[Senate Hearing 107-719]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-719
HOMELAND DEFENSE: SHARING INFORMATION WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AND THE COURTS
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 11, 2001
__________
Serial No. J-107-52
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
82-252 WASHINGTON : 2002
___________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JON KYL, Arizona
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
Bruce A. Cohen, Majority Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Sharon Prost, Minority Chief Counsel
Makan Delrahim, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Chairman
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
Benjamin Lawsky, Majority Chief Counsel
Ed Haden, Minority Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa. 27
Hatch, Hon. Orrin G., a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah...... 28
Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont. 29
Schumer, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of New
York........................................................... 1
Thurmond, Hon. Strom, a U.S. Senator from the State of South
Carolina....................................................... 30
WITNESSES
Canterbury, Chuck, National Vice President, Fraternal Order of
Police, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina........................... 10
Greiner, Jon, President, Utah Chief of Police Association, Ogden,
Utah........................................................... 14
Kerik, Bernard B., Police Commissioner, New York, New York....... 4
O'Malley, Hon. Martin, Mayor, Baltimore, Maryland................ 6
HOMELAND DEFENSE: SHARING INFORMATION WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
----------
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:14 a.m., in
Room SD-224, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E.
Schumer [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Senator Schumer.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Chairman Schumer. The hearing will come to order and let me
apologize to the witnesses. We had votes going on. These are
the vicissitudes of life on the Hill. I thank all of you for
coming. Senator Sessions is expected shortly but he has given
us the okay, the green light to proceed.
We are here this morning to discuss one of the most serious
problems undermining public safety today and that is the lack
of communication between federal and local law enforcement. One
of the worst kept secrets in law enforcement is the chronic
lack of communication between federal and local authorities.
The problem was never clearer and never more threatening than
when anthrax was discovered at the NBC studios in New York
City. The FBI knew about it for days but they failed to alert
the New York Police Department. And it is quite possible that
because of that lack of communication steps that could have
been taken to protect the public were not. It is possible that
countless New Yorkers were unnecessarily put at risk simply
because the law and culture makes information-sharing taboo.
That is a risk none of us should ever be forced to take.
Most experts point to two primary reasons for this gaping
failure in communication. First, there are legal and procedural
obstacles to sharing certain information. Second, some say that
the culture within federal law enforcement discourages
cooperation with local officials. Neither of these reasons is
acceptable. More importantly, both are eminently fixable.
Whatever the problems may be, they are getting in the way of
protecting the public. If the past few months has taught us
anything it is that any delay in patching holes in our security
network is unacceptable.
So last month Senator Clinton, Chairman Leahy and Senator
Hatch and I introduced legislation to help solve these
problems. Our bill reduces many of the practical barriers to
information-sharing. Just like other aspects of American
culture have changed since September 11, this law enforcement
culture needs to change, as well. Our bill gives that culture a
push in the right direction.
We recently passed an anti-terrorism bill that carefully
balanced the need for information-sharing among federal
agencies with the need to protect privacy rights and other
civil rights of individuals under investigation. Our proposal
builds on both the powers and protections in the anti-terrorism
bill. The act permits but does not require the federal
government to share information. In short, where information
can be shared among federal agencies, under our bill it could
be shared with local law enforcement. So if the FBI could alert
the CDC to an anthrax outbreak it could, at the same time, tell
the NYPD, as well.
At the same time, our bill subjects local law enforcement
officials who receive this information to the same privacy
protections that cover law enforcement. So if circumstances
dictate that the CDC cannot talk to anyone else about an
outbreak, neither could the NYPD. We are not changing the rules
themselves; we are simply making long-overdue changes to the
process.
Our bill also directs the administration to promulgate
regulations to guarantee the security of this information. In
protecting the public, we are protecting privacy, as well.
This proposal forges a new and open trail for communication
regarding threats that federal authorities learn about, whether
through grand juries, wiretaps, or foreign intelligence-
gathering operations. It would be absurd, especially in this
new world, for a witness to tell a federal grand jury about an
anthrax threat or for a wiretap to pick up information about a
planned car bombing but to restrict the federal government's
power to immediately give a heads-up to the appropriate local
authorities, yet that is what exactly happens now.
This is especially problematic in an era when state and
local budgets are already stretched to the breaking point. They
simply cannot afford to provide round-the-clock heightened
security on the bridges and roadways, at the power plants and
all the other vulnerable sectors. Local law enforcement needs
to know when there is a specific threat so they can target
resources appropriately and effectively. Too many times local
officials learn of security threats by watching the news
accounts instead of getting the warning directly from the
federal government and that is unacceptable.
We live in a world where we need to use every weapon in our
arsenal to protect the public. Rules and a culture that limit
information-sharing simply do not make sense. With the holiday
travel season, New Year's Eve celebrations, the Superbowl and
the Winter Olympics all on the horizon, now more than ever our
safety and security depend on maximizing the utility of our
resources.
This is no time for squabbling. It is no time to protect
turf. It is time for everyone in law enforcement to come
together. That means getting federal, state and local law
enforcement all onto the same page.
When we remove legal barriers we are also giving an impetus
to changing the culture. In the past when federal officials did
not want to share information they said well, I cannot because
of this or that law and you are not going to get a court suit
to debate whether that information can be shared. Now, once
this legislation passes, there will be no excuse about the
failure to share information. We are not requiring the sharing.
There may be some instances where the federal government says
that they cannot for a variety of reasons but, at the same
time, we are eliminating any kind of legal excuse to the
necessity to share information.
Now we all know that there is no question that knowledge is
power. The more broadly we share information and intelligence
among our federal, state and local law enforcement officials,
the better chance we have of preventing future attacks on
American soil and that is what this hearing is about and what
our legislation tries to accomplish.
President Bush recognizes the importance of local law
enforcement in our national security efforts. The
administration has directed all 94 U.S. attorneys to create
anti-terrorism task forces that include representatives from
local law enforcement. That is a good start but it is not
enough.
The administration recognizes the need for more
information-sharing and they support the objectives of our
bill. It is bipartisan, both the Chairman and ranking
Republican member of the Committee are sponsors, and we hope to
move this legislation quickly. That is why we are having this
hearing now. Administration officials have also assured me that
they are with us in this battle. We hope to have this
bipartisan legislation passed early next year to remedy the
problems our witnesses here today will be discussing and I want
to thank them all for coming.
Now we are going to turn to the witnesses. I will introduce
each first, let them speak, and then introduce the next.
Our first witness is Bernard B. Kerik. I am very proud to
introduce him. Since September 11 Bernie has become well known
beyond our home city of New York. He has shown valor and
heroism in helping lead the city in his role as commissioner of
the NYPD, a post he has held since August of 2000. But he had a
very distinguished career even before September 11 and those of
us who knew him were proud of him even before then. Prior to
his appointment Commissioner Kerik served as commissioner and
first deputy commissioner of the Department of Corrections,
where he did a great job straightening that department out. He
served on the front lines, as well as in administrative posts.
After being selected for the U.S. Department of Justice's Drug
Enforcement Task Force he helped direct one of the most
substantial narcotics investigations in the history of the
office, which resulted in the conviction of more than 60
members of the Cali Cartel. Commissioner Kerik currently serves
on the Terrorism Committee of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police.
Commissioner, we are delighted you are here. Everyone, not
only all New Yorkers but all Americans are proud of you. Your
entire statement will be read into the record.
STATEMENT OF BERNARD B. KERIK, POLICE COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK,
NEW YORK
Mr. Kerik. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Sessions and members of the Subcommittee. On behalf of Mayor
Rudolph Guiliani and the people of the city of New York I would
first like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your sustained
effort on behalf of the people of New York City in helping us
recover from the unthinkable tragedy of September 11.
I would also like to thank you, as well as Senators
Clinton, Leahy and Hatch, for your support in introducing
Senate Bill Number 1615, the Federal Local Information Sharing
Partnership Act of 2001, which addresses roadblocks to
information-sharing between federal authorities and state and
local law enforcement.
We are gratified that in holding this hearing you are
informing the public of a critical gap in the nation's ability
to defend itself against terrorism, which makes enactment of S.
1615 a crucial element of homeland defense. Congressman Weiner
of New York, along with several cosponsors, introduced a
companion bill in the House of Representatives, H.R. 3285, and
we look forward to its swift passage, as well.
Oftentimes federal law enforcement officials may have vital
information regarding public safety but are concerned that
sharing that information with states and localities would be at
odds with the federal law. Public safety demands that it must
be absolutely clear that there are no statutory barriers to
sharing this type of information with state and local law
enforcement authorities. This essential legislation is a
powerful step in that direction.
Information in the bill that would be clearly shareable
includes foreign intelligence information, electronic wiretap
information, and certain grand jury information. Under the
recently passed USA PATRIOT Act, all of this information may
only be shared between federal law enforcement and intelligence
agencies. Senate Bill Number 1615 will clearly permit this
information to be shared with state and local authorities that
are the front-line defense in the war against terrorism.
The fact that over 600,000 members of state and local
police forces are not clearly enlisted as partners in the
effort to locate and apprehend terrorists must be addressed.
Senate Bill Number 1615 amends the USA PATRIOT Act to make it
absolutely clear that the sharing of information with state and
local law enforcement is appropriate. The suggested amendments
do not mandate the sharing of information but leave with the
federal authorities the discretion as to what information to
disseminate. The discretion will still remain with the federal
agency in possession of the information. The bill also includes
a direction to the attorney general to promulgate appropriate
confidentiality guidelines for the use of the information, with
which state and local officials must comply.
Our nation is facing the greatest challenge of this
generation in its war on terrorism and every element of our
national defense must be utilized in the fight. Local police
forces are on the front line and are uniquely situated to
gather information which, when coupled with federal
intelligence, can not only solve cases but much more
importantly, prevent attacks from occurring. Continuing to
maintain walls between federal and state authorities with
respect to the sharing of real-time information represents the
worst kind of dysfunctional thinking in government and must be
addressed as quickly as possible.
Unless state and local jurisdictions are clearly included
in appropriate information-sharing, federal authorities will
remain hamstrung in their dealings with their local partners.
In addition, local jurisdictions will remain uninformed and
unprepared in the face of mounting terrorist threats and the
nation will be unable to take full advantage of the information
and assistance that 600,000 police officers across the country
can provide.
Again I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Sessions, for your leadership and support in focussing the
nation's attention on the critical need to coordinate federal,
state and local resources to protect the people of the United
States. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Commissioner Kerik follows.]
Statement of Bernard B. Kerik, New York City Police Commissioner
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, and members of the
Subcommittee.
On behalf of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and the people of New York
City, I would first like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your sustained
effort on behalf of the people of New York City, in helping us to
recover from the unthinkable tragedy of September 11th.
I would also like to thank you, as well as Senators Clinton, Leahy
and Hatch, for your support in introducing Senate Bill No. 1615, the
``Federal-Local Information Sharing Partnership Act of 2001,'' which
addresses roadblocks to information sharing between federal authorities
and state and local law enforcement.
We are gratified that in holding this hearing, you are informing
the public of a critical gap in the nation's ability to defend itself
against terrorism, which makes enactment of S. 1615 a crucial element
of homeland defense. Congressman Weiner of New York, along with several
cosponsors, introduced a companion bill in the House of
.Representatives, H.R. 3285, and we look forward to its swift passage
as well.
Often times, federal law enforcement officials may have vital
information regarding public safety, but are concerned that sharing
that information with states and localities would be at odds with
federal law. Public safety demands that it must be absolutely clear
that there are no statutory barriers to sharing this type of
information with state and local law enforcement authorities. This
essential legislation is a powerful step in that direction.
Information in the bill that would be clearly shareable includes
foreign intelligence information, electronic wiretap information, and
certain grand jury information. Under the recently passed USA PATRIOT
Act, all of this information may be shared between federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. Senate Bill No. 1615 will
clearly permit this information to be shared with state and local
authorities that are the front line defense in the war against
terrorism.
The fact that over 600,000 members of state and local police forces
are not clearly enlisted as partners in the effort to locate and
apprehend suspected terrorists must be addressed. Senate Bill No. 1615
amends the USA PATRIOT Act to make it absolutely clear that the sharing
of information with state and local law enforcement is appropriate. The
suggested amendments do not mandate the sharing of information, but
leave with the federal authorities the discretion as to what
information to disseminate. The discretion will still remain with the
federal agency in possession of the information. The bill also includes
a direction to the Attorney General to promulgate appropriate
confidentiality guidelines for the use of the information, with which
state and local officials must comply.
Our nation is facing the greatest challenge of this generation in
its war on terrorism, and every element of national defense must be
utilized in the fight. Local police forces are on the front line, and
are uniquely situated to gather information which, when coupled with
federal intelligence, can not only solve cases but, much more
important, prevent attacks from occurring. Continuing to maintain walls
between federal and state authorities
with respect to the sharing of ``real time'' information represents
the worst kind of dysfunctional thinking in government, and must be
addressed as quickly as possible.
Unless state and local jurisdictions are clearly included in
appropriate information
1
sharing, federal authorities will remain hamstrung in their
dealings with their local partners. In addition, local jurisdictions
will remain uninformed and unprepared in the face of mounting terrorist
threats, and the nation will be unable to take full advantage of the
information and assistance that 600,000 police officers across the
country can provide.
Again, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Sessions, for your leadership and support in focusing the nation's
attention on the critical need to coordinate federal, state, and local
resources to protect the people of the United States.
I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
Our next witness, equally distinguished, is Martin
O'Malley. He was elected to office in November of 1999 as the
youngest mayor in Baltimore's history. Prior to his election
Mayor O'Malley served on the Baltimore City Council from 1991
to 1999 and as an assistant state's attorney for the city of
Baltimore from 1988 to 1990 so he has prosecutorial experience,
as well.
Mayor O'Malley is a graduate of Catholic University, the
University of Maryland Law School, and he has been a vocal
proponent, one of the leading proponents, along with the
commissioner, of greater information-sharing between federal
and local law enforcement.
Mr. Mayor, we are very pleased to have you here today and
grateful you took out time from your busy schedule. Your entire
statement will be read into the record and you may proceed as
you wish.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN O'MALLEY, MAYOR, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
Mayor O'Malley. Thank you very much, Senator. Mr. Chairman,
I also want to thank the members of this Committee and your
cosponsors. I am honored to join you today and lend my voice to
the support of Senate Bill 1615, the Federal Local Information
Sharing Partnership Act of 2001. I want to thank Senators
Leahy, Hatch and yourself and Senator Clinton for hearing the
voices of America's police chiefs and on behalf of the
Conference of Mayors I want to thank you for listening to what
the mayors of this country have had to say, as well.
S. 1615 addresses a very dangerous gap created by the USA
PATRIOT Act by affirmatively allowing federal authorities to
share grand jury, wiretap, foreign intelligence operations and
confidential banking and educational records with local police.
It has become almost a cliche to say that this war is being
fought on two fronts but it is being fought on two fronts.
Uniquely for the first time since 1812 one of those fronts is
right here on American soil. Were this war being fought on two
foreign fronts I have no doubt that we would be rapidly rushing
resources to both of those foreign fronts, that we would
rapidly be rushing equipment, training and, most importantly,
intelligence to both of those fronts.
Unfortunately, we have yet to catch up with this new
reality that we are facing. We have nothing resembling rapid
intelligence being rushed to our front.
On the intelligence front we must use every resource at our
disposal--federal, state and local--to keep America's citizens
safe. Through this bill you are right to affirmatively allow
the FBI to share information with the hundreds of thousands of
local law enforcement officers across the nation.
No one wants to appear critical of the FBI or any other
state or local or federal agency, particularly in the midst of
this challenge. Local governments though and local law
enforcement can help, want to help, must help out of patriotism
and for the safety of our citizens but we must improve our
coordination and our information-sharing.
Let me say that since we first raised this issue back in
October FBI Director Mueller and Attorney General Ashcroft have
taken some concrete steps to better enlist local law
enforcement officers in this war against terrorism. The FBI's
terrorist watch list has now been added, so I am told, to the
NCIC database and just last week the INS announced it would
place the names of 314,000 foreign nationals who disappeared
after being ordered deported into NCIC, as well.
Notwithstanding that progress, we still are not where we
need to be. Although more people agree that there is no other
reasonable course but to enlist, deputize, recruit local law
enforcement into this effort, here are a couple of concrete
examples why it has to happen. It is just a simple matter of
math. There are 7,000 FBI agents assigned to this task before
us. There are 650,000 local law enforcement agents. It is
physically impossible for all tips or even most tips to be
pursued by a mere 7,000 federal law enforcement officers.
Until recently this gap, this dangerous gap, this problem
was exacerbated by a tip line where calls that would more
appropriately have warranted a 911 response by a patrol officer
instead went directly to a centralized number somewhere and we
would hope that there was follow-up on those but I seriously
doubt it. In Baltimore a local utility company called that
national tip line to report a suspicious truck parked outside
of one of its facilities. Now the police department, which
could have been there within minutes and responds in minutes
day in, day out, 24/7 to such calls, never received this
information. We found out about it when a utility executive
told our police commissioner the story at a social event. We
assume the FBI checked into the truck but we are not sure. And
given the magnitude of the calls, I seriously doubt it.
Providing security clearance to police chiefs and
intelligence units in big-city police departments would also
allow local law enforcement to do its share in protecting our
nation. Sharing information would better enable police
departments to protect cities not only against coordinated
attacks but against sort of the lone actors who, on their own
volition, may decide to join the jihad.
In Baltimore, for example, we arrested a young man of
Iranian heritage walking out of the end of the Howard Street
train tunnel which runs under our city, where he had had a
train derailment this past summer. He was wearing a mask,
carrying a backpack, and had cameras.
Even as it becomes more obvious that we have to cooperate,
we are falling short. We are falling short on coordination
among the various levels of government and between federal
agencies. For example, had one of the terrorists responsible
for flying the plane full of innocent people into a building on
September 11 been pulled over, had he been pulled over by a
Maryland state trooper two days before that attack, the CIA
would have had him on a watch list, the FBI would not, and no
information would have been relayed to that state trooper so he
could have held that person and possibly thwarted that attack.
A state trooper who would have made that traffic stop would
not have known that he was wanted by the FBI or that he was a
threat to American citizens. He would have known if he had not
paid his insurance in Maryland. He would have known if he had
let a speeding ticket go unpaid or did not show up for court.
He would have known if he had failed to pay his parking ticket
in the city of Baltimore.
The 230 names now on the watch list have been added to NCIC
but there are no pictures and in all likelihood many of these
men are probably not using their real names. Pictures are
critical to catching them. And assuming they did not go to the
Osama bin Laden school of perfect driving, some of them will
slip up. Some of them will be contacted by local law
enforcement, just as indeed Timony McVeigh was first stopped
for a traffic violation.
Most recently we have some additional coordination issues.
We read in the news report that the FBI would like local law
enforcement's help in questioning about 5,000 students who have
violated their visas yet our police commissioners has heard
nothing about these individuals. His 3,200 police officers are
not yet helping. We have been told by our U.S. attorney's
office that we have at least 12 such people in our city. We
were told that a week or 10 days ago. We know their names but
the police have not been able to interview them, we are told,
because we are waiting for the Department of Justice and the
U.S. Attorney's Office to set up a process. A process for what?
We have 70 people solely dedicated to serving fugitive warrants
in our city day in and day out. If we had been told 10 days ago
to look for these 12 individuals I have no doubt that we would
have found a great number of them by now.
In times of crisis government does not have the luxury of
acting like a big bureaucracy. A few months might not be soon
enough to safeguard American lives. Local government has a lot
of skilled, trained people who could be helping federal law
enforcement officers protect our citizens if only they had the
information to help them accomplish this job, this job which
all American law enforcement agencies must rise to.
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 provides for sharing of
intelligence between federal agencies. Now it is time to ensure
the same level of cooperation between local and federal law
enforcement. There is no time for us to say we will get to it
as soon as we set up a process.
[The prepared statement of Mayor O'Malley follows:]
Statement of Baltimore Mayor Martin O'Malley, Baltimore, Maryland
I am honored to join you today to support S. 1615, the ``Federal-
Local Information Sharing Partnership Act of 2001.''
But more importantly, I want to thank you--Chairman Leahy, Senator
Hatch, Senator Schumer and Senator Clinton--for hearing the voices of
America's police chiefs, including Baltimore's Commissioner Edward
Norris and NYPD Commissioner Bernard Kerik. Additionally, I would like
to thank you on behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, for which I
Co-Chair the Federal-Local Law Enforcement Task Force.
While the recently passed USA Patriot Act mandates that federal
agencies share information, it failed to allow the same communication
exchange with state and local police.
S. 1615 will address the gap in the USA Patriot Act by permitting,
but not requiring, federal authorities to share grand jury, wiretap,
foreign intelligence operations and confidential banking and
educational records with state and local police.
This bill provides Congress with the mechanism to ensure that such
information is shared with our country's first responders, the 645,000
local law enforcement officers.
The United States is fighting a war on two fronts--Afghanistan and
right here in America's big cities. If those fronts were Japan and
Germany, as they were in World War II, we would have the best
technology, the best equipment, and the best intelligence being sent
right to both fronts.
But, only one front in this war is overseas where we have, as we
should, equipped our men and women with the best technology, equipment
and intelligence.
The other theater is right here at home in America's big cities.
And to date, it's where we've seen the greatest loss of life. Yet, we
have insufficient equipment, too little training, and a lack of
intelligence sharing with federal authorities.
With war hitting home, we must use every resource at our disposal--
federal, state and local--to keep Americans safe. We owe it to the
American people. Through S. 1615, you are right to call on the Federal
Bureau of Investigations to better share information with the hundreds
of thousands of local law enforcement officers across this nation.
Nobody wants to criticize the FBI--particularly during a war. But
when Commissioner Norris, a former Deputy Commissioner with the NYPD,
explained what was happening in the wake of September 11th
it seemed irresponsible to remain silent. Local governments want to
help--out of patriotism, but also because we want to make sure our
people are safe.
First, let me say that since we first raised this issue in early
October, FBI Director Mueller and Attorney General Ashcroft have taken
concrete steps to enlist local law enforcement officers in the war
against terrorism.
The FBI's terrorist watch list has been added to the National Crime
Information Center database. And just last week, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service announced it would place the names of 314,000
foreign nationals, who disappeared after being ordered deported, into
the NCIC.
However, notwithstanding this progress, after three months, we are
not where we should be. Although most people agree that there is no
other reasonable course but to deputize local law enforcement, how that
occurs is still sketchy.
Here's one reason it must happen--it's a simple matter of math.
With more than a half million open tips and 7,000 FBI agents working on
this case, it is physically impossible that all tips--or even most tips
are being pursued in any meaningful way. Until recently, this problem
was exacerbated by the creation of an FBI tip line, bypassing local law
enforcement.
The tip line has since been discontinued. But while it was in
existence, thousands of calls bypassed local 911 lines, going directly
to the FBI without any tracking or reference to local officials.
In Baltimore, a local utility called the tip line to report a
suspicious truck parked outside of one of its facilities. The Police
Department, which could have been there within minutes, never received
this information. We found out about it when a utility executive told
Commissioner Norris the story at a social event. We assume the FBI
checked into the truck, but we're not sure.
Providing security clearance to Police Chiefs and intelligence
units in big city police departments would allow local law enforcement
to do its share in protecting our nation--four of the terrorists who
crashed into the Pentagon lived in Laurel, between Baltimore and
Washington.
Sharing information also would better enable police departments to
protect cities against independent kooks, who decide to join the Jihad.
In Baltimore, we arrested a young man of Iranian heritage, walking out
of the Howard Street tunnel--where we had a train derailment this past
summer--wearing a mask, and carrying a backpack and cameras.
Even as it becomes evermore obvious that we must cooperate, we are
falling short on coordination amongst the various levels of government
and between federal agencies. For instance, one of the terrorists that
flew a plane full of innocent people into a building filled with
innocent people was pulled over by a Maryland State Trooper before
September 11th. The CIA had him on a watch list. The FBI
didn't. And no information was shared with state or local law
enforcement.
The State trooper who pulled this driver over would have known he
was wanted if he had an outstanding speeding ticket in the State of
Maryland. He would have known if his insurance was expired. But he had
no way of knowing that he had just pulled over an international
terrorist.
Now, the 230 names on the FBI watch list have been added to the
NCIC, but there are no pictures. In all likelihood, these men are not
using their real names. Pictures are critical to catching them. And
unless they went to the Osama bin Laden school of perfect driving, some
of them will slip up. Local law enforcement has a very good chance of
catching them on traffic charges -just like Timothy McVeigh.
More recently, we have an additional coordination issue. We have
read in news reports that the FBI would like local law enforcement's
help in questioning about 5,000 students who are violating their visas.
Yet, our Police Commissioner has heard nothing. His 3,200 police
officers are not yet helping.
Through our local network, we have determined that we have at least
12 such people in our city. We know who and where they are. But the
police cannot interview them, we are told, because we are waiting for
the Department of Justice and the US Attorney to set up a process--for
them to tell us about the guys we already know about.
In times of crisis, government doesn't have the luxury of acting
like government. A few months might not be soon enough to safeguard
American lives. We need to move more quickly.
I'm not saying local government has all the answers. But we do have
a lot of skilled, trained people who could be helping federal law
enforcement officers do their job--if only they had the information
that would enable them to help.
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 provided for sharing of intelligence
between federal agencies. Now it's time to ensure the same level of
cooperation between local and federal law enforcement. There is no time
for us to say we'll get to it.
Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Mayor.
Our next witness is Chuck Canterbury. Chuck currently
serves as the national vice president for the Fraternal Order
of Police. He is a 23-year police veteran officer on active
duty with the Horry County, South Carolina Police Department
where he holds the rank of major and is in charge of the
operations bureau of the department.
As most know, the FOP is the nation's preeminent
association representing interests of local law enforcement
with 300,000 sworn law enforcement officers as members. Their
views on this issue are invaluable and we are very pleased,
Major Canterbury, that you were able to join us today. Your
entire statement will be read into the record. Proceed as you
wish.
STATEMENT OF CHUCK CANTERBURY, NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT,
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, MYRTLE BEACH, SOUTH CAROLINA
Mr. Canterbury. Thank you, Senator Schumer.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee.
My name is Chuck Canterbury and I am the national vice
president of the Fraternal Order of Police. I am here today on
behalf of our national president, Steve Young, to offer
testimony in support of enhanced information-sharing between
federal law enforcement and those of us at the state and local
level.
As you have already stated, in addition to being the
national vice president, I am also a major with the Horry
County Police Department in South Carolina. As a police
executive I recognize the benefits of receiving broad and
timely access to information regarding threats to our
communities but more importantly, I recognize the absolute
necessity of providing the same information to the rank and
file officers under our command.
Since the tragic events of 11 September, our nation has
moved rapidly to hunt down and neutralize terrorists both at
home and abroad and to strengthen our sense of security, which
was assaulted on that fateful day. And, like our military
personnel overseas, America's federal, state and local law
enforcement officers have done a tremendous job over the last
three months under difficult circumstances in protecting our
nation from future threats of violence.
A necessary component of these efforts has been timely
access to specific intelligence and other information regarding
threats to our national security. As our first line of defense
in cities big and small, law enforcement officers across the
country have used the information at their disposal to move
quickly to clamp down on those whose only goal is to inflict as
much damage to as many people as possible. Both before and
since September 11, many existing systems have been utilized to
share intelligence and coordinate efforts against terrorist
networks. Among these are the Regional Information Sharing
System and the NCIC, to which the FBI has recently added the
terrorist watch list. However, several barriers still remain
which restrict the flow of other much-needed information from
federal agencies to law enforcement at the state and local
level and the types of information that is permissible to
share.
As you know, broad and timely access the information and
intelligence is the linchpin in the fight against terrorism.
With 96 percent of the law enforcement officers in the United
States employed by state and local governments, it is critical
that these agencies be kept in the loop by their federal
counterparts.
In the past it has often been a one-way street with state
and local law enforcement providing information to their
federal colleagues and getting very little information in
return. We all have the same job to do but without the same
information about threats, our response is inadequate.
The importance of removing barriers to the free flow and
exchange of information is an issue which has been highlighted
by both Congress and the administration. Following September
11, many of us in state and local law enforcement expressed our
frustration with the lack of information flowing down from the
federal agencies and from the FBI in particular. National
President Young and our executive director Jim Pasco have had
comprehensive discussions with Homeland Security Director Tom
Ridge, Attorney General Ashcroft, and FBI Director Robert
Mueller and with other administrative officials on this issue.
All have recognized the importance of providing law enforcement
at the state and local level with access to as much information
as possible and General Ashcroft and Director Mueller in
particular are to be commended for their efforts in attempting
to improve the sharing of the information with nonfederal
agencies. However, they can only provide as much information as
the current law will allow.
It is for this reason that efforts were made by the
Fraternal Order of Police, in close cooperation with officials
of the New York City Police Department, to include language on
this issue as part of H.R. 3162, the USA PATRIOT Act. While
this effort was ultimately unsuccessful, we are grateful, Mr.
Chairman, that you have introduced legislation which will
continue the dialogue as to not only how information is shared
in the future but the type of information that can be provided
to state and local law enforcement.
Our state and local officers are the first line of defense
against threats to our nation. They are the first responders.
And because they represent the overwhelming majority of law
enforcement in this country, they can be a valuable asset in
the fight to improve homeland security but only if a free and
uninterrupted flow of information is allowed to exist among law
enforcement agencies at every level of government. In our
future struggles against terrorism all law enforcement agencies
will require access to the most up-to-date and comprehensive
information available and this is why it will be demanded by
those that we are sworn to protect and serve.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you on behalf of
the membership of the Fraternal Order of Police for holding
this hearing and affording us the opportunity to testify here
today. We look forward to working with you, the members of this
Subcommittee, and other interested parties on how to best
address this issue and I would be pleased to stand for any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Canterbury follows:]
Statement of Chuck Canterbury, National Vice President, Grand Lodge,
Fraternal Order of Police
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, and Members of the
Subcommittee. My name is Chuck Canterbury and I am the National Vice
President of the Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police. With over
299,000 members, the F.O.P. is the largest law enforcement labor
organization in the United States. I am here today on behalf of
National President Steve Young and the membership of our organization
to offer testimony in support of enhanced information sharing between
Federal law enforcement and those of us at the State and local level.
In addition to serving as the National Vice President of the Fraternal
Order of Police, I am also a Major with the Horny County, South
Carolina Police Department and a twenty-three year law enforcement
veteran. As a police executive, I recognize the benefits of receiving
broad and timely access to information regarding threats to our
communities. But more importantly, I recognize the absolute necessity
of providing rank and file officers under my command.
Since the tragic and heinous events of 11 September, our nation has
moved rapidly to hunt down and neutralize terrorists both at home and
abroad, and to strengthen our sense of security which was mercilessly
assaulted on that fateful day. Our nation is now at war against an
oftentimes unseen enemy. It is a war that will not be fought solely in
a foreign land by our armed forces, but right here in our own
backyards. We also know that it is not one to be handled solely by the
Federal government, but by a unified effort with our States and
localities. And like our military personnel overseas, America's the
same information to the Federal, State and local law enforcement
officers have done a tremendous job over the last three months, under
difficult circumstances, in protecting our nation from future threats
of violence.
A necessary component of these efforts has been, and must continue
to be, timely access to specific intelligence and other information
regarding threats to our national security. As our first line of
defense in cities big and small, law enforcement officers across the
country have used the information at their disposal to move quickly to
clamp down on those whose only goal is to inflict as much damage to as
many people as ., possible. Both before and since 11 September, many
existing systems have been utilized to share intelligence and
coordinate efforts against terrorist networks that operate in multiple
locations and across jurisdictional lines. One of these, the Regional
Information Sharing System (RISS) under the Department of Justice, is
comprised of six regional intelligence centers that together serve over
5,600 Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, and
facilitates information sharing and communication to support
investigative and prosecution efforts. Another is the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC), to which the Federal Bureau of Investigation
has recently added their terrorist ``watch list,'' allowing the
information to be accessed by State and local law enforcement twenty-
four hours a day, seven days a week. However, several barriers still
remain which restrict the flow of other much-needed information from
Federal agencies to law enforcement at the State and local level, and
the types of information it is permissible to share.
As you know, broad and timely access to information and
intelligence is the lynchpin in the fight against terrorism. It is
critical that State and local agencies be kept in the loop by their
Federal counterparts. Ninety-six percent of law enforcement officers in
the United States are employed by State and local governments--only
four percent are Federal agents. Yet, in critical situations, Federal
agencies citing Federal statutes restrict access to this important
information. All too often, interagency cooperation is hampered by the
lack of a free flow of information from Federal agencies to State and
local departments. In the past, it has often been a one-way street,
with State and local law enforcement providing information to their
Federal colleagues, and getting very little if any information in
return. We all have the same job to do, but without the same
information about threats, our response will be inadequate.
The importance of removing barriers to the free flow and exchange
of information is an issue which has been highlighted by both the
Congress and the Administration. Following 11 September, many in the
State and local law enforcement community expressed frustration with
the lack of information flowing down from Federal agencies, and from
the FBI in particular. National President Young and our Executive
Director Jim Pasco have had comprehensive discussions with Homeland
Security Director Tom Ridge, Attorney General John Ashcroft, FBI
Director Robert Mueller, and with other Administration officials at the
White House on this issue. All have recognized the importance of
providing law enforcement at the State and local level with access to
as much information as possible, and General Ashcroft and Director
Mueller in particular are to be commended for their efforts to improve
the sharing of intelligence and other information with nonfederal
agencies. They have provided timely notification to State and local law
enforcement about potential terrorist attacks and targets. And they
have recognized that there is room to further open lines of
communication, and the need to continue to build better relationships
with those throughout the law enforcement community. However, they can
only provide as much information as current law will allow.
It is for this reason that efforts were made by the Fraternal Order
of Police, in close cooperation with officials of the New York City
Police Department, to include language on this issue as part of H.R.
3162, the ``Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act.''
While this effort was ultimately unsuccessful, we are gratified that
you, Mr. Chairman, have introduced legislation which will continue the
dialogue as to not only how information is shared in the future, but
the type of information that can be provided to State and local law
enforcement officers and officials. Our State and local law enforcement
officers are the first line of defense against threats to our nation.
They are the first responders, and because they represent the
overwhelming majority of law enforcement in this country, they can be a
valuable asset in the fight to improve homeland security. But only if a
free and uninterrupted flow of information is allowed to exist among
law enforcement agencies at every level of government. Without
providing these men and women with as much and as specific information
as possible about what or who to be on the look out for, we are not
allowing them to operate at their peak efficiency in the war against
terrorism.
Over the last several years, we have seen dramatic increases in the
power and speed of communications technology to disseminate enormous
amounts of information to an even greater array of people. This is the
same type of information explosion which is required within the law
enforcement community if we-whether at the International, Federal,
State or local level-are to be as effective as possible in cracking
down on terrorists and those who support them. In our future struggles
against terrorism, all law, enforcement agencies will require open and
uninterrupted lines of communication, providing access to the most up-
to-date and comprehensive information available-and this is what will
be demanded by those we are sworn to protect and serve. In conclusion,
Mr. Chairman, let me thank you again on behalf of the membership of the
Fraternal Order of Police for holding this important hearing, and for
affording us the opportunity to testify here today. We look forward to
working with you, the Members of this Subcommittee, and other
interested parties on how best to address this issue and create safer
futures for our children and fellow citizens.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have at this
time.
Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Major Canterbury, for again
excellent testimony.
Our final witness is Chief Jon Greiner. Chief Greiner is
chief of police in Ogden, Utah. He has come at the special
request of Senator Hatch. It is a position he has held since
1995. He is also the president of the Utah Chiefs of Police
Association. He served for over 30 years in law enforcement,
more than 20 years as an officer in the Army Reserve. In
addition to holding two bachelors of science, Chief Greiner has
a master in social science and public administration. He serves
on multiple boards and Committees, including most importantly
for our purposes today, the Utah Public Safety Olympic Command.
Chief, like the other witnesses, your entire statement will
be read into the record and you may proceed as you wish. Thanks
for being here.
STATEMENT OF JON GREINER, PRESIDENT, UTAH CHIEF OF POLICE
ASSOCIATION, OGDEN, UTAH
Mr. Greiner. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the local law enforcement
interests and information-sharing between federal and local law
enforcement.
Hundreds of our own were murdered on September 11, 2001,
along with thousands of citizens we were sworn to protect. The
law enforcement community has been the subject of an ever-
increasing dialogue surrounding such issues as to whether
everything was done to prevent these attacks and what if any
number of possible reforms might be made to increase the
capacity of all law enforcement to prevent such attacks from
occurring in our homeland.
We, all of us, welcome this healthy process of discussion
and potential helpful legislation. As the designated symbol of
legal force in our society, we stand for those who value a
society of order and peace. It has always been a fact of life
with us, in law enforcement, that people will kill others to
accomplish their particular goals. Unfortunately, it took a
tragedy of immense proportions to bring these points of needed
discussion to the surface of public consciousness and dialogue.
A significant discovery that came as a result of this
tragedy was that many agencies, federal, state and local, had
in their possession information which may have provided clues
that the terrorist attack of September 11 of imminent and what
the overall direction of that attack may be or take. In our
world people do things based on motives, the real and the
imaginary, to murder others. When we can, we try to use
intelligence as a big part of our operational process so that
we can calculate what may happen by knowing our enemies.
For example, there were law enforcement agencies alerted to
suspicious activities surrounding flight schools. There were
also ``watch lists'' of U.S. immigration officials
naming these same terrorists involved in the September 11
attacks. Unfortunately, no one government agency possessed
enough precursors in this terrorist formula to put together all
the relevant ingredients and predict the attack. None of the
individual ingredients, standing alone, was sufficient to alert
our agencies that this event was about to take place.
Several lessons have been learned from this experience. The
first is that we must do a better job of information-sharing
among all law enforcement agencies. We too often hold
information close to our sources and do not share it with
others. Sometimes this happens to the extent of actual refusal
to help others when requests are made. The second is that we
must do this without sacrificing or compromising legal
restrictions that have been put in place. This is not to say
there are not good reasons for secrecy when it puts lives at
risk or may cause innocent people to have their images
tarnished by hasty criminal investigations but there is
enormous potential for saving the lives of innocent people if
we can recognize our potential through information-sharing.
I suggest learning these lessons. Criminals, terrorists and
evil-doers spread their propaganda falsehoods in two ways. The
first is to convince us all that evil does not exist so that we
continue to become lambs led to slaughter or we just march
forward as naive victims. The second is that evil is so
prevalent that we need to destroy our basic individual freedoms
to survive. Evil or criminals are not everywhere--quite the
contrary. They are the minority of the population law
enforcement deals with every day.
A few months ago the U.S. Congress reviewed many of the
legal barriers to efficient flow of information within various
agencies inside the federal government and, where appropriate,
lowered some barriers. These adjustments will help bring many
resources to bear on reducing the possibility of future
terrorist attacks. However, a significant component of this
information-sharing was left out. That is the sharing of
information with state and local enforcement counterparts. The
FBI, which is the lead federal agency regarding terrorism, has
but 12,000 agents. The city of New York, for instance, has more
than three times that number of sworn officers alone.
Nationally there are more than 650,000 sworn officers. Think of
it as the spider web that catches the insects of terrorism as
they fly through. The web needs to be complete to work;
otherwise, the main pieces of the web provided by federal law
enforcement have gaping holes for insects to utilize.
I think the American public is asking our legislators if
they are serious about the domestic war on terrorism and if
they are, why should we not employ all the resources at our
disposal to win the battles? Federal law enforcement resources
are, quite frankly, dwarfed by existing resources in state and
local jurisdictions. While searching out and disrupting
international terrorism remains a primary function of the
federal law enforcement, it is essential we take advantage of
state and local assets.
On October 29, 2001, FBI Director Robert Mueller reminded
the International Chiefs of Police Organization in Toronto,
Canada that there is no one institution with enough resources
or expertise to defeat terrorism. He has been quoted as saying
``It must be a joint effort across agencies, across
jurisdictions, and across borders. State and local law
enforcement are playing a critical role collecting information,
running down leads and providing the kind of expertise critical
to the effort of this magnitude and of this importance.''
Senate Bill 1615, the Federal-Local Information Sharing
Partnership Act of 2001, would foster better joint efforts by
the federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in the
war on terrorism. This bill would address the oversight in
previous legislation recently of the information-sharing
provisions of that legislation. It helps us all--federal, state
and local law enforcement--if we can cooperate on a two-way
road with a give-and-take relationship. This legislation is
essential to ensure that state and local law enforcement
agencies are able to work hand in hand with federal law
enforcement agencies such as the FBI in the war on terrorism.
On a personal note let me give you just some examples of
over 25 years of relationships my local law enforcement agency
has had with federal officers. Early in my career a local drug
rip-off of a drug dealer ended with a federal wiretap and
significant forfeitures involving DEA, FBI, IRS, U.S. Marshals
and yes, an Ogden city police officer. Today, because of that
experience, I have personnel assigned to a multi-county drug
strike force with federal DEA representation. I also have
personnel assigned to an FBI multi-jurisdictional criminal
apprehension team, an FBI joint terrorism strike force, and
locally a multi-jurisdictional gang task force and SWAT team.
These same relationships are the reason two counties and 12 law
enforcement entities in Northern Utah have gotten together to
combine law enforcement records into a singular records
management system in one software and in one location. This is
the same software being used by the largest city and county in
the state of Utah, a future collaboration being currently in
the works.
So why has Ogden done this? Our enemies, our criminals do
not recognize any boundaries we put in place. Together as a
team, we can do great things for our citizens. Individually we
usually are only the sum of our strongest parts and resources.
Another example if I might is the Utah Olympic Public
Safety Command of 20 agencies which I have the privilege to sit
on. The make-up of the command is federal, state and local law
enforcement for the most part. For the past three years we have
worked together with many other agencies in government and
private partnerships to prepare the state of Utah to host the
2002 Winter Olympics. The terrorism legislation passed recently
serves as a barrier to our work and may compromise the citizens
of Utah and our guests from around the world. We need to have
the relevant information and its source that comes as a result
of federal grand jury information, wiretapping information,
visa information, and one that may have been overlooked in this
endeavor is educational records of students studying in this
country.
In just the last 60 days, in my community, we have stopped
citizens from former Cold War world countries taking pictures
of housing and Olympic venues. We have talked with four Middle
Eastern students who have rented a condominium, put one
mattress in it and are ordering up a fast modem Internet
service. We have talked with a reclusive Middle Eastern
gentleman in a transient apartment complex whose neighbors
claim he has been seen in the middle of the night meeting with
other Middle Eastern gentlemen in remote areas of the apartment
complex.
These are the fine strands of the spider web that would
normally be written off as suspicious circumstances if the
partnership my agency has with federal and state officers did
not exist. We treat every one of these situations as a
potential problem. With less than 60 days to go until the
Olympics, we cannot afford to do otherwise. After the Olympics
the war on terrorism will still be going on and we will need to
work at contributing whatever information and resources we
might have to the total effort.
Again I appreciate this opportunity to speak with you today
and I will answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Chief Greiner follows.]
Statement of Jon J. Greiner, Police Chief, President, Utah Chiefs of
Police Association, Member Utah Olympic Public Safety Command, Ogden
City, Utah
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the local law enforcement interests in information sharing
between federal and local law enforcement.
Hundreds of our own were murdered on September 11, 2001, along with
thousands of citizens we were sworn to protect. The law enforcement
community has been the subject of an ever increasing dialogue
surrounding such issues as to whether everything was done to prevent
these attacks and what if any number of possible reforms might be made
to increase the capacity of all law enforcement to prevent such attacks
from occurring in our homeland.
We, all of us, welcome this healthy process of discussion and
potential helpful legislation. As the designated symbol of legal force
in our society, we stand for those who value a society of order and
peace. It has always been a fact of life with us, in law enforcement,
that people will kill others to accomplish their particular goals.
Unfortunately it took a tragedy of immense proportions to bring these
points of needed discussion to the surface of public consciousness and
dialogue.
A significant discovery that came as a result of this tragedy was
that many agencies, federal, state, and local, had in their possession
information which may have provided clues that the terrorist attack of
September 11th was imminent and what the overall direction
of that attack may be or take. In our world people do things based on
motives (the real and the imaginary) to murder others. When we can, we
try to use intelligence as a big part of our operational process so we
can calculate what may happen by knowing our enemies. For example there
were law enforcement agencies alerted to suspicious activities
surrounding flight schools. There were also ``watch lists'' of U.S.
Immigration officials naming these same terrorists involved in the
September 11th attacks. Unfortunately, no one government
agency possessed enough precursors in this terrorist formula to put
together all the relevant ingredients and predict the attack. None of
the individual ingredients, standing alone, was sufficient to alert our
agencies that this event was about to take place.
Several lessons have been learned from this experience. The first
is that we must do a better job of information sharing among all law
enforcement agencies. We too often hold information close to our
sources and do not share it with others. Sometimes this happens to the
extent of actual refusal to help others when requests are made. The
second is that we must do this without sacrificing or compromising
legal restrictions that have been put in place. This is not to say
there aren't good reasons for secrecy when it puts lives at risk or may
cause innocent people to have their images tarnished by hasty criminal
investigations, but there is enormous potential for saving the lives of
innocent people if we can recognize our potential through information
sharing. I suggest learning these lessons; Criminals, Terrorists and
Evildoers spread their propaganda falsehoods in two ways. The first is
to convince us that evil does not exist so that we continue to become
lambs led to slaughter or we just march forward as naive victims. The
second is that evil is so prevalent that we need to destroy our basic
individual freedoms to survive. Evil or criminals are not everywhere,
quite the contrary, they are the minority of the population law
enforcement deals with every day.
A few months ago the U.S. Congress reviewed many of the legal
barriers to efficient flow of information within various agencies
inside the federal government and where appropriate lowered some
barriers. These adjustments will help bring many resources to bear on
reducing the possibility of future terrorist attacks. However, a
significant component of this information sharing was left out. That is
the sharing of information with state and local law enforcement
counterparts. The F.B.I., which is the lead federal agency regarding
terrorism, has but 12,000 agents. The City of New York for instance has
more than three times that number of sworn officers alone. Nationally
there are more than 650,000 sworn police officers. Think of it as a
spider web that catches the insects of terrorism as they fly through.
The web needs to be complete to work, otherwise, the main pieces of the
web provided by federal law enforcement have gapping holes for insects
to utilize.
I think the American public is asking our legislators if they are
serious about the domestic war on terrorism and if they are why
shouldn't we employ all of the resources at our disposal to win the
battles? Federal law enforcement resources are quite frankly dwarfed by
existing resources in state and local jurisdictions. While searching
out and disrupting international terrorism remains a primary function
of federal law enforcement it is essential we take advantage of state
and local assets.
On October 29, 2001 FBI Director Robert Mueller reminded the
International Chiefs of Police Organization in Toronto, Canada that
there is no one institution with enough resources or expertise to
defeat terrorism. He has been quoted as saying ``It must be a joint
effort across agencies, across jurisdictions, and across borders. State
and local law enforcement are playing a critical role collecting
information, running down leads and providing the kind of expertise
critical to an effort of this magnitude and of this importance.''
Senate Bill 1615, the Federal-Local Information Sharing Partnership
Act of 2001 would foster better joint efforts by the federal, state and
local law enforcement agencies in the war on terrorism. This bill would
address the oversight in previous legislation, recently, of the
information sharing provisions of that legislation. It helps us all,
federal, state and local law enforcement if we can operate on a two-way
road with a give and take relationship. This legislation is essential
to ensure that state and local law enforcement agencies are able to
work hand-in-hand with federal law enforcement agencies, such as the
F.B.I., in the war on terrorism.
On a personal note let me give you some examples of over twenty
five years of relationships my local law enforcement agency has had
with federal officers. Early in my career a local drug rip off of a
dealer ended with a federal wire tap and significant forfeitures
involving DEA, FBI, IRS, U.S. Marshals and yes an Ogden police officer.
Today, because of that experience, I have personnel assigned to a multi
county drug strike force with federal DEA representation. I also have
personnel assigned to a FBI Multi Jurisdictional Criminal Apprehension
Team, a FBI Joint Terrorism Strike Force and locally a multi
jurisdiction gang task force and SWAT team. These same relationships
are the reason two counties and twelve law enforcement in Northern Utah
have gotten together to combine law enforcement records into a singular
Records Management system in one software and one location. This is the
same software being used by the largest city and county in the State of
Utah, a future collaboration being currently in the works. So why has
Ogden done this? Our enemies, our criminals do not recognize any
boundaries we put in place. Together, as a team, we can do great things
for our citizens, individually we usually are only the sum of our
strongest parts and resources.
Another example, if I might, is the Utah Olympic Public Safety
Command of 20 agencies which I have the privilege to sit on. The make-
up of the command is federal, state, and local law enforcement for the
most part. For the last three years we have worked together with many
other agencies in government and private partnerships to prepare the
State of Utah to host the 2002 Winter Olympics. The terrorism
legislation passed recently serves as a barrier to our work and may
compromise the citizens of Utah and our guests from around the world.
We need to have the relevant information and it's source that comes as
a result of federal grand jury information, wiretapping information,
visa information and one that may have been looked over in this
endeavor is educational records of students studying in this country.
In just the last 60 days, in my community, we have stopped citizens
from former cold war world countries taking pictures of housing and
Olympic Venues. We have talked with four Middle Eastern students who
have rented a condominium, put one mattress in it, and are ordering up
a fast modem InterNet service. We have talked with a reclusive Middle
Eastern gentleman in a transient apartment complex whose neighbors
claim he has been seen in the middle of the night meeting with other
Middle Eastern gentleman in remote areas of the apartment complex.
These are the fine strands of the spider web that would normally be
written of as suspicious circumstances if the partnership my agency has
with federal and state officers did not exist. We treat every one of
these situations as a potential problem, with less than 60 days to go
until the Olympics we cannot afford to do otherwise. After the Olympics
the war on terrorism will still be going on and we all need to work at
contributing whatever information and resources we might have to the
total effort.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today and I
will answer any questions you may have.
Thank You
Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Chief, and I want to thank all
of the witnesses for their testimony.
Let me begin with some questions. I want to ask each of you
about some specific instances. This is such a long-term and
severe problem. I remember when the former Attorney General
Janet Reno came first before us in the House Judiciary
Committee and she said her number one goal was to bring greater
cooperation between federal and local law enforcement. That was
back in 1993 and obviously we have a long way to go but it
shows you that this problem has been with us for a long time.
And just to flesh out the problem I would like to ask again
about some specifics. First is to the commissioner.
I first got involved in trying to add this legislation to
the anti-terrorism bill when I received calls from you,
Commissioner, and the mayor. You were quite upset about what
had happened with the anthrax information. Can you give us the
details as to what happened and why you were so upset about
that?
Mr. Kerik. I think primarily the anthrax investigation just
sort of brought it to light. That was that there had been a
letter received by NBC studios that the FBI had been made aware
of directly from NBC, someone at NBC, and that letter was held
for some time, maybe a week or so or even more than a week--I
do not have the exact time--before we became aware of it as a
result of other inquiries. And it was disturbing to know that
we could have been on the issue instantly and that sort of
brought all of this to light, that the FBI had not let us know.
We could have responded, as we responded--as some of my
colleagues mentioned, we respond to 911 calls for suspicious
activity for disturbing packages, for parcels, different
threatening items in the city 24 hours a day. That is what the
New York City Police Department does and we could have been
there and we could have had a handle on it much quicker.
One of the things that concerns me is we have to look at
the overall signature of what terrorism is and what terrorists
do. If you will recall back in 1993, there was an attack on the
World Trade Center. They did not succeed or at least what they
intended to do, they did not succeed. They wanted to take down
the buildings; they did not do that.
People associated with those people who were responsible
later in 1996 and 1997 again threatened the city. There was an
investigation that revealed an attempt to take down the tunnels
and bridges, some of the tunnels and bridges. The threats were
thwarted. There were people arrested, still associated with
these same people from the World Trade Center.
Now we come to 2001, there is another attack on the World
Trade Center, this time a devastating attack, and we find
during the course of the investigation that there were people
involved in this investigation or associates of that were
related to the people back in 1993.
We have to look at these groups. If they do not succeed the
first time, they are going to come back and do it again. We
have to make sure that we collect data, collect every ounce of
information that we can and we disseminate it to the people
that need the information the most. And as the chief mentioned
from Utah, I have 41,000 police officers that are out there on
a daily basis collecting information. As you know, last year we
created the Regional Intelligence Center for fighting crime in
the city--the FBI, the DEA, the Customs, ATF, the New York City
Police Department all put into one central database through
HIDTA, through New York HIDTA, and it has a major impact on
crime reduction, which is our primary goal in New York City.
I think we have to look at the primary goal of national
defense and what we can do to benefit national defense, and
that is collect information from everyone, disseminate it to
those who need it, and with the enactment of this law you will
not preclude anyone from stopping you from getting that
information.
Chairman Schumer. Let me ask you, Commissioner, did you
have discussions after you finally found out about the NBC
letter and anthrax with the head of the New York office of the
FBI or people in Washington? And did they give you any good
reason why they did not tell you immediately when they had
heard of this?
Mr. Kerik. Well, I am not here to criticize and I will say
that Barry Mawn from the New York office, the assistant
director, has been extremely cooperative. There could have been
a lack of communication.
Chairman Schumer. It is just so much part of their culture,
they do not even think to tell the NYPD, even when there is a
major scare like this? Is that fair to say?
Mr. Kerik. I think that could be what it is.
Chairman Schumer. Leaving Barry or leaving the New York
specifics out of it.
Mr. Kerik. As you mentioned earlier, there are two things
that will preclude us from getting information--the law and the
culture.
Chairman Schumer. Right.
Mr. Kerik. Culture can be changed, as you know, as in New
York City it has been, through management accountability.
Resolve the issue. The other thing is the law. Change the law
and we will get the information.
Chairman Schumer. I called Mr. Mawn, as well, and asked him
what happened after this and I did not get much. He said well,
it was sort of a mistake or whatever else. I mean did they give
you any reason why they--obviously you were upset and I am sure
you communicated with them. What was their reasoning? Did they
think it through? Did they say well, it would be a bad idea or
they just said well, we are the FBI, we can handle this, we do
not need anybody else?
Mr. Kerik. I think what happened is they sent their
investigators and they ran it their route and just failed to
contact us.
Chairman Schumer. Would it not have made sense to ask the
NYPD do you have any record of any anthrax, any traces of
anthrax in previous years? I mean there are so many obvious
questions that you would think you would reach out to local law
enforcement, particularly such a sophisticated, well
established group as NYPD.
Mr. Kerik. Absolutely. But I say in their defense, I have
to say post that event we put together an effort to ensure that
all the agencies were involved. In fact, when there is, in
fact, an anthrax scare or a threat, the teams that go out to do
the collection of evidence and analysis and environmental
studies consists of New York City detectives, members of the
FBI Joint Terrorist Task Force, FBI agents, and New York City
firefighters.
So I have to say in the FBI's defense they have been
extremely forthright in putting together a comprehensive plan
for us to attack the problem.
Chairman Schumer. So since the NBC anthrax letter you would
say at least culture-wise. They still cannot do things legally
and that is what our law changes but culture-wise they seem to
be a lot better and more cooperative?
Mr. Kerik. I think culture-wise Director Mueller and Barry
Mawn have done a tremendous job in trying to turn things
around.
Chairman Schumer. Great. And so now when there is any other
kind of danger you hear about it directly from them right away?
Mr. Kerik. Barry Mawn calls me directly. Yes, he does.
Chairman Schumer. Good. That is a good improvement.
I just want to ask you about something else you mentioned,
these same individuals you mentioned, 1993, 1997, 2001. Was
there sharing of information between NYPD and FBI about these
individuals over the course of those eight years? Was it
regular? Was it routine? Was it ad hoc? Did it never occur?
Mr. Kerik. I think the New York City Police Department is
in a sort of different circumstance than a number of other
agencies throughout the country. As you know, we have had a
Joint Terrorist Task Force for more than 20 years now in New
York City. In fact, New York City was one of the first cities
in the country to create such a task force.
So we have a more cooperative effort when it comes to
terrorism because we have FBI agents and New York City police
officers working together. And I would say the communication
was beneficial to fighting what we had to do in New York City.
In fact, in 1996 or 1997 when we took down the group that was
going to do the bridges and tunnels, that was as a result of an
investigation that eventually we had to--New York City came up
with it and turned it over to the task force.
Chairman Schumer. There has not been that much problem with
the local people telling the federal authorities; it has
generally been the other way in the past. Is that right?
Mr. Kerik. Usually it is, yes.
Chairman Schumer. Let me ask you, Mayor O'Malley, and I am
sure you have talked to Mr. Norris, your police chief. Do you
find communication, to be better since September 11 or maybe
even since the major SNAFU with the NBC anthrax letter? You are
a large city, not as large as New York. You were not at the
center of these terrorist actions. Do you think it is better?
Do you get any feeling of change? Are your folks treated a
little better?
Mayor O'Malley. It is slightly better. I think sometimes we
confuse meetings with progress. We have some great meetings
with our FBI and they are real nice people, too. It is not
about nice. It is not about congeniality or being good
colleagues.
There is a little bit of change. I think one of the biggest
changes is that Director Mueller appreciates what a huge
cultural barrier he needs to overcome as the new leaders of
that organization. But we really need to stay to the specifics.
I think we all want to hear the good news so much that we tend
not to bore down to the details, and the details are important.
The assassination of Mayar Kahani and the information that was
passed on by the NYPD to the federal authorities that they
never bothered to translate that implicated people that were
later involved in the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center,
that is an important detail. I am sure we had lots of meetings
between Mayar Kahani's assassination and the 1993 attack but we
did not follow up on it.
The 12 individuals that I am told we want to get in touch
with in the city of Baltimore and that we have wanted to get in
touch with for the last 10 days, what are we waiting for? I
mean I am glad that we are told that there are 12 individuals
but what are we waiting for?
The names of the 230 people on the watch list, the good
news is we were told that that change was made about a month
ago. The bad news is that my head of intelligence for the
Baltimore City Police Department, a very competent guy who is
held very accountable by Commissioner Norris, has attempted
several times to access those names through NCIC, has been
unsuccessful. He understands through colleagues of ours in Ann
Arbor, Michigan that there is a special code you need to put in
in order to access those names. He did not have it. He called
our local FBI office. They said we are not aware of a special
code. And in the meantime the 3,100 member of the Baltimore
City Police Department, who stop traffic all the time as part
of their duties, still are not able to access those names when
they run it through to see if they have paid their Maryland
auto insurance or their tags are up to date.
The relay of information, the sorts of tips that are much
more appropriately responded to by a patrol officer, the sort
of 911 call, mysterious Ryder truck case casing the utility
facilities, those things are not coming to us any quicker than
they were two months ago.
So I think that there is an improvement in that people at
the top of the FBI are recognizing the problem but on the
ground, Senator, and again nobody wants to appear critical at
these times but it is not happening. We have a bad case of the
slows. The federal government almost needs a Comstat process--
call it federal stat or something--to drive these things home
to completion. It is not happening. I do not know exactly why
it is happening.
The fact that you change the law I think is an important
step in the right direction but we should not be shy about
asking these questions. We really need you and your colleagues
to bore down to these details. We all want to hear the good
news but the fact of the matter is that Americans are at risk
if we do not get to the details of this and actually pick up
the phone, call local law enforcement and say how is it better,
how is it not better? And I would encourage you and your staff
to do that and not accept the answers that--you know, there is
a common phenomenon that affects all human beings in every
single organization whether it is the FBI or local law
enforcement or whatever the human organization is and that is
people tell the boss what the boss wants to hear. And I would
encourage you and your colleagues--
Chairman Schumer. It does not happen in the Senate.
Mayor O'Malley. I am sure not. But I would encourage you
and your colleagues and your staff to call the local law
enforcement up and see what they are saying. I think it was a
help to Director Mueller to get that sort of input and I would
only encourage you to keep following up.
Chairman Schumer. I agree with you, Mr. Mayor. I would say
had the mayor and the commissioner not talked a little bit
about what happened after the NBC anthrax letter we would not
have had the progress we made. But you bring a good question up
because this is dealing with information and the Comstat
system, which has been used in New York and I guess is used in
other police departments, is an information system. It is
basically giving the police--I always thought it made police
work a little more like private sector because you had
statistics and you had goals and you had to see if you made
them and you could not just talk your way around the problem.
I wanted to ask the commissioner, based on what you said,
what do you think of doing a Comstat-type of program for this
issue and for other issues in the FBI? Because one of the
things that we have been concerned with here is getting the FBI
a little leaner and meaner than they have been.
Mr. Kerik. One of the things that the mayor and I
recommended early on was that either through the Office of
Homeland Security or through the FBI that Director Mueller
appoint someone at the highest levels, directly reportable to
him or directly reportable to Tom Ridge, that would create a
Comstat mechanism to collect this intelligence and to ensure
that it went out to the appropriate parties.
Chairman Schumer. That is a great idea.
Mr. Kerik. We called for that when the mayor and I
testified earlier before Congress. We are very much in favor of
it. I think it would be extremely beneficial and it has proven
around this country that it works. Whether it is crime
statistics or internal intelligence like the Regional
Intelligence Center in New York City now, it works, and all
they have to do is create the position, have someone oversee
it, and then hold people accountable to make sure that they are
doing what they are supposed to do.
Chairman Schumer. Could not the FBI use a whole Comstat
system?
Mr. Kerik. Absolutely.
Chairman Schumer. Not just for this but for the whole way
that they operate?
Mr. Kerik. Absolutely.
Chairman Schumer. You have given us another hearing's worth
of information here but that is something I think makes a great
deal of sense, having followed it in NYPD.
Mayor O'Malley. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Schumer. Go ahead, Mr. Mayor.
Mayor O'Malley. We stole their good idea and do it across
the board in all the cities--
Chairman Schumer. You would recommend that the FBI
institute a Comstat-type system?
Mayor O'Malley. The important thing is to drive through the
completion of the task and that is what does not happen.
Chairman Schumer. Right.
Mayor O'Malley. We like to wrap ourselves in the warm
blanket feeling that if we pass it on to the FBI or the federal
government that everything has been completed and it is done
and the numbers, the sheer numbers defy that.
Chairman Schumer. Thanks.
Chief Greiner, you had said a number of interesting things.
How is the cooperation? You mentioned there is a task force in
Utah. We have the Olympics, as you mentioned, in less than 60
days. A, has the cooperation been pretty good all along? Has it
gotten better? Are you confident that when the federal
government learns of some possible problem with the Utah
Olympics that the local law enforcement on the ground in Utah
will learn it, too?
Mr. Greiner. Yes, sir, I am. Because of the Olympics I
think there has been an increased awareness of information-
sharing. We have huge geographical problems out in Utah, not
the population issues that are here on the East Coast, but the
Olympics has brought to the forefront a new discussion level
amongst all law enforcement along the Wasatch front and as a
result of that we are very attuned to everybody's needs.
The problem I see is that in the collection of the data who
gets out and does the investigation of it in a timely manner?
It is not uncommon to have real intelligence come to us and see
it also on the front page of USA Today within the same half
hour. So USA Today had the information at least before print
time, which is before law enforcement got it.
So the timeliness is still an issue but the cooperation
level, at least for the Olympics, has been superb.
Chairman Schumer. So it is that you are not getting it
quickly enough but you are getting it?
Mr. Greiner. Yes, sir.
Chairman Schumer. Although you may read about it in the
newspaper first.
Mr. Greiner. Yes, sir.
Chairman Schumer. Okay, you mentioned a couple of other
things I want to mention. Flight schools, could you just
elaborate on that a little bit? I was intrigued by what you
said but I was not clear from your testimony. Is this the
federal government had information about who was attending
flight schools and did not share it with you, that you had it
and did not get cooperation when you dealt with the feds? Just
explain that a little bit.
Mr. Greiner. There is both. I have read and heard from at
least some federal sources that there was information about
these flight schools that was not passed on, at least from the
jurisdictions where the flight schools exited. And even in my
own jurisdiction we have an airport, a regional airport, and
one of the flight services was bought by a Middle Eastern
gentleman who lives in Park City and he has bought up two or
three of the flight service schools across the state of Utah,
information that we had that was never shared with anybody and
did not come to the forefront until the September 11 tragedies.
Chairman Schumer. Now it has been better?
Mr. Greiner. Now it has been better.
Chairman Schumer. Is everything okay with those flight
schools?
Mr. Greiner. So far.
Chairman Schumer. You mentioned another issue, which is you
talked about our legislation might be missing something about
information about students on visas, nonAmerican citizens on
visas. Do you want to talk about that a little bit?
Mr. Greiner. Yes, sir, and this comes to light just this
past week. Part of the watch list that came out from the FBI
contains several names. The unfortunate part of that is that
those names are as common as John Smith or John Brown in our
culture. So as you check the register, the database of our
community, and you find those names, a number of times those
individuals are students at our local university. The
university police department has no database retrieval system
and anything that happens off-campus is in our database
retrieval system. So even going and finding out what there may
be requires a lot of extra effort, to the point that even the
president of the university asks why local police are coming on
his campus to talk to his students when it is only in response
to questions being offered from the federal people.
I think there is a wealth of information there about
students who are here maybe not with all the most desirable of
traits or desirable of motives and we need to make sure that we
understand all the people in our community and not leave that
sector of them out because I think that student visas are one
of those areas that are grossly misused and abused in our
country.
Chairman Schumer. My guess is if you tied in the university
to this a little bit more not only would you find better
information but you might do it in a nicer way.
Mr. Greiner. Yes, sir.
Chairman Schumer. If the university people say we know this
person, they seem to be fine, et cetera, it is a lot better
than having local police go knock on their door and create a
whole fuss on the campus, too. That would make sense.
Mr. Greiner. Yes, sir.
Chairman Schumer. Let me ask each of you and let me start
with Mr. Canterbury, when you bring up your complaints to
federal law enforcement, when your members do, Major
Canterbury, and you say look, we need more cooperation, do they
admit that it is a problem now, more so than before? Or do they
say you are getting all the information that we can afford to
give you? Do the indicate the law is more the problem rather
than the culture? Just tell us a little bit about that since
you represent people all across the country.
Mr. Canterbury. I think since September 11 the Fraternal
Order of Police has had good cooperation with the FBI director
and Attorney General Ashcroft and I think that we have had a
lot of input and we have been able to discuss it, but I believe
that the law is more the excuse. Obviously the change in the
law was important but the culture needs to change.
Small town America, which is where I am from, the contact
with the FBI is we need your information; we will see you
later. It is a cultural thing. It is not necessarily--as the
mayor said, we have a lot of meetings and they are nice
meetings but the exchange of information is very one-sided. I
think that obviously in the last especially two months there
has been a lot of input allowed, a lot of input requested, and
where that goes, I think time will tell but I think a change in
the law is extremely important but the change in the culture is
even more important.
Chairman Schumer. And I think it was the mayor who
mentioned that at the top levels there is a lot of cooperation
but getting it down to the lower levels is tough. That is why
Comstat is probably a good idea because that will measure how
well it is being done, as opposed to the top guys saying yes,
do it, and then the lower level guys, you never know whether
they are or are not. What do you think of that idea?
Mr. Canterbury. I think one of the most important things
that I heard today was what the mayor said about Timothy
McVeigh. The information getting to the front-line troops that
are actually making the traffic stops, and I think the chief
talked about the spider web effect, it is the 650,000 rank and
file officers that are actually going to make those contacts?
If the watch list information does not come up on the traffic
stop or it does not come up on the field interview or the
contact with the domestic dispute, then filtering back up is
much harder, but the front-line troops are the people that need
the ability to get the information because they are the ones
making the daily contacts. And we are very concerned about
that.
Chairman Schumer. Commissioner or Mayor, when you bring
this up to people at the top level do they acknowledge it is a
problem and do they seem to reflect it is more cultural or
legal?
Mayor O'Malley. At first, in the wake of the attacks, we
got from the local people a lot of legal and I think they did
not have much information themselves. I picked up the phone and
actually called Director Mueller about three weeks after the
attacks and to his credit, he called me back. At the time he
said, ``How come you are the only city in America that has this
problem?'' And to his credit, after we had a very frank
discussion, he then started reaching out and calling local law
enforcement and I think really wants to fix this. Up until that
time I do not think he fully appreciated the very, very
dangerous gap that exists.
You know, the analogy with the spider web I think is a good
one but if the information is not there, the insects are not
going to get stuck to the web. They are going to be given a
warning ticket and waved goodbye in this time of racial
profiling.
Chairman Schumer. Commissioner?
Mr. Kerik. Like I said earlier, Barry Mawn and the city
office has been extremely cooperative. But the mayor brings up
a good point and this is something I think everyone should
focus on. Does the Bureau have the information that they need?
Are they getting information from the CIA, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, from the INS, immigration? Are their
databases linked? Are the watch lists linked to the databases
from INS and the Bureau and Customs? Is there money being
funded through narcotics trafficking? Is DEA's database
involved? I think we also have to look at that, too.
If you think about a Comstat process and a process of
intelligence accountability, this is a war unlike any other war
we have in this country. This war is really jeopardizing our
national security. It has to be fought from the inside at the
lowest levels up and out. And I think the culture will change
if the order is given from the top and people are held
accountable but in doing that we have to make sure that it is
really broadly encompassing because at the end of the day
during the course of talking to the Bureau, even if they are
giving us information, we have to know what they have because
more importantly, we have to know what they do not have. What
they do not have, those 650,000 cops that patrol the streets
every day, I can almost assure you, will find or have. That is
the bottom line.
Chairman Schumer. As you say, I think the vice president
has said this, that this is the first war where more people
will die on the home front than on the battlefront. That means
that the people that you command in one way or represent are
front-line troops and cannot be treated in a secondary way that
well, we do not need you, you are not useful to us, et cetera.
And I think that is really important.
Anyone have any final words that they wish to give us? The
hearing has been very helpful in fleshing all of this out and
helping us move our legislation, which we are going to move
quickly.
As you say, Commissioner, this is not just the problem of
federal to local law enforcement. Federal agencies did not
share any of this until we passed our bill and that culture has
got to change, too, but I have a feeling the culture is more
imbedded when it goes from federal to local and that has to
change. We are taking steps to do it and your testimony will
help us get there.
Mr. Kerik. Thank you.
Chairman Schumer. I want to thank you. Mr. Mayor?
Mayor O'Malley. I would like to nominate Commissioner Kerik
to the new role of director of federal Comstat.
Chairman Schumer. He has a few other jobs. I do not know if
he would take this one.
But thank you. I thank each of the witnesses and all of the
staff who worked hard on the hearing. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Submissions for the record follow.]
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Statement of Hon. Charles E. Grassley, a U.S. Senator from the State of
Iowa
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing to
highlight the sharing of information between federal, state, and local
law enforcement and intelligence agencies. As many of you know, I
strongly believe in the importance and necessity for federal, state and
local agencies to develop protocols for improved sharing of
intelligence and other information.
Local police agencies play a significant role in preventing and
responding to terrorism. They make a valuable contribution to our
Nation's anti-terrorism efforts by building on their community policing
networks to exchange information with citizens and gather intelligence.
Federal law enforcement can't do it alone. Local police have direct and
crucial information about individuals living in their communities and
are especially qualified to assess community concerns and fears
necessary for effective intelligence gathering. We must trust them to
maintain the confidentiality of sensitive information and to allow them
to be equal partners in any collaborative efforts if those strategies
are to be effective.
Last month, I conducted two working meetings in Des Moines and
Cedar Rapids on the issue of first responder preparedness. The purpose
of these meetings was to have an open dialogue with Iowa first
responders about their mission in a crisis and how prepared they feel
they are to carry out that mission.
One of the concerns expressed privately to my staff was that the
first responders need increased information sharing with federal
investigative and intelligence agencies. These participants cited the
lack of information sharing as the key impediment to investigative and
operational efficiency, and that it could ultimately effect the
successful and timely detection and resolution of a potential terrorist
incident. These first responders identified the management of the FBI
as the probable source of the bottleneck in the flow of information
between federal agencies and local law enforcement.
For many years, I've been talking about the FBI's refusal to share
information and the negative effect this has on law enforcement's
overall effectiveness. This pattern of information hoarding is deeply
rooted within the organizational culture of the Bureau. To complicate
matters further, the FBI is structured in such a way as to restrict the
flow of information to those that need it the most, the first
responders, those men and women who are at the front lines of our
homeland defense. The investigation following the September
11th attacks has proven how critical this first line of
defense is in our nation's battle against terrorism.
To be sure, there are legitimate reasons for segregating certain
information, such as the protection of sources and methods and the
classification of sensitive information. But these reasons are often
used as a smokescreen to hoard information because it simply serves the
Bureau's interests, which unfortunately are at times focused more on
public relations than on the needs of the case. Ask any law enforcement
professional in state, local or federal government, and they will tell
you a number of stories of FBI officials claiming sole credit for
multi-jurisdictional investigations. Or, as is frequently the case,
information is withheld in order to cover-up an embarrassing blunder.
Senator Schumer has introduced a bill to allow the voluntary
sharing of information regarding future terrorist attacks. This bill to
remove some of the statutory barriers to information sharing is a good
start, but for real information sharing to occur, there must be a sea
change in the management of the FBI. Fortunately, the Justice
Department has recently revealed their reorganization plan for the FBI
and it does address the issue of information sharing. I hope this plan
is not just ``window dressing''. Furthermore, this Committee must
continue our vigilant oversight of the FBI to insure that state and
local police are receiving the information they need to effectively
prevent terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, again I want to thank you for holding a hearing on an
issue that is critical to effective law enforcement.
Statement of Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah
Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks,
the law enforcement community has been the subject of an intense level
of scrutiny, to determine, first, whether everything possible was done
to prevent the attacks, and second, what, if any, reforms can now be
made to increase the capability of law enforcement to prevent such
attacks in the future. This analysis is a healthy process, and one that
has been welcomed by virtually all of our law enforcement agencies,
although it is unfortunate that it took a tragedy of such magnitude to
bring these matters to the forefront of the public consciousness.
One of the most important revelations that has resulted from this
period of scrutiny, is the realization that, prior to the September
11th attacks, government agencies within the United States
already had in their possession clues that a terrorist attack was
imminent, and clues as to the form that such an attack might take. It
has become apparent, for instance, that law enforcement agencies had
been alerted to suspicious activities at flight schools around the
country. We have also learned that many of the terrorists who
perpetrated the September 11th attacks were on ``watch
lists'' compiled by U.S. immigration authorities prior to September
11th.
Unfortunately, no one governmental agency possessed enough of these
clues to piece together a sufficiently clear outline of the terrorists'
plans to enable us to predict and prevent the September 11th
incidents. None of the isolated pieces of information was sufficient,
standing alone, to set off warning bells that an attack was about to
take place.
Accordingly, one of the first lessons we have learned from the
September 11th attacks is that we must do a better job of
encouraging information sharing between and among our law enforcement
institutions.
There are two dimensions to the problem of sharing criminal
investigatory information between governmental agencies. First, there
is a culture, particularly within our law enforcement institutions, to
hold information close, and to refuse to disseminate it to other
governmental agencies. Second, there are often legal restrictions as to
how and when information may be lawfully disseminated.
Often, there are good reasons for both the legal restrictions on
information sharing and the culture of informational
compartmentalization. Investigations may be compromised, and lives put
at risk, if investigatory information is spread too liberally. In
addition, innocent people, who may subsequently be cleared of all
wrongdoing, may have their reputations tarnished by premature
disclosure that they are the subject of a criminal investigation.
While we must remain mindful of these concerns, we must also
recognize the enormous potential that sharing information between and
among our law enforcement institutions has to increase the probability
that terrorist activity may be identified and prevented. We must look
for ways to encourage such sharing in circumstances where the benefits
to our society outweigh the costs.
This was one of the major concerns motivating the passage of the
Anti-terrorism legislation earlier this year. In that legislation,
Congress reviewed many of the legal burners to the efficient flow of
information within various agencies of the federal government and,
where appropriate, lowered those burners. These changes are key reforms
that will unquestionably help the federal government to bring all its
resources to bear on identifying and stopping terrorist activities.
One area that was neglected by the Anti-terrorism legislation,
however, was the sharing of information between federal law enforcement
authorities and their state and local counterparts. If we are truly
serious in our domestic war on terrorism, then it is essential that we
employ all the resources at our disposal to win that war. Our federal
law enforcement resources are simply dwarfed by the resources available
in state and local jurisdictions. While disrupting international
terrorism efforts will remain primarily a function of the federal
government, it is essential that we take advantage of all the help that
state and local authorities can provide.
As FBI Director Robert Mueller recently stated, ``We all realize,
no one institution has enough resources or expertise to defeat
terrorism. It must be a joint effort across agencies, across
jurisdictions, and across borders. State and local law enforcement are
playing a critical role collecting information, running down leads, and
providing the kind of expertise critical to an effort of this magnitude
and of this importance.''
S. 1615, the Federal-Local Information Sharing Partnership Act of
2001 would foster joint efforts by the federal government and state and
local law enforcement. The,bill would address the oversight in last
month's legislation, by extending the information sharing provisions
contained in that legislation to cover, not just the federal
government, but state and local law enforcement agencies as well. This
legislation is essential to ensure that state and local law enforcement
agencies are able to work hand-in-hand with federal law enforcement
agencies such as the FBI in the war against terrorism.
In conclusion, I would like to point out that in my home state of
Utah we are in the process of pioneering cooperative law enforcement
efforts among federal, state, and local law enforcement institutions.
As we gear up for the Winter Olympics in 2002, federal, state, and
local law enforcement has come together, to an unprecedented degree, to
provide security for that event. I would like to welcome my good
friend, Jon Greiner to today's hearing. Jon is the Chief of Police in
Ogden Utah, and in that capacity he has been in the forefront of
establishing these inventive relationships. I look forward to hearing
his testimony, and that of all the fine witnesses that have been
assembled for today's hearing.
Statement of Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, a U.S. Senator from the State of
Vermont
I commend Senator Schumer for holding this hearing on the need for
and benefits of sharing information with local law enforcement. Local
law enforcement are the first responders at the scene of crises and
have to determine almost instantaneously whether the cause was an
accident, a crime or, worse, an organized terrorist attack. To make
these determinations and to know how best to respond, they should and
must have access to the information necessary to evaluate these
situations accurately and expeditiously.
I have co-sponsored with Senator Schumer, Senator Clinton, and
Senator Hatch S. 1615, the ``Federal-Local Information Sharing
Partnership Act of 2001,'' which would provide guidelines for such
sharing to take place. I originally supported this legislation during
the final deliberations between the Senate and House on the USA PATRIOT
Act. While the Senate leadership favored adding these provisions to the
bill, the House leadership wanted to defer consideration on procedural
grounds without prejudice to the merits.
S. 1615 authorizes the sharing of certain foreign intelligence
information with local law enforcement personnel. The bill resolves the
question of whether legal barriers prevent the FBI and other federal
law enforcement authorities from disclosing information to state and
local law enforcement agencies when necessary and appropriate to ensure
an effective response to terrorist threats. The Committee will review
the details of the bill carefully so that it achieves this goal without
risking unintended consequences.
On the larger issues of cooperation I am pleased that FBI Director
Robert Mueller announced last week the creation of a new position of
Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Coordination to be filled by an
experienced representative of local law enforcement. This new position
will report directly to Director Mueller. To his credit, the Director
Mueller is aware of the problem of the FBI not effectively working with
other law enforcement officers. He told one law enforcement group in
late October that offers of help from police have in some cases been
wrongly turned down, and called that ``unacceptable.'' He has promised
that the FBI will change the way it works with local police.
I have spoken to Mayor O'Malley about this issue and thank him for
the personal attention and commitment he has given to ensuring that
local law enforcement has the information and tools needed to perform
effectively in protecting our public safety.
There is, however, a separate issue of coordination between
federal, state, and local law enforcement under the Justice
Department's new joint terrorism task forces that are led by the United
States Attorneys' offices rather than FBI field offices.
For example, former FBI Associate Deputy Director Oliver B. (Buck)
Revell has raised important questions in a letter, dated December 5,
2001, to the Washington Post that Senator Hatch quoted in part at this
Committee's December 7' hearing with the Attorney General. Mr. Revell
expresses concern about the Attorney General's action of placing the
U.S. Attorneys in charge of the joint terrorism task forces as ``both
unproductive and undermines the effectiveness of the FBI's relationship
with state and local authorities.'' Mr. Revell states that several
police chiefs have advised him ``that they are not comfortable in such
a relationship led by U.S. Attorneys.'' He is concerned that the U.S.
Attorneys will not ``have the investigative resources and analytical
capabilities to execute this program.'' Mr. Revell concludes, ``Now is
not the time to undermine the capabilities of the nation's primary
agency responsible for the prevention and investigation of terrorist
activity.''
The Committee will look into these and other issues raised by the
new joint terrorism task force structure. Today marks three months
after the terrible terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon and our airlines. I know I share the gratitude of the Nation
for the valiant work of Commissioner Kerik and the New York City Police
and the other police officers around the country, including the Capitol
Police, who have been working longer hours under enormously stressful
conditions to keep us safe. I welcome all the witnesses here today.
Senator Schumer and Senator Clinton worked tirelessly during
consideration of the USA PATRIOT Act to back up the FBI Director's
words and good intentions with legislation, and expressly authorize
information sharing by the FBI with State and local law enforcement
officers, when they have a need to know the information to perform
their public safety mission in response to terrorist threats. I support
this goal.
Statement of Hon. Strom Thurmond, a U.S. Senator from the State of
South Carolina
Mr. Chairman:
I am pleased that you are holding this hearing on such a timely
issue, the sharing of information with local law enforcement. Each day,
our local law enforcement personnel are on the front lines in the war
against terrorism, and we should develop sensible policies for
coordinating the efforts of Federal and local officials. In order to
protect our Nation from future terrorist attacks, we must provide for
the easy exchange of information so that local law enforcement will be
prepared to act on a moment's notice. With the appropriate information
sharing, our various law enforcement agencies will be encouraged to
work as one team, united in the goal of ensuring the safety of our
citizens.
The USA PATRIOT Act provided some much-needed reforms for the
sharing of information on the Federal level. Before the law took
effect, law enforcement officials were largely prohibited from passing
critical information to the intelligence community. The Act expanded
the sharing of this information. For example, information derived from
grand juries and from criminal wiretaps may now be passed to
intelligence officials. This cooperation among the different agencies
of the Federal government ensures that we are not fighting terrorism
with one hand tied behind our back.
We should not stop there. We should explore further changes that
may be necessary, including the sharing of information with local law
enforcement. Local police make up the vast majority of law enforcement
officers in this country. According to Chuck Canterbury of the
Fraternal Order of Police, 960 of law enforcement officers are employed
by state and local governments while only 4% are Federal employees.
This statistic is a staggering reminder that reforms on the Federal
level do not necessarily reach the overwhelming majority of law
enforcement officers.
One way in which we can enhance information sharing is to make
further use of an existing law enforcement tool, the Regional
Information Sharing System (RISS). RISS consists of a group of six
regional information centers and is funded by grants from the
Department of Justice. One of these information centers is the Regional
Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC), which serves as an
important information-sharing tool for law enforcement in the state of
South Carolina.
Local law enforcement officers contribute to the KISS database in
order to facilitate the exchange of information between jurisdictions.
In addition, RISS incorporates other elements that allow state and
local law enforcement officers to confer with one another. For example,
the system utilizes encrypted email and bulletin boards that provide
secure forums for communication.
Although existing agreements allow the Federal government to use
RISS to share some information with local law enforcement, this sharing
of information is very limited due to existing laws and policies. Not
only should we examine statutory changes that would maximize the
ability of Federal officers to share critical information with local
police, but we should also seek to change the attitudes and behaviors
of the law enforcement community. Local police throughout the country
report that the flow of information is not a two-way street. Local
authorities often pass information to Federal authorities, but
information does not always flow from Federal officers to local
officers, even when allowed under current law.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your interest in the further improvement
of the reforms incorporated in the USA PATRIOT Act. We should carefully
consider your proposals. While we should ensure that information is not
passed in an easy or uncontrolled manner, we must remember that law
enforcement is more effective if it presents a united front in the war
against terrorism. There needs to be a fluid exchange of information,
allowing local law enforcement the ability to respond quickly to
terrorist threats. That is why I am interested in the idea of giving
Federal authorities further flexibility in passing information to local
officials. I look forward to hearing the testimony of today's
witnesses.