[Senate Hearing 107-785]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-785
PASSAGE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF S. 1214, THE PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY
ACT
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 19, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
83-182 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on February 19, 2002................................ 1
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Statement of Senator Hollings.................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Witnesses
Bonner, Hon. Robert C., Commissioner, United States Customs
Service........................................................ 13
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Brown, Douglas R., Ph.D., Vice President for Business Development
and Programs, Ancore Corporation............................... 50
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Burdette, Robert M., Town Administrator, Town of Mount Pleasant,
South Carolina................................................. 37
Flynn, Stephen E., Ph.D., Senior Fellow, National Security
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations.......................... 57
Groseclose, Jr., Bernard S., President and CEO, South Carolina
State Port Authority........................................... 34
Koch, Christopher L., President and CEO, World Shipping Council.. 61
Prepared statement........................................... 65
Loy, Hon. Admiral James M., Commandant, United States Coast Guard 7
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Riley, Jr., Hon. Joseph P., Mayor, City of Charleston, South
Carolina....................................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Summey, Hon. R. Keith, Mayor, City of North Charleston, South
Carolina....................................................... 32
Taylor, Major Alvin A., South Carolina Department of Natural
Resources...................................................... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Appendix
Lynch, Robin, President, Sea Containers America Inc., prepared
statement...................................................... 75
Cannon, Jr. Esq., J. Al, Sheriff, Charleston County, SC, letter
dated February 6, 2002, to Hon. Ernest F. Hollings............. 78
PASSAGE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF S. 1214, THE PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY
ACT
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Charleston, SC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m. at the
Charleston Maritime Center, 10 Wharfside Street, Charleston,
South Carolina, Hon. Ernest F. Hollings, Chairman of the
Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
The Chairman. This afternoon, my first urge in calling the
Committee to order is to thank a lot of folks. First, I want to
thank our distinguished colleague, the Senator from Louisiana,
John Breaux. He's the Chairman of our Maritime Subcommittee and
this is his fourth hearing in the field and following this
problem right along and possibly more knowledgeable than most
in the U.S. Senate. And we really are honored to have him with
us.
Let me thank Mr. Henry Brown. We invited our distinguished
Congressman Henry Brown of this district to sit with us. Maybe
he'll be along momentarily. I am particularly pleased that
we've got the Commandant of the Coast Guard with us, Admiral
Loy, and the Commissioner of Customs, Mr. Bonner. They are very
busy there in Washington, but to grace us with their presence
has been already a tremendous help this morning.
I thought this morning was frankly going to be a sort of
idle tourism to point out this and point that out. And on the
contrary, it was an eye opener for me to find out how well the
Coast Guard is coordinated, how sophisticated Customs is. I
think to this day, that is the best briefing that this
particular Senator and Committee has had in quite some time.
Our Secretary of Transportation was to be with us, but he
is just recovering from a hip operation and thought it best he
stay back in Washington. But right to the point, Secretary
Norman Mineta has already approved our Senate-passed home
security bill which is now over in the House side. And they
hope that they will deal with it as expeditiously as they can.
Let me thank--I will emphasize that again, Commandant
Merit, the Captain of the port, he is the No. 1 man in charge
of security and I am glad of it because I can tell from his
briefing this morning that he really is in charge. I have got
to recognize Major General Seifert. He has been nominated by
Governor Hodges in charge of homeland security and I want to
thank him for attending this hearing.
We want to acknowledge Mr. Robin Lynch, the President of
Sea Containers America, Inc. I recognize Al Cannon, our
Sheriff, who has been giving us security along with Reuben
Greenberg, the Chief of the city police here. And I will
include Mr. Lynch's and Sheriff Cannon's statements in the
record [refer to Appendix] and also my own statement in the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings,
U.S. Senator from South Carolina
Today, we are gathered to take testimony on the challenges that we
face as a nation in securing our seaports and maritime boundaries. In
the aftermath of September 11th, this is a daunting and difficult
challenge. The protection of our maritime boundaries poses unique
challenges because of the breadth of our coastline, the proximity of
the public to maritime businesses and endeavors, and the sheer volume
of container cargo and shipments of bulk petroleum products and
hazardous materials. Literally, we have thousands of tons of hazardous
cargoes, originating from foreign nations being transported by foreign
vessels right through the heart of many U.S. cities. Additionally, the
maritime trade is very open, and we do not have the best or most
reliable information about shipments, vessels, or the crew members who
man those vessels. It is, indeed, a difficult issue to address.
Lloyd's List International reported that a NATO country's
intelligence service has identified 20 merchant vessels believed to be
linked to Osama bin Laden. Those vessels are now subject to seizure in
ports all over the world. Some of the vessels are thought to be owned
outright by bin Laden's business interests, while others are on long-
term charter. The Times of London reported that bin Laden used his
ships to import into Kenya the explosives used to destroy the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
Several weeks ago, a suspected member of the Al Qaeda terrorist
network was arrested in Italy after he tried to stow-away in a shipping
container heading to Toronto. The container was furnished with a bed, a
toilet, and its own power source to operate the heater and recharge
batteries. According to the Toronto Sun, the man also had a global
satellite telephone, a laptop computer, an airline mechanics
certificate, and security passes for airports in Canada, Thailand and
Egypt.
These two stories really bring home this issue of seaport security.
Except for those of us who live in port cities like Charleston, people
often do not think about the nation's ports--these critical entry
points where industrial and consumer goods are loaded onto trucks and
railroad cars heading directly to their hometowns. But making these
ports more secure is vital to protecting our national security. The
destruction that can be accomplished through security holes at our
seaports potentially exceed any other mode of transportation. And yet
we have failed to make seaport security a priority.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of the people
who have worked to help us, not only schedule this hearing, but, in the
morning we toured the entire harbor to investigate the challenges
facing us in this area, and to witness Customs at work clearing cargo.
The Port and the City have been a gracious hosts to our visitors from
Washington, and the Coast Guard and Customs have contributed to make
this a real learning experience.
We have here today, one of the most knowledgeable Senators in the
U.S. Senate on maritime issues, Senator John Breaux. Senator Breaux is
the Subcommittee Chairman of the Surface Transportation and Merchant
Marine Subcommittee, and he really knows the maritime issues. Senator
Breaux recently got back from chairing a series of hearings on the
South Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, and I understand that it was a little
bit of an eye-opening experience, and he might be working on additional
legislation to enhance seaport security, and I look forward to working
with him on that. I welcome him to Charleston.
Last year, the U.S. Senate passed S. 1214, the Port and Maritime
Security Act, a bill that I had originally introduced in the 106th
Congress. Actually, because of the deficiencies in seaport security, we
have been working on legislation in this area for over two years--not
just since the attacks of September 11th. However, since those attacks,
the issue of seaport security has become critical. We have a long way
to go in this area, and I am hopeful that we can get to Conference with
the House on this issue as soon as possible.
The Port and Maritime Security Act would, for the first time ever,
require federal approval of port security programs. These plans will
have to meet rigorous standards for security infrastructure, screening
equipment, evacuation plans, access controls, and background checks for
workers in security-sensitive areas. The Coast Guard will be designated
as the lead agency in evaluating and approving security plans, and in
helping coordinate law enforcement and antiterrorism policies. The
Coast Guard is the Captain of the Port, and the lead agency in helping
to protect our maritime borders and coastal areas.
We also will require more information about the cargo and
passengers arriving at our ports. Right now, we do not know enough
about the ships and the cargo that call 24 hours a day. We need to
change that immediately. We will require that ships electronically
transmit their cargo manifests--and if the manifest does not match the
cargo, it will not be unloaded. We also will check crew and passenger
manifest information to identify people who could pose a security
threat. We need to know who is on these ships, and, eventually, be able
to quickly check the names with a computer database of known terrorists
or other associates of international criminal organizations. I am very
concerned about the lack of credible information that we have on
maritime trade. Security experts attempting to trace the shipping
assets of Osama bin Ladin had immense difficulties tracing his fleet of
over twenty vessels, and are quoted as saying that it was more
secretive than tracing banking assets.
The bill will help federal, state and local law enforcement
officials to better coordinate the sharing of critical information. If
a local police officer arrests someone for breaking into a secure area
of the port, timely sharing of that information with state and federal
officials might help identify the person as part of a larger
international network. It is critical that Customs agents work with the
local police, that the state police work with Immigration officials,
and that The FBI work with local port authorities. That type of
cooperation will dramatically improve port security. Much of what we
will achieve in seaport security will be advanced here in Charleston at
the local level.
The businesses that operate in seaports also play a crucial
security role. They must be brought into a cooperative environment in
which a port's law enforcement information is communicated and shared
confidentially with privately-hired security officers. In return,
private security officers must have a direct line to share information
with federal, state, and local authorities.
To verify that the cargo loads match the manifests, we will need
more Customs officials to check that cargo. Incredibly, only 2 percent
of the cargo containers arriving at our ports are ever checked by
Customs officials. While Customs does attempt to profile cargo coming
in to identify risky cargoes--two percent is totally insufficient. Let
me be clear. This is a huge hole in our national security system that
must be fixed. We need to have the best technology employed here--and
we might have to address it in more than one way. Our legislation would
seek to close this security hole by directly granting and authorizing
more than $168 million for the purchase of non-intrusive screening and
detection equipment to be used by U.S. Customs officers. These Customs
officers are on the front lines of protecting our country from the
importation of illegal and dangerous goods. We must give them the
latest technology and the most modern cargo screening equipment
available.
We also must help the private sector and the port authorities meet
these national security challenges. This problem would be much more
simple to solve if the United States had national seaports under the
control of the federal government--or if the federal government
directly funded seaport infrastructure. However, that is not the case.
Maritime infrastructure is owned by states and by the private sector.
But the federal government has a role to play here for homeland
security. We cannot force states and the private sector to comply with
security mandates, yet not provide funding. The legislation will
directly fund and authorize $390 million in grants to local port
security projects. The bill also will fund loan guarantees that could
cover as much as $3.3 billion in long term loans to port authorities
acting to improve their security infrastructure. Upgrading that
infrastructure means installing modern gates and fencing, security-
related lighting systems, remote surveillance systems, concealed video
systems, and other security equipment that contributes to the overall
level of security at our ports and waterfront facilities. I was very
pleased to see that the President's budget request had more funds for
both the Coast Guard and for Customs, but concerned that the budget
request provided no funds for grants and loans for port security. Port
security will occur in the port itself, and we must deliver the
resources to the ports and to the states to help them address what is a
federal responsibility: border protection and control.
I look forward to hearing this afternoon's testimony we truly have
a distinguished group of panelists. In particular, I would like to
recognize the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral James Loy. Admiral
Loy is going to be moving on, and I wanted to express to him, my
appreciation of his service to the nation. He has been a credit to our
nation and to the Coast Guard organization. I thank him for his
service.
I would also like to recognize Mr. Robin Lynch, President of Sea
Containers, America. Sea Containers builds marine shipping containers
here in Charleston, and I asked them to prepare testimony on how marine
containers could be used or modified to help enhance the overall
security of the container system. I will be including their testimony
in the record.
The Chairman. Finally, let me thank the State Port
Authority's Ann Moise and Chris Koch of the World Shipping
Council, who have both been highly instrumental in helping this
hearing along. Let me yield now to my colleague, Senator
Breaux.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for your courtesies and thanks to all the people of
Charleston, South Carolina, for the courtesies that they have
shown to the Committee and our staff.
It has been a wonderful and a delightful visit and I am
here because Senator Hollings told me to come here.
[Laughter.]
I will tell you how much I have enjoyed the trip and the
leadership of the distinguished Chairman. He did not clarify
the fact that the only legislation that is now passed in the
U.S. Senate dealing with maritime security and port security is
the legislation that he got through the Senate Commerce
Committee and through the U.S. Senate by a unanimous vote
addressing the great concerns that we have as a nation and we
have as a Congress about the very legitimate concerns about
maritime and port security.
Things have changed. The world is different since 9/11, and
it is clear that all of the ports of the United States are
potential targets for terrorist threats. We used to base most
of our security at ports for incoming drug trafficking coming
into our ports and that is obviously a continuing, very
important task. But there is an additional task and that is the
potential terrorism that could be perpetrated on all of the
ports of the United States.
Senator Hollings' legislation goes a very long way to try
to bring in all of the competing factors, if you will, in
coming up with a comprehensive management plan. And it is very
clear that when everybody is in charge, nobody is in charge.
And when we have local government, state government and federal
officials, Coast Guard, and Customs and all of our federal
agencies that are trying to do their jobs, there has to be a
degree of coordination if it is going to be done properly and
the way we want it to be done. So that legislation goes a long
ways toward doing that.
As Senator Hollings, the Chairman, has indicated, this is
my fourth hearing. We had started off with hearings in Port
Everglades in Florida and moved on to my home State of
Louisiana where we had hearings at the Port of New Orleans and
followed that up with hearings at the Port of Houston.
The hearing today will mark the fourth port that we've
toured or looked at. We'll be going to the West Coast later on
during the spring time. It is really interesting, all the ports
are different. All the ports are unique. And the good thing
about Senator Hollings' legislation is that it recognizes that.
This is not a one size fits all solution. The Port of
Charleston is different from the Port of New Orleans. It is
different from the Port of Houston.
It is different from the Port of Long Beach in Los Angeles.
And every port has their own difficulties and also have their
own vulnerabilities. So one size doesn't fit all. And what the
legislation truly calls for is a comprehensive plan developed
at the local level with the Coast Guard and with the Customs
and other officials involved with the state and local officials
to come up with something that needs to be done.
I won't belabor our comments, but I will tell you that I
was most impressed with what we saw here in Charleston. Of the
four ports, including my own in New Orleans, I think that you
are far ahead of all of the ports that I have seen so far in
coming up with a comprehensive plan about how this security
question needs to be addressed. You have local support. You
have volunteers. You have a coordinated effort. And it was a
pleasure to see the good work that is being done.
This is serious business. The risks are astronomical. One
container can carry 60,000 pounds. One ship can carry 3,000
containers. If you remember, Timothy McVeigh, Mr. Chairman,
when he blew up the courthouse in Oklahoma City did it with
15,000 pounds of explosives. One container can carry 60,000
pounds and one ship can carry 3,000 containers. So the risks
are really quite serious.
It is really interesting to see what you're doing. We'll
hear about that more and I just want to congratulate all the
officials for an outstanding job that I think you have done so
far and we'll have some questions from the testimony, Mr.
Chairman. But before I forget, thank you for inviting me. I ask
that my full statement be included in the record at this time.
[The prepared statement of Senator Breaux follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John B. Breaux,
U.S. Senator from Louisiana
Senator Hollings, I wanted to thank you for scheduling this
hearing, and also want to commend the people of Charleston and the port
for helping facilitate our visit and our hearing.
On any given day on Capitol Hill, as many as 20 congressional
hearings can take place at one time. At these hearings, we call upon
policy experts to enlighten us with new ideas for improving the safety,
security and prosperity of our country.
But it is good to get outside of Washington. We need to hear new
voices with fresh ideas. Conducting these field hearings helps us learn
more about the challenges facing local citizens, local governments, and
local businesses as they try to improve the quality of life in their
communities.
And touring the places and facilities directly impacted by our
public policies and new laws helps us learn more about what is
happening on the ground--where the rubber meets the road--or, in the
case of the Port of Charleston, where the hull meets the waves.
I also wanted to add my condolences, congratulations and
appreciation to Admiral Loy. I add my condolences, because Admiral Loy
will be sorely missed; I add my congratulations and appreciation
because he should be congratulated for his fine work in leading one of
the premier maritime units in the world, and also know that he was
appreciated for his efforts.
As you mentioned, I recently took my Subcommittee on a road trip,
or maybe more accurately road, plane, and boat trip. We visited
seaports at Port Everglades, Florida, Port of New Orleans, and the Port
of Houston. It really was an eye-opening experience. For instance, in
my home state of Louisiana, we will have a huge challenge with port
security. The Mississippi River bisects my state, and up and down the
river for two hundred miles are a continuous string of ports, docks and
waterfront facilities, many of them filled with explosive materials,
hazmat, and petrochemicals.
The size of these ships can hardly be imagined. While in New
Orleans, I had occasion to board a freighter with Sea Marshal's
boarding party coming into the City of New Orleans, and when on the
bridge, we were looking down at most of the City of New Orleans, with
two thirds of a mile of steel in front of us. These ships, while
currently being the lifeblood to my state's trade and industry, could
also pose to be a huge threat to my state, and ultimately to the health
of this nation. When, we were forced to close down the airport system,
we were able to regain complete control. Could you imagine what would
happen if we were to be forced to exert the level of control over our
maritime trade on the Mississippi River, that we did with our airports.
It would take months, potentially wrecking thousands of industries.
The Port of Houston was even more amazing. Our entire maritime
system transports 25 percent of all hazardous materials and 75 percent
of all petroleum used in the United States--and much of that cargo
travels right through this area. Along the 52-mile Houston Ship
Channel, there are 150 chemical plants, storage facilities and oil
refineries. When we powered by down the Channel, I witnessed two 800 or
900 foot propane tankers moored side by side, attached to a pipeline
system that stretched back to a field of propane tanks, as far as the
eye could see.
When I asked what sort of security was in place, the Coast Guard
responded that a security zone had been established, when I asked what
that constituted, the response was that it was a notice to mariners
that it was off limits. Well in essence, this sort of security is no
more than a ``no trespass'' sign--obviously, this is not adequate given
the risks. However, I also do not think that the entire blame rests
with the Coast Guard, they do not have the assets to protect our
maritime environment 24 hours a day seven days a week. This has to be a
cooperative effort. The private sector has a role in securing their
ships and terminals.
We really need to get going on this issue, for instance, your
average marine container can carry 60,000 lbs., and I would note, that
Timothy McVeigh used only 15,000 lbs. of ammonium nitrate to blow up
the Oklahoma City Federal Building. The Port of Charleston handled more
than 1.5 million of these containers last year from all over the world,
and yet Customs inspects less than 2% of these.
S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act is a necessary first
step to start coordinating a system of security at our ports, but
ultimately, it is going to require a lot of hard work here on the local
level in places like Charleston.
Mr. Chairman, I am currently in the process of working on a bi-
partisan bill of additional measures that I think will strengthen in
further, the provisions of S. 1214. I was concerned after visiting in
New Orleans, that the U.S. government is only tracking the progress of
vessels in a very few places in the United States, despite the fact
that technology is readily available to require GPS transponders to be
carried, and vessels to be tracked once entering into U.S. waters. The
technology is inexpensive, and not to allow the Coast Guard to keep
track of shipping should not be an option.
I am also concerned about the quality of information that is
available to identify and verify both foreign vessels and foreign
seamen, to ensure that they are who they say they are. We need some
sort of international system to verify the status of the maritime
industry, if we are to avoid leaving the door wide open to potential
threats--again this is not that onerous a requirement. At a hearing I
chaired last year, it was revealed that the Coast Guard alone, had
identified over 1,000 seamen operating on board Panamanian vessels with
fraudulent licenses. Close to two-thirds of the world's fleet operates
under flags-of-convenience. Places such as Liberia, Panama, the
Marshall Islands. These nations will have to take steps to ensure that
vessels operating under their registries are not security risks to our
nation.
I also want to work with the Coast Guard to ensure that we can
better protect security zones, and protect vessels who pose higher
risks to the environment or to our security, or to the health and
welfare of the public.
We have too much at risk here not to move, and not to move fast, on
policies that for the first time will coordinate protection and
strengthen our maritime borders.
Mr. Chairman, once again, I would like to thank you for scheduling
this hearing, and I look forward to the testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you. And it is not just the Oklahoma
City, but we are all reminded of the fact that it was bin Laden
who docked his ship in Mombasa, the Port of Kenya in Africa,
where he offloaded explosives and blew up the Embassy in
Nairobi, Kenya and the one in Dar Es Salaam in Tanzania where
our constituent Bob Royal is now the Ambassador. I just checked
and his new embassy will be ready in June. So we've got him all
fixed up.
One matter of point, with respect to port security, it was
at our initiative, that of Senator Graham of Florida and
myself, 2 years ago, that then President Clinton instituted a
Port Security Commission study and brought together some
seventeen federal agencies. They issued their report and we had
hearings. Then the Congress changed to the new Congress. And
again last year, we had hearings during the year and in
August--August 2nd. That is prior, of course, to September the
11th. We reported on a port security bill. Come 9/11 we had 2
more hearings, then subsequently, in October reported our bill
unanimously from the Committee and it passed the U.S. Senate
unanimously, and as I have just noted, with the approval and
endorsement of the Bush Administration.
Having said that, let me recognize our first panel, the
Admiral James M. Loy, the Commandant of the United States Coast
Guard and the Honorable Robert C. Bonner, Commissioner of the
United States Customs Service.
Admiral Loy and Commissioner Bonner, we have your prepared
statements. They will be included in their entirety in the
record. You can sum them up or deliver them as you wish.
Admiral Loy.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY, COMMANDANT, UNITED
STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Loy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon,
Senator Breaux. I am certainly honored to be with you today and
to experience the morning's tour of the port. And I, too, was
impressed with the coordinated efforts being undertaken here in
the Port of Charleston and would offer that our national
challenge is to find the best practices like we found this
morning in Charleston and make them standard nationwide, and we
will be about the business of trying to do that.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will offer my written
statement for the record and focus just on a few points that I
think is probably important----
The Chairman. They will be included.
Admiral Loy.--and press on. First, the notion of value and
vulnerability as it relates to our ports, a couple of simple
facts. The maritime industries of our nation contribute over a
trillion dollars to the GNP of our country on an annual basis.
Ninety-five percent of the non-NAFTA commerce that is carried
to and from America come and go by ship. We have about 95,000
miles of coastline to worry about in our country, three and a
half million square miles of exclusive economic zone. Seventy-
five hundred ships, mostly foreign flagged, make about 51,000
port calls in this country on an annual basis.
Over 200,000 sailors find their way toward the United
States on an annual basis. Six and a half million passengers, a
billion tons of petroleum, 6 million containers per year in the
seaways system, 16,000 a day finding their way to and from our
country.
Those simple facts, of which there are many others, lend
this notion of both value and vulnerability to the seaport
structure. 9/11 was all about an aviation issue and we have
watched the Congress and the nation at large focus on the
security implications to the aviation world since then.
But as Senator Breaux mentioned and as Senator Hollings'
bill is all about, the maritime end of our national system has
perhaps greater value and clearly greater vulnerability and we
must be about the business of dealing with that.
Most of those numbers I think that I mentioned can be
posted under both the value and the vulnerability column. Our
challenge is to raise the collective security profile of our
ports and waterways so the terrorist goes elsewhere for his
target. How do we do that? I think it is about making very real
investments. I think it is about making the kind of judgments
that are already present in the Senate bill.
I think it is about prioritizing very difficult lists and
developing risk-based decision-making tools that allow us to
deal as constructively as we can with this security challenge.
Second, the dichotomy between balancing, continuing our
commerce on the one hand and raising security profile on the
other, the second issue that I think is enormously important.
Much has been written about the issue of homeland security over
the past few years, but much of it was very narrow in scope.
Focusing on homeland defense as a function of the military,
missile defense shields, for example, or from the narrow
functional perspective such as the work of the Seaport Crime
Commission which tried to look through just the crime prism at
the seaports of our nation.
The main exception to this narrow view is the U.S.
Commission on National Security Strategy/21st Century, also
known as the Hart-Rudman Commission. Their work, especially
their work published in phase one of their report, presents
this dichotomy between projecting a doubling or tripling of
international commerce on one hand and the attendant sort of
inference that we need to loosen our port structures to enable
that to happen, and on the other hand, raising the security
profile against what they called in their January 2001 report
an asymmetric array of threats facing this country which in
their minds require us to pay attention security-wise to
actually tightening down our ports.
So loosening them to generate commerce, tightening them
down to generate security. That is the dichotomy that I think
we have to be conscious about because anything that we do in a
security profile business we must be conscious of the effort at
the same time to identify the good guys and actually facilitate
them through the system that we might build for greater
security.
The third point of four that I would make, sir, is about
conceptualizing the border of the future. We should not be
restrictive in our minds to what's going to help us today or
tomorrow. Rather, we should try to literally think our way
toward 10 or 15 years down the road, imagine what the border
parameters, what the attributes of that kind of border system
of the future should be and then build bridges in order to get
there constructively. We've been working hard since 9/11 to
understand what that border of the future might be. That is a
border concept, what is it that we think would be necessary to
balance that dichotomy of commerce on one hand and security on
the other.
Let me offer just a sort of short list of ideas that we
might even develop in Q and A. First, I think the border of the
future must be pushed outward, Mr. Chairman, such that we are
not dealing with a linear border like is often that case
between Canada over there and United States here. Rather, we
need to press our borders out all the way to the points of
origin of people and cargo and vessels or other vehicles that
are coming toward the United States.
I think a layered strategy of activity is ordered. We need
to be aggressive at points of origin overseas. We need to be
aggressive in terms of understanding what's happening in the
maritime domain as they approach our country. We need to be
concerned with our own seas, our own territorial sea and, of
course, we still need to be very much concerned with the port
of entries that actually cross our linear borders into the
maritime sector that is in the ports of America, all 361 of
them.
There are notions about how we can do that, that I think,
in fact, can be and have already been internalized in not only
the Senate bill, but as you anticipate going to Congress,
finding other good ideas that might find their way into the
House bill and nurture them in Congress such that we get the
very best initial step that we can take.
We need to be very conscious of intelligence and
information in the future, Mr. Chairman, as it relates to that
border of the future and we need to find ways to fuse classic
intelligence and commercial information in such a fashion that
we have a much better picture of what is coming toward our
country.
Ideas such as international standards, biometric
credentialing of people that are on our waterfronts and faring
in our seaways, totally coordinated law enforcement efforts
like you have applauded Charleston for this morning and the
notion of visibility, vigilance and enforcement along our
borders. Mostly on the land borders, of course, challenges for
the Customs Service and the INS.
And last, Mr. Chairman, what is the Coast Guard's role in
all of this because I think I owe you that as part of an
opening comment in the hearing. Since 9/11, we have been
attempting to design a maritime security plan for the United
States. There are five crucial points that I think are part of
that. The first is about Maritime Domain Awareness, clearly and
literally being infinitely more aware of what's happening in
the waterways around us than we were on the 10th of September.
The second notion is to control the movement of high-
interest vessels in our ports and waterways. And that varies
from simply putting a pilot on board to adding sea marshals as
necessary to escorting them literally from the seaboard all the
way to their pier and back out.
The third point is about critical infrastructure
identification and protection and making absolutely certain
that we have gone through that process of identifying critical
infrastructure in our ports and determining who is responsible
for their protection.
Fourth, simple presence, an increased presence on our
waterways. I think it has an enormous deterrence value on one
hand and certainly a response capability value on the other.
And last, outreach. We have made a concerted effort to
portray our efforts of the future as an all-hands evolution. It
should be about the kind of things that you witnessed in the
Port of Charleston this morning. It should be about volunteer
efforts. It should be about private sector efforts. It should
be about federal agency efforts. It should be about state and
local as appropriate.
All of those have to be married together in a comprehensive
port security plan for each port. I think we can nationalize a
standard plan with attributes from a model port kind of effort
that we are undertaking at the moment. Once that template is
developed, then to run port vulnerability assessments on all
the critical ports of our nation, develop an action plan from
that and make that happen.
There have been wonderful ideas emerge, Mr. Chairman, from
our time already spent in the last 5 months. Whether it is
about sea marshal, whether it is about marine safety and
security teams, whether it is about how to go about the
generation of comprehensive port security plans, those things
are very much all in order and we're working very hard to
finish them off.
From the Coast Guard's perspective, as a military service
and as a federal law enforcement agency, we are the right
people for the law to hold accountable with respect to the port
security of our nation. On the land side, the Customs Service,
of course, has the lead with respect to cargo and with INS
shares the responsibility for the people that are actually
entering the system.
But on the waterside facilities and on the waters of our
ports and waterways, there is no doubt who the responsible
agency ought to be. For over 211 years, we have been engaged in
that kind of business for our nation, hopefully with the
flexibility that can shift to the right emphasis as the right
point in our nation's history. Today's emphasis is on an anti-
terrorism division.
We are the ones who are very good at separating the guilty
from the merely suspicious and we are the ones who size up each
case and dispose of it based on a very complex array of things
that might come to play on any given one of those
responsibilities. We offer very scalable command and control
cells and frameworks in our ports. Our captains of the port
have very large and strong and legal authorities to deal with
what is necessary for them to deal with. And our port security
units and our marine safety and security teams will add teeth
to that.
We're the bridge to the Department of Defense, when
necessary, if and when, God forbid, challenges in our ports
call for us to pull from the Department of Defense the assets
necessary to make that happen.
Last, and perhaps the single most important issue, I
believe the key to our future is how well we collect, analyze,
and disseminate information in the future, Mr. Chairman. I term
the challenge in the maritime sector Maritime Domain Awareness.
We simply must make quantum improvements in our capability and
willingness to collect and share information to a central
fusion entity and then draw and act on the products that can be
produced thereby. I make no pretenses to this challenge.
Information is power. Mixing classic military intelligence on
one hand and very private commercial information on the other
will not be easy. But we must be about that chore to design
what is necessary to do that well. It is the key, after all, to
our national security in the future.
We have led an effort at our intelligence coordination
center in Suitland, Maryland, since January of 2001. I can tell
you, Mr. Chairman, it got an awful lot busier right on 9/11 and
thereafter. We have pushed a notice of arrival requirement for
incoming commercial traffic to 96 hours. We have built a
national vessel movement center. We produce tactical products
daily for our field commanders and for our Navy brethren. If
MDA, Maritime Domain Awareness, is about vehicles, in our case,
ships, people and cargo, then information about those three
elements will be the key to our future success. And by we, I
mean America, not just the Coast Guard.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am enormously appreciative of
these hearings, so that we can keep this challenge on the front
burner and in the face of America's attention. Thank you for
including me in our port tour this morning and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Loy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Admiral James M. Loy, Commandant,
United States Coast Guard
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
Committee. As Commandant of the Coast Guard, I want to thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Coast Guard's
maritime security strategy following the attacks of September 11th.
It has been said that the future has a way of arriving unannounced.
The future arrived suddenly, violently and without warning on a clear
day in September. In past years our view of national security was
projected mainly abroad, rather than within our own borders. Today, we
suffer under the constant threat of terrorism as a means of coercion or
retaliation, as much as the world already has, a reality that will no
doubt continue well into the future.
Prior to September 11th, the Coast Guard's efforts were directed
toward executing and enhancing maritime safety and security,
environmental protection, and homeland defense in addition to our other
normal peacetime missions. However, September 11th marked a change in
the comfort and confidence our American citizens had in their security
and safety. Yet despite the obvious presence of the unseen enemy, the
Coast Guard engaged in a massive response effort to protect our ports
and marine transportation system (MTS). We also immediately escalated
our force protection condition to protect our own people and
facilities. The unique nature of the Coast Guard, as an agile emergency
response-oriented organization, allowed us to immediately increase our
security posture, using existing active duty, reserve, civilian, and
auxiliary personnel; and existing shore units, ships, boats and
aircraft. One of the biggest lessons learned from September 11th is
that the nature of the threat facing all nations has changed
dramatically. What we saw on September 11th was hijackers taking over
commercial flights for the sole purpose of turning them into human
guided weapons of mass destruction. We must translate that thought
pattern and recognize the vulnerability of our maritime environment. We
must change our assumptions underlying maritime security.
As a nation that depends so heavily on the oceans and sea lanes as
avenues of prosperity, we know that whatever action we take against
further acts of terrorism must protect our ports and waterways and the
ships that use them. The MTS of the United States handles more than 2
billion tons of freight, 3 billion tons of oil, transports more than
134 million passengers by ferry, and entertains more than 7 million
cruise ship passengers each year. The vast majority of the cargo
handled by this system is immediately loaded onto or has just been
unloaded from railcars and truckbeds, making the borders of the U.S.
seaport network especially vulnerable.
Preventing another attack requires an understanding of the maritime
dimension of Homeland Security and constant vigilance across every mode
of transportation: air, land, and sea. The agencies within the
Department of Transportation, including the U.S. Coast Guard, Federal
Aviation Administration, Federal Highway Administration, Federal
Railroad Administration, Federal Transit Administration, the Saint
Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, and the Maritime
Administration (MARAD), touch all three modes of transportation and are
cooperatively linked. This is especially true of the maritime mode.
Ensuring robust port and maritime security is a national priority and
an intermodal challenge, with impacts in America's heartland
communities just as directly as the U.S. seaport cities where cargo and
passenger vessels arrive and depart daily. The United States has more
than 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland, intracoastal and
coastal waterways, serving 361 ports containing more than 3,700
passenger and cargo terminals.
Simply stated, MTS is a complex transportation network, as is
clearly evident with the activity right here in the Port of Charleston.
Individually, the Port of Charleston ranks as the 4th largest container
cargo port in the United States moving over 1.5 million twenty-foot
equivalent units (TEU) annually. Approximately, 1.9 million tons of
break-bulk cargo is handled in Charleston with an estimated annual
cargo movement valued at over 33 billion dollars. The port complex
continues to grow at an amazing rate. Current growth predictions
indicate that container cargo will double in the next 20 years. The
biggest challenge facing our MTS is how to ensure that legitimate cargo
is not unnecessarily delayed as we and other nations introduce enhanced
security measures against some very real and potent threats. The
importance of the U.S. MTS and the priority placed upon it by the
Department of Transportation cannot be overstated.
I am very proud of the job our Coast Guard men and woman have been
doing to deter potential future terrorist attacks in the maritime
arena. Our people are working long hours, other important missions are
being curtailed, and 25 percent of our total Reserve population has
been placed on active duty. In the Charleston area alone, 44 reserve
members have been recalled to assist in myriad port security missions
such as the boarding and escorting of high interest vessels. However,
this posture is not sustainable . . . nor is it an efficient or
effective use of resources. Our challenge for the future is to
determine what the new normalcy represents in terms of mission
requirements and associated operational activity, while also ensuring
that the Coast Guard is able to provide forces to meet its military
service responsibilities. While the most pressing security challenges
have been met with existing authorities, we now must work to build a
network of protections--one that transforms what has been a rapid
response into a sustained effort that recognizes heightened homeland
security as a part of normal operations. In addition, marine security
depends on the users of the system, shippers and operators, and affects
the trade corridors they use.
The intermodal aspect of the MTS requires the Department and its
agencies with a stake in MTS to take a unified approach in addressing
the expansive security requirements nation-wide. Through interagency
collaboration and extensive partnering with public, private, domestic
and international entities, tremendous steps have been taken to address
the strategic gaps between the current and desired level of protection
for our nation's ports and waterways. A key in this local outreach
effort has been the continued engagement by the Captains of the Port
with the private sector through such forums as the Port Readiness and
Harbor Safety Committees, similar to the efforts ongoing here in
Charleston. Since the attacks of September 11th, the Charleston
maritime community has worked together to implement a Port Intelligence
Team to assist in intelligence information sharing between local, State
and Federal Law Enforcement agencies, in addition to scheduling and
preparing for a massive port security exercise, Exercise Harbor Shield,
in April, to evaluate the ports ability to respond to a terrorist
threat. The teamwork and desire of the community to significantly
enhance maritime security here in Charleston is exemplary. Equally
important are partnering efforts with the international community.
Recognizing that the maritime sector of the world's economy is the most
valuable and the most vulnerable, at a recent International Maritime
Organization meeting in December, the Coast Guard proposed the
development of concrete actions that will enhance maritime security
worldwide. These proposed international recommendations are key in
intercepting threats before they reach our borders, thus extending the
borders of our domain awareness, an awareness that was lost leading up
to the attacks of September 11th.
While effective homeland security is built upon the principles of
awareness, prevention, response, and consequence management, the
primary objectives are awareness and prevention, since we hope to avoid
any need for future consequence management. Awareness helps focus
resources and provides efficiency to prevention. Prevention places a
premium on awareness, detecting, identifying, and tracking threats to
our homeland security. However, once terrorists or the means of
terrorism are on the move towards or within the United States, the
nation must have the means to detect and intercept them before they
reach our borders and our transportation system. While there are no
guarantees, there is good reason to believe that we can improve our
national ability to detect potential threats through effective use of
information that is, to a great extent, already available. Exploiting
available information to separate the good from the bad, and then stop
the bad, is the heart of the Coast Guard developed Maritime Domain
Awareness concept and overall Maritime Homeland Security Strategy. This
strategy must facilitate legitimate maritime commerce, which is
supposed to double in the next 20 years, while filtering threats by
using real time intelligence.
The goals of the Coast Guard's Maritime Homeland Security Strategy
will be to:
Build Maritime Domain Awareness.
Control movement of High-Interest Vessels.
Enhance presence and response capabilities.
Protect critical infrastructure and enhance USCG force
protection.
Conduct Domestic and International Outreach.
In summary, the Department of Transportation mounted a significant
and rapid response to this severe and unexpected threat. Notably,
maritime trade, which is critical to this country's economic strength,
continues to move through ports with minimal interruption. It is no
surprise that sustaining mobility will come at a higher cost to all of
us. But the reality is that we live in a country that prides itself on
the openness of its democracy, so we remain at risk to attacks of
terrorism. It is incumbent upon our government to minimize this risk.
With your support, the Coast Guard shall meet this challenge and ensure
that our nation's Marine Transportation System remains the very best in
the world.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Commissioner Bonner.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS SERVICE
Commissioner Bonner. Chairman Hollings and Senator Breaux.
First of all, Chairman Hollings, I want to thank you for
inviting me to testify here in Charleston today. And
Charleston, as we saw this morning, is one of the premier
seaports of our country. In fact, it is the--it is on an annual
basis that--or something in the order of over 400,000 cargo
containers are offloaded every year in the Port of Charleston.
It is close to--well, it is well over a thousand a day
containers that are unloaded at this seaport and it makes it
the fourth largest--in terms of commerce in Charleston, it is
the fourth largest seaport in the country.
By the way, I am very delighted to be here too today with
my partner in homeland security, and that is Admiral Loy of the
Coast Guard. Let me say, Senator Hollings, that you have called
our nation's seaports, and I am quoting you here, ``a gaping
hole in our national security.'' And I couldn't agree more with
that statement. And I want to thank you for having this hearing
and for focusing our attention on the profoundly important and
urgent issue of security of our nation's seaports.
And it also focuses our attention, if I might say so, on an
issue of what we must do to protect our country's seaports and
our country from the introduction of terrorist weapons,
including eventually weapons of mass destruction into or
through our seaports. And also this hearing, it seems to me,
focuses appropriate attention on a related issue, and that is
what we must do with other nations to protect our global
transportation system from exploitation and use by terrorist
organizations, and to do all this, by the way, without choking
off international trade that is so important to our country's
economy, in fact, to the world's economy.
I think we should recall that one of the expressed goals of
the terrorist organization has been to target not only American
lives, but American livelihoods, to target literally the
American economy.
Osama bin Laden stated as just that notion in his last
diatribe or one of his diatribes from his cave in Afghanistan.
And a terrorist attack at one of our seaports by concealing a
terrorist weapon in a container would, of course, have far-
reaching consequences to the port and the surrounding
community. And ultimately, it would disrupt, in my estimate,
the global trade system that depends upon containerized
shipping.
And that, if that happened, of course, that would have a
significant adverse impact on our economy as well as the
world's economy. So I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
offering and passing through the Senate, along with Senator
Breaux's help, S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act.
That bill, when enacted, will vastly improve seaport
security in any number of ways. But among other things, S.
1214, Mr. Chairman, will be a giant step in equipping the
United States Customs Service with the tools and the technology
and the information it needs to bolster our nation's defenses
against international terrorism.
It will greatly aid Customs' mission to protect and
facilitate in our international commerce, but at the same time,
ensure that cargo that is en route to the United States from
foreign destinations does not pose a threat to our country. And
that bill also will help Customs target and inspect high-risk
cargo or goods, that is, cargo or cargo containers that pose a
potential threat to our country.
Since September the 11th, Mr. Chairman, the top priority of
the U.S. Customs Service has been responding to the continuing
terrorist threat at our land borders and at our seaports. Our
highest priority, clearly, bar none, is to do everything we
reasonably and responsibly can to prevent terrorists and
terrorists weapons from entering our country through our
customs inspectors and our canine enforcement officers who are
doing just that, protecting and defending our country against
terrorists and terrorist threats at all our ports of entry
along the land border, as well as at our seaports.
In addition to using, by the way--in addition, we're using
the Customs Service's broad investigating jurisdiction to go on
the offensive, and that is, to go after--go on the attack
against terrorism by disrupting terrorist financing to limit
them from doing it to Customs Service. And we're also using our
customs special agents to investigate and deny international
terrorist organizations the weapons, the tools and the
equipment to be able to carry out and commit terrorist acts.
At about 10 a.m. on September the 11th, the Customs Service
went to what was called a level one alert across the country at
all our border entry points. And because there is a continued,
a real and continued threat that the international terrorists
will strike again at our country, we remain at level one alert
to this day and we're likely to remain at level one alert at
the U.S. Customs Service at all the border entry points for the
foreseeable future.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Bonner, just to clarify that, I mean,
some of the ports are level three--tell me they are at a level
three. Which one is which?
Commissioner Bonner. Well, the Customs Service has four
threat levels, Senator, and so it doesn't necessarily
correspond to the port threat level. But a threat level one is
the highest level of security alert at the U.S. Customs
Service. And that means that we scrutinize more people, more
vehicles and more cargo coming in than at any other level. And
it--one way I guess I would describe it, the ordinary level, by
the way, before September 11th, was a level four, so we've
moved up to our highest level of security alert at the Customs
Service. And that is the highest level we can be at without
actually shutting the borders down, which is the last thing we
want to do.
Admiral Loy. If I may, Senator Breaux, the cruise ship
industries' levels are inverted in their numeric----
Senator Breaux. I think we've got to use the same
numbering.
Commissioner Bonner. Exactly.
Senator Breaux. In one area, a three is the highest and in
the other one, number one is the highest.
Commissioner Bonner. That, by the way, is an issue that is
being looked at through the----
Senator Breaux. That is a start.
Commissioner Bonner.--Homeland Security Act. In any event,
Mr. Chairman, in approaching the priority mission to prevent
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering our country, I
couldn't agree more with Admiral Loy that U.S. Customs Service
and the U.S. Government must do everything possible to push the
border outwards. We need to expand our perimeter of security
away from the national boundaries and toward foreign points of
departure. This effort to push the border outward must include
the involvement of the trade community. And, in November, I
proposed a new Customs trade partnership against terrorism that
will vastly improve the security along the entire supply chain
from the foreign loading dock where those containers are
stuffed and loaded by foreign vendors to our land borders or to
our seaports.
We're also working on the international front with our good
friend Canada, for example, as illustrated by the 30-point
smart border declaration and was signed by Governor Ridge and
Minister Manley, Deputy Prime Minister Manley. As part of that
plan, U.S. Customs and Canadian Customs are placing personnel
at each other's ports in a hope in targeting and pre-screening
cargo that arrives at one country that is headed for the other.
For example, we're going to be in very short order, in a
matter of weeks, appointing U.S. Customs personnel to Vancouver
and to Halifax to work with Canadian Customs to target and pre-
screen containers that are being off-loaded there that are in
transit to the United States. And last month, as another
important step to push the border outward, I proposed a
container security strategy to substantially reduce the
vulnerability of cargo containers to the concealment or
smuggling of terrorist weapons.
I'd like to just take a couple of moments if I could and
say a few words about this container security strategy or
initiative. And first of all, as Admiral Loy mentioned, the
vast majority of the world's trade moves in containers. Much of
it is carried by ocean-going container ships such as you saw at
the Wando Terminal here in Charleston.
Nearly half of all the incoming freight to the United
States by night, about 46 percent, comes in to the United
States via ship, via vessel, most of that by containerized
ships. So about almost half. The rest of it by about a little
over 30 percent is coming in, moving across the United States
either from Canada or from Mexico by commercial truck. And then
you have about 20 percent that is arriving by air cargo or air
shipment.
But a lot of it is coming in by cargo vessel. And
unfortunately, as Senator Breaux, you observed, the ocean-going
cargo containers are susceptible to the terrorist threat. I
think it was Senator Hollings who pointed out that it was last
October that Italian authorities arrested a suspected Al Qaeda
operative who was an Egyptian national who was literally living
inside a sea container that was moving from Egypt through Italy
to Halifax, Canada. That individual who was headed for Canada
had airport pass security badges. And ominously, he also had an
airport mechanic's credentials.
The consequences, of course, would be far worse if
terrorists were to succeed in concealing conventional
explosives such as they use, or God forbid, concealing a weapon
of mass destruction, even a crude nuclear device among the
approximately 15,000 or 16,000 cargo containers that are off-
loaded in the United States every day. There are about 5.7
million a year containers, sea-going cargo containers that come
into the U.S. That is about 15,000 to 16,000 a day.
The devastation if one of those containers did contain a
weapon of mass destruction would be horrifying and the impact
on our global economy would be severe. Much of the world trade,
if that happened, much of the world trade, which as Admiral Loy
pointed out, goes by ocean-going cargo vessel, by containerized
ship, would stop. It would stop at least until we got a
security system in place in which we had a reasonable assurance
that containers being shipped to our country could not do harm,
do not carry weapons of mass destruction.
You know, it is very simple, I think, to state--it is
harder to do--but we ought not to wait until that happens. As
the primary agency for cargo security, U.S. Customs Service
should know everything there is to know about containers that
is headed to the Port of Charleston or other ports in this
country before it leaves the Port of Rotterdam, before it
leaves the Port of Singapore or Los Angeles or Newark or here
in Charleston. I'd like to see the container pre-screened,
targeted and pre-screened there; not here.
There are just ten--if you just take the ten largest
seaports outside the United States, the top ten mega-ports for
containerized shipping, they account for nearly half, 49
percent, of all the sea-going containers that are bound for and
arrive in this country. These ten mega-ports include, for
example, Hong Kong, Singapore, Rotterdam, Tokyo, Bremerhaven
and some others. So if we started with those mega-ports and
started with them, we should establish a new international
security standard for containers in order to protect this vital
system of global trading.
The core elements of the container security strategy are
first that we must establish international security criteria
for identifying high-risk cargo containers that pose a
potential risk, either containing terrorist weapons or
terrorists themselves. And second, we must pre-screen the high-
risk containers at the ports of shipment, the ports of origin.
In other words, before it is shipped to the United States.
That simple concept, by the way, represents a revolutionary
change in how countries operate and how Customs Services
operate because currently, Customs Services around the world,
including the U.S. Customs, target and inspect high-risk
containers at the port of arrival, when they arrive here. And
so what we're talking about is this situation where that is
plainly not sufficient to protect against the terrorist threat
and we need to develop a system that changes our focus and pre-
screens cargo containers before they head to the United States;
in other words, before they leave those ports.
The third element, by the way, of a container security
strategy is that we must maximize the use of detection
technology to pre-screen the high-risk containers. And you saw
some of that inspection technology. You saw the gamma ray VACIS
machine which takes an image inside a container. We must use
that technology that already exists to pre-screen goods before
they're shipped to the U.S.
I wanted to just take a moment, if I could, and show you a
couple of images that were taken by the VACIS machine. And I
know both you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Breaux were able to
take a look and see what a VACIS machine does. I am going to
speak without the microphone.
This is just to illustrate that--this, by the way, was a
cab of a truck that was coming across the Mexican border. It
was coming across the Mexican border. This is the cab of the
container--of a truck. It is coming across the Mexican border,
actually at Alta Mesa, California, and it went through the
VACIS machine and it was one of the ones that we--it was based
upon targeting. It wasn't based upon any specific intelligence.
And the U.S. Customs Service operator of the VACIS machine
noted two anomalies in the sleeping cab of this truck. Those
two anomalies, one was under the mattress and one was in the
ceiling of the sleeper part of the cab. And inside there was
about 250 pounds of illegal drugs.
Now, one of the reasons I wanted to show you this one was
that the traffickers thought they were going to be very clever
because with respect to this shipment, they actually shielded
in lead to defeat the VACIS machine. The reality is the lead,
like the drugs themselves, showed up like a sore thumb.
This shows you--this photo shows you the--some of the lead
shielding around the illegal drugs has been stripped away. In
fact, I have a piece of this lead shielding here that they
shielded this in. The reason I wanted to show you this--show
you this photo is it relates to drugs.
But we have inspection technology that if you had, for
example, any kind of nuclear material, weapons-grade material,
radioactive material that you were trying to bring in through a
cargo container, that machine that you saw, that x-ray gamma
ray machine that you saw will detect that as an anomaly, will
show up and will give us a basis for going in and inspecting
that particular shipment.
By the way, if it weren't lead shielded, as you know, we
have the--those personal radiation detector devices that will
sound the alarm for any kind of radioactive material. The other
thing, I think it might have been you, Mr. Chairman, you asked
with respect to--with respect to a--one of these machines,
would they show terrorists that might be hidden inside a
container. And here--this is a shot, by the way--this was taken
at Laredo, Texas, and this is a rail VACIS. We also have--we
have a VACIS machine at the rail crossing down in Laredo,
Texas. But it just shows you that this kind of x-ray and gamma
ray technology, if you take it, I mean, it will show clear
images if you have anybody inside one of these steel
containers.
So there is some important technology. What we want to do
is to take that technology that the U.S. Customs Service is
currently using to screen based upon a targeted risk those
containers coming in to the U.S. and we would like to see the
targeting and pre-screening take place at the foreign port
before those containers are shipped here.
Just one other thing, and that is part of the strategy
would also include developing and using what I would call a
smart container. Right now, these containers--these shipping
containers, they're as dumb as a post. What we want to do is to
make sure they have electronic seals on them and that they have
sensoring devices so the importer and the U.S. Customs Service
will know if anybody has tampered with that container,
particularly after it has gone through the pre-screening
process.
Just one other thing. Let me say that effective use of this
technology, Mr. Chairman, also depends on good targeting
information. And that is accurate, advanced information about
what is supposedly inside that container, who it is being
shipped from, the country of origin, the consignee and other
data. And your bill, Senator Hollings, S. 1214, will go a long
way, first of all, in making it mandatory for the first time
rather than voluntary that this advanced manifest information,
the advanced information of what's in those containers will be
supplied to the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Government.
And it is going to take us a major step closer to where we
ultimately need to be, and that is to have complete and
accurate information on all incoming containers before they
leave the foreign port and are headed to the United States.
So let me just conclude by saying, because I know the
Committee will have questions and I will be happy to answer any
questions you have, Mr. Chairman and Senator Breaux, just let
me conclude by saying that if we've learned anything from
September the 11th, it is that we must be prepared for
anything. And the Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations,
they used one component of our transportation system,
commercial aviation, on September the 11th. It is not at all
unimaginable that they will, or associated terrorist
organizations, will attempt to use another, and that is our
global trading system, using cargo containers.
And we need to, in my judgment, enact S. 1214, Mr.
Chairman. We need to act expeditiously to address this threat.
I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak.
[The prepared statement of Commissioner Bonner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert C. Bonner, Commissioner,
U.S. Customs Service
Chairman Hollings, Senator Breaux, thank you for your invitation to
Charleston to testify on issues relating to the security of America's
seaports. This is not only a city of great beauty, it is a place of
great historical significance for U.S. Customs. Our presence here dates
back to the very founding of the Customs Service, in 1789. The Bay
Street Customs House, which the agency occupied in 1879 after nearly
one hundred years in the Old Exchange Building, is one of the crown
jewels of Customs buildings. It is matched only by our Customs House in
New Orleans, and shares the distinction of having been completed by the
same federal architect--Alfred B. Mullett, of the Department of the
Treasury.
The preservation of these historic landmarks and Customs' continued
presence in them attests both to Customs' ties to the past and our
commitment to the future of America's great seaports. And we have
reason to be concerned that this future is in jeopardy, unless we take
decisive action now to protect our nation's seaports, and the global
transportation system upon which they depend, from the threat posed by
international terrorist organizations.
Let us recall that one of the express goals of the terrorists has
been not only to target American lives, but to target the American
economy. Osama Bin Laden stated as much in one of his last diatribes
from his cave in Afghanistan. An attack on one of our seaports by
terrorists would potentially have far-reaching consequences, not just
for the port itself and surrounding communities, but for our principal
system of global trade and the economy of our nation.
For that reason, I want to thank you, Chairman Hollings and Senator
Breaux, for authoring and passing S. 1214, the Port and Maritime
Security Act of 2001. This bill represents a giant stride toward
enactment of legislation that will equip the Customs Service with the
tools, the technology and the information it needs to bolster our
nation's defenses against international terrorism.
I am confident that U.S. Customs will benefit greatly from this
legislation, as will our partner in homeland security, the U.S. Coast
Guard. Indeed, I am very pleased to be here with Admiral Loy to discuss
a topic that is of such great importance to both our organizations.
Since September 11th the top priority of the U.S. Customs Service
has been responding to the continuing threat at our land borders,
seaports and airports. Our highest priority is doing everything we
reasonably and responsibly can to keep terrorists and terrorist weapons
from entering the United States.
Through our Customs inspectors and Canine Enforcement Officers, we
are doing just that: protecting and defending our country against the
terrorist threat at all our ports of entry, including our seaports. In
addition, using our broad investigative jurisdiction, our Customs
special agents are going on the offensive against the terrorists by
attacking and disrupting their financing and denying them the weapons
and equipment they need to commit terrorist acts.
Since September 11th, Customs has been at a Level One alert across
the country--at all border entry points. Level 1 requires sustained,
intensive antiterrorist questioning, and includes increased inspections
of travelers and goods at every port of entry. Because there is a
continued threat that international terrorists will attack again, we
remain at Level 1 alert to this day and will be at Level 1 for the
foreseeable future.
As part of our response, we also implemented round-the-clock
coverage by at least two armed Customs officers at every Customs
location, even at low volume crossings along our northern border. To
this day, Customs inspectors are, in many places, working 12 to 16
hours a day, six and seven days a week.
To help ensure that Customs forms a coordinated, integrated
counterterrorism strategy for border security, I established a new
Office of Anti-Terrorism within the agency. I appointed an experienced
security expert and senior military leader to head that office, who
reports directly to me.
Customs continues to lead the fight against terrorist financing,
and against those who aid and abet terrorist organizations through
financial support of their murderous activities. Last October we formed
Operation Green Quest, a joint investigative team led by Customs and
supported by the IRS, Secret Service and other Treasury Department
bureaus, as well as the FBI and the Department of Justice. I am pleased
to report that so far, Operation Green Quest has led to the seizure of
approximately $13 million in suspected terrorist assets, 11 arrests,
and the dismantling of a major middle-eastern money transfer network.
Customs agents are also working diligently under Operation Shield
America to monitor exports of strategic weapons and materials from the
U.S. They are seeking to prevent international terrorist groups from
obtaining sensitive U.S. technology, weapons and equipment that could
be used in a terrorist attack on our nation. Since the inception of
Operation Shield America, Customs agents assisted by the Department of
Commerce have visited approximately 1,000 companies in the United
States--companies that manufacture or sell items that may be sought by
terrorists or state sponsors of terrorism. During these visits, our
agents have consulted with these firms about what products of theirs
may be of interest to terrorist groups, and how they can keep them out
of the wrong hands.
To help Customs officers in the field, I have also established the
Office of Border Security. The mission of that office is to develop
more sophisticated antiterrorism targeting techniques for passengers
and cargo in each border environment.
In approaching our primary mission to prevent terrorists and
terrorist weapons from transiting our borders, I believe that Customs
must also do everything possible to ``push the border outwards.'' We
must expand our perimeter of security away from our national boundaries
and towards foreign points of departure. We can no longer afford to
think of ``the border'' merely as a physical line separating one nation
from another. We must also now think of it in terms of the actions we
can undertake with private industry and with our foreign partners to
pre-screen people and goods before they reach the U.S. The ultimate
aims of ``pushing the border outward'' are to allow U.S. Customs more
time to react to potential threats--to stop threats before they reach
us--and to expedite the flow of low-risk commerce across our borders.
Any effort to ``push the border outwards'' must include the direct
involvement of the trade community. In November, I proposed a new
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. I am pleased to tell you
that we are entering into partnership with some of the biggest U.S.
importers. This Customs-Trade partnership will vastly improve security
along the entire supply chain, from the loading docks of foreign
vendors to our land borders and seaports.
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or ``C-TPAT,''
builds on past, successful security models between Customs and the
trade that were designed to prevent legitimate commercial shipments
from being used to smuggle illegal drugs. The good news is that we
already have much of the security template in place to protect trade
from being exploited by terrorists. Our challenge now is to apply that
to as broad a range of the trade community as possible.
We are also working with our good friend Canada to harmonize
security and commercial processing between our two countries--as
illustrated by the 30-point ``Smart Border Declaration,'' signed by
Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge and Canadian Deputy Prime Minister
John Manley. Part of that plan includes placing U.S. Customs and
Canadian Customs personnel in each other's ports to help in the
targeting and pre-screening of cargo that arrives in one country and is
headed to the other. To implement this initiative, I have directed that
U.S. Customs inspectors be stationed in the ports of Vancouver,
Halifax, and Montreal to assist in the targeting and pre-screening of
cargo that arrives there and is destined for the U.S. In fact, that is
happening as we speak. Likewise, Canada Customs will soon be stationing
inspectors at U.S. ports such as Seattle and Newark.
In addition to meeting part of the goals of the Ridge/Manley
declaration, the placement of Customs inspectors in Canada is a first
step in another core area of our efforts to ``push the border
outwards,'' and that is implementation of the Container Security
Initiative, or CSI. I proposed the CSI last month to address the
vulnerability of cargo containers to the smuggling of terrorists and
terrorist weapons.
The vast majority of world trade--about 90%--moves in containers,
much of it carried on oceangoing container ships. Nearly half of all
incoming trade to the United States by value--about 46%--arrives by
ship, and most of that is in containers.
As significant as cargo container traffic is in the U.S., we are
less dependent on it than many other nations--say, Japan, South Korea,
Singapore, and the Netherlands.
Unfortunately, oceangoing cargo containers are susceptible to the
terrorist threat. You may recall the discovery by Italian authorities
last October of a suspected Al Qaeda operative, an Egyptian national,
living inside a sea container. He was headed for the Canadian port of
Halifax, with airport maps, security badges, and an airport mechanic's
credentials.
The consequences would be far worse were terrorists to succeed in
concealing a weapon of mass destruction, even a crude nuclear device,
among the tens of thousands of containers that enter U.S. ports every
day. The physical devastation and mass murder that would be caused by
such an attack are horrible to contemplate. And the impact on our
global economy would be severe. Much of world trade would simply grind
to a halt as we struggled to develop and implement a security system
that would provide assurance against another such attack.
We should not wait for such a scenario to occur. As the primary
agency for cargo security, I believe U.S. Customs should know
everything there is to know about a container headed for this country
before it leaves Rotterdam or Singapore for the Port of Newark, the
Port of Los Angeles or the Port of Charleston. I want that container
pre-screened there, not here.
Just ten of the world's largest seaports are responsible for nearly
half of all seagoing containers bound for the United States (49%).
These ``mega-ports'' include Hong Kong, Singapore, and Rotterdam.
Beginning with the mega-ports that export to the U.S., we should
establish a new international security standard for containers in order
to protect this vital system of global trade. The core elements of the
CSI are the following:
First, we must establish international security criteria for
identifying high-risk cargo containers that potentially pose a
risk of containing terrorists or terrorist weapons.
Second, we must pre-screen the high-risk containers at their
port of shipment--in other words, before they are shipped to
the U.S.
Let us consider this for a moment, and recognize that this simple
concept represents a major revolution in standard practice.
Currently, most customs services around the world--including
the U.S. Customs Service--target and inspect high-risk
containers at their port of entry, before they are introduced
into a country. This is a system that has worked for hundreds
of years, and is adequate to meet the ordinary threats
presented to customs services--such as the smuggling of
narcotics or the evasion of customs duties.
But this system is not sufficient to meet the threat presented by
international terrorist organizations. This is for one simple,
yet sobering, reason--the threat presented by weapons of mass
destruction. Certainly, if a drug trafficking organization
wants to use a cargo container to smuggle cocaine or heroin, we
are content to seize those drugs here--at the Port of
Charleston, or at any other U.S. port. But if a cargo container
has been used to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction set to go
off upon arrival in the U.S., it may be too late to save
American lives and the infrastructure of a great seaport such
as Charleston.
Accordingly, we must change our focus and alter our practice to
the new reality. Customs services around the world--including
the U.S. Customs Service--must screen high-risk cargo
containers before they leave their ports of shipment, and catch
weapons of mass destruction or other terrorist weapons before
they do their murderous damage to lives and to the global
economy.
Third, we must maximize the use of detection technology to
pre-screen high-risk containers.
Much of this technology already exists and is currently being
used by the U.S. Customs Service and other customs services
around the world to inspect cargo containers for weapons of
mass destruction. We have 4000 sensitive radiation detection
pagers and dozens of large-scale non-intrusive inspection
devices in use at ports across the country, including here in
Charleston. But we need more of this equipment, in more
locations around the country. The funds provided in the FY02
budget, and the FY02 Supplemental go a long way toward meeting
that need. This funding will permit Customs to purchase 16 more
Mobile VACIS systems, one of which will be added to Charleston,
along with a tool truck. Still more is needed, however. And for
this we look to the FY03 budget, and to the enactment into law
of a robust version of S. 1214, which also provides funding for
this equipment, among other things.
But the use of such detection technology at our seaports is not
enough. The great international seaports--Rotterdam, Singapore,
Hong Kong, among other places--must also use this equipment to
screen for weapons of mass destruction before they leave those
ports. The very survival of the global shipping economy depends
upon this.
Fourth, we must develop and broadly deploy ``smart'' boxes--
smart and secure containers with electronic seals and sensors
that will indicate to Customs and to the private importers or
carriers if particular containers have been tampered with,
particularly after they have been pre-screened.
As you can glean from this list, technology and information are
essential to a successful container security strategy, and to our
counter-terrorist mission in general. And to put it simply, the more
technology and information we have, and the earlier in the supply chain
we have them, the better.
The effective use of technology depends largely on good targeting,
for which we require advance information. Prior to September 11th, the
Customs Service examined about 2% of incoming cargo to the U.S. That
percentage is significantly higher now. However, to some the overall
number of examinations may still seem surprisingly low in proportion to
the vast amount of trade we process. Yet it is important to note that
the cargo Customs selects for intensive inspection is not chosen
randomly. In fact, it is the result of a careful screening process, a
process that uses information culled from a vast database on shipping
and trading activities known as the Automated Manifest System, or AMS.
Using targeting systems that operate within AMS, we are able to sort
through the cargo manifests provided to Customs by shippers and
carriers, and pick out those that appear unusual, suspect, or high-
risk. It is a system that has served us well, but one that can and must
serve us much better in light of September 11th.
Without the enactment of S. 1214, the submission of advance
shipping manifests will continue to be strictly voluntary. In some
ports, notably this one, Customs obtains advance information on about
97% of incoming cargo--one of the best rates in the country. We cannot
rest our Nation's homeland security, however, on the vagaries of
haphazard advance information that is often incomplete and sometimes
inaccurate: Timely, accurate, and complete information is vital to
homeland security, and we should mandate that the appropriate parties
in the transportation chain provide it in advance, so as to permit
Customs to determine whether a particular shipment warrants closer
scrutiny. S. 1214 goes a long way toward accomplishing this. As such,
S. 1214 takes us a major step closer to where we ultimately need to be,
particularly for the CSI--and that is to have full information on
incoming cargo before it even leaves the foreign port.
In fact, by mandating advance information for outbound as well as
inbound passengers and cargo, S. 1214 would expand on our successful
efforts to require airlines to submit passenger manifests to our
Advance Passenger Information System, or APIS, prior to departure. As
part of our immediate response to September 11th, we promptly sought,
and the Congress promptly enacted, legislation that made the submission
of data on incoming passengers to Customs' Advanced Passenger
Information System, or ``APIS,'' mandatory for all airlines. That law
was passed last November as part of the Aviation Security Bill.
Initially, I ordered all international airlines flying into the U.S.
from abroad to submit advance passenger information to Customs, or face
100% inspection of people and goods departing their flights. That way
we were able to better secure advance passenger information on all
incoming international flights before the new law took effect. And I
want to add that Customs is prepared to deny landing rights to any
airlines that seek to defy the new law.
I also look forward to the completion of the Automated Commercial
Environment, or ACE, which as you know is an extremely important
project for the Customs Service. ACE, our new system of trade
automation, offers major advances in both the collection and sorting of
trade data. With ACE, we will not only be able to expedite trade across
our borders, we will greatly enhance our targeting abilities. The
system's advanced features will help our officers to pinpoint risk
faster and more accurately, by allowing them to manipulate data in ways
they simply cannot now.
I believe ACE is so important to our efforts to defend against
terrorists that I have proposed a four-year goal to finish the system.
I realize the funding implications this may have on the present
schedule for ACE, but I believe they are fully warranted to protect our
country.
We are also working with the Canadian and Mexican governments to
improve information exchange and adopt benchmarked security measures
that will expand our mutual border and reduce the terrorist threat to
most of the North American continent. I mentioned the Ridge/Manley plan
earlier in my statement and some of what it will do for Customs. We are
working right now on an eight-point declaration with Mexico that would
commence unprecedented cooperation and information sharing regarding
incoming goods and passengers along our southern border.
While these initiatives will bolster our defenses against
terrorists, there are still many weaknesses. The events of September
11th demonstrated that we must be prepared for anything. The terrorists
have already exploited one key component of our transportation system:
commercial aviation. It is not at all unthinkable that they will seek
to target others, including maritime trade. I believe our seaports and
the system of global trade they support are vulnerable, and I believe
we must act now to address this threat. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. And thank you both. Admiral Loy,
when an airliner operates--we track it constantly.
Specifically, no airline or plane approaches the continental
limits of this nation and is not picked up by radar and
everything else at that time and constantly tracked through its
journey, but we get good information from the pilots and we get
good information from the shippers themselves, sometimes
customs and otherwise, but there is no constant check of the
movement of vessels. Or is there?
In other words, in the dark of night, a vessel could come
into the Port of Charleston, couldn't it, and not be concerned
at all or--I know that is not likely, but it could happen. In
other words, we do not have transponders. We have got them on
planes, but we do not have them on ships I guess is a short
question and answer. Should we have them?
Admiral Loy. Sure, I believe we should. There is an
international effort at the moment to make a carriage
requirement for all shipping internationally that would
conclude that process by 2008. I do not believe that is soon
enough. We have just this past week been working over in London
with the International Maritime Organization to accelerate that
effort toward 2004 as the end date in which all international
shipping would be required to carry that automatic
identification system, that transponder you're describing. So
that would allow us to--just to literally see, once we have the
shore infrastructure in place to read the signal that would be
emitted by that transponder. And that is an important part of
making it happen over that timeframe.
But your notion is right on track, sir, and we're trying to
do that both as a national carriage requirement and more
importantly if we can make that happen internationally in the
timeframe that we would like to see it happen, that would be a
good thing.
The Chairman. I know we have got about 703 million to local
ports to beef up security and we have got 3.3 billion in loan
guarantees and everything else. But how about the Coast Guard?
I know we're sort of behind the curve in the sense that 20
years ago Senator Breaux extended the limits of the United
States which extended the size of the United States by about
\1/3\, but did not expand the Coast Guard by \1/3\.
On the contrary, 20 years ago, we had the same personnel.
Then I remember when I first got there 35 years ago, you didn't
have any drugs. But now, superimposed not only on the standard
200-mile limit, but we have got the expanded role of drugs
checking and apprehension.
So--well, put it this way. I would say--I have always
learned that prior to 9/11, \2/3\, 65 percent of your time was
spent on drugs. Now how much time are you spending on drugs and
how much time are you spending on terrorism or are you going to
get enough money to do what you're supposed to do and enough
personnel?
Admiral Loy. Sir, again, as you have heard me speak over
the course of the last 4 years, I can look you in the eye this
time and tell you that the 2003 President's request is a solid
one. We have designed a 3-year process by which the eventual
requirements that I think are appropriate for the Coast Guard
to make our contribution to this all-hands evolution known as
port security for our nation, we will grow to the point that we
will be able to do that in 3 1-year segments.
In 2003, we will grow by about 2,200 people. I think that
is a good number in terms of executability. That is recruiting
them, training them and bringing them in and making them a
solid productive set of Coast Guardsmen. And over the course of
the 3-year bill program, we will get to where we need to get.
The notion of additional missions over time without an intended
resource and head count and boat count as part of that is very,
very true.
Without attribution to our Senator Breaux and the guy
responsible for it, who has well been a terrific supporter of
our organization, let me just say that, yes, sir, coming up to
2000, 2001, 2002, I was quite concerned as to whether or not
the Coast Guard had the wherewithal to do all America expected
of it. But the supplemental, the Fall supplemental that
produced the $209 million supplement for us, the expected
Spring supplemental added to the 2003 request will put us where
we need to be by the end of 2003, sir, on this growth curve, if
you will, that will get us over the course of that 3-year
growth system to where we can make our contribution.
The Chairman. Commissioner Bonner, you emphasized
particularly with the experience and briefing we had this
morning that intelligence is a sort of front line or the cellar
door attack or defense against terrorism. We politicians, we
say, well, wait a minute; we do not want to terrorize the
people. So we say only 2 percent of all of these containers, 98
percent chance of a terrorist coming through. Intervening, of
course, is that we're going to check every one of the hundreds
of thousands of millions of containers. That is never going to
happen. I know that and you know that. So it is kind of like
they say, it is the economy, stupid; now it is the
intelligence, stupid. In other words, we're going to have to
get the best of intelligence for the mission.
I was impressed this morning with the intelligence and the
use of technology and the coordination of effort and everything
else that you have in the Customs Service. And frankly, I
didn't know you were that sophisticated. Of course, you have
kept us in the dark in Charleston and we had to borrow dogs
from down in Camden. You say you were given two of those teams,
now, of dogs?
Commissioner Bonner. Well, I know that, but we will not
only be getting a couple of our canine officers that are good
detection dogs here in Charleston to assist in the Customs
effort, but we anticipate that we--we should be able to nearly
double the number of inspectors we have at the Port of
Charleston. And based upon the--the terrorist 2002 supplemental
as well as the President's 2003 budget if it is enacted, we
expect to be able to put in something in the order of 30
additional Customs inspectors here in Charleston, 30--15 this
year, and another 15 next year.
So, again, that is still contingent upon the 2003 budget
being enacted and getting the funding. But you're right,
Senator, in terms of the 2 percent. If I could comment on that
for a moment. I have been hearing that quite a bit in the media
that--with some alarm, that the U.S. Customs Service is only
inspecting 2 percent of the cargo containers that are coming in
to the country. And that is--that is somewhat misleading
because it seems to assume that customs is just sort of
randomly selecting out one out of every 50 containers to take a
look at.
The reality is that it is not just intelligence. We get a
lot of information and have a tremendous amount of information,
trade information, commercial information and mass information
about the cargo containers that are coming in so that we can
make a risk assessment so that we can target based upon risk.
The containers we want to look at, the 2 percent, or actually
it is more than 2 percent, but the ones that we want to look at
are the ones that pose a potential risk, particularly security
risk, that is for terrorist or terrorist weapons in particular.
We are also all for looking at containers to make sure they do
not contain any illegal drugs and the like. But we're taking a
look and we're looking at inspecting containers based upon the
risk and risk assessment.
The second thing that we're doing is we're smarter about
what we're looking at in terms of those containers. The second
thing is as the result of some technology that Customs put in
place that goes back now to 1995 that was principally designed
and developed to give us better inspection capability of a
container against illegal drugs. But we're using that same
technology as is as effective to detect weapons of mass
destruction and other kinds of explosive devices, chemical
weapons, and the like that could be smuggled into the United
States. We're using that technology. And that technology
includes the VACIS machine which is a--actually, that is a
gamma ray machine, but it basically give us an image of the
inside of the container.
And using those machines, we can inspect 20, 30, or maybe
even up to 40 containers an hour as opposed to the old system
that Customs had to go through which was actually to open the
doors of the container, to physically search, which actually
can take several hours per container. So we have got some more
sophisticated equipment. And as you know, we're also using some
radiation detector devices, as well.
So we're being smarter about what we're looking at. And the
important thing is that the U.S. Customs Service has enough
personnel and it has enough technology and it has enough
information and it has the technology to manage and manipulate
that information so that we are looking at every container that
poses a risk, particularly a security risk. That is what we
need to do. And I think that we're a long way toward doing
that.
The Chairman. Well, both of the gentlemen here emphasize
pre-clearance, pre-clearance. That is a sort of a two-way
street. I can see Bernard Groseclose--I am going to get him
here in just a little bit, but if they're pre-clearing
everything in Rotterdam and then we can speed it up as it comes
into Charleston, but what if Rotterdam says, wait a minute,
pre-clear everything in Charleston going to Rotterdam? And that
could sort of slow down and cost a heck of a lot more money.
Has that been considered?
Commissioner Bonner. Yes.
The Chairman. That is a two-way street.
Commissioner Bonner. And I think it is a two-way street. I
think it has to be a reciprocal system. If you're developing a
system that is secure, you need to make sure that all the
countries with the ports and as many ports as possible you want
in the system are doing outbound. And that would include the
U.S., so we would be doing--screening outbound for cargo, cargo
containers that are moving to Europe or to Asia and the like.
So it will be--it is a revolutionary thinking in terms of
how we would approach our business in a way. We would want to
make sure that Rotterdam and Singapore and these other ports
are targeting and pre-screening. We want to make sure that it
is effective and to our satisfaction so that we do not have
to--once that container has been pre-screened at Rotterdam,
that we--it can speed right through when it hits the Port of
Charleston. But by the same token, I think we have to be
prepared to pre-screen outbound, as well.
By the way, it is not a well known fact, but U.S. Customs
Service actually does screen or pre-screen some outbound
containers. It is a very, very small--it is under 1 percent,
but we do screen outbounds right now. We screen outbound for
what? Drug money that is leaving the United States, stolen
vehicles.
And, so, it is not totally unknown. But I think we need to
be prepared to do it ourselves because that would be part of
the system that would protect the--the global trading system
which is the movement of almost all commerce between the
trading nations by ocean-going container or container vessels.
The Chairman. Well, it is premised on the port of export
knowing the shipment, having to it the intelligence and that
information and everything else regarding the shipment in this
country. And in Rotterdam, having the knowledge of all the
shipments there and Holland or wherever it is coming from. That
is good.
Excuse me. Senator Breaux.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses for their testimony. If I have learned nothing else
today, I have learned that I will never use the phrase that we
only inspect 2 percent of the containers or less coming in to
this country because that is something that has been improperly
characterized in the media and also by those of us who are
outside of the government. And what we have learned today is
nothing further could be from the truth than the 2 percent
figure.
If the terrorists and the smugglers are banking on the fact
that we are ignoring 98 percent of the containers coming into
this country, they're in serious trouble. And many of the
things that you're doing, we cannot talk about publicly. I am
very, very confident that the net effect of what we're doing
gives you a much, much greater surveillance of the cargo coming
in than 2 percent. That is a real misleading figure and I think
the Chairman bore that out.
Admiral Loy, you had said that the--the budget for this
coming year, 2003, is a solid budget for the Coast Guard. I
think that is correct. But the comprehensive plan that our
Committee has adopted in the Senate and the House hopefully
eventually will adopt is going to call for not just the Coast
Guard doing some things, but it is going to call for port
authority, local government, state officials to also be
involved. The Coast Guard cannot do it by yourselves. And we
have to have a comprehensive effort in port security.
And I hope that the President's budget calls for more money
for local governments, state governments, and port authorities
to help be part of this comprehensive plan. And Senator
Hollings and I developed, as the Senator said, $3.3 billion for
loan guarantees and for additional allotments for grant money.
How much?
The Chairman. $703 million.
Senator Breaux. $703 million for direct grants to the local
ports and port authority. But do you think there's going to be
potential to get some money to help the local folks in this
area or not?
Admiral Loy. Senator, obviously the purse strings are on
Capitol Hill in respect to the distribution of those kind of
moneys in reference to the first responders, if you will, in
terms of funds capability or as part of the security profile up
front.
My notion as the fifth element in that five-notion plan is
about outreach. We have to sit down with probably 40 or 50
trade associations at the national level and we have
encouraged, as you found a bit this morning, each of our
Captains of the Port and their respective ports of the country
to use their leadership on the harbor seating committees or the
port readiness committees to reach out and help everyone
understand that this, in fact, is all-hands evolution.
Let me give you a couple of quick examples of what I mean.
On 9/11, we sort of as an organization surged like our search
and rescue instincts usually have us do. And we went from about
2 percent of our budgeting capability, looking at port security
on a daily basis on the 10th of September and before, to over
50 percent of our budgeted capability as an organization.
And where did we get that extra effort? We drew down our
drug enforcement effort, fisheries enforcement effort and lots
of other mission-related activity around the world and around
our nation because the nation needed us to focus on port
security on 9/11 and immediately thereafter. So we surged to
infinite places like nuclear power plants. And for the first
several weeks, it was the Coast Guard often providing waterside
security to nuclear power plants while we systematically went
about the business of seeing with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission that it was the lessee of those nuclear power
plants, that was responsible not only for landside, but
waterside security, as well.
So we were able to remind them of that, to allow them to
stand up that security profile and then we could back away from
nuclear power plants and sort of go elsewhere. I would think,
sir, that the most important all-hands evolution piece of
information to get across at the hearing this morning would be
that if you are a private sector owner of a container terminal
or of a petroleum distillery or of a fill-in-the-blank, you are
responsible for the security of that particular facility.
The Coast Guard will, in fact, as you described, gain
capability through the 2003 budget and hopefully the 2004 and
2005 budget, as well. But as Senator Hollings mentioned, there
is no way that Congress would ever be able to legislate enough
resources to us to do the whole job.
Senator Breaux. Nor should it. But the point is that the
comprehensive plan for most ports in the United States are
going to call for the local port authorities, state and local
government combined to do more than they are doing now.
Admiral Loy. And the private sector, as well.
Senator Breaux. And the private sector, as well.
Admiral Loy. Absolutely.
Senator Breaux. And our bill has room for local force and
local organizations to help them do that.
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir.
Senator Breaux. Are they going to have to pay for it by
themselves or are they going to pay for it in conjunction with
the federal government helping them?
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir.
Senator Breaux. And the concern I have, is the budget going
to request any money for that at all? I mean, I hope they
apparently will.
Admiral Loy. There's nothing in our bill that offers a pass
through in the way of grants or anything else in the
President's budget that goes up. I could check and I would be
happy to check with Governor Ridge for you, sir, and see how he
is playing that very real requirement elsewhere in this----
Senator Breaux. We're spending money like it was going out
of style in Washington right now.
Admiral Loy. Right.
Senator Breaux. We are sending money to places that need
it. I mean, New York City obviously----
Admiral Loy. Sure.
Senator Breaux.--is in great demand and justifiably so. And
doing things with the railroad and bridges and everything else.
And, of course, we are going to have to do something too. They
are not going to be able to do it all by themselves.
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir. One of the things I will point out
that is in the bill very strongly is this notion of pulling
together a comprehensive port security plan made up of a number
of different pieces. The bill calls for vessel security plans
or port facility security plans. And when the Captain of the
Port gathers all the players around that harbor safety
committee table to forge the comprehensive plan that we speak
of, it will be quite clear from those two plan sets and the
port vulnerability assessments that will be made as a result of
our legislation that will give us the action plan necessary to
press forward. How each and every item on that list is there--
is funded thereafter is the challenge you're describing, sir.
And we'll have to get our arms around that.
Senator Breaux. My final point is when you go to your
International Maritime Organization, IMO, meeting in London--
when does it come up? Next week or so?
Admiral Loy. The working session was last week, sir. The
next scheduled discussion is in early May.
Senator Breaux. I urge you to deliver them a very clear
message that the United States, I think, is not going to accept
the year 2008 for the requirement for ships calling on U.S.
ports to have transponders. That is far too long.
Admiral Loy. Certainly. That is exactly----
Senator Breaux. Send a message from--I think from this
Committee, I think he would agree, from the Chairman and I have
the minutes available to do that, but we are not going to wait
until 2008 to put a transponder--a transponder is a simple
piece of equipment. So anybody who has a single engine airplane
landing in Charleston has to have a transponder on their
airplane.
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir.
Senator Breaux. And yet you've got a super tanker that is
coming into ports all over this country with no transponder on
them. You cannot track them. That is not acceptable anymore.
Tell all your friends over there that.
Admiral Loy. I thank you for the reinforcement on that,
sir. You're absolutely right and our challenge is to also deal
with the--there are several technical issues of making it
happen well. There are frequency negotiations underway that we
would appreciate any congressional support on to make sure
those negotiations come out right. And, as I indicated earlier,
the shoreside infrastructure to read those signals as they are
being emitted is the other part we have to get done, as well.
The Chairman. One point of clarification. That solid
request of 2003, does that include still the moneys that we
have to fence from 050, the defense budget, back over to the--
--
Admiral Loy. The President's request assumes that there
will still be about a $340 million task fund from DOD, yes,
sir.
The Chairman. Well, since I studied my humility, I am going
to mend the rivers. When Commandant Merit is promoted to
captain, which should be rather shortly, you're going to leave
him here. He is doing an outstanding job. Isn't that right,
Commissioner Bonner? Weren't you impressed?
Commissioner Bonner. I was greatly impressed.
The Chairman. And, I was greatly impressed with your
Customs folks, but you had to bring them from all around. Just
let them stay here, OK? You two gentlemen have really made the
hearing for us at the Committee level. We thank you very much.
We want to move on here with the next panel, if you don't mind.
We will leave the record open for further questions.
We next call on our two distinguished Mayors, Joe Riley of
the City of Charleston and Keith Summey of the City of North
Charleston, Mr. Bernard S. Groseclose, the President of our
State Port Authority, Mr. Robert M. Burdette, Administrator of
the Town of Mount Pleasant, and Major Alvin A. Taylor of the
South Carolina Department of Natural Resources.
You're not going to find any better Mayors than Joe Riley
and Keith Summey. Mayor Riley, we have, as with all of these
gentlemen, the statements. You may deliver them fully prepared
if you wish or file them with the Committee and summarize them.
Mayor Riley.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH P. RILEY, JR.,
MAYOR, CITY OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA
Mayor Riley. Thank you very much, Senator. I have given a
copy of my prepared statement, and I will be happy to briefly
summarize them.
The Chairman. Good. It will be a part of the record.
Mayor Riley. Thank you, Senator Hollings for having us here
in Charleston and thank you very much Senator Breaux for
honoring us with your presence again. The Port and Maritime
Security Act is a very typical Senator Ernest F. Hollings'
action. It is a leadership, no nonsense, pragmatic, proactive
response to the challenge.
We saw Senator Hollings when we had Hurricane Hugo here in
1989, the way he responded from Washington, understanding
exactly on the ground, behind-the-scenes response that is
necessary. And that is what this bill before Congress does for
our maritime community.
We all understand that 9/11 created a new world and that we
have still got enemies. The fact is our enemies now realize
that our battlefields are not going to be 4,000 miles away.
Rather, the battlefields are now--they want them to be in our
cities and in our harbors and in our communities. They want to
kill our civilians, disrupt our freedoms, destroy our economy
and our way of life.
Just as they found--I believe this was said here today in
this audience, that our aircraft port system was weak in terms
of surveillance, they understand--could understand the same
about our port and maritime system. We cannot let them do it.
The Port Maritime Security Act gives us that protection. Every
American citizen is owed the right that our ports and our
places of entry are secure.
Just a few thoughts from our local perspective. First of
all, the local police, fire and emergency management systems
must be seen as they are--America's front line troops. If a
terrorist attack, an explosion, biological or chemical event
happens in one of our ports, the first response will not be
from the Army Special Forces. The first response will be from
the police officers, firefighters, and emergency personnel in
the local community.
We must have the training. We must have the equipment. We
must have resources for the additional manpower that recognize
their federal growth. What the terrorists would wish for is
that if the event occurs, that we haven't a capacity to
respond, do not have the energy, do not have the manpower, do
not have the training to respond so that their action creates
the havoc and the destruction that they desire. It has to be a
recognition that in terms of homeland security that our ports
and port communities have substantial additional needs and they
are serving substantial, additional national roles other than
those in other communities that do not have ports and water
entry within it.
Some examples, our police, as you perhaps found out today,
operate a water patrol. Our small city has 14 vessels of one
size or form and we work very closely with Captain Merit I,
too, hope, Senator Hollings, and the fabulous Coast Guard. Our
dive team assists.
When they have to inspect the ship and were concerned that
there might be explosives underneath, it was the City of
Charleston police officers, our trained dive team, our dogs,
our bomb squads that respond. It would be wise to embrace that
fact that those resources if available to the local level that
are working in partnerships now need to be recognized and
enhanced and supported so they have more equipment, that we
have additional training, that we--that our role, our federal
role and responsibility is recognized.
Another point, the chief--our fire chief, Chief Thomas,
which Senator Hollings knows very well, informed us that every
hospital in a port community should have a decontamination tent
or process. That is, it is obviously equipment that would be
set up overnight, but if we have one of these events that we do
not want to have, but if one happens, then the civilian
population should have the ability to quickly decontaminate it
and treat it at the available hospitals. That should be there
and should be pro forma. And there should be additional
training in the equipment. And one of our people, again, Chief
Thomas said that the more flexibility and the more equipped,
sometimes the guidelines that might be--that might fit the
national standpoint do not fit the local medium flexibility.
We also believe that there should be in every port a full-
time special response unit for that port with the manpower,
equipment and training that is there 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week so that that--immediately, that seconds after the event
happens, that there is that unit facility that is available.
Perhaps--this is nationally, not just locally, and I am
sure this is being discussed, but our people feel that there
needs to be a national terrorism phone number. There's got to
be a number that the people call, not just law enforcement, but
the average citizen. You know, it might even be more important
in a rural community where you see the crop duster and some
unusual looking person hanging around. People do not--do not
know how to handle that kind of information. Our people do not
have it.
And in closing, Senator Hollings and Senator Breaux,
unrelated to this, I guess, but Chief Greenberg asked that I
please formalize our request that this area be recognized as a
high intensity drug trafficking area. This is a designation
that borders and ports can be given and because of the huge
amount of cargo that comes through here, our community is
subject to a much higher than normal threat of illegal drugs
being imported and we ask for that consideration.
We thank you so much for being here. We thank you for the
wonderful leadership that you are giving our country.
[The prepared statement of Mayor Riley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph P. Riley, Jr.,
Mayor, City of Charleston, South Carolina
One of the lessons we learned from September 11th is that we are
vulnerable. Never before have we had to examine our resources in such a
way to determine where terrorism can find a weakness. Prior to
September 11th, we assumed that our airlines had everything under
control, that our skies were safe and that we could respond to any
event. Our assumptions have been wrong because we are dealing with an
enemy who is cunning, organized, well funded and willing to die in
order to destroy us. We must now appraise our resources and consider
the risks around us.
One of the vulnerabilities in Charleston is our State Ports
Authority. A substantial contributor to our economy and a valuable
state and national resource, it is imperative that we take steps to
protect this agency and our citizens who rely on this facility and
those who live in our area.
The first 6-8 hours following a terrorist incident anywhere in our
country are the most critical for the safety of our citizens. This is
the very critical period before the arrival of any state or federal
resources, so the initial emergency response depends on our local
personnel and equipment. Certainly, The City of Charleston stands ready
to assist the State Ports Authority with any incident that may happen
by making all our resources available to respond for any request for
assistance from the SPA, including our HAZ MAT Team headed by Chief
Rusty Thomas of the Charleston Fire Department. In addition our Police
Department under Chief Greenberg will make available any of their
resources including the Maritime Patrol and Swat Team. Local EMS, Fire
and/or Police will usually be the first to arrive upon the scene of an
incident. It is very important that the spirit of cooperation between
local agencies exists in order to bridge the time between the incident
and the arrival of federal assistance. It is important to remember that
an incident and the response necessary will be overwhelming. The State
Ports Authority should keep the City informed of all potential or
actual problems.
Important Issues to Consider
1. Initial Detection--The initial detection of an incident will occur
at the local level by either EMS, Fire, Police or Port Officials.
Consequently these first responders need to be trained to identify
hazardous agents and take appropriate action. Funding for training of
first responders would help to insure identification of a hazard,
assessment of the situation and containment of the hazard. We are
dealing with new threats and new hazards and the training must be
adequate for all possible occurrences.
2. Security Assessment--An assessment of the security of potential
targets is of the utmost importance in planning for a response to an
incident. A review of Port to include the docks, and cargo loading/
unloading facilities is key in the preparation of a security plan. The
identification of foreign vessels and their cargo should be included in
this review.
3. Public Information--Information passed on to the general public in
the event of an incident is crucial. Our citizens have proven that they
will respond appropriately when they have timely, clear and decisive
direction. Providing information about the incident along with
instructions on evacuation, traffic restrictions, mass care, sheltering
and self-aid will give our residents the information they need to
respond and will have a positive effect on the public's perception of
the incident and its handling by officials.
4. Shared Information--Information on potential threats and suspected
activities must be shared by organizations involved. While it may not
be possible to prevent all incidents the sharing of information can
insure that organizations are at their highest state of readiness if
necessary. As we have seen, the sharing helps put together the puzzle.
One agency may have a piece of information that allows other
information to make sense and possibly prevent a tragedy.
5. Mutual Aid--Where at all possible organizations should enter into
formal Mutual Aid agreements. This will insure that the local resources
that will be stretched from the immediate response during an incident
can be supplemented as quickly as possible.
Thank you for the opportunity to express the concerns that we have
on the local level. It is important for us all to understand the
challenges we have as a result of September 11, 2001.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mayor Summey.
STATEMENT OF HON. R. KEITH SUMMEY,
MAYOR, CITY OF NORTH CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA
Mayor Summey. Thank you, Senator Hollings and Senator
Breaux. It is a great pleasure that my community, North
Charleston, South Carolina accepts the invitation to provide
comments concerning Senate bill--S. 1214 and other general
issues surrounding seaport security.
Security features. The proposed legislation will provide
much needed improvements for the security of the U.S. borders.
Many of our concerns will be answered in the legislation. And
these include security features. Providing appropriate
guidelines for fencing and surveillance will assist the
adjacent communities as well as the ports.
Inspection of cargo. Adding Customs inspectors and agents
will increase the inspection sequence of materials. And with
only 3 percent of containers being inspected, additional agents
are very essential to this transpiring.
On-board ship personnel. We are pleased to see that the
legislation addresses information and background requirements.
Traditionally, once Customs clears the vessel, these
individuals move about our community without restriction, and
the legislation places some guidelines on this.
Security at private terminals. The South Carolina Port
Authority maintains an active police force. Its ranks may have
been reduced over time, but at least it is responsible for on-
shore incidents. Some of the private terminals have inadequate
or do not have any onshore security and the legislation begins
to address this, as well.
Background checks of on-shore personnel. It is encouraging
to see background checks with restrictions for new or
continuing employment. This piece of S. 1214 will aid the
community in many other ways regarding those folks while they
are within our communities.
Coordination among various agencies dealing with ports. We
are pleased to witness a requirement for improved coordination.
Customs, Coast Guard, United States Department of Agriculture,
and the local State Ports Authority Police provide services to
the port, and appropriate coordination can only strengthen our
local security. There is no place for turf wars on this issue.
It has to be completely coordinated.
Coordinated access to the waterfront. This will also assist
in controlling security. Many individuals have direct access to
the waterfront activities without any security checkpoints.
Manifest of cargo. We agree with the requirement to provide
information on the products entering our communities. If an
incident arises with cargo, the local authorities are usually
called to assist. A few years ago, our municipality was called
in to the local port to handle a chemical spill. This chemical
agent became unstable with humidity and water. Our police and
fire departments were involved with this effort and our fire
department maintained a command post in the site for 3 months.
We would ask that some provisions be made to include
notification of cargo, especially chemicals, and be made in
advance to the local authorities. Even correct placards on the
containers would be helpful. Chemical issues, such as this,
could be organized by groups unfriendly to our country.
This legislation is a great step forward for improving
security at the ports in the U.S. It will have some secondary
effects. Our area has been designated as a HIDA area, High
Intensity Drug Area. Improved security at the ports will assist
also ancillary with the war on drugs.
We work well with both the Coast Guard and Customs locally.
With increased efforts for security, local governments would be
called upon taxing our resources. Federal grants and other
financial assistance, such as reimbursement for expenses,
should be considered in the bill.
Another item for consideration is the efficiency of the
ports versus security. Each port must buy into the improved
security measures with enthusiasm. All of the ports in this
country compete against each other for cargo. They must not
allow the need for efficiency to take precedence over security.
Will we be able to have some influence in foreign ports to
improve their security measures? Certainly we must take care of
our ports first. However, improved security in all ports is
essential.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide input into this
very important piece of our homeland security. Thank you for
your consideration and we look forward to working with you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Groseclose is the President and CEO of our South
Carolina State Port Authority. You and your organization have
already made this hearing successful, and we really are
indebted to you. I recognize Mr. Groseclose.
STATEMENT OF BERNARD S. GROSECLOSE, JR., PRESIDENT AND CEO,
SOUTH CAROLINA STATE PORT AUTHORITY
Mr. Groseclose. Thank you, Chairman Hollings and Senator
Breaux. We have more pleasure in having you up here today to
see the Port and what's going on in Charleston. It is my
privilege to be here today in my role as President and CEO of
the South Carolina State Port Authority. The Authority, as you
may know, is an enterprise agency of the state and operates, of
course, not only here in Charleston, but also in Georgetown and
Port Royal. We are the fourth largest container port in the
United States, as has been mentioned earlier, and also a port
of strategic significance to our country. Therefore, most of my
comments will reflect that particular conduct. I assure you
that security at all of our terminals and communities that
surround them remain foremost in all of our planning.
In today's security-conscious time, the Port of Charleston
benefits from years of security awareness. This awareness led
the authorities to invest millions of dollars in high-mass
lighting and customs-approved fencing, and most importantly, in
a well-trained and professional certified police force. These
are the basics, and many ports do not have these things to
build on, as you have seen, as you've moved around the country.
The theft prevention and drug smuggling efforts of yesterday
are the first steps toward more in-depth anti-terrorist
measures that are needed today.
In 1998, Senator Hollings and Senator Graham began to push
for more awareness of drug smuggling through our nation's
ports. The U.S. Interagency Commission on Crime and Seaport
Security visited the Port of Charleston, and both listened to
waterfront leaders and shared their thoughts on these issues.
The Model Port Concept is evolved from that Commission, and the
South Carolina State Ports Authority Police began reviewing the
same situation in light of that Model. We developed a 3-year
plan designed to meet or exceed those standards where gaps
existed. These plans included enhanced access control, off-
terminal parking for those who did not require a vehicle
onsite, vehicle decals, a color-coded visitor pass system and
an ID system for Port Authority employees. The new Ports
Authority computer-based ID system has the capability of
controlling access to specific areas of our facility for each
individual once it is fully implemented. That system can also
be applied to non-Ports Authority employees by category.
It was about this same time that Senator Hollings also
worked with the Port to provide some shipboard firefighting
training for our local fire departments. And our local law
enforcement, HAZMAT and fire departments are excellent and have
always worked very closely with the Ports Authority to fill any
special needs that we have. I would like to take this
opportunity to publicly thank them and our community leadership
for their continuing effort and cooperation which will be ever
more important as we move forward for security enhancement.
Being alert to theft and drug practices cannot fully
prepare a facility for terrorism issues. Not only did the
actions of 9/11 change the priority, but they also created the
need for instant action. They added pressure for three key port
security elements. The first, Senator, long-term solution is
identification of persons with access to port terminals, either
from land or water. Two, a means to restrict those persons to
their appropriate area. And three, better intelligence
concerning the cargo entering or leaving a port by truck, train
or vessel. Port personnel have the main responsibility for
controlling access of individuals from the land side and work
very closely with Customs, the Coast Guard, INS, and USDA to
properly handle port interfaces with cargo, crew, and
passengers from the water or from the land.
Charleston is fortunate the ships that call are from the
world class liner companies who have entered the world net and
whose ships and crews are frequent repeat visitors to our port.
I compliment Customs for being as up to date on shippers and
receivers of the cargo as their limited resources and systems
will allow.
The current concept of extending our U.S. boundaries or
pushing back our borders as has been mentioned so that Customs
and the Coast Guard are involved in receiving the cargo before
it goes on board a ship is very positive. This could be a very
strong method for knowing what is coming into our country in
time to do something about it. Ports, in general, around this
country, I believe, will applaud this forward-thinking idea.
At the State Ports Authority here, the Port Police have
been on high alert since September 11. They check the photo ID
of every person coming in the gates. New decals and visitor
passes have been put into effect. We have color-coded the
passes and decals coordinated with the terminal and the site
that is being visited. All Ports Authority employees currently
wear their new ID badges. Advance notification of visitors is
required and the police follow up to ensure the person is
expected. Although every vehicle entering the gate cannot be
physically searched without disruption of commerce, an
increased number of random physical searches are being
conducted of cars and trucks at port security gates.
The ID card system with computer-controlled access is in
place for Ports Authority employees. However, rolling it out,
the remainder of the waterfront community must await standards
and guidance as to background checks. It is currently illegal
for Ports Authority Police to run a routine background check on
those other than its employees. It also is counter-productive
to start a process without knowing the types and requirements
of background checks. The system can be extended to those
waterfront workers who require regular terminal access once we
have a firm understanding that the rules governing ID cards and
the physical and legal capability to conduct background checks
is required. A federal standard needs to be in place to avoid
states moving to resolve this issue individually. I feel it is
vital that Congress act on port security to avoid duplicative
or conflicting planning. Therefore, I applaud the Senate's
action, and join the many who urge rapid consideration of this
legislation in the House.
The major issue which would benefit from national control
is that of proper IDs. Currently, the traffic control terminal
could be from many states and they call a few times a year or a
number of times a day. As mentioned today, we have over 100
different trucking companies on a given day who are sending
drivers in and out of our ports facilities there. Since there
is a national standard for a commercial driver's license, it
would be reasonable to extend that national standard to create
a more improved type of ID card. This card could be read by
port computer ID system and is designed to show the type of
background information the federal government prefers. To have
a trucker stop at each port to get a port ID is too time
consuming and to have to undergo a background check at each
port would clog the police systems and be unfair and expensive
to the driver or his company. A busy port like Charleston has
thousands of trucks a day at each of its four terminals, and
the gridlocks of a port-by-port or even state-by-state system
the truckers would cause would be overwhelming.
On the other hand, we would not advocate a nationwide ID
system for all port workers because a worker at one port does
not automatically have a reason to visit or enter another port.
The shipping and port business is highly competitive and no
port would allow any individual to enter its facility without
proof that there was a business reason to do so.
The Port of Charleston has undergone external and internal
security vulnerability assessments and depending on the final
federal guidelines, it is comfortable that it knows what it
needs to do to enhance its security. The Ports Authority is
proactively working with the Coast Guard to participate in
training exercises and tests. We are researching the most
advanced security resources and technology that will help us in
the fight against terrorism. The issue is certainly not
willingness to change, but the ability to pay for that change
and the need for firm direction as to the type of change that
is required.
We need one reasonable and proper standard with flexibility
to address different needs at different ports. We need funding
assistance to do what we know we have to do. And certainly your
bill, S. 1214 meets these needs both in direction and funding
and we strongly support that. It gives the ports the ability to
develop a plan that fits their needs and serves the security
priorities of their communities and their nations.
Here in Charleston we know our weaknesses and we want to
correct them. We know we need better perimeter control and
radiation detectors. We need more cameras and intrusion devices
and we need more staff, to give a few concrete examples. We
also need the direction and ability to proceed with appropriate
ID systems for all persons requiring regular access to our
facilities. We appreciate that S. 1214 helps to provide the
funding to make these changes quickly. Although they speak for
themselves very clearly, I add my support to those federal
agencies such as the Coast Guard and Customs who must have the
funds and the resources to expand their visibility capabilities
and their intelligence-gathering capabilities. This is
certainly a key to our mutual success. They are doing an
excellent job now given their resources, but as we all know,
they are stretched to the maximum. In addition, I strongly
support funding for our local port groups, the area's fire,
police and HAZMAT units. They will also need extra help. We
have an excellent and cooperative relationship with local and
federal agencies here in Charleston and admire the work that
they have been doing.
On a final note, I am a member of the MTS National Advisory
Council, which was sworn to provide advice to Secretary Mineta,
and we are sorry that he could not be here today. But I want
you to know that port security has been a major issue for
discussion in the National Advisory Council and something that
will continue to be of greater importance than before. We
certainly encourage in your future hearings as you discuss the
replacement of TEA-21 and the idea of a SEA-21 and so forth
that we would certainly be supportive of those efforts.
Chairman Hollings and Senator Breaux, we at the South
Carolina State Ports Authority applaud your effort. We will
work with you fully to accomplish these vital issues. We urge
the House, also, to follow through on this bill with all
possible speed. We thank this Committee and especially you, Mr.
Chairman, for working to provide us the tools both in
legislation and in funding which we need to do the job. We must
strive to provide proper port security and we want to make the
Port of Charleston a flagship for those others.
Thank you for your attention and I welcome any questions at
this time.
The Chairman. Very good. Thank you. Mr. Burdette.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. BURDETTE, TOWN ADMINISTRATOR, TOWN OF
MOUNT PLEASANT, SOUTH CAROLINA
Mr. Burdette. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Breaux. My name is Robert McPherson Burdette. I am the Town
Administrator for Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, and I am
appearing on behalf of Mayor Harry M. Hallman, Jr. and the
Mount Pleasant Town Council. Mayor Hallman sends his warmest
regards. I think he is back at his office plotting against
Mayors Riley and Summey to try and get the HL Hunley there.
Senator Breaux, Mount Pleasant is pretty much everything you
see on that side of the water. I lead somewhat of a double life
in that when I am not just the Town Administrator for Mount
Pleasant, I am also a Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve,
assigned to First U.S. Army as the Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officer to the State of South Carolina. My testimony
will draw from both my civilian and military careers as well as
from interviews with the chiefs of our police and fire
departments.
First, Mount Pleasant is a bedroom community of 50,000. The
Wando Welch Port Terminal, located on the Wando River, is
bordered on three sides by the Town of Mount Pleasant, even
though the port itself is not in the corporate limits.
Interstate 526 serves the Welch terminal. There is one two-lane
road leading to and from the port from I-526. A residential
community of over 5,000 is located within one-third of a mile
of the Welch Terminal gate, with the closest neighborhood being
literally a stone's throw from a large container yard.
S. 1214 is a major step in the right direction in
addressing port security issues, particularly in regard to
incident prevention and incident response. The emphasis on
planning and preparation is noteworthy. The Town of Mount
Pleasant has an outstanding working relationship with the U.S.
Coast Guard. The Port Captain and his staff communicate well
with our police and fire department commands. Moreover, by
virtue of my position as Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
for First U.S. Army, I am an ex officio member of the local
Port Readiness Committee, and attend those meetings, which also
address security, on a regular basis.
While S. 1214 provides a sound foundation for developing a
better port security approach, it may not go far enough in
certain areas. First, the Act, as well as the objectives of its
operating elements, does not seem to recognize that most of our
ports are surrounded by dense to moderately dense urban and
suburban populations. These residents and businesses are
generally ignorant of port operations and are, for the most
part, not aware of the potential threat posed by incidents,
accidental or intentional, that may occur on or around these
facilities.
For instance, I am told that the Wando Welch Terminal is
one of the few ports on the East Coast certified to receive and
ship explosives. An assessment of this threat to surrounding
areas, to my knowledge, has never been completed. I would
suggest that security assessments include threat assessments to
surrounding populations due to the types of shipments that are
authorized at U.S. ports.
Second, the Act refers to the need to involve local
government agencies in port security planning. This cannot be
emphasized enough. One of the most significant problems to date
is that local law enforcement agencies only receive
unclassified information from federal agencies regarding
terrorist threats. We realize that sensitive information in the
wrong hands can create huge problems and pose great risk to law
enforcement agents. Nevertheless, with over 300,000 local law
enforcement officers in the United States, local government law
enforcement constitutes a major effort in preventing incidents
by good solid police work, but we do need the information in
advance. At some point, federal law enforcement is going to
have to trust local chiefs of police and sheriffs if we are to
eradicate the terrorist element in our midst. We have a need to
know, if necessary, establish a process where directors of
local law enforcement can receive security clearances, and then
hold them responsible for this classified information just as
you would an officer in the U.S. military. Moreover, all of our
law enforcement agencies in the vicinity of the port need to be
able to communicate. To this end, resources are needed to equip
the agencies with compatible communications equipment.
Currently, all law enforcement agencies cannot talk with one
another effectively during an emergency.
Third, while it may be implied, I saw no mention of the
Army National Guard in the Act's provisions. This must be
included specifically. The National Guard departments of our
states have certainly proven valuable in enhancing our airport
security, and I would suggest they have a major role to play at
our ports and harbors. They must, however, receive additional
appropriation to make the kind of contribution that is needed.
Next, I wish to turn my attention to incident response and
consequence management. Through the direction of the Department
of Defense, the South Carolina Army National Guard has
established the 43rd Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support
Team near Fort Jackson, South Carolina. This team, commanded by
LTC Randy Clayton, is one of the 22 like units throughout the
United States established to detect chemical and biological
agents and to assess overall threat to any incident. The South
Carolina unit was recently certified by the Department of the
Army to carry out its mission. I respectfully submit that the
greatest threat for chemical, nuclear, and biological attacks
may be through our ports and that augmentation of this unit
near our ports and harbors perhaps should be considered.
Currently, it would take 3 to 4 hours for the 43rd Civil
Support Team to arrive in Charleston and be prepared for
testing and analysis. While local governments have some
detection and analysis capability, none have the capability of
the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.
Last, I will speak specifically about the Port of
Charleston. When the U.S. Navy abandoned the Charleston Navy
Base and Shipyard, it took with it most of the portside and
waterside firefighting capability that was available to
Charleston harbor. At one time, we had over 1,000 trained
shipboard firefighters in the Charleston area. Today, the local
governments of Charleston have 96 trained shipboard
firefighters. Moreover, the Navy took most of the equipment
that is necessary to attack ship and portside fires. We must
now rely on commercial tugboat companies and limited U.S. Coast
Guard support for response. We have little or no foam
firefighting capability. I would suggest that assessments of
port security include local firefighting capability and
hazardous material response capability, and that the Congress
should address equipment, manpower, and training through an
appropriation.
We are also concerned about cutbacks to our Customs agents
in Charleston, who in the past, have had as their primary
responsibility, the Charleston Port. We understand that as many
as five Customs agents in Charleston have been temporarily
reassigned to other missions as a result of the 9/11 tragedy.
Talking about security will simply not be enough. It must be
resourced and, of course, that costs money.
If we are to have secure ports, an investment must be made
at the local, state, and federal levels. I hope that the
assistance will not be in the form of mandates that are
unresourced. Any bill that requires a commitment of manpower
and equipment to achieve security of our ports must be
accompanied by a funding package.
Senator Hollings, Senator Breaux, I wish to thank you for
allowing me the honor of presenting this testimony today and I
will be glad to answer your questions.
The Chairman. Very good. Major Taylor.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR ALVIN A. TAYLOR,
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Major Taylor. Senator Hollings and Senator Breaux, I too
would like to thank you for giving us the opportunity to come
and speak here today. I do not think there's a person in this
room whose life wasn't changed after the events of September
11. And I know it changed mine. It made me look on my own
border, look at the security of ports and maritime security, to
look at things in an entirely different way than I did before
that time. And what I am going to do today is maybe give a
little different look at my idea of maritime security.
We have heard a lot today about the Port of Charleston. We
must realize we have three ports in South Carolina. The Port of
Charleston has one-fourth the most assets with the major base
located right here at the Coast Guard. But we also have Port
Royal in Beaufort County and Georgetown Port in Georgetown
County, two ports also high on the list for security needs.
When you look at maritime security, you have to remember
that South Carolina is a floating state. We are fourth in the
country in registered motor boats, and we have a lot of people
who spend a lot of time on the water. We have 20 access points
where someone could gain access to our state from offshore.
Nineteen of those have immediate access to the intracoastal
waterway. At any point in time someone can come in, not
necessarily to the Port of Charleston, may come in at North
Edisto River with the intention of ending up in the Port of
Charleston or they may even be going to Savannah.
So, in thinking about maritime security, we have got to
take a little bit outside the globe that we have been talking
about and expand it. What we have looked at today is a small
portion of what we need to be looking at when we talk about
maritime security.
It is my hope, and I know it will be, that S. 1214 will be
another good partnership bill that we had parts in before. Two
prime examples, one just recent JEA agreements that were made
possible through gentlemen from the Commerce Committee where we
were able to have funding that would help us in the protection
of our federal fisheries.
When that passed, we had no idea how important it would be
to master security. Because we have been able to have funding
through a state and federal partnership for fisheries
enforcement, now we are offshore, where we weren't before. And
it couldn't have happened at a better time.
We heard Admiral Loy speak of how they changed some of
their missions; their missions have been redefined. Now, their
No. 1 priority is national security and immediate search and
rescue, emergency search and rescue. So someone had to backfill
the mission that was traditionally theirs. And now, because of
a joint enterprise agreement or state and federal partnership,
we have been able to backfill for the Coast Guard and the
states have been able to move in and do fisheries enforcement
so the Coast Guard could spend more time on national security.
And that in itself is a security mission. I will give you
an example. Just a few weeks ago, my officers were monitoring
an offload of a longline vessel. They were in the hull of the
boat measuring fish. About 3,000 pounds of fish came off the
boat and they were down in the bottom watching every fish,
making sure everything was OK. When the boat had been offloaded
and they started looking around a little bit, they found a
secret compartment in the hull of the boat and in that
compartment were about 300 pounds of fish filets. OK, they were
fish filets. Good federal fisheries case. My point is, it could
have been something else. It could have been explosives. It
could have been biological. It could have been a number of
things that would affect our national security and it was being
brought in by a boat that was traveling just a few hours, a few
days earlier was 80 to 100 miles offshore.
Last year, our commercial fishing vessels made over 10,000
trips offshore. That is out of our rivers, bays, sounds,
harbors, ports offshore for up to 100 miles, 200 miles offshore
and then back in.
We talked this morning about HIV vessels, High Interest
Vessels. And what is a High Interest Vessel? Is it just a cargo
ship that may have a particular cargo on it or is it possibly
some other vessels that are traveling offshore and then are
coming back in? I think those are things we have got to expand
and look at.
It could be fishing vessels. It could be recreational
vessels. It could be--25,000 recreational trips last year out
of the rivers and sounds of South Carolina. We have 142 public
landings just in our six coastal counties. At any point in
time, someone could put a boat in the water and they could be
right in the Port of Charleston, the Port of Georgetown or the
Port of Port Royal, just by trailing the boat and putting them
in in a public-access area.
Over 100 marinas have overnight sleeping capabilities,
plenty of places for people who want to have access to our
state. And that is true of all states. It is not just South
Carolina. Lighthouse Bridge, just south of Charleston, opened
5,000 times last year to large vessel traffic coming in and out
of the Charleston area. So those are vessels that are
traversing the state every day. Again, that is true of all
states, especially along the Atlantic seaboard.
So what I would propose is that yes, maritime security and
port security are extremely important, but it is a bigger
picture than just some of the things we have talked about. We
have got to think about security on a big picture, not just on
the ports themselves.
Another example of a state and federal partnership that has
just been an excellent partnership has been that of our use
for--that we have had in Breaux-Hallman, maybe just Breaux-
Hollings.
Senator Breaux. No, in that case, it is Hollings-Breaux.
Major Taylor. Hollings-Breaux. And, you know, it has been
very helpful. And again, when all this was put on paper and put
down, we never thought the effect it would have for us here in
South Carolina as it deals with security. Simply, now we can
use these funds to help the Coast Guard in search and rescue
missions. Put people in boats, put them on the water, just
through having both that funding available to us.
Now, I use those two examples of federal and state
partnerships to show how I feel that S. 1214 I think should
work. And I think it should be a way to fund funds to state and
local agencies so that they can step up to the plate and be a
player, which is what we want to be.
Last year, our officers had 17,000 boating hours just in
our coastal area. That is a lot of time on boats. Shortly after
9/11, the Coast Guard had the security zone from the Naval
Weapons Station. It didn't take them but a day or so to realize
that this was a big deal because it was taking a lot of time
and a lot of manpower and a lot of hours to get the job done.
That is why we have this partnership.
I cannot say enough for the local Coast Guard men and
women. We have the best working relationship I think we have
ever had since I have been here. I, like you, Senator Hollings,
would like to see them stay. And that, in itself, is a problem
that maybe Admiral Loy and some of his people could look at in
the future, because just as people begin to get to know an
area, you get good working relationships and then in another
day or so, they are gone, and there's a new crew coming in who
have to learn each other, we have to learn the area all over
again.
Thank you for your time. Thank you for having given us the
opportunity to speak and we strongly support S. 1214 and urge
that it move forward as soon as possible.
[The prepared statement of Major Taylor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Major Alvin A. Taylor,
South Carolina Department of Natural Resources
Since the tragic events of September 11, all law enforcement groups
have redefined the mission priorities within their respective agencies.
The South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, Law Enforcement
Division is no exception. We have modified our efforts and priorities
making the security of our state and nation a priority goal. We must
send a strong message that our ports, harbors, waterways, power plants,
bridges, coastline, and water intake facilities are protected and safe.
Traditionally, our officers have been responsible for the
enforcement of our state fish, game, and boating laws. In 2001, our
coastal marine patrol officers were involved with:
1) 9,000 cases
2) 17,000 boating hours
3) 500 search and rescue hours
A FULL TIME JOB!
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has also redefined its
mission, with Homeland/Port Security now being their number one
priority. Fisheries and recreational boating enforcement are still
important missions for the Coast Guard, but are second in importance to
their security mission. These enforcement activities must now be
shouldered by the State. We anticipate that these changes within the
Coast Guard will be long term, and at some level permanent.
In 1999, the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (SCDNR)
entered into a Joint Enforcement Agreement with the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to expand SCDNR's enforcement
authority into federal waters off the coast of South Carolina. Officers
of the Marine Patrol district were certified as deputy National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) agents that were empowered to enforce federal
fisheries laws off the coast of South Carolina.
With this agreement in place with NMFS, the Coast Guard can now
take their near shore assets, and shift them from fisheries to security
in the ports, while SCDNR assists with fisheries enforcement. This
enforcement activity by the state also serves as a deterrence to
terrorist activity by providing a law enforcement presence on the
waters adjacent to the state.
In January 2002, DNR Marine Patrol officers monitored the
offloading of a long line fishing vessel that had returned from fishing
eighty to one hundred miles offshore. At the conclusion of the offload,
a secret compartment was discovered in the vessel. This compartment was
filled with illegal fish fillets. This secret compartment could have
contained explosives or other items that could have been used by
terrorists.
In addition, these fishermen could be approached to smuggle in
various items. An increased law enforcement presence would deter this
kind of activity. The commercial fisheries industry in South Carolina
landed 2.4 million pounds of fish in 2000. There were two hundred
eighty-eight charter and head boat permits issued, which resulted in
over ten thousand trips offshore. Total recreational offshore trips
were estimated at twenty five thousand one hundred twenty-one. All of
these fishing trips leave our harbors, bays, sounds, and rivers, go
offshore and then return. Any of these could be a security concern.
Along the coast of South Carolina, there are many bays, sounds, and
navigable rivers from which one can gain access to South Carolina.
There are twenty navigable entrance points where boaters can gain
access to South Carolina and then on to the Intercoastal Waterway
(ICW), which transverses the entire coast of the state. There are one
hundred twenty-two public launching sites and one hundred marinas
located in the six coastal counties. There are one hundred commercial
fishing docks from Little River to Hilton Head, South Carolina. These
areas are patrolled by SCDNR Law Enforcement officers. Many of these
coastal rivers extend inland and so do our enforcement needs. There are
many launching sites on these inland rivers where a boat can be
launched and then travel downstream into the port. We also need to be
aware of inland dams, i.e. Santee Cooper, that could create major
problems down stream, and into the port if broken.
South Carolina is the home of three commercial ports, Beaufort,
Charleston, and Georgetown. The United States Coast Guard relies
heavily on enforcement officers from SCDNR to assist in security in and
around these port sites. However, commercial shipping in our ports is
not the only maritime threat to South Carolina. The waterways and ports
of South Carolina provide unlimited opportunities for access. The
Limehouse Drawbridge located on the Stono River (ICW), south of
Charleston opened five thousand, eighty-eight times in 2001 for large
vessel traffic.
Maritime security is a greater issue then just security in the
port. As you have seen, there are many opportunities for one to gain
access into the state through the marine environment. These areas need
a law enforcement presence, which in turn will act as a deterrence.
Since September 11, SCDNR coastal officers have participated in the
following activities:
1) In the Beaufort areas we have increased water patrols around
the Marine Corp Air Station, Parris Island Marine Corp Training Center,
Harbor Town Marina, and access areas to the Savannah ports. We have
also provided security escorts for vessels using the port. This amounts
to over eight hundred additional hours of patrol time during this
period.
2) In Charleston, officers are regularly patrolling train
trusses, bridges, and marina areas, as well as assisting the Coast
Guard with marine escorts of passenger vessels in and out of the
harbor. DNR officers have also completed approximately one hundred
thirty-five hours of USCG training on boat tactics and security
escorts. This amounts to over six hundred hours of training and patrol
time during this period.
3) In Georgetown, SCDNR officers have performed water patrols
adjacent to 3-V Chemical Plant, Winyah Generating Power Station, major
bridges, and two major water intake systems. Officers have also
assisted in the escort of vessels in and out of Georgetown Harbor. This
amounts to over four hundred hours of patrol time during this period.
This work has been completed while these officers continue with
their traditional responsibilities. These activities performed by state
officers allow the Coast Guard to focus their efforts on security
issues. Any enforcement by state officers enhances national security
because of their law enforcement presence on state waters. To fulfill
our obligations to both port/maritime security, and boating/fisheries
enforcement, additional assets will be needed in the areas of
personnel, equipment, and operating revenue. S. 1214 will go a long way
towards insuring that Federal, State, and local enforcement agencies
will be able to have proper personnel, train and equip those officers,
and have sufficient funds and authority to support this mission.
Without this support we may literally run out of gas. Everyone is
stretched thin and doing all they can possibly do, both inland and
along the coast. Support of this nature is desperately needed!
The Chairman. Thank you very, very much, Major Taylor, for
the valuable contribution. We have got to think, as you say,
broadly.
Mayor Riley, I just learn more every day. But you asked for
a number, a national number on counter-terrorism should we have
any idea or suspicion of it. And we were given this by the
Coast Guard this morning. Homeland security, if a terrorist
event has occurred or is imminent, call the National Response
Center, 1-800-424-8802. So that, you've already got that, I
think. I think that is the number that the FBI is using, the
Coast Guard, Immigration Service, and everyone else.
Specifically, Mayor Riley and Mayor Summey, do you think
law enforcement, local law enforcement ought to be put under
FEMA?
Mayor Riley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Mayor Summey, do you think those people,
local law enforcement, ought to be put under FEMA?
Mayor Summey. Senator, in my recollection, you're the
expert on FEMA.
The Chairman. Well, you know, that fellow James Lee Whitt,
he cleaned it up. It is an outstanding service now.
Mayor Summey. I think the major issue is that most issues
involving local law enforcement are local issues.
The Chairman. Right.
Mayor Summey. And so the majority of the time, I think we
need to be trained to react to the events that are happening in
our country today so that they can be the backup and the
assistant responders in cases of an emergency like this. And
you know, some of the issues that we deal with on a daily
basis--you know, I talked about the containers being properly
marked as to the type of chemicals and what have you. The
majority of the containers coming into the Port of Charleston,
whether it be at Wando, whether it be at downtown Charleston,
or whether it be in North Charleston, leave the area by rail or
truck through North Charleston.
And we did a study last year. In a 1-year period of time on
I-526 between Plymouth Ferry exit and I-26 exit off of I-526,
there were 108 accidents in that year involving commercial
vehicles. And you know, within 100 yards of the two-mile
stretch of that section in North Charleston is residential and
commercial property with people. And when we respond to these
accidents involving these commercial vehicles and a lot of
times they do involve a truck containing chemicals, we need to
be able to know exactly how to respond, whether we need to
evacuate people if it is a spill or what have you.
And so, there's a lot of challenge that we must cross-train
with the Port Authority and the Customs folks so that we are
trained in how to deal with these things as they come more and
more through our community.
The Chairman. Yeah, and there would be a rare occasion for
those 108 accidents along that highway for Federal Emergency
Management Administration to be called. It would be the local
police. And there was a method in my madness to that question
because what we have confronting us right now in the Congress
is a recommendation by Governor Ridge and the President to the
effect that the law enforcement folks be put under FEMA.
There's a fancy twist to this thing. It is called the First
Response Team, and the first responder goes under FEMA.
Now, the truth of the matter is that over the last several
years, we have had down, down, down, the lowering of the
incidents of crime. The crime rate has been down, down with
community policing, and it has worked. And I had that
particular budget, my little Appropriation Subcommittee, and we
have got trained--we have got five, six schools now for that
local law enforcement training and everything else there in
addition to the FBI Academy, a cultures development--when Bob
Mueller came on as the new head of the FBI, I said for goodness
sakes, get your act together and get with local law--he talked
to local law enforcement chiefs and he said just that. We cut
out all of this arrogance and nonsense now and we are going to
have in close proximity the law enforcement--close coordination
with local law enforcement officers.
And that was met with tremendous approval and I have
watched that develop. And all of a sudden get under FEMA, while
I have the highest regard now for FEMA, because as I say, Mr.
Whitt straightened it out, and as far as I know, Mr. Albough
has done a good job up there in New York particularly and
everything of that kind, but that is not the first response.
The first fellow we wanted at Oklahoma was the FBI to try
to--and we did it--as a result trace down the culprit and
convict him. And I just do not want to see with the good
programs that we have got and the coordination and the culture
and all development of the Department of Justice, the FBI,
local law enforcement, all of a sudden put those programs under
the Federal Emergency Management Administration. Do you have a
comment, Mayor?
Mayor Riley. Well, Senator, that would be a terrible
mistake. The ability, the leadership, the Chiefs of Police in
working with the community, the people that they have, that is
a fabulous resource community connected that in a time of great
tragedy, opposite--that would be the opposite thing to do, to
divorce that from the connection of their responsibility for
the community or for the preparation of it.
What we do need is to recognize the role that we have for
our communities and for our country and make sure that it is--
your question was to the director of Customs and to the head of
the Coast Guard, to make sure that the resources are available
for these groups and for the community as far as the additional
manpower. But the last thing you want to do is short circuit a
community, a built-in ready community response.
The Chairman. Well, I have been in the forefront with
respect to our firefighters.
Mayor Riley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Together, we put in the firefighting academy
insurance department. When I got to Washington, we changed over
and put in the federal firefighting entity there. And, in fact,
that was in the 1960's and they'd pull the box, the firemen
would come and they would shoot the fireman, but he would get
nothing. If you shot an FBI man, he got a $50,000 death
benefit. So I changed that. So I have been on the firefighters'
side and more recently a cosponsor, as we know now, we have got
local assistance, particularly for the volunteer fire
departments as well as the established departments. And the
Governor Ridge recommendation is for the first response, namely
law enforcement and firefighters would be put under FEMA.
Mayor Riley. That wouldn't work. That just wouldn't work.
The Chairman. You do not think so either?
Mayor Summey. No, sir, I definitely do not.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mayor Summey. You know, in a first response scenario, we
still cannot abandon the responsibility of these police
departments or fire departments still goes on with the rest of
the city as well.
The Chairman. Right. Mr. Groseclose, with respect to the
pre-screening, the name of the game in operating a port, and
you're No. 1, is to move it, move it. And you've done it more
efficiently in a productive way than any port in the world.
Now, having said that, if we had the pre-screening at all of
the export ports into the import Port of Charleston, then they
say, wait a minute, you've got to reciprocate and you've got to
pre-screen. What's your comment about that suggestion of pre-
screening?
Mr. Groseclose. Well, I think I would agree with Mr.
Bonner's statements. I think that certainly there would be some
benefits to pushing back borders on both sides to get better
information on the contents of containers before they leave
foreign ports, before they leave the United States ports. And,
I think, that can certainly be improved upon.
The Chairman. You get good information about the shipments,
do you? I mean, they--I guess 60-70 percent are just normal
shippers regularly using the port. And so you know about them
and their credibility and trust. With respect to any new ones,
you would be looking into it and wanting to know about it. So
maybe that wouldn't hold you up there at the state ports. On
the contrary, you could facilitate it, and if they facilitated
yours, then you could move it. Both sides could move even
faster.
Mr. Groseclose. Exactly. I think there should be some time
spent in getting up to speed on both sides of the ocean, but I
think that it would be beneficial to all parties. I think it
was said by Commissioner Bonner, the Customs Service today does
a lot more inspection in terms of paying attention to who the
shippers are, what the commodities are, where they are moving,
and how they are moving and so forth. And, if changes are made
in the system, they are alerted to that and look into it, so I
think that would be beneficial.
The Chairman. I want to yield to Senator Breaux. Let me ask
about that background check, security clearance. Now, as I
understand, everybody that works at a state port facility has
that background check?
Mr. Groseclose. Yes, sir, for our own employees, yes.
The Chairman. How about the truck drivers? You said that
you wanted an identification for them, suggested ID, but they
are not checked right now?
Mr. Groseclose. No, sir. No one beyond Port Authority
employees are checked for background at this time.
The Chairman. The longshoremen offloading that ship, they
have background checks?
Mr. Groseclose. No, sir.
The Chairman. They do not? It seems like that crowd would
have the background--who are you checking, the secretaries or--
the Port Authority officials? I mean, when you say background
checks, who are you checking?
Mr. Groseclose. Every employee of the South Carolina State
Port Authority, and that is all of the authority we have at
this time.
The Chairman. Let me get right to the longshoreman, because
that could be the holdup on the House side of that bill. I know
we had some difficulty with it. We couldn't have security
installed without some kind of background check, just like you
check all your employees. They got to have a background of all
those longshoreman. Do you agree or disagree?
Mr. Groseclose. I would agree. I think there are hundreds
of employees and people representing different companies who
come on our facilities every day. We have about 600 employees,
but there are a couple of thousand people in the Port of
Charleston area who have access to our facility. We do ID
checks. We, you know, look into their reason for being there.
But today, there is no background check beyond those 600
employees that we have.
And, I think that that is a wise move. I think that some of
the concern is, that you will hear, is that doing a background
check, what do you do with that information? What kind of
restrictions do you put on and how do you deal with the people
who have a past record or something. And I think it would be
unfair to, you know, those people to never have access to a
terminal ever again.
The Chairman. Senator Breaux.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is the first
time I have ever heard of a Subcommittee that you've chaired,
Commerce, State or Justice on the Appropriations Committee as
being just that little old Committee I chair.
The Chairman. We got the money. We have been doing a good
job with it. We got the crime rate down.
Senator Breaux. And those Committees are very big
Committees. Mayor Riley, Mayor Summey, and Mr. Burdette, I
think that local governments are forever changed as of 9/11.
For the first time, we are going to be involved in doing things
that local government has never had to do before and that is
security against international terrorism and threats from
foreign countries. Local mayors have never had to do that.
And, if you're going to be involved in a comprehensive plan
providing the systems to protect Mount Pleasant, Charleston,
and North Charleston from terrorist attacks from foreign
countries, that is above and beyond your budget. And that is a
national responsibility and that is why I think that the bill
we have is very important, trying to help you to do things that
the national government normally does. You're not going to be
able to do them without some kind of assistance financially to
get it to work. Otherwise, it is just not going to work.
Mr. Groseclose, you do not know how fortunate you are. You
are, what, the head of the Port Authority for South Carolina.
They've got 14 Port Authorities in New Orleans now.
The Chairman. Fourteen?
Senator Breaux. Fourteen separate Port Authorities. At
least 14 at last count when I left town a couple of weeks ago.
They may have 15 when I get back.
The Chairman. What's our Charleston friend up there?
Senator Breaux. Todd Brinson----
The Chairman. Todd Brinson, he has all 14?
Senator Breaux. No, he just had one. There are 13 others
just like him. And you try and get 14 Port Authorities to agree
on the time of day, I want you to know it is not possible.
The Chairman. I think you ought to--I understand your port,
too, runs for a hundred miles.
Senator Breaux. Yeah, it is a long port, yeah.
The Chairman. Yeah.
Senator Breaux. That is a lot of work. It is very difficult
to coordinate and you all are fortunate in South Carolina that
you have it under one umbrella. I think that is real important.
I think, though, following up on the discussion here with
Senator Hollings about the driver's check, I mean, I think that
the people are not going to be able to enter the ports like
they did before 9/11. Used to, they'd just drive around the
port and what are you doing? Oh, looking at the ships, and not
a lot of questions being asked of drivers or guests or tourists
or people who had business there.
In the future, the only people in ports are going to be
people that have business there. And that is on land and sea.
We talked to Mr. Groseclose about that plan.
I am for restricting access to ports by sea to people who
have a business to be there. No longer can you use the port
area as a place for recreational purpose. And that is going to
be a tough thing to do because many of the ports are next to
private marinas and recreational boating areas. So it is really
difficult. And the way you have to do it is by setting up
security zones that are enforcing, not just a no trespassing
sign. It has to be more than that.
I mean, we were in the Port of Houston. I mean, you had LNG
tankers that pulled up alongside chemical refineries and all
the gas refineries and private vessels just going there. And
the only thing they basically had was a no-trespassing notice
to mariners that you're not supposed to be alongside the LNG
tanker.
A very small vessel blew up the USS COLE and killed a lot
of servicemen, a very small, little boat, probably 40 feet or
less, blew the ship out of the water and killed a number of
service people. If you did that in the Port of Houston with a
small vessel alongside an LNG tanker or alongside a chemical
refinery, you could blow up the whole City of Houston, just one
after the other.
We cannot let that happen again. I mean, the times are
different and the circumstances are different.
I think on the question of getting the background check, I
think that, for instance, drivers who rented a car from the
ports, if they had a background check, they could get a special
class of identification that allows them to come because
they've had a background check, they are in the computer file,
and people who do not submit to a background check are held to
a greater degree of surveillance when they come to the port. I
think you'd have most all your drivers being willing to submit
to that.
And that probably can be applied to aviation in the future.
People who agree to a background check would not have to stand
in line for 2 hours and have everything checked. Still would be
security, but it wouldn't be the same degree as if they hadn't
had a background check.
And I think a port can do that. I think anybody going into
a port, you pretty much have, I think, an authority to say if
you're going to use this facility, you're going to have to
abide by the rules that we set up. And I think that is
important.
Mr. Groseclose. Well, I couldn't agree with you more,
Senator, but today, we do not have the legal authority to do
background checks on anyone other than our own employees.
Senator Breaux. But if this is port adopted--I am just
asking. If the port adopted a ruling of the port that said
anybody who comes on this port property has a background
check--I mean, you wouldn't have to do it. You could get law
enforcement to do it. But they would have to have some kind
of--don't you have the authority to say if you're coming on my
property, you have to have a background check?
Mr. Groseclose. We are limited in terms of what we can do
from that standpoint. We do restrict access to the terminals,
or we should say the gates. Everybody passing through the
gates, truck drivers, individual in an automobile must produce
a photo ID, must have a reason for being there, you know, check
for why they are there and so forth. And so that is a regular
occurrence today and that has been stepped up considerably
since September 11th. There are decals on vehicles that come
and go through the facility. We have cut down considerably on
those. Unlike a lot of other ports, we do not have recreational
uses in close proximity. We have, you know, perimeter fencing,
high-mass lights, and surveillance cameras.
Senator Breaux. But you have recreational use on the water.
Mr. Groseclose. Out on the water, you're absolutely right.
The Chairman. If the Senator yields, you say that you've
got the right to prevent anyone from coming on your property
without a background check.
Mr. Groseclose. Yes sir.
The Chairman. Well, it seems like, then, you could require
it before they came on the property, a background check. What's
to restrict?
Mr. Groseclose. There is a piece of legislation that has
been introduced in the House this year----
The Chairman. To not have background checks?
Mr. Groseclose. No. To have background checks on all
people. And that would provide the authority to undertake
those.
Mayor Summey. We are very limited in local government to
run background checks. We have to go through SLED computers to
run those and there has to be sufficient reason to run those
under SLED guidelines.
Senator Breaux. Well, maybe our legislation can explore
that, but I mean, I think that it is solely appropriate. I
think it would be a positive thing for the people who use the
port because if they have a background check, you've got an ID
to show that I have got a background check, go right through,
and not be stopped for a long period of time. If you do not,
you're going to have a greater--we need to explore that and see
if that is a problem.
Major Taylor, I know that you've done some research in
Louisiana on waterfowl and fisheries over the years.
Major Taylor. Yes, sir. I have. Great state.
Senator Breaux. Raided some of my fisheries and waterfowl
in that area.
Major Taylor. Well, we'll let you have some fowl back.
Senator Breaux. Well, this has been a great panel. I thank
all of you. You've done a great job and I am delighted to be
part of it.
The Chairman. On the--Mr. Burdette, before you leave, that
sailboat that caught fire yesterday, that wasn't terrorism.
Mr. Burdette. No, sir.
The Chairman. How about the Town of Mount Pleasant, the
ship and portside firefighting capability on your great Town of
Mount Pleasant?
Mr. Burdette. Well----
The Chairman. And I understand the Coast Guard came within
12 minutes, but they had to come all the way from around the
battery to get there. And I take it the individual was sort of
trapped and--and couldn't get out and was already overcome by
the smoke and fire. What you were talking about is well taken.
But, in addition to that, without terrorism, we need better
port and shipside firefighting facility. Do we have any--see, I
live over there across the river.
Mr. Burdette. We have very little. In all of Charleston
there are 96 plain ship firefighters, in all of Charleston
County are made up by all the municipalities and also some
county personnel.
The Chairman. We've got some in Mount Pleasant?
Mr. Burdette. Oh, yes, sir. The problem is the equipment.
When the Navy left, the tugs left with it. They were able to
provide most of the water stream from waterside.
The Chairman. Yeah. And, for your information, we do have a
rule against unfunded mandating going on. We are going to make
certain that we do not offload a bunch of requirements and
responsibilities without the money.
Mayor Summey. Senator, could I just----
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Mayor Summey. The latest census, Mount Pleasant is the
fastest growing city in the state. By the next census, it is
going to be probably the fourth largest city in the State of
South Carolina. And I was telling Harry the other day, I could
see it now, you know, the signs coming in, in every direction
to Mount Pleasant is going to say Mount Pleasant, home of Harry
Hallman, across the river from the Hunley.
The Chairman. Thank you all very, very much. All right,
gentlemen. Let's have a little order here. Dr. Stephen E.
Flynn. Dr. Flynn is a Senior Fellow from the National Security
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Douglas R. Brown,
Vice President for Business Development and Programs, Ancore
Corporation, and Chris Koch of the World Shipping Council,
President and CEO of the World Shipping Council, and we thank
you very, very much for helping us in these hearings here in
Charleston today. Dr. Brown.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS R. BROWN, Ph.D., VICE PRESIDENT FOR
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRAMS, ANCORE CORPORATION
Dr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, Senator Breaux, on behalf of
Ancore Corporation, I want to stress our appreciation for your
leadership in passing the comprehensive maritime security
legislation and offering the ports help in carrying out their
day-to-day activities.
Our company offers technology to help prevent terrorism,
stop drug trafficking and money laundering, detecting smuggled
goods, and helping speed commerce through our ports. We believe
the private sector and government can develop systems of
deterrence that will help protect our nation from terrorist
attacks. We look forward to working with you and government
agencies and port authorities in carrying out systems of
deterrence.
The terrorist attacks on our country on September 11th not
only attacked our way of life, but also threatened our economy
from free and open movement of commerce it is so much a part
of.
Nowhere is this more apparent than the nation's seaports.
Last year, approximately 6 million containers moved through the
United States. It is estimated that the U.S. maritime
transportation system moved 2 billion tons of goods throughout
the system. Such a staggering volume of cargo has tremendous
economic value. They also pose significant risks for our
nation's security, as we have proven so often today.
Unfortunately, our government knows very little about
what's in the containers themselves. We have heard a number, 2
percent. Whatever it is, it is a small number of cargo
containers that are actually inspected. Even more so, we know
very little about containers that move under bond of foreign
trade zones and in trans-shipping bonds color containers poorly
enter the United States. Not much can be known about its
contents. Its contents could pose a major security risk or
danger.
Since September 11th, quite frankly, the federal government
has focused its attention on airport security. But just as
terrorists recognize the weakness of our aviation system, be
sure they are studying the vulnerabilities of our ports. Of
course it is not possible, as we have heard, to inspect every
container entering the ports. Nor, however, is it necessary in
order to protect America.
As long as our government can establish a credible
deterrent, it can substantially reduce the risk of harm to the
American public.
We urge you to consider developing a combination of
measures applied strategically at home and abroad. In a moment,
I will describe our technology and show how it can make a
significant contribution to this effort. Before doing so, I
think it is important to point out, as others have, much can be
done abroad to produce an integrated system of protection. We
urge the federal government to work with our major trading
partners to develop export screening programs and custom
shipping programs to reduce the risk long before a vessel can
approach our ports.
The federal government should support programs and create
incentives for major trading partners to inspect shipments
abroad, such as advanced clearance programs. The government
should work with private sector and foreign governments for
more secure containers and to develop profiles on custom
shippers. To document these kind of measures will discourage
terrorists and will reduce the risk of threatening cargoes
entering our ports. However, no such system can be 100 percent
foolproof, nor can we enact it with all countries we trade
with. So we also need to develop a portside capability for
inspecting cargo containers.
Our neutron scanning devices can play a dramatic role in
accompanying our nation's security goals while keeping our
ports open for business. With significant financing from the
federal government, we have developed two technologies--pulsed
fast neutron analysis and thermal neutron analysis. These
technologies have evolved as a result of our combined
experience in addressing terrorist threats in the aviation
sector and fighting the scourge of drugs.
Technology is now available to protect our ports. The PFNA
technology is so sensitive because it can detect explosives,
chemical agents, narcotics, flammable goods and currency and
even nuclear devices. It can inspect shipping containers within
2 to 7 minutes and the analysis is done automatically with no
interpretation.
PFNA technology is packaged in the cargo container
inspection system that is shown in Figures 1 through 5 of the
handout of my written testimony. *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information referred to has been retained in Committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It uses libraries of signatures of material specific nature
to detect the threats within a cargo container. Importantly,
these signatures can be upgraded as new threats occur. And that
is very important as we have seen moving through the 1990's
where we went from drugs to counter-terrorist weapons. One of
the figures there shows the detection of Sarin, the nerve gas
used in the Tokyo city attacks by the terrorists. And we
developed a signature that specifically targeted Sarin within a
fully loaded cargo container.
Also shown in my handout is what we envision for a portside
inspection--use of inspection equipment mounted on a portable
barge. Such a barge would be moved to the Port of Charleston
here where you could move from terminal to terminal and inspect
cargo containers before they actually hit the port at landside.
Such a system is not yet developed. It could be developed
quickly under a program.
Finally, we have a TNA vehicular explosive detection system
which could be employed here and other ports to detect
explosives in cargo containers for chemical weapons.
In summary, our neutron scanning technology capabilities
far beyond present conventional inspection systems. Highly
sophisticated equipment is available today for deployment and
for protection. Thank you for providing Ancore the opportunity
to share our vision and how we can work together to improve
port security to abort further terrorist acts.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas R. Brown, Ph.D., Vice President for
Business Development and Programs, Ancore Corporation
Mr. Chairman and Senator Breaux:
On behalf of Ancore Corporation, I appear to share with you our
perspective on the current vulnerabilities facing our nation's seaports
as a result of the enormous volume of uninspected cargo that moves
through them and to suggest ways in which the private sector and the
government can develop a system of deterrence that will help protect
our nation from further terrorist attacks.
We very much appreciate your leadership in passing S. 1214, the
Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001. And we very much appreciate
being given the opportunity to make recommendations about how we can
help port authorities address the significant challenges they face in
their efforts to protect the security of our country.
As part of a comprehensive plan of seaport security, our
technologies can help prevent terrorism, stop drug trafficking and
money laundering, and detect smuggling, while helping to speed commerce
through our nation's vital seaports.
September 11th Demonstrated the Potential Vulnerability of Seaports
The terrorists who attacked our country on September 11 not only
attacked our way of life, but also threatened our economy that is so
closely tied to the free and open movement of commerce. Nowhere is this
more apparent than at our nation's seaports. Whereas the government now
is seeking to protect our airports with 100 percent inspection of
passengers, baggage and air cargo, our seaports remain relatively
unprotected. We understand the Port of Charleston, for example, has in
service only one bomb-sniffing dog and one x-ray machine.
Last year, approximately 11.6 million containers entered the United
States. It is estimated that the U.S. maritime transportation system
moves roughly two billion tons of domestic and international freight
per year. According to the Department of Transportation, the total
volume of domestic and international freight will likely double over
the next two decades. Just last year, the Port of Charleston handled
1.5 million 20-ft. equivalent units (TEUs) and 520,391 tons of break
bulk cargo. The South Carolina State Port Authority is justifiably
proud of having served more than 2,589 ships and barges at its three
principal seaport terminals.
Such staggering volumes of cargo have tremendous economic value,
but they also pose significant risks to our nation's security.
Unfortunately, our government knows very little today about the
contents of containers entering through our ports. Less than two
percent is actually examined. The government knows even less about
containers moving under bond to foreign trade zones or under a
transshipment bond. Until a container formally ``enters'' the United
States, not much may be known about its contents. But its contents may
pose a major security threat the moment the container arrives in a port
or makes it onto a highway.
Since September 11, the federal government naturally has focused
much of its attention on the threat posed by potential gaps in air
security. But just as the terrorists recognized weaknesses in our
aviation system, you can be sure that they are studying the
vulnerabilities of our ports.
As you know from the Committee's own work, the Interagency
Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports concluded in 2000
that the threat of terrorism at U.S. seaports was low, but that the
vulnerability to terrorism was high. As the Commission noted, seaports
are relatively open, accessible, and handle massive volumes of cargo
that could be sabotaged at its source or in transit. In addition,
seaports tend to be near large population bases and to waterway systems
that could be used to carry harm widely throughout the population.
We should have no illusions about how obvious these potential
vulnerabilities are to terrorists. Moreover, we need to appreciate that
the more successful our government is in shutting down potential
attacks through our aviation system, the more likely our ports will
become a means of wreaking terror.
The United States Should Implement a Comprehensive System of Prevention
and Deterrence
As you no doubt appreciate, it is not possible to inspect every
container entering through our ports. Nor, however, is it necessary to
do so in order to protect the American public. As long as the
government can establish a credible deterrent, it can substantially
reduce the risk of harm to the American public.
The government and the private sector can establish an effective
system of deterrence through a series of incremental measures that
together will decrease any potential threat. No one measure, operating
in isolation, can provide sufficient benefits at acceptable costs to
society.
We urge you to consider developing a combination of measures,
applied strategically at home and abroad, to combat terrorism and to
facilitate commerce. In a moment, I'll describe for you the technology
we have developed with substantial federal government support that can
make a significant contribution in this effort. But before doing so, I
think it important to point out that much can be done abroad to produce
an integrated system of protection.
We urge the federal government to work with our major trading
partners to develop export screening programs and trusted shipper
programs to reduce risk long before a vessel nears our border. The
federal government should explore programs that create incentives for
our major trading partners to inspect cargo shipments abroad, such as
through a system of advance clearance. The government should work with
the private sector and foreign governments to develop more secure
containers and to develop profiles for trusted shippers. Adopting these
kinds of measures will discourage terrorists and will reduce the risk
that threatening cargoes will ever reach our ports.
No such system will ever be foolproof; nor can it be developed
quickly or reliably enough for every nation with which we trade. We
therefore believe it is equally essential that port authorities adopt
measures that can identify threatening cargoes when they reach our
ports, whether or not the containers are formally entering the country
or are in-transit to a foreign trade zone.
Ancore's Port-Security Technology Offers a Dramatic Improvement Over
Conventional Products
It is possible to reduce terrorist threats while maintaining a
robust flow of commerce. We have the technologies available to
accomplish our shared goals of upgrading our security systems while
maintaining the flow of commerce. Our neutron scanning devices can play
a dramatic role in accomplishing our nation's security goals while
keeping our ports and borders open for business. (We describe the two
technologies in greater detail in the attached appendix.*)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information referred to has been retained in the Committee
files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With significant financial support from the U.S. Government, we
have developed Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA) and Thermal Neutron
Analysis (TNA). The technologies have evolved as a result of our
collective experience in addressing aviation terrorist threats and in
addressing the scourge of illegal narcotics. In 1985, after the bombing
of an Air India flight leaving Canada, the Federal Aviation
Administration and others recognized that x-ray machines were
ineffective against explosives. X-ray detects shapes of dense objects,
such as guns. Modern plastic and liquid explosives, however, can be
molded into any shape and can have densities similar to many benign
materials. The federal government recognized that it needed a
technology that could identify the explosives themselves.
During this same timeframe, the U.S. Customs Service was confronted
with the scourge of increased importation of illegal drugs in cargo
containers and trucks. It was clear that manual inspection, which takes
about 15 man hours per container, could never cover more than a
fraction of a percent of the incoming shipments--neither land nor
manpower are reasonably available to do the job. In recognition of the
problem, Congress passed legislation to develop technologies for non-
intrusively scanning trucks and cargo containers to detect illegal
drugs. The program was run through DARPA, the DOD's premier research
agency. Under this and follow-on counter-terrorism programs, the U.S.
Government has put more than $40 million into the development of the
PFNA scanning system.
After years of extensive testing, PFNA technology is now available
to protect our ports (as well as our aviation system and our land
borders). Neutron scanning offers a breakthrough comparable to the
significant advance offered by Magnetic Resonance Imaging (or MRI) in
medical diagnostics. Prior to MRI, a brain tumor was invisible to x-
rays, which could detect the dense bone structure of the skull but
could not tell a doctor much about the soft tissue where the tumor hid.
With MRI, however, doctors now can quickly and non-intrusively pinpoint
a tumor in three dimensions using chemical specific signals. In a
similar fashion, PFNA can automatically pinpoint the position of
contraband based on material specific signatures, contraband that would
otherwise be undetected using traditional x-ray technology.
PFNA technology is so sensitive that it can detect explosives,
chemical agents, narcotics, dutiable goods, currency and even nuclear
devices. It can inspect a shipping container within three to seven
minutes, identifying and locating hazards without the need for human
interpretation.
PFNA uses a directed, pulsed beam of high-energy neutrons that
interact with the nuclei of elements in scanned objects. This pulsed
beam of neutrons is moved over the inspected object as it is
mechanically conveyed across the beam during inspection. The
penetrating neutron pulses interact with the elemental contents of the
items within a container, producing unique gamma ray signals. The
signals emanating are separately analyzed by the PFNA computer system.
The PFNA technology has been packaged into the Ancore Cargo
Inspector (ACI), which is an integrated device for inspection of fully
loaded cargo containers and trucks. The drawing below shows the ACI
system inspecting a fully loaded cargo container. The ACI uses
libraries of signatures to produce material-specific images of the
goods inside a cargo container. These libraries are part of the
system's data base and can be continually updated to include signatures
of new contraband or dutiable cargoes. The use of a high-speed data
processing system allows the ACI to present the results of its
inspection to the operator in a simple intuitive way.
Figure 1. PFNA inspection process.
We also envision a cargo inspection facility based on a moveable
platform, which would be particularly handy in a port such as the Port
of Charleston. The platform could be moved throughout the port to check
suspicious containers, at numerous terminals, before they ever reach
land. Such a system is not yet ready for introduction, but might be
quickly developed through a concentrated research and development
project.
Figure 2. Cargo inspection at ports.
Finally, our TNA-based Vehicular Explosive Detection System (VEDS)
could be deployed here and in other ports to detect explosives in
suspicious vans and trucks or for the detection of a ``weaponized''
cargo container full of explosives or chemical weapons. VEDS can detect
all known explosives, including military, commercial, and home-made,
while simultaneously detecting drugs.
Figure 3. Portal Vehicular Explosive Detection System (VEDS).
In summary, our neutron scanning technology offers capabilities far
beyond those of conventional inspection systems. This highly
sophisticated equipment is now ready to be deployed as part of a
nation-wide system of deterrence. The unique automatic, material
specific detection of terrorist threats can significantly increase the
security at ports, border crossing stations, airports, and even within
the domestic transportation infrastructure of potential urban targets.
Thank you again for providing Ancore with this opportunity to share
with you our vision on ways we can work together to improve port
security and deter future terrorist attacks.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Dr. Flynn.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN E. FLYNN, Ph.D., SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL
SECURITY STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Dr. Flynn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My name is
Stephen Flynn. I am a Senior Fellow with the National Security
Studies Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. I am also
a Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard and a professor at the U.S.
Coast Guard Academy. Since 1999, I have been conducting
research at the Council that has been examining in large part
the security weaknesses associated with the system of
intermodal transportation that is so indispensable to
supporting global trade and travel. That project has afforded
me the opportunity to conduct field visits within major
seaports throughout the United States, in Montreal, Rotterdam,
Hong Kong, and Kingston, Jamaica.
It is a privilege for me to be here today to testify on the
state of seaport security since the tragic events of September
11 and to outline my views on S. 1214, the Port and Maritime
Security Act. In my testimony, I hope to convey two things.
First, I will add my voice to those of the other witnesses in
validating the overdue government attention and resources now
being given to the critical issue of seaport and maritime
transportation security. Second, I will make the case for doing
whatever can be done to bolster the international and
intermodal dimensions of this historic piece of legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I worry that as you pursue this important
agenda to advance port and maritime security you are racing
against a return to complacency. Rather than recognizing
September 11 as a harbinger of how warfare will be waged in the
21st century, it appears that many Americans are choosing to
see it as an aberrant event where, thanks to our impressive
counter-terrorist operations overseas, we soon will be largely
free to return to our ``normal'' lives here at home. I hold
just the opposite view. I would argue that we are at greater
risk precisely because of the example of the catastrophic
terrorist acts of September 11. The Al Qaeda terrorists who
leveled the twin towers and slashed open the Pentagon made
launching an attack on the territory of the United States look
easy. Also, 19 men wielding box-cutters ended up accomplishing
what no adversary of the world's sole superpower could ever
have aspired to: the successful blockade of the U.S. economy
that resulted from the rush by federal authorities to close
U.S. airspace, shut down the nation's seaports, and slow truck,
car, and pedestrian traffic across the land borders with Canada
and Mexico to a trickle. They achieved a very big bang for a
very small buck. We should expect that America's adversaries
have watched and learned.
Americans need to come to grips with three realities.
First, there is military value to engaging in acts of
catastrophic terrorism. It is not simply about killing people
in large numbers or toppling buildings. It is about generating
the collateral societal and economic disruption associated with
these attacks, thereby weakening the power of the targeted
state, and creating a substantial incentive for it to reassess
its policies. Disruption is the military objective, not corpses
and rubble.
Second, for the foreseeable future, there will be anti-
American terrorists with global reach, capable of carrying out
catastrophic attacks on U.S. soil, including the use of
chemical and biological weapons. Regardless of our current
efforts to roll up the Al Qaeda network, places will always
exist for terrorists to hide, especially before they have
committed widespread atrocities, and new adversaries will
eventually arise to fill the shoes of those who have perished.
As with the war on drugs, calls for ``going to the source'' may
sound good in theory, but it will prove illusive in practice.
Terrorism expert David Long suggests a compelling analogy when
he asserts ``terrorism is like the flu--there will always be a
new strain each season.''
Third, many of America's adversaries will find catastrophic
terrorism to be their most attractive military option precisely
because of the complete dominance the United States possesses
across the conventional spectrum of force. If anyone thinks
they can succeed in a pitched battle against U.S. armed forces,
they should check with the Iraqi Republican Guard or the
Taliban army. The only rational option for the adversaries of
the world's sole superpower is to conduct asymmetric warfare.
And the most attractive asymmetric targets are the civil and
economic elements of power precisely because they are the real
basis for U.S. power and they are presently largely
unprotected.
As I survey the menu of tempting targets against which to
conduct a catastrophic terrorist act, I find our seaports and
the intermodal transportation system among the most attractive.
First, because we start from such a low security baseline as
documented by the report of the Interagency Commission on Crime
and Security in U.S. Ports that helped spawn S. 1214.
Inadequate security in our seaports is not simply a result of
benign neglect in the face of what was perceived to be a low
threat. It is also the cumulative result of what I would call,
``malign neglect.'' Many in the maritime transportation
industry, struggling in the face of competitive pressures for
greater efficiencies and lower costs, actively resisted
expenditures on security that would erode their already razor-
thin profit margins. Prior to September 11, the general neglect
of America's seaports, both in terms of investment in public
resources and attention from cash-strapped agencies like the
Coast Guard and U.S. Customs, translated into a maritime front
door that was virtually wide-open. Despite extraordinary
efforts made by federal, state, and local officials since 9/11,
things are now only marginally better. Seaports remain the only
international boundaries that receive no federal funds for
security infrastructure--something the Hollings bill properly
aims to correct.
The fact that greater vigilance within our seaports has not
translated into much in the way of additional security is a
reflection of the second reason why I believe seaports like
Charleston make attractive targets--ports are part of a global
transportation network that can be compromised at the weakest
link within that network. Charleston is the fourth largest
container port in the United States. More than 40 steamship
lines carry U.S. trade between Charleston and 140 countries
around the world. 1.5 million containers moved through this
port last year that originated from loading docks of tens of
thousands of factories or freight forwarders from every
continent. At a cost of $1,500-$3,000, a multi-ton container
can be shipped to practically anywhere on the planet. There are
no security standards associated with loading a container.
There is no requirement that a container be accounted for as it
moves from its point of origin, to the port of embarkation.
There are not even any agreed-upon security guidelines, though
there was a discussion begun last week at the International
Maritime Organization to begin to tackle that issue. What this
translates into is that there are ample opportunities for a
terrorist or a criminal to compromise freight shipments
destined for U.S. ports. Drugs, arms, and migrant traffickers
have been doing this for years.
In short, seaports make great targets because you can
essentially launch an attack from a factory, a freight
forwarder, or virtually anywhere within the intermodal
transportation system, far from our shores. If the Port of
Charleston were to be targeted by a terrorist, there would be
plenty of places to hide a weapon among the 12 million tons of
cargo, loaded and unloaded in the terminals here in 2001. An
adversary could invest in a GPS transponder and track the box's
location by satellite and set it off using a remote control. Or
he might install a triggering device that would set the weapon
off if the door of the container were opened for examination.
That brings me to my third reason to worry about the
vulnerability of the seaports and the intermodal transportation
system. If a container were to be used as a poor man's missile
and it was set off in a seaport, the inevitable fallout would
be to generate concern about the 11.5 million other containers
that arrived in the United States last year. How would we know
they were bomb free? The answer right now is that we couldn't
really say one way or the other with any real confidence,
unless we opened and inspected them all. With more than 90
percent of all transoceanic general cargo being shipped in
containers to and from the United States, stopping and
examining every container would translate into grinding global
commerce to a halt. It would make the disruption caused by the
anthrax mailings look like a minor nuisance by comparison. When
the mail service to Washington was compromised, we switched to
using more e-mails, faxes, and FedEx. If we have to do a
security scrub of the intermodal transportation system, there
is virtually no alternative to a box for moving freight. Within
a day, factories would go idle. As the world's leading importer
and exporter, most of the world's economies would share our
pain.
Expressed succinctly, seaports and the intermodal
transportation system are America's Achilles Heel. This fact
has three very important implications for the subject of
today's hearing on the vulnerability of U.S. seaports and how
the government is structured to safeguard them:
(1) Seaports cannot be separated from the international
transport system to which they belong. Ports are in essence
nodes in a network where cargo is loaded on or unloaded from
one mode--a ship--to or from other modes--trucks, trains, and,
on occasion, planes. Therefore, seaport security must always be
pursued against the context of transportation security. In
other words, efforts to improve security within the port
requires that parallel security efforts be undertaken in the
rest of the transportation and logistics network. If security
improvements are limited to the ports, the result will be to
generate the ``balloon effect''; i.e., pushing illicit
activities horizontally or vertically into the transportation
and logistics systems where there is a reduced chance of
detection or interdiction.
(2) Port security initiatives must be harmonized within a
regional and international context. Unilateral efforts to
tighten security within U.S. ports without commensurate efforts
to improve security in the ports of our neighbors will lead
shipping companies and importers to ``port-shop''; i.e., to
move their business to other market-entry points where their
goods are cleared more quickly. Thus the result of unilateral,
stepped-up security within U.S. ports could well be to erode
the competitive position of important American ports while the
focus of the security risk simply shifts outside of our reach
to Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean to ports such as Halifax,
Montreal, Vancouver, and Freeport.
(3) Since U.S. ports are among America's most critical
infrastructure, they should not be viewed as a primary line of
defense in an effort to protect the U.S. homeland. It is only
as a last resort that we should be looking to intercept a ship
or container that has been co-opted by terrorists is in a busy,
congested, and commercially vital seaport.
The bottom line is that while we must put our own house in
order, the maritime dimension of the homeland security
challenge cannot be achieved at home. It is the international
trade corridors that must be secure, not just the off-ramps
that bring trade to our shores. S. 1214 recognizes this by
including a chapter for international port security. But most
general cargo does not originate in a port--it starts much
further upstream, necessitating the need to move toward point
of origin controls, supported by a concentric series of checks
built into the system at points of transshipment, transfer of
cargo from one conveyance to another, and at points of arrival.
A common set of standard security practices to govern the
loading and movement of cargo throughout the supply chain must
be developed. The goal is to ensure that an authorized shipper
knows precisely what is in a shipment destined for U.S. shores
and can report those contents accurately. A second objective is
to ensure the electronic documentation that goes with the
shipment is complete, accurate, and secure against computer
hackers. A third objective is to reduce the risk of the
shipment being intercepted and compromised in transit.
This last objective is best achieved by advancing the means
for near-real time transparency of trade and travel flows
through technologies that can track the movement of cargo and
conveyances and which can detect when freight may have been
tampered with. Such a system ideally creates a deterrence for
criminals or terrorists to try and intercept and compromise
shipments in transit. Greater transparency also enhances the
ability for enforcement officials to quickly act on
intelligence of a compromise when they receive it by allowing
them to pinpoint the suspected freight. The importance of
providing the means for intelligence-driven targeting cannot be
overstated. The sheer number of travelers and volume of trade
along with the possibility of internal conspiracy even among
companies and transporters who are deemed low-risk makes
critical the ongoing collection of good intelligence about
potential breeches in security. But, that intelligence is
practically useless if it helps only to perform a post-attack
autopsy. Mandating ``in-transit accountability and visibility''
would provide authorities with the means to detect, track, and
intercept threats once they receive an intelligence alert, long
before a dangerous shipment entered a U.S. seaport.
S. 1214 provides a toehold to advance such a comprehensive
approach under section 115, ``mandatory advanced electronic
information for cargo and passengers and other improved Customs
reporting procedures''; section 118, ``research and development
for crime and terrorism prevention and detection technology'';
and section 207, ``enhanced cargo identification and
tracking.'' If all these sections along with a section 108,
``international port security,'' could be refined to take a
more comprehensive systems approach and could be effectively
put on steroids during the conference committee process, the
Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 would truly represent a
substantial step forward in what promises to be a long and
difficult war on global terrorism.
In conclusion, building a credible system for detecting and
intercepting terrorists who seek to exploit or target our
seaports and international transport networks would go a long
way toward containing the disruption potential of a
catastrophic terrorist act. A credible system would not
necessarily have to be perfect, but it would need to be good
enough so that when an attack does occur, the public deems it
to be as a result of a correctable fault in security rather
than an absence of security.
Ultimately getting seaport security right must not be about
fortifying our nation at the water's edge to fend off
terrorists. Instead, its aim must be to identify and take the
necessary steps to preserve the flow of trade and travel that
allows the United States to remain an open, prosperous, free,
and globally engaged society.
The Chairman. Very good. Thank you, Dr. Flynn. Mr. Koch.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER L. KOCH, PRESIDENT AND CEO, WORLD
SHIPPING COUNCIL
Mr. Koch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Breaux. Last
year, the international liner shipping industry carried
approximately 18 million TEUs of containerized cargo in U.S.
foreign trade, containing $480 billion worth of goods,
representing \2/3\ of the value of all of the nation's ocean-
borne commerce. That was approximately 4.8 million containers
of U.S. export cargo and about 7.8 million containers of import
cargo.
Now, the immediate challenges for the industry and for
government are: one, to design the security process and to
deploy the capability necessary to minimize, detect, and
intercept security risks as early as possible--before they are
loaded on a ship for delivery to their destination; and two, to
have the systems and the international protocols in place to
ensure an efficient flow of international commerce during all
possible security conditions.
What is at issue here is, as Dr. Flynn just said, not just
maritime security or transportation, or even the global
intermodal transportation system, but the flow of international
trade and the world's economic health. We all recognize, as Mr.
Bonner and Admiral Loy stated, the concern over the possibility
that the international transportation system might be used as a
conduit for terrorists. At the same time, we are aware that
government officials have indicated that if terrorists were to
attack this system, the government's response might be
literally to shut down trade. That, however, would allow the
terrorist threat to strangle international commerce. It would
be extremely damaging to the American and the world economy.
The BMW plant upstate, whether it is manufacturing for domestic
consumption or export, poultry exporters, furniture exporters--
everybody would be caught up in this economic impact that would
be felt across the nation and would be severe.
The government must have the strategy and the capability to
ensure that trade continues to flow, even if there is an
incident. The alternative is to create an even greater
incentive for terrorists to target the transportation industry
because the consequences would be so destructive.
I would like to observe that the World Shipping Council
would recommend four principles be observed as we construct
this model. First, there must be a unified and coordinated
strategy to address the issue. We recognize that the Department
of Transportation oversees transportation and the Customs
Service oversees trade. But improving security of intermodal
containerized cargo shipments requires a tightly integrated,
common approach and clear responsibilities.
Second, there should be clear, mandatory rules informing
each responsible person in the transportation chain of what is
required. Voluntary programs designed to provide enhanced
security levels and to expedite the transportation of loads of
cargo are important and should be pursued. But effective
security against terrorist threats also requires minimum, clear
requirements, with clear accountabilities which are uniformly
applied and enforced.
Third, the security regime must allow for the efficient
flow of trade. Efficient transportation and secure
transportation are not incompatible.
And finally, international cooperation is clearly necessary
to effectively and comprehensively extend enhanced security to
international supply chains.
Now, of the various components of this challenge, let me
start with ships. The Coast Guard clearly has the authority to
deal with the ``ship'' issues. S. 1214 gives them additional
tools, and we are fully supportive of that. We are also fully
supportive of the Coast Guard's mission at the IMO to expand
international security standards dealing with ships.
The second piece of this security challenge is the marine
terminal. Again, as you have pointed out earlier in the
hearing, Mr. Chairman, the report on the Interagency Commission
on Crime and Security, which started the whole initiative with
S. 1214, pointed out that in the United States, seaport
security has been found wanting. Your legislation is an
excellent start, and we are fully supportive of the bill in
that regard and the efforts of the Coast Guard.
The third issue is personnel. Again, we support S. 1214 and
the current Department of Transportation efforts to establish a
national credentialing program with uniform, minimum federal
standards for credentialing, with a federal background check
process using criminal histories and national security data and
smart card technologies for the credentialing of appropriate
transportation personnel. It should cover people with access to
restricted terminal areas and vessels, to truckers hauling the
container and other security sensitive positions. America's
seaports should have systems to ensure and record that only
approved people who are supposed to be there are there and only
when they are supposed to be there.
We also support the Coast Guard's initiative for the IMO,
to establish an international credentialing and background
check system for seafarers of all nations.
Let me turn now to the issue of the container.
Containerized cargo transportation presents distinct and
clearly complex challenges from a security perspective. First,
there are a number of different entities and different
jurisdictions involved in a shipment--those involved in loading
the container and sealing it, the documentation of the
shipments, the storage, the trucking, the railroad, the inland
terminal, the marine terminal and the ocean carrier.
Second, there's a current lack of a clearly defined and
coordinated information system to receive, analyze and act on
the data determined by the government to be necessary to pre-
screen containerized shipments before they are loaded on the
ship.
And third, there is a lack of an established or coordinated
global capability to inspect containers, when warranted, before
they are loaded aboard ships.
Accordingly, we believe it may be helpful to look at
separate, but complementary, aspects of addressing the issue,
the first being operations. We support the government
establishing a requirement that the shipper must seal a box,
originating in or destined for the United States, immediately
upon stuffing it and record the seal number on all shipping
documents. We support the government establishing standards
that all seals on containers should meet, a requirement that
the party receiving the container at each interchange check and
record the seal number and its condition, and require
procedures for when a container is received with a seal
discrepancy.
As to new equipment technology, the World Shipping Council
members have offered their support and are currently engaged in
helping the government in testing and evaluation of cost-
effective seal and equipment technologies for containers. While
such technologies have not yet been sufficiently proven to have
government standards and be required, we continue to work with
the government and are fully supportive of those initiatives.
Third, regarding cargo documentation and the government's
information requirements, you heard earlier today both
Commissioner Bonner and Admiral Loy speak very eloquently about
the need for container security initiatives to ``push out'' the
borders so that the government can acquire essential cargo
shipping information in time to analyze it and determine if
further inspection of a container is needed or appropriate
before it is loaded on a ship. That logic is clear. It is
unarguable. The port of discharge is not the place or the time
to check for terrorism.
So the government's objective should be to obtain and
analyze shipment information early enough to carry out this
objective. The first step is the government has to establish
its information requirements. What information does it want,
from whom, delivered when?
Each person in the shipping process is going to have a
role, from the shipper, to the carrier, to the intermediary.
Ocean carriers are willing to do their part. They understand
that the cargo manifest is a relevant source of information and
they are certainly willing to comply with the manifest
requirement. However, I would like to point out that the
earliest information required by the government as to cargo on
the ship is the ocean carrier's cargo manifest which is
electronically transmitted 48 hours in advance of arrival.
Importers are not required by law to provide cargo information
or make entry of the goods until 5 days after they have been
unloaded. Even more time is allowed for goods that are moving
in bond.
This is not the information process that is going to
support accomplishing the government's objective. My point here
is not to simply identify an obstacle in front of us, but to
identify the need to have an information process that allows
commerce to flow smoothly because people know what is in that
stream of commerce in time to act on it for security screening
purposes.
We understand the Department of Transportation is
considering this issue. We understand the Customs Service is
considering this issue. We understand the private sector
information are trying to determine how they can help. We hope
a single, coordinated government approach will be developed
soon.
Finally, let me touch base on container inspection
capability. It is not feasible nor is it necessary to
physically inspect every container entering a marine terminal
or port. It is necessary, however, for the government to have
the capability to inspect those containers that it identifies
as deserving further attention, whether that is on a random
basis or based on specific information. And the better the
information about a shipment, the better the government will be
able to identify which containers warrant inspection. Unless
such inspection equipment and competence is available to the
government authorities, not only in U.S. ports, but at overseas
ports, the government will have an obvious difficulty in
accomplishing its objectives. To be fully effective, a security
information system requires a way to check out a questionable
container before it is loaded on a ship heading to or from a
U.S. port. That is the whole point of ``advanced awareness.''
We believe that this issue requires immediate inter-
governmental planning and execution.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, we fully support S. 1214. We
think it is an excellent start. We hope the House will act on
it as quickly as you were able to act on it. We also commend
the Coast Guard and the Customs Service who have done a
magnificent job since the 11th of September. Their enhanced
vigilance has improved security in the U.S. and we need to
build on that. We particularly point to the advanced
information system and planning processes and inspection
capabilities and the international protocols necessary to make
that work. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Koch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher L. Koch, President and CEO,
World Shipping Council
I. Introduction
America is a free nation that generally aspires to free trade. Our
international transportation and trading system reflects that relative
openness and freedom, and we all benefit from it. But today we face a
serious, new challenge: How best to design and implement effective
maritime security measures that will successfully defend our trading
and transportation system from terrorism--while preserving the
efficiencies and benefits which consumers, businesses and every
national economy derive from today's system.
Meeting that challenge is not a simple task. ``Maritime security''
covers a variety of different, distinct industries and elements,
including: inland waterways, port facilities, marine terminals, non-
maritime facilities located on navigable waters, bridges, cruise ships,
tankers of various types, and the liner industry. This testimony will
address only the liner shipping \1\ aspects of this agenda, which,
while representing only a portion of the issues this Committee is
reviewing, are substantial enough to have produced multiple ``container
security'' initiatives within the Executive Branch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Unlike bulk carriers or ``tramp'' ships that operate for hire
on an ``as needed, where needed'' basis, liner vessels operate in
regular, scheduled services on fixed routes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2001, the international liner shipping industry carried
approximately 18 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) of
containerized cargo in America's international trade--roughly $480
billion dollars worth of goods. That represents slightly over two-
thirds of the value of all of the nation's oceanborne commerce. It
represents approximately 4.8 million containers of U.S. export cargo
and 7.8 million containers of import cargo.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Containers are different sizes, including 40 foot (most
common), 45 foot, and 20 foot. For that reason a specific number of
TEUs does not equal that number of containers, as a 40 foot container
equals two TEUs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over 800 ocean-going liner vessels, mostly containerships and roll-
on/roll-off vessels, make more than 22,000 calls at ports in the United
States each year. That's more than 60 vessel calls a day--providing
regular scheduled services to and from virtually every country in the
world. Liner shipping makes it easier and cheaper for U.S. exporters to
reach world markets, and provides American businesses and consumers
with inexpensive access to a wide variety of goods from around the
world--strengthening our economy and enhancing our quality of life. The
members of the liner shipping industry who comprise the World Shipping
Council \3\ carry over 90 percent of this volume. They truly are
``Partners in America's Trade,'' and they recognize that this
partnership requires the industry to work effectively with the
government to address the new threat that terrorists might try to use
or attack our transportation system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The membership of the Council is attached as Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The immediate challenges are (1) to design the security process and
deploy the capabilities necessary to minimize, detect and intercept
security risks as early as possible--before they are loaded aboard a
ship for delivery to their destination, and (2) to have the systems and
international protocols in place to ensure the efficient flow of
international commerce during all possible security conditions. We must
protect the system that facilitates world trade, and prevent
transportation assets from becoming means of delivering destruction. We
must protect the lives of people who make the international trade
system operate and who work and reside in areas through which trade
flows. We must protect the nation's ability to continue its trading
relations in the event terrorists do attack. And, we must recognize
that this terrorist threat is not going to go away, but only become
more challenging to address as world trade volumes grow.
For that reason, what is at issue is not just maritime security, or
the even the global, intermodal transportation system, but the flow of
international trade and the world's economic health.
Government officials have clearly stated their concern over the
possibility that our international transportation system might be used
as a conduit for terrorism. Accordingly, governments must devise and
implement effective strategies to reduce and manage such risks, and
carriers, shippers, ports, marine terminals, importers and third
parties need to support what is necessary to achieve those objectives.
At the same time, government officials have indicated that, if
terrorists were to attack this system, the government response might be
to shut down trade.\4\ That, however, would allow the terrorist threat
to strangle international trade. It would be extremely damaging to the
American and world economy. The government must have a strategy and the
capability to ensure that trade continues to flow, even if there is an
incident. The alternative would create an even greater incentive for
terrorists to target the transportation industry, because the
consequences would be so destructive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Customs Commissioner Bonner last month stated that ``the
shipping of sea containers would stop'' if a nuclear device were
detonated in a container. One can only agree with his comment that this
would be ``devastating,'' would cause ``massive layoffs'' in the
economy, and that ``we must do everything in our power to establish a
means to protect the global sea container trade, and we must do it
now.'' Speech of Commissioner Robert C. Bonner, before the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, January 17, 2002, Washington, D.C.
Coast Guard officials have made similar comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is no single solution for this problem. No single government
agency that can solve this problem. No single government that can solve
this problem on its own. Every commercial party involved in the
transportation of goods has a role to play. Every government has a role
to play.
Shippers, consignees, carriers, ports and terminal operators all
fear that in the endeavor to address these security concerns, the free
and efficient flow of commerce will be impeded, and that requirements
may be imposed that unnecessarily impede commerce and raise operating
costs, but do little to improve security. This is an entirely
legitimate concern. The answer, however, is not to delay action. What
is needed is for the government to clearly identify the new security
requirements, and for the industry to work cooperatively and quickly
with the government to determine the best, most efficient way to meet
them.
After September 11, the World Shipping Council established a
Security Advisory Committee in order to consider how the liner industry
could assist the government in the effort to improve security and
protect the flow of commerce. On January 17, the Council issued a White
Paper, which was provided to the Department of Transportation, the
Customs Service and this Committee. Based on that paper and the
continuing commitment of the liner industry to help the government
develop effective responses to these challenges, I'd like to offer the
following comments to the Committee.
II. The Challenges
Designing and implementing an effective maritime security program
will require cooperation, information sharing, and coordination between
government and industry. At the outset, the Council recommends that the
federal government's strategy and actions should be consistent with
certain principles.
First, there must be a unified, coordinated strategy to address the
issue. We recognize that the Department of Transportation oversees
transportation and the Customs Service oversees trade, but improving
the security of intermodal, containerized cargo shipments requires a
tightly integrated approach and clear responsibilities. This is
particularly true when considering information requirements for cargo
shipments, which I will discuss later. It also requires government
agencies to effectively share the information that they require.
Second, there should be clear, mandatory rules informing each
responsible person in the transportation chain what is required of
them. Voluntary programs designed to provide enhanced security levels
and to expedite the transportation of low risk cargo are important and
should be pursued. But, effective security against terrorist threats
also requires clear minimum requirements, with clear accountabilities,
which are uniformly applied and enforced.
Third, the security regime must allow for the efficient flow of
trade. Efficient transportation and secure transportation are not
incompatible.
Fourth, international cooperation is necessary to effectively and
comprehensively extend enhanced security to international supply
chains. We all recognize that there are both
legitimate concerns about unilateral U.S. actions that have
international implications and about the need for international
standards on many of these issues, rather than a crazy quilt of
differing national laws, and
legitimate concerns that the international community may not
act with the urgency and determination that the U.S. government
regards as essential.
This tension may be unavoidable, but it need not be destructive. It
requires sensitivity and effective communication on all sides. For
example, a recent Customs Service proposal to set up close security
relations with a select number of large, non-U.S. ports, including the
Port of Rotterdam, caused concern in Belgium because the ports of
Antwerp and Zeebrugge, which compete with Rotterdam, felt that the
proposal might effectively disadvantage them in their trade with the
United States. That was clearly not the intent of the proposal;
however, the reaction to it illustrates the importance of effective,
broad-based international cooperation and sensitivity to actions that
are not uniformly applied.
III. Various Aspects of Containerized Cargo Shipping
A. Ships: On the issue of ship security, we fully support the various
initiatives undertaken by the Coast Guard to address vessel security,
both using their existing authority and in leading the initiative at
the International Maritime Organization to obtain international
agreement.
The Coast Guard immediately after September 11th implemented
several measures to improve tracking vessels destined for U.S. ports
and the crews and passengers onboard these vessels. Through its sea
marshal program, implementation of safety and security zones around
vessels and escorting certain types of vessels, the Coast Guard is also
taking steps to prevent vessels from becoming terrorist targets or from
being used by terrorists as weapons.
The Coast Guard has submitted to the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) additional proposals pertaining to vessel security.
Among the proposals are the designation of security officers on every
vessel and in every company that owns or operates vessels; the
availability of alarms or other means on a vessel to notify authorities
and other ships of a terrorist hijacking; and the expedited
installation on all vessels of the Automatic Identification Systems
(AIS) by July 1, 2004, instead of the existing target date of 2008. AIS
provides, among other things, a ship's identity, position, course and
speed. The Coast Guard has also proposed to the IMO an international
system for the issuance of verifiable seafarers' documents and
background checks of individual seafarers.
These and other proposals were discussed at a U.S. initiated
working group meeting of the IMO that ended last week. Additional IMO
meetings are scheduled for later this spring and summer with a view to
approving new international vessel security measures at a special IMO
session in December.
It is too early to assess which measures may be approved later this
year by the IMO and thus become internationally binding requirements.
As an international industry operating liner vessels with multinational
crews, and under the jurisdiction of many different flag
administrations, and calling ports in many different countries, the
Council's member companies would prefer that, to the greatest extent
possible, mandatory vessel security measures be agreed to at the
international level. Clear and uniformly applied and enforced rules
would create certainty and clarity for our vessels and their crews and
help protect against breaches in, and of, the international supply
chain.
One final point about ships and security: Concern has been
expressed about terrorist organizations using shell businesses to
obtain ownership of vessels to provide a source of income and for
logistical purposes. It is very important for flag administrations to
work cooperatively with U.S. authorities to track any such terrorist
ownership, and we understand that these concerns are being addressed.
B. Marine Terminals: The security of ports and marine terminals in this
country was analyzed in the Report of the Interagency Commission on
Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports (Fall 2000) and found wanting. This
issue has been discussed at previous Committee hearings, and that
report provided an impetus for your legislation (S. 1214), Mr.
Chairman, which is now before the House of Representatives, and which
we support.
The Coast Guard, using existing statutory and regulatory authority
and working with terminal owners and operators, has already implemented
certain measures to increase security in and around waterfront
facilities.
Earlier this year, the U.S. Coast Guard Commander for the Pacific
Area issued guidelines for the individual Captains of the Port for the
inspection and maintenance of adequate security measures for waterfront
facilities in the Pacific Area. Developed in cooperation with industry
stakeholders, these guidelines are intended for all types of maritime
terminals and facilities. They cover areas such as physical property
security, personnel security, passenger security, vehicle access and
rail security, and are differentiated according to three risks levels.
As guidelines, they do not replace or supersede existing regulations.
Rather they are intended to assist the individual Captains of the Port
and the operator of a facility in evaluating the security of that
facility and taking corrective measures, if necessary. The guidelines
are a constructive first step, but further actions are needed. For
example, these guidelines do not address the issue of credentials and
access controls for people at marine terminals.
The U.S. Coast Guard included in its submission to the IMO a
proposal that all port facilities be required to develop and maintain
security plans, and that these plans would have to be approved by the
government in whose jurisdiction the facility is located according to
internationally agreed standards. In addition to this proposal, the
Coast Guard has also proposed that IMO agree to a mandatory requirement
that every port undergo, by the government in whose jurisdiction it is
located, periodic port vulnerability assessments based on
internationally agreed vulnerability assessment standards. We fully
support the efforts of the Coast Guard to raise enhanced terminal
security at the IMO. The Coast Guard has also begun the process of
preparing to conduct vulnerability assessments of U.S. ports, and,
towards that objective, is developing a so-called ``Model Port''
security concept.
C. Personnel: We support S. 1214 and the Department of Transportation
efforts to establish a national credentialing program, with uniform,
minimum federal standards for credentialing, with a federal background
check process using criminal history and national security data, and
``smart card'' technology for the credentialing of appropriate
transportation workers. It should cover people with access to
restricted marine terminal areas and to vessels, the truckers hauling
the container, and other security sensitive positions. America's
seaports should have systems to ensure and record that only approved
people who are supposed to be there are there, and only when they are
supposed to be there.
S. 1214 appropriately instructs the Department of Transportation to
work to enhance the security at foreign ports. To be credible, the
United States needs to do the same. Many foreign ports have more
developed security procedures than U.S. ports, and the institution of
credentialing, background checks, and positive access controls at U.S.
ports would be a constructive step to show the U.S. government's
resolve.
We also support the Coast Guard's initiative at the IMO to
establish an international credentialing and background check system
for seafarers of all nations. The Coast Guard estimates that 200,000
seafarers a year come to the United States. The agency's IMO proposal
is a good-faith proposal to establish an internationally accepted
system that would provide enhanced security and ensure the desired
freedom of movement for seafarers.
D. Containerized Cargo: Containerized cargo transportation presents
distinct and clearly complex challenges from a security perspective (1)
because of the number of different entities in different jurisdictions
involved in a shipment--those involved in loading and sealing the
container, documentation of the shipment, storage, trucking, railroads,
inland terminals, marine terminals, and the ocean carrier, (2) because
of the current lack of a clearly defined and coordinated information
system to receive, analyze and act on the data determined by the
government to be necessary to pre-screen containerized shipments before
they are loaded aboard a ship, and (3) because of the lack of an
established or coordinated global capability to inspect containers
before they are loaded aboard ships. Accordingly, we believe that it
may be helpful to look at separate, but complementary, aspects of
addressing this issue.
(1) Operations: We support the government establishing:
a legal requirement that the shipper must seal a container
originating in or destined for the United States upon
stuffing it, and record the seal number on all shipping
documents;
the standards that such seals must meet (preferably an
internationally accepted standard);
a requirement that the party receiving the container at
each interchange (e.g., trucker, railroad, ocean carrier)
check and record the seal and its condition upon receipt;
a requirement that when persons having custody must break
the seal for legitimate reasons, they be responsible for
affixing a new one, noting the reason, and recording the
new seal number on the documentation;
procedures for when a container is received with no seal,
a broken seal, or a seal discrepancy; and
a requirement that no loaded container be stowed aboard a
vessel without an intact, conforming seal.
While the industry recognizes that seals will not by
themselves solve security concerns, the Council believes the
above requirements would be an appropriate step to ensure a
more secure chain of custody.
(2) New Equipment Technologies: Council members have offered
their support for government efforts in the research, testing,
development and evaluation of cost-effective new technologies
that could help provide enhanced security, such as electronic
seals, and container tracking and intrusion detection
technology. While such technologies have not yet been
sufficiently proven to have government standards and be
required, carriers will continue to work with the government in
testing and evaluating such possibilities. Because there are
roughly 11 million existing containers serving as instruments
of international commerce involving multiple national
jurisdictions, it is very important that any technology
standards or devices be internationally available and accepted.
(3) Cargo Documentation and Government Information
Requirements: Customs Commissioner Bonner and Admiral Loy have
both spoken clearly about the need for container security
initiatives to ``push'' the nation's borders out, so that the
government can acquire essential cargo shipment data in time to
analyze the information and determine if further inspection of
that container is needed before it is loaded aboard ship. The
logic is clear and unarguable. The port of discharge is not the
place or the time to check for terrorism.
If the vision of earlier, more effective container security
is to become a reality, it requires better, earlier information
about cargo shipments, and the capability to effectively
inspect containers before they are loaded aboard ships. Let me
turn to these issues.
The government's objective is to obtain and analyze shipment
information early enough to implement more timely and effective
screening. The first step is for the government to establish
its information requirements--specifically, what information
does it need, from whom, when, electronically delivered to what
information system?
Each person in the shipping process has a role and an
appropriate set of requirements: the importer who has ordered
and is purchasing the goods, the shipper who is loading the
goods into the container, the carriers who are transporting the
goods, and the brokers and forwarders who assist in the cargo
information process. Today, the earliest information required
by the government is the ocean carriers' cargo manifests, which
are electronically transmitted 48 hours in advance of
arrival.\5\ Importers are not required by law to provide cargo
information and make entry of the goods until five days after
they have been unloaded (even more time is allowed if the goods
are moving ``in bond''). This is not the information process
that is going to support accomplishing the government's
objective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ NVOCC's (which are responsible for up to 40% of the cargo in
some trade lanes) are not subject to the same Customs bonding and
information filing requirements as ocean carriers; they are not
required to file cargo manifests for inbound shipments. They should be
subject to the same information filing obligations at the same time as
ocean carriers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ocean carriers are willing to do their part. They understand
that the cargo manifest is a relevant source of information,
and they will submit those manifests when required. By
themselves, however, carriers' cargo manifests have practical
limitations and are not likely to be the means by which the
government satisfies its information requirements.
Specifically, the manifest's cargo description is the
information the carrier is provided by the shipper; its level
of detail is limited; there is no uniform or detailed
definition of what is an acceptable cargo description for a
carrier's manifest; and, penalties for inadequate or inaccurate
cargo descriptions on cargo manifests are imposed only on the
carriers transmitting the information, not on the cargo
interests providing the information to the carrier--at best, an
antiquated approach when dealing with sealed containers.
An effective information system for security purposes
presumably needs specific information, from the appropriate
parties who possess that information, sooner. The information
exists--it's a matter of how best to obtain it and analyze it.
Cargo interests know what has been ordered before a container
is stuffed. The shipper who stuffs the container knows what was
put in the box. What is needed--and this is admittedly easier
to state than to implement--is a system that obtains the needed
data, from the appropriate parties, at times sufficiently in
advance of loading as to allow for effective security
prescreening.
We understand the Department of Transportation is considering
this issue. We understand the Customs Service is considering
this issue. We understand that private sector information
enterprises are trying to determine whether they can play a
role in this effort. We hope that a single government approach
will be developed soon.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we support S. 1214's recognition that
maritime security requires attention to export cargo, as well
as import cargo. We support your legislation's ``no
documentation/no loading'' requirement, and the requirement
that export shippers provide complete documentation as soon as
possible and no later than 24 hours after tendering cargo to
the marine terminal. We recommend an additional clarifying
requirement to prohibit loading a container for export unless
the shipper has provided complete documentation at least 24
hours before the commencement of loading, in order to avoid the
pressure of last minute demands that a box be loaded when the
documentation is just being provided and the government has not
had a chance to review it. Effective attention to export cargo
will demonstrate to the international community that the United
States is committed to addressing security risks in a coherent
fashion, and not just the risks involved in one direction of
foreign trade.
(4) Container Inspection Capability: There can be no argument
that non-intrusive container inspection equipment, \6\ operated
by trained personnel, is necessary, and that this is a very
important government competence. Mr. Chairman, the industry
recognizes your leadership in S. 1214's authorizing $168
million for this purpose over the next several years, and
appropriating $33 million for this in the Customs Service
Appropriations bill this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ This testimony uses the term ``inspection equipment''
generically, but recognizes that there are different kinds of equipment
(e.g., mobile, crane mounted, hand held), using different technologies
(e.g., X-ray, gamma ray) with different capabilities to identify
different materials (e.g., drugs, radioactivity, carbon dioxide,
explosives).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is not feasible or necessary to physically inspect every
container entering or leaving a port. It is necessary, however,
for the government to have the capability to inspect those
containers that it identifies as deserving further attention,
whether that be on the basis of random selection or specific
information. And the better the information about a shipment,
the better the government will be able to identify which
containers warrant such inspection.
Unless such inspection equipment and competence is available
to government authorities, not only at U.S. ports, but at
overseas ports of loading, the government will have obvious
difficulty accomplishing its objective. To be fully effective,
an advanced security information system requires a way to check
out a questionable container before it is loaded on a ship
heading to or from a U.S. port. That's the point of advanced
awareness.
This year's appropriations bill and the Administration's
budget for the coming fiscal year do not appear to provide any
funding for such equipment beyond U.S. shores. Perhaps the U.S.
government can enter into agreements at IMO or bilaterally with
its trading partners that provides for this. But, it is an
issue that requires immediate inter-governmental planning and
execution. Inspection equipment standards should be agreed
upon, and inspection capabilities and international cooperation
protocols established. Delay in having this capability means
that the government will have one less effective tool to
intercept dangerous cargo, and to keep commerce flowing in the
event of a terrorist incident.
(5) Sharing Information: While there are many aspects of
addressing this issue, intelligence will be a key part of
securing the transportation infrastructure from terrorists
threats. Appropriate means should be developed for sharing
intelligence alerts and warnings on a timely basis with
designated carrier personnel.
IV. Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the Coast Guard has done a magnificent job in
responding to maritime security since September 11, as has the Customs
Service. Maritime security has been improved because of their efforts,
and their enhanced vigilance and intelligence efforts continue. The
challenge is to build on those efforts and create a more complete and
permanent set of security procedures and systems that can better ensure
the safety of America's foreign trade. The members of the World
Shipping Council are ready and willing to help. A safe, efficient and
reliable transportation system is essential to our country's prosperity
and to the prosperity of all of our trading partners. We appreciate
your early and continued leadership on this issue, and we look forward
to working with you, the Committee, and the House of Representatives on
these issues.
Appendix A
World Shipping Council
Member Lines
APL
A.P. Moller-Maersk Sealand (including Safmarine)
Atlantic Container Line (ACL)
CP Ships (including Canada Maritime, CAST, Lykes Lines,
Contship Containerlines, TMM Lines, and ANZDL)
China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO)
China Shipping Group
CMA-CGM Group
Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores (CSAV)
Crowley Maritime Corporation
Evergreen Marine Corporation (including Lloyd Triestino)
Gearbulk Ltd.
Hamburg Sud (including Columbus Line and Alianca)
Hanjin Shipping Company
Hapag-Lloyd Container Line
HUAL
Hyundai Merchant Marine Company
Italia Line
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. (K Line)
Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (MISC)
Mediterranean Shipping Company
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines
NYK Line
Orient Overseas Container Line, Ltd. (OOCL)
P&O Nedlloyd Limited (including Farrell Lines)
Torm Lines
United Arab Shipping Company
Wan Hai Lines Ltd.
Wallenius Wilhelmsen Lines
Yangming Marine Transport Corporation
Zim Israel Navigation Company
The Chairman. Well, thank you, each of you. Dr. Flynn, you
talked about return--or race against a return to complacency.
Complacency begins in Washington. I find the people with the
war are ready to go to war. They are ready to sacrifice. And
yet at the same time, in Washington, we run an advertisement
telling people just do not worry about it; take a trip, get
your family, enjoy yourself, enjoy yourself. We say, yeah, we
are going to have to have a war, but we are not going to pay
for it; we are going to run a deficit. We have always paid for
every war. But we are going to run a deficit and do not worry
about it.
Here back home, every state is struggling, cutting back
appropriations and cutting back spending and cutting back tax
cuts.
Like Governor Bush down in Florida, he had to suspend his
tax cut. So at the local level, there is no complacency. The
race against a return to complacency is in Washington. We talk
big. But it took us 6 weeks to get airport security. Had
language that the President would stand up to bin Laden, but
couldn't stand up to Congressman Armey--now we passed port
security in two months, unanimously passed, all Republicans, it
is bipartisan, but it languishes in the House. Our Committee
has following that a rail security bill, to prevent the blowing
up of Grand Central Station in New York.
So we have got all of these things and we are trying to
move them ahead and I come back and I definitely am confirmed,
Senator Breaux, with the feel for the briefing. For example, we
got this morning that this crowd is not waiting on Washington.
The Coast Guard, the Port Authority, the local entities, not
just the state ports, but there are a lot of folks with private
concerns up and down these rivers all working together, pulling
together, the mayors, the natural resources department,
everybody is dovetailing and ready to go and not waiting on
Washington. There's no complacency, but we cannot get our own
bill through the House of Representatives.
That is a frustration to me. I do not see Washington really
leading. I think they are really following the people, which I
hope we'll continue to do because I think the people are right.
With respect to equipment, Dr. Brown, your neutron
scanners, how many do we have and in how many ports and how
soon can we get a sufficient number to start checking and
scanning the way we should?
Dr. Brown. Thank you. Right now, we are working actually
under pre-9/11 situation with the DOT counter-drug program to
get our first scanner on the border with New Mexico--I'm sorry,
Texas and Mexico. We have looked at production. We believe we
can produce the first commercial units in about 12 months, and
20 within the next 2 years, 50 within the next 3 years.
The Chairman. Fifty within the next 3 years?
Dr. Brown. Yes.
The Chairman. Well, you can see how far behind we are.
There's no question.
Dr. Brown. Well, I think the--leading into the events of 9/
11, the big problem was--would be for drugs at the border. You
saw Commissioner Bonner's pictures. It was a bunch of equipment
developed with congressional backing in the 1990's, non-
intrusive inspection equipment. There's low- and high-energy
radiography systems which you saw from Commissioner Bonner with
regards to that which is material-specific. It is a different
type, meant for fully loaded containers.
To date, Customs has only adopted the lower energy, empty
and lightly-loaded container inspection equipment. They haven't
adopted the fully-loaded container inspection equipment. So
they really haven't solved the seaside problem as far as
actually loaded equipment goes.
The Chairman. Senator Breaux.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You
know, I think about the fact that Senator Hollings is not only
on the airport security, but port security, and I am going to
start calling him Senator Security. I think that is a title
well deserved. There's nothing more important right now than
homeland security. A lot of people talk about it, but I think
you really have done something about it in both of these two
areas.
Dr. Brown, I am just really excited about what you've
presented. You know, with these hearings, a lot of times we do
not hear a lot from them, but I think in this case, we have
learned a lot from the port and the local people in Charleston.
But you know, I didn't really know that Congress had actually
passed legislation to develop technology for the non-intrusive
scanning of trucks and cargo containers to detect illegal
drugs. The program was run over at the Department of Defense.
Dr. Brown. Yeah, it was DARPA-headed program.
Senator Breaux. We spent $40 million developing this PFNA
scanning system. And you know, from what you're telling us,
that the technology is so simple, and yet it can detect
explosives, chemical agents, narcotics, durable goods,
currency, and even nuclear devices. I would liken the
comparison to the x-ray of a human compared to an MRI of a
human where the x-ray just shows bone density and the MRI shows
the tumors.
I mean, this technology I think is just outstanding. And do
you think that there's sometime in the future where we could
have in place a system where we could have the capacity to in
fact PFNA scan every container?
Dr. Brown. I do not think it is necessary to scan every
container. I mean, to do the numbers, you would need 50
scanners if they ran night and day and were in the right place
which they probably wouldn't be, you would need 50 scanners to
handle the 10 million containers coming to port.
Senator Breaux. I mean this, again, is way off in the
future, but I mean, do you envision a system sometime outside
of our time of being, for doing this, but this type of work
where you can scan an entire ship?
Dr. Brown. That, I do not think physics will allow you to
do at least in the near future. But we have talked a lot about
pushing the borders out. A year ago, I was in Dubai. They had
this huge free port. It is in the Gulf State--near Gulf states.
What happens is cargo containers come in there with raw goods
unscreened. They go to a factory area where 30,000 people are
employed largely from third-world countries and small
factories. Those cargo container goods are reprocessed, goods
such as computers, clothing, you name it or you can think of
what it might be, and they are all shipped out of there, all
unscanned. I think that would be a perfect place to start your
across-the-water scanning.
Senator Breaux. Well, I think the technology is truly
outstanding and certainly represents the future. And you know,
people are always cussing the federal government. This is an
example of the federal government working with private sector
to develop something that may not have been done had it not
been for the research dollars that the government helped put
into this program.
Dr. Brown. That is absolutely true.
Senator Breaux. Chris, thanks again. Dr. Flynn. And you're
right, I mean, your association would be critical in helping us
solve this. I am really glad to see the shipper has such a
positive attitude. You're not fighting it. You're really
standing up together with it. Thank you, gentlemen, very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Koch, thank you very, very much, the
World Shipping Council, and everything else for your wonderful
assistance. For each of the witnesses, the record will stay
open for further questions. Thank you all very much. The
Committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Robin Lynch, President, Sea Containers America
Inc.
Good morning. Mr. Chairman. My name is Robin Lynch and I am the
president of Sea Containers America Inc. My career spans thirty-four
years, serving in the maritime industry in five countries, joining Sea
Containers in 1981, and assuming my current position in 1987.
Our company was founded by Mr. James B. Sherwood during the infancy
of containerization in the mid-1960's. From that time, Sea Containers
has been unique in two respects.
First, we have remained a designer, manufacturer and lessor of
marine container equipment, giving us a unique perspective shared by no
other company; second, we have gained our reputation in the
international shipping world as being on the cutting edge of design,
construction, and deployment of special containers that have taken our
industry far beyond the original ten, twenty and forty foot boxes. We
have also had on-going experience as a container carrier--from 1968
with CONTAINERSHIPS SCANDINAVIA and MAERSK WEST AUSTRALIA, so we have
seen how the container world operates from both perspectives.
From that beginning, Sea Containers has evolved into a worldwide
transport group in over eighty countries that covers three main
activities: marine container design, manufacturing and leasing,
passenger transport, and leisure-based operations. Within each of these
segments is a number of operating units and my responsibilities cover
not only all container related matters in North and Central America
under our joint venture with General Electric (GESEACO), but also our
fast ferry service in New York Harbor (SEASTREAK).
GESEACO is the largest marine container leasing company, with close
to 1m TEU of assets, with depots and repair facilities throughout the
maritime world. Our fleet contains nearly 100,000 TEU of refrigerated
containers, 32,000 flatracks, 25,000 opentops, and 25,000 palletwide
style units. Interestingly enough, we believe this new container can
contribute to the efforts in the war on terrorism, which I will
describe below.
Our American corporate headquarters is in New York, however here in
Charleston is our North American Operations Center, our largest depot
and repair facility, our key administrative staff, and last but not
least located in the former Navy Yard is Charleston Marine Containers
Inc., which is the only ISO container manufacturing facility in the
United States. I am pleased to advise that CMCI's leading customer is
the Pentagon and at the moment thousands of QUADCONS for the Army and
TRICONS for the USMC are on order and being produced on our assembly
line. Of course, we have also designed and manufactured special units
for other government agencies, ocean carriers, railroads and trucking
companies--indeed all segments of the intermodal network.
This subcommittee has before it, in this hearing on port security
and terrorism, one of the most important topics that our nation and
industry faces today. The central point that I would like to make in my
testimony is that since container standardization through the ISO
method and nearly all manufacture of containers rests beyond total
jurisdiction of this country, we believe that the time has come for a
new global era of container ``use and responsibility''.
By this term, I believe that we can assist in the difficult task of
identifying possible terrorist-tampered containers so that they will
not enter the stream of international commerce, or if they do, enable
us to remove them before harming our fellow citizens or our vital
multimodal transport network. Multimodalism is successful in its
simplicity by allowing a seller (exporter)/purchaser (importer) to load
a container, seal it and transport to destination intact without
interruption other than a physical customs check (if required). It is
necessary to verify what is loaded in a container prior to sealing it
before the seal has any useful purpose. Assuming this was done, then
whatever type of electronic seal or hinge lock would become a
meaningful indicator if tampered with. Also, a box inspection to review
any suspicious recent (new looking) repairs or modifications would also
be necessary.
I am certain this panel recognizes that the overall issue of port
security raises concerns among each segment of the commerce chain that
their particular activity not be singled out for blame or carry an
unfair burden of responsibility. For example, several ocean carriers I
have discussed this matter with point out that they are the
intermediary between the shipper and the ultimate consignee. They
recognize that other than operations that they directly control--such
as consolidation services, container freight stations, or destination
distribution--it is only known to the shipper and consignee what is
loaded in a box and declared for customs purposes. These carriers know
the sting of being held liable when their ships are found to have drugs
placed on them without their knowledge.
This subcommittee has previously examined and heard testimony on
the very sophisticated methods of those who would tamper with the
legally stowed boxes. There have been many cases of immigrant smuggling
gangs not breaking the container lock seal, but merely removing the
door hinges and carefully removing them. There have been other
instances where boxes have been pierced open with the skills of a
surgeon to conceal drugs and other illicit cargoes. An important
opportunity for inspection authorities comes when a determination is
made to physically open and inspect a particular box. If the
authorities order the container to be unstuffed, this is a costly and
time-consuming process which causes possible cargo damage and opens up
theft potential. If, however, the cargo is palletised the whole
operation is much quicker and damage and theft opportunities lessened.
This is why the new palletwide containers are now being produced to
accommodate the common worldwide metric pallet.
Unfortunately, the number of boxes moving in international commerce
into our country, over 5.7m annually--in an intricate pattern of
container leasing company/ocean carrier/large shipper owned regime--is
so large and the flow through every U.S. port is so strong, that there
is no simple, ``one size fits all'' solution. In fact, if we are to
confront and defeat this terrorist threat we must move on a number of
fronts with coordination to ensure that carriers, port authority,
involved federal agencies and container companies are following a
concerted plan of action.
From our unique, and might I add neutral, perspective on this
matter I would suggest that the major action Congress could take would
be initiation of a system approved by an interagency task force which
would require shippers and consignees to have their facilities pre-
screened, inspected both here and abroad, and approved for movement of
goods in international commerce. Cargo shipped from known hostile areas
can be subjected to scientific developments, such as the latest seal
and hinge technology, electronic monitoring, and tracking of container
contents. Shippers and consignees who are not approved must then
receive special attention. In addition, we must promote use of x-ray,
gamma ray, and bomb detection devices.
For our part as a container designer and manufacturer, I have
prepared for the subcommittee a list of enhanced security options that
could be implemented on both a short and longer-term basis:
1. Electronic seals for containers supplied by the shippers, that
have been approved by government/ocean carrier authorities.
2. Enhanced cargo documentation to enable shippers or their
brokers to transmit data direct to U.S. authorities prior to vessel
arrival in our ports.
3. Coordinated computer-tracking technology.
4. Container x-ray/gamma ray options that do not impede terminal
cargo flow.
5. Accelerated R&D on improved tracking, locks, and production of
new secure palletwide units.
6. Increased use of sniffer dogs for detection of explosives and
other dangerous materials.
7. Look for recent repairs or work carried out to a container that
might be of a suspicious nature.
8. Accomplish all, if not most, of cargo and container inspections
at origin load point.
Other than the above, one has to always look at inspecting
containers from unknown/little known shippers and consignees, being
mindful a terrorist could always pretend to be a true shipper or
consignee!
In conclusion, Sea Containers is firmly committed to working with
our maritime partners in this important effort. To that end, we applaud
and fully support your efforts here today and look forward to passage
and rapid implementation of the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2002.
I am requesting that the attached articles from Lloyd's List on
container terrorism be included in the record.
Thank you for affording me the honor of testifying and I would be
pleased to answer any questions that you might have, or supply
additional materials for the record.
Ports in the front line
Lloyd's List, London
Monday, February 4, 2002
Section: Special Report-Maritime Emergencies
Ports around the world face the prospect of being screened by the
US and, if their security is found wanting, being graded as ``high-
risk,'' with the possibility of loss of trade.
Under proposed US legislation any country which the US determines
has a port security problem will be notified and a list of such
countries will be published prominently in US ports, on passenger
tickets and in travel advice from the US state department.
The US may ban from its own ports ships arriving from a foreign
port with insufficient security, while the US president is authorised,
without prior notice or hearing, to suspend the right of a US vessel or
person to enter such a port.
The situation is being closely watched by the international ports
industry. Peter Van Der Kluit, head of the International Association of
Ports and Harbours' European office, said his organisation was ``very
anxious'' about the security-grading plan, although the fine details
were still being made clear.
The grading could mean some ships arriving from a high-risk port
are either denied entry or subject to strict controls. One possibility
is the placing by the US Coast Guard of ``sea marshals'' on ships
deemed to be a security risk. Sea marshals have already been used on
ships classed by the Coast Guard as potentially hazardous, with the LNG
carrier Polar Eagle being boarded by a four-man team during its transit
of the Cook Inlet in Alaska last month.
The power to act against foreign ports will come if the Port and
Maritime Security Act, passed by the US Senate last December, is
adopted by Congress and signed into law by President Bush. Similar
proposals have been included in the US submission to next week's
special meeting on security at the International Maritime organisation.
The Senate bill also calls on ports and terminal operators to draw
up and submit for approval a maritime facility security plan.
The plan has to be made in conjunction with new local port security
committees, their memberships drawn from port authorities, unions, the
private sector, local, state and federal agencies and law enforcement
and under the chairmanship of the local Coast Guard captain of the
port.
What's in the box?
Lloyd's List, London
Monday, February 4, 2002
Section: Special Report-Maritime Emergencies
Millions of containers move around the world on ships, trains and
trucks and being able to pinpoint all those which contain illegal
immigrants, drugs, contraband or terrorists or terrorist materials is a
virtual impossibility.
There have been and continue to be successes as drug seizures are
made or refugees discovered. Recently, in an Italian port a container
was found to be housing a man equipped with a laptop computer, mobile
phone and enough supplies to sustain him on a long sea voyage. The ship
was bound for Canada and the man was arrested as a suspected terrorist.
Such successes, however, are rare examples since the resources
available to customs, immigration and narcotics agencies around the
world are insufficient to meet the demand. The only hope of minimising
the risk of terrorists smuggling themselves or their deadly equipment
in containers is in making the intermodal transport system as secure as
possible without hindering the free flow of trade.
The threat of terrorism delivered via a box has been known for some
time. A report by the US Department of Transportation in August 2000
suggested terrorists would be more likely to ship a nuclear bomb or its
components in one of the 550 ships, 2,500 aircraft or 45,000 containers
that entered the US every day. It also cited a war game, Wild Atom, run
by the Washington-based Centre for International Strategic Studies in
1996 in which terrorists smuggled a nuclear bomb into the US disguised
as commercial cargo on a ship.
The modern intermodal transport system of ships, rail and trucks is
already heavily exploited by organised crime. Once the container was
seen as the solution to cargo pilfering, reducing it to a fraction of a
percent, but criminals soon realised stealing the container itself
could be even more lucrative. According to a recent report commissioned
by the National Cargo Security Council, the average value of cargo
theft increased fivefold to $500,000 between the 1970s and 1990s.
``Intermodal shipping,'' the report noted, ``has revolutionised the
supply chain and transportation function by using standardised cargo
containers, computerised cargo tracking and automated cargo transfer
equipment that enables shippers to securely and efficiently transfer
containers delivered by sea to other ships for onward shipment onto
commercial railroads and trucks for overland transportation.''
The container is not only vulnerable to being stolen intact or
being broken into, despite the use of locks and seals (enterprising
thieves are known not only to break into containers but, having removed
the targeted goods, then replace them with sandbags to make up the
weight), but can also be the convenient means for smuggling contraband
goods around the world. Criminals are able to exploit the complexity of
the intermodal system to conceal the true origin of cargo within which
contraband goods are hidden.
Containers are also used to smuggle ``hot'' money from activities
such as drug dealing out of the US, exploiting the high volume of
containerised trade and the fact that US Customs devotes the majority
of its resources to inspecting inbound containers.
As it is, US Customs can only inspect a tiny percentage of import
containers, a rate that was expected prior to September 11 to fall as
low as 1% in the next few years as trade increased. An increase in its
budget, however, under the Port and Maritime Security Act passed by
Congress last December may enable it to maintain if not expand its
inspection rate.
______
J. Al Cannon, Jr. Esq., Sheriff
Charleston County, SC, February 6, 2002
Senator Ernest F. Hollings,
U.S. Senate
Washington, DC
Dear Senator Hollings:
The terrorist attacks of September 11th, and subsequent discovery
of further planned attacks have highlighted the suddenness with which
the security of the United States can be breached, as well as the
terrible cost of such a breach. Every region of the United States has
its own particular character and each geographic region brings with it
its own unique challenges from a security perspective.
In Coastal South Carolina, we are particularly mindful of the
fertile ground our coastline affords illicit maritime traffic of all
types. Coastal South Carolina has been favored grounds for smuggling
and piracy since before the American Revolution. In the current
situation, we are faced not only with the ongoing challenges of
narcotics and alien smuggling, but the clandestine importation of
weapons of mass destruction, and the potential conversion of hazardous
cargo and large seagoing vessels into weapons themselves. Methods used
to smuggle aliens can easily be used to smuggle those trained for, and
intent on, hostile terrorist action against the citizens of this
country. Now that this threat has made its presence known, we expect it
to continue for the foreseeable future.
The Charleston County Sheriff's Office supports ongoing security
operations by the United States Customs Service, as well as the United
States Coast Guard in Charleston Harbor. We further support port and
Customs operations with an explosives-sniffing canine. The current
level of security is taxing personnel and machinery to their limits on
all fronts. In addition to the bulk cargo entering the Charleston Area,
and the commercial fishing traffic, there is a constellation of
personal watercraft operating in the Coastal Waters of South Carolina.
Any of these personal watercraft can be ``weaponized'' in the manner of
the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. In the event of a high-value cargo
escort, all available local and State agencies must contribute
personnel and craft to provide adequate coverage. This is in addition
to their normal patrol duties and responsibility for the safety and
security of the boating public. There is no shortage of commitment and
professionalism, but there remains a desperate need for additional
manpower, vessels and equipment.
Weapons of mass destruction or terrorist personnel who gain entry
here can be swiftly transported via the Intracoastal Waterway along the
Eastern Seaboard from Norfolk, Virginia to Key West Florida. Rail and
road nets emanating from the Charleston area provide additional
transport options, which are already being used by those schooled in
smuggling narcotics.
Charleston itself is frequently transited by ``high-value target''
shipping, such as shipping directly supporting military operations, as
well as hazardous materials. Any one of these ships, once targeted for
sabotage or used as a weapon, could cause tremendous devastation and
loss of life in the area. There is also a substantial threat to
blockage of the harbor from a disabled or sunken vessel or sabotaged
bridge. The effects of such a disruption in commerce would ripple
across the nation.
Each of these threats provide additional challenges for local law
enforcement, and each of these threats to Charleston's maritime
operation are not limited to containerized cargo itself. Sabotage to
navigational aids, land-based intermodal facilities, bridges and access
roads has been a practice in warfare in the past, and can only be
expected to be a continued practice. The convergence of these high-
value targets in the Charleston area is of tremendous concern to those
in law enforcement.
In the furtherance of the defense of Charleston from these threats,
law enforcement is in dire need of increased personnel as well as
sufficient watercraft to provide an appropriate level of security for
high threat cargo and vessels, as well as technology to employ those
assets in the most efficient and productive manner. The transfer of
intelligence and information in rapid fashion between responsible
agencies, aided by an analysis capability is also essential to the
effective use of our assets. No single agency can accomplish this task
alone, or without the help of the maritime community and the public.
In closing, I wish to thank the Committee for consideration of this
document, and extend my appreciation for the Committee's attention to
this vital security issue.
Sincerely,
J. Al Cannon, Jr., Esq.
Sheriff.
Cc: Mr. Joe Maupin