    [Senate Hearing 107-999]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 107-999

                             NUCLEAR PLANT SECURITY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                          ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

    S. 1586, A BILL TO AMEND THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 TO AUTHORIZE THE
     CARRYING OF FIREARMS BY EMPLOYEES OF LICENSEES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

     S. 1746, A BILL TO AMEND THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 AND THE ENERGY
    REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1974 TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY AT SENSITIVE NUCLEAR
                                   FACILITIES

                                   __________

                                  JUNE 5, 2002

                                   __________

      Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works

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                                WASHINGTON : 2003
    ____________________________________________________________________________
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                   COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

                          one hundred seventh congress
                                 second session

                      JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont, Chairman
    MAX BAUCUS, Montana                  BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
    HARRY REID, Nevada                   JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
    BOB GRAHAM, Florida                  JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
    BARBARA BOXER, California            GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    RON WYDEN, Oregon                    MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island
    HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York     ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
    JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey           PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

                     Ken Connolly, Majority Staff Director
                     Dave Conover, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

    ?

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                  JUNE 5, 2002
                               OPENING STATEMENTS

    Bond, Hon. Christopher S., U.S. Senator from the State of
      Missouri.......................................................     7
    Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California...    17
    Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, U.S. Senator from the State of New
      York...........................................................    12
    Corzine, Hon. Jon S., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey..    10
    Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma...    11
    Jeffords, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont..     1
    Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada..........     5
    Smith, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from the State of New Hampshire....     2
    Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio...    14
    Warner, Hon. John W., U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of
      Virginia.......................................................    18

                                   WITNESSES

    Brian, Danielle, executive director, Project on Government
      Oversight......................................................    43
        Prepared statement...........................................    82
        Responses to additional questions from:
            Senator Clinton..........................................    86
            Senator Voinovich........................................    86
    Hastie, Donna J. Miller, Emergency Preparedness Specialist,
      Marrietta, GA..................................................    45
        Prepared statement...........................................    87
        Responses to additional questions from:
            Senator Clinton..........................................    96
            Senator Voinovich........................................    97
    Lochbaum, David, Nuclear Safety Engineer, Union of Concerned
      Scientists.....................................................    39
        Prepared statement...........................................    65
        Responses to additional questions from:
            Senator Clinton..........................................    71
            Senator Voinovich........................................    72
    Markey, Hon. Edward J., A Representative in Congress from the
      Commonwealth of Massachusetts..................................    19
    Meserve, Hon. Richard A., Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
      Commission.....................................................    23
        Prepared statement...........................................    49
        Responses to additional questions from:
            Senator Clinton..........................................    56
            Senator Voinovich........................................    59
    Redlener, Dr. Irwin, M.D., president, The Children's Hospital at
      Montefiore and president, The Children's Health Fund...........    47
        Prepared statement...........................................   102
        Responses to additional questions from:
            Senator Clinton..........................................   105
            Senator Voinovich........................................   106
    Skolds, Jack, chief nuclear officer, Exelon Nuclear..............    41
        Prepared statement...........................................    73
        Responses to additional questions from Senator Voinovich.....    80

                                     (iii)

                              ADDITIONAL MATERIAL

    Reports:
        Implications of Security Force Federalization on Nuclear
          Power Plant Security: An Evaluation by the Nuclear Energy
          Institute..................................................   113
        Nuclear Security--General Aviation Is Not A Threat (By:
          Robert Jefferson, Nuclear Safety and Security Consultant)..    35
    Statements:
        Alvarez, Robert, program director, The STAR foundation.......   106
        Lyman, Edwin S., Ph.D., president, Nuclear Control Institute.   111
    Text of Bills:
        S. 1586, A bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to
          authorize the carrying of firearms by employees of
          licensees, and for other purposes.........................126-131
        S. 1746, A bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and
          the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to strengthen
          security at sensitive nuclear facilities..................132-151

                             NUCLEAR PLANT SECURITY

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 5, 2002

                                   U.S. Senate,
                     Committee on Environment and Public Works,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
    406, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. James M. Jeffords (chairman
    of the committee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Jeffords, Smith, Bond, Corzine, Clinton,
    Reid, Boxer, Voinovich, Inhofe, Warner, Carper.

             OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS,
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT

        Senator Jeffords. The hearing will come to order.
        I believe we have before us a very important task of
    reviewing legislation that will enhance the security at our
    Nation's nuclear power plants and other civilian facilities
    that utilize radioactive materials for commercial or research
    purposes. In his State of the Union address, President Bush
    informed us that authorities had found, among other things,
    diagrams of nuclear power plants in America in terrorist caves,
    along with surveillance maps of American cities.
        In February, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    responding to an FBI report issued a warning of potential
    airline attacks against a U.S. nuclear power plant. Numerous
    media accounts had analyzed in detail the possibility of
    creating dirty bombs from a combination of readily available
    commercial sources of radiation and common explosives. We all
    know that the credibility of these threats is inherently
    difficult to pinpoint. But we all also know of the seriousness
    with which these must be viewed and it has changed forever
    since September 11.
        These are sobering times. I commend the U.S. Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission, whose chairman, Richard Meserve, is with
    us this morning, for the prompt and comprehensive efforts of
    that Agency to address threats to our civilian nuclear
    facilities. I have been briefed on the fact that they have
    placed our Nation's commercial nuclear reactors on the highest
    state of alert since September 11 and that they are conducting
    a top to bottom review of their safeguards and security system.
    This includes working closely with the intelligence community
    and others to coordinate all necessary programs.
        They have also established a new office of nuclear security
    and incident response to consolidate certain NRC security
    divisions. They have assured us that they are taking every
    precaution to ensure safety at our nuclear facilities. I am
    also aware, however, of a variety of criticisms and concerns
    that have been leveled at safety procedures of our nuclear
    facilities in the past. In spite of as much as a 6-months
    advance notice, up to half our Nation's nuclear power plants
    have performed below, that's below, the NRC's minimum security
    requirements during NRC-sponsored mock terrorist activities.
        Because of resource constraints, the NRC has since tested
    security at each nuclear plant only once every 8 years. The
    current design basic threat which set standards for actions
    facilities must take to defend against attack has not been
    significantly revised in over 40 years and do not envision the
    type of terrorist attack we now assume is possible following
    the events of September 11. There are significant concerns both
    about the design of the plants, the ability to defend against
    inside sabotage, and the location of spent fuel product.
        Former employees have complained of inadequate training and
    background checks of security guards and other personnel. These
    inconsistencies must be reviewed and must be remedied. We must
    take strong and focused action to ensure that terrorists
    continue to view our nuclear plants as undesirable targets that
    are strongly protected and difficult to damage. It is the duty
    of this Congress and this committee in particular to make sure
    that there is effective coordination and cooperation between
    licensees, the NRC, appropriate Federal agencies and State and
    local government, preventing criminal and terrorist access to
    our nuclear power plants and radioactive materials.
        As the House and Senate, in cooperation with the
    Administration, proceeds this week with intelligence hearings
    on the events leading up to the September 11 attack, this need
    for effective coordination among the various agencies
    responsible for security is starkly highlighted. We have been
    warned, we know these are possible targets. We know there have
    been problems in the past. We must allocate the resources to
    fully address these concerns.
        A single successful attack would make it clear, in
    hindsight, that it would have been worth the effort. An
    unsuccessful attack will make it sure that we did the job well.
    It is my intent to work with my colleagues on this committee
    and with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to quickly pass
    legislation out of this committee that will ensure strong,
    consistent and reliable standards for protection of our
    civilian nuclear facilities. We cannot and will not allow the
    fear factor to hamper our committees.
        It is necessary for the public to know that strong measures
    are in place to protect their homes and families against attack
    by those who hate us and our ways of life. As chairman of the
    committee, I intend to see such measures taken. I trust I will
    have the full support of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
    my colleagues in this important matter.
        Senator Smith.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB SMITH, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
                         STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

        Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ensuring
    our power plant safety, our nuclear energy facility safety is
    of course of the utmost importance to this committee but also
    to all Americans. It especially hits close to home for those of
    us who have power plants in our States, as I do, and as many in
    this committee do. It is vital that we as a committee be
    informed and do all that we can to ensure that these assets are
    indeed safe, secure, and protected.
        These facilities are, I might add, among the most protected
    structures in the Nation. But it doesn't mean that there aren't
    additional steps that can be taken to enhance that security.
    Last year, Senator inhofe and I introduced legislation together
    that would accomplish that goal. We had provisions in the bill
    that the NRC has requested for many years, provisions that the
    Senate passed in the last Congress by unanimous consent.
        These are common sense enhancements and I have spoken
    directly about them to several members of the Commission,
    including the chairman. I know that Senator Reid also has
    legislation and I'm hopeful that we can work together in a
    bipartisan way to reach agreement on that legislation.
        But as we move this process forward, it's important that we
    work with the security experts and resist efforts from those
    who want ``added security'' as a means to further an anti-
    nuclear agenda. If that's where we go in this process, then we
    are going to fail in what we wish to accomplish. We have to do
    it the right way. I'm very anxious to hear from Chairman
    Meserve on what the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been
    doing to increase security and what plans exist to update the
    design basis threat.
        But unfortunately this is not, with all due respect, Mr.
    Chairman, the forum to do it. We're not going to be able to get
    all the information this committee deserves and needs to know
    in an open forum. I'm very much a strong advocate of the right
    to know and shining the light on our hearings and not keeping
    information from the media if we don't have to. But some of the
    information that we need to discuss today is classified as
    safeguards and some is secret, all of which is on a need-to-
    know basis, little of which is suitable for an open, televised
    hearing.
        Mr. Chairman, as you know, myself and Senators Inhofe,
    Voinovich and Domenici requested that this at a minimum be a
    closed hearing. On the Armed Services Committee, of which some
    of us are members here, frequently when we have situations like
    this we have an open hearing, very briefly, and then go to a
    closed hearing and get into the sensitive materials or
    information that we need to know as a committee. To the best of
    my knowledge, no such followup hearing has been scheduled.
        So in essence, our request for a closed hearing was denied
    or ignored. Now we're going to talk about nuclear security,
    about all of our power plants, in front of the entire world on
    C-SPAN, including all those who may wish to do us harm. I find
    this absolutely unbelievable that we're doing this. I would
    just say, as a caution to witnesses, if you don't feel
    comfortable answering a question, in spite of the fact that you
    might get chastised by a Senator, I wouldn't answer it. Because
    frankly, aggravating a Senator as opposed to providing
    information that may let the terrorists find out what's going
    on in our security of our nuclear power plants, frankly, that's
    a fair exchange as far as I'm concerned. It's not going to
    aggravate this one.
        I would note also that the House Committee has held only
    closed and classified hearings on this topic. The chairman
    mentioned in his opening remarks about what we found in the
    caves of Al Qaeda. What do we want to be talking about that for
    in a public session? We almost slipped up, Senator Inhofe
    caught it when he was doing his homework last night, a
    potentially damaging mistake, while reading through the
    testimony, information that has been classified at the NRC as
    safeguards that was included in some of the written testimony
    today. I'm not blaming the witnesses for that. The witnesses
    are trying to answer and be responsive.
        But this is not the forum, in front of the cameras, all
    over the world, to do this. The Government has deemed it
    sensitive enough so as to strictly limit access to only those
    who need to know. I'm talking about safeguards, I'm not talking
    about necessarily classified or secret, as we call it in the
    formal sense. But there is a need-to-know basis, and I can tell
    you that everybody watching C-SPAN today does not need to know
    everything that we need to talk about here this morning.
        I understand that this information has leaked before. I've
    read it, I read it in USA Today. But that doesn't mean that we
    have to further that and add to it and supplement it and give
    it credibility. That's not what we do. If something is
    classified or listed as safeguards and it's in the newspaper,
    it doesn't mean we have to comment on it and make it worse. But
    it does underscore the point that these witnesses believe this
    is important information that we should have, but we just can't
    get it in this hearing.
        This is a completely open forum, I repeat again, completely
    open, national TV, world TV, let alone national, world TV
    coverage. It's safe to assume that those who want to hurt us
    are going to be watching. Good morning to them.
        If you have any thoughts that the information you're
    providing could be of the slightest use to those who wish to do
    us harm, then please don't answer the question. In order to
    ensure that the committee has the opportunity to get the
    information, I don't know why we can't commit to a separate,
    closed and classified hearing prior to moving away, moving
    toward any other comprehensive legislation. This will allow us
    to make the right decisions. It's vital for this committee to
    vigorously conduct oversight, and we can't do it this way.
        Since 9/11, I've visited Seabrook, I've communicated with
    the guards, I've met with the NRC chairman, I've met with the
    commissioners, I've talked to those who provide the security at
    Seabrook. We held a press conference after it with one of the
    members of the NRC. We didn't talk about all the safeguards. We
    didn't talk about what we do when somebody attacks the plant,
    if they attack the plant or how we might react to that or how
    many people we have at the plant to protect us or what kind of
    people they are or what weapons they have. We don't talk about
    any of that.
        It's clear that these are things we need to talk about,
    frankly, but not here. So frankly, Mr. Chairman, unless there's
    a commitment made for me to the committee that we're going to
    have a classified hearing or a closed hearing somewhere in the
    near future as a follow-on to this, I will yield all of my
    questions to anyone else who might like to ask them. Because I
    have questions that I would like to ask in a closed forum.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you. I would just point out to you
    that we held a closed hearing. We held it last fall. No one----
        Senator Smith. That was a briefing, Mr. Chairman, with all
    due respect. That was a briefing.
        Senator Jeffords. It was a hearing----
        Senator Smith. It was not a hearing.
        Senator Jeffords. It was an opportunity and no one showed
    up except me. But it's amazing what happens when you make a
    public hearing and you have the TV cameras, and we almost get
    everybody. So just to point that out, we are not going to
    breach any security, and we certainly feel if it's appropriate,
    we will have one where the security aspects will apply.
        But right now, this is also, looking at the large audience
    we have, very obvious that the public has a great interest in
    knowing and has a great right to know what is going on. This
    hearing is to make sure that the public of the United States
    has the background necessary for them to understand fully the
    problems that we're facing.
        Senator Reid.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY REID, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
                            STATE OF NEVADA

        Senator Reid. Mr. President, I only watch the highest class
    television, I was watching Headline News this morning. There
    they had a short piece on distributing to people in New York
    iodine, some kind of potassium iodide, so that if there is a
    problem in one of these nuclear facilities, they would have in
    their medicine cabinet these pills they could take to stop the
    damage done by nuclear things floating through the air. So this
    is something the American people are really concerned about, as
    they should be.
        So I appreciate very much the concern of Senator Smith. But
    also, we have concerns, the American people have, all over
    America, people are concerned about another Three Mile Island,
    another Chernobyl. We have a responsibility, this committee has
    a responsibility, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Chairman
    Meserve has always been willing to come. I'm sure he dreads it
    the night before, but that's the way it is. But he's always
    been willing to come and share whatever information he has,
    even though he knows that some answers he gives we don't like.
    But he's been very candid with us, and I appreciate that.
        The tragedy of September 11 has taught us many things. It
    taught us the importance of first responders. It taught us the
    vulnerability of our Nation's buildings and the strength of our
    Nation's resolve. Finally, it taught us that we must be
    prepared for today's threats, because they could become
    tomorrow's attacks.
        Last year I introduced legislation with Senators Clinton,
    Lieberman and Jeffords to improve the safety of our Nation's
    nuclear power plants. I appreciate the willingness of Senator
    Jeffords, as chairman of this committee, to hold this hearing
    and take a look at this legislation. I also appreciate
    Congressman Markey, who has worked so hard on these issues. He
    has done a tremendous job working to make our Nation's nuclear
    power plants as safe as they can be. As someone who has served
    with this fine man, in the House of Representatives, I
    appreciate that his voice is heard in the Senate and all over
    the country.
        I'm disappointed, however, that the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission has not chosen to do what I believe is its job with
    the same commitment to the safety of our Nation and the
    integrity of our electric supply. When Senators Clinton,
    Lieberman, Jeffords and I introduced our legislation, we
    intended to start a dialog, how we make our Nation's commercial
    nuclear power plants safer than they were before September 11.
    Many of you here today have strong views on that legislation.
    We intend to listen to those before a final draft comes out of
    this committee, of course, we all have to do that.
        But when plants are failing nearly half of their security
    evaluations, we need to more than update the curriculum. We
    need a new system, I believe. There are some plants that do a
    reasonably good job. But it's not to have peaks of success. We
    need a high plateau that secures all plants.
        Our bill also requires the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
    take a new look at the threats posed by terrorists. Our bill
    also establishes a rigorous training and evaluation program for
    the Nuclear Security Force. I must say, members of this
    committee and you, Mr. Chairman, we in Nevada have had some
    experience. Nuclear devices were assembled there for some 50
    years. We had all kinds of concerns about the safety.
        Chairman Dingle, when he was chairman of the Commerce
    Committee in the House, established a very rigorous physical
    program for security personnel there, so that if somebody tried
    to breach this perimeter, which was very close to the outside
    world, that somebody could run 50 yards and grab somebody, the
    physical training of those people was very bad. It was
    difficult, it was made harder to have people work there, but it
    was really important in the long run.
        So I think this is important, that we established a
    training program and an evaluation program for our nuclear
    security force, one that is constant and persistent. A new
    office will be established within the Regulatory Commission
    with a dedicated team of mock terrorists whose only job is to
    perfect their skills in challenging the security guards. I see,
    Mr. Chairman, when professional sports teams practice, they
    don't do it against amateur athletes playing in the park. They
    train against other professionals. Nuclear security personnel
    should do the same.
        Our bill will honor the sacrifice of our Nation's emergency
    responders by ensuring that emergency response plans are in
    place and work as we expect them. Finally, we will require
    stockpiles of medicine to help in the event of a release of
    radioactive material from a nuclear facility. We have drafted a
    comprehensive bill that will protect our Nation's nuclear
    infrastructure. The American people have told us how they
    wanted their airlines and airports protected. We're doing our
    best to follow what they want and what they need and what they
    should have. We will work to make sure that questions about the
    safety of our Nation's nuclear power plants are answered.
        It's time that we give the American people these answers.
    Today I hope we will have a constructive dialog about the ways
    to make our nuclear power plants safer. More importantly, I
    hope today will be the springboard we need to pass legislation
    in the Senate that accomplishes this goal. I hope we can do
    this, as Senator Smith has said, on a bipartisan basis. We all
    have different ideas as to how we can do this. But we need to
    do it, and we're all going to have to give a little and take a
    little to come up with a bill that will be good for the
    country.
        Thank you.
        Senator Jeffords. Senator Bond.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND,
                U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI

        Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
    holding this very important hearing on security issues facing
    our Nation's nuclear power plants. Security at nuclear power
    plants is an important issue, I think, in communities in almost
    every State in the Nation. My home State of Missouri has both a
    commercial nuclear power plant and research reactors, including
    one of the foremost nuclear medicine reactors in the Nation. My
    home in Mexico, MO is less than 25 miles from the nuclear power
    plant in neighboring Calloway County.
        We depend upon the power generated by nuclear power plants.
    Not only does it supply 20 percent of the country's power
    needs, it does so with absolutely no air pollution. Frankly,
    I'd prefer to have a nuclear power plant in my back yard than a
    fossil fuel burning plant. France, in this instance, is way
    ahead of us with 80 percent of its power generated by non-air
    polluting nuclear power.
        As we consider ways to reduce air pollution in electric
    power generation, as we seek to deal with global warming, I
    believe we will only be serious when we change the rules so
    that we can rely more heavily on nuclear power which will clean
    up our air and which will reduce the pollutants which lead to
    global warming.
        Our role here in Washington should be to ensure that
    nuclear power is safe, to ensure that operators of nuclear
    power plants have all the tools they need to run safe and
    secure facilities. But we must not make the situation worse
    with one-size-fits-all or reactionary answers. We must not be
    sidetracked by those whose hidden agenda is to deprive us of
    this environmentally clean source of energy.
        Generally commercial nuclear power plants are probably the
    most physically secure and least vulnerable of our Nation's
    industrial infrastructure. They are robust, hardened facilities
    with numerous redundant systems designed to assure public
    safety. They are one of the most intensively and
    comprehensively regulated industries in America. The Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission rules impose comprehensive security
    requirements, including physical protection systems, armed
    tactical security forces and strict access control at all
    plants.
        Is this enough? We need to hear if there are other things
    we can do to make it even safer. I will certainly support
    those.
        Nuclear power plants are safe, however, by their own
    inherent design. Typical reactor containment walls are made of
    heavily reinforced concrete up to 6 feet thick. I urge all of
    you, if you haven't seen it, to view the video tape of a
    Government test where they crashed an F-4 jet fighter into a
    containment wall at nearly 500 miles an hour. The jet was
    obliterated and the 6-foot wall was penetrated only by 2
    inches.
        Nuclear plants are also defended by robust tactical
    security forces. These are not rent-a-cops moonlighting at the
    local mall, they are screened, trained professionals, many with
    military or law enforcement experience. Current nuclear power
    security forces are subject to FBI background checks, physical
    and psychological testing, screening and substance abuse
    testing as part of the hiring process. They undergo rigorous
    training, including weapons training, proof of marksmanship,
    recognition of sabotage devices and equipment and tactical
    response training. They are subject to continuous substance
    abuse and physical fitness checks. These are generally highly
    motivated, well compensated professionals with a retention rate
    above 90 percent.
        Private nuclear plant screening forces stand in direct
    contrast to airport baggage screeners, many of whom are simply
    waiting to get a better paying job at the airport McDonald's.
    Airport security workers are untrained, unscreened, transitory,
    poorly supervised, poorly regulated and low paid. Unfortunately
    some would like to apply a cookie cutter approach of
    federalizing airport security to federalizing nuclear plant
    security.
        I think we're finding out now the problems in federalizing
    the airport security, and I think that federalizing nuclear
    power plant security could lessen the security at those plants.
    It could diminish and disrupt plant security. Effective plant
    security requires close coordination between operators and
    security forces. Creating a separate Federal chain of command
    could inhibit reaction, coordination and communication when
    most needed in the face of an attack.
        It would require the NRC to hire some 5,000 additional
    security employees. Many current security personnel would
    choose not to be come Federal employees and new security
    personnel would require years of on the job training. I think
    federalizing nuclear plant security could also reduce the
    quality of security forces. Screening requirements for Federal
    personnel in the proposed legislation are less stringent than
    those already in place in the industry.
        We do have and we should take the opportunity to see what
    reasonable steps we can take to improve security at nuclear
    power plants. I would like the provisions included in the
    legislation referred to by Senator Smith, Senator Inhofe and we
    can build on that, I believe. We can consider empowering
    security forces by eliminating weapons restrictions and
    providing limited arrest authority. We certainly should oversee
    the NRC's review of nuclear plant security measures post the
    September 11 attacks. I think the NRC testimony should be very
    helpful.
        In summary, I think the nuclear power industry has an
    unparalleled record of health and safety. They also meet
    unparalleled security requirements and must continue to do so.
    I look forward to working with my colleagues on this committee
    on any measure that will improve their ability to ensure the
    health and safety of our communities.
        Thank you.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you, Senator.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Bond follows:]

              Statement of Hon. Christopher S. Bond, U.S. Senator
                           from the State of Missouri

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on security
    issues facing our Nation's nuclear power plants.
        Security at nuclear power plants is an important issue for
    communities in almost every state. My home state of Missouri has both a
    commercial nuclear power plant and research reactors. In fact, my home
    in Mexico, Missouri is no more than 30 miles from the nuclear power
    plant in neighboring Callaway County.
        Missouri, and the Nation, depend upon the power generated by
    nuclear power plants. Not only does nuclear energy supply 20 percent of
    country's power needs, it does so with absolutely no air pollution.
        This Committee is considering ways to reduce air pollution from
    electric power generation. We must keep nuclear power as a valuable and
    environmentally friendly solution to meet our energy needs.
        Our role here in Washington is to ensure that the operators of
    nuclear power plants have all the tools they need to run safe and
    secure facilities. We must not make the solution worse with one-size-
    fits-all or quick, reactionary answers. We must not be sidetracked by
    those whose real hidden agenda is to deprive us of this environmentally
    clean source of energy.
        Commercial nuclear plants are probably the most physically secure
    and least vulnerable of our nation's industrial infrastructure. They
    are robust, hardened facilities with numerous redundant systems
    designed to assure public safety.
        They are one of the most intensively and comprehensively regulated
    industries in America. Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules impose
    comprehensive security requirements including physical protection
    systems, armed tactical security forces, and strict access control at
    all plants.
        Nuclear power plants are safe by their own inherent design. Typical
    reactor containment walls are made of heavily reinforced concrete up to
    six feet thick. I urge all of you, if you haven't seen it, to view the
    videotape of a government test where they crashed an F-4 jet fighter
    into a containment wall at nearly 500 miles per hour. The jet was
    obliterated and the 6-foot wall was penetrated only 2 inches.
        Nuclear power plants are also defended by robust tactical security
    forces. These are not rent-a-cops moonlighting at the local mall. These
    are highly screened, highly trained professionals, most with former
    military or law enforcement experience.
        Current private nuclear power plant security forces are subject to
    FBI background checks, physical and psychological testing and screening
    and substance abuse testing as part of the hiring process.
        Nuclear security forces undergo rigorous training including weapons
    training, proof of marksmanship, recognition of sabotage devises and
    equipment, and tactical response training. They are subject to
    continuous substance abuse and physical fitness checks. These are
    highly motivated, well compensated professionals with a retention rate
    above 90 percent.
        Private nuclear plant security forces stand in direct contrast to
    airport baggage screeners, many of whom were simply waiting to get a
    better paying job at the airport McDonalds. Airport security workers
    were untrained, unscreened, transitory, poorly supervised, poorly
    regulated and low paid.
        Unfortunately, some would like to apply a cooky cutter approach of
    federalizing airport security to federalizing nuclear plant security.
    federalizing nuclear plant security is not only not needed, it may make
    nuclear power plant security worse.
        Federalizing nuclear power plant security could diminish and
    disrupt plant security. Effective plant security requires close
    coordination between plant operators and security forces. Creating a
    separate Federal security chain of command could inhibit reaction,
    coordination and communication when it is needed most, in the face of
    an attack.
        Federalizing nuclear plant security would require the NRC to hire
    5,000 additional security employees. Many current security forces would
    choose not to become Federal employees leading to security force
    shortages. New security personnel would require years of on-the-job
    training to match the professionalism of current forces.
        Federalizing nuclear plant security could also reduce the quality
    of security forces. Screening requirements for Federal personnel in
    proposed legislation are less stringent than those already in place in
    the industry.
        We do have the opportunity to improve security at nuclear power
    plants. We can consider proposals which empower security forces such as
    reducing weapons restrictions or providing limited arrest authority. We
    can also closely oversee NRC's review of nuclear plant security
    measures post the September 11th attacks.
        The nuclear power industry has an unparalleled record of health and
    safety. They also meet unparalleled security requirements and must
    continue to do so. I look forward to working with my colleagues on any
    measure that will improve their ability to improve the health and
    safety of our communities. Thank you.

        Senator Jeffords. Senator Corzine.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JON S. CORZINE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
                          STATE OF NEW JERSEY

        Senator Corzine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much
    appreciate your having this hearing and so do the people of New
    Jersey. We have 4 of the 104 nuclear power plants and we're
    very close to one in our neighbor in New Jersey which has major
    impact if there were an attack or actually, if there were
    safety problems. If anything September 11 taught us it was that
    we need to be prepared. As you suggested in your opening
    remarks and others have noted broadly, there is evidence of
    interest by the terrorists in nuclear power plants.
        So I commend your leadership on leading this discussion.
    Senator Reid, Senator Inhofe and certainly Congressman Markey
    for the leadership in trying to protect our people in a way
    that is sensible but thorough, one that gives us confidence as
    we go forward. The concern is real, as I think some of the
    testimony and the data would show, unsatisfactory results with
    a number of the mock attacks, personnel record problems and
    other issues that have occurred in some instances, not
    uniformly, but I think there is time, it is time for revision
    of our processes here.
        I don't think you have to be anti-nuclear power to believe
    that we ought to do everything that is necessary, belt and
    suspenders, to provide the kind of security I think the
    American public, I know the people in my State, are looking for
    and the rules are dated and need revision and I think that's
    what this hearing is about. So I think it's a positive and
    necessary step to make sure that the public is secure.
        I would be remiss, Mr. Chairman, if I didn't at this same
    point, there are 104 of these nuclear power plants that
    certainly are a concern to our Nation. There are 123 chemical
    facilities where worst case release of toxic chemicals could
    threaten more than 1 million people. I know that this issue
    doesn't get as much headline attention, but I continue to be
    very concerned, particularly in my home State, that this
    problem, while not so headline oriented, is just as much of a
    risk to our communities and the people who live there.
        So I hope that we may be able to have similar attention,
    frankly I think that we're organized much more securely, the
    discipline associated with the NRC and our State and local
    communities with regard to that protection is quite
    substantial. I think what we're doing in chemical plant
    security in this country is one that we will feel that we have
    not taken the proper steps if disaster were to strike. So I
    hope that we can have a similar hearing with a similar element
    of focus as we go forward here.
        So I thank you and commend you for holding this hearing.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you, Senator. It's an excellent
    suggestion.
        Senator Inhofe.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,
                U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me first clear this record, because I heard the dialog
    between you and Senator Smith. Let me assure you, Mr. Chairman,
    we have not had a closed, secure hearing. We haven't had one.
    We had a members briefing, but that was held in the Johnson
    room. You weren't the only one there, because I was there too.
    So I think it's very important that we realize we have not had
    one. This should have been one, but it wasn't one.
        Now, Senator Smith's statement has dramatically shortened
    mine, because most of the things he was referring to and saying
    I would have. I don't have a nuclear plant in my State of
    Oklahoma. But I am very much concerned, 20 percent of our
    reliability is on nuclear energy, I like Senator Bond believe
    it should be more than that. After having gone through all of
    our ambient air hearings and the pollution problems that we
    have, this is one of the answers, it's cheap and clean energy.
        Last Congress, I tried very hard to pass legislation which
    would have increased the ability of the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission to protect nuclear power plants. Unfortunately,
    although we did get it passed through the Senate, in fact, it
    passed by unanimous consent, it did not become law. The NRC has
    again come forward, asking for it, the legislation that I had.
    I have reintroduced it in this Congress. I hope that we would
    pass my legislation this year.
        In short, my legislation does three things. It prescribes
    guidelines for carrying firearms and the authority to make
    arrests by nuclear power plant security professionals. Second,
    it authorizes the NRC to issue trespass regulations relating to
    the introduction of dangerous weapons, explosives and other
    dangerous instruments or materials likely to produce
    substantial personal injury or damage. That currently is not a
    Federal crime. Third, it revises the crime of sabotage of
    Federal nuclear facilities so as to cover any production,
    utilization, waste storage treatment, disposal, uranium
    enrichment or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities.
        I am keeping an open mind today and I want very much to
    hear the current state of security. I think that Congress
    understands the emotions surrounding the security of nuclear
    power plants. However, in order to make this hearing most
    productive, I really would like to focus on the facts and with
    those facts, I want to work with the majority whip and others
    on this committee to draft legislation which would address any
    deficiencies in nuclear power plant security.
        No matter what we end up doing, I want to make sure that
    Congress works with and not against the current efforts that
    are being taken by the NRC and the Office of Homeland Security.
    Finally, I repeat, I think we should have held a closed hearing
    today. There is a problem with holding a public hearing on any
    possible security deficiencies at nuclear power plants, namely,
    terrorists can get hold of the very information which we are
    using to protect the public in order to harm the public.
        In that regard, I, along with others in this committee,
    expressed our concerns in a letter to the chairman. I was
    shocked that even before the hearing started, some statements
    containing information which if correct is safeguards
    information, which if incorrect is false information used to
    start fear in the public. This committee should not be
    providing a forum for releasing safeguards information. So I
    would urge our witnesses today to carefully craft their
    remarks, so as to be responsive to our questions but not
    helpful to terrorists.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Jeffords. Senator Clinton.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, U.S. SENATOR
                       FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and
    Senator Smith for holding this important hearing. Certainly, I
    agree with the statements of both Senators Smith and Inhofe
    that as we try to educate ourselves and more importantly,
    educate the public, we do so with full awareness of the
    sensitivity of some of this information.
        I am also very pleased that Congressman Markey is here. I
    hope to have a chance to hear from him in just a few minutes. I
    also want to thank Dr. Irwin Redlener, the president of the
    Children's Hospital at Montefiore in the Bronx and president of
    the Children's Health Fund for being with us today.
        Both Dr. Redlener and I live in Westchester County. It's
    one of the most beautiful places in the country, and it is also
    a place where we have nuclear power plants. So unlike some on
    the committee, I live about 15 or 20 minutes from one of our
    104 nuclear power plants. This is the principal subject that
    the people I live near in my town and in neighboring
    communities talk to me about, every time, whether I'm going to
    the store, stopping to get a cup of coffee or just taking a
    walk in the neighborhood.
        I think it's understandable. Because the unthinkable did
    happen on September 11. Therefore, it is incumbent on us, as
    unfortunate an exercise as it may be, to think like our
    adversaries, to imagine the unimaginable and to work together
    with the appropriate officials in our Government to be as sure
    as one can be in such human endeavors that we have thought
    every unthinkable thought, we have taken every possible
    preventive measure. Because there is no guarantee in life of
    anything. But unless we've done all that we believe we should
    do to protect ourselves, then I think we are going to be found
    not to have fulfilled our responsibility.
        Certainly in my specific situation, we have more people,
    about 20 million in the Catchman area for Indian Point. It is
    in the most populated area of any nuclear power plant in our
    country. We have other nuclear power plants in much less
    populated areas. I visited the nuclear power plants at Indian
    Point and in Oswego. Certainly Oswego, which is in a much less
    populated area, doesn't pose the high level of public concern
    or frankly, as inviting a target as Indian Point does. Nowhere
    in our country do we have the same concentration of population.
    Clearly those who sought to inflict the most public, high
    visibility damage on our Nation chose our most populated city.
        It's a terrible thing to contemplate, but I think we have
    to. I don't see any alternative. Instead of being paralyzed by
    fear or being divided on different points of view or ideology,
    we all have to work together. I think that's what this
    committee is attempting to do. We have to close whatever
    loopholes exist, legislatively or regulatorily, we have to
    strengthen any weak links that we find, and we have to be
    unafraid to ask the hard questions. This is not pointing
    fingers or placing blame on anyone. We didn't have to think
    like this before September 11. Now we have to. Therefore, it is
    imperative that we know what steps have been taken, are being
    taken to protect our nuclear power plants.
        According to news reports, not in a classified briefing,
    but on the front pages of newspapers around America just last
    month, the NRC again put the Nation's nuclear power plants on a
    heightened state of alert because of information gained by our
    intelligence community. Well, you can imagine what that does to
    mothers and fathers in Westchester County and throughout
    America who have particular concerns because of their proximity
    to our nuclear power plants. Now, since 9/11, the Federal
    Government, State and local governments, and nuclear power
    plant operators and owners have taken actions, and I applaud
    those actions, to improve security. But we have the
    responsibility to ask, has enough been done. This is what we
    are going to try to find out in part today.
        The NRC has previously told this committee that it has the
    statutory tools necessary to assure that any security
    deficiencies are corrected in a timely fashion. Yet at the same
    time, I know that the NRC is strongly supporting S. 1586, which
    I think has a lot of very good provisions in it.
        As we sit here today, we know that the NRC still has not
    yet revised its rules regarding what kinds of threats nuclear
    plants must protect themselves against. The NRC has not
    completed vulnerability assessments on individual plants.
    Moreover, it is my understanding that the NRC still has not
    determined, or at least has not told us, either in a classified
    briefing or in public, what the real threat posed by modern,
    fully loaded airliners cause to a reactor containment vessel.
    Now, that decision, of course, could drive a series of other
    decisions about how to best safeguard these plants, such as
    whether and when to impose no-fly zones, whether and when to
    have Naval or Coast Guard support.
        Now, we know that the NRC is working on these issues, and I
    do appreciate everything that the Commission has been doing.
    But I think it's important that we hear from other well
    informed voices as we will at this hearing, in public, people
    who have experience in the nuclear industry, who have expertise
    with nuclear energy, so that we can make a judgment about
    whether or not those tools in that tool box for security at our
    nuclear power plants are sufficient.
        That's why I did join with Senators Reid, Jeffords and
    Lieberman in introducing legislation to start a dialog, to
    begin a discussion. I think that part of what we should be
    working on in this committee is how we determine what of the
    many additional steps that could be taken would appropriately
    be taken by national legislation.
        We need to guarantee seamless security and we need to do it
    as quickly as possible. Any legislation should ensure that new,
    higher standards are met through revisions to the design basis
    threat. We have to be more realistic about this. You can't give
    notice ahead of time to the guards at these plants so they can
    put on their flak jackets, get their weapons out of the lockers
    in which they're kept, to look as though they're ready to take
    on whatever possible attack may occur. This has to be a much
    more well thought out and constant assessment of the security
    at each and every one of our facilities. Exercises have to be
    conducted regularly.
        I believe, as someone who certainly lives within a rather
    immediate proximity to a plant, that we've got to have more
    realistic evacuation plans. If you come up to Indian Point,
    which is in a beautiful part of Westchester County, you'll be
    on two lane roads for most of that trip. You're living in a
    highly populated area. The idea that you could evacuate people,
    the idea that people that are supposed to lead the evacuation
    would even be able to get where they're needed strikes most of
    us as quite implausible.
        Now, we are stockpiling potassium iodide in New York. The
    bill that I've worked on with Senator Reid and others requires
    that stockpiling be required and that the pills be released to
    the public on a regular basis.
        Finally, I also think, because the NRC does have
    jurisdiction, that in addition to exploring the security of
    power plants, we have to raise the issue of so-called dirty
    bombs. We have to know more and protect more against the use of
    radiological dispersal devices. That has to be on the agenda as
    well as our concern about nuclear power plants, since the
    sources of such material are obviously accessible, easily so,
    in many parts of every community in our country.
        So Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, and
    I look forward to working with you and all of our colleagues to
    come up with answers to some of these questions.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
        Senator Voinovich.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH,
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

        Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I agree that the topic of today's hearing is very
    important, so important that I believe our time could be best
    spent in a closed hearing in which the members of our committee
    can discuss the security issues openly with the witnesses
    without fear of revealing information that could put those who
    work in the facilities and the public at risk. I agree with the
    sentiments expressed by Senator Smith and Senator Inhofe.
        Considering the importance of this topic, we need to hear
    all relevant information with regard to security, including
    future needs if we're to pass legislation that will enhance the
    security of our nuclear energy infrastructure. I believe it's
    impossible to get all the information we need to determine if
    legislation is needed through public hearings.
        Last August, I visited Davis Besse nuclear facility in Oak
    Harbor, OH for the purpose of reviewing the operation of the
    plant. I was extremely impressed with the security measures in
    place to gain entrance and access to that facility.
        Just this last April, I had the opportunity to spend a half
    day at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant in Perry, OH, which by the
    way is a 25 minute drive from my home, to specifically review
    their security systems. I wanted to see first-hand just what
    was happening at that facility. In fact, the entire visit was
    dedicated to security.
        I received a classified security briefing at the facility,
    which I highly recommend to all of my colleagues. In addition,
    I participated in personnel and vehicle searches, and I
    reviewed the external security systems, including meeting with
    the Coast Guard which patrols Lake Erie off the coast of the
    Perry facility.
        My tour of the security operations confirmed for me that
    every security measure is being taken to protect our energy
    supply from terrorist attack and the members of the surrounding
    community and they should be very comfortable with the level of
    security that protects them and the facility. If I were a
    terrorist, the last place I would try to take over and attack
    would be a nuclear power plant. I know that security reviews
    are currently being conducted at nuclear facilities across the
    country, but I hope they are all as secure as our Ohio
    facilities. I think it's important that we don't throw the baby
    out with the bath water trying to change things legislatively.
        In my opinion, the private sector is getting the job done.
    We do not have to federalize security, understanding that any
    system can be improved, and that's the responsibility of the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and there may be other things
    that are being suggested by members of this committee that will
    enhance those security operations in our facilities because of
    things that have happened because of 9/11.
        Recently, I visited the EU headquarters at the Hague in
    Brussels. I was told and warned that the security there was the
    best in the world. I tell you, I was impressed with the
    security required to gain entrance to that facility. But it
    didn't compare, it didn't compare with the security at Perry
    and Davis Nuclear. Because this is an opening hearing, and
    though I think it would be helpful, I can't go into the detail
    about how they determine who gets in, where they go, and how
    they can get access. It's incredible.
        I also visited the Lima Tank Plant in Ohio where they make
    the M1A1 Abrams tank, and now that's another place that the
    Federal Government is securing. I met with people from the
    Defense Department that are involved in security. I reviewed
    what they were doing there. I said to them, if you really want
    to secure this place, get in a car and go up to Perry Nuclear
    and you'll find out how to really secure a facility. That's the
    way I felt about that, compared to what I saw at this Federal
    facility that's something that we should be very concerned
    about.
        Before we move forward with any new requirements, I think
    it's imperative that the members of this committee spend some
    time carefully reviewing the existing security controls at our
    Nation's nuclear facilities. I believe that preparation for
    each and every committee member should be to include some
    closed hearings, or at least one, and classified briefings as
    well as site visits to the facilities in order to see the
    security measures in practice. Get out there and get into these
    places and see what they're doing.
        I look forward to working with my colleagues on this
    important issue and to the testimony from today's witnesses.
    Mr. Chairman, I really hope that the legislation that has been
    introduced in this hearing is really aimed at determining the
    security at our facilities, and not an effort by those who are
    opposed to nuclear power to discredit nuclear power's
    contribution to our Nation's energy needs. Nuclear power plays
    a vital role in maintaining our energy independence and
    providing a clean energy source.
        I look forward to the witnesses' testimony. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you, Senator.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]

              Statement of Hon. George V. Voinovich, U.S. Senator
                             from the State of Ohio

        Mr. Chairman, I agree that the topic of today's hearing, Nuclear
    Security, is very important. So important, that I believe our time
    could best be spent in a ``Closed Hearing'' in which the Members of our
    Committee can discuss the security issues openly with the witnesses
    without the fear of revealing too much information that could put those
    who work in the facilities and the public at risk.
        Considering the importance of this topic, we need to hear all
    relevant information with regard to security, including future needs,
    if we are to pass legislation that will enhance the security of our
    nuclear energy infrastructure.
        I believe it is impossible to get all of the information we need to
    determine if legislation is needed through public hearings.
        Last August I visited the Davis Bessie Nuclear facility in Oak
    Harbor, Ohio, for the purpose of reviewing the operation of the plant.
    I was extremely impressed with the security measures in place to gain
    entrance and access to the facility.
        And just this last April, I had the opportunity to spend a half day
    at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant in Perry, Ohio to specifically review
    their security systems. In fact, the entire visit was dedicated to
    security.
        I received a classified security briefing at the facility, which I
    highly recommend to all of my colleagues. In addition, I participated
    in personnel and vehicle searches and I reviewed the external security
    systems, including meeting with the Coast Guard which patrols Lake Erie
    off the coast of the Perry facility.
        My tour of the security operations confirmed for me that every
    security measure is being taken to protect our energy supply from
    terrorist attack and the members of the surrounding community should be
    very comfortable with the level of security that protects them and the
    facility.
        If I were a terrorist the last place I would try and take over or
    attack would be a nuclear power plant, if all of our facilities are as
    secure as Perry and Davis Bessie. I know that security reviews are
    currently being conducted at nuclear facilities across the country, and
    I hope they all are as secure as our Ohio facilities. But I think it is
    important that we don't throw the baby out with the bath water by
    trying to legislatively change the security procedures.
        Recently, I visited the EU Headquarters at the Hague in Brussels. I
    was impressed with the security required to gain entrance to the
    facility, but it didn't compare to the security at Perry and Davis
    Bessie nuclear plants. Because this is an open hearing and though I
    think it would be helpful, I can not go into detail about how they
    determine who gets in, where they can go, and what they can access, but
    it is incredible.
        I also visited the Lima Tank Plant in Lima, Ohio, where they make
    the M1A1 Abrams Tanks. I suggested to the Defense personnel that if
    they really want to see an excellent security system they should get in
    their cars and go visit the Perry Nuclear Facility.
        Before we move forward with any new requirements, I think it is
    imperative that the Members of this Committee spend time carefully
    reviewing the existing security controls at our nation's nuclear
    facilities. I believe the preparation for each and every Committee
    Member should include some closed hearings and classified briefings as
    well as site visits to the facilities in order to see the security
    measures in practice.
        I look forward to working with my colleagues on this important
    issue and to the testimony from today's witnesses. Mr Chairman, I
    really hope that the legislation that's been introduced and this
    hearing is really aimed at determining the security at our facilities
    and not an effort by those who are opposed to nuclear power to
    discredit nuclear's contribution to our nation's energy needs. Nuclear
    power plays a vital role in maintaining our energy independence and
    providing a clean energy source, and it is critical as we try to
    harmonize our energy and environmental policies. Thank you Mr.
    Chairman.

        Senator Jeffords. Senator Boxer.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
               U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

        Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I first want to address the point that this is not a
    hearing about the future of nuclear power. Of course it isn't.
    That decision is made by the marketplace and the people who
    live near the plants, and there hasn't been a new plant in 20
    years, and maybe there will be a change on that. People will
    decide that in a democracy like ours. That's good.
        For myself, I have no bias, except to say when the private
    insurers are ready to insure these plants, that will give me
    much more confidence. Right now it's the taxpayers that have to
    pick up the tab. So I think those are important points.
        I also want to address the issue of closed hearings versus
    open hearings. I just must say that the comments that have been
    reiterated by a few of my friends on the other side I find to
    be disrespectful of our chairman. That's my own personal view.
    That saddens me, because this is a man who really understands
    what belongs in a closed hearing. He had one, and all my
    colleagues who said they want one never went. He knows what
    belongs in an open hearing.
        I would remind everyone that there were lots of closed
    briefings before 9/11, and we had a disaster. So in and of
    itself, what's important is what we discuss. I want to send a
    signal to the would-be terrorists in this country and cells
    around this country and wherever they are that we are doing
    everything we can to stop them. I think Senator Voinovich is
    right, there are some plants that are moving way ahead on this.
        But there may be some problems. The reason I think an open
    hearing, Mr. Chairman, is so important--I commend you for your
    leadership and I commend Congressman Markey for his on the
    House side--is that we need to speak with one voice to those
    that would harm our people and say, we're onto you, we're onto
    you because the President of the United States, as you said,
    Mr. Chairman, in his State of the Union address told us that
    nuclear power plants were a target. This isn't some secret. The
    President announced it.
        We are here today with some of our colleagues who have
    drawn up some good legislation here to say, ``You know, take it
    somewhere else. Take it somewhere else.'' I would say for me in
    California, where we have four power plants, that this is a
    very important issue. Now, the NRC views this as such a serious
    problem, perhaps more serious than some of my colleagues, that
    they've offered free potassium iodide pills. I have urged that
    those be distributed to the people in my State. I have urged
    that the National Guard be deployed to nuclear power plants,
    just to make sure that it's safe.
        So Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the rest of my statement
    be placed in the record. I want to commend you, and I feel that
    your statement, I read it, is so balanced and so fair. You
    praise the NRC for steps they've taken. But frankly, I've been
    around here a long time, both on the House and Senate side. I
    know it's hard to bring action to a bureaucracy. It's just the
    way it is. It's even hard to bring it to a big business. So
    when we put pressure on, that's a good thing. I think this
    hearing is a good thing, and I thank you very much.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
        Senator Warner.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. WARNER,
             U.S. SENATOR FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I shall be very brief. I just
    call upon my own experience, having served on the Armed
    Services Committee for 24 years, part of which I was privileged
    to be chairman. We handled matters such as this on a regular
    basis with open and closed hearings, most often at an open
    hearing followed immediately thereafter with a closed. I would
    hope such procedures would be viewed again by the chair and
    ranking member of this committee as the appropriate way for us
    to proceed.
        I'll not further discuss this matter, because I'm anxious
    to hear from our witnesses.
        Senator Jeffords. Well, thank you very much, Senator. I
    just would alert you that arrangements have been made, minority
    staff is aware of it, too, that we intend to have members to be
    able to meet in a confidential situation to discuss matters.
        Senator Warner. Would you not have that in a formal hearing
    status? Is there some reason not to do it that way?
        Senator Jeffords. Well, it's a matter of convenience of
    members, trying to make sure that they can be there. As I said,
    the last time we had one, no one showed up except me and
    Senator Inhofe. So whatever the minority wants to work out, we
    will accommodate you.
        Senator Warner. I would hope that would be done.
        Senator Jeffords. Sure. We will just work together, and
    whatever Senator Smith----
        Senator Warner. We have gained a different perspective of
    the seriousness of the problem, as our colleague from
    California has pointed out, in the period between that briefing
    and today.
        Senator Jeffords. My only goal is to make sure every member
    has every opportunity to place themselves in a position where
    they can do their job.
        Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me 30
    seconds to respond to Senator Boxer who made a comment about my
    feelings toward you? I just want to say that, I think Senator
    Boxer knows me well enough to know that I don't deal in
    personal attacks on other members. This is a disagreement. But
    the chairman has every right to make the decision he made. I
    disagree with it, and others have. It's not a personal attack,
    and I regret that you made that charge here. But I will rebut
    it.
        Let me also say that there has never been a classified
    hearing, a hearing. There is a difference between a hearing and
    a briefing. There has never been a classified hearing. There
    was a briefing in October. A lot has happened since October. So
    let's just make sure that we're dealing with the facts here.
        Senator Jeffords. Sir, we've never had a request from you
    for the hearing. So I will take that as a request.
        Senator Smith. We requested a classified hearing today. We
    requested----
        Senator Jeffords. OK, today, fine. I appreciate hearing
    that, and I can assure you the arrangements will be made.
        Congressman Markey, I am pleased to have you here. I know
    that you have been holding hearings, some closed hearings. I
    commend you for that. You have been a leader in this area, and
    I appreciate having you here. If you have an opening statement,
    please present it.

        STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
            CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

        Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I
    appreciate the opportunity to be able to testify before you.
        I think at this stage we've already invoked the old Mo
    Udall axiom that everything has been said but not everyone has
    said it. So I begin with that as the premise for my testimony.
    I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and you, Senator Smith, for the
    invitation to testify here today.
        I have introduced on the House side the same legislation
    that Senator Reid and yourself and Senator Clinton, Senator
    Lieberman, Senator Boxer and Senator Corzine have introduced on
    this side, dealing with security at our domestic, civilian
    nuclear power plants. Senator Boxer just dealt with the
    question of whether or not a discussion of this subject in some
    way or another deals with the future of nuclear power.
        For the record, there has not been a new nuclear power
    plant ordered successfully in the United States since 1974, 28
    years ago. The reason that that is the case, as Senator Boxer
    pointed out, is that Adam Smith, in his posthumous wisdom, has
    decided that nuclear power plants cannot gain investment from
    Wall Street Republican investment bankers. Instead, what they
    have decided is to put 95 percent of their money into natural
    gas generated electrical generating facilities. That is not a
    discussion that has anything to do with the question of what is
    the level of security around the 104 existing operating nuclear
    power plants.
        Similarly, you have the question of the decommissioned
    plants, that is those plants that have already retired and what
    kind of security should be around those plants, pretty much in
    perpetuity. So these are not questions that we seek to put out
    in the public in the way that Al Qaeda could gain new
    information, because neither the chairman of the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission nor any of the witnesses are going to
    betray any classified information.
        But in the same way that the CIA and the FBI and their
    procedures before September 11 must be examined, the public
    demands that, so too must the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
    its procedures be examined, so that the public knows that the
    changes are going to be put in place. I think they understand
    and want some of that information to be classified.
    Nonetheless, the discussions have to be conducted in a way that
    ensures that security is enhanced.
        Going back to 1991, I began writing to the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission about the potential of truck bomb attacks
    at civilian nuclear power plants. At the time, I was told not
    to be concerned about the issue. Only after Oklahoma City did
    the Commission begin the process of upgrading.
        However, even that upgrade does not deal with the level of
    threat which is obvious in the aftermath of September 11. So
    let me go down, if I could, a number of the issues which I
    think we have to deal with. The reason, and Senator Clinton
    focused upon this, the reason that we have to do so is that
    we've learned from the caves of Afghanistan, on the computers
    which have been confiscated, in addition to the interviews
    which have been conducted with captured Al Qaeda members, that
    nuclear power plants, civilian nuclear power plants, are at the
    very top of the list of targets that Al Qaeda would attack if
    they could successfully do so. That's why we're here. Those are
    the statements of Al Qaeda. So the 280 million Americans who
    see these headlines have a right to know that changes have been
    made.
        So what are the issues? Well, we begin with something
    called the design basis threat. That is, what is the level of
    protection which is built into the design of a nuclear power
    plant in terms of its security? Now, the bill which has been
    introduced by Senate and House Members calls for the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission to begin a new rulemaking, a brand new
    rulemaking, to reexamine the design basis threat. That is, what
    kinds of threats could be posed against a nuclear power plant.
        Up until September 11, power plants were only protected
    against several terrorists who would arrive in an SUV, who
    would be relatively lightly armed, and who would be non-
    suicidal. Now, that's all public. Since September 11, it's
    quite clear that they could arrive in numbers of 19 or more, be
    coordinated in their attack, have advanced degrees, from
    European or American universities, be suicidal, arrive with a
    tractor-trailer and have more insider help than perhaps we had
    thought previous to September 11.
        So what the bill says is, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    should go into a new rulemaking, a formal rulemaking to deal
    with all of those issues. Nine months after September 11, the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission still has not gone into that
    formal rulemaking.
        Now, we believe that the very fact that on a formal basis,
    a Federal Agency dealing with the security of our country is
    forced to reexamine all these questions is a good thing and
    something which the American public wants. The Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission has not done that. We do not believe that
    that is an unreasonable request of a Federal Agency dealing
    with such a sensitive question.
        Second, the question dealing with the level of security
    that actually is at any one of these power plants, what is the
    mechanism by which we test its efficiency? Well, it's something
    called an operational safeguards response evaluation, that is,
    these are mock tests, force on force tests which are given by
    the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to determine whether or not
    any civilian power plant can withstand a test.
        Now, before September 11, at that relatively low level of
    challenge that would come from a terrorist group, that is now
    we realize historically kind of an elementary school level
    security exam, they were flunking at nearly a 50 percent rate
    nationally, nuclear power plants, before September 11. Now, we
    know that post-September 11, that nuclear power plants have to
    be protected against college level security exams. So what the
    bill does is call upon the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
    upgrade, again, the testing, the force on force testing against
    these nuclear power plants, to conduct it not just every 8
    years against each individual plant, but every 2 years, so that
    there is an ongoing evaluation of the security around these
    plants.
        Third, we call for the federalization of the force around
    these plants, not an unreasonable thing. At airports across the
    country, the public, I think, feels a lot better that the
    Federal Government is now going to provide the security at
    facilities which we know Al Qaeda has targeted, airports, as
    they have nuclear power plants.
        Unfortunately, right now at civilian nuclear power plants,
    some of the guards are paid less than janitors, they are not
    equally trained, they are not equally equipped, they don't get
    the same whistleblower protections that Federal employees
    would, and as a result, it's not unreasonable to assume that
    the level of security is not as high as it would be if we had
    full time Federal employees who had that responsibility. So the
    Nuclear Security Act, which we've introduced, calls for a
    federalization of the guard forces at nuclear power plants.
        Let's deal with the issue of National Guard. What should be
    the role of National Guard at these facilities? In some States,
    National Guard are deployed. In some States, National Guard are
    not deployed. In some States, National Guard have weapons with
    bullets already in them, in some they don't. In some States,
    they are authorized to shoot to kill, in other States they are
    not.
        Is it unreasonable for the American people to ask that we
    have a uniform policy across the country that everyone can
    understand is present at their nuclear power plant? I do not
    believe that that is an unreasonable request. With regard to
    the decommissioned reactors, that is, when a nuclear reactor
    has completed its life, the reactor still remains there, as
    does all of the spent fuel in the facilities that will be
    stored there until at some point in the long distant future
    there is a place somewhere in America that we could move all of
    that spent fuel. But while we wait for that date to finally
    arrive, we need some security around it.
        So what happens at the decommissioned plants? Well, among
    other things, sometimes they are stored in areas that do not
    have, clearly, the same security that that domed, reinforced
    facility does around the reactor as it operates. The casks used
    to store the spent fuel are not tested to ensure that they can
    withstand long, hot fire such as that fed by a full tank of a
    commercial jet liner. There are fewer guards onsite at
    decommissioned reactors, and security isn't tested using force
    on force exercises. Let me say that again, security is not
    tested using force on force exercises.
        So there you could create, as Senator Clinton pointed out,
    the dirty bomb, using a large or small plane attacking those
    facilities. It's a good question to ask. We know that on
    September 11, the jets that were scrambled to protect the World
    Trade Center were in eastern Massachusetts. Was there enough
    time given for them to arrive over that distance in order to
    shoot down what was at that point known to be a hijacked
    airliner?
        So in other words, a lot of people think that the plane
    would just be hijacked at an airport that was only 2 or 3
    minutes away from the nuclear power plant. What if the plane
    was hijacked 30 minutes away, and now it's clear that there is
    enough time to shoot it down, to have planes be scrambled or to
    have anti-aircraft weapons on the ground? Is it unreasonable to
    ask that there be some national policy which is established
    which has to be put in place on a coordinated basis?
        I'll just mention two other issues. Senator Clinton
    mentioned one, which is the dirty bomb, which can be created
    from the lower level radioactive materials which are stolen or
    lost around the country. There have been 1,500 reports of those
    over the past 5 years, and 50 percent of the cases still remain
    unsolved.
        There's also a question of foreign nationals employed at
    nuclear reactors. We require a security check dealing with
    their criminal background, but there is no requirement that
    they pass any background check intended to identify terrorist
    links prior to their employment. So these kinds of issues all
    would be dealt with if the NRC was forced to go into a formal
    rulemaking, rather than temporary upgrades that are made on an
    ad hoc basis, but not on a permanent basis and not as part of a
    full formal national set of hearings that would have to have
    been conducted, and where necessary, on a classified basis.
        So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for the opportunity
    of testifying before you, and I'd be glad to answer any
    questions.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you. I understand that you also
    have a telecom hearing that's schedule this morning which you
    have to attend. So I will be--no questions.
        Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Jeffords. I would be happy to yield to Senator
    Smith.
        Senator Smith. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you. Any questions?
        Senator Carper. I don't have a question, I just want to say
    it's great to see my old friend, welcome. He and I used to
    travel through Central America during the contra wars, fighting
    on other battlefields at that time. It's always a pleasure to
    be with you and we appreciate your being here with us.
        Mr. Markey. It was disconcerting to us to arrive in El
    Salvador, the country we were supporting, and be put in a
    secured van with Uzi submachine guns to protect us against
    being killed, and then to arrive in Nicaragua and for
    Congressman Carper and I to go out on a 2-mile run and have the
    people be patting us on the back in the country that we were
    trying to overthrow.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Markey. It was a very disconcerting trip in 1983, to
    witness the asymmetry of our policies at that time.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you for your excellent help. We
    will work with you as we move forward to make sure that we're
    sort of on the same page.
        Mr. Markey. Thank you. I appreciate it.
        Senator Jeffords. The first witness and the only witness is
    the Honorable Richard A. Meserve, chairman of the U.S. Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission. Thank you for testifying for the
    committee, Mr. Chairman, and it's a pleasure to be with you
    again. I have enjoyed the working relationship that has
    evolved, and I commend you for your forthrightness in getting
    us the information that we have requested and needed.
        So you may please proceed.

            STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD A. MESERVE, CHAIRMAN,
                   U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

        Dr. Meserve. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and
    members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you
    this morning on behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission.
        My written testimony discusses the current status of
    actions that the NRC has taken in response to the terrorist
    attacks that occurred on September 11 and outlines some of the
    work that lies ahead. I believe that the NRC's response to the
    attacks has been appropriate and thoughtful and that the NRC's
    current programs continue to provide a very high level of
    security. Let me briefly summarize my written testimony.
        Before September 11, nuclear power plants were among the
    best defended and most hardened facilities of the Nation's
    critical infrastructure. In the aftermath of the attacks,
    security has been enhanced even further. On September 11, the
    NRC advised our licensees to go to the highest level of
    security, which they promptly did. Our licensees have remained
    at that level since that time.
        Moreover, we have maintained a steady flow of information
    to our licensees through over 30 updates to our original threat
    advisory. In light of the continuing threat condition, we have
    issued orders to our reactor licensees to establish the
    security requirements within an established regulatory
    framework. We have continued over the months to work with the
    intelligence and law enforcement community, the Office of
    Homeland Security and others to ensure that adequate protection
    is maintained at our civilian nuclear facilities.
        In short, we are comfortable with the security at our
    nuclear power plants. We are not aware of any significant,
    credible threat that is directed at the power plants, although
    there obviously are plants or facilities that are of concern.
    We had strong security at these facilities before September 11,
    and that security has been significantly enhanced since that
    time.
        Moreover, the NRC is open to change. We are in the process
    of revising our design basis threat. We are reexamining how we
    should reinvigorate the process of conducting exercises. We are
    examining the processes by which people are cleared into the
    facilities. All of this is part of the comprehensive review of
    security that is under way at the NRC.
        Many Members of Congress have asked the NRC how they can
    help to improve security at nuclear power plants and other
    facilities. In response, the Commission has requested that
    Congress enact several specific legislative proposals that
    would amend three sections of the Atomic Energy Act. Most of
    these provisions are contained in S. 1586, which was introduced
    by Senators Inhofe and Smith at the end of last October. I
    should note that all of our proposals have been coordinated
    with the executive branch and enjoy strong support from the
    Administration.
        One of the proposals would provide Federal authorization
    for guards to carry and use firearms at NRC regulated
    facilities designated by the Commission, and to protect
    property of significance to the common defense and security
    located at or being transported to or from such facilities.
    This amendment could provide some protection for licensee
    guards from State criminal prosecution for actions taken during
    the performance of their official duties.
        At the present time, State laws govern the use of weapons
    by guards at NRC licensed facilities. Some State laws do not
    permit guards to use weapons, except to protect against an
    immediate threat to their own lives or the lives of others. In
    such States, it may not be possible to shield the guards at NRC
    licensed facilities from State prosecution.
        In addition, some State laws make it difficult for
    licensees where there are security contractors to use more
    effective weaponry. To alleviate this problem, the Commission
    has developed an additional provision not included in S. 1586,
    that would authorize the guards to carry and use such weapons
    as the Commission may require. A copy of the original proposal
    with additional language to address this concern is attached to
    my written testimony.
        Another provision would make it a Federal crime to bring
    unauthorized weapons and explosives into NRC licensed
    facilities. Although the NRC may impose sanctions against
    licensees for violations of its security regulations, there is
    no Federal law permitting the imposition of criminal sanctions
    against the person responsible for bringing the weapon or other
    dangerous instrument to the site.
        Our final proposal would make Federal prohibitions on
    sabotage applicable to the operation and construction of
    certain NRC licensed and certified facilities. We believe that
    these legislative changes that I have described will contribute
    to enhancing the security of nuclear facilities and material.
        The Commission opposes S. 1746, which would federalize the
    security forces at commercial nuclear facilities. We see
    several fundamental difficulties with this legislation. First,
    the bill separates the strategy for the security of nuclear
    facilities from that of all other types of sensitive
    facilities, such as chemical plants, refineries and dams. We
    believe society's defensive resources should be allocated in
    accordance with relative risk, and that the separation of
    nuclear facilities from all other types of sensitive facilities
    will fragment the overall consideration of risk
    inappropriately.
        Second, the requirement that the NRC establish a security
    force for sensitive nuclear facilities addresses, in our view,
    a non-existent problem. The private guard forces that exist
    today are qualified, trained and tightly regulated. Unlike the
    situation at airports, there is no need to federalize security.
        Third, the bill would bring about a fundamental shift in
    the responsibility and mission of the NRC, and could have the
    unintended consequence of detracting from the Commission's
    focus on protecting the public health and safety.
        Fourth, NRC's role as an independent regulator would be
    compromised by the bill's requirement that the NRC design
    security plans for all sensitive nuclear facilities, to
    implement the plans with NRC employees but then also to conduct
    evaluations of the efficacy of the plans.
        Fifth, the bill would create command and control
    difficulties because it would establish two classes of
    employees, both of which would be responsible for safety in the
    event of a terrorist attack licensee personnel responsible to
    the licensee for safe operations and Federal employees
    responsible to the NRC for security. In an emergency, these
    separate lines of authority could lead to a diminution in the
    capacity to ensure safety.
        These fundamental difficulties in S. 1746 argue against its
    adoption. But there are also many other concerns raised by the
    bill which are detailed in my written testimony.
        In closing, we look forward to working with the Congress,
    both on the enactment of the NRC legislative proposals I have
    discussed, and on continuing to ensure adequate protection of
    the public health and safety. I appreciate being here today to
    discuss the NRC's programs and am prepared to answer your
    questions. Thank you.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you for your excellent statement.
    As I have stated, I commend you and the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission for the comprehensive top to bottom review of
    security measures which you are undertaking. I know this is a
    complex process, and one that must be carefully considered.
        However, we also must be diligent in quickly putting into
    place appropriate measures to both provide protection and to
    give the public the confidence that we are doing so. I have
    been told that the other agencies have set specific timeframes
    for completing their Agency reviews, such as the National
    Nuclear Security Agency within the Department of Energy, which
    has committed its fiscal year 2003 budget request to establish
    a new design basis threat for the security of the Nation's
    nuclear weapons facilities by September of this year.
        Do you have a date certain for completion of your design
    basis threat and other security revisions?
        Dr. Meserve. We don't have a date certain by which to
    complete some of these tasks, although these are very much
    activities that are fully engaging the Commission. Let me say
    that we have established what we call interim compensatory
    measures at our facilities, which are significant enhancements
    on the requirements that the licensees must meet in order to
    ensure security. That gives us the comfort that we are in an
    appropriate position to deal with the situation today.
        We're in a somewhat different situation than the Department
    of Energy in that it has the authority to make the changes
    without going through a regulatory process in doing so, and so
    DOE has a somewhat easier situation in bringing about changes
    in the security environment than the NRC.
        But nonetheless, we have serious security that is in place
    and we are examining where we should go in the long term in
    terms of regulatory changes.
        Senator Jeffords. Well, it's important that you communicate
    with us, if there's anything we can do to make sure that there
    are no roadblocks that are making it difficult for you to meet
    these time demands.
        Dr. Meserve. Thank you very much, sir.
        Senator Jeffords. We want to help in every way we can to
    make sure it can be done expeditiously.
        When do you anticipate completion of the evaluation and can
    this committee anticipate we will fully share in your findings?
        Dr. Meserve. I'm sorry, explore what, sir?
        Senator Jeffords. The actions that you are taking now.
        Dr. Meserve. Well, let me say, we are prepared at any time
    to share the actions that we are undertaking. Let me say that
    they range over a wide variety of areas, and we're not holding
    up steps in one area to await actions we might take in the
    other.
        As an example, Mr. Markey had raised the question about
    dealing with a possibility of foreign nationals who might be
    employed at nuclear power plants. We have worked with the
    Immigration and Naturalization Service to complete the
    screening of employees at nuclear plants to satisfy ourselves
    that there are appropriate people employed at the plants. We
    have revised the mechanisms for providing access, particularly
    temporary access to the facilities, to upgrade the security. So
    that's a step that we have taken. There are a multitude of
    different areas in which we have taken steps as the
    circumstances arise.
        I can't commit to you exactly when the whole package of
    steps will be completed. I see this as an ongoing effort that
    is going to consume the Commission. It may consume the Congress
    for an extended period.
        Senator Jeffords. I just want to make sure that we have a
    relationship where you can freely come to us if you are having
    anything that is holding you up for which we can assist you.
        Dr. Meserve. I very much appreciate that, sir. We would not
    hesitate to seek your assistance.
        Senator Jeffords. It is my understanding in the past you
    have conducted force on force training exercises against
    individual facilities no more often than once every 8 years. Do
    you intend to increase that, and what additional resources do
    you anticipate for that, if you do?
        Dr. Meserve. Well, let me say, I think that there has been
    some confusion about the way exercises were conducted before
    September 11. It is the case that on average, the operational
    safeguards response evaluations, the OSREs, which is the
    terminology we use for the actual force-on-force drills, were
    conducted on average once every 8 years.
        But that doesn't mean that the security at the plants
    wasn't subject to continuing scrutiny. We have resident
    inspectors that are at every site. There is evaluation that is
    undertaken at the sites as part of the ongoing inspection
    efforts to satisfy ourselves that the security requirements are
    being met.
        The force-on-force drills are very hard tests. There have
    been some assertions made that we found problems at some of the
    sites at which these tests were undertaken. That's the case.
    But it's what you'd expect, in that in conducting the tests,
    the attacking force knew the entirety of the defensive scheme,
    and in fact the tests were designed to probe those areas where,
    based on a full evaluation of the defensive scheme, our experts
    had some questions about the adequacy of the defensive
    strategy. So they probed exactly at the sensitivities.
        I think it's very doubtful that a real attacking force
    would have the level of knowledge to be able to design an
    attack in that way. Nonetheless, we are undertaking a
    reexamination of the entirety of the way in which we're doing
    exercises and there is a staff paper on the resumption process
    that is expected to the Commission later this week. We will be
    starting the tabletop process, I would anticipate, in the
    summer, then go to the full force on force exercises and resume
    them later this year. The Commission has not had the
    opportunity to examine the budgetary implications of increased
    frequency. But I think it is very likely that the frequency of
    the exercises will be significantly increased.
        Senator Jeffords. What is your budget request for fiscal
    year 2003 regarding additional security measures and how do you
    anticipate it will be used?
        Dr. Meserve. We received a supplement for fiscal year 2002
    of about $36 million. My recollection for fiscal year 2003 is
    that it was on the order of $29 million or $30 million for our
    security efforts. That would involve our continuing work on
    evaluation of vulner-
    abilities, enhancements of the communications capabilities and
    security, and our own capacity to deal with confidential
    information and things of that nature.
        I know you're accustomed to hearing about billions of
    dollars in the security area, and I think it's important to
    recognize that we are a regulatory Agency, and the substantial
    part of the costs associated for security are borne by the
    licensees and, of course, don't appear in our budget. Our
    licensees have spent many millions of dollars since September
    11 dealing with the requirements that we have imposed.
        Senator Jeffords. Well, thank you. We have some additional
    questions which we will submit to you for you and your staff to
    answer. I now turn to Senator Corzine.
        Senator Corzine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
    testimony.
        But I have some concerns about how your arguments flow with
    regard to S. 1746, particularly the federalization of security.
    Quite frankly, I have a hard time understanding how defensive
    resources that might be dedicated to preserving the safety of
    our nuclear power plants would undermine on a relative risk
    basis other activities in our society. It just strikes me that
    one has to assess the kinds of problems that could occur, you
    speak about Indian Point, with 20 million people in the
    immediate area.
        I don't understand the flow of that logic with respect to
    chemical plants or other kinds of issues. It's either a
    priority and a serious risk to the public, which I think the
    public believes it is, or it isn't. I don't think we're talking
    about relative risk here, we're talking about a risk of
    something that generally is accepted as something that could be
    extraordinarily dangerous, both by identification by our
    enemies and also by our Nation itself.
        Then I add to that your third argument that somehow or
    another the unintended consequence of detracting from the
    mission of protecting public health and safety, nothing would
    be more seriously detracting or contributing to public health
    and safety than a terrorist attack that tries to use our
    infrastructure as a weapon. I'm not sure where I come out on
    the federalization of security forces. But I don't see those
    arguments holding any weight whatsoever in the context of a
    major issue with regard to public health and safety.
        First of all, I'd like to hear your comments on that.
        Dr. Meserve. Well, you've flagged a few of the arguments
    that I presented. With regard to the comparative risk issue,
    I'm not suggesting that we should not take the risks of
    security at nuclear plants seriously. What I am suggesting is
    that we have a societal issue, in fact it's one that you raised
    in your opening statement, that we have other types of
    facilities at which there are security issues. You mentioned
    the chemical plants which could have consequences that are
    equally as severe as a nuclear plant if there were a successful
    attack.
        Somehow or another, we need to develop a strategy for how
    we defend critical infrastructure of all kinds. The argument is
    by focusing just on nuclear plants, we may greatly enhance the
    security in one area, but we may be missing other areas of
    vulnerability. We need to have some sort of a comprehensive
    strategy.
        That's not the NRC's responsibility. Our responsibility is
    for the nuclear plants. But I think as a society we have an
    issue of recognizing we have limited assets to be able to spend
    on security, and somehow we need to allocate those in some
    rational way. It's a policy issue which I think is ultimately
    one for the Congress.
        With regard to the third point on the deflection----
        Senator Corzine. You could agree with your presumption that
    there are other assets in this society that need security, and
    maybe are not even meeting the kinds of standards that we're
    now meeting with regard to our nuclear power plants, and still
    argue that federalization is a good thing because it would
    provide even enhanced security on those relative merits. I
    don't know why that would dismiss it as an initiative.
        Dr. Meserve. I think that's a fair comment. But I think it
    does lead you on the path, if you're federalizing security for
    nuclear plants, to look around the corner about the
    implications of that and whether you want to do that for the
    entirety of civilian infrastructure. It does set you in a
    certain mode of how you're going to deal with these problems,
    and it might be appropriate to think about how we deal with the
    integrated set of issues, rather than just one sub-part of the
    total problem that we confront.
        The third point which I raised was the possibility of the
    deflection of the NRC. This is just to recognize the reality
    that if we were to have responsibility for over 5,000 security
    guards and implementing security plans and ensuring their
    adequacy, and putting in the equipment that's necessary, we
    would have an activity that would involve more than twice the
    number we currently have. We would become an Agency that would
    have new and demanding responsibilities in the security that we
    have not held in the past. I wouldn't want to suggest that we
    wouldn't succeed, but one of the things we'd have to fight
    against is that we could not devote the time and attention to
    the ordinary safety issues that are the matters that we deal
    with on a day-to-day basis.
        Senator Corzine. It might come with some of the advantages
    that Congressman Markey talked about, though, whistleblower
    protection, greater consistency across the Nation, a number of
    other elements that I think are possible. Since the fundamental
    issue is protecting the public from the hazards, as you had
    talked about, radiological hazards, I'm not sure that that
    isn't a stronger argument for federalization, to make sure that
    we have a common approach to protecting security.
        Let me ask one other question about spent fuel issues,
    which are certainly a topic of the day. The idea that there
    aren't force-on-force tests with regard to commissioned plants,
    is that something that is one of the options that you are
    considering? Where are you with regard to that? Is that
    similarly, is there an intention to work on the dry cask
    storage of spent fuel which, whether it's decommissioned or
    it's not decommissioned, in the current world seems to be one
    of the few options that we have that's available and certainly,
    we've got a major controversy going on in the State of New
    Jersey about Oyster Creek's storage of spent fuel in dry casks
    next to one of our major thoroughfares being an issue. Would
    you give us some comment on both decommissioned plants and
    protection with regard to dry casks?
        Dr. Meserve. I'd be glad to. Let me just note before I turn
    to that, however, that things like whistleblower protections
    are provided now. If there's an allegation of a problem at a
    nuclear plant, we provide protection to those people. It's a
    very important channel for communication.
        Senator Corzine. I'll just give anecdotal information. I
    did, as Senator Voinovich, spent time touring one of the
    nuclear power plants and spent time with individual guards.
    They did not--it was the only weakness that I actually saw in
    this whole process--is that they did not feel that they were
    plugged into the structure of protection as securely as they
    might in other ways. So I'm concerned about that.
        Dr. Meserve. It is in fact the case that since September
    11, the concern about spent fuel and possible vulnerability of
    spent fuel has been something that has received a great deal of
    attention by the NRC. One of the consequences of that is that
    we have significantly upgraded the security that is provided
    for spent fuel, and that has been an ongoing process. There is
    significantly enhanced protection of spent fuel today as
    compared to before September 11.
        We have not worked out all the implications in terms of how
    that would affect future exercises, but I would anticipate that
    future exercises will encompass a variety of aspects of the
    nuclear industry that were not so much the focus before,
    including spent fuel.
        Senator Jeffords. Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Meserve.
        As I listened carefully to both your testimony and the
    answers to questions, there were two statements you made that
    caused me some concern. It's not a reflection on the NRC so
    much as it suggests some of the continuing challenge we face to
    preparing for whatever might happen.
        The first is your reference in your written testimony and
    in response to Senator Corzine that we have to make hard
    choices because we have limited resources for security. I think
    that's the wrong way to go about this issue. We ought to figure
    out what is it we need, not only to secure nuclear power plants
    but chemical plants and the rest of our critical infrastructure
    that might be vulnerable to any kind of attack or even
    accident. We ought to say to ourselves, OK, that is the cost of
    security in the 21st century.
        Now, I understand that there are budgetary constraints that
    are imposed, but I certainly don't believe we should be
    limiting ourselves before we even understand completely what
    our functional needs are and then put price tags on them.
    That's not an NRC issue, that's a larger congressional issue.
    But I believe it's imperative that we do an analysis that is as
    honest and straightforward and as clear about the costs as we
    possibly can. Then it's up to the Congress and the American
    public to decide whether they want to bear the costs. But I
    don't think anyone in any Agency should be in any way
    constrained about what is needed before we get to that final
    point.
        The second concern I had is in response to a question by
    Chairman Jeffords. You were talking about the force-on-force
    exercises, and made the statement that it was doubtful that
    attackers would have such intimate knowledge of the nuclear
    power plants. I just think that's a false assumption. I don't
    think that's an assumption we can make today. I don't believe
    any of us should be assuming any limited knowledge or capacity
    on the part of our adversaries.
        So I would reverse the presumption and start from a basis
    that we have to presume that our adversaries know everything
    there is to know, and therefore we have to take action to
    protect ourselves against that presumption of knowledge.
        Now, with respect to the design basis threat time line,
    which apparently has been pushed back, it's already been 9
    months. Can you give us an estimate today as to how much longer
    it will take on the design basis threat re-evaluation? And
    then, after the DBT is revised, how long will it be before we
    see new security plans at plants? Will it be a matter of
    months? Will it be a matter of years? Can you give us some ball
    park estimate as to when whatever you eventually decide is the
    new design basis threat will be implemented at plants across
    the country?
        Dr. Meserve. Let me respond, if I may, first to your
    concerns, because I think there may have been some
    misunderstanding of what I intended to say. My comment about
    the need for allocation of resources was not that this has been
    a constraint on how the NRC has examined the security issue. We
    have looked at what we have thought has been necessary to
    provide adequate protection of public safety and we have
    imposed those requirements without examination of the cost
    implications of those actions.
        My comment was really a broader societal one, and it was in
    the context that Congress is going to have to decide about how
    much our society in the broad sense should spend on security as
    a whole. It wasn't that I was purporting to make that as a
    decision or a factor for the NRC to be making.
        Second, my comment about force-on-force exercises may also
    have been misunderstood. Our pre-September 11 DBT did include
    and does include inside assistance to the attackers. We
    conducted the exercises, therefore, assuming detailed knowledge
    of the details of the security plan. You and I may differ as to
    our sense of how likely it is that a terrorist attacking force
    would have that knowledge. But we have assumed that knowledge
    exists, as it's obviously a conservative approach to be taken.
        With regard to the design basis threat, this is something
    that is subject to evaluation by the Commission now. I think
    that we're talking about a period of months for us to chart a
    new course. There are implications for the DBT in terms of how
    in fact we put it in place. There are some components of it
    that obviously have to be classified, some components may
    require some regulatory changes. So there are some details that
    certainly will have to be worked out. How exactly we proceed I
    think is going to be guided by the deliberations that are
    underway before the Commission now.
        In the meantime, however, I think the most important point
    is that we have not waited all these months to make sure that
    we have put in requirements at the plants to significantly
    increase the security. We did that on a prescriptive basis, in
    that we made demands for additional guards and additional
    weapons and additional patrols, as well as consideration of
    additional modes of attack, with larger vehicle bombs, and
    things of that nature. Those are all in place at nuclear power
    plants today.
        Senator Clinton. Well, let me then just clarify, Mr.
    Chairman, because in your written testimony, you state that
    requests have been received by the NRC for extensions of the
    deadline to submit a schedule for implementation of the new
    orders that were issued back in February. How many such
    requests for extensions of time were received by the NRC and
    how many requests were granted?
        Dr. Meserve. There may be some misunderstanding of the
    testimony on that point. We have probably 30 requirements of
    that order of magnitude that we imposed on the licensees. We
    asked them to come in within 20 days and give us the schedule
    for completion of implementation and we set an absolute
    deadline of August 31 for the completion of everything.
        Some have come in and asked for an extension of the 20-day
    period within which they would give us the schedule for
    completion of all of the activities. The requests focused on
    one particular measure that required some detailed analysis of
    blast effects in order to determine what engineering changes
    would be needed. The licensees made the case that it was going
    to take them longer than 20 days to be able to complete that
    work. We have not had a request from anyone to extend the
    absolute outer limit of completing the work, which was August
    31. I apologize if there is some confusion in the statement.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you.
        Senator Jeffords. Senator Boxer.
        Senator Boxer. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I'm a little concerned about a few things
    here. I just perhaps want to make a couple of statements and
    ask a couple of questions. I am asking you, as one Senator who
    has four nuclear power plants, please don't spend your time on
    the issue of the broad question of how much we want to spend
    protecting our people. That is a decision that will be made by
    the President and by the Congress as we do our budget.
        Your job is to tell us what you need to do to protect the
    people from the disaster that would follow an attack on a
    nuclear power plant. I want to stress that. We need you to tell
    us that. I frankly don't need to hear that you don't think you
    should federalize employees. You know, to me that is an issue
    that I can go any way on. I just want to make sure the people
    we hire aren't coming from the cells of Al Qaeda, whether they
    join the Federal Government or they join a private security
    force, OK?
        So I am worried. Then I put that together with your point,
    we need to look at all the threats, you said, don't just do
    something special for the nuclear industry, and you oppose this
    legislation, which is your right, I respect that. But why don't
    you want to be a model of safety? Listen to what happened in
    New York as our colleague, Senator Clinton well knows. The
    World Trade Centers were designed for fire protection, but
    according to the engineers, much of the fire protection
    materials were displaced after the plane hit the building.
        Now, you have said in your testimony that nuclear power
    plants are designed to withstand tornadoes, hurricanes, fires,
    floods and earthquake. As a result, the structures inherently
    afford a measure of protection against deliberate aircraft
    impacts. I would suggest to you, in light of what we learned
    from the World Trade Center, that kind of rationale doesn't sit
    well. Are you--I'm not going to ask this question because I
    think I have to ask other questions in the closed briefing
    which I will attend. But I am just going to say then that I
    trust that you are doing computer modeling to see whether the
    lessons that we learned after the World Trade Center would not
    apply to this situation. So I'm not going to ask you a question
    here. In fact, I'm just assuming you are doing this.
        But I guess my point is then you say you don't know of any
    particular threat against nuclear power plants, but yet you
    made these pills available to the people, which I'm very
    grateful you did that. So I hear mixed messages. I think the
    best thing that we can do is to send a very clear message to
    everyone in the world that we are doing everything we can, as
    you say, that we are acting conservatively. I agree with that.
    That means you do more, not less.
        You know, the President announced that the nuclear power
    plants were listed as targets. We've all seen the actual
    documents that came out of the search of the caves by our brave
    men and women in uniform. So we know that.
        So you're not suggesting that nuclear power plants are not
    a target, are you, in saying you have no information? That's
    one question. Second, are you briefed by the FBI and the CIA on
    a regular basis? Do you feel comfortable with the type of
    briefings that you are getting, given all the news that is
    coming out?
        Dr. Meserve. Let me respond to several points you've made.
    I think that we've gone off in a direction I had not intended.
    I was not suggesting that the NRC should make the judgment as
    to how much society should spend for security. That is clearly
    something for the Congress.
        With regard to the aircraft, we are undertaking a very
    major effort to examine the engineering features associated
    with aircraft vulnerability of nuclear plants. That is
    something on which I would be prepared to give you a briefing
    in a closed session. That has been a major activity for the NRC
    and our contractors in the period since September 11, to assess
    the vulnerabilities and assess mitigation measures that should
    be taken.
        We have very close coordination with the FBI and the
    intelligence community and we have analysts who are intimately
    connected with assisting those agencies in evaluating threat
    information. As part of our advisory system, when a licensee
    observes something that is occurring at the plant, they report
    it to us, we coordinate with the FBI and the intelligence
    community for its evaluation. There is a very close connection
    involving security experts at the NRC, working with their
    counterparts in these other agencies, to assure that we have
    detailed information that we share with each other. My comment
    that they are not aware of a credible threat directed at a
    nuclear power plant is consistent with the information that we
    have been receiving from the intelligence community.
        I very much agree with your notion that the nuclear
    industry should be a model for society in security. I think in
    fact we are. I would invite all of you to visit a nuclear plant
    and to see the level of security that exists at these
    facilities. I think it would be very reassuring to you to visit
    a plant and see on the ground all that is in place. I can't
    obviously describe it in this session, but I very much welcome
    helping to assist you in a visit if that were necessary.
        Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, but I
    just want to make one point. I want to join with you and other
    members. We want to work with you for, you know, if there is a
    time when you don't feel that you're getting the information,
    these are the kinds of things we can help with. I wanted, and I
    will in written questions, ask you about, I have 100,000
    people, far less than Senator Clinton, living within a 10-mile
    radius of my plants. But I have many, many more living within
    50 miles.
        So I'm going to ask you to answer in writing if you will,
    what measures you're taking beyond the 10-mile rim. I thank you
    very much.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
        Senator Carper.
        Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to say to the chairman, thank you for joining
    us today and for your stewardship and for your testimony.
        In your testimony, your written testimony and also I think
    in part of your oral testimony, you talked about what we can do
    to help you and your colleagues to enhance the security of our
    nuclear facilities. You talked specifically about legislation
    introduced by several of our colleagues which has been
    introduced in this Congress which has not yet been acted on. In
    your testimony, you discuss several of the provisions of that
    legislation.
        Can you just tell me, what is the status of that
    legislation today with respect to having held hearings,
    scheduled markups? What is the status?
        Dr. Meserve. The NRC legislative proposals on security,
    passed the Senate last year, but did not succeed in passage
    through the House. They were re-introduced here again by
    Senators Smith and Inhofe.
        Senator Carper. Which Senator Smith?
        Dr. Meserve. Pardon me?
        Senator Carper. Which Senator Smith?
        Dr. Meserve. Senator Smith from New Hampshire, who was with
    us earlier. We have suggested an additional provision to that
    legislation, which has been described in our testimony. We have
    not had an opportunity for a hearing in this session of the
    Senate to discuss this. So there has not yet been a markup on
    that legislation.
        Senator Carper. Is the committee jurisdiction for the bill
    this committee?
        Dr. Meserve. I will defer to you as to the jurisdiction of
    the committees. But I believe that the jurisdiction is this
    committee.
        Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, is that correct?
        Senator Jeffords. I believe that's correct. We always claim
    it anyway.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Carper. Let's talk about the legislation that has
    been assigned to this committee over which we have
    jurisdiction. Take several pieces of it and talk with me about
    why they are necessary. Also what criticisms of those proposals
    that you might be aware of, that we should be aware of. Don't
    go into great detail, but just give me an overview, the key
    pieces of the legislation, why they're critical and any
    opposition or criticism of those that you're mindful of.
        Dr. Meserve. I think that I described in my testimony the
    NRC proposals and why we think that those are wise and how they
    would be supplemented. So those are things that--they've also--
    we have solicited and obtained the support of the executive
    branch for those components of the legislation. So those would
    be the three parts that were in Senator Smith's and Senator
    Inhofe's bill as supplemented by the additional component,
    which is the attachment to my written testimony.
        The other bill that is before this committee is the
    legislation that would govern the federalization of the guard
    forces. My testimony discussed why we have concerns that we
    have with regard to federalization.
        There's one aspect of that argument that may require some
    amplification. There is a command-and-control issue that we
    take very seriously that would arise if the troops were
    federalized at the commercial power stations. The reason is
    that it is the obligation of the licensee to assure the safe
    operations of the facility. So all of the control room staff
    and so forth are licensee employees taking instructions from
    the licensee within the regulatory environment that we
    establish. But nonetheless, it's the licensee that has the
    fundamental obligation to assure safe operations.
        The legislation would take security and rip that out of the
    responsibility of the licensee and make that a Federal
    responsibility. So that some of the employees at the site would
    work for the NRC as our employees, responsible for security,
    and the people responsible for safe operations would report to
    the licensee. You can imagine in an emergency, heaven forbid,
    if there was a terrorist attack at a facility that took out
    some equipment, we would need clear command and control as to
    responsibilities, and what actions needed to be taken. The
    licensee actions to assure bringing the plant to a safe
    condition are ones that would have to be coordinated with the
    security actions. Fracturing the chains of command in those
    circumstances, we think, would be a serious mistake. That
    should be integrated. Having that responsibility integrated
    together in the licensee organization we think is appropriate.
        Senator Carper. I want to go back to the legislation that
    you mentioned at the outset, and that is the legislation co-
    sponsored in part by Senator Smith of New Hampshire. Part of my
    question was, what are the criticisms, maybe the legitimate
    criticisms of the legislation, and how would you respond to
    those criticisms?
        Dr. Meserve. I must admit that it has been a complete
    puzzle to me in that the NRC for years has been pursuing this
    legislation. It passed the Senate last year, and I have not
    heard any criticism of the legislation, but we don't seem to be
    able to get it done.
        Senator Carper. Why do you think that is?
        Dr. Meserve. I have no idea. I think that part of the
    concern may be that it is not seen as dramatic enough. I don't
    know. It seems to me that these are changes that are
    appropriate steps to take and they are ones that I would urge
    Congress to enact. I am not aware of any criticism of them.
        Senator Carper. I would just say to my colleagues, we've
    talked a lot, seen a lot about reports that came out of the
    FBI, and I guess it was in Minnesota and Phoenix and things
    that we're mindful of and in retrospect we should have paid
    more attention to. Someone should have done something as a
    result of that. I would just hope here in this case that we not
    be guilty of not pursuing an agenda once we've discussed it and
    decided it's worth pursuing, that we not be negligent.
        Senator Jeffords. I thank the Senator for his words. I
    commend you for your testimony and it's been an enjoyable
    experience to work with you. You and your members have been
    very forthright. We will be having another closed session, so
    that any questions that the members had that they didn't feel
    appropriate to ask can be answered.
        Thank you, and we'll move to the next panel. I also ask
    unanimous consent that this Nuclear Security General Aviation
    is Not a Threat document by Senator Inhofe be made a part of
    the record. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

               Nuclear Security--General Aviation is not a Threat
     (A Report by Nuclear Safety and Security Consultant Robert Jefferson)

        Summary: The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association commissioned
    internationally recognized nuclear safety and security expert Robert M.
    Jefferson to examine the potential threat from a general aviation
    aircraft to a nuclear power facility. Jefferson concluded that even if
    a general aviation aircraft were loaded with explosives, it ``would
    fail to produce the damage necessary to cause any radiological
    involvement of the public. Certainly, if a terrorist organization were
    inclined to undertake such an effort, a light aircraft would quickly be
    dismissed as a possible vehicle due to its impracticality.''
        Specifically, Jefferson's study concluded that:
        A general aviation aircraft could not penetrate the concrete
    containment vessel protecting the nuclear reactor. While many
    containment vessels were not specifically designed to withstand an
    aircraft impact, all vessels are designed to withstand the impact of
    tornado-propelled ``missiles.'' Such missiles exceed the force of a GA
    aircraft impact.
        In one test, a 45,000-pound F4 fighter was propelled into simulated
    containment wall at over 450 miles per hour. The aircraft was
    destroyed; the concrete wall was ``uncompromised.'' (An F4 is 18 times
    heavier than a Cessna 172, the most popular GA aircraft. Even in a
    dive, a Cessna 172 can't go much faster than 200 mph.)
        Even a large commercial airliner such as a Boeing 757 would not
    likely penetrate the outer containment vessel of a nuclear power plant.
    But even if it did, the reactor vessel, which contains the nuclear
    fuel, would remain intact, according to Jefferson.
        A general aviation aircraft loaded with explosives would not likely
    cause a release of radiation. Most GA aircraft have payloads of less
    than 1,000 pounds. Any explosives would have to be carried in the
    passenger or cargo compartments. Even if a terrorist were able to rig a
    contact fuse on the nose of the aircraft, the explosion would be
    several feet away from the reactor containment building. That distance
    would reduce the damage to the point that even if the containment
    vessel were breached, there would be little or no damage to the reactor
    vessel inside.
        An aircraft attack on auxiliary buildings would not likely cause a
    release of radiation. Nuclear power plants are designed so that a
    ``single failure'' cannot cause the loss of critical safety systems.
    Support systems are not co-located at a single point. An aircraft crash
    could not destroy every safety and control system at once.
        A GA aircraft could not ignite the Zirconium cladding on spent
    nuclear fuel. Spent nuclear fuel is stored in deep pools, covered with
    up to 50 feet of water. The pool walls are concrete and steel, The pool
    itself is a relatively small target. Even if the aircraft could hit the
    pool, it would not likely disturb the spent fuel. To ignite the fuel
    cladding, the aircraft would first have to displace all the water, and
    then create a fire that would burn for about 20 hours. That would take
    some 176,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, The typical GA aircraft
    carries 60 gallons of fuel.
        Following the attacks of September 11th, the United States
    government has struggled to identify potential threats and targets for
    future terrorist activities. Potential targets identified by security
    officials have included shopping malls, banking institutions, water
    reservoirs, federal buildings, fairs, festivals, sporting events, and
    nuclear facilities. Some public officials have focused their attention
    on the potential use of light, general aviation aircraft to launch
    attacks against national assets. Specifically, claims have been made
    concerning the nation's nuclear power plants and their theoretical
    vulnerability to attacks from light aircraft.
        As a result, the government and others continue to examine the
    issues surrounding both real and perceived weaknesses in nuclear
    security. One such example of these efforts is the study initiated by
    U.S. Representative Edward J. Markey titled Security Gap: A Hard Look
    At the Soft Spots in Our Civilian Nuclear Reactor Security. In this
    ``study'', Representative Markey, who has historically proven to be an
    opponent of nuclear energy, attempts to establish a supposition that
    general aviation poses a national threat based on its potential for use
    in strikes against nuclear power plants.
        In reality, general aviation is a safe and important component of
    the United States transportation system. Moreover, light, general
    aviation aircraft do not pose a threat to domestic nuclear power plant
    security, and the facts presented in this report explain and illustrate
    this while refuting these accusations.

                       NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN STANDARDS

        It has been suggested that the design standards of nuclear power
    plants offer inadequate protection in resisting airborne attacks. One
    point raised was the fact that few nuclear reactor facilities were
    designed specifically against threats from light, general aviation
    aircraft. This point is misleading, because it overlooks the fact that
    by their very design, nuclear power plants are inherently resistant to
    such strikes. For example, in the late 70's, the Japanese government
    conducted a test in which a 45,000-pound F-4 Phantom jet was impacted
    at over 450 miles per hour into a concrete wall about the thickness of
    the containment vessel of a nuclear power plant. The results were
    dramatic. While the aircraft was completely destroyed upon impact, the
    integrity of the wall remained uncompromised. To relate this to general
    aviation, it is important to note that the F-4 Phantom jet weighs 7
    times as much as the average general aviation aircraft and was flown
    into the wall at speeds exceeding two and one half times that of a
    general aviation aircraft.
        Parallels can also be drawn to one of the standard accident
    scenarios used in the design of nuclear power plants, the impact of
    tornado-propelled missiles such as power line poles. In a series of
    tests conducted by Sandia National Labs in the 1970s, wooden power
    poles were hurled into a concrete target (simulating a containment
    wall) at speeds up to 120 miles per hour. The power pole was, in each
    case, reduced to splinters. However, the thick concrete targets were
    merely polished at the point of impact. A power pole impacting
    perpendicular to the surface of the concrete is certainly as effective
    or a more effective missile than a light (aluminum), general aviation
    aircraft.
        These tests serve to support a statement made by Chairman Richard
    Meserve of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in which he remarked,
    ``Nuclear power plants are among the most formidable structures in
    existence. Nuclear power plants are certainly far more capable to
    respond to an aircraft attack than other civilian facilities.'' This is
    not to imply that such structures are indestructible but that they are
    indeed very robust hard targets,
        The Markey report implied that a general aviation aircraft impact
    to the containment structure of a nuclear reactor could cause a full-
    scale core meltdown. However, engineering data, supported by ``real-
    world'' tests, refute these claims. The conclusions to be drawn are
    clear. Given that aircraft size and speed are two crucial elements in
    the damage equation, a light, general aviation aircraft weighing less
    than 6,000 pounds traveling at under 300 miles per hour simply lacks
    the energy to cause significant damage. In comparison, a commercial
    aircraft like the Boeing 757 weighs upwards of 250,000 pounds and
    travels at speeds in excess of 500 miles per hour. Most experts agree
    in the event an aircraft similar in size to a Boeing 757 airliner were
    to strike a nuclear power plant, in all likelihood, it would be unable
    to penetrate the outer containment vessel. But, even if it did manage
    to do so, the reactor vessel, which contains the nuclear fuel, would
    remain intact, eliminating the threat of public exposure to radioactive
    materials.
        Others have speculated a light aircraft laden with explosives might
    be used to breach a reactor containment building, again implying this
    would result in a full-scale core meltdown. Again, the capabilities of
    light aircraft argue against such an attack being successful. Very few
    general aviation aircraft have a payload as high as 1,000 pounds, even
    if flown by a small pilot and carrying minimum fuel. Further, the
    explosives would be carried in the cabin placing them at a distance
    from the point of impact. Modem explosives must be detonated, and
    impact has a small probability of causing detonation. So, even if the
    terrorist rigged a contact fuse on the nose of the airplane to set off
    the explosives, there would be several feet between the reactor
    building and the detonation. That distance would reduce the damage to
    the point that, even should the containment building be breached, there
    would be little damage inside (and no aircraft fuel to cause a fire).
    Again, such an attack would be an exercise in futility as there would
    be no radiation release and no public involvement.
        Hypothetically, a larger aircraft (not the typical general aviation
    aircraft) carrying thousands of pounds of explosives may be able to
    penetrate the outer containment vessel of a nuclear power plant,
    causing severe damage to systems inside. However, this would affect an
    immediate shutdown of the reactor, which would remain intact in such a
    scenario.
        It has been asserted that, ``NRC recognizes aircraft crashes may
    result in multiple-failure initiating events, and that non-safety
    system malfunctions could contribute to such events.'' The regulations
    for analyzing the safety of nuclear power plants require every
    conceivable element that could contribute to safety degradation must be
    considered a ``safety system.'' Further, nuclear power plants must be
    designed to prevent ``single failures,'' no matter how they propagate,
    to cause loss of critical safety systems. It is inconceivable that the
    crash of a general aviation aircraft could accomplish such broad safety
    problems in a nuclear power plant.
        Others have postulated that it would only take two hours after loss
    of ``on-site power'' at a nuclear facility for core damage to begin.
    This assumes not only loss of on-site power but also loss of standby
    power and loss of emergency core cooling. Piling one miniscule
    probability on top of another quickly stretches the limits of
    believability. These entities have also proposed that support systems
    and auxiliary buildings as also vulnerable to a successful attack. This
    assertion assumes that all support systems are co-located at a single
    point, allowing an aircraft crash to destroy everything at once. This
    is a simplification that serves the alarmist argument, but it is simply
    untrue.

    SPENT FUEL STORAGE AND UNSUBSTANTIATED RISK OF FIRE RESULTING FROM THE
                         IGNITION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

        Another possibility discussed regarding nuclear power plants
    involves the scenario of an aircraft crash somehow igniting the
    Zirconium cladding on the nuclear fuel elements. Unlike Sodium, which
    bums on exposure to air, or Magnesium, which ignites at relatively low
    temperature, solid Zirconium will not burn. Zirconium doesn't melt
    until approximately 3,330 degrees Fahrenheit. However, fine Zirconium
    shavings or dust will bum. In order to cause a Zirconium fire, it would
    be necessary for a terrorist to fracture the nuclear fuel cladding into
    small pieces before subjecting it to a source of ignition. Even
    assuming that the Zirconium was fragmented into chips, the spent fuel
    elements are either under water (upwards to 50 feet in many cases) or
    contained in massive shielding systems. This means that it would take
    an incredibly large quantity of heat to raise the temperature of the
    Zirconium and the surrounding shielding to the point of ignition.
        Moreover, since aviation gasoline burns at approximately 2,000
    degrees Fahrenheit, it would take an extended period of time to achieve
    the temperatures needed to ignite Zirconium shavings. A fire that
    persists for a long time (twenty hours has been mentioned) requires a
    substantial fuel source. In an open configuration, such as might take
    place on the ground surrounding a dry storage facility, gasoline will
    burn at a rate close to \1/3\ inch per minute (i.e., a large pan of
    gasoline burning will reduce the level of the fuel in the pan about \1/
    3\ inch per minute). Given that even the largest light aircraft carries
    less than 300 gallons of fuel, the possibility of such a condition is
    practically non-existent.
        Further, to provide an optically opaque fire and transmit as much
    heat as possible, the flames have to be at least ten feet thick. Thus,
    to engulf a dry storage cask in flames (one model is about 10 feet in
    diameter, others are larger) would require a pool at least 30 feet in
    diameter. At \1/3\ inch a minute, this would consume almost 150 gallons
    a minute even if there were no runoff. At that rate, a 20-hour fire
    would consume 400 inches of fuel, or slightly over 176,000 gallons
    (equaling one million pounds). Not even the largest military tanker can
    transport that much fuel. Using the figure of 20,000 gallons of fuel
    mentioned in the Markey report, a fire 30 feet in diameter would bum
    for a maximum of about 2.3 hours. Since light general aviation aircraft
    carry only a fraction of the cited fuel volume plus, considering
    runoff, the resulting fire from a small airplane crash would be mere
    minutes. The possibility of a fuel explosion igniting the Zirconium is
    refuted by carefully reviewing the dynamics of such an event. The
    temperature of a fireball is again about 2,000 degrees, but the
    exposure lasts for only milliseconds. This would produce insufficient
    heat to raise the temperature of the Zirconium more than a degree or so
    even if directly exposed to the fireball.
        It is hard to conceive that even a deliberate attempt to
    continuously provide additional combustible fuel to the fire over a
    prolonged time could ever ignite the Zirconium cladding on the reactor
    fuel elements. If the combustible fuel is to be delivered by an
    aircraft impacting the facility, the crash will disburse the fire over
    a wide area, and, thus, present absolutely no hazard to the spent fuel
    in either the fuel pool or the dry storage casks.

               ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE UNWARRANTED AND INEFFECTIVE

        One of the most unreasonable ideas presented to the public calls
    for anti-aircraft capabilities around nuclear power plants. The idea
    begs careful analysis focused on the potential for the unintended
    consequences of shooting down an innocent civilian aircraft. The claim
    that other countries have adopted this strategy does little to quell
    the fears of general aviation pilots or the air traveler. The volume of
    general aviation traffic and the freedom with which it is utilized is
    unique to the United States, rendering such comparisons of little
    value. The entire concept is flawed for a more significant reason. The
    federal government has a finite amount of capital available to protect
    its citizens, and, when it is spent in support of irrelevant strategies
    (leaving the more critical considerations unprotected), the nation
    becomes far more vulnerable to terrorist threats.

             ATTACK BY LIGHT GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT IMPRACTICAL

        General aviation aircraft would prove ineffective in an attack,
    similar to those carried out on September 11th. The World Trade Center
    towers and the Pentagon were large, conspicuous landmarks and, as such,
    were more easily targeted in an aerial attack than would be a nuclear
    power plant. The success of these attacks was predicated on the use of
    large, turbine-powered commercial aircraft with immense fuel carrying
    capacity. A general aviation aircraft, at only a fraction of the
    weight, speed and fuel load, would be unable to inflict damage on the
    scale witnessed on that tragic day.
        In spite of this fact, concerns have been raised regarding the
    perceived threat of general aviation to nuclear power plants. For
    example, it was reported that 21 power plants lay within 5 miles of an
    airport, implying that these airports present an inherent threat based
    on their proximity to nuclear power plants. Common sense would dictate
    that proximity is hardly the issue in such cases. It is unlikely that a
    terrorist would rule out a given target based on the travel time
    involved in reaching it. The reality is that the proximity of these
    power facilities to active airfields does not increase their exposure
    to terrorist threats.
        However, since the point has been raised, these airports (many of
    which are small general aviation facilities) serve as excellent
    examples as to why general aviation is not a threat. The light aircraft
    flown into small general aviation airports throughout the United States
    are ill suited for terrorist use, given they lack the weight, speed,
    fuel and load carrying capacity to do significant damage to a target.
        Of the 23 airports listed in the government study, 5 are so small
    that they do not even appear in AOPA's Airport Directory, a
    comprehensive compendium of civil airport data. Eleven of the airports
    are small private airstrips, most with turf (unpaved) runways. Five of
    the airstrips have runways too short to permit operations by large,
    turbine-powered aircraft. In reality, only two of the airports listed
    in the report have runways large enough to allow operation by large,
    transport-category aircraft. One of these is located proximate to the
    Three Mile Island facility in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which was
    specifically designed to sustain an impact from a large aircraft. The
    Markey report implies to a large degree that nuclear security concerns
    rest squarely with general aviation. However, scientific evidence to
    the contrary demonstrates that the concerns raised have no basis in
    fact and are completely unwarranted.

                                   CONCLUSION

        General aviation is a safe and important part of the United States
    transportation system. For the reasons cited in this report, it is
    unlikely that a terrorist would choose a light, general aviation
    aircraft to threaten a nuclear power plant. The result of such an
    endeavor would fail to produce the damage necessary to cause any
    radiological involvement of the public, Certainly, if a terrorist
    organization were inclined to undertake such an effort, a light
    aircraft would quickly be dismissed as a possible vehicle due to its
    impracticality.

        Senator Jeffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I enjoy working
    with you. We'll be back with you soon.
        Dr. Meserve. Thank you.
        Senator Jeffords. Our next panel consists of five
    witnesses. Our first witness is David Lochbaum, a nuclear
    safety engineer with Union of Concerned Scientists. Our second
    witness will be Mr. Jack Skolds, chief nuclear officer at
    Exelon Corporation. Next we will have Danielle Brian, executive
    director of the Project on Government Oversight. After Ms.
    Brian, Donna J. Hastie, a specialist in emergency preparedness,
    will testify. Finally, Dr. Irwin Redlener, president of the
    Children's Health Fund, will finish our committee's testimony
    this morning.
        Each witness is requested to keep his or her testimony to
    no more than 5 minutes. After the conclusion of all testimony,
    members will be free to ask questions. Please, speak clearly
    into the microphone to all of you. Sometimes it's difficult to
    hear from here. We greatly appreciate all of your time and your
    willingness to share your expertise with the committee and
    thank you for being here.
        Mr. Lochbaum, please proceed with your testimony.

    STATEMENT OF DAVID LOCHBAUM, NUCLEAR SAFETY ENGINEER, UNION OF
                          CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

        Mr. Lochbaum. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee. My name is David Lochbaum. I have been the nuclear
    safety engineer for the Union of Concerned Scientists since
    October 1996. Prior to joining UCS, I worked for over 17 years
    in the nuclear power industry.
        The issue before you today is the security of our nuclear
    facilities. As with many nuclear power issues, we have firmly
    staked out middle ground on this one. We disagree with industry
    representatives who contend that nuclear power plants are
    hardened structures, virtually immune from attack, and who
    claim that the health consequences from a successful attack
    would be insignificant.
        But we also disagree with those who contend that nuclear
    power plants are an undue hazard that can only be dealt with by
    immediately shutting them down. We view nuclear power plants as
    being vulnerable to sabotage and advocate taking all reasonable
    steps to reduce the chances of a successful attack and to
    minimize the harm from a successful attack.
        We are therefore pleased to support the legislation
    proposed in S. 1586 and S. 1746. Once enacted into law, these
    bills would provide millions of Americans with greater
    protection against nuclear sabotage.
        The Price Anderson Act proves the need for adequate
    security. Price Anderson was created because the liability from
    a nuclear plant accident could be so large as to prevent
    private insurance companies from underwriting that risk.
    Congress is in the process of renewing Price Anderson because
    nuclear power plants remain immense risks, hazards. The
    chemical industry and other industries do not receive
    comparable Federal liability protection.
        The 1975 fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant illustrates
    their vulnerability. A worker checking for air leaks with a
    candle started a fire that burned out of control for nearly 7
    hours. The blaze disabled all of the emergency core cooling
    systems for Unit 1 and nearly all of these systems for Unit 2.
    Only innovative efforts by workers to cobble together a
    makeshift scheme for adding water to the Unit 1 reactor
    prevented a core meltdown.
        It is not farfetched to think that one or more attackers
    armed with explosives or a large aircraft fully loaded with jet
    fuel might be able to cause more damage than one worker with
    one candle. While all provisions of both bills have merit, the
    most valuable portion of the proposed legislation is section
    four of the Nuclear Security Act. This section requires the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct force on force testing
    at each nuclear facility at least once every 2 years. The force
    on force tests pit mock intruders against the plant's barriers
    and defenders.
        How do teachers evaluate their students' academic
    performance? Do they use a checklist to verify that students
    attend classes and have textbooks, pencils, paper and
    calculators? No. They use tests that demonstrate their
    students' capabilities. Textbooks and class attendance are the
    pathway to knowledge, while tests are the best measure of
    progress along that pathway.
        Likewise, security checklists show that a nuclear power
    plant has gates, guards and guns. But they don't provide enough
    insight on progress toward security.
        Force on force tests demonstrate whether adequate security
    has been achieved. Frequent demonstration of adequate security
    performance is invaluable. The Nuclear Security Act also
    requires potassium iodide stockpiling for people living within
    50 miles of each nuclear facility. This provision is urgently
    needed to eliminate current inequities.
        That potassium iodide has value is clearly demonstrated by
    the fact that it would be distributed to nuclear plant workers
    and Federal, State and local officials responding to an
    accident. It would seem unwise not to provide equivalent
    protection for Americans living downwind of the facilities. But
    according to the NRC, only 13 States currently stockpile
    potassium iodine for people living within the emergency
    planning zones. The NRC protecting only some Americans makes
    about as much sense as the U.S. Coast Guard requiring lifeboats
    in only some cruise ships.
        Expanding the potassium iodide inventory to cover a 50-mile
    radius, rather than a 10-mile radius, increases the likelihood
    that all people in harm's way will be protected. No matter
    where the line is drawn, the question will remain about people
    living at N plus 1 miles. The 50-mile radius seems to be a
    reasonable compromise. Even if conditions affect people 60 or
    70 miles downwind of a plant, potassium iodide upwind could be
    redirected to the folks that are in harm's way.
        The proposed legislation would greatly improve nuclear
    facility security. The only element potentially missing from
    the proposed legislation is adequate protection against insider
    sabotage. There's language in the Nuclear Security Act touching
    upon insider sabotage, but it does not specifically address
    factors such as the two-person rule for vital areas, use of in-
    plant security cameras, armed security guard escorts for
    visitors to vital areas, integration of security considerations
    into normal plant safety decisionmaking, and training for
    operators when responding to acts of sabotage.
        UCS recommends the committee consider strengthening the
    proposed legislation by explicitly incorporating these items,
    obtaining a firm commitment for the NRC to include these items
    in their top to bottom review, or by providing clear guidance
    on expectations regarding these items in the committee reports
    that accompany these bills.
        In closing, UCS supports S. 1586 and S. 1746 and hopes that
    both bills become law. I have testified before Congress several
    times. Until now, it has been always to oppose this or to
    complain about that. It is a welcome change to appear today in
    full support of these bills. The worst part about these bills
    is they address reasonable steps that could be taken but have
    not yet been taken. The best part about these bills is that
    they will solve problems once they're enacted. Thank you.
        Senator Jeffords. Thank you. Very good. You were almost
    right on the 5 minutes. I appreciate that.
        Mr. Lochbaum. I practiced more than once.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Jeffords. Mr. Skolds.

    STATEMENT OF JACK SKOLDS, CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER, EXELON NUCLEAR

        Mr. Skolds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today to discuss this important issue.
        I would also like to thank several members of the committee
    for investigating the issues of nuclear plant security first-
    hand. Senators Graham, Clinton, Corzine, Smith, Voinovich and
    Specter have all toured nuclear power plants to receive
    briefings on plant security since September 11, as have several
    members of the committee's staff members. In fact, Senator
    Specter has toured three of the five nuclear power plants in
    Pennsylvania, including two Exelon facilities.
        I will focus my comments today on the legislative proposals
    before the committee, though my written statement provides
    extensive background on security at commercial nuclear plants
    in the United States after September 11 and recommendations
    that the Federal Government should take to enhance security.
        Before addressing the legislation pending before the
    Senate, however, I would like to make a few comments. We
    believe that there are people interested in doing harm to
    nuclear power plants. We have the most at risk, and we take
    this issue very seriously. The nuclear power industry is
    absolutely committed to ensuring that our plants are operated
    safely and that all necessary steps are taken to protect the
    health and safety of the public and our employees. Thousands of
    our employees live within the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the
    nuclear plants and no one has a greater interest than we do.
        Second, commercial nuclear power plants are the most well
    protected industrial facilities in the United States today and
    in fact, many businesses are turning to us as a model for
    security and emergency planning at their industrial complexes.
    Third, as the United States acts to strengthen homeland
    security in light of the new threats to the Nation's security,
    it's imperative that Federal, State and local officials work
    cooperatively with nuclear plant operators to build on the
    solid foundation of emergency response capabilities that
    existed prior to September 11.
        Let me turn my specific comments to the legislation. On S.
    1586, the nuclear industry is on record as supporting the
    provisions included in S. 1586. While some NRC licensees have
    recently expressed concern about the possible legal
    implications of providing wide ranging arrest authority to
    private security forces, the industry stands ready to work with
    the committee to resolve these concerns.
        Concerning S. 1746, it makes sweeping changes in the manner
    in which security at commercial nuclear facilities is
    addressed. Unfortunately, this legislation puts the proverbial
    cart before the horse by mandating radical legislative
    solutions to issues that have not been identified as problems.
        Section 3 of the bill would substitute a statutorily
    mandated design basis threat for that developed by the NRC and
    would federalize security at commercial nuclear power plants by
    establishing a nuclear security force within the NRC and by
    requiring the Commission to develop a security plan for each of
    the Nation's sensitive nuclear facilities. Section 3 also
    levies a tax on sensitive nuclear facilities to fund a newly
    created nuclear security fund.
        Before legislating the details of a design basis threat,
    Congress should first direct the President to conduct a
    comprehensive review with the various energy, intelligence and
    law enforcement agencies of the various threats facing nuclear
    power plants. Once such a review is completed, the NRC should
    be directed to adjust the design basis threat accordingly.
        With regard to federalization of nuclear security forces,
    Exelon strongly opposes such a drastic and unjustified change
    in the security requirements. Security forces at nuclear power
    plants are highly trained professionals. Substituting Federal
    employees to safeguard sensitive nuclear facilities may
    actually degrade security. We believe that the integrated
    command and control of plant security forces is an important
    aspect of our operations, and plant operations personnel, and
    it's essential to ensure the protection of the public health
    and safety.
        Similarly, requiring the NRC to develop the security plans
    for each of the Nation's sensitive nuclear facilities within
    180 days would be a significant task that would result in an
    unnecessary and perhaps dangerous diversion of Commission
    resources. As with federalization of the nuclear plant security
    forces, requiring a federally developed security plan for
    several dozen sites is unnecessary given the lack of evidence
    that the current system is deficient.
        Finally, a tax on nuclear power plant operators would fund
    a new and unnecessary Federal bureaucracy and would be
    unparalleled in the private sector. Simply put, this $700
    million tax would fund an activity that is effectively managed
    by the private industry.
        Section 4 establishes an operation safeguards and response
    unit at the NRC. The existing NRC operational safeguards and
    response evaluations, or OSRE, has been applied and interpreted
    in an inconsistent and at times arbitrary manner. Anti-nuclear
    groups and the NRC have at times inaccurately characterized
    licensee performance under the existing program by claiming
    that we have failed.
        Now, these programs have been conducted for approximately
    15 year. If the report had been that we had found no areas for
    improvement, I'd be very concerned. There are areas for
    improvement, and these exercises are very rigorous, these
    exercises are very detailed, and they're intended to identify
    areas for improvement.
        Senator Clinton [assuming the chair]. Mr. Skolds, you'll
    have to sum up, you're at the end of your time.
        Mr. Skolds. All right. I'll stop right there then. Thank
    you for the opportunity.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Brian.

      STATEMENT OF DANIELLE BRIAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PROJECT ON
                          GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT

        Ms. Brian. The Project on Government Oversight, an
    investigative organization that works with insiders in order to
    improve public policy, first began investigating nuclear
    security by looking at the Department of Energy's nuclear
    weapons facilities. This work caused security guards at
    commercial reactors, current and former NRC security officials
    and contractors with military experience to contact POGO about
    inadequate security at commercial nuclear plants.
        My testimony is based on information and documents from
    these insiders. I must strongly emphasize that our sources of
    information are not anti-nuclear. In fact, most of them have
    spent their entire professional lives working and supporting
    the nuclear industry. We applaud the sponsors of Senate Bills
    1586 and 1746, the Nuclear Security Act, for several important
    provisions contained in these bills.
        The NRC's current DBT is wholly inadequate. According to
    published sources, the NRC's DBT requires protection against
    fewer than a handful of outside attackers. This is absolutely
    absurd, given the September 11 attack. I'd suggest that the
    fuss about disclosing the already very public number of
    attackers nuclear plants are currently planning to defend
    against appears more that the NRC and utilities are embarrassed
    about this ridiculously low number.
        Half the nuclear power plants cannot even protect against
    these paltry current threat assumptions. Let me caution the
    committee, despite what Chairman Meserve said earlier, these
    tests are seriously dumbed down. They are not hard tests. They
    first do not go beyond this paltry threat assumption. I outline
    in my written testimony many of the other artificialities,
    including, as I think you, Senator, mentioned, that they give 6
    to 10 months advanced warning, which obviously a terrorist
    would not do.
        Can the guard force protect the integrity of the plant from
    a suicidal terrorist attack? The statistics say no. How much
    worse would those statistics be if the DBT accurately
    represented the threat we now face?
        The NRC has never tested a power plant guard force's
    ability to protect spent fuel pools, possibly the prime target
    of a terrorist attack. It is estimated that a terrorist could
    penetrate the fence line and breach a secured spent fuel pool
    in less than 60 seconds. We encourage the NRC to immediately
    recognize spent fuel pools as a primary terrorist target.
        Military special forces have told us about obvious
    vulnerabilities at most nuclear power plants that I would be
    very happy to discuss with Senators or staff. I'm
    uncomfortable, however, outlining them in public testimony. In
    very general terms, a terrorist carrying an explosive could
    blow a sizable hole in the reinforced concrete around a spent
    fuel pool. At one third of our reactors, the spent fuel pools
    are above ground, where they could be targeted from outside the
    fence line, resulting in the immediate release of high levels
    of radiation, quickly turning into an uncontrolled radioactive
    fire.
        The Nuclear Security Act requires a plant to increase
    security of these spent fuel pools. In the meantime, we
    recommend barriers and delay mechanisms to supplement security
    until the spent fuel is placed in dry casks underground. Guards
    at one plant told POGO that their only firearms training was
    firing 96 rounds or shots with their handguns, and far fewer
    with their shotguns. Standard training requires only that they
    can stand and hit a stationary target 25 years away. They have
    no training shooting on the run at a moving target.
        Recently, some of the facilities, because of the more
    advanced attention to this issue in the last few months, have
    introduced a running man across the target, where the standing
    shooter is allowed to have 10 shots trying to hit the target.
    Guards have admitted that their training is so inadequate in
    the face of a real terrorist attack, many would simply use
    their guns to protect themselves while they escaped.
        Additionally, nuclear power plant guards are severely
    outgunned. Even the NRC's DBT assumes that attackers will be
    armed with automatic weapons and explosives. Yet many guards
    are equipped only with shotguns and revolvers. Contrary to the
    ads in the Washington Post, placed by the nuclear industry
    lobbyist, NEI, guards do not normally wear flak jackets nor
    carry semi-automatic weapons. At one-third of nuclear power
    plants, the guards only have access to shotguns that are locked
    up at a distant central location.
        POGO strongly agrees with the Nuclear Security Act's
    provision reviving the OSRE program and requiring that mock
    attacks occur no less than every 2 years. Chairman Meserve also
    mentioned that the NRC is in the process of revitalizing the
    OSRE process of testing facilities. I'd like to mention that
    the NRC has twice closed that shop down because they didn't
    like what they were finding out. I would not frankly trust the
    NRC without congressional involvement to make the decisions on
    how they are going to revive that office.
        Anti-terrorism experts tell us that the worst enemy of any
    guard force is the daily grind of nothing happening. A simple
    solution is to add unannounced tests, which aren't happening
    right now by the NRC.
        Senator Clinton. You'll have to wrap up.
        Ms. Brian. Yes. POGO believes the goals achieved by
    federalizing could instead be accomplished through the
    following improvements. Security guards are among the lowest
    compensated employees. I spoke with one last night who is
    getting $2 less an hour than custodians at his facility. Guards
    must be given whistleblower protections. Despite what the
    chairman said, only Federal employees have legal whistleblower
    protection. Currently, utility and security subcontract
    employees do not.
        The Federal Government's expanded role should be to provide
    independent oversight rather than managing security and we
    strongly recommend taking the security oversight function out
    of the NRC. I'd also just like to conclude that we support S.
    1586 as it's intended to remedy some obvious failures in the
    ability of guards to protect against attacks.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Hastie.

      STATEMENT OF DONNA J. MILLER HASTIE, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
                       SPECIALIST, MARRIETTA, GA

        Ms. Hastie. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
        I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you today about the
    status, the current status at commercial nuclear power plants
    in the United States. I'd like to make three points today.
        First, commercial nuclear power plants have comprehensive,
    well developed and regularly tested emergency preparedness
    programs. The full scope of regulation pertaining to our
    nuclear emergency programs would cover a length of about 28.7
    feet. The bibliography alone for these plans is well over an
    inch thick. I've provided a description in my written testimony
    of the comprehensive programs.
        Currently, there is strong inter-agency coordination among
    the Federal, State and local agencies and with the utility to
    carry out their specific response. I believe that many of these
    Federal agencies are under the oversight of this committee.
        Nuclear power plants have to participate in an
    independently reviewed, full scale exercise every 2 years. We
    have conducted over 1,000 full scale exercises in the past 25
    years. We provide training to local workers through the
    cooperation of State agencies, and that includes firefighters,
    police, medical personnel, ambulance personnel, school
    personnel, school bus drivers and even local farmers. These
    integrated training programs are an excellent way that we build
    trusting relationships with the local communities that surround
    our power plants and also credibility with our State and
    Federal regulators and personnel.
        Second point is that the emergency preparedness programs
    are founded on a strong scientific and technical basis. This
    includes the two emergency planning zones around nuclear power
    plants. In 1976, a joint EPA and NRC task force developed a
    planning basis for offsite emergency preparedness. The task
    force performed a detailed analysis of the full range of
    possible reactor accidents to determine the appropriate
    distances from the plant that should be used for planning
    purposes. The task force received substantial input from all
    Federal agencies and relevant State agencies that would be
    responsible for implementing these protective actions.
        Following a 2-year plus study, the task force concluded
    that it was highly unlikely that prompt protective actions for
    the public would need to be taken beyond the 10 miles. That
    study led to the 10-mile and the 50-mile emergency planning
    zones that are currently used today. We know our emergency
    response plans work. Because emergency response plans developed
    by nuclear plants have been used for many non-nuclear
    emergencies.
        Evacuation of 10,000 people from Cedar Rapids, IA,
    following a fire, used the Dwayne Arnold plant. There were
    17,000 residents in St. Charles Parish in Louisiana that were
    evacuated following a leak from a nearby chemical plant, using
    Intergy's water for a three nuclear power plant plan. We've had
    hurricanes, evacuations caused by a volcano at Mount St.
    Helen's. We've used Hurricane Andrew at Turkey Point. So we
    have tested these plans many times in real events. We have
    never had to use them for a nuclear plant evaluation.
        Over the years, as new insights and experience regarding
    reactor safety have been analyzed, the 10- and 50-mile planning
    zones have continued to be found valid for our emergency
    preparedness programs. I am not aware of any new scientific or
    technical information, even post-9/11, that would support
    fundamental changes to the existing 10- and 50-mile planning
    zones.
        My third point is brief. Continual learning is an integral
    part of each of our emergency preparedness programs. We have a
    commitment to excellence throughout the industry, coupled with
    continued training, self-assessment and testing that has
    produced a high level of preparedness.
        In summary, in the past 30 years, the nuclear industry has
    conducted, as I said, over 1,000 full scale graded exercises.
    We have evidence that our emergency preparedness programs are
    effective. We continue to strive for new levels of safety.
        I thank you for the opportunity today to provide testimony
    at this hearing. I am sure that everyone here shares a common
    goal, and that is to protect the health and safety of the
    public. That's the commitment that binds us all. Thank you.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Ms. Hastie.
        Dr. Redlener.

         STATEMENT OF DR. IRWIN REDLENER, M.D., PRESIDENT, THE
    CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AT MONTEFIORE AND PRESIDENT, THE CHILDREN'S
                              HEALTH FUND

        Dr. Redlener. Thank you, Senator Clinton and Senator
    Carper. I'm also pleased to be here, and I'm anxious to be
    supportive of the Nuclear Security Act and so glad that it has
    been proposed.
        As a pediatrician, and as a public health expert who's been
    involved in public health for 30 years, I have been increasinly
    involved locally in New York and nationally in a variety of
    efforts with respect to the public health and general
    preparedness planning for ongoing terrorism. Specifically,
    among my most important concerns now has been the growing
    awareness of potential terrorist attacks on nuclear power
    facilities. Clearly, the events of September 11 demand a
    reexamination of all aspects of the vulnerability and security
    of these facilities. The fact is that because of the potential
    human consequences of a successful attack on power plants, this
    issue represents one of the most important public health
    challenges of our time.
        Here in a nutshell is what we know about the public health
    and health risks of nuclear attacks. Depending on the specifics
    of the projected attack scenarios and the extent of damage to a
    reactor, its support systems and/or the spent fuel containment
    systems, immediate civilian fatalities can range from 100 or so
    to 5,000 or more plus long term excess cancers from radiation
    exposure ranging at least into the tens of thousands. Moreover,
    nuclear terrorism is in a special category of psychological
    horror, even different from chemical and other kinds of violent
    terrorist attacks, because nuclear terrorism is evocative of
    nightmare scenarios that we've lived with for decades.
        In addition to the human toll studies, which have been done
    by many independent experts, other experts have also concluded
    that thousands of square miles could be contaminated and
    uninhabitable for years or decades under a variety of possible
    nuclear plant attack scenarios. In sum, the economic,
    psychological and societal consequences of such an event in a
    major population center would be almost incalculable.
        For all of these reasons, it's imperative that we take
    necessary and prudent steps, as we would with any other kind of
    major public health threat, to reduce the likelihood of a
    successful act of terrorism against a nuclear power plant.
        There are some steps that I believe can help us assure the
    public that we're dealing with this challenge preventively and
    effectively. Much of this is addressed in the legislation at
    hand. First and foremost, I believe strongly that the security
    at nuclear plants needs to be upgraded dramatically and
    immediately. Importantly, the upgrade of plant security needs
    to be commensurate with our new and totally different
    understanding of the capacity, ferocity and intelligence of
    terrorism as we've seen it on American soil. As a public health
    professional, having some understanding of what the public
    needs, practically and psychologically, I believe that
    federalizing the security forces at nuclear power plants is an
    urgent priority.
        Second, all spent fuel rods should be stored in hardened,
    onsite dry storage facilities pending more definitive solutions
    to the challenge of permanent storage. Unlike the reactor core
    itself, which is in a hardened containment structure, the spent
    fuel in many plants, for example, the Indian Point plant that
    Senator Clinton referred to, is in an adjacent, comparatively
    lightweight structure covered with nothing more than a
    corrugated steel roof. A significant terrorist-induced
    explosion and fire could potentially release massive doses of
    radioactive material into the atmosphere. Dry storage can
    reduce this risk dramatically.
        Third, there needs to be a top to bottom revision and
    upgrading of the emergency planning process with active Federal
    oversight. Planning for evacuation, especially in densely
    populated areas, is extremely difficult under any circumstance.
    The grossly inadequate emergency evacuation planning process
    around the Indian Point facility is a case study. The planning
    zone of 10 miles is entirely too limited and is inconsistent
    with potential expectations of damage, contamination and human
    behavior under crisis conditions.
        In fact, spontaneous, uncontrolled evacuations in a time of
    crisis, well beyond the 10-mile zone, could quickly result in
    chaos and paralysis of egress for people. Permanent relocation
    for evacuees in the event of substantial ground contamination
    would be an extraordinary challenge. Furthermore, children in
    school and day care would need to be reunited with their
    parents. Hospitalized patients, senior citizens, disabled
    persons, prisoners, persons refusing to leave the area, all
    represent some of the vexing real world challenges not met by
    the current evacuation plans.
        Finally, potassium iodide should be acquired and
    distributed on a point of use basis for a minimum of 50 miles
    from all the nuclear power plants.
        There is, of course, much more to talk about. I'm obviously
    available for whatever questions you might have.
        Senator Clinton. Well, I want to thank all of the
    witnesses. I know that other members could not stay, obviously
    the hearing went on longer than anticipated. But I think on
    behalf of every one of our members on this committee, I greatly
    appreciate your expertise, your testimony and the different
    perspectives that you have brought to bear on the issues
    confronting us.
        I think it would be very helpful for us to be able to
    submit questions to you for the record. I also would invite
    perhaps questions from the witnesses for other witnesses or for
    ongoing discussion. Because as one listened to this panel, you
    can see there is a very different perspective that I think is
    legitimately held in good faith. But it is our job to try to
    sort it out, to figure out exactly where we need to take action
    and encourage whatever steps are necessary to maximize the
    security of our nuclear power plants.
        So I thank you very much for your testimony today. I look
    forward to the questions being answered that I know I will be
    submitting to each of you. I wish that you would be, all of
    you, on call for further consultation by members and staff,
    because this is an extremely important issue. I don't think we
    can take anything for granted, no matter what worked in the
    past, I don't think we can take it for granted now and into the
    future.
        We need the extraordinary commitment that each of you
    brings to this issue to help us sort out what we should be
    doing in the future. Again, I thank you and I thank all of the
    audience, who's been very patient. I've seen heads nodding,
    depending on which perspective you agree with. But I think for
    all of us, we need to put aside preexisting attitudes, beliefs,
    experience, and take a new look at this, no matter what
    perspective we came into the hearing with today.
        With that, the committee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to
    reconvene at the call of the chair.]
        [Additional statements submitted for the record follow.]

            Statement of Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear
                             Regulatory Commission

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear
    before you on behalf of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    (NRC) to discuss safeguards and security for NRC-licensed commercial
    nuclear power plants as well as certain legislation that has been
    introduced to strengthen security at these facilities. I will discuss
    the current status of actions that NRC has taken in response to the
    terrorist acts that occurred on September 11, and will outline some of
    the work that lies ahead. I believe that the NRC's response to the
    attacks has been appropriate and thoughtful, and that the NRC's current
    programs continue to provide a very high level of security. l also
    believe that certain specific legislative proposals, which I will
    discuss later, would contribute further to the enhancement of nuclear
    plant security and l would urge the Congress to enact this legislation
    before adjourning later this year.
        The Commission recognizes the elevated concern of the American
    public about the potential for terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities
    and the use of radioactive materials for purposes of terrorism. I hope
    that my testimony today will provide a useful perspective for the
    Committee and will correct any erroneous perceptions on this important
    subject.
        For decades before September 11, 2001, nuclear power plants were
    among the best defended and most hardened facilities of the Nation's
    critical infrastructure. In the aftermath of the attacks, security has
    been enhanced even further. On September 11, the NRC immediately
    advised the licensees of nuclear power plants and certain other
    licensees to go to the highest level of security and they promptly did
    so. Our licensees have remained at the highest level of security since
    that time.
        We have maintained a steady flow of information with our licensees
    through over 30 updates to the original threat advisory. In February,
    we issued Orders to each operating power reactor licensee specifying
    actions they must take to continue the high level of security to
    protect the plants, and thereby to protect public health and safety and
    common defense and security.
        The NRC receives a substantial and steady flow of information from
    the intelligence community, law enforcement, and licensees that
    requires prompt evaluation to assess threats to facilities or
    activities regulated by the agency. The NRC routinely communicates with
    other Federal agencies, such as the Office of Homeland Security, the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Emergency Management
    Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of
    Defense. The protection of nuclear power plants and other nuclear
    facilities and activities has been a matter on which the NRC has
    received assistance from across the Government.

                                  ORGANIZATION

        Within a few weeks of the September 11 terrorist attacks, I, with
    the full support of the Commission, directed the staff to conduct a
    comprehensive re-evaluation of the current safeguards and security
    programs. The review encompasses analysis of the agency's threat
    assessment framework and design basis threat, evaluation of facility
    vulnerabilities, access authorization processes, and emergency
    preparedness and response, and review of NBC's infrastructure,
    programs, and communications.
        In this connection, I specifically directed the staff to review the
    agency's organizational structure, staffing, and training in the
    security and safeguards area. In early April 2002, the Commission
    established a new Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response in
    order to consolidate NRC security, safeguards, and incident response
    capabilities and resources. The primary responsibilities of this new
    Office include safeguards and security programs and related policy
    development, threat assessment, and incident response operations.

                             ADVISORIES AND ORDERS

        As noted previously, after the events of September 11, 2001,
    the.NRC issued numerous safeguards and threat advisories to our major
    licensees in order to strengthen the licensees' capabilities and
    readiness to respond to a potential attack on their facilities. The
    advisories provide concise and relevant guidance relating to the need
    for a given category of licensee to take specific action to enhance
    security. Some of the specific measures implemented by the licensees in
    response to the advisories included increased patrols, augmented
    security forces and capabilities, additional security posts,
    installation of additional physical barriers, vehicle checks at greater
    stand-off distances, enhanced coordination with law enforcement and
    military authorities, and more restrictive site access controls.
        The advisory process, which was in place prior to September 11, was
    developed in order to ensure rapid communication and response to
    potential security concerns. It proved to be a quick and effective
    means for communicating with licensees. Subsequent inspections and
    audits by the NRC confirmed that licensees appropriately responded to
    the actions specified in the advisories issued after the September 11
    attacks. However, in light of the current threat environment, the
    Commission concluded that the additional actions to strengthen security
    at operating power reactors and other facilities should be embodied in
    an established regulatory framework. Therefore, on February 25, 2002,
    the NRC issued Orders that modified the operating licenses for each of
    the power reactors to require compliance with specified interim
    compensatory measures.
        A number of the Orders' requirements formalize measures specified
    in the advisories issued earlier, and have already been implemented.
    Other requirements provide additional security enhancements that have
    emerged from the on-going comprehensive safeguards and security program
    re-evaluation. Implementation of the requirements must be completed by
    August 31, 2002. A licensee would have to meet a very high threshold to
    receive an extension of that date, and no such extension has been
    granted thus far.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Licensees were also required to submit a schedule of
    implementation of the Orders' requirements within 20 days of the
    February 25 Order. Requests have been received for extension of that
    deadline, and are considered on a case-by-case basis. Granting an
    extension to the schedule submission does not change the requirement
    for implementation of the February 25 Order by August 31. Nor does
    granting an extension to the schedule submission deadline mean that a
    licensee cannot meet the August 31 implementation deadline. Any
    extension dates granted for schedule submissions have been set so as to
    leave sufficient time to meet the implementation date of August 31.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        An Order was also issued on March 25, 2002, to the licensee of the
    one existing uranium conversion facility. And, on May 24, the NRC
    issued Orders for the decommissioning reactor facilities. The NRC is
    also developing Orders or considering other actions that will require
    implementation of interim compensatory measures for other categories of
    licensees.
        The NRC will continue to evaluate whether further changes are
    needed as part of our ongoing comprehensive safeguards and security
    program re-evaluation.

                                     ISSUES

        I would now like to discuss briefly a number of specific issues
    that may be of interest to the Committee. These are: (1) the design
    basis threat used to assess security readiness at nuclear facilities,
    (2) the threat of airborne attack, (3) the adequacy of security
    exercises at nuclear facilities, (4) personnel access authorization and
    related security background checks, and (5) protection of spent nuclear
    fuel. This will be followed by a discussion of proposed legislation.
    (1) Design Basis Threat
        Security programs at certain NRC-licensed facilities, including
    nuclear power reactors, are designed to protect against a specified
    level of threat called the Design Basis Threat (DBT). After September
    11, the NRC initiated a re-examination of the basic threat assumptions
    underlying the current civilian nuclear facility security programs,
    including its two established DBTs. The DBTs characterize the adversary
    force against which certain NRC licensees (power reactors, Category I
    fuel cycle facilities, and transportation of Category I special nuclear
    material) must design their physical protection systems and response
    strategies. The NRC continually assesses the threat environment and
    regularly reviews the adequacy of the DBTs in close coordination with
    the national intelligence and law enforcement community. Longer term
    revisions to the DBTs are now needed to reflect changes in the threat
    environment. Commission is currently developing specific guidance to
    the NRC staff for revising the DBTs. Any final decision on the DBTs
    will be considered with appropriate stakeholders and Federal and The
    State agencies. These revisions will lead to changes in the security
    requirements for licensed facilities and activities. The February 25
    Order referred to above includes enhancements to respond to the current
    threat environment.
    (2) Airborne Attack
        Following the use of commercial jetliners as missiles on September
    11, many questions have been raised regarding the potential effects on
    public health and safety if an aircraft attack were made on a nuclear
    facility. As we have stated many times, nuclear facilities are among
    the most hardened industrial facilities. But no existing nuclear
    facilities were specifically designed to withstand a deliberate, high-
    velocity, direct impact of a large commercial airliner.
        The capability of a plant to cope successfully with an aircraft
    impact will, in the first instance, depend upon the plant's specific
    design features. It should be recognized that nuclear power plants are
    massive structures with thick exterior walls and interior barriers of
    reinforced concrete. The plants are designed to withstand tornadoes,
    hurricanes, fires, floods, and earthquakes. As a result, the structures
    inherently afford a measure of protection against deliberate aircraft
    impacts. In addition, the defense-in-depth philosophy used in nuclear
    facility design means that plants have redundant and separated systems
    in order to ensure safety. That is, active components, such as pumps,
    have backups as part of the basic design philosophy. This provides a
    capability to respond to a variety of events, including aircraft
    attack.
        It is also important to note that nuclear power plants have a
    robust emergency preparedness program that includes biennial, evaluated
    exercises. In the event of a serious problem including a terrorist
    attack around a nuclear power plant, the plans and procedures that have
    been routinely exercised would be activated. This, provides a
    capability to respond to events of all types, including aircraft
    attack.
        In our recent Orders to nuclear power plant licensees, the
    Commission directed licensees to develop specific plans to respond to
    an event that results in damage to large areas of their plants from
    explosions or fire. In addition, mitigative measures required by the
    Orders include assuring the presence of Emergency Plan staffing and
    associated resources needed to respond to such an event. The NRC is
    also continuing a major engineering evaluation relating, to the
    vulnerabilities and potential effects of a large commercial aircraft
    striking a nuclear facility. This effort includes consideration of
    additional mitigative and protective measures.
        Suggestions have been made that anti-aircraft defenses should be
    installed at U.S. nuclear power plant sites. Such a step would present
    very difficult command and control issues, and the use of such weaponry
    could lead to significant collateral damage to plant workers and
    members of the public. Although the decision whether to deploy anti-
    aircraft capability must rest with the military, the Commission
    believes that the best approach to dealing with threats from aircraft
    is through strengthening airport and airline security measures.
    (3) Security Exercises
        The NRC has conducted force-on-force security exercises, known as
    Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations (OSREs), at nuclear reactor
    sites since 1991, and carried out similar tests before that time. These
    are tough, simulated commando-style raids, designed to identify
    shortcomings in security personnel performance or strategy
    Identification of a weakness during an exercise leads to immediate,
    corrective or compensatory measures. We are not aware of any comparable
    performance testing of security measures for any other commercial
    facilities in the United States.
        Following the September 11 attacks, force-on-force exercises were
    temporarily suspended because, in the heightened threat environment,
    the conduct of exercises would be a significant distraction to security
    forces. In addition, the NRC had diverted its limited security
    inspection resources to staff response centers and to monitor and
    evaluate the licensees' heightened security posture. We recognize,
    however, that force-on-force drills are an important means to assess
    security readiness. The NRC staff is currently preparing options for
    Commission consideration on how to reinstate security exercises. For
    example, in the future we may involve local and State law enforcement
    in the exercises and we may look at beyond-design basis threats and the
    ability of operator actions to mitigate any hypothetical damage caused
    by a beyond-design basis attack.
    (4) Personnel Access Authorization
        The NRC's comprehensive security program re-evaluation includes an
    assessment of the personnel access authorization requirements and
    programs at nuclear power facilities. This effort is intended, in part,
    to address potential insider threats.
        Current NRC regulations, which are the toughest in any non-defense
    industry in this country and which were in place prior to September 11,
    generally require an individual seeking unescorted access to a nuclear
    power plant to undergo a background investigation to verify the
    individual's true identity and require the licensee to develop
    information about the person's background. The investigation includes
    review of the individual's employment history, education history,
    credit history, military service, and character and reputation, as well
    as a psychological assessment to evaluate trustworthiness and
    reliability. The background investigation also, includes a criminal
    history check conducted by the FBI.\2\ The requirements related to
    unescorted access are also supplemented by behavioral monitoring once
    on the job, and random drug and alcohol testing as part of a
    comprehensive fitness for duty program. Further, those who enter the
    protected area pass through portal monitors that detect weapons or
    explosives.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Current NRC regulations allow an individual to obtain temporary
    unescorted access during the conduct of the criminal history check, but
    many of the other requirements for unescorted access must be satisfied
    in such a situation. The Orders issued to commercial nuclear power
    licensees in February required additional restrictions on the use of
    temporary unescorted access authorizations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We took additional steps after September 11. The NRC, in
    coordination with the FBI, checked NRC employees and licensee personnel
    against the FBI watch list established as part of the investigation of
    the events of September 11. Since that time, we have been working, with
    the Office of Homeland Security to facilitate information sharing among
    Federal agencies to enhance access to relevant information and improve
    the access authorization programs.
        The NRC is also coordinating with the Immigration and
    Naturalization Service (INS) in the effort to validate the employment
    eligibility of employees at nuclear power plants. We seek to ensure
    that only persons authorized to work in the U.S. are employed in
    nuclear power plants. However, there are limitations on the NRC's and
    its licensees' ability to obtain and use information available in INS
    and other Federal data bases for this purpose. For example, current law
    (8 U.S.C. Sec. 1342b) prohibits discrimination on the basis of alienage
    in the context of employment. This section has been interpreted to
    preclude asking non-citizens for more proof of identity than citizens.
    In addition, in the process of dealing with access authorization, the
    Constitutional rights of both citizens and non-citizens must be
    protected.
    (5) Spent Nuclear Fuel
        Most of the radioactive material at power reactors is concentrated
    in the spent nuclear fuel that has been removed from the reactors.
    Spent nuclear fuel is stored at reactor sites in spent fuel pools or in
    dry cask storage facilities. Spent fuel pools use water to cool the
    spent fuel and shield personnel from radiation. The pools are robust
    structures constructed of very thick concrete walls with stainless
    steel liners, and are designed to withstand earthquakes. Spent fuel
    casks are also robust, typically constructed of a combination of
    concrete and steel that allow for air cooling of the spent fuel.
        Spent fuel stored at NRC-licensed facilities poses a lesser
    security challenge than an operating reactor because the risk to the
    public health and safety is diminished. NBC's comprehensive safeguards
    and security program re-evaluation includes the consideration of
    potential consequences of terrorist attacks using various explosives or
    other techniques on spent fuel pools and spent nuclear fuel dry casks
    at storage sites. The program also addresses the transportation of
    spent fuel and other significant quantities of radioactive material.
        The Orders issued by the Commision on February 25, 2002, to
    operating reactors, and on May 2, 2002, to decommissioning reactors and
    the General Electric spent fuel storage facility, enhance the security
    measures for spent fuel stored in spent fuel pools. The specific
    security measures are understandably sensitive, but generally include
    requirements for increased patrols, augmented security forces and
    capabilities, additional security posts, vehicle stand-off distances,
    and enhanced coordination with law enforcement and military
    authorities. We will shortly issue a similar Order to independent spent
    fuel storage facilities using dry cask storage.
        I would also like to address security during transportation. Our
    existing regulations currently contain significant safety and security
    requirements for the transport of radioactive material. After the
    September 11, 2001 event, we also issued advisories to increase
    security in transportation of specific types of radioactive material,
    including spent fuel shipments and shipments referred to as Highway
    Route Controlled Quantities of radioactive material. In order to codify
    the advisories, the Commission is currently in the process of issuing
    Orders to licensees shipping specific quantities of radioactive
    material and will be considering, expedited rulemaking in this area as
    well. We will also review transportation requirements as part of our
    comprehensive review of the safeguards and security programs that I
    previously mentioned.

                               LEGISLATIVE NEEDS

        Since the events of September 11, 2001, many Members of Congress
    have asked the NRC how they can help to improve the security at nuclear
    power plants and other facilities. In response, the Commission has
    requested that Congress enact several specific legislative proposals
    that would amend three sections of the Atomic Energy Act. These
    proposals were contained in an omnibus bill the Commission transmitted
    to the Congress in June of last year and in letters I sent to Congress
    this fiscal year. The NRC has been seeking enactment of most of these
    amendments for almost 15 years. Most of these provisions are contained
    in S. 1586, which was introduced by Senators. Inhofe and Smith at the
    end of last October. I should note that all of our proposals have been
    coordinated with the executive branch and enjoy the strong support of
    the Administration.
        One of the proposals would provide Federal authorization for guards
    to carry and use firearms at NRC-regulated facilities designated by the
    Commission, and to protect property of significance to the common
    defense and security located at, or being transported to or from, such
    facilities. The proposal would enhance national security by eliminating
    several weaknesses under the current safeguards and security regime. In
    particular, this amendment could provide some protection for licensee
    guards from State criminal prosecution for actions taken during the
    performance of their official duties. Ameliorating guards' concerns
    regarding State prosecution should make their actions more dependable
    in situations calling for use of their weapons.
        The Atomic Energy Act permits the Department of Energy (DOE) and
    its contractors and subcontractors engaged in the protection of
    property located at nuclear facilities, or being transported to or from
    such facilities, to carry arms, make arrests, and use force as the
    Department deems necessary in the interests of the common defense and
    security. As a result, DOE guards may be shielded from State criminal
    prosecution for actions taken during the performance of their official
    duties. However, this does not apply to guards at NRC-licensed
    facilities. State laws govern the use of weapons by guards at NRC-
    licensed facilities, and some States laws do not permit guards to use
    weapons, except to protect against an immediate threat to their own
    lives or the lives of others. In such States, it may not be possible to
    shield the guards at NRC-licensed facilities from State criminal
    prosecution for actions taken during the performance of official
    duties.
        This difference between the protections offered to DOE guards and
    guard's at NRC-licensed facilities exists even where both are
    protecting special nuclear material. Several years ago, Congress
    extended the protections applicable to DOE guards to guards at the
    gaseous diffusion facilities. operated by the United States Enrichment
    Corporation. It would seem logical to extend equivalent protections to
    guards at NRC-licensed or certified facilities designated by the
    Commission.
        In addition, some State laws make it difficult for licensees or
    their security, contractors to use more effective weaponry. To
    alleviate this problem, the Commission has developed an addition to the
    proposed amendment establishing Federal authorization for guards to
    carry and use firearms at NRC-regulated facilities. This additional
    provision--not included in S. 1586--would authorize the guards to carry
    and use, where necessary to the discharge of their official duties,
    such weapons as the Commission may require, pursuant to guidelines
    issued with the concurrence of the Attorney General. A copy of the
    original proposal with additional language--to address this concern is
    attached to my written statement.
        Another provision would make it a Federal crime to bring
    unauthorized weapons and explosives into NRC-licensed facilities. There
    have been a number of reported incidents where persons without
    authorization have brought firearms into protected areas of NRC-
    regulated sites. Although the NRC may impose sanctions against the
    licensee for violations of its security regulations, there is no
    Federal law permitting the imposition of criminal sanctions against the
    person responsible for bringing the weapon or other dangerous
    instrument to the site. This amendment would assist NRC licensees in
    their efforts to safeguard licensed nuclear facilities and materials
    that must be protected against radiological sabotage or nuclear theft.
    It would permit the NRC to promulgate regulations prohibiting the
    unauthorized introduction of weapons into NRC-regulated sites.
    Violation of the regulations would constitute a Federal crime, which
    could result in a fine or imprisonment, or both.
        Our final proposal would make Federal prohibitions on sabotage
    applicable to the operation and construction of such NRC-licensed or
    certified facilities as nuclear reactors and enrichment and fuel
    fabrication facilities. This amendment would provide criminal sanctions
    for sabotage or attempted sabotage of such a facility during its
    operation or construction where the action could affect public health
    and safety during the operation of the facility.
        We believe that the modest legislative changes that I have
    described will contribute to enhancing the security of nuclear
    facilities and material. S. 1586 contains provisions that are similar
    to these proposals, except that it does not contain the more recently
    developed provision I have described authorizing guards to carry and
    use, where necessary to the discharge of their official duties, such
    weapons as the Commission may require, pursuant to guidelines issued
    with the concurrence of the Attorney General.
    S. 1746
        The Commission opposes S. 1746, which would Federalize the security
    forces at commercial nuclear facilities. There are several fundamental
    difficulties with this legislation.
        First, S. 1746 separates the strategy for the security of nuclear
    facilities from that of all other types of sensitive facilities (e.g.,
    chemical plants, refineries, and dams). We believe society's defensive
    resources should be allocated in accordance with relative risk, and
    that the separation of nuclear facilities from all other types of
    sensitive facilities will fragment the overall consideration of risk
    inappropriately. Since resources are not infinite, disproportionate
    protection at one kind of facility may increase the risks at other
    kinds of facilities.
        Second, the requirement that the NRC establish a security force for
    sensitive nuclear facilities addresses a non-existent problem. S. 1746
    would require the hiring of thousands of new Federal guards to displace
    the private security forces now used by licensees. The private guard
    forces that exist today at such facilities are qualified, trained, and
    tightly regulated. There is no need, unlike the situation of airports,
    to Federalize security at such plants. There have been no failures in
    nuclear plant security that would warrant the creation of a new Federal
    security force for NRC-licensed facilities.
        Third, S. 1746 would bring about a fundamental shift in the
    responsibility and mission of the NRC. The demands of the legislation
    would refocus the NRC principally as an agency to ensure nuclear
    security, which could have the unintended consequence of detracting
    from the Commission's mission to protect the public health and safety
    from radiological hazards.
        Fourth, NRC's role as an independent regulator would be compromised
    by the bill's requirement that the NRC design security plans for all
    sensitive nuclear facilities, implement the plans with NRC employees,
    and then conduct safeguards evaluations of the efficacy of the
    implementation of those plans. In the security area, the legislation
    would force the, NRC to regulate its own activities.
        Fifth, the bill would create command and control difficulties
    because it would establish two classes of, employees at commercial
    nuclear sites, both of which would be responsible for safety in the
    event of a terrorist attack--licensee personnel responsible to the
    licensee for safe operations and Federal employees responsible to the
    NRC for security. In an emergency situation, these separate lines of
    authority could, in fact, lead to a diminution of the capacity to
    ensure safety.
        Sixth, making guards at nuclear facilities employees of the
    Commission (as S. 1746 would do) would require significant additional
    resources that could be used more effectively in other efforts to
    enhance the security of the nation's infrastructure. Moreover, given
    the enhancement in the security threat against which the guard force
    would be required to defend in accordance with the proposed
    legislation, the NRC would be required to hire more than 5,000 new
    Federal workers, which is nearly twice the number of staff now employed
    by the agency.
        These fundamental difficulties in S. 1746 argue against its
    adoption, but there are also other concerns raised by the bill,
    including the following:
         S. 1746 does not alleviate concerns, arising from State
    law, similar to those described earlier in my discussion of differences
    between the situation of guards at DOE facilities and guards at NRC-
    licensed facilities.
         S. 1746 would create a ``Nuclear Security Fund,'' to be
    used to pay costs of salaries, training, and other expenses of the
    nuclear security force established by the bill as well as costs of
    developing and implementing security plans. To ensure that adequate
    amounts are available for these purposes, the Commission would be
    directed to assess licensees a fee ``not to exceed 1 mill per kilowatt-
    hour of electricity generated'' by ``sensitive nuclear facilities''.
    This does not take into account that a significant portion of those
    facilities (for example, decommissioned nuclear power plants) do not
    produce electricity.
         S. 1746 would create a new NRC Office (the Operations
    Safeguards and Response Unit) within the NRC. This aspect of the
    legislation has already been accomplished and thus the statutory
    provision is unnecessary. In early April of this year the Commission
    established a centralized security organization within the NRC--the
    Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. This office combines
    security responsibilities previously exercised by the Office of Nuclear
    Material Safety and Safeguards and the Office of Nuclear Reactor
    Regulation.
         S. 1746 provides a new focus on Federal-State
    relationships. For example, until now States have borne the primary
    responsibility for emergency response. However, the bill would require
    the Commission to certify that stockpiles of potassium iodide (KI)
    tablets have been established within a 50-mile radius of sensitive
    nuclear facilities, and to develop plans for prompt distribution of the
    stockpiles in the event of a release of radionuclides. Thus, S. 1746
    would require intrusion by the NRC into the States' responsibilities in
    this area. In addition, Congress recently addressed the subject of KI
    distribution in the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
    Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, which now awaits Presidential
    signature. No further legislation regarding Kl is warranted.
        In light of the above considerations, the Commission believes that
    the current system, with coordination of security and safety through,
    organizations subject to NRC regulatory scrutiny, is clearly preferable
    to that proposed by S. 1746.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In closing, the events of September 11 have had, and continue to
    have, a significant effect on both the NRC and our licensees.
    Nonetheless, our licensees' primary responsibility of ensuring safe
    operation of their facilities, and the NBC's fundamental mission of
    protecting public health and safety, have not changed. Licensees'
    physical protection programs in place prior to September 11 continue to
    be effective in protecting the public, and have been appropriately
    enhanced since September 11. Moreover, the NRC continues to work with a
    variety of agencies, including the Office of Homeland Security, in an
    effort to develop an integrated national strategy to deal with critical
    infrastructure. We continue to believe that nuclear security would be
    enhanced by enactment of the legislation proposed by the NRC. We look
    forward to working with the Congress both on the enactment of the NRC
    legislative proposals I have discussed and on continuing to ensure
    adequate protection of the public health and safety and the common
    defense and security.
        I appreciate being here today to discuss the NRC's programs and am
    prepared to answer your questions.

                                     ______

                                   Attachment

              SECTION. CARRYING OF FIREARMS BY LICENSEE EMPLOYEES

        Section 161 k. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2201(k))
    is amended to read as follows:
        ``Sec. 161. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
        ``In the performance of its functions the Commission is authorized
    to--
        ``k. (1) authorize such of, its members, officers, and employees as
    it deems necessary in the interest of the common defense and security
    to carry firearms while in the discharge of their official duties. The
    Commission may also authorize--
              ``(A) such of those employees of its contractors and
            subcontractors (at any tier) engaged in the protection of
            property under the jurisdiction of the United States located at
            facilities owned by or contracted to the United States or being
            transported to or from such facilities as it deems necessary in
            the interests of the common defense and security; and
              ``(B) such of those employees of persons licensed or
            certified by the Commission (including employees of contractors
            of licensees or certificate holders) engaged in the protection
            of (i) facilities owned or operated by a Commission licensee or
            certificate holder that are designated by the Commission, or
            (ii) property of significance to the common defense and
            security located at facilities owned or operated by a
            Commission licensee or certificate holder or being transported
            to or from such facilities;
    to carry firearms while in the discharge of their official duties. A
    person authorized to carry firearms under this subsection may, while in
    the performance of, and in connection with, official duties, make
    arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States
    committed in that person's presence or for any felony cognizable under
    the laws of the United States if that person has reasonable grounds to
    believe that the individual to be arrested has committed or is
    committing such felony. An employee of a contractor or subcontractor or
    of a Commission licensee or certificate holder (or a contractor of a
    licensee or certificate holder) authorized to carry firearms under this
    subsection may make such arrests only when the individual to be
    arrested is within, or in direct flight from, the area of such offense.
    A person granted authority to make arrests by this subsection may
    exercise that authority only in the enforcement of (A) laws regarding
    the property of the United States in the custody of the Department of
    Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or a contractor of the
    Department of Energy or Nuclear Regulatory Commission or a licensee or
    certificate holder of the Commission, or (B) laws applicable to
    facilities owned or operated by a Commission licensee or certificate
    holder that are designated by the Commission pursuant to this
    subsection, and property of significance to the common defense and
    security that is in the custody of a licensee or certificate holder or
    a contractor of a licensee or certificate holder of the Commission, or
    (C) any provision of this chapter that may subject an offender to a
    fine, imprisonment, or both. The arrest authority conferred by this
    subsection is in addition to any arrest authority under other laws; The
    Secretary and the Commission, with the approval of the Attorney
    General, shall issue guidelines to implement this subsection;
        ``(2) authorize employees of persons licensed or certified by the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission (including employees of contractors of
    licensees or certificate holders) who are trained and qualified as
    guards and whose duty is the protection of facilities designated under
    paragraph (1)(B)(i) or property described under paragraph (1)(B)(ii) to
    carry and use, where necessary to the discharge of their official
    duties, such weapons, devices, or ammunition as the Commission may
    require. Such employees shall have the power to carry and use such
    weapons while in the discharge of their official duties, regardless
    whether such employees have been designated as Federal, State, or;local
    law enforcement officers. Such employees shall have such law
    enforcement powers as are provided to them under this section and
    section 161 i. of this Act. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall
    issue guidelines, with the approval of the Attorney General, to
    implement this paragraph. The authority conferred by this paragraph
    with respect to employees of persons licensed or certified; by the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission (including employees of contractors of
    licensees or certificate holders) who are trained and qualified as
    guards and whose duty is the protection of facilities designated under
    paragraph (1)(B)(i) or property described under paragraph (1)(B)(ii)
    shall not be implemented until such guidelines have become effective;''

                                     ______

             Responses by Chairman Meserve to Additional Questions
                              from Senator Clinton

        Question 1. In your December 3rd letter to the Committee, you noted
    that NRC had a two-phase project to understand plant vulnerabilities to
    attacks by either commercial or general aviation aircraft, which you
    again mentioned today. The first phase was to be completed in January
    of 2002 and the second in June of this year. Can you please update the
    Committee on the progress of this project? Specifically, what have your
    studies determined about the ability of containment vessels to
    withstand assault by a modern aircraft?
        Response. The first phase of the project was completed in January
    2002. Simplified analyses were performed to estimate the response of
    key buildings and structures. Insights from the first phase were used
    to develop the interim compensatory measures. Specific insights from
    the first phase, including perspectives on the ability of containment
    to withstand various loads, have been classified as national security
    information.
        The staff used the insights from the first phase to develop plans
    for the detailed analyses in the second phase. Detailed models of
    representative structures and aircraft have been developed and
    calculations were performed to demonstrate the ability to perform the
    analyses. Aviation fuel combustion and fire propagation were also
    included in these analyses. These models are now being used to refine
    the insights from the first phase. The results of these analyses are
    also classified. I should also note that we are in contact with certain
    foreign governments, who are conducting similar classified
    vulnerability assessments, to peer review our results and to gain
    additional insights from their work.
        In my December 3, 2001 letter, I indicated that the need to perform
    additional work may be identified as the work progressed. Based on the
    insights gained to date, additional research and analyses are being
    planned to further refine vulnerability and consequence assessments,
    and to support evaluation of the effectiveness of compensatory
    measures. This work is currently planned through June 2003. NRC is also
    developing an experimental program to quantify more definitively the
    accuracy of the analysis methods in predicting (1) the performance of
    reinforced concrete structures under extreme loads, (2) dispersion of
    aviation fuel on impact, and (3) fire propagation. The experimental
    program is currently expected to continue through 2005.

        Question 2. NRC has not yet issued a revised Design Basis Threat,
    but has required that the nuclear industry implement interim security
    measures. As I understand it, in the normal course of events, security
    measures are based on a defined DBT. A DBT is defined first, and
    security plans are developed to meet that Threat. How were the interim
    security measures determined if a new DBT has not been defined? How can
    we be assured the interim measures are adequate if they are not based
    on an agreed DBT?
        Response. The design basis threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage
    was established in the 1970s and modified at various times since then
    so as to enable licensees to develop security plans to meet that
    threat. In the elevated threat environment that has existed since
    September 11, the Commission decided that immediate upgrades in
    security were necessary. Rather than change the DBT, the Commission
    issued advisories and then issued Orders to establish a variety of
    prescriptive requirements to enhance security. These enhancements
    include increased numbers of guards, increased weaponry, tightened
    access controls, increased standoff distances, as well as other
    changes. Because these prescriptive measures were highly specific, they
    were unambiguous and could be put in place quickly. The introduction of
    changes by way of modification to the DBT, by contrast, would have
    delayed implementation because of the need for the licensees to analyze
    the DBT to determine the additional measures that were necessary in
    order to satisfy it. In light of the comprehensive nature of the
    actions required by the Commission, the NRC is satisfied that an
    appropriate security capability is in place.
        The NRC is undertaking a revision of its security requirements and
    the DBT at this time. In fact, the staff expects to submit a first
    draft of the revised DBT to the Commission within the next few months.
    Changes to the DBT will be coordinated with the other agencies of the
    Government.

        Question 3. On the other hand, if the interim measures are in fact
    based on an assumed threat, then the NRC must already have a good idea
    of what a revised DBT should be. Why hasn't NRC issued the revised DBT
    yet?
        Response. No agency of Government has revised its DBT as yet as a
    result of September 11. The Commission has put in place a process that
    will lead to a staff recommendation for a revised DBT in the next few
    months. The NRC is coordinating with appropriate Federal agencies as it
    develops a revised DBT to ensure full consideration is given to
    information from the intelligence community and others.

        Question 4. In your recent letter to me on the damage that small
    planes could cause to a reactor, you noted that you do not expect a
    small plane attack to result in a ``serious threat to public health and
    safety.'' Please describe what kind of threat to public health and
    safety such an attack might pose, even if not deemed serious by your
    standards. Could such an attack disable several safety-related systems
    at once? Could such an attack conceivably result in ``total station
    blackout'', where all power to the reactor is cut off?
        Response. A small plane is extremely unlikely to penetrate nuclear
    power plant structures in a way that would disable several safety-
    related systems at once. Therefore, the impact of a small plane into a
    site structure is unlikely to cause either core damage or containment
    failure, both of which are required for a significant offsite release.
    Such an impact thus does not post a serious threat to public health and
    safety.
        Such an attack could conceivably cause the loss of offsite power.
    The Commission's regulations require that each plant must be able to
    recover from a station blackout. Nuclear power plants are designed with
    redundant emergency electrical power sources, in particular emergency
    diesel generators, which provide electrical power to safety system
    equipment in the case off-site power is not available.

        Question 5. Does the NRC intend to continue to run the OSRE force-
    on-force exercises? When do you think these exercises will resume? Who
    serves as the mock terrorists in these exercises? I understand that up
    until recently, these exercises were only run about once every eight
    years. How often will these exercises be performed at each facility in
    the future?
        Response. Following the September 11 attacks, NRC-evaluated force-
    on-force exercises were temporarily suspended because, in the
    heightened threat environment, the conduct of exercises could create
    vulnerabilities and would be a significant distraction to security
    forces. Moreover, the NRC had diverted its security inspection
    resources to staff response centers and to monitor and evaluate the
    licensees' heightened security posture. We recognize that force-on-
    force drills are an important means to assess security readiness and
    the NRC intends to re-initiate these drills. We are doing so by
    initially exercising the table top component of the exercises and will
    then expand the exercises to include a force-on-force component. Our
    goal is to evaluate an integrated security exercise at each site every
    three years. Licensees conduct more frequent exercises as part of their
    training programs.
        Throughout the OSRE program, the licensees have provided the
    personnel to make up the mock terrorist team for the exercises, subject
    to supervision by the NRC's experts. Some licensees trade teams of mock
    adversaries, which provides teams with the requisite expertise, but
    without the day-to-day knowledge of each site. This provides a more
    realistic simulation of the presumed expertise of the potential
    terrorists.

        Question 6. In your December 17 response to the Committee, the
    Commission indicated that the performance of more frequent periodic
    drills and exercises ``could enhance our licensees' capabilities to
    protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage.''
    Have you budgeted for increased exercises in the future?
        Response. Yes, the NRC is budgeting for more frequent exercises and
    more oversight of the licensees' security programs in general.

        Question 7. Is the NRC looking into how spent fuel can be better
    secured through dry cask storage?
        Response. Spent fuel pools are robust structures constructed of
    very thick concrete walls with stainless steel liners, and are designed
    to withstand earthquakes. Spent fuel casks are also robust, typically
    constructed of a combination of concrete and steel that allow for air
    cooling of the spent fuel. Both pools and casks can be used to store
    spent fuel safely and securely in accordance with NRC requirements.
        The comprehensive safeguards and security program re-evaluation
    being conducted by the NRC includes the consideration of potential
    consequences of terrorist attacks using various explosives or other
    techniques on spent fuel pools and spent nuclear fuel dry casks at
    storage sites. The Commission continues to evaluate the need for
    additional interim compensatory measures.

        Question 8. When was the Design Basis Threat last revised?
        Response. The DBT was last revised in 1994 to include a vehicle
    threat. This change to the DBT was reflected in a revision to 10 CFR
    73.55 and required licensees to provide measures for protection against
    a vehicle being used as a means of transporting personnel or explosives
    to the proximity of vital areas. Certain of the guidance relating to
    the implementation of the DBT has been subject to subsequent revision.

        Question 9. Is it true that the current DBT does not include a
    waterborne component? Does it include an airborne component?
        Response. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section
    73.1(a) defines the design basis threat in general terms. Specific
    details of the DBT are considered sensitive Safeguards Information and
    cannot be included as part of the public record. We would be pleased to
    respond to the question in a different forum.

                                     ______

             Responses by Chairman Meserve to Additional Questions
                             from Senator Voinovich

        Question 1. During the hearing, there seemed to be some confusion
    about the NRC's and your concerns regarding the federalization of a
    nuclear plant guard force. Can you please address this confusion?
        Response. The Commission opposes Senate bill S. 1746, which would
    federalize the security forces at commercial nuclear facilities. All
    NRC commissioners have given the matter careful consideration, and
    unanimously oppose federalization. The Commission's concerns are
    described in detail in Chairman Meserve's written testimony submitted
    for the June 5, 2002 hearing.

        Question 2. Could you please go into greater detail about the
    communication enhancements that have occurred following September 11th?
    Specifically, between the various federal agencies and NRC, the
    agencies and plants, and the plants and NRC.
        Response. The NRC has maintained steady communication with the
    intelligence community throughout the years. However, since September
    11, we have increased this communication to stay abreast of potential
    changes in the threat environment.
        Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the NRC issued
    over 30 advisories to its licensees, focusing on the threat to the
    nuclear industry and providing guidance as to measures that should be
    considered by licensees to enhance the security at their facilities.
    Following these advisories, Orders have been issued to certain classes
    of licensees, including the licensees for power reactors,
    decommissioning power reactors, a uranium conversion facility, gaseous
    diffusion plants, and Category I fuel facilities, requiring the
    implementation of interim compensatory measures designed to protect
    against an adversary force in excess of the design basis threat. We are
    preparing Orders for independent spent fuel storage installations,
    Category III fuel facilities, and licensees who ship or receive large
    quantities of radioactive material. We are also evaluating the need to
    issue Orders to certain other licensees.
        The NRC has held various workshops with members of industry to
    discuss security at licensed facilities, including the means of testing
    the security programs that have been enhanced. Licensees have regularly
    provided information and reports to the NRC summarizing their security
    enhancements, the level of commitment of resources from the State and
    local agencies, and the weapons assigned to their security force.
    Licensees also regularly report suspicious activity, including cars and
    pedestrians approaching the facility, fly-overs by aircraft, and boats
    approaching by waterway.
        The NRC has participated in many of the Office of Homeland
    Security's working groups and workshops, conferences, and meetings
    regarding the status of various initiatives, such as the Homeland
    Security Advisory System. The agency's participation in these
    conferences and meetings has been very useful and the NRC will continue
    to support them.
        For several weeks following September 11, an NRC employee was
    assigned to the FBI's Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC).
    The NRC has maintained regular communications with the Federal Aviation
    Administration, the Coast Guard, the Pentagon (particularly NORAD), and
    other Federal agencies to provide a forum for better information
    exchange on security issues.
        The NRC is in the process of deploying Secure Telecommunications
    Units (STU) and Secure Terminal Equipment (STE) at the offices of our
    Resident Inspectors at each nuclear power plant. This will allow the
    NRC to communicate sensitive and classified information to and from
    each site directly.
        The NRC continues to maintain a liaison with the Office of Homeland
    Security on matters relating to threats. In addition, the NRC continues
    to support national efforts in Continuity of Government (COG) and
    Continuity of Operations (COOP) programs.

        Question 3. In regards to the security forces at the nuclear
    facilities, the NRC has repeatedly asked for over 15 years that they be
    allowed to carry arms, use force, and make arrests. Can you please
    explain the current situation at facilities across our nation and how
    the lack of this authority jeopardizes our national security? For
    example, what do these forces have the ability to do today and what can
    they not do?
        Response. The security forces at the nuclear facilities are armed
    with sidearms for routine duties and tactical response weapons for
    responding to safeguards contingencies. The two principal changes that
    the Commission seeks is Federal authority to use deadly force and to
    carry weapons comparable to those used at Department of Energy
    facilities.
        One provision would authorize guards at NRC-regulated facilities to
    carry and use firearms to protect property of significance to the
    common defense and security. This provision is aimed at giving guards
    some protection from State criminal prosecution for actions taken
    during the performance of their official duties. Another provision
    would allow the Commission, in consultation with the Attorney General,
    to confer upon guards at NRC-designated facilities the authority to
    possess or use weapons that are comparable to those available to the
    Department of Energy guard forces. Some State laws currently preclude
    private guard forces at NRC-regulated facilities from utilizing a wide
    range of weapons. These provisions would allow guard forces to respond
    with comparable weapons in the event of an assault on a nuclear site by
    a sophisticated, well armed adversary group.

        Question 4. What kind of crime is it today to bring unauthorized
    weapons and explosives into an NRC-licensed facility? Also, please
    explain NRC's requested sabotage provisions and the expected effects.
        Response. At present, only individual State laws prohibit bringing
    weapons and explosives into an NRC-licensed facility. The NRC has
    requested legislation that would make it a Federal crime to bring
    unauthorized weapons and explosives into NRC-licensed facilities and to
    create Federal prohibitions against sabotage applicable to both
    operation and construction of nuclear facilities. The NRC has been
    seeking legislative authority for most of these changes for almost
    fifteen years.

        Question 5. Could you please speak to the claim that force-on-force
    tests by the NRC since 1991 have been below NRC's minimum expectations
    nearly half of the time?
        Response. The force-on-force drills that are conducted during an
    Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) are limited scope
    drills designed to test the licensee's ability to protect the plant
    against a violent external assault by a mock adversary force having the
    characteristics of the design basis threat. Typically, four drills were
    conducted at each site and results were documented.
        The attacking force is credited with detailed knowledge of the
    plant's lay-out, vulnerabilities and security force defense plans,
    acquired through table top exercises carried out before the force-on-
    force drills. The overall goal of the OSRE is to improve the efficacy
    of facility security by immediate identification and correction of
    weaknesses.
        In 37 of 81 OSREs conducted between August 1991 and August 2001,
    the NRC identified weaknesses.\1\ In other words, the licensee did not
    get a perfect score. For those plants at which a weakness was found,
    the attacking force was typically able in one of the four drills to
    reach a target set and simulate destruction of that equipment. In
    general, these weaknesses occurred due to deficiencies in the
    licensee's contingency response plan, in training, or in executing the
    plan. No one issue dominates the weaknesses found.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ For the 15 OSREs conducted between April 2000 and August 2001,
    a total of 59 exercises were conducted. Weaknesses were identified in 9
    of 59 exercises or 15 percent of the time. Eighty-five percent of the
    time the attacking force was defeated.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It is agency policy for NRC licensees to address identified
    weaknesses immediately through the implementation of compensatory
    measures and, where appropriate, permanent corrective actions. The NRC
    believes that the program has served an important function by
    contributing to the identification of areas for improvement in the
    licensees' security programs. The tests are considered challenging
    because they are designed to exploit potential vulnerabilities revealed
    in associated table top drills. They do not necessarily reflect the
    likelihood of success by a less informed attacking force.

        Question 6. In his testimony, Dr. Irwin Redlener alleges that
    ``Immediate civilian fatalities [from an attack on a nuclear power
    plant] can range from a hundred or so to five thousand or more
    depending on the extent of damage to the reactor, its support systems
    and spent fuel containment systems. Excess cancers from radiation
    exposures can range into the tens of thousands.'' Does NRC agree with
    that statement?
        Response. No. We believe that Dr. Redlener's consequence estimates
    of immediate civilian fatalities and excess cancers do not consider the
    likely range of consequences from an attack on a nuclear power plant.
        The NRC has performed a large number of analyses of the risks and
    consequences from severe reactor accidents. From these studies, we
    conclude that the risks and consequences are generally dominated by
    events involving a sustained loss of cooling. Events involving a
    sustained loss of cooling would proceed, in terms of fuel damage
    progression, in much the same manner regardless of whether the
    initiator was an accident or an intentional terrorist act. Possible
    differences between core damage accidents initiated by terrorist
    attacks and those initiated by other accidental means are being
    assessed.
        From our past severe accident studies, we conclude that only events
    involving both rapid core melt and early failure of the enclosing
    containment building could lead to immediate public fatalities. It is
    unlikely that terrorist attacks will result in rapid core melt or early
    containment failure because of the reactor's diverse and redundant
    safety features and robust containment. Thus, the expected number of
    prompt fatalities among the public is zero. In the unlikely event that
    rapid core melt and early containment failure were to occur,
    preliminary analyses indicate only a few immediate public fatalities,
    if any, at a representative site. The number of immediate fatalities
    near the plant is expected to be small, because of the preplanned
    emergency response actions for this population and the high threshold
    dose for immediate fatalities. In this connection, it should be noted
    that the number of prompt fatalities from the effects of radiation of
    the Chernobyl accident, including plant workers and firemen, was about
    30.
        Public fatalities would not be expected in an attack on a spent
    fuel pool unless the pool were to drain rapidly with no cooling
    measures available for an extended period of time. Rapid draining of
    the pool as a result of a terrorist attack is highly unlikely because
    of the robustness of the spent fuel pool and its large inventory of
    water. The much lower decay heat of the spent fuel in the pool would
    permit emergency cooling of the fuel using readily available measures
    that could be accomplished without significant exposure of workers to
    radiation and would also provide additional time to evacuate the area
    near the plant to prevent immediate fatalities in the event the pool
    were to drain rapidly. Also, in comparison to an operating reactor, the
    spent fuel in the pool has a lower inventory of radioactive isotopes
    that contribute to early health effects. All of these factors make it
    unlikely that a terrorist attack on a spent fuel pool would result in
    any immediate public fatalities.
        Similarly, because it is unlikely that a terrorist attack would
    result in rapid core melt and early containment failure and failure of
    preplanned emergency response actions, we believe that the number of
    additional latent cancers, if any, resulting from a terrorist attack
    would likely not be detectable as an increase in the normal background
    cancer rate. Estimates of latent (long term) cancer fatalities are
    typically based on the assumption that increasing levels of exposure
    result in a proportional increase in the risk of cancer, even at very
    low radiation doses. This assumption, which is referred to as the
    linear-nonthreshold (LNT) hypothesis, may be conservative, but it is
    customarily used for purposes of regulatory decision making. The high
    normal background cancer rate makes refinement of the models that
    quantify the increase in cancer due to low levels of exposure
    difficult.
        The LNT hypothesis can predict large numbers of latent cancer
    facilities when very small exposures are received by a very large
    number of people. To put this in perspective, scheduled domestic
    airline travel totals about 500 billion passenger miles per year.
    According to the LNT hypothesis, the radiation exposure associated with
    the airline travel would result in thousands of fatal cancers in the
    following decades.
        In summary, we believe that Dr. Redlener's consequence estimates
    overstate the consequences from an attack on a nuclear power plant.
    Estimated consequences are very dependent upon a number of parameters
    including timeliness of evacuations, weather conditions and site
    specific characteristics. As indicated above, more realistic
    assumptions result in significantly smaller consequences than those
    suggested by Dr. Redlener.

        Question 7. In his testimony, Dr. Irwin Redlener alleges that
    ``Studies . . . have concluded that thousands of square miles could be
    contaminated and uninhabitable for years or decades under a variety of
    highly plausible attack scenarios.'' Does NRC agree with that
    statement?
        Response. No. The only reactor events that could lead to a release
    of radioactivity that could potentially contaminate the land to levels
    that would make it uninhabitable involve both core melt and containment
    failure. However, as discussed in the response to the Question 7, a
    terrorist attack is unlikely to result in rapid core melt and early
    containment failure. More slowly evolving scenarios provide additional
    time for local authorities and reactor operators to intervene to
    prevent a release. Attacks on a spent fuel pool are less likely to lead
    to such a release because even if an attack could somehow drain the
    water from the spent fuel pool, the lower decay heat of the spent fuel
    in the pool would provide additional time for intervention to prevent a
    release.

        Question 8. S. 1746 would provide for mandatory stockpiling of
    potassium iodide tablets for use by populations within a 50-mile radius
    of nuclear power plants, as compared to the current NRC program for
    voluntary stockpiling within 10 miles and the provision for voluntary
    stockpiling up to 20 miles included in the ``Public Health Security and
    Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002.'' What are the
    Commission's views on the need to stockpile potassium iodide for
    populations out to 50 miles from a nuclear power plant?
        Response. The Commission believes that distribution of potassium
    iodide (KI) within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) is a
    reasonable and prudent measure for specific accident scenarios under
    conditions that involve a significant release of radioactive iodides.
    We do not agree that there is a need to stockpile KI for populations
    beyond the 10-mile EPZ.
        The objective of emergency response is to minimize the dose
    received by the public from a spectrum of accidents that could produce
    doses in excess of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective
    Action Guides (PAGs). PAGs are radiation doses that warrant the
    implementation of protective actions for the public.
        There are two EPZs around nuclear power plants. These are the 10-
    mile plume exposure EPZ and the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ. There
    are PAGs established for the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ as well as for
    the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ. Separate PAGs are established for
    each EPZ because the health risks to the public are different. The PAGs
    for the 10-mile EPZ are established to avoid early health effects. The
    protective actions include evacuation and sheltering, with
    consideration to be given of KI distribution. The PAGs for the 50-mile
    EPZ are established to reduce the risk of long-term or latent health
    effects. The protective actions include interdiction of contaminated
    food, relocation of a population out of a contaminated area, placing
    farm animals on stored feed, and access control to contaminated areas.
        The reason for the different approach is because only the
    population close (within the 10-mile EPZ) to the nuclear power plant is
    at meaningful risk of exposure to radiation and radioactive materials
    from exposure to the plume. Evacuation is the most effective protective
    measure in the event of a radiological emergency because it protects
    the whole body (including the thyroid gland and other organs) from all
    radionuclides and all exposure pathways. However, in situations when
    evacuation is not feasible, in-place sheltering is substituted as an
    effective protective action. In addition, administering potassium
    iodide is a reasonable, prudent, and inexpensive supplement to
    evacuation and sheltering for specific local conditions. When the
    population is evacuated out of the plume and potentially contaminated
    foodstuffs are embargoed, the risk from further radioactive iodine
    exposure to the thyroid gland is eliminated.
        Beyond the 10-mile EPZ, the primary radiation exposure route is the
    ingestion of radionuclides (including radioactive iodides) from water
    or contaminated foodstuff (including milk). Therefore, the primary
    protective action strategy beyond the 10-mile EPZ is eliminating
    consumption of contaminated food and water, as well as access controls
    and decontamination. While KI is a component of the protective strategy
    within the plume exposure pathway EPZ during the plume phase of the
    event, restricting consumption of contaminated foodstuff up to 50 miles
    from the plant in the direction of the release, as needed, is part of
    the overall protective strategy for all radionuclides. If ingestion is
    prevented, there is no benefit to KI administration. Moreover, the risk
    arises from ingestion of contaminated food or water over a long time.
    It is inappropriate to use KI to deal with chronic exposure.

        Question 9. S. 1746 would provide for planning of evacuation of
    populations from within a 50-mile radius surrounding nuclear power
    plants in the event of an emergency, as compared to the current Federal
    emergency program that includes planning for evacuation out to 10 miles
    from nuclear power plants. What are the Commission's views on the need
    to plan for evacuation out to 50 miles from a nuclear power plant?
        Response. The Commission does not support a requirement for the
    planning of evacuation of the population out to a 50-mile radius from a
    nuclear power plant. The Commission requires that two emergency
    planning zones (EPZs) be established around each nuclear power plant;
    an EPZ of about 10 miles in radius for planning to protect the public
    from airborne exposure (the plume exposure pathway) and an EPZ of about
    50 miles in radius for planning for actions to prevent radioactive
    material from entering the food chain (the ingestion pathway). The size
    of the EPZs represents a judgment as to the extent of detailed planning
    that must be performed to ensure an adequate response based on the
    consideration of the probabilities and consequences of a spectrum of
    accidents.
        For the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ, shelter, evacuation and
    prophylactic use of KI would be the likely principal immediate
    protective actions recommended to the general public. For the 50-mile
    ingestion pathway EPZ the planning effort involves the identification
    of major exposure pathways from contaminated food and water and the
    associated control points and mechanisms. The ingestion pathway
    exposures in general would represent a longer term problem, although
    some early protective actions to minimize subsequent contamination of
    milk or other supplies should be considered.
        The Commission evaluated several factors in establishing the size
    of the EPZs. These included risk, probability, cost effectiveness and
    the accident consequence spectrum. The Commission chose to base the
    size of the EPZs on the probability of a spectrum of accidents and the
    corresponding consequences. The Commission requires that emergency
    response plans be useful for responding to any accident that would
    produce offsite doses in excess of the EPA's Protective Action Guides
    (PAGs). These accidents include the more severe design basis accidents.
    After reviewing the potential consequences of these types of accidents,
    the Commission determined that emergency plans should be based upon a
    generic distance within which predetermined actions would minimize the
    dose received by the public. Based on the source term resulting from
    this spectrum of accidents and the applicable PAGs, a radius of about
    10 miles was selected for the plume exposure pathway and a radius of
    about 50 miles was selected for the ingestion exposure pathway.
    Although the radius of the EPZ implies a circular area, the actual
    shape would depend upon the characteristics of a particular site. The
    circular or other defined shape is assumed for planning purposes,
    whereas necessary response would likely involve only a portion of the
    total area because of meteorological conditions at the time of the
    accident. For example, there is no danger of plume exposure upwind of
    the site even within the 10-mile EPZ. Thus, in a particular emergency,
    protective actions would most likely be restricted to a small part of
    the planning zones.
        The need for evacuation beyond a few miles from the plant is
    extremely unlikely. If protective actions were needed beyond 10 miles,
    the action required would most likely be sheltering while the plume
    passes and then evacuation of relatively small areas based on the
    amount of deposition of radioactive materials on the ground from the
    passing plume. The risk is highly concentrated near the nuclear plant.
    Although there is no line at 10 miles beyond which radiation cannot
    pass, the hazard from an accident tends to decrease as one moves
    further from the plant. The Commission has concluded that beyond a
    distance of 10 miles the hazard is small enough that specific detailed
    planning for evacuation is not necessary.

        Question 10. S. 1746 would provide for emergency planning exercises
    out to 50 miles every three years. What is the current Federal and
    licensee program for conducting emergency planning exercises and drills
    at and around nuclear power plants, i.e., onsite and at 10 miles and 50
    miles?
        Response. Emergency planning regulations currently require
    emergency planning exercises to be conducted onsite for the 10-mile
    plume exposure pathway EPZ every two years, and for the 50-mile
    ingestion pathway EPZ with State involvement every six years, as
    described below.
        A full participation exercise, which tests as much of the licensee,
    State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable (without
    mandatory public participation), is conducted for each site. In such an
    exercise, appropriate offsite State and local authorities and licensee
    personnel physically and actively take part in testing their integrated
    capability to assess and respond adequately to a nuclear power plant
    accident. This exercise is conducted within 2 years prior to the
    issuance of the first operating license for full power (>5% power) and
    includes participation by each State and local government within the
    10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ and each State within the 50-mile
    ingestion pathway EPZ. Subsequently, each licensee is required to
    conduct an exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. In
    addition, the licensee takes actions necessary to ensure that adequate
    emergency response capabilities are maintained during the interval
    between biennial exercises by conducting drills, including at least one
    drill involving a combination of some of the principal functional areas
    of the licensee's emergency response capabilities.
        Offsite plans for each site are also exercised biennially with full
    participation by each offsite authority having a role under the plan.
    (This may be included as part of the biennial onsite exercise.) Where
    the offsite authority has a role under a radiological response plan for
    more than one site, it fully participates in one exercise every two
    years, and at least partially participates in other offsite plan
    exercises in this period. Partial participation means that offsite
    authorities exercise sufficiently to test direction and control
    functions; i.e., (a) protective action levels, and (b) communication
    capabilities among affected State and local authorities and the
    licensee. A State should fully participate in the ingestion pathway
    portion of exercises at least once every 6 years.
        The following NRC regulations lay out the requirements:

    10 CFR 50.47(b)(14)

        ``Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major
    portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will
    be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies
    identified as a result of exercises or drills are (will be)
    corrected.''

    10 CFR 50, App. E, (F)(2)(b)

        ``Each licensee at each site shall conduct an exercise of its
    onsite emergency plan every 2 years. The exercise may be included in
    the full participation biennial exercise. In addition, the licensee
    shall take actions necessary to ensure that adequate emergency response
    capabilities are maintained during the interval between biennial
    exercises by conducting drills, including at least one drill involving
    a combination of some of the principal functional areas of the
    licensee's onsite emergency response capabilities. The principal
    functional areas of emergency response include activities such as
    management and coordination of emergency response, accident assessment,
    protective action decision-making, and plant system repair and
    corrective actions.''

    10 CFR 50, App. E, (F)(2)(c)

        ``Offsite plans for each site shall be exercised biennially with
    full participation by each offsite authority having a role under the
    plan. Where the offsite authority has a role under a radiological
    response plan for more than one site, it shall fully participate in one
    exercise every two years, and shall, at least, partially participate in
    other offsite plan exercises in this period.''

    10 CFR 50, App. E, (F)(2)(d)

        ``A State should fully participate in the ingestion pathway portion
    of exercises at least once every six years. In States with more than
    one site, the State should rotate this participation from site to
    site.''

        Question 11. In his testimony, Dr. Irwin Redlener questions why
    aircraft are not forbidden to fly over nuclear plants. Since NRC has
    worked closely and extensively with NORAD and FAA on this very topic,
    what are the Commission's views on the practicality of excluding
    nuclear power plants, as well as other sensitive targets (sports
    stadiums, chemical facilities, tall buildings, etc.) from fly zones?
        Response. On September 23, 2001, representatives of the Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Defense (DoD), and NRC met
    to discuss aviation security. The FAA determined that an FAA Notice To
    Airmen (NOTAM) was the appropriate vehicle to advise pilots about the
    need to avoid air space above sensitive sites, such as nuclear power
    plants. The NOTAM subsequently issued on September 26, 2001, and
    updated by later NOTAMs, strongly urged pilots ``to not circle or
    loiter over the following sites: Nuclear/Electrical power plants, power
    distribution stations, dams, reservoirs, refineries, or military
    installations, unless otherwise authorized by air traffic control or as
    required to land or depart at towered/non-towered airports.'' This
    notice is still in effect.
        Since September 11, 2001, nuclear plant licensees have reported
    aircraft flying in close proximity to their facilities. On October 12,
    2001, the NRC formalized the process by issuing an advisory to
    licensees which requested that they provide immediate reports of any
    flyovers to the FAA, FBI, local law enforcement agencies, and the NRC.
        The NRC contends that the most effective means of ensuring
    protection against attack by commercial aircraft is by interdiction at
    the airport (through personnel and baggage screening), hardened cockpit
    doors, support from the U.S. Air Marshal program, warning signals from
    aircraft that a high-jacking is underway, etc.
        No fly zones around nuclear power plants and other sensitive
    targets are not practical as a matter of routine. Because of nuclear
    power plants' location in areas of dense air traffic, such as the
    northeast corridor of the United States, such flight restrictions would
    significantly disrupt air travel. A 5- or 10-mile no fly zone would
    also provide very little warning of attack, insufficient for a combat
    air patrol aircraft to respond unless it were already in the immediate
    vicinity.

        Question 12. In his testimony, Dr. Irwin Redlener states that
    nuclear fuel rods are extremely vulnerable in the deep pools where they
    are currently stored. What are the Commission's views on the protection
    provided by the pools from aircraft or ground assault?
        Response. The Commission does not agree that spent fuel stored in
    pools is ``extremely vulnerable''. The construction of the spent fuel
    storage pools is robust. Spent fuel pool wall thicknesses typically
    exceed containment wall thicknesses and are frequently not exposed on
    the exterior wall of the building in which they are housed. Although
    the structures over spent fuel pools tend to be less robust than the
    pools themselves, attacks that damage the overhead structure are not
    likely to cause the pool water to drain down. In the highly unlikely
    event that an attack caused structural debris to fall into the pool and
    damage the stored fuel, the pool water would reduce the release of
    radioactive material to the environment. In addition, the location of
    system connections to the pools is designed to prevent uncovering spent
    fuel due to drain down if the connections should fail. Most pool drain-
    down or heat-up scenarios develop slowly, thus providing time for
    operators to act to mitigate the event and prevent radiological
    release. As we stated in response to question 7, even if an attack
    could somehow rapidly empty the pool, the much lower decay heat of the
    spent fuel in the pool would permit emergency cooling of the fuel using
    readily available measures that could be accomplished without
    significant exposure of workers to radiation and would also provide
    additional time to evacuate the area near the plant to prevent any
    immediate fatalities.

        Question 13. In his testimony, Dr. Irwin Redlener states that
    nothing but costs prevent immediate transfer of spent fuel rods to dry
    cask storage. What are the Commission's views on this statement?
        Response. NRC believes that reactor licensees can safely store
    spent fuel in either spent fuel pools or in dry spent fuel storage
    casks. With respect to potential terrorist attacks, we believe that
    there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public
    is protected against such attacks for both types of spent fuel storage.
    Licensees have implemented actions as a result of the NRC Orders and
    advisories to protect against a potential terrorist attack.
    Nonetheless, we are continuing to assess whether additional measures
    are needed to strengthen further the current capability to defend such
    structures against terrorism.
        NRC disagrees with the statement that ``nothing but costs prevent
    immediate transfer of spent fuel rods to dry cask storage.'' There are
    technical issues associated with dry cask storage that need resolution
    before transfer of all spent fuel rods to dry cask storage is
    practical. The dry cask storage systems currently approved by NRC have
    not been evaluated for all the different types of fuel currently stored
    in reactor pools. New spent fuel dry storage systems would need to be
    designed, and then evaluated and approved by NRC prior to their use. In
    addition, the current production capacity of dry cask storage system
    vendors is limited and time is needed to increase production capacity.
    Finally, in the case of a site specific license application, schedules
    must allow for contested issues to be resolved through hearings prior
    to a licensing decision.

        Question 14. In her testimony, Danielle Brian implies that the
    times needed for security officers to retrieve weapons and protective
    gear is not included in the timelines for security planning and is not
    simulated in actual drills and exercises. What are the Commission's
    views on this statement?
        Response. Ms. Brian's statement is incorrect. Prior to commencement
    of the exercise, licensees are expected to have their responding guards
    positioned about the plant in places normally occupied, and with
    equipment normally carried during routine duties. As an additional
    complement to realism, the guards assigned to respond to the exercise
    scenario are required to shadow the actual on-duty guard force until
    the drill commences, ensuring that they would not be pre-positioned in
    preparation for the exercise. The timelines that are used in measuring
    licensees' performance include the time required for the guards to
    retrieve their response weapons and report to their post.

        Question 15. In her testimony, Danielle Brian states that spent
    fuel pools are not presently included in target sets for purposes of
    security evaluations and drills at nuclear plants. What are the
    Commission's views on this statement?
        Response. OSREs conducted in the past have not specifically
    targeted spent fuel pools. However, the need for performance testing
    scenarios at spent fuel pools is being included as part of NRC's
    comprehensive re-evaluation of the security and safeguards program.

                                   __________
        Statement of David Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety Engineer, Union of
                              Concerned Scientists

        On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), it is my
    pleasure to appear before the Committee and express our support for
    both S. 1586 and S. 1746. We believe that these bills, if enacted,
    would significantly reduce the risk of radiological sabotage by
    lessening the probability that attempted sabotage will be successful
    and by lessening the consequences should sabotage be successful despite
    all protective measures.
        My name is David Lochbaum. After obtaining a degree in nuclear
    engineering from The University of Tennessee in 1979, I worked more
    than 17 years in private industry, most of that time at operating
    nuclear power plants in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Kansas, New
    Jersey, and Pennsylvania. I have been the Nuclear Safety Engineer for
    UCS since October 1996. UCS, established in 1969 as a non-profit,
    public interest group, seeks to ensure that all people have clean air,
    energy and transportation, as well as food that is produced in a safe
    and sustainable manner. UCS has worked on nuclear plant safety issues
    for nearly 30 years.
        Some representatives of the nuclear industry claim that nuclear
    power plants are such hardened structures as to be virtually immune
    from attack. Other industry representatives assert that even a
    successful attack would not endanger the American public because
    radioactive material released from the sabotaged nuclear plant would so
    diluted within 5 miles as to preclude the need for either sheltering or
    evacuation. There would be no need for the security upgrades specified
    in the proposed legislation if either of these claims were valid.
        Compelling circumstantial evidence creates more than reasonable
    doubt for the veracity of the industry's claims. Force-on-force tests
    of nuclear plant security administered by the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission (NRC) since 1991 consistently demonstrated security
    capabilities below NRC's minimum expectations nearly half of the time.
    Nuclear plants cannot be considered immune from attack when security
    forces, given up to 6 months advance warning of the precise test date,
    are unable to prevent simulated reactor core damage from a very, very
    small band of mock attackers. On at least two recent occasions, a
    single mock intruder successfully simulated the destruction of the
    equipment needed to cool the reactor. Nuclear plants cannot be
    considered immune from attack when security forces are unable to
    prevent a lone saboteur from triggering a reactor meltdown. In the past
    2 years, I have attended numerous NRC public meetings where industry
    representatives contended that poor performance on a security test
    would not have occurred had an armed guard not taken a wrong turn while
    rushing to his or her response position. Again, nuclear plants cannot
    be considered immune from attack when a single mistake by a single
    guard means the difference between successful defense and reactor
    sabotage.
        With respect to the potential consequences from the successful
    attack on a nuclear plant, the industry's actions speak much louder
    than its rhetoric. If it were even close to being true that
    radioactivity releases would not endanger people living 5 miles or more
    away, then it would also be true that the nuclear power industry would
    not need Federal liability protection. Representatives of the nuclear
    power industry testified before the Congress that the Price-Anderson
    Act needed to be renewed for existing plants and expanded to cover any
    new nuclear plants that are built. The industry's need for Price-
    Anderson protection is an implicit concession that the offsite
    consequences from a nuclear plant accident /attack could be extremely
    serious.
        It is our steadfast position that U.S. nuclear plants are
    vulnerable to attack and that the consequences from a successful attack
    could be dire. It is further our position that all reasonable measures
    must be taken to lessen this risk. The proposed legislation in S. 1586
    and S. 1746 represents reasonable steps that would reduce the
    probability of a successful attack and reduce the consequences
    following a successful attack. Thus, we support both bills and hope
    they become law.

                     OPERATION SAFEGUARDS AND RESPONSE UNIT

        While all provisions of both bills have merit, the most valuable
    portion of the proposed legislation is Section 4 of S. 1746 (the
    Nuclear Security Act of 2001). This section would amend Section 204 of
    the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5844) to create an
    Operation Safeguards and Response Unit within the NRC. Subsection
    (d)(3)(B) of the amended act requires the NRC to conduct force-on-force
    testing at each nuclear plant at least once every 2 years. Force-on-
    force tests are the best measure of the integrated capability of
    security fences, locked doors, intrusion detection equipment, access
    control barriers, and armed guards to defend the plant from attempted
    sabotage. Absent such performance demonstrations, security must be
    evaluated via piece-meal audits of the various physical protection
    elements.
        How do teachers evaluate their students' academic performance? Do
    they use a checklist to verify that students attend classes with
    textbooks, pencils, paper, and calculators? No, they use tests that
    demonstrate their students' capabilities. Textbooks and class
    attendance are the pathway to knowledge while tests are the best
    measure of progress along that pathway. Likewise, security checklists
    show that a nuclear plant has gates, guards, and guns, but they provide
    little insight on how far the plant has progressed along the pathway to
    adequate security. Force-on-force tests demonstrate whether the desired
    performance objective of adequate security has been achieved. Frequent
    demonstration of adequate security performance is invaluable.
        The NRC initiated force-on-force testing in 1991. Due to resource
    constraints, the NRC only tested each nuclear plant about once every 8
    years. UCS heard from many NRC staffers and nuclear plant workers that
    security capabilities ramped up at some nuclear plants in advance of
    the force-on-force tests and rapidly declined shortly afterwards. More
    frequent testing levels out the peaks and valleys and assures more
    consistent security capabilities.
        Legislation directing the NRC to conduct frequent force-on-force
    tests ensures that the agency has the budget necessary to administer
    the tests. In July 1998, resource allocation issues prompted the NRC to
    cancel force-on-force testing. The ensuing public outcry reversed the
    NRC's decision with testing re-instituted in fall 1998. This
    legislation ensures that nuclear facility security tests are not
    discarded at the next budget crisis.
        This legislation also ensures that testing of nuclear facility
    security remains in the NRC's hands where it belongs. The nuclear
    industry has been campaigning to conduct the security tests themselves
    and to evaluate their performance on the tests. Nuclear facility
    security is too important to permit the equivalent of take-home tests
    that are self-graded. The industry's consistently poor performance on
    security tests since 1991 does not warrant self-assessment in this
    vital area.
        The very nature of nuclear plant security does not lend itself to
    industry self-assessment. The nuclear industry has successfully
    employed self-assessment in other areas. For example, requalification
    of control room operators is conducted by plant owners subject to audit
    by the NRC. The standards employed by the plant owners and the audit
    reports issued by the NRC are all publicly available for perusal by
    people living near the facility and by public-interest groups like UCS.
    In addition, NRC inspection reports covering control room operator
    performance during routine operations and during transient conditions
    are publicly available. This transparency makes it harder for self-
    assessments to cover up poor performance.
        Conditions are significantly different when it comes to nuclear
    plant security. For obvious reasons, the public does not have the same
    access to either security standards or NRC audit reports. This
    necessary opaqueness makes it easier for self-assessment to cover up
    poor performance. The NRC must retain control over nuclear plant
    security tests to protect the public against inadequate security being
    masked by the self-assessment process.
        Subsection (d)(3)(F) of the amended act requires the NRC to submit
    an annual report on force-on-force testing results to the Congress and
    the President. This annual report facilitates oversight of this
    important public health issue. This report also provides the American
    public with the ``big picture'' it deserves regarding nuclear facility
    security. The anxiety level in America following 09/11 about potential
    vulnerabilities of nuclear facilities to terrorist attack would have
    been significantly lessened had the Federal Government been able to
    point to the information in this annual report as tangible evidence of
    security preparedness. People living near nuclear facilities that had
    performed well on robust security tests conducted by NRC would take
    comfort in that knowledge. People living near nuclear facilities that
    had not performed so well on security tests would also benefit, albeit
    in a different way. Anxiety about abstract security concerns would be
    replaced by more focused concerns. The ensuing discussions about
    actions taken to compensate for and correct problem areas would allay
    anxiety faster than press releases about hardened facilities and lack
    of credible threats against specific nuclear facilities.
        Subsection (d)(4) of the amended act requires NRC in conjunction
    with FEMA and other Federal, State, and local agencies to exercise
    response to a radiological emergency at each nuclear facility at least
    once every 3 years. Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 currently requires a
    full-scale exercise of the emergency response plan for each nuclear
    power plant at least once every 2 years. UCS believes that the key
    difference between the existing requirement in Appendix E to 10 CFR
    Part 50 and the intent of subsection (d)(4) is emergency response to an
    act of radiological sabotage. The exercises conducted to satisfy 10 CFR
    50 Appendix E simulate nuclear accidents that cause releases of
    radioactivity to the air and water. The emergency response to
    radiological sabotage would be similar, but it might be more
    complicated. For example, Federal, State, and local resources might be
    more challenged following a sabotage event because of the need to also
    provide protection of other potential targets in the region. In
    addition, protective measures of securing bridges and tunnels might
    impede evacuation efforts. Therefore, it seems prudent and reasonable
    to periodically assess whether emergency response plans for nuclear
    facilities can also handle acts of sabotage.

                              DESIGN BASIS THREAT

        The second most valuable part of the proposed legislation is
    Section 3 of the Nuclear Security Act of 2001 which would amend Chapter
    14 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.) to add
    Section 170C, ``Protection of Sensitive Nuclear Facilities Against the
    Design Basis Threat.'' Subsection (c)(1) requires the NRC to revise the
    design basis threat from its 1960's-vintage level to a more realistic
    level. The current design basis threat was promulgated by the NRC
    nearly 40 years ago and has not been substantively changed other than
    the addition of the vehicle bomb requirement in 1993/1994. Subsection
    (c)(1) requires the NRC, in consultation with the Assistant to the
    President for Homeland Security and other appropriate Federal, State,
    and local agencies to review the design basis threat every 3 years and
    revise it as applicable. Subsection (c)(2) requires the NRC to report
    to Congress on changes made to the design basis threat. These
    provisions ensure that he design basis threat remains at the
    Goldilocks' level--not too high, not too low, but just right.
        Defining the design basis threat level appropriately is extremely
    important. The nuclear facility owner is responsible for protecting
    against an attack up to and including the design basis threat level.
    The Federal Government is responsible for protecting the facility from
    larger threats. This division of responsibility is both necessary and
    practical. The owner of a nuclear power plant situated along our coasts
    cannot be expected to defend the facility against an enemy destroyer
    cruising offshore. Likewise, the Federal Government cannot be expected
    to defend a privately owned nuclear power plant against sabotage by a
    handful of individuals or a small group of plant workers.
        The initial upgrade of the design basis threat is warranted. Left
    unchanged, the current design basis threat requires the Federal
    Government to protect Americans from radiological sabotage caused by as
    few as four persons or two plant workers. It requires the Federal
    Government to protect nuclear plants from a truck bomb of the size used
    by Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City. It's unrealistic to expect that
    the Federal Government could adequately defend against such a small
    attacking force.
        Subsections (d)(2)(B)(iv) and (d)(2)(B)(v) explicitly require
    security protection for spent fuel whether it is stored in wet-pools or
    dry casks. Highlighting the potential hazard from spent fuel, and the
    corresponding need for its protection, is very important. Since 1991,
    Over 300 force-on-force exercises have been administered by NRC at U.S.
    nuclear power plants. None of those exercises ever tested the security
    protection for spent fuel. We are not suggesting that the spent fuel
    hazard is equivalent to the reactor hazard; rather that the spent fuel
    hazard is not negligible and must be appropriately protected. Thus, it
    is beneficial that this proposed legislation clearly establishes that
    the design basis threat applies to both the reactor and its spent fuel,
    thus making it more likely that both hazards will be adequately
    protected.

                          POTASSIUM IODIDE STOCKPILES

        Section 5 of the Nuclear Security Act of 2001 amends Section 170 of
    the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2210) to require stockpiling
    of potassium iodide for the population with a 50-mile radius around
    each nuclear facility. The amendment additionally requires distribution
    plans to be developed to get the potassium iodide to people as
    expeditiously as possible in event of a nuclear accident/attack.
        Potassium iodide does not provide immunity from all radioactivity
    that could be released following a nuclear accident/attack, but it does
    provide protection against thyroid damage caused by radioactive iodine
    (I-131). That potassium iodide has value is clearly demonstrated by the
    fact that it is distributed to nuclear plant workers and to Federal,
    State, and local personnel responding to the nuclear accident/attack.
    It would seem imprudent public policy not to provide equivalent
    protection for the innocent people living downwind of the facility.
        According to the NRC, 13 states currently stockpile potassium
    iodide for the people living within the emergency planning zone around
    nuclear power plants. The proposed legislation eliminates the inequity
    associated with some Americans being protected while many other
    Americans are not protected. The NRC protecting only some Americans
    makes about as much sense as the U.S. Coast Guard requiring lifeboats
    on only some cruise ships. Given its low cost and long shelf life, it
    would seem exceedingly difficult for Federal, State, and local
    authorities to assure American victims that everything had been done to
    protect them from radiation if potassium iodide hadn't been stockpiled
    and distributed.
        Consider the following hypothetical situation. State X has two
    operating nuclear power plants. Plant A is located in the northern part
    of the State while Plant B is in the southeastern corner of the state.
    State X has not stockpiled potassium iodide, while State Y on its
    eastern border has done so. A serious accident at Plant B releases
    large amounts of radiation to the air necessitating both sheltering and
    evacuations. Residents in State Y living within the emergency planning
    zone are also provided potassium iodide. Residents in State X living
    within the emergency planning zone do not receive potassium iodide.
        In all likelihood, the post-mortem for this accident would cause
    potassium iodide to be stockpiled in State X for the people within the
    emergency planning zone around Plant A. Federal and State X authorities
    would have a very tough time explaining why the people in State Y
    received greater protection. Parents in State X will never know whether
    their children's thyroid illnesses might have been prevented had they
    just been given a dollar's worth of potassium iodide like their friends
    with healthy kids over in State Y received. Enacting the proposed
    legislation will prevent this hypothetical situation from becoming a
    tragic reality.
        Expanding the potassium iodide inventory to cover a 50-mile radius
    rather than a 10-mile radius decreases the likelihood that affected
    people will not be protected. No matter where the line is drawn, the
    question will remain about people living at N+1 miles. The 50-mile
    radius seems to be a reasonable compromise. Even if conditions affect
    people 60 or 70 miles downwind, the 50-mile inventory makes it more
    likely that potassium iodide can be redirected from people living 40-
    to 50-mile upwind to affected people downwind.

            CARRYING OF FIREARMS BY NUCLEAR FACILITY SECURITY FORCES

        Section 1 of S. 1586 would amend Chapter 14 of Title I of the
    Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.) to replace
    subsection k with a subsection authorizing security guards to carry
    firearms. Another subsection would be added to authorize security
    guards to make arrests, subject to limitations, of persons committing
    felonies or reasonably believed to have committed felonies. This
    legislation ensures security guards are properly equipped and
    authorized to carry out their protective assignments.

                  FEDERALIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY FORCE

        Section 3 of the Nuclear Security Act of 2001 would amend Chapter
    14 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.) to add
    Section 170C, ``Protection of Sensitive Nuclear Facilities Against the
    Design Basis Threat.'' Subsection (b)(1) requires NRC to employ the
    nuclear security force at sensitive nuclear facilities. This provision
    is our least favorite part of the proposed legislation. Our concern is
    in having the NRC responsible both for providing security and for
    assessing whether security is adequate. It would seem to create at
    least organizational tension if not an outright conflict-of-interest
    for the NRC staff to do both.
        Federalization of the nuclear security force provides gains to
    offset the conflict-of-interest concern. For example, subsection
    (e)(2)(A) requires the NRC to establish minimum qualification standards
    for members of the nuclear security force. Currently, the qualification
    standards for security personnel are established by the plant owners or
    the companies they've contracted with for security. Consequently,
    there's a very wide range of ``minimum'' qualification standards.
        There is also a wide range of working conditions for security
    guards at nuclear plants. Security guards at some plants have told me
    about good working conditions. They get fair compensation and benefits
    and receive good initial and follow-up training. They reported security
    staffing levels sufficient to permit adequate coverage of all posts and
    to avoid fatigue associated with chronic overtime. Unfortunately, I
    have also heard from security guards complaining about poor training,
    defective equipment, insufficient staffing levels, low pay, lack of
    medical benefits, and other factors contributing to bad morale.
    Federalization is unlikely to make all security guards content all the
    time, but it should serve to narrow the gap between the guard forces at
    facilities where management recognizes their importance and the guard
    forces at facilities where management views them as undesired financial
    drains.
        The periodic force-on-force testing conducted by the NRC as
    proposed in Section 4 of the Nuclear Security Act of 2001 could achieve
    the same positive gain as would result from federalizing the nuclear
    security force. Plant owners who currently undervalue their security
    guards would likely have to change that outlook in order to attain the
    required performance levels on the 2-year force-on-force tests.

                      PROTECTION AGAINST INSIDER SABOTAGE

        As detailed above, the proposed legislation contains many
    provisions that individually and collectively improve nuclear facility
    security. The only element potentially missing from the proposed
    legislation is adequate protection against insider sabotage. Subsection
    (c)(1)(A)(iv) of the proposed amendment to Chapter 14 of the Atomic
    Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.) outlined in Section 3 of
    the Nuclear Security Act of 2001 requires the NRC to revise the design
    basis threat to include several nuclear workers assisting in an attack.
    Subsection (b)(2) requires the NRC to ``develop and implement a
    security plan for each sensitive nuclear facility to ensure the
    security of all sensitive nuclear facilities against the design basis
    threat.'' UCS recommends that the Committee consider strengthening the
    proposed language by revising it to explicitly incorporate the
    following items, obtaining a firm commitment from the NRC to include
    these items as appropriate in the security plans, or providing clear
    guidance on expectations regarding these items in the Committee reports
    accompanying the bills:
         Two person rule for vital areas.--Authorized individuals
    typically gain entry to vital areas within nuclear facilities using
    computerized access cards. An authorized individual could thus enter
    vital area(s) alone and tamper with safety equipment. Adoption of the
    two-person rule for vital area entry would eliminate the opportunity
    for a single person acting alone to attempt sabotage.
         In-plant security cameras.--The majority of security
    cameras in use today at nuclear facilities protect against unauthorized
    intrusion to the site. Fewer security cameras are deployed inside the
    facility to protect against sabotage. Installation of additional
    security cameras within the nuclear facility would provide greater
    protection against sabotage by workers.
         Security guard accompanying visitors in vital areas.--
    Under certain conditions, a single authorized individual can escort
    five visitors into vital areas without being accompanied by a security
    guard. These visitors have had no background investigations other than
    a perfunctory check using the social security numbers they provide. The
    potential exists for an insider to arrange for the external attackers
    to enter the facility as visitors and then escort them into vital
    areas. Requiring all visitors into vital areas to be accompanied by a
    security guard provides substantive protection against this threat.
         50.59 screenings for insider sabotage.--10 CFR 50.59
    requires proposed modifications to nuclear facilities and planned
    changes to procedures to be reviewed for possible erosion of safety
    margins. Safety margin reductions must be approved in advance by the
    NRC. But these 50.59 screenings do not specifically require an
    evaluation of whether the changes provide insiders with greater
    opportunities for sabotage. For example, a temporary configuration
    during a refueling outage may reduce response time to less than that
    available when the plant is operating. The insider may elect to attempt
    sabotage during this vulnerable period. If this vulnerability was
    identified, it would be possible to compensate for it by posting a
    security guard by essential equipment during the temporary alignment.
    Requiring 50.59 screenings to explicitly assess insider sabotage
    provides substantive protection against this threat.
         Compensation for longer testinglinspection intervals.--In
    recent years, the NRC has allowed plant owners to lengthen the interval
    between tests and inspections of safety equipment. The reductions in
    testing/inspection frequencies have been justified using actual
    experience of component failure rates. Longer testing/inspection
    intervals-particularly when their schedules are readily available-
    provide insiders with ample opportunities to plan and execute a
    campaign of tampering with safety equipment over time with the aim of
    disabling all mitigating and containment systems when sabotage is
    ultimately attempted. These opportunities should be lessened by the NRC
    (a) recognizing that equipment tests and inspections also guard
    against-sabotage and therefore intervals must not be solely based on
    observed failure rates, or (b) requiring random tests/inspections to be
    conducted if the intervals are solely based on observed failure rates.
         Providing operators with anti-sabotage training.--The
    NRC's Generic Fundamentals Examination Question Bank for boiling water
    reactor (BWR) operator license candidates has 959 pages of questions
    while the NRC's Generic Fundamentals Examination Question Bank for
    pressurized water reactor (PWR) operator license candidates has 977
    pages of questions Not a single one of the literally hundreds of
    questions directly deals with how to defend the plant from an insider
    attempting radiological sabotage. Operator candidates receive classroom
    instruction and control room simulator training on how to cope with
    postulated pipe breaks, pump failures, and power outages. Licensed
    operators receive annual retraining on these subjects. Training
    operator candidates and licensed operators on how to respond to
    scenarios such as an insider attempting to take over the control room
    or an insider manipulating switches from the remote shutdown panel
    would supplement the skills they develop to handle nonsabotage
    emergencies.
        In summary, UCS supports both S. 1586 and S. 1746 and hope that
    both bills become law. If only one part of the bills became law, we'd
    prefer that it be the part requiring the NRC to conduct force-on-force
    security tests at each nuclear facility at least once every 2 years. If
    only one part of the bills didn't become law, we'd least miss the part
    federalizing the nuclear security forces.

                                     ______

              Responses by David Lochbaum to Additional Questions
                              from Senator Clinton

        Question 1. In your testimony, you stated that you thought ``the
    most valuable portion of the proposed legislation is Section 4'' to
    create on Operation Safeguards and Response Unit within the NRC. Can
    you please comment on Chairman Meserve's testimony, which indicated
    that this aspect of the legislation has already been accomplished and
    is therefore unnecessary?
        Response. On April 7, 2002, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    established an Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response to
    consolidate the agency's efforts for nuclear facility security. This
    office is in many ways superior to the Operation Safeguards and
    Response Unit described in the proposed legislation. For example, it
    reports at a more senior level within the NRC than was proposed for the
    Operation Safeguards and Response Unit. However, we disagree with
    Chairman Meserve that the objective of the proposed legislation has
    already been accomplished. The proposed legislation in Section 4 of the
    Nuclear Security Act did not merely shuffle and rename bureaucratic
    pieces. It charged the Operation Safeguards and Response Unit with
    performing force-on-force security exercises at all nuclear facilities
    under NRC's purview at least once every 2 years. The newly established
    Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response would conduct these
    security exercises, but the NRC did not require it to conduct exercises
    at all, let alone once every 2 years. Thus, the actions taken by the
    NRC on April 7th were a step in the right direction, but they remain
    several steps shy of the destination. The proposed legislation in
    Section 4 will move the agency the remaining steps. Absent this
    legislation, those steps might not be taken.

        Question 2. In your testimony, you talked about NRC's resource
    constraints, which apparently inhibited the Commission's ability to run
    force-on-force exercises at the plants. Can you provide more detail on
    this issue and explain how the legislation we are considering today
    addresses that issue?
        Response. In June 1998, the Senate Appropriations Committee
    suggested that it would cut the NRC's budget by approximately 40
    percent. In the ensuing discussions regarding this suggestion, the
    budget cut was scaled back to a much more modest reduction. The
    Appropriations bill authorizing the NRC's budget required the agency to
    report monthly to the Congress on its progress in handling specific
    activities. For example, the NRC reported on goals of completing 95
    percent of all license amendment applications within 1 year and 100
    percent of all such applications within 2 years. The NRC did not want
    to miss goals it was reporting to Congress each month. Therefore, the
    agency reallocated staff so as to provide greater assurance that these
    tasks would be completed on time. The NRC was not required to report to
    Congress on its progress in other areas, such as how often it tested
    nuclear plant security. Thus, the aforementioned staff reassignments
    were from non-reported areas to reported areas. In July 1998, the NRC's
    Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation canceled the
    force-on-force security testing program that the agency had been
    conducting since 1991. This cancellation was part of the staff
    reassignments made following the June 1998 budget debates.
        The proposed legislation would address the problem by providing the
    NRC with a mandate to conduct force-on-force security tests at all
    nuclear facilities at least once every 2 years. The NRC would have to
    request in its annual budget sufficient funding to accomplish this
    mandate.

        Question 3. You and others today have expressed concerns about
    federalizing security at our Nation's nuclear power plants, but you
    have also indicated that there are certain threats against which plants
    cannot be expected to defend as has the NRC. So how do we best provide
    seam-less security at these facilities?
        Response. UCS views the Design Basis Threat (DBT) as the line
    between the threat level that individual plant owners must defend
    against and the larger threat level that the Federal Government is
    expected to defend against. The best way to provide seam-less security
    would be to require the NRC to promulgate regulations analogous to
    those in Appendix E to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The
    NRC promulgated Appendix E to require all nuclear plant owners to have
    an emergency plan in case of accidents. The regulations include
    provisions for periodically testing the emergency plan with exercises
    involving local, state, and Federal agencies. Collectively, these
    regulations help assure that all of the entities that would need to
    function following a nuclear plant accident have procedures in place
    along with adequate training. During the hearing on June 5th, the
    Committee heard testimony praising the effectiveness of emergency
    planning.
        Comparable regulations could require nuclear plant owners to have
    formal plans in case of larger than DBT attacks. Periodic exercises of
    the plans would enable U.S. military, State National Guardsmen, local
    law enforcement, U.S. Coast Guard, and other entities to demonstrate
    their proficiencies. As in the case of emergency planning, it would
    seem most appropriate for the NRC to be responsible for bringing these
    various authorities together to ensure adequate nuclear plant security.
    If it promulgated comparable regulations, the NRC would be positioned
    to assure that plant owners could defend against threats up to and
    including the DBT and that other entities could defend against larger
    threats.

        Question 4. In your testimony, you indicate that the qualification
    standards for security personnel are established by the plant owners or
    the companies that the have contracted with for security resulting in a
    wide range of minimum qualification standards. Is this something that
    needs to be addressed and if so, how? In your opinion, does the
    legislation being considered today address this issue?
        Response. We believe that the proposed legislation does address the
    concern about diverse qualification standards. The force-on-force
    security tests conducted at least once every 2 years as specified in
    Section 4 of the Nuclear Security Act represent a performance standard
    that is superior to minimum qualification standards. Poor performance
    on the security tests would require plant owners to fix the problems,
    either by upgrading the caliber of security guards or by increasing the
    security guard staffing levels to compensate for qualification
    shortfalls. With respect to public health and safety, either option is
    acceptable as long as adequate overall performance is demonstrated by
    the force-on-force testing.

                                     ______

              Responses by David Lochbaum to Additional Questions
                             from Senator Voinovich

        Question 1. In your testimony, you stated that the second most
    valuable provision of S. 1746 deals with amending the design basis
    threat. One of the sections provides for a NRC report to Congress about
    the changes made to the design basis threat. In your opinion, what do
    you think the value of making the changes public will have?
        Response. UCS did not envision the NRC's report to Congress being
    publicly available. Congress receives information from other agencies
    that is not made public. We thought this report would also be treated
    confidentially. We considered this report as providing Congress with
    essential information needed to make informed oversight decisions and
    helping to ensure that the design basis threat remained neither too
    high nor too low.

        Question 2. Specifically, what impact does this have on our
    national security by publishing these changes, and do you think Members
    of Congress should be involved in making decisions about the adaptation
    of this threat analysis?
        Response. As indicated in our response to Question 1, UCS did not
    envision that the NRC's report would be publicly available. In that
    context, we see no adverse impact to national security. We feel the
    report would enhance national security by affording Congress the
    opportunity to evaluate threat management for nuclear power plants with
    threat management in other areas. Armed with this information Members
    of Congress would be better positioned to shore up identified
    vulnerabilities through better definitions of where security surpluses
    exist.

        Question 3. In terms of retired military and law enforcement
    officials, such as the FBI, what impact do you think federalizing the
    nuclear security force would have on personnel?
        Response. Based on statements by nuclear industry representatives
    about their high retention rate for security personnel and our own
    discussions with security personnel at several nuclear plant sites, UCS
    believes that the majority of people guarding nuclear plants today
    would be guarding nuclear plants tomorrow in Federal hats if the
    proposed legislation were enacted. Some of the security personnel have
    told us they are pleased with their labor contacts and are apprehensive
    about ``trading down'' if federalization occurred. But most of the
    security personnel we have talked with complain about low wages, poor
    health plans, insufficient training, and long working hours. They
    consider federalization was one way, but not the only way, to remedy
    unsatisfactory working conditions.
        As noted in our written testimony, if one part of the proposed
    legislation was not enacted, we'd hope it was the federalization part.
    If the force-on-force security testing part was enacted, we believe it
    would cause those plant owners who may be currently undervaluing their
    security personnel to remedy any unsatisfactory working conditions.

                                   __________
        Statement of Jack Skolds, Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear

        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am Jack Skolds, Chief
    Nuclear Officer for Exelon Nuclear, the nuclear division of Exelon
    Generation Company. Exelon Generation is a wholly owned subsidiary of
    Exelon Corporation, which was formed in 2000 by the merger of Unicom
    Corporation of Chicago and PECO Energy Company of Philadelphia. Exelon
    Generation currently owns and operates approximately 37,000 megawatts
    of diversified electrical generation, including 17 nuclear reactors
    that generate 16,970 megawatts of electricity. Exelon is the largest
    nuclear generation operator in the country with approximately 20
    percent of the nation's nuclear generation capacity, and the third
    largest private nuclear operator in the world. We also own 50 percent
    of AmerGen Energy, which is a partnership with British Energy of
    Edinburgh, Scotland. AmerGen owns 3 of the 17 units in the Exelon
    fleet, with plants in Illinois, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
    legislative proposals addressing several important security issues at
    commercial nuclear power plants.
        I would also thank several members of the committee for their
    efforts to investigate the issue of nuclear plant security first-hand.
    Senators Graham, Clinton, Corzine, Smith, Voinovich and Specter have
    all toured nuclear power plants to receive briefings on plant security
    since September 11, as have several of the committee's staff members.
    In fact, Senator Specter has toured three of the five nuclear power
    plants in Pennsylvania, including two Exelon facilities.
        My testimony today will focus on three areas:
        First, I will address legislative proposals pending before the
    Senate on nuclear plant security.
        Second, I will provide the Committee with an overview of nuclear
    plant security.
        Third, I will provide the Committee with recommendations regarding
    actions the Federal Government can take to address nuclear plant
    security issues in the post-September 11th environment.
        Before addressing these issues, however, let me make a few
    preliminary comments.
        Let me begin by assuring the Committee that the nuclear power
    industry is absolutely committed to ensuring that our plants are
    operated safely and that all necessary steps are taken to protect the
    health and safety of the public and our employees. No one has a greater
    interest in protecting the safety and security of nuclear plants than
    the owners and operators of those facilities.
        In addition, it is important for the Committee to understand that
    commercial nuclear power plants are the most well-protected industrial
    facilities in the United States today. In fact, many businesses are
    turning to the nuclear industry as a model for providing security and
    emergency planning at their industrial complexes.
        Finally, as the United States acts to strengthen homeland security
    in light of new threats to the nation's security, it is imperative that
    Federal, State, and local officials work cooperatively with nuclear
    plant operators to buildupon the solid foundation of emergency response
    capabilities that existed prior to September 11th.

                         PENDING LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

        The Committee's letter of invitation requested comments on two
    legislative proposals pending before the Senate: S. 1586, ``a bill to
    amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to authorize the carrying of
    firearms by employees of licensees, and for other purposes'' and S.
    1746, ``a bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to strengthen
    security at sensitive nuclear facilities.'' My comments will address
    these bills, as well as H.R. 2983, legislation to reauthorize the
    Price-Anderson Act of 1954, which was passed by the U.S. House of
    Representatives and which is awaiting action by the Senate.
    S. 1586
        S. 1586, introduced by Senator Jim Inhofe, amends the Atomic Energy
    Act to authorize NRC licensee employees to carry firearms, provides
    limited arrest authority to such employees, and establishes a fine or
    imprisonment for the sabotage of commercial nuclear facilities. These
    provisions were submitted to Congress by the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission several years ago and were approved by the Senate during the
    106th Congress as part of S. 1627, the NRC Fairness in Funding Act of
    2000, and as part of separate appropriations legislation.
        The nuclear industry testified in support of the provisions as part
    of its testimony on S. 1627 during the 106th Congress, though some NRC
    licensees have recently expressed concern about the possible legal
    implications of providing wide-ranging arrest authority to private
    security forces. The industry stands ready to work with the Committee
    to resolve these concerns.
    S. 1746
        S. 1746, introduced by Senator Harry Reid and other members of the
    Committee, makes sweeping changes in the manner in which security at
    commercial nuclear facilities is addressed. Unfortunately, S. 1746 puts
    the proverbial cart before the horse by mandating radical legislative
    solutions to issues that have not been identified as problems.
        Section 3 would substitute a statutorily mandated design basis
    threat for that developed by the independent Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission and would federalize security at commercial nuclear power
    plants by establishing a nuclear security force within the NRC and by
    requiring the Commission to develop a security plan for each of the
    nation's sensitive nuclear facilities. Section 3 also levies a tax on
    sensitive nuclear facilities to fund a newly created Nuclear Security
    Fund within the Treasury to pay for these massive and sweeping new
    Federal responsibilities.
        Exelon is concerned about the imposition of a statutorily mandated
    design basis threat which prejudges the nature of the design basis
    threat without a comprehensive review by the NRC in conjunction with
    Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. If legislative
    action in this area is deemed necessary, Congress should first direct
    the President to conduct a comprehensive review with the various
    energy, intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the various
    threats facing nuclear power plants. Once such a review is completed,
    the NRC should be directed to adjust the design basis threat
    accordingly.
        With regard to federalization of nuclear plant security forces,
    Exelon strongly opposes such a drastic and unjustified change in
    security requirements. Security forces at nuclear power plants are
    highly trained professionals. Substituting Federal employees to
    safeguard sensitive nuclear facilities may actually degrade security.
    The background check requirements, hiring qualifications, and training
    standards in the bill are actually less stringent than those currently
    enforced by the NRC.
        Federalizing the nuclear security forces would also eliminate some
    of the best candidates for nuclear security forces by effectively
    barring recipients of Federal pensions from serving as Federal
    employees. Some of the current members of nuclear security forces are
    military retirees who would be forced to choose between resigning their
    position or giving up their Federal pensions. In addition, nuclear
    power plant security forces work in an integrated manner with plant
    operators during a security event to coordinate responses to security
    threats. Integrated command and control of plant security forces and
    plant operations personnel is essential to assure the protection of
    public health and safety. Finally, federalizing nuclear security forces
    would fundamentally change the mission of the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission. Hiring, training, and managing a security force of 7,000
    employees would be a massive undertaking and might well detract from
    the Commission's core mission of assuring that plants are operated in a
    manner that protects the public health and safety. It also places the
    NRC in an active role in day to day operations at the nation's nuclear
    power plants--a dramatic reversal of the efforts the Congress, the
    executive branch, the Commission, and the industry have made over the
    past 30 years to ensure the NRC is a regulator, not an operator.
        Similarly, requiring the NRC to develop security plans for each of
    the nation's sensitive nuclear facilities within 180 days would be a
    significant task that would result in an unnecessary--and perhaps
    dangerous--diversion of Commission resources. The NRC currently has
    detailed regulations governing security requirements at plants, and
    plant personnel can best handle the coordination of plant security
    forces with State and local law enforcement officials. As with
    federalization of nuclear plant security forces, requiring a federally
    developed security plan for several dozen sites is unnecessary given
    the complete lack of evidence that the current system is deficient.
        Finally, a tax on nuclear plant operators would fund a new and
    unnecessary Federal bureaucracy and would be unparalleled in the
    private sector. Simply put, the tax would fund an activity that is
    currently being effectively managed by the private industry. In
    addition, the tax potentially would force nuclear power plant customers
    to inappropriately fund national defense activities and would likely
    result in some nuclear plants subsidizing the cost of security at other
    plants.
        Section 4 establishes an Operation Safeguards and Response Unit at
    the NRC. The existing NRC Operational Safeguards and Response
    Evaluations (OSRE) program has been applied and interpreted in an
    inconsistent and at times arbitrary manner. Anti-nuclear groups and the
    NRC have at times inaccurately characterized licensee performance under
    the existing OSRE program by claiming that licensees have ``failed'' a
    significant portion of force-on-force drills.
        It is important to note that the OSRE program evaluates plant
    security, and not plant safety. Given the ability of plant operators to
    safely shut down an operating reactor in a matter of seconds, OSRE
    drills alone are not an accurate reflection of plant safety.
        The NRC has been striving to develop a more objective methodology
    for determining the ability of nuclear plants to respond to design
    basis threats. The program would potentially result in more frequent
    force on force drills than in the past. The Commission has also moved
    to enhance its organizational structure with respect to security by
    creating a new office dealing with security policies and programs.
        Senator Reid's legislation seeks to address problems with the
    current program by mandating a highly prescriptive program that could
    prevent the Commission from establishing amore effective and more
    appropriate program to evaluate the performance of plant security
    forces.
        Section 4 also inappropriately expands the emergency planning zone
    around sensitive nuclear facilities from a 10-mile radius to a 50-mile
    radius. There has been no evidence to suggest that such a radical
    change in the current regulatory system is warranted to protect public
    health and safety. Extending the 10-mile emergency planning zone to a
    50-mile radius would require planners to address an area of 7,857
    square miles (as opposed to the current emergency planning zone which
    encompasses 315 square miles). Such an expansion would only serve to
    diffuse the resources available to and distract the personnel
    responsible for emergency planning from focusing on enhancing planning
    that may have been ignored in other sectors prior to 9/11 and from
    continuing to ensure current planning is satisfactory. Again, absent
    compelling evidence on the need to undertake such a massive effort,
    Congress should defer to the NRC, FEMA, and EPA in determining the
    appropriate radius for emergency planning purposes.
        Section 5 directs the Commission to establish a stockpile of
    potassium iodide tablets and to develop plans for the prompt
    distribution of potassium iodide tablets within a 50-mile radius of all
    sensitive nuclear facilities; The NRC, in conjunction with the
    Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human
    Services, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, has recommended
    that potassium iodide be made available at the request of State
    governments for distribution within the 10-mile emergency planning zone
    around commercial nuclear power plants. There is no scientific basis
    for expanding the distribution of potassium iodide to an area within 50
    miles of a sensitive nuclear facility.
        Section 6 of the legislation directs the Commission to request
    assistance from Governors and the President in the event of war or
    other national emergency. While such assistance may be appropriate in
    the event of war or other national emergency, the Commission is not
    barred under current law from requesting such assistance. In addition,
    as the Commission stated in its review of the legislation, such
    assistance may not be appropriate in all circumstances and could divert
    resources from more vulnerable parts of the nation's infrastructure.
    H.R. 2983
        H.R. 2983, which was passed by the U.S. House by voice vote last
    year, includes an amendment by Representative Ed Markey to address the
    nuclear security issue. Under the Markey amendment, the President is
    directed to conduct a study to identify the types of threats that pose
    an appreciable risk to NRC licensed facilities. The legislation
    includes a number of issues to be considered during this study,
    including each of the issues enumerated in Section 3 of S. 1746. The
    President is also required to classify each type of threat as being the
    responsibility of the Federal Government or of NRC licensees.
        Exelon strongly supports the Markey amendment as an appropriate
    first step in identifying what additional changes maybe necessary to
    protect commercial nuclear facilities in he aftermath of September
    11th. The amendment allows the White House to tap all Federal
    intelligence and law enforcement resources to assess the nature of the
    threats that are faced by commercial nuclear facilities. The amendment
    also directs the White House to clearly delineate between threats
    against which licensees must defend and threats against which law
    enforcement officials and the Federal Government must defend. Only
    after such an assessment is conducted can Congress make a well-informed
    decision regarding what additional resources and requirements are
    necessary to protect commercial nuclear facilities.

               THE INDUSTRY'S APPROACH TO NUCLEAR PLANT SECURITY

        Protection of public health and safety requires both the safe
    operation of nuclear plants and the physical protection of the plant
    against potential threats.
        The industry today is operating the nation's 103 nuclear reactors
    more efficiently and safely than ever before. The average capacity
    factor for nuclear plants reached an all-time high of 91 percent in
    2001 according to preliminary data from the Nuclear Energy Institute,
    while the industrial safety accident rate for nuclear plants in 2000
    was a record-low 0.26, compared to an average accident rate in the
    manufacturing sector of 4.0.
        As another measure of safety, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    monitors the number of ``significant events'' at each nuclear reactor
    (broadly defines as occurrences that challenge a plant safety system).
    The average number of significant events per unit has declined from
    2.37 per year in 1985 to 0.03 per year in 2000, the latest year for
    which data is available.
        Nuclear power today provides 20 percent of the nation's electricity
    each year, and it does so without emitting any of the pollutants
    associated with acid rain or global warming. In fact, nuclear power has
    played a major role in allowing many regions of the country come into
    compliance with Clean Air Act requirements.
        The industry's commitment to safety also extends to plant security.
    In fact, commercial nuclear power plants are regarded by many to be the
    most well protected industrial facilities in the United States today.
    Indeed, many other industries are turning to the nuclear industry as a
    model for providing security at a variety of commercial facilities. For
    example, in addition to unique physical protections employed at
    commercial nuclear facilities, the nuclear industry is alone among
    critical infrastructure industries in using the Federal Bureau of
    Investigations to run criminal background checks on applicants for
    positions at sensitive facilities.

    Current Law
        Existing Federal statutes and regulations provide strict standards
    requiring licensees to take actions necessary to protect the public
    health and safety. NRC requirements and industry programs are
    predicated on the need to protect the public from the possibility of
    exposure to radioactive release caused by acts of sabotage.
        The current design basis threat--the threat against which a plant
    licensee must be able to protect--assumes a suicidal, well-trained
    paramilitary force, armed with automatic weapons and explosives, that
    is intent on forcing its way into a nuclear power plant to commit
    radiological sabotage. The design basis threat also assumes that the
    attackers will have insider knowledge of plant systems and plant
    security plans and even insider assistance.
        This assumed threat forms the basis for security response plans and
    training drills. These plans and drills are tested regularly by the NRC
    as part of their Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE). The
    OSRE program has also provided the industry with the opportunity to
    identify areas where security can be improved and enhanced.

    Physical Design of Plants
        A number of defenses exist to counter such a threat. Nuclear
    plants, by their very design, provide a redundant set of physical
    barriers designed both to keep radiation and radioactive materials
    inside the plant and to keep intruders outside' the plant. The reactor
    core is protected by a containment structure comprised of several feet
    of thick reinforced concrete walls, a steel liner, additional concrete
    walls within containment, and a several inches-thick high tensile steel
    reactor vessel. The metal cladding on the fuel itself also serves as an
    additional protective barrier. In addition, there are multiple systems
    of the safety equipment needed to safely shut down the reactor. This
    ``defense in depth'' design explains why the FBI considers nuclear
    plants to be ``hardened targets.''
        Nuclear plant sites have three distinct zones, each of which has
    different levels of physical and human defenses. The first zone, called
    the ``owner-controlled area,'' includes all of the property that is
    associated with the plant. The owner controlled area typically ranges
    in size from several dozen to hundreds of acres of land and serves as
    an effective buffer zone around the critical areas of the plant.
        The second zone, the ``protected area,'' is a physically enclosed
    area' surrounding the plant into which access in controlled. Physical
    barriers to intrusion include barbed wire and razor' wire fences,
    microwave and electronic intrusion detection systems, closed circuit
    television systems, isolation zones, extensive lighting, system
    monitoring by redundant alarm stations, and vehicle barrier systems.
    Access to the protected area is restricted to a select population of
    site personnel with a need for entry.
        To access the protected area, plant employees and visitors must
    pass through a metal detector and an explosives detector. X-ray
    machines are also used to screen material brought into the protected
    area by employees and visitors. In addition, employees must utilize a
    hand-geometry device to confirm their identity before entering the
    protected area.
        The third zone, the ``vital area,'' includes those areas within the
    protected area containing equipment essential for operating the plant
    safely and successfully shutting, down in the case of an event.
    Additional barriers are in place to protect vital areas of the plant;
    including concrete floors, walls, and ceilings; steel locked and
    alarmed doors; and key card access doors. Access to the vital area is
    even further restricted to a select population of site personnel with a
    need for entry. These access lists are routinely reviewed to confirm
    the need for access. The defensive contingency plans used by security
    forces are geared toward protection of these critical areas:

    Security Forces
        In addition to the robust physical structures protecting the plant,
    licensees maintain a highly trained, well-equipped security force to
    guard each facility. Security personnel, many of whom have law
    enforcement or military experience, must undergo extensive background
    checks, including fingerprint submittal for an FBI criminal record
    check; physical and psychological testing and screening; credit and
    reference checks; education and work history verification; and routine
    drug and alcohol screening. The nuclear industry is unique among energy
    industries in having a cooperative relationship with the FBI to
    facilitate such criminal record checks.
        In addition, security personnel are subject to rigorous training
    requirements. Initial nuclear security officer training includes a wide
    variety of topics, including NRC requirements for nuclear--facility
    physical security, recognition of sabotage devices and equipment,
    contraband detection devices and operation, firearms training and
    tactical response training. Annual supplemental training covers areas
    such as weapons proficiency, physical readiness, stress fire course,
    force-on-force drills, and table top drills. A significant amount of
    annual training focuses on force-on-force training, which covers such
    topics as threat assessment and tactical response, response force
    deployment and interdiction, protection of specified vital equipment
    and protected areas, multiple target acquisition and engagement, and
    the use of armored body bunkers, ballistic shields, and other
    specialized security equipment.
        As a further protection to the public, each nuclear power plant has
    an extensive and well-honed emergency response organization and systems
    in place to respond to and mitigate any emergency that arises.
    Emergency response plans are tightly integrated with local, State and
    Federal regulatory and emergency authorities and undergo regular
    training and drilling. The emergency planning zone includes an area
    within a 10-mile radius of the plant, an area encompassing roughly 315
    square miles. Since September 11, Exelon Nuclear has conducted security
    briefings for State and local officials in each of the States in which
    we operate to reinforce the coordination and response plans in the
    event of an emergency.

    September 11 and Its Aftermath
        Upon notification by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on September
    11, all nuclear plants immediately increased their security to Level 3,
    the highest level of security maintained at commercial nuclear
    reactors. All U.S. commercial reactors remain at Level 3.
        Since September 11, nuclear plants have also extended the point of
    initial screening of people entering the plant site from the protected
    area boundary to a point in the owner controlled area boundary. This
    initial screening includes an identification check, confirmation of the
    purpose for entering the site, and a thorough vehicle inspection for
    all visitors. State police and, in some cases the National Guard, have
    augmented this effort. In addition, armed patrols have extended their
    patrols to include a larger portion of the owner-controlled area. These
    patrols are coordinated with onsite personnel to enhance detection and
    deter potential threats.
        Given the uncertain nature of potential attacks, Exelon Nuclear and
    other reactor operators took a variety or protective measures in
    conjunction with NRC guidance. These included actions to harden site
    access, increase security resources, and improve operational readiness.
        To harden site access, Exelon has: established armed owner control
    area checkpoints for all vehicles entering the site; implemented
    additional vehicle pre-screening and control of all onsite deliveries
    upon entry to the owner-controlled area; positioned barriers to prevent
    access at alternate Owner Controlled Area entrances; restricted visitor
    access to those required for essential plant work; extended background
    checks for all personnel with temporary unescorted access; checked
    employee data bases against FBI watch lists of suspected terrorists
    from all known terrorist organizations.
        To increase security resources, Exelon has: increased the number of
    security officers; procured additional weapons and upgraded armaments;
    added armed security posts at key plant locations; increased the
    security presence at each site entrance; added local law enforcement,
    and at times National Guard, posted at site entrances.
        To enhance operational readiness, Exelon has: enhanced plant
    procedures and operator training for use during an attack or credible
    threat; implemented a fleet-wide threat assessment procedure to respond
    to threat situations; elevated attention to security and fire
    protection related equipment; established protocol for augmented
    Federal and State law enforcement assistance and intervention.
        Since shortly after September 11, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    has been engaged in a top-to-bottom review of the Design Basis Threat
    to reevaluate its adequacy. As an interim measure, the Commission
    issued Orders on February 25th of that year which imposes significant
    additional requirements on licensees pending the completion of a more
    comprehensive review of safeguards and security program requirements.
        While many of the specifics regarding the NRC Orders are classified
    as safeguards information and cannot be disclosed to the public, issues
    addressed by the Orders include security officer staffing levels,
    protection against potential vehicle and waterborne threats, protection
    of used fuel, enhanced access authorization controls, and mitigation
    efforts in the event of an attack.

               ADDITIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

        As the United States acts to strengthen homeland defense in light
    of new threats to the nation's security, it is imperative that Federal,
    State, and local officials work cooperatively with nuclear plant
    operators to buildupon the solid foundation of emergency response
    capability that existed prior to September 11.
        In particular, there are several steps that we believe the Federal
    Government should take to address security issues at nuclear power
    plants.
         There must be a clearer delineation of responsibility
    between government and plant licensees. Federal law currently requires
    NRC licensees to protect against a variety of potential threats to
    commercial nuclear power plants, but the law also considers many
    threats to be outside the scope of licensee responsibility and instead
    relies on law enforcement agencies and the military to protect against
    certain threats. Congress and the Administration must determine where
    the line between licensee and government responsibility lies in light
    of the new threats faced by nuclear power plants and other facilities
    that make up the nation's critical energy infrastructure.
         There must be improved communication and coordination
    among licensees and the various Federal, State and local agencies
    involved in emergency response planning. The Federal Government has a
    role in financially supporting many of the actions necessary to
    accommodate this improved communication and coordination.
         The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has incurred--and will
    continue to incur--additional costs to address new security concerns.
    Congress should support the NRC's request for additional funding to
    support additional actions undertaken in support of homeland defense.
         The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should revise its
    protocol of threat levels to conform with that used by the Office of
    Homeland Security.
         In determining the resources necessary to protect nuclear
    power plants, the Federal Government should consider the potential
    vulnerability of these plants relative to other potential critical
    infrastructure targets and allocate limited Federal resources to those
    facilities deemed to be most vulnerable to terrorist attack.

    Delineation of Government and Licensee Responsibility
        The most pressing challenge facing Congress and other Federal
    policymakers is ow to allocate responsibility for protecting the
    nation's critical infrastructure against attacks by terrorists and
    other enemies of the state. Federal law currently requires Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensees to protect against a variety of
    potential threats to commercial nuclear power plants. Federal law
    considers many potential threats to be outside the scope of licensee
    responsibility and instead relies on law enforcement agencies and the
    military to protect against certain threats. The question facing
    Congress and the Administration is where the line between licensee and
    government responsibility lies in light of the new threats faced by
    nuclear power plants and other facilities that make up the nation's
    critical energy infrastructure.
        The events of September 11 have presented the Nation with a variety
    of new challenges. Protection of the country's critical infrastructure
    is among the most important of these challenges, but it is a challenge
    that I am confident the nuclear energy industry can and will continue
    to meet.
        Exelon Nuclear fully supports the NBC's efforts to conduct a top-
    to-bottom review of security requirements pertaining to nuclear
    facilities. We continue to assess security at our plants and have taken
    appropriate steps to increase security measures as a result of the
    heightened State of alert.
        As Congress and the Administration debate what changes in Federal
    law and policies are appropriate in the aftermath of the September 11
    attacks, strong consideration should be given to building upon the
    existing regulatory system which distinguishes between threats for
    which licensees are responsible and threats for which law enforcement
    and the military are responsible.
        As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, the House of
    Representatives endorsed one such approach last year as part of H.R.
    2983, the Price-Anderson Amendments Act, which passed by the House by
    voice vote. The House legislation directs the President to conduct an
    assessment of potential threats against nuclear facilities and to
    classify each threat as one for which the Federal Government should be
    responsible or as one for which NRC licensees should be responsible The
    measure also requires the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to promulgate a
    rulemaking to ensure that licensees address the threats identified in
    the report as a licensee responsibility.
        Exelon strongly supports the Price-Anderson provisions as a
    reasoned approach to this very important issue. The Presidential study
    will allow the White House to coordinate the efforts of a number of
    Federal agencies to conduct a comprehensive threat assessment. Such an
    approach will also allow personnel knowledgeable in security matters to
    make decisions in coordination with intelligence officials to ensure
    that nuclear facilities are treated in a manner consistent with the
    protection of other critical infrastructure facilities.

    Improved Communication and Coordination
        The need for improved communication and coordination among
    licensees and Federal, State and local government agencies is perhaps
    best illustrated by an event at AmerGen's Three Mile Island (TMI) plant
    last year. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission notified AmerGen on
    October 17, 2001, that the Federal Government had received information
    that it believed constituted a credible threat against the plant. A
    number of Federal agencies and organizations, including the NRC, the
    FBI, the FAA, and NORAD, were involved in the subsequent response to
    what was later determined not to be a credible threat.
        Site personnel took immediate action to secure the plant, which was
    in the midst of a maintenance and refueling outage. The company also
    requested--and received--additional security assistance from the
    Pennsylvania State Police.
        The ``threat'' against Three Mile Island showed that the regulatory
    system currently in place can work effectively in response to a
    potential threat. As the licensee, AmerGen took immediate action to
    secure the site physically and called in additional assistance from the
    law enforcement community, while the Federal Government and the
    military took action to protect the plant against potential threats
    that fell outside the design basis threat against which AmerGen is
    responsible for defending.
        At the same time, the TMI event also provided both the industry and
    the government with some valuable ``lessons learned,'' including the
    need to work more closely with Federal officials to clarify the nature
    of threat information, the need to develop coordination procedures with
    multiple Federal agencies, and the need to communicate effectively with
    local elected officials and emergency services personnel.
        The Commission took a step toward addressing some of these issues
    earlier this year when it established an Office of Nuclear Security and
    Incident Response to consolidate and streamline selected NRC security,
    safeguards, and incident response responsibilities and resources. While
    this should address some coordination and communications issues, other
    Federal agencies must engage in similar efforts.
        Finally, it is important that the NRC be integrated into the
    intelligence community's process for assessing and communicating
    potential threats against commercial nuclear facilities and other NRC
    licensees. Nuclear plant licensees are highly dependent on receiving
    threat information from the NRC, so it is essential that the Commission
    itself be fully integrated into the intelligence community's threat
    assessment process.

    Expansion of NRC Mission
        The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has incurred--and will continue
    to incur--additional costs to address new security concerns. While the
    Commission plans to reallocate existing resources to support the new
    Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, the NRC's mission
    with regard to security is likely to expand as the Federal Government
    reassesses the responsibilities of various parties for providing
    nuclear security. NRC's efforts should be coordinated with the broader
    efforts of the Office of Homeland Security. Congress should support the
    NRC's request for additional funding to support additional actions
    undertaken in support of homeland defense.

    Security Protocols and Procedures
        As I noted earlier, the NRC currently uses a three level security
    classification system. Each of the nation's 103 reactors have been at
    the top level, Level 3, since September 11 and the Commission has
    indicated that plants will remain at Level 3 for the foreseeable
    future. This situation begs the question of how meaningful the
    different security classifications are if the highest level of alert
    effectively becomes the only level of security. Given these concerns
    and the need for consistency in communicating the urgency of potential
    threats, the Commission should revise its protocol of security levels
    to conform to the five level classification system established by the
    Office of Homeland Security. Such a system would also allow the
    Commission and licensees to distinguish between the current generalized
    heightened State of alert and a more specific threat against a plant or
    plants.
        As the NRC develops a new security level classification; it should
    establish security requirements that correspond appropriately to the
    various threat levels. In essence, the Commission must redefine the
    baseline security requirements for plants assuming a ``green'' alert
    level where no threat exists. The Commission should then require
    appropriate additional security requirements as alert levels are
    upgraded. This will allow plant operators and emergency response
    officials to develop readiness levels commensurate with the threat
    level that exists.

    Balancing the Need for Enhanced Security and Limited Federal Resources
        In determining the resources necessary to protect nuclear power
    plants, the Federal Government should consider the potential
    vulnerability of these plants relative to other potential critical
    infrastructure targets and allocate limited Federal resources to those
    facilities deemed to be most vulnerable to' terrorist attack.
        For example, some in Congress have advocated federalizing nuclear
    plant security forces. As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, the
    industry has a highly trained force of security personnel guarding
    commercial nuclear plants. Replacing these forces with Federal
    employees is unnecessary and would complicate the ability of licensees
    to coordinate the response of plant and security personnel in the event
    of a terrorist attack. Federalizing nuclear security forces would also
    unnecessarily limit the pool of potential guards by prohibiting retired
    military and other government officials who would' be prohibited from
    serving as Federal security personnel and continuing to draw, their
    Federal pension.
        Others in Congress and elsewhere have advocated placing anti-
    aircraft artillery installations at nuclear plants to protect against
    an air attack. The industry believes that Federal resources would be
    more properly focused on increased airport security to ensure that
    terrorists are denied access to the large commercial airliners that are
    of most concern.
        Given the strong physical structures at nuclear plants and the
    highly trained guard force to protect commercial nuclear facilities,
    resources may be more appropriately focused on other critical
    infrastructure facilities.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss these issues
    with you. Let me close by reiterating that the nuclear industry
    recognizes our responsibility, for protecting the public health and
    safety, and we are committed to taking the steps necessary to do so.
        I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

                                     ______

    Responses by Jack Skolds to Additional Questions from Senator Voinovich

        Question 1. Please explain your claim that the owners and operators
    of nuclear facilities have the greatest interest in protecting the
    safety and security of the plants.
        Response. As the owner and operator of a commercial nuclear
    reactor, Exelon's foremost responsibility is to the protection of the
    health and safety of the public and of our employees. Exelon Nuclear's
    commitment is outlined in our Conduct of Operations policy, which
    states that we ``will operate and maintain nuclear power plants with
    the full commitment to public and employee health and safety.''
        Thousands of nuclear plant workers and their families live within
    the 10-mile emergency planning zone which surrounds commercial nuclear
    reactors. Clearly, these employees have an overriding personal interest
    in making sure that they do not take any action that would threaten the
    safety or security of the plant.
        From a business perspective, nuclear plants represent the largest
    corporate asset of most nuclear plant owner and operators. The
    management of the corporation would never place these assets at risk by
    cutting back on necessary safety and security measures. The safe
    operation of our plants is the first priority of plant operators.
        Thus, while the general public undoubtedly shares our strong
    interest in assuring that nuclear plans are operated safely and
    securely, the combination of personal and business factors mentioned
    above make it clear that the owners and operators of nuclear facilities
    have the greatest interest in protecting the safety and security of the
    plants.

        Question 2. What are the specific concerns with Congress being
    involved with, and possibly even setting, the design basis threat?
        Response. Congress has the responsibility to provide guidance to--
    and to conduct oversight of--the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
    and other Federal agencies regarding the level of security and safety
    expected by the American public, but establishing the details of the
    design basis threat is best accomplished by experts in nuclear safety
    who have access to the full range of intelligence information regarding
    threats to nuclear facilities.
        Establishing the details of the design basis threat through the
    regulatory process is beneficial for several reasons:
        First, establishing the design basis threat requires a significant
    amount of expertise in the area of threat assessment. The NRC and other
    Federal agencies have an established relationship with the intelligence
    community and have established a process for gathering and evaluating
    threat information.
        Second, it is important that the NRC have the ability to update the
    design basis threat without the enactment of legislation, a difficult
    task in the best of times. The design basis threat is currently
    codified in NRC regulations and can be changed through the rulemaking
    process.
        Finally, although the regulatory process can be lengthy, it
    provides for significant input from all stakeholders and interested
    parties in a manner that cannot be duplicated by the Congress.
    Regulations are typically issued in draft form, with an opportunity for
    public comment and, in some cases, public hearings.
        The industry recognizes that Congress is responsible for assuring
    that the NRC and the nuclear industry are examining and responding to
    the events of September 11th, including the nature of the potential
    threat to our national infrastructure.
        The nuclear industry would welcome the opportunity to provide to
    the Committee with more details on the nature of plant security and
    information regarding the many improvements in plant security
    operations that have been made since last year in a closed session.

        Question 3. Could you please explain specifically why you believe
    the requirements, standards, and qualifications of a federalized
    security force would degrade security?
        Response. Following the introduction of legislation in both the
    Senate and the House of Representatives calling for the federalization
    of the security forces at nuclear power plants, the industry conducted
    a review of this issue through its trade association, the Nuclear
    Energy Institute (NEI). NEI issued a lengthy report on the issue
    (``Implications of Security Force Federalization on Nuclear Plant
    Security Safety''), which I am attaching to this response. The report
    concludes that federalizing nuclear power plant security could have
    several negative impacts:
         It could diminish and disrupt plant security by
    bifurcating the management responsibilities over the security forces.
         It could unnecessarily distract the NRC from its NRC's
    primary mission of protecting public health and safety through the safe
    operation of nuclear plants by creating one of the largest law
    enforcement and security agencies in the country.
         It could reduce the stringent hiring standards, extensive
    background checks, training and performance reviews that are already in
    place for our private security forces since existing standards exceed
    the minimum standards specified in proposed legislation.
         It could squander vital experience that current forces now
    have by replacing these private security forces with Federal personnel
    with little or no experience at nuclear plant facilities.
         Federalizing nuclear plant security forces when nuclear
    plants are already among the most secure privately owned facilities in
    the country may easily result in a mis-allocation of limited Federal
    security forces. For this reason, the industry believes that Congress
    and the Administration should conduct a comprehensive review of
    security at all critical energy infrastructure before making patchwork
    changes in security requirements.

        Question 4. Can you explain the concerns of NRC licensees about he
    possible legal implications of providing arrest authority to private
    security forces and the possible remedies to these concerns?
        Response. The nuclear industry largely supports the efforts of the
    NRC to increase the legal authority of our security forces. We are
    concerned, however, that efforts to blur the distinction between local
    law enforcement agencies and private security forces may have
    unintended consequences. For example, a wide body of State and Federal
    law has developed to establish the rights and responsibilities
    associated with the arrest authority of local law enforcement agents,
    but it is not clear how the underlying principles would be applied to
    private security forces. For example, would the arrest authority of our
    private security forces extend beyond our perimeters to permit the
    arrest of demonstrators that might block access to our facilities? In
    addition, would granting arrest authority to private security forces
    restrict their ability to engage in interviews of individuals or
    conduct searches of an individual's property on the plant site?
        Notwithstanding the authority to arrest or not arrest, our nuclear
    plant security officers are currently fully prepared to perform their
    duties to protect our facilities.

        Question 5. As the largest nuclear operator in the country, can you
    speak to how the NRC and the facilities have responded to various
    threats and concerns following Three Mile Island up to September 11?
        Response. Since the Three Mile Island incident, a significant
    number of security measures have been taken. Improved vehicle barriers
    have been installed, improved training of security officers has been
    employed, and strengthened physical barriers have been erected.

                                   __________
    Statement of Danielle Brian, Executive Director, Project on Government
                                Oversight (POGO)

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, POGO first began
    investigating security at nuclear facilities over 16 months ago. We are
    an investigative organization that works with insiders in order to
    improve public policy. We have neither a pro- nor an anti-nuclear
    agenda. We began investigating the Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear
    weapons facilities because more than a dozen insiders--current and
    former DOE and contractor security officials, contractors with military
    experience who test and evaluate the security at these facilities, and
    members of various guard forces--came to us with grave concerns
    regarding inadequate security pre-September 11.
        Just prior to September 11, we completed our report ``U.S. Nuclear
    Weapons Complex: Security at Risk,'' concluding that our nation's ten
    nuclear weapons facilities, which house nearly one thousand tons of
    weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium, regularly fail to
    protect this material from mock terrorist attacks. Once security became
    a national priority, we briefed these alarming findings with the
    National Security Council, the Office of Homeland Security, the
    Pentagon Nuclear Command and Control staff, the staff of the Scowcroft
    End-to-End Review, the Office of Management and Budget, numerous
    Congressional Committees and Members, and at Rep. Chris Shays' request,
    the General Accounting Office.
        Because of this work, guards from commercial nuclear power plants
    across the country began contacting POGO with similar concerns about
    inadequate security at the plants where they work. In April, POGO
    accompanied a group of nuclear power plant security guards to brief a
    dozen Congressional offices and Committee staff about their first hand
    concerns. We then began working with current and former Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC) security officials and contractors with
    military capabilities who test and evaluate security at commercial
    reactors. These people echo the same concerns about ongoing inadequate
    security at commercial nuclear power plants.
        My testimony is based on the information and documents gathered
    from these insiders. Again, I believe it is important to emphasize that
    our sources of information are not ``anti-nuclear.'' In fact, most of
    them have worked in the nuclear energy field for most of their adult
    lives. We applaud the sponsors of Senate Bills 1586 and 1746, the
    ``Nuclear Security Act,'' for several important provisions contained in
    these bills.

                            THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT

        Nuclear facilities are required to protect against a specified
    level of threat (known as the Design Basis Threat or DBT) from outside
    attackers and inside conspirators using a specific set of weapons.
    NRC's current DBT is wholly inadequate and must be made more realistic.
    According to published sources including U.S. News and World Report,
    the NRC's DBT requires protection against only three outside attackers
    with the help of one passive insider. This is absurd given the 19
    terrorists involved in the highly coordinated, technologically advanced
    September 11 attack.
        Rumors are that DOE will increase its DBT to approximately ten
    outside attackers and significantly upgrade the weaponry and tools that
    adversaries can be expected to use in an attack; However, although some
    in NRC have also recommended an increase tots DBT, there seems to be
    resistance within the senior ranks of the NRC to committing to making
    these improvements. There appears to be no justification for the NRC to
    have a less robust DBT for nuclear power plants than DOE has for
    nuclear weapons facilities. A successful attack on either a nuclear
    power plant or weapons facility would cause unfathomable damage to
    surrounding populations. We believe that the provisions in the
    ``Nuclear Security Act'' for a new and significantly upgraded DBT are
    absolutely essential.
        In addition to the inadequate number of attackers to be protected
    against, the current DBT does not require protection against some of
    the most dangerous weapons that are available on the open market today,
    such as 50 caliber API sniper rounds that can penetrate hardened guard
    posts and vehicles, nor do they use simulated chemical or biological
    agents that would require the guard force to be trained with gas masks.
    Furthermore, performance tests do not employ diversionary tactics that
    are likely to be used during an attack, such as remote controlled
    explosives. POGO agrees with the Nuclear Security Act's provisions that
    the new DBT include enhanced requirements for more realistic weapons,
    explosives, tools, and tactics, as well as more outside attackers and
    active inside collaborators.

                                POOR PERFORMANCE

        Though the DBT is severely inadequate compared to what we now
    recognize as the threat, half the nuclear power plants cannot even
    protect against this current standard of three outside attackers. David
    Orrik, the head of the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation
    (OSRE) program, testified before the House Commerce Committee on April
    11, that in 46 percent of the force-on-force security tests:

            ``the expert NRC team identified a significant weakness--
            significant being defined as the adversary team simulating
            sabotaging a target set, which would lead to core damage and in
            many cases, to a probable radioactive release. It is important
            to note that, even with adequate time for the plants to prepare
            and make themselves ready for the OSRE, that 46 percent still
            had--a weakness in armed response.''

        Let me caution the Committee--these tests are seriously dumbed down
    to favor the guard forces. The utilities are informed of an upcoming
    test six to 10 months in advance giving them plenty of time to prepare,
    the guards are usually aware of the attack scenarios, the mock
    terrorists are allowed to be made up of the utilities' own management
    staff, and the weapons used in the tests are not nearly as dangerous as
    those that can easily be found on the open market.
        Despite their clear artificiality and imperfections that favor the
    guard forces, force-on-force performance tests are still the best test
    of the performance of a guard force in protecting key targets at a
    nuclear facility. This is the key issue that cannot be forgotten--can
    the guard force protect the integrity of the reactor and the spent fuel
    pools from a suicidal terrorist attack? The statistics say no. How much
    worse would those statistics be if the DBT accurately represented the
    very real and sophisticated threat we know we are now facing?
        The mindset of both the utilities and the NRC is far too
    compliance-oriented--rather than performance tested. Our security
    guards are regularly told that security upgrades are unnecessary
    because the utility is already in ``compliance'' with NRC regulations.
    In other words, if a checklist of requirements for detection, delay,
    and response is met--to include such items as a double-fence, alarms, a
    certain number of guards--the facility is deemed secure. However,
    performance tests repeatedly reveal that despite this ``compliance''
    with requirements, physical security and the guard forces cannot stop
    terrorists from causing catastrophic damage to the reactor. This
    institutionalized bureaucratic complacency may be the biggest
    impediment to adequate security.
        A post-September 11 example of this phenomenon is that armed guards
    are now required to accompany all visiting trucks coming onto the site.
    We are told, there is often no extra guard available, and therefore, a
    guard is required to leave his post uncovered to accompany the truck.
    In these cases, the facility may be in compliance with this new
    requirement, yet guards are concerned that there is a hole in their
    defensive posture.

                 SPENT FUEL POOLS ARE SECURITY'S POOR STEPCHILD

        The NRC has never tested a power plant guard force's ability to
    protect spent fuel pools--possibly the prime target of a terrorist
    attack. In October of 2000 the NRC started to recognize the problem of
    spent fuel fires in a study of the effects of accidents. However, in
    100 pages of analysis, they never considered sabotage by terrorists.
    The NRC needs to create a target/assets list prioritized by importance.
        Several spent fuel pools at nuclear power plants across the country
    are only 50 yards from the double fence line. In a terrorist attack,
    the initial strike would likely be extraordinarily violent, fast, and
    with a significant level of human carnage. According to Sandia National
    Lab's ``Barrier Technology Handbook,'' it is estimated that a terrorist
    could penetrate the fence line and breach a door or side of a secured
    building in less than 60 seconds. We encourage the NRC to immediately
    recognize spent fuel pools as a primary terrorist target.
        We have been advised by military Special Forces sources of specific
    and obvious vulnerabilities at most nuclear power plants that I would
    be happy to discuss with Senators or staff. I am uncomfortable,
    however, outlining them in public testimony.
        To explain in general terms, a certain type of explosive, which a
    terrorist could carry on his back, would allow him to blow a sizable
    hole in the reinforced concrete bottom or wall of the spent fuel pool.
    At nuclear plants that have boiling water reactors (BWR)--about one-
    third of the existing reactors are BWRs--things could be even worse.
    These reactors have the spent fuel pools above ground. In these cases,
    a certain kind of explosive could even be launched from outside the
    fence line into the side of the pool. According to an unclassified
    study by Brookhaven National Lab, under certain conditions, the pool
    would start draining immediately, which could result in the immediate
    release of high-levels of radiation, quickly turning into an
    uncontrolled radioactive fire, and the plant could do nothing effective
    about it.
        The Nuclear Security Act does require a plan to increase security
    of these spent fuel pools. In the meantime, we would encourage the
    addition of barriers and delay mechanisms to supplement security until
    the spent fuel is placed in dry casks underground.

                        INADEQUATE TRAINING AND WEAPONRY

        Guards from several of the power plants have registered complaints
    with POGO about inadequate training as well. For example, one facility
    hired a new class of guards after September 11. The vast majority of
    the new recruits had never fired a gun before. During their training,
    they were limited to firing 96 rounds with their handgun, and far fewer
    with their shotguns. Two guards quit after 2 months on the job
    believing they couldn't protect the plant in the case of a terrorist
    attack. They told POGO, and other guards have admitted to NRC
    inspectors, that their training is so inadequate; in the face of real
    terrorist attack, many guards would use their guns simply to protect
    themselves while they escaped from the plant. Other guards with decades
    of experience protecting nuclear power plants bemoaned the lack of
    training outside the classroom, as well as the lack of modern tactical
    training. For example, their firearms training requires only that they
    be capable of standing and hitting a stationary target 25 yards away--
    they have no training shooting on the run at a moving target.
        Additionally, the guard forces at nuclear power plants are severely
    out-gunned. Even the NRC's DBT assumes that attackers will be armed
    with automatic weapons and explosives, yet many guard forces around the
    country are equipped only with shotguns and revolvers. We understand
    that the NRC is working with the Committee on legislative language to
    address this discrepancy.

                   SECURITY TESTS: MORE OFTEN AND MORE ROBUST

        NRC's virtually defunct Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation
    (OSRE) program conducts force-on-force tests using mock attackers only
    once every eight years at each plant. According to the nuclear power
    plant security guards and NRC inspectors we have interviewed, this 8-
    year hiatus creates a woeful lack of focus on security between tests.
    According to the guards with whom we have been working, because the
    tests are announced so far in advance, the utility management has time
    to quickly invest in security training consultants to improve their
    posture and chances of success. The guards advise us that after OSRE
    force-on-force tests, the security posture regularly returns to a bare
    minimum.
        POGO agrees with the Nuclear Security Act's provision to require
    that such tests occur no less than every 2 years to ensure that
    heightened standards remain in effect. POGO additionally recommends
    that the utility only be given 24- to 36-hour notice and that the
    utility be required to freeze in place the guard force to be tested at
    the moment of notification, rather than being allowed to call in the
    youngest or most capable guards.
        Currently, the mock terrorists and the attack scenarios to be
    tested are chosen by the utilities. The mock terrorists can be county
    or State police, the utility's own training staff, or even their own
    utility management staff--the very people who have a stake in ensuring
    success. With all due respect to these people, and as genuine as they
    may be in trying to test the physical security of the facility, none of
    them are trained to have the mindset or skills of highly trained
    terrorists. POGO recommends the use of military Special Forces units
    that are already trained to act as the adversarial team in force-on-
    force tests.
        According to the guards, they know within an hour or two when a
    test will take place and what part of the plant the mock terrorists
    will attack. They tell us that contrary to the full-page ads in the
    Washington Post and other newspapers, they do not normally wear flack
    jackets or their communications gear, nor do they carry their semi-
    automatic weapons. Sometimes, the guards are more than a football
    field's distance away from their weapons and flack jackets. However,
    when the mock attack is about to take place, the guards are magically
    wearing their flack jackets and communications gear and have their
    weapons in hand. Even more troubling is the fact that, at one-third of
    nuclear power plants, the guards only have access to shotguns, and they
    are locked up at a central location. In case of a real attack, the
    guards would have to go to that location, unlock the cabinet, get their
    shotguns and protective gear, and return to their post. By that time,
    the terrorists would have achieved their goals and caused catastrophic
    damage. Ongoing, limited-scope performance tests should regularly be
    testing the timelines for terrorist access to critical components.
        If the facility fails a performance test, the Nuclear Security Act
    requires re-testing every 6 months until it passes. We would recommend
    immediately calling in a well-armed and trained National Guard unit as
    compensatory action to supplement security until the facility passes a
    new OSRE test.
        We have learned from anti-terrorism experts that the worst enemy of
    any guard force is the daily grind of nothing happening. Guards are
    only human. A simple way to combat this problem is to add unannounced
    checks by the NRC to security testing. Fast food chains and the Postal
    Service frequently use a ``mystery shopper'' to use a false ILK or
    exploit some other weakness. Because the guards know a ``mystery
    shopper'' may be in their midst at any time, they remain more alert.
    This would be a very low cost tool that would significantly supplement
    security.

                                 FEDERALIZATION

        We recognize that federalizing the security force is a contentious
    issue. POGO believes that the same goals can be accomplished through
    far more vigorous Federal oversight, along with upgraded training,
    compensation, and authority granted to security forces.
        Currently, security guards who are risking their lives are among
    the lowest compensated employees at many plants. Pay scales and first
    responder benefits for security forces, including life and disability
    insurance, should be commensurate with those accorded to local police
    and fire departments. We cannot expect our security guards to give
    their all when we do not fairly provide for them in the event that they
    are injured while performing this dangerous and important job. Also,
    people working at nuclear power plants, including NRC and utility
    employees as well as contractor and subcontractor employees, should be
    given whistleblower protections. In the current climate of fear and
    whistleblower retaliation, it has been our experience that people have
    been deterred from coming forward with important information that could
    help fix security problems. The Paul Revere Act, introduced in the
    House; and soon to be introduced in the Senate, would strengthen
    whistleblower rights and extend them to Federal contractor employees.
        We applaud the introduction of Senate Bill 1586 that recognizes
    that security forces do not have enough authority to carry out their
    mission. Currently, guards are prohibited from using deadly force
    unless an intruder wields a gun; or they feel their life or the life of
    someone else is in danger, in accordance with State law. In other
    words, if an attacker jumps over the fence with a backpack and runs
    toward the reactor building or spent fuel pool, the guard can only
    attempt to chase down the attacker. We have been told of an instance
    when an NRC inspector observed a guard follow a mock terrorist during a
    force-on-force drill as he destroyed critical target sets in the
    reactor complex. When asked why he wasn't doing anything to stop him,
    the guard explained that he didn't have the authority to shoot an
    intruder who was only destroying property. The NRC has been trying to
    resolve this conflict for years. This legislation must remedy this
    obvious failure.
        Local law enforcement and first responders should also be given
    clearance to receive safeguard information so they can better
    coordinate emergency response plans. Currently, local law enforcement
    and first responders, in many cases, do not have adequate familiarity
    with the layout of critical areas of the plant that is necessary to
    respond to an emergency.
        If there is any expanded role for the Federal Government, it should
    be providing independent oversight, rather than management of security.
    Robust and credible Federal oversight is absolutely key to adequate
    security at both the nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons
    facilities. POGO has already recommended taking the security oversight
    function out of DOE, and we strongly recommend the same for NRC. NRC
    has historically been altogether too compliant with industry's wishes.
    For example, recently agreeing to industry's demands to replace OSRE
    with industry self assessments of security was totally irresponsible.
    History has shown that the critical job of security oversight cannot be
    adequately performed from within these agencies. Therefore we suggest
    that a small independent Office of Nuclear Security be created, perhaps
    housed in the Office of Homeland Security, or perhaps as an independent
    agency reporting to the Congress and President. Its purpose would be to
    provide oversight over and test the security of both government and
    commercial nuclear facilities.
        We would be happy to assist you and your staff as you work to
    refine these pieces of legislation, as well as making some of our
    inside sources available to you so that you can learn from their first-
    hand experiences.

                                     ______

           Response by Danielle Brian to an Additional Question from
                                Senator Clinton

        Question. In your testimony, you indicate that the mock terrorists
    and the attack scenarios to be tested at the plants are chosen by the
    utilities themselves. Can you explain further?
        Response. The OSRE does not use special forces military units, or
    their own trained adversary units, in their force on force tests of the
    power plant guard forces. The utilities are allowed to choose the
    adversary force--which is a key element of these tests. The utilities
    over time have chosen their own management personnel, their own
    training staff, and local and State police units as adversaries. This
    is a serious flaw in the tests. Even if these adversary forces are
    trained at all, they are not trained to have a terrorist mindset--as
    some military special forces units are. We strongly recommend that
    special military units, or OSRE's own trained adversary units be used
    for force-on-force tests. The utilities are also allowed to choose the
    scenario to be tested--for example, the location of the attack, as well
    as the target. In that the guard force has 6-9 months to practice these
    particular scenarios, the guards are never surprised by either the
    timing of the attack, or the tactics of the ``terrorists.'' When they
    are surprised by an unscripted tactic, the utility complains that the
    adversaries ``cheated.'' For these reasons, and others, we believe
    these tests are dumbed-down and not credible.
        One way to address these artificialities in the oversight would be
    to create a permanent Office of Nuclear Security in the new Department
    of Homeland Security. We have come to believe that the nuclear
    agencies, including the Department of Energy, are incapable of serious
    self-evaluation. We have talked to OMB and Homeland Security about this
    idea, and they believe it has merit. Moving the OSRE function out of
    NRC and into Homeland Security would be a quantum leap toward serious
    security oversight of our nation's nuclear power plants.

                                     ______

              Responses by Danielle Brian to Additional Questions
                             from Senator Voinovich

        Question 1. In your testimony, you stated that a re-evaluation of
    the design basis threat is necessary. However, S. 1746 provides for a
    NRC report to Congress about the changes made to the design basis
    threat. In your opinion, what is the value of making these changes
    public?
        Response. I never suggested that the new DBT be made public. In
    fact, I believe it should not be public. However, the Congress should
    fully understand the basis for and the credibility of the new DBT--not
    only for the number of outside attackers, and the issue of passive/
    active insiders, but also the kinds of weaponry, tools, explosives,
    etc. that can be used by the adversaries. Without informed
    Congressional oversight, agencies have historically been incapable of
    maintaining even adequate standards.

        Question 2. Specifically, what impact will publishing these changes
    have on our national security and do you think Members of Congress
    should be involved in making decisions about the adaption of this
    threat analysis?
        Response. I never suggested that the new DBT be made public. In
    fact, I believe it should not be public. However, the Congress should
    fully understand the basis for and the credibility of the new DBT--not
    only for the number of outside attackers, and the issue of passive/
    active insiders, but also the kinds of weaponry, tools, explosives,
    etc. that can be used by the adversaries. Without informed
    Congressional oversight, agencies have historically been incapable of
    maintaining even adequate standards.

        Question 3. Currently, the NRC, like many other Federal agencies,
    is facing a human capital crisis to get people to work for the agency
    with the appropriate education, training, and experience. Many of the
    steps that you suggest in your testimony, such as training and testing,
    require more people with this specialized knowledge. How do you suggest
    that the NRC attract and keep these appropriate nuclear security people
    to meet these proposed requirements?
        Response. The NRC is currently in the process of hiring a number of
    new people in security, and we understand their applicants are highly
    qualified. Our testimony, however, referred specifically to the
    inadequate training provided to the security guards by the utility's
    security subcontractors. The poor pay, benefits and training afforded
    many nuclear security guard forces is a very serious issue that may
    require a legislative fix.

                                   __________
         Statement of Donna J. Hastie, BS, MS, Emergency Preparedness
                           Specialist, Marrietta, GA

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Donna Miller Hastie. My
    experience in emergency planning includes 23 years in the commercial
    nuclear power industry in the U.S. and abroad. Before joining the
    nuclear industry, I supervised a nuclear medicine program in a
    hospital. During my career, I have served as an evaluator or observer
    at over 500 emergency preparedness drills and exercises. And, for many
    years, I have had the pleasure of co-sponsoring and teaching emergency
    preparedness in a continuing education course at Harvard University. I
    have also made presentations or taught at MIT, Rutgers, and the
    Leadership School at Wharton.
        My experience includes:
         Manager of the Emergency Preparedness (EP) program for the
    Beaver Valley Power Plant in Pennsylvania, including onsite emergency
    response readiness and coordination with offsite State and local
    emergency response organizations. The 10-mile emergency planning zone
    (EPZ) for Beaver Valley included three States, three counties, 30
    municipalities, three NRC regions, two FEMA regions, and 37 Federal
    agencies that make up the Regional Advisory Council (RAC).
         Program Manager in the emergency preparedness division for
    the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). During my 14 years at
    INPO, I completed 280 plus plant visits and at the time of my
    retirement, was manager of the emergency preparedness program for the
    Institute. I have been to every plant in the United States at least
    once, many more than once, and many outside the US. INPO's EP program
    included identifying areas of strengths and recommendations for
    enhancements for emergency response programs at nuclear power plants.
         Manager of the Emergency Preparedness program at PSEG,
    (Salem/Hope Creek plants) in New Jersey for 5 years. The 10-mile EPZ
    for PSEG included two States, four counties, one NRC region, two FEMA
    regions, and again, multiple other Federal agencies.
        Since my second retirement in August of 2001, I have worked as an
    emergency preparedness consultant in the nuclear industry.
        As you can see, most of my career has been in emergency planning in
    radiation-related fields. And, like many people whose career is devoted
    to one area, I am occasionally reminded that many people are not
    familiar with the extensive history and experience in emergency
    planning that is the standard for commercial nuclear power plants.
        I look at my testimony today as an opportunity to provide
    enlightenment about an area that has, since September 11, generated
    considerable concern and much speculation among many Americans, and
    that is, the history of emergency preparedness programs at U.S. nuclear
    power plants.
        Emergency planning for nuclear plants actually goes back to 1970.
    In my testimony today, I will review how the work of the past 30 years
    has put in place emergency preparedness program elements to protect the
    health and safety of the public. This will include sections on:
         What is Emergency Planning?
         What is the Regulatory History of Emergency Planning?
         What are the Existing Roles and Responsibilities?
         What are the Existing Emergency Preparedness Program
    Elements?
         What is the Experience with Nuclear Plant Emergency
    Response Programs?
        What is the Nuclear Industry's Commitment to Emergency Planning?
        Any comprehensive history of emergency planning must include the
    regulatory history, complete with titles and citations that can often
    make for laborious reading. But to not detail that history would be a
    disservice to this committee.

                          A. WHAT IS NUCLEAR PLANNING?

        Emergency Preparedness has three goals: (1) to protect the plant
    worker; (2) to protect the plant equipment; and (3) to protect the
    health and safety of the general public. An emergency plan and
    implementing procedures provide the basis for safeguarding the
    population and the work force.
        Since 1980, every nuclear power plant in the United States has been
    required by Federal law to create an onsite emergency response plan and
    ensure that offsite plans exist to protect public health and safety.
    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approves onsite plans. Approval
    of offsite plans is coordinated between NRC and the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA). Both onsite and offsite plans must be
    approved for the plant to obtain and retain an operating license.
        Total emergency preparedness requires plans for the response of
    both systems and people. The engineering design of the plant provides
    for safe operations. The operating procedures address appropriate
    systems response during emergencies. The emergency plan and
    implementing procedures provide the basis for safeguarding the
    population and the work force.
        In the nuclear industry, effective emergency preparedness depends
    on mutually supportive planning. The multi jurisdictional nature of the
    emergency planning zone (EPZ) plan requires that arrangements must be
    made at multiple governmental levels--contiguous counties within the
    10-mile EPZ cooperating with mutual aid agreements, joined by State and
    Federal agency coordination. Federal departments and agencies, State
    and local governments, voluntary disaster relief organizations, and the
    private sector work together to meet basic human needs and restore
    essential services after an emergency.

                             B. REGULATORY HISTORY

        In December 1970, the NRC (then the Atomic Energy Commission)
    introduced emergency planning requirements into the regulations.
    (35FR19568, December 24, 1970). The content of application, technical
    information section was amended to include Section 10CFR50.34 ``A
    discussion of the applicant's preliminary plans for coping with
    emergencies''. 10CF50.34 embodying the first emergency planning rules,
    required a discussion of plans for coping with emergencies, and set
    forth-minimum requirements. Also, Appendix E provided additional items
    that shall be included in these plans. (35FR19568, December 24, 1970).
        In 1973, the Federal interagency responsibility for radiological
    incident emergency response planning was identified in the Federal
    Register Notice of January 17. (38FR2356). The notice was revised
    December 24, 1975, and published in the Federal Register (40FR248).
        In the January 17, 1973 notice, the Environmental Protection Agency
    (EPA) was assigned the responsibility for:
        (1) establishing protective action guidelines; (2) recommending
    appropriate protective actions; (3) assisting State agencies in the
    development of emergency response plans; and (4) establishing radiation
    detection and measurement systems.
        In December 1974, the NRC developed NUREG75-111, ``Guide and
    Checklist for the Development and Evaluation of State and Local
    Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Fixed
    Nuclear Facilities'' to assist in developing the offsite plans.
        In September 1975, the EPA issued EPA-520/1-75-001, ``Manual of
    Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear
    Incidents.''
        In 1975, the NRC published Regulatory Guide 1.101 that set out the
    format and content of onsite emergency plans. At that time, offsite
    emergency planning was required for licensing purposes only in the low-
    population zone (LPZ) located within about a 3-mile radius of the
    plant. The EPZ was defined in 10CR100.11. At this time the only plan
    required to be submitted was the plant plan.
        In 1976, a Task Force of NRC and EPA representatives determined the
    appropriate degree of emergency response planning efforts. A joint EPA/
    NRC document in December 1978: NUREG-0396, ``Planning Basis for the
    Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency
    Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants.''
    introduced the concept of establishing emergency planning zones
    (EPZs)--the Plume Exposure Pathway (0 to 10 miles) and the Ingestion
    Pathway (0 to 50) miles.
        In December 1979, FEMA was assigned lead responsibility for the
    evaluation of offsite planning and response by President Carter in a
    White House statement and Fact Sheet. FEMA developed a review process,
    established in the 44 CFR350 regulations. These regulations were
    finalized in the Federal Register Notice on September 28, 1983
    (48FR44332). NRC retained jurisdiction over plant licensing and
    operation and onsite emergency preparedness.
        In August 1979, extensive changes were made to the NRC's
    regulations following the TMI accident. The changes were noticed in the
    August 19, 1979 Federal Register pages 55402--55418. There were several
    key changes to the regulations. These included the addition of 10CFR
    50.47 and major additions to Appendix E. The additions included
    detailed instruction for developing the emergency response
    organization, assessment action, activation of the emergency
    organization, notification procedures, emergency facilities and
    equipment, training, emergency procedures, recovery efforts and
    emergency computer systems.
        In November 1980, a joint NRC/FEMA document, NUREG-0654/FEMAEP-1,
    ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency
    Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants''
    establishing the substantive basis for both onsite and offsite
    emergency planning. It required joint licensee/state/offsite agency
    participation in an annual simulated accident scenario (exercise) as a
    condition for an operating license.
        On December 16, 1980, memorandums of understanding written between
    the NRC and FEMA were formalized.
        In September 1984, the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
    (FRERP), published as an interim document in the September 12, 1984,
    Federal Register (29FR35896) outlined the authority and responsibility
    of each of the 12 Federal agencies that have the resource and
    capabilities needed to respond to a radiological emergency. The plan
    was first tested in a full-scale exercise at the St. Lucie Nuclear
    Facility on March 6-8, 1984. FEMA published the final operational FRERP
    in the November 8, 1985, Federal Register (50FR46542).
        In February 1985, the NRC/FEMA response was published in NUREG-098
    1/FEMA-51, Rev. l, ``NRC/FEMA Operational Response Procedures for
    Response to a Commercial Nuclear Reactor Accident''.
        In November 1985, FEMA issued FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the
    Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power
    Plants''. The Guide establishes the areas to be reviewed and the
    acceptance criteria.
        In November 1986, FEMA issued Guidance Memorandum EV-2,
    ``Protective Actions for School Children''. The purpose of the guidance
    is to assist State and local government officials and administrators of
    public and private schools in developing emergency response plans for
    use in protecting the students.
        In 1992, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) was implemented. (This
    comprehensive plan may be implemented concurrently with the Federal
    Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), which details the Federal
    response to a peacetime radiological emergency). The FRP describes the
    policies, planning assumptions, concept of operations, response and
    recovery actions, and responsibilities of 27 Federal departments and
    agencies, including the American Red Cross, that guide Federal
    operations following residential declaration or emergency.
        In July 1996, a Federal Register notice announced the strategic
    review of FEMA's Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program and
    requested comments.
        In 1999, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published the
    EPA Radiological Emergency Response Plan (EPA-RERP) to replace the
    1986, EPA Radiological Emergency Response Plan. The EPA-RERP has been
    developed to reflect changes in EPA's programmatic and operational
    concepts for responding to radiological incidents and emergencies. The
    new plan represents EPA's integrated approach to management of
    radiological releases.
        In 1999, the NRC's risk significance program; the Reactor Oversight
    Process integrated the NRC's inspection, assessment, and enforcement
    programs. The Operating Reactor Assessment Program evaluates the
    overall safety performance of operating commercial nuclear reactors and
    communicates those results to licensee management, members of the
    public, and other government agencies.
        The assessment program collects information from inspections and
    performance indicators (PIs) in order to enable the agency to arrive at
    objective conclusions about the licensee's safety performance. Based on
    this assessment information, the NRC determines the appropriate level
    of agency response, including supplemental inspection sand pertinent
    regulatory actions ranging from management meetings up to and including
    orders for plant shutdown. The NRC's revised inspection program
    includes three parts: baseline inspections; generic safety issues and
    special inspections; and supplemental inspections performed as a result
    of risk significant performance issues.
        In April 2001, NRC published new EP inspection procedures to
    determine, in conjunction with the performance indicators, whether a
    licensee is meeting the Cornerstone Objective and Performance
    Expectation. The cornerstone objective is ``To ensure that the licensee
    is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the public
    health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency''. The
    cornerstone performance expectation is ``Demonstration that reasonable
    assurance exists that the licensee can effectively implement its
    emergency plan to adequately protect the public health and safety in
    the event of a radiological emergency.''
        In September 2001, FEMA published the ``Radiological Emergency
    Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology'' (66FR47526), the
    Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise evaluation areas and
    associated criteria, to be effective October 1, 2001.
        In April 2002, FEMA published corrections to certain provisions of
    the ``Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation
    Methodology'' exercise evaluation areas.
        Since 1979, more than 2000 graded exercises have been conducted.
    In-depth critiques are conducted following each exercise and areas for
    improvement, as well as strengths, are identified. The improvement
    areas are corrected and tested in subsequent exercises to prevent
    recurrence.

                         C. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

        Before March 1979, accident at Three Mile Island (TMI), offsite
    emergency planning at nuclear power sites by utilities and local and
    State authorities was done under the NRC oversight and basically on a
    voluntary basis. Specific requirements for off-site emergency planning
    as a precondition for licensing had not been established, and as a
    result, the capabilities to respond to a radiological accident varied
    greatly.
        One of the major lessons learned from TMI was the need for a
    comprehensive, coordinated response plan, by every level of government
    and integration with onsite and offsite plans.
        To investigate these and other concerns, President Carter appointed
    a special investigative body, the Kemeny Commission, to study the Three
    Mile Island accident. Following the Commission's report, the President
    directed that principal Federal responsibility for off-site emergency
    planning around nuclear power plants would be transferred from NRC to
    FEMA.
        FEMA had been established in 1978 (prior to TMI) in order in order
    to create a single emergency planning and response manager for the
    Federal Government. FEMA coordinates offsite measures at all levels of
    government to safeguard the population, while NRC maintains
    responsibility to oversee emergency actions taken inside the nuclear
    plant boundaries. NRC maintains its authority as the licensing
    authority for commercial nuclear power plants; FEMA provides
    recommendations and findings to NRC for use in its deliberations. Both
    agencies have issued extensive instruction in the Code of Federal
    Regulations to explain how their respective responsibilities are
    carried out.
        Following is a brief description of licensee, state, local, and
    Federal responsibilities:
         Licensees are responsible for operating the plant in a
    safe manner and for being prepared to respond to a radiological
    emergency in a manner such as to effectively mitigate the consequences
    of the emergency. If an accident should occur, the licensee is
    responsible for stabilizing the situation, bringing the plant to a safe
    condition, limiting the consequences, implementing on-site emergency
    planning, making off-site initial notifications and protective
    recommendations and providing sufficient plant status information to
    assist in off-site emergency response. The licensee is responsible for
    monitoring the plant and radiological parameters to determine the level
    of the emergency (unusual event, alert, site area emergency, or general
    emergency and recommend onsite and offsite protective actions.
         State and local agencies are responsible for maintaining
    the offsite emergency preparedness. In case of an accident, the State
    and local designee will consider the emergency action recommendation of
    the licensee and make any off-site protective action decision,
    including sheltering and evacuation. The offsite authorities are
    responsible for activating the alert and notification systems. Having
    alerted the public, the State or local agency will provide additional
    information to the public through the electronic media including what
    protective actions should be taken.
         State Emergency Management Agencies are the lead
    organization responsible for developing the State Radiological
    Emergency Preparedness Plan and for coordinating the development of
    associated county plans. They have a lead role and responsibility for
    the training of State and local emergency response organizations and
    for the conduct of public information and education. (In California the
    local agencies have the lead role).
         State Departments of Health are the State technical
    agencies responsible for the assessment of the impact of a radiological
    emergency and the environment. These agencies also function as the
    technical advisor to the emergency management organization in
    radiological matters and protective actions.
         County and municipal emergency management officials are
    responsible for the development and implementation of their respective
    emergency response plans. The Federal, state, county, and local
    governments have developed coordinated radiological emergency
    preparedness plans. The plans are coordinated with the licensee onsite
    emergency plan and periodically exercised to ensure a fully
    coordinated, effective response and the availability by the required
    offsite support for an onsite emergency. State and local emergency
    plans have been prepared for every commercial nuclear power site in the
    country. All have received FEMA 44CFR350 evaluation and have been
    tested in exercises.
         The Federal Government's role is to support the licensee,
    State, and local agencies in an emergency.
         The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the Cognizant
    Federal Agency when an event occurs at a commercial nuclear power
    plant. The NRC/FEMA response is documented in NUREG-0981 /FEMA 51, Rev.
    1, ``NRC/FEMA Operational Response Procedures for Response to a
    Commercial Nuclear Reactor Accident, `` February 1985. The agency
    maintains a 24-hour-a-day Headquarters Incident Response Center where
    the Operations Officer is an engineer or scientist specifically trained
    for that job. The Center functions as the NRC's point of direct
    communication through dedicated telephone lines with all operating
    commercial nuclear power plants. The Center notifies additional NRC
    personnel, including regional offices, and other Federal agencies as
    needed. During an emergency, the NRC establishes three teams:

              the Reactor Safety Team follows the course of the
            plant event and attempts to anticipate future plant responses;
              the Protective Measures Team follows the event from
            the radiological standpoint; and
              the headquarters Executive Team determines if or when
            to escalate the NRC response.

        The teams also include Congressional, Government, and Public
    Affairs liaison. NRC participates in a licensee-graded exercise once
    each quarter.
         The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is
    responsible for off-site emergency plans and maintains the Emergency
    Information and Coordination Center (EICC) in Washington, DC, with
    communications capability to its regions and other Federal agencies.
    FEMA's Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP) has a two fold
    emphasis: (1) assistance to State and local governments in developing
    emergency plans (44 CFR 350); (2) coordination of Federal agencies'
    assignments to carry out Federal functions (44 CFR 351).

         D. WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF AN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM?

        All U.S. nuclear reactor facilities are required to participate in
    independently reviewed; full-scale emergency exercises every 2 years
    (and training drills in off years). For each exercise, the licensee
    creates a confidential emergency scenario to be played out by plant
    staff and local emergency response organizations, including law
    enforcement, local hospitals, radiological monitoring teams and others.
    Post-exercise critiques by the Federal agencies and exercise
    participants identify areas that need to be corrected in future
    exercises or improvements that need to be made to the plan itself.
    Following is a brief summary of the elements that are tested regularly:
         Onsite Emergency Organization.--The licensee is
    responsible for developing the onsite emergency organization of plant
    staff personnel for all shifts. An emergency coordinator must be
    designated who shall be on shift at all times and have the authority
    and responsibility to immediately and unilaterally initiate any
    emergency actions required to protect the health and safety of the
    public. Certain responsibilities cannot be delegated to others in the
    organization, including the decision to notify and to recommend
    protective actions to authorities responsible for offsite emergency
    measures.
         Emergency Classification System.--All utilities at all
    commercial nuclear power plants use a standard emergency classification
    system. The emergency classification system provides for graduated
    levels of response from minor events of low consequence to very severe
    events. Specific Emergency Action Levels (EAL) trigger each
    classification.
         Emergency Communications and Notification Methods and
    Procedures.--The licensee must have the capability to notify
    responsible State and local government agencies within 15 minutes after
    declaring one of four emergency action levels. The licensee must also
    demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been
    established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the
    public within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway. The notification
    system should have the capability to essentially complete the initial
    notification of the public within the EPZ within about 15 minutes once
    the offsite responsible State or local authorities decide to notify
    them. In November 1985, FEMA issued FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the
    Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants.
        Offsite Communications.--Each licensee is responsible for a primary
    and backup telephone system to make notifications to offsite agencies
    (e.g., NRC, State, and counties) within 15 minutes after recognition
    and classification of an emergency condition at the plant. A dedicated
    telephone line has been established between the plant control room and
    the NRC's headquarters Incident Response Center. IE Information Notice
    No. 86-97, ``Emergency Communications System,'' dated November 28,
    1986, defines the emergency communications requirements.
        Public Alerting Systems.--Off-site emergency agencies are
    responsible for notifying the public of an emergency and activating the
    notification system. However, the licensee must be able to demonstrate
    that a notification system is available within the 10-mile EPZ. Sirens
    are the predominant method of public alerting around the U.S.
    commercial nuclear plants and Federal regulations have established
    criteria for the design of acceptable siren systems. The number of
    sirens that are required for the 10-mile EPZ will depend on the
    population density, type of terrain and other limiting factors. The
    average site will have between 50 to 85 sirens positioned throughout
    their EPZ.
        Public Notification.--Once the public has been alerted to an
    emergency, the capability must be in place to provide an informational
    message or instructions to the public through out the 10 miles EPZ
    within 15 minutes. This capability must be available 24 hours per day.
    The most common method of providing instructions to the public is local
    radio and television stations. Another method of providing instructions
    to the public is by the Alert Notification System (ANS), a system of AM
    and FM radio stations which provide or are capable of providing, 24
    hours per day transmission and have backup power generation capability.
        In order to instruct the public to tune to a specific radio,
    television, or an EBS radio station for emergency information once
    alerted, emergency preparedness public information brochures are
    distributed throughout the 10-mile EPZ. The brochures identify the
    method of alerting and measures to be taken once alerted. The brochures
    discuss the various protective measures that residents may be asked to
    take, including sheltering, evacuation, and use of thyroid blocking
    agents or other precautionary measures.
         Public Education and Information.--The responsibility to
    insure the education of the general public concerning radiological
    emergencies and protective actions is jointly shared by the licensee,
    the State and the local governments. Information is disseminated
    annually to the public within the 10-mile EPZ. Specifically,
    information is provided describing how they will be notified in the
    event of an emergency and what initial actions should be taken upon
    notification. In addition, educational information on radiation
    contacts and special needs for the handicapped are addressed, as well
    as how to obtain additional information.
         Emergency Facilities and Equipment.--Adequate provisions
    must be made for facilities and equipment to support the response to a
    given emergency. This includes monitoring, assessment, decontamination,
    first aid treatment and transportation. The physical facilities include
    an onsite technical support center, an operational support center, a
    near-site emergency operations facility, an onsite and offsite
    communications system, and a media center.
    Emergency Response Centers
        Control Room (Onsite).--The Control Room is the primary facility
    where plant conditions are monitored and controlled and where
    corrective actions are taken to mitigate degradation of reactor
    systems.
        Technical Support Center (Onsite).--The TSC is an emergency
    operations work area from that designated technical and engineering
    personnel trend plant conditions in order to predict further
    degradation and to devise appropriate corrective actions.
        Operational Support Center (OSC) (Onsite).--The OSC is the assembly
    point for personnel providing emergency assistance to the Emergency
    Organization. The purpose of the OSC is to provide an assembly. and
    staging area for essential operations support personnel who are
    deployed into onsite areas.
        Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) (Offsite).--The EOF is the
    primary offsite center for the management of the licensee's emergency
    response, coordination of radiological and environmental assessments,
    and determination of recommended public protective actions.
        Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) (Offsite).--The JPIC is the
    principal media contact point for the licensee, state, and local
    communities during a radiological emergency.
        State Emergency Operations Center (EOC).--This facility provides
    the management of offsite emergency responses. The State EOC will serve
    as a location from which local officials may request manpower and
    resource assistance.
        Local Community Emergency Operations Centers (EOC).--The local EOCs
    serve the purpose of maintaining a communications point within each
    community as well as providing this capability with other adjacent
    communities and the State. Each local chief executive can direct
    protective actions to be taken for his community and can activate the
    public alerting system for his community.
         Accident Assessment.--The means for determining the
    magnitude of and for continually assessing the impact of the release of
    radioactive material must be available to respond to an accident. Dose
    assessment is performed using actual in-plant effluent radiation
    monitors to generate the radionuclide source term, meteorological
    instrumentation, and associated hardware to develop a dispersion model
    for an atmospheric release, hydrological instrumentation to develop
    dilution factos for a liquid release, and the assumption of appropriate
    dose conversion factors (DCF) to account for the isotopic mixture and
    its concurrent chemical and physical state.
        As part of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program,
    nuclear power plants maintain a fixed environmental monitoring system,
    within the 10-mile EPZ, consisting of Thermoluminescent Dosimeters
    (TLDs), air particle detectors and another environmental media sampling
    stations. During 12 and/or subsequent to emergency conditions, this
    program is modified to collect and analyze additional samples from
    existing stations. Results are used to confirm radiation exposure
    estimates and environmental calculations.
         Protective Response.--A range of protective actions for
    emergency workers and the public have been developed for the 10-mile
    EPZ. Systems are available to warn and advise onsite individuals
    including employees not having emergency assignments, visitors,
    contractors, construction personnel, or others in public access areas.
    Provisions have been made for these individuals to leave the site by
    designated routes to some suitable offsite locations.
        If needed, monitoring and decontamination capabilities of
    individuals leaving the site have been established. Having requested
    non-essential personnel to leave the site, the licensee must have the
    capability to account for all individuals onsite and be able to provide
    the names of missing individuals within 30 minutes of the start of an
    emergency. The licensee must be able to account for all onsite
    individuals continuously after that time.
        The licensee will also make recommendations, if needed, to the
    affected State and local authorities. This may include sheltering,
    evacuation, or use of potassium iodide in a sector around the plant,
    early dismissal of school children, or relocating individuals in a
    specific sector. As part of this process, the emergency plan includes a
    designated evacuation route and relocation centers in most areas and
    shelter areas. People whose mobility is impaired and the means for
    registering and monitoring of individuals at relocation centers have
    been established.
        For the 50-mile ingestion pathway, the procedure for protecting the
    public from consuming contaminated foodstuffs is addressed. The
    requirement that dairy animals be put on stored feed is a protective
    action. Lists are available of the names and locations of all plants
    that process milk products and other agricultural products.
         Radiological Exposure Control.--The licensee has
    established onsite exposure guidelines that are consistent with the
    EPA's Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action
    Guidelines. These guidelines address providing first aid, performing
    assessment actions, and decontamination, removal of injured persons and
    providing transportation and medical treatment of the injured. As an
    example of guidance developed on this subject, FEMA issued Guidance
    Memorandum EV-2, ``Protective Actions for School Children'' dated
    November 13, 1986. The purpose of the guidance is to assist State and
    local government officials and administrators of public and private
    schools in developing emergency response plans for use in protecting
    the students.
         Medical and Public Health Support.--Local and backup
    hospitals and medical services are identified for medical support of
    contaminated injured individuals. The licensee is responsible for
    having the onsite-first aid capability. Transportation arrangements of
    the injured persons to the medical facilities are also part of the
    emergencyplanning program.
         Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post Accident
    Operations.--Following the accident and when the plant has.been
    stabilized, the licensee will go into the recovery phase of the event.
         Exercises and Drills.--Each licensee is required to
    exercise its emergency plan annually. Each licensee is required to
    exercise with offsite authorities within the plume exposure pathway 10-
    mile EPZ biennially. All parties within the ingestion pathway 50-mile
    EPZ must exercise its plan every 6 years.
         Continual Improvement. Critiques and Corrective Actions.--
    Following each exercise or drill, the licensee and Federal, State and
    local emergency response personnel conduct an in-depth critique. Areas
    for improvement are noted and placed in the licensee corrective action
    system. Corrective action attention is a year round responsibility.
         Audits, Reviews, and Self Assessments.--One element
    assuring corrective actions is the audit or program review process
    through which all emergency preparedness programs work. Program reviews
    (checks) range from one end of the spectrum to the other . . . from
    quarterly communications checks (internally and externally) and
    equipment/facility checks to independent program reviews of the EP
    program. Periodic (on a set schedule) tests of the prompt public
    notification system are also a part of this process.
        Audits are conducted by the licensee's own quality assurance
    departments and inspections are conducted at various times by outside
    regulatory groups such as the NRC. These audits/inspections cover all
    aspects of the emergency preparedness program. In all cases, the
    associated emergency plans and procedures must be reviewed at least
    annually and revised as necessary.
        Licensee's periodically self-assess their program elements.
    Frequently the licensee will request a subject matter expert from
    another department or licensee to participate in the self-assessment.
         Emergency Response Training.--Annual training of company
    personnel (onsite and offsite) and training of noncompany personnel
    (offsite at the local level) is conducted. This process is continual
    throughout the year. This element of emergency planning incorporates
    the following methods: classroom instruction; performance-based
    training, walk through for specific groups within certain emergency
    response facilities and between facilities; integrated drills; training
    drills; and medical drills.
         Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ).--In 1978, a joint task
    force of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and US Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed the planning basis for offsite
    emergency preparedness efforts considered ``necessary and prudent'' for
    power reactor facilities. During the development of the planning basis,
    the task force received substantial input from other Federal agencies
    and the Inter-organizational Advisory Committee on Radiological
    Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness of the Conference of State
    Radiation Control Program Directors, which also included
    representatives of the National Association of State Directors for
    Disaster Preparedness and the U.S. Civil Defense Council.
        Subsequently, the planning basis has been adopted by the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency, which assumed the Federal lead role in
    offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness
    responsibilities under order from President Carter in 1979. This
    planning basis continues today as the primary basis utilized by the
    Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC)\1\
    with respect to coordinating all Federal responsibilities for assisting
    State and local governments in radiological emergency planning and
    preparedness activities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The FRPCC is chaired by FEMA, and includes representatives from
    the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human
    Services, Transportation, Agriculture, Interior, Veterans Affairs,
    State, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, and the General Services
    Administration, NASA, USEPA and USNRC.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        An important element of the planning basis developed by the NRC/EPA
    task force is that it defines the geographical area around nuclear
    power plants over which planning for predetermined actions should be
    carried out to protect public health and safety in the event of a
    radiological emergency at a nuclear power plant. In developing the
    planning basis, the task force did not attempt to define a single
    accident scenario. Rather, the task force considered a number of
    potential accidents, including the core-melt accident release scenarios
    of the Reactor Safety Study.
        The planning basis was related to two predominant pathways by which
    a population might be exposed to radiation released as the result of an
    accident. The two exposure pathways include the following:
        a. The plume exposure pathway includes direct exposure from
    radiation in a plume as it passes, as well as from radioactive material
    deposited on the ground or other surfaces. The pathway also includes
    exposure from inhalation of radioactive material in the passing plume.
    The recommended protective actions for the plume exposure pathway are
    evacuation from the area, or sheltering, if timely evacuation is not-
    practical. More recently, the States are considering whether to include
    the distribution and use of potassium iodide to protect against
    exposure from radioactive iodine in the plume, as a supplement to
    evacuation and sheltering.
        b. The ingestion exposure pathway includes exposure from the
    consumption of contaminated water, milk, or foods. The recommended
    protective actions for the ingestion pathway include near-term actions,
    such as removing cows from pasture and putting them on stored feed
    supplies, as well as long-term actions such as monitoring and
    interdicting sources of water, milk and foods, as necessary to protect
    public health and safety.
        The areas, over which planning efforts are carried out, referred to
    as emergency planning zones (EPZs), are associated with the plume
    exposure pathway and the ingestion exposure pathway. The EPZs are
    defined as the areas for which planning is carried out to assure that
    prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the
    event of an accident. The two EPZs are discussed in more details below:
        (a) The plume exposure EPZ includes a radius of 10 miles (more than
    300 square miles) around the plant. The size of the plume exposure EPZ
    is based on the following conclusions by the NRC/EPA task force:
         Projected doses to the public from design basis accidents
    would not exceed Protective Action Guide (PAG) levels\2\ beyond the 10-
    mile zone;
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Protective Action Guide (PAG) levels refer to criteria that are
    established by the EPA. The PAG is a level of projected radiation dose
    from an unplanned release at which a specific protective action should
    be taken. For example, the PAG for initiating evacuation or sheltering
    is when members of the public are projected to receive 1 rem or more
    from an actual or anticipated release. The PAGs are published in EPA
    Report 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective
    Actions for Nuclear Incidents,'' 1992.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Projected doses from most core melt sequences would not
    exceed PAG levels beyond the 10-mile zone;
         For the worst-case core melt sequences, immediately life-
    threatening doses would generally not occur beyond the 10-mile zone;
         Detailed planning within the 10-mile zone would provide a
    substantial base to support the expansion of emergency response efforts
    in the event this proved necessary.
        b. The ingestion exposure EPZ includes a radius of 50 miles (more
    than 2500 square miles) around the plant. The size of the ingestion
    exposure EPZ is based on the following conclusions by the NRC/EPA task
    force:
         The downwind range within which contamination might occur
    will generally not exceed PAG levels beyond the 50-mile zone because of
    wind shifts during the release and travel periods;
         There may be conversion of radioactive iodine suspended in
    the atmosphere during transit to chemical forms that do not readily
    enter the ingestion pathway;
         Much of the particulate material in a plume will have
    deposited on the ground during transit within the 50-mile zone; and
         The small likelihood of exceeding ingestion pathway PAG
    levels at 50 miles is comparable to the small likelihood of exceeding
    plume exposure PAG levels at 10 miles.
        The 10- and 50-mile EPZs are currently employed in nuclear power
    plant emergency preparedness programs as the basis for planning,
    testing and exercising predetermined emergency response capabilities.

        D. WHAT IS THE EXPERIENCE WITH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE
                                   PROGRAMS?

        Emergency response plans developed by the nuclear industry have
    been activated successfully by local officials for use in other
    emergencies. A few examples:
         The evacuation of 10,000 people from Cedar Rapids, Iowa,
    in July 1985, following a fire at a city-operated sewage treatment
    plant that dispersed a black cloud of toxic fumes over the city. State
    and local officials used a draft plan developed for Alliant Energy's
    Duane Arnold nuclear plant.
         The evacuation of 17,000 residents of St. Charles Parish,
    LA., following a leak from a nearby chemical plant in December 1982.
    State and local officials worked from a draft plan for Entergy's
    Waterford 3 nuclear plant, which was not yet operating.
      e. what is the nuclear industry's commitment to emergency planning?
        Emergency preparedness at U.S. nuclear power plants is an integral
    part of daily operations. A commitment to excellence throughout the
    industry coupled with continual training and testing, has produced a
    high level of preparedness. For example:
         Emergency response plans are constantly upgraded through
    lessons learned from actual plan activation, as well as repeated
    drills, exercises and independent critiques.
         Training programs are conducted annually for all emergency
    response personnel. The National Nuclear Accrediting Board accredits
    training programs for operators and technical staff.
         Effective methods have.been developed to assess
    performance in drills and exercises, and to improve emergency
    preparedness through lessons learned.
         State-of-the-art response facilities have been built and
    existing facilities upgraded to aid effective handling of emergencies.
         Sophisticated plant computer systems have been developed
    to serve as effective tools for dealing with emergencies.
         Advancements in communications technology have been
    incorporated to improve the industry's ability to respond to
    emergencies.

                                     ______

         Response by Donna J. Miller Hastie to an Additional Question
                              from Senator Clinton

        Question.  Your testimony provides a great deal of detail on
    emergency preparedness and evacuation. It cites several cases of
    evacuations using response plans developed by the nuclear industry.
    However, these examples were all populations less than 17,000. What
    complications do you expect with populations much larger than this?
    What effect would population density have on the ability to evacuate an
    area?
        Response. The studies provided in NUMARC NESP-004 ``Identification
    and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations,'' (Table 2-2)
    (Document Attached) provide a study of fifty evacuations of up to
    300,000 people.
        In addition, a 1989 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) study showed
    that during the 9-year period 1980-1988, the United States experienced
    250 emergencies that required the evacuation of more than 1,000 people.
    The emergencies ranged from hurricanes and floods to spills and leaks
    of toxic chemicals. Some critics have voiced skepticism that any large
    number of people could be evacuated in a short period of time, but
    experience demonstrates the contrary.
        The following are examples of successful evacuations of larger
    populations for non-nuclear emergencies. All the evacuations were
    performed safely and orderly.
         300,000 evacuees of Hurricane Elena (Pinellas, Florida) 8/
    29/85.
         150,000 evacuees Hurricane Gloria (Monmouth County, NJ),
    37,000 evacuees from New Hanover County, NC, and 50,000 evacuees from
    Worcester, MD, 9/26/85.
         42,000 evacuees from Hurricane Alicia (Galveston, TX) 8/
    16/83.
         25,000 evacuees from a transport accident (Cambridge,
    Ohio) 6/2/87.
         20,000 evacuees from a train derailment (Miamisburg, Ohio
    7/8/86.
         10,000 evacuees from a chemical explosion (Superior, WI)
    5/6/82.
        I am not aware of any evacuations in the United States that
    experienced significant problems. State and local emergency management
    personnel are well trained to effectively conduct safe evacuations, and
    take this responsibility seriously.
        The effect that a large population density would have on the
    ability to evacuate an area has been demonstrated on a number of
    occasions, such as frequent evacuations of 100,000 plus people from
    large sporting events. I believe the type of planning we currently
    perform for a nuclear power plant provides a sound basis for large
    population evacuations.

                                     ______

          Responses by Donna J. Miller Hastie to Additional Questions
                             from Senator Voinovich

        The United States nuclear industry, in coordination with Federal,
    State and local agencies has the most advanced and demonstrated
    effective emergency preparedness programs in the country, perhaps the
    world. In partnership with our Federal, State and local colleagues, we
    are the recognized experts.
        Even with the expertise and history, we are not complacent. Our
    history is one of continuous improvement and we are currently
    evaluating and responding to the implications of September 11, 2001.
    Emergency Preparedness performed interim compensatory measures in
    response to September 11 that included specific actions to:
         Determine the potential effect on the plant and on site
    evacuation strategies, modify procedures and equipment, as necessary.
         Review site response plans and take actions to assure the
    response to terrorist threats is well planned, tested and available.
         Provide emergency action levels (EALs) to ensure that a
    site-specific credible threat results in a declaration of at least a
    notification of unusual event. Review and validate the strategy for
    escalation to higher event classifications.
         Implement site specific, credible threat EALs per November
    6, 2001 NRC recommended actions, as confirmed by the NRC letter to NEI
    February 4, 2002.
        We, the industry and involved local, State, and Federal agencies
    believe that we can help the country in the War on Terrorism and
    Homeland Security by serving as a model for other industries and
    critical infrastructure that have not had the same advantage of long-
    term experience in testing and refining emergency preparedness
    programs.
        Question 1. In your testimony, you have provided an extensive list
    on the history of emergency planning. Could you briefly highlight the
    major changes the NRC and facilities have gone through in response to
    national security and other perceived threats since Three Mile Island?
    In your opinion, do they respond well and make the necessary changes?
        Response. The Three Mile Island (TMI)-related changes are only the
    beginning of immediate and continuous improvements the industry made in
    emergency preparedness. As an industry, we continue to actively
    identify and implement improvements to nuclear safety and emergency
    preparedness as an intended, industry safety culture that rests on
    continuing self-assessment and continuous learning.
        As a result of the accident in March 1979 at the TMI site, several
    study groups were formed to study the responses to the accident and to
    make recommendations for corrective actions.
        On April 11, 1979, in response to TMI, President Carter established
    a Commission to conduct . . . ``a comprehensive study and investigation
    of the recent accident involving the nuclear power facility on Three
    Mile Island in Pennsylvania.'' Dr. John G. Kemeny, then President of
    Dartmouth College chaired the Commission. The ``Report of the
    President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island'' (Kemeny
    Commission) concluded that prior to the accident, emergency planning
    had not received sufficient priority and that programs needed to be
    upgraded.
        Recommendations made by the Kemeny Commission included:
        1. Responsibility for offsite emergency planning should be assigned
    to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); before an operating
    license is granted the State must have an emergency plan approved by
    FEMA.
        2. Planning should involve the identification of several different
    kinds of accidents with different possible offsite radiological
    consequences; local communities should have funds and support adequate
    for preparing these plans
        3. Medical means should be developed for protecting the public
    against radiation.
        4. The public should be better informed about nuclear power and
    given clear information on what actions to take during emergencies
        5. Further studies should be conducted with reference to evacuation
    planning and methodologies.
        6. The role of various Federal support agencies must be specified.
        The industry made a strong and comprehensive response to the
    overall recommendation, ``Utilities must make sufficient advance
    preparation for the mitigation of emergencies . . .'' The industry's
    response included, but was not limited to, the following:
         Utilities have established emergency response
    organizations using personnel with a wide variety of technical
    expertises useful in responding to emergencies. Members of emergency
    response organizations are designated and trained in advance regarding
    their roles during an emergency.
         Using scenario information similar to a real event,
    practice emergency drills are held several times a year so emergency
    teams can develop and maintain proficiency in their emergency response
    roles. Each utility is also required to regularly pass a Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Federal Emergency Management Agency
    (FEMA) graded exercise that tests the level of preparedness within the
    10-mile emergency planning zone. The exercises are conducted every two
    years involving utility, local, and state emergency organizations and
    response teams. Emergency preparedness programs within the 50-mile
    emergency planning zone are tested every six years.
         Each plant now maintains an onsite technical support
    center that is activated and staffed during an emergency to assist the
    plant operations staff. Emergency off-site facilities have also been
    established that are activated and staffed by utility personnel during
    an emergency to coordinate off-site support for the utility. local,
    State, and Federal emergency response organizations.
         The industry now has in place mutual assistance agreements
    in which all utilities agree to share their resources promptly in the
    event of a transportation accident or a plant emergency. An Emergency
    Resources Manual, maintained for the industry by the Institute of
    Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) lists emergency response points of
    contact at all utilities, identifies equipment and technical expertise
    available at various organizations, and provides copies of the
    agreements that specify the terms and conditions that apply to exchange
    of equipment or services provided.
        Another recommendation, ``Emergency plans must detail clearly and
    consistently the actions public officials and utilities should take in
    the event of off-site radiation doses resulting from release of
    radioactivity . . .'' also received strong industry response.
         Each nuclear utility has developed station and corporate
    emergency plans to coordinate their response efforts in the event of a
    significant release of radioactivity off-site. These comprehensive
    radiological emergency response plans were developed in conjunction
    with State and local governments to define the actions to be taken by
    each party to protect the public's health and safety. Supporting
    implementation procedures provide guidance for accomplishing the
    detailed actions.
         The effectiveness of these plans has been demonstrated
    through the successful completion of regular federally graded full-
    scale exercises at all plants.
         Emergency plans also include provisions for providing
    timely and accurate information to the public. Joint information
    centers have been established where utility and government
    representatives prepare press releases and hold briefings for the
    public and media.
        The Special Inquiry Group (Rogovin Report) reached many of the same
    conclusions as the Kemeny Commission. The report pointed out that the
    existence of adequate county and local emergency plans is a critical
    component of the overall emergency planning effort. The recommendations
    made in the report include:
        1. Workable evacuation plans must be considered a prerequisite to
    continued operation of existing and future reactors.
        2. Plant operations, however, should not be made absolutely
    contingent on approved local plans.
        3. Adequate funding must be provided to local emergency planning,
    perhaps by the utility.
        4. The emergency plan should be treated as if it were an engineered
    safety system. If a portion of the plan cannot be carried out
    (evacuation cannot be carried out due to a blizzard, for example)
    considerations should be given to limiting operations.
        5. Emergency planning zones should be developed on a site specific
    basis
        6. Existing reactors may be required to install additional accident
    mitigation systems to limit offsite consequences.
        These recommendations, and many more, have been successfully
    implemented and tested following the TMI accident. Additional post-TMI
    planning requirements are listed in Attachment 1. These are just the
    beginning of regulation regarding Emergency Preparedness programs. The
    regulations grew from these few to the current 28-feet of EP regulation
    in the Public Document room.
        In addition to Federal regulation, licensee applicants have to
    describe the emergency plan in their Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
    (PSAR) and submit as part of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
    The PSAR must contain sufficient preliminary information to ensure that
    adequate emergency planning will exist. The plans must show
    compatibility of the onsite and offsite emergency plans, and of
    facility and site design with respect to roads, population distribution
    and land use. The FSAR must contain detailed plans for coping with
    emergencies. The information must be sufficient to provide the NRC with
    assurance of coordination among the licensee and supporting groups
    prior to issuing an operating license for the plant.
        The TMI-related changes are only a part of the scale and scope of
    emergency preparedness program improvements. The industry continues to
    actively identify and implement improvements to nuclear safety and
    emergency preparedness. This trend of continuous improvement is
    demonstrated in the included graphs.
        In conclusion, industry standards and NRC regulations and oversight
    require industry programs have the continuous capability to protect the
    public from possible exposure to radioactive release caused by an
    accident or a terrorist event. All plants have comprehensive measures
    for safety and security that include: Robust containment; Redundant;
    diverse plant safety systems; Trained plant staff, skilled in accident
    and event response; Comprehensive emergency plans; Rigorous security
    plans and well-trained and equipped security forces; Established
    facilities and equipment to support accident mitigation and
    communications with offsite emergency response organizations; Alert and
    notification systems, such as siren systems, to notify the public of an
    event; and Annual, communications with the population within the 10-
    mile emergency planning zone describing what to do in the case of an
    emergency.

        Question 2. In your testimony, you discuss and provide several
    examples of situations where nuclear power plant emergency response
    plans have been activated successfully by local officials to support
    evacuations for other, non-nuclear events. Can you please provide a
    fuller set of examples and/or references that more fully describe such
    situations?
        Response. A 1989 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) study showed that
    during the nine year period 1980-1988, the United States experienced
    250 emergencies that required the evacuation of more than 1,000 people.
    The emergencies ranged from hurricanes and floods to spills and leaks
    of toxic chemicals. Some critics have voiced skepticism that any large
    number of people could be evacuated in a short period of time, but
    experience demonstrates the contrary.
        Evacuation plans have never been used to evacuate a nuclear power
    plant in the event of an emergency. Several nuclear emergency response
    plans, however, were activated successfully by local officials for use
    in non-nuclear emergencies. All the evacuations were performed safely
    and orderly. A few examples:
         The evacuation of 10,000 people from Cedar Rapids, Iowa,
    in July 1985, following a fire at a city-operated sewage treatment
    plant that dispersed a black cloud of toxic gas fumes over the city.
    State and local officials used a plan developed for the now Nuclear
    Management Company's Duane Arnold nuclear plant.
         The evacuation of 17,000 residents of St. Charles Parish,
    LA, following a leak from a nearby chemical plant in December 1982.
    State and local officials worked from a plan for the now Entergy's
    Waterford 3 nuclear plant, which was in the late stages of final
    construction.
         The evacuation of 13,000 people from Naticoke, PA, in
    March 1987, when a fire from a metal plant blanketed the community with
    toxic smoke. Pennsylvania Power and Light's Susquehanna nuclear plant
    response plan was used.
         The evacuation of about 6,000 residents and visitors from
    Grover City, CA, in July 1985, when a 10-day fire costumed more than
    75,000 acres of nearby grassland. The evacuation was based on the
    Diablo Canyon nuclear plant emergency plan produced by Pacific Gas &
    Electric Co.
        Examples of large numbers of people that can be evacuated in a
    relatively short period of time:
         In August 1965, nearly all the 150,000 people living in
    Baton Rouge, LA, were evacuated in only two hours following an accident
    involving a chorine-carrying barge.
         In June 1972, virtually all of Wilks-Barre, PA's, 75,000
    residents were evacuated in an hour after flood warnings were issued.
         Several large-scale evacuations preceding on coming
    hurricanes have been carried out successfully, including: the 1980
    evacuation of 400,000 from Corpus Christi, TX, to escape Hurricane
    Allen; the 1985 evacuation of 300,00 from Pinellas County, FL, in
    advance of Hurricane Elena; the 1985 evacuations from Connecticut,
    Maryland, New Jersey, New York and North Carolina totaling 318,000 in
    the Path of Hurricane Gloria; and the 1992 evacuation of several
    100,000 from south Dade County, FL, as Hurricane Andrew approached.
        NEI's 1989 study of evacuations found that communities that have
    conducted field exercises of emergency plans performed better than the
    communities that had not. The study concluded that there was
    significant value in testing plans, because such plans revealed areas
    for improvement.
        The crash of USAir Flight 427 in PA in September 1994 called on the
    expertise of the emergency responders from Beaver County, who had
    trained and practiced through the many years with the now First
    Energy's Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Plant. Employees of Beaver
    Valley's emergency preparedness department worked with the State and
    local emergency management agency personnel in the recovery effort. The
    plant also filled the state emergency management agency's request for
    disposable suits, gloves, boots, etc. for use by the workers at the
    crash site, which had been declared a biological hazard.
        Additional information: NEI, (previously NUMARC) authorized an
    independent study ``Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting
    Emergency Evacuations,'' NUMARC/NESP-004, February 1989.
        This study of the ``Identification and Analysis of Factors
    Affecting Emergency Evacuations,'' was undertaken in 1987-1988. The
    study effort entailed the compilation and analysis of data on emergency
    evacuations occurring in the United States since 1980. The study
    focused on 50 disaster events that required 1000 or more persons to be
    evacuated.
        The report shared insights, understanding, and knowledge gained
    from the collection and analysis of large scale, U.S. evacuations
    occurring in response to both natural and man-made hazards. The results
    of the study enhanced the level of understanding of the evacuation
    process.
        Evacuations of the public in connection with natural disasters or
    technological/industrial accidents are a frequent occurrence in the
    United States. Emergency evacuations involving 100 or more persons
    occur, on the average, more than once per week. These evacuations
    generally have proceeded smoothly and safely without plans and with
    little evacuation training.
        Following each United States census, utilities conduct new
    population density charts and could designate new evacuation routes, if
    significant changes occur in population densities or in critical
    locations such as schools, hospitals, elderly care facilities, etc. For
    example, when a minor bridge (not a primary evacuation route) was
    closed for repair near the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant in Florida,
    extensive compensatory measures were put in place.
        Communities around nuclear power plants are better protected in the
    event of all types of emergencies than other communities, by virtue of
    the emergency preparedness infrastructure that has been put in place.
        Question 3. S. 1746 would provide for mandatory stockpiling of
    potassium iodide tablets for use by populations within a 50-mile radius
    of nuclear power plants, as compared to the current NRC program for
    voluntary stockpiling within 10 miles and the provision for voluntary
    stockpiling up to 20 miles included in the ``Public Health Security and
    Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.'' What are your
    views on the need to stockpile potassium iodide for populations out to
    50 miles from a nuclear power plant?
        Response. The current NRC/Federal program requires States and
    Tribal governments to consider including KI as a supplemental
    protective measure (i.e., the State and Tribal governments make the
    decision). The program is limited to covering populations in the 10-
    mile emergency planning zone around nuclear power plants. NRC will
    provide an initial supply of KI tablets upon request, and may consider
    extending the program to fund replenishment supplies. Distribution of
    KI is a ``supplement'' to the primary protective actions of evacuation
    and sheltering in the 10-mile emergency planning zone and protecting
    food and water supplies in the 50-mile ingestion-planning zone.
        Attachment 2 is a listing of States that have agreed to stockpile
    or distribute potassium iodide.
        In my testimony I discussed the technical basis for the 10- and 50-
    mile emergency planning zones. In 1978, a joint task force of the US
    Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the US Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission (NRC) developed the planning basis for offsite emergency
    preparedness efforts considered ``necessary and prudent'' for power
    reactor facilities. During the extensive two-year study the task force
    performed a detailed analysis of the full range of possible reactor
    accidents to determine the appropriate distance from the plant that
    should be used for planning prompt protective actions, such as
    evacuation and sheltering, as well as longer-term actions such as
    protecting food supplies.
        The task force received substantial input from all Federal agencies
    and relevant State agencies that would be responsible for implementing
    protective action. Even following the events of September 11, there is
    no credible scientific or technical information to indicate the need
    for a 50-mile distribution of KI or to suggest that the EPZs and
    related current regulatory system for emergency preparedness should be
    changed.
        The current KI distribution programs are voluntary and delegate
    decision-making authority to State and local governments. S. 1746 would
    abrogate the authority of the States to reflect the specific needs of
    their people and could create a Federal program that would likely be
    less effective. Used nuclear fuel discharged from the reactor is not a
    radioiodine KI issue.

        Question 4.  S. 1746 would provide for planning of evacuation of
    populations from within a 50-mile radius surrounding nuclear power
    plants in the event of an emergency, as compared to the current Federal
    emergency program that includes planning for evacuation out to 10 miles
    from nuclear power plants. What are your views on the need to plan for
    evacuation out to 50 miles from a nuclear power plant?
        Response. The above response contains answers to part of this
    question. The current NRC/Federal program includes provisions to extend
    protective actions such as evacuation and sheltering beyond 10 miles,
    if needed. The dilution of resources and refocus of priorities to plan
    for a 50-mile emergency planning zone, that does not have a credible
    scientific or technical basis, may degrade the current high level of
    protection that is provided to citizens that live within the 10-mile
    EPZ that is based on our best scientific and technical understanding of
    potential consequences.

        Question 5. S. 1746 would provide for emergency planning exercises
    out to 50 miles every three years. What is the current Federal and
    licensee program for conducting emergency planning exercises and drills
    at and around nuclear power plants, i.e., onsite and at 10 miles and 50
    miles?
        Response. Emergency exercises and drills are important as a test of
    the planning, procedures, and training of utility, State, and local
    community emergency capabilities. Planning, coordinating and evaluating
    drills and exercises are major undertakings involving significant
    resources both within and outside the utility.
        Utilities are required to conduct a full-scale; NRC graded exercise
    every two years. During the off year, the utility conducts a self-
    evaluated exercise. In addition multiple training drills are conducted
    throughout the year.
        Under 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E the nuclear power licensees,
    State, and local emergency response organizations are required to
    exercise the 10-mile plume pathway emergency-planning zone biennially.
    The 50-mile ingestion pathway is exercised every 6 years. Conduct of
    the 50-mile ingestion-planning zone involves the full or partial
    participation of Federal, State and local agencies with the planning
    zone.
        The specific response capabilities for the 12 Federal agencies
    involved in responding to an emergency at a nuclear power plant are
    contained in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP),
    published as an interim document in the September 12, 1984, Federal
    Register (29FR35896). This plan outlined the authority and
    responsibility of each of the 12 Federal agencies that have the
    resource and capabilities needed to respond to a radiological
    emergency. The plan was first tested in a full-scale exercise at the
    St. Lucie Nuclear Facility on March 6-8, 1984. FEMA published the final
    operational FRERP in the November 8, 1985, Federal Register
    (50FR46542). This plan works in conjunction with the Federal Response
    Plan (FRP) that identifies the responsibilities of the Federal agencies
    involved in response to all emergencies. The FRP has been in place
    since April 1992, Public law 93-288, as amended. The FRP represents a
    concerted effort by the Federal Government to provide assistance in an
    expeditious manner to save lives and protect property.
        The FRP was developed through the efforts of 27 departments and
    agencies. The purpose of the FRP is to facilitate the delivery of all
    types of Federal response assistance to States to help them deal with
    the consequences of significant disasters. This plan outlines the
    planning assumptions, policies, concept of operations, organizational
    structure and specific assignments of responsibility to the department
    and agencies in providing Federal response assistance to supplement the
    State and local response.

                                     ______

                                  Attachment 1

                         POST TMI-PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

        In July 1979 the NRC issued NUREG-0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task
    Force Status Report and Short Term Recommendations. The report
    identified short-term engineering fixes to assure more reliable reactor
    operations, recommended the establishment of an onsite technical
    support center and operational support center, and specified improved
    in-plant monitoring and staffing.
        In September, 1979 the NRC issued NUREG-0610, Draft Emergency
    Action Level guidelines, which established the four classes of
    emergency action levels (Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site
    Area Emergency, and General Emergency.)
        On December 19, 1979, the NRC published for comment the proposed
    new regulations concerning emergency planning for power reactors (10
    CFR 50. Appendix E). The proposed rulemaking would incorporate the
    various NUREGs, recommendations, letters, and proposals which had been
    issued since March.
        In January 1980, the NRC published the first draft for comment of
    NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological
    Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power
    Plants. This interim document was based on the draft version of
    Appendix E and public comment was formally requested under Federal
    Register Notice 44 FR 9768 on February 13, 1980.
        On August 19, 1980, the final version of Appendix E was adopted by
    publication in the Federal Register (45 FR 55410). It became effective
    on November 3, 1980. Subsequently in October 1980, the final version of
    NUREG-0654 was published as NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1.
     Statement of Irwin Redlener, M.D., President, The Children's Hospital
            at Montefiore; and President, The Children's Health Fund
        Thank you, Chairman Jeffords, Ranking Member Smith and Members of
    the Committee, for the opportunity to testify this morning. I am Dr.
    Irwin Redlener, a pediatrician and president of the Children's Health
    Fund headquartered in New York and the new Children's Hospital at
    Montefiore Medical Center in the Bronx. I have had a career in public
    health and health services delivery spanning more than three decades.
    However, allow me to share some background information with respect to
    my role in the matters before the Committee today.
        First, on September 11, 2001 I dispatched two mobile medical units
    from our New York programs to lower Manhattan to participate in the
    enormous emergency medical response to the terrorist attacks at the
    World Trade Center. We also assisted in a number of additional ways in
    the immediate aftermath in terms of medical services and continue to
    provide mental health support to families and children throughout the
    City who have been affected by the attacks.
        In addition, with a colleague who heads the Center for Pediatric
    Emergency Medicine at the New York University Medical Center, Dr.
    George Foltin, I established the New York City Task Force on Pediatric
    Disaster Preparedness in December. I am also a founding member of the
    Task Force on Terrorism of the American Academy of Pediatrics. Over the
    last 8 months I have been working to ensure that Federal efforts
    designed to improve preparedness for terrorist attacks include specific
    provisions to ensure the safety of children.
        In New York City I have had regular contact, formal and informal,
    with City and private sector officials responsible for disaster
    response. Since October of last year I have had continuous contact with
    Federal officials regarding various issues with respect to homeland
    security. These issues have included my ongoing concerns regarding the
    security of nuclear power plants in general and the Indian Point
    nuclear power plants in particular. Finally, during the 1980's, I was
    significantly involved in the analysis of Crisis Relocation Planning,
    the response proposed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to
    the threat of large-scale nuclear attack on the United States.
        The September 11 attacks on the United States have had remarkable
    consequences for Americans and for American society. In a real sense,
    on a beautiful day this past September, we were both invaded and
    profoundly shaken as a nation. For generations we have had a sense of
    detachment from the grim realities which plague so many parts of the
    world, where uncertainty and terror play out in daily life and the
    public consciousness is always aware, on some level, of the potential
    for deadly large-scale violence. Less than two dozen violent and
    suicidal fanatics, connected to a diffusive and elusive global network
    of terror, has essentially ended the American reverie of protected
    isolation.
        The cliche is that this is a ``new world'', and, indeed, it is. How
    we respond, what plans we make, how we adjust ourselves
    psychologically, what resources we ultimately bring to bear and how we
    reorganize our government systems and agencies to prevent, mitigate or
    reduce the impact of on-going terrorism in the United States remain
    open questions.
        We will see conflicts between civil rights and necessary
    intelligence gathering capability; we'll struggle with interagency
    communications and rivalries over areas of responsibility and control.
    And there `will be major debates over how to prioritize and balance the
    response to terrorism against the ongoing societal concerns which pre-
    date September 11, 2001.
        However, no matter how these debates unfold, it is clear that the
    perceptions of risk, vulnerability and homeland security must rapidly
    evolve and adapt to the new realities of a Nation targeted by smart,
    committed agents of terror. There are, needless to say, a myriad of
    complex issues to be covered under the rubrics of the war against
    terrorism and the effort to enhance the security of the United States.
    One of these areas, the subject of this morning's hearings, concerns
    the potential risks and vulnerabilities of the 103 nuclear power plants
    currently operating throughout the country. Unfortunately, I also need
    to add that children, the elderly and the infirm bear a
    disproportionately high burden of vulnerability to consequences of and
    reactions to a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant.
        Although the possibility of a catastrophic event occurring at a
    nuclear power plant as a result of accident, natural disaster or
    deliberate act of terrorism has always been on the table, the events of
    September 11 demand a re-examination of all aspects of the
    vulnerability and security of the nation's nuclear facilities. Simply
    put, what was improbable to the point of impossible, has become
    possible. Assessment of risk and specific planning scenarios need to
    evolve to new levels taking into account a much more aggressive,
    educated, trained and organized terrorist for whom capture or death is
    not a deterrent to action.
        A medical analogy here would be the mutation of a bacteriologic
    agent which becomes orders of magnitude more virulent and
    simultaneously unresponsive to first-line antibiotics. Traditional
    approaches to prevention, early identification and treatment would need
    to change dramatically. In effect, this is precisely what we are
    dealing with in terms of necessary measures to secure and reduce the
    risk posed by nuclear power facilities today in the United States.
    Acceptable risk and security measures appropriate on September 10,
    became unacceptable and insecure on September 11.
        The potential consequences of failing to do everything possible to
    reduce or eliminate the population risks from acts of terrorism carried
    out against nuclear facilities are extraordinary and horrific. Attack
    scenarios well within the realm of possibility for many nuclear
    facilities can have horrendous consequences for populations in the
    vicinity of a nuclear plant. Immediate civilian fatalities can range
    from a hundred or so to five thousand or more, depending on the extent
    of damage to the reactor, its support systems and the spent fuel
    containment systems. Excess cancers from radiation exposures can range
    into the tens of thousands. Moreover, nuclear terrorism is in a special
    category of horror, evocative of the nightmare scenarios which first
    arose during the height of the cold war.
        Beyond the direct mortality and morbidity estimates, verified by
    numerous studies of experts in and out of government, are layer upon
    layer of unimaginable potential health and economic consequences from a
    successful attack on a power plant. Studies by independent physicists
    and organizations, including the Brookhaven National Laboratories, have
    concluded that thousands of square miles could be contaminated and
    uninhabitable for years or decades under a variety of highly plausible
    attack scenarios. In sum, the economic, psychological and societal
    consequences of such an event in a major population center would be
    almost incalculable.
        For all of these reasons, it is imperative that we take necessary
    and prudent steps to reduce the likelihood of a successful act of
    terrorism against a nuclear power facility. There are two points which
    are, perhaps obvious, but worth stating:
        First, to the very limits of our human limits, intelligence
    capacity should be upgraded to the point where terrorist planning can
    be disrupted prior to implementation. And, second, a cogent case can be
    made for closing nuclear power plants altogether, particularly those
    with inherent safety problems, those in highly populated areas with
    inadequate evacuation plans or those with relatively insufficient means
    of safeguarding spent fuel rods. The fact is that the Indian Point
    facility meets all three criteria for closing, even though
    discontinuing energy production does not fully eliminate the risk and
    even though there would be modest temporary increases in energy costs
    in the region. In my opinion, this is clearly a case in which the true
    risks to people of continuing operations are far greater than the
    benefits, by any measure.
        Putting aside the question of plant decommissioning, here are some
    actions that can be undertaken immediately:
        1. Security at nuclear plants needs to be upgraded dramatically and
    immediately, commensurate with our new and totally different
    understanding of the capacity and ferocity of terrorism on American
    soil.-- The ``design basis threats'' which used to be the standard
    scenarios for anti-terrorism planning need to be upgraded, informed by
    the events of September 11, to include a whole new range of potential
    actions for which security measures must anticipate, plan for and test.
    Can we explain to our children and grandchildren in Westchester County,
    New York why special U.S. military forces, for instance are not
    guarding Indian Point? Incredibly, just 6 weeks ago the New York Post
    reported that a journalist spent 20 minutes flying over the Indian
    Point facility. Can we explain why aircraft are not forbidden to fly
    over the plant?
        2. All spent fuel rods should be stored in hardened, onsite, dry
    storage facilities, pending a more definitive solution to the challenge
    of permanent storage.--Spent nuclear fuel rods in places like the
    Indian Point plant are kept in deep water pools. Unlike the reactor
    core itself, which is in a hardened containment structure, the spent
    fuel pool is in an adjacent, comparatively lightweight structure. Many
    of these spent rod structures are covered with nothing more than a
    corrugated steel roof. Moreover, the pools are now packed at high
    density, so much so that spent fuel will ignite and burn if water,
    essential to keeping the spent rods cool, is lost from the pool. This
    would release a massive amount of radioactive material to the
    atmosphere. Dry storage can make the spent fuel dramatically less
    vulnerable. Money is the only barrier to moving rapidly to hardened,
    dry storage of the used fuel.
        3. There needs to be a top-to-bottom revision and upgrading of the
    emergency planning process, with active Federal oversight.--Planning
    for evacuation in densely populated areas is extremely difficult. The
    grossly inadequate emergency evacuation planning process around the
    Indian Point facility is a case in point. Spontaneous, uncontrolled
    evacuation in time of crisis, as happened at Three Mile Island, could
    quickly result in chaos and paralysis of egress. Permanent relocation
    for evacuees in the event of substantial ground contamination would be
    an extraordinary challenge.
        Reuniting school children and children in day care with their
    parents in the current plans are dependent upon wildly unrealistic
    expectations with respect to the likely behavior of school bus drivers,
    emergency officials and parents. Plans are extremely insufficient
    regarding the size and scope of the area which would need evacuation in
    a nuclear emergency. The same could be said regarding what to do with
    senior citizens, hospitalized or disabled individuals and those who
    refuse to leave. The entire notion of evacuation planning is so
    massive, complex and resource intense that it is unfair and
    unreasonable to expect this to happen, if it can happen at all, without
    extensive and revised preparations and a strong role for the Federal
    Government. A recent Marist Institute survey on the subject of
    evacuation planning revealed that more than 75 percent of residents
    living within 10 miles of Indian Point do not believe that the current
    evacuation plan is workable. Only a very small percentage of people
    even within a 10-mile radius of the plant know where the reception
    centers are located. Chaos would ensue under any attempt to evacuate
    the area in the event of a terrorist nuclear incident at Indian Point
    since 60 percent of people within 50 miles of the plant, well beyond
    the planning zone, would attempt to evacuate. We have every reason to
    be concerned that people within the 10-mile evacuation zone would, in
    fact, not be able to leave because of road and transportation
    congestion caused by people in large numbers outside the 10-mile range
    attempting to leave as quickly as possible.
        4. Potassium iodide should be acquired and distributed on a ``point
    of use'' basis for a minimum of 50 miles radius from all nuclear power
    plants.--Radioactive iodine, I-131, is released from reactor explosions
    and, if inhaled or ingested in sufficient quantities, can cause high
    rates of thyroid cancer in children. If the proper dose of potassium
    iodide (KI) is given prior to or within 2 hours of exposure to I-131,
    this particular outcome, that is excess thyroid cancers, can be almost
    entirely prevented.
        Because the window of opportunity to have this beneficial effect of
    KI is very narrow, it is not sufficient to have the drug only at
    central distribution points. It must be available at home, in schools
    and in day care centers. In addition, there must be a major public
    education campaign to inform people about the benefits of having KI
    ready for administration, especially to children and pregnant women. It
    also must be pointed out that KI is not a ``radiation pill.'' It will
    do nothing for any other consequence of exposure to cesium-137 or other
    isotopes. It is also essential that proper measures be taken by
    government to ensure that food and water available for ingestion by
    children not have evidence of I-131 or other harmful radiation by-
    products such as Strontium-90.
        These four steps would, in my estimation, be appropriate initial
    measures to prevent and/or ameliorate a terrorist attack on any one of
    the nation's nuclear power facility. As a physician and public health
    professional, as a resident of a community with the least safe nuclear
    power plant in the nation--one which has 21 million people living with
    50 miles of the facility, I urge you to strongly consider these
    recommendations and move forward as quickly as possible.
        I also recognize that this is just the beginning and nothing more
    than a component--albeit a very important component--of a much larger
    agenda. Even in the nuclear arena, there are many other concerns beyond
    nuclear plant security. The Federation of American Scientists and the
    Health Physics Society have begun to raise important concerns about the
    status of so-called ``sealed'' and ``orphan'' sources of radioactive
    materials used in health care and many other industries. Management
    control, security and oversight of these materials is variable to the
    extreme. Stolen radioactive materials can be used to make simple and
    potentially deadly ``dirty bombs'' which, if nothing else, have the
    capability of rendering large land areas uninhabitable.
        Again, I thank you for the opportunity to offer testimony at this
    hearing. I deeply respect the responsibility you and your colleagues
    have in this time of enormous uncertainty and danger. On behalf of my
    colleagues in health care and public health I wish you strength and
    courage to do what needs to get done to safeguard all Americans from
    every form of terror.
        Thank you.

                                     ______

           Responses by Irwin Redlener, M.D. to Additional Questions
                              from Senator Clinton

        Question 1. In your testimony, you talk about how children and the
    elderly bear a disproportionately high burden of vulnerability to
    consequences of a radiological release. Can you please elaborate on
    this?
        Response. Children represent a special level of vulnerability to
    any act of terrorism, particularly those involving chemical, biological
    or radiological agents. I have elaborated on the chemical and
    biological issues elsewhere, but I would like to focus on the problem
    with excess radiologic exposure. In incidents such as a successful
    attack on the main reactor core of a nuclear power plant, release of
    radioactive iodine, I-131, is rapidly absorbed into the thyroid gland
    of a child (most rapidly in younger children and infants) resulting in
    a very dramatic rate of thyroid cancer. Although this can happen with
    adults, absorption is much slower and the cancer rates much less
    affected.
        It should be noted that children are more likely to be crawling
    around the ground, more exposed to radioactive contamination, and more
    likely to ingest toxic or contaminated substances. Finally, children
    need to receive potassium iodide (KI) just before or immediately after
    (within two hours) exposure in order for the KI to have any beneficial
    effect.
        Radiation sickness itself can be much more severe in children
    resulting in more rapid decline and greater loss of life. There are
    other potential health consequences, but the we need to also note that
    the psychological needs of children in a time of crisis and chaos, in
    terms of potential separation from caretaker (school and day care) and
    needs during evacuation make this a major issue, as well.
        Seniors, more likely to be infirm, needing medications and other
    health related devices and management will have another series of
    special vulnerabilities during a time of rapid evacuation and
    resettlement

        Question 2. There are some who have testified today that it should
    be up to the states to decide whether or not to stockpile KI tablets
    and how to distribute these tablets to their residents, should the
    state chose to make them available at all.
        Do you think it is important for KI tablets to be available to
    everyone living near one of these plants? And if so, how should
    distribution be handled?
        Response. KI distribution should be a national policy of the
    highest priority, as long as any possibility of nuclear terrorism
    exists. A 50-mile distribution radius from every nuclear power plant
    should be the absolute minimum, although a good case can be made for
    having a 200-mile distribution objective. Many cases of thyroid cancer
    in children were found at significant distances from Chernobyl
    following the reactor accident there. Although some have made the case
    that this resulted from the fact that children were allowed to eat
    contaminated food, the evidence is far from conclusive. Distribution of
    KI, in any case, should be to ``point of use'' (i.e., homes, school,
    day care, etc.), not central stockpiles. There is no justification to
    permit states or localities to ``opt out'' of KI distribution.
        Finally, a clear, on-going, public education campaign must
    accompany the plan to be sure that people understand what the dangers
    are and what is accomplished by administration of KI. It also needs to
    be clarified that KI is not a general ``anti-radiation panacea'', since
    it does nothing whatsoever for any other issue than the prevention of
    thyroid cancer following inhalation or ingestion of I-131.

        Question 3. In your testimony, you noted that lost or stolen
    radioactive sealed sources can be used to make a simple and potentially
    deadly ``dirty bomb''. Are there any suggestions you could offer us on
    how to better protect these so-called sealed sources.
        Response. Much greater accountability is needed for the management
    of the nation's supplies of radioactive materials used in health care
    and throughout many industries. These sealed and orphan sources
    represent a significant vulnerability in terms of the construction of
    so-called ``dirty nuclear bombs'' by terrorists.

                                     ______

           Responses by Irwin Redlener, M.D. to Additional Questions
                             from Senator Voinovich

        Question 1. In your testimony, you stated that our nation should
    consider the ``closing of nuclear plants altogether'' that have a
    variety of problems. What do you recommend be the process for
    evaluating a facility for this kind of drastic step?
        How does the fact that communities rely on this low cost reliable
    energy source or that a facility does not immediately become safe after
    it is shutdown play in this determination?
        What impact would the closing of a nuclear site have on the
    elderly, poor, and children who are vulnerable to the high costs of
    energy??
        Response. Closing a nuclear power plant is an extremely serious
    decision with obvious impact on energy production and cost, employment
    and other concerns. We are simply weighing risks and benefits and need
    to be extremely mindful of the dramatic increase of perceived and
    actual vulnerability that America has experienced since last fall. I
    also need to emphasize that the closing or decommissioning of a nuclear
    power plant does not eliminate risk, but does significantly reduce
    certain of the risks over time.
        That said, there are clearly a large number of America's nuclear
    power plants for which the benefits of remaining active are overwhelmed
    by down-side risks and newly appreciated levels of vulnerability. In my
    mind there are a number of threshold issues which need to be explored
    in assessing the risk of any plant. Here are several criteria which
    would lead me to suggest that a particular plant should be considered
    for closing:
         Is the plant a ``high target value'' in terms of
    population density or economic impact of a potential successful attack?
         Are there particular vulnerabilities of the plant's
    containment systems for either the main reactor or the spent fuel rod
    storage system?
         Is there a history of poor safety or security ratings?
         Is there a viable evacuation plan?
        The Indian Point facility in Buchanan, New York, some 40 miles from
    midtown Manhattan, for instance, fails all of these criteria and should
    be high on the list of plants needing to be closed.
        Still, even with all four of these criteria being met by Indian
    Point, this is still an important question with major economic
    considerations for local and regional residents.
        My feeling is, however, that under the circumstances, in the post-
    9/11 world of terrorist reality in America, we need do what needs to be
    done. We are at war. If there is need to help the elderly and low-
    income populations manage with higher energy costs, then, in my
    judgement, part of the homeland security strategy may well entail
    providing an energy supplemental resource for those who need it.

        Question 2. Are there any harmful effects of the misuse of
    potassium iodide?
        If distributed widely, as you suggested, how can we ensure that it
    is not misused?
        Response. The main harmful effect of potassium iodide would be
    related to over-dosage in infants which could result in dangerous
    situations of low thyroid function with potential complications of
    slowing brain growth and development. This is preventable with
    education about dose and administration of KI for providers and the
    general public, just as we do for Tylenol, cold medications or anything
    else we do for pediatric medication management.
        Again, thank you so much for allowing me this opportunity to expand
    my testimony to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

                                   __________
     Statement of Robert Alvarez, Program Director for the STAR Foundation

        My name is Robert Alvarez, Program Director for the STAR
    Foundation. We are grateful for the opportunity to provide this written
    statement regarding the Nuclear Security Act of 2001. The STAR
    Foundation is a research and advocacy organization, which is focused on
    energy, health and environmental policy issues. The Foundation is based
    in East Hampton, NY and has offices in Washington D.C. Phone: 301-585-
    7672.
        Between 1993 and 1999, I served as a Senior Policy Advisor to the
    Secretary of Energy for National Security, Environment, Safety &
    Health, and Labor Policy. My responsibilities included directing the
    DOE's Office of Energy Emergency Planning. In this position, I directed
    assessments of the risks and consequences of energy emergencies,
    including those involving nuclear facilities.

         RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO NUCLEAR SAFETY AT REACTOR
                                   FACILITIES

        The Nuclear Security Act (S. 1746) represents a positive step in
    the protection of public safety and health from acts of terror against
    commercial nuclear facilities.
        The Need for Timely Revised Design Basis Threat.--The STAR
    Foundation strongly supports the provision in S. 1746 which requires
    the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop a realistic and timely
    Design Basis Threat for commercial nuclear power stations. We
    respectfully recommend that this legislation include formal
    participation in the development of a revised Design Basis Threat by
    other affected agencies, such as the Defense and Energy Departments,
    the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Administration, the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal intelligence community.
    Such an interagency effort is necessary and will avoid the costly,
    inefficient, and largely ad hoc approach now being taken.
        The NRC's current ``top to bottom'' review of security at nuclear
    power stations appears to have no endpoint. By comparison the National
    Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) within the Department of Energy has
    committed in its fiscal year 2003 Budget Request to establish a new
    Design Basis Threat for the security of the nation's nuclear weapons
    facilities by September of this year. The NNSA has already established
    a dedicated taskforce to review current security measures and to
    provide recommendations for a revised Design Basis Threat, which takes
    into account the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001.
        There is no good reason why the NRC should not follow the lead of
    the NNSA and establish a timely revision of its Design Basis Threat
    with a date certain. Due to the absence of clarity and timeliness by
    the NRC, the Nuclear Security Act of 2001 (S. 1746) is very necessary,
    and if adopted, will establish the necessary Federal framework to meet
    the challenges in this era of terrorism.
        Protection of Spent Fuel Should be Given High Priority.--
    Specifically, the STAR Foundation urges major emphasis be given to
    provisions that which would reduce the risks associated with inherent
    vulnerabilities associated with spent fuel pools.
        Unlike reactors, which are in steel vessels surrounded by thick
    concrete containment, spent fuel pools, containing some of the largest
    concentrations of radioactivity on the planet, are in unhardened
    structures that include thin metal corrugated buildings. If enough
    water drains by accident or design, the fuel could heat up and catch
    fire with catastrophic consequences comparable to a reactor meltdown.
    This is of particular concern for the many BWR spent fuel pools which
    are elevated several stories above the ground.
        The first place to begin is to promptly remove as much of the
    40,000+ tons of spent nuclear fuel as possible, and place it in
    multiple, dry, hardened onsite storage containers. This will greatly
    reduce risks in the near term by reducing fire dangers and the
    potential for large radiological releases. The technology exists to
    achieve this important public safety objective and has been deployed
    for several years on a modest scale in the United States and more
    extensively in Europe.
        For more than twenty years, Germany officially recognized that
    densely compacted spent fuel pools cannot be protected against acts of
    terror and has implemented an extensive dry spent fuel storage program.
    By comparison, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which in its more
    recent studies, concedes these risks may exist at U.S. nuclear
    stations, supports ``wall-to-wall'' fuel pool compaction. Before
    September 11th the NRC had already reduced security, emergency planning
    and accident insurance coverage at eleven closed reactors with spent
    fuel pools.
        In a world where animus against the United States remains high, and
    where detailed knowledge about nuclear technologies and access to
    advanced weaponry are widespread, a national program to achieve safe
    and secure storage of spent reactor fuel should be given high priority.
    In particular, efforts should be undertaken to further harden existing
    dry spent fuel storage containers, such as berming or additional
    hardened containment. The following illustration provides and example
    of what additional hardening of dry spent fuel containers might look
    like.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3695.029

        The costs of hardened onsite dry storage are not prohibitively
    expensive and are estimated in the range of tens-of-millions of dollars
    per site. Currently a single dry cask unit costs between half a million
    to one million dollars. Additional hardening may double this cost. For
    instance, a recent study done at Princeton University found that if the
    Salem Reactor station in New Jersey placed all of it's spent fuel into
    dry-hardened casks, the costs for 38 new dry casks would be between $34
    and $76 million. However, the costs of doing too little or nothing
    could be incalculable.
        The Need for Logical and Adequate Nuclear Emergency Planning and
    Response.--S. 1746 calls for the expansion of the emergency planning
    zone for nuclear accidents from 10 to 50 miles. The logic of simply
    expanding the emergency planning zone does not necessarily provide for
    adequate emergency response and public safety. Even with an expanded
    emergency planning zone, the current system is unstructured and is not
    site-specific, with respect to population density, meteorology,
    logistical, transportation access criteria, and long-term risks from
    land and building contamination.
        Instead the STAR Foundation recommends a framework for nuclear
    accident emergency planning and response be established as part of S.
    1746. Such a framework would include:
         Development of a specific prioritized system based on the
    goals of (1) saving lives and early injuries; (2) and reducing
    radiation doses below limits of exposure (Protective Action Guides--
    PAGs) for purposes of evacuation, relocation and safe return.
         Initiation of a precautionary response when the
    probability of a major release of radioactivity from a core melt or
    spent fuel fire becomes significant (10 percent or greater). State
    authorities should have the technical capability to promptly identify
    and evaluate plant conditions that call for a precautionary response.
         Protective Action Recommendations should be based on
    measurements that are compared to pre-established long-term guidelines
    for annual exposures--set as a small faction of the short term
    Protective Action Guides. The current system is based on measurements
    of contamination levels of food, water and land and buildings, without
    any regard for long-term exposures and critical issues such as when
    people are able to return.
         There should be three zones:
        1. 0 to 5 miles for ``plume protection''--emphasizing prompt early
    evacuation.
        2. 5-25 Miles: for ``plume protection'' that includes evacuation
    and sheltering based on weather conditions.
        3. >25 miles for ``plume protection'' for evacuation, sheltering or
    relocation based on monitoring.
        Because of the ability of large concentrations to travel and be
    deposited over great distances, from weather conditions such as
    rainstorms, there should be an Ingestion Protection Plan based on
    Protective Action Guides set by the EPA for contaminated foodstuffs.
         There should be a classification level that addresses
    releases from spent fuel pools and other spent fuel storage facilities.
    Currently, there are four classification levels based on severity,
    plant condition, size of release, and accident probability, none of
    which apply to spent fuel pools.
         There should be intensive, broad-based pre-emergency
    educational in the ``Inner Planning Zone'' that goes from 0 to 25
    miles, and information dissemination in all other zones. Citizens
    should be involved in the design and implementation of the educational
    program. There should be an upgraded flow of information during
    emergencies. Currently, pre-emergency education is limited to
    disseminating brochures, calendars etc by the utility, with a 10-mile
    radius, as well as emergency procedures that are distributed to key
    locations within the 10-mile zone.
         State authorities should have the independent technical
    capability to identify, and classify the severity of an emergency.
    States should also have a quick-reaction capability for plume tracking
    and dose projection. Currently, the reactor owner has the primary
    responsibility for identifying an emergency and classifying its
    severity. States are totally dependant on the reactor owner for
    information and have limited capability for plume tracking and dose
    estimation. Federal authorities have substantial plume tracking and
    radiation monitoring capabilities that are subject to several hours of
    delay before deployment.
         Local counties potentially at risk should coordinate the
    development and implementation of emergency plans. There should be
    extensive ``horizontal'' communications among counties and
    municipalities. There should be extensive training, especially for
    volunteer emergency workers and staff at schools, hospitals and other
    institutions. Currently, there is limited coordination and minimal
    training if any provided to potential ``at risk'' counties.
         There should be plans for screening and external
    decontamination of persons potentially exposed or concerned about
    exposure. There should be plans to call in national medical resources
    in the event of a severe accident/event in which thousands of people
    may require treatment for serious radiation exposures. Currently, the
    NRC requires screening for 20 percent of the people in a 10-mile zone.
    There are limited arrangements for treating a small number of seriously
    exposed people. There is no explicit for the integration of national
    medical resources in the case of a large-scale emergency.
         Emergency preparedness should be regarded as a safety-
    system equivalent to an in-plant system (e.g., emergency core cooling).
    As such significant degradation of state emergency preparedness (e.g.
    failure to remove snow from roads) should be grounds for shutting down
    the plant. The plant's operating license should be contingent on the
    continuous maintenance of an effective emergency response capability.
    Currently, there is a Federal requirement of an emergency plan to be in
    place as a condition for continued plant operation. There are no
    requirements that the plan be capable of execution when the plant is
    operating.

                                   BACKGROUND

        As the 21st century begins, the basic concepts of warfare are being
    transformed by the highly destructive acts of terror by small, well-
    organized groups against military and civilian targets. Over the past
    two decades, such attacks have occurred, tragically, with increased
    frequency and destruction. Of particular concern are nuclear reactor
    stations. By virtue of their potentially enormous radiological impacts,
    nuclear energy facilities represent an unpredictable risk of becoming
    weapons of mass destruction at the hands of terrorists.
        This concern was underscored by President Bush, on January 27th,
    when he informed the Nation in his State Of the Union Address that U.S.
    nuclear reactor information was found in a terrorist enclave in
    Afghanistan.
        Nuclear power facilities have long been considered as potential
    terrorist targets, and limited programs are in place to protect them.
    But, in the aftermath of September 11th, the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission concedes that U.S. reactor stations are not designed to
    withstand destructive attacks using a jumbo passenger jet with a full
    load of fuel as a missile. For over three decades now, the NRC and it's
    predecessor--the Atomic Energy Commission--have refused to require
    reactors to be hardened against aerial attacks because it is considered
    prohibitively expensive.
        After September 11th, nuclear reactors can no longer be viewed
    merely as machines that generate electricity. The potential
    consequences of a terrorist attack transcend cost/benefit analyses of
    nuclear energy. No other energy technology has the potential for
    catastrophic releases of radioactivity, even greater than nuclear
    weapons explosions, causing thousands of deaths and cancers, and
    rendering large populated or farming areas uninhabitable, possibly for
    centuries.
        The only ``real world'' analog to the potential consequences of a
    nuclear terrorist attack is the tragic aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl
    reactor accident in the Ukraine. Fourteen years after the accident,
    U.N. scientists estimated that some 74,000 square-miles in Northern and
    Eastern Europe still remain heavily contaminated with cesium-137 from
    Chernobyl. Large numbers of people still live in contaminated zones
    that would trigger evacuation, and removal of foodstuffs, in the United
    States.
        There are no credible scientific tools to predict acts of malice,
    much less to compare the risk of terrorism with the benefits of nuclear
    generated electricity. A terrorist attack, by its very nature occurs by
    total surprise. Yet, knowing this, the U.S. commercial nuclear industry
    and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have steadfastly resisted
    inclusion of terrorism into the underlying safety requirements for
    nuclear power stations, on the absurd, but technically correct basis
    that terrorist acts cannot be foreseen.
        In a world where animus against the United States is growing, and
    where detailed knowledge about nuclear technologies and access to
    advanced weaponry are widespread, the security and safety of nuclear
    power stations should be of the highest priority.

         REACTOR SPENT FUEL POOLS POSE THE GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR HARM

        In terms of severe radiological impacts, the most significant
    vulnerabilities at nuclear stations involve reactor spent fuel pools.
    Unlike reactors, which are in steel vessels surrounded by thick
    concrete containment, spent fuel pools, which contain some of the
    largest concentrations of radioactivity on the planet, are in less
    hardened structures that include corrugated buildings. An attack
    against a spent fuel pool could drain enough water to cause a
    catastrophic radiological fire that cannot be extinguished.
        Depending on the reactor design, significant water drainage
    exposing highly radioactive cores could occur in less than an hour.
    Once the spent fuel rods are exposed the zirconium cladding could heat
    up in a matter of hours to about 1000 degrees Celsius, and undergo
    instantaneous ignition. As the fire a rages, the zirconium interacts
    with the remaining water and steam, generating hydrogen, which further
    intensifies the conflagration.
        Over the past several decades, the U.S. nuclear power industry has
    generated several billion curies of long-lived radioactivity, contained
    in more than 40,000 tons of reactor-irradiated spent fuel. One spent
    fuel pool has more long-lived radioactivity than was released into the
    northern hemisphere by all nuclear weapons tests combined. On average,
    spent fuel pools hold 5 to 10 times more long-lived radioactivity than
    a reactor core. Pools at one third of U.S. reactor sites are in
    unhardened buildings, elevated several stories above ground.
        The NRC concluded over the past several years that the loss of pool
    water by accident or by acts of malice could lead to very serious
    radiological fires that are comparable or worse than reactor meltdowns.
    The NRC also finds that ponds at reactors closed for many years could
    pose similar dangers. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concedes
    that such a fire probably could not be extinguished; it could rage for
    days. Most important in June 2001, the NRC staff informed the
    Commission that its spent fuel safety policy and procedures did not
    cover vulnerabilities to terrorism or sabotage. Despite these
    concessions, the NRC staff recommended that the Commission greatly
    reduce security and emergency evacuation requirements at
    decommissioning reactors and reducing accident insurance coverage by
    more than half. Prior to September 11th particularly, worrisome is the
    large amount of cesium 137 in fuel ponds. With a half-life of 30 years,
    cesium 137 gives off highly penetrating radiation and is absorbed in
    the food chain as if it were potassium. According to the NRC, as much
    as 100 percent of a pool's cesium 137 would be released into the
    environment in a fire. In comparison, the 1986 Chernobyl accident
    released about 40 percent of the reactor core's 6 million curies of
    cesium 137 into the atmosphere, resulting in massive offsite radiation
    exposures. According to a 1997 study done by Brookhaven National
    Laboratory for the NRC, a spent fuel fire could render about 188 square
    miles uninhabitable and cause as many as 28,000 cancer fatalities and
    $59 billion in damage.
        Despite the fact that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recognizes
    this problem, the commercial nuclear power industry thus far, has
    successfully resisted security upgrades that involve the hardening of
    spent fuel storage. It is time for Congress to act.

                      YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM

        Early this year, President Bush submitted a formal certification to
    proceed with the construction of a permanent high-level radioactive
    waste repository at the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada. Much has been
    said by the nuclear industry and the Bush administration that opening
    the Yucca Mountain site will serve as a primary means to protect
    existing spent fuel from terrorist attacks.
        Recently the House of Representatives, fueled by terrorism
    concerns, voted overwhelmingly to proceed with a geological repository
    for high-level radioactive wastes at the Department of Energy's Yucca
    Mountain site in Nevada. Now the battle lines are drawn in the Senate,
    as arguments heat up over the risks of transporting reactor spent fuel
    versus disposing of it in Yucca Mountain.
        Obscured in this contentious debate, however, is a more important
    and timely question. How can we protect spent reactor fuel already in
    vulnerable pools scattered across the country from terrorist attacks
    over the next 30-40 years.
        The first place to begin is to promptly remove as much of the more
    than 40,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel and place it in multiple, dry,
    hardened onsite storage containers. This will greatly reduce risks in
    the near term by reducing fire dangers and the potential for large
    radiological releases.
        Even if the Yucca Mountain site opens under the DOE's optimistic
    date of 2010, large amounts of spent fuel will remain in pools for
    decades, awaiting shipment. By the time the Yucca Mountain Repository
    fills up, reactors allowed to operate beyond their 30-year NRC
    licenses, could generate over 40,000 additional tons of spent fuel for
    storage in vulnerable pools.

                              THE CHALLENGE AHEAD

        The current Design Basis Threat, which provides the ``envelope'' in
    which nuclear power station safeguards and security operate does not
    factor in the type of attacks that occurred on September 11th. Guards
    are only required to protect against no more than 4 individuals, and
    have not taken any steps to harden vital parts of the reactor station
    such as the control room and spent fuel pools. These latter
    vulnerabilities are the primary focus of the Project, because ``gates,
    guards, and guns'' are not sufficient to defend against an advanced
    weapons or aircraft attack against facilities that are similar in
    construction to ordinary commercial structures.
        Nonetheless, the commercial nuclear industry strongly resists
    significant security improvements, particularly capital upgrades to
    harden facilities. Attacks against spent fuel pools were never part of
    NRC security performance tests prior to September 11th.
        A major factor that fuels industry resistance to increasing the
    design basis threat is that the financial stability of much of the
    nuclear power industry has been undercut through deregulation.
        As a result of utility deregulation many of America's nuclear power
    stations are now owned by limited liability corporations, (some with
    foreign partners) which possess questionable capital reserves. This
    means these companies may not have sufficient funds to manage major
    contingencies such as major equipment failure and replacement, nuclear
    safety upgrades, and increased safeguards and security. Under
    deregulation, these new reactor owners can no longer rely on a
    regulated rate base for cash-flow. Competitive market pressures and
    bankruptcy can put pressure on reactor owners to cut back on
    ``variable'' costs such as meeting safety requirements, repairing
    safety systems and other equipment, and having adequate staffing to
    ensure safe operation. Adding to existing difficulties are the impacts
    of electric utility deregulation. Three nuclear power station owners
    (Enron, P,G&E, and Southern California Edison) are in bankruptcy.

                                   __________
                Statement of Edwin S. Lyman, Ph.D., President,
                           Nuclear Control Institute

        The purpose of this brief testimony is to provide preliminary data
    to support the contention that the current 10-mile radius of the
    emergency planning zone for plume exposure (``plume exposure EPZ'') is
    inadequate, in the event of a beyond-design-basis (``severe'') accident
    or terrorist event at a commercial nuclear power plant, and will fail
    to protect the public in accordance with Federal guidelines. Therefore,
    the call for an extension of the emergency planning zone to 50 miles
    contained in S. 1746, ``Nuclear Security Act of 2002,'' is an
    appropriate and prudent measure that merits serious consideration. In
    fact, such a change will be necessary to provide the level of
    protection now called for by FDA and EPA in the event of a severe
    nuclear reactor accident.
        We have used the MACCS2 code to generate estimates of thyroid dose
    and total effective dose equivalent (TEDE)\1\ to members of the public
    downwind of a severe radiological release at a nuclear power plant,
    involving core melt, vessel breach and containment failure.\2\ The
    total radioactive iodine release assumed is about 60 percent of the
    core inventory, similar to the release from the Chernobyl accident. The
    calculated doses assume only exposures due to passage of the initial
    plume and due to deposited contamination for 1 week following the
    accident; thus long-term doses are not considered. Ingestion doses (the
    milk pathway) are also not considered. The calculations are for a
    generic pressurized-water reactor and a single meteorological condition
    (atmospheric stability class D, wind speed 4.4 miles per hour, and no
    precipitation). The exposed individuals are assumed to be 30-year-old
    adults. Other assumptions for this model, including the source term,
    can be found in a recent publication.\3\ The intent here is not to be
    comprehensive, but simply to demonstrate the severity of these events.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ TEDE is the sum of the dose due to external radiation and the
    ``committed effective dose'' delivered for up to a 50-year period as a
    result of internal exposure resulting from radionuclide intake.
        \2\ D.I. Chanin and M.L. Young, Code Manual for MACCS2: Volume 1,
    User's Guide, SAND97-0594, Sandia National Laboratories, 1997.
        \3\ Edwin S. Lyman, ``Public Health Risks of Substituting Mixed-
    Oxide for Uranium Fuel in Light-Water Reactors,'' Science and Global
    Security 9 (2001) 33-79.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The pertinent results are summarized in the following table:

        Distance (miles): 15; Peak Thyroid Dose (rem): 626; Peak TEDE
    (rem): 163.
        Distance (miles): 28; Peak Thyroid Dose (rem): 292; Peak TEDE
    (rem): 60.
        Distance (miles): 45; Peak Thyroid Dose (rem): 254; Peak TEDE
    (rem): 38.

        The relevance of these values is as follows:
        Thyroid prophylaxis. According to the FDA's recent guidance on the
    administration of potassium iodide (KI) as a prophylactic measure, it
    is recommended that adults between the ages of 18 and 40 take 130 mg of
    KI daily if their thyroid exposure is projected to exceed 10 rem.\4\
    From the table, it can be seen that this threshold is exceeded by a
    factor of 25 for the most affected individuals at a distance of 45
    miles. Thus according to FDA guidance, KI administration would be
    recommended for some individuals located at least 45 miles downwind of
    the accident.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug
    Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, ``Potassium
    Iodide as a Thyroid Blocking Agent in Radiation Emergencies,'' Guidance
    Document, November 2001. Available on the Web at www.fda.gov/cder/
    guidance/index.htm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The situation is even more severe for children and pregnant or
    lactating women. For these individuals, the FDA recommends KI
    prophylaxis if the projected thyroid dose is greater than 5 rem. To
    convert the thyroid doses in the above table, which were estimated for
    30-year-old adults, to children, who would receive a larger thyroid
    dose for the same radioactive iodine intake, a factor of between two
    and ten should be applied, depending on the age.\5\ Thus the thyroid
    dose to children could exceed the FDA threshold for KI administration
    at even greater distances than for adults.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP),
    Age-Dependent Doses to Members of the Public From Intake of
    Radionuclides, Part 5, ICRP Publication 72, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1996).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Evacuation. According to the EPA ``protective action guides''
    (PAGs), evacuation should normally be initiated if the total effective
    dose equivalent (TEDE) exceeds 1 rem.\6\ It is obvious from the above
    table that according to this rule, evacuation would be recommended at
    more than 45 miles downwind from the site.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ T. McKenna, J. Tefethen, K. Gant, J. Jolicoeur, G. Kuzo and G.
    Athey, RTM-96: Response Technical Manual, NUREG/BR-0150, Vol. 1, Rev.
    4, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 1996, p. G-7.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Conclusion. The 10-mile plume exposure EPZ was never intended to
    provide significant protection against the long-term carcinogenic
    effects of radiation exposure, but was only intended to reduce the
    early fatalities that could occur from acute radiation poisoning.
    Nevertheless, the ultimate long-term health consequences of a severe
    radiological release would be catastrophic, and the government must be
    obliged to ensure that these longer-term effects be avoided to the
    maximum extent possible. Thus an extension of emergency planning to a
    region extending at least 50 miles downwind of nuclear reactor sites is
    an essential measure to bolster protection of the public in the event
    of a terrorist attack on a nuclear plant.

                                   __________
     Implications of Security Force Federalization on Nuclear Power Plant
            Security: An Evaluation by the Nuclear Energy Institute

                               Executive Summary

        The September 11 attacks have prompted new consideration of
    security arrangements in the United States. They have caused us all to
    reconsider past efforts regarding security and to reevaluate the
    threats we face. The nation, reluctantly, is adapting to heightened
    security alerts, and airport security personnel have been federalized.
        This era of heightened homeland security also has prompted the
    introduction of legislative proposals to federalize security forces at
    the nation's nuclear facilities. This paper addresses the implications
    of proposals to replace an established, skilled private security force
    with federal guards at nuclear power plants.
        Recently, airport baggage screening functions were federalized for
    a fixed period to correct deficiencies that could not be solved by any
    other means. The responsibilities and attributes of airport baggage
    screeners and nuclear power plant security forces, which protect the
    plants, are not comparable. Although they performed relatively simple
    and limited duties, airport security personnel were characterized as
    untrained, unscreened, transitory, poorly supervised, poorly regulated
    and low paid.
        In sharp contrast, nuclear power plant security forces, many of
    which have law enforcement or military experience, are subject to FBI
    background checks, physical and psychological testing and screening and
    substance abuse testing as part of the hiring process. The nuclear
    energy industry is unique among energy industries in having a
    cooperative relationship with the FBI to facilitate such criminal
    record checks.
        Nuclear plant security personnel also undergo rigorous training.
    Initially, they are provided seven weeks of training, including weapons
    proficiency and proof of marksmanship, recognition of sabotage devices
    and equipment, and tactical response training. Nuclear security
    personnel are required to requalify annually in physical and physical
    fitness characteristics and in job skills. They are subject to a
    continuous behavior observation program for substance abuse and
    psychological fitness. On average, retention of the security force is
    above 90 percent and the officers are paid an annual salary of $35,000
    and provided a full benefits package.
        The duties of these personnel involve both traditional industrial
    security and defense of the facility against a specified, military-
    capable land assault force. The industry's security forces are aided in
    this effort by modern intrusion detection systems and barriers,
    biometric and other advanced recognition technology for workers
    entering vital areas of the plant, internal fortifications and the most
    capable weaponry permitted under law.
        As a part of their training, security officers participate in
    exercises on an annual basis. As part of the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission's federal oversight of security requirements, the industry's
    private security forces must demonstrate their readiness during mock
    assaults conducted by federally supervised forces. No other private
    industrial facilities have the combination of robust physical
    protection, well-trained and armed security forces and emergency
    response capability that is found at every nuclear power plant in the
    United States.
        All of these attributes of the industry security program are
    embedded in federal regulations and federal oversight. It is possible
    for federally employed forces to replace private security officers, but
    it would result in numerous and significant disadvantages that could
    result in diminished security at these facilities.
        There are more than 5,000 privately employed security officers in
    the nuclear energy industry. Their compensation levels correspond to
    GS-9 on the federal scale or E-8 (O-2) on the military scale. Owing to
    the large number of the current force with prior military or local law
    enforcement backgrounds and the restrictions imposed by federal law
    and/or local laws associated with their existing pension credits, many
    will find federal employment less attractive. They will choose to leave
    this service and seek different private employment. This will result in
    potentially thousands of displaced workers and difficulties in
    recruiting individuals with comparable backgrounds and skills. In
    addition, hiring a federal work force of more than 5,000 officers at
    these pay scales may have significant impact on existing federal pay
    scales for current federal security forces with less sophisticated
    responsibilities.
        Legislative proposals such as S. 1746 to federally employ security
    personnel at nuclear power plants would have the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission manage the program. Adding more than 5,000 employees to the
    NRC workforce would nearly triple the size of the agency and
    significantly dilute its focus on safety and oversight. The hiring,
    training and management of this workforce also could result in a
    transition period of diminished efficiency and security protection. If
    a different federal employer is chosen, the NRC as an independent
    federal agency will be faced with oversight of another federal agency
    as well as the company that owns and/or operates the power plant. This
    would dilute the NRC's safety focus as well.

          FEDERALIZING SECURITY FORCE WOULD WEAKEN COORDINATION WITH
                               REACTOR OPERATORS

        Federal employment would result in a bifurcation of responsibility
    for activities on a privately owned site. There would be two separate
    chains of command for site employees--one for the security force and
    one for the plant operating staff. This may result in a cooperative
    working relationship during routine plant activity. But in the event of
    a threat against the facility, this division of responsibility could
    hinder the plant's response.
        Protecting a nuclear facility against intruders requires highly
    coordinated action on the part of both the reactor operating
    professionals and the security forces. Reactor safety could be
    compromised without excellent coordination. Given the variety of
    tactical situations that could exist under an attack, this coordination
    must occur in real time and under rapidly changing circumstances. Dual
    chains of command would make this coordination very difficult, if not
    impossible.
        Dual chains of command also complicate efficiency of operations.
    The size and tactical deployment of security forces is highly dependent
    on physical features and the use of intrusion detection and monitoring
    systems. The placement and use of these systems also impacts equipment
    accessibility for plant operating staffs, which in turn has an impact
    on reactor safety during normal operation and if the facility faces an
    attack. Resolution of these conflicting interests to achieve high
    levels of both efficiency and protection will be adversely affected by
    a bifurcation of accountability.
        Security forces at nuclear facilities have multiple
    responsibilities. They are responsible for industrial security and
    protection of the plant assets on a daily basis. But they also must
    demonstrate the ability to protect the facility from a defined attack
    scenario, as required by NRC regulation.
        Undertaking both roles, a federal employer will face a broad range
    of new liabilities. This will impose a significant new dimension for
    the federal government and will become a distinct disadvantage to
    federal employment. Conversely, the dual responsibilities associated
    with private employment of a federally regulated security force is a
    significant advantage. It allows the private employer to provide a more
    diverse set of assignments for security forces. Without such diversity,
    the security forces would be relegated to armed sentry duties only.
    Maintaining a highly alert security posture is difficult without this
    diversity of assignments.

                OTHER LEGISLATIVE CHANGES COULD IMPROVE SECURITY

        Whether the security force is federally or privately employed,
    there are necessary and beneficial legislative changes directly
    impacting the effectiveness of the security force that the industry and
    the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recommend. Without new legislation,
    some security forces are restricted in the use of deadly force, and
    state/local laws limit the weapons that may be deployed on private
    property. Federal legislation is needed to remove these constraints and
    make security programs consistent nationwide.
        Clearly, private employees provide excellent nuclear power plant
    security. Routine security could be accomplished by federal employees,
    but entails significant difficulties that, in a practical sense, would
    result in diminished safety, security and efficiency both during a
    transition period and in the long run. This paper does not address the
    protection of nuclear facilities and other parts of the national
    critical infrastructure from broader acts of war. The industry supports
    a broad analysis to determine the threats we now face and develop a
    seamless defense that integrates the capabilities of our industry,
    state and local governments, and the federal government, including the
    CIA, FBI, FEMA and the military. Broader acts of war and the relative
    risks of the facilities should be considered as part of this
    comprehensive analysis.
        Nuclear power plants are the most robust physical structures in the
    industrial sector and are protected by highly skilled, well-armed
    paramilitary forces. The industry has been at the highest state of
    alert since September 11 and is reviewing its security programs to
    incorporate lessons learned from the attacks. The NRC also is
    conducting a ``top-to-bottom'' review of the federal regulations that
    apply to nuclear plant security and the security. More than 20 of the
    nation's governors, state security directors and Members of Congress
    who have toured nuclear power facilities since September 11 have
    commented on the outstanding security programs.
        The nuclear energy industry has always had an uncompromising
    commitment to safety and security. The industry remains committed to
    providing the best possible security for workers at our plants, their
    families and residents of 31 states who live near the nation's nuclear
    power plants. The industry will work with the Bush administration and
    the Congress to review and enhance our security as may be required in
    light of recent events. However, a transition from private to federal
    security forces at nuclear power plants is an illconceived and
    misguided proposal that provides no enhanced protection of the public
    or the nuclear power facilities that provide electricity for one of
    every five American homes and businesses.

                                  INTRODUCTION

        The Nuclear Regulatory Commission sets rigorous standards for
    nuclear power plant security measures and security forces. These
    security forces represent an elite group of individuals--carefully
    screened before hiring, trained both in general and facility--specific
    security knowledge, and required to requalify every year.
        Security begins with the hiring process. Applicants for security
    officer positions must undergo detailed evaluations, including FBI
    background checks and evaluations of their psychological and physical
    fitness. Those who are hired are subject to ongoing behavior
    observation and drug and alcohol screening. They also are trained
    regularly and evaluated in ``anti-terrorist'' exercises.
        A clear chain of command is necessary for effective security at a
    nuclear power plant because of the close interrelationship between the
    security force and plant operators. In the event of a threat, plant
    operators carry out plant emergency operations and procedures, while
    the security force protects the equipment that is needed to maintain
    reactor safety. Close coordination between the security force and plant
    operators is best achieved when both are integrated under a single
    management structure. Federalization would undercut this.

                          A REVIEW OF SECURITY ISSUES

        Since September 11, the nuclear energy industry has reviewed
    nuclear plant security requirements and assessed the advantages and
    disadvantages of federalizing security professionals. This review
    included:
        1. policy and implementation issues associated with federalizing
    nuclear power plant security forces;
        2. attributes of an effective security force, how it might be
    affected by federalization, and the related NRC regulatory
    requirements;
        3. characteristics of the existing nuclear plant security force,
    regulated under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part
    73;
        4. industry-supported security improvements that should be
    implemented.
        This paper discusses the industry's findings and conclusions.

                              Policy Implications

        There are numerous negative policy and safety implications of
    legislation introduced by Senator Harry Reid (S. 1746) and the
    companion bill (H.R. 3382) in the House of Representatives introduced
    by Congressman Ed Markey. Fundamentally, the legislation would weaken
    security at nuclear power plants by unnecessarily federalizing nuclear
    power plant security. The proposed legislation also would have a
    profound impact on the nation's energy diversity, environmental well-
    being, economic security and the national common defense. Those impacts
    include:
         Diminishing and disrupting plant security. Effective
    security, including a successful response to a terrorist threat at a
    nuclear power plant, is highly dependent upon coordinated efforts by
    security forces and power plant operators. By replacing the proven,
    effective security forces already in place at nuclear plants, the Reid-
    Markey proposals bifurcate management responsibilities for these
    functions. Doing so will lessen the industry's ability to fully protect
    public health and safety.
         Creating one of the largest law enforcement and security
    agencies in the country. The Reid-Markey legislation would require the
    NRC to hire an estimated 5,000 additional security employees and would
    make the NRC one of the largest law enforcement/security agencies in
    the country--larger than the Secret Service or the Bureau of Alcohol,
    Tobacco and Firearms. By doubling or tripling the workforce of the NRC,
    the legislation could change the agency's primary mission from that of
    protecting public health and safety to providing for the general
    defense of the country.
         Reducing the stringent screening requirements for security
    personnel. Requiring security forces at nuclear facilities to be
    federal employees likely would reduce the strict hiring standards,
    extensive background checks, training and ongoing performance reviews
    already in place for private security forces. In fact, many Department
    of Energy nuclear facilities have private security forces, as do
    federally operated nuclear plants, such as the Tennessee Valley
    Authority reactors. The qualifications outlined in the Reid-Markey
    legislation are less stringent than those already in place in the
    industry.
         Squandering vital experience. Replacing private nuclear
    plant security forces with federal personnel with little or no
    experience at nuclear power facilities would set aside years of on-the-
    job experience gained through countless security exercises and NRC-
    managed drills. Moreover, such a transition raises serious contractual
    issues regarding existing security forces.
         Misallocating vital and limited federal security
    resources. Nuclear power plants are already among the most secure
    private facilities in the country, while other components of the
    nation's critical infrastructure may require greater protection. Only
    through a comprehensive review of critical infrastructure security
    needs can policymakers balance the available resources with the wide
    spectrum of legitimate security needs. Coordinating the efforts of
    federal agencies to conduct a comprehensive threat assessment will
    avoid having regulatory and security decisions made in a political
    vacuum without necessary guidance from government experts in security
    and intelligence gathering.
         Blurring the line between providing national defense and
    maintaining industrial security. By placing the burden of providing for
    the common defense solely upon consumers of nuclear energy, the Reid-
    Markey proposal undermines both national security and energy diversity.
         Reducing economic stability and environmental well-being.
    Nuclear power provides economic stability to our nation's consumers and
    industries by providing a reliable source of electricity at a low cost.
    By discouraging its use, the legislation erodes that stability and
    constrains an essential source of electricity that does not produce
    greenhouse gases or other air pollutants.
         Breaching the line between civilian law enforcement and
    military force. By placing the command of a military-like force--
    consisting of more than 5,000 personnel--in the hands of an independent
    U.S. agency, the legislation obfuscates the clear historical line
    between civilian and military responsibilities.

                Nuclear Power Plant Security Is Effective Today

        The federal requirements for security at our nation's nuclear power
    facilities are designed to provide a high assurance that the nuclear
    power plants are protected from radiological sabotage. Rigorous
    requirements, coupled with industry commitment and strong NRC
    oversight, have resulted in well-designed paramilitary security
    programs at our nation's nuclear plants. These plants have multi-
    layered security programs that effectively combine engineered physical
    security features, administrative controls, and a highly trained and
    equipped security response force.
        Employment requirements for security force personnel are quite
    extensive, with specific requirements for employment suitability,
    medical qualifications, physiological requirements and physical
    fitness.
        They are also very specific and detailed with respect to training
    and qualification. Security officers are required to complete training
    in more than 70 security-related areas, including weapons training,
    tactical response force operations, use of deadly force, and the
    searching of vehicles, packages and personnel. Security force personnel
    must requalify every year. In addition to the performance requirements,
    security officers must re-qualify each year on the employment
    suitability, physical, psychological and physical fitness requirements.
        The security force weapons and equipment regulations are also
    extensive and formidable. Armed security personnel are required to be
    proficient with semiautomatic rifles, shotguns and semiautomatic
    pistols or revolvers. They also are required to have available tactical
    response equipment such as tactical helmets, body armor, gas masks,
    tear gas, night vision equipment and portable radios.
        The NRC's security regulations specifically require that each
    company operate, develop and maintain a well-designed security response
    plan for its facility. The response plans must be reviewed and approved
    by the NRC prior to being implemented. Finally as part of the response
    plan, the security force is required to develop a strong liaison with
    local law enforcement to ensure effective coordination of response.
        NRC security requirements have resulted in the development of
    highly professional security programs and security forces at our
    nation's nuclear power plants:
        1. The nuclear energy industry employs more than 5,000 trained
    nuclear security professionals.
        2. On average, each facility employs 80 nuclear security officers
    dedicated to protecting the nuclear facility against the threat of
    radiological sabotage.
        3. Approximately 67 percent of the industry's security officers
    have prior military, law enforcement or industrial security experience.
        4. More than 17 percent have a college degree.
        5. Nuclear security officers are well-paid professionals, with an
    average annual salary of $35,000.
        6. Job satisfaction for the security officers is extremely high, as
    demonstrated by a retention rate of 90 percent.
        7. Training for a new security officer is extensive. On average, a
    nuclear security officer receives 270 hours of training prior to being
    deployed to the security force.
        8. The industry has a strong commitment to continuing training and
    drills for security officers. On average, the nuclear security officer
    will spend approximately 60 hours each year completing requalification
    training, with approximately 30 hours spent on anti-terrorist tactical
    training exercises.
        9. Security officers also participate in considerable training
    activities with local law enforcement agencies and emergency response
    agencies. At least annually, and in many cases more often,
    familiarization and coordination training is conducted with local law
    enforcement personnel and such organizations as fire departments and
    emergency medical organizations.
        10. Physical fitness is an important requirement for security force
    officers. Each facility's security program includes a physical fitness
    regime that effectively tests the cardiovascular fitness and endurance
    levels of security force personnel.
        11. In addition to security program duties, nuclear security
    officers also perform a number of other critical safety functions for
    the plant. These include plant fire brigade, plant fire watch patrols,
    emergency medical technicians for first aid responses, and designated
    emergency response plan actions.

                       Industry Supports Security Changes

        The nuclear energy industry took immediate actions to enhance
    security in response to the events of September 11. However, federal
    legislation is required to make improvements in some areas, such as the
    authority to use automatic weapons where state laws preclude their use
    by nuclear security officers.
        In fact, the industry has supported the NRC's repeated requests to
    Congress to enhance security, long before the attacks of September 11.
    Combining these long-requested authorities with additional actions
    suggested by recent security reviews, the nuclear industry has compiled
    the following list of industry-supported security improvements.
        The nuclear energy industry supports legislation that would contain
    the following elements:
        1. The president, or his designee, should conduct a comprehensive
    review of nuclear power plant security, including consideration of the
    entire spectrum of possible terrorist threats.
        2. The NRC should determine if changes are needed in the criteria
    against which nuclear plant security forces must successfully defend
    the facility--which is called the plant's design basis threat. Any
    revisions to the threat against which plant security forces must defend
    should be based on a reasonable expectation of the security
    responsibility of the industry. As such, the review of possible
    terrorist threats against nuclear plants should determine whether the
    defense against such a threat should be the responsibility of the
    federal government or the company.
        3. The NRC should be granted the authority to permit plant security
    forces to carry and use weapons commensurate with the plant's
    responsibilities to respond to the design basis threat and to permit
    plant security forces to make arrests without warrants if and as
    necessary.
        4. A nuclear plant's security forces should be granted the
    authority to use deadly force, if necessary, to protect the plant. This
    authority currently is subject to varying interpretations of state and
    federal law.
        5. Federal law should be expanded to prohibit the unauthorized
    introduction of firearms into facilities licensed by the NRC and to
    prohibit the sabotage of NRC-licensed or NRC-certified facilities.
        6. Communications between nuclear plants, law enforcement agencies,
    and, when appropriate, armed services (including the National Guard)
    should be reinforced, and consideration should be given to placing
    secure communications equipment at each facility.
        The costs of additional security--such as National Guard personnel
    and state police, which have been and may be necessary to respond to
    terrorist threats that are clearly acts of war--should be the
    responsibility of the federal government or the states.

                        Attributes of Effective Security

        Which would provide more effective security at a nuclear power
    plant--a security force that is federally staffed or one that is
    federally regulated? Is there a significant difference between the two
    approaches?
        To answer these questions, the nuclear energy industry analyzed
    security force effectiveness and identified 10 attributes of an
    effective security officer. These qualities are similar to those
    examined by the NRC in 1976 when it determined that private security
    forces would be a more effective means of safeguarding nuclear power
    plants than federal guards. The attributes were evaluated to determine
    whether a federal security force or a federally regulated force of
    private security officers would have an advantage for each attribute.
        The results indicate areas where plant safety would be
    disadvantaged by the use of federal officers. Of these, the most
    important is the introduction of a second chain of command. Who makes
    decisions during an attack, and how well the security force is
    coordinated with other activities on site, is extremely important in
    determining security force effectiveness. Two chains of command, one
    federal and the other corporate, will significantly complicate
    coordination. Plant response must be fully integrated during a crisis.
        The industry's review raised other issues related to
    federalization. A change to federally staffed security would disrupt
    existing security during the implementation period. This disruption
    could compromise nuclear plants' ability to respond to threats at a
    time when the threats are believed to be greater than usual.

                              GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

        In order to respond to a new assessment of the post-September 11
    terrorist threats, federal legislation may be required under either
    approach.
        The same security standards should be set under either approach.
    Regulatory changes would be required in either case. NRC regulations
    contain stringent security standards that the industry must meet.
        Integrating federal security officers into normal plant operations
    would be essential for smooth day-to-day operations--but such
    integration would present major challenges.
        A dual chain of command for security forces and plant operations
    personnel would make effective crisis response more difficult.
        A transition to federal security employees at nuclear power plants
    would cause major disruptions in security force stability for several
    years, displace many of the thousands of current security officers, and
    potentially undermine security effectiveness at this time of heightened
    alert.

                   DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES

    1. Physical and Mental Fitness
        Physical and mental fitness standards must be applied to applicants
    for security positions and to security personnel already employed at
    the facility. Security officers must meet stringent physical standards,
    be free of psychological disorders and substance abuse problems, and
    must undergo criminal background checks.
        These standards should be appropriate for the expected duties.
    Thus, standards for a checkpoint officer may differ from those of an
    armed responder. In both cases, standards would have to be set by
    federal regulation. There are no generic federal standards that would
    automatically apply to a federal guard force. Moreover, there is
    concern that the myriad of civil service requirements may be an
    impediment to maintaining an effective security force and achieving
    standards as high as those now in the NRC's regulations.
        Existing NRC regulations require:
        Physical Qualifications.--Prior to employment, or assignment to the
    security organization, an individual must meet the following physical
    qualification criteria:
        1. A nuclear security officer must have no physical weaknesses or
    abnormalities that would adversely affect his/her performance of
    assigned security job duties.
        2. The officer must successfully pass a physical examination
    administered by a licensed physician.
        3. Armed personnel must meet the following additional physical
    requirements: (a) Vision: Distant visual acuity in each eye shall be
    correctable to 20/30 in the better eye and 20/40 in the other eye with
    eyeglasses or contact lenses. Field of vision must be at least 70
    horizontal meridians in each eye. The ability to distinguish red, green
    and yellow is required. Loss of vision in one eye is disqualifying.
    Glaucoma is disqualifying, unless controlled by acceptable medical or
    surgical means. (b) Hearing: Individuals shall have no hearing loss in
    the better ear greater than 30 decibels average at 500 Hz, 1,000 Hz,
    and 2,000 Hz with no hearing loss exceeding 40 decibels at any one
    frequency. (c) Diseases: Individuals must have no established medical
    history or medical diagnosis of epilepsy or diabetes, or any other
    disease that would adversely affect his or her ability to perform
    assigned duties. (d) Addiction: Individuals must have no established
    medical history or medical diagnosis of habitual alcoholism or drug
    addiction. (e) Other physical requirements: An individual who has been
    incapacitated due to a serious illness, injury, disease or operation
    that could interfere with the effective performance of assigned
    security job duties must, prior to resumption of such duties, provide
    medical evidence of recovery and ability to perform such security job
    duties.
        Mental Qualifications.--Prior to employment, or assignment to the
    security organization, an individual must meet the following mental
    qualification criteria:
        1. Individuals whose security tasks and job duties are directly
    associated with the effective implementation of physical security and
    contingency plans must demonstrate mental alertness and the capability
    to exercise good judgment, implement instructions, assimilate assigned
    security tasks, and accurately communicate as required by their job
    duties.
        2. In addition, armed officers and central alarm station operators
    must have no emotional instability that would interfere with the
    effective performance of assigned security job duties. This
    determination must be made by a licensed psychologist, psychiatrist,
    physician or other person professionally trained to identify emotional
    instability.
        3. The company must arrange for continuous observation of security
    personnel and for appropriate corrective measures by supervisors for
    indications of emotional instability of individuals in the course of
    performing assigned security job duties.
        Physical Fitness Qualifications.--Security force members must
    demonstrate physical fitness for assigned security job duties by
    performing a practical physical exercise program within a specific time
    period as described in the licensee training and qualifications plan.
    This program must consider job-related functions such as strenuous
    activity, physical exertion, levels of stress and exposure to the
    elements as they pertain to security duties.
        Requalification.--At least every 12 months, security officers are
    required to demonstrate that they continue to meet the physical, mental
    and physical fitness requirements.
    2. Security Knowledge
        Certain general knowledge of security procedures and skills is
    important, no matter what type of facility the security officer is
    protecting. This includes use of equipment and weapons, general
    tactics, general procedures, self-defense and knowledge of legal
    authority.
        There may be a benefit to standardizing training through a central
    academy or use of centrally generated training guides and material. The
    federal government could do this, but the nuclear energy industry
    already has a proven track record for developing standardized training
    programs--notably for reactor operator training.
        For a specific site, a security officer needs substantial local
    knowledge to be effective. This includes detailed knowledge of
    procedures, strategies and the facility's physical layout. At a nuclear
    power plant, security officers also must understand plant operations
    and procedures, radiation protection and safety procedures. This
    knowledge is site-specific and precludes moving officers from one
    facility to another without extensive retraining.
        Although general security and facility-specific training is
    integrated into an on-site training program, facility-specific training
    cannot be effectively integrated into a central security academy
    program.
        Existing NRC regulations require:
        Training Requirements.--Before performing security-related tasks or
    duties, an individual must be trained and must demonstrate that he or
    she can perform these tasks and duties in accordance with the
    licensee's documented training and qualifications plan. This training
    must include knowledge of the threat conditions that must be deterred.
    These include:
        1. a determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or
    deceptive actions, by several persons;
        2. well-trained (including military training and skills), dedicated
    individuals;
        3. inside assistance, which may include a knowledgeable individual
    who attempts to participate in a passive role (e.g., providing
    information), an active role (e.g., facilitating entrance and exit,
    disabling alarms and communications, participating in violent attack),
    or both;
        4. weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons,
    equipped with silencers and having long range accuracy;
        5. hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and
    explosives for use as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying
    reactor, or features of the safeguards system; and
        6. a four-wheel drive vehicle for transporting personnel and their
    hand-carried equipment or explosives.
        Qualification Requirements.--An individual must be qualified in
    accordance with the company's NRC-approved training and qualifications
    plan before being assigned to perform security-related duties.
        1. Educational development: Possess a high school diploma or pass
    an equivalent performance examination.
        2. Criminal history: Have no criminal history that reflects on his
    or her reliability.
        3. Age: An armed officer must be 21 years of age or older.
        Security Knowledge, Skills and Abilities.--Each individual assigned
    to perform the security-related task identified in the licensee
    physical security or contingency plan must demonstrate his or her
    capability in the following areas:
        1. NRC requirements and guidance for physical security at nuclear
    facilities;
        2. nuclear security officer's duties and responsibilities;
        3. physical security system design and operation;
        4. security access control system design and operation;
        5. vehicle, package and personnel contraband search process;
        6. self defense and weapons use;
        7. adversary force capabilities, tactics, motivation and
    objectives;
        8. tactical response program design and operations; and
        9. security contingency event response program.
        Requalification.--Security personnel must requalify at least every
    12 months to perform assigned security tasks and duties for both normal
    and contingency operations--which include radiological safety,
    operating practices, quality assurance, industrial safety and fire
    protection.
    3. Alertness, Motivation and Adherence to Requirements
        Maintaining an alert security force capable of supporting long
    periods of routine activity without any hostile activity is essential.
    Techniques used to maintain alertness include the integration of
    training and drills, rotation of assignments, and the introduction of
    varied activity into the security officer's schedule. Officers need to
    be involved in day-to-day activity without detracting from their
    ability to respond to a threat. Involving a federal officer force in
    routine plant activities would be a challenge. Yet it is very difficult
    to maintain a highly trained, motivated force whose only responsibility
    is to sit in a fixed position and respond when there is a terrorist
    threat.
        Motivation is a willingness to endure hardships in the performance
    of duty, to use force when necessary, and even to risk one's life.
    Close integration of the security force in plant operations helps to
    establish those personal relations with other plant workers that are so
    important in providing continuous motivation. Under ideal conditions,
    the security officer is protecting more than a physical structure--he
    is protecting a closely-knit workforce that operates the facility.
    Involvement with those he is protecting at the plant and within the
    local community is a significant motivating factor.
        Adherence to requirements is the willingness to enforce unpopular
    rules and procedures. This is a complex issue that must be fostered by
    effective management methods. The nuclear energy industry's strong
    safety culture fosters strict compliance with rules and procedures.
    4. Legal Authority: Weapons, Detention, Search and Use of Force
        Security officers must have clear authority under the law to detain
    and search intruders and to use deadly force, if necessary, to protect
    public health and safety. They also must be equipped with, and
    authorized to use, weapons and equipment that are adequate for the
    threat and defensive strategy being used.
        State laws vary in what they permit. In most states, civilian
    security forces are restricted in the weapons they can use and in their
    authority to detain and search intruders. These laws would apply
    equally to federally regulated and federally employed security
    officers. Regardless of whether nuclear power plant security is
    federalized, legislation is needed to establish the necessary authority
    in this area.
        Existing NRC regulations require:
                Weapons Training
        Security officers who are armed to perform assigned security duties
    must be trained in accordance with the licensee's weapons training
    program. Security officers must be proficient in the use of assigned
    weapon(s) and shall meet prescribed standards in the following areas:
        1. mechanical assembly, disassembly, range penetration capability
    of weapon, and bull's-eye firing;
        2. weapons cleaning and storage;
        3. combat firing, day and night;
        4. safe weapons handling;
        5. clearing, loading, unloading, and reloading;
        6. when to draw and point a weapon;
        7. rapid-fire techniques;
        8. close-quarter firing;
        9. firing under stress; and
        10. zeroing assigned weapon(s).

                Weapons Qualification and Re-qualification Program

        Prior to working as an armed security officer, an individual must
    qualify on each weapon are used at the facility. In addition, each
    individual must be requalify at least every 12 months.
        Handgun.--Armed security officers must qualify with a revolver or
    semiautomatic pistol firing a nationally recognized course of fire. The
    qualifying score shall be an accumulated total of 70 percent of the
    maximum obtainable score.
        Semiautomatic Rifle.--Security officers assigned to use
    semiautomatic rifle must qualify with a semiautomatic rifle by firing a
    nationally recognized Course of fire. The qualifying score shall be an
    accumulated total of 80 percent of the maximum obtainable score.
        Shotgun.--Security officers assigned to use the shotgun must
    qualify by firing 15 yards from the hip and 25 yards from the shoulder.
        Requalification.--Individuals shall requalify on weapons at least
    every 12 months.

                Security Officer Weapons and Response Equipment

        Semiautomatic Rifles; Shotguns; Semiautomatic pistols or revolvers;
    Ammunition.--For each assigned weapon as appropriate to the
    individual's assigned contingency security job duties.
    5. Security Workforce Stability
        The 90 percent retention rate for the industry's security forces is
    an excellent indication of the stability of the current workforce. A
    transition to a federalized workforce would not improve this
    outstanding retention rate.
    6. Physical Barriers and Other Protection
        Physical barriers to entry, electronic aids, plant layout,
    defensive positions, and personnel protective equipment all enhance
    security force effectiveness. Although these are major factors in
    effective security of a facility, they are not related to whether
    guards are private or federalized. However, these physical features
    affect the number of armed responders needed. Increased use of physical
    features may reduce the number of responders needed for a given threat
    but may impact plant operations. There are frequent conflicts between
    the needs for security and free access of the plant for safe
    operations.
        Existing NRC regulations require:
        Physical Protection.--Vehicle barriers and/or other physical
    restrictions must be provided as necessary to ensure that the protected
    area of the plant cannot be breached by a direct vehicular assault or
    by detonation of a vehicle carrying a bomb. All vehicles, personnel and
    material entering the protected area must first be thoroughly inspected
    by security officers to ensure that no weapons, explosive or other such
    items are brought onto the plant site.
        Physical access to the protected area of the plant is controlled
    through the use of physical barriers, intrusion detection equipment,
    closed circuit surveillance equipment, a designated isolation zone and
    exterior lighting. Physical access to the inner areas of the plant
    where vital plant equipment also is controlled through the use of
    physical barriers, locked and alarmed doors, and cardreader access
    control systems. The barriers are substantial enough to effectively
    delay entry in order for effective armed response by plant security
    forces.
        Within the protected zone, access to all vital areas of the plant
    must be further protected. This access may be controlled by a security
    officer or provided by computer-controlled ``key-card'' access systems.
    Plant employees must have a documented need prior to gaining access to
    each vital area.
        Physical security plans must document the defensive positions and
    delaying barriers used to enhance security force effectiveness.
        Personnel Protective Equipment.--The following personal equipment
    must be readily available for individuals assigned to security duties:
        (1) combat helmet;
        (2) body armor (bullet-resistant vest);
        (3) full-face gas mask;
        (4) flashlights and batteries;
        (5) baton;
        (6) handcuffs;
        (7) ammunition/equipment belt;
        (8) binoculars;
        (9) night-vision aids, i.e., hand-fired illumination flares or
    equivalent;
        (10) tear gas or other non-lethal gas;
        (11) duress alarms; and
        (12) two-way portable radios.
    7. Deterrent Image
        The industry's security programs combine strong physical security
    features with highly trained paramilitary security professionals. Both
    features are highly visible and provide a strong deterrent to anyone
    considering attacking a nuclear power plant.
    8. Compatibility With Normal Operations
        Nuclear power plant security forces are extremely well integrated
    into the normal day-to-day operations of the facility. The security
    officers and staff work closely with reactor operators and other plant
    staff to help ensure the safe and efficient operation of the
    facilities. For instance, during plant maintenance and refueling
    outages, plant management must be able to increase the security force
    to clear additional worker and vehicles into the plant protected area.
    They must be able to balance the extra cost of those security assets
    against the increase in productivity associated with enabling more
    rapid access to the facility. In addition, basic industrial security
    must be integrated into the security force responsibility on a
    redundant force is needed.
    9. Liaison With Local Officials
        Close liaison with local officials is an integral provision of the
    security regulations and, in fact, has been implemented effectively by
    the industry. Efforts undertaken since September 11 are an excellent
    example of the effective working relationships that exist among
    industry security forces and their counterparts in local law
    enforcement.
    10. Chain of Command and Control During Crisis
        Security forces also are extremely well integrated into the
    emergency operations of the nuclear facilities. During plant
    emergencies, particularly security situations, security forces work
    very closely with the plant operating staff to help ensure the safe
    operation and, if required, shutdown of the reactor.

                          Concentric Rings of Security

        Nuclear power plant security is a multifaceted approach that can
    best be thought of as concentric rings, with security becoming tighter
    as one reaches the center.
        The first layer of security is found at the ``owner-controlled
    area.'' This area includes all property associated with the plant.
    Electric companies generally patrol and control vehicle access to this
    area.
        The second layer of security is in the ``protected area.'' Access
    to this enclosed area is strictly controlled. Unescorted access
    requires a computer-coded badge issued by security personnel. Fences,
    barbed wire, microwave detection equipment, cameras and other detection
    devices prevent unauthorized entry.
        The third layer of security, and most heavily controlled area of
    the plant, is the ``vital area.'' This area contains the equipment
    essential for operating the plant safely and successfully shutting it
    down in case of an unusual event. Security contingency plans are
    designed to protect this area of the plant.
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                       Multiple Layers of Reactor Safety

        The Atomic Energy Act and NRC's regulations are the basis for the
    industry's approach to security. These guidelines and the industry's
    commitment to safety ensure that nuclear power plants are operated in a
    manner that protects public health and safety. Licenses issued by the
    NRC contain technical specifications that establish safety limits for
    plant operation.
        The plant designs and physical features are the first line of
    defense. By design, our plants provide multiple concrete and steel
    barriers that protect vital safety systems and the reactor fuel from
    sabotage. These barriers begin with the fuel-rod casing, or
    ``cladding,'' itself, and progresses outward from the fuel to include
    several-inch-thick steel that makes up the reactor vessel, a bioshield
    that is composed of steel and leaded concrete, covered by a steel
    containment vessel, and capped by a several-foot-thick shield building
    wall.
        Nuclear power plants also incorporate systems that are designed to
    prevent the type of accident that could cause the release of
    radioactive material into the environment. These include operating and
    safety systems that ensure full redundancy for necessary supporting
    equipment, onsite and offsite power sources, redundant sources of
    emergency power, with additional redundancy in the emergency reactor
    cooling and shutdown systems.

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         Conclusion: No Clear Advantage to Federalizing Security Forces
        The Nuclear Energy Institute believes that the continued use of
    private security forces that meet strict federal standards provides
    greater security at nuclear power plants than replacing these
    established, well-trained forces with teams of federal officers, as
    contemplated by legislation proposed in both the U.S. Senate and House
    of Representatives.
        Force effectiveness depends upon personal qualities and actions
    that are prescribed by standards, regulations or policies essentially
    independent of the officer's federal or private status. For example,
    NRC regulations equally applicable to federal or private officers
    specify physical and mental requirements, criminal background checks,
    training, weaponry and duties. Based on established effectiveness
    criteria, there is no clear advantage to a federal security force. But
    there are significant disadvantages.
        NEI's findings confirm the results of the original NRC study (NUREG
    0015, 1976) used to support rulemaking that established the existing
    use of federally regulated private nuclear security forces.
        Security is enhanced by stability. The current officer forces are
    well trained and familiar with existing plant-specific security plans,
    the facility, local law enforcement agencies, the local geography and
    the local community. Federalizing the nuclear security officers likely
    would result in major changes to the current security force. This would
    severely disrupt the current organizational structure and effectiveness
    of the force. New security officers would require extensive training
    and orientation. This is particularly imprudent in a time of heightened
    homeland security.

            OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVING SECURITY THROUGH LEGISLATION

        Notwithstanding the strength of the nuclear industry's security
    program, the industry is examining how security programs at nuclear
    power plants can be augmented in the aftermath of the September 11
    events. The industry supports a number of security enhancements that
    could be achieved through legislation, such as granting nuclear plant
    security officers the authority to detain and search intruders and to
    use deadly force when necessary.

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