[Senate Hearing 107-801]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-801
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 7 AND JULY 31, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
David S. Lyles, Staff Director
Judith A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom
february 7, 2002
Page
Franks, Gen. Tommy R., USA, Commander in Chief, United States
Central Command................................................ 5
Operation Enduring Freedom
july 31, 2002
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense................... 61
Franks, Gen. Tommy R., USA, Commander in Chief, United States
Central Command................................................ 71
(iii)
CONDUCT OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Cleland,
Landrieu, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Benjamin E. Nelson, Carnahan,
Dayton, Warner, Inhofe, Roberts, Sessions, Collins, and
Bunning.
Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director; and Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; Jeremy L. Hekhuis, professional staff member;
Maren Leed, professional staff member; and Terence P. Szuplat,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
Republican staff director; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff
member; L. David Cherington, minority counsel; Edward H. Edens
IV, professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional
staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff member; Mary
Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member; George W. Lauffer, professional
staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member;
Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Joseph T.
Sixeas, professional staff member; and Scott W. Stucky,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Daniel K. Goldsmith, Thomas C.
Moore, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Erik Raven,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator
Cleland; Marshall A. Hevron and Jeffrey S. Wiener, assistants
to Senator Landrieu; Neil D. Campbell, assistant to Senator
Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka;
William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric
Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Neal Orringer,
assistant to Senator Carnahan; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant
to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum;
Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas
Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr.
assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator
Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets this morning to receive testimony from General Tommy
Franks, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, on the
conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, the campaign against the
al Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban regime that harbored them.
Senator Warner and I traveled to the Afghan theater over
Thanksgiving to visit our forces and to discuss the campaign
with General Franks and his subordinate commanders. Other
members of our committee have since traveled to the region.
Everyone who has visited our forces comes away deeply impressed
by their professionalism and commitment and also deeply
impressed by the leader who joins us today.
General Franks, thank you for your assistance during our
visits. Thank you for your usual candor in our discussions, and
I welcome you back to the committee to continue those
discussions.
Four months ago, America's Armed Forces and our coalition
partners launched the first wave of Operation Enduring Freedom,
and on the first day of the war General Franks sent the
following message to our men and women in uniform: ``Today, the
might of our coalition stands poised to strike at the heart of
those who challenged our liberties and brought terror to our
shores on September 11. Soon, you will enter into harm's way
and strike the first blow in what will be a long and arduous
campaign against terrorism. Our goal,'' General Franks said,
``in this campaign is neither retaliation nor retribution, but
victory. Today, the eyes of the world will be upon you. I know
you will do your duty.''
Well, for the past 4 months, the eyes of the world have,
indeed, been on our forces as they have done their duty. Led by
General Franks, they have used innovative techniques and
revolutionary technologies to destroy the heart of the al Qaeda
network, to topple the Taliban, and to liberate the Afghan
people from tyranny. We have seen our Armed Forces conduct not
only combat sorties but humanitarian food drops--reflecting
America's compassion for the suffering Afghan people alongside
our determination to bring terrorists to justice.
We have seen small teams of special operations forces
serving alongside Afghan opposition forces, 21st century
warriors on horseback coordinating attacks and calling in
precision air strikes against Taliban and al Qaeda targets. We
have seen precision-guided munitions more often than ever
before.
The Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, General Richard
Myers, told the committee Tuesday that nearly 60 percent of all
munitions used in Afghanistan were precision-guided, compared
to 10 percent during the Gulf War 10 years ago. We have seen
unmanned aerial vehicles, Global Hawk and Predator, reveal the
location of enemy forces and quickly relay that information to
fighters and bombers overhead for precision air strikes,
sometimes within minutes.
We have seen an unprecedented level of cooperation between
the military services: Marine helicopters ferrying Army
soldiers from Navy ships into landing zones in Afghanistan that
were secured by special operations forces, with air cover from
the Navy and Air Force. That is joint operations at its very
best. It is the foundation upon which the services need to
continue building. The excellence and innovation of our forces
in and around Afghanistan is a tribute to many factors: first
and foremost the versatility of our brave men and women in
uniform, the investments in planning over many years, and as
General Myers testified, ``a good plan'' from General Tommy
Franks.
General Franks, the Nation is grateful for your leadership
in this most important mission. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
testified Tuesday that the Defense Department has already begun
the process of assessing the lessons learned from our
operations in Afghanistan. This committee will look carefully
at those operations as we work with the Department to give our
forces the support they need in, as General Franks put it, the
``long and arduous campaign against terrorism,'' and as we work
to shape our forces for the future. Today's hearing is an
important step in that process.
Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was a very
sincere, heartfelt statement you delivered. The chairman and I
remember well our trip, General Franks, and it was made
successful with your help and guidance. We thank you.
The chairman and I have served in the Senate 24 years now.
This is our 24th year. We have seen a lot of commanders, we
have studied about many more, and you are going to take your
place in a long line of distinguished senior combat commanders
in American military history. If I may say, as I have come to
know you very well in the past year or so, you carry out your
responsibilities with an unusual sense of humility, and your
hallmarks are taken from your name. You are frank, honest, and
straightforward, and you ask nothing in return but the
privilege to wear that uniform, serve your country, and be with
your men and women of the Armed Services. Well done, sir.
I want to also mention that we talked yesterday about the
troops under your command. All too often, we overlook the fact
that the Central Intelligence Agency served right alongside the
individuals from the combat troops, along with other Federal
civilians who served their role quietly and with great dignity.
They, too, take their place in the historical annals of this
combat situation.
Senator Levin and I were also very moved when we met these
teams because history is being written by the noncommissioned
officer and petty officer--teams often composed of one
commissioned officer and a dozen or more noncommissioned
officers. They are really the fighting sergeants and petty
officers. They, too, have written an extraordinary history. So
it is a tribute to your leadership and the men and women under
your command that we have achieved, in my judgment, many of the
goals that our distinguished and courageous President laid down
with clarity.
Since this war began on October 7, al Qaeda has been
severely fractured and its remaining members are on the run.
Terrorist training camps in Afghanistan have been dismantled
and destroyed. The Taliban regime has been defeated, and the
nation of Afghanistan has been returned to its people to take
up another great challenge, and that is to achieve some form of
democracy. I want to talk a little bit about that.
We did not go there, and our President made this very
clear, with any timetable. As he said, we will take as long as
it is necessary to achieve our goals. We are not going to be an
occupation Army, and I want to repeat that. We are not there as
an occupation Army. We, working together with our allies, are
to ``turn that land over to its people.'' You mentioned to me
yesterday when we visited that some 40 or 50 nations are making
this possible.
But now we have to, with some greater degree of clarity,
explain first to the men and women in uniform and their
families, and then to the American people, what we have
achieved and what, in your professional judgment, remains to be
done. We must determine how we very carefully begin to phase
out of the combat operations and put those remaining units of
the U.S. military in such support roles as necessary to enable
the international organizations and other organizations and
agencies of our Federal Government to go about the tough
business of nation-building. We cannot do it all in a day, but
our President said we will take whatever time is necessary.
We have to make it very clear that, as the combat role
phases down, this other challenge comes up, and it is a gray
area, and that explanation is needed not only for our own
people but the other people in the world. As our President has
correctly said, we are going to defeat terrorism wherever it is
in the world, and these forces now under your command who have
performed so bravely and courageously may be needed tomorrow or
the next day elsewhere to fight this global war on terrorism.
You know that requires retraining, that requires the
opportunity for them to rejoin their families and get ready for
whatever the next operation may be, and the equipment itself
has been under a lot of strain and needs to be reworked. So I
hope that today, as the two of us discussed yesterday
privately, we can lay down some of the guideposts as this
transition takes place. It is not going to be a cut-and-run
approach. No one would ever support that. Our President has
repeatedly said we are going to be there as long as is
necessary, but those roles are going to change.
So we wish you well. We must always keep in mind September
11. Yesterday I was visited by families who lost loved ones on
that day. It was a tragic day for our country, and we will
never forget it as our Nation rebuilds and moves forward from
that day. It was a defining and unifying moment for our
country, and out of it that tragedy grew a support for our
President, and for those in uniform and others engaged in this
battle, unlike any support since World War II.
Now Congress, particularly this committee, is solidly
behind you, and we are going to address the budget our
President has sent to us a budget to provide for the
enhancement of our military forces, and to better care for the
men and women of those forces.
So I thank you again, General, and those who are with you
for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. There is going
to be a vote at 10:05, I believe, and we will try to work right
through that vote as we did the other day.
At this time, we are going to, of course, recognize General
Franks for his opening remarks and we will then proceed to a
first round of questions of 6 minutes for each Senator on the
basis of the early bird rule, and then following that one round
of questioning in open session the committee is going to go
into a closed session with General Franks in Hart 219.
General, welcome.
STATEMENT OF GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General Franks. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, first let
me say that I am honored to appear on behalf of the coalition
to discuss our role in Operation Enduring Freedom, America's
global war on terrorism. I am privileged to command today more
than 78,000 men and women, of them 14,000 coalition forces from
17 nations in the theater as we speak today. I am proud of
their commitment, their incredible competence, their success,
and their sacrifices.
Our Secretary directed on 12 September that we should
prepare credible military options the day after one of the most
horrific strikes on this country in our history. The concept of
a plan and mission were proposed to President Bush on 21
September. He approved and directed the continuation of
planning. Planning was completed. Forces were beginning to
stage by 30 September.
The plan, including target sets, sequencing, force
requirements, and command and control relationships, was
briefed to Secretary Rumsfeld on 1 October in final form and
briefed to and approved by President Bush on 2 October, when he
issued an attack order to commence operations on 7 October.
Forces were staged and ready by 6 October. Our forces began
combat operations on the 7th, as directed, 26 days after the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
I could not be more pleased with the professionalism of
that decision-making process. It was absolutely first-rate, all
the way from the principals I mentioned to their staffs to
other agencies of the Government. The concept briefed and
approved included coordination of basing, staging, and
overflight requirements, the execution as well as what we have
described as lines of operation conducted simultaneously rather
than sequentially, including, to name but a few, the direct
attack of al Qaeda and Taliban command and control, and also
humanitarian assistance, as the chairman mentioned, for more
than 26 million Afghan people.
Another line of operation was operational fires, the
delivery of kinetic munitions from air to ground: yet another,
reconnaissance and direct action by special operating forces.
Others included support to opposition forces on the ground in
Afghanistan, information operations, and political military
activities, including coalition-building. Those operations, as
I mentioned, were conducted simultaneously. The very simple
purpose was to build and maintain pressure inside Afghanistan,
with the objective of the destruction of the al Qaeda terrorist
network and the government of the Taliban.
On 7 October, al Qaeda and the Taliban controlled more than
80 percent of the country of Afghanistan, and terrorists were,
in fact, harbored and sheltered in that country. On 22
December, 76 days later, a new interim administration was
established in Kabul, and all of us are familiar with Chairman
Hamid Karzai, who gives Afghanistan a chance.
Our activities today remain focused on gaining and
exploiting intelligence in order to preempt and disrupt planned
future terrorist acts, to positively confirm or deny all over
Afghanistan the presence of Taliban or al Qaeda fighter
pockets, to search through each possible location for evidence
of weapons of mass destruction. We remain committed to the
conduct of military operations to eliminate pockets of
resistance to the interim administration of Afghanistan and to
a long-term government.
We work to support Afghan forces as required, and we
continue to conduct and support civil military operations in an
advisory capacity in the country of Afghanistan. As we speak,
the coalition includes more than 50 nations, as mentioned by
Senator Warner. Twenty seven of those nations have national
liaison elements at our headquarters in Tampa, Florida. That
team remains cohesive and, in fact, is continuing to grow.
Our forces today operate from 15 nations, from within 30
bases. The forces we see committed to this fight today
originated from 267 bases and ports around the world, and have
consistently overflown 46 nations. I am pleased with the
progress, but much work remains to be done.
The real story of Operation Enduring Freedom is a story of
human spirit, U.S. coalition men and women in uniform and, as
the Senator mentioned, civilian patriots. They come from many
nations. They are united by a sense of duty and they evidence
every day a great deal of selfless service. Our pride in these
people is boundless, and our thanks is the same. They are the
reason that this campaign will succeed.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, let me simply say that the
will and the support of the American people as they are
represented, as those wishes are represented by Members of
Congress and our Commander in Chief, have left nothing for this
CINC to desire. The men and women of Central Command express
their profound appreciation to the American people, to this
body, and our President and Secretary of Defense, for
continuing steadfast resolve, support, and leadership.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that my prepared
remarks be entered into the record, and I would be pleased to
take your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Franks follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Tommy R. Franks, USA
Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee: I am
honored to appear before you today to describe U.S. Central Command's
role in America's Global War on Terrorism--a fight that involves every
element of our national power and extends around the world. I am
privileged to command a coalition force of more that 75,000 men and
women at work today in the central region as part of Operation Enduring
Freedom. I am so very proud of them--their professionalism, their
commitment, their resolve, their successes, and their sacrifices. Our
operations thus far represent the first steps in what we all know will
be a long, difficult, and dangerous campaign. We have been very
successful to this point, but much work remains to be done. I have
visited Afghanistan several times since the campaign started and can
attest to the dramatic changes coalition forces have brought to the
lives of the Afghan people. Talented and dedicated men and women in
uniform, side-by-side with diplomats, arm-in-arm with anti-Taliban
Afghans, supported by the American people and the international
community, executing an unconventional war--these are the
characteristics of the fight we've seen.
The events of 11 September have impressed upon all of us the
vulnerability of a free and open society to those who do not value
human life and, in fact, despise the principles for which America
stands. The violence of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon indicate the increasing lethality of terrorist networks with
global reach. These attacks further define a pattern we have seen
emerge over the past several years. At my confirmation hearing in June
2000, I described the nature of the threat posed by a number of
terrorist organizations, many of which are resident in Central
Command's area of responsibility. This region has long been associated
with some of the most dangerous terrorist organizations, including al
Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Three of the seven nations on the
State Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism are in our area.
Over the past 7 years American interests have been attacked five times
in countries within this region: the Office of Program Management for
the Saudi Arabian National Guard, 1995; Khobar Towers, 1996; the
American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; and the U.S.S. Cole
in 2000. As I said last year in my remarks to this committee, ``These
attacks demonstrate that our opponents are dedicated, determined, and
resourceful.''
On 11 September 2001, I was enroute to Pakistan, to meet with
President Musharraf, to discuss a number of issues, among them,
security cooperation and terrorism. The events of that day caused me to
curtail my trip and return immediately to Tampa, Florida, where my
staff was already working to ensure, what we refer to in the military
as, ``command and control survivability'' while continuing to develop
``situational awareness'' along with Defense and other government
agencies. On 12 September the Secretary of Defense directed the
preparation of ``credible military options'' to respond to
international terrorism. For Central Command, that directive guided the
preparation of the warplan we see unfolding in Afghanistan today. The
concept, which I briefed to the President on 21 September proposed that
``U.S. Central Command, as a part of America's Global War on Terrorism
. . . would destroy the al Qaeda network inside Afghanistan along with
the illegitimate Taliban regime which was harboring and protecting the
terrorists. . .''
When I returned to Tampa our headquarters and subordinate
commanders were finalizing plans for combat operations. Planning
involved not only the evaluation of the current enemy situation, but
also the history of military operations in Afghanistan and the
political and military situation across the region. This ``mission
analysis'' resulted in my recommendation of a military course of action
which was approved by Secretary Rumsfeld on 1 October. I briefed the
concept to President Bush on 2 October, and he directed that combat
operations should begin on 7 October--26 days after the attacks on New
York and the Pentagon.
Operations would involve the full weight of America's national
power, and would include significant contributions from the
international community. Coalition nations were already joining the
fight against terrorism and many were sending military liaison teams to
our headquarters in Tampa. The coalition has grown to more than 50
nations, with 27 nations having representatives at our headquarters. Of
our currently deployed strength of approximately 75,000 personnel,
14,000 are coalition forces.
With the cooperation and support of this coalition and the
integration of virtually every agency of our Government, we have
executed multiple ``Lines of Operation'', attacking simultaneously on
several fronts. Our intention from the outset was to seize the
initiative and reinforce success, while keeping in mind the lessons of
previous campaigns in Afghanistan--avoid ``invading'', and work with
(rather than against) the people. A critical enabler of the strategy
was the coordination of basing, staging and over-flight. This
political-military coordination set (and maintains) the conditions
necessary to execute and support sustained combat. Among the lines of
operation which characterize the campaign have been ``Direct Attack of
the Leadership of al Qaeda and the Taliban'', and the provision of
``Humanitarian Aid'' to the Afghan people. Another line has focused on
``Destroying the Taliban Military,'' using unconventional warfare
forces alongside Afghan opposition groups whose goals were consistent
with our own. ``Operational Fires'' directed by horse-mounted Special
Forces troopers have also proven to be unique and successful.
Additionally, we have employed Special Operating Forces (SOF) in
``Reconnaissance and Direct Action'' roles while maintaining the
capability to introduce ``Operational Maneuver'' (conventional forces)
if required. Through the course of the operation, more than 100
``Sensitive Site'' exploitations have been conducted, seeking evidence
of development or production of weapons of mass destruction. As forces
have attacked ``Caves and Tunnels'' to deny enemy safe harbor, ``Radio
Broadcast and Leaflet Programs'' have effectively informed the
population of our goals and encouraged enemy forces to surrender.
The success of these lines of operation, which have been applied
simultaneously rather than sequentially, is a matter of record. On 7
October, the Taliban controlled more than 80 percent of Afghanistan,
and anti-Taliban forces were on the defensive. Al Qaeda was entrenched
in camps and safe houses throughout the country. In fact, Afghanistan
was a terrorist sponsored state. By October 20 we had destroyed
virtually all Taliban air defenses and had conducted a highly
successful direct action mission on the residence of Mullah Omar in the
middle of the Taliban capital, Kandahar. During this time frame Special
Forces detachments linked up with anti-Taliban leaders and coordinated
operational fires and logistical support on multiple fronts. Twenty
days later, the provincial capital of Mazar-e Sharif fell. In rapid
succession, Herat, Kabul, and Jalalabad followed. By mid December, U.S.
Marines had secured Kandahar Airport and the Taliban capital was in the
hands of anti-Taliban forces. Within weeks the Taliban and al Qaeda
were reduced to isolated pockets of fighters. On 22 December I traveled
to Kabul to attend a moving ceremony marking the inauguration of the
Afghan interim government--78 days after the beginning of combat
operations.
Today, the Taliban have been removed from power and the al Qaeda
network in Afghanistan has been destroyed. We continue to exploit
detainees and sensitive sites for their intelligence value in order to
prevent future terrorist attacks and to further our understanding of al
Qaeda--their plans, membership, structure, and intentions. We are
investigating each site to confirm or deny the existence of research
into, or production of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.
Coalition forces continue to locate and destroy remaining pockets of
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters and to search for surviving leadership.
The coalition continues to grow and remains committed to America's
Global War on Terrorism.
President Bush said last week in a joint statement with Chairman
Hamid Karzai, that our two nations have committed to building ``a
lasting permanent solution for Afghanistan security needs . . . based
upon strengthening Afghanistan's own capacities. We will work with
Afghanistan's friends in the international community to help
Afghanistan stand up and train a national military and police force.''
We are working today with Afghanistan's interim authority to fulfill
this promise. The standup of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Kabul is an example of progress to date. The ISAF's
daily operations with local police are providing needed security and
stability for the citizens of Kabul, and U.S. Central Command will
continue to support these efforts. There is much work left to be done,
and to quote the President again, ``It will take as long as it takes.''
In the 149 days since 11 September, our forces have amassed a
remarkable record of achievements. Following are but a few examples:
All positioning and resupply of forces in the theater has been
accomplished by air as a result of a remarkable effort by U.S.
Transportation Command. In addition to providing the firepower and
``staying power'' of two carrier battlegroups, the Navy steamed the
U.S.S. Kitty Hawk 6,000 miles at flank speed to establish an afloat
forward operating base for Special Operating Forces. In terms of
operational fires, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force pilots have
delivered in excess of 18,000 munitions, of which, more than 10,000
were precision guided. During Operation Desert Storm we averaged 10
aircraft per target; in Operation Enduring Freedom we have averaged 2
targets per aircraft. Our airmen have flown the longest combat fighter
mission in our Nation's history (more than 15 hours), and conducted the
longest surveillance mission (26 hours). The extensive use of unmanned
aerial vehicles has permitted around the clock surveillance of critical
sites, facilities, and troop concentrations. Our psychological warfare
operators have delivered more than 50 million leaflets, and transport
crews have delivered 2.5 million humanitarian daily rations, 1,700 tons
of wheat, and 328,200 blankets. More than 5,000 radios have been
provided to the Afghan people, and our broadcast capabilities continue
to bring music to people for the first time in more than 6 years. We
also have made enormous improvements in our ability to bring firepower
to bear rapidly. Through improved technology and training the Tomahawk
targeting cycle has been reduced from 101 minutes during Operation
Allied Force to 19 minutes during Operation Enduring Freedom, with half
of our Tomahawks having been fired from submarines.
We are now in the preliminary stages of capturing the lessons of
this campaign. It is too early to draw final conclusions because the
fight continues, but we do have some emerging insights:
Combining the resources and capabilities of the Defense Department,
Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies of the Federal
Government has produced results no single entity could have achieved.
Similarly, the adoption of flexible coalition arrangements has enabled
us to leverage individual national strengths. ``The mission has
determined the coalition; the coalition has not determined the
mission.''
This operation continues to be commanded and controlled from Tampa,
Florida with fielded technology that provides real time connectivity
with air, ground, naval, and Special Operations Forces 7,000 miles
away. Our forces which have deployed from over 267 bases; are operating
from 30 locations in 15 nations; and over flying 46 nations in the
course of operations; yet our ability to ``see'' the battlefield
literally and figuratively at each location provides unprecedented
situational awareness.
Security cooperation, diplomacy, and military-to-military contacts
have built personal relationships which have proven invaluable during
the campaign. Humanitarian airdrops; economic and security assistance
to coalition partners and regional allies; visits to the region by
senior administration, congressional, and military officials; and a
U.S. commitment to post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan have
permitted us to build upon these essential relationships. Our
investment in security cooperation has been repaid tenfold in access to
basing, staging, and overflight rights with regional partners. We must
not underestimate the worth of our commitment to these programs.
Precision guided munitions are more than a force multiplier. They
have reduced the numbers of air sorties required to destroy targets and
have resulted in unprecedented low levels of collateral damage. From
this perspective, precision guided munitions have had a strategic
effect.
As we have said in the past, the availability of strategic airlift
is critical to the success of operations which require force
projection. Our current airlift fleet requires strict management and
innovative scheduling. This would seem to validate the testimony the
committee received last year. We must continue to expand our strategic
lift capabilities.
The importance of combined and joint operations training and
readiness has been revalidated. The power of a well-trained air-ground
team has permitted the melding of 19th century Cavalry and 21st century
precision guided munitions into an effective fighting force.
A continuous, unimpeded flow of intelligence remains key to success
on the battlefield. Human intelligence is essential when mission
objectives include locating, identifying, and capturing or killing
mobile targets. This requires people on the ground. Similarly, unmanned
aerial vehicles have proven their worth in the skies over Afghanistan.
We must continue to expand their use, develop their capabilities, and
increase their numbers.
Information Operations also have been vital to the success of
Operation Enduring Freedom. Psychological operations, electronic
warfare, and a number of special capabilities have proven their value
and potential. To maintain information dominance, we must commit to
improving our ability to influence target audiences and manipulate our
adversary's information environment. Continued development of these
capabilities is essential.
Again, these are only glimpses of lessons we may take from the
campaign in Afghanistan. Much study is required to separate ``useful
truths'' as they may relate to the enduring nature of warfare, from
observations which, while interesting, may not offer much as we prepare
for an uncertain future.
Our operations to this point represent a first step in what will be
a long campaign to defeat terrorism. The terrorist attacks of 11
September have impressed upon all of us the importance of taking the
fight to the enemy and maintaining the initiative. Our Command remains
``on the offensive''.
The real story of Operation Enduring Freedom is a story of the
human spirit--U.S. and coalition men and women in uniform and civilian
patriots--those who serve and those who support, those who command and
those under command. From Special Forces troopers representing nine
nations in Kandahar to the ``Red Shirt'' ordnance handlers aboard our
aircraft carriers, to Jordanian medics serving in a hospital in Mazar-e
Sharif, new standards of excellence have been set. Our pilots and
airlift specialists, intelligence analysts, staff specialists, those
who stand sentinel, and members of government agencies whose bravery
will likely never be known, have worked hand-in-hand toward a common
goal, each of them serving tirelessly without complaint, many in harm's
way and under extreme environmental conditions. They come from many
nations, but are unified by their sense of duty and selfless service.
Our pride in these people should be boundless, our thanks the same.
They are the means by which we will defeat the scourge of terrorism.
In a great work, ``On War,'' published in 1873, Baron Carl Von
Clausewitz affirmed that successful war required the ``trinity'' of the
people, the government, and the military . . . to enter into war
without this support would be folly. Operation Enduring Freedom rests
firmly upon the foundation of that trilogy. The will and support of the
American people, represented by Members of Congress and our Commander
in Chief, have left nothing to be desired. The men and women of Central
Command express their profound appreciation to the American People, to
this body, and to our Commander in Chief for continuing steadfast
resolve.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Franks. The statement
will be incorporated into the record in its entirety.
General, let me start off by asking you a question which
was asked of the CIA yesterday, and that has to do with the
damage that has been done to the al Qaeda network as a result
of our operations in Afghanistan. Can you give us your
assessment as to how much damage has been done to al Qaeda's
ability to carry out terrorist operations worldwide, to their
command and control structure and to their leadership
structure?
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to do
that. I will take it in reverse order of your presentation
initially, which talked about the Taliban, this illegitimate
government that initially sponsored and harbored al Qaeda.
Obviously, the harboring is gone. There is no more Taliban
government inside the country of Afghanistan, and so I believe
that makes it difficult for al Qaeda to operate from the
battlespace of Afghanistan.
I believe that the command and control architecture of al
Qaeda has been disrupted. There certainly are no longer cells
of coordinated planning activity linked with, in some cases,
state-of-the-art communications operating from within
Afghanistan. So, Mr. Chairman, I would simply summarize by
saying the harboring is no longer there, the networks are not
free to operate on their own terms, and a great many of the
terrorists themselves have been captured or killed.
There are al Qaeda left inside Afghanistan, and they remain
the subject of our ongoing military operations which, as
Senator Warner said, will continue until we are finished. But I
think, sir, that that is a summary of where we stand right now.
The network does not operate as a network from inside
Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. The Central Command is investigating the
circumstances of the January raid by U.S. special forces in the
village of Hazar Kadam. A media report suggests that 18 people
were killed and 27 taken prisoner. Can you tell us what the
status of that investigation is, and what you found out about
that incident so far?
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to.
We had intelligence information that led up to a special
operation on two compounds in the area of Hazar Kadam, as you
mentioned. I, too, have read the reports in the media that you
have outlined, and in a discussion with Chairman Hamid Karzai a
few days after that incident in Kabul, when I visited him, he
told me that he was not certain as to the circumstances of
that, and that he believed there may well have been some
friendlies associated with him in the general area of this
contact.
I told him that based on that I intended to conduct an
investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the
operation. That investigation is ongoing as we speak today. I
suspect, as Secretary Rumsfeld said yesterday, that within 2
weeks time that investigation will be completed. A
determination that we made early on was that the 27 detainees
that we took from these two sites in Afghanistan would be
interrogated, and when a determination was made that they were
neither Taliban nor al Qaeda, nor possessed any information
that would permit us to do the mission that I described to you
a minute ago, that we would turn them over to Afghan
authorities.
I have also read that the 27 detainees were released
yesterday. In fact, the 27 detainees were given to Afghan
authorities yesterday, and the suspicion at the point when we
gave them, surrendered them to the Afghan authorities, is at
least some number of them were criminals, and they were
received by Afghan authorities as criminals.
Chairman Levin. General, we have, as you pointed out,
ongoing operations in Afghanistan, ongoing pockets of
resistance, ongoing conflicts between warlords competing for
control of territory, still chaos in places, threats in places.
You said that interim President Karzai gives Afghanistan a
chance, and I could not agree with you more.
He has strongly urged that it may be necessary for the
United States to participate at some level in the international
security assistance force until there is a national army which
is put in place, and trained. There has to be an international
security assistance force. I think everyone agrees to that. The
question is whether or not, if U.S. participation at some level
proves to be necessary in that force, we would participate as
the interim president suggests may be necessary. Can you give
us the pros and cons of that, and has a final decision been
made?
General Franks. Senator Levin, I would not prejudge
decisions that our President may take on that, and I would not
really talk about our military-to-military and security
cooperation relationship with either the interim or
transitional or permanent government of Afghanistan, because we
certainly will have a security cooperation relationship with
Afghanistan as it continues to develop.
An international security assistance force by a very narrow
mandate from the United Nations provides for this capability,
which the United Kingdom currently leads, by having set up
police precincts and so forth inside the city of Kabul. There
is no question that we will consider such things as the
training and the support of Afghan forces as we work with them
to create a national army for Afghanistan. There is no question
about that, but the implication of that statement, at least in
my mind, is not that we will pick up a substantial role within
the international security assistance force.
So we remain committed--based on the guidance that I have
from the Secretary and from the President--to the assistance of
this growing Afghan capability. We intend to help them form an
Afghan national army, there is no question about that. We
intend to remain engaged with this country for the foreseeable
future.
The specifics of the contribution by this country, our
country, or the contributions by the international community,
remain open. It is being discussed, and the specific
relationship between assisting in the creation of a police
capability within Afghanistan, and the assistance provided to
create an Afghan national army, a lot of discussion is
continuing to be done about that, but one should take that we
will remain engaged in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. I will pick up on that line of questioning
in following my observations in my opening statement. It is not
to be an occupation army, correct?
General Franks. Correct.
Senator Warner. Good, and the responsibilities of our
service persons will not be those of policemen in the streets,
once we can establish within the Afghan government structure
the ability to do that, am I not correct on that?
General Franks. Senator, I believe that is correct.
Senator Warner. Good, but we have to explain the proper
role of the U.S. military so that the families of our military
people and the people here in this country realize our success.
We may not yet have caught the leadership, bin Laden or Omar,
but we are going to achieve that some day. Don't you agree?
General Franks. Sir, there is no question about that.
Senator Warner. The remarkable series of goals laid out by
our President have now been achieved. We can now begin to look
to transition and have other agencies of our Federal Government
and international agencies come in to pick up those
responsibilities, because you want your forces ready and
positioned to pursue the terrorists elsewhere in the world if
that be the decision of our President, and hopefully coalition
members.
General Franks. Senator Warner, as we said, our operations,
as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, represent one piece of
our national approach, our strategic approach to this global
war on terrorism. So yes, sir, I would say that the way you
described it is precisely correct.
Senator Warner. There is a remarkable chapter in this
conflict, and indeed your own role. One day you are a combat
soldier, the next day you are a diplomat. You are dealing with
not only the border nations but many others who come in, and
then, if I may say with a little levity, politicians. Today's
Washington Post carries a very interesting story about how
allegations are arising that Iran is shipping in arms and
support for one of the warlords, as they are referred to. How
many warlords are there?
General Franks. Sir, I could not tell you how many warlords
there are, because I really do not use that term. There are a
great many pockets of power within the country.
Senator Warner. Pockets of power, that is again your
diplomacy coming through. But again here it says,
``unpredictable warlords could move out to destabilize the
situation.'' This is remarkable.
I had a great deal of respect for General Clark, our former
NATO commander, and the operations in Kosovo, preceded by those
in Bosnia. A great deal of his time was needed to reconcile the
differences among the NATO nations as they sat around the
councils deciding what authority would be given to him as the
Commander in Chief of the forces. You have had a greater degree
of authority and perhaps, maybe, a greater degree of
cooperation from those countries that have stepped up to
contribute in this effort. Is that a fair observation?
General Franks. Sir, I do not know that I would say that
the degree of authority I have had is any greater than that Wes
Clark had during the campaign you mentioned. I would say that
the remarkable clarity of guidance from the Defense Secretary
and from our President, the degree of confidence which they
have placed in our ability to direct this campaign, deserves
note.
One of the lessons to be taken from this at the strategic
level is the value of what I just described, and so, sir, it is
true that on a great many occasions I have traveled through the
region. I have met with the leaders, and we have discussed the
issues that needed to be resolved in order to ensure basing,
staging, overflight.
I would also point out that a great many diplomats, as well
as our own Secretary, have traveled to the region. I would not
need to remind the Chairman and you, Senator Warner, of the
value of your trip into this region to meet with leaders. All
of this served as an enabling approach to let the military
operation be executed in the way we described it to our
President, the way we wanted to go after the operation, and all
the pieces and parts of that, sir, I would say came together in
a way that produced an approach which has served our interest
up to this point.
Senator Warner. When I said I thought you had more
authority I had a little bit of a foundation for that, and that
is a statement made by the President in Crawford, Texas, when
you stood by his side and he said, ``when Tommy Franks says
`mission complete, Mr. President,' that is when we start moving
troops out.'' Remember that?
General Franks. Senator, I do.
Senator Warner. That is an extraordinary statement of trust
reposed in you by the Commander in Chief.
General Franks. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Can you give us some boundaries of the
definition of mission complete, as you see it now and hope to
achieve it?
General Franks. Senator Warner, what we see inside
Afghanistan, as I described in the first part of the hearing,
has to do with Chairman Hamid Karzai and the people of
Afghanistan having a chance. That is not to be confused with
the operational construct of the mission of Operation Enduring
Freedom which we see ongoing in Afghanistan today, and therein
lies, sir, the issue with definition. I believe it is what our
President had in mind when he said the mission is completed
when the Commander in Chief says the mission is completed.
Now, what that means is, if we take a look at the
objectives that we had for this campaign from the day we
started the destruction of the al Qaeda terrorist network
inside Afghanistan, the destruction of this illegitimate
government of the Taliban which was in place and harbored that
network, sir, if you take only those two points, it is possible
to determine the end state of the military operational mission
inside Afghanistan.
What does that involve? Well, we know that al Qaeda as an
operating network, as I described it earlier, is not conducting
operations within Afghanistan because the connectivity, the
ability to plan and think inside Afghanistan has been taken
away by the incredible work of the men and women who, sir, you
described earlier, so that is where that is.
So what remains to be done? Analysis of every piece of
intelligence information with respect to where we may find
potential weapons of mass destruction sites, where we have
reason to believe that there may have been pursuit of such
weapons. Senator, we have to go there with military forces to
investigate these places, to gain intelligence information, to
gain insight into the construct of the al Qaeda network.
We have said more than 60 countries are influenced by this.
What do those operations look like? We have benefitted by the
exploitation of a great amount of information already taken
from sensitive sites and potential weapons of mass destruction
sites. We have not been through all of them in enough detail
yet, and so, sir, this CINC will not tell my Secretary or our
President we have reached the end of the military piece until
we have been through all of them, until we have satisfied
ourselves, sir.
A second point. We will not reach a military operational
end state in Afghanistan as long as there is any credible
threat from puddles or pockets of al Qaeda or residual hardcore
Taliban. Sir, those two issues relate to the operational
construct that my forces see inside Afghanistan.
The relationship between our forces in Operation Enduring
Freedom and the international security assistance force
currently operating under UN mandate inside Kabul is one that
is designed to ensure that the operations of ISAF do not
conflict with the operational considerations which I just
described to you. The international security assistance force
as it is set in Kabul has a liaison element from me, more than
30 people. Every operation that we conduct, ISAF and Operation
Enduring Freedom inside Afghanistan, is coordinated. When we
reach the point where we have accomplished the objectives,
Senator Warner, which I described, then I will go to the
Secretary of Defense and say, Mr. Secretary, this is what we
see, this is what we believe, and I believe it is okay for you
to tell the President that the description he gave at Crawford,
Texas, has been met.
Senator Warner. Thank you, General. That is very helpful.
My time is up.
Chairman Levin. We expect a vote to start any minute, and
again we hope to work through the vote. This is the order we
have. Senator Landrieu, Senator Sessions, Senator Ben Nelson,
and Senator Collins will be the next four.
Senator Landrieu.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for calling this hearing. General Franks, let me take this
opportunity to welcome you and to sincerely thank you for your
outstanding commitment to all of the men and women in uniform
that you so ably represent. Thank them for their extraordinary
work and dedication, and tell them they have made us all very
proud.
I want also to commend you for the way you have conducted
the humanitarian efforts which support our tactical efforts on
the ground, because as you and I talked about earlier, before
the hearing, those are equally critical to our long-term
success as our military operations.
Getting back to that statement in Crawford, Texas, before I
get on to my questions, I think the President has put to you an
extraordinary responsibility to help us determine when we have
accomplished what we set out to do. Destroying the Taliban,
destroying the immediate threat, is clearly something we can
all agree to. The more difficult question becomes, how far
should we go to minimize a threat that could be created by
leaving an atmosphere where a similar regime could stand up?
That is an extraordinarily difficult question, and I am
confident that you and the men and women you serve with can
provide us with good leadership, because we most certainly do
not want to spend the time, the energy, the money, and the
lives to leave the job undone and to cause there to be
additional threats to our Nation, to innocent men and women
here, or to our allies around the world, so I look forward to
working with you in that regard.
Let me ask if you could comment--and I know this will be a
great joy for you to comment on--about the tremendous work that
our special operations forces have done.
It has been interesting, the sort of high tech/low tech
dichotomy of how we have won this war, with some of the most
extraordinary precision weapons and things that have come out
of books that we could not even imagine used to win this war.
But we have also seen our special forces riding on horses and
donkeys, climbing into caves. Could you comment for our
committee on the special work that our special operations
forces have done, and share with us the three most important
ways we can support them, strengthen them, and help them in the
future?
General Franks. Senator Landrieu, I would be pleased to do
that. Let me make a quick comment about humanitarian
assistance. I mentioned earlier the benefit which I think has
accrued to the people of Afghanistan, and I mentioned the
number of more than 26 million of them. As we started this
operation, about 7 million people were believed to be at risk
for loss of life as a result of conditions inside Afghanistan.
What we find today is half a dozen airports opened, and we find
the lines of communication opened from a variety of countries
providing for the required amount of food to get into
Afghanistan.
Our specific operation resulted in these humanitarian daily
rations which have been described and more than 2\1/2\ million
of them brought in by air drop, 328,000 blankets delivered to
people who needed them, 1,700 tons of wheat, hundreds and
hundreds of sorties committed to this. Afghanistan remains a
tough place.
Just for a minute on our special forces, and special
operations issues, one of the characteristics of this campaign
was our linkage with opposition groups of Afghanistan. Many
people have said we aligned ourselves with the Northern
Alliance. In fact, it was opposition groups, some in the north
and some in the south, and it was our special forces teams who
linked with and worked with and assisted in training and
provided logistics support to and leveraged operational fires
during the course of this operation, hundreds of these men
involved in activity, as you described it, some on horseback.
The interesting point is that a great many of them on
horseback were nonetheless equipped with some of the very best
technology that our Nation has to offer, which gave them even
though in small numbers the ability to work with these
opposition groups in pursuit of objectives which were informed
by our plan. With these people being in touch with us,
incredibly brave people--I have spoken to a great many of them.
I remember a medic I met one night in Mazar-e Sharif in
October, a noncommissioned officer, and I asked him what had
been his experience, and he described it to me like this. He
said, ``well, when you are riding on horseback, and you have
never ridden a horse before, on a mountain path with a few
thousand feet above you on one side and a few thousand feet
down on the other, it occurs to you to wonder whether your
greatest preoccupation is with medicine or staying on the
horse.'' I thought that was an appropriate comment.
I said, ``well, what sorts of maladies have you treated?''
and he said, ``I have given a lot of aspirin, and I have also
conducted some amputations.''
That is a comment both to the professional excellence of
these young people, as well as to their motivation. The
activities that they have undertaken in Afghanistan are
remarkable. They will be recorded in history, thought about,
talked about for a long time into the future. They have
included unconventional warfare activities and they have also
included direct action operations, virtually nonstop since 19
October.
Senator Landrieu. My question is, in light of that, because
they have played such a key role in our victories and our new
strategies, and it is clear to us how successful they have
been, what are the three things this committee or this
administration could do to support their efforts to either give
them more training, more equipment, more supplies, or change?
Is there anything you can see already from lessons learned
about the one or two things we could do for our special ops
forces?
General Franks. Ma'am, I think what we will find when we
roll up the lessons of this is that the technologies with which
we have equipped these special ops forces have been tremendous.
I believe that everything from the science and technology work
(S&T) that is included in this budget for 2003 to the
procurement of some of the technologies that are used, that
were used in Afghanistan by these people will pay us great
dividends in the future.
I think that in terms of structure considerations, whether
we want more certain sorts of branches or services in our
special forces will be the subject of analysis that will come
out at the end of this. Some people have said we are not nearly
large enough, and so we need to have more. I think we will all
be in agreement with the value of special forces. I think what
we will be careful of is to be sure that the standards for
training--and this is a very long, very difficult training
process, so these people are very highly qualified.
We are going to want to retain that doctrine. We are going
to want to retain that training, and to set some standards, but
technologies as I have described it will be something that I
think the lessons will bear out for us in the future, and we
will also find some technologies that we want to apply to some
of our air frames that we have identified high value in.
Senator Landrieu. That leads me to my next question, and my
time has almost expired, but giving the Members some time to
come back, let me just ask my second question. That is about
the unmanned aerial vehicles, the platforms you talked about.
What is the next generation that you would perceive based on
the lessons learned? Where can we be looking to the future?
What is your vision for our unmanned aircraft?
General Franks. Yes, ma'am. I think that the sense for over
a year has been that unmanned aerial vehicles were of high
interest to us. I think we have recognized that since before
even we started operations in October last year. I think the
first thing we will want to do, and I think it is reflected in
the budget, is we are going to want procurement of some
platforms and capability which we already know about, where we
want to expand in terms of numbers.
We also want to take some technologies which we have been
able to identify which exist in part of our fleet and not in
the other part of the fleet. We are going to want to increase
the technologies, the technological capabilities on these
platforms as we procure them. I think we are going to want to
use S&T money over time to determine where we can move ahead to
advanced technologies that we are not even quite sure of yet,
but we are going to want to conduct that experimentation, and I
believe that is reflected in this budget.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. My time has expired. Let me
recognize Senator Inhofe next for questions.
[The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
Thank you Mr. Chairman:
I would like to thank you for calling this hearing. I would also
like to take this opportunity to welcome and thank General Franks for
the outstanding commitment you and every uniformed man and woman
assigned to Central Command, and across the globe, continue to bring to
the war on terrorism.
The prosecution of this war, under your watchful eye, is not only
the first of its kind in the 21st century, but the first of its kind
ever in the history of warfighting. No longer can we rely on the honor
of sanctioned states fighting a war of symmetry. We now find ourselves
thrust into a new era of rogue individuals and regimes who know no
honor. They not only risk our lives, but the innocent lives of the men,
women, and children in their own states.
We have, from the beginning, fought a ``just'' war. We have fought
with honor and special compassion for non-combatants. The women of
Afghanistan can once again pursue their dreams of an education. The
children can hold soccer games in the street and watch television
without fear of reprisal or even death at the hands of the Taliban. I
would like to commend the General for the humanitarian operations,
which are just as critical to our long-term success and long-term
security, as wiping out the asymmetric threats we face from within the
states we aid.
Now is the time to work together, unified in our determination to
be ready. A ``ready'' fighting force is one which is ready physically--
with the proper clothing, weapons, and supplies. One which is ready
mentally--to face brutal uncertainties and yet, deal compassionately
with those who are innocents. One which is ready spiritually, for some,
who should be given that opportunity whenever and wherever it is
needed.
Today's readiness definition is much more complex than the
definition of a decade ago. The leaders responsible for maintaining it
face even greater challenges than ever before. The end of the Cold War
changed the security landscape for the foreseeable future.
Today, we are not simply concerned about whether our forces are
trained and equipped to respond to a major theater war, but rather our
readiness for a wide range of small, and potentially destabilizing,
local and regional conflicts.
We must have a consensus about the nature and priority of threats
the United States will most likely face and a consensus among military
leaders about the steps that should be taken to counter them.
I know that I speak in unison with my colleagues when I say that
this committee and the American people remain extremely grateful to our
men and women in uniform for their continued dedication and service and
to leaders of the caliber of General Franks. Again, welcome General
Franks, I have a couple of brief questions for you regarding the war on
terrorism.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
First of all, I think you have quite a few members who got
here a little late, General Franks, because of the prayer
breakfast, which went off in a beautiful way, so it was very
rewarding. I would say that our good Admiral did a great job,
too.
General Franks, because I was communicating with your
office, I spent the last couple of weeks out in different
places. I commented when we had our hearing a couple of days
ago that back when Republicans were important I was the
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on
Readiness, and so I made a habit of getting out and really
trying to see, at the level of where the troops are, what our
readiness was. Of course we have gone through a real
problematic time in every category, from modernization to
quality of life to force structure.
It is force structure that is of concern to me, because as
the budget came down, as we told the Secretary, one of the two
areas of weakness was force structure and the other was in
military construction, because they were relatively flat in
this budget. If you look at our force structure in terms of
where we were in 1991 and where we are today as we start
rebuilding up, we are really at about half the force strength
that we were back during the Persian Gulf War in terms of Army
divisions, tactical air wings, ships, and last week we were at
a number of different installations: Ramstein, Aviano, Vicenza,
Camp Darby. One thing that I noticed, and I would just love to
make this a permanent thing, I have never seen such enthusiasm
of our troops. I have never seen such commitment.
I talked to a number of those who were injured in Lanstuhl.
I know you have been over there, and two of them had gone down
in a helicopter with the 101st. There was a heavy equipment
accident in which Corporal Justin Ringle was severely injured.
The one that touched me I guess more than anyone else was
Latoya Stennis, ironically on U.S.S. Stennis, and she had been
pulled overboard and fell 65, 70 feet, which would normally be
to her death, and it did crush both of her lungs, but she sat
there, a very small young lady. She said, I am just anxious to
get back. Each one without exception, the ones I talked to in
the hospital who had been injured, they all said they wanted a
career, and a lot of them had not been that way before.
Now, my concern is this, that we have, as I look at this
map before us here, so many volatile areas. You have done just
a miraculous job in Afghanistan, but I look at some other
places where we could be all of a sudden having to deploy
troops. I spent time at the 21st TACOM, or 21st TSC, I guess it
is, that is responsible for the logistics, and certainly the
commitment that they have in taking care of the Balkans, where
I went up and looked there, too, is using that capacity.
Now, if something should happen in the Persian Gulf, and as
volatile as things are down there we have to consider that, it
would be very difficult--in fact, I believe we would have to
withdraw our troops from Bosnia and Kosovo to go through a
retraining, and certainly severely limit what we would be doing
in logistical support.
We were told by a number of people in the field that if
something like that happened we would be 100 percent dependent
on Guard and Reserve. As you well know, right now our Guard and
Reserve are in a critical situation. They are all dedicated,
and they want to be there, but there are a lot of employers who
just cannot handle that kind of deployment, and so we have a
very high OPTEMPO of our regular services and all services over
there. We have a crisis, certainly, with some MOSs in the Guard
and Reserve, and I would like to have you address for just a
minute the inadequacy or the adequacy of the number of troops
on hand, and what we would do if another MTR should come
forward, how we would handle it.
It looks like I am the only one here, so we have all the
time we want. You are used to that luxury. I am not.
General Franks. Senator Inhofe, we could just have a long
conversation here.
Senator Inhofe. That is right.
General Franks. I think both our technologies and our
structure will be informed by the lessons of Afghanistan. I
would not want to prejudge the specifics, as I mentioned to
Senator Landrieu, of whether the structure, for example, of our
special forces would grow or change in character. I think there
is a double edged sword involved in it. I think were we not
able to be informed by the lessons of Afghanistan, it may well
be that we would have structured in a way that may have been
inappropriate if we had increased the structure absent the
information we have gained from Afghanistan. I think you are
also correct that one size will not fit all, and certainly
Afghanistan is one level of contingency and a major theater war
is another.
I think what we will try to do is take the lessons out of
Afghanistan, take the ones that are enduring as they relate to
capabilities we see in the future, and I think, sir, you will
see in time adjustments to structure by MOS as will be
warranted in order to do that.
I agree with you on your comments, certainly, about the
commitment and the selfless nature of these people, the ones in
the hospital and also the ones on the ground, wherever it is
that they may be, supporting combat search and rescue, or
flying from aircraft carriers. They are incredible.
I do identify with your point about the Guard and Reserve
and employers, because I recall from previous service the need
to talk to employers and not penalize people, our people who
are coming on active duty, by putting them in a position where
it was not good for them or their employer in terms of overall
end strength and things like that.
Senator Inhofe, I think I would leave that to the services
to make their judgments on, but I do believe that the structure
will be informed by some of the lessons we have taken out of
Afghanistan.
Senator Inhofe. When you talk about employers, there are
employers who are just superpatriots and would like to do it,
and we can talk to them, but also it is a competitive world out
there and so there are some who just absolutely cannot do it.
So the only choice then they have is to get out, and that is a
sad thing. This has been a great concern to me.
You mentioned Afghanistan. We do not know--I am sure that
did affect the thoughts as we go forward with force structure
changes and other things. We would not have had any idea 6
months ago that we would be doing what we are doing. I can
remember sitting at this very table in this very seat when the
people were saying, well, we are no longer going to be needing
ground troops, that is going to be a thing of the past. So it
is a moving target, and we do not know here today but what 6
months from now it might be a totally different type of
conflict, and so we have to be ready for the totally
unexpected, unfortunately.
I am sure you are aware of it, even though it was thought
to be more of a Navy and Marine Corps issue, that is the
training on Vieques. It is really an all-services issue for a
number of reasons. A couple of weeks ago I went out on the
U.S.S. Wasp, the U.S.S. Mount Whitney, and the JFK, where they
are doing training. Now, they were lucky enough to have inert
training before the deployment. However, the Washington may not
be that fortunate, and this is the concern I have, because you
are receiving these trained troops over there.
We want to be sure that they are trained to the ultimate,
but I have to say this, as I went out and I talked to all of
these elements that were training, they said three things.
Number 1, you cannot do it all. It has to be unified in order
to really train them to the degree to meet our expectations;
number 2, that it is great that we have the training for the
JFK, some of it was on Vieques where it could be unified, but
it was inert; and number 3, it would have been better if we had
been able to have live training.
Do you have any thoughts about that, or any input on that
issue? Keep one other thing in mind: if there is one thing that
is more important than the level of training, it is the fact
that if we allow this to happen, every range in the world is at
risk, all of the ranges. With that in mind, what thoughts do
you have?
General Franks. Senator, the combatant commanders are
blessed by receiving well-trained and equipped forces from the
services, and as I would say to our great Navy, I would also
say to the Army and to our Air Force that the things that
provide for them and the things that support them in the
training and the readiness levels for their formations I
support, and all the unified commanders will support.
The thing that I do not think the unified commanders are
capable of doing honestly is trying to help them figure out--in
the case of the Navy--whether it is Vieques or all of the other
issues that have gone into that. We are blessed because the
forces we have received in our theater up to this point have
been well-trained, well-equipped, and extremely ready.
I am very much aware of the issue that you brought forth,
and I think we all have it as a concern. The solution, though,
is not on the tip of my tongue.
Senator Inhofe. It is a tough one. I talked to General
Jones and he felt the level of training could be better if we
had had that full, live opportunity as we have in the past.
Lastly, and then my time will be up and Senator Nelson will
be next, I just wanted to mention this. I have long, since
1987, been one of the real advocates of the V-22 and that
technology, using it not just for the Marines, not just for the
Coast Guard, but for all the other applications.
As you look at the effort that you have been running over
in Afghanistan, if you had had that vehicle, how would that
have affected you? What value would that have been to you?
General Franks. Sir, I had a discussion with someone in the
last few days about the V-22, and I am pleased, as a unified
commander, to see the program move forward, but it made me
think of exactly that question.
The first place that we introduced our Marines into
Afghanistan, you will recall, was forward operating base Rhino,
much reported. Interestingly, the distance from the ships, the
amphibious readiness group that was used for that, to forward
operating base Rhino was 350 miles. In order for us to get in
there just in this one particular case, some refueling was
required in Pakistan, as a matter of fact.
I started thinking about the 500-mile combat radius of the
V-22, and I started thinking about the speed of it and its
carrying capacity, and it became more clear to me, in the
context of this operation in Afghanistan, whereas you know, we
did not--Afghanistan is a land-locked country, yet we were
doing a great deal of our work from the sea, and so that did
occur to me, and I thought about that, and in this particular
case that air frame or something like it would have been great
for our operation.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, General Franks. Thank
you for all you are doing over there.
General Franks. Sir, thank you for your support and the
visit.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
General Franks, on this 128th day of Operation Enduring
Freedom, I would like to begin by thanking you for your
efforts, and applaud your efforts, and the results of your
command from the integrated joint and coalition missions. I
would also congratulate you for your selection of forces and
for your simultaneous supervision of Operations Southern Watch
and Northern Watch and the deployed forces around the Horn of
Africa, all well-executed with few casualties.
You must be proud, as we are, of your marines, your
sailors, your soldiers, and your airmen, and I simply want to
thank you on behalf of the people of the State of Nebraska, and
I know I speak for all Americans.
I have a couple of questions regarding the mission in
Afghanistan, the fiscal year 2003 defense budget, and a couple
of members of the axis of evil that seem to be close under your
command.
First of all, with the objectives in Afghanistan to destroy
the Taliban and al Qaeda, to be able to go through and analyze
the materials and the information that is available and then
eliminate the residual Taliban and al Qaeda operations, to what
extent do you believe that we have destroyed the underground
operating centers, or the tunnels and the caves we hear about
in Afghanistan?
Obviously, they have been struck on numerous occasions with
heavy duty munitions, but are we certain that these facilities
cannot be used again? Because if we are going to eliminate the
residual areas, obviously, we have to degrade their capacity to
be able to continue. That is my first question.
General Franks. I think that it would not be accurate to
say that each cave complex that exists in Afghanistan has been
closed, because there literally are thousands of them.
Interestingly, we even received some great assistance by the
National Geologic Survey as we were determining which of these
could support command and control of operations in size and
depth and this sort of thing.
In fact, Senator, as you said, hundreds of these complexes
have been destroyed, some destroyed to the point where it was
not worth our energy to go and completely dig them out. What
was in there will remain in there for eternity.
In a great many cases, we have reopened them and gone into
them and then reclosed them, and so I will not even try to give
you an answer that is directly objective in terms of no, there
is no possibility. What we want to be sure of is that there is
neither the capability of people to go back in them, nor the
inclination of a state to support people who would go back in
them such as al Qaeda did.
Senator Ben Nelson. That would be one of the things that
you would want to have accomplished before you told the
Commander in Chief the mission is accomplished in Afghanistan?
General Franks. Absolutely.
Senator Ben Nelson. Then with respect to the 2003 Defense
budget, I have reviewed a great deal of the budget and, of
course, listened to General Myers yesterday say 60 percent of
the weapons that were used were smart weapons, strategic
weapons, and that the munitions are also in low supply, and we
have to rebuild our supply. Are we going to be able to have
enough conventional weapons to continue to do the kinds of
things we need to do while we rebuild the smart munitions?
General Franks. Senator, as best I can tell, we can do what
we need to do. As you certainly know and as I think Dick Myers
said, we expended something around 18,000 munitions in this and
about 10,000 of those were precision munitions. Probably half
of that 10,000 were these pieces of ordnance you described that
we used also in cave closings, the JDAMs, and so I think there
is a major effort being supported by this committee as well as
the other body to move forward with procurement of additional
munitions in the future.
Whether we have enough to do anything we may ever have to
do in the interim until all of that comes online, sir, I would
not want to speculate, but we do still have substantial
stockage levels.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, it is probably a question that if
we were going to get into specifics, we had better raise it and
answer it during the closed session, but for the benefit of the
American people, we are not at that point where we cannot
continue to do what we need to do.
General Franks. That is right, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. In terms of Iraq, do we think at the
present time that it is a strategic threat to the United
States? Obviously, there continue to be concerns that there are
weapons of mass destruction being created and maintained there,
and support, maybe, of some of the enemies that we are trying
to rout out, but is it a strategic threat at the present time?
General Franks. Sir, since the end of the Gulf War we have
seen no evidence that Saddam Hussein was willing to undo his
weapons of mass destruction program, so he had the interest and
he continues to have the interest, and I believe, sir, were
there no other reason to characterize Iraq as a strategic risk,
I would do so on that basis. In my opinion this pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction is a great threat to a great many
nations on this planet, and so I would say yes, it does
represent a strategic threat and, of course, remains on our
list of states which sponsor terrorism, and I think I would
probably leave it at that point, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. I believe my time is up. Thank you very
much, General Franks, and continued good fortune in your
endeavors. Thank you.
The next Senator is Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Franks, congratulations on your leadership. I know
you had some second-guessers there for a while, but you were a
soldier's soldier. You developed a good plan that you believed
would work, and you have been proven correct.
We also need to celebrate and recognize the terrific
courage displayed by our men and women in uniform who helped
execute the plan that you developed, and we should not forget
the loss of life, too, from my home State of Alabama, Michael
Spann in the prison riot and Gunnery Sergeant Bryson in a
helicopter crash.
So we did lose some lives, but I have to tell you, I think
at the beginning if it had been said that the loss would turn
out to be as small as it is, people would not have believed it
in light of what has happened. I think that is a tribute to you
and to the strategies and tactics that you undertook.
There are a couple of things that I have been concerned
about. I will change the subject a little bit. I have been the
ranking member on the Seapower Subcommittee, and you mentioned
the demands that were placed on you with regard to bringing in
supplies and munitions and transportation, and actually you
requested, as I understood it, three carriers at the beginning.
General Franks. That is correct, sir, and we now have them.
Senator Sessions. The third was the Kitty Hawk.
General Franks. Yes, sir, it was.
Senator Sessions. That carrier, did it fulfill its
responsibilities and requirements?
General Franks. Yes, sir, it did.
Senator Sessions. What use was made of the Kitty Hawk?
General Franks. Sir, a general comment if I can, first. One
of the great things about a naval carrier battle group is not
only its fire power, which is there, to be sure, but also its
staying power, and what we have seen in this campaign is both
the fire power and the staying power of our Navy in the
Northern Arabian Sea.
The Kitty Hawk was used, sir, and I think, as has been
well-advertised, as a forward operating base for special
operations forces for a period of time. It was very effective
in that role, and one wants to always consider the capabilities
and the capacities of a carrier battle group.
On the other hand, one always wants to think about the plug
and play capabilities we have in our military, and during a
given point in time, how can those be best used to accomplish
the mission. I applaud not only the flexibility but the
capability of the United States Navy to have been able to set
conditions for the success of this campaign which, make no
mistake about it, Senator, they certainly have done.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think so, too. I visited the
Kitty Hawk in Japan recently, and it is set for
decommissioning, and it makes you wonder--it was in the region,
it got there quickly and played a critical role, performed the
mission completely, and it is painful for me to think that a
ship with that much capability may not be with us much longer.
General Franks. Sir, I understand the point, and I think
that Admiral Vern Clark and the Secretary of the Navy are
giving every possible consideration to the amounts of resources
they want to commit to the readiness equation compared to the
amount they want to commit to the modernization equation. Even
though that really is not my business or my line of work, I do
have great confidence that they will make the right decision
about the Navy, and I think the decision they make will be
supported by Secretary Rumsfeld.
Senator Sessions. With regard to the prisoners that are at
Guantanamo, it strikes me as quite plain that their conditions
are superior to our troops in most areas in Afghanistan now, if
not all of them. Is it not true that a lot of our troops are
still not getting hot meals, and they have very temporary
quarters at best?
General Franks. Sir, that is true.
Senator Sessions. Can you give us some of the hardships
they are working under right now in the wintertime?
General Franks. Sir, as we speak we have the forces I
described earlier in 30, 40, 50 different areas in very small
groups. They are essentially what I would have described years
ago when I was first in Germany, they are living on the
economy, so to speak. They are mobile, they are moving about
from day to day, they are enduring environmental hardship, and
they remain about as dedicated and motivated as any group of
American military people I have ever seen.
Senator Sessions. It is true, is it not, that they have to
assume at any time they could be the target of some terrorist
who may not have been captured?
General Franks. Senator, that is exactly right.
Senator Sessions. Well, we salute you, and each one of
them, and I appreciate the service and contribution of all
those men and women. We particularly are saddened by the loss
of life that has occurred. I mentioned Gunnery Sergeant Steven
Bryson. He was in the KC-130, and I know that in Guantanamo Bay
there are people being held there who participated in the
prison riot that resulted in the death of Michael Spann from
Winfield, Alabama. It is just a personal thing to think that
these matters are not all intellectual. Our people's lives are
at stake.
Thank you for your leadership.
General Franks. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I would join with my colleagues in paying my
highest tribute to you for your leadership. As you say, all of
the different elements came together. It has been an
extraordinary success thus far.
General Franks. Thank you, sir.
Senator Dayton. I was one of a group that also went over
last month to Afghanistan. In Uzbekistan, we were briefed by
General Hackenbeck and at the special operations center in
Bagram by General Harold. I was so impressed there with the
quality and the professionalism of those men and their
officers, and they described in detail as well, as you have
described here today, the planning and the execution of that
plan, and professionalism, and courage resolved in carrying it
out.
General Franks. Sir, they are wonderful.
Senator Dayton. We had lunch at one place and dinner at
another with some of the troops, and again I was just really
impressed with how high their morale is. I want to qualify,
Senator Sessions, that they are not getting hot meals, but they
are getting warm meals, because the MREs can now, with modern
technology, put it in a little warming pad there and it does
not get hot, but it gets warm. Though I do know, with regret,
that I did not see any Spam in any of those MREs, since that is
produced in Austin, Minnesota. But some things must pass.
General Franks. Sir, the CINC has no comment. [Laughter.]
Senator Dayton. That was the response I got from the
troops, too. [Laughter.]
I think one of the most impressive aspects of this
operation which you referred to earlier was the rapidity of our
response. It is probably not exactly comparable, but as I
recall the Operation Desert Storm build-up occurred over a
period of 5 or 6 months before we engaged militarily, and you
commenced the military engagement, as you said in your
testimony, 7,000 miles away, only 26 days after the September
11 attack. I think that is extraordinary.
What are the key changes during that decade, or even not
comparing it to Operation Desert Storm, what has enabled you to
make that kind of rapid response?
General Franks. Senator Dayton, I would just give two quick
points. One, there is now a much different composition of
force. I think 10 years ago what my predecessor had to grapple
with was the same relative distance that we are working with,
but he also had to grapple at that time with hundreds of
thousands of people, whereas we have not had that footprint.
Additionally, I think a great many lessons were taken from
Operation Desert Storm, some of which had to do with
positioning of assets, others with diplomatic efforts to build
relationships in this region where one can coordinate some
staging and basing and overflight opportunity.
Sir, I guess the third point I would give would be the
overwhelming international support of Operation Enduring
Freedom. The world feels as though it was attacked on 11
September, and any capital one goes to, at least the ones I
have been to, that is very evident, and their willingness to
support us has been and remains incredible.
Senator Dayton. If you addressed this question when I was
voting, I apologize for the redundancy, but in your full
statement that is in the record you referred to some of these,
again, very preliminary lessons that have been drawn from this
experience, and you referred then to the very complex movement
of troops and equipment and supplies and the like. I can attest
to that, having tried to get into those two locations on C-
130s. It is amazing, at least the sophisticated movement of all
of these factors.
What are the choke points, particularly as they would
relate to this committee's view of what needs to be
replenished? What are we short of?
General Franks. Sir, I think that the unified commands over
the past years have talked on the need for strategic lift. Our
lift capability is--I will leave others to describe all of the
numbers associated with that, but one of the first things that
a combatant commander will address is this business of how many
tons can we move in a given period of time a long way away, and
so I think, rather than creating a revelation, the experience
in Afghanistan served as a reminder at least to me that we need
to retain some focus on our strategic lift and our ability to
move these forces around.
I think we have taken a lesson out of Afghanistan. We have
taken an awful lot of them, sir, that I will not waste the
committee's time with, but we have learned the value of
combined arms and joint training, having Army, Air Force, Navy
people together. I mean, we have learned some lessons like that
which have been of tremendous impact. We have learned lessons
that have to do with the application of technology.
As I have told many people before, my headquarters sat in
Tampa, Florida, and commanded and controlled forces at work in
the country of Afghanistan while we were moving international
forces from more than 250 bases from around the world, from 30
different countries. That was enabled by technology, by some
foresight, some application of money over a period of time that
set us up for success.
I think we will take lessons from that and say, where are
the places that we do not yet have enough? What technological
lessons did we learn in command and control, for example, that
we need to move forward with? I think those will be lessons
that we will come out of this with.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
There is always an intense media focus on the civilian and
noncombatant casualties, which is necessary and is important. I
think the 99-plus percent of missions that are carried out
successfully without loss of noncombatant life do not get the
same attention, and referencing some points some others have
made, the relatively low loss of American men and women and
casualties, given the scope of the operation, I think is
commendable. Any loss is too much, but again, what are the key
lessons we can draw from this experience? What are the factors
in that?
General Franks. Senator, I think I would join a great many
people in saying any loss of innocent life is a shame. It is
not something that anyone would be proud of, wearing the
uniform on the ground, or as we sit here. I think at the same
time, though, I would point out that the loss of thousands of
lives--with a great many nations represented--in New York and
Washington and Pennsylvania on 11 September set conditions
where our Nation was ready to go to war, and war is terribly
demanding. I think this committee recognizes that this decision
was not taken lightly.
My view is that this has been the most accurate war ever
fought in this Nation's history. I believe that the precision
of this effort has been incredible. When we have identified an
error where we have put precision guided munitions in the wrong
place, we have been very quick to say we did that, and, sir, we
will continue to do that.
The thing that I do not think we will do is be quick to
rush to a judgment that takes as truth information that may be
provided by sources who do not share the same value of human
life that we share in this country, and sir, I have to leave it
at that point. I am extremely proud of the professionalism and
the performance of our people in this campaign. That does not
say that mistakes have not been made. They surely have, and
each time they have, we have worked hard to acknowledge it.
Senator Dayton. My time is up, but I share your assessment,
and I wanted to point out, as you said, I would agree that I
think the degree of success and precision has been
extraordinary, and also it is a fact of minimizing the loss of
American life or casualties, too, so I salute you again.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dayton.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Franks, let me begin by echoing the thanks of my
colleagues for your outstanding service and leadership. We have
had tremendous support from long-time allies like Turkey, as
well as from newer friends such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in
conducting the war against terrorism in Afghanistan.
When I was in the region and met with Turkish officials,
however, they expressed great concern about any expansion of
our operations, particularly if we were to go into Iraq. They
expressed concerns about what the impact would be on regional
stability, on Turkey's economy, on a possible breakup of Iraq
into a separate Kurdish state in the north. They were concerned
about a flow of refugees similar to what Turkey experienced
after the Gulf War. Could you comment on efforts that are being
made as far as military leaders that you are discussing with in
the region to maintain the strength of the coalition?
General Franks. Yes, ma'am, I would be pleased to.
One of the things I applaud is the fact that we have a
magnificent Turkish officer on my staff in Tampa, and have had
since the very beginning of this, along with, as I mentioned
earlier, 26 other nations who have national representatives on
our staff. The coordination that has made possible, to include,
in fact, a lot of NATO countries, has been an enabler of this
operation.
I think that the focus of this coalition and the focus of
this work is on Afghanistan. We have not had discussions,
military-to-military, with other nations about Iraq or about
any of the other countries in our region, so through my
experience, I would say that whatever actions are deemed
appropriate, there will be efforts if our operations expand, as
they well may around the world, and not just in our area of
responsibility. This will result in consultations by the
leadership in our State Department and by our President with
the people with whom they need to consult and discuss the
concerns such as the ones you mentioned. That is really the
best I can give you. We have had no military-to-military
discussion of potential future operations in Iraq.
Senator Collins. Have military leaders of Turkey and other
countries in the coalition expressed concerns to you about
expansion of military operations?
General Franks. I would say, sort of. What we do is, and
what we have done since we started Operation Enduring Freedom,
is I meet with them every day at 9:00 in the morning and we
will go around, and there will constantly be interest in any
other planning that they may perceive is coming up, and they
will ask a question. They will say, what do you have in your
mind, General, about the next phase of the operation? We have
very open and frank discussions about where we perceive
problems, about what we believe potential solutions may be. So
I cannot actually say that there is evidence of concern, but
there is evidence of interest in each of the countries all of
the time.
Senator Collins. I want to turn now to a budget question.
Earlier this week, General Myers in his testimony before this
committee talked about the importance of operations in the
information domain, and cited as an example the Navy and Air
Force's intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft
in guiding our special operations forces on ground strikes and
for other purposes.
With regard to this year's Defense budget, do you feel that
our manned Navy and Air Force ISR platforms such as the P-3,
the EP-3, and the RC-135 are funded sufficiently?
General Franks. Ma'am, I am not dodging, but I simply do
not know what the numbers look like in the submission for 2003,
because I have not looked at the specific numbers for platforms
like P-3 or RL, and so I really cannot give you a good answer.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
General Franks, it is nice to see you again. We knew you
when you were Third Army Commander in Atlanta, and you have a
tremendous task on your hands, but you have acquitted yourself
beautifully, you and all the people under your command, and we
are all very proud of you. The country is united behind you,
Congress is united behind you, and that has to give you a good
feeling when you tackle the tremendous responsibilities you
have.
General Franks. Senator, thank you.
Senator Cleland. Three issues: surveillance, intelligence,
and reconnaissance. I have been discussing with the Secretary
of the Air Force some ideas that he has put forward that maybe
we can combine the JSTARS capability and the AWACS capability
on one aircraft, maybe a 767.
Currently, they are on two different aircraft, and knowing
how much real-time battlefield intelligence means to commanders
such as yourself, particularly in terms of targeting of
precision weapons, is that something that might be useful to
you in the experience you have had? That on one platform, say a
Boeing 767, you have both the AWACS and the JSTARS capability
there, over the battlefield, with long hang time, so to speak?
Putting that together in one aircraft, would that be something
that would be a plus in terms of your intelligence-gathering
capabilities?
General Franks. Senator Cleland, first, I certainly would
not turn down anything. Any opportunity to use less fuel in
order to accomplish the same mission, when in fact we have to
bring the fuel, load the fuel, do the refueling, et cetera, is
good, so my experience has been that the aggregation of
technologies is generally useful.
Now, that is my out-of-my-lane answer, sir. What I would
say is that what we have, the results of AWACS and JSTARS in
this particular operation in Afghanistan, have been terrific.
What they have brought, despite the fact that they operate from
two platforms, has been substantial, and I would say, certainly
in the case of AWACS, we would have had a heck of a time
accomplishing what our airmen have been able to accomplish
without it.
Senator Cleland. Now, can we move on to the use of
precision weapons? General Clark, in discussing the Kosovo war,
the Balkan war, said that this country had used precision
weapons to a level hitherto unknown, and when I was in Aviano,
Italy, about a year or so ago, it was made known to me that in
the Gulf War in 1991 against Iraq a majority of our weapons
were so-called dumb weapons, but by the time we got to the
Balkan war a majority of the weapons were precision weapons. I
gather here, in the war in Afghanistan, we have taken that even
a step further.
Your point about this being the most precise war we have
ever fought in terms of attacking our targets, I gather we are
still perfecting and continuing to escalate the use of
precision weapons and fine-tune it.
General Franks. Senator Cleland, one of the obvious
characteristics of this campaign has been the accuracy that I
described, 18,000 plus weapons having been delivered, 10,000 of
those precision munitions, by far and away the greatest
application of precision munitions in the history of our
country at any point, at any place, at any time.
I think someone told me the other day that in the Gulf War
we averaged 10 aircraft per target. In this war we have
averaged two targets per aircraft.
Senator Cleland. That is quite amazing, and the use of
special ops or special forces, Rangers, the special forces and
Seals and other special operations forces, it does seem to me
we have perfected in this war the use of those special
operations forces to a very fine degree, and that has helped
our precision, it has minimized our own casualties, and it has
maximized the lethality of our attack. Is that your
understanding?
General Franks. Sir, that is my understanding. There is
great advantage to precision-guided munitions in any context.
One sees a factored or a geometric growth in the effectiveness,
even of precision-guided munitions, when there are people on
the ground physically in contact with the target, able to see a
target. We have seen that, and I believe that is one of the
characteristics of this particular campaign of which our Nation
should be very proud. It is the bravery of the people on the
ground and the competency of our technologies mated with one
another to great effect.
Senator Cleland. I had the pleasure of visiting with a
couple or three special forces servicemen who had been right
there on the ground, and so close to a 2,000-pound bomb that
they themselves suffered some injuries. They were that close to
the target, that engaged, and I think that is something we
cannot forget, that young men and women are still putting their
lives on the line for the rest of us.
Thank you, General, for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
Senator Bunning.
Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to also add my congratulations to General
Franks for his unbelievable accomplishments in Afghanistan. I
do have some questions that I hope that he does not take wrong,
but if, in fact, our mission was to seek out and destroy the
Taliban and al Qaeda, and to help free the Afghani people from
the totalitarian government that was there, maybe you can help
me out. Why were so many people able to flee Afghanistan that
were al Qaeda and/or Taliban?
I see in today's paper, The Washington Times, that we
actually only have 324 people in custody in Afghanistan and 158
at Guantanamo. That adds up to approximately 500 people.
Now, I know there were an awful lot of people that were
Taliban fighters. Do you have any idea of the percentage that
were al Qaeda that you were in the process of attacking?
General Franks. Sir, I do not know. I am not sure what the
al Qaeda percentage of the Taliban was. I think you have asked
a valid question. With a mission of the destruction of the al
Qaeda network, the al Qaeda network inside Afghanistan, and an
illegitimate government harboring them, with those as
objectives, one will quickly say, well, this goes to the
personality level of the people. I think the approach that has
been taken, the destruction of the networks, has necessarily
killed some, detained some, and fractured these organizations,
and a lot of them have moved, as we say, into the hills, or are
puddling in places inside Afghanistan, and some, as I have said
before, have certainly left Afghanistan.
So, sir, the description that I would give is, people who
are anxious to not be caught, they are on the run. They are
working hard to get away and are considering only one border,
the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is about
1,500 miles long. At one point in time President Musharraf of
Pakistan had about 100,000 people on that border in areas
familiar to them providing assistance and, in fact, have
delivered more than 100 of the people that they have detained
coming across the border, have rendered them to us. So, sir, I
think that is probably the best answer I can give you.
Senator Bunning. Well, today's headline in The Washington
Times on the CIA Director's report to the Intelligence
Committee yesterday tells us a different story, tells us that
most of the people have escaped through Iran into Iraq, and
that they are regrouping and preparing to launch additional
attacks on the United States, or what other place they choose
to attack.
The Secretary was here 2 days ago asking this committee to
approve a budget of over $1 billion a day.
General Franks. Yes, sir.
Senator Bunning. $1 billion a day. That is $370-some
billion. Are you telling us that we cannot do a better job of
finding out who escaped, where they escaped to? I think you
have done an unbelievable job in Afghanistan, as far as the
replacement of an illegitimate government with a temporary one,
and I think the Afghani people are legitimately pleased that
that has happened. But I am not pleased, and I do not think any
Americans are pleased, that we have not done a better job on al
Qaeda, the terrorist group that attacked the World Trade Center
and planned it, and did those things, so I think we are half-
way there.
General Franks. Sir, I agree with you. I think we are half-
way there, and I think the characteristic of what we will see
in the future will be the continuing relationship between
Defense forces and those of George Tenet as all of us continue
to work to finish the 50 percent that you describe, and so I
would not argue with you a bit.
Senator Bunning. Here is my real hangup, though. It looks
like we are going to have to go it alone if we go into Iraq. I
mean, there are unbelievable things in the newspaper today that
really bother me. The average American is bothered by this.
General Franks. I must confess, there are things in the
media every day which bother me. [Laughter.]
Senator Bunning. That goes without saying. I do not believe
anything I read, and very few things that I am told about
personally, but the fact of the matter is, we have had a
coalition in Afghanistan. If, in fact, the brains and brawn of
the al Qaeda concentrate their efforts, and we know they do
this in Iraq, are we ready to do what we have to do?
General Franks. Sir, I would leave that decision,
certainly, with our Commander in Chief. I think that it
behooves all of us to put ourselves in a position to answer the
call of America if the decisions are made. I have been very
confident in that leadership up to this point, certainly with
Afghanistan, and sir, I guess I really would not speculate
about what the future might hold.
Senator Bunning. Well, I am not speculating, but if, in
fact, we are in a war against terrorists, and the terrorists
happen to be in a certain country preparing other attacks, then
I would think that we would definitely take some action against
that country.
General Franks. Sir, I would agree with that, and I think
we have been pretty clear about saying any time, any place. The
fact is that this is a global war on terrorism. Our efforts in
Afghanistan have represented the first part of it. It is going
to take a long time.
Senator Bunning, as I think Director George Tenet probably
mentioned to the committee, there are more than 60 places
around the world where we see the evidence of al Qaeda. I think
he also mentioned, and I am not sure precisely the number, that
perhaps 1,000 people from this organization have been arrested
since 11 September. I can tell you that within my particular
area of responsibility there have been something more than 500
arrests since 11 September outside of Afghanistan, and not
counting the ones we described before, because of the
willingness of the nations of this world to reach out and
continue to pursue these people until, in fact, we can reduce
the threat to our own country and to theirs.
But I will say that I do agree with Director Tenet when he
said, this is dangerous. These people are committed. There are
still a great many of them, and we have an awful lot of work to
do.
Senator Bunning. Well, if we are going to sell the budget,
we had better sell the fact that we have still not finished the
job.
General Franks. Sir, we are going to do our part.
Senator Bunning. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Carnahan.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Franks, you have certainly distinguished yourself
as an innovative tactician and an exceptional leader, and we
commend you for that.
Last month, I was standing in Bagram Air Force Base with a
young soldier, and his comment to me was, we know why we are
here, and we want to stay until we get the job done. So I think
that level of morale certainly reveals the leadership that
these young people are receiving.
I understand that short-range fighters cannot easily reach
deep inland into targets in Eastern, Central, or Southeastern
Asia as well as Eastern Africa, so in the future, do you think
that the American forces may grow increasingly reliant on, say,
Navy fighter jets or long-range bombers? Would you describe the
role that you think the long-range bombers and the fighter jets
have played in the war in Afghanistan?
General Franks. Ma'am, that is a good question. I took a
look this morning to see where we were in what we call the
sortie count, the number of flights that we do from bases and
from naval assets and so forth, and the snapshot that I got
from that was about 20,000 sorties, about half of those from
carrier-based assets, some very long-range activity. We had
global power involved in this, which we were flying from
Whiteman Air Force Base here in the United States. These very
long missions were performed by pilots who were willing to do
an awful lot to go a long ways, an absolutely monumental
performance by their effort.
We also had some short-range assets operating over extended
ranges, for example, an F-15 pilot who flew a 15-hour mission.
We had the longest reconnaissance flight flown in our Nation's
history, 26 hours, and those were by Air Force assets. We also
had these being flown from the carrier decks at the same time,
and so in my own mind I do not have a vision of precisely what
that mix should be.
I will say that I do see a need to continue in the future a
balance of that mix because of the complementary capability
that these airframes bring.
Senator Carnahan. One other question. Certainly, the tempo
of their operation has slowed down now, and much of what is
left now is on the ground by our special forces, and these
soldiers are having to rout out the enemy in villages and forts
and caves. Can you describe the action of our special forces
troops at this stage of the conflict, and what you think will
be in weeks and months ahead.
General Franks. Our special operations forces are engaged
in many activities. One is to provide assistance and training
to Afghan forces. We had been providing assistance, advice,
training, and another of the jobs they perform over there is
what we call assault, or direct action. We have capabilities to
move our people around over there in the air and on the ground.
We have very highly trained and capable special operating
forces as of this morning, from eight different countries,
inside Afghanistan. They are conducting strategic
reconnaissance missions today.
They may well conduct direct action missions within the
next 24 hours. It is continuing activity, and that activity
will continue until we have satisfied ourselves that there are
not any more of the pockets that Senator Bunning mentioned a
moment ago. We are going to run them all down, and that is what
our special operators are doing now.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, it was about 3 or 4 years ago that Senator
Inouye, Senator Stevens, myself, and others were in South Korea
meeting with a certain general who was the CG of the U.S.
forces in Korea. We were going to North Korea with the first
delegation allowed into North Korea, and we saw this tall drink
of water from Oklahoma State with stars on his shoulders, and
after the common sense briefing and our experience there, we
knew that there were probably some greater things and greater
missions to come for this man.
I just want to say, General, you have really exceeded our
expectations, not that they were not real high to begin with,
and in terms of this Senator's confidence in you, I am going to
stand behind you when you take the bows, and you are taking the
bows now, and I will stand beside you when you take the boos,
and I do not expect any.
By the way, I would report to you that Eddie Sutton has a
pretty good team at Oklahoma State. Not good enough to beat
Kansas, but a pretty good team. [Laughter.]
No objection there?
General Franks. No objection. [Laughter.]
Senator Roberts. On page 7 in your statement you indicated
the mission has determined the coalition, the coalition has not
determined the mission, and Senator Warner talked about that
some. We are going to take into consideration the further
enlargement of NATO. The specific countries to be added, all
deserving, are still unknown, but I am going to ask you three
questions and then see if I can get a response from you,
because I am worried about NATO. I am worried about the
strategic concept that was adopted 2 years ago this spring. I
also worry about NATO in regards to Article 9 and their role in
something which I think transcends most of this concept, and
something they should be involved in, and one concern is from a
combat capability perspective. What would be the impact on the
war if we were to fight side by side with allies with
significantly less technologically advanced weapons systems? I
think we all know the answer to that.
Additionally, what would be the impact on your efforts if
the targeting was controlled or dictated from NATO
headquarters, as it was with General Wes Clark? My concern is
that we are going to enlarge NATO with nations with very
limited military capability and exacerbate the capability that
we all know exists.
Now, Senator Lugar went over and talked to the folks there.
You cannot find a stronger supporter than Senator Lugar for
NATO. He said, what would happen if in fact al Qaeda had
attacked the Brandenburg Gates, the Eiffel Tower, or God
forbid, Big Ben in London, and what we would do, as a member of
NATO, under Article 9, one for all, all for one?
Now, NATO's strategic concept involves everything from
ethnic cleansing and the environment to crime and drugs. I
maintain that if every Senator knew what we were involved with
in terms of obligations, I am not so sure they would have
bought into that.
So with your statement again on page 7, the mission
determines the coalition, the coalition does not determine the
mission, I remember when the Apache helicopters could not even
land in a particular area because the French had a fuel dump in
that area, and President Clinton had to call President Chirac
to say, move the fuel dump so we can land Apache helicopters.
That was a hell of a way to run a war, and so I am a little
worried about the future of NATO and if they do not accept,
they meaning all of the nations involved, this mission in
regards to international terrorism as best we can, where are we
headed here?
General Franks. Senator Roberts, you know me, I am not
going to say too much about NATO. What I will say is that we
have a great many NATO nations operating with us in the
Operation Enduring Freedom Task Force.
Senator Roberts. So it is a coalition of the willing?
General Franks. It is a coalition of the willing, and in
that context, which is something I do know about and I can talk
to, their contributions have been very powerful, they have been
sustained. They certainly have been willing to do this, and so
what I see of the nations represented down in Tampa is a very
positive contribution.
Now, technological variances, technological differences,
the fact that our Armed Forces are well advanced beyond the
capabilities brought by these nations, of course that is a
consideration. Sir, you know this because you have seen it
before, what happens to us is, ``plug and play'' these assets.
We determine the work to be done, we take the very best asset
available to do that, and since we are dealing with willing
nations, they provide the asset we need, and we have had great
success in doing that.
In terms of command and control and this notion of the
mission determining the coalition rather than the other way
around, sir, I must tell you that since 11 September the
willingness of nations to work side-by-side to go after
terrorism is incredible, and so I am not sure what may have
happened in a standing coalition arrangement like NATO, given
the circumstances that you mentioned. But the point that I
think we wanted to make, and the reason that we have used the
term repeatedly, ``a coalition of the willing,'' a flexible
coalition, and we talked about the mission determining the
coalition, is to alert everyone, as the President has said, if
you are in this, you are in this, if you are not, you are not.
So we are not going to have negotiations of missions, and we
are not going to negotiate the next target, the means of attack
and so forth.
As I said when we first started, Senator Roberts, we have
about 50 nations, more than 50 nations involved in this now, 27
of them with us in Tampa, and that is growing today, not
shrinking.
Senator Roberts. My time has expired. I just want to toss
in one more. Do you have any concern that you are based out of
Tampa? Every time I would hear a quote from you I would always
think you were in theater. I guess you are in theater, except
you are 7,000 miles away. That is unprecedented. It is amazing.
Not amazing, but it shows you our capability.
I heard some instant expert on TV last night, somebody way
below your rank and that is retired, say that you should be in
theater as opposed to being in Tampa. Any comment?
General Franks. Sir, I welcome a chance to talk about that.
I think 10 years ago--I think what our Nation's military wants
and what we need is flexibility, and we need to be able to do
what the mission, what the numbers of troops involved and our
capabilities and situations direct. 10 years ago we did not
have the capability to do that. Now we have the capability to
track in real time the situation on the battlefield and, in
fact, having brought our assets into this theater from 267 air
bases and seaports in 30 countries, we have had situational
awareness of this, as you said, Senator Roberts, which is
unprecedented.
I think the lesson we want to draw from this is not the
lesson that we want to have offset command and control away
from a theater for every subsequent operation, and so I do not
totally disagree with those who say you want to be in the
center of the campaign. I think what we want to do is look at
the mission: we want to look at the enemy we are going to
fight, the troops available, the terrain, and one thing that I
would encourage everyone to remember is the time available in
which to do the operation.
The amount of time that is necessary to move a large,
unified headquarters in some cases will fly in the face of a
decision that says, let us just move it there, and so I do not
think one size fits all. I think what we want is the ability to
either be remote, or offset, or to be present in-theater. In
this case, the judgment was we were best served to use the
technologies this committee and our Nation has provided our
military. I think they were used effectively, and the
situational awareness, as well as I believe the touch with
people on the ground has been very good in this effort.
Senator Roberts. That also deals with access denial. Your
point is well-taken.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I want to follow up on
that. I have had the privilege of visiting the headquarters
twice, and I am amazed that you all have utilized the
technology so well, so that everything is real-time from
thousands of miles away. I think it is symbolic of this whole
new kind of effort that the Secretary of Defense has come here
and has spoken to us in saying that what is illustrative of
this new kind of war is a special operations troop on horseback
with the Northern Alliance calling in to pinpoint air strikes,
and because of technology, and because of the space program,
and because of the instant communication, you have been able to
prosecute the war from there.
Just to follow up Senator Roberts, General Schwartzkopf
commanded 10 years before you. I would be curious as to the
considerable ease that you have in directing the war compared
to General Schwartzkopf from McGill Air Force Base in Tampa 10
years before.
General Franks. Sir, it does go to technology. It has to do
with the doctrine that we use to structure the Armed Forces
which have participated in this effort. We do not talk much
about that, but there have been evolutions in our view over the
past 10 years. There have been evolutions in our ability to
train leaders and decisionmakers and staff people over the past
10 years.
When that is coupled with the ability to
videoteleconference, which, Senator, as you have seen with
literally all of the leaders involved in this, whether they may
be at one of a half-dozen locations in Afghanistan or on a ship
at sea, wherever they may be, bringing frontline states the
ability to do that 24 hours a day has enabled us to do, or the
leaders at all levels to do what we have talked about for
years, and that is to be able to see the eye and to gain a
sense of the appreciation of a particular campaign, a plan, a
battlefield from a long ways away. It is not perfect, to be
sure, but far, far beyond what I think we would be seeing had
we looked at it 10 years ago.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I was also struck, the
last time I visited there, by the representatives of so many of
these nations that have now joined us in the coalition who are
directly represented there by military personnel at the CENTCOM
headquarters. It was my privilege, with Senator Lieberman, to
visit with them and to speak to them, and that is an
interesting concept for a military headquarters, that you bring
in all of your partners in their military to join with you.
General Franks. Sir, it has been a great blessing in this
effort. As I mentioned to Senator Roberts, the ability to
coordinate these activities without a loss of a lot of fidelity
across the nations doing all the hard work has been incredible.
It is beyond any of my experience in more than 35 years.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of
questions if we are going into closed session, particularly
with regard to some of the screening that is going on with the
detainees, and I will defer until we are in closed session.
Chairman Levin. That is fine. I will be, though, asking a
question about that in open session, after we are done with
Senator Akaka. I do not know if that changes your plan or not.
Senator Bill Nelson. I will defer to the wisdom of my
chairman's question.
Chairman Levin. The question I have in mind is one that I
think can and should be answered in open session, but since you
raise that issue I wanted to alert you.
Senator Bill Nelson. You sent me in a delegation from this
committee down to Guantanamo as the first to visit, and my
concern was not about the humanitarian treatment, because that
was quickly apparent, that they were getting treated as well as
our marines, but I did have a concern, which I expressed in
this committee several days ago to the Secretary of Defense,
about whether or not we are getting the information from those
detainees, and so whatever is your pleasure.
Chairman Levin. My question is a different question from
that. Thank you very much.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
join my colleagues, General Franks, to express my gratitude for
a job well done in Afghanistan. While no command is easy, the
Central Command has had its share of challenges in recent
years. I want you to know that I am comforted to know that our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are in your capable
command.
General Franks. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. General, one area of concern I have revolves
around recent reports of military missions involving the
capture and death of civilians who could be or have been
determined not to be associated with terrorist organizations.
According to articles in this morning's edition of The
Washington Post and The New York Times, the incident involving
the release of 27 individuals who have been determined not to
be connected to either the Taliban or al Qaeda is under
investigation. So my question is, what steps, if any, are being
taken to ensure that innocent civilians are protected as we
continue Operation Enduring Freedom?
General Franks. Senator, that is a good question, and I am
pleased to answer it. I think from each experience like this we
learn lessons. Some of the lessons will come out when we have
completed our investigation of this, as this has been described
I think even by Chairman Karzai in the last few days.
Afghanistan remains Afghanistan, and there is in fact a great
deal of intrigue within this country, and there are pools and
puddles and pockets of resistance in places within the country.
In some cases there are Afghan forces who are close to or in
these pockets. We may on a given day know or not know the
locations of these people.
What I want to do is see the results of the investigation,
which I think we will have in 2 weeks time, and then we will
adjust as we need to adjust in the event that we determine that
mistakes were made.
The one point that I would make, sir, is that I read the
report you mentioned, and I would make only one correction for
the committee, and that is the 27 you mentioned were not, in
fact, released. The 27 were turned over to Afghan authorities.
Again to be borne out during the course of the investigation,
but I believe that among that number there were some criminals
which were being sought by Afghan authorities. So as I said,
there is a bit of intrigue in this, and there is enough
information that led me to want this fully and factually
investigated, and so as you would expect, sir, we will do that
in due course, and then we will take the action that we need to
take.
Senator Akaka. I also want to commend you on what you just
said, and your method of proceeding as you meet these
intriguing problems, and you have done a good job in doing
this, and I hope you will continue to do that. I happen to
chair the Readiness Subcommittee here, and so with respect to
readiness, do you feel that the fiscal year 2003 budget that
was presented by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is adequate to
support CENTCOM with respect to Operation Enduring Freedom?
General Franks. Senator, I do. I have reviewed--and as I
mentioned earlier, I have not reviewed in micro detail the
insides of each of the service sorts of issues--but in terms of
the Central Command and our ability to conduct our operations
within our regions, sir, I agree and applaud the submission.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka. I have just one
additional question for the open session. If anybody else has
one question, perhaps we could do it that way.
General Franks, you and I have spoken about the issue which
I am going to ask you about here, and that is the question of
the status of the Taliban detainees under the Geneva
Conventions. Here I am referring to the ones that you have
control over, because Guantanamo is not in your jurisdiction,
but these 300 or 400 people are, and one of the important
considerations in any decision as to their status as to whether
they are prisoners of war or not is the precedent that would be
set and its impact on our people who might be captured. That is
our concern. We want our personnel who are captured, whether or
not they are in uniform, to be treated pursuant to
international law, and to be treated properly.
The regulation, which is titled, ``Enemy Prisoners of War,
Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees,''
requires that if there is any doubt--and that is the word of
the regulation--as to whether or not a person, having committed
a belligerent act and been taken into custody by U.S. Armed
Forces, belongs to any of the categories enumerated in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, then a three-person tribunal needs to determine their
status.
Now, the tribunal that I am referring to here is not the
military tribunal which is under consideration for trials of
persons that might be charged for international war crimes.
That is a different tribunal. The tribunal I am referring to
here is the one we provide for in our own regulations for
situations where people are detained and where there is a doubt
about their status, which is apparently the case with at least
the Taliban detainees.
Has such a tribunal been convened in the case of any of
these detainees, or has the decision been made to hold these
tribunals according to our regulations?
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a valid
question and, as you said, we discussed it yesterday. No
tribunals have been conducted up to this point either in
Guantanamo or inside Afghanistan, and in my personal view for a
very good reason.
That is not to say they will not be conducted, but they
have not been. The reason is that this is based on, or will be
based on, a determination of categories of what is to be a
prisoner of war as opposed to what is to be an unlawful
combatant. Careful review and study by the councils within our
own country and within our own government so that we have
precise definition in policy terms of this, so that if we have
the tribunal that you mentioned, a decision to do so will be in
accordance with our laws, and our guidance.
So rather than having anyone try to prejudge the
categorization, it is the intrigue of the Taliban as an
illegitimate government and al Qaeda as a terrorist network,
and rather than any prejudgment of that, I think the policy
determination to date is that we will treat these detainees in
a way consistent with our obligations and sir, that is the
status as we speak.
Chairman Levin. The language of the regulation says, if any
doubt arises as to whether a person is in one category or
another, then the tribunal is, by our regulation, to be
appointed to make that status determination. I think we have to
realize that this is not a prejudgment issue, this is a
question as to who should make the judgment where there is a
doubt, and I just hope that being a country of laws and very
importantly wanting other countries to treat our people
according to international law, that we will proceed with
dispatch and with care under our own regulations.
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, we certainly will.
Chairman Levin. I happen to agree with those who say the
issue here is not whether we are humanely treating the
detainees, because I am convinced we are. We have had people go
down to Guantanamo, and that is clearly not the issue. As
people pointed out, they are being treated a lot better than
our own soldiers. They have better food, frequently, than our
people over in Afghanistan who are fighting, for instance, and
so my concern is the capture of our people by others and the
precedent that we want to set, that we should be very conscious
of it, as I know you are.
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, we will do it correctly.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I received a number of calls
from active and retired servicemen about the concerns of future
operations where our servicemembers may be incarcerated. We can
get tangled up in too many of these regulations, how the world
perceives we have treated the detainees is important. I think
under the circumstances the Secretary of Defense has done the
best he can, and I think he would be the first to admit that
some of the early pictures did not accurately convey the
attitude this country was taking towards those people.
To close out with two questions regarding two nations.
Saudi Arabia has been an integral part of our deterrence and
base structure in the sense of the Prince Sultan Air Base and
its integral role. Beginning with the Gulf War in 1991,
throughout this conflict, and in the intervening years, they
have been a valued ally in enabling the United States, together
with other nations, to provide stability in that region.
How do you foresee the continued relationships with regard
to security between the United States and Saudi Arabia?
General Franks. Senator Warner, thank you for the question.
I remember some of the media commentary and some of the
questioning from a week or 10 days ago, perhaps a bit longer,
about whether in fact the Saudis had asked us to remove our
assets. I said at that time, and sir, I will say again today,
that if that has happened that certainly has not happened
within the frame of my knowledge, and it is my forces which are
located in Saudi Arabia. I am not sure what the future will
hold, but I am sure that whatever decisions are taken with
regard to the placement of my forces, our forces, will be done
in consultation with the government of Saudi Arabia.
I think the ongoing dialogue, which recognizes the
contributions the Saudis have made to this effort and to
efforts that go back in history, must be maintained. We need to
recognize what has been done. That should not prejudge whether
or not we may adjust forces, but what I do believe is that if
we should choose to adjust forces, it will be done in
consultation with the government of Saudi Arabia.
Senator Warner. I do not doubt that, and we have resolved
that somewhat unfortunate situation.
With regards to the female officers and enlisted personnel,
we have overcome that. I think the Saudis have played an
integral role and, as I look at the region, they have a very
large border on Yemen which is figuring more and more in our
future plans with regard to deterring terrorism. Is that not a
critical role?
General Franks. That is true, yes, sir.
Senator Warner. They have been very helpful in that.
Shifting then to Iran, in the beginning of this operation
we received reports here in the committee--indeed, many of them
were expressed in the open press--that they had a role in
facilitating the operation in the sense that the U.S. and
allied nations could first transit food and other supplies, and
second there was some overture to the effect that if you have
to go in and perform a rescue operation, perhaps some
assistance could be given in that venue.
However, in the ensuing weeks and months now, our President
has sounded a warning. Has that relationship lessened with
regard to their assistance? As I mentioned earlier today, I
cannot establish the veracity of that at this point in time,
but nevertheless, it is reported responsibly in the press here
as far as I can determine. Has there been a lessening of their
assistance role?
General Franks. Sir, I would not want to oversell the
assistance offered.
Senator Warner. But it was offered at one time?
General Franks. It was offered at one time. I will support
the comment that Director Tenet made where he said there are
reasons for us to be concerned about activities that go on
inside Iran with respect to our efforts in Afghanistan even,
and so we are very simply watchful, and we heard what our
President said.
Senator Warner. As did I. I just was puzzled. Have you had
an opportunity to read this particular article?
General Franks. Sir, which one is that?
Senator Warner. This is today's Washington Post, Thursday,
February 7, in which they say, ``Iran has begun funneling money
and weapons to one of Afghanistan's most unpredictable
warlords, a move that could further destabilize a country where
order remains fragile at best, according to Government
authorities here in the Afghan capital.''
Dostrum, the man who rules the strategic northern city of
Mazar-e Sharif, has been provided cars, trucks, firearms,
ammunition, cash for his soldiers, two senior intelligence
officials in Afghanistan's interim central government, things
of this nature.
General Franks. Senator Warner, as a matter of fact, I did
read that, and I cannot comment as to the veracity of that
particular piece, but I do know from my experience in
Afghanistan that Afghanistan is faced with, among others, two
direct problems.
One is the frictions that exist between the various
ethnicities, tribes, and so forth inside Afghanistan; and a
second issue is the support of certain opposition leaders
inside Afghanistan by outside states. So without being able to
talk about whether Iran has provided these specifics to Dostrum
in Mazar-e Sharif, because I am not sure of that, but we are
very much aware, and have been for a period of time, of a
number of governments with relationships with these opposition
group leaders. So I would say, Senator, that the information is
not surprising, although I cannot verify the veracity of it.
Senator Warner. Would their motive be to contribute to
instability, or thwart what we are trying to bring about by way
of a new government?
General Franks. I do not know that I would characterize
their motive. I would say that on our side we are watching
these activities very carefully.
Senator Warner. Turning to Pakistan, we should not finish
this hearing without recognizing the very important role of
that nation and, indeed, the courage of its president.
General Franks. Sir, my experience in dealing with
President Musharraf over a period of time is that he has
evidenced in reality a desire to be a member of the global war
on terrorism. I believe that his efforts have been very
supportive of us. I have great respect for what President
Musharraf has done in support of our efforts in Afghanistan. We
all recognize what his objectives are with respect to his own
country, his own economy. I believe he has taken risk in order
to support us, and I believe we respect it.
Senator Warner. Likewise Oman. That government has been
very helpful in their usual, quiet manner.
General Franks. Sir, that is exactly correct. We have had
support from nations across our region for this operation, Oman
certainly among them.
Senator Warner. I thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions, did you have a question?
Senator Sessions. Yes, one question. You emphasized on the
request of what choke points and bottlenecks were that lift was
important to you being able to transport materials there. Let
me ask you, what kind of airlift did you find most valuable,
and what do you think we would need more of in a conflict that
required a more rapid transport and more items to transport?
General Franks. Sir, I think I am a fan of the C-17. I
believe that the airframe bore out tremendous capability in
this campaign. I am also a fan of the life extension programs
that we work in the C-5 fleet, because it is there, it is
available.
What we look for as unified commanders is the ability to
get what we call the big gray tails, the larger airframes in
and out of an area, and our ability to have the C-17, the C-130
size airframe, and things like the C-5 are very important to us
as we move forward.
Senator Sessions. You have been through a conflict that had
to transport a lot of materials quickly. Assuming we could be
involved in an even larger one in the future, are we
sufficiently capable in airlift, and do we need more strength
there in your opinion?
General Franks. Senator, in my opinion we do need more
strength in our strategic lift capability. I looked at the
numbers of what we have flown in the Afghanistan operation, and
we have flown C-17s on more than 1,500 strategic lifts, C-130s
I think on a tremendous number, more than 3,000 inside the
theater. We have relied on the C-5 with almost 600 strategic
lifts, and the list goes on and on and on.
So one of the first things that will come to the mind,
Senator, of any combatant commander is our ability to move
quickly and in an agile way into a theater of operations, and
so it will remain an issue with us. My view is that the effort
we put into strategic lift and mobility is effort well-spent.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. We will move now immediately to
a closed session in Hart 219. Thank you all. We will stand
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
geneva convention privileges not accorded to detainees
1. Senator Levin. General Franks, if it is finally decided that the
detainees taken into custody in Afghanistan by forces under your
control are not entitled to prisoner of war status under the Geneva
Conventions, what are the specific privileges that they will not
receive that they would have received if they were determined to be
prisoners of war?
General Franks. The President and Secretary of Defense have
determined that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees under Department of
Defense control are not entitled to enemy prisoner of war (EPW) status.
U.S. Forces are treating the detainees humanely and, to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner
consistent with the principles of the Geneva Convention.
The practical effect of this determination and its application to
detainees held at the short-term detention facility and collection
points in Afghanistan has been, and will continue to be negligible. We
are ensuring the safety of the detainees and providing them necessary
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. We are working closely with
representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
providing them access to our facilities and the detainees. In fact, the
detainees are being provided most of the rights and privileges normally
reserved to EPW. However, as the detainees are not EPW, certain
privileges of EPW are not being provided (establish canteens, pay EPW
stipend, receive musical instruments, scientific equipment, sports
outfits, etc.). I am confident that we are satisfying our obligations
under international law.
implementation of multi-service regulation
2. Senator Levin. General Franks, the Multi-Service Regulation
(Army Regulation 190-8, OPNAVINST 3461.6, AFJI 31-304, MCO 3461.1)
titled ``Enemy Prisoners of War Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees,
and Other Detainees,'' provides in paragraph 1-6a that ``if any doubt
arises as to whether a person, having committed a belligerent act and
been taken into custody by U.S. Armed Forces, belongs to any of the
categories enumerated in Article 4, GPW, such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the present Convention until such time as their status
has been determined by a competent tribunal.''
Additionally, paragraph 1-4g of the Multi-Service Regulation
provides that ``Combatant Commanders, Task Force Commanders, and Joint
Task Force Commanders have the overall responsibility for the EPW, CI,
and RP program, operations, and contingency plans in the theater of
operations involved to ensure compliance with international laws of
war.''
Why haven't you implemented the Multi-Service Regulation by holding
the three-officer tribunals called for by paragraph 1-6a and spelled
out in paragraphs 1-6b through g of that regulation?
General Franks. The President has concluded ``there is no doubt''
as to the status of the detainees. Consequently, there is no
requirement for USCENTCOM to conduct Article 5 tribunals in
Afghanistan. We are treating detainees in accordance with the
requirements of the Multi-Service Regulation as applied to detainees
that are not entitled to enemy prisoner of war (EPW) status, consistent
with the President's decision.
Within the Department of Defense, the Multi-Service Regulation
implements the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War (GPW) and other aspects of international law relating
to captured/detained persons. As such, we use this regulation as the
basis for the treatment of the detainees held in Afghanistan, and, as
noted previously, the detainees are being provided most of the rights
and privileges normally reserved to EPW.
Under the GPW and the Multi-Service Regulation, any person who has
committed a belligerent act and thereafter comes into the power of
another must, if there is any doubt as to status, be treated as a
prisoner of war unless a competent tribunal determines that the person
is not entitled to protected status under Article 5, GPW.
Prior to initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom and based on the
unique character of the conflict and the opposing forces, we requested
guidance regarding the appropriate status of any captured/detained
persons who might come into U.S. custody. Pending this guidance, on 17
October 2001, we initiated planning for Article 5 tribunals to
determine the legal status of individuals captured or detained by U.S.
Forces. However, the subsequent determination that al Qaeda and Taliban
individuals under the control of the Department of Defense are not
entitled to EPW status obviated the need for any such tribunals.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
b-52s
3. Senator Landrieu. General Franks, Louisiana has a rich military
heritage, with all services being prominently represented in the state.
Many of our men and women serving under United States Central Command
(CENTCOM) and in other areas are assigned to units in Louisiana. I am
proud of Louisiana's contributions to all areas of this war. In
planning the air attacks and ground support missions, the B-52 was
engaged daily in many of these missions. Would you explain the
different payloads for the different missions?
General Franks. The B-52, like all combat aircraft, is capable of
supporting various air-to-ground missions with standard weapons
payloads. This allows maximum flexibility to re-task the aircraft after
takeoff as the battle evolves. To explain the relationship between
aircraft payload and mission, it is useful to briefly summarize the
process involved. In general, combat aircraft are scheduled to attack
specific pre-planned targets in accordance with current command
guidance. During this process however, air planners evaluate the
potential for airborne re-tasking and determine the specific weapons
payload best suited to meet both primary and alternate mission
requirements. The operational art associated with choosing the
appropriate payload, strikes a balance between optimal weapons effects
and mission flexibility. In certain situations, air commanders may
elect to sacrifice specific weapons effects provided by more
specialized weapons for the flexibility to execute a variety of
missions with general-purpose weapons.
Within the above context, specific B-52 payloads are better suited
for specific mission conditions and target types. For example, Joint
Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), satellite guided weapons recently
discussed in the press, are heavy-weight general-purpose warheads
designed to achieve adequate effects against a wide variety of targets:
Recent combat operations in Afghanistan highlighted the diversity of
these satellite-guided weapons by enabling B-52 aircraft to employ
ordnance in close proximity to friendly forces. This mission, known as
CAS, or close air support, is historically reserved for fighter type
aircraft capable of visually acquiring both friendly and enemy forces
before weapons release. There are two current versions of the satellite
guided JDAM including a warhead capable of penetrating reinforced
concrete or bedrock. These weapons are particularly well-suited for
attacking caves and other underground facilities used to protect enemy
forces and equipment from non-penetrating weapons. Satellite-guided
weapons may be employed in any type of weather. This flexibility is
extremely valuable to commanders, but the large warhead often presents
significant collateral damage concerns. Additionally, JDAM are not
quite as accurate as those weapons guided by Light Amplification by
Stimulated Emission of Radiation (LASER) energy or video data link.
Strikes against discrete mobile targets in urban areas often require
smaller, more precise warheads to minimize unintended damage to
civilians and infrastructure in close proximity to these targets. In
these situations, the B-52 may be tasked to employ the AGM-142, which
is an extremely precise video guided weapon with a much smaller
warhead. In addition to point targets and infrastructure targets, the
B-52 may be employed with an assortment of anti-armor and anti-
personnel cluster munitions capable of being dispersed over a fairly
wide area. These weapons can also be effective against enemy
concentrations in support of friendly ground forces. Recent
technological advancements are dramatically improving the accuracy of
both the cluster munitions dispenser as well as the individual sub-
munitions. Finally, when robust enemy air defenses call for strikes
from long range, the B-52 is capable of employing cruise missiles. The
Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile can reach targets located
hundreds of miles from the launch area in order to keep the B-52 out of
harms way.
Perhaps the most valuable B-52 capability is the diversity and size
of its payload. Like the B-2 and B-1 heavy bombers, the B-52 can be
tasked against multiple targets per sortie. The B-52 may employ
precision weapons against several high value point targets, followed by
unguided weapons or leaflets before returning to its takeoff base.
4. Senator Landrieu. General Franks, in your statement, you refer
to moving from ``10 sorties per target to 2 targets per sortie.'' Would
you say the B-52, even at its current age, has repackaged itself as a
premiere carriage of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)?
General Franks. Yes. The B-52 is now entering its 50th year of
active duty (41 years for the H model) and it is still the forefront of
this Nation's military capabilities. Its recent use in this theater
highlights the B-52's transformational capabilities. The B-52 maintains
the capability to slug it out in a full-scale conventional conflict
while adapting to carry out pinpoint strikes in support of special
operations. The B-52 should not be looked at as a legacy system, but
rather as an updated and transforming weapon system remaining at the
front lines of service to this Nation that continues to deliver each
and every time it is called to war--any kind of war.
The B-52 is one of the platforms we have counted on during
Operation Enduring Freedom. It can service multiple targets on one
sortie, and has the endurance and flexibility to remain on station for
extended periods with mixed weapons loads. The B-52 also carries the
AGM-142 and the Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile, both long
range precision weapons that hold an even greater variety of targets at
risk. Finally, the B-52 is certified to carry Laser Guided Bombs,
although it requires a fighter or a ground party to ``spot the target''
with laser energy to deliver this variety of PGM.
special operations
5. Senator Landrieu. General Franks, we have all witnessed and been
truly impressed by the effectiveness of special operations forces
working under your command. Yet, it is my understanding that there are
no special operations units permanently assigned to your area of
responsibility. When I met with General Tagney, the Deputy Commander in
Chief of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), a few months ago, he
stated that the jury was still out on whether the special operations
forces structure is sufficient. In your estimation, is the current
system--where SOCOM supports with available units--optimal? Or are you
in favor of increasing the number of special operations forces and
dedicating units to the CENTCOM area?
General Franks. Senator Landrieu, I am definitely in support of
increasing the number of special operations forces oriented to our
theater. Furthermore, I believe that there should be a special
operations presence permanently assigned in the CENTCOM Area of
Responsibility.
General Charlie Holland, the Commander of the Special Operations
Command, has done a spectacular job of ensuring the forces assigned to
him are thoroughly trained to accomplish tasked missions. I applaud his
efforts and personally thank him.
However, the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility is distant from the
United States. Just the sheer time it takes to mobilize, transport, and
off-load from aircraft once troops arrive in theater can cause delays
upwards of 24-36 hours. While this may seem a relatively short amount
of time, it can be significant when dealing with the threat in our
region.
Additionally, in the war against terrorism the Department of
Defense must work within an inter-agency environment to seek out
individuals intent on harming Americans. The U.S. military must be
prepared to operate in a preemptive manner to disrupt these actions in
order to protect American interests everywhere.
Lastly, our friends and allies in the CENTCOM Area of
Responsibility have provided superb support to the United States
efforts recently. By increasing the permanently assigned forces in the
CENTCOM region, we send a signal that we are committed to the mutual
defense of our allies.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nelson
destruction of underground operating centers in afghanistan
6. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, to what extent have we
destroyed underground operating centers and tunnels in Afghanistan? Are
we certain that these facilities cannot be used again, possibly during
peacekeeping operations?
General Franks. [Deleted]. We have by no means destroyed every
underground facility in Afghanistan, given its centuries' old history
of cave usage; however, we have identified and destroyed a great many
underground facilities that had been used as Taliban/al Qaeda safe-
havens and/or strongholds, thus denying the opportunity for their
future use. We have a great deal of work remaining to be done in
Afghanistan. We will continue to locate and destroy underground
facilities in the months ahead.
offensive operations
7. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, how much longer do you
predict we will be engaged in offensive operations before we begin the
transition into peacekeeping operations?
General Franks. Senator, our offensive operations are event-driven
vice time-driven so I would not venture a prediction on how much longer
we will be engaged in offensive operations. As long as there are known
or suspected pockets of al Qaeda in Afghanistan, we will continue to
seek them out and kill or capture them.
[Deleted].
fiscal year 2003 defense budget
8. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, as I reviewed the defense
budget for next year and read General Myers' statements on the posture
of our Department of Defense, I learned that our inventory of laser
guided and precision guided munitions is low. In regards to the
efficient use of these munitions, after we eliminate critical targets
such as enemy anti-air defenses, are we employing less expensive
conventional munitions in order to preserve our low density/high demand
munitions?
General Franks. [Deleted].
9. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, I would like to know if
there is anything, equipment, munitions, expertise, or any other type
of support that we can provide your command in order to make our
operation even more successful?
General Franks. Given our mission, ongoing operations, the need for
continued security cooperation and the concerns stated above, our key
requirements, as reflected in my integrated priority list, focus on
deploying, building combat power, and executing combat operations. The
diverse and volatile nature of the region requires military
capabilities that are versatile as well as agile.
Strategic Lift--One of the critical enablers in the
execution of current operations. With few permanently stationed
forces in the region, our power projection capability depends
upon strategic lift and robust land- and sea-based
prepositioned assets. Our ability to deploy forces and
equipment quickly remains the linchpin for responding to
contingencies in USCENTCOM's Area of Responsibility.
Continued procurement of the C-17, modernization of the C-5,
and support of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program is critical
to meeting major theater war deployment timelines. Our
requirements for strategic and intra-theater airlift are
addressed adequately in Mobility Requirements Study 05. We
support expanding the C-17 aircraft buy, and funding for the C-
5 Aircraft Reliability Enhancements and Re-engining Program.
The procurement of large, medium speed, roll-on/roll-off
ships is on track and will significantly enhance our lift
capability. Under the current procurement plan, we will meet
USCENTCOM force and sustainment deployment timelines with these
vessels and Ready Reserve Fleet assets by the end of fiscal
year 2003.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers--
Robust C\4\ is imperative for situational awareness and to
ensure real-time command and control. We are developing a
deployable command and control headquarters that will provide
the necessary flexibility to direct operations throughout our
Area of Responsibility.
The complex strategic environment in our area requires a
reliable and secure command, control, communications, and
computers infrastructure. Additionally, intelligence,
operations, and support systems increasingly rely on assured
communications bandwidth. We have made progress in enhancing
our theater systems and have been successful in getting
critical information directly to the warfighters; however,
there is still work to be done.
We are concerned with the lack of available satellite
bandwidth as the current military satellite infrastructure is
saturated. The Predator and Global Hawk unmanned aerial
vehicles demand large bandwidths and currently use nearly 25
percent of that which is available from commercial satellites.
As we look toward the future, we need a secure, joint theater
infrastructure that takes advantage of fiber optic cable and
commercial satellite services now available in the Gulf States,
and must also consider approaches to support forces in the
Central Asian States.
The Coalition Coordination Center, located at our
Headquarters in Tampa, now supports national liaison teams from
27 nations. This poses an increasing demand on our
infrastructure. We must factor in these requirements and ensure
our ability to expand to meet coalition requirements in the
future.
Full Dimensional Protection--The goal of our force
protection program is to protect our personnel, family members
residing overseas, and infrastructure from acts of terrorism.
Over the past year, several improvements have been made to our
program. We have revised our Antiterrorism Operating
Procedures, incorporated policy changes, and streamlined our
terrorism threat assessment and force protection condition
implementation process.
As part of this process improvement, our vulnerability
assessment teams have taken a country-wide approach to identify
and eliminate potential `seams' and `gaps' in our force
protection coverage. We have expanded our assessments from a
focus on the physical security of sites to a more comprehensive
look at vulnerabilities and patterns that could be exploited by
terrorists. These include travel routes, lodging sites, and air
and seaports of debarkation. Our objective is to harden these
areas and mitigate risk.
To combat the ever-changing terrorist threat, we must
continue to take advantage of technological solutions to force
protection challenges. Physical security systems are needed to
improve our ability to screen personnel and vehicles and to
detect the presence of explosives. Additionally, perimeter
surveillance systems are needed to enhance our ability to
detect intruders. Critical manpower increases are also required
in order to provide our component commanders with the manning
necessary to accomplish their antiterrorism responsibilities.
Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, USCENTCOM has
challenged all previous assumptions concerning terrorism, as
well as the methods for prevention of terrorist attacks. Our
goal is to provide the right level of protection and response
capabilities for all U.S. assets.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance--This
tiered-system approach enables our forces to react rapidly and
decisively to changes on the battlefield. Predator and Global
Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles have been proven to be invaluble
in providing long dwell surveillance, tracking, positive
identification, and collateral and strike damage assessment.
Global Hawk, for example, flew sorties approaching 30 hours in
duration and imaged over 600 targets during a single mission
over Afghanistan.
Our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance strategy
is sound but is constrained by the scarcity of assets--both
platforms and trained linguists and analysts. The necessity of
maintaining 24-hour focus on disparate targets amplifies the
effects of critical shortages in key surveillance platforms and
crews. We are forced to choose between applying resources to
competing high-value targets in different locations. Continued
congressional support is essential to these vital intelligence
programs, which are central to our ability to provide force
protection and actionable intelligence to our combat forces.
Security Cooperation--The importance of continued
investment in security cooperation cannot be overstated. It is
not a ``one size fits all'' program; it must be tailored to our
interests in each country. We have designed our program to
assure regional allies, friends, and partners of our long-term
commitment. Because of the great diversity seen in this region,
we make use of a wide range of funding options. Overseas
humanitarian disaster and civic aid programs enable us to
conduct demining and humanitarian assistance actions, which are
vital tools for maintaining our influence in many of the
economically challenged nations in the region. The Warsaw
Initiative, Traditional CINC Activities, and Cooperative Threat
Reduction funding enable participation in exercises, symposia,
officer and noncommissioned officers exchanges, and small unit
training.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program must continue to
be funded robustly. This program tests our doctrine, command
and control arrangements, and tactics during command post and
field-level training to confirm the feasibility of our planning
efforts. These exercises include participants and
representatives from numerous nations as observers.
As noted earlier, IMET is a valuable cooperative education
program that has paid the U.S. dividends for decades.
Similarly, Foreign Military Financing continues to be a vital
tool to enhance cooperative security and pursue U.S. interests
in our region. We are advocates of this program for Afghanistan
so that we can fund the very important work of helping that
country build a viable, professional military, subordinate to
legitimate civilian authority.
We will continue to pursue cooperative security opportunities
throughout the region. The most effective way to do this is by
putting U.S. boots on the ground, U.S. ships in ports, and U.S.
aircraft in the skies alongside the forces of our regional
partners.
Prepositioning and Forward Presence--Prepositioning
military assets in the region helps mitigate our time-distance
challenge, ensures access, demonstrates our commitment to the
region, and facilitates sustainment of deployed forces.
The Navy and Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Force
program, comprised of Maritime Prepositioned Ship Squadrons 1,
2, and 3, maintains a high materiel readiness rate. When fully
fielded the Maritime Prepositioning Force Enhancement Program
will provide each squadron a fleet hospital, a Navy mobile
construction battalion, an expeditionary airfield, and
additional warfighting equipment. The Squadron-1 and -2
Enhancement ships are already on station.
The Army's prepositioning program is advancing on schedule
with a goal of placing a heavy division of equipment in the
region. The brigade set in Kuwait maintains high operational
readiness and is exercised regularly. The prepositioned site in
Qatar (Camp As Sallyah) houses the second brigade set and a
division base set is estimated to be completed before the end
of fiscal year 2003. Challenges in this area remain in reaching
our end state objectives for equipment on hand, modernization,
and filling our sustainment stockage levels. The afloat combat
brigade, APS-3, is complete, and combat ready. A second afloat
combat brigade will augment APS-3 and should be in place by
August 2002. Current plans are to fill 83 percent of the
equipment requirement in the near term. We support 100 percent
fill of this requirement.
The Air Force Harvest Falcon bare-base materiel program is
vital to USCENTCOM. These assets support the rapid generation
of temporary bases and have been employed effectively to
facilitate key bases in Operation Enduring Freedom. Failure to
preposition these bare-base sets would result in further over
tasking of critical strategic lift assets at the start of a
conflict. Over the past decade, the demand for Harvest Falcon
assets by all CINCs has been extremely keen. [Deleted]
Combat Systems and Combat Systems Support--We depend
on Combat Systems and Combat Systems Support to project power
rapidly, maintain full spectrum information dominance, and
prevent deterioration of equipment and capabilities. While
various Service programs provide a wide variety of capabilities
to our assigned forces, we have identified several systems of
particular interest to the Command.
Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrated the effectiveness of
precision guided munitions in improving target effects,
lowering collateral damage, and allowing a single aircraft to
attack multiple targets. Funding for these systems must remain
a priority effort.
Amphibious lift is critical to execution of our presence
mission, overcoming access challenges, and projecting power as
part of USCENTCOM's contingency operations. The ability to
shape the battlefield in high-threat environments requires a
fully funded, next-generation Amphibious Transport Dock
program.
We look to the Army for sustained funding and the fielding of
additional AH-64D Apache Longbow Helicopters and for the Family
of Medium Tactical Vehicles.
The capabilities inherent in the V-22 Osprey are invaluable
to both Special Forces and conventional forces in the USCENTCOM
theater.
iraqi strategic threat
10. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, is Iraq, at this time, a
strategic threat to the United States?
General Franks. Saddam Hussein's quest for weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) has been well documented and since inspectors have
not been allowed in Iraq since 1998, Saddam Hussein has had time to
rebuild his WMD capability [deleted].
nature of iraqi resistance
11. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, some have said that the
formula we used in Afghanistan is a model that could transfer to Iraq.
The consensus is lining up behind three possible steps the U.S. could
take against Iraq: (1) arm the Iraqi resistance; (2) air strikes on key
weapon of mass destruction sites; and (3) a full scale land invasion.
I am aware that over the last 10 years the Iraqi resistance has
tried unsuccessfully (and without U.S. military support) to topple
Saddam Hussein. Can you analyze the Iraqi resistance and compare their
capability to that of the Northern or Eastern Alliances?
General Franks. There has been a great deal of speculation
following the Gulf War that various Iraqi opposition groups would unite
and overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. We could compare and contrast
the Iraqi opposition with the Northern and Eastern Alliances, but it
may be more useful to examine the Saddam Hussein regime and how it has
successfully kept opposition in check.
First, unlike Afghanistan, Iraq has a well-developed government and
a substantial military. Saddam has been in power for over two decades.
[Deleted] Second, despite UN sanctions, Saddam has comparatively more
resources at his disposal than the Taliban had. [Deleted].
Although there are many groups in Iraq who want to overthrow
Saddam, he has much greater power over these groups than the Taliban
had over the Northern and Eastern Alliances.
regional support for u.s. removal of saddam hussein
12. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, the fear of breaking up the
Arab coalition against global terrorism is cited, so far, as the chief
reason why the U.S. may be leery of putting Saddam Hussein in the
crosshairs. Much emphasis has been placed on a potential cease-fire in
Israel and the Palestinian terrorists to continue Arab support for U.S.
efforts against terrorism. What support would we have from Arab leaders
in the region to remove Saddam Hussein from power once and for all?
General Franks. [Deleted].
iraqi diplomacy
13. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, what do you make of Iraq's
recent overture towards diplomacy as mentioned in the Washington Post
yesterday?
General Franks. Saddam's current round of diplomacy has been aptly
call a ``charm offensive.'' Since 11 September, and more recently since
President Bush's inclusion of Iraq in the ``axis of evil,'' Iraq has
sought to bolster its diplomatic standing. But no one will be fooled at
Saddam's attempt to seek friends in the region and throughout the world
at a time when he is being scrutinized for his regime's wrongdoing.
Iraq's neighbors are sympathetic to the suffering of the Iraqi
people under Saddam's regime. For that reason, and for commercial
reasons, some of Iraq's neighbors have been cautiously receptive to
improving ties with Iraq. [Deleted].
iranian training al qaeda and taliban fighters
14. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, there are reports that
there is Iranian influence in western Afghanistan, particularly in
Herat and Mazar-e Sharif. Are the Iranians training pockets of al Qaeda
and Taliban fighters? If so, have we targeted those areas? If not, why?
General Franks. [Deleted].
osama bin laden
15. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, yesterday The Christian
Science Monitor reported that a former chief of Osama bin Laden is now
saying that the terrorist has escaped into Iran. When our offensive
began in Afghanistan, Iran stated that its border would be controlled
and that fleeing al Qaeda and Taliban fighters would be denied entry
into Iran. Is this statement consistent with what our intelligence
sources have provided you?
General Franks. [Deleted].
16. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, to the best of your
knowledge, is bin Laden alive?
General Franks. [Deleted].
17. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, what is the last known
location we have for bin Laden?
General Franks. [Deleted].
18. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, does your intelligence
indicate that Osama bin Laden is now in Iran?
General Franks. [Deleted].
19. Senator Ben Nelson. Is it possible that Osama bin Laden is in
Iran?
General Franks. [Deleted].
iranian strategic threat
20. Senator Ben Nelson. General Franks, is Iran a strategic threat
to the United States?
General Franks. [Deleted].
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond
forward deployed headquarters
21. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, according to recent press
reports both you and General Hailston, the Commander of the Marines in
the Pacific, have established forward command posts in Southwest Asia
to facilitate the operations in the region. I understand that there
have been discussions of maintaining such command posts in the region
permanently. What has prevented us from establishing a permanent
forward CENTCOM headquarters in the region? What are your views on the
matter?
General Franks. Senator Thurmond, at present all of the component
headquarters of United States Central Command are in the Gulf region in
support of our operations to combat terrorism. This includes Army
Forces Central Command, Naval Forces Central Command, Air Forces
Central Command, Marine Forces Central Command, and Special Operations
Command Central. Of these, only Naval Forces Central Command is
permanently stationed in the region. We are making plans for Special
Operations Command Central to have a relatively small forward
headquarters in Qatar. The others will remain in the region as long as
required to complete our mission, then will redeploy to their home
bases. My headquarters, however, has thus far remained in Tampa. I have
chosen to keep my headquarters in Tampa because of the unprecedented
ability to capture the situational awareness needed to command and
control operations. The technological advances of the past 10 years
provide me and my staff with capabilities far beyond those that existed
previously. Additionally, the time necessary to move a large, unified
headquarters along with the coalition staff that is so integral to our
operations made staying in Tampa, at least so far, the best choice.
Every headquarters, however, must possess the capability to be remote,
offset, or in the theater. With regard to establishing a Central
Command Headquarters in the region, I am exploring that option. There
are certain operational benefits to being in the region, but there are
also implications which must be considered. The situation in the region
continues to change and thus we must continue to evaluate our options.
russia's role in afghanistan
22. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, what role is Russia playing
in Afghanistan and what interaction have you had with Russian
officials?
General Franks. The Russian involvement in Afghanistan has been
largely in the humanitarian assistance arena. They have between 200 to
300 personnel in Afghanistan located primarily in the northeast region
between Takhar and Kabul. They have an engineer unit involved in
reopening the Salang tunnel. In November 2001 they opened a hospital in
Kabul that treated over 5,200 patients before the Russians turned it
over to the Afghanis in, by their reporting, January 2002. Russian aide
shipments have come through EMERCON, and to date have delivered tons of
food stuffs; tons of medical supplies; 15,282 beds; 11,000 blankets;
1,200 heaters; and 780 tents. They also had a search and rescue
detachment at Dushanbe, Tajikistan, which has since redeployed.
[Deleted].
role of u.s. forces in the republics
23. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, it is well known that we have
hundreds of troops deployed to the former Soviet Republics bordering
Afghanistan. What are their specific roles? What compensation is the
United States paying for allowing our forces to operate out of the
republics?
General Franks. The role of U.S. and coalition troops deployed to
the ``Stans'' is in support of the campaign in Afghanistan. We have a
base in Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan that continues to function as an
operational and logistics sustainment base for Operation Enduring
Freedom. We hope to remain engaged at this base for the foreseeable
future. In Manas, Kyrgystan we are engaged with the government to
develop a coalition logistics hub for operations in Afghanistan. Manas
also has potential for use in the future for contingency forward
basing.
Kyrgyz Republic: [Deleted]
Uzbekistan: [Deleted]
Turkmenistan: [Deleted]
Tajikistan: [Deleted]
Kazakhstan: [Deleted]
reserve components
24. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, the fight against terrorism,
both at home and overseas, has again demonstrated our reliance on the
Reserve components. I know you agree with me that without the support
of our citizen soldiers, the battle against the Taliban would have been
longer. Based on your experience with the Reserve components units
deployed in your theater, what improvements should be made regarding
their training and equipment?
General Franks. Senator Thurmond, you are right on target
highlighting the magnificent contribution our Reserve men and women
have made to this operation. The Reserve Forces and individual
augmentees we have received fill critical roles. Their training should
continue to be focused on maintaining the same standards their active
duty counterparts train to and their equipment should be of the same
quality as what the active force trains with. I would have to defer to
the Service Chiefs, for how they envision training and equipping the
Reserves as an integral part of the Total Force.
no-fly zones
25. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, although we are all focused
on Afghanistan, we must not forget that our forces are still engaged in
maintaining the no-fly zones over Iraq. Although the news that our
forces bombed an Iraqi radar site or a missile site periodically
reminds us of this mission, the danger and importance of this mission
are fading from the Nation's memory. What is the scope of the current
effort to enforce the no-fly zone, and how has the effort against the
Taliban impacted this mission? What allies are actively contributing
forces to this effort?
General Franks. The scope and mission of our Operation Southern
Watch (OSW) has not changed because of Afghanistan. The Combined Forces
Air Component Commander (CFACC) has worked diligently to ensure
enforcement of the southern no-fly zone in Iraq. [Deleted] We are
looking at new and better ways to maintain our vigilance without
depleting resources.
military cooperation with iran
26. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, President Bush has identified
Iran as one of the so-called axis of evil states. Although I agree with
the President that Iran has a history of support for terrorism, I have
read articles in which there are implications that Iran supported our
effort in Afghanistan. At the CENTCOM level, have you had any contact
with Iranian military or civilian leadership? What, if any, interaction
was there between the coalition and Iran in defeating the Taliban?
General Franks. [Deleted].
force structure
27. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, no doubt the strikes against
terrorism have stressed our personnel, equipment, and resources.
Although you have successfully carried out the mission, I am confident
that the task would have been easier with better and more resources.
What specific type of military specialty skills and equipment were not
available to you because of shortfalls in the inventory?
General Franks. I am extremely proud of the efforts and
achievements of our forces in this operation. All the services have
readily provided everything, from troops to equipment, I have asked
for. Because of this, I have not felt constrained in the execution of
my mission.
There are items that, if available in greater quantities, would
have given me greater operational freedom. We do need more strength in
our strategic lift capability. For Operation Enduring Freedom we have
flown the C-17s in more than 1,500 strategic lifts, have relied on the
C-5 for almost 600 strategic lifts, and have also flown more than 3,000
C-130 sorties inside the theater. Our ability to move quickly and in an
agile way into a theater of operations is critical to mission success
and so I support any effort to increase our mobility and strategic lift
capability.
Additionally, our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
strategy is sound but is constrained by the scarcity of assets--both
platforms and trained linguists and analysts. The necessity of
maintaining 24-hour focus on disparate targets amplifies the effects of
critical shortages in key surveillance platforms and crews. We are
forced to choose between applying resources to competing high-value
targets in different locations. Continued congressional support is
essential to these vital intelligence programs, which are central to
our ability to provide force protection and actionable intelligence to
our combat forces.
civil affairs
28. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, the Marine Corps Capstone
Concept is Expeditionary Maneuver from the Sea. The Corps also talks
about scalability, the ability to tailor their Marine Air Ground Task
Forces (MAGTF) to meet the mission. The Marine Expeditionary Unit
Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC), which you employed in Afghanistan
with great success, is advertised as a presence and engagement force
which promotes peace and stability. In your estimate does the MEUSOC
have the ability to plan and conduct civil military operations and
deploy with organic Civil Affairs assets, or is it necessary for them
to reach back for this capability or link to other U.S. Forces such as
U.S. Special Operations Command assets in theater?
General Franks. The MEUSOC does not have organic civil affairs
assets to plan and conduct civil-military operations (CMO). If CMO
planning is necessary, the MEUSOC requests civil affairs support. A
Marine Corps civil affairs group (CAG) normally provides this support.
The Marine Corps has two CAGs, both are in the Reserve component. U.S.
Army civil affairs forces can also provide this support with a civil
affairs battalion substituting for a CAG. The U.S. Army currently has
one active component civil affairs battalion and 25 Reserve component
battalions.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith
linguists
29. Senator Smith. General Franks, I have seen press accounts
indicating that we did not have sufficient numbers of linguists trained
in the languages spoken in Afghanistan, such as Dahri and Pashto, to
communicate with the locals as quickly as we would have liked. Did you
have enough foreign language speakers in the appropriate language
skills to provide the essential link between your forces and the native
population? Would you have liked to have more, and do we need more
language training programs?
General Franks. [Deleted].
night vision capabilities
30. Senator Smith. General Franks, it has been reported in the
press that the Marine Corps has assessed that they need improvement in
their night target designation capability. Has this shortfall been an
obstacle to planning operations, and would it be beneficial for you to
have improved night vision capabilities?
General Franks. Senator Smith, from my perspective, the Marine
Corps has done a magnificent job in Afghanistan. However, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps obviously desires the best equipment for
our marines, and I would defer any questions as to shortfalls to him.
intelligence gathering in afghanistan
31. Senator Smith. General Franks, clandestine direct-action
operations, particularly those aimed at capturing or killing specific
individuals or groups, depend on having timely, high-quality
intelligence about the targets in question. Are U.S. intelligence-
gathering capabilities against targets in Afghanistan sufficient to
provide special operations forces with high quality intelligence on a
timely basis?
General Franks. Your question of ``sufficiency'' of intelligence
gathering to support special operations forces (SOF) operations ``on a
timely basis'' is best answered in light of the operational environment
in Afghanistan. The Intelligence Community overall has been very
responsive to the unique and often demanding needs of the SOF for
mission planning and execution. [Deleted]
We may never have all of the intelligence fidelity we want, but we
must have a robust ``base-force'' of HUMINT/SIGINT/IMINT capability
from which to draw.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum
interim brigade combat teams in afghanistan
32. Senator Santorum. General Franks, the Army is already forming
two Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd
Infantry Division (Medium) and 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry
Division (Light), at Fort Lewis, Washington. Yet when it came time this
past November to insert ground forces into Afghanistan, it was the
Marines that were tasked the responsibility of taking control of a base
near Kandahar. Some have commented that these Marine forces combine
more tactical maneuver capability and more firepower to sustain
themselves than the Army's comparable rapid-deployment forces. Why were
the two IBCTs--currently using surrogate equipment similar to the
Marines Corps' equipment--not deployed to Afghanistan? Since we have
heard that ``transformation'' is more than just new equipment, wouldn't
a deployment to Afghanistan offer the perfect opportunity to
demonstrate the training, tactics, and doctrine that are inherent to
the IBCTs?
General Franks. That is a very good question, but to answer it
properly I would like to focus on those weeks immediately after
September 11. During that time we were aggressively seeking country
clearances for over-flight and basing of our forces in the area of
operations. We were also rapidly flowing special operations and air
forces, and their supporting equipment into theater. Movement of these
forces required a Herculean strategic airlift effort. The utility of
the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), already
forward deployed aboard ships and, thus, not affected by country
clearances, made them a force of choice. Of equal importance, the
Marine Expeditionary Units have their own inherent logistic support.
The fact that the Navy and Marine Team could quickly sail into position
and assume a multitude of missions meant that there was no immediate
need to deploy an IBCT like unit. Depending on geographic
considerations the IBCT may well be the force of choice for future
operations.
precision munitions
33. Senator Santorum. General Franks, as we saw with the air war in
Kosovo, the services have increasingly relied heavily on the use of
preferred or precision munitions in the execution of military
operations. Reports are that 10,000 of the 18,000 munitions used in the
conflict in Afghanistan have been precision munitions. Do we currently
have an adequate inventory of precision munitions to press the war on
terrorism to another theater and still conduct military operations in
Afghanistan?
General Franks. Senator Santorum, many of the precision munitions
used in Afghanistan were Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). The
high demand for these relatively inexpensive but very effective weapons
will require us to ensure adequate inventory is maintained. [Deleted].
precision munitions
34. Senator Santorum. General Franks, with respect to laser-guided
bombs (LGBs), would the Department prefer to procure these munitions on
a sole-source or competitive basis?
General Franks. [Deleted].
role of pakistani intelligence
35. Senator Santorum. General Franks, there is evidence linking the
Taliban with elements of Pakistan's intelligence service, the Inter-
Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID). The ISID is tasked with the
collection of foreign and domestic intelligence; coordination of
intelligence functions of the three military services; surveillance
over its cadre, foreigners, the media, politically active segments of
Pakistani society, diplomats of other countries accredited to Pakistan
and Pakistani diplomats serving outside the country; the interception
and monitoring of communications; and the conduct of covert offensive
operations. Has Pakistan's ISID been helpful in providing timely and
accurate information?
General Franks. [Deleted].
pakistan's inter-services intelligence directorate
36. Senator Santorum. General Franks, what changes has General
Pervez Musharraf taken with respect to leadership within the ISI? Has
the ISI demonstrated a bias in favor of the Taliban?
General Franks. [Deleted].
central command and cyber safeguards
37. Senator Santorum. General Franks, in response to a question
raised by Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, you noted that Operation
Enduring Freedom was being coordinated from U.S. Central Command
headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida as opposed to
in theater. In your response to Senator Roberts, you indicated that
technological advances since the Persian Gulf War had enabled U.S.
Central Command to accomplish this task. Do you have adequate
safeguards and security in place to protect against a cyber-attack or
cyber-intrusion made by a hostile or malicious entity?
General Franks. Command and Control of Operation Enduring Freedom
is primarily conducted over secure Department of Defense networks that
use National Security Agency approved encryption for communications. We
have also deployed intrusion detection systems at every classified and
unclassified connection to the Defense Information Systems Network to
actively block hostile activity. Additionally, U.S. Central Command has
updated its information assurance policies to defend against emerging
technologies and more sophisticated hacker attacks. Standard firewall
and router configurations have been implemented to reduce exposure of
U.S. Central Command's networks to unauthorized users. Assessments are
performed both remotely and on site using automated tools to detect and
correct known vulnerabilities. We have seen an increase in probing and
intrusion attempts over the last 6 months but our implemented defense
mechanisms have prevented unauthorized access.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard
space systems in afghanistan
38. Senator Allard. General Franks, the early budget materials
we've had an opportunity to review suggest that space-based
capabilities are receiving greater priority than they have in the past.
What is your view on the role that military and commercial space
systems have played in the Afghan campaign, the contributions they have
made, and any shortfalls you may have identified?
General Franks. Senator Allard, with regard to U.S. military
satellites, we have taken full advantage of all of our space systems
and maximized their contributions to combat operations: [deleted].
[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Cleland, Landrieu, Reed, E. Benjamin Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton,
Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, and
Bunning.
Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; Gabriella Eisen,
nominations clerk; Gary J. Howard, systems administrator; and
Bridget M. Whalan, special assistant.
Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard
W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling,
counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
Republican staff director; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff
member; L. David Cherington, minority counsel; George W.
Lauffer, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie,
professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff
member; Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel; and Richard F.
Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Daniel K. Goldsmith, Andrew Kent,
and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Barry Gene (B.G.)
Wright, assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Neal
Orringer, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Benjamin L. Cassidy,
assistant to Senator Warner; Dan Twining, assistant to Senator
McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Robert
Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders
and Lance Landry, assistants to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway
II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Michael Bopp, assistant to
Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator
Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody. Our committee
meets this afternoon to receive testimony from Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and from General Tommy Franks,
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command. The subject is
Operation Enduring Freedom, the campaign against the al Qaeda
terrorists and the Taliban regime that harbored them. We
welcome both of our witnesses to the committee this afternoon.
We thank you again for your great service to our Nation.
General Franks testified before the committee on February
7, 4 months after the commencement of Operation Enduring
Freedom. We are now more than 9 months into the operation and
significant changes have taken place on the ground in
Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition military successes have created
a situation in which much good has taken place, both for the
fight against terrorism and for the people of Afghanistan. The
Taliban has been removed from power. Al Qaeda has lost its safe
haven. The U.N.-authorized International Security Assistance
Force has brought a more secure environment to Kabul and
enabled the meeting there of the emergency Loya Jirga in June,
which elected President Karzai and a Transitional Authority to
govern Afghanistan.
Over 1 million refugees and hundreds of thousands of
internally displaced persons have returned. Over 3 million
children have returned to primary school. A poppy eradication
program is underway with substantial assistance from Great
Britain. A nationwide vaccination campaign has been launched.
U.S. and French soldiers have complementary training
programs for an Afghan army and the first ethnically mixed
class of 350 enlisted men and 36 officers graduated last week.
The Germans are training an Afghan police force.
Despite the battlefield successes and in some cases because
of them, numerous challenges and problems remain. Remaining
Taliban and al Qaeda forces have learned to avoid massing their
forces and now operate in smaller guerrilla-like groups that
are harder to track and defeat. They also avoid open areas and
operate out of and intermingle with civilians in towns and
villages.
Security outside of Kabul and its environs is lacking, with
factional fighting between forces loyal to various warlords and
banditry in rural areas taking their toll on civilians and aid
agencies. The absence of central government control from these
areas is discouraging international donors from making badly
needed investments. Promised aid from the international
community is slow to arrive and little has been pledged for
reconstruction.
Regional warlords are refusing to send customs and taxes
that they collect to Kabul. The Afghan Vice President for
transitional assistance has been assassinated and President
Karzai has dismissed his Afghan bodyguards and replaced them
with American soldiers. A severe drought continues and, with
refugees returning in record numbers, a humanitarian crisis may
be looming this coming winter.
Finally, there have been several instances in which U.S.
military action has mistakenly resulted in civilian casualties.
Various polls and anecdotal evidence point to a resultant loss
of Afghan public support for U.S. military efforts in
Afghanistan and an accompanying loss of confidence in the
government of President Karzai.
This background raises a number of issues that I hope we
will be able to explore this afternoon. For example, should we
heed the advice of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who
believes that ``a limited expansion of the International
Security Assistance Force to areas outside of Kabul would make
a huge contribution to the consolidation of peace?''
Should U.S. forces in Afghanistan make a special effort to
support the government of President Karzai and assist it in
spreading its control throughout the country?
Should a method be found, perhaps through the Agency for
International Development, to provide development assistance to
those communities that have mistakenly suffered casualties from
U.S. or coalition military action?
We all look forward to the testimony of our witnesses this
afternoon as we seek to explore these issues and other issues
relating to the road ahead in Afghanistan. We will have a
closed session immediately following this session in our main
hearing room, Russell 222. Before we hear, of course, from our
witnesses, I will turn to Senator Warner for any comments that
he may wish to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming these witnesses.
As you recall, Mr. Chairman, on July 9 of this year, I
wrote a formal letter to you requesting that this committee
have this hearing we are now holding today prior to our August
recess. I ask unanimous consent that my letter be made a part
of the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Warner. It has been a number of months, 6 in total,
since the committee has conducted a hearing on Operation
Enduring Freedom and operations in and around the AOR of
Afghanistan. Almost 10 months have passed since our U.S. troops
and coalition partners began military operations against the
Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. I, for one, remain amazed
at our initial successes in Afghanistan. It is a great credit
to the leadership given by our President, by our Secretary of
Defense, by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and yourself,
General, and, most particularly, the men and women of the Armed
Forces that carried out your orders.
The American people are very proud of what has been done
and there is justification for that pride. It has been earned
through hard work and indeed tragic losses of life and limb.
Our thoughts and our prayers are with the families of those who
have suffered, as always has been, the brunt of warfare.
Mr. Secretary, you were quite prophetic when you warned us
early that despite the initial successes, this war was far from
over. Afghanistan remains a very dangerous place. We see the
manifestation of that warning almost every day. As active
military operations have become less frequent and peacekeeping
and nation building efforts have moved to the forefront, it
becomes more important than ever for Congress and the American
people to fully understand the military missions and diplomatic
tasks that remain to be done.
Again, it is a tribute to the President, to all of you, and
our men and women in uniform that so much has been accomplished
in such a short period. The Taliban regime has been defeated
and dismantled. The al Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan
has been effectively disrupted and its remaining elements are
on the run. Yet today, we receive reports that there is some
coalescing of those forces and possibly a designation of new
leaders. I hope you will touch on that point. A level of peace
and security is being established that allows humanitarian aid,
as the Chairman said, to flow.
By any measure, these operations have been successful.
However, we must be mindful that much remains to be done.
Pockets of the Taliban and the al Qaeda resistance continue to
pose targets and must be rooted out. That is tedious,
dangerous, and risky work for the U.S. and our allied forces.
Our allied forces have played a major role in this war, and
the coalition has been very successful. However, warlords
continue to menace the countryside outside of Kabul. I still
call them warlords. Mr. Secretary, you have another name for
them that you use in your formal statement. But as yet, they
are not fully committed to the concepts of central government
and democracy, and that poses a challenge.
Afghanistan, yes, is now on a path toward democracy with
the beginnings of a central government. But what military
missions remain for the United States and the coalition troops?
Our coalition partners, particularly the Turks, are leading an
International Security Assistance Force to help maintain order
and security in and around Kabul. The mandate for this force
will expire in December of this year. What is the future role
and scope of this force and, most particularly, U.S.
responsibilities?
Our President has committed to help Afghanistan organize
and train a national police force and an army to ensure
internal stability and security. That is a good and sound
decision. But what is the status of this endeavor? What role
are our coalition partners playing to share the burdens?
Al Qaeda appears to be on the run from Afghanistan, but
other nations in the region have harbored or condoned similar
activities in the past. What is the next step in this global
war on terrorism?
The attacks of September 11 introduced this Nation to a new
era and a new kind of conflict, not against nations with
standing Armed Forces, but against a worldwide network of
terrorists who do not observe the commonly accepted laws and
conventions of the civilized world. Unconventional war,
asymmetric war, has become the norm. This new era demands
capabilities that can defend, defeat, and deter both expected
and unexpected threats.
All of us have learned many lessons from this conflict.
General Franks, we look forward to you to talk specifically
about the lessons learned for today and tomorrow's military.
Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush have made it clear
that transforming our forces to defend America from current and
emerging threats is their highest priority. This committee has
worked with you on that. We have a bill in conference now which
goes a long way to achieve many of those goals. Clearly,
however, we must continue to learn from these experiences and
build on our capabilities that have served us as well in this
operation.
As our Nation rebuilds and moves forward from that tragic
day of September 11, it will be remembered as a unifying
moment. Our Nation is united as I perceive it today in purpose
and determination as seldom before in our history, perhaps not
as strongly as since the closing days of World War II. We are
behind the President, and we are behind the soldiers, the
sailors, the airmen, and the marines in the front lines.
As the military effort evolves, we in Congress will do
everything we can to provide our Armed Forces the resources and
capabilities they need to win this war and to continue to wage
the fight on terrorism wherever it is.
I thank you both for coming today and I look forward to
hearing your testimony.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Before we turn to Secretary Rumsfeld for his opening
statement, at this time, I insert for the record, without
objection, the prepared statement of Senator Thurmond. Also at
this time, the committee will take a brief recess and will
reconvene shortly.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond
Mr. Chairman, I want to express my appreciation to you and to
Senator Warner, our Ranking Member, for scheduling this hearing on
Operation Enduring Freedom. Although the Armed Services Committee has
received numerous closed briefings on these operations, this is the
first hearing totally dedicated to our activities in Afghanistan. I
believe it is important that we air this matter in a public forum and
that the American people have the opportunity to hear from the most
senior officials in the Department of Defense in a forum other than the
daily press briefings.
Our Nation is blessed to have the most professional soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines in the world. They have displayed that
professionalism during the past months under the most arduous
conditions and with great sacrifice. In that regard, I again want to
express my condolences to the families and friends of the soldiers,
sailors, and airmen who have been killed or wounded in the war against
the terrorist forces in Afghanistan and the Philippines. I want them
all to know how proud I am of their service and sacrifice.
Mr. Chairman, as President Bush told the Nation, the war against
terrorism will be long and challenging. It will be fought by small
special units and out of the glare of the headlines. The past months
have lived up to that prediction. After the first important victories,
our forces are now hunting down the terrorist forces on a ``one by
one'' basis, a process that is trying some of our countrymen's
patience. I anticipate that the hunt for the terrorist will take longer
than any of us anticipated and we may not have the absolute victory
that we all seek. Although defeating terrorism must be our ultimate
goal, concurrently we must provide an environment in Afghanistan that
will permit this war torn nation to rebuild its political and economic
base. If we can dedicate the resources and time to rebuild Bosnia and
Kosovo, we must be willing to do the same for Afghanistan. I hope that
both Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks will focus on this issue
during their testimony. We have sacrificed too many lives and resources
in Afghanistan to let the country and its people revert to chaos and
anarchy.
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks, I look forward to your
testimony and want to express my appreciation for the job you both are
doing in leading our forces in this war against terrorism.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 3:12 p.m., the hearing recessed and the
committee proceeded to other business; the hearing reconvened
at 3:20 p.m.]
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, we turn to you.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee. I thank you for this opportunity to update the
committee on our progress in the war on terrorism. Certainly
since September 11, when you and Senator Warner arrived at the
Pentagon, this committee has given its full support to the
global war on terror, for which we express our appreciation.
I am very pleased to be here with the combatant commander
of the U.S. Central Command, General Tommy Franks. He is an
outstanding soldier, an able leader, and is doing a superb job
for our country.
General Franks and I had the pleasure of spending some
portion of this morning with another outstanding officer who is
sitting behind General Franks, who was also front and center in
Afghanistan for a good period. His name is Colonel John
Mulholland, United States Army, the Fifth Special Forces Group.
He has been in Washington to brief on lessons learned from the
activities in which he was involved in Afghanistan and is
currently stationed back in his home base at Fort Campbell,
Kentucky.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to make some brief remarks and
then have my full remarks put in the record.
Chairman Levin. They will be made part of the record.
Secretary Rumsfeld. While we have made good progress, as
each of you has indicated, in a relatively short period of
time, it is also true that this war is far from over. We face
very determined adversaries. They have demonstrated ingenuity,
a callous disregard for innocent human life, and victory will
not come easily or quickly. It will require patience of the
American people at home and the courage of our service men and
women abroad. Fortunately, patience and courage are virtues
that our Nation has in abundance, and I have no doubt that we
will prevail.
Last fall when President Bush announced the start of the
war on terrorism, he made clear his determination that
terrorists that threaten us will find no safe haven, no
sanctuary, and that their state sponsors will be held
accountable and made to understand that there is a price to be
paid for financing, harboring, and otherwise supporting
terrorists. He issued a worldwide call to arms, inviting all
freedom-loving nations to join in this fight.
Mr. Chairman, in the intervening months, the world has
responded to the President's call. The global coalition that
President Bush and Secretary Powell assembled comprises today
some 70 countries. Each is making important contributions to
the global war on terror. We are now roughly 9 months into the
war, still closer to the beginning than the end. But while much
difficult work remains before us, it is worth taking a moment
to reflect and take stock on just how much U.S. and coalition
forces have accomplished thus far in reversing the tide of
terrorism.
At this time last year, Afghanistan was a pariah state. The
Taliban regime was in power and brutally repressing the Afghan
people. Afghanistan was a sanctuary for thousands of foreign
terrorists who had free range to train, plan, organize, and
finance attacks on innocent civilians across the globe. A
humanitarian crisis of considerable proportions loomed.
Assistance was disrupted, famine was pervasive, and refugees
were fleeing their country by literally hundreds of thousands.
Consider just some of the human rights reports which
detailed conditions in Afghanistan before the arrival of
coalition forces. Amnesty International's 2001 Human Rights
Report declared that Afghans suffered pervasive human rights
abuses, including arbitrary detention and torture. The Taliban
continued to impose harsh restrictions on personal conduct and
behavior as a means of enforcing their particular
interpretation of Islamic law. Young women living in areas
captured by the Taliban were reportedly abducted by guards and
taken against their will to Taliban commanders.
Human Rights Watch's report of 2001 described a situation
where Taliban forces subjected local civilians to a ruthless
and systematic policy of collective punishment. There was
systematic discrimination against women. Violations of a dress
code could result in public beatings and lashings by the
religious police, who wield leather batons reinforced with
metal studs.
Women were not permitted to work outside the home except in
health care, and girls over 8 years old were not permitted to
attend school. All of this was enforced by the so-called
Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.
Mr. Chairman, what a difference a year makes. Today, thanks
to the coalition efforts and the remarkable courage of our men
and women in uniform, the Taliban have been driven from power,
al Qaeda is on the run, and Afghanistan is no longer a base for
terrorist operations or a breeding ground for radical Islamic
militancy. The beatings by religious police and executions in
soccer stadiums have stopped. The humanitarian crisis has been
averted, international workers are no longer held hostage, aid
is once again flowing, and the Afghan people have been
liberated.
Through the recent Loya Jirga process, the Afghan people
have exercised their right of self-determination. A new
president has been selected, a new cabinet has been sworn in,
and a transitional government representative of the people has
been established to lead the nation for the next 2 years until
a constitutional Loya Jirga is held.
We are working with the new Afghan government to lay the
foundations for longer term stability and to reverse the
conditions that allowed terrorist regimes to take root in the
first place. The U.S. and others are helping to train a new
Afghan National Army, a force committed not to one group or one
faction, but to the defense of the entire nation, which we hope
will allow Afghans to take responsibility for their own
security rather than relying on foreign forces.
Last week, the first battalion of more than 300 soldiers
graduated and there are an additional 600 Afghan soldiers being
trained in two battalions.
We also have helped avert a humanitarian catastrophe. The
U.S. and coalition partners have delivered some 500,000 metric
tons of food since the start of the war--enough to feed almost
7 million needy Afghans. Thanks to those efforts, the grim
predictions of starvation last winter did not come to pass.
U.S. military-civil affairs teams have dug wells, built
hospitals, repaired roads, bridges, and irrigation canals. They
have rebuilt 49 schools in 8 different regions. Thanks to those
efforts, some 30,000 boys and girls--the hope and future of the
country--are back in school. One civil affairs team has even
introduced Afghan children to Little League baseball. Last
Friday, they held their first game.
De-mining teams from Norway, Britain, Poland, and Jordan
have helped clear land mines from hundreds of thousands of
square meters of terrain. Jordan built a hospital in Mazar-e
Sharif that has now treated more than 92,000 patients,
including 22,000 children. Spain and Korea have also built
hospitals. Japan has pledged $500 million to rehabilitate
Afghanistan. Russia has cleared out and rebuilt the Salang
Tunnel, the main artery linking Kabul with the north, allowing
transportation of thousands of tons of food and medicine and
supplies.
With the cooperation of over 80 countries across the globe,
some 2,400 individuals around the world have been detained and
interrogated, and over 500 enemy combatants are currently under
DOD control. I think the number currently is something like
650. They are being interrogated and they are yielding
information that is helping to prevent further violence and
bloodshed.
For example, with the help of our Pakistani allies, we have
captured a senior al Qaeda leader who in turn provided
information that led to the capture of still other senior al
Qaeda leaders. For every terrorist plot we discover and every
terrorist cell that is disrupted, there are dozens of others in
the works. Al Qaeda operated not only in Afghanistan, but in
more than 60 countries, including the U.S. They have trained
literally thousands of terrorists who are now at large across
the globe.
Moreover, al Qaeda is not the only global network, and
other terrorist networks have growing relationships with
terrorist states that harbor and finance them, and may one day
share weapons of mass destruction with them.
Our goal in Afghanistan is to ensure that that country does
not again become a training ground for terrorists. That work
is, of course, not complete. Taliban and al Qaeda fugitives are
still at large. Some are in Afghanistan. Others are just across
the borders, waiting for an opportunity to return. They
continue to pose a threat.
These are real challenges, but the security situation,
while not ideal, is significantly improved from what we found
on our arrival 9 months ago. The best measure of progress is
the flow of people. Since January, hundreds of thousands of
Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons have returned
to their homes. That is a ringing vote of confidence in the
progress that is being made in Afghanistan. These people are
voting with their feet. They are concluding that life is better
in Afghanistan than it was where they were, and I suspect that
they are right.
By making clear from the beginning that this was not a war
against Islam, by keeping our footprint modest, by partnering
with Afghan forces that oppose the Taliban and al Qaeda, and by
demonstrating our concern for the welfare of the Afghan people
through the delivery of humanitarian relief from the very first
days of the war, we showed the Afghan people that we were
coming as a force of liberation, not a force of occupation. In
most of the country, coalition forces have been welcomed as
liberators.
Understandably, our military mission has changed and
evolved. Some forces are now rotating out of Afghanistan. This
should not be taken as a sign that the effort in Afghanistan is
wrapping up. It is not. To the contrary, in recent weeks,
Turkey has increased its Afghan presence by sending over 1,300
troops to Kabul to assume leadership of the International
Security Assistance Force. Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands
will soon deploy F-16 fighters to Kyrgystan--that is
Kyrgystan--which it was misquoted the other day and caused a
little stir in Kurdistan--and they are going to be there for
air operations.
Romania has deployed an infantry battalion to Afghanistan
and has offered an infantry mountain company, a nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons response company, and four
MiG-21 fighters. Slovakia will soon deploy an engineering unit.
Special operations forces from Canada, Germany, Australia, and
other nations continue to work with U.S. Special Forces teams
on the ground, combing through caves searching for Taliban and
al Qaeda fugitives, and gathering critical intelligence
information. They are also creating a presence with the
regional political leaders, or warlords as some people call
them, which is contributing to a considerably more stable
situation in that country because of their presence.
Moreover, our hunt for terrorist networks is not limited to
Afghanistan. The war on terrorism is a global campaign against
a global adversary--indeed, adversaries, plural. We learned on
September 11 that in a world of international finance,
communication, and transportation, even relatively isolated
individuals and organizations can have global reach and the
ability to bring unprecedented destruction on innocent
civilians.
The challenge for us is to find a way to live in that 21st
century world as free people. Let there be no doubt we can do
so, but it requires new ways of thinking, new ways of fighting,
and new strategies for defending our people and our way of
life.
The war on terrorism began in Afghanistan, to be sure, but
it will not end there. It will not end until terrorist networks
have been rooted out. It will not end until the state sponsors
of terror are made to understand that aiding, abetting, and
harboring terrorists has deadly consequences for those who do
so. It will not end until those developing nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons end their threats to innocent men,
women, and children. It will not end until our people and the
people of the world's free nations can once again live in
peace, free from fear.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement. I would like to
submit my written statement and these maps for the record.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I apologize for the
distraction of having to hold my hand in the air, but the surgeon tells
me that I need to keep it above my heart for several more weeks.
Thank you for this opportunity to update the committee on our
progress in the war on terror.
While we have made good progress in a relatively short period of
time, let there be no doubt: this war is far from over. The road ahead
will be difficult and dangerous. We face determined adversaries. They
have demonstrated ingenuity and a callous disregard for innocent human
life. Victory will not come easily or quickly--it will require patience
from Americans at home, and the courage of our service men and women
abroad. Fortunately, patience and courage are virtues our Nation has in
abundance. I have no doubt that we will prevail.
Last fall, when President Bush announced the start of the war on
terrorism, he declared war not just on the perpetrators of the deadly
attacks of September 11, but against all terrorists of global reach,
their organizations and sponsors.
He made clear his determination that terrorists that threaten us
will find no safe haven, no sanctuary, anywhere--and that their state
sponsors will be held accountable and made to understand there is a
heavy price to be paid for financing, harboring, or otherwise
supporting terrorists. He issued a worldwide call to arms, inviting all
freedom-loving nations to join us in this fight.
Mr. Chairman, in the intervening months, the world has responded to
the President's call. The global coalition President Bush assembled
comprises some 70 nations. They are helping in many different ways.
Most are sharing intelligence. Many are seizing terrorist assets or
breaking up terrorist cells on their territory. Others are providing
airlift, basing, over-flight and refueling, or are contributing air,
sea and ground forces, combat air patrols, mine clearing, and special
operations. Some are helping quietly, others openly. But each is making
important contributions to the global war on terror.
We are now roughly 9 months into this war, still closer to the
beginning than to the end. But while much difficult work remains before
us, it is worth taking a moment to reflect and take stock of just how
much U.S. and coalition forces have accomplished thus far in reversing
the tide of terrorism.
At this time last year, Afghanistan was a pariah state. The Taliban
regime was in power and brutally repressed the Afghan people. The
country was a sanctuary for thousands of foreign terrorists, who had
free range to train, plan and organize attacks on innocent civilians
across the globe. There was harsh repressive rule. The economy and
banking sector were in a state of collapse, and the country was
financially dependent on terrorist networks and overseas Islamic
extremist elements. A humanitarian crisis of considerable proportions
loomed. Humanitarian assistance was disrupted, famine was pervasive,
and refugees were fleeing the country by the hundreds of thousands.
Consider just some of the human rights reports which detailed
conditions in Afghanistan before the arrival of coalition forces:
According to the State Department's February 2001 Human Rights
Report, ``The Taliban continued to commit numerous, serious and
systemic abuses. Citizens were unable to change their government or
choose their leaders peacefully. The Taliban carried out summary
justice . . . and . . . were responsible for political and other extra-
judicial killings, including targeted killings, summary executions, and
deaths in custody. . . . Women and girls were subjected to rape,
kidnapping, and forced marriage.''
Amnesty International's 2001 Human Rights Report declared that
Afghans suffered pervasive ``human rights abuses, including arbitrary
detention and torture. . . . The Taliban continued to impose harsh
restrictions on personal conduct and behavior as a means of enforcing
their particular interpretation of Islamic law. . . . Young women
living in areas captured by the Taliban . . . were reportedly abducted
by guards and taken against their will as `wives' for Taliban
commanders.''
Human Rights Watch's report for 2001 described a situation where
``Taliban forces subjected local civilians to a ruthless and systematic
policy of collective punishment. Summary executions, the deliberate
destruction of homes, and confiscation of farmland were recurrent
practices in these campaigns.'' There was ``systematic discrimination
against women. . . . Violations of the dress code . . . could result in
public beatings and lashing by the Religious Police, who wielded
leather batons reinforced with metal studs. Women were not permitted to
work outside the home except in the area of health care, and girls over
8 years old were not permitted to attend school. The decrees
contributed to an illiteracy level for women of over 90 percent.'' All
of this enforced by the so-called Minister for the Promotion of Virtue
and the Prevention of Vice.
Human Right Watch also reported widespread ``harassment of
international aid agency staff,'' who were in some cases taken hostage.
According to the State Department report, in August 2001 ``the Taliban
arrested eight foreign aid workers affiliated with an NGO on charges of
proselytizing. An estimated 48 Afghan employees of the NGO also were
arrested and reportedly also charged with apostasy. . . . The Taliban
reportedly stated that 59 children who had been taught by the arrested
workers were sent to a correctional facility.''
Mr. Chairman, what a difference a year makes.
Today, thanks to coalition efforts--and the remarkable courage of
our men and women in uniform--the Taliban have been driven from power,
al Qaeda is on the run, Afghanistan is no longer a base of global
terrorist operations or a breeding ground for radical Islamic
militancy, the beatings by religious police and executions in soccer
stadiums have stopped, the humanitarian crisis has been averted,
international workers are no longer held hostage, aid is once again
flowing, and the Afghan people have been liberated. Afghanistan is a
free nation, where aid workers can provide humanitarian aid, girls can
study, women can work, the people can choose their leaders peacefully
and refugees can return.
Through the recent Loya Jirga process, the Afghan people have
exercised their right of self-determination. More than 1,500 delegates
from all 32 provinces and all ethnic backgrounds came together under
one roof to chart their nation's political future. A new president has
been selected, a new cabinet has been sworn in, a transitional
government representative of the Afghan people has been established to
lead the nation for the next 2 years until a constitutional Loya Jirga
is held.
The new Afghan government is still in its early stages, and it
doesn't yet have the institutions of government to direct, such as
internal security, tax collection and the like. But it has begun the
process of working to develop the banking sector, tax laws, and a new
currency. New trade and commercial investment policies are also being
put in place, with the aim of building foreign investor confidence. A
corps of civil servants is being established, with pay under U.N.
supervision, and ministries are beginning to function. The judicial
system is being reformed, so that rule of law can take root. A growing
civil society is emerging, with open political discourse and an
emerging free press. We're fortunate that their leadership is taking
seriously the challenge of self-government.
With self-government must eventually come self-sufficiency--and
that self-sufficiency must, over time, also extend to security. That is
why we are working with the new Afghan government to lay the
foundations for longer-term stability and to reverse the conditions
that allowed terrorist regimes to take root in the first place. The
U.S. and others are helping to train a new Afghan National Army--a
force committed not to one group or faction but to the defense of the
entire nation, which we hope will allow Afghans to take responsibility
for their own security rather than relying on foreign forces. Last
week, the 1st Battalion of more than 300 soldiers graduated, and there
are an additional 600 Afghan soldiers being trained in two battalions.
In all, we expect to train 18 battalions--over 10,000 soldiers--by the
end of 2003. We are also ``training the trainers'' so that the process
can eventually become self-sustaining. Already some 38 countries have
offered weapons, equipment, funds or support for this effort.
We have also helped to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in
Afghanistan. The U.S. and coalition partners have delivered over
500,000 metric tons of food since the start of the war--enough to feed
almost 7 million needy Afghans. Thanks to those efforts, the grim
predictions of starvation last winter did not come to pass. Today, the
United States is providing over $450 million in humanitarian assistance
for the Afghan people.
The Department of Defense has allotted $10 million to dozens of
humanitarian projects throughout Afghanistan. U.S. military civil
affairs teams have dug wells, built hospitals, and repaired roads,
bridges and irrigation canals. We have rebuilt 49 schools in eight
different regions. Thanks to those efforts, some 30,000 boys and
girls--the hope and future of Afghanistan--are back in school. One
civil affairs team has even introduced Afghan kids to Little League
baseball. They organized two teams, which have been practicing twice a
week for the past several weeks using donated baseball supplies. Last
Friday, they held Afghanistan's first Little League game.
It must be emphasized that coalition partners are making important
contributions. De-mining teams from Norway, Britain, Poland and Jordan
have helped clear land mines from hundreds of thousands of square
meters of terrain, although there are still an enormous number of land
mines in that country. Jordan built a hospital in Mazar-e Sharif that
has now treated more than 92,000 patients, including 22,000 children.
Spain and Korea have also built hospitals, and Japan has pledged $500
million to rehabilitate Afghanistan. Russia has cleared out and rebuilt
the Salang Tunnel, the main artery linking Kabul with the North,
allowing transportation of thousands of tons of food, medicine and
supplies.
With the cooperation of over 90 countries, some 2,400 individuals
around the world have been detained and interviewed, and over 500 enemy
combatants are currently under DOD control. They are being
interrogated, and are yielding information that is helping to prevent
further violence and bloodshed.
For example, with the help of our Pakistani allies, we captured a
senior al Qaeda leader, Abu Zubaydah, who in turn provided information
that led to the capture of others such as Jose Padilla--an American al
Qaeda operative.
Al Qaeda forces left behind valuable intelligence information--
computer hard drives, diskettes, laptops, videos, notebooks with
information--that has given us insight into their capabilities, how
they operate, and in some cases actionable intelligence about planned
terrorist operations. For example, videotapes found in an al Qaeda safe
house in Afghanistan revealed detailed plans of a plot to strike U.S.
targets in Singapore. Working with Singapore authorities, that al Qaeda
cell was broken up and their planned attack disrupted.
These successes must not lull us into complacency. For every
terrorist plot we discover and every terrorist cell we disrupt, there
are dozens of others in the works. Al Qaeda operates not only in
Afghanistan, but in more than 60 countries including the U.S.
Undoubtedly, coalition efforts have made recruitment harder, planning
harder, and moving between countries harder. But they have trained
literally thousands of terrorists who are now at large across the
globe. These ``sleeper'' cells undoubtedly have plans for further
attacks. They had raised a good deal of money, and they still have
financial backers giving them money.
Moreover, al Qaeda is not the only global terrorist network.
Terrorist networks have growing relationships with terrorist states
that harbor and finance them--and may one day share weapons of mass
destruction with them. What this means is that Afghanistan is only the
first stage in a long, difficult, and dangerous war on terrorism.
Our goal in Afghanistan is to ensure that that country does not,
again, become a terrorist training ground. That work is, of course, by
no means complete. Taliban and al Qaeda fugitives are still at large--
some are in Afghanistan, others fled across the borders waiting for the
opportunity to return. They continue to pose a threat. In recent weeks,
coalition forces have come under attack again in Kandahar and Oruzgan,
and Pakistani forces have engaged al Qaeda in a number of firefights,
reminders of the dangers that continue to exist.
Moreover, there are still ethnic tensions within Afghanistan, and
Afghanistan is still highly dependent on foreign assistance--both
financial aid and humanitarian relief. The country lacks agricultural
self-sufficiency, there are periodic outbreaks of cholera and
dysentery, and a high infant mortality rate due to poor hygiene and
inadequate medical services.
These are real challenges. But two things should be clear: One,
Afghanistan is clearly a much better place to live today than it was a
year ago. Two, the United States and its international partners are
making a maximum effort to assist Afghanistan's new government in
economic, humanitarian, security, and other fields.
Afghan leaders coming to Washington all attest that the security
picture in the country is sound. The Taliban have so far failed to
mount their often-predicted spring offensive. Despite numerous threats,
the Loya Jirga convened with no serious security incidents. Conflicts
among regional commanders have been dampened--often by discreet U.S.
influence exerted by our personnel. The security situation, while not
ideal, is significantly improved from what we found on our arrival 9
months ago, when the Taliban controlled and oppressed 90 percent of the
country.
The best measure of progress is the flow of people. Before the war
began, thousands upon thousands of refugees and internally displaced
persons had fled their homes to escape Taliban repression. Since
January, hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees and internally
displaced persons have returned to their homes. The Afghan people are
voting with their feet. They're coming back to their homes. That is a
ringing vote of confidence in the progress that's being made in
Afghanistan.
With the removal of the Taliban regime, and the efforts to break up
large pockets of al Qaeda as they tried to regroup, coalition efforts
in Afghanistan are now focused mostly on smaller operations--cave-by-
cave searches, sweeps for arms, intelligence, and smaller pockets of
terrorists as they have dispersed. Indeed, the humanitarian effort I
have described has been of invaluable assistance to us in these
operations.
By making clear from the beginning that this was not a war against
Islam, by keeping our footprint modest and partnering with Afghan
forces that opposed the Taliban and al Qaeda, and by demonstrating our
concern for the welfare of the Afghan people through the delivery of
humanitarian relief from the first days of the war, we showed the
Afghan people that we were coming as a force of liberation, not a force
of occupation.
In fact, out of 32 provinces in Afghanistan, our forces have
experienced harassment attacks in only a few provinces--in the former
Taliban strongholds of southern and eastern Afghanistan. In most of the
country coalition forces have been welcomed as liberators.
That, in turn, has paid dividends in the hunt for Taliban and al
Qaeda. For example, we have been finding additional caches of weapons
several times a week, not because we're clever or stumbled on them, but
because local Afghans have come to us and told us where those caches
are located. They are leading U.S. Special Forces and military
personnel to those caches, so that they can be gathered up and either
destroyed or provided to the new Afghan National Army. This too is a
vote of confidence in coalition efforts.
Understandably, as our military mission has changed and evolved,
some forces are now rotating out of Afghanistan, including from the
U.K. and Canada--even as they continue to play a critical role
elsewhere in the world. This should not be taken as a sign that the
effort in Afghanistan is wrapping up. To the contrary, in recent weeks:
Turkey has increased its Afghan presence, sending over
1,300 troops to Kabul to assume leadership of the International
Security Assistance Force.
Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands will soon deploy
F-16 fighters to Kyrgyzstan for air operations over
Afghanistan.
Romania has deployed an infantry battalion to
Afghanistan and has offered an infantry mountain company, a
nuclear, biological and chemical response company and four MiG-
21 fighters, and Slovakia will soon deploy an engineering unit.
Special Operation forces from Canada, Germany,
Australia and other nations continue to work with U.S. Special
Forces teams on the ground, combing through the caves,
searching for Taliban and al Qaeda fugitives, gathering
critical intelligence information.
Moreover, our hunt for terrorist networks is not limited to
Afghanistan. At this moment, planes and ships from Australia, Bahrain,
Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain,
the U.K. and others patrol the seas and skies in distant corners of the
globe, conducting aerial surveillance, leadership interdiction and
maritime interception operations. France and Italy have both deployed
their carrier battle groups to support Operation Enduring Freedom.
Germany has taken a leadership role with surface naval forces operating
around the Horn of Africa. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies
from dozens of countries are helping to seize terrorist assets, freeze
their bank accounts, close front companies, and disrupt terrorist cells
as they plan future attacks. Significant arrests have been made on many
continents, from Europe to Southeast Asia.
The war on terrorism is a global campaign against a global
adversary. We learned on September 11 that in a world of international
finance, communications, and transportation, even relatively isolated
individuals or organizations can have global reach--and the ability to
cause unprecedented destruction on innocent civilians.
The challenge for us is to find a way to live in that 21st century
world as free people. Let there be no doubt: we can do so. But it
requires new ways of thinking, new ways of fighting, and new strategies
for defending our people and our way of life.
In the war on terror, an enormous advantage accrues to the
attacker. A terrorist can strike at any place, at any time, using any
conceivable technique. It is physically impossible to defend our people
in every place, at every time, against every conceivable technique. So
the only way to deal with that threat is to take the war to the
terrorists--to go after them where they are, and kill them, capture
them or otherwise disrupt them. As the President has said, ``the first
and best way to secure America's homeland is to attack the enemy where
he hides and plans.'' This is what we have done, and are doing.
The war on terrorism began in Afghanistan, to be sure, but it will
not end there. It will not end until terrorist networks have been
rooted out, wherever they exist. It will not end until the state
sponsors of terror are made to understand that aiding, abetting and
harboring terrorists has deadly consequences for those that try it. It
will not end until those developing nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons end their threat to innocent men, women and children.
It will not end until our people--and the people of the world's
free nations--can once again live in peace and free from fear.
Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to take your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Franks.
STATEMENT OF GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and members
of the committee: I am honored to be here today with Secretary
Rumsfeld. I would ask that my statement be entered into the
record and I will provide brief verbal remarks.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
General Franks. I am honored to be here before the
committee today. I have in fact looked forward to this session
as an opportunity to highlight the extraordinary achievements
by more than 71,000 U.S. and coalition troops currently under
my command. In fact, that coalition is carrying the fight to
the enemy as described by the Secretary. Their courage,
tenacity, and professionalism inspire me every day and are
certainly a source of great pride to the American people.
When I last appeared before the committee on February 7 of
this year, I told you that our successes represented but first
steps in what would certainly be a long campaign, and that
remains the case. Our focus was on removing the Taliban from
power and destroying the al Qaeda network within Afghanistan.
Now the Taliban has, in fact, been destroyed in Afghanistan,
and we continue to locate and engage remaining pockets of
terrorists and their supporters to improve security and
stability of the emerging Afghan nation.
Over the past 6 months, Mr. Chairman, the coalition has
grown steadily from 50 nations to, as the Secretary said, 70
nations today. 40 of our coalition partners are currently
engaged in and around Afghanistan in support of our operations
and 24 nations have forces located inside Afghanistan as we
speak.
Successes up to this point are attributable to the will of
this country and to each of the coalition members--a will which
I believe has been grossly underestimated by the terrorist
organizations which threaten us still. The Taliban, as I
mentioned, is gone. Al Qaeda's senior leadership is in
disarray. Many of their planners, travel facilitators, and
logisticians are now dead or captured. Their training
facilities in Afghanistan were destroyed. Command and control
capabilities were disrupted and their remaining leaders are, as
the Secretary said, on the run.
However, al Qaeda has not lost its will to conceive, to
plan, and to execute terrorist operations worldwide. It is the
relentless pressure provided by our military, the militaries of
the coalition, and financial and diplomatic efforts over the
past 10 months that have prevented al Qaeda from sustaining its
pre-September 11 capacity.
In the month of March, U.S. and coalition, as well as
Afghan military forces, conducted the largest combat operation
to date in Afghanistan. That was Operation Anaconda. It
resulted in the elimination of the Shahi-Khot and Chumarra
Valleys as sanctuaries for concentrations of al Qaeda.
Operation Anaconda was a major success. A significant enemy
pocket was destroyed, and notice was served by that operation
that terrorists would have no safe harbor in Afghanistan.
Our efforts are now aimed at an operation we call Mountain
Lion. More than 300 weapon and ammunition caches have been
located and destroyed since January 1 this year during that
operation. An exceptionally encouraging trend is that over the
past 2 months, 159 of those caches were identified to us by
local Afghan people in the country.
As we led up to June's Loya Jirga, as described by the
Secretary, we made the decision to put a combined joint task
force, which we call CJTF-180, forward in Afghanistan commanded
by a three-star, a lieutenant general. This task force gives us
a single joint command responsible to me and to the Secretary
for all military functions in the country. It establishes a
full-time senior presence. That commander on the ground
developed very close personal and professional relationships
with Afghan military and political leaders, as well as senior
members of the Afghan transitional authority.
As the Secretary mentioned, we are now training the Afghan
National Army. On the 23rd of this month, the first battalion
of our 300 graduated soldiers. It was multi-ethnic. It was the
first battalion of its type in that country and, interestingly,
it was flanked on either side by two additional battalions
currently in training. For the first time in decades, the
beginnings of a professional, representative military force are
striving to form themselves to serve the people of Afghanistan.
Another vital factor contributing to stability within
Afghanistan has been and remains the International Security
Assistance Force. This force, initially headed by the United
Kingdom and now by Turkey, served to provide an environment
within Kabul wherein the Loya Jirga process could not only take
root, but could provide for the first elections held inside
Afghanistan in a long time. The contributions of this
International Security Assistance Force have been--and they
will continue to be--important to the Afghan people during the
current period of transition.
With the establishment of the most secure environment
Afghanistan has seen in more than 20 years, we were able to
effectively begin civil-military operations. Since March our
combined military task force that works with civil affairs
operations has deployed teams throughout Afghanistan and worked
with literally hundreds of non-governmental organizations as
they do the work, as they provide the humanitarian materials,
help provide the education system, repair agricultural
infrastructure, and provide water to the people. They have
identified 89 major humanitarian projects, 43 of which have
been completed.
As the Secretary says, what we have seen is that more than
600,000 internally displaced persons and more than 1.3 million
refugees have returned to their homes. People vote with their
feet.
While the return of this many Afghans to their homes will
certainly stress the infrastructure as it has been destroyed in
that country over the last 20-plus years, it represents
something else. It represents the desire of the people of that
country to reclaim their heritage and build for the future.
Now, we intend to capitalize on the successes that I have
described up to this point. In order to do that, our efforts
are going to remain focused on the eradication of the terrorist
networks that exist within Afghanistan, the charter given to us
by the Secretary and by our President.
The reason that we continue to do that is because one part
of our effort is designed to be sure that we do not permit an
environment to be created where terrorism can be reintroduced
into Afghanistan. With that in mind, U.S. and coalition forces
have screened more than 7,500 people detained inside
Afghanistan. More than 3,500 interrogations have been conducted
on 2,200 individuals.
The Secretary mentioned the number of detainees that we
currently hold. I would also mention that those detainees
represent 44 different nations. 16,000 documents were screened.
12,000 of those were added to our database. Recruitment methods
for al Qaeda were identified. Suspected members were taken care
of as described by the Secretary. Weapons caches throughout
Afghanistan were located.
Now, having said that and having described our success
given the list that I just described, we recognize that the
Afghan battlefield remains a very complex and a very dangerous
place. In some areas, small numbers of remaining enemy troops
have blended in with sympathetic segments of the civilian
population. Tribal and ethnic and cultural conflicts, driven in
some cases by traditional rivalries going back a long time,
continue to lead to factional clashes, and these incidents
threaten stability and provide challenges to our coalition
forces who are doing the hard work.
Distinguishing between friend and foe remains a very
difficult task in such a complex environment. We will continue
to refine our tactics, our techniques, our procedures, and our
approaches as we move forward. As I said, we have a lot of
awfully hard work left to do to finish the enemy in
Afghanistan.
As I close, I would like to make clear that we all
recognize that we have a great deal of work left to do. While
U.S. and coalition forces have done a lot in the past 10
months, the potential for terrorist attacks and for setbacks
inside Afghanistan remains very real. Afghanistan is rising
from oppression of the Taliban into an independent, democratic
nation. I am optimistic about that future, but I am also
pragmatic.
I am very proud of each and every one of the men and women
who serve this country and the coalition countries represented
in our efforts. They serve selflessly and tirelessly in the
execution of the mission regardless of the uniform of their
service or the nation from which they come. As we speak today,
they are hard at work inside Afghanistan. Inside that dangerous
environment, they are performing remarkably.
Mr. Chairman, I thank Congress and the American people for
the tremendous support that you have given our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and the coalition I have described.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Franks follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Tommy R. Franks, USA
Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and members of the committee, I am
honored to appear before you today. I have looked forward to this
session as an opportunity to highlight the extraordinary achievements
of the 71,000 U.S. and coalition troops I am privileged to command. The
servicemen and women of Central Command and the coalition are carrying
the fight to the enemy. Their record of courage, tenacity, and
professionalism inspires me every day, and is a source of great pride
for the American people.
I would like to begin by recognizing the coalition nations whose
contributions of forces, equipment, and economic support to the Central
Region signal worldwide determination to eradicate terrorism. Of
course, our success to date would not have been possible without the
determination and will of the Afghan people who are beginning to
experience the blessings of democracy and freedom.
When I last appeared before the committee on February 7, 2002, I
told you our successes to date represented the first steps in what
would be a long campaign to defeat terrorism. Our focus was on removing
the Taliban from power and destroying the al Qaeda network within
Afghanistan. Now that the Taliban has been destroyed, we continue to
locate and engage remaining pockets of terrorists and their supporters
to improve the security and stability of the emerging Afghan nation.
Over the past 6 months, the coalition has grown steadily from 50
nations in February to 70 today; 37 coalition nations are represented
at our headquarters in Tampa and in the Central Region, and 15 nations
have forces in Afghanistan.
Operational success to this point is directly attributable to the
will of our country and each coalition member--a will which I believe
has been grossly underestimated by the terrorist organizations which
threaten us. The Taliban has been removed from power. Al Qaeda senior
leadership is in disarray. Many of their planners, travel facilitators,
and logisticians are now dead or captured. Their training facilities in
Afghanistan have been destroyed, command and control capabilities have
been disrupted, and their remaining leaders are on the run. However, al
Qaeda has not lost its will to conceive, plan and execute terrorist
operations world-wide. It is the relentless pressure of military,
financial, and diplomatic efforts over the last 10 months that have
prevented the al Qaeda from sustaining its pre-September 11 capacity.
Our coalition partners will remain key to our operations. Their
contributions have included ground, air, naval, and special operations
forces along with logistics support, humanitarian assistance, and
basing. We are continuing to cycle these forces in and out as coalition
countries remain committed to our efforts. For example, a Romanian
infantry battalion recently replaced the Canadian light infantry and
began combat operations a little over a week ago.
Since February, U.S. and coalition air forces have flown more than
36,000 sorties in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Twenty-one
thousand of these sorties were flown over Afghanistan with more than
6,000 being strike sorties. Coalition air forces have provided fighter
and attack aircraft to support ground operations, tanker and
surveillance aircraft, and vital inter- and intra-theater airlift.
Neighboring countries, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, have provided
critical basing for coalition aircraft. Uzbekistan continues to
facilitate the safe flow of humanitarian assistance to the Afghan
people across the Friendship Bridge, while Kyrgyzstan hosts a coalition
air hub and supports the use of its road and rail infrastructure for
humanitarian assistance shipments into Afghanistan. This is testament
to the relationships and military-to-military contacts we have built
over the years, but more so a testament to the will of these countries
to eradicate terrorism.
It doesn't end there. Naval forces from the United States and 11
coalition countries continue to support ground operations and conduct
leadership interdiction operations. We have queried more than 16,000
vessels and boarded approximately 200 since November 2001. France alone
has deployed fully one-quarter of its fleet in direct support of
Operation Enduring Freedom. Terrorists cannot hide. We will find them
regardless of the methods or environments they use to spread and
support their networks. We continue to use every legal means to
eliminate their operations.
Other examples of invaluable coalition contributions include Norway
providing 21 hardened vehicles valued at $2.1 million for our special
operations forces; the Czech Republic deploying a consequence
management team to Kuwait; and Spain sending helicopters to Kyrgyzstan.
Germany is leading the training of Afghan police forces and Italy is
engaged in rebuilding the judiciary.
Coalition forces have also provided equipment and personnel to
clear mines in Afghanistan. British, Jordanian, Norwegian, and Polish
engineers have accomplished the dangerous work of methodically clearing
in excess of 1.7 million square meters of terrain. Among the many
countries that stand with us, Pakistan deserves special mention because
its cooperation and support have been critical to our success. U.S. and
coalition aircraft have been granted use of Pakistani airspace and
authority for the movement of logistics by sea and land routes.
Pakistan Army operations in the Northwest Frontier Provinces, in
coordination with coalition operations along the Afghan border, have
maintained the pressure on al Qaeda. These operations have not been
without cost to the people of Pakistan. While the Pakistan Army has
killed and captured hundreds of former Taliban and al Qaeda fighters,
they have had a number of their own troops killed by terrorist forces.
Pakistan and its leadership continue to evidence exceptional resolve.
Two recent examples of successful combined operations, resulting in
the detention of four suspected al Qaeda members, exemplify the success
of forces acting together. On July 13, and 17, as the result of
intercepts received by navy vessels and aircraft from Canada, France,
Italy and the Netherlands, two boats were targeted, intercepted, and
boarded in the Gulf of Oman. On each boat, two men matching
descriptions contained in our terrorist database were captured and
transported to our detainee facility in Bagram.
In the month of March, U.S., coalition, and Afghan military forces
conducted the largest combat operation in Afghanistan to date--
Operation Anaconda. It resulted in the elimination of the Shahi-Khot
and Chumarra Valleys as sanctuaries for concentrations of al Qaeda and
Taliban. Operation Anaconda was a major success; a significant enemy
pocket was destroyed, and notice was served to terrorists that there
would be no safe harbor in Afghanistan.
United States and coalition conventional and special operations
forces are currently conducting Operation Mountain Lion. More than 300
weapon and ammunition caches have been located and destroyed since
January 1, 2002. An exceptionally encouraging trend is that 159 of
these caches were identified to coalition forces by local Afghans in
just the past 60 days. Our operations demonstrate to terrorists and
terrorist sympathizers that they have nowhere to hide. We will continue
Operation Mountain Lion to root out remaining terrorists as long as it
takes.
As we led up to the June Loya Jirga, the XVIII Airborne Corps was
designated Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) and was deployed to
Afghanistan. This task force gives us a single joint command
responsible for military functions in the country, and establishes
full-time, senior command presence forward on the ground. Through
routine and frequent contact, the commander has developed close
professional relationships with Afghan military and political leaders
and senior members of the Afghan Transitional Authority.
We are now also training the Afghan National Army and Border
Security Forces. On July 23, the first U.S.-trained, multi-ethnic
Afghan battalion stood proudly on the graduation parade field flanked
on either side by two more battalions currently in training, one being
trained by our French Partners. For the first time in decades, we see
the beginnings of a professional, representative military force ready
to serve the people of Afghanistan.
While this in itself represents a remarkable achievement, building
the Afghan National Army will require a long-term commitment, focusing
on the establishment of the Central Kabul Corps over the next 2 years.
In concert with the central government, we are developing a master plan
to map the way ahead for a trained, supportable national army,
responsive to the central government and capable of securing Afghan
borders and stabilizing the interior.
Another vital factor contributing to the stability of Afghanistan
is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. This
force, initially led by the United Kingdom, and now by Turkey, served
as guarantor of an environment in which the Loya Jirga was safely
conducted. This historic event occurred without significant incident,
and on June 19, the first ``election'' in Afghanistan since 1963 was
concluded. The contributions of ISAF have been, and will continue to
be, important to the Afghan people during the current period of
transition.
Choosing Hamid Karzai as President and confirming his selection of
cabinet ministers, the Loya Jirga was comprised of women, nomads,
internally displaced persons, refugees, Islamic clerics, professionals,
and all major ethnic and tribal groups. Selecting the transitional
government, however, was only a first step. Afghanistan will require
continuing robust international assistance to build an enhanced
security environment in which the Afghan government can mature.
With the establishment of the most secure environment Afghanistan
has experienced in more than 20 years, we are now able to effectively
conduct civil-military operations and provide humanitarian assistance
across most of the country. Since March, our Combined Joint Civil-
Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) has deployed teams throughout
Afghanistan and has coordinated with literally hundreds of governmental
agencies and non-governmental organizations to deliver humanitarian
materials, help revive the education system, repair agricultural
infrastructure, and provide potable drinking water. We have identified
89 humanitarian projects, including reconstruction of 49 schools, 15
medical facilities, and 12 drinking-water wells. To date, 43 of these
projects have been completed at a cost of $4.5 million. Many of these
efforts have helped facilitate the return of 614,000 internally
displaced persons and 1.3 million refugees to their homes. As Secretary
Rumsfeld has said on numerous occasions, ``people vote with their
feet.'' While the return of so many Afghans to their homes will
certainly stress existing infrastructure, it represents the desire of
the people to reclaim their heritage and build for the future. The
coalition continues to help. Jordanian, Korean and Spanish field
hospitals have treated more than 100,000 Afghan civilians, the majority
of whom have been women and children. Such efforts give the Afghan
people hope, and help provide an environment in which that hope can
flourish.
We intend to capitalize upon achievements to date. Focusing our
efforts on completing the eradication of terrorist groups is the key to
preventing their return. The key to eradication of the enemy is the
exploitation of captured persons and documents in Afghanistan, at
Guantanamo Bay, and within the U.S. To date, such efforts have led to
the arrests of individuals in Algeria, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan,
Kenya, France, Singapore, Somalia, and the United Kingdom. Intelligence
derived from these arrests has been useful in preventing terrorist
operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, France, Turkey, Yemen, and Saudi
Arabia.
The scale of our human intelligence effort has been extraordinary.
Let me cite a few examples.
U.S. and coalition forces have screened more than
7,500 detainees in Afghanistan.
More than 3,500 interrogations have been conducted on
2,200 individuals.
These interrogations have led to the detention at
Guantanamo Bay of 500-plus terrorists from 44 different
countries.
16,000 documents have been screened and 12,000 added
to a database.
Recruitment methods for al Qaeda have been documented.
Suspected al Qaeda members have been positively
identified.
Weapons caches throughout Afghanistan have been
located.
Plots to blow up U.S. air bases in Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, and Pakistan, and the U.S. Embassy in Yemen have been
disrupted.
Methods of al Qaeda financing have been detected.
While we remain optimistic given coalition successes, the
Afghanistan battlefield remains dangerous and complex. In some areas,
small numbers of remaining enemy have blended in with sympathetic
segments of the civilian population. Tribal, ethnic and cultural
conflicts, driven in some cases by traditional rivalries, lead to
factional clashes, and these incidents threaten stability and present
challenges to coalition forces. Distinguishing between friend and foe
remains a difficult task. We will continue to refine our tactics,
techniques, and procedures to address the Identification Friend or Foe
(IFF) problem.
As in past wars, combat operations are imperfect, even in this age
of technology and precision. Distinguishing between friend and foe is
but one example of this fact. War entails risk to friendly forces and
civilians who are located in or near an area of conflict. During
Operation Enduring Freedom, we have taken extensive measures in an
effort to ensure the accuracy and precision of our fires. Nevertheless,
we have seen military and civilian casualties. We have investigated a
number of reports of ``friendly fire.'' In each case, commanders at
every level have worked to determine the facts, locations, and sequence
of the events associated with the report. When casualties are found to
have occurred, we have applied lessons learned to improve our
techniques and procedures. When civilians have been killed or injured,
we have worked with local leaders to express regret for the loss of
life and to inform them about our mission. The incident near Deh Rawod
on the first of July provides an example of our approach to reports of
civilian casualties. We know civilians were killed and injured in this
operation based upon preliminary inquiry conducted immediately
following the incident. We also know that aircraft in the area reported
ground fire during the operation. Based upon these facts, an
investigation was initiated on July 14, and is ongoing to build a more
complete understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
incident. When that investigation is complete, we will apply any
lessons learned. In the meantime, a coalition team has been positioned
in Deh Rawod in coordination with local government officials. This team
provides an opportunity to increase local understanding of our
operations and enhance the willingness of NGOs to begin work in the
area.
In my testimony in February, I described several emerging
observations that give us insight to ongoing and future military
operations. Following are several of the more important of these
observations:
Strategic airlift remains key current and future
military operations. We are on a glidepath to expand our
strategic airlift capabilities, and must remain committed to
the task.
The use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) continues
to be a key force multiplier, increasing the likelihood of
successful target engagement, reducing the number of aircraft
sorties required to destroy a target, limiting collateral
damage, and enabling the commander on the ground to more
effectively engage targets. Forces in Afghanistan have expended
more than 12,000 PGMs, approximately 50 percent of the total
munitions expended. The committee's continuing support of these
programs is appreciated.
Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines continue to pose a
significant threat to U.S. and coalition forces and the Afghan
people, and must be cleared. We estimate that more than 3
million mines are spread throughout Afghanistan. Service
efforts to improve our mine clearing capability remain
important to current and future readiness.
An area in which modern warfare has forever been
transformed is that of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR). Platforms such as Predator and Global
Hawk have provided real-time intelligence, enhanced situational
awareness, and facilitated command and control at all levels.
These assets have proven the value of unmanned aerial systems
and we must continue to build upon this growing capability.
In closing, I want to make clear that our work in Afghanistan is
not finished. While U.S. and coalition forces have accomplished much
over the past 10 months, the potential for terrorist acts and setbacks
remains very real. Afghanistan is rising from the oppression of the
Taliban into an independent, democratic nation. I am optimistic about
the future, but much work remains to be done.
September 11 changed America forever. The terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center, Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon united us and our
coalition partners in a mission to eliminate global terrorism. Central
Command remains committed to that mission.
I am very proud of each and every one of the men and women who
continue to serve selflessly and tirelessly in the execution of our
mission regardless of the uniform of service they wear or the nation
from which they come. I thank Congress and the American people for the
tremendous support you have given them.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
We will have one round of 6-minute questioning. There are
so many of us here today that we had better limit it to that so
we will have time to go into our closed session. We will
proceed on the early bird basis as usual.
General Franks, let me start with you. You noted in your
prepared statement that the building of the Afghan National
Army will require a long-term commitment. I understand the goal
is to train a 60,000-man force. At the current rate, I believe
that that would take almost 8 years to meet that goal. Are
those figures correct, and do you have an assessment as to how
long U.S. and coalition forces will be required to remain in
Afghanistan?
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, the way we are approaching
that right now, I believe that we will probably by the end of
December of this year produce 3,000 to 4,000 trained members of
the Afghan National Army. By about this time next summer, we
expect that number to be in the vicinity of 8,000. By the end
of 2003, I believe somewhere around 13,000 in the Afghan
National Army.
Now, with respect to how long we will continue to conduct
that training effort is certainly a decision for the Secretary
and at the policy level. My suspicion is that we will begin to
look at approaches to provide that training which may give
relief to our uniformed people, who are conducting that
training now, a policy decision to be made in the future.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has
recommended the expansion of the International Security
Assistance Force outside of Kabul. I think he has made that
recommendation before. He says that it would make a huge
contribution to the consolidation of peace. Would you support
the limited expansion of that International Security Assistance
Force? Would you be willing to urge other nations to provide
the troops to make that happen, and would you be willing for
U.S. troops to participate in that force as a way to attract
other nations to contribute troops to it?
Secretary Rumsfeld. My view, and the view of the
administration all along, has been that the International
Security Assistance Force is a good thing, and to the extent
countries are interested in expanding it, as the Secretary
General of the United Nations has indicated he favors, would
certainly be a useful thing.
The problem is that no countries are stepping forward to do
that. We have had a good deal of difficulty, first of all,
recruiting the original group of countries to serve in the
International Security Assistance Force. Then as those
countries have rotated out, including the U.K. now, we have had
to help recruit Turkey to come in and take the leadership.
Turkey leaves at the end of this year and we are going to have
to recruit a new successor for that.
Our task, as we saw it, is best characterized by General
Franks' efforts, to go after the al Qaeda and the Taliban and
our support of the ISAF with logistics, intelligence, and
communications and quick reaction support, if necessary. As
General Franks also indicated, our task is to help train the
Afghanistan National Army and raise money for it.
We feel that our plate is pretty full and it would be an
inappropriate use of our forces to employ them as additional
International Security Assistance Force troops. We feel that
trying to stop terrorists from committing additional terrorist
acts is our first priority; our second priority is to support
the existing ISAF; and our third priority is to train an Afghan
National Army.
If people step forward, terrific.
Chairman Levin. If people step forward?
Secretary Rumsfeld. If other countries want to step forward
and volunteer their forces to expand the ISAF. The problem is
the only people that have been recommending it have been people
who do not have troops.
Chairman Levin. General, let me ask you this question about
the July 1 incident, the so-called wedding incident. What can
you tell us about the circumstances surrounding that incident,
in which up to 54 Afghan civilians were killed? Very
specifically, can you tell us whether or not the investigation,
which I gather is ongoing, has corroborated a claim that the
aircraft were fired on from the ground?
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, I have looked at the gun
tapes from those aircraft. The Secretary has looked at a part
of those gun tapes. What I would say at this point is that the
initial assessment I asked our ground commander over there,
General McNeil, who told us that we should do an investigation
and determine as best we can, all the facts and circumstances
surrounding that, along with the context within which that
event took place.
That investigation is, in fact, under way right now.
Statements are being taken as a part of that investigation. I
will say that there were points of intelligence that led us to
the area. When we put our forces into the area, and as I think
the Secretary has said on a previous occasion, we had them not
only in the air, but we had people on the ground observing
these operations as we were conducting a sweep through this
area.
Now, there is no question that there was ground to air
fire. There is no question, Mr. Chairman. Now, I have read much
about whether or not this is air defense or whether this is
celebratory fire from the wedding. Sir, the purpose of the
investigation is to make those determinations. So, sir, that is
where we stand right now on that incident.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Just to conclude that, on the tapes that you saw, was there
evidence on those tapes of ground fire against those planes?
General Franks. Sir, there was evidence on the tapes of
ground fire, yes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
General, reading your testimony back, you say: ``In
closing, I want to make clear that our work in Afghanistan is
not yet finished.'' Describe to us as best you can
``finished.'' When, in your judgment, will you be finished in
your mission?
General Franks. Senator Warner, we entered into this with
what I believe was a blessing. When the President of the United
States and the Secretary of Defense described a mission that
says remove the Taliban from effective control of the country
of Afghanistan, it is a discreet mission and I am satisfied
with that.
The second part of that mission was to destroy the al Qaeda
network as well as the tentacle pieces of that network, such as
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan that existed within
Afghanistan, which if linked together represented a global
threat. The Secretary and I have described that we have work
left to do in that regard. In my view, there are no large
pockets such as the Tora Bora pocket or the Anaconda pocket in
place in Afghanistan right now.
Sir, I am not sure how long it will take us to work our way
through each and every piece of the geography of this terribly
compartmented country to assure ourselves, my bosses and me,
that the work has been completed.
Sir, the third part of our effort there is to provide as
best we can for the creation of a secure and stable environment
within which a democratic government can mature in the country
of Afghanistan. There are a lot of different approaches, a lot
of different possibilities to that, Senator Warner.
But the military piece of it that I have in my mission is
to prevent the reintroduction of terrorism into Afghanistan
such as we found it post-September 11 of last year.
You asked me a question, sir, that was very short. I have
given you a long answer. I do not know how long it will take us
to work through each of the pieces of that very military
mission. I believe the force structure we have in place today
gives us an opportunity to do the work which the President and
the Secretary have asked our military to do. So, we are just
continuing with that until we see ourselves able to put a check
beside each component of the mission.
Senator Warner. Mr. Secretary, do you want to add to that
definition of ``finished''?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir, just to add a couple of
thoughts. I think the way to think about the task to achieve
what General Franks indicated is the goal, in that it requires
that we look at security at several different levels. There is
the security of the people that were elected by the Loya Jirga.
It is important that the government survive and do its job.
There is security in the major cities and the ability of
humanitarian workers to provide for the needs of people. There
is the problem of border security. They need border guards.
There is the problem of police; they need police.
There is the task we mentioned of dealing with the al Qaeda
and the Taliban to see that they do not come back and attempt
to reassert themselves. There are potential conflicts between
factions within the country. There are drug lords and people
involved in drug trafficking. There is also crime, normal
crime.
The goal, needless to say, is to have the Afghan government
assume all of these responsibilities. My suspicion is that they
will do so at a different pace. Clearly they do not have the
ability to go after the al Qaeda and the Taliban at the present
time without the cooperation of the coalition forces. But they
do have the beginnings of some capability to start dealing with
certain other aspects of it. The answer to the question is how
fast can the civil side step up and take over some of those
responsibilities and how soon the national army can begin to
take over some of their responsibilities.
Senator Warner. You have been very candid in describing
those tasks and in saying that you are having difficulty
recruiting someone to take over the responsibility, say when
the Turks finish their term. All of that indicates to this
Senator that we best tell the American people that we are going
to be there for a long time.
Secretary Rumsfeld. My goal is to have the Afghan
government be successful and systematically, incrementally
begin to develop the kinds of institutions of government that
they need to take over these responsibilities. It is a
difficult task, but we have a lot of coalition countries trying
to help. I think that the work is well under way.
Senator Warner. As mentioned by the General, one of the
missions was to destoy al Qaeda the network. There have been
reports that al Qaeda has begun to reconstitute itself, that it
has found safe havens in adjoining nations, and that new
leadership is somehow coming to the forefront. What can you
tell us on that? Candidly, if you cannot, we will wait until
the closed session, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think I would prefer to do it in
closed session.
Senator Warner. All right. Thank you very much.
I think it is important the record reflect that you give us
the latest on bin Laden. I think we know the answer, but the
record should contain it. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. You want me to once again acknowledge
the reality that we do not know where he is or if he is alive.
He is either alive and in Afghanistan or someplace else, or he
is dead. He clearly is not active and engaged to the extent
that he was previously. If he is alive and if he is
functioning, he is functioning in very difficult circumstances
where life is harder for them, the senior people, in terms of
movement, in terms of communication, in terms of raising money,
and in terms of training terrorists. That is a good thing.
Senator Warner. Do you anticipate that we will see efforts
to begin to get more security beyond Kabul, which is now the
central focus? How soon do we hope to move out with other
forces into those areas to obtain the security and to achieve
the very goals which you enumerated, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Warner, I would characterize
the country at the present time as being reasonably secure. It
is uneven, but for the most part, except for a few incidents
from time to time, most of the country is reasonably secure. It
is secure because coalition forces are in a variety of
locations. Special Forces are embedded into the regional
leaders' forces. We have forces in Bagram and in Kandahar.
The one portion is the southeast area which tends to have
the most incidents, because there is not a regional leader that
has a good grip on things at the present time. I think we just
have to live with that for a period and continue to work on
that problem.
Senator Warner. My time is up, unless the General wants to
fill out any questions.
General Franks. I might just add to what the Secretary
said. I checked this morning just before the hearing. As we
speak today, we have our people, coalition and American people,
in more than 40 locations inside Afghanistan doing the work
that the Secretary described. So we are out and about.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks,
Secretary and General, for your extraordinary leadership, and
thanks to the American men and women who are serving in uniform
under your command who have performed brilliantly. I think it
is important to restate what a lot of us felt, which after
September 11, when this response was being planned, there were
naysayers who were reminding us that the Afghanis had
slaughtered the British in an earlier generation and defeated
the mighty Soviet Union and that we were getting in over our
heads.
But thanks to great leadership by the two of you and, with
all respect, even greater effort by those on the ground,
together with the terrifying force of our high technology
weapons, we achieved an extraordinary victory over the Taliban
and did disrupt al Qaeda. I think as we go on to the next
phase, we should not lose sight of that great victory and what
it suggests about the dominance of the American military in a
world that remains dangerous.
General Franks, I did want to ask you about one of the
operations you referred to, Tora Bora, because from within the
United States and outside Europe and even in Afghanistan there
have been criticisms of that operation, some of them stating
that we allegedly used more Afghani fighters than we should
have and not enough U.S. troops on the ground.
There have been some criticisms from, I gather, reported in
the press and from Afghan commanders, who said U.S. forces were
not being aggressive enough on the ground to defeat the
guerrillas. I wanted to ask you if you would respond to those
on the record.
General Franks. Senator Lieberman, I would be pleased to.
Let me first say thanks to you and other members of the
committee who have visited our people in Afghanistan. I believe
your visit was back in January when you had an opportunity to
see our people first-hand.
In Tora Bora, in early December 2001, the United States of
America at that time had about 1,300 Americans in country in 17
different locations. Kandahar was at that time still not fully
under control. We had our Marine forces operating out of Camp
Rhino, which was our initial point of entry into Afghanistan.
We were very mindful--I guess I will take credit or blame for
this. I was very mindful of the Soviet experience of more than
10 years, having introduced 620,000 troops into Afghanistan,
more than 15,000 of them being killed, more than 55,000 of them
being wounded.
We characterized this effort in Afghanistan as a complex
and unconventional effort from the very day we started. As of
that time in early December, we also kept in mind that the
country of Afghanistan, ultimately, must belong to the Afghan
people. It was Afghans who wanted to attack in the Tora Bora
area. We had Special Forces troopers with those Afghans, to be
sure.
We had linkage with the Pakistanis, who some would say,
although not much reported at that time, had in the vicinity of
100,000 troops on the western Pakistani border along a great
many of the likely points of exfiltration, from Afghanistan
into Pakistan.
Did the enemy get out of Tora Bora? Senator, yes, to be
sure. As we looked at the plan--and I looked at it before the
operation, obviously, and I have looked at it since the
operation--to see what did the plan say or do within the
context that I just described to you that should have been done
perhaps differently.
The plan called for an approach up two parallel valleys
with blocking forces at the ends of those valleys. The
relationships that we had at that time with the Afghan forces
on the ground were in their beginning state. Based on that
information, we determined we would not try to stop the Afghans
who wanted to move into Tora Bora, where we had done a great
deal of operational fires or kinetic work, as you would recall,
since February 7, when we began the operation.
As the Afghan forces moved to contact, they encountered al
Qaeda and residual Taliban elements. I have seen speculation as
to the number of enemy forces in Tora Bora that range from a
few hundred to a few thousand. I believe that we do not know
what the total size of that enemy force in that area was. I
believe that some of those forces to be sure did move into
Pakistan, and the reason I know that, Senator, is because
almost 300 of them were captured by the Pakistanis along that
border that I described a minute ago.
Senator Lieberman. General, do we know how many of the
enemy we killed at Tora Bora?
General Franks. Senator, we really do not know how many we
killed at Tora Bora. You will recall perhaps a similar question
on Anaconda or how many did we kill. The pounding that we put
into that area, the numbers of caves and compound complexes
that were closed in that fight over the duration of it, make it
virtually impossible to know how many were killed. The
assessment that I have read, and I believe it, is in the
hundreds.
The elevations that our people and the Afghans themselves
were working in ranged from 5,000 up to 13,000 feet. So this
was not a fight or armored vehicles and so forth. I am
satisfied with the way this operation was conducted--no, I will
not say that. I am satisfied with the decision process that
permitted the Afghans to go to work in the Tora Bora area.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
My time is up. Perhaps in the closed session I would ask
you, since Tora Bora was in the nature of a first battle and
adaptations and adjustments are always made after first
battles, what lessons we learned from it for successive
actions.
General Franks. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we have a
lot of members. I will try not to use all my time.
In concern to the budget I thought it had two glaring
deficiencies, one of which I would like to bring up now that
has already been touched on. The chairman talked about the
distant future on end strength. We have called up 80,000 Guard
and Reserves. We put stop-losses on those that are there right
now.
I think those of us on this side of the table can tell you
that there is a serious problem with our Guard and Reserve
components, because we measure that by letters that come in.
These people are loyal. They want to fight and they want to be
there. But by the very nature of their job they cannot be fully
deployed all the time.
Now as you look into the future, there is going to be a
time when the stop-loss is lifted, when the Reserves and the
Guard go home. General Franks, how do you plan to continue the
war effort when that time comes?
General Franks. Senator Inhofe, thanks for visiting a
couple of months ago, by the way.
I think probably the Secretary is in a much better position
to answer than I am. I will give you a short combatant
commander view as a receiver of forces provided by the Services
for our efforts in Afghanistan and, in fact, across my area of
responsibility. We have a great many Guardsmen, Reservists, all
Services, doing an absolutely remarkable job.
Probably the comment that I could make is that it makes a
great deal of difference to us to have that pool from which to
draw, because one of the things it does for us, Senator, is it
permits us to cycle our people through so that we do not put
everyone in an overseas circumstance for the duration. That,
sir, is the best I can give you from a combatant view.
Senator Inhofe. Before Secretary Rumsfeld responds, I can
remember back during Bosnia and Kosovo when the 21st TACOM--
they have changed the name of it now--said that if there was
another war effort, they would be totally dependent upon Guard
and Reserve. Of course, this is exactly what has happened. That
is why I have a great concern that it is something we need to
address.
Mr. Secretary, any comments about that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir, Senator. You are right, we
have 85,000 Reserve and Guard personnel in the present call-up.
We have some 20,000-plus stop-loss. We are currently over our
previously authorized end strength, in the plus 2 percent
level. We have a significant effort going on in each of the
Services to look at how they can increase their tooth to tail
ratio--reduce the tail and increase the tooth.
It is time to do that. We are capable of doing a much more
efficient job and it is important to do that. To an extent if
we cannot get what we need by making those efficiencies, then
obviously we will come in for more end strength if we need it.
But at the moment, we do not even need to. I am told the
emergency allows us to go up, in all Services, I think all
Services except the Marines are currently above that prior
authorized level.
I will say this. The reason for having the Guard and
Reserve is because we considered the total force concept. Using
them is not bad. It is the way the thing was designed. It is
working very well.
Now, are there folks that are inconvenienced? Yes. On the
other hand, there are a great many of those people who are
volunteers. I do not know what the fraction is, but it is not a
trivial portion of the total number of Guard and Reserve who
are serving on a volunteer basis as opposed to a mandatory
basis.
Senator Inhofe. That is reassuring. I think we hear from a
lot of them that are called up. As I say, they want to fight,
but they cannot handle the length and the number of the
deployments.
I want to bring up something on mobility. I put that in two
categories: one on our refueling capacity and another on lift.
I was, as you were good enough to point out, General Franks, on
the U.S.S. Kennedy when they were doing operations up in
Afghanistan, where F-18s were taking off and coming back. They
not only required refueling capability, but multi refueling
capability on those particular exercises.
I know that we have a shortage of KC-135s, and I think they
were using KC-10s at that time up there. But I would like you
to tell us how were you affected adversely, General Franks, in
Afghanistan by the lack of KC-135 refueling capability?
General Franks. Sir, probably the best answer I can give
you is maybe by way of example. We like to use our global reach
and global power capability. In order to do that, we have to
position tanking capability in numerous different places. When
you do that, you fragment the numbers that you have, which if
all together in one piece of geography might be absolutely
ample in order to do a major war, small scale, or something
else.
In the particular case of this fight halfway around the
world and the use of global assets--B-2s and so forth--we find
that it did not kill us in Afghanistan because we were able to
have air power coming from our carrier decks, which were close
enough to be able to have one tanker up in orbit over
Afghanistan and be able to refuel multiple attack aircraft from
it.
Had the circumstance been different, then 135s or KC-10
refuelers would have been a problem. Sir, I cannot give you the
numbers and I cannot quantify beyond that.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I might just say, if I may, that the
place where the strain or the inconvenience would show up, to
use your word, would not be in Central Command. It would be in
the other commands. To the extent you have these high demand,
low density assets and capabilities, it is in the other
CINCdoms that you end up with something less than they might
prefer.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that. But if something happens
there, then there is a problem.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You are quite right.
Chairman Levin. ``CINCdom''? Okay.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I did say that, didn't I? [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, Colonel, welcome. We appreciate
your service to our country and especially the leadership you
provide to our young men and women out there who are doing a
fantastic job.
Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to enter into
the record an article in Army Times titled ``What We Learned
from Afghanistan,'' and an article in Defense News titled
``U.S. Army, Navy Mull Lessons Learned in Afghanistan War.''
Chairman Levin. They will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, for me, Operation Enduring Freedom has
become Operation Enduring Frustration. I can remember the
aftermath of September 11, the feeling on Capitol Hill, the
sense of outrage, the sense of focus, and the sense of purpose.
For me, having served in the military, that clarity of purpose,
that clarity of commitment, enhanced our military capacity to
do the job.
For instance, we passed a congressional resolution that
gave the President the ability to use all necessary force and
it specifically mentioned September 11. In other words, we gave
you the authority to go after those who came after us. For me
that is still mission number one. I think it is fine to nation-
build or liberate Afghanistan, but the frustration continues
because we still have not killed or captured Osama bin Laden
and his terrorist cadre.
Do you happen to know where he is?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I responded to that when Senator Warner
asked it and the answer is obviously the United States of
America does not know where he is. We do not know if he is dead
or alive. We do know that he is having a great deal of
difficulty functioning. He may be dead, he may be seriously
wounded. He may be in Afghanistan, or he may be somewhere else.
But wherever he is, if he is, you can be certain he is
having one dickens of a time operating his apparatus. Now, is
he critical? Well, he is important, but there are plenty of
people, 6, 8, 10, 12 people probably, who could take over the
al Qaeda network. They know where the bank accounts are. They
know the names of the people who are trained. They know the
sleeper cells that exist around the world.
So the task is not a manhunt for Osama bin Laden, as your
question suggests. The task is to find the terrorists wherever
they are, bin Laden plus all the others, and deal with them and
the countries that are providing safe haven to them. That we
are trying to do.
Senator Cleland. Well, that is my question. If we do not
know where he is, how can we go after him?
Second, is he not in western Pakistan, basically in a
sanctuary there, an area where even the Pakistani troops are
not welcome? Are we not vulnerable then to another attack or
his continued organization of attack against us? One of the
things I learned in Vietnam was if the terrorist does not lose,
he wins. This is why I am so committed personally to making
sure that his end is in sight. It troubles me and I am
frustrated that his end is not in sight or is the end of this
terrorist cadre in sight. That for me is mission number one for
our government and mission number one for our military.
Second, I am frustrated by the fact that in the biggest
operation of the war, Operation Anaconda, apparently, according
to the Army Times, the third brigade of the 101st Airborne-Air
Assault was told not to deploy with their 105-millimeter
howitzers that they would normally take into battle. In other
words, here we are sending a brigade into the biggest battle of
the war without their artillery support.
Is that normal? Is that something we are going to do? I am
especially bothered and frustrated because you cancelled the
Army's latest artillery piece, the Crusader. Is that a new way
of deploying the Army, without artillery support?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would like to have a chance to answer
those questions. First, if we thought he was in western
Pakistan, the Pakistani government, the army, and the folks
that are working in that area, I believe, would go find them.
We do not know that he is there. That is pure press
speculation. People are saying that.
Yes, he might be anywhere. But do we know where he is? Do
we have coordinates? No. Are we trying hard? Is intelligence
working on it? You bet it is. So simply because something like
that is in the press does not mean that he is in western
Pakistan, although he may be.
You said mission number one ought to be the al Qaeda and
the Taliban. That is exactly what we are doing, and we are
doing it all across the globe. People are getting arrested
every day. Arms caches are being discovered every day. People
are being interrogated, and people are being detained. It seems
to me that the United States Armed Forces were designed to deal
with armies, navies, and air forces. Doing a single manhunt is
a different type of thing. The intelligence community is
working hard on it. General Franks is working hard on it.
People across the globe are working hard on it.
You can be frustrated if you want. I am not. I think that
we have a serious effort going on and serious work is being
done. The pressure that is being put on those terrorist
networks is important and it is causing them difficulty in all
the things they have to do, like raising money and recruiting
and retaining people. Does that mean there will not be another
terrorist attack? No, there may very well be. Terrorists can
attack at any time, any place, using any technique.
I would like General Franks to talk about the howitzers. He
is an artilleryman.
General Franks. Sir, I would be glad to talk about the
howitzers and the 101st, as well as the overall structure
inside Afghanistan. Actually, I have not read the Army Times
article, but I will respond to the question that you asked.
The elevations in question in Operation Anaconda were at
the low end, just below 8,000 feet, and at the high end, above
12,000 feet. An M199 howitzer weighs 4,520 pounds. The maximum
ordnance for a 119 howitzer, Senator, how high it goes, is
8,000 meters. That puts it at 24,000 feet, whereas the ordnance
for a mortar is less than one-half of that. That affects the
literally hundreds of aircraft close air support sorties that
are available to the combatants on the ground during Operation
Anaconda.
Senator, a 60-millimeter mortar weighs 47 pounds. An 81-
millimeter mortar weighs 89 pounds. A 120-millimeter mortar
weighs in the vicinity of 400 pounds. A total of 26 of those
systems were available for use during Operation Anaconda.
I have spoken to the brigade commander. I have spoken to
the division commander. I have spoken to the land component
commander both before and after Operation Anaconda, and I, sir,
find no justification for the comment that you made with
respect to the cannons coming with the 101st Airborne Division
Air Assault.
Senator Cleland. I am getting this out of the Center for
Army Lessons Learned briefing obtained by the Army Times, where
Colonel Mike Hemster, the Center's Director, said it would be
``a legitimate conclusion to assume that had there been a
battery of howitzers on the Anaconda battlefield, the guns
could have shut down al Qaeda mortars that inflicted most of
the roughly 38 U.S. casualties on the first day of battle.''
I was just interested in how we were deploying our forces
here, especially since the Secretary has cancelled the latest
artillery piece by the Army. Then I find that we are sending a
brigade into battle here without its normal artillery
component. I just wondered if this was a new order of battle or
if it was something special.
General Franks. Sir, the Secretary may want to respond
more. Sir, from your military experience as well as I know from
mine that each and every deployment and each and every mission
that we undertake is going to consider all that is necessary
the mission to be done, the enemy that we are going to fight,
the terrain in which we are going to fight, and the lift assets
available and what to do with it.
In this particular case, with respect to the Center for
Army Lessons Learned, I simply do not agree with the
observation, sir.
Senator Cleland. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for a very comprehensive statement
in regards to our mission in Afghanistan. I hope all of our
colleagues read your full statement. There have been some sour
notes in what has been a chorus of support up to this point as
to the conduct of the war.
I listed from your statement seven positive
accomplishments, ranging from the 70 nation cooperation, which
is certainly unique and unprecedented, to intel and
transformation lessons learned. I want to also thank General
Franks and would likely draw the attention my colleagues in the
Senate to page 11 of your statement, where you listed four
suggestions imperative, I think, to our military success in
regards to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, new
threats, transformation, and what we need to do. You listed
four and I thank you for that.
Now, let me say that Senator Inhofe gave me a segue. It is
not atypical of Senators to jump from one pasture to another,
so I am going to jump from one country away.
Winston Churchill in his comment on dictators, and I think
it applies to Saddam Hussein: ``Dictators ride to and fro on
tigers; they dare not dismount, and the tigers are getting
hungry.'' I have met with some Iraqi dissidents and I could
feel the hunger of the tiger in their desire to take their
country back from that tyrant.
We have had a lot of discussion in the press recently on
the potential war against Iraq. Should we have that kind of a
conflict in the immediate future, in the spring, or wherever--
and I know that decision has not been made--that would cause
some concern in regards to the mission that we would not be
able to complete?
Churchill also said, ``It is better to jaw-jaw than to war-
war.'' So this question would be for the Secretary: Do you see
any opportunity to safeguard the Middle East and the civilized
world in reference to Saddam Hussein by jaw-jaw containment
rather than war-war?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess that is a question really that
is best posed to the President, the Secretary of State, and
Congress. But there is no question that the problems in that
part of the world need to be addressed and have been addressed
from a diplomatic and economic standpoint. We must address the
sanctions that the U.N. has had in place, the enormous number
of countries that have worked on the other problems in the
Middle East apart from the specific one that you mentioned, and
the worldwide efforts against proliferation.
But over time, the economic sanctions weaken and the
diplomatic effort seems to get a little tired. The progress
that he has been able to make in providing support to the
terrorist states all across the globe is serious. I guess there
is room for all types of efforts--political, economic,
diplomatic, and military.
Senator Roberts. Should the decision be made to take
military action, do you feel you have the authority to ``go to
war'' against Iraq based on terrorism connections or the U.N.
resolution or Public Law 102-1, the Gulf War, without any
further approval of Congress?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Those are issues for the President and
I would not have a comment on them.
Senator Roberts. In fact, on lessons learned, the U.S.
military is conducting a significant experiment exercise called
Millennium Challenge 2002. Do you see any opportunity to bring
forward some of the capability demonstrated in that exercise
and that challenge to put it to use in either Afghanistan or a
possible military conflict in regards to Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I would not want to talk about
a possibility of a conflict in Iraq. This is an Afghan hearing.
But with respect to Millennium Challenge that the Joint Forces
Command is conducting, I was down there earlier this week.
There is no question that the exercises and experiments that
they are undertaking are valuable, interesting, and will have
applicability to all things that we do in any area of
responsibility across the globe. I am very encouraged by what
they are doing.
Senator Roberts. General Franks, there is a recent article
that stated friendly fire still plagues the U.S. military. We
talked about that before. Would you comment on this continuing
problem and also the interoperability of our own equipment?
General Franks. Senator, I think by and large that the
interoperability of our equipment has been good. I think that
the lessons that we have learned in Afghanistan will cause us
to think hard about how we distribute pieces of equipment. In
an unconventional sort of conflict, we wind up using people to
do things that may be their third or fourth or fifth priority
function in terms of the way they are equipped. So I think we
will take that kind of lesson to heart.
In terms of friendly fire, I will say that any time there
is a friendly fire incident, whether it has to do with one of
our military youngsters or whether it has to do with a
civilian, it is not only a sad thing, it is something that we
want to avoid, something that we want to find either
technological solutions, training solutions or tactics,
technique, or procedure sorts of modifications, that enable us
to not have repeat performances.
This committee knows--and sir, you certainly know--that we
have never had the perfect circumstance for a war. We find
Afghanistan no different. We have had loss of life because of
friendly fire incidents in Afghanistan and I regret that. I
will say that I do have great confidence in not only the young
people, that being the sergeants and the young captains and so
forth on the ground doing the work, I also have confidence in
their leadership.
I have confidence in the flag officers, the generals, and
the colonels who look at every report of these sorts of
incidents and try to figure out how can we avoid a repeat. Sir,
that is the best answer I can give you.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I just
want to add one thing.
Mr. Secretary, in regard to Scott Speicher, the Navy pilot
we left behind in the Gulf War, I wrote in February of this
year requesting that Scott's status be changed from missing in
action. First he was killed in action and then we or the
Department had him changed to missing in action upon a request.
My request now is to prisoner of war status. I want to thank
Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz for the continuing dialogue in
that regard. But we have not had an answer and we just need
some assurance that the decision on the status will be made
soon. Of course, if it is a decision we do not want, do not
send it up. But we hope the decision will be reached and I
wanted to mention that to you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks, let me commend you
for your leadership and your determination over these many
months. Also, I think it is fitting that you asked Colonel
Mulholland to join you. He is here today representing many
younger special operators. I think he would be the first to
admit they carried the ball for us. They did a magnificent job.
Thank you, Colonel and General.
Let me follow up a bit the line of questioning that Senator
Cleland opened up. First an informational question: Did the
101st have 105s in country ready to operate in Anaconda?
General Franks. No, sir, they did not have 105s. At that
time, we had no cannon artillery in Afghanistan.
Senator Reed. So with the availability of 105s, the
decision to employ or use or have them available was made many
weeks or days before Operation Anaconda, correct? They simply
did not have the pieces in country, is that correct?
General Franks. Sir, they did not have the pieces in
country. When our land component commander decided to bring the
101st brigade over, he performed the analysis of the terrain
where that brigade was going to be used and determined that it
was not necessary to bring the cannons with them.
Senator Reed. Now, the absence of field artillery places
much more emphasis and importance on close air support. In your
observations at Tora Bora, Anaconda, and throughout the course
of the operations, do you think there has to be additional work
to harmonize the doctrine of the Air Force, the Navy, and the
Army with respect to close air support? Is there a common
doctrine? Is there misunderstanding? Does this operation
represent not just the absence of field artillery, but genuine
misunderstandings about what close air support means and what
it will provide?
General Franks. Senator, that is a fair question. I do not
think so. I believe that we would never say in the middle of a
battle or of a war, ``Gosh, everything is just right and there
is no lesson to be learned.'' We have learned training lessons
about this. We have learned how to better advantage training
opportunities, where for example we will have both the Naval
and Air Force aviation employed at the same time. We have
learned things about how we can better harmonize our technology
to be sure that we do not have one form of airplane used by one
Service that is not able to acquire and attack based on laser
work that works with another sort of airframe.
So, of course, we have learned these kinds of lessons. But,
Senator, doctrinally, I believe that it is recognized that
United States Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircraft
provide close air support. So, we have learned the lessons. My
view is that the lessons we have learned have not been
catastrophic, but the application of those lessons will make us
better in the future.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
Mr. Secretary, you indicated in your remarks that we have
American personnel in the headquarters of every warlord, or
something to that effect.
Secretary Rumsfeld. A lot of them.
Senator Reed. What happens if these warlords are responsive
to us but not responsive to Karzai or vice versa? Do you have
any advice?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is a complicated problem and it is
one I will discuss at greater length in the closed session. But
the short answer is that the Afghan regional leaders have
armies, they are in charge of them, and they pay those people.
Our Special Forces are embedded in most of those units.
They are young folks and they do a great job in guiding and
offering advice, but they are in charge of those armies. When
there is any kind of a difficulty where two regional leaders
seem to be having a dust-up, then we have tough choices to
make, not just in terms of participating in their dust-up,
because that is between them, but in seeing if it can be
stopped and, if it cannot be stopped, how our folks avoid
getting in the middle of it.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, we are trying to create a national army,
which I presume means at some point these warlord armies are
disbanded. Would you comment upon that process of building a
national army and the future demobilizing of these private
armies?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There again is an issue that is going
to play out over a period of time. It is unlikely that the
regional leaders are going to disband their armies if there is
not something that is providing security in those regions, or
not something that they feel they have a voice in. It is going
to be a difficult task for the central government's leadership
to fashion a set of relationships--political relationships,
financial relationships, military relationships--over a period
of time. As the Afghan army and the central government's border
patrol and police forces evolve and develop to the extent that
the interaction between the center and the regions evolves
properly, one might hope that that would happen. But it is not
written how long it will take or whether it will be even
symmetrical in how it plays out.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
Senator Bunning.
Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for coming. I appreciate it. I have been
greatly disturbed by press reports of potential operational
plans in Iraq. I strongly urge you, Mr. Secretary, in
conjunction with the FBI, to do your best to find those who are
leaking classified material to the press and send them to jail
for a long time. I think it is vital to our national security.
There is none of us up here that know anything about the plans,
so it is coming from within. I suggest that you make a very
strong effort to find out where it is coming from and treat it
thusly.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I am doing everything that is
legally proper to do.
Senator Bunning. Well, do whatever it takes.
Secretary Rumsfeld, there have been reports of al Qaeda
members active in the disputed region of Kashmir. Have you made
any progress in rooting those terrorists out? Has Pakistan been
cooperating with your efforts?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, the reports about al Qaeda in
Kashmir are ambiguous.
Senator Bunning. Ambiguous, not true?
Secretary Rumsfeld. They are ambiguous. That is to say,
there is not real clarity as to whether they are there or not.
If so, how many or where? First of all, the phrase ``al Qaeda''
is a definitional issue to some extent. The scraps of
information that we get are suggestive but not conclusive.
Second, I personally believe that the answer to the second
part of your question is that the Pakistani government, if they
believed and knew there were al Qaeda in Kashmir, would go do
something about it. They have told me that and I believe them.
Senator Bunning. My follow-up question was that if
President Musharraf's government did know would they pursue.
They would?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I believe so. Do you not, General?
General Franks. Senator Bunning, I would add that I do
agree with what the Secretary said. I agree with it because,
just as Secretary Rumsfeld has spent considerable time with
President Musharraf, I have spent time with him. What he has
proven over time by having already given us--and I am not sure,
sir, what the number is, but literally hundreds of prisoners
from a great many nations--leads me to believe that, yes, he
would do that.
Senator Bunning. I am going to follow up on Senator Reed
for a second, because I have a letter from General Myers
telling me that part of the reason artillery was not taken into
Afghanistan was ``the ability of U.S. air assets to deliver
precision munitions at any time.'' We both know that air power,
while it can be very awesome and do wonderful things, it cannot
do everything. It cannot deliver munitions at any time for the
simple reason that it is subject to on-station time, the number
of aircraft available, weather, anti-aircraft threats, and
sometimes even altitude. Do you agree that air power cannot be
all things to all people? Why do you think General Myers said
this to me?
General Franks. Sir, I do not know. I know him very well
and I think that he very well recognizes that the mortar, for
example, as I talked about it a minute ago----
Senator Bunning. I was told that by others before.
General Franks.----is a very capable all-weather, day and
night system. I will say on behalf of air power--I am an air
power advocate and I am a believer in air power--I think it
needs to be coupled with a capability on the ground that gives
you an all-weather capability.
I cannot talk specifically to what Dick meant when he sent
you the note. But I do know that he very much believes in the
use of systems like the mortar and so forth to give that 24-
hour all-weather capability.
Senator Bunning. Well, my concern obviously was for the
safety of those doing the operation, and I know your concern as
the commander over there would be just the same. But depending
on air power and its reliability when, in fact, it could
possibly not be there when you need it seems to me to be
questionable at best and risky.
General Franks. Sir, for sure, but thanks to this
committee, we have equipped those Army forces with a
magnificent mortar in the 120-millimeter mortar. It is a very
capable system. I am an artilleryman by upbringing and so I am
not anti-artillery. But I recognize things. For example, you
can put four 120-millimeter mortars and the ammunition that you
want for a given fight in one helicopter, a CH-47, whereas if
you do that with these lightweight howitzers it is one howitzer
per helicopter.
So it is hard for me to make a comparison that one would
like to be drawn to that says there is something terribly wrong
with not having had cannons.
Senator Bunning. The biggest problem, General, is that
sometimes the helicopter cannot fly at certain altitudes and,
therefore, you cannot use it.
General Franks. Sir, that is absolutely correct without a
doubt. We inserted the people for these operations based on a
pretty thorough plan using helicopters. On the same type
helicopters that we used to insert the people, we also inserted
the equipment at those altitudes.
Senator Bunning. My time has expired. I want to thank you
both for being here.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bunning.
Senator Carnahan.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also
like to thank our witnesses today for their outstanding service
to our country during these troubling times.
General Franks, I understand that the Iranians were at
first very cooperative in our operation within Afghanistan and
now we are hearing reports of their efforts to undercut on the
ongoing U.S. mission there. Could you discuss the nature of our
relationship with the Iranian forces that are deployed in
Afghanistan?
General Franks. Senator, the Secretary will give a much
better answer than I, but let me give an operational level sort
of an answer. As we have worked Afghanistan, we have found two
large problems. One is this inclination for tribals and ethnic
backgrounds within the country to contest one another. The
other has been the interests of nations around Afghanistan in
terms of wanting to influence what is going on on the inside of
Afghanistan.
My appreciation with respect to several countries--Iran is
one of them--is that they have not been entirely helpful in
everything that we have tried to do in Afghanistan. I would
turn to the Secretary.
Senator Carnahan. Have the Iranian contacts with the
warlords in any way compromised the Central Command's
relationship with friendly Afghan forces?
General Franks. Ma'am, it is hard to know. For example, one
regional leader in the west, obviously being very close to
Iran, has a great deal of traffic back and forth between Iran
and Afghanistan and has had relationships with the Iranians for
a long time. The specifics of whether or not that has
complicated our efforts to stabilize and to kill and capture
the Taliban and al Qaeda in that part of the country, that has
not been an effect, a direct operational effect, that I have
seen.
Senator Carnahan. Mr. Secretary, with the assistance of the
Russians, Iran has made substantial progress toward
constructing a nuclear reactor and reports indicate that it
could be completed as early as 18 months from now. I know the
administration shares my concerns certainly as to what the
impact of this reactor might have on regional security as well
as national security, and I was wondering if you would comment
as to your views about the threat that this reactor poses and
how the administration plans to handle this issue.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I think that your concern and
the administration's concern is very well placed. Iran is
probably unquestionably burning off, wasting, more natural gas
and the energy that it would provide than the entire nuclear
system that they are building would provide them. They are not
short of gas or oil. They do not need the nuclear facility for
anything that is legitimate by way of energy in their country.
It is a concern to us that the Russians have been and are
continuing to provide that assistance.
With respect to your first question, the United States and
most coalition countries are trying to do things that will
strengthen the central government of Afghanistan. Therefore,
our work is to help build a national army and to see that the
assistance that comes in from abroad is funneled through that
government so that they have some leverage and begin to work
with the regional leaders in a way that is advantageous to the
population as a whole.
To the extent that Iran deals separately with regional
forces, obviously, it is unhelpful to the central government.
To the extent that al Qaeda remnants are able to move back and
forth across the Iranian borders and find safe haven in Iran,
it is notably unhelpful to the global war on terrorism.
You are quite right, there was speculation about the degree
of their assistance early on. But I think if one wanted to net
it out, it would be hard to say that they have been a
constructive force with respect to the global war on terrorism.
They are sending assistance, weapons, money, and people into
Damascus and Lebanon, for fostering and fomenting terrorist
acts. They are far from clean.
Senator Carnahan. General Franks, the U.S. Transportation
Commander, General John Handy, was quoted in the paper the
other day describing projected shortfalls in aircraft
capability as the war on terrorism continues to tax our fleet
of C-17s, C-130s, C-141s, and C-5s. Would you describe what you
think is the importance of our airlift and how it has played in
rapidly deploying our combat forces there? Also, could you
comment on the DOD's airlift needs?
General Franks. I included in my written statement what I
think would be taken as an agreement with General John Handy
with respect to strategic lift. If you look at Afghanistan, you
are talking about a landlocked country. So whatever we are
moving in and out of Afghanistan, at least for the first
several months until we were able to start using land lines of
communication, we did by air.
Transportation Command has done an incredible job with the
assets available to them. I think John Handy's view is that the
number of airframes needs to be increased. I agree with that
view. In terms of the way it is prioritized, I cannot talk to
how many that means in a given year. But I think we all
recognize that for our work in the future strategic lift is
going to be absolutely critical to us.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you. My time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General Franks, thank you for your
service, your very fine service. This is a great and free
country. It is appropriate that the leaders of our war effort
come before the committee and answer tough questions,
complaints, and second-guessing, and from that we learn.
My observation is that our military is taking extraordinary
steps to learn. It is creative and innovative, perhaps more
than any military in history. It is transforming itself in
remarkable ways, and for that I salute you. I have no doubt
that the next conflict will be better than this one, but it was
a tremendous improvement over the last one and it continues to
improve. I think all of us have to recognize that and salute
you for it.
We had complaints before this war began, fears expressed
that I was just thinking about recently: oh, we are not going
to be able to win this war; the Russians had failed; we were
going to fail; we cannot succeed in this far-off place; we
cannot get enough friendly nations to help us move our material
and personnel in; if we attack, it will really make the
terrorists mad and they will really bomb us even more than they
are today; that the Arab street would go up in arms; that the
Afghan people were not going to like American troops coming
there, would not accept our effort, and would not be friendly
to us; and that Arab nations would all in a unanimous effort
oppose what we have done.
So facing a lot of difficulties and a lot of challenges,
you have negotiated those with great skill, I believe,
diplomatically, militarily, politically. We have made more
progress than we have a right to expect at this time. I just
want to say on behalf of myself, along with others in this
country who agree with me, that we have done very well. We
thank you for it, and we have achieved tremendous military
success.
This Taliban government, that we had the capability of
defeating, has been defeated. It no longer exists. Yes, we have
not captured bin Laden, but I do not think anybody could make
it a policy of the United States to guarantee we could capture
one person anywhere in the world. If you give me a head start
in Alabama, you will have a hard time finding me, I will just
tell you.
So I am not disappointed. I would be disappointed if he
were still orchestrating and pulling the strings behind his
terrorist network. I think we have to be pleased with what has
happened in Pakistan. They have taken a stand on the right
side. The Philippines have made tremendous progress against
terrorism, killing the leader of that group and making real
progress there. We have gotten greater help from the Europeans
from intelligence. Other Arab nations have helped us with
intelligence and insight into this terrorist network. I believe
we have done a lot of good.
Mr. Secretary, I know you have been criticized for not
moving far enough in nation-building, as some would like to
call it. My understanding is first of all we have about 5,000
troops in Afghanistan. Is that correct?
Secretary Rumsfeld. A little more.
Senator Sessions. A little more. We have 7,000 in Kosovo
with no prospect of getting a lot more of those home very
rapidly. I think you have been exactly correct to do everything
within reason to not allow our presence to expand unnecessarily
and to allow ourselves to be committed unnecessarily to our
military forces to do things we cannot achieve.
Are you satisfied where you are in that effort in terms of
striking the right balance between helping rebuild this country
without turning our military into a police force in every
village, hamlet, and farm in Afghanistan?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Sessions, first thank you very
much. You are right. You have posed the tension that exists as
to how to manage a difficult and delicate situation.
In thinking about some of the earlier questions as to how
we got to where we are, it seems to me there were several
things that took place. First, was that the nature of the
Taliban was so repressive and egregious that the people of
Afghanistan felt liberated.
Second, a lot of Afghan people did not like the foreigners,
the al Qaeda, coming in there and taking over major portions of
their country.
Third, you are right; the decision to have a relatively
limited footprint, unlike the Soviets and other countries might
have, and avoid being seen as a foreign occupying country,
particularly in a place like Afghanistan, was terribly
important.
Next, we made a determined effort to avoid collateral
damage. For a country that has been bombed like it was during
the civil wars and Soviet occupation, and all the people that
were killed, and all the carnage, and the damage to vineyards,
buildings, institutions, and religious idols, the fact that we
have been so careful was respected.
General Franks from the very first day started humanitarian
assistance, and it seems to me that has helped as well.
The one area where we are really uneven is in countering
lies and disinformation by the Taliban, the al Qaeda, and the
forces that oppose us. We have not done a brilliant job there.
Their training manuals organize them to do it. They are
skillful at it. They are on the ground and were able to
constantly try to make it look like it was an anti-Afghan
effort, or an anti-Islam effort, or a foreign occupying effort.
We were constantly trying to correct that. Every time they
would do it, they would have free run of the media for a period
of time before we could get ourselves organized to try to
counter it.
But your question is right on the mark. That was the
tension all along, how to do that. I appreciate your comment.
Senator Sessions. Well, thank you for that.
General Franks, just a brief question with regard to
airlift and precision-guided munitions. You made reference to
that in your statement. This budget has increased funding
substantially for both of those. It is something that is very
critical, as well as to unmanned aerial vehicles. Are we where
we need to be? I frankly think that we could find more if you
have to have it. Where are we in terms of your satisfaction
level with the increase in airlift, unmanned vehicles, and
precision-guided munitions?
General Franks. Sir, thank you for the question. There has
never been a combatant commander without an appetite. I am one
with an appetite for the sorts of systems you talk about. I
think that what we see with precision-guided munitions right
now instructs us a lot for the future of warfare. I think what
we have seen with unmanned aerial systems and the way we have
seen them used in Afghanistan, while imperfect to be sure, has
taught us about what we want to do.
I think we have seen that the requirement to move a number
of people and tons a long ways by air taught us something about
our strategic mobility. So my appetite for those systems as a
combatant is insatiable. But I am also pragmatic enough to
recognize that there will be only so much resource and that
some prioritization will have to be done there. So if I just
keep my humble position, then more is better. But I recognize
that a sense of prioritization will have to be done within the
various military Services and within the secretariat.
Senator Sessions. On those three things, I think they
should be prioritized and we should not skimp on those.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General, I want to join with others in
saluting both of you for your extraordinary efforts and your
successes in the last 2\1/2\ months. You accomplished more in
about a 10-week period late last year than the old Soviet Union
accomplished in 10 years in Afghanistan. You routed an enemy
which believed itself to be entrenched and equipped to prevail
against you, and you initiated a military engagement in about 6
weeks versus, as I recall, in Operation Desert Storm which took
about 6 months a decade before.
From all accounts and those who have more expertise in this
realm than I, your prosecution of the war was if not
transformational, at least it involved a lot of breakthrough
innovation. I assume this will be studied for many years to
come, especially the combination of precision targeting and the
delivery of overwhelming force to maximize lethality against
the enemy and minimization of the casualties to our own forces,
our allies, and even the civilians in these enemy-occupied
territories. This is really exceptional and again enormous to
your credit.
It seems to me that one lesson of all of this, going back
to the beginning on September 11, is that even with this
overwhelming superiority militarily, we as a country do not
enjoy invincibility. We can retaliate, we have proven with
devastating punishment against an enemy attack, but the damage
and the death and the destruction that attack can cause against
us causing an unprecedented menu of options that our enemies
have available. These blows raise some obvious questions like:
can we afford to wait to retaliate in future situations?
I believe it is that question which caused the President to
raise at West Point the possibility of preemption. I guess in
my view, its appeal is matched only by its peril. If it is
employed, it seems to me it is going to have profound
implications for our country and for other countries around the
world, friends and foes alike, and for the future of military
conflict in this world.
So I would ask each of you in turn, Mr. Secretary and
General, how do you apply the experiences of the al Qaeda
attack on this country and the subsequent Afghan war to the
groups and governments which pose these prospective threats to
us today?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, your question is central. It
is one that not just Congress or the United States, but the
world, is considering. It is elevated because of several
things. Most importantly, it is the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. The 21st century is a period where our margin
for error is modest, where we put at risk not by weapons of
mass destruction hundreds, or thousands, but hundreds of
thousands, or potentially millions of people.
If one looks at what happened, Afghanistan did not attack
the United States. Afghanistan behaved in a way that harbored
the al Qaeda, who did attack the United States. As tragic as it
was, it was not with weapons of mass destruction that time. The
United States made a conscious decision to engage in what
people call preemption, preventative action, or anticipatory
self-defense. I think of it as self-defense. We went after
Afghanistan, which had not attacked us, but we went there to
eliminate the Taliban as a governing body. We also eliminated
the ability of the al Qaeda to use that country as a base for
their terrorist network.
We did it because we knew we could not simply sit here and
allow them to continue to train thousands of additional
terrorists who will without question get their hands on weapons
of mass destruction in the period ahead. It is written. It is
not ``if,'' it is ``when.'' There is just too much of it around
the world, too many terrorist states that are engaged in
weapons programs, involved with chemical weapons, biological
weapons, and aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons.
Therefore, what you have raised is exactly what this
country and the world has to consider, because we are in a 21st
century security environment and it is notably different than
the 20th century.
Senator Dayton. General?
General Franks. Senator, the only answer I can give is just
the notion that says to take the fight to the enemy. The
operational concept is maintain initiative by taking the fight
to the enemy.
Senator Dayton. Mr. Secretary, given with what you said,
that we are likely to live the rest of our lives in the
foreseeable future in a world where, given the proliferation of
both the technology as well as the scientific and technological
know-how to put that into effect, there will be groups or
governments who do or may have these capabilities who are
inimical to our interests, who may perceive us as enemies, what
are the triggers? What are the tripwires that we use? Do we go
in preemptively every time we have identified such? How do we
frame that debate and deliberation?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, it seems to me that is
something that this body and other nations and academic
institutions need to consider. What one has to do is to balance
the advantages, as General Franks suggested, of anticipatory
self-defense or preventative action, against the disadvantages
of not doing it. One has to weigh those. There are a number of
factors that have to come into play.
Obviously, there are countries like the United Kingdom that
have weapons of mass destruction. Democracies do not tend to
attack other people. They do not tend to go after their
neighbors. They do not tend to sponsor terrorist states. So if
one wants to look at one differentiation and a way to do a
quick triage, democracies that have weapons of mass destruction
tend not to be threats.
There are other countries that, depending on their degree
of intimacy with terrorist networks, obviously elevate
themselves as problems. My guess is that our society and the
world will end up reading and listening to what the dictators
and the repressive regimes around the world say about what they
think those weapons ought to be used for, what they think of
their neighbors, and how they condemn the alleged illegitimacy
of their neighbors, and the things that they tell to their
people.
We have a wonderful way of turning a blind eye to what
these people are saying. If we sat down and looked at what they
are doing to their own people--starvation, repression,
butchery, use of chemicals--and if you look at the
aggressiveness of their programs, which is another measuring
item, how close are they to having these weapons and how close
are they to using those weapons? You would have to agree that
these are tough calls.
But if you look at what they are doing to their people and
then look at what they are saying they want to do to other
nations in the world, pretty soon people have to nod and say,
``Well, they are nominating themselves, they are not being
nominated.''
Senator Dayton. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dayton.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to start off, Mr. Secretary, by
saying you are doing a great job. I can recall during your
confirmation process there were a few naysayers out there, but
I think you have proven them wrong, and your leadership of our
Armed Forces during some very timely, some very trying times,
is very much appreciated, and particularly by myself. I just
wanted to express that to you in a public manner today.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much.
Senator Allard. I think that your efforts to take a serious
look at our legacy systems is appropriate. I continue to hear
people expound upon wanting to stay with some of the older
legacy systems. I have always felt that we need to work to
modernize our forces. That is going to be the strength of our
country and I think that your efforts in trying to modernize
those forces is going to make a difference 10 or 20 years from
now.
I just have heard the comment from some individuals that
maybe we should have had more people on the ground; if we had
had more people on the ground, maybe Osama bin Laden would not
have escaped. But I do think that fewer people on the ground
and higher technology saved American lives. If I were to make a
tradeoff there, I will take the American life any day. So that
is where I am coming from and I just wanted to say those things
to you, Mr. Secretary.
My question is to you, General Franks. You have been there.
You have talked with people on the ground. I would like to have
your honest assessment of how our space-based assets have
helped during Operation Enduring Freedom. I would also like to
have you discuss where we may need improvements in the future
as far as our space-based assets are concerned.
General Franks. Senator, I will tell you that the pieces of
this operation, which have been successful, would not have been
so without space-based assets. It is simply a fact. I will give
you only one example, but I could give you many. We could talk
about command and control of unmanned aerial systems. We can
talk about intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capability. We could discuss this, sir, in closed session. But
I will use a different example.
I will use the example of what we have referred to as
offset command and control for many years in our Armed Forces.
But until this particular effort in Afghanistan, we actually
have never seen it. What I mean is the business of having
combatant command and control located in Tampa, Florida, with a
war fight or in control of a war fight that is going on in
Afghanistan.
Is that a perfect circumstance? Of course not. The one
thing that this committee recognizes is the ability to reach
out and touch people and explain to them. That care is a part
of the military work and so we miss that. On the other hand,
space-basing has given us the ability through huge pipes to be
more situationally aware thousands of miles away from this
battlefield, I would posit, than we have ever been before when
we were on the battlefield.
Senator Allard. Could you comment about the role of
commercial space-based products and do you see an increase of
their role in the future?
General Franks. Senator, I would have to give you something
for the record, to be very honest with you. I see a great many
space-based products from the commercial sector, but I do not
have an informed or mature view of it.
Senator Allard. I understand that we had to rely on
commercial space imaging, for example, to help us some during
this process. When you respond in your written response, I
would appreciate it if you would make some comments in that
direction.
General Franks. I will do that, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Space-based commercial imagery products have played and will
continue to play an increasingly important role in intelligence
monitoring and operational planning.
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), in concert with
government contractors, has developed collection and production
processes to incorporate commercial imagery into our intelligence-
gathering efforts. NIMA's Central Imagery Tasking Office validates
CENTCOM's commercial imagery requirements, works with vendors to
accomplish collection, purchases appropriate licenses, and makes the
imagery available to U.S. Government organizations via NIMA's web-based
Commercial Satellite Imagery Library.
At CENTCOM, geospatial information analysts use the imagery data to
create a variety of geospatial products (such as image maps, map
revisions, precise geo-location graphics, and situational awareness
tools) at the unclassified level. The data can also be incorporated
with classified products. However, the availability of unclassified
commercial imagery products is extremely useful for collaboration with
coalition partners and non-governmental organizations, because
classified national imagery products are generally not releasable to
them.
National intelligence agencies, Service intelligence centers,
CENTCOM, and our Service topographic units routinely use commercial
multi-spectral imagery to evaluate the battlefield. Examples include:
the identification of drop zones, landing zones, areas of limitation,
and trafficability of hostile forces. As commercial hyper-spectral
imaging capabilities become more robust, we will be able to accomplish
these tasks with more accuracy. Hyperspectral imagery also holds great
potential for the development of enemy activity signatures, perhaps
most significantly the identification of chemical and biological
weapons activity.
Another important role for commercial imagery products lies in the
arena of public affairs. When we release statements concerning enemy
activity supported by evidence from commercial imagery sources, any
charges of DOD manipulation of the imagery are thwarted because the
same imagery is available to the public.
Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, commercial
imagery has been used to update 1:50,000- and 1:100,000-scale
topographic maps, which are essential combat planning tools for forces
on the ground in Afghanistan. I have incorporated commercial imagery
into many of our operational planning tools, and used it routinely in
briefings to coalition partners. Commercial imagery products have been
especially useful in debriefings of detainees.
Although commercial imagery has great utility in support of
military operations, it cannot be used as a substitute for existing and
future national imagery sources. National systems will remain vital to
our intelligence efforts, especially in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility.
Senator Allard. I appreciate that very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.
Senator Landrieu.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know the time is getting late, but I appreciate, Mr.
Secretary, seeing you and having you here. General Franks,
thank you for your extraordinary service.
I have a statement I would like to submit, Mr. Chairman,
for the record. I ask unanimous consent.
[The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
Thank you Mr. Chairman:
I would like to thank you for calling this hearing. I would also
like to take this opportunity to welcome and thank Secretary Rumsfeld
and General Franks for the outstanding commitment they and every
uniformed man and woman, here and across the globe, continue to bring
to the war on terrorism.
The prosecution of this war, under your watchful eyes, has now
moved into an even more difficult phase. Our mettle and resolve as a
united nation is now under its most stringent test--will we be able to
continue winning the war on terrorism without the ``popularity vote''
of the evening news? Will our troops still be in the forefront of the
minds and hearts of Americans? I say the answer to that is ``YES.''
Mr. Secretary and General Franks, now more than ever before, as the
American public and the world settle in to the idea that we will be
fighting this war for months, even years, you must continue to provide
the leadership and the guidance by which our defense priorities are set
for our two most important goals: Eradicating terrorism--not
unilaterally, but with the support and participation of our allies and
friends--and, fostering the growth and stability of freedom and
democracy for citizens in those countries who have been gripped with
terror for so many years.
As we move into planning for the next phase of this war, it is
clear we must be thoughtful, systematic, determined, and have ``right''
on our side. Only then can we feel justified in taking the necessary
steps to eradicate terrorists. We look forward to the day when
terrorist groups are few or none, and do not receive support from any
governmental body, in any country. There will soon be nowhere for
terrorists to hide and no training grounds for their particular kind of
evil.
The war in Afghanistan is proving to be a catalyst for change in
our military. We are successfully transitioning from our legacy force
and concentration on multiple major theater wars to a lighter, leaner
force, which is able to take on any asymmetry of war which may arise.
Most importantly--and I cannot emphasize this enough--we need to be
able to successfully stabilize previously destabilized regions and
begin the long process of helping to rebuild these nations through
careful planning, persistence, and innovation. This is the only means
we have to ensure our long term success in keeping terrorists from
regaining control over the societies we have set free. The women and
children in these countries must have the freedom to study, to walk
along the streets, to receive healthcare, to play, to worship--and all
without fear of being killed for the simplest of life's liberties.
This committee relies on your visits to us and our visits to these
regions to provide the firsthand updates we must have to ensure all the
needed resources are available to our troops. We take this
responsibility to heart each and every day and our thoughts and prayers
continue to be with our men and women in uniform and with their
families.
They have our respect, our admiration, our support, and that of the
American public to continue winning this war by defeating those who
would take away our freedoms, our very way of life, and who would leave
a legacy of conflict, fear, and oppression for our children.
Once again, I thank you both for your dedication, guidance, and
leadership of our troops now, and through the duration of the war on
terrorism.
Senator Landrieu. Let me emphasize, though, one part of the
statement and it will lead into the two questions that I have
for you gentlemen.
One part of the statement says--and Senator Lieberman
really honed in on this in terms of his line of questioning and
comments--that there is no question that we have been
extraordinarily successful in our military operations. There is
not a critic that I know of in the world in terms of that. We
might have made a small mistake here or there, but, overall, it
has been an extraordinarily successful operation because of our
superior technology, our organizational skills, and our just
overall capacity.
But I think the challenge that lays before us is after
winning the war how to establish and stand up the peace so that
we are not continuing to fight the same wars, so that we are
not accomplishing great things on one battlefield only to lay
the seeds of, unfortunately, another battlefield in the future.
So my statement says something about the challenge before
us to be able to successfully stabilize previously unstable
regions and to begin the long process of rebuilding these
nations through careful planning, persistence, and innovation.
There does seem to be some disagreement about what we call it,
but I am not sure there is any real disagreement about the need
for and the necessity to finish a job we have started.
Finishing has to do with eliminating the operations of a
terrorist organization and eliminating its possible rebirth.
That is a greater challenge and it is harder to put our hands
around.
Given that, how are we explaining our plan to President
Karzai, who has asked for additional help and support outside
of the region that we have defined? How do we explain to our
partners and allies, who have asked for support outside, what
we have determined we should do? What do we say to them after
the agreements that have been signed about helping to stand up
the peace? What is our explanation to why we quasi-considered,
but not accepted, their invitation to expand our operations to
prevent another war or prevent the seeds of discontent from
sprouting up again? Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is a question, Senator, that is
critical. Our country and the world needs to help find an
answer to it. Afghanistan is a country in which the
institutions of government have been destroyed for a couple of
decades. It is without a lot of the normal things that one
would have like: an army, border patrol, police, courts, and
all of those ministries that need to do things.
For it to be able to assume responsibility for its own
security so that people return, economic activity can go
forward, and humanitarian assistance can be provided, it will
require a period of time. What we have said is that we want to
do everything humanly possible to help the central government,
and we are trying to see that every type of assistance comes
through that government so that it becomes stronger.
We are helping to train the Afghan army. We are helping to
ask the world for money to come in and help provide border
patrols and help provide police training. We are the ones who
helped encourage the countries to volunteer for the
International Security Assistance Force, recruited Turkey to
become the successor leader, and now trying to recruit other
countries to succeed Turkey in December.
When we deal with President Karzai, he knows that. He
understands that. When we talk about priorities as to what we
ought to be doing, and he agrees with us that our first job is
to stop the al Qaeda and the Taliban from retaking the country.
Senator Landrieu. But in all fairness, Mr. Secretary--and I
agree that we have done an extraordinary amount of work and
that we most certainly cannot do it all--the long-term success
would be rebuilding that country and helping them. But is it
not true that he has asked us for this assistance and to go
outside of Kabul and to stand up the multinational force with
some more assets of our own?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There is no question that President
Karzai would like that. There is no question that we would like
that. The question is, what ought we to do with what resources
we have and how can we be most helpful? I think if President
Karzai were here, he would agree with us that what we are doing
in supporting the ISAF, in training the Afghan National Army,
in going after the al Qaeda and Taliban, and by having our
Armed Forces with most of the regional political leaders' and
warlords' units to provide security around the country is a
higher priority than having additional ISAF, notwithstanding
the fact we would like to see that happen.
Senator Landrieu. I appreciate that. I just think that in
this whole debate, which is complementary or fits the debate
about Iraq and what we need to do in Iraq, I agree with you the
threat is real. This country has no good intentions. It is of
great interest and should be to every American about what is
going on in Iraq and what our measures are to deal with it.
But I am going to have difficulty trying to explain to at
least my constituents in Louisiana why we would be looking like
we are somewhat hesitant in Afghanistan when the job seems more
doable than what we are facing or potentially facing in Iraq.
It is not a clear message.
So while I am thinking, knowing, and believing the threat
is real and being one of the Senators willing to do something,
we would have to come across with a little more direct words
matching effort to go there.
I am going to submit my last question, which has to do with
our commitment to stand up civil affairs, which is a very
important component, General Franks, to what you are doing.
Again, we are excellent at winning the war. We have the
capability for it. I think the Army has the capability. I do
not question the capability of our service men or women in any
way. It is the political will that I wonder about and if it is
there to step up to the civil affairs aspect of this so we can
keep our men and women out of harm's way in the future.
I will submit my additional questions, Mr. Chairman, for
the record.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Landrieu.
General Franks. Senator, I might give just a quick response
on civil affairs. The Secretary mentioned earlier the
humanitarian assistance since the very first days of this.
Also, since the very first days of it, we have been using civil
affairs people and, in fact, have had a flag officer inside
Afghanistan since, I believe, December as a civil affairs
commander. When I mentioned the 300-plus nongovernmental
organizations and the projects, it is actually those civil
affairs units who are affecting the coordination that is
bringing all that to pass.
Senator Landrieu. But for the record, Mr. Chairman, we
have, I think, approximately 4,000 civil affairs and we have
158 in the country. Can you clarify those numbers were the
numbers?
General Franks. I do not know what the civil affairs
numbers in the country are right now. I will supply that for
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The breakdown of Civil Affairs personnel within the U.S. Military
is as follows:
U.S. Army Reserve.......................................... 3,024
U.S. Army Active........................................... 220
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.................................. 275
------------
Total.................................................... 3,519
Of the above numbers, 155 U.S. Army Reserve and 15 U.S. Army Active
Civil Affairs soldiers are currently deployed to Afghanistan in support
of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, may I make one comment on
this subject?
Chairman Levin. Sure.
Secretary Rumsfeld. One of the dilemmas is that to the
extent the United States or any country goes in and substitutes
its other capabilities for the absence of a capability. One has
to know that that is a good thing if it is temporary and if it
stabilizes the situation. It is a bad thing if it creates a
dependency on the part of that country for those capabilities.
What we saw was a promise to get out of Bosnia by Christmas
1996 and we are still there. What we need to do is find how can
we provide the Afghan government with the kind of support that
will enable it to develop the strength to provide for its own
security and that other countries--ISAF, coalition forces, the
U.S. or anyone else--will not have to be there at all.
Trying to do that, there is no road map for it. It is not
science; it is art. We are doing it as well as we know how. My
impression is that the priorities are right, and my impression
is that President Karzai would agree with the priorities. But
that is not to say he would not like more help. He would.
You are quite right, we have to get other countries to step
up and deliver on their pledges of money and support.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
I thank both witnesses for their patience. It has been a
long afternoon. I add my voice to the chorus of appreciation
for the great job you are doing for the country.
I have been listening carefully to the questions and the
answers and, I am reminded of my old, dear friend Morris Udall,
who once said everything that can possibly be said on this
subject has been said, only not everyone has said it; the issue
has been pretty well covered. But I do have several comments.
First of all, Mr. Secretary, since the issue of Iraq and
leaking was brought up, I am entertained because you have been
around this town a long time. The fact is that I am reminded a
bit of Claude Rains' protestations about what was going on in
Rick's Casino. The fact is there are competing proposals within
the administration and certain people are using or attempting
to gain advantage by leaking information.
We have had leaks on everything short of the use of
tactical nuclear weapons. When it is resolved within the
administration, Mr. Secretary, as to what the strategy will be
for the regime change in Iraq, which the President has been
steadfast and I strongly support that has to be done, then I
think you will find the leaks will stop. But it is a game that
was played when you first came here nearly 30 years ago and it
will probably be played 30 years from now.
As far as Tora Bora is concerned, we all know we needed
more boots on the ground, but we learn lessons. We learn
lessons and the following operations have been much more
successful.
But the main thing I want to comment on is the situation as
regard to Afghanistan. Many of us remember 1989 when the Soviet
Union, with our help to the freedom fighters and resisters, was
driven out of Afghanistan. We, rightfully perhaps, given the
challenges at the time, turned our back. Chaos ensued and the
Taliban came to power.
It is very clear the lessons of history. You said, ``It is
not art, it is science,'' but we all can learn from history,
Mr. Secretary. When we turned our back on Afghanistan, the
people preferred a totalitarian government to chaos. Right now
outside of Kabul, we are bordering to some degree on chaos. You
mentioned yourself that there are warlords who are fighting
against one another and we do not know whose side to intervene
on.
The fact is we need to expand the peacekeeping force. We
cannot expect any other country to do it. Yes, we were supposed
to be out of Bosnia by Christmas, but we have a reason to
remain in Bosnia. We need to expand our peacekeeping forces or
we will repeat the lesson of 1989. The assassination of the
vice president clearly indicates that. The need to provide U.S.
troops as security forces for the president within his own
capital clearly indicates that.
You will be making a serious mistake if you say, ``Well, we
expect other countries to step up.'' We are the world's
superpower. We have to step up.
Finally, I want to discuss with you just briefly this whole
issue of aircraft leasing. I will not go into a diatribe about
it except to say that the American people right now are very
upset at major corporations cooking the books. You are about to
cook the books on this lease arrangement for either 737s, 100
of them, or 4 VIP 767s. I have two questions.
One, where was the four VIP 767 aircraft on your priority
list? I cannot find it anywhere. Second of all, would you agree
that it is necessary to get authorization from this committee
before entering into any lease purchase agreement of any either
737s or 767s?
I thank you for your patience and I thank you for being
here to give us your very enlightening answers to many very
important questions.
Secretary Rumsfeld. May I make just three quick responses?
Senator McCain. You can do anything, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. On the leak issue, I do not doubt for a
minute that there are differing views about what one ought to
do. I can tell you one thing: the relationship between the
senior civilian leadership in the Department, between the
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Central
Command, General Franks, is working well. The discussions that
take place and the process that has been established have been
working as well as I have ever seen.
To the extent there are people down at lower levels who do
not agree with one level or another----
Senator McCain. Or other branches of the government.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Whatever. You are quite right, I came
here in 1957, and it has always been so.
Second, I do not agree that the situation in Afghanistan
outside of Kabul is bordering on chaos. I think it is
reasonably secure, but it is less secure and worse in the
southeastern part of the country. The one location where there
is an ISAF, Kabul, the vice president was assassinated. So it
is an untidy place, but it is a lot tidier than it used to be.
I agree with you; there simply must be more capability,
from wherever, to assist the Karzai government in security,
theirs and elsewhere.
Last, on the lease arrangement, you are quite right; some
of the specifics that you referred to were not in the
President's budget. I do not know the answer technically as to
what authority the Department has or does not have with respect
to lease arrangements. I know that in the private sector, one
always looks at the lease-buy alternative and makes a judgment
with it as to what is the most effective.
I am told that the Air Force has the responsibility for
reviewing these things and is doing so.
Senator McCain. Could you answer the final question that I
asked? Do you believe that before entering into a lease-
purchase agreement or leasing agreement that you should get
authorization from this committee?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is what I do not know the answer
to. That is a technical question. I would have to go back and
check.
Senator McCain. What is technical about it? This is the
authorizing committee, Mr. Secretary. You have been around long
enough to know whether it should be approved of by this
committee or not, or should it be done unilaterally? I do not
think it is a technical question. I think it is a very
important question about the authority and responsibility of
the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess I answered it as well as I can.
I would have to go back to see what is in the authorization
language, what is in the appropriation language, and how the
conferences came out. I just do not know the answer. You may
not think it is technical, but it is.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld. But if I answer it wrong, then I have
to go back and correct the record, and I simply do not know
what authority the Air Force currently has with respect to it.
In accordance with section 8159 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2002, the Air Force may enter into a lease for up
to 100 commercially configured, general-purpose, Boeing 767 aircraft,
30 days after submitting a report to the congressional defense
committees concerning the proposed lease.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. I just would make a quick comment before we
close this meeting. A number of us have raised the question
about whether or not we should be doing more to assist the
Afghan government to assure that there will not be a return to
chaos in the rest of the country outside of Kabul. I must say I
agree with Senator McCain and others who have raised the point
that we must lead in this area.
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has said that a limited
expansion of the International Security Assistance Force to
areas outside of Kabul would make a huge contribution to the
consolidation of peace. I would hope that the administration
would consider that additional support.
Mr. Secretary, you have said a number of times that the
allocation of the forces that we have there represents the top
priorities and that you believe that President Karzai would
agree if he were here. I think that is correct. The question is
whether any additional resources should be offered,
particularly if it might result in other countries coming
through with pledges and with forces so that we could heed that
advice of Secretary General Annan and get some forces, like the
International Security Assistance Force, to the areas outside
of Kabul. I would hope that this administration would consider
that. That is a huge issue and I think we do not want to win
this war and then lose the peace in the sense of seeing a
return to chaos. I do not think anybody would want that to
happen.
Your last comment is that more capability is needed ``from
wherever,'' to use your word, to assist the Karzai government.
``Wherever'' may need to include some contribution from us if
it is going to include contribution from other places. I just
hope that that remains a possibility in the thinking of the
administration, because the stakes are so huge here.
We will recess now, unless you want to add a comment. We
want to thank you again for your presence, for your tremendous
energy, for what you have done to really make it possible for
us to have the successes we have had in Afghanistan.
We will now resume promptly in closed session in room 222
of the Russell Building. Thank you both.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
iraq
1. Senator Landrieu. Secretary Rumsfeld, at this morning's Foreign
Relations Committee hearing on U.S. policy towards Iraq, Anthony
Cordesman--who also testified at a hearing of the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee that I chaired earlier this year on Iraq--
stated that he believed that the U.S. should not give up on containment
of Iraq until ``nation-building'' is a bipartisan term. What he was
highlighting was the fact that after every major military operation,
there is almost inevitably some peace operation that follows. If we are
not willing to commit more U.S. troops to support multinational peace
operations in Afghanistan--measures Chairman Karzai has requested--how
can we even think that we would persuade our allies and Iraqis that we
would be serious about ensuring peace and stability in Iraq after we
have removed Saddam Hussein?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The President has not made a final decision
regarding military options on Iraq. That said, if the U.S. coalition
partners move against Iraq, our strategy will have a post-Saddam
component, which would seek to establish a broadly-based representative
government. Such a government in Iraq would generate confidence that it
will be committed to meeting the needs of the Iraqi people. Any
presumed U.S. or coalition role in the post-Saddam period must
necessarily be conditioned by the fact that we seek no permanent
territorial presence there. However, that should not cause anyone to
think that we will shrink from urgent post-Saddam responsibilities
there. The post-Saddam situation is difficult to predict, but, before
departing, the U.S. will work to ensure that the new government
renounces weapons of mass destruction, poses no threat to its own
people or to its neighbors, and does not engage in any activities that
pose a threat to international stability. Our intention is to stay as
long as necessary, but not a minute longer.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond
roles of non-governmental organizations
2. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, historically, the United
States has relied on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide
the bulk of humanitarian aid and support for rebuilding the nation's
infrastructure. What support are the NGOs providing to Afghanistan and
how are their efforts coordinated into the U.S. plans for Afghanistan?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There are currently over 300 NGOs in
Afghanistan. U.S. Government Agencies (U.S. Agency for International
Development, U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense,
and the Center for Disease Control) are working with over 30 of these
NGOs to provide services in the areas of food, water, shelter, health,
agriculture, education, reconstruction, work programs, and demining. Of
the approximately $513 million the U.S. Government has spent for aid to
Afghanistan in fiscal year 2002 approximately $135 million has been
given to NGOs. U.S. civil affairs soldiers in Afghanistan have spent
about $8 million on humanitaritian assistance activities, mostly
involving schools, hospitals, and water projects. A number of these
projects have been developed in direct coordination with NGOs.
coordinating coalition forces
3. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, our experience in Bosnia
and Kosova highlighted problems in coordinating the efforts of the
coalition forces. The war against terrorism has forged a coalition of
more than 60 nations that has complicated the coordination effort. What
are the most significant issues in coordinating the efforts of the
coalition in its fight against the terrorists and how is the Department
addressing these problems?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The United States has benefited greatly from
having more than 60 countries involved in the military portion of the
war on terrorism. These benefits have been political as well as
military in nature. Our coalition partners have provided indispensable
assistance ranging from direct military action to logistical and
humanitarian support. We would not have been as successful as we have
been to date without such a robust coalition. Coalition support and
assistance has allowed U.S. forces to concentrate their efforts and
reduced the financial costs of the war to the U.S. Government.
Some of the most challenging issues associated with the coalition
stem from the fact that initially coalition partners offered more
forces for the war in Afghanistan than the U.S. Central Command was
able to use. Our inability to use all forces offered immediately did
create concerns for some coalition partners. The passage of time and
the phased inclusion of more coalition forces in the war on terrorism
have contributed to alleviating these concerns. Also, CENTCOM's
inclusion of the coalition senior national representatives in the day-
to-day planning process at Tampa has demonstrated the importance that
we place on the coalition.
long-term plans for basing u.s. forces
4. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, what are the Department's
long range plans for stationing U.S. forces in Afghanistan and the
nations that currently provide basing rights?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Currently, the United States plans to maintain
a military presence in Afghanistan to complete Operation Enduring
Freedom and to train the Afghan National Army. However, even after
these missions are completed, the United States plan to continue
providing Afghanistan with long-term military assistance and
educational opportunities through our Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs.
These program activities will be administered through our Office of
Military Cooperation (OMC) in the American embassy in Kabul. Beyond
these steps, any decisions on a future United States military presence
in Afghanistan will have to take into account any requirement for an
actual force presence (as opposed to base access rights or other
arrangements), the success of the Afghan National Army training
program, and the wishes of the Afghan Government. The Department has
not made any decisions on a future military presence in Afghanistan.
In addition to considering a future United States force presence in
Afghanistan, the Department believes that we must also maintain our
cooperation with countries in the Central Asian region. Although we do
not envision permanent U.S. bases in these states, we do intend to
increase long-term security cooperation and to pursue future access to
Central Asia.
combat roles of coalition forces
5. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, because of its parochialism,
the U.S. media provides almost daily accounts of U.S. military
operations in Afghanistan. What combat operations are our coalition
partners conducting in Afghanistan and how do they compare with ours?
General Franks. Today, our coalition partners are conducting the
same demanding combat operations as our U.S. forces on the ground in
Afghanistan. These missions include: [Deleted.]
quality of life
6. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, based on the Department's
experience in the deployment of forces to Bosnia and Kosovo (where we
built facilities for our forces that rivaled what our forces have in
Germany), what are your plans for housing and caring for our forces in
Afghanistan?
General Franks. I strive to provide the best possible facilities
for American forces serving in Afghanistan. We established a baseline
to ensure quality of life was consistent across the CENTCOM AOR. We
develop our camps consistent with our mission, resources, and long-term
objectives.
We recently published a guide for contingency and long-term base
camp facilities. The CENTCOM Contingency and Long-Term Base Camp
Facilities Standards establish facilities consistent with the base
camp's mission. The Services and component commanders use the guide for
planning and forecasting construction requirements. Master planning
provides an integrated strategy for construction and maintenance of
required facilities at the best possible cost. The level of detail of
the Base Camp Master Plan depends on the maturity of the location, the
speed at which the operational need for a base camp develops, and the
expected length of stay.
The CENTCOM Contingency and Long Term Base Camp Facilities
Standards provide consistent standards and expectations across Service
components for infrastructure development, security, sustainment,
survivability (essential for the quality of life), safety, and
affordable working and living environments. The components are required
to adhere to the publication to ensure adequate facilities are provided
for personnel deployed in contingency and long-term operations within
the CENTCOM AOR.
training the afghan army
7. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, recently, the United States
completed the training of the first Afghan army battalion. I understand
that the French are training a second battalion. How will the training
of the Afghan military be accomplished and to what standards are you
training these forces?
General Franks. The training of the Afghan military will be
accomplished in a deliberate manner in order to facilitate a stable
environment in Afghanistan. The Commander of the Combined Joint Task
Force 180 (CJTF-180) is leading the CENTCOM training effort. CJTF-180
has the mission to assist the Afghan government in organizing,
training, and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA).
Our approach to the training of the Afghan military is to
strengthen the center first while working to cement relationships with
the regional leaders. We are focused on building a military capability
for Afghans to handle their own security in a way that is closely
integrated with other internal security institutions and reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan. We believe the key to the successful
establishment of the ANA is to focus the effort on ``Afghan
Supportable'' standards, using weapons and equipment already in
Afghanistan as much as possible in order to complement donors'
contributions in funds, resources, and training support.
Based on the Secretary of Defense's approval of the ``Quick Start''
plan in May 2002, 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (FOB-31), has
developed a standard program of instruction (POI) for an infantry
battalion. ANA battalions will begin training with individual skills
then progress to squad, platoon, and company level operations. The ANA
battalion staff will receive training separately to enable them to
integrate into platoon and company level operations. The 10-week course
gives the ANA battalions a minimal level of proficiency on which to
build. Each iteration will be broken down into three phases: the first
phase will focus on inprocessing, basic infantry skills, and basic
rifle marksmanship; the second phase will focus on specialty infantry
training consisting of mortar, demolition, recoilless rifle, machine
gun, medical, communication, and combat support training; the third and
final phase will focus on platoon and company collective tasks
culminating in a battalion level coordinated Field Training Exercise
(FTX) integrating all three line companies, the battalion heavy weapons
company, and battalion support assets.
We continue to work through the many challenges to this start-up
effort. This process will require a long-term commitment on the part of
the United States, the United Nations, and the coalition.
support of u.s. forces
8. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, the tragic effects of
collateral damage have provided fodder for the media and led to press
accounts that the United States forces are losing the support of the
Afghan people. What is your assessment of the relationship between the
Afghan civilian population and our forces? How does that compare with
the relationship between our allies and the Afghan people?
General Franks. While these incidents are regrettable, there has
been no noticeable effect on the support of the Afghan people. The
Afghan view of the U.S. is that we helped them dismantle the oppressive
Taliban regime and we are in Afghanistan to assist them in rebuilding
their nation. Most Afghans believe that the U.S. is the primary source
of humanitarian assistance throughout the country, even though this is
not necessarily true.
In the near-term, the Afghan people view the U.S. and coalition
forces as critical to the establishment of the necessary infrastructure
to allow Afghanistan to become a viable country. Sustaining this
positive attitude will be tied directly to the progress in our
developmental efforts because the Afghans have very high expectations
in this area. If there is not a noticeable improvement in quality of
life and the supporting infrastructure, we may encounter a decrease in
the acceptance of U.S. and coalition presence by the Afghan populace.
These isolated occurrences of collateral damage have not materially
effected the overall support of the Afghan people for our operations.
Our efforts are still perceived to be essential for the development of
a viable Afghan nation and a better life.
lessons learned
9. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, as you rotate forces through
Afghanistan, how do you ensure that the lessons learned are passed to
the incoming units? What in your personal views do you consider the
most important lesson learned at the unit level?
General Franks. Joint and Service-oriented Lessons Learned. There
are a number of means by which CENTCOM and its component commands are
able to ensure that lessons learned are transferred as units deploy and
redeploy to and from the CENTCOM AOR. Web databases like the Joint
Lessons Learned Program (JLLP), Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL),
Naval Lessons Learned System (NLLS), and the Air Force Center for
Knowledge Sharing Lessons Learned (AFCKSLL) all provide valuable
information to units as they prepare to deploy to Afghanistan while
fine-tuning joint Large Force Exercises (LFEs) and Service inter-
deployment training and readiness matrices.
CENTCOM AOR Indoctrination Training. In addition, CENTCOM
headquarters and its component commands have a formal indoctrination
(INDOC) process that officers and enlisted are required to complete
prior to deployment and/or immediately upon arrival in the CENTCOM AOR.
These INDOCs are continually updated through real-world lessons
learned. Rules-of-engagement, operating areas and procedures, command
and control procedures, public affairs and safety are addressed.
U.S. Army Transfer Of Authority (TOA)/U.S. Navy ``In-Chop''
Process. The TOA/In-Chop processes are another means of passing lessons
learned from one tactical/operational commander to another prior to
transferring responsibility within the CENTCOM AOR. In addition to the
formal administrative transfer of equipment, the out-going commander
provides a TOA/passdown briefing to the in-coming commander.
Unit-level Lessons Learned. Clearly, we have the best-trained
military personnel in the world and the Services should be proud of
that fact. Still, Operation Enduring Freedom has taught us a few
things. I would say that one of our greatest lessons learned is the
need to incorporate high altitude operations into our unit-level
training and to continue to refine our tactics in this area.
Specifically, with the majority of our forces operating at altitudes
well above 6,000 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL), we are learning just how
hard it is to operate in the high-altitude environment. This is
compounded by the fact that the majority of our Large Force Exercise
(LFE) military training areas within the U.S. are at altitudes below
2,000 feet MSL. Our troops have had to adapt to their environment and
have done an outstanding job in developing innovative ways to maintain
combat effectiveness in the harsh environment of Afghanistan. In
addition, I would add that we need to aggressively incorporate new
technologies and systems into unit-level training exercises in order to
improve the weapons, equipment, and command and control systems our
soldiers use in combat.
10. Senator Thurmond. General Franks, are the Services
incorporating lessons learned in their professional development
courses?
General Franks. I hesitate to speak on behalf of the Services. I
will say that all the Services have a means by which to archive lessons
learned for incorporation into their Service professional development
courses. Service databases like: the Center for Army Lessons Learned
(CALL), Naval Lessons Learned System (NLLS), and the Air Force Center
for Knowledge Sharing Lessons Learned (AFCKSLL) all provide valuable
information that could be incorporated into Service advancement courses
and professional development programs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith
the people's republic of china and taiwan
11. Senator Smith. Secretary Rumsfeld, I'm going to veer off the
hearing subject, because I believe developments in Asia are critical,
and it's not often enough you're before us and we can bring matters
directly to your attention.
Specifically, I have concerns about the renewal of military-to-
military contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC). It was
evident to us in the past that the Chinese were benefiting from these
exchanges far more than we were, and that the past administration let
PRC officers garner militarily useful information helpful to them in
their ongoing preparations for the invasion of Taiwan--a visit to FedEx
in Memphis where they learned about bar-coding comes to mind.
I'm already disturbed to learn that this administration classified
its latest military-to-military report for no apparent reason. Can you
explain to me why this issue shouldn't be in the public domain, and can
you tell me why we should restart these exchanges, when it's self-
evident they will never be either reciprocal or transparent?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our military contacts with the PRC are an
element of our overall China policy and reflect the President's
realistic view of the PRC. The administration continues, moreover, to
adhere strictly to the provisions of Section 1201, P.L. 106-65, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 which prohibits
the disclosure of certain categories of information that could enhance
China's military capability. No exchanges similar to the People's
Liberation Army visit to the Federal Express center in Memphis are
planned or ongoing. The Department of Defense will continue to conduct
a case-by-case review of all military contacts with China to ensure
compliance with the President's policy and legislative guidelines.
Second, in an effort to prepare a more substantive and
comprehensive report, the 2001 Annual Report on the Current State of
Military-to-Military Exchanges with the People's Liberation Army drew
upon classified materials for the first time. The use of these
materials required the entire report to be classified. Your staff can
access the classified report, which is stored in Room S-407 in the
Capitol.
12. Senator Smith. Secretary Rumsfeld, we have still not delivered
AMRAAMs promised to Taiwan, despite recent news that China conducted
two tests of the Russian-made AA-12 Adder medium range air-to-air
missile. Why not?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense is firmly committed
to implementing the obligations of the Taiwan Relations Act, and to
providing Taiwan with all necessary defense articles and services. U.S.
policy on providing AMRAAM is that we will not be the first country to
introduce these weapons into the region. In light of reported Chinese
acquisition of the AA-12, the State Department, in cooperation with
DOD, is in the process of reviewing this policy.
13. Senator Smith. Secretary Rumsfeld, since President Bush
endorsed, during his campaign, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, why
would DOD not embrace the House language in the defense authorization
bill on training Taiwanese officers? Why can't we engage with Chinese
democrats in Taiwan, as opposed to the dictators in Beijing? I know the
State Department already has its talking points out opposed to this
House provision on Taiwan, before the DOD even makes up its mind--but I
hope you come down on the right side of this issue, consistent with
President Bush's campaign commitment.
Secretary Rumsfeld. While we welcome Congress' support for the U.S.
commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and for the President's
commitment to the defense of Taiwan, we believe that the objectives of
Section 1202 are best achieved by preserving the traditional statutory
role of the Secretary to exercise authority, direction, and control
over the Department of Defense to conduct such activities as are
appropriate to support those commitments, including his authority to
preserve the confidentiality of such activities.
personnel rotations
14. Senator Smith. General Franks, I have recently read articles
and reports addressing a concern about the military personnel system
and the manner in which the people--the service men and women who are
truly responsible for accomplishing transformation--are rotated in and
out of jobs and billets too quickly. That personnel cycling does not
allow the individuals the time necessary to become a master of their
assigned duty, let alone a true expert before moving on to ``check the
box'' somewhere else. While I have been impressed with the results of
our forces to date, I would like to know how personnel rotations affect
your operations at your staff headquarters?
General Franks. Rotation as a matter of policy has had very little,
if any, affect on operations in the headquarters. Let me address the
issue from two perspectives, permanent party and temporary duty, since
they are managed very differently.
From a permanent party perspective I believe our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines enjoy tremendous stability and clearly have an
opportunity to not only develop professionally but contribute
significantly in a joint environment. For officers, Goldwater-Nichols
requires specific minimum tour length. In general, our officers will
serve a minimum of 3 years on the staff. Typically, the only time we
reassign an officer short of 3 years in the headquarters is to take
command of a unit or attend a service Professional Military Education
school--both great opportunities. While not governed by law, the same
is generally true for our enlisted members. In fact, many of them seek,
and are granted, authority to stay a fourth year.
As for individual augmentees, those assigned in a temporary duty
capacity, Service policies today rotate them somewhere between 90 days
and 1 year. Again, as a matter of policy I have not seen any
significant negative impacts as a result of these rotations. When we
ask for augmentation, we are normally looking for specific skill sets--
we expect these folks to show up already possessing the requisite
skills and be ready to go immediately to work. Almost without
exception, that's the case.
There are some challenges with regard to our mission in our theater
of operations--specifically with respect to our more technical career
fields. Shorter rotations tend to give our technical folks less time to
become familiar with deployed systems and have much opportunity to
subsequently use that familiarity to contribute. We're working with the
Services now to address these issues.
15. Senator Smith. General Franks, additionally, how do full unit
rotations, like the one recently completed by the 101st Airborne out of
Afghanistan, affect the stability and proficiency on their assigned
areas of responsibilities? What are the benefits of having a unit in
place for only 6 months at a time when I am sure it takes much longer
to learn the nuances of combat operations and the local culture and
such things--both tangible and intangible--that make the units truly
effective and even more efficient?
General Franks. This question is better answered by the Department
of the Army. As a general comment regarding the effect of operations in
Afghanistan on the readiness of our Armed Forces, it is my opinion that
the operations we have conducted in Afghanistan have strengthened the
overall combat readiness of our troops by giving them a taste of what
real-world combat operations are all about. The fear, anxiety, boredom,
physical pain, and sense of accomplishment that combat offers a soldier
cannot be fully simulated during a training exercise.
Still, this qualitative information is not easily transferred to an
analytically based, post-deployment Training and Readiness Report.
Normally, a unit is at its combat training and readiness peak when it
deploys. During the course of any deployment, some mission areas will
not be performed as often as others. Those missions and skill sets
performed often will result in razor-sharp combat readiness in those
areas. Obviously, those skill sets and missions not performed as often
due to the nature of the deployment will need to be refreshed following
redeployment.
[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]