[Senate Hearing 107-798]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-798
NEXT STEPS IN IRAQ
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 25 AND 26, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Wednesday, September 25, 2002
Page
Holbrooke, Hon. Richard C., former U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations, counselor, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Letter to President Bush from Senators Biden and Lugar regarding
Iraq, dated September 10, 2002................................. 16
McFarlane, Hon. Robert C., former National Security Advisor,
chairman, Energy & Communications Solutions, Washington, DC.... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll, September 23, 2002--Questions on
Invading Iraq.................................................. 30
Thursday, September 26, 2002
Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., former Secretary of State, chairman,
National Democratic Institute, Washington, DC.................. 52
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 109
Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared
statement...................................................... 110
``In Iraq's Arsenal: Nature's Deadliest Poison,'' article by
Steve Sternberg, USA Today, September 26, 2002................. 87
Kissinger, Hon. Henry A., former Secretary of State, CEO,
Kissinger Associates, Inc., New York, NY....................... 58
Prepared statement........................................... 61
Letter to Particia A. McNerney, Republican staff director, from
Ryan C. Crocker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, dated May 29, 2002............................ 74
Powell, Hon. Colin L., Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 111
Prepared statement........................................... 118
Response to additional question for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 158
(iii)
NEXT STEPS IN IRAQ
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Wellstone,
Boxer, Bill Nelson, Rockefeller, Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Chafee,
and Brownback.
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order, please. Good
afternoon. In late July and early August, this committee held 2
days of hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq, and our purpose
was to begin a national discussion of that policy and to raise
some of the difficult questions surrounding any consideration
of the next step. We heard from a broad range of expert
witnesses, and in the weeks since prominent Americans with
decades of experience in foreign policy and national security
policy have spoken out, and so has the Bush administration in
public statements, in hearings before the Congress, and
President Bush's powerful speech in the United Nations General
Assembly.
As a result, I believe there is an emerging bipartisan
consensus on the basic principles for moving forward on Iraq,
and rather than give this entire statement that I have, let me
suggest that I am of the view, and speaking for myself, that no
matter how well conducted, foreign policy cannot be sustained
without the informed consent of the American people.
I personally am looking forward to the President shortly
going to the Nation, as he went to the United Nations, and
making the case for what he wishes to do relative to Iraq. He
made a compelling case in the United Nations as to why Iraq has
violated the United Nations' own rules, principles, and
sanctions, but that is not sufficient, in my view, nor do I
believe the President believes it is sufficient to convince the
American people as to what we must do.
It is one thing to lay out the threat. But we need a clear,
unequivocal statement of what the U.S. objective is in Iraq. Is
it weapons of mass destruction? Is it regime change? Is it
return of Bahraini prisoners? What is it? Why has--and I
believe I am inclined to believe it has, but why has the policy
of containing Saddam failed? What is the urgency? What are the
regional considerations? What should we be prepared for? What
is likely to occur in the mind of the President, and what
about--Senator Lugar and I sent an extensive letter to the
President prior to his speech before the United Nations asking
him to consider, which I am positive he will, what other
commitments are we talking about?
What about the day after? What responsibility, if any, do
we have? What is the President's vision for what Iraq will look
like after Saddam is gone? Are we committing the American
people to a sustained commitment to Iraq until there is
stability in Iraq?
I realize no one can predict exactly how long that would
take, but what is the commitment we are making? What are we
about to do?
And so there are many questions to be answered. I think
they all have answers, and I am, for one, anxious to hear the
President lay out in some explicit detail what it is he is
going to be asking of the American people, and I, for one,
believe that, as I have said before, if Saddam Hussein is
around 5 years from now, we have a serious problem.
The question is, again, what are we asking the American
people? What are we about to commit them to, and what latitude
and authority does the President need to meet those
commitments?
With that, let me yield, and I might add, tomorrow we are
going to be hearing from former Secretaries of State as well as
the Secretary of State. Unfortunately, two of our witnesses had
to cancel. I sincerely thank Mr. McFarlane for responding on
such very short notice to be able to be here today, but we will
continue this process of trying to discern what it is that we
are about to sign on to and, as I said, I know of no policy
that can be sustained unless you tell the American people,
front end, what it is that we are going to expect of them. And
I think they are up to anything, anything we ask of them if we
are straight with them and tell them what the potential price
may be in order to enhance our security, and we clearly would
be more secure without Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons
of mass destruction.
I would yield to my friend Senator Helms, and I think I am
right, Mr. Chairman, that this is your first hearing. You have
been here for a markup, but your first hearing since you had to
take a little sojourn and get yourself back in shape again, and
we are delighted to see you back.
Senator Helms. I am running 60 miles an hour now.
The Chairman. That is about 20 miles an hour faster than I
run, and about 40 miles slower than you usually run, and I have
no doubt you will be up to 100 in no time.
Senator Helms. If you will believe what I just said, you
will believe anything.
Of course, we welcome Richard Holbrooke and Mr. McFarlane.
We have met with them many times, and they have been many times
helpful. The focus of the hearing today, as Joe has said, will
be the role of the United Nations in addressing the threats
posed by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and, Mr. Chairman,
I recall when we took our committee to the United Nations for
hearings when Ambassador Holbrooke was serving in New York, we
had a discussion about Secretary General Kofi Annan's assertion
that the United Nations charter was the sole source of
legitimacy in the use of force, and during that hearing you and
I forcefully agreed that this was not the view of the U.S.
Senate.
While the President is attempting to ascertain a political
recitation at the United Nations and support from a coalition
of the willing, there is no debate that the United States
retains the authority to use force to protect the national
security interest of the United States, and with that, I am
going to conclude, and await answers and the testimony of our
two distinguished witnesses.
The Chairman. Our first panel today is Ambassador Richard
C. Holbrooke, who served as the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations from 1999 to 2001. Before
joining the U.N. mission, he was vice chairman of Credite
Suisse First Boston from 1996 to 1999. He also served as
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
from 1994 to 1996, and was the Ambassador to Germany from 1993
to 1994, and is currently a counselor for the Council on
Foreign Relations, and vice chairman of a leading private
equity firm.
We also have Hon. Robert McFarlane. It is good to have you
back.
Mr. McFarlane was National Security Advisor from 1983 to
1985. He also served as Deputy National Security Advisor from
1982 to 1983, and counselor at the State Department from 1981
to 1982. He is currently chairman of Energy and Communications
Solutions, an infrastructure development firm.
I welcome you both, and we regret that Mr. Pickering and
Ambassador Kirkpatrick were unable at the last moment to be
able to appear, and we thank both the witnesses for being here.
The floor is yours, Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR
TO THE UNITED NATIONS, COUNSELOR, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
NEW YORK, NY
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of
this distinguished committee. It is a great honor to appear
before you again today at the start of hearings of such
historic importance, and to join you, Mr. Chairman, in
especially welcoming Senator Helms back here again.
The last time I testified before this committee, he sat
where you did, and you were very gracious in your support of
me, and I welcome the confidence and support all of you who are
here today have given me.
In my opening remarks, I shall discuss three key issues,
first, the process which is finally underway in both the
Congress and the United Nations Security Council after what I
believe was a costly and unnecessary delay; second, the goal of
American policy in regard to Iraq, that is, regime change,
which I support; and third, the draft resolution before you
today, to which I would suggest four specific changes before
passage.
In regard to the first matter, let me say that the process
does, indeed, matter, and the prolonged reluctance of the
administration to consult adequately with either the Congress
or the Security Council was a costly, self-inflicted mistake.
During the long and confused summer, an impression of disarray
was left with the world, and during that same period those who
opposed any action against Saddam and those who simply
disagreed with the tactics being followed coalesced into a
large, almost inadvertent opposition. It was only when the
President and the administration, however reluctantly, pledged
to send a resolution to the Hill that the problem here began to
resolve itself, but the problem is far from over.
If the administration refuses to consider responsible and
serious changes to the resolution that comes out of Congress,
it would again needlessly weaken the unity necessary for
success. Congress always has a role in such issues, and it must
be a coequal branch in deliberations over the draft before you.
Senator Helms, I even knew that before you told it to me,
because I learned it in high school, but it was one of your
main lessons in your trips to New York, and I just want to
repeat it.
The other matter was equally serious, the all-too-visible
contempt for the United Nations, and even some of our closest
friends, was a major impediment to the very sort of collective
action that is most likely to succeed.
The President's well-crafted and well-delivered speech to
the General Assembly in New York, followed by Secretary
Powell's intense negotiations with Security Council members,
has significantly improved the situation. I know that some
Members of this body have strong views on the proper sequencing
of these two tracks, specifically that congressional action
should follow a new Security Council resolution, as was the
case in 1990-1991.
My own view on this is that it would be better in this case
if the Congress did act first. This would help Secretary Powell
in obtaining the best possible resolution at the Security
Council by sending a signal of national unity to the Security
Council's members, especially those countries most critical to
Security Council resolution. Russia and France of course come
to mind.
However, I would add that sequencing is not an absolutely
critical issue. It can work in either direction. The exact
wording of your resolution that is before you today, which I
will turn to in a moment, is, however, extremely important.
While it is absolutely necessary for the United States to make
a clear, good faith effort to achieve a new Security Council
resolution, I do not believe it is absolutely essential to
achieve it. Highly desirable, yes. Absolutely essential, no.
Saddam's clear violation of existing Security Council
resolutions does provide an existing legal basis for action,
but as former Secretary of State James Baker has written, from
a political and practical point of view, it would greatly
enhance America's position if we received another clear,
renewed mandate, and that is what Secretary Powell is currently
seeking.
In fact, twice in the last decade, in Bosnia in 1995 and
especially in Kosovo in 1999, the Clinton administration took
military action without Security Council approval, and that was
because the Russians had indicated to us that they would veto.
To be sure, we did have unanimous NATO support in both cases,
something that is far less likely today, especially in light of
recent events in Germany.
The Clinton administration's actions in Bosnia, which were
supported by many members of this committee, most notably
Chairman Biden, who had urged action years before it took
place, did not even receive support from the House, yet
President Clinton acted in accordance with his constitutional
authority. As you proceed, I hope we should keep in mind and
not ignore such recent history.
Having said that, I wish to make clear that in my view the
dismissive attitude shown by some members of the administration
toward the U.N. over the last 20 months was not only
unnecessary, but it weakened us internationally for no reason
at all, especially when we belatedly sought international
support.
I speak of this issue before a committee whose leadership
on this issue is unparalleled and before a chairman who, along
with his predecessor, Senator Helms, wrote an important page in
the history of United States-United Nations relations. I will
always be deeply grateful for the support, advice, and
encouragement that I received from every member of the
committee who is here today and many others as we face the
effort to reform the financial structure of the U.N. in
accordance with the Helms-Biden legislation.
With regular visits to New York from most of this
committee, including a decisive one from Senator Biden in
December of 2000, we were able to persuade all 190 nations of
the United Nations to approve the most fundamental overhaul of
the U.N. financial structure in almost 30 years, a reform that
included a 15-percent reduction of U.S. dues to the U.N. Yet
despite the best efforts of Senator Biden, Senator Helms, and
many of you, all of you on this committee, in fact, the
Congress has still failed to release the remaining $244 million
due in the third round of the Helms-Biden effort to pay down
the arrears.
I mention this issue, which may seem diversionary to why we
are here today, for a reason. In order to lead, in order to
assemble international coalitions of the willing for action, as
President George Herbert Walker Bush did in 1991, groundwork
must be laid internationally through efforts like the
collaborative Helms-Biden reform effort at the U.N. Without the
success of that effort, the administration would be facing
today arrears of such magnitude that Secretary Powell's efforts
and the national interest in gaining Security Council approval
would be severely weakened, yet some people still do not see
that the United Nations, with all its flaws, is still
indispensable, and that it serves our national interests far
more often than it weakens them. This is especially true if the
United States, instead of ignoring or undermining the United
Nations, works to strengthen it through strong leadership.
Let me now turn to the question of America's national
security goals in this unfolding drama. The last
administration, of which I was part, supported regime change as
a legitimate policy goal. This was a change from the position
of the first Bush administration, and one I fully supported. I
would point out that after Kosovo and the indictment of
Slobodan Milosevic by the International War Crimes Tribunal, we
adopted a similar goal regarding Milosevic and carried out a
policy of isolation, covert assistance, overt assistance to his
opponents and, with the decisive involvement of the Serbian
people, ultimately succeeded.
Now, in my view, Saddam is even more dangerous than
Milosevic, given his continuing quest for weapons of mass
destruction. Left alone, he will only seek to become stronger.
Senator Biden said in his opening remarks, if Saddam is around
5 years from now, we have a serious problem. I certainly agree
with that, and I think we would all agree that we already have
a problem. It just gets more serious if we delay dealing with
it.
Hence, I accept the argument that once the goal of regime
change is established, the United States should work to achieve
it. Having agreed that regime change is desirable, even
necessary, does not, however, go to the question of means. If
events take a fortunate turn, the people themselves might rise
up and remove a dictator after massive international pressure
and isolation. Although this has happened in the last 17 years
in one form or another in such diverse places as the
Philippines, Romania, and Yugoslavia, we all understand it is
virtually inconceivable in Iraq.
There is perhaps a somewhat higher chance that an
individual, acting alone, or a small group of people with
direct access to Saddam, might take action to eliminate a
tyrant whose behavior threatens their own survival. This is, in
fact, the situation today in Iraq. The entire Iraqi military
surely must recognize that it will be destroyed, and probably
quickly, if events follow their present course to its logical
conclusion.
Yet even as we hope for such an outcome, we cannot base
policy on it. That would be substituting prayer for policy, and
that is not a good approach to a serious foreign policy issue
like the one before you today. Still, it is tempting to
entertain the hope before we move on to more realistic and more
difficult scenarios.
This brings us back to the use of force to achieve our
goals. If all else fails, collective action against Saddam is,
in my view, justified by the situation and the record of the
last decade. While we talk of airtight inspections, weapons
inspections, no notice anywhere, any time, and disarmament, we
must recognize that once launched on a course for either of
those goals the chances for a military conflict go up
dramatically, because Saddam is unlikely to fully comply, so we
should not deceive ourselves on this point, Mr. Chairman. We
are talking today about a very possible war and, once started,
that war will have as its objective, whether stated or not, a
change of regime in Baghdad.
It is highly unfortunate that some advocates of regime
change have talked in terms of, ``going it alone,'' or the need
to, ``act unilaterally,'' or proclaim an alleged new doctrine
of preemptive war. In fact, the United States will not be alone
in such a campaign, as Secretary Rumsfeld has stated in the
last week. In addition to the British, whose Prime Minister,
Tony Blair, deserves enormous praise for his staunch and
eloquent support of the United States, and especially for his
extraordinary presentation yesterday in the House of Commons,
which goes much farther than anything issued here in this
country so far in justifying the stand that both of us have
taken, I believe that Turkey, the indispensable NATO ally, will
be supportive, as well as several other key nations that will
find ways to assist the campaign without compromising their own
domestic situation.
I also believe that the odds favor a successful outcome
against Iraq and, as Senator John Kerry has written recently,
probably rather quickly. The deterioration of the Iraqi
military since 1991, and the vast improvement in the American
military, which I have seen first-hand over the last four
decades, suggests that success should be readily achievable.
However, in the fog of war, terrible things can happen. There
is a real danger that we should not ignore, which we cannot
ignore, that what starts as a war against Iraq, especially if
protracted, could metastasize into wider conflict between Arabs
and Israel.
It is, in my view, irresponsible for people, some of them
closely allied to the administration and purporting to speak
for it, to talk of the war as a ``cake walk'' or a quick trip
to Baghdad. They may be right, and, like all Americans, I hope
this will be the case if war comes, but such language, Mr.
Chairman, such language demeans and insults the risks that
brave young American men and women will face and are already
facing in Afghanistan and the Balkans, and the casualties that
will inevitably take place, even under the best of
circumstances.
I defer, of course, to several members of this committee
whose courage under fire in Vietnam is a matter of record, but
as a veteran of 3\1/2\ years as a State Department civilian
working alongside the military in the Mekong Delta and in
Saigon, as an eye witness to war and its horrors on two other
continents, I must stress the obvious, war is truly hell. There
is nothing noble or heroic about its consequences. Even though
it can bring out the best in people, it can also bring out the
worst. If war comes, let us go forward with a sober
appreciation of its horrors, its waste, its costs.
Let me turn now, finally, to the draft resolution itself. I
note that in transmitting it to the Congress, the White House
invited a full and frank discussion over the draft wording. As
Chairman Biden already noted earlier this week, it is just a
draft. The last time such a draft came up right after September
11, changes were made in a bipartisan spirit. I believe the
current draft proposal from the administration would, indeed,
need to benefit from the same action by you and your
colleagues, although I hope that it will be as rapid as
possible.
Let me offer four initial specific suggestions for
improvement of the draft before you, and I think there may be
many others, but I would like to offer you four. First, and
most important, I believe the authority requested in the final
sentence, section 2, is too broad, specifically in regard to
the third phrase, which would authorize the President to use
all means to ``restore international peace and security in the
region.''
This phrase, which I believe is taken out of context from
paragraph 34 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 of 1991,
has a different meaning in the draft resolution before you than
it had in Security Council Resolution 687. It is far too broad.
It amounts to virtual blank check authority. Resolution 687
clearly referred only to the preceding paragraphs of that
specific Security Council resolution.
The region referred to in Security Council Resolution 687
meant Kuwait and Iraq and, Mr. Chairman, I checked this with
Ambassador Pickering when he realized he could not be here
today. He was the Ambassador in New York at the time it was
passed. He was absolutely clear that that phrase in Resolution
687 meant only Iraq and Kuwait, and I would like to offer that
to you as you deliberate.
In the draft before you, however, the phrase could mean
anything at all, and I strongly endorse the concerns addressed
by Senator Feingold and some of his colleagues. The phrase
should simply be removed. Refining it, which is an option, is
simply too cumbersome and unnecessary. The final resolution
should, in my view, focus clearly on Iraq, nothing else.
My second suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is that the resolution
contain a statement of strong support for the efforts of the
President, the Secretary of State, and their colleagues to seek
and achieve a satisfactory Security Council resolution. For
some reason, the draft does not emphasize the effort at the
Security Council, which I know is of great concern to all of
us. This would emphasize the importance of the Security Council
and show our unity to those nations now wavering over this
issue.
Third, I would suggest that you add a reporting clause
requiring the administration to inform and consult Congress on
a very timely basis, perhaps as frequently as every month, in
writing, and even more frequently in closed and highly
confidential meetings, as they proceed. The administration
should not be left with the ability to say that if this
resolution passes, they have discharged their obligation to
consult and inform Congress, as President Johnson did after the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution in August 1964.
I remember this vividly, because I was in Vietnam when that
passed, and quite frankly, and it is critical to your
deliberations, none of us in Vietnam understood what the Gulf
of Tonkin resolution meant. It was used for a purpose not
intended by the people who voted for it, and it is very
important that that not happen here.
Fourth, I would strongly urge you to add a section
concerning the importance of post-conflict reconstruction in
Iraq as part of a broad new policy toward the region. Since the
story of Afghanistan is not entirely satisfactory on this
point, to put it mildly, and since some people are already
suggesting that reconstruction can be done either by other
countries, or simply through the Iraqis using their own oil
revenues, it is important to make clear that you do not
consider the job over simply if Saddam is replaced by somebody
else.
A successor might be almost as bad, or bad in a different
way. Chaos could follow. The materiel for weapons of mass
destruction could fall into the wrong hands. We do not want to
see Iraq become a safe haven for other forms of terrorists, as
happened in Afghanistan after the United States so
unfortunately turned its back on that country in 1989. That
mistake in Afghanistan, second only, in my opinion, to letting
Saddam survive in 1991, created the conditions that led to
Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network setting up shop in
Afghanistan.
I would recommend, Mr. Chairman, therefore, that you add to
this resolution language making clear that the post-Saddam
structure in Iraq is of continuing concern to the United
States, not only what happens in Baghdad, but also in the south
and in the Kurdish north. These groups must not be betrayed and
slaughtered again. The time to make that clear is now, before
anything begins on the battlefield.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. I thank
you for the opportunity to be here, and look forward to
entering into a dialog with you and your colleagues on this
momentous occasion.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Holbrooke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard C. Holbrooke, Former Ambassador to
the United Nations
Mr. Chairman, members of this distinguished Committee:
It is a great honor to appear before you again today, at the start
of hearings of such historic importance. In my opening remarks I shall
discuss three key issues--first, the process which is finally underway
in both the Congress and the United Nations Security Council, after a
costly and unnecessary delay; second, the goal of American policy in
regard to Iraq--that is, regime change--which I support; and third, the
draft resolution before you today, to which I would suggest at least
four specific changes before passage.
In regard to the first matter, let me say that process does indeed
matter, and the prolonged reluctance of the Administration to consult
adequately with either the Congress or the United Nations Security
Council was a costly self-inflicted mistake. During the long and
confused summer, an impression of disarray was left with the world, and
during that same period, those who opposed any action against Saddam
and those who simply disagreed with the tactics being followed
coalesced into a large, almost inadvertent opposition. It was only when
the President and his team, however reluctantly, pledged to send a
resolution to the Hill that the problem began to resolve itself and the
problem is far from over. If the Administration refuses to consider
changes from Congress it will--again--needlessly weaken the utility
necessary for success. Congress always has a role in such issues, and
it must be a co-equal branch in the deliberations over the draft before
you. The other matter was equally serious: the all-too visible contempt
for the United Nations and even some of our closest friends was a major
impediment to the very sort of collective action that is most likely to
succeed. The President's well-crafted and well-delivered speech to the
General Assembly, followed by Secretary Powell's intense negotiations
with Security Council members, has significantly improved the
situation.
I know that some members of this body have strong views on the
proper sequencing of these two tracks--specifically, that Congressional
action should follow a new Security Council resolution, as was the case
in 1990-91. My own view on this is that it would be better in this case
if the Congress acted first; this would help Secretary Powell in
obtaining the best possible resolution by sending a signal of national
unity to the members of the Security Council--especially those
countries most critical to the resolution. Russia and France come to
mind. However, I would add that sequencing is not an absolutely
critical issue--it could work in either direction. The exact wording of
your resolution, which I will turn to in a moment, is, however, very
important.
While it is absolutely necessary for the United States to make a
clear good faith effort to achieve a new Security Council resolution, I
do not believe it is absolutely essential to achieve it. Highly
desireable--yes. Absolutely essential--no. Saddam's clear violation of
existing Security Council resolutions does provide an existing legal
basis for action. But, as former Secretary of State James Baker has
written, from a political and practical point of view it would greatly
enhance our position if we received another clear renewed mandate--and
that is what Secretary Powell is currently seeking.
In fact, twice in the last decade, in Bosnia in 1995 and especially
in Kosovo in 1999, the Clinton Administration took military action
without specific Security Council approval. To be sure, we did have
unanimous NATO support in both cases, something that is less likely
today in light of recent events in Germany. The Clinton
Administration's actions in Bosnia, which were supported by many
members of this Committee, most notably Chairman Biden--who had urged
action years before it took place--did not even receive full support
from the House, yet President Clinton acted in accordance with his
Constitutional authority. We should not ignore such recent history as
we proceed.
Having said that, I wish to make clear that the dismissive attitude
shown by some members of this Administration toward the United Nations
over the last twenty months was not only unnecessary, it weakened us
internationally for no reason at all, especially when we belatedly
sought international support. I speak of this issue before a Committee
whose leadership on this issue is unparalleled, and before a Chairman
who, along with his predecessor, Senator Helms, wrote an important page
in the history of U.S.-U.N. relations. I will always be deeply grateful
for the support, advice and encouragement that I received from every
member of this committee as we faced the effort to reform the financial
structure of the UN in accordance with the Helms-Biden legislation.
With regular visits to New York from most of this committee, including
a decisive one from Senator Biden in December 2000, we were able to
persuade all 190 member states of the UN to approve the most
fundamental overhaul of the UN financial structure in almost thirty
years, a reform that included a fifteen percent reduction in U.S. dues
to the UN. Yet despite the best efforts of Senator Biden, Senator
Helms, and many of you, the Congress has still failed to release the
remaining $244 million due in the third round of the effort to pay down
our arrears.
I mention this issue for a reason: in order to lead, in order to
assemble international coalitions for action--as President George H.W.
Bush did in 1991--groundwork must be laid through efforts like the
collaborative Helms-Biden reform effort. Without the success of that
effort, we would now be facing an arrears of such magnitude that
Secretary Powell's efforts would be weakened. Yet some still do not see
that the United Nations, with all its flaws, is still indispensable,
and serves our national interests far more often than it weakens them.
This is especially true if the United States, instead of ignoring the
UN, works to strengthen it through strong leadership.
Let me now turn to the question of America's national security
goals in this unfolding drama. The last Administration supported regime
change as a legitimate policy goal. This was a change from the position
of the first Bush Administration, and one that I fully supported. I
would point out that, after Kosovo and the indictment of Slobodan
Milosevic by the International War Crimes Tribunal, we adopted a
similar goal regarding Milosevic, and carried out a policy of
isolation, covert and overt assistance to his opponents, and--with the
decisive involvement of the Serbian people--succeeded. Saddam is even
more dangerous than Milosevic, given his continuing quest for weapons
of mass destruction. Left alone, he will only seek to become stronger,
and thus a greater threat to the region and beyond. Hence, I accept the
argument that once the goal of regime change is established, the United
States should work to achieve it.
Having agreed that regime change is desirable--even necessary--does
not, however, go to the question of means. If events take a fortunate
turn, the people themselves may rise up and remove a dictator after
massive international pressure and isolation. Although in the last
seventeen years this has happened, in one form or another, in such
diverse places as the Philippines, Romania, and Yugoslavia, we all
understand that it is virtually inconceivable in Iraq. There is perhaps
a somewhat higher chance that an individual acting alone, or a small
group of people with direct access, might take action to eliminate a
tyrant whose behavior threatens their own survival. This is, in fact,
the situation today in Iraq: the entire Iraqi military surely must
recognize that it will be destroyed--and probably quickly--if events
follow their present course to its logical conclusion. Yet even as we
hope for such an outcome, we cannot base policy on it; that would be
substituting prayer for policy, never a good approach to a serious
venture. Still, it is tempting to entertain the hope, before moving on
to more realistic--and more difficult--scenarios.
This brings us back to the use of force to achieve our goals. If
all else fails, collective action against Saddam is, in my view,
justified by the situation and the record of the last decade. While we
talk of airtight weapons inspection--no notice, anywhere, anytime--and
disarmament, we must recognize that once launched on a course for
either of those objectives, the chances for a military conflict go up
dramatically, since Saddam is unlikely to comply fully. So we should
not deceive ourselves on this point: we are talking today about a very
possible war. And once started, that war will have as its objective,
whether stated or not, a change of regime in Baghdad.
It is highly unfortunate that some advocates of regime change have
talked in terms of ``going it alone'' or the need to act
``unilaterally'' or proclaimed an alleged new doctrine of pre-emptive
war. In fact, the United States will not be alone in such a campaign,
as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated last week. In addition to the
British, whose Prime Minister, Tony Blair, deserves enormous praise for
his staunch and eloquent support of the United States, I believe that
Turkey, the indispensable NATO ally, will be supportive, as well as
several other key nations that will find ways to assist a campaign
without compromising their own domestic situation.
I also believe that the odds favor a successful outcome against
Iraq, and, as Senator John Kerry has written, probably rather quickly.
The deterioration of the Iraqi military since 1991, and the vast
improvement in the American military, which I have seen first hand over
the last several decades, suggests that success should be readily
achievable. However, in the fog of war terrible things can happen.
There is a real danger, which we should not ignore, that what starts as
a war against Iraq, especially if protracted, could metastasize into a
wider conflict between Arabs and Israel. It is irresponsible for
people, some of them closely allied to the Administration and
purporting to speak for it, who talk of the war as a ``cakewalk'' or a
quick rush to Baghdad. They may be right, and like all Americans I hope
this will be the case if war comes. But such language demeans and
insults the risks that brave young American men and women will face,
and are already facing in Afghanistan and the Balkans, and the
casualties that will inevitably take place even under the best of
circumstances. I defer, of course, to several members of this Committee
whose courage under fire in Vietnam is a matter of record. But, as a
veteran of three years as a State Department civilian working alongside
the American military in Vietnam, and a eyewitness to war and its
horrors on two other continents, I must stress the obvious: war is
truly hell. There is nothing noble or heroic about its consequences,
even though it can bring out the best in people; it can also bring out
the worst. If war comes, let us go forward with a sober appreciation of
its honors, its waste, its costs.
Let me turn now, finally, to the draft resolution itself I note
that in transmitting it to the Congress, the White House invited a full
and frank discussion over the draft wording. As Chairman Biden noted
already, it is just a draft. The last time such a draft came up, right
after September 11, changes were made in a bipartisan spirit. I believe
that the current draft proposal from the Administration could benefit
from the same action, although I hope--and I urge--that it be as rapid
as possible.
Let me offer at least four specific suggestions for improvement:
first, and most important, I believe that the authority
requested in the final sentence (Section 2) is too broad,
specifically in regard to the third phrase, which would
authorize the President to use all means to ``restore
international peace and security in the region.'' This phrase,
which I believe is taken out of context from paragraph 34 of UN
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), has a different meaning
in this draft resolution than it had in 687. It is far too
broad--amounting to a virtual ``blank check'' authority.
Resolution 687 referred, clearly, only to the preceding
paragraphs of the Security Council resolution; the region
referred to in 687 meant Kuwait and Iraq. In the draft before
you, it could mean anything, and I strongly endorse the
concerns expressed by Senator Feingold and some of his
colleagues. This phrase should simply be removed; refining it,
which is an option, is simply too cumbersome and unnecessary.
Your resolution should focus clearly on Iraq--nothing else.
second, I believe the resolution should contain a statement
of strong support for the efforts of the president, the
Secretary of State, and their colleagues to achieve a
satisfactory Security Council resolution. This would emphasize
the importance of the Security Council and show our unity to
the nations now wavering over this issue.
third, I would suggest that you add a reporting clause,
requiring the Administration to inform and consult the Congress
on a very timely basis, perhaps as frequently as every month,
in writing, and even more frequently in closed and highly
confidential meetings, as they proceed. The Administration
should not be left with the ability to say that if this
resolution passes, they have discharged their obligation to
consult and inform Congress, as President Johnson did after the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution in August 1964.
fourth, I would strongly urge you to add a section
concerning the importance of post-conflict reconstruction in
Iraq as part of a broad new policy towards the region. Since
the story of Afghanistan is not entirely satisfactory on this
point--to put it mildly--and since some people are already
suggesting that reconstruction can be done either by other
countries or simply through the Iraqis using their own oil
revenues, it is important to make clear that the job is not
over simply if Saddam is replaced by someone else. A successor
might be almost as bad, or bad in a different way. Chaos could
follow. The material for Weapons of Mass Destruction could fall
into the wrong hands. We do not want to see Iraq become a safe
haven for other forms of terrorists, as happened in Afghanistan
after the United States turned its back on the country in 1989.
That mistake--second only, in my opinion, to letting Saddam
survive in 1991--created the conditions that led to Osama bin
Laden and the Al-qaeda network setting up shop in Afghanistan.
I would recommend, therefore, that you add to this resolution
language making clear that the post-Saddam structure in Iraq is of
continuing concern to the United States, not only in Baghdad but also
in the south and in the Kurdish north. These groups must not be
betrayed and slaughtered again. The time to make that clear is now--
before anything begins on the battlefield.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. I look forward
to entering into a dialogue with you on this momentous occasion.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for being here. Mr.
McFarlane, thank you for being here. It is good to have you
back before the committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. McFARLANE, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR, CHAIRMAN, ENERGY & COMMUNICATIONS SOLUTIONS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. McFarlane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am deeply honored
to be invited to participate in your deliberations on the
decision to go or not to go to war, deeply honored always to be
party to the deliberations of this great body. My father served
in the other body, but I have had the honor of serving at the
Armed Services Committee under the leadership of Chairman
Stennis, Senator Goldwater, Senator Jackson, giants of this
body.
I come today as one who was deployed in the Gulf of Tonkin
in 1964, and shortly thereafter commanded a unit of the first
landing of American forces in Vietnam. That landing occurred
under Presidential authority, endorsed by the U.S. Senate. The
events leading up to our engagement there, specifically the
fraud that was perpetrated on this body and on the American
people, profoundly affected American attitudes toward launching
war and, since that day, and in the ensuing decades, the
mistrust stemming from our ill-conceived entry into that
conflict has resulted in sustained serious introspection
concerning why and how we decide to go to war.
We live in a world, not to say a community of nation states
that coexist, compete, covet, and conspire to survive and
prosper. Through centuries of struggle, we have conceived
doctrines, defenses, dogmas designed to settle disputes among
states peacefully: concepts like mediation, arbitration, arms
control, collective security have all been tried and have often
succeeded in reducing tensions and settling disagreements.
To be fair, even the failures of one or another of these
frameworks have been useful, for they have added to our
knowledge of what works and what does not work and, thus, they
move us closer to building an international system that can be
effective in settling disputes peacefully. But we are not there
yet. Disputes and violence among nation states seem to be
inevitable for as long as the lust for power and hubris remain
unchecked by institutions and popular governments, and that is
what brings us here today.
Today and for the past generation we have faced a threat
from Saddam Hussein that has proven resistant to all of the
bodies, the systems, the frameworks, the creations of
architecture and statecraft that we have devised. The threat is
posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hand of a
monomaniacal despot bent upon regional domination, with all
that such domination would imply for nations throughout the
world.
Today, in Iraq, there are chemical and biological weapons
and systems to deliver them on the shelf that could be used to
kill tens if not hundreds of thousands of people in the region
and beyond. History tells us that Saddam Hussein also has the
will to use these weapons, and has done so. In short, we face a
man with the means and the willingness to attack his neighbors
and us.
Through the years, through trial and error in the use of
these several efforts at dispute resolution that I have
described, we have begun to distill a few rules about going to
war, and we have begun to establish a few of them in custom and
practice, although not in law. The one that is most shared
among nations is the notion that force ought not to be used
except as a last resort, and before resorting to it, states
should exhaust all of the nonviolent alternatives.
For the past 6 weeks, that is what President Bush has been
doing. Together with allies, he has presented the factual
record of Saddam Hussein's successful drive to attain chemical
and biological weapons and the means to deliver them. He has
made the case for action to deal with this clear and present
threat to the peace as called for in the United Nations
charter.
Within weeks, the coming weeks, he will have made the case
at the United Nations, made the case with the U.S. allies,
before the U.S. Congress, and I believe before the American
people, for taking action to constrain once and for all the
ruthless ambitions of Saddam Hussein.
I agree with Ambassador Holbrooke that to move forward in
this action does not require a new U.N. resolution. Indeed, to
insist on yet another one in the face of the violations and
persistent abuse that we have seen in the past 10 years is to
devalue the importance of a U.N. resolution.
In calling for action, I recognize that some have called
launching a war today against Iraq preemption. I disagree.
Preemption implies precipitous action taken without warning
against an evident threat without affording the threatening
country an opportunity to cure the grievance. This is surely
not the case with Saddam Hussein. For 20 years he has been
afforded the opportunity to demonstrate a change in the
aggressive behavior expressed in his invasion of Iran and of
Kuwait, his repressive brutality against his own people, and
his obvious ambition for regional hegemony.
Clearly, however, a launching of a war in Iraq will
establish a precedent that we cannot want to see emulated by
others, without fulfillment of accepted principles. I am
confident that the President and his administration are focused
on that very issue, and that the relevant criteria to justify a
preemptive attack will be enunciated in the days ahead.
They will include in my judgment, among others,
transgressions such as we are seeing in Iraq in recent history,
a history of aggression against neighbors, unchecked power
within Iraq, and the possession and the will, the military
means to inflict mass casualties, the ability and readiness to
use them on short notice.
It is a measure of moral strength in our society that we
place a very heavy burden of proof on our government before it
launches a war, but this forbearance does come at a price, a
price measured in the growing risk of attack by Iraq as we
continue to explore alternative means. It is never easy to
judge how much lost time and risk is prudent. Our modern
tendency to hold out hope beyond all reasonable expectations
was born in an era when the threatened action would not have
been catastrophic. Today, however, the price of error is much,
much higher, measured in horrendous loss.
Mr. Chairman, in light of this history of aggression and
brutality, of willful violation of United Nations resolutions
and obstruction of its inspectors, with evidence of an extant
and growing arsenal of mass destruction systems and a
willingness to use them, and having used all alternative means
at hand to avoid conflict, we must now act. To do so is not to
preempt. Far from it. It is to do our duty. It is to vindicate
the trust of generations before us to act with prudence and
deliberation to defend our values, our people, and our way of
life.
What specifically should we do? The President should
shortly complete the deliberate process of consultation with
the Senate and the House, he should complete his consultations
and efforts to engender support and cooperation among allies,
and he should continue to work with the United Nations to
engender its support and understanding.
We should then stage our forces in the countries that
Ambassador Holbrooke just mentioned, and gulf states that I
believe will be ready to provide all the staging we need, and
then we should move deliberately to seize and hold Baghdad and,
as necessary, to neutralize the Republican Guards and organize
Iraqi forces to destroy the systems of mass destruction and to
be prepared to undertake the long building process to establish
the institutions of government worthy of the name and the
renewal of the Iraqi economy.
I join with Ambassador Holbrooke in lamenting the betrayal
the United States inflicted on Afghanistan 12 years ago, and of
the awful price we payed for that betrayal to a country that
achieved historic victory for us in the cold war. To have left
it in ruins with 1,000 dead, 3 million refugees, infrastructure
destroyed, and not to have even cared enough to leave people on
the ground to determine if some day we might become threatened
once again ourselves, represents a betrayal of historic
proportion and ignorance begging credulity.
I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to join you
today, and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McFarlane follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert C. McFarlane, Former National
Security Advisor
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the
committee today.
I come as one who was deployed in the Gulf of Tonkin in the summer
of 1964 and soon after commanded a unit in the first landing of U.S.
forces in Vietnam under presidential authority endorsed by the United
States Senate. The events leading up to our engagement there--
specifically the fraud that was perpetrated on this body and our
people--profoundly affected American attitudes toward launching war
since that day. In the ensuing decades the mistrust stemming from our
ill-conceived entry into Vietnam has resulted in sustained, serious
introspection concerning why and how we decide to go to war
We live in a world--not to say a community--of nation states that
coexist, compete, covet and conspire to survive and prosper. Through
centuries of struggle we have conceived doctrines, defenses and dogma
designed to settle disputes among states peacefully. Such concepts as
mediation, arbitration, arms control, and collective security have been
tried and often have succeeded in settling disagreements. And to be
fair, even the failures of one or another of these mechanisms have been
useful for they have added to our knowledge of what works and what
doesn't and thus lead us closer to a system that is truly capable of
keeping the peace. But we aren't there yet. Disputes and violence among
states seem to remain inevitable for as long as lust for power and
hubris remain unchecked by institutions and popular governance. And
that's what brings us here today.
Today and for the past generation we have faced a threat from
Saddam Hussein that has proven resistant to all of the bodies, systems
and architecture of statecraft we have devised. This threat is posed by
weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a monomaniacal despot bent
upon regional domination with all that such domination would imply for
nations throughout the world. Today in Iraq there are chemical and
biological weapons and systems to deliver them on the shelf that if
used could kill tens--if not hundreds--of thousands of innocent people.
And history tells us that Saddam Hussein also has the will to use these
awful weapons. In short, we face a man with the means and the proven
willingness to attack his neighbors and us.
Through the years through trial and error in the use of the several
efforts at dispute resolution I've described, we have begun to distill
a few rules about going to war and to try to establish them in
customary practice if not law. We must recognize, however, that while
these rules may nurture more civil practice among nation states they
don't solve the problem. The one that is most shared among nations
throughout the world is the notion that force ought to be a last resort
and before resorting to it states should exhaust the nonviolent
alternatives. For the past six weeks that is what President Bush has
been doing. Together with allies he has presented the factual record of
Saddam Hussein's successful drive to attain chemical and biological
weapons and the means to deliver them. He has made the case for action
to deal, with this clear and present threat to the peace as called for
in the UN charter. Within weeks he will have made the case at the UN,
with allies, and before the U.S. Congress for taking action to
constrain once and for all the ruthless ambitions of Saddam Hussein.
Some have called this preemption. I disagree. For preemption
implies precipitous action taken without warning against an evident
threat without affording the threatening country an opportunity to cure
the grievance. This is surely not the case with Saddam Hussein. For
twenty years he has been afforded the opportunity to demonstrate a
change in the aggressive behavior expressed in his invasion of
neighboring Iran and Kuwait, his repressive brutality against his own
people and his obvious ambition for regional hegemony.
Clearly our launching of an attack on Iraq will establish a
precedent that we cannot want to see emulated by others without
fulfillment of accepted principles. I am confident that the
Administration is focused on that issue and the relevant criteria today
and that they will be enunciated in the days ahead. They will include
inter alia transgressions such as we see in Iraq today--a history of
aggression, unchecked power, and military means with the capacity to
inflict mass casualties.
It is a sign of moral strength in a society that it places a heavy
burden of proof on its government before approving the initiation of
war. This forbearance comes at a price measured in the growing risk of
attack as we explore alternative means of resolution. It is never easy
to judge how much lost time and increased risk is prudent. Our modern
tendency to hold out hope beyond all reasonable expectations was born
in an era when the threatened action would not be catastrophic. Today,
however, the price of error is much higher--measured in horrendous
loss.
Mr. Chairman, in light of this history of aggression and brutality,
of willful violation of United Nations resolutions and obstruction of
its inspectors, with evidence of an extant and growing arsenal of mass
destruction systems and a willingness to use them, and having used all
alternative means at hand to avoid conflict, we must now act To do so
is not to preempt--far from it. It is to do our duty, it is to
vindicate the trust of generations before us to act with prudence and
deliberation to defend our values, our people and our way of life.
The Chairman. I thank you very much, Mr. McFarlane. After
consulting with Senator Helms, we have a pretty full house
here, we will go on the first round for 7 minutes if that is OK
with my colleagues, and let me thank you, Mr. McFarlane, for
your statement. Particularly I was impressed with your opening
comments, which I think mirrored all of our concern. That is,
if we go to war now, we had better, unlike in 1964, know what
we are about to do.
Senator Lugar and I--and I hope he will not mind my making
the letter public we wrote to the President of the United
States on September 10, the day before he made his historic
speech at the United Nations, suggesting a number of things.
We were not being presumptuous. We were being hopefully
helpful here, and one of the things we suggested in that two-
page letter was that, ``The American people must know the
military, financial, and human capital the United States would
be prepared to commit to help realize that vision. The Iraqi
people and their neighbors must be confident that chaos will
not follow Saddam Hussein. Moreover, you would help assuage
international concerns that the current unsettled situation in
Afghanistan may be replicated in Iraq, with far greater
strategic consequences.''
[The letter referred to follows:]
United States Senate,
Washington, DC, September 10, 2002.
The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
Thank you for meeting with us last week to begin a dialogue on
Iraq. We very much appreciate the spirit of the meeting and your desire
to engage Congress, the American people and the international community
in this critical discussion. We were pleased to learn that you intend
to seek authorization from Congress prior to any use of force by the
United States Armed Forces to ensure Iraq's disarmament.
Mr. President, we share your conviction that the combination of
Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction poses a significant
threat to Iraq's people, its region and the world. Simply put, either
these weapons must be dislodged from Iraq, or Saddam Hussein must be
dislodged from power.
Last month, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began hearings
on Iraq and heard from a broad range of expert witnesses. In the weeks
since, prominent Americans with decades of experience in foreign and
national security policy have expressed their views. In the weeks to
come, we look forward to hearing from the intelligence community and
policy officials of your Administration in hearings before Congress and
from you in the case you make to the American people and the
international community.
Mr. President, based on what we have heard to date, there is not
yet a consensus on many critical questions. For example, what is the
likelihood that Iraq would use its weapons of mass destruction against
us, to deter us or to supply terrorists? What are Iraq's links to
terrorist groups, including those responsible for the attacks of
September 11, 2001? Can Iraq be disarmed without the use of force?
Would attacking Iraq precipitate the very thing we are trying to
prevent: the use of weapons of mass destruction against us or countries
such as Israel? Can we shift substantial resources to the Iraqi theater
without compromising the war on terrorism in many other areas? What
would be our obligations to a post-Saddam Iraq militarily and
economically? It will be impossible to answer these questions with
certainty in advance; however, they must be part of the calculus you
make in weighing the various courses of action.
Despite these uncertainties, in our judgement there are several
principles that already enjoy broad bipartisan agreement and that would
maximize the opportunities for success while minimizing the risks as we
move forward on Iraq. We urge you to embrace them.
First, the United States should pursue a policy that has. broad
international support. Such support is desirable for both substantive
and political reasons. Our allies around the world and our friends in
the region have important, and possibly even necessary contributions to
make to the effort to disarm Iraq. We may need their support for any
initiatives we take at the United Nations. Should we pursue military
action, we will want them with us and, at a minimum, require basing and
overflight rights from several countries. If, in the course of
disarming Iraq, we end Saddam Hussein's regime, a massive rebuilding
effort will be required that the United States will not want to
shoulder alone. We also depend on the active and continued cooperation
of many allies in the unfinished war against terrorism. In short,
building international support for our Iraq policy must be a priority.
Second, we should make it clear that Iraq is the world's concern,
not just our own. For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has flaunted
the will of the international community, breaking solemn obligations to
disarm. These obligations were made not to the United States, but to
the United Nations. In your speech to the General Assembly this week,
we urge you to seek a new Security Council mandate requiting Iraq to
accept an unconditional weapons inspections regime that gives
inspectors the power to go anywhere, anytime. It could set a deadline
for Iraqi compliance and make clear that any failure by Iraq to comply
will result in the mandate's enforcement. Although we recognize that it
will require difficult diplomacy, we believe your Administration can
succeed in gaining international support--much as President George H.
W. Bush did before the Gulf War. Such a mandate would have the merit of
putting the focus where it belongs: on Iraq's dangerous and illegal
weapons programs.
Third, we must be candid with the American people that Iraq
represents a long term commitment by the United States. We urge you to
formulate and express a vision for a democratic, unified, post-Saddam
Iraq, living in peace with its neighbors. The American people must know
the military, financial and human capital the United States would be
prepared to commit to help realize that vision. The Iraqi people and
their neighbors must be confident that chaos will not follow Saddam
Hussein. Moreover, you would help assuage international concerns that
the current unsettled situation in Afghanistan may be replicated in
Iraq, with far greater strategic consequences.
Mr. President, we thank you for beginning the process of
consultation on Iraq. We stand ready to work closely with you on this
grave and important issue.
Sincerely,
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman.
Richard G. Lugar.
The Chairman. The reason I mention that is the mention of
Afghanistan. And I am going to move to you, if I may, in my
short time here, Ambassador Holbrooke, and ask you two
questions and, as usual, we are old friends and we both are
fairly direct. It is a pointed question.
Would you, were you sitting here, vote for the resolution
as submitted to the U.S. Senate in draft form by the
administration if that were the only option you had? Vote for
that resolution or vote no on that resolution?
Ambassador Holbrooke. You mean no chance to amend it?
The Chairman. No chance, because quite frankly, although I
am not in the negotiation, that appears to be where we are at
this moment.
Senator Kerry. You can answer it without electoral
consequence.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I appreciate that.
First of all, I had understood from your remarks on
television, in fact, that it was a draft resolution, that it
was not an up or down vote.
The Chairman. It was not intended to be, as I understood
it, but things sometimes have unintended consequences the way
things flow and, as I understand it--I may be mistaken,
although I have not been in the room--there is a relatively
good chance that there will be no change in the resolution,
although that is not a settled point yet, but regardless of
whether it is or not, we may be faced--possibly we may be faced
with having to vote on that resolution, that draft resolution
unchanged.
Do you think, were you sitting here, would you support that
resolution? And that is your only vote, you vote yes for it or
you vote no on it.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I understand your question. I was not
prepared for it, because I am not aware that that procedure is
justified by the circumstances. I have come here today, as you
know, in an effort to support the administration and recommend
a show of unity in a very difficult moment.
I think that the politicization of the issue and the denial
to the Congress of a chance to put its own point of view
forward in the normal manner would be extraordinary, and it
would be very ill-considered for this reason. It would divide
the Congress when what the administration and the President
need most is a show of unity, and I am not sure how I would
vote at this point if that was the only choice, because I think
it would be a choice so deleterious to the national interest.
The Chairman. I happen to agree with you. I think that it
would be a gigantic mistake, as I indicated to the President
when he asked. The last thing the President needs is like that
old joke, ``the board voted 5 to 4 for your speedy recovery.''
That is not what is needed here.
Let me ask you a second question, then. You indicated it is
in the national interest to get Security Council approval for
the use of force. Why is it in the national interest? It seems
self-evident that it is. Why do you say it is so clearly in the
national interest?
Ambassador Holbrooke. It is in the interest, but it is
important but not essential. I want to underscore that.
President Clinton and the previous administration took military
action in the Balkans twice without Security Council
resolutions and, unlike the current situation, where there are
at least a dozen resolutions already on the books being
violated, so you do have a basis for action without a new
resolution. There were none in regard to Milosevic.
Now, why, therefore, do I think it would be important? And
here Secretary Baker has written about this quite eloquently in
the New York Times, because the circumstances we are now
contemplating are somewhat new. It is a new situation. We are
on the edge of war, and when you go into an undertaking as
serious as this, it is very important to have support.
Now, in that regard, Mr. Chairman, let me make a point
which I know that no committee in the Congress is more familiar
with than yours, because around this very table a rather
historic photo was taken 2 years ago which I have on my wall,
and I know you do, where you and Senator Helms accompanied by
Senator Warner and Senator Levin, and many of the people here
today, posed with all 15 members of the Security Council, a
photograph never taken before and not replicated since.
The fact is that the United Nations Security Council, while
it is not in a position to declare itself the only authority
that can legitimize the use of force, and here I agree with
Senator Helms' opening comment, is nonetheless the body in the
world, the only body in the world that has the stature and
authority that makes a difference.
Let us take two specific examples, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Both countries would love to see Saddam removed. Both countries
for different reasons will be in a much stronger position to
assist the United States, if the venture must begin, if there
is Security Council approval. That is true for Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar, France, and all our other allies in NATO.
The Chairman. My time is about up. How long are we going to
have to stay if we go?
Ambassador Holbrooke. I cannot answer that question.
The Chairman. Give me your estimates.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Mr. Chairman, we discussed this in
regard to other areas. I do not believe in exit strategies. I
believe in defining the mission, not setting deadlines, and
then getting the job done, and what Bud McFarlane and I are
both saying, if you undertake a venture and you are the world's
leading country, you just have to damn well see it through. We
have troops in Korea 49 years later. We have troops in Bosnia 7
years later. We had troops in the Sinai for a quarter century.
We can afford this if it is in our national interest, and I
would never guess a question like that. I do not think we
should put a time limit on it.
The Chairman. My time is up. Is it fair to say you are
saying we would have to stay, whether it is a day or 20 years,
we would have to stay as long as it took to secure and
stabilize that nation?
Ambassador Holbrooke. I think that is fair to say. If we
undertake this venture, we cannot walk away from it like we did
from Afghanistan or Iraq in 1991.
The Chairman. Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Mr. Ambassador, the United Nations has
passed, I believe, 16 resolutions pertaining to Iraqi conduct.
Is that about right?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes, sir.
Senator Helms. With the exception of very limited air and
cruise missile strikes, as well as increasingly loosened
sanctions, there has been no serious effort to compel Iraqi
compliance, has there?
Ambassador Holbrooke. The Iraqis have defied the
resolutions and the inspectors withdrew 3 years ago, and since
then it has been a stalemate. There have, however, been very
strong efforts to enforce the sanctions and the economic
limits. The Iraqis cheat, but there is not any question that
these have had an effect.
Senator Helms. What do you think is the threshold beyond
which a failure to enforce these resolutions undermines the
United Nations' credibility and at the same time endangers U.S.
national security?
Ambassador Holbrooke. I think that if Iraq defies the
resolutions they have weakened the importance of the Security
Council, and they have defied them in the past.
Now, not all the 16 resolutions involve weapons of mass
destruction. Some involve prisoners of war from Kuwait and so
on, so those are the second tier. No one should think we should
go to war with Iraq because they are still withholding
information on Kuwaiti POWs, but the core resolutions, and
there are probably at least 10 of those, are quite serious and
fundamental.
Senator Helms. I had a friend who called me from Raleigh
the other day and he said, ``how many resolutions has the
United Nations already done,'' and I said, I think it is 16,
but I stand to be corrected.
Ambassador Holbrooke. It is 16, but you will notice that in
the resolution the administration sent to you they only listed
11, so they dropped 5 resolutions as being below the threshold
that rises to this seriousness.
Senator Helms. Well, back to my question. Why do we even
need an additional resolution?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, as I said, Mr. Chairman--excuse
me, Senator Helms, but I will always think of you as the
chairman. As I said in my opening statement, it is highly
desirable, but not essential, because the basis for collective
action exists already. I know that is a very difficult answer
for some of my friends on this committee, but it is my deepest
considered opinion, and I want to put it in four words,
desirable but not necessary.
Senator Helms. I think maybe it ought to be mentioned here
sometime, I know the chairman knows it and other Senators
probably do too, that it is my understanding that negotiations
are, indeed, going on between House and Senate bipartisan
leadership with the White House, and I think that is of some
interest in connection with the questions we are asking and you
are answering. Do you agree, Mr. Ambassador, that the United
States' national security interests are better protected
through the use of these so-called coalitions of the willing?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes. You know, in practical terms--
and my colleague, who served in the military, on the witness
stand with me can attest to this. In practical terms, the going
alone option is rhetoric. The military cannot get there without
the support of some of the countries in the area and coalitions
of the willing are always better than so-called unilateralism,
and no matter how good our logistical lift, our intelligence,
our communications, we are always better off and probably more
than better off.
It is essential to have the support of, at a minimum, the
Turks for logistical reasons, somebody in the gulf for the
same, and intelligence. Going into who is up to the Secretaries
of State and Defense. That is very sensitive and British
political support has been extraordinarily valuable. So I think
the answer to your question is clearly yes, and that is why we
should not even think about so-called unilateralism. It is a
kind of a macho phrase that may sound good in a talk radio
show, but it is not a meaningful phrase to military planners.
Senator Helms. Let me turn to Colonel McFarlane, and by the
way, I join Joe in welcoming you to the committee. It is good
to see you again.
Mr. McFarlane, Saddam Hussein has a track record of
manipulating United Nations inspection demands as a way of
buying time. Even now, he is repeating his antics of 1998,
claiming to accept inspections while he is throwing up
roadblocks to their success and dispersing his weapons
programs.
Now, assuming that many of the permanent members of the
Security Council believe that we need to go through this
charade with Saddam, do you think we ought to put a date on the
U.N. resolution as an ultimatum?
Mr. McFarlane. Senator Helms, I believe that we should not
seek another resolution for the reasons that you have
enumerated already. If 16 of them in the past have been
violated and rejected, what promise is there, what prospect
that yet another one is going to result in a different
behavior? But I think we need to present that record to stress
that renewed inspections hold little promise of better results,
to point out that the existing ones authorize inspectors to go
back, but not to delude ourselves and to engage in the delaying
tactics that are inevitable if we go down this road.
Senator Helms. By the way, before I use all my time, for
the information of the committee, I believe most of us know
this, the conference report on the State authorization bill
that releases the final $244 million and should pass the Senate
this afternoon or tomorrow without any glitches, this will
fully implement the Helms-Biden U.N. reform bill. I think that
ought to be made a matter of record.
Ambassador Holbrooke. That is very good news, Senator.
Senator Helms. I yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me also add
how good it is to see the ranking member back here again at the
hearing.
I would like to thank the ranking member and the chairman
for convening these hearings on Iraq, which promise to be
excellent follow-ons to the hearings this committee held in
July and August. I attended all or part of the five panels of
those hearings, and I am glad I did. In August, I then traveled
around my home State of Wisconsin listening extensively to my
constituents' views on Iraq. I actually held 21 town meetings,
and for the first time ever, in addition to health care,
concerns on foreign policy and, in particular, Iraq, led the
list of concerns.
I attended numerous briefings and read countless reports
from a variety of sources. I tried to listen carefully to the
administration, and have read quite closely the proposed
resolution authorizing the use of force that the administration
sent to Congress last week.
Mr. Chairman, after all of this, I still do not have
answers to some fundamental questions. I remain extremely
troubled by the administration's shifting justifications for
going to war in Iraq. I remain skeptical about the need to take
unilateral action now, and to accept all of the associated
costs of that decision. I remain unconvinced that the
administration has thought through the potential cost and
challenges of post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq, or even
thought through how to address the issue of weapons of mass
destruction once an engagement begins, and I am surprised and
disappointed that, after months of heated rhetoric, the
administration could not yet manage a more thoughtful and
focused proposal than the language we received last week.
Mr. Chairman, I also remain deeply concerned about Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction program. I reject the assertion
that disagreeing with the administration means resigning
ourselves to doing nothing. I would like to work with my
colleagues and with the administration to address this threat
in a focused and serious way that serves our national interest,
including our interest in continuing to work with other
countries around the world to fight terrorism.
In the end, the use of force may well be required, but to
date what the administration is proposing does not make the
grade. The message is confused, the vision hazy, the assurances
facile. We are making decisions that could send young Americans
to war, decisions that could have far-reaching consequences for
the global campaign against terrorism and for America's role in
the world in the 21st century. I think it is reasonable to
demand policy that makes sense.
Perhaps this hearing can help point the way to such policy.
Our witnesses today are distinguished and thoughtful, and
committed to working in the best interests of the country, and
it has always been a great pleasure to work with my friend
Ambassador Holbrooke and, of course, to see him here today.
Mr. Chairman, in terms of questions, let me begin by asking
Ambassador Holbrooke, what would you say are the historical
precedents for a major U.S. military operation in response to
this type of threat?
Ambassador Holbrooke. By that you mean an action before a
military action was taken against us?
Senator Feingold. And on the type of concern with regard to
the type of threats that Iraq raises.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Immediately, off the top of my head,
I cannot think of any, Senator Feingold. On the question of
preemptive war, there are plenty of preemptive wars in history.
The Six-Day War in 1967, the Israeli attack on the Iraqi
nuclear reactor in 1981, widely condemned at the time. In
retrospect, it looks like a visionary action.
We all know the lessons of history, that Hitler should have
been taken on in 1936 preemptively. Hitler himself admitted he
would have been doomed if we had done it. You can argue the
Spanish-American War was a preemptive war, without any
provocation at all, since the Maine was not blown up by the
Spanish, according to the Hyman Rickover investigation of it in
1975.
Having said that, I feel intensely uncomfortable with the
assertion of a new doctrine for preventive war, or preemptive
war. I just do not see the necessity of it, and with the
greatest respect for the people who did it, and in the effort
to support their goal in Iraq, I believe that by asserting a
universal right instead of focusing on Iraq the administration
has weakened the dialog we are having here today, and I would
urge you to discuss this tomorrow with your most senior
witness, because no President ever would have renounced the
right to strike first if we were endangered.
This was a long doctrinal battle during the cold war which
Senator Biden, Senator Hagel, Senator Lugar and others
participated in. No President would have denied it, but to
assert it as a universal right at a moment when we are trying
to build a specific coalition on a specific threat actually
worked against its goal.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that answer, but the more
recent ones seem to be cases that involved cases of actual
prevention, and having read what the administration is talking
about in terms of their doctrine of preemption, to me in some
ways it sounds more like prevention, which of course has to be
a core element of any foreign policy. Every day we should use a
range of foreign policy tools to prevent threats from emerging.
But announcing that we will unilaterally use our military might
to eliminate those who may threaten us in the future,
announcing that we basically just are going to play by our own
rules, which it almost appears we make up as we go along, may
not be conducive to building a strong coalition against
terrorism or to combating the anti-American propaganda that
passes for news in so much of the world. I am wondering what
you would say about the distinction between prevention and
preemption.
Ambassador Holbrooke. By the way, in the list of preemptive
actions I forgot to add the moment when we wrestled mighty
Grenada to its knees.
I think the issue you raise is incredibly important, and to
assert a new doctrine and to get mixed up here on this issue is
not, to my mind, valuable in the debate that we are having. And
I am sorry to see that it was introduced earlier this year in a
speech at a time when we should have been focused on the
specific threat. And I do not know why it was done, and it does
not help us internationally, and I think it confuses Americans.
We will respond to any threat, and any President will act
preemptively when he or she has to, but why declare a doctrine
which is unnecessary? It always was there, as those of you who
participated in the debate over ``no first use'' will remember.
This committee held many hearings on the issue.
The funny thing, Senator Feingold, is if you take away the
rhetoric and the controversy, I do not think it amounted to
much, but it was presented in such a dramatic way that it has
muddied the discussion which we are having here today.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I could not agree with that statement more.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I want to use a portion of my
time to just discuss two or three issues. The first one is one
that you raised, and I think is very important, and that is,
how is the resolution going to be formulated, who will debate
it, and what have you.
Let me respectfully make a suggestion that the chairman
work with the leadership of the Senate, Senator Daschle and
others, to gain jurisdiction for this committee for 1 week with
regard to this resolution. This will not delay, as I
understand, the work of the Senate in terms of the bills that
are now on the floor, but it would firmly establish the
jurisdiction of the committee and give Members an opportunity
to participate, and I will support that with Senator Lott.
I would say to the chairman that there was a small meeting
this morning involving Senator Lott. I attended the meeting,
Senator McCain was there, and Senator Santorum, and in essence
I made some suggestions to him that he did not indicate that he
would accept them, but he was going to discuss them with
members of the administration.
The Chairman. Without taking out of your time, let me
respond, because this is so important. I share the Senator's
view. I did not formally make the request. I raised that as the
appropriate way to proceed.
I was informed that either the combination of the
administration, or the administration and the joint leadership
concluded that no one should be in on the negotiations other
than the Speaker of the House, the majority leader and the
minority leader in the House and the majority leader and
minority leader in the Senate and their staffs. I think that is
a mistake. I suspect it is a growing sentiment in my caucus, I
may be wrong, that it should go through this procedure. It
would not be unduly delayed, I happen to agree with you. I
cannot guarantee the outcome.
Senator Lugar. The second suggestion follows from the
letter you read that the two of us wrote to the President, and
I want to spell out again the importance, I think, not only of
the President speaking to this, to the American people, but of
all of us of trying to think through the cost of the war and
the peace.
Now, people are making tries at this. Larry Lindsey, the
chairman of the Council on Economic Advisors, suggests $100
billion. Some have upped that figure. The implications of this
with regard to all of our budgeting, all of our priorities for
several years, are very substantial. This does not deny the
need to go to war if that is required, but it does require the
American people have some idea in advance of priorities that
have been set, and I think this really has to be spelled out.
Third, there is a pledge to avert chaos in Iraq and in a
post-war situation that is implied, at least in the draft of
the resolution. However, I have been trying to query the
administration as to whether in the planning there is an idea
of how many troops are going to be involved and for how long. I
am informed there has been some discussion of that, and I am
glad that is the case, but I think probably publicly there
needs to be more.
Afghanistan has been mentioned by our witnesses today. This
is not a good example of averting chaos after a war. In the
case of Iraq, we know that you have a 17 percent Sunni minority
that is in control and a 60 percent Shiite majority that could
very well commit atrocities against their former oppressors.
Are we going to take the responsibility of policing Iraq, and
the answer probably is yes, if we are to avoid total chaos. But
that is something that really has to be discussed.
The fourth thing that must be determined is our plan for
finally getting our hands on the weapons of mass destruction in
the midst of all of this police activity, expenditure, and war.
That is not clear at all, where these dual purpose sheds are
that deal with chemical and biological weapons.
Some thoughts have been that perhaps when we get there we
may be able to interrogate scientists who have been involved in
this and that they will lead us to these sites. Our main focus
must be to eliminate the weapons of mass destruction. How
ironic, having fought a war and trying to maintain order we
still would not know where the weapons were or whether they had
been destroyed. We must hear from someone about how we will do
this.
Now, finally, Mr. Chairman, you have been most tolerant
about my editorializing about weapons of mass destruction in
Russia, but it is relevant. We are asked, how do we know
whether Saddam might, in fact, develop something in the next
year? The answer always is, he might get the fissile material
from somewhere else. Where? Someone has suggested recently
Africa. Well, a better bet is Russia.
Now, we have been talking about this in the committee with
some productive results. The chairman and I visited with the
President, Dr. Rice, and the Vice President in June about this
specific issue. Unknown to the President, various regulations
were run up by the Congress that were not waived by the
administration this year had led to a stoppage of the Nunn-
Lugar program in Russia.
The President was startled by this, instructed Dr. Rice to
move ahead, she has, she has written a very good letter which I
used on the Senate floor to get an amendment to give the
President waiver authority so we might start destroying the
40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons in Russia. That is now
in the Defense appropriations conference. It has not yet
happened. Nothing is happening at Shchuchya. The 40,000 metric
tons are still sitting there, hopefully not for the Iraqis or
for somebody else, but nevertheless, they are all still there.
So I plea in public for the House conferees to let it go.
Let the President have the waiver authority. Ditto in the
Defense authorization committee. The Senate has provided the
President with permanent waiver authority to destroy weapons of
mass destruction. The House conferees have not acceded to that
wish. That is tied up as of this moment.
Still the President asked and we offered legislation in
this committee to let the so-called Nunn-Lugar act operate
outside the former Soviet Union in places like Pakistan, or
Afghanistan, or wherever threats might show up. The House
conferees have said no. They do not want it outside of Russia.
This is incomprehensible, given the debate we are having today
about Iraq, and this is why I take the time of this committee
in this very public way, to plead with the House conferees in
these two situations, Defense authorization and Defense
appropriations we must give the President of the United States
at this crisis time waiver authority so he can proceed to
destroy the weapons of mass destruction, or even find them,
wherever they may be outside of Russia, and I think this is
relevant to the hearing.
I thank the witnesses for offering suggestions on the
resolution, and I would say with regard to the final sentence
that you mentioned, Ambassador Holbrooke, I made that point
this morning. It is not good language, and I have shared that
with Senator Biden's staff, and so perhaps we can make some
improvement there.
I thought the reporting requirement was an interesting
idea, and I am not sure how that works in, but I am sure
craftsmen can probably find some way, and likewise, the post-
conflict construction of Iraq, I have made already quite a to-
do about. I think that is important, otherwise, there will be
chaos.
But I just appreciate both of you coming. Your testimony
has been very, very thoughtful. It comes from great experience.
You are friends of the committee and friends of us. I thank
you.
The Chairman. With the indulgence of the committee, I think
it is appropriate to make two points at this time, not in terms
of questions. I think part of what is going on here as it
relates to Iraq is that there is a desire to demonstrate, and I
am prepared to demonstrate it, support for the President's
initiative at the United Nations and support for separating
Saddam from his weapons, or from power, or both.
That is going simultaneously with an effort yet to be
articulated to me as to exactly what the administration is
seeking at the U.N. Now, maybe my colleagues know. No one has
told me, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,
specifically what is being sought by Secretary Powell at the
United Nations.
To make the point of Mr. McFarlane, he said there needs to
be a criteria enunciated in the days ahead as the basis for our
action. The irony is, we are being asked to vote on a
declaration of war before that criteria is set, for make no
mistake, although I am only an adjunct professor of
constitutional law, this area I know. A resolution authorizing
the use of force has the same exact force as a declaration of
war, and so in a sense there is some confusion. As my grandpop
might have said, I am not sure the horse can carry the sleigh,
or we are putting the cart before the horse, to keep this
stupid metaphor going.
The notion here is, I am convinced the President is well-
intended here. Senator Lugar may recall, in the necessary
absence of Senator Helms, at a White House congressional
leadership meeting just 2 weeks ago, the President turned to me
as he did others and said, ``Mr. Chairman, what do you think?''
I said, Mr. President, I will be with you as long as--and I
laid out two things, and the ending thing was, Mr. President,
you tell the people of America forthrightly that we will have
to stay, that American forces will be in place for some period
of time, and that the cost will be significant, and he looked
at me, and he said, ``I will,'' so I am confident he will do
it.
I am just uneasy about the way we are going about this now,
because we may end up right where Bud McFarlane does not want
us to end up, and anybody from the Gulf of Tonkin days on and
the Vietnam generation does not want us to end up, and that is
a mixed message to the American people about what we are
committing them to.
I am sorry for that editorial interjection, but in part to
try to explain to the people who may be listening to this why
there is some confusion. There is not here an unwillingness to
cooperate with the President. There is a desire to cooperate,
but I think we have to get the lines a little clearer.
I yield to my friend from California, Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Senator Biden, Senator Helms.
Thank you for this hearing.
I just want to say, Senator Lugar, there is no more
important time for Nunn-Lugar than now, and anything that I can
do to help you, I stand ready to do that.
Mr. Chairman, as a Member of Congress for 20 years I want
to put my questions into some perspective and put my values out
there as a United States Senator, and as a mother and a
grandmother.
Mr. Chairman, I voted to go to war twice in recent years,
once--and you had tremendous leadership on this--to stop a
genocide under Milosevic, with a Democratic President, and
after 9/11 to give this President the power to respond in any
way necessary to conduct a war against these terrorists. Having
said that, I want to say two things about how I view war.
One, I view war as a last resort, not as a first resort,
and second, I believe that any President who is asking us to go
to war lay out a path for peace or a way to avoid war, and I
have to say in this particular circumstance, at this point, I
do not sense that this President used this war as a last resort
because he has not really laid out a path for peace. I have
served with four Presidents now, and I have not seen this
before but I do see it now.
And with that, I want to ask some questions and make a
couple more comments. Mr. Ambassador, when you opened your
testimony you said, ``the prolonged reluctance of this
administration to consult adequately with either the Congress
or the United Nations Security Council was a costly, self-
inflicted mistake. During a long and confused summer, an
impression of disarray was left with the world . . .''.
Well, I want to say something here that is not easy to say,
but I do not think that was a mistake. I think that was a plan,
and all you have to do is see the comments of Andrew Card, who
said, we do not roll out a new product during the summer, and I
ask unanimous consent to place into the record the exact words
of Andrew Card on that point.
[The information referred to follows:]
The following is from an article in the New York Times, of
September 14, 2002, entitled ``Never Forget What?'' by Frank Rich.
Candor is so little prized in Washington that you want to
shake the hand of anyone who dares commit it. So cheers to
Andrew Card, the president's chief of staff, for telling the
Times's Elisabeth Bumiller the real reason that his boss
withheld his full-frontal move on Saddam Hussein until
September. ``From a marketing point of view, you don't
introduce new products in August.''
Senator Boxer. I do not think it was any kind of mistake. I
think it was a plan to make this political. That is very
distressing. These issues are too important. A man like Saddam
Hussein having these weapons of mass destruction is too
important to politicize.
Chairman Biden opened up the hearing and he said, if Saddam
is around in 5 years we have got a serious problem. Now, I
would like to ask both of you this question. Chairman Biden is
saying that today. Why didn't the first Bush administration
feel that if Saddam was around 5 years later from 1991 it would
be a severe problem? Why did they not move toward regime
change?
Ambassador Holbrooke. I think you should address that to
the Secretary of State, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs at
the time but may have some insight. I would simply say that
whatever the rationale at the time, they said they could not do
it because it was not in the Security Council resolution. I
find that a very strange explanation for the specific manner in
which the war was terminated after a nice round 100-hour mark.
They argued that they would have to go to Baghdad to do it. I
do not believe that was necessarily so, but you have to ask
them that question, Senator Boxer.
I have said before, and I must say it today, I believe it
was the single greatest mistake in American foreign policy
since the end of the Vietnam war, and that is why we are here
today.
There is one last point. The entire intelligence community
told the President, President Bush, senior, that Saddam would
not survive anyway, and that was, of course, historically
wrong.
Senator Boxer. He has been around since 1968 as the strong
man of that country.
Ambassador Holbrooke. And that goes to the Ba'athist
structure of the country, but I would have to defer to people
who were there in the administration 12 years, or 11 years ago
at this time.
Senator Boxer. Mr. McFarlane, would you care to try that
answer? In other words, the chairman said here if Saddam is
around in 5 years, his exact words were, ``we have a serious
problem.'' Why didn't President Bush feel the same way in 1991?
Mr. McFarlane. Senator Boxer, I think that being in the
other body at the time you were a witness to the very, very
intense arguments in the Senate about the resolution of support
for going to war in 1991. It was a very, very intense argument
which the Senate very narrowly, by one vote, endorsed the
President's action. I think the Senate was acting in its
traditional mode of care, perhaps looking back to the Gulf of
Tonkin resolution in which an open-ended authority was abused,
and consequently endorsed the limited action of rejecting or
expelling from Kuwait and restoring the territorial integrity
of Kuwait as the extent of authority.
Senator Boxer. I get your point. You are saying the
resolution was limited. I would just make the point that the
big debate in the Senate actually, and in the House where I
was, was whether there ought to be 60 more days of sanctions
before force, but I do not have time to get into it, and I
appreciate your answer.
Let me get into a couple of other questions. I see the
yellow light is on. Mr. Ambassador, in your editorial that you
wrote, which I thought was very strong, on August 27, you said,
``a campaign against Saddam Hussein cannot be waged without
allies,'' and in the resolution that was sent up there is no
reference to doing this with allies whatsoever, and I want to
ask you two questions, then I will yield.
My understanding is that some in Tony Blair's cabinet
backed the use of force for Britian to be involved if there was
another U.N. resolution, and through that resolution the use of
force. That is my understanding of what Britain did. Do you
feel, am I accurate on that point?
Ambassador Holbrooke. I do not know.
Senator Boxer. And then second, do you think we could
strengthen the resolution if we talked about working with our
allies, because the one thing I know from my people back home,
they do not want us to do this alone. The blood, the treasure,
it all--and I think they want to see that we have allies with
us, and yet there is no mention, and you did not mention it as
you picked over the resolution.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I share your point. I suggested four
changes in the resolution, one deletion, three additions. What
you are essentially proposing is a fifth, an addition which
stresses the importance of allies. There is a very revealing
poll in yesterday's USA Today, whereby an overwhelming majority
of the American public would be willing to see U.S. troops in
an effort to deal with Saddam if we had allies, if the Congress
approved and if the Security Council supported it.
The more amazing thing was that, given the same option U.S.
troops in Iraq absent congressional support, absent allies and
absent the Security Council, there was a swing of 30 to 40
points. I have never seen such a swing on an issue like this,
and this would reinforce your point, Senator Boxer.
The Chairman. Would you say that again?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yesterday's USA Today has a very
revealing poll in which by margins of something like 68 to 30--
do not hold me to the exact numbers, Mr. Chairman--the American
public said they would support an attack on Iraq with American
ground troops if there was congressional support.
A second question, if there is U.N. Security Council
action, the same margin, if there are allies, the same margin,
slight differences, and then the poll asked, would you support
it without the Congress, 35 to 60 no. Would you support it
without the U.N. approval, the same margin, no, without allies,
the same margin, no.
In other words, what Senator Boxer is saying is reinforced
by, I think, the good common sense of the American public. They
want to get rid of Saddam, as everyone on this committee does.
They do not want to go it alone. The only nuanced difference
between us, Senator, which you and I discussed privately, is
whether a new Security Council resolution is required or not,
and I am bound by my previous comments on that and by my
experience, but I think that we cannot go it alone, and that is
why I wrote that article, and if you and your colleagues add an
additional Therefore clause concerning the need for allies, I
think it would help the administration, but I cannot speak for
them.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, can I indulge you for 30
seconds more?
The Chairman. Sure.
Senator Boxer. In your first op ed piece you said,
``existing Security Council resolutions will not be enough.''
In your second one, you changed, but I agree with your first
one, and let me just close by saying this. I agree with where
the American people are today. Now, they may change. I agree
with where the American people are today, and the difference
between us, I say, Mr. Ambassador, is this:
I would want to put working with our allies, working with
the United Nations not in a Whereas clause, but in the actual
Resolved clause, because sticking something in a Whereas clause
does not mean anything, but if it is in the Resolved clause
that we will do this through the United Nations, we will do
this with our allies, we will not do it alone is a strong
difference between where I am coming from, where the American
people are coming from, which is right there, and where this
administration is coming from with a blank check, which I could
never support, and I appreciate the comments of both of you
here today.
The Chairman. For the record, since it was referenced, with
the indulgence of my colleague from Nebraska, the question in
the USA Today poll, ``some people say they would support
invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops only if certain
conditions were true. For each of the following conditions,
please say if you favor or oppose invading . . .''.
How about if the United Nations supported invading? And 79
percent would favor.
How about if the United States opposed invading? Only 37
percent would favor.
Senator Boxer. The United Nations, or United States?
The Chairman. I am sorry. Would you oppose or favor if the
United Nations supported invading Iraq? And 79 percent said we
would support invading if the U.N. supported invading.
When asked if the U.N. opposed invading, only 37 percent
said they would favor it, and so it is overwhelming clear, at
least----
Ambassador Holbrooke. Mr. Chairman, you might add, because
I was trying to remember the same question on Congress and our
allies----
The Chairman. It says if Congress supports, 69 percent in
favor, if Congress opposes, only 37 percent favor, other
countries participating in invading Iraq, 79 percent would
favor, the United States invading alone, only 38 would favor.
Ambassador Holbrooke. That is a very sophisticated set of
answers, Senator Boxer.
The Chairman. I would ask unanimous consent that this be
put in the record.
[The poll from USA Today follows:]
USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll, 9/23/2002
12. Question. Some people say they would support invading Iraq with
U.S. ground troops only if certain conditions were true. For each of
the following conditions, please say if you would favor or oppose
invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops if it were true. How about if--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
No
Favor Oppose Opinion
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. The United Nations supported invading
Iraq
National Adults (Sept 20-22 2002)....... 79 19 2
B. The United Nations opposed invading
Iraq
National Adults (Sept 20-22 2002)....... 37 58 5
C. Congress supported invading Iraq
National Adults (Sept 20-22 2002)....... 69 28 3
D. Congress opposed invading Iraq
National Adults (Sept 20-22 2002)....... 37 59 4
E. Other countries participated in
invading Iraq
National Adults (Sept 20-22 2002)....... 79 18 3
F. The United States had to invade Iraq
alone
National Adults (Sept 20-22 2002)....... 38 59 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Holbrooke. There is a 30 to 40 percent swing
against unilateralism, is the way I would interpret those
answers.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and gentlemen,
thank you for coming before us today, because your experience
and talent and insight is very important to this debate, and
you each have presented I think important points, and I would
like to delve into a couple in a moment, but before I do, I
want to go on record, Mr. Chairman, in support of every
utterance of my wise, learned colleague from Indiana's
statement. I think Senator Lugar makes, as he always does makes
eminent good sense. I would strongly support his suggestion to
you that whatever is the appropriate responsible approach, ask
that this committee be part of this deliberation.
I have not been around very long, Mr. Chairman, but I am a
bit astounded when I read in one of the publications this
morning that the chairman of the House International Relations
Committee, when asked what his role has been in working with
the administration on this resolution to maybe take this Nation
to war, his comment was something to the effect that Tom Lantos
the, of course, Democrat ranking member of that committee, Tom
and I are pressing our nose up against the window looking in.
There is something that does not quite fit with that kind
of response. I do not know if your nose is up against the
window, but the fact is, this is about as serious an issues as
the Congress will ever debate. My question to you, Mr.
Chairman, and maybe you could give us some sense of this, what
was the procedure in 1991 when that resolution was passed? Did
this committee have a role, or was it bypassed like this
committee is being bypassed today?
The Chairman. And again, this is not against the Senator's
time for questions. When I go back and refresh my recollection,
exactly what the sequence was, but there were three important
points.
One, initially Kuwait was invaded in August. The President
asserted he did not need congressional authority, and his
Attorney General, who is actually a good friend and has helped
me teach a couple of my classes, asserted that the war clause
only was put there for the Congress to be able to declare war
if the President did not, and that was literally asserted by
the White House.
And then I, along with several others, probably Senator
Lugar, I do not recall, insisted that that issue be litigated
before the committee, of the requirement, and we had
constitutional scholar after scholar come and testify in open
hearing saying the President must submit a resolution seeking
approval.
We solicited that resolution, and then President Bush did
what I thought, quite frankly, was a very wise thing, and that
is, he said, I do not want you to vote on this in the midst of
congressional elections. He said, this should be put over until
the congressional elections are over, even though it was more
urgent then, in that there was a country invaded and occupied,
and we had 250,000 troops amassing on the ground. He still
said, I guess because of his experience as a combat veteran he
still said, we should not vote now.
And then we came back--we came back in January and voted
after the election, and I cannot say to my friend with
certainty whether or not the resolution of the President
ultimately submitted in that interim period was once again
before the committee or not. I do not recall. Maybe my friend
from Indiana does.
But the point is, there was considerable debate, because we
did not vote in a highly charged electoral circumstance, but
that was the sequencing.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that, and it may
well be that we go back and examine that record as to how it
was done in 1990 and 1991, especially in light of the fact that
we are a few weeks away from an election, and this deserves the
kind of thoughtful time and debate that I think the American
public deserve and, quite frankly, the world deserves.
I am also astounded that those who know most about those
issues, the ranking members of the Armed Services Committee,
the Foreign Relations Committee, the Intelligence Committee--
some are with us today--are not part of the process in writing
or drafting or amending a resolution, and I would hope that
whenever that resolution is taken up in the House and the
Senate, that it will be the Members, the senior Members of this
committee that will lead that floor debate, that will manage
that bill.
Now, with that said, Mr. Chairman, I want to ask a question
of Ambassador Holbrooke. In his testimony he cites, I believe
on page 4--and I will read this so I have it exactly right,
``however, in the fog of war terrible things can happen,'' but
I am particularly interested in your next point, Mr.
Ambassador, and I would appreciate it if you could talk in more
detail about what you mean.
This point, you say, ``there is a real danger which we
should not ignore that what starts as a war against Iraq,
especially if protracted, could metastasize into a wider
conflict between Arabs and Israel.'' Would you please expand on
that? Thank you.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I do not want to be Cassandra, and I
do not want to make a worst case scenario, but prudent policy
planning for civilians and military alike requires that you
consider worst case scenarios, and people who do not, who
thought, for example, in the summer of 1914 that it would be a
short war, live with consequences incalculable for the rest of
history.
I share the view expressed by some members of this
committee, Senator Kerry among others, that the odds
significantly favor a rapid military success, but as you well
know from your own experience in Indochina, military plans are
scrapped and rewritten on a daily basis, and the key to this
war--and here I speak as a civilian. The key to this war will
be whether the degradation and destruction of Saddam's weapons
of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and to me, that
is an unknown, will precede his ability to put something
against Israel.
In 1991, he put 35 Scud missiles into Tel Aviv. The
Israelis did not respond. According to current newspaper
accounts, the Israelis will not be so self-contained this time
and, given the other issues raging to the west of Iraq between
the Palestinians and the Israelis, we cannot preclude the worst
case scenarios.
Again, Senator, you and I share a Vietnam experience, as
does Bud McFarlane, and we all know that things do not always
work out according to plan in wars, and as we go forward, if we
go forward, we should do it without predicting cake walks, but
with a readiness to deal with this, and it would obviously be
for the military chiefs in closed session to discuss with you
what they have in mind to prevent this.
I can assure you of one thing. The U.S. military planners
are well aware of the risks, probably far more aware than I am,
and anyone who dismisses this out of hand, as I have seen some
rather casual television so-called experts, is being very
irresponsible. We cannot just sit here and say, it is going to
be a cake walk, because we do not know what will happen.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. McFarlane, would you care to
respond to that?
Mr. McFarlane. Senator Hagel, it seems clear that Saddam's
behavior is not predictable, but that there is a very strong
animus toward Israel there, and that in the last war his use of
weapons against them had, beyond its explosive purpose, to
perhaps engender that very thing, a wider war, but indeed, that
is a scenario that is not implausible at all, that the use of
Scuds against Israel and their reaction, which has been
confirmed as likely, would bring in other Arab parties to the
conflict, with very unpredictable consequences, but a far
greater commitment required by us to deal with it.
Senator Hagel. Thank you both. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. I am going to defer to my colleague from
West Virginia.
The Chairman. Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. And as he was here before I was, I
will defer to Senator Chafee.
The Chairman. Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen. I would just like to have you discuss the relative
threats to the United States from, first, terrorism, and second
from Iraq, especially in light of how they are hemmed in by our
international coalition, enforcing the no-fly zones. How do you
weigh the threats against the United States from those two, in
some way they might be mixed, but by and large separate
dangers, Iraq, as we are discussing here, but also
international terrorism?
Mr. McFarlane. Senator Chafee, the scale and capability of
the al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist threat has not been fully
defined, I think, by our government, and yet it is asserted
that beyond Afghanistan affiliates in more than 50 cities and
countries throughout the world have the training, the funding
capability, to carry out major violence against the United
States.
Evidence of the past 10 years of the, what is it, half a
dozen attacks from 1993 in New York to the embassies in Africa,
to the USS Cole and Khobar Towers and so forth, are evidence
that this is a very potent force and will remain so for a long
time, in my judgment. One thing that has been underreported is
the level of funding that is sustaining this work, which is not
trivial. It is, in my judgment, more than $1 billion annually.
Global terrorism, oriented primarily against the United States,
is going to be with us for a long time.
Saddam Hussein, as someone who is unchecked by a Congress
or other institution, as made clear that he has ambitions to
dominate his region. His invasion of two neighbor countries,
the force that he maintains in being, which gives him the
capability to do it again, his determination to achieve weapons
of mass destruction, beg the question for what purpose, if not
to expand his influence and to coerce the behavior of
neighboring states.
One also has to ask whether or not, given his history of
supporting terrorists, the most notable recently deceased Abu
Nidal, but Black June, Black September and others, underscore
that his support for terrorists and terrorism is on the record,
and therefore to suggest the plausibility of his providing
terrorists with weapons of mass destruction in the perhaps hope
of achieving anonymity through this third party use with his
sponsorship, I certainly cannot assert that that is a high or a
low probability, but given his history, it is a plausible
scenario.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Nothing to add, Senator.
Senator Chafee. I will follow that up with, in light of the
potential to fan the flames of anti-Americanism not only in the
region but apparently in Europe also, is our intervention in
Iraq counterproductive to our war on terrorism?
Ambassador Holbrooke. That I will take a shot at, Senator
Chafee, and my answer is simple. It depends. What does it
depend on, and this goes back to Senator Hagel's question. It
depends upon the war itself. If it is quickly successful in its
objectives, I would share Fuet Jami's well-known statement that
there would be dancing in the streets of Baghdad, and no
mourning in any of the other Arab capitals.
If the war does not go quickly, if it has consequences--and
that is why I made the allusion in 1914, where everyone thought
it would be a short war. It was not, and the world changed--
then you are in a different situation.
As anyone in this room who has served in the military
knows, military plans start getting rewritten and scrapped on
day one. Our whole bombing campaign in Serbia, for example, was
initially miscalculated, and the NATO command in Brussels,
General Clark and company, had to redo it.
So you have asked a fair question, but the outcome of the
military determines the political situation that follows. That
was true in 1914. It was true in 1945. It was true in the Six-
Day War in the Mideast. It is true in Vietnam. It is the core
fact. People think there is war, and then there is diplomacy.
It is not true. If war is an extension of diplomacy by other
means, then diplomacy is an extension of war, as a result of
it, and so that is why what we are talking about has such
enormous consequences.
Senator Chafee. I could not agree with you more. I think it
was in your written statement you did say--Senator Hagel quoted
from one of your statements, but also, war is truly hell, and
went on to talk about the horrors and waste and its costs, so
in light of that, just to followup on the same question, how do
we justify--and again, I guess, going back to Senator Feingold,
how do we justify without concrete evidence of a threat? In
answering Mr. McFarlane's testimony here that the threat is
just no different from several years ago, how do we justify
this action?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, most of us in this room,
unless we have access to current intelligence information,
which I do not, cannot answer the question precisely. It is my
view, however, that Saddam Hussein has spent 12 years doing
whatever he can to rebuild himself. He could not rebuild his
ground forces, which are about one third the size of 1991, but
since inspectors left Iraq 3 years ago he has, without
question, done what he could----
Senator Chafee. Let me interrupt. Even with our
overflights, our satellite reconnaissance, our no-fly zones? He
is hemmed in.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I will answer that subquestion on two
levels. No. 1, even if we had cameras that could see through
concrete bunkers and lead, all they would be was cameras, so we
would not actually know what we do not know, and second, you
can only do this with on the ground--and Hans Blix himself said
last week, the excellent Swedish head of the U.N. inspection
mission, which is preparing to go back in under certain
circumstances, that nothing will be foolproof, but this goes to
a very fundamental question.
If Saddam is a problem today, as Senator Biden has said, he
will be a much worse problem if he is left untouched for 3 or 5
years, and that is why all of us as individuals, and you
especially, as Senators, are going to have to decide whether to
support a policy which has a very high probability of leading
to war--why would anyone even consider it under these
circumstances, and I hate war. I have been in refugee camps
everywhere, I have been shot at, the whole works.
The reason we have to contemplate it, in my view, although
I agree with Senator Boxer, as a last resort, is that he will
be more dangerous in the future. In 3 to 5 years he will be
more powerful, and I do not agree that nothing has happened to
bring it to a crisis. Why it is happening at exactly now,
September of 2002, is a separate issue, but he has had 12 years
in which he has done everything he can--he has made himself an
international outlaw, essentially.
If there is a state in defiance of the world system, the
U.N. Security Council, which everyone in this room has talked
positively about, it is Saddam and the Iraqis.
Senator Chafee. I do take exception to the definitive
aspect that he will be more of a threat in 5 years. That is
debatable. Fidel Castro, you might have said he will be more of
a threat if left untouched, and here, years later, he is not
more of a threat, so that is a debatable point. I do not take
that as an absolute.
The Chairman. Did you want to respond, Mr. McFarlane?
Mr. McFarlane. Please, Mr. Chairman. I do not think any of
us can give you certainties on almost anything regarding Saddam
Hussein. I would like to recall, however, Senator Lugar's
comment about the plausible risks and the stated ambitions that
we have heard from Saddam Hussein.
Nuclear materials are poorly guarded in much of the former
Soviet Union. Thanks to Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn, the
program that was so well begun and is continuing has to be
sustained and, unless it is, the plausibility of nuclear
materials being misdirected, stolen, purchased, or whatever,
cannot be denied, and the existence of a nuclear program in
Iraq, which is a matter of fact under the United Kingdom's
report, issued yesterday, gives us just cause in guarding
against the growth of that program.
The Chairman. Let me, before I yield to Senator
Rockefeller, make a point that I think is a distinction with a
difference. I think we miss the boat when we are talking about
Iraq. Iraq violated international norms, invaded another
country, essentially sued for peace, essentially signed an
armistice, the conditions of which were contained in the U.N.
resolutions, and has clearly violated those resolutions.
Whether or not they are a threat or not, they violated those
resolutions.
I hope we stop talking about preemption. This is not
preemption. Maybe we should or should not go to Iraq, and I
have an open mind about that, but it is fundamentally different
than invading a similar country in terms of seeking weapons of
mass destruction, acted against their own people, not to the
same extent, like Iran, or North Korea. They are not in the
same situation. Iraq signed essentially a peace agreement with
conditions. The conditions are contained in U.N. resolutions.
They have violated them on their face. That is a fundamentally
different thing.
I wish the President and everyone else would stop talking
about preemption and give people around the world the sense
that we are acting like cowboys, and/or they have a right to
act preemptively. This is a different deal.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Mr. Chairman, I pray that what you
have just said is understood, because many of your colleagues
have talked about the fact that they do not feel the rationale
has been adequately explained. If we would just focus on what
you just said, then we could have a clear discussion of whether
it is appropriate to move toward war. When we get into these
theories about preemptive war, we bring in all these extra
factors, so I heartily support what you have just said.
The Chairman. Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
What you said, let me use as a segue, because I was in an
Intelligence Committee meeting yesterday, and it was
fascinating, because there was--well, he was behind a screen so
he was not visible--but there was a Minneapolis FBI agent, and
he had reviewed Moussouai, and Moussouai's French visa had run
out.
Now, the FBI agents are lawyers, and they are trained to
enforce the law, so he had two choices, and one was that he act
upon the act of wrongdoing on the part of Moussouai, which was,
he had a visa that had run out, and it was French, and he said,
this cannot stand, and so he went to do something about that,
and I asked him, well, and substantiated more in the press this
morning, there has been some talk that he had quite a lot to do
with terrorism, too, and would that not call for surveillance,
and he said no. My job is to make sure that he did not--I mean,
I am a little bit, with all due respect, reminded of that kind
of comparison.
Something changed after 9/11 is my general impression. I
sure did, and I think everything has changed, so I am happy to
talk about how it took Wendell Wilkie to come and testify
before, I presume, this committee, or maybe it was a House
committee, to get Lend Lease passed at Roosevelt's request,
because Roosevelt could not get it done himself, so the British
would not sink, so we could go ahead, and precedents are
incredibly important.
My question is, are precedents of a different nature now,
and I want to put that in the form of a question of a different
nature to both of our witnesses. We use the word, preemption,
and I am also uncomfortable with the word preemption. I think
it is an unfortunate word. It talks about unilateralism, and I
get lots of e-mails on that subject.
And on the other hand, supposing we changed the Security
Council resolution in ways which have been suggested, and
others have suggested, and it was done, and in fact it was done
prior to the point that we voted, which probably will not
happen, but if that were the case, that would be a neater,
cleaner way of doing it.
The question then arises, what is it that our allies,
having, let us say, voted with us, would then proceed to do
about it, and at some point it seems to me, and I agree with
the chairman that, do not let Saddam Hussein hang around from 3
to 5 years, because I will guarantee you he is a lot worse.
He does not want to be a martyr. I think he wants to leave
a legacy, and I do not really want to think a whole lot about
what kind of legacy that might be, and it might well be at our
expense, and it was not all wrong when Dick Cheney raised the
question, what if the risk is that we get attacked, what would
we say then? What would we say then? What would we say to our
grandchildren then? Everything is, what would we say to our
grandchildren? What if we get attacked, and he picks us over
Israel?
I do not think he would. I think he would take Israel over
us. Is there a difference between that? In fact, because would
we not then come to the defense of Israel?
So my question is, given a new world order, which is going
to last for a very, very long time under the domination called
non-state terrorism, which is cellular in function, which has
absolutely nothing to do in many ways with things like Security
Council resolutions, it is what I want, when I choose and how I
choose, and you will never know, but I will do it because I do
not like you and that is what I have been trained to do, I have
been trained to kill you--al-Qaeda.
Now, Saddam may not be thinking that way. I think he
probably is. Is he more prepared? He surely is. Is he a greater
threat than he was in 1991? He surely is. He has different ways
of launching Scuds that go faster and farther, there is no
question on that.
So my question is, if we do the unilateral, or if we do not
do the unilateral but do the Security Council, and then they
say, OK, we are with you on this, and maybe they give us fly
zones or landing zones, or they give us this or that, but with
the exception of one or two, are they going to be there for us,
and if they are not there for us, does that mean in this
debate, precedent-based, historically based, that we sort of
sit and take it, or are we going to end up basically being
unilateral anyway because we cannot have our children
smallpoxed?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Your question is, if no one was with
us, would we go it alone anyway?
Senator Rockefeller. And more refined than that, if people
were with us, in what measurable way would they, in fact, be
with us which would count for us in terms of dealing with that
crisis?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator Rockefeller, in the first
part of your question, we will not be alone. The British have
already made clear that they will be with us, and I would put a
great deal of confidence in the fact that the Turks will be
with us, and to some degree we will have support, logistics,
basing and so on.
Let us take Germany, for example. The Germans have said
they will not be with us, but the bases will still be available
for us to deploy out of.
Senator Rockefeller. But that is my point. That is my
point. I brought in the bases. I said, let us allow for those,
the fly over and all of that, but at some point it is either
troops on the ground or it is missiles, or it is the things
which cause people to retaliate, or which, as Senator Chafee
said when he was here, counterproductive--I mean, I think that
is going to happen anyway. That dynamic works through something
called poverty, so what really is the point on this, both of
you?
Ambassador Holbrooke. I think we have to defer to the
military planners.
Senator Rockefeller. I do not want to defer. I want to
defer to you two.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Bud, why don't you go first. You are
a military man. I have a view on this, but you should speak
first.
Mr. McFarlane. This is an issue that ought to be much more
front and center in this debate that is unfolding, Senator
Rockefeller. This will not be a cake walk at all. It is
possible that the brutality of Saddam will lead his organized
army and the Republican Guards to fall away, and yet I cannot
imagine that he will not maintain some capability and, indeed,
a capability to use these awful weapons against us or against
Israel, or both.
Your question is, will anybody be there with us?
Senator Rockefeller. In a significant way.
Mr. McFarlane. I do not believe that there will, and that
is an issue that I, and I am sure you, have focused on for a
long time, and that is, if we are alone, is it still
nonetheless imperative that we do this? Is the alternative of
allowing this awful threat to grow, and some day be launched
against anybody too big a risk to take, and I think it is, even
if we have to do this alone.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Senator, let me just try--I think I
now understand the question. If you are talking about materiel
support, airplanes pilots, combat troops, it is very unlikely
that non-American assets, including the British, would account
for more than 10 percent. I am making up that number. That was
the case in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia. That is the case
in Afghanistan, where, in fact, the Pentagon rather
interestingly rejected a lot of the offered help initially.
According to today's Times, they are beginning to look back on
that as a mistake. So the materiel assistance, it will be
marginal.
The United States military strength is greater than all the
other NATO countries combined. You know the statistics on this.
The logistics, however, is indispensable, and the political
support is far more important, in my view, than some of the
spokesmen for the administration, who have been sort of
contemptuous of it.
It is very important in my mind that Prime Minster Blair
did what he did yesterday in the House of Commons. I believe in
the end the French will come around. Maybe I am being over-
optimistic, but I have worked a long time with the French, and
in the end they do not want to be left behind, but they always
want to be the last ones to come on board. They therefore get a
better seat on the train. The Germans are a special problem
because of the recent election, which I consider very
unfortunate, but in the long run it is not going to damage
U.S.-German relations.
The Arab states in the gulf are all trying to maneuver to
find ways to help us without compromising themselves or create
domestic disturbances, and I do not know the state of play in
Riyadh and Qatar and Bahrain and Kuwait, but they are going to
find ways to help us within the limits they can. American
troops are already basing in the East African Horn now to
prepare for exigencies, with the permission of the local
countries.
So if you are meaning symbolic, logistical, political, we
will not be alone. If you are meaning a really material
addition to our fire power, I would say, again, as a civilian,
that it will be marginal.
I hope that is responsive to your question, Senator.
Senator Rockefeller. Mr. Chairman, I think the political is
tremendously important. It has psychological meaning. The
question is, how long does that psychological meaning last? How
long does it help us if it is our boots on the ground, if it is
our guns that are shooting, if it is our missiles that are
killing their people, and I agree with what you both said, all
three of you have said, and that is that the probability of our
being at war is very likely, and we can do all kinds of things
to make that stay as far away as possible, give him a chance to
back off as much as possible.
Who knows, he could change his mind. He could play some
kind of game with us that might not be a game. I doubt it, but
he might, but in the end I think that that threat is real, and
I just cannot deal with Woodrow Wilson and Wendell Wilkie in
trying to set my mind to contemplate the scenario that plays
out before us.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I find that I agree quite a
bit with my colleague from West Virginia. It is my intention at
this point to support a resolution. I hope that that resolution
does, in fact, incorporate the Ambassador's suggestions, which
I think are excellent.
The vagueness of this resolution that has been sent to us
as a draft begs for specificity, and the four points that you
raised in your testimony I certainly hope are going to be
included.
I was quite intrigued to hear your comments that since the
Constitution would confer upon the President as Commander in
Chief the right to act to protect the interest of the United
States, by him then coming out and enunciating this preemptive
war doctrine, it has actually weakened his position. Would you
elucidate further?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, you have put in a much more
succinct and pointed phrase what I think both Chairman Biden
and I were saying about preemptive war. Why was it necessary to
do it, when every President from Washington on has been able to
do it, when the history shows that Presidents have used force
234 times, according to yesterday's papers, and asked for
declarations of war only 5 times, or 11 times if you take each
axis country individually, so that is my strong view, that we
have muddied the discussion.
Senator Nelson. It seems somewhere in American history I
heard of a President that said, ``speak softly and carry a big
stick,'' and that people respected the United States, and of
course that leads me as to why a lot of this conversation has
been going on, and then you know, sadly, I read on the front
page of the Washington Post today the quote that Senator
Daschle felt compelled to take the floor this morning and
quote, and I read from the Washington Post.
``Four times in the past few days Bush,'' referring to the
President, ``has suggested that Democrats do not care about
national security, saying on Monday that the Democratic-
controlled Senate is, `not interested in the security of the
American people,' '' and that is a sad commentary coming out of
the mouth of the President of what is to be the United States,
when in fact it is very divisive.
Ambassador Holbrooke. I have read this article, as you
have, Senator, and I very much note Senator Biden's earlier
chronology of 1990-1991, that President Bush Sr., waited until
after the midterm elections in order to have this discussion.
However, it is the President's prerogative to send up a
proposed piece of legislation whenever he wants to, and he has
chosen to do it at this time, and that is why we are here
today, instead of having this discussion in December or
January.
So whatever the background, whatever the reasons, this is
where we are, and it would be easier to have this discussion
absent the overtones of the final days of a very critical
midterm election, but it has happened before in history.
Woodrow Wilson in 1918 did this, took the war-peace issues to
the Nation and lost both Houses of Congress, so there are
precedents. In any case, we are where we are.
Senator Nelson. Did Woodrow Wilson, in your recollection of
history, make statements like this?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, I do not want to give history
lessons, but he did something even more extraordinary. Senator
Biden's predecessor at the time was Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., as
chairman of this committee, and was also Senate majority
leader, and Woodrow Wilson chose to launch the attack on the
Senate in Fanueil Hall in Boston, and from that point on
Senator Lodge never forgave him, and the personal animosity
turned into an all-out war, and that is why the League of
Nations died, so President Wilson's political judgment on these
things left something to be desired. I do not know whether
there are any historical analogies or not. Senator Rockefeller
talked about Wendell Wilkie. I think that is a particularly
interesting incident.
But the bottom line here, Senator, is, we are where we are.
We are discussing a momentous issue today, war and peace, in
the context of a political calendar, and we cannot avoid it,
even if we may wish otherwise.
Senator Nelson. What do you think, both of you--look into
your crystal ball. If we are ready to go to war, how are we
going to handle Germany, given the position that they have
painted themselves into, in a corner?
Ambassador Holbrooke. I was Ambassador to Germany, and I
know Chancellor Schroeder quite well, and Foreign Minister
Fischer. I believe the ties between the United States and
Germany are unbreakable, based upon culture, commerce, common
heritage, and the legacy of the cold war, and I believe we are
going to get through this.
There are permanent interests of countries, and the
permanent interests of Germany are to be close to the United
States. In fact, Chancellor Schroeder flew to London this
morning specifically to ask Prime Minster Blair to intervene
with the White House, but there is also personal relationships.
Clinton and Yeltsin had a good relationship. It helped policy.
Gorbachev and Reagan, when Bud was working on this, had a good
relationship, and it helped world history. President Bush and
President Putin have a good relationship that helps.
In this case, the personal relationships are working the
other way. It is not going to be a core issues, and I note that
Germany has now offered to lead the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and Fischer, the Foreign
Minister, is reaching out to his American counterpart, Colin
Powell, as we speak.
But on Iraq, it would appear to me that Chancellor
Schroeder dug himself much deeper in than he probably now
thinks is wise. On the other hand, he won the narrowest
election in post-war German history. I do not consider this a
long-term crisis, but going back to Senator Rockefeller's
question, it will definitely affect that issue.
One last point. The Bundestag, your counterpart body, would
have to approve any German deployments. When Schroeder went to
the Bundestag for approval, he won by only two votes, so my
German friends have told me that he could not win a vote to
send forces directly into Iraq anyway. On the other hand, it
did not have to become this intense and this personal.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I wonder what recent history would have been
had we accepted the offer after he risked his career to send
troops to Afghanistan, had we accepted the offer. I wonder what
it would have been had we not unceremoniously pulled out of
Kyoto as he walked into the President's office.
So these personal things do matter, but I happen to agree,
for what it is worth, with the Ambassador that the core
relationship is so deep, so strong, that we will overcome
personalities.
But let me speak to Afghanistan for a minute, because like
Cooperative Threat Reduction and Nunn-Lugar, I do think it
relates, but not to the same extent, and that is that it seems
pretty clear now, I emphasize appears, fairly clear now that
the Defense Department has rethought a position that Senators
Lugar, myself, I believe the Senator from Florida and the
Senator from Nebraska all pushed for, which was that we expand
the international security force in Afghanistan, that we engage
NATO--as a matter of fact, Senator Lugar and I once again
importuned the President to take NATO up on its offer for
participation in Afghanistan, arguing that failure to do so was
counterintuitive and counterproductive in terms of U.S.-NATO
relations, and it seems as though now--and that was rejected
over the strong objection on the part of the Defense
Department, (a) to expand, (b) to include NATO, (c) to take
advantage of the French and/or German offers for deployment.
Now, if what we read is correct, and we had, by the way,
several hearings that addressed this issue, calling the
administration up, asking them to reconsider this position,
specifically asking them to reconsider this position, and now
it looks like they may be reconsidering the position. I ask you
both, starting with you, Mr. McFarlane, if during this somewhat
tumultuous period the administration is able to reconfigure an
international security force with some muscle, some NATO
signature, if you will, do it, and is able to put it in place,
will that have any positive or negative impact on our ability
to get support and/or succeed in Iraq, or is it not relevant?
How will it play?
I know you know so many foreign leaders. How do you think
that would play in terms of the objective we all seek, which is
a more cooperative effort to deal with Saddam? Saddam is not
just our problem, he is the world's problem. We may be the only
solution, but he is the world's problem.
Is there any correlation between how we handle, from this
point out, Afghanistan and its stability and our demonstrating
to the world we have kind of learned a--what we intend in Iraq,
and I will close this question--it sounds more like a diatribe
than a question, but I have met with the Foreign Ministers of
most of the European countries, beginning this February, and
Iraq is always the subject at some point or another, or heads
of state from our European allies that we have hosted here, and
in almost every instance I have been asked the question, what
is our intention relative to an Iraq without Saddam?
They have no doubt we can take out Saddam. They wonder,
what after, so that is the reason I ask this question, because
there seems to be an inordinate amount of unease--or maybe
inordinate is not right. There is an incredible amount of
unease among our European and Arab friends of what happens to a
destabilized Iraq, even without Saddam.
Does the question make any sense?
Mr. McFarlane. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think first, your
suggestion of the need for expansion in Afghanistan is right on
the mark. If you think back 20 years to Lebanon, where our
intention was to establish a truly Lebanese army, Shia, Sunni,
Christian, Greek Orthodox and so forth, that was a sound idea,
and essentially we are trying to do that in Afghanistan today,
but it is not here, and it will not be here for a long, long
time, and until we have that kind of force plus a separate
constabulary worthy of the name, it is going to be a very
unstable place.
Today, all the guns are in the hands of the Northern
Alliance, and it is a very unstable situation that can only be
relieved by an expanded ISAF, in my judgment. Whether the
additional units of volunteers from European countries should
be individual or under NATO auspices, I do not have an opinion
on. Clearly, we do need and would benefit from greater European
participation.
A second point, I think, is that to the extent our advocacy
for a larger ISAF and a welcoming of a greater role for
ourselves in it would relieve part of the angst, I think, that
is real in Europe, and Asia for that matter, about
unilateralism on our part, it would be a positive good in
relieving some of those concerns.
I think finally, however, that what would do the most good
of all is to do both of those things, but then pledge very
emphatically that if we go into Iraq, to not only change the
regime, but restore or build institutions that can promise
greater stability in the future, and that will take years and
years, but it has to be done.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Holbrooke. With your permission, I would like
this to be my final answer, because I am running very late. I
was supposed to host a dinner tonight for President Gusmao of
East Timor in New York, and Nick Plath is going to handle it,
but I would like to get there before it is over.
You and I have discussed this many times. I wrote an
article on this in early November, and you and I share the same
view. What you said about Germany I agree with completely. It
was unnecessary, when Schroeder put his whole career on the
line, to treat it that way.
I am very struck by today's New York Times article from the
NATO summit saying the Americans regret they did not give NATO
a role. This goes back to Senator Lugar's famous phrase, which
has now become part of the language, ``out of area, out of
business.'' I believe you initiated that phrase for NATO, and
you and I have been allies on that.
The ISAF should have been outside of Kabul, and the
fundamental mistake that was made in Afghanistan was that while
we proclaimed support for Karzai we strengthened the war lords,
who are also drug lords, and whose strength is incompatible
with any kind of affective central government, even a loose one
in a loose federation, and you talked to Karzai when he was
here about this.
He minimizes the problem when he talks to us because he
does not want to play into the hands of the critics of the
administration that supported him, but he knows it is a
problem, and you and I both talked to him privately, and I
agree with what Bud McFarlane said, and if they are beginning
to realize that they should have done it differently in
Afghanistan, if they are beginning to realize that Bosnia is
not the place that they should pull out of, as they wanted to a
year and a half ago, then I hope those lessons will be applied
to Iraq, if and when the time comes.
The Chairman. Nation-building ain't a dirty word, but that
is what we are talking about, nation-building.
I understand you have to go.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. I would just thank the Ambassador, but I
wish that he would leave if he needs to at this point, and I
will raise my questions afterwards.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Senator Lugar, and before
I leave, I did not express my own views on Nunn-Lugar because
it would only be repetitive, but we need it more than ever, and
your leadership has been extraordinary on that. Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, let me just say for the record
that the quote, ``out of area, out of business,'' came from
somewhere else. I did not originate it, although I have
utilized it. I think it was accurate, and I appreciate the fact
that NATO has moved in that way. I would just underline what
you and Ambassador Holbrooke have pointed out, that we did try
to emphasize NATO in Afghanistan because it offered a
structure.
If Lord Robertson was able to assign countries so there is
not a pick-up game every 3 months as to who might volunteer,
and they would be prepared to do that. Lord Robertson came here
to the United States and made those comments. Now, hopefully
that may offer some structure, but something is needed there.
Likewise, I just want to make a point once again for the
record that President Bush has been commended for recommending
that it be postponed until after the election. He did that, but
the argument at that meeting was that there would be new
Members seated in the new Congress, so as a result the old
Members ought not to be voting in late November or December,
because hearings were to be held. The chairman pointed out in
his memo this committee met in December, as in Armed Services,
but still there was resistance all the way through by the
administration having to vote.
And I can recall going to the White House with people who
were arguing that the President should simply use the war
powers resolution. In other words President Bush should just
proceed, then after the requisite 30 or 90 days or so, if it
had not worked out, come back and ask for something at that
point.
Now, fortunately, we had the vote on January 11 which gave
us 4 days to go before 250,000 people or more would go into
combat. So I am hopeful that we can sort of reconstruct all of
that history. I think it is relevant for this situation,
because ideally I think we still ought to take jurisdiction in
the committee if we can do so for a period of time, it is
reasonable for us to fashion a resolution. It may or may not be
the one that is debated but nevertheless it should be our job.
In it there were two resolutions that were offered in the
Senate, and they were the rival resolutions from the Armed
Services Committee, one offered by my friend Sam Nunn, and
another offered by Senator Warner. These went together with the
majority leader, Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. Dole, the minority
leader, and those were the two offerings that we had at that
point.
I just wanted to ask you, Mr. McFarlane, in your judgment,
would the Security Council be more likely to fashion a
resolution that dealt with Iraq if the Senate held a vote
before the Security Council acted? In other words, some have
argued that the Security Council members, quite apart from
Saddam, may finally doubt the resolve of this country, feel
that once again we are bluffing, that for the last 11 years or
so people have huffed and puffed about violations of the
Security Council resolutions, as well as incursions in the no-
fly zone, but not a whole lot has occurred and as a matter of
fact, we have been gone for 4 years.
If he was a betting man, he might guess we might be gone
for 4 more, but would it be helpful for us to vote, just
playing the devil's advocate for a moment, sooner rather than
later to indicate some resolve, the administration and the
Congress working together?
Mr. McFarlane. Senator Lugar, I think it would have a very
positive impact, and the demonstration of that resolve and
support and commitment that you suggest, and that that impact
would be felt by members of the Security Council.
This is not a direct analogy at all, but I recall very well
the run-up to the first summit with President Gorbachev in 1985
in Geneva, and the impact that the Senate, the majority
resolution actually had on Gorbachev, separately the action of
all permanent members of the Security Council, in joining in
the support of President Reagan as he left for Geneva, and this
very vivid public solidarity expressed in New York from
Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterand, Craxi, I believe, and Nakasone,
echoed--not echoed, but in parallel with that of the Senate,
the joint resolution, and then of course the American people
were at 70 percent supporting the President's positions going
to Geneva, were more than Gorbachev could ignore, and it had a
profound effect--it is in his memoirs--in influencing his
position of change and a revolution that gradually led to
successes in arms control and elsewhere.
I think it has a very positive impact.
Senator Lugar. Let me ask a second question. What should be
the proper call with regard to the tactics of fighting a war in
Iraq if we have one? For example, some have argued, I think
privately rather than publicly, that the type of tactics that
the United States ought to adopt in Iraq that would minimize
the loss of American lives and minimize civilian losses and
what-have-you are extraordinarily new and different, involving
smart weapons, special forces, and so forth. But this requires,
of course, not only an element of surprise but coordination
which only our country might be able to bring this off
successfully. To invite others into these intricate tactics is
to risk failure.
That, at least, was the argument made with regard to many
of the tactics adopted in Afghanistan. The one reason that
allies were not invited in was that they did not have lift
capacity, but second they were not really compatible with the
particular training and tactics that we were going to use in
the Northern Alliance and so forth.
From your own experience in this, and this has been
extensive, what do you think of that argument? Is it the
prudent thing, once we have decided to do this, even if we have
a Security Council resolution and so forth, for us to counsel
with our allies and say, now let us handle this in our way,
because we believe we can do so with the minimum loss of lives
and minimum amount of time and so forth. As opposed to taking
time to involve several nations so that there is a show of
their ability to participate?
Mr. McFarlane. Well, I believe it is a little disingenuous
to discount and disparage the role of allies because of
incompatibility, or not having common tactics and so forth,
given that that is what we have been working on for more than
50 years in NATO, for example, and that commonality in fact
exists. I would credit to an extent the arguments specific to
Afghanistan that we were going into something where we were
very much blind. This deserves in itself a lot of focus,
because the intelligence of the United States before that
conflict about the situation in Afghanistan was appallingly
bad.
The idea that the CIA for 10 years had to read in the
newspapers that we had a drug problem there and not put anybody
on the ground, that we had a growing cell of terrorist activity
there and not put anybody on the ground, with the result that
we finally go to war with nobody on the ground, led us to have
to rely on the resourcefulness of our special operations
people, and they did a remarkably good job.
How much better it would have been if they knew who the
good guys and who the bad guys were, and we ended up hiring bad
guys who called air strikes on good guys. Well, that is another
story.
But your point is well taken. It is surely feasible to
carry out the kind of tactics we are going to need to use in
Iraq with allied units. We have operated in this kind of area.
We have trained for it together, and we ought to be encouraging
it. This does not even include the enormous political gain that
comes from the political support that we also enjoy.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, let me just make a point,
prompted by that testimony. I am hopeful, and I do not draw any
conclusions, but I am hopeful our intelligence with regard to
Iraq is substantially better than Mr. McFarlane is pointing out
it was prior to our war in Afghanistan. I mention that not with
regard to the questions we have been raising of intelligence,
because we participated in a good meeting with the CIA Director
and others, but on these questions in which there do not seem
to be many answers in terms of political leadership inside of
Iraq.
We have the exiles and some identification with these
persons who purport to be a potential government or coalition.
Granted Saddam has suppressed most people and they probably
would not be showing their heads, but at the same time, we are
about to get into a situation of potential instability, and I
am not comfortable that of our knowledge of potential new
leadership. I am hopeful we know more about the military
predicament, but I am not confident we know where the weapons
of mass destruction are, and that is a very large question in
all of this.
I suppose one value of these hearings is that you sound
these alarms and it sort of sends signals. You ask somebody to
look and watch, because it appears to me we are on the
threshold of having to make some tough judgments in a military
way, quite apart from the post-Saddam situation if we come to
that, and in a political way, but these are just thoughts that
are prompted by experienced testimony you have given, and I
appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I might point out that there are 600,000 to
700,000, as Mr. McFarlane has indirectly referenced in early
answers, 600,000 to 700,000 Shia Iraqi refugees in Iran,
600,000 to 700,000 in Iran. What happens then? We are talking
about 60 percent of the population.
Senator Lugar. They become very interested in Iraq.
The Chairman. Yes, but they are Iraqis in Iraq. Senator.
Senator Nelson. That begs the question. As we look to the
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, how do you keep Iraq together with
all of those forces pulling at it, the Kurds in the north, the
Shia in the south, and how in the world do we protect the
interests of the United States, and what is the plan for that?
Can we discuss that? We do not hear that discussion coming out
of the administration, but that is a very important element for
the future protection and the interests of the United States.
The Chairman. If the Senator would yield, part of the
value, hopefully, of these hearings, to in a sense parrot the
point Senator Lugar was making, is hopefully we send out the
sort of cries for assistance here. We had testimony, as you
well know, on so-called the day after, and former Secretary
Weinberger and Secretary Rumsfeld, Weinberger last month,
Rumsfeld last week, suggested the United States would not need
to stay very long in Iraq.
They argued that Iraq has a talented population,
considerable resources to pay for its own reconstruction, will
quickly be able to organize itself politically, economically,
and militarily into a peaceful unified nation, free of weapons
of mass destruction.
But then we also had testimony here before this committee
from considerably talented military experts, one whose sole job
was post-war planning--I mean, post-victory planning, who
indicated that 75,000 troops were required at a cost of $16
billion for the first year to maintain order, to preserve
Iraq's integrity, secure weapons of mass destruction sites.
Other experts we had predicted that the United States will
have to engage substantial resources for years, and among the
more significant challenges for years, and among the more
significant challenges that Iraq will not be able to handle on
its own from a plethora of witnesses was, cleaning up after
effects of a battle, and malicious destruction by Saddam with
chemical and biological weapons, and providing basic
humanitarian needs. We saw what happened in Afghanistan, a
smaller country--dealing with refugees, displaced persons,
catching Saddam if he flees, providing police protection, and
preventing reprisal killings, detoxification of the Ba'athist
officials and security services, aiding in the formation of a
new government, ensuring Iraq territorial integrity, and
dealing with possible Iranian and Turkish intervention,
rebuilding the oil sector while ensuring the smooth reentry of
Iraqi oil into the world markets, and promoting legitimacy of a
new government for Iraq in the Arab world.
I met, as we all have, I assume with the Iraqi National
Congress. I admit this is now 5 months old. They came to me and
said, hey, we are not getting any response from the
administration. We are asking them to help train us on how to
run an infrastructure. They said, well, we will talk to you
later. Who is going to run these things?
This is able to be done, but it sure requires some
significant thought process a little bit ahead of time, and as
I said, I believe--I am not just hopeful, I believe the
President before, no matter under what circumstances, he
arrives at the use of force, if he arrives at that, I am
convinced he will come to us and the Nation with answers to
some of these questions, but I do not think it is an
exaggeration to suggest that the speech at the United Nations,
although an incredibly important speech, was not designed to
answer these questions. It was not designed to answer these
questions, and these questions, if not answered, have to at
least be spoken to.
Again, I will end where I began. It is not hyperbole to
suggest that the American people will not sustain the action we
undertake if they are not informed front end. What we are
asking of them, I believe if we ask of them, they will respond
if we make our case, but I think we have got a little ways to
go here, and I am hopeful that we can in a bipartisan way
arrive at these conclusions.
I regret the statements that I read in the paper. I suspect
those statements related to the homeland security resolution,
and not to Iraq. They were ill-advised, no matter what they
related to, but they are probably not as bad as they appear,
but I just hope we kind of get beyond this. I wish everybody
would sort of calm down a little bit and we could all just take
this a piece at a time and work our way through this, and we
will arrive at the right conclusion, I have confidence in that,
but I would respectfully suggest we are not quite there yet,
and your testimony, Mr. McFarlane, has been insightful and
helpful, and it reflects a joint position, even though we may
start from different places.
You are of the school, like many other very bright people,
who say, going to the U.N. to seek this permission is not
necessary and probably counterproductive, and others say it is
essential to go to the U.N. first. Notwithstanding the fact
that there may be disagreement on that point, there is
agreement on the point that it is better to go with others if
we can. It is better to have others in on the deal for paying
the bill, if we can, and it is better to have at least some
support and/or the acquiescence of the rest of the world if we
can, but if we cannot get any of that, and our national
interests are still at stake, we must respond.
And so the question is to me, how do we get to the point
where we limit the downside as much as we can, and increase the
possible upside as much as we can, and that is what this is
about right now. I hope no one listening to this in a foreign
government or overseas thinks this reflects any fundamental
disagreement about Saddam, but it does reflect the natural and
necessary impulses of a democracy, to be able to determine what
we are about to do and make sure all are signing on to the same
deal.
My dad, who just passed away, used to say, ``I like to know
who is responsible so I know who to hold accountable.'' Well, I
think the American people have a right to know what we have in
mind before we ask them to sign on, and I thank you, Mr.
McFarlane, for being here. You have great experience. I thank
Ambassador Holbrooke.
Tomorrow, again, we have--unfortunately former Secretary of
State Eagleburger was to testify but he is ill, not seriously
ill, but he is unable to be here. There are no alarm bells. He
just has the flu, or something to that effect and is not able
to be here tomorrow. Our witness list will be made up of former
Secretary Albright, former Secretary Kissinger, as well as the
present Secretary of State, Colin Powell.
I do not intend that these, with the permission of my
Republican colleagues as well, to be the last hearings we are
going to have on this, but I do think it is important to have
the three Secretaries of State tomorrow, and I will pursue with
Senator Lugar his suggestion that this committee at least have
an opportunity to debate--not debate, but to have hearings on
whatever resolution we are going to be considering.
And I am not suggesting that we should not be able to be
discharged if we are unable to reach any conclusion. It is not
meant to be in any way an attempt to hold anything up, and I
further would suggest that the purpose of committees is to
allow all of our colleagues the benefit of having done some
serious spade work before we vote on important subjects. It
seems to me to be the responsibility of this committee to do
that. I will attempt to work with my colleague to do that.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, may I make one more, I hope
diplomatic comment, and that is, essentially all of us today,
whatever we have thought of past administrations or this one,
are really trying to ask questions in which we hope that there
is planning going on in our administration now on these
critical issues. We may not have been informed of it.
But on these questions of the numbers of people required in
Iraq, or the thoughtfulness about the Sunnis and the Shiites
and the implications of Iran and other countries, there are a
lot of very bright people in America, a good number of them I
am sure in the administration. The question is, has there been
a focus, and if so, I think we would appreciate in this
committee some sharing of that.
Now, some of it may be highly classified, or even the fact
that people are thinking about it is classified, but at some
point, historically, the American people are going to ask of
us, where were you when all of this went on, did you raise
these questions, and we would say, we just did not think of
that, we were fastened on something else.
I think the committee hearing today, aided by our two
witnesses, did think of a number of things, and both of us and
others have indicated we are using this forum almost to send
messages, and please, to do things.
I would just like to say, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the
spirit with which you have approached this hearing, as well as
others. Sort of clamoring outside of the committee room are
many who want comments as to whether the whole Iraq issue has
become viciously partisan, and so forth. The fact is that it
could be, but it should not.
The chairman is a candidate for reelection this year.
Fortunately, I am not, so I have the comfort zone at least of
that situation to say that I understand. People who are
involved in election campaigns, reading the analysis every day,
does Iraq supplant every other issue, or something of this
variety, may be tempted to get into some other analysis, but
thank goodness, that was not the case here, so I thank the
chairman, and I think the bipartisanship and the
nonpartisanship really with regard to this issue has been very
important, and that was true of our first two hearings, it was
true of this one, and it is important in terms of our own
credibility, because we are raising these questions with our
administration as well as the rest of the world.
If we do so from a degree of unity, why, obviously it is
highly, much more effective, so I thank the chairman.
The Chairman. We often kid about this, but it probably
hurts us both that at least you and I--not least, you and I
have been almost completely unified in this endeavor, as has
Senator Hagel and, I might add, if you notice way down the
other end there in terms of seniority is the Senator from
Florida who has, to the best of my knowledge, stayed for every
last drop of every hearing.
We are not attempting to be self-congratulatory. We are
trying to send a simple message. This committee, this Congress,
the people who have primary responsibility in this Congress for
at least presenting this debate are unified and are trying to
help, not be obstructionist. We are trying to help the
President in resolving a very difficult situation.
We all know--I have been here for almost 30 years, this
Senator has been here 28 years, if I am not mistaken.
Senator Lugar. Twenty-six.
The Chairman. We have been around a long time We understand
that no President is ever in a position where he has 100
percent of the information he needs to make a decision. We
understand that.
The only thing we want to know is that he has thought
through, the administration has thought through, even if the
answers are not available, has raised all the pertinent issues,
because--I keep saying how the American public has to be
informed. I want to be informed. I want to be informed before I
vote on these things.
Again, I thank you all. Bud, thank you for sitting through
our little dialog here, our conversation among ourselves. You
are very gracious to do that.
But again, this is not a divided committee. This is a
united committee in our effort to do what is right for this
country, and I have not a single doubt in my mind that the
three Senators here and the rest of the members of this
committee will do what we think is right, regardless of what we
think the political pressures are relative to each of our
political parties, and I think that is how everyone is going to
act.
This is too important. There are some things worth losing
elections over. There are some things worth losing elections
over. This is one of those things that is so big that, even if
it was going to be politically costly, we have no choice but to
do a thorough and deliberate job.
Again, I thank everyone. Thank you for your indulgence. We
are adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene at 10:30 a.m., September 26, 2002.]
NEXT STEPS IN IRAQ
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:35 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of
the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Sarbanes, Feingold, Wellstone,
Boxer, Bill Nelson, Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Frist, Chafee, Allen,
and Brownback.
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.
Starting in July, the committee has held a series of
hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq, and we have heard from a
broad range of experts and witnesses, former senior officials
on the basic questions before the country, which is, what
threat does Iraq pose to the United States? What are our
possible responses? How do our allies around the world and our
friends in the region see the problem? What would be our
responsibilities the day after? What is the goal that we have
here?
I think the President is dead right about the danger of
Saddam Hussein. The witnesses and my colleagues are tired of
hearing me say this. I think no matter how well formulated a
foreign policy, it will not be sustained very long without the
informed consent of the American people.
So one of the questions I have been asking is, at what
point, if it gets to this that we ``take down Saddam,'' do the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State turn to the
President and say, we are done here, Mr. President? We have met
our goals and we can go home. I think we should be talking
about that.
This morning we continue our inquiry with two Americans who
have had an extraordinary impact on our country's foreign
policy and security problems: former Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, and former Secretary of State Dr. Henry
Kissinger. This committee has heard from them on many occasions
in the past and I am pleased to welcome them both here again to
help us work through a difficult challenge posed by Iraq.
This afternoon we are going to hear from the current
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and I will have a lengthier
statement at that time.
For now, let me simply welcome our two witnesses and tell
them how pleased we are they are here for this important
process and yield to my very good friend from North Carolina,
Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
You have rung the bell this morning by bringing these two
leaders here this morning. I join in welcoming them here. If I
had been a little closer, I would have hugged you, but it is
hard to do it with a barricade like that.
We could not have, I think, two finer examples of
naturalized citizens. I have thought about that a lot. They are
a tribute to the opportunities offered by our country to all
citizens. And certainly I join you and the rest of the
committee in welcoming both of them.
An international consensus to rid the world once and for
all of Saddam Hussein is developing, I think, and the
President's speech to the General Assembly of the United
Nations 2 weeks ago presented the clearest possible case for
action against the Iraqi regime of Hussein.
Tony Blair. My affection for that guy just keeps increasing
because he has really stuck with us in thick and thin. His
speech and his report to the British Parliament also laid the
case out clearly and succinctly.
Yesterday Ambassador Holbrooke sat where you are sitting
this morning, ma'am. He called Turkey our indispensable NATO
ally. I could not agree more, and that country's assistance is
noteworthy.
The Washington Post reported last week that Qatar and
Jordan and Saudi Arabia are coming around, even at the expense
of criticism and possible--possible--unrest within their
jurisdictions.
In any case, it is certainly good to see you here this
morning, and all of us will be interested in your assessment of
the further steps we can take to solidify the key support of
our key allies. And I thank you for being here, both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Let me suggest to our witnesses something that we do not
often suggest. I am not asking you to be limited by time. This
is such an important issue. I mean this sincerely. We have two
incredibly knowledgeable people and we will benefit from
whatever time you think is necessary for you to make the points
that you make. So I am going to ask the staff not to turn on
the timer light and apologize to my colleagues. I do not expect
that the witnesses will take an inordinate amount of time, but
your statements are so important I do not want you to feel
rushed to say I am summarizing my statement in 3 minutes or 5
minutes and move from there, unless that is what you prefer to
do. I just want you to know we are anxious, truly anxious, to
hear from you both.
Only in order of recent occupants of the chair, I would
yield first to Secretary of State Albright and then to Dr.
Kissinger and then we will move to questions, if that is
appropriate and all right with my colleagues.
Senator Helms. Good.
The Chairman. Secretary Albright.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF
STATE, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and
Senator Helms, thank you for your kind comments. It is very
nice to see you.
I am delighted to be here as you exercise your patriotic
duty to ask questions about the substance and direction of
American policy toward Iraq. To me this committee is kind of
like a second home, and it is a special honor to be accompanied
by my very distinguished and charismatic predecessor and
especially very good friend.
I think I speak on behalf of both of us, Senator Helms,
that there is no greater honor than to serve this country,
especially for those of us who were not able to be born here
but have benefited from the great generosity of the American
people.
Mr. Chairman, the President's speech to the U.N. 2 weeks
ago paralleled many of the statements that I made when I served
as U.N. Ambassador and as Secretary of State. The details of
Saddam's noncompliance with Security Council resolutions were
not new, nor was the President's challenge for the Council to
respond firmly or face a forceful American response.
The difference now is that weapons inspectors have been
absent from Iraq for almost 4 years, and the risk that Saddam
Hussein will succeed in reconstituting deliverable weapons of
mass destruction has increased. It is in the interest not only
of the United States but also of the entire international
community to act.
So I strongly support the administration's decision to back
the return of U.N. inspectors to Iraq without any conditions.
The path of inspections is all too familiar, but it is worth
traveling one last time. If the Iraqis break their promise, the
case for military action will be stronger. If they keep it, the
U.N. inspection and monitoring regime will resume, and that is
good. Before the inspectors were kicked out, they had destroyed
more weapons of mass destruction capacity than the gulf war
itself had. Unfettered inspections and monitoring will make it
far harder for Iraq to continue developing advanced arms.
So we must be willing to take a ``yes'' for an answer. But
we must also be prepared for a negative response.
The President has asked Congress for the authority to use
all means necessary to enforce Iraq's compliance with U.N.
Security Council resolutions. He should have this authority and
members of the Security Council should join us in the
enforcement effort. And I refer particularly to permanent
Council members France, Russia, and China. You know, we speak
about the United Nations, but ultimately it is the individual
members who make the decision. These are the countries that
most vigorously promote the Council's prerogatives, and they
should be the countries most determined to see that its
resolutions are enforced.
If Saddam continues to behave like Saddam, we have
legitimate grounds for acting on behalf of the Security Council
to bring Iraq into compliance. This answers the question of why
a confrontation might be necessary.
It does not, however, answer two other questions. The first
is how and the second is when.
The question of how has two parts. One is military, which I
will leave to my friends in uniform. The other is the problem
of planning for a post-Saddam era. This is complicated because
we could be confronted with a no-win choice. One option might
be a prolonged U.S. military occupation of the country that
served as the cultural capital of Islam during that
civilization's Golden Age. This would hand a new organizing
tool to anti-American terrorists worldwide.
The other option is to withdraw promptly and risk plunging
the country into factionalism and civil war. It is naive to
think that a peaceful and democratic Iraq will automatically
emerge from the ashes of our invasion. It is crazy to believe
we can run post-war Iraq alone. And it is essential that the
administration think through the consequences of all this in
advance, which it is not evident to me that they have done. One
thing is certain. We may be able to win a war against Iraq
without a broad coalition. But there is no way we can win the
peace without help from many others.
As for when to confront Iraq, the answer should be at a
time of our own choosing. In making that choice, several
factors should be borne in mind.
As evil as Saddam Hussein is, he is not the reason anti-
aircraft guns ring this city and a Department of Homeland
Defense is being created. Saddam Hussein remains the enemy we
know. His military is far weaker than it was a decade ago, and
he knows that he will be obliterated if he ever tries to attack
another country again. As a rule, people who build statues to
themselves are not suicidal.
The more urgent threat remains al-Qaeda and related groups
because deterrence is ineffective against those who embrace
death. More than a year after September 11, only a handful of
al-Qaeda's top leaders have been eliminated and its funding
sources have not dried up. Terrorist attacks continue to take
place and al-Qaeda members are reportedly filtering back into
Afghanistan.
Defeating al-Qaeda is not a part-time job, and we will need
the sustained help of governments everywhere and especially in
the Islamic world. And we must make an undivided commitment of
our own military power, diplomatic capital, intelligence, and
law enforcement resources.
This is not the time or place for short attention spans.
The fight against al-Qaeda must remain our top priority.
I did note that yesterday, Dr. Rice in an interview talked
about the fact that they can now link some al-Qaeda people and
Iraq. This kind of information is just dribbling out and I am
not sure that we fully understand what it means or that we have
enough information about it. And I hope very much that that is
something that we can all explore.
In his memoirs, one of our most illustrious predecessors,
Secretary of State Acheson, wrote that it is sometimes
necessary to over-dramatize a threat in order to arouse public
support for a policy. This administration is now doing just
that by trying to claim September 11 as a primary reason to go
to war against Iraq. Officials say that September 11 created a
new reality, which is that terrorists might be able to obtain
weapons of mass destruction. That is, of course, a reality but
hardly a new one. There are perhaps half a dozen other
countries that are thought to have weapons of mass destruction
programs and links to terrorism that are at least as extensive
as Iraq's.
Certainly the danger is real, but eliminating Saddam will
not eliminate the threat. It might even make it worse if anti-
American extremists elsewhere are energized by an assault on
Baghdad.
There is a valid case for using force against Iraq, but
timing matters. At a minimum, the administration still needs to
develop a coalition, strengthen Iraqi opposition groups and
develop a coherent blueprint for the post-Saddam era. It must
also conduct diplomacy aimed at cooling tensions in the Middle
East and make certain that a war with Iraq does not result in
attacks against Israel and a broader regional conflict.
To buy this time, we should give notice that if U.N.
inspectors are again rebuffed by Iraq, we will destroy, without
warning, any facilities in that country we believe are being
used to develop prohibited arms. Even if those suspicions prove
wrong, the blame should fall on Iraq for denying access, not on
America for enforcing the Security Council's will.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, let me say that I expect Congress
to authorize the President to use force against Iraq. I hope,
however, that it will not be necessary to use the authority in
question. America must respond firmly to Saddam Hussein, but I
do not share the irrational exuberance for conflict that is
present among some pundits and perhaps even a few
administration officials. It is not an American trait to want
war, and it is not a sign of sound leadership to understate the
risks of war or to offer constantly shifting rationales, as
this administration has, for undertaking such a venture.
I also question the administration's wisdom in publicly
adding new and hegemonic language to our national security
strategy. This document brags unnecessarily about American
strength and gives ammunition to those who accuse us of
pursuing our interests without regard to international norms.
More than 200 years ago when the British Empire was at its
height, Edmund Burke wrote, ``I dread our own power and our own
ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded. We may say that
we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard of
power. But every other nation will think we shall abuse it.
Sooner or later, this must produce a combination against us
which may end in our ruin.''
Mr. Chairman, there is a gathering danger that America will
be perceived as a nation uninterested in the concerns of others
at the precise moment we most need global cooperation to fight
terrorism, proliferation, and menacing dictators such as Saddam
Hussein.
We must, therefore, be strong but also smart in
articulating the why, planing the how, and choosing the when of
actions directed against Iraq and other challenges we face. And
we must be clear not only about what America is against, but
what America is for. We are against terrorism and Saddam
Hussein; that is a given. But we are for democracy and
development, the rule of law and respect for human rights.
These priorities must not be lost amidst the sound and fury of
some parts of this present debate.
I salute you and the committee for these hearings because I
think that they are providing a very important place to debate,
as calmly as we can, what is the most difficult decision any
President and Congress has to make, to go to war.
I will not take more advantage of your time and hope very
much that a lot of the issues that we have will come up in
questions. I am very, very pleased now to turn the floor over
to my good friend, Secretary Kissinger. I am sure that he
agrees heartily with everything I have said.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Madeleine K. Albright, Former Secretary of
State
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am delighted to be here.
This Committee is like a second home, and it is a special honor to be
accompanied by my very distinguished predecessor and friend, Secretary
Kissinger.
Mr. Chairman, the President's speech to the UN two weeks ago
paralleled many of the statements I made when serving as UN Ambassador
and Secretary of State. The details of Saddam's noncompliance with
Security Council resolutions were not new. Nor was the President's
challenge for the Council to respond firmly or face the likelihood of a
forceful American response.
The difference now is that weapons inspectors have been absent from
Iraq for almost four years. The risk that Saddam Hussein will succeed
in reconstituting deliverable weapons of mass destruction has
increased. It is in the interests not only of the United States, but
also of the entire international community to act.
So I strongly support the Administration's decision to back the
return of UN inspectors to Iraq. The path of inspections is all too
familiar, but it is worth traveling one last time. If the Iraqis break
their promise, the case for military action will be stronger. If they
keep it, the UN inspection and monitoring regime will resume, and that
is good. Before the inspectors were kicked out, they had destroyed more
weapons of mass destruction capacity than the Gulf War. Unfettered
inspections and monitoring will make it far harder for Iraq to continue
developing advanced arms.
So we must be willing to take ``yes'' for an answer. But we must
also be prepared for a negative response.
The President has asked Congress for the authority to use all means
necessary to enforce Iraq's compliance with UN Security Council
Resolutions, the most important of which requires Baghdad to destroy
its weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missile programs.
The President should have this authority, and members of the
Security Council should join us in the enforcement effort. I refer
particularly to permanent Council Members France, Russia and China.
These are the countries that most vigorously promote the Council's
prerogatives. They should be the countries most determined to see that
its Resolutions are enforced.
If Saddam continues to behave like Saddam, we have legitimate
grounds for acting on behalf of the Security Council to bring Iraq into
compliance. This answers the question of ``why'' a confrontation might
be necessary. As President Clinton said almost four years ago, the
Iraqi leader threatens ``the security of the world,'' and the ``best
way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi
government.''
This does not, however, answer two other questions. The first is
``how'' and the second is ``when.''
The question of ``how'' has two parts. One is military, which I
will leave to my friends in uniform. The other is the problem of
planning for the post-Saddam era. This is complicated because we could
be confronted with a no-win choice. One option might be a prolonged
U.S. military occupation of the country that served as the cultural
capital of Islam during that civilization's Golden Age. This would hand
a new organizing tool to anti-American terrorists worldwide.
The other option is to withdraw promptly and risk plunging the
country into factionalism and civil war. It is naive to think that a
peaceful and democratic Iraq will automatically emerge from the ashes
of our invasion. It is crazy to believe we can run post-war Iraq alone.
And it is essential that the Administration think the consequences of
all this through in advance, which it has not yet done. One thing is
certain. We may be able to win a war against Iraq without a broad
coalition. But there is no way we can win the peace without help from
many others.
As for ``when'' to confront Iraq, the answer should be at a time of
our own choosing. In making that choice, several factors should be
borne in mind.
As evil as Saddam Hussein is, he is not the reason anti-aircraft
guns ring this city, a Department of Homeland Defense is being created,
and the phrases ``ground zero,'' ``Let's roll'' and ``9-1-1'' have
acquired new meanings.
Saddam Hussein remains the enemy we know. Since the administration
of former President George H.W. Bush, each time Mr. Hussein has pushed,
we have pushed back. Today, American and British planes enforce no-
flight zones over 40 percent of his country and a maritime force
prevents weapons from reaching Iraq by sea. Saddam Hussein's military
is far weaker than it was a decade ago. And he knows that he will be
obliterated if he ever tries to attack another country again. As a
rule, people who build statues to themselves are not suicidal.
The more urgent threat remains Al-Qaeda and related groups, because
deterrence is ineffective against those who embrace death. More than a
year after September 11, only a handful of Al-Qaeda's top leaders have
been eliminated. Its funding sources have not dried up. Terrorist
attacks continue to take place. And Al-Qaeda members are reportedly
filtering back into Afghanistan where thousands of Taliban hide in
plain sight, and the international community has failed to establish a
meaningful security presence outside Kabul.
Defeating Al-Qaeda is not a part time job. We will need the
sustained help of governments everywhere, and especially in the Islamic
world. And we must make an undivided commitment of our own military
power, diplomatic capital, intelligence and law enforcement resources.
This is not the time or place for short attention spans. The fight
against Al-Qaeda must remain our top priority.
In his Memoirs, former Secretary of State Acheson wrote that it is
sometimes necessary to over-dramatize a threat in order to arouse
public support. This Administration is now doing just that by trying to
claim September 11 as a primary reason to go to war against Iraq.
Officials say that September 11 created a ``new reality,'' which is
that terrorists might be able to obtain weapons of mass destruction.
That is, of course, a reality--but hardly a new one. And there are
perhaps half a dozen other countries that are thought to have weapons
of mass destruction programs and links to terrorism that are at least
as extensive as Iraq's.
Certainly, the danger is real, but eliminating Saddam will not
eliminate the threat, and might even make it worse if anti-American
extremists elsewhere are strengthened by an assault on Baghdad.
Unlike the Gulf War, which was paid for largely by others, a war
with Iraq will be paid for by us, and could cost anywhere from sixty to
two hundred billion dollars in direct costs, not to mention what the
mere prospect of war is doing to our economy. Congress should consider
whether our country would be more secure using those funds to intensify
the pursuit of Al-Qaeda, secure Russia's nuclear arsenal, strengthen
homeland defense, improve public diplomacy, and transform Afghanistan
into a permanent terrorist-free zone.
As I said, there is a valid case for using force against Iraq, if
that is needed to ensure disarmament under UN Security Council
Resolutions. But timing matters.
At a minimum, the Administration still needs to develop a
coalition, strengthen Iraqi opposition groups, fine-tune military
planning, develop a coherent blueprint for the post-Saddam era, and
identify the resources required to fund the war. It must also conduct
diplomacy aimed at cooling tensions in the Middle East, and make
certain that war with Iraq does not result in attacks against Israel
and a broader regional conflict.
To buy this time, we should give notice that if UN inspectors are
again rebuffed by Iraq, we will destroy without warning any facilities
in that country we believe are being used to develop prohibited arms.
Even if those suspicions prove wrong, the blame should fall on Iraq for
denying access, not on America for enforcing the Security Council's
will.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, let me say that I expect Congress to
authorize the President to use force against Iraq. I hope, however,
that Senators will continue to exercise their patriotic duty to ask
hard questions. And that the language of the Resolution will be drawn
more narrowly than the Administration's draft, which includes an
authorization of force unrelated to any specific countries, threats,
American interests or periods of time.
I also hope it will not be necessary to use the authority in
question. America must respond firmly to Saddam Hussein and it may be
necessary to wage war to remove him. But I do not share the irrational
exuberance for this conflict that is present among some pundits and
perhaps even a few Administration officials. That enthusiasm is not
shared by many in our military or among professional diplomats. It is
not an American trait to want war. And it is not a sign of sound
leadership to understate the risks of war, or to offer constantly
shifting rationales--as this Administration has--for undertaking such a
venture.
I also question the Administration's wisdom in publicly adding new
and ostentatiously hegemonic language to our national security
strategy. This document brags unnecessarily about American strength,
and gives ammunition to those who accuse us of pursuing our interests
without regard to international norms.
More than 200 years ago, when the British Empire was at its height,
Edmund Burke wrote, ``I dread our own power and our own ambition; I
dread our being too much dreaded . . . We may say that we shall not
abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard of power. But every other
nation will think we shall abuse it. Sooner or later, this must produce
a combination against us which may end in our ruin.''
Mr. Chairman, there is a gathering danger that America will be
perceived as a nation uninterested in the concerns of others at the
precise moment we most need global cooperation to fight terrorism,
proliferation and menacing dictators such as Saddam Hussein.
We must, therefore, be strong but also smart in articulating the
``why,'' planning the ``how,'' and choosing the ``when'' of actions
directed against Iraq and other challenges we face. And we must be
clear not only about what America is against, but also about what
America is for. We are against terrorism and Saddam Hussein; that is a
given. But we are for democracy and development, the rule of law and
respect for human rights. These priorities must not be lost amidst the
sound and fury of the present debate.
Thank you for your attention. I will be pleased to respond to any
questions you may have.
The Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, you are probably the single
most listened-to voice in the last 30 years in American foreign
policy. It is an honor to have you here and it is a pleasure.
It is almost 30 years to the day since the first time I met you
at a similar hearing. At least we have now got each other's
names straight. It is a long story. But at any rate, welcome,
Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Secretary. Happy to have you here.
STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
STATE, CEO, KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, INC., NEW YORK, NY
Secretary Kissinger. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, good morning. Like Madeleine, I would like to
express my pleasure at being here. I have the recollections of
many meetings in this room, of the different chairmen and of
the issues that have deeply affected our country.
Madeleine and I have been friends for decades and we have
discussed these problems between us--when we were in office,
when one of us was in office and when both of us were out of
office. And as she pointed out, we share the experience of
having had the great good luck of finding refuge in this
country and safety from totalitarianism. That then also created
a very special sense of obligation and concern for the role
that America plays in the world.
The Senate and the Congress have been asked to express
themselves on what action the United States should take to deal
with the threat being posed by the illegal stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and by their potential
growth.
President Bush has reaffirmed America's commitment to a
cooperative world order by asking the United Nations to rectify
Iraq's defiance of a large number of United Nations resolutions
mandating the destruction of these stockpiles, as well as
Iraq's flagrant breach of its pledge to do so as a condition
for the suspension of the gulf war in 1991. If, by fudging its
response, the world community opts to face the risk of an even
greater threat in the future, the issue becomes one of whether
America and a coalition of the like-minded should acquiesce to
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
I do not believe that the issue of America acting alone
will arise. Whatever happens, a significant number of countries
will support, and maybe a larger number will welcome, an
American action. I think that Secretary Albright and I agree
that the authority for such action already exists in the form
of previous resolutions whether or not the U.N. passes another
resolution.
But there is a question as to the when and the how. I would
like to stress, first that there is an integral connection
between the Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and
the terrorist threat. I do not believe it is possible to
separate these two issues or to deal with them in sequence. For
how we deal with Iraq will affect our ability to deal with the
terrorist threat.
On September 11, 2001, the world entered a new period.
Private, non-state organizations had undertaken threats to
national and international security by stealth attacks. Highly
disciplined operatives were scattered around the globe, some on
the soil of America's closest allies and of even America
itself. Having no territory to defend, these terrorists are not
subject to the deterrent threats familiar to us from the cold
war. Having as their aim the destruction of social cohesion,
they are not interested in the conciliating procedures and
compromises of traditional diplomacy.
Modern technology in the service of terror gives no
warning; its perpetrators are capable of inflicting
catastrophic damage and vanishing with the act of commission.
The relationship of international politics to the traditional
notions of sovereignty is inherent in the nature of the
challenge, therefore also to the accumulation of weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq. Moreover, violation of U.N.
resolutions cannot be separated from the war against terrorism.
In the cold war world there was a degree of uniformity in
the assessment of risk between the two nuclear sides. But when
many different states threaten each other for incongruent
purposes and when they acquire weapons of mass destruction, who
is to do the deterring and in the face of what provocation?
This is especially true when what has to be deterred is not
simply the use of weapons of mass destruction, but the threat
of them.
In the discussion that is going on today, one hears a great
deal of talk about the danger that American and allied action
might provoke the use of existing stockpiles of weapons of mass
destruction against Saudi Arabia, Israel, or other targets. But
if that is a danger today, how much more of a danger will it be
some years from now? What this illustrates is the complexity of
the challenge rather than the obstacle to dealing with it now.
Therefore, when the question is asked, why now, I would
like to ask the question, why not now? What is the reason for
not dealing with it?
Global terrorism cannot flourish without the support of
states that either sympathize with or acquiesce in its actions.
To the extent that these countries observe the flouting of
United Nations resolutions, the weakening of international
norms, and the defiance of America, they feel less restrained
in acquiescing to or ignoring terrorist activities. For nations
of the world to accept the presence of growing stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction in the very region where this new
form of terrorism originated, is to undermine restraint with
respect to not only weapons proliferation but the psychological
impulse toward terrorism altogether.
In short, the continuation of illegal proliferation and the
global dangers that involves, the rejection or unfeasibility of
establishing a viable inspection system, and the however subtle
growth of terrorism require action--preferably by the
international community but, as an ultimate resort, by America
together with those countries prepared to support it.
It is argued, and has been argued by my friend, that
dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq weakens the
war against terrorism. It is not clear to me what measures
required in the war against terrorism would be either
interrupted or weakened by actions that might may be imposed on
us if it is not possible to do away with the stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq by other means.
One can make the opposite argument, that by showing our
determination to prevent such threats, we strengthen the war
against terrorism.
At any rate, my basic point is that the two issues are so
closely related that they cannot be separated, and that the
attempt to separate them will make it difficult to achieve
either. The war against terrorism will take many years. Dealing
with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq cannot wait for many
years. So one can only really argue about the number of months
by which one can defer action.
At the same time, while reserving the option to act in
concert only with those nations it can convince to join the
effort, I strongly support the United States' appeal to
cooperative action by the world community. As the most powerful
nation in this world, the United States has a special,
unilateral, capacity--indeed, obligation--to take the lead in
the implementation of its convictions. But it also has a
special obligation to justify its actions by principles that
transcend the assertion of preponderant power. It cannot be
either in the American national interest or in the world's
interest to develop principles that grant every nation an
unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of
threats to its security.
The case for enforcement of established resolutions derives
from the special danger Iraq poses by its violations of the
United Nations resolutions. This does not require a universal
principle. Indeed, I would favor a discussion, led by the
United States, of those principles of preemption that are
compatible with the operation of an international system
separate from the case of Iraq which does not require such a
debate.
Second, if military action against Iraq is unavoidable, it
becomes most important to address the issues of reconstruction
and the future of the region.
Iraq is a country of strategic importance to the
equilibrium of the region. It is composed of a combination of
at least three, and maybe several more, ethnic groups. A
Federal system enabling these groups to live together without
domination and oppression is surely desirable, but how this can
be achieved and with what degree of American involvement, is a
matter that requires serious thought.
Moreover, I believe that, when military action proves
necessary, however many nations hesitate to support it
explicitly, we will encounter a larger degree of support by
inviting them to join a program of post-war reconstruction,
which I believe is in the interest of the region and in the
interest of the world.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Congress has an
opportunity to vindicate a system of international order. I
urge you to give the President the authority to enforce the
appropriate U.N. resolutions, together with the world
community, if at all possible, in concert with like-minded
nations if necessary. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Kissinger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Henry A. Kissinger, Former Secretary of
State
Mr. Chairman: Congress is considering one of the most consequential
expressions of its views since the end of the Cold War: what action the
United States should take to deal with the threat posed by illegal
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and their potential
growth. President Bush has reaffirmed America's commitment to a
cooperative world order by asking the United Nations to rectify Iraq's
defiance of a large number of U.N. resolutions mandating the
destruction of these stockpiles as well as Iraq's flagrant breach of
its pledge to do so as a condition for the suspension of the Gulf War
in 1991. But were the world community, by fudging its response, to opt
for the risk of a greater threat in the future, can America and a
coalition of the like-minded acquiesce in stockpiles of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq? Thus the Committee will need to consider not only
the risk of action but also the consequences of inaction.
The Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction will be growing
in an international environment in which their danger merges with the
threat of terrorism. For on September 11, 2001, the world entered a new
period in which private, non-state organizations undertook to threaten
national and international security by stealth attacks. The controversy
about preemption is a symptom of the impact of this transformation. At
bottom, it is a debate between the traditional notion of sovereignty of
the nation-state prevalent since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and
the adaptation required by both modern technology and the nature of the
terrorist threat.
Osama bin Laden's base was on the territory of a national state,
though his was not a national cause. Highly disciplined operatives are
scattered around the globe, some on the soil of America's closest
allies and even within America itself. They enjoy financial and
organizational support from a number of states--most frequently from
private individuals ostensibly not under the control of their
governments. Bases for terrorists have been established in several
countries, usually in areas where the governments can plausibly deny
control or are actually not in control, such as in Yemen, Somalia, or
perhaps Indonesia and Iran. Having no territory to defend, the
terrorists are not subject to the deterrent threats of the Cold War;
having as their aim the destruction of social cohesion, they are not
interested in the conciliating procedures and compromises of
traditional diplomacy.
Unlike the previous centuries, when the movement of armies
foreshadowed threat, modern technology in the service of terror gives
no warning, and its perpetrators vanish with the act of commission. And
since these attacks are capable of inflicting catastrophic damage,
traditional notions of sovereignty have to be modified with respect to
countries that harbor terrorist headquarters or terrorist training
centers. The problem of preemption is inherent in the nature of the
terrorist challenge.
The accumulation of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in
violation of U.N. resolutions cannot be separated from the post-
Afghanistan phase of the war against terrorism. Iraq is located in the
midst of a region that has been the hotbed of the special type of
global terrorist activity from which the attack on the United States
was organized. And the consequences of weapons of mass destruction have
many similarities to those of terrorism. They can be used without
warning; their impact is catastrophic. In some circumstances, their
origin can be uncertain. If the world is not to turn into a doomsday
machine, a way must be found to prevent proliferation--especially to
rogue states whose governments have no restraint on the exercise of
their power.
Cold War principles of deterrence are almost impossible to
implement when there is a multiplicity of states, some of them
harboring terrorists in position to wreak havoc. The Cold War world
reflected a certain uniformity in the assessment of risk between the
nuclear sides. But when many states threaten each other for incongruent
purposes, who is to do the deterring, and in the face of what
provocation? This is especially true when that which must be deterred
is not simply the use of weapons of mass destruction but the threat of
them.
Suicide bombing has shown that the calculations of jihad fighters
are not those of the Cold War leaders. The concern that war with Iraq
could unleash Iraqi weapons of mass destruction on Israel and Saudi
Arabia is a demonstration of how even existing stockpiles of weapons
turn into instruments of blackmail and self-deterrence. Procrastination
is bound to magnify such possibilities.
The existence and, even more, the growth of stockpiles of weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq poses a threat to international peace and
stability. The issue is not primarily whether Iraq was involved in the
terrorist attack on the United States. The challenge of Iraq is
essentially geopolitical and psychological. Its policy is implacably
hostile to the United States, to neighboring countries, and to
established rules that govern relations among nations. It possesses
growing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam
Hussein has used in the war against Iran and on his own population.
Iraq is working again to develop a nuclear capability. Saddam Hussein
breached his commitment to the United Nations by preventing the
operation of the international inspection system he had accepted on his
territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War. There
is no possibility of a direct negotiation between Washington and
Baghdad and no basis for trusting Iraq's promises to the international
community. By what reasoning can the world community--or America--
acquiesce in this state of affairs?
If these capabilities remain intact, they will become an
instrument--actual and symbolic--for the destabilization of a volatile
region. And if Saddam Hussein's regime survives both the Gulf War and
the anti-terrorism campaign, this fact alone will compound the existing
terrorist menace.
By its defiance of the U.N. Security Council resolutions requiring
it to give up weapons of mass destruction, Iraq has in effect asserted
the determination to possess weapons whose very existence compounds the
terrorist threat immeasurably. Global terrorism cannot flourish except
with the support of states that either sympathize or acquiesce in its
actions. To the extent that these countries observe the flouting of
U.N. resolutions, the weakening of international norms, and the
defiance of America, they feel less restrained in acquiescing in or
ignoring terrorist activities. For the nations of the world to accept
the existence of growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction
where the new form of terrorism has been spawned is to undermine
restraint with respect not only to weapons proliferation but to the
psychological impulse toward terrorism altogether.
The campaign in Afghanistan was an important first step. But if it
remains the principal move in the war against terrorism, it runs the
risk of petering out into an intelligence operation while the rest of
the region gradually slides back to the pre-9/11 pattern, with radicals
encouraged by the demonstration of the world's hesitation and moderates
demoralized by the continuation of an unimpaired Iraq as an aggressive
regional power. In short, the continuation of illegal proliferation,
the global dangers which it involves, the rejection or infeasibility of
a viable inspection system, and the growth of terrorism require action,
preferably global, but as an ultimate resort of America's, together
with those countries prepared to support it.
It is argued that dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
weakens the war against terrorism. The opposite is more likely to be
true. Eliminating such weapons in Iraq is an important aspect of the
second phase of the anti-terrorism campaign. It demonstrates American
determination to get at the root causes and some of the ultimate
capabilities of what is, in essence, a crusade against free values.
Enforcing U.N. resolutions in Iraq does not compete with the
capabilities needed to pursue the second phase of the anti-terrorism
campaign. In all likelihood, such action will strengthen it by
additional deployments to the region.
Nor should it weaken the cooperation of other countries in the
anti-terror campaign. Assisting in this effort is not a favor other
countries do for the United States but ultimately for themselves. And
what exactly will they decline to support without risking their entire
relationship to the United States? The fight against terrorism will
take many years. To wait for its end before acting is to guarantee that
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction multiply.
At the same time, while reserving the option to act in concert with
only the nations it can convince, the United States is wise to appeal
to cooperative action of the world community. As the most powerful
nation in the world, the United States has a special unilateral
capacity and, indeed, obligation to lead in implementing its
convictions. But it also has a special obligation to justify its
actions by principles that transcend the assertions of preponderant
power. It cannot be in either the American national interest or the
world's interest to develop principles that grant every nation an
unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats to
its security. The case for enforcement of established resolutions
should be the opening move in a serious effort of consultation to
develop fundamental principles that other nations can consider in the
general interest.
The United Nations is therefore challenged to come up with a
control system that eliminates existing weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq--together with procedures to prevent their being rebuilt. The
control system must go far beyond the inspection system negated by
Saddam Hussein's evasions and violations. It must prevent any
possibility for local authorities to harass informants or to impede
free access to the inspectors. It should be backed by standby authority
and perhaps a standby force to remove any obstacle to transparency.
Moreover, any system of inspection must be measured against the decline
in vigilance that accompanied the previously flawed system's operation.
Nor can it be achieved at the price of lifting sanctions while Saddam
Hussein stays in office. For that would provide the Iraqi regime with
the means of rearmament as a reward for ending its violations. Indeed,
the rigorous measures required to implement the U.N.'s own resolutions
are almost surely incompatible with Hussein's continuation in power.
In the end, enforcement of U.N. resolutions should be coupled with
a program of reconstruction for Iraq. Because of the precedent-setting
nature of this war, its outcome will determine the way U.S. actions
will ultimately be viewed. And we may find more nations willing to
cooperate in reconstruction than in enforcement, if only because no
country wants to see an exclusive position for America in a region so
central to international political and economic stability.
Reconstruction will require dealing with how to preserve the unity
and ensure the territorial integrity of a country that is an essential
component of any Gulf equilibrium. A federal system to enable the
Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish ethnic groups of Iraq to live together
without domination by one of them is surely appropriate. But any
serious planning would have to consider the means to prevent autonomy
from turning to independence, which, in the case of the Kurds, would
put Turkish support for the military phase at risk. And all this would
have to take place in the context of a government capable of resisting
pressures from the remnants of the old regime or from neighboring
countries determined to destabilize the emerging system.
The United States has put forward a reasoned definition of the
dangers: the possession of weapons of mass destruction by governments
that have demonstrated their willingness to use them, have professed
hostility toward America or its allies, and are not restrained by
domestic institutions. Can the world community reject that definition
of the danger?
However the issue of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is
resolved, the longer-range goal must be to devise a system for dealing
with new attempts by additional countries to acquire weapons of mass
destruction or biological and chemical weapons. We are only at the
beginning of the threat of global proliferation. The nations of the
world must face the impossibility of letting such a process run
unchecked. The United States would contribute much to a new
international order if it invited the rest of the world, and especially
the major nuclear powers, to cooperate in creating a system to deal
with this challenge to humanity on a more institutional basis.
Congress has an opportunity to vindicate a system of international
order. I urge you to give the President the authority to enforce the
appropriate U.N. resolutions together with the world community if at
all possible, in concert with like-minded nations if necessary.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
With the permission of Senator Helms, we will go 7-minutes
rounds. Does that make sense?
Senator Helms. Yes, sir. That would be fine.
The Chairman. Let me again thank you both.
There are a number of questions, as you can tell by the
attendance here. I would like to focus on just one aspect, and
I apologize for being parochial in the sense of articulating my
view.
I arrive at the same spot that you both do, which is that
it is not a question of if, it is a question of when and how we
deal with this problem of Saddam Hussein. I for one think that
the distinction made by Dr. Kissinger is a very important one
and implied by the comments of Secretary Albright, that we need
not yield to a newly and not fully articulated doctrine of
preemption to justify action against Saddam Hussein.
I am operating on the premise that I am likely to be faced
with voting for a resolution that I think is not a good
resolution, because I believe that the President will not go
alone. I believe there are other nations in the world, whether
it is a Kosovo model or a U.N. model, that we will not be
alone. And I am quite confident of that. But I do worry about a
resolution that sets a precedent for future Presidents,
Democrat and Republican, that they will be able to turn,
assuming I am here after November, and say, well, Biden, you
voted for a resolution that said the following.
We all have a resolution in front of us that I think is so
broad, and unnecessarily broad, without articulating the
rationale for action and a conclusion that I have reached, as a
matter of policy, that the President should be in a position to
be able to enforce the U.N. resolutions, preferably with the
U.N. stepping up to the ball, clearly with some outside help,
but if need be, reserving the right to enforce them alone.
But we have kind of put the cart before the horse here in a
sense. The President keeps saying that he has not made a
decision about war. I believe him. He said that privately and
he said that publicly. Yet, he is asking us for an equivalent
of a declaration of war. I cannot think of any time in American
history where there has been a resolution sought authorizing
the use of force at the discretion of the President against an
individual country before the President has come to the
American people and us and said, this is what I intend to do.
That disturbs me.
It further disturbs me that there is no clear articulation
as it relates to precedent, based on the administration
witnesses, as to what the legal rationale for action is. In the
Armed Services Committee, some of the testimony was, as I
understand it--I did not attend at all, but just on the reading
of the news excerpts--that it fits within this doctrine of
preemption.
I for one would like to see a resolution make it clear that
that is not the basis upon which we are giving the President
authority, adopting a non-articulated or, I think, poorly
articulated doctrine of preemption that warrants the debate Dr.
Kissinger refers to, led by the United States, as to whether or
not the world should change its attitude.
If I am not mistaken, you have pointed out, Dr. Kissinger,
it was back as far as the first half of the 1600s that after
the religious wars, we agreed on a modus operandi of how we
proceed, as to what constitutes a legitimate action on the part
of one nation state moving against another nation state. And to
change that blithely is, I think, a very dangerous precedent.
So it leads me, believe it or not, to a question coming
from a Senator who is likely to vote for what is probably going
to be an imperfect resolution, but because I think the
President should be in a position to be able to enforce the
U.N. resolutions.
Now, here is my question. Given the sequence of events that
got us to this moment, this hearing, and the primary rationale
being offered by the administration at the moment for wanting
us to act, the U.S. Congress, is that it strengthens his hand
at the United Nations to get the United Nations to do the thing
that they should do, and that is jointly enforce a violation of
what effectively are the conditions of surrender of a country
that invaded another country, lost the war, and agreed to a set
of conditions in the wake of that loss, the U.N. resolutions,
and that this would strengthen the President's hand.
If that is the case--and I think it is a legitimate case--
then it seems to me we should be saying to the President in a
resolution, Mr. President, we authorize you to act in
conjunction with a U.N. resolution, a Security Council
resolution, authorizing force in the absence of Saddam agreeing
to unfettered inspection. And if the Security Council does not
give you that or if that is granted through the Security
Council and Saddam resists, then we authorize you, with some
further conditions, to use force independently if need be.
Can either of you tell me why that is not a more rational
way for us to do this in terms of making two cases? One, giving
the President sufficient authority; and two, not leaving the
impression around the world and allowing us to be subject to
the criticism that comes from many quarters of the world that
we are ignoring international law, that we are ignoring the
United Nations, that we are acting independently and we are
acting without any serious consideration of what the rest of
the world thinks.
Because nobody that I know suggests we can win the second
war--and I agree they are inseparable, although there is no
evidence that al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein were united in their
effort in 9/11, none that I have heard, no matter what is
implied, none that I have heard. We need the cooperation of the
intelligence services from Beijing to Moscow, to Berlin, to
Singapore in order to win that second fight.
So in the waning seconds of my time here, would it not be a
better way to sequence, not condition, but to sequence any
resolution we have, rather than give a broad declaration to the
President, when you have in the New York Times today, whether
it is true or not, an article saying that there is a
disagreement still within the administration as to whether or
not we want the U.N. involved and one unnamed spokesperson
saying, all we need is the congressional declaration and we can
go? It does not matter what the U.N. does.
Can you speak to that? I realize that is a long question,
but it is fairly basic. Does it make more sense to sequence,
not condition? Or should we just go the other way?
Secretary Albright. If I might, Mr. Chairman. I think you
have asked a key question here because it goes to the
relationship between the role of Congress and our participation
in an international organization.
I have I think the dubious honor on having spent more time
dealing on Iraqi resolutions, both as U.N. Ambassador and as
Secretary of State, than anybody else. When I went to New York
first in 1993, we had these resolutions on the table, and we
worked very hard to try to get compliance with them through a
variety of means, which I will not go through, that you all
know. I am the first one to testify to the fact that it gets
harder and harder to get coordination and compliance by
everybody on the Security Council. It was there initially. It
is harder and harder to get. But when you get it, it is a
really big deal because it does allow you to have more
legitimacy behind the way you operate abroad.
Obviously, when you cannot get it, as we did not on Kosovo,
we took another route, but at least we could see whether we
were trying that particular approach.
If I might just say this, when I sat at the United Nations,
I used to sit there and think, in my political science
professor mode, that this is the most fascinating thing in the
world, that you actually are talking about what is going on
inside another country and that you have the right to do that.
That is a very different concept that came into existence. And
as Secretary Kissinger said, we are in a very different phase
where there are non-state actors and you have to look at things
in a different way. Nobody is denying the complication of this.
But it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that your suggestion
makes a great deal of sense. I also know that when I was at the
U.N. and as Secretary, it helps a lot when you have the power
of Congress behind you. It is a big plus in your pocket. So I
think a resolution--I am not going to get into the wording of
it--makes sense.
The Chairman. No, I am not either. Just conceptually.
Secretary Albright. But the other thing I must say that
bothers me, if I might say this, I think we are loading too
much onto this issue. There are many people within or outside
the administration that had a different agenda from the very
beginning, and I think they are finding this, in some ways, a
useful horse.
And I think the issue of preemption is a huge issue, and I
would definitely agree with Secretary Kissinger that it is
worth discussing. It is a huge deal. It is a totally different
way of operating. It is one thing for self-defense, and I think
that becomes a complicated issue of how quickly do you move
when you believe you are being attacked. But I think to load
this issue now with a major discussion of change in our whole
strategic policy is a mistake, and I think we need to deal with
this issue as you have presented it, and as I have heard the
discussion. But we do not need to load it with ideological
issues that had nothing to do with this in the first place.
The Chairman. Dr. Kissinger.
Secretary Kissinger. When the President spoke at the
General Assembly, he did not base the case on a general
doctrine of preemption. He based the case on Iraq's violations
of a whole series of U.N. resolutions and agreements related to
the gulf war.
The Chairman. I agree.
Secretary Kissinger. Therefore, the issue of preemption is
inherent in the terrorist challenge because there you have non-
state actors operating from the territory of states in pursuit
of objectives that go beyond national borders.
However, this is not an issue that needs to be settled
theoretically now. To justify action against Iraq, it is
sufficient to examine the behavior of Iraq and the systematic
violation of its undertakings and of the U.N. resolutions.
Second, in order to establish a relationship between
terrorism and violations of U.N. resolutions on Iraq, it is not
necessary to demonstrate a specific connection between al-Qaeda
and Iraq. It is sufficient to point out that one of the motives
of the terrorist groups is to convey their belief that the will
of the West and of the United States is flagging and that they
can assert their claims by ruthless demonstration of power. And
to the extent that a country is surrounded by nations
acquiescing to or helping terrorism explicitly, it is getting
away with a violation of the international system. Overall, the
psychological support for terrorism will only grow.
I believe that the two issues cannot be separated because
of that psychological and geopolitical connection. It is also
why I believe that taking action on the violation of U.N.
resolutions is part and parcel of the war against terrorism,
independent of whether al-Qaeda had--or has--connections in
Baghdad, of which I have no personal knowledge.
I should also think that the media tend to emphasize
whatever disagreements may exist at middle- and lower-levels.
My impression--and the Secretary of State will, undoubtedly,
express himself more convincingly on this than I can--is that,
on the basic principles we are discussing here, the
administration is indeed united and that the basic principles
we are discussing here are in the fundamental national
interest.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a give
and take between these two distinguished Americans. Do you
agree with Secretary Kissinger, Ma'am?
Secretary Albright. Well, I agree with part of what he has
said. I think that there certainly is the question, the way he
has redefined it, on preemption that makes sense to me, that it
is important to have a discussion about it, but not apply it to
this, and that there are, in fact, legitimate resolutions that
are already in place.
I have a disagreement, somewhat, not in the fact that what
is going on in Iraq is terrorism and that it links to terrorism
generally, but that I am concerned about the timing on this
because, as Chairman Biden said, there are certain aspects of
the war against terrorism that require cooperation, even among
countries that we do not particularly agree with, on
intelligence, on tracking the money of al-Qaeda and Osama bin
Laden, and on law enforcement when the people come into their
various territories. And I think this is not the time to
disrupt that.
I think one of the things--actually Henry and I have talked
about this a lot--we do talk to each other. And by the way, may
I say the only time that there was not disagreement between the
State Department and the White House was when Henry Kissinger
was both National Security Advisor and Secretary of State.
Otherwise, it is hard wired.
But I think that there is this question about what is the
right timing on this. What you pointed out, Henry, is that
having unsheathed the sword here, if we in fact do not use it
immediately, do we lose credibility? I do not think so because
I hope very much that we would continue to be robust in our
fighting of terrorism in Afghanistan, where I pointed out we
have not finished, and also make clear what we believe in. So I
hope we are not in this position, having threatened, that we
cannot take a measured approach to what we are doing.
Secretary Kissinger. Could I make two points?
Senator Helms. Yes, sir.
Secretary Kissinger. First, when one talks about timing,
when is there a better time to deal with Iraq than at this
moment, when the major nations of the Security Council are not
in open opposition to us and can be brought along? Above all,
the war against terrorism will take many years. The decision
one has to make is whether to wait, permitting the growth of
stockpiles for many more years until one has to address the
issue under quite different international circumstances.
Second, when nations help in the fight against terrorism,
they are not just helping us; they are helping themselves.
Russia has a major interest in not permitting fundamentalism to
become a dominant force in the Muslim world. The war against
terrorism must be conducted on the basis of its protagonists
having common interest, rather than looked at as if it were a
special challenge to the United States. To the extent that
other nations believe in the importance of a strong America,
they will not stop cooperating with us on something that is so
much in their own interest, because after all we are enforcing
U.N. resolutions.
I do believe that we must go through a process that is now
already underway and which will make clear what support we can
generate and what coalitions we can create. I am sure the
Secretary of State will talk about this in the afternoon.
Secretary Albright. I think that I do not believe, nor did
I say, that the war on terrorism would have to be finished.
First of all, I think it will not be finished for a long time.
It is unfortunately what we have to live with for most of our
lives and our children's lives. So there can be no termination
to our effort on it.
But I think that we are in a crucial phase as far as
finishing the job in Afghanistan. Just to use an image here, I
think that we do have Saddam in a box, a strategic box. We do
not know a lot about it, but I have a feeling that if we blow
up the box, that as the sparks fly out, they will have an
effect already on a region that is inflamed and we cannot
forget what is happening or not happening in the Middle East.
So I actually think we are probably not as far apart as
might seem. It is a matter of timing and our favorite
diplomatic word, ``nuance,'' in terms of when we do things. I
agree with Henry that we cannot persuade other countries to
think that fighting the war on terrorism is only in our
benefit. It has to be in their benefit also, obviously.
But I think it is just unnecessary to do this this moment,
and what I am advocating is that we play out the U.N. string
with the support of Congress in the pocket of the President and
the Ambassador, and we will have a better chance of getting
support by the other countries if it is evident to everybody
that the Iraqis stiffed us. And that is where my timing comes
in.
Senator Helms. Do you have any further comment?
Secretary Kissinger. It really is a question of whether we
are talking about a few months or a few years. The process, as
it now seems to evolve, seems to me to require some months of
clarification and that seems to me also perfectly consistent
with what the administration is doing and saying. So I do not
think there is a fundamental difference, if that is what we are
talking about.
The Chairman. You are both talking about a few months, are
you not, as opposed to a few years?
Secretary Kissinger. Then there is no difference.
Senator Helms. What was your answer to his question?
The Chairman. I said you are both talking about a few
months, and your response was, yes, if that's the case, there
is no difference. Right? Is that correct?
Secretary Kissinger. I am talking of a few months.
The Chairman. And I understand, Madam Secretary, you are
talking months, not years.
Secretary Albright. Correct, but I think that we have to
run out the string.
The Chairman. No, I understand.
Secretary Albright. And may I just say this. The inspectors
have to get in. They have to have a chance to work it, et
cetera.
Secretary Kissinger. May I say something about that?
The Chairman. Sure.
Secretary Kissinger. I think that before inspectors go in,
or as inspectors go in, we require for ourselves some
definition of what is considered an adequate inspection system.
The Chairman. Absolutely.
Secretary Kissinger. The previous inspection system was
clearly not workable. My understanding is that an inspection
system needs to have some assurance that its inspectors can
talk to potential informants without interference from local
authorities. I do not know how you bring this about, but those
concerns need to be answered since we know that the previous
inspection system has not worked. One must not permit the word
``inspection'' to be used as a subterfuge for endless
procrastination. And inspections must be tied to a system that
gives major assurance that we will not see a repetition of what
we have been going through for the last 10 years.
Secretary Albright. You have given us unusual leeway, and I
do not want to take advantage of it. But I think the timing
also depends on whether we hear from the administration what a
day-after plan looks like. It is the getting the inspectors in
and going through that string, but I think it is irresponsible
to go in without knowing a little bit more than at least I know
about what their plans are afterwards. So for me the timing
depends a lot on the information that comes out on the U.N.
string, and on what very detailed plans are--not on the
military side, because that is not my job and never was, but
more on the process of not leaving a vacuum there.
The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kissinger, is it your position the war against
Iraq is necessary and inevitable?
Secretary Kissinger. My position is that military action to
enforce the U.N. resolutions is necessary if they cannot be
implemented any other way. And I think it is likely.
Senator Sarbanes. Therefore, should we move to military
action?
Secretary Kissinger. We should not move to military action
until we have run out the string on the diplomatic process that
is now underway.
Senator Sarbanes. Is there a peaceful path by which this
matter can be solved?
Secretary Kissinger. I have difficulty visualizing how an
inspection system can operate while Saddam Hussein is in
unimpaired power. It will certainly require some political
changes in Iraq. But I would be open-minded enough to allow for
the possibility that somebody could produce an inspection
system that can really operate. I do not think the issue should
be defined strictly in terms of who is for war and who is
against war.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, that is a pretty fundamental
question, is it not, whether we are going to go to war or not
or whether there is a peaceful path? I take it your position is
you do not think there is a peaceful path. You just sort of
dismissed the inspection path. So if we do that, what is left?
War.
Secretary Kissinger. No, no. I think there is a peaceful
path.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, what is that peaceful path?
Secretary Kissinger. Theoretically, if the U.N. passes a
strong resolution and if an inspection system is devised that
meets the objectives of the U.N. resolution, it is possible
that they will agree to it. Under those conditions, that would
indeed be a peaceful solution. That it is unlikely this will
happen, is a judgment, not a course of action, and we should
run out the full diplomatic string.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, because you think it might work or
just as a matter of appearance?
Secretary Kissinger. Not as a matter of appearance. I would
like it to work. I think it is unlikely to work, but I would be
delighted if it worked.
Senator Sarbanes. You say in your statement that we have to
entertain a program of reconstruction for Iraq.
Secretary Kissinger. Are you talking to me?
Senator Sarbanes. Yes, and that is on page 5 of your
statement.
Secretary Kissinger. Right.
Senator Sarbanes. What do you think about the program of
reconstruction in Afghanistan?
Secretary Kissinger. Afghanistan is a notoriously difficult
country for foreigners to deal with or to reconstruct. I
strongly favor economic aid to Afghanistan.
Senator Sarbanes. Do you think we are paying adequate
attention to the question of reconstruction in Afghanistan? You
argue here on Iraq, we are going to go in, and then we are
going to do a major reconstruction program in order, in effect,
to deal with the aftermath. What about the reconstruction
program in Afghanistan? If we are going to look at what kind of
reconstruction program would we do, how committed have we
remained in Afghanistan in order to do reconstruction?
Secretary Kissinger. It depends on how you define
reconstruction.
First, about Iraq. Reconstruction in Iraq should be
undertaken not just by the United States, but by an
international consortium, international community, and a group
of major interested countries.
Something akin to that should be done in Afghanistan, too,
though Afghanistan has the additional difficulty that the
country is run by a group of warlords whose subjugation would
require a major military effort. In the past, attempts to that
have produced a situation in which the warlords, who normally
fight each other, unite against the foreigner seeking to curb
their power. So I would be uneasy about a major military effort
to pacify the whole country. I would favor whatever can be done
with a reasonable military effort and a significant economic
effort, together with other nations. But I do have a question
in Afghanistan, which would not arise to the same extent in
Iraq.
Senator Sarbanes. Is the effort underway in Afghanistan for
reconstruction up to the standard that you think it should be?
Are we falling short, perhaps woefully short, in Afghanistan?
There are some who think we are risking turning a success into
a failure by not following up on the reconstruction.
Secretary Kissinger. The first thing one has to consider,
Senator, is this: if, on September 10, 2001, somebody had said
that we were going to have an expeditionary force in
Afghanistan, were going to overthrow the Taliban, operate all
over the Middle East, and do all this within 6 weeks, it would
have been considered incredible. So, considering the magnitude
of the challenge we have faced and the unusual cast of thinking
required vis-a-vis American traditions, I think we have done
well in Afghanistan. As things continue----
Senator Sarbanes. You think at this point that our
reconstruction effort is adequate and meets the standard? You
do not think we should be doing more?
Secretary Kissinger. I think we have done the best that
could be done under present circumstances. As time goes on, we
will probably want to strengthen the reconstruction effort.
Senator Sarbanes. Could I hear from Secretary Albright on
these points?
Secretary Albright. I disagree. I think that we have done a
halfway job in Afghanistan and we need to keep our attention on
it. I know that I certainly have met with some Afghan
officials, and they are grateful to us, but they understand
that there is a lot more to do and that there is reconstitution
there potentially of some al-Qaeda groupings, and Pakistan
continues to be a haven for some of these issues. So I think it
is very hard. We have not finished the job and this concerns
me.
And I might say that I think we have to deal with something
very serious here. The issue of Afghanistan is as a result of
unintended consequences of previous foreign policy decisions,
and I think we have to be very careful about the unintended
consequences of whatever decision we make on Iraq. And Iraq at
the moment, as I have said, I think is in a strategic box. We
need to be careful about blowing it up and seeing what the
problems are.
And to answer your previous question, I do think there is a
possibility here that there could be some working of the issue
if in fact the international community is mobilized. We did it
once, and the problem was that it dissipated over the years. We
do continue to bomb. We have authority to do that. And I think
we have got to be careful about making this a war versus the
fact that 40 percent of Iraq is already under a no-fly zone. So
it is a matter of enforcing issues and giving strength to the
United Nations resolution, that maybe the threat of this will,
in fact, make it possible to have a different solution.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, and I
appreciate it. I hope we will have a second round because I
want to address this issue.
The Chairman. We will. I realize I am frustrating my
colleagues at the end here on both ends, but I am going to let
the witnesses go on, otherwise I will go to a 15-minute rule
for each Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. I just want to say I do want to come back
to the preemption issue. I see Secretary Kissinger has put
Yemen, Somalia, Indonesia, and Iran on the agenda here, and I
want to explore that with him.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kissinger in his testimony says ``the United Nations
is, therefore, challenged to come up with a control system that
eliminates the existing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq,
together with procedures to prevent their being rebuilt.'' This
follows his discussion of the violation by Iraq of United
Nations resolutions dealing with weapons of mass destruction.
And certainly he is right. This is at the heart of our
problem, but it is obviously very difficult to think through
how the United Nations is going to have this ability under
current conditions or even with Hans Blix and inspectors going
back in. This does not negate the discussion we have had of
timing, but it is at the heart of the matter. How in the world
do you ever find weapons of mass destruction and then, as Dr.
Kissinger said, have a control system not only that destroys
them but that makes sure that no one ever rebuilds them? That
is a degree of invasion of sovereignty that is very
substantial.
Secretary Albright mentions it is naive to think that a
peaceful and democratic Iraq will automatically emerge in the
ashes of our invasion. It is crazy to believe, she says, we can
run post-war Iraq alone. It is essential that the
administration think of the consequence of all this through in
advance. But she says, it has not yet been done.
Now that is at the heart of our dilemma. As the chairman
has said, we are heading toward a resolution, a very imperfect
one, in which many Senators may vote in favor of authorizing
our President to have this authority so that he has some
bargaining ability with the rest of the world.
But the consequences of this are critically important. I
have not heard any discussion of Secretary Kissinger's thought
about how the United Nations or anyone else comes up with a
control system. We need to hear about this rapidly.
And the chairman and I, about 5 o'clock last night, were
having a dialog between the two of us, and Mr. McFarlane who
was left as a survivor at the witness table at that point,
essentially saying we are trying to send messages. We are
asking somebody. Now, this afternoon we will have our Secretary
of State, and we will ask him. Is there a plan? Do we have any
idea what we plan to do in Iraq after we win the war? How do we
stop the fragmentation of this box that Secretary Albright has
talked about?
All the testimony we have had from the Iraqis who came
before us before was simply to confirm it is a very complex
country with many nationalities and divisive groups, Iran
coming in from one area, Turkey from another. This is very
tough business right now.
The Chairman. If the Senator will yield. And every one of
those witnesses said the United States has to be the one to
manage this.
Senator Lugar. Yes, so we come back to that. How about the
United Nations?
And you are probably both right. We ought to try to make
sure there are a lot of other helpers to help pay for this as
well as sustain it for a period of time.
But let us take the worst case scenario. It is us. Do we
have any idea, any plan for how to bring about peace in Iraq,
the territorial integrity, peace with the neighbors, to get the
weapons of mass destruction?
Now, maybe somebody in the administration does. Maybe even
as we speak there are people who will come and say, we have
thought of those things. We have not told you about them and
they are highly classified. That would be reassuring.
But I simply use this opportunity to ask either of you. You
do not know what the administration is doing, but Secretary
Albright, what would you do? How would we begin to think
through the situation at the end of the war in the worst case
scenario that we are there alone? Now, you said we enlist other
people. We try to do that. But what are the elements of a plan
for a post-war Iraq?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, I think that we do
have to recognize, while I agree with Henry that Afghanistan is
full of warlords and a real problem, Iraq is not exactly a
unified place. And everything that we have ever heard is that
it is a country that was created by outside powers that put
together at least three groups, the Kurds, the Shiites, and the
Sunnis. And that is the least of it. So the integrity of the
country is an issue.
I met previously many, many times with the Iraqi
opposition, and as somebody whose father was part of an exile
movement, I applaud those people, but I also know how difficult
it is. Everybody has a different view, and believe me, the
Czechoslovak exile movement had nothing in common with the
Iraqi one.
So I think that there are very many different kinds of
groupings. When I met with them, they all had a different idea
about what to do. And I think the first thing that has to
happen is to try to bring them together in some particular way.
The reason that I also believe that it is essential to get
more international support is while it has not been perfect,
Bosnia and Kosovo have, in fact, provided a model of what
happens when you work with an international organization in
terms of getting a high representative and various countries
participating in not only the reconstruction, but the modeling
of local elections, et cetera. We cannot do that alone. So that
is one of the reasons I think it is important to have U.N.
support because it does provide some kind of model. That is a
beginning.
But I was plagued always whenever I suggested using force--
and I did--with what is the exit strategy. As far as I have
heard, none. And I do think that the administration, while
there is no way they can give us all the details on this--I
think that is impossible--they do need to give us a better
blueprint for what is out there after the day after.
Senator Lugar. Secretary Kissinger, do you have any idea as
to how the control situation might work with regard to the
weapons of mass destruction, how we would get to something that
is satisfying?
Secretary Kissinger. I think this is a question that should
be addressed to the Secretary of State.
At some point in this process, we have to make clear what
we would consider an adequate inspection system or, at the
least, what we do not consider an adequate inspection system.
Otherwise, there will be no criteria on which to base our
actions. I have put down here some general ideas, but I have
not studied in detail what you would require.
At the same time, I want to warn against the danger of
using the imperfection of any solution as an argument for doing
nothing. From where we stand now, the choice is this: will
there be enforcement of the U.N. resolutions, or will these
stockpiles continue to grow? I think the danger of acquiescing
is greater than some of the concerns that have been raised, but
I also think we have to answer this question.
Now, about a post-war Iraq and its political organization.
That really requires really a lot of thinking because it is
easy enough to say you have a democratic government. The
question is, how quickly can you create it and what are the
interim arrangements that have to be made. One also has to keep
in mind that there will be great temptations on the part of
Iran to wreck any political structure in order to shift the
balance of power in the region, and that there will be other
neighboring claimants as well. This is not a vacuum in which
one can operate politically with an unlimited time span, but an
issue that has to be dealt with.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I would just add yesterday one
of our witnesses suggested, as Dr. Kissinger has, we may not
have the perfect solutions but that should not defeat action.
But the administration ought to report to the Congress at least
every 30 days on how it was going. In other words, if you are
still trying to perfect the solutions, that one resolution to
go to war ought not to suffice for the next 8 years, given all
the ramifications that we are discussing that would follow.
Secretary Kissinger. Also, the power to improve what exists
now is not too high. We do not have to achieve perfection in
order to have the people of Iraq live under better conditions
than they live in now.
The Chairman. The interim solution will be a MacArthur in
Baghdad.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that a
letter relevant to what we are discussing right now from the
State Department be printed in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, it will be placed in the
record.
[The letter referred to follows:]
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, May 29, 2002.
Ms. Patricia A. McNerney
Republican Staff Director,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Dirksen Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Ms. McNerney:
As we discussed on May 23, the Bush Administration regards the
Future of Iraq project as a key part of our Iraq regime change policy.
We notified the appropriations and authorization committees on March 21
and held consultations on this project with you and your colleagues in
April and May. In response to questions from you and the SACFO, on May
21 we provided you a paper describing how we proposed (1) to move
forward now to fund Phases I and II of the project, in the amount of
$1.54 million out of the total $5 million for the project, and (2) not
to use the Middle East Institute but rather to bring management of the
project inside the State Department. We plan to carry out this project
through small, grants to policy NGOs and to a neutral conference-
planning institute. We will consult with authorizing and appropriations
committees before we decide to move forward on Phase III and beyond.
In particular, I want to address the three questions you posed.
First, for the substantive work of the working groups, it is our
intention to fund the work in Phases I and II of the project through
policy-oriented NGOs that have expertise in the subject matter of the
working groups, are able to work effectively and credibly with Iraqi
and international experts, and have the organizational capacity and
ability to handle a grant of funds from the State Department. For
example, among the characteristics of an ideal NGO to help handle the
Public Health and Humanitarian Needs working group, in addition to
these general criteria, would be an understanding of the health care
and humanitarian needs of Iraqis inside Iraq, a track record of
delivering health care and humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees,
knowledge of how to administer public health programs, and familiarity
with best practices in health care and humanitarian aid delivery. (This
working group will be a particular challenge, as no one group is likely
to have the same high level of expertise in both public health and
humanitarian needs, so we intend to try to find the best fit.) We would
prefer the substantive work to be done by NGOs led by free Iraqis,
though we recognize that for some of the working groups, there may not
be an existing Iraq-focused group with the necessary expertise and
organizational capacity to administer a grant of USG funds. In such a
case, we would look at universities, private businesses, or non-Iraq-
focused NGOs with (i) special expertise in the subject matter, (ii) the
necessary organizational capacity, and (iii) the ability and
willingness to work with a broad range of free Iraqis.
Second, we intend to involve about 10-20 Iraqis in each working
group. We have canvassed the broadest possible range of Iraq-focused
groups, both political an non-political to solicit names, although we
have made clear that the final determinant will be the Department,
subject to approval by an inter-agency steering group that includes
members from the Department of Defense, the National Security Council,
and the Office of the Vice President. To date, we have received
hundreds of names from Iraqi opposition groups and others. To narrow
the lists, we will look to the individual's expertise in the subject
matter of the working group, to the individual's ability to contribute
to practical problem-solving, and to their ability to work with Iraqi,
U.S. and international experts.
Finally, in response to your view that we should start a discussion
of political issues in Phase I of the project, we are bringing forward
the working group on Political Principles and Procedures to Phase I. We
believe we can do this within the existing $1.54 million budget, though
we may have to move forward our consultations on Phase III by a couple
of weeks to accommodate this change, or we may delay one of the other
working groups until Phase III.
We hope that this information will be sufficient to enable us to,
go ahead with the Future of Iraq project. Please do not hesitate to
contact me if you require further information.
Sincerely,
Ryan C. Crocker,
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern Affairs.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly
appreciate Senator Lugar's line of questioning.
To get some initial answers about some of these basic
questions about the day after is not to suggest that any of us
are in a do-nothing posture. The administration is passionate
about regime change in Iraq, and I subscribe to a policy that
supports regime change by reasonable means. It does not mean I
will sign off on any proposal aimed at that end. I cannot
imagine any American would not support the overall goal. Saddam
Hussein's rule has been brutally violent.
So I guess I would like to just assume, in terms of my
questions, that a military operation has been successful in
toppling Saddam Hussein, and I would like to see if we could
get you to at least speculate on a couple of specific points,
following on Senator Lugar's question.
The Iraqi people have suffered terribly from years of
deprivation. Of course, they have been consistently told that
it is American support for sanctions that is responsible for
their plight.
If widespread civil conflict breaks out in the wake of
military action, a significant military presence, obviously,
might be required for some time, particularly given the reality
of weapons of mass destruction in the country. What kind of
reaction can we expect from the Iraqi people if the United
States moves to invade and then for some period of time has to
occupy the country? Secretary Albright?
Secretary Albright. I have to tell you frankly we do not
know because we have been told that there are many people who
would welcome us with open arms on the assumption that they
have lived under the terrible boot of a dictator and that they
know that he is responsible for this and that the United States
is not. But in our lives I think we have all dealt with people
who have been heavily propagandized for a number of years, and
they have, as you have said, Senator, been basically told that
the sanctions are the fault of the United States. Some of them
will definitely not be pleased to see us there.
Plus, I think as I said in my testimony, Baghdad is a very
special place to the Islamic religion, and the question is how
others would react to a United States occupation of that
country.
Then there is the whole issue of the divisions within Iraq
itself.
I think we all need to ask these kinds of questions so that
the people at the State Department who are working on this
know. What would we do if a civil war developed in Iraq between
the Sunnis and the Shias, or what if the Kurds take a different
position vis-a-vis each other? They are not also totally
united. So I think these are the kinds of questions that have
to go down.
But we cannot assume that this is like liberating central
Europe after Hitler. This is a different situation, and so we
have to look at that very carefully.
Senator Feingold. Let me follow that. Then I want to hear
Dr. Kissinger's remarks. Can you say anything more specifically
about what kind of threat conditions our U.S. soldiers might be
facing for months on end and what we could do to reduce the
threat? I wonder if you would follow with that, Secretary
Albright.
Secretary Albright. I think, again, this is something we do
not know because it depends if it is the Republican Guard or
the people that have been very close to Saddam Hussein--if we
are in Baghdad with hand-to-hand fighting from block to block,
I think there would be a threat. And I think that the number of
forces that will have to stay there and should to protect our
own forces as a result of our own experiences in this, we would
have to assume that there would be a threat to our military.
Whether it exists or not, we cannot take the chance of sending
them in without assuming that there would be.
Senator Feingold. Dr. Kissinger.
Secretary Kissinger. First, as to the political outcome in
Iraq. I do not pretend to be an expert on Iraqi conditions, but
I do think a lot will depend on what kind of outcome takes
place. It is conceivable that, if the United Nations takes a
firm stand and if this country is united in its general
direction, as I believe it is and will be, that Saddam may then
do what Milosevic did after Kosovo: accept some kind of
agreement that in fact undermines his rule and, after a certain
interval, he is removed. It is not very likely, but it is also
not totally inconceivable.
What is more conceivable, though still not very probable,
is that some of the military people in Iraq will decide that
they have gone about as far as they can that to fight a
suicidal war is senseless and that we suddenly find Saddam has
been removed. In that case, we would have the problem of
negotiating with a de facto government. The question of coming
up with an inspection system with real teeth would be very
relevant, which the Government of Iraq would be less of an
issue.
From the point of view of post-war reconstruction, the most
complex situation would be one in which military action leads
to the disintegration of all authority in Iraq. Then the need
to reestablish authority, as was the case in the occupation of
Germany and, to some extent, of Japan, would pose an
extraordinarily complicated issue.
I am opposed to the prolonged occupation of a Muslim
country in the heart of the Muslim world and by Western nations
proclaiming the right to re-educate that country. Such an
undertaking would prove very difficult and should really be
turned over to some kind of new international group in which we
would have a very major role. But it is very difficult to talk
about all this in the abstract.
Senator Feingold. Well, I appreciate that answer. And if I
could just comment, Mr. Chairman, and then turn it over. We are
talking about a scenario here where we have militarily
succeeded, but no matter who is taking over there, we still
have the problem of the weapons of mass destruction and
securing those weapons of mass destruction. I do not think that
is the time to start figuring out how we are going to secure
those weapons of mass destruction.
I agree with Senator Lugar, although I certainly do not
want to try to put words in his mouth, that there is a sense
here that we are not getting even the outlines or the general
concept of what would that entail. What would be the American
commitment? What kind of agreements do we have to get up front
from our allies about how to achieve the kinds of things in
that area that Senator Lugar has devoted so much of his career
to doing in other places?
So I think this is central, and I am worried that we are
talking about knocking out Saddam Hussein and then trying to
figure it out after the fact.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I add my welcome and thanks to both of you. We are grateful
for your appearance this morning and the benefit of your
expertise and insight and great experience. Thank you.
I would just add a comment to what the Senator from
Wisconsin and prior to the Senator from Wisconsin's comments,
the Senator from Indiana said, but more to the point, their
line of questioning. I think as you have sat through this for
about an hour-and-a-half, you both are getting a sense, at
least from some on this committee, where the thrust of this is,
this great question, this debate, this issue of whether we
should go to war and the questions that you both began with,
how, when. I think it is clear to state that no one has all the
answers, and I think it is also clear to state, going back to
referencing the Senator from Wisconsin's point, I do not know
if there is a Member of the Congress certainly that I am aware
of that does not take seriously the threat of Saddam Hussein.
Now, that said, we differ a bit on how we deal with that.
But there are those who minimalize even such a debate and how
outrageous to even question things like the destabilization of
the Middle East. I mean, how foolish of you to ask such a
question. If we could just get rid of Saddam Hussein, then all
of our problems would go away. Everybody knows that. And you
heard some of that.
I want to go back to the destabilization issue in a moment
and would like very much to hear from each of you on a
particular question I will ask on that.
But before I do, Secretary Albright, you are the most
recent Secretary of State who has had to deal with this issue.
You were Secretary of State in the first 2 years after Saddam
Hussein kicked the U.N. inspectors out. What did your
administration learn that you could share with this committee
on how we should be dealing with Saddam Hussein and this issue
today, the debate that is going on today?
For example, did your administration ever closely examine
or pursue tightening those resolutions or forcing those
resolutions at the U.N. and looking seriously at a military
option, to go through maybe what President Bush is going
through now, realizing that you did not have the force of
September 11? You did not have the mobilization of the country,
the world, the Congress behind you on that. But is there
anything that you can share with this committee with the
experience you had most recently that might give us some
assistance here as we grapple with this great debate of our
time?
Because I am one who believes that we are not talking about
just going to war with Iraq. You both have talked about
preemption, about doctrines, about the future, of what this
will do to balance of power and geopolitical strategic
interests, economic interests. We are talking about an awful
lot here. Your point, Madam Secretary, about overloading the
structure and the system, I generally happen to agree with
that.
But not to get off into that tangent, I would like to stay
on focus on asking you to answer the question and then I would
come back to a more particular question I have for each of you.
Thank you.
Secretary Albright. I, unfortunately, do have more
experience with this than most, and I think we have to keep in
mind the following, that we did try very hard to keep a
consensus in the United Nations. There began to be what we
called sanctions fatigue. As we know, certain of our friends
and allies had a different idea. But we, for a long time, kept
a completely unanimous Security Council to enforce the
resolutions, but ultimately it was very hard I think to keep
everybody in line.
We began to think about very much the kind of thing that
Secretary Powell came forward with at the beginning of the
administration, which were the smart sanctions which was trying
to limit and tighten the box on the regime and not to punish
the people because one of the things that was happening was we
were losing support because there was increasing--I would
actually not have agreed with this--propaganda, basically that
it was our fault that the people were suffering.
We also did consider a number of military options, and I
think we managed to do what was the right thing, which was to
keep constantly vigilance on the no-fly zones to make sure that
he stayed within that box, and were more and more robust in
that bombing not just when our pilots were illuminated, but
when we felt that there was danger from ground-to-air attacks.
So I think we really did bomb and do that job well, and they
are continuing to do it now.
I must say that while there were sometimes discussions
about a ground option, you point out very accurately the mood
is very different after 9/11, and I think that there was no way
to do that psychologically, much less do I think physically
given what we knew about the numbers that were necessary to do
that.
I stand down to no one in terms of my characterization of
Saddam Hussein in terms of being a danger and an evil. And I
think the question is what is the best way to handle it. I do
think that the continued bombing is the way to do it. And as I
suggested in my testimony, if we know or have suspicions that
some facility is actually in the process of doing something
with weapons of mass destruction, I think we have the authority
to just go and do the bombing. So I think that we need to
continue this robust keeping him in a box until we are ready
with all the plans that we need to have some other aspect if it
cannot be handled in some other way.
May I just make one other point? The inspection issue is a
dreadful one because what happened in the course of the years,
the original inspection regime became weaker and it did work at
the beginning. As I said, the inspectors managed to get rid of
more weapons of mass destruction than the war itself. But
ultimately there were changes in the modalities, and I do think
that the deal that Kofi Annan made in 1998 was a problem in
terms of inspectors had to be accompanied by diplomats and all
that. But even that has not been enforced. So we need to get
back to an intrusive and overall inspection regime, not the
modalities that we have had in the past.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, may I ask if Secretary
Kissinger had any response to that, we would welcome his
response?
Secretary Kissinger. I think the conditions after September
11 produced the current situation. I understand why, before
September 11, it was deemed not to be desirable but, sooner or
later, we would have faced this problem. Sooner or later, the
problem of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq would have had
to be faced, but I generally sympathize with the answer that
Madeleine has given.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Wellstone.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I
have been listening and I have a bunch of questions prepared by
staff, but I am going to try to go with our discussion and try
to ask some questions based upon what is on my mind.
I think it was Senator Hagel who said that there is no
disagreement about Saddam Hussein. Nobody I know wants to just
put him in parentheses and say we will get back to thinking
about this in 3 to 5 years from now. I do not know anybody who
has taken that position at all.
A couple of observations and one question. Senator Sarbanes
asked Dr. Kissinger, is there a path to peace? Dr. Kissinger
said, I do not know but certainly we ought to play it out. I
want to emphasize that again. It seems to me that, although
Secretary of State Albright is correct that this has not worked
so far, it is simply not true that you cannot design an
international arms inspection regime that could work and that
insists on unfettered access and that gets whatever weapons of
mass destruction there are out. It seems to me we would want
to, first of all, pursue that with all vigor before we talk
about going to war. It seems to me the military option would be
the last option.
My question is when I hear you all say what happens
afterward, we win militarily but then we are there--and then I
have heard I think both of you say we do not want to be doing
this alone. That is for sure. Then I heard Secretary Albright
say I have got some real concerns about this war against
terrorism and al-Qaeda and I want to make sure this does not
undercut our efforts in South Asia and the Near East where we
need the assets on the ground and we need the cooperation. And
then I think about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
It would seem to me that there would be a world of
difference in terms of both what our men and women face if we
have to go in, God forbid, in terms of what the reaction in the
Near East and South Asia and throughout the world would be,
much less who is going to do the occupying afterwards. It would
make a huge difference whether we did this with the
international community or we did it alone. Do you think there
are some major differences here in terms of all of the
consequences? Because the resolution calls for preemptive,
unilateral military action. That is what we are voting on.
Do you think there is a difference in terms of the
consequences on all three fronts between our doing it alone
versus if we have to? And I still believe that the arms
inspection regime ought to be given the first priority. That if
we have to, that we do it internationally would make a huge
difference or not?
Secretary Albright. Well, I happen to believe it makes a
huge difference to do it internationally, and the first gulf
war was done internationally. That was a huge difference to
have that coalition, and the first President Bush worked that
very well. I admire what was done, and there is great
continuity where we picked it up in 1993 from there. So I do
think that it is very important to do it internationally. It
would make a huge difference.
If it is impossible and if we are given better information
than at least I believe we have on how rapidly this has to be
done, I think that we then owe it to our people to take action.
But all that is missing. Those are the missing pieces.
And I must say that I think this is a remarkable
discussion. I think the fact that we are able to have these
kinds of discussions is what the American people need to hear
because this is going to be long-term and expensive. There are
a lot of priorities that we will have to set aside because of
this. I am very concerned not just about a unilateral foreign
policy but a unidimensional foreign policy. We will suffer for
that in the long run.
Senator Wellstone. Dr. Kissinger.
Secretary Kissinger. Look back at the first gulf war, it is
important to understand its structure. It is indeed correct
that the first President Bush achieved an international
consensus. It is also true that he moved some 400,000 American
troops into the region before there was international
consensus. For it was clear that we could not march in and
march out and that the implication of the President's conduct
was that, if we did not achieve international consensus, we
would operate with those nations that would support us. I
believe that one reason he received as much support as he did
was that he opted for a way by which other nations could
influence our actions and participate in them. So in principle,
the difference is not so great in the methods of the Bush
family with respect to the gulf and with which, I must say, I
agree.
Second, in conducting these discussions, we have to keep in
mind that we do seem to agree that what we are talking about
here is timing. We are not talking about the principle. One has
to take care lest these discussions of the inspection system
and of what might happen are not used for endless
procrastination. On the other hand, we have to be serious in
conducting them.
Senator Wellstone. Well, if I could say to me the two
issues that I feel like are staring me in the face--and I
appreciate the answer of both of you--are, one, as a matter of
public policy, are we not going to make it the first priority
to try to put into effect an arms inspection regime that will
work, unfettered access, and will insist that these weapons of
mass destruction are out? Is that the first priority or not? I
think some, frankly, do not think it is. They have other
priorities. And some think it is.
The second point I would make is it seems to me that we are
in an odd position right now because, on the one hand, we are
saying to the United Nations we want your support. On the other
hand, we are asked to vote on a resolution that gives the
United Nations the back of the hand and says regardless of what
you do, we are going in. And if we go in unilaterally, I would
just say to the chairman again, I think that the consequences
throughout the Near East and South Asia, the consequences in
the world that we live in, and the consequences for our men and
women that are there in Iraq could be very serious.
I think we need to pay very special attention to that, the
difference between unilateral, going alone, and having the
support of the international community. If it requires more
diplomatic heavy lifting, we ought to at least make every
effort to do that first. That would be my plea here today.
Secretary Kissinger. If one looks at the discussion taking
place in the Security Council, it is interesting that none of
the permanent members has threatened a veto. For they know
that, by abstaining, if that is what they are indeed going to
do, they will make possible a resolution that will support our
action--assuming we can achieve nine votes. Britain will
clearly be for us. And I am not sure that France will abstain.
But it is not necessary now to speculate about what the
individual countries may or may not do in a final vote.
Second, as I pointed out before, I am convinced that, if
military action is taken, we will not be acting alone and that
there will be significant countries supporting the United
States. None of this is absolute, and one always has to keep
focused on the alternatives. But we all do seem to agree that
we cannot acquiesce in the growth of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, so what we are really talking about is the
means for dealing with that problem.
The Chairman. Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both,
our esteemed witnesses today, for your insights and comments.
I think I speak for everyone on this committee that no one
cares to risk lives unnecessarily of the men and women in
uniform. We do not want war. It is not in our interest.
However, when you think of the priorities of the Federal
Government and you say, gosh, there are a lot of different
concerns and priorities, the top responsibility is national
security. Unfortunately, we only have a theoretical unimpeded
path to disarming Saddam Hussein.
I would say to Secretary Albright that we have had
briefings, and some of these briefings were of a highly
classified nature. We cannot necessarily publicly state every
bit of intelligence, very credible intelligence, about the
capabilities that Saddam has as far as chemical and biological
weapons and the means of delivering those. One can be in a box
and still deliver outside that box. Also, the concern is that
he may transfer some of that capability to terrorists.
I know, Madam Secretary, you were Secretary of State in
1998, and I do not mean to get into legalistic matters. But in
1998, the Senate passed Senate Concurrent Resolution 71 with
all the Whereases and the Resolved clauses. In many ways, this
resolution is a furtherance of it. In fact, it is entitled a
furtherance of the 1998 resolution. As Secretary of State, did
you support this resolution, which urged the President ``to
take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to the
threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass
destruction programs?''
Secretary Albright. First of all, we did want them to end
everything in terms of their weapons of mass destruction. But
the terms of that resolution were somewhat different. They were
more narrow in terms of the scope for the President. My reading
of it here is that it was to bring Iraq into compliance with
its international obligations.
I think part of the problem with the current resolution--
and again, I do not think it is up to me as a private citizen
to even begin to think about how you draft that last paragraph,
but I think what is troubling to me as a private citizen is it
sounds very much like a carte blanche to do things within the
entire region. I think that is one of the questions and how
much impact and activity the Congress wants to have in this.
I worked for Senator Muskie, so I understand the role of
Congress in foreign policy, and I respected it as Secretary of
State. I think here, as Senator Lugar suggested, part of the
difference in this resolution is that it needs to have more of
a reporting role in some way. So that is the difference.
The resolution that we had in 1998 was more limited, and I
did support it.
Senator Allen. I would say, Mr. Chairman, that you made
some comments having to do with a sense of the Senate which
makes, a great deal of sense logistically and diplomatically in
that we would encourage more allies to be with us. I do think
the Bush administration--we will hear from the Secretary of
State this afternoon--is making efforts in the United Nations
and obviously, with our NATO allies and others who are not NATO
members, countries in the Middle East, which is very important.
Logistically, in the unfortunate event that military action is
needed, you want allies, if nothing else, for some of the bases
for the tactical air strikes, allies will also help, obviously,
in making sure that any conflagration stays in Iraq and that we
do not end up having Saddam, as he has done in the past, trying
to get Israel into this and trying to make this into religious
wars.
I would say, Mr. Chairman, that those sort of constructive
additions to Whereas clauses in here would make sense, but I
ask Secretary Albright: Since the statement back in 1998 urging
the President to take all necessary and appropriate actions--
which is pretty broad--to respond to the threat posed by Iraq's
refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs, have
you seen anything, Madam Secretary, in the subsequent 4 years
to lead you to believe he has not gotten stronger in his
stockpiles and capabilities, whether in delivery systems or in
the biological or the chemical weapons programs?
Secretary Albright. Again, I think it is very hard to tell.
I have had a briefing also, and I think that he has probably
gotten weaker in terms of some of the conventional aspects that
he has. And we do not know enough about what has happened in
the others, but it is of concern. I in no way am
underestimating the concern that we should have, and we were
concerned and continue to be concerned. I think the question is
whether an all-out invasion of some kind is the right approach
to take at this time.
I also believe, Senator, that one of the strengths that we
have had in all of this is a continuity and in many ways
bipartisanship as far as the policy toward Iraq is concerned.
We were handed Saddam Hussein in 1993 with a set of resolutions
that we worked very hard to get international support for. I
hope very much that we continue to see this in a bipartisan
way. The way this question is asked is a little bit as to what
we did and when, and I just think that we have all been on this
really difficult road of trying to deal with what I call
Migraine Hussein. I mean, he has really been there throughout,
and I think we are looking for the best methods to make sure
that he stays in a box that does not explode and make the
Middle East more complicated than it already is.
Senator Allen. Madam Secretary, I just wanted to see if
there is consistency of thought and so forth since 1998.
I ask Secretary Kissinger: You mentioned if not now, why
not now? It reminds me of Ronald Reagan's statement about if
not now, when? If not the United States, then who is going to
disarm Saddam Hussein for his clear violations? We do need to
have our allies.
Do you feel that if the United Nations does not act, that
we still should act with as many allies as possible in the
event military action is necessary?
Secretary Kissinger. Yes, I do because if we do not, we
will face a worse problem a year or 2 or 3 from now.
Senator Allen. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, could I ask Senator Allen,
when he quoted whatever it was he quoted to Secretary Albright,
what was he quoting from?
Senator Allen. I was quoting from Senate Concurrent
Resolution 71, which was a resolution passed in 1998 condemning
Iraq's threat to international peace and security. This was the
second resolved point.
Senator Sarbanes. Did that pass?
Senator Allen. I asked the Secretary if she supported it
and she said she did.
Secretary Albright. If I might ask. I was thinking we were
talking about what happened August 14, 1998, which became
public law.
Senator Sarbanes. That is not this resolution. This
resolution did not pass, and the resolution that passed on
August 14 and the public law that passed on October 31 were
both more narrowly drawn. The public law on October 31 said at
the end: ``nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize
or otherwise speak to the issue of United States armed forces
except as provided in section 4(a)(2) in carrying out this
act.'' And 4(a)(2) talked about draw-down of military defense
articles for the Iraqi opposition.
And the other one, Public Law 105-235 at the end said that
``the President is urged to take appropriate action in
accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the
United States,'' which of course includes, amongst other
things, the War Powers Act, and that was very carefully worked
out in the Congress.
And my understanding--and if I am wrong, I certainly want
to be corrected--is that the resolution from which the Senator
is quoting in fact was not passed by the Congress.
Senator Allen. I would say, Mr. Chairman, to my good friend
from Maryland, I wanted to ask what her position was on this
resolution. This resolution, I would say to my friend from
Maryland, Senator Sarbanes, was sponsored by the following
Senators who are still here, and it had bipartisan support: Mr.
Daschle, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Dodd, Kerry, Moynihan, Byrd, Wyden,
Hollings, and Akaka, as well as others on our side of the
aisle.
Senator Sarbanes. It did not have Senator Biden or me
cosponsoring it or a number of others. In fact, it did not have
Senator Lugar. I am looking at this resolution. When the
resolution was finally worked out, there was much more narrow
and careful language. That is the only point I am making.
I am laying this out because the premise that was given to
the Secretary was that this was passed by the Congress,
presumably acquiesced in by the administration. The language
you quoted was not passed by the Congress. I have the language
that was passed by the Congress. In both instances, the
relevant paragraphs are far more narrow and pointed than what
you quoted to the Secretary, which was an open-ended thing. The
fact that some people went on it when it was introduced--that
was not the end product.
Senator Allen. Nevertheless, I would say, Mr. Chairman,
that it was the sentiments of those bipartisan leaders in it. I
think we can all stipulate that matters in Iraq have not gotten
less dire since 1998 when this concern was actually addressed
by the Senate and with Secretary Albright as Secretary of
State.
Senator Sarbanes. Oh, I am not addressing that issue. Maybe
it is getting more dire, maybe it is not. I am just addressing
the issue that you put a question to the Secretary, the premise
of which was that that language had been adopted by the
Congress, and that is not the case.
Secretary Albright. Senator Sarbanes, I appreciate very
much the clarification because the language that I have here
that I was responding to was out of Public Law 105-235 that
does, in fact, have the final paragraph from which I quoted in
responding to your question.
Senator Sarbanes. It says any action should be ``in
accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the
United States.'' Is that correct?
Secretary Albright. Right, and to bring Iraq into
compliance with its international obligations, not the broad
language that is in the resolution that has been proposed by
the administration that, as I said, gives carte blanche to the
administration to do what it wants in the Middle East. I
disagree with that, and I hope very much that that will, in the
course of this, be redrafted.
But to the point, Senator Allen, I think that we have all,
over the years, tried to figure out how to deal with the horror
of Saddam Hussein and the mood in the country is different at
different times. I am very proud of what we tried to do to keep
him in his box.
Senator Allen. Well, as we develop this draft resolution we
will fine tune it, if it needs fine tuning--and any legislative
branch is naturally going to change something; that is just the
nature of a legislative branch of the government. But the draft
resolution does say the President is authorized to use the
means he determines to be appropriate to enforce the United
Nations Security Council resolutions that are referenced above
in the Whereas clauses.
I think that the chairman does have some good ideas that I
would like to work with him on, particularly having allies join
with us.
The Chairman. I do not want to take up Senator Boxer's
time. She has been so patient.
But I was involved in that negotiation. I will not
characterize anybody else. I will speak for myself. The reason
why I felt comfortable in voting for the amended resolution was
the addition of the paragraphs that said ``the Government of
Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of international
obligations. Therefore, the President is urged to take
appropriate action in accordance with the Constitution and
relevant laws of the United States.''
The other one that we talked about, Public Law 105-338 on
October 31, added the section which I may be mistaken but I
think I was in the room and helped draft, which was section 8,
rule of construction, which says, ``nothing in this act shall
be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the issue of
United States armed forces except as provided in section
4(a)(2) in carrying out this act.'' And that was giving aid and
assistance.
Senator Sarbanes. To the opposition.
The Chairman. To the opposition.
Again, this is not a matter of argument. At least I am not
trying. Hopefully we can do what we have always done with these
resolutions, going all the way back to the gulf war or as
recently as 9/11. And that is, when we have got cooler heads,
we sit down. We have worked through it. Administrations have
cooperated. We have ended up with something we could all live
with that gave the President the necessary authority needed to
meet the limited objective he stated. Hopefully that process is
still underway and we will be able to do that. I am anxious to
work with the Senator to incorporate, to the degree he agrees
with Senator Lugar or me or anyone else, additional language.
But let me yield and apologize to the Senator from
California and blame the Senator from Maryland.
Senator Boxer. I think the Senator from Maryland is right,
these points are important. I cannot thank both of you enough,
because you have helped me cement my views, and I want to tell
you why. During yesterday's hearing with Mr. McFarlane and
Ambassador Holbrooke I spoke about how I voted for force twice
recently, once against Milosevic in your day, Madam Secretary,
and once after 9/11 under the current administration, and I
also spoke about my belief, very strong belief that the use of
force should be a last resort, and that I believe every
President has an obligation to lay out a path for peace before
taking us to war.
In my view, I have not seen this President do that yet, and
in the view of my constituents, thousands of whom are calling
me--it is unbelievable, every 2 days, we get 1,000 calls or e-
mails They are saying they feel the President is itching to go
to war, and to put in a nicer way, a phrase that Secretary
Albright used, not pertaining to the President in her opinion,
but she said ``some in the administration have an irrational
exuberance for war,'' and I think that does speak for a lot of
my constituents.
Well, I want to thank you in particular, Secretary
Albright, because you did for me something that I have not
heard yet before today from someone at your level. You have
laid out a path for peace, and I believe your statement was a
breath of fresh air in the drumbeat of war.
I also would say to Dr. Kissinger, for one brief, shining
moment in your answer to Senator Sarbanes, I think you laid out
a path for peace, a little bit more skeptically than Secretary
Albright, but nonetheless, it was there, and I can tell you
that I take pleasure in small victories as this debate moves
forward. For the first time, I have seen experts lay out a path
to avoid bloodshed, and I understand it is not an easy path. I
understand it might not work. I understand it will take a
strong, intrusive, unfettered inspection regime, followed by
dismantlement of anything found.
I personally demand that Iraq live up to the U.N.
resolutions, particularly regarding inspection and
dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction. They agreed to
it. They must live up to it, and the world must ensure that,
not just our Nation, because if it is just our Nation, I am
very worried, as the Senator from the largest state in the
Nation, about the risks and the cost borne by our people. The
world must step up to the plate, and I think the world will if
we do this right.
Yesterday, Senator Danny Inouye took to the floor. Danny
Inouye is a war hero. He has more medals than, I do not know,
probably anyone that I know.
The Chairman. Including the Medal of Honor.
Senator Boxer. Including the Medal of Honor, and I want to
tell you what he said. He said, ``there are those who plan war
and there are those who fight war,'' and as we sit here talking
about post-war regime in Iraq, as we sit and plan for that, I
want us to think for a moment the path we are taking if we do
not follow the path for peace that I heard outlined here today,
and I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, at this time
to introduce into the record an article in today's USA Today.
It is entitled, ``In Iraq's Arsenal: Nature's Deadliest
Poison.'' Botulinum toxin might be the most diabolical of
Saddam's terror tools, but the U.S. is far from ready to
protect its troops. I would like to put that in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The article referred to follows:]
[From USA Today, September 26, 2002]
In Iraq's Arsenal: Nature's Deadliest Poison
(by steve sternberg)
Botulinum toxin might be the most diabolical of Saddam Hussein's
terror tools, but the U.S. is far from ready to protect its troops--the
only remedy is antitoxin made from horse serum.
In the year since an unknown bioterrorist stuffed envelopes with
anthrax and mailed them, the government has stockpiled anthrax vaccine
and antibiotics, planned mass vaccination campaigns and ordered 209
million fresh doses of smallpox vaccine.
Yet the United States is still unprepared to contend with other
agents on its A-list of potential biowarfare threats, especially
botulinum toxin, an experimental terror tool of Saddam Hussein's.
Botulinum toxin, the most poisonous substance known, is about
100,000 times deadlier than the neurotoxin sarin, which was used in an
attack on Tokyo subways in 1995 that killed 10 and sent 5,000 people
streaming into hospitals. During the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq reportedly
stockpiled thousands of liters of the botulinum toxin and funneled some
into bombs.
Today, as the United States edges closer to another war with Iraq,
U.S. troops would be just as vulnerable to botulinum toxin as they were
a decade ago. There's still no government-approved vaccine, and the
only antitoxin is made by extracting antibodies from the blood of
vaccinated horses using decades-old technology.
Antitoxin, which clears toxin from the blood, is so scarce that
there isn't enough to safeguard thousands of troops from a botulinum
attack. There are other major problems: Antitoxin is too difficult to
administer on the battlefield, and it can have life-threatening side
effects.
Although a 21st-century biotechversion is in laboratory trials, it
will be years before the experimental antitoxin reaches battlefield or
civilian stockpiles.
``Unfortunately, there's nothing really available for people yet,
other than horse serum,'' says George Lewis, a retired Army veterinary
microbiologist who oversaw the program that developed the equine
antitoxin shipped to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War.
When botulism strikes, it strikes hard. The toxin destroys the
nerves that enable people to breathe and swallow. Until the nerves
regenerate, which takes weeks or months, paralysis sets in. Without
ventilators and mechanical life support, victims almost always die.
Botulinum toxin's availability and lethality make it a potentially
fearsome weapon. It is difficult to defend against on the battlefield
or in the hands of urban bioterrorists, who wouldn't have to kill
millions or even thousands to have a considerable impact.
The toxin was so popular among Iraqi bioweapons scientists that
they claimed to have produced botulinum toxin on an industrial scale.
After the Gulf War, Iraq told U.N. weapons inspectors that it had
stockpiled nearly 20,000 liters of toxin in solution in anticipation of
a U.S. attack. Some of it, Iraq said, had been loaded into more than
100 solution-filled ``wet bombs,'' which were never used.
Security analysts believe Iraq's bioweapons arsenal is much larger
than Iraqi leaders acknowledge. Even the experts can only guess at what
Iraqi biologists have cooked up since 1998, when U.N. inspections
ended.
``The biological program is a black hole,'' says Avigdor Haselkorn,
a Defense Department adviser with the Geopolitical Forum, a consulting
group, and author of The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and
Deterrence, an analysis of the Iraqi program.
If Saddam had chosen to use botulinum in 1991, he would have caught
the U.S. military with its guard down. At the start of the Gulf War,
the U.S. stockpile of equine antitoxin totaled roughly 2,600 doses.
During the war, the Army bought a herd of horses, vaccinated them and
began extracting their antibodies for antitoxin. But three years after
the war, the funding died and the effort ended.
Military experts concede that biohazard suits and a costly, crude
vaccine remain the best defense against a battlefield botulinum attack.
Antitoxin won't help much on the battlefield, they say, because it must
be given via a prolonged intravenous drip right after exposure.
``If there was a massive exposure on the battlefield, there aren't
enough medical assets to give antitoxin to enough people,'' says Col.
David Danley of the Army's Joint Program Office for Biological Defense.
Where it comes from
The toxin is made by a microscopic bacterium, Clostridium
botulinum. Most people think of botulism as a scary byproduct of
careless home and commercial canning, because the bacterium grows--and
produces toxin--only in airless environments such as vacuum-packed jars
and cans.
Adults get botulism from direct exposure to the toxin in food or
dirty hypodermic needles, where spores can germinate in leftover
liquid. But adults represent just one-third of the roughly 100 cases
that occur in the USA each year. The rest are infants who are infected
with spores traveling on dust motes in air or who are unwittingly fed
spore-carrying honey. The spores germinate in the oxygen-free darkness
of the infants' intestines, producing toxin from within.
Microscopic C. botulinum spores, which are found in backyards
everywhere, are easily accessible to those with the know-how to extract
and grow them. In the hands of an urban terrorist, experts say, the
toxin could wreak havoc.
``More people have died from West Nile virus than died from the
anthrax letters, but the chaos and terror and economic impact of
anthrax were incalculable. You could do that with botulinum toxin,''
says Stephen Arnon of the California Department of Health, who led the
effort to develop a human version of antitoxin to treat infants. ``With
the simplest of lab equipment, for $1,000, you could make enough toxin
to kill hundreds of people.''
If a bioterrorist were to release a cloud of botulinum in a major
city, 50,000 people would get sick, and 30,000 of them would die
without antitoxin treatment, according to a report released this year
by the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine, a think
tank financed partly by Congress.
Because 80% to 90% of the beds in any intensive care unit in any
given city are usually full--and because most cities have just a few
hundred intensive care beds--fewer than 100 cases of botulism could
lock up every intensive care ward in a city like San Francisco for
weeks, says James Marks of the University of California-San Francisco,
an author of the report.
The gridlock would displace cancer patients, heart patients and
candidates for elective surgery, Marks says, depriving them of life
support and turning them into ``collateral damage.''
The religious sect Aum Shinrikyo attempted to weaponize botulinum
toxin before its attack on the Tokyo subway system. Aum Shinrikyo's
attempt failed because the botulinum variant members used turned out to
be non-lethal. Sarin was the group's second choice.
``Botulinum toxin is a very scary agent,'' says Arturo Casadevall,
an infectious-disease specialist at Albert Einstein College of Medicine
in New York. ``We wouldn't know we were attacked until we had an
epidemic of paralyzed people with no explanation.''
Casadevall notes that ordinary medicines wouldn't help the victims.
``One of my fears,'' he says, ``is that if we get hit we wouldn't have
enough respirators in New York City. If you had an attack that involved
thousands of people, you couldn't put them in the (intensive care
unit).''
Quick access to antitoxin would shorten the course of the illness.
If a bioterrorist were to release a cloud of botulinum toxin in a big
city, antitoxin could save about half of the lives that would be lost.
But antitoxin is in perilously short supply. After the Gulf War,
the Army stockpiled 5,000 doses of finished antitoxin from its herd of
horses. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention stored some of
what remains in freezers, but officials will not disclose exactly how
much they have on hand. The Army put 45,000 unprocessed doses into the
deep freeze.
In 1999, the Army abandoned the program and donated 53 horses to
the Air Force Academy stables. Some were auctioned or sold, stable
manager Billy Jack Barrett says; others are kept at the stables for
cadets and others to ride.
The story of the Army's botulinum antitoxin program provides a
compelling example of the nation's once-ambivalent commitment to
biodefense, experts say.
Before the Gulf War, most military analysts were more concerned
about nuclear and chemical weapons than they were about biological
agents. In 1972, 140 countries--including Iraq--renounced offensive
biowarfare by signing the Biological Weapons Convention. But the treaty
didn't deter Iraq from launching a covert bioweapons program.
CIA bioweapons analyst Kimberly Stergulz says bioterrorism offers
rogue nations like Iraq--and ``non-state actors'' like al-Qaeda--cheap
access to weapons of mass destruction. A rogue nation can launch an
extensive biowarfare program for about $10 million, compared with the
$2 billion needed to build nuclear arms.
Analysts estimate that by the time Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990,
Baghdad had spent $100 million on biowarfare delivery devices and
agents. Besides botulism, the Iraqis brewed up vast amounts of anthrax;
ricin, a castor-bean toxin that blocks breathing and circulation; and
Clostridium perfringens, which causes gangrene.
No one knows how effective Iraq's arsenal would have been had
Saddam elected to drop those bombs. Some animal research suggests that
botulinum is 40 to 80 times more lethal when it is consumed in food
than when it is inhaled into the lungs.
Before the United States abandoned offensive bioweapons research in
1969, tests on Horn Island, near Pascagoula, Miss., suggested botulinum
isn't effective when it's dropped in a small bomb.
``It just didn't kill guinea pigs downrange,'' says David Franz,
former commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for
Infectious Diseases.
But a British intelligence report released Tuesday says Iraq is
``judged to be self-sufficient'' in the technology needed to improve
its bioweapons, including fermenters, centrifuges and spray dryers. The
L-29 drone aircraft developed by Iraqi engineers are basically high-
tech crop-dusters capable of unleashing up to 80 gallons of toxin or
other agents in a deadly mist.
In the wake of Sept. 11 and the anthrax attacks, the government has
developed a renewed interest in the botulism antitoxin, says Nicholas
Pomato, vice president of research at Intracell, the Gaithersburg, Md.,
biotech firm that made the antitoxin during the Gulf War.
Intracell has begun negotiating to finish the job of processing the
Army's stored horse serum, Pomato says, at a cost of $15 million to $20
million--about $500 a dose. ``Double that cost if you start making the
material from scratch again from horses,'' Pomato says.
But he adds that it will take time to outfit a processing facility
and begin the work. New supplies, he says, won't be tested and ready
for use until next year.
Since the Army has decided not to stockpile antitoxin because it
would be unwieldy to use on the battlefield, Pomato says, the CDC plans
to take over the serum for use in the event of a bioterror attack
against civilians.
But horse antitoxin isn't without drawbacks. The human body might
recognize it as foreign and reject it, much as it would a transplanted
organ. Doctors who administer antitoxin must keep drugs on hand to
counter allergic reactions and rejection.
Ironically, because botulism is such a rare disease, drug companies
have elected to invest in more profitable products--such as the toxin
itself. A purified form of botulinum toxin, sold as Botox, is used to
treat a long list of ailments, including eye-muscle spasms, post-stroke
spasticity, migraine headaches and cerebral palsy. Botox's popularity
as a wrinkle relaxer also promises to turn it into a billion-dollar
cosmetic drug.
The anthrax attacks, impending war with Iraq and an imminent flood
of government research money could provoke new interest in treating the
botulism itself. Marks, at the University of California-San Francisco,
and his colleagues at the Army's infectious-diseases research institute
already have begun exploiting the new tools of biotechnology to develop
an alternative to equine antitoxin.
In late August, they reported success in developing a trio of
genetically engineered human antibodies. Given together in animal
tests, the three antibodies inactivated botulinum toxin type A, the
most lethal toxin and the one preferred by Saddam. Biotech antitoxin,
Marks says, could ``deweaponize'' botulinum toxin.
Because the antibodies persist in the body for months, troops going
into battle could be immunized; protection would last six months. The
antibodies are 100 times stronger than the human antibodies used to
treat infants, but the experimental antibodies will take years to
develop.
Human clinical trials have not yet begun. Moreover, type A
botulinum toxin is only one of seven types; different antibody
cocktails must be identified for each one.
Marks says vast amounts could be made cheaply in high-production
fermenters to treat civilians stricken in a bioterror attack. ``One
kilogram could treat 10,000 people,'' he says, and an industrial
fermenter could crank out 120 kilograms a month.
The challenge now, Marks says, is to ``make them, get them into
humans and see if they work.''
The Army has a vaccine, developed years ago, that primes the immune
system to make its own anti-botulinum antibodies. It is rarely used
because so few people run the risk of exposure to the toxin. The
vaccine has never gotten government approval because the Army has never
been able to mount a large-scale study showing that the vaccine works.
As a result, the vaccine can be used only under a special exemption
from FDA rules. Newer vaccines are also in the works, but they are
years from winning approval.
The Botox connection
In an odd twist, vaccinating soldiers or civilians also would
immunize them against Botox, the only potential bioterror agent
approved for use as a drug.
Botox, which is made by Allergan, poses a dilemma to health
officials and bioterror strategists. Vaccinating soldiers and the
public would protect against exposure to the toxin, but it also would
deprive people of Botox's benefit--and knock a blockbuster product with
estimated sales of $430 million this year off the market.
Former FDA commissioner Donald Kennedy, a Stanford University
neurobiologist who has used the toxin for years in research, says the
risk of leaving the public unprotected is just too great.
``Who would have imagined a world in which terror weapons are used
as beauty aids?'' Kennedy wrote in a recent issue of the journal
Science.
Kennedy, the journal's editor, worries that mass producing Botox,
and trying to improve it, will ultimately make it a bigger threat. ``I
think we should develop a vaccine,'' he says.
Allergan vice president Mitchell Brin, a Botox pioneer, says his
firm has chosen to stay out of the vaccine debate. Brin says the
company has assured the government that it will keep its Botox
operation secret to preserve national security. ``We don't talk about
our manufacturing facilities,'' he says. ``We've agreed to keep a low
profile.''
weapons against bioterrorism--(bioterror agent)
Anthrax
Symptoms: A high fever and flu-like symptoms for inhalation
anthrax; a black lesion from cutaneous anthrax. Anthrax cannot be
transmitted from person to person.
Defenses: Antibiotic Cipro, which must be taken for 60 days, is the
only drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration to treat
inhalation anthrax. But so far, all of the anthrax strains have been
identified also have been sensitive to doxycycline and other
tetracycline antibiotics, as well as penicillin. Bayer, maker of Cipro,
tripled it production last fall.
Botulinum toxin
Symptoms: Botulism always begins with paralysis in the muscles of
the head, eyes and face and throat. The first signs appear 12 to 72
hours after exposure. They are typically droopy eyelids, the absence of
smile lines around the eyes and dilated pupils. Paralysis descends down
the body, with muscles growing limp. Muscles that govern breathing and
swallowing stop working. Patients need life-support to survive.
Defenses: An experimental vaccine made from inactivated toxin is
used mainly to protect people who work with botulinum and Botox
(purified toxin, which is sold as a drug). Newer biotech versions are
also in the works. Human anti-toxin made of antibodies from the blood
of vaccinated humans is used to treat infant botulism. Horse antitoxin,
made from the blood of vaccinated horses, is used to treat adults with
the disease.
Smallpox
Symptoms: High fever, chills and head and back aches begin one to
six days after exposure. A rash forms on the face, arms and legs and
can cause severe scarring. The disease is spread through person-to-
person contact. It is highly contagious, especially in populations in
which few people have been vaccinated or have had the disease.
Defenses: Vaccination against smallpox in the USA ended in 1971;
the world's last naturally occurring case was in Somalia in 1977. The
United States currently has 155 million doses of vaccine made decades
ago kept in storage. Another 209 million doses have been ordered and
are expected by the end of the year, bringing the total supply to 364
million doses.
Tularemia (also known as rabbit fever)
Symptoms: The bacteria-borne disease cannot be spread from person
to person; it is usually spread through contaminated animals or meat.
Initial symptoms include fever, chills and weakness. Tularemia triggers
pneumonia, pleuritis and lymph-node disease within three to five days
of exposure. The disease is rare in the USA, but outbreaks commonly
occur in Europe and Russia.
Defenses: Tularemia is treated with antibiotics; the military has a
vaccine, but it's not available for general use. Treatment with
antibiotics after exposure is effective.
Plague
Symptoms: High fever, chills and headache begin one to six days
after exposure. Death can occur within two to four days.
Defenses: The vaccine for bubonic plague, which is transmitted by
fleas, is not effective against the aerosolized form that would be used
in bioterrorism. Antibiotic treatment must begin within 24 hours of
symptoms to improve chances of survival.
Viral homorrhagic fever
Symptoms: Depending on the virus (Ebola, Marburg, others), symptoms
can be high fever, diarrhea and muscle aches, followed by severe chest
pain, shock and bleeding. Death can occur in seven days.
Defenses: No licensed vaccines exist for any of these diseases,
though experimental versions have been made for yellow fever and
Argentine hemorrhagic fever. The only therapy is supportive, mainly
intravenous fluids. An antiviral drug called ribavirin has proven
useful in people with Rift Valley and Lassa fevers. An oral form can be
used when there are mass casualties and not enough health workers or
equipment to give it intravenously.
Senator Boxer. I think sometimes we are not paying enough
attention to this, at least in my opinion.
I want to say that I listened to National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice with great interest, and I spoke to the
chairman about what Condoleezza Rice said today about the
presence of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and Madeleine Albright, Secretary
Albright, you referred to this, and to me it was very
interesting.
It seems a whole new line is developing here as a
rationale, and since she raised the question, which we have
been briefed on but none of us really raised it, I want to say
today what I believe to be the case. I believe there may be
some al-Qaeda there. I also believe, in my opinion, from what I
know, there is more al-Qaeda in Pakistan. There is more al-
Qaeda in Africa, and there is more al-Qaeda in the United
States of America itself, in this Nation, and so those of my
colleagues who bring up not taking our eye off the ball in the
war against terrorism, and to you, Madam Secretary, for
mentioning that, I think that is very important.
To me, the issue in Iraq is simple. Weapons of mass
destruction have got to be inspected. We have got to find them
if they are there. We have got to get them dismantled. But all
these other issues, I think, added now are very interesting,
and go to some of the cynicism that I hear among my
constituents, and I want to put that point out there.
I have a question, believe it or not, that deals with the
Carnegie Foundation. The Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace released a study called, ``Iraq, A New Approach,'' which
advocates a policy of U.N.-sanctioned, coerced inspections.
This plan envisions that an armed inspection implementation
force would be added to support international inspectors. I
wonder if either of you have read this report, or have a
feeling about it, because as I search for a path to peace, it
is through the inspection regime, but I want to make sure it is
a strong inspection regime, and I think that the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace may have come up with some
idea that we can seize on and develop and I wonder if you,
Secretary Albright, and then Secretary Kissinger, could
respond.
Ms. Albright. Secretary Boxer, I think that--I have not
read the report. I have read about it, and I do find it an
interesting concept, because part of the issue is how to try to
get intrusive inspections that actually have some teeth to
them, and while I think there probably are some technical
difficulties to it, I think it is certainly worth exploring.
If I might also say, I know this is not an easy subject to
bring up, but I do not think it would hurt if we considered the
fact that Saddam Hussein is a war criminal, and the War Crimes
Tribunal made a big difference when we were dealing with
Milosevic, and I think this is something we might also think
about.
Senator Boxer. Actually, that was my next question. My time
has run out, but I will submit it and hope that you can respond
to it. I would greatly appreciate it.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, I proposed that 5 months
ago. He should be declared a war criminal.
Senator Boxer. Can we hear from Dr. Kissinger?
Dr. Kissinger. I do not agree with the statements that have
been heard around here about the administration's irrational
exuberance for war. The administration is facing a problem on
which we all agree: the existence of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq. They are facing the problem that, if we
acquiesce in that now, these weapons will only continue to grow
and we will face the same problem a year or 2 or 3 from now.
The President went to the United Nations, put the case to
the United Nations, and there-by started a process I am
confident he will let run to a reasonable conclusion. We have
all agreed here that we are talking about months not years, so
the difference in regard to all of this is relatively small.
Now, with respect to that inspection system. I have talked
to General Boyd, who was one of the drafters, and I have read
the report. I put a sentence in my statement about a stand-by
force and a stand-by authority when I discussed the general
requirement for inspection, so I think it is a useful idea. If
an inspection system were worked out, that would be a possible
element of it.
The only warning I would issue is not to use inspections as
a means for avoiding the problem and then having to face the
same issue down the road. We should of course see what can be
worked out in good faith. I cannot make a big contribution
because I do not know enough about it, but I think the
administration will in fact, do this because they will have to
answer the question of the inspection system as it goes through
the process. But if that does not prove feasible we will have
to face the issue within a limited period of time for action.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I apologize to the Senator from Rhode Island
for this additional intervention, and it will just take a
second, but I want to make sure the record is straight. My
understanding was, the comment was made earlier on that some
within the administration were engaged in irrational exuberance
about war. I do not think that was said of the President.
The second point is----
Senator Boxer. I said that, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I know. I just want to make sure what we are
talking about here, because we are trying to--and the witnesses
are incredibly helpful to this degree. We are trying to work
something out here. We are trying to do this cooperatively. We
are not looking for disagreement. We are looking for agreement
to deal with what we all agree is a bad guy and a bad
situation, meaning Saddam.
Part of the reason why I think we are in this dilemma is
that as recently as today in the press--and I can tell you from
my personal experience there is still real disagreement within
this administration about how to proceed. Now, I know the
Secretary of State is going to tell us there is not much, but
there is. There has been at least up until today, and so part
of our problem relates to whether or not we pick up the paper
and read a statement made by, say, Mr. Wolfowitz, as opposed to
a statement made by the Secretary of State. Sometimes they are
way apart.
The President is working his way through, deciding who he
agrees with on each of the things, but guaranteed there is a
fundamental difference being presented to the President on
these issues.
And the second point is, the Senator from Indiana and I had
an opportunity to meet with the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr.
Ivanov. We asked about amendments to a new resolution in the
Security Council. His initial response to us was, there was no
need for one.
As we pursued this along the lines of Dr. Kissinger's
comments and Secretary Albright's comments, we said the
inspection regime as played out prior to them being removed was
not good enough. The point Dr. Kissinger made, we could not
interview potential defectors and/or collaborators because Kofi
Annan had come along and said, you are allowed to have an Iraqi
military person standing in the room. That is unacceptable.
We also discussed the possibility of the need for a
military force to accompany the inspectors, and to that, and I
am anxious to hear what the Secretary of State has to say, the
Foreign Minister said he was open to that. The Russians were
open to that. So I would not be so quick--and I know neither of
the witnesses are suggesting it. I would not be so quick to
suggest that Secretary Powell may not be able to pull off
something very positive here to get us down this road we all
say we want to go down.
So I just want to make those two points as it relates to
how it is beginning to move, and hopefully, God willing, and my
grandpop used to say, ``and the creek not rising,'' we could
end up at the end of the day with the same kind of resolution
agreement we had as we work through the 1998 resolution with
sufficient safeguards built into it.
But at any rate--and Senator, you and the Senator from
Florida can take additional time to ask your questions, because
you have been so patient.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I
know we all share the same goals and had a good discussion
about that, but one of the areas that does concern me is the
international relations that have been, the dynamics that have
been created by this initiative and, of course, the elections
in Germany are, I guess, on the front burner as to how that
became an issue in that country.
But one--and you read the comments from the various
international leaders from around the country, whether it is
China, Japan, Kuwait, even our friends in Canada, they are all
expressing concerns about this, but particularly one of the
quotes was from President Mubarak, who is maybe one of the
deans in the Arab world, has been there since the early
eighties as the leader of his country, and he said just several
weeks ago, ``if you strike Iraq, not one Arab leader will be
able to control the angry outburst of the masses.''
And maybe we should not argue, just for the sake of
discussion, about whether he is right or wrong, but supposing
he is right, then what happens, and from your experience, maybe
you could take us down that path. What countries are most
susceptible in the region to the angry outburst of the masses?
Jordan, certainly King Abdullah has expressed concerns, and
where do we go? Then do we go into Jordan and help him out? Do
we go into Saudi Arabia or Egypt to help them out? Maybe you
could go down that path a little bit, if he is right, just for
the sake of argument.
Ms. Albright. First of all, could I just say I appreciate
Chairman Biden straightening out the business about exuberance,
because I did not say it about the President or the whole
administration, but I do think, as I said earlier, that there
are those who had an agenda even before this started, so that
concerns me.
I think Secretary Kissinger is right when he says that if
we go in and do this ultimately there will be some that have
said they would have nothing to do with us that will have
something to do with us, so I do not dispute that.
On the other hand, I do think that we have had many signals
from various Arab leaders in the region who are very concerned
about what the sparks of this might initiate, and King Abdullah
has made that very clear. I think the Saudis, one of the
reasons that they have backed off a lot on this is that they
are concerned about what happens on their street, and that we
do have to be concerned about how, that we find ourselves in
the rather peculiar position, if I can put it this way, that we
might be opposed to those who disagree with their governments,
but are not necessarily extremists about how this is carried
out.
So I think again, as people consider what the effect of
this will be, we need to hear more from those who have up-to-
date intelligence as to what the effect of all of this will be
in those countries, because there is little doubt in my mind
that there will be outpourings of sentiment against what we
have done.
Dr. Kissinger. I am assuming that we will not act unless we
believe it is in the overwhelming interest of national and
international security. If that is indeed the judgment of the
administration, it cannot be deterred by the threat of
outbursts in the streets, because that is what will happen and
it will surely become a source of permanent source of
blackmail.
The countries you mentioned have shown a pretty good
capacity to control their streets. Still we cannot be driven in
our fundamental judgment of what is necessary for international
order by the fear or threat of demonstrations.
The growth of Iraq's stockpiles is a serious problem and it
must be addressed. It can hopefully be dealt with through the
processes now being conducted, but even if it is not, I do not
think the demonstrations are going to prove disastrous.
Moreover, the German election was not caused by American
policy. There were many elements within German politics that
produced this reaction, and it will almost certainly be
resolved in the weeks to come in a cooperative spirit.
Senator Sarbanes. Would the Senator yield on that very
point for just a minute?
Senator Chafee. Certainly.
Senator Sarbanes. I am interested to hear Dr. Kissinger say
that, because on January 13 you wrote--and I would only make
this point because earlier in this discussion you said we
should not engage in speculation about individual countries,
and I wanted to just quote what you said then. Talking about
building up this movement against Hussein you said, ``Britain
will not easily abandon the pivotal role, based upon its
special relationship with the United States, that it has earned
for itself in the evolution of the crisis, nor will Germany
move into active opposition to the United States, especially in
an election year.''
Dr. Kissinger. All of us who have been concerned with
German-American relations were surprised by the fact that an
anti-American appeal could evoke such feelings.
Senator Sarbanes. But it does underscore, I think, the
warning you gave today about the danger of speculating about
individual countries.
Dr. Kissinger. That is right. I had not understood the
degree to which such feeling had evolved, but it surely has
deeper causes than a reaction to the immediate tactics
regarding this situation.
Senator Sarbanes. I thank the Senator.
Senator Chafee. Thank you. I will just followup a little
bit.
At a hearing we had earlier this month, I asked one of the
witnesses about spontaneous combustion that has happened, and
specifically I mentioned Iran, and how we were caught so flat-
footed. It just seemed to happen overnight. We did not even get
our embassy evacuated, obviously.
The witness responded by saying yes, as a matter of fact,
one of the leading scholars in the area wrote a book, ``Iran
Under the Pahlavis,'' by Professor Lenkowski, if I have
pronounced it right, and saying it is the most stable regime in
the region--his book was not a best-seller--so we have to be
aware of that, and when President Mubarak is making these type
of statements, no Arab leader will be able to control the
outbursts--let me get it right, the angry outbursts of the
masses, I think we have to listen, and if we are going down
this road, go down it.
And I guess I will ask one more time, if Jordan is, the
Arab leader cannot control the outburst of the masses, or
Egypt, for the sake of argument, then what do we do?
Ms. Albright. Could I, Senator--I think that--I hate to, I
really do hate to disagree with Henry on this. I think that as
we look at what the causes of terrorism are--I remember,
Chairman Biden asked me when I testified sometime ago whether
poverty was the cause of terrorism, and I remember saying, we
do not know that.
We do know that there are people who are looking for
reasons to be opposed to us that are part of societies that are
dysfunctional, or where there is a great gap between the rich
and the poor, or people have no way of knowing what their
future will be, that they are out there as potential recruits
for terrorism and therefore, if the streets explode, it is not
just a matter of controlling them by the monarch or the ruler.
It may be impossible, and it may, in fact, create an
environment that hurts us in the overall fight against
terrorism, and that is my concern.
Senator Chafee. I would agree with that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kissinger. One has to go back to the fundamental issue:
that there are stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq, in violation of the U.N. resolution; that we are engaged
in a diplomatic process to attempt to deal with this. First of
all, does Mubarak really mean this, and second, even if he
does, can we ultimately be deterred from doing what we should
do and leave these weapons undisturbed? Will that not create a
worse problem with the streets as time goes on? These are the
questions that need to be addressed.
Senator Chafee. I know my time is up, but I guess I did not
get an answer to the question, what does happen, just for the
sake of argument? Do we preemptively go into Jordan if there is
someone there, but I do not want to take any more time.
Dr. Kissinger. The word ``preemptively'' is being thrown
around too loosely in the debate. It has always been understood
that, if there is a fundamental threat to national security,
one reserves the option for military action. There have been
occasions in the past--as when the Jordanian Government was
threatened--that the United States was willing to give it very
substantial support.
Nobody could recommend moving American troops into Egypt or
Jordan on the basis of riots in the streets. This will have to
be dealt with when the issues arise and in a way that is not
determined by an abstract theory of preemption, but by an
assessment of the national security and international security
as perceived at that moment.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am intrigued by
the declaration of this preemption doctrine. As I read the
Constitution, the President in his role as Commander in Chief
can act preemptively for the protection of the interest of the
United States. What is different in this declaration of
preemption, and if there is an emphasis on it, is there a
weakening of the actual constitutional responsibilities of the
Commander in Chief?
Dr. Kissinger. This is a question you should address to
administration witnesses. I have not had the document in my
hand yet, but I have read it on the Internet. I have expressed
my general view in my statement and elsewhere: that I do not
believe it is in the American interest to proclaim a universal
theory of preemption that any nation can then use to protect
itself against its definition of a threat.
I also believe that, given the kind of terrorism that now
exists, dealing with it would be incompatible with some of the
notions of sovereignty that have evolved in the 17th, 18th, and
19th centuries, and that have governed the rules among nations.
For there is an element of preemption inherent in the nature of
the terrorist threat and in the nature of the modern frame of
reference.
It would therefore be useful to initiate a general
international discussion, or Security Council discussion, of
what principles of preemption could be universally applied so
that not every major nation could attack every nation around
its periphery. I have no resolution to this problem, but--as I
recall the statement when I read it--preemption is listed as an
absolutely last resort in that document, and primarily aimed at
terror. One really ought to ask the people who drafted it. My
own view on preemption is the one I have stated.
Senator Nelson. Madam Secretary.
Ms. Albright. Well, I think that it becomes a very kind of
shadowy area in terms of what the right of self-defense is
versus the preemption, and I think you raise a very important
point, that perhaps it does undermine the whole concept of
self-defense if, in fact, you begin now to see it as a new
doctrine, and that is what has concerned me, is that all of a
sudden--you know, everybody has been looking for a term for the
post-cold war era and whether deterrence still works, and these
are very important discussions, but I do not think they should
be superimposed on what we are trying to deal with now, because
it is so unclear, and I agree with Secretary Kissinger that it
would be worth having a national as well as an international
discussion of this, not in any kind of an overly rapid or
hysterical way.
Dr. Kissinger. In retrospect, I did not argue that at the
time. It would have been appropriate to take preemptive action
against bin Laden in Afghanistan and, as these terrorist cells
exist, it cannot be precluded. But what it means in an
international system both as a concept and as something that
can be more or less universally accepted so that it does not
become arbitrary, is a problem we are at the beginning of not
at the solution of it.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have come away from this
discussion and others we have had both in this committee and
our other committee, the Armed Services Committee, thinking
that the draft resolution that was sent to us clearly needs to
be changed, that Ambassador Holbrooke had four suggestions of
change yesterday that I think were excellent, and I am just
curious about the views of our two witnesses here with respect
to those suggestions.
One was to delete the clause that would seemingly give
carte blanche to go into the whole area, and nail it down just
as a resolution authorizing force in Iraq, another one was to
make reference to a U.N. Security Council resolution, a third
would be the executive branch reporting clause to the Congress,
and a fourth was a clause as to the post-conflict Iraq, and
what would be our planning efforts and responsibilities there.
Are we moving in the right direction with such changes to
the resolution?
Ms. Albright. Well, I do not think that as a private
citizen it is absolutely right to give you suggestions on this,
but my problem with the resolution that came here is its
broadness, and you all have in previous ways worked out a
resolution that makes clearer what the co-responsibility of the
executive and legislative branch is in this, and as somebody
that was in an administration that we always have had
discussions about the war powers, I do think that it is up to
you all to figure out how to refine this, and it is essential,
frankly, but I am not sure it is appropriate for me to make
suggestions.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kissinger. I have not studied the resolution enough to
make suggestions. As a general proposition, however I think the
President should be given authority of a nature that makes
clear that: No. 1, the Congress understands the relationship of
the Iraq issue to other issues in the area, and does not just
deal with it or look at it in strictly Iraq terms; and No. 2,
that the President is given adequate flexibility to deal with
this as to reporting requirements.
Senator Sarbanes. I am not clear on that answer. Is it your
view the President should be authorized to take military action
with respect to issues in the region, and not just with respect
to Iraq?
Dr. Kissinger. I am now most concerned about the issue of
Iraq. The resolution should clearly indicate the relationship
of the Iraqi issue to others, though I really have not studied
this enough to make drafting suggestions.
The Chairman. Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
very much for being here, and for lasting through this.
A couple of quick things. I want to apologize for not being
here during a portion of this hearing. There were other
hearings I had to be at.
A point that I would like to make is, at least for this
Member, if we need to narrow the resolution or add restrictions
or reporting requirements to that, I would be open to any of
that being done as long as at the end of the day it allows the
President the use of force, including military force against
Iraq if the administration decides it is necessary to move on
forward.
So working the wording on this to make it clear that it is
not expansive, it cannot be used in other places, I think that
is good, and if we can do that and get a large, positive vote
for it, because I think that is an important statement to make,
that it be a large vote in the Senate for moving forward on
this, I think it would be a very positive statement to do.
Secretary Kissinger, I wanted to ask you, in looking
through your statement about a post-Saddam Iraq and the impact
on terrorism if we do move forward against Iraq--and I
apologize if this question has been asked in another forum or
while I was not here, but I see a problem if we do not move
forward--and you articulate that some people will ask ``why
now,'' and you would ask, ``why not now'' in your original
statement. I can see a lot of difficulty if we move forward,
but I see a lot of difficulty if we do not move forward, and I
think there is a substantial positive scenario if we do move
forward on Iraq, not on the basis of a preemption doctrine, but
on the basis of what he has failed to do with U.N. resolutions,
that we could have a substantial positive impact on the Iraqi
people and the war on terrorism if this is done right, and with
the right reasoning in place.
Dr. Kissinger. That is my view.
Senator Brownback. I would like you to articulate, how do
you see this impacting the whole region and its war on
terrorism if we do move forward with this war on Iraq?
Dr. Kissinger. There are many causes for which groups join
terrorism, and Madeleine has indicated some of them. I would
focus on the toleration of terrorist groups by government more
afraid of the consequences of not tolerating them; and, second,
on the perception that, in the end, the United States and its
friends not appear too weak to defend their fundamental
interests.
For all these reasons, a demonstration that the United
States will insist on carrying out obligations it has
undertaken, particularly in this region and especially with
respect to weapons of mass destruction, will have a positive
impact on the war against terrorism.
As I have said, I do not accept the proposition that there
is a distinction between the war on terrorism and the Iraqi
problem. I believe the two are closely related. The war against
terrorism must be pursued energetically. Our credibility with
respect to it will be enhanced if we act as I have indicated
and, more importantly, as the administration has indicated, on
the Iraq issue.
Senator Brownback. Previously I have worked a lot with the
Iraqi National Congress, the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998 that
Secretary Albright, you worked on its implementation, and with
Senator Kerrey of Nebraska, Bob Kerrey, the former Senator.
Both of us concluded--and this is somewhat wishful thinking,
but I do not think so, that Iraq will move to democracy and
will be, we would hope and think, clearly very possible in the
near future, a strong democracy. It has resources underneath
it. It has an educated population. It is not without its
difficulties and divisions within the country, north and south
and in the middle, but that this could be a very strong force
for democracy once Saddam is removed in that region.
Secretary Albright, you would have dealt with that a lot as
Secretary, and probably had a lot of opportunity to think about
that recently as well.
Ms. Albright. Well, I think it would be much wished, and
clearly the population of Iraq is a little bit different in
terms of its modernity and education from some of the other
places, but the question that I think we have, and we raised,
was, what is the plan to get from here to there, that it will
not be simple, that there is not only the potential of
democracy, but also the potential of internecine fighting
before we get there, and what I have wanted to hear a little
bit more from the administration, what is the plan from getting
here to there?
I am chairman of the board of the National Democratic
Institute, that has been working very hard at looking at
different ways that democracy might be possible in the Middle
East. We have programs in Yemen and Bahrain, and I am not one
of those people who believes that it is impossible to have
democracy in the Middle East, but I think that we have to get
there in a systematic way, and understand how we get there, and
I must say that while I have a great deal of respect for those
people who try to work with the Iraqi National Congress, it is
not a group that I think is quite--has shown so far that it has
the continuity and the cooperation within it to be ready to
have democracy.
I have talked to the Kurdish leaders. They would so much
like to hear us talking about not regime change but a freeing
of Iraq, and I think we should be thinking about that, but I
think it is a long way between here and there, and that is why
we need to see a little bit more how we get there, and what the
role of the United States in that will be.
Dr. Kissinger. I would say that the choices with respect to
weapons of mass destruction are relatively limited. Our choices
after a military operation will require us to bring about
substantial improvement in Iraqi conditions. I would consider
it unlikely that one could move there to full democracy in a
very brief time. However I think it is essential to move to
accountability of the government institutions toward some type
of constitutional system, and to substantial improvement in the
lives of the population. We cannot do that all alone and it
will require an international effort.
Senator Brownback. I would certainly agree with that. I
think there is a potential to do something extraordinarily
positive for a lot of people and extraordinarily positive for
our security here, not without huge risks, substantial risks,
but the risks of waiting I have concluded are greater than
those of acting now.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You have been very patient. With your
permission, I would like to let Senator Sarbanes--he says he
has another question, and I know you missed your shuttles, two
of them here.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, I am looking at a dispatch
from a Virginia paper reporting on a meeting at the University
of Virginia on Tuesday at the Miller Center, at which General
Scowcroft and Secretary Eagleburger spoke. They had a crowd of,
it says here of over 900 people, and the director of the center
says, ``I do not know of a larger gathering, or an event of
this kind in the city in a long time.''
At that event, General Scowcroft said, ``America cannot
fight a global war on terrorism without the active assistance
of other nations, and must consider what the consequences of
actions taken in Iraq might be for that international
cooperation. Saddam is a terrible, evil man,'' he said, ``but
he is not a problem for us because of terrorism. If we
antagonize the world, it could cripple world support for the
war on terrorism. We cannot win the war on terrorism without
international support.''
And, of course, earlier, a little over a month ago, General
Scowcroft had an article in the Wall Street Journal in which he
said, amongst other things, ``an attack on Iraq now would
seriously jeopardize our counterterrorist campaign.''
Now, Secretary Kissinger, you have argued here this morning
just to the contrary. You think an attack on Iraq would help
the counterterrorism campaign, but General Scowcroft is very
strong on this point. I mean, he argues it with considerable
force, so what is your take on this, Secretary Albright?
Ms. Albright. Well, I agree with what General Scowcroft has
said. That has kind of been my point, is that basically the war
on terrorism I think we have been told by the President is our
top priority, and I do think that in many ways, either because
assets are removed, or because we cannot get the kind of
cooperation we need from the rest of the international
community for pursuing the terrorists, that this in some ways
is an additional task that we do not need right now.
But I think, Senator, the problem that we are all having in
this is that there is nothing that is written in stone in this,
that there are answers that are not out there, and we are all,
I think, trying to seek them, and my personal opinion is that,
as you pointed out earlier, we have not finished in
Afghanistan. In fact, far from it.
Senator Sarbanes. We may not have finished elsewhere. I was
struck by Secretary Kissinger's statement here, and I just
alluded to it before, and I want to come back to it. At the
bottom of page 1 of your statement, bases for terrorists have
been established in several countries, and I am now quoting,
``usually in areas where the governments can plausibly deny
control, are actually not in control, such as in Yemen,
Somalia, or perhaps Indonesia and Iran.''
Now, should we not be focused on that specific problem at
this time, if these terrorists have established these bases,
this infrastructure, like what they had in Afghanistan,
although presumably not as fully developed, should not the
immediate focus of our attention be to figure out how to
destroy that infrastructure?
Dr. Kissinger. General Scowcroft is a long-time associate
and friend of mine, for whom I have very high regard. We just
have a serious difference of opinion on that subject. I do not
believe that the war against these bases is competitive with
the need to destroy the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
Indeed, I believe that success, either diplomatic or military,
in destroying these weapons of mass destruction will enhance
our ability to conduct another war. Scowcroft has a different
opinion.
Senator Sarbanes. What do you think we should do about
these four countries here?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, one would have to deal with them, and
there is no general rule. Somalia has no government, really at
least no effective government. Thus the question is, what are
these places actually doing? Yemen has a government, but not in
every region of the country. With respect to bases from which
terrorist attacks are being planned or might be planned against
the United States, we cannot exclude, ultimately, the use of
military action.
Obviously, a country like Indonesia is of such a magnitude
that this is not something to be done except under the most
extreme provocation--which does not exist right now. It is not
even clear whether there are bases on these islands, as some
people claim, so one would have to go about this country by
country, and consider the nature of each threat.
The Chairman. Not that you ever need me to defend you, Dr.
Kissinger, but as I listened to Senator Sarbanes and your
response, am I missing something, or is there--it seems to me
that your underlying premise is that if and when the President
takes action, he is not going to be antagonizing the rest of
the world, that he is going to have a sufficient portion of the
rest of the world with him. Is that--I mean, because I think
everybody agrees----
Dr. Kissinger. That is my underlying premise.
The Chairman. Again, though there is a disagreement, one of
the things that I find the most difficult as I try to go
through this----
Dr. Kissinger. It depends upon how you define the rest of
the world. But, as a general principle, if you take all the
major countries and all the other countries, I do not believe--
--
Senator Sarbanes. What is your analysis if it is done
unilaterally?
The Chairman. In other words----
Senator Sarbanes. What is your analysis if it is done
unilaterally, American military action unilaterally?
Dr. Kissinger. I do not believe it will happen.
Senator Sarbanes. But we have to reason this through, do we
not?
Dr. Kissinger. But I am convinced that----
Senator Sarbanes. Would you condition the President's
ability to act on the premise that it not be unilateral?
Dr. Kissinger. We pay a higher price if we act
unilaterally, but I have enough confidence in the President
that, if he did act, I would assume it to have been necessary.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, the rhetoric that has been used it
seems is moving us increasingly to the position where we do not
have options. If they do not act, then we say, aha, he did not
act. He said he was going to act, unilaterally or not, and he
did not do it.
The Chairman. Well, if I can, you have been here 3 hours.
You have been incredible. I just want to conclude by thanking
you and also pointing out what I think is a fair statement, I
hope is a fair statement, and that is that, as it relates to
Saddam Hussein in Iraq, as policymakers writ large, the
President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,
they are never going to have more than 75 percent of the facts
they need to know to be certain.
There is no way we can reach the point where there is
certainty, so where we peel off among us is the degree to which
it seems to me--it is not observation, but the degree to which
we think certain things are going to fall into place. I happen
to agree with Dr. Kissinger on this point. I cannot fathom the
President going alone. I just cannot fathom the President going
alone.
If I am wrong about that--and I am going to end up having
to take a chance here when I vote. If I am wrong about that, I
have made a tragic mistake, because he would be making a tragic
mistake if he went alone, but that comes down to a little bit
of faith here. I mean, it comes down to the point where, at
least for me, what I do not know I have to look at, and based
on my personal conversations, public conversations, I have to
take a chance. We all do at some point. We are not going to get
all the facts here.
One point I would make, though, and I publicly urge the
President, he made a very compelling case to the United Nations
as to why Iraq has violated the United Nations standards. That
is a different case than the case to the American people of
what he is asking the American people to be prepared to do.
I will end where I began this hearing. I am absolutely
convinced that no matter how well-formulated a foreign policy,
it cannot be sustained without the informed consent of the
American people, and at this moment we do not have that
informed consent.
You go home--and I will just read from today's paper, the
Washington Times. It says, ``An increasing number of Republican
lawmakers are saying that President Bush has not made a
convincing case of using force against Iraq, although they
expect the Congress to overwhelmingly approve a resolution
authorizing military force.''
Representative Michael N. Castle of Delaware, a very good,
personal friend, said the same thing I have been saying at
home, and what I have been hearing at home. He said ``that the
administration lobbying job on Capitol Hill has been `so
dismal' that the best arguments by far thus far have been made
by Tony Blair.'' He goes on to say, there is almost ``no
discussion with the administration, said Mr. Castle, a member
of the House Intelligence Committee.''
``I do not know if they think we are all glued to the
Sunday talk shows, but we are not. Most of us have questions.
Members of Congress are not getting the information . . .
Quote, ``no Republican mentioned the public disagreements among
the Democrats . . . I am looking for more information,'' said
Representative Ray La Hood of Illinois, a Republican member of
the Intelligence Committee.'' You go on and on.
Now, that does not mean the case is not there. That does
not mean the case is not there. I have the advantage or
disadvantage of having access to, on a regular basis, the
Secretary of State, the President because of this job, but I
really think it is very important, very important that the case
be made in more detail, and not confuse having made the case of
a violation of U.N. resolutions as being synonymous with having
made the case to the American people that we may be asking
them--not only, as my friend from Kansas says, taking a chance
here, we have to be prepared. Are we prepared?
For example, we had testimony in our second set of hearings
from a retired executive director, Colonel Scott Feil, whose
job was post-conflict resolution questions and what we do. He
says, ``the requirements are providing a core security for the
largest city, about 10 million in population, in the largest
state, which is about 40 percent of the population, and
humanitarian efforts, securing WMD and associated facilities,
patrolling the Iranian border areas, the Kurdish areas,
protecting the Shat Al-Arab oil fields, monitoring the region
from the Tigris to the Euphrates, and Syrian border--the Tigris
and the Euphrates contain the bulk of the population--and then
conducting the integrated disarmament and demobilization
process in coordination with the integrated efforts.''
He goes on to say, ``the total cost of this force, once
again based on U.S. equivalence--there is wide variation in the
country--could range up to $16 billion and a force of 75,000 to
operate within Iraq.''
Now, it may not be 75,000, but I will conclude by saying,
in my last meeting with the President, along with 10 other
congressional leaders, the President turned to me in the
presence of everyone, as he asked other people, and he said,
``Mr. Chairman, what do you think,'' and I said, Mr. President,
I will be with you as long as you make a clear case to the
American people, including telling them we are going to have to
be there for a while, we are going to have to put American
forces on the ground there for a while, and it could cost a lot
of money. His response was, ``I will do that.'' That has not
been done yet.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Chairman, you are very thorough.
Would you mind if I make just a quick comment on this regard,
because I think you have got quite a valid point. I mentioned
to other people the calls into my office, many are running
against this, even though polling numbers say they are for it.
What the President did at the U.N. was, he spoke at the
United Nations, and I did not hear new information come
forward, but he recited, here is the case. I think we should
have the President up to a joint session of the Congress and
have him say, here is the case, and here is what we will do,
because what the U.N. did, and what the President took
advantage of there was to say, OK, you want me to go to the
United Nations, I will go to the U.N. Here is my case, and when
you put it all together, it stacks up that Saddam has made a
great case against himself. He is the one who has made the
case.
I think if the President will come up to a joint session of
Congress, address the Congress and the American people
similarly, here is the case, and that you will cumulatively
see, in the private briefings we have, and the public hearings
we have had, an extraordinary condemnation, but it does need to
be laid out collectively to the American public, because you
are right, no policy of ours, if it is to engage a war effort
in this country, can be sustained without the sustained support
of the American people, and I think that would be an important
thing for the President to do and for us to engage.
The Chairman. I am making that point, and I appreciate the
witnesses sticking around for our intramural discussion here,
but I am making an additional point, an additional point not
merely what the threat is, which is critically important, but
what we are going to ask of the American people to meet the
threat. I think they are prepared, but we have to tell them.
What I worry about after being here 30 years, I do not want
to go through a process where we engage, we succeed on the
military front, we lose some or many American forces in the
process, but we will succeed and then find 18 months from now
we do not have the same people who called for going to war
refusing in the budget price to say, I am going to vote for an
extra $30 billion for Iraq this year, instead of--which will
have to be made, instead of a tax cut, or prescription drugs,
or for whatever it is, because those are the choices we are
going to have to make.
And I watched in Afghanistan, Mr. and Mrs. Secretary, I
asked, I sat with the President for literally hours, over 3
hours on this. The President said, we need a mini Marshall
Plan. The President said, we need to have forces there to
provide security. The President said, this was a long term
obligation. The President said, we are in there for the long
haul. We cannot get the House and we cannot get some of our
colleagues to vote the money we need there.
Now, I do not want to be around when my son, who just got
back from Kosovo, or his friends are sitting in the middle of
Baghdad and the U.S. Senate says, well, wait a minute, you did
not tell me that we had to vote for an extra $10, $20, $30, $40
billion to finish this job. I want everybody on the line.
My father, who died 2 weeks ago, used to say, ``I like to
know who is in charge so I know who to hold responsible,'' and
I am prepared to do it, but I do not want to be part of an
outfit that votes to send us to war, or gives the President
that authority, and then leaves him hanging, or is unsure
whether the President is willing to come back to us and say,
pay the price.
I promise you if we go, forget your permanent tax cut.
There is not enough money. If we go, forget the idea that we
are going to have a massive new health care program. Now, that,
I am prepared to make those choices, but let us not kid the
American people, because I am not in for a guns and butter
routine here. I am not going down that route again.
I first met the distinguished Secretary of State when I
first got here as a 29-year-old kid, and our first meeting was
on the Vietnam war. I am not going to go there again. We have
to tell the American people what the likely price is, even
though we do not know for certain. It may be a lot less.
We will have the present Secretary of State at 2:30. I
thank my colleagues. This has been incredibly helpful, and you
have been here for over 3 hours. We owe you.
[Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the committee adjourned to
reconvene at 2:30 p.m., the same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold,
Wellstone, Boxer, Bill Nelson, Rockefeller, Helms, Lugar,
Hagel, Gordon Smith, Frist, Chafee, Allen, and Brownback.
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order. Good
afternoon. It's a pleasure to welcome the Secretary of State,
Secretary Powell, back to this committee.
Mr. Secretary, as you know, in late July this committee
began hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq and our purpose--and
it's no surprise to anyone, because we've both said it, you and
I had discussions back then about those hearings and whether
they should take place and so on and so forth, and we've
cooperated in this all along, as has the administration,
generally. Our purpose was to start a national discussion on
Iraqi policy, raise the difficult questions that surround it,
and consider how that policy should move and in what direction.
We've heard from a broad range of experts and expert
witnesses. Elsewhere, prominent Americans with decades of
experience in foreign and national security policy have spoken
out, and the Bush administration has begun to do so, as well,
in public statements and hearings before the Congress and
President Bush's important speech to the United Nations General
Assembly and, I would note, in your testimony before our
counterparts in the House.
As a result, I believe there's an emerging bipartisan
consensus on some basic principles for moving forward on Iraq.
I want to make it clear I speak for no one but myself here. I'm
not speaking for the committee, for the Democratic Party, or
for anyone; I'm just saying what I think is emerging here. And
I think the emerging consensus on some basic principles is, in
no small part, due to your leadership.
First, Iraq is the world's concern, not just the concern of
the United States. Mr. Secretary, I know that you were
instrumental--I believe; I don't know--you were instrumental in
shaping the President's speech to the United Nations. I thought
it was a devastating indictment, by the U.N.'s own standards,
of Iraq's defiance of the international community. For more
than a decade, Saddam has flaunted solemn obligations,
obligations made not to the United States alone, but to the
United Nations, and the President was right to take the issue
to the United Nations, and right to make it clear that the
legitimacy of that institution and its efficacy depends, in no
small part, on how it responds.
Second, it seems to me there's a consensus that we should
pursue a policy toward Iraq that has broad international
support. To put it in colloquial terms, it's obviously better
if we move with the world behind us than if we move with the
world against us. I applaud your effort to build that support
and hopefully you'll talk about that today. I applaud your
efforts. And our allies around the world and the region have
important contributions and, in some cases, necessary
contributions to make if we are to succeed, and we--I think all
of us on this committee support and encourage and hope for the
best in your unfinished business before the Security Council as
you pursue gaining this support.
The third general principle, I think, that has emerged here
is that many of us share the conviction that Saddam Hussein's
relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and his
possession of some already, especially his pursuit of nuclear
weapons, which I do not believe he possesses, pose a
significant threat to Iraq's people, its region, and to the
world. Ultimately, in my view, either he must be dislodged from
his weapons or dislodged from power.
I believe there's a broad consensus on these principles,
but important, indeed, fundamental questions remain about the
administration's Iraqi policy and about the consequences of the
various courses of action under consideration. And that puts us
in an extraordinary situation in an extraordinary moment.
The President has asked Congress for an expansive grant of
authority to wage war before he, himself, has decided to go to
war or addressed some of the unanswered questions. Now, I have
no doubt that part of the reason you're here is to be able to
answer those questions. And, in fairness to the President, he
has just begun to do that.
I would note, as I did with Secretary Kissinger just, it
seems a moment ago, an hour ago, that to make the case before
the United Nations as to how Saddam has violated the United
Nations commitments is a different case than making the case to
the American people as to what we're about to ask of them if,
in fact, we are in a position as the President has indicated we
might end up in, if we end up in a position where we're asked
to do this ourselves.
He made, as I said, a powerful case that Saddam is the
world's problem, but he has yet, I believe, to make the case to
the American people that the United States must solve the
problem alone, if necessary.
The threat posed by Iraq is real and escalating, in my
view. And the singular capacity of the United States to deal
with this threat alone is equally as real. We have the capacity
to do that. But so are the potential costs. They are real.
Indeed, I believe the degree to which we act alone correlates
with the price we'll have to pay in lives, dollars, and
influence around the world. That is the burden we may have to
bear, but one I know you do not wish to bear, nor does the
President wish to bear alone. But before we bear that burden,
the American people have to know what is being asked of them,
what they're being asked to sign up to.
And so, Mr. Secretary, I hope that here today you will
address some of these questions and that in the days and weeks
to come we will hear the President, either before joint session
or on national television, laying out what it is we're going to
ask of the American people.
What is the likelihood that Iraq would use weapons of mass
destruction against us to blackmail us or to supply terrorists?
What is our objective? Is it to compel Iraq to destroy its
illegal weapons of mass destruction or to liberate Kuwaiti
prisoners or to end Saddam Hussein's regime? What is the
rationale for our action? To enforce the U.N. Security Council
resolution that Saddam has flaunted for more than a decade or
to preempt that possibility that he'll use those weapons? And
what is the rationale we are going to use?
Some are confused--we discussed this at length today--about
whether or not we would proceed based on a doctrine of
preemption or based on a doctrine that this is a fellow who
lost the war, essentially signed an armistice the conditions of
which were contained in U.N. resolutions, and he now has
violated those, and, therefore, we have reason to proceed.
Would attacking Iraq risk precipitating the very thing we're
trying to prevent, the use of those weapons?
I know we have no absolute answers to these, but I think,
in fairness to the American people, we should discuss them.
There are many more questions which I will not take the time to
ask now, because my colleagues will pursue them as we go around
this table, but ultimately, Mr. Secretary, your appearance here
today is part of a singularly important process that must
culminate with the President securing the informed consent of
the American people for our policy toward Iraq. I'm confident
he can do that. I'm confident that can be done. But I am also
absolutely confident it can only be done with some significant
change in the resolution that has been sent to us and some
clear specification of what the President will be asking of us.
Mr. Secretary, when the President had the congressional
leadership down to the Cabinet room about 2 weeks ago, he asked
a number of us questions. And when he turned and asked me my
view, I indicated to him that I was prepared to be with him,
assuming several things. One, that he continued to pursue the
course he was pursing at the United Nations and exhaust those
possible avenues, as well as state clearly to the American
people once we've succeeded in dethroning--removing Saddam--and
I have no doubt we will if we undertake that--what we are going
to have to do--what we may have to do in terms of staying in
Iraq, and what the cost may be without any clear definition of
how many troops or how long.
And the President said to me, as you recall, he would do
that. He has yet to do that. I'm confident he will do that. And
only then, I think, can we have some certainty that once we
undertake this, we will have the American people with us
committed to do the whole job.
Senator Brownback, I think, was the only person left in the
room when the two former Secretaries were leaving, and I
indicated that I hope to God we don't do--not you; we, the
Congress, giving the President the authority--I hope we don't
say to the American people what was said to them by previous
Congresses just before I arrived here in the 1960s, that we can
have guns and butter, we can have everything we want, the costs
will be able to be borne, no matter what they are, without us
making any sacrifices.
It may be everything works out like clockwork and there's
no problem, but I do not want to be part of a Senate that gives
the President the authority where we move and it ends up that
we are required to commit billions of dollars a year to sustain
a unified Iraq after we defeat the present government and not
be able to get the money and the commitment up here to do it. I
will not be part of that, personally. And I think everyone
should know what we're in for and what the possible costs are,
even though we can't say for certain.
So, Mr. Secretary, I'm delighted you're here. I mean this
sincerely, I am thankful you are here and I'm thankful you're
the Secretary of State at this moment, and I look forward to
hearing what you have to say, but I will now yield, if I may,
to Senator Helms.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to welcome Secretary of State
Powell back before this Committee.
Mr. Secretary, as you know, in late July this Committee began
hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq. Our purpose was to start a
national discussion of that policy and to raise the difficult questions
that surround any consideration of next steps.
We have heard from a broad range of expert witnesses. Elsewhere,
prominent Americans with decades of experience in foreign and national
security policy have spoken out. And the Bush Administration has begun
to do so as well--in public statements, in hearings before Congress,
and in President Bush's important speech to the United Nations General
Assembly.
As a result, I believe there is an emerging bi-partisan consensus
on some basic principles for moving forward on Iraq. And this is in no
small measure due to your leadership.
First, Iraq is the world's concern, not just a concern of the
United States. Mr. Secretary, I believe that you were instrumental in
shaping the President's speech to the United Nations. It was a
devastating indictment, by the U.N.'s own standards, of Iraq's defiance
of the international community. For more than a decade, Saddam has
flaunted solemn obligations--obligations made not to the United States,
but to the United Nations. The President was right to take this issue
to the U.N. and right to make it clear that the legitimacy of that
institution and the effectiveness of international security cooperation
is at stake.
Second, we should pursue a policy toward Iraq that has broad
international support. To be colloquial about this matter, it is better
if we move with the world behind us than against us. I applaud your
efforts to build that support. Our allies around the world and in the
region have important and necessary contributions to make in the effort
to disarm Iraq. And we must continue to work with them in the
unfinished war against terrorism.
Third, many of us share the conviction that Saddam Hussein's
relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear
weapons, poses a significant threat to Iraq's people, its region and
the world. Ultimately, either Saddam must be dislodged from his
weapons, or he must be dislodged from power.
I believe there is a broad consensus on these principles. But
important, indeed fundamental questions remain about the
Administration's Iraq policy and about the consequences of the various
courses of action under consideration.
And that puts us in an extraordinary situation. The President has
asked Congress for an expansive grant of authority to wage war before
he himself has decided to go to war or addressed these unanswered
questions. I have no doubt that you are here to answer these questions.
The President's speech to the United Nations was an important
moment. He made a powerful case, under the U.N.'s own standards, that
Saddam Hussein is the world's problem. But he has not yet made the case
to the American people that the United States must solve this problem
alone, if necessary.
The threat posed by Iraq is real and escalating. The singular
capacity of the United States to deal with this threat alone is real.
But so are the potential costs. Indeed, I believe the degree to which
we act alone correlates with the price we will have to pay in lives,
dollars and influence around the world.
That is a burden we may have to bear--one I know that you and the
President do not wish to bear alone. But before we bear that burden,
the American people have to know what they are being asked to sign up
to.
And so Mr. Secretary, I hope that, here today, you will address
some of these questions, and that in the days and weeks to come, we
will hear the President laying out what it is we are going to ask of
the American people.
What is the likelihood that Iraq would use its weapons of mass
destruction against us, to blackmail us or to supply to terrorists?
What is our objective? To compel Iraq to destroy its illegal
weapons of mass destruction programs? Or to liberate Kuwaiti prisoners?
Or to end Saddam Hussein's regime?
What is the rationale for our action? To enforce the U.N. Security
Council resolutions that Saddam has flaunted for more than a decade? Or
to preempt the possibility he will use his weapons against us?
Would attacking Iraq risk precipitating the very thing we are
trying to prevent: the use of weapons of mass destruction? I know we
have no absolute answers to these things, but I think in fairness to
the American people, we should discuss them.
Ultimately, Mr. Secretary, your appearance here today is part of a
singularly important process that must culminate with the President
securing the informed consent of the American people for our policy
toward Iraq. I am confident he can do that. But I'm also absolutely
confident it can only be done with some significant change in the
resolution that has been sent to us and with some clear specification
as to what the President will be asking of us.
I hope we in the Congress don't say to the American people what was
said to them by previous Congresses in the 1960s--that we can have guns
and butter, everything we want, and that the costs could be borne
without any sacrifices.
It may be everything works out like clockwork and there's no
problem. But I do not want to be part of a Senate that gives the
President the authority where we move, and it ends up that we are
required to submit billions of dollars a year to sustain a unified Iraq
after we defeat Saddam, and not be able to get the money and the
commitment up here to do it. I will not be part of that personally. I
think everyone should know what we're in for and what the possible
costs are, even though we can't say for certain.
So Mr. Secretary, I'm delighted you're here. I am thankful you are
here and I'm thankful you are the Secretary of State at this moment.
And I look forward to hearing what you have to say.
But I will now yield, if I may, to Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
The first time I ever saw this gentleman, he was
resplendent in his uniform performing before the then-President
of the United States and doing a great job at reporting to the
President. I made some comment, and President Reagan wrote on a
little pad, ``Like him?'' Slid it over. And I wrote, ``I sure
do.'' I still do, Mr. Secretary.
I'm just going to use about two pages of my statement and
ask unanimous consent that it be made part of the record, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. It will be.
Senator Helms. I do want to mention publicly that there are
two criticisms, and they've been directed at the present
President of the United States. First, it's been suggested by
some that the President failed to pay due diligence to the role
of the United Nations. Well, that simply is not so. The
President has challenged that much-ballyhooed institution in
New York to seize this opportunity to become an important actor
in world affairs and not just a critic of people who are doing
the heavy lifting in dealing with foreign affairs.
The truth is, the President's September 12 speech to the
United Nations methodically detailed the history of Iraqi
noncompliance with the U.N. Security Council resolutions. It's
now up to the United Nations to demonstrate that it is the U.N.
that has the will to enforce its resolutions and rhetoric.
And the second point is that some have suggested that the
President has not fully taken into account the legitimate role
of the Congress in fundamental questions of war and peace. But
the truth is, Mr. Chairman, Congress has been and continues to
be consulted. The President formally asked Congress to pass a
resolution giving him the authority to end the Saddam Hussein
problem once and for all.
Having said all that, welcome, sir. It's always good to see
you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Jesse Helms
Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for your having scheduled this week's
series of hearings to address the resolution authorizing the use of
force against Iraq.
The Senate long ago gave our committee exclusive jurisdiction to
review intervention abroad and declarations of war. That is an
important obligation. I am pleased that our committee has taken such an
active role in considering (1) the threats posed by the Iraqi regime
under Saddam Hussein, and, (2) the appropriate U.S. response to these
threats.
The President's speech two weeks ago to the General Assembly of the
United Nations presented the clearest possible case for action against
the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. I will support the President.
Ten years of noncompliance with United Nations resolutions, the
continued brutality waged against his own population, the imprisonment
of hundreds of Kuwaiti citizens held since 1990, and evidence of
continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction are all the evidence
any Senator needs to support the President, which certainly I do and
will continue to do.
Mr. Chairman, there are two criticisms that have been directed
against the President. First, it has been suggested by some that the
President failed to pay due diligence to the role of the United
Nations. Well, that simply is not so. The President has challenged the
much-ballyhooed institution in New York to seize this opportunity to
become an important actor in world affairs, not just a critic of people
who are doing the heavy-lifting in dealing with foreign affairs.
The truth is, the President's September 12 speech to the United
Nations methodically detailed the history of Iraqi noncompliance with
U.N. Security Council resolutions. It is now up to the United Nations
to demonstrate that it is the U.N. that has the will to enforce its
resolutions and rhetoric.
The ball is clearly in the U.N.'s court. If the Security Council
now fails to support action against Saddam Hussein, the U.N.'s
ineffectiveness and irrelevance will be incontrovertibly clear.
Surely, if the September 11 attacks taught us anything, it is that
America does not have the luxury of sitting idle while our enemies
conspire against us. We simply cannot wait for Iraq to acquire the
nuclear weapons to add to the chemical and biological weapons Iraq
already possesses.
Second, some have suggested that the President has not fully taken
into account the legitimate role of the Congress in fundamental
questions of war and peace.
Mr. Chairman, the truth is, Congress has been, and continues to be,
consulted. The President formally asked Congress to pass a resolution
giving him the authority to end the Saddam Hussein problem once and for
all.
Mr. Chairman, I am confident that the Senate will give the
President the authority he has requested.
Like the United Nations, we too must consider our own previous
declarations and mandates. We must consider our strong words in the
Iraq Liberation Act.
We must consider our previous joint letters to the President. We
must consider our previous grants of authority to the President.
In 1998, the Congress authorized an earlier President to take
appropriate action to bring Iraq into compliance with its United
Nations-imposed obligations. Are we not obliged to give this President
similar authority, and trust that he will take meaningful action to
address the dangerous threats to peace and security posed by Saddam
Hussein's regime?
The answer, to borrow a Latin expression used by lawyers--res ipsa
loquitur.
Mr. Chairman, the thing does indeed speak for itself. Let's get
about the business of standing with the President.
The Chairman. The floor is yours, Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Powell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Chairman, it's a great pleasure to be back before
the committee. I always look forward to the opportunity to
discuss the foreign policy of the United States before the
distinguished members of this committee, and I'm especially
pleased to be here today to follow the very distinguished
witnesses who have preceded me, Secretary Kissinger and
Secretary Albright today, and Ambassador Holbrooke and my old
friend and former National Security Advisor, as I was, Bud
McFarlane yesterday, as well as other witnesses.
As I was working out of my office this morning and watching
television out of the corner of my eye and also looking at the
clock, I assumed that Henry was going to run the clock on me as
well himself and Madeleine.
But I'm pleased that he allowed you to recess long enough
to get a bite of lunch and, therefore, to be ready for me.
I do welcome this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. We have talked
about this issue on many occasions, and I'm pleased to be able
to do it again today. Before beginning, let me take the
opportunity to again thank the committee for the support that
they have provided to the State Department. You will have that
opportunity once again with the State authorization bill that
is before you, and we're very anxious to see action on that
bill because there are a lot of authorities in there that we
can use, and I hope that it will be moved promptly so that we
can get going on that.
And, Senator Helms, it would be remiss of me not to take
note once again that this is probably the last time you and I
will be together at a hearing and to thank you for the support
you've provided to the men and women of the Armed Forces, to
the men and women of the State Department and the friendship
and support you've extended to me over many years, Mr.
Chairman, and for that I am deeply appreciative.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned that you met with the
President. It was 3 weeks ago, if I'm not mistaken now.
The Chairman. That's correct.
Secretary Powell. And it was in a time of enormous debate
and speculation as to what the President was going to do.
August is over now. We were all back together. And he laid it
out rather clearly in that afternoon session with the
leadership that he was going to consult with Congress and that
he was going to consult with the international community. And,
as you noted, he has done exactly just that, and that's what we
have been doing for the last 3 weeks since he made that
statement. And this appearance today and the appearance that my
colleagues in the administration have been making before
various committees, Director Tenet and Secretary Rumsfeld, are
all part of that consultation process.
I have a longer statement that I would like to submit for
the record, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to summarize that
now.
The Chairman. Without objection, it will be placed in the
record.
Secretary Powell. I also am prepared to comment on the
various issues that previous witnesses have made, the so-called
doctrine of preemption and other issues that have been raised
over the last 2 days, as we go through the hearing and as
questions are raised.
Senator Biden, Senator Helms, and so many other members of
the committee, we've talked about Iraq a number of times over
the years, and I always have to go back to 1990 when Saddam
Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait when I was chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Iraqis brutalized the population
and rejected, at that time, the international community's
ultimatum to withdraw.
At that time, we built a worldwide coalition with the clear
political purpose of liberating Kuwait. And the military
instrument of that coalition, led by America, had an equally
clear military objective that flowed directly from the
political purpose, and that was to eject the Iraqi Army from
Kuwait.
The United Nations Security Council endorsed this purpose
and objective, and the international community responded with
unprecedented political backing, financial support, and
military forces. As a result, we not only accomplished our
mission in the gulf war, we did it in a way that I think was a
model of American international leadership and international
cooperation.
When that war ended, the United Nations Security Council
agreed to take measures to ensure that Iraq did not threaten
any of its neighbors again. Saddam Hussein, we knew, was a man
who, after all, had sent his armies against Iran in 1980 and
then against Kuwait in 1990. We knew he was a man who had fired
ballistic missiles at neighboring countries and who had used
chemical weapons in the war with Iran and even against his own
people.
The United States and the international community were
strongly determined to prevent any future aggression, so the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 of April 1991
fixed the terms of the cease-fire in the gulf. And the
fundamental purpose of this resolution and many more that
followed was restoration of regional peace and security by way
of a series of stringent demands on Iraq, particularly its
disarmament with respect to weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers.
Desert Storm had dramatically reduced Iraq's more
conventional military capability while at the same time--and we
did this deliberately--not leaving Iraq so prostrate that it
could not defend itself against Iran, its former enemy.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, you know the rest
of the story. You heard the President relate it at the United
Nations 2 weeks ago today. Iraq has defied the United Nations
and refused to comply completely with any of the United Nations
Security Council resolutions. Moreover, since December 1998,
when the U.N. inspection teams left Iraq because of the
regime's flagrant defiance of the United Nations, the Iraqi
regime has been free to pursue the development of weapons of
mass destruction.
Meanwhile, the world has changed dramatically. Since
September 11, 2001, the world is a different place. As a
consequence of the terrorist attacks on that day and of the war
on terrorism that those attacks made necessary, a new reality
was born. The world had to recognize that the potential
connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction
moved terrorism to a new level of threat. In fact, that nexus
became the overriding security concern of our Nation. It still
is, and it will continue to be our overriding concern for some
years to come.
We now see that a proven menace like Saddam Hussein in
possession of weapons of mass destruction could empower a few
terrorists with those weapons to threaten millions of innocent
people. President Bush is fully determined to deal with this
threat. His administration is determined to defeat it. I
believe the American people would have us do no less.
President Bush is also aware of the need to engage the
international community. He understands how powerful a strong
and unified international community can be, as we have seen so
well demonstrated in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and
elsewhere.
The need to engage the international community is why the
President took his message on the grave and gathering danger of
Iraq to the United Nations on the 12th of September. Moreover,
it is the United Nations that is the offended party, not Iraq,
as some would have us believe or might even claim. It was the
United Nations resolutions that were systematically and
brutally ignored and violated for these past 12 years. It was
United Nations inspectors who found it impossible to do their
job and had to leave the work unfinished. The President's
challenge, therefore, to the United Nations General Assembly
and through them to the Security Council was a direct one and
it was a very simple one, ``If you would remain relevant, then
you must act in the face of these repeated violations.''
I was there that day, and the President's speech was a
powerful one, and it energized the entire meeting hall. It
changed the political landscape on which this issue was being
discussed--that one speech--and it made it clear that Iraq is
the problem. Iraq is the one who is in material breach of the
demands placed upon it by the United Nations. It is not the
United States that is in the dock; it is not the United Nations
that is in the dock. It is not the Security Council that is in
the dock. It is not France or Britain or Russia or the United
Kingdom or all the other members of the Security Council. It is
Iraq that is in the dock, and we must not lose sight of that
simple, clear fact.
The President, in his speech, then went on to make it clear
what was expected of Iraq to repair this material breach. He
made it clear that the issue was more than disarming Iraq by
eliminating its weapons of mass destruction and its mid- and
long-range missile programs. The United Nations resolutions
also spoke of terrorism, of human rights, the return of
prisoners and property.
Iraq stands guilty. It convicts itself by its actions.
There can be no question that it is in material breach of its
obligations. All of these demands on Iraq are spelled out in
the 16 Security Council resolutions levied against that country
since 1991.
Over the weekend following the President's speech at the
United Nations, I watched the reaction. I watched the pressure
build on the Iraqi regime as the Arab League, the Secretary
General, and so many others pressed Iraq on their need to take
action. They essentially told Iraq the jig was up. Nobody was
going to listen to these phony excuses anymore, and the
pressure built to an enormous level.
On Monday of that week--the next week, Iraq responded with
a familiar tactical ploy. The Iraqi Foreign Minister said Iraq
would let the inspectors back in without conditions. And later
in the week, in a speech at the United Nations, their Foreign
Minister challenged President Bush's September 12 speech. He
even called for a discussion of the issues of inspection teams
in accordance with international law, already qualifying his
Monday offer of inspections without conditions. Now, 2 days
ago, we have an Iraqi Presidential advisor telling the press in
Baghdad that weapons inspectors would be allowed to go wherever
they want.
But these people are not deceiving anyone. It is a ploy we
have seen before on many occasions. And on each of these
occasions, once inspectors began to operate, Iraq continued to
do everything to frustrate their work.
Mr. Chairman, I will just call your and the members'
attention to the written statement that I have provided where I
record a dozen examples of Iraq's defiance of these resolutions
and of the U.N. mandate. Cited in my longer statement is
everything from intimidation at gunpoint to holding up
inspectors while all the incriminating evidence was removed. It
is a litany of defiance and unscrupulous behavior and every
sort of attempt at noncompliance. And I, by no means, in my
longer statement, have listed everything, only a sampling.
The regime is infamous for its ploys, its stalling tactics,
its demand on inspectors, sometimes at the point of a gun, and
its general and consistent defiance of the mandate of the
United Nations Security Council. There is absolutely no reason
at all to expect that Iraq has changed; at least they haven't
given us any indications to suspect that they have changed. And
this latest effort to welcome inspectors without conditions is
another ploy.
Let's be clear about the reason for their suddenly being
willing, after several years, to accept inspectors. Iraqis did
not suddenly see the error of their ways. They were responding
to the heat and pressure generated by the international
community after President Bush's speech at the U.N. We must
keep that pressure on.
The United States has made it clear to our Security Council
colleagues that we will not fall for this ploy. This is the
time to apply more pressure, not to relent. We must not believe
that inspectors going in on the same conditions and under the
same terms that they went in on so many occasions earlier would
be acceptable now. We won't fall for that. These 4 years have
been more than enough time for Iraq to procure, develop, and
hide proscribed items well beyond the reach of the kinds of
inspections that were subject to Saddam's cheat-and-retreat
approach from 1991 to 1998.
It is up to the United Nations Security Council to decide
what action is now required of Iraq to deal with this material
breach of the U.N.'s mandate. If part of the solution involves
an inspection regime, it must be a regime that goes in with the
authority of a new resolution that removes the weaknesses of
the present regime and which will not tolerate any Iraqi
disobedience. It cannot be a resolution that we are going to
negotiate with Iraq. The resolution or resolutions must be
strong enough and comprehensive enough so that they produce
disarmament and not just inspections.
Many U.N. members, including some on the Security Council,
want to take Iraq at its word and send inspectors back in right
now without any new resolution and new authority, and we
believe that this would be a recipe for failure. The debate we
are having within the Security Council now is on the need for
and the wording of a resolution or, some feel, more than one
resolution.
Our position is clear. We must face the facts and find Iraq
in material breach. Then we must specify the actions we demand
of Iraq. And President Bush has already discussed what he
believes is appropriate.
And then there's a third element. We must determine what
consequences will flow from Iraq's failure to take action. Just
laying out a new inspection regime and declaring them in
material breach isn't enough. The Security Council must face up
to their responsibility to take action or to allow action to be
taken in the face of continued Iraqi violation.
That is what makes it different this time. This time,
unlike any time over the previous 12 years of Iraqi defiance,
there must be hard consequences. This time Iraq must comply
with the U.N. mandate or there will be decisive action to
compel compliance.
We are listening to other points of view, and we are
working to reach agreement within the Security Council. It is a
difficult debate. There are strong views one way or the other.
As you may have noticed in some of the press reporting in the
last 24 hours, we have come into agreement with the United
Kingdom of what the elements of a resolution should look like.
I am sending a senior official from my Department to Paris this
evening and then on to Moscow to discuss with the French and
the Russians what we believe should be in such a resolution. We
are briefing representatives of the Chinese Government here in
Washington today. And so far, in the last 12 hours, I've spoken
to my French colleague, Foreign Minister de Villepin, my
Russian colleague, Foreign Minister Ivanov, my Chinese
colleague, Foreign Minister Tang, and Secretary General Kofi
Annan describing the progress we have made with the British and
the fact that we are now expanding the circle of consultation.
We're a long way from getting agreement, but we're working
hard, and there are many points where we are in agreement, and
there are some outstanding issues that have to be dealt with.
Some have suggested that there is a conflict in this
approach, that U.S. interests should be our total concern. We
are a member of the Security Council. We are a member of the
United Nations. It is a multilateral institution whose
resolutions have been violated. So I think it is quite
appropriate for the President to seek action by the United
Nations through its Security Council.
But the United States, as an entirely separate matter,
believes that its interests is threatened. We believe that we
are at risk and our interests in different parts of the world
are at risk by Iraqi development of weapons of mass destruction
and by the nature of this regime. We are trying to solve the
problem through the United Nations and in a multilateral way.
But, at the same time, if the United Nations is not able to
act, and to act decisively--and I think that would be a
terrible indictment of the United Nations--then the United
States will have to make its own decision as to whether the
danger posed by Iraq is such that we have to act in order to
defend our country and our interests.
I believe strongly, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, that our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations
would be helped enormously by a strong congressional resolution
authorizing President Bush to take necessary and appropriate
action. Language has been proposed by the President, and I know
it's a subject of intense discussion in both bodies and with
the White House and various members of the President's national
security team, and it is healthy to have such discussion and
debate. But I hope it is not too prolonged, and I ask for your
action in the very near future to provide the President such a
resolution to show the world that we are united in this effort.
Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in the intelligence community
and the Department of Defense are giving the Congress the
information that it will need with respect to the details of
our intelligence assessment and military contingency planning
that Secretary Rumsfeld is conducting, and I will leave those
issues to them.
But let me just make two points before I end this
presentation. We can have debates about the size and nature of
the Iraqi stockpile. We can have debates about how long it will
take him to reach this level of readiness or that level of
readiness with respect to these weapons. But no one can doubt
two things. One, they are in violation of these resolutions.
There's no debate about that. And, second, they have not lost
the intent to develop these weapons of mass destruction.
Whether they are 1 day, 5 days, 1 year, or 7 years away from
any particular weapon, whether their stockpile is small,
medium, or large, what has not been lost is the intent to have
such weapons of mass destruction.
The challenge before us now is to see whether or not the
Iraqi regime makes a sea change in this behavior because of
this international presence, and they'll only make this kind of
change if they sense there will be consequences for not having
made such a change. The President is determined that we cannot
look away again. This matter must be dealt with. Hopefully, it
will be dealt with by nations coming together the way they came
together 12 years ago.
We recognize the seriousness of this issue. We recognize
the consequences for our economy. We recognize the consequences
for other foreign policy interests that we have around the
world. We recognize the consequences for our Middle East
policies. And we also recognize that if it becomes necessary to
see the regime changed in Iraq, then a great obligation is
placed upon those of us who will be changing that regime for
the future of Iraq and for the future of the Iraqi people. And
I can assure you that this issue is receiving the highest
attention within the State Department, the Defense Department,
and all the other institutions of government.
If I just may close with one other observation, because I
know it came up earlier in the hearings, this comment about
``new doctrine of preemption.'' If you would go to the new
National Security Strategy that the President issued not too
long ago and look at the specific section which talks about our
strategy and doctrine, you will find that we have not abandoned
containment. We have not abandoned deterrence. We still have
thousands of nuclear weapons. We still have a magnificent
military force that can deter. We haven't abandoned these time-
honored methods of using our national power.
But, what that chapter specifically says is there is now a
new threat out there. There is a threat that doesn't respond
the way older threats did to deterrence, that did not respond
to theories of containment. These are terrorists. These are
people who are willing to ignore what's going to happen to
them. They are suicidal. They believe in evil concepts, and
they're going to come at us. And so a doctrine of preemption or
an element of preemption in our strategy is appropriate.
It's not a new doctrine. It's been around for as long as
warfare has been around. I can give you example after example
in our own history of preemptive actions. In fact, I might even
suggest that when President Clinton thought it necessary to
attack the chemical plant in Sudan not too long ago, one might
say that was a preemptive act or an act of prevention.
When you have this kind of new threat, this kind of new
enemy, then this doctrine of preemption should rise a little
higher in your consideration, because this kind of enemy will
not be deterred or contained the way perhaps the Soviet Union
might have been and was contained and deterred in the past.
So see it as elevation of one of the many tools that we've
always had, but don't see it as a new doctrine that excludes or
eliminates all the other tools of national security and
military power.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Powell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear
before you to testify on the Administration's position with regard to
Iraq.
Senator Biden, Senator Helms, you and several other of the
committee members have been discussing Iraq with me for a long time. In
fact, all the way back to the Gulf War.
In 1990, Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait, brutalized the
population, and rejected the international community's ultimatum to
withdraw.
The U.S. built a world-wide coalition with the clear political
purpose of liberating Kuwait. The military instrument of that
coalition, led by America, had an equally clear military objective that
flowed directly from the political purpose: eject the Iraqi army from
Kuwait.
The United Nations Security Council endorsed this purpose and
objective, and the international community responded with unprecedented
political backing, financial support, and military forces. As a result,
we not only accomplished our mission in the Gulf War, the way we did it
was a model of American leadership and international cooperation.
When the war ended, the UN Security Council agreed to take measures
to ensure Iraq did not threaten any of its neighbors again. Saddam
Hussein was a man after all who had sent his armies against Iran in
1980 and then against Kuwait in 1990, who had fired ballistic missiles
at neighboring countries, and who had used chemical weapons in the war
with Iran and even against his own people. The United States and the
international community were strongly determined to prevent any future
aggression.
UN Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 fixed the terms
of the ceasefire in the Gulf. The fundamental purpose of this
resolution and many more that followed was restoration of regional
peace and security by way of a series of stringent demands on Iraq,
particularly its disarmament with respect to weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150
kilometers. Desert Storm had dramatically reduced Iraq's more
conventional military capability while at the same time not leaving
Iraq so prostrate it could not defend itself against Iran.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, you know the rest of the
story. You heard the President relate it at the United Nations two
weeks ago today. Iraq has defied the United Nations and refused to
comply completely with any of the UN Security Council resolutions.
Moreover, since December 1998 when the UN's inspection teams left iraq
because of the regime's flagrant defiance of the UN, the Iraqi regime
has been free to pursue weapons of mass destruction.
Meanwhile, the world has changed dramatically.
Since September 11, 2001, the world is a different place. As a
consequence of the terrorist attacks on that day and of the war on
terrorism that those attacks made necessary, a new reality was born:
the world had to recognize that the potential connection between
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction moved terrorism to a new
level of threat. In fact, that nexus became the overriding security
concern of our nation. It still is. It will continue to be for some
years to come.
We now see that a proven menace like Saddam Hussein, in possession
of weapons of mass destruction, could empower a few terrorists to
threaten millions of innocent people.
President Bush is fully determined to deal with this threat. His
Administration is determined to defeat it. I believe the American
people would have us do no less.
President Bush is also aware of the need to engage the
international community. He understands how powerful a strong and
unified international community can be, as we have seen so well-
demonstrated in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
The need to engage the international community is why the President
took his message on the grave and gathering danger of Iraq to the
United Nations last week. Moreover, it is the United Nations that is
the offended party, not Iraq, as some might claim.
It was United Nations resolutions that were systematically and
brutally ignored and violated for these past 12 years. It was United
Nations inspectors who found it impossible to do their job and had to
leave their work unfinished.
The President's challenge to the United Nations General Assembly
was a direct and simple one: If you would remain relevant, you must
act.
The President's speech was powerful and energized the UN General
Assembly debate. It changed the political landscape on which this issue
was being discussed, Iraq is the problem. Iraq is in material breach of
the demands placed upon it by the United Nations.
President Bush made clear in his speech what Iraq must do to repair
this breach:
Iraq must immediately and unconditionally forswear,
disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass
destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.
Iraq must end all support for terrorism and act to suppress
it, as all states are required to do by UN Security Council
resolutions.
Iraq must cease persecution of its civilian population,
including Shia, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and others, again as
required by UN Security Council resolutions.
Iraq must release or account for all Gulf War personnel
whose fate is still unknown. It must return the remains of any
who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for
losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and it must
cooperate fully with international efforts to resolve these
issues, once again as required by Security Council resolutions.
And Iraq must immediately end all illicit trade outside the
oil-for-food program. It must accept UN administration of funds
from that program, to ensure that the money is used fairly and
promptly for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
All of these demands on Iraq are spelled out in the sixteen
Security Council resolutions levied against that country since 1991. If
these demands on Iraq sound like regime change, then so be it. And Mr.
Chairman, if there is regime change, brought about either by Iraqi
voluntary compliance with these demands or by the use of military force
to compel compliance, the United States will commit wholeheartedly to
the reconstruction of Iraq as a democratic state with its territory
intact.
Over the weekend following the President's speech, I watched the
pressure build on the Iraqi regime as the Arab League, the Secretary
General and others pressed Iraq on the need to take action.
On Monday of last week, Iraq responded with a familiar, tactical
ploy. The Iraqi Foreign Minister said Iraq would let the inspectors in
without conditions. But he is not deceiving anyone. And later last
week, in a speech at the United Nations, the Foreign Minister
challenged President Bush's September 12th speech. He then called for a
discussion of the issue of inspection teams ``in accordance with
international law''--almost immediately rescinding his Monday offer of
inspections ``without conditions.'' Now, two days ago, we have an Iraqi
presidential adviser telling the press in Baghdad, that weapons
inspectors would be allowed to go ``wherever they want.''
It is a ploy we have seen before, on many occasions. And on each
occasion, once inspectors began to operate Iraq continued to do
everything to frustrate their work.
In May 1991, for example, just after suspension of hostilities in
the Gulf War, Iraq accepted the unrestricted freedom of entry and exit
without delay or hindrance for UN inspectors and their property,
supplies, and equipment.
In June 1991--a short month later--Iraqis fired warning shots at
the inspectors to keep them away from suspicious vehicles.
Three months later, in September, the Iraqis confiscated a set of
documents from the inspectors. When the inspectors refused to comply
with an Iraqi demand to give up a second set of documents, the Iraqis
surrounded them and for four days refused to let them leave the
inspection site. Finally, when the UN threatened enforcement action,
the inspectors were allowed to leave.
In February 1992 Iraq refused to comply with a UN inspection team's
decision to destroy certain facilities used in proscribed programs and
in April of that year Iraq demanded a halt to the inspectors' aerial
flights.
Later, in July of that year, Iraq refused the inspectors access to
the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture. The inspectors had reliable
information that the site contained archives related to proscribed
activities. They finally gained access only after members of the
Council threatened enforcement action.
In January 1993, Iraq refused to allow the UN inspection teams to
use their own aircraft to fly into Iraq.
In June and July of 1993, Iraq refused to allow the UN inspectors
to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two missile engine
test stands.
In March 1996, Iraqi security forces refused UN inspection teams
access to five sites designated for inspection. The teams entered the
sites after delays of up to 17 hours--which of course permitted the
Iraqis to remove any incriminating evidence.
In November 1996, Iraq blocked UN inspectors from removing remnants
of missile engines for in-depth analysis outside Iraq.
In June 1997, Iraqi escorts on board a UN inspector team helicopter
attempted physically to prevent the UN pilot from flying the helicopter
in the direction of its intended destination.
In that month also, Iraq again blocked UN inspection teams from
entering designated sites for inspection.
In September 1997, an Iraqi officer attacked a UN inspector on
board a UN helicopter while the inspector was attempting to take
photographs of unauthorized movement of Iraqi vehicles inside a site
designated for inspection.
Also in September, while seeking access to a site declared by Iraq
to be ``sensitive,'' UN inspectors witnessed and videotaped Iraqi
guards moving files, burning documents, and dumping ash-filled waste
cans into a nearby river.
Mr. Chairman, I have left out much and could go on--all the way to
the departure of the UN inspection teams from Iraq in December 1998
because they could no longer do their job. And I could talk about
Operation Desert Fox, the military action that resulted.
But I believe you get the point.
The Iraqi regime is infamous for its ploys, its stalling tactics,
its demands on inspectors--sometimes at the point of a gun, and its
general and consistent defiance of the mandate of the UN Security
Council.
There is absolutely no reason at all to expect that Iraq has
changed, that this latest effort to welcome inspectors without
conditions is not another ploy.
Let's be clear about the reason for their announcement. The Iraqis
did not suddenly see the error of their past ways. They were responding
to the heat and pressure generated by the international community after
President Bush's speech.
The United States has made it clear to our Security Council
colleagues that we will not fall for this ploy. This is the time to
apply more pressure, not to relent. We must not believe that inspectors
going in on the same conditions that caused their withdrawal four years
ago is in any way acceptable. These four years have been more than
enough time for Iraq to procure, develop, and hide proscribed items
well beyond the reach of the kinds of inspectors that were subject to
Saddam's cheat and retreat approach from 1991 to 1998.
The United States has determined that Iraq's obstruction of UN
Security Council resolutions and its gross violation of its obligations
cannot continue. In his speech to the General Assembly, the President
challenged the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. The
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, said the same thing. We, our closest
allies, and our friends around the world are prepared to do our part to
enforce Security Council resolutions and render harmless the Iraqi
threat. We are discussing now the best way to proceed with the other
members of the Security Council and with close friends. We are trying
to find a solution.
If part of the solution involves an inspection regime, it must be a
regime that goes in with the authority of a new resolution that removes
the weaknesses of the present regime and which will not tolerate any
Iraqi disobedience. It cannot be a resolution that will be negotiated
with Iraq. The resolution must be strong enough and comprehensive
enough that it produces disarmament, not just inspections.
Many UN members, including some on the Security Council, want to
take Iraq at its word and send inspectors back in without any new
resolution or new authority. This is a recipe for failure.
The debate we are having within the Council is on need for and the
specific wording of a resolution. Our position is clear. We must face
the facts and find Iraq in material breach. Then, we must specify the
actions we demand of Iraq--which President Bush has already shown us.
And we must determine what consequences will flow from Iraq's failure
to take action.
That is what makes this time different. This time, unlike any time
over the previous 12 years of Iraqi defiance, there must be hard
consequences. This time, Iraq must comply with the UN mandate or there
will be decisive action to compel compliance.
In New York, we are listening to other points of view and trying to
reach agreement within the Security Council. It is a difficult debate.
We are also preserving the President's ability to defend our nation and
our interests.
Some have suggested that there is a conflict in this approach, that
U.S. interests should be our total concern.
But Mr. Chairman, both of these issues are important. We are a
member of the UN Security Council. We are a member of the UN. It is a
multilateral institution whose resolutions have been violated. But the
United States, as a separate matter, believes that its interest is
threatened. We are trying to solve this problem through the United
Nations and in a multilateral way. The President took the case to the
UN because it is the body that should deal with such matters as Iraq.
It was created to deal with such matters. And President Bush is hoping
that the UN will act and act in a decisive way.
But at the same time, if the UN is not able to act and, act
decisively--and I think that would be a terrible indictment of the UN--
then the United States will have to make its own decision as to whether
the danger posed by Iraq is such that we have to act in order to defend
our country and our interests.
And Mr. Chairman, our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations
would be helped by a strong Congressional resolution authorizing
President Bush to take action.
I ask for your immediate action on such a resolution to show the
world that we are united in this effort.
Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in the intelligence community and in
the Department of Defense are giving the Congress what it will need
with respect to intelligence on Iraq and on military contingency
planning. So I won't speak to those areas.
But let me say this about the Iraqi threat before I stop and allow
the greater part of this time for your important questions.
We can have debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi
stockpile of WMD and of midand long-range missiles. But no one can
doubt the record of Iraqi violations of United Nations Security Council
resolutions, one after another, and for twelve long years.
And no one can doubt that the Iraqi dictator's intentions have not
changed. He wants weapons of mass destruction as clearly as he wants to
remain in power.
Thank you and I'll stop there and take your questions.
The Chairman. I thank you. I thank you for that
explanation. And it's something that I think, as your two
predecessors early this morning said, warrants some legitimate
discussion and debate internationally. And I know you too well.
I know you don't want to set a precedent that allows India to
say, ``By the way, Pakistan has done the following. We reserve
the right to preemptively act.'' So I understand that. I've had
lengthy discussions with Dr. Rice on this. I think this is not
so much a departure, although there are some who wish to make
it sound like a gigantic departure. But we'll leave that for
another day.
I just want to make sure that anything I vote for is not
premised on the notion that this is a preemptive doctrine. This
is premised on the notion that a bad guy invaded another
country. He lost the war. He had to settle. Certain terms were
agreed to with the world at the U.N. He's violated that. That's
all we need. We're not invoking a new rationale to move against
Iraq.
But let me suggest, and I have already: we should start the
clock. I apologize. We'll stick to 7 minutes, if we can,
because, obviously, there are many members here.
Anytime you need a little bit of a break, you just raise
that pencil and we'll recess for a minute. We're probably going
to have to recess at some point for a vote, at 3:45. That's
Senate time. That could be 4, 5, 6, 7.
But it's supposedly 3:45. And when we do break, because
this is so important, I'm not going to do the usual practice of
letting us continue. We'll break, everybody breaks, we go vote,
and everybody comes back, because it's too important what the
Secretary has to say.
Let me begin. And there are a lot of questions. My
colleagues, I'm sure, will cover many that I want to speak to,
as well.
Mr. Secretary, there is a sound rationale, in my view, to
your statement on page six which says, ``Mr. Chairman, our
diplomatic efforts at the United Nations would be helped by a
strong congressional resolution authorizing President Bush to
take action.'' Part of our dilemma here is that, as I said at
the outset, we're being asked to pass a resolution that is
broad before the President has made a decision whether or not
he is going to go to war. So we're going to give, in effect,
under constitutional theory, the equivalent of a declaration of
war before the President has decided to go to war. I don't know
of any time in American history that's ever been done. That
doesn't mean it shouldn't be done, but it is a bit unusual.
One of the things I raised earlier today, would not your
purposes be met if we gave the President authority to use
whatever force is necessary in conjunction with a Security
Council resolution, if one is acquired; and if one is not
acquired--or if one's acquired and we are, to use the
vernacular, ``stiffed'' by Saddam Hussein, the President would
be authorized to use force; and if one is not acquired, the
President would be authorized to use force?
It would seem to me that gives you every tool, but it
satisfies the skepticism on the part of many of my colleagues,
notwithstanding their knowledge of your intense desire to make
this a world problem, that it will not be short-circuited.
In the New York Times today--and, again, although I know it
calls itself ``the paper of record,'' I'm not suggesting
everything in the paper is accurate. What I am suggesting is
there is a reference that all we need from, quote,
``unidentified administration officials''--all we need is a
congressional declaration. We don't have to worry about
anything else. That worries some people up here, because we do
know--and I know you'll say, ``No, I don't''--I understand, but
I know for a fact there are serious people in your
administration that didn't want to go to the United Nations,
think it was a mistake to have gone to the U.N.--not the
President--think it's a mistake to have gone to the United
Nations, and are very disappointed we went to the United
Nations.
And so my question is, why would it not make sense--I'm not
asking you to rewrite the resolution--but why would it not make
sense to have a resolution that says, ``We authorize the
President to conform with any U.N. resolution.'' If he doesn't
get one that has a follow-through to it, we authorize him to
follow through and use force? But it sequences them. It doesn't
condition them. It sequences them. Doesn't that make sense?
Doesn't that give you all the authority you need to make it
clear to your colleagues we're for real?
Secretary Powell. It's an interesting formulation, Mr.
Chairman, and I'd like to see it in writing and discuss it with
the President, because the way you have laid it out, he gets
the authority with a U.N. Security Council resolution and he
gets the authority without--or in the absence, I should say----
The Chairman. But it's sequenced.
Secretary Powell [continuing]. Of a Security Council
resolution. I'd have to see the language and then talk to the
President.
The Chairman. I'm not asking you to commit to it, but----
Secretary Powell. What we don't want to do, though, is to
any way suggest that we are not united as a Nation behind our
efforts to find a diplomatic solution.
The Chairman. Well, quite frankly, one of the reasons why I
suggest we're going to have to have a different kind of
resolution--and I've been discussing this with my good friend
from Indiana, a different resolution--is that the last thing I
think we need, as I said earlier this morning, is, ``The board
voted five to four for your speedy recovery.'' We want to be
united here. We want whatever we do to get as many votes as
possible. And I fear that the present resolution--and it's
being negotiated--there's still good-faith negotiation going
on--is pretty far from that point right now.
Let me move to a second question in the time that I have
and probably the only other question I'll be able to ask you.
You stated at the end of your statement, and you indicated in
your formal statement, that--let me find the exact quote: ``The
U.S. will commit wholeheartedly to the reconstruction of Iraq
as a democratic state within its territorial boundaries.''
Now, if I can ask you the question this way. Scenario. We
go in with or without the U.N. I'm confident we won't go in
alone, because you'll get some folks to go with us, even if
it's not the U.N.--maybe a Kosovo model. I have great faith in
you, boss. We take down Saddam Hussein. We begin the
commitment, which is, the United States commits wholeheartedly
to the reconstruction of Iraq as a democratic state within its
territorial boundaries. Whether or not we get others to help
us, implicit is that for a while, some U.S. presence will be
required, hopefully in conjunction with others, and some
financial assistance will be required, hopefully with others.
When do you, as Secretary of State, or the Secretary of
Defense, in that circumstance, feel confident to be able to say
to the President--not how long it will take, but at what point
do we have to get before, consistent with this commitment,
you're able to turn to the President and say, ``Mr. President,
we can now leave. We can now leave. We can now disengage''?
Is that at the point where there is a democratic government
in place, or is it at a point prior to that?
In other words, what are we--what is the end game here? I'm
not looking for an exit strategy in timing, but what is the end
game? Because with some in the State Department, as it related
to Afghanistan, there was, at the outset, a very different view
of what our role in Afghanistan was going to be, more
consistent with mine, which was we were going to have a greater
presence. The International Security Force was going to be
expanded beyond Kabul. The President sat with me and you and
others and talked about a mini-Marshall Plan. And we're a long
way from there.
So what I'm trying to get at is, what are we signing the
folks on for? Not in terms of hours, days, or dollars. What is
the point at which we can, in good faith, say, ``We can now
leave''? Is it when there is a democratic government, or what
is it? That's my question.
Secretary Powell. I'd just preface my response by saying,
of course, the President has not made any decision with respect
to military action and still is hopeful for a political/
diplomatic solution, but that really is in the hands of Saddam
Hussein, not us or the United Nations.
But should it become necessary to take unilateral action or
action that we would hope would be multilateral, or if it's the
Kosovo model with like-minded, willing nations, and we go in
and remove the regime, I think we would have an obligation
afterwards first to make sure that we remove all weapons of
mass destruction, which is what started this all, and use all
of our presence, plus intelligence assets. Plus, I suspect, a
lot of people would be coming forward at that point in the
absence of Saddam Hussein and his regime, to tell us what's
been going on and make sure that this nation has been disarmed
of those kinds of weapons or the capability to produce those
weapons, and that the government that we would help put in
place would be a representative government no longer committed
to use its wealth--great wealth, I might add--for any such
purposes. We would want to put in a government that would be
representative of the people.
And the term, really, ``put in the government,'' isn't the
right way to put it. The better way to put it is to ``raise up
a government,'' allow the Iraqi people to create a government,
using those who are outside the country who have expressed an
interest in coming back and helping with this, and who have
been against this regime for a long time, the opposition, and
also those from within the country. So there would be some
effort at reconciliation and some commitment to a single state
that is not going to be broken up into three pieces that will
have a representative, democratic model as its political basis.
I won't sit before you today and say it's going to look
like the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate in the
Jeffersonian model--we're a long way from there--but something
that will be seen by the international community as a
representative government that will keep this state together,
that will foreswear the use of any weapons of mass destruction
or the development of them, and that we will put in place a
system that the great wealth of Iraq--roughly $20 billion a
year is available to the people of this country--will be used
to develop the country, to develop the infrastructure, help
people in need in a more equitable distribution of the treasure
of that nation for the benefit of the people of that nation.
I think it will take time, and I can't tell you how many
years.
The Chairman. I'm not asking for time.
Secretary Powell. You didn't ask. But it will take strong
American presence. That presence will be political presence,
and it'll probably be military presence, and we shouldn't
deceive ourselves. And we are not. In our conversations on this
subject, we recognize that we are on the cusp of a very, very
demanding and long-term commitment if we have to go down this
road. But there are certain opportunities that come with this
commitment, the opportunity to create this kind of a government
in a part of the world where it's almost unknown. And it could
be a model for other nations in the region, an opportunity, not
to take a basket-case country like Afghanistan, but a country
with an educated population, although there are disparities
between the three different groups, and with this wealth that
can be used for legitimate purpose.
You made a comparison to Afghanistan. This morning I kicked
off a session at the World Bank of the Afghan Reconstruction
Support Group. Sixty nations came again to talk about the
rebuilding of Afghanistan. We made an additional pledge to that
effort, $33 million out of the recent supplemental. Other
nations are making their pledge. And we have accomplished a
great deal in Afghanistan. There's a lot more to be done, and
one can argue whether ISAF should be expanded or not. But I
think the security situation is not as bad as some say, but it
certainly isn't as good as we want it to be. But we're working
these issues, and we should be very proud of what we've
accomplished over the last 9 months.
The Chairman. Well, one thing is clear. When we succeed
militarily, if we decide we have to go, it will not be like the
gulf war when Johnnie comes marching home within 3 to 5 days or
several weeks or months. Some Johnnies are going to stay there.
Secretary Powell. We understand that.
The Chairman. OK. I just----
Secretary Powell. We have to make sure.
The Chairman. I'm not opposing that. I just want to make
sure we understand.
Secretary Powell. Ambassador Holbrooke made a point
yesterday that I just might touch on in this regard. The gulf
war was fought for the singular purpose of ejecting the Iraqi
army from Kuwait, restoring a legitimate government, and
stabilizing the region and bringing Iraq down to conventional
size. It was our hope that Hussein would not survive it. He
did. But nevertheless, the decision to do that was a wise
decision and one those of us who were there----
The Chairman. I'm not second-guessing.
Secretary Powell [continuing]. Never regretted. And it
wasn't a decision made at the end of the war. It was made
before the war. That's how we got that coalition together.
The Chairman. This is a different deal, though.
Secretary Powell. It is a different deal.
The Chairman. Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Mr. Secretary, it's kind of refreshing to
hear everybody singing from the same songbook on this. There
are a few voices, but they're out in the bushes somewhere and
they're not identifying themselves to the people.
Condoleezza Rice said the other day that the United States
will be completely devoted to the reconstruction of Iraq as a
unified democratic state in the event of a military strike that
topples Saddam Hussein. Now, this was said this morning. This
was essentially said by you this afternoon.
Now, one question that comes to mind, given the enormous
financial stakes of countries like France and Russia and
Germany, how will their views, do you think, figure into a
post-Saddam economy and all the rest of it?
Secretary Powell. We would certainly take their views into
account. The Russians, for example, have a commercial interest
in Iraq, and Iraq has quite a debt to Russia. All of the other
nations will have, I think, an economic interest in Iraq, and I
think they will also have a desire to participate in the
rebuilding.
We have been in conversation with our friends in the
Security Council on this, and Secretary General Kofi Annan and
I have talked about this in hypothetical terms, and I know that
if it ever came to this, the international community would be
most willing to play a role. And I think it'll be not just a
role of how do we get in there first and make the most money we
can, I think it'll be a role to establish commercial contracts
and see, you know, what we can do to make proper investments.
But I think it'll be also for the purpose of rebuilding a
nation and trying to put in place the kind of nation we'd all
like to see in that part of the world. So I think it is quite
possible, under those circumstances, to harness the
international community in a most positive and effective way.
Senator Helms. Every once in awhile the Devil makes me do
things, and this morning was one of them. I wanted to get these
two former Secretaries, who are a little bit at odds with each
other, to talk to us in terms of specific questions. And the
outcome was interesting. For example, Madeleine Albright argued
that Saddam Hussein is ``in a box,'' quote/unquote, and that
continuing a policy of combining sanctions with containment
will suffice. But then Henry Kissinger got in there, and that
didn't--he had some different views. But it was interesting to
hear these people who served as Secretaries several years back.
Now, Secretary Albright also suggested this morning that
all of this attention to Iraq is distracting from the war on
terrorism around the world. Secretary of State Kissinger
countered that to wait for the end of our fight against global
terrorism before acting is to guarantee that the stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction will multiply. And I wonder if you
agree or disagree with Henry Kissinger.
Secretary Powell. On both points. With respect to
containment, keeping him in a box, but he continues to bounce
against the walls of that box, and one of these days he'll have
a box cutter and then he'll be out, and we don't want to wait
and see that day. We think we have been at this long enough,
and it's time to deal with the contents of the box.
With respect to the second point on distracting, I'm not
sure what evidence Secretary Albright put forward to the fact
that we are distracted from the war against terrorism. Almost
every day now we see another set of arrests somewhere in the
world as we work with our partners in the international
community. We see al-Qaeda cells being broken up here. We're
working with the Yemenis. We see things happening in Spain, in
Portugal, in Germany. And so we're hard at work, our law-
enforcement activities, our financial task forces that are
chasing down al-Qaeda finances. We continue to work in
Afghanistan to rebuild that country. That's what I was doing
this morning before coming over here. So the campaign against
terrorism is going well.
And all of these actions, I might say, could be
characterized as preemptive actions: going after their
finances, going after where they might be next, ripping up the
cells, all of this before they have a chance to act.
So the campaign against terrorism is going in full swing,
and I don't see why there is a suggestion that somehow if we
had to undertake this mission, it would be at the expense of
the campaign against terrorism. Would it require a surge? Yes.
Would it require a lot of our energy? Yes. But the suggestion
that we weren't going to be able to continue the campaign
against terrorism if we moved in this direction I don't think
is an accurate assessment.
Senator Helms. I wonder of your reaction to anti-American
rhetoric of the Schroeder campaign for Chancellor of Germany. I
was terribly offended by that. Now, the guy won. No question
about that. But it was a very small margin of victory. So what
do you think will be the long-term impact on U.S.-German
relations if this anti-American election rhetoric continues?
Secretary Powell. We were deeply disturbed and offended by
how the Iraqi issue played into the recent German election, and
we were very disappointed. We made that disappointment known to
Chancellor Schroeder and to many other German officials, and we
were particularly horrified by the comments of the Minister of
Justice and her comparison of President Bush and some of his
actions to those of Hitler. And we expressed our outrage over
that.
But I have to stand back and take a look at some other
things to put this in context and perspective. Germany has been
very helpful in a number of areas over the past year. They've
been very supportive of our efforts in Afghanistan. They've
been very supportive of our campaign against terrorism. What we
saw in this recent election I don't think was so much anti-
American as it was anti a particular American policy.
Joschka Fischer, my Foreign Minister colleague, gives some
of the most powerful pro-American speeches you can hear. When
we needed a place to hold a conference to create the new Afghan
authority last year, it was Germany that stepped forward and
volunteered, and we held the conference in Bonn. And when we
had the loya jirga recently and needed somebody to sponsor
that, the Germans did it. And when we needed somebody to help
train the new Afghan police, military, and border forces,
Germany stepped forward. And Germany has indicated the desire
now to take over the ISAF.
So we have been good friends with Germany for many years.
We will remain good friends in the years to come. But a serious
breach occurred in recent weeks as a result of the matter in
which this issue inserted itself into the German election
campaign, and we were disappointed, disturbed, and we expressed
our concerns to our German colleagues.
Senator Helms. Mr. Secretary, it's always good to see you,
and thank you for coming.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, before I yield to the Senator
from Maryland, it's been pointed out by one of my colleagues--
you'll never guess who, and I won't name them--but when I said
``Johnnie comes marching home,'' I should have said ``Johnnie
and Jill come marching home.''
Secretary Powell. Absolutely.
The Chairman. And I apologize for that, because there are--
--
Secretary Powell. I knew that's what you meant, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for the help.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I'm looking at pages two and three of your
statement. Is the United States prepared to go to war against
Iraq if it engages in illicit trade outside the oil-for-food
program that's been established by the U.N.?
Secretary Powell. The principal concern that we have are
weapons of mass destruction, and the principal focus of the
U.N. resolutions are on weapons of mass destruction, and that's
what the inspection regime was trying to uncover and destroy.
At the same time, however, Iraq is in violation----
Senator Sarbanes. I understand that, but I'm looking----
Secretary Powell [continuing]. Of many other provisions
and----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. I'm looking at your
statement, and you say ``what Iraq must do repair this
breach.''
Secretary Powell. Right.
Senator Sarbanes. And I'm trying to section this out. You
list 5 things. The first, of course, is the removal of all
weapons of mass destruction. But I want to go to the others.
Are we prepared to go to war to make sure they comply with U.N.
resolutions on illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program?
You've got it listed here.
Secretary Powell. I've got it listed as one of a number of
issues that they are in material breach of. I don't think I
linked going to war to any one of them or any combination of
them.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, you say ``what they must do.''
Secretary Powell. Right.
Senator Sarbanes. So they must do that or otherwise we're
prepared to move against them?
Secretary Powell. I don't think I said that, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. OK, well, what about----
Secretary Powell. I'm saying----
Senator Sarbanes. What about----
Secretary Powell. I'm identifying--if I may, I'm
identifying the specific U.N. resolutions that they're in
violation of. And under U.N. resolutions they are supposed to
comply with those resolutions. They have the force of
international law.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, you say, ``If these demands on Iraq
sound like `regime change,' then so be it.'' Will we take
military action or go to war in order to make them release or
account for all gulf war personnel whose fate is still unknown?
Would we do that?
Secretary Powell. I think the operating clause in that that
is of the greatest concern is the one having to do with weapons
of mass destruction. It is unlikely that any of the others
individually would lead to that kind of consequence.
Senator Sarbanes. So if they did that, that's the one
toward which war is directed.
Secretary Powell. I think what we have to do--no, I don't
want to make that connection, Senator. I think what we have to
do is look at their total response to these resolutions. And
the resolution of greatest concern, the issue of greatest
concern are the weapons of mass destruction, which is why, in
1998, both the U.S. Congress and the previous administration
made that the policy of the U.S. Government.
Senator Sarbanes. Why are you listing all these things if
the weapons is the thing? Shouldn't we--do you want authority
to use military force against Iraq, from the Congress, in order
to make them comply with U.N. resolutions on illicit trade
outside the oil-for-food program? Do you want that authority?
Secretary Powell. The principal reason for the authority is
for the President to do what he needs to do to focus on the
principal offense that he has been presenting to the Nation,
and that is weapons of mass destruction. The rest of those
elements----
Senator Sarbanes. All right, I want to take you through the
rest of them. Do you want authority to go to war in order to
accomplish----
Secretary Powell. The President hasn't asked for any
authority----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Compliance with those
resolutions?
Secretary Powell. The President has not linked authority to
go to war to any of those elements. The President has asked
for----
Senator Sarbanes. It's right in the resolution. You have
all these Whereas's where you enumerate these resolutions, and
then you say, ``The President is authorized to use all means
that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order
to enforce the United Nations Security Council resolutions
referenced above.'' And the ones that are referenced above are
all of them. And all of them encompass illicit trade outside
the oil for food--accounting for the missing, et cetera, et
cetera.
So you want the authority to use force to carry out those
resolutions. Is that correct?
Secretary Powell. Yes, he wants the authority to use force
to carry out those resolutions where he believes force is the
appropriate way to get implementation of those resolutions. I
think it unlikely that the President would use force if he
complied with the weapons of mass destruction conditions. It
seems very unlikely, then, that he would be using force to
comply with any of the other resolutions.
Senator Sarbanes. But you want the authority to use the
force even if he complies with the weapons of mass destruction
resolution. You want the authority to go beyond that to all the
other resolutions. Is that correct?
Secretary Powell. The President was putting the case
forward that all of these resolutions produce a pattern of
misbehavior and material breach that he wanted the authority to
deal with in a way that he thought appropriate.
Senator Sarbanes. So if they comply with the weapons of
mass destruction, but not the others, you want the authority to
be able to use force to compel compliance with the others. Is
that correct?
Secretary Powell. That's the way the resolution is
currently worded, but we all know, I think, that the major
problem, the offense, what the President is focused on and the
danger to us and to the world are the weapons of mass
destruction.
Senator Sarbanes. Why did you word it this way? I mean, you
worded this resolution. We're trying to examine it, and we see
a broad reach of authority here.
Which leads me to my next point. I want to ask, who
prepared the preemptive doctrine here in this National Security
Strategy? Who's the author of this document?
Secretary Powell. It's an administration document, and we
all participated in it.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I know, but someone must be the
responsible person for----
Secretary Powell. The actual pulling it together was done
in the National Security Council, but we all participated in
it. I had authors working on it. Others had authors working on
it.
Senator Sarbanes. So, I mean, this is your document.
Secretary Powell. It is the President's document.
Senator Sarbanes. And this notion of a preemptive strike,
you don't regard that as a departure from past American--I know
you spoke earlier, ``Well, you know, we've done preemption
under certain circumstances.'' I think the example you used was
a strike against a chemical plant.
Secretary Powell. There are many others I could use.
Senator Sarbanes. Yes. But when have we ever launched a war
against another country on this basis?
Secretary Powell. Where does that document say we're going
to launch a war against a country? What it says is that there
is a new threat that is different from the threats we have
engaged in the past. Deterrence and containment, as strategies,
has not gone away. Preemption has always been a tool available
to a President, not just in this administration, but throughout
military history.
I would say that when we launched an attack against Panama
the 20th of December, 1989, it was a form of preemption,
because we were afraid that Noriega would be killing more
American citizens, other than the ones that he killed. And the
specific context of preemption there is that when you're
dealing with terrorist threats--it is written almost
exclusively around terrorist threats--when dealing with
terrorist threats of the kind we saw on the 20th, or excuse me,
on 9/11, threats of that nature, preemption rises higher in our
hierarchy of options because they tend not to be--terrorists
tend not to be deterred or contained in the way that states are
deterred and contained.
The chapter also concludes with some discussion about the
fact that this is not to be entered into lightly and one should
look for other alternatives, and it should be done with the
most serious consideration.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, Mr. Chairman, my time's up. I'd
just close with this observation. Every article about it, about
the doctrine you've put out, has language such as this: ``Bush
Details Preemptive Strike Policy Under New Security Plan,''
``U.S. Will Attack Nations, Groups That Pose Threats,'' ``Will
Act Alone If Necessary,'' and that's just out of one newspaper.
They're all saying the same thing.
Now, you sort of addressed it to and tried to put it in a
different context, but a lot of people are either
misinterpreting you or perceiving it as it is, and I'm not sure
which is the case yet. But it would seem to me to be of some
concern if you don't mean to do this, to leave this impression,
that that's how it's being read.
Secretary Powell. I didn't put it in a different context. I
put it in the context in which it was written. And I would
encourage everyone to read that one very short section of the
National Security Strategy, and you will find that it talks
about the traditional tools of national security and military
forces, and then it shifts and talks about the new threat we
are facing from terrorists and why preemption is something that
should rise in our hierarchy of available options.
The Chairman. I suggest that we ought to be able to work
out what the operative resolutions are. I don't think anybody
wants to go to war over liberating Kuwaiti prisoners, including
the President. So maybe we can get--it is in the resolution.
That's my point. I can't imagine the President not being
willing to take it out. But at any rate----
Senator Sarbanes. Why did he put it in?
The Chairman. Well, I don't know why he put it in, but--he
didn't call me first.
I am very close--matter of fact.
Senator Wellstone. Senator Biden, I know we're going to
vote, but could some of us say to the Secretary we really
apologize. We have a caucus meeting after the vote, and we have
questions, and I'm very sorry we didn't get a chance to put
some of them to you. Thank you for being here.
The Chairman. I'm very sorry--quite frankly, I shouldn't
say this. I'm very sorry our leadership set the caucus for this
time. I think it was inappropriate for them to do it this way.
I told them not to. We should stay here and listen to you
instead of go to the caucus, in my view.
We will adjourn until we vote. We're going to come right
back.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Senator Lugar is recognized.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Powell, at the last hearing in this committee
room, I made a plea to you in behalf of the President and
yourself and the administration for a language in the
Appropriations bill for Armed Services and authorization for
Armed Services to give the President the ability to waive
previous congressional stipulations so that our Nation could
start destroying chemical weapons in Russia under the Nunn-
Lugar program in particular, and so that the general provisions
of the Nunn-Lugar act might prevail.
And this is pertinent to the Moscow Treaty, at least in my
judgment. The Nunn-Lugar program is destroying dangerous
missiles as we speak and this will continue unless we stop
them. I appreciate your great efforts and I wanted to take this
moment simply to thank you for your intervention, for your
timely calls to members of the House conference committees. And
I'm hopeful the President will get that authority so that our
Nation might be able to destroy weapons of mass destruction in
large quantities, even as we are discussing the very terrible
circumstances in Iraq.
Second, I want to just comment, the chairman mentioned
earlier in the meeting, and this has brought some fresh
questions during the interval, that he and I have been working
on some language with regard to the resolution that we thought
might have a broader support, listening to our colleagues
around the table. I raised, yesterday, the hope that our
committee might, in fact, have jurisdiction with regard to the
resolution for at least a week so that we at least fulfill our
role. Whether that will happen or not, I do not know, but it is
true that the chairman and I have been trying to work through
this.
Now, from the press over in front of the Senate I had the
question, ``Well, what do you think of the latest
administration draft?'' And so I said, well, I have not seen
any such draft. I'm unaware that there is such a draft. And
they said, ``There is.'' Now, if the chairman is aware of this,
he hasn't told me. I am not aware of it.
And I would just simply say again, we are trying very hard
to obtain substantial support for the President. It is very
difficult to do this when we are working constructively and
simply discover inadvertently that somebody in the press is
already informing us that there is a new draft. I will say no
more. But please register that thought if you will.
The third thing, I appreciated very much your outlining
this afternoon what a new Iraq Government might look like.
Granted we do not know that there will be military action. And,
as Secretary Kissinger pointed out today, there could be a coup
in Iraq: the military might dispatch Saddam, and they deal with
us, and that's a different picture.
But in response to all the contingencies that you were
asked--that is, if a regime change occurred--you pointed out
that it would have to be a regime that would help us find and
destroy the weapons of mass destruction. That will take some
doing, as you pointed out: scientists, intelligence sources,
everybody. But at least that's a formation of a plan. It
indicates some sound thinking about this area, which we asked
for.
With regard to a new Iraqi Government, you said we'd try to
raise up a government representative of the people with the
democratic model as the basis, keeping the state together. Oil
resources would be focused on financing humanitarian projects
for the people. A strong American presence will be required,
both political and military, probably for some time and
preferably the presence of a lot of our allies and friends in
the area.
Now, that is important, and I suspect that it comes not
only from your own supposition, but from the planning efforts
on the part of the administration. In other words, there are
people actually at work on this. The chairman and I have been
asking for this in the hearings, evidence that, even in our
important discussion about war and peace, we are thinking about
the consequences. And there are consequences, obviously,
coming.
And we would hope, perhaps, as a part of the resolution to
be adopted by the Congress, some formal structure for regular
consultation between the administration and the Congress as we
identify the resources and authority that will be needed. The
American people must understand how this will evolve as opposed
to the Gulf of Tonkin situation in which we go to war, Vietnam
goes on and on, there is no really formal way of telling what
was going to happen. So all of this, I just simply wanted to
say at the outset.
Now, having said this, an interesting piece the 23rd of
September in the Wall Street Journal by David Price Jones, the
senior editor of National Review. He points out the origin of
Iraq, at least in his formulation, came because the British
when they put together a state after World War I. They put
together several clashing groups. His claim is that it took a
dictator then, a king that was imposed, and it's taken one ever
since to hold this country together. Maybe true, maybe not.
Evolution in Iraq--and we all need to learn much more about
that--may permit this coalition, this representative government
that speaks for all the people. There are other voices who say
there could be a bloodbath of Shiites mopping up on Sunnis
because of all the slights in the past, or the Iranians
intervening, quite apart from the Kurds and Turkey in the
north.
So it's still a stretch for many, historically, to try to
think in terms of this representative democracy. On the other
hand, it is important that the Iraqis know, that the world
knows, that the American people know that that is our goal,
that that's the formulation, a different government in a
difficult neighborhood implying a great deal of American
resources--human, military, and civilian and money and time.
And it seems to me if that is the formulation you and the
President are able to present, the case is much more powerful.
It represents, really, as you say, an opportunity, as opposed
to a situation of chaos and gloom in comparison to Afghanistan
or what have you.
Do you have any comment about any of the above?
Secretary Powell. Well, just, first, thank you for your
comments about the waiver authority we requested. And with
respect to the latest, quote, ``administration draft,'' I will
check on that when I get back to the office and make the point
to the White House that you have made to me.
On reconstruction, I'm sure that the President would want
to consult regularly, and if that sort of guidance was
contained in a resolution, I don't know that he would find
anything objectionable about it.
And with respect to the Wall Street Journal comment and
article, quite true. The British created this in 1921, and it
is something of an odd creation, and that's the way they did it
and disengaged, and there is no democratic tradition. But we've
seen a lot of states in recent times with not much of a
democratic tradition, but when exposed to the possibility of
moving in that direction, they have done so with dispatch. That
doesn't mean it can't be done, but it will be a difficult and
challenging task for all of us, and we very much recognize
this. And we also know the kind of commitment that'll be
required from us and from others to bring it about. But if we
do bring it about, it will be an historic change in that part
of the region, and there is an opportunity there.
We have to be mindful, as came out in the questioning
earlier, about the fact that there will still be a campaign
against terrorism going on in other parts of the world.
Afghanistan will still be going on. And we'll be stressed. We
will truly be stressed. But I think it is possible to manage it
all.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you for your candor. And I hope the
State Department, which is very good at coming up with phrases,
comes up with a new word for nation-building, because that's
what we're going to be doing.
The Senator from Wisconsin.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, if I might add, I don't think
the concern about nation-building comes out of the State
Department.
The Chairman. No, it doesn't. No, no. But maybe they can be
helpful with the White House to come up with--I wasn't
implying--you had a----
Secretary Powell. I know you weren't.
The Chairman. We may need a word, though.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here today
to discuss United States policy toward Iraq, and I welcome the
opportunity.
For months, the administration has continued to rachet up
the rhetoric on Iraq, and, as we've already talked about, last
week sent proposed language authorizing the use of force to the
Congress. It is high time that this committee had the
opportunity to hear a bit about just what is being proposed and
what the implications are for our national security and foreign
policy priorities.
And I think this is especially true because, I've got to
say, that because months into this debate I think we still lack
clarity on a number of points. I think we're hearing shifting
justifications for taking military action in Iraq now. Part of
this was illustrated by Senator Sarbanes' listing of the
different possible justifications, vis-a-vis Security Council
resolutions, some of which I'm quite certain this country would
not invade Iraq in order to enforce.
The same thing goes for the sort of intermittent popping up
of the claim that Iraq and al-Qaeda were in league on 9/11.
Yesterday, the Secretary of Defense basically asserted that.
When someone asked the press secretary of the President whether
or not that was the case, he said, ``Well, they could get
together.'' So the trouble is, Mr. Secretary, it's unsettling
to get this feeling that there are really shifting
justifications for what is being contemplated here.
We still know very little about precisely what mission is
being proposed and what kind of commitments the American people
are being asked to make. And so I, for one, given where we're
at at this point, am very reluctant to support any resolution
without clarity on these critical issues.
As you know, I have tremendous respect for you, though,
Secretary Powell, and I take your views very seriously, and
that's why I'm very pleased that we have the chance to talk to
you today.
Mr. Secretary, the administration has asked for the
authority to use force in Iraq. Actually, the administration
has asked for authority to use force throughout the region, but
we are talking about Iraq today. What is the mission being
proposed? Is it disarmament? Are we proposing to do that? Or is
it regime change? How does regime change relate to the problems
of weapons of mass destruction? Or is it enforcement of U.N.
resolutions? Which mission is it?
Secretary Powell. The President hopes that it will be
possible to solve this problem and deal with this crisis with
military force as the last resort. If it is necessary to use
military force because Iraq does not come into compliance with
the resolutions, particularly--and especially, really--the
focus is on weapons of mass destruction resolutions. The others
might be considered a lesser included offense within a
principal offense of weapons of mass destruction.
If the President finds it necessary or the international
community finds it necessary to use military force to enforce
those resolutions, at that point, I would not prejudge what the
international community would say or what the President might
say, but it seems to me clear that we're using military force
because the regime intends not to come into compliance, and,
therefore, the regime has to be changed.
Senator Feingold. Is it possible that it would involve
disarmament without regime change?
Secretary Powell. It would seem to me if the Iraqis----
Senator Feingold. The military action.
Secretary Powell. If the Iraqis do not cooperate and do not
allow inspectors in under a new inspection regime to do the
work that has to be done, then there is no point in continuing
to deal with this regime in any way, shape, fashion, or form.
And I think what comes into play at that point is what came
into play back in 1998 when President Clinton looked at this
problem and when the Congress looked at this problem. Both
President Clinton and the Congress--and, in the case of this
administration, we continue their policy of regime change
because we had doubts about the willingness of this regime to
come into compliance with these resolutions, especially those
resolutions dealing with disarmament, getting rid of weapons of
mass destruction.
Senator Feingold. Under that formulation then, the mission
is disarmament, and the regime is an impediment to that
mission. It is not the mission----
Secretary Powell. That's right.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. To change the regime.
Secretary Powell. The mission from 1991 to 1998 was to get
the inspectors in to make sure that they had disarmed. In 1998,
when the inspectors could no longer do their work, the
administration at that time and the Congress at that time said
that the only way to get disarmament was for regime change, and
regime change became American policy because the regime would
not disarm.
Senator Feingold. I understand. Now, let me follow on that.
Secretary Powell. Yes.
Senator Feingold. If that's the case, are you aware of any
significant planning for securing WMD sites in Iraq in the
event of a military invasion? If the government were to be
toppled and some degree of chaos were to reign for some period,
isn't there a very real risk that weapons of mass destruction
and the means to make them will be taken out of the country or
sold off to exactly the kind of non-state actors that the
United States is worried about? Do we know enough about where
WMD sites are to be confident in our ability to secure them?
And it seems that it would take a pretty large force to secure
these throughout the country, and that if we don't succeed in
all of this, then we've not actually succeeded in what I think
you and I agreed was really the core idea of what the mission
here is.
Secretary Powell. I think there's a danger that we might
not be able to get to every site that contains weapons of mass
destruction or the capacity to develop weapons of mass
destruction. The intelligence is not that perfect. But you can
be sure--and here I don't want to get into military planning or
options, and it's really the role of Secretary Rumsfeld and
General Myers. But I'm quite sure, in any contingency planning
that's going on in the Pentagon, the securing of those sites
and disarmament is a major element of military planning.
Senator Feingold. Finally, the Iraqi people have suffered
terribly from years of deprivation, and they've been
consistently and, I think, falsely told that it is American
support for sanctions that is responsible for their plight. If
widespread civil conflict breaks out in the wake of military
action, a significant military presence obviously might be
required for some time, particularly, again, given the
existence of weapons of mass destruction in the country.
What do you think is the kind of reaction we can expect
from the Iraqi people if the United States moves to invade and
then, for some period, has to actually occupy their country?
Secretary Powell. This is a very important question on
which there are many points of view. Some suggest that the
Iraqi people will be delighted to see the end of this regime.
This regime has suppressed its minorities, violated the human
rights of its citizens, and not made good use of the resources
that it has to better the lives of its people, but instead has
used those resources for war and development of weapons of mass
destruction.
I think a good argument can be made that the removal of
this regime would be greeted warmly by the people as long as
they felt a better life was awaiting them and that a different
kind of government would be coming in that would take care of
their needs and not the needs of a dictator intent on the kind
of aggression that Saddam Hussein has been intent upon.
Others argue that the very fact that it would be non-Arabs
or Americans coming in to take control for awhile of an Arab
country might be a difficult problem for the population. I
think----
Senator Feingold. But, Mr. Secretary, what's your view?
Secretary Powell. I think that if the operation was done
with dispatch, was done quickly, and the Nation was clearly put
on a path of the kind that I described earlier--getting rid of
the weapons of mass destruction, putting in place a
representative government, making it clear, as history
demonstrates, the United States does not come to stay. The
United States comes to help, it comes to build, and then
leaves. We have no territorial ambitions or any motives of
aggrandizement--then I think this probably would be received
with pleasure by the people of Iraq.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for coming today. I want to first
thank you also for your steady leadership through this process.
This has not been a simple challenge, and I don't believe it
gets any easier, and you understand that. But I think I speak
for this country, and I think I can speak for the world, we are
glad you are where you are and we appreciate it, and the team
that you have backing you up, your ambassadors and all, who are
part of your operation. So thank you.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagel. I also want to say that I was very pleased
to learn that it appears now that Assistant Secretary Kelly is
going to North Korea. I know that is hourly and that could yet
change. But, as you know, we have had some discussion about
``axis of evil'' and the countries, and I think the direction
that we appear to be headed here is the responsible direction.
I had an opportunity to be briefed by the Japanese
Ambassador here the last couple of days as I know you have, and
the President has by the Japanese Prime Minister about this.
And Iraq obviously seeps into everyone's conversation
regardless what the issue is.
I want to take the time I have to frame up a general
question for you, Mr. Secretary, one that some of us have been
concerned about; it's been dismissed by some. And that is maybe
that the general area of the possibility of a ripple effect in
the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, focusing on, a bit
on the Israeli situation, the Israeli-Palestinian problem, what
kind of an effect this could have, short-term, long-term, if,
in fact we invade Iraq with a coalition. And followup questions
that we have discussed here, how long the United States would
have to stay in Iraq.
I know they are all subjective. You cannot calibrate it
precisely. But I think this committee, certainly this Senator,
would be very interested in having you address that. You
obviously have had to think through this a little bit as to
some of the ``what ifs.'' What if we get into a little more
than we thought? What if Saddam Hussein throws some Scuds with
biological/chemical-tipped warheads and all these things that
you've had to think through--not just the Defense Department,
but you've had to think through them. You went through that
once.
And also in connection with that, maybe you could go a
little deeper in your response to Senator Sarbanes as he quoted
you back about the United States wholeheartedly committed to
reconstruction.
A plan. How far are we along the way with a plan? I know
what you've said, and I hear it from the administration, ``We
want a democracy and democratic institutions.'' You said today
that it most likely won't be a U.S. model in the first year. We
accept that. But is there any plan? Who's working on something?
Identify for me who is out there as to who we can go to to help
us on the ground.
I know I've thrown a lot at you, but take it in any
sequence you like.
Thank you.
Secretary Powell. With respect to the Middle East peace
situation that you touched on, I think that it is important
that during this period of tension and buildup we do everything
we can to keep the Middle East peace process on track. We're
working very hard on this, Senator Hagel. We had good meetings
in New York last week with Arab leaders with the quartet. And
for the first time in a long time in the presence of the
quartet, we brought in representatives of the Israeli
Government and the Palestine Authority. We had a rather
energized debate, let me put it that way. And we have seen some
progress with respect to transformation within the Palestinian
Authority and some other things happening. Some slow progress,
but I was encouraged by that progress.
Unfortunately, as so often happens in that part of the
world, the events of the last week and the situation at the
Muqatta once again, with the Israeli ringing of it, has been a
very unhelpful development, and we're working hard to see if we
can break this siege once again and get back on a positive
track and not constantly be sliding back down the hill.
It is important for us to do everything we can to stabilize
that part of the world and show progress, regardless of what
else is going on, but especially in light of what might be
going on in Iraq.
There is also no doubt--there is no love lost for Saddam
Hussein in any of the countries in the region. They recognize
that he is one of the biggest destabilizing elements in the
whole region and that a different kind of regime in Iraq would
be quite welcome. They are not unmindful of the fact that the
two invasions he's conducted in the last 20 years have been
against neighbors. And they would like to see that kind of a
change, but they are uneasy about how that change comes about
and whether it will be in a way that further destabilizes the
region. So it'll be a time of great tension.
But I think if such an operation becomes necessary, that if
it is done with dispatch, with efficiency, and with a clear
sense of purpose and determination to bring this to an end, it
will generate support and we can deal the other issues of
uncertainty, such as the Middle East peace plan and concerns
that might exist in the Arab street.
With respect to Scuds and how they may be used against
neighboring countries, it is an issue I've faced before for
real. We went into the Desert Storm conflict quite confident
they would use chemical weapons. They did not. We were
expecting it. And we knew they had radiological capability and
biological capability, and we prepared ourselves for that. And
they did fire Scuds at neighbors, and we dealt with that. And
we are thinking through the consequences of potential responses
from neighbors, and all that is part of our calculus.
And on your last point, the plan for reconstruction, there
are task forces at work. There's a task force in my department.
We're working with the Defense Department, National Security
Council, and others. And as that work progresses, I think there
will be opportunities to share that work with the Congress. As
you can appreciate, it's quite sensitive and compartmentalized
at the moment.
Senator Hagel. I've got the little yellow timing light
here.
It was referenced recently by a member of your
administration that one of the areas that we could count on if
we invaded Iraq was to use Jordanian areas. Can you talk about
that? It was my understanding that that was still pretty iffy.
Secretary Powell. I think I would rather yield to my
colleagues in the Defense Department who might be having more
direct conversations of this nature, and I would not want to
speak for the Jordanian Government in this----
Senator Hagel. Has King Abdullah's position shifted
publicly on this? The last I knew----
Secretary Powell. From what to what, Senator?
Senator Hagel. From what he--last I knew, what he said
publicly was that he wasn't prepared yet to commit to any
invasion or use of Jordan for an invasion of Iraq.
Secretary Powell. I think that remains his public position,
and I don't think we have asked him for permission to do
anything yet. So the question is not before us at the moment.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. How much time are
we operating on?
The Chairman. Seven minutes.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, welcome, and thank you so much for your
superb efforts at the United Nations. We do appreciate it.
Let me begin by saying that I completely support what you
have said in your testimony, and hope the United Nations will
understand there's a broad base of support for that here in the
Congress, that the regime of an inspection regime must, in your
words, have the authority of a new resolution, it must remove
the weaknesses of the present regime and cannot tolerate Iraqi
resistance and games and so forth. We can't go back to where
we've been. And I think everybody of common sense, hopefully,
would support that notion.
Would you say to Americans that we are in a stronger
position with respect to the prosecution of a war and our
relations in the world if we have the support of the United
Nations?
Secretary Powell. Yes.
Senator Kerry. And given that fact, would you also say that
it is important to proceed now to try to give time to the U.N.
to try to--and I'm not saying how much, and I certainly am not
suggesting that our rights ought to be subjugated--but to give
them sufficient time to be able to lend us that support so we
are operating from a position of strength?
Secretary Powell. Yes, and that's what we're doing now,
Senator. We are in the most intense consultations. And earlier
I mentioned that the United States and the United Kingdom have
come together on a proposed resolution which I've sent my Under
Secretary for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, off this
afternoon to visit Paris and Moscow and present our ideas to
the French and the Russians. And I've discussed those ideas
with my Chinese colleague earlier this morning on the phone and
presented it to one of his Foreign Minister associates who is
visiting here in Washington. So we are working to try to bring
the Security Council together on a resolution.
Senator Kerry. And if the United Nations were to pass a
resolution that, indeed, changed the regime and provided for
genuinely airtight, comprehensive, unfettered, unconditional
access, which I think is the only standard that can exist here,
is it your judgment that if that were not complied with and
they didn't provide authority for force commensurate with that,
that they would then have no choice but to provide authority
for use of force? I mean, I assume that they would be
completely rendering themselves useless and meaningless and
have held themselves up to the highest level of contempt if
they didn't.
Secretary Powell. It's certainly the case that I am making
and the President is making to our colleagues in the Security
Council, don't go down this road unless you are prepared to
take action if there is continued violation of the kind we have
seen in the past with respect to a new resolution.
Now, the debate really is, should we come back to the
Security Council again for new authority, or should the
authority be imbedded in one resolution?
Senator Kerry. I understand. But what I'm asking you really
is, isn't the new authority an inevitability if they, in fact,
give you this regime?
Secretary Powell. If they give--well, I believe it should
be inevitable, either under the framework of the United Nations
or if, for one reason or another, the United Nations does not
wish to take that action.
Senator Kerry. Well, that brings me----
Secretary Powell. But the President reserves the right to
take the action with like-minded nations, just as was done in
Kosovo.
Senator Kerry. Fair enough. And I would accept where we are
up until this point.
Now, the purpose of the resolution that the President has
submitted to us, and, indeed, the purpose of your going to the
United Nations, is to seek the strength of a U.N. resolution,
really to enforce the U.N.'s purpose in all its prior
resolutions, correct?
Secretary Powell. Yes, sir.
Senator Kerry. And what you are seeking from us in the
resolution you have submitted to us is, in fact, enforcement of
the U.N. resolutions. I mean, that's--there's a list of U.N.
resolutions, correct?
Secretary Powell. Yes.
Senator Kerry. And so you're seeking, from the U.S.
Congress, the right to use force to enforce those. Now, let me
ask you----
Secretary Powell. Either--if I just--just to make sure we
have a common understanding--to act as part of a multilateral
effort, but also, in the event that the President sees that the
U.N. will not be able to act and----
Senator Kerry. Well, I understand.
Secretary Powell [continuing]. Decides that it is in our
interest to act with like-minded nations. And we believe there
would be like-minded nations at that time.
Senator Kerry. But the action, this is what I'm trying to
get at. What we're seeking now, what you have acknowledged is
the United States would be stronger if we had the United
Nations. The United Nations has already expressed itself in a
series of resolutions. All of those resolutions were listed in
the President's speech. They are now listed in the resolution
before us. What we are effectively being asked is to provide
the capacity for the enforcement of these resolutions, the most
important of which, you have acknowledged, is weapons
inspection.
Secretary Powell. Right. Weapons disarmament. Disarmament.
Senator Kerry. Weapons destruction----
Secretary Powell. Right.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Not inspection. Now, none of
those resolutions mention or seek regime change.
Secretary Powell. That's correct.
Senator Kerry. So the United States is, in effect, sort of
moving unilaterally to decide there is another goal here
outside of the United Nations. They don't mention regime change
except to the degree that enforcement of the inspection and
destructions may ultimately require a regime change.
Secretary Powell. Yes. That's the basis for U.S. Government
policy, as expressed both by two Presidents in a row and the
Congress since 1998.
Senator Kerry. So, therefore, I would ask you, Mr.
Secretary, and, through you, the President, based on some of
the questions Senator Sarbanes asked earlier--I mean, I would
assume, based on your experience and, I mean, just knowing you
as I do, I can't believe you would recommend to the President
that he should go to war simply to enforce, what, the proper
sale of oil. I would assume the President is not going to go to
war simply--where is the listing here----
Senator Sarbanes. Page three.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. The release of the gulf war
personnel. Let me sort of come to my question. I mean, if--if--
and I know it's a huge if; but if Iraq were pushed to a point
that they had to comply, and did comply fully with an
unfettered, unconditional spot inspection satisfactory to the
new regime which you are seeking from the United Nations, and
it was met, would you go to war?
Secretary Powell. If Iraq was disarmed as a result of an
inspection regime that gave us and the Security Council
confidence that it had been disarmed----
Senator Kerry. Correct.
Secretary Powell [continuing]. I think it unlikely that we
would find a causus belli.
Senator Kerry. Then don't we have to give that its
opportunity to work? Don't you have to exhaust that
possibility?
Secretary Powell. That's exactly the challenge that the
President presented to the United Nations.
Senator Kerry. Then why are we being asked----
Secretary Powell. Because we believe----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. For a very broad resolution
where we would give the authority to the President to go to war
for so much more than that, prior to that even happening? I
mean, you're asking the Congress of the United States to give a
blanket permission to go to war for a broad set of things that
aren't even encompassed in the resolutions, none of which rise,
in your own testimony now, to the level of going to war?
Secretary Powell. Which broad set of things that----
Senator Kerry. Well, I mean, are you telling me we're going
to go to war because they haven't returned all the stolen
property and accepted losses from the war?
Secretary Powell. I think the President has made it clear
in all of his conversations with Members of Congress, in his
presentations to the American people, and his presentation to
the United Nations that Iraq has to be disarmed. That----
Senator Kerry. I agree.
Secretary Powell [continuing]. Is the major problem.
Senator Kerry. I agree completely.
Secretary Powell. But there are also, as you talked about,
the various resolutions, the 16 resolutions, the almost 30
conditions contained within all those resolutions, there are a
lot of other things that Iraq is in violation of.
Senator Kerry. I completely agree.
Secretary Powell. But there is no question that light that
is glowing at us is the one that has to do with weapons of mass
destruction. And the whole inspection regime went after that
one. There was no inspection regime on Kuwaiti prisoners or the
oil-for-food program. There are other ways to deal with that.
And so what the President is asking for the authority to do
is to take appropriate action either with the U.N. or, if the
U.N. does not act, for him to work with other like-minded
nations to disarm Iraq.
And the whole purpose of a regime-change policy that came
in in 1998 was because the regime, the Iraqi regime at that
time, was acting in a way that suggested the only way you could
get satisfaction of that disarmament requirement was through a
change in the regime.
Senator Kerry. Well, if I could just say, Mr. Secretary,
the reason--and I'll close. My time is up, and I don't want to
abuse it. But may I say to you, sir--and I don't want any
misinterpretation about my position. I really want none
whatsoever. The issue, to me, is not whether Saddam Hussein
should be held accountable. Of course he should. The issue is
not whether or not these weapons are a threat. Yes, they are.
The issue is, how do we go about this?
And the question remains why, if the gravamen of threat to
the United States, according to most rational people's
judgment, is the weapons of mass destruction, the capacity of
Saddam Hussein to miscalculate, the capacity of those weapons
to slide off to a surrogate terrorist group--all of those
threats are real--but if you could satisfy that threat without
a drop of blood spilled because the United Nations succeeds in
putting in place an unfettered, unconditional spot inspection
that results in destruction--I have no confidence,
incidentally, that that will happen automatically. But it seems
to me that's what builds you the legitimacy of the casus belli
and the consent of the American people to finally make that
commitment, and it just baffles me why the resolution doesn't
reflect that, rather than this extraordinary broad overreach.
The Chairman. Because it was written by the White House
Counsel and not the Secretary of State.
Secretary Powell. May I make one final point?
The Chairman. Yes.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, Senator. And I understand your
point. If I can, just before shifting, come back to Senator
Hagel briefly, yes, Assistant Secretary Kelly will be traveling
to Pyongyang on the 3rd of October as a Presidential envoy.
Senator Sarbanes. Was the resolution written--I heard from
someone the State Department wrote it. But I now understand
from what Senator Biden said that that's not the case and that
the resolution was written by the White House Counsel. It came
up here under the White House Counsel's name.
Secretary Powell. I think it came up from the White House.
We all saw the resolution in the process of it being drafted. I
saw it before it was submitted.
Senator Sarbanes. Where was the locus for writing it, at
the State Department?
Secretary Powell. I can't tell you, Senator, whether my
lawyers were involved in it or not, but I think the principal
focus of writing and authorship was in the White House.
The Chairman. Well, on a different subject of some
interest, since you mentioned it at the front end of your
testimony, we just passed the State Department Authorization
bill. The House has passed it. The President will get it soon.
If he signs it, which I hope he will, you'll have $80 million
to take care of your last payment----
Secretary Powell. Whew.
The Chairman [continuing]. And a lot of other things, so I
just thought that might give you a little good news in all the
fun you're having here today.
Secretary Powell. The money was going to expire Monday, so
thank you.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, I just want to thank you.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Secretary, for being here.
At the earlier session, I asked the former Secretaries a
question relative to what President Mubarak said several weeks
ago, and that was, ``If you strike Iraq, not one Arab leader
will be able to control the angry outbursts of the masses.''
Now, as we go forward and you listen to someone who's been
in the country since the early 1980s, probably longer than
anybody else in the region, what do you think? Is this
hyperbole? And if we're going to listen to these respected
leaders in the world--and I'll also quote General Musharraf,
``An attack on Iraq will have very negative repercussions
around the Islamic world''--how do we, absent the overwhelming
proof that constraints on Saddam Hussein are not working, how
do we listen to these leaders and risk what they're saying?
Secretary Powell. There will be a period of heightened
tension if we have to undertake military operations against
Iraq. Many of them have also said to us that if it becomes
necessary, it would be better if it was done under the
provisions of a U.N. mandate, U.N. resolution. That would
assist them enormously in dealing with the problems that might
exist within their countries.
There's no question there will be tension. But, at the same
time, every one of these leaders also tells us that there is no
question in their minds that Saddam Hussein is in violation,
there's no question in their minds that he's a threat to
regional stability and peace, there's no question in their
minds that he is a threat to the region and has demonstrated
previously his willingness to use weapons of mass destruction,
and there is no doubt in their minds that he continues to have
the intent to develop these weapons of mass destruction. And so
if it was done in a way that was decisive and that was swift
and with the promise of a better life for the Iraqis
afterwards, I think the spill-out--spill-off problems that
might exist in the region for some period of time could be
managed.
Senator Chafee. In light of that, what's the difference
between your experience in 1991 in forming an international
coalition and the trouble, obviously, that we're having this
year? You talked about these leaders knowing Saddam Hussein is
a threat. Back in 1991 they gladly signed up to an
international coalition, save Jordan, but this time, obviously,
the dynamics are so different. It's 11 years later, and they're
expressing grave, grave reservations. Does that tell us
something?
Secretary Powell. Well, there are many differences. In
1990, it was a invasion of a fellow Arab nation. I mean, Iraq
left its borders to invade another nation and take it over and
eject a ruling family. It was on the verge, perhaps, of
invading another neighbor, Saudi Arabia. And so there was no
doubt about the threat. It was clear, it was present. And the
response that the international community made to that
aggression was that we would reverse that aggression, and we
would do it in a way that did not invade an Arab country in the
process of doing it. We weren't going to Baghdad. We weren't
invading Iraq. We were ejecting Iraq from Kuwait. And that gave
us the wherewithal to put together this international coalition
that consisted of Arab armies cooperating with us and fighting
alongside of us. The Syrian army, the Egyptian army, the gulf
military forces, and other Muslim nations participated in it.
And it was for that reason that we had a limited mission, which
was to eject the Iraqi army and not move on Baghdad.
This is different. We have now seen, 11 years later, that
this individual still remains a threat, still tries to develop
weapons of mass destruction, and it is a different context. And
it's also a different context with respect to the situation
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. It's a much more
heated environment. But keep in mind, it was heated then.
People were worried then. And as the results of our success in
the gulf war, we found that we were able to manage this heat
that existed in the region and even use our success in the gulf
war to get the Madrid process underway, the Madrid meetings
that took place in the fall of 1991 which, in due course, led
to other progress in trying to solve the Middle East crisis.
Unfortunately, that did not solve the Middle East crisis and
it's still with us, and it's in a much more difficult situation
than it was then.
Senator Chafee. So to get right down to it, the threat is
different.
Secretary Powell. The threat is different, the environment
is different, and the only way to deal with the threat right
now if we do not get compliance on the part of the Iraqi
regime, Saddam Hussein--if we don't get compliance this time,
then it is a different kind of military mission that must be
undertaken, must be to go in and remove the regime.
Senator Chafee. Would it be fair to say the threat is
lesser?
Secretary Powell. The threat--if you're talking about the
capacity of the Iraqi military, its conventional capacity is
nowhere near where it was 12 years ago. I would guess it's
about perhaps 30 percent of its--30 to 40 percent of its size
and certainly of its effectiveness. Its weapons of mass
destruction, we destroyed a lot. The inspectors did great work.
Sometimes people talk down to the inspectors about the
wonderful work they did for a period of 7 years. They helped
with intelligence and helped with defectors who gave them
information, but then they were thrown out and we don't know
what's been reconstituted over the last 3 to 4 years. So there
is still the threat of weapons of mass destruction being used
in any new conflict.
Senator Chafee. It seems to me then that if the threat is
lesser, we're having to horsewhip our allies into a coalition,
the Arab friends and neighbors in the region----
Secretary Powell. Yes.
Senator Chafee [continuing]. Are all saying, ``Don't do
it.''
Secretary Powell. The coalition just----
Senator Chafee. Madeleine Albright said, ``This is a
mistake.'' And all you have to do is run your hand over the
black granite at the Vietnam Memorial to see what mistakes do.
Secretary Powell. The coalition just didn't snap together
on the first day of the conflict back in 1990. It took a lot of
hard work. It took a lot of discussion and a lot of hard work
on the part of Secretary Baker, then-Secretary of Defense
Cheney, yours truly, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and, above all, President Bush and the other members of the
Cabinet, to bring that coalition into being. And we are working
in that same vein now. That's why President Bush took it to the
United Nations on the 12th of September. He didn't go to the
United Nations on the 12th of September to issue a declaration
of war. It was a declaration of purpose, ``We've got to do
something about this.''
And, yes, there are these dangers in the region that
Secretary Albright spoke of, but we believe one of the greatest
dangers in the region right now is the danger of this
individual being able to thumb his nose once again at the
United Nations, and the United Nations doing nothing about it,
and his intent, unchanged, to continued to develop weapons of
mass destruction. And we may not be able to keep him in his box
forever. We might not be able to contain him forever. We can't
continue to take the risk of him coming out of that box or him
showing up one day with the capability that threatens his
neighbors or threatens our interests or threatens us directly,
or his working with terrorist organizations which threaten us
directly.
Senator Chafee. Before my time runs out, I know Senator
Kerry talked about it. Isn't that all the more reason to have
more time on debate on this and----
Secretary Powell. Well, I think----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. Giving the time for the----
Secretary Powell. I think we are having that debate now,
both here in the United States and in the United Nations.
We're--I mean, I haven't spent--I've been doing nothing for the
last 2 weeks since the President's speech but working this--
yes, I have been doing other things, let me not sell myself
short, others will do that for me.
But this certainly has been a priority for me for the last
several weeks.
Senator Chafee. You're terrific. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, do you need a break?
Secretary Powell. No, I'm fine.
The Chairman. OK. And if you'd like a cup of coffee or
something----
Secretary Powell. I'm great.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you know better than I do that
when--I guess it was, I don't know--Senator Lugar or Senator
Hagel were talking about the, sort of the artificial construct
of this country named Iraq after 1921. This country, and I know
you know this, but make sure I get it right--is divided Arab,
Indo-European--that is, Kurds--and the rest of the population
is Arab. Arab population is split Sunni and Shia. Kurds, non-
Arabs, are Sunnis. Sixty percent of the population is
essentially in the southeastern part between the Tigris and the
Euphrates, generally.
The Shia, there are 600,000 to 700,000, based on, I think,
your Department's estimates, Shia in Iran right now as
displaced refugees. Do we have any sense--I'm not suggesting
you should know, but do we have any sense whether or not if
Saddam were gone, they'd come back? Do we have the problem and
opportunity of 600,000-700,000 people moving back across the
border, and all that that entails, good and bad? And do we have
any sense of whether or not they'll come back looking to settle
scores with the roughly 20 percent of the Arab Sunni
population, which is the Ba'ath, the essence of the Ba'ath
Party?
In my discussions, and we've all had them over the years,
with the Iraqi National Congress, there are real deep
disagreements. Do we have any sense of what this diaspora of
Shia in Iran, particularly, are likely to--anything about their
attitudes, about democracy, or their attitudes about a united
Iraq. Can you talk to us about that?
Secretary Powell. I don't know, Senator. I haven't seen any
data on attitudes or whether we have done any analysis of that
or polling of that population. I'll have to look at that. If we
have, I'll provide it for the record.
The Chairman. Now, you may not be able to answer the
question in public, but we all know from our individual
interfacing with foreign leaders that the Turks are very
concerned about the Kurds. We also know that the Kurds, some
Kurds, kind of like it just the way it is. This is as close to
an autonomous republic that they have had since 1921. And we
know that not all Kurds, but a number of Kurds, still harbor a
desire for a Kurdistan, which, I know you know this, the map is
very small--but which goes well into Turkey and into Iran. Are
we going to have to make any commitments to the Turks that the
Kurds aren't going to know about? Or are we going to have to
make any commitments or lay down the law to the Kurds before we
enlist the Turks?
In other words, everybody we've spoken to, military, non-
military, says this operation--and you are one of the most
well-known military men; you don't think that way anymore, but
you are--everybody tells us that without Turkey's participation
or accommodation militarily, this is a very difficult
undertaking for us. So how are you all playing this Kurd-Turk
deal?
Secretary Powell. We've made it clear that in any future
Iraq, we are interested in retaining the country as it
currently exists, within those borders, and would not be
supporting an independent Kurdistan.
The Chairman. And the Kurds know that?
Secretary Powell. It's been our declared policy.
The Chairman. Yes. Do you have a sense--how great is your
concern? I'm not suggesting it's not manageable, but how great
is your concern that Saddam lashes out against Israel to try to
make this a larger war? What is your sense of his capacity to
do that?
Secretary Powell. He does have some capacity to do that. We
believe he still holds some Scud missiles that the inspectors
did not destroy during their period of activity inside Iraq,
and we have to assume he has that capability. But it is far
less than he did in 1990. But it is, nevertheless, something we
are concerned about.
The Chairman. Now, have you--I'm sure you have--have you
calculated what the response or reaction will be in Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, the gulf states, if Israel
were to respond in kind or beyond what they were--what came
their way?
Because it seems to me--and, again, this is just, you know,
a student of the region--part of Sharon's doctrine--I'm making
it up; there's no Sharon doctrine--but part of Sharon's
doctrine is the absolute demonstration that Israel is prepared
to respond to anything, and respond beyond what was delivered
to them. Assume that were to occur. Do you, have you factored
in what happens in the Arab states from the gulf to Jordan and
Egypt?
Secretary Powell. We have factored both alternatives into
our thinking, and we will stay in the closest consultation with
our Israeli friends as to the nature of any threat they might
be facing.
The Chairman. Since we only have a few left, I'm going to
yield now, but before I let you go, with your permission, I
want to ask you about one other aspect of the resolution, but
my time's up.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, on the front page of the Wall Street Journal
this morning, there is an analysis of administration foreign
policy which suggests, among other things, that it's been very
assertive, very bold, successful, at least in pushing the
envelope in many ways. It suggests that one repercussion of
this, successful or not, is resentment on the part of many
countries that we are pushing ahead in these ways.
Certainly without getting into any thesis the Wall Street
Journal has, it's been evident as we've discussed the previous
war with Afghanistan with NATO allies, that many feel that they
invoked Article V and that we did not take them seriously. We
have responded--we, in a broad sense--that we were attacked, we
had lift capacity, and, except for the British, they did not,
that the specific tactics of that war were unique there,
perhaps, the success there.
But, at the same time, there has come to be an argument
over the relevance of NATO. And this is a very important
alliance, a very important group of countries for success.
I'm wondering, how can we constructively rebuild the kind
of esprit de corps that we need. Lord Robertson and others
suggested from the beginning that NATO might take over the
responsibility in Afghanistan of assigning roles, rather than
sort of a pickup game every 3 months or whoever volunteered,
and we might really enlist more people to help us in this
particular situation.
I know you've thought about this a great deal, and so this
is not a comment of criticism; it's just a comment of
observation that we need these countries. Specifically, I know
Secretary Rumsfeld is over there, maybe as we speak, visiting
about the creation of a response force of 20,000 soldiers. Such
a force might relieve the need for NATO countries to cover
every responsibility. Can you make an overall comment about
where and how our allies contribute to success in a post-Iraq
scenario, whatever it may be?
Secretary Powell. I'm a great supporter of NATO. I started
my career in NATO as a young second lieutenant and ended my
field career in NATO as a corps commander. And I have been
astonished to see the growth of NATO in the years following the
end of the cold war. That wasn't supposed to happen. But guess
what? They all want to join. And we're about to see a
significant expansion of NATO. So it is as relevant as it has
ever been, but just in new ways. And it can take on new
missions and new challenges. Integrating all of these new
members into an alliance that is resting on the pillars of
democracy and the free enterprise system and the individual
rights of men and women, in and of itself, is a significant
achievement for the alliance.
NATO stepped up to that the very first day after 9/11 when
they invoked Article V. Now, there were those that suggested,
well, then the whole alliance is coming. But what we didn't
really need was the whole Alliance to show up as NATO. What we
got, though, were Alliance members who contributed to Operation
Enduring Freedom and to ISAF. So NATO is in Afghanistan--its
techniques. All the training we do is in alliances in
Afghanistan, our command and control ability, our ability to
work with nations, different nations with different languages
and different force structures, but they're all unified by
their membership in NATO. And I've seen this happen time and
again over the years.
So NATO, even if it isn't there as a formal structure, is
there, in terms of the capacity that it has, and I think it
will be there in any future operation we have, because that's
where you go to to pull this capability from.
My colleague, Don Rumsfeld, made a case the day before
yesterday for a rapid reaction force that has new capabilities
that is transformed for these new kinds of challenges that are
coming along. And I think his presentation was warmly received,
and we'll see how the Alliance responds to this.
So NATO does have an important role to play in the future,
and I'm glad that we're going to be on an expansion run with
them in November in Prague.
You also gave me a softball there, Senator, to talk about
our foreign policy. Even though there are those who
occasionally resent us, they tend not to show too much
resentment when they come to my office and when they go to see
the President. Individual nation leaders go to see the
President in the Oval Office. They are thankful for our
willingness to stand up for what we believe in. They are
appreciative of our efforts to break down trading barriers and
to expand the circle of economic liberalization and to talk
about human rights.
We spend a great deal of time saying, well, we haven't made
enough progress in the Middle East, or, we have this Iraq
problem, but we don't spend enough time talking about
rapprochement and the strong relationship we've built with
Russia, strong relationship we're building with China, our
successes with respect to free trade agreements and how the
President's going to trade promotion authority. We don't talk
enough about the President's leadership with respect to HIV/
AIDS and other infectious diseases. We don't talk enough about
the African Growth and Opportunity Act expanded.
And so we have got a lot of good things going on. We don't
talk enough about how we got a Treaty of Moscow and we put the
ABM Treaty in the past, and we're still going to cut ballistic
missiles pointed at each other by some 60 or 70 percent, all
without destroying the strategic framework. Yet everybody last
year resented the United States even thinking in these terms.
Well, we pulled it off and we got a good agreement with the
Russians, which I trust this body will ratify in the not-too-
distant future.
And so we've got a lot of good things going on that
occasionally don't get talked about because we're focusing on
the crisis of the moment, which is the way it is and the way
things tend to be looked at. But we have had a number of
foreign policy successes. There are a number of initiatives
underway. And if you occupy the position of leadership that the
United States does, you must assert it. You must lead. That's
what President Bush is doing. And I think we will be showing to
the world that success comes from such assertive, responsible
behavior working with our friends and allies.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I think that the NATO nations
that listen to what the Secretary just said will be heartened
by that. I appreciate your being that explicit and
comprehensive.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to offer a word of
congratulations--and maybe I'm historically inaccurate, so you
may check the record. But I think there has not been an
authorization bill for the State Department that passed both
houses and was conferred upon and signed by the President since
1986.
Secretary Powell. See, another foreign policy success that
I wasn't even going to take credit for.
Senator Biden. But whose is it?
Senator Lugar. But congratulations.
The Chairman. I'm sure the President is responsible for
that.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, seriously. Mr.
Chairman, that bill cleans up a lot of things and gives us a
lot to work with, and we really are appreciative.
The Chairman. We had a lot of help.
Senator Sarbanes. Oh, I'm sorry. Senator Nelson. I beg your
pardon.
Senator Sarbanes. I don't think you had a turn, did you?
Senator Nelson. Not yet.
The Chairman. I beg your pardon. Sorry.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, we have a downed American
pilot from the gulf war. You and I have talked about this.
Since I have spoken to you, I have spoken to every leader that
I can get my hands on from the gulf region asking them to task
their intelligence apparatus to see if they can get any
information. Indeed, Captain Scott Speicher's status has been
changed by the Department of Defense from killed in action to
missing in action. And there is some consideration right now of
perhaps changing his status to missing-captured, because there
was a credible live sighting of Captain Speicher alive being
driven to the hospital by a defector who was deemed credible.
So I would just encourage you--Senator Pat Roberts of
Kansas and I and Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire are the
ones that have been involved, mainly. Captain Speicher is from
Jacksonville. His family is there. There's a wife and children
and you can imagine the agony they're going through. So as we
are getting ready to do an inspection regime on weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, I would encourage you to press the issue
of the missing American pilot, as well.
Secretary Powell. Senator, you should have no doubt about
that. I think I mentioned it in my prepared testimony. I'm in
close touch with Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz, who has a personal interest in this and monitors it,
and there were some developments earlier this week that I spent
time on and, through intermediaries, was in touch with the
family, so we take it very, very seriously and we watch it very
closely and it will never be far from our mind. He went down
when I was chairman, and I'll never forget it.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Could you help me understand how what is being trumpeted as
a preemptive doctrine is any different from how we've always
operated, that the President clearly has the authority, as
Commander in Chief, to act if it's in the interest of the
United States, to protect the United States?
Secretary Powell. Well, I agree with you, Senator, and I
had a chance to talk about this a little bit earlier, but I
would like to say another word about it. In the National
Security Strategy, what we attempted to convey with that
language was that traditional means of deterrence and
containment that worked against state actors--the Soviet Union,
China, others--when you look at what happened to us on 9/11, we
were struck by a terrorist group, not by a state actor, by a
terrorist group that didn't come out to fight us in the field
of battle, but sent in suicide bombers.
And so it is a different kind of threat. And as we look at
the tools available to us to deal with this threat, one of the
tools that we have to be able to use are preemption tools. When
if we see this kind of attack coming at us, then the act of
preemption or taking preemptive action should be something we
consider and perhaps consider it more readily than we might
have in the past.
I have reread that chapter a number of times since seeing
all the press speculation and all the editorials being written
on how it represents a revolutionary new doctrine, and I,
frankly, don't find it revolutionary. I find it sensible.
The reason it's focused on so heavily in that particular
section of the National Security Strategy, it was an effort on
the President's part and the author's part to explain to people
why this new threat has now been elevated in our thinking and
how preemption, therefore, also has to be elevated in our
thinking. But it is a tool that we have always had and we have
used in the past and we're using today as we try to preempt
their financial systems and we try to preempt their movements,
we try to preempt their activities around the world. All of the
arrests that are taking place now are good, solid preemptive
actions.
Preemption may well rise to be a military action at some
point. But the purpose of that section was not to be as
revolutionary as it has been portrayed, but to elevate the
concept of preemption in our thinking and in our strategic
discussions.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, you have, I'm sure, noted over the last
couple of months and may well have had personal contact with
your friends and former colleagues, General Zinni,
Schwartzkopf, Clark, Joe Hoar, Shalikashvili, others, about
their reservations about going to war in Iraq. You obviously
have high regard for their judgment. You served with them. Some
have testified before this committee. Some have testified
before the Armed Services Committee. All have spoken out
publicly on their concerns and reservations. Would you care to
address those concerns in any way you like?
Secretary Powell. These are old friends and colleagues of
mine, and we all served together in one capacity or another,
and I would expect them to put forward concerns and
reservations.
This would be a daunting military operation. I don't accept
the premise that it's going to be a ``cakewalk.'' No sensible
military officer would go into any operation thinking it's
going to be a ``cakewalk.'' And so I think it was useful of
them to put down their perspective.
And you can be sure that my colleagues in the Pentagon and
those who took over for me when I retired and left the uniform
understand what will be required if asked to do this. But I
don't think one of them would say that it is an impossible
mission or that difficult, really, if you put your mind to it
and you put the resources to it.
We have to be mindful of the day-after scenario that we've
been talking about, and it will probably require a fairly
significant commitment of troops to manage and occupy Iraq
until such time as you can turn it over. That, I think, is a
daunting problem, as well. And you can be sure that their
concerns, their reservations, and their points of view are
being considered. And I have respect for their points of view.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Can you tell this committee what kind of progress we have
made, our country, in enlisting Arab country support in our
efforts here if, in fact, the option is a military option?
Secretary Powell. The Arab countries have had reservations,
and they have made public statements, and they've also made
private statements. I'd rather not get into the specifics of
each country, but let me make this overall observation. A lot
has changed since the President's speech on the 12th of
September. A lot has changed once the President put the case
out publicly and we stopped all the dueling op-ed pieces and
the dueling leaks and all the other things that were happening
in August. Once the President put the case down clearly and
asked the U.N. for action, that changed a number of attitudes
among our Arab friends.
Senator Hagel. Back to the issue on opposition forces,
wherever, however they be and what role they may play. I noted
here in the paper we are now engaged or soon will be engaged in
training some form of opposition force. I think some of the
terms used is ``scouts'' and other descriptions. What do you
know about that? Where are they coming from? Is this a Northern
Alliance kind of an effort? Are they there? Where are they? Why
didn't we know about them before?
Secretary Powell. Senator, no decisions have been made yet,
but there is certainly a great deal of planning underway as
referenced in newspapers. But I would really prefer to yield to
my colleagues in the Pentagon in a closed session to get into
the details of this.
Senator Hagel. OK.
Back to the issue of the resolution questions that were
asked--and maybe you said this and I didn't hear it--the
current back and forth and negotiation, if that's what's going
on--most of us are not aware of it--are you involved in that?
Do you have a representative involved in that day to day
negotiation with the language----
Secretary Powell. I haven't been involved in the day to day
discussions that may be taking place between the administration
and Members of Congress on the resolution. We all were involved
in the preparation of the resolution or--although it came out
the White House signed out by the President's Counsel, Mr.
Gonzalez, I believe. I'm quite confident that as Congress
decides what changes it believes are appropriate to the
resolution and the President considers those changes, that we
will have a chance to weigh in as to the impact that those
changes would have on anything we're doing diplomatically.
I would just reinforce, however, that I believe it's
important that action be taken on a resolution quickly as a way
of showing unity of purpose within the U.S. Government. That
would be helpful to me in my diplomatic efforts with the U.N.
Senator Hagel. Well, obviously, my implication there, and
you, I'm sure, follow it--and I have nothing against lawyers.
I've got one in the family, actually, one of my brothers.
Secretary Powell. Me too.
Senator Hagel. And you do, too. But one per family should
be sufficient. And I apologize to Sarbanes and Biden on this
point, but I don't think framing up the verbiage in an intent
of going to war should be left to the President's Counsel's
office, and I am concerned--maybe only I am concerned about
that. It's important that the people who are going to have to
implement this and carry out whatever it is the lawyers decide
is the right way to do it be part of that, as well as you.
And the other thing that concerns me about the resolution
is this, I think, is the same office who had counseled the
President that he doesn't need any involvement by the Congress
to go to war in Iraq. And so if you'd care to comment on that,
I'm sure we would welcome any thoughts you have.
Secretary Powell. The resolution that the President sent
up, we all saw, had an opportunity to comment on--I did--and
reflected our input, but it came out of the White House, which
is where I would have expected it to come out of. As
modifications are made, as changes are made, and I think as we
get closer to what the will of the Congress might be, I'm quite
confident that the President will share it with the rest of us
and we'll have a chance to give our input.
Senator Hagel. Well, thank you. I've got a little more time
here, and I've got one additional question.
In the Washington Post today there's a headline, ``Bush
Asserts That Al Qaeda Has Links To Iraq's Hussein.'' And I know
you generally responded to that over here, but there's a quote
in here from Secretary Rumsfeld--I know you don't speak for
him: ``A few hours before Bush's remarks, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld was asked by reporters traveling with him in
Warsaw if there are any linkages between al-Qaeda and Iraq.''
After, there's now been some generalization that there might be
new evidence here on training and there was past training and
so on. And this is the quote, if this is correct, from
Secretary Rumsfeld in response to that question, ``I have no
desire to go beyond saying the answer is yes.''
Well, I find that interesting. I know it's not your quote.
I'm not saying you answer for anyone other than yourself on
this, but there is a thing that is rumbling around, I think, in
the country and the world, Mr. Secretary, and that's the
credibility of the argument here. And if the credibility of the
argument continues to be stretched and pulled, and one week
it's this and this week it's this, and much of the evidence of
what I'm talking about, too, came out today in the hearings, as
you know, trying to define a number of the questions that were
asked what is the objective.
I know you know this, but I don't think we can ever
overstate the importance of the credibility of our senior
members of our government. And to say, yes, I know there is
evidence there, but I don't want to tell you any more about it,
that does not encourage any of us, nor does it give the
American public a heck of a lot of faith that, in fact, what
anyone is saying is true. We've been through one of those
experiences before.
Secretary Powell. I think Director Tenet has spoken to this
in his classified testimony, and I would encourage you to take
a look at what George said.
To summarize what I can say in open testimony, there is
evidence of linkage between al-Qaeda and Iraq. Second, there is
no linkage to 9/11 that we are aware of, but I can't dismiss
that possibility. And, third, perhaps part of the confusion on
this issue is that we're learning more over time as we get
access to more and more people who have been detained or
captured and as we have other defectors coming forward and as
we really focus our intelligence assets on this question. And
so there is no doubt that there are linkages, that there have
been al-Qaeda members in Baghdad, and there have been contacts
that have occurred over the years.
There's no smoking gun linkage to 9/11, but it cannot
totally be ruled out. And one of the reasons for the
development of this story over the recent days and weeks is
that we're learning more. And I think George Tenet, in his
prepared classified testimony, talks to this in a way that I
think will answer your question and reassure Congress that
we're doing the best we can not to strain our credibility. That
is not in our interest and that is not our intention.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. I was at such a briefing. I can't comment on
it except just for the record to show I dissent from the
characterization of the Secretary of Defense.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Secretary, I wasn't clear earlier
whether you were suggesting that the Congress had adopted a
decision supporting the use of military force to achieve regime
change.
Secretary Powell. No, I was saying that in--I don't have
the public law in front of me, but the Congress did adopt a
position with respect to a regime change.
Senator Sarbanes. For the use of military force?
Secretary Powell. I don't have the law in front of me, so I
don't want to say what was contained within that public law.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, that's the Iraq Liberation Act----
Secretary Powell. Yes.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Of 1998, I presume, and that
was an effort to try to give a boost to the Iraqi opposition
and is stated as a policy to remove the regime. But that law,
at the very end of it--do you have it there--oh, I thought you
were looking----
Secretary Powell. No, I don't think so.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, at the very end of it, it says,
``Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or
otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces,
except as provided in Section 4(a)(2) in carrying out this
Act.'' And 4(a)(2), the section--the exception section--dealt
with providing military draw-downs to provide aid to this Iraqi
opposition. But there's not been, to my knowledge, at least,
any authorization by the Congress for the President to use
force to achieve regime change.
Secretary Powell. I would have to review my own transcript
of earlier this afternoon. I don't recall that I said that.
What I said was that the Congress and the Clinton
administration and then the Bush administration, over a period
from 1998 on, have established that it is the policy of the
U.S. Government, as it says here in Section III, ``should be
the policy of the United States, to support efforts to remove
the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to
promote the emergence of a democratic government,'' the Iraqi
Liberation Act.
Senator Sarbanes. Right.
Secretary Powell. Imbedded in that was the intent to
support opposition forces to this end.
Senator Sarbanes. Yes.
Secretary Powell. But it became the policy of the U.S.
Government, as expressed in this act, and I think--I don't know
if it's in other acts or not--and it became, it was a policy
that was enunciated by President Clinton.
Senator Sarbanes. But also imbedded in that act is the
section I read to you----
Secretary Powell. Yes, it is.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Which is right at the end of
it which says, ``Nothing shall be construed to authorize or
otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces.''
Secretary Powell. Nor do I think that I asserted that it
did authorize the use of United States Armed Forces.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I just want to be clear on that
point.
Secretary Powell. Yes.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, on this National Security Strategy,
I have this question and one other. David Broder says in a
column this week, and I'm going to quote him, ``The restatement
of the United States' fundamental defense doctrine issued by
the Bush administration last week substituting preemption of
potential threats for containment of aggression is probably the
most dramatic and far-reaching change in national security
policy in a half a century.'' And then he discusses this.
And then later he talks about the evolution of our policy
through the isolationism between the two world wars to the
bipartisan containment policy and so forth. He says, ``A common
characteristic of the whole 20th century was a readiness of the
United States to respond to threats to its security and its
reluctance to initiate conflict or issue ultimatums to anyone.
When aggressors pushed forward, we pushed back, but we did not
start fights ourselves. Now with the doctrine of preemption
justified by the all-too-real threat of terrorism, Bush is
proposing to scrap that distinction. Instead, he has searched
the right of the United States, as the only superpower, to
judge the degree of potential danger itself and to take
whatever action it deems necessary to eliminate that threat.''
Now, you, today, have spent some time sort of saying, well,
this isn't a big change and it's not a large thing, although
it's being interpreted by all commentators as a large thing.
And earlier, in response to Senator Nelson, you focused on
preempting terrorism, but the document also has preemption of
states, as well, not just of terrorist organizations. So it
extends to states, which is a radical change in the heretofore
approach to dealing with states.
If this document does not state a new preemptive doctrine
of significance, and, therefore, it's been widely
misinterpreted or misrepresented in the press, why hasn't the
administration taken steps to correct that misunderstanding or
misinterpretation?
Secretary Powell. Because I believe the document speaks for
itself.
Senator Sarbanes. It's not speaking the way--everyone else
thinks it speaks differently than the way you----
Secretary Powell. Every time a new national security
document comes out, which is on some regular basis, there is
always something in it that draws attention. And in the light
of the situation in Iraq and in light of 9/11, that particular
section has been focused on rather extensively.
I don't think--I don't have it in front of me, but I don't
think it says that the doctrine of preemption substitutes or
eliminates containment or deterrence. We still have forces in
our structure, military structure, and we still have tools
available to us diplomatically that go well beyond preemption
and, frankly, go back to our tried and true doctrines of
containment and doctrines of deterrence. It highlights the way
it's written.
It highlights the fact that terrorism of the kind we saw
practiced in 9/11 presents a new threat to us and we have to
consider the doctrine or the idea or the concept of preemption
as a way of dealing with these. And it also puts it in a
context that says it should not be done lightly, it should not
be done without understanding of the consequences, and it
should not be done in a way that people would think that we are
just simply running around looking for wars. I think that is an
overstatement of what the document says.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I think it's safe to say that it
redefines ``imminent threat.''
I'd just end on a sort of a--perhaps a lighter note. I
enjoyed this cartoon by Tom Toles in the Post. It says, ``A new
policy. The U.S. has the right to do whatever we want, whenever
we want, wherever we want, to whomever we want regardless of
what anyone else in the world thinks about it.'' And then he
says, ``Did I leave anything out?'' The fellow says, ``Well,
with rights, don't there also come responsibilities?'' He
thinks about that and then he says, ``It is the responsibility
of the rest of the world to help us pay for it.''
So I just commend that to you for your attention.
Secretary Powell. What I would commend to you, Senator, is
the United States should have the right to defend itself----
Senator Sarbanes. Absolutely.
Secretary Powell [continuing]. Against terrorist threats
that are coming our way.
Senator Sarbanes. But you've been----
Secretary Powell. And if a terrorist threat is coming our
way or if there is a nation out there that we know is planning
to conduct action against us that we could preemptively stop,
then I see no reason why the President should not do that.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, Secretary Kissinger this morning
mentioned those potential candidates for that approach because
of the presence of al-Qaeda terrorism--Somalia, Yemen, Iran,
and Indonesia--in his testimony. What's your view of that?
Secretary Powell. I'm not putting anybody on a candidate
list. It depends on what the threat is, the reality of that
threat, the proximity of that threat, the danger of that
threat, and whether or not a President of the United States
should take action to preempt or prevent such a threat.
And if he has sufficient information that this threat is
coming against the United States and he can take action to
prevent it or preempt it, however--whichever word you prefer--I
see no reason why we should deny a President of the United
States the option to do that, or we should find that to be
objectionable or somehow distasteful or somehow inconsistent--
--
Senator Sarbanes. Is that to suggest that----
Secretary Powell [continuing]. With our policies of long
duration.
Senator Sarbanes. Is that to suggest there are other
potential candidates lined up behind Iraq?
Secretary Powell. We're not looking at candidates. We're
looking at national security strategy, at a strategy of dealing
with threats that might be coming at the United States of
America, and I believe it would be irresponsible for us not to
consider the doctrine of preemption or prevention or concept,
if you wish to call it that. When we see a real and present
danger that is coming our way and we can do something about it,
then why should not the President do something about it to
protect the American people?
Senator Sarbanes. Unilaterally----
Secretary Powell. I think the American people understand
that.
Senator Sarbanes. Unilaterally do something about it?
Secretary Powell. Sir?
Senator Sarbanes. Unilaterally do something about it?
Secretary Powell. Maybe it's unilaterally, maybe----
Senator Sarbanes. Do other----
Secretary Powell [continuing]. It's not unilaterally.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Do other nations----
The Chairman. Senator?
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Can other----
The Chairman. Senator?
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Do other nations have
recourse to the same line of thinking?
Secretary Powell. There is no nation that should not have
recourse to a line of thinking when a threat is coming its way.
It's inherent in the sovereignty of a nation to protect itself.
The Chairman. One of the problems----
Secretary Powell. If we saw--if we were able to spot--well
I don't want to get into anecdotal stuff, the Japanese fleet
sailing on Pearl Harbor and knew what was going to happen and
knew what was coming our way, preemption would have been a very
sound policy, in my judgment, if the President had enough
information and if he could present to the world, before or
after the fact, why he did it and make the case for it. It
seems to me that's the kind of thing you would have done.
Senator Sarbanes. I don't find that analogy really on all
fours.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Powell. Yes?
The Chairman. One of the problems of having a powerful
chairman of another committee on your committee is he thinks
he's chairman of that committee, too.
And the only prerogative of being the chairman is you get
to ask the last question, at least I thought it used to be. At
any rate----
Senator Sarbanes. I yield to the chairman.
The Chairman. I thank you. After 20 minutes, he yields to
me.
But I love him, and he has good questions.
But let me ask you a concluding question here, because we
only have a few minutes left on this vote and I'm sure you will
not miss being able to leave.
I'm not looking for percentages, but can you tell us what
the next stages in your negotiations are, in your attempt to
get a resolution through the Security Council that has teeth in
it on a different regime of inspection? And ancillary to that,
are you unalterably opposed, is the President unalterably
opposed, to a two-step process? Or need it be one-step?
Secretary Powell. On the first question, within the last 24
hours we came into agreement with the United Kingdom on what we
thought a good resolution looked like and should contain. And,
as I mentioned earlier, we are now--both the United States and
the United Kingdom have begun consultations with the other
permanent members of the Security Council on our idea. And we
expect that there will be agreement on a number of elements and
there will be disagreement on a number of elements. That's what
a negotiation is all about.
The press likes to portray this as being in disarray, but
most negotiations are in disarray until you have an agreement,
and we're working on that.
With respect to one resolution or two resolutions and the
distinction being that the second resolution has the trigger,
we believe one resolution is a better solution, a better
outcome, but we're mindful that our colleagues in the Security
Council have other ideas. And so we have sent our
representatives out to hear those other ideas and to begin a
discussion, and I would not prejudge what the President might
do after he has received the result of that consultation.
The Chairman. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I wish
you luck in the effort, and we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Response to Additional Question for the Record
Response of Hon. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, to Additional
Question for the Record Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
attitudes of iraqi shia towards democracy.
Question. What are the attitudes of the Shia diaspora in Iran about
democracy or about a united Iraq?
Answer. The State Department regularly meets with a variety of
Iraqi Shia opposition groups, including the Tehran-based Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. All of the predominantly
Shia groups that we meet with consistently express their support for a
future democratic Iraq that has maintained its territorial integrity.
Additionally, we recently received a letter signed by 121 prominent
Shia independents, which highlights the historical commitment of Iraqi
Shia to a unified Iraqi state, and details the signatories commitment
to a democratic Iraq.
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