with DPI''.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        UNDPI describes the procedure to become an associated NGO as
    follows:
        ``An NGO that meets the established criteria should send an
    official letter from its headquarters to the Chief of the NGO Section,
    Department of Public Information, expressing interest in association
    with DPI. The letter should state the reasons why the organization
    seeks such association and should briefly describe its information
    programmes. This letter should be accompanied by at least six samples
    of recent information materials produced by the applying organization.
    Letters of reference from U.N. Departments, U.N. Programmes and
    Specialized Agencies, and/or U.N. Information Centres and Services
    (UNICs and UNISs) will greatly enhance consideration of the
    application.
        Once the application process is completed, the DPI Committee on
    Non-Governmental Organizations will review applications at its
    scheduled sessions. Applicants are notified immediately of the results
    of the Committee's deliberations. Associated NGO's are then invited to
    designate their main and alternate representatives to the Department of
    Public Information.
        Please note: Association of NGO's with DPI does not constitute
    their incorporation into the United Nations system, nor does it entitle
    associated organizations or their staff to any kind of privileges,
    immunities or special status.''\33\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \33\ Id. See FN 30, supra, re: disclaimer/privileges.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Clearly, the application process is subjective and, arguably,
    institutionally biased toward participation by a preponderance of
    groups considered sympathetic to the relevant summit's cause (that is,
    against dissent).\34\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ See http://www.ngo.org/index2.htm, link to ``applications for
    associative status with DPI''. The UN's NGO home page offers a feel for
    the type of organizations it seeks to include, the description of which
    rings of the U.N. endorsement of its typical endeavors, with which the
    NGO's are to have input: ``Its aim is to help promote collaborations
    between NGO's throughout the world, so that together we can more
    effectively partner with the United Nations and each other to create a
    more peaceful, just, equitable and sustainable world for this and
    future generations.'' That is, organizations whose application
    reference materials demonstrate opposition to UN-sponsored initiatives
    face an adversarial review of their application. For a report on bias
    in the selection process, see, e.g., http://www.washtimes.com/national/
    20020511-32784532. htm, in the context of the 2002 U.N child Summit
    (UNICEF).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For an example of NGO participation, consider the 1992 the U.N.
    Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED or ``Earth Summit'')
    in Rio de Janeiro, likely the largest treaty summit in recent memory,
    though soon to be eclipsed by ``Rio-plus-10'' the World Summit on
    Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, August 2002. Rio is commonly
    recognized as ushering in the boom era of mass NGO participation. Rio
    has the added relevance for these purposes as being the session that
    produced, inter alia, the UNFCCC,\35\ that the Kyoto Protocol amends by
    making its universal voluntary ``commitments'' mandatory for certain
    among the world's economic powers.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ See http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/treaties/
    conv.htm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the summer of 1992, as the United States Presidential and
    general elections prepared to launch, nations of the world convened in
    Rio for the UNCED under the guise of the United Nations Environment
    Programme (UNEP), which is under the direction of the U.N. General
    Assembly.\36\ Numerous non-binding, in effect, position papers were
    generated with great effort, though disagreement tended to be more
    fairly characterized as disputes over whose priority was granted
    highest esteem.\37\ Several other documents emerged from the fortnight-
    long diplomacy, the binding nature of which are arguable given a great
    degree of voluntariness but which nonetheless rose to the level of
    ``treaty''.\38\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \36\ See http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html.
        \37\ Among the international ``agreements'' being developed were
    the Rio Declaration, and the similar if much more exhaustive (600
    pages) Agenda 21. These were enormous if non-binding documents
    containing a lot of ``shoulds'', but as accurately characterized by the
    Cato Institute's P.J. O'Rourke, each ``having the same approximate
    force in law as a note passed in study hall.'' (All the Troubles in the
    World, p. 214, 1994).
        \38\ See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, actually
    finalized in Rio. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1760, p. 79; and
    depositary notification C.N.329.1996.TREATIES-2 of 18 March 1996.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Participants at Rio included delegations from all recognized
    national governments including scores of heads of state. 95 NGO's plus
    numerous among their subsidiaries were accredited representing
    national, regional and international common interests or agendas. These
    interests ranged from scientific and even architectural and various
    other professional societies, industry and laborers, gender and
    environmentalist pressure groups and/or their legal arms, spiritual to
    indigenous peoples.\39\ These were condensed in practice at the summit
    under the ``Global Forum,'' to centralize their presence, and voice.
    The latter act presumes NGO support for the summit undertakings.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \39\ See UNFCCC NGO roster, at http://unfccc.int/sessions/97feb/
    ngo.htm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        NGO activities ranged from the informal--media availabilities,
    pamphlet and newsletter distribution--to quasi-formal--presentation of
    the product of petition drives before the plenary and subsidiary body
    sessions.\40\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \40\ For the schedule of Johannesburg NGO events, see http://
    www.worldsummit.org.za/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Though NGO's have no formal vote or role at negotiations, efforts
    have been underway for some time to find paying roles for NGO's in
    implementing and monitoring compliance with treaty agreements.
    Specifically, for example, environmentalist advocates seek a formal
    paying role as an independent auditing and verification monitors of
    company and country GHG emissions/reductions.\41\ Indeed, domestically,
    NGO's have already received literally millions of taxpayer dollars to
    advocate Kyoto.\42\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \41\ Under Kyoto this would be pursuant to Article 17: ``The
    Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles,
    modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification,
    reporting and accountability for emissions trading. ``
        \42\ See, e.g., ``Cashing in on Global Warming'', http://
    www.cei.org/gencon/005,01248.cfm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Many agreements, be they addressing environment or human rights,
    offer the potential for such business opportunities. That is one way
    the NGO's elevate their ``negotiating'' presence. They do have
    potential interests at stake to pursue, just as they possess an
    impressive media presence and potentially valuable approval to grant to
    or withhold from parties.
        Representatives of groups directly impacted by potential
    commitments--industry and labor--were fairly limited in Rio
    (approximately 20 percent of the accredited NGO's) and fairly split
    between those standing to lose economic activity--anti-energy-
    suppression interests such as the coal industry, energy users, mine
    workers--and those seeking ``rents'' through GHG restrictions with
    mechanisms such as credit-trading schemes.\43\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \43\ For example, an immediate post-negotiation internal Enron
    memo, dated December 12 1997 and written by the Enron Corp. 's
    representative attending Kyoto, excitedly described Kyoto as
    ``precisely what [Enron has] been lobbying for,'' cited numerous
    ``wins'', and concluded: ``This agreement will be good for Enron
    stock!!'' The reasons for Enron's advocacy are numerous, and similar to
    various other business NGO participants'. Enron held positions as owner
    of the world's largest wind turbine manufacturer and half owner of the
    world's largest solar energy venture, both of which would have faced
    tremendously increased markets under Kyoto's effective requirement of
    dramatically lowered fossil fuel use (particularly coal) among
    developed countries. For similar reasons, Enron faced tremendous
    earnings prospects from its large natural gas holdings and its gas
    pipeline network, the world's largest outside of Gazprom. For
    disclosure, the author briefly worked for Enron, during which time this
    effort was a source of disagreement.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        By the time of the July 2002 ``COP 6.5'' in Bonn, Germany,
    sufficient ``industry'' NGO's, falsely presumed as a matter of practice
    to be ``anti-Kyoto'', attended that the U.S. State Department had
    informally begun addressing two discrete constituencies in separate,
    restricted briefings. This did not accurately bifurcate the ideological
    or substantive positions of the groups, but rather manifest a common
    predisposition--that State representatives simply had to know was
    false--that Kyoto, and environmental agreements generally, created a
    clash of ``industry vs. environmentalists.'' In fact, industry groups
    are among the most aggressive ``direct'' pro-treaty lobbying forces at
    treaty negotiations and elsewhere, and aggressive in their indirect
    advocacy (funding green and business advocacy groups).\44\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \44\ Re: the former, see, e.g., Alexander Cockburn, ``An Enron Tale
    of Strange Bedfellows,'' Los Angeles Times (December 28, 2001). The
    latter is manifested by the ``Business Council for a Sustainable Energy
    Future'' and its European counterpart, constituted by (at the time)
    Enron and like-minded interests.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Therefore, while State deemed a separation of ideologies as
    appropriate it did so such that pro-Kyoto NGO's constituted one group,
    while the other advocacy section supposedly competing for State's ear
    consisted of a deeply split ``Industry'' cadre, despite pro-Kyoto
    industry being at least equally represented as Kyoto opponents. This
    skews the NGO input at least so far as concerns the U.S. delegation,
    offering pro-Kyoto NGO advocates a de facto greater advocacy role.\45\
    This matters because, as discussed, infra, the U.S. has not withdrawn
    from Kyoto but retains its signature and continues to send a full
    delegation to negotiations, even if they curiously assume a reduced
    role.\46\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \45\ For NGO claims of influence see ``Greens' Success at Kyoto'',
    http://www.cei.org/gencon/014,02873.cfm
        \46\ See FN 123, infra.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In conclusion, treaty negotiations take place among delegates,
    though NGO's serve as welcome pressure groups, with a limited formal
    role but a select membership chosen by proponents of the agreement on
    the table.
             the treaty power under the united states constitution
        In the United States, treaty power is governed by Article II
    Section 2 of the Constitution, stating ``[The President] shall have
    Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
    Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur''.
    Therefore, the Executive may negotiate agreements, the terms of which
    do not, pursuant to our own Constitution, become effective against the
    U.S. until and unless the Senate ratifies the agreement by two-thirds
    of those voting.\47\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \47\ This clearly does not require 67 votes as is often asserted.
    ``Although the number of Senators who must be present is not specified,
    the Senate's practice with respect to major treaties is to conduct the
    final treaty vote at a time when most Senators are available.'' See,
    ``Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S.
    Senate'', p. 11, at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
    getdoc.cgi?dbname= 106--cong--senate--print&docid=f:66922.pdf. Compare
    this ``present'' requirement with other ``two thirds'' requirements,
    Article I, Section 5, regarding House impeachments; Article I Section 7
    re: veto override; and Article V re: proposing amendments to the
    Constitution.
        Hamilton addressed the deliberation over two-thirds of those
    ``present'', vs. of the body as constituted, in Federalist No. 75.
    There, he identified the fear about ``as constituted'', that a minority
    of Senators could impede ratification through simple, convenient
    absences. See ``Consent'', infra, for further discussion.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It does not seem there was any doubt during its formulation that
    the Constitution would permit treaties, which, to the extent they
    transfer any authority outside of the system the Constitution
    established, potentially threaten the very document authorizing such
    agreements. Discussion of the treaty power among the Framers appears
    principally confined to the necessity to concentrate it at the Federal
    level, so as to not be ``liable to the infractions of 13 different
    legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction,
    acting under the authority of those legislatures'', and thus ``protect
    the faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole union.''\48\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \48\ See Hamilton, Federalist No. 22, sentiments repeated by
    Madison in Federalist No. 44.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In Federalist No. 64 Jay addressed an apparent, similar multiple
    actor problem but through vesting the treaty power in a dynamic,
    impressionable ``popular assembly'', advocating instead housing
    principal authority in the executive. In Federalist No. 69 Hamilton
    weighed the merits of vesting the power solely in the executive, musing
    over what he later described as ``the trite topic of the intermixture
    of powers,'' albeit one addressed amongst the Framers ``with no small
    degree of vehemence.''\49\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \49\ Federalist No. 75.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Arguably, modern conflicts arising from signed-but-not ratified
    treaties are a problem easily avoided, or at least mitigated, were the
    treaty power fixed solely within one branch (certainly, if with the
    Executive). Still, the practical, political problems discussed herein,
    borne of the simple bifurcation of authority, do not seem to have
    registered discussion by the Framers. One can safely presume this is
    because the Framers did not envision ``permanent alliances'' becoming
    so profuse that hundreds of modern instruments would emerge to the
    extent even of addressing unification of road signals.
        Pertinent to this discussion, the Framers likely also could not
    envision commission to a treaty such as Kyoto: international agreements
    to curb domestic behavior to retard what is inarguably a marginal
    contribution to a hypothetical risk--man-made climate change--even in
    advance of science advancing the hypothesis some appreciable degree
    toward knowledge. Similarly, it is difficult to fathom the Framers
    envisioning administration of their creation such that scores of
    treaties would receive an executive signature yet never face Senate
    consideration. Times change, and with them perspectives. As Rabkin
    plainly asserts ``[l]egal scholars no longer take the constitutional
    strictures of earlier times so seriously.''\50\ Now, ``in the view of
    legal scholars, anything might be the proper subject of a treaty.''\51\
    This, in an undeniable spiral of cheapening the seriousness of
    ``permanent alliances'' against which President Washington warned in
    his Farewell Address.\52\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \50\ ``Sovereignty'' at 18. The same can be said for policymakers,
    be they elected, appointed or career. See Chief Justice Hughes'
    admonition, supra.
        \51\ Id. at 22.
        \52\ Farewell Address, delivered on September 17, 1796. Washington
    similarly urged that the US must ``Act for ourselves and not for
    others,'' by forming an ``American character wholly free of foreign
    attachments.'' See http://www.house.gov/paul/tst/tst2002/tst041502.htm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        One constitutional ambiguity arises in the question of which
    agreements rise to the level of a ``treaty'' requiring Senate
    ratification?\53\ Further, notwithstanding the ratification
    requirement, the treaty process inherently requires executive
    commitment of a sort. What are the other implications of such a
    commitment, now that we have seen that this practice does not in fact
    even serve the protocol function of a qualifying a state for
    ratification?\54\ Can an Executive validly agree to treaty language
    circumventing constitutional requirements?\55\ These questions and
    their answers, to the extent they exist, are exemplar of the murky
    nature of this field of law, driven in practice less by established
    legal rules than protocol. This curiosity extends to U.S. practice,
    whereby both the executive branch and Senate operate on the presumption
    that the Senate may not consider a treaty until a President transmits
    it to the Senate, though such requirement is found neither in the
    Constitution nor U.S. laws.\56\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \53\ This issue arises from other powers found in Article II of the
    Constitution, specifically the Executive Power Clause (Section I), the
    Commander-in-Chief Clause (Section 2) and, most interesting, the duty
    to take Care that the laws are ``faithfully executed'', which concludes
    Section 3. ``Where the powers of the President are exclusive--as the
    Commander in Chief power--the President may make an international
    agreement solely on his own. Such agreements are often called sole
    executive agreements.'' National Treaty Law and Practice (Austria,
    Chile, Columbia, Netherlands, U.S.) eds. Monroe Leigh, Merritt R.
    Blakeslee, and L. Benjamin Ederington. Washington, DC, American Society
    of International Law 1999, Chapter 6, National Treaty Law and Practice:
    United States (Robert E. Dalton), ``Section G, Legal Bases for
    Agreements Not Formally Approved By the Legislature''. See http://
    www.asil.org/ dalton.pdf. This document offers an extensive discussion
    of this issue, including a discussion of United States v. Belmont (301
    U.S. 324 (1937)), involving an intermingling in one document of
    assignment of funds and U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union. There,
    the Court asserted as regards the particular agreement at issue, ``[A]n
    international compact, as this was, is not always a treaty that
    requires the participation of the Senate,'' but in this case an
    exercise of the President's power to enter executive agreement pursuant
    to his independent authority. Id. at 330.
        The Court asserted limits to the reach of this duty to ``take
    Care'', in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
    The Court determined that President Truman usurped the lawmaking power
    of Congress by his claim of independent constitutional authority to
    take control of and operate the nation's steel mills during the Korean
    War on the basis of on an ``inherent'' power to protect the well-being
    and safety of the Nation as well as his Article II exclusive powers as
    Commander-in-Chief and executive.
        Finally, see also ``Treaties and Other International Agreements:
    The Role of the U.S. Senate'', pp. 25-26, at http://
    frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106--cong--senate--
    print &docid=f:66922.pdf.
        The State Department defines ``treaty'' as follows: ``International
    agreements (regardless of their title, designation, or form) whose
    entry into force with respect to the United States takes place only
    after the Senate has given its advice and consent''. See ``Department
    of State Circular 175, Procedures on Treaties'', Foreign Affairs
    Manual, 11 FAM 700, Treaties and Other International Agreements,
    TL:POL-36, Revised February 25, 1985, Sec. 11 FAM 721.2
    ``Constitutional Requirements''.
        The Vienna Convention, Article 2, defines ``treaty'' for its
    purposes as: ``an international agreement concluded between States in
    written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
    single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever
    its particular designation''.
        \54\ See ``Signature'' discussion, infra.
        \55\ A simple answer might seem to be that the Constitution cannot
    be read to permit commitments in violation of its terms, which terms
    may only be amended by the prescribed amendment process. Things are not
    that simple, however, such that this question is beyond the scope of
    this paper. See Rabkin, pp. 10-22. Commitments raising this tension are
    nonetheless made. Consider the Vienna Convention, a document that
    claims to bind parties to such documents, to some degree, by mere
    signature. Does that signature in fact violate the Constitution? Can a
    signatory state plausibly claim they are not bound to any degree by a
    treaty that acknowledges signature as imputing a level of pre-
    ratification commitment?
        \56\ See discussion of ``Submission,'' infra. Senate rules indicate
    it has indirectly established ``transmission'' as a condition
    precedent. These rules do not, however, make clear that the Foreign
    Relations Committee can refuse to consider a treaty on the basis that
    it was never transmitted--an unlikely controversy. A more likely battle
    would pit a White House opposed to ratification objecting to FRC
    consideration of a treaty on the basis that there was never a
    transmittal. The prospect of such a conflict, though facially bizarre
    prospect given a president apparently retains the right to effectively
    withdraw the U.S. signature until some point in the pre-ratification
    stage (pre-transmittal, or pre-vote, or post-defeat but returned to
    Committee as pending matter). See, e.g., http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
    ps/2002/9968.htm.
        These prospects further warrant consideration not merely because
    the signature by an executive poses some level of commitment to a
    treaty's objectives, if not its specific terms. Consider also a Senate
    and White House deeply divided, rhetorically at least, over a signed-
    but-not-ratified treaty as they appear to be over Kyoto, and the
    potential showdown over ``advice and consent'' which that conflict
    poses.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Congress has formalized this delegation power, for certain
    Presidential authorities regarding the conduct of foreign affairs, in
    the State Department's authorizing statute.\57\ In practice this
    delegation includes signing (and withdrawing from) treaties.\58\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \57\ ``22 U.S.C. Sec. 2656.--Management of foreign affairs. The
    Secretary of State shall perform such duties as shall from time to time
    be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the President relative to
    correspondences, commissions, or instructions to or with public
    ministers or consuls from the United States, or to negotiations with
    public ministers from foreign states or princes, or to memorials or
    other applications from foreign public ministers or other foreigners,
    or to such other matters respecting foreign affairs as the President of
    the United States shall assign to the Department, and he shall conduct
    the business of the Department in such manner as the President shall
    direct.'' It is certainly this general authority that State exercised
    in notifying the U.N. that the US has no intention to be bound by the
    Rome Treaty (its 6 May 2002 letter to U.N. Secretary General Annan (see
    text at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm).
        \58\ See e.g. Kyoto, signed by USA's functioning U.N. Ambassador,
    Peter Burleigh. See http://www.bellona. no/en/b3/air/climate/buenos--
    aires/10952.html.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The requirement of Senate ``Advice'' is not as straightforward as a
    plain reading of Article II intimates. Here, Kyoto also offers an
    interesting case study, as a treaty entered in spite of formal if non-
    binding (and unsolicited) Senate advice.\59\ An Executive eschewing
    Senate advice does not as a matter of law doom a treaty as failing to
    meet constitutional muster. An Executive subsequently nullifying the
    U.S. signature, or a Senate vote on ratification, should be the final
    word on that though, again matters in practice have not developed quite
    so simply.\60\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \59\ ``Byrd-Hagel,'' S.Res. 98 105th Congress (105-54, 1997). The
    operative language is as follows: ``Resolved, That it is the sense of
    the Senate that----
        (1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to,
    or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention
    on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997,
    or thereafter, which would----
        (A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
    emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
    agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or
    reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within
    the same compliance period, or
        (B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United
    States''.
        Kyoto nonetheless emerged, clearly not satisfying Byrd-Hagel
    condition (1)(A), by differentiating not only between 36 ``covered''
    countries, but by differentiating the commitments among those
    countries. Regarding condition (1)(B), among prominent economic
    analysts only the Clinton White House's Council of Economic Advisors,
    contended that no ``serious economic harm''. President Clinton never
    submitted the treaty to the Senate over the course of the remaining 27
    months of his presidency. Upon leaving office the relevant CEA
    professionals publicly amended their assertions regarding Kyoto's
    economic impact. (See USA Today, June 12, 2001). See discussion of
    ``Advice, infra.
        A fair question is: which is the more constitutionally offensive
    practice? 1) Eschewing advice and committing to a treaty yet not
    offering the Senate its opportunity to consent or disapprove; or 2)
    rescinding the U.S. signature from one ``rejected'', signed-but-never-
    submitted treaty, on the express basis that ``even without
    ratification, the president's signature conveys standing and a U.S.
    obligation to support and not undermine the Treaty'' (see Rumsfeld
    comments, p. 27, infra), yet not similarly treating other rhetorically
    ``rejected'' agreements.
        \60\ ``(6) Treaties Reported by the [Foreign Relations] Committee
    but neither approved nor formally returned to the President by the
    Senate are automatically returned to the Committee calendar at the end
    of a Congress; the Committee must report them out again for the Senate
    to consider them.'' Therefore, a ``defeated'' treaty is not necessarily
    rejected until it is returned to the President. See ``Treaties and
    Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate'', p. 12;
    see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov /cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106--
    cong--senate--print&docid=f:66922.pdf. The Senate may also keep a
    ``defeated'' treaty alive by adopting or entering a motion to
    reconsider. Id. at 3.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The concerns raised by an Executive ``freelancing'' treaty
    commitments without seeking or heeding Senate advice can be further
    compounded by a treaty barring the standard practice of a party to set
    forth objections and/or reservations.\61\ It is through such objections
    and reservations, asserted by the Senate as a condition of
    ratification, that makes policy development by supranational bodies
    constitutionally tolerable given their lack of checks and balances, and
    limited accountability.\62\ Yet the U.S. agreed to and then signed the
    Kyoto Protocol despite it having exacerbated the sin of omission of
    seeking Senate advice with the rare, express prohibition of
    reservations.\63\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \61\ ``The conditions included by the Senate in its resolutions of
    advice and consent to ratification fall into four general categories:
    reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos.'' National
    Treaty Law and Practice (Austria, Chile, Columbia, Netherlands, U.S.)
    eds. Monroe Leigh, Merritt R. Blakeslee, and L. Benjamin Ederington.
    Washington, DC, American Society of International Law 1999, Chapter 6,
    National Treaty Law and Practice: United States (Robert E. Dalton), p.
    6.
        Vienna Article 2 defines ``reservation'' as: ``a unilateral
    statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing,
    ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it
    purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions
    of the treaty in their application to that State''. Part Two of Vienna,
    Articles 19-23, address reservations exclusively.
        \62\ See, e.g., Rabkin, p.ix.
        \63\ Kyoto Article 26 asserts, in toto: ``No reservations may be
    made to this Protocol.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report serving as the
    Senate's most formal statement on these matters outside of Standing
    Senate Rules states the following regarding nearly this precise
    circumstance, except for the compounding factor of eschewing advice
    prior to the ``no reservation'' constraint:
        ``Some multilateral treaties have contained an article prohibiting
    reservations. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has taken the
    position that the executive branch negotiators should not agree to this
    prohibition. The Senate has given its advice and consent to a few
    treaties containing the prohibition, but the committee has stated that
    approval of these treaties should not be construed as a precedent for
    such clauses in future treaties. It has further stated that the
    President's agreement to such a clause could not constrain the Senate's
    right and obligation to attach reservations to its advice and
    consent.''\64\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \64\ ``Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the
    U.S. Senate'', p. 2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Specifically addressing the UNFCCC, which the Senate nonetheless
    quickly ratified despite its own ``no reservations'' clause, the same
    Report cautions ``The Foreign Relations Committee has cautioned the
    administration that Senate consent in these cases should not be
    construed as a precedent.''\65\ The Report went on to caution against
    any attempt to alter the UNFCCC's voluntary scheme by committing to
    mandatory reductions, asserting any such commitment would require
    ratification.\66\ The Report then recites Senate intervention when the
    negotiations appeared to be headed toward not merely binding
    commitments requiring subsequent ratification, but differential
    commitments among parties with likely serious U.S. economic
    impacts.\67\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \65\ Id. at p. 274.
        \66\ Id. at 276.
        \67\ ``In mid-1997, as these negotiations were underway, the Senate
    passed S. Res. 98, which stated that the Senate would not approve any
    agreement on binding reductions in greenhouse gases that did not
    include commitments by developing countries as well as developed/
    industrialized countries, or that would result in harm to the U.S.
    economy. The administration has not transmitted the Kyoto Protocol to
    the Senate because, among other reasons, developing countries have to
    date not been willing to consider making binding commitments regarding
    their greenhouse gas emissions.'' Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Kyoto nonetheless emerged as such a ``take it or leave it''
    document but with no ``fast-track'' type authorization or abdication.
    Indeed, it is fair to say the opposite vote was registered though non-
    binding by necessity given the nature and timing of such a preemptive
    strike. NAFTA can therefore hardly be analogized to Kyoto as both
    having been similarly foisted upon the Senate, though it is noteworthy
    that the composition of Congress can certainly change measurably in the
    interim between fast-track approval (or Byrd-Hagel) and the opportunity
    to offer consent.
        This combination found in Kyoto of not obtaining (ignoring) Senate
    advice and restricting permissible consent is constitutionally
    indefensible in theory, though it does not impede Senate ratification.
    Indeed, it is now accepted practice for Congress to offer advance
    approval of suspending the Senate ability to provide objections and/or
    reservations when voting on ratification of specific agreements.\68\
    ``Some scholars have pointed out the constitutional difficulties of
    this scheme, but it did not raise any great controversy.''\69\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \68\ See, e.g., S. 2062 (107th Congress), ``The Comprehensive Trade
    Negotiating Authority Act of 2002''. The express logic behind providing
    this authority is to provide the President's negotiators the ability to
    strike deals not subject to subsequent modification as a condition of
    ratification, and their counterparts confidence in U.S. promises. It is
    arguable that congressional approval of such authority constitutes
    advice, if uninformed advice, still conditioned upon Senate
    ratification of the deal itself.
        \69\ Rabkin at 18.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Signature
        Individual agreements provide a window during which the document
    may be signed. For example, the Kyoto Protocol, agreed to in December
    1997, was open for Party signature for a finite period of 1 year. As
    discussed, supra, that window and/or failure to sign the document were
    meaningless, as non-signatories subsequently ratified the Protocol.
    Whether signing the document is meaningless, however, is discussed,
    infra. The U.S. signed Kyoto on 12 November 1998.
        It is clear from Article II, Section 2 that the Executive has the
    power to negotiate agreements if not de jure unilateral power to craft
    their content. This power to negotiate treaties doubtless includes the
    ability to make various, sub-ratification levels of commitment such as
    agreement and signature, so long as the agreement makes no pretense of
    abrogating the ratification requirement.\70\ The ``advice'' limitation
    on this negotiating power is subject to Senate forgiveness (for the
    failure to seek advice), via providing consent nonetheless.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \70\ See Rabkin pp. 12-16.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Most treaties provide for a discrete signing function as a
    condition precedent to being eligible to accede via ratification.\71\
    Signatures may be challenged but barring such challenge are presumed
    valid.\72\ Questions arise, certainly in the recent contexts of the
    Rome Treaty and Kyoto Protocol, of other signature implications. Like
    most individual treaty documents ``customary law'' and its
    ``codification'' the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties\73\
    recognize the requirement of many systems of legislative approval for
    an agreement's specific terms to be binding.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \71\ See FN 19, supra. Kyoto Article 24 states: ``1) . . . This
    Protocol shall be open for accession from the day after the date on
    which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification,
    acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the
    Depositary. 2. Any regional economic integration organization which
    becomes a Party to this Protocol without any of its member States being
    a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under this Protocol. In
    the case of such organizations, one or more of whose member States is a
    Party to this Protocol, the organization and its member States shall
    decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of
    their obligations under this Protocol. In such cases, the organization
    and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under
    this Protocol concurrently. 3. In their instruments of ratification,
    acceptance, approval or accession, regional economic integration
    organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect
    to the matters governed by this Protocol. These organizations shall
    also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of
    any substantial modification in the extent of their competence.''
        \72\ Vienna sets forth generally, followed by an illustrative
    roster of, who may commit a state: ``Article 7, Full powers: 1. A
    person is considered as representing a State for the purpose of
    adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of
    expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty if:
        (a) he produces appropriate full powers; or (b) it appears from the
    practice of the States concerned or from other circumstances that their
    intention was to consider that person as representing the State for
    such purposes and to dispense with full powers.'' A state may
    subsequently confirm an unauthorized signature (Article 8).
        \73\ ``The United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention but
    this portion likely represents customary international law on the
    subject.'' ``Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about the
    Kyoto Protocol'', p. 3, FN 9. CRS Report for Congress (March 29, 2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The principle that a signature cannot be truly meaningless,
    developed likely for purposes of ensuring sincere negotiations,
    nonetheless was formalized as Vienna Article 18. That provision asserts
    international agreement that a pre-ratification commitment, e.g.,
    signature, as nonetheless binding a state to certain degree.\74\ Yet
    how seriously do states take this testament to the issue of a non-
    ratifying signatory state: ``a State is obliged to refrain from acts
    which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty,'' until and
    unless ``it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party
    to the treaty, or it has expressed its consent to be bound by the
    treaty''?\75\ It is either ironic, or proof positive that this effort
    failed, that the U.S. bears an enormous inventory of signed-but-not-
    ratified instruments including many never even ``transmitted'' to the
    Senate.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \74\ Vienna manifests throughout, e.g., Articles 11, 12, 18,
    manifest that states operate on the presumption that a signature is the
    promise of a binding relationship, presumably through ratification. ``A
    paramount principle of international law is pacta sunt servanda-that
    treaties must be kept.'' Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ``Treaties
    and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate'',
    S.Rpt. 106-71, p. 7; see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov /cgi-bin/
    getdoc.cgi?dbname=106--cong--senate--print& docid=f:66922.pdf. What of
    the documents that a country signs, but does not ratify? That question
    and the ambiguous answers, to the extent they exist, prompted President
    Bush to withdraw from the unratified Rome Treaty. Specifically, the
    U.S. sought to avert legitimate concerns that its signature would
    impute some form of acquiescence with Rome.
        However, many treaties are signed but not ratified, particularly by
    the US. The same ambiguities underlie the concerns over Kyoto
    discussed, herein. As with Rome, the President voiced his disagreement
    with his predecessor's signature. As regards Kyoto, however, he has not
    manifested this rhetoric with action. Consider that the President then
    offers and formally proceeds with a proposal clearly running counter to
    Kyoto's goals and objectives, as he did with his pending proposal to
    address U.S. GHG emissions. This proposal envisions emissions
    increasing, clearly in violation of Kyoto's objective of massive
    reductions. Certainly, mere proposals likely do not run hard afoul of
    Vienna. But what if the proposal is enacted?
        \75\ See ``Withdrawal'', infra.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Defending a claim that the U.S. somehow violates Vienna Article 18
    via, e.g., Kyoto, the U.S. would likely posit the argument that it
    never ratified Vienna. Particularly as regards Article 18, this
    argument is sophisticated. It requires a state to argue that it is not
    bound by signing a treaty that purports to govern the interpretation of
    treaties, the terms of which establish that signing a treaty in the
    absence of ratification still binds the signatory to the treaty's goals
    and objectives.\76\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \76\ Consider a prospective automobile purchaser talking terms then
    taking the car off the lot for a spin, though without finalizing any
    deal. He parks it in his garage, and otherwise treats the offer of sale
    as a deal he accepted, for some period of time. Now consider the U.S.
    signing a treaty, though never formalizing the deal, yet also acting as
    if it had ``bought'' the agreement for 30 years through various and
    sundry diplomatic and administrative actions, or merely on the basis
    that it waited three decades before testing its strictures?
        It is likely that such a doctrine of constructive acceptance exists
    in the law of international agreements. Vienna Article 11, ``Means of
    expressing consent to be bound by a treaty,'' does not offer much
    guidance, asserting ``The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty
    may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a
    treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any
    other means if so agreed.'' However, Part 5, ``Invalidity, Termination
    and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties'' makes the case more
    plainly: ``Article 45 Loss of a right to invoke a ground for
    invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation
    of a treaty: A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating,
    terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty
    under articles 46 to 50 or articles 60 and 62 if, after becoming aware
    of the facts:
        (a) it shall have expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or
    remains in force or continues in operation, as the case may be; or
        (b) it must by reason of its conduct be considered as having
    acquiesced in the validity of the treaty or in its maintenance in force
    or in operation, as the case may be.''
        Media reports indicated that President Bush intended to withdraw
    from Vienna concurrent with his Rome withdrawal, though this did not
    occur. This would (or will) occur after having satisfied Vienna's
    Article 18 test for ``withdrawal'' of the unratified ICC. Clearly,
    therefore, such a move would be intended to impact the status of other
    signed-but-not-ratified agreements. Presuming this was successful (see
    FN 76, supra), particular implications of such a move as regards Kyoto
    include that the U.S. would be free of the Vienna Article 18 argument
    of commitment to Kyoto's object and purpose (if not residual
    ``customary'' doctrine, if any exists). The U.S. position would be that
    it is ``out'' of Kyoto solely on the basis that one executive verbally
    claimed that to be the case, with no formalization of that position.
    That is, the signed document remains available for ``re-entry'' by a
    subsequent executive solely on the basis that he verbally asserts that
    this is the U.S. position. To pursue or even enable such a dynamic is
    shortsighted and flies in the face of the bulk of the rationale behind
    treaties.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It was presumably in recognition of the perils of feel-good treaty
    signature when a state has no intention of ratifying leading the Bush
    Administration to formally disavow its signature on the Rome Treaty.
    Consider the following statements by Cabinet officers:
        ``Since we have no intention of ratifying it, it is appropriate for
    us, because we have such serious problems with the ICC, to notify the .
    . . secretary-general that we do not intend to ratify it and therefore
    we are no longer bound in any was to its purpose and objective''
    Secretary of State Colin Powell, CNN.com, May 5, 2002
        ``Even without ratification, the president's signature conveys
    standing and a U.S. obligation to support and not undermine the
    Treaty''. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, State Department Info,
    Jan. 11, 2001
        Now, of course, the Administration faces the unavoidable question
    of why does it refuse to disavow the U.S. signature on Kyoto? That is,
    should it desire to avoid having, e.g., its proposed ``Climate Action
    Plan'' challenged as violative of Vienna, via Kyoto.\77\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \77\ Compare Administration statements on Kyoto remarkably similar
    to its rhetoric establishing why Rome must be ``unsigned'':
        President Bush--``I'll tell you one thing I'm not going to do . . .
    I'm not going to let the United States carry the burden for cleaning up
    the world's air, like the Kyoto treaty would have done.'' ABCNews.com,
    March 28, 2001
        President Bush--``I do not support the Kyoto Treaty . . . The Kyoto
    treaty would severely damage the United States economy and I don't
    accept that.'' Washington Times, June 5, 2002
        Vice-President Cheney--``We do not support the approach of the
    Kyoto treaty.'' MSNBC March 17, 2001
        Secretary of State Colin Powell--``The Kyoto Protocol, as far as
    the United States is concerned, is a dead letter.'' Interview with Fox
    News' Tony Snow, June 17, 2001
        National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice--to European diplomats,
    the ''protocol is totally unacceptable and already dead at the arrival
    of the Bush Administration''; also quoted at the same meeting asserting
    Kyoto was ``dead on arrival'' in the United States. March 17th, 2001
        National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice--``It might have been
    better to let people know in advance, including our allies, that we
    were not going to support the protocol.'' USATODAY.com June 7, 2001
        Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christie Todd
    Whitman--``We have no interest in implementing that treaty.''
    Washington Post, March 28, 2001
        White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer--``The president has been
    unequivocal. He does not support the Kyoto treaty. It is not in the
    United States' economic interest.'' CNN.com, March 29, 2001
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These implications of treaty signature and the related quagmire of
    ``how much sovereignty does (the U.S.) cede at what step?'' is exemplar
    of the murky nature of this field of law, driven in practice less by
    established legal rules than protocol.
        In sum, achieving the signature stage enters a state into an
    ambiguous level of commitment; obligations begin to emerge, such that a
    notification of intent not to become a party action is required to
    truly change a nation's status.
    Executive Transmittal of a Treaty
        Is there a reverse equivalent to the Constitution's ``presentment''
    clause, for treaties?\78\ A plain reading of Article II, Section 2
    indicates an Executive's function is complete upon treaty signature, or
    at least that the signature reasonably triggers the Senate's ability to
    attempt consent though the Executive may not be stripped of authority
    to continue relevant treaty functions. Certainly, if a president
    transmits a treaty to the Senate with its concomitant request for a
    vote, there is no doubt that the Senate may vote upon it. But what
    about a treaty signed but not submitted to the Senate?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \78\ U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7: ``Every Bill which
    shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
    before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
    States''.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        An authoritative Foreign Relations Committee report asserts the
    Senate's most formal position on the matter, outside of its standing
    rules which are largely silent or ambiguous:
    ``Consideration by the Senate
        A second phase begins when the President transmits a concluded
    treaty to the Senate and the responsibility moves to the Senate.
        Following are the main steps during the Senate phase.
        (1) Presidential submission.-The Secretary of State formally
    submits treaties to the President for transmittal to the Senate. A
    considerable time may elapse between signature and submission to the
    Senate, and on rare occasions a treaty signed on behalf of the United
    States may never be submitted to the Senate at all and thus never enter
    into force for the United States. When transmitted to the Senate,
    treaties are accompanied by a Presidential message consisting of the
    text of the treaty, a letter of transmittal requesting the advice and
    consent of the Senate, and the earlier letter of submittal of the
    Secretary of State which usually contains a detailed description and
    analysis of the treaty.''\79\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \79\ ``Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the
    U.S. Senate'', S.Rpt.106-71, p. 7.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Senate is historically conditioned to wait for executive
    transmittal prior to considering an agreement and its rules now
    recognize this practice, having in effect manufactured a
    ``presentment'' equivalent. The FRC Report offers in fact an
    explanation of protocol, and nothing more, serving as the principal
    impediment to the Senate considering a treaty absent the Executive
    transmitting it to them. There is no constitutional bar. Though the
    Senate has the constitutional right to set its own rules of
    operation,\80\ there exists no express prohibition in the rules,
    either.\81\ It is a matter of interpretation. These rules are binding
    of course only on the Senate but are a matter of interpretation, and
    that is largely irrelevant:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \80\ ``Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . .
    .'' Article I, Section 5.
        \81\ With or without transmittal it would be fair for a Member (or
    private litigant who can establish standing) to call on the Senate to
    vote on the entire spate of modern treaties signed-but-not-ratified
    treaties. It seems particularly disrespectful of the Constitution,
    however, for the Senate not to at minimum vote on aberrations such as
    Kyoto, qualifying for immediate rejection because of the unacceptable
    combination of the Executive breaching specific Senate instruction,
    then accepting the disavowed terms also with a prohibition on
    reservations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Yet these Senate rules do not make clear that the Foreign Relations
    Committee can refuse an Executive request to consider a treaty on the
    basis that it was never transmitted. Such a battle is of course
    unlikely: if an Executive desired a treaty vote he would in all
    likelihood ``transmit'' a treaty with such a request.\82\ A conflict is
    more likely to involve a White House opposed to ratification, objecting
    to FRC consideration on the basis that there was never a transmittal.
    The prospect of such a conflict is also, however, facially bizarre
    given a president apparently retains the right to effectively withdraw
    the U.S. signature until some point in the pre-ratification stage (see
    ``Withdrawal'', infra).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \82\ Such a request does not necessarily accompany a transmittal
    recommendation. See discussion of President Reagan's transmittal of the
    Protocols to the Geneva Convention, infra.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As also discussed, in Kyoto we see a Senate and White House deeply
    divided, rhetorically at least, over a particular signed-but-not-
    ratified treaty. This merits consideration of the potential showdown
    over authority to ultimately commit the U.S. In this instance, we face
    a president asserting a position (``rejects'' the treaty) but unwilling
    to formalize it. Indeed, this administration actually has rejected the
    idea of withdrawal.\83\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \83\ In May 2002, the author formally petitioned the State
    Department on behalf of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, to
    replicate the withdrawal from Rome, re: Kyoto. State responded in June
    2002. It elected to not assert which of the two ambiguous U.S. Kyoto
    positions--rhetorical vs. submitted--is operative. Its response was
    mildly incoherent in attempting to avoid addressing the merits
    presented in the request, merely rejecting this request for
    clarification of the ambiguity on the simple basis that ``[w]e have
    gone to considerable lengths, internationally, over the past year to
    make our position with respect to the Kyoto Protocol clear and
    unambiguous.'' In short, they're not confused about the position--
    whatever it is--so it requires no clarification.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Whether an executive must ``transmit'' a treaty, or whether the
    Senate may vote on signed agreements of its own accord, is a question
    that has yet to be adjudicated. It has yet to even be legislated other
    than Senate internal rules of operation. Congress addressed transmittal
    of international agreements other than treaties in the Case-Zablocki
    Act.\84\ This Act did not, however, indirectly establish Executive
    discretion regarding transmittal of treaties to Congress, as its clear
    import was to inform Congress of agreements in which Congress had had
    no consultative or approval role.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \84\ 1 U.S.C Sections 112a and 112b; as added by act of September
    23, 1950, 64 Stat. 980; and added by Public Law 92-403 [Case-Zablocki
    Act, S. 596], 86 Stat. 619, approved August 22, 1972.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Senate Foreign Relations Committee possesses exclusive
    congressional jurisdiction over treaties (though as was seen regarding
    Kyoto, other committees, both House and Senate, may weigh in on various
    aspects of the agreement). That is, FRC is the gatekeeper determining
    which treaties may be reported for floor consideration:
                             ``rule 1--jurisdiction
        (a) Substantive.--In accordance with Senate Rule XXV.1(j), the
    jurisdiction of the Committee shall extend to all proposed legislation,
    messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the
    following subjects: . . .
        17. Treaties and executive agreements, except reciprocal trade
    agreements. . . .
        (b) Oversight.--The Committee also has a responsibility under
    Senate Rule XXVI.8, which provides that ' . . . each standing Committee
    . . . shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application,
    administration, and execution of those laws or parts of laws, the
    subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of the Committee.'
        (c) `Advice and Consent' Clauses.--The Committee has a special
    responsibility to assist the Senate in its constitutional function of
    providing 'advice and consent' to all treaties entered into by the
    United States and all nominations to the principal executive branch
    positions in the field of foreign policy and diplomacy . . .
                                rule 9--treaties
        (a) The Committee is the only Committee of the Senate with
    jurisdiction to review and report to the Senate on treaties submitted
    by the President for Senate advice and consent. Because the House of
    Representatives has no role in the approval of treaties, the Committee
    is therefore the only congressional committee with responsibility for
    treaties.''
        FRC Rule 9 then seemingly creates a transmittal condition precedent
    to considering a treaty:
        ``(b) Once submitted by the President for advice and consent, each
    treaty is referred to the Committee and remains on its calendar from
    Congress to Congress until the Committee takes action to report it to
    the Senate or recommend its return to the President, or until the
    Committee is discharged of the treaty by the Senate.''
        It does appear a Member is not able to move a treaty toward a floor
    vote in the absence of at least FRC consideration, though the relevant
    rule does not seem to resolve the question of whether the Senate can
    vote absent transmission (that is, take matters into its own hands to,
    e.g., clarify an ambiguous U.S. position):
             ``rule xxx executive session--proceedings on treaties
        1. (a) When a treaty shall be laid before the Senate for
    ratification, it shall be read a first time; and no motion in respect
    to it shall be in order, except to refer it to a committee, to print it
    in confidence for the use of the Senate, or to remove the injunction of
    secrecy . . .
        2. Treaties transmitted by the President to the Senate for
    ratification shall be resumed at the second or any subsequent session
    of the same Congress at the stage in which they were left at the final
    adjournment of the session at which they were transmitted; but all
    proceedings on treaties shall terminate with the Congress, and they
    shall be resumed at the commencement of the next Congress as if no
    proceedings had previously been had thereon.\85\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \85\ Found at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule30.htm
    (emphasis added).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        So, the Senate seemingly manufactures a ``requirement'' of
    presentment. This does not make that requirement law but likely
    demonstrates that a court might well defer a legal challenge to an
    ambiguous U.S. treaty posture under the ``political question''
    doctrine. Such a challenge, for example, could seek formal withdrawal
    from Kyoto as a necessary step given the Executive's avowed rejection
    of a signed treaty. The State Department manifested the position, in
    the context of its communication to the U.N. regarding Rome, that
    withdrawal from such a document requires this transmission pursuant to
    the delegation of certain ``Management of foreign affairs'' in 22
    U.S.C. Sec. 2656.\86\ This because by that act the Bush Administration
    formally recognized the legal implications to signing a treaty,
    seemingly giving merit to such an effort to compel other withdrawals to
    resolve similar ambiguities and potential risks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \86\ See FN 57, supra.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Still, this language raises an interesting debating point as to
    whether there is the equivalent of a ``presentment'' requirement. That
    is, the Senate arguably hereby distinguishes between ``Treaties
    transmitted by the President to the Senate for ratification'', and,
    ``When a treaty shall be laid before the Senate for ratification'',
    that is, of the accord of one of its Members.
        There clearly is no constitutional prohibition to the Senate taking
    a signed treaty upon itself to consider, only a Senate rule possibly
    indicating they have decided otherwise. The Senate has the right to
    establish its rules of operation under Article I, Section 5, but that
    language offers no prohibition and indeed is ambiguous at best as to
    this matter. Certainly given the rhetoric of potential natural
    catastrophe surrounding Kyoto, if President Bush insists on continuing
    the U.S.' ambiguous role in Kyoto the Senate should take matters into
    its own hands, and decide the fate of this agreement.
        Regarding the transmittal itself, by practice, this communication
    is considered formally as part of the Senate Treaty Document sent by
    the White House.\87\ Clearly, a transmittal message need not request
    ratification, but an Executive certainly may ask the Senate to reject a
    treaty. Similarly, though not identical, is that in practice a
    transmittal letter does not require ``transmission'' of the particular
    treaty language for a vote, but can include a mere request that the
    Senate express its sense that the treaty is not acceptable. This likely
    satisfies the Vienna test for manifesting a state's intention to not be
    bound by a treaty, if it does not equate with rejection. President
    Reagan's transmittal of the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention
    offers an example of what may be considered ``risk-free transmittal'',
    that is, asking for disapproval while not risking present or future
    ratification of the actual agreement.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \87\ See, e.g., ``The President's Transmittal Message'', H.Doc.
    107-20; http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ cgibin/
    useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=td007.pdf&directory=/diskb/
    wais/data/107--cong--documents.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        After transmitting and asking for ratification of Protocol II,
    additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 concluded at
    Geneva on June 10, 1977, President Reagan requested the Senate express
    its sense of disapproval of Protocol I, which he did not transmit.
    Addressing in part a topic very timely to a current debate,
    specifically the status of certain combatants, President Reagan wrote:
        ``While I recommend that the Senate grant advice and consent to
    this agreement [Protocol II], I have at the same time concluded that
    the United States cannot ratify a second agreement on the law of armed
    conflict negotiated during the same period. I am referring to Protocol
    I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which would revise the
    rules applicable to international armed conflicts. Like all other
    efforts associated with the International Committee of the Red Cross,
    this agreement has certain meritorious elements.''\88\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \88\ United States: Message From the President Transmitting
    Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Relating to the
    Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts, January 29,
    1987 (http://www.fed-soc.org/pdf/ABARespID.pdf).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Calling Protocol I ``fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed'',
    Reagan described its flaws in principle and with some specific
    examples, then shifted the burden to the Senate without actually
    transmitting the Protocol with a recommendation to reject, stating in
    relevant part:
        ``These problems are so fundamental in character that they cannot
    be remedied through reservations, and I therefore have decided not to
    submit the Protocol to the Senate in any form, and I would invite an
    expression of the sense of the Senate that it shares this view.''\89\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \89\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The deviation from form--sending treaty language for ratification--
    extended to the request--mere disapproval of non-transmitted language.
    Yet Reagan described his desired outcome as if it were a mere, standard
    ``rejection'':
        ``It is unfortunate that Protocol I must be rejected. We would have
    preferred to ratify such a convention, which as I said contains certain
    sound elements. But we cannot allow other nations of the world, however
    numerous, to impose upon us and our allies and friends an unacceptable
    and thoroughly distasteful price for joining a convention drawn to
    advance the laws of war . . . The repudiation of Protocol I is one
    additional step, at the ideological level so important to terrorist
    organizations, to deny these groups legitimacy as international actors.
    Therefore, I request that the Senate act promptly to give advice and
    consent to the ratification of the agreement I am transmitting today,
    subject to the understandings and reservations that are described more
    fully in the attached report. I would also invite an expression of the
    sense of the Senate that it shares the view that the United States
    should not ratify Protocol I, thereby reaffirming its support for
    traditional humanitarian law, and its opposition to the politicization
    of that law by groups that employ terrorist practices.''\90\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \90\ Id. (emphasis added).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This quasi-transmittal offers a model for Executive request of the
    Senate regarding other commitments through which the U.S. presents an
    ambiguous posture. It does not, however, guarantee clarification: The
    Senate elected to vote on neither Protocol, adding them to the heap of
    literally dozens of treaties signed but not ratified, not to mention
    those of which never were the subject of a ``transmittal'' to the
    Senate.\91\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \91\ See http://www.icrc.org/eng/party--gc.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This does offer authority for the proposition that the Senate need
    wait for neither a Presidential transmission of language, nor a request
    to ratify a treaty in order to speak to the issue of whether it accepts
    the commitment. In the case of Kyoto, Byrd-Hagel has no relevant
    ``consent'' impact--though potentially great influence as ``advice''
    eschewed--Kyoto not having been agreed at the time this (inherently)
    non-binding resolution passed.
        Another question involves the implications of ``transmitting'' a
    treaty to Senate. Upon such communication, has the President ceded his
    ability to withdraw, as President Bush withdrew from Rome? If so, is it
    for a reasonable period for the Senate to act, say, the term of one
    Congress, which ability is revived by the absence of Senate action over
    another reasonable period of time?
        Such resolution seems unnecessarily complex and, presuming no
    presentment requirement exists for treaties, two outcomes appear
    equally possible. The courts could determine some form of ``mutual
    jurisdiction'' during a post-transmittal, pre-vote stage, during which
    either branch may decide or at least advance the fate of an agreement.
    Alternatively, the courts could determine that such an Executive
    function should not be undertaken lightly. In such instance, they might
    reason, given that even post-transmission--whatever the request--the
    President retains the ability to formally request Senate rejection
    decide that upon transmission the Senate obtains sole jurisdiction.
        Finally, the courts may determine that there is indeed a
    presentment requirement for treaties. In such case, it would be
    reasonable to rule that, just as the President has the right to sit on
    a treaty until presentment, the senate has the same right after
    presentment. Of course, even President Bush's recent withdrawal from
    Rome appears unprecedented, if precisely what longstanding
    international policy held to be appropriate behavior. Thus, despite
    that all of this remains conjecture, the increased possibility of
    challenge to these questionable modern practices merits inquiry.
           role of congress in the treaty process--advice and consent
        What obligations and impediments arise from the constitutional
    requirement of ``advice and consent'', particularly in the unique
    circumstances offered by development of Kyoto? Further, what role does
    the Senate play in possible withdrawal in such unique circumstances?
    Finally, if a ratified agreement is amended, is it subject to further
    advice and consent?
    Advice: Kyoto Example
        We have already examined the nontraditional role the Senate played
    in offering advice to the Executive regarding the Kyoto Protocol,
    development of which began soon after--and, arguably, partially as a
    consequence of--the inauguration of a new U.S. administration. As
    discussed, this process toward binding international commitments
    regarding domestic energy use emissions not declared, for the most
    part, ``pollutants'' by any nation in the world, came almost
    immediately on the heels of agreeing in Rio to the UNFCCC's voluntary
    campaign.\92\ This, certain domestic efforts,\93\ and a lack of
    administration solicitation of advice alarmed many within the Senate.
    As negotiations advanced, Senators took it upon themselves to register
    advice.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \92\ Per Kyoto's Preamble, it developed, de jure, ``Being guided by
    Article 3 of the Convention,'' (Principles), which was the omnibus
    ``protect the planet'' provision. This rationalization emerged, de
    facto, however directly pursuant to the new U.S. administration's
    assertion of ``changed circumstances''. The next step, of actually
    drafting a binding document, came ``Pursuant to the Berlin Mandate
    adopted by decision 1/CP.1 of the Conference of the Parties to the
    Convention at its first session,'' as also set forth in Kyoto's
    preamble.
        \93\ Specifically, in 1993, the new Clinton-Gore Administration
    created a State Department slot for former Senator Tim Wirth,
    Undersecretary of State of Global Affairs, including in its portfolio
    ``environment''. Wirth was famous for his statement in 1990 as a
    Democratic Senator from Colorado, ``We've got to ride the global
    warming issue. Even if the theory of global warming is wrong, we will
    be doing the right thing in terms of economic and environmental
    policy.'' Cited in ``Global Warming: Just a Lot of Hot Air?'', The
    Actuarial Review, August 1998 (Fred Kilbourne) (see http://
    www.casact.org/pubs/actrev/aug98/gwfredk. htm). Rio, in hindsight, soon
    began to look like an agreement whose authors had no sincere intent of
    determining its effectiveness when it was almost immediately used as a
    springboard to obtain mandatory, reduction commitments. In 1996, Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of State Rafe Pomerance asserted that ``the
    administration has been working on this policy for more than a year'',
    quoted in Nature, 25 July 1996.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Senate, seeing what was developing, unanimously passed a non-
    binding, ``Sense of the Senate Resolution'':
        ``Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that----
        (1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to,
    or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention
    on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997,
    or thereafter, which would----
        (A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
    emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
    agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or
    reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within
    the same compliance period, or
        (B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United
    States.''\94\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \94\ ``Byrd-Hagel,'' S.Res. 98 105th Congress (105-54 July 21,
    1997).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Subsequent to this advice, and upon other nations of the world
    resisting U.S. positions, Vice President Al Gore arranged to fly to
    Kyoto, where he encouraged U.S. negotiators to show ``increased
    negotiating flexibility.'' Kyoto emerged, clearly not satisfying Byrd-
    Hagel condition (1)(A) by differentiating between 38 ``covered''
    countries. Opponents were also angry over the agreement to
    differentiate various commitments among those countries.\95\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \95\ Specifically, parties committed to varying percentages of
    reduction from 1990 levels of GHG emissions. Some were permitted to
    increase emissions (e.g., Australia, by 8 percent), others permitted to
    pool their emission increases/reductions under a bubble (the EU), while
    the U.S. committed to reduce GHG emissions by 7 percent below 1990, or
    19 percent below today's emission levels according to the Department of
    Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Regarding condition (1)(B), among prominent economic analysts only
    the Clinton White House's Council of Economic Advisors, contended that
    no ``serious economic harm'' would result.\96\ President Clinton never
    submitted the treaty to the Senate over the course of the remaining 25
    months of his presidency. Upon leaving office the relevant CEA
    professionals publicly amended their assertions regarding Kyoto's
    economic impact.\97\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \96\ EIA, e.g., estimated Kyoto's economic impact upon the U.S.
    economy at $400 billion annually. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy
    Information Admin., Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting.
    Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy markets and Economic
    Activity. Washington, DC. October 1998.
        \97\ See USA Today, June 12, 2001.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Administration disregard for Senate advice was exacerbated when the
    White House soon adopted a mantra of seeking ``meaningful participation
    by key developing countries,'' a rhetorical sleight of hand to
    facilitate ratification. Still, this received no widespread
    condemnation, despite the administration's ploy being an apparent,
    significant diminution of the Senate's most prominent ``Advice''.
        The composition of the Senate can change appreciably over a short
    time and, so long as the U.S. remains a signatory, it may feasibly
    ratify Kyoto.\98\ All past sins of omission, and commission regarding
    the Article II ``Advice'' requirement are absolvable through a
    ratification vote.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \98\ True, as described, supra, several non-signatory nations
    ratified Kyoto nonetheless. These nations share neither our
    Constitution, nor our adherence to protocol, and it seems implausible
    that the U.S. Senate should ever reverse an Executive having rejected a
    signed, unratified treaty that the Senate has made no move to consider.
    It seems an open question whether Article II prohibits such an act.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Consent'', or Ratification
        As noted, it is clear from Article II Section 2 that the executive
    has the power to negotiate agreements, and principal role therein. This
    typically involves at minimum one signature stage, at minimum as a
    protocol, formalizing'' the signatory's eligibility for
    ratification.\99\ However, it is also clear pursuant to Article II the
    terms of any agreement negotiated by the executive do not become
    effective against the U.S. until and unless the Senate ratifies the
    agreement by two-thirds of those voting.\100\ This presumably intimates
    a limitation on the treaty power of an executive not being able to
    validly enter agreements circumventing the constitutional ratification
    requirement.\101\ Further, this raises the possible issue of what rises
    to the level of a treaty requiring Senate ratification?\102\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \99\ Some systems, as recognized by individual treaties and the
    Vienna Convention, allow for binding treaty commitments to arise from
    this signature, equivalent with, e.g., U.S. Senate ratification.
        \100\ See FN 47, supra.
        \101\ See FN 55, supra.
        \102\ See FN 53, supra.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Treaties typically recognize that a significant number of countries
    do not permit the ``Executive'' to formally bind his nation through a
    signature, but that it is a fairly common requirement that one or more
    legislative bodies approve of the document. To the extent a particular
    document does not address this issue, the Vienna Convention codifies
    the ``customary'' recognition of this practice. Treaties also typically
    provide a window for ratification. We have already seen, supra, the
    ambiguities surrounding whether the Senate may of its own accord
    consider a treaty for ratification.
        The ``Consent'' function offers the Senate a second bite as the
    ``Advice'' apple. That is, with the rare exception found in Kyoto,
    treaties typically allow reservations and/or objections to particular
    provisions.\103\ The executive may make suggestions regarding such
    objections, as it at issue in the current debate regarding Senate
    ratification of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
    Pollutants (POPs Treaty).\104\ Domestic U.S. parties whose products or
    businesses would be covered by this agreement's restrictions seek
    ratification, but conditional upon one of two options in the treaty
    language over the addition of new chemicals to the list of covered
    substances.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \103\ See the UN's Model Instrument of Reservation at http://
    untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyHandbook/ annex6.htm.
        \104\ See EPA statement on POPs Treaty at http://www.epa.gov/
    oppfead1/cb/csb--page/updates/popsleg.htm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Specifically, these parties seek a reservation to the effect that
    each addition to the list of covered chemicals requires discrete
    ratification by countries recognizing this addition. This raises
    another relevant ``Consent'' issue: whether treaty amendments require
    individual ratification. The treaty itself typically addresses this
    matter.\105\ To the extent an agreement does not address this matter,
    Vienna offers ambiguous guidance as to what rule governs.\106\ This
    contributes to the reality in practice that Senate ratification clearly
    can be made contingent upon any modifications to the particular treaty
    being subject to ratification prior to being binding on the U.S.\107\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \105\ See, e.g., Kyoto Article 20.
        \106\ See Articles 41, 42.
        \107\ In consenting to the Genocide Convention, the Senate added a
    reservation that the U.S. must first specifically consent to IJC
    jurisdiction before submitting any dispute to which the United States
    was a party. ``Treaties and other International Agreements'', p. 21.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Kyoto's amendment mechanism is set forth through various Articles.
    First, specifically discussing ``non-compliance'' and consequences,''
    Article 18 reads, in pertinent part, ``Any procedures and mechanisms
    under this Article entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by
    means of an amendment to this Protocol.'' Such amendment occurs as set
    forth in Article 20:
        ``1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Protocol.
        2. Amendments to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary
    session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
    Parties to this Protocol.
        3. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any
    proposed amendment to this Protocol by consensus. If all efforts at
    consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment
    shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of
    the Parties present and voting at the meeting. The adopted amendment
    shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall
    circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.'' (emphasis added)
        Kyoto then proceeds to indicate that Senate ratification of Kyoto
    even in its current, incomplete form and without a specific reservation
    to this effect, nonetheless permits the U.S. to claim it is not bound
    by any subsequent narrowing of Kyoto's terms without separate
    ratification:
        ``4. Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be
    deposited with the Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with
    paragraph 3 above shall enter into force for those Parties having
    accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the
    Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at least three fourths of
    the Parties to this Protocol.''
        This is reassuring to some degree given that Kyoto permits all
    nations to vote on binding consequences applicable only to those 36
    countries actually covered by Kyoto's restrictions. Reassuring as this
    ``out'' may be, it remains foreseeable that the requisite three-fourths
    of, e.g., all 178 parties to Kyoto should they ultimately ratify, can
    occur if that large universe of countries facing all benefit, no pain
    under Kyoto merely coalesce. The incentive to ``stick it'' to
    particular countries, for example the U.S., is enormous, given the
    amounts of money involved under a fully implemented rationing structure
    that is Kyoto. Given international pressures to proceed ``with the
    flow'' should the U.S. actually ratify Kyoto, this presents alarming
    opportunities for other nations to extract even more benefits out of
    the U.S. in this context than Kyoto's generous ``capacity building''
    and ``development'' funds already envision.\108\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \108\ In response to this very practice of treaties moving far
    along in the development stage that it takes political capital, often
    not spent, to extricate from even that level of agreement, the Bush
    Administration has initiated an informal policy group to look down the
    road at potential such entanglements particularly in the environmental
    context. This would seem to be a lesson learned from Rio and Kyoto.
    Participants are drawn, inter alia, from the State Department, Council
    on Environmental Quality, and National Security Council.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Senate ratification cannot constitutionally be abrogated by the
    Executive,\109\ though as we have seen Congress can anticipatorily
    abdicate the Senate's ability to modify an agreement's language, and
    thus its ability to offer substantive objections or reservations
    (though not to reject a treaty).\110\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \109\ See Rabkin, pp. 12-16.
        \110\ See discussion of NAFTA, supra.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Consideration of treaties must begin in the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee. Again, and contrary to that reality that scores of
    treaties formally transmitted to the Senate lie dormant, Senate FRC
    Rule 9 calls for swift initiation of the consideration process:
        d) Insofar as possible, the Committee should conduct a public
    hearing on each treaty as soon as possible after its submission by the
    President. Except in extraordinary circumstances, treaties reported to
    the Senate shall be accompanied by a written report.
        As also discussed in ``Transmittal'', Senate Standing Rule XXX
    governs Senate treaty procedure.
        The Constitution requires two-thirds of those ``present,'' or
    voting. As mentioned, Alexander Hamilton foresaw possible political
    gamesmanship in the ratification process, detailed in Federalist No.
    75. Hamilton argued that requiring two-thirds of those ``present''
    would mitigate these opportunities. Hamilton's fears were prescient,
    though the resolved language suffers a similar soft underbelly for
    political hijinks.
        Imagine one party seeing great political gain in voting for a
    politically charged treaty so long as it failed, and great peril--
    political and otherwise--if enacted. This describes the dynamic between
    many Senators and Kyoto. Extensive polling data show, for example, that
    the concept of ``doing something'' about ``global warming'' enjoys
    popular support so long as it remains a proposal potentially warding
    off future catastrophe. The actual requirements of massive energy use
    reductions, and how to attain them, are not quite so popular.
        Consider a height of media and trade competitor outrage about a
    U.S. President having informally ``rejected'' a treaty, say after one
    World or Kyoto summit. The savvy Majority Leader might schedule a
    treaty vote (see debate over ``Transmittal,'' supra). The intent would
    be the near-certain, near-unanimous support of one party and a nicely
    contrasting party bloc voting nearly unanimously against. Two-thirds
    would not be achieved. Whispers to the Majority party's business
    supporters could issue that the treaty stands no chance, so do not
    become alarmed. This display would provide one party an opportunity to
    declare their concern and support for a document that is politically
    advantageous among certain constituencies, while casting its opposition
    as heartlessly standing in the way. That party would carry a powerful
    rhetorical weapon into the next elections.
        This scenario collapses should most, e.g., Republicans simply not
    be ``present'' come vote time. In such case, it seems highly likely the
    attempted ploy would severely backfire, to great fanfare and political
    heat from the other party's own ``green'' base. Members would rush to
    the well to change their vote, and/or the treaty would ultimately be
    pulled from consideration, naturally amid claims of the opposition's
    irresponsibility. The alternative to this retreat would be a party
    single-handedly responsible for the U.S. committing itself to a treaty
    wildly unpopular even in theory among most labor and energy consuming
    interests. For this reason, the required Senate vote remains subject to
    gamesmanship.
        Further, and as referenced, supra, in theory problems can arise
    with agreements open for ratification though they are subject to
    further negotiations, and indeed may require significant narrowing of
    the meaning of its various provisions before offering sufficient detail
    to be enforceable or even considered a meeting of the minds. Kyoto is a
    sterling example of such problems.
        Kyoto's express window for ratification was already open by, e.g.,
    the November 2000 COP-6 in The Hague, and numerous countries had
    already ratified the agreement such that it could go into effect
    against them should it gain sufficient ratifications.\111\ The Hague
    negotiations collapsed with no alteration or narrowing of the terms
    after the EU and U.S. avowed wildly divergent opinions on the meaning
    of several terms key to the agreement's financial impact on the
    U.S.\112\ The parties immediately called ``COP-6.5'', held in Marrakech
    in September 2001, to resume negotiations. By that time, President Bush
    had taken office and repeated his campaign opposition to Kyoto,
    solidifying the rhetorical, if not de facto, ``rejection'' by the U.S.
    initiated at The Hague collapse.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \111\ Of course, these ratifying nations were not those facing
    actual emission reduction obligations under Kyoto, but among the 140
    ``exempt'' nations, who were principally made eligible to receive
    wealth transfers under the treaty's auspices.
        \112\ These negotiations occurred after the U.S. Presidential
    election but prior to its resolution. There, the EU negotiators, likely
    sensing desperation on the part of Clinton Administration negotiators
    aware an administration opposed to Kyoto might well be inaugurated
    soon, refused to take ``yes'' for an answer on key issues on the table.
    Specifically, they held to a unique assertion regarding the significant
    limitation upon sinks (credits for land use practices which actually
    remove GHGs from the atmosphere), simply not visible to the naked eye
    when reading the relevant Kyoto title (Article 3). The EU implausibly
    insisted that parties intended the language that sinks ``shall be used
    to meet the commitments under this article'' really only intended
    allowance for insignificant sink credits. Given the U.S. intended to
    meet a major portion of its Kyoto commitment through sinks, this
    initiated the beginning of the (temporary?) ``end'' of full-fledged
    U.S. participation in Kyoto talks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Therefore, Kyoto actually collapsed, so far as U.S. participation
    is concerned, under the prior administration. The more relevant lesson
    is that treaties open for ratification can, and often do, present
    little in the way of an actual meeting of the minds permitting
    implementation and compliance. Ratification should always be undertaken
    warily, but, as this shows, should not even be considered when the
    treaty remains subject to determining what it is that parties actually
    agreed.
    Deposit of Ratification Instrument
        Despite the Clinton Administration negotiating Kyoto, for example,
    over the course of 25 months it never ``communicated'' the treaty to
    the Senate for a ratification vote.\113\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \113\ See ``Submission'', supra, for discussion of the necessity of
    communicating a treaty to the Senate, or whether the Executive's
    signature is sufficient justification for the Court to assert the
    Senate's ability to ratify the document
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Still, though a ratification vote would create a stronger argument
    of commitment, under Vienna Article 18, than would mere signature, it
    does not formalize ``consent to be bound by the treaty'', pursuant to
    the terms of most pacts. Even after agreement, signature, and a
    ratification vote a country is not formally bound to the terms of a
    treaty until it submits its instrument of ratification.\114\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \114\ See the UN's ``Model Instrument for Ratification'', at http:/
    /untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyHandbook/ annex4.htm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Post-Ratification
        Treaties can either require parties to enact implementing
    legislation, or be ``self-implementing'', that is, needing no new
    authority to implement its terms.\115\ Clearly, of course, as
    authorities vary by state, a self-implementing treaty to one party may
    require implementing legislation by another. Typically, however, self-
    implementing treaties provide reporting and accounting functions
    generally available to any relevant regulatory or administrative body.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \115\ ``Implementation The executive branch has the primary
    responsibility for carrying out treaties and ascertaining that other
    parties fulfill their obligations after treaties and other
    international agreements enter into force, but the Senate or the entire
    Congress share in the following phases.'' ``Treaties and Other
    International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate'', p. 12. ``A
    question that may be raised under U.S. law is whether or not Congress
    has a duty to implement a treaty which is in force internationally, but
    which requires additional legislation or implementation or an
    appropriation of funds to give effect to obligations assumed
    internationally by the United States. When implementation of a treaty
    requires domestic legislation or an appropriation of funds, only the
    Congress can provide them.'' Id. at pp. 166-67. Despite no specific
    implementing legislation, however, the Senate has indeed appropriated
    funds in pursuit of administrative programs seeking to advance Rio's
    objectives.
        The FRC Report continues, ``The extent of congressional obligation
    to implement a treaty under U.S. law has not been resolved in
    principle. FN 61 According to an often-cited authority, Congress has
    generally responded 'to a sense of duty to carry out what the treaty-
    makers promised, to a reluctance to defy and confront the President
    (especially after he can no longer retreat), to an unwillingness to
    make the U.S. system appear undependable, even ludicrous . . .''' Id.
    at 167, quoting Henkin, Louis. Foreign Affairs and the United States
    Constitution. 2d ed. 1996, pp. 205-206. The referenced FN 61 says in
    pertinent part, ``[F]ailure to implement an internationally perfected
    treaty would constitute a violation of obligations assumed by the
    United States under international law. See Memorandum of April 12,
    1976, by Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, as quoted in
    U.S. Department of State. Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law
    1976. 1977, p. 221.'' This begs the question: ``to precisely what
    extent was the ``non-binding'' Rio binding?''
        Addressing this question prior to ratification, ``[t]he [Senate
    Foreign Relations] Committee made clear, in other words, its view that
    '[t]he final framework convention contains no legally binding
    commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions' . . . While these
    statements may not be as legally binding as a formal condition to the
    Senate's ratification of the 1992 Convention [ed: reservations were
    prohibited by Rio's terms], it is doubtful that any administration
    could ignore them.'' ``Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions
    about the Kyoto Protocol'', p. 4. CRS Report for Congress (March 29,
    2001), citing in part 138 CONG. REC. 33521 (Oct. 7, 1992)(statement of
    Sen. McConnell).
        To avoid future such uncertainty, in S.Res. 98 the Senate ``stated
    the view that any agreement which would require Senate advice and
    consent should be accompanied by a detailed analysis of its economic
    impact and of any legislation and regulations necessary to implement
    the agreement.'' See CRS Report at p. 6, FN 25.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        An example of a self-ratifying treaty is the Rasmar Convention, or
    Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
    Waterfowl Habitats.\116\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \116\ I.L.M. 11:963-976; September 1972. This Convention entered
    force on December 21, 1975, after the required signatures of seven
    countries. The U.S. Senate consented to ratification of the Convention
    on October 9, 1986, and the President signed instruments of
    ratification on November 10, 1986.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Convention requires no implementing legislation as it merely
    requires maintenance of a list of wetlands of international importance
    and encourages ``wise use'' of wetlands in order to preserve the
    ecological characteristics from which wetland values derive. The
    required function(s) can be effected under existing regulatory and/or
    administrative authority, in this case the task is merely the U.S. Fish
    and Wildlife Service serving as an administrative authority, in
    consultation with the Department of State.\117\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \117\ See http://laws.fws.gov/lawsdigest/treaty.html#list.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Kyoto Protocol, however, is an entirely different story. Even
    in theory it is highly suspect that Kyoto could possibly proceed
    without implementing legislation. This because for the U.S. to achieve
    its obligations realistically requires significant reduction in
    emissions from energy use. The former, emissions, are for the most part
    not considered ``pollutants'' and therefore not regulated; the latter,
    actual energy use, is not regulated in any governmental sense but by
    market forces. Kyoto reductions would in fact require a massive series
    of initiatives to implement its regime, from emissions limitations and
    myriad tax provisions to internal versions of, inter alia, the
    international verification and trading infrastructures. That maze is
    illustrative of a treaty that is decidedly not self-implementing.
    Withdrawal
        The U.S. Constitution is silent as to the process for treaty
    withdrawal. Treaties provide their own provisions for withdrawal from
    their commitments. Kyoto's procedure, for example, is set forth in
    Article 27, as follows:
        ``1. At any time after 3 years from the date on which this Protocol
    has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this
    Protocol by giving written notification to the Depositary.
        2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of 1 year from
    the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of
    withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the
    notification of withdrawal.
        3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered
    as also having withdrawn from this Protocol.''
        Clearly, Senate ratification of a treaty that includes a withdrawal
    mechanism should resolve the question of the legitimacy of an executive
    acting pursuant to such mechanism. Though withdrawal can be politically
    contentious, little controversy appears likely over the actual process
    of withdrawal from treaties in-effect.\118\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \118\ Yet this is not the case, be the treaty in effect or
    otherwise. ``Domestically, the Constitution does not prescribe a
    process for the United States to terminate a treaty, and the process
    remains controversial. Treaties have been terminated in a variety of
    ways, including by the President following a joint resolution of
    Congress, by the President following action by the Senate, by the
    President and with subsequent congressional or Senate approval, and by
    the President alone.'' ``Treaties and Other International Agreements,''
    at 14.
        Regarding ABM, controversy exists in that numerous Members of
    Congress have filed suit against President Bush's invocation of the
    withdrawal provision in the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, signed
    with the now-defunct Soviet Union. See also S. 1565 (107th), proposed
    Senate resolution of disapproval.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        That focused upon in this paper, however, is the curious, topical
    matter of withdrawing from agreements not ratified because of the
    possibility of obligations arising from pre-ratification
    commitments.\119\ The treaty may merely be signed, and not transmitted
    to the Senate. The document may have been transmitted but not yet taken
    up. As discussed in ``Submission'', supra, that transmittal may or may
    not matter. Finally, a treaty may have been taken up for Senate
    consideration, but failed to achieve the requisite two-thirds
    vote.\120\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \119\ There is also little room to dispute that an ``agreed to''
    treaty as yet unsigned requires no withdrawal, given that even the
    ``troublemaking'' provision Vienna 18, is triggered by the signature,
    not some even less formal level of ``commitment''. Specifically: ``A
    State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
    purpose of a treaty when (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged
    instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance
    or approval . . .'' The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius
    would indicate that ``commitments'' begin with the signature. Also, the
    pre-signature, ``agreement'' stage as in the 1997 Kyoto ``agreement''
    likely does not rise to the level of ``exchanging documents.'' See the
    canons noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.
        \120\ Does the latter circumstance satisfy the Vienna test of
    making ``its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty''?
    This is a fascinating question given that ``(6) Treaties Reported by
    the [Foreign Relations] Committee but neither approved nor formally
    returned to the President by the Senate are automatically returned to
    the Committee calendar at the end of a Congress; the Committee must
    report them out again for the Senate to consider them.'' Therefore, a
    ``defeated'' treaty is not necessarily rejected until it is returned to
    the President. See ``Treaties and Other International Agreements: The
    Role of the U.S. Senate'', p. 12, at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
    cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106--cong--senate--print&docid=f:66922. pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Kyoto's sole relevant provision addresses only a treaty having
    entered into force and offers no guidance as to how a state extracts
    itself from whatever commitments are incurred through signature.\121\
    This is seemingly true with the Vienna Convention's numerous relevant
    Articles (54--72), though those seem arguably susceptible to claims
    that they translate at minimum in spirit to state efforts to ``[make]
    its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty''.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \121\ For an example of withdrawal from a treaty in effect, see
    U.S. termination of recognition of compulsory jurisdiction of the
    International Court of Justice Treaty Series, vol. l, p. 9.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The UNFCCC ought to serve as an authority on this issue, but,
    curiously, the same UNFCCC correspondence to the author regarding the
    U.S. status re: Kyoto, cited in FN 19, supra, also asserted: ``There is
    no procedure for the withdrawal of a signature in the [UNFCCC or
    Kyoto].'' A follow-up request as to whether this indicates the UNFCCC
    does not recognize the Vienna Convention has gone unanswered to date.
        We can be confident that, at least in the case of the U.S., the
    Vienna Article 18 requirement is not satisfied by senior officers
    merely speaking ill of a treaty.\122\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \122\ Vienna does permit rejection or withdrawal, if not elsewhere
    provided otherwise and only under certain conditions, by
    ``denunciation.'' See, e.g., Articles 42-44, 56, etc. However, that
    appears to be a term of art applicable only to executives with
    unilateral power to effect a treaty. Clearly, given the discussion
    above, that does not by itself seem to exclude the U.S. and its own
    system's peculiarities, when a treaty has yet to be ratified. Still,
    President Bush's precedent regarding Rome has established how the U.S.
    expresses its rejection. Mere badmouthing can reasonably be viewed as a
    negotiating ploy for a better offer.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As regards the never ratified, never transmitted Kyoto (or Rome),
    President Bush's badmouthing of the treaty, though he may clearly still
    reject it, would not be considered to constitute rejection by
    ``denunciation.'' The U.S. continues to send delegations to the
    relevant negotiations, though in a strange, voluntarily mitigated role
    that is a matter of some controversy.\123\ Kyoto provides for
    ``observers'' in Article 15: ``2. Parties to the Convention that are
    not Parties to this Protocol may participate as observers in the
    proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies. When the
    subsidiary bodies serve as the subsidiary bodies of this Protocol,
    decisions under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are
    Parties to this Protocol.'' It is this provision the Administration
    seems to believe it is invoking by attending negotiations in full
    force, but in a somewhat ``backbench'' role.\124\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \123\ One reason provided by the Bush Administration, publicly if
    informally for the U.S. not having submitted any communication to the
    UNFCCC indicating its intent to not be bound by Kyoto is that the U.S.
    must remain a part of ``the Kyoto process''. There is no ``Kyoto
    process,'' however, until the treaty achieves sufficient ratification
    to go into effect. Until that time, these negotiations remain part of
    the Rio Process (e.g., Kyoto emerged not from COP-1, or a Kyoto
    process, but COP-3, of the Rio Process pursuant to Rio Article 7). The
    U.S. delegation now assumes a second-class citizen posture,
    communicating desires through a proxy nation (typically Canada, one of
    the ``umbrella group'' nations; other such groups are the EU, the G-77
    and China, etc.). This seems a wasted exercise as until Kyoto goes into
    effect, as a ratifying party to Rio the U.S. has every right to
    actively participate in the current round of COPs. This is another
    example of how protocol, or the desire to not upset other parties,
    dominates treaty process more than legal requirements.
        \124\ The Administration are likely incorrect. Specifically, the
    U.S. is informally spreading the word that because it has not ratified
    Kyoto it is not a ``Party'', but thereby eligible for Article 15
    ``observer'' status. Yet it is clear that ``Party'' status originated
    with the agreement to Kyoto's terms at the close of COP-3.
    Specifically, Kyoto's own language belies a claim that until Kyoto is
    made effective by sufficient ratifications there are no ``Parties'' to
    the agreement.
        The relevant provisions include, but are in no way limited to, the
    following: a) Kyoto's preamble prior to its articles states ``The
    Parties to this Protocol . . . Have agreed as follows: [Articles] . .
    .'', dated December 1997 and setting forth articles clearly reading in
    the present tense, and not as if relevant solely upon ratification; b)
    Articles 6.2, 7.4, 16, 18 and 20, among others, all reference
    activities which to the extent they have been addressed in the days
    since COP-3 manifest that it is ``Parties''--to the Protocol, not the
    UNFCCC--who have been deliberating since; c) Article 13.2 makes clear
    that any decisions made regarding further narrowing of the Kyoto
    language, subsequent to COP-3, were made by Parties to the Protocol;
    and d) Article 13.7 appears to set forth the mechanism by which COP-6.5
    (Bonn) was called and particularly timed, at the request of a Party to
    Kyoto.
        In sum, it takes remarkable creativity to contend under the
    language of Kyoto that no Parties to Kyoto exist until sufficient
    ratifications to bring Kyoto into effect have been submitted to the
    Directorate.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Instead, withdrawal from a treaty (in effect) sufficient to satisfy
    Vienna is accomplished by communicating this intent to the other
    parties to the treaty.\125\ As regards the unratified Rome Treaty,
    President Bush doubtless satisfied the relevant requirement by
    submitting an instrument rescinding the signature to the same body to
    which the signature was communicated. Regarding such treaties, however,
    until such communication, any nation is free to pursue an action
    seeking to have, for example, either the Bush energy plan calling for
    the construction of more coal-fired power plants, or its ``Climate
    Action'' proposal allowing increased greenhouse gas emissions, for they
    clearly violate Kyoto's ``object and purpose''.\126\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \125\ See Vienna Article 67.
        \126\ Further, would the U.S. extending, or even permitting the
    continued application of, oil and gas depletion allowances (tax breaks
    facilitating lower-priced energy) also constitute a violation of Vienna
    via Kyoto? If so, how about recently extended state subsidies for the
    German coal industry, a nation which subsequently ratified Kyoto?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Finally, reconsider the Geneva Convention Protocol I. President
    Reagan transmitted a statement to the Senate whereby he did not send
    the language and ask for an unsuccessful vote on ratification, but
    asked for an ``expression of the sense of the Senate'' that it shared
    his disapproving view of the agreement. This appears to be a mere
    semantic distinction, but by so doing President Reagan performed a
    burden shift, establishing by precedent a position on which very few
    hard and fast rules govern. This transmittal intimated that the treaty
    was purely in the Senate's realm upon Executive signature, when in fact
    it is likely in the province of either the Executive or the Senate at
    this point to act.
                                   conclusion
        The Kyoto Protocol, and its predecessor the Rio Treaty, offer an
    excellent example of the distorted modern application of the Treaty
    Power. This article intends to expose the impropriety of the U.S.
    agreeing to amend the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
    (UNFCC, or Rio Treaty), by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.
        For whatever specific reasons (economic growth, failure to foresee
    the energy requirements of the ``new economy'', or other), the U.S.,
    like many nations, failed to meet its voluntary Rio targets.\127\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \127\ See, e.g., http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/eunc3.pdf.
    The EU, which under Kyoto has negotiated a ``bubble'' such that it
    could pool its increases and ``reductions'', announced in May that it
    met its Rio target. It said it had reduced greenhouse gases by 3.5
    percent below 1990 levels in 2000. This is commonly attributed to the
    ending of coal subsidies in Great Britain in their push to replace coal
    with gas, shutting down East German industry and that Europe did not
    match the U.S.' decade-long economic expansion. Russia, e.g., met its
    target by regressing economically.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Now some advocates assert, ``Because the U.S. has not met its Rio
    goal, we must commit to even greater mandatory reductions (Kyoto)''.
    Attempting instead to comply with the initial treaty seems the more
    appropriate response, for several reasons.
        Rio went into force in March 1994. President Clinton did not
    request, nor did Congress enact, independent legislation implementing
    Rio, which was not an inherently self-executing treaty.\128\ Authority
    and precedent make clear that responsibility for proposing such
    programs lies with the White House.\129\ If our ``non-binding'' Rio
    obligations in fact ``bound'' the U.S. to achieve specific
    reductions\130\--contrary to contemporary Senate and Executive
    assertions of U.S. intent--then the Executive interpretation of Rio
    Article 4 throughout the 1990's was actually incorrect, and is
    responsible. The pending question is apparently: does the U.S. respond
    by attempting to meet such Rio promises, or by making further, even
    deeper, binding promises?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \128\ As the party charged with ``making'' treaties the Executive
    is responsible for meeting, or at minimum proposing legislation to
    affect, treaty commitments. President Clinton proposed a Btu tax,
    though not expressly in pursuit of Rio. It failed once and did not
    emerge again. He instituted his Climate Action Plan, which with minor
    recent modifications continues to this day with more than 50 voluntary
    programs, though a quick search of Thomas revealed no implementing
    legislation. Congress did appropriate money in response to proposals by
    the Executive. See, e.g., ``Treaties and Other International
    Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate'', S. Rpt. 106-71, p.4.
        \129\ ``Implementation The executive branch has the primary
    responsibility for carrying out treaties and ascertaining that other
    parties fulfill their obligations after treaties and other
    international agreements enter into force, but the Senate or the entire
    Congress share in the following phases.'' ``Treaties and Other
    International Agreements'', p. 12. ``A question that may be raised
    under U.S. law is whether or not Congress has a duty to implement a
    treaty which is in force internationally, but which requires additional
    legislation or implementation or an appropriation of funds to give
    effect to obligations assumed internationally by the United States.
    When implementation of a treaty requires domestic legislation or an
    appropriation of funds, only the Congress can provide them.'' Id. at
    pp. 166-67.
        The FRC Report continues, ``The extent of congressional obligation
    to implement a treaty under U.S. law has not been resolved in
    principle. FN 61 According to an often-cited authority, Congress has
    generally responded 'to a sense of duty to carry out what the treaty-
    makers promised, to a reluctance to defy and confront the President
    (especially after he can no longer retreat), to an unwillingness to
    make the U.S. system appear undependable, even ludicrous . . .''' Id.
    at 167, quoting Henkin, Louis. Foreign Affairs and the United States
    Constitution. 2d ed. 1996, pp. 205-206. The referenced FN 61 says in
    pertinent part, ``[F]ailure to implement an internationally perfected
    treaty would constitute a violation of obligations assumed by the
    United States under international law. See Memorandum of April 12,
    1976, by Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, as quoted in
    U.S. Department of State. Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law
    1976. 1977, p. 221.'' This begs the question: ``to precisely what
    extent was the ``non-binding'' Rio binding?
        \130\ Addressing the question, above (FN 5), prior to ratification,
    ``[t]he [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee made clear, in other
    words, its view that '[t]he final framework convention contains no
    legally binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions' . . .
    While these statements may not be as legally binding as a formal
    condition to the Senate's ratification of the 1992 Convention [ed:
    reservations were prohibited by Rio's terms], it is doubtful that any
    administration could ignore them.'' ``Global Climate Change: Selected
    Legal Questions about the Kyoto Protocol'', p. 4. CRS Report for
    Congress (March 29, 2001), citing in part 138 CONG. REC. 33521 (Oct. 7,
    1992)(statement of Sen. McConnell).
        To avoid future such uncertainty, in S.Res. 98 (105th Cong., 1st
    Sess., adopted at 143 CONG. REC. S 8138 (daily ed. July 25, 1997)), the
    Senate ``stated the view that any agreement which would require Senate
    advice and consent should be accompanied by a detailed analysis of its
    economic impact and of any legislation and regulations necessary to
    implement the agreement.'' See CRS Report at p. 6, FN 25.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Skipping specific pursuit of the U.S.' Rio promises, in favor of
    Kyoto's binding commitments even greater than those we've failed to
    attain, seems highly illogical. Compounding this of course is that,
    precisely 5 years ago tomorrow, the Senate unanimously spoke to what it
    recognized was an unacceptable drift away from the U.S. Rio stance
    adamantly opposed to binding commitments. The Senate, seeing what was
    developing, asserted its ``Advice'' pursuant to Article II, Section 2
    of the U.S. Constitution, passing S. Res. 98.\131\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \131\ ``In mid-1997, as these negotiations were underway, the
    Senate passed S. Res. 98 [ed.: ``Byrd-Hagel,'' S.Res. 98 105th Congress
    (105-54 July 21, 1997)], which stated that the Senate would not approve
    any agreement on binding reductions in greenhouse gases that did not
    include commitments by developing countries as well as developed/
    industrialized countries, or that would result in harm to the U.S.
    economy. The administration has not transmitted the Kyoto Protocol to
    the Senate because, among other reasons, developing countries have to
    date not been willing to consider making binding commitments regarding
    their greenhouse gas emissions.'' ``Treaties and Other International
    Agreements'', p. 276.
        The operative language is as follows: ``Resolved, That it is the
    sense of the Senate that----
        (1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to,
    or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention
    on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997,
    or thereafter, which would----
        (A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
    emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
    agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or
    reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within
    the same compliance period, or
        (B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United
    States''.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Subsequent to and despite this Advice, U.S. negotiators clearly
    disregarded both major Byrd-Hagel recommendations: Kyoto did not
    require developing countries to share our commitments, and even the
    Clinton White House economic advisors have recanted their refutations
    of the Kyoto cost estimates.\132\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \132\ ``Economists from the Clinton White House now concede that
    complying with Kyoto's mandatory reductions in greenhouse gases would
    be difficult--and more expensive to American consumers than they
    thought when they were in charge.'' USA Today, 12 June 2001.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Since then, nothing has emerged to indicate that Kyoto does not
    still violate both key Byrd-Hagel conditions, and it is likely that
    very few Senators have amended their position against a treaty causing
    ``serious economic harm.'' However, Clinton Administration officials
    did admit that they began working on the plan for binding commitments
    within 1 year after Rio went into effect.\133\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \133\ In 1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rafe Pomerance
    asserted that ``the administration has been working on this policy for
    more than a year'', quoted in Nature, 25 July 1996.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Kyoto, too, is clearly intended to be a similar step in a ``treaty
    hopping'' campaign: even the models on which it is based predict an
    undetectable climatic impact\134\--at a cost to the U.S. of up to $400
    billion annually\135\--yet may be 1/30th of what its proponents
    seek.\136\ Rio and Kyoto offer differing commitments but purport ``the
    same ultimate objective.''\137\ The U.N. IPCC has said this means
    reducing GHG emissions by as much as 60-80 percent, which wildly
    exceeds Kyoto's specified ambitions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \134\ See, Testimony of Dr. Sallie Baliunas to the Senate Committee
    on Environment and Public Works, at http://www.techcentralstation.com/
    1051/envirowrapper.jsp?PID=1051-450&CID=1051-031302C.
        \135\ U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,
    Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting. ``Impacts of the Kyoto
    Protocol on U.S. Energy markets and Economic Activity.'' Washington,
    DC. October 1998.
        \136\ ``Yet the climate simulations lead to the conclusion that the
    Kyoto reductions will have little effect in the twenty-first century
    (15), and 1930 Kyotos' may be needed to reduce warming to an acceptable
    level.' James Hansen, Makiko Sato, Reto Ruedy, Andrew Lacis, and Valdar
    Oinas, ``Global warming in the twenty-first century: An alternative
    scenario,'' Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences, August 29,
    2000.
        Hansen was citing Malakoff, D. (1997) Science 278, 2048.
        \137\ ``[S]tabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
    atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
    interference with the climate system.'' See, e.g., Rio Article 2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As such the U.S. should require, prior to and as part of ratifying
    any further agreements, express acknowledgement not only of the actual
    ``ultimate goal'', but that it is committed to its practical
    requirements, in this case up to ``30 Kyotos''.
        Such ``treaty hopping'' agendas illustrate the importance of Senate
    treaty ``reservations'', or the Senate's second bite at the ``Advice''
    apple. This comes of course during the ``Consent'' function, which
    function the U.S. negotiators unfortunately eviscerated. After agreeing
    to terms incompatible with Byrd-Hagel, the Administration also accepted
    Kyoto's prohibition on reservations, or the Senate's ability to specify
    the specific understandings or conditions of the U.S. commitment. This
    despite the Senate also having forewarned the administration about this
    in advance of Kyoto.\138\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \138\ See ``Treaties and Other International Agreements,'' at 274.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In summation, President Bush ought to match his assertions of
    having ``rejected'' Kyoto with the requisite submission to the U.N. to
    that effect, as was done regarding the International Criminal
    Court.\139\ In the absence of that act, the White House must at minimum
    assist resolution of the ambiguous U.S. role in Kyoto by requesting the
    Senate disapprove of the treaty. In the absence of that, the Senate
    should recognize that there is no reverse equivalent of the
    ``presentment'' clause\140\, regarding treaties. Only protocol, not any
    constitutional prohibition, impedes Senate consideration of a signed
    treaty. Certainly given the imperative rhetoric surrounding Kyoto, if
    President Bush insists on continuing the U.S.' ambiguous role the
    Senate should take matters into its own hands, and decide the fate of
    this agreement.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \139\ The President manifested that this is how the United States
    makes ``its intention clear to not become a party to the treaty,'' as
    required by ``customary'' law and the Vienna Convention Article 18.
    ``[S]ignature by the U.S. does impose an obligation on the U.S. under
    international law to refrain from actions that would undermine the
    Protocol's object and purpose. That obligation continues to apply until
    such time as the U.S. ratifies the Protocol or makes clear its intent
    not to do so.'' ``Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about
    the Kyoto Protocol'', CRS Report for Congress (March 29, 2001).
        \140\ U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7: ``Every Bill which
    shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
    before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
    States''.
        Though it has not yet done so, precedent indicates the Senate can
    also effect this outcome by passing a Sense of the Senate expressing
    disapproval of a signed, not ratified treaty. See, ``Withdrawal,'' in
    attached article.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        That resolution should by definition be rejection of Kyoto.
    Otherwise, by accepting this double indignity of ignoring advice and
    prohibiting reservations, this body would condone Executive
    circumvention of the Senate's constitutional treaty role.
                                   __________
     Statement of Jon Reisman, Associate Professor of Economics and Public
                     Policy, University of Maine at Machias
        I would like to call the attention of the Committees on Foreign
    Relations and Environment and Public Works to a troubling development
    in New England, where all six New England Governors (NEG) have entered
    into an unconstitutional agreement with the Eastern Canadian Premiers
    (ECP) to implement the Kyoto Protocol's caps on carbon dioxide
    (CO2) emissions. \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \1\Committee on the Environment and the Northeast International
    Committee on Energy of the Conference of New England Governors and
    Eastern Canadian Premiers, Climate Change Action Plan 2001. http://
    www.scics.gc.ca/pdf/850084011--e.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In my view, the NEG/ECP climate change agreement:
          Violates Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution: ``No
    State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation . . . No
    State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any
    Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power . .
    .'' and
          Seeks to implement the Kyoto Protocol before the U.S.
    Senate has ratified it, and when, in fact, it has been rejected
    explicitly by the President and implicitly by the terms of Senate
    Resolution No. 98 by a vote of 95-0.
        The NEG/ECP climate change agreement is a transparent attempt to
    implement the Kyoto Protocol, without reference to the complex terms of
    the Protocol itself. It calls for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to
    1990 levels by 2010 and to 10 percent below 1990 levels by 2020. This
    level of reduction substantially exceeds the 7 percent reduction target
    that the United States would need to meet by 2008-2012 under the Kyoto
    agreement.
        Action steps under the NEG/ECP climate agreement include:
        1) establishing a regional, standardized greenhouse gas emissions
    inventory and emissions reduction plan;
        2) ``educating'' the public about the ``problem, causes and
    solutions'' of global warming;
        3) decreasing emissions from the electricity and transportation
    sectors, and
        4) creating a regional registry and emissions trading mechanism.
        The New England Governors are scheduled to travel to Quebec this
    August and likely will sign an agreement with the Eastern Canadian
    Premiers to begin implementing the unconstitutional pledge they made
    last year. \2\ This year, they intend to work out specific goals and
    implementation schemes.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \2\News summary of the 2001 meeting at http://www.edie.net/news/
    Archive/4632.cfm
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        There is settled precedent supporting the position that the NEG/ECP
    climate agreement violates the U.S. Constitution. In Holmes v.
    Jennison, Chief Justice Taney emphasized the broad intent of the
    framers underlying Section 10:
        ``As these words ('agreement or compact') could not have been idly
    or superfluously used by the framers of the Constitution, they cannot
    be construed to mean the same thing with the word treaty. They
    evidently mean something more, and were designed to make the
    prohibition more comprehensive. . . . The word `agreement' does not
    necessarily import and direct any express stipulation; nor is it
    necessary that it should be in writing. . . .
        ``And the use of all of these terms, `treaty,' `agreement,'
    `compact,' show that it was the intention of the framers of the
    Constitution to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; and that
    they anxiously desired to cutoff all connection or communication
    between a State and a foreign power; and we shall fail to execute that
    evident intention, unless we give to the word `agreement' its most
    extended signification; and so apply it as to prohibit every agreement,
    written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied, by the
    mutual understanding of the parties.'' 14 Pet. (39 U.S.) 540, 570-572
    (1840).
        In addition to these legal concerns, the policy wisdom of
    implementing Kyoto may certainly be debated in the face of the National
    Academy of Sciences' recent finding that anthropogenic vs. natural
    causality is still clouded by considerable uncertainty \3\. Correlation
    is not causation, and the atmospheric models that global warming
    advocates rely upon predict that the upper atmosphere will warm first,
    something that has not happened and is still unexplained. Furthermore,
    those same flawed models predict that the reductions in CO2
    envisioned in Kyoto will essentially have no effect on climate \4\.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \3\National Academy of Sciences. Climate Change Science: An
    Analysis of Some Key Questions (2001) http://books.nap.edu/books/
    0309075742/html/
         \4\Testimony of Dr. Sallie Baliunas to the Senate Committee on
    Environment and Public Works http://www.techcentralstation.com/1051/
    envirowrapper.jsp?PID=1051-450&CID=1051-031302C
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Committee on Foreign Relations should hold a separate inquiry
    on the purpose and Constitutional legitimacy of the NEG/ECP climate
    change agreement. Allowing six New England States to move forward to
    implement the Kyoto Protocol would support the proposition that States
    are free to ignore Article 1, Section 10, and are at liberty to
    negotiate and implement international agreements without the advice and
    consent of the U.S. Senate.
        These concerns are far from academic. Suppose, for example, that
    Vermont had disagreed with the Senate's rejection of the League of
    Nations, and had recognized and joined that entity? Article 1, Section
    10 exists precisely to avoid such situations.
        If the Environment and Public Works Committee supports the efforts
    of New England's Governors, it should introduce legislation to
    implement Kyoto's caps on a nationwide basis, and let that legislation
    be fully debated on the floor of the Senate. There is absolutely no
    defensible environmental or economic rationale for piecemeal regional
    implementation of an international agreement that fails, by its terms,
    to address future emissions growth by rapidly growing developing
    nations such as China and India. Implementing Kyoto targets on a
    regional basis would lead only to competitive disadvantage, lost wages
    and jobs, and larger State budget deficits at a time of increasing
    economic uncertainty.
        I hope that the Committees will join me in urging the
    Administration to notify the New England Governors that the United
    States Constitution still applies in New England, even on environmental
    matters. We have not, as yet, dispensed with the formality of having
    the President negotiate and the Senate ratify international agreements
    before we implement them. States are proscribed from making foreign or
    interstate agreements. That Constitutional principle is at risk here.
                                     ______

        Jon Reisman is an associate professor of economics and public
    policy at the University of Maine at Machias, where he teaches a
    variety of courses including Environmental Policy and Political
    Correctness in American Society. He has a B.A. in economics and
    environmental studies from Colby College, an M.A. in economics from
    Brown University and an M.A. in public policy and management from the
    University of Southern Maine.
        Reisman worked for Gov. Angus King in 1995 getting rid of federally
    mandated car testing in Maine. Upon returning to rural Downeast Maine,
    he led the effort opposing the endangered species listing of Atlantic
    salmon. In 1998 he was the GOP nominee in Maine's 2d congressional
    district.
        Reisman pioneered an innovative course offering, ``Political
    Correctness in American Society'' at the University of Maine at
    Machias. The course is now offered on the web. Reisman's home page is
    http://www.umm.maine.edu/faculty/jreisman/jreisman.html
                                     ______

                                   Synthesis
                             (by John C. Dernbach)
        In June 1992, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
    Development (UNCED, or Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, the nations of
    the world agreed to implement an ambitious plan for sustainable
    development. The United States was one of those countries. Has the
    United States moved toward or away from sustainable development in the
    10-year period since Rio? What should the country do next? The book has
    sought to answer both questions.
        Sustainable development is ecologically sustainable human
    development; it includes but is not limited to economic development.
    Sustainable development affirms the basic goals of development since
    the end of World War II, but changes them in one key way. Development
    is based on peace, economic development, social betterment, and
    effective national governance. Its goals are human freedom,
    opportunity, and quality of life, and it has succeeded in many ways.
        Unfortunately, we now face growing environmental degradation around
    the world, and a growing gap between rich and poor. Increasingly, these
    problems undermine and hinder traditional methods of economic and
    social development. Deforestation and overfishing mean that many people
    and businesses can no longer earn a livelihood. Pollution impairs human
    health and thus human betterment. Conflicts over water and other
    resources lead to violence and civil strife. These and other problems
    are profoundly destabilizing because they mean less freedom and
    opportunity and lower quality of life.
        Sustainable development responds to these problems by adding
    environmental protection to the goals of traditional development.
    Instead of development at the environment's expense, or environmental
    protection at the expense of development, sustainable development would
    achieve both traditional development and environmental protection or
    restoration at the same time. Sustainable development affirms the
    importance of freedom, opportunity, and quality of life, for both
    present and future generations.
        Sustainable development should matter to the United States because
    freedom, opportunity, and quality of life are among our core goals as a
    Nation. Providing a better life for those who come after us is also a
    basic American value. Sustainable development would lead to a stronger,
    more efficient, and more productive America, because this country's
    economic, environmental, social, and security goals would support each
    other in greater and greater degrees over time, rather than undermine
    one another. Sustainable development would also both require and
    promote effective governance and legal systems, which Americans also
    value. By addressing the destabilizing effects of poverty and
    environmental degradation around the world, the United States could
    help make the world more secure. In addition, U.S. economic and
    military power, as well as the ethical and religious foundations for
    sustainability, suggest a special obligation to work for sustainable
    development.
        The United States has, unquestionably, begun to take some steps
    toward sustainable development. In fact, those who see sustainable
    development as including prior and ongoing efforts, such as
    conservation and pollution control, could rightly say that the 1990's
    saw a continuation of activities that began before the Earth Summit.
    Yet, on balance, the United States is now far from being a sustainable
    society, and in many respects is farther away than it was in 1992.
        While there is ``good news'' and ``bad news'' to report, the bad
    news is told in general trends, broad studies, and for entire economic
    sectors or program areas. All too frequently, the good news is limited
    to specific examples and particular programs. The United States has not
    responded in a way that corresponds to the seriousness of the problems
    we face or to the opportunities provided by sustainable development.
    Nevertheless, legal and policy tools are available to put the United
    States on a direct path to sustainability, to our great advantage and
    without major dislocations-if we can muster the will and the vision to
    use them.
        This synthesis begins with an overview of the book's findings and
    recommendations, followed by an explanation of sustainable development
    and its importance to the United States. It then summarizes each of the
    book's major sections, which concern consumption and population;
    international trade, finance, and development assistance; conservation
    and management of natural resources; waste and toxic chemicals;
    education; institutions and infrastructure; and governance. Throughout,
    the synthesis summarizes and often excerpts from individual chapters.
                                    overview
    A Little Good News
        In virtually every area of American life, a few people and
    organizations are exercising leadership for sustainability. A small
    number of Federal agencies, State governments, local governments,
    corporations, universities, and others have taken a leadership role in
    moving toward sustainable development over the past decade. Nearly all
    of these efforts contain room for improvement. Still, they demonstrate
    that it is both possible and desirable to reconcile environmental,
    social, and economic goals. For instance:
        The Federal Government greatly expanded its use of habitat
    conservation plans in the past decade to reconcile conflicts between
    economic development and endangered species protection. A few States
    have begun to implement strategies for sustainable development and use
    indicators for sustainability.
        At the community level, some sustainability initiatives have been
    undertaken, and are yielding some positive results.
        A handful of major corporations are seriously embracing the
    ``triple bottom line'' of environment, economy, and society or equity
    as a way of setting and achieving goals. A small minority of primary
    schools, high schools, and higher education institutions are teaching
    students to perform the kind of integrated and interdisciplinary
    analysis needed to make decisions that simultaneously further social,
    economic, and environmental goals.
        In a few areas, the United States has played a significant and
    constructive international leadership role. These include the
    protection of high seas fisheries, the prevention of lead poisoning,
    integration of environmental considerations into trade agreements, and
    incorporation of environmental impact reviews and public participation
    in World Bank projects.
        The President's Council on Sustainable Development (PCSD), an
    advisory council that existed between 1993 and 1999, developed hundreds
    of recommendations that would foster national security, economic
    development, job creation, and environmental protection at the same
    time. The PCSD and others outlined a policy framework showing that the
    United States actually could make significant progress toward
    sustainable development.
        There is much better information about many environmental problems
    now than there was 10 years ago, and generally greater access to it. We
    also have a much better idea of the steps needed to achieve sustainable
    development, and have made significant progress in creating the policy
    and legal tools necessary to do so.
    A Lot of Bad News
        Energy and materials consumption grew substantially in the past
    decade, and reduced or outweighed many specific environmental
    achievements. With 5 percent of the world's population, the United
    States was at the time of the Earth Summit responsible for about 24
    percent of the world's energy consumption and almost 30 percent of the
    world's raw materials consumption. Since the Earth Summit, materials
    use has increased 10 percent, primary energy consumption has increased
    21 percent, and energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2)
    emissions have increased by 13 percent. Over and over, increases in
    materials and energy efficiency, and in the effectiveness of pollution
    controls for individual sources, are outweighed by increases in
    consumption. Despite a significant increase in municipal waste
    recycling in the past decade, for example, the U.S. generation and
    disposal of municipal solid waste per capita have been growing since
    1996. U.S. population-the number of people consuming resources and
    energy-grew by 32.7 million, or 13.2 percent, from 1990 to 2000, the
    largest single decade of growth in the nation's history.
        Moreover, the United States has not exercised the kind of
    international leadership necessary to encourage or support sustainable
    development around the world. The United States is not a Party to many
    treaties and international agreements that are intended to foster
    sustainable development in specific contexts, including the Convention
    on Biological Diversity and the Kyoto Protocol. Current patterns of
    international trade cause environmental harm and impair sustainable
    development in part because U.S. trade policy tends to put short-term
    domestic economic goals ahead of sustainable development. U.S. official
    development assistance has declined since Rio. Although the United
    States was the second largest provider of official development
    assistance in 2000, its contribution was the lowest of all
    industrialized countries, measured as a percentage of gross domestic
    income.
        U.S. law and policy continue to encourage unsustainable development
    in a variety of ways. These include subsidies, ``grandfather''
    provisions for existing and more-polluting facilities and activities in
    pollution control laws, and fragmented local decisionmaking that
    encourages sprawl. Such laws and policies mean that individuals and
    corporations have fewer choices, and less sustainable choices, than
    they would otherwise.
        The United States has no national strategy for achieving
    sustainable development, and no generally accepted indicators to mark
    progress along the way. Nor does the United States have a meaningful or
    effective strategy to address climate change, biodiversity, and many
    other issues. Neither the executive branch nor the U.S. Congress
    systematically analyze proposed activities to find ways to make
    significant progress on economic, environmental, social, and security
    goals at the same time.
        As a whole, the condition of America's natural resources and
    ecosystems has not improved, and appears to have deteriorated slightly,
    over the past decade. There was no discernible improvement in our
    rivers, streams, and lakes, and the quality of our ocean coastal waters
    appears to have deteriorated. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions increased,
    and a large number of plant and animal species continue to be at risk
    of extinction. U.S. agriculture is less sustainable, and urban sprawl
    continues relatively unabated. Air quality improved slightly, but not
    enough to fully protect human health.
        The social and institutional infrastructure and supports needed for
    sustainable development continue to cause environmental degradation and
    underserve the poor. The negative environmental impacts of
    transportation increased during the past decade, despite significant
    legislative changes. The U.S. sanitation system remains vulnerable to
    breakdowns, the level of communicable diseases is high when compared to
    other developed countries, and there has been no discernible progress
    in improving access to medical care.
    Recommendations for the Next Decade
        The path to sustainability is not an easy one, but it is marked by
    basic American values. These include freedom, opportunity, and quality
    of life; greater efficiency; more effective and responsive governance;
    a desire to make a better world for those who follow us; a willingness
    to find and exploit opportunities; a quest for a safer world; and a
    sense of calling to play a constructive role in international affairs.
    All of these are underscored by our ethical and even religious
    obligations toward each other and the environment.
        The United States would take a large and decisive step toward
    sustainability if individuals, businesses, educational institutions,
    local and State governments, Federal agencies and others would simply
    adopt and build on the leading sustainability practices of their
    counterparts here and in other nations.
        A national strategy for sustainable development, with specified
    goals and priorities, would harness all sectors of society to achieve
    our economic, social, environmental, and security goals. The strategy
    could be modeled on that of the European Union (EU) and States such as
    New Jersey, and specifically address climate change, biodiversity, and
    other major issues. An executive-level entity would be needed to
    coordinate and assist in the implementation of the strategy. A
    counterpart entity in Congress would also be helpful. The strategy
    would more likely be effective if there were a set of indicators to
    measure progress in achieving its goals. Comparable State and local
    strategies and indicators are also needed.
        The United States needs to recognize that its substantial
    consumption levels, coupled with domestic population growth, have
    serious environmental, social, and economic impacts. Americans also
    need to understand that human well-being can be decoupled from high
    consumption of materials and energy. A shift in taxes from labor and
    income, on one hand, to materials and energy consumption, on the other,
    would encourage both greater efficiency and reduced negative
    environmental impacts.
        Congress should repeal or modify laws, policies, and subsidies that
    encourage unsustainable development. The elimination of subsidies would
    also have positive budgetary impacts. The repeal or modification of
    such laws would provide more and better opportunities for individuals
    and corporations to act in a more sustainable manner, and would remove
    an important set of barriers to sustainability.
        Protection of natural resources and the environment must focus more
    holistically on the resources to be protected, and on understanding
    those resources. Congress and the States need to assure that these
    resources are protected from all significant threats, and are protected
    from those threats to the same degree. In addition, the type of
    substantive goals that exist in the air and water pollution control
    programs, as well as supportive implementing mechanisms, should be
    applied to biodiversity, climate change, oceans under U.S.
    jurisdiction, forests, and other natural resources. The United States
    also needs to fund or support the development of more complete and
    reliable information about ecosystems as well as about the connections
    among its economic, environmental, social, and security goals.
        Social infrastructure, institutions, and laws should be designed
    and operated to further economic, environmental, and social goals at
    the same time. Public health services and, at a minimum, basic medical
    services should be available to all. Transportation infrastructure
    should be more efficient and diverse, and provide people with more
    choices.
        The United States needs to take a stronger and more constructive
    leadership role internationally, not only on terrorism but on the broad
    range of issues related to sustainable development. The United States
    should further increase its official development assistance, while
    taking measures to ensure that the money is spent effectively and for
    sustainable development. More broadly, U.S. foreign policy, including
    trade policy, needs to be more supportive of the development aspect of
    sustainable development. The United States should also become a Party
    to many of the international treaties that would foster sustainable
    development, including the Convention on Biological Diversity, the
    Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Aarhus Convention on Access to
    Information, the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent, the
    Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, and the Basel
    Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
    Wastes.
        Some longer term changes are also needed if the United States is to
    achieve sustainable development. They include the evolution of judicial
    understanding of property to update expectations about the productive
    value of ecosystems and the establishment of more inviting avenues for
    public participation in and challenge to decisions affecting
    sustainability.
    What Is Sustainable Development?
        Sustainable development is human development that is ecologically
    sustainable. Its aims are human freedom, opportunity, and higher
    quality of life. It is not another name for economic development,
    although it includes economic development.
        Because ``sustainable'' modifies ``development,'' it is first
    important to understand what development means. Although Americans
    understand development to mean the transformation of a field or woodlot
    into housing or a mall, development has a different meaning at the
    international level. Since the end of World War II, the United States
    and most of the world community have successfully sought greater peace
    and security, economic development, and social development or human
    rights. They have also sought national governance that supports these
    goals, even though they recognize that international efforts are also
    needed. As understood internationally, these are the four elements of
    development. This understanding of development grew out of the
    experiences of the last world war and the great depression that
    preceded and contributed to it, and a firm desire to ensure that the
    conditions that led to them would not occur again. More positively,
    development is intended to foster human freedom, opportunity, and
    quality of life.
        For more than half a century, we have measured progress by the
    extent to which we have realized these goals. And there has been a
    great deal of progress. The world is more free, there is more
    opportunity, and most humans have a higher quality of life now than
    they did in 1945.
        But until recently, protecting and restoring the environment was
    not among these goals. Indeed, progress in achieving these other goals
    was considered to outweigh or even justify any environmental
    degradation that may have occurred.
        As the World Commission on Environment and Development concluded in
    1987, progress in the past half century has come with a price we cannot
    ignore and can no longer afford-massive and growing environmental
    degradation, and a growing number of people in poverty. The commission
    concluded that countries should seek sustainable development-
    ''development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
    the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.''
    Sustainable development would thus meet human needs over the long term;
    the present generation would not benefit at the expense of future
    generations. When nations of the world endorsed sustainable development
    at the Earth Summit in 1992, they redefined progress to include
    environmental protection and restoration.
        Sustainable development is based on a sober and realistic appraisal
    of how humans need to approach the problems of the next half century or
    more. Like traditional development, it is premised on a recognition of
    what can happen when freedom, opportunity, and quality of life are
    inequitably realized or are diminishing.
        Every major international and regional report on the condition of
    the environment shows continuing and deteriorating environmental
    conditions. The gap between the rich and poor continues to grow.
    Poverty and environmental degradation are mutually reinforcing; poor
    people live in the most polluted or degraded environments, and this
    contributes to their poverty. Although poverty and environmental
    degradation are important in their own right, they also can cause or
    contribute to wars, starvation, ethnic tensions, and terrorism, which
    are more likely to get headlines than their underlying causes. Like
    terrorism, poverty and environmental degradation are destabilizing. The
    pressures caused by poverty and environmental degradation are likely to
    increase in the next half century. Global population is expected to
    grow from roughly six to nine billion, or 50 percent, by 2050. The
    global economy is likely to grow by a factor of three to five in the
    same period. As difficult and challenging as things now appear, they
    are likely to become much more difficult and challenging in the decades
    ahead.
        Sustainable development also has deep ethical and religious roots.
    Sustainable development leads to two major shifts in ethical thinking
    and action. It recognizes the connections between humanity's social,
    ecological, and economic obligations, and it recognizes responsibility
    for future as well as present generations. Agenda 21, the blueprint for
    sustainable development adopted at the Earth Summit, thus calls for
    distributive justice, or a fair sharing of environmental resources by
    humans. The distributive justice theme was in response to demands by
    developing countries that they have the same right to use natural
    resources as developed countries. Agenda 21 also suggests that humans
    have a moral responsibility to limit activities that, if not curtailed
    or redirected, will severely degrade or even destroy ecosystems.
    Because human damage to the environment also hurts other humans,
    sustainable development recognizes the relationship between
    environmental protection and social justice.
        The sacred texts and beliefs underlying the world's religions also
    support sustainable development, even if that has not been true of
    their practices. These religious traditions support appreciation for
    all life; human stewardship of creation; harmony among humans, their
    communities, and their environment; and a caring for place. They also
    indicate that the natural world is valuable in itself, not simply
    insofar as humans may value it. They articulate the importance of deep
    respect for creation, both human and nonhuman, and living in a manner
    that is ecologically sustainable. These texts and beliefs also indicate
    the importance of fair and equitable sharing of resources, which would
    mean both ceilings and floors for consumption. Finally, they suggest
    that people be given an opportunity to participate in decisions that
    will affect their lives and their communities.
        To achieve sustainable development, nations at the Earth Summit
    endorsed two important but nonbinding texts, Agenda 21 and the Rio
    Declaration. (They also agreed to a separate set of principles for
    forestry.) As a global plan of action for sustainable development,
    Agenda 21 is intended to be carried out primarily, but not exclusively,
    by countries within their own borders. Agenda 21, which contains 40
    separate chapters, runs several hundred pages regardless of how it is
    printed. These chapters focus on the social and economic dimensions of
    sustainable development, e.g., poverty, human health, and population;
    conservation and management of natural resources, e.g., atmosphere,
    forests, biological diversity, and various wastes and toxic chemicals;
    the role of major groups, e.g., children and youth, women, farmers,
    workers, and business and industry, in attaining sustainable
    development; and means of implementation, e.g., financial resources,
    technology transfer, science, education, and public information. Each
    chapter identifies specific actions to be taken, explains generally why
    these actions are necessary, identifies the persons or institutions who
    are to take action, and describes specific means of implementation.
        The Rio Declaration is a set of 27 principles for sustainable
    development. Key principles include the integration of environment and
    development in decisionmaking, sustainable patterns of resource
    production and consumption, the polluter-pays principle, the
    precautionary approach or principle, developed country leadership,
    intergenerational equity, and public participation. The polluter-pays
    principle would have polluters bear the costs of preventing and
    cleaning up environmental problems rather than impose the costs of
    those problems on others. According to the precautionary principle, the
    absence of complete scientific certainty about serious problems is not
    an excuse for refusing to take action. These principles also are woven
    into Agenda 21.
        In Rio, the international community also established a process for
    reviewing national and international progress toward sustainable
    development. Agenda 21 has been, and continues to be, the focal point
    of that process.
        When countries agreed to Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, they
    agreed to implement these agreements, both at home and in their foreign
    policy. The United States, under the leadership of President George
    H.W. Bush, was one of those countries.
    Why Should Sustainable Development Matter to the United States?
        Americans should care about sustainable development because its
    goals-human freedom, opportunity, and quality of life-are also our
    goals. We sought independence for these purposes, established a legal
    and economic system premised on their importance, endured a civil war
    to protect that system and expand its opportunities to others, and
    fought two world wars and numerous other conflicts to protect ourselves
    and help make those same opportunities available to others.
        Sustainable development, moreover, is not just about us, the
    current generation of Americans. It is, in the U.S. Constitution's
    words, about ``ourselves and our posterity,'' our children,
    grandchildren, nieces, nephews, and others not yet born who will
    someday inhabit this country. We pride ourselves on providing our
    descendants greater opportunities and a better quality of life.
    Sustainable development would do precisely that. Without it, we cannot
    assure our children and grandchildren a better life, and are likely to
    leave them a poorer one.
        Sustainable development would lead to a stronger and more efficient
    America because we would be pursuing social, economic, environmental,
    and security goals in ways that are more mutually reinforcing or
    supportive over time, not contradictory or antagonistic. The result
    would be a stronger, more efficient country that provides its citizens
    and their descendants increasingly more opportunities in a quality
    natural environment. Increased energy efficiency would reduce energy
    costs for manufacturers and consumers, and would also mean reduced
    pollution. In addition to securing an ongoing supply of timber and
    paper products, sustainable forestry matters because we rely on forests
    for watershed maintenance, pollution abatement, climate control, jobs,
    and recreation. Similarly, a sustainable transportation system would
    make it easier, less expensive, and less environmentally damaging for
    people of all incomes to travel from home to work and other
    destinations. Cleaner production is likely to be less costly and more
    efficient, reduce the economic and social burdens created by human
    exposure to hazardous wastes and substances, and improve the
    occupational health and safety of workers.
        Sustainable development would also lead to better and more
    responsive governance, which is another basic American value. Ensuring
    that our economic, social, environmental, and security goals are
    mutually supportive would require that the government does not
    subsidize with one hand what it controls on the other. It would also
    require more public involvement in many decisionmaking processes
    because public input is more likely to ensure that these goals are
    harmonized.
        Sustainable development would also lead to a safer, more stable and
    secure world outside American borders. That would have important and
    positive consequences for both ourselves and others, particularly after
    September 11, 2001. The world is deeply divided between haves and have-
    nots, and the risk of evolution toward an unstable, two-class world,
    with a huge global underclass, is quite real. Americans have a large
    stake in the prevention or avoidance of humanitarian emergencies,
    national and regional conflicts, environmental deterioration,
    terrorism, illicit drugs, the spread of diseases, illegal migration,
    and other disasters. These threats to our security do not need
    passports to cross borders. None of the goals that this country has
    pursued around the world-peace and stability, human rights and
    democratization, expansion of trade and markets, environmental
    protection, or putting an end to hunger and extreme deprivation-can be
    accomplished effectively except in the context of sustainable
    development. Thus, while sustainable development assistance in
    developing countries can be justified on humanitarian grounds, it is
    also consistent with the strategic interests of the United States.
        Americans have a special role to play in sustainable development.
    We have the largest economy and the most powerful military in the
    world. Not only do we have enormous capability to bring to bear in the
    pursuit of sustainable development, we also bear a significant share of
    the responsibility for the global environmental problems that
    sustainable development is intended to address. The United States is
    the world's largest producer and consumer of materials and energy.
    Since the U.S. model of production and consumption is widely emulated
    throughout the world, U.S. domestic actions could also have a major
    international effect.
        It is often said that nations or individuals can lead, follow, or
    get out of the way. The United States is in an unparalleled position to
    play a key international leadership role on sustainable development.
    The United States could instead permit the EU, Japan, and other
    developed countries to play the leadership role, and follow their lead.
    That would be unpalatable to many, but it would be better than doing
    nothing. Because of its dominant role in international affairs,
    however, the United States cannot simply get out of the way. If the
    United States does not lead or follow, it will be an obstacle to
    international efforts to achieve sustainable development.
        The ethical and religious justifications for sustainable
    development also provide a reason that Americans should care. U.S.
    actions do not simply affect us; they affect others as well. Historic
    and continuing U.S. emissions of GHGs are likely to adversely affect
    others by contributing to rising sea levels and higher temperatures
    around the world, for example. Moreover, the texts and beliefs of each
    of the world's major religions teach responsibility toward other humans
    as well as the environment. Because Americans see themselves as a
    religious people, they should respond accordingly.
        Finally, our government agreed to Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration
    at the Earth Summit. These texts are not legally binding, but a
    nation's political commitment is not a trivial thing. Indeed, it is in
    the national interest to honor international political commitments.
        The decisions we make about sustainable development are defining
    decisions for the United States. They will define the values for which
    our country stands.
                                    summary
        The major sections of this book focus on consumption and
    population; international trade, finance, and development assistance;
    conservation and management of natural resources; waste and toxic
    chemicals; education; institutions and infrastructure; and governance.
    What follows is a summary of each section, including a summary or
    excerpts from relevant individual chapters. For almost all chapters,
    the summary includes a review of efforts over the past decade and
    recommendations. While most of the recommendations are directed to the
    United States, a few are directed to the international community.
    Consumption and Population
        ``To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life
    for all people,'' the Rio Declaration states, governments ``should
    reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and
    consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies.'' As Agenda
    21 observes, ``the major cause of the continued deterioration of the
    global environment is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and
    production, particularly in industrialized countries.'' Agenda 21 also
    describes world population growth, in combination with unsustainable
    consumption patterns, as placing ``increasingly severe stresses on the
    life-supporting capacities of our planet.''
        A simple model developed in the 1970's describes the relationship
    between population and consumption. The model is expressed as a
    formula: I = PAT. The formula expresses a community's overall
    environmental impact (I) as the product of its population size (P), its
    affluence or per capita level of consumption (A), and the technology
    and social arrangements that underlay each unit of consumption (T).
    While consumption of materials, consumption of energy, and population
    are not wholly determinative of environmental impacts, they are
    enormously influential.
    Materials
        Sustainable use of materials or resources can be measured by
    answering two questions. First, how is the rate of resource use related
    to the overall stock of resources? Second, what portion of resources in
    use are lost to the environment? The first question measures
    utilization of resources, and the second measures consumption. Put
    another way, the first reflects the sustainability of supply, and the
    second the sustainability of the receiving ecosystems. Almost all
    levels of resource use and many types of environmental impacts in the
    United States have increased from levels already generally agreed to be
    unsustainable.
        At the time of the Earth Summit, the average American was
    responsible for the extraction and employment of more than 100 pounds
    of material daily, which is more than any other country in world. These
    materials include metals, wood products, paper, agricultural products,
    construction materials, and fossil fuels. Ten years later, the quantity
    has increased by about 10 percent. The biggest increase over the past
    decade was for nonrenewable organic materials (including fossil fuels).
    The hike in overall materials use is also due in part to increases in
    the use of construction materials, such as sand, gravel, and stone,
    whose utilization requires large amounts of energy. Iron, steel, and
    other heavy metals continue to be used less, while light metals
    (particularly aluminum), plastics, and composites are used more. This
    latter trend is favorable, because the depletion time for heavier
    metals is shorter than that for aluminum.
        Environmental impacts of resource consumption in the United States
    appear to have increased by about 15 percent over the past decade
    because of population growth and an increase in gross domestic product
    (GDP) per capita. Americans produce more municipal waste per capita
    than any other country, are the leading producer of GHG emissions, and
    are probably the world's largest producer of toxic wastes. This
    increase in U.S. consumption has occurred despite a movement from more
    resource-intensive production to greater use of services.
        U.S. Government programs and policies have promoted inefficient
    utilization and use of natural resources. These policies include many
    types of direct and indirect subsidies for, among other things, timber
    cutting, agriculture, hard rock mining, and extraction and use of
    fossil fuels. While there are success stories in reduction of materials
    use and environmental impacts in the past decade (specific eco-
    industrial parks, corporate programs, and even government programs),
    these efforts have not changed the overall pattern or result.
        To make significant progress toward sustainability, the U.S.
    Government should gain a better understanding of what resource
    sustainability really means, and should put in place a framework for
    achieving specific goals related to sustainability of materials. The
    United States should also lead international efforts to discuss and
    achieve sustainable production and consumption patterns in this and
    other developed countries.
        Subsidy reform and restructuring existing taxes are two of the
    biggest challenges to sustainable consumption and production.
    Environmentally harmful subsidies need to be phased out gradually. In
    addition, the United States should begin shifting taxes from labor and
    income to materials and energy. This tax shift should result in more
    efficient use and reuse of materials and energy. Norway, Sweden, and
    other countries have already begun such a tax shift.
        Public education is also essential to this effort, and is perhaps
    needed more than anything else. The principal cause of unsustainable
    resource use is largely a social system that promotes ``conspicuous
    consumption'' rather than intelligent, conservative resource use.
    Technological innovation can modify this trend somewhat, as can policy
    initiatives. But true sustainability will require that we satisfy our
    needs, not by increased use of resources, but by more intelligent use.
    Laws and policies alone will not lead to that understanding, but they
    might result from it.
    Energy
        Primary energy consumption in the United States increased by
    approximately 20 percent between 1992 and 2000, an annual average rate
    of 2.4 percent. This growth rate was higher than the 0.8 percent
    average annual growth rate of the two prior decades. At the same time,
    the average annual GDP increase for 1992 to 2000 was 50 percent higher
    than it was between 1972 and 1992, indicating that economic growth
    drove energy consumption.
        For the production and consumption of energy, the journey toward
    sustainability can be measured by progress toward three goals:
    increased energy efficiency (or reduced energy intensity), increased
    renewable energy use, and reductions in energy-related CO2
    emissions. For the first goal, progress in the past decade continued at
    the same pace as the previous two decades. Energy efficiency, measured
    in terms of amount of energy consumed per dollar of GDP, continued to
    decline at the same steady pace it has declined since 1972-about 2
    percent per year. While the United States is improving energy
    efficiency at a faster rate than other industrialized countries, it is
    less energy-efficient (or more energy-intensive) than these countries.
    For the second and third goals, the United States achieved less since
    1992 than it did in the two decades that preceded the Earth Summit, and
    appears to be moving away from sustainability. Renewable energy
    consumption grew at a slower annual pace since 1992 (1.3 percent) than
    in the previous two decades (1.6 percent). In fact, renewable energy's
    share of total U.S. energy consumption actually declined from 7.2
    percent in 1992 to 6.9 percent in 2000. In addition, energy-related
    CO2 emissions increased by 13 percent since 1992. The annual
    rate of increase in CO2 emissions since 1992 (1.8 percent)
    is more than three times the annual increase of the previous two
    decades (0.5 percent).
        In every major sector, energy use grew over the past decade. Energy
    use for residential and commercial buildings increased because of
    population growth and the trend toward larger and more energy-consuming
    homes as well the proliferation of electricity-using devices. These
    trends offset energy efficiency and energy conservation gains for
    appliances and home building materials. Energy use for passenger
    transportation increased because of the popularity of sport utility
    vehicles and light trucks and an increase in vehicle miles traveled.
    Energy use for freight transport increased because of rapid growth in
    the volume of freight shipped and a shift toward more energy-intensive
    trucking. Industrial use of energy increased, despite a shift away from
    energy-intensive industry, because of growth in manufacturing.
        While the United States had in place numerous energy conservation
    and renewable energy laws at the time of the 1992 Earth Summit, the
    country has done little to strengthen those laws since then. Many of
    these early laws grew out of the Arab oil embargoes of the 1970's.
    Among other things, these laws established corporate average fuel
    economy (CAFE) standards for automobiles, required the U.S. Department
    of Energy (DOE) to develop mandatory energy efficiency standards for
    home appliances, provided tax credits to encourage investments in solar
    and wind technologies, and required utilities to make greater use of
    renewable energy and energy conservation. A few major changes in law
    and policy have occurred since 1992. Federal research and development
    funding for energy efficient technologies has increased, and standards
    continue to be issued for increasingly more efficient appliances. But
    CAFE standards for new vehicles have not been improved, despite
    substantial improvements in automotive technology.
        Progress in sustainability for production and consumption of energy
    in coming decades can be measured in terms of progress in reduction of
    energy-related CO2 emissions. Because reducing such
    emissions would require increases in energy efficiency and renewable
    energy, a decrease in CO2 emissions is a useful way of
    summarizing progress toward all three goals. Analyses have shown that
    vigorous implementation of cost-effective energy efficiency and
    renewable energy policies could result in reduction of energy-related
    CO2 emissions in the United States to 1990 levels by 2020 or
    earlier, which would be a major step toward energy sustainability
    goals. However, U.S. emissions in 2000 were more than 15 percent above
    1990 levels, and are projected to continue to increase under business-
    as-usual scenarios.
        The policies needed to achieve energy production and consumption
    sustainability goals are indicative of the seriousness of the needed
    effort. They include a carbon fee or charge that begins at a relatively
    low level and then increases over time. Money received from this fee or
    charge could be returned to the taxpayer in the form of lower income
    taxes or used to support sustainable energy programs. An emissions
    trading system should be coupled with the fee or charge to enhance its
    economic efficiency. Increased spending for Federal research and
    development for energy efficiency and renewable energy would likely
    lead to the development of more efficient, less costly, and more
    reliable technologies. In addition, a variety of policies should be
    employed to improve energy efficiency in buildings, industry,
    transportation, and electrical generation. Energy efficiency policies
    include a mix of tax credits, voluntary programs, increased energy
    efficiency standards for motors and appliances, improved fuel economy
    standards for motor vehicles, policies to increase use of
    telecommuting, and a requirement to increase the percentage of
    electricity generated by renewable energy.
        U.S. population reached 281.4 million in 2000, an overall increase
    of 32.7 million, or 13.2 percent, since 1990. This is the largest
    population increase in any 10-year period in U.S. history, surpassing
    even the postwar baby boom. U.S. population is growing more rapidly
    today than is the Chinese population. One American consumes 17 times as
    much energy as the average Indian, and 9 times as much as the average
    Chinese. Thus, while the billion-plus populations in China and India
    obviously raise serious concerns, at the margin population growth is a
    bigger issue in the United States than in China or India. The reason is
    simple: an additional American consumes so much more than an additional
    Chinese or Indian.
        In 2000, the average number of children born per woman in the U.S.
    population was 2.1, which is the replacement rate. Population grew
    significantly because of the ``population momentum'' caused by the
    higher birthrates of previous generations and because of immigration.
    Immigration is currently contributing roughly one-half of the annual
    population growth.
        The sustainability of the current U.S. population can be questioned
    on a variety of grounds. The United States depends increasingly on
    imports of oil and other natural resources. Americans and other
    residents of industrialized countries are also living beyond their
    means, depleting vital ecosystems and nonrenewable resource stocks. A
    U.S. population with grossly disproportionate consumption patterns
    slated to grow by 10 percent or more per decade, while striving to
    raise its per capita consumption even further, is not a recipe for
    sustainability.
        While the United States has no explicit policy regarding population
    size or growth, it does have one in practice. The tax code as well as
    laws on women's rights, inheritance, and labor all indirectly influence
    people's choices regarding family size. The legality and availability
    of family planning and abortion services have more direct influences on
    family size choices. Immigration laws and policies also play a large
    role in determining U.S. population.
        The most basic thing the United States can do is simply recognize
    that population is a domestic as well as a foreign issue, and that the
    domestic and foreign aspects of population are linked. People seek to
    immigrate to the United States, for instance, because conditions in
    their own countries are not tolerable to them. The United States also
    needs to examine seriously its carrying capacity. The United States
    cannot claim that it is taking steps toward sustainable development
    without first analyzing its environmental resource base. This country
    should develop policies to ensure that the population does not exceed
    its carrying capacity, including its ability to draw on foreign
    resources. Immigration policies should be analyzed and developed in
    this context, and not the other way around.
    International Trade, Finance, and Development Assistance
        For better and for worse, America's domestic activities have a
    great influence on domestic activities in other countries. But U.S.
    foreign policy also has direct consequences for sustainable
    development. As Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration make clear, a
    country's sustainable development commitments extend to both its
    domestic and foreign policy. This section summarizes U.S. international
    efforts regarding trade, official development assistance, and family
    planning assistance. It also summarizes U.S. efforts concerning an
    issue that has gained importance since the Earth Summit-private
    financial flows to developing countries.
    International Trade
        The United States has played a leading and generally positive role
    in steering trade rules in the direction of sustainable development,
    with modest success. Yet 10 years after Rio, the discrepancy between
    the vision of sustainable development and reality is too obvious to
    deny-current patterns of international trade cause environmental harm
    and impair sustainable development. By decreasing rather than
    increasing its attention to the profound problems of global
    underdevelopment and poverty, U.S. policy over the past decade has not
    only failed to serve the substantive policy goal of sustainable
    development but has also contributed to the polarization of
    international diplomacy between rich and poor.
        Two major trade agreements were adopted in the past decade, and
    provide a context for this analysis. The United States negotiated the
    North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada to
    reduce trade barriers among the three countries, and then ratified it.
    Several environmental issues were directly addressed in NAFTA, and the
    Parties also concluded two separate environmental agreements. In
    addition, the United States and other countries concluded the long-
    running Uruguay round of trade negotiations, which established the
    World Trade Organization (WTO). The Clinton Administration secured
    congressional approval of the Uruguay Round results.
        The United States has taken significant positive steps over the
    past decade to enhance consideration of the environmental and
    developmental consequences of its trade policy, and has actively
    supported institutions and polices that would promote such procedural
    integration of policy in other governments and international
    organizations. In 1992, the worlds of trade policy and environmental
    policy still knew very little about each other and seldom interacted.
    The use of an environmental assessment for NAFTA deepened awareness of
    the issues at stake for both government officials and the public. These
    and other experiences led President William J. Clinton to issue an
    Executive Order in 1999 requiring the preparation of an environmental
    review for most major trade agreements. On the other hand, the United
    States continues to subsidize and thus protect domestic agricultural
    producers and others that perpetuate environmental harms in the United
    States.
        The United States has also been a pioneer in opening up its
    international trade processes to public participation and has been the
    leading proponent of participatory reforms in international
    institutions. The United States enhanced and structured the access of
    environmental interests to trade policy during the 1990's. The United
    States has also been the most active and persistent proponent of
    increased public participation in dispute settlement procedures under
    WTO and NAFTA.
        Yet America's substantive trade policies are very uneven in
    fostering sustainable development. Promoting the economic interests of
    the United States remains the central consideration in trade policy. As
    a result, U.S. trade policies often put short-term and purely domestic
    goals ahead of a broader sustainable development strategy. The widely
    publicized failure of the 1999 WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle
    occurred in large part because developing countries saw the U.S.
    position as giving short shrift to their needs.
        In a broad sense, too, the structure of international trade still
    works against sustainable development. The fault, though, does not lie
    exclusively, or even primarily, with tradeofficials and trade policies.
    What goods are produced where and what services are provided where are
    influenced not by trade policy but by the economic, social, and
    geographical conditions of each country and the economic and social
    policies of national governments. A major problem has been the
    insistence by the United States and other developed countries that
    trade should replace aid as the main vehicle for transferring economic
    resources to developing countries, without attending in a timely or
    adequate manner to other conditions that must also be addressed if the
    resource flows of trade are to promote development on a sustainable
    basis. These other conditions include debt repayments and deteriorating
    environmental conditions in developing countries.
        Domestically, the United States needs to deepen and
    institutionalize its policy integration. The United States should
    establish a sustainable development coordinating entity within the
    executive office of the president that would include the U.S. trade
    representative. Congressional responsibility for trade policy should
    also be reallocated to better incorporate environmental and
    developmental considerations. The United States should continue to
    advocate in all forums for increased transparency, including public
    availability of documents and summaries of confidential deliberations,
    enhanced access for the public to key processes, and nongovernmental
    organization (NGO) representation on national delegations at every
    appropriate international negotiation on trade issues.
        To exercise greater international leadership, the United States
    needs to observe more faithfully in its domestic policies the policy
    prescriptions it advances for international trade and economic
    development in other countries, especially by removing barriers to
    access to the U.S. market and by eliminating substantial subsidies to
    key trade-relevant sectors of the American economy. The United States
    also needs to work more actively and constructively with developing
    countries to resolve key impediments relevant to international trade
    that are restricting their economic development and leading to
    continued environmental degradation. Moreover, while the ``trade, not
    aid'' mantra has substantial validity, aid continues to be a vital
    policy element, substantively and symbolically. As part of its trade
    policy, the United States needs to increase its official development
    assistance.
    Official Development Assistance
        U.S. official development assistance (ODA) has declined
    significantly since Rio. Developed countries agreed at Rio to provide
    ODA to developing countries in an amount equal to 0.7 percent of their
    GDP. The provision of this aid was part of the Rio bargain between
    developed and developing countries; developing countries were unwilling
    to have environmental conditions imposed on their development, but
    agreed to integrate environmental considerations and outcomes into
    their development process if they received financial help. The United
    States specifically declined to accept the 0.7 percent commitment,
    however. Part of the developed world's broad responsibility for
    sustainable development under Agenda 21 nonetheless includes assisting
    developing countries, especially when these countries are asked to
    respond to environmental threats that are largely not of their own
    making.
        More broadly, sustainable development includes the antipoverty
    agenda of traditional development. The gap between rich and poor
    continues to grow. Among the 4.6 billion people who live in developing
    countries, three-fifths live in communities without basic sanitation,
    one-third are without safe drinking water, one-quarter lack adequate
    housing, and one-fifth are undernourished. One-half of humanity
    ``survives'' on less than $2 per day. The eradication of poverty is a
    worthy goal in itself. But from a strategic perspective, the
    eradication of poverty would also help reduce conflicts, social
    disruption, and disease. In addition, improved economic conditions may
    reduce the pool of the disillusioned and disaffected from which
    terrorist campaigns have frequently drawn.
        Average annual U.S. ODA disbursements from 1990-1992 (set at 1999
    prices) were approximately $12.38 billion; from 1998-2000, U.S.
    disbursements averaged approximately $9.27 billion, representing
    slightly more than a 25 percent drop in real dollars. The United States
    still provides more ODA than any other country except Japan. As a
    percentage of gross domestic income, however, U.S. ODA declined from an
    average of .22 percent in 1984-1988 to .10 percent in 1998-2000, the
    lowest of all industrialized countries.
        ODA does not account for all U.S. governmental assistance that
    could contribute to sustainable development. For example, it does not
    include U.S. aid to former Soviet bloc countries or the peacekeeping
    operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Nor does ODA include private
    financial flows to developing countries. Nevertheless, ODA levels
    indicate general trends and help identify the extent to which the
    United States is engaged with the rest of the world. ODA also does
    things that private financial flows do not; ODA supports peace and
    security, alleviates health and environmental crises, encourages
    educational improvements, and rewards countries that move toward
    democracy and the rule of law. In this way, it can help provide the
    infrastructure that will attract or encourage private investment.
        Two funds for international environmental assistance were made
    permanent after Rio. The U.S. record in fostering sustainable
    development under these funds is mixed. The Montreal Protocol's
    Multilateral Fund exists to aid developing countries in meeting their
    obligations to reduce their production and consumption of substances
    that cause depletion of stratospheric ozone. Funds are disbursed for
    approved projects that contribute to phasing out ozone-depleting
    substances. Over the life of the fund, the United States has
    contributed its full assessed share-$327 million, or slightly more than
    one-quarter of the entire fund. The Global Environment Facility (GEF)
    provides funds to developing countries for specific projects to reduce
    GHG emissions and to protect biodiversity, international waters, and
    the stratospheric ozone layer. The United States paid its full share
    during the GEF's pilot phase, but has paid much less than its share
    since then. Because the United States was in arrears, other countries
    held off paying some of their commitment.
        The United States should increase ODA for sustainable development,
    although it needs to ensure that this aid is actually effective.
    President George W. Bush's commitment in early 2002 to an additional $5
    billion in foreign assistance is a step in the right direction. The
    United States would reap benefits from increased aid in the form of a
    more stable world and improved environmental conditions. By resolving
    questions concerning its financial commitments to multilateral
    organizations, the United States would also send a message that it is
    engaged in global issues and follows through on its international
    obligations. In addition to continuing its aid under the Multilateral
    Fund, the United States should clear up its arrears with respect to the
    GEF.
        Beyond resources, there needs to be a new structure for development
    cooperation, not just an architecture for international finance. It
    should include not only development assistance but also trade, debt
    management, private investment and capital flows, private sector
    development, and access to technology. Instead of operating on a
    government-to-government basis, development assistance should be
    synergistic with private sector development and the strengthening of
    civil society as a whole. Development assistance must also be based on
    common interests and the complementary needs of the rich and the poor,
    defined to some extent by international agreements. In that sense,
    development assistance is part of the price we pay to prevent the root
    cause of threats to our security. Development assistance should, in
    addition, support sustainable human development, and not simply build
    economies and dams. Economies exist for people, not vice versa. Growth
    should replenish environmental heritage, not replace it. Development
    cooperation should also promote democratization and good governance,
    and it should be driven by the needs of the receiving country. Finally,
    for much of the world, development assistance should be recognized as
    an essential building block to a vibrant private sector and successful
    financial markets.
        The international community should set firm financial and other
    commitments for developed countries to help realize the goals set by
    the U.N. General Assembly in its 2000 Millennium Declaration. These
    include, for example, the goal of reducing by one-half, by the year
    2015, the proportion of the world's people whose income is less than $1
    a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. The
    international community should also ensure adherence to these
    commitments. At day's end, the only world that works is one in which
    the aspirations for fairness and opportunity by poor people and
    developing nations are being realized. Such commitments should, in
    addition, help strengthen developing country interest in cooperation on
    environmental objectives.
        The results of aid matter a great deal. Accordingly, there should
    be some type of specific and regular reporting on how aid is used in
    developing countries, and what results it is achieving. This aid should
    foster sustainable development; it should not support environmentally
    harmful activities or be lost to corruption. Such information should
    help inform and persuade the public and policymakers in developed
    countries about the benefits of international assistance for
    sustainable development.
    Family Planning Assistance
        Since 1992, the United States has provided an average of $430
    million annually for family planning programs, and is the largest
    single donor to such programs. Still, the world's population is
    expected to grow to 9.3 billion by 2050, and nearly all of that growth
    will occur in developing countries. In addition to contributing to
    increases in poverty, resource consumption, and pollution, population
    growth plays a critical role in generating urbanization, migration, and
    political instability. At the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and
    Development, countries agreed to curb population growth, not by setting
    numerical targets and focusing on birth control efforts, but rather by
    improving people's (particularly young women's) education, health, and
    social standing, on the theory that this would lead to smaller
    families. Developed countries agreed to provide one-third of the cost
    of implementing the Cairo program ($5.7 billion annually). Developed
    countries together, though, are providing only about one-third of what
    they promised in Cairo. And twice in the past decade, the United States
    has reversed its position on whether this family planning assistance
    can go to organizations that perform or actively promote abortion as a
    family planning method. The United States needs to be a more generous
    and consistent contributor to international family planning.
        The international community should also build on the work of the
    Cairo Conference on Population and Development, which connected
    population growth to women's roles, rights, and reproductive health
    issues. Countries should collectively consider the relationships among
    population growth, distribution, and mobility; environmental
    degradation; and the spread of diseases. Two key sets of connections
    involve fresh water and global warming. Population growth is an
    exceedingly important factor in increasing demand for fresh water, and
    causing environmental degradation that compromises its availability.
    Population growth is also related, directly or indirectly, to national
    rates of fossil fuel use as well as land clearing and conversion, both
    of which are major sources of GHG emissions. It should also be noted
    that the populations most vulnerable to global warming and least able
    to adapt are among the most rapidly growing ones.
    Private Finance
        At the time of the Earth Summit, about one-half of the net flow of
    capital from developed to developing countries was ODA, and about one-
    half was private. By 2000, despite a series of financial crises in the
    late 1990's, private investment outstripped public assistance by a
    factor of almost seven to one. In 2000, private flows from the United
    States constituted 38 percent of total private financial flows to
    developing countries (as well as countries in transition to a market
    economy, such as Russia and Poland), a much larger portion than any
    other country. National-level capacity to promote sustainable
    development in many countries has lagged behind the rapid pace of
    economic globalization, and many investments affect transboundary or
    global ecosystems for which there is no governance infrastructure.
        This surge in private finance was not anticipated in Rio. As a
    consequence, Agenda 21 provides little explicit guidance regarding the
    goals or policies that developed country governments should undertake
    to ensure that private North-South flows promote sustainable
    development. The Rio Declaration, however, provides some guidance,
    stating the importance of integrating sustainability into mainstream
    economic decisionmaking and of public participation in those decisions.
    Although there are many policy levers for influencing private finance,
    the two most significant institutions for influencing the environmental
    character of private financial flows to developing countries are
    bilateral export and investment promotion agencies and multilateral
    financial institutions.
        The United States supports two key bilateral export and investment
    promotion agencies-the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),
    an investment promotion agency, and the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank),
    an export credit agency. Environmental and social evaluation and
    disclosure requirements for OPIC and Eximbank have strengthened over
    time, particularly in the past decade. Projects funded by both are
    subject to environmental impact statements and detailed environmental
    reviews, for example. Some disclosure requirements, in fact, represent
    international best practice. But while reforms at OPIC and Eximbank
    have provided a basis for challenging environmentally and socially
    damaging projects, they fall short of an explicit mandate to promote
    sustainable development.
        Multilateral development banks (MDBs), particularly the World Bank
    Group, also play a significant role in channeling private financial
    flows through their direct participation in a variety of private sector
    transactions. MDBs have also played a significant indirect role in
    influencing North-South financial flows, particularly through their
    promotion of the ``Washington consensus.'' The Washington consensus
    emphasizes the role of capital market and trade liberalization,
    privatization, and removal of other constraints on integration into the
    international economy. The United States controls the largest single
    share of capital subscription as well as the largest number of votes on
    the World Bank Group boards.
        Even before Rio, the United States demonstrated significant
    international leadership in MDB reform by advocating environmental
    impact reviews and public participation in projects, but the United
    States has not yet adequately addressed the role of MDBs in leveraging
    private finance. For instance, environmental impact statements are
    still not required for structural adjustment loans from any of the
    MDBs, even though such loans are arguably the most potent vehicle for
    leveraging the policy environment in which private investment takes
    place. Experience during the 1980's and 1990's, moreover, showed that
    the Washington consensus could undermine sustainable development if not
    accompanied by strong independent regulatory capacity and other
    improvements in governance. In some cases, U.S. policy has promoted the
    Washington consensus at the expense of sustainable development.
        The United States should work for further progress with both
    bilateral agencies and MDBs to move private finance toward sustainable
    development. For OPIC and Eximbank, the United States should move
    private financial flows to developing countries in a more sustainable
    direction by maintaining high environmental and disclosure standards.
    It should also promote the upward harmonization of sustainable
    development policies and procedures for export credit agencies. The
    United States should push harder for the integration of sustainability
    objectives into the private sector development activities of MDBs. The
    United States should proactively monitor the performance of MDBs in
    complying with agreed policies and strategies. Finally, OPIC and
    Eximbank, and the private sector arms of MDBs, should go beyond mere
    compliance with environmental standards and disclosure requirements,
    and shift their portfolios toward investments insustainability.
    Conservation and Management of Natural Resources
        Our environment provides the basis for our lives and well being,
    and also helps give meaning and context to our lives. Fresh water is
    essential for human life, for the growing of food and other ``natural
    services'' to humans, and for natural communities. Oceans and estuaries
    provide food, recreation, and jobs for humans. We need to be able to
    breathe healthy air. A stable climate has provided part of the basis
    for our civilization, ensuring reasonably consistent temperatures and
    precipitation from year to year, and thus providing a predictable basis
    for agriculture and other human essentials. Biodiversity can provide
    valuable products to humans, but it also has intrinsic value. Forests
    and agriculture provide necessary products and food, as well as a
    source of human livelihood. The land provides a basis for almost all
    human activities, and its proper use can make life easier or harder.
    Each of these is addressed here.
    Fresh Water
        Relatively little change in fresh water quality or the law
    governing fresh water has occurred in the decade since Rio. Agenda 21
    promotes more sustainable, reliable, and healthy water supplies for
    both human consumption and economic uses, while seeking to restore and
    sustain the health of aquatic ecosystems. In 1992, the United States
    already had in place a detailed set of laws and institutions designed
    to protect and manage fresh water resources that implemented the basic
    tenets of Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. They include the Clean
    Water Act (CWA) and other Federal statutes, as well as State laws
    governing allocation and protection of water supplies. These measures
    laid the framework for sustainable use and protection of fresh water
    resources. As a result, most Americans have access to adequate supplies
    of fresh water of at least acceptable quality relative to much of the
    world, and U.S. agriculture and industry have similar adequate quantity
    and quality. These laws and institutions also provide the basis for
    integrated decisionmaking in the area of water resources, watershed-
    based restoration and protection programs, and aquatic ecosystem
    integrity. Legal tools exist to implement the precautionary principle
    for some, but not all, sources of water pollution.
        The law governing fresh water has changed in only marginal ways
    since Rio, partly because legal tools for water resource protection
    were relatively sophisticated at the time. The lack of significant
    legal change is also due in part to political barriers to further
    improvements designed to address issues and problems that have evaded
    solutions under existing law. While additional regulations have been
    implemented to address more point sources of pollution, a comprehensive
    regime to tackle runoff from agriculture, city streets, and other land
    uses remains elusive. Moreover, efforts to address the cumulative
    impacts of multiple sources of pollution on specific water bodies have
    been reinvigorated, but progress has been slow due to legal and
    political controversy. Similarly, legal tools to address physical
    impairments to U.S. aquatic ecosystems remain fragmented and poorly
    implemented. Some of the gaps in national and State programs to protect
    water resources have been filled by a wellspring of local and regional
    watershed programs around the country designed to promote
    collaborative, holistic solutions to problems in individual watersheds.
        Little improvement has been realized in actual water quality since
    1992. Long-term ambient water quality trends are difficult to evaluate,
    but available data suggest that, on a nationwide basis, there has been
    no clear trend in water quality over the past decade. Meanwhile,
    between 35 percent and 45 percent of the nation's rivers and lakes
    remain impaired for at least some beneficial uses. Threats to human
    health continue through contamination of swimming waters, fish and
    shellfish, and drinking water. Similarly, fresh water aquatic species
    and the ecosystems on which they depend remain impaired due to chemical
    pollution as well as widespread habitat loss and impairment. Indeed,
    fresh water ecosystems are among the most, if not the most, threatened
    ecosystems in North America.
        The United States could make progress in reducing these problems
    through changes and improvements in U.S. freshwater policy. In addition
    to continued efforts to control industry and sewage treatment plants,
    an analogous comprehensive program to reduce polluted runoff from rural
    and urban sources remains imperative if additional water quality
    improvements are to be realized. These programs should involve both new
    pollution controls and changes in agricultural policy designed to
    prevent or to discourage farming of surplus crops on environmentally
    sensitive lands. Integrated, holistic watershed protection efforts need
    to be strengthened both by encouraging and supporting existing and new
    watershed programs, and by strengthening the legal tools in the CWA
    designed to address pollution from multiple sources. Aquatic habitat
    can be restored by including a broader range of impairments within the
    broad definition of ``pollution'' in the CWA. In addition, there should
    be improvements in Federal and State programs to protect wetlands,
    floodplains, and other habitats; to restore aquatic ecosystems that
    have been modified by dams, channelization, and other artificial
    structures; and to protect critical minimum-instream-flow regimes.
    Oceans and Estuaries
        Although the United States has played a leading role in protecting
    high seas fisheries, the ocean under its control appears to be in
    poorer shape now than it was in 1992. The United States controls more
    than four million square miles of ocean, an area larger than the
    country's land mass. Agenda 21 identifies four program areas that are
    particularly relevant to U.S. responsibilities for this area:
    integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas,
    controlling marine pollution, protecting marine living resources of the
    high seas, and protecting marine living resources under national
    jurisdiction.
    Coastal Areas
        Existing laws have been insufficient to prevent the overall
    degradation of the nation's coastal zones or to make significant
    progress in restoring degraded areas, particularly degraded wetlands.
    Through Agenda 21, nations committed themselves to integrated
    management and sustainable development of coastal areas, including the
    application of preventive and precautionary measures to protect and
    preserve sensitive offshore ecosystems. Even before Rio, the United
    States had laws in place to encourage coastal zone management and to
    protect its wetlands and estuaries. However, one-half of the U.S.
    population lives in a county that has an ocean coastline, and the
    coastal population is growing faster than the Nation as a whole. If
    current projections are correct, population pressures are likely to
    result in further degradation of coastal wetlands, beaches, and waters
    and the services they provide, despite fairly extensive State and
    Federal regulation. To address these problems, Congress should decide
    that (1) preserving viable coastal zones for future generations is a
    national priority, and (2) preserving functional nearshore and offshore
    ecosystems and the services that they provide for the future requires
    buying, restoring, and preserving coastal property now, particularly
    functional wetlands and other buffer areas between the land and the
    sea.
    Marine Pollution
        Agenda 21 seeks to halt and reverse degradation of the marine
    environment from various sources of pollution. By the time of the Rio
    conference, the United States already had a reasonably effective legal
    structure in place to control pollutants from identifiable industrial,
    municipal and ship-based sources of marine pollution, and from oil
    pollution. Runoff, however, is not effectively addressed. Most marine
    pollution now comes from sources that are not well regulated under the
    CWA-especially urban runoff and agricultural runoff. Congress thus
    should require States to have enforceable measures to control runoff,
    and should give private citizens a right to sue such polluters when
    they impair ocean quality. Congress should also amend the CWA to
    require the establishment of water quality standards for the part of
    the ocean that is under U.S. control.
    Marine Species on High Seas
        The United States was a world leader in international conservation
    of marine species before Rio, and it maintained that role throughout
    the last decade. Agenda 21 encourages sustainable use and conservation
    of living resources of the high seas. A number of commercially
    important fish species, such as tuna, mackerel, and marlin, as well as
    the great whales, spend much of their lives in waters outside any
    nation's regulatory jurisdiction. U.S. efforts over the last few years
    have included initiating new programs to protect species, such as
    sharks, that have only relatively recently become commercial fishing
    targets. But basic status of one-half of the fished highly migratory
    species is unknown. The United States should thus fund, or help fund,
    comprehensive international scientific research to obtain basic
    information about international marine living resources, and to reduce,
    and encourage other nations to reduce, catch limits for all species
    known to be or suspected of being in danger of being overfished.
    Marine Species Under U.S. Jurisdiction
        Fish stocks under U.S. Federal management are suffering, and there
    is insufficient information to determine the status of 65 percent of
    U.S. fish stocks. Yet there is reason to believe that Federal fisheries
    and fishery management may have improved since 1992. As Agenda 21
    explains, although the marine living resources and nearshore fish
    existing mostly within a nation's jurisdiction can help meet a nation's
    nutritional and social needs, they can do so only if they are not
    overfished or overharvested. The 1976 statute governing fisheries was
    amended by the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act to incorporate
    sustainable thinking and a precautionary approach into U.S. domestic
    fisheries management. Still, it may take a decade before we can measure
    the true biological effects of legal changes in fisheries management,
    and the unintentional catching of nontarget species remains a problem.
    To make further progress, the United States needs to fund and support
    research to discover the complex interactions of marine living species
    and their environment. Without understanding marine ecosystems, truly
    sustainable management measures cannot be implemented. To facilitate
    comprehensive ecosystem management of its seas, the United States
    should also work toward overhauling its current species-by-species,
    medium-specific, multistatute, multigovernment, and multiagency legal
    regime for the oceans.
        More generally, the United States currently lacks two visions of
    the ocean necessary to promote sustainable development-visions that it
    should articulate in the next few years. First, the United States needs
    a philosophical vision of the marine environment as an integrated
    ecosystem that should be used with caution. Second, the United States
    needs a more concrete vision of what the oceans under its territorial
    control should be. The Oceans Act of 2000, which establishes a
    commission whose sole function is to make recommendations for a
    coordinated and comprehensive ocean policy, offers the Federal
    Government a means to identify and articulate these two visions.
        In the last years of the decade, and especially since 2000, the
    Federal Government has shown decidedly more interest in protecting its
    marine resources. This interest appears in the Oceans Act of 2000, in
    the Coral Reef Conservation Act of 2000, in President Clinton's Marine
    Protected Area Executive Order (which the Bush Administration has now
    adopted), and in the 2-year-long effort to turn the northern Hawaiian
    Islands into a national marine sanctuary. While recovery of ocean
    ecosystems can take decades, these recent legislative and executive
    efforts to protect the ocean suggest that the issue of sustainable
    ocean ecosystems may finally have arrived on the U.S. political agenda.
    Air Pollution
        Air pollution can make life unsustainable by harming the ecosystem
    upon which all life depends and harming the health of both future and
    present generations. The air pollution control activities described in
    Agenda 21 are broadly consistent with long-term U.S. law and policy,
    particularly the Clean Air Act (CAA). Several Rio Declaration
    principles taken together, including the right to a healthy and
    productive life in harmony with nature and the elimination of
    ``unsustainable patterns of production,'' suggest the importance of
    focusing on the economic activities and technologies that produce air
    pollution. The overwhelming majority of air pollution comes from a
    single class of activities-burning fossil fuels. Emissions of most air
    pollutants declined somewhat over the past decade. Despite these
    improvements, the United States has not achieved the goals of the Rio
    Declaration because we have generally failed to do what we need to do-
    substitute clean sustainable technologies for the basic dirty ones in
    use when the CAA was enacted more than 30 years ago.
        Since the Earth Summit, the United States has reduced emissions
    contributing to urban air pollution and acid rain, except for nitrogen
    oxides. Air pollution levels are still too high, however, to ensure all
    human beings have a healthy and productive life. Inspite of strong
    economic growth and growing population, carbon monoxide declined by 2
    percent, volatile organic compound emissions by 13 percent, particulate
    matter by 7 to 13 percent, and hazardous air pollutants by perhaps 39
    percent. Still, large sections of the country are not in compliance
    with health-based air quality standards. If the U.S. Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA) succeeds in an effort it began several years
    ago to strengthen air quality standards, the CAA may deliver further
    benefits in the future.
        An ambitious program to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions, created by
    the 1990 Amendments to that Act, resulted in an overall reduction of
    emissions from all sources by 17 percent between 1992 and 1999. This
    program has not stopped transboundary harms, however, and has not fully
    protected ecosystems; most lakes and ecosystems remain damaged. By
    contrast, the United States has made substantial progress in reducing
    pollutants responsible for stratospheric ozone depletion.
        The United States has made only very modest progress toward
    deployment of sustainable technology. It has made substantial
    technological changes in sectors once served by ozone-depleting
    chemicals, and some progress with respect to sustainable vehicle
    technology (thanks to California's low emission vehicle (LEV) program),
    but almost no progress in changing how electricity is generated. New
    electric-generating facilities, which are built and operated to meet
    increased demand, tend to rely on less polluting fuels, particularly
    natural gas. Still, less efficient and more polluting electrical
    generating plants that were operating in 1970 continue to do so.
        To move toward sustainable development on air quality, the country
    must move away from its dependence upon fossil fuels, especially fuels
    that produce such large contributions to urban air pollution, acid
    rain, and global warming. As a first step, the United States should
    phaseout coal-fired power generation, which supplied 51 percent of the
    power generated by electric utilities in 1998. The United States should
    also expand and strengthen the LEV program in order to replace the
    internal combustion engine. Government policy should be used to ensure
    that new technologies are continuously more efficient and less
    polluting than existing ones, and that existing technologies are
    actually retired on a periodic basis rather than allowed to operate
    indefinitely. Several legal mechanisms have the potential to create an
    economic dynamic favoring such a change. These include increasingly
    stringent mass-based limits, pollution taxes, and an ``environmental
    competition law.''
    Climate Change
        In late 1992, the United States became the fourth country in the
    world to ratify the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
    (UNFCCC). Five years later, in 1997, the United States agreed to a
    protocol in Kyoto, Japan, under which developed countries would reduce
    their GHG emissions by about 5 percent from 1990 levels by 2008-2012,
    and the United States would reduce its emissions by 7 percent from 1990
    levels in the same period. Although President Bush repudiated the Kyoto
    Protocol in 2001, the United States is still a Party to the UNFCCC.
    While the convention is a framework on which more explicit agreements
    are to be based, it nonetheless contains commitments. And these
    commitments are different from those in Agenda 21 and the Rio
    Declaration, because they are legally binding. For GHG emissions, the
    United States has failed to comply with the spirit, if not the letter,
    of the convention.
        The United States is the world's single largest producer of GHG
    emissions. By 2000, U.S. GHG emissions were 13.6 percent higher than
    1990 emissions measured in carbon equivalents. More recently, U.S.
    emissions were projected to exceed 1990 levels by more than 46 percent
    by 2020. (CO2, a principal GHG, is not directly regulated
    under the CAA.)
        The United States has generally adhered to UNFCCC obligations that
    are not related to emissions. Parties agreed to annually report their
    national GHG emissions and to develop plans to mitigate climate change.
    The United States has done so. In addition, Parties agreed to support
    and further develop research on global warming. The United States has
    consistently supported scientific research and has shared information
    about global warming with other Parties.
        Although the UNFCCC contains no ``hard'' or ``numerical'' emission
    limitations, it does contain two commitments regarding emissions.
    First, developed countries agreed on a short-term goal-to ``aim'' to
    reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. The United States and
    other developed countries thus promised to adopt policies and measures
    that had a reasonable expectation of reducing GHG emissions to 1990
    levels by 2000. A strong case can be made that the United States has
    failed to abide by this promise. President Clinton's proposed energy
    tax was rejected in 1993 by Congress. Then the Clinton Administration
    initiated a climate change program based on voluntary initiatives, but
    emissions continued to increase significantly.
        The UNFCCC also contains a long-term goal, and commitments that go
    with it. Developed countries agreed to adopt policies and measures
    ``consistent with the objective of the Convention.'' The convention's
    objective is ``stabilization of [GHG] concentrations in the atmosphere
    at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
    the climate system.'' However, the U.S. actions described above,
    including repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol, are inconsistent with
    achieving the convention's long-term objective. In early 2001, the
    Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an international
    group of climate scientists organized under the United Nations,
    concluded that the earth's average surface temperature could rise by
    2.5 to 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit (F) from 1990 to 2100, which is higher
    than the IPCC's estimate of 5 years earlier. This report also
    strengthened the IPCC's prior conclusion that human-caused global
    warming is already happening. A strong case can be made that the IPCC's
    projections of future climate change would constitute ``dangerous
    interference with the climate system'' even toward the lower end of the
    IPCC projection, and that it is already too late to prevent some
    atmospheric damage from global warming. The likely effects of global
    warming include rising sea levels, more frequent floods and droughts,
    and an increase in tropical diseases.
        The excuses used by the United States for not acting are also
    inconsistent with the convention. Many U.S. decisionmakers have said it
    would be unfair to the United States to have to reduce GHG emissions if
    developing nations aren't required to do so. But in the UNFCCC,
    developed countries agreed to take the lead in reducing GHG emissions
    because they are responsible for the largest share of historic and
    current emissions, and because they have greater capability to reduce
    them. Many decisionmakers also claim that global warming science is too
    uncertain to justify programs that might turn out to be an unnecessary
    drag on the U.S. economy. Yet the United States and other UNFCCC
    Parties specifically agreed to take ``precautionary measures'' to
    reduce GHG emissions, and recognized that the ``lack of full scientific
    certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing'' cost-
    effective measures. Notably, many such cost-effective measures are
    available.
        The United States should adopt GHG emission reduction programs that
    will reduce U.S. GHG emissions to 1990 levels as soon as technically
    feasible. Because the United States is already 13.6 percent above 1990
    levels, and because a business-as-usual approach to GHG emissions is
    expected to significantly increase this difference in the next 6 years,
    the United States will also need to participate in emissions trading
    and use carbon sequestration projects, coupled with aggressive policy
    responses, to achieve this reduction. In addition, the United States
    should commit to make further reductions to achieve the Kyoto target of
    7 percent below 1990 levels as soon as possible after achieving the
    first goal. This would allow the United States to merge with the
    approach taken by the rest of the world pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol
    even though it may be technically infeasible for the United States to
    comply with the Kyoto goal between 2008 and 2012. The United States
    needs to make it clear that it will eventually catch up with
    commitments being made by the rest of the world.
        The record on voluntary global warming programs has demonstrated
    that they alone cannot be relied upon to achieve the type of reductions
    required. Therefore, the United States needs to adopt both emissions
    caps for various sectors and a mix of financial incentives and
    regulatory requirements. Moreover, the United States should take
    leadership on getting an international consensus on what atmospheric
    concentrations of GHGs will not present a dangerous interference with
    the climate system. That would help the international community better
    understand what national obligations will be needed to prevent
    dangerous interference with the climate system.
    Biodiversity
        The Convention on Biological Diversity, which seeks to ensure both
    the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, was opened for
    signature in Rio. The convention is a major innovation because it
    provides a legal foundation that did not previously exist in the United
    States and in most other countries for the conservation of
    biodiversity. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the
    Convention on Biological Diversity. Agenda 21, which the United States
    did agree to, also provides for biodiversity conservation. Both Agenda
    21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity would have nations adopt
    national strategies for the conservation and sustainable use of
    biological resources. Key elements of a national strategy include an
    inventory and monitoring of important biodiversity resources, and the
    creation of in situ (in place) biodiversity reserves. Ten years after
    Rio, the United States has no explicit comprehensive biodiversity
    conservation program in place, and a great many species and ecosystems
    are at risk.
        Biodiversity conservation is still not a generally accepted legal
    standard in the United States. At best, it is an objective which may be
    considered along with other competing objectives when resource managers
    make allocation decisions that promote or impair biodiversity. The
    reason is simple. Biodiversity emerged as a concept after the basic
    public land and environmental laws were in place, and domestic politics
    have prevented ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity
    and all efforts to develop a national biodiversity conservation
    strategy.
        The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 does not provide a
    complete foundation for such a strategy. The ESA imposes a duty on
    public and private parties to prevent the extinction of a limited
    number of endangered or threatened species-those that are listed under
    the Act. In 2000, more than 1,200 species were listed, but an estimated
    66,000 were at risk of extinction. The ESA is also a backward approach
    to biodiversity because it only indirectly addresses the major cause of
    biodiversity loss-habitat destruction-and it does not address other
    causes such as the invasion of exotic species and air and water
    pollution. Since 1992, however, the ESA has evolved to encourage the
    use of large-scale multispecies habitat conservation plans and other
    forms of ecosystem management. By the end of 2000, the U.S. Department
    of the Interior had approved habitat conservation plans covering 20
    million acres. While this suggests that it is possible to move from
    individual species to general biodiversity conservation within the
    framework of the ESA, the results of this approach have yet to be
    tested by time.
        Since the Earth Summit, many biodiversity conservation initiatives
    have been started in the United States by all levels of government and
    by private parties. But they are often ad hoc efforts to solve a single
    example of past environmental degradation, such as the restoration of
    sheet flows to the Everglades, or efforts to avoid a worst-case
    enforcement scenario under the ESA. The U.S. Government has also tried
    to manage large blocks of public lands on an ecosystem basis and has
    participated in ecosystem restoration experiments on a collaborative
    stakeholder basis. These efforts have occurred in national forests,
    wilderness areas, national parks, and Bureau of Land Management lands-
    areas that in many cases could be turned into public land biodiversity
    reserves. These efforts are extremely fragile because they lack a firm
    legal foundation, can be modified in response to changed political
    conditions, and include no clear performance standards to measure their
    success should they endure. Thus, the future of many of the
    biodiversity-related conservation initiatives implemented since 1992 is
    in doubt.
        To implement the Earth Summit's objectives, the United States
    should immediately take four steps. First, it should ratify the
    Convention on Biological Diversity. Ratification would establish
    biodiversity conservation as an overarching legal objective in the
    United States and stimulate the development of a comprehensive national
    biodiversity conservation strategy. Second, the legal mandates of the
    major Federal land management and regulatory agencies should be revised
    to require them to conserve biodiversity to the maximum extent
    consistent with due process and the sustainable use of natural
    resources. This would include clarifying the role of State and local
    governments as well as private parties in habitat conservation plans.
    Third, the United States should create a Biological Survey, equal in
    stature to the U.S. Geological Survey, to inventory the nation's
    biodiversity heritage and to provide the necessary scientific support
    for the establishment of biodiversity indices and conservation
    performance standards. Finally, although biodiversity conservation is
    primarily a national responsibility, private land stewardship must be
    recognized and supported.
    Forestry
        The United States made halting steps in law reform and in the
    implementation of forest sustainability during the past decade. The
    governments meeting in Rio agreed to a separate set of principles for
    sustainable development of forests. In general, sustainable forestry is
    based on ecosystem integrity, economic viability, and social
    responsibility. Other principles relevant to the United States include
    opportunity for stakeholder participation in forestry decisions,
    ``timely, reliable, and accurate'' information, comprehensive
    assessment of forest values, integration of forest management with
    management of adjacent areas to protect viability or unique ecosystems,
    and the incorporation of environmental costs and benefits into market
    mechanisms.
        Forest ecosystems cover one-third of the land area of the United
    States, and two-thirds of that land is productive enough to have value
    as commercial timberland. Public forests account for 42.4 percent of
    the forest area in the United States; they are owned and managed by the
    Federal, State, and local governments; and have contributed
    disproportionately to sustainability through demonstration programs and
    innovative practices. Private forests account for the rest. The basic
    structure of forestry law, firmly established prior to 1992, provides
    the background against which to discern recent trends.
        The physical area of forests changed little in the past decade.
    Data on species diversity, forest structure, water quality, and many
    other dimensions of ecological sustainability are not cumulated
    nationally for forests in a way that invites evaluation of changes
    since 1992. Information on economic viability and social responsibility
    is even more elusive.
        After the Rio Summit, the U.S. Forest Service began a slow, but
    steady, shift toward general sustainable development principles. The
    most important legal vehicle for promoting this change is the
    Government Performance and Results Act, which was enacted in 1993. The
    legislation requires all agencies to set both long-and short-term
    measurable performance objectives and to conduct periodic assessments
    and revisions. This spurred the Forest Service to employ adaptive
    management to monitor and evaluate its activities based on parameters
    relating to such sustainability criteria as the health of the land,
    quality of water, and user satisfaction. These changes help provide
    ``timely, reliable, and accurate information'' about forests. The
    Forest Service also shifted its emphasis under the ESA from interagency
    coordination and prohibitive policy to the broader use of habitat
    conservation plans. In 2000, the Forest Service promulgated a new
    framework for planning that establishes maintenance and restoration of
    ecological sustainability as the first priority for management. The
    2000 rule, and a 2001 rule prohibiting logging and road building in
    many roadless areas of the national forests, constitute the single most
    important positive development in the application of substantive
    standards to promote sustainable development of public lands. The Bush
    Administration, however, has indicated that it will alter both
    regulations.
        On private lands, a slight strengthening of State forest practice
    laws and increased promotion of best management practices have improved
    the legal regime, but these changes tended to be overwhelmed by market
    forces. Until water pollution control begins to force abatement and
    mitigation of runoff, private forest owners will not face significantly
    heightened incentives for sustainable practices. On the other hand, new
    certification systems for sustainable practices have arisen in the past
    decade; under these programs, third parties such as the Forest
    Stewardship Council certify forest products as ``sustainable,'' and
    major purchasers confine their purchases to certified products. These
    systems have begun to reshape market demand.
        In the coming decade, the United States should strengthen its legal
    mechanisms for promoting public participation, citizen enforcement,
    best forestry management practices, and landscape-level planning. These
    recommendations are top priorities for facilitating sustainable
    development. Existing property, market, and administrative regimes can
    all be deployed in the service of more sustainable forestry by flexibly
    demanding that environmental performance indicators be achieved through
    mitigation, ecosystem services, and adaptive management. In addition,
    the 2000 and 2001 rules should be supported, not altered. These
    regulations are important because large-scale, e.g., forestwide,
    planning is needed to implement ecosystem management. Federal and State
    governments should also throw their purchasing weight behind the Forest
    Stewardship Council's certification program.
    Agriculture
        The United States has a diverse and dynamic system of agriculture.
    If it is to be sustainable, it must meet at least three criteria that
    are explicit in or logically derived from Agenda 21 and the Rio
    Declaration. Agriculture must become internally sustainable, which
    requires that it preserve its resource base; avoid pollution,
    salinization, or other degradation of the soil and water; and be able
    to respond to plant and animal disease, pests, periodic climate
    variation, and changing market conditions. Agriculture must also be
    externally sustainable. That is, it must not impose external costs on
    nonagricultural society or surrounding natural resources. Finally,
    agriculture must exhibit responsive sustainability; it must be
    sufficiently dynamic and flexible that it is able to respond to change
    and help the Nation respond to crises in other sectors of the economy,
    e.g., to participate in global warming remedies through the use of
    sequestered carbon.
        Internal sustainability is being challenged in the West by
    competing demands for irrigation water, although the increased use of
    water conservation practices eases this somewhat. From 1992 to 1997,
    however, one-quarter of all agricultural land converted to urban uses
    was prime farmland.
        U.S. agriculture is not externally sustainable. Since 1985, there
    has been a gradual and fundamental change unfolding in Federal
    agricultural policy. A series of programs (evidenced by the 2002 farm
    bill) now encourage farmers to adopt conservation or environmental
    protection practices on some of their land. Taken together, these
    mostly voluntary agricultural programs represent a vast investment in
    conserving practices. Still, farm policy continues to direct farmers
    away from sustainability. The system of support payments, which will
    grow even larger now that the 2002 farm bill has become law, encourages
    farmers to grow commodity crops, which have greater adverse
    environmental effects, and drives small, family farms out of business.
    There are larger and fewer farms employing ever more intensive
    practices, usually in the form of monoculture. There is almost
    universal reliance on inorganic fertilizers to replace lost natural
    soil nutrients. Chemical pesticides are heavily relied on to deal with
    the vulnerability of monocultures to pests. Pollution of both surface
    and groundwater from agricultural sources may be the single largest
    source of pollution in the Nation. Waterways of all types suffer from
    sedimentation.
        Responsive sustainability is challenged by several uncertainties,
    perhaps the clearest of which is climate change. Rapid changes in
    climate, including more frequent droughts and floods, could be
    disastrous for agriculture. Another example of uncertainty is the
    effect of specialization in the use of genetic stock. Because the
    United States operates an agricultural system that is close to
    monocultural, future pests, diseases, or human dilemmas could create
    large problems unless we preserve the broader genetic stock, or
    germplasm, from which current plant varieties are derived. Other
    sources of uncertainty are created by the increased use of genetically
    modified organisms and by world markets.
        Steps needed to move the United States toward sustainable
    agriculture include the stabilization of irrigation agriculture through
    greater water conservation and protection against salinity. The United
    States should also renew its campaign to reduce erosion. Prime
    agricultural land must be protected against urban and suburban
    development. The nation's larger drainage systems should be re-
    engineered to achieve systematic control of polluted runoff. In
    addition, affirmative steps should be taken to protect germplasm. More
    generally, the internalization of environmental costs should be an
    obligation of contemporary agriculture. For the long term, the science
    of ecology must be fully integrated into agricultural research.
    Land Use
        Sprawl continued during the past decade. The ``smart growth''
    movement has led to some legislative and policy changes, particularly
    at the State level. But there is a wide gap between the talk of reform
    and actual reform, and not enough time has elapsed to fairly assess
    whether any of the policy changes are making a meaningful difference.
        Sustainable land development requires consistent integration of
    social, environmental, and economic considerations in decisionmaking to
    produce a sound, coordinated, and harmonious built environment. Our
    system of land use controls and decisionmaking must be consistent both
    horizontally (among and between neighboring jurisdictions) and
    vertically (from one level of government to the next). Achieving this
    result requires heightened levels of intergovernmental cooperation,
    coordination, and support. Effective sustainable land development
    policies must minimize sprawl and maximize sound development
    opportunities so that the United States may conserve important lands,
    preserve the natural environment, protect air and water quality,
    promote affordable housing through compact development and urban
    renewal, and encourage urban ``infill'' rather than rural development.
        Agenda 21 asserts that national governments should delegate
    ``planning and management responsibilities to the lowest level of
    public authority consistent with effective action.'' This is the
    lightning rod of land use reform debate in the United States-whether
    traditional local land use planning and decisionmaking can achieve
    sustainable development.
        The smart growth movement is proving to be, at least in rhetoric, a
    solution for both the disorganized and inefficient system of land use
    controls of the past and a framework for a new future paradigm. In
    general, smart growth principles mirror many of the implementation
    strategies for sustainable land development under Agenda 21.
        At the national level, there has been a lot of talk, some bits and
    pieces of reforms, but overall very little action. The Federal
    Government has taken notice of allegations of environmental injustice
    in the siting of various locally unwanted land uses, and has taken
    initial steps to foster greater social equity.
        There is a much greater level of activity in many States than at
    the national level. While there were some State-level comprehensive
    land use planning reforms before 1992, the last decade has witnessed an
    unprecedented level of attention and activity at the State level. Some
    States have undertaken a comprehensive recodification of State planning
    and zoning enabling statutes that provide local governments with tools
    to promote sustainable land use. More than one-half the States explored
    reform options through task forces or study commissions. Some States
    have adopted changes through public referendum initiatives. Yet on
    balance States are just starting to make significant statutory changes
    that offer the promise of promoting more sustainable land development
    practices. It will take even more time for these reforms to translate
    into observable and quantifiable changes in our neighborhoods and
    communities once States have provided the opportunity for changed
    behaviors.
        Sustainable land use will require continued leadership for, and
    interest in, meaningful land use reforms. States must create a new
    culture of cooperative and intergovernmental decisionmaking at the
    local level. State and Federal Governments must target spending on
    initiatives and programs that promote urban renewal and infill, and
    thus revitalize our cities. The Federal Government should also modify
    existing programs so that, where State and local participation is
    optional, access to Federal money is conditioned on implementation of
    sustainable land use plans.
    Waste and Toxic Chemicals
        According to Agenda 21, the root cause of waste and toxic chemicals
    problems is unsustainable patterns of production and consumption. These
    patterns are unsustainable because they harm humans and ecosystems,
    deplete materials and energy, and, in some cases, may threaten national
    security. This section summarizes U.S. efforts concerning toxic
    chemicals as well as pesticides. It also summarizes U.S. efforts
    concerning three types of waste-hazardous waste (including Superfund),
    municipal solid waste, and radioactive waste. In addition, it
    summarizes State and Federal legislation facilitating private cleanups
    of brownfield sites-sites contaminated with hazardous substances.
    Toxic Chemicals and Pesticides
        The United States made significant progress in moving toward a more
    sustainable approach to chemicals and pesticides over the past decade,
    but still has a long way to go. The most relevant sustainable
    development principles are the precautionary principle,
    intergenerational equity, access to information, integrated
    decisionmaking, and control of trade of hazardous chemicals in
    international trade. They apply with particular force to chemicals and
    pesticides because of incomplete information about their risks, their
    potential to cause future harms, and the need for public information
    about them.
        Little progress was made in reducing the risks of chemicals that
    are currently being used in commerce. The 1976 Toxic Substances Control
    Act (TSCA) requires manufacturers of new chemicals to submit
    information about the environmental and health risks of these chemicals
    to EPA before they can be manufactured. Relatively little information
    exists concerning the 60,000 or so chemicals already in commerce that
    were grandfathered under TSCA, and little progress was made in
    assessing their risks over the past decade. Several voluntary
    information collection initiatives-one for high production volume
    chemicals and another for chemicals to which children are commonly
    exposed-are promising, but it remains to be seen whether anything more
    than assessments will be conducted.
        Similarly, little progress was made concerning the introduction of
    new chemicals into commerce. Although premanufacture approval is
    required under TSCA for new chemicals, the United States requires
    relatively little information before giving that approval. While both
    EPA and the EU have concluded that requiring better information would
    reduce risks, EPA has not taken steps to do so. The EU runs a premarket
    approval program rather than, in the case of the United States, a
    premanufacturing approval program. Because only 10 percent of new
    chemicals are likely to go to market, the EU program focuses more
    intensely on fewer chemicals, and thus permits a more certain hazard
    prediction than the system of review used in the United States.
        The toxics release inventory (TRI) led to continued reductions in
    chemical releases over the past decade. Under TRI, manufacturing
    facilities with 10 or more employees report releases and transfers of
    several hundred toxic chemicals. Between 1988 and 1999, total releases
    of the ``core'' set of chemicals that were reported consistently over
    that time declined by 45.5 percent, although total production waste
    increased slightly. The TRI was expanded in the 1990's to include
    hundreds of new chemicals, Federal facilities, and new industry groups.
    These expansions have increased the information available to citizens,
    which may lead to further reductions.
        Pollution prevention would further many of the goals of sustainable
    development because it relies on more efficient processes and practices
    to reduce the amount of pollution that is created. Although much
    progress was made in the development of pollution prevention tools and
    education, it is not clear to what extent pollution prevention has been
    adopted in practice.
        Use of pesticides in agriculture has leveled off since 1985, and
    utilization of the most highly toxic pesticides has declined. But the
    most important change in pesticide regulation over the past decade
    occurred with the adoption of the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act. The
    Act focuses on pesticide residues in food, and requires EPA to assess
    the aggregate and cumulative risks of these pesticides, rather than
    assessing safety based on one pesticide and one medium at a time. The
    Act also requires safety factors, reflecting both the precautionary
    principle and intergenerational equity.
        The United States made some progress in the regulation of
    genetically modified organisms (GMOs) under TSCA, but it did not put in
    place a framework for regulating the new GMO plants that are being bred
    to produce chemicals. Such organisms are increasingly the technology of
    choice for the manufacture of chemicals and pesticides.
        In the international arena, the United States has been at the table
    for negotiations and has been among the world's leaders in developing
    and adopting international standards for chemicals, some legally
    binding, and some not. However, the United States has not yet ratified
    certain recent treaties and protocols. These include the Rotterdam
    Convention on Prior Informed Consent (prohibiting the export of
    specified chemicals without explicit agreement by the importing
    country), the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
    (protecting health and environment from specified pollutants), the
    Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (setting up an international framework
    for managing trade of GMOs and seeds), and the Biodiversity Convention
    on which the Cartagena Protocol is based.
        To make progress, or further progress, toward sustainable
    development, Congress should modify TSCA to provide a clearer standard
    for health and safety to encourage greater pollution prevention. TSCA
    should also be amended to shift the presumption that chemicals are
    ``innocent until proven guilty'' to a burden on manufacturers to prove
    that chemicals are safe as used in the market. In addition, TSCA should
    be amended to level the playing field between new and existing
    chemicals; the present approach perversely creates disincentives for
    bringing new and safer technologies to market. New chemicals should be
    reviewed on a premarket, not a premanufacture, basis, and manufacturers
    should be required to submit the same kind of information they would to
    the EU. EPA also needs to broaden its use of tools for the management
    of chemical risks, including labels and hazard classification. As new
    chemical hazard information is generated by EPA through voluntary
    screening initiatives, TRI listings should be modified accordingly.
        The United States should evaluate its pollution prevention efforts
    to determine where they have succeeded and failed. The United States
    also needs to expand efforts to integrate pollution prevention into
    core regulatory efforts for air, water, and waste management. EPA needs
    to implement the Food Quality Protection Act on a priority basis, in a
    transparent manner, and with full public disclosure. In addition, the
    United States needs to revise the regulatory framework for regulation
    of biotechnology and assure that it will effectively cover both new and
    existing products. Moreover, the United States needs to seriously
    consider whether a labeling approach might have a place in enhancing
    consumer confidence, if not the safety, of such foods. Finally, the
    United States should ratify the agreements described above. In the
    longer term, the United States needs to recognize that many of the
    major chemical risks do not respect national boundaries.
    Lead
        In the past 10 years, the United States has used its domestic
    efforts on lead poisoning prevention and abatement to help support
    efforts in other countries. Lead poisoning remains a serious threat to
    health and development, particularly but not exclusively in developing
    countries. Because lead poisoning is expensive and difficult if not
    impossible to cure, prevention is the best approach. The United States
    should maintain and intensify its leadership role on lead poisoning
    prevention in an internationalized context by supporting adoption of a
    Global Lead Initiative (GLI) and by playing a leadership role in
    implementing it thereafter. The GLI should be designed to complete a
    worldwide phaseout of leaded gasoline on an expedited basis, and use
    the momentum from that success to address the multiple other sources of
    lead exposure. The United States should continue to support the global
    phaseout of leaded gasoline in all relevant international fora. The
    United States should also support such complementary activities as the
    development of an international network dedicated to raising public
    awareness and exchanging best practices for phaseout and prevention,
    including those based on U.S. experience.
        In addition to the United States, the international community
    should support the establishment and implementation of a GLI to
    complete the phaseout of leaded gasoline and then other sources of lead
    poisoning. While the conquest of lead poisoning would constitute a
    signal victory in itself, its concrete achievement should also serve as
    an optimism-engendering model of international cooperation adaptable to
    solving other threats to sustainable development.
        The project should initially convene a technical advisory group to
    work in partnership with identified government focal points, as well as
    NGO's and the private sector, to prepare action plans for phaseout that
    include milestones and timelines for national action. Mandating, not
    merely recommending, the formation of the technical advisory process
    and funding, not merely morally encouraging, the GLI as a sustained
    project are essential to its success.
    Hazardous Waste and Superfund
        The basic structure of U.S. domestic laws with respect to hazardous
    waste was established in the 1970's and 1980's. The Comprehensive
    Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or the
    Superfund Act) created a multifaceted scheme for eliminating dangerous
    conditions created by hazardous waste spills and improper disposal of
    hazardous substances. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
    focused on ``cradle-to-grave'' regulation of ongoing hazardous waste
    generation, transportation, and disposal.
        Agenda 21 is premised on an ``overall cleaner production
    approach,'' with the goal of preventing or minimizing further hazardous
    waste generation, which would have the United States go further. Rio
    Declaration principles supporting integrated decisionmaking and the
    reduction and elimination of unsustainable patterns of production and
    consumption provide a foundation for that. Indeed, a zero level of
    hazardous waste generation appears to be a worthwhile long-term goal.
    In addition, Agenda 21 calls for environmentally effective management
    of the waste that is generated. Agenda 21 also urges ratification of
    the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
    Hazardous Waste, which sets forth more effective rules with respect to
    the transboundary shipping of hazardous wastes.
        Cleanup activity under CERCLA has been completed on about one-half
    of all Superfund sites listed on the national priority list, and more
    than 6,400 removal actions have been undertaken since 1993 to remove
    immediate and direct public health and environmental threats. Although
    CERCLA has been very modestly amended in the decade since Rio and
    subject to some intermittent administrative ``fine tuning,'' those
    legal changes have diminished or, for the most part, left unimproved
    the statute's overall environmental effectiveness. While the
    legislation was amended in early 2002 to encourage private cleanups at
    contaminated or ``brownfield'' sites, the statute still excludes oil-
    based wastes at non-brownfield sites, and the exemption for secured
    creditors was actually broadened in 1996. Moreover, EPA's tax-based
    Superfund trust fund has not been replenished since the special
    Superfund taxes expired at the end of 1995, and the fund will run out
    of money in 2003 unless significant changes are made.
        Similarly, RCRA has never been comprehensively amended with a view
    to implementing sustainable development for hazardous waste. While the
    statute intensively regulates certain wastes, the legal definition of
    hazardous waste creates many regulatory uncertainties, and the statute
    excludes ``solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage'' and ``solid
    or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows''-two major and
    environmentally unsound loopholes. Moreover, the statute lacks any
    enforceable provisions directly intended to decrease or eliminate the
    generation of hazardous wastes. EPA's biennial hazardous waste reports
    reflect relatively little recent progress in decreasing the generation
    of hazardous wastes. Nor has the United States ratified the Basel
    Convention.
        To move toward sustainable development, CERCLA should be amended to
    narrow its exemption for secured creditors, to eliminate the statute's
    ``petroleum exclusion,'' and to provide a stable source of funding for
    the Superfund program, at realistic levels, for at least another
    decade. RCRA (and CERCLA) should be altered to mandate phased decreases
    in the generation of hazardous wastes (by dates certain) at U.S.
    industrial facilities, to provide that hazardous wastes in domestic
    sewage and irrigation return flows be made subject to RCRA regulation,
    and to replace RCRA's current regulatory definition of ``hazardous
    waste'' with a consistent, straightforward, and comprehensive
    definition. The United States should also ratify the original version
    of the Basel Convention and amend domestic hazardous waste laws to
    conform with the convention.
    Brownfields Redevelopment
        The United States has as many as 500,000 brownfield sites,
    properties that are underdeveloped or abandoned because of actual or
    potential contamination from past industrial or commercial use. Because
    of CERCLA and counterpart State laws, ownership or use of these
    properties could result in significant liability. In the past decade,
    virtually every State has adopted laws to facilitate the reuse of
    brownfield sites through voluntary cleanup programs. These laws confer
    three principal advantages on private sector actors and others who are
    willing to remediate a site-streamlined administrative cleanup
    procedures, relaxed cleanup standards, and liability protection.
    Brownfields revitalization is widely viewed as successful, as thousands
    of sites have been remediated in State programs. In early 2002, similar
    provisions under CERCLA were signed into law.
        Each decision to remediate and reuse a brownfield site eliminates
    environmental health risks while promoting reinvestment, creating jobs,
    slowing the acceleration of suburban ``greenfields'' development,
    decreasing polarization of communities, and fostering public
    involvement in every aspect of redevelopment efforts. Brownfield
    redevelopment thus involves integrated decisionmaking, promotion of
    sustainable human settlements, and public participation-all central
    features of sustainable development. In principle, too, State
    leadership in brownfields revitalization fulfills the Agenda 21
    recommendation that national governments delegate institutional
    responsibility for sustainable development ``to the lowest level of
    public authority consistent with effective action.''
        States should modify their programs in three ways to make them more
    fully consistent with sustainable development, however. First, a higher
    level of government oversight is needed to ensure early, simultaneous,
    and coordinated consideration of social, environmental, and economic
    goals. There is typically no comprehensive review of the project and
    little if any supervision of the cleanup process. The assumption is
    that redevelopment will result in less contamination, but that is
    merely an assumption. States should modify their laws to provide for
    State oversight throughout the process.
        Second, a shortcoming of virtually every brownfields program is the
    relative lack of concern for future generations. State and Federal
    programs define success in terms of short-term results based on
    specific uses that could change over time or with future ownership.
    States should modify their laws to guarantee long-term protection of
    sites where remediation has taken place.
        Third, there is relatively little opportunity for public
    participation in the cleanup process. Public participation is
    especially important because many brownfield sites are located in
    neighborhoods with higher than average concentrations of persons of
    color and other minorities. Public involvement helps ensure equity in
    the decisionmaking process and helps ensure consistency between
    community plans and developer plans. States should thus require full
    and active citizen participation throughout the revitalization process.
    Municipal Solid Waste
        Solid waste, according to Agenda 21, is all waste that is not
    radioactive or legally hazardous. In the United States, the term
    encompasses nonhazardous industrial, oil and gas, mining, agricultural,
    and municipal solid wastes. While municipal solid waste, also known as
    trash or garbage, comprises only a fraction of these wastes, it is
    easily the best known and best studied of these types of waste.
    Accordingly, this part of the review focuses on municipal solid waste.
        Agenda 21's objectives for solid waste are contained in a hierarchy
    of (1) minimizing wastes that are produced, (2) maximizing
    environmentally sound reuse and recycling of wastes, and (3) the
    environmentally sound disposal and treatment of wastes that cannot be
    used or reused or recycled. Underlying this hierarchy are estimates of
    relative environmental impact and cost. Each successive tier of the
    hierarchy involves more materials use and loss. That, in turn, means
    more loss of economic value and, generally, more environmental impact
    than the previous level.
        Based on this hierarchy, the following three indicators or goals
    appear to be a useful way of measuring a move toward sustainable waste
    management: (1) decreasing per capita generation; (2) decoupling of
    waste generation from GDP; and (3) even if waste generation rises,
    decreasing per capita waste disposal though increased recycling,
    composting, and resource recovery.
        A threshold problem in analyzing U.S. efforts in meeting these
    three goals is a lack of standardization about what is and should be
    counted. Three prominent data sources that should be useful in
    analyzing sustainability trends at the national level collect data in
    different ways and make different assumptions in accounting. Still, it
    is possible to discern basic trends.
        First, per capita waste generation in the United States declined
    somewhat from 1990 to 1995, but has increased steadily since 1996,
    perhaps owing to the strong economy. Second, there does not appear to
    be any decoupling of waste generation from GDP; in fact, GDP increases
    seem to automatically include commensurately increasing waste
    generation rates. A trend toward lighter packaging appears to have been
    offset by increases in purchasing and waste. Finally, even after
    recycling and composting, the numbers of pounds of waste generated per
    capita per day have been increasing since 1996, according to both
    California and EPA data.
        These three trends are particularly notable, because the past
    decade saw large changes in how municipal solid waste is managed. The
    trash capacity crisis that the country faced in the late 1980's created
    tremendous enthusiasm for recycling and waste reduction programs. These
    programs have had a significant and positive effect. EPA reports that,
    in 1999, although 230 million tons of municipal solid waste were
    generated, 50 million more tons of waste were not created due to waste
    prevention programs. The trash capacity crisis also led to the
    development of larger, more environmentally protective landfills and
    incinerators, as a result of which capacity is no longer a significant
    issue. That growth in infrastructure, however, has reduced pressure for
    recycling and waste reduction.
        To move toward sustainability, the United States should make
    progress on all three goals or indicators. To reduce per capita waste
    generation, States could follow the lead of an Oregon statute that sets
    goals for stabilizing and reducing per capita waste generation. To
    decouple waste generation from GDP growth, the United States should
    explore examples of where decoupling has already occurred, e.g., yard
    waste, and develop programs that are targeted at specific waste
    streams. To reduce per-capita waste disposal, more recycling and
    composting is needed, coupled with incentives to reduce waste being
    disposed. Better and more nationally consistent data is necessary for
    all of these recommendations, and for all solid wastes.
    Radioactive Waste
        Radioactive waste results from nuclear-powered electric generation
    and other civilian uses as well as the manufacture and disposal of
    nuclear weapons. In addition to its radioactive nature, it differs from
    other wastes because it can be highly dangerous for thousands of years
    and because some radioactive waste can be used to make new nuclear
    weapons. As a result, the control of radioactive waste deeply
    implicates the security aspects of sustainable development.
        While the cold war ended just before the 1992 Earth Summit, the
    full meaning of this change had not yet permeated the nuclear
    establishment. Since 1992, an enormous rethinking of the role of
    nuclear technology and the management of nuclear waste has begun.
    Enormous stockpiles of ``special nuclear materials'' and other
    radioactive materials that were painstakingly built up for nuclear
    weapons arsenals have been rendered surplus, raising difficult
    questions about what to do with them. Moreover, Agenda 21 focused only
    on commercial nuclear waste, not on radioactive waste from nuclear
    weapons production. Because of greater public awareness and disclosure
    about problems related to nuclear weapons production since the Earth
    Summit, it is now apparent that the cost of radioactive waste cleanup
    at nuclear weapons productionsites far exceeds the costs of civilian
    radioactive waste controls.
        In the 10 years since Rio, the United States took a number of
    actions that move the country closer to sustainability in nuclear waste
    control, if measured by the limited recommendations set forth in Agenda
    21. Among other things, Agenda 21 calls on countries to minimize
    radioactive waste, transfer radioactive waste control technologies, and
    support international efforts for radioactive waste control. Private
    industry has reduced the amount of low-level commercial waste per unit
    of activity. The amount of high-level nuclear waste from nuclear
    weapons material production was reduced largely by DOE's lower level of
    nuclear weapons production, but not by efficient operations. The United
    States has generally supported technology transfer in radioactive waste
    control. On the other hand, some technologies promoted for radioactive
    waste control may present significant risks of facilitating nuclear
    proliferation. The United States provided significant and broad support
    for international and regional cooperation and coordination, even
    though its efforts were uneven.
        When measured against the broader principles in the Rio
    Declaration, however, the United States has fallen short of making
    significant progress toward sustainability in radioactive waste
    controls. U.S. controls on most radioactive waste generally contain
    explicit, if imperfect, requirements that intergenerational or long-
    term impacts be considered. The issue of intergenerational impacts has
    been a focus of debates about the effectiveness of proposed geologic
    repositories for such wastes. However, neither a complete understanding
    of the implications, nor a mature ability to deal with this issue, have
    yet evolved.
        Significant progress has been made in opening up radioactive waste
    control to public knowledge and participation. Much remains to be done,
    however, and some backsliding has already begun. DOE began an
    ``openness'' initiative to provide the public more information about
    radioactive waste control, but that effort has waned, and large amounts
    of information that were previously available on websites from the
    United States have been eliminated, ostensibly for security purposes.
        Since 1992, two events have improved worker safety, but the overall
    problem of DOE self-regulation remains intractable. First, DOE has
    begun to encourage modern integrated safety management techniques to
    involve all workers in safety planning. Second, Congress passed a
    landmark worker compensation bill that provides Federal compensation
    for cancer, chronic beryllium disease, and silicosis to current and
    former nuclear workers and their surviving family members.
    Unfortunately, DOE is retreating toward its traditional insular culture
    of self-regulation and contractor self-assessments, thus reversing the
    momentum toward greater contractor accountability and safety that was
    developed in the 1990's.
        The polluter-pays principle is particularly problematic in the case
    of radioactive waste. The intergenerational nature of radioactive waste
    almost guarantees that some of the costs will be borne by future
    generations rather than by those who benefited from electric power or
    nuclear weapons. A limited trust fund was established for one site, and
    there were proposals for other trust funds. To the extent that waste
    and liability producing practices fail to internalize the full costs of
    doing business, the same practices will continue to produce
    environmental problems.
        To make progress toward sustainability in radioactive waste
    control, the United States will need to rely on existing laws and
    institutions more effectively. But new organizations and institutions
    will likely be required to operate new facilities for plutonium
    disposition and for long-term stewardship of facilities where
    radioactive waste has been stabilized or contained, but not removed. A
    dedicated trust fund and politically insulated organization will likely
    be required to ensure the availability of funds for post-cleanup
    stewardship of nuclear facilities. The United States needs to invest in
    better science and technology to provide a stronger and more publicly
    acceptable basis for decisionmaking. The government needs to
    acknowledge the seamless connection between certain aspects of
    radioactive waste control and nuclear weapons proliferation. It should
    therefore support changes in the International Atomic Energy Agency to
    separate its regulatory safety and safeguards functions from its
    nuclear promotion activities. Finally, the government should seek to
    bridge the gap between current policies and the public's understanding
    and support for those policies. A major challenge is whether technical
    concerns about the security of radioactive wastes and related nuclear
    operations are compatible with open and democratic decisionmaking
    processes.
    Nongovernmental Actors
        As Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration recognize, an informed and
    active civil society plays an integral role in realizing sustainable
    development. A democratic society can only accomplish the far-reaching
    individual and organizational changes required for sustainable
    development by making readily available the information that citizens
    need to make their own choices and by involving citizens in making
    societal choices. More generally, sustainable development is not simply
    the responsibility of governments. Every part of civil society has a
    role to play, not just in influencing government decisions, but also in
    the activities it conducts on a daily basis. Public access to
    information and governmental decisionmaking processes is one key aspect
    of this issue. Another is the role played by business and industry. A
    third is the extent to which sustainable development is understood in
    ethical or religious terms.
    Public Access to Information, Participation, and Justice
        In 1992, the United States already had in place basic laws and
    practices to promote transparency, participation, and accountability.
    These include the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Administrative
    Procedure Act, the Government in the Sunshine Act, and access
    provisions in most environmental laws. During the past decade, FOIA was
    amended to include electronic as well as written material. Executive
    Orders began to build a structure to incorporate the goals of the
    environmental justice movement into the Federal Government, and bring
    some new voices into decisionmaking.
        Yet overall change in the past decade was not measured primarily by
    new laws, but rather by practical changes in access to information. The
    1990's brought a dramatic growth in access to information through the
    Internet. Research on indicators to track sustainable development
    flourished. As an alternative to litigation, collaborative
    decisionmaking processes became more common, bringing more
    perspectives, information, and ideas for finding solutions to the
    table. Environmental Defense, an environmental advocacy organization,
    developed a web-based scorecard that allows residents to find emissions
    from factories or power plants in their community.
        Even as new technology greatly increased the public's ability to
    share and use data, though, public reporting and analysis of
    information and participation in decisions stalled or lost ground in
    some respects. It proved difficult to develop a more unified and
    integrated information system that would give citizens easier access to
    government information. Such efforts often faced bitter political
    divisions and an entrenched legacy of fragmented information systems
    and structures developed around separate laws and programs of an
    earlier era. In a period of declining civic engagement, much of the
    country's innovative energy and investment went into technical
    developments rather than improving governance structures and norms,
    despite efforts to reinvent government to serve citizens. Judicial
    action made it more difficult to utilize established citizen suit
    provisions. Internationally, the United States sometimes took the lead
    but often stood on the sidelines on access issues.
        The United States has not taken the basic step of adopting-let
    alone using-a set of indicators and institutionalizing a process to
    involve the public in decisions aimed at sustainable development. A new
    Administration refused to make public the list of companies consulted
    in developing its energy plan, constrained access to Presidential
    records, and adopted a narrower interpretation and application of FOIA.
        The assumptions for expanding access were abruptly reframed
    following September 11 as the country struggled to address the
    potential use of information by terrorists. After the first, hurried
    decisions to remove some information from the Internet, the debate has
    begun to be reframed in terms of identifying specific types of data for
    which the danger of generalized public availability outweighs the
    public's interest in access. Yet this framing also recognizes that
    public access is, itself, a way to reduce risk by providing information
    that spurs public awareness and action.
        In this changed setting, the United States can take seven steps to
    put information and participation at the center of action to achieve
    sustainability, both at home and internationally. The United States
    should develop, adopt, and make regularly available to the public
    indicators of sustainable development. The United States should also
    develop environmental indicators and use them in preparing and
    publishing an annual state of the environment report. More broadly, the
    United States needs to adopt a set of principles that reflect the
    significant role of information in good governance and in enabling the
    public to play its role in sustainable development. The United States
    should also make significant investments in developing websites and
    web-based tools to tailor information to the needs of individuals and
    organizations. In addition, the United States should establish a
    national forum to engage citizens and NGO's on sustainable development.
    The government should find ways to strengthen public access to justice,
    reversing the past decade's general trend toward restricted public
    access to the courts. Finally, the United States should play a lead
    international role in promoting transparency, public participation, and
    accountability. To do so, the United States should, among other things,
    ratify the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
    Participation in Decisionmaking and Access to Justice in Environmental
    Matters.
    Business and Industry
        Sustainable development can only be accomplished with the support
    of business and, as some firms are beginning to discover, there are
    profits to be made from sustainability. Agenda 21 charted a course of
    action for business and industry in five main areas: (1) global
    corporate environmental management; (2) environmentally sound
    production and consumption patterns; (3) risk and hazard mitigation;
    (4) full cost accounting; and (5) international environmental support
    activities. For its part, American business has tended to ignore
    sustainable development since Rio. Of the firms that have engaged the
    concept, most have concentrated exclusively on its environmental
    dimension. That is not to say there has not been meaningful advancement
    since Rio, particularly in business' ability to manage the
    environmental aspects of operations, goods, and services. In addition,
    some American companies are among those pioneers working on the
    sustainability frontier. But the journey is in its early stages, and
    the U.S. business community is by and large still formulating a case
    for, and a plan of action on, sustainable development.
        Over the last several years, many large and medium-sized firms, and
    to a lesser extent even smaller enterprises, have been continuously
    improving techniques to promote compliance with environmental laws.
    More recently, and particularly in the last 5 years, leading firms have
    begun to focus on nonregulated aspects of operations, and are
    experimenting with new methods to reduce their environmental footprint,
    increase competitiveness, and capitalize on opportunities created by
    next-generation policy initiatives that work with the grain of the
    market. Some of these firms can point to significant progress toward
    sustainability, especially in areas such as eco-efficiency,
    environmental management systems, communications with stakeholders, and
    transparency. Changing internal and external perceptions of social
    equity, the prospect of cost reductions and market share growth through
    innovation, increased shareholder value, positive brand recognition,
    and a variety of other factors are gradually but perceptibly prompting
    business to adopt strategies founded on sustainability principles. Only
    a limited number of companies have endeavored to incorporate
    sustainable development into operations and strategy, however, and some
    of these firms have been much more active than others.
        Building on insights gained in dealing with globalization, and
    guided by a sharper perspective of national security and the benefits
    of multilateral action in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
    September 11, government and private enterprise need to come together
    to forge a tighter alliance on all three dimensions of sustainable
    development: the social, the economic, and the environmental. To make
    further progress, government, business, and other interested
    stakeholders should consider the following framework. First, business
    needs to operationalize the concept of sustainable development in
    practical business terms. Second, the Administration, together with
    leaders from business and environmental organizations, needs to build a
    stronger constituency for sustainable development in the business
    community and Congress. Third, the Administration and business both
    need to gain a better understanding of the interdependent relationship
    between globalization and sustainable development. Fourth, Congress,
    the executive branch, and the business community need to work together
    to promote and facilitate good governance through national
    implementation and international cooperation.
        Fifth, business, working with government, financiers, investors,
    insurers, consumers, NGO's, and the public needs to develop
    sustainability indicators, data, and communication techniques that will
    enable informed distinctions among companies, goods, and services.
    Sixth, business, working with NGO's, supply chains, and other
    stakeholders, needs to significantly expand the web of existing
    partnerships and strategic alliances in order to promote new and better
    techniques and tools, and to spread best practices more widely.
    Seventh, lawmakers and policy decisionmakers (at the Federal, State,
    and local levels) need to work with leaders from business, NGO's, the
    bar, and the community to achieve consensus on a satisfactory blend of
    policy instruments to foster sustainable business practices. Eighth,
    changes in the nature of management education are needed so that
    graduates emerge from business schools with the ability to incorporate
    sustainable development and considerations of corporate social
    responsibility as elements of competitive strategy.
    Sustainability as a Religious and Ethical Concern
        The United States should support, and the U.N. General Assembly
    should endorse, the Earth Charter. The Earth Charter, which was
    completed in 2000 after a 5-year process that involved extensive
    consultations and outreach, articulates the inspirational vision, basic
    values, and essential principles needed for a global ethic to support
    sustainable development. The Earth Charter contains 16 principles and
    61 supporting principles, and has broad resonance among the world's
    major religions and ethical systems. Its main purpose is to establish a
    sound ethical foundation for the emerging global society, and to help
    build a sustainable world based on respect for nature, universal human
    rights, economic justice, and a democratic culture of peace. The Earth
    Charter is intended to help people of all ages in every walk of life to
    better understand the spirit and implement the substance of truly
    sustainable development. Besides showing what sustainable living is all
    about, it offers a coherent, integrated standard for evaluating
    possible responses to particular issues. And, as one of its drafters
    stated, the Earth Charter is intended ``to give the emerging global
    consciousness the spiritual depth-the soul-needed to build a just and
    peaceful world community and to protect the integrity of Earth's
    ecological systems.''
        Endorsement of the Earth Charter by the U.N. General Assembly would
    not, of course, make it legally binding. But it would signal
    recognition by the world's leaders that sustainable development has a
    compelling ethical and religious foundation. That, in turn, could have
    a powerful and positive effect on efforts to move toward sustainable
    development, including efforts in the United States.
    Education
        Aside from the word ``government,'' ``education'' appears more
    often than any other term in Agenda 21. Education underlies and has the
    potential to reinforce every other priority. Education also provides
    future voters and decisionmakers with the intellectual tools needed to
    achieve a sustainable society. Government can help educate people by
    providing information and ideas. But our educational institutions for
    kindergarten through twelfth grade, as well as our institutions for
    higher education, also have a crucial role to play.
    Kindergarten Through Twelfth Grade
        Education for sustainability at the primary, middle school, and
    high school level builds on environmental education by helping students
    understand and address the relationship between natural systems and the
    effect of human social and economic activities on those systems. Agenda
    21 seeks to reform educational systems and practices accordingly.
    Happily, U.S. resources-tangible and intangible, financial and human-
    could be instrumental in solving these problems. Kindergarten through
    twelfth grade (K-12) education is a major shaper of the truths,
    attitudes, ethics, concepts, and behaviors of American society. By
    reshaping K-12 education in the United States so that it systematically
    and effectively fosters sustainability, we will be able to make greater
    progress toward the achievement of a sustainable world.
        Groundwork has been laid in the 10 years since Rio for
    sustainability education. Some recent changes in educational practices,
    e.g., service learning, a focus on literacies and skills, standards
    that support interdisciplinary understanding and complex thinking, and
    growing recognition of the importance of systems thinking, help to
    prepare our youth to understand and implement sustainable development.
    Several organizations, and a network for those organizations, now exist
    that attempt to define and develop skills and dispositions in youth
    that will enable them to create a more sustainable world as future
    workers and citizens.
        In the past decade, an understanding of what sustainability
    education should mean has also been developed in the United States. A
    broad consensus can be seen among the goals of sustainability education
    theoreticians and practitioners on some key student outcomes and some
    essential knowledge, skills, and dispositions. These include ecological
    literacy, including human-environment relationships; system dynamics
    and ``systems thinking''; the ability to truly value and learn from
    others; an understanding of the importance of place; sustainable
    economics; citizenship; and creativity and visioning. Each of these is
    being taught, to some degree, in some classrooms.
        Overall, however, education for sustainability has only a toe-hold
    in mainstream K-12 education in the United States. The United States
    has not adopted sustainability education as a clearly stated, broadly
    applied, national goal. Very few K-12 educators in the United States
    have ever heard of sustainability education; few educators have worked
    explicitly to implement education for sustainability in their
    classrooms. While our educational system works to develop many of the
    discrete skills that future problem solvers will need to diagnose and
    solve our global problems, as a Nation we lack the systematic
    understanding that explains these complex threats to sustainability.
    Our educational system, moreover, is often inappropriately focused on
    basic literacy and easily testable knowledge, which does not adequately
    prepare future voters and decisionmakers to understand current problems
    and to craft solutions for them. We do not prepare teachers to create
    experiences for students that help them engage with the rich, complex,
    interdisciplinary world in which they live. We do not fund the
    infrastructure needed to support a sustained and nationwide
    implementation of an educational program for sustainability. Only a
    single State, Vermont, has educational standards that explicitly
    address sustainability. Even environmental education, an important and
    well-established component of sustainability education, is increasingly
    eclipsed in importance and increasingly slighted in funding.
        To make significant progress on sustainability education, schools
    of education need to ensure that teachers understand sustainability,
    and can apply this knowledge and skill in the work they do with
    students. State education organizations should approve standards for
    sustainability education. Statewide assessments of student learning
    should be modified to reflect this goal. These efforts should also
    connect students with work being done in the community to foster
    sustainability. While some first-rate work has been done to create and
    distribute curriculum units, much remains to be done. Of course, public
    and private funding is needed to support this effort. A change in the
    knowledge and skills that colleges and universities expect from
    entering students could also help move K-12 education for
    sustainability forward.
    Higher Education
        Higher education for sustainability is like environmental education
    because it draws on an environmental foundation. But it is different
    from much environmental education because it includes the social and
    economic dimensions of sustainability, and is designed to help students
    think about problems in an integrated manner. Since higher education to
    date largely fails to expose students to issues and considerations
    outside the narrow confines of their disciplines, it consequently fails
    to produce integrated decisionmakers. Higher education for sustainable
    development primarily involves teaching students to understand
    ecological, social, and economic problems through the many lenses of an
    interdisciplinary framework. It assumes that integrated decisionmaking
    is not possible without integrated thinking. Effective and rigorous
    teaching of integrated thinking-without becoming soft and watering down
    the disciplines-is both a powerful intellectual challenge and a
    profound necessity.
        A genuine commitment to creating a sustainable future would be
    evidenced in most of the following seven critical dimensions of
    institutional life. These are based on Agenda 21 and various national
    and international conferences. Disciplinary, professional, liberal
    arts, and general education requirements at the university would
    involve interdisciplinary decisionmaking and reflect a fundamental
    concern for sustainability. Research at the institution would focus
    significantly on sustainable development. Faculty and staff development
    rewards would cultivate an understanding of, and contributions to,
    sustainable development. Campus operations would be oriented toward
    reducing the institution's ``ecological footprint.'' Student
    opportunities and engagement on campus would reflect a deep commitment
    to sustainability through new student orientation, scholarships,
    internships, and job placement counseling. The institution's outreach
    and service would support local, regional, and global partnerships to
    enhance sustainability. The university's mission, structure, and
    planning would communicate and promote sustainability.
        Since the Earth Summit, however, education for sustainable
    development in the United States has been underfunded and
    undersupported, both within and outside the academy. Tensions have
    arisen between environmental educators and sustainability educators,
    and no consensus has been reached on who or what institutions should
    guide higher education for sustainability. The U.S. Government has
    shown little interest in pursuing this agenda. For the most part,
    pressure on universities and colleges to begin to embrace the challenge
    of sustainable development has originated from within. At a small
    minority of institutions, highly motivated and committed presidents,
    faculty members, staff members, and students have effected change in
    significant ways. At a larger minority, there is evidence of increased
    eco-efficiency in operations or new offerings in environmental studies.
    Colleges and universities in America are increasingly adopting
    sustainability initiatives in one or more of these seven critical
    dimensions of institutional life. But an authentic institutional
    commitment to sustainable development is rare.
        A deeper commitment to sustainable development in higher education
    requires three broad changes. First, higher education must commit
    itself to steady reform in teaching, research, faculty and staff hiring
    and development, operations, student opportunities, outreach, and
    mission and structure. Second, sustainability must become a priority of
    the specialized academic organizations, disciplines, and professions
    that influence universities. Third, external stakeholders, including
    opinion leaders, alumni, employers and funders, should pressure Federal
    and State governments to move the education and research agenda of
    higher education toward a greater focus on sustainability. Since the
    Federal Government provides more than 90 percent of the funding for
    academic research, it influences deeply the priorities for research and
    helps shape academic fields.
    Institutions and Infrastructure
        In a sustainable society, effective governmental and
    nongovernmental institutions deliver essential services to people on an
    equitable basis. The built infrastructure for necessary public services
    in a sustainable society should also be durable, available and
    affordable to all, and environmentally protective or restorative. Two
    key examples are transportation and medical and public health services.
    Transportation
        The traditional approach to transportation planning in the United
    States has been to maximize roadway capacity, travel speed, and
    mobility, generally within the context of large subsidies to motorized
    transportation. A sustainable transportation system, by contrast, seeks
    to maximize efficiency in overall resource use. In Agenda 21's words,
    it is ``more efficient, less polluting and safer.'' Its basic
    components include increasing modal diversity, with more emphasis on
    public transit, walking, and bicycling; paying more attention to the
    pattern of transportation and land use; encouraging use of efficient
    transportation modes whenever practical; charging users the true costs
    of transportation; and encouraging better connectivity between modes.
        American transportation policy has become increasingly cognizant of
    these patterns. Just as Agenda 21 was being adopted, the United States
    was entering the beginning stage of a fundamental change in Federal
    transportation policy. While the Intermodal Surface Transportation
    Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 authorized substantial Federal funding
    for highway expansion, its name suggested the beginning of a new
    direction-a greater emphasis on all modes of travel, not just highways,
    and an emphasis on environmental and economic efficiency. In general,
    ISTEA eschewed substantive regulatory requirements in favor of
    procedural ones intended to assure the consideration of nationally
    important goals, along with appropriate funding mechanisms to enable
    regions and States to put efficiency strategies into effect. The
    cornerstone of this approach was (and remains) a planning process
    established for metropolitan areas and States that is intended to
    ``minimize transportation-related fuel consumption and air pollution.''
    The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), adopted in
    1998, reauthorized the 1991 law with only minor changes to these key
    provisions.
        Despite some positive trends in the past decade, however, the
    environmental impacts of transportation generally increased. From 1995
    through 2000, transit use grew 21 percent while driving increased by
    just 11 percent. The growth rate in vehicle miles traveled per capita
    slowed somewhat from what it had been in the 1980's. On the other hand,
    a number of trends all point to increased inefficiency in travel
    patterns. The number of vehicle miles traveled grew from 2 to 2.6
    trillion miles between 1990 and 1998. Other negative trends include an
    increase in average trip length, growth in the number of vehicle trips
    taken per person and per household per year, and a decline in average
    vehicle occupancy. Transportation is by far the largest consumer of
    petroleum products in the United States, accounting for some two-thirds
    of our oil consumption. Transportation is also responsible for rising
    CO2 emissions and continuing unhealthy air quality. In some
    communities, parking lots now constitute the largest single category of
    land use. Increased driving also means increased congestion; Americans
    now spend roughly one of every eight waking hours in cars.
        The United States is moving toward sustainability in transportation
    in some respects; there have been measurable improvements in process,
    in mode shifts, and even in some environmental indicators. But with
    long-term trends foretelling a dramatically growing population and a
    growing economy, mere motion toward the goal is not enough, because the
    goal is itself moving farther and farther away, and becoming more
    difficult to achieve.
        To move the United States to an effective course for sustainability
    in transportation, Congress and the Federal agencies must buildupon the
    policy reforms of the 1990's through a suite of measures. The first
    step is to recognize clearly that travel choices available to most
    Americans have been sharply curtailed by past policies, from high
    subsidies to housing to tax polices and zoning laws, that have made it
    unattractive or impossible to choose more sustainable options such as
    walking, cycling, riding transit, living close to our jobs, and driving
    smaller, more efficient motor vehicles. Another step is to establish
    and work toward specific transportation goals, such as increased energy
    efficiency, equal access to jobs, and a safe walking route to school
    for each child. The United States should also adopt policy measures
    that would reduce demand for motorized transportation; encourage the
    use of alternative transportation modes; and reduce the environmental,
    social, and economic costs of transportation.
    Medical and Public Health Services
        The U.S. health system works very well, compared to the developing
    world. But the comparison to the remainder of the developed world,
    especially to the wealthier European countries, is not as favorable.
    The health provisions of Agenda 21 focus not only on environmental
    pollution but also on basic medical care, preventive medicine, and
    improving mental as well as physical health. Equality in access to
    basic goods and services is part of sustainable development, both as an
    issue of fairness and because sustained inequalities impede development
    and destabilize society. Thus, basic medical and public health services
    are critical to a more just and economically sound nation.
        While no bright line separates public health services from personal
    medical services, medical services are those that treat diseases and
    injuries in the individual. Public health is concerned with the
    community. Public health services are not a substitute for personal
    medical services, but they can prevent the need for medical services,
    and they are less expensive and more widely available than medical
    services.
        The U.S. sanitation system works well, with outbreaks of water and
    foodborne illnesses happening infrequently enough to be front page
    news. Yet the public health system has suffered from decades of
    neglect, a lack of national standards, fragmentation of staffing and
    resources among thousands of legal jurisdictions, and a general lack of
    public support and funding. As a result, the system is vulnerable to
    breakdowns and has a limited ability to cope with new threats,
    including terrorism and climate change.
        The level of communicable diseases in the United States, especially
    human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/
    AIDS), is high for a developed country, and affects sustainable
    development. Communicable diseases are transmitted by people to other
    people, and are thus different from sanitation or environmental
    diseases. The poor suffer disproportionately from such diseases, both
    because access to medical care services is limited for the poor, and
    because environmental factors increase the spread of communicable
    diseases among the poor. Ironically, past success in eradicating
    smallpox and polio, and in dramatically reducing measles and
    tuberculosis, has undermined public support for communicable disease
    control spending and programs.
        Over the last 10 years, there has been no progress in improving
    access to medical care in the United States. Indeed, there are some
    indications that the quality of available care has diminished due to
    economic pressures. The United States does not guarantee universal
    access to medical care. Instead, it relies on a combination of
    voluntary, employer-paid health insurance, government entitlement
    through Medicare for the elderly, and a limited program for indigent
    persons not covered by employer-paid health insurance. Approximately 40
    million persons are not covered by any of these plans, and many persons
    with some coverage still do not have adequate access to medical care.
    Congress has been unwilling to assume the burden of universal access or
    of increasing employer mandates, and the States do not have the
    economic resources to bridge the gap. This results in a less healthy
    work force and distorts economic development because it
    disproportionately harms low wage earners.
        To move closer to sustainability, the United States should retain
    local enforcement for public health, but provide standards, funding,
    and oversight at the Federal level. There should be a national civil
    service system for public health professionals, especially those who
    manage health departments. The United States also needs to fund proper
    postmortem examination procedures to diagnose every death from a
    communicable disease. In addition, the United States should set
    standards on antibiotic usage to identify patterns of disease spread
    and to limit the development of antibiotic-resistant organisms.
    Universal health insurance would improve individual health and the
    health of the population, which would be good for development and might
    reduce projected incremental costs as preventive services improve. If
    the United States is not prepared to do that, it should at least make
    routine care and preventive services universally available. This would
    include providing education and support to improve health habits, such
    as better nutrition, exercise, and the cessation of dangerous habits
    such as smoking. By doing so, the United States would improve health
    and productivity, serve distributive justice, and bring the country
    closer to sustainability for basic medical services.
    Governance
        The national government, as well as State and local governments,
    needs to play an important role in sustainable development. Perhaps the
    most important thing they can do, Agenda 21 says, is integrate their
    decisionmaking on environmental, social, economic, and security issues.
    National governments are also urged to delegate ``responsibilities to
    the lowest level of public authority consistent with effective
    action.'' In the past 10 years, no level of government in the United
    States has provided strong support for sustainable development. State
    and local efforts, though, have been more widespread and effective than
    national ones.
    Local Governance
        Integrated decisionmaking should, at least in principle, be easier
    at the local level, because the connections between economic, social,
    and environmental issues are easier to understand and most of the
    relevant stakeholders live or work nearby. Agenda 21 calls on
    localities to consult with key stakeholders to arrive at a consensus on
    local strategies for sustainable development, and States that by 1996
    most local authorities in each country should have developed ``a local
    Agenda 21'' for their community. However, Agenda 21 does not generally
    address the reality of multiple municipalities within a specific
    metropolitan region. Fragmented decisionmaking among municipalities in
    the same region causes sprawling growth patterns that increase traffic,
    cause air and water pollution, increase water consumption, and destroy
    wetlands. Communities and regions across the country also continue to
    be largely divided along economic and racial lines, both physically and
    socially.
        National policies to foster community sustainability did not change
    significantly in the past decade. Significant progress was made in
    promoting the redevelopment of brownfields and providing alternatives
    to highway transportation, but many Federal laws continue to be
    obstacles to local sustainability. The Federal mortgage interest
    deduction, for instance, favors wealthier home buyers over those who
    are less wealthy, renters, multifamily property owners, and people who
    rehabilitate existing structures.
        Many States enacted ``smart growth'' laws to control some of the
    environmental effects of sprawl. But all too often, these laws leave
    untouched a framework of State laws that encourage the creation of
    largely autonomous municipalities, and require that these
    municipalities raise revenue by property taxes to support services
    within their boundaries. Such laws encourage municipalities to compete
    for property wealth and exclude less expensive housing, a tactic that
    fosters sprawl and impedes intermunicipal cooperation. The lack of laws
    requiring coordination in housing, education, regional revenue sharing,
    and land use remains a major obstacle to local sustainable development
    efforts.
        At the local level, a few communities adopted ``local Agenda 21s''
    through broad participation, but municipalities in the United States
    are beginning to show great creativity and innovation on local
    sustainability. Municipal sustainable development efforts-in locations
    such as Burlington, Chicago, and Santa Monica-were encouraged by the
    PCSD. Those municipalities and others employed techniques such as
    inclusionary zoning, providing incentives to developers to use existing
    sewer and water infrastructure, and reducing water usage. But most
    municipalities have a long way to go. For example, although mixed use
    zoning promotes walkable, pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods, most
    municipalities still require single use zoning.
        Achieving local sustainability will require more than local
    efforts. Congress and the Federal Government should use conditional
    funding mechanisms to provide incentives for municipalities to
    cooperate and grow smartly. The Federal mortgage interest deduction
    should be changed so that it does not encourage single-family housing.
    States need to move toward a system that better promotes regional
    governance and shares taxes within a region. States should also create
    regional planning commissions and empower them to use various
    regulatory and fiscal incentives and disincentives to encourage
    cooperation among municipalities and channel growth in particular ways.
    States, in addition, should modify their zoning laws to encourage more
    mixed-use zoning. Municipalities should charge, and be empowered to
    charge, fees requiring developers to pay the full cost of new services
    and infrastructure. As municipalities move toward a regional approach,
    each municipality in a region should also accept its ``fair share'' of
    affordable housing units. And at all levels, more must be done to
    provide incentives for the establishment of public/private partnerships
    and broad-based consensus-building efforts.
    State Governance
        The goals of sustainable development-simultaneously achieving
    economic, social, environmental, and security goals while maintaining
    the ability of future generations to attain such goals-are the goals of
    State governments. Except for the national security element of the
    security goal, States have great responsibility for achieving those
    goals in the United States. The decentralized decisionmaking
    recommended by the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 is also consistent
    with the constitutional structure of U.S. governance, which gives
    substantial authority to States.
        Before the Earth Summit, many States promoted integrated
    decisionmaking through laws requiring environmental impact statements
    for major projects, constitutional provisions concerning the
    environment, planning laws, and statutes encouraging pollution
    prevention. They did not necessarily result in the type of integrated
    decisionmaking envisioned by the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, but
    they did substantially increase the level of consideration of
    environmental issues in economic development decisions. Many State
    constitutional provisions and statutes also contained aspirational
    language concerning intergenerational equity. Federal pollution control
    statutes adopted in the 1970's and 1980's used a Federal-State
    partnership model that strongly encouraged States to improve their
    environmental programs and allowed them to continue exercising
    authority in areas where there is no Federal regulation.
        Since the Earth Summit, a number of States have made substantial
    progress in creating and implementing policies aimed at achieving
    sustainable development. As a group, States are fulfilling their role
    as laboratories for experimenting with programs and are, to an extent,
    leading policy development in the United States. Minnesota, New Jersey,
    and Oregon have established or expanded planning, decisionmaking, and
    goal-setting efforts for sustainable development. Maryland enacted a
    series of programs intended to reform land development practices by
    encouraging development in existing centers and discouraging
    development of greenfields. Many States have undertaken supportive
    policy-specific initiatives that are consistent with sustainable
    development, including laws and policies to foster smart growth,
    recycling, energy efficiency, renewable energy, watershed protection,
    pollution prevention, and redevelopment of brownfields. A report by the
    Resource Renewal Institute evaluating the ``shifting emphasis toward
    sustainability'' in all 50 States, however, shows a substantial gap
    between the leading and lagging States.
        Devolution, or transferring power to States to deal with
    environmental issues, also dominated discussions of environmental law
    in the 1990's. The National Environmental Performance Partnership
    System (NEPPS) was established in 1995 to provide States the
    opportunity to negotiate greater flexibility within the context of
    existing Federal pollution control laws.
        Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Oregon have also established
    indicators to track progress toward sustainability. Minnesota's
    Progress Indicator suggests that the State's gross domestic product may
    overstate that State's actual progress toward environmental, economic,
    and social goals. In 2000, the State reported that, according to the
    Progress Indicator, the State's performance peaked in the mid-1980's,
    and had declined to a point where by 1995 the levels were similar to
    the indicator's values for the early 1960's.
        In the next 5 to 10 years, States need to make sustainable
    development an explicit goal. More States need to follow the examples
    set by leading jurisdictions and adopt and implement strategies and
    policies promoting sustainable development and holding themselves
    accountable (through the use of indicators) for achieving
    sustainability. Governors must ensure adequate and effective
    interagency cooperation by designating a cabinet-level person who will
    be responsible for fostering sustainable development, including
    sustainable land development. States should also make greater use of
    environmental impact assessment, particularly to bring
    intergenerational equity into their development and policy decisions.
    Finally, States should work with EPA and other Federal agencies to use
    NEPPS to improve Federal-State environmental governance for achieving
    goals, and for monitoring and reporting progress.
    National Governance
        In a world of sovereign nations, sustainable development cannot be
    achieved unless it is actively supported by national governments. In a
    basic sense, the requirements for good governance for sustainable
    development are the same as those for good governance in general. These
    include effective governmental institutions, national laws, a favorable
    investment climate, public access to information, public participation
    in governmental decisionmaking, and access to justice. But sustainable
    development requires more than that. Most basically, it requires that
    national governments integrate the environment into national
    decisionmaking in broader and deeper ways over time. Agenda 21
    recommends that they do so through national strategies. At the 5-year
    review of Earth Summit commitments in 1997, nations agreed to have such
    strategies in place by 2002. National strategies would guide
    governmental decisionmaking on a range on issues, include priorities
    and timetables, change in response to changing conditions, and harness
    the energy and creativity of nongovernmental actors, including the
    private sector.
        The United States has no such strategy. Sustainable development is
    not actively supported by the president or congressional leaders. There
    is no strategic thinking or action on behalf of the Federal Government.
    There is no governmental coordinating or implementing mechanism for a
    national strategy, and little public education.
        The PCSD (1993-1999), an advisory council established by President
    Clinton, might have provided (and, if resurrected, could still provide)
    the basis for a national strategy. The PCSD brought together diverse
    stakeholders from around the country and fashioned a detailed set of
    recommendations for sustainable development in the United States. But
    it had no authority to implement its own recommendations, and neither
    President Clinton nor Vice President Al Gore showed interest in seeking
    implementation. Nor was there much interest in Congress during the same
    period.
        The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which until 1995 was
    required to issue national reports on the state of the nation's
    environment, has not issued such reviews on a regular basis for years.
    On the other hand, a 1993 statute, the Government Performance and
    Results Act (GPRA), requires Federal agencies to engage in a strategic
    planning process, and some agencies have used sustainable development
    to guide that process.
        The United States should adopt and implement a national strategy
    for sustainable development. It should include meaningful goals,
    indicators of progress toward those goals, legal and institutional
    mechanisms for achieving them, and public education. The strategy
    should be built on existing laws and legal authority, and thus should
    ensure wider use of the GPRA to move agency planning toward sustainable
    development. It should prioritize those issues that are of greatest
    importance. Some executive level entity, perhaps the CEQ, should be
    responsible for coordinating its development and implementation. But
    CEQ's now-extinguished annual reporting function should be transferred
    to an independent and properly funded entity, either in or out of the
    Federal Government. That would help ensure that a long-term perspective
    is brought to bear in national decisionmaking-one of the most important
    prerequisites for sustainable development.
        The international community would add significant value to the
    national sustainable development strategy process if countries were to
    agree that implementation of national sustainable development
    strategies should begin no later than 2005. It would also help if
    countries would agree that national trends for the degradation and loss
    of natural resources should be reversed by 2015. Such goals would give
    more specific content to the national strategy process, and would also
    incorporate a specific and easily understood goal into the meaning of
    sustainable development. This goal would help focus national and
    international efforts, and would help galvanize citizens, NGO's, and
    corporations in countries around the world.
    Looking Ahead
        A defining characteristic of a sustainable society is that it can
    successfully adapt to new and different conditions. We have grown and
    prospered as a Nation because we have been able to take advantage of
    opportunities and respond to threats that our founders could not have
    imagined. The challenges of growing global environmental degradation,
    and the growing gap between rich and poor are quite obvious. But the
    opportunity is equally real-to build an ecologically sustainable
    framework that provides greater freedom, opportunity, and quality of
    life for all. Law and policies are not the only means of achieving a
    sustainable society, but they will play an important role.
        The essential missing ingredient thus far, and which needs to be
    supplied in the coming decade, is commitment-commitment by government
    at all levels, educational institutions, business and industry, NGO's,
    and individuals. We know what we need to do, and we also know why. As
    Americans, we are called to face these challenges, and to seize this
    opportunity.

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