[Senate Hearing 107-764]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-764
THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 28, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
David S. Lyles, Staff Director
Judy A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
february 28, 2002
Page
Grossman, Hon. Marc I., Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs........................................................ 15
Feith, Hon. Douglas J., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.... 25
Ralston, Gen. Joseph W., USAF, Commander in Chief, United States
European Command............................................... 30
(iii)
THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Landrieu, Reed, E. Benjamin Nelson, Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Roberts, and Sessions.
Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
Republican staff director; Edward H. Edens IV, professional
staff member; and George W. Lauffer, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Dara R. Alpert, Daniel K.
Goldsmith, Jennifer Key, Thomas C. Moore, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Jeffrey S. Wiener, assistant to
Senator Landrieu; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric
Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Brady King, assistant
to Senator Dayton; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant to Senator
Warner; Christopher J. Paul, assistant to Senator McCain;
George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert
Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders
and Charles Cogar, assistants to Senator Allard; James P.
Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway
II, assistant to Senator Sessions; and Derek Maurer, assistant
to Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets this morning to receive testimony on the future of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In just 9 months,
NATO heads of state and government will meet in Prague to make
a decision on enlargement of the Alliance and to focus on a
number of other crucial areas.
In our invitation letters to the witnesses, Senator Warner
and I asked them to comment on NATO enlargement issues; on the
role of NATO in the global fight against terrorism; the
organizational and transformational changes, if any, that NATO
needs to make; the technological and capabilities gap that has
developed between the United States and the other members and
how that gap should be addressed; the NATO-Russia relationship
and how the ``NATO at 20'' concept should be implemented; how
an enlarged NATO could function effectively as a military
organization; and any other issues that our witnesses consider
relevant to the future of NATO.
Depending on whom you talk to, NATO's glass is either half-
full or half-empty. Some on both sides of the Atlantic have
raised concerns about the future roles and missions of NATO and
NATO's relevance in the post-September 11 world. Some have even
cited NATO's invocation of Article V for the first time in its
history and the numerous offers by NATO members to participate
in the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a
factor demonstrating NATO's weakness because the United States
has not seen fit to take up most of those offers.
I am reminded of a statement by NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson upon the conclusion of the meeting of NATO's heads of
state and government in June of last year that: ``NATO's
credibility is its capability.'' He made that statement to
exhort the Alliance's European members to spend more wisely on
defense. That exhortation has not borne fruit, because Lord
Robertson said publicly last month: ``The truth is that Europe
remains a military pygmy.''
To put the issue in some context, the $48 billion annual
increase requested by President Bush for the defense budget
constitutes 150 percent of the total defense spending of the
United Kingdom or France, the next largest NATO member states'
defense budgets after the United States.
I must admit that I am from the glass is half-full camp. I
am a strong supporter of NATO, the most successful alliance in
the history of the world. NATO successfully deterred an attack
by the former Soviet Union and also, very importantly, helped
to keep the peace among the nations of Western Europe for 5
decades.
In recent years, NATO forces fired shots in anger for the
first time in its history and brought a negotiated end to the
conflict in Bosnia. NATO conducted an air war against Serbian
security forces and reversed ethnic cleansing for the first
time in history. Even though the United States carried out the
bulk of the Kosovo air campaign, I believe it was the moral
strength and cohesion of 19 sovereign nations that led to the
successful conclusion of the conflict.
At the present time, the Alliance is conducting three
peacekeeping operations in the Balkans: Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Macedonia. The Europeans are providing the bulk of the forces
for these operations and the overwhelming majority of the civil
assistance and financial support for those countries. Pursuant
to NATO's invocation of Article V in response to the horrendous
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, NATO
airborne early warning aircraft were deployed to patrol the
skies over America and NATO's standing naval forces were
deployed to the eastern Mediterranean at the United States'
request.
But the fact remains that NATO must address a number of
crucial issues no later than the November Prague summit.
Today we begin our consideration of all of these issues
with three administration witnesses. I want to welcome Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman; Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Doug Feith; and the Commander
in Chief, U.S. European Command, and NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander-Europe, General Joe Ralston. It is good to have all
three of you before us again.
Before I call on Senator Warner, I want to extend a warm
welcome to Rudolph Petan, who is the Chairman of the Committee
for Defense of the National Assembly of the Republic of
Slovenia. I am wondering, if he is in the room, whether he
would stand and be recognized.
It is nice to have you with us. We understand your
ambassador is also with you and there may be some other
ambassadors from other countries who are with us here today. I
do not know all of them. I wonder if all the ambassadors who
are here would please stand and be recognized. Nice to have you
all with us.
I wonder if you could tell us what countries you are from,
please.
Romanian Ambassador. Romania.
Slovenian Ambassador. Slovenia.
Lithuanian Ambassador. Lithuania.
Chairman Levin. Nice to have you all.
Senator Warner, let me first thank you for pressing the
urgency of this hearing. It is a very important hearing, as you
have pointed out to me, and I am delighted now to call upon
you.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
commend you on your statement. I will ask that my entire
statement be placed in the record, along with the statement of
Senator Thurmond, and I shall give portions of it now.
I begin by stating, consistent with your opening statement,
that our comments are not to be interpreted in any way other
than with the greatest respect for NATO and our constructive
concern with regard to its future. I want to make that very
clear. I have been singled out as a critic since I took a
strong stance during the last debate about NATO expansion. I
hope not to take that stance in the future and will do so only
if I believe that those steps have to be taken here in the
Senate.
I asked the chairman to schedule this hearing because I
would not desire to see the Senate faced with a fait accompli
some time late next year, and we have to just simply say a yes
or a no. This committee authorizes, and the Appropriations
Committee appropriates, enormous sums of money for NATO. I feel
that Congress should be a partner that is consulted,
particularly this year when we are going to consider the
enlargement issue.
I hope our two witnesses, Secretary Grossman and Secretary
Feith, can assure this committee, Congress, and most
particularly the Senate, given its advise and consent role with
regard to treaties and international agreements, that we will
be made a partner in the consultations and the deliberations
with regard to the expansion issues and any change with regard
to the missions of NATO.
With that in mind, I now pose several questions at the
outset. I join the chairman in asking: What is the future role
and mission of NATO in a world where threats to NATO members
are now non-state in many respects, in the form of terrorism,
through global syndicates and organizations, and other threats
that were never envisioned at the time the NATO charter was
drawn up?
The question is: Is NATO beginning to equip itself with
regard to these new threats? General, I hope you can comment on
that. You have observed, as have others in your position, the
magnificent performance of our forces, the forces of Great
Britain and other nations in the Afghan region. The special
operations teams--15, 20-member teams, highly trained to go in
and perform a mission--which the chairman and I observed in our
visit to that region in November are a perfect example.
Now, that is something that NATO should begin to envision.
No longer are we faced with one division up, one division in
reserve. That type of warfare is most unlikely. I am not saying
that it should be totally eliminated from your operational
plans, but it is most unlikely. This type of operation
capability that we have witnessed in Afghanistan would be
needed by NATO if it were to be engaged to repel these global
threats of terrorism.
The chairman referred to the technological gap. It is
growing and it is of great concern. You quoted Secretary
General Robertson. I would like to give a little larger quote.
We know Lord Robertson very well. The chairman, members of this
committee, and I have met with him regularly when he was the
Defense Minister for the United Kingdom. He has done a
brilliant job, I think, in his role as Secretary General. Let
me quote him: ``The United States must have partners who can
contribute their fair share to operations which benefit the
entire European Atlantic community. But the reality is . . .
hardly any European country can deploy usable and effective
forces in significant numbers outside their borders and sustain
them for months or even years, as we all need to do today. For
all Europe's rhetoric and annual investment of over $140
billion by NATO's European members, we still need U.S. help to
move, command, and provision a major operation. American
critics of Europe's military incapability are right. So, if we
are to ensure that the United States moves neither towards
unilateralism nor isolationism, all European countries must
show a new willingness to develop effective crisis management
capabilities.''
I know of no initiative here in the Senate towards any
unilateralism or isolationism. I do not know how he selected
those rather strong words. But we have an obligation to our
taxpayers in the country who are contributing significant sums,
and to the men and women in uniform who are posted to the NATO
commands, to make sure that this remains a viable organization
and is worthy of our contributions.
History reflects the importance of the U.S. presence on the
European continent. There may be old jealousies and
animosities, but we have, as a Nation, kept a steady hand to
reconcile differences between those countries that go back for
generations. I think they recognize that and that we wish to
remain a partner--not a big brother, a partner--in this
operation.
Now, as to the potential future enlargement, we welcome the
ambassadors and others who will be following the proceedings in
the Senate. I fully appreciate and respect the desire of your
nations to be assessed as fairly and objectively as possible as
this question of enlargement comes up.
I think we have to step back and say, is it really time to
move forward with any significant enlargement when internally
we recognize certain problems, from equipment to missions?
Would it not be better just to let this round pass by, take our
house and put it in order, and then begin to look to the future
for such enlargement as we feel is necessary?
My concerns with NATO expansion have not changed
substantially since the full Senate last debated the issue in
1998 because, if anything, the problems revealed by the Kosovo
operation in 1999 have increased my apprehension about the
future rounds. I start from the basic premise that NATO is
first and foremost a military alliance. That is why NATO was
founded. That is why it continues today. Nations should be
invited to join NATO only if there is a compelling military,
not political, rationale for additional members and only if
those additional members will make a positive military
contribution to the Alliance.
In my view that case has yet to be made for the nine
nations currently seeking consideration. We must always keep in
mind that any country joining NATO will be extended the
protection of Article V of the NATO charter, which states: ``An
armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all.'' That
article was proudly invoked for the first time following the
attacks on the United States on September 11.
This security guarantee is the most solemn commitment any
nation can make. Are the people willing to risk U.S. military
troops and expend significant taxpayer dollars to defend the
nine additional nations seeking NATO membership pursuant to
Article V? That is the fundamental question.
If NATO expands beyond its current 19 members, some fear--
and I share that fear--that the Alliance will become
increasingly inefficient and indecisive, a mini-United Nations
for Europe, but a United Nations without a strong military
capability. We saw the Kosovo operation. We saw how 19 members
worked on those issues. You add 9, you get to 28. Does that
make the Alliance an almost unmanageable command challenge from
a military perspective?
I say this only because of my sincere respect for the tens
of thousands of men and women who have proudly served in NATO
and the very large commitments of funds from their respective
nations. General Ralston, what number commander are you in the
history of NATO?
General Ralston. Thirteenth.
Senator Warner. Thirteenth commander.
Senator Lieberman. Lucky 13.
Senator Warner. In the annals of military history of the
western world, there are times when there is a great regiment
or a great division and when that nation can no longer support
that regiment or division, rather than let it atrophy or change
in some way, they proudly, as we say in the military, retire
the colors. Maybe we should consider proudly retiring the
colors of NATO and start over again and figure out what it is
we need by way of an organization and such military
capabilities to meet the future threats, and therefore preserve
the integrity and the traditions of this organization which so
many have given their lives and their careers to make it what
it is. I think that is something that fundamentally we ought to
take a look at.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statements of Senator Warner and Senator
Thurmond follow:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for scheduling this important hearing on
the future of the NATO Alliance and the military implications of
further NATO expansion. As I said in my January 3 letter to you
recommending early hearings on NATO expansion, this is an important
issue that deserves serious and thorough review by the Senate. Today,
we begin the committee's consideration of this critical issue.
The broad issue before us this morning is the future of NATO--in my
view, the most valuable security alliance in the history of the United
States, if not the world. In light of the events of the past several
years, and particularly events since September 11, NATO is now
confronted with some fundamental questions about its future:
What is the future role and mission of NATO in a world
where threats to NATO members are now primarily non-state
global threats, such as global terrorist organizations?
Is NATO equipping to meet the asymmetric threat?
Will NATO be able to operate as an effective military
alliance if NATO's European members continue not to make the
critical investments in defense that the United States is
making?
Are the other 18 nations in NATO concerned with the
technological gap between the United States and their nations
and do they plan to address this problem?
Is bigger better--what are the compelling reasons to
expand?
Let me quote from NATO Secretary General Robertson's recent speech
on NATO's future at the recent Wehrkunde Conference in Munich:
``The United States must have partners who can contribute their
fair share to operations which benefit the entire Euro-Atlantic
community. . . But the reality is . . . hardly any European
country can deploy useable and effective forces in significant
numbers outside their borders, and sustain them for months or
even years as we all need to do today. For all Europe's
rhetoric, and annual investment of over $140 billion by NATO's
European members, we still need U.S. help to move, command and
provision a major operation. American critics of Europe's
military incapability are right. So, if we are to ensure that
the United States moves neither towards unilateralism nor
isolationism, all European countries must show a new
willingness to develop effective crisis management
capabilities.''
Against this backdrop of questions on NATO's future is the issue of
the further enlargement of NATO--which will be a main focus of the
Prague Summit in November. Currently nine nations are under
consideration for NATO membership. My question is this: should we be
considering dramatically expanding what is fundamentally a military
alliance at the same time we are trying to define NATO's future mission
and address critical shortfalls in current NATO member military
capabilities and spending? Should NATO not get its own house in order
before considering further expansion?
My concerns with NATO expansion have not changed substantially
since the full Senate last debated this issue in 1998. If anything, the
problems revealed by the Kosovo operation in 1999 have increased my
apprehension about future rounds of NATO enlargement.
I start from the basic premise that NATO is first and foremost a
military alliance. That is why NATO was founded; that is why it
continues today. Nations should be invited to join NATO only if there
is a compelling military rationale for additional members, and only if
those additional members will make a positive military contribution to
the Alliance. In my view, that case has yet to be made for the nine
nations currently seeking NATO membership.
We must always keep in mind that any country joining NATO will be
extended the protection of Article V of the NATO charter which states,
``An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all.'' That article
was invoked for the first time following the attacks on the United
States on September 11.
This security guarantee is the most solemn commitment any nation
can make. Are the American people willing to risk U.S. military troops
and expend taxpayers' dollars to defend the nine additional nations
seeking NATO membership? This will be a hard sell, given the declining
defense budgets of our current NATO allies and the meager military
contributions that could be made by the nine aspirant countries.
If NATO expands beyond its current 19 members, some fear that the
Alliance may become increasingly inefficient and indecisive--a mini-
United Nations for Europe. We witnessed some of the problems involved
in operating by consensus during the Kosovo air operation. So the
question is, will the addition of up to nine new member states--for a
total of 28 nations--make that problem potentially unmanageable from a
military perspective?
NATO is an alliance that has worked well for over 50 years, beyond
the expectations of its founding fathers. Before we make a decision to
enlarge the Alliance further, we need to carefully review and study all
possible ramifications of expansion. We begin that process today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
______
Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our distinguished panel. I
especially want to welcome General Ralston, who has appeared before
this committee numerous times and has always provided incisive and
beneficial testimony.
As the United States focuses on the events of September 11 and its
role in the 21st century, so must NATO refocus its role. This fall,
NATO will hold a summit in Prague that in my judgment will redefine the
Alliance's 21st century role and mission in post-Cold War conflicts. In
my judgement, a significant objective of the conference must be the
restructuring of Europe's military capabilities that have fallen behind
ours. Secretary General Lord Robertson stated in a recent article: ``I
want Europe to share the military burden, because it is in our
interests for Europe to play a stronger role in the trans-Atlantic
partnership, and take on more defense and security responsibilities. My
aim is for the European countries, in NATO and the [European Union], to
have a military capacity that better reflects their political and
economic might.''
Mr. Chairman, I applaud the Secretary General's comments and hope
our European allies will heed his words.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the panel's testimony and a
continued strong NATO.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, thank you for your very
important and heartfelt statement.
While we are considering the expansion of NATO, I notice
that our witness table is shrinking.
Before I call on our witnesses, let me see if any of our
colleagues would like to give an opening statement.
Senator Lieberman.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. I
do have a statement which I would ask be included in the
record. I thank you for holding the hearing. I thank our
witnesses, and I thank Senator Warner for his thoughtful
statement. I know that in some sense his concern about the
Freedom Consolidation Act of 2001, a bill of which I am a co-
sponsor, has engendered this hearing, and that is appropriate
and constructive.
I certainly agree with him that as the administration makes
these momentous decisions, Congress and the Senate particularly
should be fully involved, not afterward, but as policy is being
formulated.
I, as my sponsorship of this bill indicates, have a
different point of view here, with all respect. If I may try to
briefly state it historically, NATO is the greatest military
Alliance in the history of the world, created after the Second
World War, for the central purpose of defending Western Europe
and the values of freedom that we share with our European
allies from Soviet threat, from at the worst Soviet invasion.
I think NATO also always had another purpose, which was to
be a unifier of Europe and the U.S., and particularly Europe
post-war, to create a structure in which the nations of Europe
who had fought one another would build a community together. Of
course, it has done that magnificently.
But we have come a long way. We obviously won an
extraordinary victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War. I
know that there are some ways in which history tells us that
when the reasons that motivated the creation of an alliance no
longer exist that the alliance withers. While we were
victorious in the Cold War, it seems to me that the purpose of
sustaining European unity within itself, now on a broader
scale, as the Berlin Wall falls and the movement of freedom,
our values, spread to the East across Europe, that remains a
very strong purpose.
Also, the Alliance takes on broader regional and global
responsibilities for security and in doing so is a tremendous
asset to the United States, as the sole superpower in the
world. In some ways my own feeling is that NATO has evolved
since the Berlin Wall collapsed, and it has evolved in its
mission. Its history has drawn it to go to places where its
founders never could have imagined it would have gone, all in
pursuit--and this is my most important point, to me anyway--of
the values that motivated the creation of NATO in the first
place, which are the protection, advancement, and spread of
freedom.
On the military part, I want to trace developments here.
For years, physical defense of member nations' home soil as
defined in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty has been at
the core of our Alliance. That mission changed in the 1990s
with Bosnia and then Kosovo, as NATO applied appropriate force
outside, although just outside, its immediate borders for the
common good of stability in Europe and to advance ideals,
certainly anti-genocidal ideals, that emerged naturally from
the Second World War.
Now we have taken an additional turn in response to the
horrific attacks on the U.S. of last September 11, where NATO
invoked Article V for the first time in its history, responding
to attacks on our soil by supporting a war against an enemy
half a world away from the United States--hard for the founders
of NATO to have conceived of.
But I think this evolution in our Alliance is both
realistic and healthy and very much in advancement of the
values that NATO was founded on. Technology has obviously
collapsed geographical distinctions to the point that today a
plot conceived anywhere in the world can pose just as serious a
threat to NATO's members' security as an aggressive military
movement by a nearby neighbor nation.
I think NATO has to accept that new reality, has accepted
that new reality, and has to embrace a more expansive
geographical understanding of its mission. That is why I am a
co-sponsor of the Freedom Consolidation Act. I believe NATO
membership should be open to a large number of nations. If it
is, NATO can become an even more potent protector of trans-
Atlantic and global security from threats that include
terrorism.
It can be a better facilitator of regional conflict
resolution and a more influential incubator of democracy.
Expanding NATO to countries that are mentioned in the act that
I referred to--Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Bulgaria, and Romania--is a way to secure for as far as we can
see forward the historic victory of American ideals that we won
in the Cold War.
Do we accept responsibilities thereby? Yes, we do. But I
think that they are worth accepting. I believe that any
democratic European--and I stress--any democratic European
nation that meets NATO's criteria and can be a net contributor
to the security of the United States and of the Alliance as a
whole should be admitted to NATO, hopefully this November at
the meeting in Prague.
I look forward to hearing how the administration is
assessing the candidates. I look forward to working with the
administration on this, and I am anxious to hear today how the
administration intends to involve the Senate and the House in
these deliberations approaching the Prague summit.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to say
that.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
I welcome Under Secretary of State Grossman, Under Secretary of
Defense Feith, and NATO Supreme Commander General Ralston, and thank
them for their service to our Nation.
Our subject is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--an alliance
of free, democratic nations--unique in human history for its
characteristics and its success. Today, the Alliance's principled
strength not only protects the peace and freedom of the transatlantic
community, but contributes to building a world that is ever more free,
more democratic, and more prosperous. Partner states are learning from
NATO and striving to emulate the Alliance's standards of military
professionalism, transparent civilian control of military power and
resources, and the legal and civil foundations of popular legitimacy.
NATO is a set of indispensable tools for the security of member
states. Through its history, the Alliance has undergone stresses and
strains. Like a marriage, a political and military alliance among free
nations requires work and compromise. The United States and its allies
have overcome earlier differences, but we confront new strains today:
an alleged ``divergence of values''; budgetary decisions between costly
defense transformation and the demands of diverse and aging societies;
and the need to conceive of defense differently in light of terrorists'
previously inconceivable brutality. Our changing relations with former
adversaries and the violent acts of new antagonists put the
transatlantic Alliance at a crossroads with regard to strategy and
mission, capabilities and the will to use them. We and our allies can
thrash out our differences over these matters as we have in the past,
as an alliance of partners. We cannot succeed if our manner of
communication deteriorates to that of a superpower and its satellites.
I look forward to being reassured by our witnesses that we will avoid
that fate. Apart from the quality of our interaction within NATO, we
have important policy issues on which I would like to comment briefly.
Like the United States on a bilateral basis, the NATO Alliance is
engaged in a crucial partnership with the Russian Federation. We cannot
contain the proliferation of missile technology or prevent transfers of
plutonium or chemical or biological weapons agents to potential
terrorists or aggressors without Russian cooperation at many levels.
Russia can help in combating terrorism in much of Central Asia and
beyond. Russia's peacekeeping assets and experience complement the
Alliance in multilateral missions along the periphery of NATO's area of
responsibility. I trust our witnesses today will lay out the thinking
in the administration and at Alliance headquarters on how the proposed
NATO-Russia Council and other NATO mechanisms involving Russia might be
used in the coming years.
For years, physical defense of member nations' home soil, as
defined under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, has been the core
of our Alliance. That mission changed with Bosnia and then Kosovo, as
NATO applied appropriate force just outside its immediate borders for
the common good of stability in Europe.
The awful events of September 11 prompted further evolution, as
NATO invoked Article V, responding to the attacks on American soil by
supporting a war against an enemy half a world away from the United
States. This evolution in Alliance thinking is realistic and healthy.
Technology has collapsed geographical distinctions to the point that
today, a plot conceived in North Africa, South America or Southeast
Asia can pose just as serious a threat to NATO members' security as an
aggressive military movement by a nearby nation. I believe NATO must
accept this new reality and embrace a more expansive geographical
understanding of its mission.
Moreover, Alliance members must close the growing gap in armed
forces capabilities between the United States and our European NATO
partners. As we know from our experience in Kosovo, the gap isn't just
lingering, it is widening. Allowing it to persist threatens Europe's
security, puts a disproportionate burden on the United States, and
creates an awkward imbalance in the Alliance. America's military is the
best in the world for a simple reason: we spend a lot to train our
forces and to buy the sophisticated weapons systems they employ in
combat. The administration's proposed level for military spending for
fiscal year 2003 exemplifies our ongoing commitment to defense. I look
forward to hearing from Secretary Feith and General Ralston about how
plans for spending and transformation of U.S. capabilities relate to
our role in NATO. But my strongest message is for our allies: It's time
for all NATO nations to overcome internal political resistance and make
a priority of upgrading and transforming their capabilities.
I hope we will hear in detail today how the administration is
persuading our allies to invest much more in capabilities geared toward
likely future missions and interoperability. But political will and
commitment drive capabilities. Frankly, we must also ask: Do our allies
agree with us on the nature of the threats we face and on what missions
are likely? Is the Alliance united on the use of collective military
force to combat instability in the broadest transatlantic region,
instability arising from terrorism or regional aggression?
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I note that today's hearing responds to the
request of Senator Warner to examine the Freedom Consolidation Act of
2001, a bill I co-sponsor, and the larger question of U.S. policy
toward admitting new members to the Alliance. I believe NATO membership
should be open to a large number of nations. If it is, NATO can become
an even more potent protector of transatlantic and global security from
threats including terrorism, a better facilitator of regional conflict
resolution, and a more influential incubator of democracy. Any
democratic European nation that meets NATO's criteria and can be a net
contributor to the security of the United States and of the Alliance as
a whole should be admitted. I support welcoming into NATO at the Prague
summit as many candidate nations as meet these criteria. Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania have made
impressive progress in that direction. I look forward to hearing how
the administration is assessing the candidates and working with them to
improve their democratic institutions and military capabilities. I hope
we will also hear today how the administration is working with allies
to achieve a consensus on enlargement before the Prague summit.
Finally, I am interested in how Croatia and other Partnership for Peace
member countries may advance their relationships with the Alliance.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Did Senator Warner want to be recognized?
Senator Warner. Our colleague stated quite accurately that
I did block the passage by the Senate of the Freedom
Consolidation Act of 2001, and I did so not because of specific
objections to the proposed legislation, but the procedural
manner in which it was being handled. Namely, it was the last
day of the session, there were not more than two or three
Senators on the floor, and therefore it should not have been
acted upon by the United States Senate on what we call the
unanimous consent calendar, where we just accept it without any
debate, without any hearings.
I think this is deserving of very careful consideration by
the entire Senate. Perhaps this hearing will suffice, but if
not additional hearings should be ordered so that we can
consider it, and then have some presentation and debate on the
floor of the Senate before we adopt it.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Warner. I absolutely
agree, and I think this is very constructive.
Chairman Levin. We will continue on our early bird venture.
Senator Roberts.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS
Senator Roberts. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In 1999 when I approached the issue of NATO enlargement, I
said: ``I am concerned that the organization is now at a fork
in the road. One path leads to continued relevancy and
continued success, the other leads to disunity and a loss of
direction and also relevance.''
Today I share the Senator from Virginia's concern. I am
even more concerned with the future of NATO. It was created, as
has been said and will be said by virtually everyone, as a
defensive alliance and remained so through the end of the Cold
War. But because of a myriad of reasons, the military
capability gap, which does exist, current and emerging
worldwide threats, lack of a direct threat to the continuing
viability of Europe, the emergence of the European Union (EU)
and its military capability or the lack of it, the very growth
of NATO membership, I question whether NATO is or can remain
purely a defensive alliance.
There is going to be a great deal of pressure to continue
to think of NATO for what it was during the last 50 years--I
have that prejudice--a defensive Alliance of like-minded
nations focused on a common threat. No matter how loudly we
proclaim that NATO remains what it was and its formula for past
success guarantees continued success, it seems to me we must
face the fact that NATO has changed and will continue to
change.
Now, how the transformed NATO fits into our notion of vital
national interest must be explored and examined--that is why we
are having this hearing. Certainly what has not changed is that
the United States must remain linked to our allies in Europe.
That is not the question or the issue. If NATO is no longer
primarily a defensive Alliance, then I would challenge any
Senator to take a look at the strategic concept adopted two
springs ago, at the 50-year anniversary of NATO, and read the
obligations of what we now have in that strategic concept. I
question seriously whether many Senators have read that and
know of our obligations in regards to this organization.
Will it remain viable and will it remain relevant? That is
the question, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for holding the
hearing.
I do want to say one other thing. Senator Dick Lugar has to
be one of the strongest supporters of NATO that I know of in
Congress. When he speaks people listen. He is a recognized
expert and observer in regards to foreign policy. He recently,
on the 19th of January, delivered a very hard-hitting speech to
NATO in Brussels, and he said: ``If NATO does not help tackle
the most pressing security threat to our countries today, a
threat I believe is existential because it involves the threat
of weapons of mass destruction, it will cease to be the premier
Alliance it has been and will become increasingly marginal. As
important as they are, neither NATO enlargement nor NATO-Russia
cooperation is the most critical issue facing our Nation today.
That issue is the war on terrorism. NATO has to decide whether
it wants to participate in this war. It has to decide whether
it wants to be relevant in addressing the major security
challenge of our day.''
That is a pretty strong warning, strong words from one of
the Senate's most pro-NATO Senators. I think it is food for
thought. I look forward to the questions and I thank the
witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
welcome Secretary Grossman, Secretary Feith, and particularly
welcome General Ralston, who is a great leader of our forces in
Europe. Thank you, Joe, for being here.
I was particularly struck by Senator Warner's questions
which are fundamental to the consideration of all of these
issues. Although some on the panel have reached a conclusion
one way or the other, I think for many the issue is still
subject to debate and questioning. But those questions,
Senator, are profound and very important.
NATO was created, as we all know, as both a military and a
political alliance, predominantly a military alliance in its
first several decades, I think, particularly focused on, as
Senator Roberts said, the defense of Europe. It was a defense
from a foreign threat, if you will, or at least an external
threat, the Soviet Union, and also from internal disputes,
which had cast Europe into two major world wars.
All of that has changed fundamentally in the last several
years. Indeed, it is appropriate at this crossroads that we
talk about the new mission of NATO and a new vision for NATO. I
think we have to approach it with a recognition of the changes
and also with the questions that Senator Warner alluded to
about its character today: Is it primarily a military alliance,
or has it become a political alliance? Is it a way in which we
can expand the values of the United States, or is it something
that is more of an operational military arrangement?
These are the issues I think we will confront over the next
several months as we consider the issue of expansion. There is
no avoiding, one, the issue, nor, two, the reality that an
alliance of some form, be it political more than military or
military more than political, is in the best interests of the
United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me inquire of
the chair, we are doing opening statements now and then what
are we going to have in the way of rounds?
Chairman Levin. Depending on how long their statements are,
I hope the first round would be perhaps 8 minutes long.
Senator Inhofe. I would like to make a brief opening
statement. General Ralston, I have had a chance to be over
there where we are training, visiting the hospital at Lansduhl,
talking to these kids when they are coming back. Without
exception, they all said--they have this spirit of patriotism
and this drive--that they all want to get back to their units,
they all want to make a career. So you have done a wonderful
job over there in instilling this in them.
I particularly remember a young lady whose name was Stennis
and she was on the U.S.S. Stennis by coincidence. She had an
accident in a refueling operation. You are familiar with this.
She ended up going overboard and crushing her lungs, and yet
she was anxious to get back.
I see all this as it relates to NATO. I say the same thing
to Secretary Feith. You and I were in the Fletcher conference
as participants together, and I remember you said NATO would be
one of your great challenges. I would hope that during your
opening statements, during this meeting, that we can talk about
what effect the expansion of NATO is going to have on our tempo
of operations (OPTEMPO).
I listened to Senator Lieberman and I greatly respect him,
but I disagree with the statement that they can be a net
contributor to the security of the United States. I am not sure
that they have the capability of doing that militarily and
politically.
We were divided on our participation in both Bosnia and
then in the Balkans, and I think it was because of NATO. That
was the argument that was used to get us in there. My concern
was at that time we were down to about one-half the force
strength that we had been during the end of the Persian Gulf
War, and can we really expect to maintain that OPTEMPO? I am
not sure just how many Guard and Reserve we have over there
right now, but they cannot sustain that level. We all know
that.
The budget was deficient in two areas, military
construction and force structure. So I am concerned about how
our participation in the expansion of NATO will affect our
capability to meet our own strategy, and that is to defend
America.
Those are the concerns I have shared with you privately
before, and I hope we get a chance to address them in this
hearing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Ralston, it is a pleasure to have you here on this
side of the water this week. Last week we spent time on your
side in Brussels. I appreciate very much the information that
you were able to provide to us as we spoke that time about NATO
and the future of NATO.
Of course, Secretary Feith, I welcome you back, and
Secretary Grossman. I am very interested in your comments, your
thoughts about the future of NATO, and particularly as to the
future relationships in the world. We are talking about
membership in effect, but at the same time it is clear we are
talking about mission, and we are talking about capacity,
contribution of members. We may have to redefine
``contribution'' in terms of ability of allies to be able to
fight the kind of war that we just finished fighting in
Afghanistan.
With the technology that we are facing and the
transformation of the military as we move forward, it seems
clear to me based on what I have learned and continue to see,
that our technology and our ability in the United States
perhaps supersedes the ability of others to have that kind of
technology. Whether it is precision bombs or whatever it may
be, we seem to lead that way.
My concern about NATO and expanding it is a little similar
to what I heard Senator Warner say. That is that expanding it
may mean bringing individuals in, and perhaps it is on the
basis of having allies, having friends, being supportive of
democracy, and moving forward in that direction. But is that
the same direction that we want to go for mutual defense, or
would we be expanding the obligation of the United States to
include others if we are going to have the preeminent role in
providing the technology, particularly as it relates to the
percent of our budget, the GDP, that we are investing in
defense spending, on a comparative basis to our friends and our
allies in other parts of the world?
Contributions can come in all flavors. Clearly, passing the
plate to expand the capacity of technology and the cost of
technology from some of those who may not be in a position to
do much technology on their own and would like to support the
United States in the effort that we have for technology. I am
not recommending that. I am suggesting that there may be all
kinds of ways to define contribution and the relationship.
Before we make a decision about expanding any kind of
membership, I think we in fact do have to have an idea of what
the mission is and what the expectation is of all the members
to the mission. Lest it be said that we are being unilateral, I
think it is important for us to ask as part of the obligation
that we have, are we expanding our role disproportionately to
the process by expanding the number of members in the
organization?
Does it become a mini-United Nations? Should it become like
that? I am not suggesting for a minute that we ignore it or we
scrap it, but I do think that we have to have it well-defined
before we decide whether we add other members.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Sessions.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Chairman Levin.
I am really proud of the nations that desire to join NATO.
It is a thrill to see these countries with whom not long ago we
had hostile relationships, who were nothing like a democracy,
totalitarian and oppressing their people in so many different
ways. So it is a positive event in the world that we have an
opportunity to discuss whether or not NATO should include them.
I share some of the concerns that have been raised about
the broadening of the mission of NATO. Exactly what does it
stand for? What does it mean? We are talking about immigration,
ethnic cleansing, crime, economic issues. Are those now going
to be part of the treaty? I am concerned about that. Others
have expressed that better than I.
My comments at this point would be: This is a good
development; whatever we do, we need to affirm our commitment
to seeing these nine nations and others develop economically
and politically, develop their security, and enhance their
personal quality of life in those countries, which in the long
run will advance our national interest.
One of my specific concerns, however, is that as the group
gets larger I will want to inquire of you what the power of one
nation is. What power does that nation have to block an
otherwise unanimous vote or unanimous agreement? I remember
distinctly during the Kosovo war that we had to have nations
vote on targets of our United States Air Force as we carried
that through, and I remember the commander of that air campaign
testified with some emotion in this committee that had they
been allowed to be more aggressive as he recommended from the
beginning, the war would have ended much sooner, with much less
loss of life.
This unanimous agreement caused us to be less effective in
ending the war promptly and it exacerbated the loss of life.
That is one of my concerns.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Landrieu.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. I will be brief.
Let me say from the opening that I am supportive of the
expansion of NATO and think it is a most positive development
that our Alliance that has served this country and this world
so well would want to expand. I do acknowledge, though, along
the lines of what Senator Roberts said and according to Senator
Lugar's statement, that the threat has fundamentally changed.
Therefore, the purpose of the Alliance needs to also change and
to be brought into more focus for the challenges today.
I think the threat of terrorism is something that, while
the United States can fight unilaterally, we would be much more
effective fighting within the structure of an Alliance. Just
because the threat has changed, which is obvious, the need for
alliances I think is greater today than at almost any time, and
I mean that.
Second, I also think the expansion should be focused on
providing strategic strength to the Alliance. Looking to the
south in terms of the strategic expansion, as you can see from
the map, would be something that we need to keep in focus.
Finally, what Senator Nelson mentioned I think is
important, and that is the capability gap between the members.
Those are some of the things that I am interested in.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Landrieu.
Now our witnesses. Secretary Grossman.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARC I. GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
Mr. Grossman. Senator Levin, Senator Warner, other members
of the committee: First of all, let me say what an honor and a
privilege it is for me to be here. I know I speak on behalf of
my colleagues that we are very glad to have this conversation,
to have this consultation, to have this hearing about where
NATO is headed, what we want for NATO, and, as Senator Warner
said, how to make sure that the Senate of the United States is
a partner in trying to figure this out with us.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission I also have a statement
for the record. I would like to use part of it and, with the
permission of General Ralston and Under Secretary Feith, if I
might give a broad overview of where we stand. Then, of course,
they would each make a statement, and we would be very glad to
answer any questions anybody might have.
Chairman Levin. All the statements will be made part of the
record in their entirety.
Mr. Grossman. Thank you, sir.
Before I do anything else, though, I want to make sure that
I thank you and so many other Members of the Senate for what
you have done, are doing, and I know will do to continue to
support NATO, as many of you have said, the greatest alliance
in history. Senator Warner, that very much includes
constructive criticism. They get it from us, they get it from
you.
I have had the good fortune to take advice and consent from
all of you over the years and I believe we always made better
decisions because of it.
When I remember--and Senator Roberts and Senator Warner
talked about it--to the debate in 1998 and 1999, I recall the
importance of Senator Kyl's amendment. I recall the work that
many Senators did in this committee and in other committees,
including Senator Helms, Senator Biden, and, as Senator Roberts
said, Senator Lugar. For my part, Senator Warner and Mr.
Chairman, I can tell you that we will be in closest possible
consultation with the Senate, not when this is all over, but as
much as possible in advance.
Mr. Chairman, you said in your invitation letter that we
come to you at a time when people on both sides of the Atlantic
are asking questions about the future of NATO. Some people run
away from this debate. I welcome this debate. I think NATO
governments, our Senates, our Houses, our Parliaments, our
people, ought to be talking about the future of NATO. That is
what a democratic military, political, and security policy is
all about.
We all know the future of NATO has been debated before, and
we have always come back to the fundamentals: values matter, as
Senator Lieberman said; collective defense matters;
capabilities matter; the trans-Atlantic relationship matters;
and because NATO has always adapted to the challenges that have
been before it, I believe NATO matters.
Before I try to answer some of the questions, Mr. Chairman,
in your invitation letter, I ask you to consider three
quotations. First quotation: Winston Churchill, Fulton,
Missouri, March 5, 1946: ``From Stettin in the Baltic to
Trieste on the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across
the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the
ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe: Warsaw, Berlin,
Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia.''
The second quotation: Vaclav Havel in Prague July 1, 1991:
``Prague, once the victim of the Warsaw Pact, has become the
city where the Warsaw Pact met its end as an instrument of the
Cold War.''
Third: President George Bush, Warsaw, June 15, 2001: ``All
of Europe's democracies from the Baltics to the Black Sea and
all that lie in between should have the same chance for
security and freedom and the same chance to join the
institutions of Europe as Europe's old democracies have.''
I think we have come a long way and, like Senator Sessions,
I believe these are positive developments.
Let me state clearly, as you have all said, that the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization remains a fundamental pillar of
America's foreign and defense policy. As President Bush's
speech in Prague shows, we want NATO to succeed. I believe that
this Alliance should be an even more effective tool in our
world after the 11th of September, and I have come to the
conclusion that NATO is more important after the 11th of
September and not less important.
The attacks of September 11 and NATO's rapid and steadfast
response prove NATO's continuing value. As many Senators have
said, invoking Article V for the first time in NATO's history
sent a clear message that the Alliance is united and determined
to defeat terrorism.
We greatly value NATO's collective response as well as the
contribution of individual allies to Operation Enduring
Freedom, to the International Security Assistance Force in
Kabul, and, as the chairman said, NATO Airborne Warning and
Control Systems (AWACS) have logged over 2,600 hours patrolling
the skies over American cities. As he also pointed out, NATO's
ships patrol the eastern Mediterranean and all NATO allies have
provided blanket overflight rights, access to ports and bases,
refueling assistance, and stepped-up intelligence efforts.
Fifty years of cooperation through NATO made natural the
participation of allied and partner forces in these operations.
General Ralston and also Under Secretary Feith will take you
through more detail of that.
I come back to my conclusion that September 11 has brought
home to all of us the new threats and the challenges that we
face. That is why when NATO foreign ministers met together in
Brussels last December they agreed to intensify common efforts
to meet new threats, first from terrorism and second from
weapons of mass destruction. When President Bush meets with
allied leaders in Prague, we expect that allies will be ready
to approve a program of action to enhance NATO's ability to
deal with these and other threats.
I am confident that NATO will respond to these challenges
because NATO has adapted successfully in its history. As the
chairman pointed out, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has
been key to the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. A round of
enlargement began to erase the line that Stalin had drawn
across Europe. NATO acted to end the war in Bosnia, NATO
responded to end murder in Kosovo, and NATO has built new
partnerships with countries interested in NATO membership in
the Euro-Atlantic area.
In your statements, you talked about the future of NATO and
what was foreseen in the future. I want to try a quotation out
on you. Speaking in 1950 following a NATO meeting in Brussels,
Dean Acheson said this: ``The attitude we take is that we and
our allies are moving ahead with courage and with determination
to build our common strength. We regard dangers as common
dangers, and we believe they can and must be met with common
strength. We are taking the policy that we are going forward
with vigor and determination and with courage and we reject any
policy of sitting quivering in a storm cellar waiting for
others to decide what fate they may prepare for us.''
Although he might have been talking about a different
threat at that time, I believe that is tremendous foresight for
the United States as we face issues of terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction.
The 11th of September made clear that the world is far from
safe and secure. Czech President Havel, if I could quote him
again, who will host the Prague summit in November, said that
September 11 alerted us to the evil existing in this world. I
would say from our perspective, we still reject the policy of
quivering in a storm cellar.
I agree with Senator Landrieu that in this world allies are
indispensable if we are to defeat new threats posed by
terrorists and hostile states seeking weapons of mass
destruction.
I think we should be honest about this: NATO faces many
challenges. I guess I would put myself in the glass half full
or even a little bit more than half full camp. We can meet
these challenges. I think the Prague summit will mark a crucial
step in our effort to shape this Alliance for a new century.
There are three themes that we would like to present to
you: first, we ought to ensure that NATO has the new
capabilities needed to meet today's threats; second, we ought
to extend NATO's membership to more of Europe's new
democracies; and third, we ought to intensify NATO's
relationship with Russia, with Ukraine, and with other
partners. New capabilities, new members, new relationships.
Let me start first with new capabilities, because clearly
from your comments and from our beliefs that is where we have
to start. If the Prague summit is only a summit about expansion
or only a summit about new partnerships, we do not believe it
will be a success. It has to also be a summit about new
capabilities, because the required effort to improve NATO's
capabilities to meet 21st century threats is key to our ability
to go forward.
Senator Roberts talked a little bit about the NATO
strategic concept. I think this goes back to a great deal of
foresight by people who worked on the strategic concept both,
sir, in 1991 and in 1999. The strategic concept in 1991 said
that ``Alliance security interests can be affected by other
risks of a wider nature, including the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources,
and acts of terrorism.''
The 1999 strategic concept reiterated this recognition and,
I think, took a step forward by saying that ``There are new
risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability that become clear:
oppression, ethnic conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and the global spread of weapons technology and
terrorism.''
The growing capabilities gap between the United States and
Europe is the single most serious long-term problem facing
NATO. I know that General Ralston and Under Secretary Feith
will address this issue. You both quoted Secretary General
Robertson, and we want to support the efforts that he is making
to improve NATO's capabilities. I can assure you that from our
perspective this will be a centerpiece of the Prague summit.
Let me talk for a moment, if I could, about new members. As
I said, our second goal for Prague is to continue the process
of building a united Euro-Atlantic community by extending
membership to those democratic European countries who have
demonstrated their ability to defend the principles of
democracy, individual liberty, rule of law, and are ready to
make a military contribution.
As President Bush observed last year in Warsaw: ``Yalta did
not ratify a natural divide. It divided a living
civilization.'' This process of enlargement to Europe's new
democracies, launched in 1997, in my view has begun to fulfil
its promise and has brought us closer to the vision of NATO's
founders for a free and united Europe.
But I believe our work is not yet done. In his first
meeting with the allies last June, President Bush secured a
consensus to take concrete historic decisions at Prague to
advance enlargement. He made clear to allies and aspirants his
belief that NATO should not calculate how little we can get
away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of
freedom.
Since President Bush spoke, we have been working closely
with allies and the nine current aspirant countries to
strengthen their military preparations and their societies, so
that these aspirants who will be asked to join NATO will add to
NATO's strength and its vitality. In fact, today an inter-
agency team led by Ambassador Burns is finishing a consultation
in each one of these countries, where we have been very clear
with them what is to be required to meet NATO standards.
I want to repeat, Senator Warner, Senator Levin, and
others, that we look forward to close and continuing dialogue
with the members of this committee and others as we approach
these historic decisions. The Senate has great responsibility
on this question, and we want to work with you to forge a
united approach to enlargement.
Some people have asked whether since the 11th of September
enlargement should remain a priority. I think I can speak on
our behalf and the President's behalf to say that the answer to
that question is yes. The events of September 11 have
reinforced the importance of even closer cooperation and
integration between the United States and the democracies of
Europe.
As you have said in your first round of statements, you are
rightly concerned about the capabilities and contributions that
potential new allies will bring to this Alliance. All nine
aspirants know that NATO involves serious commitments and
solemn responsibilities. Many have already demonstrated this,
both in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. I would particularly
point out a statement from the Vilnius Group, the group where
these countries get together and consult, meeting in Sofia last
October, when they declared their shared intention to fully
support the war against terrorism and to act as allies of the
United States of America.
We believe that NATO enlargement is a means of achieving
NATO's core purposes and will contribute to NATO's continuing
dynamism and the core security institutions of the Euro-
Atlantic area. We look forward to the closest possible
consultation with Congress on this subject and, if the Alliance
does offer new invitations, to the debate in the Senate on that
proposition.
Third, if I could talk for just a moment about new
relationships. Our third goal in Prague is also aimed at
advancing NATO's core principles, those principles that say
that we ought to live in peace with all peoples and promoting
stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. As we work to complete the
vision of a united Europe of which Winston Churchill once
observed ``no nation should be permanently outcast,'' we should
continue to reach out and expand cooperation and integration
with all of NATO's partners.
NATO and Russia have taken steps to give new impetus and
direction to their extensive cooperation in the aftermath of
September 11. President Bush's vision is of a Russia fully
reformed, fully democratic, closely bound with the rest of
Europe, and which is able to build partnerships with European
institutions, including NATO.
At the most recent ministerial meeting in Brussels, allies
agreed to create a new NATO-Russia body separate from the North
Atlantic Council to facilitate joint decisions and actions in
areas of common concern between NATO and Russia. We have been
working intensively with allies to develop this new body, and I
report to you that we expect to have it in place by the time of
the Reykjavik NATO ministerial meeting this May.
This so-called ``At 20'' relationship will offer Russia,
not the guarantee, but the opportunity to participate in
shaping the developments of cooperative mechanisms in such
areas that the allies choose, such as counterterrorism, civil
emergency preparedness, air space management, and joint
training and exercises.
Let me be clear: ``At 20'' will not give Russia a veto over
NATO actions in any area. It is not a back door to NATO
membership. It will not infringe on NATO prerogatives. NATO
members will continue to make any decision by consensus on any
issue. The NATO-Russia Council will be fully separate from the
North Atlantic Council, which will continue to meet and make
decisions, as it always has, on the full range of issues and on
NATO's agenda.
While forging these new relationships with Russia, our
cooperative vision for NATO embraces all of NATO's partners,
including Ukraine, countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and
our Mediterranean dialogue partners.
Mr. Chairman, nearly 53 years after its creation, NATO
remains the core of the United States' commitment to Europe and
the bedrock of our security and stability in this dangerous
world. I think Secretary Powell made this point well when he
observed that ``The value of NATO can be seen by the fact that
10 years after the Cold War nations are still seeking to join
the Alliance, not to leave it.'' NATO's fundamentals--its
values, its common commitment to defend freedom--remain sound.
President Bush has a profound respect for NATO's
achievements and a determination to strengthen it for the
future. As you have all pointed out, we and our allies have
much work ahead of us, but I believe also an historic
opportunity, because a Europe whole, free, and at peace, which
is something that we used to talk about as a goal, is now fast
becoming a reality.
As we look to our agenda in Prague of new capabilities, new
members, and new relationships, we look forward to consulting
closely with the members of this committee to ensure that NATO
will meet the challenges of today and tomorrow as successfully
as it has met the challenges of the past.
I thank you very much, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Marc I. Grossman
Senator Levin, Senator Warner, members of the committee, it is an
honor and a privilege to be here. I thank you for the opportunity to
address the Senate Armed Services Committee and especially to sit on
this panel with my friends and colleagues, Doug Feith and Joe Ralston.
Before I do anything else, let me thank you and so many other
Members of the Senate for what you have done, are doing and, I know,
will do to continue to support NATO, the greatest Alliance in history.
I have had the privilege and good fortune to consult with you and take
your advice over the years on NATO. We have always made better
decisions because of it.
When I remember the work we did in getting ready for the last round
of NATO enlargement, I recall the Kyl Amendment and the work that so
many Senators did both in this committee and in the Foreign Relations
Committee, including Senator Helms, Senator Biden, and Senator Lugar. I
know we will have as much useful dialogue and consultation in the
future.
As you say in your invitation letter, Mr. Chairman, I come before
this committee at a time when some on both sides of the Atlantic are
asking questions about the future of NATO. I welcome this debate. Our
governments, our parliaments, and our publics ought to talk about the
future of NATO. That is what democratically supported foreign and
defense policy is all about. The future of NATO has been debated before
and we have always come back to the fundamentals: values matter.
Collective defense matters. Capabilities matter. The transatlantic
relationship matters. Because NATO has always adapted to meet new
challenges, NATO matters.
Before I try to answer some of the questions posed in your letter
of invitation and speak to some of the current debate about NATO taking
place in Europe and the United States, I ask you to step back with me
for just a moment and realize how far we have come. Think about these
three quotations:
First: Winston Churchill, Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946: ``From
Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has
descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals
of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin,
Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these
famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call
the Soviet sphere.''
Second: President Vaclav Havel, in Prague on July 1, 1991:
``Prague, once the victim of the Warsaw Pact, became the city where the
Warsaw Pact met its end as an instrument of the Cold War.''
Third: President George Bush, Warsaw, June 15, 2001: ``All of
Europe's democracies, from the Baltics to the Black Sea and all that
lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom--and
the same chance to join the institutions of Europe--as Europe's old
democracies have.''
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains a fundamental pillar
of our foreign and defense policy. As President Bush's speech in Prague
shows (and it is worth reading again as we enter into the critical
months before the Prague Summit), we want NATO to succeed. The Alliance
must be an effective tool in the world after September 11.
NATO is not less important after September 11, it is more
important.
21st century nato: new capabilities, new members, new relationships
The attacks of September 11 and NATO's rapid and steadfast response
prove NATO's continuing value. Invoking Article V for the first time in
its history, NATO sent a clear message that the Alliance is united and
determined to defeat terrorism.
We greatly value NATO's collective response, as well as the
contributions of individual allies to Operation Enduring Freedom and
the International Security Assistance Force. NATO AWACS have logged
over 2,600 hours patrolling the skies above American cities, and NATO
ships patrol the Eastern Mediterranean. All NATO allies have provided
blanket overflight rights, access to ports and bases, refueling
assistance, and stepped up intelligence efforts.
Fifty years of cooperation through NATO made natural the
participation of Allied and partner forces in Operation Enduring
Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force. Allied and
partner contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom include extensive
air reconnaissance, refueling, cargo, and close air support missions,
an array of special forces missions, specialized nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons units, mine clearing units, medical units, and an
array of allied ships on patrol. Almost all of the contributors to the
International Security Assistance Force, currently led by Britain and
we hope to be followed by Turkey, are either current allies, potential
future allies, or NATO partner countries who have been training and
exercising with NATO in the Partnership for Peace. Altogether these
allies and partners have deployed nearly 4,000 troops to Afghanistan.
September 11 has brought home to us all that we face new threats
and new challenges. That is why NATO ministers at their meeting in
Brussels last December agreed to intensify common efforts to meet the
threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction that all allies
face. When President Bush meets with allied leaders in Prague later
this year, we expect that allies will be ready to approve a program of
action to enhance NATO's ability to deal with these and other threats.
I am confident that NATO will respond to these challenges, just as
it has responded to every challenge that has come its way. I say this
because, contrary to the myth of NATO as a Cold War relic struggling to
define its role since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO has adapted
effectively throughout its history. From integrating West Germany in
the 1950s to responding to Soviet missile build-ups of the 1960s and
1970s, to the INF debates in the 1980s and the ultimate demise of the
Warsaw Pact in the 1990s, NATO has responded to new threats while
seizing opportunities to foster stability and security.
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been key to the stability
and security of the Euro-Atlantic area. A round of enlargement began to
erase the line Stalin drew across Europe. NATO responded to end murder
in Kosovo. NATO acted to end a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO has
built new patterns of cooperation through a Permanent Joint Council
with Russia, NATO-Ukraine Commission, the Partnership for Peace and the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
As we consider the future of NATO, the words of one of its founders
over half a century ago still offer guidance on the road ahead.
Speaking in December 1950 following a NAC meeting in Brussels, Dean
Acheson observed:
``The attitude which we take is that we and our allies are moving
ahead with courage and with determination to build our common strength.
We regard dangers as common dangers and we believe that they can and
must be met by common strength. We believe that they need our help in
order to maintain their security and that we need their help. . .
Therefore, we are taking a policy of going forward with vigor and with
determination and with courage. We are rejecting any policy of sitting
quivering in a storm cellar waiting for whatever fate others may wish
to prepare for us.''
The September 11 attacks made clear that the world is far from safe
and secure. Czech President Vaclav Havel, who will host the Prague
Summit, observed that September 11 ``alerted us to the evil existing in
this world. We still reject the policy of quivering in a storm cellar.
In this dangerous world, allies are indispensable if we are to defeat
new threats posed by terrorists and hostile states seeking weapons of
mass destruction. Those who suggest that NATO is no longer essential
ignore the fact that NATO derives its strength from the common purpose
of defending our people and our values.
NATO faces many challenges. The Prague Summit will mark a crucial
step in our effort to shape an Alliance for the new century. Our agenda
will be threefold:
ensuring NATO has the new capabilities needed to meet
today's threats to our people,
extending NATO's membership to more of Europe's newer
democracies, and
intensifying NATO's relationship with Russia, Ukraine,
and other partners.
New capabilities. New members. New relationships. It is no accident
that this new agenda parallels NATO's founding goals as set out in the
1949 Washington Treaty--to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and
civilization of our peoples, live in peace with all peoples and
governments, and promote the stability and well-being of the North
Atlantic area.
NEW CAPABILITIES
The required effort to improve NATO's capabilities to meet 21st
century threats will build on work done since the end of the Cold War.
NATO's strategic concept recognized as early as 1991 that ``Alliance
security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature,
including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of
the flow of vital resources, and actions of terrorism and sabotage.''
The 1999 Strategic Concept reiterated this recognition, noting that
``new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability were becoming
clearer--oppression, ethnic conflict, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, and the global spread of weapons technology and
terrorism.''
The growing capabilities gap between the United States and Europe
is the most serious long-term problem facing NATO and must be
addressed. NATO allies need flexible, sustainable forces, able to move
long distances in a hurry and deliver overwhelming firepower on
arrival. Today, the United States has the vast preponderance of such
forces. Other allies, by comparison, have only limited capabilities in
critical areas such as lift, precision weapons, intelligence and
surveillance platforms, and protection of forces against biological and
chemical agents. NATO Secretary General Robertson is committed to
bridging the gap between the U.S. and European allies, and will make
this a centerpiece of the Prague Summit. We welcome these initiatives
and will continue to urge allies to refocus their defense efforts, if
need be by pooling their resources to do collectively what they are
unable to do individually. If our allies are serious about bridging
this gap, however, they must be prepared to do much more to improve
their capabilities.''
NEW MEMBERS
Our second goal for Prague is to continue the process of building a
united Euro-Atlantic community by extending membership to those
democratic European countries who have demonstrated their determination
to defend the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule
of law, their desire to promote stability, and their resolve to unite
their efforts for collective defense.
As the President observed last year in Warsaw, ``Yalta did not
ratify a natural divide, it divided a living civilization.'' He made it
clear that his goal is to erase the false lines that have divided
Europe and to ``welcome into Europe's home'' every European nation that
struggles toward democracy, free markets, and a strong civic culture.
The process of enlargement to Europe's new democracies launched in 1997
has fulfilled NATO's promise and brought us closer to completing the
vision of NATO's founders of a free and united Europe. But our work is
not done.
The President affirmed his belief in NATO membership for ``all of
Europe's democracies that seek it and are ready to share the
responsibilities that NATO brings.'' In his first meeting with allies
last June, the President secured a consensus to take concrete, historic
decisions at Prague to advance enlargement. He made clear to allies and
aspirants his belief that NATO ``should not calculate how little we can
get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of
freedom.''
Since the President spoke, we have been working closely with allies
and the nine current aspirant countries to strengthen their
preparations so that the aspirants who may be asked to join will add to
NATO's strength and vitality. Today, a team led by Ambassador Burns is
completing a series of visits to all nine current aspirant countries to
reinforce the importance of addressing key reform priorities in the
months before Prague. We look forward in the months ahead to a close
and continuing dialogue with the members of this committee and others
as we approach these historic decisions. You have great responsibility
on this question. It is our goal and expectation that, working with
you, we will be able to forge a solid and united approach to
enlargement and build an equally strong consensus with the Alliance.
Some have asked in the aftermath of September 11 whether
enlargement should remain a priority. The President's answer is
``yes.'' The events of September 11 have reinforced the importance of
even closer cooperation and integration between the United States and
all the democracies of Europe. If we are to meet new threats to our
security, we need to build the broadest and strongest coalition
possible of countries that share our values and are able to act
effectively with us. With freedom under attack, we must demonstrate our
resolve to do as much as we can to advance its cause.
Members of this committee will rightly ask what capabilities and
contributions potential new members will bring to the Alliance. The
Washington Treaty makes clear that states invited to join NATO should
be in a position to further the principles of the treaty and contribute
to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. This is the standard that we
and our allies will apply as we approach decisions at Prague. All nine
aspirants know that NATO involves serious commitments and solemn
responsibilities. Many have already demonstrated their determination to
contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. The Vilnius Group,
meeting in Sofia last October declared their shared intention to
``fully support the war against terrorism'' and to ``act as allies of
the United States.'' Individually, aspirants have responded as de facto
allies offering overflight rights, transit and basing privileges,
military and police forces, medical units and transport support to U.S.
efforts. Most will participate in the International Security Assistance
Force in Afghanistan. Prior to September 11, most aspirant countries
had contributed actively to NATO efforts to prevent further hostilities
in the Balkans.
We believe that NATO enlargement is a means of achieving NATO's
core purposes, and will contribute to NATO's continuing dynamism as the
core security institution in the Euro-Atlantic area. Enlargement will
also widen the circle of democracies and expand the zone of stability
and security through the Baltics and the Balkans. Not to embrace
countries that have overcome years of communist dictatorship and have
proven their ability and willingness to contribute to our common
security would be to abandon the very principles that have been NATO's
source of strength and vitality. We look forward to the closest
consultations with Congress on this subject, and if NATO does offer new
invitations, to the debate in the Senate on that proposition.
NEW RELATIONSHIPS
Our third goal for Prague is also aimed at advancing NATO's core
principles--those of living in peace with all peoples and promoting
stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. As we work to complete the vision
of a united Europe from which, Winston Churchill once observed, ``no
nation should be permanently outcast,'' we must continue to reach out
and expand cooperation and integration with all of NATO's partners.
NATO and Russia have taken steps to give new impetus and direction
to their extensive cooperation in the aftermath of September 11.
President Bush's vision is of a Russia ``fully reformed, fully
democratic, and closely bound to the rest of Europe,'' which is able to
build partnerships with Europe's great institutions, including NATO.
At the most recent ministerial meetings in Brussels, allies agreed
to create a new NATO-Russia body--the NATO-Russia Council--that will
facilitate joint decisions and actions in areas of common concern
between NATO and Russia. We have been working intensively with allies
in Brussels to develop this new body, which we expect to have in place
by the time of the Reykjavik NATO ministerial this May.
This so-called ``At 20'' relationship will offer Russia the
opportunity to participate in shaping the development of cooperative
mechanisms in areas that the Alliance chooses, such as counter-
terrorism, civil emergency preparedness, airspace management, and joint
training and exercises. ``At 20'' will not give Russia the ability to
veto NATO actions in any areas. It is not a back door to NATO
membership. Nor will it infringe on NATO prerogatives. NATO members
will continue to take any decision by consensus on any issue. The NATO-
Russia Council will be fully separate from the NAC, which will continue
to meet and make decisions as it always has on the full range of issues
on NATO's agenda.
While forging new links with Russia, our cooperative vision for
NATO embraces all of NATO's partners, including Ukraine, countries in
the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Mediterranean Dialogue partners. In
fact, NATO is the only institution that can unite the continent in
security cooperation, and remains the nexus for broadening and
deepening Euro-Atlantic security.
We are particularly determined to focus NATO's partner activities
on countries of Central Asia that have played such constructive roles
in the war against terrorism. The Partnership for Peace and EAPC have
been successful vehicles for integration, but we believe that much more
can be done to expand cooperation between NATO and these countries.
Nearly 53 years after its creation, NATO remains the core of the
United States commitment to Europe and the bedrock of our security and
stability in a still dangerous world. Secretary Powell made this point
best in his confirmation hearings when he observed that ``the value of
NATO can be seen by the fact that 10 years after the Cold War, nations
are still seeking to join the Alliance, not to leave it.'' NATO can
meet new threats, building cooperation with former enemies, and
ensuring stability in Southeast Europe, giving time for this region to
become a part of the European mainstream. NATO's fundamentals--its
shared values, and common commitment to defend freedom--remain sound.
President Bush has a profound respect for NATO's achievements and a
determination to strengthen it for the future. We and our allies have
much work ahead, but also an historic opportunity to achieve our goals
of defending, integrating, and stabilizing the Euro-Atlantic area and
continuing to strengthen this greatest of alliances. A Europe whole,
free and at peace is a goal fast becoming a reality. As we look to
Prague and our agenda of new capabilities, new members, and new
relationships, we look forward to working closely with the members of
this committee to ensure that NATO will meet the challenges of today
and tomorrow as successfully as it has those of the past.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Grossman.
Secretary Feith.
STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS J. FEITH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY
Mr. Feith. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members
of the committee: I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the
future of NATO with you.
As happens from time to time and especially since the
West's victory in the Cold War, questions arise about NATO's
relevance and, as Senator Warner raised the question this
morning, about the justification for its perpetuation. I agree
that such questions are useful. It is not a good idea to take
our larger institutions for granted. It is salutary to review
the Alliance's rationale and examine its institutions.
Today we perform this review in light of the lessons of
September 11; lessons about key vulnerabilities of our country
despite our conventional military power; lessons about new
types of threats; lessons about the global nature of our
military responsibilities; lessons about surprise,
unpredictability, and the necessity for the United States
military to be adaptable and flexible; and lessons about the
value of our community of allies and friends around the world.
NATO and our NATO allies responded to the September 11
attack quickly, loyally, and usefully. NATO showed that it can
adapt and respond to unforeseen challenges. Less than 24 hours
after the terrorist attack against America, our NATO allies, as
has been pointed out by many of you, invoked for the first time
in history Article V, the collective defense provision of the
Alliance's 1949 treaty.
Soon after that NATO took steps to assist us in the war.
For example, seven NATO airborne warning and control system,
AWACS, aircraft are now patrolling U.S. skies, protecting
Americans at home, and freeing up the U.S. AWACS fleet for
important work abroad.
Individual NATO allies and partners are contributing to the
war effort and to the post-Taliban reconstruction and security
effort in Afghanistan. Some of the allies' contributions have
come through the formal mechanisms of the Alliance and some
outside those structures. But all should be appreciated as the
fruit of more than 50 years of joint planning, training, and
operations within the Alliance.
NATO's core mission remains, as it should, the collective
defense of its members, as stated in Article V. But NATO will
continue to adapt to deal with new threats and to capitalize on
its strengths.
The Prague summit, the first in the new millennium for
NATO, is scheduled for November of this year. At the summit the
United States hopes to accelerate NATO's transformation,
stressing, as Secretary Grossman said, new capabilities, new
members, and new relationships. President Bush has reaffirmed
the U.S. aspiration to promote a Europe whole and free. In
Warsaw last June he declared: ``I believe in NATO membership
for all of Europe's democracies that seek it and are ready to
share the responsibility that NATO brings. As we plan the
Prague summit, we should not calculate how little we can get
away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of
freedom.''
Mr. Chairman, we recognize that enlargement of the Alliance
is not an exercise free of risks and difficult judgments.
People of experience and wisdom warn of the dangers of making
the Alliance excessively unwieldy. They do not want the
Alliance to dilute its military capabilities through expansion
and they are concerned about NATO's relations with important
neighbors. They want to ensure that any enlargement will
strengthen NATO's ability to perform its essential defense
mission. They want to ensure that the commitment of new members
to the Alliance's principles and work will be enduring and
fulfillable.
These are prudent cautionary considerations and they are
informing the administration's enlargement strategy. We think
NATO can enlarge, indeed should, in ways that will serve the
national security interests of the United States and of our
current allies. A Europe united on the basis of democratic
principles, the rule of law, respect for individual rights, and
other tenets of the Alliance will be better able to resist and
defeat terrorist threats and other threats.
The U.S. Government believes that an enlarged Alliance that
conducts joint defense and operational planning, promotes
interoperability, and encourages realistic training exercises
will be a more effective partner in answering global security
challenges.
The aspirant countries have made impressive contributions
to NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In 2001, seven of
the nine NATO aspirants made force contributions to NATO
operations in Kosovo and eight of the nine to NATO operations
in Bosnia.
They have also shown much-appreciated solidarity with the
United States through their contributions to Operation Enduring
Freedom. They have conducted themselves as we want our allies
to act. For operations in Afghanistan, the aspirants have
provided troops, intelligence, over-flight rights, access to
bases, and public diplomatic support.
As the administration deliberates on specific candidacies,
the Defense Department will be assessing the state of the
aspirants' military structures, their implementation of defense
reform, the readiness of military units dedicated to NATO
missions, and the military value the aspirant countries can add
to NATO.
The transformation of NATO's capabilities can and should
proceed hand in hand with its enlargement. This is the greatest
challenge for the Alliance in the coming years. NATO operations
in Bosnia and Kosovo, as has been commented on by several of
you, exposed collective Alliance shortfalls in the capabilities
most relevant to modern warfare. They also exposed a disturbing
and growing capabilities gap between the United States and its
allies.
We heard encouraging rhetoric in the 1999 Washington
summit, but by and large have seen meager results. The widening
capabilities gap not only weakens the Alliance's military
potential, it could in time erode NATO's political solidarity.
In our view the Alliance needs to focus on a few
priorities, including: Defending its forces and populations
against weapons of mass destruction; doing a better job of
getting allies' forces to the fight; ensuring that allies'
forces can communicate easily with one another without fear of
eavesdropping or jamming by their adversaries; and improving
allies' contributions to modern fast-paced and more precise
combat operations.
We cannot transform NATO's capabilities overnight, but we
cannot afford to settle for business as usual. As we encourage
allies to spend more on defense, it is even more important that
we get them to spend smarter. The Joint Strike Fighter program
is a model of cooperation and efficiency involving the United
States and several allies.
A third goal for the Prague summit is strengthening NATO's
relationship with Russia and revitalizing its relations with
other partners. We are working hard with our allies to enhance
the NATO-Russia relationship. I was in Moscow on Monday and
discussed this with the representatives of the Russian defense
ministry.
The best way to proceed, we think, is to build a record of
success on practical projects that benefit everyone involved.
We believe that this effort can dissipate vestigial fears in
Russia that NATO threatens its security. We also think that
fostering engagement with Russia can induce further democratic,
market, and military reform in that country and contribute to
improved Russian relations with its neighbors. In short, we
view the NATO-Russia relationship as complementing our direct
efforts to establish a new framework of U.S.-Russia relations.
As we build the NATO-Russia relationship and as the
Alliance and Russia work together where we can, it is essential
that NATO retain its ability to decide and act independently on
important security issues. We are conscious of the importance
of protecting alliance solidarity and effectiveness. As
Secretary Grossman has pointed out, the North Atlantic Council
will decide by consensus on the form and substance of our
cooperation with Russia. Russia will not have a veto over
Alliance decisions, and NATO-Russia cooperation will not be
allowed to discourage or marginalize other partners. We are
confident that we can respect these safeguards as we improve
NATO's ties to Russia.
The Partnership for Peace is a NATO success story, having
produced practical cooperation between the allies and 27
partners from Europe through Central Asia. We want to maintain
and strengthen partnership programs beyond Prague, especially
in ways that increase the partners' ability to operate with
NATO in crisis response operations. We should not be surprised
if, following invitations to some number of aspirants at
Prague, other partners step forward to declare interest in NATO
membership.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, for over 50 years, as has been
stated and restated here as a sign of the widespread
appreciation of this point and its importance to the Senate, to
the NATO, and to the United States in general, NATO has not
only been a successful alliance, but perhaps the most
successful alliance in history. This year we have an
opportunity to enlarge and transform it, to help ensure that
future generations of our Euro-Atlantic community, which I view
as the core of the community of the world's democratic states,
are ready and able to secure their freedom.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feith follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Douglas J. Feith
Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you the future of NATO.
As happens from time to time, especially since the West's victory
in the Cold War, questions arise about NATO's relevance. Such questions
are useful. We shouldn't take large institutions for granted. It is
salutary to review the Alliance's rationale and examine its
institutions.
Today, we perform this review in light of the lessons of September
11: lessons about key vulnerabilities of our country despite our
conventional military power; lessons about new types of threats;
lessons about the global nature of our military responsibilities;
lessons about surprise, unpredictability and the necessity for the U.S.
military to be adaptable and flexible; and, lessons about the value of
our community of allies and friends around the world.
In his statement to NATO defense ministers last June, Secretary
Rumsfeld listed terrorism first among the types of new threats facing
the Alliance. The others he mentioned were cyber-attack, high-tech
conventional weapons, and ballistic and cruise missiles armed with
weapons of mass destruction. Three months later, on September 11, the
first of these anticipated threats materialized with awful impact in
New York and Washington.
NATO and our NATO allies responded to the September 11 attack
quickly, loyally and usefully. NATO showed it can adapt and respond to
unforeseen challenges.
Less than 24 hours after the terrorists' attack against America,
our NATO allies invoked, for the first time in history, Article V--the
collective defense provision--of the 1949 NATO Treaty. Soon thereafter,
NATO took a series of steps to assist us in the war against terrorism.
For example, seven NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
aircraft are now patrolling U.S. skies, relieving us of a significant
burden and freeing up the U.S. AWACS fleet for important work abroad.
Individual NATO allies and partners are contributing to the war effort
and to the post-Taliban reconstruction and security effort in
Afghanistan. Some of the allies' contributions have come through formal
Alliance structures and some outside those structures. All those
contributions, however, should be appreciated as the fruit of more than
50 years of joint planning, training and operations within the NATO
Alliance.
NATO's core mission remains, as it should, the collective defense
of its members, as stated in Article V. But NATO will continue to adapt
to deal with new threats and to capitalize on its strengths in the
current era. The Prague Summit--NATO's first in the new millennium--is
scheduled for November of this year. At that Summit, the United States
hopes to accelerate NATO's transformation, stressing three themes: new
members, new capabilities, and new relationships.
ENLARGEMENT
President Bush has reaffirmed the U.S. aspiration to promote a
Europe ``whole and free.'' In Warsaw last June, he declared: ``I
believe in NATO membership for all of Europe's democracies that seek it
and are ready to share the responsibility that NATO brings. . . . As we
plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get
away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom.''
Mr. Chairman, we recognize that enlargement of the Alliance is not
an exercise free of risks and difficult judgments. People of experience
and wisdom warn of the dangers of making the Alliance excessively
unwieldy. They do not want the Alliance to dilute its military
capabilities through expansion and they are concerned about NATO's
relations with important neighbors. They want to ensure that any
enlargement will strengthen NATO's ability to perform its essential
defense mission. They want to ensure that the commitment of new members
to the Alliance's principles and work will be enduring and fulfillable.
These are prudent cautionary considerations and they are informing
the administration's enlargement strategy. We think NATO can enlarge--
indeed should--in ways that will serve the national security interests
of the United States and our current allies. A Europe united on the
basis of democratic principles, the rule of law, respect for individual
rights and the other tenets of the Alliance will be better able to
resist and defeat terrorist threats and other threats. The U.S.
Government believes that an enlarged Alliance that conducts joint
defense and operational planning, promotes interoperability, and
encourages realistic training exercises will be a more effective
partner in answering global security challenges.
The aspirant countries have made impressive contributions to NATO-
led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In 2001, seven of the nine NATO
aspirants made force contributions to NATO operations in Kosovo and
eight of the nine to NATO operations in Bosnia. They have also shown
much-appreciated solidarity with the United States through their
contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom. They have conducted
themselves as we want our allies to act. For operations in Afghanistan,
the aspirants have provided troops, intelligence, over-flight rights,
access to bases, and public diplomatic support. As the administration
deliberates on specific candidacies, the Defense Department will be
assessing the state of the aspirants' military structures, their
implementation of defense reform, the readiness of military units
dedicated to NATO missions, and the military value the aspirant
countries can add to NATO.
TRANSFORMATION
The transformation of NATO's capabilities can and should proceed
hand-in-hand with its enlargement. This may be the gravest challenge
for the Alliance in the coming years. NATO operations in Bosnia and
Kosovo exposed collective Alliance shortfalls in the capabilities most
relevant to modern warfare; they also exposed a disturbing--and
growing--capabilities gap between the United States and its allies. We
heard encouraging rhetoric at the 1999 Washington Summit, but by-and-
large have seen meager results. The widening capabilities gap not only
weakens the Alliance's military potential, it could in time erode
NATO's political solidarity.
In our view, the Alliance needs to focus on a few priorities,
including: defending its forces and populations against weapons of mass
destruction; doing a better job of getting allies' forces to the fight;
ensuring that allied forces can communicate easily with one another
without fear of eavesdropping or jamming by their adversaries; and
improving allies' contributions to modern, fast-paced, and more precise
combat operations.
We cannot transform NATO capabilities overnight, but we cannot
afford to settle for ``business as usual.'' As we encourage allies to
spend more on defense, it is even more important that we get them to
``spend smarter.'' The Joint Strike Fighter program is a model of
cooperation and efficiency involving the United States and several
allies.
NEW RELATIONSHIPS
A third goal for the Prague summit is strengthening NATO's
relationship with Russia and revitalizing its relations with other
partners.
We are working hard with our allies to enhance the NATO-Russia
relationship. The best way to proceed, we think, is to build a record
of success on practical projects that benefit everyone involved. We
believe that this effort can dissipate vestigial fears in Russia that
NATO threatens its security. We also think that fostering engagement
with Russia can induce further democratic, market and military reform
in that country and contribute to improved Russian relations with its
neighbors. In short, we view the NATO-Russia relationship as
complementary to our bilateral efforts to establish a new framework of
United States-Russia relations.
As we build this enhanced relationship, and as the Alliance and
Russia work together where we can, it is essential that NATO retain its
independent ability to decide and act on important security issues. We
are conscious of the importance of protecting Alliance solidarity and
effectiveness. The North Atlantic Council will decide, by consensus, on
the form and substance of our cooperation with Russia. Russia will not
have a veto over Alliance decisions. NATO-Russia cooperation will not
be allowed to discourage or marginalize other partners. We are
confident that we can respect these safeguards as we improve NATO's
ties to Russia.
The Partnership for Peace is a NATO success story, having produced
practical cooperation between the allies and 27 partners from Europe
through Central Asia. We want to maintain and strengthen partnership
programs beyond Prague, especially in ways that increase the partners'
ability to operate with NATO forces in crisis response operations. We
should not be surprised if, following invitations to some number of
aspirants at Prague, other partners step forward to declare interest in
NATO membership.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, for over 50 years, NATO has been a successful
alliance, perhaps the most successful alliance in history. This year,
we have an opportunity to enlarge and transform NATO to help ensure
that future generations of our Euro-Atlantic community--the core of the
community of the world's democratic states--are ready and able to
secure their freedom.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Feith.
General Ralston.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH W. RALSTON, USAF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
General Ralston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner,
and members of the committee. I will be brief. I would like to
talk to you for a moment about European Command (EUCOM) as well
as NATO.
Starting off, I would like to thank the committee for your
support of our budget request for last year and 2002. When I
was here, I told you my number one priority was for the
military construction and the facilities that our people live
and work in in EUCOM. For the first time in a decade, you
reversed the trend of declining spending and you gave us about
$360 million, and that is much appreciated by every soldier,
sailor, airman, and marine in the European theater.
In our budget request for 2003, once again my top priority
is the facilities that our people live and work in and I
request your continued support in that regard.
USEUCOM AOR
Mr. Chairman, if I could direct your attention to this
chart that we have over here. I think it helps to remind us
about European Command, and it may be a bit misnamed. It
includes the countries not only of Europe, but most of Africa
that you see in green and some very important Middle Eastern
countries, including Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. There are 91
countries in total in the European Command area of
responsibility (EUCOM AOR).
We have about 115,000 troops there to do that. That is 8
percent of the active duty military strength that we have. I
would just like to give you my opinion that 8 percent is not
excessive for half the countries of the world in which we are
responsible for maintaining stability.
I would also like to remind the committee that as we speak
this morning EUCOM is involved in five ongoing combat
operations. First, we have our pilots flying over northern
Iraq. Just before I came to this hearing this morning I got a
call that our pilots were fired upon and attacked this morning,
and we responded by taking out some air defense sites that are
there.
We have the operations ongoing in Bosnia and Kosovo, as
well as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. I would like
to talk about one of those for a moment, if you could give me
my next chart.
BALKANS TROOP COMMITMENT
Sometimes we need to remind ourselves of the progress that
has been made in Bosnia. Troop levels are not the only
indicator, but troop levels are dependent upon the situation on
the ground. As you remember, we went into Bosnia with 60,000
troops 6 years ago. Americans made up 20,000 of that. We were
33 percent of the effort. Every 6 months we take a look at how
we are doing, what is the situation on the ground, and we
adjust the troop level to correspond to that.
Today we have less than 18,000 total troops. The U.S. is
about 17 percent of that effort. When I testified before this
committee last year, we had 4,400 Americans in Bosnia. Today we
have a little over 3,000. Next month we should be at 2,500. My
recommendation back to the North Atlantic Council for this fall
will be about 1,800 Americans. That will be less than 10
percent of what we started.
I believe that that represents the progress that is being
made on the ground in Bosnia, and we have tried to adjust our
troop levels accordingly.
NATO's commitment to stability in the Balkans and its
September 12 invocation of Article V clearly demonstrate the
flexibility of the Alliance. Much has been said already about
the NATO AWACS and the Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean. I
will not repeat that. I might like to add that several NATO
allies as well as other nations in our area of responsibility
have provided intelligence, they have frozen terrorist
financial assets, and they have detained suspected terrorists
in their respective countries. I might add that in the European
theater over 1,500 terrorists have been arrested and taken off
the street in the past 90 days.
They have provided basing and overflight rights and other
forms of key support in our global efforts to combat terrorism.
NATO nations provided cargo aircraft and manpower and expertise
to prepare and load cargo pallets for shipment in support of
our efforts in Afghanistan. Some contributed directly to the
strike missions in Afghanistan, and several countries in the
EUCOM area of responsibility are contributing to our
stabilization efforts there.
I might say a word about NATO's Partnership for Peace
program. Sometimes that does not get the attention I think that
it deserves. To give you an example, every time we have a NATO
meeting in Brussels of secretaries of state or secretaries of
defense or chairmen of the joint chiefs equivalent, it is not
only the 19 NATO nations that meet and do the business, but we
reset the table and we set the table at 19 plus 27. That is 19
NATO nations plus 27 Partnership for Peace nations. That is
several times a year at the very highest levels of our
Government we are meeting and interacting with these people.
I think it is no surprise that when the United States
needed Uzbekhistan for our efforts in Afghanistan that
Uzbekhistan has been a member of Partnership for Peace and
their foreign minister, their defense minister, their chairman
of the joint chiefs equivalent have been interacting with their
NATO counterparts for many years. I think that was very much
important in their decision to support the United States in our
effort.
Mr. Chairman, that is all I have. I am certainly prepared
to answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statements of General Ralston follow:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, USAF
The North Atlantic Treaty established an Alliance that has endured
over half a century. During its first 40, NATO manifested the political
will and military capability to deter Soviet expansionism, and that
deterrence worked. It provided for the rearmament of Germany within a
framework acceptable to her wartime foes. It solidly linked, through
forward presence and nuclear deterrence, the United States to the
security of Western Europe. The stable security environment, combined
with the Marshall Plan, facilitated a rapid economic recovery and the
subsequent growth of Western Europe into our largest trading partner.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, its planned economy overtaken by the
vibrant markets of the Alliance, crumbled and collapsed.
Without a common foe, some commentators argued, NATO would lose its
reason for existence, yet the member nations chose to continue their
Alliance, and to transform and adapt it to new circumstances. Massive,
static conventional defenses were reduced and made more mobile.
Numerous newly independent nations looked to NATO as a source of
stability in an uncertain, new world order, and as a bastion of
democratic experience. These countries were linked to NATO through the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council, followed by the establishment of
the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council.
The end of the Cold War bipolar order unleashed nationalist,
ethnic, and religious tensions resulting in widespread outbreaks of
violence. NATO's relevance in the face of these new threats was
reaffirmed by its stabilization of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. The
operational employment of NATO forces to solve a major European
security problem in the Balkans, outside of NATO's perimeter, confirmed
the enduring value of the Alliance. The inclusion of partner nations in
Balkan operations underscores the payoff of PfP, both in the reform of
former communist militaries and in the relief of the manpower burden on
NATO.
An unexpected dimension of NATO's security guarantee, and its
relevance to U.S. security, came to worldwide attention after September
11. America's NATO allies agreed to invoke Article V of the North
Atlantic Treaty, considering the attack on New York and Washington as
an attack against them all. A dramatic manifestation of this support is
the deployment of part of NATO is Airborne Early Warning and Control
Force to patrol America's skies. Additionally, NATO's standing naval
forces are patrolling the Mediterranean to prevent terrorist movement
and thereby impede the ability of terrorist groups to organize and
orchestrate operations against the U.S. or our European allies.
Thousands of allied troops are supporting Operation Enduring
Freedom in the CENTCOM theater. Allies, and partners as well, have
granted access to their airspace and facilities. Less visible but
equally important is the enhanced information sharing occasioned by the
invocation of Article V, which has provided numerous leads in the
global war on terrorism. In sum, the Alliance continues to play an
enormously valuable role for the United States.
NATO began with 12 members, adding Greece and Turkey in 1952,
Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, and Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic in 1999. Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for
the accession of further European states. To be invited, members must
unanimously agree that a candidate would adhere to the principles of
the treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.
The record of the three newest members bears on the desirability of
further enlargement.
At the time of the 1999 accession, an interagency review estimated
10 years would be required for full integration. The integration
processes that we would expect to be accomplished in the first 3 years
have been largely successful; the new members are fully engaged in the
NATO defense planning process, manning the majority of their NATO staff
positions, and are committed to making progress toward providing the
forces and resources that NATO is asking of them. Despite the progress
to date, we are learning that some long-term efforts, such as
development of a non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps or major weapons
systems acquisitions, will take longer, perhaps even a generation,
before completion.
The defense budgets for each of the new members have remained
strong since accession despite domestic economic challenges. For
example, the Czech Ministry of Defense was the only ministry to be
spared cuts during their recent 2 year-long recession, and Poland's 6-
year defense plan guarantees defense spending at 1.95 percent of GDP.
According to the Secretary of Defense's 2001 report on allied burden
sharing, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, respectively, are
ranked 6th, 8th, and 11th in terms of defense spending as a percentage
of GDP in relationship to the other NATO members. While all three
defense budgets will continue to face pressure from competing
ministries, clearly the three new members have demonstrated the will to
support national defense.
The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, thanks to their similar
backgrounds, have proven to be excellent mentors to the current round
of NATO aspirants. They are working to extend peace and security
eastward. The Poles are particularly active with military-to-military
contacts with Lithuania. The Czechs are active with the Slovaks and
Lithuanians, and plan to contribute an artillery battalion to the
2,500-strong Slovak-Polish-Czech Peacekeeping Brigade, expecting to be
ready for duty by 2005.
All three nations have made substantial contributions to ongoing
operations, particularly in the Balkans. They supported Operation
Allied Force by providing bases, airfields, and transit rights for NATO
troops and aircraft. Their combined Stabilization Force (SFOR)/Kosovo
Force (KFOR) troop contribution has historically averaged nearly 2,000
troops. In response to NATO's April 2000 call for additional Reserve
Forces, the Poles quickly sent an additional 700 troops. This planned
60-day KFOR rotation lasted more than 5 months. More recently, the
Czechs contributed an additional 120-man contingent to support
Operation Essential Harvest in Macedonia.
The three new members are making hard choices about where to spend
their limited defense dollars, while maintaining the momentum they have
established. We are watching their progress closely, and find
significant challenges lie in areas such as developing a viable NCO
corps, implementing an integrated planning, budgeting, and procurement
process, and modernizing their inventory of Soviet-era equipment.
Meeting these challenges will require significant monetary investment.
Equally important, but not as costly, is continued exposure to Western
schools and training, which will help them adapt to Western style
thinking, leadership, and especially decisionmaking.
Elected officials in all three countries face competing priorities
for resources while their social systems and economies are still in
transition. They must carefully prioritize, focus on their long-term
goals, and avoid short-term expedient solutions. The key to success is
sustained national will; only that can ensure the new member nations
continue to progress in NATO integration.
With each round of enlargement, the issues of cost, defensibility,
and military capability are justifiably debated. As reported by the
Congressional Budget Office, the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic to NATO reduced the U.S. share of the civil budget from
23.3 percent to 22.5 percent, and the military budget from 28.0 percent
to 26.2 percent. The U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program
(NSIP) budget fell from 28.3 percent to 25.2 percent. The allies share
the common costs of the 1999 enlargement, which NATO has estimated at
$1.5 billion over 10 years, through the military budget and the NSIP.
Of those costs, $1.3 billion is for infrastructure improvements that
are to be paid by the NSIP. The U.S. share of that cost would be
approximately $400 million--or roughly one-fourth over 10 years. The
payoff resides partly in having airfields and logistics facilities able
to support NATO and U.S. operations and exercises. Readiness also
improves given the greater freedom of maneuver allowed our forces
exercising in these countries.
An additional, discretionary cost borne by the United States is the
financing of purchases of U.S. equipment and training through security
assistance. The President's request for fiscal year 2003 Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and
Training (IMET) combined for the new members is just under $41 million.
These Department of State grant funds support important Department of
Defense initiatives to improve new member defense capabilities and
enhance interoperability with U.S. forces, while providing U.S. access
to new member militaries, governments, and bases. Thus, this sum could
be seen as an investment, especially since the FMF funds return to the
American defense industry in the form of equipment purchases. (IMET
funds also return to the U.S. through the purchase of training and
education.) I have provided some preliminary considerations, but other
DOD organizations will provide authoritative cost forecasts for the
upcoming round of enlargement.
We must also consider the potential cost of not enlarging. The
aspirant nations have put forth a strong effort in good faith toward
becoming members, and have taken political positions in support of the
Alliance in recent conflicts. Their elected officials have made
membership an important part of their public agenda and sought to
increase public support for NATO. From a military standpoint, the
outstanding cooperation and support we have enjoyed in terms of troop
contributions to ongoing operations and the use of infrastructure and
transit rights could be jeopardized.
President Bush has endorsed enlargement in principle, as did the
heads of state of the other allies at last June's informal summit. The
enlargement of NATO is ultimately a political, not a military decision.
A country with a relatively weak military may still be a productive
addition to the Alliance for strong political reasons alone. A case
could also be made where a country with a strong military may not be a
productive addition due to political concerns. There are nevertheless
valid military considerations bearing upon suitability for membership.
The nine aspirant nations have made considerable progress under the
NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) established in 1999. They have agreed
to pursue Partnership Goals related to the MAP within the PfP Planning
and Review Process. The Partnership Goals integrate lessons learned
from the previous round of enlargement and the tenets of the NATO
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), providing a roadmap toward
reform. NATO has provided the aspirants with feedback on their progress
through assessments of both their accomplishment of Partnership Goals
and their MAP annual national plans. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)
has conducted in-country assessments of aspirants' progress at the
direction of the Secretary of Defense.
The aspirants have a common legacy of authoritarian Communist
defense planning that was unaccountable to the public. They have
dedicated considerable effort to producing new national strategy
documents in a transparent way, to garner public and parliamentary
support. The aspirant militaries can be broken down into two main
categories: those who inherited a burden of obsolete Warsaw Pact
equipment and imbalanced personnel structures, and those who had to
build armed forces from scratch. Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania fit
clearly into the first category, and Slovakia to a lesser degree, since
it began its existence as an independent nation in 1993, obtaining a
disparate mix of one-third of the Czechoslovak armed forces.
The Baltics fit clearly into the second category, having been
stripped bare of all equipment and infrastructure upon the departure of
Soviet forces. Similarly, Slovenia and Macedonia did not inherit any
part of the Yugoslav armed forces upon independence. Aspirants with
legacy militaries have struggled to downsize equipment and personnel
while restructuring their forces according to their new strategic
situation. Aspirants without legacy militaries have struggled to
recruit sufficient qualified personnel and acquire a coherent mix of
equipment.
Areas of concern to both categories, on which they have made good
progress, include English language capability, legal arrangements in
support of operations, the ability to secure classified information,
infrastructure to support NATO deployments, NCO corps development, and
quality of life for troops. All are financially constrained in their
reform efforts by small defense budgets, which compete with other
national reform priorities.
ASPIRANT MILITARY CAPABILITIES
As EUCOM's military contribution to the political decision making
process regarding which aspirants the United States will support for
admission to NATO, we have been tasked to provide the Secretary of
Defense and the President with an assessment of each aspirant's current
military posture. The aspirant countries have worked to develop their
military capabilities, based on lessons learned in the previous round
of NATO enlargement (Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary) and through
participation in Operation Enduring Freedom, SFOR, KFOR, PfP, and the
MAP. In making our assessment of their progress and current status,
EUCOM has focused on four primary areas: strategy and force structure,
defensive capabilities, legal and legislative issues, and security
procedures. Following is a general description of the criteria EUCOM is
using to examine the aspirants in each of these four areas.
Strategy and Force Structure. Sound national security and military
strategy documents, effective interagency resource management,
rationalized force structures, personnel management, and English
language capability are top-level indicators of military potential. The
capstone national strategy documents with public and parliamentary
support are at various levels of development and approval, with no
obvious stragglers. Planning, programming, and budgeting system-type
resource planning is being implemented slowly.
Military force structure is currently being revised to combine
immediate reaction, rapid reaction, and main/territorial defense
forces, with national resources, to include funding, focused on the
first two. In all cases, transition requires painful personnel
restructuring, and its success will be indicative of a sound National
Military Strategy. Personnel management includes accession, knowing
what specialists you have and need, a balanced rank structure, an
effective NCO corps, quality of life, and professional education. These
are building blocks of a quality force. Similarly, English language is
the foundation of interoperability. All have made excellent progress in
training key individuals during the last few years.
Defense Capabilities. Defense capabilities, aligned according to
the NATO DCI categories, are the heart of preparedness, and proof of
sound planning and budgeting. The bottom line is: can they deploy a
reasonably sized force, sustain it, communicate with it, protect it,
and fight effectively with it? Deployability and mobility, particularly
by air and sea, are generally weak areas for all aspirants.
Sustainability and logistics, to include the nation's ability to
support its deployed forces and to support NATO deployments on its
national territory (host nation support, air transport handling,
airfield, road, rail, and port infrastructure), vary among the
aspirants.
Effective engagement includes a basic ability to fight, on the
offense and defense, in varying conditions of daylight, weather,
terrain, etc. The aspirants have focused funding on equipping and
training elite units in the short-term, expanding to the entire force
in the long-term. In evaluating an aspirant's ability to engage
effectively, we closely examine the capabilities of their land, air,
and maritime forces. Air forces are expensive, and flying hours have
been under-funded, resulting in degraded training. All aspirants have
marginally effective air forces. Survivability of forces and
infrastructure ensures the military can continue to fight once
attacked. Survivability and engagement capabilities vary among the
aspirants.
Consultation, Command, and Control (a NATO term synonymous with
U.S. C\4\), through reliable and secure communication and information
systems strengthen the effectiveness and interoperability of forces.
Aspirants have been investing in this area and have benefited from
comprehensive C\4\ studies accomplished by USEUCOM and the USAF
Electronic Systems Center. Most have demonstrated progress in
establishing centralized C\4\ planning. Most aspirants can monitor
their airspace, but have limited ability to enforce their airspace
sovereignty. The U.S.-funded Regional Airspace Initiative has provided
modern Air Sovereignty Operations Centers to all aspirants except
Macedonia and Albania.
Wrapping up defense capabilities, EUCOM assessed the aspirants'
ability to deploy a small (company-sized) light infantry unit in
support of NATO and their ability to sustain, protect, communicate, and
fight with that force. NATO considers this size effort to be the lowest
common denominator of capability that would be expected of any NATO
aspirant.
Legal and Legislative. Aspirants are aware that legal obstacles to
reinforcement of, or transit by NATO forces, as well as to deployment
of national forces in support of NATO, can be prejudicial to accession.
All have resolved or are in the process of resolving these obstacles.
Security. Another area of interest is the ability to protect
classified information. The aspirants have fairly strict traditions
regarding classified handling and are making good progress in the
establishment of national authorities and policies, investigative
clearance-granting services and document registries. Security of
communications and information systems is generally weaker than
physical and personnel security. Information assurance programs are at
varying levels of development and progress.
The military assessments of the aspirants, based on these criteria,
continue to be updated. It would be premature at this point to publicly
release relative comparisons or rankings.
CONCLUSION
It is important to reaffirm that NATO's overarching objective of
opening up the Alliance to new members is to enhance stability in
Europe as a whole, more than to expand NATO's military influence or
capabilities or to alter the nature of its basic defense posture.
Clearly, the aspirants have focused their efforts on areas crucial to
the previous NATO enlargement, as identified through the MAP process
The steady integration record of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic indicates further enlargement can be successfully managed.
While being cognizant of the dollar cost of enlargement, we should keep
in mind the potential costs of delaying enlargement. NATO remains
relevant and viable in the post-September 11 world, and the aspirant
nations offer limited but improving military capabilities and
infrastructure to the Alliance. I will be pleased to provide the
committee with any additional information it may require on this or
other matters of concern.
______
Prepared Statement by Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, USAF
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, it is my
privilege to appear before you as Commander in Chief, United States
European Command (USEUCOM), to discuss the posture of U.S. forces in
our theater. Since I last testified, USEUCOM has successfully promoted
stability, strengthened ties with countries throughout the theater and
maintained its ability to fight and win in armed conflict against all
types of enemies--including asymmetric threats like terrorism. We have
been able to do this because of your support in the past, and our
ability to continue these efforts depends wholly upon your continued
support in the future.
The USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses a vast
geographic region covering over 14 million square miles of the globe.
It includes 91 sovereign nations stretching from the northern tip of
Norway to South Africa, and from the Atlantic seaboard of Europe and
Africa to parts of the Middle East and beyond the Black Sea. Our AOR's
astonishing diversity encompasses the full range of human conditions:
some nations are among the wealthiest of the world, while others exist
in a state of abject poverty; some are open democracies with long
histories of respect for human liberties, while others are
dictatorships or failed states. Above all, USEUCOM's AOR is dynamic
with new opportunities and new challenges regularly emerging.
USEUCOM's missions are themselves complex and dynamic. The men and
women of the Command operate throughout Europe, Africa, the Levant, the
waters of the Mediterranean, and in the skies over Iraq. They serve in
the Balkans in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
peace operations, and support the war on terrorism from locations
throughout the theater. Through their presence, we maintain commitments
to our regional friends and allies and clearly demonstrate our intent
to preserve and protect our national interests. We do all of this with
minimal force presence and a moderate level of resources.
We also represent the U.S. contribution to NATO and promote U.S.
leadership within that vital organization. Far from a Cold War relic,
NATO's prompt invocation of Article V for the campaign against
terrorism demonstrated the strategic flexibility that makes it as
relevant today as it was 50 years ago. USEUCOM supports NATO's
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program with active bilateral and
multilateral relationships across Western and Central Europe, as well
as the area formerly within the Soviet Union. This security cooperation
contributes to the extraordinary democratic progress many nations have
achieved both militarily and politically. This interaction also helps
counter both conventional, coercive threats and international terrorism
by helping to ensure that our respective strategies are complementary.
By ensuring access, interoperability and intelligence cooperation, our
efforts have dramatically expanded the range of options available to
the President and Secretary of Defense. A similar process, adapted to
subregional conditions, helps maintain stability in the Middle East and
North Africa. All of these efforts depend on USEUCOM's core
capability--conducting rapid and decisive military operations across
the spectrum of conflict. When called, USEUCOM stands ready to step up
to a conflict and win it.
The horrific events of 11 September 2001 and shortly thereafter
acutely remind us of the conventional, chemical, biological, and,
potentially, nuclear terrorist threats that exist throughout the world.
At the same time, emerging opportunities within the theater are
allowing us to more effectively combat these threats to Americans both
abroad and at home. Indeed, several nations within our AOR have
provided intelligence, basing and overflight rights and other forms of
key support in our global efforts to combat terrorism. Without an
aggressive and continuous security cooperation program, many of these
opportunities would not have been possible. The continued pursuit of
these opportunities will allow us to more effectively accomplish our
most important mission--the protection of the American people and our
way of life.
To successfully prosecute the global campaign against terrorism in
Europe and Africa while remaining postured to meet emerging threats
across the spectrum of conflict, we particularly need your support in
four critical and interrelated areas--all of which are closely tied to
our supporting infrastructure. These four critical areas are force
protection; the sustainment, restoration and modernization (SRM) of our
existing infrastructure; new military construction (MILCON); and
modernization of our outdated command, control, communications, and
computers (C\4\) infrastructure.
Force protection is a fundamental concern and takes on an added
dimension in this theater because our forces' training, day-to-day
operations and off-duty and family time are spent on foreign soil. We
have realigned resources to assist in perimeter defense and reallocated
intelligence assets to more aggressively pursue analysis of terrorist
organizations and share intelligence with coalition partners and
allies. But still more needs to be done, and we need your continued
assistance in addressing force protection shortfalls. We also need your
support for continued, revitalized investment in the sustainment,
restoration, and modernization (SRM) of our existing infrastructure, as
well as new military construction. Our ability to project American
power, protect our forces and provide our service members with an
appropriate quality of life all depend on the health of our
installations and facilities. Finally, we need your help in modernizing
our woefully outdated command, control, communications, and computers
infrastructure. I will expand upon each of these needs later in this
statement, but first I would like to update you on our strategic vision
for the theater, our ongoing operations and security cooperation
initiatives, and some of the high-profile issues and unique challenges
we encounter in our area of responsibility.
STRATEGIC VISION OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
Consistent with the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, USEUCOM
envisions maintaining and posturing a force that will assure U.S.
allies and friends in our AOR, dissuade potential adversaries, deter
threats and counter coercion, and, if necessary, decisively defeat any
adversary.
Assure Allies and Friends: The presence of potent U.S.
forces served as a visible guarantee of U.S. commitment during
the long years of the Cold War. In today's security
environment, visible military presence lends credibility to
U.S. policy declarations that would not otherwise be
achievable. Because ``we are here,'' our allies and friends are
assured that they can count on us and they take our national
positions into account in their own political and military
decision processes. Likewise, a potential aggressor is less
likely to be deceived about U.S. commitment and resolve.
Dissuade Potential Adversaries: Against the backdrop
of continuing U.S. modernization and transformation, the
forward presence and activity of U.S. forces is a powerful
deterrent to potential aggressors who might contemplate a
military challenge against us or our friends and allies. U.S.
unilateral, Alliance, and coalition capability is so clearly
superior that most potential aggressors are dissuaded from
committing resources to a manifestly hopeless competition.
However, there remain asymmetric threats in the world today
that may not be influenced by our superior conventional
military capability alone. To dissuade these potential
adversaries we must continue to develop new, cooperative
capabilities to deter, and if necessary, defeat asymmetric
threats.
Deter Threats and Counter Coercion: Despite our
efforts to dissuade potential adversaries, a regime or group
may convince itself that the U.S. will not respond to
aggression because of a lack of will or interest, or
commitments elsewhere. USEUCOM is ready to respond with actions
to disabuse such actors of their mistaken impression and
simultaneously prepare for conflict should a miscalculation be
translated into action against us.
Decisively Defeat Any Adversary: History shows that
periodically, at unexpected times and places, we are confronted
with actual aggression. Whether military or non-military,
conventional or unconventional, proportional or asymmetric,
these threats can be highly destructive. USEUCOM stands ready
to face and defeat any aggression in our AOR.
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND STRATEGIC FUNDAMENTALS
To achieve the USEUCOM vision, we focus on four strategic
fundamentals: security cooperation, forward presence, readiness and
joint training, and interoperability.
Security Cooperation
Our strategic vision is best achieved in concert with allies,
partners and friends, and USEUCOM aggressively pursues a number of
programs that create conditions for coordinated, combined military
action. An example of this cooperative effort includes the commitment
made by Turkey during Operation Enduring Freedom to use its airspace,
bases and Special Forces units to assist in the war against terrorism.
Other NATO allies, as well as many non-NATO partners, have contributed
personnel and equipment to the fight against terrorism, the closely
associated humanitarian relief effort, or both. Our in-theater presence
and day-to-day military interaction with both our NATO allies and non-
NATO partners was key to bringing this commitment to fruition. Other
security efforts in theater include working with our friends throughout
Africa to improve their peacekeeping capabilities, increasing military
cooperation with Russia, and developing new relationships with
countries of the Caucasus region. These efforts have protected and
strengthened important U.S. economic and security interests, while
assuring our European friends that the U.S. remains committed to
European security.
Joint Training and Interoperability
Not only must we be concerned with our interoperability with our
partners in the theater, we must also be concerned with
interoperability among our own Armed Services. By exploiting the
symbiotic relationship between interoperability and joint training, we
capitalize on the opportunities to improve our readiness. Accordingly,
USEUCOM's training program, based on established mission requirements
and driven by training objectives, emphasizes both joint (multi-
service) and combined (multi-national) exercises within available
resources.
Although we have made substantive progress in materiel and
equipment interoperability among the services, information
interoperability remains a major challenge. As the technologies that
allow us to exchange information improve, it is important that we be
able to understand this information. We gain this level of information
interoperability through common systems architecture and through
practice in our joint and combined training and exercise events.
Forward Presence
Without a forward presence in Europe our activities in Africa,
Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus would be logistically and financially
prohibitive. The forward presence of strike platforms; intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; amphibious units; and
Special Forces is vital to our ability to conduct timely and effective
military operations. Make no mistake, our ability to rapidly respond to
crises is critical to the stability of our AOR. Our location, literally
``one ocean closer'' to many places of conflict, uniquely situates
USEUCOM as a strategic platform from which to rapidly project forces to
protect American interests. In the past year, our forces have been used
to both deter aggression and demonstrate U.S. resolve.
Readiness
The readiness of USEUCOM's assigned forces is our most significant
contribution to national security. Our security cooperation efforts
help sustain readiness by providing valuable training opportunities
while strengthening interoperability and relationships with those
alongside whom we may meet future threats. These activities help shape
the international environment by incorporating other nations and
improving our multinational expertise in the region. They also improve
our ability to respond unilaterally or in concert with other nations,
and they prepare us for the uncertain regional requirements of the
future. Thanks to the support of Congress, forces assigned to this
theater are well-prepared for their current operations. The Command's
forces are fully engaged and continue to rely upon augmentation and
Reserve Forces to carry out our many diverse missions. Dedicated young
men and women valiantly executing a wide variety of operations to
support our national strategy make up the heart of our theater readiness.
CURRENT OPERATIONS
Over the last year, the Nation called upon USEUCOM to demonstrate
its readiness by conducting a wide range of operations across the range
of military operations.
Operation Enduring Freedom
Following the events of 11 September, USEUCOM, in a cooperative
effort with U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), has played a significant
role in operations associated with the war on terrorism in Afghanistan.
Every USEUCOM component has provided invaluable personnel, equipment,
and logistics support to this effort. Tons of supplies and pre-
positioned equipment have been pushed rapidly forward to support
operations at remote locations. Ramstein Air Base, Germany served as a
vital staging base for U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
aircraft executing humanitarian assistance airdrop missions that
provided approximately 2.4 million rations in 197 sorties over a 3-
month period. On 15 November, three C-17s operating out of Ramstein Air
Base dropped over 105 tons of humanitarian supplies, including wheat,
blankets and daily rations in Afghanistan--the largest single drop in
history. Incirlik Air Base, Turkey also played a critical role,
supporting these C-17 air mobility missions with a forward based KC-135
aerial refueling capability. Additionally, Incirlik served as a
logistics hub for USCENTCOM bound humanitarian assistance missions
coming through USEUCOM's AOR, allowing those aircraft to deliver
thousands of pounds of humanitarian supplies. Those missions engendered
support within the population of Afghanistan for the U.S. cause and
undermined support to the Taliban.
USEUCOM has received and coordinated critical support from our NATO
allies in the war on terrorism. For more than 50 years, NATO looked
east, perfecting plans to rapidly move forces to reinforce Europeans
allies and halt aggression. It is an irony that the first time NATO
invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty, it was to send forces west
to help secure U.S. skies in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks.
NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) aircraft have been patrolling the
skies over North America, replacing U.S. Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) that have deployed in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom. NATO's Standing Naval Forces have also deployed to the Eastern
Mediterranean. Germany and Canada provided cargo aircraft and the
essential manpower and expertise to prepare and load cargo pallets for
shipment. Berlin also provided additional force protection personnel
from the German Army and National Police Force to guard key U.S.
facilities in Germany. The United Kingdom contributed directly to
strike missions in Afghanistan, and several countries, including the
UK, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark,
Portugal, Belgium, Canada, Greece, and Turkey have indicated their
willingness to assume prominent roles in the post-conflict
stabilization effort.
Our non-NATO partners in Europe have provided similar assistance.
Bulgaria's enthusiastic support of OEF serves as a case in point. Like
Ankara, Sofia provided basing rights for our tanker aircraft that
refuel the humanitarian flights. Romania, Sweden, and Finland have also
offered to assist in post-conflict stabilization. In short, while the
capabilities of each European nation are different, all can contribute
to this effort, and virtually all have. Some nations contributed
directly to the military strikes in Afghanistan, while others extended
over-flight rights, froze terrorist financial assets, and detained
suspected terrorists in their respective countries. USEUCOM has been,
and continues to be, center stage in coordinating these efforts among
our allies and friends in the AOR.
Operation Northern Watch
The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Operation Northern Watch
(ONW), consisting of forces from the U.S., Turkey and the United
Kingdom, continues to enforce the Northern No-Fly Zone (NNFZ) over Iraq
and monitor Iraqi compliance with applicable U.N. Security Council
resolutions. These missions are dangerous and complex, and in the last
year, Iraqi air defense challenges to these missions have become more
frequent. Coalition forces have taken all available force protection
measures. Saddam Hussein's strategy of eroding international support
for applicable U.N. resolutions may be threatened by new international
appreciation for the dangers of terrorism and rogue states. USEUCOM
will continue to play a prominent role in enforcing the NNFZ and in
ensuring Iraq's compliance with U.N. resolutions.
Balkan Operations
One of the greatest challenges to peace, stability, and democracy
in Europe is the integration of the Balkan states into the rest of the
continent, an objective the U.S. shares with our allies. Prospects for
regional stability have improved due to the international community's
focused and unified efforts. Recent developments, like the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) parliamentary approval of the
Framework Agreement and the peaceful provincial elections in Kosovo,
have increased regional stability.
We continue to scrutinize both the size and structure of U.S.
forces deployed to the Balkans, both unilaterally and as part of NATO's
Six Month Reviews (SMR). Operation Joint Forge continues to enforce the
General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) by providing military
presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina to deter hostilities, promoting a stable
environment, and supporting a transition to civil authority. In Bosnia,
force numbers have been reduced from 60,000 when the mission began, to
just over 17,000 personnel. Europe as a whole has endeavored to live up
to its personnel and financial commitments of support to Balkan
operations. Thirty-two nations contribute forces to the Stabilization
Force (SFOR), with the 28 European nations comprising 80 percent of the
combined force. The U.S. has reduced its troop commitment from over
20,000 (33 percent of the total force) in 1996 to 3,100 (approximately
18 percent) today. The way ahead in Bosnia remains contingent upon the
international community's ability to build civil institutions, reduce
and restructure indigenous armed forces, and promote the rule of law. A
key provision is the establishment of a competent Bosnian Police Force.
An international police presence is also required to assist Bosnian
police and provide in extremis protection to international personnel.
Further reductions in troop strength through the biannual NATO SMR are
possible.
Apprehending the remaining war criminals is an important aspect of
reestablishing the rule of law throughout the Balkans, and this remains
among SFOR's highest priorities. Within Bosnia, SFOR is continually on
the alert for fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), or for information that might lead to
their apprehension. By the ICTY's figures, the effort to bring war
criminals to justice has been successful. Since the Tribunal's
inception, 116 individuals have been publicly indicted with 30 still at
large--the vast majority of whom have not been heard from in a number
of years. There is little information available on the remaining few,
but we do know those still alive reside outside SFOR's mandated area;
rarely, if ever, enter Bosnia; and take extraordinary, potentially
violent precautions to remain free. When actionable intelligence is
available we act to detain these individuals. In addition to military
action, some of the accused have also come into custody through the
efforts of various national police forces and voluntary surrenders.
Many of the accused known to be alive and at large reside in locations
where the governments might be motivated to cooperate with the
international authorities through political or economic inducements.
This has arguably been successful in the past, with the most notable
example that of the arrest, imprisonment, and subsequent extradition of
Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague.
Operation Joint Guardian remains the lynchpin supporting NATO
military operations in Kosovo (KFOR). KFOR has just under 35,000 troops
deployed in Kosovo which is 4,000 less than when I testified to this
committee last year. This force is drawn from 34 nations, including
Russia, and, as in Bosnia, the Europeans have stepped up to this
commitment with 31 European countries deploying over 80 percent of the
total force. The U.S., with approximately 5,200 troops in Kosovo,
provides around 15 percent of the force. Despite the cessation of
active hostilities in the FYROM, sporadic violence still erupts
throughout the region. Although the number of violent actions appears
to be declining, KFOR continues to require a significant military
presence for the foreseeable future to deter renewed hostilities.
The international community has made substantial progress in laying
the foundation for returning the rule of law to Kosovo, and, just as in
Bosnia, this is where an exit strategy must begin. The United Nations
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) police force is currently supported by 51
nations. Additionally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe's (OSCE) Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) has graduated over
4,000 multi-ethnic officers since its inception in September 1999. The
U.N. policing plan is on target and continues to put officer graduates
alongside UNMIK veteran contract officers. The ultimate goal of this
endeavor is to replace the U.N. contract police force entirely, turning
law enforcement responsibilities over to the citizens of Kosovo. On the
other side of the equation, UNMIK has published more than 100
regulations with the force of law. They have also appointed more than
400 local judges and prosecutors, with five district courts and some
lower courts in operation. Finally, 11 international judges and five
international prosecutors have been appointed to the district courts,
and an international judge now sits on the Supreme Court.
The FYROM faces daunting new challenges with regard to its current
political and security situation. The government of FYROM recently
concluded a political settlement through a U.S./EU/NATO-brokered
Framework Agreement (FWA) with the country's four leading political
parties. This FWA successfully met the NATO-established preconditions
for facilitating the voluntary disarmament of the National Liberation
Army (NLA), called Operation Essential Harvest. NATO's North Atlantic
Council determined that a NATO mission, termed Operation Amber Fox,
would provide an in extremis extraction force to support OSCE and EU
monitors following Operation Essential Harvest. On 15 November 2001,
the FYROM Parliament ratified the FWA, which institutionalized
constitutional reforms. The return of FYROM security forces to crisis
regions is proceeding in coordination with EU and OSCE monitors.
One dynamic at work that raises concerns for all U.S. and NATO
forces in the Balkans is the presence of elements with ties to
international terrorist networks. Although to date no U.S. forces in
the Balkans have been attacked, the region has surfaced as a potential
trouble spot in our war against terrorism. Accordingly, we have
developed an aggressive, regional counterterrorism program that
includes U.S. and Alliance military forces, our respective national
agencies and, to the maximum degree possible, the local Balkan
governments. We are using tactical counterintelligence and human
intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities to great effect in identifying
terrorist network operations and curtailing them throughout the region.
Continuing to invest in HUMINT and engaging the population to develop
information on potential threats and their intentions is important both
to peace and stability operations in the Balkans and to our global
counterterrorism efforts.
Operation Focus Relief
Although now complete, Operation Focus Relief is a clear example of
a USEUCOM success story in Africa. The impetus for Operation Focus
Relief was the near collapse of the United Nations Aid Mission in
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in early 2000. The U.S. committed to train and
equip military forces from West African nations in the essential skills
required to participate in U.N. Chapter VII peacekeeping operations in
Sierra Leone. In the fall of 2000, Special Forces under the operational
control of Special Operations Command, Europe, began training and
equipping light infantry battalions from Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal to
meet the challenges posed by antigovernment forces in Sierra Leone.
U.N. officials have acknowledged the performance of the U.S. trained
troops, and the situation in Sierra Leone has improved. Initiatives
like OFR train Africans to help themselves, reduce the potential need
for U.S. troops to be deployed to the continent, and provide a valuable
opportunity for military-to-military interaction and the promotion of
democratic values in an area of increasing importance to U.S. global
interests. OFR and operations like it are a worthwhile investment.
MILITARY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES
Beyond current operations, USEUCOM remains engaged in a wide range
of cooperative security and military activities designed to strengthen
our strategic partnerships and better prepare us to meet future crises.
Defense Cooperation and Security Assistance
Defense cooperation and security assistance programs are vital to
attaining foreign policy and national security objectives. These
programs promote interoperability with U.S. forces and help to build
professional, capable militaries in friendly and allied nations.
Through 40 Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC), we are in partnership
with U.S. embassies throughout the theater conducting military security
cooperation in support of U.S. objectives, to include promoting an
international coalition capable of fighting terrorism.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides irreplaceable resources
for modernizing the military forces of our friends and allies, and has
been essential to U.S. influence during the dynamic transformation of
Central and Eastern Europe and key African partners. FMF assists
nations without the means to acquire U.S. military goods, services and
training and provides access to U.S. expertise in defense restructuring
and management. These programs, designed to promote interoperability,
are essential to our coalition operations. A priority this year is
restoring FMF to Turkey, an indispensable ally who has demonstrated the
value of its geo-strategic position in virtually all of our on-going
operations.
Likewise, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of $4.5 billion in fiscal
year 2001 to Europe demonstrate the continued primacy of Trans-Atlantic
defense relationships to U.S. security interests. FMS encourages
interoperability between U.S. and European forces, maintains a strong
U.S. presence in the development and implementation of the Defense
Capabilities Initiative (DCI), and helps modernize the militaries of
new friends and partners in ways critical to our security interests. We
have worked closely with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and
the services to ensure that USEUCOM's priorities are reflected in the
fiscal year 2003 budget request.
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
IMET is perhaps our greatest tool for promoting long-term
beneficial change in foreign militaries, as foreign military and
civilian leaders encounter firsthand the American civil-military
culture. IMET focuses on professional development, the role of the
military in a democratic society and English language training. In
fiscal year 2001, the program trained almost 1,450 military and
civilian international students in U.S. military schools. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, IMET is particularly important as it provides
educational opportunities that emphasize and reinforce civilian control
of the military, which contributes to domestic stability. The increase
in IMET funding for fiscal year 2002 is absolutely the right course of
action, providing a great return for a relatively small investment.
Partnership for Peace (PfP)
NATO's PfP program continues to meet its goal of deepening
interaction, extending stability in Eastern Europe, providing
consultation mechanisms for participants who feel threatened, assisting
in the pursuit of democratic reforms, and preparing nations for
possible NATO membership. Besides underpinning strategic stability in
Central and Eastern Europe, the program provides a basis for
cooperation with Central Asian states supporting our war on terrorism.
By including partner nations in NATO combined joint task force (CJTF)
exercises, we have increased coalition interoperability, which now
allows partner nations to contribute to NATO operations in the Balkans
and provide structure for regional security initiatives.
Regional Centers for Security Studies
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is at
the forefront of our regional security cooperation efforts in Western
and Central Europe as well as Eurasia. A jointly funded U.S. and German
venture, the Center strengthens security cooperation among European
nations and serves as an indispensable institution for bilateral and
multilateral activities, and military and civilian exchanges throughout
the region. The Marshall Center is an important part of our interaction
with Russia. In fact, the Center's largest participating nation is
Russia (147 individuals), with Romania second (127), and Ukraine third
(125). Over 6,000 military and civilian leaders from North America,
Europe and Eurasia have participated in Marshall Center programs since
1994. As a result, the Center has helped nations develop national
security strategy documents, restructure crisis management programs,
improve their defense management resource processes, properly balance
military expenditures, and undertake responsible defense reforms.
Marshall Center graduates continue to move into positions of
increasingly greater influence. They now include over 50 Ministers/
Deputy Ministers of Defense, Chiefs/Deputy Chiefs of Defense, cabinet
officials, parliamentarians, ambassadors, and flag officers.
Building on the success of the Marshall Center, the Africa Center
for Strategic Studies (ACSS) was established in December 1999. ACSS
provides a series of seminars, symposia, conferences, and outreach
programs designed to promote good governance and democratic values in
the African defense and security sectors. The Center conducted two
seminars in fiscal year 2001, the first in Gabon during February and
the second in Ghana during August. In the absence of a permanent site
on the African continent, ACSS currently rotates the location of its
seminars. Once ACSS is permanently located in Africa, it will be
continuously and more effectively involved with the countries on the
continent. The Center verifies America's long-term commitment to work
with our partners in Africa, while enhancing our national strategy
through relatively low-cost, high-impact engagement opportunities.
The mission of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic
Studies (NESA CSS) is to enhance stability by providing an academic
environment where regional strategic issues can be addressed,
partnerships fostered, defense related decision-making improved, and
cooperation strengthened among military and civilian leaders from the
region and the U.S. Located at the National Defense University in
Washington, NESA CSS held its inaugural event 31 October 2000. Since
its inauguration, the center has conducted three executive or senior
executive level seminars, as well as a short seminar focusing on
National Missile Defense. After 11 September, NESA CSS initiated a
``Washington Seminar Series'' on counterterrorism to foster a coalition
to deal with this threat. Like ACSS and the Marshall Center, NESA CSS
provides a low cost, high-impact engagement opportunity that solidifies
America's commitment to work with Near East and South Asian partners in
a way that supports our national strategy and objectives.
African Crisis Response Initiative
The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is a security
cooperation activity designed to enhance the training and operational
capabilities of African militaries for increased participation in
multinational humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations. The
program is managed jointly by the Department of State and the
Department of Defense (DOD), with USEUCOM designated by DOD as the
executive agent for all military training. ACRI has trained militaries
in eight African nations to date. The goal of ACRI is to
institutionalize self-sustaining military skill sets and crisis
response capabilities within African militaries. ACRI trained forces
could be offered by their governments for peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations upon request by the United Nations, the Organization of
African Unity, subregional African organizations, or other
multinational coalitions. ACRI works to shape the African military
culture by promoting professional and apolitical militaries,
reinforcing respect for human rights and providing a strong example of
democratic, civil-military relations. Because ACRI promotes stability
and security in a volatile region, USEUCOM supports continuing the
program to include adding new partner nations and assisting current
partners in sustaining proficiency. We should also expand the
relationship with subregional organizations and increase crisis
response capabilities at the multinational level.
THEATER ISSUES
Each unified command has its own high visibility issues within its
geographic boundaries. This section addresses the most prominent of
those in the USEUCOM area of responsibility.
U.S. Support to NATO
U.S. funding commitments to NATO are based on obligations agreed to
at the North Atlantic Council (NAC), composed of representatives from
each of the member nations. Shortfalls in U.S. funding for NATO have
been chronic in the past and have only served to erode American
credibility and thwart our national programs while forcing DOD to
divert monies from other mission essential areas. I encourage Congress
to recognize that full funding of our NATO commitments will help ensure
the full execution of national programs, as well as the continued
security and stability of Europe.
NATO Enlargement
NATO membership addresses a major preoccupation of Central European
states with their national security by extending the common defense
guarantee of Article V. While NATO has successfully evolved into an
organization capable of conflict prevention and management, the
Alliance's invocation of Article V following the 11 September terrorist
attacks and the many contributions of NATO allies and aspirants to the
counterterrorism effort, have demonstrated that NATO's collective
defense role maintains value. Indeed, the war on terrorism has provoked
new thinking about NATO's role in the future, as well as the benefits
of admitting new members given the tremendous support of the aspirant
nations in the wake of the attack. Nine nations--Albania, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia--all aspire to an invitation to join
the Alliance during the Prague summit in November of this year.
President Bush affirmed strong U.S. support for the open door policy,
underscoring that the U.S. ``will be prepared to make concrete,
historic decisions with allies to advance NATO enlargement'' at Prague.
Ultimately, political factors and allied consensus will determine
each aspirant's suitability for membership. As our military
contribution to this process, USEUCOM has provided detailed defense
assessments of each aspirant's military readiness to the Pentagon. The
nine aspirants have greatly benefited from U.S.-funded defense reform
studies and the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) with its associated
Partnership Goals in addressing these challenges. These mechanisms have
provided a valuable roadmap toward democratic military reform and
interoperability.
Defense Capabilities Initiative
The objective of the Defense Capabilities Initiative, launched at
NATO's 1999 Washington summit, is to ensure the effectiveness of
multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions.
The Initiative's two primary thrusts, improving national capabilities
and exploring means to pool capabilities, allow our allies and partners
to enhance interoperability, take advantage of economies of scale, and
afford participation to those countries that lack the resources to act
alone. The Defense Capabilities Initiative contains 58 classified
objectives in 5 broad categories: deployability and mobility,
sustainability and logistics, effective engagement, survivability, and
command and control.
In June 2001, a North Atlantic Council Defense Ministers Session in
Brussels acknowledged progress in some Defense Capabilities Initiative
areas, but noted a number of critical and long-standing deficiencies in
others. Emphasizing the political, diplomatic, and economic advantages
afforded by multilateral operational capability, NATO Secretary-General
Lord Robertson has repeatedly encouraged improved capabilities by two
means: more efficient use of available resources, and when necessary,
increased funding.
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
The EU remains committed to developing a common ESDP among its
members, and the 11 September attacks have enhanced that commitment.
Clearly, this is a positive development. In our view, ESDP can
strengthen Europe's security posture as long as it is achieved in a
manner that is complementary to NATO, not in competition with it. Both
U.S. and NATO interests are best served by a relationship with the EU
that results in transparency and cooperation. Accordingly, U.S.
leadership must continue to assist efforts to harmonize NATO and EU
policies and avoid duplication of command, control, communications,
computers and intelligence (C\4\I) structures and processes. NATO's
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) should continue to
play the central role in military planning to meet crises and
contingencies. Likewise, if the EU were to create a duplicate planning
headquarters, it would only serve to make it more confusing to develop
coherent plans and hence, complicate the process of gaining the
consensus needed to act. The EU should also seek to avoid investing
limited resources in ESDP capabilities that are redundant with, as
opposed to complementary to, NATO capabilities. Equally important is
avoiding the imposition of dual mission requirements on units and
resources already stretched thin. The best way to do this is to give
the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander a robust role as strategic
coordinator for both NATO and EU-led operations.
Missile Defense
The evil of terrorism is a real global threat, with certain radical
groups and nations willing to utilize any available weapon of mass
destruction to further their cause. As potentially hostile states work
to develop long-range missiles to coerce and threaten countries in
North America and Europe, we must be prepared to respond to the worst
possible threats. As the President has made clear, we must have a
missile defense capability that protects not only the U.S. and our
deployed forces, but also our friends and allies. As we develop missile
defense, USEUCOM will continue to consult with our friends in the AOR.
The argument that Europe would be more secure if the U.S. were less
secure from a missile attack is unreasonable. An America less
vulnerable to accidental or rogue attack will be less distracted from
the issues associated with European defense and other common security
interests. What we have found in discussions with our allies is not
necessarily an argument with the concept of a missile defense, but
rather concern for the future relationship between the U.S. and Russia.
These concerns have softened significantly following the discussions
last year between Presidents Bush and Putin. NATO Secretary-General
Robertson, in tandem with U.S. policymakers, also continues to develop
this issue through NATO's political structure.
REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Russia
Although newly assigned to USEUCOM's AOR [UCP Resolution
Dependent], Russia clearly plays an immense role in the theater. U.S.
and Russian forces maintain excellent working relationships within the
two Balkan missions, SFOR and KFOR. Everyday, troops from our two
countries conduct combined training and execute common missions side-
by-side as we continue to strengthen stability in the region. In
addition to the strong cooperation in the Balkans, USNAVEUR has taken a
leading role in security cooperation between the U.S. and Russian
Federation navies. The Russian Federation Navy participated in this
year's BALTOPS 01 exercise, and recent events between the Russian Black
Sea Fleet and the U.S. Sixth Fleet have shown that our respective naval
forces can successfully operate together. Planning for future events
continues, as a Russia-U.S.-U.K. working group conference hosted by the
Royal Navy in London laid the groundwork for a five-day conference and
wargame to be held in May 2002. The shared threat of international
terrorism, particularly that propagated by Islamic extremists, offers
the chance for further political, diplomatic, and, potentially,
military cooperation.
While there are several signs of improvement in the U.S.-Russian
military relationship, the Russian military has not yet completely
committed itself to a wider, long-term security cooperation program.
Although President Putin currently supports U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism, Russian defense officials remain cautious of U.S. motives
and intentions, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Still,
the Putin administration's increased interaction with both the U.S. and
NATO, offers us new opportunities to reduce suspicions and build mutual
trust.
Caucasus
The importance of Caucasus oil and gas reserves and their ability
to meet growing European energy needs, comes precisely at a time when
Russia is still immersed in its yet to be completed social, political,
and economic evolution. It also comes at a time when China is emerging
as a major regional economic and political power, with vastly increased
energy requirements. With relief from the restrictions of Section 907
of the Freedom Support Act, USEUCOM can more effectively embark upon a
program of military interaction in the Caucasus. Contacts with
Azerbaijan and Armenia will ensure these countries are exposed to a
long-standing democratic military model, and will also enable us to
exploit the opportunities these countries, particularly Azerbaijan,
offer the United States in support of the war on terrorism.
Azerbaijan is integral to the stability of Eurasia. Its geo-
strategic position; pro-western economic, political and military
orientation; and its abundant energy resources, have already proven to
be high priorities for USEUCOM security cooperation efforts.
Azerbaijan's cooperation, as demonstrated through the offer of its
airfields during OEF and its hosting of a NATO PfP exercise, sends a
positive signal of its commitment to be a valuable and reliable ally. A
stable Azerbaijan is necessary not only because of its vast energy
deposits, but also because it can help forestall terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Armenia, historically a strategic partner with Russia, has also
persistently and vocally pursued closer ties to the U.S. at the highest
levels. Armenia's motivation lies in its eagerness to enlist the U.S.
to mitigate historically hostile relations with Turkey and attract
potential economic development assistance and investment that Russia
cannot provide. Armenia has asked for U.S. advice on establishing a
program of instruction for a national military senior service college
and for help in establishing peacekeeping units that could participate
in international efforts such as the Balkans. With relief from the
restrictions of Section 907, USEUCOM will be able to take advantage of
these opportunities.
Our military interaction with Georgia has continued to increase
since that nation was added to USEUCOM's AOR 4 years ago. Georgia
hosted its first multinational NATO PfP exercise with USEUCOM support
in 2001, providing a good example of the kind of security cooperation
opportunities we can achieve, not only there, but also potentially in
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Based on Department of State guidance, USEUCOM
is considering an ambitious program to assist in the reformation of the
Georgian armed forces, from top to bottom, to provide the government of
Georgia the ability to better defend and secure its sovereignty. It is
important to note that Georgia's internal security situation has only
recently begun to stabilize, and we remain concerned about the presence
of terrorist-related activities there. We are addressing these concerns
in our own counterterrorism campaign.
Middle East
Israel, Syria, and Lebanon lie within USEUCOM's area of
responsibility, and, of course, this is an area where tensions continue
to run high. Our extensive military security cooperation with Israel
continues. The U.S. is actively involved at all levels with the Israeli
Defense Force in joint research and development projects, combined
civil-military projects, joint commercial ventures, military-to-
military discussions, military exercises and many high level military
and civilian visits. The U.S. provides Israel with over $2 billion
annually in foreign military financing.
Due primarily to its position on the State Department's list of
state sponsors of terrorism, Syria currently receives no U.S. economic
aid or support, is ineligible for any security assistance programs,
receives few political visits from U.S. leaders, and maintains no
routine military-to-military contact with USEUCOM. Similarly, our aid
to Lebanon is nominal, including only a small amount of IMET funding.
While Syria and Lebanon condemned the al Qaida attacks, they disagree
with our identification of groups such as Hizballah as foreign
terrorist organizations. They instead view such groups as ``freedom
fighters'' battling against foreign occupation. We must endeavor to
persuade Syria and Lebanon to join us in actively combating
international terrorist groups.
North Africa
Most nations of North Africa have condemned the 11 September
attacks and have offered varying levels of support to our efforts to
fight terrorism. Morocco and Tunisia remain two of our staunchest long-
term allies on the African continent, and we regularly conduct
exercises and other activities with their armed forces. Both
traditionally have been moderate voices in the Arab world, and we will
continue to rely on them to help stem the tide of terrorism and radical
extremism.
Our current engagement strategy with Algeria is characterized by a
slow, measured approach. While military security cooperation is closely
tied to Algerian progress in implementing political and economic
reform, the attacks on 11 September have brought about an interagency
effort to increase cooperation with Algeria, specifically in those
areas that will aid in countering terrorism. For example, small
investments in border security will increase regional stability and
reduce the threat of transnational terrorism emanating from Algeria.
Libya has long been a key source of tension in North Africa.
Qadhafi's traditional support to various subversive and dissident
groups has been detrimental to regional stability and opposed to U.S.
goals in Africa. Recently, however, as Qadhafi has attempted to reenter
the world stage, Tripoli has made overtures seeking to normalize
relations with the U.S. While it is too early to determine the
legitimacy of these overtures, we should determine the best interagency
approach to influence Libya's policy against terrorism, while promoting
regional stability.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa is a geographically immense and diverse region.
Significant economic, ethnic, cultural, political, and environmental
differences have contributed to a climate of conflict and instability
in which no fewer than three major conflicts rage and others continue
to smolder. Although there are pockets of terrorist-related activities
in this region of Africa, we also find examples of peaceful change.
There is ample evidence of democratic governance and integration of
former opponents into governments and militaries earnestly striving for
the advancement of the nations they represent and defend. Our challenge
at USEUCOM is to accentuate these positive trends while helping to
contain and resolve problems. USEUCOM has identified several objectives
for its military cooperation activities in Sub-Saharan Africa,
primarily based on the need to protect U.S. citizens or assets and
support the global war on terrorism.
Finally, one cannot address Sub-Saharan Africa without considering
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(HIV/AIDS) epidemic. This human tragedy is characterized in some areas
by infection rates reaching 40 percent. This will be a destabilizing
factor for years to come. USEUCOM seeks to ameliorate this disaster by
leveraging tools such as the Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention
Program to support AIDS education and behavior modification efforts in
African militaries. The goal is to prevent the spread of the virus when
African armies deploy to support peacekeeping operations and respond to
humanitarian crises.
CHALLENGES AND SHORTFALLS
USEUCOM faces a number of challenges as we seek to best posture our
forces for success against present and emerging threats to U.S.
national interests. This section describes some of those challenges and
how we are meeting them, and requests your assistance in addressing
some of our shortfalls.
Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP)
We view force protection in the accomplishment of our mission as a
primary concern. The attacks on 11 September served as a painful
reminder that terrorism can strike anywhere and at anytime. As we weigh
our current intelligence capabilities in theater against the layered
deterrent imperatives required for this new operational environment, we
need your support to improve several areas. I will focus on our needs
regarding infrastructure later in this statement, but at this point, I
would like to address some other aspects of force protection.
We are enhancing our security posture both through improved
physical measures at our installations and by improving intelligence
gathering and sharing with our coalition partners and law enforcement
agencies to afford timely warning. Our programs and posture have
increased dramatically in recent years to include public awareness,
training, physical security upgrades, and formal agreements with U.S.
ambassadors that clearly delineate force protection responsibilities
for DOD personnel. In June 2001, we updated our USEUCOM AT/FP
Operations Order to include recommendations from the Cole Commission.
We also developed a program called the Vulnerability Assessment
Management Program to track installation vulnerabilities and to take
corrective actions when necessary. We trained 170 new unit level AT/FP
officers in fiscal year 2001. Over the last year, we began developing a
database called the Joint Risk Assessment Management Program to capture
intelligence, operational, and logistical information and provide
threat and vulnerability assessments for forces in transit in our
theater.
We have augmented these efforts with a new, complementary database
that captures all local, USEUCOM-reported incidents and actions that
might be related to terrorist activity. With these tools, we seek to
improve the networked operations of warfighters in USEUCOM, other U.S.
agencies, and our allies. We have broken new ground with DOD and non-
DOD law enforcement agencies to integrate into our data networks their
sensitive information and intelligence in order to gain a clearer
picture of terrorist activity. Our law enforcement and
counterintelligence elements provide access to foreign counterparts and
serve as conduits for time-sensitive information exchange. As a result,
we have been able to provide timely intelligence information to foreign
law enforcement entities regarding suspected terrorist travel and
activity, resulting in surveillance operations, arrests, and
detentions. Moreover, information provided to us by foreign law
enforcement and counterintelligence counterparts has allowed us to
refocus our own limited intelligence assets.
We are working closely with other U.S. agencies, like the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and with our partner nations to eradicate
support for global terrorism through a wide range of military, law
enforcement, and economic means. While we have witnessed many successes
in this effort, I am still concerned that we do not have the most
efficient and effective processes to attain information dominance and
decision superiority in this war. We need to examine ways for new
technologies and information exchange to enhance our success. For that
reason, we created a Joint Interagency Coordination Group to strengthen
the relationship with all government agencies and USEUCOM partners on
terrorist activities in this theater. We received strong support from
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in
this effort. Several ambassadors in the region have also been very
supportive. In order to defeat terrorist networks, it is essential to
improve coordination among all instruments of national and
international power that contribute to this objective. Your continued
support of U.S. involvement in this and related activities is important
and appreciated.
Theater Basing
Last August the Secretary of Defense directed that all combatant
commanders review their overseas basing requirements and examine
opportunities for joint use of facilities and land by the services,
consolidation of infrastructure, and enhanced training. USEUCOM will
submit the findings of this Overseas Basing Requirements Study (OBRS)
to the Joint Staff in March. In addressing the OBRS, we are seeking
basing efficiencies through a detailed review of existing
infrastructure utilization. By identifying potential excess
installations and means of making more efficient use of our existing
infrastructure, we are ensuring that our future military construction
(MILCON) and sustainment, restoration and modernization (SRM)
investments are focused on enduring installations.
Much of the groundwork for the OBRS was well underway over a year
ago when USEUCOM established a formal theater basing working group in
an effort to bring together the basing plans of each of our service
components, address the issues that cross service lines, and best
posture our in-theater forces to meet current and emerging threats. The
release of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provided the working
group with the force structure information needed to pursue an
appropriate basing strategy. The QDR does not cite any significant
changes in force structure in the European theater other than planning
for an Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) over the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP). Preliminary planning for IBCT conversion is underway
and is reflected in USAREUR's efficient basing initiatives.
USAREUR's Efficient Basing East (EBE) consolidation is currently in
the design phase. In addition to the $25 million appropriated by
Congress for the design phase, $68.7 million of construction funding
will be part of DOD's fiscal year 2003 MILCON request. Consistent with
the objectives of the OBRS, EBE is an initiative to enhance readiness,
gain efficiencies, and improve the well-being of 3,500 soldiers and
5,000 family members by re-stationing a brigade combat team (BCT) from
13 widely dispersed installations to a single location in Grafenwoehr,
Germany. Executing this initiative will facilitate command and control,
lower transportation costs, allow for better force protection, improve
access to training areas, eliminate over 5 million square feet of
excess inventory, and reduce annual base operations costs by up to
$39.5 million. USAREUR's other major basing initiative, titled
Efficient Basing South (EBS), is likewise consistent with the OBRS
objectives. EBS, which consists of adding a second airborne battalion
in Italy in the fiscal years 2002-2004 timeframe, will provide USEUCOM
with enhanced early entry capabilities and increased flexibility. To
reduce the total cost, USAREUR plans to base this unit at their
existing facility near Vicenza. Approximately $120 million in
additional MILCON funding in fiscal year 2003 has been included for the
expansion of barracks, child development centers, and schools to
support this efficient basing initiative.
USAFE is also working to consolidate its geographically separated
units throughout the AOR to its enduring, major operating bases.
Similarly, USNAVEUR is proceeding with consolidations at Gaeta, La
Maddalena, and London. Finally, in coordination with U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM), we are investigating potential joint
basing options for Special Operations Forces (SOF) stationed in our
AOR. This, too, will provide greater crisis response capabilities,
enhanced joint training opportunities, and improved efficiencies.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Shortfalls
USEUCOM requires an integrated architecture to collect, collate,
filter, and process data from disparate sources of information,
allowing analysts to detect, identify, analyze and predict potential
threats within our AOR. DOD initiatives to provide unified commanders
with organic, multi-discipline intelligence collection capabilities--to
include airborne collectors like unmanned aerial vehicles and
measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) capabilities--are
particularly helpful in this regard. We appreciate your support for
these and similar initiatives that enhance our ISR architecture.
En Route Infrastructure
En route infrastructure is critically important for strategic
deployment and sustainment. Here again, the war on terrorism provides a
useful example. Throughout Operation Enduring Freedom, USEUCOM and
USTRANSCOM have partnered together with our NATO allies to support
USCENTCOM. The European En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee
provided the framework for this successful partnership and is the
mechanism we must leverage to improve deployment capabilities.
Virtually all of the forces and supplies transported to USCENTCOM went
through and were supported by infrastructure belonging to our NATO
southern flank allies: Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Turkey. The Spanish
bases, Moron and Rota, in particular, are essential to ensuring optimal
force flow in contingency operations; but they are not as well
developed as we would like. While our allies have given their approval
for our construction projects and all remaining construction is in the
FYDP, we must maintain our commitment.
Air Traffic Control
The tremendous growth in the air traffic and communication
industries in Europe presents increasing challenges for air traffic
control agencies, civil air carriers, and military aviation. At the
same time, expansion of communication technologies is threatening to
overtax a limited radio frequency spectrum. To address these
challenges, many countries are mandating more efficient air traffic
communications systems and avionics. Due to its current air traffic
congestion, Europe is leading worldwide implementation in this regard.
Accordingly, we need to equip our aircraft with the new communications
capabilities they require for flight in European airspace.
KEY SUPPORT IN THEATER
Considering the scope of our mission, along with the size and
diversity of our AOR, we rely extensively on support from several
organizations. I would like to point out the contributions of a couple
of those organizations, in particular, upon which we rely daily.
Reserve Units
The variability of USEUCOM missions and requirements demands full
access to the total spectrum of service capability offered by the
Reserve components (RC). Quite simply the mission cannot be
accomplished without RC assistance across the full spectrum of
operations. In fiscal year 2001, the RC provided approximately 1.5
million man-days of support to the theater. This figure represents the
equivalent of an additional 3,981 full time service members in theater.
Over the past year there were on average 2,800 RC service members
deployed in support of Balkans operations at any one time. They
currently provide 60 percent of U.S. forces in SFOR and 10 percent of
U.S. forces in KFOR. Since the start of Balkans operations, there have
been over 14,000 Army reservists and over 9,000 Army Guardsmen deployed
to the Balkans. We also requested the mobilization of nearly 150
Reserve members to augment HQ USEUCOM for Operation Enduring Freedom.
USEUCOM's four Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity sites in the
continental United States--another invaluable RC contribution--play an
integral role in the theater intelligence analysis and production
architecture. The reservists at these sites provide 40 percent of the
Joint Analysis Center's (JAC) scheduled production, allowing the JAC
the flexibility to reorient its production effort to support expanding
contingency operations.
Reserve component contributions in support of USCINCEUR's Theater
Security Cooperation plans are also significant. RC forces are a
primary source of manpower for USEUCOM's Joint Contact Team Program and
the PfP exercise program. RC forces and service members provide real
world contributions through unilateral and combined exercises involving
USEUCOM, NATO partners, and PfP countries. This RC involvement is the
primary way to lower the active force operating tempo and capitalize on
providing Reserve expertise to enhance USEUCOM exercises.
Another important security cooperation program carried out by
Reserve Forces is the State Partnership Program (SPP), which assists
partner nations in making the transition from authoritarian to
democratic governments. This program matches emerging democracies in
the AOR with partner states in the U.S. Currently there are 19 states
partnered with 17 foreign nations in the AOR. This past year was
extremely successful as National Guard soldiers and airmen conducted
over 250 events with partner nations. Civic leader visits to SPP
partner nations are particularly important. Relations that began as
simple military-to-military contacts within the SPP have blossomed into
associations encompassing nearly every facet of society--unit
partnerships, sister cities, student exchanges, scientific
collaborations, and business ties. This ability to interact with our
partner nations in all sectors of society is the key strength of the
SPP. It has acted as a stabilizing influence throughout the USEUCOM
AOR, and will continue to do so in years to come.
SPP has been so successful that USEUCOM is aggressively seeking
funding to expand the program to Africa, starting with South Africa and
Morocco. Although the challenges faced by African nations differ from
those of Eastern Europe, many nations are ready for the opportunity
that SPP provides. For a small investment, we can provide candidate
nations access to the expertise of an entire state government
infrastructure ranging from public health to wildlife management. A
state government more closely resembles the government structure of a
small African nation. The SPP will serve as a tremendous complement to
our traditional African engagement activities.
National Intelligence Support
USEUCOM depends heavily on other government agencies for the
intelligence and information needed to meet our mission requirements.
The Defense Information Systems Agency--Europe (DISA-E) provides
critical long-haul and other communications to USEUCOM, service
components, and coalition partners during peacetime, contingencies, and
wartime. DISA actively supports SFOR, KFOR, ONW, and other USEUCOM
missions by engineering the communications needed to transport
intelligence data from multiple collection sources via processing
points and on to the warfighters. DISA is also developing the Global
Information Grid, which promises to enhance our ability to maintain
information superiority on the battlefield by increasing information
access and transfer rates. We also depend heavily upon the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA's Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
Service--to include both the Defense Attache System and the Forward
Operating Bases--routinely provides critical information, and we
strongly advocate expanding this program in the USEUCOM AOR. DIA's
resources are critical to our counterterrorism efforts as well as to
our other ongoing contingency operations. Another DIA initiative, the
Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), is
providing a much-needed conduit for strong collaborative doctrine and
interoperable databases to service the unified command customer.
Critical to these DIA efforts will be the release of data from the
Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency (NSA). NSA
products and services continue to be force multipliers for USEUCOM, and
we support NSA's transformation to a distributed architecture that
promises to enhance the synergy between national and tactical signals
intelligence (SIGINT) assets. Our SIGINT analytic capability must be
robust and must keep pace with technology. Finally, the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) provides important geospatial
information, imagery, and imagery analysis to support USEUCOM
operations. NIMA has repeatedly demonstrated its responsiveness to
USEUCOM crisis operations; however, the geospatial resources required
to support the global operations needed to meet today's crises are
limited. Moreover, NIMA, and the intelligence community in general,
suffers from a lack of experienced imagery analysts which threatens our
ability to provide timely and accurate indications and warning and to
support ongoing operations throughout the theater. We hope that you
will look favorably upon providing DISA, DIA, NSA, and NIMA the
resources they need to effectively support us.
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
Recent operations, including OEF, well illustrate the unified
commands' critical dependence upon the strategic mobility afforded by
USTRANSCOM. Quite frankly, without USTRANSCOM's strategic lift support,
we would be hard-pressed to execute OEF or virtually any other
contingency operation. The recent QDR and defense plans indicate an
increased demand for strategic airlift support, and USTRANSCOM merits
your help in this regard.
INFRASTRUCTURE: USEUCOM'S FOREMOST INVESTMENT NEED
The quality of our theater infrastructure impacts everything we do
in USEUCOM. Sound infrastructure is critical to conducting our mission
and to providing our service members and their families with an
appropriate quality of life. Taking care of people enhances readiness,
retention and, ultimately, mission accomplishment. To this end, the
service men and women of USEUCOM should be afforded a standard of
living equal to their counterparts stationed at home. To be quite
frank, we are not there yet, and we need your support to make this
imperative a reality. To simultaneously contribute to the global
campaign against terrorism, maintain our ability to rapidly respond to
regional threats to U.S. interests, and afford our forward-based forces
a reasonable level of force protection and a suitable quality of life,
we specifically need you to invest in four inter-related facets of our
infrastructure. These four facets are improved force protection and
antiterrorism measures; sustainment, restoration, and modernization
(SRM) of our enduring facilities; new MILCON; and command, control,
communications, and computers (C\4\) enhancement.
Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Infrastructure Improvements
USEUCOM components received $30.4 million in fiscal year 2001
Emergency Supplemental funding following the 11 September attacks. We
greatly appreciate Congress' efforts to provide us with this much-
needed infusion of resources, which allowed us to significantly improve
our secure communications capabilities, upgrade our physical security,
and generally increase the protection of our installations. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Combating Terrorism Initiative
Fund has also been instrumental in mitigating some of our force
protection vulnerabilities. In fiscal year 2001 the command received
$5.8 million in these funds, which helped eliminate some weaknesses
identified through vulnerability assessments.
While Emergency Supplemental funding and Combating Terrorism
Initiative Funds are steps in the right direction, adequate resources
continue to be a major challenge for AT/FP service priorities. As
mentioned earlier, we have taken several procedural steps to improve
our force protection posture through enhanced coalition intelligence
and early warning systems, but we must still address physical
installation vulnerabilities. Assessments at both the theater
headquarters and component levels by the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency's Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment program have
helped identify installation vulnerabilities and underscored the need
for additional funding. We reviewed our most critical AT/FP shortfalls
and prioritized our remaining unfunded requirements. These include
strengthening U.S. facilities against chemical, biological, and
radiological threats and mass casualty-producing explosive devices, as
well as improving the access control features at installation entry
points.
Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM)
Sustaining, restoring, and modernizing our work and living
environments are critical to USEUCOM mission accomplishment. DOD has
programmed full funding for USEUCOM housing SRM, but working areas and
facilities continue to be a concern. Like barracks and family housing,
the work environment is improving, but at a slower rate. Throughout the
theater there are still work environments that are overcrowded and have
inadequate and inefficient lighting and heating systems. From runways
to repair docks to billeting and housing areas, the infrastructure that
supports our operations and people has been under funded for many
years. As might be expected, this problem has compounded annually.
The average age of our facilities is now 32 years old, and our
oldest facilities are 90 years old. Over 80 percent of the
installations in USEUCOM are assessed as C-3, meaning that there are
significant facility deficiencies that prevent performing some
missions. Yet SRM to revitalize and modernize USAREUR and USNAVEUR
installations is currently underfunded by $1.3 billion and is barely
funded to sustain their present condition. The Air Force recently
committed to fully fund sustainment for USAFE through 2007 and to start
funding restoration and modernization toward the DOD goal with the
intent of improving facilities to an acceptable level by 2010.
Military Construction
We have begun to make the significant investments needed over the
next decade to enhance our support infrastructure and take care of our
most valuable resource--our people. Positive results continue from the
increased funding we have received over the past 2 years, to include
the $360.9 million approved in fiscal year 2002 (including $94.6
million for DOD agencies in the theater). The Command's service members
and families see the positive trend in our infrastructure and are
grateful to Congress for providing the funding needed to make this
possible. However, a great deal of our infrastructure remains
inadequate and our service members continue to work in dilapidated
facilities spread over inefficient, geographically separated
installations. In many places we are still working to replace
temporary, container office space with quality construction. In short,
we need your continued investment to replace some of our single service
member and family living quarters, work facilities, and quality of life
infrastructure.
The majority of our fiscal year 2003 MILCON budget request for non-
family housing is comprised of barracks and similar quality of life
requests, while 34 percent of the requested funding is dedicated to
work environment facilities. This 34 percent constitutes eight projects
with a value of more than $110 million. We greatly appreciate your
prior approval for the planning and design of the Efficient Basing East
(EBE) initiative. This initiative is one that will provide new and
efficient workspace for service members while gaining installation
management efficiencies that will save taxpayer dollars. The first two
MILCON projects to support EBE are in the fiscal year 2003 MILCON
budget with a combined value of $59.3 million, along with $9.4 million
for site preparation.
Funding to meet the DOD requirements for quality housing for
service members and their families continues to be a critical element
in attracting and retaining the high caliber personnel who make our
military forces the best in the world. Our components remain on track
to meet the earlier DPG requirement for the year 2010, and are
presently working with their respective service headquarters to meet
the current DOD requirement to eliminate sub-standard family housing
units by 2007. Inadequate living conditions do not convey the message
we want to send to the young, committed patriots who volunteer to serve
their Nation overseas.
Build-to-lease housing is an option that provides quality
accommodations with no capital investment and no acquisition of land
from the host nation. The largest in-theater build-to-lease housing
project to date will be the Residenza dei Marina complex to support the
U.S. Naval Air Station, Sigonella. This complex is presently under
construction and will provide 526 units of quality family housing with
due regard for force protection measures. This area will be owned and
maintained by the contractor and the lease is for 10 years with
extension options. If at some time in the distant future this housing
is no longer needed, we will end our contract and walk away because we
own and owe nothing. This same concept will be applied to the build-to-
lease housing presently planned to support USAREUR's families that move
to Grafenwoehr as part of Efficient Basing East. DOD has programmed
full funding for USEUCOM housing through fiscal year 2009 with a total
of $2.3 billion. We need your support to keep this critical quality of
life program on line.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C\4\) Infrastructure
Theater C\4\ infrastructure shortfalls remain another of our most
critical concerns. Our World War II-era C\4\ infrastructure continues
to compromise our ability to communicate within and outside of the
theater and deprives our posts, camps, stations and bases of the robust
communications foundation needed to transition to network-centric
operations. Our forces in theater are experiencing connectivity speeds
similar to a home computer operating over a dial-up modem. Given the
new strategic era and the internal and external challenges we face, it
is imperative for both force protection and operational capability that
we equip our people with the best capabilities to collect, process, and
disseminate time-sensitive information quickly and accurately.
OTHER QUALITY OF LIFE PROGRAMS
Beyond our infrastructure there remain a few other issues that
impact the quality of our service and family members' lives. Schools
and health services, in particular, have a significant effect on our
personnel readiness.
Department of Defense Dependent Schools (DODDS)
The quality of programs provided by DODDS in Europe ranks very high
as a quality of life indicator for both military and civilian members
of the Command. Continued congressional support for full-day
kindergarten (FDK) and an optimal pupil-to-teacher ratio (PTR) for
fiscal years 2000 and 2001 has produced substantive improvements.
However, planned and programmed upgrades, alterations, and new
construction in fiscal year 2003 remain crucial for meeting successful,
timely program completion. FDK and a reduction of PTR in the first,
second, and third grades provide services similar to those available to
CONUS students. DODDS needs your continued support to implement FDK and
PTR initiatives and to ensure adequate facilities are available for
improving student achievement during the critical early stages of
learning.
Children overseas lack the options available to CONUS families for
remedial and enrichment summer academic programs. Parents in Europe
continue to urge commanders to offer no-fee school options for students
overseas on par with what is available to students in the U.S. Funding
and staffing have been the main impediments to offering these options,
as Congress has not authorized DOD to use appropriated funds for summer
school support. Congressional support for the DOD proposal to authorize
a summer school program free of charge in overseas school systems would
be greatly appreciated.
Health Care
USEUCOM health services are pursuing several initiatives and
programs designed to optimize health care support to our beneficiary
population. We continue to improve or replace our aging facility
infrastructure (in line with the Efficient Basing programs) with
several major construction efforts. Our emphasis continues on improving
our communications pathways to support state-of-the-art medical
technology, diagnostic digital imagery, and automated medical
information communications. We have improved health care availability
for all beneficiaries with the TRICARE for Life and TRICARE Plus
programs and the ``Open Access'' initiative. The Women, Infants, and
Children (WIC) program provides essential nutritional education and
nutritious food support to young, needy mothers and their children
within the military community. WIC was implemented at several pilot
sites and efforts continue to expand this program across the European
military community. Due to your support, health care is a positive
contributor to quality of life in the USEUCOM community.
CONCLUSION
While we in USEUCOM are confronted by a vast array of challenges as
we carry out our diverse missions, we have maintained our ability to
respond to the full spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian assistance
to major theater war and nuclear deterrence, and have done so with a
moderate amount of resources and a reduced force presence. We are
actively engaged today in the global campaign against terrorism and
have developed a broad, multifaceted plan to defeat terrorism
throughout our AOR. Our on-going operations, particularly with respect
to the Balkans, have, thus far, been successful. While regional
challenges remain and the risks of setbacks are ever-present, we remain
optimistic that USEUCOM's continued activities will bring about the
desired military end-state sought by the U.S., its allies and
responsible regional entities. Security cooperation in the theater
continues to pay significant dividends, recently highlighted in the
support provided by our allies in the war against terrorism. U.S.
security cooperation efforts in the theater help ensure continued
cohesion between our traditional military counterparts, and sow the
seeds for future cooperation in new areas such as the Caucasus.
Throughout this statement, I have outlined many needs for your
support, but none is greater than the need to improve our long-
neglected infrastructure, and this remains my foremost priority. To
simultaneously contribute to the global campaign against terrorism,
maintain our ability to rapidly respond to regional threats to U.S.
interests, and afford our forward-based forces a reasonable level of
force protection and quality of life, we need your continued investment
in our infrastructure. To this end, we invite you to come and visit our
installations, and scrutinize our plans to ensure that we are wisely
investing the American people's treasure. Interact with our young
service men and women as they perform their daily operations and view
their work environment and living arrangements. They continue to be our
best spokespeople, and I think you will be, as I am, immensely proud of
them.
In closing, I would like to thank Congress for its continued
support, without which our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
Coast Guardsmen would be unable to perform the tasks assigned to them
by our Nation. With your continued assistance, they will remain ready
and postured forward to defend freedom, foster cooperation and promote
stability throughout Europe, the Middle East, Eurasia, and Africa. I
sincerely appreciate this opportunity to outline the state of the U.S.
European Command and will be pleased to provide the committee with any
additional information it may require.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Ralston. Thank
you all for very helpful statements.
I have a couple of questions which are not directly related
to today's subject, but which are very pressing and very much
on the mind of many of us and of our public. First, General
Ralston, relative to the situation in the country of Georgia,
yesterday a senior U.S. official said that the Pentagon will
soon begin training several Georgian battalions to counter the
growing terrorist threat in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge region.
Today Russian officials expressed some concern about that
mission. Has the decision been made to carry out this train and
equip mission in Georgia?
General Ralston. Mr. Chairman, let me give a little bit of
an explanation before I answer directly to that.
Chairman Levin. Let me interrupt for one second. We will
have an 8-minute round the first round, so if you could keep
all your answers brief. We will go in strict early bird order.
I mistakenly deviated from that in one instance and we will
have to go back to a strict early bird order. I thank the
Senators who understand the mistake that I made.
Now, General Ralston, let me go back to you.
General Ralston. Mr. Chairman, Georgia is a member of
Partnership for Peace. I was tasked last fall to send an
assessment team to Georgia, which we have been working with for
many years, to see if there was something that could be done to
help them in their anti-terrorist efforts in Georgia. That
assessment was provided to the Pentagon in December. I have not
been given any tasking or any order to carry out that mission.
We are prepared to do so if given the order, but to my
knowledge a decision has not been made, because I have not been
tasked to do that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
Secretary Feith, there is a quote this morning on the
Internet by the official spokesman of Russia's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yakavenko, regarding the Russian-American
talks at the expert level focusing on the progress in preparing
a draft treaty on reduction of strategic offensive arms. This
is what he said: ``There is some progress. First of all, a
common understanding was reached that a treaty on the reduction
of strategic offensive arms will bear a legally binding
character and the sides will submit it for the consideration of
their legislative bodies.''
Is that accurate?
Mr. Feith. Mr. Chairman, what we agreed to is that there
would be an agreement of a legally binding nature. We did not
make a decision as to whether that agreement would be a treaty
or what is known as an executive-legislative agreement.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
One other matter. Mr. Feith, I wrote Secretary Rumsfeld a
letter, which is apparently now in your office for drafting a
response, regarding the proposed Office of Strategic Influence.
I know now the decision has been made not to proceed with it. I
asked for a number of documents, and I had other questions.
Will that information be forthcoming promptly to me?
Mr. Feith. Yes, it will, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Let me ask General Ralston this question relating to the
possibility that there be some role specialization within NATO.
British Defense Secretary Hoon is reported to have stated
recently that the European allies should seek to improve their
defense capabilities by cooperation among themselves and
perhaps role specialization. Can you give us your views as to
whether you believe that role specialization, particularly on
the part of smaller European nations, might be appropriate as a
way of addressing some of the new threats and capabilities
which we are all struggling with relative to both existing
members and new members of NATO?
General Ralston. Mr. Chairman, a complex subject, but I
will give you a short answer. I think some of it is
appropriate. We have a defense planning process where all the
nations come together. We try to make sure that we have the
capabilities that we need.
Let me give you an example. Let us take the Czech Republic,
one of the new members that has just come in. The Czech
Republic has very good chemical, biological, and radiological
defense capabilities. They have provided those capabilities to
us. This is an example where a country has a certain expertise
and if you call that specialization then I think that is good
for the Alliance and it is something that could be looked at in
a broader context.
Chairman Levin. Is there a possibility of new roles and
missions, particularly the possibility of NATO special forces?
General Ralston. This is something that the nations have to
look at. Right now many of the Alliance members have extremely
capable special forces. That is not the issue. I think the
issue is whether NATO should have NATO special forces, like
NATO AWACS. There are some significant issues with that and I
think that is something we just have to look at.
Chairman Levin. Will you keep us informed on any progress
along that line?
Mr. Feith. Yes, sir, I will.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I believe that Secretary Feith made the statement that the
results of the commitment of NATO allies in 1998 to improved
capabilities in five functional areas has produced, in his
words, meager results. General, would you give us your
assessment on the overall result of our NATO allies in
achieving the objectives of the defense capabilities initiative
which was launched by Secretary of Defense Cohen in June 1998?
General Ralston. Mr. Chairman, first of all, the Defense
Capabilities Initiatives (DCI) were 58 specific issues. They
were broken down among the five categories, but they included
such things as strategic lift, for example. While some progress
has been made on some of the issues, I would have to tell you
that my overall assessment is that it has not been as
successful as what any of us wanted. We still have, I think,
some very glaring holes in our capabilities, strategic lift
being one of them in order to get troops anywhere soon.
One of the things that is being looked at is the A-400M
Airlifter, if you will. That has not moved forward, although
there is a lot of talk and a lot of rhetoric about it. I might
add that if it did move forward it would be 2008 or 2010 before
we would have the first one. That is the type of thing that I
think needs to be worked on very hard.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Secretary Feith, you mentioned that you visited the Russian
defense ministry. You discussed NATO enlargement, I think you
said, with them. What was their reaction to it, briefly?
Mr. Feith. We discussed actually the NATO-Russian
relationship. I do not think we explicitly discussed NATO
enlargement.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Let me ask Secretary Grossman this question. It is one I
have been concerned about. In a way it goes back to Senator
Sessions' question about the difficulty of getting consensus
when it comes to something like targets. It is a very
debilitating kind of a requirement in the middle of a war.
I want to push that problem beyond even what Senator
Sessions has raised, to a more fundamental problem, but which
is similar. What happens if a NATO member no longer is
committed to the fundamental values, as we have talked about
here, of NATO? What happens if it turns from democracy to
dictatorship? The more countries that are involved in NATO, the
greater the statistical likelihood of that happening, without
any identification of any country where it is more likely than
not. Statistically it is more likely that sooner or later one
of the countries in NATO or that might join NATO could turn
from a democracy to a dictatorship. Yet, there is no way of
suspending or removing a country from NATO who no longer
complies with the fundamental values that are set forth in the
Washington Treaty.
Should NATO have available a mechanism to suspend a member
which no longer adheres to the fundamental principles of the
Washington Treaty--democracy, individual liberty, and the rule
of law--to get around this problem of blocking a consensus in a
very specific way, as Senator Sessions has pointed out?
Mr. Grossman. Senator, let me try to answer that question a
couple of ways. First, to where Senator Sessions started, of
course the consensus principle at NATO has applied since 1949
and I would argue has been quite successful. Yes, there are
times when one country or another country may object to a
certain NATO policy. Since these are all democracies and have
to get together, we think it is a useful thing for the
consensus principle to exist. That matters whether you are
Iceland or Luxembourg or the United States of America. That is
a fundamental principle of the Alliance.
The reason I start there, Mr. Chairman, is that I think
that is part of the answer to your question, which is that this
consensus principle that we have is the biggest incentive to
keep people on the right track.
Chairman Levin. That assumes they are all democracies. Now
go to my assumption. One becomes a dictatorship and vetoes what
everyone else in NATO sees as essential for NATO self-defense.
Mr. Grossman. I think that what we would have to do is make
sure through the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process that we
are trying to get people in what we are sure are going to stay
democracies. I do not mean to avoid your question here.
Chairman Levin. You are doing it. Not successfully, but you
are avoiding it.
Mr. Grossman. I deal with this at the front end, which is
to make sure that people have met a certain standard before
they get in. To kick people out, it seems to me, would lower
our standards rather than raise them. The consensus principle
is what keeps it all together.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Secretary Feith, in response to Senator Levin's question
about your successful meetings in Russia a few days ago, you
replied that the current thinking with regard to this type of
agreement between Russia and the United States would be in the
nature of an executive agreement, or something less than a
treaty?
Mr. Feith. What we have said to the Russians is that we are
interested in reaching agreement on a number of issues. It
could be one agreement, it could be multiple agreements, and
depending on what the agreements are and what their subject
matter is, they would be suited for different forms. We are
perfectly happy to enter into a treaty with them if we can come
up with an agreement that warrants treaty status.
Senator Warner. There is no effort to reach some type of
understanding that would circumvent the advise and consent role
of the Senate with regard to that type of agreement?
Mr. Feith. No, there is not, and there is actually a
recognition of the value of having Congress, the Senate in
particular, involved with us as we go forward on this.
Senator Warner. That answers my question.
Chairman Levin. Would you yield just for 10 seconds on that
subject?
Senator Warner. Yes.
Chairman Levin. If you do not enter into a treaty, it is
not legally binding on any other than the current
administration. I think you should be aware of that--not just
the wisdom of involving the Senate in that we ultimately have
the power of the purse and can technically override whatever
you do, it is the fact that it does not bind this country
beyond the current administration if you do it by executive
order.
I thank you for yielding.
Mr. Feith. Mr. Chairman, I was referring to a particular
kind of international agreement that is often referred to as an
executive-legislative agreement, where both houses of Congress
have a vote on it.
Senator Warner. It seems to this Senator--and I have
followed the relationships between the United States and the
Soviet Union now for over 30 years--that we are enjoying under
President Putin a positive trend. There are certainly many
things which any one of us could pick out as entirely
unsatisfactory, but overall there is a positive trend. If we
were to go into a situation where, for example, the Baltic
nations were recommended for membership, would that not affect
our relationship with Russia, for example their participation
in the Balkans and their participation in the Afghan situation?
In other words, in a broad front now they are working with
our President on the war on terrorism and to me that is an
imperative of the highest order as compared to expansion of
NATO. Maybe I am looking at it selfishly, but I think our
country is beginning to look inward with homeland defense and
the extraordinary attack that we suffered on the 11th and how
best to deter and, if necessary, defend against another attack.
To the extent Russia helps, we are protecting the homeland
of the United States of America to some degree. Of course, we
are relying on a wide range of allies to help us. Nevertheless,
they have stepped forward as a partner.
If we were to proceed on an issue like the Baltics, which
has been a difficult question all along, it seems to me it
could be disruptive. Do you have some views on that?
Mr. Feith. Senator, it is a serious concern that you raise.
We have, though, in recent months had some experience that I
think allows us to evaluate the danger that you are flagging.
The discussion about NATO expansion and the possibility that it
may include the Baltic states has been very lively and very
prominent now for months. Over these same months while this
discussion was going on, we have been working with the Russians
on creating this new framework for relations between the United
States and Russia.
What is remarkable is in the course of these very intense
discussions that we have had in the foreign ministry channel,
the defense ministry channel, and of course the summit meetings
between our Presidents, what is clear is, although the Russians
understand, recognize, pay close attention to this debate, and
understand the possibility of NATO's expansion, their reaction
has not been to say that this will destroy our relationship. On
the contrary, they are eager to get closer to NATO.
I think that we have things to learn from the way the
dialogue has developed about the Russian recognition over the
time that we have been working with them that NATO is not a
threat to them. I think that we can proceed with these
decisions about how we want the Alliance to grow without really
worrying that it is going to set back a relationship that we
consider enormously important and are intent on improving,
which is our relationship with Russia.
Senator Warner. This is one Senator who will be watching
that issue, because I am gravely concerned about our homeland
defense and the need for a wide range of assistance from many
nations, including Russia, as we hopefully deter and then
defend against terrorism.
General Ralston, I think you quite properly brought up the
mission that we are flying around the clock in the north and
the south of Iraq. I think it would be important in this
hearing if you give us an update on the threat that Iraq poses,
and the need for the continuance of those operations,
presumably, in your professional judgment. Also, how do we
reconcile the fact that our men and women are flying those
missions together with Great Britain, and taking a risk of
life, with what is my understanding that at the same time we
are openly trading with Iraq to meet our demands here at home
for petroleum. We are importing now over 50 percent, and Iraq
is a growing figure in that 50 percent.
General Ralston. Senator Warner, let me state from the
European military perspective. We have this ongoing operation
that we are flying in conjunction with the U.K. and Turkey.
These are the three countries that are involved. We have been
enforcing the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel.
Everything in Operation Southern Watch and the rest of Iraq,
General Franks in Central Command is responsible for.
It is a significant effort that we undertake. Last year we
flew over 6,000 sorties enforcing the no-fly zone in the north.
As I said before, there are numerous times when our aviators
are fired upon. We respond whenever we can to take out any
threats in order to ensure their safety.
Whether or not the benefit that comes out of enforcing that
no-fly zone offsets the risk and expense that goes into it, I
am not in a position to judge. That is properly a call for the
policymakers in Washington. We do our very best to carry out
the mission that we have been given. We have been doing that
for 11 years now, and it is a significant effort.
Senator Warner. General Ralston, lastly, as we approach
this new round of consideration of new members, we took in
three new members last time--Hungary, the Czech Republic, and
Poland. What were the criteria that we laid down for their
admission, and what did they have to do to fulfill that
criteria in a period of time? Where are they today in meeting
that criteria, and will they have met it by the fall when we
are looking at a new round of membership?
General Ralston. There were numerous criteria that were
outlined, Senator Warner, and let me try to list some of those.
One is to reform and restructure their military, and let me
give an example. Only a nation can decide what level of
expenditure they are going to commit to their defense. Let me
talk about Poland for a moment. In the case of Poland, that is
approximately 2 percent of their GDP. Those of us in uniform,
once a country decides what level of resources they are going
to provide, we give the best advice we can on getting the
proper balance between the size of the military, the training
of that military, and the equipment that the military has.
In the case of Poland, Poland had something like 400,000
troops in uniform. There is no way that Poland can adequately
train and equip a force of that size. So our advice was, in
order to get that into balance, you need to draw down the size
of your force, but make it better trained and better equipped.
I was in Poland a year ago. They had drawn down to 207,000
troops. I was there a month ago and they are now at 165,000
troops, en route to 150, which is their goal. They have been
coming down each year, approaching that goal that was outlined.
With regard to the interoperability of their equipment, it
is no secret that the new members had Soviet era equipment. You
do not replace that overnight. They are trying to get the
proper balance in the size and put the expenditure now into
western systems, if you will, that will be more interoperable
with NATO. We are not there yet with any one of the three
countries, but I do not believe there was any expectation that
we would be there by 2002. This was at least a decade-long
project and in my judgment will probably take longer than that.
Senator Warner. My time is up. You failed to answer about
the present threat of Iraq today to our security and indeed to
the security of the region. Can you give us a capsule estimate
of that threat?
General Ralston. I think that the concern that I have--and
let me speak personally here. The issue with regard to the
threat from Iraq is not so much one of whether they were tied
to 11 September and what happened here. You have to look at
their capability in terms of weapons of mass destruction, the
ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and what is
their intent to do that.
My own judgment is that they have a capability. I am less
certain as to what their intent is. That is where I think the
policymakers need to focus in that regard.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that
a letter asking for this hearing be placed into the record.
Chairman Levin. The letter will be placed in the record at
the appropriate place.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Levin. Also a statement of Senator McCain on the
future of NATO will be placed at the appropriate place in the
record as well.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to explore the
administration's agenda to transform and enlarge NATO at the Prague
summit this November. Other than the defeat of global terrorism--an
endeavor in which our NATO allies play a key role--few issues are more
important to the international order we wish to build in this new era
than enlarging our community of values and giving it the means to
defeat the new threats of terrorism and unconventional weapons.
I have communicated with the President on this issue and am very
encouraged by his strong support for a new and far-reaching Atlantic
agenda. I fully endorse the President's vision of an Alliance that
stretches from the Baltics to the Black Sea, created by a robust round
of enlargement driven not by ``how little we can get away with, but how
much we can do to advance the cause of freedom,'' as he said in Warsaw
last June. I share the administration's determination that even as we
work to enlarge the Alliance, we share a mandate with NATO's existing
members to ensure that they are capable of meeting the new threats, and
that our Alliance is structured to respond to them.
That said, I believe the hand-wringing in Washington academic
circles and the corridors of Brussels about the Alliance's existential
crisis is misplaced. Rather than engaging in a stifling, bureaucratic
debate about NATO's core purpose, we should devote our attention to
sustaining the success our Alliance has enjoyed in deterring Soviet
aggression, bringing a stable peace to the Balkans, and uniting our
community of values. Our task is to invigorate the Alliance with this
premise: that the Atlantic community is not a group of Cold War-era
military allies looking for new missions to stay relevant, but a
political community of like-minded nations that is dedicated to the
principles of democracy, and to fostering a continent where war is
unimaginable, security is guaranteed, and prosperity unbounded. This
pledge reflects our common values, which are universal, and whose
potency is multiplied, not diluted, as more and more people share in
them.
As we share those values, so we must urgently work together to put
in place the means to defend them. We live in a new era, and the
Alliance has no choice but to adapt to the new threats. Lest we forget,
NATO has successfully taken on new challenges before--in the 1950s,
when it integrated West Germany; in the 1960s and 1970s, in responding
to the Soviet missile buildup; in the 1980s, in working through the INF
debate; and in the 1990s, when it brought peace to Bosnia, integrated
former members of the Warsaw Pact, and defeated Slobodan Milosevic's
tyranny. We are a strong Alliance, and debate within our circles about
capabilities, roles, and missions can be healthy.
Our fundamental goal at Prague must be to transform what has become
a somewhat divisive trans-Atlantic debate about the role and relevance
of our NATO partners in the war on terrorism into a concrete plan of
action to align the Alliance's purpose of collective defense with the
threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction--dangers that
threaten the people of Europe no less than the American people, as
demonstrated by the number of terrorist plots that have been foiled on
European soil in the last year alone. In the face of this threat, I
agree completely with Under Secretary Grossman's statement that NATO is
not less important after September 11, it is more important. Because it
is more important--as demonstrated by the Alliance's invocation of
Article V for the first time in its history--we and our allies must
devote ourselves to building the capabilities to defeat the threat that
has required us to come together in our common defense.
Like other members of the committee, I am eager to learn more about
the proposed operating guidelines of the new NATO/Russia Council. I
appreciate the witnesses' assurances that the North Atlantic Council
will maintain deliberations separate from the NATO/Russia Council, and
that the NAC itself will determine which issues and decisions to bring
to the NATO/Russia Council for consideration. I look forward to better
understanding how these principles will operate in practice, in order
to ensure that NATO's institutional integrity is not compromised by a
well-meaning effort to give our friends in Moscow a meaningful role in
our councils. I and other members of this committee will need
assurances that this new NATO/Russia body will, as Under Secretary
Grossman states, offer Russia the opportunity to participate in shaping
mechanisms for cooperation in areas that we choose, leaving the North
Atlantic Council free to determine when and to what extent Russia will
participate in NATO-related actions.
I am also interested in the witnesses' views on how NATO
enlargement will affect the interests of our Turkish allies. Turkey is
a front-line state in the war on terrorism, as was Germany a front-line
state during the Cold War. Turkey has made important contributions to
securing the peace in Afghanistan and will be integral to any campaign
against Iraq. It is also central to our objectives of ending terrorism
and promoting democratic stability in Central Asia. A tolerant Muslim
nation with a secular government, Turkey's strong support and active
cooperation demonstrate the fallacy our enemies would have the world
believe: that our campaign against terrorism is a war against Islam.
The support of Turkey, a loyal friend and ally, lays this myth to rest
and stands in stark contrast to the disappointing cooperation we have
received in this campaign from another erstwhile Muslim ``ally,'' Saudi
Arabia.
For too long, Europe has held Turkey at arm's length. NATO's
southeastern expansion would secure Europe's southern flank, enhance
stability in the Western Balkans, and end Turkey's strategic isolation
from the Alliance. It would help diminish continuing frictions in
Turkey's relationship with the EU, minimizing Turkish grievances over
ESDP and opening the door to the development of effective coordination
between the EU and NATO. A visionary enlargement of the NATO Alliance
to the south combined with the EU's historic expansion to the east
would bring about a new and welcome cohesion of Turkey to Europe. The
recent joint statement by Greece and Turkey in favor of NATO membership
for Bulgaria and Romania is a promising demonstration of how
enlargement can positively influence regional dynamics.
The Prague summit's task will be to institutionalize these
changes--new capabilities to defeat the new threats, new members who
are ready and willing to join in the defense of our common values, and
perhaps a new relationship with Russia--laying the foundation for an
invigorated Euro-Atlantic alliance. If Prague is to provide a
foundation for a stronger and more coherent Alliance, the summit cannot
be ambiguous about its purpose or temporize about the size and
membership of the community it commits to defend.
That said, our Alliance is strong: we defeated Slobodan Milosevic's
rogue regime, and we stand shoulder-to-shoulder as peacekeepers in the
Balkans--where American troops should remain for as long as they are
needed. Our continuing operations to consolidate Balkan peace reflect
both America's commitment to our European partners and our joint
responsibility to uphold a boots-on-the-ground leadership role in
Europe.
The events of September 11 have already served to clarify NATO's
role and mission. American leadership within NATO has been enhanced by
our leading role in the ongoing war. The terrorist assaults have bound
the Alliance more closely together in a tangible way, with NATO assets
helping to defend the American homeland and forces of member and
aspirant nations working together in Central Asia. I hope it has helped
us put aside our previous differences over an emerging, if unrealized,
European security identity in favor of NATO's existing security
architecture. It has laid a strong foundation for NATO's future
relations with Russia.
I look forward to working with the administration and members of
this committee to transform and enlarge our Alliance to meet the
threats of this age and secure the freedom of our people, as NATO has
successfully done for the past half century.
Chairman Levin. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Not only is NATO expanding outward, but also within Europe
there is a conscious attempt to develop a European identity for
their defense forces, the European security and defense policy.
In addition to that, you have already mentioned the NATO ``At
20,'' where Russia is being approached to have some type of
counselor role, if not an active role.
Could you comment on these developments, particularly the
independent initiatives for European security forces, Secretary
Grossman, Secretary Feith, and then General Ralston?
Mr. Grossman. Sure, I would be glad to, Senator. First of
all, let me say that we support Europe's efforts to get
stronger, and we support Europe's efforts to have a European
security and defense identity and a European security and
defense policy. What we did in 1999 and have since is to make
sure that European security and defense identity and policy is
built up in support of the NATO Alliance. We have always felt
that the actions or the possible actions of that European
security and defense identity and policy should come only if
the NATO Alliance is not engaged as a whole, is not engaged
militarily. That is a diplomatic way of saying that we want to
make sure that NATO has a right of first refusal.
In terms of Europe building up its capabilities, and
meeting the headline goal that they set for themselves for
2003--to have 60,000 forces deployable in 60 days, sustainable
for a year--we think that would be an outstanding thing and
something that would really help in terms of Euro-Atlantic
security.
Senator Reed. Secretary Feith?
Mr. Feith. I agree with what Secretary Grossman said. If
the European security and defense concept is the spur
necessary, if it is the vehicle that will succeed in increasing
European capabilities that will be available to NATO, then it
will have proven to be a good thing. I would like to say it is
extremely useful that this committee does stress this point,
and we are pleased to make reference to the interest that this
committee takes in NATO capabilities when we are talking with
our allies.
But, as has been stressed, there has been overpromising and
underdelivery on the whole issue of capabilities, whether it is
specifically regarding NATO or the ESDP.
Senator Reed. General Ralston?
General Ralston. Senator Reed, first of all, I agree with
the two previous statements there. In particular, if the
European Union is going to increase their military capabilities
for their own reasons or whatever, then that is a capability
that also is available to NATO. I support that, with one
proviso. I have said we need to do that in a way that does not
detract from the NATO Alliance. In particular, if the European
Union builds a duplicative planning mechanism to that of NATO,
then I think that would be very destructive.
I will give you three quick reasons why that is bad. If you
tried to duplicate, for example, the planning headquarters that
we have at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE),
you are talking about thousands of military officers and the
physical plant by which to house them. Where are those
resources going to come from? There is only one place. They
would come from the battalions and the squadrons and ships that
we need to do the fighting.
The second reason: What do military planners do in times of
crisis? We make options for our political masters. We come up
with options A, B, and C. Option A has a certain set of forces
and a certain risk factor and a certain chance of success, and
option B a different set of forces, different risk, different
chance of success. If the European Union does this
independently, they will not come up with options A, B, and C;
they will come up with options 1, 2, and 3, and then the two
political bodies, the European Union and NATO, are going to
have great confusion as they try to talk through this issue
together because one of them is using option 2 and the other
one is talking about option B.
The third reason: If the European Union goes off and plans
this on their own and they want battalion X for their
operation, someone has to ensure battalion X is not committed
to a NATO plan and a NATO operation.
Now, these are solvable problems and I would offer at least
for consideration that this is not hard to solve. You can take
the four nations that are not in NATO that are in the European
Union, they are all good nations--Sweden, Finland, Austria, and
Ireland--and bring their planners to SHAPE headquarters and we
will together plan options A, B, and C. You have not wasted
resources by having extra planners and extra headquarters. You
have not introduced confusion into the system because both
political bodies will have the same set of options. You have
not double-tasked units to do that.
By the way, I have officers from all four of those nations
at my headquarters today. So I think, with the proviso that you
do not duplicate the planning mechanism, this can be a positive
thing.
Senator Reed. Let me raise another issue that has been
addressed by practically all of my colleagues. That is the gap
between our capabilities and the capabilities of all of our
allies, those that are in NATO and those that aspire to become
part of NATO. It seems to me that they have a very daunting
task because the gap keeps dramatically widening.
I am wondering--and maybe this is all just back of the
envelope analysis--in your view, General, and perhaps the
Secretaries, is that gap so wide now that it could never be
effectively breached unless there is an inordinate amount of
spending? As you indicated in the case of Poland, they have
basically decided they are going to spend 2 percent and that is
it, and then they structure their forces around that.
Are we in a perennial sort of mismatch, even if there is a
bit of accelerated spending in Europe, in terms of our
capabilities and their capabilities?
General Ralston. First of all, there is a gap today, there
is no question about that. It is not across every nation,
because there are certain nations in the Alliance that can
perform and do perform every day very well with their United
States counterparts. But as a general rule, as you look at the
defense spending of each of the European nations and as that
continues to go down, here is the problem you get into. If
defense budgets go up slightly, procurement goes up a lot.
Conversely, if defense budgets go down even slightly,
procurement goes down dramatically, because such a high
percentage of the budget is taken up by the personnel costs and
the base infrastructure costs.
If you have a country that has a 10 percent decrease in
their budget 3 years in a row, their procurement is going to go
absolutely to zero. That is the problem we have. That is why I
think Lord Robertson has been so aggressive in trying to get
the European nations to increase their defense budgets. Even a
slight increase helps you on the procurement side, because
again that is something that can go into the research, the
development, and the procurement of systems.
Senator Reed. Now, just a follow-on question, General
Ralston and Secretary Grossman. In your prospective planning,
particularly looking at the countries who are aspiring to
enter, have you suggested a budget pathway for them in terms of
getting up to a level where they can operate with us, and then
to an ultimate level where they are fully interoperable with
the kind of expertise and technical skill that we have? Do you
have anything like that in your plans?
General Ralston. Let me try that and then also have
Secretary Grossman and Secretary Feith address that. Once
again, as I look at it, once a nation decides how much they are
going to spend--and let us talk about the Baltics here for a
moment. Let me talk about Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. I was
very impressed by the job that has been done there in terms of
trying to get their people programs right. They said, the first
thing you have to do is work with your people. I think they are
right about that: Educate the people, give them a decent place
to work as you start through it.
They have collectively gotten together and said: Let us put
together an air defense network that would be useful to NATO if
we become NATO members. I have visited their air defense
centers there and, quite frankly, I was in one in Estonia that
I would have been proud to have had when I was commander of the
Alaska NORAD region. It was absolutely up to date and
modernized. Nokia had done, from Finland, a lot of work in
terms of wiring their things together. There was a young
lieutenant on this radar scope who was a graduate from West
Point. There was a young lieutenant on this radar scope who was
a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy at Colorado
Springs. They were working very hard on training their people
from the bottom up, and I think they made a remarkably good
start on working that.
So what do we do? We encourage them to keep doing that and
to keep working in that direction.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
My time has expired, but if Secretary Grossman would
respond.
Mr. Grossman. I just wanted to say, Senator Reed, that I
support a point that General Ralston made in his opening
comments. If you look at the number of defense capabilities in
the defense capabilities initiative, 58, we have now concluded
not only did we not get what we needed from that, but it was
too many. So the points that Secretary Feith made about
focusing in on getting people to the fight, sustaining them
there, focusing on weapons of mass destruction, that is how we
are going to be working toward the Prague summit. There are too
many now; we want to get that number down so that we can
actually produce some results.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to make a comment on the Levin doctrine, i.e., no
treaty, no binding commitment from one administration to
another, the strategic concept that was adopted 2 years ago. As
a matter of fact, I wrote a rather detailed letter to the
Clinton administration asking if in fact those commitments as
outlined in the strategic concept represented a treaty. It took
a while to get that back. They indicated no, it was not. I
think that is subject to change. Not that we want to change it.
I am not trying to either say I am for it or to perjure it. I
just think it is an important point that the chairman made.
I have several observations. I am going to read again what
Senator Lugar said: ``If we fail to defend our societies from a
major terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction,
we and the Alliance will have failed in the most fundamental
sense of defending our nations and our way of life, and no one
will care what NATO did or did not accomplish on enlargement at
the Prague summit. That is why the Alliance must fundamentally
rethink its role in the world in the wake of September 11.'' I
agree with this statement.
I am on the Intelligence Committee. It is my opinion that
the sober reality is that the danger of Americans and Europeans
being killed today at work or home is perhaps greater than at
any time in recent history. I believe that and so I think from
the threat standpoint we should consider that, which
underscores the value of intelligence and the analytical
ability of our intelligence.
The other observation I would make is that this threat is
global. We have to have allies, and we have to have alliances.
NATO has to play a part. They cannot be circumscribed by any
artificial boundaries. All of our alliances are going to be
reviewed and recast in the light of this new challenge.
Let me say also that, rightly or wrongly, the legacy of
Kosovo has reinforced the concern that NATO is not up to the
job of fighting a modern war. Again, I do not mean to perjure
NATO, but we did not do that in Afghanistan, obviously, or
wherever else that we will conduct our military missions.
Now, having said that, in the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee on the Armed Services Committee,
chaired by Senator Landrieu, I am the ranking member. I always
ask people, what keeps you up at night in regards to any
emerging threat or real threat? I would like to ask each of you
what emerging threat to NATO keeps you up at night.
Mr. Grossman. Weapons of mass destruction, Senator.
Mr. Feith. Senator, I think it is clear that the danger of
nuclear weapons or biological weapons in the hands of
terrorists is about the most troubling prospect that we have
from the point of view of I think the whole range of national
security officials in our Government.
General Ralston. I would only add to that. First of all, I
agree with that. Second, the reason that I stay awake at night
worrying about it is not that there are not other threats out
there, but I know how to handle the other threats. I have
capabilities to handle the other threats. We are not where we
need to be in terms of handling that kind of a threat, and that
is why we need to put effort into that.
Senator Roberts. If that is the case and if any
justification for the expansion, continuation, and
modernization of NATO has to be threat-based, then I think
Senator Warner and Senator Lugar's advice is well-taken. But
how do we do this?
NATO has always operated as a consensus organization. 16
was difficult. 19 has been challenging, and that is the nicest
way I can put it, especially after Kosovo. 28? This is like
trying to transport frogs in a wheel barrow, and I do not mean
to make light of it. I would assume we are going to continue as
a consensus organization. If the answer is yes, it seems to me
we are going to have to have a coalition of the willing or
maybe follow Senator Warner's suggestion. Although I am not
sure I want to call it the Warner suggestion, but it seems we
would have to have something like the U.N. and the Security
Council or a coalition of the willing.
If the answer is no, how are we going to handle that
problem from a simple military procedure standpoint?
Mr. Grossman. Senator, if I could try to answer your
question in three ways. First, in terms of weapons of mass
destruction, you received essentially the same answer from all
of us. Our objective, it seems to me, in transforming NATO and
in bringing new members into NATO is to make sure that they
understand that this is the threat. Again, you talked a little
bit in your opening statement about the strategic concept. If
you go back to strategic concept before 1991, there is nothing
in there about weapons of mass destruction. The 1991 strategic
concept starts to talk about it. The 1999 strategic concept
holds it out as a real threat to the Alliance.
We said in 1999 that NATO had to do more in the area of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We now have a WMD Center,
but much more needs to be done.
The second thing is, like General Ralston, I will give you
an example of how new members actually are quite useful in
changing people's perception of the threat. One of the ways to
deal with weapons of mass destruction, of course, is missile
defense. I think if you go around now and see who in the
Alliance are among the most enthusiastic supporters of missile
defense, you will find Poland, for example, which is a new
member, recognizes a new threat and has a new policy. In a way,
I think those things, the new members and the new threats,
allow us to transform the Alliance.
A final point, and that is that I think none of us would
want to say here that what our objective is is to make NATO
into the OSCE or the U.N. Security Council or anything else.
This is an alliance for collective defense, and it is my
judgment that the way to keep it an alliance of collective
defense is to keep it based on consent, to keep it based on
standards, but to recognize that sometimes those threats
change.
Senator Roberts. Would anybody else like to comment?
Mr. Feith. I think Secretary Grossman did a pretty good
job.
Mr. Grossman. I would actually add one sentence if I could,
Senator. That was about this question of coalitions. I may be
getting out of my lane here because I do not work at the
Defense Department, but I think Secretary Rumsfeld has this
right where he says that one of the lessons of Operation
Enduring Freedom is that you want the coalition to match the
mission and not the other way around. I think that is a very
important point and something that NATO can use to build on.
Senator Roberts. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Roberts.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Building a little bit on what Senator Roberts asked on what
keeps you up at night, can I assume--and I think, Secretary
Grossman, you have already responded to this--that when you say
weapons of mass destruction you are also concerned about the
missile delivery of those weapons? Is that correct?
Mr. Grossman. The whole package. The whole package, not
only of delivery, but, as Under Secretary Feith said, the
connection to terrorism.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, thank you.
Let us go back to something Senator Reed was talking about
in terms of the capabilities gap. I think he was referring to
how that would affect the new nations coming into the Alliance.
Secretary Feith, I believe you said Bosnia and Kosovo exposed
the capabilities gap between the United States and its allies.
Do you have any way of quantifying that? Have you thought about
that? I am interested in two things: First is the lesson we
learned in Bosnia and Kosovo on the capabilities gap; and then
second, how that might apply to new partners coming into the
Alliance.
Mr. Feith. Senator, I think that General Ralston may be
better able to talk about what kind of quantifiable measures we
have for that.
General Ralston. Let me talk in terms of capabilities. What
we desperately need are abilities to get forces wherever they
need to be around the globe. That is the strategic lift piece.
There is a deficiency there, something we need to work on.
Let me talk air systems for a moment--precision attack. The
United States has made great progress in terms of our ability
to attack not only with laser-guided bombs. Many of the other
allies have laser-guided bombs, but we have gone the next step,
the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), so that it will work
in all weather. That is something that needs to be worked upon.
There is a huge deficiency that needs to be worked upon in
capabilities for electronic warfare in terms of jamming of
enemy defenses. If we are going to go in an operation anywhere
today, it is almost imperative that the United States of
America provide the EA-6B jamming platforms wherever you are
going to go, because nobody else does that. I can quantify it
in terms of those kinds of capabilities that we need to carry
out modern warfare. I cannot quantify it and put a number on
it.
Senator Inhofe. If you later on can decide there is some
way when we are talking about this gap that would help us in
quantifying it, just for the record you might send anything in
that you can.
[The information follows:]
One document that sought to quantify the capabilities gap between
the U.S. and Europe is a recent RAND study on the Kosovo campaign.
Operation Allied Force was almost entirely an air campaign. Therefore,
capability differences were mainly shown in the areas of air forces and
command and control.
The United States provides over 700 of the 1,055 aircraft deployed
in the allied effort. The U.S. flew over 60 percent of the sorties
during the campaign including 90 percent of the advanced intelligence
and reconnaissance missions, over 90 percent of the electronic warfare
missions, fired over 80 percent of the precision guided air weapons,
and launched over 95 percent of the cruise missiles. About 35 percent
of the roughly 23,000 bombs and missiles used during the campaign were
precision guided. The U.S. flew virtually all the strikes in the early
phases of Operation Allied Force because it was the only member with
all-weather, precision-guided munitions. In addition, the U.S. deployed
several intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and other
high-tech platforms with capabilities that allies simply don't have.
These included: 4 RC-135 Rivet Joint, 5 Predator and 7 Hunter UAV
systems, 2 EP-3s, 4 EO-P3s, 5 U-2s, 7 Guardrail aircraft, 2 E-8 Joint
Stars, and 4 EC-130 Compass Call.
U.S. and allied forces showed similar differences during Operation
Deliberate Force in Bosnia. The U.S. flew 2,318 of 3,515 coalition
(about 66 percent) combat sorties between 29 August and 21 September
1995.
Senator Inhofe. General Ralston, let me carry that a little
bit further. Senator Sessions brought up the problem with
strategic lift. I chaired the Readiness Subcommittee for 4
years, and that is one of the things I have really been
concerned with. That is one of the great drains that Kosovo and
Bosnia have made. Now we find out in our refueling capacity we
have bladder problems in fuel cells in the KC-135 that are
going to have to be addressed.
All these lift problems are very expensive problems. We
know where we are with the C-141s now. They are going to go
out. We are talking about, and I see growing support, for
increasing our C-17 capabilities. Then, of course, the aging C-
5.
What do you see out there as a solution to this problem? We
have been talking about the lift capability and what is
happening right now with the use of our C-17 fleet. It has been
a great success. It has been wonderful. But we also know that
it is wearing out.
General Ralston. Let me try to address it two ways. I think
there is a U.S. issue here. The United States of America needs
to decide how you are going to keep a modernized strategic lift
capability, not only air but at sea.
Senator Inhofe. We need to do that, but we are depending on
you to help us do that.
General Ralston. Yes, sir. What I have to state as a
unified commander is I need the capability to get X amount of
stuff to Y place in a certain time period. I am going to have
to depend upon General Jumper, the United States Air Force, and
Secretary Roche to decide what is the right acquisition
strategy here, whether you upgrade C-5s or you buy more C-17s
or some combination of both, or what you do about the tankers.
Those are the types of things that I am not staffed for. I am
trying to fight the war this afternoon, not 15 years
downstream. We do have a mechanism in our military to do that.
Now let me take that to NATO. Here is where I think we
really have to put as much pressure as we can on the other
nations to come up with their strategic lift. I am not going to
tell them what kind of airplane it needs to be, but it
certainly has to be able to get from point X to point Y, carry
the types of things you need to carry, and be responsive. Right
now that capability does not exist.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate it.
One of the things that I would like to ask you just for
clarification: I am very proud that you are able to get this
down, looking to the future in Bosnia for example, getting down
to 10 percent of the force that we had in back when we were
only supposed to be there for 12 months. I think we need also
to talk about the fact that, while the lift capability drian
may be 10 percent, the logistical support that comes out of
what they used to call the 21st TACOM--I do not know what they
call it any more--is probably going to be up around a quarter
of it, as opposed to 10 percent of it.
So the total effort and expenditure and the use of our
assets, even when the number of troops is down to 10 percent of
what they were before, would actually be greater than 10
percent. Would you not agree with that? Are we using our
logistics support down there that could be used somewhere else?
General Ralston. I would have to do some thinking about
that. The reason I might slightly quarrel with that
characterization is because we do not provide logistics support
for the other nations. We support only the United States. So if
the U.S. forces are 10 percent of what they were, I do not know
that it is exactly linear, but I think it is pretty close.
Senator Inhofe. Is it? I am glad to hear that if it is.
I just got back from, as I say, the former 21st TACOM and
talked about what they are doing, what their drains are, and
what their expectations are for other incursions.
General Ralston. Yes, sir. I might say that they are very
busy. They are doing an extraordinarily fine job. Some things
they are doing are not normally appreciated. Rather than
sending everything to Afghanistan by air, 21st TACOM worked out
a capability to send it by train. So we sent a couple of
practice trains to let us see if we could get through all of
the diplomatic hurdles to get a train from Germany to
Afghanistan, and they were successful in doing that. Now in
something like 2 weeks we can get a huge train from Germany to
Afghanistan, which reduces tremendously the capability to have
to ship it by air.
Senator Inhofe. I saw that over there, and I am very
grateful that they were able to accomplish that.
Secretary Feith, one of the things that people have talked
about is perhaps waiting for this expansion until such time as
they are more suited to be allies in terms of what their
capabilities are and what their contributions could be. Is this
something that is being discussed now?
Mr. Feith. Senator, the issue of timing is being discussed.
There is a recognition that it is important when we issue
invitations that we have countries that are ready to enter the
Alliance and have met the standards. So while we have not as an
administration made a firm decision on the point, this issue of
timing is very much at the fore of our minds. We have been
discussing it, and we are undoubtedly going to be discussing it
a great deal more as we head up toward the May meetings and
then on to Prague.
Senator Inhofe. Secretary Grossman, I know you were quoting
the first George Bush when you talked about the
characterization of sitting quivering in your storm cellar. I
am not one of those who is sitting quivering, but I am one of
those who has not really decided yet on what we are going to do
in terms of all the things that we have been discussing.
Senator Levin brought up the process of termination. You
said, of course, you are on the front end of that. Secretary
Feith, do you have any thoughts on that? Let us say somebody
comes in, they are qualified, we rejoice and we embrace them,
and then we find out that they are not making their
contribution. What are your thoughts on a policy on that?
Mr. Feith. It has been a subject, while it has been raised
over the years, that has not been thought of as an imminent
problem. Nobody has worked out an answer to it because, I
guess, number one, it is not viewed as imminent; and number
two, the working out of the answer may be more disruptive than
constructive.
Senator Inhofe. That is fine. Thank you very much.
My time has expired, but I think, General Ralston, I may
send some questions for the record on this issue of troop
strength that we are dealing with in the Guard and Reserves,
the 60,000 that we have over there right now, their OPTEMPO,
and some of the problems in the critical MOSs. That is of great
concern to me, and I know it is to you, too.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Grossman, I appreciate your effective testimony,
directness, and candor as we have discussed some difficult
issues. You noted that Secretary Rumsfeld said the coalition
needs to meet the mission. We were able to do that in
Afghanistan. We were able to put together the kind of coalition
we needed to do that.
Now, if this were a conflict in NATO would we under the
NATO rules of unanimity not have that flexibility? As we expand
NATO, does not that add to a limitation on our ability to put
together a coalition that fits the mission?
Mr. Grossman. Maybe General Ralston can help me if I get
this wrong, but it seems to me that the unanimity principle in
NATO is a decision that NATO will do the work, and then those
people who want to go ahead and do the work sign up to do the
work. So whether it is the Czech Republic coming with chemical
weapons and biological weapons defenses, the United States with
what we bring, or the British with what they bring, then
essentially you have a coalition inside of NATO.
I do not mean to answer both questions at the same time,
but NATO would have to decide as a group, yes, we are going to
take on that mission, and then it would fall to General Ralston
to carry out that mission with a group of countries that would
be interested in doing so.
Senator Sessions. Let us follow that a little bit further.
Let us say, as Senator Levin suggested, that there is a
significant ethnic problem, not unlike the Balkans, and
everybody is putting pressure for reform and trying to avoid
war, as we did in Kosovo. Let us say as a result of these
tensions one NATO member has a regime change, just like that.
Now we have a group that identifies with the people we are
trying to correct, and they vote solidly against any action
whatsoever. What do we do then?
Mr. Grossman. Senator Sessions, first, I do not think we
should have too rosy a view of what has happened in NATO on
this issue since 1949. It has not been without its bumps and
its lumps in the road. I do not want to name countries here,
but countries have changed regime in NATO over time, and
sometimes that has been a big challenge.
We believe that if countries are in NATO that they signed
up to these values, that they will in the end do the right
thing. As I say, that has been our practice, it has been our
experience really for 50 years.
You and Senator Levin might be right, and we may all be
here 5 or 6 years from now with a big problem on our hands.
That is why we are so focused on getting the standards right in
the membership action plan.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Feith suggested it could be
disruptive, it surely would be somewhat contentious, to discuss
this openly and directly. I am inclined to think that we
should. There would be two ways that come to my mind. I would
think one would be less than unanimity in a vote; or the other
would be the ability to vote out a member who rejects the
ideals and overall commitment of the NATO group. What would be
the possibility if those were discussed openly with our NATO
members?
Mr. Grossman. I do not mean to be flippant here, but if you
look at the history of NATO and what the United States has
tried to do in pushing new missions, new mandates, new things,
I would not be surprised if there are some afternoons that
there are a number of countries who would like to vote us out
of the Alliance. I think we have to be careful of that.
Again, I tried to answer Senator Levin's question, although
it was not to his satisfaction.
Senator Sessions. That would really break my heart.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Grossman. Well, it would break mine.
Senator Sessions. There is something a lot deeper afoot if
that occurred than just a dispute over----
Mr. Grossman. Indeed. As I said, I did not answer the
question very well for Senator Levin. I think that if the
standard is set----
Senator Sessions. You answered it. As he said, it just was
not real satisfactory, or we are not sure we agree with it.
Mr. Grossman. Fair enough.
The standard has to be higher rather than lower, and I
believe if there was a way out of the Alliance, standards would
go down rather than would go up. That is my perspective.
Senator Sessions. What if a nation does not opt out of the
war, sends a token force, but wants to micromanage the mission?
We had this last time, General Ralston. What do we do then?
General Ralston. I do not want to give a long answer here,
but I take a little bit of issue with the characterization that
we had it wrong last time. There are some things we could have
done better. I take blame for this because I was here in
Washington. For the first week of the war, we struggled. At the
end of that first week, we drew up a piece of paper on a
Saturday morning in the Pentagon, and I got it coordinated with
my allied friends. It said: For 95 percent of the targets, we
do not ever want to hear about them in nations' capitals;
General Clark has the authority to do whatever he needs to do
on those fielded forces.
There were some categories of targets that we said rightly
need to go to nations' capitals. Let me give you an example:
Should we or should we not attack a target in Montenegro? There
was a valid political reason as to why you might want to keep
Montenegro out of the war. We said: Before you attack anything
in Montenegro, go back to the capitals and get a political
consensus that that is the right thing to do. Even that had an
escape clause that said if there is anything there that
threatens an air crew or an airplane, then you are
automatically cleared to take it out.
Once we put that piece of paper out, from my perspective
things got much better. If I had to do it all over again, we
should have put that piece of paper out before day 1, not after
we were into the conflict.
Senator Sessions. If a nation asserts itself and does not
agree with your directive about what the targets ought to be
and says, we insist on being involved, you are not going to
attack Belgrade, you are not going to knock out electric
plants, you are not going to knock out bridges--and that was
discussed during this time----have we not hamstrung ourselves?
General Ralston. Once again, I would take the construct
that if we were looking solely at the tactical aspects of the
Kosovo campaign, then I might have done it differently than
what the Alliance did. But I do not think that is the
significant point. The significant point is at the end of 78
days we had 19 nations that were even more strongly united, and
I think that was by far the most important event for the
successful outcome of that campaign.
Senator Sessions. I appreciate that, and I do not say that
this was a failure or a disaster as a campaign. I just say that
it evidences a potential for a greater problem in the future.
Maybe we will have an even greater gulf between what we need to
be doing to effectively complete a combat mission than we had
in Kosovo. How can we get around that? Particularly, the
``lowest common denominator'' was the phrase that you heard
used, and as we increase the number the lowest common
denominator gets lower. It is more difficult to maintain
unanimity.
General Ralston. Yes, sir. Let me try one other thing. On
the political side of the house that Secretary Grossman has
talked about, we have a parallel on the military side of the
house. We have a military committee where every one of the 19
nations has a military officer who represents their national
military view. We get a mission from the political authorities.
We then have a force generation exercise that we conduct in the
military headquarters, and that is when we decide what
capabilities we are going to pick from what nations.
We are not going to pick capabilities from a nation if that
nation is not up to snuff or up to standard. So there are many
operations that we do today where we do not have all 19
nations' military forces involved. There may be 16 nations or
12 nations or 6 nations as we do that. You have a mechanism by
which you can pick the capabilities that you need to carry out
that mission.
Take Task Force Fox in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia right now. You only have a handful of nations that
are involved in that. There may only be five or six nations
doing that. Those people who do not have troops involved in
that, my personal experience is we have not had a problem at
all. They recognize they do not have troops at risk in that,
and so they are not going to try to drive the operation, even
though they may have views on it.
Senator Sessions. I just felt like it was honest to say
that NATO met and directed the deployment of the United States
Air Force in Kosovo, and that is a big deal. We are a great
Nation, and I want us to work in partnership and harmony. But
we have to be pretty clear that we are not unnecessarily tying
the hands of our military that sometimes have to act decisively
and quickly, without delay, and maybe 19, 22, 25, 27 votes may
not be so readily available.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
I do not think there is any doubt that the challenge or the
complications of working in a coalition are greater than if you
act unilaterally. I think that is clear. The advantages of
working in a coalition, at least in the case of Kosovo or in
Bosnia, clearly outweighed those constraints. Would you not
agree with that, General?
General Ralston. Yes, sir, I would agree with that.
Chairman Levin. You described the value that we ended up
with, which is the strength, the cohesion, the message that is
sent when you have 19 nations acting together for a common
goal. If you can achieve that, even though along the way there
are more complications in working out some things, that can far
outweigh, and I think it did outweigh in Kosovo and in other
places, those complications.
You are shaking your head, so I assume that you all would
agree with that. Is that accurate?
Mr. Feith. If I may, Mr. Chairman. You point out that it is
not all black and white and that what you have is a real
problem, and I think what Senator Sessions is calling attention
to is a real problem. We should not leave the impression that
we are denying the premise of his question, which is that the
larger the group gets the more the danger of it being unwieldy.
That is absolutely correct.
That does have to be balanced against the whole range of
benefits of enlargement. It needs to be netted out. I think
that the point that my colleagues have made is that, first of
all, the problem in practice has not been as great as one might
think theoretically. Second, the irreducible problem still has
to be netted out against the other points.
There is one additional point that I think is important to
highlight. What has happened in the war on terrorism is we have
developed a new model, a very interesting model, where NATO as
an institution has functioned as part of the war, and yet we
have this concept of rolling coalitions that Secretary Rumsfeld
has expounded and Secretary Grossman was referring to earlier.
It is not the case that the United States cannot act in the
world in its own defense under any circumstances without
consensus at NATO, and I do not think we should leave anybody
with that impression.
We have the ability to act, and even when we are acting, as
we are in the war on terrorism, where it is not entirely a NATO
war, NATO is not irrelevant and NATO has contributed valuably.
This shows how valuable it is to be able to be flexible in your
policymaking and for NATO to be flexible as an institution to
deal with new circumstances.
Chairman Levin. I hope that the value of coalitions will be
remembered when we talk about the war on terrorism. I think
some of the rhetoric which has flowed from Washington has made
it more difficult to put together essential coalitions, which
will be so essential to carry out that war. I will leave it at
that because that is not the subject of today's hearing, but it
is an important subject. Since you raised the question of the
war on terrorism and the value of having coalitions to fight
that war, even though you want to reserve the right to act
unilaterally, I would make that statement.
I want to go back to the enlargement issue. There have been
some recent reports that NATO may decide to issue invitations
to several nations in November, but to stagger their admission
into NATO as they meet the criteria for membership. This would
be a departure from the last enlargement round. It would seem
awfully complicated to me and create lots of problems,
including any problems relative to the procedures here to
ratify or approve those admissions.
Can you tell us if there is any truth to the reports that
there may be staggered enlargement and, if so, what the
justification for that process might be? Secretary Grossman?
Mr. Grossman. I would be glad to answer, Senator. There has
been that conversation, mostly in Europe. People have talked
about this as a way to deal with a number less than nine. I
think it is fair to say that, although the President has not
decided and I do not think our direct bosses have decided. At
our level we are not attracted to this at all, for precisely
the reasons that you say.
The additional reason I would put in is I would have a hard
time understanding how you give somebody a partial Article V
guarantee. So I think at our level when we talk about it this
is not something we are very much interested in at all.
Chairman Levin. Now, on another matter: European members of
NATO that have adopted the euro as their common currency have
pledged not to run deficits higher than 3 percent of their
gross domestic products. Germany, for instance, which has only
been devoting about 1.5 percent of its GDP to defense, is
already bumping up against its 3 percent of GDP ceiling, which
is something they adopted when they adopted the euro. They are
up against that ceiling, so, for instance, they were unable to
recently give a guarantee to the partners that they would fund
a full share of the development of a new Airbus military
transport aircraft.
Secretary Grossman, is the 3 percent ceiling I referred to
a problem for NATO members who have adopted the euro, but who
seek to and should spend more to improve their defense
capabilities?
Mr. Grossman. Senator, I would say, of course, it is really
for them to respond. From my perspective it is not the 3
percent limit that is the problem. It is the choices that they
make in their own societies about what to spend their money on.
We make choices all the time. You here make choices between
social programs and defense and all the things that we do.
When you are dealing with European countries, they have
made a series of choices over the years that have been
different. Our message to them is that in the society that you
have, if you are going to defend yourself, you have to spend
more money on defense. If you have simultaneously as a European
Union member pledged yourself to the 3 percent, then you need
to change your priorities inside your society.
Chairman Levin. General Ralston, you have commented on the
reduction of forces in Bosnia. When Senator Warner and I
visited Bosnia during Thanksgiving, we talked to the
Stabilization Force Commander, General Silvester, and
Ambassador Bond about an exit strategy from Bosnia. They both
emphasized, as you have emphasized, the need for addressing all
of the elements of the rule of law in Bosnia, including
prosecutorial, judiciary, and penal system reform.
I understand that the UN's task force, the International
Police Task Force, mandate expires in December and that the
European Union is going to provide a follow-on police mission
that is not going to address fully the issues involved with the
rule of law. You have also pointed out, I believe, that the
international community's approach in Kosovo does address those
other elements of the rule of law.
Can you describe to us the approach that is being taken in
Kosovo and Bosnia, tell us which approach is preferable, and
what changes you believe would need to be made in Bosnia, if
any, to provide that exit strategy?
General Ralston. Mr. Chairman, as you have stated, the two
situations are different. I think what everyone agrees upon is
that we do need the rule of law, which is more than police. It
includes all the things that you mentioned. I think everybody
agrees with that.
Now, the question is how do you get there quickly? In the
case of Bosnia, as you have pointed out, the United Nations has
provided the International Police Task Force there for the last
6 years. They have today about 1,500 unarmed police officers
that are in Bosnia. Their mandate does expire at the end of
this year. The European Union has recently made the decision
that they would take over that particular mission.
My understanding is, and these are approximate, that there
are about 530-some officers, I think 460-some uniformed
officers, another 60-some civilians, unarmed, that would go in
to replace those 1,500.
The concern I have with that in my own personal view is you
need to get the local people involved in their policing of
their own functions and their rule of law. In Kosovo, for
example, OSCE set up a police academy. It happens to be run by
a retired American military officer. They have trained 4,300
local Kosovar citizens--Serb, Albanian, minority, female, male.
We have those 4,300 on the streets and every 3 months we are
putting out about another 300. The next class graduates in
March. We will have about 6,000 by the end of this year.
The difference is it is the local people that are there on
the street doing the police functions and ultimately the rule
of law, whereas in Bosnia we do not do that. Again, these are
decisions that the nations have to make.
If I could offer an idea, I think there is some merit to
having the police academy and training local people as opposed
to depending upon the United Nations or the European Union to
do the policing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I think our witnesses today
and the participation by our colleagues have made this a very
important hearing. I commend each of you.
Secretary Grossman, I have to tell you in the business in
which the Senator and I were engaged, when a Senator whispers
in my ear that they would not want you as an opponent that
measures up in our estimate.
Chairman Levin. It was not me, by the way.
Mr. Grossman. I was going to say, I have not convinced the
chairman of that.
Chairman Levin. But it very well could have been me.
Senator Warner. You are a great tribute to the marvelous
career force that our Nation has in the foreign service.
Mr. Grossman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you. I can remember when you were
Deputy Chief of Mission in Turkey and now you are third in
rank. Well done.
Mr. Grossman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. Therefore, I will give you this question.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Grossman. I knew there was no free lunch.
Senator Warner. On the subject of missile defense, we have
watched our President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of
Defense, in a very brilliant way, work through concerns of
Russia. Those concerns were expressed somewhat perhaps--this is
my judgment--in a less strong way than we anticipated at the
time, and allied reaction was in some areas rather high for a
period in the negative sense.
What is the status of the European allies now that we are
working through? Secretary Feith, you will be given a chance to
comment on this. Are there significant residual concerns about
the proposed U.S. missile defense among our allies? Are they
beginning to get, and I say this respectfully, a more realistic
appreciation after September 11 of what can happen even by way
of not state-sponsored attack, but terrorist attack and/or the
accidental firing of a weapon, which is a threat in itself?
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Why do you not take it just generally, so
that I can get one or two other questions in, and then expand
that for the record, because this response will be very
carefully examined.
Mr. Grossman. OK. First of all, I think there is an
increasing recognition of the threat on the part of our allies
because of September 11, as you say. Also because all of us in
our own way have tried again and again to make them recognize
that, if you look at the map and see the circles from places
like Iraq and Iran and other countries that are developing
weapons of mass destruction, those circles include lots of
Europe. We think that we are making some progress there.
Second, I always believed that if we were going to be
successful, and I think the President and Secretary Rumsfeld
and Secretary Powell were very successful in, as you say,
making the Russia issue come out right, that our allies would
be much relieved, and I think they are. So we have an opening
to do more.
Third, since we are talking about NATO, I am still
convinced that NATO is going to be one of the ways into this
issue of missile defense, what used to be known as theater
missile defenses in NATO. Who is working on missile defenses
today? NATO is. For some countries, theater missile defense is
missile defense. So we can build on that.
Senator Warner. Absolutely.
Secretary Feith, if you have anything to add, if you would
put it in the record. General Ralston, likewise put it in the
record.
[The information follows:]
Mr. Grossman. In the wake of the September 11 attacks on the United
States, our NATO allies are focusing greater attention on the threats
to security posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic
missiles as a means of delivery. NATO as an organization is also very
much engaged in assessing the WMD threat and trying to improve Alliance
capabilities against it. In our consultations with our NATO allies, we
continue to point out that without an ability to protect their
territory and population centers, they will be increasingly vulnerable
to coercion or blackmail as well as possible physical attack from rogue
states with ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.
We believe we share with allies a strategic interest in examining
defense options against the full spectrum of missile threats.
The NATO allies' views toward missile defense vary, but overall,
there has been greater allied interest in missile defense cooperation
and improving WMD response capabilities. Nevertheless, many allies
continue to reserve their positions on specific aspects of missile
defense cooperation until they can examine more detailed, concrete U.S.
proposals in this area. We intend to continue to consult closely with
allies as our missile defense research, development, test, and
evaluation program advances, and offer specific opportunities for
European participation.
Although some NATO allies have expressed concerns about the
potential impact missile defense would have on broader U.S.-Russia and
NATO-Russia relations, our consultations with Russia to create a new
strategic relationship have done a great deal to assuage their
concerns. We have kept allies informed on the status of U.S.-Russian
discussions. Moreover, NATO is also engaged in discussions with Russia
on how to broaden their political-military relationship and enhance
cooperation in a number of areas, including missile defense.
Many allies would like to know more about the potential costs
associated with their participation in the missile defense program. In
our continuing consultations with our NATO allies, we will be
addressing these issues as we determine what the missile defense
architecture will look like.
General Ralston. [For the administration] The defense departments
of Germany and the Netherlands, and U.S. forces stationed in Europe are
doing the majority of the work with missile defense systems today.
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) II missiles are the only active
missile defense system used by NATO forces. Germany, the Netherlands,
and Greece as well as United States Army, Europe (USAREUR) forces
stationed in Germany, employ them.
As the most active defense players, the U.S., Germany, and
Netherlands force, participate in an annual exercise sponsored by the
Royal Netherlands Air Force called ``Joint Project Optic Windmill''
(JPOW). This exercise provides participating NATO forces the
opportunity to practice joint and combined theater missile defense
(TMD) operations. Various European nations have participated as passive
defense or counterforce operations players.
Future exercises, including JPOW VII, to be held in the Netherlands
in late fiscal year 2002 and JPOW VIII, now being planned for fiscal
year 2004 with Turkey as the exercise location, will continue to train
our forces to respond to various theater missile threats.
Our forces in U.S. Army Europe are scheduled to upgrade one of two
battalions from PAC-II to PAC-III in fiscal year 2008. The PAC-III
missile is smaller than the current PAC-II missile and will increase
the firepower from 4 to 16 missiles per launcher. PAC-III also provides
for earlier detect:ion and expanded engagement of theater ballistic
missile targets. The Netherlands plans a similar upgrade, possibly as
early as fiscal year 2005, and Germany is still considering the cost
and scope of PAC-III upgrades.
NATO Shared Early Warning (SEW-N). NATO continues to progress with
their SEW-N program and is following a three-phase program that
involves the U.S. Joint Analysis Center (JAC) Molesworth and the NATO
Ballistic Missile Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
network. To support a 1994 U.S. Government directive to share regional
ballistic missile early warning information with NATO and individual
Alliance members, the U.S. proposed a three-phase program:
1. Phase I: Radiant Mercury (RM) installed as multi-level security
(MLS) guard. RM strips various data from J-series messages so that data
is releasable to various partner nations. This was completed in 1999.
2. Phase II: RM provides geographically filtered data to Linked
Operations and Intelligence Centers Europe, and both the Global Command
and Control system SEW server and the NATO Interim Combined Air
Operations Center Capability SEW server at Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe. Scheduled to be completed in late 2002.
3. Phase III: NATO extends data dissemination to its critical C2
nodes. Completion date is not yet determined.
Finally, USEUCOM is continuing to develop its relationship to NATO
through various memoranda of agreement. Efforts to better define SEW-N
information architecture, availability, maintenance support, and costs
will enhance the overall effectiveness of the system. USEUCOM expects
to complete these efforts by mid-year 2002.
Senator Warner. Secretary Feith or Mr. Grossman, the United
States is providing a substantial amount of dollar assistance
to the aspirant nations looking to the fall meeting on
expansion. In the last year, $55 million were distributed. To
what extent are other nations in NATO providing comparable
assistance to the nine nations seeking to join NATO, and which
nations provide assistance that dollar-wise approximates that
of the United States taxpayer?
Mr. Feith. Senator, with your permission, I would like to
respond for the record. I do not have the answer off the top of
my head.
Senator Warner. Fine.
[The information referred to follows:]
Almost all NATO allies are providing some level of assistance to
the nine nations seeking to join NATO. The assistance covers many
different areas, to include:
Excess military equipment.
Combat training of military forces.
Language training.
Slots at military schools.
Military advisors seconded to aspirant Ministries of
Defense.
Support of military exercises.
[Deleted.]
As many NATO allies are members of the European Union, we have
included EU assistance to the aspirant states in a separate line.
Senator Warner. I raised that issue the night that I
interjected my opposition to the passage of the proposal that
Mr. Lieberman discussed. I would like to know what the others
are doing, because this had a very significant dollar amount in
it as proposed.
To all of you gentlemen, if you want to put it in the
record because it is quite voluminous: Give us the views of our
allies on NATO expansion in a summary of what each of the other
18 nations feel, each of the other 18 nations, because I think
it is important for the Senate to have that information as we
begin to proceed, hopefully as a partner, in the deliberations
on this expansion issue.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Grossman. [For the administration] All allies support further
enlargement and share the U.S. view that the events of September 11
highlight the importance of building the broadest, strongest possible
Alliance. A broad consensus is forming behind President Bush's vision
of the most robust round possible, for all aspirants that are ready to
assume the responsibilities of membership.
I will be travelling to many NATO capitals in Europe April 15-19 to
consult further on a common allied approach to the upcoming Prague NATO
summit. Enlargement will be a key focus of this trip.
We have encouraged allies not to advocate for specific candidates
until we can develop an agreed Alliance consensus. Allies have
concurred that the question of ``who'' should be invited should not be
addressed until closer to the Prague Summit in order to give aspirant
countries the maximum opportunity to meet their reform goals. We are
also seeking to avoid early and conflicting commitments among allies to
facilitate efforts to build a NATO consensus.
We will be consulting closely with the Senate in the months ahead
on the progress of individual candidates and the views of our allies.
Senator Warner. Lastly, I will read this one and you can
respond for the record. NATO's Membership Action Plan, called
MAP, established a program of activities to assist aspiring
countries in their preparations for possible future membership
in NATO. The MAP states that aspirants would be expected ``to
settle ethnic disputes or external disputes, including
irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes by
peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles and to pursue
good neighborly relations.''
This is an area of the world, that is the proposed nine
aspirants, those nine nations seeking to join, with many ethnic
minorities and longstanding border and other internal or cross-
border disputes. We all recognize that. What progress have the
nine aspirants made with regard to settling such disputes
within the framework of the MAP?
I presume that progress has been made. If you can say that
much and then place the rest of it in the record. Anyone wish
to comment?
Mr. Grossman. I was just trying to think where to start.
Senator, I want to go back to your first question, which was
what other allies think about expansion. We have asked our
allies, and we have tried very hard to live by this rule
ourselves, that nobody start choosing particular names until
some time later in the year. We want to avoid a beauty contest.
We would like to make sure that we continue to get progress
from these countries.
What I am about to tell you would be my judgment, which is
to say that I believe that the vast majority of allies,
certainly all the people I have talked to, are interested in
some expansion. I believe there is a consensus forming around
President Bush's statement that we ought to do as much as we
can and not as little as we can.
I think it will not surprise you also that there will be,
as I think Senator Landrieu said, differences in perception
between countries in the North and countries in the South.
Those are all conversations yet to come. But I believe that
there is nobody in the Alliance today who stands up and says it
would be the absolutely wrong thing to do. As I say, we have
tried very hard to keep ambiguous, for reasons that you would
understand. I hope you will support us, and we want as much
progress as we can possibly make.
On the second question, yes, I would be glad to respond for
the record. I can tell you that in every single one of the
visits to the nine countries that Ambassador Burns and his team
made this was high on their agenda. I will give you one from
the past and one from the future. What we saw between the Czech
Republic and Hungary as both of them were getting ready to join
NATO was a settlement of some of their disputes, a positive
thing. In aspirants, I would cite the very good work that has
been done in the Baltic states to deal with people who speak
Russian, their Russian minorities, through OSCE and other ways.
I am sure there are others, and I would be glad to submit them
for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Albania:
Albania has no significant ethnic problems within its borders. The
Constitution provides for ``pluralism'' and ``religious coexistence''
and protects the rights of minorities to ``freely express, without
prohibition or compulsion, their ethnic, cultural, religious, and
linguistic belonging . . . to preserve and develop them, to study and
be taught in their mother tongue, and to unite in organizations and
associations for the protection of their interests and identity.'' A
National Minorities Section in the Ministry of Local Government
monitors the participation of national minorities in policymaking, both
at the local and national levels, while the Office of National
Minorities in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs monitors Albania's
compliance with international obligations and commitments as they
relate to minority issues.
While no recent official statistics exist regarding the size of
various ethnic communities in Albania, the ethnic Greek community is
clearly the largest minority group in Albania, estimated at
approximately 3 percent of the population. Ethnic Greeks in Albania
have complained about the government's failure to recognize the
existence of ``ethnic Greek towns,'' to determine the exact size of
their population, to utilize Greek on official documents and public
signs in Greek areas, and to provide adequate Greek language education.
Ethnic Greeks, however, led by their cultural association Omonia, have
access to government leaders at all levels and are represented in
government, parliament, and other public sectors. Other, smaller
minority communities (Vlachs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Roma and
Egyptians) together represent approximately 2 percent of the population
in Albania.
Albania maintains good relations with its neighbors Serbia and
Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, Italy, and Greece and continues to play
a constructive role in the region. The Albanian government has
consistently condemned Albanian extremism in Macedonia and southern
Serbia, promoted peaceful dialogue and Macedonian territorial
integrity, and supported moderate Albanian leaders in the region.
Weak borders continue to plague Albania as crossborder trafficking
in weapons, persons, and contraband contributes to regional
instability. The U.S. and NATO are presently working with Albania on
ways to strengthen its border security.
Bulgaria:
Bulgaria has no outstanding border disputes with any of its
neighbors (Romania, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey). Rather,
Bulgaria has been actively seeking greater cooperation with
neighboring states on such crossing border problems as drug smuggling
and trafficking in persons. It has initiated high-level bilateral and
trilateral (Bulgaria-Greece-Turkey and Bulgaria-Romania-Turkey)
consultations to coordinate on issues of mutual interest.
Bulgarians pride themselves on their tolerance of various ethnic
groups and religions, and the country has been an island of ethnic
stability in the troubled Balkans. The Armenian and Jewish communities
are particularly well integrated. The new government is reviving a
council to address ethnic issues, has announced plans to set aside some
police academy slots for minorities, and has declared its interest in
seeking economic development in areas with large minority populations.
However, as noted in the 2001 Human Rights Report, serious
discrimination exists in practice, particularly against the Roma
community. Bulgaria's large ethnic Turkish minority (10 percent of the
population) is relatively well integrated, though more can be done in
this area. The current government includes ethnic Turkish cabinet
ministers for the first time. Relations with Ankara (and with Athens)
are very good.
Though many Bulgarians believe Macedonians are really ethnic
Bulgarians and the government does not recognize a Macedonian
``ethnicity,'' Bulgaria was the first state to extend recognition to
the FYROM. Bulgaria has been a staunch supporter of Macedonia's
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and has sought to improve
economic links with Macedonia both bilaterally and through regional
initiatives.
Bulgaria has been concerned about the treatment of ethnic
Bulgarians in Serbia, particularly under the Milosevic regime, but has
pursued these concerns exclusively through diplomatic means.
Estonia:
Estonia currently has no external or ethnic disputes of note. The
OSCE mission established to monitor integration of the Russian-speaking
minority (28 percent of the population) in Estonia was closed on
December 31, 2001 after determination that Estonia met the criteria for
integration. The United States continues to work with the GOE to assist
with its ongoing integration efforts.
In March 1999, Estonian and Russian officials initialed a border
agreement after 4 years of negotiations. While the GOE is prepared to
sign the agreement, Russian officials have held back, citing lack of
sufficient support in the Duma for ratification. The GOE continues to
await action by the Russian government.
Latvia:
Latvia currently has no ethnic or external disputes of note. Russia
has criticized Latvia for not paying sufficient attention to the rights
of its ethnic Russian minority (30 percent of the population), however,
Latvia has made good progress, demonstrated by the closing of the OSCE
mission in Riga on January 1, 2002. Almost all Latvian residents,
regardless of their ethnic status, are eligible to apply for
naturalization, and Latvia has made naturalization easier over the last
year by reducing fees and accepting school certificates in place of
naturalization examinations. In addition, Latvia's social integration
foundation is operational and making grants for projects designed to
bring the ethnic Russian-speaking minority into fuller participation in
civil society; Latvia's education, language, and citizenship laws are
all in compliance with international norms, and it has mounted a public
awareness campaign to promote citizenship.
Social integration is an ongoing process. Latvia is in the process
of amending its election law to remove a requirement that candidates
for public office speak fluent Latvian.
Latvia and Russia have initialed a border treaty, but the GOR has
not yet submitted the treaty to the Duma, citing insufficient support
among parliamentarians.
Lithuania:
Lithuania has no major outstanding ethnic disputes, irredentist
claims, or jurisdictional disputes. Lithuania settled its land borders
with Latvia in the late 1990s and with Poland in the early 1990s. While
only 8.7 percent of its population are of Russian descent, Lithuania
has not had problems in the integration of ethnic Russians. A
Lithuania-Belarus agreement has been signed, but Belarus has yet to
complete the demarcation of its border. Lithuania has signed and
ratified agreements on its borders with Russia, but is waiting for
Russia to ratify the agreements.
Former Yugoslov Republic of Macedonia:
Macedonia has been a strong promoter of cooperation in the region
and strives to maintain good neighborly relations. Through the
Southeast Europe Cooperation Process, Macedonia has been a driver for
multilateral regional cooperation, especially in the trade sphere.
Relations continue to improve with the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in the post-Milosevic era. Both sides resolved long-standing
differences over their common border in a February 2001 agreement,
which delimited their heretofore indefinite and un-demarcated border.
We are encouraging the Macedonian government, in cooperation with
UNMIK, NATO, and Kosovar institutions of self-government, to take steps
to implement the agreement's provision for resolving practical problems
of property access and cross-border movement as they relate to the
border with Kosovo.
Macedonia's relations with Albania are deepening, and we are
encouraging both governments to further strengthen the relationship,
especially in the areas of border security cooperation. In March, they
signed a Free Trade Agreement. Macedonia's relations with Bulgaria are
positive and constructive, as witnessed by a steady exchange of high-
level visits. Greece and Macedonia have taken great strides in recent
years to strengthen bilateral political, economic, and security
cooperation. Talks on resolving outstanding differences over the name
continue under U.N. auspices, but this issue has not hindered the
continued development of constructive bilateral relations.
With the signing of the Framework Agreement in August 2001 by
Macedonia's President and multiethnic government coalition leaders, and
the subsequent passage of constitutional amendments called for in the
agreement, the foundation has been laid for Macedonia's return to peace
and stability in a context of improved civil rights for minority
groups. Together with our international community partners, we will
continue to work with Macedonia's government, elected representatives,
and citizens to move the country back from crisis toward normalcy,
achieve full implementation of the Agreement, and restore trust and
cooperation among all of Macedonia's citizens.
Slovakia:
Slovakia continues to be committed to good neighborly relations,
and has been an active supporter and promoter of cooperation in the
region, in particular by means of the Visegrad 4 (V4). In the field of
human rights and the protection of people belonging to national
minorities, the current government has made significant progress.
However, continued close attention will be required for those groups in
society most likely to suffer from abuse or discrimination.
Slovakia's stance vis-a-vis the Hungarian ``status law,'' clearly
demonstrated its commitment to maintain good neighborly relations.
While concerned by what the Slovaks view as a provocative tone coming
from Hungary, they nonetheless are committed to resolving the issue via
the experts working group rather than in the media. As noted, the V4 is
Slovakia's most important vehicle for developing neighborly relations.
The V4's main goal remains cooperation in the context of EU accession,
but it is also developing an internal dimension in the fields of
environment, justice, culture, and recently also certain defense
issues. As for Slovenia, Austria, and the Ukraine, there are several
issues under negotiation at the working level.
As for human rights, a law establishing a public defender of rights
(ombudsman) entered into force on January 1, 2002. The office is to
start functioning September 2002. A draft law on equal treatment and
the creation of an equal opportunities center remains pending.
Regarding treatment of persons belonging to national minorities, the
current government undertook a significant number of steps that put in
place a stronger institutional and legislative basis to deal with
minority issues. The funding for the plenipotentiary for the Roma
community was nearly doubled in 2002. However, serious cases of
racially motivated crime, police brutality, and discrimination
concerning the Roma continue to be reported by NGOs.
Slovenia:
Slovenia enjoys cordial relations with its neighbors. While there
are some as yet unresolved disputes related to borders and ethnic
minorities, Slovenia has consistently demonstrated its commitment to
pursue peaceful resolutions bilaterally or through multilateral
channels.
According to the 1991 census, 23 different minorities make up about
12 percent of the population of Slovenia. Upon achieving independence,
Slovenia offered citizenship to all residents, regardless of ethnicity
or origin. Slovenia later offered permanent resident status to (non-
Slovene) former Yugoslav citizens who had immigrated to Slovenia, but
had not taken up the citizenship offer. The Constitution provides
special rights and protections including the right to use their own
national symbols, enjoy bilingual education, and benefit from other
privileges--to the two ``autochthonous'' minority groups, namely, the
Italians and Hungarians. The government of Slovenia continues to work
with the Romani community on the implementation of legislation
addressing Roma issues. Roma still face problems with housing,
education, and unemployment, among others, but the government's Roma
Assistance program, adopted in 1995, is helping. The government is
particularly focusing on involving more Roma in education, as the key
to progress in other areas.
States of Yugoslav Succession: Slovenia has played a positive role
in ongoing discussions among the successor states to the former
Yugoslavia. Along with the other successor states, Slovenia signed the
framework state succession agreement in June 2001. Macedonia and Bosnia
have already ratified the agreement; Slovenia, Croatia and the FRY hope
to sign in the near future. Issues remain on the division of financial
and other assets and government representatives hold regular meetings
toward this end. The two most controversial questions concern some $600
million alleged to have disappeared from the accounts of the former
central bank of Yugoslavia and how to cover outstanding deposits of
Bosnian and Croatian account-holders in the former Ljubljanska Banka.
Croatia: On July 2001, Slovenia and Croatia reached agreement on
the delineation of their border and on the joint ownership and
management of the Krsko nuclear power plant. Both governments have
initialed the border agreement, but Croatia subsequently declined to
sign, citing a lack of support in its parliament for the agreement.
Croatia has suggested setting aside the agreement and submitting the
border issue to international arbitration, but Slovenia prefers not to
reopen the issue. The government of Slovenia is hopeful that Croatia
will choose to sign and ratify the existing agreement. Both governments
signed the Krsko nuclear plant agreement in December 2001. Although
both have still to ratify it, a joint working group that is to lay the
foundations for the establishment of a new company to manage the plant
began meeting in January 2002.
Italy: Slovenia's border with Italy was settled through the Treaty
of Osimo, signed by Italy and Yugoslavia in 1975. Slovenia formally
undertook the obligations of the Treaty via an exchange of diplomatic
notes in 1992. The Treaty additionally acknowledged the right of
Italian claimants to compensation for property expropriated in
Yugoslavia and the right to protection of the Italian ethnic minority
in Yugloslavia and the Slovene minority in Italy. In 1983, Yugoslavia
and Italy finalized the Rome Agreement on compensation to Italians who
had lost property in Yugoslavia. In accordance with that agreement,
Slovenia has been depositing funds into a special account in
Luxembourg. Italy has not yet drawn on those funds to compensate its
citizens. Some of those entitled to compensation, including some
Italian-Americans, have expressed displeasure with the provisions of
the agreement and/or its implementation. The government of Slovenia
works with the Italian government to ensure that the rights of the
Slovene ethnic minority are respected. Slovenia continues to call on
Italy to implement Italy's February 2001 law on the protection of the
Slovene minority and to provide bilingual documents, such as ID cards
and census forms, where warranted.
Austria: Slovenia enjoys generally excellent relations with
Austria. The government of Slovenia works through diplomatic channels
to try to ensure that Austria protects the language and other rights of
the Slovene ethnic minority. One issue that disturbs the relationship
concerns the 1945 decisions by Yugoslavia (the ``AVNOJ decrees'') to
expel most German citizens or people of German origin and confiscate
their property. Some Austrians, such as Carinthia's Governor Joerg
Haider, have demanded that Slovenia rescind these decrees and/or pay
reparations to those expelled or their families. In addition, it is
much more difficult for these people (or their heirs) than for others
to claim their lost property or compensation for it under Slovenia's
1991 denationalization law.
Hungary: Slovenia and Hungary enjoy good relations. There are no
disputes over their border, nor are there serious concerns over the
treatment of the Hungarian minority in Slovenia or the Slovene minority
in Hungary.
Romania:
Romania seeks to contribute to regional stability by maintaining
generally good relations with all of its neighbors.
Hungary: Romania and Hungary maintain good relations, and finalized
in December 2001 an agreement to resolve a contentious Hungarian Status
Law implementation issue. Romanian-Hungarians are Romania's largest
ethnic minority group (7 percent of the population), and in February
2001, the Romanian government (GOR) passed a law that implements a 20
percent clause for official use of another language in constituencies
where 20 percent or more of the population speak a language other than
Romanian. The ethnic Romanian-Hungarian party (UDMR) signed a protocol
with the ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD), and generally votes in
support of the government.
Serbia: Romania and Serbia maintain good relations. The GOR
supported democratization efforts there in cooperation with the U.S.
and the international community, and continues to support re-
integration of Serbia into the regional community (i.e., into trade and
regional base organizations such as Stability Pact).
Bulgaria: Romania has good relations with Bulgaria, and seeks to
strengthen ties and increase cross Danube commerce. Both countries
mutually support each other as NATO candidates in the upcoming Prague
summit, as well as for eventual EU membership.
Ukraine: Relations are generally good, although occasional disputes
have occurred concerning treatment of ethnic Romanians in the Ukraine.
Most recently, there have been discussions between the two governments
at the expert level to resolve issues concerning education for their
respective minorities in the other country. The situation in Moldova
has also precluded the launching of the trilateral (Romania, Ukraine,
Moldova) commission.
Moldova: Romania seeks to maintain generally good relations with
Moldova, but tension has arisen recently subsequent to the communist
electoral victory one year ago in Moldova. For the most part, the GOR
tends to say little about Moldova, since Moldova is sensitive to
statements that might be seen as impinging on its sovereignty. Romania
has aligned itself with the EU, the council Europe, and the OSCE
regarding the situation in Moldova.
Russia: Romania maintains generally good relations with Russia,
seeking to ensure that Russia will accept Romania's decision to join
any collective security arrangement (such as NATO). Romania also hopes
that Russia will return gold deposited in 1916 with the Czar's
government.
Regarding internal ethnic disputes, relations with the ethnic
Hungarian community are generally good and improving. The GOR strategy
on the Roma community is being fine tuned in consultation with the Roma
leadership. The GOR and the Roma community admit that the difficulties
the Roma face will take many years to fix.
Senator Warner. At this time I am glad the chairman
recognized the presence today of several ambassadors from those
nations in the category of aspirants. I and other Members of
the Senate and perhaps the House are frequently invited to
various functions here in the Nation's capital. I know a person
for whom I have high regard, Mrs. Finley, often hosts a number
of these informal discussions where Members of Congress have
the opportunity to talk with the ambassadors and other
representatives from these nations. In every instance in which
I have participated, I think it has been done on a very high
level, an absolutely superb professional exchange of views. I
think that their active participation, be it the ambassadors,
defense ministers, secretaries of state, or foreign affairs
ministers, it has been done very well. It will continue, I am
sure. The intensity is likely to pick up in the months to come.
We should encourage it.
I think it would be wise that we do not begin to have a
short list developed until we look at the overall issue. I come
back to the basic proposition, do we need to get the house more
in order before we decide to acquire more teams? You can look
at the baseball franchises here in the United States. There is
a lot of concern that that house is not in order before they
get new franchises.
Thank you, gentlemen, very much.
Chairman Levin. Talking about houses being in order, NATO
Secretary General Robertson on February 3 in a major speech
titled ``NATO's Future,'' after urging the Europeans to get
their house in order and to spend more on defense, said that:
``The United States must do more, too. Not in terms of soldiers
on the ground or aircraft in the air, but in facilitating the
process of European defense modernization. By easing
unnecessary restrictions on technology transfer and industrial
cooperation, Washington can improve the quality of the
capabilities available and diminish any problems our forces
have in working together.''
Secretary Feith, do you agree?
Mr. Feith. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Are those efforts being successfully made?
Mr. Feith. Yes, we are working on harmonizing export
control policies with our allies so that we can have a more
open exchange of technology.
Chairman Levin. You are not talking rhetoric here.
Mr. Feith. No, we are talking technology.
Chairman Levin. Just one quick comment on missile defense
because it is irresistible.
Senator Warner. That is why I am waiting.
Chairman Levin. In that case, I am tempted to make it a
very long comment, because I love to have you at my side.
Secretary Grossman, you talked about more realistic
appreciation of threats after September 11. I could not agree
with you more. I think September 11 gave us a very realistic
appreciation of where the real threats lie. We differ as to how
to answer that question, but that is the test: What is the
lesson of September 11 in terms of realistic threats to us and
the likely threats? We will leave it at that. Otherwise we will
be here all afternoon.
I think we join Senator Warner in thanking you all for your
testimony. Next time you are here together, we will give you a
little wider table. We thank again our special visitors for
joining us today, and we will stand adjourned. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS
1. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Grossman, how will the proposed
NATO-Russia Council avoid the antagonism that crippled the Joint
Permanent Council?
Secretary Grossman. Creating the new NATO-Russia Council will be an
important milestone for the new era of Russia's relationship with the
West. With the decision of President Putin to advance Russia's
interests by seeking cooperation with Euro-Atlantic institutions rather
than opposing them, the path was cleared to make NATO an instrument to
enhance security for all countries in Europe and North America. Of
course, it will be up to the Russian authorities how much use they will
make of this opportunity to develop a positive relationship between
Russia and NATO.
We are confident that the new NATO-Russia Council will provide for
smoother and more effective cooperation between the Alliance and Russia
through the substantive issues it will be dealing with and through its
procedure.
With its focus undertaking practical, well-defined, mutually
beneficial projects the new Council will be built around shared
interests of allies and Russia to address commonly perceived security
threats. In the struggle against terrorism, in crisis management, on
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also in the areas
of civil emergencies, search and rescue, and scientific cooperation,
NATO allies and Russia dispose of useful and important resources to
improve security for their mutual benefit. The new Council will build
upon the strengths of the existing NATO-Russia cooperation, such as the
military cooperation in the peacekeeping missions in Southeastern
Europe that has been marked by a professional approach, to develop and
achieve well-defined goals. On the procedural side, the new Council
``At 20'' will allow Russia to participate in the consultation and
decision-making process as an equal partner, while not giving Russia a
veto on NATO decisions or the ability to restrict NATO's freedom of
action.
2. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Grossman, what issues or areas of
policy can we say today will remain the exclusive concern of the North
Atlantic Council?
Secretary Grossman. Our approach in developing a new mechanism for
NATO-Russia relations has been to identify concrete, practical, well-
defined projects to serve as the basis for building cooperation between
NATO and Russia. The intent is to identify projects of mutual interest
to both NATO and Russia where we believe there is a high probability of
success. We have deliberately avoided building the new relationship on
ill-defined generic lists of issues or areas, which impinge on the key
equities of the NATO Alliance.
It is clear to all parties, including Russia, that the work of the
new body will in no way inhibit the North Atlantic Council (NAC) from
taking a decision on any issue. Russia also understands that the new
Council will have no say on core NATO policies and areas such as
individual and collective defense (Article V), membership (Article X),
and the military planning process, which will remain the exclusive
domain of the North Atlantic Council.
A consensus in the North Atlantic Council will be necessary to put
and keep any issue on the agenda of the new NATO-Russia Council. Any
ally can remove an item from the agenda of the new body at any time.
The primacy of the North Atlantic Council in NATO's decisions and
actions will not be affected.
Within this framework, our aim is to start with a modest agenda for
cooperation and, as a solid record of achievement develops, expand the
agenda and with it the NATO-Russia contribution to our larger goal of a
Europe whole, free, and at peace that works together to meet the
threats to our security.
FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING FUNDS
3. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Feith, what systems and
capabilities are aspirant states buying with U.S. Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) funds?
Secretary Feith. FMF funds provided to aspirant states are used
primarily to advance the objectives of Partnership for Peace. These
funds allow recipient countries to acquire defense equipment and
services that facilitate participation in peacekeeping activities and
interoperability with U.S. forces and NATO. FMF funds have been spent
on priorities such as the Regional Airspace Initiative/Air Sovereignty
Operations Centers, National Military Command Centers, and English
language training. In addition, provision of NATO-interoperable
equipment such as tactical communications equipment, tactical vehicles,
computers, search and rescue equipment, as well as uniforms and
individual equipment help to support peacekeeping units and elements
that participate in Partnership for Peace activities. Countries have
also utilized this FMF to undertake contractor-led reform initiatives
suggested by Department of Defense studies, non-commissioned officer
and officer development, and personnel management reform. The focus has
been to facilitate greater compatibility with NATO, strengthen
democratic control of the military, and improve defense planning,
budgeting, logistical, acquisition, and data management processes.
4. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Feith, is the administration
satisfied that these FMF procurements are optimal in fulfillment of
each country's Membership Action Plan?
Secretary Feith. We are satisfied that the aspirants' FMF
procurements are in line with the goals of their respective Membership
Action Plans.
While the U.S. and NATO provide specific guidance and
recommendations to the NATO aspirants through the Membership Action
Plan, any decisions made by the aspirants on the basis of such advice
remain national decisions undertaken and implemented at the sole
responsibility of the country concerned. We would also note that some
of the aspirants have been provided military equipment by other states,
which would drive the specific support packages that would be needed by
such aspirants.
CONSISTENCY OF ADVICE
5. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Grossman, the U.S. and several
larger NATO allies consult bilaterally with partner states about the
development of their military capabilities. Are individual partners
getting consistent advice?
Secretary Grossman. Yes. In the same way that we confer with allies
on the range of issues that come before the North Atlantic Council, we
have adopted similar or complimentary messages to deliver to the
aspirants regarding necessary reform efforts.
The aspirants have come before the NAC on a number of occasions
since they began the Membership Action Plan process. This March and
April each aspirant once again is having its progress reviewed. Prior
to these meetings, allies review the aspirants' progress and develop
consistent messages. It has been our experience that allies share our
concerns and are urging aspirants to focus or similar priorities. These
include the demonstration of a broad and enduring commitment to
democratic values; a clear commitment to a free market economy and
continued economic reforms; broad and sustainable public support for
membership; continued progress toward meeting all MAP objectives, and
the ability to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area
and contribute to NATO's core mission of collective self-defense.
NATO PARTNER GOALS
6. Senator Lieberman. General Ralston, are partner states pursuing
(or drawn into) overly ambitious goals, redundancies, or
contradictions? How is this coordinated among NATO members?
General Ralston. There are numerous checks and balances within the
NATO PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) that ensure goals addressed
to partners are not overly ambitious, redundant, or contradictory, but
instead represent a realistic challenge to nations. The North Atlantic
Council established the objectives of PARP to improve interoperability
with NATO, increase transparency of defense planning processes, and
prepare aspirant nations for NATO membership. The Partnership Goals
(PGs) are designed to fulfill these objectives. Partners are
discouraged from accepting PGs that represent an unreasonable burden on
their national resources.
The many levels of consultation within PARP also help to prevent
partners from over-extending their resources or setting redundant
goals. First, in the development of PGs, the SHAPE staff consults with
the International Staff to ensure the PGs comply with political
guidance and to ensure they pose a reasonable challenge. Then, NATO
sends a team of military, political, and financial experts to the
nations for ``bilateral'' discussions. One focus of these meetings is
to ensure the principle of reasonable challenge is not violated. After
the bilateral discussions, the Political-Military Steering Committee
(PMSC) holds discussions with the partners in Brussels, prior to the
PGs being forwarded to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council for
approval. Again, partners' ability to resource the PGs is closely
scrutinized by the PMSC. Furthermore, the adoption of, or commitment
to, specific goals is entirely voluntary. In order to lessen the
burden, partners are encouraged to leverage bilateral assistance
programs as much as possible in the fulfillment of these goals. In
previous PARP cycles, NATO discovered a few nations had been overly
ambitious in their acceptance of PGs. This was possibly motivated by
their aspirations for NATO membership and their desire to appear to be
making an acceptable effort. NATO has sought to correct this problem in
the current cycle and most nations have had the number of PGs addressed
to them reduced significantly.
CONSENSUS OF ALLIES
7. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Grossman, assuming that we and our
allies in NATO would be best served by achieving consensus before the
Prague Summit on which aspirant states to offer accession negotiations,
how will the United States manage the consultation process over the
coming 7 months to achieve such a consensus?
Secretary Grossman. Our goal is to build a strong allied consensus
on specific candidates by Prague. All allies support further
enlargement, and a broad consensus is forming behind President Bush's
vision of the most robust round possible, as long as aspirants are
ready to assume the responsibilities of membership. We have encouraged
allies not to advocate specific candidacies until we can develop are
agreed Alliance consensus. In mid-April, we are beginning those
consultations with a visit by Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Marc Grossman, to NATO headquarters in Brussels and the capitals of
nine of our allies to discuss matters related to the Prague Summit.
Allies have agreed that the question of ``who'' should be invited
should not be addressed until after the May ministerial at Reykjavik.
Instead, we are seeking to keep aspirant countries focused on meeting
their reform goals through the Membership Action Plan and avoid early
and conflicting commitments among allies.
DIVERGENCE OF VALUES
8. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Grossman, Secretary Feith, and
General Ralston, our consultations at the Munich Security Conference
earlier this month suggested a significant divide between U.S. and
European societies and political leaders about what we have to defend
ourselves against. We spent proportionally so much more on defense
because, some people assert, we are arming against threats the
Europeans ignore. In what respects do you find this depiction of the
situation correct or mistaken?
Secretary Grossman. We believe the events of September 11 attest to
the enemy we are now confronting. I think the support we have received
from our allies both individually and collectively attests to their
commitment to help defend our common values. With their contributions
to Operation Enduring Freedom, they are proving that commitment by air,
by land, and by sea.
Both we and our allies and partners must maintain and enhance the
capacity to address today's asymmetric threats, terrorism foremost
among them. We are encouraging allies to address key shortfalls through
collective investment to ensure the continued ability to defend
ourselves in a world that is both less familiar and more dangerous. The
Europeans have acknowledged their shortcomings particularly in
logistics, strategic lift, personal protection/detection for biological
and chemical weapons, and communications--during its recent
Capabilities Improvement Conference. Many would tell you themselves
that European nations have not done as much as they or we believe
necessary to meet their military shortfalls and narrow the growing
transatlantic capability gap.
This is why we have included capabilities as one of the main
thrusts of the Prague Summit. We are looking for ways by which the
Europeans can redress and prioritize these continued shortcomings.
Among the options we propose are increased focus and prioritization on
the most essential areas capabilities.
Our bottom line is that even with a more concentrated focus, these
capabilities can only be achieved with a significant increase in
defense spending aimed at capabilities instead of non-deployable force
structure. To further focus their efforts and make improvement in
capabilities more affordable, we are encouraging allies to consider
pooling their resources so that they can do collectively what they are
incapable of doing as individuals.
Secretary Feith. Our European allies broadly share our view of the
threats to transatlantic security in the 21st century, including the
growing dangers associated with terrorist efforts to obtain weapons of
mass destruction. Despite the broad convergence of our views on the
threats to the Alliance, we do sometimes disagree with certain allies
over aspects of how we--individually or as an Alliance--should respond
to those threats. We also see different emphasis among our allies. For
example, with the exception of the UK and France, none see themselves
in a role as a global military power. As a result, overall European
defense spending often reflects a more regional perspective. That said,
a number of allies have been willing to contribute to ``coalitions of
the willing'' far from NATO territory, as in the case in Afghanistan
today.
The current and projected levels of allied defense spending are a
source of concern. Allies will need to make the necessary investments
to field a 21st century force, but it is estimated that overall allied
defense spending will fall roughly 1 percent from 2001 to 2002. Budgets
are unlikely to rise soon because allies are dealing with sluggish
economies and continued pressure to increase domestic spending.
Moreover, as European officials have acknowledged, their defense
budgets produce proportionately much less in terms of real military
capabilities than does the United States. Europe's fragmented defense
industries and, in some cases, continued investments in outdated force
structures also contribute to some capabilities shortfalls among our
NATO allies.
General Ralston. In one crucial respect, our European allies and
friends share our view of the threat--they agree that terrorism must be
at the top of the agenda. They put their soldiers--for them, as for us,
their most precious asset on the line in Afghanistan. They have
provided everything we have formally asked for to support Operation
Enduring Freedom.
That said, the Europeans do view defense issues differently and
spend less money on defense. They choose a different set of priorities
with more emphasis on social programs and accept the fact that they
will play a much smaller role in world affairs. With the exception of
France and the UK, the European nations have chosen to not maintain
nuclear weapons and the associated infrastructure.
9. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Grossman, what is the content of
your dialogue with allies about this divergence of values?
Secretary Grossman. I believe that the state of the Euro-Atlantic
partnership is strong. From East Timor to Sierra Leone, when a crisis
looms or fighting erupts, we turn to Europe just as Europe turns to us
to bring our combined strengths to bear. Witness the offers of
assistance and actions that have flowed from September 11. Our European
allies responded meaningfully to the attacks where many of those killed
were Europeans. Together with us, our allies instantaneously understood
that terrorists struck at the heart of our shared values.
When differences with our allies arise, they tend to arise over
means, not ends--over how to accomplish an objective, not the
fundamental values that lie beneath.
As I say, many Europeans governments have acknowledged their
defense shortcomings and would tell you themselves that they have not
done as much as we believe necessary to meet their military shortfalls
and narrow the growing transatlantic capability gap. At the same time,
our allies stand beside us in NATO, ready and willing to act, as we saw
to the unquestioned invocation of Article V following the attacks
against their ally, the United States, on September 11.
As NATO adapts to address the different threat environment we have
encountered over the past 6 months, it will continue to be the
guarantor of security and stability in Euro-Atlantic region for the
21st century. This is not just an American interest, but a view also
shared by our allies. By adding new members, developing new
capabilities, and nurturing new relationships, NATO will be prepared to
meet 21st century challenges and fulfill its mission to protect the
freedom and security of its members and continue to promote stability
in Europe.
10. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Feith, how do you respond to the
assertions that this administration assigns little value to the
transatlantic Alliance or inclines to interact with the allies as
satellites?
Secretary Feith. Such assertions are false.
For over 50 years, NATO has been the most successful military
alliance in history. As Secretary Rumsfeld has made clear during his
meetings with allied counterparts, the U.S. has a vital interest in
NATO, which will remain the anchor of America's security commitment to
Europe. We value highly our bilateral and multilateral security
relationships with our NATO allies and recognize their central
importance to peace and security; any suggestion to the contrary is
flat wrong.
The value that the administration sees in NATO can be seen by how
NATO responded to the September 11 attacks: NATO and our NATO allies
responded quickly, loyally and usefully. Soon after invocation of
Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time, NATO took a
series of steps to assist us in the war against terrorism. In addition
to seven NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft
patrolling U.S. skies, individual NATO allies and partners are
contributing to the war effort and to the post-Taliban reconstruction
and security effort in Afghanistan. Some of the allies' contributions
have come through formal Alliance structures and some outside those
structures. All those contributions, however, should be appreciated as
the fruit of more than 50 years of joint planning, training, and
operations within the NATO Alliance.
CAPABILITIES GAP
11. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Grossman, Secretary Feith, and
General Ralston, Secretary Grossman stated that the U.S. favors a
shorter, more focused agenda than the 58 measures of the Defense
Capabilities Initiative (DCI). How should we revise the DCI to prepare
for global counter-terrorism operations and bind allied governments to
more robust spending?
Secretary Grossman. We believe the events of September 11 have
added new urgency to our efforts to enhance NATO's ability to meet the
threats of the new global security environment. We believe the capacity
for collective action remains the foundation of collective security.
Toward this end, we favor a shorter and more focused agenda for the
Defense Capabilities Initiative which will address key shortfalls and
allow the Alliance to field and sustain more flexible and survivable
forces. The Alliance should make capabilities a focal point for the
Prague Summit to ensure the quantity and quality of forces necessary to
meet today's asymmetric threats, terrorism foremost among them.
To meet this objective, we believe allies should consider
specialization, joint procurement, and collective investment. We will
also encourage allies to focus their defense spending on key priorities
to ensure that the Alliance meets its capability goals.
Secretary Feith. In many respects, progress toward DCI has been
disappointingly slow with only modest progress in fulfilling DCI
requirements. In the follow-on program to DCI, we want to keep the
message simple and focused. As an Alliance, we need to field real
capabilities in four areas:
- Defending against weapons of mass destruction
- Transporting forces promptly to the fight and sustaining them
there
- Connecting friendly forces with timely, secure communications
and targeting data
- Fielding a more balanced and modern allied contribution to
combat operations
Over the next several months, we intend to work closely with our
allies to prepare for the Prague Summit and identify tangible,
significant capabilities improvements in these four areas. These needed
improvements are relevant to the entire range of NATO missions,
including NATO's contribution to the war on terrorism.
General Ralston. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson has
repeatedly encouraged improved capabilities along two fronts: more
efficient use of available resources, and when necessary, increased
funding.
Since the DCI was launched in Washington in March 1999, it has
provided much justification for increased defense spending. The DCI was
based on the fundamental fighting tasks of move, shoot, communicate,
protect, and sustain. Those fundamental skill sets remain as valid for
a NATO Article V operation as they do for the global war on terrorism
(GWOT). The High Level Steering Group (HLSG) has identified a number of
long-standing deficiencies, particularly: strategic air and sea lift,
alliance ground surveillance, combat identification, and suppression of
enemy air defenses. Another area of concern rests with weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Our experience with anthrax-tainted mail has been a
bit of a wake-up call to our allies, who recognize we must address
nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) defensive capability
shortfalls.
The GWOT provides us with another opportunity to highlight these
shortfalls. I don't see a need to revamp the concept behind DCI, as
those principles are still valid; however, I believe a simplified
approach is warranted. Strategic lift is a vital concern shared by all
allies; terrorist cells often hide in remote places for the very
protection that isolation provides. Precision munitions are vital to
prosecute combat operations and to minimize unintended casualties.
Communications, particularly compatible, secure communications are
critical to coordinating our Alliance efforts. Logistics, especially
over the long distances required, demand the small footprint that only
light, deployable combat forces possess. Lastly, force protection,
particularly NBC protection, must be a top priority.
TECH TRANSFER
12. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Feith, do our defense trade
controls and protection of American firms' competitive advantages work
against the advancement of interoperability?
Secretary Feith. In general, no. NATO's European members can close
the capabilities gap and increase interoperability significantly
through increased investment in strategic lift and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. European firms
offer a wide variety of relevant systems, but our European allies do
not always procure them in sufficient numbers. At the same time,
comparable American systems are often as readily available to our NATO
allies as the non-lift and non-ISR systems we routinely supply to our
European allies.
In some cases, exports of certain sensitive ISR systems may be
subjected to additional scrutiny by both the executive and legislative
branches. While this may complicate the ability of NATO's European
members to increase interoperability through the purchase of U.S.-made
systems by adding extra steps, we have generally provided such items to
our NATO allies to enhance the Alliance's overall capabilities.
13. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Feith, we have the market power
within NATO countries of both overwhelming supplier and overwhelming
consumer of military equipment. Please discuss how we are managing the
economic, political, and technology impacts on Alliance nations of this
imbalance in our favor.
Secretary Feith. The United States is the world's principal
supplier and consumer of military equipment. We export nearly three
times as many arms worldwide as our NATO allies combined, and spend
more than twice as much on defense procurement.
This imbalance is largely a result of choices made by our NATO
allies, who as a group, have opted to spend proportionately less on
defense procurement and defense research and development, and together,
have settled on less capability and less advanced technology than we
feel is necessary. This contributes to the so-called ``capabilities
gap'' between the United States and our NATO allies. The new
capabilities initiative that we are working with our allies to
implement will help to remedy this imbalance, but insufficient defense
spending by our NATO allies remains an issue.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond
RUSSIA'S NEW ROLE IN NATO
14. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Grossman, according to a February
26, 2002 article in the New York Times, after months of internal
discussion and dispute, NATO has offered Russia a new form of
relationship that will see a Russian ambassador sitting between
Portugal and Spain at meetings to discuss and decide significant issues
of mutual concern. What specifically will be Russia's role in NATO's
military deliberations and how will it influence that process?
Secretary Grossman. In developing the proposal for the NATO-Russia
Council (NRC), allies agreed that Russia would not be able to use this
new body to restrict NATO's freedom of action (have a veto) and that
consensus among the 19 allies will always be required to place any
specific issue on the agenda of the NRC and to continue working an
issue in the NRC. NATO allies will always be in a position to take a
decision on any issue at any time, regardless of the state of
discussions in the NRC.
Under these same arrangements, Russian military reps will continue
to meet with NATO's Military Committee (MC) to work on an agenda agreed
by NATO allies in the NAC, but this will not affect in any way the MC's
ability to provide independent military advice to the NAC based on the
MC's internal consultations (without the Russians).
EXPANSION OF NATO MEMBERSHIP
15. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Grossman, I understand that during
the upcoming NATO Summit in Prague, as many as nine countries are
hoping to be invited to become NATO members. What nations does the
United States consider the prime candidates for new NATO membership and
why?
Secretary Grossman. All allies support further enlargement, and a
broad consensus is forming behind President Bush's vision of the most
robust round possible, as long as aspirants are ready to assume the
responsibilities of membership.
In order to achieve this goal, we are seeking to keep aspirant
countries focused on meeting their reform goals through the Membership
Action Plan, and have been urging allies not to advocate for specific
candidates until we can develop an agreed Alliance consensus. In order
to give aspirant countries as much time as possible to implement
reforms, we have all agreed that the question of ``who'' should be
invited would not be addressed until the fall.
Before any country is invited, all allies will want to be convinced
that its admission will contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and that
its commitment to democracy and the rule of law is irrevocable.
NATO'S FUTURE
16. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Feith, with Russia's new role and
NATO's enlargement to the East, there is the fear that NATO's military
role will be secondary and politics will take a predominant role since
the new nations have little to add in terms of military capability. Do
you agree with this assessment? If not, why not?
Secretary Feith. I disagree strongly.
NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. The Alliance
succeeds because it is an organization of shared values, such as
civilian control of the military, democracy, and respect for individual
rights. Naturally, these values create a need for a considerable amount
of policy coordination and political leadership within NATO. In a
sense, NATO's military strength derives from its political activities.
NATO aspirants have varying levels of military capabilities based
on their inherent sizes and recent histories. Through NATO's Membership
Action Plan, the U.S. and NATO have worked with these aspirants to
strengthen their militaries through serious reform, planning, and
implementation. While some of the aspirants may have a less than robust
military capability to provide the Alliance, we are confident that they
have pragmatic and achievable plans that will contribute serious
military capabilities in the future. Even with limited capabilities,
most of the NATO aspirants have demonstrated ``allied-like'' behavior
by providing military support to KFOR, SFOR, Operation Enduring
Freedom, and the ISAF.
NATO'S IMPORTANCE
17. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Feith, as the United States focuses
on the worldwide terrorist threat and the Pacific region as suggested
by the QDR, Europeans are concerned that our role in NATO will
diminish. What is your response to these concerns?
Secretary Feith. These concerns are not valid.
For over 50 years, NATO has been the most successful military
alliance in history. As Secretary Rumsfeld has made clear during his
meetings with allied counterparts, the U.S. has a vital interest in
NATO, which will remain the anchor of America's security commitment to
Europe. We value highly our bilateral and multilateral security
relationships with our NATO allies and recognize their central
importance to peace and security; any suggestion to the contrary is
flat wrong.
BOSNIAN POLICE FORCE
18. Senator Thurmond. General Ralston, in your prepared comments
regarding Bosnia, you say that the way ahead in Bosnia remains
contingent upon the international community. A key provision is the
establishment of a competent Bosnian police force and the presence of
an international police force. The issue of establishing a police force
has been on the agenda for some time. What is the status and why is it
taking this long to establish a reliable police force?
General Ralston. Since 1996, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (UNMBIH) has had the responsibility of assisting the
Bosnians in establishing the foundation for effective, democratic, and
sustainable law enforcement agencies. Their mandate expires on 31
December 2002, and the European Union (EU) plans to fill the police
training void with their own police mission (called the EU Police
Mission, or EUPM; the EU currently plans a 3-year mission beginning 1
January 2003).
19. Senator Thurmond. General Ralston, how many nations are
contributing to the international police force?
General Ralston. As of 18 February 2002, there were 43 contributing
nations to the International Police Task Force (IPTF). The U.S.
contribution is 59 officers out of a total of 1,850.
EFFICIENT BASING EAST
20. Senator Thurmond. General Ralston, I complement you on the
extensive description of the major basing initiatives and military
construction requirements in Europe. It is important that the committee
get a better appreciation of these issues since both require a
substantial investment. How much support, either cash or payment-in-
kind, are the Europeans providing to support our facilities improvement
program?
General Ralston. For Efficient Basing East (EB-E), the Federal
Republic of Germany has committed to provide payment-in-kind (PIK) of
$28.0 million for the Brigade Complex consisting of a General
Instruction Building, Army Reserve Center, Communications Center,
Information Processing System, and an Administration Facility at
Grafenwoehr Training Area, GE.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, installation closures
and negotiations have resulted in total payments of $142.5 million to
the DOD Overseas Military Facility Recovery Account (DOMFIRA) and PIK
made by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) totaling $354.8 million.
Additionally, the FRG is providing facilities at Ramstein and
Spangdalhem Air Bases that recreate capabilities that the U.S. will
return at Rhein Main AB. The new facilities at Ramstein and Spangdalhem
equal an additional $487.5 million worth of projects provided by the
FRG as part of the ``Quid Pro Quo'' agreement.
In summary, the RV and PIK programs have provided key quality of
life facilities such as housing, dormitories, and barracks in the early
1990s when there was minimum MILCON funding in the EUCOM AOR. Further,
the program continues to provide essential strategic facilities at
Ramstein and Spangdalhem Air Bases, key facilities in the future at
Grafenwoehr Training Area in support of EB-E, and at other locations
throughout the theater.
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH RESIDUAL PAYMENT MONETARY COMPENSATION RECEIVED IN DOD OVERSEAS MILITARY FACILITY
RECOVERY ACCOUNT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Site Payment ($000) Date Source
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Woensdrecht Ground Launch Cruise Missile Site. 30,000.0 Oct. 1989 The Netherlands
168 Sites Returned to Germany Prior to 1990... 3,026.8 April 1992 Germany
Pfullendorf Communications Tower.............. 49.1 Apr. 1993 Germany
Decimomannu Air Weapons Training.............. 1,676.0 1993 Italy
Facility (3 payments: 1 each from............. 782.0 1993 Italy
Germany, United Kingdom, and Italy)........... 2,842.0 March 1995 Italy
Donges Metz Pipeline.......................... 32,956.7 Dec. 1994 France
Wildflecken Training Area Targetry Equipment.. 3,500.0 Dec. 1994 Germany
Holy Loch..................................... 680.6 Feb. 1995 United Kingdom
Bremerhaven (Phone Equipment)................. 124.1 Aug. 1995 Germany
Soesterberg Air Base.......................... 31,000.0 Sept. 1996 The Netherlands
Lucius Clay Kaserne........................... 31,700.0 Oct. 1996 Germany
Doerverden Communications Facility............ 180.0 Mar. 1997 Germany
Duensen Communications Facility............... 253.0 Mar. 1997 Germany
Koeterberg Radar Relay Site................... 65.0 Mar. 1997 Germany
Soesterberg Family Housing Annex.............. 11,876.8 Aug. 1997 The Netherlands
Florennes Air Base (18 buildings)............. 17,600.0 Sept. 1997 Belgium
Mohammedia Storage and Fuel Facility.......... 3,150.0 Dec. 1998 Morocco
Site 54, Israel, (Total $2M, payable in 4 1000.0 Dec. 2001 Israel
increments of $500K, 2 increments received to
date.
----------------
Total....................................... 142,462.1 \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Payment of $30 million for the return of the Woensdrecht Ground Launch Cruise Missile site, The Netherlands,
was received in 1989, prior to the establishment of the ``Department of Defense Military Facility Investment
Recovery Account.'' The payment was deposited to the Treasury as a miscellaneous receipt.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PAYMENT-IN-KIND COMPENSATION
Germany
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount (in
millions of Date Source
dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quid Quo Pro
Rhein Main (Ramstein Air Base 62.5 Germany
benefit)..........................
Replicate Rhein Main Air Base 425.0 Germany
strategic capabilities
(Spangdalhem and Ramstein benefit)
-------------
Total............................ 487.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PIK
PIK#1 (1 project).................. 25.5 Apr. 1993 Germany
PIK #2 (12 projects)............... 110.0 Dec. 1993 Germany
PIK #3 (14 projects)............... 67.1 Sept. 1994 Germany
PIK #4 (8 projects)................ 55.0 Nov. 1996 Germany
PIK #5 (1 project)................. 5.0 Feb. 1998 Germany
PIK #6 (4 projects)................ 44.4 Dec. 1998 Germany
USAFE PIK (1 project).............. 8.8 Nov. 2000 Germany
PIK #7 (4 projects)................ 39.0 Feb. 2001 Germany
-------------
Total (PIK)...................... 354.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
TURKEY--NATO ENLARGEMENT
21. Senator McCain. Secretary Grossman, Turkey is a front-line
state in the war on terrorism, as was Germany a front-line state during
the Cold War. Turkey has made important contributions to securing the
peace in Afghanistan and will be integral to any campaign against Iraq.
It is also central to our objectives of ending terrorism and promoting
democratic stability in Central Asia. Turkey's strong support and
active cooperation demonstrate the fallacy our enemies would have the
world believe: that our campaign against terrorism is a war against
Islam.
For too long, Europe has held Turkey at arm's length. NATO's
southeastern expansion would secure Europe's southern flank, enhance
stability in the Western Balkans, and end Turkey's strategic isolation
for the Alliance. It would help diminish continuing frictions in
Turkey's relationship with the European Union (EU). A visionary
enlargement of the NATO Alliance to the south combined with the EU's
historic expansion to the east would bring about a new and welcome
cohesion of Turkey to Europe. The recent joint statement by Greece and
Turkey in favor of NATO membership for Bulgaria and Romania is a
promising demonstration of how enlargement can positively influence
regional dynamics.
Could you share your views on how you believe the administration's
agenda for Prague will affect our Turkish allies, and what role they
will play in this process?
Secretary Grossman. We believe the U.S. agenda for the Prague NATO
summit will work well for Turkey. On membership, the administration
favors as robust a round of NATO expansion as possible and understands
the argument for geographic balance as NATO enlarges. While decisions
will not be made until the fall, Turkey's joint support with Greece in
favor of membership for Bulgaria and Romania is noteworthy and will
certainly carry weight as NATO members collectively decide which
countries to invite to join the Alliance at Prague. On capabilities, we
count on Turkey's support to adjust and enhance NATO's ability to deal
with the asymmetric threats that the attacks of September 11 brought
home. Turkey spends proportionally more on defense than any other ally,
and, within the constraints of a difficult domestic economic situation,
Turkey is making commendable progress in modernizing its forces. It is
our view that deeper, closer NATO relations with Russia and Ukraine
will contribute significantly to improvement of the overall security
situation in Europe and Eurasia, including Turkey's special areas of
interest.
NATO'S SUCCESSES
22. Senator McCain. General Ralston, we live in a new era, and the
Alliance has no choice but to adapt to the new threats. Lest we forget,
NATO has successfully taken on new challenges before--in the 1950s,
when it integrated West Germany; in the 1960s and 1970s, in responding
to the Soviet missile buildup; in the 1980s, in working through the INF
debate; and in the 1990s, when it brought peace to Bosnia, integrated
former members of the Warsaw Pact, and defeated Slobodan Milosevic's
tyranny. We are a strong Alliance, and debate within our circles about
capabilities, roles, and missions can be healthy.
Despite all the recent hand-wringing about NATO's purpose, I
believe the events of September 11 have already served to clarify
NATO's role and mission. American leadership within NATO has been
enhanced by our leading role in the ongoing war. The terrorist assaults
have bound the Alliance more closely together in a tangible way, with
NATO assets helping to defend the American homeland and forces of
member and aspirant nations working together in Central Asia. I hope it
has helped us put aside our previous differences over an emerging, if
unrealized, European security identity in favor of NATO's existing
security architecture. It has laid a strong foundation for NATO's
future relations with Russia.
Could you share your views on NATO's fundamental strengths, and
help us put existing differences with the allies over the war on terror
in the context of other differences we have successfully overcome in
the Alliance's history?
General Ralston. NATO's fundamental strength is the ability of
nations with similar values to reach consensus on tough issues, like
those enumerated in the question. Another strength is its set of
technical standards and doctrine that can be practiced in exercises to
form the basis of interoperability in war. Harmonization of deployed
multinational forces is far simpler when commanders can refer back to a
common NATO way of doing things. The Defense Planning Process, while
not perfect, is a good way of ensuring that NATO has the forces and
capabilities it needs to meet the threat in a more coherent way than if
each nation did its planning independently. Years of cooperation in
these areas have produced the ability to generate effective
multinational forces. For example, the war in Afghanistan has been
fought with an effective multinational force including participants
from numerous NATO allies, even though it is not a NATO operation. The
conduct of the GWOT is under American leadership, with varying
coalitions supporting us as we operate in theaters around the world.
Given the many locations and means of struggle possible, not all allies
will agree with our approach all the time. The Alliance needs to agree
on its future role in dealing with terrorism, based on a common
assessment of the threat. From a military perspective, our allies have
many forces that could be brought to bear in situations requiring an
international response, for example, consequence management for a WMD
incident occurring across borders. The Alliance needs to agree on the
best way to take advantage of the capabilities of its members to defend
itself against the spectrum of possible terrorist acts. This should not
be as difficult a decision process as some of the previous challenges
NATO has faced.
VALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF NATO'S NEWEST MEMBERS
23. Senator McCain. Secretary Grossman, when the Senate debated the
last round of NATO enlargement, there were many questions about the
military and political value of inviting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic to join the Alliance. Yet days after their accession they
joined us in going to war against Slobodan Milosevic. Since then, they
have been among our staunchest supporters within NATO councils--better
friends of the United States than some of our older allies.
I believe the performance and strong support we have received from
our newest allies in Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague are instructive as we
consider inviting new members to join the Alliance in the next round of
NATO enlargement. Could you give us your views on this?
Secretary Grossman. Senator McCain, I could not agree more. Our
three newest allies have made consistent and invaluable contributions
to the Alliance. The aspirant countries have been demonstrating an
equal commitment to cooperative behavior among themselves and have
worked closely and well with NATO--in many cases over the past 3 years.
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have all made good progress
and developed forward-leaning plans to continue their defense reform
efforts. As you say, all three supported NATO's Kosovo mission from
their earliest days as allies, and all three provided immediate offers
of support after September 11. In the Balkans, the three together have
provided approximately 2000 troops on average in SFOR and KFOR. Each
country offers unique capabilities and expertise such as the Poles with
demining assets, the Czechs with reconnaissance capability, and the
Hungarians with engineering skills.
While all nine aspirants still have important work to do between
now and Prague, they also deserve recognition for their reform efforts
and for their support in the struggle against terrorism and their
participation in NATO peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans. Through the
Vilnius Group, they are acting as partners in preparing themselves for
NATO membership, not as rivals. In the aftermath of September 11, they
all made significant contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom and
the International Security Assistance Force, providing overflight
rights, access to bases, specialized units, troops for ISAF, and solid
political support. Even in the Balkans, the aspirants (except for
Albania) have been providing contributions to SFOR and KFOR consistent
with their capabilities.
CAPABILITIES OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES
24. Senator McCain. Secretary Feith, I have been very encouraged by
the President's strong support for a new and far-reaching Atlantic
agenda. I fully endorse the President's vision of an Alliance that
stretches from the Baltics to the Black Sea, created by a robust round
of enlargement driven not by ``how little we can get away with, but how
much we can do to advance the cause of freedom,'' as he said in Warsaw
last June. I share the administration's determination that even as we
work to enlarge the Alliance, we share a mandate with NATO's existing
members to ensure that they are capable of meeting new threats, and
that our Alliance is structured to respond to them.
Our fundamental goal at Prague must be to transform what has become
a somewhat divisive Trans-Atlantic debate about the role and relevance
of our NATO partners in the war on terrorism, into a concrete plan of
action to align the Alliance's purpose of collective defense with the
threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Could you discuss
some of the concrete ways we can work with our European partners to
develop the specialized capabilities to respond to the new threats.
Secretary Feith. In many respects, progress in fulfilling DCI
requirements has been disappointing. In the follow-on program to DCI,
we want to keep the message simple and focused. As an Alliance, we need
to field real capabilities in four areas:
- Defending against weapons of mass destruction
- Transporting forces promptly to the fight and sustaining them
there
- Connecting friendly forces with timely, secure communications
and targeting data
- Fielding a more balanced and modern allied contribution to
combat operations
Over the next several months, we intend to work closely with our
allies to prepare for the Prague Summit and identify tangible,
significant capabilities improvements in these four areas. These needed
improvements are relevant to the entire range of NATO missions,
including NATO's contribution to the war on terrorism.
NATO/RUSSIA COUNCIL
25. Senator McCain. Secretary Grossman, like other members of the
committee, I am eager to learn more about the proposed operating
guidelines of the new NATO/Russia Council. I appreciate your assurances
that the North Atlantic Council will maintain deliberations separate
from the NATO/Russia Council, and that the North Atlantic Council
itself will determine which issues and decisions to bring to the NATO/
Russia Council for consideration. I look forward to better
understanding how these principles will operate in practice, in order
to ensure that NATO's institutional integrity is not compromised by a
well-meaning effort to give our friends in Moscow a meaningful role in
our councils. I and other members of this committee will need
assurances that this new NATO/Russia body will, as you say, offer
Russia the opportunity to participate in shaping mechanisms for
cooperation in areas we choose, leaving the North Atlantic Council free
to determine when and to what extent Russia will participate in NATO-
related actions.
Will you explain in more detail how you foresee the interaction
between Russia and NATO once the NATO/Russia Council is established at
Reykjavik?
Secretary Grossman. We expect that the new NATO-Russia body will
operate as follows:
- The North Atlantic Council (NAC) will decide by consensus
whether to put an issue on the agenda of the NATO Russia
Council;
- If Russia proposes a topic for discussion or an issue for
decision, the NAC will decide, again by consensus, whether NATO
can agree to this proposal;
- In either case, whether NATO or Russia put forward the
proposal, the NAC will also have to decide for NATO how the
issue will be handled, i.e. whether allies will need to pre-
coordinate their position or whether no pre-coordination is
necessary;
- All allies will have to agree to any decision or action taken
by the NATO-Russia Council;
- Moreover, the NAC can, at any time, take a decision on any
issue, whether or not that issue is or has been discussed in
the NATO-Russia Council;
- Any ally can pull back any issue to ``At 19'' at any time
without revealing its concern or identity.
Building on the expressions of commitment from allies and Russia to
forge a new relationship, and operating within these guidelines, we
expect that the new NATO-Russia Council, starting with a modest agenda,
will focus on those issues where allies and Russia are ready and
capable for joint decisions and actions ``At 20.''
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
26. Senator Smith. Secretary Feith, in 1991 and 1992, Presidents
George H.W. Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Boris Yeltsin annnounced their
intention unilaterially to reduce U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear
weapons (TNWs) arsenals--both by reducing the warhead stockpiles and by
eliminating some entire classes of these weapons. The current U.S.
arsenal of TNWs has been drastically reduced to around 1,670 warheads
and there are few concerns about the safety of storage conditions of
these weapons. There have also been reductions in the Russian force,
but significant uncertainty remains about the size and safety of the
Russian TNWs arsenal--estimates of which range from anywhere between
3,500 to upwards of 18,000. In 1997 the United States outlined its
concerns about security of Russian TNWs and raised the issue in tandem
with bilateral efforts to reduce strategic forces in the context of
START III framework discussions. More recently, NATO expressed its
concerns about the large number of Russian ``tactical nuclear weapons
of all types'' and has called upon Russia ``to bring to completion the
reductions in these forces announced in 1991-1992, and to further
review tactical nuclear weapons'' acknowledging that there could be
serious problems with Russia's tactical nuclear weapons arsenal and the
Alliance. Aside from vague references in speeches, however, little of
substance has been done by Russia to clarify what it has done to
address the concerns about its TNWs arsenal. What are the United States
and NATO doing to attain more clarity from Moscow on the status of
Russian follow-through on the 1991 and 1992 Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives on TNWs, and the status of the current stockpile of the
Russian tactical nuclear arsenal?
Secretary Feith. There are presently no official U.S.-Russian
exchanges on the status of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs).
In the early to mid 1990s, the Russian Ministry of Defense sent
periodic progress reports to DOD about the elimination of tactical
weapons returned to Russia from other former Soviet republics. However,
these proffered Russian status reports ceased about 1995. President
Yeltsin pledged that Russia would honor its PNI pledges by the end of
2000. The Russians stated in multiple venues that, except for the
elimination of Ground Forces' nuclear weapons, their PNIs have been
completed.
Moscow has never declared the number of nuclear warheads in the
Russian stockpile. While bilateral declarations of stockpiles could
become part of some future agreement, Russia has argued that non-
strategic weapons are outside the scope of START.
27. Senator Smith. Secretary Feith, what is the United States doing
to ensure the safety and the reduction of Russian tactical nuclear
weapons?
Secretary Feith. The Department of Defense, through the Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) program, is working closely with the Russia
Federation to prevent nuclear proliferation by improving the safety and
security of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Under
applicable international agreements, we are working with the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MOD) to enhance the security of nuclear weapons
storage sites that hold both tactical and strategic warheads. We also
are working together to improve the security of warheads during
transportation.
In recent years, we have provided ``quick fix fencing'' and other
equipment for storage site improvements, inventory control systems,
personnel reliability and safety equipment, emergency response
equipment, and guard force equipment. We also conduct railcar
maintenance, and your assistance has helped to reduce MOD's response
and recovery times to respond to nuclear accidents or incidents. We are
encouraged by the reduction and consolidation of tactical and strategic
weapons in Russia by transporting warheads to consolidation and
dismantlement facilities. Since the nuclear weapons transportation
security project's inception in January 2000, shipments of nuclear
warheads to such facilities have increased to seven or eight a month.
28. Senator Smith. General Ralston, the threat of a terrorist
attack using a nuclear weapon has become more urgent as organized
terrorism increases. Russia's stored TNWs are potentially vulnerable to
terrorists or unfriendly nations who will buy or steal them. Compared
to the United States, Russians lack stringent, centrally coordinated
procedures for ensuring the safety of its TNWs. Russia has an
indeterminate number of these weapons, which could pose a proliferation
and terrorist threat. TNWs are smaller and more portable than strategic
nuclear weapons and some models could be used by terrorists without the
authority of centralized command and control oversight mechanisms. What
steps are currently being taken by NATO and the United States to ensure
that Russian TNWs are secure and will not fall into the hands of
terrorists?
General Ralston. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Smith. General Ralston, now that the United States has
a better relationship with Russia and both nations are cooperating to
prevent terrorism, what is being done to specifically address the
proliferation and terrorist dangers associated with TNWs?
General Ralston. [Deleted.] CTR has promoted non-proliferation
through constructive engagement and represents a proactive approach to
mitigating the threat of residual Russian nuclear weapons.
COST OF EXPANSION
30. Senator Smith. General Ralston, the costs of NATO expansion
have been estimated as low as $1.5 billion over 10 years--but I
understand RAND and CBO may have had alternative cost estimates that
were much higher. Do we have any accurate costs for expansion,
particularly for those additional nations that are seeking membership,
such as Slovenia and the Baltic States?
General Ralston. Estimating the cost of NATO expansion depends on
the assumptions and parameters chosen, and different assumptions can
yield widely varying estimates. EUCOM does not have cost estimates for
the potential addition of new members, but DOD is currently studying
the cost implications of enlargement to provide to the President for
his mandated report to Congress on enlargement. The President is
required to report before any decision by the North Atlantic Council to
invite any country to join NATO.
NATO AND ASIA
31. Senator Smith. General Ralston, where would NATO stand on the
U.S. meeting any threat in Asia, with Asia still the most likely
flashpoint in the world today?
General Ralston. A NATO operation outside of the Euro-Atlantic area
is not excluded by the Strategic Concept of 1999. Precedent for
operating outside NATO's immediate borders was set in the Balkans. The
position of NATO on an Asian contingency would depend on the
circumstances of the threat or conflict the U.S. would meet, in
particular to what extent the member nations assessed their vital
interests to be at stake. As with the current contingency in
Afghanistan, bilateral support from allies would be more likely than an
agreement to involve NATO as a whole at considerable distance from the
Euro-Atlantic area.
NATO AND TAIWAN
32. Senator Smith. General Ralston, would NATO support the U.S.
with forward deployment of forces, overflight rights, etc., if the U.S.
were to intervene to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack?
General Ralston. The position of NATO on a U.S. contingency in
Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack would likely be neutral, as it
would not involve an attack on a member state. However, individual
allies would grant transit and basing rights according to their
assessment of their national interest in doing so.
NATO AND IRAQ
33. Senator Smith. General Ralston, where would NATO stand on
military action against Iraq, given NATO's past weak position (except
Britain) during Operation Desert Fox?
General Ralston. I believe NATO's position on military action
against Iraq would depend on the evidence that would be produced
regarding Iraq's possession of WMD and their intent to use WMD. An
attack by Iraq against any member state would be met with overwhelming
NATO military action.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]